THE PROMOTION
OF AN AUSTRIAN IDENTITY
1918–1938

Jamie Andrew McGregor Bulloch

Ph.D.
University College London
Abstract

This thesis examines constructs of Österreichertum promoted by Austrian conservatism in the years 1918-38. It is an interdisciplinary examination of political discourse, as well as of intellectual and literary formulations of Austrian identity. It considers why, in the majority of cases, the idea of Austrian nationhood was rejected in the inter-war era, and explores the Austro-German synthesis of identity that acted as a substitute for an independent national consciousness.

The work focuses on the personality and politics of Ignaz Seipel; the Ständestaat regime and Vaterländische Front; the Heimatschutz and the legitimists; and literary and historical constructs of Austrian identity. Among these last constructs can be found those few publicists of the period who affirmed the existence of an Austrian nation. Their ideas did not bear fruit until after World War II, when Austrian political leaders took the country on the path to independent nationhood.
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Introduction

This thesis has its genesis in an undergraduate dissertation on the Anschluss, which itself was the product of a schoolboy interest in the question of whether, for the Austrians, March 1938 represented a foreign invasion and occupation, or a 'reunion'. The quest to know what the average Austrian citizen thought about Anschluss was given up long ago, due to the epistemological problems that such an investigation inevitably encounters: we cannot know how representative a sample of people's views would be, even if these were at our disposal. An interest in the subject of Austrian identity has remained, however. To avoid the pitfalls outlined above and to limit speculation, this study eschews a mass psychological analysis. Rather it focuses on constructs of identity, as they were formulated by political and intellectual elites of the inter-war era, and on how these were disseminated to the population at large via various media. No claim is made that the majority of Austrians shared the opinions of these public figures and organisations. Nor have I attempted to analyse the influence that the political and cultural ideas had on the Austrians, due to the poor empirical base of such an approach.1 In short, what follows is a study of propaganda from the political arena, complemented by a survey of cultural (primarily literary) production, which reflect or reconstruct an idea of Österreichertum. It will be shown, moreover, that this idea was the property of Austrian conservatism, a fact which is acknowledged by the focus of this thesis.

The concept of 'identity' has become the theme of many seminar series, conferences and publications in the past generation. Indeed it would not be
out of place to say that it has become something of a fashionable subject in academic circles. This ubiquity brings with it the danger that, given the intangible, ethereal nature of identity, it can become ever more difficult to define exactly what it is.² In the realm of history we frequently deal with a concept of collective identity which is either attached to states, or to other groups commonly known as ‘ethnic’, but elsewhere referred to as ‘races’ or ‘nations’. Here already we see a need to impart some sort of precision to the terminology used in any particular study of identity. For this reason, the following section will survey a selection of the broad range of literature that has appeared in the last twenty years on the interrelated concepts of ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘national identity’. This will conclude with an explanation of how some key terms are to be understood in the context of the thesis, and an elaboration of the methodological parameters that have been employed.

What is a Nation?

Of key importance to this thesis is a clear understanding of the concept ‘nation’. What becomes evident, however, from both historical sources which discuss Austrian identity, and the theoretical writing consulted for this survey is the discrepancy between different definitions of the term. Peter Alter argues that none of the many definitions is universally valid,³ while Eric Hobsbawm insists that all objective definitions of the nation have failed, noting that the criteria used for defining a nation are ‘fuzzy’ and ‘shifting’.⁴
As a term, ‘nation’ has existed since the Middle Ages. Initially, Elie Kedourie suggests, it referred to a group of men, united by kinship, which was larger than a family, but smaller than a clan. At the beginning of the nineteenth century ‘nation’ emerged as a different collective term with a variety of meanings. Two of these are of direct relevance to this thesis. The first, which in Europe was closely linked with the French Revolution, said that the nation equalled the sovereign people and thus was indivisible from a distinct territory and a unified political community. The second, as advocated by Johann-Gottfried von Herder and his Romantic contemporaries, saw the nation as a cultural and linguistic entity. The conflict between the two definitions can be clearly seen in the example of the population of Alsace-Lorraine. In French eyes, these German-speakers were French because they resided on French soil and formed part of the political community of France. The Herderian view, on the other hand, argued that they were German as they spoke German and belonged to the German cultural nation. And yet this view of the nation, being cultural rather than political, did not insist that each nation should possess its own state. In Herder’s eyes, therefore, membership of the German nation was compatible with a loyalty to, say, the states of Prussia or Bavaria.

Building on these two interpretations, the German historian, Friedrich von Meinecke, advanced the proposition in 1908 that two types of nation existed: the ‘Staatsnation’ (political nation, or ‘nation-state’) and the ‘Kulturnation’ (cultural nation). As we will see in the first chapter, this paradigm can be found in both the theoretical writing of Ignaz Seipel on the relationship between the nation and the state, and his ‘Austrian’ propaganda.
of the 1920s. Indeed, a dual concept of the nation still appears in contemporary works in this field of research, such as Anthony Smith’s National Identity. Smith sets out a western, or civic-territorial, concept of the nation next to an eastern, or ethnic, concept. These have similarities with the Staatsnation and Kulturnation, although Smith maintains that both types of nation he writes about share the idea of a territorially bounded unit of population. He argues that the nationalism associated with the ethnic idea of the nation campaigns for a state for that nation. This distances it conceptually from the Kulturnation. As we have seen Herder’s concept of the nation was compatible with loyalty to a non- or sub-national state. The cultural conception of the nation did not necessarily imply a political programme of the nation state. This fact has direct relevance to the example of Austria in the inter-war years. It will be demonstrated how leading figures of Austrian conservatism had no difficulty combining German national pride with a strong Austrian patriotism, and insisted that the boundaries of nation and state need not coincide.

Objective and subjective perceptions of the nation provide another duality. Superficially it might seem that they correspond with the concepts of the Staatsnation and Kulturnation. Such an evaluation would argue that the Staatsnation determines the nationality of the individual, which is based on concrete political criteria of residence, ancestry or birth. The Kulturnation, on the other hand, involves a measure of voluntary association, the magnitude of which depends on the individual. An English speaker with a British passport might think of himself as Scottish or Welsh, for example, thereby invoking the cultural concept of the nation. Yet one
could make a plausible case for reversing these conceptual relationships. Language is, after all, an important objective criterion of identity, whereas it could be argued that membership of a political community involves a subjective decision. If I chose to move abroad and fulfil all residency qualifications, my nationality in the sense of Staatsnation would change. My mother tongue and the core of my cultural make-up (Kulturnation) would, however, remain the same. In this example, Staatsnation is linked to subjective criteria, and Kulturnation to objective ones.

Although the above oversimplifies the objective-subjective distinction, it nevertheless illustrates further the difficulty in establishing a clear definition of the nation. In this vein we have noted Hobsbawm’s rejection of any universal objective definition of the nation. However, he does give consideration to thinkers such as Ernst Renan and Otto Bauer (whose ideas will be discussed in detail in the next chapter), both of whom, although recognising some objective elements, conceived the nation largely in subjective terms. Renan’s famous paper Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? concluded that the nation was an ‘everyday plebiscite’, by which he meant that individuals voluntarily and continually affirmed their membership of a nation. Bauer and the Austro-Marxists also saw nationality as an individual choice. A fundamental difference exists between the two approaches, however. Renan’s idea of the nation was very much in terms of the Staatsnation. He rejected ethnicity as the core element of the nation; rather he understood the nation as a real political and territorial entity. The Austro-Marxists, on the other hand, saw nations in cultural terms.
(Kulturnation) as their blueprints for a restructuring of the Habsburg Monarchy reveal. 17

Where modern commentators do tend to agree is in the proposition that the nation is a constructed and temporal entity. 18 Alter asserts that they 'are synthetic and need to be created'. 19 Mary Fulbrook contrasts the 'constructionists' with the 'essentialists', who cling to the Romantic notion that nations are eternal and natural entities. 20 The essentialist view of the nation may proliferate in nationalist propaganda, and is therefore highly useful for political purposes. But in the more sober world of historical analysis, it shows disregard for modern historical processes. As Hobsbawm writes, the nation 'belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period', 21 an argument which Benedict Anderson has explored further in his work, Imagined Communities. Anderson differentiates the nation from other types of collective identities, showing how the former can only achieve cohesion through the modern phenomenon of mass media. He demonstrates that the nation must, to a considerable extent, be an imagined community, as any one individual will, during his lifetime, know only a tiny proportion of this group to which he belongs. Without the shared experiences offered to the nation by mass media, as well as a common education, ritual, custom, tradition, a collective identity on such a large scale would be a non-starter. 22

For the nation-building process, as described by Anderson, to be most effective, it seems reasonable to assume that the national elites should have at their disposal a political apparatus and key institutions which allow the transmission and consolidation of national myths, traditions etc. In other words, the nation-state, with its overt symbols and common education,
offers the best opportunity to imbue a given population with a sense of shared consciousness. This view, in keeping with the 'constructionist' approach, sees the nation as a temporal and political phenomenon, which according to Gellner is the product of nationalism rather than its cause. In the same vein, Hobsbawm asserts that 'nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round'. Neither of the two, nor John Breuilly, who takes a similar position, would argue that the nation is devoid of cultural content. However, for these commentators, it is first and foremost a political construct which gives the state both internal cohesion and external legitimacy. Indeed Hobsbawm only considers nations where a state is attached to them, while Breuilly demonstrates how a widespread German national consciousness was forged only after the creation of the German state, rather than itself being the chief cause of unification.

This thesis subscribes to the view that the nation is a construct, rather than an eternal and natural entity. Yet in the study that follows, no attempt is made to evaluate whether the Austria of the inter-war years would qualify, according to a given set of objective criteria, for nation status. The aim is not to provide a definitive concept of the nation that is universally applicable, but rather to examine a particular construct of identity. We are not concerned here with posing the questions 'what is a nation?' or 'how does a nation develop?', but with establishing how the nation was understood by certain people. For this reason our thesis traces and works with the concepts of nationhood adumbrated by those individuals and groups under investigation. In the light of Hobsbawm's aforementioned assertion that that all objective definitions of the nation have failed, it seems
appropriate to allow the Austrian political and cultural elites to speak for
themselves on the matter. Here I agree with David Miller, who asserts that
the criteria of what constitutes a nation involves people’s beliefs about
nationhood.\(^29\)

The theoretical work surrounding nationhood is, therefore, of interest to
this thesis in two respects. In the first instance this is where, seeing the
nation as a construct, the theory examines the mechanics of identity
formulation. Of importance here is the sense of ‘the other’, against which a
particular identity can be defined.\(^30\) Then there is the idea of a shared
historical legacy – and by extension a common future – which is
emphasised in order to underline the cohesiveness of a given population.\(^31\)
Thirdly there is the use of myth, ritual, symbol and education, as well as the
role of art and culture, as vehicles for the promotion of the identity
construct.\(^32\) These features of identity formulation and promotion will be
highlighted in the analysis of Austrian inter-war identity that follows.

The second way in which the theory is of relevance is where it refers
directly to the German and Austrian experience.\(^33\) One might also highlight
the particular resonance that the word \textit{Nation} has in German. Whereas in
English, the concepts of state and nation have almost fused and become
subsumed under the one term ‘nation’,\(^34\) in German – especially during the
period under investigation here – this is not the case.\(^35\) \textit{Nation}, therefore,
does not necessarily refer to a (nation) state.\(^36\) If we take the English word
‘nationality’, the linguistic differentiation is highlighted more clearly. The
word can be translated into German either by \textit{Nationalität}, or
\textit{Staatsbürgerschaft}. The latter has an unequivocal political connotation, in
that it refers to an individual’s citizenship of a particular state. *Nationalität* is more ambiguous in that it can, like *Staatsbürgerschaft*, express citizenship, or it can denote ethnic affiliation.

When applied to Germany, however, the above distinction becomes blurred. The *Reich* citizenship law of 1913, which made uniform the variety of arrangements across Germany, was based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. This conferred the status of being German on the basis of descent (blood). Thus one could technically be a German citizen, even if one’s family had lived away from the fatherland for hundreds of years. By contrast, descendants of immigrants remained aliens (*Volksfremde*). They could not obtain German citizenship, even if they – or their parents – had been born in the *Reich*. This arrangement was unchanged by West German administrations to allow East German refugees the right to a new passport if they crossed the border, on the basis that they were of German descent. The law came in for harsh criticism from post-war immigrants to the Federal Republic. They were initially invited over to fill the labour shortage in West Germany, but successive governments of the Republic, believing that these *Gastarbeiter* would stay and work for a few years before returning home, ignored the potential long-term consequences. As many *Gastarbeiter* chose to remain in West Germany, they became stuck in a legal no man’s land, unable to enjoy the benefits and rights of West German citizenship. Even their children and grandchildren, born on German soil, were – until recently – denied the same status as ‘ethnic Germans’, who flooded into the newly unified Germany from parts of the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe.
That these *Volksdeutsche* had never previously set foot on German soil, was no obstacle to their acquiring German citizenship.

The above excursus is of considerable importance as it throws more light on the larger question of 'Germanness', or *Deutschtum*, in the twentieth century, of which Austrian inter-war identity is an integral part. That an archaic citizenship law could survive basically unchanged for so long is indicative of German ideas of nationhood which have straddled the boundary between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*. Despite the position of certain historians who emphasise the political and territorial framework of the nation, the ethnic element of nationhood still has a key role in the formulation of identity constructs around the world. A striking example of this could be seen on 9 April 2000, when Romany leaders called on the UN to confer 'the status of a non-territorial nation to the Romany people', and requested representation on a number of international bodies. It is of interest to note that the Romany proposal is similar to Social Democrat ideas for solving the nationality problems of the Habsburg Monarchy. These will be discussed below.

As we have seen, Meinecke's distinction between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* is problematic when applied to the various forms the German state has taken in the twentieth century. In general, the models are probably too outdated and unsophisticated to inform contemporary theory on nations and nationalism. For the purpose of this thesis, however, they remain relevant. They find an echo in the dual allegiance of Austrians (to the Austrian state, and German nation) as reformulated by Ignaz Seipel and other prominent Austrians of the inter-war period. An acquaintance with
Meinecke's ideas provides a useful starting point for understanding this apparent split identity. Indeed, Martin Spät has used the ideas of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* to construct framework of his thesis on Austrian national identity since the Second World War. He calls them 'the most coherent concepts with which to explain and approach the question of a transformation of national identity in Austria and elsewhere in western Europe'.

As this thesis also works with the two concepts, a brief explanation of how they are to be understood will be given.

For the purposes of this thesis, *Staatsnation* refers to the political concept of the nation, whose territorial boundaries are congruent with state sovereignty. Membership of this nation is determined by citizenship, irrespective of linguistic, cultural or ethnic considerations. From the end of the First World War until *Anschluss*, Austria falls into the category of a *Staatsnation*. The *Kulturnation*, on the other hand, is to be understood as an ethnic and cultural construct, which exists independently of state frontiers. Membership of this type of nation is not so clearly defined, and its constituency is subject to considerable vacillation. In spite of a variety of elements which would seem to allocate the majority of individuals to a particular *Kulturnation*, without the legal framework which upholds the *Staatsnation*, membership of a *Kulturnation* becomes, from the individual’s viewpoint, largely self-prescriptive. Amongst the patriotic Austrians discussed below, most saw their national affiliation (*Kulturnation*) as German, but a few professed themselves to be members of an Austrian nation. Where the term 'nation' is employed in this thesis, it will refer, unless otherwise stated, to the idea of the greater German *Kulturnation*. 
Similarly, ‘nationalism’ means German nationalism, describing specifically the movements that advocated Anschluss.

**National Identity?**

If the concept of the nation causes difficulties for the contemporary scholar, the concept of national identity is even more problematic from a theoretical standpoint. National identity is not merely an identification with a collective group known as the nation, but also with the content of that collective consciousness. The former poses few problems – either an individual identifies with a nation or he does not. He may change his target of identification over time, or harbour a composite national identity. On an individual level, however, profession of national identity remains quantifiable and simple to analyse. The make-up of national identity is, on the other hand, pretty unfathomable, and lends itself poorly to logical analysis. Take the seemingly harmless question ‘what is British national identity?’. There will, of course, be no shortage of individuals ready to list elements that they believe constitute this identity. It is unlikely, however, that any two people chosen at random will produce the same set of answers. No doubt some common elements will emerge, but others are bound to appear in mutual contradiction. So whose judgement does one rely on? Or do we simply adopt a quantitative analysis and accept as valid those elements of identity which are listed most frequently?

It is perhaps more important to seek the origins of people’s responses to such a question. There are no doubt still those who, refreshing Herderian
thought with a dose of potted Jungian theory, believe in an innate national spirit. For our purposes the view that we are born with our national consciousness is best dismissed. Secondly, we might consider that those questioned have based their answers on an objective analysis of British national identity. This, however, is also problematic as it presupposes that British national identity has a defined and knowable content which is independent of the human imagination. Thirdly, we might assume that the responses are conditioned by a number of environmental factors, of which education and mass media are the most significant. This conclusion, which accords with Anderson’s notion of the ‘imagined community’, seems by far the likeliest. It shows up the mythical, artificial nature of national identity, which is at its most effective when it plants vivid collective memories in the mind of the individual.

Even if we accept that, like the nation, national identity is a construct, the problems do not disappear. We have observed that investigation into the content of a particular national identity is unlikely to result in homogenous answers, suggesting that the construct is highly fragile and contingent. An alternative conclusion is that national identity is fragmented into a multitude of constructs, each of which bears the stamp of the individual. A sufficiently large sample might reveal that these individual constructs gravitate around a few core ideas, but we are left with the same problem outlined above, namely how to evaluate the data. Work has been undertaken in this field by the categorising of these core ideas and searching for comparability across different nations. Smith has produced such an analysis of national identity, in which he isolates certain key elements common to the identities of both
types of nation (civic-territorial and ethnic). Given that we have recognised the validity of the Kulturnation concept for the case of inter-war Austria, however, Smith's results are problematic for this thesis. His assertion that common legal rights and duties as well as a common economy are two of the five 'fundamental features' of national identity is incompatible with the idea of a nation without a common political structure.

So far we have outlined the difficulties of investigating national identity 'from below', that is to say taking as a starting point the ideas and opinions of a mass of individuals. These problems can be bypassed, however, if we shift our focus to the promotion of identity 'from above' and examine the broadcast output in the fields of governments, political parties and movements, individuals in public life etc. This allows us to analyse specific constructs of identity whose content is of importance as it exists in the public arena, for general consumption. With this approach, which is employed by this thesis, the selection of relevant data has a coherency rather than being a stab in the dark, and the analysis is a qualitative rather than quantitative process. On the other hand, this method can offer only hints, but no hard data, as to the feelings and ideas of the members of the nation as a whole regarding their collective identity.

A similar approach has been adopted by Mary Fulbrook, who has criticised Anthony Smith's attempts to isolate the elements which constitute national identity. In her work on German national identity since the Holocaust, Fulbrook's stated method is to examine the 'processes of formation and reformation of particular forms of collective identity, which
are claimed to be national, under historical circumstances'. As well as focusing on the discourse of identity promotion from above, Fulbrook’s work has a second parallel to this thesis. She does not limit her theory strictly to the national level, but frequently refers – as in the citation above – to collective identity in general. This flexibility is, of course, necessary when considering the examples of the two German states after 1949, both of which claimed to represent the German nation politically. While it could be maintained that both the FRG and GDR eventually embarked on the process of constructing separate national identities, for many there existed one German nation divided into two states.

The examples of East and West Germany offer useful points of comparison for inter-war Austria, which was also presented as a component of the larger German nation. For this reason, it is erroneous to talk of an Austrian national identity in the inter-war period in the context of the approach used here. The most comprehensive study on inter-war Austrian identity to date, by Corinna Peniston-Bird, argues that a national identity did exist, but her methodology is very different from mine. She examines debate on Austria in various spheres – though concentrates primarily on the economic – and interprets these as evidence in favour of the existence of a national identity. The political arena is by and large ignored, and deliberately so, as Peniston-Bird admits that ‘if the nation is understood as a political construct it is legitimate to argue that there was little Austrian identity in the inter-war period, because the state attained little legitimacy or popular support’.
Peniston-Bird argues that a sense of Austrian identity could co-exist with a lack of support for the Austrian state. This thesis also contends that the identity constructs examined here were not wholly dependent on the rump Austrian state of St. Germain. Both studies indeed share a number of ideas in common, particularly that of the importance of the Habsburg legacy to formulations of identity. Nevertheless our conclusions on the existence of an Austrian national identity are at variance. This can partly be explained by the importance allocated to different sources: whereas political discourse is subordinated in Peniston-Bird’s work, it forms the focus of this thesis. More important is the fact that Peniston-Bird puts an interpretative gloss on her sources to conclude that the identity she examines can be called ‘national’. This work, on the other hand, takes a more voyeuristic approach: it allows the sources to debate amongst themselves issues such as nationhood and identity, thereby producing a different verdict.

To summarise, this thesis is based on the following assumptions. First, that no universal definition of the nation exists, but that it can mean different things to different people, and that it is not co-terminous with the state. Second, that national identity, in the sense of an individual’s professed nationality, is self-prescriptive. If X insists he is German, or Austrian, or even both, this overrides any objective determinants which a third party might use to define X’s identity. Third, that national identity – or a similar collective identity – is a construct with two forms. The first of these is the identity formulation designed and publicised from above by a government/regime or another type of group. The second is the construct that is processed in the mind of the individual from the various sources of
information relating to collective identity to which he or she has been exposed. It is probable that in each individual the construct will differ, according to the value he or she places on the various components of a particular identity (or competing identities) that are articulated in the public arena.

These assumptions shape the approach selected for this study towards the question of inter-war Austrian identity. The thesis works with definitions of nationhood from the sources themselves. It examines constructs of identity of the first type outlined above, and the mechanisms by which these constructs are broadcast to their intended audience. Finally, the object of inquiry is a discrete historical phenomenon. Austrian inter-war identity will be investigated for its own sake and in its own context, rather than be used as a model to illustrate a wider theory of collective identity. In this respect, any parallels drawn with East and West Germany are pertinent as they reinforce the idiosyncrasies of German identity. Widening the investigation, however, to embrace such examples as North and South Korea, would fall outside the intended scope of this work.

**Existing Research into Austrian identity**

Perhaps the best-known work on Austrian identity is the idiosyncratic volume by Friedrich Heer entitled Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität (The struggle over Austrian identity).\(^{51}\) In this psychological history, as Ernst Bruckmüller has described it,\(^{52}\) Heer looks at the question both in general and in detail, throughout a millennium of Austrian history,
in an attempt to trace a pattern of development. He highlights for example the influence of Bohemia, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Maria Theresia's struggle with Frederick the Great, and the reign of Franz Joseph. As far as the inter-war period is concerned, Heer sees the First Republic's downfall as the product of an unreal belief in Germany combined with the irrational idea that Austria was an unviable state. He dedicates much of this particular chapter to Seipel and his attempts to promote an Austrian consciousness. Another chapter looks at the Anschluss movement and its intellectual supporters, most notably the pan-German historian Heinrich von Srbik. A third chapter focuses on the persons of Schuschnigg and Hitler, looking at their respective backgrounds and attitudes towards Austria.

By considering Austrian identity from the middle ages to the twentieth-century, Ernst Bruckmüller has also seen Austrian nationhood as a long-term development, isolating the historical antecedents of today's republic. He analyses different themes, such as provincial (Land) identity, and the roles of the Catholic Church, language, the army, bureaucracy and aristocracy, examining how these have all contributed to a collective identity in Austria. Of similar breadth is the collection of essays edited by Richard G. Plaschka, Gerald Stourzh and Jan Paul Niederkorn which investigates the meaning of the word Austria in different centuries and contexts. It is a very welcome collection, providing a good overall picture of the problem of Austrian identity, as well as an excellent background for students of the First Republic. The essay by Gerald Stourzh treats the period between the collapse of the Monarchy and the birth of the Second Republic. Stourzh concurs that 1918 marked the most radical change in
the concept of Austria as it was at this point that it became divorced from
the dynasty. Having argued that the awareness of being German, but not
*Reich* German, was ubiquitous in inter-war Austria, he traces the roots of
the Austrian nation idea back to individual theses in the 1930s, then isolates
several factors which were prominent for the rebirth of an Austrian
consciousness after World War II. One can find Stourzh’s ideas in a more
expanded form in his book *Vom Reich zur Republik*, four essays which deal
with the issue of Austrian identity in the twentieth century.56 These examine
the changes in Austrian consciousness since 1867; the historical foundations
of the Second Republic; changes in Austrian consciousness in the twentieth
century and using Switzerland as a model; and Austrian identity in the
transition from the 1980s to the 1990s.

The contrast between the frail Austrian identity of the inter-war era and
the more solid national identity of the Second Republic is the theme of
several works. The most substantial of these is by Felix Kreissler, first
published in French in the 1970s, and in German a decade later.57 Like other
commentators, Kreissler focuses his attention mainly on the period
following *Anschluss*. He argues that the experiences of Nazi occupation,
resistance and detention in the concentration camps allowed the Austrians to
break finally with the notion that they were a mere German *Stamm*, and
identify themselves as a distinct nation. By conducting a large number of
interviews with prominent figures who lived through the *Anschluss* era, he
attempts to document this change at the personal as well as collective level,
identifying which factors were most responsible for the shift away from a
German consciousness in Austria. Later in the book, by processing data
from a number of surveys, he demonstrates how the Austrians have developed a far stronger sense of national identity over the decades since the Second World War, in spite of the re-emergence of right-wing pan-German ideas in the 1960s.

William T. Bluhm has also documented the evolution of Austrian nationhood since the Second World War, using interviews for a large part of his work. He examines the inter-war period as a background to his main study, considering in particular Seipel’s main theoretical work and his career, as well as giving an overview of the ‘Austrianism’ of the Ständestaat era. Another section takes a brief look at what he calls ‘literary Austrianism’, but it offers only Anton Wildgans and Hugo von Hofmannsthal as examples. As already discussed, Martin Späť’s thesis on the transformation of Austrian national identity since World War II uses the rival concepts of Kulturnation and Staatsnation as a framework for understanding the change. He argues that the national identity of the Austrians in the First Republic was German, as they understood the idea of the nation in a cultural sense. It was not until the idea of the modern political nation took root in Austria that an independent national identity evolved. Other works examining contemporary Austrian identity include a short book by Hannes Androsch, which is more of a potted political and economic history of the Second Republic, and an essay by Otto Schulmeister. F.C. Hornquist has taken issue with the Archive of the Austrian Resistance in Vienna, arguing that the period from 1938 to 1945 was not as significant as has been suggested in forging an Austrian national consciousness. Hornquist’s argument that the extent of Austrian resistance
in the *Anschluss* era has been overestimated may have some justification. His principal thesis, however, is weakened by a lack of documentary evidence to back his claims, and an ignorance of the Austrian identity formulated in the *Ständestaat* era.

Works which focus on Austrian identity in the First Republic have either been essays or chapters in broader studies of the period. In Norbert Leser’s book on intellectual life in Vienna, Kurt Skalnik sketches the ideas of some individuals, such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Ernst Winter and Alfred Klahr who, already in the 1930s, insisted on the existence of an Austrian *national* identity. A similar piece by Skalnik appears in a book on the First Republic he edited with Erika Weinzierl. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann looks at the ‘Austrian’ ideology of the *Ständestaat* in a chapter of his work on the failed Nazi *putsch* of 1934, while Robert Kriechbaumer examines the background to the German element of Austrian identity in the authoritarian era. Stanley Suval, in his book on the *Anschluss* question, devotes a chapter to the writers and intellectuals who made important contributions towards the fashioning of an Austrian identity. He sees their efforts as representing an ‘Austrian anthropology’. Suval’s work provided considerable inspiration for the fifth chapter of this thesis. Ernst Hoor’s history of the First Republic, which draws considerably on the work of Gordon Brook-Shepherd, emphasises the lack of national identity in the period, as well as the prevailing negative attitude towards the state itself. Like Brook-Shepherd, he underestimates the importance of Seipel for the patriotic campaign of the 1930s. Heinrich Bußhoff’s study of the Dollfuss regime looks in particular at the idea of the Austrian mission, as it was
publicised in the Catholic press. Both Ludwig Reichhold and, to a lesser extent, Irmgard Bärnthaler also investigate the patriotic campaign of the 1930s in their books on the *Vaterländische Front*.

The most comprehensive examination to date of Austrian identity in the inter-war years is the aforementioned thesis by Corinna Peniston-Bird. Like this work, her study employs an interdisciplinary approach and aims to identify ideas of Austrian nationhood in the First Republic. She argues that contemporary thinking interpreted the nation as a cultural construct, and concludes that Austria went a long way to building a national identity during the First Republic. I would agree, as would Spät, that the *Kulturnation* idea dominated in the inter-war period. It cannot be overlooked, however, that the overwhelming majority of discourse on the matter referred to the German identity of Austria. Moreover I feel that political propaganda, which Peniston-Bird excludes from her work, is critical to understanding constructs of Austrian identity in the inter-war era, as the nexus of the problem was reconciliation with an independent rump state. Peniston-Bird rightly states that Austrian national identity is an under-researched subject in the history of the inter-war years. While I would concede that the seeds of a national identity were present in the period, it will be shown that the vocabulary used in official propaganda rejected the concept of Austrian nationhood. This is an important point, as it helps to explain why a national consciousness did not take root in Austria until after World War II, and why those publicists who did argue for the existence of Austrian nationhood in the First Republic remained isolated.
Peniston-Bird considers the entire debate on Austrian identity, looking at both pan-German argumentation as well as patriotic discourse, whereas this thesis concentrates on the latter. Her work focuses on the economic debate about Anschluss, although she has broadened the study by considering literary and intellectual figures, as well as the importance of language for identity. Particularly interesting is the chapter that treats tourism in the inter-war years. It shows how this industry demands an evaluation of one's own country for the purposes of publicity both at home and abroad. Such a process inevitably involves a consideration of identity on a local as well as state level.

This thesis expands on differing strands of existing research into the field of inter-war Austrian identity. It considers the writings and speeches of a variety of patriotic and predominantly conservative groupings and individuals, and analyses the identity constructs which can be discerned within. As an interdisciplinary study, it offers a greater perspective on the subject than a political analysis, acknowledging the importance of culture and education to the question of identity formulation. Overall the aims are to give greater insight into the Austro-German synthesis that formed the framework for identity construction, to reflect the colourful landscape of ideas about Austrian identity which emerged from the patriotic camp in the inter-war period, and to offer new impetus for further research into a fascinating subject.
Structure of Chapters

The first chapter begins with a background to the specific problems associated with the construction of a post-imperial identity for rump Austria, looking in particular at the contingency of 'Austria' as a concept. The bulk of the chapter is centred on the writings and speeches of Ignaz Seipel. Member of the last imperial cabinet, leader of the Christian Social Party after the war and twice Chancellor of the First Republic, Seipel was the most prominent Austrian politician of the 1920s. He was also the key conservative figure in promoting an Austrian patriotism in the first decade after the war. His formulation of this identity was based on a belief in the virtues of imperial Austria, while also possessing a strong theoretical framework, as revealed in his 1917 publication, Nation und Staat. Seipel's work was a justification of the Habsburg Monarchy, and was one of several works that tried to demonstrate how its continued existence could be secured if sufficient reform in favour of the nationalities were carried out. Other blueprints for the Empire's survival had originated from the Social Democratic camp, most notably from Otto Bauer, Seipel's chief antagonist in the 1920s. These will be compared to Seipel's work. When the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed, the Social Democrats became advocates of Anschluss, particularly as a like-minded government was at the helm in Germany. This aim of union with Germany meant that, like the Pan-Germans, the Social Democrats on the whole did not share Seipel's Austrianism.

The chapter will highlight how Seipel's construct of Austrian identity contained a strong German element. This was not the Deutschturn of the
Prussian-dominated German nation state, but instead reflected a set of universal values that had found political expression in the Holy Roman Empire. Seipel drew on Austria’s past to find support for an interpretation of the concept ‘German’ which he argued was older and truer than that represented by the creation of Bismarck and the Hohenzollern dynasty. One of the key features of the German imperial idea (*Reichsidee*) had been its loose political structure. The many and varied German peoples, such as the Saxons, Bavarians and Austrians, had lived in their own lands with a considerable degree of autonomy. Seipel argued that the individuality of the Austrians would be swamped within the German state; they could best serve the German nation and fulfil their historical mission by remaining without.

The study of Seipel also provides an important background to the period of authoritarian rule in inter-war Austria, which began with the emasculation of parliament in March 1933 and continued until *Anschluss*. In the second chapter, it will be shown how Seipel’s intellectual legacy featured strongly in patriotic government propaganda. Following Hitler’s accession to power in Germany and the consequent threat to Austrian sovereignty, this strove to forge a stronger identification with the state. A more destructive feature of Seipel’s tenure, his campaign against the Social Democrats, was intensified in this period. It culminated in the disastrous civil war of 1934, which severely weakened Austria’s integrity by splitting the anti-Nazi forces into two opposing camps.

The beginning of authoritarian rule in Austria ominously coincided with the Nazi takeover of power in Germany. This emboldened National Socialism in Austria, which had become the vanguard of the *Anschluss*.
movement. It will be shown how, using the propaganda machine of the *Vaterländische Front*, the Seipel formula of ‘Austrian state – German nation’ was preserved in the *Ständestaat* era, leading to a struggle between authoritarian Austria and Nazi Germany as to which could most faithfully represent the true German idea. The concept of a separate Austrian nation was firmly rejected; Austrians could be contrasted with Prussians, but not with Germans overall. The regime emphasised the greatness of Austria’s history; her multinational, Catholic, and therefore universal heritage; and tried to re-educate the population to understand the necessity of continued independence. This involved the conceptualisation of a distinct Austrian identity based heavily on the past – tradition, history, religion, culture – but also one which accorded with the new political structure of the country.

The third chapter looks at two movements in the inter-war era that gave momentum to the patriotic campaign and contributed to the promotion of an Austrian identity. The first of these was the *Heimatschutz*, a paramilitary organisation with its origins in the *ad hoc* militias formed at the end of the war to protect Austria’s borders from Yugoslav incursions. Under Prince Starhemberg in the 1930s, it achieved a semblance of unity as a movement and became the chief partner of the Christian Social Party in the *Ständestaat* regime. Chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg always viewed the *Heimatschutz* with some suspicion as they were wary of the movement’s ambitions, especially the personal ambitions of Starhemberg, who at times seemed ready to sacrifice all principles to achieve political success. In 1936 Schuschnigg managed to liquidate the movement and integrate its members into the newly-formed militia of the *Vaterländische Front*, the *Frontmiliz*. 
In spite of its unreliability as a prop for the authoritarian regime, the Heimatschutz did make a valuable contribution to the patriotic campaign and the promotion of an Austrian identity. When Starhemberg was also Vice-Chancellor and head of the Vaterländische Front, his speeches frequently repeated the ideas of Seipel, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, usually sharpened by a liberal dose of vitriol against Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, his troops battled with Nazi gangs on the streets, heightening the conflict between the two brands of fascism struggling for control in Austria. The Heimatschutz was equally, if not more aggressive in its anti-socialist stance. It played a key role in the civil war of 1934 and undoubtedly widened the division between right and left, thereby helping to alienate the latter from the authoritarian regime and, by extension, from the patriotic campaign.

The legitimists were not a political association, nor could they be considered a mass movement. What they had in common with the rightist paramilitary force was a decentralised organisation, and influence as well as sympathy in the highest political circles. For example, Chancellor Schuschnigg was a well-known monarchist supporter, while the legitimists were given their own organisation within the Vaterländische Front, known as the Traditionsreferat. In practice, this body wielded little power; its establishment was intended to channel the campaign for the restoration of the Monarchy into propaganda that would promote Austrian history, tradition and culture.

Whereas the ambitions of the Heimatschutz leaders were often questionable, the legitimists could be counted amongst the staunchest supporters of Austrian independence and the most passionate advocates of a
distinct Austrian identity. Their principal goal of restoration was incompatible with Anschluss ideology, unless Anschluss took the form of a reconstituted Holy Roman Empire, with Vienna and the Habsburgs at its centre. It was equally incompatible, however, with the real political constellation of Central Europe. The successor states viewed any moves towards restoration as a potential threat to their independence, while Nazi Germany threatened an invasion should the Habsburgs be recalled. Membership of the monarchist associations remained small throughout the inter-war era, and their influence amongst the population was probably not that considerable. As the emphasis here is on identity promotion from above, however, inter-war Austrian legitimism is of significance. It gave birth to some of the most vibrant and clearly-defined constructs of Austrian identity, and encouraged the population to indulge in nostalgia. Given the importance of the Habsburg legacy to conservative formulations of Austrian identity, it is logical that legitimist propaganda should be a field of inquiry in this thesis.

The final chapter will examine the contributions made to the formulation of an Austrian identity outside the political arena, namely by the intellectual and cultural communities of the inter-war period. These range from theories concerning the nature of Austrian identity, ethnicity and culture to the reflection of an Austrian consciousness in a selection of literary works. The chapter is divided into four sections. These look, in turn, at writers, historians, Catholic periodicals, and at the attempts to construct an Austrian anthropology. This last section includes the most radical voices who rejected the notion that the Austrians were a German
people, but rather that they constituted a nation in their own right. While this was to become the line which prevailed after 1945, it will be shown that, between the wars, these constructs of identity were marginalised, as they contrasted too sharply with those of the government.

The conclusion will re-address the problem outlined above, and consider the relationship between the formulation of Austrian identity during the inter-war period, and that immediately following World War II. It will be suggested that the experiences of the Anschluss era and of National Socialist rule helped eliminate the German component from constructs of Austrian identity. This led to the advocacy of separate Austrian nationhood, and the gradual consolidation of an Austrian national identity.

2 Note the bold opening to Mary Fulbrook's recent book: 'National identity does not exist, as an essence to be sought for, found and defined.' Fulbrook, Mary, German National Identity after the Holocaust, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 1.
4 Hobsbawm, p. 5.
5 Kedourie, Elie, Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford (UK) and Cambridge (USA), 1993, p. 5
6 Herder's ideas are so frequently reproduced in literature on nationalism and national identity that an individual reference is not necessary here.
9 Smith observes that Meinecke's distinction is valid, even if his use of the terms can be called into question. Ibid., p. 8.
10 Ibid., pp. 8-12.
11 Ibid., p. 13.
12 That individuals can be bi-, or trilingual, does not invalidate this premise.
13 See also Alter, who maintains that the Kulturnation is based on more objective criteria. Alter, p. 14.
14 There are many interesting alleys to get lost down, which happily fall outside of the remit of this work.
15 Hobsbawm, pp. 7-8. It will be shown below, however, that Bauer did not concur with Renan's conclusions.
16 The full text 'Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?' can be found at http://www.bmlisieux.com/archives/nation02.htm (28/10/2001)
These will be considered in the next chapter. It will also be shown that Bauer did not concur with Renan’s conclusions.


Alter, p. 21.

German National Identity after the Holocaust, pp. 8-14.

Hobsbawm, p. 9.

Anderson, passim.

Gellner, p. 55.

Hobsbawm, p. 10. Later in the same work (p. 78) the author slightly qualifies this assertion by stating that nations are frequently the product of establishing a state rather than the other way round (my italics).

See Nationalism and the State, passim.

Ibid., p. 420.

Hobsbawm, pp. 9-10.

Breuilly, John, ‘Sovereignty and Boundaries: Modern State Formation and National Identity in Germany’ in National Historians and European History, passim.


German National Identity after the Holocaust, pp. 15-16.

See Alter, p. 7; Smith, p. 14.


Of the literature cited above this includes Hobsbawm, Fulbrook’s German National Identity after the Holocaust, and Breuilly’s essay: ‘Sovereignty and Boundaries: Modern State Formation and National Identity in Germany’. Anderson also devotes considerable space to a discussion of the nation within the context of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Interestingly, Hobsbawm cites the New English Dictionary of 1908, which noted that the old meaning of the word ‘nation’ was being superceded by ‘the notion of political unity and independence’. Hobsbawm, p. 18.

See Alter, p. 18. Ignaz Seipel, the focus of the next chapter, remarked to a foreign audience the difference in how the term ‘nation’ was understood by Germans (in these he included the Austrians) and French.

In the chapter which follows there will be a comprehensive examination of the difference between the nation and the state as seen through Austrian eyes.

For more, see German National Identity after the Holocaust, pp. 181-82.

For the full text of the declaration see http://www.hri.ca/racism/meetings/warsaw.htm (28/10/2001).

It has already been shown, however, that Anthony Smith formulates two types of nation.


I include here not just formal schooling, but upbringing in the home whereby information is transmitted from generation to generation.

For more, see Grew, pp. 31-43.

Smith, pp. 8-14.


German National Identity after the Holocaust, pp. 13-14.

Ibid., p. 15.

A very radical viewpoint had it that there was one German nation, divided into three states: the FRG, the GDR and Austria.


Ibid., p. 16.
51 Heer, Friedrich, Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität, Hermann Böhlau Nachf., Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 1981.
53 Ibid. The book focuses on the period up to 1918, although the post-imperial era is also considered.
66 Gordon Brook-Shepherd has written a book on Dollfuss and one on the Anschluss, which focuses on Schuschnigg’s tenure, but has not yet devoted a work to the 1920s. See Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, Dollfuss, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., New York, 1961; Anschluss. The Rape of Austria, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1963.
69 Peniston-Bird.
70 Ibid., p. 16.
71 Ernst Hoor argues that, apart from certain individual cases, an Austrian national consciousness in the First Republic was non-existent. See Hoor, p. 71.
72 How these works were selected will be described in the chapter itself.
Chapter 1

Ignaz Seipel

Together with his Social Democrat adversary, Otto Bauer, the prelate Ignaz Seipel dominated the Austrian political scene of the 1920s. Whereas Bauer conducted his career from the opposition benches after a short tenure as Foreign Minister in Karl Renner’s administration, Seipel twice held the post of Chancellor. As Christian Social Party chairman he continued to exercise considerable influence over Austrian policy-making under other premiers.¹ Seipel articulated a traditional, conservative construct of Austrian identity, frequently referred to here as Österreichertum. It was strongly linked to the imperial past, rather than republican present, which accorded with Seipel’s monarchist sympathies. Seipel habitually invoked this construct of Österreichertum as an affirmation of Austria, and her ability to survive what seemed to be an impossible independent existence caught in the vice of the Versailles system. The apparent bleakness of the country’s economic future and the unhappy occasion of its birth, defeat in the War, provoked an initial wave of negativity towards the ‘rump state’.

Seipel merits individual examination here as he was one of the few political figures, and certainly the most prominent, who consistently demonstrated a cool attitude towards Anschluss, or union with Germany. Drawing on traditional rather than modern theories of the nation and the state, which he had articulated in a wartime publication, Seipel laid the foundations for a belief in Austria and a conviction that she could exist as an independent country. In the eyes of some he become the ‘Father of the
Fatherland',\(^2\) by seemingly saving the country from economic ruin in 1922, and in his endeavours to unite the Austrian population under his patriotic banner. As important is the inspiration he provided for the more comprehensive patriotic campaign of the 1930s (the subject of the next chapter). The other side of Seipel’s legacy was his uncompromising anti-Socialist stance, and push towards authoritarianism, which undermined his oft-repeated desire to achieve a unity of purpose in Austrian society. Seipel displayed an increasing hostility towards Social Democracy in the 1920s and expressed support for the Fascist *Heimwehren*.\(^3\) Seipel hoped to recruit these for his authoritarian experiments, temper their excesses and ensure that they stay in the Austrian patriotic camp, rather than follow the path towards extreme German nationalism. By his anti-Socialist and anti-democratic behaviour, Seipel alienated a large section of the population and paved the way both for the civil war of 1934, and the experiment with authoritarian government under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg.

Although a negative perception of Austria’s economic situation can to a large extent explain why the Republic met with little enthusiasm in her early years, it cannot in itself illustrate the specific problems posed by the identification with an entity called ‘Austria’. To understand these and to set Seipel’s construct of Austrian identity in context, it is important to examine briefly the genealogy of the name ‘Austria’. Friedrich Heer’s assertion, that no other historical entity in Europe has been so tied to an identity problem as Austria,\(^4\) is well illuminated by the words of Viktor von Andrian-Werburg:
Austria is a purely imagined name, which means neither a distinct people nor a land or nation. It is a conventional name for a complex of clearly differentiated nationalities... There are Italians, Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, who together constitute the Austrian Empire. But there exists no Austria, no Austrian, no Austrian nationality, and, except for a span of land around Vienna, there never did. There are no attachments, no memories of centuries-old unity and greatness, no historical ties which knit the various peoples of one and the same state together – the history of Austria is, all in all, small and sparse in factual material. None of these peoples is so much superior to any other in numbers, intelligence, or preponderant influence and wealth as to make it possible for any one to absorb the others in time.\(^5\)

The above quotation from the 1840s shows that, even many decades before the advent of the First Republic, 'Austria' was difficult to define. It corresponded neither with a distinct historic territory nor with nationality. The idea of Austria – and it was often more of an idea than a tangible reality – was inextricably linked to its ruling dynasty: first the Babenbergs, then the Habsburgs.

'Austria' as a name begins its history at the end of the tenth century as Ostarrichi, a vernacular term for the march and border area of the Carolingian Empire connected with the bishopric of Freising. In 1156 this land, referred to as Austriae ducatus, was promoted to a duchy by the
privilium minus, and covered the area roughly corresponding today with
the two Länder of Upper and Lower Austria. After the Habsburgs took
power as dukes of Austria in 1276, the duchy was soon known as dominium
Austriae, which was more frequently understood as meaning the dynasty
than as a collective term for the territory. By the late Middle Ages, the term
‘House of Austria’ (Haus Österreich) was in common usage.6

While the Habsburgs acquired more territories to add to the duchy of
Austria above and below the Enns, which later became two separate
duchies, their total family holdings lacked an official collective name.
Habsburgs became dukes of Styria, princely counts of Tyrol, kings of
Bohemia and Hungary, but no title existed to denote the ruler of the sum of
the kingdoms and crownlands. Grete Klingenstein has shown that the
eighteenth century saw attempts to give some legal definition to the term
Austria. For example, the Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana of 1768 used
the name to cover all the German hereditary lands, including Bohemia, as
one legal unit.7 These, of course, formed only part of the Habsburg lands.
What is more, ‘Austria’ was still widely used at the time to refer to the
duchy alone. The only unity the combined territories of the Monarchy
enjoyed was implied by the term Haus Österreich, although the name
Austria was employed in the laconic parlance of diplomacy.8

On 11 August 1804, as the moribund Holy Roman Empire was
approaching its demise, Franz issued a patent styling himself Emperor of
Austria. Well aware that his existing title of Holy Roman Emperor had no
more than theoretical significance, he wished to bestow upon himself the
same dignity enjoyed by the emperors of France and Russia. While the
patent finally seemed to give concrete definition and cohesion to the entirety of the Habsburg lands, in fact it referred only to the Emperor and did not mention the name of the state he ruled. The term ‘Austria’ remained a designation of the Monarchy’s ruling house, rather than a legal name for the empire as a whole.

Ernst Bruckmüller argues that, in 1848, the concept of ‘Austria’ continued to possess more than one meaning. It could be understood first as the two archduchies of Upper and Lower Austria; secondly, as the whole Monarchy; thirdly, as envisaged by the Pillersdorf constitution of that year, as the Monarchy minus Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia. It was only following the octroyed constitution of March 1849, which referred to ‘the united and indivisible Empire of Austria’, that the Monarchy, now under a strongly centralised government, received an official and legal name. A decade later, the Silvester Patent was declared valid for the entire ‘Austrian Imperial Hereditary Monarchy’.

The idea of a unified state under the name ‘Austria’ was short-lived. The Ausgleich with Hungary of 1867 split the Empire into two distinct halves. The lands that constituted the kingdom of Hungary were no longer part of Austria. Meanwhile, the non-Hungarian lands, although referred to conventionally as Austria, were sometimes collectively called Cisleithania, but officially bore the cumbersome name of ‘the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat’ (Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder). It was not until towards the end of the First World War that the last Emperor, Karl, officially designated the territories of Cisleithania as Austria. Throughout the whole of the dualist period the ruler of the House
of Habsburg continued to employ the title ‘Emperor of Austria’ even though, *de jure*, an Austrian empire did not exist.

The shifting meaning of the term ‘Austria’ returns us to the quotation from Andrian-Werburg. When he claimed that Austria was ‘a purely imagined name’, he understood that it was far more a dynastic idea than a real state. The only continuity running throughout the history of the name is that of the ruling house. France existed as the land of the French, the nascent Germany as the land of the Germans; Austria, by contrast, was not the land of the Austrians, but that of the House of Austria. This fact must have had a highly significant impact on the question of Austrian identity. For whereas a French, German or Hungarian nation clearly existed, an Austrian one did not. The Monarchy was home to Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Slovenes, Poles, Serbs, Croats, Ruthenians, Romanians, Jews, but who were the Austrians? Were they inhabitants of the original duchies, of the Monarchy as a whole, or of Cisleithania? One could even argue that no Austrians existed at all; even Franz Joseph once famously insisted that he was a German prince.

It is commonly said that those who felt themselves to be truly ‘Austrian’ were to be found in the imperial army and the large civil service.\(^\text{11}\) These Austrians, irrespective of nationality, were those who ranked their allegiance to the state and the dynasty above that to a particular nationality. Ernst Bruckmüller writes of an ‘Austrian national consciousness’ amongst the ‘*Hofratsnation*’ of the bureaucracy.\(^\text{12}\) At a time when the political and social organisation of the Monarchy still favoured the Germans, traditionally the *Staatsvolk* (state-people) of Cisleithania, they had less
cause to pursue a national agenda along the lines of the other nationalities.\textsuperscript{13} For this reason they felt the strongest attachment to the idea of Austria. Moreover, the rabid German nationalism of Georg von Schönerer and his party, although vociferous, found only a faint echo amongst the German population at large, and these Pan-Germans gained a mere token representation in the \textit{Reichsrat}.\textsuperscript{14}

A common Austrian identity as a centripetal factor in the western half of the Monarchy became ever weaker as national tension increased throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Quarrels over the right to ‘national’ education and the use of different languages in the bureaucracy, issues in which the other nationalities justifiably felt disadvantaged compared to the Germans, developed into conflict, particularly in the ethnically mixed areas such as Bohemia. Here, for example, the Germans obstinately defended their position against the demands of the Czechs and, consequently, German nationalism strengthened to the detriment of the supranational Austrian idea. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the \textit{Ausgleich} of 1867, the last major constitutional attempt to settle the nationality problems in the Monarchy, relied on the hegemony of Germans and Hungarians in their respective halves of the Empire. Franz Joseph, tired of experiment and wary of Magyar opposition, refused to entertain any more major constitutional changes that might have given other nationalities of Cisleithania the same opportunities as those enjoyed by the Germans. The proposed ‘trialist’ solution, for instance, in which the Czech lands would have been promoted to the same status as Austria and Hungary, and which was favoured by the
heir apparent, Franz Ferdinand, was destined to remain on paper. When Karl, in a last-ditch attempt to save the Empire at the end of the war, announced that he would transform Austria into a free federation of the various nationalities, it was too late. Leaders of the various nationalities had already prepared for a future outside the Monarchy. For the Austrian Germans, excepting those who shared Schönerer’s vision of a politically united Protestant German nation under Hohenzollern leadership, there was much more reason to maintain the Monarchy. Only within the Habsburg Empire could they hope to preserve the status they enjoyed as the *Staatsvolk* of Cisleithania.

The historical associations of Austria outlined above reveal the framework within which constructs of ‘Austrianness’ — *Österreichertum* — would have to be built in the 1920s. Before observing how Seipel approached the problem of *Österreichertum* in the post-imperial setting, we will examine his theoretical work, *Nation und Staat*, and Otto Bauer’s *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (The Nationality Question and Social Democracy), both of which reveal how either man understood the concepts of nation and state. Seipel’s 1916 publication, like Bauer’s, addresses the nationality problem of the Monarchy. The theoretical parameters that Seipel draws, however, are equally applicable to his formulation of Austrian identity in the inter-war era: the paradigms elaborated in *Nation und Staat* are distinctly echoed in his ‘Austrian’ propaganda of the 1920s. Bauer’s work, which antedates Seipel’s by almost a decade, presents the Social Democratic blueprint for the future of the Monarchy, largely based on the work of Karl Renner. The War destroyed
Bauer’s belief in the potential virtues of the Habsburg Empire, however, and led him to view with suspicion such Österreichertum as espoused by Seipel.\textsuperscript{16}

**The Theoretical Background**

When *Nation und Staat* appeared in print, Seipel, who had been Professor of Moral Theology at the University of Salzburg since 1909, was serving as military chaplain of the Salzburg Reserve Hospital. At the time he had no direct involvement in politics, although his association with the Catholic *Leo-Gesellschaft*, of which he was a director, brought him into contact with such figures as Heinrich Lammasch, advisor to Franz Ferdinand.

Seipel’s fundamental premise in his work is that *Nation* and *Staat* are two distinct concepts. This was at odds with the theory underpinning ‘nation states’ such as Britain and France, where the idea of the nation was held to be a political one and thus co-terminous with the state. Seipel saw the nation as a cultural, rather than political community – what we have chosen to label as *Kulturnation* – and he called the nation an imprecise concept.\textsuperscript{17} For him the nation defined itself not simply in racial or linguistic terms, but more importantly as the product of historical development. The word Seipel employs is ‘Schicksalsgemeinschaft’, or community of destiny. While he admitted that a certain number of shared physiological factors based on a common ancestry were necessary to forge a cultural community out of a large number of people, it was not this *per se* which created the nation.
Seipel insisted that the common destiny was the process whereby the fusion took place. The character traits deemed to be the property of a nation were to a certain extent a result of similar physiological features, but more importantly a consequence of Schicksalsgemeinschaft. In the same way Seipel argued that the existence of a uniform linguistic community could be explained only partly by biological descent from people speaking the same tongue. It was rather the shared Schicksal which had the decisive influence over the creation of a national language. Seipel concluded that the nation was a mass of people of more or less similar elements, welded together by a common destiny to form a unity of culture and language.18

The ideas presented by Bauer were similar. He observed that confusion over the concept of the nation resulted from the idea that the nation state was a political ideal. In Imperial Germany, he remarked, the word ‘nation’ was used to refer to the territory of the German state; this was a definition which Bauer rejected.19 He also dismissed Renan’s theory of the nation as insufficient. It was not correct, Bauer argued, that all people who belonged (and wanted to belong) to a political entity formed a nation. The example of Austria disproved this theory. It was also false to imply that all those who belonged to a nation wanted political unity for it. Bauer remarked that the Germans of Switzerland and Austria did not want to realise the dream of German unity.20

Like Seipel, Bauer insisted that the nation was a natural and a cultural community, forged together by a common history (Bauer also employs the term Schicksalsgemeinschaft).21 He thought it important to emphasise the cultural aspect, as it prevented a mere racial understanding of the nation.
The distinctness of Germans and Czechs, in spite of centuries of interbreeding, proved the fallacy of the racial definition.²² Bauer elaborated his ‘system’ of the elements of a nation as follows: a common history was the impulse for the nation; a common culture and ancestry were the means by which this took shape; and a common language was the means of conveying a common culture.²³

Seipel saw the state as a product of a parallel development to that of the nation: ‘...I define the state as the sum of the peoples, tribes, families and individuals who consolidated a Schicksalgemeinschaft, on the basis of a common territory, into a lasting political unit of the highest order.’²⁴ Like Bauer, he noted that the difference between nation and state was that the former constituted a cultural community, the latter a political one. Seipel made a clear distinction between the two, demonstrating that one can have an allegiance to and love for both, without the boundaries of nation and state necessarily coinciding. Working with his particular view of the nation, Seipel rejected the idea of the ‘nation state’, arguing that it was neither possible to have a state which was purely homogenous in national terms, nor one which contained all members of a particular nation. He used the example of the Balkans to highlight his point, and concluded that ‘...delimitation by nationality is the most problematic and least favourable for the state.’²⁵

For Seipel, the supranational state represented a superior framework for the political organisation of people. A multinational state bridged the gaps between various peoples and allowed them to learn to understand one another, in order that national ideals should become subordinated to higher
ones. This theory had a clear contemporary relevance given the highly-charged nationalist sentiments of wartime. Seipel’s idealised state would foster national reconciliation rather than hostility, thus preventing the kind of catastrophe which afflicted Europe between 1914 and 1918.

Seipel observed that the supranational state was compatible with a strong attachment to one’s nation. He enthusiastically professed himself to be a member of the German nation. He wrote, ‘The Ostmark in the south, as well as the two Prussias in the north, not to mention what lies in-between, are true parts of Germany, if one understands this word in the natural sense as the land of the Germans.’ Seipel was proud to be German and at the same time a loyal subject of the Habsburg Monarchy. He emphasised that nation and state were of equal importance to the individual. He welcomed nationale Gesinnung, or national-mindedness, but differentiated it from nationalism. He condemned the latter as the erroneous conviction that membership of a nationality was the greatest human possession.

As an example of the advantages of the multinational state, Seipel pointed to how Austria was able to guarantee Polish national rights in a way which neither Germany nor Russia could. Citing 1848 and the revolutionary era, Bauer reiterated how the ‘non-historic’ nations had not wished for the Empire’s downfall, but her preservation, as a means of protection from the ‘historic’ nations. Seipel also argued that, were the Austrian-Germans to join the German Empire, the only benefit would be that Germany would gain a few million more citizens. The loss for Europe as a whole, however, would be immense. He also remarked how the other nationalities in Austria could benefit from their contact with the German language and culture.
Likewise, the German nation had the advantage of being able to look into ‘foreign worlds’. ³¹

Seipel’s universalist outlook was underscored by his Catholic faith. Like the Monarchy, the Catholic Church transcended national, but also state boundaries. Seipel recalled the example of the Roman Empire, which had compensated vanquished peoples for their loss of ‘national’ independence by conferring on them Roman citizenship. The supranational ideal, he added, was revived under Charlemagne, who had given political unity to a family of nations already united religiously under the cloak of Catholicism. ³² From this we infer that Seipel’s vision was not merely of a successful Danubian Monarchy, but of a unified Europe. This view is reinforced by his endorsement of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European movement.

Encouraged by the introduction in January 1907 of universal manhood suffrage for Reichsrat elections in Cisleithania, the Social Democrats supported the continued existence of the Habsburg Monarchy at least until the outbreak of the First World War. Karl Renner, to whom Bauer refers in his work by the nom-de-plume Rudolf Springer, was a particular enthusiast of the multinational state. ³³ He declared that the nation state idea was moribund, and that the trend was moving towards the multinational state, citing the British Empire as an example. ³⁴ Renner argued, moreover, that the multinational state could address the nationality problem in a way in which the small national state could not. ³⁵

Renner formulated an ingenious proposal to reform the Monarchy. He advocated the principle of personal, as opposed to territorial, autonomy,
thereby cleverly detaching the national issue from the struggle between centralism and federalism. Political and national issues were to be separated; the nationalities would be responsible for cultural and national affairs, which could operate on an extra-territorial basis. The state would be organised on two principles, economic and ethnic, which meant that the population, too, would be organised dually. They would belong to one of the eight self-governing ‘Gubernia’, with which Renner planned to replace the existing crownlands, as well as to one of the eight nationalities.  

Irrespective of where an individual resided, therefore, matters relating specifically to his nationality were administered by the national body. In theory, the blueprint provided a strong guarantee of national rights and equality.

Robert Kann suggests that the Renner plan contained too much in the way of social reform to be acceptable to the crown. It was criticised for being too complex, and it is arguable that it was conceived too late in the day to solve the nationality problem. Even within the Austrian Social Democratic Party there was not universal acceptance of Renner’s proposals. They met with opposition from the Marxist left, but also from some Slavs, mainly Czechs. Renner’s programme still implied German cultural leadership in Austria, and he suggested German as the language of mediation and communication at the highest level of government. He also made frequent reference to the idea of the German cultural mission.

In Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, Bauer showed his support for the Renner programme, which he outlined in detail. He took a particular angle, examining the national conflict within the framework of
Marxist thinking. For Bauer, the problem was only a small part of the larger social question which the development of capitalism had produced for all European peoples. For example, the dominance of Germans in the dualist era reflected the class inequality of the Empire. In opposition to their oppressors, workers developed a strong national feeling. The result of this national radicalism was that workers were incapable of collaborating with their comrades of other nationalities. National autonomy, therefore, had to become the constitutional programme of all workers.

Seipel was aware that the Monarchy could not survive the war without considerable internal reform. A year after the appearance of Nation und Staat, he published Gedanken zur österreichischen Verfassungsreform, in which he set out his plans to resolve the nationality problem. Following the line of argument of Nation und Staat, Seipel rejected the division of the Empire into national territories. Instead, like Renner, he advocated the personal principle of nationality. Just as all Protestants or Catholics formed a religious community, he observed, all members of a nationality formed a national community, irrespective of where they lived. Seipel followed Renner's division of competences between the national bodies and the central government. He advocated, furthermore, that the number of representatives in Parliament from each nationality should be fixed in advance and correspond with the percentage of the Monarchy's subjects that a particular nationality constituted.

As well as being devoted to the Habsburg tradition, Seipel was convinced of the practical advantages of the Monarchy's continued existence. Europe needed Austria, he believed, and Austria still had a
European mission, a universal, pacifistic one as a counter-weight to nationalism. Seipel remained loyal to the dynasty until the end, accepting a post in the last Imperial Cabinet under Heinrich Lammasch. A text issued to officials in his ministry – Social Welfare – contained the following:

Understand that in this serious hour I entered the Government and thus also your ranks, above all as a declaration of my belief in Austria... I hope... it will be my colleagues' and my own privilege... not to liquidate the company Austria, but to prove its vitality once more.45

An Unviable State?

When the Monarchy collapsed, Austria as a centuries-old imperial idea vanished overnight, as did the ruling house that had provided the focus for an 'Austrian' identity. What remained, once the other nationalities had elected for severance from the old Empire, was a core group of Alpine crownlands with a predominantly German-speaking population,46 which corresponded to a large extent with the so-called hereditary lands (Erblande) of the House of Habsburg.47 Otto Bauer commented:

German-Austria is not an entity which has evolved organically. It is merely what was left of the old Empire once the other nationalities had broken away. It remains a loose bundle of provinces [Länder] whose feeling of belonging
together politically and whose economic foundation was
destroyed by the collapse of the old Empire and the former
economic area... The liquidation of the old Empire deprived
a large number of German-Austrians of their function and
thus also removed the economic basis for their existence. 48

Such an assessment reflected the lack of a natural collective identity for the
rump state.

Within Austria, it was widely believed that the Republic was in a
parlous economic state. The ratio of arable land to forests and mountainous
areas was low. Providing sufficient food for the two million inhabitants of
Vienna, without grain and meat from Hungary, was consequently a difficult
task. 49 The peasantry of the Länder, upon whom the capital now depended
even more, compounded the problem by trying to withhold any food
reserves which they may have had. 50 Francis Carsten has unearthed several
documents showing the nutritional privations suffered by the Viennese in
the fifteen months following the armistice, including one which observed
that children were receiving no more than 800 calories per day. 51 In
addition, Austria had lost 99 per cent of her former hard coal deposits and
90 per cent of her lignite. 52 Carsten cites sources reporting how some
Viennese chopped up their doors and stripped bark off the trees in the parks
to heat their 'ice-cold' homes. 53

Some recent appraisals of the Austrian inter-war economy have
presented a picture that takes issue with the prevailing image of
unviability. 54 The mass hunger, shortages of fuel and general economic
dislocation which the break-up of the Monarchy occasioned was not unique to Austria amongst the successor states. Stefan Karner concedes that the problem of food supply was not relieved until the 1930s.\textsuperscript{55} He shows, however, that in other areas, the Austrian Republic had been more fortunate in its share of the Monarchy's material inheritance. It possessed 90 per cent of the Empire's automobile industry, 83 per cent of its locomotive production, 75 per cent of the rubber industry, 74 per cent of the railway carriage production, 35 per cent of the iron and steel production, and 34 per cent of the production of agricultural machinery.\textsuperscript{56} Komlos notes, moreover, that the infrastructure of the new state had been untouched by the ravages of the War, while Austria could also boast a skilled labour force, and institutes for technical training.\textsuperscript{57} Berger concludes that, once the international exchange of goods and services was re-established, the Austrian economy was better off than those of all the other successor states apart from Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{58}

In spite of these interesting conclusions, one cannot escape the fact that the major political parties thought and acted on the basis that the Austrian Republic was an unviable entity. Given the strong links between perception and identity outlined in the introduction, this is significant. It had been hoped that the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, granted to the other nationalities of the Monarchy, would be extended to Austria. The argument of unviability was used to reinforce the expressed aim of union with Germany. On 12 November 1918, the Provisional National Assembly passed a resolution stating that \textit{Deutschösterreich} (German-Austria, the name chosen for the state) was a part of the German Republic.\textsuperscript{59} Between
February 27 and March 2 1919, Otto Bauer, as Austrian Foreign Minister, held negotiations with his German counterpart over the possible incorporation of Austria into Weimar Germany. 60

No negotiation was permitted in Paris, however. Article 81 of the Treaty of St. Germain strictly prohibited Anschluss. What is more, the Allies rejected the name chosen for the new state, insisting that the prefix Deutsch be dropped, to make it simply ‘Austria’. Bauer commented that ‘the imperialism of the foreign powers forced the hated name of Austria on us’. 61 Karl Renner, the first Chancellor of the Republic, later wrote that to call the state Austria was ahistorical. 62 The enforced change of name hid the one element of identity which, it could be argued, the vast majority of its citizens had in common: they were ethnically German. According to Bauer, the name Deutschösterreich was supposed to signify that the Republic was not a successor to the Monarchy, but that it only claimed the German areas. 63

The extent to which pessimism about the future of Austria was due to the psychological effects of losing the War, the loss of Empire, or to increased German national feeling, cannot be determined with any precision, but I have no doubt that these factors all played a part. Apart from Wilhelm Miklas, the future president, the deputies of the Provisional National Assembly had voted unanimously for the 12 November motion incorporating German-Austria into Germany. In the immediate aftermath of the War it seemed as if nobody was willing to accept an independent rump Austria.
For the Pan-German party, the issue seemed relatively straightforward. Their programme stated that *Anschluss* was the chief, almost unique, goal of the Party, to which every other consideration must be subordinated. Once union was realised, the Party and its programme would be superfluous.\(^{64}\)

The reality of the international political situation, however, led them to adopt a more constructive approach to the Austrian state, until the time came when *Anschluss* might be a possibility. While, particularly in the early years of the Republic, they maintained their propaganda in favour of *Anschluss*, they also entered government in coalition with the Christian-Social Party. A bourgeois bloc was thus formed which kept the Social Democrats out of power. The Pan-Germans' co-operation included supporting the Geneva loans in 1922 to reconstruct Austria's economy, even though the price of these was a reconfirmation of the *Anschluss* ban. While the Versailles system remained in place, political considerations overrode national ones.

Alfred Low observes that the movement for *Anschluss* was, in 1918-19, under Socialist auspices.\(^{65}\) Bauer confirms this.\(^{66}\) Within Social Democracy, as Hans Haas maintains, it was Otto Bauer himself who was the engine for *Anschluss*.\(^{67}\) The principles of Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, which showed a clear preference for the multinational state over the nation state, seemed to have been blown away by the War. Citing a speech from the end of October 1918, however, Haas notes that Bauer's drive for union with Germany was motivated by economic, rather than political or national considerations.\(^{68}\) Yet it is unlikely that the national
motive was entirely absent. Like Seipel, Bauer's views on nationhood had not changed: both considered themselves to be German.

Haas argues that the Anschluss idea made little headway amongst the workers, and he suggests that the Social Democrats may have publicly supported union in part to attract middle-class voters. The Treaty of St. Germain wrecked Bauer's Anschluss policy, and he resigned as Foreign Minister in July 1919. According to Low, the Pan-German idea gradually waned in Social Democratic propaganda from this point. Although on paper the Party kept Anschluss in its programme until 1933, it made no attempt to interfere with the state's integrity or sovereignty after 1919. On the contrary, Austrian Labour's role in ensuring a smooth transition from Monarchy to Republic and its major contribution to the design of the constitution of 1920, suggests a commitment to the Republic that counter-balances the Anschluss propaganda.

The Christian Social Party had a less uniform position on Anschluss than their voting of 12 November might suggest. A faction within the Party, led by Seipel, preferred the idea of a Danubian federation with the other successor states, and adopted a cool attitude towards Anschluss. Leopold Kunschak, leader of the Christian Social trade unions, said that a third group within the Party favoured a different option. In addition to the pro-Anschluss faction, which obtained most of its support from the Länder, and the supporters of a Danube federation whose centre of gravity was Vienna, there were those -- primarily Tyroleans -- who advocated the creation of a Catholic South German state.
Although proposals for a Danubian federation fizzled out with the formation of the Little Entente, the Seipel wing of the Party retained its lack of appetite for Anschluss. It was the natural home of the monarchist elements amongst the Christian Socials, for whom union with Germany was incompatible with the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty. The faction’s influence within the Party as a whole increased when Seipel became deputy chairman in October 1919, and Party leader in June 1921.

Whereas Seipel articulated the narrative of Austria as an unviable state before the League of Nations in 1922, at home he had been consistent in his positive attitude towards the country. For the Christmas edition of the Kärntner Tagblatt in 1919, he penned an essay entitled ‘Christmas Wishes – Hopes for the Future’, in which he encouraged a more optimistic outlook:

[Austria] will continue to live, but only if she wants to survive; for in fact only one danger threatens us, the danger that her own children will lose their belief in the future... If Austria is not to perish, then being an Austrian must be made something of value... 77

At the end of 1920, he reiterated his positive belief in Austria’s future, saying it was wrong to talk only of Austria’s poverty since both her agriculture and industry showed great potential. Given the right circumstances the Republic would be able to compete with almost every other country in the world, he forecast. 78 Three years later, Seipel was still urging each Austrian ‘to have a positive attitude towards the state, to love
the people and to prove one's hope for the future of both of these through one's actions.\textsuperscript{79}

In his inaugural speech as Chancellor, on 31 May 1922, Seipel noted that there had been many who had never believed in the viability of Austria from the start. Since that time more had adopted this view. Seipel asserted that he was not amongst the pessimists; to work for the Republic one had to believe in its viability. He stated that the question of Austria's viability was closely tied to the degree to which people in Austria emphasised the necessity of \textit{Anschluss}.\textsuperscript{80} By this he meant that the campaign for union with Germany was fuelled by the apparent hopelessness of Austria's situation, but also that \textit{Anschluss} propaganda necessarily created a negative attitude towards Austria, thereby lessening her chances of survival.

\textbf{The Austrian Mission and Seipel's Construct of Austrian Identity}

We have noted above how both Seipel and Bauer drew a distinction between the nation and the state in their respective writings. It has also been observed how they considered themselves to be German. Where a gulf existed between the two, however, was in their identification with a concept of \textit{Österreichertum}. In the context of this study, \textit{Österreichertum} is not composed of an objective set of elements, of which citizenship of Austria would be an integral one. It refers here to a construct whose content is to a large extent defined by the individual, thereby according with the self-prescriptive nature of identity outlined in the introduction to this thesis.
Die österreichische Revolution is very revealing of Bauer’s attitude towards the concepts of Österreichtum and Deutschtum. He saw the two as competing poles of identification, which had been struggling for the soul of the German bourgeoisie in Austria for almost two centuries.\textsuperscript{81} Before World War I the struggle was symbolised by the figures of Karl Lueger and Georg von Schönerer. In the Republic, according to Bauer, the old Austrian tradition survived amongst the Viennese patricians and petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry of the Alps, whereas the German tradition lived on amongst the intelligentsia, as well as the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry of the border areas.\textsuperscript{82}

Bauer extended the association of Österreichtum with old Austrian tradition to monarchist factions in the Republic.\textsuperscript{83} These, as we have seen, were concentrated in Seipel’s wing of the Christian Social Party. Bauer saw parliamentary ratification of the Geneva loans (which the Social Democrats had opposed due to the foreign control that would be imposed over the Austrian economy) as an overwhelming victory for Österreichtum over Deutschtum in the soul of the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{84} The authority which foreign ‘capitalist’ governments obtained over Austria also freed the Austrian bourgeoisie from the control of the proletariat, Bauer wrote.\textsuperscript{85} It is clear that, in his eyes, Österreichtum had purely negative connotations, and was linked with the forces of reaction. For them it had disappeared with the Empire.

The Social Democrats did, therefore, design an alternative construct of identity based on the ideas associated with Österreichtum. Instead they took as their focus the republican state form and the 1920 constitution,
which had chiefly been the work of the legal expert and Social Democrat, Hans Kelsen. In its final form the constitution represented a compromise between centralists and Land particularism. Austria became a federal state, which had not been Kelsen’s original intention. He had concluded from constitutional law which had been issued in ‘German-Austria’ that the state had been conceived as centralistic and unified, and that all decisions made by regional assemblies were consequently irrelevant. Paragraph two of the constitutional law of 30 October 1918, he pointed out, said that legislative power was exercised by the Provisional National Assembly. There was no provision in this law for competing alternative or competing legislative bodies.

The fact the Social Democrats were the most ardent supporters of a centralist state structure meant that they championed a unified Republic with a single political identity over a fragmented one with competing identities. In spite of the federal principle, the constitution made Austria a political entity and endowed her with a republican identity. In their Linz Programme of 1926 the Social Democrats reaffirmed their loyalty to the Republic, and called on the workers to help defend it against the forces of reaction.

Unlike Bauer, Seipel saw no conflict between the concepts of Österreichtum and Deutschum. On the contrary, he articulated the duality of Austrian identity, i.e. Austrian and German, by reiterating the ideas he had expressed in Nation und Staat. In Berlin in 1926, Seipel illustrated the different concept of the nation in western Europe, where talk of the German nation elicited fears of Anschluss. He added that the Austrians were
frequently criticised for their lack of national feeling. Such a reproach, said Seipel, ignored the fact that the Austrians combined loyalty to a far larger nation with an allegiance to their state. Independence, he insisted, did not make the Austrians any less national-minded than Germans in the Reich; the Austrians lived in a German state. Addressing a domestic audience Seipel admitted his doubts over whether the German national ideal was best served by following the model of the western European states. The German nation remained for the Austrians the great cultural community to which they belonged, but a Greater-German state need not be their goal. In a speech delivered in Paris in June 1926, entitled ‘Austria as she really is’, Seipel explained that neither the German word ‘Volk’ nor the imported word ‘Nation’ had anything to do with citizenship, but were more akin to the term ‘race’. He then referred the French audience to the book he had written ten years previously, in which they would find the German interpretations of nation and state.

The arguments Seipel had presented for the preservation of the Monarchy in Nation und Staat could therefore be used to reject the Anschluss solution. In an article for the Reichspost in November 1918, he remarked that the German-Austrians were used to being part of a large state. This legacy would inspire them to look in all directions, in an attempt to become an equal partner in a larger federation. While Seipel admitted that the cultural and ethnic ties with Germany made Anschluss appear an attractive solution, he noted that no final decision in favour of union could be made, as it was not yet clear to the Austrians how they could best serve the German people. In an essay entitled ‘The New State and its
Construction According to the Christian Social Programme’, Seipel explained that Anschluss would be compensation for the large territorial losses facing Germany at the Peace Settlement, and that union might provide salvation for the collapsed Austrian economy. He wondered, however, whether such hopes would prove to be deceptive. He posed the question ‘...where does our true cultural task lie?’, and concluded that Austria’s best hopes lay in a Danubian federation, which might eventually include Germany.\(^93\)

Seipel frequently expressed this preference for a larger state unit, comprising the successor states of the Monarchy. Comments that appeared nominally to support the Anschluss idea arose from his belief that a settlement of the German question was fundamental to lasting peace in Europe.\(^94\) His opposition to the creation of a Greater Germany was, therefore, not contradicted by the comment that both Anschluss and Danubian federation should be the long-term aims of the Austrians.\(^95\) In a wider perspective Seipel supported the idea of a united Europe, evinced by his endorsement of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropa movement.\(^96\) Seipel was in fact President of the Austrian committee. His response to the question ‘Do you think the creation of a United States of Europe necessary and possible?’, which appeared in the movement’s journal in 1925, was decidedly positive. He affirmed that the transformation of Europe into a unified economic zone, which could be followed by political union when the Europeans were ripe for such a move, was necessary to guarantee world peace. A United States of Europe was also a possibility if European statesmen could revise their concept of the state and show sufficient open-
mindedness. In 1929, Seipel gave a lecture in which he emphasised that Austria’s future was inextricably linked to Europe and reiterated his positive attitude towards the idea of a United States of Europe.

We have seen that support for Anschluss came not only from the Social Democrats and Pan-Germans, but also from within Seipel’s own party. Insisting on their rights of autonomy, some of the Länder threatened Austria’s integrity by attempting to secede. In a plebiscite held in Vorarlberg in 1921, about 80 per cent of voters opted for union with Switzerland, although the Swiss prudently refused to negotiate with the province while it remained under Austrian sovereignty. Otto Ender, Governor of Vorarlberg and later Chancellor, had expressed the view that geographically and racially, the Land was far closer to Switzerland than Austria. Similarly, Salzburg and Tyrol had unilaterally opted for Anschluss to Germany. In a Christmas article for the Reichspost in 1921, Seipel showed understanding for the independent actions of the Länder. He noted that the plebiscites had been a frustrated reaction to the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of St. Germain. He asserted, however, that before any revision of the Treaty was possible, it was necessary to ‘strengthen the Austrian variety of Deutschum, Deutschösterreichertum [German-Austrianness], and to consolidate its individuality...’

Publicly, tacit support for Anschluss pacified both a section of Christian Social voters and the Pan-Germans, who were coalition partners for most of the 1920s. Abroad it could act as a warning to the international community of the possible consequences, should Austria remain in her precarious economic state. At Geneva in 1922, for example, Seipel invoked
the spectre of Anschluss in the hope that this might help persuade those present to grant Austria the financial credits she was seeking. As noted above, he told the League that Austria in her present state was not a viable entity. If Austria were to collapse, a vacuum would appear in the heart of Europe which would suck in her neighbours and upset the artificially sustained balance between them. Seipel concluded:

...before the people of Austria perish in their prison, they will do everything to free themselves from the barriers and chains which restrain and oppress them. The League of Nations must ensure that this can happen without shattering the peace and without spoiling the relationships between Austria's neighbours.¹⁰⁵

At a deeper level, however, Anschluss ran counter to the role Seipel envisaged for the Austrians in post-war Europe. Austrian history had not ended with 1918, he asserted. The past revealed other critical breaks, such as Austria's exclusion from a possible Greater German solution after 1866. He maintained that this had been no fault of the Habsburgs. Austria could not have given up her ties with the other nationalities of the Monarchy for the sake of the German nation state, as this would have meant renouncing her 'mission' and betraying the Austrian idea.¹⁰⁶ This mission, he explained elsewhere, had been handed down to the Austrian-Germans from history. First, the task had been to defend Christian-western culture from the invaders in the east. Subsequently it had been the cultural integration into
the European system of the peoples settled in the east. Finally, Austria’s mission was the political and economic concentration of the Danube Basin, a process not yet complete. 107

Rather than interpreting 1918 as a complete break with the past, therefore, Seipel drew lines of continuity with the Monarchy. He asserted that Austria had kept faith with her idea after 1866, and could continue to do so in the post-war era. The collapse of the Monarchy need not consign the Austrian ‘mission’ to the dustbin of history. Seipel concluded that Austria’s present role was to be a country which maintained the friendliest of relationships with other states. She would always keep her doors open, exchanging not only material goods but also the spiritual and cultural richness she had developed in her past. 108 He argued that before any political reorganisation of central Europe could occur, the Austrians had to consider this historical role. 109

Seipel underlined his emphasis on historical continuity by avoiding references to the Republic, referring instead to the Austrian Vaterland. His choice of words was criticised by the Social Democratic opposition for its obvious connections with the past. 110 Seipel defended himself on the issue in a speech to Viennese Christian Socials in 1922. ‘Vaterland’, he explained, was a German word. It could be understood by those who loved their country, because it belonged to the people who had possessed the country in the past and who must continue to do so in the future. Out of love for the Fatherland, they were ready to endure sacrifices on its behalf. Seipel remarked that he was encouraged to find so many Austrians who approved
the use of the term, and hoped that these people would be prepared to collaborate for the sake of their common Fatherland.\textsuperscript{111}

The preference of ‘Fatherland’ over ‘Republic’ when referring to Austria was indicative of Seipel’s dislike of republican democracy. He had accommodated himself to the republican state form after the collapse of the Monarchy,\textsuperscript{112} but it is highly doubtful that he was committed to it in the long term. This became apparent towards the end of the decade when, disillusioned by the apparent impasse of parliamentary democracy in Austria, he advocated a more authoritarian form of government which weakened the power of the parties. He showed scant regard for democracy by public endorsement of the Heimwehr movement. Carsten has shown that, as far back as 1922, Seipel had tried to negotiate an arrangement whereby the Heimwehren would be financed by industrialists, channelling the funds through the Chancellor’s office. The negotiations failed due to the hostility on behalf of some Heimwehr elements towards the Christian Social Party.\textsuperscript{113} In 1928, a similar plan was successful.\textsuperscript{114}

In three lectures he delivered between December 1928 and July 1929,\textsuperscript{115} Seipel expressed his approval of the fact that the Heimwehren were not immediately linked to any political party and that they attracted members from all classes. For this reason, they were able to direct their loyalty towards the Austrian state. He also considered it important that the Social Democrats, with their paramilitary arm, should not enjoy exclusive control of the streets. One of the strongest driving forces of the Heimwehr movement, he claimed, was their quest for ‘true democracy’.\textsuperscript{116} ‘True democracy’ was the subject of the speech Seipel made in December 1928,
while in his Munich critique of democracy of January 1929, he declared that democracy was the best form of government, but only in its 'true' form. He added that not all people were 'sufficiently mature for democracy', and this led to disappointment with the system.\textsuperscript{117}

Seipel never gave concrete definition to the idea of 'true democracy', although it is clear that his language was influenced by the theories of corporatism which will be discussed in the next chapter. He showed reserve in embracing the more radical ideas of corporatism, warning that contemporary vocational groups had nothing in common with the mediaeval Stände. He did consider, however, that corporate representation was fundamental to reform of the state.\textsuperscript{118} In more practical terms, Seipel favoured expanding the powers of the President to cover emergency rule, while also supporting the notion that the President should be elected by the people, rather than by the members of the two houses.\textsuperscript{119} As we shall see in the following chapter, both of these propositions were incorporated into the constitutional reform of 1929.

The desire for an alternative to republican democracy is reflected in Seipel's construct of Österreichertum. His formulation of Austrian identity borrowed intellectually from the past and sat uncomfortably in the context of the modern state form which Austria had given herself after the War. We will see that it was in the framework of the backward-looking Ständestaat that these ideas of Austrian conservatism could best flourish.

Seipel's construct of Österreichertum affirmed the idea that the Austrians shared common experiences that set them apart from other Germans. Although Seipel denied that an Austrian nation existed, he
asserted that the Austrians were a *Volk* with a noble past and a distinct identity. In a lecture given in July 1929 entitled ‘The Austrian Idea’, he said that before the creation of humanity, ideas of people existed in God, among which was the idea of the Austrian (*der österreichische Mensch*). The Austrian became who he was because he lived according to the divine idea of Austria. To understand the Austrian idea, he explained, it was necessary to consider three factors: race, landscape and, most importantly, history.

Racially, the Austrian was a mixture of closely-related peoples of the ‘Indo-Germanic’ family. Geographically, Seipel claimed, present-day Austria had no natural boundaries. Together with the important presence of the Danube, into which all her rivers flowed, this fact had made Austria a natural thoroughfare and had consigned her historically to be a product of *Völkerwanderung* (the migration of the peoples).\(^\text{120}\)

Seipel gave further substance to his construct of Austrian identity by highlighting the country’s rich cultural tradition. He remarked that it was an important task of the universities to cultivate the Austrian elements within the framework of German culture, and thereby to enrich it.\(^\text{121}\) In his Paris speech cited above, Seipel highlighted Austrian achievements in both art and music, noting the strong individuality which had made them famous the world over. Austria’s artistic treasures had been produced independently of centuries of geopolitical changes, although her close connections with the rest of Germany, Italy, Bohemia and Hungary had allowed her to become a particularly fruitful centre of cultural achievement.\(^\text{122}\) To an Austrian audience Seipel said that the natural flow of culture and ideas across the country’s borders had been fundamental to the high level of artistic
achievement. It was not, he argued, just home-grown figures such as Mozart, Haydn and Strauss who had made Austria great in music. Her renown was due to the fact that others, such as Beethoven or Brahms, were able find their artistic home in Austria. State boundaries had never been cultural ones for Austria, and so it must remain in the future.\textsuperscript{123}

**Conclusion**

In his sociological study of Seipel, Ernst Karl Winter asserts that the contemporary significance of *Nation und Staat* has been overestimated by biographers.\textsuperscript{124} As noted in my introduction, many of the ideas of *Nation und Staat* can be found in German Romantic thought, particularly in the work of Herder.\textsuperscript{125} According to Winter, they were shared by all those with Greater-Austrian sympathies.\textsuperscript{126} We have also seen how Karl Renner and Otto Bauer published similar theories of nationality before Seipel’s work appeared in print. Furthermore, Winter contests the notion that Seipel was the great opponent of *Anschluss* he has been made out to be. He argues that it is impossible to tell whether Seipel’s support for the independence of Austria was out of regard for the peace treaties, or because he really believed in the historical necessity of several German states. Winter surmises that Seipel probably did not know the answer himself, which belies the assumption that he possessed a clear and definite conception of Austrian foreign policy. Seipel’s scholastic training allowed him to adopt a general policy of accommodation which, in its attempts to satisfy both sides, gave the Austrian Republic a reputation of characterlessness.\textsuperscript{127}
Seipel's formula of nation and state was not an innovation, but it was sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the post-imperial state of Austria. The programme of Bauer's Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, which was scientific, logical and full of practical detail, was made redundant by the collapse of the Monarchy. Seipel's Nation und Staat, although logically coherent, was more metaphysical in its approach and thus less dependent on detail for its impact. Bauer had supported the multinational state until the War changed his opinion, and Renner remained a Greater-Austrian until 1918. Seipel, on the other hand, did not abandon his Greater-Austrian sympathies when the Empire was liquidated. His attachment to the Monarchy and Austrian tradition prompted him to seek alternatives to Anschluss. Whereas the Social Democrats renounced the idea of a supranational state in favour of Greater Germany, Seipel saw both a Danubian federation and independence as preferable to the narrow nation state solution. The theory Seipel had adumbrated in 1916 continued to underpin his understanding of Austria in the 1920s. Winter notes that Seipel wanted to have Nation und Staat reprinted in 1929.128

Winter's judgement of Seipel must be seen from the perspective of the critic himself. As we will see in chapter four, Winter was one of few in the inter-war years who rejected the thesis that the Austrians were a German people, but took the highly unorthodox line at the time that they constituted a nation in their own right. He was, therefore, highly sceptical of any formulation of Austrian identity which emphasised the German element, and was vehemently opposed to Anschluss. Like Seipel, however, Winter highlighted the importance of Austria for Europe as a whole. Indeed he
admitted that the Chancellor’s real achievement was his evaluation of Austria’s position in Europe. On the other hand, the accusation that Seipel’s defence of Austrian independence in the face of Anschluss has been overestimated must at least partially be explained by the difference in the two men’s conceptions of Austrian identity.

Our starting point for examining Seipel’s construct of Austrian identity was the attitude of the three main political parties towards the Anschluss question. It was then shown that the ideas Seipel had formulated in Nation und Staat to defend the Habsburg Monarchy were revived in Republican Austria to produce the formula of dual allegiance to the German nation and Austrian state. Yet Seipel’s stance on Anschluss, though linked to his perception of Austrian identity, did not determine it exclusively. This is due to the fact that his formulation of Austrian identity transcended the narrow territorial and political boundaries of inter-war Austria. We have remarked on his preference for the word ‘Fatherland’ over ‘Republic’ when referring to Austria. We have also seen how he refused to interpret 1918 as the end of one history and the beginning of another. Thirdly, there are the frequent, often vague, references to Austria’s future in larger state units. They reflect a desire for the restoration of a central European empire in which Austrians would play a leading role. These all reveal that the Republican idea made little impression on Seipel’s understanding of Austria. To a large extent his construct of Österreichertum could exist independently of considerations of Anschluss for the very reason that it evaded the political realities of the time. It is true that Seipel carried out his day-to-day political responsibilities with a certain pragmatism and flexibility, showing that he could adapt
where necessary to the reality of the Republic. Intellectually, however, he preferred to ignore it altogether and seek refuge in the ideas and traditions of the past.

Seipel’s construct of Austrian identity begins with the premise that Österreichertum is a sub-national identity, a variant of Deutschtum. Nevertheless it is different from a regional or provincial one as it is linked to a much larger imperial idea. Paying little regard to the reality of the rump Austrian Republic, Seipel’s construct draws heavily, if not exclusively, on the Habsburg past. Austrian-Germans are presented as a people forged chiefly by dint of their common history, and by the special missions with which they had been charged in the Danube basin. The Austrians have also been shaped by their homeland, most importantly because it has been a crossroads offering contact with a wide variety of peoples. Their role as exchangers of culture, and their imperial experiences have made the Austrians into an open-minded people with a truly European outlook. It is also argued that they have developed an individual and rich culture. This has a German basis, but is shaped by contact with other nationalities through history.

Seipel’s importance to this study extends to the influence his ideas enjoyed after his death. Engelbert Dollfuss, who took Austria from parliamentary democracy to authoritarian government and who led the patriotic campaign of the 1930s, had been in contact with Seipel as far back as February 1919. We also know that he visited the prelate on his deathbed, an encounter which Klemens von Klemperer, who sees Dollfuss as Seipel’s spiritual heir, suggests was to influence the course of the
former’s policies. More importantly, Kurt von Schuschnigg openly acknowledged the importance of Seipel’s legacy to the ideology of the Ständestaat and the Vaterländische Front in a whole chapter of his book Dreimal Österreich. According to Ernst Hanisch, the success of the Geneva Protocols gave birth to a Seipel-myth in the Christian Social Party that projected a far stronger Austrian identity than before. He became known as the ‘Father of the Fatherland’, the man who had taught the people to believe in Austria. Certainly the propaganda of the authoritarian regime, which tirelessly promoted the idea of the Austrian mission and boasted that the Austrians were the best Germans, demonstrates that Seipel’s thinking was a principal inspiration behind the patriotic campaign of the 1930s.

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1 It has been argued that Seipel’s dominance of the Christian Social Party was even greater than Karl Lueger’s had been. See Bußhoff, pp. 56-57.
3 These will be discussed in detail in chapter three.
4 Heer, p. 9.
6 Zöllner, Erich, ‘Der Österreichbegriff. Aspekte seiner historischen Formen und Wandlungen’ in Was heißt Österreich?, p. 23. For more on the name Austria in the Middle Ages, see Lindner, Thomas, ‘Sprachwissenschaftliche Bemerkungen zu den Namen Österreich und Austria’ in Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur, 1997, Heft 1 (286), pp. 15-19.
8 Ibid., pp. 174, 176.
9 Ibid., p. 153.
10 Bruckmüller, Ernst, ‘Österreichbegriff und Österreichbewußtsein in der Franzisko-Josephinischen Epoche’ in ibid., p. 257.
12 Bruckmüller, Nation Österreich, pp. 91-92.
14 Schönerer’s party had 5 seats after the 1897 election. See ibid., p. 21.
15 The word ‘Germandom’ is sometimes used as an English equivalent of *Deutschtum*. While ‘Austrianness’ is not attractive, I think it beats Austriandom.

16 See, for example, Bauer, Otto, *Die österreichische Revolution*, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Vienna, 1923, p. 207.


18 Ibid., p. 6


20 Ibid., pp. 172-73.

21 Ibid., pp. 21-24.

22 Ibid., pp. 116-119.

23 Ibid., p. 131.

24 *Nation und Staat*, p. 9.


26 Ibid., p. 17.

27 Ibid., p. 47.

28 Ibid., p. 57.

29 Ibid., p. 70.

30 *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, p. 270.

31 *Nation und Staat*, pp. 88-89, 93.

32 Ibid., p. 12.

33 Bauer writes of how Renner advocated the Monarchy’s continued existence throughout the War. See *Die österreichische Revolution*, pp. 54-55.


36 The plan did not include Hungary, although Renner understood that the nationality problem in the other half of the Empire would have to be solved too. He believed, however, that such a radical transformation of Cisleithania would exert sufficient moral pressure on Hungary to reform.

37 Kann, Volume II, pp. 158-60.

38 Ibid., pp. 162-66.

39 *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, p. 239.

40 Ibid., p. 269.

41 Ibid., p. 302.

42 Ibid., p. 313.

43 Ibid., p. 319.


46 Michael John has noted that Carinthia contained just over 35,000 Slovenes. The Burgenland, which became part of Austria in 1922, is said to have had about 40,000 Croats and 10,000 Hungarians. See John, p. 45.

47 Georg Wagner has argued that a historical precedent for the First (and Second) Republic did exist. He refers back to the ‘Stato de Austria’ from 1500 as the basis of the twentieth-century Austrian Federal State. Wagner goes further in suggesting that a continuity exists from the sixteenth-century to the present. See Wagner, Georg, ‘Von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein’ in Wagner, Georg (ed.), *Österreich von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein. Studien und Ansprachen*, Verlag der österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, Vienna, 1982, pp. 109-16.

48 *Die österreichische Revolution*, p. 113.


52 Berger, p. 271.
55 Karner, p. 257.
56 Ibid., p. 255.
57 Komlos, p. 300.
58 Berger, p. 271.
59 See Die österreichische Revolution, p. 103.
61 Die österreichische Revolution, p. 159.
63 Die österreichische Revolution, p. 159.
65 Ibid., p. 17.
66 Die österreichische Revolution, p. 102.
68 Ibid., p. 37. See also Braunthal, p. 35.
69 Haas, pp. 39-40.
70 Low, p. 50.
71 The Linz Programme of 1926 stated that 'Social Democracy considers the Anschluss of German-Austria to the German Reich as a necessary conclusion of the national revolution of 1918.' Cited in Berchtold, Klaus (ed.), Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 1967, p. 264.
72 Seipel did not become a member of Parliament until after the elections of February 1919, so he had not participated in the Anschluss resolution of 12 November.
73 Renner observed that this seemed the main alternative to an independent Austria in October 1918, but that subsequent events made it an impossibility as far as the Provisional National Assembly was concerned. See Renner, p. 21.
74 See Low, p. 83.
75 Ibid., p. 92. Also cited in Renner, p. 39.
76 See Die österreichische Revolution, pp. 148-49.
77 Rennhofer, p. 192.
78 Reichspost, 25/12/20, p. 1.
79 Cited in Rennhofer, p. 390.
81 Die österreichische Revolution, p. 49.
82 Ibid., p. 50.
83 Ibid., pp. 148, 277.
84 Ibid., p. 270.
85 Ibid., p. 266.
87 Ibid., p. 86.
89 Geßl, pp. 286-87.
90 Ibid., pp. 295-96.
91 Ibid., pp. 322-23.
92 Reichspost, 31/11/18, Morgenblatt, p. 1.
93 Rennhofer, pp. 170-72.
94 See ibid., pp. 567-68.
95 Ibid., p. 463.
96 The Paneuropa movement will be discussed further in chapter four.
97 Paneuropa, Year 2, Nos. 2-3, pp. 63-64.
98 Seipel, Ignaz, Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung, Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung, Vienna and Leipzig, 1930, p. 189.
99 All the Länder administrations in Austria were controlled by the Christian Socials save the Social Democrat bastion of Vienna. For more on the conflict within the Christian Social Party, see Hanisch, pp. 76-78.
101 Ibid., p. 10.
102 In Salzburg, less than 2 per cent and in Tyrol, less than 7 per cent voted for Austrian independence. Suval, The Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era, p. 169.
103 Reichspost, 25/12/21, p. 2.
104 Heer notes that Seipel had to tread carefully when professing his Österreichertum, to avoid agitating both Pan-Germans and members of his own party. See Heer, p. 359.
105 Geßl, p. 32.
106 Reichspost, 9/7/1929, p. 3.
107 Rennhofer, p. 442.
108 Reichspost, 9/7/1929, p. 3.
109 Rennhofer, p. 442.
110 See Renner, p. 41.
111 Geßl, p. 43.
112 pp. 57-58.
113 Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria, pp. 60-61.
115 For the text of these speeches see Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung, pp. 130-35, 167-77, 177-88.
116 Ibid., pp. 133-34.
117 Ibid., pp. 168-69.
118 Ibid., pp. 183, 204.
119 Ibid., p. 121.
120 Reichspost, 9/7/1929, p. 2.
121 Rennhofer, p. 441.
122 Geßl, p. 323.
123 Ibid., p. 297.
125 See also Spät, pp. 17-18; Nation Österreich: Sozialhistorische Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung, pp. 133-34.
126 Winter, Seipel, p. 148. ‘Greater-Austrian’ refers to Imperial Austria.
127 Ibid., pp. 150-52.
128 Ibid., p. 147.
129 Ibid.
130 See Rennhofer, p. 175.

76
133 Hanisch, p. 77.
Chapter 2

The *Ständestaat* and the *Vaterländische Front*

The period of authoritarian rule\(^1\) in Austria from 1933 until the *Anschluss* saw the most concerted attempt in the inter-war era to forge an Austrian identity. Hitler's consolidation of power in Germany, which coincided with the suspension of the Austrian Parliament,\(^2\) resulted in the introduction of a hostile policy towards the Austrian state with the ultimate aim of *Anschluss*. Equally serious were the terrorist attacks by Austrian Nazis within the state, as well as the sympathy for National Socialism evinced by significant numbers of individuals within key institutions such as the army, the police and the universities.\(^3\) The Dollfuss and Schuschnigg governments were, therefore, obliged to defend the independence of Austria from German aggression, while preventing the destabilisation of the state from within. To this end it was necessary to consolidate and further Austrian patriotism while checking the growing influence of National Socialism.

This chapter will briefly examine the liquidation of parliamentary democracy in Austria and the establishment of the authoritarian state. This is known as the *Ständestaat* because of the corporatist principles on which it was to be based. The subsequent section will analyse the construct of Austrian identity conceived by the *Ständestaat* regime. The means employed by successive authoritarian governments and the *Vaterländische Front* — the patriotic organisation established by the regime as a replacement for political parties — to promote this identity will then be considered.
Political Background

Engelbert Dollfuss was put forward by the Christian Social Party to form a new cabinet after the fall of the Buresch government in May 1932. Although federal Minister of Agriculture, Dollfuss was not a member of Parliament, nor did he become one. His candidature was strengthened, however, by the fact that he was untainted by the party political hostility of the 1920s. Initially Dollfuss tried to unite the Christian Socials, Heimatblock, Landbund and Pan-Germans behind his cabinet, but the last of these declined to join a coalition. They were opposed to the Lausanne loan which, like the Geneva loan of 1922, renewed the prohibition of Anschluss for a further ten years. Austria’s new Chancellor told the Heimatschutz leader, Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, that he was also considering bringing the Social Democrats into his government. Otto Bauer later confirmed this in conversation with Charles Gulick. The ‘red-black’ coalition never materialised, however, and Dollfuss began his tenure as Chancellor with a majority of only one seat in Parliament.

This slimmest of majorities was to lead ultimately to the end of parliamentary democracy in Austria. On 4 March 1933, Parliament met to debate motions pertaining to the recent railway strike. One of the ballots resulted in a tie, which prompted the President of the House, Karl Renner, to resign his post, freeing himself to vote against the government. The second and third presidents, Ramek (Christian Social) and Straffner (Pan-German), likewise resigned their posts, thus paralysing the working of Parliament.
Those factions, such as the Heimatschutz and the right-wing of the Christian Social Party, who had for some time been seeking to establish a more authoritarian form of government in Austria, could now move to dispense with a legislature which they considered moribund. This was not, however, Dollfuss' plan at the beginning of the crisis. Meetings of the party leadership for March 1933 show that he, as well as many other prominent Christian Socials, saw rule by decree as a stop-gap measure until the time was right to recall Parliament. ⁹

The Christian Socials generally concurred, however, that Parliament should not be recalled before certain constitutional changes had been agreed which would strengthen the executive. Dollfuss told the party leadership on 7 March that he sensed among the population a certain contempt for Parliament in its current form. The only solution to the crisis, he suggested, was another change in the constitution after consultation with the other parties. ¹⁰ By the time a new constitution had been submitted for 'parliamentary' ratification in May 1934, however, the Social Democratic Party was outlawed. Dollfuss, as well as the democratic wing of the Christian Social Party, had evidently bowed to the pressure of both the Heimatschutz and Italy. The Austrian Chancellor had visited Mussolini in Spring 1933. He reported back to his party that the Italian leader was concerned about events unfolding in Germany, and was prepared to back Austria's independence. ¹¹ For her part, Austria would have to carry out certain domestic reforms, such as the strengthening of the position of the Heimatschutz within the cabinet. ¹² Dollfuss was also advised to crush the Social Democrats if he wanted to
remain in power. Meanwhile, at the Vatican, Dollfuss was told that the Pope viewed Marxism as the greatest evil in modern society.

In Spring 1933, irrespective of Heimatschutz and Italian pressure, the Christian Social Party was united in the belief that it could not risk a general election, for which its opponents of all colours were clamouring. The previous Nationalrat elections in November 1930 had seen the Party lose seats to the Social Democrats, who then became the largest party in Parliament. Of greater concern was the showing that the National Socialists had made at the 1932 Landtag and district elections. While they had failed to win a parliamentary seat in 1930, in 1932 they received about twenty-five per cent of the vote. Moreover, their electoral hopes were boosted by the Nazi accession to power in Germany. It was therefore argued that the Christian Socials had to hold on to power at all costs, as this was the only protection they had against a Nazi takeover and the realisation of Anschluss. Such an argument assumes considerable significance in the context of this study. The liquidation of parliamentary democracy in Austria was justified as a defensive, preventative measure aimed at the preservation of Austrian independence. In 1937 Schuschnigg wrote that it was the ‘fight for the Fatherland’ which prompted Dollfuss to execute the dramatic changes. The Christian Social Party continued to parade itself as the champion of Austrian independence and the natural home of Austrian patriotism. The Ständestaat could, therefore, be promoted as the framework in which an Austrian identity could best be nurtured, and from which Austrian independence could be defended most effectively.
Gulick, a strong critic of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg regime, has argued that to justify the *Ständestaat* as a bulwark against Nazism was a lame excuse. He takes the view that the ruling elites were not forced into this policy, rather that “the two Chancellors and their associates were determined to establish and to perpetuate their own varieties of Fascism.”\(^{17}\) Elsewhere, as we have seen, Gulick concedes that Dollfuß set out with democratic intentions, and had no fixed political plans for the future.\(^{18}\) Ulrich Kluge asserts that Dollfuß did not consciously set out to establish an authoritarian state, while Irmgard Bärnthaler argues that Hitler’s takeover of power was a primary motivation for the creation of the *Ständestaat*.\(^{19}\)

1934 was a momentous year for Austria. In February a *Heimatschutz* discovery of an arms cache belonging to the Social Democratic paramilitary association, the *Schutzbund*, precipitated a brief but decisive civil war. The Social Democratic Party was subsequently banned, deprived of its control over Vienna city council, and the cleavage in Austrian political life seemed complete. Meanwhile, Austria’s tie to Italy was strengthened in March by the signing of the first of the Rome protocols. This represented a loose arrangement between Austria, Italy and Hungary, in which the three states agreed to co-ordinate matters of foreign policy.

On 1 May 1934, the new constitution was promulgated. It effectively placed all political power in the hands of the executive, while providing for the establishment of five advisory bodies to the government. The Austrian National Socialists, who had been outlawed in June 1933, were meanwhile increasing the intensity of their terrorist campaign.\(^{20}\) This reached its zenith on 25 July, when they staged an abortive *putsch*. The government, with
Heimatschutz paramilitary support, soon recovered power, while Mussolini sent a clear warning to Hitler by mobilising Italian forces at the Brenner Pass. The putschists fatally wounded Dollfuss, however, and Kurt von Schuschnigg was appointed by President Miklas as his successor.

During Schuschnigg's tenure all political parties were liquidated in Austria as part of the transition to a corporate state. The Vaterländische Front continued in its efforts to unite the Austrian population under one banner and to promote the patriotic cause. When Mussolini and Hitler concluded the Rome-Berlin axis, however, Austria had effectively lost her protector. Lacking the foreign support that had emboldened Dollfuss' defence of Austrian independence, Schuschnigg chose an accommodation with Germany as a way of relieving the tension between the two countries.

Following the embarrassment of the 1934 putsch, Hitler had decided on an evolutionary method to achieve Anschluss and had sent Franz von Papen to Vienna to negotiate with the Austrian Chancellor. Hitler met Schuschnigg in Munich in 1936, and this meeting resulted in the July Agreement. This recognised Austria's independence; secondly, it acknowledged that National Socialism in Austria was a purely Austrian affair in which the German government had no right to intervene; and thirdly, stated that Austria would conduct her policies on a line which corresponded to the fact that she was a German state. An additional secret protocol was signed, known as the 'Gentlemen Agreement' (sic.). It placed stricter obligations on Austria. Schuschnigg was obliged to appoint a member of the self-styled 'National Opposition' to the cabinet; to agree to an amnesty for all National Socialist prisoners; to prevent anti-German propaganda from appearing in the media;
and to permit German subjects in Austria to join Nazi organisations, provided that they refrain from trying to influence Austrians. In return, Austrian National Socialism was again recognised as a purely Austrian affair, while the thousand-Mark levy, which had been imposed on all German tourists to Austria in June 1933, was lifted.  

Schuschnigg was now established on his so-called ‘German course’. Without Mussolini’s sponsorship, the Heimatschutz lost its influence, while that of the German nationalists increased. Although the Austrian Nazi party remained illegal, its underground campaign for Anschluss was given new momentum, while the terms of the secret protocol placed restrictions on the content of Vaterländische Front propaganda. Schuschnigg faithfully fulfilled his part of the 1936 bargain, but Hitler became impatient with the speed of the process towards Anschluss. He invited the Austrian Chancellor to Berchtesgaden in February 1938, ostensibly to reconfirm the terms of the 1936 agreement. In the event, Schuschnigg was presented with an ultimatum that went further than the Munich arrangement. In particular, he was forced to appoint the Nazi sympathiser, Arthur von Seyss-Inquart, as Minister of Security, which gave the latter control over the police and gendarmerie. 

In a radio broadcast to explain the new ‘agreement’, Hitler neglected to mention Austrian independence, but instead talked of the suffering of Germans who currently lived outside the borders of the Reich. It was now transparent that he had no intention of honouring the German side of the bargain. Schuschnigg finally decided to settle the matter by holding a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, believing that he could count on a majority of two-thirds. Hitler ordered that the referendum be
cancelled and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed Chancellor. Lacking any international support, Schuschnigg and President Miklas capitulated. The following day, German troops crossed the border.

The Ständestaat

The occasion of the abandonment of the parliamentary system took the government by surprise. The lack of decisiveness of the executive immediately after March 1933 shows that no agreed blueprint existed for body or bodies to replace Parliament. Indeed the period from March 1933 to May 1934 is characterised by a good deal of government improvisation. However, authoritarian trends and ideas for restructuring the state on a corporate basis had been harboured by elements of Austrian conservatism for some time. Karl von Vogelsang was a Prussian-born, Catholic convert, whose social theory was influential on the evolution of the Austrian Christian Social movement in the late nineteenth century. Vogelsang enshrined the organisation of society into Stände (estates, corporations, professional groups) in his works. Alfred Diamant has shown that Vogelsang’s ideas enjoyed a renaissance in the late 1920s, and suggests that they helped, along with those of Othmar Spann (see below), provide an important intellectual basis for the Ständestaat. They were revived by the leading writer of the Vogelsang school, Anton Orel.

The other key individual who promoted a corporatist theory of the state in inter-war Austria was Othmar Spann. Spann’s ideas became influential, not only amongst his students at Vienna University, but also within the
various Heimwehren, as we will see in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{31} Both the Vogelsang and Spann schools repudiated the modern individualistic society which manifested itself in liberalism and capitalism. They advocated an organic structure of society, arguing that mediaeval institutions such as the guild, the Church, and the fief had lent that era a strong corporate harmony.\textsuperscript{32}

However influential these theories of corporatism were for the development of the Ständestaat, I do not feel that they adequately explain the conservative departure from the principle of republican democracy in the 1920s. The constitution of 1920 had concentrated political power in the lower house of Parliament, the Nationalrat. The strength of the legislature led Seipel to complain of the hegemony of the parties, while twice Chancellor Schober referred to the ‘hypertrophy of parliamentarism’.\textsuperscript{33} The constitutional reforms in 1929 worked in favour of the executive branch by strengthening the position of the President, whose former role had largely been ceremonial. He was to be directly elected by the population (previously he had been chosen by an assembly composed of both chambers), he could dissolve Parliament, and had the right to issue emergency decrees in a certain areas of legislation while Parliament was not in session. The actual procedure for implementing these was so cumbersome, however, that no presidential decree was issued for the remainder of democracy’s lifetime in inter-war Austria.\textsuperscript{34}

The Social Democrats were able to negotiate the details of these constitutional reforms, unlike in 1934. While the changes seemed to favour the bourgeois government parties, they did not offend the principles of
parliamentary democracy *per se*. The original government proposals for
reform, which had been influenced by pressure from the *Heimwehren*\(^{35}\) to
smash democracy, painted a very different picture, however. Amongst other
things, the President was to have much more flexibility over emergency
decrees, which could be issued even when Parliament was in session. It was
proposed that he could dissolve Parliament and postpone fresh elections
indefinitely, if the government decided that ‘extraordinary circumstances
prevailed’. Vienna was to be abolished as a *Land*, thereby destroying the one
bastion of Social Democrat power in the country. The reforms would also
make constitutional change much easier, by lowering the necessary two-
thirds majority to a simple majority vote in Parliament.\(^{36}\)

Such sweeping changes to the constitutional structure of the Republic
would have been a major step on the road to a dictatorship. At the very least,
they would have emasculated the Social Democrats as a political force in
Austria. It is evident, therefore, that the political representatives of Austrian
conservatism were seeking an authoritarian solution several years before the
opportunity to abandon parliamentary democracy presented itself. That this
solution may have included elements of corporatist theory (the 1929 reforms
stipulated that the second chamber, the *Bundesrat*, was supposed to be
partly representative of the occupational estates at some undetermined time
in the future) was of secondary importance.

By the terms of the May Constitution, the Austrian upper and lower
houses were replaced by four advisory bodies and one organ which had the
power to pass or veto bills initiated by the government. The four consulting
bodies, or councils, were the *Staatsrat*, which considered state affairs in
general; the Bundeskulturrat, responsible for education and culture; the Bundeswirtschaftsrat, which looked after economic matters; and the Länderrat, which represented the interests of the individual Länder. The Staatsrat was composed of an unlimited number of members, all appointed by the President. The Bundeskulturrat was to contain between 70 and 80 members, the Bundeswirtschaftsrat between 30 and 40, while the Länderrat was made up of the governors and heads of finance in each Land. The highest assembly was the Bundestag, which took 20 members from the Staatsrat, ten from the Bundeskulturrat, 20 from the Bundeswirtschaftsrat and nine from the Länderrat. Initially the members of the Bundeskulturrat and Bundeswirtschaftsrat were to be appointed, until the various Berufsstände, or corporations, had been established. Then, the seats would be decided by election within the corporations.\textsuperscript{37} The constitution provided for seven corporations in Austrian society: Agriculture and Forestry; Industry and Mining; Business; Finance and Insurance; Free Professions; Trade and Communication; and Public Service. The May Constitution effectively placed all power in the hands of the executive, and strengthened in particular the position of the Chancellor. The four councils were toothless, while the Bundestag could only accept or reject proposed legislation, not discuss it. Moreover the constitution never really came to life, as the organisation of the corporate bodies remained in its infancy until the Anschluss.\textsuperscript{38}
The ‘Austrian’ Ideology of the Ständestaat

At the end of the preceding chapter it was noted that Seipel’s intellectual shadow loomed large over the Ständestaat era. In 1937 Schuschnigg wrote that everything the former Chancellor had said and written was relevant to contemporary Austria. Without Seipel, he asserted, later developments in Austria would have been impossible. Bußhoff, meanwhile, sees Seipel as a more important figure for the Ständestaat than Dollfuss himself. In its attempts to win support for independent Austria, the authoritarian regime continued to distinguish between nation and state, rather than argue the case for a separate Austrian national identity. Shortly after coming to power, Dollfuss remarked that Austria was an independent German state. Later in the same year he affirmed, ‘we are and will remain Germans’. On the occasion of the first general assembly of the Vaterländische Front in September 1933 he said, ‘we are so German, so obviously German, that it seems superfluous to emphasise this fact. We declare here that we want to serve this German people honestly and truly … We Austrians … have a German country.’

The German character of Austria was anchored in the preamble to the May Constitution of 1934, where it was proclaimed that Austria was a German state. In a radio broadcast to accompany the introduction of the new constitution, the Chancellor explained that this was as natural as the declaration that the official state language was German. Elsewhere Dollfuss referred to the German Volk in Austria and its place within the German nation. Echoing Seipel, he announced that an independent Austria had an
important role to play for Germany as a whole. He re-affirmed the importance of the Austrian mission, for the benefit of both the German nation and Europe. This mission, he elaborated, was to build bridges between *Gesamtdeutschum* and other nations.\(^{47}\)

Schuschnigg took the same line. In a speech at the first *Vaterländische Front* congress on 19 January 1936, he explained that Dollfuss’ recognition of Austria as a German state revealed a part of Austria’s German legacy and her German mission. This mission was to be interpreted as the task of international conciliation. History, as well as the present, Schuschnigg said, proved that the Austrians, in a free and independent country, accomplished spiritual and cultural goals for the German people as no others could do.\(^{48}\) Hand in hand with the campaign to consolidate Austrian patriotism, government propaganda consistently referred to the Austrians as members of the larger German people. It was argued that, although the Austrian Germans chose to live in a different state from those in the *Reich*, it did not follow that they should be regarded as ‘foreign Germans’. Contemporary Germany was not the exclusive motherland of the German people; history had shown that the German people had always lived in a variety of states.\(^{49}\) In an attempt to reconcile loyalty to the German people with that to the Austrian state, Schuschnigg developed Seipel’s ideas into the formula of ‘one nation, two states’.\(^{50}\) In a newspaper interview in 1937, the Chancellor rejected *Anschluss*, and said, ‘Our race, our language, our culture, our history is German, certainly; but we have two states, one is the German Empire, the other is Austria.’\(^{51}\)
It might appear paradoxical, even suicidal, that in attempting to prevent union with Germany, Austria should insist on her German character, rather than seek to fashion a distinct Austrian nationhood. Seipel had argued that membership of the larger German *Kulturnation* did not prohibit the existence of an independent Austrian state. His ideas had been publicised, however, in a period when *Anschluss*, had it not been prohibited by the Versailles Settlement, would have been a matter of consensual agreement between the two states. With the accession to power of the National Socialists in Germany, this was clearly no longer the case. In the face of the threat to Austrian independence it might seem more prudent to have distanced ‘Austrian’ from ‘German’ in government propaganda. The inferiority complex of Austrian Germans, stemming from the late imperial era, had resurfaced, however. Nazi propaganda in Germany criticised the Austrians for betraying the German national idea. These attacks evidently hit a sore spot. Guido Zernatto, the last Secretary General of the *Vaterländische Front*, concluded that criticism from the Third Reich led to the repeated emphasis on the German character of the Austrian state. It resulted in an intellectual struggle over the rightful interpretation of Deutschtum. For example, an article which appeared in the Front’s *Wiener Stadt-Journal* shortly before *Anschluss* noted that the Nazis understood the Greater-German idea in a political sense, while the Austrians saw it in cultural terms.

Especially prior to the July agreement of 1936 the *Ständestaat* regime parried German criticism and fought back itself. Political leaders were swift to dismiss Nazi charges that the Austrians were betraying German values in
their rejection of Anschluss. In a speech in Graz on 19 November 1933, Dollfuss defended the right of Austrians to demand not to be seen as second-class Germans. Half a year later he insisted that the Austrian ‘children’ of German soil would not allow themselves be told by people from ‘over there’ what it meant to be German. According to Dollfuss, Vienna had, for half a millennium, been the symbol of the German city and of German culture as a whole. National Socialism, with its aggressive promotion of German nationalism, was presented as illegitimate, ahistorical and primitive. In short, it was rejected as thoroughly un-German. Starhemberg echoed this view at the first Vaterländische Front congress in January 1936. At a meeting of the Christian Social Party Club on 3 May 1933, Dollfuss remarked to his colleagues that ‘Germany [had] destroyed more in four weeks than she had built up in twelve years. There should still be a place where, in the eyes of the world, the Germans have not gone completely mad.’ For this reason, the authoritarian regime declared that it was possible to fight the National Socialist movement without damaging the face of the German nation. Austria was presented as the repository of true German culture, which justified the maintenance of her independence. In January 1934, Schuschnigg said at the first Vaterländische Front meeting for Lower Austria, ‘The affirmation of Austria does not contradict one’s recognition of being German. On the contrary it is part of the true Greater-German concept’. Furthermore, an article written by the federal commissioner of the Front, Walter Adam, stressed that German beliefs and true Österreichertum were compatible. The struggle against National Socialism was compared to previous threats to German-Christian culture such as the
Ottoman invasions or the Counter-Reformation. Austria, it was claimed, was not merely defending her own existence, but also that of German culture in its entirety. She was therefore continuing her historical mission for the greater good of Germandom.

The German identity of Austria, as widely publicised in the authoritarian era, was based on a particular interpretation of German history. After Anschluss, Schuschnigg wrote of Austria's allegiance to the 'true soul' of Germany. The regime claimed that only in Austria had the great virtues of the German nation survived. In effect, Österreichertum was promoted as true Deutschtum. Indeed, Dollfuss asserted in November 1933 that the concepts 'good German' and 'good Austrian' were identical. The Education Minister, Dr. Pernten, reiterated this idea four years later. Critical to this thesis was the so-called Reichsidee, or imperial idea, which, it was frequently emphasised, had been the traditional framework for the political organisation of the German people. Austria had been the historical bearer of this idea. Tension between Germany and Austria, it was argued, arose from the conflict between the nation state concept and the imperial idea. National Socialism was said to have championed the former, just as Prussia had done. Austria, on the other hand, was struggling to remain true to the older German idea. Vaterländische Front propaganda explained that the German idea was based on principles which were neither territorial nor national, but universal and global. The imperial idea, Dollfuss asserted, had endowed the German nation with a far looser associational framework than the nation state idea, and it had accommodated the diversity of the German peoples. By including the federal principle in the structure of the Ständestaat, the
Chancellor explained, Austria was adhering to a fundamental element of German culture.\textsuperscript{71}

The introduction to this thesis acknowledged the importance of the concept of 'the other' to constructs of identity. The selection of Prussia as 'the other' for a formulation of Austrian identity was of great significance. For the reasons outlined above, Austrian identity could not be posited against a German one. Austria's traditional rival, however, provided a fine antithesis. It was therefore possible to distinguish certain elements particular to the Austrian, which could be contrasted not with the German, but with the Prussian. Whereas the Austrians were praised as good Germans, the German heritage of the Prussians was questioned. A \textit{Vaterländische Front} press release from December 1934 included an article stating that it was no surprise that the Prussians, the vanguard of the anti-Catholic \textit{Los-von-Rom} movement, had Slav ancestry, or were at least of mixed German-Slav blood.\textsuperscript{72} While Austria was presented as the defender of German values, Prussia, with her \textit{kleindeutsch}, Protestant and centralist ideology, was the destroyer. 'Because we feel German', declared Starhemberg in January 1936, there could be no Greater-Prussian domination in Austria.\textsuperscript{73} By representing National Socialism as a modern form of Prussianism,\textsuperscript{74} the \textit{Ständestaat} regime could plunder a wealth of historical arguments with which it justified the fight for Austrian independence.

While the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime rejected the idea of an Austrian nation or nationality, it highlighted particular traditions, customs and qualities which were considered distinctly Austrian. \textit{Vaterländische Front} propaganda referred habitually to the Austrian man and the Austrian \textit{Stamm}
or *Volksstamm*. The Austrian man was said to be a historical and geographical, rather than racial product, marked by his particular experiences and development in the border region of the German cultural sphere. An article in *Vaterländische Front* from November 1933 stated that *Österreichertum* was founded on its particular history, religion, statehood, education and destiny. Recalling Seipel, Dollfuss said that co-habitation over the centuries with other peoples had made the Austrian 'softer, more patient, more understanding, made for other cultures, while preserving the purity of his own.' An article in *Wiener Stadt-Journal* asserted that this thousand-year experience of living amongst other peoples meant the Austrian spirit differed clearly from that of the Reich Germans. Without ever denying his *Deutschtum*, the Austrian possessed a cultural, rather than racial understanding of the German nation. The special mission assigned to the inhabitants of the old Ostmark had thus been a significant factor in the shaping and definition of *homo Austriacus*. A *Vaterländische Front* assessment of the first year of the authoritarian course stated that Austrian man had disappeared in the party state. Prior to the emasculation of Parliament, it argued, only party and *Länder* interests had existed. With the arrival of the supra-party regime, *homo Austriacus* had been re-awakened at the time when the state was threatened both by international Marxism and German National Socialism.

Over the centuries the shared experience and common development of those Germans in the Danube basin had shaped the Austrian *Stamm*. Dollfuss insisted that the particularities of each German *Stamm* be recognised and preserved. In his opinion, the variety of the different German peoples should
be celebrated, as it had always been a valuable part of German culture. This diversity gave rise to the 'great, beautiful mosaic of the German nation.' It was claimed, moreover, that history showed the Austrian Stamm to be more developed than other Germans. In a radio broadcast in May 1993, the Christian Social Party leader, Army Minister and former Chancellor, Karl Vaugoin, stated that Austria had already been a respected, flowering German state at a time when other Stämme, who were now claiming Deutsche für themselves alone, were still ignorant of what it meant to be German. In his speech to the Front in January 1936, Starhemberg talked of preserving the 'Austrian' character of Austria, without really explaining what this meant, apart from the implication that her sovereignty be maintained. A Front press release from March 1937 referred to Germans of Austrian character, while an article from the Wiener Front mentioned Austria's essence and character (Wesen und Eigenart). Another article noted that the Austrians were not Austrians because they were Germans, but the other way round. For this very reason they could only be Germans in their particular Austrian way. In his conclusion to Dreimal Österreich, Schuschnigg went further by trying to distinguish the essential features of the Austrian character. He decided that these were the capacity to alleviate conflict and a skill in communicating German spirit and culture throughout the world.

The chief focus for Austrian identity during the authoritarian era was the Austrian Fatherland. This endowed the rather abstract notions of Österreichertum with a real framework, encouraged the development of a patriotism in a literal sense, and offered the most concrete argument for the preservation of an independent Austrian state. In July 1933, Dollfuß
remarked, ‘We are and will remain a small, indivisible entity from Lake
Constance to the borders of the Burgenland, from the Czech border to the
Karawanken Mountains’. As noted above, it was Austria’s particular
geographical location as a march area of the Holy Roman Empire that was
said to have shaped her people’s mission throughout history. In addition to
being a historical product, homo Austriacus was closely linked to his soil
(bodenständig). Moreover, the imperial idea had determined a loose political
structure which accorded with the inherent variety of the German peoples.
Schuschnigg wrote in Dreimal Österreich that an independent Austrian state
best suited its German Stamm. Dollfuss had argued that Österreichertum
had been independent since the establishment of the Ostmark. He also
claimed, ‘We are a country which led the German people and the whole of
Europe for centuries’. This gave the Austrians the right to reject Anschluss.

In the first appeal to join the Vaterländische Front on 21 May 1933,
Austrians were informed of the re-awakening of love for, and awareness of,
their Fatherland (Vaterlandsliebe and Vaterlandsbewusstsein). Some
months later, Dollfuss himself referred to the ‘vaterländisch’ and
‘bodenständig’ population of Austria in condemning the wave of National
Socialist terror attacks. References to the Fatherland occur habitually in
speeches by Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, Starhemberg and other leading political
figures of the Ständestaat era. As we have seen with reference to Seipel, this
choice of vocabulary implied a strong sense of continuity with the past.

The other significant element of Österreichertum promoted by the
authoritarian regime was Catholicism. The religious component of Austrian
identity was emphasised more than ever in the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg era. The

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May Constitution began with the words ‘In the name of God the Almighty, from whom all right emanates.’ The preamble also proclaimed Austria to be a ‘Christian’ state. Dollfuss elaborated on this in his radio broadcast of 1 May 1934. Where the constitution dealt with social and moral questions, he said, its terms were based on the everlasting laws of Christian philosophy. In addition, the blessing of the Holy See had been given to the ‘new’ Austria in the form of a Concordat, signed at midnight on that date. The Austrian people, moreover, were said to possess an ‘inner attachment to the Christian credo.’

Catholicism had for centuries been a cornerstone of Österreichertum, cemented by the alliance between throne and altar. Ständestaat propaganda saw a natural link between Christianity and true German values. Thus in May 1934, Dollfuss declared, ‘Our native German people first became great and strong when it united itself with Christianity.’ Significantly, the terms ‘Christian/Catholic’ and ‘German’ were often linked with a hyphen in written propaganda, suggesting the indivisibility of the two. Indeed, in July 1934 Dollfuss commented that the Austrians would only find the way forward if they could combine their native Deutschum and the Catholic faith. A few weeks previously he had stressed the necessity of achieving the right synthesis between the two.

The authoritarian regime was quick to contrast the status of organised religion in Austria and in Germany. In spite of the fact that Nazi Germany had managed to conclude a concordat with the Vatican on 20 July 1933, leaders of Christian churches began to be persecuted soon afterwards. Whereas Catholicism and its social teaching really did inform the political
ideology of the authoritarian state in Austria, National Socialist thinking, however muddled and ill defined, derived from a wide variety of quite different theories. Front propaganda spoke of the evolution of a ‘neo-heathenism’ in the Third Reich, while in December 1933, Austrian bishops expressed a strong rejection of National Socialism. Here was more fuel for the argument that the National Socialists did not represent the true German soul.

Finally we should consider how the political culture established by the Ständestaat was integrated into the regime’s construct of Austrian identity. Although, like Italy, Austria never fully developed into a corporate state, the corporate idea was widely publicised in government propaganda. In his speech to accompany the introduction of the May Constitution, Dollfuss remarked that the vocational groups (Berufsstände) had for centuries been the backbone of the social order of the German Fatherland. It was announced that the symbols designed by Professor Clemens Holzmeister to represent each of the Stände were based on old guild designs. Dollfuss also explained that the new constitution contained fundamental elements of old German law, while he likened the role of the mayors in Austria to that of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire in their competence in choosing the President. While the Ständestaat heralded a ‘new’ beginning, the Chancellor said, it also represented a ‘regeneration’ for Austria. Dollfuss remarked that the suspension of Parliament in March 1933 ‘drew a line’ under the ‘revolutionary’ post-war period. In this way he implied that 1918-1933 had been a historical aberration, whereas the Ständestaat was the
natural heir of the Monarchy and would allow the traditions of old Austria to flourish once more.

On 9 September 1933, Dollfuss announced that Austria was the first state to follow the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.\textsuperscript{114} This had been issued in 1931, on the fortieth anniversary of a previous encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which had detailed Rome’s stance on the social question. Rerum Novarum had stressed that it was the government’s duty not merely to supervise law and order, but also to ensure public well-being and private prosperity.\textsuperscript{115} Quadragesimo Anno criticised the extreme positions of capitalism and communism, both of which only served one section of society.\textsuperscript{116} The task of the state was to ‘abolish conflict between classes with different interests, and so foster and promote harmony between the various ranks of society ... The aim of social legislation must, therefore, be the re-establishment of vocational groups.’\textsuperscript{117} The encyclical sanctioned any form of government so long as it took account of justice and the common good.\textsuperscript{118} Social reconstruction was to be preceded by a renewal of the Christian spirit,\textsuperscript{119} which itself should inspire economic principles.\textsuperscript{120} Socialism was condemned as ‘the bitterest adversary’ of the economic order.\textsuperscript{121} In the eyes of the Austrian ruling elite, Quadragesimo Anno blessed the transformation from a ‘revolutionary’ parliamentary democracy to a Christian corporate state. Indeed, Dollfuss claimed that the encyclical promoted the idea of the corporate state.\textsuperscript{122}

The authoritarian regime also claimed that the Ständestaat was the most apt political system for the Austrian people. Schuschnigg cited Goethe, who had written that a political system could not be imported, but had to have its
natural roots in the people it served. This was defence against the criticism that Austria had aped her neighbours in replacing parliamentary democracy with a dictatorship; in particular, against claims that the Ständestaat was based on the Italian model. At a congress of the official workers' unions in June 1937, Schuschnigg declared that the Ständestaat was not a mere copy of any other system, but that it was a 'thoroughly original, specifically Austrian' experiment.

The claims that a Ständestaat was somehow specifically Austrian are highly dubious. Even if we ignore the ubiquity of the guild system in the mediaeval era, the idea of a corporate political structure as an alternative to parliamentary democracy was widespread amongst the European right in the inter-war period. Spain, Italy and Portugal all experimented with corporatism, while a number of other Fascist movements in central and eastern Europe included this system of government in their political manifestos. One would expect slight differences in the development of corporatism from country to country, but this would not substantiate the claim of originality for the Austrian model. This claim is further weakened by the fact that the corporatist institutions were never seriously developed by the Ständestaat regime. It is nevertheless worth consideration here as it shows how an attempt was made to legitimate the new political order by ascribing to it patriotic Austrian credentials.

It is perhaps Schuschnigg himself who provides us with the most perceptive analysis of the 'Austrian' ideology of the Ständestaat. In Dreimal Österreich he comments that Seipel was the first to achieve a synthesis between 'German' and 'Austrian', while elsewhere in the book he remarks...
that this synthesis is realised in a Catholic framework.\textsuperscript{126} In other words, the authoritarian regime sought to effect a balance between the country’s German inheritance and her Austrian traditions, in an endeavour to justify independence. The Austrian population was informed that they constituted a German \textit{Stamm}, but that their German identity was very different from that formulated by National Socialism. The Nazi construct of German identity was seen to represent a bastardised form of German culture, sullied with excessive nationalism. It was argued that, like Prussia before it, National Socialist Germany had betrayed the imperial idea in its espousal of the nation-state idea, and had rejected the Christian framework in which true German culture had flourished throughout history. Austria, in contrast, had remained faithful to the ideals of the Holy Roman Empire and she must remain independent if these ideals were to be preserved. Various elements were highlighted distinguishing the Austrians from other German \textit{Stämme}. A distinct historical development and, especially, a particular cultural mission singled out the Austrians as special. Without an independent Austrian state, this mission would be lost, to the detriment of both the German nation and the European family of peoples.
The Vaterländische Front

Prince Starhemberg, head of the Vaterländische Front, leader of the Heimatschutz and Vice-Chancellor, takes credit for the inspiration behind the organisation. In his memoirs he claims to have told Dollfuss that, to counter the Nazi menace, a greater Austrian terror had to be established. To obtain finances for the patriotic action, Starhemberg visited Mussolini, who at the time paraded as Austria's protector. The Italian leader, who had already helped the Heimatschutz to acquire arms, was encouraged by the authoritarian course in Austria and promised money to Starhemberg. In conjunction with the Heimatschutz, Dollfuss set up the Heimatdienst, a government propaganda office, in March 1933. Walter Adam, who was then in charge of the Heimatdienst, later first Commissioner of the Front, argued that, in the parliamentary era, personal contact between politicians and the ordinary man had been lacking. The Heimatdienst was to fill this hole by answering individual letters and queries.

The first official announcement of the Vaterländische Front appeared in the Wiener Zeitung on 21 May 1933. The appeal to encourage membership of the Front was saturated with the words 'Austria' and 'Austrian'. It likened Dollfuss to two great Austrian heroes in times of crisis, Field Marshal Radetzky and Prince Eugene, and urged the people to stand behind their leader and fight for the country. The Vaterländische Front was to unite all those who unequivocally considered themselves to be Austrian and who loved their Fatherland and Heimat. All groups or individuals who
wished to serve the Fatherland were invited to join in order to achieve the common goal: ‘Austria and its right to live, Austria and its duty to live in order to fulfil its mission in Central Europe for the good of the entire German nation.’ It is plain from the hollow rhetoric of the text that, at this stage, the Vaterländische Front was little more than an idea, lacking in structure or detail. Whereas the NSDAP in Germany had years to establish an effective organisation and intricate network before the party came to power, the Front was to suffer from being an improvised, reactive organisation. This reflected the defensive nature of the fight for Austrian independence.

The Front was supposed to be a replacement for all political parties, which were considered superfluous following the liquidation of parliamentary democracy. In spite of this fact, the Christian Socials initially profited from the transition, as they were able to continue running Austrian affairs along with the Heimatschutz and Landbund without fear that fresh elections might prejudice their advantageous position. Dollfuss had told the party committee on 3 May 1933 that the new Front should not be tainted by class struggle, but should represent the affirmation of an idea, namely that of Austrian patriotism. As well as being viewed as means to fight National Socialism, the dissolution of the parties was seen as a way of finally crushing the Social Democrats. At the beginning of May 1933, Dollfuss told a Christian Social Party conference in Salzburg that there were three groupings in Austria: Marxists, brown Socialists, and the Austrian Front. A few weeks later the Chancellor outlined the task of the new government and declared that ‘all those who [wanted] neither brown nor red Socialism should join the Austrian
Fatherland Front'. Although it had been claimed that the Front was for all Austrian citizens, Dollfuss now made it clear that one could not be a Socialist and a patriot at the same time. He further signalled that in the two-front war against National Socialism and the Social Democrats, the latter were regarded as equal a threat as the former. A secret report from January 1935 even considered the Socialists a greater menace than the National Socialists.

The transcripts of Christian Social Party club meetings disclose the suspicion that only a minority of the population was now behind the Chancellor. This did not, however, prevent the Front from rapidly acquiring a large membership. Already by June 1933, Vaugoin was boasting that 500,000 people had joined. By November 1934 this figure had risen to over a million, while a year later it was reckoned to be 2,150,000. Zernatto estimates that by Anschluss there were three million members. This apparently enthusiastic manifestation of support for the government and for Austrian independence must be qualified by the fact that refusal to join led, in many cases, to redundancy. For instance, state officials were obliged to join, while on 29 September 1933, the Director General of the Austrian state Railways published a report which stated that all employees who rejected membership would be replaced. On 23 January 1934 the government announced that state contracts would only be awarded to businesses which were patriotic (vaterlandstreu) and which exclusively employed members of the Front. In December 1935 Starhemberg, then Front leader, declared that all Austrians outside of the organisation were enemies of the state and second-class citizens. The true sympathies of
members could not be gauged. The *Vaterländische Front* was only ever a
unified organisation on a superficial level. By 1938 even National Socialists
were nominal members.

The precise nature of the Front and its relationship to the state became
clearer after May 1934, when these details were enshrined in the new
constitution.\(^{145}\) The Front was recognised as a legal entity and was
designated as the representative of the Austrian state idea. Its alleged aim
was the political union of all citizens who stood for an independent,
Christian, German and corporately-structured Austria. It was likened to the
two great patriotic movements that had emerged at the time of the Turkish
invasion, and during the Napoleonic Wars. In face of the new threat to
Austria's existence, the Front was heralded as the country's protection
against internal and external enemies.\(^{146}\) In November 1933, it was made
clear that the government and *Vaterländische Front* were separate entities.
The former still exercised all legislative and executive power, whereas the
latter was responsible for ensuring that all loyal Austrians could contribute to
the affairs and administration of the state. Neither government nor Front was
deemed subordinate to the other, although the Front was prohibited from
interfering in the areas of competence of public authorities.\(^{147}\)

The official membership badge of the organisation was red-white-red\(^{148}\)
and enamel. A regulation permitted the inclusion of the *Kruckenkreuz* in
flags, pennants and armbands. As can be seen below, the *Kruckenkreuz*\(^{149}\) is
a symbol similar to the *Hakenkreuz*, or swastika. Its origins, however, are
markedly different. Whereas the swastika was originally an Eastern fertility
symbol,\(^{150}\) the *Kruckenkreuz* boasts a Christian heritage and can be seen on
the side of the Ruprechtskirche in Vienna, as well as on the facade of the Hotel de los Reyes Catolicos in Santiago de Compostela. Front propaganda claimed that it was first used on coins around the year AD 454 by Dietrich von Bern. From the eleventh century it was the cross in front of which the German Kings received the Imperial crown. In the late middle ages it was a crusader symbol, the coat of arms of the Holy Sepulchre in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The propaganda leaflet pointed out that the Kruckenkreuz had in fact existed officially in Austria since 1922, when it was chosen by Seipel to back the two and five Groschen coins. In October 1935, moreover, the Kruckenkreuz was given parity with the Austrian state flag. Bärnthaler suggests that the Kruckenkreuz became a distinguishing mark between Christian Austria and heathen National Socialist Germany.

Structurally, the Front was divided into a civil and military section. The military section was composed of members of patriotic paramilitary associations and was charged with halting any activity which might hinder the development of the patriotic movement. It had a particular responsibility for training young people in Austria. The civil section comprised the Front leadership, the organisation of the Berufsstände and various assistant organisations. As with the political structure of the Ständestaat, the Front was divided into sections for the seven Berufsstände, themselves arranged into two groups, representing those in private and public employment respectively. The Front also established an intricate vertical network, so as to provide maximum contact with individual members. At the top was the federal leadership, followed by a leadership for each Land, region, town or village, and group or cell.
Zernatto explains that, as the *Vaterländische Front* was the sole bearer of political will in Austria, it was not comparable to a political party which concentrates its energies on maintaining or increasing support as a means to power. The task of the organisation was rather to provide various services for the population. As well as acting as a propaganda machine and a focus for patriotic sympathies, the Front established various subsidiary organisations. These included the *Mutterschutzwerk* (for the protection of expectant and nursing mothers) and the *Kinderferienwerk* (for the organisation of children's holidays), both of which were set up during Dollfuss' tenure, as well as *Neues Leben* (literally 'New Life' - an organisation concerned with cultural and leisure pursuits) and *Österreichisches Jungvolk* (the youth organisation). The focus on youth was prudent, as it was a section of the population in which the Nazis commanded much influence and support. Österreichisches Jungvolk was initially formed by combining youth organisations of the *Heimatschutz* and the *Ostmärkische Sturmscharen*, a Catholic association set up in 1930 by Schuschnigg. By March 1938 the Jungvolk had 130,000 members. According to Zernatto, a new generation was growing up, filled with enthusiasm for the Austrian idea.

**Propaganda**

The *Vaterländische Front* was above all a propaganda machine which campaigned ardently against *Anschluss* and promoted an Austrian patriotism. August 1933 saw the first edition of the monthly publication *Vaterländische*
Front. This newspaper contained a summary of events from the previous month as well as details of all Front activities, both past and future. Most articles were features, concerned with either political or cultural-historical topics, or direct addresses from high-ranking political figures. A typical article appeared in the February 1934 issue under the title ‘The achievements of the Dollfuss Government in 1933’, which credited the Chancellor with having breathed life into the Austrian man conceived by Seipel. A regular feature of Vaterländische Front was a section called ‘What is the situation in Germany?’ This would outline, amongst other things, the problems with the German economy as well as the oppression suffered by inhabitants of the Third Reich.

From Spring 1935, Vaterländische Front was published in separate editions by the individual Länder. As the Salzburg organ explained, this was necessary to be able to satisfy the various needs and wishes of each Land. The City of Vienna received its own fortnightly Front newspaper, Wiener Stadt-Journal, in May 1935. In the same year the districts of Vienna had local Front publications. The archives contain two other organs for groupings within the Front. The first of these is Sozialpolitischer Dienst, a daily paper which was printed for the official union designed to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of the trade union federation. The second is Der Beamte, a fortnightly publication for all state employees.

From 12 January 1934, the federal leadership of the Vaterländische Front printed a weekly information bulletin, available to all regional and district heads of the organisation, to heads of associated organisations and to certain other representatives. It was stressed that the bulletin was not a
newspaper and was not to be made directly accessible to everybody; it was headed by the words, 'For information only! Not to be published!' The bulletin was seen as means of communication from the federal leadership to lower levels, offering guidelines to ensure the unity of the movement. By reading the bulletin, regional and local leaders would be well informed about the events of the week, both in government circles and in the 'enemy camp' – which in January 1934 was deemed to consist of the Austrian National Socialists, the Marxists and the Hitler regime in Germany. Armed with 'enlightening' material, Front leaders would be able to counter political opponents with their own propaganda. Subscribers to this press service were advised to discuss the material they received in small groups so that the information might then gradually disseminate. In particular, each bulletin contained a specific section entitled 'Material for Discussion' ('Rednermaterial').

As the value of the spreading of propaganda by this means became acknowledged, the role of the Redner, or speaker, was more formally defined. A booklet was printed entitled Vaterländische Front Regulations for Assemblies and Speakers which divided speakers into three categories: local, provincial (Land) and federal. Only first-rate orators fell into the highest category. Another publication, the Speakers' Information Service, which ran 17 issues between October 1936 and February 1938, contained material on all aspects of the Ständestaat and Vaterländische Front, historical and cultural topics, as well as propaganda damning the 'illegals', the Austrian National Socialists.
Although the bulletins from the Front press service had a restricted circulation, much of the material in them was reproduced directly in the press. Articles from the first two bulletins, for example, appeared verbatim in the February 1934 edition of *Vaterländische Front*. Moreover, the bulletin from 16 March 1934 announced that the press service had created a regular link with the Viennese daily newspapers and was sending them items of news, feature articles and notification of forthcoming events. Negotiations with the individual papers would determine which material would be published. By 1937 the bulletins had openly become press releases, which is demonstrated by qualifications such as ‘Viennese edition’, ‘edition for the state capitals’, or ‘edition for weekly newspapers’.

One of the most conspicuous ways in which the Front tried to bolster support for an independent Austria was in its negative depiction of Nazi Germany. As well as portraying National Socialism as a modern form of Prussianism, Front propaganda described the Third Reich as a haven of barbarity, brutality, economic misery and political oppression. Hitler-Germany was presented as a troublemaker who was creating anxiety throughout Europe. Other countries no longer trusted Germany and were consequently increasing arms production. All reports of an economic miracle in Germany were countered by articles which stated, for example, that unemployment was rising there, while international finance had lost confidence in the Mark. German foreign trade was said to be in ruins, and the economy on the brink of collapse. The Third Reich was also shown to be politically unstable, as the example of the Night of the Long Knives demonstrated. Anecdotes were reproduced to show how intolerable life
was in the Reich. One of these came from an Austrian postman, who had emigrated to Germany in search of a better life, but later returned when his expectations were sorely disappointed. Another told of the fines imposed on shoemakers in the Reich who refused to attend obligatory meetings. A marked difference is detectable between anti-Nazi propaganda before and after the July agreement of 1936. Already in 1935 the tone was becoming less harsh. This is demonstrated by the following remark from a regular feature called ‘Pictures from Germany’: ‘The situation in the job-market does not look at all as rosy as the National Socialists always describe it.’ A fortnight later, the Vaterländische Front propaganda machine even had something positive to say about Hitler-Germany: ‘The economic consolidation of concerns and trusts under the National Socialist regime is remarkable.’ By the terms of the July agreement, the Austrian media were obliged to avoid direct criticism of the Reich. For this reason, all attacks on National Socialism were targeted at the Austrian Nazis, the so-called ‘illegals’. The agreement permitted this, as National Socialism in Austria was deemed a purely internal affair.

Dollfuss as Martyr

James William Miller has remarked that one of the differences in political culture between the Ständestaat and Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy was that no ‘leader cult’ existed in the Austrian regime. This is very evident in the case of Schuschnigg, the reserved, intellectual Chancellor who lacked the charisma of Hitler or Mussolini. Even Dollfuss, a leader with great
personality, and far more in the populist mould than his successor, did not in his lifetime develop the same mystical aura that surrounded the German and Italian leaders. After his assassination by Nazi terrorists in the unsuccessful putsch of July 1934, however, Dollfuss was made into an instant martyr, a symbol of the struggle for Austrian independence.

The Front press service commented on Dollfuss' murder in the following way:

Austria's great Chancellor died alone. Hundreds of thousands vowed their loyalty to him, hundreds of thousands cheered him Sunday after Sunday ... It was a hero's death. Nobody has loved our Fatherland, our Austria, more profoundly, more ardently, than our leader ... Dead? No. Our leader, Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss lives on in the heart of every Austrian, lives on in his idea, for which he sacrificed his young life, lives on as the innovator of our Fatherland ... His achievement, to have re-awakened the Austrian idea and to have secured Austria's independence, is everlasting. 183

An article by Karl Stepan, the first leader of the Front, in the August 1934 edition of Vaterländische Front adopted a similar tone:

Our Chancellor, who was love and goodness personified, rests in his grave. From the horrors of the World War, the brave soldier returned home. When he served his Austria in
peacetime with all his energy, he died a hero's death. His life, prepared to sacrifice itself, this gracious, simple life of a unique human being, who wanted to be everything, is a fantastic example to us all ... In the Vaterländische Front our leader lives on ... Now it is up to us to show how much we love our Chancellor, how much we love his and our Austria. Now we must remain loyal like him, in life and death.184

Several other reports in the propaganda sheets exploited Dollfuss' death by portraying the putschists as evil thugs and the Chancellor as saintly. Walter Adam wrote, 'A wallet was stolen from the jacket of the dying or already dead Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss. It was then found in the Chancellor's courtyard, at a place where the bodysearch of those arrested had been carried out'.185

A short story by Joseph Roth entitled 'Vision', which appeared in Wiener Stadt-Journal, described the murder of a diminutive Chancellor. The perpetrators were described as 'bloodthirsty' and members of a party whose leader is called Cain. The victim, meanwhile, was 'pious'.186 Even Schuschnigg, who was not known for sentimental effusion, furnished Dreimal Österreich with a eulogy of his predecessor, gave a detailed account of the last minutes of his life and also referred to him as a martyr.187 Soon after Dollfuss' assassination, Stepan announced that all Vaterländische Front rallies, assemblies and meetings were to begin with the words, 'Our leader Dollfuss welcomes you! Austria!'188
The assassination provided the Front with a rich vein of propaganda. Emboldened by the support Italy had shown in sending troops to the Brenner Pass, serious accusations were levelled at Germany. The Heimatdienst published a booklet known as the Brown Book, which reproduced sources pertaining to the abortive putsch. The conclusion which could be drawn from these were that the Nazi Party in Austria, the fight against the Austrian government and the July revolt, as well as Dollfuss' murder, were organised within, and financed by, the Party in Germany. The Front produced further proof that Hitler was planning to destroy Austrian independence: Austria had been labelled as Gau VIII in Nazi plans, and an Austrian legion – a military unit of Austrian citizens – existed in Germany.

George Clare recalls how Dollfuss was given a lavish and pompous funeral, how pictures and busts of the dead Chancellor suddenly appeared everywhere in Vienna, and how a complete Dollfuss mythology evolved within a year. The day of the Chancellor's burial was called 'a stirring protest of the whole population against the acts of violence committed by the National Socialists'. A campaign was begun to raise money for a monument to Dollfuss. Over two and a half years later, construction on the memorial began. This was to be the college for leaders of Österreichisches Jungvolk.

Each year, the anniversary of Dollfuss' death was marked in grand fashion. In 1935, 280,000 people gathered in the Heldenplatz in Vienna, while both Schuschnigg and Starhemberg delivered memorial speeches. The Chancellor talked of Austrians as crusaders in the struggle to ensure that Austria survived. Starhemberg said that the memory of Dollfuss was
‘nothing more and nothing less than the unqualified declaration of belief in
the timeless, eternal concept of Austria’. He continued that the Austrians
were grateful to Dollfuss for having taught them how to understand the
concept of the Austrian mission.195 A year later, Der Beamte dedicated a
whole page to the life and work of the dead Chancellor, and commented that
Dollfuss had returned the Fatherland to the Austrians. Another page in the
paper was filled with an article describing Dollfuss’ holidays in Lower
Austria.196 In 1937, a requiem was held for Dollfuss in the Stephansdom and
a wreath was laid in the crypt where he lay buried.197 That same year he was
even honoured with his own name day, Engelbert-Sonntag.198

An undated piece of sheet music for the march, ‘We boys stand at the
ready’ is extant in the Vaterländische Front archive. Subtitled ‘Song for
youth’, it contains the following lyrics: ‘Boys, close the ranks well! A dead
man leads us on. He gave his blood for Austria, a true German man. The
murderer’s bullets which hit him stirred the people from their quarrels and
sleep.’ The chorus runs: ‘We boys stand at the ready! With Dollfuss into the
new era!’199 In Front propaganda, Dollfuss seemed to become more than a
man. He was depicted as having died in body only; his soul was living on as
the spirit of the new Austria. Dollfuss was identified with everything that had
changed since the liquidation of democracy, demonstrated by the countless
references to the ‘Dollfuss-state’, ‘Dollfuss-Austria’, ‘Dollfuss-constitution’
and the ‘Dollfuss-course’.200 In short, the martyred Dollfuss became a key
symbol for Austrian identity.

116
Education and Culture

In its genesis, the *Vaterländische Front* was envisaged as a purely political movement, as stated by the law relating to the organisation, which was issued on the same day as the corporate constitution. Paragraph two declared that the aim of the Front was the *political* concentration of all patriotic Austrians. The cabinet papers show that an earlier draft of the law contained the words ‘and cultural’ before ‘concentration’. These were subsequently deleted.\(^2\) A Front communication of 27 April 1934, however, stated that the goal of the organisation was the political *and* cultural concentration of all Austrian patriots.\(^2\) In addition, another communication of March 1934 gave notice that an Office for Culture (*Kulturamt*) was to be established, as the Front should also represent cultural issues in Austria. Its first task was to develop the *Mutterschutzwerk* (mentioned above) as part of a larger social and cultural project for families.\(^3\) In May 1934, the Front’s Culture Department (*Kulturreferat*) was set up under Dr. Leopold Langhammer, while in September of that year, cultural advisers (*Kulturreferente*) were appointed to each borough or district in Austria.\(^4\)

Just over a year later, the first monthly report appeared from the Front’s Culture Department, and was distributed to the heads of the organisation in each of the *Länder*, and through them to local leaders. It explained that the role of the advisers was to promote as Austrian all activity which corresponded with the principles on which the corporate state was based; which was rooted in Austrian tradition; and which fostered respect for Austrian achievements, work and the Austrian way of life. Individuals were
not to be forced to represent these ideas directly in their works, although they were expected to pay due respect to them. The cultural advisers would be responsible for taking action against anti-Austrian attitudes in the cultural sphere. For a work of art to receive the patronage of the Culture Department, it would have to demonstrate a respect for Christian teaching, for 'true' Deutschtum and, therefore, the Austrian idea, and for the new community of the people (Volksgemeinschaft).

The principle behind the Culture Department was to influence rather than control cultural life in Austria. It promoted patriotic works of art and literature, and attempted to arouse interest in Austrian culture by holding evening events which would be entertaining, but instructive. It was not intended, for example, that the evenings should try to compete with dance schools or jazz clubs, although in the provinces, folk dances and folk songs ought to be strongly promoted. Each programme should include at least two presentations that would have the long-term aim of improving the intellectual and cultural awareness of Front members. The evening should conclude on a lighter note, with music, an artistic performance, or some dance. At larger events, slide-shows, short films or poetry readings might be arranged.

One of the most significant ways in which the Culture Department sought to influence cultural life in a patriotic vein was in its promotion of 'the Austrian book'. This term appeared in the Department's October 1935 report. It referred to any work of literature, fiction or non-fiction, which was either a piece of pure patriotic propaganda or, at the very least, displayed a positive stance towards Austria as interpreted by the Vaterländische Front. Already in May 1935, a short list of recommended...
books had been printed which were considered to possess excellent accounts of Austria in a historical context, and which provided a foundation and elaboration of the imperial idea. The books, which included three on Dollfuss, one on the continuity between Seipel and Dollfuss, and two others entitled The Heart of Europe and Austria’s European Mission, were to be made widely available in all localities and particularly in public libraries. In October cultural advisers were advised that, in the months leading up to Christmas, it was essential that a potent propaganda campaign for the Austrian book be pursued. Booksellers should be persuaded to display works by patriotic authors in their shop windows, while every effort was to be made to have anti-Austrian books removed from the shelves. Another list of recommended works included collections of speeches by Schuschnigg and Starhemberg, a biography of Seipel and a few books concerning the construction and ideology of the Ständestaat.

In a further drive to promote patriotic literature, exhibitions of ‘good Austrian books’ were held in the capitals of all the Länder just before Christmas 1935. This campaign was a response to the large amount of National Socialist propaganda being sold very cheaply in Austria. The list of works to be exhibited was divided between political literature and belles-lettres. The former included the usual hagiographies of leading Austrian politicians and selections of their speeches, but also books on political theory which were primarily concerned with corporatism and authoritarian rule. The list of belles-lettres was dominated by contemporary writers such as Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Weinheber and Wildgans. A much more extensive list of recommended books, this time in the form of a catalogue, appeared in
a booklet published by the Culture Department. The catalogue is undated and, although it is not made explicit, it appears that the booklet was intended for general consumption. The introduction affirmed the existence of a distinct Austrian literature and observed that, while not being exhaustive, the list of books included was to help the reader gain a better understanding of the concepts of the Austrian Fatherland and of Austrian culture.

Alongside its work in the field of literature, the Culture Department had six other sub-departments which looked after fine art, music, film, theatre, education and training. The cinema was seen as a highly important medium through which the Front could exert its influence, as it was then the favoured entertainment of the working class. In October 1934, a film institute was established, as was a periodical entitled Der gute Film. Besides encouraging the making of patriotic films and those with artistic value, the institute acted as a filter to eliminate 'inferior' films before they reached the censors. In November and December 1934, the institute rejected twenty-one per cent of films offered for release. In 1935 the proportion had been reduced to only eight per cent. Cultural advisers were instructed to listen to a regular ten minute radio broadcast by the institute, which gave information relating to 'good films'. Traditional crafts were also encouraged, as demonstrated by a week-long exhibition in Hollabrunn in September 1935.

A Front communication from August 1934 stated that the correct upbringing and influencing of children in a patriotic spirit was one of the most important tasks of the new state. It was essential that the younger generation be educated in a manner to enable them to complete the work of
reconstructing the Austrian state. It was noted that, before the establishment of the authoritarian regime, a large proportion of teachers and lecturers had been sympathetic either to Marxism, or to the German-national cause. In 1933, the Ministry of Education made it obligatory for teachers to provide schoolchildren with a patriotic education (*vaterländische Erziehung*). It warned that any attempt to disseminate anti-Austrian propaganda amongst pupils would be treated severely. School authorities were expected to encourage teachers to join the Front and to wear the official badge.

An advisory book for teachers of German at business schools was published by the Front at the end of 1934. Written by Dr. Karl Reishofer, it affords a fascinating insight into the means by which teachers might instil a patriotic spirit in Austrian pupils. Reishofer explained that the main aims of German lessons were to foster a pupil's love and pride in the way of his people and to introduce him to all the cultural achievements of his country. German was the most important subject at school, as it forged links with other subjects, especially History and Geography. In conjunction with these, the subject could develop into an Austrian *Heimatkunde*, that is, a study of the significance of the concepts 'Austria' and 'Austrian'. No literature should be studied which did not properly reflect Austria and the Austrian character. Teachers should work with patriotic texts which, within the larger canon of German literature, presented the particular nature of the Austrian *Heimat* and its purpose and mission within the context of the German novel.
Of equal importance was a study of the history of Austrian literature. Students should be made aware that Austria was the country where the *Nibelungenlied* originated; the place where *Minnesang* flourished; the chosen home of Walther von der Vogelweide; the German heartland of poetic art throughout the Middle Ages; and where the first Faust drama both appeared and was performed. Reishofer then highlighted the renaissance enjoyed at the time by the works of Grillparzer, and commented that the contemporary writers Wildgans and Ginskey were writing poetry in the traditional Austrian style. Reishofer suggested German lessons should also give particular consideration to that poetry from the War which reflected the immense sacrifice of Austria’s heroes for the idea of the Fatherland.

Reishofer also encouraged teachers to enlighten their pupils as to the idiosyncrasies of Austrian German. By making them appreciate the Austrian variants of German, in particular the Viennese dialect, the students would gain a further understanding into the nature of the Austrian character as mirrored in the language. The diction and melody of Austrian German, as opposed to the harder rhythm of the Germans from the North, reflected the greater softness of the Austrian countryside and soul. Similarly, pupils should be introduced to the idiosyncrasies of Austrian punctuation. All in all, the study of Austrian German could be developed into an Austrian philosophy of language.

In 1935 the government issued new curricular guidelines for secondary schools for the forthcoming academic year. They noted the importance of educating young people in a patriotic spirit, by emphasising the study of Austrian literature, history, traditions and geography as well as Austria’s
achievements for the German people and culture. All subjects were to use as much ‘Austrian’ material as possible; history courses in particular should awaken a love for the Austrian people and Fatherland. In addition, pupils were to spend three months studying Bürgerkunde, an introduction to the social and political structure of Ständestaat Austria.\textsuperscript{229}

One of the textbooks used for the seventh and eighth classes was entitled Österreich, Volk und Staat. Published in 1936, it began with extracts from Anton Wildgans’ patriotic Rede über Österreich.\textsuperscript{230} This was followed by a short piece on each of the nine Austrian Länder, written by patriotic authors such as Franz Karl Ginskey, Max Mell and Josef Perkonig. Also included were historical and cultural essays by, amongst others, Hugo Hantsch and Josef Nadler. The volume concluded with a section which contained excerpts from speeches by Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, Starhemberg and Miklas.\textsuperscript{231}

The attempts to educate young people in a patriotic spirit continued outside of the classroom. In summer 1935 courses for teachers were organised to enable them to offer ‘pre-military’ training to their pupils. These mainly attracted physical education instructors. It was estimated that 2,100 teachers of all subjects had taken the courses the following year.\textsuperscript{232} In 1936 the youth organisation, Österreichisches Jungvolk, was established. This extra-curricular association offered outdoor pursuits, as well as musical and cultural activities. Discipline was military, with regular drill, uniforms and the obligatory wearing of the Jungvolk badge. Boys and girls were required to maintain a neat appearance at all times. In a booklet for female members it was stipulated that face, neck, ears, teeth and hands had to be kept clean;
fingernails must be cut and unvarnished; hair carefully combed. Any sort of make-up was forbidden.²³³ Both the boys’ and girls’ organisations had their own monthly magazines – Österreichisches Jungvolk: Weibliche Jugend and Österreichisches Jungvolk: Bubenblatt, with a print run of 100,000 and 85,000 copies respectively.²³⁴ From September 1937, two magazines for each sex were published, targeted at different age groups. The publications contained a mixture of short-cultural historical articles, ideas for activities, and songs with highly patriotic lyrics, as well as contributions from members. One girl wrote of her holiday with the organisation:

Not one of us should like to miss what devotion to the household and to the Heimat brings us – although this continual and great devotion is very easy to overlook ... Amongst fruit, flowers and vegetables, the holidays have developed a sense of preparation for life – a happy, enjoyable training for my future as a housewife. Because that’s what I want to be one day.²³⁵

A comparison with the Hitler-Jugend movement is hard to ignore. As mentioned above, one of the pre-cursors to the youth movement was the Ostmärkische Sturmscharen, founded in December 1930 in Tyrol by Schuschnigg, who remained the association’s leader (the term used was ‘Reichsführer’) until its dissolution in 1936. It started as a cultural-political youth movement, attracting males of university age or younger. The Sturmscharen soon developed into a paramilitary force like the
Heimatschutz, and participated in the fighting of February 1934. Unlike the Heimatschutz, it was a well-organised movement and its patriotic credentials were unquestionable.236

Although Schuschnigg insisted that no organisational connection existed between the Sturmscharen and the Christian Social Party,237 their core ideas were difficult to separate, while Sturmscharen propaganda was identical to that of the Front. Anticipating the May constitution, the Sturmscharen announced in March 1933 that they were Catholics, Germans and Austrians. They called for a re-organisation of the state into Stände and professed their loyalty to the Austrian Fatherland.238 The movement’s organ, Sturm über Österreich, which initially had a circulation of 18,000, contained a variety of political, historical and cultural articles mirroring those to be found in Vaterländische Front. The Austrian mission, Austria’s importance for Europe, true Deutschum and the defects of National Socialism were all regular themes of this propaganda sheet. The fact that their leader was also Chancellor from July 1934 onwards further strengthened the bond. The movement’s professed autonomy could not disguise the fact that it was another instrument of the authoritarian regime in its patriotic campaign.

While the education of the next generation of Austrians was crucial for the future of both the regime and the country, adults were also encouraged to improve their knowledge of Austria’s history, traditions and culture. The archives contain a proof copy of a paper aimed at enlightening adults, entitled Das Schulungsgut der Vaterländische Front.239 It explained that the basis for the new Austrian state was the imperial idea, which should shape the reconstruction of the economy, as well as political and cultural life. The
imperial idea was a divine principle which determined the spiritual life of a people and the co-existence of different peoples. It was said to contain a hierarchy of values for life within the state and for the politics of the state. Ultimately, the imperial idea allowed different peoples to transcend their individual existences and work together for the benefit of the Christian Occident.  

In a section entitled 'History and Patriotic Education', the paper bemoaned the fact that many representations of Austrian history, and not only those in schools, were unsuitable for educating the public in an Austrian way. A new conception of history which promoted belief in Austria had to be introduced to replace the predominant gesamtdeutsch historiography. To understand Austria’s German mission, the document remarked, a clear explanation of the nature of Deutschtum was needed. Only precise historical research could do this, not effusion for the word ‘German’. It was, therefore, necessary to ask, ‘Is racism German? Is centralism German? Is the struggle against Christianity German? Are German and Germanic (germanisch) one and the same?’ The paper asserted that to be German meant to be universal, not narrow. As German people evolved out of Stämme, each with their own characteristics and dialect, ‘German’ was an expression of diversity. For this very reason, it was necessary to emphasise that Austria’s mission was not merely German, but European.

An undated Front pamphlet was issued with the title, ‘Austrians, learn your history!’ The pamphlet, a reaction to Nazi propaganda, took up the Austrian-Prussian polemic. It asked, ‘Who, Austrian Germans, expelled you from the Reich?’ The answer given was ‘the spirit of Potsdam’, created by
the ‘francophile’ Frederick II of Prussia. The pamphlet observed that it was Austria, not Prussia, which had provided the German bulwark against the Turks and the French; Napoleon’s defeat would have been impossible without Austria. It also alleged that ‘the spirit of Potsdam’ destroyed the great German Reich to create a kleinpreussisch one. So while Austria believed in the German spirit which created the great German thinkers and musical giants, it rejected the Potsdam spirit, which in spite of all its national packaging, was un-German and a slap in the face of Austria. National Socialism, the leaflet added, was the barbaric revival of Potsdam. Austria was the last bulwark of the German spirit and because of this, the Austrians had to learn their history, believe in themselves, and be proud to be Austrian. 247

Neues Leben

Neues Leben (New Life) was established by Guido Zernatto when he became secretary general of the Vaterländische Front. It was envisaged as a mass cultural and leisure organisation under the aegis of the Front. In a radio broadcast of July 1936, both Zernatto and Dr. Winkler-Hornradon, the organisation’s head of adult education, outlined the aims of the new Front-Werk. 248 Zernatto explained that, having laid the foundations for the new state, it was time to fulfil Austria’s cultural mission, time to reconnect the Austrian people with their cultural life. The name ‘Neues Leben’ had been chosen, he noted, as it pointed towards the future after the difficult years the state had faced. Dr. Winkler-Hormadon specified that the people themselves
were the architects of *Neues Leben*. Everybody should shape the organisation which, out of the spirit of the new Austria, would prepare the way for an all-encompassing culture of the people (*Volkskultur*). A year later Zernatto talked of *Neues Leben* as a means to regenerate the Austrian people by returning them to the sources of their own folklore and traditions (*Volkstum*), as well as to their own art and culture. According to Gulick, *Neues Leben* was seen as a replacement, and a very poor one at that, for the various Socialist associations which had organised cultural and sporting activities for workers. Moreover, Zernatto had to refute accusations that it was an imitation of similar organisations in Italy and Germany, namely *Dopolavoro* and *Kraft durch Freude*. He argued that *Neues Leben* was unlike its foreign counterparts in that it was not conceived just for the workers, but for all citizens.

In spite of such a claim, it is clear that *Neues Leben*, which expanded the work of the Culture Department, was designed to promote Austrian culture amongst the masses, in particular in urban areas. Indeed a chief aim of the organisation was to ensure that art did not remain the preserve of an educated elite. *Neues Leben* embraced, therefore, new media such as radio and film to develop a popular mass culture. Travelling cinemas were established and listening booths were installed throughout the country for those too poor to afford a wireless set. In seeking to redress the cultural balance between the intelligentsia and the workers, *Neues Leben* adopted a cultural policy favouring traditional *Heimat*-oriented art over modernity. While the secretary general of the organisation, Rudolf Kloss, included ‘modern art’ as an element of Austria’s cultural mission, elsewhere it was
argued that the gap between the artist and the people had widened to the extent that a large proportion of the population indulged in kitsch, to fulfil their cultural needs. Neues Leben advocated the development of a people's culture which should represent the Austrian idea; should be the true manifestation of the character and sensibility of the people; should be closely linked to the individual's Heimat; and should be the product of the broadest sections of society. In this way the 'simple people' would find a path to the high cultural achievements of its greatest men. A further indication of the regime's preference for traditional popular art forms is the list of authors who were honoured by the government in November 1936. Recipients of awards included Josef Weinheber, Paula Grogger and Karl-Heinz Waggerl, three of the most prominent proponents of Heimatkunst.

Membership of Neues Leben was open to any Austrian citizen over the age of eighteen. To encourage as many as possible to join, the organisation did not stipulate that applicants had to be members of the Front, although these did receive a fifty per cent discount on subscription, as did members of the official trade union. The organisation was divided into departments which covered the following areas: literature, art, music, theatre, radio, film, Volkskultur, travel, mountain climbing, guided tours, lectures, and physical training. Benefits for members included reductions on railway tickets, particularly for group travel. The popularity of the organisation, still in its infancy at the time of Anschluss, is shown by the half a million members it had attracted by February 1938. Neues Leben also produced a monthly illustrated magazine which ran three issues from December 1937 to March 1938, with a print run of 300,000.
In addition to the many exhibitions co-ordinated by Neues Leben, such as ‘Landscape Drawings from Austria’, ‘Austrian Costumes’ and ‘Modern Peasant Furniture’, a number of competitions were run for all members. In one, competitors were invited to design a souvenir ‘which positively expressed Austria’s good taste’. In another, they were asked to show how festivals could be celebrated, using old regional or local customs. A competition entitled ‘The Good Austrian Cine-film’ invited members to send in a film which showed Austria’s beauty. There were no rules to govern the subject matter, although suggestions given included Austrian festivals, local customs and ‘our people at work’. An information sheet for Neues Leben in Vienna showed that, in its first year, the city had organised almost 300 lectures, 150 tours, 30 excursions, 100 literary and musical evenings, 40 theatre trips, and a number of educational courses.

The Legitimist Question in the Authoritarian Era

The contribution of the legitimist organisations to the promotion of an Austrian identity is discussed in the following chapter. Here we will examine the role which the legitimist question played in government propaganda in the Ständestaat era.

That a restoration of the monarchy was considered during Schuschnigg’s tenure is well documented. In July 1935 the Chancellor admitted to Zessner-Spitzenberg, a leading figure in the legitimist movement, that the repealing of the anti-Habsburg laws was, in his opinion, the first step towards a restoration of the Monarchy. Otto von Habsburg would only really be able
to return to Austria with his full dynastic rights restored. A year earlier, as
Minister for Justice, Schuschnigg had met Otto in Paris and assured him that
the goal of restoration would influence his policies wherever possible.

Once he had been appointed Chancellor, Schuschnigg met Otto again and
discussed the conditions upon which the latter’s becoming Austria’s head of
state depended. To minimise foreign opposition, the heir would not be able
to carry the title Emperor, but Prince (Landesfürst). For diplomatic
purposes, a referendum on the question of restoration would also have to be
arranged. Negotiations between the government and the Habsburgs
continued throughout Schuschnigg’s tenure. Further meetings between the
Chancellor and Otto took place in August 1936 and January 1937. At the
second of these the Chancellor pledged to effect a restoration some time that
year, even if this risked a serious European conflict. Perhaps the most
famous communication between the two parties was the letter written by
Otto to Schuschnigg dated 11 February 1938. In a last ditch attempt to save
Austria, Otto offered to take over control of the country, not as a monarch,
but as Chancellor. Schuschnigg rejected the idea.

Although details of negotiations between the Austrian government and
Otto were kept secret, the fact that a restoration was being considered was
not. In February 1937 Schuschnigg discussed the matter with Hitler’s
Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, in Vienna. Von Neurath told the
Chancellor quite bluntly that such a move would mean suicide for Austria.
The Germans evidently took Schuschnigg’s words seriously, as they gave the
codename ‘Otto’ to the plan for the invasion of Austria.
Within Austria, the legitimist cause drew much comment from official circles. Under Dollfuss, who openly confessed that he was not a monarchist, the official position was that any propaganda which supported the patriotic campaign was to be welcomed, although a restoration was out of the question. In response to alarmist reports from abroad that Dollfuss had been fixing the terms of a restoration with the Italians and Hungarians in Rome, a Front bulletin from 16 March 1934 quoted various leading politicians on the matter. Dollfuss had stated in a Graz newspaper that a reconsideration of the anti-Habsburg laws and the restoration of the Monarchy were totally separate issues. It was damaging to Austria's position to put the two together. Vice-Chancellor Emil Fey had said in an interview for a Parisian paper that the monarchist question was not relevant. In any case, the possibility of a restoration could not be decided by Austria alone as it was an international, rather than purely Austrian concern. If the government accepted the support of the legitimists within the Vaterländische Front, this did not mean that it concurred with the movement's programme.  

Unlike his predecessor, Schuschnigg was a convinced monarchist and a member of the largest legitimist grouping within Austria. During his time as Chancellor, the government's attitude towards a restoration became more sympathetic. At the first Front congress in January 1936, Starhemberg said:

It is understandable and welcome that, at the time when Austria has become Austrian again, the memory of a term has been awakened which is inseparably linked to our Fatherland: the term Habsburg ... It is impossible to want to shape an
Austria of the future, which in some form is not rooted in the past, and it is quite impossible to deny that over the centuries Habsburg’s greatness was also Austria’s greatness … A healthy monarchist propaganda is firmly in accordance with the patriotic idea and supplements it valuably. We can quite well imagine that the time will come when the terms Habsburg and Austria come together again for the fortune and blossoming of both …

While this speech admitted no concrete plans for a restoration, a clear sign was given that the idea was being considered. In a more radical departure from the attitude towards a restoration in the Dollfuss period, Schuschnigg declared at the second Front congress that any decision regarding the form of state in Austria was to be made by Austria alone and not by the international community.

In spite of Schuschnigg’s sympathy for the legitimist cause, his ultimate rejection of a restoration, even of Otto’s becoming Chancellor, illustrates that he understood the impossibility of such a move. Nevertheless, the restoration question throughout the Ständestaat era provided much nourishment for the patriotic cause. In recognition of this fact, the legitimists were accorded a semi-autonomous position within the Front. The Traditionsreferat was established as a counter-balance to the Front organisation for the ‘legal opposition’, who were Nazis by any other name. Its official brief was to cultivate Austrian historical tradition, although its leadership strove for greater influence within the Front. Zessner-
Spitzenberg, who became head of the *Traditionsreferat*, saw its role as being that of an important pressure group which would lay the foundations for a distinct Austrian historical and *national* consciousness.\textsuperscript{273} The importance of such a statement, which will be discussed in the next two chapters, was that amongst the legitimists there were those who publicly affirmed the existence of an Austrian nation.

**Conclusion**

Seipel’s efforts to discourage blind faith in the *Anschluss* solution by postulating the value of an independent *Österreichertum* were continued and elaborated in the *Ständestaat* era. The former Chancellor had encouraged a belief in the economic viability of the country and intellectually reformulated a conservative paradigm of collective identity which, while strongly acknowledging the ethnic and cultural relationship with other Germans, isolated the Austrians as a distinct *Stamm* with unique qualities formed as a result of their particular historical development. The change of regime in Germany, which turned a peaceful neighbour into a hostile one, precipitated an amplification of Seipel’s Austrian ideology under Dollfuß and Schuschnigg, transforming the political and social climate of the country.

Unlike the NSDAP in Germany, which had gained mass support before coming to power, the *Ständestaat* regime lacked a popular mandate, but was rather imposed on the Austrian population from above. The introduction of authoritarian rule was justified in public as the best means of preserving Austrian sovereignty, and all that this implied for European and German
culture and values. In this way, the Ständestaat regime equated itself with
Austrian patriotism and 'true' German national feeling. Although the
regime's political elite may genuinely have believed some of its own
propaganda, it could not hide the fact that, on another level, the liquidation
of parliamentary democracy was a crude way of preserving conservative
hegemony in Austria, and crushing the Social Democratic opposition. That
the Dollfuss government was greatly encouraged to destroy parliamentary
democracy by Mussolini and the Fascist Heimwehren, significant elements of
which were sympathetic to union with the Third Reich, throws further doubt
on the supposed patriotic motives of the move to authoritarian rule.

The Vaterländische Front was supposed to be the replacement for
political parties in Austria. It was the mechanism with which the Dollfuss-
Schuschnigg regime attempted to disseminate their construct of
Österreichertum. The Front sought to engage as large a proportion of the
population as possible, and infuse all areas of life with its patriotic
ideology.\(^{274}\) Like ruling parties in other dictatorships it established a variety
of subsidiary organisations targeted at different activities and sections of the
population. Heinrich Bußhoff maintains that the Front was chiefly an
organisation established to support and consolidate government power. He
argues that it never evolved into what it was claimed to be – a great patriotic
movement independent of party or class.\(^{275}\) It has been shown above that
membership was anything but voluntary.

Lacking a clear sense of 'the other' with regards to Germany, the
Austrian identity promoted in the authoritarian era must have at times
appeared confusing. Bußhoff has suggested that *homo Austriacus* was
posited only as an antithesis to the National Socialist, without any concrete contemporary goals. It is Schuschnigg again who ironically betrayed the deficiencies of the regime’s ideology. In Dreimal Österreich he cited a speech by Hammerstein in 1935, who had said that the Austrian idea was difficult to grasp.

A major faultline in Ständestaat ideology, according to Bernard Natter, was an overestimation of the importance of Austria in the inter-war era. The idea of a Christian universal empire in central Europe was out of proportion to the actual political power that Austria wielded internationally. It could not compete effectively, he states, with the ‘earthier imperialism of the Third Reich’. Moreover he contends that the concept of Austria’s mission as a bringer of German culture to south-east Europe could just as easily be exploited by National Socialism to further its expansionist aims in that region.

1 Whether one can label the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime ‘Fascist’ has been the subject of debate. James William Miller sees Dollfuss as a ‘peasant authoritarian’ rather than a Fascist and labels his government an ‘association of convenience between Fascist and non-Fascist elements.’ Miller, James William, ‘Bauerndemokratie in Practice: Dollfuß and the Austrian Agricultural Health System’ in German Studies Review, Volume IX, No. 3, October 1988, pp. 405-07. Hans Mommsen argues that the Ständestaat lacked several basic characteristics of a Fascist state, even if some parallels did exist. See Mommsen, Hans, ‘Theorie und Praxis des österreichischen Ständestaats 1934 bis 1938’ in Leser, pp. 174-92. I have followed Mommsen’s practice and employed the term ‘authoritarian regime’. See also Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria, p. 237.

2 The last democratic elections in Germany before World War II took place just a day after the final Nationalrat session.


5 Starhemberg, Ernst Rüdiger, Memoiren, Amalthea Verlag, Vienna and Munich, 1971, p. 126.
Behind the government were 66 Christian Socials, 9 Landbund deputies and 8 from the Heimatblock. In opposition were 72 Social Democrats and 10 Pan-Germans.

For a more detailed account of the events see Gulick, Volume II, pp. 1018-22.


Ibid., p. 66 fn. See also Carsten, The First Austrian Republic, p. 182.

Gehl, p. 233.


Dreimal Österreich, pp. 213-14 and p. 235.

Gulick, Volume II, p. 1858.

Ibid., pp. 994-95.

Kluge, Ulrich, Der Österreichische Ständestaat 1934-1938. Entstehung und Scheitern, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna, 1984, pp 51-52; Bärnthaler, p. 10

National Socialist violence in Austria had escalated in 1932 with clashes between Nazis and Social Democrats. In June 1933, bomb attacks began; by February 1934 there were as many as forty explosions a day throughout the country. See Pauley, Bruce, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism, The Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1981, pp. 105-06.

The precise role which Germany played in the putsch has not been established. Internationally, however, Hitler was implicated in the affair.

For the full protocol of the agreement, see Reichhold, pp. 220-21.

At best, this group could be equated with the old Pan-Germans. At worst, they were nothing more than National Socialists with a respectable face.


The details of the Berchtesgaden meeting are sufficiently well known to be able to omit them here. For the most comprehensive account see Schuschnigg, Kurt von, Austrian Requiem.

Ibid., p. 36.


Ibid., p. 132.

For more on Orel see ibid., pp. 142-45.


For more details on the constitutional reforms of 1929 see ibid., pp. 874-77.

More on the Heimwehren’s relationship with elements of the conservative political elite in this period can be found in Edmondson, C. Earl, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics 1918-1936, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1978, pp. 72-81. See also Kerekes, Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie, pp. 57-64.


Dreimal Österreich, pp. 80, 93. For the continuity between Seipel and Dollfuß see also Bärnthaler, p. 9. Gerhard Jagschitz, on the other hand, has argued that there was only minor continuity between the two Chancellors. He discerns differences between their political practice, in intellect, and attitude towards religion. See Jagschitz, Gerhard, ‘Engelbert Dollfuß’ in Weissensteimer, Friedrich and Weinzierl, Erika (eds.), Die österreichischen Bundeskanzler – Leben und Werk, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, Vienna, 1983, pp. 208-9.

Bußhofl, p. 312. See also Fabri, Friedrich, Zur Psychologie des österreichischen Nationalgedankens unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des legitimistischen konservativen Denkens (1918-38), PhD, Mainz, 1954, pp. 40-41.

See, for example, an article entitled ‘Nation und Staat’ in Wiener Stadt-Journal, 8/8/36.


See ibid., p. 82.

Reproduced in Berchtold, p. 431.

Protokolle des Ministerrates der Ersten Republik: Ab. VIII, Band 6, p. 488.

See, for example, Tautscher, p. 59.

Ibid., pp. 84-86.

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik, Parteiarchive/Vaterländische Front (henceforth ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF), K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, Ausgabe für die Landeshauptstädte, 19/1/36. See also Vaterländische Front, February 1936.


See Wiener Stadt-Journal (a Vaterländische Front paper for Vienna), 22/7/36, p. 1; also Dreimal Österreich, p. 311.


For examples of some of the criticisms levelled at the Austrians, see an article in Reichspost 15/4/32, p. 3.


Tautscher, pp. 81, 84.

See Bußhoff, p. 17.

As Dollfuß emphasised in a speech on 25/6/33, cited in Tautscher, p. 118.

ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, Wiener Ausgabe III, 19/1/36.

Protokolle des Klubvorstandes, p. 249.

ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.50, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 23/11/34.

Quoted in Bärnthaler, p. 41.


Kindermann, p. 27.

Austrian Requiem, p. 37.

Bußhoff, p. 39.
67 See, for example, Dreimal Österreich, p. 21, or an article entitled ‘Der Kampf um das Reichsgedanken’ in Vaterländische Front, November 1933, p. 2.
68 Dreimal Österreich, p. 21.
69 Vaterländische Front, November 1933, p. 2.
70 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.50, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländische Front, 20/12/34.
71 Tautscher, p. 49.
72 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.50, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 20/12/34.
73 Ibid., K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 19/1/36, Wiener Ausgabe III.
74 This idea was not conceived by the Ständestaat. It was Goebbels who famously said in a speech in May 1931: ‘National Socialism is modern Prussianism. We National Socialists are today the Prussians in Germany, irrespective of whether one is a Wurttemberger, Bavarian or anything else. The idea is Prussia...’. See Reichspost, 15/4/32, p. 3.
75 It is difficult to find an accurate translation of Stamm in English. Bluhm notes that it translates literally as ‘tribe’ (see Bluhm, p. 4), while Peniston-Bird in her glossary refers to it as ‘of common stock’ (see Peniston-Bird, p. iv). The latter is closer to the German, but too awkward and cumbersome to be used repeatedly in English. As with many other words in this study, I have left it in the German throughout.
76 See, for example, Tautscher, p. 81.
77 Vaterländische Front, November 1933, p. 1.
78 Tautscher, p. 86.
79 Wiener Stadt-Journal, 11/1/37, p. 3.
80 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 28/2/34.
81 Quoted in Bußhoff, p. 45.
82 Tautscher, p. 80.
83 Quoted in Bärnthaler, p. 19.
84 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 19/1/36, Wiener Ausgabe III.
85 Ibid., K.46, 3/11/37, Ausgabe für die Landeshauptstädte.
86 Wiener Front, April 1937, p. 4.
88 Dreimal Österreich, p. 331.
89 Tautscher, p. 83.
90 Dreimal Österreich, p. 317.
91 Bußhoff, p. 28.
92 Tautscher, p. 84.
93 Reproduced in Reichhold, p. 95.
94 Wiener Zeitung, 19/1/1934, reproduced in ibid., p. 110.
95 Protokolle des Ministerrates der Ersten Republik: Ab. VIII, Band 6, p. 488.
96 Ibid.
97 Berchtold, p. 436. See also Vaterländische Front, May 1934, p. 2.
99 Ibid., p. 13.
100 See, for example, ibid., p. 16, p. 49, p. 64; Wiener Front, April 1937, p. 4.
101 Tautscher, p. 79.
102 Ibid.
103 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 2/2/34.
105 There are countless works that explore the antecedents of Nazi ideology. One that focuses on the quasi-religious aspects of this is Goodricke-Clarke, Nicholas, The Occult

106 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K. 49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 2/2/34.
108 Berchthold, p. 436
110 Tautscher, p. 57.
111 Ibid., p. 59.
112 Berchthold, pp. 434-35.
113 Ibid., p. 434.
114 Bärnthaler, p. 27.
117 Ibid., p. 37.
118 Ibid., p. 39.
119 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
120 Ibid., p. 62.
121 Ibid., p. 44.
122 Tautscher, p. 49.
123 Dreimal Österreich, p. 117.
124 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K. 47, Pressedienststelle der Stadt Wien, 14/6/37, Wiener Ausgabe III.
125 Dreimal Österreich, p. 80.
126 Ibid., p. 228.
127 For a more detailed analysis of Starhemberg’s role in the First Republic, see the chapter on the Heimatschutz.
128 Starhemberg, p. 138.
129 Ibid., pp. 139-142.
131 The article is reproduced in Reichhold, p. 95.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 This is confirmed by Schuschnigg in Dreimal Österreich, p. 222.
135 Protokolle des Klubvorstandes, p. 263.
136 Bärnthaler, p. 15.
138 Bärnthaler, p. 87.
139 See Protokolle des Klubvorstandes, pp. 153, 205.
140 Bärnthaler, pp. 20, 71, 105.
141 Zernatto, p. 94.
142 Bärnthaler, p. 105.
144 Ibid., p. 104.
146 Vaterländische Front, November 1933, p. 1.
147 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.50, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 3/11/34.
148 The colours of the Austrian flag.
149
150 Goodricke-Clarke, p. 20.
ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.51, Flugblätter, ‘Das Kruckenkreuz’. 
Bärnthaler, p. 28.

Ibid., p. 27.

ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.50, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 21/9/34.
Ibid., 28/9/34.

Bärnthaler, p. 74.

Zernatto, p. 93-94.


For more on the Sturmscharen, see below.

Zernatto, p. 91.

Vaterländische Front, February 1934, p. 2.

See, for example, Vaterländische Front, March 1934, p. 11.


See ibid., K.48.

See ibid., K.53.

Ibid., K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 12/1/34.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., K.55, ‘Versammlungs- und Rednerordnung der Vaterländischen Front’.

See ibid., K.55, ‘Redner – Informationsdienst’.

Ibid., K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 12/1/34 and 19/1/34; Vaterländische Front, February 1934.

ÖSta/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 16/3/34.

Ibid., K.49, 12/1/34; K.49,19/1/34.

Ibid., K.49, 6/4/34.

Ibid., K.49, 16/3/34, K.49, 25/5/34.

Ibid., K.49, 6/7/34.

Ibid., K.49, 9/3/34. For other tales of woe see ibid., K.49, 16/3/34.

Ibid., K.49, 8/6/34.

Ibid., K.50, 18/1/35.

Ibid., K.50, 1/2/35.


ÖSta/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 28/7/34.

Vaterländische Front, August 1934, p. 1.

ÖSta/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 10/8/34.


Ibid., K.50, 5/10/34.

Ibid., K.50, 10/8/34.


Vaterländische Front, October 1934.


Der Beamte – Organ der Dienststellenorganisation der V.F., 24/7/36, pp. 1, 3.
Ibid., p. 150. For more on the prevalence of gesamtdeutsch historiography in inter-war Austria see chapter four.

Ibid., p. 159.

Ibid., pp. 178-79.

Ibid., p. 185.

Ibid., K.51, Flugblätter.

Ibid.

Ibid., K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 1/7/36, Wiener Ausgabe II.

Ibid., K.45, 5/5/37, Wiener Ausgabe III.


ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 28/7/36, Wiener Ausgabe II.


Bärnthaler, p. 191.


Ibid., March 1937, p. 72.

Ibid., January 1937, p. 2; April 1937, p. 121; Neues Leben, December 1937, p. 19.


Neues Leben

ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.45, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 21/1/37, Wiener Ausgabe.

Ibid., K.56, Mitteilungsblatt der Landesschwalwerschaft Wien, July 1937, p. 2.

For details on the anti-Habsburg laws see the following chapter.

Mosser, Ingrid, Der Legitimismus und die Frage der Habsburger-restauration in der innenpolitischen Zielsetzung des autoritären Regimes in Österreich (1933-1938), PhD, Vienna, 1979, pp. 185-86.

Ibid., p. 198.

Ibid., pp. 201-04.


Ibid., pp. 311-12.

Ibid., p. 306.

ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 16/3/34.

Ibid., K.46, Pressedienststelle der Vaterländischen Front, 19/1/36, Wiener Ausgabe V.

Ibid., K.54, ‘17.18. OKTOBER 1936’, p. 22.


Ibid., p. 74. For more information on the Traditionsreferat, see the following chapter.

Gerhard Jagschitz believes that the VF did not turn out as Dollfuss had hoped and that it became merely a large bureaucratic apparatus. See Jagschitz in Weissensteimer/Weinzierl, p. 205.

Bußhoff, p. 307.

Ibid., p. 19.

Dreimal Österreich, p. 329.

Chapter 3

The Heimatschutz and Legitimists

In a chart showing diverse social theories in inter-war Austria, Alfred Diamant has grouped the Heimatschutz and the legitimists together as exhibiting anti-democratic and pro-capitalist trends.¹ Other similarities between the two invite an examination of them together in this chapter. Neither was strictly a political party, although the Heimatblock won eight parliamentary seats in 1930, while Gustav Wolff’s legitimist organisation feebly contested the 1923 and 1927 elections. Secondly, both the Heimatschutz and the legitimists sided with the patriotic campaign after 1933. Thirdly, a significant overlap existed in the membership of both organisations. While the Heimatschutz programme did not include a demand for the restoration of the Habsburgs, many of the movement’s leaders harboured monarchist sympathies,² particularly those officers who had served in the army under the Imperial regime. One could similarly find members of legitimist associations who participated in Heimatschutz activities. Finally, both the Heimatschutz and the legitimists were heterogeneous and splintered movements, containing various factions and associations.

This chapter examines the two organisations consecutively, starting with a brief history of the movements and placing them in the context of the inter-war period. The main body of the chapter is devoted to the publicity of both groupings in the Ständestaat era, and analyses how this contributed to the
promotion of an Austrian identity. The conclusion will consider how effectively the movements contributed to the patriotic campaign.

The *Heimatschutz* – Origins and History

The *Heimatschutz* represents the most problematic group for this study. Given the autonomous nature of the provincial associations, any attempts to generalise about the movement, or to deal with it in a couple of paragraphs, must fail. For instance, it is misleading to suggest that the *Heimatschutz* was a consistent defender of Austrian sovereignty, given that its Styrian association worked closely with the National Socialists to destroy independence. Even the name of the movement presents difficulties. In an article on the early history of the organisation, C. Earl Edmondson opts for the label *Heimwehr* when referring to the movement as a whole.⁴ This is a practice adhered to by many commentators writing in English.⁵ Starhemberg, however, uses the term *Heimatschutz* in his memoirs,⁶ as does Schuschnigg in *Dreimal Österreich*.⁷ Edmondson points out that different names were used for the associations in each *Land*.⁸ Thus the names *Heimatdienst, Selbstschutzverband, Heimwehr, Heimatwehr, Heimschutzverband* and *Heimatschutz* were all used to refer to provincial associations. These acquired a central leadership in 1930 under Starhemberg, who was known as the *Bundesführer* (Federal Leader) of the Austrian *Heimatschutz*. Moreover, the movement’s official organ, which first appeared on 10 September 1932, was called *Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung*, and from 4 November
1933, Der Heimatschützer. In this chapter Heimwehr will be used to refer to the movement as a whole in the 1920s, and Heimatschutz in the 1930s.

The various Heimwehr associations emerged at the end of the War, most notably in the border regions of German-Austria. As ad hoc units of soldiers, students and peasants, they defended in particular the borders of Carinthia and Styria from the incursions of Yugoslav troops. In addition to the menace of foreign invasion, the threat of a Socialist revolution prompted further action from these local defence units. Widespread fear was caused by the formation of armed Socialist groups, as well as by revolutionary activity in neighbouring Bavaria and Hungary. While Heimwehr and Socialist formations initially co-operated to repel the Yugoslavs, the collaboration ended when the threat from the south had passed. Throughout the inter-war era the Heimwehr would parade itself as the archenemy of Socialists, Marxists, Bolsheviks or Communists – these terms were used interchangeably in their propaganda. Indeed, it could be argued that the urge to destroy the Social Democratic Party and its associate paramilitary formation, together with the rejection of parliamentary democracy, were the only factors of cohesion within the movement.

By the summer of 1920, Heimwehr organisations had been established on a more official basis in several of the Austrian Länder. In Styria and Salzburg, groups received direct subsidies from Munich. An all-Austrian union of right-wing paramilitary forces was formed with the help of a similar association in Bavaria. The latter's aim was the unification of all Germans in a single state, and in the 1920s at least, a large proportion of the Heimwehr associations were Pan-German in outlook. Many of them, for
instance, were unhappy with Seipel's rejection of Anschluss and opposed his acceptance of the Geneva loan in 1922.\textsuperscript{13} Even Starhemberg, who in his memoirs seeks to present himself as the most patriotic of all Austrians, admits that in the first few years after the War, while a member of various paramilitary units, he was greatly influenced by German-national and National Socialist thinking.\textsuperscript{14} It is critical to understand this background when assessing the contribution of the Heimatschutz to the dissemination of an Austrian consciousness.

The Heimwehr organisations presented themselves as supra-party associations and they attracted members from the three main bourgeois parties (Christian Socials, Pan-Germans and Landbund). Consequently they urged their following to vote for any non-Socialist candidate at elections. Strong links existed between the Heimwehren and sections of the Christian Social Party, paving the way for the power share in the early Ständestaat era. In a few Länder, such as Vorarlberg, the movement enjoyed the status of a semi-official auxiliary police force, by co-operating closely with the Christian Social administration. An attempt by Seipel and the overall Heimwehr leader, Richard Steidle, to repeat this on a national level failed because of disagreement between different factions in the movement.\textsuperscript{15} Meanwhile, as early as 1920, the Styrian association split into two groups, one Christian Social, the other Pan-German.\textsuperscript{16} Ideological as well as regional differences within the Heimwehr are important factors to consider when gauging the effectiveness of the movement as a vehicle for Austrian patriotism.

The central leadership of the Heimwehr was often weak. In 1923, three distinct groupings could be identified.\textsuperscript{17} The largest of these was known as
the Alpine Club, comprising associations from Carinthia, Salzburg, Upper Austria, the Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Its centre of gravity was in Innsbruck, thus bestowing upon the Tyrolean leader, Richard Steidle, and his chief of staff, Major Pabst, a de facto leadership. Over the next few years several attempts were made to unite the rest of the provincial organisations, with varying results. Yet a significant cleavage still existed between the Styrian organisation and the other associations. In July 1928, therefore, a conference of the Heimwehren established a dual leadership for the movement, whereby Walter Pfrimer, the German nationalist head of the Styrian Heimatschutz, became the second federal leader alongside Steidle, with the same rights to make emergency decisions. This gave the movement a fragile unity at a time when the number and size of its marches and demonstrations were increasing although, as the American military attaché in Vienna noted, the provincial organisations still enjoyed a large measure of independence. He added that in each Land, an executive committee was composed of Pan-German and Christian Social supporters, according to either party’s representation in the provincial diet.

With the right wing of the Christian Social party seeking to eclipse all Socialist influence in Austria and move towards a more authoritarian course, the ties between the government and Heimwehr were strengthened. In a speech in December 1928, Seipel openly acknowledged his support for the movement. He remarked that the Heimwehr was a useful tool for eliminating the hegemony of the parties. At about the same time, the Heimwehr came under the influence of the corporatist ideas of Othmar Spann. In September 1929 it demanded radical constitutional changes, offering to participate in
the cabinet if the present government felt too weak to instigate them.  

Under Schober, the reform of the constitution in November 1929 met some of these demands, although the Heimwehr became impatient and threatened a putsch on the night of 18 November. On the advice of Seipel, it backed down, although this episode underlined the uneasy relationship between the movement and the central administration.

Like Seipel, both Schober and Army Minister Vaugoin displayed considerable sympathy for the Heimwehr and its aims. As long as it could be manipulated as a force to counter the Social Democrats and the Schutzbund, it was seen as a valuable ally. When it started to demand political power for itself, its influence needed to be checked. Hence Schober ordered the expatriation of Pabst in June 1930 for meddling in Austrian affairs. Moreover, the German nationalist elements in the Heimwehren complicated the movement’s relationship with those leading political figures such as Seipel, who defended the independence of Austria against the Anschluss idea.

May 1930 saw the swearing of the Korneuburger oath, which outlined the fundamental aims of the Heimwehr. It began, ‘We want to reconstruct Austria from its foundations. We want the People’s State of the Heimwehren’. The oath rejected western parliamentary democracy, demanding in its place a corporatist state with a strong, non-party leadership. It did not, however, make any specific references to Austria, stipulating only that those who took the oath professed themselves to be ‘bearers of the new German state idea’. The same year marked the ascendancy of Starhemberg who, with his close ties to both Mussolini and
the Christian Socials, became federal leader of the *Heimatschutz* on 2 September, and later in that month received the post of Minister of the Interior in Vaugoin's government. Another *Heimatschutz* leader, Hueber, Hermann Göring's brother-in-law, became Minister for Justice.

Parliamentary elections were scheduled for 9 November. For the first time, the movement contested the elections, winning eight seats. Its manifesto contained stronger and more explicit German nationalist sentiments than the Korneuburger Oath. The aim of the movement, it stated, was a united German *Ständestaat*.²⁹

Following the election, the coalition with the Christian Socials broke up. Starhemberg had tried to negotiate an electoral pact with the National Socialists and openly predicted that the two movements would unite. Within the ranks of the *Heimatschutz* a certain discontent was voiced that the movement had abandoned its non-party stance while old squabbles between rival factions split the membership between those who supported Starhemberg and others loyal to Steidle.³⁰ The movement's desperation manifested itself in September 1931, when Pfrimer attempted a badly-organised *putsch* which the government quashed without difficulty. Starhemberg hoped to hold the *Heimatschutz* together by placating the nationalist elements. What is more, he went to Berlin in April 1932 for talks with Hitler.³¹ However, when the offer came from Dollfuss to participate in his new government, Starhemberg led the movement into the patriotic, anti-*Anschluss* camp, thereby causing a complete break with the Styrian organisation, which by now was openly co-operating with the National Socialists.

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The *Heimatschutz* received three cabinet posts, while Starhemberg later became deputy leader of the *Vaterländische Front* and, under Schuschnigg, both its leader and Vice-Chancellor of Austria. This delicate compromise lasted until May 1936 when Starhemberg was dismissed from the government and the Front. By this time, the power of the *Heimatschutz* had diminished, having also lost the important backing of Mussolini since his accommodation with Hitler. In October of that year, the organisation was liquidated and its members integrated into the patriotic *Frontmiliz*.

**The *Heimatschutz* and Austrian Identity**

It has been noted that a large proportion of the *Heimatschutz* was sympathetic to the Pan-German cause. Not only had many of its members fought alongside German soldiers during the war (and some of these, like Starhemberg, later in the *Freikorps*), but the role played by Reich Germans in the formation, development and subsidy of the paramilitary units also fostered the dream of a greater Germany amongst the early associations. *Der Starhemberg-Jäger*, the paper of the Upper Austrian *Heimatwehr*, openly declared its support for *Anschluss* in February 1930.\(^{32}\) The desire for greater German unity was still being voiced by *Heimatschutz* propaganda in 1932. For example, in the second edition of the movement’s official organ, *Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung*, an article stated that the movement ‘continually regretted’ that the Germans in Austria could not be united with their ‘brothers in Saxony, Bavaria, Pomerania, Prussia and Swabia, in Württemberg, Schleswig, Hanover and Baden’.\(^{33}\) A week later, the same
paper attacked French attempts to interfere in Austrian affairs and prevent Anschluss by encouraging the restoration of the Habsburgs. Staatswehr, a legitimist paper, noted in October 1932 that Heimatschutz rallies openly supported Anschluss, while Steidle told a Heimatschutz meeting in the same month that the terms of St. Germain could not be enforced indefinitely. ‘We will … have to wait’, he said, ‘until the great German Reich is again capable of playing the role she merits in the world’. Similarly, in January 1933 Starhemberg told the Viennese association that the Austrian people would have to put up with the injustice of St. Germain until they had the strength to struggle for self-determination.

Within this context of Greater-German aspirations, the Heimwehren always displayed their own brand of patriotism: they were attached to their Heimat, rather than to the Austrian state. Der Starhemberg-Jäger noted in 1930 that the source of loyalty to German Volkstum had to be a love of one’s Heimat. Starhemberg himself remarked that one of the tasks of the Heimwehren was to foster this love amongst young people. The larger Fatherland remained Germany, in which Austria, the old Ostmark, should play an integrated but important role. For this reason Der Starhemberg-Jäger agreed with the opinion of former Chancellor Streeruwitz, who had said that the Austrians would not come to the Reich as beggars demanding Anschluss, but as German citizens with equal rights. Moreover, in spite of admiration for the NSDAP in Germany, the paper insisted that regeneration in Austria could only be achieved by a ‘native’ movement, not one imported from outside.
Heimatschutz propaganda frequently appeared to contradict itself, however. The same article which criticised French obstruction of Anschluss also called for a strong ‘anti-Marxist’ front to protect Austria’s Deutschum and safeguard Austria’s independence, as ‘only an independent Austria, an Austria that [was] half-way stabilised economically, [could keep] the German legacy of the Ostmark truly German’. Meanwhile, three months before his attack on the Treaty of St. Germain, Starhemberg delivered a speech in Vienna at the first meeting of the Heimatschutz leadership, in which he stressed the movement’s role in the reconstruction of Austria to secure her independence.

These confusing signals reflect the ethereal nature of Austrian identity in the inter-war years, and also highlight how the variety of Heimwehr associations differed and vacillated in their conception of this identity. When established as an important player in the government coalition, but unsure of its future role in Austrian affairs, the Heimatschutz closely watched the events unfolding in Germany. Democracy in the Reich seemed to have been eclipsed, although the supremacy of the National Socialists was as yet unclear. Ideologically, the Heimatschutz claimed it was closer to the German right-wing veterans’ paramilitary association, the Stahlhelm, than to the Nazis, yet its relationship to Hitler’s party was ambivalent. When the National Socialists appeared to be unco-operative with the other national parties in Germany, they were derided by Heimatschutz propaganda. Hitler’s negotiations with the Catholic Centre Party were dismissed as the product of a ‘shameless greed for power’.
When Hitler finally accepted the leadership of a coalition government, however, the paper was suddenly full of praise. Under the headline ‘Patriotic Government in Germany too!’, an article explained that the Adolf Hitler who headed the new coalition cabinet was not the same Adolf Hitler who had paraded himself as the party leader only a few months previously. Just as the National Socialists, by ‘sacrificing their Party egoism on the altar of the Fatherland’, could now be the true bearers and executors of the Fascist idea in Germany, the Heimatschutz was the only native movement in Austria capable of bringing Fascism to the ‘second German state’. 45

It is revealing that the Heimatschutz leadership and propaganda writers were quick to contrast the NSDAP in the Reich with the Austrian Nazis. The harsh anti-Socialist measures of the Nazi Party in Germany were applauded, whereas criticism was levelled at its Austrian counterparts who, in an attempt to win mandates, were ‘siding ... publicly with the Austrobolsheviks’. 46 This article referred to the fact that the National Socialists, like the Social Democrats, were demanded the recall of Parliament, following its suspension on 4 March, and calling for fresh Parliamentary elections. If the 1932 Landtag elections were a reliable guide to the strength of their support in Austria, the Nazis could expect an impressive showing at a general election. 47 The Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung called on them, however, to follow Hitler’s example, reject the extant political system and become patriotic. 48 Another article contained an open letter from Starhemberg to the leader of the Austrian National Socialists, Alfred Prokesch. Starhemberg argued that the German and Austrian parties had only the name and uniform in common. The German
NSDAP, he declared, was a national movement for regeneration and freedom, led by men of German blood. The Austrian equivalent was a political party, led by a handful of people with Czech roots, which represented a serious threat to Deutschum in Austria.49

In its Janus-like attitude towards National Socialism in the early months of 1933, the Heimatschutz leadership betrayed its own thirst for power. It savaged those who practised party politics, yet had found excuses for its own participation in the system since 1930. Unlike the Austrian Nazis, the Heimatschutz could not be sure of winning many seats in fresh parliamentary elections. National Socialism in Germany was presented as a native and patriotic movement, whereas in Austria it was not. As a rival right-radical organisation, the Austrian Nazis threatened the ascendancy of the Heimatschutz. Both presented authoritarian, anti-socialist and German-national platforms. Degrees of difference in their programmes did exist, but prior to October 1933, when Starhemberg became deputy leader of the Front, there were a number of similarities. In 1931, many Heimatschutz members had even defected to the Nazis as, Edmondson suggests, the latter were better organised.50 Only when the Heimatschutz opted to join forces with the patriotic camp did the distinction between the two Fascist movements become clearer.

When viewed in the context of its urge to achieve political hegemony in Austria, the Heimatschutz attitude towards Austrian identity in this period becomes more intelligible. There are sufficient speeches in favour of Anschluss, some of which have been cited above, to indicate that many Heimatschutz leaders held the long-term aim of a greater Germany. That
they should also refer to Austrian independence in positive terms reflected the desire that within a greater Germany, a place should be found for a semi-autonomous, Heimatschutz-dominated Austria. Even as late as February 1938, long after the eclipse of the Heimatschutz, Starhemberg sought a rapprochement with Berlin in an attempt to regain power. Moreover, Heimatschutz invective before 1933, and to some extent after this as well, was aimed squarely at the Social Democrats. The movement saw its role as protecting the Heimat not from Anschluss, but from Marxism and the latter's alleged betrayal of the German people.

During 1933, the whole tenor of Heimatschutz propaganda changed. Moves towards the centralisation of power in Germany occasioned an article in the Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung by Dr. Bodo Kaltenboeck, a regular feature writer for the paper. Kaltenboeck remarked that the demotion of the German Länder to the status of provinces had consequences for Austria with regard to the Anschluss question. Supporters of Austrian integration into a greater Germany, he added, had always stressed Austria's special position derived from her historical mission. Nowhere in Anschluss literature had it been envisaged that Austria would be swallowed up by a Greater Prussia. Therefore, according to Kaltenboeck, the Heimatschutz should watch events in a sober fashion. 'The national revolution' in Germany had not yet shown its true face. Another article by Kaltenboeck three weeks later argued that National Socialism and Bolshevism had much in common. Public praise for Hitler had disappeared from the Heimatschutz's official paper. Instead readers learned that the German people, like the Russians, were prisoners of their government. Their only hope now lay with
the Reichswehr. Kaltenboeck added an ‘urgent’ warning to the Germans in Austria not to let themselves be dragged along the chaotic path of the Reich, but to make themselves free and strong so that they might once again become the backbone of Deutschtum. 

It is interesting to note the similarity of Heimatschutz propaganda to that of the Ständestaat regime. First it drew a comparison between Hitler Germany and Prussia. Secondly, Nazism and Socialism were fused together as common enemies of Austria. Thirdly, reference was made to Austria’s special status, her historical mission, and she was singled out as the repository of true German culture. Dollfuss did not officially announce the creation of the Vaterländische Front until 20 May. In April, however, the Chancellor had visited Mussolini, with whom the Heimatschutz, and Starhemberg in particular, enjoyed close relations. The Italian leader was keen to see a greater participation of the Heimatschutz in Austrian affairs; shortly afterwards Dollfuss strengthened the movement’s position in the cabinet. Starhemberg later claimed that the Vaterländische Front was his own idea. In any event, Mussolini’s wish to see a strong Austrian bulwark against Nazi Germany pushed Dollfuss and Starhemberg closer together. Their relationship was cordial, although not without a degree of mutual suspicion. Over the next twelve months both sides held secret negotiations with the National Socialists, in an attempt to rid themselves of the dependency on the other partner. Nevertheless, Mussolini’s influence ensured that the Heimatschutz entered the patriotic camp.

The first unequivocal display of solidarity between the Heimatschutz and the government took place at Schönbrunn Palace on 14 May 1933. This was
the setting for a *Heimatschutz* rally, in which Dollfuss participated, to mark
the 250th anniversary of the liberation of Vienna from the Turks. One of the
heroes of that historical struggle had been an ancestor of Starhemberg. At a
leadership meeting of the Lower Austrian *Heimatschutzverband* a week
before the rally, Starhemberg talked of the need to preserve the historical
idea of Austria, which hadn't been in so much danger since the time of the
Babenbergs.57 He continued to refer to Austria's historical greatness at the
Schönbrunn rally, invoking not only the threat of the Turks, but also the
country's heroic struggle against Napoleon. In both these instances, he
explained, implicitly drawing a parallel with the contemporary menaces of
National Socialism and Marxism, Austria's heroes had not died so that she
might disappear off the map. It was the task of the *Heimatschutz* to fight for
Austrian independence. Starhemberg added that the Austrian people awaited
a saviour of their *Heimat*; the *Heimatschutz* called on Chancellor Dollfuss to
act as this saviour and to be the creator of a new *Vaterland*. The movement
promised to be loyal through thick and thin, and to demonstrate that the
*Ostmark* idea was not dead.58

Starhemberg's rhetoric at the Schönbrunn rally was proof that the
*Heimatschutz* and government were on the same course and that the
movement had, outwardly at least, redefined itself. Approval of Dollfuss and
displays of loyalty to the Chancellor had manifested themselves before, but
never so forcefully.59 One has only to go back to October 1932 to hear
Starhemberg announce that it was the task of the *Heimatschutz* to take over
the sole leadership of the country in the near future.60 *Heimatschutz*
enthusiasm for *Anschluss* had also cooled. While Starhemberg continued to
advocate his belief in a greater Germany, he rejected the National Socialist model, in which Berlin planned to rule Austria as a province via a Reichskommissar. The question of Austrian independence thus became central to Heimatschutz propaganda, replacing its former repudiation of the Versailles system. In publicly opposing both the German and Austrian NSDAP, the movement gave itself a patriotic face which balanced its German-national ethos.

Heimatschutz propaganda also began to articulate the notion of a distinct Austrian identity. An article from 1929 in Die Heimat, the organ of the Viennese Heimwehr, had insisted that the Austrian was not a German, but someone who possessed his own qualities. A month later another article referred to ‘one blood, one people, one Austria’. On the other hand Starhemberg ridiculed the notion of homo Austriacus in a speech delivered to Upper Austrian Heimatschutz leaders in February 1933. While conceding that the Austrians possessed certain qualities as a result of their particular historical development, he emphasised that they were the German people, or a part of the German people living in Austria. In spite of the change in emphasis, Heimatschutz propaganda still upheld that Austria was a German state; in this it was in accordance with official government propaganda.

Articles started to appear in the Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung with titles such as ‘Austria’s mission’, ‘Austria and we Austrians’, and ‘Where are you going, Austria?’ Two things are of note here: first, that this paramilitary movement was including cultural and historical themes in its propaganda; secondly, that repeated reference was being made to the terms ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrian’ alongside those of ‘Greater Germany’ and
‘German’. One article noted that Greater Germany could not be realised under the present regime in the Reich. Unification would prevent Austria from fulfilling her historical mission as a European bulwark, and her cultural one as bearer of German civilisation.\textsuperscript{65} Austria’s importance for Europe was amplified in an article which traced the historical role of Austria back to the era when she acted as an outpost of the Roman Empire. This period had defined her mission, which was truly European in the sense that the term ‘Austrian’ included all the peoples who came under the sceptre of the House of Habsburg.\textsuperscript{66}

When Starhemberg became deputy leader of the \textit{Vaterländische Front} in October 1933, \textit{Heimatschutz} and government propaganda became almost identical. In July the \textit{Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung} had boasted that the idea for a patriotic front had come from Starhemberg himself. The movement welcomed the creation of the Front, claiming it as its own intellectual property and promising that it would ensure the Front was not misused for party interests.\textsuperscript{67}

The new \textit{Heimatschutz} paper, \textit{Der Heimatschützer}, announced it was the mouthpiece of the movement.\textsuperscript{68} The positions held by several leading \textit{Heimatschutz} figures in government posts,\textsuperscript{69} however, meant that \textit{Der Heimatschützer} could not avoid acting as a government organ as well. Already in its fourth edition, the paper contained an appeal from Starhemberg, which announced that the goal of the \textit{Heimatschutz} was a ‘Christian, a free and independent, a strong and German Austria’,\textsuperscript{70} a formula often repeated by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. Over the next three years the paper printed articles and reproduced many speeches by Starhemberg acting
in his government roles. When Berger-Waldenegg, another prominent Heimatschutz leader, became Foreign Minister under Schuschnigg, Der Heimatschützer regularly printed articles penned by him, outlining Austrian foreign policy. One edition of the paper even contained a 58-page supplement full of articles detailing the successes of the Austrian economy, industry and agriculture.

A history of the movement, published in 1935, boasted that the Heimatschutz was the first organisation to revive pride in being Austrian. It referred to the bloody events of 1927 as an 'Austrian miracle', the occasion on which the movement earned its spurs as an anti-Socialist force. From that time, the book claimed, a new Austria was born. It was thanks to the Heimatschutz that the oldest and most valuable part of German Volkstum was saved from alien influences. The movement had led Austria back to herself, saving the country's very existence and preventing the betrayal of her mission. The centuries-old tradition of Austria would not be destroyed by falsely-interpreted ideas of a Greater Germany. Curiously, the Schönbrunn rally was described as the 'victorious spring of the newly-awakened Austrian national consciousness.'

Given this fusion of Heimatschutz and government propaganda from late 1933 onwards, there is little need to repeat a great quantity of the material presented in the previous chapter. Two things, however, might be noted. First, the Heimatschutz laid particular emphasis on the idea of Austrians as one hundred per cent Germans, but of the oldest and best variety. For example, Starhemberg could often be heard boasting that the Austrians were executing their German mission in the Danube basin when Slav dialects were
still being spoken in Berlin. Secondly, one can highlight the special place occupied by Dollfuss in Heimatschutz propaganda. Not only was the former Chancellor invoked as a martyr by the Heimatschutz, as he was in Front literature, but the movement appeared to claim him as one of their own. While Starhemberg remained the honoured leader of the organisation, Dollfuss became one of its symbols. Thus an article in Der Heimatschützer concerning the ‘new Austria’ and the Heimatschutz’s role in its creation was only one of many which praised Dollfuss for his work and commemorated his heroic death. On another occasion, the paper said of the Heimatschutz movement:

… our deeds speak for themselves … we salute with the greatest of respect the dead, at the top of the list, Chancellor Dollfuss. Politically and militarily, we have always acted properly; Seipel was for us, Dollfuss was for us, the future is for us: the future, a Dollfuss-Austria, which is lead by us Fascists …

While boasting that it would become the dominant political force in Austria, the Heimatschutz included Dollfuss amongst its ideological brethren and made frequent references to the Ständestaat as Dollfuss-Austria. This demonstrated strong support for the government and its programme to develop an Austrian identity in the authoritarian era.

On an official level the relationship between Starhemberg and Schuschnigg was necessarily close because of the so-called dualist system,
whereby the Heimatschutz leader had assumed the positions of Vice-Chancellor and head of the Vaterländische Front, while Schuschnigg was Chancellor and deputy leader of the Front. The personal relations between the two were more strained, however, than those between Starhemberg and Dollfuss. When Schuschnigg managed to rid himself of Starhemberg and total reliance on the Heimatschutz in May 1936, one might have expected a hostile reaction from the movement’s propaganda. However, the Heimatschutz had been too closely identified with the government to reinvent itself again. In any case, the movement was in a much weaker position than it had been at its zenith in 1934. In March 1936 it was reported that subsidies from Mussolini had stopped and that, financially, the Heimatschutz was in severe difficulties. Der Heimatschützer even welcomed Starhemberg’s dismissal from the government; relieved of the burdens of his political duties, he would be able to devote all his energies once again to leading the movement. It was admitted that on certain occasions the Heimatschutz leader had felt himself compromised by his government responsibilities. The movement continued to support Schuschnigg until its dissolution by the Chancellor in October 1936. Even this action elicited a mild response. Starhemberg pleaded with his followers to remain levelheaded. Anybody who took arms against the state at such a critical time, he insisted, would be betraying the patriotic idea and the Heimatschutz idea which would survive with its love for, and loyalty to, Austria.
The Legitimists – A Brief Background

Membership of the various legitimist, or monarchist, associations remained very small throughout the inter-war era. Any influence they had they owed largely to monarchist sympathies in the highest political circles, particularly those of Chancellor Schuschnigg. Their place in this thesis can however be justified. As outlined in the introduction, we are concerned with constructs of identity themselves, rather than the mass influence these may or may not have had. Legitimist propaganda, moreover, revealed a strong sense of Austrian identity; some monarchist publicists went as far as to advocate Austrian nationhood. All of the legitimist associations were active in keeping alive the traditions of Austria’s imperial past, thereby fashioning a far stronger identification with the Habsburg dynasty than with a Greater Germany. Unlike the Heimatschutz, the legitimist movements held a consistent and unequivocal position on the question of Austrian independence. United by the conviction that the legitimate head of state in Austria was Otto von Habsburg, the son of the last Emperor, the legitimists unswervingly opposed the Anschluss idea.

Legitimist activity began immediately after the break-up of the Monarchy. It was very much a minority voice at a time when Austria was in the process of revolution and the support for Anschluss was extensive. In the early 1920s, a number of monarchist circles were formed, some splinter groups from others. Two principal associations are worth noting. The first of these started life in 1920 as the Freie Vereinigung aller schwarzgelben Legitimisten (Free Union of all Black-Yellow Legitimists), changing its

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name in June 1923 to the Kaisertreue Volkspartei (People’s Party loyal to the Emperor). In the 1930s it became known as the Wolff-Verband (Wolff Group) after its leader Gustav Wolff, a colonel with democratic leanings who became a convert to monarcho-monia in 1920. Wolff was the editor of Staatswehr, which first appeared as a military newspaper in November 1918. From 1919 it carried the subtitle ‘democratic organ of all officers and military officials of German-Austria’. This reflected its initial support for Anschluss until the formation of the Freie Vereinigung aller schwarzgelben Legitimisten, after which time it became a purely legitimist paper. For example, an article in January 1919 noted that the only question worth asking was not if union with Germany should take place, but when. In August of that year articles concerning the Habsburg family began to appear, while a month later Staatswehr criticised the wartime alliance with the German Empire and showed a preference for a Danube federation over Anschluss.

On 1 May 1921, the other main legitimist group, centred around Prince von und zu Liechtenstein, took the name Reichsbund der Österreicher (Imperial Association of Monarchists). It was composed chiefly of Austrian aristocrats. Unlike Wolff’s organisation, the Reichsbund saw itself as a non-political association, concentrating on economic, cultural and social issues. It stressed the importance of preserving the traditional connections between Austria and the successor states of the Monarchy. Within a short time the Reichsbund had attracted most of the Catholic legitimists, who considered their political interests as represented by the Christian Social Party. 1926 saw the first edition of the Reichsbund’s organ, Der Österreicher, which
appeared monthly until 1930 when it was printed every fortnight. From 1 January 1932, Der Österreichcher became a weekly paper. 90

Rivalry between these two major legitimist groups existed throughout most of the inter-war era. When, in August 1932, the Iron Ring was established as an umbrella organisation for all monarchist activity in Austria, with the Reichsbund as its leading player, Wolff’s group refused to join. Only as late as 20 November 1937 did the Kaisertreue Volksbewegung (People’s Movement loyal to the Emperor), as it was now styled, join forces with all the other legitimist associations. 91 Until that point, both organisations claimed that they were the one true representative of legitimist thinking in Austria. The difference between the two, however, could be seen in their blueprints for the future of Austria and hence the social composition of their, admittedly tiny, memberships. Whereas the Reichsbund, and later the Iron Ring, was the natural home for monarchists in the conservative and aristocratic camps, Wolff’s group received most of its support from workers and Kleinbürger. This was reflected in its political programme, which called for a democratic monarchy like that in England. The association criticised a splinter group, the Partei der österreichischen Monarchisten (Party of Austrian Monarchists), for wanting to subordinate the Austrian people to the dynasty, thereby allowing the re-establishment of a court camarilla. 92

Attempts by Wolff’s Kaisertreue Volkspartei to establish an electoral coalition in 1923 and again in 1927 were unsuccessful. Standing on its own in the first of these elections, Wolff’s group won only 3,474 votes, far fewer than he had hoped for. 93 The Partei der österreichischer Monarchisten joined with the Christian Socials for the 1923 general election and their
President, Ernst von der Wense, became a deputy. However, the activity of the legitimist associations in the inter-war years was not in the first instance focused on acquiring political power. In the 1920s, apart from their cultivation of Austrian traditions and history, and their opposition of Anschluss, the legitimists campaigned for the repeal of the anti-Habsburg laws and the return of the dynasty. All legitimist groups claimed that the Republic was illegal, as the referendum to decide the future political form of Austria had not taken place as promised in Karl’s manifesto of 16 October 1918. In the 1930s, the legitimists were quick to join the struggle for Austrian independence and the fight against National Socialism. With the abandonment of parliamentary democracy, they saw their chance to increase their influence over Austrian affairs; the Iron Ring joined the Front before the official founding date. Wolff’s group also became a corporate member in mid-July 1933.

As the Dollfuss regime strove to strengthen an Austrian patriotism, the legitimists were no longer such a marginalised group in Austria. Their activity and propaganda was comparable to that of the Front, in that it promoted Austria’s special status within the German nation. Although restoration of the Monarchy never became government policy, both Dollfuss and Schuschnigg saw the value of legitimist propaganda to their cause. This was especially true of Schuschnigg, who was himself a monarchist and member of the Reichsbund until the Anschluss. As shown here, he even toyed with the possibility of a restoration. Dollfuss was not a monarchist sympathiser and emphasised in an interview in August 1933 that the Front would not pursue any monarchist plans. On the other hand, he welcomed the
legitimists joining the Front, explaining that they were concerned with securing Austria’s independence. He added, however, that this was their only point of contact with his programme.\textsuperscript{98}

In January 1936, after Starhemberg had visited Otto von Habsburg in exile, an agreement was reached between the Front and the legitimists. The agreement recognised that the Ständestaat was the only framework in which a restored Monarchy could function, while point twelve provided for the creation of the \textit{Traditionsreferat}, an official organisation within the Front in which legitimist propaganda would be permitted.\textsuperscript{99} Zessner-Spitzenberg, a leading propaganda writer within the Iron Ring, became head of the \textit{Traditionsreferat} and set out the organisation’s aims as follows:

Cultivation of the Austrian tradition. Consolidation and dissemination of the historical principles behind the Austrian idea. Promotion and defence of an Austrian concept of history. Promotion of activities and school courses on the history of the Austrian state idea. Protection against anti-Austrian attacks in the historical sphere. Encouragement and organisation of general and local commemoration services. Cultivation of the dynastic tradition and exertion of influence over the activity of legitimist organisations within the \textit{Vaterländische Front}.\textsuperscript{100}

It could be argued that the organisation was set up merely to pacify the monarchists and to keep a check on their propaganda, out of fear of a
reaction from Berlin. The *Traditionsreferat* was established as a sort of counter-balance to the *Volkspolitischer Referat*, and the government actually allowed it little power.\(^{101}\) Compared with Zessner-Spitzenberg’s outline for the organisation, the official brief regarding the role of the *Traditionsreferat* sounded quite tame: ‘Its task is the cultivation of the unbroken unity of the old-Austrian tradition, enriched through the centuries, and of the ‘reverence’ for the great historical value of this tradition in the new Austria as well.’ It was publicly denied that the organisation represented the interests of any one group, even those of the legitimists.\(^{102}\) Furthermore, the *Traditionsreferat* was not even mentioned in the new statute for the Front.\(^{103}\) Schuschnigg wrote in *Dreimal Österreich* that the government welcomed the positive attitude towards an independent Austria publicised by legitimists.\(^{104}\) Their support for the restoration of the Monarchy, however, was treated with caution.

The legitimist associations also organised commemorations and celebrations for members of the Habsburg family, past and present. August 1930 witnessed the centenary of the birth of Franz Joseph. This event was marked by celebrations throughout Austria, including a service in St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna.\(^{105}\) A couple of months earlier, the Austrian legitimist workers’ community had arranged a commemoration assembly in Vienna for Franz Ferdinand and his wife.\(^{106}\) The last Emperor, Karl, had already been honoured in April 1928, when a monument dedicated to him was unveiled in the Michaelerkirche in Vienna.\(^{107}\) Seven years later, the Iron Ring organised a memorial ceremony for him, including a mass in the Kapuzinerkirche.\(^{108}\) Furthermore, Otto’s birthday on 20 November was
regularly celebrated in grand fashion by the legitimists. This anniversary attracted particular attention in 1935, when a number of prominent government figures, including Schuschnigg, attended a mass in the Kapuzinerkirche.\textsuperscript{109}

The legitimist cause was afforded further publicity by a campaign in which districts within Austria bestowed honorary citizenship on Otto. The first to do so was Ampass, in the Tyrol, on 6 December 1931, followed by many others.\textsuperscript{110} By the beginning of March 1938, 1603 districts had awarded the title to the Habsburg prince.\textsuperscript{111} Other legitimist activity included the events organised by the Iron Ring at the Catholic conference in September 1933, during which Dollfuss made his Trabrennplatz speech at the first \textit{Vaterländische Front} rally. These were: two ‘Austrian’ evenings, an ‘Austrian’ rally, and a commemoration mass for the \textit{Reichsbund}.\textsuperscript{112}

Although the primary goal of Habsburg restoration was never achieved, not all legitimist lobbying was in vain. The campaign for the reversal of the anti-Habsburg laws passed by the Renner government after the war bore fruit in July 1935. In addition to committing the Imperial family to exile, the laws of 1919 had confiscated all crown property.\textsuperscript{113} The legitimists had always maintained that these laws were unjust, particularly the clauses which had permitted the confiscation of private property from individual members of the dynasty. The anti-Habsburg laws were excluded from the May Constitution, although they remained as ‘simple laws’.\textsuperscript{114} On 3 July 1935, the cabinet issued a new law which repealed the expulsion and returned all private property to the family. As they still claimed their rights to the throne, Otto and Zita were prohibited from returning to Austria, but three of Otto’s
siblings did come back, and the Iron Ring claimed the new law as a part success.\textsuperscript{115}

In the last few months before \textit{Anschluss}, the Iron Ring increased its activity. On 11 January 1938 alone, fifty monarchist rallies took place all over Austria, nine of them in Vienna.\textsuperscript{116} After the \textit{Anschluss}, almost all the movement's leaders were swiftly arrested, and some of them were sent to the concentration camps.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{The Legitimists and Austrian Identity}

The monarchists harboured a very strong sense of Austrian identity and displayed an ardent patriotism.\textsuperscript{118} Although the various associations proposed different templates concerning the form a restored Habsburg Monarchy should take, all legitimists believed in Austria's unique status. This is exemplified by an article by P.B. Fiala for \textit{Der Österreicher} entitled "\textit{Deutschtum und Österreichertum}". Fiala argued that \textit{Österreichertum} was on a higher level than \textit{Deutschtum}. Like Seipel, he saw it as a cultural rather than national concept. In Germany one could find the German nation, he remarked, whereas in Austria, German culture could be found. Culture was always universal, nationalism on the other hand limited. A comparison between the culture of Germany and Austria showed a marked difference in Austria's favour, Fiala maintained. Particularly in Protestant Germany there was a tendency, he remarked, to concentrate on the superficial and to think in quantitative terms, while in Austria one looked below the surface of things. Fiala asserted that the mediaeval universalism in German culture had

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been preserved only in Austria. The Reformation had brought with it national chauvinism and particularism, while in Austria one could still detect the three main strands of European culture which had found its highest expression in the Holy Roman Empire: Christianity, Antiquity and Deutschtum.\textsuperscript{119}

Allied to this acknowledgement of a particular Austrian culture was a belief in the existence of \textit{homo Austriacus}. In the article cited above, Fiala referred to Austrians as half-breeds who possessed a better Deutschtum than the ‘pure-blooded’ people in Germany.\textsuperscript{120} Joseph August Lux held a series of lectures on the subject of \textit{der österreichische Mensch}, in which he argued that the Austrian was a racial-biological, cultural, historical fact, recognised both by national and international law. He pointed to Austria’s high cultural achievements and emphasised the role played by the Habsburgs in these.\textsuperscript{121}

On another occasion, at a conference in Upper Austria, five themes relating to the concept of the \textit{homo Austriacus} were discussed. These were: Austrian religious life; Austrian art; Austrian political culture; the Austrian contribution to literature; and Austrian family culture.\textsuperscript{122} A few months later, Zessner-Spitzenberg, in a speech to celebrate Otto’s 21st birthday, referred to the ‘character, sense and obligatory mission of \textit{der österreichische Mensch}, which was ‘unmistakably prescribed by the landscape and history’. This mission, he noted, was not merely a German one, but a Slav, Latin and Magyar one as well.\textsuperscript{123}

In a Front press release from July 1937, Zessner-Spitzenberg remarked in his role as head of the \textit{Traditionsreferat} that the Austrians were no longer a mere \textit{Stamm} of the German \textit{Volk}, but in fact constituted an independent Austrian \textit{Volk} within the German cultural sphere. He added that the
Austrians had developed as a mixture of various German Stämme, under the influence of other nations and cultures. He also stressed the tradition of an independent Austrian statehood. He argued that to belittle the Austrians as mere pioneers in the shaping of German history contradicted the sovereignty of the Austrian state. That the Austrian mission in south-eastern Europe had been beneficial to the entire German-speaking world did not mean that this mission had been executed with a gesamtdeutsch mandate, he remarked. On the contrary, it was Austria's own state and cultural mission. Similarly, he wrote that Austria's European function was based on no other dictate than her own tradition and state idea. In other words, while admitting a national relationship between Germans and Austrians, Zessner-Spitzenberg viewed the histories of the two countries as distinct, and argued that the Austrian mission had been pursued independently of any greater-German idea. This formulation of Austrian identity exceeded the official government line, and came close to an acknowledgement of Austrian nationhood.

The case for an Austrian nation was frequently made within legitimist publications. In July 1920 an article for Staatswehr regretted that Austria lacked both a national consciousness and a belief in her people and Fatherland. The people had to realise that Austria was a separate country and also a separate nation. The article concluded by declaring, 'Our faith is Catholic, not Protestant. Our dynasty is Habsburg, not Hohenzollern. Our Fatherland is Austria, not the German Empire or Prussia.' Occasional articles in Der Österreicher similarly argued that the Austrians and their culture were totally separate from the Germans and theirs. For instance, F. Helmich and Alfons von Stillfried both rejected the view that the Austrians
were merely one of the many German tribes, arguing that they also constituted their own nation and should be proud of that fact.\textsuperscript{127} Other contributors asserted that the nation could not be viewed in racial terms, as peoples in the modern world were no longer of pure race. Instead, a common cultural, religious and historical development was the deciding factor which distinguished the nation.\textsuperscript{128}

That such articles were printed in Staatswehr and Der Österreicher reflected the breadth of views to be found within the legitimist associations. Apart from the issue of restoration, the papers did not pursue a strict editorial line, but rather served as a general forum for debate on political, cultural and historical matters. The contributions referring to Austria as a nation were balanced by many others which stuck to the more orthodox position of Austria as the representative of a higher, universal German culture, and of Austrians as the best Germans. Following Hitler’s accession to power in Germany, however, the proportion of articles which highlighted concrete differences between Austria and Germany increased.

\textbf{Anschluss} was strongly rejected by legitimists even before the rise of the NSDAP. Staatswehr wrote in 1919 of a new Austria rising like the phoenix from the ashes of the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{129} The only solution involving Germany that appeared acceptable to legitimists was a Greater-Austrian, rather than a Greater-German one. A Staatswehr editorial observed that \textit{Anschluss} should only be realised if a Habsburg regained the German Imperial crown and if the Hungarians and South Slavs were included in the new empire.\textsuperscript{130} Der Österreicher remarked that a new central European empire would return the Germans to their thousand-year-old tradition and would correspond with the
old Austrian tradition, which had been torn apart in 1866. Such a transformation was scarcely likely, cautioned the paper, as the Germans had since that time been educated to think in a different way, one which was kleindeutsch and Greater-Prussian. Most legitimist commentators agreed, therefore, that a change in Austria’s state form would have to exclude Germany. In June 1923 Staatswehr considered union with a Volk which was so different in character impossible.

Predictably, the proposals for the 1931 customs union between Germany and Austria were also criticised by monarchist publications. While Der Österreicher accepted that the two parties had ruled out political union, it commented that the customs union would necessarily affect Austria’s independence, as both sides would be drawn into the network of international friendships and conflicts of the other. Another article highlighted the oft-cited threat of Austria being swallowed up by a Prussian-dominated Germany which was seeking compensation for the colonies she had lost after the War. After 1933, legitimist propaganda became increasingly anti-German, particularly that of Wolff’s association. Staatswehr, for example, called Hitler’s takeover of power ‘Austria’s revenge for Königgrätz’.

It took some time, and a more accurate appraisal of the international situation, for monarchists to content themselves with the independent Austria as confirmed by St. Germain. Convinced that the Paris Peace Settlement had not provided a lasting solution for Central Europe, the official goal of the Reichsbund had not only been for the return of the Habsburgs, but for the restoration of the Monarchy according to the Pragmatic Sanction. In June
1930 this was renounced in favour of a *kleinösterreichisch* programme, which limited the demand of restoration to Austria's post-war borders.\textsuperscript{136} After this decision had been taken, however, proposals to reorganise the constellation of central Europe and to strengthen Austria's position occupied an important place in legitimist propaganda. Rather than a customs union with Germany, argued *Der Österreicher*, Austria should seek to renew her historical ties with the successor states and work towards the formation of a Danube federation. The latter, it commented, would be a far sounder regional treaty than one with Germany, as it would constitute a collaboration between areas which complemented one another economically.\textsuperscript{137} *Staatswehr* had already disclosed its preference for some sort of union with Hungary in 1919, and printed several articles during the following year which considered the advantages of a Danube federation.\textsuperscript{138} *Der Österreicher* maintained that a solution to the central European problem lay exclusively with an Austro-Hungaro-Italian co-operation, which other successor states could then join.\textsuperscript{139} It was argued that the geographical and climactic properties of the Danube Basin had established a natural link between the various nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy. This favoured the Danube federation as the most suitable solution for the region.\textsuperscript{140}

The most valuable contribution made by monarchists to the patriotic campaign was their promotion of Austrian cultural tradition and history throughout the inter-war era. Although propaganda in favour of a restoration was treated with caution by the authoritarian regime, both Schuschnigg and Starhemberg said on a number of occasions that it was impossible to separate Austria's history from that of the Habsburgs, while the country's
future had to have some roots in her past. Nowhere were the connections between Habsburg and contemporary Austria expressed more abundantly than within monarchist propaganda. Almost every edition of Der Österreicher contained articles concerning the great history of Austria and the lives and deeds of her rulers. In particular there were numerous commemorative pieces for every conceivable anniversary pertaining to Franz Joseph and Karl, as well as photographs and poems which eulogised the dynasty. The front page of most editions reproduced old photographs with no relevance to the headline. The most peculiar instance of this occurred following Dollfuss' death, when a smallish box carrying the announcement of the Chancellor’s murder appeared next to a picture showing Karl, Colonel von Boroevic and Field Marshall Archduke Eugen studying a map in November 1917. Der Österreicher also included many articles detailing the life of the exiled Otto and his mother, Zita. Otto's education and development was a regular feature of Staatswehr, which also printed many historical features, as well as frequent articles discussing the Austrian mission.

Conclusion

Both the Heimatschutz and the monarchists played important roles in the campaign to preserve Austrian independence in the 1930s. In different ways they helped the drive to develop an Austrian consciousness, or patriotism. Both stood close to the government, although the relationships were not unproblematic. Schuschnigg and Dollfuss were obliged to keep a check on
the two movements so that their propaganda and activity fell broadly in line with that of the Front. The legitimists were the group most attached to Austrian tradition, and least sympathetic towards Anschluss, yet their aim of a Habsburg restoration provoked hostile reactions from abroad and thus threatened the integrity of the state. The Heimatschutz allowed patriotic propaganda to be disseminated to a wider audience and acted as a useful paramilitary back-up for the government. However, the movement’s motives were dubious, and its quest for power at any price was just as much of a threat to the independence of Austria.

The genesis of the Heimatschutz provided for a variety of factions, some regional, others ideological, which survived even under Starhemberg’s leadership in the 1930s.145 Behind the scenes intense rivalry existed between Heimatschutz leaders, most notoriously between Starhemberg and Fey. In April 1933, a conspiracy sought to oust Starhemberg and replace him with a person more acceptable to the National Socialists.146 The proclamations of loyalty to the government and the patriotic front, and the condemnation of National Socialism, did not prevent attempts at an accommodation with the Nazis in order to secure a hold on power.147 It is highly probable that, if a suitable offer had come from Hitler, it would have been accepted as a preferable alternative to co-operation with Dollfuss.

In spite of the fact that the Heimatschutz leaders may have been driven more by personal ambition than patriotism, the movement’s activities, at least after October 1933, helped fuel the patriotic cause. Its impressive rallies and demonstrations, as well as its propaganda, gave a show of unity and purpose which belied the truth and disguised the strong Pan-German
sympathies of the early Heimwehren. Outwardly at least, the Heimatschutz appeared no less committed to independence than the Front. Although the movement's propaganda borrowed considerably from other constructs of Austrian identity, for a few critical years it publicly attacked National Socialism in both its German and Austrian forms, and lent its weight to the patriotic campaign of the government.

Like Seipel, the legitimists paid great attention to assessing what it meant to be Austrian, and how the Habsburg past related to the rump state of post-1918. In this respect it is interesting to note how the idea of 'Austria' articulated in some monarchist propaganda was able to come to terms with the small territorial boundaries of St. Germain. The constructs of Austrian identity elaborated by legitimists displayed a clearer distinctness than constructs of Österreichertum articulated by either Seipel, or the Front. Habsburg stood at centre stage of their formulations. Whereas Seipel, who himself harboured monarchist sympathies, had understood Österreichertum as a variant of Deutschum, legitimist publicists habitually argued that it was the best variant. Some also relegated the importance of Deutschum in their formulation of Austrian identity, particularly in reference to the Austrian mission in the Danube region. In subordinating the German element of Austrian identity these publicists began to break with the Kulturnation concept and came close to affirming Austrian nationhood. Others presented a construct of Österreichertum within the context of the Staatsnation concept, and thus made the case for an Austrian nation. The next chapter explores inter-war constructs of Austrian nationhood in more detail, the majority of which were developed by publicists with monarchist leanings.
Before the advent of the Ständestaat, the monarchist associations reached only a small section of society. Circulation figures for Der Österreicher, which Friedrich Wagner has been able to provide only for the period 1936-38, show that the paper published a weekly total of 9-10,000 copies. As this was arguably the period when sympathy for legitimism was at its height, one might assume that circulation was considerably lower in the 1920s. According to Wagner, the circulation of Staatwehr was only a third of that of Der Österreicher. With the advent of the Front, however, the legitimists were able to affirm the patriotic campaign and identify more strongly with the aims and propaganda of the government, even if their primary goal of restoration was at odds with official policy. Ingrid Mosser argues that the authoritarian regime adopted the ideas publicised by the legitimists and used them as the backbone of its propaganda to uphold the independence of Austria. It is an interesting thesis with much evidence in its favour, although like many other studies I feel it underestimates the importance of Seipel, whose legacy is well documented elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Front recognised that Habsburg could act as an important symbol of Austrian independence and identity. This common purpose potentially gave legitimism a wider forum for the promotion of its activity and dissemination of propaganda. Although it is well documented that a wave of Habsburg nostalgia swept across Austria in the mid-1930s, this does not prove a dramatic increase in support for the legitimist movement itself, as the circulation figures given above suggest.
1 Diamant, p. 105.
2 See Renner, pp. 73, 144.
4 See, for example, Carsten, The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938; Gedye, The Austrians, A Thousand Year Odyssey.
5 Starhemberg.
6 Dreimal Österreich.
7 ‘Early Heimwehr Aims and Activities’, p. 105fn.
8 The prominent historian Ludwig Jedlicka also use Heimatschutz to describe the organisation in the 1930s. See Jedlicka, Ludwig, ‘Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg und die politische Entwicklung in Österreich im Frühjahr 1938’ in Institut für österreichische Geschichtsforschung und Wiener Katholische Akademie, Österreich und Europa: Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag, Verlag Styria, Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1965, pp. 547-64.
9 Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria, p. 44.
11 Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria, p. 49.
12 This organisation was known as Orka – Organisation Kanzler – after the Bavarian Rudolf Kanzler. See Edmondson, pp. 24-25.
13 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
14 Starhemberg, p. 48.
15 Carsten, Fascist Movements in Austria, p. 60. The Treaty of St. Germain had severely restricted the size of Austria’s army. Seipel and others hoped that this could be strengthened by using the Heimwehren as a military police.
16 Ibid., p. 49.
17 Ibid., p. 63.
18 Edmonson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, p. 36.
19 C. Earl Edmondson rejects what he believes to be a general assumption that, between 1924 and 1926, a period which saw little action from the movement, the Heimwehren were inactive. Edmondson argues that it was a period of internal consolidation. He also highlights plans for a putsch in the winter of 1926-27. See ‘Early Heimwehr Aims and Activities’, pp. 128, 136.
20 Edmonson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, p. 58.
21 Ibid., p. 59.
22 Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung, pp. 133-34.
23 Edmonson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, p. 81.
24 Ibid., p. 76.
25 Major Pabst was a German citizen who fled the Reich after the failure of the Kapp putsch. The expulsion order against him was rescinded in October 1930.
26 Berchtold, p. 402.
27 Ibid., p. 403.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 404.
31 Ibid., p. 157.
32 Der Starhember-Jäger, 14/2/30, p. 5. See also ibid., 13/5/30, p. 1.
34 Ibid., 24/9/32, p. 1.
35 Staatswehr, October 1932, p. 3. As late as autumn 1934, E.K. Winter’s Die Aktion publicised its suspicions about the true sympathies of the Heimatschutz. See Die Aktion, 14/9/34, p. 3.
36 Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung, 15/10/32, p. 3.
37 Ibid., 21/1/33, p. 3. Starhemberg reiterated this at a meeting of Heimatschutz leaders in Linz on 2/2/33, as did Steidle in Innsbruck to Tyrolean leaders on 8/2/33. See ibid., 4/2/33, p. 3 & 18/2/33, p. 2.
In the 1930 general election, the Austrian National Socialists had failed to win a seat.

For example, an article entitled ‘Government and Heimatschutz’ in ibid., 8/10/32, pp. 1-2, and the programmatic speech by Starhemberg on 20/2/33, reproduced in 25/2/33, pp. 1-2.

In a speech reproduced in ibid., 22/10/32, p. 3.

From Starhemberg’s speech to the Lower Austrian Heimatschutzverband, reproduced in ibid., 13/5/33, p. 2.

Reproduced in Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung, 4/2/33, p. 3.

Reproduced in Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung, 24/9/32, p. 2.

Reproduced in Österreichische Heimatschutzzeitung, 20/5/33, p. 3.


Dollfuss reorganised his cabinet on 10/5/33. Neustädter-Stürmer became minister for work creation, while Fey became full minister for public security.

Starhemberg, p. 138.

See, for example, an article entitled ‘Government and Heimatschutz’ in ibid., 8/10/32, pp. 1-2, and the programmatic speech by Starhemberg on 20/2/33, reproduced in 25/2/33, pp. 1-2.

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Starhemberg, p. 138.
85 From 18/6/1920 Staatswehr carried the subtitle ‘Schwarzgelb bis in die Knochen’ (Black-yellow to the bones), the famous patriotic slogan of Karl Lueger.

86 Staatswehr, 28/1/1919, p. 3. See also an article in ibid., 4/4/1919, pp. 2-3.


88 Mosser, pp. 32-33.

89 Fabri, pp. 30-31.

90 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, pp. 64-65.

91 Mosser, p. 340.


93 Mosser, p. 53.

94 Ibid., p. 48.

95 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 9.

96 Mosser, p. 245.

97 See also a Vaterländische Front communication to the legitimists in July 1936, cited in Mosser, p. 309.

98 See Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 235.

99 Wohnout, p. 68.

100 Ibid., p. 74.

101 Ibid. See also Mosser, p. 343.

102 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.49, Ausgabe für Wochenblätter, 18/10/37.

103 Wohnout, p. 77.

104 Dreimal Österreich, p. 281.

105 See Der Österreichischer, 15/7/30, p. 1; 39/7/30, pp. 1-2; Festnummer 1930; September 1930, pp. 1-8.

106 See ibid., June 1930, pp. 2-3.

107 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 197.


109 See ibid., 22/11/35, also Mosser, p. 291.

110 Mosser, p. 54.

111 Ibid., p. 353.

112 See Der Österreichischer, 15/9/33, p. 6.

113 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 86.

114 Mosser, p. 146.

115 Ibid., pp. 174-75.

116 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 324.

117 Zessner-Spitzenberg, for example, died in Dachau on 1 August 1938. See Mosser, p. 350.

118 See, for example, Staatswehr, 31/12/20, p. 1.

119 Der Österreichischer, 23/2/31, pp. 3-4.

120 Ibid., p. 3.

121 See ibid., 16/12/32, p. 2 and also an article by Lux in ibid., 7/10/32, pp. 1-2.

122 See ibid., 25/8/33, p. 4.

123 Cited in ibid., 8/12/33, pp. 1-2. Other articles dealing with the concept of homo Austriacus can be found in ibid., 2/11/34, p. 5 and ibid., 23/11/34., p. 7.

124 ÖStA/AdR, ParteiA/VF, K.45, Pressestelle der Vaterländischen Front, 12/7/37, Ausgabe für die Landeshauptstädte.

125 Ibid.

126 Staatswehr, 30/7/20, p. 2. Other Staatswehr articles which argue for Austrian nationhood include: 31/12/20, p. 2; 21/1/21, pp. 1-2; 18/2/21, pp. 1-2; 20/4/26, p. 3.

127 Der Österreichischer, 31/8/34, p. 6 and ibid., 28/9/34, p. 3.

128 See articles by Franz Ritter Weiss-Tihanyi von Mainprugg and Berthold Dietrich in ibid., 23/10/36, p. 4; 21/5/37, p. 5, also a speech by Dietrich von Hildebrand, cited in ibid., 7/8/36, p. 5.


130 Ibid., 28/5/20, p. 1.

131 Der Österreichischer, 6/8/31, p. 3.
133 Der Österreicher, 28/3/31, p. 2.
134 Ibid., 11/6/31, p. 3.
135 Staatswehr, June 1933, p. 1.
136 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 40.
137 Der Österreicher, 28/3/31, p. 2. See also ibid., 27/5/31, p. 1.
139 Ibid., 11/6/31, p. 1.
141 See, for example, a speech by Schuschnigg on 19/1/36, reproduced in the Viennese issue of Vaterländische Front, February 1936, also Starhemberg’s speech at a local V.F. meeting in Vienna on 11/12/35, cited in Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 272.
142 See, for example, Der Österreicher, June 1930, p. 1; 29/7/30, pp. 1-2; 16/8/31, pp. 1-2; 25/3/32, p. 2; 6/4/32, p. 1.
143 Ibid., 26/7/34, p. 1.
144 See, for example, Staatswehr, 1/12/23, pp. 1-2; 10/7/23, p. 1; 7/8/23, pp. 1-2; 8/8/26, p. 1.
145 A German document from December 1933 reported disintegration within the movement, with four groups attempting to outdo each other. See Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, Band II, 1, p. 184.
146 Edmonson, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, pp. 177-78.
147 Starhemberg’s ambivalence towards National Socialism and the Anschluss question was well-publicised, as exemplified by an article in the legitimist paper, Staatswehr, which referred to him as the ‘Austrian Sphinx’. See Staatswehr, 20/1/1932, p. 1. Both at home and abroad, he was considered politically fickle. See Kerekes, Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie, p. 90; Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie C: 1933-1937, Band I, 2, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1971, p. 818.
148 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, p. 66.
149 Ibid., p. 54.
150 Mosser, pp. 61-62.
151 For more on the Habsburg nostalgia, see Gedye, p. 209; Clare, pp, 161-62; Carsten, The First Austrian Republic, p. 237; Mosser, p. 275.
Chapter 4

Literary and Historical Constructs of Austrian Identity

This chapter considers how groups and individuals outside the immediate political sphere either produced their own constructs of Österreichertum, or reflected existing models in their work, thus offering a contribution to the discourse on Austrian identity. Many of the sources examined here, emanating from writers, historians, sociologists and other publicists, echoed the Seipel-Dollfuss-Schuschnigg formula. Others demonstrated a quite different understanding of Austrian identity, ranging from those who betrayed strong German nationalist sympathies, yet outlined an Austrian particularism, to those who advocated the existence of an Austrian nation, separate and distinct from the German one. The result of such an investigation is a large melting pot of ideas, some of which concur and complement, while others conflict and contrast.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first surveys the Austrian publishing scene of the inter-war years, and looks at the consequences of official cultural policy in the Ständestaat era. It then engages with a number of writers to examine literary constructs, or reflections, of Österreichertum in the inter-war era. The literary works dealt with here were selected after an extensive survey of secondary literature on the subject. The aim has been to isolate a set of texts which is representative for the task in hand rather than exhaustive. Other scholars will no doubt find omissions, but it is hoped that
the consensus of numerous expert commentators on Austrian literature has, in the main, been able to provide an acceptable selection.

The process of ascribing political sympathies to writers must be largely a speculative one. The inclusion of a writer in this chapter need in no way suggest that he endorsed the Christian Social Party, or supported the Ständestaat regime. What can be legitimately argued, however, is that the texts under scrutiny have strong affinities with the constructs of Österreichertum publicised by Austrian conservatism. This has been the main criterion for their selection. For the most part, the fictional texts are treated in the same way as all others. That is to say, the approach is one of the historian rather than the literary critic.

The second section notes the strength of German national feeling at Austrian universities in the inter-war period, and then considers the work of a number of Austrian historians from these years. It will be shown that Austrian historians set themselves the task of emphasising the role of Austria in German history as a whole, but this did not prevent a large proportion of them from favouring the political solution of a Greater Germany. Some, on the other hand, put a stronger accent on Austria’s multinational and Habsburg legacy, and thus their ideas accorded neatly with Front propaganda.

The third section considers two Catholic periodicals of the period: Schönere Zukunft and Der Christliche Ständestaat. These provided forums for lively debate on the nature of Österreichertum, and thus are central to the topic of this thesis. The final section examines the most radical foundations of Austrian identity, which employed a colourful array of arguments to
demonstrate the existence of an Austrian nation. Often harbouring strong monarchist sympathies, these groups and individuals constructed an Austrian anthropology to prove that the Austrians were not Germans, as endlessly claimed.

Writers

A number of critics have questioned whether it is correct to speak of an Austrian literature, or whether this should be seen as part of the larger canon of German literature. On the one hand, commentators such as David Luft argue that Austrian culture was, in the inter-war years, insignificantly distinct from German culture; on the other, writers such as Claudio Magris highlight specific features of Austrian literature. To appreciate how intensely the issue has been debated, one need look no further than the bibliography compiled by Donald Daviau and Jorun Johns for Modern Austrian Literature. The list of books and articles runs to almost forty pages. Another discussion of the topic exceeds the scope of this thesis. More important here is the extent to which the writers of the inter-war period reflected ideas of Austria in their works. It will be shown that several authors did conceive of themselves as 'Austrian', whilst acknowledging the wider German cultural nation to which they belonged.

No survey of Austrian literary output from the inter-war period should neglect the practical difficulties faced by the small country in maintaining an independent publishing industry. Austria had a population many times smaller in number than Germany. Any truly successful Austrian writer,
therefore, had to conquer the German as well as his or her home market. Until 1933 this was not a problem; the majority of Austrian writers had German publishers. Indeed, Hofmannsthal's Der Schwierige was premiered in Munich rather than in Vienna. When National Socialist censorship took hold in Germany, however, patriotic Austrian authors were faced with a dilemma. If their works contained material or ideas which were deemed unacceptable to the Third Reich authorities, they potentially faced a ruinous drop in income, not to mention a significant loss of exposure within the German-speaking world.

This situation caused a split amongst prominent literary figures in Austria. In May 1933, at the International PEN Club meeting in Ragusa, the Austrian delegation introduced a motion condemning the burning by students in Germany of books by unacceptable authors. In protest, the German delegation walked out of the meeting and they were joined by the Austrians Grete von Urbanitsky, Felix Salten, the publisher Paul Zsolnay, and Egon Caesar Corti, amongst others. While Urbanitsky and Corti both admitted to National Socialist sympathies, Salten and Zsolnay attempted to justify their action as an attempt to protect the German book market for Austria.³ A year later the Austrian PEN Club met in Vienna in an attempt to find a compromise between the conflicting groups. The polarisation was merely exacerbated, however, and the two sides remained sharply divided for the remaining years of the Republic.⁴

A further and related problem, which may have hindered the propagation of patriotic literature in the inter-war years, was the relative scarcity of Austrian publishing houses. Writers might have no option but to secure a
deal from one of the larger companies in Germany. The Austrian houses which did exist were faced with the same problem as the country’s writers: they, too, had to sell in Germany to ensure a decent profit. Paul Zsolnay’s behaviour in Ragusa amply demonstrates this point. Austrian publishers were cautious about printing literature with an excessively Austrian bias. It was a situation bemoaned by Joseph Roth in an article which appeared in the Catholic periodical Der Christliche Ständestaat. Roth remarked that there were publishers in Austria, but no specific Austrian publishing house. Without such an institution, he warned, no Austrian spirit would ever evolve.⁵ The practical hold that Germany had over the Austrian literary scene is shown by the fact that, between December 1936 and March 1938, seventy Austrian writers signed a Bekenntnisbuch declaring their support for Hitler and National Socialism.⁶

Censorship in Ständestaat Austria was nowhere near as draconian as in National Socialist Germany. For example, writers were not forced to obtain membership of any literary organisation as they were in the Third Reich. However, those writers who produced works not deemed to be in the interest of the state could not obtain a government subsidy, or win one of the literary prizes. Donald Daviau has indicated that writers found it difficult to publish works containing pronounced left-wing views.⁷ Moreover, we have seen that the Vaterländische Front afforded considerable publicity to writers and works favoured by the regime. In practice the Front exercised a certain control over literary life.⁸ One might assume that this could only nurture a crop of patriotic Austrian authors. In fact, this was not the case; the awards were granted by a small panel of writers and academics, a significant
proportion of whom had German-national, if not National Socialist convictions. Many of the literary prizes were given to writers of a similar ideological persuasion, or at least to those whose works neatly dovetailed with Nazi cultural ideals.  

The inter-war period in Austria saw a prevalence of Heimatliteratur. This literary genre, which made use of localised settings and predominantly dealt with rural themes, is worth brief consideration here as it was the favoured literary form of the Ständestaat. Although the state prizes for literature, introduced in July 1934, were designed to reward writers who promoted Austria in their works, the majority of recipients were those who dealt predominantly with local themes. Heimatliteratur was, however, very similar to the Blut-und-Boden (Blood and Earth) style of literature favoured in the Third Reich. In their attempt to further the development of a literary genre which could be held up as ‘Austrian’, the cultural authorities of the Ständestaat thus unwittingly advanced a forum which could be penetrated by National Socialist values several years before the Anschluss.  

Karl Heinrich Waggerl, a classic exponent of Heimatliteratur, was the most popular Austrian writer of the 1930s. His novel Brot narrates the endeavours of Simon Röck to farm a notoriously difficult piece of land in an area long ago abandoned by all other inhabitants. The novel stresses Simon’s piety, modesty and persistence, affording a contrast between his simple but honest life and the materialism and deception of other characters in the narrative. Richard Billinger’s mystery plays, Das Perchtenspiel and Rauhnacht, are set in rural communities in the Innviertel of Upper Austria. Both introduce elements of folklore from the region and feature characters
who return to a rural community after time spent away from the area. These individuals, with their other experiences, find it difficult to reintegrate themselves into an environment whose values no longer accord with their own. All three outsiders meet unfortunate ends directly related to their involvement with the pagan life which surrounds them.

Josef Perkonig’s collection of short stories, Ländliche Novellen, has rural themes at its core. E. Allen McCormick makes the case for Perkonig as a universal writer. It is argued that his stories expose universal human traits, thereby transcending the narrow boundaries of their Carinthian setting. While this is certainly truer of Perkonig than of Waggerl, for instance, it is clear that the Ländliche Novellen, given a less critical reading than McCormick’s, possess the classic qualities of Blut-und-Boden literature. This is well highlighted by Die Gemeinde der Freudigen, a short tale which describes the consequences of an outbreak of typhoid in a tiny, isolated rural community. The villagers at first lose their faith, only to recover it on Christmas Eve when they hear the bells of the church ring out.

The poetry of Guido Zernatto, General Secretary of the Front under Schuschnigg, is another illustrative example of Heimatkunst. In a naturalistic style, but full of references to his strong Catholic faith, he describes many aspects of rural life, from livestock to the changing of the seasons. The human characters he portrays, such as the maid who awakes next to a sick pig, lead arduous lives, yet their persistence and honest labour for the common weal are shown to be exemplary. In his poetry Zernatto promoted the same values he encouraged in his political and cultural role under the Ständestaat regime.
While the majority of Heimatliteratur idealised the virtues of a rural existence in opposition to the decadence of urban life, two Austrian poets who wrote about their native Vienna deserve attention here. Both Franz Karl Ginskey and Josef Weinheber produced verse which, although set in the city, shared much in common with the works above. Ginskey’s Vienna is at one remove from the ‘Red Vienna’ of the inter-war years, so despised by the communities of the Austrian provinces. His Altwiener Balladen look at life from various periods of Austria’s glorious past, invoking such legendary figures as Prince Eugene and Mozart. More importantly, the ordinary characters of his ballads also act out local customs and traditions. These individuals belong neither to the industrial proletariat nor to the sophisticated middle-class but are, for example, ordinary Viennese grave-diggers and locksmiths who display the same home-spun wisdom and superstition as their provincial counterparts.\(^{17}\)

Weinheber lays much emphasis on the Viennese dialect in his poems. His Wien wörtlich, which includes many poems written in wienerisch, includes a guide to his use of different symbols to indicate pronunciation. Leitspruch, the first poem of the collection, explains that he has chosen to write in the vernacular rather than in the language of Goethe and Schiller, as this is what he hears spoken around him in the pub. In this way Weinheber claims to be the poet of the people. In Wir Wiener, a poem which details the essential characteristics of the Viennese, he employs the first person plural throughout, indicating that he is one of the group he describes.\(^{18}\) The other poems of the collection, with their hackneyed settings of the Prater, the Heuriger and the Vienna Woods, demonstrate that the Viennese community
he portrays and with which he strongly identifies, is similar to that eulogised by Ginskey. He mocks the pretensions of the coffee-house intelligentsia, but praises and claims solidarity with the ordinary man.

These works of Heimatliteratur reflected a construct of identity which was rooted in localised, Austrian settings. Their strong Catholic undertones and explicit endorsement of traditional values accorded with the backward-looking ideology of Ständestaat Austria, and provided an antithesis to international literary modernism. That the values of Ständestaat Austria shared much in common with Nazi Germany is reflected in the fact that Heimatliteratur writers who showed no hostility to the Nazi occupation continued to have their works published after Anschluss. These works were in fact encouraged, as they conformed to National Socialist cultural policy.

Even works idealising Vienna, symbol of the old Monarchy, found favour with the new authorities. This is perhaps best illustrated not by literature, but by the example of the Wiener Film, which was highly popular in the 1930s. This cinematic genre, like Weinheber's poetry, made extensive use of the Viennese dialect, was for the most part light-hearted, and frequently chose pre-World War I Vienna as its setting. As the films were unpolitical in nature, they did not undermine the Nazi regime and thus flourished after 1938, benefiting from the extra money injected by the Reich. Moreover, the company Wien-Film was established in 1938 as the main production centre for the Ostmark. The Anschluss of Austrian literature to Germany, as that of cinema, had been initiated several years before 1938. This helped to ensure that the political Anschluss did not liquidate the entire Austrian literary scene.
Away from the bluntness of Heimatliteratur, some writers engaged seriously with the concept of Austrian identity and displayed a patriotism similar to that encouraged by Seipel. In 1915, Hugo von Hofmannsthal became the editor at Insel Verlag of a new series of books containing writing which reflected Austria's historical mission. The series was named Österreichische Bibliothek and consisted of pieces by many authors from different eras. Hofmannsthal was pleasantly surprised to learn that his project had a precedent. In 1809, during the Napoleonic Wars, Philipp Count Stadion had founded the Vaterländische Blätter, which had been designed to cement a closer connection amongst the provinces of the Monarchy and to present to inhabitants of other countries, particularly those in the German states, a 'higher' concept of Austria. Hofmannsthal thought it lamentable that, in the hundred years since, the concept of Austria's mission as a centripetal factor for the nationalities of the Monarchy had been neglected. Unlike Prussia, he commented, whose great historical figures were venerated in literature, Austria lacked a popular tradition of representing her heroes and heroines such as Maria Theresa, Prince Eugene and Radetzky. The intention of the Österreichische Bibliothek was to rectify this, as well as to include writing reflecting all the landscapes and aspects of Austrian life, in particular the traditions of songs, fables and sagas. In short, what was to emerge from the series of books was a voice which was seldom heard – the voice of Austria.

Brian Coughlan notes that, although we cannot be sure whether Hofmannsthal read Nation und Staat, it is likely that he was acquainted with Seipel's ideas at the end of the war. The fact that Hofmannsthal articulated
similar ideas in his essays suggests rather that the principles underpinning
_Nation und Staat_ may have been the intellectual property of Austrian
conservatism in general. It has already been noted that that they were not
highly original. At all events, in a piece entitled _Österreich im Spiegel seiner
Dichtung_ (Austria Reflected in her Literature), Hofmannsthal suggested a
‘harmonious duality’ for those Austrians feeling an affinity with the German
state. It was vital, Hofmannsthal insisted, that during the critical times facing
them, the Austrians preserve this duality of belonging to both the German
nation and the Austrian state.29

Hofmannsthal penned several other essays in which he examined the
nature of _Österreicher tüm_. For him, Franz Grillparzer embodied the classic
Austrian characteristics and reproduced them in his works. In the figures of
Rudolf II from _Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg_ and the daughter in _Der arme
Spielmann_, Grillparzer had portrayed the Austrian traits of a profound soul,
patience, lack of affectation, timidity, as well as a sense of unity with God
and nature. Other Austrian features found by Hofmannsthal in Grillparzer’s
works included a naive and natural cleverness, a natural wit, total simplicity,
an economy of expression, a sense of the appropriate, and a tolerant
vitality.30 In a talk Hofmannsthal gave on Grillparzer in May 1922, he also
highlighted the ‘soft power of the heart’ to be found in Austria, reflected in
the music of Haydn, Mozart and Schubert, in addition to the talent for poetic
and dramatic creativity.31

Hofmannsthal was ever keen to emphasise and promote the Austrian
cultural traditions which reflected as well as nurtured the Austrian
_Volkscharakter_. In _Österreich im Spiegel seiner Dichtung_, he remarked that
Austria had first become a significant cultural presence through her music. In the atmosphere of the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, he said, Austrian writing developed as an autonomous entity whose close link with the Volk gave it a pronounced vernacular character. This Volk element was distinct in the works of writers such as Grillparzer, Raimund, Nestroy, Anzengruber, Rosegger and Stifter. Unlike intellectual or educated literary matter, it contained humour and good cheer. Goethe, Hofmannsthal claimed, was unable to integrate humour into his dramatisation of the Faust legend, betraying a lack of the Volk element, which had never been as apparent on the stages of Berlin, Munich or Dresden as in Austria. Vienna had a theatrical tradition which derived from the people.  

According to Hofmannsthal, this popular tradition in Austrian literature had been severed by the end of the nineteenth century, when ‘culture’ and ‘entertainment’ had become divorced. He endeavoured to revive it by means of the Salzburg Festival, a project which he undertook after the war with the collaboration of Richard Strauss, Max Rheinhardt, and Leopold von Andrian. The Festival staged works which continued the tradition of Baroque theatre in Austria. These included Hofmannsthal’s own Jedermann and Das Salzburger große Welttheater, as well as plays by, amongst others, Max Mell and Richard Billinger. W.E. Yates notes, however, that the rise in ticket prices as a result of the inflationary period meant that the plays of the Festival were not always performed in front of the people for whom they were intended, but rather to audiences of tourists and those with money.  

We have seen that Front propaganda regularly exploited the traditional Austrian-Prussian polarity in an attempt to draw a clear distinction between
Ständestaat Austria and National Socialist Germany. Amongst Austrian writers, it was Hofmannsthal who most explicitly and famously explored the supposed antithesis by listing the characteristics of each in two facing columns. Starting with the entities of Prussia and Austria, Hofmannsthal wrote that the former was an artificial construction of the people, held together by the idea of the state. Austria on the other hand was a product of evolution, a natural, historical entity, drawing cohesion from a love of the Heimat. This difference produced in Prussia more virtue and efficiency; in Austria more piety and humanity. Hofmannsthal then examined the social structure of each land. He concluded that whereas Prussia possessed a loose social fabric, with the various classes of society divided in its culture, quite the opposite was true for Austria. As far as individual people were concerned, the Prussian lacked a sense of history; acted according to the rules; thought dialectically; found crises; was self-confident, self-righteous, industrious and schoolmasterly. The Austrian was said to possess a historical instinct; act according to decency; reject dialecticism; avoid crises; and be self-ironic, pleasure-loving, shy, vain and funny.35

The poet Richard von Schaukal also contrasted Austrians with Reich Germans in his Zeitgemäße deutsche Betrachtungen, published during World War I. He noted that the ‘typical’ Austrian was characterised by his gentleness, flexibility, changeability, doubt, boldness, spirit, mockery, casualness, delicacy, taste and vagueness. The ‘typical’ German, on the other hand, was marked by hardness, harshness, rigidity, belief, security, humour, seriousness, stamina, dignity, education, and clarity. Metaphorically, the
Austrian could be represented by a spark and electricity; the German by a
flame and oil.\textsuperscript{36}

Hofmannsthal repeated the Austrian-Prussian antithesis in his comedy
\textit{Der Schwierige}. The play is set, one assumes, just after World War I. The
eponymous Hans Karl represents, somewhat anachronistically, an Austrian
society which had disintegrated by the time of the play’s premiere in Vienna
in 1924. Ironically, the German Neuhoff highlights the anachronism when he
says of the Viennese salon he attends, ‘All these people who you meet here
don’t really exist any more. They are nothing but shadows now.’\textsuperscript{37} In spite of
this, Hofmannsthal allows his comic figure the upper hand at the end of the
play, when, having rejected the advances of Neuhoff, Helene announces her
love for Hans Karl and they become engaged. The world of old Austria is
allowed to shine still. The character of Hans Karl is symbolic of \textit{homo}
\textit{Austriacus}, whereas his rival in love, Neuhoff, is the quintessential Prussian,
or, at the very least, north German. As W.E. Yates points out in an
introduction to the play, both characters possess many of the traits outlined
by Hofmannsthal in the \textit{Preusse und Österreicher} comparison.\textsuperscript{38}

Like Seipel, Hofmannsthal also championed the universal, European
element of Austrian identity. Indeed, he was one of the prominent figures
who were asked to offer their ideas on a ‘United States of Europe’ for
\textit{Paneuropa}, a publication which will be discussed below.\textsuperscript{39} In Switzerland in
1916 he had delivered a speech entitled \textit{Die Idee Europa}, in which he
pleaded for a new way of European thinking to combat the dominant
material values of the machine age. He thought it most appropriate that such
a hope should be uttered on Swiss soil, the bridge between north and south,
east and west. Moreover, it could find no more suitable advocate than an Austrian, for whoever said the word ‘Austria’ said a thousand years of struggle for Europe, mission in Europe and belief in Europe. For the Austrians – Germans, Latins and Slavs – living on the soil of two Roman Empires, Europe was the primary colour of the planets and the stars. Hofmannsthal was also convinced that the ‘new Europe’ needed Austria, needed her unartificial ‘elasticity’ in order to understand the polymorphic east.

One of the contemporary contributors to the Österreichische Bibliothek was the poet and dramatist Anton Wildgans. Hofmannsthal had already received permission from Wildgans to use some of the latter’s poems for an earlier literary project which had not been realised. Among these was Das Grosse Händefalten, subtitled ‘A Prayer for Austria’s People and Fighters’. Wildgans presents himself to God no longer as an aloof poet, but as the advocate for his people on ‘this day of judgement’. In speaking for Austria’s people, he does not plead for victory, but for justice. Significantly, Wildgans does not adopt a German-national tone in the poem, which was characteristic of much wartime propaganda within the Habsburg Monarchy. National chauvinism is conspicuously absent in two further war poems by Wildgans, Infanterie and Stimme zu Gott im Kriege. In all three cases the Volk he addresses is not the German one, but rather the entire multinational population of the Habsburg Empire.

In November 1929, Wildgans had planned to deliver a speech about Austria to a Swedish audience. He was too ill to undertake the journey and instead broadcast the talk over the Austrian radio on 1 January 1930. The
text was published that same year as *Rede über Österreich*. Joseph Bradisch credits Wildgans with having invented the term ‘*der österreichische Mensch*’. ⁴⁶ While this is incorrect, it is nevertheless true that Wildgans explored the nature of Österreichertum as passionately as any Austrian publicist of the period. Like the Austrian ‘anthropologists’, who are the focus of the final part of this chapter, Wildgans noted the many cultural and racial influences which had diluted the *Deutschtum* of the German settlers in the Alpine and Danube regions, giving rise to the evolution of Austrian man over the centuries. ⁴⁷

Wildgans thought that humanity was an essential feature of *homo Austriacus*. This had developed as a result of the Austrians’ particular history, culture and natural environment. Their experience of living together with other peoples, he asserted, in particular of being the leading *Volk* in the Habsburg Empire, was crucial. *Homo Austriacus*, Wildgans contended, had to abandon all national bias in his role as a ruler of other *Völker*; he was obliged to stand above all parties, to learn to think in the different ways of other peoples, and to understand their souls. In short, Wildgans noted, he became a psychologist. The Austrian was not a man of direct action, he argued, but a conciliatory being, patient and tolerant. His idea of justice was not derived from any moral doctrine, but rather evolved from natural instinct. Because Austrian man possessed an artistic nature, his way of working owed far more to creative improvisation and handicraft than to disciplined and mechanic fabrication.

Wildgans admitted that the Austrians were somewhat conservative and hesitant in their attitude towards progress. Such an accusation, he said, had
often been levelled against them; Wildgans saw it as a consequence of possessing a strong historical awareness and a culture that stretched back centuries. With such treasures it was not surprising that the Austrians did not embrace novelty and passing trends, he remarked. Another common charge against the Austrians, he said, was that they were hedonistic and lacked seriousness. Wildgans countered that, while they might possess a pronounced love for life, the Austrians had never failed to execute their duty when called upon. 48

Wildgans, like Seipel and Hofmannsthal, saw the European dimension of Österreichtum. In the same speech, he remarked that it was not just the destiny of Austria that had been decided on the soil of the old Habsburg Empire, but that of the whole of Europe. Never had this been better exemplified than by the First World War, in which, according to Wildgans, old Austria had performed her last deed for Europe. Over the centuries the Austrian had become accustomed to participating in great events in history, and had paid a bloody price for them. It was this experience, Wildgans suggested, which had allowed him to rise above himself and become a European. Moreover, the power of the Habsburgs had extended far beyond the borders of their hereditary lands. There had been a time when the sun never set on the Empire, a time in which world politics were decided in the Vienna Hofburg. World-wide culture had come to Vienna, truly making her, alongside London and Paris, a world city whose universal influence had created the österreichische Mensch. 49

A reconstruction of the imperial past, so central to formulations of Austrian identity within Austrian conservatism in the inter-war years, found
an evocative example in Wildgans' *Musik der Kindheit*. This is not a fictional piece, but a prose work which poetically recalls the writer's childhood in pre-war Vienna. From a window of his first home Wildgans had a view of the Franz Joseph barracks. Here he would watch the soldiers and hear them play the 'Gott erhalte', the imperial anthem which became the most powerful symbol of the 'unforgettable' Fatherland of his childhood.\textsuperscript{50} Even though he lived in a big city, Wildgans explains that he 'saw' his Heimat in his soul and felt it in his heart. He was overwhelmed by the grandiose Corpus Christi procession. The significance that this display of history and contemporary power had for him, a boy brought up on patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor, would be unimaginable to the present generation, he notes. It is not something he says he regrets, however. In *Rede über Österreich* Wildgans showed a positive attitude towards post-imperial Austria. Here he advocates that different times need different notions and symbols, relevant to the society and state which they represent.

In spite of Wildgans' refusal to stay rooted in the past, and his understanding that the old symbols of power (such as flags and parades) existed to strengthen Habsburg rule over those 'who could not think lucidly enough',\textsuperscript{51} *Musik der Kindheit* remains an evocation of a golden past. It is limited to Vienna and its surroundings, yet through his preoccupation with the splendour of the imperial capital, Wildgans offers a taste of the Monarchy as a whole.

A distinct Austrian culture was promoted in *Österreich im Prisma der Idee*, by the poet Leopold von Andrian, a close friend of Hofmannsthal. The work was a series of fictional discussions between representatives of four
Austrian Stände (an aristocrat, a Jesuit priest, a poet and a Heimatschutz officer) designed as a catechism for the patriotic campaign. From the depths of his soul, the Austrian had created his own culture out of German Geistigkeit, the prologue declared. Andrian also explored the differences between Austrian and Reich German use of language, emphasising the melody and rhythm of the former, as well as the linguistic influences on Austrian German bequeathed by the multinational Habsburg legacy. Another conservative writer and critic, Hermann Bahr, explored the nature of Austrian culture and the Austrian character in essays he wrote on Adalbert Stifter, Gustav Klimt and Catholic music.

Bahr’s novel Österreich in Ewigkeit, published in 1929, was a strong affirmation of contemporary Austria. The novel features the visit of a princess to an Austrian provincial town. The notary calls her the last remnant of old Austria, while the princess refers to herself as a mixture of ‘twelve races’. As part of her ninetieth birthday celebrations a speech is delivered by the prelate Monsignore Zingerl, a character whose similarities to Seipel are too close to be coincidental. The prelate tells her that he still believes in Austria; his position and a sense of duty strengthen this faith. The princess replies that she will continue to believe in Austria as long as she believes in God, and God will not let the Austrians down. She then utters the words of the novel’s title, ‘Austria forever!’, takes heart from the recognition that she is not alone in her optimism, and professes her belief in the importance of the Austrian mission. This aristocratic symbol of the Monarchy, together with the appearance of the Seipel character, show that Bahr drew on the Habsburg legacy to formulate a hopeful, positive scenario for Austria’s
future. Indeed, the *Staatsanwalt* at the start of the novel insists that old Austria, in its form since the Vienna Congress, lives on. Even if the present shuns this Austria, it will return.\footnote{At the conclusion of the novel, he re-articulates his faith, as does the patriotic notary.} At the conclusion of the novel, he re-articulates his faith, as does the patriotic notary.\footnote{At the conclusion of the novel, he re-articulates his faith, as does the patriotic notary.}

Felix Braun’s lengthy *Agnes Altkirchner*, from 1927, also points towards a brighter Austrian future while drawing on the legacy of the past. The novel comprises seven books which cover the years from 1913 to 1919 in turn. Friedrich Achberger states that *Agnes Altkirchner* is the first literary attempt at a blueprint for republican Austria. He argues that one of the most important themes in the book is the preservation of bourgeois values throughout the war and suggests that the eponymous heroine is an allegory for Austria.\footnote{Some of the novel’s protagonists flirt with the abortive revolution. After this interlude, however, they re-establish the normal lives they led beforehand. The novel begins and ends with a speech from a well-known writer (could Hofmannsthal have been a model here?), providing a framework of continuity from the Monarchy to the Republic. At the start of the novel he warns against impending doom for Europe, but promises rebirth from the rubble. In the second speech he urges the reconstruction of humanity.} Some of the novel’s protagonists flirt with the abortive revolution. After this interlude, however, they re-establish the normal lives they led beforehand. The novel begins and ends with a speech from a well-known writer (could Hofmannsthal have been a model here?), providing a framework of continuity from the Monarchy to the Republic. At the start of the novel he warns against impending doom for Europe, but promises rebirth from the rubble. In the second speech he urges the reconstruction of humanity.

Claudio Magris, in his somewhat controversial book on the concept of the Habsburg myth in Austrian literature, argues that Austrian writers from the nineteenth century onwards have used an idealised picture of the Monarchy as an escape from reality. Magris contests that the events of 1918 severed all links with reality in Austrian literature, fostering a flight into sentimentality and fantasy. The Austrian public of the 1920s and 1930s
could, therefore, forget the present and enjoy a diet of stories from the age of the Waltz.\textsuperscript{61} It is certainly true that a larger number of literary works from inter-war Austria are set in the Habsburg imperial past. But other commentators have taken issue with Magris’ dismissive conclusions. W.G. Sebald, for instance, rejects the idea that the works of Joseph Roth, in their reconstitution of his former Heimat, attempt to preserve some sort of illusion.\textsuperscript{62} It is not surprising that writers who experienced the collapse of the Monarchy in 1918 should somehow absorb and use the past as a vehicle for exploring the question of identity in the post-war years. Friedrich Achberger argues that the complete picture of old Austria could not be formed until after 1918. Many texts which refer back to the imperial period, he states, are attempts to capture the Austrian experience of transition and to divine meaning from this.\textsuperscript{63} What is more, not all works by writers under investigation in this study depicted the old Empire as a former paradise. Werfel’s writing includes much criticism of the social milieu in the last days of the Monarchy, in particular his portrayal of the generation conflict. Even Roth, in some of his earlier books, frequently betrays an ambiguous attitude towards pre-war Austria.

One of the best-known literary works from the inter-war period portraying the final years of the Monarchy is Joseph Roth’s \textit{Radetzkymarsch}. The novel concerns Franz and Carl-Joseph von Trotta, the son and grandson respectively of a Slovene lieutenant who saved the life of Franz Joseph at the battle of Solferino. Franz Trotta, a civil servant in Austrian Silesia, is portrayed as the archetype of the Austrian bureaucracy; a true ‘Austrian’ in its most universal sense. As a servant of the Habsburgs, his true home is the

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Hofburg. His idealised vision of the Monarchy is an empire where the
crownlands are nothing more than outer courts of the Imperial Palace in
Vienna, and where the nationalities are simply subjects of the Habsburgs. In
the final letter he writes to his son, he pleads, ‘Fate has raised our stock from
peasant frontiersmen to Austrians. Let us remain as such’. ⁶⁴

Although Carl-Joseph, an officer in the Imperial Cavalry, also displays
affection for the dynasty and a pride in being Austrian, he feels distanced
from the ubiquitous portrait of Franz Joseph, ‘who had [gradually] taken on
the indifferent, habitual aspect of his stamps and coins … The eyes – once
they had suggested the clear blue skies of summer vacation – were now
composed of hard blue china’. ⁶⁵ The novel is framed by a sense of loss –
either a loss which has already occurred, or that which is to come.

The Cassandra of the novel is Count Chojnocki, who confidently but in
melancholic fashion predicts the end of the Empire and the dynasty. He
states that the Fatherland has already ceased to exist; it is falling to pieces
around them. Franz Joseph ‘keeps his ancient throne by the sheer miracle of
his being still able to sit on it’. The people no longer believe in God,
Chojnicki continues. Their new religion is nationalism. The Monarchy,
however, ‘is founded … on the belief that God chose the Habsburgs to reign
over a certain number of Christian peoples’. The Emperor is ‘the Pope’s
secular brother’, apostolic, dependent on ‘the grace of God and the piety of
the people’. Chojnocki argues that the German Emperor could continue to
rule without God, whereas Franz Joseph cannot. ⁶⁶

Radetzkymarsch is pessimistic. As well as portraying the death throes of
the Monarchy, it suggests a dark future. Indeed, the novel seems to offer no
hope, no hint of rebirth from the ashes of the Monarchy. There is only decay
and destruction. The ideal, so cherished by Franz von Trotta, of the
supranational Empire, the universal meaning of Austria, is already moribund
by the time his son reaches maturity. Roth seems, therefore, to offer no
alternative for a post-Habsburg Austrian identity in the novel. The same
accusation might be made of Franz Theodor Csokor’s drama, 3. November
1918. This play, first published in 1936 and premiered in December 1937,
focuses on a small unit of the Austro-Hungarian army at the end of the war.
It is composed of soldiers of many different nationalities, most of whom have
become disillusioned with the Empire. The drama’s oft-cited scene is the
improvised funeral of Colonel Radosin, the one soldier who shows himself
prepared to continue fighting for the Monarchy when the news of its
imminent dismemberment becomes known. Out of desperation he shoots
himself off-stage, and is buried by his comrades. In turn, the soldiers throw a
handful of soil over the body, symbolically burying the Monarchy with their
fiercely loyal colonel. Their words are, ‘Earth from Hungary ... earth from
Poland ... earth from Carinthia ... Slovenian earth ... Czech earth ... Roman
earth’. The last to take his turn is the Jewish doctor, Grün, who stutters,
‘Earth – from – earth from – Austria!’ Interestingly, this final line was
omitted from the original production by demand of the censors.68

Like Radetzkymarsch, Csokor’s play looks backwards. It concludes with
the Slovene and Carinthian now on opposite sides fighting over the Austrian-
Yugoslav border. Earlier, Radosin has tried to convince his fellow soldiers of
the values of the Monarchy. He speaks warmly of the fraternity between the
men of different nationalities and stresses the common, supranational bond
they have developed in the army. He says that the further they were
distanced from their respective homelands, the more they became Greeks,
rather than Athenians, Spartans, or Thebans. Radosin dismisses the national
aspirations of the soldiers by contesting that what they really want is to stay
together. 'We have often sinned against each other, we've harmed, annoyed,
mistrusted each other and stirred up hatred', he admits. The colonel promises
them, however, that all will be made good in the future. For this reason they
must fight on, for the Fatherland, 'a Fatherland above the peoples'. As the
news arrives that the Monarchy is breaking up, Radosin pleads to keep the
men on his side. He insists that the Empire as a whole has always been more
valuable than the sum of its parts. The Austrians were more than a nation, he
implores. The constant mixing of the peoples has resulted in them all
understanding each other, while allowing all strangers to feel comfortable
among them. But just as there is no future for the Monarchy, the colonel's
arguments fail to win over his men. Unlike them he is not a Croat, a German,
or a Hungarian, but an Austrian. With his suicide, universal Austria has
ceased to exist. While the Jewish doctor may offer his earth from Austria as
a parting to Radosin, this is not the soil of the First Republic. Amongst the
turmoil of national aspirations Dr. Grün no longer has a Heimat.
Significantly, he is the only character to share the colonel's beliefs.

Franz Werfel's Barbara oder die Frömmigkeit looks back at the
Monarchy and at the subsequent revolutionary period from the perspective
of the late 1920s. Ferdinand R. has become a ship's doctor, sailing around
the world from port to port, a life which symbolises the rootlessness he
suffers after the collapse of the Empire. The details and events of
Ferdinand's present existence are only sketched perfunctorily; the main narrative consists of his recollection of the past. The principal theme running through his vicissitudinous life is the relationship with his Czech nanny, the Barbara of the novel's title. The loving bond between the two remains the only constant in an unstable history. Direct reflection on the significance of the Monarchy is infrequent in the novel, but the character of Barbara embodies the positive values of old Austria. Friedrich Achberger considers that she is its very essence. Ferdinand himself only realises this some time after the War, when he visits Barbara in Bohemia. She gives him a large bag of gold coins which she had been saving for him since his father died. These possess much more than their considerable material value. For Ferdinand, the coins represent Barbara. He considers that, although he never loved the Emperor or his state, it is as if Barbara's gift is 'the purest extract, the noble fineness of the sunken Empire'. He realises that his antipathy towards the Monarchy is a consequence of his own, unhappy experiences. He was badly treated by the Empire, but at least had a home there.

The final chapter of Barbara is almost identical to the first. Ferdinand empties the bag of coins into the sea. In doing this he considers that he has protected Barbara's legacy in the depths of the world. Perhaps he believes that these values may prevail again one day, or perhaps he is merely preserving their place in history. While the novel ends less gloomily than Radetzkymarsch, the future still appears empty and insecure. A characteristic of Ferdinand we learn about at the beginning of the novel is that he possesses a highly acute memory. Lacking a purposeful sense of direction, he looks back upon his life in a quest for its meaning. As Achberger notes, Barbara
can only survive in Ferdinand’s memory.\textsuperscript{76} He clings to the universal values she represents for him, aware that they have become swamped by the material ones of the age in which he now lives.

Barbara’s bag of coins is replaced by a military standard in Alexander Lernet-Holenia’s novel, \textit{Die Standarte}. Herbert Menis, who joins the army in 1915 aged only 16, falls in love with Resa Lang, and also becomes obsessed with his regimental standard. He suddenly understands how people can shed blood for their country. Resa finds herself competing with the standard for Menis’ devotion. When he is first alone with the standard, he compares it to a woman, but considers it purer.\textsuperscript{77} After his company has been decimated following stubborn disobedience in the ranks, Menis takes it upon himself to guard the standard and return it to the Emperor in Vienna. When he finally arrives at Schönbrunn Palace, all the soldiers have been released from their military oath. Unable to deliver the standard to his Emperor, who is in the process of fleeing, Menis throws it into the fire to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. He believes that all the regimental standards will rise from the ashes as new, to stand above the people.

The similarity between Menis’ feelings towards the regimental standard and those of Ferdinand towards Barbara’s coins is striking. The standard symbolises the universal ideal of the Monarchy, one to which Menis becomes increasingly attached. Even after his company has broken up, he believes that all the nationalities will return to the Empire. It is holy and cannot disappear forever.\textsuperscript{78} Like \textit{Barbara}, \textit{Die Standarte} is narrated in flashback mode, from a point in time several years after the war. It is implied that, for Menis, the past is more real than anything else.\textsuperscript{79}
The prognosis of this novel for Austria's future is more hopeful than that of the three works discussed above. After all, Menis clings to the conviction that the Monarchy will come again. However the sense of loss is similar to that in the texts by Roth, Csokor and Werfel. What is more, there is no attempt by the leading character to adapt to the new situation of republican Austria. Like Carl-Joseph, Radosin and Ferdinand R., he can only look backwards. More explicitly than Radetzkymarsch or Barbara, Die Standarte presents one man's reverence for an idea of the past and a conception of a universal Austrian identity, albeit one which is naively idealised.

Robert Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften is also set in the late imperial era, but it does not fit Magris' model of escapist literature comfortably. It is in no way a eulogy of the old Monarchy, and yet the satire is often gentle, the critical aspect tempered by humour. While mocking 'Kakanien', as Musil labels the Empire, he writes that in so many ways which were unrecognised, it was an exemplary state. In the times when the Monarchy was not afflicted by national conflict, the various nationalities all got on splendidly. Of course, such times were rare: Musil continues by writing that the problems arose from the simple antipathy of each person to the endeavours of another. This is a sentiment which unites everybody in the modern age, he argues; in Kakanien it merely developed much earlier. Musil is under no illusion as to the faults of the multinational Monarchy. Nevertheless, the tone of his analysis reveals at least an affection for the past, if not a sense of loss.

Two of Roth's short novels, Zipper und sein Vater and Die Flucht ohne Ende, examine the experience of dislocation after World War I. In the
former, the narrator tells of the narrowness of the new Heimat. Even those Austrians who had previously never left their own district suddenly feel impelled to break out into the wide world and banish their present existence.\textsuperscript{82} This echoes Seipel's idea that the Austrians were by nature 'big-state people', uncomfortable in a small republic after their experience of empire. In Die Flucht ohne Ende, the main character, Franz Tunda (to whom the narrator refers as a 'European'), relates how since the war he has felt an outsider on the Ringstrasse in Vienna, whereas previously he had formed part of the elegant crowd promenading there.\textsuperscript{83} At the novella's conclusion the narrator encounters Tunda in Paris. The latter has 'no career, no love, no desire, no hope, no ambition and not even any egoism'. In the narrator's eyes he is more superfluous to the world than anyone before him.\textsuperscript{84} Tunda may well be an extreme case in point, but his experience mirrors that of many soldiers in central Europe after the war. More generally, it highlights the emotional difficulty of coping with life after the Monarchy. When Tunda returns to Vienna we are told he no longer has a Heimat, and is a man without name, rank or title.\textsuperscript{85} If Tunda never glorifies the past, he is nevertheless touched by an involuntary nostalgia for a time when he possessed an identity within the imperial framework. In Werfel's Der Tod des Kleinbürgers, which looks more directly at the disruption of economic identity, the nostalgia is unequivocal. Herr Fiala caresses his smoking pipes in the family's sitting room, 'seizing at better and long-forgotten times'. He also stares wistfully at a photograph from 1910 (he likens this to an altar), which shows him in his former profession as a civil servant in the imperial treasury.\textsuperscript{86}
Of all the periods of Habsburg rule in Europe, none better represents the universal nature of the dynasty's Empire than the reign of Charles V. Felix Braun chose this emperor's life as the subject for his play Kaiser Karl der Fünfte. The drama highlights problems afflicting Charles' Empire which have a direct parallel to the Europe, in particular central Europe, of the first quarter of the twentieth century. The Emperor mourns the fact that Europe is disintegrating into 'self-centred, vain' nations, which increasingly shut themselves off from each other. They all covet what others possess, whereas in Charles' eyes, one emperor should reign over them all. He resolves to stand by his belief in one empire and one confession, as he has been assigned his role by the grace of God. In desperation, on the eve of his flight from Innsbruck, he protests that he desired a united Europe and peace. Later, in the monastery, he admits to previous mistakes and regrets his warmongering attitude. He warns his son, Franz, that the peoples will fight against him, too. Europe's nations are teaching a new concept of the Trinity, one which will cause countless more deaths. Worst of all, the Roman Empire is decaying into fire, blood, horror and misery.

Kaiser Karl der Fünfte has a dual perspective. On one level it depicts the zenith of Habsburg power and its subsequent decline. The portrayal is not without criticism. In his endeavour to preserve the universal ideal of the Roman Empire, Charles is shown to have chosen questionable courses of action. In the cloister he confesses that since the death of Isabella he has demonstrated more love for the crown itself than for the souls of his subjects. On another level the play recalls the collapse of the Monarchy in 1918, and the ensuing problems this created for Europe. Braun implies that
the nationalities of the Monarchy were neglected, their aspirations
suppressed, all in an attempt to maintain Habsburg dominion. And yet the
universal ideal of Austria remains untarnished.

Whether or not one concurs with Magris’ thesis of the Habsburg myth in
Austrian literature, it is evident that many writers of the inter-war years
chose to explore the Habsburg past in their works. In the selection examined
above, the world of the Monarchy comes across as one in which the
characters possess a strong sense of Fatherland and *Heimat*. The Empire, for
all its faults, is shown to have given the individual a sense of identification,
one which disappears rapidly after 1918. The uncomfortable feeling of
generational conflict before 1914, and anger at the authorities which pushed
Austria into World War I, are balanced by the affirmation that the universal
function of Austria as a solution to the menace of nationalism did exist at
least as an ideal, and by the dislocation of individuals when the Empire
crumbled. Above all one can gauge a painful sense of loss, the sense that the
dismemberment of the Monarchy had found no meaningful replacement.

These works reflect traditional, conservative constructs of
*Österreichertum*. By choosing the multinational Empire as their setting, they
engage with the universal element of Austrian identity. *Radetzkymarsch*,
*Kaiser Karl der Fünfte* and *3. November 1918* all debate the Austrian mission
in an affirmative way, as to a lesser extent does Musil in *Der Mann ohne
Eigenschaften*. We have seen how a section of Austrian conservatism found
it difficult to reconcile itself first with the reality of post-imperial rump
Austria, and second with the republican state form. That some writers seem
to indicate a bleak future only amplifies the positive aspects of the imperial
age they refract in their texts. What is more, Barbara’s coins and Menis’ standard suggest that the Austrian idea has been preserved, if in a latent form.

A number of fictional works surveyed here debate the qualities of *homo Austriacus*, some by employing the Austrian-Prussian polarity we have seen both in Front propaganda and in the work of Hofmannsthal. Perhaps the most famous instance of this is to be found in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. When news arrives in Vienna that Germany is planning a celebration for the thirtieth jubilee of Wilhelm II in 1918, the Austrians decide to begin a similar campaign to celebrate seventy years of Franz Joseph’s reign as Emperor, the anniversary of which will fall in the same year. We are told that, as well as honouring their monarch, the German festivities will remind the world of the Reich’s greatness and power. Anxious not to be outdone the Austrians, centred around Count Leinsdorf, embark on a search to find appropriate markers or themes for the Austrian campaign. This they find a troublesome exercise; they can only come up with vague slogans such as ‘Emperor of Peace’, ‘European Landmark’, ‘True Austria’ and ‘Culture and Capital’.

The attempt to devise a great patriotic campaign in competition with the German plans is symbolic of Austria’s quest to define an identity for herself after the collapse of the Monarchy. There are striking parallels between Leinsdorf and Seipel. The attempts to ape Germany and then surpass her in the magnitude and pomp of the celebrations reflect the fact that an independent Austrian identity lacked clarity and purposeful direction. On the other hand, the patriotic campaign affords differentiation between Austria and Germany. The characters of Count Leinsdorf and Paul Arnheim,
meanwhile, like Hofmannsthal’s Hans Karl and Neuhoff, are representative figures of their respective countries.\textsuperscript{90}

A more explicit contrast between Austria and Germany is found in Franz Werfel’s novella, \textit{Die Entfremdung} (‘Estrangement’). Apart from a short beginning and end, the narrative unfolds in the mind of Gabriele Rittner, an Austrian from Salzburg who has gone to visit her brother in Berlin. She has been knocked down by a bus, and is recuperating under sedation in hospital. Scenes from her life past and present are jumbled in a prolonged dream sequence, centred on her relationship with her brother, and charged with anxiety. We learn that in childhood the two siblings were very close. Now that Erwin, the brother, has left Salzburg for Berlin and is married, Gabriele feels that he is lost to her. In her mind, Erwin is controlled by his wife, Judith, and has changed, infected both by Berlin and his spouse. Although it is not made clear, the reader is invited to consider that the road accident is a suicide attempt on Gabriele’s part.

The novella offers numerous comparisons between Austria and Prussia, while the choice of an exclusively subjective narrative permits a large bias in favour of the former and an uncritical prejudice against the latter. That Salzburg is the hometown of Gabriele and Erwin is surely no coincidence, set as it is on the German border. As children, the two look out to the German Alps. Erwin boasts that one day he will ‘make it over there’. Gabriele replies with caution, ‘Erwin! It’s dangerous. There are robbers there, or strange peoples’.\textsuperscript{91} When Erwin turns his childhood dream into reality, Gabriele remarks to her grandmother that he has ‘sold himself’. In her eyes, he is no
longer the same; he soon speaks in the Berlin dialect, rather than using 'their' words. 92

She is even more dismayed when she visits him in Berlin. He refers to his adoptive city as home and is ashamed of the 'horrible narrowness' and 'superstition' which characterised their childhood. Judith, he adds, has shown him 'the other side of life'. 93 He tells his sister not to be angry. People change, he asserts. In Berlin 'you does not get anywhere with sentimentality'. You have the choice either to be a hammer or an anvil. To be the former is far better; if you don't learn this, you're soon 'yesterday's news'. 94 In spite of Erwin's enthusiastic and wholehearted adoption of his new Prussian milieu – significantly he lives in Hohenzollernstrasse – Judith admits to Gabriele that he retains traces of his upbringing. He is, she says patronisingly, a little lethargic and has no energy. He displays the 'malady of all Austrians: musician's blood and no industry'. 95

Gabriele's perception of the Berliners betrays the anxiety and alienation of a foreigner. At the train station she feels surrounded by a mass of automatons. The city seems to swallow up the people into its vortex. The faces are grey, display a morose energy and 'a readiness to attack'. The bypassers stick out their chins in an exaggerated manner, while only the napes of their necks show any colour. Effecting a contrast between this unfriendly, mechanic society, and the humanity Gabriele is used to at home, she remarks to herself that in Salzburg or Vienna it is customary to collect people from the station. This does not happen in Berlin. 96

Parallels to this scene can be found in both Joseph Roth's Die Flucht ohne Ende and Braun's Agnes Altkirchner. In Roth's novella, the itinerant
Franz Tunda finds himself in Germany a few years after the war. Everything around him seems to be orderly. The young people have serious faces, nobody speaks a word; they appear to be marching towards an ideal. Grown men and women also march to the same step. All are going to the station which seems to be their temple. In Agnes Altkirchner, Anselm Schreiber has an uneasy train journey through Prussia, finding his fellow-passengers particularly strange and distant. Once in Berlin, Anselm realises just how different he and the Austrians are from those in this alien city.

Friedrich Schreyvogl’s fictionalised biography of Grillparzer, first published in 1935, explores the Austrian-German polarity in a meeting between the Austrian writer and Hegel. The philosopher is full of criticism for Austrian thinkers. He tells Grillparzer, ‘The Austrians have a strange method of philosophy. They always think on the basis of emotion. Their deduction proceeds on the sward of imagination and not on the hard road of logic. That has no use in philosophy’. Significantly, Grillparzer finds Hegel’s philosophy difficult to grasp and considers it inadequate. Later, an encounter takes place between two north German writers and a group of Austrian ones in a Viennese cafe, which results in an argument over the state of German literature. The north Germans see themselves as part of a new, dynamic movement, which is part of the rebirth of the German nation. Grillparzer, displaying the Viennese fascination with death insists that this must also occur. Germany and Austria are then likened to the head and body of the German nation. The head is rational, the body is sensual.

In Die Standarte, Alexander Lernet-Holenia uses army officers to expose the differences between Austrians and Germans. A World War I Austrian
regiment in Karanabesch is under the command of a German officer by the name of Bottenlauben. He remarks that the Germans are optimistic for the future. Anschütz, an Austrian officer, replies that the Austrians are quite the opposite. They have learned their lesson as a European colonial power, and are prepared for the future. The sense here is that Austria, as an old power, can only look backwards to her past, whereas the optimism of the Germans reflects the fact that their nation state has only a short history and lacks the burdens associated with Austria's past.¹⁰¹

The attempts by these fictional works to highlight characteristics that are presented as quintessentially Austrian, sometimes by effecting a contrast with German or Prussian ones, reflect the traditional assertion of formulations of Österreichertum that the Austrian (der österreichische Mensch) is endowed with a particular set of qualities setting him apart from other Germans. Outside the realm of fiction, we have already seen writers such as Hofmannsthal and Wildgans concentrate their efforts on providing more comprehensive, if generalised, analyses of homo Austriacus. Later in this chapter we will learn how a more anthropological approach to the idea of the Austrian reached different conclusions about the relationship between Austrians and Germans.

Historians

As we have seen in chapter two, the governments of the authoritarian era took significant measures to ensure that education in Austrian primary and secondary schools, particularly with regard to the teaching of History,
promoted a patriotic awareness. However the spirit of German nationalism
reigned at the universities as it had for decades prior to World War I.\textsuperscript{102} This
is very well illustrated by the attempts of Ernst Karl Winter, who will feature
prominently later in this chapter, to obtain his Habilitation, the post-doctoral
qualification leading to tenure at university. His first application to become
qualified in May 1929 was rejected by Othmar Spann, who explained to
Winter that he was not sufficiently national, that is, German nationally-
minded, to be accepted. The Dean of the Sociology Faculty then told Winter
that until he had written a lead article supporting Anschluss for the ‘Dötz’
(Deutschösterreichische Tageszeitung, the organ of the National Socialists in
Vienna) he would not receive his qualification. A second attempt failed in
1934, for exactly the same reasons.\textsuperscript{103}

Herbert Dachs has observed that, prior to World War I, German-
Austrian historians did not offer much to emotionally bind all the peoples of
the Empire, but rather concentrated on the role played by the Germans in the
Monarchy.\textsuperscript{104} They had supported the Habsburg Empire and believed in its
importance for Central Europe, and several historians worked for the
wartime propaganda machine producing patriotic literature. Apart from
Ludo Moritz Hartmann, all showed regret at the collapse of the
Monarchy.\textsuperscript{105} With the dissolution of the imperial idea, their focus and hope
became the German nation, which transcended the political uncertainty of the
early post-war years.\textsuperscript{106}

Both Dachs and Gernot Heiss note that a large proportion of historians
teaching at Austrian universities in the inter-war era, irrespective of their
ideological outlook, viewed Austria as a state against its own will.\textsuperscript{107} They
were strongly opposed to the peace treaties and, in the 1920s at least, lent their support to the *Anschluss* movement. Many attacked the plans for a Danube Federation.\(^{108}\) Even some of those who initially welcomed the *Anschluss* in 1938, such as Heinrich von Srbik, the most prominent Austrian historian of the period, saw themselves as Austrian patriots nevertheless. Srbik defended his *gesamtdeutsch* conception of history by claiming that he sought to revise *kleindeutsch* historiography, emphasising instead Austria’s special place in German history.\(^{109}\) In a sense there is little to divide Srbik’s and Schuschnigg’s evaluation of Austria’s past. Both men subscribed to the concept of Austria as the traditional leader of the German nation. Where they differed was in their interpretation of this past for contemporary political purposes. Schuschnigg believed he could use the formula to preserve Austria’s independence; Srbik sought to justify his support of the political unity of the German nation.

The case of Srbik highlights a phenomenon not uncommon in inter-war Austria, yet one which further complicates the question of Austrian identity during the period. We saw that Seipel’s construct of *Österreichertum* was not defined merely by his position on the *Anschluss* question. Srbik’s example, too, blurs any neat distinction between conscious ‘Austrians’ supporting independence on the one hand, and Pan-Germans supporting *Anschluss* on the other. Even in the 1930s the advocates for union with Germany contained some who accepted and promoted the existence of a distinct *Österreichertum*. The position of these intellectuals on the issue of *Anschluss* was not simply that of accepting or rejecting the concept of an Austrian identity, but rather it depended on their particular understanding of
Österreichertum and how they believed it was best served. Anschluss was not a single programme; different groups in both Austria and Germany had varying ideas as to how the relationship between the two states would be realised politically. The intellectuals around Srbik could not have envisaged the final form Anschluss took after 1938. They saw Austria playing a leading role in a Greater Germany, not as a collection of Alpine and Danubian provinces swallowed up in a centralised, Prussian-dominated Reich. This is an issue to which we will return in the conclusion.

Historians in the Srbik mould rejected the notion of a separate Austrian history. At a lecture in Berlin, Srbik asserted that an examination of Austria’s past showed that it had always been closely linked to German history. These Pan-German historians emphasised the major contributions made by Austria, and particularly by the Habsburgs, to German history. In this way, they claimed they were attempting to overcome the predominance of kleindeutsch historiography and to rehabilitate the Habsburg Empire in the eyes of Reich Germans. It was felt that Austria’s decisive role in German history had been neglected or even ignored by German historians since 1866. Srbik and like-minded historians tried to redress the balance, with an emphasis on the special mission the Austrians had fulfilled for the German nation.

Srbik held a more conciliatory attitude towards the Austrian-Prussian polemic frequently exposed by other writers. In the introduction to his biography of Metternich, for example, Srbik placed Bismarck next to the former Austrian Chancellor as a leader of Mitteleuropa. Elsewhere Srbik described both Maria Theresia and her rival, Frederick, as great figures of
German history. Similarly he argued that, in the move towards a new empire for all Germans after 1815, both Austria and Prussia had claims to leadership: the former by dint of its centuries-old Habsburg legacy, the latter as it had proved decisive in delivering the Germans from the Napoleonic yoke. Metternich’s rejection of this unification of the German nation under one emperor is called his ‘heavy responsibility vis-à-vis the German future’. Srbik heavily criticised a book by another historian, R.F. Kaindl, for ignoring all the negative aspects of Austria, and all the positive ones about Prussia. Kaindl defended himself by accusing Srbik of being infected by the kleindeutsch ideas he was attempting to revise in his work, Österreich, Preußen, Deutschland.

Srbik outlined his gesamtdeutsch (Pan-German) view of Austrian history in a series of three lectures, published in 1936 as Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte (Austria in German History). He insisted that the history of Germany was not one of politically independent states, but that a common German history did exist. He talked of a German Volkseinheit (unity of the German people) and rubbished the geo-political theses which claimed that Austria was by nature a Danubian state. Rudolf IV was not the creator of homo Austriacus; Österreichertum did not possess a separate ‘cultural physiognomy’, Srbik argued. On the contrary, Austria’s population was still entirely German under Maximilian, while even Charles V’s universalism was a German legacy. The Habsburgs, he observed, remained German, and were not solely responsible for the decline of the Holy Roman Empire. While the Austrian-Prussian dualism in the eighteenth century was largely destructive for the German Gesamtvolk (German people as a whole), Srbik
conceded, in some ways it had proved to be a creative force as well. Maria Theresia learned much from Frederick the Great, he noted, while her son, Joseph II, pursued a policy of Germanisation out of a sense of loyalty to his position as German Emperor. The failure of the German Bund, according to Srbik, was the fault of both Austria and Prussia, although the former had united herself once more with Germany for the Great War. Hundreds of thousands died, not only for their state, but for the German Gesamtvolk.¹¹⁸

Together with the literary historian Josef Nadler, Srbik produced a collection of essays in 1936 entitled Österreichs Erbe und Sendung im Deutschen Raum (Austria’s Legacy and Mission in the German Sphere). The aim of the work, as outlined in the introduction, was to give a comprehensive picture of Austria and its German people.¹¹⁹ All the essays accorded with Srbik’s programme of presenting Austria as an equal and important part of the German nation, and demonstrated that Austrian history was inseparable from German history. Wilhelm Bauer contributed a piece which emphasised the Deutschtum of the German-Austrian. While Austria was a peripheral land geographically, he admitted, she had always been more aware of her German character than other parts of the nation.¹²⁰ Heinrich Kretschmayr argued that the expansion of Austria to the east in the sixteenth century corresponded with Pan-German interests.¹²¹ Meanwhile, Hans Sellmayr made the case for the Baroque as an Austrian style of art, but insisted that its true power was only understood when seen in the context of German art and history as a whole.¹²² Similarly, Nadler isolated particular features of Austrian literature but argued that, during Maria Theresia’s reign, Austria cut herself off from the Latin-Roman Baroque and re-entered the literary community of the
German people. He observed that the German national philosophy and literature which was developed in the North facilitated the German regeneration of Austria.123

In 1934, Nadler produced an anthropological study of the German people in which he examined the various Stämme in turn. The Austrians, he wrote, were an offshoot of the Bavarians. He played down the notion that the German inhabitants of the Danubian march reproduced freely with Slav peoples, arguing that racial mixing occurred in isolated pockets only.124 Like Srbik, Nadler highlighted the importance of doing justice to Austria’s achievements for German history. He wrote that Austria had not been a mere border land, but a great power and an important centre for art and science, citing Vienna’s significance for both German music and theatre.125

Professing similar views to the Srbik group, yet outside of it, was the younger historian Hugo Hantsch. Overall he too saw Austrian history through Greater-German spectacles, but he did not underplay Austria’s separate development from the rest of the German nation. In this way he presented an alternative construct of Austria’s German identity. Hantsch supported the independence of a Catholic Austria, and therefore stood adjacent to the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg line. Like Srbik, Hantsch saw it an important part of his task to teach the Germans about the achievements of Austria and the Habsburgs on behalf of Deutschum.126 In common with Front propaganda, however, Hantsch also explored the wider context of Austria’s importance for central Europe.

In his works from the inter-war period, which included the first volume of his Geschichte Österreichs (History of Austria),127 he treated Austrian
history as a subject matter in its own right. In the introduction to *Geschichte Österreichs* he outlined his attempt to examine Austria as a unity.\(^{128}\) The volume begins with the foundation of the Ostmark in the tenth century and focuses on the territories ruled by the Babenbergs and Habsburgs until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In spite of the fact that Hantsch gives consideration to the other nationalities of the Empire, the German accent of his conception of Austrian history is strong. In a slightly earlier work, Hantsch noted that at the beginning of the sixteenth century Austria became Germany's destiny, and vice-versa.\(^{129}\) Although the centripetal moment in the Empire was very weak at the time, and the acquisition of Hungary in 1526 saw the Habsburgs take their first steps outside the Empire, he asserted that the new political formation of Habsburg lands allowed German culture to be spread more widely, while giving new succour to those German cultural elements already existing in Bohemia and Hungary.\(^{130}\) Referring to the start of the eighteenth century Hantsch wrote:

> Much foreign blood flows in the veins of the people in Austria... but the population of small towns remains what it always was, and the large mass of native peasantry stays free of any racial mixing. German blood is stronger than foreign blood and, within a short time, is able to assimilate the foreign elements... The country remains German and the German way soon flows more widely throughout the whole of the Danube-Vltava territory.\(^{131}\)
Essentially, Hugo Hantsch’s writings supported *Vaterländische Front* propaganda in that they promoted the notion of Austria’s German mission and stressed that *Deutschtum* in Austria was no way inferior to that in the *Reich*.132

Hantsch explored the implications of Austria’s geographical location. He stated that Vienna was Europe’s centre, from where Austria stood open to the whole world. Austria’s European significance had been the basis of all Metternichian policy. The former Chancellor, Hantsch argued, saw Austria not merely as the bulwark and heart of the Empire, but as the heart of central Europe, even of the whole of Europe. On a more metaphysical note, Hantsch stressed that Austria was an idea, namely the idea of a universal state, which could never restrict itself to serving a particular national interest. She represented the imperial idea, which in its essence, was a European one.133

Hantsch saw Catholicism as an important component of Austrian identity. He observed that the fortunes of the Habsburg Empire and the Catholic Church had always been closely linked. The monarch had been the secular arm of the church; during the struggles of the Reformation, the House of Austria managed to preserve what little remained of Catholicism until it was possible to re-establish it. The Counter-Reformation generally succeeded, he commented, where the influence of the Habsburgs was dominant.134

What united almost all Austrian historians active in the inter-war years was their effort to amplify the role Austria had played in German and European history. Numerous articles by leading intellectuals stressed the need to revise the *kleindeutsch* historiography which predominated both in
Germany and Austria. The author of one of these, Richard von Kralik, had already attempted his own Austrian history, first published in 1913. As one might expect for its time, this encompassed the whole of the Monarchy and its peoples, threaded together, as Kralik put it, by an idea. Kralik revealed the lack of Austro-centric historiography when he declared that his work was breaking ranks with the majority of contemporary histories by not favouring Prussia over Austria. The trend against which he fought thrived in the inter-war years. The writing of history was dominated by figures who, while they demonstrated an appreciation of ‘Austrian’ identity, saw Anschluss as the means to the highest political expression of the German nation. Their historiography was Austrian, in that it challenged the kleindeutsch conception of German history, but also gesamtdeutsch in that it set Austria’s past fully within the framework of that history.

Catholic Periodicals: Schönere Zukunft & Der Christliche Standestaat

Schönere Zukunft, a weekly conservative cultural journal, was established in Vienna in 1925. Its founder and publisher was Joseph Eberle, a German citizen who had been living in Austria for a number of years. In a leading article for the first edition, Eberle stated that the reason for starting up this new publication was to strengthen the Catholic press in both Austria and Vienna. In his opinion, Austria faced the task of re-educating her own people in a Catholic sense. Schönere Zukunft was principally devoted to Catholic affairs, containing a digest of global news about the Church, but on a regular basis it also printed articles which dealt with Austrian culture and
history, as well as her contemporary relationship with Germany. At the time, of course, this meant Weimar Germany, not the Third Reich.

In the same editorial for the first issue, Eberle examined two trains of thought concerning, as he put it, a settlement between the Austrian idea and the new German development. The first, influenced by Protestantism, promoted the nation state concept (i.e. Anschluss), while the second, with its roots in Catholicism, favoured the universal, supranational state idea. No Catholic, Eberle added, could wish to see central Europe become an enlarged Prussia.\(^{138}\) Although Eberle was a German, he evidently felt his Catholicism to be an equally strong pole of identity. He saw it as the duty of all Catholics to ensure that Austria was reconnected to her old traditions. She must be preserved culturally and rebuilt politically, as she had a cultural mission to fulfil for the German nation as a whole.\(^{139}\)

Although Schönere Zukunft was published in Vienna, a significant proportion of its readership lived in Germany. This led to occasional criticisms from that quarter that the publication’s focus was too Austrian. Eberle countered with the remark that Austria deservedly received such attention because she provided the leadership of Catholicism in central Europe.\(^{140}\) He also defended the paper against the accusation that it posited the old German Reichsidee against the Austrian idea of the Danubian multinational Empire. He asserted that the two did not conflict. What is more, he continued, Schönere Zukunft did not promote a specific rejection of Anschluss, but merely took the same reserved line as the Christian Social Party on the issue.\(^{141}\) The previous year, Eberle had written that those complaining of an excessive Austrian bias in politics and history had become
'Prussianised'. Schönere Zukunft was not concerned with presenting one-sided Österreichertum, he countered, but with re-establishing the Catholic vision of history and its political ideals which had existed until 1866. From this one can see that Eberle’s Greater-German sympathies were within the same Catholic framework as those of Seipel and, later, Dollfuß and Schuschnigg.

Although the paper refrained from involving itself directly in the struggle between Nazi Germany and Ständestaat Austria after 1933, this was not so much due to a tacit support for the Anschluss movement, but stemmed far more from a desire to avoid alienating its German readership and, ultimately, censorship within the Reich. Before Hitler’s triumph in Germany, Eberle had in fact campaigned vigorously against National Socialism, both within Schönere Zukunft, and in a short book entitled Zum Kampf gegen Hitler. After Anschluss, Eberle proffered a conciliatory message. In the first issue following the fall of the Schuschnigg government, he again highlighted Austria’s cultural and historical achievements, while he begged the ‘victors’ of March 1938 to allow Austria the rightful place within Germany which she deserved. The paper continued to be published until 1941, when it was closed down by the Gestapo, and Eberle was arrested on suspicion of passing information to foreign news agencies.

Throughout the inter-war ear, Schönere Zukunft printed a large variety of articles from contributors whose views on Austrian identity conflicted. On the one hand it published occasional pieces by Srbik; on the other we can find offerings from those affirming the existence of an Austrian nation, such as Zessner-Spitzenberg and Ernst Karl Winter. An essay by the latter on the
Gothic, Baroque and Romantic in Austria was accompanied by an editorial note, however, remarking that the paper only partly agreed with its content.\textsuperscript{147} Two articles which appeared in a single issue of Schönere Zukunft illustrate further how the publication was open to diverging opinions on the question of the relationship between Germany and Austria. Dr. Hans Eibl, by his own admission a keen supporter of Anschluss, lavished praise on recent speeches Seipel had made in Paris which touched on the issue. Eibl wrote that the Chancellor had not explicitly talked about Anschluss, but had laid down the premises on which it could take place.\textsuperscript{148} In contrast, Heinrich Freiherr von Raabl-Werner stressed the importance of the historical and cultural ties with the other peoples of the Danube basin. He wrote that the relationship of German-Austrians with the other Habsburg nationalities had been closer than that with the ‘north Germans’ and concluded that nothing could be worse than to turn the desire for Anschluss into reality.\textsuperscript{149} Both men agreed, however, on the dominant German element of Austrian identity, and Raabl-Werner maintained that nobody felt more German than the German-Austrians.\textsuperscript{150}

In a previous issue of Schönere Zukunft, Eibl had written an article on the importance of the Austrian Volksstamm for the German Gesamtvolk. While admitting to other cultural and racial influences on the Austrian Stamm, Eibl insisted that the German influence had been the strongest of all. This had resulted in the Austrians developing as a German people.\textsuperscript{151} Eibl also drew the traditional comparison between Austrians and Prussians, noting that the former possessed an overwhelming belief in ‘the great order of things’. This belief resigned the Austrians to the limitations of human
endeavour, but gave them trust in the significance of all events, and fostered a submission to the rule of a higher power.\textsuperscript{152}

Der Christliche Ständestaat was an Austrian periodical founded in 1933 by another German émigré, Dietrich von Hildebrandt. In spite of its name, the publication was independent from both the government and the Vaterländische Front, although much of its content mirrored the patriotic propaganda of the Ständestaat era. Like Schöne Zukunft, Der Christliche Ständestaat was a pronouncedly Catholic and conservative journal which printed, in the main, cultural and historical articles. Unlike Eberle’s paper, however, it focused almost exclusively on Austria and matters Austrian, and unequivocally backed Austria in the struggle against National Socialist Germany. Indeed, its editor had moved to Austria in order to avoid the restrictions imposed by the Nazi regime in Germany. In his editorial for the first issue of the periodical, Hildebrandt wrote of the ‘true’ Deutschtum in Austria, which contrasted sharply with the misplaced feelings and ideals in evidence elsewhere. The purpose of his paper, he continued, was to aid the ideological conquest of Austria for her mission, namely the promotion of this Deutschtum, both inside the country and abroad.\textsuperscript{153}

The idea of the Austrian mission was articulated as habitually in the pages of Der Christliche Ständestaat as it was in the speeches of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. In accordance with official Front ideology, the many contributors to the publication asserted that the mission was a German one, and that the Austrians were the bearers of true German culture and ideals, having preserved the tradition of Deutschtum as a universal concept, rather than a narrower national one.\textsuperscript{154} In an article by Dr. Leopold Zahn, entitled
'Österreichertum and Latin Deutschtum', it was observed that the Austrian was a supra-German being, the German in his oldest and purest form, deeply rooted in the traditions of the Holy Roman Empire. The Austrian, as a direct descendant of the 'old German', had as his complement the Latin-Roman element, whereas the 'new German' had the Slav one. The Latin-Roman complement, Zahn argued, was a constructive, corrective element which had facilitated the Germans' integration into the European cultural community. The Slav complement, on the other hand, strengthened the innate tendency of the Germans towards self-destruction and tempted them back into chaos and barbarism. An anonymous article compared the Austrian and the German Mensch, arguing that, in spite of having mixed with other peoples, the former had remained unchanged over the years. The Austrians had preserved the true German character, while the Reich Germans had been transformed over the centuries by a process of Prussification.

It has been observed that the Austrians suffered from a deep-rooted inferiority complex about being second-rate, or 'foreign' Germans. This was allegedly a factor contributing to the obsession with promoting the German character of Austria, insisting that Austrians were 'true' Germans. The complex is transparent in several articles which appeared in Der Christliche Ständestaat. Clemens von Kettenburg, for instance, insisted that the character of the Austrian people was as German as that of the Rhenish Franks or the Alemanns. The make-up of those east of the Elbe, on the other hand, was predominantly Slav. Leo Octavio Wildner, in defending the concept of homo Austriacus, wrote that he did not exist as a contrast to Deutschtum since he possessed the 'original' German character, just as the
Viennese spoken dialect had preserved forms from the Old High German language.¹⁵⁸

Dr. Franz Giehl argued that the concept of *homo Austriacus* had a sound historical basis. Even before the union with Bohemia and Hungary, he maintained, it was possible to detect the beginnings of a unified administration in Austria, as well as the roots of an Austrian consciousness. In 1518, a Pan-Austrian diet met in Innsbruck which, according to the intentions of the Emperor, was to be the first Austrian parliament. Giehl argued that, uniquely among all the German *Stämme*, the Austrian had been united with his own state for more than five centuries, during which time a distinct people had evolved as nowhere else in the German nation.¹⁵⁹ Richard von Schaukal, whose Austrian consciousness became ever more pronounced throughout the 1930s, thought the government’s emphasis on the German nature of Austria to be excessive. Unlike some commentators he did not deny the strong German element of *Österreichertum*.¹⁶⁰ He did, however, believe in the independence of an Austrian *Volkstum*. What is more, he considered it suitable to apply the term nation to a *Staatsvolk*, that is, a nation in the political sense. For him, the Austrians were unquestionably a *Staatsvolk* and therefore, potentially, a nation.¹⁶¹

Heinrich Mataja, Foreign Minister under Seipel, and Raimund Poukar, biographer of the former Chancellor, were men who had consistently held an orthodox conservative position on the question of Austrian identity. For example, both saw the Austrians as a German *Stamm* and conceived of Austria’s mission as that of preserving German values. However, the tension between Germany and Austria which increasingly endangered the latter’s
independence, affected their understanding of the relationship between the two countries. Mataja wrote that the difference between the Austrians and the other German Stämme was not significantly more marked than that between the Stämme of the Reich themselves. Nevertheless, he observed, it occasionally happened that a part of the larger Volk assumed the character of an independent nation. This had occurred with the Swiss and the Dutch, both of whom were originally part of the German nation, but now no longer felt as such. As for Austria, Mataja contended, she could best fulfil her German mission from within the German nation. Whether this was possible depended on the German Reich. If the National Socialist regime permanently refrained from interfering in Austrian affairs and fully respected her independence, then Austria could happily highlight the Christian-German foundations of her culture and there would be no need for her to style herself as a separate nation. If the Germans continued to stir up trouble, however, the development of the Austrian nation was as good as assured, Mataja predicted. Poukar emphasised that Austria and the Austrians were a German country and a German people, although they were so different from other German peoples both racially and emotionally that they represented a special case. Like Mataja, Poukar conceded that there might come a time when they considered themselves a nation apart from the Germans.

An Austrian Anthropology – Harbingers of the Austrian Nation

This section examines the output of some academics and other publicists who formulated ideas of Austria and Austrians outside of the Greater-
German context. Their endeavours, which encompass history, politics, anthropology and culture, mark a significant point in the quest to find a truly national identity for the Austrians. It has been mentioned that many of the ideas discussed here were too radical to be palatable to both the average Austrian citizen and the governing elite alike. Nevertheless, they warrant investigation for two reasons. Firstly, they complete the set of constructs of Austrian identity produced by conservatives in the inter-war period. Secondly, they foreshadow the government-led initiative after 1945 to break the umbilical cord with Germany and to embark on the path towards Austrian nationhood.

Two books published during World War I offer an introduction to the notion of an Austrian anthropology in the inter-war era. In 1916, Robert Müller wrote that four ‘races’ existed in Central Europe: German, Austrian, Balkan and Turk. His conception of race was not biological; he noted that the complexion of the Austrian could vary from Aryan to Mongolian. Erwin Hanslik was writing about der österreichische Mensch as early as 1917. He examined Austria both as a geo-political entity and as an idea. He asserted that the borders of the Monarchy were endowed by nature – ‘an Austrian land exists from the beginning’ – and sought to show clear differences between the Austrian and German spirit (Geist), also emphasising
the importance of the Slav influence.\textsuperscript{168} In line with the idea of the self-prescriptive nature of identity, Hanslik insisted that nobody could be compelled to be an Austrian, it was a matter of individual conscience.\textsuperscript{169}

In 1927 a collection of essays appeared under the title \textit{Die Österreichische Aktion: Programmatische Studien}. The publication was a forum for the ultra-patriotic movement of the same name, which had Ernst Karl Winter as its spokesman. This comprised sociologists as well as historians, several of whom were active culturally or politically in the legitimist movement. As firm believers in Austrian nationhood, they presented an Austrian historiography which was independent from the German one. In short, their aim was to prove that the only significant link between the Austrians and the Germans was linguistic.

These publicists had difficulty being accepted into the main academic community and so were forced to expound their ideas in periodicals and books which were privately published, such as \textit{Wiener Politische Blätter}, \textit{Vaterland}, and the book of essays mentioned above. Winter and HK Zessner-Spitzenberg both achieved greater exposure politically. The latter’s contribution to the legitimist movement, and his role as head of the \textit{Traditionsreferat}, has already been examined. Winter, who maintained a good relationship with Dollfuss, was made a deputy Mayor of Vienna and was charged by the Chancellor with the task of winning the former Social Democrats over to the patriotic side. The \textit{Aktion Winter}, as it was to become known, failed largely due to the fact that its leader was too supportive of the Social Democrats and thus exceeded his remit as far as the government was concerned.\textsuperscript{170} Winter soon became marginalised and was viewed as an
eccentric figure whose ideas were too strong for the palate of the government, *Vaterländische Front* and *Heimatschutz* alike. 171

In his introduction to *Die Österreichische Aktion: Programmatische Studien*, Winter explained that the cultural and political orientation of the book was European. He added that the goal was not central Europe, but Europe as a whole. In his eyes, Europe was a synthesis of the Orient and Occident, and of Greek and Roman thought. Winter claimed that the Austrian idea was preserved by the European idea. Both sought to avoid national block-building in the European sphere by promoting a higher, more universal order for the various peoples who inhabited it. For Winter, this meant abandoning all ideas that Marxist 'barbarianism' might prove to be the force for regeneration. Instead, Europe had to return to the foundations of her culture, encapsulated by the Roman Imperial idea and the Catholic Church. 172 In his essay on the 'Austrian and European spheres', Winter showed that Austria was linked to all of the seven territorial 'systems' he had defined in Europe. For this reason, to think in an Austrian way was to think European. Austria's historical legacy meant she must make herself responsible for Europe's future. 173

*Wiener Politische Blätter* was a journal edited and privately published by Winter between 1933 and 1936. In its first issue he wrote that the four guiding ideas of the publication were the religious, the conservative, the social and the European. 174 Austria's European identity, according to Winter, was one of the most important factors distinguishing the Austrians from the Germans. Old Austria had first become a real European power through her dynastic links with Burgundy and Spain. This experience, as well as the
acquisition of Bohemia and Hungary, permitted Austria to undergo a very different historical development from that of Germany. Ultimately it allowed the Austrians to evolve from a German Stamm into a European state. Winter tried to promote this idea further in an open letter addressed to the Austrian president. ‘More than Germany’, he wrote, ‘Austria is a European state’. In a subsequent article he wrote that any German mission Austria may have had was always subordinate to her European one. The fact that the Austrians had stepped out of the narrow confines of Deutschum had prepared them for an extra-German task. Even as a small state she could, like Switzerland, act as mediator between the two political halves of Europe.

Alfred Missong, another leading member of Österreichische Aktion, contributed an essay to the volume which focused more directly on Austria’s significance for Europe and examined Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropa movement. Missong’s starting point was the difference between Austrian and Prussian conservatism. He accused the latter, which he defined as the spirit of Luther, Hegel, Kant and Bismarck, of creating division and conflict, and ignoring the solidarity of the European peoples. ‘True’ conservatism, he argued, was embodied by Austria. It eschewed nationalism and found its natural home in pacifistic Europeanism. The European, pacifistic idea was therefore nothing more than the development of the Austrian idea, he maintained. Historically, the concept of the universal Empire was the manifestation of the consciousness of solidarity in European Christendom.

Missong emphasised the Roman rather than German ethos of the Empire. He noted that the label ‘German nation’ was tagged on to the name ‘Holy Roman Empire’ only during the Reformation. As a universal empire,
he observed, it could never be severed from its Roman roots. This was because 'Roman' was not a national definition, but supranational, the very core of the imperial idea. The 'King of the Germans' was a title obtained through election by the German princes, but only via coronation by the Pope did this king then accede to the title Emperor, he wrote. 179

Missong thought that the efforts to establish a significant Pan-European movement were a step in the right direction. He remarked, however, that Coudenhove-Kalergi's idea was stillborn. The principal purpose of Paneuropa was economic union. To attempt to achieve this in advance of 'higher' common European aims could not lead to success, he considered. Nevertheless, Missong asserted that Austria's destiny was, as in the past, directly linked to that of Europe. Just as she had once shaped and pacified Europe, Europe had now to shape Austria and bring peace to the country. 180

Winter contributed two essays to Die Österreichische Aktion which set out his argument for a distinct Austrian identity, on the basis of the country's historical development. He considered it worth noting that, already in the prehistoric period, the geographical organism which was to become Austria-Bohemia-Hungary had a unique, unified culture. This it owed to the Japhedites, an Indo-European, Caucasian people. Later, the culture was destroyed by migrating Indo-Germanics, he said, who were immediately faced with the task of 'organising' the Danube area. The task failed, Winter noted, becoming instead a struggle for existence. He advanced the theory that three separate cultural regions developed in the Danubian sphere: Alpine, Sudeten and Carpathian. In historical times these areas became populated, not by a race of several peoples, but by a symbiosis of several
races. Meanwhile, he added, three European cultural entities evolved: Romano-Celtic, Graeco-Slav and German. The Roman Empire, in conjunction with the Christian church, produced a new, Catholic ordering of society which was to form the basis of the Christian-German culture of the Middle Ages.¹⁸¹

Winter then examined Europe as a whole and stated that, by dint of its river system, it was divided into three areas, also corresponding to the three races of the continent’s Christian history. These were the Latins in the southwest (France, Italy, Spain), the Slavs in the north-east (Russia), and the Germans in the centre. Winter also isolated seven continental ‘systems’, historic entities which comprised the entire continent, one of which was Austria-Bohemia-Hungary.¹⁸² The historical integrity of Austria-Bohemia-Hungary formed the core of Winter’s second essay in the volume. He argued that Austria existed prior to the German Volk and would still exist after it. This, he remarked, was on account of the fact that cultural and regional community preceded racial and linguistic community. The basic theme of Austrian history, he asserted, was Empire-building on the foundation of the tripartite structure of Austria-Bohemia-Hungary. At the time of the Carolingian Ostmark, a process of assimilation had occurred, moulding the Slavs, Avars and Franks into a ‘state community’ and thereby disturbing the ‘nationalist’ Bavarian Ostmark-idea. Indeed, Winter added, the connection with both Bohemia and Hungary, without which Austria would have become a mere extension of Bavaria, constituted the true Ostmark-mission of Austria.¹⁸³
In the Middle Ages, he continued, Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Poland and Croatia started to display a greater affinity in art and science with Latin south-west Europe than with Germany. Winter argued that, at this point, Austria was already experiencing a separate development from that of Germany. This, he said, occurred out of historical necessity; she swapped her German policy for a European orientation.\footnote{184} From this perspective, the definitive 'split' from Germany in 1866 was a product of Austrian history. Winter asserted that it was a logical consequence of both her geopolitical situation, as well as the religious divide of central Europe. The tragedy of 1866, he added, was not Austria's exclusion from the new German national state, but rather an unhealthy close relationship with this Germany. In Winter's eyes, the dual Monarchy had acted as a servant for Prussian Germany. Prior to 1866, Austria had influenced the German \textit{Völker}; after Königgrätz, Prussian-German culture penetrated into Austria, Bohemia and Hungary.\footnote{185}

The historical divergence of the Austrians from other German peoples was a central tenet of Winter's work. His insistence on the Austrians' cultural distinctiveness made him a prominent advocate of \textit{homo Austriacus}. In April 1936 he gave a lecture on this very topic. It was reproduced in the following month's edition of \textit{Wiener Politische Blätter}. He said that the idea of \textit{homo Austriacus} lay at the heart of the 'Austrian Renaissance'. He was referring here to the patriotic campaign of the \textit{Ständestaat}, which he saw as a reaction to National Socialism. The following plea illustrates how his thinking diverged from the ideas of the Front:
We must have the courage to recognise the following: The ‘German people’ and ‘German culture’, which have always been problematic enough for Austria, but which, following the reconstruction of Germany by National Socialism, no longer have any relevance for us, are giving way to the ‘Austrian people’ and ‘Austrian culture’.¹⁸⁶

Unlike the formulations of identity examined hitherto, Winter did not advocate a dual allegiance to the German nation and the Austrian state. Rather he saw the Austrian Volk as a separate entity from the German, possessing its own indigenous culture. He argued that Austrian history proved that the most profound values of its Volkstum were not to be found in linguistic culture, but in its geopolitical heritage. Thus the German written language had not been a key factor in determining the national character of Austria; the Austrian state and landscape were far more important influences. Winter stressed that the Austrian Volkstum was a reality which had evolved over the centuries. A German Volkstum encompassing all German speakers did not exist, had never existed, and would never exist.¹⁸⁷

The detachment of Austria from Germany was, Winter indicated, a centuries-long process, during which the Austrian state, Volk and culture had been formed. He argued that one could talk of an Austrian race, as well as of homo Austriacus. In its embryonic form, he observed, this had been an intellectual idea. Later, it adopted a more physical form. The Austrians had evolved from a mosaic of races into a Volkstum. They were now in the process of becoming a new race, as had the Romans, the English, the
Americans and the Germans, Winter asserted. That the Austrian and German
Volkstum were, in spite of the common language, very different entities,
could be proven by the racial foundations of both peoples. The north German
Volkstum, he maintained, was determined by the numerical and
organisational superiority of the Nordic race. In Austria, on the other hand,
the Nordic element was only a part of an ancient mixture which included
Alpine, Mediterranean and Dinaric ones. In spite of the later Carolingian and
Bavarian colonisation in the Ostmark, Winter added, the Nordic race only
played a subordinate role in the development of the Austrian Volkstum.
Before the first Bavarian occupation of the Alpine and Danubian lands, he
argued, Illyrian, Noric, Roman, Slav, Irish and Byzantine forefathers and
tutors all left their mark on what was to become homo Austriacus. The
Nordic invasion merely threw back the Alpine-Danubian Volkstum by a
thousand years.\textsuperscript{188}

Winter pursued the anthropological line further to repudiate National
Socialist racial propaganda. He said that examinations of early Habsburg
skeletons had disproved any assertions that the mediaeval monarchs had
Nordic roots. Rudolf IV, \textit{der Stifter}, belonged to the ‘Noric’ race, Winter
asserted, which concurred with very old genealogical theories concerning the
Alsatian origins of the Habsburgs. Another issue that Winter highlighted to
undermine Nazi racial theory was the particular affinity between
Österreichertum and Judentum which characterised Austrian history.\textsuperscript{189} He
noted that mediaeval chronicles even proposed the idea that the Austrian
monarchs descended from Jewish kings. Above all, Winter stressed, Austrian
culture of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was unthinkable without its
Jewish element. This exposed the Nordic idolatry of Nazi leaders such as Hitler, Göring and Goebbels, all three of whom could not hide their Mediterranean, Dinaric and Alpine racial heritage, Winter sniped.¹⁹⁰

With these historical, cultural and racial components of Austrian identity, Winter sought to prove the existence of an Austrian nation. Having stepped out of the narrow confines of Deutschtum, the Austrians, in his eyes, became a separate Volk from the Germans, a far more independent entity than the Austrian Stamm referred to in government propaganda. Indeed, Winter was mildly critical of the ‘Austrian course’ of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, arguing that, even before the 1936 July agreement, it was marked more by German than Austrian traditions. It was insufficient, he wrote, to promote an Austrian state-consciousness as beginning with Seipel. What was needed, he argued, was a sober examination of the entire history of Austrian statehood and cultural development, to effect a proper continuation between past and present.¹⁹¹

Another principal member of Österreichische Aktion was Wilhelm Schmid. He was also the editor of Vaterland, and head of another anti-Anschluss movement known as Vaterländische Aktion. This movement hoped for the rebirth of a great Catholic empire, and consequently had a strongly religious ethos. The first point of its programme stated that Austria was intrinsically tied to the Catholic Church. She was therefore obliged to translate the Church’s teachings into political reality.¹⁹²

Vaterland carried the subtitle ‘Paper for Catholic Österreichertum’ and announced that it was the mouthpiece of a group called ‘Greater-Austrian Youth’, which had been founded in 1925.¹⁹³ As the name implies, Greater-
Austrian, or großösterreichisch deliberately avoided the großdeutsch-kleineutsch dichotomy which most commonly provided the framework within which conceptions of Austrian history, culture, and ultimately, identity, were formulated. Rather than try to define Austria's relationship to Gesamtdéutschum, the Greater-Austrians posited the Habsburg Monarchy as their ideal, lauding the multinational idea of which it had been the bearer. Apart from an unequivocal rejection of Anschluss, the aim of Vaterland, as detailed in the periodical's first issue, was to represent homo Austriacus as he had appeared in all ages of history. The paper would lay particular value on the cultivation of the original characteristics which constituted Österreichertum. In this task it proposed to retrieve Austrian tales, legends, myths, sayings, customs, songs and games from the depths of obscurity. Vaterland also intended to devote appropriate space to Austrian humour. This it did by means of a regular feature, which consisted of mildly amusing anecdotes or jokes.

Articles in Vaterland habitually affirmed the existence of an Austrian nation. In the penultimate issue of the periodical, it was stated that an Austrian nation could be traced back at least to 1384, when a decree issued by Albrecht III mentioned the 'Natio Austriae'. The same article offered a more modern example from the end of the Napoleonic Wars: Count Stadion's announcement, 'We have constituted ourselves as a nation'. Another contribution suggested that even the authoritarian regime recognised the existence of the Austrian nation. From a speech by Schuschnigg to members of the military academy, the following sentence was highlighted: 'Your task, our task is to make sure that the Austrian army
remains what it was, for the benefit of our Austrian people and for the benefit of the Austrian nation'.

C.F. Hrauda, a regular contributor to Vaterland, tackled the problem of the concepts 'nation' and what he referred to as 'Staatszugehörigkeit' (citizenship). He remarked that a distinction was frequently made between the two, but only when applied to the cases of Germany and Austria. For Hrauda, however, the only valid definition of the word 'nation' was the one understood by the English, Spanish and the French; that is to say, the concept of a people organised into one state, whether this people be mono- or polylingual, whether the state form a complete linguistic territory, or merely part of one. On this basis, Hrauda contested, an Austrian nation had existed for centuries, even before the establishment of a German nation. By the same token, das deutsche Volk meant nothing more than the population of Germany. Hildebrandt, the editor of Der Christliche Ständestaat, also offered two definitions of the word nation, one which understood it in a larger sense, the other in a narrower sense. These corresponded to the concepts of Kulturnation and Staatsnation, as outlined in our introduction. Hildebrandt concluded that Austria constituted a nation in the narrower sense.

Berthold Dietrich rejected the idea that language was a significant determining factor for identity. He used the example of Athens and Sparta to show that a common language did not necessarily mean the development of a common culture. For him, Austria and Germany possessed different histories and cultural heritages. Curt Weigl noted that Austria belonged to a very specific cultural sphere which contained some basic German elements, but
which, since the Middle Ages, bore strong Italian traits as well as some French influences.\textsuperscript{202} Johann Steinbock, a theologian, believed that the Austrians had evolved into a distinct \textit{Volk} in a similar fashion to the Swiss-Germans. They were more than a mere German \textit{Stamm}, he argued, not even possessing Germanic racial purity.\textsuperscript{203} P. Hildebrand Waagen asserted that it was the Catholic-Protestant divide which had produced the major contrast between \textit{homo Austriacus} and his German counterpart.\textsuperscript{204}

Like Winter, Hrauda emphasised the varied cultural and biological make-up of the Austrian people. He delivered a lecture to the Greater-Austrian association in August 1933, in the course of which he contrasted the Austrians and the Germans. Hrauda began with the earliest influences on \textit{Österreichertum}, noting that, amongst other things, the Celts had given the Austrian character its liveliness and a feeling for art, as well as a certain inconsistency. Romans, Huns, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Avars and Magyars had all left their mark, but the most important non-Germanic element in the Austrian make-up was the Slav one, he said. Geographical and climactic factors also merited consideration. Hrauda stated that the lands of the Monarchy had formed a territorial unity. Austria looked to the south, whereas Germany looked to the north. For this reason, he asserted, the Baroque had blossomed in Austria and left an indelible print on the Austrian soul. The Baroque, Hrauda declared, was Austrian in the truest sense. He noted that Pan-Germans tended to see the movement as rather un-German. This missed the point that the Baroque directly corresponded to the Austrian spirit. It was often said that Salzburg lacked the stamp of a German city. This was of course true; it was an Austrian one, Hrauda concluded.\textsuperscript{205}
The final issue of *Vaterland* led with a defiant editorial from Schmid, in which he uncompromisingly summarised his belief in the independence of Austrian history and culture. He asserted that nobody had been able to refute the argument that, since the Reformation, a *gesamtddeutsch* culture had no longer existed. The Reformation had split Germany both religiously and culturally into two halves. Each religion had shaped its own culture. Neither was there a *gesamtddeutsch* history. The political history of the Danube region was that of the Habsburg Empire; the region did not belong to the German sphere. Any school pupil could see that from a map, he stated. A typical Austrian culture did exist, which although it contained many Germanic elements, was not a part of German culture. 206

From late 1935 onwards, an increasing number of articles in *Der Christliche Ständestaat* argued the case for an Austrian nation. Alfons Freiherr von Stillfried remarked that there were only two ways to banish the spectre of *Anschluss*. One of these was to recall the Habsburg dynasty, but that was a decision which was not entirely in Austria’s hands. The other was to promote and disseminate an Austrian national consciousness. Stillfried argued that the concept of a nation was not permanent; it changed over time. The Italians, for example, were no longer Romans, just as the English would no longer consider themselves Germans. The Austrians, a mixture of the original Bavarian *Stamm* and other peoples, had begun their own national development about three hundred years previously, he maintained. 207 Rudolf Brendl was of a similar opinion. He insisted that, in order to preserve the independence and freedom of their state, the Austrians had to make the transition from a ‘patriotic population’ to a *Staatsnation*. In this process, he
observed, it must not merely ape the examples of Switzerland, Belgium or Holland, but create its own model with a specific political consciousness and culture. These ought to correspond to the particular values gained from its Western-European inheritance.\textsuperscript{208}

Zessner-Spitzenberg, head of the \textit{Traditionsreferat}, and another founding member of \textit{Österreichische Aktion}, used the 1934 constitution as his starting-point to promote the idea of an Austrian nation. He noted that, from the preamble, it was clear that the constitution had been given to the Austrian \textit{Volk} and \textit{not} to the German \textit{Volk} in Austria, nor to the Austrian \textit{Stamm} or the Germans of Austria. Consequently, he inferred, not only did an Austrian state exist, but the bearers of this state were the Austrian people. Zessner-Spitzenberg argued that wherever a \textit{Volk} existed, so did a \textit{Volkstum}. In the Austrian case, this \textit{Volkstum} was more than 95 per cent German according to its language and thousand-year-old culture. In spite of this, he asserted, the Austrian character had been shaped by its own territory, by Austrian history, by the Austrian idea and by the Austrian mission of reconciliation between peoples. Without denying the old German elements which were essential parts of \textit{Österreichertum}, it was possible to talk of an Austrian national character, of Austrian national characteristics and of an Austrian nation in the same way that the terms Austrian National Bank and Austrian National Library were in current usage.\textsuperscript{209}

A prominent individual who revised his view on Austrian nationhood was Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-European movement of the inter-war period. Coudenhove-Kalergi described himself as ‘a Czechoslovak citizen and a German writer [with] French blood in his
veins'. His cosmopolitan background emerges more fully when one considers the fact that the Coudenhoves were from the Netherlands, the Kalergis were of Greek stock, while his father and mother were Austrian and Japanese respectively. The movement, which was established in 1923, had its headquarters in the Vienna Hofburg. Seipel was chosen as the honorary president of its first congress in 1926. The first issue of Paneuropa warned that Europe faced three grave threats to her existence: self-destruction by means of another war; conquest by Russia; and economic ruin. The only way the continent could protect herself from these dangers was by a European union. Paneuropa's manifesto was, in essence, very simple. It advocated the need for an arbitration treaty to guarantee peace; an alliance to secure freedom; and a customs union to protect the economy. The movement envisioned this European union to encompass the peninsular between Russia, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean. Also included were Iceland and the European colonies, but not Britain or her Empire.

One issue of Paneuropa in 1928 was devoted entirely to the Anschluss question. Coudenhove-Kalergi recognised the dearth of patriotism in Austria and remarked how this hole was filled either by a local patriotism or by German-national sentiment. At the time he took the orthodox view that the Austrians formed a Stamm of the German nation, although he was to revise his opinion following the Nazi triumph in Germany. Nevertheless, Coudenhove-Kalergi discerned pronounced differences in character between the Austrians and the north Germans and felt that the strong desire for Anschluss he perceived in Austria was due more to the conviction that Austria was not a viable state, than to any national motive. The Austrian
Stamm, he believed, was the European variety of the German nation, by
which he suggested that the Austrians were the most cosmopolitan Germans.
No other German Stamm enjoyed such widespread sympathy as the Austrian,
which deserved such a reception because of its talents, its way of life, and
because of the great personalities it had given the world. 213

Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed that the Austrians showed great
enthusiasm for the Paneuropa movement, whose programme he believed
would solve the Austrian problem. A European union, with Vienna as its
capital, would give Austria another mission, another idea to exist for. At
present, her unwillingness to live was precisely because she lacked such a
raison d’être. With Pan-Europe as Austria’s guiding idea, she would be able
to reconnect with her historical traditions as Europe’s bulwark against the
Turkish menace, and as the bridge between north and south, and east and
west. 214

Several years later, in 1935, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued the case for
Austrian nationhood. He said that nations were historical constructs. They
came into being, and disappeared again. Austrian national feeling had not
existed prior to World War I, he remarked. The patriotic fight against
National Socialism, however, had given birth to an Austrian nationalism.
Coudenhove-Kalergi thus asserted that the Austrian nation dated from 1934.
The development was incomplete, he argued, as Austrian citizens still tended
to think of the nation as a cultural rather than political entity. 215

The attempts at an Austrian anthropology and the arguments justifying
the existence of an Austrian nation contain some inventive ideas, and
represent the most positive designs of Austrian identity in the inter-war
period. Like the legitimists, with whom they shared common ground, these
harbingers of an Austrian nation were in a tiny minority. Their ideas were
swamped by the consensus of most publicists regarding the German element
of Austrian identity. What is more, the concept of Austrian nationhood was
rejected in Vaterländische Front propaganda. It was not until after the
Second World War that some of the ideas presented here would be adopted
by important elements of the political community in Austria.

Conclusion

A variety of material has been examined here, which has brought
forward a large number of ideas pertaining to constructs of Austrian identity.
That so many different publicists concurred on the broader aspects of
Österreichertum, however, reinforces the notion that Seipel's formulations
of identity from the 1920s were based on traditional ideas shared by large
sections of Austrian conservatism (although this argument does not diminish
his importance for this thesis). The majority of writers, historians and other
publicists included in this study took their cue from a traditional theory of the
nation which did not recognise that territorial boundaries and a common
political culture could endow a population with the status of a nation. The
Kulturnation concept dominated that of the Staatsnation.

With a traditional theory of the nation came traditional ideas about
Austria's supra-national mission, and her Habsburg and Catholic heritage.
Constructs of Österreichertum, as some historians showed, could even exist
alongside support for Anschluss with the Third Reich, proving that these
constructs operated within a political vacuum. Other publicists were more pronounced in their affirmation of an Austrian identity, and contrasted their Österreichertum with negative constructs of Nazi Germany. The formulations of Austrian identity of these commentators went hand in hand with support for the Austrian state and her independence. They often explored the essential characteristics of the Austrian and related these to his particular historical development.

The last grouping examined in this chapter broke with the traditional concept of the Kulturnation and advocated the existence of a separate Austrian nation. Using arguments based on race, culture, geography, religion and historical development, they attempted to show just how distinct homo Austriacus was from his German counterpart. What linked their theories was an emphasis on the importance of Austrian statehood for her national development. In this way they embraced the political dimension of collective identity and moved towards the concept of Staatsnation. It has been observed that the theories of these publicists were too radical to find favour with official propagandists. Indeed, Winter's Die Aktion was frequently confiscated and censored, while Schuschnigg admitted that some of the activities of the movement of the same name conflicted with the ethos of the Front. Other mouthpieces, such as Wiener Politische Blätter and Vaterland, could only have found very small audiences, and so the advocates of an Austrian nation were destined to remain a fringe group in inter-war Austria. After 1945, however, their ideas did bear fruit, as the political elite sought to reconstruct Austrian identity with as little reference to Germany as possible.
2 Daviau, Donald G. and Johns, Jorun B., ‘On the Question of Austrian Literature – A Bibliography’ in Modern Austrian Literature, Vol. 17, Nos. 3-4, 1984, pp. 219-258.
3 Ibid., p. 62.
4 Ibid., p. 63.
5 Der Christliche Ständestaat, 29/8/37, p. 804.
7 Major Figures of Modern Austrian Literature: The Inter-war Years, p. 53
8 Ibid., p. 64.
9 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
12 Major Figures of Modern Austrian Literature: The Inter-war Years, p. 5.
13 Waggerl, Karl Heinrich, Brot, Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg, 1930.
18 Weinheber, Josef, Wien wörtlich, Adolf Luser Verlag, Vienna and Leipzig, 1935, pp. 4-8.
19 See ‘Die Kaffeehauspositur’ in ibid., p. 96.
20 Kramer, Thomas and Prucha, Martin, Filme im Lauf der Zeit: 100 Jahre Kino in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, Ueberreuter, Vienna, 1994, pp. 152, 157. The Austrian film industry had been as dependent as publishing on the German market. In April 1936 an effective Anschluss of the industry to the Third Reich took place. Austrian producers signed an agreement banning Jews from working in film. The agreement also placed Austrian film production under the control of Nazi Propagandastellen. See ibid., p. 76.
24 Ibid., p. 281.
25 Ibid., pp. 283-85.
26 Ibid., pp. 286-87.
27 Ibid., p. 289.
28 Coghlan, p. 136.
31 ‘Rede auf Grillparzer’ in Prosa IV, pp. 113, 122-23.
39 See Paneuropa, Year 2, Volumes 1-3, p. 35.
42 See Hofmannsthal, Hugo von, and Wildgans, Anton, Briefwechsel, Lothar Stielun Verlag, Heidelberg, 1971, p. 3 (fn.).
44 Indeed, in his famous radio speech of 1930, Wildgans noted that the Monarchy could never have survived as a mere comrade-in-arms of Deutschtum. See Wildgans, Anton, Rede über Österreich, F.G. Speidel’sche Verlag, Vienna and Leipzig, 1930, p. 15.
47 Rede über Österreich, pp. 31, 24.
48 Ibid., pp. 15-16, 27, 32-35.
51 Ibid., pp. 284-85.
54 Bahr, Hermann, Bilderbuch, Wiener literarische Anstalt, Vienna and Leipzig, 1921, pp. 21-26, 52-58, 70-77.
56 Ibid., pp. 101-106.
57 Ibid., p. 8.
58 Ibid., pp. 156-58.
60 Braun, Felix, Agnes Altirchner, Insel-Verlag, Leipzig, 1927, pp. 26ff., 976.
61 Magris, p. 241.
63 Achberger, p. 42.
65 Ibid., p. 67.
66 Ibid., pp. 155-56.
68 Major Figures of Modern Austrian Literature: The Inter-war Years, pp. 67-68.
69 Csokor, pp. 22, 25, 28-29.
70 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
71 Ibid., p. 53.
72 Ibid., p. 64.
73 Achberger, p. 45.
75 Ibid., p. 808.
76 Achberger, p. 45.
78 Ibid., p. 275.
79 Ibid., p. 323.
81 It is interesting to note that Musil believed in the existence of an Austrian literature and considered his prose style distinctly Austrian. See Brokoph-Mauch, Gudrun, ‘Das Österreichische als bewußte und unbewußte Gestaltung im Werk Robert Musils’ in *Modern Austrian Literature*, Vol. 17, Nos. 3/4, 1984, p. 159.
84 Ibid., p. 133.
85 Ibid., p. 10.
88 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
89 Ibid., p. 153.
90 *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*. See especially volume 1, chapters 21-23.
91 Werfel, Franz, *Die Entfremdung in Meisternovellen*, S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt, 1972, p. 175. Werfel’s wife, Alma Mahler, had long-believed that *Anschluss* was the only way to save Austria from ruin. The writer was apparently dismayed by her attitude. See Jungk, Peter Stephan, *A Life Torn by History: Franz Werfel 1890-1945*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1990, p. 119.
92 Die Entfremdung, p. 197.
93 Ibid., pp. 178-79.
94 Ibid., p. 170.
95 Ibid., p. 172.
96 Ibid., p. 155.
97 Roth, *Die Flucht ohne Ende*, p. 70.
98 See Agnes Altkirchner, pp. 325, 329, 339.
100 Ibid, chapter 9.
101 *Die Standarte*, pp. 95-96.
103 *Wiener Politische Blätter*, 5/7/36, p. 245. Winter was one of the few who questioned the conventional use of the term ‘national’ in inter-war Austria to refer to those who harboured strong German-national sympathies. He argued that that they should be called ‘international’ instead, as their national feeling lay outside of Austria’s borders. See *Die Aktion*, 12/1/35, p. 5.
104 Dachs, p. 2.
105 Ibid., pp. 30, 3, 38.
106 Ibid., p. 16.
108 Dachs, pp. 40, 74.
148 Ibid., 15/8/26, p. 1109.
149 Ibid., pp. 1111-12.
150 Ibid., 15/8/26, p. 1111.
151 Ibid., 20/12/25, p. 290.
153 Der Christliche Ständestaat, 3/12/33, p. 3.
154 See, for example, articles by Schaukal, Viktor Buchgraber and Hildebrandt in ibid., 4/3/34, pp. 3-4, 25/11/34, pp. 3-6 & 1/12/35, pp. 1143-48.
155 Ibid., 10/2/35, p. 137.
156 Ibid., 9/5/37, pp. 421-22.
158 Ibid., 24/12/33, p. 11.
159 Ibid., 15/4/34, pp. 10-11.
160 Ibid., 13/5/34, p. 4.
161 Ibid., 7/10/34, pp. 3-4.
162 Ibid., 25/12/36, pp. 1216-17.
163 Ibid., 10/1/37, pp. 6-7.
165 Ibid., 18-39.
166 Where Hanslik refers to ‘Austria’ he includes Transleithania.
168 Ibid., p. 126.
169 Ibid., p. 49.
170 For the programme of the Aktion, see Die Aktion, 14/9/34, pp. 5-6. See also ibid., 9/3/35, pp. 1-2, for the reproduction of a letter from Schuschnigg to Winter, thanking him for his work, but explaining how it has sometimes conflicted with the ethos of the authoritarian state.
171 See, for example, the following articles which appeared in Der Heimatschützer: 6/10/34, p. 2; 13/10/34, p. 3; 27/10/34, p. 3; 14/3/36, p. 2.
173 Ibid., ‘Der europäische und das österreichische Raum’ in ibid., pp. 24-25.
175 Ibid., 20/8/33, p. 105.
176 Ibid., 16/4/33, p. 41.
177 Ibid., 21/7/35, pp. 115-16.
179 Ibid., pp. 46-48.
180 Ibid., pp. 57-59.
181 Winter, Ernst Karl, ‘Der europäische und das österreichische Raum’ in ibid., pp. 14-17.
182 Ibid., pp. 18-24.
184 Ibid., p. 29.
185 Ibid., p. 34.
187 Ibid., pp. 195-96.
188 Ibid., pp. 197-98.
As an aside it is worth noting here that, unlike a great number of his gentile contemporaries who displayed a similar positive attitude towards Austrian identity, Winter was refreshingly free of all traces of anti-semitism. Indeed, so pronounced was the prejudice against towards Jews in Catholic publications such as Schönere Zukunft or the Ostmärkische Sturmscharen’s Sturm über Österreich, that Winter’s views on the subject are highly conspicuous.


Vaterland, November/December 1927, p. 86.

Ibid., May-June 1927, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 4.

See, for example, ibid., July-August 1930, p. 45.


Ibid., October 1936, p. 61.

Ibid., June 1937, pp. 18-20.

Der Christliche Ständestaat, 23/9/34, pp. 3-4.

Vaterland, September-December 1930, pp. 67-68.

Ibid., January-April 1931, p. 93.

Ibid., p. 88.

Ibid., February 1936, p. 139.

Ibid., October 1933, pp. 84-85; December 1933, pp. 121-25.

Ibid., March 1938, pp. 126-27.

Der Christliche Ständestaat, 22/3/36, pp. 276-77.

Ibid., 1/9/35, pp. 835-36.

Ibid., 9/1/38, pp. 4-5.

Paneuropa, June 1924, Heft 3, p. 3. N.B. The name of the movement and its publication was initially written ‘Pan-Europa’. Later this became ‘Paneuropa’, without the hyphen. For the sake of simplicity and consistency, the later spelling will be used throughout.

For more on Coudenhoove-Kalergi’s life and work see the following biography:


Paneuropa, April 1924, Heft 1, pp. 3-7.

Ibid., Jahrgang 4, Heft 7, pp. 3-5.

Ibid., pp. 16-18.

See Die Aktion, 4/5/35, pp. 4-6.

Die Aktion had been sanctioned by Dollfuss as a worker’s movement, in an attempt to win over the sympathies of the working-class. Winter, who was known to be someone who ‘stood on the right, but thought on the left’ was put in charge of the organisation. It should not be confused with Die österreichische Aktion, the group of academics of which Winter was a founding member.

Conclusion

The intention of this thesis has been to investigate the promotion of an Austrian identity in the years between the formation of the First Republic (1918) and Anschluss (1938). More specifically I have concentrated on particular constructs of identity which were articulated, in the main, by conservative, monarchist and Fascist elements of the political, intellectual and literary communities of that era. The choice of the right as a focus of study was made for two principal reasons. First, Austrian inter-war conservatism is an under-researched field of study compared with Austrian labour for the same period. Secondly, it was on the right that a particular type of Austrian identity was formulated – referred to frequently throughout the text as Österreichertum. This borrowed heavily from Austria’s Habsburg legacy in preference to reconstructing a post-imperial republican identity. That the notion of Österreichertum was predominantly a construct of Austrian conservatism has been proven by Otto Bauer’s comments on the consequences of Seipel’s negotiations at Geneva in 1922.

The introduction engaged with contemporary theory relating to the concepts of the nation, nationalism and national identity. It was suggested that attempts to treat inter-war Austria as a nation posed a methodological problem. As has been shown, the constructs of identity under investigation did not admit, save for a few radical exceptions, the existence of an Austrian nation. Formulations of identity from the conservative camp insisted that the Austrians were a German people, and that they constituted an integral part of the German nation. This logic was based on an understanding of the nation in
cultural rather than political terms (*Kulturnation* rather than *Staatsnation*), as the introduction suggested. It was expressed as an intention of this thesis, founded on the idea that identity is self-prescriptive, to work with the definition of nation as understood by the actors themselves. In this way it is hoped that we have been able to gain a richer understanding of Austrian identity constructs produced by inter-war Austrian conservatism.

We have restricted ourselves in this study to constructs of identity from above. It was suggested that investigations of identity at grass-roots level rely on collecting a sufficiently representative selection of data. These are usually processed quantitatively, by means of survey techniques. In the case of Austria, the data are lacking for the inter-war era, but regular surveys have been carried out since World War II on the question of Austrian national identity. Felix Kreissler, William Blum and Martin Spät all reproduce figures for a number of these surveys. They make interesting reading, but one must always be wary of findings without knowing how a particular question has been phrased. At all events, the methodology is very different from that employed here, which has taken a qualitative approach to individual constructs of identity without attempting to consider the impact they had on their intended audience.

The first chapter began with some background to the specific historical and semantic problems presented by the concept of Austria. It was shown that, although many nationalities were to be found in the Habsburg Monarchy, none of these was called ‘Austrian’. Geographically, Austria referred to the brace of duchies divided by the River Enns; historically, it referred to the ruling dynasty of the Empire; conventionally, it was a term for
the sum of the Monarchy's territories, or after 1867, of the non-Hungarian crownlands. In the light of the lack of identification of the word 'Austrian' with a cultural or ethnic unit of the Monarchy (those who became 'Austrians' in the First Republic, save for the small national minorities, had been Germans), the national self-identification as 'German' can be seen as both logical and understandable.

The denial of nationhood for a state in inter-war Europe is at first perplexing; it went against the grain of the times. The 'national' principle was supposed to have triumphed at the Paris Peace Settlement. The great Empires which filled the territory of central and eastern Europe were broken up or pushed back, and their place was filled by 'nation-states'. In truth, the principle of national self-determination was not the only one at work in Paris; strategic, economic and historic considerations were also taken into account when finalising the political borders. As far as Austria was concerned, there was no doubt that the strategic principle triumphed over the national one. The (German) Austrians were prohibited from joining up with Germany, as it would strengthen the latter, whereas the motive behind the terms of the Treaty of Versailles was to seriously weaken Germany.

The perception that the principle of self-determination had been violated in the German case led initially to widespread antipathy towards the new Austrian state. She was 'a rump state', 'a state against her own will', 'what was left'. The apparent impossibility of her economic situation added the idea of 'unviability' to the negative appraisal of the Republic. It is in this context that we must consider the constructs of Österreichertum which evolved.
The seemingly poor economic outlook of the Republic renewed the demand for *Anschluss*. For those in the political community, whose German-national feeling was stronger than their attachment to an Austrian idea (not to the rump Austrian state itself), the national motive made *Anschluss* all the more attractive. Such individuals were to be found in all three main political groups. An alternative solution was proposed by a smaller grouping in the Christian Social Party, whose sympathies remained with old Austria and thus whose *Österreicher* prevailed over their German-national feeling. They advocated a Danube Federation with the successor states of the Monarchy. The plan, which would have aped the old Empire, remained a dead duck due to the lack of foreign interest.

One of the most prominent advocates of a Danube Federation was Ignaz Seipel, the leading figure of the Christian Social Party, and the dominant force in Austrian conservatism in the 1920s. It was seen that he formulated a construct of Austrian identity which was based on the *Kulturnation* concept, and encouraged a dual allegiance to the German nation and to *Österreicher*. One remarks with caution and qualification that Seipel promoted an allegiance to the Austrian state, as his political machinations and utterances throughout the 1920s suggest that he was opposed to the form of state chosen for Austria – a democratic parliamentary republic. Seipel toyed with ideas of corporatism and authoritarianism, in his words to rid Austria of the hegemony of the political parties. In reality this meant crushing Social Democrats, with whom he had developed an increasingly strained and tense relationship in the Republic’s first decade.
It was shown that the Social Democrats shared an understanding of the *Kulturnation* concept with Seipel. They had produced theoretical blueprints for a solution of the national problem of the Monarchy which antedated Seipel's not dissimilar *Nation und Staat*, the ideas of which underpinned his concept of *Österreichertum*.

Although, unlike Seipel and his faction of the Christian Social Party, the Social Democrats opted for the *Anschluss* solution following the armistice (chiefly for economic reasons) they nevertheless played a key role in bringing order to the new state and endowing it with a democratic constitution. Following the St. Germain prohibition, *Anschluss* was a pipe-dream.

The Social Democrats did not, in the main, share Seipel's *Österreichertum*. The identity they brought to Austria was political and republican, set in the present and forward-looking. The constitution made Austria a political reality and gave it a sort of political identity. Seipel did not share the Social Democrats' republicanism. His construct of Austrian identity, typical of Austrian conservatism, was rooted in the past, playing on the country's Habsburg and Catholic heritage. As if to distance himself intellectually from the Republican state, he began to use the word 'Fatherland' when referring to Austria. The word 'Republic' became ever less frequent in his utterances.

However negative Seipel's views towards parliamentary democracy, his public view of Austria was affirmative. He urged the population to develop a patriotic spirit and to believe in the viability of their state. Although he was somebody who was known to oppose *Anschluss*, Seipel's pronouncements on the issue were sometimes a little more cryptic. This raises an important
question: How did support for, or rejection of, Anschluss affect formulations of Österreichertum? The unsophisticated view would argue that support for Anschluss would effectively be a denial of a distinct Austrian identity; positive constructs of Austrian identity could only function in the context of an anti-Austrian position.

The reality is somewhat different. Seipel’s formulation of Österreichertum reveals that it is as much intellectually and emotionally grounded as it is related to one specific territory or political entity. The Catholic and Habsburg legacies combine to give a European, if not universal concept of the Austrian idea. Research pertaining to the shifting meaning of Austria throughout the centuries suggests that Österreichertum is flexible. It can relate to a wide variety of territories and political arrangements. Moreover, Anschluss, it is often forgotten, could take a variety of forms. The historical event known by that name has created indelible associations and hidden the fact that union with Germany could just as easily have taken the form of a federation. The status of the Länder would have had to have been clarified, but a corporate Austrian identity could have been preserved.

Perhaps the most extreme example of the flexibility of Österreichertum can be seen in the reactions of Austrian National Socialists after Anschluss. Politically, the Burgenland and Vorarlberg were dismantled as Länder, while the names of Upper and Lower Austria were changed to Ober- and Niederdonau respectively. What remained were seven Gaue, which now constituted the Ostmark, rather than Austria. Soon after, this was changed to the Reichsgaue of the Alps and the Danube. Officially at least, an Austrian identity had ceased to exist. Yet the Austrian National Socialists were
unhappy about the course of events following the annexation. They resented the fact that their long struggle to destabilise the Ständestaat regime and to bring about Anschluss had met with scant personal reward, the top prizes being awarded to ‘outsiders’ from the Altreich, as Germany became known. Many also considered that the incorporation of Austria into the Reich had gone too far. As illegal propaganda prior to 1938 shows, Austrian Nazis admitted to certain elements of a German-Austrian identity. They had hoped that, after Anschluss, they would be able to run Austria themselves, as a semi-autonomous entity within a Greater Germany. When it became clear that the outcome would be radically different, some voiced their dissent and formed an illegal opposition group. They published an open letter to Gauleiter Bürckel, the most prominent official from Germany, in which they complained that Austria was being treated like a conquered colony where he, Bürckel, exercised total power. They wrote, ‘We will not be deceived and we can see with total clarity where we are heading. It is not the Anschluss of Austria, but the subjugation of Austria to Prussian dominance … We want to administer our country ourselves!’

A central narrative of conservatism’s formulation of Austrian identity was the concept of an Austrian mission. This idea crept regularly into Seipel’s utterances and he used it as a justification for rejecting the nation state solution for the Austrians. The Austrian mission in Seipel’s construct of Österreichertum was largely based on what he believed the Habsburgs had done for Europe as a whole, and the German nation in particular, at both a cultural and political level. He transposed the mission to the present, insisting
that contemporary Austria still had an important role to fulfil as a conciliator between nations.

Seipel's intellectual legacy for the Ständestaat, while openly acknowledged by his contemporaries, is not always recognised by historians. It is not uncommon, therefore, to read that Dollfuss was Austria's patriot and that it was he who first gave the Austrians a belief in their country. Quite apart from the fact that Seipel's push towards an authoritarian solution for Austria finally bore fruit politically in the form of the Ständestaat regime, his construct of Österreichertum is highly visible in Vaterländische Front propaganda. We read, therefore, of Austria's German population who possess a dual allegiance to Austria and the German nation. We also read of Austria's German and European mission. Although it has been shown that these ideas did not originate with Seipel, he was the conduit via which they passed, at times unaltered, to the ideology of the Ständestaat.

The focus on Dollfuss as Austria's great patriot is probably explained by the changed domestic and international circumstances after 1933. The abandonment of parliamentary democracy and the establishment of the authoritarian state was a victory for Austrian conservatism and its Fascist allies. A large propaganda machine – the Vaterländische Front – was set up which now churned out a wealth of material devoted to the conservative construct of Austrian identity. The changed international situation, that is to say the Nazi's accession to power in Germany, meant that Anschluss was now being demanded (not only in Germany), as National Socialism aimed to realise its own vision of the Greater-German dream. A potential threat to Austrian independence (and thus to conservative hegemony) now existed,
which brought a resolute anti-Anschluss stance from the Ständestaat regime. Government propaganda defended Austrian sovereignty, and used the cultural and intellectual arguments articulated by Seipel to reinforce their position.

It was not that the ideas had changed, therefore, but that formulations of Österreichertum and declarations of patriotism became much more visible. Not only did the constant threat to Austrian independence demand a daily engagement with ideas of Austrian identity; the Vaterländische Front machine also ensured that these ideas continually and relentlessly found their way into people’s lives. In chapter two we examined the mechanism of the Front, noting in particular the cultural activities it organised as well as the youth associations it established. We also observed how the regime endeavoured to get a firmer grip on education at all levels, to ensure that children and adults were instructed in a patriotic spirit.

We have been able to detect two major differences in the construct of Österreichertum advanced by Seipel, and that by the Ständestaat regime. The first of these was in its closer relationship to the Austrian state. Once the Republic had been buried by the liquidation of parliamentary democracy, Austrian conservatism no longer had any need to distance its formulation of Austrian identity from the political entity called Austria. What is more, the fact that the country’s sovereignty was threatened by Nazi Germany produced a strong identification between Austrian identity and its territorial borders.

The second difference was due to the fact that a Feindbild (enemy image) now existed, providing a significant ‘other’ against which constructs
of identity can be most sharply defined. Whereas Germany had never
provided an ‘other’ in the minds of Austrian conservatism, National
Socialism was held up as the antithesis of everything that Österreichertum.
but also Deutschtum, stood for. The historical rivalry between Austria and
Prussia for mastery of Germany was re-enacted in Front propaganda as a
battle for the true German soul between Ständestaat Austria and Nazi
Germany. Echoing Goebbels, Austrian propaganda equated National
Socialism with the Prussian spirit, and thus unleashed a torrent of abuse
based on historical arguments.

The ‘Austrianism’ of the Ständestaat era probably reached its zenith on
the day that Dollfuss was murdered in the abortive Nazi coup of July 1934.
Mussolini had sent troops to the Brenner Pass to demonstrate that Fascist
Italy would take up arms for the cause of Austrian independence. Meanwhile
the assassinated Chancellor had become a martyr for the Austrian cause.
Under Schuschnigg’s dictatorship, the Italian protection disappeared and the
rapprochement made by the Austrian Chancellor with Hitler obliged a
change in course for Front propaganda. Austrian Nazis could still be vilified
in the press, as Austrian National Socialism was deemed at internal affair.
The Third Reich, however, was to be above explicit criticism in the Austrian
media. The Ständestaat construct of Österreichertum therefore lost the
significant ‘other’.

It is still perplexing that the Ständestaat regime did not depart more
radically from Seipel’s construct of Österreichertum to articulate something
more akin to an Austrian national identity, thus putting a greater distance
between it and the Nazi dictatorship. There is no evidence that the
population would have been receptive to such thinking (although that need not concern us here, as the focus is on identity promotion from above). Nor will we make any speculative claims for the agency of national identity by suggesting that the declaration of nationhood would have strengthened the fight for Austrian independence. The fact remains, however, that Front propaganda opted for subtle, rather than radical, differentiation. Talk of German missions in various parts of central Europe could, ironically, be seen as an affirmation of the very event the Ständestaat was trying to prevent, namely Anschluss.

The fact that Front propaganda still employed the Seipel formula of dual German-Austrian allegiance must lead us to conclude that the old concept of Österreichertum was still influential amongst a younger generation of Austrian conservatives. While they paraded themselves as the most devoted of Austrian patriots, both Schuschnigg and Dollfuss felt strongly German in a (cultural) national sense. As a student, Dollfuss had been in favour of Anschluss and had belonged to the radical German nationalist wing of the Catholic association, the Cartell Verband. Schuschnigg noted that Dollfuss remained a ‘national’ until Hitler came to power in Germany. According to Walter Goldinger, Schuschnigg, while retaining a deep affection for the Monarchy and a pride in Austria’s past glory, was more influenced by the concept of the Holy Roman Empire than by the Danube Monarchy. For him, the Monarchy had been strongly German. Schuschnigg recalled, moreover, that his education at a Jesuit school had left him open to a powerful German-national influence. Referring back to the Anschluss, he famously remarked
that he did not order resistance to the German troops as he wanted to avoid a ‘fratricidal war’. 9

The Heimwehr was a splintered movement, divided on provincial as well as ideological lines. Some of the associations looked towards Germany, and ultimately towards Nazism, others found backing from Fascist Italy, and gratefully accepted the arms and money that were offered. In return, Mussolini charged his clients with crushing Social Democracy and agitating for a dictatorship in Austria. In this spirit, troops battled for mastery of the streets with the Republikanischer Schutzbund, and demanded radical constitutional reform. A few Heimwehr leaders had been influenced by the corporatist ideas of Othmar Spann and used them as ideological support for their bid to power.

In spite of the regular fragmentation of the Heimwehr movement, in the 1930s it achieved a certain degree of organisation and central leadership under Starhemberg. Now known as the Heimatschutz, this incarnation of the Heimwehren demands consideration in any examination of Österreichertum in the 1930s. For almost three years the Heimatschutz was, at least publicly, an integral part of the Ständestaat regime and the patriotic Front.

Following Dollfuss' death, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg had a dualist arrangement, sharing the top political jobs between them. In this period the propaganda of the Heimatschutz aped that of the Front; its newspapers effectively became government mouthpieces. The movement did not produce original or more radical constructs of Österreichertum, but it served the patriotic campaign by reformulating the ideas of the Ständestaat regime. Behind the scenes, Starhemberg undermined his patriotic credentials, and
loyalty to Schuschnigg by trying to reach a secret deal with Hitler. Wary of a possible coup, the Chancellor had the Heimatschutz dissolved in 1936.

The legitimists were a grouping on the fringes of society, although their programme had the sympathy of some influential figures in Austria. Restoration of the Habsburg dynasty was always a non-starter, particularly after the farcical attempts by Karl to regain the throne in Hungary, where monarchists enjoyed far greater influence. The legitimists were also a highly fragmented movement, often no more than a loose collection of associations. They nevertheless produced some interesting, even eccentric, ideas about what it meant to be Austrian.

In their idealisation of Habsburg tradition, the legitimists accentuated many of the features of Österreichertum. Their focus for an Austrian identity was exclusively Habsburg, although many were able to reconcile themselves eventually with the small state, particularly if this seemed to offer a more realistic hope for a Habsburg restoration than a reconstituted Danube superstate. The monarchists put themselves at the forefront of the patriotic campaign of the 1930s; their constructs of Österreichertum were never as conciliatory towards Germany as those articulated in official propaganda. As was to be expected, they played a particular role in highlighting Austria’s distinct cultural traditions and in this role they could be safely incorporated into the Front, where they were encouraged to keep all talk of restoration to a minimum so as not to upset the neighbours.

This study has also examined historical, intellectual and literary reflections and constructs of Österreichertum. It was seen that authors of a certain conservative stamp often chose not to engage with the realities of the
present, but to revisit Austria’s (fairly recent) past in order to salvage some meaning for an apparently bleak present. What they returned with seemed to be an understanding that Austrian tradition encompassed values worth preserving, even if they had little potential for impact in the immediate present. Österreichertum was given a more affirmative reception by other writers and publicists who developed their own constructs by selecting a variety of ‘quintessential’ characteristics, as well as historical and cultural artefacts, for scrutiny. It was shown how the historians themselves frequently shared strong Pan-German convictions, which broke the classic mould of Österreichertum by backing the nation state solution. They nevertheless had a sufficiently keen sense of Austrian tradition and their own brand of patriotism which allowed them to focus on Austria’s historical importance for the German nation as a whole.

The final set of publicists we examined had taken an important conceptual leap from the paradigm of Austrian identity which has been the focus of most of this work. They broke free from the Kulturnation concept which lay at the heart of conservative Österreichertum and embraced the modern, political idea of the nation. This allowed them to create a new Austrian identity without reference to Germandom, and one which promised to be reinforced by a rich seam of ideas and theories. The disciplines of History, Geography, Genealogy, Sociology, Anthroplogy, and Cultural Criticism were all recruited to the campaign to promote Austrian nationhood. But their ideas were too radical for the inter-war years, and were frowned upon by political conservatism.
Save for these harbingers of Austrian nationhood, we have seen that the constructs of Österreichertum formulated within Austrian conservatism had much in common. They all operated within the framework of the larger German nation, although the relationship to a political entity called Germany was more complicated. The imperial past was indispensable to these ideas although, again, just how important Habsburg was to individual constructs varied from person to person. A third essential element, as I see it, was the Catholic one. This synthesised with the supranational legacy to produce a European dimension to Austrian identity. One might also argue that Österreichertum, in accordance with its conservative character, operated most comfortably in paternalistic, authoritarian structures. The universalism of conservative Österreichertum was Catholic and hierarchical, the very antithesis of the egalitarianism of international Socialism.

The Kulturnation concept which underpinned traditional Österreichertum would not escape unscathed from World War II. To see how the emphasis had changed, I have chosen to conclude with the opinions of three leading Austrian politicians in the aftermath of the War. The first of these is the Communist Ernst Fischer, who filled the post of Minister for Education until October 1945. His ideas had a precedent in Austrian Communism. In 1937, Alfred Klahr wrote a series of articles for the underground organ, Weg und Ziel, in which he presented a scientific foundation for the Austrian nation. In the March issue he argued that, on the basis of their political independence, the Austrians had undergone a national development which diverged from that of the Germans. Klahr’s theories

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heralded a change in communist thinking and soon became part of the official party programme.

In 1945, Fischer published a text on the evolution of the Austrian national character. He asserted that the Anschluss era had taught millions the contrasts between Austrians and Germans. Austria was beginning to discover herself; a people was evolving into a state people and then into a nation. He slammed Pan-German falsifications of history, insisting that the Austrians were never a German Stamm, but a product of their own historical development. The Austrians were a mix of Bavarian, Aleman, Celtic and Slav stock, but they should be viewed collectively as a political entity, like the Swiss, rather than in racial terms. The historical process which formed the Austrians was not a German, but an Austrian and European one.

After detailing a long list of quintessentially Austrian characteristics, Fischer examined the ethnic strands of the Austrians, for no other reason than to refute the claim that they were pure Germans. After all, he admitted, all the European peoples were composed of a colourful mix of races. More importantly for Fischer, Austria had taken a different historical development from that of Germany since the end of the Thirty Years War, when she had oriented herself on Spain and Italy. The final break had come with the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, after which Österreichertum and Deutschtum were two distinct elements. Fischer maintained that after the initial enthusiasm for Anschluss had passed in 1918, the Austrians had regarded the Germans with a ‘frosty indifference’ which turned to antipathy when the troops invaded in March 1938. He claimed that the Austrians had been ready to take up arms to defend their country against Hitler-Germany.
Karl Renner, who was the first Chancellor of the Second Republic and thereafter its President, had urged Austrians in 1938 to vote affirmatively in Hitler’s plebiscite. He said on 27 October 1946:

Our people possesses such a marked individuality, different from all other peoples, that it is united and can also claim to pronounce itself an independent nation. Its tie to the Germans of the Reich by a common language can be no obstacle.  

Leopold Figl of the People’s Party, who replaced Renner as Chancellor, said in his inaugural speech on 21 December 1945:

Our Austria is a small state, but it intends to remain true to its great tradition, which above all was a cultural tradition, as a refuge of peace in the centre of Europe. If we repeatedly stress, with a fanaticism borne of a native loyalty, that we are not a second German state; that we were never a cast-off of another nationality and never will be, but that we are nothing apart from Austrians, and this with all our hearts and with that passion which every allegiance to a nation must harbour, then this is no invention by us who today bear the responsibility for this state, but the most profound understanding of all Austrians, wherever they may stand in this Austria.
See Spät, Kreissler, Bluhm, passim.

2 See DÖW, 4003, Österreichischer Beobachter.

3 Kreissler, p. 147. Seyss-Inquart, who very briefly replaced Schuschnigg as Chancellor, believed, moreover, that Austria could retain a special status within the Reich. See ibid., p. 37fn. For more on the attitude of Austrian Nazis to the takeover, see Pauley, p. 179.

Dolfuss, p. 29.

3 Seyss-Inquart, who very briefly replaced Schuschnigg as Chancellor, believed, moreover, that Austria could retain a special status within the Reich. See ibid., p. 37fn. For more on the attitude of Austrian Nazis to the takeover, see Pauley, p. 179.

4 Dollfuss, p. 29.

5 Jagschitz in Weissensteimer/Weinzierl, p. 209.

6 Austrian Requiem, p. 158.


8 Dreimal Österreich, pp. 32, 36-38.

9 Austrian Requiem, p. 46.

10 See Kreissler, p. 42; also Skalnik in Weinzierl/Skalnik, p. 20.

11 Fischer, Ernst, Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters, Schriftenreihe ‘Neues Österreich’ Heft 2, Vienna, 1945, p. 3.

12 Ibid., pp. 4-9, 13-15, 30-31.

13 Kreissler, p. 399.

14 Ibid., p. 415. The first ÖVP programme after the war was produced by Alfred Missong who, as we have seen, was one of the few partisans of Austrian nationhood in the inter-war years.
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