The Court and Councils of Philip III of Spain.

Vol. I.

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For Philip, the first.
This study is concerned with the Administration of Philip III of Spain, and suggests that it was with that Administration rather than with the Duke of Lerma that real power lay. Lerma himself is seen as a courtier, concerned to enrich himself and his family and quite unconcerned with affairs of state—save where they impinged upon his own cupidity or upon his relationship with the King. It is therefore argued that he had no faction and hardly any interest in policymaking. The councils themselves are seen as being composed of independent, properly professional men, and the study is particularly concerned to analyse the councils of State, War and Finance; attendance registers for these councils are used here.

Philip himself is described as a man at once reliant personally upon the superficially brilliant Lerma and also, and more profoundly, as a man who needed and valued enormously the advice of his councils. He separated Court and Government, relaxing with Lerma while leaving the business of government to the councils. Such policy as he had beyond this is generally described as being belligerent.

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My debt to my wife and mother is profound; they provided the time. Professor John Lynch of University College, London, has given much expert guidance, and has done so with great patience; I owe him a great deal.

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Since a second volume is provided, I have included the list of contents, abbreviations, bibliographical notes etc. in that second volume; they may therefore be more conveniently used in conjunction with the text.
1. Introduction.
At the moment of his accession - some said even before it - the young Philip III granted a councillorship of State to Francisco Gomez de Sandoval y Rojas, Marquis of Denia; he thereby apparently confirmed the worst fears his father had entertained as to the probable nature of his government, and symbolically inaugurated for History the effete era of the privanza in which the kings of Spain successively abandoned their kingship into the hands of their favourites. Denia himself, later Duke of Lerma, has become in this view a man at once avaricious for personal wealth while also a politico intent on dominating the Government, and initially achieving this by appointing his own favourites and relatives to major offices at the expense of dismissing the servants of the old King, in pursuit of policies that are usually described as pacific.

In fact, Philip eventually belied every expectation by giving Spain a properly conciliar government, as he reformed the machine he had inherited almost beyond recognition. Casual, lazy and diffident, he was to prove in this respect wiser than his father; he learned how to delegate. He did so painfully and in peculiarly fitful

1. The Transference of Power, 1598 - 1603.

A slightly shorter version of this chapter is to be published in The English Historical Review.

2 - Francesco Serrano, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to Doge and Senate of Venice, 14 Sept. 1598, Cal. Ven., IX, 736.

manner, as the deficiencies that led him to rely personally on Lerma led him also to rely on a fully autonomous Administration. That in turn became vastly more professionalised and competent than it had been, at least latterly, under Philip II, and it was dominated not by Lerma but by the men of Philip II. Philip's first major act, in 1598-9, was to reorganise the Council of War, and if he did so chiefly only because he wanted it to give him a great victory with which to celebrate the opening of his reign, he did so thoroughly; in 1597, War had sat 61 times, in 1599 it sat 130. At first, Philip tried to govern his foreign affairs by relying chiefly on informal advice from within his Court, but in 1600, still in quest of his great victory, he reorganised his Council of State; moribund and of no real consequence in Philip II's last years, it sat 43 times in 1600. The same wanful superficiality initially characterised his management of financial affairs until in 1602 he finally reformed the Council of Finance; in 1597 it had sat 74 times, in 1603 it met 94.

Denia's future and ambitions lay rooted in the degrading poverty of his past and were almost wholly uncomplicated by political considerations. Since his accession to the estates in 1575 he had been concerned with only the most rudimentary financial survival. In 1579 he had abased himself before Philip II - 'it is certain that I do not know a man who finds himself in greater poverty' - but won only a token award, and then only sixteen months later. By 1583 he was begging

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1 - Denia to Philip II, 28 May 1579, B.M. Add. 28, 341, f. 352. He repeated the request in 1580 and was paid for his guard duties at the Monzon Cortes. Same to same, 20 Sept. 1580 and anonymous and undated.
the royal confessor to help save him from the indignity of selling all his goods, even his marital bed, and taking his starving family into a charitable home.\(^1\) Nothing materialised and only three months later, stripped of all honour, he was writing again to the King - '...I return again to throw myself at (Your Majesty's) feet, impressing upon Your Majesty that if for my sins you do not help me ... (I will be) in such dire hardship as to be unable to afford a crust of bread or to pay anything of what I owe'.\(^2\) Denia was learning how to influence a Court. He finally struck the right chord when his letter of October 1584 found its way to Mateo Vázquez.\(^3\) Moved to a 'great compassion' by a poverty 'rarely seen in one of his quality', the Secretary recommended a grant, and in his own time - four years later - Philip complied.\(^4\) The value of the award is not recorded, but any improvement it effected was doubtless nullified by the penal honour granted Denia in 1592 of appointment to the viceroyalty of Valencia.\(^5\) In 1583 his Castilian rents had been worth c. 9,493 ducats annually, but by 1598, together with all his incomes, they brought in only 8,027 ducats.\(^6\) For this man,

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\) Baze to Fr. Diego de Chaves, 8 Jun. 1583, B.M. Add. 28, 342, ff. 122 and 177.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\) Same to Philip II, 23 Sept. 1583, ibid., f. 250.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\) Same to same, 20 Oct. 1584, B.M. Add. 28, 345, f. 211.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\) Vázquez to Philip II, 12 Jan. 1585, B.M. Add. 28, 374, f. 274.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\) On the conditions under which such men served, below, pp.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{6}}\) The 1583 figure, converted from maravedís, from Denia to Chaves, op. cit., and the 1598 from Inventories of Lerma's goods, 1598-1625, A.D.L. 54, no fol.
an unpaid councillorship of State was of only symbolic importance; over
the next twenty years he would attend only 22 of 739 meetings of the
Council. His real interests lay elsewhere; by 1625, after the
confiscations of Philip IV and after nearly seven years beyond the
royal favour, his Castilian rents and incomes would be worth 32,073
ducats annually.\(^1\) To amass and protect this fortune, he systematically
set about controlling the Court, and did so with remarkable success,
but in order that he might enjoy it properly he was quite prepared to
allow the Administration to cope with the drudgery of los papeles. He
had better things to do.

State itself had had only nominal importance in the 1590s,
meeting rarely and being concerned with only minor matters – with
widows asking for ayudas, the organisation of the postal system and
the like.\(^2\) Exhibiting a sublime indifference to the possibility of
death that alarmed and astonished his Court and nearly wrecked his
Government, Philip II had glanced in its direction only reluctantly
and only at his own moments of physical crisis.\(^3\) As early as 1591 a
great historian had echoed a general and increasing fear – 'If His
Majesty should tire of working – as at present – and want to take
some day for himself, or if illness should so oblige him, the whole

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1 - Inventories of Lerma, ibid.
2 - The consultas for 1590-7 are incorporated in A.G.S. E.2741,
unfoliated; the material in this and the following paragraphs on
State and the Junta is based on this and on Letters and Minutes of
Christoval de Moura, 1594-1598, B.M. Add. 28, 379, passim.
3 - For a remarkable compendium of his illnesses, Gil González Dávila,
Historia de ... Don Felipe III, published in Salazar de Mendoza,
machine (of government) is brought to a standstill' - and had urged as 'the most natural remedy' that life be breathed into the Council of State. \(^1\) In 1592 Philip's advisers were forced to make practical provisions for a Minority, \(^2\) and in 1593 - at roughly the point at which he finally abandoned his insistence on writing personally any comments on state papers other than those of the Council of War\(^3\) - even el Prudente began to take the point; in March, rumours began to circulate that he was considering remodelling and expanding the Council of State 'so that in case of any accident, his son may find support adequate to the burden which will fall upon him'. \(^4\) Neither disaster materialised, and not until 1596 - when the Court again gave him up for dead\(^5\) - did he take practical action, turning his attention not only to the Council of State but more generally to the nature of his governmental institutions and to the quality of the men who staffed them. It would be, even for him, a sobering spectacle; he would find Finance corrupt, \(^6\) Castile structurally inadequate, \(^7\) and Indies

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1 - Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Felipe Segundo, Madrid, 1876-77, iv, p. 475.
2 - The Constable of Castile being sent away from Court because of his pretensions to influence in the event of a Minority. Thomas Contarini, Venetian ambassador, to Doge and Senate, 12 Mar. 1592, Madrid Cal. Ven., lx, 43.
3 - On War, below, p. 9, n. 2.
4 - Francesco Vendorsmin, Venetian ambassador, to Doge and Senate, 26 Mar. 1593, Cal. Ven., lx, 143.
5 - Ibid., 418, 422, 528 and (on 1597) 610.
6 - The visita of Lic. Laguna's commission found over half the officials guilty of misdemeanours of some kind, and levied fines totalling c. 63,856 ducats on them. In addition, seven men were dismissed, three lost their offices without being formally deprived and another six were transferred to other posts. Copy of the report, 20 Feb. 1596, B.N. 3827, f. 254.
7 - In February 1598, Philip published a radical reform of the Council
riven by internal rivalries. He began with State; from 9 July 1596, roughly at monthly intervals, his son sat as President of the Council.

It was, even now, a charade. The Executive effectively consisted by 1596 of Cristóvão de Moura and Juan de Idiáquez, who received all despatches and consultas a común and took them to the royal sickbed. By 1598, a común, the rump of the Junta de Noche, had become virtually an institution of state, the Perfect Master's final answer to the problems of ruling. The body on which the Prince sat was more or less the old Junta; with him, it sat as the Council of State, without him as a junta responsible to Moura and Idiáquez. Its jurisdictional scope was limited, its executive powers non-existent, but it sat for the remainder of the reign, earnestly considering its trivia and teaching the Prince how to rule. It did not of course do that - he was not even allowed to write his own comments - but it taught him what a Council of State was not for and afforded him a close look at his father's senior advisers. A training-school for the

1 - In his 'last days', Philip set up a junta to investigate Indies, but it met only a few times and achieved nothing; the difficulties 'increased daily' and the 'confusion and bad despatch of business for which this Council is so noted' had to await solution by Philip III. Copy of cédula establishing the Cámara de Indias, 25 Aug. 1600, B.N. 11, 592, f. 241. See below, pp. 77-8.

2 - See, for instance, the meeting of 24 Sept. 1597, thought important
Prince, this curious body was gratuitously intended as something of a Regency Council for the young King; Philip formally enjoined his son to use the members of the Junta and the councillors of State—whenever they might be—at the time of his death and to 'avail himself of them all the time that they live and have health and strength to continue'. In his final dispensation he appointed Moura camarero mayor of his son and gave a councillorship of State to García de Loaysa, Archbishop-elect of Toledo. Then he died—on the feast of Philip Martyr.

On 20 September 1598, after the immediate obsequies and after exactly a week in power, Philip III effectively resurrected the Council of State, convoking a meeting on that day and ordering that he was henceforth to be 'consulted' after every meeting. On the following day, War was convened for the first time and within a week the Junta was abolished. State met frequently if irregularly—eight times in seven and a half weeks—and with a cheerfully unrestricted membership; by November almost every available man of note had enough to justify two consultas; these concerned themselves with a salary for a castellan appointed by the Archduke Albert; the payment of 100 escudos to the Archduke Ernest's secretary; a pension for the daughter of Julián Romero, and with matters of comparable unimportance. Idiáquez, Velada, Fuensalida and Chinchón attended. Cédulas, 24 Sept. 1597, A.G.S. E. 2023, ff. 11 and 12.

2 - Ibid., and codicil of 5 Aug. 1598, Ibid., f. 37, and anonymous account of the death of Philip II, B.N. 5972, f. 155v.
3 - González Dávila (1771), p. 31.
4 - Philip III to Francisco de Idiáquez, 20 Sept. 1598, A.G.S. E. 2636, no fol.
5 - Carlos Seco Serrano, 'Los Comienzos de la Privanza de Lerma Según los Embajadores Florentinos', Boletín de la Real Academia de la
attended either State itself or War as State councillor — Moura, Idiáquez; the dukes of Najera and Medina-Sidonia; the counts of Fuensalida, Miranda, Fuentes, Chinchón and Denia; the Adelantado of Castile; Rodrigo Vázquez de Arce, President of Castile; Juan de Borja and Pedro de Velasco. This flood-tide of the aristocracy found reflection on War, which consisted for the first twenty meetings of the reign — three professional attendances apart — entirely of a State membership. War had been, latterly, the most important of Philip II's councils; he had retained its consultas after he had renounced all others, and at least by January 1597 it had become virtually a privy council, devoid of aristocrats and dominated by Moura and Idiáquez. For the great aristocrats, therefore, appointment to this body carried a profound significance, and they preened themselves on their apparent restoration to power — the Adelantado roundly declaring that the world 'would see what the Spanish were worth now that they have a free hand, and are no longer subject to a single brain that thought it knew all that could be known and treated


1 - Councillors of State were entitled to sit on War; references in this study to 'councillors of War' refer to the men appointed specifically to War.

2 - War's are the only consultas on which I have found even the royal initial in 1597-8; Philip's last such being on a consulta dated exactly a year before his death. Attendance Register. Forty three meetings into the new reign, War was still dealing with the backlog of Philip's business.Cnta. War, 23 Nov. 1598, A.G.S. G.A. 527, f. 105.

3 - They sat as the State members, and only two councillors of War attended regularly — Pedro de Padilla and Juan de Acuña Vela. Juan
everyone else as a blockhead. Reporting this, the Venetian ambassador prayed that Philip would not be led into rash ventures.¹

Philip was not sure where he was headed. On 29 October, he granted Denia an ayuda of 568,000 ducats,² and began to relax from the cares of government. He summoned State on 11 and 12 November and forgot about it for nearly seven weeks. Nevertheless, a turning-point had been reached. What had happened with the aristocrats was simple; with the beginning of a new reign, they had been especially anxious to catch the royal eye—where better to do so than at Court, how better than by serving on the councils? For his part, determined to proclaim his accession with a flourish, Philip had allowed them to add lustre to the new Court, but by mid-November the first of the two stages of the aristocratic restoration had largely burned itself out. In the shadow of the grandees, however, a revolution had been instigated on the junior half of War, where the appointments of Puñonrostro, Velasco, Enríquez and Valencia and the return of Acuña Vela by 9 November had manifested less Philip's tolerance of the aristocracy than his military ambitions and, instinctively, that reverence for experience that was to be the hallmark of his reign.

Philip III has been accused of many things, but not generally of an exuberant belligerence, and yet this was a distinguishing

¹—Soranzo to Doge and Senate, 27 Sept. 1598, Cal. Ven., IX, 744.
²—'Querella' of Lic. Chumacero Sotomayor, B.M. Eg. 2081, f. 128.
feature of his early years. This, after all, was the young man who had had to be restrained from participating in 1596 in the defence of Cadiz, and of whom the Earl of Essex had feared in 1598 that 'his ... blood is hotter and his humour of ambition is like to be greater' than his father's. It was to be Philip III who would dream of personally leading crusades in Africa and Italy in 1600, who would in three years send two armadas into northern waters, and who would as late as 1603 dream of a great victory in Africa to match his grandfather's. Philip ached for greatness, and if in his early years he tilted at his dream with the special enthusiasms of a young man desperate to cut a figure in the world, he persevered with it in later years even when he had had to face the harshest realities of failure. It was therefore natural enough that he should have first turned his serious attention to his Council of War. Where his appointments to State had been haphazard, those to War were clearly defined and had specific purpose.

Field commanders of excellence, his new professional councillors were

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1 - Agustino Nani, Venetian ambassador to Doge and Senate, 14 Jul. 1596, Cal. Ven., IX, 469.
3 - Catá. Juan de Idiáquez, 10 May 1600, E.M. Eg. 329, f. 131. See below, pp. 131-2.
5 - On his kingship, see especially, below, pp. 284-308.
men of a stamp, appointed and sitting as a group; from 26 October 1598 - when Punoñrostro, Velasco and Enríquez first sat together - to 13 February 1599, five of them aggregated 143 attendances and sixteen State councillors only 175. Observers took partial note. Ambassador Guicciardini reported back to Florence that 'this Prince lacks only experience and those insights that his youth and the scanty education given him by his father have not allowed him to acquire, but that if the councillors are good, the government will be most competent'. 1 Abroad, Englishmen were particularly concerned. In January, a merchant wrote home that 'the young King has altered many of his Council; only such as are fit for the wars are in estimation with him', 2 and in February Cecil was informed that 'The Council of War of 12 persons sits five times a week, and since 13 September, when the old King died, all the old martial men are sent for, and soldiers are training'. 3

These men were to prove wiser than they knew. Philip appointed another four councillors in 1599-1601, and bequeathed five

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of the nine to his son in 1621 as the nucleus of his Council of War, and a sixth died in 1621, three years after leaving War for the Finance presidency.\(^1\) A historic generation was appointed in 1598-1601, and it began work on a Council sitting twice as frequently as Philip II's had done in 1597-8.\(^2\)

In December, Philip rekindled optimism at home by dismissing Moura, an avowed enemy of the Council of State,\(^3\) and by reconvening the Council itself; from Lisbon, the Count of Peralta, for thirty years a proponent of properly conciliar government admired the royal performance — 'the King our lord has more spirit than was thought' — and looked forward with relish to 'a new style (of government) for the ordinary conduct of affairs' based upon the arch-stone of State.\(^4\) Philip then prepared to depart with his Court for the east, where he was to meet and marry his bride, and formally confirmed Denia's status by appointing him sumiller de corps.\(^5\) He was inconsiderately delayed

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1 - On these men, below, pp. 253-6.
2 - In 1597 War sat 61 times; in 1598, 75 times to 13 Sept., and 63 in the remainder of the year; in 1599, 130; 1600, 143; 1601, 109; 1602, 127. The average attendance of the councillors of War in 1597 had been 1.5 per meeting; in 1598 it was 1.6 under Philip II and 2.21 under his son; 1599, 5.23; 1600, 5.25; 1601, 5.16; 1602, 6.12.
3 - Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, (1857), pp. 1 and 56.
4 - To Esteban de Ibarra, Dec. 1598, printed in Cadiz, xlili, pp. 555-6.
by the haggling of the Cortes, and while he fretted he casually appointed Bishop Salvatierra as examining judge (visitador) of the Council of Finance and abandoned his father's projected reforms of the Council of Castile. His monies were voted on 21 January, and he left on the following day, not to return until October.

Those months belonged to the Court, as Philip launched joyously into his kingship, creating deliberately for himself what one dazzled contemporary called 'a new style of greatness'. Denia naturally shared the centre of the stage; the Council of State had, at its first meeting, advised the King against going to Valencia, but the Court now made its way to Denia itself, where the Marquis lavishly entertained it. In all, Denia spent some 300,000 ducats on the journey, but found ready compensation in a variety of grants, one worth no less than 173,000 ducats. The journey witnessed the final transformation of a monachal into a baroque Court, and Denia's own part in the triumph was formally acknowledged on the return to

1 - ibid., pp. 3-4.
3 - González Dávila (1771), pp. 64-5.
4 - Cinta St., 20 Sept. 1598, A.G.S. E. 2636, f. 48.
5 - B.N. 2346, f. 206.
6 - González Dávila (1771), p. 69.
7 - On the Sevillian escribanía de sacas, below, pp. 46 and 340.
Madrid, when on 11 November he was raised to the title by which he is known to history. To help him celebrate, Philip granted him another 400,000 ducats.

The new greatness was achieved almost wholly at the expense of Philip's governmental responsibilities. In planning the journey, he had appreciated that his grandeza would hardly be furthered by the presence of a host of dour lawyers and clerks, and especially so since they would have to be paid, housed and fed for the journey. For this reason, and because the marital gambol was not to be interfered with by affairs of state, he had left the professional councils in Madrid to cope as best they could, taking with him only a handful of administrators to act as liaison officers. State and War alone were significantly represented, but State travelled in effect only once again to ornament the royal greatness. Philip naturally had to have his high Court officials and great magnates travel splendidly with him, and since by happy coincidence these men tended to be councillors of State he was able to take State with him. At the last moment he must have realised that he had forgotten to appoint all such luminaries, and with only three hours to go before he left Madrid he hurriedly conferred councillorships upon the dukes of Infantado and

2 - B.M. Eg. 2081, f. 128.
3 - For a not entirely accurate list, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 6. On the royal itinerary in general and its effect upon the Administration, below, pp. 129-153.
Terranova, the Count of Alva de Liste and the Cardinal of Seville. It was not a happy portent for the Council. Nor was the fact that not all senior councillors qualified for the journey; alone of the presidents of councils, those of Italy and Aragón accompanied the Court, and the Count of Chinchón, as deputy to both, had to stay in Madrid. Similarly, the Council was deprived during the journey of Miranda who returned to Madrid on his promotion to the presidency of Castile. Not that it mattered much; State met only four times during the progress.

By contrast, War was not only divided into two halves, but was convened 68 times during the journey alone, as Philip again made the distinction absolute between a Council of War whose advice he specifically and urgently needed and the rest of the Administration. War spent 1599 preparing the armada that would give him his great victory in Ireland, and it alone was therefore allowed to intrude on the festivities. By using War, Philip incidentally offered the aristocracy a second chance to display zeal and abilities in his service, by sitting as councillors of State, and found them ignoring the opportunity; only Fuentes (61) and Nájera (38) attended over half the meetings.

As the Court meandered back to Madrid, it was therefore not clear with whom the future belonged, the courtier-politicians or the professional administrators. Philip, however, had reached his decision in favour of the latter and began now slowly but systematically to

1 - ibid., pp. 5-6 and Seco Serrano (1959), p. 82, n. 2.
implement it. He turned first to the great men of affairs - men of presidential or councillor of State timbre. Thus far his only major decisions concerning such men had been to dismiss Moura in December 1598, to appoint Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas, great-uncle of Denia, to succeed the dead García de Loaysa in the see of Toledo in April 1599, and to replace Vázquez de Arce as President of Castile with Miranda in the following month. Between October 1599 and April 1600 he added changes in the presidencies of Inquisition, Orders and Italy and appointed a successor to Moura as leader of the Council of Portugal. He then turned, if under the impress of humiliation, to the Council of State. History has not judged these changes well, allowing Philip neither his right to dispense with his father's servants nor that to replace them with men of his own choice. It has not because it has followed uncritically the views of a Venetian ambassador, Simon Contarini, who compounded malevolence and ignorance by not even being in Spain at the time.

'I say that in Spain the Council (of State) is everything, but it is not free, except in name, for there is no one who dares give his view freely, and especially so if it is against the will of the Duke (of Lerma). For having done so, García de Loaysa, Archbishop of Toledo . . . . . fell into

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1 - Papal Bull of appointment, 19 Apr. 1599, A.G.S. Pat. Real, Bulas y Breves Sueltos, 5842.
disgrace, and Rodrigo Vázquez, President of Castile, was stripped of his duties and expelled from Court, (and this) cost him his life. The same happened to Pedro Portocarrero, Inquisitor-General, and to Don Pedro de Guzmán, gentleman of the Chamber, who spoke ill of the Duke to the King ...'.

In matters of state ... there is a division between the followers of Philip II and those of Philip III, each holding superior the government of his time; that of Philip II (is) Don Cristóbal (de Moura) its leader, Don Juan de Idiaquez, the Marquis of Velada, the Count of Chinchón, Prince Doria ...'.

Two statements in this phantasmagoria - that State was by 1605 'everything' and that the system of Philip III differed significantly from that of his father - were substantially correct; the rest was at best irrelevant, most notably in its obsession with Lerma, at worst nonsensical. The origin of the story about the opposition to Lerma

1 - Contarini (1857), pp. 579 and 567.
2 - For instance - Guzmán's post lapsed automatically with Philip II's death, and he was appointed to his Chamber by Philip III, serving until he died; Moura's disapproval might be thought understandable in the circumstances, but it prevented him neither according a grudging admiration to the quality of the new Council of State (below, p. 30) nor from accepting the leadership of the Council in 1612; Idiaquez, Velada and Chinchón led State in its deliberations, each serving to his death and thereby exercising more influence than they could have done under Philip II; Idiaquez became the most important policymaker in Spain, and his advice was revered by the King (below, pp. 353-6, 363-71 and Cabrera de Córdoba, 1857, p. 530); Doria's monogram is found on no consulta in the 1590s, and he never sat under Philip III; Lerma
of García and Vázquez probably lay in the embellishments given over six years to Cabrera de Córdoba’s muted speculation of June 1599 that they had both advised Philip II to set up a regency-like council or junta to guide his son in his first years.¹ Such would not explain the early favours granted them by Philip III. García, indeed, had been specifically nominated to Toledo in March 1598 at the insistence of the-then Princep, and was notably in favour at his accession.² He had known Philip intimately since his appointment as his tutor in 1585 and if he lost favour in the few months before his death in January had sat on State only twice by 1605 and he certainly did not dominate those meetings (below, pp. 375–6); on Contarini’s hearsay evidence it might be remarked that Vázquez and Portocarrero were dismissed when Philip was itinerant, and that even if outspoken opposition to Lerma necessarily led to dismissal — it did not; see below, p. 27 — the fact that García died in February, Vázquez was dismissed in May and Portocarrero in September–October should have led a perceptive man to wonder why intelligent men did not learn the value of discretion. On the dismissal of a criado of Lerma’s for attacking the ‘confused and ignorant’ government of Philip II in contrast to a eulogy on Philip III’s, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 173, 192, 236, 243 and 413.

1599 there must have been dramatic reason. No such is recorded, and the best that contemporary Court gossip could produce in seeking nefarious explanation for a septuagenarian death was to speculate on a dispute over a pension.\(^1\) A glance in the direction of the virulent plague that decimated the servants of Philip II might have been more pertinent.\(^2\) Vázquez was certainly dismissed, but Cabrera absolved Lerma, if only by omission, in his astonishment – 'His Majesty having made so much use of him since he inherited, putting all the government of these realms in his charge'.\(^3\) As Philip acknowledged to Vázquez himself, the matter was simple enough; he wanted Miranda as his President of Castile.\(^4\)

2 - On the extraordinary death-rate among the councillors of Indies at the beginning of the reign, E. Schäfer, i, p.245. Of Philip II's presidents, Castile and Aragón died in 1599, Inquisition in 1600, Crusade in 1602, Orders in 1604, Finance in 1605 and Indies in 1606; his aristocratic courtiers and administrators died in quick succession – Loaysa, Fuensalida and Diego de Córdoba in 1599; Nájera, 1600; Infantado, 1601; the Adelantado, 1602; Alva de Liste, 1604; Sesa and Borja, 1606; Olivares, 1607; Chinchón and Miranda, 1608. The professional councillors of War died in 1599 and 1606; only one councillor of Finance survived 1607, and then only in poor health (below, p.265); one secretary of State died and the other retired in 1600; one secretary of Castile died in 1599, the other retired in 1602. The plague was doubtless responsible for many of these deaths and many scholars would equally doubtless follow Dr. Schäfer in wondering how far the climate of Valladolid itself was responsible. Certainly, the town was notorious at the time for its climate; see Cervantes, Exemplary Stories, Penguin Classics, 1972, p.143.
4 - González Dávila (1623), p.378.
Philip III was now master of his own destiny, and if we must seek uniform cause for these dismissals we would do well to concentrate upon him. García and Vázquez - like Moura, who contrived to stay at Court until April 1600 - had once ruled him; as he found his feet, so he ended the age of subservience to grave old men. We should perhaps only wonder that it took him so long. This syndrome probably also accounted for Portocarrero and Martín de Córdoba, Marquis of Cortés and President of Orders, both unfortunate enough to have been appointed in 1595-6 when Philip II had been attempting to restrict his son's future options.\(^1\) Portocarrero, moreover, was Bishop of Cuenca, and again unlike his father, Philip III was a stickler for episcopal residence.\(^2\) There are, too, indications that he was not even particularly efficient.\(^3\)

Philip broke further with his father's practice by filling these vacancies immediately.\(^4\) He chose men of character and distinction, also perhaps something of a novelty; the substitution of


3 - His successor had to involve himself in discreetly replacing many inappropriate Inquisitors. In a remarkably perceptive passage, Lea commented on the incident and its wider implications - 'This indicated a desire to resume the close watchfulness of Ferdinand which had long since been forgotten in the turmoil and absences of Charles V and the secluded labours of Philip II, over despatches and *consultas*. A bureaucracy was establishing itself in which the various departments of the government were becoming more or less independent of the monarch ...'. Lea proceeded to show Philip III fitfully intervening to some effect in governmental affairs, vol. 1, pp. 299-300.

4 - Scharer, i, 112-3, recording that Philip II left Indies vacant for more than seventeen years.
a Juan de Idiáquez for a Córdoba or of a Fernando Niño de Guevara for a Portocarrero was hardly suggestive of declining standards. 1

El Greco's Inquisitor moreover - a criado of Lerma's? - was appointed on his return from Rome; the best man became available, and was therefore appointed. The same criteria of excellence were applied to Italy as Philip appointed Juan Fernández de Velasco y Tobar, Constable of Castile, Spain's leading soldier and twice Governor of Milan, to succeed Miranda. 2 Miranda's own advancement to Castile was doubtless not hindered by his long association with Lerma, but Cabrera, who would have known, drew no causative connection. Miranda had served Philip II in two vicereoyalties, as President of Italy and as councillor of State, and was much loved by Philip III; we need hardly look to Lerma to explain his promotion. 3

Lerma's favour may, however, reasonably be discerned in the appointment of an uncle, Juan de Borja, to succeed Moura on Portugal, although as an experienced diplomat and administrator recently returned from Portugal, his appointment was natural enough to have

5 - For a swingeing indictment of Philip II's presidents, 'Advertencias al Duque de Lerma ...', B.N. 10857, f. 81.
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 58, 92, 95.
3 - On relationship with Philip III, ibid., pp. 174, 198, 335, 337-8, and with Lerma, p. 129.
been inevitable. It was, too, emphatically in evidence in the appointment of his great-uncle Bernardo to succeed García; bishops of Pamplona could not normally hope for advancement to the see of Toledo, however well-deserving they were. Such was not, however, the faction-building normally ascribed to Lerma; both men served him ill, if at all. Borja, troubled by gout, served on Portugal and State in 1600 but retired from Portugal in 1601, did not follow the Court to Valladolid until 1603, and then sat on State only infrequently until retiring in 1605. Cardinal-archbishops of Toledo also had a way of doing much as they pleased, and within months Bernardo found himself refusing first to live at Court and then to follow it to Valladolid and thereby refusing incidentally to serve on State - and in all probability refusing appointment as Inquisitor-General. He also found himself quarrelling ostentatiously with Lerma and penning the most remarkable of all indictments of his activities. Like the other appointees of 1599, Toledo was a man of character and independence. If this was ducal favouritism, it was of a peculiar sort - and especially so, it might be thought, since the only one of the

1 - On appointment, ibid., p.52.
2 - Cabrera welcomed the appointment, thinking him 'a well-deserving person of great qualities', ibid., p.12.
3 - On service on Portugal, ibid., pp.103 and 184; on councillorship of State, below, pp.242-3; on illness, Guicciardini (1959), p.87.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp.94,97,141,162,294, and below, p.79.
5 - See below, pp.26-27.
inherited presidents who was related to Lerma would also shortly be dismissed, for corruption. 1

Having made these appointments, Philip again tried to forget the cares of government, and relied for advice on matters pertaining to the unreformed councils of State and Finance on a variety of grotesquely-composed juntas. 2 State itself, having last met in August, was not reconvened. Problems would not, unfortunately, evaporate and disaster in the Atlantic and the renewal of criticism at home provided Philip with his final impetus. The Adelantado's failure to even reach Ireland rankled deeply — '... and in spite of his relationship with the Duke of Lerma, so bitter is the feeling against him on account of his failure this year, that he has not kissed hands yet'. 3 Philip began to look for other dreams. By the end of January 1600, he and his advisers were becoming a laughing-stock; on 24th., the Venetian ambassador wrote scathingly of the lack of policymaking in regard to England — '... here there are no signs of provision either for offence or defence, and if they do come to any decision it will be so late and confused that it will end in nothing, as usually happens with their deliberations'. 4 On 12 February 1600, the Council of State was reconvened.

1 - On the Marquis of Poza, below, pp. 31-5.
2 - For the most grotesque, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 48-9.
3 - Francesco Contarini, Venetian ambassador, to Doge and Senate, 7 Dec. 1599, Cal. Ven., IX, 831.
4 - Same to same, 24 Jan. 1600 (New Style), ibid., 845.
Philip departed with Lerma almost immediately for what was to become his annual progress through Old Castile, and left the Council to its own devices. A pattern was becoming clear; Court and Government were being separated. The hunting season was near, and as they were to do every year, Philip and Lerma took themselves off to the lodges and palaces. They returned briefly to Madrid in April, but did not return until the end of September, and even then alternated in the last months of the year between the capital and the Escorial. The extravagance too continued; at the time he reconvened State, Philip granted Lerma 50,000 ducats for being the first to inform him of the safe arrival of the Indies fleet. The third resurrection of State therefore took place in depressingly familiar circumstances. Again, Philip was not concerned to properly define its membership; not only did the courtiers - Nájera, Infantado and Alva de Liste - continue to attend, but so too did Moura and the Adelantado, both in disgrace. There were some hopeful signs; in Idiáquez, Chinchón and Miranda, the Council had an experienced core, and although it met only six times in ten weeks it was allowed to concern itself with major matters of foreign affairs - the Saluzzo crisis, relations with England, the rebellions in Flanders - and it had major power to influence, Philip accepting its recommendations quite uncritically. It was a beginning - perhaps.

1 - On their itineracy, below, pp. 129-134.
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 16.
For one man, it was not enough. On 9 May 1600 the Cardinal of Toledo addressed himself to his great-nephew. It was generally believed, he wrote that

The King applies himself freely to what (you) advise and ask for, and it is said that the (projected) removal to Valladolid (will be on account of) the building of the Church and palace there that Your Excellency desires and covets so vehemently.

(It is also said that) the King is taken to the countryside so that he shall not deal with anyone nor ascertain the multitude of virtues and good talents that there are in all kinds of his subjects. This same is said of the Queen's household and of that of the King, that particular attention is taken of persons appointed by Your Excellency ... The current belief is that the people who can communicate and deal with Your Excellency are those who are favoured on account of the flatteries they afford Your Excellency, and everyone doubts their integrity and competence ... The observation must be made of Your Excellency that (you) indignantly and ungenerously ignore such warnings, counsels or petitions as are not to (your) taste, and that the replies and discussions on matters of business accord with the humour and pleasure in which Your Excellency finds himself and not with their subject-matter ...'.
Toledo's fears were profound; 'in all that one sees, reads and hears', he went on, 'clear signs are in evidence which threaten the patent ruin of this Monarchy ...'. He was not concerned - Vázquez's perhaps apart - with the presidential changes, rather advising that Indies and Finance be added to the list, but stressed that both itineracy and extravagance must cease and that the King surround himself with 'independent and free men' who would honestly and openly advise him.¹

His reward would have surprised Contarini, had he been in Spain; on 22 June, Toledo sat for the first time on the Council of State.

If Lerma took notice of Toledo's complaints, he took no action upon them, and spent 1600 not only planning the removal to Valladolid but speculating financially upon it, as always with brilliant success.²

His attitude to matters political he manifested by his disinterest in the meeting of 22 June, which as it happened was on several accounts an extraordinary event. Philip and Lerma were in Ávila when some news came about the Saluzzo crisis, and for what was to be the only time in the reign, Philip summoned the Council of State to meet him on the road. He was dreaming of leading his armies into Italy against the French, and marked his interest by actually attending the Council himself, for the first time in the reign. Lerma did not deign to do so.³

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¹ A copy of the letter, B.N. 5013, f. 101, from Granada.
² On this, below, pp. 48–9.
³ A second meeting was held on 25 June, in Babilafuente; Lerma did not attend. Attendance Register. See also Cabrera de Córdoba (1857) pp. 71–2, 74.
It was not therefore surprising that it was Philip himself and not Lerma who finally took the initiative in establishing State properly. Suddenly and accidentally, he found another cause. On 4 July, Idiáquez casually threw out for the consideration of his colleagues the idea of sending an empresa to help the Irish Catholics, and Philip as casually referred the matter back to the Council for further deliberation. He was not particularly concerned with Ireland; in reply to a consulta of 1 July he had only suggested that aid to the Irish be increased. But on 11 July, State considered a report from the Duke of Sesa in Rome which argued strongly for a more active intervention in England; if Spain did not act, the succession would soon pass to James VI, while prompt action would elicit support not merely from the Catholics but from many heretics and politicians, among them the Admiral, Treasurer General and Cecil himself. The Council reiterated Philip II's policy of supporting the candidature of the infanta Isabel. Two days later, it reconsidered Idiáquez's proposal; Chinchón, Miranda, Borja, Toledo and Niño de Guevara rejected it, and a confused King delayed. On 23 July, the Council again argued strongly against involvement, but Philip had found his cause; the expedition would be of service to the Lord, and he would find the money even if he had to go without himself. On his reply to the next consulta (29 July) he repeated his ambition; the plague was now on the wane, and 'in so

1 - Cntas.St.1,4,11,13,23 July 1600, A.G.S. E. 2511, ff. 4, 27, 48, 1, 2.
abundant a year, everything is easier and cheaper. He held firm in the face of further conciliar resistance, and State, which had met twelve times in the first six months of the year, was convened on twenty five in July–October, but on only a further six in November and December as the prospects for an empresa in 1600 receded. With postponement, Philip lapsed into a lethargy broken only when matters Irish were discussed, but the postponement itself had ensured State’s survival, as the body charged with executing the royal policy. Like War, it had risen because the King wanted a victory.

Needing the Council, Philip at last applied himself in 1600-01 to establishing a proper membership. In the spring of 1600 he finally rid himself of Moura and the Adelantado, both consigned into disgrace, and allowed Najera and Infantado to retire once again with honour. Fuentes also left, to assume the Governorship of Milan, and although the gravity of the Italian crisis was justification enough for the employment of his outstanding military gifts in the key duchy, the appointment was certainly an ambiguous one. Again royal antipathy is more apparent than is ducal. That Simon Contarini, five years hence, perceived the enmity of Lerma behind Fuentes’ removal from Court may be thought, if not quite perhaps proof of ducal innocence, somewhat less pertinent than Guicciardini’s assertion of 1598 that the two were close friends. Philip’s refusals over a

1 - Gnta. St. 29 July 1600, ibid., f. 9.
decade to allow Fuentes to return suggested that it was he who had
tired of the Count; probably, like the Adelantado, Fuentes had been
tainted by the 1599 failure. 1 Negatively, Philip chose not to summon
back various men appointed to ambassadorial or viceregal posts by
his father or himself – Cardona in Navarre, Sesa in Rome, Albuquerque
in Aragón, Zúñiga in Brussels – but all save the venerable Cardona
would eventually be allowed to return, as indeed would even Moura
himself. 2 In the spring of 1601, when the Court moved to Valladolid,
only one available man of distinction had not been appointed, and his
absence provoked much comment. The Count of Olivares was, in
Portalegre’s words, ‘born for affairs, and experienced in the most
important of them from his youth to his old age’. Moura, in reply,
allowed that the Council contained ‘some most capable men’ but thought
that Olivares had been excluded ‘on account of his not conforming with
the current mode of living’. But it was Moura himself who was out of
touch, in thinking that a great junta should be chosen to supervise
affairs ‘as was the custom under the old patron’. 3 Spain now all but
had a properly conciliar government, headed by a regularly-functioning

1 – On Philip’s refusals, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 68, 69-70, 72, 117,
216, 414. One Englishman had closely identified them with the policy
of 1599 – ‘the furious humour of the Count of Fuentes and the
Adelantado, who are counted the Hotspurs of Spain, and malicious
against England, may carry the young King into some action
contrary to all probability …’, Thomas Philipps to William
Philipps, 6 July 1699, Cal. Dom., 1598-1601, 80. Fuentes was certainly
the councillor of State most closely associated with the policy,
see above, p. 16.
2 – See, 1604; Albuquerque, 1610; Moura, 1612; Zúñiga, 1616.
3 – Portalegre to Moura, 2 May 1601, and reply, 14 May 1601, printed in
Codoín, xlíıı, pp. 569-572.
and independent Council of State. In November, the Count of Olivares began his councilorship.

He joined a Council which carried a little surplus weight in Lerma and his relatives and the royal confessor, Gaspar de Córdoba, and an insipid courtier in the Marquis of Velada, but which incorporated as its nucleus the experienced and distinguished presidents of Orders (Idiáquez), Castile (Miranda), Inquisition (Niño de Guevara) and Italy (the Constable) and the Count of Chinchón. Even Lerma's enemies - Contarini, still not in Spain, apart - could only admire the new body. Fray Jerónimo de Sepúlveda was among those who had seen Lerma's hand everywhere; with hardly a pause between denunciations, he set down his view of the Council - 'The King, on inheriting these kingdoms, established a great Council of State, and appointed to it great men, all very well qualified men, each of them worthy of governing the whole world'.

In the autumn of 1600, Philip had appointed Juan de Acuña - 'a very severe and upright man' - as visitador of Finance in succession to Salvatierra, who had apparently accomplished nothing. While Acuña worked, Finance continued in the trough in which it had found itself from the beginning of the reign. Here, indeed, Philip very nearly practiced what his father's school of thought would have had him do, subordinating the Council to a junta, de Hacienda. He allowed Lerma, too, to dabble seriously in the Council's affairs, both of them treating it with a cavalier indifference best expressed by Philip

himself when in 1601 referring a scheme to raise a million ducats to the Junta 'because it is my wish that this be done without the Council of Finance having a hand in it'.

They behaved thus because it was easy; under a president - Francisco de Rojas, Marquis of Poza - who at best was less than authoritative and who was currently concerned only with saving his own position in the face of a third visita in less than five years, Finance was in no condition to defend itself. Appropriately, it achieved its only major entrée into the great financial affairs of state by surreptitiously negotiating an asiento without the royal knowledge.

 Appropriately, too, its only overt resistance to the Junta was led not by President but by councillors, who in 1601 balked at ratifying the Junta's decisions on the grounds that 'they do not know the causes and reasons for the decisions taken in the Junta since they are not present at its deliberations'.

Philip's reply was definitive: 'when I order a despatch to be made, the Council is not required to know how or with what advice I have decided upon it, for this is not its concern, (which is) only to fulfil the orders sent it in my name'.

Not surprisingly, Poza's Finance was often even unaware of what the Crown's financial policies were.

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2 - All other attempts to persuade the asentistas to advance credit having failed, Finance arranged a 400,000 ducats loan, Cnta. Fin., 27 Oct. 1600, ibid, f.241. In 1601 it similarly arranged a 200,000 ducats loan, but Philip cancelled the agreement, Cntas. Fin., 16 Feb. and 20 Mar. 1601, A.G.S. C.J.H. 293, ff. 92 and 95.
4 - See, for instance, Cnta. Fin., 11 Jun. 1600 in which the Council
Mechanically, Finance worked tolerably well under Poza, but at low levels consistent with its unimportance. In the period from January 1597 to the death of Philip II it had sat at the same level of frequency as War (136:132), but as War doubled its work-rate, Finance was left behind—sitting 61 times in 1599, 62 in 1600, and 70 in 1601. By September 1598, moreover, the inherited councillors had little service left as a group; of the five, Juan de Menchaca died in August 1600, Esteban de Ibarra effectively retired at the end of 1601 to perform other duties, and Luis Gaitán de Ayala retired at the end of 1604. Only Francisco de Salablanca, who continued regularly until his death in 1607, made any continuous impression after the 1602 reorganisation; of the others, only Gaitán in 1603, Alonso de Agreda in 1604 and Ibarra on his return proper in 1609 attended more than half the meetings in any one year. Poza appointed three new councillors, but the inductions of Juan Pascual and Alonso Ramírez de Prado manifested less his concern for the well-being of his Council than that for his relationship with Lerma. Acuña himself was appointed as one of the two councillors of Castile whose presence was legally required, but retired on commencing his visita. These appointments brought the average attendance up from 4.2 in 1597 to a range of 5.0-6.0 in 1598-1601, but consistency of attendance was low; the 1597 figure had been maintained by six men, while that of 5.94 in 1600—the highest of this period—required nine.

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Virtually all Finance's documentation for 1602, the year when the reorganisation was effected, has been lost. Cabrera, however, in the autumn of 1601 commented not implausibly upon the reason for Philip's decision to reform the Council - his inability to provide food for his own table and salaries for his servants.\(^1\) It must have been at about this time that Acuña presented his report, for Poza's riposte denying multiple accusations of corruption was dated 26 November 1601.\(^2\) The Ordenanza for the new Council, finally published in October 1602 did not of course publicise such malfeasance, but it did allow itself some astringent comments upon the presidential failure to follow proper administrative procedures and to adequately discipline the Council's officials.\(^3\) Only one structural change was evident from the thirteen extant initialled consultas for 1602, but it was definitive; Finance was given to its reformer.\(^4\)

Acuña brought about a transformation comparable to that on War in 1598. In 1603-5, his Council sat 37.5\% more frequently than had Poza's, and five new councillors were appointed in 1603, and another four in 1604-5 as replacements for Poza's dying councillors. These men would not serve for the generation that War's would, but four attended

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2 - A copy, B.M. Add. 28, 378, f. 247.
3 - For instance, on the failure to keep the accounts properly - 'and because the accounts have not been kept with precision many ill-effects have followed, and there has not been the balance and good order in my royal books that is necessary ...', copy of the Ordenanza of 26 Oct. 1602, B.M. Add. 9, 932, f. 42b.
for a decade, a fifth to 1618, and a sixth would still be sitting as 1622 ended. They sat on a fully autonomous Council. Indeed, at only its fourth meeting, the new Council had the self-confidence to advise Philip that a proposal of Lerma's could be followed 'neither in justice nor in conscience', and by October 1603 could refuse to acknowledge the validity of a ducal order on the grounds that 'ministers' of His Majesty could not be held to have 'proper authority' when they did not follow proper administrative procedures. Where Lerma could not tread, the Junta most certainly could not, and it sank into trivial and deferential oblivion, concerned now only with material that was too unimportant for the Council itself.

The Government of Philip III may be said to have been fully in operation from the moment in January 1603 when the new Council of Finance began its work. It is the purpose of this study to trace the interaction between Philip, Lerma and Administration and their response to the problems of governing the largest empire the world had yet seen.

1 - On the councillors of Finance, below, pp.262-269
4 - See, for instance, its attitude in 1604 to a quite minor matter - 'it appears to this Junta that this does not belong to it and that Your Majesty ought to be pleased to refer it to the Council of Finance'. Cnta. Jnta. de Hacienda, 20 Jan. 1604, A.G.S. C.J.H. 320, no fol. On the later history of the Junta, below, pp. 113-4
11. Government and the Court.
A. Ambition.

The distinction between Lerma's generally passive and subordinate influence on the formulation of policy and his avaricious interest in self-aggrandisement was fundamental to the history of the reign, and suggestive of its most important characteristic - the distinction to be drawn between a corrupted and extravagant Court and a strong and independent, if costly, Administration.

Lerma's own interests remained consistent with both his general background and his actions in 1598-1602. He was a courtier and a nobleman. As far as may be gauged, his appeal for the King was that of a brilliant and sophisticated man of the world for an introverted youth. Perhaps he was something of a substitute for a father the King had hardly known; more probably, he provided that splendid and accomplished worldly ease which the King so painfully lacked, and in this reflected glory lay his attraction.

For Lerma, everything flowed with flawless symmetry from the royal favour - the mercedes, the great marriages, the vast extension of his landed estates. From this flowed, too, his political interests; it was no accident that his keenest such activity was in negotiating the marriages of the royal children, for they were his charges, nor -
his own religious susceptibilities apart—was it accidental that he was intimately involved with the morisco expulsion, for here at last the King found that grandeza he sought so ardently.\(^1\) Lerma served Philip assiduously; it tends to be overlooked. He was obviously always particularly concerned to control himself appointments to the royal household, his technique being simply to hold all major offices in those of King and heir himself,\(^2\) and to appoint his relatives and criados liberally to minor posts,\(^3\) but without allowing any of them, even his eldest son, to gain intimate and independent access to either.\(^4\) Such was welcome enough to both Philips but not to the Queen; secure, however, in the King’s grace, Lerma could be ruthless with her, dismissing her own camarera mayor in 1601 in favour of his own

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1 - On his political activities, below, pp.
2 - He was appointed caballerizo mayor to Philip by Philip II in 1598, Anonymous account of death of Philip II, B.N. 5,972, ff. 155-6; on appointment as suillller de corps, above, p. 13; he allowed Velada to serve as King’s mayordomo mayor and succeeded him on his death in 1616; on his appointment as ayo and mayordomo mayor of the heir, below, p. 52.
3 - On his eldest son, below, n. 4; on his criados, below, pp. 39, 120-121; on his dominance of the royal secretaryship, below, p. 125; among the gentlemen of the King’s camar were his son Diego, nephew Pedro de Lemos and son-in-law the Marquis of la Baneza; his brother Juan Gomez was also his teniente as King’s caballerizo mayor and gentleman of the camar.
4 - On Cristóbal, his eldest son, later Duke of Cea and then of Uceda, and his rivalry with Lerma, below, pp.
sister-in-law,¹ and adding further to reinal outrage by appointing
Franqueza as her secretary in 1602.²

The Sandoval were one of the twenty most distinguished
families in Spain,³ could trace the Denia marquisate back to 1484 and
their ancestry to Ferdinand the Catholic.⁴ Politically, however, they
were living on memories, their only recent achievements having been
to provide an archbishop of Seville,⁵ and the arms that cradled the
dying Don Carlos.⁶ Dynastically, they were living on hopes, and those
rather wan. Certainly, they had formed marital connections with the
three richest families in Spain — the Medina-Sidonia, Fernández de
Castro (Lemos) and Padilla (Adelantados Mayores de Castilla) — as
well as with the Medinaceli, Altamira and Villamizar.⁷ But a Medina-
Sidonia trifled with a Sandoval, and for Lerma both that and the

¹ - The Duchess of Gandia being replaced by doña Angela de la Cerda, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857),p. 27; see also, ibid., p. 148.
² - ibid., p. 150.
³ - They were one of the original grandes.
⁴ - Alonso López de Haro, Nobiliario Genealogico, 1622, i, p. 156.
⁵ - Cristóbal, Archbishop 1573-81.
⁶ - Lerma's father doing so as Carlos' camarero mayor. Relacion de los servicios prestados por los duques de Lerma a los reyes de España', B.N. 11260, f. 6, a copy of a royal cádula of 1603.
⁷ - Medina-Sidonia — their heir, Manuel, to Lerma's daughter Juana; Lemos — Fernando, 6th Count, marrying Lerma's sister Catalina, and their son Pedro (7th Count) marrying Lerma's daughter Catalina; Padilla — Mariana marrying the future Uceda; Medinaceli — Lerma himself marrying Catalina, daughter of the 4th Duke; Altamira — Don Lope de Moscoso Osorio, later 1st Count of Altamira; marrying Leonor, Lerma's sister; Villamizar — doña Bernardina Corco marrying Lerma's brother, Juan Gómez. López de Haro (1622), i, pp. 63, 165-36; Yañez, Memorias, 1723, pp. 23-5, 74-6; Malvezzi, Adiciones, pp. 144-5; B.N. 11085, ff. 242v-261v. López is generally the most reliable of these sources.
Lemos connection were distaff and therefore potentially dangerous; to
 gain the prestige of such an alliance, the family had to risk its
 inheritance. The Padilla - in 1597 - had granted him a daughter, for his
 eldest son, but not, inevitably, the heiress; Mariana had two elder
 brothers. But by one of the genealogical disasters to which the
 Spanish aristocracy were so prone, those brothers died without heirs
 and she succeeded; Lerma's grandson would succeed to the dukedoms of
 Lerma, Cea and Uceda, the countship of Santa Gadea and the post of
 Adelantado mayor itself.

 Under Philip III - as Padilla had implicitly recognised - a
 Sandoval marriage assumed rather more obvious possibilities, and Lerma
 exploited them to good effect - the Miranda heir in 1601, the
 rejection of a further, and almost completed, Medinaceli marriage for
 the best of all available heiresses, the Infantado. His eldest son did
 even better - a double connection with the Enriquez family (Admirals
 of Castile and dukes of Medina Riosco); in 1612, the sister of the

1 - On these, as affecting councillors of State, below, pp.229-230.
2 - Daughter Francisca marrying Diego de Zúñiga Avellaneda Bazán y
 Cardenas, López de Haro (1622), i, 448 and Cabrera de Córdoba (1857),
p.129.
3 - His second son, Diego Gómez, married the heiress of the 6th Duke on
 7 Aug. 1603, *ibid.*, pp.184-5; on cancellation of Diego's projected
 Medinaceli marriage, *ibid.*, pp.100 and 146.
4 - On arrangements for marriage of Uceda's heir, Francisco, to doña
 Feliche, daughter of Admiral Luis Enriquez, *ibid.*, p.387, and on
 marriage of doña Luisa to Juan Alonso, 9th Admiral (12 Nov. 1612),
 López de Haro (1622), i, 166. This latter was a rearrangement
 necessitated by the death of Uceda's daughter in 1602, Cabrera de
the wealthy Marquis of Pliego for his own re-marriage; and in 1617, the Osuna heir for a daughter.

Such a family clearly had to have its *grandez* acknowledge formally. Lerma's own dukedom was therefore followed by those of Cea (1604) and Uceda (1610) for his eldest son, the marquisates of Villamizar (1599) and Belmonte for his brother and Uceda's second son. Symmetry demanded, too, appropriate chivalric recognition. During the Valencian foray of 1599 the grand commanderies of Calatrava and of Castile, in the Order of Santiago, had fortuitously fallen vacant, and the first, reputedly worth 10,000 ducats annually, was bestowed illegally on Lerma's second son, Diego. The second, worth 16,000 ducats, was not to be given away; held by Philip II's leading courtier, the Count of Fuensalida, it passed on his death by natural progression to Lerma himself. These were followed by the grand commandery of Montesa for cousin Fernando Borja; a double Santiago commandery for son Cristobal; an *encomienda* worth 7,000 ducats annually together.

1 - *ibid.*, p. 470.
2 - Juan Tellez Girón marrying Isabel on 11 Dec. 1617, López de Haro, (1622), i, 167.
3 - Cea, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 208; Uceda, *ibid.*, p. 394; Villamizar, *ibid.*, p. 55 and Matías de Novoa, *Memorias*, printed in *Codex*, lx and lxi, lxi, p. 71; I have found no date for the Belmonte grant, to Bernardo Antonio, but it was made before 1616, López de Haro (1622), i, 165.
6 - No date of appointment is recorded for this; he is generally known by the title.
7 - Of Ornachos and Caravaca, López de Haro (1622), i, 166.
with the posts of provincial de la santa hermandad of Seville and caballerizo mayor of Córdoba for brother Juan, and a clavería of Alcántara for his primogenital grandson.

In turn, social eminence demanded seigneurial and financial expression. The Court offices were not lucrative; with the exception of that of general de la caballería de España — created for Lerma in 1603 and worth 12,000 ducats annually — they paid only a token salary, and that often years in arrears. Philip allowed his cortes and municipalities to lavish vast amounts on Lerma, but made few substantial monetary awards himself after 1599. These were hardly even pocket money, more than repaid by Lerma's expenses in entertaining the Court and in maintaining the new greatness — a new livery for the caballería costing him 120,000 ducats in 1605, the French marriages of 1615 — which he did not even attend personally —

1 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 151 and 60.
2 - López de Haro (1622), i, 167.
3 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 171. See below, p. 75.
4 - See below, p. 156.
5 - Among them, 90,000 ducats from the Valencian servicio, cita, lic. Juan de Chumacero, B.M.Eg. 2081, f. 128. On the awards associated with the removal of the Court, below, pp. 47-8.
6 - Chumacero recorded awards of 15,400 ducats from the accounts of the Treasurer General on 15 Apr. 1600, and an undated award of 14,000 ducats from the same source, ibid. For more minor awards, see Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 13, 55.
7 - ibid., p. 244.
some 400,000 ducats. Occasionally he even repaid the compliment, giving King and exchequer their own ayudas de costa - 10,000 ducats in plate in 1601, a camarín worth over 100,000 ducats in 1603, a (reputed) 800,000 ducats in 1608. He lavished his patronage, too, on the Universities and, more especially, the Church, calculating himself that he had spent 1,152,283 ducats on ecclesiastical buildings alone.

Such monies represented for Lerma only a means to an end. The new style of greatness cost money, and his apologist only exaggerated when defending him - 'Spaniards and foreigners admired in the Duke the greatness of Spain'. Novoa might more pertinently have placed the King at the head of the admirers. Lerma's ostentation was fundamental to and definitive of his political existence.

When in 1601 he suffered one of his frequent illnesses, Philip sought to encourage his convalescence by presenting him with a string of pearls worth some 30,000 ducats. It was the perfect measure of the man - Lerma could flaunt the pearls while losing none of the security they represented. To concentrate on his politico-

1 - González Dávila (1771), p.185, quoting from Lerma's inventory.
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p.117.
3 - ibid., pp.171-2.
4 - ibid., p.403.
5 - González Dávila (1771), p.41, again citing Lerma's inventories. He is in broad agreement here with Yáñez (1723), p.24, who recorded that Lerma founded 11 monasteries, 2 iglesias colegiales and 'many pious places in the Universities of Salamanca, Alcalá and Valladolid.
6 - Novoa, lxi, p.126.
7 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p.113.
administrative activities, even on the monetary grants, is to miss the point of his privanza. The supreme courtier was also the supreme speculator and investor; real estate, seigneurial and municipal, afforded him the security he craved for. Lerma collected towns.

The most complete inventory of those towns was compiled in 1616 and listed thirty four, excluding their lugares de jurisdicción and the ancestral estates in Cea, Denia, Villamizar and Ampudia. It did not record how he came by these estates, but Cabrera inevitably commented upon some of them, and from his record it appears likely that the majority were bought by Lerma himself. He had Philip giving him the Aragonese town of Purroy in 1599, and Valladolid granting Tudela de Duero in 1607 for millones exemption, but otherwise accretion was by purchase. The list was formidable — in 1600, having already bought three towns from the estate of the dead Admiral for 100,000 ducats, he was negotiating for two more with thirty lugares and reputedly worth 533,333 ducats; in 1602, having bought Valdemoro for 120,000 ducats he opened negotiations for Getafe and los Caravancholes in Madrid; in 1606, he paid 324,000 ducats for more than

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1 - B.N. 7423, ff. 134v-135. This magnificent tract was compiled from the Government's financial records for 1616, and I have found it in error only insofar as it was occasionally incomplete; see below, p. 175, n. 5. It included 30 lugares in the Cea dukedom and three towns in the countship of Ampudia. An inferior copy, B.M. Harl. 3569, f. 107.
3 - See below, pp. 48-9.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 62; figure converted from maravedís.
5 - ibid., p. 134.
thirty lugares in the Lerma dukedom, again in Madrid; in 1607, he followed this with the thirteen lugares of Behetria and its 6,000 vecinos, and then paid 600,000 ducats for eleven more places, with 9,000 vecinos to round off the Cea and Lerma estates.

The 1606 purchase was complemented by a royal grant of some 10,000 ducats of rent; the second of 1607 by another such grant, of unspecified value; in 1601, Philip gave him the adelantamiento of Cazorla, worth 20,000 ducats of annual rent, and when he found the Cámara de Castilla — under President Miranda — unwilling to accede to his request for the restoration of some rents confiscated from his family in 1479, Lerma turned to Philip and was granted 72,000 ducats of Italian rents in compensation. This was language he understood. When in 1603 his son married the Infantado heiress, Lerma congratulated him with 20,000 ducats worth of rent, but gave him only half that amount — Diego Gómez would have to wait on his father's death for the other 10,000 ducats.

Together with the seigneurial went commercial concessions

1 - ibid., p.176.  2 - ibid., pp.309-10.
3 - ibid., p.333  4 - ibid., p.292.
5 - ibid., p.333  6 - ibid., p.94.
7 - ibid., p.150. See also, pp.86,88-9,96-7,109.
8 - ibid., pp.176 and 184-5. See also, pp.148 and 509 for other grants made to relatives.
and other mercedes involving readily-realisable assets. The two most substantial awards, however, proved too hot even for Lerma's hands, and he had eventually to restore them, both to the city of Seville. The first, the escribanía de sacas y cosas vedadas of Andalusia, dealt with the almojarifazgo rents and had various excise duties in Seville and along the whole southern coastline. But the storm of protest at its award was such that in 1600 - the year after the grant - Lerma had to renounce it in the King, who in turn sold part of it back to Seville for 173,000 ducats.\(^1\) Lerma doubtless received compensation, but none is recorded. In 1608, however, Seville forced the cancellation of his right to a due of 1½ on its merchandise as part of the millones agreement.\(^2\) No matter; there were always other awards - jaspar mines in the bishopric of Osma and the concession on the stones used to decorate the Escorial itself; fishing rights in Valencia and Catalonia; the office of gran canceller of Naples, which he sold for 80,000 ducats; the elevation of Denia itself into a city and an episcopal capital.\(^6\)

There were, too, municipal offices. He had picked up a couple

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1 - On this, below, p. 340, n. 1.
3 - B.N. 7423, f. 135.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 176.
5 - Cnta., Lic. Juan de Chumacero, B.M. Eg. 2081, f. 128.
during the journey of 1599,\textsuperscript{1} but soon learned to concentrate on the alcaidías. Such were generally more prestigious than lucrative, although he could — and therefore did — occasionally reap profit from them.\textsuperscript{2}

In the south, he held the tenancies of the Torre de Oro in Seville and the old frontier fortress of Vélez himself,\textsuperscript{3} and gave his eldest son that of the Alhambra in Granada,\textsuperscript{4} but these were casual accretions. The hand of the master was revealed in the location of the Castilian alcaidías — that of the city of Burgos; those of the royal houses, palaces and stables of the King in Madrid, together with those of the casas del Campo y Sol and bosques of Abrojo; the palaces of Tordesillas; those of León, Valladolid and Toledo, together with those of the bridges and gates of the latter.\textsuperscript{5} There was marvellous system here, for these were among the King’s chief places of relaxation, and Philip visited them all regularly, generally indeed.

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\textsuperscript{1} One of them, an Alicante escribanía, included jurisdiction over an unspecified town in Aragón, B.N. 2346, f. 206.

\textsuperscript{2} On alcaidías, below, p. 189, n. 1, and on Lerma’s dealings in that of Valladolid, below, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{3} B.N. 7423, f. 135.

\textsuperscript{4} López de Haro (1622), i, 166.

\textsuperscript{5} Burgos, given as a merced, 23 Jan. 1599 and perpetuated 3 Apr. 1601; Casa Real (Madrid) and bosques of Abrojo, given on vacation, 12 Sept. 1600; that of the palaces and caballerías of the King in Madrid and of the casas del Campo y Sol, given in perpetuity, 6 Jul. 1601; Tordesillas, on 6 Dec. 1600, Lerma was given the perpetuation of this office, which he had held since 1584; Valladolid casas, 29 Dec. 1601; Torres de León, 9 Feb. 1606; Toledo — given 15 May 1610 in perpetuity the alcaidía of the palaces of the city of Toledo, gates and bridges of Alcántara and of the gate and Tower of Cambrón. Also given, at an unspecified date, that of Ucles, Cnta. Lic. Alonso de Cabrera, 25 Jun. 1625, printed by A.G. Palencia (1932), pp. 520–4.
all within an average year. Lerma as alcaide controlled the very right of entry to these palaces, and therefore access to the King himself; unwelcome influences could be kept out of the palaces, even indeed in the case of Madrid, out of the royal stables! Madrid apart, he concentrated on Philip’s two favourite haunts, Burgos and Valladolid. In Burgos, he was also escribano mayor, Treasurer of the House of Money and Captain General of the artillery of the royal palaces. ¹ But Valladolid he dominated as he brought the city back to a quite feudal baronage. He held himself the posts of alcaide, escribano mayor de los hijosdalgo, canceller, and guardamayor de la Casa del Monte of the city and its district within ten leagues. ² What was left over, he gave to his favourite Rodrigo Calderón, son of a leading citizen ³ - alguacil mayor, archivero, registrador de la Cancillería, mayordomo de obras, alcalde de la cárcel real, correo mayor, twice a regidor with voting seniority. ⁴ For good measure, he added a concession on the Bulls of Crusade printed in the town, ⁵ took the Simancas alcaidía for himself, ⁶ and gave the bishopric to Dr. Bautista Acevedo, another criado, ⁷ during the Court’s residence. ⁸

¹ - B.N. 7423, f. 135.
² - ibid.
³ - J. Juderías (1905), xlll, p. 337. See also below, pp. 119-114, 124.
⁴ - B.N. 11011, ff. 218-19 and 230v-231.
⁵ - This is sometimes listed as a royal merced, by for instance, the Court señor, valuing it at 8,000 ducats annually, B.N. 11011, f. 219, but Calderón is recorded in B.N. 56754, f. 54 as buying it.
⁷ - On him, below, pp. 78-9, 119-120.
⁸ - On this, below, pp. 119-120.
Valladolid, moreover, unlike Madrid, had a controlled right of entry, and Lerma could therefore control entry not merely into the palace but into the City itself.¹ That was power as he understood it.

The process whereby Lerma gained control of Valladolid's alcaidía showed his touch at its surest. During the speculation as to the removal of the Court in 1600, Valladolid judiciously presented him with a regimiento in perpetuity with the first vote after the corregidor and with an annual salary of 4,000 ducats.² In December, shortly before the decision was published, he bought the alcaidía de las casas (reales) of Valladolid for 25,089,904 maravedís, and in 1601 after the inevitable appreciation sold it for 64,897,317.³ He sold it well - to the King!⁴ In return, Philip gave him the City's alcaidía in perpetuity, again worth 4,000 ducats annually.⁵ The Duke was only starting. In 1602, he bought some houses in Madrid, doubtless well aware that the day would come when they would appreciate in value. What he did with them is not recorded, but presumably he sold them, for in 1606 a grateful Madrid indulged him not merely with immense bribes, but with a palace, no less.⁶ Still he was not finished; Valladolid's alcabala exemption was purchased at a price, and it was Lerma's - the town of Tudela de Duero.⁷ Thus the hand of the master.

¹ - See cntr. St., 22 Dec. 1601, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 40, and also, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 75.
² - ibid., p. 78.
³ - ibid., p. 106 and B.M. Eg. 2081, f. 128.
⁴ - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 106.
⁵ - ibid., p. 145.
⁶ - ibid., p. 306.
⁷ - ibid., pp. 270-1.
B. Decline and Fall.

Lerma was powerful. That is not to say that he exercised his power, nor even that he particularly wanted it; it is to say that power was allowed him by the King. Occasionally, he involved himself seriously in matters political or administrative, but largely only when and because he had to. Politics were an encumbrance, the by-product of the relationship with the King which allowed him his wealth. His health was not good, and his recurrent illnesses were accompanied by a melancholic abandonment of such governmental duties as he undertook.\(^1\) But more importantly, satiated boredom was never far off, and with his secular ambitions satisfied, it was characteristic of him that he turned his mind to the Church. It was characteristic, too, that his crises should have lasted for months, and finally for years; he never properly recovered from his second – in 1612 – but although he decided at that time to leave Court, he never quite got round to doing so. It was all too much effort.

His first crisis was self-induced, and almost certainly artificial. In October 1607 he proclaimed his retirement,\(^2\) and continued to do so in the face of the royal refusal to grant him the necessary licence.\(^3\) His position at Court was unchallenged and an

\(^{1}\) See Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 13, 210-13, 299, 478-9, and below, p. 53.
\(^{2}\) ibid., p. 317.
\(^{3}\) ibid., p. 322.
incredulous Cabrera waspishly—and probably correctly—calculated that, having dissipated his wealth, he was trying to force the King into making him new grants. But in January 1608 he was conspicuously absent from the swearing-in of the Prince, and shortly afterwards despatched all his possessions to Lerma itself, with the proclaimed intention of following immediately himself. As late as the middle of March, he was still expected to leave. Why he did not do so is unclear, but during 1608 he was subjected to a rising volume of criticism, and he decided that the only alternative to leaving was to mend his ways. Lerma, after his fashion, reformed himself and applied himself to reforming both Court and Administration.

The second crisis was far more serious. In October 1611 Calderón, having failed to secure the succession to the papers of the late senior secretary of State Andrés de Prada, asked permission to retire to his house. Why exactly he should have done so is not recorded, but it soon became evident that he had not asked of his own accord. Philip wanted him out of Court, and in November he was appointed ambassador to Venice. In later years he would be accused of having murdered the Queen, and the juxtaposition of her death and his request hardly appears coincidental. On 27 April 1612 he left

Court, now ostensibly as extraordinary ambassador to Flanders and France. It was a sensational defeat for Lerma, and he sank into melancholy, abandoning his audiences to his son and announcing that if he could not have Calderón to assist him he would have no one.

Lerma might have seen it coming. In 1610, his eldest son had begun to acquire an identity of his own—a second dukedom, of Uceda, in January, successful opposition to his own remarriage in July, and the reported succession to his post of caballerizo mayor to the King in the autumn. As he rose Lerma declined, accepting in January 1611 the posts of ayo and mayordomo mayor of the Prince, posts of for him, purely honorific importance granted his own age (57) and the presumed longevity of a King who was not yet thirty three. Not until July 1612 however—when he failed to secure Calderón's return—did he realise the seriousness of his position and take up the challenge, forcing Philip, for the first time, to balance two competing parties. The King did so with some skill. In August, he found Lerma insisting that Bernabé de Bibanco, his own secretary, be retired and replaced by Tristan de Ciriza, Uceda insisting that he stay in his post. Bibanco stayed, and Ciriza was appointed to the royal household. In September the parties were further balanced when Bibanco's formal

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2 - See ibid., pp. 459, 462-3, 473, 488.
3 - ibid., pp. 459, 478.
4 - ibid., p. 394.
5 - ibid., p. 412.
6 - ibid., p. 419. This apparently did not materialise.
7 - ibid., p. 429.
8 - ibid., p. 488.
9 - ibid., p. 490.
appointment was paralleled by the promotion of Tristan's brother Juan to the vacant secretaryship of State. 1 It was not enough for Lerma; on 23 October, therefore, Philip issued the famous cédula ordering the councils to obey 'all that the Duke shall say to or order you', 2 and almost immediately overruled Finance to allow Tristan to profit by 15,000 ducats from the highly irregular and illegal sale of his office of contador de mercedes on his promotion to the secretaryship of Inquisition. 3 Lerma's recovery was incomplete; his failure to re-establish Calderón in August 4 was partially confirmed in 1614 by Philip's refusal to allow Calderón's son to succeed to the papers of the dying Idiáquez, the King preferring as Cabrera put it 'to introduce the Duke of Uceda into the papers'. 5 In 1615 illness forced Lerma to abandon to Uceda the duty of accompanying the royal children for their French marriages, and in his title Philip ominously referred to Uceda as the heir-apparent to all Lerma's Court offices. 6


3 - On the Finance case, below, pp. 100-101, 209-210. No title is extant for the Inquisition post, but he was appointed royal secretary on 31 Dec. 1612, A.G.S. Q.C. 40, an appointment which necessarily preceded appointment to a conciliar post.

4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 490. 5 - ibid., pp. 550-1.

6 - Cédula of Instruction for the Duke of Uceda printed by Mantuano (1618), p. 175. See also, González Dávila (1771), pp. 185-8.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find the most definitive account of Lerma's fall dating his decline in the first instance to the fall of Calderón and, more pertinently, insisting that the final drama was played out over a period of some two and a half years prior to his final departure from Court on 4 October 1618. That account has it that the complaints of the heir's Maestro about Lerma's neglecting his duties as ayo set the final chain of motion in action as early as 1616. From that autumn Philip therefore gradually lessened the practical powers allowed Lerma while he watched his conduct in respect of educating the Prince, and in the spring of 1618 finally ordered him to his estates. Lerma then contrived to secure a succession of postponements until finally, having sent his coach away three times in August-September — and having been refused help by Cardinal Toledo in respect of securing another postponement — he was finally dismissed under royal threat of personal violence.

The importance of this account lies less in its ascription of motive than in the chronological framework it provides, and in its stressing that the initiative was Lerma's — that he had professed his intention of resigning for 'more than a year and a half' prior to a final insistence during a stay at Lerma itself in 1617.1 This last is crucial, for Novoa, too, is found insisting on just such a crisis.2 Clearly, contemporaries knew that something critical

1 - Anonymous account of the fall of Lerma, October 1618, B.N. 2348, f. 401. A slightly different version, B.N. 1104, f. 152.
2 - Novoa, lxi, p. 142.
had happened there between King and Duke, but the anonymous writer was the only one who thought that Lerma had wanted to resign and who recorded that his threats to do so had started more than eighteen months before the confrontation at Lerma.

He thought, however, that that confrontation had taken place in July or August 1617; Lerma in fact spent two periods of a month - the whole of August, and mid-September to mid-October - in Lerma, and it was during the first fortnight of October that he was joined by the King. The importance of the error concerns not the Lerma stay itself but the dating of the first threat; 'more than a year and a half' from July 1617 would date that in the days or weeks prior to c. February 1616, whereas if we carry those months back from October 1617 we are left with that first threat being made some time prior to c. April 1616. The writer was of course expressing himself very loosely, and it would be unnecessary to pursue the ambiguity were it not for the fact that Lerma himself, in the most important document of the reign, expressed himself as vaguely in referring back to that very threat.

The only extant letters between Lerma and Philip which comment upon their personal relationship belong to this period. At the end of July 1617 Lerma abandoned his governmental duties to his son and left San Lorenzo for Lerma itself. On 5 August he wrote to Philip about the threat of war in Italy, and the King replied six days later. He had been ill, and complained of Lerma's not having written often

1 - See below, pp. 325-6
enough. If Lerma replied, his letter has not survived, and he is next found writing on 27 August in reply to a royal letter of 24th. He specifically stated that 'I wish ... to see Your Majesty and serve him'. Had it been in doubt? Philip replied that he was looking forward to seeing Lerma - 'quedo muy alvorozado para veros' - and took the unusual step of enclosing a letter from the Prince in which sentiments were expressed that were perhaps unbecoming in a King - 'hurry back, for we cannot suffer so long a separation from you'.

Lerma did so, returning to the Escorial by 8 September. But on about 20th., he left again and returned to Lerma. No evidence remains to explain this departure, but a fortnight later Philip himself took that same road. The confrontation mentioned above took place within the next two weeks; by 18 October, Philip was on his way back to San Lorenzo, with Lerma trailing a couple of days behind him. On 21st., Lerma was at Ventosilla, and he joined Philip at Balsain on 29th. We may now consider a document salvaged for us by Gonzalez Davila:

' Señor. Your Majesty has known for seven years that I have wanted to be a religious, and most recently (learned this) through the papers that I showed him a year ago in Segovia.

2 - Lerma to Philip III, from Lerma, 27 Aug. 1617, ibid., f. 481.
3 - Philip III to Lerma, from San Lorenzo, 29 Aug. 1617, ibid.
4 - Prince Philip to Lerma, from San Lorenzo, 27 Aug. 1617, ibid., f. 485.
I have asked many times for a licence from Your Majesty, (and) he was not pleased to give it to me; and because of this, and out of the love that I hold for him, when finally in Lerma all my insistence was of no avail, I decided to take another course.

Dávila affirmed that 'the date of this letter, written in his own hand, is Ventosilla, 17 July 1612'. In this he was clearly incorrect, among other reasons because Lerma was in Madrid on that day. With Dávila there can be no suggestion of forgery; time and again, he ferreted out documents of seminal value — where others all too easily adduced their own reasons, for instance, for the dismissals of Portocarrero and Vázquez de Arce, he went to the archives and found the only documents which gave explicit clues to the real reasons; where others described Lerma's extravagance, he quantified it from his own inventories. His works are consistently illuminated with the remarkable document; this is only the most important.

Two alternative dates present themselves; the Segovia-Lerma-Ventosilla sequence would fit almost exactly a date of 17 July 1610, and such an ascription would have the merit of meaning that Dávila misread only one digit. But this may be ruled out chiefly on internal

1 - González Dávila (1771), p. 203.
2 - He had last been in Lerma on 5 Nov. 1611, but had not apparently been to Segovia since July 1609. Although Lerma was in deep crisis in 1612 it seems unlikely in the extreme that he was thinking of a religious career as early as 1605, and Cabrera, who was watching him particularly closely in 1612, saw no indications that would fit the various circumstances implicit in the letter. The explanation probably lies in the uniquely illegible ducal hand.
3 - On Portocarrero, above, p. 21, n. 2; on Vázquez, p. 20, n. 4; on the inventories, p. 14, n. 6 and 43, n. 5.
evidence; it is all but explicitly stated in the letter that Lerma had taken the first step in committing himself to an ecclesiastical career, but in July 1610 he is known to have been making the final arrangements for his marriage to a rich widow. ¹

The letter makes very obvious sense, however, if consigned to October 1617, and to c. 21st. when Lerma was in Ventosilla immediately after the King had left Lerma itself. Such would corroborate the tradition of a confrontation at Lerma and push the disenchantment back to precisely the time specified by the chronicler of decline, and it would confirm his insistence that the initiative came from Lerma rather than from the King. If such be accepted, it would appear certain that both of Lerma's departures to his home-town and his pursuit on the second occasion by the King were specifically related to his intention to resign.

There is one difficulty in this dating; it is not known for certain whether Lerma was in Segovia in October 1616. He was in Madrid to the eighth and again from the 20th. to the end of the month. The eleven days unaccounted for would be quite consistent with a journey to Segovia, and indeed had he not undertaken such a journey in October 1616 it would have been quite exceptional - only the fourth October of the reign thus far when he had not done so, ² and if he stayed in Madrid throughout that month it would have been the first.

¹ - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), entry of 'end of July' 1610, p. 412. The date may be further ruled out by virtue of the same difficulties as obtain with a 1612 dating; see above, p. 57, n. 2.
² - The exceptions being the Octobers of 1607-9, each divided between Madrid and San Lorenzo.
time in the reign that he had spent the whole of October in one place.

There is a second possibility here; if we exclude October 1616, he was last in Segovia between 5 and 15 December 1615 - might he in a hurried moment have expressed himself loosely and referred in October 1617 to December 1615 as 'a year ago'? Had that been the Segovia visit in question it would have been very near the 'more than a year and a half ago' of the anonymous writer. Further, it is known that Lerma's position was in doubt at that time; the Segovia visit took place on the return to Madrid after the French marriages for which he had been superseded by his son, the newly-proclaimed heir to his Court offices.¹

It is therefore all but certain that the letter was written on or about 21 October 1617, but it is possible to reconstruct the ducal position at that time even without having recourse to it. One fact is certain - that as late as the end of August 1617 the King was still vastly enamoured of Lerma and anxious to retain his services - and a second may be assumed - that since Lerma's cardinalate was conferred in March 1618,² he must have made up his mind to seek it by, at the latest, circa October 1617. Cardinalates were not obtained overnight, and Lerma could hardly have delayed any longer and had it conferred in March. Even without Dávila's letter, therefore, it may be adduced that in the autumn of 1617 Lerma had decided upon an

¹ - See above, p. 53.
² - In a secret Consistory on 26 March 1618, Yáñez (1723), p. 25.
ecclesiastical career and had done so despite being still securely rooted in the favour of both King and heir. As the anonymous writer maintained, as that letter established, the initiative came from Lerma.

A year later a resolute King dismissed a tearful Duke under threat of violence. To explain the apparent contradiction we can but dabble in unfashionable psychological waters. Lerma had threatened to resign before and had even, perhaps fully three years before, committed that resignation to paper, but Philip had been equal to him. But sending his luggage away from Court in 1607 and loitering himself was vastly different from twice leaving in 1617 and involving the Pope as an ally against the King. For nearly twenty years Philip had lavished every indulgence on this man; during August and September he had first assured him in writing of his continuing devotion and then chased after him to Lerma. But the Duke was leaving. There was nothing more that Philip could offer him; might not Philip's revulsion on learning this have explained his singleminded determination not to allow Lerma back? Moreover, the anonymous chronicler specifically stated that six months before Lerma's departure in October 1618 he was given a paper by the King formally dismissing him. That six months would take us back precisely to the time of the conferring of the cardinalate. In other words, when Philip was finally presented with what he regarded as a treacherous fait accompli, he reacted as a Hapsburg might be expected to. If Lerma was leaving, he could hardly

1 - B.N. 2348, f. 401.
have allowed it to be known, moreover, that he was doing so of his own accord. The lion roared, therefore, in a context vastly different from that generally imagined, and because he did so Lerma took fright. Might he not have hoped that in his last years he could have enjoyed the best of both worlds, secular and ecclesiastical? Might not his tears of October 1618 have been those of disappointment in that expectation? Might he not have realised—like the Count of Lemos at precisely the same time¹—that the King of Spain could be cajoled and persuaded but not threatened? Certainly, he applied himself, as he had in his previous crises,² to regain favour by frenetically cutting down on public expenditure, and not the least of the ironies of the reign was the tenour of his final administrative note to Finance—'The many and necessary expenses that His Majesty has had since he inherited these realms, together with the wars and armies that he has maintained in Italy and in Flanders and against the Infidel, have put the royal patrimony in the painful state that (you) know of, (and) this obliges the consideration with much care ... of reform ... The best expedient that can be used now is to eschew expenses in all parts'. Finance, in common with all other government agencies, was to see to this and also 'to the benefit and relief' of His Majesty's vassals.³

¹ - See below, p.82.
² - See below, pp.74-5.
³ - To President Salazar, 22 Sept. 1618, A.G.S. C.J.H.402, no fol. See also his notes to Martín de Arostegui (?), 21 May 1618, cutting down military salaries, A.G.S. E.2034, f.97, and to Juan de Ciriza, 25 Jan.1618, on provisions for Germany, A.G.S. E.2032, no fol.
Lerma's fall has generally been attributed to the workings of courtly intrigues, but if Philip listened to Uceda and Aliaga it would have been only because he was predisposed to do so by his own revulsion from the Duke.¹ Six weeks after Lerma's departure, he informed the councils that the old administrative procedure was henceforth to cease; only he himself or a secretary would now give any orders to the councils or juntas.² If Uceda was the new power at Court, it was an inauspicious beginning. Philip, moreover, held to his purpose, and the result of Lerma's fall was not less but more power to the councils.³ Uceda's own lack of character and of interest in administrative routine made his father a political leviathan by comparison. He had never been particularly active in administrative affairs; his first note to a council in 1601 had been followed by a score or so more notes annually over the next decades.⁴ When Lerma handed over the audiences to him they effectively ceased—Cabrera somewhat euphemistically recording in 1604 that he was 'little inclined to affairs!',⁵ and in 1612 that Lerma had not wanted to give audiences 'and his son never wanted to', and therefore the despatch of

¹ On the other changes of 1618, below, pp. 82-84.
² Cédula of 15 Nov. 1618, quoted by Valiente (1963), p. 162.
³ One contemporary realised this—'... and although the Duke of Uceda and Maestro Luis de Aliaga ... succeeded him in the valimiento, they did not have the fullness of power ...', A. de Leon Pinelo, Anales de Madrid (1931), p. 204. On Philip's role, see below, pp. 214-308.
⁵ Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 216. See also p. 212.
business is not conducted'. Uceda's one distinction in life was that his handwriting was worse than his father's, and he was rather wickedly if truthfully characterised by a contemporary - 'He rose late, did little and understood less'.

Such influence as he enjoyed was spent well over a year before the end of the reign—by February 1620, the Venetian ambassador in England was aware that 'the Duke of Uceda had declined greatly, so the Duke of Osuna had been recalled to Spain'; in March, Philip himself gave audience to a foreign dignitary while Uceda merely made the arrangements; in June, his secretary Juan de Salazar was debarred from giving any audiences or dealing with any correspondence. He held on until the end of the reign, when Philip ended as he had begun; with only a few hours to live, he set the seal on the advancement of the Sandoval by elevating Uceda to a princedom. He offered, too, a councillorship of State; appropriately—he had never sat on State or War—Uceda refused, but pathetically accepted the post of mayor domo mayor to the heir.

1 - ibid., p. 478.
2 - B.N. 11085, f. 242v.
3 - Girolamo Landi to Doge and Senate, 14 Feb. 1620, Cal. Ven., XVI, 245.
4 - Undated and unaddressed royal note, March 1620, A.G.S. E. 2327, f. 92.
5 - E.N. 18723/7, f. 90.
6 - Of Bisiniano, B.N. 11085, f. 261v.
7 - ibid., and B.N. 11011, f. 211v.
3. A Corrupt Administration?

Good government of the finances consists in always using (resources) for the general good ... and misgovernment, on the contrary, is when they are used for the individual'.

Duke of Lerma. ¹

In considering the nature of the corruption under Philip III it is necessary to draw a primary distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary, between independent aggrandisement by regular administrators and that defended and supported by the power of a Court favourite. It is pertinent, too, to recall that corruption was endemic within the system and that it had to be regularly rooted out.

In his last years, Philip II had had to concern himself repeatedly with the problem at the highest levels of his administration - in 1592 with the Council of Castile, ² in 1593 with frauds of some 5,000,000 ducats on the Indies accounts, ³ and in 1596 with the Council

¹ - To Juan de Ciriza, 15 Feb. 1616, referring in particular to the situation in Flanders; inside cnta. St., 23 Nov. 1615, A.G.S. E. 2030, no fol.

² - '... and anyone who has not performed his duties properly is to be punished, for it is my view that there is more leniency ('blandura') than is appropriate, and I fear that this is because many judges are not doing what they ought ...'. Instruction of Philip II to Rodrigo Vázquez de Arce on appointment as President, 1592, B.M. Add. 28, 456, f. 115b, a copy.

of Finance. The distinction in this political society between the tolerable and the intolerable - between, for instance, fees and bribes - was very fine. Venality had to be venial. When the remarkable Francisco de Salablanca died in 1607 in the middle of his ninth decade, Cabrera mourned the passing of 'a very senior minister of Finance and (a man) of great integrity', overlooking - if he knew of - his having been fined 200 ducats and sentenced to 'grave admonishment' by Laguna's commission in 1596. Others of equal character were also fined by that visita, but among those cleared was Lic. Alonso Ramírez de Prado.

The difference between these men under Philip III was partly circumstantial in that Ramírez had the opportunity for peculation while Salablanca did not - Ramírez, that is, sat on extra-conciliar juntas negotiating vast amounts with asentistas, whereas Salablanca

1 - See above, p. 6, n. 6.
2 - See J.H. Parry, Public Offices, pp. 70-71.
3 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 306
4 - B. N. 3827, f. 254, pp. cit.
5 - Such as Diego de Herrera and Luis de Alarcón, both later councillors of Finance, and contador Martín de Pradeda; on these, below, pp. 111, 218; 226; 210-211
6 - On his career, below, pp. 11-3
sat as only one of several councillors of Finance. But the real difference between them was of character, of ethos; Ramírez, even before he struck gold on the Junta de Hacienda in 1606, and despite his acquittal in 1596, was a political adventurer, protected by Lerma and unconcerned with his professional duties – he sat only seven times on Finance throughout 1605–6.¹ As early as the beginning of 1602 he was attracting ostentatious comment by living, as was said, like a king.² Salablanca, however, despite his conviction in 1596, was an honest and admired administrator, sitting regularly on Finance until within six weeks of his death.³ Ramírez died in prison – itself a pertinent comment on the fibre of this Administration – having been brought to account for frauds of 358,671 ducats⁴; Salablanca, after more than sixty years in the royal service, died with insufficient estate to pay for his own funeral.⁵ It will be argued that it was he, not Ramírez, who was the truly symbolic figure.

1 - On his career, below, pp. 266–7, and on his councillorship of Finance, pp. 266
2 - Sepúlveda (1924), p. 292.
3 - On his councillorship, below, pp. 264
4 - See below, pp. 266–7.
5 - Cnta. Fin., 14 May 1608, A.G.S. C.J.H. 345, f. 140. This was not uncommon; see below, pp. 181–2.
Before proceeding to our own analysis of the careers of these men and their fellows we might consider the verdicts passed on the régime at three very different junctures. The first of these, manifest in the reforms of 1607–9, had the salutary merit of emanating from within the Administration itself, the second and third – of 1618 and 1621/2 – of being the verdicts of enemies of Lerma and his son. If Lerma's power was absolute and nefariously employed, it is reasonable to assume that there would probably have been no reforms in 1607–9, and that the criados with whom he is generally assumed to have packed the Administration would have been dismissed in 1621 if not in 1618, especially because the later changes were associated not only with the beginning of a new reign but with a welling reform movement.

*** ***
As the first decade of the reign drew to a close, Spain was convulsed by a series of cumulative disasters at home and abroad, the recession in the Indies trade precipitating humiliating mutiny and cease-fire in the Low Countries and bankruptcy at home. The Government was further rocked by the discovery of massive corruption among the very men to whom it had entrusted in 1606 the problem of solving the financial crisis, but it performed the marvel of not merely surviving but of emerging the stronger from its crisis. In the period between the arrest of Ramírez de Prado on 26 December 1606 and the assassination of Henry IV (14 May 1610) a reforming spirit cours ed through both Government and Court and left no one unaffected, from the King himself down.

Fernando Carrillo's commission as visitador of State and Finance on 2 January 1607 was the proper starting-point and it was thoroughly unambiguous in intent; no man in Spain was better-equipped for the task, and none could be relied upon to pursue it as

1 - For a discussion of these disasters, John Lynch (1969), pp. 11, 34, 36, 41-2.
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 296-7
3 - 'Visita y cargos de D. Pedro Franqueza ...', 22 Dec. 1609, Madrid, B.M.Eg. 2060, f. 1; f. 6 giving date of commission.
relentlessly. A Cordoban, he was by profession a lawyer, educated by
the Jesuits before progressing through universities in Osuna, Rome
and Salamanca. He had then entered the royal service as a Crown
advocate at Court—a step unusual for a young lawyer, such men
generally finding there was more profit in opposing than in defending
the royal causes—and he very quickly won a reputation for himself:

In 1594 his remarkable qualities were recognised by his appointment
as Superintendent of Justice and Finance in the Netherlands with a
brief generously enjoining him to 'put the affairs of the Low
Countries in order'. He may not have done quite that but as
Superintendent and then as commissary for the peace negotiations with
the Dutch and English he earned the unstinted gratitude and
admiration of the Archdukes. In 1599 Flanders was left in his hands
while they journeyed to Spain, and they were as sorry to lose him in
1600 on his own departure as they were reassured by his immediate
return—Albert making an exception in his case to his aversion to

1—González Dávila (1623), p. 483.
2—On this, his concept of public service and his financial
difficulties, below, pp. 111-112.
3—'y en poco tiempo se igualo con los mejores ...', González Dávila
(1623), p. 483.
4—His Instructions printed by Gonzalez Davila, ibid. Carrillo's
widow, in a petition on his death dated his appointment as in
1595, Petition of doña Francisca Fajardo to Philip IV, 8 Jun. 1622,
5—During their absence he was left with Diego de Ibarra and Juan
Bautista de Tassis as a governing trio; the former returned to
Spain and the latter went to France as ambassador, ibid., pp. 345-6.
lawyers, and Isabel paying him the supreme compliment of thinking
him more than a match for his English opponents. Baltasar de Zúñiga,
his colleague in those negotiations, could find only one suggestion
of a fault, in that his bluntness with his juniors and equals
extended into his dealings with his superiors. Ruthlessness in the
pursuit of his duty was, however, precisely the quality that
distinguished Carrillo, and others admired or feared him for it. On
his death González Dávila wrote that 'had the times been milder, he
would without doubt have been the first minister of his age'. He
understated. For the last decade or so of the reign, Carrillo had been
the most important man in Spain after the King. Among those who
quailed before him was the Duke of Lerma.

Spanish justice was criticised at the time, as it has been
since, for its slowness in reaching a verdict and for its practice,
especially in cases involving administrative corruption, of imposing
monetary rather than physical penalties. Neither criticism obtained
in the circumstances of the case begun in January 1607; fraud of the

1 - 'He has been so very diligent that one would think he was from
another profession'. Albert to Lerma, 3 Apr. 1600, printed in Codex,
xliii, p. 323. See also same to same, 19 Nov. 1599, ibid., pp. 322-3.
2 - 'Don Fernando is not a man they will deceive, because he
understands them, and thus is very well suited (to the task),
Isabel to Lerma, 28 May 1600, printed in B.R.A.M (1905), p. 279.
3 - B.M. Eg. 2079, f. 245.
4 - González Dávila (1623), p. 484.
5 - See below, pp. 92, 102-3, 323-4, 346.
6 - It is curious to find an Englishman criticising Spanish justice
for its liberality, but Sir Charles Cornwallis did so, concluding
that its endemic leniency encouraged future transgressions,
Discourse, p. 441.
nature and scale practiced by Villalonga\(^1\) and his associates inevitably took time to unravel, and the first concern of the commission in sentencing was naturally to recover anything it could for a bankrupt royal exchequer. The arrests of Villalonga, Ramírez and Álvarez Pereira\(^2\) had in themselves dramatic enough effect - 'These imprisonments have caused great admiration in this Court, since they are three men who were so important in it, and thus the other ministers have been frightened and will all ensure that henceforth they exercise their offices as they are obliged to do ...'.\(^3\) Wonder turned to incredulity when in May Calderón himself was arrested,\(^4\) but he was immediately cleared by a separate commission on which Carrillo sat with Idiáquez and Miranda\(^5\) - perhaps because the prosecution itself was irregular; since he held no administrative office he was not subject to administrative visita. Doubtless he was protected, too, by Lerma, but in 1607 he was a very minor figure; when he became a major one and overstepped the mark, he too would fall. That was in the nature of things.\(^6\)

The visita proper continued slowly and thoroughly. The collection and collation of evidence both documentary and verbal was

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1 - On this notorious Secretary of State, below, pp. 72-3, 99-100, 114-121.
2 - Secretary of Portugal; see below, p. 72.
3 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 298.
4 - Ibid., p. 306.
5 - Ibid., p. 307.
6 - See above, p. 48, and below, pp. 99-100, 118-121.
a time-consuming affair, but by April Carrillo was ready to virtually acquit Álvarez Pereira as he reached out for more substantial victims, arresting Juan Nuñez Correa, asentista and arrendador, on charges of complicity with Villalonga and Ramírez in asiento and commercial frauds. By January 1608 he had uncovered sufficient evidence to call in the fiscal of Inquisition to investigate Villalonga's secretarship of that Council, although to Villalonga himself, some months over the brink of madness, it was no longer of any consequence. With Ramírez, too, wilting under the strain, Carrillo was finally ready in February 1608. He left the Inquisition charges to the fiscal, and indicted Villalonga on 464 counts. Ramírez, despite having already confessed, took natural enough fright and suddenly decided to exercise his prerogative and refused to have Carrillo as his judge. It availed him little; he lived only until August, and the investigation had proceeded far enough for a truncated sentence to be published in September. Villalonga had no escape. In July 1609, Carrillo called in the fiscal of the Council of Aragón to investigate

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1 - He informed Álvaro's wife that their separation would not be a long one, *ibid.*, p. 300. On his discovery of corruption within the Council of Portugal, *ibid.*, p. 301.  
2 - *ibid.*, p. 304.  
3 - *ibid.*, p. 324. The fiscal was Fernando Acevedo; on him, below, 103-4.  
4 - *ibid.*, p. 315.  
5 - *ibid.*, p. 318.  
6 - *ibid.*, p. 323.  
7 - *ibid.*, p. 333.  
8 - *ibid.*, p. 345.  
9 - See below, p. 73. All outstanding charges were dropped on his death, *ibid.*, p. 349. In May, his son Antonio was fined 1,000 ducats, deprived of his Crusade fiscalía and expelled from Court in perpetuity, *ibid.*, p. 368. He was formally deprived of his office on 28 Aug. 1609, royal cédula of that date, A.H.N.Cons., L.de P. 724, ff. 71-2.
his activities as Secretary of that Council, and on 22 December finally presented his findings to the King.

The process dragged on until 20 October 1611 when the verdicts of the fiscales of Inquisition and Aragon against Villalonga and his criados were published, but Carrillo's conclusions became known almost immediately, and remained unaltered in substance. Some slight leniency was shown by Philip to Villalonga's family, and the Inquisition and Aragon cases added only another 6,259 ducats to Villalonga's fine and a further 1,160 ducats of fines against six criados. The balance sheet, concerned now with depredations from within the councils of State, Aragon, Inquisition and Finance and the Junta de Hacienda made startling reading; in addition to the confiscation of all mercedes and the life sentences against the two administrators, fines totalling 2,477,101 ducats were levied:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fine (ducats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villalonga</td>
<td>1,406,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramírez de Prado</td>
<td>358,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuñez Correa</td>
<td>711,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villalonga's criados</td>
<td>1,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 372-4. See also, pp. 398, 400, 403.
2 - B.M.Eg. 2060, f.1.
3 - 'Testimonio de las sentencias dadas en la visita de ... Franqueza ... y ... Ramírez de Prado y otros ...', 20 Oct. 1611, by Francisco de Monzon, ibid., f. 98.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857) recording them in his entry of 16 Jan. 1610, p. 394.
5 - See ibid., p. 400.
6 - B.M.Eg., 2060, ff. 98-100. I have found no record of the conclusions vis-a-vis the Council of Portugal.
The nature and length of the trial focussed attention on the need for reform, and its success encouraged hopes of such being effected. While the enquiry was still in its infancy, Lerma himself took obvious note; in March 1607 he instigated a massive reform of all military and naval expenses at home and abroad, and in October, as he professedly hovered on the brink of resignation, he extended his interest to an equally massive reform of all royal mercedes. It was indeed a time for desperate measures - in March he was subjected to a humiliating demonstration by his own vassals, and in July to the appearance throughout Madrid and on the very gates of the royal palace of libellous pasquines. Cabrera commented slyly on his newly-

1 - He ordered an enquiry into and a reform of all military and naval salaries in Flanders, Italy and Sicily and Spain itself, with special reference to the reduction of the size of the tercios. When Prada presented an interim report on the situation in Flanders alone, Lerma irately retorted that he expected the more general enquiry to be carried out at once. He referred the matter to State, remarking that 'in the present state of the royal exchequer it is necessary to eschew every extraneous expense'. Notes to Prada, 8 Mar. and 7 Jul. 1607, A.G.S. E. 2025, ff. 14 and 15. Over the next two years, Lerma developed a close interest in naval reforms - cutting down on expenses, accelerating the supply of money, even re-forming squadrons and armadas. See, for example, notes to Bartolomé de Aguilar, 28 and 29 Oct. 1607, A.G.S. G.A. 670, no fols.; to Juan de Acuña, 20 Nov. 1608 and 17 Feb. 1609, A.G.S. C.J.H. 356, no fols.; etc. See, for example, Fin. 28 Mar. 1608, ibid., 352, f. 18, 13 and 16 May 1609, ibid. 356, f. 134 and 156. It was not coincidental that Philip himself took a close interest in naval reforms in 1606-7; see below p. 299.

2 - Below, p. 168, n. 2.

3 - Diccionario de Historia de España, ii, p. 223.

4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 348.
found diligence — 'He has given general audiences on most days without differentiating (between) people — a thing which he did not formerly do — and it is attributed to a memorandum which a certain Franciscan monk gave him advising him of what was being widely said of him ....'.¹ In his zeal he even went so far as to reform the behaviour of palace officials² and to return, for the first time since 1603, to the Council of State.³ Philip, too, in his own way took notice, attempting in 1607–9 to reduce the expenses of both Court and Government.⁴ In 1609 he took two more substantial steps. Fearful of attack by enemy forces, he resurrected the milicia general, ordering each nobleman to organise and train a levy from his estates. Since 1603 Lerma had been paid 12,000 ducats a year as capitán general de la caballería de España, and Philip at last found a task worthy of that dignity, ordering Lerma to organise the whole operation. He had, as he explicitly made clear, a second purpose — 'although originally commissaries were appointed to organise this ... I have so much confidence in your love and zeal that I now wish this to be organised by your hand and (those) of the persons named by you ....'.⁵ The last of the royal courtly gestures was made coincidentally with the submission of Carrillo's

1 - ibid., pp. 344-5.  
2 - ibid., p. 356.  
4 - See below, pp. 164–9.  
5 - Copy of untitled cédula, dated 1609 only, to the Duke of Lerma, A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 221. See also, above, p. 42.
conclusions, when Philip decreed that no military habits would be given for four years, and that anyone petitioning for one would be imprisoned.  

Such were straws in the wind, significant rather than important. More substantially, Philip effected radical structural alterations in the councils of Castile, Finance and Indies and, in a series of presidential changes necessitated by the deaths or retirements of incumbents similarly improved the quality of their leadership, together with those of Aragón and Inquisition. The Finance reform involved the publication of a new arancel or fee-book and a redefinition of the duties of the contadores; the fees that officials could charge or were entitled to were hopelessly complicated, and in a remarkably ambitious project, Philip addressed himself to rationalising dues that had often been fixed in pre-Hapsburg Spain. In doing so, he provoked an explosion of protest from officials deprived of their time-hallowed rights, but after some delay he held firm and published the new dispensation in September 1608. 

With Castile and Indies, Philip's problem was one of administrative imbalance and of commensurate inefficiency; Castile's judges were overworked while the Council of Indies itself was underworked by virtue of the concentration of responsibility in its Cámara. In redressing these imbalances, Philip fully acknowledged the failure of his measures at the beginning of the reign. In February

2 - See below, pp. 198
1608, he implemented his father's decade-old decrees and established the Sala de Gobierno to take the main weight of Castile's judicial business. With Indies, he did the reverse, in March 1609 abolishing the Cámara established in 1600. He thereby restored to the full Council control over the government of the Indies, retaining the Junta de Guerra de Indias as the only part of the mechanism found to have been working satisfactorily. The measure was somewhat ungraciously received by the Council's modern historian as 'a deluge of empty words and almost a burlesque on reality' on the curious grounds that no reforming measure 'given in the time of Lerma and countersigned by a man of the qualities of ... Calderón' could conceivably be deserving of serious attention. Dr. Schäfer protested too much; there was probably some measure of truth in his description of the Cámara as a tool of Lerma's, and he was doubtless correct in ascribing the Count of Lemos's advancement to the presidency as a direct result of his relationship with Lerma. But as he himself found, the suppression of the Cámara had been implemented specifically on the recommendation of Lemos himself; was it not curious that a client should have so advised his patron?; was this not, if anything, a defeat for Lerma?; was not Lemos's own supercession by Juan de Acuña

2 - Cédula abolishing the Cámara, 17 Mar. 1609, A.G.S. G.A.713, no fol., a copy.
3 - Schäfer, 1, 203.
4 - ibid., p. 186. See ibid., pp. 105-6.
5 - Schäfer, i, 187-8; his concern patently being to improve the efficiency and integrity of the Council.
evidence of the spirit of reform? was not Villalonga's fall, or Lerma's own crisis, further such evidence?

The first of Philip's presidential changes was outrageous. Dr. Juan Bautista Acevedo was an extraordinary choice for the Castile presidency at any time, but more especially at this. Miranda had been ailing for some time, by November 1607 had decided to retire, and refused to change his mind despite pressure from the Court. His age and the effects of an old war-wound were catching up on him, and the change was overdue, since his infirmity had dislocated the Council's work by forcing it either to adjourn to his house or to meet without him. An Englishman wondered whether his retirement 'may probably mean a change of policy; for he may have foreseen great events approaching and have desired to withdraw'. Great changes were in the air, but Miranda himself presided over them, and like Lemos left his Council after reforming it. He did so because he was dying; he retired in April and died in September. The appointment of Bautista, therefore, came in the midst of reform, but it came, too, at precisely the moment when Lerma was proclaiming his own retirement—was it

1 - On Acuña's appointment, below, pp. 80
2 - On this notorious criado of Lerma's, below, pp. 105-6, 119-120
4 - On war-wound, González Dávila (1623), p. 380, and on dislocation, the sources cited above, n. 3.
5 - Secretary to the English ambassador, addressing the Doge and Senate of Venice, 12 Apr. 1608, Cal. Ven., X1, 232.
7 - See above, p. 52.
the 1608 version of the 1612 cédula, the extraordinary royal favour granted Lerma as reassurance of his own position?¹

In the event it was of little practical consequence; Bautista was appointed on 13 April and died on 9 July.² Since 1603 he had served as an unlikely Inquisitor General, and was now succeeded in that dignity by Cardinal Toledo; after at least two, and perhaps four, refusals, and with the Court again resident in Madrid, he felt at last able to accept the appointment.³ His credentials require no restatement. For his new President of Castile, Philip turned not to the men Court gossip made the favourites – Lemos, Velada and Tomás de Borja, each closely connected with Lerma⁴ – but to the President of Valladolid, Lic. Pedro Manso. The appointment was, in its different way, as outrageous as Bautista’s had been. Manso’s was the most brilliant career of the reign; he had been appointed to Valladolid only in 1606, and was not yet thirty eight.⁵ His qualities, however, had been

1 - On the cédula, above, p. 53.
3 - On refusal in 1601, ibid., 94, 97; details confirmed in B.N. 2577, f. 83. Cabrera reported that on Nino de Guevara’s departure in 1602, Philip already had the Brief for Toledo’s appointment. Eight months later, after Juan de Zúñiga’s death, he reported that it was again thought certain that Toledo would be appointed, especially if the Court returned to Madrid, ibid., pp. 141, 154, 162. The suggestion that Toledo was offered the post in 1599 and 1603 is speculative. On his appointment, ibid., p. 346 and Lea, 1, 557.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 344; On Lemos, below, pp. 105-106; on Velada, pp. 155, 151-2, 171. Borja was Lerma’s uncle.
5 - Cabrera recorded that in 1606 he was not yet 36, ibid., p. 296 and dated appointment as 30 Aug. 1608, ibid., p. 345, but A.G.S. Q.C. 37 dates this 6 Sept. 1608.
recognised by good judges — among them Vázquez de Arce and Miranda, both of whom had furthered his career\(^1\) — and both Lerma and his most bitter enemy, the Queen, were competing for his favour.\(^2\) If Lerma was involved in Manso's appointment, it would only have been to demonstrate his concern for good government, especially so since his appointment came shortly before those to the presidencies of the Council of Aragón and the Chancillerías of Valladolid and Granada of men known to Cabrera to have been both worthy of their new positions and quite independent of Lerma.\(^3\) Manso himself immediately confirmed the purpose of his appointment by tackling the immense administrative and disciplinary problems involved in reforming the offices of the escribanos de provincia y del crimen and alguaciles de corte,\(^4\) but his star shone only briefly. Having begun the morisco expulsion, he asked in August 1610 to be relieved of the presidency on grounds of ill-health.\(^5\) Juan de Acuña was appointed in October, and Manso died at the end of November, not yet forty.\(^6\)

In December 1609 Acuña had been appointed to succeed Lemos on Indies on his departure for the viceroyalty of Naples, and was himself succeeded on Finance by Carrillo.\(^7\) The characters and

\(^1\) González Dávila (1623), pp. 389-390.
\(^2\) González Dávila reported that he was appointed Patriarch of the Indies as reward for his supervision of the Expulsion and for his reforming activities at the insistence of the Queen, ibid., pp. 390. Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 344 wrote of his being 'much favoured' by Lerma.
\(^3\) ibid., p. 357.
\(^4\) ibid., p. 353.
achievements of Acuña and Carrillo will be considered in their proper contexts; suffice it for the moment to remark that Acuña had all Carrillo's qualities save his absolute ruthlessness and that they were the two most renowned judges in Spain. Carrillo, moreover, was promoted to Finance the day after he presented his great visita conclusions; his appointment was in itself therefore as comprehensive a declaration of intent as the King could make and gave definitive perspective to the other changes of this time. Acuña was succeeded as President of Indies by the Marquis of Salinas, and again it was a thoroughly appropriate choice, of a man who had held three Indies viceroys. The presidencies of Orders and Italy remained unchanged in the distinguished hands of Idiáquez and the Constable.

Of the three councils which form the subject-proper of this study, both Finance and War were fully staffed by 1609. State, however, was in serious difficulties as the servants of Philip II died off. For various reasons — among them the demands made on suitable candidates by the Dutch war and the Expulsion — Philip delayed reform, but in 1610-11 appointed six new councillors and restored the Council to a fully pristine health.


1 - On their presidencies of Finance, below, pp. 266-272 and 273-278 respectively; on relationships with Lerma, pp. 315-324; on Carrillo, pp. 100-103, 178-9, 340-349, and on his visita, above, pp. 68-73.

2 - On visita conclusions, above, p. 73.

3 - i.e., Don Luis Velasco; for career, Appendix 11, no. 315.

4 - On these councils, below, pp. 226-231.
The conclusion that Lerma's fall was a highly personalised affair was confirmed by the events - or rather, by the lack of them - in October 1618. The only leading administrator to fall coincidentally with Lerma was the Count of Lemos, now President of Italy, but the anonymous writer on Lerma's fall was not certain that the two events were related. He thought that Lemos and Fernando de Borja, comendador mayor de Montesa, were involved in that miseducation of the Prince to which he in large part ascribed Lerma's fall; he had it that when Borja was dismissed, Lemos attempted to force Philip to reinstate him by threatening his own resignation, only to be shattered on finding it accepted. The connection he drew, therefore, was courtly rather than political or administrative, his implication clearly that Lemos did not fall specifically because Lerma did so.  

Lerma's fall did of course have potentially serious consequences for Calderón, but he was already a figure of the past, although he could entertain some hopes of the future while Philip III lived.  

Lemos was succeeded on Italy by the Count of Benavente, an affable, languid courtier whose energies appear to have been chiefly sexual; he had eighteen children. His new eminence was incidental, the 

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B.1618.

1 - B.N. 2348, f. 401, esp. cit.  
2 - See below, pp. 86.
real significance attaching to it only that he accepted it. A personal favourite of Philip's from the beginning of the reign,¹ he had certainly refused a councillorship of State in 1611 and probably rejected the presidency of Italy at the same time.² He had sat briefly on War as State councillor in 1615, but only when the Court came to him and had fleetingly appeared on State itself in 1617. As President of Italy he took up his councillorship of State again, sitting regularly from February 1619 until his final illness began in 1621.³ It is of course possible - but in the highest degree unlikely - that Benavente deliberately eschewed power while Lerma held it. Had he done so, contemporaries might be expected to have commented upon the fact; none did so. Nor, moreover, was there to be any indication in his exercise of a fairly insipid councillorship of State that he finally deigned to join the Council to pursue with any conviction any specific line of foreign policy.⁴

The only other presidential change at the time of Lerma's fall was also incidental to it, although it had rather more significance for the future. Cardinal Toledo died in December 1618 and was succeeded as Inquisitor General by the royal confessor.

¹ - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p.8 recording that in 1599 he had ridden with Philip and Denia in January through the streets of Madrid in discreet disguise and that he had been thought a candidate for the Orders presidency, ibid., pp.23-4. The Court señor recorded that Philip spoke well of him in his last minutes, B.N.11011, f.210.
³ - On his councillorship, below, pp.146
⁴ - See below, pp.383
Fray Luis de Aliaga. Aliaga had ambitions in both the courtly and political spheres, but again, his appointment as such was not directly related to Lerma's fall.  

The only other changes were also coincidental. Cardinal Zapata happened to return from Rome as Lerma fell and was appointed to State, and the Count of Gondomar similarly returned briefly on a temporary respite from his English embassy and resumed his councillorship of Finance. Dr. Antonio Bonal disappeared from Finance for five meetings in September-October, but returned to sit through to his dismissal in the last hours of the reign, but the other changes on Finance, as on War and State, were purely normal and in no way related to Lerma's fall. No faction fell with Lerma because he had none.

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1 - Toledo died on 7 Dec., Salazar y Castro (1688), p. 225, and Aliaga was commissioned on 4 Jan. 1619, Lea, i, 557.  
2 - On Aliaga, below, pp. 87, 108-111.  
3 - On Zapata, below, p. 383, and on Gondomar, pp. 268, 272, 273.  
4 - On his dismissal, below, p. 85, and on councillorship, p. 274.  
5 - On appointments to these councils, below, pp. 226-231; on changes in 1621-2, pp. 88-90.
In the last hours of Philip III's reign, Uceda dismissed two councillors of Castile of somewhat dubious reputation—Dr. Antonio Bonal and Lic. Pedro de Tapia—and deprived the former also of his joint councillorship of Finance. He hoped thereby to demonstrate his concern for good government, but as always with him, it was too little and too late. Philip IV and his entourage would hardly be satisfied with that offering. They were after larger game.

On the first day of the reign, 31 March, secretaries Tomás de Ángulo of Castile and Bernabé de Bibanco of Inquisition were dismissed from office, and Juan de Ciriza was deprived of his State consultas but allowed to retain his other papers. The hunt was warming up; these three men were each connected with Lerma or Uceda. Two weeks later, on 15 April, Lerma himself was deprived of his notorious Sicilian rents. But it was still all fairly minor—both Ángulo and Ciriza were later reinstated—token gestures, perhaps, during the artificial interlude created by the coincidence of the

2 - Bassompierre (1943), p. 79.
3 - On Ángulo, below, pp. 120-3, 122; on Bibanco, above, pp. 52-3 and below, pp. 127. On Ciriza, above, 52-3 and below, pp. 127.
4 - Bassompierre (1943), p. 79. On these, above, p. 45.
5 - Ángulo as supernumerary councillor of Finance, 15 Apr. 1623, A.G.S. Q.C.40 and Cédula of 10 Apr. 1623, Entry Book of Royal Orders, 1623, B.M. Eg. 335, f. 365b. Ciriza as Secretary of State for Italian affairs, A.G.S. Q.C.25.
royal obsequies with the Easter devotions. On 23 April the hunt began in earnest; Uceda and Aliaga were ordered to leave the Court,¹ and Carrillo was given his commission to investigate all Philip III's grants to Lerma.² On 28 April, Osuna was imprisoned.³ Aliaga remained true to his ubiquitous self, sitting on State until 27 April,⁴ but Uceda went quietly, although at the end of the following year he essayed something of a comeback.⁵ Lerma, proclaiming himself 'very rich and happy',⁶ was content to live out his last days in characteristic splendour.⁷ While the various investigations were proceeding, that of Calderón was speeded up, until on 21 October he died in expiation of Spain's sins.⁸

Two presidencies changed hands, both after some delay. With Castile, the effective dismissal of Fernando Acevedo, brother of the notorious Dr. Juan Bautista, proved simpler than did the problem of

1 - B.N. 11011, f. 213.  
2 - B.N. 2352, f. 450.  
3 - B.N. 11085, f. 214.  
4 - Attendance Register, State.  
5 - He was eventually sentenced to a fine of 20,000 ducats and eight years exile, but González Dávila (1623), p. 172 recorded that a royal decree of 19 Dec. 1622 suspended the sentence, instead appointing him Vicerey and Captain General of Catalonia. He did not take up the position.  
6 - To Philip IV, B.M. Eg. 740, f. 13b. The copyist of the letter dated it 13 Apr. 1627; it was presumably written in April 1621.  
7 - An anonymous writer in July 1621 wrote of him that 'his spirit is, as it has always been, to concern himself only with self-indulgence, and with having banquets daily in monasteries ... God alone sees his soul', ibid., f. 18.  
8 - B.N. 11011, f. 225v.
persuading Francisco de Contreras out of an eight year retirement to replace him; it took Philip IV until September to do so. With the problem was reversed; Aliaga refused to resign, and as late as the end of June was still gaily 'consulting' the King from his exile, while his Council continued to work headless, in Madrid. Not until February 1622 did Philip succeed in ridding himself of Aliaga and in appointing his successor. While the farce continued, the Inquisition itself took two important steps, abolishing the scandalous councillorship afforded the Dominicans in perpetuity on Aliaga's appointment as councillor in 1614, and nominating a new councillor to bring itself up to strength. The other presidential changes were quite normal – Rococampofrio's interim presidency of Finance was confirmed after Salazar finally died, and the deaths of presidents of Italy (Benavente, 7 November 1621 and Zúñiga, 7 October

2 - Cnta. of Aliaga, 28 Jun. 1621, B.M. Eg. 345, f. 63. On the difficulty of removing an Inquisitor General who would neither resign nor accept a bishopric so that he might be forced to do so on the grounds of episcopal residence, Lea, i, 307-8.
3 - Lea, ibid., p. 577 dating the commission of Andrés Pacheco as 12 Feb. 1622, and González Dávila (1623), p. 443 the papal confirmation as 26 Apr. 1622.
4 - Cnta. Inq., 24 Sept. 1621, B.M. Eg. 345, f. 42. On this, below, p. 110.
5 - The Patriarch being largely absent and Juan Ramírez, senior councillor, being ill; the Council recommended three men and Philip chose Dr. Cifuentes Loarte, Cnta. Inq., 21 Apr. 1621, ibid., f. 60.
1622), and of Indies (Carrillo, 23 April 1622) necessitated new appointments.

The new régime largely contented itself with the proceedings against Lerma, Uceda, Aliaga, Osuna and Calderón. The Marquis of la Laguna disappeared temporarily — and discreetly? — from State, and was therefore Aliaga apart, the only member of that Council affected by the death of Philip III. If he lost favour, he regained it quickly. Of the councillors of War, Hinojosa and Gelves alone left, but both had effectively ended their councillorships in 1620, one on appointment as Viceroy of Navarre, the other on virtual retirement. One councillor of Italy — the Marquis of la Floresta — was dismissed, but for insolence toward his President rather than for any association with the Sandeoval, and he was later reinstated. A few minor figures completed the list.

There were more new appointments than there were dismissals, but such was not surprising at the beginning of a reign, and they were far from radical in scope. Only State — and therefore its membership

2. Ibid., 484. Villela appointed 17 Jul. 1623, A.G.S. Q.C. 30, although dated 17 Aug. 1623 by Schafer in his Appendix; González Dávila, ibid. 484 has him acting as President from 1622.
3. He returned to War as State councillor and sat regularly in 1622; on his career, below, pp. 231-2, 245.
4. On them, below respectively, pp. 244, 250, 256-7; 244, 256, 254.
5. Bassompierre (1943), p. 78. He appears in several lists or consultas of the mid-1620s; see, for example, González Dávila (1623), p. 454.
6. Among them was Quevedo; others included González Centeno, Secretary of Philip III, Andrés de Velázquez, espía mayor, and of course Bernabé de Bibanco; see below, pp. 315.
of War - was seriously affected, as on 1 May the Marquis of Aytona, Duke of Montesclaros and Diego de Ibarra made their first appearance, with the Marquis of Monteleon joining them at the next meeting, on 25 May. Ibarra's promotion was merited and perhaps overdue, as he now entered service under his third Hapsburg. 1 The three aristocrats had had no experience in the central Administration under Philip III but had extensive diplomatic and viceregal qualifications for their new eminence. 2 Although none of the four have ever apparently been described as enemies of Lerma or Uceda, their sudden appearance as a cohesive group hardly appears coincidental. Two other men were also appointed to State, but only in honorary capacities prior to departure from the Court - Zúñiga's eldest brother, the Count of Monterrey, and Fernando Acevedo, replaced President of Castile. 3 War itself was vaguely and unsubstantially affected in 1622 as ten new councillors made their first appearances, but eight of them aggregated only thirty attendances between them in 1622 and only the Count of Gondomar (15) and Pedro Pacheco (81) made any significant impression. Among the eight was the future Count-Duke of Olivares. If, as has often been suggested, he had been systematically excluded from power by the Sandoval, it was rather remarkable that he was not to be found

1 - On his extraordinary councillorship of War, below, pp. 255
2 - For their careers, below, Appendix II, pp. 414-415, nss. 13, 113.
3 - Monterrey going to Rome as ambassador without ever having sat on State, Acevedo sitting twice, on 16 and 28 Sept., before returning to his archdiocese. Attendance Register and B.N. 11011, ff. 214v and 220.
found among the new appointees of 1621. His father had sat when Lerma
was at the height of his power, his uncle before and after his
decline; it might reasonably be suggested that Don Gaspar did not
attend until 1622 because he had not wanted to. 1

It proved unnecessary to replace Bonal on Finance as a
complicated series of substitutions made good his loss, 2 but both he
and Tapia were replaced on Castile, Philip IV confirming his father's
two nominees. 3 A routine promotion to a third new councillorship of
Castile resulted in a new fiscal being appointed to Finance; again,
the change was in no way connected with the change of régime as such. 4
Indeed, the first appointment to either Finance or Castile savouring
of a new favouritism was that of Don Pedro de Guzmán, promoted to
Castile from Orders at the end of 1622. 5 Two new secretaries were
named for Finance in November 1621, one to replace the retiring
Rodríguez Criado, the other to enable Miguel de Ipeñarrieta to
concentrate on his jointly-held councillorship. 6

A visitador was appointed for Orders in July, 7 and major

1 - On the councillorship of the 2nd. Count, below, pp. 240 - 241
and of Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, pp. 246
2 - See below, pp. 291.
3 - Lic. Juan de Frías Mesia, 1 Apr. 1621, A.G.S. Q.C. 26, and Lic.
Belenguer de Apoiz Daviz, 12 Jun. 1621, ibid., 9. Their nomination by
Philip III, B.N. 11011, f. 211v.
4 - Lic. García Pérez de Araciel had been appointed councillor of
Finance on 5 May 1618, but ordered not to take possession of the
office for three years, A.H.N. Cons. L de P. 724, f. 299. On his
service on Finance below, pp. 291. He was replaced as fiscal of
Castile by Francisco de Alarcon, Escocampofrio, to Philip IV, 6
5 - On 11 Dec. 1622, A.G.S. Q.C. 37. He is described as the Count of
Olivares, but his exact relationship with the family is not
certain.
structural changes were attempted with Finance and the viceregal government of Portugal. Finance had grown significantly in size in the last years of Philip III, and in October 1621 the intention was proclaimed of reducing it. In November, however, the secretarial appointments nullified one important provision, and at least by the end of 1622 the size of the Council itself had not been reduced. More radically, the viceregal authority in Portugal was abolished and replaced by a troika of Governors.

As the replacements for the dismissed ministers were themselves men who had been trained under Philip III, so too were many of the most important servants of the old King among those most highly honoured by the new — most notably, of course, Zúñiga as first


7 - Don Antonio de Castro, councillor of Orders, B.N. 11011, f. 216v.

1 - See below, pp. 276-281.

2 - An undated copy of the 'Reformación', B.N. 6754, ff. 91-2; details confirmed in slightly truncated form in B.N. 11011, ff. 222v-225, this latter providing the date. On the secretariat, below, p. 280.

3 - i.e., Don Diego de Castro, Count of Vasto; Don Alonso Mesia, Bishop of Coimbra, and Don Alvarino Alvarez Portugal, the Viceroy, the Marquis of Alenquer, returned to Castile, B.N. 11011, f. 217.
minister and later President of Italy, and of the other councillors of
State Infantado and Benavente were accorded major Court offices and
Mejía the delicate task of guarding Osuna. The enquiries into the
depredations of Lerma, Uceda and Osuna were similarly staffed by the
servants of Philip III; indeed, when Lerma heard that he was to be
judged by Carrillo he wrote to Philip IV begging that he should not
be arraigned before so great an enemy — comment sufficient, it may be
thought, on the probity of Philip III’s Administration.

The only radical changes in this period were in the staffing
of the Court, as Philip IV indulged himself in bestowing titles, habits
and sees much as his father had done. Such was inevitable at the
beginning of a reign. For all the sound and fury of the reformers,
therefore, the verdict passed on Philip III’s régime was a lethargic
one, but it was nonetheless a valuable testament to the integrity of
that régime. We may now turn to considering the men who were the
exceptions to the rule.

1 - Infantado, caballerizo mayor; Benavente, mayor domo mayor; Mejía also
became a gentilhombre de la cámara, B.N. 11011, ff. 213–213v, and
Bassompierre (1943), p. 81.
2 - The Court señores reporting this, added that Lerma need fear no
partiality in a man ‘who the world knows to be one of the most
learned Christians and upright judges in Europe’, B.N. 11011, f. 217.
The commission consisted of Carrillo, Lic. Juan Chanacero de
Sotomayor, Lic. Alonso de Cabrera and Dr. Geronimo Caimon, B.N. 2352,
3 - These listed fully by the Court señores, B.N. 11011, ff. 212v-214v, 216v,
217–8, 219–222v.
4 - A number of men returned to Court, and it may be that some at least
of them had been opponents of the Sandoval — the Marquises of
Velada, Villamanrique, del Real, de los Aros, de Alcanizes; Dukes of
Béjar, Cardona; Count of Villamediana; Don Diego de Aragón, B.N. 11011,
ff. 212v and 216v.
4. The Criado.

The most remarkable aspect of Lerma's patronage was that it was so little exercised. Less than a score of professional administrators can be identified as at most owing some advancement in their careers to him, few of them held major offices of state — and then mostly in the first half of the reign — and, Lemos and Aliaga apart, they did not last for very long. Such should not really be surprising, for the equation was quite simple, even if we assume that Lerma wanted to control policymaking — with the royal favour, he hardly needed a faction; without it, one would have been of no use to him. Moreover, even with the royal assent the creation of such a faction would have been a difficult matter, for there were other forces at work within political society apart from his own, most notably the inbuilt conservatism and strength of the political institutions. What Lerma did do was to occasionally take advantage of circumstances, or of certain weaknesses in those institutions, to 'place' his own men, but he did so haphazardly without any abiding interest in systematically controlling any given offices of state, and indeed, insofar as he had any such interest it was in offices ecclesiastical rather than secular. When he placed men in office, it was not to pursue any policies — he did not need them to do that —
much less to speculate on their own account, for by so doing they could undermine his own position. He placed them as a reward for their services to him, services personal rather than political, and rendered chiefly in the days of his penury under Philip II. The most significant fact about his criados proper — that is, excluding his relatives — was their background — Calderón had been his page; Bautista Acevedo, tutor to his children; Aliaga, his confessor; both Ciriza, Íñigo Ibáñez de Santa Cruz and Dr. Juan González Centeno, his secretaries; Tomás de Ángulo, his accountant; Juan Pascual, his financier. Villalonga, too, may be presumed to have belonged to this group, his rapid promotion to the State secretaryship in 1600 being highly suggestive of his having formed intimate contact in the 1590s as Secretary of Aragón for Valencian affairs with the-then Denia, Viceroy of that Kingdom.

Lerma's ability to influence administrative appointments depended on no sanction other than the royal favour. The two documents which are generally presumed to have given some form to that ability

1 - From April 1589, Juderías (1905), pp. 338.
4 - Identified from their rubricas on Lerma's administrative notes; on these notes, below, pp. 304-324.
6 - Sepúlveda (1924), p. 247.
7 - Curiously, no reliable source mentions any close relationship between the two at the beginning of the reign, and the connection is assumed — not unreasonably in view of Villalonga's career; see below, pp. 99-100, 114-121.
had in fact other significances. The cédula of 1612, as has been seen, had its own very peculiar importance in respect of courtly politics, confirming Lerma's position after his crisis of 1611-12. The order sent to the President of Finance in 1605 that henceforth all de parte petitions were to be referred to the Council by the King through a secretary, and that the Council was not to consider any requests not so remitted, had a purely administrative importance. Clearly, since Lerma could influence the King, it had a possible value to him; he could use the power to speed up certain applications and perhaps to withhold or delay others. He had, however, always had that power, and made little use of it in the future, as he had in the past. Further, councils could not take decisions; only when the King signified his assent on a consulta did a conciliar recommendation become a decision, and Lerma could exercise his power rather more conveniently at that juncture than at the beginning of the process. The administrative context was more important than the ducal; the Administration was consistently concerned with the untruths and half-truths told by petitioners, and needed both to vet inappropriate applications and to ensure that all previous awards granted - or refused - an applicant be listed for consideration. Without such a central clearing operation a petitioner could not only falsify his

1 - See above, p.53.
2 - Lerma to Juan de Acuña, 9 Jul. 1605, quoted by Valiente (1963), p.68, n.3, a copy.
past services or past decisions, but could play one council off against another. As recently as 1603, Lerma and the Council of Castile had attempted to reform the procedure and as late as 1618 the Junta de Reformación would still be concerned with it.\(^1\) In any event, it was quite normal for the King to remit material to the councils, and he did so quite punctiliously\(^2\) - government would otherwise have collapsed - and the overwhelming majority of Lerma’s notes to the councils were similarly innocuous.\(^3\)

Those notes could concern a criado in two ways - either in ordering payment of monies to him or in appointing him to an office. In both instances Lerma worked through the councils both because they controlled the purse-strings and because they had legally-defined rights in respect of controlling the appointment of their own personnel. Administrators in hardship or seeking mercedes or ayudas de costa had to apply to their own councils, and Lerma’s only interest in such applications was in occasionally forwarding them to the appropriate body; they would have found their way, if sometimes more slowly, without his involvement. His notes were therefore at once concerned with men of dubious probity but also with men such as Carrillo,\(^4\) and most significantly of all, they were concerned with

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2 - See below, pp. 284-308.
3 - See below, pp. 309-324.
4 - To Pedro de Contreras, 30 Jun. 1611, A.G.S. C.J.H. 366, no fol., authorising payment of 4,000 ducats to Carrillo 'having consideration to his services ... and the need in which he finds himself'.

Lerma himself. When he was legitimately owed money, he approached the councils as did everyone else. ¹ So, too, did his criados and family.

For instance, Calderón in 1614 asked the King for exemption from the duty of lodging troops in la Oliva, and Lerma in forwarding the request to War fully explained his reasons — that it was a small place, its inhabitants were very poor and that Calderón was entitled to exemption for it as he held the countship of the town. ² The significance of the request was less that it was minor than that it was addressed to the council least able of all the major bodies to resist Lerma. ³ All had that power and used it, sometimes to the point of open defiance of both King and Duke, ⁴ but such was Lerma's conservatism that they were rarely thus tested. More typical of routine administration was a council's questioning of an award or its demanding that it be paid from sources other than those insisted upon by Lerma. This latter — the location of available monies — was the real problem and will be considered in various contexts. For present purposes, a small example will suffice; in 1605 Uceda's wife was given a grant of 1,000 ducats so that she could go to Flanders, and when Lerma informed Finance of the award it discreetly replied that 'it appeared convenient' to ask His Majesty to give a proper...

¹— 'Señor, The Duke of Lerma asks Your Majesty to order that the 9,000 maravedís that he has in salary for the alcaldía and tenancy of the palaces of Tordesillas should be situated in some of the royal rents ...', Cnta. Fin., 4 Jul. 1608, A.G.S. C.J.H. 352, no fol. See also a similar request, Cnta. Fin., 16 Mar. 1608, ibid.


³— i.e., because it had no active president; see below, pp. 99-100.

⁴— For examples, below, pp. 101-3, 315-325, etc.
order authorising the award and perhaps also to suggest where the money might come from. Philip ordered that the rents were to be situated in 'crecimientos de rentas' and Finance then replied that the Duchess wanted them in the Portuguese rents but that these were reserved for other purposes; perhaps His Majesty might suggest a further alternative? Philip then gave the Council carte blanche to use whichever source appeared most appropriate to it. It was a small but significant case; Finance could not refuse the award, but it could limit the damage done it by in effect refusing to locate it as either King or Duchess wanted.

The one device within this spectrum which Lerma used with consistent dubiousness was to order councils to pay certain amounts of cash for what he termed 'secret expenses of state' and specifically enjoining that 'no account ever be asked' for the use of the money. It would be surprising if at least some of this money did not find its way into his pockets or those of his criados. The amounts varied from a hundred to several thousand ducats, but when the larger amounts were involved, Lerma clearly felt obliged to give some hint as to purpose - 2,000 ducats were to be paid annually from 1610 for 'a work of very great charity' which would be of divine as well as of royal service. Ordinarily such monies were clearly destined - at least ostensibly - for the support of the spy service, a matter in

which Lerma maintained an especial interest, \(^1\) and it may be of significance that they were normally entrusted to administrators such as Andrés de Prada or Antonio de Arósteguí whose integrity has never been in doubt. Beyond this, it is possible only to speculate as to the nature or level of any peculation by the Duke. He was not given to ignoring such opportunities.

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Lerma had to be even more circumspect in attempting to introduce his criados into administrative offices, for all councils except State and War had formal and effective powers of resistance. They had, in fine, hallowed Ordenanzas defining their legal rights and duties, and presidents with the authority to assert or defend them. The King himself was President of State — and therefore of War — and he appointed its councillors and secretaries and, theoretically, supervised their conduct. The radical growth in State's practical powers under Philip III was not, however, matched by comparable organisational growth, and of its personnel, only the secretarial officials were directly and manifestly responsible to internal discipline. \(^2\)

Conciliar leadership and procedural practice were of absolute importance. The significance of the first may best be expressed by pointing out that Franqueza and Calderón were

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\(^1\) See below, pp. 309–311

\(^2\) Excluding, that is, the porters, who were shared with War and, after 1607, the contadores de mercedes, both minor offices; on the latter, below, pp. 100
secretaries of State, which had no purse-strings to tempt them, and not of, for instance, Finance, which had. To appoint such men to the State offices, Lerma had only to give them control of the papers. There was no president to argue against their appointments, nor were there statutes demanding any particular requirements of a secretary of State. Even so, he was characteristically cautious; Franqueza exercised the office for a year before being formally appointed, and Calderón never was so appointed. Both, moreover, were balanced by their co-secretary Prada, junior to Franqueza but senior to Calderón.

These structural differences between State and War and the other councils may be further evidenced by considering the manner in which Lerma succeeded in placing three men as contadores de mercedes in the offices of State (1607-1614) and of Finance (1612). With State, he had merely to write to the secretary of the Council informing him that the two individuals had been appointed, and the matter was effectively at an end. 3

The 1612 case became something of a classic. In the event, Lerma was again successful, but the case was yet the exception that proved all the rules. The legal point at issue was the right of

1 - State secretaries did of course have financial rewards attaching to their office, and these were not inconsiderable; see below, pp. 190-194.

2 - Franqueza's appointment recorded by Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 62, entry of 4 Mar. 1600, and my first record of his acting as secretary, 24 Mar. 1600. His title of royal secretary, however, was dated 10 Jul. 1601, A.G.S. Q.C. 36; this preface conciliar appointment, but no formal appointment is recorded. Not even that much exists for Calderón. Formal titles do exist for all other secretaries of State.

3 - Appointment of Juan de Ceballos as contador for Aragonese
Tristán de Ciriza to sell his office to whomsoever he chose by virtue of a royal licence granted in 1611.¹ When in November 1612 his purchaser presented the title for which he had paid 15,000 ducats, Finance summarily refused to admit him and curtly brushed Lerma's objections aside; the licence specifically allowed it a veto on any unsuitable candidate, and it exercised that right. For good measure, it threw uninhibited — and well-documented — accusations at the King himself of illegality, lack of judgement and plain dereliction of duty. But Philip held firm and refused to cancel the sale.²

The uniqueness of the case was that all three principals were found in quite extraordinary postures—Lerma, locked in combat with Finance over such an office in support of a criado³; Philip, breaking his own virtually hard and fast rule about not allowing the sale or renunciation of administrative offices⁴; Carrillo, losing.⁵ There was, however, far more at stake in November 1612 than the control of a single office, and the stances adopted by Lerma and Philip are explicable only in the context of the former's crisis at that time; he fought Carrillo because he had to fight Uceda, and Philip supported

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³ - On his deference to the councils, below, pp. 102-3, 315-325.
⁴ - On this, below, pp. 245-7.
⁵ - See, for example, below, pp. 102-3, 315-325, 340-9.
him because he wanted to retain him. Carrillo himself was easily able to deal with Philip or Lerma or his criados in cases where the ducal prestige was not involved, and was, indeed, currently administering a massive defeat to the combined forces of Philip, Lerma and the Council of Castile over an office worth nearly twelve times as much as Ciriza's. It took him two years to May 1613 to achieve that victory, but he had to concern himself then only with matters of good government, regal and ducal prestige, but not with ducal survival. 2

In the last resort, therefore, Lerma could defeat the most outstanding of presidents on his own ground. More characteristic of his relationship with Carrillo, however, was a note of 1615 - 'On other occasions I have asked (you) to grant the merced to Gaspar Rodríguez of the office of receptor of the Council of Finance, and I now return to ask again ...'. Rodríguez may well have been quite as worthy as Lerma claimed; Carrillo did not appoint him. 4 This deference was typical. When Uceda sought a humble contaduría post for a criado, Lerma in asking Carrillo to appoint him, duly recorded that he 'would receive this as a very great favour'. 5 On another occasion,

1 - See above, p. 53.  
2 - See below, pp. 340-349.  
4 - No record survives in either the A.G.S. Q.C. or A.H.N. Cons.L. de P. series, and I have found no record of him in the Council's papers.  
5 - The criado was Bartolome de Arteaga. Lerma to Carrillo, 15 Oct. 1611, A.G.S. C.J.H. 366, no fol.
Lerma expressed himself even more definitively; when Carrillo refused to dismiss an incumbent in favour of Miguel Zapata, a criado recommended by Lerma, and instead appointed him only to a post for which he thought him qualified, Lerma explained himself fully—'I kiss the hands of Your Excellency for the favour done me in this, but that which I have always asked for my recommendees ('encomendados') is that they should be placed reasonably... and if they cannot be placed justly, I would not want them given any position... and especially so when it might be at the expense of someone else'.

Not every president, of course, was a Carrillo, but each had the authority to resist the encroachments of Lerma or his criados. To control a council other than State or War, therefore, Lerma would have to control the presidency, and especially so since within the councils themselves presidential power could be virtually absolute. This he patently did not do. Miranda on Castile and Borja on Portugal may conceivably have been appointed to further his ends but, as has been remarked, there are no indications that either did so. Fernando Acevedo, despite his dismissal in 1621 and his kinship with the notorious Dr. Juan Bautista Acevedo, should probably also be thus

1 - Same to same, 2 Feb. 1611, ibid. The position was in the administration of the ports of Valencia. For similar examples, Lerma to Acuña, 23 Sept. 1608, asking him to favour Nicolás de Durango, A.G.S. C.J.H. 353, no fol., or Uceda to Carrillo, asking for a post for Francisco de Santa Cruz, A.G.S. C.J.H. 395, no fol.
2 - See below, pp. 235-25, 340-4
3 - See above, pp. 22-23, and on their councillorships of State, below, respectively, pp. 240; 258-7, 242-3.
characterised. His promotion to the presidency of Castile in 1616 was certainly unduly rapid, but he appears to have exercised his charge independently enough. The best-informed of commentators in 1621 thought him a worthy man of many admirable qualities, and his career would appear to confirm this judgement. One of the judges of Villalonga in 1608, he had had to be ordered to accept the presidency, and exercised it with a marked integrity; he led the Junta de Reformación — and was therefore, among other things, chiefly responsible for the famous consulta of February 1619 — and led vigorously, too, the opposition in 1619 to the Portuguese journey, remonstrating personally with King Uceda and Aliaga about the deleterious consequences of the excursion to good government. When he was replaced in 1621, it was with full honours that he left Court.

The differing significances vis-à-vis Lerma of the presidential careers of Toledo and Poza require no restatement.

Of the major councils, Finance had the most distinguished succession of presidents, all of them after the effective dismissal of Poza in

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1 - See Appendix II, no. 180. It may well be that the proximity of his celebrating the marriages of 1615 and his appointment to Castile (15 Feb. 1616, A.G.S. Q.C.14) was not accidental.

2 - i.e., the Court seño,r, B.N. 11011, f. 223v. 3 - See above, p. 72, n. 3.

4 - Documents printed by González Dávila (1623), p. 395.

5 - The documents of the Junta published by González Palencia (1932).

6 - See León Pinalo (1931), pp. 129 and 381-6.

7 - He was given a councillorship of State, 6,000 ducats of rent and two titles in Italy, two habits and the promise of the first vacant Santiago encomienda, B.N. 11011, f. 223.

8 - On Toledo, above, pp. 23-4, 26-7, 79, n. 3; on Poza, pp. 31-4.
1602 men of quite unimpeachable integrity. Both presidents of Orders after 1599 - Juan de Idiáquez and the Marquis of Caracena - have remained free of any taint of being identified with Lerma, and if we absolve Miranda, inherited from Philip II as President of Italy, only Lemos of the presidents of Italy and Indies has not remained free of such taint. We are left, therefore, only with Lemos and Bautista Acevedo as men who may reasonably be described as criados placed in presidential office by Lerma, and even Lemos showed commendable independence on at least one occasion. Both held two presidencies, but of their four appointments, only Lemos's to Indies in 1603 was unequivocal; on his return from Naples with Lerma's widowed sister, the incumbent was dismissed and he was appointed. Lemos was, however, a dilettante; already by 1606 it was rumoured that he would be returning to Naples. He left Indies for Naples in 1609, and although it was rumoured in 1613 that he was to be appointed to the presidency of Castile, he was instead appointed to the far less important Italy,
and did not bother for most of his presidency to actually attend the Council.\(^1\) Bautista's scandalous appointment to Inquisition in 1603 in all probability only followed Toledo's refusal of the post,\(^2\) and when in 1608 he was promoted to the Castile post, it was only after Miranda had insisted on retiring, and with indeed only three months to live himself.\(^3\)

As therefore with secretaries Franqueza and Calderón, so with the presidencies, Lerma was chiefly concerned to take advantage of circumstances and of structural weaknesses in order to place his criados; no one could gainsay a presidential appointment. There doubtless was a point beyond which Lerma could not have gone in respect of appointing a whole series of men of Bautista's stamp to presidential office, but he was both too wise and too lethargic to find out where it was. Unless we understand that Bautista was exceptional — and that Acuña, Carrillo, Idiáquez, the Constable, Niño de Guevara, Toledo, Salazar and their like were typical — the reign becomes incomprehensible. These, the most important positions of state, went ordinarily to the most appropriate candidates. That was the rule; the rider may then be added that occasionally Lerma influenced

\(^1\) Appointment to Italy, *ibid.*, p. 509; on absenteeism, below, p. 225.
\(^2\) See above, p. 79, n. 3.
\(^3\) See above, p. 78.
an appointment to the advantage of an associate. ¹

The same rule applied with councillorships. ² In the first instance, there was little point in Lerma's attempting to 'pack' a council in order to influence its policy, despite the accusations traditionally levelled against him to that effect. Conciliar decisions were not reached after a vote. Again, structural differences between State and War and the presidential councils were fundamental. Largely because they had no president, but also because of the highly individualistic character of their councillors, State and War often recorded individual pareceres in their consultas. The King therefore often had available to him the views of each councillor and could – if he chose – base his decisions on purely personal considerations. In practice, however, the possibility of that happening arose only rarely, since only in the most exceptional circumstances did all councillors actually record properly distinct pareceres. What happened, in effect, was that the first two or three speakers outlined their reactions to a problem and the others voted en bloc signifying their assent or dissent. Seniority of speaking carried great prestige, and was gauged strictly by date of appointment to the council; thus, for instance, Moura who had not sat at all since 1600 immediately took over the leadership of State on his return in 1612 while Lerma himself did not qualify to lead the Council until 1616.

¹ On appointments to presidencies, below, pp. 124-5
² On appointments to councillorships, below, pp. 207-21, 216-217, 247-250
What was important in practice, both to fellow-councillors and to King, was the quality of a man's parecer, and fundamental to the judgement both made of that was the quality and length of the experience that informed it. Of course, Lerma himself was the exception to the rule, in that when he sat on State both councillors and King paid particular attention to his views, but the very fact of his attendance was testament to the importance of State, and the fact that he never stepped outside the mainstream of conciliar thought testament to the prestige of the Council and of his own conservatism. But he was, and absolutely, the only exception to the rule.¹

On presidential Finance, procedural practice was even more important. The president appointed councillors and convened meetings with an authority that made the Council a reflection of his own personality. The president was the Council — indeed, Finance often expressed itself in the presidential first person. The same order of precedence was observed as with State and War, but only in the very rarest of circumstances — perhaps a dozen or two times in the reign — did the consultas of the Council even record individual pareceres.²

Very few of Lerma's criados, therefore, were appointed to councillorships,³ and only Aliaga and Pascual came from that group.

¹ On the councillors of State, below, pp.377-381 and on Lerma, pp.375-381
² See below, pp.203-206
³ Of the councillors of State sitting from 1600, only Poza, Borja, Toledo, Miranda, Infantado VI, La Laguna and Aliaga have ever been connected, however vaguely or often erroneously, by either contemporaries or modern historians with Lerma; of those of War, only San German has been similarly suspected. Of the 134 men who
emanating from within his own household. Lerma advanced both careers with his usual conservatism. Pascual was tolerably well-qualified for a councillorship of Finance but was, significantly enough, appointed during the Poza presidency. Although he continued to sit under Acuña in 1603–4, he was effectively finished as a political force by 1602, and achieved his notorious eminence not as a councillor of Finance but as a member of a junta not subject to direct conciliar control. Aliaga's promotions were orthodox to the point of ordinariness. In the first six years of his royal confessorship he achieved the administrative importance customarily afforded the guardian of the royal conscience, but again, only in an extra-conciliar capacity as a member of various juntas. Not until 1614 was he

sat on Finance, Castile, Indies and Orders four were dismissed during the reign for malfeasance - Ramírez de Prado, García de Medrano, Bonal and Tapia - and Pascual of Finance was saved from dismissal only by his death. It appears that Ocontrillo and Agustín Álvarez de Toledo of Indies owed their advancement to Lerma. None of those identified as having sat on Italy, Aragón and Navarre have ever been connected, and of Portugal's councillors, only Borja, his son and Álvarez Pereira have ever been accused of such a connection with Lerma or of corruption. Inquisition was, however, significantly undermined; see generally, below, pp. 125–8.

1 - See below, p. 266, n. 1.
2 - See below, p. 115.
3 - His first entrée into major affairs of state came at the end of 1612 when he was given control of the papers held by previous royal confessors; he had already been confessor for four years and could have reasonably expected to have been given those papers much earlier. Lerma to Pedro de Contreras, 15 Dec. 1612, A.G.S. C.J.H. 356, no fol.
appointed to his first councillorship of Inquisition, not until 1615 was he promoted to State itself, and not until after Lerma had fallen was he appointed to a conciliar presidency. He probably had little, therefore, for which to thank Lerma beyond the favour of his original appointment as confessor in 1608, and even that may have been one of merit - Cabrera had welcomed him as 'a man of great virtue and scholarship'. The only extraordinary favour he received thereafter from Lerma was that in 1614 he was appointed supernumerary councillor of Inquisition with precedence over all his colleagues. It was the only occasion in the reign when such an award was made, and Aliaga was therefore the only man specifically exempted from the normal conciliar structural discipline. But although this was clearly a personal favour, the true significance of the award lay in the proviso added - that whenever in the future the royal confessor was a Dominican he was to succeed to the post, and when he was not it was to be given to a member of the Order. In a very substantial sense, therefore, the award was less testament to Lerma's zeal for advancing Aliaga than to that for indulging his beloved Dominicans.

Not until the last three years of the reign did Aliaga conduct himself in a manner that drew him to the attention of

2 - ibid., p. 560. The position was abolished in 1621 (above, p. 87, n. 4) after Inquisition had described it as 'so prejudicial and so contrary to the reputation of this Council ... of the very greatest detriment ...', Cnta. Inq., 24 Sept. 1621, B.M. Eg. 345, f. 42.
contemporaries. He then set about with something of a vengeance to correct that state of affairs, and over those years earned for himself a notoriety matched perhaps only by Lerma himself and Calderón. The more scurrilous stories about him were duly recorded, anonymously, in 1621 and his character analysed with some lack of charity; the royal confessor and Inquisitor General was a friend of astrologers, none too diligent about saying Mass, accustomed to living in the ostentatious style of a secular prince, crude in his eating habits, lewd in his conversation — withal, 'little decency and less religion'. ¹ All this may well have been true, and even relevant to his political activities in his later years, but it should not inform our picture of the man advanced by Lerma. Aliaga was his own man, and at least until he achieved his own power-base as Inquisitor General in 1619 he was in no way an exceptional figure — saving, perhaps, that uniquely among Lerma's criados he was able to wean himself from his master. ²

Without an award such as that made to Aliaga in 1614, there was little point in advancing a criado to a councillorship in order to pursue a political objective, although since councillors of Castile were automatically judges there could be some profit for Lerma or a criado in his influencing an appointment to that Council.

¹ 'Sobre las partes de Frai Luis de Aliaga, confesor del Rey Felipe III', B.N. 2348, ff. 59-66.
² On Aliaga's councillorship of State, below, pp. 244, 244-6
There was, however, point in accelerating a man's progress to a junior councillorship as reward in itself, and it may well be that Lerma did so in favour of a small group of men who were never expressly connected with him by any contemporary commentator, but who shared a rapidity of promotion at the beginning of the reign with, in each case, a reputation of some dubiety — Lic. Juan de Ocontrillo of Indies and Castile; Lic. Agustín Álvarez de Toledo of Indies; Pedro de Tapia of Castile, and Dr. Antonio Bonal of Castile and Finance. All had had respectable careers under Philip II and all, with the possible exception of Bonal for whom no title of appointment to Castile has survived,¹ achieved suspiciously rapid promotions at the beginning of the reign.² None, however, became major figures.³

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1 - See Appendix II, nos. 218, 261, 230 and 117.
2 - This was in itself of course suspicious in view of the promotions of Franquezap Pascual and Ramírez de Prado; see above, pp. 33, n. 1 and 100, n. 2.
3 - Bonal and Tapia were dismissed in 1621; see above, p. 85. Neither was thought important enough to justify the instigation of judicial proceedings. On Bonal's councillorship of Finance, below, pp. 274 and 279. On Tapia's arrogance at the beginning of the reign, see an untitled memorandum of Francisco González de Heredia 'against the pretensions of Lic. Pedro de Tapia' in which he rebutted Tapia's claims to precedence over him; undated, a second memorandum dated 14 Oct. 1599, B.N. 12179, ff. 8–9. González won his case; see the verdict, B.N. 11319/31, undated. On Álvarez de Toledo and Ocontrillo, see Schäfer, i, pp. 249–250, 180; and 194–5 respectively.
There was, however, a second dimension to the distortion of normal promotion, and it allowed Lerma his one consistent breach into the decision-making process for his criados — he could take business away from the councils and invest it in junta, but even here he was subjected to the restraints imposed both by institutional strength and his own conservatism.

The junta, whether formal or occasional, occupied a peculiarly important administrative niche. Fully autonomous, the councils of Philip III became more and not less jealous of their jurisdictional rights, and they did so despite — partly, indeed, because of — the continuing increase in the volume of government business; finding it increasingly difficult to cope with their own business they yet insisted that they would yield none of it. The junta was therefore necessary — and increasingly so — as an agent of delegation, taking some of the weight off the councils and serving, often only theoretically so, as a medium of compromise between warring councils.

Lerma's interest in the junta was simple; he could influence it — its convocation, composition and agenda — far more readily than he could a council. There were, however, as always, major limitations both as to ambition and ability. We have already seen, for instance, how he was able to take advantage of the weakness of Poza's Finance to raise the Junta de Hacienda to a position of major importance at the

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1 For a fuller discussion of the junta, below, pp. 321-3
On conciliar powers and rivalry, below, pp. 327-350
beginning of the reign, but that the Junta then declined in the face of a reformed and properly-led Council. 1 The status of the Junta was therefore directly related to the prestige of the Council itself, and the cycle repeated itself exactly as the prestige of the Council sank again following the financial disasters of 1606-7. Philip spent much of 1606, as he had 1601, playing with the idea of establishing a paraconciliar junta to deal with all consultas on the pattern of the old Junta de Noche, and he did so under the very obvious influence of Lerma - in January, the membership was to have been composed of Acuña, President of Finance; Cardinal Javierre, royal confessor and councillor of State; Ramírez de Prado and Franquez, now Count of Villalonga. 2 By July the prospective members were to be Cardinals Toledo and Javierre, Miranda, Borja and Villalonga, 3 and by September, Miranda, Idiáquez and Acuña - all of them presidents - Javierre, Ramírez de Prado and Villalonga. 4 Lerma, therefore, was clearly determined to place criados on the Junta, but was sufficiently sensitive of the administrative niceties to balance them with independent and properly professional administrators.

Elsewhere, he was similarly cautious. The informal junta, established to meet an occasional or immediate need and with its

1 - See above, pp. 31-2. 2 - Sabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 269. 3 - ibid., p. 283. 4 - ibid., p. 287. These in fact did sit regularly on the Junta; see, for instance, its consultas of 3 Oct. 16 and 22 Nov. 1606, A.G.S. C.J.H. 345, no fol., ff. 241, 227.
membership appointed on and for the moment represented the easiest prey of all. It comes as no surprise, for instance, to find Franqueza and Ramírez de Prado sitting in 1603 on a junta dealing with troop supplies for Flanders; or Ramírez in 1602 considering some arbitrios; or Pascual and Poza in 1600 dealing with supplies for Guipúzcoa; or La Oliva in 1613-14 concerning himself with a variety of matters ranging from the reform of the army and administration of the royal patrimony in Flanders to the allocation of minor mercedes.

So, too, Lerma himself appeared occasionally; in 1601, for instance, with Franqueza on a junta considering minor military appointments.

Even with such occasional juntas as these, however, Lerma was abidingly cautious, going to almost mathematical lengths to ensure a balance with the professional administrator; Ramírez and Franqueza in 1603 were thus balanced by Idiáquez and Esteban de Ibarra, Pascual and Poza in 1600 by Ibarra again, La Oliva in 1613-14 by Idiáquez, and Lerma himself and Franqueza in 1601 by Idiáquez and Esteban de Ibarra.

The more formal juntas, tied to one or more councils and governed by its own ordenanza or cédula, presented greater
difficulties, but again Lerma kept the rules as he understood them. War's de Fábricas may serve as an example. In 1603 it was established to supervise virtually all matters naval, and was ordered to meet at least three times weekly and allowed precedence over all councils and tribunals 'without any exception'. Among its founder-members were FranquezavRamírez de Prado and Álvarez Pereira, but balance was supplied by Idiáquez, Acuña, Acuña Vela and Esteban de Ibarra.¹

Although Lerma's criados were appreciably advanced by him in respect of junta membership, two major limitations emerge in that he generally took advantage of circumstances - and rarely created them - and fastidiously balanced the criado with the professional administrator. Two more complete the definition; most of the important criados were secretaries, and few survived into the second decade of the reign.

The less formalised junta could have two justifications, being established either as a sub-committee of a particular council on the recommendation of the council itself or on direct royal order to consider a particular problem, or as a special body concerned with an urgent or critical matter. The membership of the former would almost invariably be limited to the personnel of the council concerned while that of the latter would be drawn from several. One factor, however, was common to both in the attendance as full voting members of conciliar secretaries. The secretary was a far more substantial figure than he has tended to appear of late. He was

certainly no Gonzalo Pérez — the times were too sophisticated for that — but he was still a major figure of state, and an Andrés de Prada, an Antonio de Arostegui or a Cristóbal de Ipeñarrieta could exercise considerable influence on the policymaking process. But so, too, could a Franqueza, a Calderón or an Ángulo. As Secretary of State itself, Franqueza was a clerk — if a well-paid one¹ — writing up the consultas and passing them back and forth between King and Council, and dealing with despatches, but as a member of a junta he could consider the great affairs of state and could legitimately and fully make his voice heard — on the organisation of the Army of Flanders,² on the future of the Moriscos of Valencia,³ on the provisioning of the empresa de Irlanda.⁴

By ubiquitously thus appearing on a plethora of occasional bodies in addition to doing his regular work as Secretary of State and as a member of formal juntas, Franqueza at once gave the world a false impression of greatness and, ultimately, ensured his own fall. When contemporaries spoke of the great power of the non-presidential criado — that is, chiefly of Franqueza and Calderón — it was to the extra-conciliar rôle that they were referring. The reins of power could often be drawn together and concentrated in such a junta, although the Junta de Hacienda was, as will be seen, the last

¹ On secretarial salaries and fees, below, pp. 190–194.
² Cnta. untitled junta (Idiáquez, Lema, Miranda, Córdoba and Franqueza) established as a result of a consulta of a State junta, 9 Sept. 1602, A.G.S. E. 2023, f. 82.
³ Cnta. untitled junta (Idiáquez, Córdoba, Franqueza and Esteban de Ibarra, 21 Sept. 1603, ibid., no fol.
⁴ Cnta. untitled junta (Velada, Idiáquez, Córdoba, Franqueza and Esteban de Ibarra) 9 Mar. 1603, A.G.S. E. 2511, no fol.
great junta on which at least one important and corrupt criado was a major figure. ¹ Lerma did continue after c.1608 to put business in the way of his followers in this manner, but Calderón's fall in 1611 was the final drama in an era which had effectively ended with the arrest of Villalonga. Government was too serious to be left to such men; the lesson had finally been learned. ²

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The criado was not the simple creature sometimes imagined and certain qualifications may properly be demanded of him — that he be an intimate of Lerma's raised by him to major administrative office for which he was more or less inadequately qualified; exercising his office corruptly; dependent upon Lerma for his survival in office, and rewarded, often lavishly, by him. In fine, the criado proper was a courtier superimposed upon the Administration. Only Calderón met all the requirements, although Bautista Acevedo and Villalonga should probably be characterised as nearly perfect examples of the species.

Alone of these men, Villalonga had had some solid administrative experience prior to his initial advancement by Lerma — some thirty five years or so in the offices of Aragón and Inquisition. ³

Bautista had merely 'visited' the Zaragoza archbishopric and

¹ - On juntas, see also below, pp. 331-333.
² - See also below, p. 123.
³ - B.M. Eg. 2060, ff.1-6 and Juderias (1908), pp. 314-6 and Appendix 11, no. 44.
achieved the dubious chaplaincy of the Court's House of Correction for Fallen Women under Philip II, while Calderón had had no administrative experience of any kind. All three were marked out for advancement at the beginning of the reign, Villalonga and Calderón achieving it during the 1599 journey, respectively as Secretary of the Cortes of Aragón and as ayuda de cámara to the King. Bautista was offered a canonry in Toledo and the bishopric of Tortosa, but refused both and had to wait until 1601 for the see of Valladolid. Villalonga and Bautista then progressed rapidly, respectively to the Italian secretaryship of State in 1600 and to the Inquisitorship General in 1603, but Calderón continued as a courtier until effectively assuming the junior secretaryship of State in 1607.

Of the three, Villalonga, the erstwhile administrator, was the least successful. Bautista as an ecclesiastic ran a different course from the two secretaries, but ran it well; the Valladolid post and the Patriarchate of the Indies (1605) were their own rewards, each more lucrative than either of his presidencies. For good measure, when in

1 - González Dávila (1623), p. 383.
2 - He is often referred to as having been made secretary of Castile in 1599, a mistake emanating from confusion of the two uses of the word cámara; see below, n. 4.
5 - González Dávila (1623), p. 383.
6 - See above, p. 100, n. 2.
7 - González Dávila (1623), p. 384.
8 - No title exists for the appointment (above, p. 100, n. 2).
1607 he was obliged to renounce Valladolid, he was given some 12,000 ducats of rent in compensation — a rather apposite example, indeed, of the balance struck between Philip's insistence on episcopal residence and Lerma's on protecting the interests of a criado.

The difference between the favours granted Villalonga and Calderón is instructive. Where the then Franqueza married the daughter of a regidor of Alcalá, Calderón won the señora of la Oliva; where Franqueza was raised only to a countship, Calderón won a marquisate; where Villalonga was abandoned by Lerma in 1607, Calderón was lavishly protected by him in 1611-12. Both were given military habits for themselves and their families, but Calderón's were the more irregular grants — among them, a habit for an infant son and the comendadoría mayor de Aragón for the father he disowned. At Court, too, he could more than match Villalonga's dubious secretaryship to the

1 — Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 310; see also, ibid., p. 272.
2 — See above, p. 21, n. 2.
3 — Franqueza; doña Ana Gravial, López de Haro (1622), i, 408. Calderón; doña Ines de Vargas, B.N. 11011, f. 226.
4 — Franqueza, Count of Villalonga; Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 188. Calderón, Marquis of Siete Iglesias, ibid., p. 558. At the same time his son was made Count of la Oliva, ibid.
5 — Franqueza, ibid., p. 294; Calderón, ibid., pp. 456-7, 459, 462-3, 473, 488 and above, p. 52. I have retained the use of Calderón's surname rather than use his title on grounds of general usage; Franqueza has been traditionally known by name or by title.
6 — On habits of Calderón's sons, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 267, López de Haro (1622), i, 419 and Juderías (1905), p. 352; these were, one in Alcántara in 1605 for a son not yet two, one in 1606 for Juan in Calatrava; in 1607 the priorate of S. Juan for Miguel. On his father, also comendador mayor de Montalbán (Santiago), López de Haro, ibid. On disavowal of father, below, p. 121, n. 5. Calderón was comendador of Ocana (Santiago), and Franqueza comendador of Silla (S. Juan?), Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 456-7, 459, 402.
Queen with his own captaincy of the German Guard and his father's lieutenancy of the Spanish. 1 Villalonga held only one municipal office - that of alcalde mayor de sacas y cosas vedadas of the city and district of Murcia, worth probably less than 1,000 ducats a year 2 - while Calderón had, in addition to his many Valladolid offices, 3 two voting regimientos and an escribanía in Plasencia, and regimientos in Soria and Nava. He had, too, a seat in perpetuity in the Madrid town hall and its casa de la comedia, was an unlikely patron of the royal chapel in Madrid and of the Portaceli monastery, and had two lucrative concessions on the East Indies and Brazilian trades. 4

The disparity - reflected even in the circumstances of their births 5 - had a fine symbolism; these men stood for the two levels of protected corruption - Villalonga, the bureaucrat adopted as it were by Lerma and advanced by him, but left largely to speculate on his own account, and Calderón the court favourite - as might be said, Lerma's Lerma - grafted on to the Administration and having his fortune presented to him through the misindulgence of the royal grace. They

3 See above, p. 48. 4 - B.N. 11011, ff. 219 and 230 v - 231.
5 Villalonga was the son of an Inquisition familiar, Juderías (1908), p. 312; Calderon was the son of a soldier serving in Flanders and was conceived if not born out of wedlock, Juderías (1905), p. 337 and López de Haro (1622), i, 419. On Calderón's 'proving' in 1612 that he was really the son of the great Alva, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 497. Bautista Acevedo was also of dubious enough birth to have to hazard a limpieza test, González Dávila (1623), p. 483.
were of course extreme examples, but the other criados of Lerma and his son divided between these two types - Angulo, Aliaga and the Ciriza, professional administrators; Ibañez de Santa Cruz, González Centeno, la Oliva, Andrés de Velazquez, Juan Vázquez de Salazar and Bernabé de Bibanco, courtiers.

The first group certainly owed their initial advancement to Lerma, but all four men were left thereafter to their own devices and worked as professional administrators, achieving promotions appropriate to their positions. Indeed, only Angulo received any spectacular single promotion; an insignificant Secretary of Crusade could not normally hope for promotion to a junior secretaryship (de Justicia) of Castile, especially after only a year in office, but appointed to Castile in 1605, he stayed there for the rest of the reign. 1 Juan de Ciriza's career was in itself unexceptional, 2 and those of his brother Tristan and of Aliaga were distinguished in terms of promotions only by the extraordinary favours of 1612 and 1614, and in both cases the identity of the criado was, as has been suggested, incidental to wider issues. 3 Broadly, however, these men had one thing in common as against Villalonga and Calderón - second generation criados, they achieved their eminence in or soon after 1608, and,

1 - Royal secretary, 6 Dec. 1604, A.G.S. Q.C. 40; Secretary of Crusade, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), entry 27 Nov. 1604, p. 239; Castile Secretary de Justicia, 19 Sept. 1605 and de Camara y Estado, 19 Nov. 1608, A.G.S. Q.C. 40.
2 - He had, for instance, seven years secretarial experience prior to his appointment to the State office; see Appendix II, no. 43, p. 41.3
3 - On Tristan de Ciriza, above, pp. 52-3 and 100-102; on Aliaga, above, p. 110.
Tristan apart—who died in 1614—they survived until the end of
the reign. Only Aliaga, and then only after Lerma's fall, achieved
either major administrative position or personal notoriety on the
scale of Villalonga, Calderón or Bautista Acevedo. The second
generation was much more modest than the first—as Philip IV
recognised by executing Calderón but by merely rebuking Juan de
Ciriza and Angulo. Aliaga was of course again the exception to the
rule.  

These men came from within the Lerma household and shared
with Calderón and Bautista Acevedo and the majority of the second
group this common origin and, Aliaga again excepted, the manner of
their introduction into los papeles as personal secretaries to Lerma,
writing the notes he was too lazy to write for himself—Ibañez de
Santa Cruz, González Centeno, la Oliva, Bibanco and Vázquez de Salazar
were all originally thus engaged, the latter two with Uceda. This
second group achieved no great conciliar eminence—Ibañez, González
and Bibanco were royal secretaries, but only Bibanco progressed to a
conciliar post, although Vázquez was allowed to buy the Indies
receptoría.  

Broadly, therefore, the Sandoval criado was a domestic servant
or personal aide casually introduced into administrative office, and

1—Angulo and Juan de Ciriza both held important positions prior to
1608, but Angulo was promoted in that year to the senior Castile
post (above, p. 122, n. 1) and Ciriza was only one of four secretaries
of Indies, was not promoted to War until 1610 and State until 1612.
2—See above, pp. 85–6.
3—Identified from their handwriting and rubricas; on these notes,
below, pp. 309–324.
4—See below, pp. 211–212, 349.
generally indeed into minor office. There was no system here justifying the usage of the vocabulary of 'faction'; it was all too haphazard. Nor were they introduced to use their offices for their own and their patrons' gain – the worst service a man could render his patron was to be found dishonest. Fascination with the rise of these men should not obscure the simple relevance of their decline. The more successful a man became so the more insecure he became, for the point inevitably arose with a Villalonga or a Calderón where the scandal he caused jeopardised the royal greatness and the prestige of the monarchy itself; then he had to go. The King loved Lerma, and Lerma, of all his criados, loved Calderón, but Calderón fell from power – that was arguably the most significant event of the reign. This was a society that needed scapegoats, and if found them almost regularly. The final qualification of the criado was that he be expendable.

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The Offices.

The offices held by these men reflected Lerma's own caution and limited interests; criados were appointed to the secretaryships of State, presidencies and to extra-conciliar juntas precisely because it was so easy to appoint them. Beyond this we find a concentration in the royal secretaryship, the Council of Castile and in the offices of the Church and the Council of Inquisition.

The royal secretaryship had its own very obvious significance, and was indeed the only office systematically undermined throughout the reign, all of its holders apart from Tristan de Ciriza - who died prematurely - being dismissed (Ibañez de Santa Cruz, Bibanco and González Centeno), a fate shared with at least one Queen's secretary in Villalonga.

Castile variously incorporated Bautista Acevedo (and Miranda and Fernando Acevedo) in the presidency; Ramírez de Prado, Bonal, Ocontrillo and Gil Ramírez de Arellano as councillors; Angulo as Secretary and Tapia and Ocontrillo as fiscales. With State, Castile was the most prestigious of the councils being both the supreme judicial body and, with Inquisition, the chief dispenser of patronage secular and ecclesiastical. The significance of such appointments need hardly 1.

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1 - There is no extant record of any connection with Lerma, but, unusually for an administrator, he turned up fairly regularly in Court ceremonies; suspicion therefore may attach to him. For career details, Appendix II, no. 126, p. 442.
be stressed. Castile's councillors, moreover, were as judges required to sit *ex-officio* on certain other councils to legitimise their judicial activities - two sat as *de tarde* councillors of Finance, \(^1\) one each on Inquisition and Crusade as *comisarios*, and one on War as *asesor* when after 1604 that Council assumed some modest judicial function. \(^2\) Thus, for instance, Ramírez de Prado and Bonal sat on Finance, and Tapia and Ocontrillo on Inquisition.

Again, however, there were significant limitations. It will be observed that the councillors of Castile were all appointed in the first years of the reign, mostly indeed in 1599 - the nearest Lerma came to 'packing' a Council - but that they were all from that group connected with him only by implication. That they were corrupt, and significantly so, is proven only in the case of Ramírez de Prado. He, moreover, was the only one of these men to achieve exceptionally rapid promotion to the Cámara, the Council's supreme organ. In practice, that distinction went with seniority, and only two exceptions appear to have been made to the rule, in the highly pertinent cases of Ramírez himself and Carrillo. \(^3\) Of the others, only Ocontrillo (c.1611) and Ramírez de Arellano (1614) were promoted to the Cámara. Castile was much troubled during Philip III's reign, but Ramírez de Prado was in effect -

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1 - See below, pp. 262.
2 - See below, pp. 4-28
3 - No title of appointment survives for Ramírez, but he is found witnessing cédulas (as councillor) between 1600-06. Carrillo was appointed supernumerary councillor on 14 Feb. 1600 but left at once for Flanders, and since he was appointed to the Cámara immediately on his return (8 Jan. 1603) he effectively took up both simultaneously. A.G.S. Q.C.14.
Bautista Acevedo and his three months' presidency apart - the only major criado to hold significant office.

Inquisition, however, was undermined in remarkable fashion. It had Bautista Acevedo as President for five years and Aliaga for half that time; it had Aliaga's 1614 councillorship, together with Tapia, Ocontrillo and Lic. Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa, criado of Calderón, as councillors; Villalonga, Bibanco and Tristan de Ciriza as unlikely secretaries. These appointments, however, should be seen against a more general background, for favouritism and nepotism flourished with the Suprema as with no other major council. Philip II had set the tone in June 1598 by appointing Lic. Alonso Marques de Prado as councillor merely for his services as the Duke of Feria's assistant in Catalonia. His son followed suit; Fernando Acevedo may well have deserved his fiscalía, and later his councillorship, but he was appointed during his brother's presidency, and an uncle of Lemos and a son of Benavente both found councillorships for which they were disqualified, respectively, by their youth and illegitimacy.

Crusade, although far less important than Inquisition, was subjected to similar treatment. Paniagua de Loaysa, for instance,

presided briefly over it in 1612, and it suffered Ángulo as a secretary and Lic. Alonso Ramírez de Prado, son of the councillor of Castile, as fiscal until his dismissal in 1609. It was, moreover, the only council with which Philip allowed the sale of a councillorship.

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To establish that Lerma and his criados were less important administratively than is generally assumed is not of course to establish that they were not important, nor even occasionally — major figures of state. It is merely to plead for some perspective. Of course, some were important and some were corrupt, but there was rather more to this Administration than Villalonga, Bautista Acevedo and Calderón. We may now pass to more pertinent perspectives.

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1 - ibid., p. 492.
2 - On Ángulo, above, p. 122, n. 1; on Ramírez, above, p. 72, n. 9.
3 - Juan de Chavarri paying 1,496,000 maravedís in 1603–4 for the right to renounce his office for one life, 'Relacion general de todos los maravedís que se han recibido y pagado en las arcas de tres llaves ...', B.N. 6754, f. 54; on the sale and renunciation of administrative offices, below, pp. 100–2.
5. Court and Councils.

A. Itineracy: 'Tan repetinas mudanzas'.

Philip III was rarely in one place for long. There could be various political or courtly justifications for the royal travels - a royal birth or marriage, the meeting of a Cortes, the need for Philip to show himself to his various peoples - but they were abidingly personal and subject to an often capricious whim. Philip liked to return time and again to his favourite places of relaxation; generally, these were in Castile - Burgos, Tordesillas, Lerma, Venta de la Venta, Segovia, Salamanca and Aranjuez, together with Madrid, Valladolid and the Escorial - and each year he visited some of them, not regularly but as the mood took him. He rarely went outside this circuit and never, for instance, travelled as King farther south in Castile than Toledo, although he favoured his eastern kingdoms with his expensive presence in the early years. The Court was always uncertain of the royal movements, the Government chary of them; State advice to omit Valencia and Aragón from the 1599 itinerary was ignored, as were its pleas at the beginning of the reign that he go to Portugal, those of 1619 that he should not. Appropriately, it was

1 - The quotation, from Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 196-7.
2 - Royal itinerary, based upon the date-lines of royal letters and cédulas and on B.N. 2347, f. 343.
Philip III who moved his immense Court twice within five years, and
left it even on those two occasions bemused as to its eventual fate.
The speculation as to the removal began as soon as the Court returned
to Madrid in 1599, and no sooner had it settled in Valladolid than
rumours began of an imminent return to Madrid. Having eventually
returned, it was disturbed in 1608 and again in 1610 by surmise of a
re-return to Valladolid, and all this in addition to the routine
speculation as to the royal movements — where would Philip spend his
summer in 1605?; which of two unnecessary journeys, to Valencia or
Portugal, would he undertake in 1612? 4

The irresponsibility of the early years was inspired at
once by Philip's own concepts of regal grandeza and by his fondness —
inspired no doubt by his Valencian favourite — for his eastern
kingdoms. Somewhere, at the beginning, there would be a dramatic
gesture for him to make; he was not quite sure where. In 1600 he
abandoned his projected crusade into Africa in favour of a personal
intervention in Italy to resolve the Saluzzo crisis. Quite how he
intended to do this was not very clear, and when so informed State did
not press him on the point. Instead, as was its wont when opposing him,
it offered effusive thanks to the Almighty for having given Spain a
king of such courage, wisdom and Christianity, and stressed that its

1 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 56, 59, 75, 80, 81, 88, etc.
2 - ibid., pp. 126 and 145.
3 - ibid., pp. 351, 406.
4 - ibid., pp. 280, 460.
5 - Cnta. Juan de Idiáquez, 10 May 1600, B.M. Eg. 329, f. 131, and above, p. 27.
opposition was motivated only by its concern for the 'greater good of Christianity'; His Majesty was young and would have other opportunities to show his qualities, but for the moment, a more pressing need was to secure the succession. Financially, the requisite grandeza could not be supported, and Philip was urged to wait on the outcome of negotiations before proceeding. Withal, the greater valour would consist in not going. Philip was persuaded. He informed the Council that he would go to Barcelona instead.¹

State again thanked Heaven, and turned to a fresh disabusal. Certainly, the King must do what God commanded, but had he interpreted Him correctly? Might not France draw a different interpretation and construe such a journey as a challenge? The Council repeated its objections, but Philip continued his preparations.² On reflection, he changed his mind again, and in 1601 moved the Court to Valladolid.

By February 1602 he had approved a journey to Portugal to counter the growing unrest there,³ left at once for Valencia but on his return in March began again planning for Portugal.⁴ The Government impressed the absolute importance of this journey upon him and by June, the arrangements had proceeded far enough to incorporate the plans for conciliar division.⁵ But Philip dallied; his summers were

² - Cnta. St., 27 Oct. 1600, ibid., f. 123.
⁴ - Pedro Álvarez Pereira to Lerma, 30 Mar. 1602, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 79.
for Castile. By September it was again an open question as to whether he would go. The Queen was pregnant and could not accompany him, and a State junta - led by Lerma - attempted to cajole him into using this to justify a short trip, in which he could lavishly promise reforms and a visit proper at a less inopportune time, have his monies voted and return home at once. 1 He did not go. In December, in response to frantic pleas from Moura, now Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, War advised that affairs in Portugal 'could not be worsened ... except by a rebellion', 2 and in February a State junta stressed that there was now no question as to advisability; Philip had to go. He agreed - 'the more I think about it, the more necessary I believe my journey to Portugal to be'; when the Queen was better there would be no problem. 3

Spring, however, was approaching, and in April he left for an extended Castilian tour, cancelling the Portuguese journey in favour of a pleasant summer in the bosques of Madrid. 4

In November, Philip posed a new problem for State - should he go to Valencia or Portugal that winter? Idiáquez alone thought Valencia worth consideration, but recounted the various financial deficits and the advantages of a Portuguese Subsidy, prompting Olivares to add the rider that if there was a Subsidy in it Philip

1 - Cnta. Jnta., 9 Sept. 1602, ibid., f. 82. The other members were Idiáquez, Miranda and Córdoba.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 135 and 172.
should go to India. The other councillors expressed themselves as forcibly - Borja, himself Portuguese, warning of the rampant disaffection in Portugal; Miranda scornfully contrasting the 'rodeo de Valencia y Sevilla' with the necessary 'jornada de Portugal'; Poza reminding Philip of his legal duty to go; Chinchón, Alva de Liste and Infantado adding to the unanimity. Philip thanked the Council for its advice and approved the journey. Within days, however, Lema was informing Borja that Philip had decided to hold the Valencian cortes and that he would be leaving in a couple of weeks. Cabrera, bewildered enough by rumours of a projected return of the Court to Madrid, gasped at the royal decision and felt for the already impoverished valencianos.

Philip grew slowly into the acceptance of his responsibilities; in 1606, 1607 and 1609 he was fairly sedentary, but in 1605 was away from Valladolid from April until the second week in November, in 1608 from Madrid for three and a half months, and in 1610 from Madrid from March until mid-September. This last, however, was the watershed; thereafter he alternated between Madrid and San Lorenzo for most of the year, and limited himself to brief progresses in

1 - '...The Portuguese have begun to suspect ... that Your Majesty holds them in little regard because he does not favour them with his royal presence, and it appears to them that that Kingdom has been reduced to a province, as if it had been conquered'.
2 - Cnta. St., 2 Nov. 1603, A.G.S. E. 2636, f. 125.
3 - Letter of 24 Nov. 1603, B.M. Add. 28, 425, f. 144.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 196-7. It was in this entry that he used the phrase quoted in the subheading to this chapter.
5 - A misconception of Contarini's is of significance here; he had Philip spending 'eight months of the year in his country houses,
October–November, with of course the exceptions of the marital journey of 1615 and the Portuguese excursion of 1619.

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Royal itineracy was expensive of time, of personal and public inconvenience, and of administrative dislocation. The two removals of the Court, for instance, were vast upheavals, posing immense logistical problems; transport, food, and lodging had to be paid for by administrators and courtiers by the Crown, and simple mechanics meant that on both occasions the turmoil lasted for several months. In 1601, to provide lodgings in Valladolid, the Audiencia had to be moved to Medina del Campo, Medina's fair to Burgos, and the University and Inquisition of Valladolid had to vacate their quarters; the cortes had to be dismissed in Madrid and reconvened in Valladolid; the Court prison had to be moved and its inmates fed and lodged on the journey, and suitors and appellants had either to follow the Court or effectively abandon their cases. Since there was insufficient transport, the progress had to be a gradual one; the councils, for instance, moved at fifteen day intervals, and in 1606 some officials had even to walk the 150 miles to Madrid.

particularly in the Escorial', Contarini (1857), p. 562. He was writing in 1605; in 1604 Philip stopped briefly at the Escorial en route to Valladolid, and in September stayed there for 10 days and in October for four. In 1605, of the 310 days for which I can account, he spent not one at San Lorenzo. More perhaps than any other man, Contarini has been responsible for posterity's verdict on Philip III and his reign.

On each occasion it took over three months for the councils to move. The removals were of course disastrous for the towns involved, as Madrid acknowledged by offering immense sums for the return in 1606, and as Philip acknowledged in 1608 by granting Valladolid a decade's alcabala exemption in compensation for its loss. The effects stretched even farther afield; during the Valladolid residence the Customs House of Badajoz - and presumably, therefore, the city's trading community as a whole - suffered a serious decline as travellers bound for Court from Lisbon by-passed the city for more convenient northern routes.

Royal progresses posed problems as immense. The 1619 journey might be taken as an example. Philip calculated that he needed a guard of some 3,500 men, but had to thrash around desperately to find them. War ruled out a levy from the Barbary presidios because once the men were allowed on land they would none of them be seen again, and one from Galicia on grounds of logical practicalities. Choosing Andalusia as the least-disqualified source, it then set about the task

1 - On administrative dislocation, below, pp.138-152.
2 - It paid 250,000 ducats over ten years and a tax of one-sixth on its rents, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 270.
3 - Ibid., p. 351.
4 - The return to Madrid was foreseen by one shrewd man who bought the escribanía de rentas of the city and district of Badajoz for 1,500 ducats in 1604 and who opened negotiations for its sale in 1609 at 2,000 ducats. Cantas. Fin., 7 Dec. 1603 and 18 Feb. 1604, A.G.S. C.J.H. 309, f. 224 and 320, f. 269, and report of contador Salcedo, 7 Oct. 1622 and untitled record of perpetuation of Sebastián Montero, A.G.S. D.G.T. 24: 322, City and Province of Badajoz.
of enlisting captains and disciplining the motley levy. Some twenty five ships would be necessary to carry them, and War had to rearrange the duties of the squadrons of Cantabria, the Straits and the coasts of Portugal in order to find them and ensure that Philip enter the realm with appropriate majesty. ¹

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The King was morally, and often legally, obliged to compensate his servants for the inconvenience and expense caused them by his travels. Their roots and families might be in Madrid in 1601, but they had to go where the King commanded; such was part of the price of the royal service. ² In return, they could expect compensation. For the removals themselves, for instance, each councillor of Castile was paid 1,000 ducats, ³ those of Finance 500, ⁴ and of Indies 600. ⁵ The cost of each journey for Indies alone was some 14,000 ducats, ⁶ and by repute the 1601 removal cost some 3,000,000 ducats—enough, as Sepúlveda wryly pointed out, to send an armada against England. ⁷

As always, such payments took time; by March 1607, the two

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² On the royal service, below, cap. 6, pp. 113-21.
³ Cnta. Cámara de Castilla, 15 Dec. 1606, B.M. Eg. 337, f. 152.
⁵ Schafer, i, pp. 184-5.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ Sepúlveda (1924), p. 244.
secretaries of War had still not been paid their ayudas for either journey,\(^1\) and as late as December of that year the secretaries of the Camara of Castile were still appealing that the award of ayudas of 600 ducats for each journey be raised to one of 1,000.\(^2\) This held true more generally, with less formal payments; Juan Ruiz de Velasco, official mayor of the War secretariat, waiting for compensation after the 1599 journey, was fortunate enough to hear of a condemned ship in Cartagena, and sought his recompense in the form of one of its casks, worth 400–500 ducats.\(^3\) In 1619, the best that War could do for secretary Arce and three secretarial officials was to suggest that they be paid for part of the debts they incurred on the Portuguese jornada.\(^4\)

The Court came first. Members of the royal family had to travel in appropriate style, and that did not come cheaply — when in 1607 the infantas found Madrid too hot for their taste, they decided to go to San Lorenzo immediately, and Acuña had to find some 2,000 ducats literally overnight for their expenses.\(^5\) More generally,

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2 - Cnta. Camara de Castilla, 15 Dec. 1606, B. M. Eg. 337, f. 152.
3 - Cnta. War, 24 Mar. 1599, A. G. S. G. A. 552, no fol. Miguel de Ayllon, variously a porter of four councils, is found in 1597 pleading with Philip II for payment for a journey in 1596 in cash; Philip apparently insisted on payment in kind, Cnta. War, 10 Feb. 1597, A. G. S. G. A. 499, no fol. Payment in kind was quite common; see below, pp. 187–8.
although courtiers were often in considerable hardship—especially at the lower levels⁠¹—they as a rule did better than the administrators, since their condition reflected on the royal grandeza; Court expenses were therefore calculated before a royal journey, administrative, afterwards. For the 1603 journey to celebrate the birth of the heir, Philip had to pay some 400,000 ducats for courtly expenses, most of it in backpayment of his household's salaries;² and generously complemented this with a series of appropriate mercedes reputedly costing another 600,000.³ For the 1615 journey, the household costs escalated daily; as early as 1613 Lerma and Carrillo agreed on a figure of 120,000 ducats for certain expenses only for Lerma to inform the President within days that he had thought of other costs which would consume a further 20,000,⁴ and in 1615 itself the Duke added the same amount to an agreed 80,000 ducats in precisely the same circumstances.⁵

The Court came first, too, when Philip allocated those lodgings (casas de aposento) to which his servants were legally entitled. Lerma, as always, did extraordinarily well for himself, being

¹ - See below, pp. 154–156.
² - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 164; see also, ibid., p. 168 on the provision of twenty encomiendas to courtiers.
³ - ibid., p. 164.
⁵ - Same to same, 26 Mar. 1615, A.G.S. C.J.d. 387, no fol.
able in 1599 to vacate quarters large enough to house State and War, and in the consequent reshuffle, mayordomo Velada took over accommodation previously large enough for the immense Council of Indies.¹ Conversely, there were no proper lodgings available in Valladolid in 1601 for Portugal, and it had to accommodate itself in the house of the Count of Salinas, its leader.² Even with the evacuation of Valladolid's tribunals and University, there was a period of great chaos while the city hurriedly erected new buildings for its army of guests.³

The final confirmation of return to a cheaper and healthier Madrid was welcome enough to the King's servants for him to have to forcibly prevent some of them encamping for Madrid in February 1606 before arrangements were finalised.⁴ The return itself brought Madrid to chaos; not only had the city and its lodging-houses decayed in the royal absence, but the announcement of the return encouraged the various entrepreneurs who lived off the Court to flood back after their exclusion from Valladolid by the controlled right of entry.⁵ The situation was further aggravated by the increase in the size of both Court and Government in the years since 1601, and by July there were over 600 royal servants competing for

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¹ Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 50.  
² ibid., p. 103.  
³ ibid., pp. 97, 126 and 270.  
⁴ ibid., p. 270.  
⁵ On the logistics of feeding the Court in Madrid, see ibid., pp. 271 and 281.

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eighty places, and emergency measures had to be introduced to provide them with some semblance of housing.  

Nevertheless, it took years to sort out the chaos. Juan Nuñez Vela, porter of State and War, had to wait until 1609 before being housed, and he was among the more fortunate. Finance and its tribunals had still not been completely rehoused by the end of the reign. In 1608 Finance was deprived of the duty of collecting the monies offered by Madrid for the return in favour of a reorganised Castile, which in turn downgraded Finance from its third-ranking seniority behind itself and State to a position inferior to Indies and Italy. Castile then dealt easily enough with Finance's counter-attack, its aposentadores refusing to allow Finance lodgings in contravention of direct royal orders in reply to consultas of September 1609, October 1614, February and October 1615. A decade after the return, and with at least twenty seven of its officials still not accommodated, Finance retaliated and refused to disburse some monies due to the aposentadores. The latter then blithely reacted by depriving councillors of Finance either of their lodgings or of compensatory allowances. After four had been so treated, Finance — in October 1616 — again turned to the King and received a less than

1 - ibid.
authoritative reply; 'it would be as well' if it would pay Castile its money and 'it would be as well' if the aposentadores would provide Finance with its accommodation. In their own good time — and encouraged perhaps more by the enquiry of the Junta de Reformación into their general behaviour — the aposentadores did so, but as late as January 1621 Secretary of Finance Rodríguez Criado at least had still not been housed.

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The royal travels had the most serious and continuing effect on the functioning of the Administration. Again, simple mechanics were important. All incoming documentation addressed to the King had first to go to the capital, be forwarded to the King, considered by him and then, almost invariably, referred back to the councils. They in turn then discussed the matter and sent their consultas to Philip, who read them and sent back his reply. Then the decision could be implemented — unless Philip asked, as he often did, for more advice, and provided there were no other complications. This was an especially tiresome procedure for State, for its information had in the first instance to come from abroad. Thus, for example, on average some seven weeks elapsed between ambassador Velasco writing his despatches in London

and their being considered by State in Madrid, although they normally arrived in Madrid within 22-25 days. The responsibility was manifestly Philip's, his itineracy compounding his often-erratic diligence; for instance, in August 1606 State had to consider some letters from Flanders, but while those of Spinola were only three weeks old those of Zúñiga were nearly seven. ¹ Again, as the great crisis of 1610 moved to its climax, State was still concerning itself in mid-April with letters from France and Italy of between 27 February and 10 March. ² That the Administration could in fact support the royal itineracy — but only granted appropriate royal application — was evidenced by the reaction to the momentous news contained in Cardenas's despatches from Paris of 17 May 1610. Normally such letters would take three weeks to reach the Council in Madrid, but the itinerant Council met in Lerma on 24 May, that resident in Madrid considered its consulta on 26th, and returned both to the King, and the itinerant body considered his response on 29th. ³ But the assassination of a fellow-monarch was clearly an exceptional case.

Once information reached the Government a dual complication arose. If a decision was taken during an itineracy, the men travelling with the Court had the opportunity of undue or immediate influence as

¹ - The letters dated respectively 18 July and 22 June, cnta. St. 12 Aug. 1606, A.G.S. E. 2512, f. 121.
² - On 14 April, for instance, it considered letters from Milan of 9 and 10 March, from Savoy of 28 February, 5 and 7 March, and from Paris of 27 February, cnta. St. 14 Apr. 1610, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol.
against those administrators left behind. There were moments of prime absurdity — thus, for instance, 'today, in a place where His Majesty ate' some papers were given to Idiáquez to consider; they concerned the duration of the Suspension of Arms. 1 Again, in 1608 Idiáquez found himself considering the question of war or peace with the Dutch at a meeting in Valladolid in company with Albuquerque, making his first appearance on the Council. 2 However, at least State was represented on the royal travels by its senior and most important councillor; Finance and War, normally unrepresented save on the great progresses of 1615 and 1619, found themselves faced with the problem of communicating with the King. Ordinarily they were obliged to wait until Philip replied to a consulta or until he returned to the capital, but in extraordinary circumstances might be obliged to send a messenger directly to him. Thus War in 1604 'finding itself close to the royal person' of the King sent two councillors to plead a particular case. 3 Similarly, Finance in dispute in 1617 and 1620 with Orders, sent first its fiscal and then a councillor to catch Philip and present its cases before its rival could do so. 4 Formal divisions of these councils presented obvious problems; in 1619 the Council of

2 - Cnta. Mitin. St., 19 Sept. 1608, A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 146. On the unique significance of Idiáquez's councillorship, below, pp. 353-6, 363-75
War resident in Madrid found that it was unable to look at some papers relevant to an important discussion because a secretary had them with him in Portugal. Itineracy, therefore, caused complications between and within councils and the decision-making process was often slowed down, un-balanced or indeed simply in effect abandoned for months at a time.

The secretaries of State were particularly affected, as over the first half of the reign in particular the division between them often became, during itineracies, less one of differentiation of papeles than of one of importance between the secretary itinerant and the secretary resident. The real importance of the division lay in the identity of the men concerned; broadly, the criado-secretary travelled with King and Duke, and therefore became in effect, if often only temporarily, the senior secretary. We thus find Calderón, for instance, forwarding papers to Prada in Madrid in 1608 and - quite improperly - giving him instructions. Similarly, in 1602 we find Franqueza - unlike Calderón actually Secretary of State and senior to Prada - being entrusted during an itineracy with the most secret papers on Flanders.

1 - The Council complained that 'it is lacking information that it should justly have on everything concerned with its duties, and it cannot give the appropriate orders (without these papers)....', cntrW, resident War, 28 Jun. 1619, AGS G.A.840, no fol.

2 - In 1599, for instance, Philip deferred a decision on a dispute between War and Finance until he returned to Madrid, three months later, cntrW, 5 Jul. 1599, AGS G.A.553, no fol. See also Lerma to Prada, 23 May 1609, B.N.1492, f. 266v, a copy, deferring a decision on some State consultas until the royal return.

3 - From Lerma, 15 Jul. 1608, AGS E.2025, f. 134; on Calderón, above, p. 100.

4 - CntA, JntA de Dos, 26 Feb. 1602, AGS E.2023, f. 83
not be exaggerated; as always with Lerma, the moment was of importance, its exploitation never too systematic - thus, for instance, Prada travelled in 1608 and his papers were taken over by Antonio de Arosteguí, Secretary of War, and not by a criado.

Far more importantly, itineracy affected the composition of the Council of State. Indeed, it had significant effect upon appointments to the Council. As in 1599 with four councillors, 1 so Toledo in 1600, Albuquerque in 1608 and Benavente in 1615 all made their first appearances on itinerant councils, while Aliaga took up regular attendance in Valladolid in 1615 after having only sat once previously. Four great councillors of State or War also made their first appearances on itinerant councils of War - Diego de Ibarra at Barcelona in 1599, the sixth duke of Infantado, Brochero and la Laguna at an extraordinary meeting in Madrid in July 1601 after the Council proper had left for Valladolid.

Similarly, as the Court travelled, so it became more convenient for men to sit; Alva de Liste sat regularly on State only after the removal to Valladolid, and Enríquez and Castrillo both reappeared on War there in 1615 after not having sat since 1609 and 1612 respectively. Ironically, Juan de Cardona was appointed to State in 1602 so that he could make the arrangements in Lisbon for the imminent royal arrival; he went, but the arrangements were cancelled and so was his councillorship. 2

1 - See above, pp. 15-16.
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 149.
Conversely, State's composition was consistently affected as various courtiers and advisers travelled with the King. The loss of the courtiers from the resident Council was generally not serious; Lerma was the least diligent and Velada the least important of the councillors. Nor was the loss of the royal confessors, who necessarily travelled with the King, of any great consequence. Javierre exercised only a token councillorship; Aliaga was not appointed to State until 1615 and travelled then and in 1619 and only Córdoba had repeatedly to abandon his conciliar duties—appointed in October 1600, he missed six weeks in 1601, nearly five and a half months in 1602, three and a half in 1603 and three in 1604. One loss, however, was fundamental. Juan de Idiaquez travelled every year until his death except in 1612; the royal travels deprived State of his services for c. 154 weeks between January 1602 and his death in October 1614, and he, more than any other man, was responsible for setting the tone of the Council's discussions. In 1613 he asked to be excused from further travels on grounds of ill-health, but Philip refused; while he had life, Don Juan was to work at his papers and travel with his King. The loss to State was severe, and since he was also President of Orders that Council's efficiency may also be presumed to have suffered severely.

For all that he took Idiaquez with him, Philip clearly

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1 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 530. For further analysis of Idiaquez's absences, below, pp. 240.
regarded the Council resident as the proper Council of State. It will be recalled, for instance, that in 1600 he went so far as to summon State from Madrid to Avila to deal with an important matter rather than simply rely on advice from his itinerant advisers. ¹ He never did that again, although in 1615 and 1619 the Council was formally divided. Otherwise, only in 1608 (3) and 1610 (5) did he even call itinerant councils.

After 1600 State was deprived of the services of itinerant councillors in 1601, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1606, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611 and 1614 and was formally divided in 1615 and 1619. Additionally, the removals of 1601 and 1606 caused considerable dislocation; State met only once between 15 April and 1 June 1601 and only once in the ten weeks after 28 April 1606. On both occasions, moreover, it lost its conciliar presidents, travelling with their own councils, for additional periods — in 1601, Idiáquez for ten weeks, the Constable for two months and Miranda for over three; in 1606, Idiáquez for three months and Miranda for several weeks longer. ²

In 1606 State maintained an average attendance of 5.57 councillors per meeting in the three months before the upheaval began, but after resuming in Madrid in July averaged only 4.43 over the remainder of the year. This erosion of consistency was a

¹ - See above, p. 27.
² - The Constable did not sit between 28 February and 14 March, but as he missed only one meeting no conclusions are drawn.
recurring phenomenon; thus far it had happened in 1601, 1602, 1602 and 1604. The Valencian sojourn of 1604 had particularly serious effects, for in 1603 the Council had settled down for the first time since the end of 1600 and was maintaining a stability of attendance it was not to show again in the years prior to 1612; the ten meetings prior to the departure were attended by the quite remarkable average of 9.7 councillors, but the eleven coinciding with the four months itineracy were attended by only 5.0, and the ten immediately after the return by only 5.1.

This second Valencian foray was the last itineracy with at least overtly political justification until 1615, but Philip continued his annual trips around Castile and, especially in the years of crisis of 1608–1610, directly furthered the decline of the Council associated primarily with his failure to replace dying councillors.¹ In 1608 the Council was divided for just over sixteen weeks – losing Idiáquez, Velada and Toledo – and in 1609 for a further sixteen, during which it again lost the two laymen. On neither occasion did the reunited Council regain its former stability; the first ten meetings of 1608 were attended by 4.7 councillors, the last seven, after reunification, by 2.85, and while in 1609 the first thirteen were

¹ - On this, below, pp. 243-4.
attended by 4.23, the average for the last nine was only 3.62. In the following year royal irresponsibility reached its nadir; as Henry IV mustered his forces, Philip blithely began a tour of Old Castile that lasted for thirty three weeks, and left a Council in Madrid on which only four men sat regularly, of whom only one - the Constable - was a major and experienced councillor.

The preposterous tour of 1610 was, however, the turning-point; in 1611, 1613 and 1614 there were brief progresses but State lost only Idiáquez of its serious councillors and had now in regular attendance the group of new councillors with whom resurgence was associated. After 1610, in fine, State was itself vastly more professionalised and less troubled by the royal itineracy. The progresses of 1615 and 1619, however, caused considerable dislocation both in respect of attendance and frequency of convocation; on both occasions a month’s work was lost at the beginning of the progress, and in 1615 similar periods were also lost as the Court travelled first from Valladolid to Burgos and then to Madrid. By 1619 Lerma had gone, but Philip still relaxed into the old ways. Ironically faced now by a Council which, save Aliaga, was unanimous that he should go not to Portugal but to Aragón, he retorted that he was going to Portugal and that those councillors who wished to do so could accompany him.

1 - In 1608 Chinchon happened to die as the Court returned, but the decline in attendance was nonetheless significant.
2 - The others being Toledo, Infantado and Albuquerque. Méjia sat once.
3 - See below, pp. 244-6.
4 - Cnta. St., 19 Apr. 1619, A.G.S. E. 2326, ff. 65-6.
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- **Key:** 'x', 'o' as p.150; 'x' - Council resident in Madrid

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Extract: "The Council of War..."
On the whole, War and Finance were affected much less severely by the royal itineracy than was State. In the first instance, of course, their councillors were not important courtiers and were not therefore ordinarily called upon to travel with the Court. ¹ War was deprived of itinerant councillors of State, but again the loss was not too significant, and especially so since Idiáquez himself did not attend the Council normally with any great regularity. ² As with State, however, so with War a number of men were appointed to the Council, or returned to it, during itineracies. ³

The removals of the Court did disrupt both councils seriously. War, having met 14, 13 and 9 times in the first three months of 1601, sat not at all in April, and its seventeen meetings of April 1606 were followed by only one in May. Attendance, too, was affected; in 1601 it lost Valencia for six weeks, and in 1606 Mejia for five, with Gúzman resuming regular attendance on the return to Madrid. Finance did not sit at all in the five weeks after 11 April 1601 – having sat eight times in the previous five – and lost three weeks' work in 1606. In 1601 it was deprived of Esteban de Ibarra, Secretary of War and travelling with that Council, for twenty one meetings, and in 1606 lost him again, for nearly three months. On the latter occasion

¹ - On their Court offices, below, pp. 250-275.
² - See below, 260-261.
³ - See above, p. 145.
it also lost its two councillors of Castile for some four months.

The annual royal progresses did not affect the mechanical performances of War and Finance as they did that of State, although the Valencian journey of 1604 appears to have slightly affected Finance's frequency of convocation.¹ The effect of these progresses was chiefly, and seriously, felt in the slowing-down of the conduct of their business.² The journeys of 1615 and 1619, however, inevitably had disruptive effect. Finance stayed behind on both occasions, but lost Carrillo for a month in 1615 and Gamboa, also councillor of Castile, for the whole of the 1619 journey. Philip compromised with War. In 1615 he blithely ordered everyone who was able to go to Valladolid, but found that several councillors had to stay behind to deal with outstanding judicial business³—Brochero missed the first ten and Diego de Ibarra the first fourteen itinerant meetings, and Salazar and Pobar stayed behind throughout. In 1619, Philip formally divided the Council into two, with the itinerant being the senior half,⁴ and both sat regularly with consistent membership.⁵

¹—It sat seven times in December 1603, but only three times each in January and February 1604; it also lost Gaitán de Ayala, councillor of Castile, for four weeks.
²—See above, pp. 143-4.
⁵—See extract from Attendance Register, above, p. 152.
B. The Cost.

The Government of Philip III knew better than to try to tabulate the exact cost of the Court of Philip III because it was, probably literally, incalculable. Broadly, there were two types of expenditure on the Court - the first, coming under the purview of the Council of Finance, consisted of the normal annual allowances, while the second consisted of what may be generally characterised as de gracia awards made directly by the King himself. The first of these was more or less fixed, if within fairly generous limits, but the second was as fluid as the royal benevolence itself; as the mood took him, Philip might add hundreds of thousands of ducats a year to the normal expenditure.

In the autumn of each year, Finance worked out its projected expenditure for the forthcoming financial year. It was a task of quite byzantine complexity. The budget for the financial year ending in October 1609 might be taken as an example. Some 1,800,000 ducats — incidentally, the precise amount thought to be coming from the Indies — were allocated for Flanders while some 834,030 ducats were reserved for various courtly expenses;

- 620,000 — the ordinary expenses of both royal houses, the cámaras of King and Queen, and the correos.
- 40,000 — casa de Castilla.
20,100 - royal chapel
53,840 - Spanish and German guards
100,090 - salaries of the criados of both royal houses.

These figures incorporate several complications. They omit, for instance, the costs of the households of the royal children and of the upkeep of the various alcazares, the expenditure on carriages and sundry royal grants charged each year to the household accounts. Conversely, they include several expenses in block payments which were usually calculated separately - for instance, normally a figure of about 620,000 ducats would be listed for the 'ordinarios' of the two royal houses, and this would include the salaries of the criados but exclude the expenses of both cámaras and of the correos, each of which generally had their own accounts. Finance here was doing two things - laying down its broad priorities, as for example between the normal expenditure on the Court as against that on Flanders, and making a separate calculation of priorities within the household accounts. Thus the 100,090 ducats in the last entry was the current annual cost of the salaries of the criados of the royal households, but was not actually paid them as such; since they were owed more than three years' salary it was given to them as a temporary settlement against what was owing to them for two years.¹

¹ 'Relaciones' of the state of the royal exchequer, 1 Nov. 1608-31 Oct. 1609 and 1607-8, A.G.S. C.J.H. 352, no fol., and 345, no vol.
All courtiers, from Lerma himself down, were owed varying amounts of money, and during the financial year itself therefore the principle of the greatest need continued to operate; thus, for instance, at the beginning of 1609 some men who were nearly four years in arrears were able to use the part-settlement of some three year old claims to justify their being considered next. Finance, abstracted as it always was by the cost of the Court, did what it could, but courtiers knew naturally that their best line of approach lay through the King himself. Liberal always with those nearest to him, Philip readily and repeatedly ordered Finance to pay his courtiers, but found that even his authority could not conjure up non-existent monies. Typical of the way in which the Court was actually financed was his order of March 1601 to Finance that three groups of courtly salaries be paid, totalling in all 187,113 ducats. He therefore established a priority — to encourage courtiers to go to Valladolid with the Court — but gave no concrete help himself, either to courtiers or to Finance. It remained a gesture, only one-third effective; Finance found 50,000 ducats.


In this morass, figures lost virtually all meaning and on only the rarest occasions did either Crown or Government bother to calculate a mean figure for any actual expenditure. Nevertheless, certain conclusions may be obviously drawn. That the Court was too expensive need hardly be stated, but to find the salaries of the Queen's household alone in 1607 costing 52,591 ducats or those of her cámara in 1608, 53,563 ducats adds point to the conclusion. That it became more expensive over the first decade appears also self-evident; in 1603, for instance, the royal chaplaincy and guards cost 54,643 ducats while by 1608 the cost had risen to 63,707 ducats. Similarly, in 1603 112,690 ducats met the costs of the criados of both royal households and of the transport corps, whereas by 1608 the King's criados alone were costing 112,399 ducats. Equally obviously, the payment of monies on such a scale must have had serious political consequences; we have seen, for instance, how the budget for 1608-9 reserved virtually half the money coming from the Indies to meet some courtly expenses, and that 834,030 ducats was indeed two and a half times as much as was ordinarily reserved for the cost of the

1 - 'Memorial de lo librado en el dinero que vino en los últimos galeones para pagar los gajes de las casas reales', A.G.S. C.J.H. 353, no fol.
3 - On 1608, 'Memorial de lo librado ...', op. cit., and on 1603, Lerma to Acuña, 22 Oct. 1603, op. cit.
Atlantic fleet and nearly seven times the current cost of the conciliar nonumina.  

The great itineracy of 1610 brought Philip's grandeza to a humiliating degradation. In the first three months of his presidency, Carrillo paid out 162,407 ducats for various major courtly expenses, and when the itineracy began he had little left for the Court. In March he paid only 3,000 ducats for the expenses of the Queen's household, and Philip and Lerma had on their own initiative to order the corregidores of Burgos, Valladolid and Aranda to take the necessary money from the millones. Carrillo then reminded Lerma that it was his duty to administer the royal finances, but graciously offered to listen to any respectable suggestions from the Duke as to how his management of those finances might be improved. Lerma yielded, congratulating Carrillo on his logic. By August, therefore, the President felt free to provide only 12,000 of the 100,000 reales demanded by the Queen's comptroller, and the latter in turn, complaining that the offer would barely provide for two days' expenses and that he had debts already of 70,000 reales, had to beg Lerma to move the Court to Lerma itself where twice as much credit

\[1\] On the 1608-9 budget, above, pp. 154-5; on the cost of the fleet, below, pp. 151-2, and on the nonumina, pp. 165-6.


\[4\] Same to same, undated, ibid.; since the reply was dated 10 Apr. 1610 (below, n. 5), this would have been written at the end of the first week in April.

\[5\] Carrillo to Lerma, 10 Apr. 1610, Madrid, ibid.

\[6\] Lerma to Carrillo, 23 Apr. 1610, Ventosilla, ibid.
could be obtained.¹ Lerma - characteristically - could only throw himself, and the royal greatness, into Carrillo's arms; the Queen's ladies-in-waiting were having to rely on their relatives for food, and the King's reputation was suffering appalling damage on the streets of Aranda, especially since the disaster was being observed by itinerant ambassadors. Carrillo was not even to let his Council know the contents of Lerma's letter, and was to provide money at once.²

It can have been no coincidence that the tour of 1610 was the last great indulgent itineracy of the reign. Whether Carrillo paid any money to the Queen's ladies is not recorded, but he persevered throughout his presidency with his more general onslaught on the royal extravagance - in 1611 he professed himself willing to provide for the Court with his own blood and in 1613 rather more substantially lent the King 7,000 ducats to pay for some expenses³; in 1614 he warned Philip that he was putting himself in danger of 'infamous ruin and disaster' if he did not cut down on expenses⁴; and foresaw for 1615 and 1616 'such a great deficit as will obviate payment of the most necessary expenses'⁵; in 1617 he in quick

¹ - Contralor de la Reyna to Lerma, 28 Aug. 1610, Aranda, ibid. The Court did go to Lerma at once.
² - Lerma to Carrillo, 28 Aug. 1610, Aranda, ibid. That the ambassadors were itinerant may have been partly due to the fact that their houses in Madrid were falling into disrepair because of the royal failure to pay for them. See same to same, 12 Jun. 1610, A.G.S. C.J.H. 353, no fol.
⁵ - Cnta. Carrillo, 28 Oct. 1614, ibid., f. 35.
succession remonstrated twice with Philip, twice with Lerma and once each with Uceda and Juan de Ciriza warning them that expenses had to be pared and that Philip had to understand this, or be made to do so, 'so that he might be pleased not to charge the royal exchequer with expenses that it cannot support ...'.

Carrillo met with real, if relative, success; Court expenditure appears to have reached a peak in 1611-13 and to have declined thereafter. The budget for 1611 allowed 720,000 ducats for the ordinarios of the royal houses - the highest verifiable figure for those expenses for the reign, and one that had risen from 683,404 ducats in 1610 - and a quite extraordinary 100,000 ducats for the casa de Castilla. Those two expenses alone, therefore, accounted for over half the anticipated income from the Indies (1,500,000 ducats) and very nearly equalled the allocation for Flanders (960,000 ducats).

The ordinarios - the largest single item of expenditure - were maintained at 720,000 ducats in the budgets for 1612 and 1613, but by 1615 had been brought down to 600,000 ducats, and stayed at that level for the remainder of the reign.

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3 - 'Relacion de las cosas precisas que ay que consignar cada un año en los dos millones con que el Reyno sirve a Su Md. para desde la paga de fin de mayo del año que viene ...', 6 Aug. 1611, A.G.S. C.J.H. 367, no fol.
It may be no coincidence that from 1615 the figures for Court expenditure become intelligible to the point of reliability. They show a distinct levelling off of expenditure over the years 1615-17 and a pronounced drop thereafter as the commitment in central Europe grew. Like the ordinarios, the extraordinarios of the two royal houses remained constant over the years 1615-17 - despite the rather remarkable fact that the Queen was dead - at 150,000 ducats, but unlike them then dropped significantly, to 100,000 ducats in 1619 and down to 60,000 in 1620 and 1621. Similarly, the cost of the royal carruajes dropped from 50,000 ducats over the years 1615, 1617 and 1619 to 30,000 in 1620 and 1621. Other figures are not strictly comparable because of the conglomerate method of calculation whereby different accounts were variously merged or separated as convenience dictated. Nevertheless, the extraordinarios and the carruajes expenses, taken together, show a remarkable trend - in 1615 and 1617, they cost 200,000 ducats; in 1619, 150,000, and in 1621, 90,000. Conversely, monies were at last made available for rather more substantial purposes; the Atlantic fleet, for instance, as late as 1617 was maintained at 300,000 ducats, but by 1620-21 was receiving 480,000 while the allocation for the presidios rose over a similar period from 400,000 to 480,000 ducats. 

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1 - The figures for this paragraph are taken from the consultas cited above, p. 160, n. 4.
In the twenty three months from January 1619 to November 1620, the councils of State and War paid out 150,354 ducats in various awards after consulting Philip, but he himself dispensed by decrees with 259,495. Of seventy four awards by the councils, only eleven were for amounts in excess of 1,000 ducats, whereas of Philip's forty five, twenty three were in excess of that figure. The council's awards were almost exclusively political rather than courtly in nature; they included, for instance, no less than 110,000 ducats in ambassadorial salaries and expenses and only two significant awards were for courtly purposes—2,366 ducats to an imperial ayuda de cámara, and 12,000 for Philibert of Savoy's expenses on the 1619 journey. The remainder were eloquent testimony to the nature of the Government's commitments—pensions to soldiers' widows; 700 ducats for seven Jesuits; 100 ducats for an Irishman, to enable him to return to fight in Flanders; two awards of 200 ducats to Irishwomen entering religious life, and awards to English and Dutch gentlemen. Philip's grants, however, included only 22,000 ducats in politico-administrative expenses, a sum only sixty five ducats in excess of his disbursement on jewels for himself and his friends. They included, too, a further 130,000 ducats in ayudas to cousin Philibert. Smaller sums told much more.

1 - 'Relación de las mercedes y ayudas de costa que desde principio demenero de 1619 se a servido Su Magd.de hacer por resoluciones de consultas de los Consejos de Estado y Guerra', 1 Dec. 1620, by Bartolome de Anaya y Villanueva, A.G.S. C.J.H. 414, no fol.
of the royal interests - 18,000 ducats for a cardinal's journey to Rome; 12,000 ducats in ayudas for his own doctors; 14,000 ducats in food allowances and salaries for three of his son's courtiers; 8,000 ducats for a chapel in Flanders; 1,500 ducats for the daughter of the imperial ambassador; 1,160 ducats for a Court lady; 1,000 ducats for the cavalry of his daughter, the Queen of France; 1,400 ducats for the widow of an ayuda de cámara; 1,000 ducats for a noblewoman in a convent.1

Not without justice was Philip known as Philip the Good; this generosity was born of a basic moral decency as much as of his own concept of grandeza. His definition of his obligations, however, took emphatic cognisance - as it had done throughout the reign - of the demands of his Court and did so to the neglect of more serious duties; his de gracia awards were not only, therefore, preposterous in extent, but were profoundly unbalanced in nature. The Court - comprised of those people nearest the King physically or spiritually - came first.

Generosity was compounded by an inability to understand the realities of finance. That money was needed for good or holy purposes seemed to Philip justification enough for authorising its payment,

1 - 'Relación de las mercedes y ayudas de costas que su Magestad se a servido de hacer por decretos rúbricados de su real mano desde primero de enero mil seiscientos diez y nueve ...', by the same, ibid. A third relación recorded that when he died Philip had not yet paid awards amounting to 18,310 ducats, ibid.
and if he was unable to refuse requests from his courtiers he was
equally unable to refuse himself, to differentiate between needs, or
even indeed to appreciate that a vast number of minor awards added
up to large ones. In 1608, for instance, at a time when the foreign
ambassadors' houses in Madrid were falling into disrepair because of
his failure to pay the landlords properly, he spent 3,000 ducats
entertaining the Persian ambassador, 4,000 ducats on the completion
of his own genealogy, 2,000 ducats on some mules, 2,800 ducats on
the Queen's cavalry, and authorised scores of other such payments. 6
Even when he accepted the need to cut down on such expenditure, he was
unable to accept that this actually involved not giving awards; in
December 1613 he tacitly agreed to Carrillo's demands that he eschew
all unnecessary expenses but yet within seven weeks ordered the
President to find some 109,000 ducats, over half of which was to be
for quite unnecessary, courtly, expenses—40,000 ducats for some
infantrymen; 27,000 for a present for the King of Persia; 10,000 for a
jewel for a prince; 23,000 for the Count of Barajas; 5,000 for a jewel
for the French ambassador, and 4,000 for a present for himself. 7

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2 - Same to same, 24 Jan. 1608, ibid. 3 - Same to same, 26 Feb. 1608, ibid.
4 - Same to same, 28 Mar. 1608, ibid. 5 - Same to same, 30 Mar. 1608, ibid.
6 - The legajo cited above, nn. 1-5, consists largely of orders of
payment for de gracia awards and for courtly expenses.
The cost of Philip's Administration is more nearly calculable. Again, there are a number of variables but it appears certain that over the reign expenditure on the Administration was multiplied by a factor of between two and three. The autonomy afforded the councils by Philip led to a dramatic rise in the volume of business they conducted, and that in turn necessitated an increase in the number of personnel they employed. The price rise, moreover, compounded the difficulties created for the Crown by this cycle by forcing it to increase the salaries it paid to its administrators. Thus, for instance, in 1598 there were twenty-two secretaries of state, earning a total of 9,333 ducats annually at an average of 424 ducats each, but by the mid 1620s there were forty-seven, earning 38,941 ducats, now at 828 each. Each secretary of course had to have officials working under him, and the cost of those rose over the same period from 1,120 ducats to 6,448. Similarly, in 1593 the Orders contador mayor de cuentas was paid 133 ducats but by 1620 was earning 200, and his teniente was granted a rise over the same period from 40 to 80 ducats. Moreover, as will be seen, salary was only the beginning; all these men had to have casa de aposento and courtly allowances. In 1597, Philip II's last full year, the conciliar nómina had amounted to 79,543 ducats, but by 1600 it had risen to 90,000.

1 - 'Advertencias a el conde duque para el remedio de los Danos de la Monarchia ....', anonymous but probably by the Finance secretariat; mid 1620s, B.N. 904, f. 47.
3 - Below, pp. 169-170.
by 1608 to 123,000, ¹ by 1616 to 154,899, ² and by 1620 to 190,000. ³

The payment of such increases was a remarkable achievement in view of the decline in resources; the 1620 figure, for instance, was achieved despite a reduction in the servicio from 120,000 to 100,000 ducats. ⁴ The nature and extent of this escalation may be evidenced by the difficulties of Orders, paid by a Fugger asiento on the rent of the mesas maestrales. On a 1604 cost of 47,430 ducats, a ten year asiento was arranged for 48,000 ducats for the years 1604-14, but by 1614 the actual cost was 70,666 ducats, and by 1617 the Council was asking for an increase on even that figure, pleading that it needed another 2,658 ducats. In 1617, however, the Fuggers while only paying Orders 70,666 ducats were in fact themselves drawing 79,731 ducats from the Orders rents, the additional 9,065 ducats comprising the interest owed them. On one council alone therefore a price rise of c. 68% in ten years still left an annual deficit of 11,723 ducats.

That deficit could have been nearly made good if Philip had been of harder heart; in 1597 his father had granted some monasteries a single limosna from the Orders nómina because of the sterility of that disastrous year, but Philip III allowed the award to become a

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¹ - 'Relacion de la hazienda que S.M. tendra hasta fin de octubre ... 1609', A.G.S. C.J.H. 345, no fol.
⁴ - Ibid.
traditional one, and by 1617 it was costing the Council some 8,606 ducats annually.¹ The royal generosity was self-defeating.

This was true more generally, for Philip persisted in charging monies to the conciliar accounts, and in consulta after consulta Finance had to remind him that each such award meant a deficit for the council concerned and a delay in the payment of conciliar salaries. It had some successes, but Philip nevertheless continued in his confused way; in 1611, for instance, Finance persuaded him that because Brochero of War could not get a 3,000 ducats award actually paid out of the Seville almojarifazgos was no reason for his having it from the War nómina,² but failed to divert an award of 66 ducats to porter Juan Nuñez Vela.³ At least Philip had a superficial justification when administrators were concerned; he had none whatsoever for ordering in 1616 that Lema's salary as mayordomo mayor be charged to the councils,⁴ nor had he any in the same year for brusquely ordering Finance to pay 200 ducats of courtly salary from its nómina, even if the claim was sponsored by his own aunt.⁵

Finance had to keep a wary eye open, too, in other directions; in

¹ - Cant. Fin., 12 May 1619, A.G.S. C.J.H. 405, f. 105. The limosanas were given in the form of wheat, the figures quoted being the cost price which was manipulated by the Fuggers.
1611 it had to bitterly oppose an award made to Antonio de Arosteguí in the Granada alcabalas. Only one other such grant had been made by a Hapsburg— to Lerma!— and it was appropriate that Arosteguí's award was not for his normal duties, but for his activities in the French marriage negotiations.¹

It was equally characteristic of Philip that when he made gestures in the direction of financial reform they should have been utterly inappropriate. In 1601 he ordered War to cease consulting him on the provision of any new military salaries, in effect attempting to deprive unemployed or wounded soldiers of the possibilities of compensation and even of employment.² What he was really after was to stop those men cluttering up his Court with their ugly, importuning presence. In the distress of 1607 he even went so far as to order War and Finance at least to cease consulting him on all de parte business or, if they were unable to do that, to drastically reduce the number of their submissions. Both opposed him. War vigorously pointed out that the applications concerned men who had run great risks and lost their blood, often indeed their lives, in the royal service and that King and Government had no option; in deserving cases, such grants as could be made had to be made.³

Finance, as pointedly, lectured Philip on the difference between the

'obligatory debt' and those de gracia awards which he might profitably eschew.¹ His decree became a dead letter, but was nevertheless in its own way profoundly significant of his purpose and priorities.

So too was the way in which he involved his councils in his courtly festivities. There were seven ordinary feasts in which they were expected to participate — New Year, the Epiphany, Easter Sunday, Pentecost, Christmas, Bulls of San Juan and Santiago — and for each they were entitled to compensatory allowances — to colaciones, luminarias, limosnas, gajes, gastos destradac and the like. The cost was immense. The Cámara of Castile, for instance, cost some 5,000 ducats annually in this respect; for each feast, the President was allowed 2,000 reales, each councillor and secretary 1,000, and when luminarias were in order the President was entitled to an extra 48 escudos and each councillor to twenty four. Additionally, for the three religious feasts, an ayuda of 2,000 ducats was paid to the President and one of 1,000 to each councillor and secretary.² Various attempts were made to reduce these expenses,³ but by 1618 the Junta de Reformación was recording persistent failure and a rising conciliar expenditure, estimating indeed that Philip was spending more than 30,000 ducats annually on

colaciones alone. The Junta's attempt in 1618 clearly met with as little success; an authoritative source estimated that in the mid 1620s the Crown could have saved 82,000 ducats annually by abolishing the conciliar propinas de colaciones and luminarias and a further 11,500 by depriving the procuradores de cortes of the same rights. It listed, too, the different amounts paid ordinarily by the Government for three councils, and if it was not strictly now the Government of Philip III, the figures yet bear repetition;

Castile; - 25,333 ducats - salary

6,000 "" - gastos destrados, fiestas and luminarias

Indies; 22,666 "" - salary

21,837 "" - propinas and luminarias

21,266 "" - colaciones and achas

Finance; 33,813 "" - salary

22,840 "" - propinas and luminarias

23,690 "" - colaciones and achas

8,773 "" - casa de aposento allowance

4,800 "" - colaciones and achas for the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas. 2

Additionally, of course, there were the extraordinary expenses,

1 - Cnta. Junta de Reformación, ibid. x.
2 - 'Advertencias a el conde duque ....", B.N. 904, ff. 43v-47. All but the second figure are converted from maravedís. On Indies, see also Schäfer, 1, pp. 124-6 and 249-258.
and these were inevitably very heavy. On the Emperor's death in 1603, for instance, the obsequies reputedly cost 100,000 ducats each for Court and council, and would have cost very much more had Philip not been prevailed upon to limit mourning to Valladolid and Madrid alone and not, as he had at first intended, to impose luto general throughout the whole country. Again, on the death of his Queen, the mourning costs for Finance and its Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas alone came to 2,602 ducats, and the money had to be found by the Council itself. Castile, more fortunate in its resources, cost over twice as much but found the money more easily.

2 - Finance's difficulty being that it had no income from legal confiscations, as Castile did. Cnta. Fin., 6 Apr. 1605, A.G.S. C.J.H. 321, no fol.
III. The Personnel of Government.
There were fortunes to be made in the royal service, but the criteria governing such success were less those of excellence of ability and integrity than those of the accidents of opportunity. Indeed, the rewards were ordinarily so inadequate as to make it a cause for wonder that men entered the service at all. Three considerations, however, were persuasive. Negatively, there was not much of an alternative for qualified men—as Sancho Panza acknowledged, 'better the King's crumb than the lord's favour'. More positively, that service offered security of employment and conferred prestige. This latter was of immense importance; Quevedo was not being merely sardonic when he observed that the burden of being the King's overworked servant was 'much relieved (or supposed to be) by the honour of being his servant'. Honour was a tangible, indeed a quantifiable, reward.

It was thus appropriate that the supreme councillorship should have been unsalaried; a place on State was not given lightly, and appointment itself was reward enough. Many councillors of State held salaried posts on other councils, but these were commensurate

2 - Cervantes (1965), p. 346
with their abilities and importance and were not given specifically as reward for their services on State. Nor were they given *ayudas*. None are listed in the Council's files, and even Cabrera noticed only two, both quite exceptional. Fray Gaspar de Córdoba was given a 2,000 ducats pension in 1602, but he was clearly less able to support himself than were his aristocratic colleagues, and courtier Alva de Liste was given an immense award, but explicitly to discourage him from retirement.

Nothing, indeed, became the councillor of State like the leaving. As aristocrats, they most coveted social and courtly eminence, but were repeatedly thus favoured only in exceptional circumstances. Fuentes, the Constable, Olivares and Zúñiga were all given new or improved *encomiendas*, but only for their foreign service, and Miranda was similarly favoured, but only on his retirement. Awards, too, were given to the families of Borja and Sesa, but only after their deaths. So, too, with the supreme honour of *grandeza*. In 1603, Chinchón, Poza and Olivares, all active councillors, were summarily refused that dignity and told not:

1 - See below, pp. 230–231
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 146.
3 - Ibid., pp. 134–5.
4 - Fuentes, Ibid., p. 275; the Constable, Ibid., p. 417; Olivares, Ibid., p. 156, and Zúñiga - not yet a councillor - Ibid., p. 192.
6 - Borja's son was given an improved *encomienda* and his seat on Portugal; see below, pp. 202. On Sesá, Cabrera, op. cit., pp. 268–9.
to hope that Philip would change his mind in future, while Moura (1600), Fuentes (1600) and Spinola (1612) were allowed to remain covered in the royal presence - but only before leaving it for foreign service. Philip could be relentless; the fabulously wealthy Spinola ached for the honour but had to wait years before Philip obliged him, and Villafranca, not yet a councillor, furiously resigned his appointment to Milan and retired to his estates when refused a grandeeship.

The same parsimony operated with the bestowal of titles. Certainly, Philip created new titles with a relish probably unequalled in all Spanish history - he created at least five new dukedoms, forty-two marquisates and sixty-three countships - but did

2 - Moura, ibid., pp. 56, 58; Spinola, ibid., p. 473; Fuentes, B.N. 7423, f. 104, this latter adding that the award was both for his military services and because his county would revert to the Crown on his death.
3 - ‘I see him (as being) totally devoid of cupidity and of personal gain ... If His Majesty allowed him to choose between being covered or having that office which has now been given to him (i.e., maestre de campo general) he would choose the former, because he is greatly concerned that he shall be remembered in the histories as having given some special service to God and to His Majesty ...’. Thus Prada’s appraisal in 1605, to Lerma, 5 Mar. 1605, B.N. 1492, f. 215v, a copy. Although thoroughly exceptional in other respects, Spinola was in this more Spanish than the Spanish; in 1616 this man, who paid for whole armies, is found insisting that the 300 escudos of monthly salary paid to his son should be raised to the 400 paid to the sons of other grandees - otherwise ‘it will be of great damage to my reputation, this being the most valuable thing in this life’, to Lerma, 14 May 1616, A.G.S. E. 2030, no fol.
5 - A list comprised chiefly from B.N. 7423, ff. 104-7, and Porreño (1723) p. 311. Neither is comprehensive and I have added to them, chiefly with material from Cabrera de Córdoba (1857). These figures
not bestow them upon his administrators. Miranda was raised to the dukedom in 1608, but only on his retirement, and in all probability only as an attempt to encourage him to remain in the Castile presidency, and - Lerma apart - only Moura and Spinola of the other councillors of State were given titles, both again for foreign service. Similarly, although councillors of War did better, it was not for their service on the Council; la Laguna and Castrillo won theirs' before their councillorships; Pobar, his for a marriage, and Velasco his for his courtly services and to mark his retirement as veedor y comisario general. Enríquez won his countship in Flanders, and Gélves and San German were both given supplementary titles, but for their viceregal services in Aragón and Milan respectively.

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3. Both held titles when appointed. On la Laguna, ibid., p. 8. No date is recorded for Castrillo's award.
4. Ibid., p. 459.
5. Cabrera implied rather than stated the connection, ibid., pp. 323, 345 and below, p. 278.
6. Ibid., p. 221.
7. Gélves' countship was raised to a marquisate, ibid., p. 540. San German was given the marquisate of la Hinojosa, although again the connection was not specifically made by Cabrera, ibid., p. 469.
The marquisate of Valle de Cerrato was the only title conferred specifically for conciliar service, and even that was given tardily, two years after the promotion to the Castile presidency that it was supposed to complement. Of the councillors of Finance only Sarmiento de Acuña was given a title, and that, appropriately, for his ambassadorial services in England.

The professional administrators were as ill-rewarded as the peers on State, and the conditions under which they worked both at home and abroad may be most appropriately illustrated by following briefly the difficulties and expenses incurred by the best and most honest of them. Carrillo, as in so much else, was a perfect symbol. His service in Flanders was costly. For his 1595 journey, he was given an ayuda of 1,000 ducats, remarkably inadequate for a ninety-six day journey which involved transporting his family and possessions, and his own estimate was that it cost a further 4,000 ducats of his own. On arrival, he had then to maintain four establishments — one for himself on campaign, two in Brussels for his wife and two sons, and one in his home town of Córdoba for his other sons — and he tabulated these residential expenses alone at some 16,000 ducats. His only compensation was a merced of 1,500-2,000 ducats from a sympathetic Albert.

3 - No more precise figure is given.
At the end of his tour of duty he returned to Spain, arriving at Court on a Monday. On the Wednesday week 2,000 ducats were delivered to his house with a royal order that he leave that very day for Flanders to serve as peace commissary. Characteristically - and unusually for a royal servant in even normal circumstances - he did so; the return took another three months and cost him a further 3,000 escudos (c. 3,200 ducats). Characteristically, too, because he was leading a reforming ministry, he refused to ask for an ayuda. At the end of 1602 he returned to Spain to take up the councillorship of Castile to which he had been appointed during his brief sojourn in 1600. He progressed rapidly by way of the Cámara and various juntas to his great visita of 1607-9, and was given another 2,000 ducats on completing the latter, but was left uncertain as to whether this was in acknowledgement of his services in Flanders or for the visita itself. With the Finance presidency he was given in 1609 the customary 8,000 ducats merced, and another such with the Indies appointment of 1617, but was given no allowance for the 1615 journey. At the end of the reign he was awarded a further 4,000 ducats for sixteen years service on the comisión de hebreas.

His sons, too, served the Crown at some expense. Two won habits, but both died as soldiers, the elder in action at the age of twenty four, and a third was given 500 ducats for his studies but elected to serve the King in Italy, at his own expense.

When Carrillo died in 1622 he left debts of some 14,000 ducats.
The Junta considering his widow's request for a posthumous merced listed the various grants made him and drew remarkable conclusions; he had been 'most amply rewarded' for 'he was occupied in the greatest offices of the realm ... and although he deserved them and exercised them well, they should also be considered as reward, for they were not given to him for any seniority, but because he deserved them most and would serve them best'. It had been his privilege to serve the King; perhaps Indies would give her a merced. The Junta would not. ¹

Foreign, or even regional, service was the administrator's nightmare, and Carrillo's reappointment to Flanders was only the most extreme example of the obedience required of the royal servant. He was indeed very fortunate in being allowed to return to Spain in 1602 as early as 1602, for administrators at every level could be subjected in this respect to the most erratic royal whim — thus Fuentes, at the top of the scale, was explicitly made to stay in Milan until he died, ² while contador Diego de Herrera, at roughly the bottom, had after six years in Portugal, to remind Philip of his promise that his tour of duty would not exceed one. ³

The most disastrous appointment of course, as is well known, ⁴ was the ambassadorial, and the chief ambition of most appointees was

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¹ Memorial of doña Francisca Fajarda, to Philip IV, 8 Jun. 1622, printed by A. González Palencia (1932), pp. 344-356.
² Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 378. See also, above, pp. 29-30.
⁴ See G. Mattingly (1965), pp. 222-5.
to secure release - or the promise of it - from their burden. None expressed themselves quite as plaintively as Girón in France, but his plea cited in the heading of this chapter would have found a general echo. ¹ More subtly, Sarmiento de Acuña wrote from England in 1616 that he needed to come home because he had something to tell His Majesty that was so important that he dared not entrust it to a letter, but he then gave his game away by asking not simply for some money for his travelling expenses but also for an ayuda de costa and a title. The councillors of State turned a friendly blind eye and suggested granting him his request, but Philip, unfooled, vetoed judiciously - if one man was allowed such a favour, everybody would start demanding it. ² This attitude was most perfectly expressed - although doubtless for his own reasons; he had voted for Sarmiento de Acuña's licence - by Aliaga when in 1617 he suggested denying Osuna's request for a licence after seventeen expensive years abroad - 'this is the first time that the Duke has asked for a licence, and if it is given to him on this occasion, the service of Your Majesty could be endangered'. ³

The difficulties in replacing a man were two-fold; his debts had to be paid, and an agreeable successor found. Castro, for instance, was unable to leave Rome in 1616 until debts of 14,000 ducats had

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¹ See above, p.173.
² Cnta.St., 26 Jan. 1616, A.G.S. E. 2514, f. 69. See also below, pp. 393-4.
³ Cnta.St., 14 Nov. 1617, A.G.S. E. 1880, no fol.
been paid, while his successor, Zúñiga, was similarly unable to leave Vienna until his of 10,000 were met. ¹ Again, Bautista de Tassis in Paris in 1603, knowing that he was on the point of being replaced, reminded the King that he was owed 3,000 ducats. State took the hint and impressed upon Philip that the money had to be paid before a successor could be named. ² While, however, ambassadorial patience and resource remained unexhausted, the King could pay with promises; Sesa, in Rome since 1590, was appeased in 1601 with an ayuda and a councillorship of State and in 1602 with the post of mayordomo mayor to the Queen, but was not actually replaced until 1604. ³

These conditions obtained nearer home. Luis Enríquez’s service on War was twice interrupted by service away from the capital, and by July 1615 he had sat in effect only for nine months since his departure for Flanders at the end of 1601. Appointed Governor of Galicia on his return in 1607, he had the singular misfortune to be reappointed in 1615. Like Carrillo’s, however, his second tenure was brief; in poor health, he was able to persuade Philip to replace him, and in September 1616 recommended his councillorship. ⁴ Juan de Cardona was

¹ - Lema to Carrillo, 26 Feb. 1616 (Castro) and 12 Nov. 1616 (Zúñiga), A.G.S. C.J.H. 392, no fol. and f. 3.
³ - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 102, 143, 154, 163.
less successful, dying at 90 in 1609, some twenty years after his first retirement and after a succession of disappointments (1599, 1602, 1603 and 1609) in his expectation of being allowed to return to a councillorship of State. ¹ Like Carrillo, these men were given ayudas on appointment to office, had to rely on their salary and their own resources and then claim for their losses only after they had been disbursed. Thus Enríquez in 1609 had to undertake a visita of the Galician coast and claimed a merced only when he despatched his report to Madrid, ² while Puñonrostro, visítador of the northern frontier in the 1601 invasion-scare, had to prove that he had spent his own money on the mission, but only when he returned to the capital, ³ and this despite the Government's knowledge of his financial difficulties even before his appointment. ⁴

Few councillors of War escaped such missions. Puñonrostro himself had as recently as 1596 supervised the defence of Lisbon, and in 1603 barely escaped a similar appointment to Seville, ⁵ and all but five of his twenty one colleagues had their service interrupted by occasional or more permanent appointments ⁶ - a commentary at once upon

¹ - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 23-4, 145, 149, 155, 158-9, 166, 180, 362, 366 and 384. See also above, p. 145.
⁴ - In appointing him, War had to have Philip suspend a lawsuit over his estates in order that he could go, Cnta. War, 8 Feb. 1602, A.G.S. G.A. 589, no fol. See also, below, p. 200.
⁶ - i.e., Valencia, Tassis, Esteban de Ibarra, Sotomayor and Pobar, all recently returned.
their extraordinary qualifications and the junior status of their Council. ¹ The councillor of State was more sedentary, both because he had other duties at the centre and because, promoted as the climax of his career, he had already done ample service abroad. ² Of the thirty one who sat after 1599, only eight left the Council on such service, three of them — Moura, the Adelantado and Fuentes — in extraordinary circumstances in 1600. ³ In effect, therefore, only five — Spinola, the Constable, Villafranca, Niño de Guevara and Zapata — were appointed away from the capital, and the Constable and Villafranca, like Moura, returned to resume their councillorships. The professional administrator, too, tended to stay in the capital once appointed; of Finance's thirty four councillors, only three had their services interrupted, and one of them — Esteban de Ibarra — was so affected as Secretary of War rather than as Councillor of Finance. ⁴

Several men were, like Cardona, appointed to councillorships prior to foreign or regional service, and several, like Carrillo and Sesa, were appointed to make their absence more endurable. They could then work with greater dignity, but, more importantly, with greater hope — one day they would return, and to a councillorship. Far more systematically, men returning from such service were similarly rewarded. Obviously, they

¹ - See below, pp. 247-251
² - See below, pp. 226-230
³ - See above, pp. 29-30.
⁴ - The others being Cabala and Sarmiento de Acuña; see below, pp. 273, 275.
were the better qualified by their service, but equally the conclusion is inescapable that their councillorships were given as reward for their service. They were paid less — indeed, on State, not at all — than they had been, but no longer had to support their official expenses. When their position was becoming untenable, like the ambassadors they asked either for an ayuda or for leave to come to the capital for financial or health reasons. Once there, they could press their case on a King unable to pay an ayuda and be replaced by men seeking a reputation and who, perhaps having served in relative comfort at the centre, would not ask for an ayuda for some time. It had become a convention, and may be illustrated by the process whereby the brothers Pedroso were appointed to Finance. Bernabé, as proveedor general of the Atlantic fleet, was given an ayuda of 1,500 ducats in 1599 to cover his expenses over the previous two years, but had immediately to ask for another such amount, and was awarded 1,000 ducats.¹ His work, however, continued to take him expensively round Spain,² and in January 1603 he was appointed to Finance.³ In September he asked leave to retire from the proveedoría on grounds of ill-health, and to be allowed, as a merced, to renounce it in his brother.⁴ This was an unusual step, but Juan was both well-qualified

¹ - Cnta. War, 3 Nov. 1599, A.G.S. G.A. 553, no fol.
² - In 1599 he served as visitador of the almojarifazgo administrativo, Cnta. Fin., 2 Oct. 1599, A.G.S. C.J.H. 274, f. 231.
for the post and in difficulties of his own; after thirteen years as a proveedor in Spain, Portugal and Brittany, he had had no ayuda and was some 4,000 ducats in debt. The renunciation was allowed, and took place in October, but both remained in difficulties, and in November again approached their councils; Bernabé was now without a salary, and Juan unable to afford even to take up his new post. Bernabé was therefore allowed to retain the military salary while Juan was given a 1,000 ducats ayuda. It took another year to resolve their difficulties, and not until January 1605 did Bernabé commence his councillorship. Juan then went through the familiar routine, satisfying War in 1608 that he deserved an ayuda, and in 1610, a few months convalescence. In 1614, he was appointed contador in the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, but continued to tour Spain as proveedor general. In 1617, while in Gibraltar, he was appointed supernumerary councillor of Finance, but not until 1619 did he plead for the three or four months leave of absence to come to Court for

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2 - First sitting on 12 Jan., Attendance Register.
3 - Canta. War, 6 Sept. 1608, A.G.S. G.A. 689, no fol. In January, Bernabé was given a 4,000 ducats ayuda in reward for 38 years' service, Lerma to Acuña, 26 Jan. 1608, A.G.S. C.J.H. 352, f. ?
convalescence. This was granted, and in May 1620 he took up his councillorship.

Such promotions should not be misinterpreted. Certainly, there was something of a convention here, but councils knew their men and did not accept stories of hardship—much less disburse monies—uncritically. Nor were inappropriate men appointed to the councils. Diego de Brochero, for instance, serving as Admiral of the Atlantic Fleet duly claimed for an ayuda in 1598 and then in 1602 for leave of absence to 'come (to Valladolid) to treat of and remedy his financial affairs'. On doing so he took up his councillorship of War. No man was better qualified for the post—and few, perhaps, currently needed so much on a council dominated by soldiers—than Spain’s leading sailor, and no councillor of State, War or Finance was to serve with a diligence as remarkable as his. That he was appointed almost casually was of no consequence; that he was appointed was.

Promotion to Philip III’s councils went by merit and experience; with a few courtly exceptions, that was an inviolable rule.

2 - Nor of course did acceptance by a council inevitably lead to a councillorship; State thus acknowledged Villafranca’s hardship in 1609 at a time when Court rumour had it that he was on the point of being appointed to State. Philip did not appoint him. Cnta. St., 7 Apr. 1609, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol., and Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), 371.
4 - On his councillorship, below, pp. 255-6.
5 - Nor did his difficulties cease; in 1603 War insisted that unless Philip gave him a grant he would be unable to support the cost of living at Court, Cnta. War, 7 Oct. 1603, A.G.S. G.A. 604, no fol. See also above, p. 167.
Foreign or regional experience was only part of the more general qualification, but an appreciation of its importance does help to establish that a conciliar appointment was a climactic honour. As Carrillo's widow found, promotion was its own reward. On appointment, presidents were given ayudas and secretaries of State and councillors of Castile military habits, but otherwise an administrator at this level had to rely on his salary and was not ordinarily allowed any supplementary ayudas.

Often, indeed, the Crown could not even find the cash for the salary. Pons of Finance was instead given a food allowance - not an uncommon arrangement - but found consistent difficulty in locating his award as one source after another became exhausted, and after fifteen years was some 12,000 ducats in arrears of his colleagues.¹ One of them, Diego de Bazan, was given 1,000 ducats of annual rent in lieu of a salary,² while as has been seen the Pedroso retained their salaries from their previous positions.³ Conversely, Sarmiento de Acuña was given his salary as councillor of Finance to meet his expenses in England.⁴ Lower down the scale, the officials of the War secretariat, faced as their Council acknowledged with 'little possibility of maintaining themselves' on their salaries were given a housing

¹ Appointed by Philip II in 1598, he did not take up his seat until formally reappointed on 26 Oct. 1602, and the arrears were calculated from 1598. Memorandum of his services, 25 May 1613, and cta. Carrillo, 4 Aug. 1614, A.G.S. C.J.H. 380, f. 119; his appointment in 1602, A.G.S. Q.C. 20.
³ See above, pp. 184-5.
allowance instead of an increase, while Lobo Castrillo on his promotion to State's offices was deprived of his 300 ducats salary and given rents in Navarre and Naples.

The general recession extended even to those minor municipal offices occasionally given or sold to senior administrators as ayudas. Many, Carrillo among them, were given escribanías de rentas, but as early as 1600 the Crown had to order the abolition ('consumo') of the seventy two offices of escribanos mayores, both because they were no longer necessary and because it could not support the meagre sum (c. 21,826 ducats) of their annual salary. More importantly, in

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<td>Badajoz</td>
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The only exception to the rule, then, was in the Salamanca escribanías, but no less than 201 of the 318 offices sold over the twenty years were sold in 1588-1592, and only 20 between 1593 and 1599. A.G.S. D.G.T. 24: 322, Cities and Provinces of Madrid, Salamanca and Badajoz.

See also, for statements by Finance of Philip II's policy on office sales and the limited possibilities open to Philip III, Cntas Fin., 9 Jul. and 16 Oct. 1600, A.G.S. C.J.H. 284, ff. 16 and 31.

4 - See Appendix II, for instance, the offices held by Carrillo, Menchaca of Finance, Sarmiento Valladares of Castile, and Amezqueta, Secretary of Castile, respectively, nos.

1611 in accordance with an agreement with the Cortes, it had to abandon its practice of awarding castle alcaidias to administrators. 1

The councillor had only one possibility of supplementing his salary. If he was appointed to an institutionalised junta he was entitled to an extra allowance, and similarly councillors of Castile working jointly on other councils were paid for their attendance, 2 but in 1607 all other councillors were deprived of any such second salaries. 3 Every councillor found his salary inadequate, even those of Castile; Mena de Barrionuevo, jointly asesor of War, died 'notoriously poor' after thirty years in the royal service, and others suffered similarly. 4 However he came by his post, and at whichever level he served, the councillor was liable to a similar fate. Salablanca and Pons of Finance both died leaving insufficient estate to pay for their own

1 - They were traditionally granted to administrators for various reasons - strategically important, they were thereby placed in reliable hands; sometimes, too, it was part of a process of centralisation, taking them out of the hands of local families who had in some cases held them since the Reconquest. The first recorded sale was by Philip II, of that of Alcalá la Real in 1574 to Lic. Benito López de Gamboa. On offices held by Pedro de Padilla and Dr. Andrés Lozada y Prada, below, pp. 200 and 202-3; on those of Lerma, above, pp. 47-8. The turning-point was Philip's refusal in 1611 to allow Molina de Medrano to buy back the Vélez tenancy which had been held by three members of his family, and his refusal to sell a second office to an unnamed person, Cantas. Fin., 11 Mar. and 9 Aug. 1603, A.G.S. 309, ff. 52 and 124 and 13 Aug. 1611, C. J. H. 2365, f. 220.

2 - On these, above, p. 126.

3 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 321. For the context of the decision, above, p. 74.

4 - Cantas. War, 28 Sept. 1618, A.G.S. G.A. 826, f. 93. On Juan de Frías, see below, p. 200.
funerals—the former after sixty years in the Ministry—and the heirs of both had to borrow money to pay for the burials. ¹ Bernabé de Pedroso had, unlike them, come to his councillorship from outside the Ministry, but he too died in poverty after forty-five years service, the last eight as councillor. ² Juan de Acuña Vela of War, after seventy-one years service, the last fifteen as councillor, left insufficient estate to pay for his son’s education, ³ and Puñonrostro, maestre de campo general in 1588 and councillor of War for eleven years, left his family in great hardship. ⁴ Even a presidency, as Carrillo had again found, carried no guarantee of solvency; when Juan de Acuña died in 1615 after forty-seven years in the royal service, the last twelve as President successively of Finance, Indies and Castile, he left more than 4,000 ducats of debts, and his widow had both to sell some of his goods to meet some of these and throw herself on the royal mercy for the funeral expenses. ⁵

One senior administrator, however, never complained seriously of financial difficulties. The secretary was properly rewarded. His was

4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 398. See also below, pp. 200
the best salary of all; the secretaries of State, for instance, were paid more than the presidents of Castile and Inquisition, those of Italy more than that of Finance. ¹ This, however, was only a beginning. Like the senior councillor, the secretary was regularly co-opted onto juntas, and was paid for his troubles, but unlike them he had the right of derecho, of levying fees for his administrative work. He was thus paid for every royal title, cédula and despatch he drew up and witnessed, and for verifying the claims of applicants for offices and mercedes. These could vary enormously, but as the volume of government business rose, so the secretary profited; the secretaries of State thus earned an extra 3,000 ducats or so each annually, and those of Italy, some 2,000. ²

The secretary was thus, and willingly, the most overworked member of the conciliar hierarchy, and he jealously accumulated work. His achievements and ambitions were most perfectly expressed in the career of Francisco González de Heredia. Exceptionally able and

¹ - The material in this paragraph is chiefly drawn from two undated papers (1619?) on the Italy secretaryship, A.G.S. C.J.H. 561405, f. 152; 'Las causas de que procede el dano en los derechos de los secretarios del Consejo de Italia ...', and 'Medio para poner en ejecución el reparto y aumento de los derechos de los despachos del Consejo de Italia'. See also, cédulas of appointment to War of Andrés de Prada and Andrés de Alva, 13 Jun. 1586, B.N. 2058, ff. 14-18, copies; and Instruction given to Gabriel de Zayas on appointment as Secretary of Italy, 20 Oct. 1579, B.N. 1167, ff. 338-341, a copy. ² - Papers on the Italian secretaryship cited above, n. 1.
experienced, he was able to manage both Orders secretaryships together with Castile's Patronato Real, with the help of only two officials. He did so to his own considerable advantage, leaving a fortune of some 250,000 ducats. The Crown, too, profited, but had to replace him with three secretaries, each with two officials, and all with housing and financial allowances, and thereby increased the burden on the nómina by the 10,000 ducats annually which González's labours had saved it.

His was of course an extraordinary case, but was nonetheless significant of the work being done by secretaries, and this found more general recognition in the early years of the reign in the number of offices being divided; they could not only support, but indeed demanded more men. Italy had been divided into three in 1595, and Finance into two in 1596, and Portugal (1602) and Indies (1604) were both divided into four, all previously having been held by one official.

Philip tried to reverse the trend by uniting the secretaryships of

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4 - Cédula reorganising the secretariat of the Council of Italy, 28 Jun. 1595, B.N. Eg. 338, f. 106, a copy.
5 - B.N. 3827, f. 254.
6 - Portugal, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 145-6; Indies, ibid., p. 225 and on the latter see also, Schäfer, i, pp. 198.
War (1600-04), and Castile's Justicia and Cámara y Estado papers (1599-1605), but had to admit failure in both cases; there was too much work to be done.

The secretaries were of course only too happy with the situation, and only on four occasions did any of them consent to promotions to councillorships. Juan de Ibarra did so on Indies and Álvarez Pereira on Portugal, but both only on receipt of adequate compensation—Ibarra receiving 4,000 ducats of annual rent, and Álvarez an ayuda of 15,000 maravedís and an encomienda and 500,000 reis of rent for his son. In effect, then, they were paid to leave their offices in order to allow general rationalisations to take place. The other cases were different in kind, reflecting the royal reverence for experience. The prodigiously overworked Esteban de Ibarra held both secretaryships of War together with a councillorship of Finance—and, indeed, a vast amount of junta business—but in

1 - Esteban de Ibarra holding one office from 21 Aug. 1598 (A.G.S. Q.C. 13) until his appointment to a councillorship; on Prada's promotion to State in 1600 he assumed his papers; he held both until 1606, when he was succeeded by Antonio de Arostegui (12 Mar., ibid., 7) and Bartolome de Aguilar y Anaya (18 Mar., ibid., 9).

2 - Luis Vázquez de Molina y Salazar, Justicia secretary, taking over the Cámara papers on the retirement of Juan Vázquez de Salazar on 4 Jan. 1599 (ibid., 32); on his own retirement he was succeeded by Juan Ruiz de Velasco, who in turn in 1605 was succeeded by Juan de Amezqueta and Tomás de Ángulo; see Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 150, 259-260, and for dates, Appendix 11, nos. 239-243.

3 - On rents, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 198-200.

4 - ibid., pp. 145-6 and 199.
effect his secretarial duties cost him his councillorship, and he sat as an effective councillor of Finance only after he had been promoted from the secretaryship to a councillorship of War. In less gargantuan fashion, Miguel de Ipeñarrieta held both secretaryship and councillorship of Finance, and was able to perform both satisfactorily.

The secretary's officials did not share his wealth, but could claim for supplementary ayudas, and did so quite regularly. Bartolomé Aguilar y Anaya of War was rewarded in 1600 for his services and compensated for his difficulties by being appointed royal secretary, a marvellously sophisticated award by the Crown since it cost nothing while giving him the guarantee of an eventual conciliar appointment; not promotion but the promise of it was his reward. He had, however, still to eat, and four months later had to ask again, and was awarded a 300 ducats ayuda. Not until 1606 was he finally appointed to a conciliar post. Not every official was as fortunate. Birbiesca of Finance won the acknowledgement that his 250 ducats salary was inadequate and was in 1602 awarded an annual ayuda of one suppressed escribanía worth 20,000 maravedís (c. 53.3 ducats). By 1609 he was again in difficulties sufficient to merit a merced of 150 ducats but

1 - On Ibarra, below, p. 265, and on Ipeñarrieta, p. 280.
4 - See above, p. 193, n. 1.
insufficient to prevent him asking for yet another in 1610, being awarded 100 ducats. This, however, was to be a last cash award, and he was given a second annual escribanía to prevent him asking for more cash in future.¹ Femat of War experienced similar difficulties; awarded 300 ducats in 1607, he had to ask again in 1610 and was granted another 300.²

The use of the suppressed escribanía was significant of the Crown's more general economic difficulties. With hardly any more offices to sell, and with indeed hardly anyone willing to buy them, it could only sell back to the towns the privilege of exemption from further sales, and it generally used the meagre profits to reward its own servants; in 1597, for instance, Finance met its own expenses for the Feast of the Bulls by abolishing nine escribanías, worth 40,000 maravedis each,³ and in 1596 had supplemented the salaries of its secretarial officials by granting them three offices, a procedure it repeated in Easter 1597, giving them now one each.⁴

Such was perfectly legitimate, but the Crown did occasionally resell these offices, almost invariably to help its own servants. As the offices were minor, so were the administrators - secretarial

4 - Memorandum of Pedro de Lecama and the officials of the secretariat, 7 Jul. 1605, A.G.S. D.G.T. 24: 323.
officials, conciliar porters, escribanos de cámaras, parejadores de las obras and the like. A typical case was that of the escribanía of Sanchobueno, a village in Salamanca; sold for 100 ducats in 1592, it was suppressed in the advantage of Finance's secretarial officials, and in 1602 it was re-created and sold for 50,000 maravedís (c.133.3 ducats), abolished once again, then re-created and sold again, still in 1602. The Cortes were forthright in their condemnation of such practice; no objection could be made to the 1592 transaction, but the successive deals of 1602 were dubious. The reasons for the two sales of that year are not recorded, but the first was clearly cancelled and the money would then have had to be returned to the purchaser. There would have been profit for the Crown, therefore, only in the abolition of 1592 and the second such of 1602. What the Crown was doing in 1592—and probably again in 1602—was to give some slight relief to its own servants, and the very complexity of the procedure was highly significant of the decline in its resources. It would have been far easier for it to grant the administrators the proceeds from first sales, but there were hardly of these. Thus, too, it only very rarely resorted to the correlative device of granting an office to an administrator and making him pay for the privilege. It was not worth the trouble. ¹

¹— Cities and provinces of Salamanca, Madrid and Badajoz, A.G.S. D.C.T. 24; 322.
Finance, unlike State and War, employed a large number of accountants, at sub-secretarial official level. The contador could rely on his fees ('derecho') to supplement his salary, but also found himself in chronic difficulties. The older his office the longer ago its rewards had been fixed, and the more inadequate they therefore were; by 1608 the contadores de rentas were complaining of a price rise of over 600% since their salaries had been fixed - at 400 ducats - 150 years previously,¹ and the contadores de mercedes similarly complained at the same time of salaries 132 years old.² For such men, further price rises or coinage devaluation were simply extra vexations. But even more recently-founded offices had their hardship; the contador del libro de caja coincidentally asked for a rise on the 2,000 ducats granted his office on its foundation in 1593.³

Administrative as well as economic circumstances had changed somewhat since the days of Columbus's youth, and for only one office had change been advantageous. The contadores de resultados now required only four hours daily to fulfil the work for which they were paid 600 ducats annually, and could spend the rest of their week on contracted de parte business, an arrangement which suited Pedro de Bañuelos - until

¹ - Memorandum of the contadores de rentas, 1608, A.G.S. C.J.H. 352, no fol
² - Memorandum of the contadores de mercedes, 1608, ibid.
he was promoted to the de rentas office. More typically, the contador del libro de caja found his expenses consuming two-thirds of his salary. In the reorganisation of the Finance offices in 1602 an attempt was made to rationalise these anachronisms but was not completed, and not until 1608 was the new fee-book ('arancel') introduced. It was the first such since 1476.

Broadly, this raised the salary level at the expense of the derecho, and it caused an uproar. One of the complaints of the contadores de rentas illustrated the manner in which government business could, by force of economic circumstance, be conducted at this level. One quarter of their work was de parte, the rest de oficio, and in order to conduct this latter, the contadores had each to maintain four officials, and did so in extraordinary fashion by 'putting-out' the de parte work and paying the officials' salaries from the profit thereby made. The new arancel, however, deprived them of virtually all their fees and they were consequently unable to maintain the officials to conduct the main volume of their work. Similarly, the contadores de mercedes were forced to dismiss some of their twelve officials. Such was perhaps commendable enough, but the Crown was

1 - Memorandum of the contadores de rentas, op. cit. The contador was obliged to spend three hours daily plus another five weekly.
4 - Memorandum of the contadores de rentas, op. cit.
5 - Memorandum of the contadores de mercedes, op. cit.
then morally obliged to employ the dismissed men elsewhere. The anachronisms of a century and a half could not be wiped out overnight. Inevitably, too, more were created. Two offices profited from the reforms; the contadores de la razón were accorded a three-fold rise to 300,000 maravedís (c. 800 ducats) and were given an additional ayuda of 200 ducats together with two suppressed escribanías,¹ and the contadores de relaciones were given an improved derecho.²

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¹ Memorandum of the contadores de rentas, op. cit.
² Memorandum of the contadores de mercedes, op. cit.
Finance and the renunciation and sale of administrative offices.

As he neared the end of his active service, the administrator was faced with the problem of losing his salary and housing and financial allowances and of being therefore quite unable to maintain himself and his family. In exceptional circumstances, he might be given a lucrative award on retirement; thus Padilla of War was appointed alcaide of the Alhambra, while Finance's contador Ayardi was appointed ad honorem councillor with a salary of 200 ducats and the appropriate allowances. More generally, however, the administrator had to wait until he was on or over the brink of death before he or his family could ask for a compensatory ayuda. The Crown, sensible of its obligations, did its best to provide some measure of reward—thus Lic. Juan de Frías's daughter was given a military habit with which to tempt a suitor, while Puñonrostro's eleven year old son was given titular command of a company at arms.

The principle that a son might be rewarded for his father's services was well-established; there was thus nothing wrong with the

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1 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 27.
3 - See also above, pp. 179, 190.
4 - Cnta. War, 28 Sept. 1618, A.G.S. G.A. 826, f. 93.
theory of the Junta dealing with the claims of Carrillo's widow that the habits granted to his sons had been for his and not for their services. More generously, however, the principle was frequently and formally acknowledged prior to an award; when Luis Gaitán de Ayala died in 1607, Finance advised Philip that, as he had served with distinction and been ill-rewarded, his son should be employed in the royal service as a posthumous merced.¹

The principle thus acknowledged had a more general application, for the administrator frequently asked that his son be invested with his own office as just such a reward. Frequently, indeed, at the administrative levels the son had assisted the father in his later years with a view to securing the succession, and the Crown was therefore faced with a real temptation; aware of the quality of the projected renunciatee, it would be able to reward the administrator and to maintain its own standards at little cost to itself. It was therefore prepared to consider the pleas made to it by its ageing servants, and the sale or renunciation of an office should not therefore be necessarily thought indicative of declining standards.

In practice, the privilege was allowed almost exclusively only at the lower administrative levels, and, as invariably, only when appropriate safeguards were in operation. On four occasions, it was

allowed with councillorships, but so exceptional were the circumstances that none in effect represented a formal renunciation. The sons of Chinchón and Borja were allowed to succeed respectively to their Treasurership General of Aragón (and Italy) and councillorship of Portugal, but both had to wait for nearly five years before being allowed to enter into their new posts.¹ The third grant — and the only one on a major central council — was also made to a relative of a great man of state, but, an award of favour, it was not posthumous; Rodrigo de Castro, uncle of the Count of Lemos, was allowed to deputise on Inquisition for Francisco Manuel who had been appointed while underage even though he himself was no older.² More formally, the right was allowed on insignificant Crusade, but Finance was able to cancel the licence, ostensibly because it could not guarantee the quality of the son to whom Philip had allowed the right, but in practice because of its shocked objections of principle.³

The Castro licence was thus the only one not granted posthumously, and one other great man of state was not dissimilarly rewarded. On the night before Andrés de Prada died, Philip visited him and comforted him with the grant of a Santiago habit for one nephew.

¹ On Chinchón’s son, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 384, 400 and 519; on Borja’s, ibid., pp. 288-9. See Appendix 11, nos.
² ibid., p. 345.
³ Luis Valle de la Cerda had failed to renounce his office and when his widow asked that a deputy be named until a son came of age Finance took cynical, perhaps legally dubious, advantage of the minority to rule that the second life should last only until one son, preferably the eldest, attained his majority. Cnta. Fin., 6 Dec. 1606, A.G.S. C.J.H. 341, no fol.
and the la Coruña alcaldía and an appointment as royal secretary for another. It was however, to be thirteen years before the latter was appointed to a conciliar post.

This was a doubly appropriate award, concerning as it did a man who was himself part of one of the many secretarial dynasties. Although Philip continued to appoint members of these dynasties to secretaryships, he effectively put an end to what had been a growing practice under his father. The secretaries of Castile had had a legal right to renounce their offices, and those of State had latterly had it effectively, but Philip allowed it only on comparatively unimportant Aragón, where the Gasol and Villanueva had de facto if not de jure renunciation. On the major councils he allowed no more renunciations; his father's standards were not high enough for him.

On occasions, however, he did allow it at administrative level. The problems facing him at this level were perfectly illustrated at the end of the reign by his and Finance's reactions to two cases.

2 - Lozada y Prada appointed Secretary of State, 30 Apr. 1624, ibid.
3 - 'Since time immemorial ... they have always passed from fathers to sons ...', Miguel de Ondarca Cavala to Gregorio de Tapia, undated, a reply to Tapia's letter of 18 Apr. 1605, A.G.S. C.C. 888, f. 48; the two inherited secretaries of Justicia and Cámara y Estado (Appendix II, nos. 139 and 140, pp. 443) were almost certainly related; none of their successors were.
4 - The inherited Secretaries being Francisco and Martín de Idiáquez, the latter indeed having specifically succeeded Juan de Idiáquez (31 Dec. 1596), Pérez Mínguez (1935), pp. 219 and 264. Again, no more were related.
permission to renounce in favour of his son in reward for his fifty two years' service. That service had variously taken him to Flanders, Granada, Seville and Aranjuez as well as Madrid and Valladolid, and having spent his wife's dowry and never having had a merced, he asked for the renunciation as the only inheritance his son could receive.

In a significant manifestation of the tension always present between the principle and justifiable expediency, Finance divided over his request, and in doing so afforded two statements of the arguments as to the advisability of permitting such renunciations. The first half, led by President Salazar, impressed upon Philip that both the length and quality of Rodríguez's service justified the favour, and drew more general conclusions:

'Your Majesty should grant the favour that he asks because—(the son) having the requisite qualifications—these councillors think it convenient that the son of a father who has served with satisfaction and with intelligence and integrity should continue serving the office that his father held. This example ... would give encouragement ... to those who serve because, knowing that their sons have to be favoured and helped, they would not divert themselves from the service of Your Majesty ... so that when they die they will not be left unhelped and in hardship ...'.

In the view of these councillors, the safeguards suggested by Rodríguez...

1—Thus, Francisco de Gasol succeeded Gerónimo de Gasol, while Agustín de Villanueva was followed by Jerónimo de Villanueva and then by Juan Lorenzo de Villanueva. I have found no formal evidence of renunciation as such.
were sufficient to ensure that the renunciation could be properly allowed; his son was only fourteen, and Rodríguez would therefore continue in his post until he attained his majority, and had agreed that if when the time came his son should prove to have neither the requisite qualities nor the age the licence should be cancelled. Moreover, in their view, the office was not very demanding of intelligence, and they therefore strongly advised Philip to allow the request.

Their colleagues, sympathetic to the supplicant, insisted that the legal prohibition on filling offices before they became vacant be preserved. The son might not fulfil the hopes of the father, and might indeed be complacent in learning the duties of the office if he was assured that it was to be his. Disagreeing with their colleagues as to the qualities demanded by the position, they pointed to the deleterious effect on administrative morale; others who had served as diligently as Rodríguez and with as little reward, and who had only reached their positions after years in the service, would be discouraged. The office should be filled only when it became vacant, and then only in the best candidate. Rodríguez's services should be acknowledged by the grant of a place in Finance's offices to his son, but any further promotion should then reflect only the son's abilities and experience. Philip, true to his general policy, supported this latter view.¹

At the same time, Finance considered a similar request from Treasurer General Juan Ibañez Segovia. He had served for thirty six years, sometimes at great personal risk, and in his twelve years as Treasurer had received no merced or ayuda and was unable to properly pay his officials. Unlike Rodríguez's, his son was a mature man with ten years' royal service to his credit, and with his character and qualifications therefore well known to the Council. Again it divided, although now in different formation. Salazar now led a minority of three in advising that although the son would be a 'very appropriate' choice the prohibitive laws should nevertheless be observed. The majority of seven, including two of the five who had voted against Rodríguez, considered the son's qualities sufficient to justify an exemption, especially since he had helped his father in the office. Philip, consistent, refused. 1

Nearly two years later, in the last months of the reign, the Treasurer tried again, and like others, found a second hearing more successful. With the further service to his credit, he met now with a unanimously favourable response from the councillors, and their suggestion that the thirty eight year old Mateo was the candidate they would recommend were the office vacant changed the royal mind. 2 The Crown had exacted extra service, and now gave a merced at no cost.

2 - Cnta. Fin., 7 Feb. 1621, A.G.S. C.J.H. 414, f. 267. Salazar, ill, was absent for this meeting.
Others won the same privilege, but no more easily. Pedro Luís de Torregrossa, contador del libro de caja, left his daughters only his debts, and Finance allowed them effective renunciation, but with the stipulation that it be left to Miguel Pérez Collado, his nephew and, more importantly, his official and a man of known character. Again, the Crown had the best of both worlds. Rodríguez de Torres had been able to cite five cases in which renunciation had been allowed by Philip or his father, one of them in the Casa de Contratación. Of the other four, no information is extant on that by Juan Vello de Acuña of his office of contador de rentas in his son, but at least by the end of the reign Francisco de Monzón had not actually handed over his of contador de mercedes, nor Diego López de Gojenaga his de sueldo; in all probability, therefore, the Crown was again exacting extra years of service for the renunciation. The documentation for the last case cited by Rodríguez reflected the Crown's thinking in his and other cases. Alexo Dolmos had by 1601 served for forty-two years in Finance's offices, twelve in various minor positions, and the last thirty as contador de sueldo, and between 1591 and 1596 had also served as contador de la razón. Claiming that he had been overlooked for promotion, he asked to be allowed to renounce in reward for his services, and the Council agreed both to this and to the ancillary

request for a pension of 300 ducats annually to support his old age. It was satisfied with the qualities of a son who had assisted him during his illnesses and deputised for him during his absences, and Philip agreed to the renunciation, but refused the pension and allowed instead a single award of 600 ducats. Dolmós's hopes being thus thwarted, he had to return and ask permission to exercise his offices jointly with his son—and to share the salary with him—and both Council and King agreed, again winning extra years of service.

The Crown drove hard bargains. Cristóbal de Almacán, after forty years in the service asked for permission in 1603 to renounce his office in favour of a future son-in-law so that he might provide at least one daughter of his four with a dowry, but while he was pressing his case found his office granted to someone else. Then offered 300 ducats pension, he found that too inadequate, and spent a further twenty months asking both that it be increased and that he be given some post with which to support himself. Finance recommended a further 200 ducats of annual pension, but again Philip limited the grant, to a three year period.

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2 - Cnta.Fin., 11 Mar.1601, ibid., f.87.
The sale of administrative offices was strictly illegal, but was nevertheless countenanced on a few occasions, in each of which exceptional circumstances obtained. Although each council controlled its own sales Finance had to ratify their agreements by entering them in the libro de la razón and it was therefore able to interfere in their sales. Its first concern was to observe the law, its second, more pragmatic, to make the best of circumstances by using its authority to ensure that the Crown profited from the few sales allowed by the King or by other councils.

The reign of Philip II had ended inauspiciously. In 1594 he had bluntly advertised the sale of War's escribanía de cámara de los negocios de justicia, and had cynically auctioned it off, twice agreeing a price with a purchaser only to dispossess him when higher bids were offered. He thereby raised the price from 8,000 to 11,027 ducats before his victim took legal proceedings against him and forced him to abandon the sale altogether.

The nearest Philip III came to such cynicism was in allowing Tristan de Ciriza to sell his office in 1612, and in rebuking him Finance made its principles quite clear; "if this office were vacant ... this Council would not propose Valencia for it to Your Majesty, but..."
persons who had passed through other contadurías and who had practice and knowledge of the papers of the royal exchequer. Only on two occasions did Finance itself break those principles.

Martín de Pradeda had by 1599 served for twenty-three years as escribano de cámara in the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, and had for the last three served jointly in the same office in the second Contaduría. By doing so, he had saved the exchequer some 120 ducats annually. Despite this, he was allowed to renounce only on condition that he pay 2,000 ducats, and because the office was not lucrative he was unable to find a successor. Nine years later, therefore, he appealed again to the generosity of the Council, and if he found satisfaction, in having the 2,000 ducats cancelled, so did the Council. Its self-interest demanded that it retain a valued servant, and one from whom, indeed, it had once again exacted extra years of service;

The Council says that Martín de Pradeda is a good official and serves well, and because of this the most important matters ... are ordinarily committed to him, and he would be missed if he should leave the said office. It therefore holds it to be most convenient to the service of Your Majesty (to allow him) - what he now asks ... because, holding a cédula of Your Majesty allowing him to dispose of it in life or in death, he will

be content and continue to serve in it'.

The concern to reap profit from necessity governed Finance's reaction to the problem of selling its own receptoría and those of Castile and Indies. Its own it sold for 50,000 ducats, an immensely profitable transaction tolerated only because, with a spectacular and puzzling decline in the revenue from criminal fines, it found the office no longer supporting itself. The other cases were different in kind, and in both Finance was concerned to preserve its own jurisdictional interests. The Castile office was granted for two lives as a merced to Uceda's secretary, and Finance was able to profit rather nicely from the alienation and to affirm its own authority by selling him the perpetuation for another 3,200 ducats. It was indeed rather pleased with itself; the office was of little importance and the final agreement - unlike the first - 'very advantageous to the royal exchequer'. A year later it asserted its authority more trenchantly when Castile sold the perpetuation of the Indies office for three lives for 11,000 ducats; with a sale involved Finance refused ratification, and sternly rebuked Philip for having

tolerated the project; better not to sell than to sell at a profit. ¹

¹ - Cnta. Fin.,? Nov. 1616, A.G.S. C.J.H. 391, no fol. A copy, and therefore no royal decision is recorded. See also, Schäfer, I, p. 374.
7. Councils and Councillors.

In considering both appointments to councils and the exercise of councillorships there are exceptions to every rule. On State and War in particular, for instance, the fact of appointment did not necessarily mean that a man would actually sit, nor indeed that he had not already sat, and on every council there could be the very greatest differences between institutional and personal performances - between, for instance, State's sitting only 32 times in 1608 or Finance's 122 in the same year, or between Brochero, sitting 1,688 times on War or Belvedere, sitting only twice. All councils had men who were councillors only in name. Many different pressures or circumstances could limit a man's service, again especially on aristocratic State and War, but they could obtain, too, on the professional councils. Of Finance's thirty four councillors, five, serving as deputies, sat only 42 times between them - Monroy, Mazo, Hurtado, Ayandí and Alarcón - and a sixth, Cabala, sat only 36 times before being appointed to a post in Seville; a seventh, Sarmiento de Acuña, was lost to an embassy; an eighth, Acuña, sat only 26 times as he waited to begin his visita; a ninth, Ibarra, attended only seven times in

1 - The statistical and biographical material upon which this chapter is based is summarised in vol. 11, below, pp. 399-464.
2 - The figure relates only to the initialled consultas; he probably attended over 120 or so of the other 153 meetings.
five years and a tenth, Ramírez de Prado, only seven in two, as other interests consumed their time; and an eleventh, Gaitán de Ayala, only 19 in two as illness caught up with him. What was important about a council in the first instance, therefore, was how the nucleus of its councillors served and, correlative, how ancillary councillors were used to make good temporary deficiencies. A presidency, too, was fundamental; Finance, under Pozo, Acuña, Carrillo and Salazar underwent such radical changes as almost entitle us to speak of four different Councils of Finance. No council, in short, can be properly studied without the statistical data of performance and attendance. For State, War and Finance, such data will be used in detail, but that discussion might profitably be prefaced by some general remarks as to the nature of the composition of the other councils.

The major, Castilian, councils divided into three groups - State for the greater, and War, the lesser, aristocracy; Castile, Orders, Indies and Inquisition, for the university-educated; and Finance, effectively self-educated. Although there were occasional deficiencies in the experience of groups of councillors and although individual ambition could be limited by social class, it remains true that this Administration offered a career for the talents; the exigencies of governing impossibly complex empire had created a class of men of massive and bewildering experience, and Philip III made the fullest use of them.
a. The lawyer-councillor; Castile, Indies, Orders and Inquisition.

Castile, Indies \(^1\) and Orders were for letrados. Castile had six doctorates, Indies and Orders three each, and all other of their councillors had first degrees except for Ibarra, Duarte and Ocampo on Indies, the two títulos Malpica and Gerona and Pérez de Rivera on Castile. \(^2\) All councillors of Castile and Orders had traditionally to be of caballero rank, but there was only the occasional suggestion of nobility, and then only in five cases – Castile's two títulos; Pimentel, the illegitimate son of Benavente; Guzmán, related to the Olivares; and Padilla, holders of a señorío, the latter three all sitting on Orders. \(^3\)

There were four routes, all judicial, to a place on these councils, with Castile additionally siphoning off a number of men from other councils and in turn providing ex-officio members to War, Finance, Inquisition and Crusade. The first was the Audiencia; three of Castile's councillors came directly from those of Valladolid or Granada, and at least another eleven had begun their careers there, and

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1 - The councillors listed in my appendix differ from those listed by Dr. Schäfer; he did not include Criado y Castilla (no. 277), Ocampo (291) and Pérez de Araciel (295), while I have included in my analysis those five listed by him but of whom I have found no other record – Arias Maldonado (270), Ayala (271), Maldonado Verdejo (288), Roco de Villagutierrez Chumacero (296) and Rodríguez de Valtodano (267). He was clearly incorrect in having Saavedra (297) promoted from Finance and I have included him among those of unidentified background.

2 - The A.H.N. Cons., L.de P. and A.G.S. Q.C. series almost invariably list a man's degree, but there are exceptions and it may be that some of these men had in fact graduated; it would appear highly
five of Indies' and seven of Orders' also came directly. Additionally, Castile and Indies both took one councillor from the Seville Contratación, and another seven of the latter's members were appointed on their returns from Audiencia posts in the Indies, four as oidores and three as presidents. The second source, the alcaldía de casa y corte, provided Castile with seven, Indies with eight and Orders with one, and the third, the oidoría of Finance's Contadurías Mayores, three, six and none respectively.

The last and the most regular of the routes was the conciliar fiscalía. The fiscal was a definitive figure, for he was the Crown lawyer in those judicial cases which formed the largest sector of the business of all Castilian councils except State, War and Finance; it was thus his existence which in effect defined the consejo supremo,¹ and he brought a peculiarly valuable expertise to the council table. Six of Philip III's seven fiscales of Castile were promoted by him to councillorships,² and they brought diverse

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3 - See Appendix II, respectively nos. 197, 233, 334, 326, 332.
1 - 'Supremo' in this context being synonymous with 'judicial'; only Castile and Inquisition were literally 'supreme' in that they were final courts of appeal.
2 - A seventh, Diego Ramírez (248) was appointed (19 Apr. 1600, A.G.S. Q.C. 12) but apparently did not take up the post, which was filled by Lic. Gilimon Ramírez de Arellano (226).
experience of other offices - three having been fiscales and one an oidor in the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda, and one a fiscal and then councillor of Indies. Moreover, another seven of the councillors of Castile had served as fiscales in a wide range of offices. Six of the eight Orders' fiscales after 1604\(^1\) went on to councillorships, as did all of Indies' seven, while two other councillors of Indies had also served as fiscales, of Orders and the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda.

Information is available on the backgrounds of thirty eight of the forty one councillors of Castile appointed by Philip III, thirty six of Indies' thirty nine and thirteen of Orders' twenty one; of these, the four judicial posts therefore provided twenty, thirty five and thirteen respectively, the outstanding councillor of Indies being Juan de Ibarra, promoted from the secretariat. The councillor of Orders could reasonably hope for a promotion to Castile; of the thirteen promoted during the reign, one went to Inquisition, one to the presidency of Valladolid, and ten went directly - and Ocontrillo indirectly - to Castile. On Indies, however, the councillorship tended to be a final honour; of the forty six serving in all, twenty seven served until they retired or died,\(^2\) five were appointed to the

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1 - The office certainly existed prior to 1604, but I have found no record of appointments before that date.

2 - The dates of their deaths derive almost exclusively from Dr. Schäfer's appendix, i, 355-8.
Contratación presidency, one to that of Granada and one to a professorship at Salamanca. In all, seven were appointed directly to Castile, but Villagómez died before taking up his appointment, and Villela was sent to Flanders to serve in Carrillo's old post, like him in 1600 a supernumerary councillor not to sit, at least yet, on the Council.  

Of the others, Gasca de Salazar was promoted by Philip II, and Flores by Philip IV. Philip III, therefore, directly promoted only four men to Castile. Another three, however, progressed indirectly, Tejada y Mendoza and Marmolejo via the Contratación presidency, the latter under Philip IV, and Pérez de Araciel through the Castile fiscalía.

In addition, therefore, to the four judicial routes,
eighteen of the councillors of Castile appointed by Philip III - that is, approximately half - came from other councillorships; eight came from Orders, six from Indies and Villagómez came indirectly from the Contratación, and one each from Navarre, Aragón and Inquisition. There was thus a considerable diversification of

1 - González Dávila (1623), p. 468. He was appointed President under Philip IV; see no. 260.
2 - Appointed to Indies 15 Jun. 1570 and to Castile 29 Sept. 1592, A.G.S. Q.C.11; Dr. Schäfer (Appendix II, no. 40) had 29 Nov. 1592 for the latter date, and has him finishing on Indies on his promotion. I have found him initialling an Indies consulta in 1598.
3 - i.e., Alderete de Haro (196), Benavides (198), Cabrera (200), Contreras (203), López de Salcedo (210), Medinilla (212), Medránco (213) and Padilla (219).
4 - i.e., Molina de Medránco (216), Ocontrillo (218), Pérez de Aponte (221), Salcedo (227), Pérez de Araciel (222) and Villagómez (235).
5 - i.e., San Vicente (229), Guardiola (208) and Paniagua de Loaysa (220).
experience, and one broadly justifying González Dávila's dictum that the councillors of Castile were 'the most learned men of the kingdom'.

Inquisition was broadly of a kind with these three councils. Of its thirty-one councillors, the backgrounds of twenty-five can be analysed. Of these at least six councillors, as has been seen, owed their offices to the exercise of favour. University education was again fundamental; five had doctorates and only three—Castro, Manuel and Gúzman—were not licentiates. Five sat as Castile comisarios, a further two were promoted from Inquisition's own fiscalia and another from the post of auditor de rota in Rome. It was thus substantially part of the letrado network. In at least five other cases legal experience was supplemented by ecclesiastical—two came from regional Inquisitorships, two from episcopacies and one from the chaplaincy of Madrid's Encarnación.

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1 - González Dávila (1623), p. 356.
2 - See above, p. 127.
3 - I have found no record of Gúzman's holding a degree, but it appears highly probable that he had such; he later rose to be Archbishop of Seville.
Note: the extra-Castilian councils.

The biographical information on the extra-Castilian councillors allows of only one substantial conclusion in that it confirms the well-known subordination of those kingdoms to Castile. The leading aristocrats on Italy, Aragón and Portugal - Navarre had none - were castilianised, appointed only too obviously as centralising agents. More generally, subordination was expressed in the limited possibilities open to their members; they could not hope for a place on a Castilian council, and it can hardly have soothed their resentment to appreciate that those councils were after all concerned with matters Castilian. In particular, the regentes of Aragón and the Italian members of Italy were men of considerable distinction, generally as appears with that legal training necessary for a place on Castile, Orders and Indies, and with considerable administrative experience. But only two councillors of Aragón were promoted to central councils - Monserrat de Guardiola under Philip II to Castile, and Navarro to Inquisition - and the councillor could otherwise hope only for the place that went with seniority on the Junta de Guerra de Aragón. Navarre did somewhat

1 - See, most obviously, the Chinchón on Italy and Aragón, the Moura and Borja on Portugal, respectively, nos. 432, 433 (and 414, 415); 461, 462; 451, 452.

2 - See, for instance, the careers of Caimán (399), Corseto (402), Quintana Dueñas (409), Rodríguez de Salamanca (412) and Tapia (413) of Italy; Fontanet (436), Martínez de Villar (439) and Zalba de Vallsca (448). The information on these men in the Appendix derives chiefly from González Dávila (1623), pp. 454-5 and 438.
better; it had, at different removes, supplied Contreras and Ramírez de Prado to Castile at the beginning of the reign, and it provided San Vicente as supernumerary councillor of Castile in 1615, and Jiménez de Oco to the Orders fiscalía in 1614, whence he passed in 1616 to a councillorship. But such were exceptional; more typical was the career of Camargo, sitting curiously on both Aragón and Navarre and winning a promotion to the Granada cidoria. Regente Escudero of Italy almost shared San Vicente's triumph, but died before taking up his place on Castile.  

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1 - A.H.N. Cons. L. de P. 724, f. 25v. He did not however appear in the Granada lists for 1606 and 1607, and in 1607 took up the position of cidor in Valladolid. Almansa and Acosta were also both promoted from Navarre to Granada, but Acosta again did not take up his place, continuing on Navarre for four years.

b. The Presidents.

After the dismissals of Vázquez de Arce, Cortés, Portocarrero, Poza and Laguna, Philip III appointed twenty two presidents to Castile, Finance, Indies, Orders, Inquisition and Italy, together with one Governor each for Finance and Italy as deputies for ill and absent presidents. There was no aristocratic restoration. Philip III left three of those six councils in titled hands, but only eight of his son's appointees were nobles - Miranda (Castile); Lemos (Indies and Italy); Salinas (Indies); the Constable and Benavente (Italy); Salazar (Finance) and Caracena (Orders). Two distinctions should be drawn here - between Italy and the other councils, and between the old and the new aristocracy. Italy, conceived to rule a foreign land, was necessarily led by great magnates, for only they had the elevated experience and rank appropriate to the leadership. The Constable and Benavente had such in full measure, and if Lemos was a less obvious choice, he had some modicum of Italian experience to complement that gained from his leadership of Indies. In the event he was largely an absentee president, and his deputy, Dr. Juan Beltrán de Guevara, was thoroughly well-qualified. The Presidents of Italy, therefore, are not directly

1 - On the significance of social rank in determining which nobles served in Italy, below, pp. 235-6
relevant to the problem of the role of the aristocracy in government.

Of the titulos leading the Castilian letrado councils, only Miranda and Lemos were of the old aristocracy; Salinas, Salazar and Caracena all had new titles, as did Acuña for the latter part of his presidency of Castile, and all were men of singular distinction and achievement. The old aristocracy, indeed, did rather less well than it might have even ordinarily expected.

The lawyer was more successful. Although Inquisition, like Italy, demanded a particular qualification of its president — it was amply fulfilled; two were cardinals, two, bishops and one a royal confessor — it had in Niño de Guévara, Zúñiga and even Bautista Acevedo presidents with legal training. Castile, Finance and Indies were effectively dominated by lawyer-administrators; all four of Miranda's successors on Castile and Acuña and Carrillo on both Finance and Indies were thus qualified, as were Governors Beltrán de Guévara (Italy) and Cocompofrio (Finance). Neither of Order's presidents had legal training, but Idiáquez was qualified for any government post while Caracena, previously Governor of Galicia, had clearly demonstrated his administrative abilities as Viceroy of Valencia supervising the Expulsion.

Philip III's president, therefore, was a man of considerable political and administrative experience, as often as not with legal
training; only exceptionally was he closely associated with Lerma,¹ and even more rarely was he drawn from the higher aristocracy; and he had virtually no previous experience of his council.²

His tenure of office was, however, fairly consistently undermined by absenteeism caused either by ill-health or by various other claims on his time. Finance was apparently alone in its resistance to such pressure, and indeed in this respect attained perfection; in the twenty five years³ from 1597 to 1622, its presidents missed only 22 of the 1584 meetings for which initialled consultas have survived, and three of those were accounted for by Carrillo's journey with the Court in 1615 and ten by Salazar's terminal illness at the turn of 1620-21. Orders, however, was as has been seen consistently deprived of Idiáquez,⁴ while Castile suffered over the three years from the autumn of 1607 from the successive illnesses and deaths of Miranda, Bautista Acevedo and Manso.⁵ Inquisition, similarly, having lost Niño de Guevara a little over a year after he replaced Portocarrero then lost Zúñiga within another five months.⁶ Italy fared

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1 - See above, pp.103-6.
2 - Acuña had served on Castile and briefly on Finance, and Zúñiga and Aliaga on Inquisition, but none of the others had had any previous experience of their councils.
3 - On the lack of documentation for 1602, above, p.34.
4 - See above, p.146.
5 - See above, pp.78-9.
6 - On Niño's appointment to Seville, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp.94 and 97, and on Zúñiga's death, ibid., pp.154,162. See also Lea, i, p.306 for the suggestion that Niño was effectively dismissed.
worst of all, The Constable, appointed on his return from Italy, left Court immediately to convalesce, and with this absence coinciding with the removal of the Court, missed two months' work on State, and also presumably therefore on Italy. 1 His extraordinary embassy to England then deprived both of his services for more than fifteen months in 1603-4, 2 but he then attended State at least regularly until his appointment to Milan in the autumn of 1610. 3 When he returned in the summer of 1612 it was as a broken man, and he was unable to resume on State, and regente Lanz served as his deputy on Italy. 5 With Lemos being virtually an absentee president, 6 Italy was thus effectively without a president for eight years to September 1618. Benavente's appointment rectified the situation only temporarily, for he and his successor, Zúñiga, both died within nineteen months of the beginning of Philip IV's reign.

1 - He was appointed in May 1600, returned to Court on 29 Dec., and assumed the presidency on 10 Jan. 1601, leaving for two months on 21 Jan. 1601, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 58, 92, 95, 96. He sat on State on 29 Jan. 1601, but not again until 1 April, Attendance Register.

2 - Attendance Register. On English embassy, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), 190-1; see also, ibid., pp. 174 and 195 on projected appointments in 1603 to Flanders and Milan.


4 - ibid., pp. 479, 488 and 496 and Attendance Register.

5 - ibid., p. 417.

State, War and Finance: Appointments and the Exercise of Councillorships.

A. The Council of State, 1600 - 1621.

Appointments.

Appointment to State could be marvellously chaotic. As has been seen, five of the councillors sitting after the reorganisation of the spring of 1600 made their first appearances or assumed regular councillorships on itinerant councils, while Poza was appointed apparently only to compensate him for his dismissal from the presidency of Finance. 1 Four more men - Córdoba, the Constable, Olivares and Méjia - were all sworn in after they had actually begun sitting. The Constable and Olivares, indeed, were even then only formally appointed to add honour to impending foreign service, but while the Constable - having already sat 74 times - went abroad, Olivares evaded his appointment and assumed his councillorship. 2 Not dissimilarly, La Laguna, given the alternative of the Valencian viceregency or a councillorship, chose the latter, 3 while Albuquerque, appointed to State

2 - Méjia's is the only extant title to a councillorship, 5 Oct. 1612, A.G.S. Q.C.5; he first sat on 3 Sept. 1610, and regularly from 30 Apr. 1611. On appointment, see also Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 431. Córdoba first sat on 19 Oct. 1600, the Constable on 29 Jan. 1601 and Olivares on 5 Nov. 1601; on their appointments, ibid., pp. 88, 156, 203.
3 - On appointment, ibid., pp. 453, 456 and 459.
to honour his departure for the Aragonese viceroyalty, sat twice in 1608 - on itinerant councils - did not take up regular attendance until 1610 and yet contrived to evade going to Aragón. Conversely, Cardona, appointed in similar circumstances did not sit at all, while Sesa and Zúñiga both assumed councillorships on returning from abroad and having won release from further foreign service. Finally, the sixth duke of Infantado was given his councillorship in reward for a Sandoval marriage. In all, therefore, thirteen of the twenty eight councillors attending after 23 April 1600 were introduced in quite casual manner, but once again the manner of induction was less important than the fact. Many of these men became major councillors.

Beneath the smokescreen there was system enough. State was the supreme policymaking body; as an anonymous contemporary wrote, 'its authority is the most that the King gives to his vassals'. That authority was concerned chiefly with formulating Spanish foreign policies, and the vassals were great nobles with considerable personal experience abroad. Neither qualification was absolute, but as a body State was elitist, both socially and politically.

The Count of Fuentes may to all intents and purposes be excluded from our analysis of the councillors proper of State since he

1 - ibid., p. 346.
2 - On these men, above, pp. 180-2.
3 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 184-5.
4 - B.N.904, f. 44, op. cit.
sat only twice after that meeting on 23 April 1600 which effectively divided Philip's old Council of State from his new.¹ Of the twenty seven, sixteen were of the titled aristocracy at the time of appointment:

Dukes: Infantado, Sesa, Albuquerque, the Constable (Frias).

Marquises: Velada, Poza, Villafranca, Lerma (Denia), la Laguna.

Counts: Chinchón, Miranda, Borja (Ficallo), the Alva de Liste, Olivares, Benavente.

The remaining eleven divided into two groups, neither exclusive of the other and both subordinate to the first. Most obviously, there were the ecclesiastics - confessors Córdoba, Javierre and Aliaga and cardinals Niño de Guevara, Toledo and Zapata. Even here, however, there were two representatives of great houses; Toledo and Zapata were ecclesiastical younger sons, and the latter would indeed have succeeded to the title of Count of Barajas on the death of his brother without heirs if he had not already entered the religious life.² Niño de Guevara was also of rank, if on a slightly lower plane, being also an ecclesiastical younger son, but of a family only ennobled by Philip III.

The other five councillors may be broadly characterised as meritocrats; Spinola, Méjia and Zúñiga coming to the Council from brilliant careers abroad, and Idiáquez and Moura achieving their

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¹ See above, pp. 29-30; the Adelantado, Najera and the fifth duke of Infantado made their last appearances on that day, while Moura left after the previous meeting (8 April).
² López de Haro (1622), ii, 224-5.
³ His brother Juan being created Count of Villanover de Tormes in 1601, ibid., i, pp. 117-8 and 213.
chiefly at home, at the centre of government. Again, however, there was no
nobility here; Spinola had an Italian title, while Mejía and Zúñiga were
both younger sons of great houses. The two administrators, moreover,
raised their families in status, if not quite to social greatness —
Idíaquez, comendador mayor de León, was father of a duke and a count,¹
while Moura became a marquis, a grandee of Portugal and consuegro of a
count.² It would perhaps be stretching the point to include Moura among
those who held a title when appointed to State — as he did when
reappointed in 1612 — but Zapata should certainly be added to the
aristocratic list, and Toledo, Mejía and Zúñiga, perhaps even Niño de
Guevara, might reasonably be similarly bracketed with the greatest
of the land. If we similarly include Spinola, we are left only with the
three confessors and the two former secretaries as the exceptions to
the aristocratic rule.

Thoughts of any 'aristocratic restoration' must, however, be
tempered by the realisation that the very richest tended not to serve;
there was no place at all for an Enríquez, Osuña, Lemos or Béjar and
while Medina-Sidonia and the Adelantado did serve at the beginning of
the reign, they did so only briefly and were not succeeded on the
Council by relatives.

Acknowledgement should similarly be made of the remarkable

¹ - ie., the Count of Aramayona and the Duke of Ciudad Real.
² - His son married the daughter of the Count of Tentugal, Cabrera de
Córdoba (1857), p. 542; on his title, of Castel-Rodrigo, ibid., pp. 1, 3,
and 58.
precariousness of inheritance. Four of the titulos - Poza, the sixth Count of Alva de Liste, Sesa and Benavente - inherited through the deaths of elder brothers, while Miranda - like the Adelantado before him - won his title by marrying his own niece. The two greatest of the titles passed even more haphazardly. The fifth duke of Infantado, himself a councillor, inherited directly from his grandfather and in turn passed the title on to his own granddaughter. She married twice before becoming the heiress, and it was thus her second husband, the seventh son of the third marquis of Mondejar, who had the incredible good fortune to become the sixth duke.\(^1\) The Albuquerque title similarly went to the second husband of the daughter of the fourth duke.\(^2\) These accidents were to have significant effect on the careers of these men, and consequently upon the type of expertise available to the Council.

Councillorships of State were not for the young. Of the twenty one for whom information is available,\(^3\) only four - Spinola (41), Lerma (45), Borja (47) and the sixth duke of Infantado (48) - were not at least fifty when appointed, and only Spinola, la Laguna and Zapata survived into the 1630s.

There was no direct conciliar path to State, just as there

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\(^1\) López de Haro (1622), I, p. 253.  \(^2\) Ibid., p. 351.  
\(^3\) Dates of birth are available for 12, and in 8 cases it has been possible to infer a minimum age; for example, Benavente, appointed in 1615 may be presumed to have been over 50 since he had been appointed Captain General of León in 1580. The six exceptions - Córdoba, Javierre, Velada, la Laguna, the Constable and the sixth Count of Alva de Liste. In the cases of the three men inherited from Philip II I have calculated from the date of reappointment by Philip III.
was no promotion from State to other councils; this council was unique, and the qualifications for it lay outside normal administrative experience. Councillors of State might sit on, or more normally, preside over other councils, but there was no causative link. The neat arrangement of 1599 therefore proved to be coincidental; Miranda (Castile), Poza (Finance) and Idiáquez (Orders) were not followed on to State by any of their presidential successors, and none of Indies' were elevated. Two presidencies, however, were exceptional, Italy for reasons already discussed, and Inquisition because of Philip's religious susceptibilities. Both were represented on State by three men, but the exceptions were the more interesting, and indeed significant. With Zúñiga exercising only a six-week presidency of Inquisition, in effect only one president of each was not appointed, and they — Bautista Acevedo and Lemos — were of course precisely the two most closely associated with Lerma. These presidencies apart, only the royal confessarship carried anything resembling an ex-officio councillorship, but even here one of four — Fr. Mardones — was not appointed.

Nor was there promotion from State's junior Council, although la Laguna and Mejia had both sat as councillors of War. La Laguna sat only twice, in 1601, and then earned his councillorship of State by both his foreign service and by having the right courtly connections, and

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1 - See above, p. 31.
2 - See above, p. 222.
3 - See above, pp. 78-9, 105-6, 118-19.
4 - On 1603-6 embassy to Flanders, Cabrera de Cérdoba (1857), pp. 172, 183, 235, 268, 289. In 1611 he was given two cuentos for life and the alternative of a councillorship or the Valencian viceroyalty, and shortly after being sworn in as councillor left the post of mayor-
although Mejía's was more nearly a direct promotion, it was immediately earned - as was Villafranca's - by services in administering the Expulsion. ¹

Appointment to State represented a supremely personal choice by the King, and since so many considerations might weigh in his mind in any one case, analysis of his appointments will necessarily be complex. Above all else, however, it must be remembered that Philip himself changed over the years. At the beginning of the reign he had appointed men more or less as they became available; of the twenty seven sitting after April 1600 no fewer than fifteen had been appointed by the end of 1603. ² These men, together with Javierre (1605) and the fifth count of Alva de Liste (1608), formed the first of two distinct generations of councillors divided by the year 1610. The difference between the two was precisely that the first was appointed, and often sat, casually, while the second - Aliaga apart - consisted of men of excellence, all of whom took their councillorships seriously; it was the difference at once between the dilettante and the professional, between the euphoria of the beginning of the reign and the trauma of the middle.

domo mayor to the Queen; perhaps therefore his councillorship was a quid pro quo for renouncing the Court office, ibid., pp. 453, 456, 459.
1 - ibid., p. 431, and cnta. St., 26 Mar. 1611, A.G.S. E. 2643, no fol., which made the specific connection with their morisco services.
2 - Sesa, who did not sit until 1604, is included in the fifteen because he was appointed in 1603; see above, p. 181. Conversely, Moura's appointment is taken in this connection as being in 1612.
The first requirement of a councillor of State should obviously have been, and generally was, of experience of foreign service. Only eight had not served abroad, and of those Javierre and Aliaga sat as confessors and Toledo as Primate of Spain, while of the laymen Lerma and Albuquerque had exercised domestic vicereyalties and Poza a great presidency, if with some lack of positive distinction. Infantado and the sixth count of Alva de Liste alone therefore of the eight brought no particular expertise by way of at least nominal compensation.

Otherwise, the range of experience was dazzling, probably far outstripping that available to any contemporary ruler. Five had served in Italian vicereyalties, and of those the fifth count of Alva alone had not also been entrusted with at least one other major position, and he had served in Sicily for thirteen years; Velada, Miranda and Benavente had also served in domestic vicereyalties, while Olivares had held a French embassy. Nine others had served on at least one embassy - Idiáquez, Córdoba, Sesa and Chinchón in Italy; Villafranca in France; la Laguna in Flanders; Moura in Portugal; Borja in both Germany and Portugal, and Zúñiga in Flanders, France and Germany. Additionally, course, Idiáquez, Moura, Chinchón and Miranda had had vast experience of foreign policymaking at the centre of government.

The military service of the councillors was less
comprehensive, especially after the loss of Fuentes and the Adelantado, but the first generation could count on the expertise of the Constable, and to a less distinguished extent on that of Chinchón, Olivares, Miranda and Sesa, and the second on the brilliance of Spinola and Mejía, and, again less importantly, on that of Zúñiga. Sailors were in shorter supply, and again the Adelantado's experience was missed, until the induction of Villafranca in 1611-12, although both Sesa and Mejía had fought at Lepanto, and Zúñiga on the 1588 empresa.

There were deficiencies. In the first half of the reign no councillor, after Fuentes's departure, was able to draw on recent first-hand experience of Flemish affairs, and this deficiency obtained until the appearance of Mejía, Spinola, la Laguna and Villafranca in 1611-12. There was a shortage of French experts; Zúñiga had been Ambassador in Paris in 1603-6 but did not sit until 1617, and Villafranca's extraordinary embassy of 1608-9 was thus the only other recent personal experience. Nor, the Constable's extraordinary embassy of 1604 apart, was there any personal experience of English affairs. In practice, these deficiencies were of only limited consequence because the Council could rely on both ambassadorial and other reports and on the use in juntas of the expertise of men who had recent and ample experience of these areas. There was one exception; the complete absence of any realistic information on the English situation prior to 1604 had disastrous effects, as the Council was forced to formulate an English policy in
virtually complete ignorance of political realities in England. ¹

The significance of these deficiencies was that they were in large part sociological in origin. It was no accident that fifteen in all had served in Italy. The most distinguished of the Spanish aristocrats — that is, the heads of great houses — tended to serve in the major Italian diplomatic posts while their younger brothers entered military or ecclesiastical careers; thus, State's ecclesiastics apart, the definitive distinction between the councillor of State, titled with Italian diplomatic service, and the councillor of War, untitled and a troop leader in Flanders. ² As rules went in this society, this was remarkably fixed. Of the fifteen, ten — including Zapata — were titled heads of families, while of the five títulos who had not served abroad at all, four — Poza, Infantado, the sixth count of Alva and Albuquerque — were among those who had inherited their titles unexpectedly. Only Lerma himself therefore of the five exceptions was an eldest son, and he had presumably not served abroad because of his financial difficulties.

Correlatively, the other three men who had not served abroad at all — Aliaga, Javierre and Toledo — sat as ecclesiastics rather than as aristocrats, while of the four who had served abroad but not in Italy, la Laguna and Zúñiga were both younger sons while Moura and Borja, as Portuguese, were at once both effectively excluded from the

¹ — See below, pp. 354-5
² — On the councillors of War, below, pp. 247-257
Italian service and necessarily required to work in Portugal.

Distinctive patterns begin therefore to emerge. With a few exceptions, mostly ecclesiastical, the councillor of State was the head of a family and had, unless he had inherited unexpectedly or late in life, served as a diplomat, normally in Italy. Two other factors require investigation – the relationship between 'courtly' and properly professional appointments, and the manner in which councillorships were exercised, both individually and corporately. There was a remarkably precise correlation between the two.

The first generation was both more numerous than the second and, as a whole, less broadly experienced. In respect of both manner of appointment and service it divided into two main groups with a third bridging the two. The retention of Idiáquez, Chinchón and Miranda and the induction of Olivares and the Constable provided the Council with a solid and highly professional core of quite massively variegated experience. It had also, however, six men with no foreign experience at all, and of those Lerma, Infantado and the sixth count of Alva sat as courtiers and Córdoba, Javierre and Toledo attended as senior ecclesiastics. Although Velada had considerable foreign experience, he, too, sat as a royal intimate. The third group consisted of men who were well-qualified for councillorships but who, for different reasons, made little quantitative impression upon the Council. The fifth count of Alva and Sesa served only briefly before dying, as did Niño de Guevara before being appointed to Seville. Only
Poza and Borja, therefore, both relatives of Lerma, were actively irresponsible. With the appointment of Alva's brother in 1608 the era of the casual appointee was finally closed; only two of the ten thereafter appointed - Albuquerque and Aliaga - had not served abroad, and only with Aliaga and la Laguna were there suggestions of favour being exercised in respect of appointment.

Twelve councillors in all made little or no quantitative impression upon the Council, and only three of them belonged to the second generation - Spinola and Zapata, because they left to pursue their professional careers, and Moura, because he was recalled only shortly before dying. Similarly, Niño de Guevara, Sesa and the fifth Alva were each available for less than two years. The other six were all closely connected with the Court - Lerma, Córdoba, Javierre, the sixth count of Alva, Borja and Poza. Conversely, only seven members of the first generation were numbered among the fifteen statistically most important councillors, and two of those - Toledo and Velada - are thus included only by virtue of having sat at the lowest of levels over long periods. The other five, however, were precisely those men best-qualified for councillorships - Idiáquez, Chinchón, Miranda, Olivares and the Constable.

The rule becomes almost absolute; the closer a man's connection with the Court or the less purely political the reason for appointing him, the less likely he was to take his councillorship seriously.

The one exception to the rule of 'courtly' amateurism
was Infantado. Between 1603 and 1608 he sat with a casualness fully appropriate to the circumstances of his appointment,¹ but in 1609-10 transformed himself into as professional a councillor as any of his colleagues, eventually indeed attending more times than any of them. His career was marvellously symbolic of the more general transformation of the Council, as he became the Moura of his generation, the erstwhile courtier turned professional administrator.²

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1 - See above, p. 227.
2 - Moura having come to Court in 1554 as menino to doña Juana, A.C.C. in Diccionario de Historia de España, 2nd. edition, (1968), vol. 11, p. 1137.
The reign then divided itself neatly into two parts after the reorganisation of 1600: the first ten years to 1609, and the last twelve from 1610, with two troughs, the first (1606-9) as the Council all but disintegrated, and the second (1610-13) as it transformed itself. This was true at once of Council and councillors. In the first period it met on more than forty occasions only in 1600 and 1605, whereas in the second it fell below that figure only in 1611-13, and indeed over the last seven years to the end of 1621 and despite the great itineracies of 1615 and 1619, it sat more times than it had in the whole of the first ten. The difference was one of professionalised consistency; in the first ten years it met more than fifteen times in any four months on four occasions, while in the last twelve it did so on twenty three. The average attendance reflected this, for while it only sank below 4.00 in five years (1607-10 and 1617), its maintenance in the first period was almost wholly due to a core of five men while in the second only three men, all left over from the first generation - Lerma, Velada and Toledo - failed to attend with impressive regularity.

The most important councillors in the first part of the reign, then, were the best qualified and most able of them. Until his
retirement in August 1614, within two months of his death, Idiáquez led the Council at a remarkable average attendance of 72.3%. It was a noble effort, unmarred by any absences other than those of the royal itineracies; they, indeed, accounted for the six years in which he fell below a 70% attendance,¹ and the professionalism of his performance was evidenced by his attendance in those years not thus affected - 1600 (92.6%), 1605 (89.1%), 1607 (85.7%), and 1612 (92.3%). Miranda was the least important of his major colleagues, but despite his duties on Castile still attended over 60% of the meetings in all years to the end of 1604 except for 1602 (34.3%).² He then missed the first four months of 1605 and effectively retired at the end of that year.³ Chinchón, with only one personal absence - of four months in 1603 to visit his ill wife⁴ - sat more consistently, at an average of 80.8% to within five days of his death in September 1608. The recently desk-bound experience of these men was complemented by the more immediately foreign service of the Constable and Olivares; from January 1602 until his departure for Milan in October 1610 the Constable sat at over 75% of the meetings, saving only the fourteen months' absence of 1603–4 for his English embassy, while Olivares - a ten months' absence in 1603 in Seville on government business apart - missed only four meetings out of 139 from September 1602 until his

¹ - The others thus affected - 1601 (75.5%), 1604 (77.1%), 1606 (76.9%) and 1613 (75%); see above, p. 146.
² - No explanation is recorded, but it was not due to an itineracy.
³ - He sat thereafter only 7 times; on his illness, above, p. 78.
⁴ - He was absent between 21 April and 21 August; on the reason, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 173 and 183.
sudden death in March 1607. The Council had thus a consistently professional core; by the end of 1607, only on seventy seven occasions had it met without at least three of these men in attendance, and thirty two of those belonged to 1600-01, before the Constable and Olivares took up regular attendance, and a further twenty six to 1604 when the Constable was in England and Olivares temporarily absent.

Of their colleagues, the courtiers inevitably had the worst records. Velada in 1605 and 1611 twice contrived to sit at six consecutive meetings, but attended only 157 times (25.4%) over sixteen and a half years, and only in five did he sit at more than one third of the annual meetings, with a best attendance of 37.1% in 1604. Infantado started promisingly enough, attending sixty of seventy four meetings over the last twenty one months in Valladolid, but then reverted to apparent type by sitting only once in the next twenty. Lerma had sat three times by the end of 1607.

Eight more distinguished men served in effect as ancillary councillors, either fitfully for for limited periods. Niño de Guevara and Poza both served regularly (83% and 86.3%) for periods of just under two years, and thus had the longest consecutive attendances of the eight. Córdoba was necessarily itinerant, but his attendance of 59.8% at those meetings for which he was available contrasted poorly with that of Idiaquez. Toledo was affected by different residential

2 - On Córdoba's itineracy, above, p. 146.
requirements and could thus plead some excuse at least until the Court returned to Madrid; having sat regularly enough (85%) in the second half of 1600 he was all but absent in Valladolid, saving only an eight months' attendance when in 1603 he travelled to Court on ecclesiastical and family business.¹ His real proclivities revealed themselves when on the return in 1606 he sat only briefly (9:14) before tiring of Court and returning to Toledo itself.² Even when in 1608 his Inquisitorship brought him back to Court, he sat consistently only for nine months (22:24) until August 1610.³

The councillorships of the fifth count of Alva and Sesa reflected their poor health. Having sat once in 1600, Alva attended regularly after the removal to Valladolid (16:26) before retiring at the end of 1601. After then returning in March 1602 at the royal insistence,⁴ he sat regularly until his final retirement in June 1604 with one absence of two months accounting for eight of his nineteen absences from fifty six meetings in that period. Sesa similarly sat for four months (11:12) in 1604, missed as many again, and then returned for a final nine and a half months (27:32) before retiring in September 1605.⁵ Bórja, too, was ill, but his failure was more irresponsible, and he bestirred himself only in 1600 (65.8%) and for

¹ - See Rafael Alcalá Lainez (1935), pp. 110-112.
³ - The papal Brief arrived on 4 Oct. 1608, ibid., p. 351, and he resumed regularly on 20 Nov.
⁴ - See above, p. 174.
⁵ - He made a last attendance on 15 Nov. 1605, and died on 9 Jan. 1606.
nine months in 1603-4 (76.9%), then missed a further six months in October 1604 before returning for a final fifteen months (38.3%), retiring in October 1605. Javierre made no impression.

In 1608 two more men were introduced, Albuquerque sitting twice on itinerant councils in that year, and the sixth count of Alva de Liste sat for ten weeks in January–March 1608 and for a further nine months in 1609 but still sat only twenty two times in all. In 1607, for the first time, the average attendance sank below 4.00 and as the great politico-economic crisis approached its climax State could rely – after Chinchón's death – on the attendance of only two men of distinguished achievement. Of these, the Constable would be appointed to Milan in October 1610 while Idiáquez would attend less than 60% of each year's meetings between 1608 and 1611 as he travelled with the King. Two great magnates, however, belatedly took up regular attendance – Infantado, from January 1609 (66:70 to December 1610), and Albuquerque a year later (36:38 to December 1610). They were inadequate compensation for the losses of Chinchón and Olivares, and two great soldiers who could have provided such compensation – Méjia and Spinola – sat only once, in September 1610. In 1610, therefore, of

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1 – See also above, p. 23.
nine councillors four - Velada, Lerma, Spinola and Mejía - sat only ten times between them, and Idiáquez sat at only eighteen of forty four meetings, five of which were itinerant. With the Constable's departure only four men were left in regular attendance - the seventy year old Idiáquez, who would continue his travels; Toledo, who might tire of attendance at any moment; Albuquerque, who would retire in February 1613, and Infantado, who would alone continue to sit regularly for many years. At the end of 1610, the Council of State was on the point of disintegration.

It was saved by a transformation comparable to that on War at the beginning of the reign, as improved frequency and consistency of convocation was matched by a vastly improved consistency of attendance. Continuity between the old and the new was provided by Idiáquez, Infantado and Albuquerque. Between January 1611 and 16 August 1614 Idiáquez sat at sixty five meetings and missed a further twenty six through his itineracy, but was otherwise absent for only six. He died on 12 October, at seventy four and after twenty eight years as a councillor. Albuquerque continued to his retirement as he had in 1610 (59:68), and Infantado into the next reign as he had since January 1609. In the thirteen years to the end of 1621, he attended over 90% of the annual meetings in five (1611-14, 1621), over 80% in two (1609-10), over

70% in three (1616, 1618 and 1620), and over 60% in a further one (1617, 68.9%). Overall, he attended 75.5% of all meetings, but exclusive of the itineracies of 1615 and 1619 missed only 97 of 538 (81.9%).

Two new councillors served only briefly - Spinola at 30:35 over the year to his return to Flanders in April 1612, and Moura at 40:49 between March 1612 and his retirement in November 1613. Of the others, only Villafranca and Zapata did not sit at a similar level from their inductions to the end of the reign. Mejia, from April 1611 and excluding the itineracy of 1619, sat at 88% (414:470) of the meetings to the end of 1621, and la Laguna at 78.6% of those from January 1612 to the end of the reign. Villafranca sat at an Infantado-like 93.8% from January 1612 until his departure for Milan in August 1615 and at a similar level from his return (18 September 1618) until April 1620. He then missed thirteen months before resuming, again at the same level, under Philip IV.

Velada, Lerma and Toledo concluded their councillorships at their accustomed levels and were therefore all but passengers,¹ and in July 1615 Aliaga in effect took over from Villafranca, and sat at over half of the remaining meetings, with a five months' absence after the fall of Lerma. In 1617, the average attendance again fell briefly below 4.00 (3.87), but there was still consistency of attendance, with

¹ - Velada sat 62 times between January 1611 and his retirement on 21 June 1616; Lerma, 13 from January 1611 to his dismissal; Toledo sat throughout 1613, but for only half a year or so in 1611-12 and 1614-16, and only very occasionally in 1617-18.
Infantado, Mejia and la Laguna all sitting at over 70% of the meetings, and Zuniga's introduction in July made good the deficiency. He, Benavente and Zapata were the only new councillors after Aliaga, and they maintained the requisite standards; Zúñiga and Benavente sat respectively at 78.2% and 91.8% of the meetings from July 1617 and February 1619 to the end of the reign, and Zapata at 65.9% of those over the two years from September 1618.¹

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¹ - All three figures take account of the 1619 itineracy, when Zúñiga alone travelled. Zapata left in 1620 to take up the viceroyalty of Naples.
B. The Council of War, 1597 - 1622.

Appointments.

The councillor of War was socially junior to the councillor of State, and his experience was therefore of a different, less elevated kind. If was, however, if anything more extensive, and the professionalism with which he performed his duties was certainly basically superior - so much so, indeed, that after 1601 Philip had in effect only to appoint supplementary councillors. In 1601 there were nine councillors of War and in 1621 five of them still formed the nucleus of the Council, with la Laguna, who had only sat twice as a professional member, sitting now as a councillor of State. Additionally, Velasco, Count of Salazar, sat regularly from October 1598 until his promotion to the Finance presidency in January 1618. The efficiency of the Council of War therefore depended on the correlation of the performances of three groups of men - the generation of 1598-1601; the two groups appointed in the years 1604/5-1610, together with Castrillo (1612); and the councillors of State.

Excluding the assessores, who joined War from Castile for a few meetings annually after 1604 to comprise the Consejo de Guerra de Justicia, Philip III appointed twenty-two councillors of War, two of whom - Acuña Vela and Padilla - were inherited from his father. Eleven
held titles, but none had inherited directly. Of the six held on appointment, those of la Laguna, Castrillo and Belveder were newly-created, while that of San Germán was Savoyard. ¹ Puñonrostro and Mirabel alone, therefore, held inherited titles on appointment, but did so by respectively succeeding a dead brother and marrying an heiress. ² Of the others, Laso and Pimentel inherited indirectly after appointment while Guzmán, Velasco and Enríquez were given their titles by Philip. The latter's, indeed, was a Portuguese title given, like the supplementary marquisates of Hinojosa and Gelves for extra-Castilian service. ³ In sum, therefore, only ten held Spanish titles and six of those were new creations, and neither the dukedom nor the major titles were represented:

Marquises: la Laguna, Gelves, Pobar, la Hinojosa, Castrillo, Belveder, Mirabel.

Counts: Puñonrostro, Laso (Villanover), Salazar, Enríquez (Villaflor).

Of the twenty-two, only six were neither segundones nor sons of such. No information is available on the families of Tassis and Brochero, but both were clearly of some rank, the first having risen to occupy a French embassy and the second to that of Almirante General and the Grand Priorship of San Juan. ⁴ Two may be precisely defined as hidalgos; Acuña Vela's father had died in battle as an untitled Viceroy.

¹ - On San Germán, Caro de Torres (1629), p. 187.
² - Puñonrostro being a second and Mirabel a third son.
³ - See above, p. 176.
⁴ - Brochero may have been distantly related to the Alva de Liste, who traditionally held major office in the Order of San Juan.
of Peru and he himself had then followed a military career in Europe, and Sotomayor, also son of an untitled father, had won a legendary name for himself first in Flanders and then, more especially, as a true conquistador in the Indies. Less obviously, the hidalguía should also incorporate Diego de Ibarra, son of a proveedor y comisario general and councillor of War and, like him, a comendador of Santiago. The antecedents of his namesake Esteban are again unclear, but they were certainly inferior to those of any other councillor, his career owing its first impetus to the patronage of the great Alva.

Experience reflected social status. The two American governorships of Sotomayor and Padilla's in Milan were the nearest they had come to viceregal dignity, and they were exceptional positions in that they demanded a chiefly military qualification. Similarly, the only full embassy held before appointment was Bautista de Tassis's in Paris, of a post which, curiously, went by tradition to segundones. The minor governorships of Padilla, Puñacrostro and Méjia and the extraordinary embassies of Bautista de Tassis, Pimentel (Gélves) and Guzmán were again quite appropriate to rank.

2 - For details of his career, Caro de Torres (1620), passim.
3 - de la Mota (1599), p. 303 and Salazar y Castro (1688), p. 228.
4 - See letters of President Pazos of Castile to Philip II of 27 Feb., 4 Mar., and 2 Apr. 1580, printed in Codorníu, viii, pp. 521-3.
5 - On American viceregal appointments and on Sotomayor's refusal of a second term in Chile, Schäfer, ii, p. 530, Appendix V, no. 6.
6 - For a list of ambassadors, with career details, Archivo General de Simancas, Catálogo de Negociaciones de Francia, pp. 726-733.
Service on War could form the recommendation for further advancement. San Germán y de la Hinojosa, Castrillo, Enríquez and Gélves all thus rose to domestic vicereinalties, with Hinojosa also progressing to the Milan Governorship and Gélves to that of New Spain. Giron and Zúñiga thus rose, too, to a French embassy and the captaincy generalship of Portugal respectively, and four extraordinary missions abroad — by Diego de Ibarra, la Laguna, Giron and Laso — were enhanced by the dignity of their councillorships.

Court service followed a similar pattern. Five held minor positions as gentlemen of the camar or boca of the King, and four held variously important posts in the minor Courts of Flanders and Savoy, but while none held major Spanish posts before appointment five were thus promoted after years of service. Only in the case of Guzmán, later Marquis of Pobar, was there any suggestion of the exercise of favour in respect of appointment, and that regal and not ducal. The advancements of la Laguna and San Germán owed nothing to their connections with Lerma.

Ineligible, then, for the greatest offices of state, the councillors had carved out their own destinies as professional

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1 - Gélves's appointment, in 1621, was not taken up; see Schafer.
2 - ie., San Germán, Pobar, Méjia, Sotomayor, and Mirabel.
3 - Flanders; Diego de Ibarra, la Laguna, Laso, and Savoy, Castrillo.
4 - ie., Velasco, Enríquez, Castrillo, Brochero, and Mirabel, the last four under Philip IV; on la Laguna, above, p. 231, n. 4.
5 - See below, pp. 259-7
6 - On la Laguna, below, p. 273 and on San Germán, below, p. 256-7
soldiers of excellence, and had done so in every theatre of war, Mediterranean, Dutch, English, French, Italian, African, Portuguese, Aragonese, German, Atlantic and transoceanic. They had begun to come of military age at the end of Philip II's first decade, and from Sotomayor's marching with Alva in 1567 had fought at every major engagement over the years to the Truce of 1607. Thus only Admiral Brochero and administrator - and formerly proveador - Esteban de Ibarra had not led troops, and only Brochero, Velasco and Castrillo are not recorded as having served in Flanders.

As with State, the accidents of circumstance could dictate the moment of induction. Six were appointed on their return from foreign or regional service,¹ and five to add dignity to foreign service.² For all but Esteban de Ibarra the seat on War was the first Spanish conciliar post, and only for Méjia, la Laguna and Salazar was there a further promotion under Philip III. But if the experience justifying a councillorship of War was not thought appropriate to a seat on other councils it was, as has been seen, relevant to a wide range of domestic and foreign positions, and only six councillorships were not interrupted by appointment to such.³

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1 - i.e., Diego de Ibarra, Brochero, Tassis, San Germán, Sotomayor, Zúñiga.
2 - See above, p. 250.
3 - These included Esteban de Ibarra, who was engaged in a vast amount of governmental work; see below, pp. 256, 265. The others included Acuña Vela, Valencia and Sotomayor, all appointed as the climax of their careers. The other two were Tassis and Pobar.
The revolutionary structural changes brought about in 1598 - 1601 were broadly maintained throughout the reign. With the exception of 1603 - when Diego de Ibarra and Brochero were both temporarily absent - the average attendance remained at least three times that maintained in 1597 (1.5) until the end of 1609, with indeed a quadrupled expansion in 1607-8. The deaths of four councillors in 1610 brought it down between 3.00-4.00 in the years to 1613, and it declined further in 1614-15 to 2.00-3.00, but then rose again, and in 1620-22 stayed over 4.00. The decline of 1610 was not serious, for the nucleus remained in consistent attendance, and with the coincidental resurrection of the senior half of the Council the overall average remained over 5.00, while even in 1614-15 the professionals' record was still an improvement on the 1597 level.

This was maintained in the face of a radical increase in the frequency of convocation. In 1599 - 1602 War sat on average twice as frequently as in 1597 (114.5; 61), and although the level dropped in 1603-6 it remained at an average of 83 annually with 1604 - the worst year of the reign - still an improvement (65) on 1597. In 1607 the

1 - See above, pp.10-13.
2 - In 1602 it was not strictly trebled, at 4.19.
frequency picked up again and averaged 96.5 annually to 1615, with the low figures of 1610 (87) and 1615 (80) associated with the royal itineracy. From 1616 it recovered still further, and to the end of 1622 maintained an average level (131.4) even exceeding that of the beginning of the reign.

If Philip changed the Council almost beyond recognition from the body he had inherited, he persisted with an unchanged councillorship, the two inherited councillors prefiguring the type of man he was to appoint himself - Acuña Vela's experience going back to service under the Emperor, and Padilla's encompassing spells in Africa, the Alpujarras, Flanders, Portugal, Naples and Milan. Padilla, however, sat only once before retiring and Acuña Vela, in his seventh year on the Council was joined in 1598 by Puñonrostro, Velasco, Enríquez and Valencia, in 1599 by Diego de Ibarra, and in 1601 by Pimentel, la Laguna and Brochero. La Laguna alone of these men was not massively experienced, and he alone - and then only as professional councillor - made no great impression on the Council; Enríquez, Ibarra, Pimentel (Gelves) and Brochero were still sitting regularly in 1621, as was la Laguna on the senior half; Velasco sat regularly until January 1618, Puñonrostro until December 1609, Acuña Vela until August 1606 and

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1 - Deduced from a statement of his services in cnta.War, 3 Jul. 1616, A.G.S. G.A.808, f.115.
Valencia until August 1605.

Only in the latter two cases, however, was service completely uninterrupted. Of the absences of Puñonrostro, Ibarra and Brochero, only the first’s, in 1599-1601, was of any real significance. In two cases interruption was serious and continuous – Enríquez’s service in Flanders and Galicia restricted him to ten of the twenty-two and a half years to the death of Philip III,¹ and Pimentel’s in Italy (1601-1606) and Aragón (1613) his to eight and a half out of twenty and a half.² The loss of Enríquez was the more serious; having sat at 81% of the meetings to September 1601,³ he thereafter sat for only nine and a half months in 1607-8 and on the itinerant Council in 1615. From resuming in September 1616 he sat at 69.8% to the end of the reign. Pimentel (Gálves) was less diligent; by October 1617, he had served only for five calendar years, and then at a low level – only rising above 70% in 1613 – and in the three and a half years remaining to him sat at only 55%.

La Laguna’s apart, his was the worst record of the men appointed by 1601. The ageing Acuña Vela kept pace with the increase in meetings, fell below a 60% attendance only in 1603, and averaged 71% over the period from the beginning of 1597 to his retirement. Velasco

¹ See above, p.176.
² Although appointed to Aragón in 1613 he did not leave War until the end of 1614; see Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 513 and 540.
³ The percentage includes only the figures for the resident Council in 1599.
was the least effective of the major councillors, but if he sat at over 75% of the meetings in only six years (1600, 1601, 1607, 1611, 1612 and 1616) he still averaged 63% to the end of 1617. Puñonrostro and Valencia, for shorter periods, had more remarkable records; Puñonrostro sat only nine times between January 1599 and May 1601, but thereafter to his retirement maintained an average of 80% attendance, falling below 75% only in 1602, and Valencia to August 1605 was disturbed only by the itineracy of 1599 (67%), but maintained an overall attendance of 82%, and in 1600 and 1602 sat at over 96%.

Two men had records as remarkable but over virtually the whole reign, Diego de Ibarra attending 72% of all meetings between 1600 and 1622, and Brochero 78% over 1603-1622. In thirteen of his twenty-three full years Ibarra sat at over 75%, and in two of those attended more than 90% (1600, 92%; 1601, 93%) and in another three more than 80% (1602, 87%; 1613, 86%; 1616, 84%). In another two he sat at between 70-75% (1617, 1618). Even in 1607, when he missed over five months for his Flemish mission, he sat at 53% of the total meetings. Brochero did even better, sitting at over 75% in seventeen years. He made only one, itinerant, attendance in 1601 and sat for only two months in 1602. He then sat regularly for three years (78%) before leaving again on naval business, and on his return in December 1606 began the most remarkable sequence.

1 - See above, p. 145, and on appointment to Council, p. 186.
2 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 266.
of attendance on any of the three councils, sitting at over 75% of the meetings in each of the years to the end of 1621; 1623 would open with Don Diego having sat at 87.5% of the meetings of the previous sixteen years.  

In 1605-6, at the moment when State was beginning to fall apart, these men were reinforced by the first ancillary group of councillors, of four men of varied and considerable experience — Tassis, Esteban de Ibarra, Mejía and San Germán. Brought in in effect as replacements for Valencia, Acuña Vela and Pimentel — the first two having died, and the third on service in Italy — they served adequately but without becoming major councillors. Tassis and Ibarra both sat once in 1604 before taking up regular service in 1606, and then served at 66 and 67% respectively until their deaths in 1610. These performances were creditable enough in view of their advanced years — Tassis died magnificently; at ninety through overeating at a banquet,  while Ibarra suffered both from poor health and the demands made on him by his councillorship of Finance.  Mejía and San Germán were less diligent. Mejía sat at only eighty six meetings in the twenty five months to March 1607 (49%) and San Germán at 58% of those between August 1605 and October 1609. Both then departed on morisco service.

1 - The figure excludes the meetings of the resident Council in 1619, when he travelled with the Court, sitting at 90.1% of the itinerant meetings.
3 - Cabrera described him as 'de hontos años' at the time of his death, but I have found no record of the date of his birth, ibid., p. 418. On his councillorship of Finance, below, pp. 165.
4 - On San Germán's appointment to morisco service, ibid., pp. 384, 386, 391; see also, pp. 409 and 431.
Méjia returned briefly in 1610, and from 1611 attended as State councillor. San Germén's councillorship, however, virtually ended in 1607. He sat briefly in 1611-12 before being despatched to Milan, now as Marquis of San Germén y de la Hinjosa, but the humiliations he brought on his own and his King's head probably cost him a councillorship of State, and when he resumed on War in 1616 he maintained only a dispirited 20% attendance until November 1620, when Philip effectively exiled him. 2

In 1606-10 a second ancillary group joined, barger but less diligent than the first - Guzmán, Sotomayor, Girón, Zúñiga and Laso - and in 1612 they were further supplemented by Castrillo. All were distinguished soldiers, but only Sotomayor - appointed on his return from the Indies 3 - made any immediate impression, sitting at 84% of the meetings between April 1607 and his retirement on the brink of death in February 1610. 4 Girón's service was twice interrupted by foreign service. He sat only briefly in 1608 on a short visit from Flanders, and did not resume until again returning from Flanders in 1610. 5 In June 1613, having sat at 64% of the last three years' meetings,

1 - On title, ibid., p. 459, and on departure, pp. 466 and 469.
2 - In October 1620 State suggested that a soldier of great experience be sent to deal with a possible Anglo-French campaign against Navarre, but put forward no names; Philip chose Hinojosa, cnta. St. 10 Oct. 1620, A.G.S. E. 2034, ff. 60-2. He left in November, and sat once again on War, in April 1621.
3 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 301.
4 - On death at turn of April-May, cnta. War, 7 May 1610, A.G.S. G.A. 729, f. 41.
he returned yet again to Flanders, and then went on to his French embassy. Returning in November 1620, he resumed at 70% to the end of 1622. Castrillo, too, made a false start; after only six months' service, he was appointed Viceroy of Navarre, made occasional attendances in 1616-17 and took up regular attendance again only in August 1618, thereafter sitting to the end of 1622 at a low level (47%) commensurate perhaps with his extraordinary age.

The others made varyingly negligible impressions. Laso, appointed in 1609 to add honour to a reforming mission in Flanders, sat only four times, and his councillorship was distinguished only by his apparent confusion as to which half of the Council he belonged and as to whether he was entitled to use his new title of Count of Hanover. Zúñiga, like Girón, sat only between missions abroad, and only thirty six times in all in 1609-11. Guzmán sat at a not dissimilar level over the period 1606-22, well-qualified for a councillorship, he attended less than three hundred times in all, his time occupied by ambitions both

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1 - ibid., p. 525.
2 - No date is recorded for the Navarre appointment, but it seems certain from biographical information to have been in 1612 or 1613.
3 - If González Dávila's biographical details are correct, he would have been well over a hundred when he died; probably he was nearer the mark when ascribing over sixty years' royal service to him than in having him fighting at Oran, el Peñón and la Goletta. González Dávila (1623), p. 516. See also Salazar y Castro (1688), p. 230. He died in 1629.
4 - He used his name even after given the title (Cabrera de Córdoba, 1857, pp. 369, 373), until on 5 July, using the title, he sat on the senior half of the Council; his next attendance, on 21 August, was on the junior half, as Rodrigo Laso.
5 - No date is recorded for his appointment to Portugal, and I assume this to be the cause of his departure.
courtly and marital.  

Castrillo was in effect the last councillor appointed. Belveder sat twice in 1619 before going to Flanders, and Mirabel thirty five times in 1620 while trying to delay, or more probably to wriggle out of, his appointment to the Paris embassy.  

In 1610, then, War lost Puñonrostro, Tassis, Esteban de Ibarra and Sotomayor to the grave and San Germán to the marisco expulsion, and the new councillors largely failed to make good their loss. Mélia, Zúñiga and Laso made little or no impression and Girón and Castrillo were of only limited value in the years 1610-13, while San Germán y de la Hinojosa, Pobar and Gélves made only moderate contributions over the years to the end of the reign. Apart therefore from the two spells of service by Castrillo (1612, 1618-22) and Girón (1610-13, 1620-22) no councillor other than the survivors of the generation of 1598-1601 was of any real importance after 1610. This, however, was of hardly any consequence both because of that continuity and because of the transformation of the senior half of the Council.  

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1 - On the comic failure of his attempt to win a Medina-Sidonia marriage in 1603, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 165 and 168; on closeness to Philip, ibid., pp. 6, 39, 66, 89, 187; on failure to secure the daughter of the Marquis of Malpica in 1611, ibid., pp. 411 and 413; on creation of Pobar marquisate by Philip to encourage the projected marriage to doña Juana Portocarrero in 1611, ibid., p. 459; on career and Court positions of, Appendix 11, no. 63.

2 - Paz (1914), pp. 741-3.
The Councillors of State on War.

Individuals' performance on War reflected almost exactly their attendance on State, with the proviso that the courtiers and certain of the more important administrators tended to ignore the Council, at once less prestigious and important than State - thus Lerma, for instance, sat only four times and Velada twenty three, while Idiáquez, too busy to attend, sat only 124 times in all after 1599, failing to reach double figures in eight years, and sitting not at all in 1610.

The establishment proper of State in 1600 and the commensurate changes brought the senior half of War to collapse; against the 374 attendances by State councillors in 1599, there were only 83 in 1600, and the average State attendance fell to 0.72, with a highest individual attendance of seventeen (out of 126) by Chinchón. In 1601 this fell even lower (0.5), but then picked up again in 1602 (1.9) as Chinchón, the Constable and Olivares formed a cohesive core - Olivares, to his death, maintaining an average of 76.5% attendance; Chinchón, to December 1607, 46.9%, and the Constable, from 1601 to October 1610, 52.7%. These figures were again lower than those they maintained on State, but were adequate and consistent enough to provide realistic liaison with the senior Council. Idiáquez and Miranda alone of the major councillors of State in this period made no impression, presumably because of their
presidential and extra-conciliar work, \(^1\) while the ancillary councillors sat with the same partial or occasional diligence they showed on State, with again the proviso that variations were invariably negative. Again, too, the deaths of Chinchón and Olivares were critical, and in 1607-9 the average fell once more between 2.00 State councillors per meeting.

In the second part of the reign, Idiaquez, Moura, Albuquerque, Aliaga and Zapata all fell seriously below the levels they maintained on State, \(^2\) while Zuñiga served regularly only from July 1617 to the end of 1619 (207-289, excluding the 1619 itineracy) and then sat only twenty three times in 1621. The other major councillors, however, sat with the same consistency as on State - Infantado over fourteen years (1609-22) at 64.8\%; Mejía, twelve (1611-22) at 80.1\%, and La Laguna eleven (1612-22) at 68.9\% - and were ably supported by Spinola, Villafranca and Benavente, each again sitting with a consistency comparable to that they showed on State. \(^3\)

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\(^1\) The Constable, however, was also a president, and for Chinchón War was a fourth council.

\(^2\) Idiaquez sat only 16 times between 1610 and his death; Moura only 12; Albuquerque, 57; Aliaga, 4, and Zapata in effect only during 1619 (43:95), with a further 3 attendances in 1618 and 6 in 1620.

\(^3\) Villafranca at 66\% from 1612-22, excluding the itineracies and his absence of 1620-1; Benavente at 58.7\% from March 1619 to the end of the reign; Spinola at 90:97 from April 1611 to May 1612. The figure for Benavente allows for the 1619 itineracy.
Thirty four men sat as councillors of Finance under Philip III, five of them inherited from Philip II, and both their appointments and councillorships were largely governed by presidential leadership. Except briefly in 1607 - when three councillors died and a fourth left - Finance maintained an average attendance higher than that of State or War, and like those councils, it expanded considerably in size over the reign, from 4.2 in 1597 to 9.1 in 1622. Until the Carrillo presidency, this was accompanied by a similar expansion in the frequency of convocation.

The nature of the councillorship remained unaltered from that of Philip II, a fine compound of financial, judicial and military expertise. Eight men sat, with varying degrees of formality, as ex-officio councillors, coming from Castile to sanction the Council's judicial activities. Of the twenty-one others for whom career details are available, sixteen came from within Finance's offices - eleven as contadores, three as Treasurers-General, and two as secretaries. Moreover, three of the councillors of Castile - Ramírez de Prado, de la Mota and Corral - had served in the Finance fiscalía. To a substantial

1 - Agreda, López de Ayala, de la Mota, Corral, Contreras, Bonal, Acuña and Ramírez de Prado.
2 - The exceptions being Menchaca, Fernández Espinosa, Bazán, de la Serna and Hurtado de Mendoza.
3 - Gaitán de Ayala, Salablanca, Cabala, Pons, Herrera, Gamboa, Soria, Baxuelos, Juan de Pedrosa, Ayarzábal and Alarcón.
4 - Mesía de Tovar, Monroy and Mazo de la Vega.
5 - The Ipeñarrieta, Miguel also having 30 years service as contador.
extent, therefore, Finance provided its own councillors. Two more — Pascual and Bernabé de Pedrosa — brought experience of military financing, and the membership was rounded off by two former corregidores, Porres and Sarmiento de Acuña, and by the variegated experience of Esteban de Ibarra.

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1. Francisco de Rojas, Marquis of Poza (1590 — 1602).

The structure of the Council of Finance under the Marquis of Poza has already been analysed in some detail,¹ and it remains to consider the manner in which councillorships were exercised during his unfortunate presidency.

The five councillors he brought with him into Philip II's reign were a nicely balanced group — Agreda, a senior councillor of Castile; Salablanca, with five decades' service in the Ministry; Gaitán de Ayala, with ten years' such service and eleven as a Madrid corregidor; and with experience, too, of military affairs; and, uniquely among the councillors of Finance proper, a university graduate; and Ibarra, a military administrator with service in Portugal in 1580, Aragón in 1591 and Flanders (1591 – ?1595).²

All sat with professional conscientiousness under Philip II.

1 - See above, pp. 31-5.
2 - Cnta. Fin. 12 Jan. 1607, A. G. S. C. J. H. 345, no fol. ¹
3 - No information is available on Menchaza other than that in Appendix 11, no. 99, below, p. 431, but the lack of such indicates that he had not graduated through the Finance offices.
Of the 132 meetings for which rúbricas are recorded from January 1597 to the death of the old King, Salablanca missed one, Agreda three, Menchaza nine, and Gaitán after his return in June 1597 ten (out of 79), and Ibarra, after his in November 1597, seventeen (out of 64). They were, however, old men, and as they aged and as some were employed on extra-conciliar work, some of their performances would wane. Nevertheless they served until they were at death's door; Menchaza in August 1600, Gaitán in December 1606 and Ibarra in September 1610 were all still sitting in the month of their deaths; Agreda retired in August 1607 a month or so before dying, and Salablanca left in March 1607 some six weeks before dying, at eighty-five years of age. As was his practice, Philip was indeed following his father's advice and using his servants while they had 'health and strength to continue'.

As has been remarked, however, they had little service left as a group by the beginning of the reign. Menchaza maintained an 88% attendance from January 1597 to August 1600 and Salablanca, even inclusive of an eight months' absence in 1600, sat at 87.1% of the meetings to March 1607. The three more widely-experienced men all declined in importance. Agreda and Ibarra travelled with the Court in 1599, and neither recaptured former consistency on returning. Agreda did

1 - Dates of death from Cabrera de Córdoba (1857) - Menchaza, p. 80; Gaitán de Ayala, p. 297; Ibarra, p. 418; Agreda, pp. 313-4; Salablanca, p. 306.
2 - See above, p. 8.
the better, at a respectable 48.9% from 1603 to 1607, but Ibarra effectively retired until 1607 after a 57.8% attendance in 1600. Gaitán de Ayala continued at the highest level - over 90% in 1599-1601, and over 80% in 1603 - but after 1604 (48%) he effectively retired, with only a further nineteen appearances in 1605-6.

It seems certain from deteriorating patterns of attendance that the declines of Agreda and Gaitán were commensurate on increasingly poor health rather than on any extra-conciliar duties. Ibarra's was a special case. He had been appointed specifically on account of what Carrillo was to call 'sus canas experiencias y bien parecer' and - again extraordinarily - was only required to sit at afternoon sessions. It was precisely the demand made on those qualities that deprived Finance of his services between 1601 and 1607. Even when he resumed regular membership of Finance in the autumn of 1607 he attended only at a low level that contrasted with his diligence as a new councillor of War - sitting respectively at 35% and 67% to his death - and the difference was one of priority and not of conflicting timetable since he often attended both on the same day. Not until the last fourteen months of his life did he recapture the consistency of 1598.

1 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 140 and 225 had Agreda appointed respectively to the presidency of the Audiencia of Valladolid and a councillorship of Indies; neither materialised.
3 - At the turn of 1601-2 he undertook the reform of the militia against a possible invasion, carta, St. 22 Dec. 1601, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 40. On other activities, below, pp. 269, 274, 313.
Of the three new councillors appointed in 1598–9 only Pascual made any continuous statistical impression upon the Council, passing 80% in 1603–4 and with a lowest attendance of 66% in 1601—curious, indeed, to notice how he increased his diligence from precisely the moment in 1602 when he lost the royal favour,¹ and found himself faced, too, with an unsympathetic president. Conversely, Ramírez de Prado progressively abandoned his councillorship after the reorganisation, as other interests consumed his time; he sat at 63% of the meetings between 1599 and 1601, with a highest attendance of 79% in that latter year, but by 1603–4 was down to 34%, and sat only a further seven times in the following two years. Acuña sat only twenty six times before commencing his visita.

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2. Juan de Acuña (1602–1609).

As has again been seen, Acuña transformed Finance.² The overall performance of his Council was marred by one extraordinarily bad year, when in 1606 it met only 54 times, at nearly half its new frequency, but it still sat in all some 20% more frequently than Poza's

¹ On his decline of 1602, when he was all but posted to Naples, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 141, 148 and 151. Cabrera recorded that when he died he owed the King 16,000,000 (maravedis?) and that all his verifiable estate was therefore sequestrated, ibid., p. 236.
² See above, pp. 34-5.
had done, and in 1603-5 the improvement was one of 37.5% and in 1607-8, of 72.6%. In 1609, as crisis ebbed, the Council reverted to the exact level of 1603-5. Finance had caught up with resurgent War; in four of the seven years to 1609 it sat more frequently and, even inclusive of 1606, sat in all some forty three times more than War. In fine, what had been done for War in 1598 and State in 1600 was in 1602 done for Finance; the Council was given full autonomy and - subject to the royal assent - responsibility for policymaking. The conclusion is quantifiable, and manifest in the correlation of the performances of the three councils on the graph showing the frequency of conciliar meetings.

Where, prior to 1602, Finance's performance had borne no relation to that of either State or War, there emerged a basic and continuing similarity after that year as all three councils - but particularly War and Finance - responded seismically to the exigencies of crisis. The patterns varied - each Council having its own modus operandi, and each being concerned with different aspects of the overall problem - but the correlation was fundamental and would grow more pronounced as the reign proceeded.¹

Acuña changed, too, the nature of the councillorship. He appointed eleven councillors, two - López de Ayala and Contreras - as

¹ - See below, Appendix 1, graph 1, p.400. For further development of this theme, below, pp.273
de tarde councillors of Castile. No information is available on the background of Fernández Espinosa, but of the other eight six came from within Finance's own offices, while Bernabé de Pedrós brought a training in military finances and Sarmiento de Acuña some twenty years' military and municipal experience.

These men sat on the whole as diligently, if not for quite as long, as the new councillors of War of 1598-1601. Only in 1604-5 were there less than five men attending at least 80% of the annual meetings, and in 1604 four sat at more than 90% while in 1605 three did so. The heart of Acuña's Council was therefore thoroughly professional, and seven of his councillors had records rivalling those of all but Diego de Ibarra and Brochero on War:

Mesia de Tovar - 83%, December 1604 - December 1622...
Herrera - 75%, June 1607 - December 1622...
Pons - 82%, January 1603 - September 1618.
López de Ayala - 84%, July 1607 - December 1618.
Ipeñarrieta, C. de - 83%, January 1603 - August 1612.
Pedrós, B. de - 76%, January 1605 - November 1613.
Sarmiento de Acuña - 70%, September 1604 - August 1613.

The one structural weakness of Acuña's presidency - and

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1 - i.e., Cabala, Pons, Pedrós, Herrera, Cristóbal de Ipeñarrieta, Mesia de Tovar; see above, p. 262, nn. 4-6. This was a perhaps significant increase on Poza's two out of five with such experience.
generally it was not a serious one - was his inability to impose himself on his secondary councillors. These fell into three categories; the seven inherited from Poza, the three appointed by Acuña himself as deputies for absentees, and those several councillors from whom at one time or another he did not demand consistently regular attendance.

Of the old councillors, Salablanca sat at 87% of the meetings to March 1607 and Pascual at 89% to January 1605, but Agreda did well only in spasms, which were generally separated by long absences, and Gaitán de Ayala sat regularly to 1607 but only at a low level of consistency. Ramírez de Prado appeared on average at every third meeting in 1603-4 and was replaced, and Ibarra made no impact at all until 1609. In 1603-4, the men inherited from Poza comprised approximately half of the Council (1603: 3.7: 7.19; 1604: 3.3: 7.58) but their consistency of attendance was low, and by 1605-6 they accounted for less than one fifth of the attendance (1605: 1.5: 7.95; 1606: 1.6: 7.41). Only Pascual was able to serve without interruption for convalescence, and it was ironically appropriate that three of them should have died in 1607 at the height of crisis.

Such absences made it difficult for the President to replace councillors immediately, but Acuña persistently aggravated his problem by his reluctance to retire such men; he clearly had a high regard for experience and repeatedly tolerated waning performances from the more distinguished elderly councillors. Better, in his view, to have such men...
available intermittently than not at all. Indeed, of the eight men he introduced after January 1603, only López de Ayala was nominated specifically as a replacement, and even then he had sat ten times in the previous three months. Perhaps Acuña was testing his appropriateness for the task; three others, two of them *de facto* replacements, also sat before being formally appointed,¹ while three had to wait for periods of between fourteen and eighteen months after appointment before taking up their councillorships.²

Acuña's difficulties were most clearly evidenced by the tortuous process whereby Martín de Porres eventually took up his councillorship in 1604. In 1599, Ramírez de Prado had joined in effect as substitute first for Ibarra and then for Salablanca, but with the latter's return in August 1600 coinciding with the death of Menchaza, he then continued to sit in his place. He did so in preference to Porres who had — at least reputedly — been appointed in Menchaza's place.³ But when Ramírez himself began a six months absence in October 1603, it was not Porres but Alonso Fernández Espinosa who deputised; Fernández attended forty three meetings, only two of which were also attended by Ramírez, and between them they missed only four meetings. What made this an exceptional substitution, however, was the attendance at three of those meetings of Porres — that is, Ramírez, having come on to the

¹ — i.e., Ibarra, Fernández Espinosa and Porres.
² — On Pedroso and Herrera, above, pp.179 and 184-6. Herrera was appointed in 1605 and first sat in 1607, and Mesia in 1603 and first sat in 1604.
Council as a deputy, now had his own deputy in Fernández, who in turn was deputised for by Porres! But as Ramírez had become a full councillor, so too now did Porres, and Fernández was further demoted. At the end of July 1604, having already sat four times, Porres was formally appointed to the Council, but as a general rather than specific replacement, Ramírez still sitting regularly until the end of the year. Fernández was restricted to a brief service in December 1604 when four councillors were absent, and to a regular attendance in the second half of 1606, when after the return to Madrid a badly faltering Council had to be restored to shape. But with two further appearances in 1607, his councillorship ended.

Acuña's respect for age and distinction was in evidence in a number of cases - for example, in those of Agreda, Gaitán de Ayala and Ibarra - but was most clearly typified by his tolerance of the persistently poor performance of Contreras. His had been a distinguished career, not dissimilar indeed to Acuña's own, and he would yet rise, if reluctantly, to the heights of the Castile presidency under Philip IV. 1 He first sat in February 1603 and took up a more or less regular attendance in June, averaging a 56% attendance over the next eighteen months, but declined to 29% over the years 1605-9. Ibarra, afforded a similar indulgence, was allowed in 1608-9 to serve as something of an alternate councillor to Contreras; in 1608 one or the

1 - See above, pp. 86-7.
other of them was present at 54 of 122 meetings, and in 1609 at 53 of 67, but in the two years they sat jointly at only twenty four.¹

Sarmiento de Acuña was indulged in slightly different circumstances. Appointed in September 1604 as supernumerary councillor to succeed to the first vacant place, he commenced immediately, perhaps as an overdue replacement for Cabala, and to the end of 1607 continued to deputise whenever occasion offered. He was never to become a full councillor, but by 1608–9 he was almost sitting in his own right and by December 1609 had sat at nearly three-quarters of all meetings since his induction.

Acuña, therefore, was clearly more concerned with the calibre of his councillors and with maintaining a sufficient rather than a strictly legal level of attendance, and by 1608–9 he had solved his most important problems with his councillors and brought the Council itself to a very high level of consistency; in both those years he had seven out of ten, himself of course included, sitting at more than 80% of the meetings, with in 1609 an eighth over 70%. Only Ibarra and Contreras were failing him.

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¹ The significance of their performances is further analysed, below, pp. 273–4.
No one failed Carrillo. More self-assured, more ruthless than Acuña, he drove his councillors harder while making his Council more compact. In the first four months of 1610, as he took stock, Finance sat even less frequently than did State, and over that whole first year it sat only fifty two times in all - less even than under Poza. In 1611-14 it then reverted to much the level of the Acuña years before settling down to an average of sixty three meetings in the years 1615-17. In all, therefore, Carrillo convened Finance only six times a year more on average than Poza had done and some twenty less than Acuña. But with this contraction went an expansion of authority which finds remarkable reflection in the graph recording frequency of convocation, State, War and Finance now reacting to and registering political pressures as if they were one barometer. 1

To make a council more compact was, of course, to make it more manageable, and with the exception of Sarmiento de Acuña, who was allowed to continue much as before, Carrillo's councillors sat with a consistently higher level of diligence than they had shown even under Acuña. Despite, therefore, the reduction in the number of annual meetings, Contreras found himself sitting at more meetings in three and three-quarter years under Carrillo than he had in seven under Acuña, at an

1 - See below, Appendix 1, graph 1, p. 400
average now of 63% to his retirement in August 1613. Ibarra had not much life left in him but was allowed only eight absences before retiring in September 1610 on the verge of death.

In the years to 1613, Carrillo reduced the size of his Council by simply ignoring a succession of deaths and departures; thus Ibarra was not replaced at all, while Cristóbal de Ipeñarrieta’s place remained unoccupied for twenty eight months after his death in August 1612. In 1613 Sarmiento de Acuña left for England and Fabian de Monroy was appointed supernumerary councillor to deputise for him during his absence; Carrillo did not like supernumerary councillors, and the unfortunate Monroy sat only seven times. \(^1\) When Contreras retired in 1613, however, Carrillo was obliged to replace him since he sat as de tarde member, and Dr. Antonio Bonal succeeded him, and did so to some purpose, sitting at 86% of the meetings to the end of the reign.

Bernabé de Pedroso saw 1613 out and promptly died, and Carrillo was unable to delay longer; on 1 February 1614, Gamboa, Soria and Bañuelos were brought in specifically as replacements for Ipeñarrieta, Sarmiento/Monroy and Pedroso. Gamboa had been appointed in March 1613 to succeed Ipeñarrieta but had been working in Seville and immediately left again, returning to commence regular service in December; García Mazo de la Vega was therefore introduced as a temporary substitute for him. He, too, however, held a supernumerary title.

\(^1\) On Carrillo and supernumerary councillors, below, pp. 275-6.
and was accordingly restricted to fifteen attendances. All four came from the Council's own offices, and with the exception of Mazo each sat with the requisite diligence; Bañuelos died on 21 October 1614, but nonetheless sat at 93% of the meetings to 11 October, while Soria sat at 84% from February and Gamboa at 87% from December 1613, both to the end of 1622.

The appointment of the supernumerary Monroy to deputise for the supernumerary Sarmiento de Acuña heralded the commencement of Carrillo's difficulties with a King who at once wanted the number of councillors reduced, but who persisted in appointing supernumerary councillors of not always appropriate stature. Carrillo ignored them. Don Juan de la Serna, caballerizo of the Prince and infantas, was appointed in March 1616, but sat only ten times during Carrillo's presidency. The qualifications of Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza y Castilla for a councillorship are - significantly? - not recorded; his service, however, was precise enough, limited to six successive meetings in 1616. Tomás de Ayarri was certainly qualified for a councillorship,

1 - Gamboa and Bañuelos having been contadores; Soria, fiscal, and Mazo, Treasurer General.
but Philip's appointing him *ad honorem* councillor in December 1616 doubtless ruined him in Carrillo's eyes, and he was allowed only four attendances.¹ He, Hurtado and de la Serna, therefore, aggregated a mere eighteen attendances under Carrillo. Luis de Alarcón was perhaps even more unfortunate; in 1612, with already more than forty years' service in Finance's offices to his credit, he was strongly recommended by the Council itself as successor to Cristóbal de Ipenarrísta, but found his title of appointment accompanied by another ordering him not to take up the position until further notice.² He would wait until 1620, and then sit only ten times.

In August 1617, with the Duke sulking in Lerma, Philip himself conferred on Carrillo the distinction enjoyed otherwise only by Bautista Acevedo³ of a joint presidency, promoting him to Indies with retention of Finance.⁴ He stayed with Finance until the end of the year, and when he relinquished office he bequeathed to his successor a Council that had structurally reached perfection. The replacements of 1614 had made good the early losses, and by 1615 he had six councillors attending over 80% of the meetings and a further three over 70%. In 1616-17 he improved even on that, and had in each

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³ See above, pp. 78-9.
⁴ In letter of 5 Aug. 1617, cited above, p. 56, n. 1.
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The dates on the right are those for which no initialled consultas have survived.
year eight councillors attending more than 80% of the meetings. In 1617 the average attendance for the first time passed 8.00, reaching 8.25; this represented a failure rate against both the legal and practical norms of 0.75 councillors per meeting, and was explained in large part by Herrera's three and a half months absence in the spring. He had brought the frequency of meetings to a remarkably consistent level, with 63 in 1615, 62 in 1616 and 64 in 1617. Don Fernando turned now to Indies; before long he would be accused of re-writing the laws governing those far-off lands.¹

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For his new President, Philip turned once again in an unexpected direction, but again chose a distinguished administrator. Don Bernardino de Velasco y Aragón was descended from an illegitimate branch of the House of Haro, dukes of Frías and Constables of Castile.² He had served Philip II in Portugal in 1580 and again in 1585-6 as a captain of men-at-arms and then of cavalry, and in c.1582 had been appointed **vededor y comisario general** of the Infantry of Castile, and had occupied that post until retiring in 1608.³ For the last

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³ Cntas. as above, n. 2; on retirement, Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), pp. 323 and 345.
seventeen years he had also served as one of the pillars of the professional half of War (1599-1617 at 65%). As Carrillo had proved his abilities in his great visita, so Salazar had proved his in supervising the morisco expulsion; it was not only his victims who took note of his efficiency.¹

His leadership of Finance inevitably suffered in comparison with Carrillo's, but it was competent enough, and differed substantially only in his toleration of an increase in the membership. Four of the inherited councillors continued at their accustomed level to the end of 1622 (Mesía de Tovar, Herrera, Gamboa and Bazán), while Bonal did so to his dismissal in 1621, López de Ayala and Pons to their retirements in December and September 1618. Only López de Ayala was immediately and formally replaced, as Lic. Gilimon de la Mota commenced as de tarde councillor at the beginning of 1619. When he in turn began a long absence in May 1620 he was deputised for first by Alarcón - irregularly since he was not a councillor of Castile - and then, more permanently, by Lic. Diego de Corral y Arellano.²

Like Acuña, Salazar preferred to use such experienced men as were available, and unlike Carrillo, he had no strong antipathy to the supernumerary councillor. Thus in April 1618 de la Serna was allowed to

² - de la Mota had been appointed to deputise for Bonal (5 Mar. 1618, A.H.N. Cons., L.de P., 724, f. 290-1) but had not sat and on 10 Jan. 1619 (ibid., f. 306v; but 16 Jan. according to A.G.S. Q.C.9) was appointed to succeed López de Ayala. On Alarcón, above, p. 276. No title is extant for Corral's appointment; he first sat on 12 Jul. 1620.
assume regular membership and secretary Miguel de Ipeñarrieta was accorded a supernumerary councillorship specifically so that he could register a vote at meetings which of course he invariably attended. 

Similarly, when Sarmiento de Acuña, now Count of Gondomar, returned from England, he was allowed to resume his councillorship, while Juan de Pedrós was permitted to take up in 1620 his appointment of 1617. Only the two councillors of Castile of the seven men introduced or reintroduced by Salazar were not supernumerary councillors, and only they and Alarcón were brought in specifically as replacements. They were, nevertheless, with the possible exception of de la Serna, career-professionals; but but he had served for years in the Ministry.

Salazar's presidency effectively ended on 13 December 1620. He sat only once thereafter (10 January 1621) before dying, four days before his King, at the end of March 1621. He had found the burden of office increasingly heavy and had repeatedly asked leave to retire, but was not formally allowed to do so until the beginning of March. 

For ten of the eleven meetings between 13 December 1620 and 7 March 1621, therefore, the Council operated without a president, but thereafter it worked under the supervision of a Governor, Dr. Juan Rococampofrío. Again, Philip's choice was an unorthodox one. Inquisitor of Valladolid, Rococampofrío

1 - Titles of 19 Mar. 1618, A.H.N. Cons., L. de P. 724, ff. 291 and 293.
2 - Title of Dr. Don Juan Rococampofrío as Governor of the Council of Finance, 2 Mar. 1621, ibid., ff. 342-3.
had gone to Flanders in 1602 as Vicar General of the Army, and his conduct of asiento negotiations in Flanders was apparently his only relevant qualification for the promotion to Finance, since on returning in 1605 he had resumed his Inquisitorship, proceeding thence to a councillorship of Inquisition. ¹ Sensibly, he continued to run the Council as Salazar had done. With the return of de la Mota in July he found it unnecessary to appoint a replacement for Bonal, and by the end of 1622 he had introduced only one new councillor, Lic. García Pérez de Araciel. Since, however, García sat only seventeen times in all, the composition of the Council, as it entered 1623, remained substantially unaltered.

After four meetings as Governor, one of them under Philip IV, Rococampofrio was formally appointed President on 17 April. ² As Finance entered 1623, it was staffed by thirteen councillors, eight of whom were attending more than 80% of the annual meetings. Three of these – Mesiade Tovar, Herrera and Gondomar – had begun their service under Acuña; another three – Gamboa, Soria and Bazán – had exercised full councillorships under Carrillo, and five – de la Serna, Juan de Pedroso, Miguel de Ipeñarrieta, de la Mota and Corral y Arellano – had been promoted by Salazar. As with State and War, Philip IV inherited a strongly resilient and professionally-staffed Council. He was more fortunate than his father had been in 1598.

IV. The Machinery of Government.
Many of the most important features of the machinery of government as it operated under Philip III have already been described, and it remains to essay a more general discussion of how the machine worked in practice. The least disadvantageous approach appears to be to compartmentalise— to consider the significance of regal and ducal activity and then to look at the work of the councils in two different contexts, institutional and personal.

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Immaturity was the chief royal characteristic in the early years; alternately buoyant with idealism and unrealistic optimism or depressed by self-doubt and lethargy, Philip at the outset of his reign was a not-untypical adolescent—save that he was called upon to govern the largest empire the world had yet seen. A young man anxious to cut a figure in the world, he was both avid for greatness and yet cowed by the greatness thrust upon him, and already by 1601 he had erected monuments to his adolescence in the form of a re-established Council of State and a reorganised Council of War, designed specifically to win him his great victory, but allowed to stand to save him from himself.¹ Conscious at once therefore of his inadequacies and opportunities, he was deeply imbued also with a sense of divine mission; how could it be otherwise with a king of Spain, the grandson of the legendary Emperor and the son of el Prudente? Philip himself indeed in 1603 perfectly summarised these different elements in his own character—'It appears to me just that the expedition to Algeria should go ahead, and if God is pleased to dispose of it in such a manner as I have reason to hope for from such good ministers as those who have advised me..... I will follow the example of my grandfather. For this reason, preparations are to be made forthwith, and so that everything necessary for this

¹—See above, pp. 10-13, 24, and 28-31.
expedition be provided you are to meet on at least one day a week in the house of the Count of Miranda to discuss this, and are to advise me after every meeting so that I can make a decision on every matter and order it implemented'.

Philip's reliance on his 'good ministers' was virtually absolute, but took of course different forms with different groups of them. We should begin with his relationship with the Council of State.

From the first, Philip was quite content to simply agree to State's recommendations unless he found himself seized by his special enthusiasms. At such moments — as we have seen in a number of different contexts — kingship became truly inspirational; 'having considered this with the attention that the matter demands, and having asked God to guide me to what is convenient to His purpose and to the universal good of Christendom, which is the chief end that I hold ...'. State soon learned to reply in kind, and its consultas became in consequence at such moments documents of quite florid eloquence. Faced, for instance, with Philip's resolve to break with France in 1600 it set out to satisfy his conscience and self-esteem; 'Your Majesty has met his obligations to God, to men and to what he owes to his own greatness and nobility of spirit and to the flowering of his manhood. No one could attribute (failure to go to war) to anything other than the sacred

2 - On the Irish expedition, above, pp. 28–9; on his intention to march into Italy over the Saluzzo crisis, above, pp. 27 and 130–1; and on his determination to go to Portugal in 1603, above, p. 132.
3 - Cnta. St., 2 Sept. 1600, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 67. He was dealing with the problem of the English succession.
zeal that Your Majesty has for the good of Christendom and its expansion, and if the King of France does not accommodate himself to your just demands it will only be because his sins blind him to the favour that God has given and is giving him ...'. It then proceeded to argue on military and financial grounds against his policy. Similarly, when confronted with his decision to send the empressa to Ireland, it confessed itself unable to fully express its admiration for 'the sacred zeal, great valour and prudence that Your Majesty has shown in this business, which, because of its quality and importance and on account of its being so worthy of the greatness of Your Majesty and so resoundingly to the advantage of the Lord our God, to the strengthening of the sacred Faith, the universal good of Christendom and ... the reputation of Your Majesty at a time when so many think that your power has diminished'. It then again argued in minute detail against the royal policy. This technique served equally well to console Philip in moments of desolation - thus disaster at Nieuwpoort in 1600 should be an occasion for giving thanks to God for an admittedly inscrutable favour, while the Irish disaster was obviously a test from which a young king would emerge the stronger.

For all its condescension this approach was very nicely judged,

2 - Gna. St. 23 Jul. 1600, A. G. S. E. 2511, f. 2.
3 - Gna. St. 29 Jul. 1600, ibid., f. 9.
4 - Gna. St. 3 Mar. 1602, ibid., f. 64.
and exactly suited to the needs of these extraordinary moments. It was not of course always successful; the royal determination held firm over Ireland in 1600 but wavered over the journey to Portugal in 1603, and on both occasions therefore disappointed the Council. Conversely, if Philip did not himself march against the French in 1600 or win his Charles-like victory in Africa in 1603 he relented perhaps more because his own determination failed him than because he allowed State to dissuade him. In the longer term, however, there was a more profound victory for State as Philip identified himself with a Council that so obviously spoke his own language, if only to oppose him. Thus it was, for instance, that he entrusted control over the Irish or Algerian expeditions to men who were at best lukewarm about them, but who were nonetheless his 'good ministers'. Thus it was, too, that he himself attended the Council’s deliberations when it was dealing with matters in which he had a particular interest— in June 1600 over the Saluzzo crisis, and again in September over the possibility of a peace with the Dutch, and in March 1602 on the consequences of the failure in Ireland. Philip’s enthusiasms bound him to the Council. This was particularly true of course of his involvement with Ireland; we have already seen how that had quite incalculable political consequences in that it led him to reorganise War and virtually to

1 - See above, p. 27.  
3 - Cnvs.St., 3 Mar. 1602, ibid., f.64.
call State itself into existence. It had, at the end of 1601, further and spectacular consequence. In those first two years of State's existence proper, Philip was quite content to simply agree with the minimum of effort - 'esta bien', 'lo que parece', 'assi' - with whatever the Council was recommending, save where Ireland was concerned; then his interest was informed and urgent. His attitude was illustrated in extreme form by the manner of his response to a consulta of 11 July 1600 in which State dealt with the range of possibilities open to him in connection with the problem of the English succession. Among them was mentioned the expedition to Ireland, and by 23 July he had replied on this latter point, but on the remainder, he needed time to think; State received his reply - which merely affirmed the traditional policy of supporting the candidature of Isabel - some six months later. On 22 December 1601, however, State presented him with a consulta of the greatest complexity and importance and the manner in which Philip dealt with each of fifteen separate recommendations both established him, for virtually the first time in the reign, as a man intellectually capable of directing and ordering the conciliar system and marked a decisive break with the past.

It was of course a consulta concerned primarily with the second

1 - See above, pp. 10-13, 24 and 28-31.
2 - Cntas. St., 11 and 23 Jul. 1600 and 13 Jan. 1601, A.G.S. E. 2511, ff. 48, 2 and 76.
empeza de Irlanda, and in the years to come Philip continued to apply himself most keenly to those consultas dealing with his special enthusiasms. But his treatment of other subjects, most notably of affairs in the Netherlands, showed the same awakening of interest, a new sense of involvement. Failure in Ireland bound him even closer to the Council, as from May 1602 it moved slowly but inevitably towards a rapprochement with James of Scotland, now destined to be king of England.¹ Thus when in February 1603 his own confessor suggested that English affairs be in effect transferred from the jurisdiction of the Council into that of a junta, Philip's reply was definitive of the importance that he attached to State itself - 'one cannot entrust such a great matter to anything less than the whole Council and to such councillors, and I therefore charge (the Council) to deal with it'.²

When in May 1603 State acknowledged final failure in England, it satisfied the royal conscience with appropriate eloquence - 'the chief cause of (the war) has been that of religion, to help and liberate the Catholics of that kingdom from the tyranny and oppression of the heretics, and so that all be reduced to obedience to the Holy See...'.³ Peace was now justified because it would enable Philip to help the English Catholics by means of negotiating with the new king. He was convinced; his instructions to Juan Bautista de Tassis on his

¹ - See particularly, Cnta. St., 18 May 1602, id., f. 77.
² - Cnta. St., 1 Feb. 1603, id., f. 88.
³ - Cnta. St., 11 May 1603, id., f. 91
departure for England proclaimed that peace was 'equally necessary for the universal good of Christendom and for that of my kingdoms'.

By August, he was looking forward to a new sort of greatness - 'my friendship is more important to (James) than that of anyone else'.

Beneath the verbiage, however, there was new realism; in February 1604 he bluntly refused to aid the Scottish Catholics in rebellion on the pragmatic grounds that 'what is important to those Catholics is that their King should not enter into suspicion of them'. Philip was beginning to grow up.

There was, however, still a victory to be won, and he turned his attention now, with his Council, to Flanders. His new cause was of course also the Almighty's; his reaction to the troop rebellions of the spring of 1604 was to express concern that the mutinados had, for the first time, expressed anti-Catholic sentiments. Accordingly, he overruled both State and Albert and ordered that they were not to be paid at the expense of loyalist troops. He did not persevere with that policy, but applied himself with relish to State's Flemish consultas, and did so to some purpose. In 1605 he was able to inform the Council that he was making an extra 1,200,000 escudos available for the pursuit of the war, and took vast pride in the achievement; the amount was more than his exchequer could bear but was provided 'so that God and the world shall see that for my part I am doing what I can for the universal

1 - Copy of the Instructions, undated, B.N. 2347, f. 70.
4 - Cant. St., 8 May 1604, A.G.S. E. 2023, f. 130.
good of Christendom and for that of my kingdoms'.¹ For a brief moment, the Council, with the exception of Idiáquez, shared the royal optimism, but in August it moved decisively on to the road that would ultimately lead to truce and then peace with the Dutch, advising Philip that even more money had to be found to continue the war and effectively therefore suggested that he would fail to subdue the rebels. He rounded on it as he had never done, nor would do again - 'it astonishes me that the Council, knowing what extraordinary provisions have been made this year and what the state of my exchequer is, should press for new provisions to be made. The Council, in which I trust so much, should properly do what it can ... and not content itself by proposing to me what it knows cannot be done, for such will not justify the confidence that I have in its help and advice'.² Perhaps the most critical moment in State's fortunes had arrived.

Over the next years, Philip allowed the Council to decay, neither replacing dying councillors³ nor paying any real attention to its consultas. He simply lost interest in it and in his foreign policies; no victory, no King. Nevertheless, State's authority as such did not decline significantly. It remained in control of the Spanish foreign policy, unencumbered now by any appreciable royal interest. Before proceeding further, we might consider the nature of Philip's relationship with War and Finance.

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¹ Cnta. St., 6 Jan. 1605, A.G. S. E. 2025, f. 133.
³ See above, pp. 239, 243-4.
With War and Finance, Philip exercised a mechanical kingship. By far the greater part of his activity was passive and desultory but was yet surprisingly commendable, for if his insipid agreements to recommendations manifested the low level of interest that he maintained in those councils' staple affairs they yet allowed them on the whole to get on with their work. Such was the price they paid for getting their consultas returned fairly quickly, and although his activity was prone to the occasional eccentricity - he might take six days or six months - it appears that Finance's consultas were normally returned in about three weeks. In view of the amount of work on the royal shoulders this was a not-uncreditable performance. It was of course essentially a negative approach, and as we will see, it tended to break down on the more complex matters, and especially so when different councils offered different advice on a particular matter; in such circumstances, Philip's kingship virtually collapsed. Ordinarily, however, it was equal to the demands that War and Finance made on it. Unlike State, War and Finance generally sent consultas to the King that were basically very simple in content, each dealing not with the complications of high diplomacy but with a single problem, simply set out. In the majority of cases an 'assi' from Philip was all that was

1 - On 12 Jan 1613, for instance, Finance sent Philip a consulta and a cádula which was to be signed, and on 13 July 1613 had to remind him that he had not returned them, consulta Fin., 12 Jan, and 13 Jul. 1613 A.G.S. C.J.H. 374, f. 4.

2 - Finance's consultas normally give the date on which they were returned by the King on the dorso; this figure is arrived at from these and from calculations based on each consulta used in this study.

3 - See below, pp. 332-350
properly required, but again his kingship was often not equal to the exceptional, to those consultas that demanded an immediate answer.\(^1\)

As again with State, therefore, royal indecisiveness or laziness basically served to compound conciliar importance, but at times also obstructed conciliar effectiveness. At such moments, Finance was the better-equipped to deal with him since it had a president who was himself a man of authority and who could therefore remonstrate directly with either Philip or with Lerma. We have already seen Acuña and Carrillo doing so in other contexts and the point will be further developed.\(^2\) War had no such immediate and direct possibility of redress, and chose, like State, to appeal to the best side of the royal character. It did so by ingenuously and simply increasing the royal work-load when it wanted a decision; thus, for instance, in 1601 'in fulfilling its duty and what it owes to Your Majesty, the Council cannot refrain' from bringing the needs of the gente de guerra to the royal attention,\(^3\) while in 1602 it found it 'unavoidably necessary' to remind Philip of the problems of the guardas de Castilla.\(^4\) Again, in 1604 it was 'certain' that His Majesty was fully aware of the deplorable state of the French presidios but 'regrettably' had to

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1 - See, for instance, below, p.\textit{247}, and more generally, pp.\textit{330–350}
2 - See above, pp.\textit{35, 100–102, 158–160} and below, pp.\textit{316–24, 140–1}
4 - Cnta. War, 8 Feb. 1602, A. G. S. G. A. 589, no fol.
remind him. It could, however, be pungent enough when occasion
demanded, insisting for example in 1600 on a reply to a consulta of
only 'the other day'.

With both councils, Philip was prone to take up sudden and
often inexplicable enthusiasms, and especially so of course at the
beginning of the reign. His interest in War's establishment of a
milicia general in 1600 was doubtless connected with Lerma's
involvement in the project, but the Council equally found him stirred
into unlikely action by the problems of provisioning the Indies fleet
in Tercera, of putting the galeras de España into asiento in 1601,
or even of housing government agents in Portugal in 1605. So, too, it
had inflicted upon it the sudden grand gestures - the capricious
decision of 1605 to suddenly reduce the Galician presidios, the rage
of 1602 that the non-payment of some monies could only be 'the
manifest fault of ministers'.

Such interests were occasional and not normally followed
through too energetically. Philip did, however, have policies of his

1 - Cantá War, 9 Apr. 1604, A.G.S. G.A. 604, f. 39. For a similar example, in
connection with some problems in Portugal, Cantá War, 7 Jun. 1602,
A.G.S. G.A. 589, no fol.
2 - Cantá War, 1 Sept. 1600, A.G.S. G.A. 570, f. 183.
3 - Cantá War, 7 Jan. 1600, A.G.S. G.A. 569, f. 15. On Lerma, above, p. 75.
5 - Cantá War, 22 Nov. and 30 Dec. 1601, A.G.S. G.A. 579, no folks.
7 - Cantá War, 15 Jan. 1605, ibid., f. 12.
8 - Cantá War, 3 Oct. 1602, A.G.S. G.A. 589, no fol. See also, Cantá 11 Oct.
1602, ibid.
own which he pursued with some consistency. He did not, for instance, like to alienate offices. Thus at the beginning of the reign he ordered Finance not to sell any more rights of renunciation to municipal offices. It was, too, entirely due to him that the Crown retained control of a number of administrative offices which Finance variously advised him to sell or make renunciab...
when the Junta de Hacienda suggested selling the relatively trivial office of pesador mayor de los pescados frescos y escabechados de la corte for the apparently laudable purpose of repairing the Pardo, he curtly refused. ¹ On occasion, he might proceed from the particular to the general; Finance's suggestion that the alcaldía of Velez be sold elicited the retort that not only was it not to be sold but that no alcaldía with any strategic importance was ever to be sold again. ² Similarly, when it came to his attention that, following the practice under his father, Finance was not even advising him of sales of treasuryships of the royal rents, he ordered that he was henceforth to be consulted about each case. ³ Paradoxically, his opposition to the sale of offices also manifested itself in his determination to secure the best possible price, and he not infrequently insisted that a figure agreed upon by the Council and the purchaser be significantly increased; if he had to sell his principles, he would drive a hard bargain. ⁴

Philip therefore maintained a close interest in this branch of policy and aligned himself firmly on the side of administrative integrity. Nevertheless, his policy was riddled with inconsistencies. To order that no further renunciations be allowed in the municipalities

⁴ As, for instance, with the sale of the Antequera alcaldía; Finance had agreed a price of 4,000 ducats, but Philip insisted on an extra 500, Cnta. Fin., 11 Mar. 1603, A.G.S. C.J.A. 3309, f. 124.
was something less than the grand gesture it appeared; since there were hardly any offices left to which that right could be sold,¹ and the policy itself came somewhat ill from the man who granted whole towns to Lerma and his criados.² Similarly, Philip's grant to Tristan de Ciriza of his notorious licence to sell the office of contador de mercedes contrasted rather sadly with his more general policy over the alienation of administrative offices.³ Nor, indeed, was he even always able to hold to that latter; we have already seen how the Treasurer General, refused the right of renunciation in 1619, was allowed it in 1621.⁴ Finally, as with all his assertive gestures, there was the recurring failure to distinguish between the major and the minor; in 1609 he endangered the negotiation of a major asiento for Flanders as his indecisiveness left Finance with only two days to conduct the sale of an office in Seville worth over 98,000 ducats.⁵

He pursued a similar idee fixee with War - that soldiers should not be allowed to pester him at Court. Thus in the first instance in order to discourage them he persistently cut down on the mercedes suggested by War, reducing a proposed grant of 300 ducats to

¹ See above, pp. 188, n. 3 and 195-6. ² Above, especially pp. 3 On Ciriza, above, pp. 53 and 209-210. ⁴ Above, p. 206. ⁵ On 20 June 1609, Finance suggested that 98,000 ducats could be taken from the proceeds of the sale of the Seville House of Money's treasuryship for two asentistas; they had made the condition that such money as was not paid to them by 15 July would be deducted by them from an asiento they were providing in Flanders. A new and higher bid for the office was then made, but on condition that it would be withdrawn if not accepted within six days, and on 4 July Finance informed Philip of this. On 5 July, he returned the first consulta, but did not return that of 4 July until the 8th, thus leaving Finance two days to arrange the sale. Cntas. Fin., 20. Jun. and 4 Jul. 1609, A.G.S. C.J.H. 356, ff. 172 and 397.
one of 200, ¹ or refusing to pay the whole of an award made by the
dead Adelantado. ² More generally, as has again been seen, he ordered in
1601 and in 1607 that de parte awards made by the Council be
dramatically reduced, grand gestures that both contrasted ill with his
own generosity elsewhere and were largely ineffectual; in 1611 and yet
again in 1615 he is found having to repeat them. ³

Philip found great difficulty therefore in imposing himself
positively upon his councils. He perceived, and rightly, that the prime
demand that a conciliar kingship made of him was that he respond
fairly quickly and decisively to consultas, and this he did, if often
insipidly. In a substantial sense, therefore, he fulfilled his regal
duty. The importance of this should not be understated; at even his
worst moments, he kept the machine working. This in itself was a
considerable achievement. Conciliar kingship, of course, also made a
secondary, qualitative demand, and it was here that Philip's tended to
break down, at those moments when he was required to impose himself
upon the councils or perhaps to discipline them. We will shortly
consider an example of this latter in another context, ⁴ but should
first leave Philip's relationship with War and Finance by appraising
the manner in which he actively co-operated with the councils.

At about the time that he began to lose interest in State's

¹ - Cnta. War, 20 Aug. 1600, A. G. S. G. A. 570, f. 118.
⁴ - Below, pp. 316-318.
consultas, Philip found War concerning itself seriously with the problem of naval reforms, and he took a keen interest in its deliberations. Doubtless, it was in part his grandeza that attracted him to the cause of naval reforms— in 1606 there was talk in the Council of State of war with England,¹ and of course the Dutch war was approaching its climax— but his activity was natural and unforced; he was merely fulfilling his kingly duty, taking a major interest in a major problem. In August 1606 he authorised a major ship-building programme— 'the most important matter for my service and for the good of these realms'²— and three months later complemented this by assenting to the introduction of a forced-apprenticeship scheme for poor youths of twelve to sixteen years of age who were to be taken off the streets and endowed with naval careers.³ Interest extended to more routine matters— the nature of naval salaries,⁴ the movement of squadrons,⁵ the provision of infantry for the navy.⁶ Royal interest was compounded by royal authority— 'it is important to properly reform this;'⁷ 'no time must be lost in despatching this squadron;'⁸ 'in order to gain time, which is the most important consideration at the moment, I have signed the patents.'⁹ Again, however, the ultimate beneficiary

of royal interest was conciliar authority — 'I remain very satisfied with the care that the Council has taken over this matter, and charge it to continue doing so in future ....' ; 'I greatly thank you for the care that you have shown in treating of this, which was no less than the importance of such a matter demanded .... All that you say on this appears satisfactory and I have ordered that all possible monies be provided'; 'the Council has deliberated very well on this and therefore I have signed the despatches that came with this consulta ... and I charge the Council to ... continue to advise me on what it is doing'; 'I greatly regret seeing that things have come to this extremity ... advise me on what has been done about it ....'.

A comparison of Philip's reactions here with his activity later in the reign as the long countdown to the resumption of hostilities began is instructive. In 1615 such was the state of the presidios and the navy that War considered their reinforcement to be 'the most important business with which it is currently concerned', but it found that State had decided that priority of resource be given to Italy and Flanders. It chose therefore to make its case for extra money on a piece-meal basis; between February and July 1615 it sent seventeen separate consultas to Philip stressing that it needed money for different purposes. Philip simply referred all these problems to

1 - Cnta. War, 2 Aug. 1606, sp. cit.
3 - Cnta. War, 30 Apr. 1607, ibid.
4 - Cnta. War, 30 Jan. 1607, ibid.
6 - Cnta. War, 29 Dec. 1615, ibid., f. 14, mentioning the seventeen consultas.
Carrillo, and War had to send a secretary to negotiate with the President, who as it happened was currently itinerant in Valladolid. Carrillo treated him to a lecture - 'un largo discurso' - on what he had done and on why he could provide no more money. War therefore appealed in a major consulta to Philip, certain was usual that His Majesty knew 'better than anyone' of the problems facing it, and complaining that 'all who are involved in government know how the President conducts business', accused Carrillo of not carrying out royal orders to provide extra money. Philip was unmoved, and left the matter in Carrillo's hands, reminding War that Carrillo had the order to pay what was possible. 1 By September, War was complaining that no more than five ships in the Atlantic Fleet were in fit condition to serve properly in 1616, begged that money be found to build more, and complained again that Carrillo was not co-operating. 2 Philip merely ordered it to draw up an account of all available ships and men. 2 In December, War took advantage of the news that two Dutch ships were loose in the Bay of Lagos to plead again for more money, and Philip with unconscious irony replied that the 300,000 ducats that Carrillo had allocated for the navy should be sufficient for the ships that War possessed. 3

Both in 1606-7 and in 1615, Philip's interest and activity in the problems of naval reform were close and basically commendable. In

2 - Cnta. War, 2 Sept. 1615, ibid., no fol.
3 - Cnta. War, 21 Dec. 1615, ibid.
1606-7, however, he was still impressionable enough to give vent to his enthusiasm; he saw the problems, he thought he saw the solutions and he threw himself eagerly at both. What he did not see was the context of the problems. In 1615, on the other hand, he was no less personally involved but could see now the much more general context and could discipline himself — and the Council of War — accordingly. Resources were limited and priorities were allocated; War would have to wait its turn. The King had grown up. For all that he was dynamically involved in 1606-7, it was in 1615 that he more properly and fully controlled conciliar government, harnessing the energies of three councils to a rationalised end, realising at last that problems required rather more than the royal wish to solve them.

Within the framework of State's priorities, therefore, Philip was allowing Carrillo powers that were all but ministerial; he acknowledged fully the justice of War's demands, but would not interfere with Carrillo's allocation of money. But it was the councils and not just this one man of exceptional resource and character who exercised the plenitude of power. Philip pursued the same line with Carrillo's successor. It may of course have been no coincidence that Salazar, twenty years a councillor of War, allowed War an increase of 60% in 1620, to 480,000 ducats, but War still found it insufficient. With the Truce coming to an end, with the Dutch trespassing in both Indies, it again found Philip following his President of Finance and ordering it to do what it could with the monies he had allowed it. He himself could do
nothing.1

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Philip's application to State's papers showed the same maturation over the last eight years of the reign, but before it did it underwent, in the years 1606-12, the most awful regression. Until the beginning of 1607 he continued to take some notice of consultas dealing with Flemish affairs,2 but did no more than the minimum of work with other papers; typical of such activity was his response to a major consulta of a State junta in April 1607, which consisted merely of agreeing to each one of seventeen recommendations without taking a discernible interest in any one of them.3 Typical, too, was the note sounded by Idiáquez in May 1608 when he suggested that James of England would greatly rejoice if Philip deigned to reply to any one of the six or seven letters he had written him.4 By that time, Philip had lost even his interest in Flemish affairs - in July, his reaction to State's suggestion that at very best only a defensive war could be waged in Flanders was to have it ask the opinion of two soldiers who had recently served there, and he 'reserved the problem of Flanders for future (consideration)'5; in September, a major consulta concerning itself with the extent of the Truce, the problems of the Indies navigation, freedom of exercise of religion in Flanders and the

2 His interest really ended with attempts in January 1607 to find money for Flanders; see especially, Cntas. Inta. de Hac., 24 and 31 Jan. 1607, A.G.S. C.J.H. 345, no fol. and f. 230.
4 Cnta. Idiáquez, 24 May 1608, A.G.S. E. 2513, fno fol.
5 Cnta. St., 26 Jul. 1608, A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 139.
responses to be made to any French activity elicited an 'esta bien' and a confirmation that some orders asked by the Council had been given.¹ Defeat was humiliating; Philip wanted nothing to do with it.²

Since in the years to the end of 1612 Philip made absolutely no positive impression upon State's consultas, no qualitative analysis of his decisions is possible. We may confine ourselves therefore to the quantitative, remarking that on approximately 46% of the consultas of the years 1609-1612 he merely scribbled an 'esta bien', a 'lo que parece en todo' and the like. On the remainder, interest was barely more comprehensive; on roughly the same proportion again he agreed to what the Council had recommended and merely added the rider that he should be given information on a further detail - on the details of the instructions to be given to an ambassador; on the reply to be made to a foreign ambassador; on the historical precedents for the establishment of English consulates in Spain; or on the need to match the French gesture in sending an extraordinary ambassador to England. Philip's constant referral of such back to the Council betokened a complete unwillingness to take even the smallest decision by himself and also therefore testified to the increased importance of the Council. The roles of master and servant had become almost reversed; the royal development after a decade in power was in the

² - On State's policy in these years, below, pp. 361-6
direction, not of a more independent and self-confident judgement but of a greater and more consistent reliance upon the advice of his councillors.

In 1613 Philip worked hard enough to have put his father to shame. The transformation, astonishing and absolute, is inexplicable. Doubtless it had much to do with the ending of the great annual itineracies,¹ and doubtless it equally had much to do with the grandeza to be won in the great project undertaken that year, of reforming the royal domain and army in Flanders. Certainly, the resurgent interest manifested itself most dramatically in the papers dealing with this latter problem.² Probably, the most important factors were three — the realisation that Spain was once again, after the death of Henry IV and the diplomatic revolution that that involved, the greatest power in Europe; the interest aroused by the reformed and largely re-staffed Council itself, now more self-confident than it had ever been; the long, last illness of Idiáquez, who in the previous five or six years had virtually been the Council of State, and upon whom Philip had almost absolutely depended.³ Perhaps, too, having won his great victory by expelling the moriscos, Philip had found fulfilment in his kingship.

In 1615 he flirted briefly with the idea of another Algerian

1 - See above, pp. 148-9.
2 - See especially the great consulta of Idiáquez and la Oliva, 16 Jan. 1613, A.G.S. E. 2027, no fol.
3 - On these factors, below, pp. 369-375.
expedition, but otherwise entertained no hopes of an easy greatness. State followed a policy of limited involvement in the successive crises in central Europe while trying to isolate James of England by holding out to him the prospect - more apparent than real - of a Spanish marriage, and Philip followed it closely and with quite remarkable diligence. Indeed, at moments, the level of his interest was quite phenomenal; the Cleves-Jülich crisis of 1614 and the great problem of the Bohemian succession - where, admittedly, there was a throne to be won - found Philip quite exhaustively involved. His policy, however, was that of the Council; he fully realised the weakness of Spanish power behind the great façade and determined resolutely that he should become involved in no wars. For the first time in the reign he fully adopted that apparent pacifism generally held so typical of him.

From the end of 1616, however, opinion in Madrid began to move, slowly but inexorably, in the direction of a more assertive foreign policy, and Philip moved with it. Frustration with a Dutch peace that was

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1 -Cntas. St., 12 Jan. 1615, A.G.S. E. 2514, ff. 37-8. In the event he did no more than provide 12,000 ducats for the King of Algeria, with whom he was allied. His interest here was perhaps a natural extension of that in a now-completed morisco expulsion; on his interest in the latter, see particularly, Cntas. St., 20 Feb. 1614, A.G.S. E. 2644, no fol.

2 - See, for example, on Cleves, his response to Cntas. St., 29 Jul. and 14 Sept., 1614, A.G.S. E. 2028, no fol. ; the most remarkable example of his involvement in the Bohemian succession, Cntas. St., 27 May and 11 Jun. 1616, A.G.S. E. 2326, f. 19. See also, Cntas. St., 30 Apr. 1616, ibid., f. 15.

3 - See especially his replies to Cntas. St., 27 May and 11 Jun. 1616, A.G.S. E. 2320, no fol., and to 28 Feb. 1616, A.G.S. E. 2030, no fol.; in each of these he specifically ruled out war as being anything but a last resort.
proving as fractious and as expensive as a war was the catalyst.

Philip's interest in his governmental duties took a new and singular form as from 1616 he began working closely with the conciliar secretaries; he now gradually assumed the responsibility that had long been Lerma's, and issued orders in his own name. Generally, the secretaries wrote the notes and he initialled them but increasingly he began to write his own. His interest ranged comprehensively from the small to the large, from whether contador Juan de San Martin be given a merced to the nature of army reforms in Italy. His major interests, however, were two— with money and with Flanders. Uniquely, he began to involve himself in asiento negotiations, and did so with one end in view. By November 1619 he was making specific plans for the renewal of the Dutch War, ordering the establishment immediately of a new fleet in

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1 - To President of Finance (Salazar), 13 Dec. 1620, A.G.S. C.J.H. 410, no 2
fols. Similarly, see notes to same of 18 Jan. 1619 dealing with a request by the Count of Fuensalida, A.G.S. C.J.H. 405, no fol. and of 18 Sept. 1619 on a present for a bishop, A.G.S. C.J.H. 566, no fol. See also, on similar levels, a note to Aliaga of 13 Mar. 1620 on the jurisdiction of the Church in Cambrai; one of 6 Jun. 1619 to Juan de Ciriza ordering him to find pilots experienced in the passage of the Cape of Good Hope; one of 22 Mar. 1619 to Martin de Arostegui ordering some naval reinforcements to be sent to the Philippines. Respectively, A.G.S. E. 2035, f. 101; E. 2033, f. 131, and G.A. 840, f. 163.

2 - To Carrillo (?), 30 Sept. 1617, A.G.S. C.J.H. 395, no fol., dealing with the provision of money for Italy.

3 - See for example, notes to Carrillo, 23 Apr. 1616, A.G.S. C.J.H. 391, no fol., ordering the payment of 500,000 ducats for Milan, or that of 30 Sept. 1617 informing him that 300,000 ducats were to be provided in Milan, A.G.S. C.J.H. 395, no fol. See also note to Juan de Ciriza of 23 Feb. 1619 informing him, and therefore State, of the progress of negotiations for an asiento for Flanders, A.G.S. E. 2033, f. 119.
Flanders - 'it is important not to lose an hour of time in this' - and throughout 1620 he maintained a remarkable interest in the Flemish consultas, not infrequently indeed writing comments on them longer than those of the Council itself. With a dramatic sense of theatre, Philip brought his reign to a close. On 12 and 13 March 1621 he authorised an asiento of 1,500,000 ducats for use in Flanders, Germany and Italy, and set the stage for the last and greatest of his gestures. He made it from his death-bed. On 29 March 1621 he ordered that hostilities with the Dutch were to be renewed. Two days later he died, at peace with his conscience.

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1 - To President Salazar of Finance, 28 Nov. 1619, A.G.S. C.J.H. 405, f. 235.
2 - See, for example, consultas Sta, 5 May and 1 Aug. 1620, A.G.S. E. 2034, ff. 17-18 and 8-16.
3 - Notes to President Salazar of Finance, 12 and 13 Mar. 1621, A.G.S. C.J.H. 414, no fols.
4 - 'His Majesty has decided that from the completion of the Truce, which is on 9 April next ... the Dutch ... will be treated ... as enemies ... in the form and the manner that obtained before the Truce.' Juan de Ciriza to Martin de Aróstegui, 29 Mar. 1621, A.G.S. G.A. 865, no fol.
As the King's confidant, Lerma naturally assumed an administrative role, assisting Philip in a number of ways but fundamentally as an aide helping him deal with mountains of paper. Novel as it often was, this role should not be seen as quasi prime-ministerial; as always, Lerma's interest was fitful, his lethargy constant, his opportunism occasional, his conservatism extraordinary. Government and its problems were too complex for a dilettante to control, and Lerma usually knew better than to try.

He had, certainly, access to all governmental papers. In the first instance, this was a natural consequence of administrative routine, as despatches and correspondence addressed directly to the King were sent to him, and of course during an itinerancy Lerma's access to these papers would be compounded. Philip then had either to make a decision or circulate the papers to the appropriate council, junta or administrator. He allowed Lerma to read such of these papers as he cared to, doubtless discussed them with him, and then usually had him send them to the councils — thus, for instance, letters from the Pope,₁ cousin Philibert,₂ and the Archdukes in Flanders³ were read by Lerma before being passed on to State. Foreign ambassadors

₁ - Lerma to Antonio de Aróstegui, 17 Jan. 1618, forwarding the letter and ordering State to consider it, A.G.S. E. 1866, f. 1. See similarly cnta. St., 13 Sept. 1618, ibid., f. 51 dealing with affairs in Rome brought to the Council's attention by Lerma.
₂ - Same to same, 3 Sept. 1618, ibid., f. 49.
₃ - Same to Juan de Ciriza, 14 May 1616, A.G.S. E. 2030, no fol.
similarly merited ducal attention. On occasion he negotiated directly with them and was often more formally involved, as mayor, it fell to him to keep a supervisory eye upon them, and it was therefore he who dealt with their housing problems or with complaints made by them against Spaniards.

Of course, matters involving ambassadors tended to be of the first importance, but unless he was particularly interested in the matter at hand Lerma did little more than keep a watching brief, and even when he was so interested he kept State informed of what he was doing and passed on any relevant papers to it. For him, the appearance of greatness was more important than the substance. Similarly, he looked at the newly-arrived corres as they were brought to the King. This was a rather more irregular practice since he had no formal administrative position, but again special circumstances obtained; he was effective, although not titular, head of the spy service. Men wishing employment in

1 - Thus, for instance, with Digby of Britain in 1615; he then informed State of what had been said and it then formulated a reaction, conta. St., 26 Mar. 1615, A.G.S. E. 2514, f. 49.
2 - On housing of the English ambassador, Lerma to Arostegui, 9 Jul. 1611, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol. See also examples cited above, p. 159, n. 2 and 164, n. 1.
3 - See, for instance, the complaint made by the Florentine ambassador in 1618 about an alleged libel on his master; Lerma forwarded the matter to State, conta. St., 29 Mar. 1618, A.G.S E. 1866, f. 32.
4 - His most active involvement with a foreign ambassador was with Cornwallis of Britain in 1605, and much of his correspondence with Prada has survived in Andrés de Ustarroz's copies, B.N. 1492. On his reference of material to State, particularly letters to Prada of 19 May and 1 Jun. (ff. 219 and 22); and Prada to Lerma, 24 May 1605 (f. 237v). See also, Prada to Lerma, 16 Mar. 1605, A.G.S. E. 2512, f. 40.
that service or with information real or imaginary to impart to it approached him. So, too, the secretaries were careful to keep him informed of what was happening - Prada in 1605, for instance, is found telling him 'what is new in intelligence'. Again, however, his interest was fitful and we should no more take it seriously than did the secretaries themselves who generally merely kept him informed and who often used him to hurry up their business - Anaya of War, for instance, in 1611 'in order to tire Your Excellency as little as possible', sent a summary of his despatches, and received a prompt reply ordering War to consider them.

Lerma's commission of papers and information to the councils was pedantic in the extreme, and at the highest level - with State - only a few instances have survived of any behaviour on his part that was anything less than quite correct. On two occasions he ordered secretaries to retain some papers until such a time as Philip made a policy decision, but in both cases the issues involved

1 - Thus Juan de Medicis to Lerma, 24 Apr. 1610, offering to spy on Venice, A.G.S. K.1427, f. 19.
2 - When two Dutchmen approached him in 1617 with some information, he wrote to Juan de Ciriza ordering him to investigate its reliability, letter of 17 Oct. 1617, A.G.S. E. 2028, no fol. See also, cnta. St., 16 Jun. 1609 dealing with a paper forwarded by Lerma from a man who had a plan for conquering the Dutch with 6,000 Spaniards! A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 211.
3 - Prada to Lerma, 20 Aug. 1605, B.N. 1492, f. 231, a copy.
4 - Anaya to Lerma, 5 Mar. 1611, and reply, 8 Mar., A.G.S. G.A. 744, f. 10.
were relatively minor. 1 Once, he dealt in a half-truth, in ordering that some papers from Baltasar de Zúñiga were to be considered by State without the Council being informed of the identity of their author, but such was probably nothing more than an expedient designed to make for more judicious debate, since the Council tended to follow Zúñiga closely. 2 Similarly, there was a practical enough reason for his only recorded attempt to influence the composition of the Council itself, when in 1604 he stipulated that the Milan correos was not to be discussed unless the Constable was present 3 - the Constable having served as Governor of Milan was clearly entitled to be heard on such a matter. We are left with only one of Lerma's hundreds of notes to State which was in any substantial way sinister, and even then, in attempting to influence the views of members of the Council, it was not his own but the King's views that he impressed. In May 1607, dealing with the truce negotiations with the Dutch, Prada took it upon himself to ask Lerma whether 'because the matter is so important and sensitive it ought to pass before the censure of the Council' - proof, perhaps, of

1 - In 1607 he ordered Prada to retain some papers from the Netherlands until such a time as Philip made a decision on them, letter of 22 Jul., 1607, B.N. 1492, f. 269v, a copy; in 1612, he similarly ordered Antonio de Arostegui to retain a consulta (sic), again until Philip made a decision, on the payment of pensions in Flanders, letter of 16 Feb. 1612, A.G.S. E. 2026, no fol.

2 - Lerma to Prada, 26 Feb. 1605, B.N. 1492, f. 268v, a copy.

3 - Same to same, 28 Oct. 1604, A.G.S. E. 841, f. 180. The Constable's advice on military matters was accorded an equally singular distinction when in 1606 he was shown a War consulta on which there had been some small disagreement among the councillors; he thus acted as arbiter and Philip followed his advice, cmta. War, 8 May 1606, A.G.S. G.A. 653, no fol.
the Council's prestige even in its worst decline? - and Lerma decided upon a most curious compromise, ordering that Prada 'before the Council inform Miranda and (Idiáquez) of all this ... and tell them that His Majesty is inclined to the following ...'.

Once information reached a council, it consulted the King and he then took a decision. Doubtless Lerma offered advice at this state at least on occasion, but there is no evidence whatsoever for the often-propagated view that Lerma actually made those decisions himself and in effect therefore used the King as his secretary. The areas of responsibility between King and Duke were far too clearly defined for that, as indeed was the King's own political philosophy, which consisted more or less in toto of a reliance upon the councils - a reliance which was ultimately of course to prove more enduring than that on Lerma. Most obviously, Philip himself replied to the consultas - a simple enough observation, perhaps, but one of some significance when we consider the view that posterity has normally held of his kingship; his words, like his writing, were his own. Of course, in the nature of things, explicit evidence on this (alleged) problem offers itself only on the rarest occasions. In 1605, when State was dealing with a particularly urgent matter, Prada forwarded the relevant documents to Philip with an accompanying note to Lerma asking him to ensure that the consulta now being despatched, which is easy to resolve, returns answered at once and

1 - Prada to Lerma, 6 May 1607 and reply of same date, B.N. 1492, f. 305, a copy.
(with the enclosed) letter signed', and Lerma replied that 'I will ask His Majesty to give a decision on the consulta and (to send) the letter ... returned and signed'. More explicitly, in 1608 he wrote to Prada promising to advise him when Philip had made a decision on some papers for which he was waiting. It would have been easy enough — and probably more convenient — for Lerma himself to give decisions in such cases, but he was not the King of Spain and did not pretend to be. What was happening in practice was that once again administrators were using him in order to secure rapid decisions from the King.

Lerma did indeed have authority from Philip to give orders in his name, and much of the confusion as to the reality of his administrative role has stemmed from misinterpretation of the famous phrase with which he prefaced virtually all such orders — 'His Majesty has commanded me ...'. It meant what it said it meant; nothing more. In manner and content, such notes were secretarial rather than executive; the administrative context was again more important than the ducal. The immense amount of business coming to the King had to be rationalised; petitioners, informants, correspondents, even councils and their secretaries, were not necessarily the best judges of the overall degrees of importance and urgency of their business, and these

1 - Prada to Lerma, 10 Oct. 1605 and reply of 12 Oct., ibid., f. 236, copies.
2 - Lerma to Prada, 23 Nov. 1608, A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 85.
3 - This was a standard technique; for other examples, below, p. 322-3.
inevitably had to be gauged at the King's desk. A decision once reached might then, however simple, involve communication with a number of different agencies or individuals. Lerma's normal role was to assist in these tasks as a part-time, if occasionally exalted, secretary; on Philip's behalf, he passed on to the councils memoranda from supplicants, correspondence from interested parties, and consultas from other councils and juntas, ordering them to consider a particular matter and advise the King, and after a decision was made he might inform the different parties and perhaps order the drawing-up of the relevant executive documents. Characteristically, the great majority of his notes were not even written in his own hand but in those of a personal secretary and were only initialled by him. ¹

Since most governmental decisions in one form or another involved the provision of money, Lerma's role might best be examined through his relationship with the Council of Finance, and especially so since the largest single part of his extant correspondence relates to that Council's work. ² In turn, the greater part of that correspondence consisted of orders authorising the payment of small amounts of money. Most grants, of course, were made after a council had consulted the King, and Lerma ordinarily only involved himself in these if a problem arose—should monies that State had agreed were owing to Martin de la

¹ - On the identification of these secretaries, above, p. 94.
Cerda be paid in Spain or in Flanders? Similarly, he interceded regularly in favour of men not paid monies granted them — General Cubiaur in 1608 died before State's award to him was paid, and Lerma urged Finance to pay it to his family. Certainly, there was nothing irregular in such notes, but it is probably not fanciful to see behind most of them a personal appeal made directly to Philip or Lerma — to see this in a sense, therefore, almost as a courtly rather than an administrative activity by the Duke. Such was undoubtedly the case in the majority of instances where he ordered the payment of monies not specifically agreed to by a council, for these almost invariably concerned the payment of courtly expenses — a subject in which, as we have seen, he retained the closest and most natural of interests.

Again, there was nothing irregular here, save perhaps the judgement; the royal authority with which Lerma acted was sufficient. Such were not normally considered to be negotiable orders although, as has again been seen, Finance often did make an issue of them on the grounds of feasibility.

At the other end of the spectrum lay the greatest affairs of state, but again when Lerma involved himself he did so in thoroughly...
conservative and legitimist spirit. This may best be illustrated as it were in extremis from the terrible days of April 1610 when, it will be recalled, the Government was concerned with the apparently imminent launching of Henry IV's 'Grand Design' while King and Duke were driven to distraction by their inability to pay for their tour of Old Castile. On 22 April Lerma wrote to Carrillo perhaps the most unique of all his extant conciliar notes, and proclaimed the importance he attached to it by scribbling it furiously and entirely in his own hand. The expulsion of the moriscos of Aragón could not proceed because the money for the galleys had not been provided, and the moriscos themselves were on the point of rising in revolt with French help; unless 200,000 of the million ducats assigned for the purpose were forwarded 'without a day of delay', Spain herself would be put daily in greater peril. It was a matter 'of the very greatest importance and one justifiably causing His Majesty great concern'. 1 On the same day the Madrid Council of State advised Philip that the moriscos were so restive that 'some disorder may be feared' and that 'many most damaging troubles' would ensue if the money were not immediately made available. 2 On the following day this consulta was already on its way back to Madrid after having been read by the King and with another note from Lerma to Carrillo; fearing now an 'irreparable damage, with the French so close (to the border) and

2. - Cant. St., 22 Apr. 1610, ibid.
on the point of declaring war', he cut his demands to 100,000 ducats. ¹
In a second note on the same day he further stressed that with French
aggression imminent 'the situation is worsening daily in such a way'
that without immediate remedy 'some great disaster may be feared'. ²
As it happened, it was largely a false alarm; on the following day the
Court heard of the death of Henry. ³ However, supported as he had been
on 23 April by the fullest authority of the King and of the Council of
State, Lerma would surely have by-passed Finance if he could have done
so; he did not because he had neither the determination nor the
expertise to do so. In what he certainly thought was the gravest crisis
of his period in power and in the matter that probably above all
others was closest to the King's heart, Lerma threw himself into the
arms of the Council of Finance. The policy was fixed, the moment of
prime urgency, but he knew no other way of getting things done.

This held true more generally; indeed, the more important the
matter and the more imperious the tone of command the more in fact he
was led to acknowledge his dependence upon the Council. Thus, for
instance, when in 1608 all attempts by Council and junta to raise money
for Flanders and Portugal had failed, Lerma, far from doing anything
himself, threw the matter back to Acuña and his Council - 'the

¹ - Lerma to Carrillo, 23 Apr. 1610, ibid.
² - Same 'to same, 23 Apr. 1610, ibid.
³ - See above, p. 142.
necessities being so great and the lack of resources so complete, the Council cannot be excused from re-applying itself to the problem ... and His Majesty hopes that (you) will find some way of making good the money that is needed'. ¹ So, too, in 1617 Carrillo was first ordered 'not to rest' until the Piedmont provisions were made, ² and when his energy and will failed to provide a solution Lerma could do no more than place 'the authority and reputation' of Spain in his hands in the form of an order to find what he could. ³

Traumas of course were rare, but such correspondence of Lerma's was extraordinary only in degree. Between the two ends of the spectrum lay a broad mass of unspectacular material forming the staple diet of the Council, and here too Lerma's activity was normally quite legitimist. Normally it took the form of ordering the payment of monies in implementation of decisions reached after other councils had consulted the King - thus, for instance, 150,000 ducats for Laracha, ⁴ 10,000 for some ships going to Flanders, ⁵ 8,500 for some guardas despatched to Catalonia. ⁶ The very fact of giving an order, however, necessarily allowed Finance to involve itself in matters of which it might hitherto have known nothing, and after Poza's dismissal, it was only too ready to do so. This was especially true with asiento business, which

⁵ Same to same, 30 Apr. 1610, A.G.S. C.J.H. 392, no fol.
⁶ Same to same, 3 Dec. (?) 1616, ibid.
lay in the shaded areas just beyond Finance's control – necessarily so since the establishment of a need for an asiento lay often if not usually with the local agent of the Crown. In rare instances that agent might even conduct the negotiations himself; Albert in 1608 thus arranged for the provision of 100,000 escudos in Flanders, and Lerma therefore simply ordered Finance to reserve that amount from the Indies income and to make up the despatches. Normally, however, the negotiations would involve the central government and the President of Finance would either sit himself on the juntas which usually dealt with the matter or appoint a councillor or secretary to represent him. Thus Finance itself, although not directly involved, was normally represented in these discussions. But even if it had no such representation it became involved in the next stage when an agreement made, Lerma himself would often inform it of the terms of agreement or encharge it with refining the details, sometimes giving specific orders as to which resources were to be used. In such circumstances, Acuña Carrillo adopted different approaches, but to the same end. Acuña in 1604 was blunt enough to inform Philip that an agreement approved by

1 - Same to Acuña, 1 Jan. 1608, A.G.S. C.J.H. 353, no fol.
2 - See, for instance, his notes to Acuña of 31 Jan. 1603 or 3 Feb. 1608 A.G.S. C.J.H. 311, no fol., and 353, no fol. Lerma’s most interested asiento involvement was that of 1603; see particularly his letter to Acuña of 12 Jul. 1603 ordering him to make a new agreement for an asiento for Flanders – perhaps the longest of all his conciliar letters, A.G.S. C.J.H. 311, no fol.
Lerma was at a 'very excessive price', but supple enough to do so in such a way as to have the matter transferred to Finance and then to improve the terms himself. ¹ The following year he repeated the trick, over two clauses of another agreement he found unsatisfactory. ² Carrillo was more forthright; his comment on Lerma's suggestion in 1613 that an agreement be cancelled was to have him ask Philip 'not to take a final decision in this case without hearing the Council, since these matters are such that its view will always be the most healthy ('sans'). He then gave his own advice, ³ and found Lerma replying that what he had really meant was that no decision had been intended 'without your first consulting' on it. ⁴ Don Fernando then obligingly did so, ⁵ and found Lerma duly grateful. ⁵

When Finance's interests proper were concerned, Lerma was of course normally even more deferential. Several instances of the treatment meted out to him by both Acuña and Carrillo when he did stray or trespass have already been considered, and another will be shortly examined in a wider context. ⁶ Lerma liked to be helpful; unfortunately for him, Acuña and Carrillo attached little value to his

⁴ - Lerma to Carrillo, 18 Mar. 1613, ibid.
⁵ - Carrillo to Lerma, 2 Apr. 1613, ibid.
⁶ - See above, pp. 35, 97-8, 101-3, 158-160, 209-10, and below, pp. 310-3, 340-7
wisdom. For present purposes, an example of the reaction of each to his assistance may suffice. In 1608 Acuña was informed by him that the King had made an award from some vellón proceeds to a friar, and duly informed him that Philip had thereby acted illegally - 'it is contrary to what His Majesty has ordered and to his promises to the Kingdom'. ¹ His Majesty took the point; he ordered Lerma to give Acuña thanks 'for the warning which has appeared to him very good' and to inform him that he was 'pleased' to order that the manufacture of vellón cease. ² Six months earlier, however, Acuña and his Council had themselves suggested that 150,000 cruzados-worth of vellón be minted to meet a crisis that was holding up the sailing of the Indies fleet. ³ If illegalities had to be practiced, better on a large scale by a responsible council than on a minor by the King of Spain himself. At the other end of the scale, we may rest with Carrillo's not untypical outburst when Lerma proposed raising money by selling a major office in Seville - 'an acrid thing ... not a matter which can even be considered but a most dangerous expedient ...'. King and Duke gave way. ⁴

It should not of course be imagined that the initiative lay

2 - Lerma to Acuña, 26 Jul. 1608, ibid.
3 - Acuña to Lerma, 24 Jan. 1608 and reply of 28 Jan., ibid.
4 - The office was that of guardamayor in the Customs House, cont. Fin., 21 May 1611, A.G.S. C.J.H. 365, f. 145. For a similar reaction, to Lerma's suggestion that the Customs House alguacilazo be sold, cont. Fin., 28 May 1611, ibid., f. 155.
ordinarily with Lerma. Most of Finance's business was conducted quite independently of him and, like the rest of the Administration, it used him as much if not more than he used it. We might conclude by looking at two of the lighter moments in the Carrillo correspondence. In 1613, Carrillo forbore to inform Philip and Lerma of the anticipated income from the flota, as he deigned to assure Lerma in order not to repeat risking past overestimates; His Majesty would be saved from miscalculations and from their consequences if Finance itself drew up the accounts for the coming year.\(^1\) Lerma thought this a very good idea and, confessing himself satisfied with the 'zeal and care' of the Council, merely urged that some money be made available for Larache. He went so far as to apologise for thereby inconveniencing Carrillo,\(^2\) and in his good-mannered deference quite missed the point of the intrigue — that Carrillo and his Council intended to work out all the incomes and then let Philip know precisely what he would have to spend in that year, and how he could best spend it.

There were of course times when Carrillo was only too pleased to let Lerma know what he and his Council were doing, for he consistently used the Duke to speed up the Council's business. Even a week could be too long for him to have to wait for a reply to a consulta, and King

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3 - See for instance, letter to Lerma of 19 Jan. 1610, complaining that a consulta of 12 Jan. of the junta de guerra de hacienda had not been answered, A.G.S. C.J.H.361, no fol.
and Duke developed something of a propensity for being ill at moments when presidential wrath was aroused. In 1613, for instance, Lerma is found apologising through Juan de Ciriza for the fatigue that prevented him giving Carrillo an immediate and direct reply, and having Ciriza give it in his stead.¹ The next day, Ciriza was informing Carrillo that he would have regrettably to delay overnight presenting some of his letters to the Duke on account of Lerma's 'serious' illness.² It was not surprising that in June 1613 King and Duke were weary; Carrillo had been virtually at war with them in May and when on the last day of that month he won his inevitable victory, Lerma himself yielded in a note remarkable not merely for its abjectness but also because it represents his only extant attempt at humour - His Majesty had been unable to attend to business at once because he had a sore gum and had had to have a tooth extracted ('un carrillo').³ For the King of Spain and his best friend such was indeed a genuflection.

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² Same to same, 7 Jun. 1613, in reply to Carrillo's letter of same day, ibid.
³ Lerma to Carrillo, 31 May 1613, A.G.S. C.J.H. 376, no fol. For the context of this remarkable note, below, p. 346.
The man who 'rose late and did little' need not detain us. The Duke of Uceda's political activity - if thus it may be dignified - was confined to sending a few notes annually to different councils in which he circulated consultas, forwarded memoranda or informed the councils of small mercedes granted by the King. Only one has survived in which he even dealt with a large sum of money; in 1611 he informed Finance that some 132,000 ducats should be given to the Swiss. He did not know how the money was to be raised, but he knew that it should be given them because the Constable had told him so. Otherwise, he confined himself to trivia, and the only pattern worth recording was that he stepped up his activity at moments when his father was in trouble - thus, for instance, in August 1611 he interceded with Carrillo on behalf of the organists of the royal chapel, ordered him to send two jewels to Parma and Mantua, and asked him for advice about the problems of veedor Xauregui. Again, in the late summer of 1617 he roused himself to see that Andrés de Colmenares was paid a merced owing to him, that Lemos was given the

1 - See also above, pp. 52-3 and 62-3.
4 - Same to same, 21 Aug. 1611, A.G.S. C.J.H. 366, no fol.
perpetuation of an office, \(^1\) and that an important consulta from Aragón reached War. \(^2\) Such was Uceda's impact upon the machinery of government.

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\(^1\) Same to same, 17 Jul. 1617, A.G.S. C.J.H. 395, f. 43.
Geographically, the scope of the councils was wide. State dealt with everything happening diplomatically in the European and Mediterranean worlds and with any impingement such made on the Indies; War with everything military within the peninsula, its adjacent islands and the north African coast and with the appointment of soldiers abroad; and Finance with the administration of all Castilian rents and incomes, including those arriving annually from the Indies. Their business divided formally into two parts, policymaking and administrative, with the control of personnel— their appointment and supervision— encroaching upon both. While, however, State dealt ordinarily and chiefly in the first, War and Finance were thus concerned with the second, but such was the area of competence allowed them that they became in effect policymaking bodies. War, primarily concerned with the maintenance of the presidios and the armed forces, had weekly to appoint men to every type of military post or deal with the provisioning of fortresses, and in aggregate such activity formed a substantial contribution to policymaking. Such was only its routine activity, and of course it was directly and obviously involved in the great matters of the day; it did discuss, and inevitably, the question of whether there
should be war or peace and indeed was very probably initially responsible for the shift in emphasis towards a more belligerent foreign policy in the last years of the reign.\(^1\) Finance's concern with policy was generally even more apparent. Its formal *raison d'être* was to prepare annual accounts of the state of the exchequer and to project that forward for the next year,\(^2\) and its staple rôle was therefore to administer the royal income with a view to making money available in both long and short term. Its rôle as policymaker at this level need hardly be stressed. Even its more prosaic activities may in aggregate be thus classified. In 1603, for instance, it was ordered to find 240,000 ducats for Guipúzcoa and another 12,000 for El Peñón and Melilla, and decided that the greater part be filched from the *servicio*. It then had to consider the problems thereby caused with the *asentistas*, to whom that money was pledged, but went ahead, providing the remainder from *alcabales*, jurés already assigned for the Tagus navigation and the conciliar account. Later of course it would have to rejuggle those accounts; for the moment, in administering a routine royal command it had made policy of its own.\(^3\)

Their agenda reflected their different rôles. State dealt ordinarily with ambassadorial despatches and other information

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1 - See below, p.387–9, 391.
2 - 'Ordenanza' of 26 Oct.1602 re-establishing the Council, B.M. Add., 9932,f.42b, a copy.
pertinent to foreign policy and, with occasional exceptions - as for instance with the Expulsion or the royal itineracy - with little domestic material. This was referred to it by the King and the frequency of convocation of the Council might therefore vary with his diligence, particularly, as has been seen, over the first half of the reign. The other two councils were more autonomous. Finance also found much of its business coming to it in the form of a royal command to consider or implement the suggestion of another council or junta, but its convocation reflected virtually absolutely the wishes of its president, and, as has again been seen, each had his own modus operandi. War was on occasion subject to royal direction, particularly in respect of those more important matters that the King saw fit to reserve for the consejo pleno, the Council at which the attendance of the councillors of State was specifically required. Such was exceptional, and the greater part of its activity consisted in dealing with the despatches from its own agents. These, unlike State's ambassadorial despatches, came directly to it without - save again in exceptional circumstances - having been read by the King. The Council itself therefore ordinarily drew up its own agenda. Incoming papers were of course read by a secretary, and the Council tended on the whole to ask

1 - See above, pp. 239ff.
2 - See above, pp. 31-5, 266-7, 273, 278, 279.
3 - In practice these meetings were not always attended by all councillors of State; an rather mutable concept of a quorum prevailed on such occasions, but consistently fundamental to it was the attendance of the important councillors of State.
for further information or await supplementary correspondence before considering a problem; thus when, for instance, in 1603 it considered some problems in Cadiz it concerned itself with letters that were variously 49, 21 and 15 days old, now clearly considering that it had enough information to justify a consulta. Of course, if the importance of the matter in hand warranted it, War turned to it at once; in 1606 it considered a number of letters from leading ministers and agents in Portugal all within seven days of their being written.

The machine was lubricated by the secretary, who had to both ensure that his council had information appropriate to its needs and then execute decisions made after consultation with the King. His first task therefore was to sift through the vast correspondence directed to his council, gauge its importance—probably, in the case of State, to translate or decode it—and present it for discussion when it had been decided that it was to be dealt with. He then wrote up a consulta in draft form, circulated it for ratification to the councillors in the cases of State and War and to the president in that of Finance, wrote up the final copy with any necessary emendations, circulated it again, now for initialling, and then sent it to the King. On receiving it back, he would draw up the despatches and other orders implementing a decision, often after reintroducing it to

council or president for detailed instructions. He was therefore the servant of his council and his importance reflected that of the council; indeed, much of his more important activity consisted in keeping his eyes open for the interests of his council, particularly when he sat as its representative on extra-conciliar juntas. Although some of his business was conducted orally, in the true spirit of this Administration he committed everything to paper and maintained a vast correspondence — with his president or council, its agents, correspondents and suppliants, the secretaries of other councils and juntas, with Lerma himself or perhaps even with the King, and with the other secretaries in his own office.

The juntas as has been seen, was used extensively both to deal with the shaded areas of responsibility between councils or as a specialised sub-committee of a council looking at problems which it itself was unable to deal with, usually for reasons of time, and might therefore be an occasional or formally-established body and either intra- or extra-conciliar in composition. But — and it can hardly be

1 - See above, pp. 113-8.
2 - On this latter, see particularly the correspondence of Antonio de Arangüé and Juan de Ciriza of State, examples of which survive in any State legajo after 1614, and in which Arangüé as senior secretary ordered Ciriza to draw up despatches or letters or to find information — a correspondence which, incidentally establishes that the distinction between the State secretaries was one of seniority rather than of concern, as it had been under Philip II and was again to be under Philip IV, for certain geographic areas. Secretaries of course could take some papers with them when they retired and the most important of their extant correspondence is therefore that of Frada, copied from the original by Andrés de Uztarroz and preserved in B.N. 1492.
3 - Above, pp. 113-8.
overstressed - it was an inferior body in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, such as for instance those variously obtaining with the Junta de Hacienda. ¹ Thus while the occasional junta was often given conciliatory consultas as its brief, its own report would in turn be normally discussed and ratified by the full council or councils concerned. Only rarely, too, did such a junta achieve any significant status. An exception here was the Junta de Galeras, which was established in 1601 to consider whether the galleys should best be put into asiento or into administration, and which managed to stay alive to administer galley affairs on a semi-permanent basis. ² It may be presumed to have survived precisely because it was convenient for War to allow it to do so, with a membership including only one non-councillor of War - and he, indeed, a man with strong connections with the Council - it was a useful and not-resented tool. ³ State, free of the crushing volume of business facing War and Finance, and prestigiously far beyond the ambitions of any junta, had little need of juntas - save to dabble in others' affairs - and had only one of any significance, that de dos or de tres, depending usually on whether Lerma

1 - See above, pp. 31-5 and 113-4.
3 - Its staple membership; Miranda, the Constable, Idiáquez, Velasco, Esteban de Ibarra, and briefly in 1608, Javierre. Bernabe de Pedreno was the non-councillor; on his career, above, pp. 184-5.
or Córdoba joined Idíáquez and Miranda.  

Established in 1600, it was allowed two brief spells of activity, in 1602-3 and 1607-8, and ranged over a curiously vague spectrum of problems, from whether the Marquis of Comares should be allowed to marry to the nature of the organisation of the gente de guerra of Galicia, but it was an occasional body and knew better than to encroach on the full Council's domain.

The formal junta had an existence of its own and functioned mechanically much as a council-in-miniature. But although it had its own rights and obligations, composition and frequency of convocation legally defined it suffered by comparison with a council in terms of power, authority and — especially — in the loyalty of its members. If its preserve was unexceptional and if it kept within them it was allowed by the councils to quietly pursue its work, but if it offended either prescription it drew upon itself the most violent of onslaughts.

Where honour and self-importance were concerned seventeenth century Spaniards were not inclined to gentleness.

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1 - Velada, Franqueza and Esteban de Ibarra also sat occasionally; the latter was not of course a member of State and his attendance was testimony to the value that Philip set upon his advice.

2 - The first extant consulta dates in draft form, from September 1600, A.G.S. E. 1288, f. 159. Consultas from 1602-3 are collected in A.G.S. E. 2023, and see especially ff. 82-4, 87-8, 114-5; on 1607-8 see especially A.G.S. E. 2025, ff. 56, 69, 75-7, 78-9.


4 - Cnta. same, 18 Sept. 1607, A.G.S. E. 2637, no fol.

5 - Thus in 1607 it refused to take any responsibility for the peace negotiations with the Dutch because such 'properly' belonged to the full Council, Cnta. 16 Nov. 1607, A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 56. See similarly, Cnta. 17 Feb. 1608, ibid., ff. 78-9.

6 - See examples cited below, p. 334-335, 336-350.
Inter-conciliar rivalry was the price Philip paid for conciliar autonomy and it was, in equally substantial measures, a curse and a blessing on his government. The range of the rivalries may be illustrated, perhaps most appropriately, from the records of War. Probably it relished its combats, certainly it engaged regularly and ferociously in them - with Castile over jurisdiction over soldiers accused and/or found guilty of civilian offences,\(^1\) or over precedence on a junta\(^2\); with Indies over a whole gamut of problems from the right to appoint the Governor and Captain General of Chile\(^3\) or the flota captains\(^4\) to the control over the armada de Barlovento\(^5\) or the seating and voting arrangements in the Junta de Guerra de Indias\(^6\); with Finance over the appointment of contadores for the galeras de España\(^7\) or a mayordomo of artillery\(^8\) or again over representation on a junta,


\(^3\) Enta. War, 26 Nov. 1610, A.G.S. G.A. 729, f. 47.


\(^5\) Cnta. War, 4 May 1601, A.G.S. G.A. 579, no fol.


\(^7\) Cnta. War, 13 Mar. 1601, A.G.S. G.A. 579, no fol.

\(^8\) Cnta. War, 6 May 1615, A.G.S. G.A. 799, f. 32.
de Hacienda de Guerra\(^1\); with Aragón over the control of the gente de guerra de Aragón.\(^2\) Only with State, with which of course it had a direct relationship, was War at all tolerant; all other councils it clearly regarded as inferior.\(^3\)

There were of course severe disadvantages in this, but they were largely counterbalanced by the generosity with which each council brought its rivals' mistakes to the royal attention - thus War had Castile persistently disobeying decisions given, naturally enough, in its own favour by Philip II and Philip III\(^4\) and seriously delaying the conduct of business by its fractiousness,\(^5\) and it had Indies woefully ill-qualified for the task of appointing soldiers.\(^6\) Rivalry brought out much of the best as well as of the worst in conciliar government and in examining one aspect of one such rivalry in detail we may assess rather more than the nature and importance of the rivalry itself, the very nature - in its strengths and weaknesses - of conciliar government.

3 - Thus even when the councillors of State were absent, War was fully prepared to cede State sway over matters to which it might not unreasonably have laid claim itself; see, over mercedes for soldiers going to Italy, Cnta. War, 22 Dec. 1600, A.G.S. G.A. 570, f. 26, or over provisioning such troops, Cnta. War, 13 Jul. 1604, A.G.S. G.A. 626, f. 15.
4 - Cnta. War, 22 Dec. 1599, A.G.S. G.A. 553, f. 76.
5 - Thus over a contraband case which had dragged on for seven years as the two councils fought, Cnta. War, 7 Oct. 1603, A.G.S. G.A. 605, f. 6.
6 - 'Because the councillors of Indies are of such a different profession they are not obliged to know which persons are most appropriate for these positions'; the dispute was over the right of appointment to the Governorship of Chile, Cnta. War, 26 Nov. 1610, A.G.S. G.A. 729, f. 47.
Finance, Castile and the Sale of Offices.

The tension between Castile and Finance was that between the council responsible for the control of local government and that concerned with, *inter alia*, the municipalities as a primary financial resource, and the sale of municipal offices, touching as it did upon matters of policy and prestige to which both were particularly sensitive, brought this tension into the open and, finally, to breaking-point. That it did so was largely due in the event to the factiousness of the Cámara de Castilla\(^1\) against a Finance temporarily weakened at the beginning of the reign, but the collision was inevitable in a situation in which the Cámara was responsible for the sale of renunciable offices\(^2\) while Finance controlled a considerable number of municipal offices. This entanglement was nowhere more in evidence than in Seville, where Finance controlled the Customs House, House of Money and *almajerifazgo* rents while the Cámara was responsible for the Audiencia, which in turn claimed some jurisdiction over financial bodies, and it was no accident that Seville, at once the focal-point of the Indies trade and the wealthiest municipality in Spain, was to be the

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1 - The Council of Castile supervised local government in Castile, Navarre and the Canaries, and the Cámara was set up in 1588 as a separate department dealing specifically with matters of patronage; it supervised all ecclesiastical and judicial appointments and those to all local offices in the gift of the Crown, including those of the Chancillerías and Audiencias. Cédula establishing the Cámara, 6 Jan. 1588, B.N. 2058, ff. 157-167, a copy.

ground over which the conflict came to a head.

Jurisdictional difficulties were compounded by administrative procedures which necessarily involved each council in the other's affairs, since Finance had to keep a record of all offices sold while Castile despatched all municipal titles. Thus, for instance, when the depositaria general of Seville was renounced, the Cámara despatched the title and then passed the matter over to Finance, while when Finance itself sold an Oviedo regimiento, it took the razón and then transferred the documents to the Cámara which drew up and despatched the title.

Relations were further strained by virtue of Castile's extraordinary powers as the highest court in Spain. It thereby had the right to pass judgement on any of Finance's actions against which an appeal was entered, and since Finance's functions necessarily did not make it a popular body there was no shortage of such appellants. This was particularly true in matters relating to the sale of offices since all sales were legally allowed only after any contradichos had been heard, and these of course were judged by Castile; thus, for instance, it questioned the sale of the treasuryship of Seville's House of Money not because Finance did not have the right to sell or give the office to whomever it chose, but because the city itself questioned one

aspect of the transaction, the sale of *voc y vota*. \(^1\) Equally, it could become involved through subsidiary bodies; at the beginning of the reign, Finance sold the *lanchadoría de pescados* in Seville, but when a dozen years later the holder tried to extend the scope of the office to cover all ships using the port, the city had sufficient cause to appeal to the Audiencia to judge the legitimacy of his actions and, by implication, that of the original sale. \(^2\) Castile's arm was long.

It was especially so because it had ended the reign of Philip II firmly in the ascendant, daring even to secretly 'amend' or openly refuse to sign Finance's titles to the staple minor municipal offices, and easily winning a favourable verdict from the Prince, dealing with the Finance papers. \(^3\) Doubtless encouraged by this verdict and by Finance's own weakness under Pozas, it continued its arrogant way in 1599 obstructing Finance's *almojarifazgo* reforms \(^4\) and in 1600 winning a remarkable judgement from Philip allowing it to supervise the abolition of the sixty two *escribanías mayores de rentas*, offices which only too obviously belonged to Finance. \(^5\)

With the Castile supremacy thus confirmed and with Acuña soft-

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pedalling, the dispute lay dormant during the Acuña presidency although the councils did quarrel over other matters. ¹ But as that presidency ended the dispute flared again, and it found Castile still very much in the ascendant. In 1609 the Cámara's grant of the office of tesorero de las rentas reales y receptor de penas de cámara of the city and district of Cartagena found Finance objecting on proprietorial, legal and practical grounds, and asking Philip to restate the traditional embargo on the Cámara's granting or selling such offices, and especially so in view of its proclaimed intention of alienating the Segovia office. The judgement was again unfavourable, Philip wanly attempting to palliate Finance by ordering that it should take charge of the greater offices 'from which some considerable profit can be derived'. ² An ad hoc reply vexing Finance and leaving the basic problem unsolved, it was typical of Philip, but in seeking the easy life he made an uncomfortable bed for himself; office sales were shortly to take a new and more important form, and Finance was about to come under the trenchant presidency of Carrillo. The case that signalled the end of Castile's supremacy and the beginning of Finance's lasted for two years and justifies close attention, defining as it does, most of the balances positive and negative of conciliar government.

¹ - See above, pp. 140-141 on the casa de aposento quarrel that began in 1606; on Castile's interference over some vellón minting, cñta. Fin., 31 Jan. 1605, A.G.S. C.J.H. 333, no fol.
The office in question, of escribanía or secretary of the Seville Customs House, was one of those given to Lerma as a merced in 1599, then renounced in the Crown and sold to the City itself, for 173,000 ducats.\(^1\)

At Lerma's direction, Finance began in May 1611 a review of a number of offices in Seville with the purpose ultimately of selling them,\(^2\) and in that month was told by Lerma that the King had decided to sell the escribanía with the right of renunciation for some 10,000 ducats.

The Council patiently replied by advising King and Duke that the office was already held with a royal title;\(^3\) not for the last time in this case had Lerma made only too obvious the level of his involvement in governmental affairs. A second such example followed shortly; in August he asked Finance whether it had dealt with the office and it had - again not for the last time - to despatch a consulta merely

1 - See above, p. 46.

The escribanía originally dealt with all autos touching on the almojarifazgo rents and formed the basis of the escribanía de sacas, diezmos, y aduanas y cosas vedadas created in 1510 to supervise the affairs of all ports from Gibraleón to Cartagena. A second escribanía was added, apparently toward the end of Philip II's reign for the Seville Customs House to deal with the causas de visitas of the district of the almojarifazgos. Both were given to Lerma in 1599, and on their sale to Seville they were sold to Diego de Yanguas and Francisco Armeno Araque, but Finance refused to ratify these sales and put the offices into administration. Cntas. Fin. 21 May 1611 and 30 Jun. 1612, A.G.S. C.J.H. 365, f. 148 and 371, f. 371.

2 - Among them, the lanchaduría de pescados, cnta. Fin., 21 May 1611, A.G.S C.J.H. 365, f. 146; that of sobreguarda mayor de las aduanas, cnta. Fin. same date, ibid., f. 145; the escribanía de seguros, cnta. Fin. 28 May 1611, ibid., f. 153; the alguacilazgo de la aduana, cnta. Fin., same date ibid., f. 155; in November, the escribanía de los jueces de comisión was added, cnta. Fin., 13 Nov. 1611, ibid., f. 291.

summarising a previous consulta. The office was not for sale. Philip's reply was hardly illuminating, but interpreted by Finance as meaning that he had agreed that the matter was at an end; he would bear it in mind. ¹

Nothing more was heard of the office until April 1612 when Domingo de Cabala, administrador general de las rentas reales, informed a startled Finance that the Cámara had obtained permission to sell the office for 10,500 ducats to pay for 'certain necessary and important', although unspecified, expenses. The challenge Castile had thrown down was unequivocal; Cabala, Finance's chief agent in Seville, had been ordered to advise Castile in absolute secrecy as to the duties of the office, and Finance itself was merely told that its own official administering the office was to be dismissed. Showing a weakness that was probably to result in his own dismissal, Cabala meekly gave Castile the information it sought, and to his own Council gave a copy. Finance's response was immediate and pointed, and if the language in which it addressed itself to the King was muted by later standards it was yet strong; the sale would lead to 'the very greatest of dangers' and to 'irremediable difficulties'. The office itself was second in importance only to that of the administrador general himself and Finance, having refused to allow Seville to even appoint a nominee to administer the office could not countenance a sale, and especially not for the paltry

sum of 10,500 ducats — withal, an 'insupportable' transaction; administered by Finance, the office was of 'the very greatest benefit to the royal exchequer and a hundred times more profitable' than any sale could be. Philip, impressed, relented and abandoned thoughts of sale.¹

Finance was therefore doubly astonished to receive a note from Lerma two months later asking what the office of escribano of the Seville Customs House was and what it would be worth if sold with right of renunciation to a well-qualified person with the same conditions as those enjoyed by Villalonga. It dutifully sent Philip copies of the consultas of May and August 1611 and of April 1612 and tactfully pointed out not that Lerma himself had once held the office of which he was so ignorant, but that Villalonga had held an office not in Seville but in Murcia.²

In the summer of 1612, then, the decision of April remained valid as far as Finance was concerned. Philip, however, had deferred not simply to it but also to Castile; caught in a cleft between the councils he, as it were, abdicated and left them to resolve the issue by themselves.

This of course they could not do, and with Finance regarding

² - Cnta. Fin., 30 Jun. 1612, ibid. Finance was so astonished at Lerma's forgetfulness that it took the unique step of reproducing his note at the beginning of the consulta. Normally it would summarise such notes in indirect speech, and thereby avoided giving the offence that would be implicit if it attempted to comment on the note.
the matter as closed, the Cámara in the spring of 1613 proceeded with the sale, dispossessing Finance's administrator and replacing him with the purchaser, Fernando de la Bastida. Finance exploded. Allowing Philip that 'perhaps' the Cámara had not reminded him of the decision he had made not to sell the office, it turned on the Cámara and the consequences of its actions — 'to sell this office is to sell the government of the (almójarifazgo) rents', and such administrative dislocation would be compounded by the loss of some 20,000 ducats annually merely from the juros located in the rents. In all, it fell to Finance, as Philip's 'minister in justice and rightful conscience' to advise him of the disastrous consequences ('lesión enormissima') that would result to the rents and from the 'spoliation' of the juros. The construction it placed on Bastida's motives was simple, ungenerous and well-informed. He had recently been dismissed from office in the Customs House after a visita and was clearly prepared to pay 10,500 ducats simply to regain office. Moreover, his vested interest as one of the largest shippers in the Indies trade and his intimacy with many substantial foreign merchants should necessarily have debarred him from such an office. These, however, were merely personal disqualifications and the Council turned on its real adversary:

'The Council does not put (these objections) forward simply so that Your Majesty might remove them by dismissing the individual, but so that Your Majesty shall realise and personally
acknowledge the offence and damage that the royal exchequer of Your Majesty and his service receive (when) such matters are dealt with by persons and a Council who do not supervise such matters as a duty of office, and who do not have experience of them as does this Council, and who are seen to have failed both as regards the principle and (the choice of) individual in such an important matter.'

Proceeding thence to the general, it impressed the logical conclusion upon the King:

'It has appeared to the Council that it is in no way appropriate nor is it practicable that this sale should proceed, nor should other similar sales relating to the administration of the royal rents be undertaken by the Câmara, and it is very necessary that Your Majesty should so command it'.

Philip, however, was still unable to decide, and six weeks later, on 27 April, the Council had to send yet another consulta stressing both the damage resulting from the delay and his decision of April 1612.

It was at this juncture, while it awaited the decisions on these two consultas, that Finance obtained its first important success. It did so in Seville. Cabala was replaced by Alonso de Carcamo, and the strong

2 - Cnta. Fin., 27 Apr. 1613, ibid.
implication that his weakness had cost him his position was reinforced by Carcamo's resolute defiance of the Cámara. His refusal in the face of a royal title to allow Bastida to enter his office was strictly treasonable, but Finance supported him resolutely in yet another consulta, on 4 May. Three days later, Philip at last returned the consulta of 16 March together with that of 27 April and attempted once again to compromise; Bastida's money was to be returned and the office was to be given for four years to a qualified and capable man, and at the end of that period Finance was to consult him again on the future of the office.¹ Neither council would be satisfied with that.

On 23 May, the consulta of 4th. was returned with the decision; 'I have already ordered in this what you will see, and it is to be executed'.² Finance's mystification at this veritable inscrutability was soon dispelled; the decision was once again given in favour of Castile. Carrillo descended upon his King and had him promise him that the sale was cancelled. Philip gave the promise, and the Council triumphantly thanked him for, as it put it, the 'merced' he had thus given his exchequer. On 28 May, Carcamo reported from Seville that the Cámara had given Bastida yet another royal title to office, and that he had again refused to admit him. The report was sent by extraordinary

² - Cntas. Fin., 4 May 1613, ibid.
messenger and was discussed by Finance on 31 May. It spoke briefly of the 'absolutely irreparable' damage to the royal rents and the decline in royal prestige 'in a place like Seville' that was full of foreigners, but otherwise eschewed rhetoric. It merely refused clearance for the sailing of the Indies fleet.¹ As the consulta was being drawn up Carrillo scribbled a note to Lerma: 'I have need of a word with Your Excellency'.² It was the day of the celebrated royal toothache,³ and while the 'word' itself is not recorded the capitulation of Castile is; some time that day its President wrote to Seville cancelling Bastida's title on his own and immediate authority.⁴

The bitterness engendered by this dispute had been compounded as it reached its climax early in 1613 by two other cases of major importance, and Finance's success in those and the Seville case signalled the decisive shift in supremacy.

The first concerned Finance's sale of the alguacilazgo mayor of Tenerife, together with some adjacent alcaldías de las carceles and alguacilazgos to Gaspar de Alvear for 12,000 ducats. It was a case in which Carrillo himself was particularly involved; the proceeds were to supply the needs of the royal household, and since Alvear refused to make the down-payment of 10,000 ducats until he had received the royal title, Carrillo himself advanced 7,000 ducats for the royal expenses on condition that he be repaid within two days of Alvear's payment. He was

¹ - Gta. Fin., 31 May 1613, ibid., no fol.
³ - See above, p. 324.
therefore less than usually inclined to tolerance when the Cámara sought to delay the sale by claiming that over 20,000 ducats could be obtained for the office and declaring that in any event it proposed to grant the proceeds to Tomás de Ángulo and Juan de Ciriza. Both these men had of course the very closest relationships with Lerma. Claiming that Tenerife lay beyond the Cámara's jurisdiction because it did not contribute to the millones, Finance turned on it and Philip with the usual asperity:

'It is the custom of the Council of Finance, by virtue of its laws and ordinances, to sell and dispose of ... offices and other resources for as much as can be obtained, in order to supply what is so necessary. If it ... is to be restrained ... by such cédulas de diligencias the royal service will never be accomplished ... and it would be necessary for the Cámara to supply the public needs and those of Your Majesty, and not this Council'.

Philip took the hint. In a judgement reminiscent of that in the Cartagena case of 1609 he attempted a compromise, but one that now favoured Finance rather than the Cámara: the office was to be sold for as much as possible, but only for six or eight years as against the sixteen favoured by Finance and that of a life by the Cámara, and the proceeds were to go not to the secretaries but for the payment of royal household expenses. Finance's victory was virtually complete, and
its judgement was shortly vindicated when it managed to get 12,000 ducats for the office.  

In the spring of 1613, Philip decided to raise some money for the impending French marriages by creating and selling a hundred escribanías and receptorías de la corte and awarded jurisdiction over the project to the Cámara. Finance received his decision ill, but took advantage of the occasion to claim not merely that it should be given control of these offices but that it should take over from Castile the supervision of the sales of all newly-created offices. Philip referred the matter to a junta on which the two presidents were joined by Idiáquez and Velada. The two councillors of State wisely refrained from expressing views on the matter and left their colleagues to fight their own battle. Del Valle offered little fight; he declared himself firmly against the sales in principle but did not press the point and deferred judgement as to whether his Council should be deprived of its wider rights over new offices. He was clearly tired of fighting. Carrillo was not; the marriage sales were necessary and they belonged, with all others, by right, tradition and law to Finance. He won.  

In 1614 agents were sent out through all Spain to sell all outstanding municipal

2 - Cntas. untitled junta, 17 Apr. 1613, summarising the Finance consulta, ibid., f. 12.
offices to which no title could be established, and they reported to Finance.  

With Finance's advantage thus emphatically confirmed the dispute declined in importance to a squabbling over details. Finance's attitude to what was still the most prestigious of the councils became rather condescendingly magisterial. We have already seen how in 1615 and 1616 it more or less slapped Castile's wrists over the alienation of two conciliar receptórias, and it continued on its curt way - brusquely dealing with the Cámara's accusation of under-pricing the tesorería del senoreaje of the Madrid House of Money, while admonishing it on similar grounds over its own sale of the escribanía de la Justicia of Seville, and simply cancelling its sale of the post of correo mayor of Toledo precisely because the price was not adequate.

This latter was Carrillo's final gesture, and he left his successor untroubled by Castile's ambitions until the last months of the reign; indeed Salazar's position was so strong that in 1619 he was

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1 - Much of the documentation for these sales is collected in A.G.S. C.J.H. 383, unfoliated, and see also A.G.S. D.G.T. 24: 324, passim.
2 - Above, pp. 211-212.
3 - Castile claimed that this could be sold for 15,000-16,000 ducats, Finance that it was worth 1,838. Finance eventually sold it for less than 3,000, Cnta. Fin., 12 Jun. 1615, A.G.S. C.J.H. 387, f. 75.
5 - Cnta. Fin., 20 Sept. 1617, ibid., no fol.
able to make the remarkable - not to say ridiculous - claim that Castile's jurisdiction was no superior to Finance's. In June 1620 he had to remonstrate with Castile over its attempts to sell some quite insignificant almocaces and corredurías, but in October of that year had to take sterner action when Castile sold two offices in Seville and extended the rights of the escribanos del número of Madrid; he allied himself with Indies over the Seville offices and won an easy verdict. With a new King, however, the contest began anew as in May 1621 Castile sought to re-establish its former eminence; the dispute that had so tested Philip III, and indeed his father, would now test his son.

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4 - The dispute arose over control of the sales of the offices of correos mayores, Cnta. Fin., 30 May 1621, A.G.S. C.J.H. 414, f. 105, and Philip IV appointed Francisco de Contreras to investigate the more general dispute; his report, in a consulta of 25 May 1621, B.M. Add. 14, 017, f. 78.
Councillors.

The external problems facing the Spain of Philip III may be stated simply enough with Idiaquez in his consideration of a suspension of arms with the Dutch in 1608 - 'in substance everything is a dream'; at war or not, Spain could never be at peace. Over the reign of course the form if not the substance of the problem changed, and as it did the Council of State had to adjust its policies. But the Council also changed. We have seen how its membership was made up by two separate generations - how, as the first began to die off, the Council itself progressively disintegrated between 1607-10, hesitantly improved its mechanical performance as new councillors were appointed, and then reached a peak of professionalism over the last years of the reign. 2

The personality of the Council changed in both reflection of these structural changes and the shifts in Spain's external position; diffident and often unsure of itself at the beginning of the reign it began to pick up confidence after the English Peace, but progressively lost it again in the crises of 1607-10 as Idiaquez alone held it together. After the reorganisation and as the external situation improved, it slowly but surely grew in assertiveness over the remainder of the reign, until in the end it became perhaps over-

1 - Cnta. ditin. St., 19 Sept. 1608, A. G. S. E. 2025, f. 146.
2 - See above, p. 239.
confident. In its early years, it had dreamed of peace after years of war; in its later, after years of peace, it dreamed of war.

The nature of conciliar debate has not always been understood. Most obviously, there was no vote taken as such. Councillors spoke in strict order of precedence based upon seniority of appointment, and in practice the first two or three speakers usually spoke in sufficient detail as to have their juniors simply recording agreement with them. A typical consulta listing pareceres would therefore record separately the views of the two or three senior councillors and simply record the others as being in agreement. Such was more than mere procedural convenience, for throughout the reign discussions were conducted within a broad consensus of agreement as to aims and policy. The role of the Council therefore consisted largely in advising on adjustments to be made in view of particular events or information; each councillor was entitled to have his parecer listed separately if he wished, and junior councillors often did so in lengthy detail, but normally, being in agreement, they were content to agree. If they had specialist information or expertise available they readily used it, and the Council was only too pleased to take advantage of it. It was not just a platform for the senior councillors; as it happened indeed the only two men to suffer unduly from modesty were two of the most senior, Velada and Moura, now Castel Rodrigo, while some of the most valuable suggestions came from the most junior, and especially so in the cases of
the Constable and Olivares.\footnote{Om Velada, below, pp.356,374,381-2; on Castel Rodrigo, pp.374-5; on the Constable, pp.359,372-3; and on Olivares, pp.357-9} Any councillor could impress himself upon the Council if he wanted to, but in practice only those who took their duties seriously - with the possible exception of Lerma himself - actually did so. Policies were not made or unmade lightly or quickly; what was important in the final analysis was the mood of the Council as a corporate entity, the atmosphere at council table, and men did not affect that with sudden or dramatic intrusions; they contributed to it by attending and speaking regularly. The most formative and determinative factor in the evolution of policy was the character of the men who sat regularly. Policymaking was the sum of routine responses to routine problems.

Discussions were led in the early years by Idiáquez, Chinchón and Miranda. Councillors under Philip II, they brought the stolid, conscientious virtues of his government to that of his son, but they brought also a lack of imagination and assurance that often suggested that they were themselves new to the actual policymaking process. The view they took of European politics was unrelievedly and determinedly gloomy - 'because all other states (both Catholic and heretic) are as one in their determination to oppose Your Majesty and his Monarchy, we may always fear the worst (of their intentions) ... and look only to ourselves for solutions'.\footnote{Cntr. St., 5 Dec. 1602, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 82} Fearful of the resource and confidence of
each of their three northern enemies, they had little real belief in
the power of Spain herself. By 1600, they were prepared for negotiations
with the Dutch in which it would be Spain who would be the supplicant and
they looked wanfully to the likelihood of the succession to the
English throne of a man whose intentions and powers they feared more
than those of the dying Jezebel. Their greatest fears, however, centred
upon the Most Christian King with whom they were nominally at peace —
"we cannot have confidence in the peace with France because after she
has aided the rebels publicly, it cannot be doubted that she will
break (with Spain) when (she feels) most damage can be done to
Your Majesty ...". Time and again, therefore, they prepared for war
with France — in 1600, 1602, 1603.

More flexible than Chinchón, more assured than Miranda, it was
Idiáquez who was the real leader, and he led the Council to cope as
best it could with successive crises while attempting to break the
circle in England. The policy of securing the succession for a client,
or at the least for a favourably-disposed monarch was hopelessly
midjudged, and it was so because in the first instance the Council did

1 - See especially cnta. St., 13 Sept. 1600, ibid., f. 17.
2 - On this common theme, cnta. St. 23 May 1602, 1 Feb., 11 and 22 Jul.
1603, ibid., ff. 80, 88, 48, 102.
4 - Cnta., Inta. of Three, Sept. 1600, A.G.S. E. 1288, f. 159, a rough draft.
   The concern was with the Saluzzo crisis.
5 - Cnta. St., 12 Sept. 1602, A.G.S. K. 1426, f. 38; again the concern was
   with the security of the overland routes to Flanders.
6 - Cnta. St., 22 Jul. 1603, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 102. See also cnta. War, 10 Dec.
not have the expertise to compensate for the lack of reliable information from England itself. It thus compounded its miscalculation of James' character and ambitions by believing that England's Catholicism was strong while its protestantism was of a political nature. It therefore dithered, adhering to Philip II's policy of supporting the candidature of Isabel until overtaken by events, and then looked for a heretical candidate until that policy also foundered. Lack of ambassadorial information was of course a major handicap, but a man who had already been at the centre of Spanish government since 1579 should have understood English politics rather better than Idiaquez did; as late as July 1603 he still thought that English protestantism was purchasable - 'the practice in England has always been to sell oneself for money ...'. Shrewd and thorough as he was, he was still Philip II's man, imprisoned by the old King's philosophy and strategy, as he perhaps unconsciously acknowledged when in 1602 observing that 'the French are following ... their ancient custom, which is to wish that peace and war depend upon them'. In the old days it had depended on Spain, and he occasionally sought to return to them - thus in 1600 his championship of the empresa de Irlanda or in 1602 his longing to have 'the world see that deeds

1 - For instance, in cnts.St., 1 Feb.1603, A.G.S. E.2511, f.88.
2 - Cnta.St., 22 Jul.1603, ibid., f.102.
4 - See above, p.28.
correspond to words'.

In the early years conciliar discussions rarely became more than a commentary upon the views of these three men. Toledo and the fifth count of Alva gave the most eloquent and forceful support to them, but it was always thoroughly orthodox. Poza exhibited a refreshing cynicism but little else, while Niño de Guevara and Borja made little positive impression and Velada determinedly failed to show any character at all.

More highly personalised contributions were made by Córdoba, the Constable and Olivares. Córdoba was nothing if not an individualist, campaigning on behalf of the Almighty and himself. Thus, ill-equipped by experience to offer any military or political advice on the disaster in Ireland, he contented himself with a more fundamental analysis of

2 - Toledo much favoured a policy of a mailed fist, and the fullest statement of his attitudes was revealed at the meeting of 22 Jul. 1603. He did disagree with his colleagues on one occasion, but since they were discussing whether or not England should be united to Spain after the death of Elizabeth - he thought not - the matter proved of little consequence. Cnta.St., 22 Jul. 1603 and 11 Jul. 1600, A.G.S. E. 2511, ff. 102 and 48. On Alva, seeking to teach the 'diabolical' James a lesson, Cnta.St., 22 Jul. 1603, op. cit., and for a similar parecer, Cnta.St., 31 May 1603, ibid., f. 90.
3 - Thus he was prepared to tolerate a non-Catholic King of England in preference to James VI and was forthright enough to suggest a ruthless disengagement from Ireland in 1602, leaving the Irish to make what terms they could with England, Cnta.St., 1 Feb. 1603 and 2 Nov. 1602, ibid., ff. 88 and 83.
4 - The only notable parecer offered by either being Borja's opposing the royal journey to Valencia and favouring one to Portugal, above, p. 133.
5 - See particularly his quite remarkable abnegation of responsibility at the meeting of 22 Jul., 1603, Cnta. cited above, n. 2; every other councillor dealt in great detail, but Velada merely agreed entirely with Idiáquez.
the national spiritual malaise that was the true cause of the débâcle. Appropriately, he saved his most astonishing outburst for the great meeting of July 1603 considering the accession of James to the English throne. Lifted to the heights of religious exaltation by the abomination of James he launched himself with all the dreadful majesty of an Old Testament prophet into the most complete statement of the religious duties of Spanish kingship, but having purged himself then came down in favour of negotiating with England—probably the most remarkable piece of intellectual elasticity of the reign. Even he, therefore, was in the conciliar mainstream, and between the apocalyptic outbursts he was quietly orthodox, save for an unsuccessful advocacy of policy of stripping the Council of more important business in favour of juntas on which he sat.

The Constable and Olivares were in their different ways as

2 - '... it is not possible that Your Majesty should not help the Catholic cause, because the greatness that God has given Your Majesty obliged him to do so ... The King of England has made a profession of faith that is so abominable and wishes his subjects to make it ... and if Your Majesty does not oppose himself to such rebels, to such impertinent heretics— to their words and deeds—and if he does not defend the honour of God, He will not defend that of Your Majesty ... One wonders how friendship with such a heretic is even to be considered ... One reads in the Scriptures of such a king, and should with reason fear to make friendship with so bad a heretic, such an enemy of Catholicism ... ', Cnta.St., 22 Jul. 1603, cp. cit.
3 - Thus his attempt to have the Junta de Tres deal with the English succession, Cnta.St., 1 Feb. 1603, ibid., f. 88. More generally, on his attempt to double its weekly meetings, Cnta.Junta.de Tres, 12 Jul. 1603, A.G.S. E. 2023, f. 115.
experienced as the three leaders but were unversed in the governmental ways of Philip II and brought a freshness of vision to the Council that they, for the moment, could not. Resentful of Vervins and suspicious of allowing its architect, Albert, to negotiate with England, the Constable was second to none in his insistence on the preservation of Spanish greatness. But it was he too who most resolutely opposed the empresa de Irlanda, standing alone in telling the King that it was headed for certain disaster, and proven right he took an equally resolute stand against further involvement, finding now a more general following. Nor was it simply on military matters that he sternly instructed the Council; it was he who stripped away much of its woolly thinking in reminding it of the ramifications of pursuing religious freedom for the English Catholics as against the Spanish position in the Netherlands, and who warned it that regardless of any convenient promises he might make James would be obliged to continue to support the Dutch after he had made peace with Spain. The precision and coolness of his views found echo in those of Olivares, the most junior but intellectually the most able of the councillors. From December 1602 he began, if cautiously, to make the first of several suggestions that

1 - Cnta.St., 31 May 1603, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 90.
2 - Cnta.St., 4 Aug. 1601, ibid., f. 43.
3 - Cnta.St., 2 Nov. 1602, ibid., f. 83.
4 - Cnta.St., 22 Jul. 1603, ibid., f. 102.
were to alter the attitude to the English succession. The first to abandon Isabel’s claims, he initiated the search for an English candidate, and then abandoned that position, but if like the others he was still misled as to the real internal condition of England he was more completely aware than they of the true diplomatic balances in Europe and stood out as a man apart, with his finger on pulses they never thought of examining.

Failure in England proved of paradoxical advantage to the Council, and it was with some relief that it ceased to entertain unrealisable hopes and accepted political realities north of the Channel. There was some initial pessimism as to the ambitions of the new King and the residuum of defensiveness among the servants of Philip II – Chinchón in 1604 feared that ‘the peace of Europe depends upon the King of England.’ There was, too, continuing resentment over English activities in the Indies and even a sudden preparedness on the part of some councillors for war with James in 1606. But in essence his succession removed much of the frenetic apprehensiveness from the Council’s deliberations; faced with reality and finding it less traumatic than it had feared it developed a policy of carefully-calculated tolerance towards James, and in doing so became itself more

1 - Cnta.St., 5 Dec. 1602, ibid., f. 82.
2 - The fullest statements of his attitudes, Cntas.St., 1 Feb. and 22 Jul. 1603, ibid., ff. 88 and 102; the latter in particular includes some very significant observations on military realities in the Netherlands as well as on the diplomatic possibilities open to Spain in connection with the new England.
3 - Cnta.St., 20 Jan. 1604, A.G.S. E. 2512, f. 27.
4 - Cnta.St., 12 Aug. 1606, ibid., f. 121; the Council was chiefly concerned with persecutions in England and English activities in the Indies.
reasonable. It continued to fear French ambition in Flanders and Italy, but even here a greater realism prevailed as it came to appreciate that Henry IV was no leviathan. Indeed, it often even appeared to forget about Henry as it concentrated its attention on one enemy, in Flanders. It was able to do so not only because of the improvement brought about by the English peace - 'the remedy for Flanders' as Sesa called it - but because it was itself now more maturely conditioned to its responsibilities.

In January 1604 James suggested that Spain might make an exploratory truce of three or four months with the Dutch. State rejected the idea out of hand, but with brilliant insight began to consider the possibility of encouraging James to think about a Spanish marriage, a prospect that would hold him enthralled into the 1620s. Some profit could be derived in its view from a suspension of hostilities for some years, but the only result of a short and immediate cessation would be to allow the Dutch to save Ostend. The war was to be pursued. Flanders remained as always basically a simple problem, capable of solution if only enough money could be found and viewed therefore in financial rather than in military or diplomatic

1 - Cnta. St., 22 Jun. 1604, A.G.S. E. 2024, f. 84.
2 - Cnta. St., 20 Jan. 1604, A.G.S. E. 2512, f. 27. Philip was at first less than enthralled; on 26 Oct. 1604, Lerma wrote to Prada telling him that 'for the moment' the Council was not to pursue the idea, A.G.S. E. 841, f. 180.
terms—as Olivares put it, victory in Flanders would go to 'whoever is left with the last escudo'. The premise as such was not debated; Chinchón even calculated that the war had cost some 200,000,000 of them and was able to foresee the defeat of the Dutch by commercial sanctions. Indeed, Dutch incursions into the Indies appeared to him a manifestation of the degree to which they were themselves under pressure, but then in the nightmare that was Flanders rebel strength or weakness at any one moment always provided a convincing argument for stepping up the scale of the war.

In 1604, however, money was not available in any viable quantity, and the troops inevitably mutinied. The Council's concern throughout the year therefore became to decide whether to reward mutiny or exacerbate it by allocating priority of resource to loyalist troops, and it debated the matter at painful length, deciding eventually to pay the mutineers first. In fact Albert reached the same decision independently and earlier and offended the Council by first negotiating and then agreeing terms with the rebel soldiers. In the face of the dilemma, even Spinola's military successes seemed of secondary importance, and the Council spent 1604 grimly determined merely to pursue the war and hope for a financial miracle.

At the turn of the year the miracle happened, and 1605 opened

1—Carta, St., 6 Jan. 1605, A.G.S. E. 2023, f. 134.
2—Carta, St., 14 Sept. 1604, A.G.S. E. 2024, f. 61.
3—See especially, Carta, St., 21 Mar. 1605, ibid., f. 21.
4—Carta, St., 22 Jun. 1604, ibid., f. 84.
with marvellous optimism as Acuña's reforms made more money available and as the galleons for once exceeded expectations; by March a provision of 6,000,000 ducats was being discussed. The Constable looked forward to 'making war in the house of the enemy', and if he retained his distrust of the general who would have to wage his campaign, brusquely dismissed any question of a truce - 'a very ill-founded' consideration in his view. Idiáquez alone of his colleagues was not at one with him in this new mood. At the end of January he permitted himself to wonder aloud whether there should be peace if the Dutch refused to acknowledge archducal sovereignty. He thus intimated that the provision of the money and the successes past and future of Spinola only brought Spain back to something of the position she had occupied in 1600, if without the humiliation of that year. He did not yet put it thus openly, but he was the first to suggest that anticipated military success would only prepare a strong negotiating position. Within a couple of months the Constable himself was pondering the point. Granting that a long suspension could be useful, he found Idiáquez nudging him a stage further, in doubting whether the rebels could actually be brought to the table while suggesting that exploratory approaches be made them. Growing in stature and

1 - Cnta.St., 21 Mar. 1605, ibid., f. 42.
4 - ibid.
judgement, Idiáquez was becoming quite serpentine.

Despite his caution, euphoria reigned until August. Albert then reported that the reinforcements from Italy were both fewer in number and less capable than he had hoped, and pressed for more money. The Council drew back, waiting to see positive results from the money it had made available, and provoked its King to fury by doing so.¹ By November, with Spinola successful in Frisia, and with Albert still asking for more money, the decisive moment had arrived. Idiáquez's mind was made up, and although he still moved cautiously he more or less determined that there would have to be a truce.² The mutinies of the following year confirmed his fears, and at meeting after meeting he insisted that more money had to be found for Flanders, knowing fully well that it could not be. It was not to his colleagues, who reluctantly followed his lead, that he addressed himself but to his King; to state, as he did in October 1606, that 'the letters of the Archduke always conclude with a request for money' was his way of telling Philip that the war could not be continued.³

Juan de Idiáquez.

When, in discussing the crisis with England in 1606 that might
easily have led to war, Chinchón averred that Idiáquez 'has discussed (these affairs) in a manner that leaves little to be said',\(^1\) he formally acknowledged the growing ascendancy of the comendador mayor over himself and his colleagues. As State declined, the most important and professional of its councillors became even more openly what he had long been to those colleagues - the most important maker of foreign policy in Spain. It was he who led a reluctant Council and King to agree to the Truce - 'the most convenient thing that can be desired in this war, and that most desired in years past', as he put it in January 1607.\(^2\) Over the next two years he guided them patiently but firmly to his goal. The initiative of course came from Albert himself and throughout 1607-8 Madrid broadly if resentfully followed his policy. The matter was dealt with by occasional juntas as well as by State itself, but both were dominated by Idiáquez, and the policy they pursued was best summarised by a junta of February 1607 on which he sat with Miranda - 'the best way to make (the Dutch) come to their senses is through war and to continue what has been accomplished in these last two years'.\(^3\) Idiáquez talked of war but thought of peace, and the real purpose of the policy pursued from 1607 was best summarised by, of all people, Villalonga, in the very last of his

\(^1\) Cnta.St.,12 Aug.1606, A.G. S. E. 2512,f.121.  
governmental activities - 'it is certain that when peace or a truce is considered in any war forces ought to be doubled so that such might be enjoyed advantageously'.

By that, no more was meant than that the enemy was to be confronted with an apparent determination on Spain's part to continue the war vigorously; the increase in force was little more than a negotiating ploy and a guarantee in case negotiations failed. The chief concern of Idiáquez and his colleagues was therefore to present a façade, and its chief manifestation increasingly became to exercise the optimum control over the Archduke Albert, whom they distrusted with a fine consistency - were they not, after all, told in September 1607 that he was determined on a peace simply to facilitate his own election as King of the Romans? For all that, they followed him; Idiáquez himself, for instance, was in February 1608 still irate at Albert's de facto acknowledgement of rebel sovereignty, but could do little more than insist that Albert himself make it clear to the Dutch that His Majesty (sic) had granted them this only on the understanding that free and public exercise of religion be granted to Catholics in their territories. This latter and the rights of navigation in the Indies both East and West remained the chief obstacles to agreement but provided also the pretext for the ostensible determination to

2 - Such was the view of Diego de Ibarra, reported in Cnta.St., 6 Sept. 1607, A.G.S. E. 2025, f. 40.
3 - Cnta.St., 28 Feb. 1608, ibid., f. 37. On distrust of Albert and reluctant following of his advice, see also Cnta.St., 12 May 1607, ibid., f. 30.
continue the war. Indeed, in July 1608, State actually commissioned estimates of the cost of pursuing offensive or defensive war in Flanders, but its real concern was to convince Philip that even the latter was hardly possible rather than to convince the Dutch that it might actually do either.¹ To the very end, however, it continued its ambivalent approach; Idiaquez himself, for instance, while advising in September 1608 that the truce be extended,² was as late as 7 April 1609 talking of strengthening the Atlantic fleet in case the Peace did not materialize.³

Frustrated imperialist that he was, it was thus Idiaquez who in Madrid was most responsible for the Peace, and by the time it was signed he occupied a quite unique position in governmental circles; his word was almost law. In 1608-9, by virtue of the importance that Philip attached to his advice - and by virtue of the itinerary that both reflected and compounded that importance - he became a one-man junta, entrusted with a mass of occasional problems from every part of the administrative spectrum. At de parte level, for instance, it was he who decided to what salary an oidor in Valladolid was entitled,⁴ or whether a diplomat deserved the tuscn⁵ or a soldier a councillorship

1 - Cnta. St., 26 Jul. 1608, ibid., f. 139.
2 - Cnta. St., 19 Sept. 1608, ibid., f. 146.
3 - Cnta. St., 7 Apr. 1609, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol.
5 - Cnta. same, 6 Dec. 1608, ibid., f. 175.
of War. His terms of reference, therefore, were supraconciliar — it was he who decided whether an arbitrio placed before Finance was practicable; who advised on whether social reforms in the manning of the galeras de España were justified or whether those de Sicilia were best repaired in Denia. He dealt, too, with a wide range of State’s material, especially on morisco affairs — should an offer from the nuevos convertidos of Aragón and Valencia be accepted?; what should be done about the flights to France?

That such problems should have been referred to a senior councillor was in itself unusual rather than extraordinary; normally a junta of two or three men would be convened for such purposes. It was, however, quite extraordinary that matters of policymaking should have been thus referred — how were negotiations with the Dutch to be conducted?; should a Catholic League be actively supported by Spain? It was Don Juan who decided. His prestige transcended even this honour as he was afforded a distinction unique within the reign and in all probability unparalleled in the whole of Spanish Hapsburg history — in 1608-9 he formally and explicitly sat on occasions as
'The Council of State', formulating Spanish policy toward England and, to a lesser extent, toward Savoy. His status - as Carrillo's would shortly be - was now ministerial.

The accolade reflected his greater maturity as much as the decline of the Council itself. Acutely conscious, as always, of Spanish weaknesses, he had come to appreciate those of other powers. He had learned, above all, how to properly evaluate intelligence; as the Franco-Italian crisis welled, he stressed those items in Cardenas's reports which dwelt on the internal and foreign difficulties of Henry IV and he followed the ambassador in advocating a determined resistance in the belief that Henry would desist if opposed. Indeed, his confidence in himself and in his country was such that he felt that he could laugh at the King of France, and he did so repeatedly in quite sardonic vein. His touch, however, was sure. Harder now, he was swayed little by emotional appeals for Spanish help and the few frenetic tears he shed - unlike those of the earlier years - were mostly crocodilian. The years had tempered the romantic element in

1 - See for instance, cartas St., 31 Mar. and 30 Apr. 1608 and 9 May 1609, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fols.
2 - Thus, for instance, a parecer of February 1610; he did not believe that Henry IV seriously intended war, believing that he was attempting to get his wishes by simply cowering Spain. Threatened war was also part of his attempt to win the sympathy of his own dissident subjects, cartas St., 13 Feb. 1610, A.G.S. K. 1427, f. 4.
3 - Before Henry's death, Idiáquez thus portrayed the Prince of Condé as an innocent who had only fled France in order to defend his honour in the only way open to him, while after Henry's death he saw the Prince as a danger, and a man to be physically secured lest he embarrass the envisaged rapprochement, ibid., and cartas St. 29 May 1610 A.G.S. K. 1593, f. 24.
his nature and he dreamed now of no empresses.¹ His mastery of both foreign affairs and of Philip is perhaps best illustrated by his reaction to the assassination of Henry. First, he looked to satisfy his King—'such a great action as the expulsion of the mosisco and the preparation of arms so that (Your Majesty) could oppose the injustice of the King of France in all parts with the firmness of spirit and courage (has been repaid by the Almighty) ... who has been pleased to help the sacred and just intentions of Your Majesty by taking Henry IV from the world by the means we have just seen. This is His justice and it has caused great admiration and fear in everyone ...'. Then, with the usual sarcasm at the expense of the Bourbon, he turned to the new France—'Your Majesties should make the appropriate demonstrations of grief, not because Henry IV deserved it, but because the Queen of France has always shown a desire for friendship ...'. Thus, with God, the King of Spain and the Queen of France as allies the Basque ex-secretary led the grandees of the Council into a rapprochement with France.² The new golden age had at last dawned and Idiáquez, having waited long enough for it, seized the opportunities it presented.

As Idiáquez had immediately recognised, Ravaillac's mad dagger

² - Cnta. itin. St., 24 May 1610, A.G.S. K. 1593, f. 22.
virtually removed France from the European political scenario; the sickly Louis XIII's lack of an heir and the proclivities of the Queen Mother - compounded by the failure of the Austrian Hapsburgs to provide the traditional spouse - re-routed all diplomatic roads once again to Madrid. Negotiation for the Franco-Spanish marital alliance thus formed the centrepiece of the Council's new policies, and although both governments maintained the habitual suspicion of each other's intentions, probably through force of habit, the Council entertained no serious reservations as to the desirability of the alliance. In consequence, Franco-Spanish relations at least as far as Madrid was concerned became largely relegated to discussions of details, and the Council's main concern became not to embarrass the Regent by allowing the Huguenots any possible leverage over her. ¹

Relations with England were equally dominated by marital considerations. James would move dangerously close in 1612-13 to assuming the active championship of Protestant Germany and would continue to aggrieve Spain by martyring priests and colonising Virginia, and he would continue, too, to scheme with the Dutch and make angrily anti-Spanish noises. ² But Anglo-Spanish relations moved progressively to a reasoned tolerance as Madrid and London realised the various usefulnesses of James' search of a bride for his son and

¹ - By for instance abandoning Condé, cntas.St., 24, 26, 29 May 1610, A.G.S. K.1593,ff. 22-4 and by not allowing the Huguenots to hear of agreements reached with the Regent, cnta.St., 4 Aug. 1611, A.G.S. E.2513, no fol.
² - See especially, cntas.St., 2, 20 and 27 Sept. 1612, ibid., no fols.
the apparent availability of Philip's daughter. She was not of course available, but determined to keep relations with England off the boil the Council resolutely refused to give or take offence; it realised fully well that in order to practice the old trick of the donkey's carrot it had to be very tactful and patient with the donkey lest his interest be diverted elsewhere, and so it assiduously encouraged James' wooing. 1

With the ambivalent exception of the Duke of Lerma 2 the councillors united behind Idiáquez in these last years of his life with a remarkable if often faceless consistency. Velada had developed no greater facility for self-expression and contrived with his accustomed resolution to say nothing of any consequence. A few suggestions may be generously characterised as being vaguely novel - that the Pope ought to be informed of the progress of the French marriage negotiations 3; that Cecil and Rochester in England were not very friendly towards each other 4 - but he never strayed far, and his only distinction was that he once contrived to record specific agreement with Idiáquez - 'el comendador mayor de León' - no fewer than six times within a parecer of only 230 words. 5 Toledo had

developed more positively into one of the shrewdest of the councillors. Generally content with the complementary suggestion or advice as to detail, he was at one with Idiáquez on all essentials save where religious considerations were involved. At such moments he tended to the extreme; in 1611, for instance, 'inspired by the great zeal that he has for the service of God and Your Majesty and the good of these realms, and in keeping with his obligations as ... Inquisitor General', he demanded that the scandals caused by the British ambassador in Madrid be brought to an end by forcing James to withdraw him. The Spanish ambassador in London was ill, and if he were brought home James would eventually have to follow suit. Similarly, it was rather better theology than it was policymaking to envy the fate of some English martyrs, but for the most part he was restrained if not secular and it was perhaps more characteristic of him that it was he, Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of All Spain, who stressed the untrustworthiness of the Curia to the Council. The Constable had little interest in theology but tended in his last months on the Council in 1610 to reveal something of a predilection for history.

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Content to follow the consensus, he took military affairs for his own and dealt with them with his accustomed shrewdness, but he did tend latterly to expatiate on historical themes – thus his treatment of the military possibilities open to Spain in February 1610 was prefaced by a rationale of the history of French aggression in Italy, while his consideration of the same crisis in April came within the purview of an analysis of recent Italian diplomatic history. He had always had this tendency, and had at times used it to remarkable effect, but it now perhaps served him ill; in August he was appointed to Italy. The Council would miss him, professionally and personally.

Perhaps in those last months he had seen himself as something of an elder statesman. He would have had reason enough, for only Idiáquez and Toledo of his colleagues were men of real stature. Infantado and Albuquerque sat regularly enough, but made no positive impression, although in 1611 the former began to develop confidence in

1 - Cnta. St., 13 Feb. 1610, ibid.
2 - Cnta. St., 14 Apr. 1610, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol. See similarly, Cnta. St. 18 Sept. 1610, ibid., in which he analysed the character of an Englishman by going back not merely to his own dealings with him as Ambassador to James for the peace negotiations, but by looking too at his behaviour when he had visited the Court of Philip II.
3 - See particularly his dispassionate analysis of English Catholicism and the difference between James and Elizabeth; he observed for instance that Elizabeth's persecution had started from the moment that Philip II had begun to actively support them and that she had thus attacked them for rebellion and not for religion, and he concluded that 'Your Majesty is not obliged to ensure that France and England shall be made Catholic if they do not wish it'. Cnta. St., 16 Jun. 1605, A.G.S. E. 2512, f. 30.
4 - Cabrera de Córdoba (1857), p. 414.
his own judgement. ¹ The new councillors initially shared this deference; Villafranca, la Laguna, Spinola and Méjia were content to fill the traditional rôle of the junior councillor, listening but speaking little and generally simply assenting in block votes. One man, however, made no greater contribution, and he spoke at the beginning of the meetings before even Idiáquez. Moura, now Castel Rodrigo, rarely expressed a forcible opinion and was found thoroughly inadequate as the new leader of the Council. At no time in 1612-13 did he provide any actual leadership and only rarely indeed did he even touch upon all the aspects of the problems being discussed. On for instance the second consulta after his return he is found commenting briefly upon some of the questions raised by Velasco’s despatches from London but excusing himself from any detailed discussion of the whole matter of English policy ‘because he was inexperienced in these matters’. ² Such modesty was perhaps not unbecoming in a man returning to the centre of government from virtual exile, but he never improved upon it. His inadequacy was the more puzzling because he was clearly a man of intelligence and resource and one who exhibited the characteristics of a long familiarity with the business of policymaking — an almost absolute concern for the reliability of information and a determination "

¹ - See particularly Cnta. St., 7 Jan. 1611, A.G.S. K. 1611, f. 15 in which he dealt with some lucidity with the nature of the divisions in French political circles.
to pursue diplomacy as far as possible in every situation. But the astonishing reluctant continued to Velada-like proportions and to the end of his life. Doubtless he was cowed after his exile, but it is fascinating to speculate how far his inhibitions were those of the supremely successful servant of Philip II, capable enough but unequipped psychologically for decision-making itself. ¹

The Duke of Lerma.

Lerma’s councillorship had begun casually enough. In the first years of State’s existence proper he only very occasionally deigned to call in to the Council or to sit on a junta, almost as if indeed he was dropping in to see what happened on such occasions. His first attendance, in 1601, was exceptional in that it saw him dissenting, with Niño de Guevara, from the majority view — of Idiáquez, Miranda, Córdoba and the Constable — over the projected release of the young Richard Hawkins. ² Otherwise, attendance reflected his, and the King’s, special interests — in March 1602 at the Council on the consequences of failure in Ireland, ³ and in 1602-3 on State juntas considering the projected royal journey to Portugal ⁴ and the projected royal

¹ - Something of the same was in evidence with the early Idiáquez, although of course to nothing like the same degree; he matured significantly under Philip III and it is surprising to see this having to happen to one so apparently experienced in the use of power.

³ - Cnta. St., 3 Mar. 1602, A.G.S. E. 2511, f. 64.
⁴ - Cntas., jntas. 26 Jun. and 9 Sept. 1602, A.G.S. E. 2023, ff. 82 and 83.
involvement in Africa. He then attended the extraordinary meeting of the Council in July 1603 reviewing the situation created by James' succession in England. It was a somewhat modest contribution, and having made it he retired, sitting not at all in the years 1604–7.

From 1608 until his dismissal he contrived to sit at least once annually, save in 1615. Attendance, however, still reflected special interests; of the nineteen meetings he attended in the years 1608–14, six were concerned with African and morisco affairs and another six with the French marriages, while a further one was concerned with both. Moreover, even when he sat to discuss the great matters of foreign affairs exceptional circumstances obtained; attending the great meeting of February 1610 on the Franco-Italian crisis he showed himself to be concerned in substantial part with arguing the need to accelerate the Expulsion. Similarly, when he sat at the two meetings of the itinerant Council discussing the death of Henry IV he did so as

3 - The following consultas, cited in this paragraph, are not included in the Attendance Register: 1 Sept. 1608; 26 Dec. 1609, 15 Feb. and 27 Nov. 1610; 4 Jul. 1613.
the Court expert on etiquette, advising Philip chiefly on the nature of the mourning that was appropriate rather than on the diplomatic revolution that had thereby been brought about.\(^1\) One other attendance may also be ascribed to a special interest - that in 1608 when the Council was dealing with the flight of religious to France.\(^2\) Of the nineteen attendances, therefore, between 1608 and 1614 no fewer than seventeen were accounted for by special interests or occasioned by exceptional circumstance; indeed, since the attendances of 1602 and 1603 may also reasonably be described as extraordinary, and since he did not attend at all in 1615, we are left with Lerma having, as 1616 opened, sat at only three meetings that were neither in themselves extraordinary nor concerned with matters in which he had a particular interest.\(^3\) The contribution was still a modest one.

His status, however, had changed, for in the years from 1608 he had only to open his mouth at Council table to have his colleagues competing with their eulogies; it was as if he now dropped in to have his morale boosted. Indeed, the view of him as the true heir of Philip II found rhetorical expression in the adjective consistently used by his colleagues to describe the quality of his views - 'prudent'. Thus the

3 - The exceptions being the meetings of July 1601 (above, p. 375) and those of May and August 1614 (below, pp. 381, 387).
itinerant Council, for instance, in September 1608 thought that his views were 'very prudently considered'. Even Idiáquez was afflicted by the disease, but of course it was the councillors who spoke after Lerma who suffered most. Infantado, himself about to assume a major role on the Council, may be taken as an example, if an extreme one. In 1608, on a matter of the very greatest importance, he recorded merely that 'he agrees with all that the Duke of Lerma has said, because it appears to him that he has left nothing untouched', and went only from bad to worse. In 1610 he had to look hard, but found a minor point on which to agree, and in 1611, having dared to make exactly the same points as Lerma he obligingly recorded his admiration for what he had 'so prudently said', only to find that he had not finished; thus when Lerma offered his supplemental parecer, Infantado too returned, to say nothing more than that he agreed with this second view.

It was of course normal for later speakers to record simple agreement with earlier, but the pattern of voting when Lerma attended was, after 1608, in every degree exceptional, and the awe in which he was held by his colleagues was most perfectly expressed in September 1612. Lerma had opened the discussion by giving an account of his

1 - Cnta. itin. St., 1 Sept. 1608, A.G. S. E. 2638, f. 36.
4 - Cnta. St., 7 Jan. 1611, A.G. S. K. 1611, f. 15.
dealings with some French noblemen:

Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo: "That the action of the Duke of Lerma was very Christian and prudent, so admirable and worthy of such a great minister of Your Majesty ...".

(Idiáquez): "That it has greatly pleased him to have heard what ... Lerma has said, because it was so convenient for the service of God and for the good of Christianity and so worthy of such a great minister of Your Majesty ...".

Marquis of Velada: "He agrees with what has been said ...".

Lerma then returned and added a minor detail.

Cardinal Toledo: "That it has greatly pleased him to hear what the Duke of Lerma has said, because all of it has been so worthy of admiration, and thus he agrees with him".

The same is offered by the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque, the Marquis of Villafranca and Don Agustín Méjía.

All the Council agrees with what the Duke of Lerma has said (on this latter point). 1

The pattern of subservience was complete. It was, however, just that - a pattern. Even at such meetings as this, ducal dominance was more apparent than real. The views that he propounded were hardly worthy of such acclamation; although they were intelligent and precise, they were

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in no substantial sense novel. Like any other councillor, he worked within the consensus, merely adding the occasional suggestion that was new. It was his practice to speak at some length—indeed his pareceres were as a rule impressively comprehensive in their scope—but he consistently made the same points as Idiáquez had done. He was generally loth to acknowledge his debt but, like the gentleman he was, felt obliged to do so on occasions, and indeed did so more frequently than Idiáquez acknowledged any debt to him. He, and with him the other councillors, knew who the real leader was.

After Idiáquez's death, Lerma made no attempt to seize the leadership, and indeed gave the Council even less of his time, sitting only six times after October 1614. The Council abased itself before him in December 1614, and generally followed him in debates in 1616 and 1617, but only two men, both related by marriage, now practiced an active obeisance. Infantado and la Laguna both humiliated themselves.

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1. For an example of his making exactly the same points as Idiáquez, but without acknowledgement, cnta. St., 3 Jan. 1612, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol. He recorded specific agreement with Idiáquez in cntas. 24 and 29 May 1610, op. cit., 13 Feb. 1610, A.G.S. K. 1427, f. 4 and 2 Sept. 1612, A.G.S. E. 2513, no fol., and with Chinchón in cnta. 30 Mar. 1608, op. cit.
2. The consulta of 12 Dec. 1614, A.G.S. E. 2028, no fol. is not included in the Attendance Register.
3. 'Firstly, it should praise—and with reason—all that the Duke of Lerma has said with his accustomed prudence and great zeal for the service of Your Majesty ...', cnta. St. 12, Dec. 1614, op. cit.
4. On 1616, below, pp. 318-9, and in 1617, cntas. 16 Feb. and 9 Apr., A.G.S. E. 2031, no fol. and 2326, f. 27.
most awfully in 1614 and 1618 respectively,\(^1\) and were generally only too prepared to follow where he led.\(^2\) Of the new councillors, however, only Aliaga, in 1616 and twice in 1617, went out of his way to agree with him.\(^3\) These men were no sycophants. Thus, for instance, as early as 1613 Villafranca and Mejía, joined indeed by even la Laguna, rather conspicuously failed to acknowledge their agreement with him,\(^4\) and when in 1616 Mejía failed to make the slightest of bows in his direction Lerma felt obliged to return with a supplemental statement agreeing with him.\(^5\) There was deep significance in that little incident.

The two most senior of Lerma's co-survivors from the first generation were no more covetous than he of the leadership. Velada generally solved the problem of his embarrassment at having to lead the Council by staying away, but when attendance was unavoidable - he still had his grandeeship to earn - took refuge in polite self-deprecation. Thus after some sixteen years as a councillor, he was able

\(^1\) On Infanta do, see particularly, cnta. St., 27 May 1614, A.G.S. E. 2030, no fol. La Laguna in 1618 'was the other day of the view that the galleons of Naples should not leave the Adriatic Sea, but having heard what the Duke of Lerma now says, he changes his mind and is of his view in everything', cnta. St., 14 Feb. 1618, A.G.S. E. 1881, no f.

\(^2\) See for example, cntas. St., 15 Dec. 1616 and 18 Feb. and 9 Apr. 1617, A.G.S. K. 1593, f. 54, E. 2031, no fol. and E. 2326, f. 27.

\(^3\) He did so in the consultas cited above, n. 2.

\(^4\) Cnta. St., 4 Jul. 1613, A.G.S. E. 2643, no fol.

\(^5\) Cnta. St., 15 Dec. 1616, op. cit.
to defer uncritically to Méjía, Villafranca and la Laguna as those 'most experienced' in Flemish affairs, and it was a reaction utterly typical of him. His councillorship was buried in 1615 when Sarmiento de Acuña's reports from England left him with 'little to say' on matters French and Savoyard; when, since matters German were in Zúñiga's hands 'he does not say more than that he (Zúñiga) will have Your Majesty's orders on what he is to do in everything', and when, since the despatches from Juliers brought nothing new 'he does not offer any more advice for the moment'. Velada need detain us no more than he did the Council. If, on the other hand, Toledo's failure to seize the leadership comes as no surprise, his new-found diffidence certainly does. It may have been acedia that accounted for his deference to his colleagues on matters secular, but what had happened to the old Cardinal when he was prepared to waive his objections to an English marriage merely because a majority of a junta of theologians were prepared to sanction it? Toledo's decline was puzzling and saddening.

There was thus a very real vacuum after the death of Idiáquez, and it was filled by a collective leadership. With the exceptions of

2 - See also his pareceres on Cntas. St., 29 Aug. 1615 and 11 Feb. 1615, A.G.S. E. 2514, f. 57 and 2326, f. 68.
la Laguna, Zapata and Benavente, who tended to follow rather than to lead, the councillors of the second generation were remarkable men, hardened and thoroughly realistic, and they worked within an equally remarkable consensus. At the core of that consensus were two men. The Marquis of Villafranca was much given to rhetoric - so much so indeed that the Council had to set something of a time-limit upon him and was, more perhaps than any other councillor, a man passionately determined to strike at the enemies of his country. His first instinct was for action, speedy and decisive, but his second - and it was this that ruled him - was for caution. Eloquent, forceful and imaginative, he soared on occasion to remarkable heights, and his pareceres were, on the whole, more consistently interesting than those of any other councillor. The Marquis was never dull. Don Agustín Mejia by comparison said little. Dour and concise, he was perhaps the most brilliant of Philip III's soldiers, and in his own quiet way guided the Council on all military affairs. His King, like his colleagues on the Council, hung on every one of his words. Mejia's influence on the course of

1 - In cnta.St., 27 May 1614, A.G.S. E. 2028, no fol., he regretted that he would have to confine himself because of this time-limit.

2 - See especially his parecer on the cosmic dangers of the situation in Germany, in cnta.St., 19 Apr. 1619, A.G.S. E. 2326, ff. 65-6.


4 - Thus when in 1615 he was unable to afford to travel with the Court, Lerma wrote twice to Carrillo, firstly that 'His Majesty has ordered (Mejia) to come here, for he is so distinguished and so valuable that the service of His Majesty suffers from his not being available'. He therefore ordered Carrillo to give him an allowance. Four days later, Lerma wrote that Mejia was to come to Valladolid even if the money was not paid. Notes to Carrillo, 20 and 24 Jun. 1615, A.G.S. C.J.H. 387, no fols.
Spanish history was profound.

Three other men - Infantado, Zúñiga and Aliaga - made varying major contributions. Infantado had begun to emerge as a councillor of real significance from about the end of 1612 and by the time of the French marriages was, after a dozen years on the Council, quite as self-confident as any of his colleagues, saving of course when Lerma attended. His particular interest was in central Europe, and although he had never served there he had made something of a special study of the problems of the area. It served him well, for in 1616-17 the Council temporarily lost Villafranca and was left therefore with only Mejía as a major figure. Infantado took advantage of the moment, and did so with a vengeance. In January 1616 he offered the Council perhaps the most extraordinary parecer of the reign and seized the initiative on German policy; having laboriously studied all relevant governmental documentation, even taking his terms of reference back as far as 1348, he in an immense statement persuaded his staggered colleagues and admiring King to cede Spanish claims to the Bohemian throne in favour of the Archduke Ferdinand. Infantado had arrived, and for fifteen months Spain's central European policy was his; thus in June 1616 his colleagues had him prepare a statement on their position on the problems of that area since he was 'the best informed and able of them'.

on the matter,\textsuperscript{1} while in March 1617, having listened to his views, the Council simply recorded agreement 'with all he has said'.\textsuperscript{2}

Basic to Infantado's views, and indeed to the whole Council's, was an abiding deference to the advice of ambassadors Zúñiga and Sarmiento de Acuña,\textsuperscript{3} and it was therefore inevitable that when Zúñiga commenced regular attendance at the Council he should have proceeded - like Olivares before him - to wag it by its tail. Only on Germany was his sway ever as complete as Idiaquez's had been, and it was established spectacularly and immediately; having made an isolated first appearance in 1616, he assumed regular attendance on 9 July 1617 and was at that meeting accorded the extraordinary distinction of being allowed to lead the discussion. He did so, and his colleagues merely deferred to him.\textsuperscript{4} Voluble but precise, he dealt in grand analyses but brought too a comprehensive knowledge of the minutiae of European affairs to the Council; he knew the men and had been to the places that the Council had to talk about.\textsuperscript{5}

Aliaga began unexceptionally and modestly enough.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} Cnta. St., 1 Jun. 1616, \textit{ibid.}, f. 19.
\textsuperscript{2} Cnta. St., 16 Mar. 1617, \textit{ibid.}, ff. 30-1. See also Cnta. 1 Jun. 1616, \textit{ibid.}, ff. 19-20, and 'Advertencias del Duque del Infantado sobre el negocio de la successión de los Reynos de Ungria y Bohemia', \textit{ibid.}, f. 20.
\textsuperscript{3} Thus on Zúñiga, see Cnta. St., 30 Jun. 1614, A.G.S. E. 2028, no fol., and 11 Feb. 1615, E. 2326, f. 68. On Sarmiento de Acuña, below, p.
\textsuperscript{4} Cnta. St., 9 Jul. 1617, \textit{ibid.}, f. 38. Similarly, see Cnta. St., 6 Aug. 1617, \textit{ibid.}, f. 60.
\textsuperscript{5} See especially his \textit{parecer} on Flanders in Cnta. St., 7 Apr. 1618, A.G.S. E. 2034, f. 4.
from the first, he was yet always part of the mainstream; thus, for instance, he was emphatically against the English marriage on grounds of 'good conscience' but was, like Toledo, prepared to follow the majority of theologians in sanctioning it. He paraded himself most forcefully indeed as the guardian of the national conscience, but knew when to bend with the wind; shrewd and crafty, he was a realist and in 1617 rather beautifully justified the dissimulation he not infrequently advocated on grounds of 'public honesty'.

These five men, so different in personality, were united on a common aim; they wanted war. In a broad sense, of course, that was the aim of all Philip III's councillors of State, as it was of Philip himself. They had made peace with England in 1604 and with the Dutch in 1609 less because they wanted peace than because war itself had failed, and because they recognised the need for a breathing-space. Peace, so-called, became in fact a nightmare, a bewildering succession of crises in Italy, central and northern Europe and across the seas. Idiáquez had foreseen this in 1608 when he had wondered whether for Spain there could ever be a difference between peace and war, and the dilemma haunted the Council for the remainder of the reign. It did so of course against the backdrop of the countdown to April 1621, but more importantly perhaps

it did so against the backdrop of a succession of crises, each one of which left the Council more frustrated at its inability to act decisively to resolve its problems; ultimately, force was the answer and that the Council could not employ it immediately only made its eventual use all the more inevitable.

In 1612, the Duke of Lerma himself had acknowledged the limitations placed on Spain's freedom of action by financial necessity; 'if the royal exchequer of Your Majesty were less sorely-pressed, he would recommend breaking the peace with England and helping in Ireland .... but, seeing that affairs are in the condition that they are, it is better to wait until we can (properly) help ...'.¹ That was the spirit of the years to 1621, and Lerma himself echoed it faithfully and repeatedly. In August 1614, for instance, he confessed that 'if affairs in Italy were not in the state that they are ... he would be moved to give very terrible advice in connection with France because (French activities in Italy) have made him so indignant'.² Similarly, when in 1616 Savoy was rumoured to be on the point of involving the Dutch in Italy Lerma took the extraordinary step of attending the Council of War's debate on the crisis, thus making only his third appearance on that Council and the first since 1599; he then gave it

¹ - Cnta.St., 2 Sept. 1612, A.G.S. E.2513, no fol.
as his view that the preservation of the Catholicism of Italy might have to be considered as more important than the preservation of the Truce with the Dutch. ¹

Lerma of course was all for the easy life, abroad as at home, and for him to speak in such terms was the more significant of the mood of the Council as a whole. With a vengeful patience it waited for the day when it would be able to deal with its enemies, and its attitude was informed by men who were rather more active by temperament than the Duke himself. Villafranca and Méjia were soldiers, and so too, for all his diplomatic experience was Zúñiga, and they – the three most important councillors after Idiáquez’s death – created the mood. As early, for instance, as the middle of 1614 Villafranca and Méjia turned a discussion of the Jülich crisis into one of whether the Truce with the Dutch should be broken. They impressed upon Philip the weakness of his position as against the Dutch on land and sea, and concluded that the time was not yet for war – unless there was no other way to baulk the Dutch. ² They were strongly supported in May 1614 by Lerma himself, who stressed the need for financial reform at home and in Flanders and who suggested that Philip send a precautionary sum of at least 300,000 escudos to Flanders. ³ Such restraint did not come easily to the two

³ - Cnta. St., 27 May 1614, ibid.
soldiers; thus Villafranca, while arguing the need for caution in June had not been able to resist pointing out that help could be sent north from Italy since there was no probability of any significant Turkish naval activity that year.\(^1\) Similarly, in January 1615, dealing with that 'declared enemy' Savoy, he toyed with the idea of putting the affairs of Italy into quick order by sending a fleet to take Nice.\(^2\)

Diplomacy of course won what arms could not; probably Spanish power in Europe had never appeared as dominant as it did in 1615. The marriages of that year not only confirmed the neutralisation of France, but had a salivating effect on James of England - so much so, indeed, that by July he was already concerning himself with the problems of etiquette involved in the very ceremony of Charles' Spanish marriage.\(^3\) Nor was it only the King who was so preoccupied; the Queen herself by February 1616 was looking forward to an extra marriage, for the Prince of Denmark, and obligingly offered Philip some of her own jewels to compensate him for his expenses in celebrating the French marriages.\(^4\) At every level, the triumph in England seemed complete; the fall of Somerset was of little consequence since Villiers was reported by Sarmiento de Acuña to be 'firm' in the Spanish service,\(^5\) and if the current English

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ambassador conducted himself in the Council's view very agreeably 'in all touching Spain',⁠¹ his predecessor was fond enough of the country not only to want to become a Catholic but to retire to a monastery in Spain itself.⁠²

The Council was neither fooled nor distracted by its triumphs, appreciating - perhaps more than did its enemies - that they were merely temporary, that France in particular would not remain weak indefinitely and that the central problem, in Flanders, remained unsolved. It was thus for reasons Flemish that the Council in March 1615 moved tentatively to a commitment to the principle of an English marriage - 'the most convenient thing, and the only remedy for Christianity and for the security and quietude of everything in Flanders'.⁠³ In July, Mejia finally persuaded it to take the marriage seriously precisely because an alliance with England would largely guarantee the safety of the Indies and perhaps even lead to the cession by James of the places he held in Flanders.⁠⁴ Time was getting short.

So, too, in 1616 was patience. In February, State considered some letters from Albert and Spinola in which they assumed that Philip would not want to break the Truce; Mejia took offence at their presumption.⁠⁵

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² - ibid., Cornwallis, Cnta. St., 4 Mar. 1617, f. 85.
³ - Cnta. St., 26 Mar. 1615, ibid., f. 49.
⁴ - Cnta. St., 18 Jul. 1615, ibid., ff. 52-3.
Similarly, when Albert gave some orders in the royal name Aliaga, in August, thought his actions highly significant of his wish to be independent of Madrid and sternly advised Philip that this the more obliged him 'to consider the state of affairs in Flanders'. Eyes were turning north. In 1615, War had begun that review of naval weakness that was to lead to the great reforms of 1620-21, and it had done so because it was alarmed by the increase in Dutch naval activity. On 26 December 1616 it met in emergency session to discuss the news that the Dutch were reportedly about to help the Duke of Savoy, and it was at this meeting that Lerma pondered aloud the possibility of breaking the Truce with the Dutch. His colleagues needed no prompting. Their concerns were of course less with religious than with military matters, and they seized the opportunity; Mejía thought that 'it would not be a bad thing' to break the Truce 'because war could be made with little more than the current expense', and Diego de Ibarra led the professional councillors in arguing that open war could be renewed because prolonging the peace served only Dutch interests. The die was cast; eleven days previously State, led by Lerma, had debated the Italian crisis and had concluded that the peace of Italy had to be preserved. At that meeting,

1 - Cnta. St., 6 Aug. 1616, ibid.
2 - See above, pp. 161 and 300-301.
3 - See above, pp. 387-8.
4 - Cnta. War, 26 Dec. 1616, A.G.S. G.A. 808, no fol.
however, there had been no mention of any Dutch activity in Italy. ¹

That was the catalyst. For the Dutch to increase their naval activities
in both the Indies and off Africa was bad enough; that they should even
appear to be thinking about involving themselves in Italy was
insupportable. There could be no peace with them; it remained to decide
how and when to renew the war.

There were now just over four years to go before the Truce
formally expired, and everything that happened in Europe in those years
was, to the Council, subordinate to that one consideration. It followed
resolutely a policy of minimal involvement in the crises of those
years, determined that it would not be dragged into war before it was
ready. Thus, for instance, in 1618 Zúñiga and Aligga led it in its
determination not to go to war in Italy, ² while in 1619 it was
Villafranca who took the lead in arguing that because the 'war-machine'
was not yet ready the Bohemian problem should be solved rather by
negotiation than by 'ill-made war'. ³

The breathing-space was nearly lost in 1619, as relations with
England deteriorated critically. The possibility that James would
involve himself actively in the Palatinate appeared in the late

¹ - Cnta.St.,15 Dec.1616,A.G.S. K.1593,f.54,a copy.
autumn of that year to presage the collapse of the whole English policy. In December 1618 Villafranca had observed that the time was 'one for dealing and uniting with the King of England in all possible ways', but by the summer of 1619 the Council was beginning to fear that such was becoming impossible, that it was being systematically deceived by James. In June, Zúñiga irately noted that it was 'the traditional practice of heretics to tell lies', but yet advised that a last diplomatic effort be made - by telling him all sorts of flattering lies! - to dissuade James from actively supporting his son-in-law in Bohemia. The time and the place were not yet. By October, however, a breach appeared imminent. On 27th, the Council considered a report that James was to ally himself with the Dutch in action against the East Indies and that he had asked for Dutch help over Bohemia. He was now an enemy. But still the time was not yet - 'in any other circumstances we would already have arms in our hands' - and still the Council hoped that the prospect of the marriage would work its spell. Gondomar had been in Spain throughout 1619 and on 27 November he presented a report to the Council in which he argued that circumstances had changed greatly since he had left England; that there was no longer any purpose in trying to win

1 - Cnta. St., 25 Dec. 1618, ibid., f. 11.
3 - Cnta. St., 27 Oct. 1619, ibid., f. 33.
over a king who himself had no intention of going through with the
marriage, and that arms — and more particularly, the fleet — be prepared
for action. For years the Council had done little more than follow
Gondomar's advice on matters English, considering him, as Infantado had
put it in 1614, 'the best informed and shrewdest' of all Philip's
ambassadors. But there was special pleading here of a rather
unsavoury kind; the Ambassador's statement concluded by asking that he
should not be sent back to England. The Council was sympathetic to
him but still prepared to stretch to the limit to conciliate James
even though it doubted whether such was really possible. Gondomar
went back to England.

As it happened, the crisis then resolved itself with the election
of the Archduke Ferdinand to the imperial throne and with the
clarification of James' real intentions once Gondomar had returned.
Now the Council could concentrate on the Dutch. It did not debate
whether the war was to be renewed. Policies were not made thus; there
were no climactic discussions at which great decisions were reached.
Policy was the expression of an attitude, and the attitude of the
Council of State was now, as it had been for years, resolute and fixed;

1 - Cnta. St., 27 Nov. 1619, ibid., f. 34.
2 - Cnta. St., 18 Apr. 1614, A.G.S. E. 2514, f. 16.
3 - Cnta. St., 27 Nov. 1619, sp. cit.
4 - See ibid., and cnta. St., 28 Nov. 1619, ibid., f. 47.
5 - Relations with England continued of course to be under strain; see
especially, Cnta. St., 26 May 1620, A.G.S. E. 2515, f. 37 in which Aliaga
and Zúñiga began to doubt whether the marriage should in fact go
through, and on the Palatinate, Cnta. War 9 Oct., 1620, A.G.S. G.A. 553,
the Dutch had to be fought. That premise as such was not debated; it evolved. Discussions took place on details, and only one of those really mattered—the question of timing. The Council did not at the end of the reign suddenly decide to renew the war; it decided merely that the circumstances were then as propitious as they were ever likely to be. There was thus no contradiction as against the determination not to become involved earlier in central or southern Europe; the army, as Villafranca had pointed out as late as 1619, was not then ready, and was not to be used and wasted on any other than the Dutch. By 1621 Villafranca thought it not only ready, but so ready that it had to be used; among the reasons he propounded for resuming the war was the highly significant one that 'an army that is unoccupied causes apprehension to all, whereas one that is occupied causes dread only in the area where it operates'.

For him, those two years had been vital; the time was now.

Villafranca himself had not changed in those two years any more than had the Council itself, or indeed the King. The régime of Philip III has been maligned on most counts, but the chief accusations have been two—that it was pacific, and that it was dominated by the royal favourites. It was neither. It was aggressive and it was dominated by the councils. Spain neither assumed a passive and pacific

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stance because Lerma was in favour nor a more belligerent one because he had gone. Nor of course was he removed by any 'war-faction'; he resigned. His chief relevance in this context was that he wasted monies that could have gone to the armies. The renewal of the war was consistent with everything that Philip and State had done throughout the reign; it was no more an aberration that his last decision had been to renew it than it had been in effect his first to send an armada to Ireland. He had established War and State to give him his victory, and he left them with what they wanted most, the decision to make war again.

The decision was probably unwise, and opposition to it was led, not by a faction, but by another council; Finance argued on grounds of practicality that with the 1620 flota having brought less than 300,000 ducats for the Crown the war could not be properly supported. State's hope was that the war would be localised, short and successful. It had, of course, always been thus, yet beneath any rationalisation, any race against time before France and England intervened, there was an inevitability about the decision, and it came from within the very fibre of the Council itself. We should leave

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State arguing its case before Philip IV and with in particular the advice offered the new king by men appointed to the Council in 1603 and 1610 respectively. Infantado believed that Albert's death was a manifestation of the divine favour, since it would allow Spain to exercise a more direct control over its army in Flanders. State had 'so many times' advised Philip III that the Truce should not be prolonged if its terms could not be improved, and he reiterated that advice. The moment was right for war; a large and well-provisioned army was ready to fight, and the states bordering on Flanders were each distracted by their own problems - France by its heretics, England with the Palatinate and Germany with the imperial struggle. His advice was therefore not to waste the advantages of the moment; to do so would be a grievous blow to the royal reputation. Melia thought that the army in Flanders was, in both quantity and quality, the best he had ever known Spain to have there and that 'time should not be lost, for the summer is already well-advanced'. Neither Philip II nor Philip III had ever had an opportunity like this, 'for according to intelligence ... the rebels are extremely weak, and their divisions over the matter of religion (are) as great as they could be ... The army should take advantage of this occasion, for it will be so superior to that of the enemy, and the expense that (has been incurred) ... should not be wasted'. 

1 - Catar. St., 30 Jul. 1621, A.G.S. E. 2035, f. 94.