PLATE I
JAMES C. PRICHARD'S VIEWS OF MANKIND.
AN ANTHROPOLOGIST BETWEEN THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND
THE VICTORIAN AGE

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Abstract

The Bristol doctor James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848) is acknowledged as Britain's foremost student of anthropology and ethnology in the early nineteenth century. At a time when European scholars increasingly embraced racial theories to account for cultural diversities, Prichard was a stout defender of monogenism. Being was brought up as a Quaker, he later converted to Anglicanism, embracing the Evangelical wing of the church. He regarded the unity of mankind as a necessary precondition in the struggle to uphold Christian morality under threat of materialism and Utilitarianism. Oddly, his theories have often been misrepresented, in particular their opposition to contemporary racial theorizing has been underestimated. My dissertation, the first study dedicated exclusively to Prichard, explores his notions of man's place in nature and puts them in the context of contemporary European learning. This comprises an investigation into his theories of insanity as well as his ethnological writings laid down in his *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind* and other works. In order to support monogenism Prichard became a self-taught expert in philology and mythology, adding the latest results of continental scholarship to the knowledge acquired at Edinburgh University.

He studied German comparative philology years before the method spread in Britain, availing himself of methods deemed by many as theologically dangerous. Yet, synthesizing German Romantic theories with Edinburgh learning, Prichard's anthropology remained within the framework of Christian piety, culminating in the assertion that mankind was a unity due to its common "psychology" which Prichard inferred from his observation that all human tribes believed in a life after death. The concept of the atonement, so important for early nineteenth-century Evangelicals, came to stand at the core of Prichard's anthropology. But his conflation of science and theology appeared increasingly unacceptable. By delineating the debates Prichard was engaged in, the thesis adds to the understanding of the development from eighteenth-century thought to secularized mid-nineteenth-century theories of man.
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Preface and Acknowledgements

Unless otherwise stated all translations into the English language are mine. All references are cited in each chapter in full when they appear for the first time, subsequent references to the same source are mostly abbreviated. The full references of the DNB, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Nouvelle biographie universelle, the OED, and the Wellesley Index are to be found only in the bibliographical appendix. The usage of the letter "ae" in the quotations has (with one exception) been changed to "æ". Cross-references to other chapters of this thesis are stated as: "see ch. x". The thesis contains a number of plates, including copies of several portraits. In all those cases where the name of the artist is not given, I have been unable to ascertain his identity.

I should like to express my gratitude to all those who have generously helped me during the last years. My thanks go to my supervisor Christopher Lawrence who had the kindness of taking me on as his student and whose pungent criticisms were very valuable; to William F. Bynum who has provided me with much encouragement and good advice; to Michael Neve who did the same and told me that Prichard's Adam was not black. Thanks to Bernd Weisbrod for his friendship and many useful references, to John Pickstone for his constructive comments; and to Caroline Overy for all her help and kindness. The staff of the following institutions have been exceedingly friendly: the Wellcome Institute Library, the Edinburgh Special Collections Library, the University Library at Göttingen, the Public Record Office as well as the Central Library at Bristol, and the British Library. I am especially grateful to John Burrow: his courses at the University of Sussex were the beginning of it all. I am also deeply indebted to Michael Biddiss who read my imperfect text not just sentence by sentence but word by word, pointing out innumerable flaws. And I want to thank Roy Porter. He was happy to be the other half of my mind. The years spent writing this dissertation have been happy years thanks to him.
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1. Introduction

The farthest the Bristol doctor James Cowles Prichard ever got away from home was a journey to the Continent in 1831. Yet, his mind was widely travelled. In his spare hours, mostly between five and eight in the mornings, Prichard studied descriptions of aboriginal tribes all over the world, perusing countless volumes of travel literature, anatomical observations, and linguistic tracts, contemplating how mankind had spread over the globe in those some six thousand years between the creation of Adam and Eve and his own birth in 1786.

Nowadays Prichard is regarded as "a leading student" of his field. In a semantically less scrupulous age he was revered as "the founder of the English branch of the sciences of anthropology and ethnology". He himself employed both terms only from the 1830s. From his M. D. dissertation in 1808 up to his death in 1848 he strove to prove that the Scriptures gave a correct account of what he termed "the natural history of man". Saint Augustine had deplored a lack of interest in man's moral nature, Prichard added that the same was true for man's "physical nature" as well. His Researches into the Physical History of Mankind aimed to fill the gap. Oddly, most historians of our time have shied away from the many volumes of the three editions of the Researches reading instead Prichard's one-volume edition The Natural History of Man. In his own time things were not much better. He had attempted to found his ethnology on theory. But after his death his Researches was used merely as a reference work of ethnographic details. His views were no longer seriously discussed.

This dissertation aims to demonstrate why Prichard was so relentless in his pursuit, and why he was himself increasingly convinced that he had failed. It will examine issues such as Prichard's famous "invention" of a disease called "moral insanity", his usage of psychology as anthropological category, his vindication of Hebrew as a God-given institution, and his
attitude towards the crucial topic of racial theory. Following up his theoretical allegiances and aversions, his sources and how he used them, the thesis will explore several fields of European theorizing between the 1750s and the middle of the nineteenth century, evoking a world view which contrasts starkly with the concerns of our own century. Far from explaining the origins of modern scientific concepts, Prichard's intellectual pursuits belong to a bygone world. Had his scientific views of human nature been universally accepted by the time of his death in 1848, the following one and a half centuries would have taken a very different course.

Prichard's character and personal circumstances will be addressed only cursorily; instead the thesis will focus on the seventeen volumes and dozens of articles he wrote. His interests were various, ranging from an apologia for bloodletting to Egyptian chronology. Through textual analysis of his works we will be able to gain an understanding of his general beliefs and opinions. We will see that Prichard's views were quite consistent throughout his life. This is all the more remarkable as he lived through a transitional epoch. Born under the ancien regime, he passed his childhood during the era of the French Revolution, witnessing the turmoils of the Anglo-French wars and the subsequent rise of a new European order. After 1815 the world of his youth was no longer in existence.

While it may be said that all eras are prone to change, Prichard's generation experienced these changes with great awareness, hailing them as progress, or branding them as a decline from better standards. As Culler has recently said, "the period 1815 to 1840 was a dark one in English history, with the economic collapse following the Napoleonic wars, the oppressiveness of the Tory reaction, the agitations surrounding the Catholic emancipation and the first Reform Bill, the hopes and fears of the Revolution of 1830, the Bristol riots and rick-burning, the fearful suffering of the poor".
Industrial society arose, leading to a reconfiguration of the social system. Market mechanisms, set out in theory in the eighteenth century, were seen to govern the distribution of social and material resources. In natural history Linnaeus' static classification by external resemblance was superseded by taxonomies focusing on the internal characters of organisms, form and function becoming soon the two guiding categories. Anatomy was enriched by the comparative method whose adherents attempted to relate different families of species to each other. Theories of preformation and preexistence, which hitherto had accounted for the fixity of species, were replaced by epigenesis. The demise of the concept of the Chain of Being went hand in hand with various new speculations on species change, Lamarck's and Erasmus Darwin's theories of transmutation threatening the notion of God's finite creation.

In Britain, the age of Deism and Enlightenment was virtually terminated by the execution of Louis XVI and the Anglo-French wars. The old patronage system gave way to modern-style party politics, the abstract entity of the "state" being redefined as the organ of decision-taking where previously this function had been regarded as residing with the King in Parliament or the Prime Minister and his government. As the state came to be seen as the abstract embodiment of political power, liberal theories were formulated, aiming to save the liberties of the individual from the incursions of the state.

The colonial enterprise was pursued with vigour, Britons increasingly emphasizing the role of the "Empire". Traditional social ties dissolved, and there were growing perceptions of class struggle. Hence the great fears that the French Revolution might be more than merely a French calamity. The ideology of liberty was then equated by many with "materialism" and political turmoil. Two types of theory were conceived to oppose the revolutionary threat: liberal Utilitarian theory attempted to play down the state's influence, stressing the ordering principles inherent
to the operation of market mechanisms. Alternatively, a retreat into inner values was suggested. Instead of focusing on material gains, better living standards and political participation, a return to morality was recommended, inward ethical nobility being emphasized over wealth and social status which were criticized as superficial. In this respect the philosophy of Idealism, the spiritual side of the Romantic movement, and a new religious piety linked up with each other. In Britain, the Evangelical movement set out to safeguard morality and Christianity.

Eighteenth-century theology had largely rested on the comfortable analogy between God as Father of the world and the monarch as father of the populace, both concepts residing in the notion of the paterfamilias. In the nineteenth century this system of legitimation broke up. While society was remodelled, theology was gradually removed from its foundation in anthropology and the natural law tradition. Religion came to be founded on another reference system. From the eighteenth century natural theology had suggested a harmony between the interests of government and religion. Yet, as the reputation of the sciences grew, truth was increasingly regarded as a question of observation and verification. Within the system of natural theology religious truth was submitted to the same categories. Like scientific hypotheses, religion came to derive its legitimacy from the production of proofs. The very existence of natural laws was considered to exemplify divine providence. The argument appeared convincing. Yet, at the same time, natural theology was criticized for paying no heed to the transcendental side of religion, in particular, religious miracles of which the Scriptures told. While scientific objectivity came to be regarded as the standard of truth, orthodox defenders of religion felt increasingly besieged, their position being threatened from the very quarter which was the pride of the age: the sciences.

All these developments Prichard witnessed with increasing unease. Being educated by those whose outlook had been formed during the
eighteenth century, he found his views challenged by younger generations who were brought up in the new spirit. His life straddled the old and the new. The overriding characteristic of the latter was, in his view, a tendency towards materialism, by which he understood not just materialism à la française but also British utilitarianism which served as the philosophical basis for economic and colonial expansion. Fighting these views, Prichard advocated a consequent distinction between the realm of the soul and that of the body. This dualism referred to the analogous distinction between the realm of man and nature on the one hand, and the kingdom of God, on the other hand. The latter was supreme: in all his works Prichard strove to sustain the idea that men had the moral responsibility to heed the demands of the invisible moral part of their cosmos. He aimed to sustain the moral axioms of Christianity.

His religious creed went hand in hand with his political conservatism. His concept of an active God, interfering with the world, linked up with his notion of benevolent rulers surveying the lives and welfare of their inferiors. Beyond this old regime notion of patriarchy, however, Prichard's life and works hardly invite analyses aiming to uncover hidden political interests behind scientific positions and allegiances. This approach to the human sciences in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century has been opened up by scholars such as Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin, and David Bloor.14

With respect to Prichard's peers in medicine and natural history, Adrian Desmond has developed the same line of thought. He has demonstrated that transformationism was, contrary to previous assumptions, widespread in British natural science during the 1830s and 1840s, political radicals being especially open to the idea of species evolution.15 In The Politics of Evolution Desmond delineated parallels between the scientific ideas of contemporary writers on natural history and their political inclinations, demonstrating how arguments over theory
reflected the political struggle of the radical fringe against the London establishment.\textsuperscript{16} This political contextualization applies to Prichard, too, insofar as he rejected political radicalism as much as the doctrine of transmutation. What makes matters more complex in his case is that he was living in provincial Bristol. Irrespective of his political conservatism, he was destined to remain outside the medical establishment of the capital. This made it easier for him to object to doctrines held by the London establishment. Prichard was subject to the kind of group pressure characteristic of provincial towns, having to heed not just the opinions of his medical colleagues, but those of the Bristol dignitaries of all professions.

What makes it even more difficult to apply Desmond's approach to Prichard is the fact that the latter's combination of evangelical creed, anti-utilitarian philanthropy, and political conservatism is not mentioned in Desmond's book. It is very difficult to locate him within Desmond's matrix. His preference for the Tory party notwithstanding, Prichard was not very much engaged with politics. His political remarks were confined to expressing his strong anti-utilitarian sentiment. To his chagrin, utilitarianism appeared to him increasingly hegemonic.

Spiritually and philosophically, Prichard found a home in evangelicalism. While William Paley's natural theology was suspected of utilitarian notions of expediency, the evangelicals emphasized piety for its own sake.\textsuperscript{17} They spurned what they perceived as Paleyan complacent theodicy culminating in patriotic exultations of the Creator who had endowed Britain with coal so that she could rise and govern. Dissatisfied with the prevalent form of natural theology, people like Prichard, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and William Whewell supported other goals.\textsuperscript{18} Prichard's worldly service for his creed consisted in his attempt scientifically to prove the Scriptures; in particular, he was concerned with the Biblical account of natural history (comprising the living world and excluding geology).

In recent years the religious side of the experience of "crisis" so
common among Victorian intellectuals has been extensively addressed: Jeffrey Paul von Arx, Richard Brent, Jack Morrell, Arnold Thackray, and Frank M. Turner have, amongst others, explored the continuing concern of the Victorians for questions of religion. The sources of "Victorian pessimism" in particular have been located in unresolved religious tensions in the individual perception as well as in society. While religious struggles of the Victorian age have thus been reinvested with historical significance, the old antinomy between religious and secular movements appeared increasingly anachronistic. There certainly was no smooth transition from the former to the latter.

Much has been written about early nineteenth-century attempts to reconcile geological discoveries with Biblical chronology. Peter Bowler, Martin Rudwick, and Roy Porter have shown that the conceptual fissures in contemporary geology do not support the notion of a polarized quarrel between science and religion, envisaged by many writers, from A. D. White to Charles Coulston Gillispie. If some geologists, notably the members of the Geological Society of London, abstained from referring to the Bible they did so out of the conviction that the scientific arena was not the right place for Biblical disquisitions. Prichard adopted the same attitude. Yet, in footnotes and appendices he would come back to his favoured topic, namely, how to reconcile science and the Bible.

That British natural sciences were closely bound up with natural theology has been shown by writers such as Susan F. Cannon, Robert M. Young, Pietro Corsi, John Hedley Brooke, Jack Morrell, Arnold Thackray, and Richard Yeo. Cannon and Young paved the way by arguing that British scientists justified their disciplines through reference to natural theology. Yeo, by contrast, has claimed that this perspective suggests a more stable reputation than the sciences actually possessed: irrespective of its ultimate foundation in natural theology "British science was a relatively insecure cultural activity". Far from enjoying universal acceptance British
men of science would have felt the need to legitimize their methods as well as their personal morality. Yeo did well in reminding us not to overemphasize the dominance of scientific ideology.

As for Prichard, however, a different picture presents itself. It is true that he had difficulties in securing ethnology its acknowledgement as a new discipline. But his concerns centred on another object. Though Prichard agreed that the sciences had to be pursued independently from religion, he rejected the idea that Christianity should play no role in the scientific perception of the world. He feared for religion much more than for his brain-child ethnology. Accordingly, his research programme, as one may call it, was to prove religion as it was laid down in the Scriptures through science. In that respect he was following the recipe of evidential theology. At the same time, however, he was aware that accomplishing this goal was not enough; in the end Christianity resided in faith, not in knowledge. Brooke has described contemporary fears about "whether natural theology, by claiming so much of its authority from science, might not have dug its own grave".

Brooke and Pietro Corsi have demonstrated how quarrels among various natural theology factions unsettled the very doctrine. Prichard's approach to the topic of science and religion was, indeed, a balancing act of sorts. What makes it even more interesting is the field he chose: the science of man, or anthropology as it was called in Germany by the second half of the eighteenth century. The term was soon adopted in Britain.

Prichard explored the subject in all its facets, physiology, the philosophy of the human mind, and the field which, as he rightly perceived, had been opened up only recently: ethnological studies. He argued that, just as the naturalist investigated the vegetable and animal realm, paying due tribute to the manifold forms extant in various geographical provinces, so human tribes had to be studied equally assiduously. He was a stout monogenist, believing that all mankind was
one and thence accountable to the same God, and that, therefore, nobody had the right to enslave or to kill another human being. He did not think in terms of the rights of man. His objections to slavery and the death penalty resided in his religious convictions.29

Prichard's fight for monogenism reflected his desire to return to a patriarchal world order where all members were responsible to each other, the lower classes owing deference to their superiors, while these in turn had to provide for those in need. Even though he never spelt it out, this was the notion on which his concept of the relationship between the human varieties was modelled. He argued incessantly against polygenists and materialists of all shades and denominations. The species unity of mankind, guaranteeing the validity of Prichard's Christian outlooks, could be proved only through intimate knowledge of all human varieties. This is the philosophy which lay at the basis of his intense occupation with ethnological investigations and in whose pursuit he integrated various other disciplines: physiology, comparative anatomy, philology, mythology, archaeology, Biblical criticism, and the study of the human mind.

During his lifetime Prichard exerted great influence over his peers and those younger scholars who trod in his footsteps. While French, German and American ethnologists were split between monogenist and polygenist doctrines, Prichard's personal influence ensured that until the 1840s British ethnology was dominated by monogenism.30

Early nineteenth-century French polygenism was a product of the Ideologues' philosophy. It exerted some influence on German thinkers. Yet, in post-revolutionary Britain, not many people were willing to engage with French philosophy. And powerful American theories of genuine racial inequality were to develop only from the 1830s. This was another reason why polygenism was slow to gain ground in Britain. It was not until the 1820s and 1830s that polygenist views became popular in Britain through the influence of a new generation of French scholars - historians.
and physiologists. Prichard felt that despite all his efforts the number of his opponents was rising. Shortly after his death British ethnological opinion on the question of monogenism was as divided as in other countries.

The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the flourishing of racial theories. Racial evolution and degeneration, and the dangers of racial mixture were employed to account for the character of peoples and individuals alike. In conjunction with the notion of the "survival of the fittest" and widespread social paranoia, racial theories justified the extirpation of "bad stocks", furthering theories of eugenics and social control. One of the key questions this dissertation has to address is how Prichard's concepts must be ranged within the broad historical spectrum: were he and his theories simply a relic of the old order? Or was he a proper representative of his time who just had the bad fortune of growing out of tune with mainstream theories? And if so, why was he so influential? Another possibility would be that he was actually "ahead" of his contemporaries, feeling the pangs of problems which are bothering twentieth-century ecologists and even activists for animal rights. Whatever the answer to these questions, Prichard's explicit anti-racialism distinguish him from the type of theorizing prevalent from the 1840s.

Oddly, his anti-racist stance has not been fully acknowledged. Léon Poliakov and Hugh MacDougall believed that he was eulogising the Aryans; Stuart Gilman held him for a racial degenerationist; Reginald Horsman declared that there was no difference between Prichard's "permanent" varieties and other writers' "races". Nancy Stepan claimed that he was "the leading student of biological races in Britain in the early part of the nineteenth century". George Stocking asserted even that Prichard "retreated" gradually "in the face of racialism". The reasons for these misconceptions do not always lie in superficial reading or in the reliance on secondary sources. In many instances errors have arisen when
historians have regarded Prichard's terminology with the eyes of a twentieth-century reader. The usage of the words "race" or "Arian", to give a very simple example, does not in itself justify the allegation that a nineteenth-century author was a racial theoretician. The issue of "race", as it was considered in the early nineteenth century, was discussed within reference systems quite different from those of the twentieth century. As part of his anthropology, Prichard's attitude to the concept of race must be explained through the whole of his intellectual interests. This does not just involve Prichard's insights into natural history, but also his philosophy of the human mind, his religion and the interrelations between the disciplines he was engaged with. Practically speaking, those historians who have interpreted Prichard after perusal of one of his books only - and that applies to the great majority - could not possibly get him right. For, as an ethnologist, he was a philosopher of the human mind; and as a philosopher of the human mind, he defended Christian dualism.

If Prichard's theories went out of fashion it was not because of his scientific errors, or his adherence to obsolete scientific systems, but because the tide of secularization washed away the metaphysical foundations on which his science rested. He perceived the change. He wanted to prevent it. His endeavour to uphold religion expressed itself as the ardent attempt to sustain the unity of mankind against rising racial theorizing. As he was conscious of being increasingly out of touch with contemporary opinions, Prichard's science is not devoid of heroism. Preferring tradition over innovation he referred his audiences to better times in the past. Ironically, the result was that his scientifically founded theories of man are more easily reconcilable with our own assumptions than the vast majority of opinions on the subject uttered during the latter sixty years of the nineteenth century.

There have been various interpretations to account for the move from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, from the ancien regime to
"modernity".\textsuperscript{38} With a view to putting Prichard's writings into perspective some of these approaches will be discussed: authors like Michel Foucault and Wolf Lepenies have emphasized that the changes did not only concern the ways of the world, but also the ways in which the world was perceived. In their view the level of interpretation ought not to be that of dates and events, but the more abstract sphere of the sociology of knowledge.

Foucault popularized the term "episteme" to delineate the shift. As he explained in \textit{Les mots et les choses}, the same sort of changes took place in three central departments of knowledge: the study of language, of natural history, and of economics. These three fields constitute the "human sciences" lying at the heart of the modern episteme. Foucault's method, the archaeology of knowledge, aims to diagnose the progression from the eighteenth century episteme to that of the nineteenth century. As he described it, "it will show that [in the nineteenth century] the general area of knowledge is no longer that of identities and differences, that of non-quantitative orders, that of a universal characterization, of a general taxonomy, of a non-measurable mathesis, but an area made up of organic structures, that is, of internal relations between elements whose totality performs a function".\textsuperscript{39}

Foucault's interpretation is illuminating in many respects. However, it has been questioned whether the epistemological changes were as clear-cut as he defined them. Phillip Sloan has pointed out that "the eighteenth-century was never dominated by an ahistorical concept of 'natural history' to be contrasted with the historical 'biology' of the nineteenth-century".\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, the conflation of analysis with cultural critique has somewhat marred Foucault's overall project. His theories of discursive formations have been subject to extensive historical criticism.\textsuperscript{41} His insistence on the "death of the author", in particular, puts unnecessary limits upon his method of textual analysis. Given that the archaeologist himself is well-advised to keep in mind that his historical narrative will always be tinged
by personal bias, it appears unconvincing that a text should not be analysed in view of the overall outlook of its author.

Other approaches to an epistemological interpretation of historical change include Scott Atran's *Cognitive Foundations of Natural History*. Atran has argued that scientific perception became increasingly professionalized, insofar as what he calls "common sense" was no longer considered as a basis for the selection of scientific categories. In a similar vein Schlüter has suggested that growing professionalization during the nineteenth century implied that detailed observations increasingly dominated over the attempt to provide the grand theoretical synthesis. Both Atran and Schlüter describe a movement which can be broadly subsumed under Max Weber's concept of the "disenchantment" ("Entzauberung") of the world, a process relieving all social spheres of their transcendental or teleological momentum.

Another attempt to account for the structural changes from the old system to modern times has been put forward by the German social anthropologist Wolf Lepenies in his *Das Ende der Naturgeschichte* (the end of natural history). In some respects inspired by Foucault, his theory is slightly less ambitious and more specific than the latter's. Lepenies has argued that, with respect to the fields of history and natural history, the main difference between the two epochs lies in the historicization or, as he put it, the "temporalization" of nature. The idea follows in effect a suggestion of Arthur Lovejoy. In his seminal book on the Chain of Being Lovejoy asserted that the concept of the *scala naturae* was recast in a more dynamic way in the end of the eighteenth century. Thus Kant's theory of cosmic evolution, for example, was nothing else but a "temporalized version of the principle of plenitude".

While Lovejoy detected the temporalization of the Chain of Being mainly in German Idealism and German Romantic theory, Lepenies has convincingly placed it in the context of European natural history. The
reason for the change, he suggested, was the increasing "pressure of experience" ("Erfahrungsdruck").

Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries information in natural history accumulated so enormously that it was ultimately impossible to range it into the horizontal scale of synchronically existing entities provided by the concept of the Chain of Being. Instead all information was organized in a matrix comprising both dimensions, the synchronical and the diachronical. The result, Lepenies has claimed, was thinking in terms of historical development. Kant's dogma that natural history was not just the description of nature but the explanation of natural processes, highlighted this change of perspective completed by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The "end of natural history" marks the point where the traditional understanding of natural history dissolved in favour of dynamic thinking, scientific specialization, and the self-referential reflection of the sciences. In this way scientific disciplines themselves became the objects of historicization. Thus, the nineteenth century produced many publications on "the history of..." - medicine, natural history, philosophy and so forth.

Lepenies has been criticized for not proving his theories sufficiently. In a rather unfavourable review Phillip Sloan has asserted that Lepenies failed to illustrate the so-called "pressure of experience". Moreover, Sloan enumerated a number of genuinely ahistorical nineteenth-century doctrines of natural history to show that the author's notion of temporalization was flawed. Yet Lepenies did not actually mean to say that a temporalized perspective of natural history was replacing the lateral description. The growing complexity which he demonstrated, and which was captured in his idea of the end of "natural history", simply added the historical to the descriptive dimension.

His attempt to explain why in the last third of the eighteenth century time became such an important historical category is not irrelevant for our approach to Prichard's writings. For Prichard's ethnology had its source in
theories of man put forward first in Scotland and France, explaining the savage state not as an alternative to civilization but as a stage which all peoples pass through in their phylogenic development. From the end of the eighteenth century theories of nature and of man's place in nature were rife with notions of progress and decline, labelled as "perfectibility" and "corruption" or, later, as social "evolution" and "degeneration". It is the development of this processual thinking that Lepenies aimed to delineate.50

So much for the theories of Foucault and Lepenies. Neither of them, however, is of great help in approaching the problem set out above, namely whether, within the course of intellectual history and the history of science, Prichard was, so to speak, a fossil. In this dissertation it will be shown that the doctor in many respects adhered to old doctrines which his own contemporaries regarded as already antiquated. His medicine and physiological concepts, in particular, were thoroughly old-fashioned. At the same time, however, he had recourse to very new methodologies. For example, he referred to members of the German school of Biblical higher criticism, at a time when devout British writers would not touch their books (he much preferred German theological publications over the works of contemporary British divines). He converted early on to Cuvier's geological theory of several subsequent creations. And he was one of the very first British writers on philology to import the new method of comparative historical linguistics from Germany into England. Mingling old and new, Prichard poses a riddle to the historian wishing to pin down his ideas to a particular place and time.

One way of solving the problem would be to declare him an eclecticist - which he doubtless was. For ethnology as he conceived it was the amalgamation of various other established disciplines. However, there is good reason for not being content with that solution. For if Prichard's specificity had been just a question of eclecticism, there is no reason why he
should not have had followers even beyond his death. But this was not the case. The real stumbling block was Prichard's devoutness. Late nineteenth-century Victorians were still very much given to Christian declarations. But these were uttered rather in the introductions or epilogues of their books. Prichard, by contrast, had attempted overtly to relate scientific knowledge of man's place in nature to the Biblical narrative.

Among the manifold theories accounting for the epochal changes between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries there is one which enables us to translate the phenomenon into general terms, thereby accounting for the riddle as to why Prichard's theories were so original and yet so traditional. The approach in question has been put forward by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann who has suggested examining historical development as the crystallization of various social systems. Luhmann refers his theory to systems such as law, government, religion, education, and the sciences. If any given system has the ability of its own "reproduction", it will sustain itself through time. The capacity for reproduction depends on the system's ability to produce its own semantic "code" which shields the system from alien incursions while at the same time opening up the possibility of internal strife and further development. A crucial characteristic of any fully developed system is its "self-observation", the institutionalization of self-analysis and thus of self-definition by means of favouring particular aspects while ignoring others (which in turn may be pointed out only by external observers - or critics). As in individual consciousness, the identity of a system is constituted through selective self-awareness. The development of all these faculties is what Luhmann has termed systemic "differentiation", this process designating his perception of historical change. Broadly speaking differentiation means individuation plus growing complexity.

Let us consider the process of differentiation by means of the example of politics: in medieval times the feudal prince represented at the same
time the government, the law, and even a sacred principle. During the subsequent centuries these three spheres became increasingly independent from the figure of the prince as well as from each other, constituting themselves as specific social spheres with their own semantics and their own self-perception, until around 1800 political semantics had redefined the notion of the state "as the formula by means of which the political system of any given society describes itself."

What makes Luhmann's approach particularly appealing is, firstly, the fact that he does not aim to enlarge one particular insight into an "episteme" (this being the stumbling-block for Foucault). Instead Luhmann attempts to provide an explanatory system which by accommodating sociological analyses in a temporal sequence may shed new light on our perceptions of historical processes. Secondly, and unlike the theories of Foucault and Lepenies, Luhmann's approach allows for varying positions in different countries. Like Max Weber - another sociologist deeply engaged with historical process - Luhmann has not attempted to write a universal history of the world from his sociological viewpoint. Rather he focuses on eras of intensified "differentiation". One of those is the period between the seventeenth century and 1800.

What has been explained with respect to politics applies to the sciences as well. Initially being regarded as the handmaid of religion, science became increasingly independent. The next step has been described by Steven Shapin who has shown that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries scientific truth was class-based: gentlemen scientists, Shapin has explained, were not only by definition truth-tellers (for otherwise they were giving the lie to their peers, a deed which could be settled only in a duel), but they also were endowed with superior refinement and hence better perception than common people. Following Luhmann's method we can cast the subsequent process of scientific professionalization as the detachment of scientific pursuits from non-scientific semantic rules derived
from the system of society itself and, as must be added, from the ethical code of religion. The reasons why Prichard’s notion of science appeared increasingly unacceptable to his peers was that he kept blurring the semantic reference systems, not only superimposing theological considerations but, indeed, having theology provide his research programme. Natural theology was reconciled with science because, in extremis, it allowed free scientific pursuit within the assumption that scientists’ findings would be compatible with divine contrivance. Prichard, by contrast, declared it his aim to prove the truth of Scripture. However, irrespective of its need for social legitimation, the scientific system had established its code by the 1820s. Its conflation with theology was no longer tolerable.

We have said that Prichard appeared outdated shortly after his death. In fact, only in one respect was he rehabilitated. His entry in the DNB from 1896 stated that "it is curious to notice how nowadays the doctrine of development rehabilitates his discussion of the races of man as varieties of one species". Indeed, previous historical accounts of Prichard have emphasized his place in the history leading up to Darwin’s evolutionism.

In his Evolution and Society, John Burrow opened up a most stimulating approach to the question: investigating Utilitarian philosophy and theories of social evolution Burrow highlighted the parallels between eighteenth-century Scottish conjectural history and nineteenth-century theories of social evolution. Exploring the philosophical background of social evolutionism, Burrow perceived a conceptual gap between late-eighteenth century conjectural history and late nineteenth century social evolutionism. He was looking, as it were, for the missing link bridging both epochs. Later, authors such as George Stocking and also Gay Weber endeavoured to provide an alternative approach. Yet the fundamental rift still remains to be explained: eighteenth-century authors with a concern for the laws of society harboured also an interest in the wider anthropological
context, their nineteenth-century successors, by contrast, largely ignored the anthropological implications of their studies. From the beginning of the century, the subject belonged to the domain of physiologists and naturalists. The anthropological dimension of their theories has been put onto the map by W. F. Bynum's doctoral thesis, "Time's Noblest Offspring." Examining writers such as Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Charles Lyell, Robert Chambers, and Prichard, Bynum aimed to show that Darwin's theory did not spring up suddenly, like a mutation in the genealogy of intellectual thought. Instead he believed, so to speak, in the evolution of evolutionism during the nineteenth century.

Since Bynum's important study the historiography of science has greatly expanded, focussing on the development as well as the rivalries of early nineteenth-century theories concerning man's place in nature. Michael Biddiss, Nancy Stepan, and Michael Banton have discussed the problem in light of the rise of racial theory. Peter Bowler and Stephen Jacyna, Dietrich von Engelhardt and Timothy Lenoir, Toby Appel and Bernard Balan have described, amongst many others, nineteenth-century disputes on natural history in England, Germany, and France. Prichard's science came to develop against the backdrop of the interplay between the "Romantic gestation of nature" and the rising threat of materialism. He had to come to terms with new approaches to nature such as transcendental anatomy, new forms of vitalism and phrenology, whose attitude towards religion was only gradually taking shape. John Hedley Brooke, Adrian Desmond, Stephen Jacyna, Timothy Lenoir, and Philip F. Rehbock have furthered our understanding on the theological sides of disputes within biology and physiology. The surge of learned journals and the activities of Europe's scientific societies ensured that the debate was carried out on an international level.

One of the protagonists in the development of anthropological thought was, of course, Dr Prichard. In his insightful introduction to a
reprint of the first edition of Prichard's *Researches into the Physical History of Man*. George Stocking has stressed Prichard's intermediary role, while claiming that this was only part of the answer. As a vehement opponent of species transformationism Prichard can hardly be considered as a "forerunner of Darwin". Hence Stocking developed another theory to explain the development of evolutionism. Writing in the early 1970s he relied on the then fashionable notion of paradigms. Accordingly, Prichard's writings represented the starting point. Stocking linked Prichard's approach to what he termed the "biblical-ethnological" paradigm. Prichard's adversaries, the polygenists, were subsumed as defenders of the "polygenist-physiological anthropological paradigm" because Stocking held that their ethnology was based mainly on comparative anatomy. Arguing dialectically, Stocking drew the conclusion, that evolutionary theory was the synthesis of these two approaches.

In the light of this concept Stocking formulated his interpretation of Prichard's writings, emphasizing, in particular, Prichard's great reliance on philology. He argued that Prichard's fame as ethnologist was so great and his personal engagement with the subject so deep that he managed to shape the rising science of ethnology in Britain, stamping it with his belief in monogenism and his abhorrence of racial theories attempting to reintroduce the notion of fundamental human diversity through the backdoor. At the same time, however, Stocking asserted that the tide of racialist thinking was so strong that Prichard himself gradually succumbed to its influence. That is one of the points on which this thesis will deviate from Stocking's interpretation.

The other two scholars who have thoroughly engaged with Prichard's theories are W. F. Bynum and Michael Neve. In his doctoral thesis, Neve put Prichard into the context of Bristol's scientifically interested bourgeoisie. Thanks to Neve we know how scientific pursuits helped to unify Bristol's affluent citizenry, political and religious
antagonisms notwithstanding. Bynum, by contrast, dealing with theory, has highlighted those traits in Prichard's thinking which are reminiscent of Darwinism. These are Prichard's concept of marital selection and his idea that the white varieties of mankind had evolved from black ancestors. Bynum compared the first with Darwin's theory of sexual selection and referred the latter to Scottish Enlightenment social philosophy.

While this thesis is greatly indebted to the findings of Bynum and Stocking, it challenges their interpretations in many particulars. Among the other authors who have commented on Prichard, the works of John Burrow and Herbert Odom have to be mentioned here: Burrow cast a view on Prichard in his Evolution and Society and dwelt on him in an essay on philology, comparing his concept of linguistic development to those of other contemporary philologists. Herbert Odom wrote the entry for Prichard in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Both authors have been concerned to combat anachronist interpretations of Prichard.

This thesis focusses on Prichard's theories of man, on his philosophy of the human mind, his ethnology and anthropology. Setting out the sources of his theories, it will not be confined to Prichard alone. In order to understand his writings, we will consider them in the context of his learning, that is, on the backdrop of contemporary scholarship in Britain, Germany, France, and America. This dissertation is not just about Prichard, but about the scientific knowledge of his times. German theories in the fields of physiology, medicine, philology and mythology are of particular importance. Prichard found in German authors of the Romantic and post-Romantic age the piety he was missing in France, and a moral judiciousness that was, in his view, superior to that of his own countrymen.

In the second chapter Prichard's biography will be delineated as well as his role and situation as a doctor. One aspect of his medical practice was his expertise in insanity. He gained lasting fame as the "inventor" of a new
nosological category, "moral insanity". The origins of this concept and its anthropological implications will be demonstrated in the third chapter. Having thus outlined Prichard's philosophy of the human mind we will turn to his magnum opus, the *Researches*. The fourth chapter will delineate his proofs of monogenism. From the 1830s Prichard took the unity of man's mental constitution for a strong proof of monogenism. His usage of psychology in anthropology will be described in the fifth chapter, followed by a discussion of the question whether his attitude towards the Bible changed substantially between the 1810s and the 1840s. The sixth chapter will tackle the question how Prichard's views might have changed from the first to the second and third editions of the *Researches*. As we shall see, the overarching goal of proving monogenism was the reason why Prichard's theories of man were remarkably consistent over the years.

In the seventh chapter we will examine Prichard's ethnology, addressing the scientific institutionalization of the discipline as well as Prichard's views of human development. Most important in this chapter is the discussion of Prichard's attitude towards budding racial theories. Two central aspects of his ethnology will be mentioned separately, namely, Prichard's theories of philology and mythology which will be addressed in the eighth and ninth chapter.68

This table of contents reflects to a certain extent Prichard's publishing activities. In line with nineteenth-century notions of philosophical hierarchy, we will, so to speak, ascend from the earth-bound field of medicine and physiology towards the purely mental sphere of religious mythologies. The conclusion, finally, will address the question of Prichard's impact as well as his philosophy of history. By means of locating Prichard's thought within the ideological spectrum of Utilitarianism, on the one hand, and German Idealism, on the other, we will be able to form a picture of his role in the intellectual history of the first half of the nineteenth century.
1 We know about Prichard's journey because he mentioned it in an article on "Temperament", in: J. Forbes, A. Tweedie, J. Conolly (eds), The Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, 4 vols, London (Sherwood, Gilbert, Piper), 1833-1835, vol. 4, 159-174, p. 172. It might here be appropriate to make it clear that this thesis is an intellectual biography rather than a life as such of James Cowles Prichard. The lack of publicly available documentary material for his life would make the latter a difficult enterprise. I have been informed by Dr Neve that Mr John Crump has been planning for some years to publish a biography of Prichard, based upon unpublished manuscript material in his possession. My attempts to make contact with Mr Crump have been to no avail.


3 See the entry for Prichard in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11. ed., 1919, vol. 19, 478. Traditionally, Buffon, Blumenbach, and Prichard are reckoned as the "founders" of anthropology in their respective countries. Regarding Buffon this view has been questioned recently, see: Claude Blanckaert, "Buffon and the Natural History of Man: Writing History and the 'Foundational Myth' of Anthropology", History of the Human Sciences, 6 (1993), 13-50.

4 In Prichard's understanding the term "man" designated the whole of mankind. In this thesis words like "mankind", "humanity", and "men" are used interchangeably and in accordance with Prichard's diction.

5 Prichard, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind, 3. ed., 5 vols, London (Sherwood, Gilbert, Piper; John and Arthur Arch), 1836-1847, vol. 1, v. Prichard spelled Augustine's name in the German fashion without an "e".


7 As John Burrow pointed out, the period of Victorian progressivism was a very short-lived one, see his A Liberal Descent, Victorian Historians and the English Past, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1981, 288.


10 The term will be spelt with a capital "U" whenever it refers to Benthamism.

11 Whenever this thesis refers to a particular wing of the established church, the word "Evangelical" will be spelt with a capital letter, when it refers to evangelical tendencies the term will be used like any other adjective.


16 Adrian Desmond, *The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine, and


23 The works of these authors have been cited above. They cannot be discussed in detail here, we will come back to their theses where it is appropriate.

24 Cannon, Science in Culture: The Early Victorian Period; Young, Darwin's Metaphor.

25 Yeo, Defining Science, 31.

26 See below ch. 7.

27 Brooke, Science and Religion, 223.

28 The term "anthropologia" was used as early as 1501, see: Justin Stagl, A History of Curiosity. The Theory of Travel 1550-1800. Chur (Harwood Academic Publishers), 1995, 233.
29 For Prichard's views of slavery see ch. 6. About capital punishment Prichard said: "A single private individual would scarcely think himself justified in taking upon himself the office of the Almighty, and inflicting mortal punishment on a person whom he knew to have perpetrated a crime. If such an act would be, not meritorious, but culpable, when executed by one individual, it does not seem clear how it becomes more righteous when that person has any given number of accomplices, or in other words, what invests any number of individuals, say twelve men, over whom presides a thirteenth, with the right to put to death a fellow-creature who has incurred guilt"; see his A Treatise on Insanity, and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind, London (Sherwood), 1835, 399.


31 See ch. 8.

32 Prichard was deeply concerned by the threatened extinction of indigenous human tribes. And he stressed that animals as far as feeling and suffering were concerned, did have a soul.

33 The earliest usage of the term "racialism", recorded in the OED, is from 1901; see: OED, vol. XIII. Strictly speaking it is not admissible to use it with reference to Prichard's times. Whenever I employ the term, I merely use it to denote the position of a thinker according our own moral standards.


35 From the 1840s Prichard used the term "Arian", adopted from German sources. He never employed the Anglicized form "Aryan"; cf. ch. 7, section B.

36 The book most historians of anthropology and racial theory have read is The Natural History of Man: Comprising Inquiries into the Modifying Influence of Physical and Moral Agencies on the Different Tribes of the
Human Family, London (H. Bailliere), 1843.


38 I follow the conventional understanding of "modernity" as the epoch beginning in the nineteenth century.


47 Lepenies, *Das Ende der Naturgeschichte*, 53.
48 Ibid., 37.
55 Shapin has criticized Luhmann's "Cartesian" understanding of science. However, his objection that "early modern culture produced a range of scientific enterprises, some of which bore little resemblance to the Cartesian project", rather supports than undermines Luhmann's account of historical differentiation. See Shapin, *A Social History of Truth*, 120.


62 The concept has been famously derived from Thomas Kuhn's account of scientific transformation, see T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1962.

63 Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", c-cvi.

64 I do not quite agree with Stocking, see ch. 10.


66 Bynum, "Time's Noblest Offspring", 87-88, 101-103; the topics are addressed in ch. 7, section A, and ch. 6, section C.


68 The discussion of Prichard's views on mythology is based largely on his book on Egyptian mythology, published in 1819. The reason why one of Prichard's earliest publications is not addressed earlier in the thesis is that the disciplines of mythology and philology are so nearly allied that they are better addressed in conjunction with each other.
Part I

Dr Prichard
2. THE LIFE OF JAMES COWLES PRICHARD

In the eighteenth century the city of Bristol was a thriving port. Connecting the mainland to the four corners of the world it was bristling with merchants and sailors of all nationalities. Not one of the centres of British industrialization, it was yet one of Britain's five biggest towns. Its inhabitants came from all social strata, paupers and poor labourers crowding into the cheap parishes at the muddy banks of the Avon, the better-off residing in the parishes of Saint Michael, Saint Augustine or way up in Clifton.

After the turn of the century, however, Bristol's economy slowly but steadily declined. The population rose to 85 000 but its mercantile power was relatively stagnant. Between 1800 and 1820 hunger-stricken paupers rioted intermittently. Bristol's merchants defended their status on several fronts, fending off the demonstrations of the lower classes, trying to assert themselves against the landed aristocracy of the surrounding shires, and striving to keep up with fashionable London as well as the centres of learning, Oxford and Cambridge. They consciously created what may be called, in Habermas's term, a "public sphere", setting up clubs and learned societies, fostering the arts and sciences. It was a gentlemanly pursuit which, as Michael Neve has shown, united the bourgeois community across political and theological differences. By virtue of their scientific culture, the bourgeois citizenry of Bristol aligned themselves around common goals and a common identity. As Neve has pointed out, "scientific culture in early nineteenth century Bristol was markedly non-utilitarian, and conservative". The radical doctor Thomas Beddoes died in 1808. Samuel Taylor Coleridge had turned from a Sturm-and-Drang revolutionary into a pious conservative. Bristol was purged. In the early nineteenth century Bristol was a bulwark of natural theology, with the existing world being taken for the best of all possible ones.
For a long time Bristol had been one of the strongholds of the Society of Friends. Theologically safe and economically promising, it lured many a Quaker to settle down there. One of them was the merchant Thomas Prichard (1765-1843) who, coming from Ross in Herefordshire, arrived with his family in 1793. Prichard already had ties to the city: he owned shares in the iron trade of the local Harford family. From the 1780s and throughout the 1790s he was one of the subscribers to the Bristol Infirmary. This subscription was part of the philanthropic duty he owed to God and his country. It was not his idea that his eldest son should spend almost thirty years of his life as a physician to the Infirmary.

Thomas's forefathers had been Quakers since the foundation of the sect in the seventeenth century, Roger Prichard having come over from Ireland in 1668 to purchase an estate in Herefordshire. Prichard's father married at the age of twenty. Mary Leys, his wife, was Welsh; she died early. And since the father had the means he retired from his business personally to oversee the education of his four children, three boys and one girl. Born on Feb. 11 1786, James Cowles was the eldest. The second name was derived from the surname of his grandmother. James was a very common name among the Prichard family. In this chapter Prichard's life will be told chronologically, intersected by sub-sections whenever a particular stage of his life cannot be dealt with in a paragraph.

When Prichard had become an ethnologist of renown, his friends spread the lore that he had an "inbred" propensity for the sciences. His friend and colleague John Addington Symonds told the story of James, the little boy who, strolling around the colourful area of Bristol harbour, liked "to talk with foreigners, who arrived at that port, in their own tongues. On one occasion he acosted a Greek sailor in Romaic, and the man was so delighted that he caught the boy-linguist in his arms and kissed him heartily". If Prichard had a talent for languages, his education furthered the natural inclination. In 1800, after the death of his wife, Thomas Prichard
returned to Ross. Henceforth his children would not attend a school any more. Instead they were taught by private tutors, the greatest weight was put on languages, namely, French, Latin and Greek. Thomas, Thomas Prichard's second son, emigrated to America. Edward, the third son, became a banker in Ross. The daughter Mary married. James was destined to follow his father into the iron trade. But he objected to the plan, wanting to become a man of science instead. For a Quaker who wanted to earn a living in one of the traditional professions, medicine was the appropriate field. Thomas Prichard wanted his son to "retain the primitive simplicity & orthodoxy of genuine quakerism which he feared the study of medicine would contaminate". But his protestations cannot have been too severe, for in 1802 James started an apprenticeship in Bristol, studying with a Quaker doctor named Thomas Pole, a specialist in man-midwifery. Afterwards Thomas Prichard sent his son to the Quaker William Tothill at Staines and his then partner Dr Robert Pope (who later was to become physician to George III). From September 1804 James attended for a year medical lectures at St. Thomas's Hospital in London. In 1805 he entered the University of Edinburgh, taking his M. D. degree in 1808. For his dissertation subject he had chosen what was to become his life-long occupation: an investigation into the origin of the varieties of man.

To complete his education Prichard afterwards went to Trinity College, Cambridge. In that year, 1808, he took a decisive step: he left the Quaker sect and turned towards the Anglican faith. According to Hodgkin, Prichard converted "on the grounds of conviction". Hodgkin "never learned.. the doctrinal points which occasioned his separation". But it is quite likely that Edinburgh training had spoiled Prichard for Quakerism. When the seventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica appeared in 1830 a Bristol Quaker journal, The Friends' Monthly Magazine, published a very negative review, regretting most of all "that we perceive... the peculiarities of what has been not inaptly termed 'Scotch Philosophy'". This rift over
the appreciation of Scottish philosophy may have been decisive: while Quakers tended to reject it, Prichard remained influenced by Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart and others throughout his life. His decision to leave the Quakers was, perhaps, also due to a desire to shake off the fetters of the Quaker customs, known as their "peculiarity". Edinburgh University and Quakerism were the two decisive, albeit conflicting, influences which shaped Prichard's learning and outlook.

**Edinburgh University**

As Michael Neve has pointed out, until the 1840s most Bristol doctors had learned their trade in Edinburgh. It was not only accessible to dissenters but also cheaper than Oxford or Cambridge University. Edinburgh provided Prichard with a sound eighteenth-century education. The doctrines of Cullen, Whytt, John Gregory, Monro primus and secundus were still taught long after the doctors had died: their sometimes less ingenious sons had inherited not only their fathers' chairs, but also their lectures. At the same time, there was an influx of new theory. In the extramural schools, in particular, teachings of the great Göttingen anatomist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) and of the leading French physiologists, Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), Etienne Geoffroy de Saint-Hilaire (1772-1844), Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) were taken up by some teachers soon after they had been published on the Continent. Later in life Prichard was (wrongly) accused of underestimating the achievements of British medicine. In fact he did not neglect British scholarship but rather gave continental learning its due. New works on medicine and physiology were eagerly taken up by many teachers at Edinburgh University. As early as 1796 the extramural teacher John Allen (1771-1843) mentioned Blumenbach in his courses - "Bloomenbach" as one of Allen's students spelt the name. In 1801 Allen published *An Introduction to the Study of the Animal Economy*, the translation of a book by Cuvier.
Extramural teachers such as Allen and the anatomist John Barclay (1758-1826) provided popular courses which were an important addition to the University curriculum. Student societies gave opportunities to the young men to put their growing erudition to the test. Most prominent among medical students was the Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh, convening fortnightly on Saturday evenings. Prichard was a member, and so were some of those young men who are known to have been his friends in later life, including John Bishop Estlin and Thomas Arnould. At the Royal Medical Society the students could mix with University professors in an atmosphere more casual than that in the lecture rooms. Professors resident in Edinburgh might attend moderately frequently. The society conveyed a "diploma" to all students who had presented a Question and a Dissertation. John Bishop Estlin tried to rehabilitate necessitarianism. A young man called J. Thatcher questioned Blumenbach's concept of the nisus formativus. Prichard wrote, for a session in spring 1807, some fifty pages on the varieties of the human species, presenting a short version of his later M. D. dissertation.

Like all serious students, he had a tight schedule. At the university he attended the courses of Alexander Monro tertius (anatomy and chirurgery), Thomas Charles Hope (chemistry), James Gregory (medical practice), Andrew Duncan Sen. (institutes of medicine), James Home (materia medica), and Daniel Rutherford (botany). In addition he attended courses in clinical practice at the infirmary, a course in man-midwifery and at least one course by Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) on moral philosophy. Perhaps he also went to hear Robert Jameson's lectures on natural history. At the time that Prichard came to Edinburgh, the influential extramural teacher John Allen had already left, yet Prichard became acquainted with his theories, crediting him later as a teacher "whose lectures, delivered many years ago at Edinburgh, contributed there to introduce more correct principles of reasoning on subjects connected with the animal economy."
His studies were quite comprehensive. It was customary for many medical professors to reflect upon the philosophy of the mind, the inherent laws of society, and natural history. Prichard rarely referred to his tutors. It is, therefore, impossible to ascertain who had a special impact on him.

However, Edinburgh training influenced his theorizing throughout his life. Duncan taught in his course that John Hunter's concept of a vital principle was a doubtful theory. Home adverted extensively on the sympathy between mind and body, asserting that "The mind & the body act mutually on one another with great force". Monro tertius, allegedly delivering the lectures of his late father and grandfather, informed his students about the central role of the nervous system. Indeed, the properties of the nervous system lay at the basis of the "physiological model" taught at Edinburgh University. (In the early nineteenth century no credence was given to either mechanistic reductionism or the Brunonian system.) Prichard also adopted the notion that animal life was not reducible to other forces.

While adhering to the doctrine of sympathy he was a philosophical dualist who believed that the phenomenon of life was, up to a certain extent, a question of physico-chemical processes. Prichard insisted that the germination of a seed could be explained as a chain of chemical processes and had nothing to do with the action of a vital principle. It was the "organization" of an organism which made it prone to react to chemical stimuli. Beyond this point, however, God was the only accountable cause: life itself could be explained only by reference to "a principle endowed with intelligence and design; it is the same principle, and one and the same agent in all created bodies, since all are formed on similar and harmonious laws; it is, in fact, nothing more or less than the energy of the Deity, operating continually through the universe, in preserving and renewing the various tribes of beings, in a manner scarcely less wonderful than at the period when they were first called into existence".
If there was one medical figure whom Prichard always confidently relied on and referred to, it was Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689). In 1820 Prichard was to publish a book in which he attempted to explain the causes of the great fever epidemic in Bristol between 1817 and 1819. Pondering the mechanisms of contagion he reverted to Sydenham’s "old fashioned and almost exploded hypothesis ... I mean the doctrine of a pestilential constitution of the air ... which predisposes human bodies to febrile diseases". While his medical peers were quarrelling over whether "distress of the poor" gave rise to contagious diseases, Prichard stated that the Bristol fever was particularly vicious among the upper classes who lived, as he presented it, isolated from all possible sources of infection; and thus contagion alone could not explain feverish conditions.

Another instance where Prichard evoked Sydenham’s memory was in respect to bleeding. He was very much in favour of it, even in cases of fever when many of his colleagues had discarded the practice because of its weakening effect. Prichard by contrast retained it, referring to Sydenham who had applied the treatment as well. Symonds described Prichard’s style of treatment accordingly: "He liked in practice, as in other matters, broad views rather than a fine analysis of symptoms and minutiae of treatment".

But there was another side to Edinburgh teaching: due to the strong sense of tradition at the University, medical learning comprised differing theories of several generations of teachers. With respect to the concept of sensibility this was particularly disorienting. Some teachers, including Whytt, John Gregory and Monro secundus, "postulated a non-material sentient principle as the basis of life". Cullen and his followers, by contrast, were more materially minded, envisaging the possibility that the material body and the immaterial mind were connected via the principle of sensibility (and through the operation of "sympathy"). As Christopher Lawrence has put it: "there was an effectual shift in Scottish physiological
thought, particularly in Cullen's work, from a strict dualism to what might be termed as operational monism, with the nervous system itself as the bridge which possessed attributes of both mind and body". We have said that Prichard was basically a dualist. At the same time, however, and in particular when he was contemplating the immediate causes of insanity, he was obliged to allow for a connection between a derangement of the body and a derangement of the mind. His solutions to the question will be discussed later, for the time being it is important to notice that the problems he had in grappling with the phenomenon of insanity, were a direct reflection of the differing positions within the Edinburgh debate on sensibility and the role of the nervous system.

Prichard's views of the mind were also shaped through another influence: Dugald Stewart's moral philosophy. His and Thomas Reid's common-sense philosophy, with its concept of innate faculties, challenged Locke's model of the mind as a tabula rasa which was inscribed through the impressions a human being received after birth. Since Etienne de Condillac (1714-1780) had appropriated Locke's theory for a theory of sensationalism which was the basis of French Ideologue materialism, Locke's philosophy had become problematic. Reid and Stewart's innatism attempted to establish a counter-model against Condillac's sensationalism, which supported the moral doctrines of Christianity and of natural theology, in particular.

Advocating "an inductive science of mind", Stewart lectured on almost everything pertaining to what nowadays is called the "social sciences". The philosophy of the human mind was considered as the paramount and most noble subject a scholar could deal with. An echo of this opinion is found in Prichard's first book on the subject of insanity where he stated that his discussion of insanity was "an inquiry which is of itself equally important in its relation to the philosophy of the human mind".
Yet, Dugald Stewart's lectures on moral philosophy went far beyond a strictly theoretical contemplation of the mental faculties. The topics he addressed included the origin and development of language and the question whether the "moderns" had degenerated from a former high state of mental and bodily constitution, compared with the "heroic ages of antiquity". Pondering man's place in nature, Stewart classified mankind into six different varieties.

On the whole, the atmosphere at Edinburgh was characterized by a great emphasis of classical scholarship; as Lisa Rosner has described it, medicine was "a literary activity". It fitted with Prichard's personal taste. French, Latin, and Greek were de rigueur. But it was not uncommon for students of medicine to learn German as well. Prichard acquired the language only after his studies were completed, in the latter half of the 1810s. In the subsequent years he also made himself familiar with Sanskrit, Hebrew, Arabic, and Celtic. Henry Alford, a student pupil at the Bristol Infirmary observed Prichard conversing with foreign patients in "French, German, and especially Welsh ... It was said that he had talked Hebrew with a Jew", the last of which Alford could not personally confirm.

While virtually all Professors at Edinburgh University reasoned along the lines of natural theology, it was understood that references to Providence and the Scriptures had to be avoided as far as possible. Scientific pursuit in Edinburgh was carried out according to what were depicted as Baconian and Newtonian principles, while it was understood that the final principles of life were inscrutable to human reason. As Prichard put it at the Royal Medical Society: if problems seemed to be insoluable they should not be referred to God but left "for the attempts of future inquirers". It is easy to imagine that this was exactly the attitude his father had wanted to save him from when he was pressing him to go into the iron trade. Thomas Prichard loved knowledge. In his spare time he had studied Hebrew,
French, German and history. But his type of learning was quite different from the occupation of his son; for people like Thomas Prichard medicine had the reputation of probing sometimes too deeply into what was God's realm alone. In later life James Prichard often complained about being accused of insufficient Scripturalism. Yet, the reviews of his books do not bear out this impression. His complaints may have reflected his own scruples rather more than those of his peers. Leaving the network of the Quaker sect was not an easy thing to do. Prichard struggled hard to reconcile his scientific curiosity with his religious creed.

Quakerism
In the early nineteenth century the Quakers were split into two factions: on the one hand, there were the strict "Quietists", who trusted only the "light within", and lived withdrawn from the business of the world while promoting anti-intellectualism. On the other hand, there were the more open-minded "gay", "Evangelicals". They relied on the word of the Bible, but they were not adverse to questioning its meaning to understand it properly: Biblical scholarship and even Biblical criticism were part and parcel of their spiritual life. Even though they would not have admitted it, evangelical Quakers could agree on many theological matters with other religious dissenters. According to Elisabeth Isichei "a quaker evangelical felt himself closer to a non-Quaker evangelical than to a quietist from his own church". Thomas Prichard, for example, subscribed to the short-lived journal The Friend that the Unitarian Coleridge published in 1809 and 1810.

The evangelical side of Quaker faith has been perceptively described by Elisabeth Isichei: "Their theology was rooted in the concept of Original Sin. Through the Fall, the image of God in man is totally effaced so that it is impossible for man to please God or obey His Law by his own efforts". Atonement was at hand, though. It came through reliance on Christ.
Adam's fall had plunged mankind into darkness. The world's sins were laid on Christ. Through faith the sinner conferred on himself the atonement granted to Christ. "This faith", Isichei has pointed out, "is to be distinguished from the nominal Christian's 'notional' knowledge of God". Faith sprang from the heart - the evangelical Quakers, too, had a notion of the "inner light".56

When Prichard left the Quaker sect in 1808, he dropped the custom of wearing a hat at all times and of addressing other people with "thou" and "thee". Still, aligning himself to the evangelical wing of the Anglican church, he seems to never have discarded the spiritual elements of Quaker piety.57

The outward so-called "peculiarity" of the Quakers, was, so to speak, a matter of appearance only, comparable to the bodily integuments such as hair and skin colour which Prichard came to discount as meaningful criteria for the classification of mankind. In that respect the Quaker and the evangelical traditions were at one. The latter's emphasis on personal experience can be compared to the inner light of the Quakers. "Evangelical Christianity", Frank Turner has written, "spurned nominal Christianity that allegedly involved the outward forms without the inner experience confirming the presence of real Christian faith".58 Prichard's anthropology as well as his theories of madness were deeply imbued by the notion that all mankind had in themselves some core notion of righteousness which, far from being an intellectual contrivance, was "felt" by the entire body. There was more than a superficial resemblance between common-sense philosophy and Quaker theology. Prichard deserted the sect, but he remained deeply pious. "His opinions, during the greater part of his life, were in strict conformity with the doctrines embodied in the book of Common Prayer", Symonds declared.59 The work of his lifetime was devoted to saving religion from materialism. He wanted to do it through science, not in defiance to it.
After a year at Trinity College, Cambridge, Prichard went to St. John's College at Oxford. Not feeling comfortable there, he swiftly moved within Oxford to Trinity College where he took the gown of a Gentleman commoner and stayed until 1810. Finally, he returned to Bristol, began in private practice and shared in another practice run by his colleague Dr King. He lectured on medical matters. In 1811 he married the sister of a friend from Edinburgh times. Anna Maria Estlin was the daughter of the Unitarian minister John Prior Estlin and the sister of John Bishop Estlin, Prichard's student friend, who established an Eye Dispensary in Bristol. Anna Maria was a good match for Prichard, the Estlins belonging to Bristol's dignitaries. The date of the marriage is known: Feb. 28. It also is known that James and Anna Maria had ten children of whom nine survived to adult age. Apart from this the records are silent about Prichard's wife.

Within the range of the cultural-political outlook of the Bristol bourgeoisie, Prichard and his brother in-law stood at opposite ends. In the parliamentary polls Estlin voted regularly for the liberal representatives while Prichard preferred conservative candidates. He adhered to notions of paternalism that he considered to be threatened by political radicalism and the prevailing Utilitarian philosophy. He inhabited a complex conceptual world. There was the religious sphere which was horizontally organized, all men being equal in the eyes of God; and there was the world of men which was vertically structured, consisting of hierarchies whose existence - as the French Revolution had proved - was vital for political coherence as well as the persistence of religion. Due to the particular solidarity of the Bristol bourgeoisie, matters of politics rarely got in the way of good relations. This did not even change in the early 1830s when Bristol was debating the Reform Bill. Prichard rejected the social and moral assumptions behind the Bill, adhering to an old-style society of "Christian patriarchy" which he felt to be, as Michael Neve has put it, "under threat from the bourgeois utilitarianism" that engineered the poor law reforms.
In 1811 Prichard became a physician to Saint Peter's Hospital, a combined poor house and lunatic asylum. It was no great honour to work there, but it was one more step in his career. Prichard himself described the place as rather filthy and wretched. Particularly during the great fever epidemic between 1817 and 1819, the hospital was overcrowded, the feverish paupers infecting the madmen. Prichard was not surprised by this: following Sydenham he made the foul air responsible for the spread of fever at Saint Peter's. Prichard remained in his position at the Hospital until 1832. But early on he attempted to become a physician to the Infirmary. His entry into the higher echelons of the tight-knit network of Bristol's medical class was not that easy. The physicians to the Infirmary were elected by the subscribers. Prichard got through only at his third attempt, in 1816. In 1813 he had brought out an extended version of his M. D. dissertation, *Researches into the Physical History of Man*. It was well received by the press, yet failed to procure him much support for his entry at the Infirmary. For that purpose it was vital to participate in municipal affairs, give lectures, become a member of the right clubs, know the right people. Prichard did what he could and finally succeeded.

**Prichard's Medicine**

Working for the Bristol Infirmary was honourable, albeit not because of the *clientèle*. Well-do-to people relied on private medical services. The big hospitals were only for the poor. Like Saint Peter's Hospital, the Infirmary was overcrowded, two patients usually having to share one bed. The regulations were strict, the treatment sometimes more feared than disease. As a contemporary doctor described it:

The Infirmary is the refuge of persons labouring in the most extreme cases of disease. Therefore the mortality in spite of the eminent skill of the medical officers must be considerable. To this House the dreadful casualties which occur in our city are every day publicly carried through
the streets and become the objects of surgical operations. These causes produce a feeling of terror in the minds of many of the common people, which they associate with the name of the Infirmary; and the consequence is not unfrequently a degree of unwillingness to apply to that Institution for relief.69

Once admitted, an out-patient had to turn up regularly, failing to show up would result in his dismissal.70 Prichard's treatments were sometimes feared. First of all, there was his predilection for bleeding. It drove one patient to poetry:

Dr. Prichard do appear.
With his attendance & his care,
He fills his patients full of sorrow
- You must be bled to day & cupped tomorrow.71

When Henry Alford, a resident pupil at the Infirmary, fell ill, Prichard "ordered him to be bled twenty ounces [one pint] in the afternoon; the same evening to have twenty leeches to his temples, and the following morning to have ten grains of calomel in one dose!"72 Prichard did not reserve his care for his patients alone. When suffering from a headache he would apply the treatment to his own veins.73

But there was another type of cure which appeared even to some of his contemporaries as savage.74 Nicknamed as the "Tomahawk practice", commonly known as trepanning, it was Prichard's "peculiar mode of counter-irritation in all those forms of cerebral disease which are accompanied by coma, stupor, or diminished sensibility, excluding those which are attended with excitement". The doctor would make an incision into the scalp, fill the wound with peas and have it suppurate for a few weeks, or even months, in order to restore the balance of liquids to the vascular system of the brain.75 The cure was certainly apt to remind every patient of his faculty of sensibility. Prichard advertised it in the London Medical Gazette - "If any practitioner should be desirous of trying this
remedy ... I would advise him to make the incision completely through the scalp for the length of four or five inches over the sagittal suture".76 This treatment followed from Prichard's belief that the state of the vascular system of the brain was the key to its pathology. The doctor was a medical interventionist who believed that severe diseases required severe remedies.77 (It was not until the 1830s that he endorsed moral treatment in cases of insanity). Henry Alford described Prichard's medical approach as "heroic": "counter-irritation in every form he pushed to an extreme degree".78

Prichard's medical views were consciously conservative. If he had had his way, he would have turned the clock backwards to the age of Sydenham. In an address he delivered at the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association in 1835 he gave an overview of the history of medicine. Ostensibly historical, it was an enthusiastic manifesto against Cullen's theory of fever, the ensuing system of Brunonianism and all versions of a doctrine of a vis medicatrix or a vital principle. Cullen's pathology had beckoned the end of dualism. Since Prichard believed in dualism he rejected the theories of Cullen and his followers seemingly directed against it:

When we compare these speculations, which may be said to have divided between them, as votaries, the last generation of physicians, we may well ask, if we can divest ourselves of partiality for the theories which almost belong to our own times, and in the belief of which some of us were educated; whether they are at all preferable to doctrines at least respectable by reason of antiquity, but long ago abandoned: and it is not a matter of surprise to find one of the soundest philosophers of the present age declaring in plain terms that medicine, considered as a science, has scarcely made any progress since the days of Hippocrates.79

There stood doctor Prichard, generally known as a shy, benevolent man, telling his audience that all their cherished modern medicine was useless, and that the only theory which was worthwhile retaining was Hippocrates's
humoralism. Humoralism, Prichard said, had been discarded by Cullen and others because "the explanations which the humoral system afforded, were inadequate and conjectural". But unlike the fashionable jabbering concerning a vis medicatrix, humoral pathology had the virtue of being rational: "of explaining phenomena, with reference to agencies for the most part mechanical, and similar to those which are recognized in operation under a variety of circumstances". Humoralism simply made sense to Prichard, it was practical, in conformity with the known laws of nature. And it afforded him with the only types of remedies he knew: bleeding, purging and vomiting the patients, and administering to them physical stimulants such as wine. At the close of his long lecture Prichard expressed his wishes for the future of the medical community, underlining his optimistic hopes "that a reproach often cast upon us of scepticism and irreligion, will no longer be imputed". On the whole, Prichard's programme was simple, aiming to shed modish concepts and to return to theories that did not attempt to account for matters which were not part of the physician's domain. Humoral pathology was, perhaps, not the most elaborate, yet it was prudent.

Prichard's admission as physician to the Infirmary had been the main hurdle on his career path. When he was finally elected in 1816 he quickly established his reputation as a worthy member of honorable Bristol. Among the many clubs he joined and the many committees he sat on, one is particularly important. In 1822 the Bristol Institution for the Advancement of Science was set up. It was split into two bodies: the Institution itself and the enclave of the Philosophical and Literary Society which pursued literary objects, ranging from geology to philology, from the interpretation of engravings on ancient stones to deliberations about the advantages of literal translations of the Bible. Sometimes the Society invited controversial speakers, so for example in 1827 the phrenologist Johann Caspar
Spurzheim. At one memorable evening in 1825 the members of the Society were assisting at the opening of an Egyptian mummy that the chamberlain of the city had brought home from an excursion to Egypt. Michael Neve has characterized the spirit of the Bristol Institution including the Philosophical and Literary Society: it "was the preserve of a small part of Bristol society, with an established mercantile and professional clientele with no petit-bourgeois elements. It may seem curious that the science that came out of such financial sources was quite so ornamental, so theological and orthodox, so non-utilitarian. But this it was - a device for cultural annexation to the Oxbridge network".

As the institutionalization of Bristol's attempt to keep up with Britain's scientific centres, the Philosophical and Literary Society provided Prichard with the two-fold opportunity of establishing his local reputation and trying out his scientific ideas on a moderately well informed audience. In one instance, namely, after he had given a paper on the doctrine of a vital principle in 1828, he was encouraged by his hearers to enlarge his lecture into a book. There he delineated his dualist philosophy; quoting Dugald Stewart he wrote: "the universal mind ... though everywhere present, where matter exists, though everywhere moving and arranging the parts of matter, appears to do so without being united with matter as is the case with visible created beings. There is, therefore, at least one being or substance of that nature which we call mind, separate from organized body".

The doctrine of a vital principle occurred to Prichard as nothing less than the attempt to substitute some earthly principle for God's almightiness, an effort which, incidentally, was scientifically unfounded. Instead, as we have seen, Prichard preferred to talk of the "energy of the deity". At the same time, however, he gave due consideration to the forces of chemical and mechanical operations involved in processes of growth and nutrition. This attitude was in no small part the outcome of Prichard's
Edinburgh education. Prichard's philosophy of life can be duly considered as representative of the type of philosophy supported by the Philosophical and Literary Society in the 1820s.89

Prichard swiftly assumed a central position; by the 1830s he was, together with the Anglican clergyman and amateur geologist William Daniel Conybeare (1787-1857), a leading spirit of the Society.90 Conybeare was Prichard's friend and his antithesis in many respects: he was a Whig, Prichard was a Tory. Conybeare had an exuberant temperament and got easily into a passion. Prichard was shy and quiet.91 Yet the two got on well with each other, Prichard dedicating his book on the Celtic language to Conybeare.92 Other members included the Dean of Bristol the Revd Henry Beeke, the printer John M. Gutch, the German-born J. S. Miller (formerly Müller) who was the curator of the Institution, the eminent surgeon Richard Smith, John Bishop Estlin, and the Revd Lant Carpenter as well as Carpenter's son, the physician William Benjamin. In 1827 the Institution had over 300 members.93 Coleridge was made an honorary member in 1823 but did not appear to have any interest in events at the Society.94

By the mid-twenties Prichard's reputation was established, the fact being sealed by his election into the Royal Society of London in 1827 (most probably he was elected in response to his publication of the second edition of the Researches). His schedule was tight. In addition to his private practice, and his obligations at Saint Peter's Hospital and the Infirmary, he gave medical lectures at the Infirmary and literary lectures at the Philosophical and Literary Society where he also held various functions. He was a member of the New Bears Club (from 1833 the Park Street Club) and, together with John Bishop Estlin and the Revd Lant Carpenter, of the Debating Society at the Bristol Institution.95 Between 1826 and 1828 he acted as a medical visitor to Gloucestershire madhouses. In 1829 he was one of the main protagonists behind the plan to set up a college "for classical and scientific education" designed to admit religious dissenters.96
foundation meeting, chaired by Prichard, it was declared that Bristol as "the second city in the empire" with its 120,000 souls was in dire need of an institute providing "at a diminished expense" higher education that was open to dissenters. £15,000 were raised, and Bristol College was set up in 1831. It initially flourished, offering for example theological courses by William Conybeare (delivered to an exclusively Anglican audience) or lectures on logic by Francis Newman (1805-1897), the brother of the later Cardinal John Henry Newman, who was - to Prichard's delight - deeply interested in African linguistics. Among the students of the college were Prichard's sons and a young man who was to come to great fame: Walter Bagehot, Prichard's nephew on the Estlin side of the family.

While Prichard was restlessly scurrying between private patients, hospitals, learned societies and attendance at church, he wrote one book after another. In 1819 he had published a book on Egyptian mythology, in 1822 one on madness, and in 1826 the second edition of his Researches. In 1829 he published his book on the vital principle and in 1831 the outcome of his researches on the origin of the Celtic language. He was a regular contributor to journals of medical and general interest, wrote articles for scientific dictionaries, published two more books on insanity (1835 and 1842), the five volumes of the third edition of the Researches (1836-1848), and then their abridgement, The Natural History of Man (1843).

In the 1830s, Prichard's activities expanded further: he was Pro-Director of the Bristol Institution, a Vice-President of The Bristol Established Church Society and Book Association, and a member of the Bristol Auxiliary Temperance Societies. He was involved in the attempt to set up a Statistical Society. In 1834 he co-founded the Bristol District Branch of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association which had been set up two years previously. At the fourth meeting of the Association in 1835, Prichard read an address and was afterwards elected into the Council of the Association. In 1837 he was elected President of the Bristol Medical Library.
In 1837, 1838 and 1840 he was sitting on the governing board of Bristol College. As if all that was not enough he suggested in 1840 establishing an independent medical school. Certainly, not all of these institutions demanded the same amount of engagement, yet in a closed society like his every absence from an assignment was noticed. Prichard's social duties were immense.

One organisation, in which he was most actively involved, was the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Set up in 1831, it could appear to proud Bristolians like the imitation of an idea they had had a few years earlier. Prichard could not attend the first meeting in York, however he was so eager to contribute that he sent in a paper for publication in the Report of 1831-32 which had not been commissioned. Prichard attended most annual meetings of the British Association, frequently contributing papers.

His financial position was never threatened, yet he had to work for his living and that of his family: "here I am fully engaged in my medical practice on which I am mainly dependent", he wrote when declining an invitation to come to London to see a man of the African Mandingo tribe. As he had a large family "of course all other matters must be very subordinate".

What he referred to as his "scribbling habit which custom has rendered" the outlet "of an in-born propensity", was done in the early morning hours before his life as a doctor began. It was common for a doctor to have a private practice and work at a hospital at the same time. Prichard followed both occupations until 1843 when he resigned from the Infirmary. His private practice was said to be "large". In 1837 Prichard bought by auction a spacious house, known as the Red Lodge, which he had been renting. The price was £1800, 800 of which he paid on signing the contract, the rest was paid on a mortgage. He was living comfortably, without, however, being well-off.
Personal Disposition and Allegiances

As a mature man, Prichard was universally known as shy and quiet. It was a trait that intensified with age. In his youth Prichard certainly was not the embodiment of humility and calmness. As a 29-year old, in 1815, he had enrolled as a volunteer to defend his country against the impending invasion of Napoleon, confident that his riding practice had turned him into "a tolerable good Match for a Frenchman".112

In those years Prichard was a member of the Wernerian society. He had been elected at the suggestion of Robert Jameson (1774-1854), at the time the dominant naturalist in Edinburgh.113 The Society supported the "Neptunist" theory of a universal Deluge, rejecting the rival claim of the "Vulcanists" who favoured a destruction of the earth by fire. Among its members were the geologist Richard Kirwan, the anatomist John Barclay, the chemist Thomas Thomson, the biogeographer Robert Brown. It was flattering for Prichard to be accepted in their midst. The energy he could not spend fighting the French hordes was invested on behalf of Wernerian geology; a defence of Werner's theory published in Thomas Thomson's Annals of Philosophy,114 sparked a hefty debate with an anonymous reader who was theologically even more orthodox than the Wernerians.

Prichard reasserted the well-known theory that the six days of creation had to be understood as a figurative expression, representing instead long epochs in the history of the earth.115 The discussion, carried out in the pages of Robert Jameson's Philosophical Magazine, was conducted polemically, Prichard giving full vent to his exasperation about the ignorance of his anonymous critic.116 In those days, he did not appear very much concerned about insulting theological orthodoxy. Supporting the Neptunist theory against Hutton, he was on the "pious" side anyway.117

In 1824 Prichard chaired a committee collecting £ 7000 to assist the Greeks in their war against the Turks that had broken out in 1822. The
money was "expended in such articles as were judged best adapted to the wants of the Greeks", including printing-presses, with Greek and Roman types, a compass, surgical and mathematical instruments, as well as medicines. (It seems that the Greeks were expected to defend themselves against "the ferocious tyranny of their barbaric oppressors" through superior scholarship).\textsuperscript{118} Apart from his readiness to fight Napoleon, it was the only occasion on record when he supported an explicit political cause outside the poll booth. In both cases, however, he acted as a patriot and in unison with British sentiment. When it came to domestic political strife Prichard did not participate. If he happened to engage himself it was over scientific and medical issues. As Michael Neve has shown, this attitude was fully in line with the scientific ideology of bourgeois Bristol.\textsuperscript{119}

Yet, as Prichard grew older, he appeared increasingly reserved. When he addressed the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association in 1835, a contribution to the \textit{Lancet} characterized his speech as "exceedingly long. Of the first portion, hardly an entire sentence crossed the table to the right or left". It was at this very occasion that Prichard had read out his manifesto favouring Sydenham. But the reporter of the \textit{Lancet} could not even get enraged about it, having strained his ears to catch Prichard's words he merely noted: "to our mind, much too long for the occasion".\textsuperscript{120}

This incidence was typical: Prichard was ardent of mind, and resolute in the pursuit of his medical duties, yet in the end he was barely audible. His own colleague, John Addington Symonds described Prichard's voice as "rather weak and low, but very distinct in articulation. His manners and deportment ... were simple and unaffected; - and in general company he evidently spoke with effort or even reluctance, unless upon subjects of business or of scientific and literary interest".\textsuperscript{121} Similar problems arose for his readers: "my manuscripts generally puzzle printers", Prichard confessed; and it was not easy for the public to follow the red thread of his thoughts through the mass of details.\textsuperscript{122} He had evidently difficulties in getting his
message across, as was highlighted by the fact that Symonds himself distorted Prichard's views of the classification of mankind in his commemorative address.123

When the British Association was looking for a president of the Bristol meeting in 1836 they contemplated Prichard and Conybeare. In the end Lord Lansdown was elected. The other two were given the position of vice-president, "Conybeare and Prichard being either too excitable or too tame", as John Phillips, the local secretary of the BAAS in Yorkshire, put it in a letter to William Vernon Harcourt.124 But the influential Harcourt had already had the same thought, writing that "I should have proposed Conybeare but do not think he would get decently through the dinners and Prichard is too quiet".125

Nicolaas Rupke has made the case for "utilitarian underpinnings of metropolitan science".126 In this light Prichard, who derided the preeminence of utilitarianism over morality, was a true man of the provinces. London's dominance over the rest of Britain was undisputed.127 Londoners would customarily give token applause to provincial achievements, the famous anatomist Charles Bell, for example, praising Prichard's learning as a special gift to be found "only in the Provinces". At the meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association in 1835 Bell stressed the advantages possessed by the members of this Association over the London practitioners, who were in a troubled stream, and had to struggle with difficulties, although they had the advantage of communicating easily with each others. It had long been observed that gentlemen in the Provinces possessed a great advantage in being thrown upon their own resources, by which means they acquired a manliness of character, and produced the most beneficial results.128

Bell had condescended all the way from London to deliver the official thanks to Prichard's Address. A man like William Benjamin Carpenter was
a lot less enthusiastic about the unique opportunities of provincial life. He felt, in Desmond's words, "hopelessly isolated in Bristol". "Living as I do", he lamented in a letter, "so completely out of the way of knowing what is being done in Science, except through the ordinary Journals, I am always uncertain if I am really working to any advantage".

Prichard, being a bookish man, was content as long as he obtained the publications he required: they were his access to British and continental learning. Living with and surrounded by books, "he generally wore a large, loose overcoat, with roomy side-pockets, large enough to hold a quarto or small folio case-book; and he generally carried other books with him on the seat of his carriage". Prichard, too, was aware that he was living "out of the world, in association with almost none except patients and apothecaries". Yet he did not move to London until 1845 at the age of sixty. And his "retirement" to the capital involved the arduous work of travelling across the country as a member of Lord Shaftesbury's Lunacy Commission - a task which he reportedly loathed, but which was deemed "an honourable and comparatively lucrative appointment".

Prichard tried, though without success, to get professorial status at the Bristol Institution. He wanted to leave the medical profession, but the opportunity never presented itself. In 1842 he attempted to get the chair of the recently deceased Thomas Arnold, regius professor of history at Oxford. At the suggestion of his friend William Daniel Conybeare and William Buckland he recommended himself in a letter to Prime Minister Peel, adding that Peel might obtain references from Christian Carl Josias Bunsen, the Prussian diplomat and scholar, and from William Whewell of Trinity College, Cambridge. But the chair went to the classicist John Cramer.

In 1845 Prichard endeavoured to solicit a chair of philology at Oxford. Seeking Buckland's support he wrote: "I have often read papers or lectures on ethnological subjects containing general views of philology, which have been well received by large audiences at the Bristol Institution and think I
could lecture on philology ... well enough for the purposes of the new appointment".  

But once more his hopes were stifled. Thus he accepted the invitation to become a Commissioner in Lunacy. After three years of much travelling through the psychiatric institutions of the country Prichard caught a fever and died, reportedly of pericarditis, on Dec. 22, 1848, aged 63. In his obituary address Symonds said that "although Dr. Prichard appears to have applied himself with zeal to the practice of his profession ... his favourite study evidently absorbed much of his attention". Indeed, Prichard's national and international honours were bestowed upon him for his achievements in the field of ethnology. He was a corresponding member of many international institutions, including the Institut National, the Académie Royale de Médecine, and the Statistical Society of France, the American Philosophical Society, the Academy of Natural Science of Philadelphia, the Ethnographical Society of New York, the Russian Geographical Society, and the Philosophical Society of Siena. In 1827 he was made fellow of the Royal Society. In 1835 he received an honorary doctorate from Oxford University; it was conferred upon him at the occasion of the Oxford meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association - Symonds remarked that "Dr. Prichard appeared rather pained than elated by all the flattering notice that fell upon him, and was obviously relieved to turn attention from topics so personal to him by reading his Retrospective Address".

Odom maintained that "Prichard's home was a centre of intellectual life in Bristol and attracted many eminent visitors". Allegedly, Coleridge counted among them. Since John Prior Estlin was a friend of Coleridge, Prichard certainly met him. Yet neither man mentioned the other, Trevor Levere even voiced the suspicion that they did not know each other. Among Prichard's correspondence partners counted scholars like the American ethnologist Charles Pickering, the Göttingen physiologist
Rudolph Wagner, and the German Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, whom Prichard considered as his "venerable friend". In addition to English dignitaries, Prichard met Alexander von Humboldt, as well as the Prussian diplomat Christian Carl Josias Bunsen ("a most enlightened and learned man") and the promising philologist Max Müller. However, these acquaintances were merely casual. Even among his fellow countrymen it is difficult to single out friendships of Prichard that could be considered as truly intimate. Apart from Conybeare, Francis Newman and his relatives, there were the Quakers Dr Thomas Hodgkin and Dr Thomas Hancock whom Prichard genuinely valued. Despite his frequent appearance in committee chairs he was personally a reserved man. Everybody praised his learning and his friendly character. Yet if we follow Symonds's characterization it is rather difficult to imagine Prichard at the centre of sophisticated intellectual conversation. For the doctor was not only shy, but also somewhat dry:

Fancy and imagination were not prominent faculties in Dr. Prichard. He was never at a loss for a suitable illustration to enrich his style, which was affluent as well as terse and vigorous. Yet there was not that conscious enjoyment in the pursuit of analogies and likenesses, which belongs to men in whom the faculties I have adverted to are strongly marked. And, correspondently with this, I think that he had no decided aesthetical tendency, no such sensibility to the beautiful as would lead him to dwell on the enjoyments of poetry and the fine arts.

There is, indeed, no sign that Prichard contemplated beauty. His judgement was informed by moral views, not by aesthetic belief. Prichard's domination of British ethnology ensured that the science grew as a thoroughly protestant endeavour. And his "provincial" abstention from social festivities gave him the opportunity to display the solid learning which became the basis of his reputation.


4 This interpretation challenges the views of Turner and others who have emphasized the ideological gaps between Anglicans and Nonconformists, see: Frank M. Turner, "The Crisis of Faith", in: idem, Contesting Cultural Authority. Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1993, 73-100, p. 79-79.

5 Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 128. The city had also a strong anti-slavery movement, see: Peter Marshall, Bristol and the Abolition of Slavery, Bristol (Historical Association), 1973.

6 Richard Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 504-505, Bristol Public Record Office, 35893 (36) k. i., unless otherwise stated all citations refer to the volume under this reference.

7 Isabel Southall, Memorials of the Prichards of Almeley and Their Descendants, 2. ed., Birmingham (printed privately), 1901, 39.

8 See: "A List of Subscribers and Donations to Bristol Infirmary 1761-1805", Bristol Public Record Office, 35893 (21). Thomas Prichard figures as a subscriber almost without interruption from 1782 to 1795.

9 Southall, Memorials of the Prichards of Almeley, 10.

10 For Prichard's biography see Richard Cull, "Short Biographical Notice of the Author", in: Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 4. ed., 2 vols, ed. by Edwin Norris, London (Baillière), 1855, pref. to vol. 1; Thomas Hodgkin, "Biographical Notice of Dr. Prichard", British Foreign and Medical Review, 27 (1849), 550-559; Denis Leigh, "James Cowles Prichard,
M. D., 1786-1848", Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 48 (1955), 586-590; Herbert Odom, "Prichard", in: Charles Coulston Gillispie (ed.), Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 14 vols, New York (Charles Scribner's Sons), 1970-1976, vol. 1, 136-138; George W. Stocking Jr, "From Chronology to Ethnology. James Cowles Prichard and British Anthropology. 1800-1850", in his edition of James Cowles Prichard, Researches into the Physical History of Man, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1973, ix-cx; John Addington Symonds, Some Account of the Life, Writings, and Character of the Late James Cowles Prichard, Bristol (Evans & Abbott), 1849; D. Hack Tuke, Prichard and Symonds in Especial Relation to Mental Science with Chapters on Moral Insanity, London (Churchill), 1891, 65-100; see also his entry for Prichard in the Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 46; G. E. Weare, James Cowles Prichard (Physician and Ethnologist, 1781 [sic]-1848). A Brief Restrospect, Bristol, repr. from the Bristol Times & Mirror, 1898. All of these accounts are based mainly on Richard Smith's Manuscript Memoirs. Smith was a senior colleague of Prichard and not a little eccentric. He had a book bound in the skin of an executed murderer and owned his own museum of anatomy. As if possessed by a Hegelian desire of acquiring power over people by means of knowing them, he collected newspaper clippings, letters, and all kinds of information concerning Bristol's medical establishment. In Prichard's case he even urged J. B. Cross, a former teacher of Greek in Thomas Prichard's household, to provide him with some information on Prichard's vita, see Cross's reply from 13. 7. 1831, in: Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 504. The other important source for Prichard's life and family is Southall, Memorials of the Prichards. In addition, there are a few letters in British and other libraries.

11 Symonds, Some Account, 7.
12 Richard Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 504.
13 Hodgkin, "Biographical Notice", 551.
14 Ibid., 553.
15 See the review in: The Friends' Monthly Magazine, 1 (1831), no. XII, tenth month, 705-709.
16 Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 268.

18 [Anon.], "Prichard's Retrospect Address", Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, 4 (1837), 159-160, p. 160 ("if there is any fault to be found with his Address, it is the very uncommon one, that it betrays perhaps a deeper acquaintance with the medical literature of other countries than with that of his own").


20 Rosner, Medical Education in the Age of Improvement, 119-128.

21 [Anon.], Obituary of John Bishop Estlin, Bristol Mirror, 16. 6. 1855.


24 Prichard, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", ibid., 58 (1807-1808), 87-134; see ch. 6.

25 Monro tertius was a notoriously bad lecturer, see Rosner, Medical Education in the Age of Improvement, 48.

27 Jameson was an eminent figure in the Royal Medical Society. For a student interested in natural history it would have been natural to attend his course. Cf. the lecture notes of a student from 1806: [anon.], "Notes from Mr Jameson's Lectures on Natural History. Delivered in Summer Session A. D. 1806", Edinburgh University Library, Special Collections, gen. 847.

28 Prichard, A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle, as Maintained by Some Writers on Physiology with Observations on the Causes of Physical and Animal Life, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1829, viii. For Allen see: Jacyna, Philosophic Whigs, ch. 2. Allen had supported the French revolution, but after the turn of the century he became the "general factotum" (L. S. Jacyna) of Lord and Lady Holland, and his revolutionary phase was over.

29 See: [anon.], "Notes on the Institutions of Medicine by Dr. Andrew Duncan [sen.]", 1799, 18-19, Edinburgh University Library, Special Collections, Dc.8. 157.


31 Lawrence, "Medicine as Culture", 428. See also: Barfoot, "James Gregory", 197-263.

32 Rosner, Medical Education in the Age of Improvement, 133. For Brunonianism see: W. F. Bynum, Roy Porter (eds), Brunonianism in Britain and Europe. Medical History, Supplement No. 8, 1988; for the ambiguities concerning the parallels between Cullen's theory and Brunonianism see: Lawrence, "Cullen, Brown and the Poverty of Essentialism", ibid., 1-21.
33 Lawrence has discussed this doctrine in the context of Alexander Monro secundus; see his "Medicine as Culture", 173.

34 In this context Prichard cited the Edinburgh chemist Thomas Thomson; see Thomson's A System of Chemistry, 4 vols, Edinburgh (Bell and Bradfute), 1802. It is interesting that Prichard should quote Thomson who in his Introduction did not hide his general vitalist leanings. For the relevant reference to Thomson see: Prichard, A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle, note on p. 136.

35 Ibid., 123 (emphases in the original). The term "energy" as well as the idea of the uniform principle were derived from Thomas Hancock, Essay on Instinct and its Physical and Moral Relations, London (W. Phillips et al.), 1824, 139, 142; see chs 3 and 5 below.

36 Prichard, A History of the Epidemic Fever, Which Prevailed in Bristol, During the Years 1817, 1818, and 1819; Founded on Reports of St. Peter's Hospital and the Bristol Infirmary, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1820, 98. Cf. also Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 281-282.

37 Prichard believed that in rich patients "the disease indeed... must be considered ... to have orginated or to have sprung up afresh", see his A History of the Epidemic Fever, 97.


39 Symonds, Some Account, 50.

40 Lawrence, "Medicine as Culture", 261.

41 Ibid., 429.


43 The subject will be discussed in ch. 3.


45 Prichard, A Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System, Part the First: Comprising Convulsive and Maniacal Affections, London (Thomas and George Underwood), 1822, 8.


47 Ibid., 356-357. Stewart enumerated: European, Samoiede, Tartar, Hindu, Negro, and American, stating that his object was "to enquire into the origin of our spicies [sic]."

48 Rosner, Medical Education in the Age of Improvement, 121.

49 In collaboration with William Tothill, a former medical teacher of his, he published a translation: Johannes von Müller, An Universal History in Twenty-Four Books, 3 vols, London (Longman, Hurt, Rees, Orme, and Brown), 1818. For Tothill's role as a teacher see Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 504-505. For the collaboration of Tothill see Symonds, Some Account. 46. The Universal History was reprinted in 1834 and again in 1840.

50 Cull, "Short Biographical Notice of the Author", xxiii. It is doubtful, however, whether he ever spoke it fluently: when corresponding with Rudolph Wagner, the Göttingen editor of his Researches, he wrote in French, see: Prichard's letter to Rudolph Wagner, 30. 4. 1841, Nachlaß Rudolph Wagner, Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, Manuskriptabteilung, Cod. MS R. Wagner 6.


52 Prichard, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", 89.

53 Prichard's friend, Thomas Hodgkin, never dared doing it, even if this meant that he could not marry the woman he desired, see: Louis Rosenfeld, Thomas Hodgkin. Morbid Anatomist and Social Activist, Lanham, Maryl. (Madison Books), 1992, 177-178.

54 This account of the Quakers follows: Elisabeth Isichei, Victorian Quakers, London (Oxford Univ. Press), 1970, ch. 1, the quote is from p. 11. See also:


56 Isichei, *Victorian Quakers*, 5.


59b Unfortunately we do not know anything about Prichard’s stay at any of the universities.


61 Prichard had two daughters and eight sons. The oldest son, James Cowles, became a minister and died insane, in 1848. Among the others were: another minister (Constantine Estlin, born 1820), a post-master (Albert Hermann, born 1831), and a soldier and adventurer (Iltutus, born 1825). Prichard’s third son, Augustin (born 1818), was named after Saint Augustine: he was born when Prichard was studying German, therefore the name of the child was spelt in the German manner. Augustin took over Prichard’s practice in the 1840s. Notice the historical significance of the names Constantine and Albert. The dates are from: Southall, *Memorials of the Prichards*, 36-37.

62 In 1812, 1832, 1837, and 1841 Prichard voted. In 1830 and 1835 he did not participate in the Bristol polls. See: *The Bristol Poll, being a List of the Householders, Freeholders, and Freemen, who voted at the General Election for Members to Serve in Parliament, for the City and County of Bristol*, published in Bristol following the general elections of 1812, 1820, 1830, 1832, 1835, 1837, 1841, by three different publishers: J. Mills, Philip Rose, J. Wansbrough.
63 The conservative bent of Anglicanism has been emphasized, e.g., by Turner, see his "Cultural Apostasy and the Foundations of Victorian Intellectual Life", in: idem, Contesting Cultural Authority, 38-72, p. 46.


65 Prichard, A History of the Epidemic Fever, 88. On 21. 11. 1817 Prichard published an open letter in Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, warning of the epidemic. His letter was discounted as irresponsible scare-mongering by James Johnson, the Deputy-Governor of St. Peter's Hospital, cf. the newspaper-clippings in Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 538.

66 His resignation took effect in July 1832, see: ibid., 540.

67 Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 286. For the infirmary see: Alford, "The Bristol Infirmary in My Student Days"; Munro Smith, A History of the Bristol Royal Infirmary, Bristol (J. W. Arrowsmith), London (Simpkin), 1917; Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", ch. 6; for Bristol medicine see also: idem, "Orthodoxy and Fringe: Medicine in Late Georgian Bristol", in: W. F. Bynum, Roy Porter (eds), Medical Fringe and Medical Orthodoxy 1750-1850, London (Croom Helm), 1987, 40-55.

68 Smith, The Bristol Royal Infirmary, 198.

69 Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 568.

70 Ibid., printed notice on p. 523.

71 Ibid., 512.

72 Smith, The Bristol Royal Infirmary, 198-199.

73 See Tuke's entry of Prichard in the DNB, vol. 46.

[Anon.], "Abstract of the Proceedings of the Medical Section of the Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science held at Bristol, in August, 1836", *British and Foreign Medical Review*, 2 (1836), 594-601, the quote is from p. 596. The treatment was a familiar therapy, yet, Prichard described it as if it was his speciality.


Despite his Sydenhamian explanation of fever he strongly opted in favour of the segregation of fever patients in their own ward to spare those suffering from other ailments from contagion, see: Prichard, *A History of the Epidemic Fever*, 110.

Alford, "The Bristol Infirmary in My Student Days", 177.

Prichard, "An Address, Delivered at the Third Anniversary Meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, July 23d 1835", *Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association*, 4 (1836), 1-54, p. 5.

There were many doctors who combined humoralism and a belief in the vis medicatrix as one, Prichard, however, distinguished between the two.

This is not an exhaustive summary of Prichard's medical views. His opinion on Broussais's theories, for example was most interesting, see ch. 3.

"Abstracts of Papers, & c Read Before the Philosophical & Literary Society Annexed to the Bristol Institution. Beginning with the Paper Read at the Evening Meeting on 6th January 1825", Bristol Central Library, B 12361, p. 1; see also Richard Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 644-646. For a more detailed account of the event see ch. 9.

Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 157.

For a list of the subject-matters he treated see the bibliographical appendix.


Ibid., 33.
See note 35 above.

Ibid., 31-33. See also Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 279-281.

Ibid., 174.

For Prichard's character see below.

Prichard, The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations Proved by a Comparison of Their Dialects With the Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Teutonic Languages, Forming a Supplement to Researches into the Physical History of Mankind, Oxford (S. Collingwood), 1831.

Bristol Institution, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Held February 8, 1827, Bristol (J. Mills), 1827, 5-8.

Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 20.

Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 544, 546, 518. For the New Bears and Park Street Club see Smith, The Bristol Royal Infirmary, 233-234.

Prospectus of a College for Classical and Scientific Education, to be Established in or near the City of Bristol, s.l., s.d., Bristol Central Library, B 23363.

Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 661-666.


Woodrow Wilson is said to have referred Bagehot's views of society to Prichard's teachings; see: Nancy Stepan, "Biology and Degeneration: Races and Proper Places", in: J. Edward Chamberlin, Sander L. Gilman (eds), Degeneration. The Dark Side of Progress, New York (Columbia Univ. Press), 1985, 97-120, p. 186.

Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 520, 624, 626.
101 See the "List of the Council and Shareholders of the Bristol College", ibid., 674, 678; the list covers only the period 1837-1840, from 1837 to 1839 Prichard sat on the College's council.

102 Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 204.

103 In fact it was known that the British Association had been modelled on the German example of annual scientific congresses, see: Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 540.

104 As he was "actively engaged in the practice of my profession" he could not leave Bristol. See his letter to John Phillips, the Secretary of the Yorkshire Philosophical Society, 26. 8. 1831, BAAS Correspondence, Radcliffe Science Library, Oxford, fol. 64-65.


106 He contributed papers in 1832 (Oxford), 1836 (Bristol), 1839 (Birmingham).

107 Letter to Washington, August 1838, Prichard Papers, Royal Geographical Society.


109 For speculations on the possible reasons of his resignation see Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 270.

110 Symonds, Some Account, 8.

111 See the contract at the Bristol Public Record Office, 5535 (50).

112 See Prichard's letter to John Rose Hale, 6. 4. 1815, Edinburgh, National Library, 15385 (f.3).

113 "Wernerian Society Minutes", 2 vols, Edinburgh, 1808-1830, vol. 1, entry for 13. 3. 1813. As happened so often, Prichard's name was taken down as "Pritchard". In 1835 he was no longer a member (see vol. 2). Edinburgh Univ. Library, Special Collections, Dc. 2.55-56.


118 See the newspaper clipping in: Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 572.

119 See note 83 above.


121 Symonds, *Some Account*, 50.

122 Letter to Washington, 18. 4. 1839, Prichard Papers, Royal Geographical Society.

123 See ch. 7 below.

124 See his letter to William Vernon Harcourt, the vice-president of the BAAS, 5. 8. 1836, in: Jack Morrell, Arnold Thackray (eds), *Gentlemen of Science. Early Correspondence of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, London (Royal Historical Society), 1984, 234 (emphasis in the original).

125 See Harcourt's letter to James David Forbes, 1. 10. 1835, in: Morrell, Thackray (eds), *Early Correspondence*, 219. Prichard himself when asked his opinion on the election of Lord Lansdown was all in favour of him, agreeing with Harcourt that it would be "highly injurious to the Association" to appoint a man who was "chiefly known as a politician", see Prichard's letter to Harcourt 3. 11. 1835 in: ibid., 220. See also: Morrell, Thackray, *Gentlemen of Science*, 250.


128 [Anon.], "On Prichard’s Retrospective Address", *Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association*, 4 (1836), xvi.


131 Alford, "The Bristol Infirmary in My Student Days", 176.

132 Prichard's letter to Hodgkin, see note 108 above.

133 Nicholas Hervey, "The Lunacy Commission 1845-60, with Special Reference to the Implementation of Policy in Kent and Surrey", Ph. D. diss., Bristol University, 1987, 146.


135 Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England", 204.

136 See Buckland's letter to Whewell, 22. 7. 1842, Whewell Papers, Trinity College, Cambridge, quoted in: Nicolaas A. Rupke, *The Great Chain of History. William Buckland and the English School of Geology (1814-1849)*, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1983, 202. See also Prichard's letter to Peel, Dec. 1842, Peel Papers, British Library, Manuscript Dept, vol. 3411; 40512. f. 93. Prichard also mentioned also a Mr Haldane. It is not obvious whom he was referring to. All fairly well known Haldanes at the time were Scottish religious writers, one of them, Robert Haldane (1772-1854) was also a scientist and member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.


138 Prichard's letter to Buckland, 8. 3. 1845, Royal Society of London, BL. 251. 111. I have not been able to find out which professorship exactly Prichard had in mind. Only in 1868 was a chair of philology installed at Oxford.

139 Cull, "Short Biographical Notice", xxiv.

140 Bristol Public Record Office, see the documents catalogued under 16082.

141 See the list of honours and titles on the title page of Prichard, *A Treatise on Insanity, and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind*, London (Sherwood), 1835.

142 Odom, "Prichard", 137.


144 Odom, "Prichard", 137.

See Prichard’s letter to Washington, 3. 4. 1840, Prichard Papers, Royal Geographical Society.

Wagner published a translation of the third edition of Prichard’s *Researches*. The project was conceived unbeknownst to Prichard who was elated when he learned about it, see his letter to Wagner, 30. 4. 1841, Nachlaß Rudolph Wagner, Göttinger Universitätsbibliothek, Manuskriptabteilung, Cod. MS R. Wagner 6.

See Prichard’s letter to Washington, 23. 5. 1840, Prichard Papers, Royal Geographical Society.

Prichard’s letter to Washington, 3. 4. 1840, ibid.

Symonds, *Some Account*, 48. In Hodgkin’s "Biographical Notice" (p. 558) Prichard was characterized as "very cheerful, sociable, easy and unpretending in his discourse and manners, and has so much modesty, artlessness, and child-like simplicity about him, that no one would be prepared to say, upon slight acquaintance, that he was anything more than an ordinary, sensible, well-disposed man".
A. Introduction

We do not have any bed-side records witnessing to Prichard's role as a doctor. Yet, it is possible to see how his acclaimed modesty influenced his medical writings, in particular those on insanity. For, he did not stress any special faculties of his own, comparable to Francis Willis's famous stare, nor did he give much credit to his role as a diagnosing specialist.

Although he practised heroic medicine even in cases of mental disease, he considered the medical understanding of insanity as being a part of the philosophy of the human mind. This was not unusual. In the eighteenth century insanity was widely explained within the Lockean philosophical framework of enlightened rationality: delusions or illusions, basically erroneous thinking, led human reason into error. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the wake of the French Revolution and in the midst of the transformations which the industrial revolution brought about, new theories of insanity emerged. Prichard was one of those who attempted to rechart the traditional understanding of madness. This appeared necessary to him because the realm of unsoundness of mind changed its character and became as unfathomable as the epoch appeared to many who were witnessing it. Increasingly, cases of insanity became known in which the patients did not seem to dwell in some delusive state. They displayed deep sullenness, unmitigated fury, utter shamelessness, seemingly without either purpose or motivation.
One of the constructs newly used to explain the evidence was Prichard's concept of moral insanity. It referred to a derangement of those mental faculties which presided over man's emotive framework as well as his moral faculty. Prichard put it forward, first in 1833, in an article in The Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine. In the Treatise on Insanity, published in 1835, he gave his account of the medical knowledge on madness, inscribing moral insanity into medical nosology and embedding the doctrine in his medical philosophy.

In the course of his elaborations of the concept, Prichard presented a number of case studies which he had solicited from other doctors in order to prove his theory. One of these was the case of "a gentleman", provided by his Bristol colleague, John Addington Symonds. Symonds reported that "in his social relations [the gentleman] had become fickle, suspicious, and irascible; he was reckless in his expenditure, and uncertain in his projects, while his general behaviour was such as to impress almost every one who came in contact with him". However, there was no "evidence that he entertained any belief in things morally or physically impossible, or in opposition to the general opinion of mankind". He had suffered a severe concussion of the brain, and since his recovery had conducted himself more extravagantly than ever. He advertised for sale property which he knew to be entailed; after a little increase of income by the death of a near relative, he commenced great alterations in his residence, and before they were finished suddenly left his family, together with a large establishment, under the care of a youth, his son, who was provided with no other means of supplying the wants of the household than a power of attorney for collecting rents.

The man had inflicted "so great injury to property in which he had only a life-interest, had involved himself so deeply in debt, and was, notwithstanding, so lavish and absurd in his expenditure, that it became a very desirable object to enforce some restraint upon his actions".

"After due deliberation", Symonds ended, "I came to the conclusion,
that, although I had been unable to trace any positive intellectual error, there was such a morbid condition of the feelings, habits, and motives, as to constitute a case of what has been correctly designated by Dr. Prichard as moral insanity. I therefore did not hesitate to sign the usual certificate."³

The communications by Symonds and other alienists seemed to confirm the theory of moral insanity.⁴ Prichard had defined it as a form of "madness consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination". People suffering from this mental disorder displayed, Prichard wrote, "eccentricity of conduct, singular and absurd habits" combined with "a wayward and intractable temper, with a decay of social affections, an aversion to the nearest relatives and friends formerly beloved, - in short, with a change in the moral character of the individual".⁵

Neither the sources of the concept, nor its social and philosophical implications have been described conclusively. It has been variously suggested that moral insanity linked up with later notions concerning "lesions of the will power",⁶ or that the concept derived from tenets of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy or from the French alienists Philippe Pinel and Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol.⁷ But most scholars who put forward these theories were only cursorily interested in Prichard; his theories on madness have rarely stood at the centre of investigation.⁸

This chapter will address two issues:
1. It will probe the theoretical predicaments which inspired Prichard to come up with the concept of moral insanity, and in the course of this Prichard's previously neglected sources will be examined.
2. The chapter will also discuss the concept of moral insanity itself and inquire into its underlying implications as well as into the functions which it fulfilled within Prichard's political and religious viewpoints. In
particular, I will ask how far "moral insanity" was an expression of Prichard's religious views and to which extent it was presented as a response to the rise of capitalist society.

In the contemporary historiography of madness, there is a strong urge to unmask the economic or professional interests which informed the medical theories of nineteenth-century alienists. Scholars such as Andrew Scull, David Mellett, and Richard Russell have helped to put the history of madness into perspective. At first sight, the case described above may appear as evidence of Prichard's desire to enlarge the juridical competencies of his profession. But a closer look reveals that his work allows this kind of analysis to only a very limited extent. To read his writings in this light would be to mistake the actual non-medical sub-text of his theories.

By retracing Prichard's route to the idea of "moral insanity", I wish to demonstrate that the theory reflected Prichard's dismay at the decline of religion in a materialist age. Yet, this concept was not merely the disillusioned response of a cultural pessimist. By explaining madness within the framework of humoralism as a bodily constitution, Prichard dispensed with the idea that reason was the supreme arbiter of humanity. He showed madness to be part of the human condition: anybody was liable to become mad. The descent into madness proper was the result of accidental circumstances. By virtue of this theory Prichard defied the pretensions of the phrenologists who claimed to have found a key to the human psyche. In his anti-phrenological approach, based on non-cerebral sources of madness, Prichard was heavily inspired by German Romantic medicine. However, it was only in the 1840s that he finally acknowledged the intimate links between German teachings and his theory of moral insanity. How little Prichard shared contemporary attempts to bolster the image of the medical profession - how little, indeed, he believed that medicine could do anything about the depraved state of human nature - is
revealed in his answer to the question under what circumstances it was necessary to certify a mentally disturbed person.

The term "moral insanity" had already been employed in the eighteenth century by Thomas Arnold and Benjamin Rush. But they saw the perversion of the moral sense as a result of madness - not as the definition of the disorder. Their ideas, therefore, had little to do with Prichard's understanding of the term.\textsuperscript{10} Prichard himself saw parallels between the notion of moral insanity and the theories of Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol (1772-1840), the famous Paris mad-doctor.\textsuperscript{11} Prichard even averred that Esquirol had identified the salient characteristic of moral insanity - the absence of intellectual delusion.\textsuperscript{12} He was justified inasmuch as Esquirol had introduced "the view that the obsessional disorders were a form of insanity".\textsuperscript{13} Ironically, however, the French alienist dissociated himself explicitly from Prichard's definition of moral insanity, for Esquirol insisted that all forms of madness were accompanied by a lesion of the understanding.\textsuperscript{14} Only after Esquirol's death in 1840 would Prichard no longer link "moral insanity" to the French doctor's concept of "monomania". In 1842 he wrote: "With great deference to this justly celebrated physician we venture to observe, that the term monomania does not appear applicable to a disorder which is not characterised by any particular error or delusion".\textsuperscript{15} But there are other authors whom Prichard read and quoted and whom, in his \textit{Treatise on Insanity}, he did not credit with having inspired him.

\textbf{B. Prichard's Views of Madness in 1822}

Prichard's deep-rooted piety and conservatism appear at odds with his formulation of a theory like that of moral insanity which smacked of novelty and whose nosology, as will be explained, came dangerously close to the tenets of F. J. V. Broussais who was derided as a materialist. That Prichard should have devised such a theory is all the more surprising since
certain aspects of it seemingly contradicted his own earlier work. In 1822, he had published a Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System, in many respects a conventional account of insanity, devised along the lines of the Lockean notion that a madman had lost his wits, but not his soul.16

It fulfilled two purposes. First, Prichard used it to refute the popular, non-medical idea that the soul or mind itself could be diseased. Second, he employed it to defend religion against materialists who located madness in the brain and reduced the soul to a function of the brain. Against both of these notions Prichard pitted the idea that insanity consisted in a faulty transmission of data from the brain into the mind. Madness, in other words, arose from some organic malfunctioning either in the brain or in the nervous system more generally. The brain was not the organ of mind but the intermediary between the body and the immaterial reasoning powers. How the brain related to the reasoning faculty, Prichard thought to be a medical mystery which it was not given to man to penetrate.17 All he knew for sure was that madness was seated in the nervous system, whereas the mind was "in no wise involved in the calamity".18 But owing to some mechanico-chemical disorder in the nervous system the mind was led to take for "memory" what in fact was merely "reverie", so that its reasoning operations subsequently went amiss.19 By putting forward this explanation, Prichard saw himself as following in the tradition of William Cullen, a teacher of James Gregory whose courses on medical practice Prichard had attended at Edinburgh.20 Indeed, the highest medical authorities had sanctioned the doctrine. The Tukes had used it as the basis of their maxims on moral treatment.21 It was the standard definition in British legal practice.22 There was no obvious reason for Prichard to give it up.

Nonetheless, in the mid-thirties, we find him stating in A Treatise on Insanity that the traditional account of madness was not sufficient; Locke's theory was "by far too limited". The formula "reasoning correctly from erroneous premises" was applicable to certain forms of insanity only,
namely to all those in which the understanding was out of order. But there existed another type of madness to which Locke's definition did not apply.\textsuperscript{23} It consisted in the perversion of the emotive faculties such as the sense of self-preservation or natural affection for one's relatives. In 1822, Prichard had stipulated that these, together with the reasoning power, were beyond physical illness since they were innate attributes of the immaterial mind. In 1835, they were still faculties of the mind of an immaterial nature, but, Prichard declared, they could be diseased.\textsuperscript{24} Materialistic as that sounds, Prichard was far from resigning himself to physicalism. Why then, it must be asked, did Prichard depart from received medical doctrines?

My suggestion is that both the 1822 and the 1835 treatises had the same target. They were attempts by Prichard to attack materialistic physiology, most notably phrenology. Craniology - as it was also called - was, for him, something akin to the application of Priestley's materialism to the philosophy of mind.\textsuperscript{25} Between 1810 and 1819, Franz Joseph Gall and Johann Caspar Spurzheim had published five big volumes on the anatomy and functions of the brain, asserting that all mental differences among men were, in W. F. Bynum's words, "rooted in the topography of the central nervous system".\textsuperscript{26} In this multi-volume insult to Prichard's world view, Gall and Spurzheim divided the brain into numerous distinct "organs" each of which was responsible for a particular mental faculty. The respective size of these organs was visible from the outside: the skull displayed protuberances in those places where certain faculties were especially well developed. The soul, in other words, had its place in the brain.\textsuperscript{27} The innermost nature of man was evident to everybody who only knew how to read the signs, i.e. the bumps. Prichard railed throughout his life against this theory.\textsuperscript{28} The difference was only that over time he was to change his arguments.

At Edinburgh University, Prichard had become acquainted with common-sense philosophy of Dugald Stewart and Thomas Reid. Its tenets
were readily reconcilable with Christian theology. Diametrically opposed to these doctrines and yet structurally very similar were the ideas of Gall and Spurzheim. Both systems presupposed certain innate faculties: a moral sense, natural affections, the power-of understanding, etc. But while the common-sense philosophers referred these to the immaterial mind, the phrenologists, in locating them in the brain, underlined their material nature. This notion was tied to Gall’s inference "that the moral and intellectual world of man begins where the brain begins, and that it ends where the brain ends". This theory appeared to Prichard all the more pernicious as Gall doubted the perfectibility of human morals. If peoples could fall back into ignorance and barbarism, this was, for Gall, due to the physical limits which their brains posed to the development of the moral faculties.29

Prichard’s Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System aimed at refuting the central tenets of phrenology, including what he perceived as a debasement of humanity. He strove to show 1. that the supreme faculties of the mind were independent of the bodily constitution;30 2. that for the exercise of the lower faculties of perception and sensation (i.e. those which could be perturbed) the entire nervous system was at least as important as the brain itself;31 and 3. that some forms of madness such as epilepsy were - "in some unknown way" - ultimately referable to an "irritated portion of the stomach or intestines" or "disease in the liver, and other abdominal viscera" - and therefore not to some lesion of the cerebral structure.32 His tactic was to discount the role of the brain alone, playing down its significance for mental processes, whether in sickness or in health. It was an approach which Prichard never forsook. The problem was, however, that the main hypothesis of the 1822 book could not be sustained. It became increasingly impossible to assert that mental processes were independent of the particular conformation of the brain, for, during the 1820s, a rising number of pathological anatomists attributed insanity to lesions of specific
parts of the brain. The results of experimental physiologists, who manipulated the brain structures in animals, made it more and more difficult to deny that mental functions were dependent on the cerebral structure.33

The question which engaged many mad-doctors was whether insanity was regularly accompanied by a physical lesion of the brain. Until 1820 it was commonly assumed that in many cases of madness, there were no lesions to be discovered. Implicitly, this view bolstered the notion that the brain was not the organ of mind. But in the 1820s the tide changed, the "seekers after the 'sick organs'" gained in confidence. Especially among French medical men, lack of pathological evidence was taken as a proof of the immaturity of pathological techniques rather than for a fact.34

Prichard considered the writings of Esquirol's protégé Etienne-Jean Georget as decisive: Georget asserted that insanity was an idiopathic disease of the cerebral structure. His publication on insanity in 182335 inspired, as Prichard put it, "minute and laborious researches into the morbid changes connected with this disease".36 But Georget held many tenets which his British colleague scorned. He was a fervent adherent of Gall's craniology, he was regarded as the spearhead of French liberal medical theory, and he "openly professed materialism".37 Yet, since his opinions were accepted within the influential Esquirol circle, Prichard had to come to terms with the new emphasis on pathological and anatomical evidence. Even under the tutelage of the conservative Esquirol,38 French physiology and anatomy were permeated by views which, in England, were likely to be seen as verging on materialism.

Esquirol himself denounced the "rash pretenions of those who assume that they can fix upon the diseased portion of the brain".39 But his pupils tended to follow the path which Gall and Spurzheim had delineated. If only some of their findings were true, then what happened to the mind? What was left of the inviolable soul, the divine spirit in man?
In the 1820s, in the course of contemplating the nature of madness and the make-up of the mental faculties, Prichard came across a medical approach which spelled out many of his own implicit assumptions about the cultural meaning of madness and which helped him to come to terms with the notion that mental faculties could be diseased like any other part of the body. It was a form of somatic pathology which would not - like that of Gall - regard the functions of the soul as congruent with the structure of the brain. It relieved Prichard of the problem of how to reconcile medicine with metaphysics. The crucial belief was a form of emotional insanity which was by definition not accompanied by a lesion of the cerebral structure. The notion came from Germany, from what Prichard referred to as "the school of Nasse". The doctrines of this group were derived from the Idealist philosophy of mind. Unlike the theory of "mania without delusion" which Philippe Pinel (1746-1826) had applied to raving maniacs who, before and after their fits, displayed no delusive convictions, that of the Nasse school addressed a wider range of emotional disorders that comprised not only states of "exalted mania", but all possible sorts of emotional aberration, ranged on a scale from excess to depression. It was to become the core of moral insanity. In 1822 Prichard contemplated that a type of insanity involving only the "active powers" and not the intellect would require a "very different theory". German texts on insanity provided him with the clue necessary to develop it.

From the last third of the eighteenth century the Germans had been debating the relationship between body and soul, with respect to anthropology as well as to physics. By the 1820s, there were two opposing factions which quarrelled passionately with each other: the somatists of the Nasse school, and the psychicists under the theoretical guidance of Johann Christian August Heinroth (1773-1843). German medical theory, unlike the French, was slow to enter into Britain. When the English finally got round to reading the Germans, they picked out what they needed,
irrespective of whether they were combining notions which in Germany belonged to separate schools. In this, Prichard was no exception. On the contrary, his sympathy for certain of Heinroth’s doctrines did not prevent him from cherishing some tenets of the Nasse school as well.

It is well known that conservative British men of letters such as Carlyle and Coleridge found in German Romanticism the depth of religiosity and feeling which they felt was lacking in their own culture. Prichard, too, turned to German learning and German piety. His scientific ethos required him to express his theories without having recourse to theological arguments. It was an attitude which applied not only to his ideas on madness but also to his anthropological and philological writings. Nonetheless, he had great sympathy for scholarly texts whose authors were less conscious about the conflation of theology and science. In this respect, German Romantic medical theories served as a legitimation of his own opinions. In order fully to understand Prichard’s views it will be necessary to explain these theories in some detail.

Christian Friedrich Nasse, Maximilian Jacobi, Franz Francke and a few other Germans had as their mouthpiece a periodical edited by Nasse, initially called Zeitschrift für psychische Ärzte, later called Zeitschrift für Anthropologie. Published in Leipzig from 1818, it was reckoned the first high-quality periodical on insanity to be set up in Germany. In 1824, the journal included an excerpt from Prichard’s book on nervous disorders. It was then, at the latest, that he became acquainted with this particular German theory of madness. Indeed, Prichard’s footnotes in the Treatise on Insanity reveal that he paid a lot of attention to the Zeitschrift and the articles of one of its most eminent editors, Maximilian Jacobi.

Deeply involved in Romantic philosophizing, the contributors of the Zeitschrift tried to support what they perceived as real and inner human values against superficial French rationality. Practising in Halle and Bonn, Nasse (1778-1851) was a pupil of Johann Christian Reill. Jacobi (1755-1858)
was the son of a famous philosopher who had been a companion of Goethe. Their politics of the body bolstered the notion of a holistic interplay between all parts of the body and the soul, while at the same time, they believed in a distinct hierarchy in which the soul was constantly at odds with the flesh. When the body took over, the state of health as well as the morality of the individual was in danger. Nasse, Jacobi, and a Dresden doctor called Franz Francke (1796-1837) propounded the idea that there existed a form of mental dislocation which was caused by diseases of the visceral organs and which expressed itself solely in a derangement of the emotions.

Starting from the position of Cartesian dualism, turning himself against Stahl's animism and Heinroth's exuberant idealism as well as the psychical materialism which many zealous anatomists proposed, Francke asserted, in 1824, what Prichard had suggested two years earlier, namely that madness was "a sympathetic disease of the brain" whose original source was an organic disease in the viscera. "The essence", Francke wrote, "the natural cause of psychical disease resides in the body". He expressly turned against those pathologists for whom anatomical evidence of brain disorder was a guide to the seat and nature of the disease. Nasse mocked "the doctrine, repeated in all physiological text-books, that the soul must have a distinct seat somewhere in the body". He saw the entire living body as a unity, and hence madness affected the whole of man's physical appearance. It may be, Jacobi wrote, that the manifestations of the reasoning faculty are almost fully intact, and "none the less there is mental disturbance". For, "this or that side of the emotional life may be affected" by some disease of "certain parts of the organism". These views are so nearly allied to the theory of moral insanity that it appears quite likely that the German texts left their trace in Prichard's mind.

That the viscera could lie at the roots of madness Prichard had already stated in 1822. But then, he had seen the emotions and the understanding as
mental faculties which were untouchable by organic operations. The Nasse school, too, directed their efforts against phrenology. But unlike Prichard, they had no qualms about theorizing on the interrelationship between body and mind. Jacobi, in particular, criticized the traditional approach to madness which, in his opinion, had always wrongly focused on the understanding. For the nosology of madness, as he saw it, the emotional framework was more important than the understanding. "The melancholic", Jacobi said, "is not plunged into his disease by virtue of this or that sad idea, rather the idea arises because he suffers from some such disease". Prichard quoted the phrase approvingly when reporting a case where he himself had acted as the consulting physician. According to the Nasse school, at the onset of most cases of madness there existed a derangement of the emotions, brought about by a disease in parts of the organism. This could - but need not necessarily - lead to a deranged understanding. While the latter disease was indeed seated in the brain, dislocated emotions signified a disease of the visceral organs, be it the heart, the liver, the stomach or a part of the intestines. Thus the way was paved for the pathology of moral insanity.

In pitting the diseases of the passions against those of the intellect, the Germans relied heavily on the time-honoured doctrine of humoralism. As a faculty whose functioning was clearly dependent on the brain, the understanding was open to anatomical investigations. Not so the passions: their expression was a matter of the body's physical constitution. Humoralist doctrines were used to theorize and classify them. In Jacobi's words, the task was to investigate "the temperaments as somatic basis of the affective powers and the passions".

While, in 1822, Prichard was not interested in the temperaments, by the mid-thirties he explicitly applied humoralism to the nosology of madness. In his article on "Temperament" in The Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, he greatly relied on German sources, and on Jacobi's publications
The nineteenth-century version of humoralism did without the notion that any given temperament was due to the superabundance of a particular bodily fluid. Instead, as Francke put it, temperament referred simply to "the specific individual constitution of physico-psychical life". This implied, as Jacobi phrased it, that "there are as many different temperaments as there are different individuals". Prichard expressed himself in a similar manner: after having declared that moral insanity referred to the "preternatural excitement of the temper and spirits", he specified that "in fact, the varieties of moral insanity are perhaps as numerous as the modifications of feeling or passion in the human mind".

In this interpretation, the temperaments were being proffered as indicators of man's psychological constitution. Jacobi contended that "the impact which the brain exerts on the psyche [was] far less well established" than that of the temperaments. Humoralism was used to found a bodily system of emotions which could not be explained by reference to processes within the brain. The latter was responsible for matters concerning man's intellect, while the particular humoral constitution of the body determined his moral conformation. Thus Jacobi mustered humoralism against modern phrenological materialism. The second volume of his Sammlungen was devoted to anthropological investigations executed along humoralist lines and dedicated to the rejection of phrenology. Prichard took up the torch: indeed, "the varieties of temperament and the peculiarities of organization belonging to individuals are so related to predisposition to mental disease", that he declared himself "anxious to give a brief and distinct statement" about them. He appended a long "Supplementary Note on Peculiar Configurations of the Skull" to his Treatise where he discussed the matter in order to prove that the psychological systems of the phrenologists were wrong.

The emphasis on the humoral doctrine linked up with a reconsideration of the role of instincts. During the eighteenth century,
instincts had been regarded by many as the base animal counterpart of
divine human rationality. At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
however, their status was remodelled. For Prichard, the work of the
physician Thomas Hancock (1783-1849) was of decisive importance. The two
men had studied together at Edinburgh, and had remained friends ever
since. Hancock was a Quaker, known as a pious metaphysician.

In his Essay on Instinct and Its Physical and Moral Relations, he
rescued the instincts from their low status in brutish nature. Starting from
Thomas Reid's and Dugald Stewart's philosophy, Hancock asserted that
instincts were characteristic of man as well as animals. It was wrong to see
them as the brute substitute for human rationality; they belonged to that
part of the constitution of which the living creature, human as well as
animal, was not consciously aware. But although they were innate,
instincts were modifiable. Most notably, domestication led to an animal's
loss of its natural instincts.

Hancock did not see this as altogether desirable. Not only were
domesticated animals predisposed to catch new forms of disease, but their
natures could also be altered for the worse: the beaver in the native state
was, according to Hancock, "politic, vigilant, social, labouring incessantly for
the public good"; in captivity, however, all these positive characteristics
disappeared. The analogy between animals and man was easily made.
Hancock praised the "pure and natural state" of the human senses while he
saw with critical eyes what civilization did to them: "as men, the more they
degenerate, grow the vainer, they come at last to believe that without divine
assistance by their own wisdom merely they may be happy". This statement
flowed from Hancock's belief that morality was not a question of rationality:
"Reason does not enable man to fulfil the ends of his creation", he wrote.
The divinity had implanted a moral standard or "spiritual principle" in the
human constitution, it formed part of man's instinctive fabric.

Hancock fruitfully combined strong religious belief, the philosophy of
the human mind, post-revolutionary Rousseauist criticism and the Romantic scepticism towards rationality. Prichard more than once mentioned the book at crucial points in his analyses, since it helped him to envision insanity as part of the human condition. His elaborate system of exciting and predisposing causes of madness fitted neatly with the modernized form of humoralism and Hancock’s Essay on Instinct. As for the exciting causes, Prichard distinguished between moral and physical ones. To the former he ascribed a much greater impact: "a more decided preponderance will appear on the side of moral causes as the principal agents concerned in the development of mental disorders". But irrespective of the nature of the "accidental excitements", madness could break out only if the exciting causes met with a bodily predisposition to madness: "A certain peculiarity of natural temperament or habit of body is a necessary condition for the development of insanity: without the previous existence of this condition the causes which give rise to the disease will either act upon the individual without any noxious effect, or they will call forth some other train of morbid phenomena". This medical distinction between predisposing and exciting causes - standard knowledge - had an important role within Prichard’s theory, for he added that the predisposition to insanity was part of human nature. Referring to Hancock, Prichard declared: "it may be said in one sense that a preparation is made for this species of derangement [madness] in the constitution of the human mind".

Prichard came to this conclusion through extending Hancock’s hypothesis of the loss of animal instincts under the conditions of domestication, to human cultures of varying degrees of civilization. He held the widespread notion that with the increasing refinement of society madness was increasing also. Hancock helped him to account for that phenomenon in a manner which would not call in question the perfection of creation. A propensity to madness was nothing less than a necessary
corollary of the human ability to survive. While in animals the sense of self-preservation operated unconsciously or instinctively, human nature was endowed with the faculty of foresight: "Hope and fear, anxiety respecting the future, are the principles in human nature by which the care of self-preservation is insured". Hope, fear, and anxiety were deeply ingrained in the human psyche, being inherent to man's nature and hence beyond the control of rationality.

The theory had a desirable side-effect. Etienne de Condillac and his followers thought that animal instincts were reducible to habit and experience. So, to do the opposite and bolster the role of the instincts as part of the body's constitution as a whole amounted to a refutation of sensationalism and its derivative schools. Thanks to Hancock, Prichard was able to appreciate theories which emphasized the significance of madness as a phenomenon of the body's essential make-up. It was a crucial spur to Prichard's growing interest in the psychological nature of man as understood by German anthropologists and alienists.

Prichard was not the only mad-doctor to discover the significance of German theories of madness. Before him, Philippe Pinel, taking the same course, had also arrived at the notion of emotional disorders. But in Britain Prichard was the first to utilize the full potential of the German approach.

German theories of the human mind as well as of madness were native to the German intellectual traditions. To some extent this was a question of language: the German word "Gemüt" has no exact equivalent in English. Prichard translated "Gemüt" as "sentiment", but "Gemüt" is more than that. It refers to the emotional disposition or the moral framework of man and relates to the understanding, as heart relates to brain. Hence German semantics suggested a classification of madness which naturally included the notion of diseased emotions. It enabled Prichard to regard the passions as ontologically distinct from the other faculties of the mind.
While Prichard referred the passions and the understanding to the realm of physical materiality, there was one faculty which was exempt. Following the German distinction between the mental faculties, Prichard conceived not only the complementary duality of sentiment and understanding, but also added a third principle, judgement, one of the contemporary English translations of "Vernunft". Unlike the powers of sentiment and understanding, this third component of German Idealist philosophy remained the link between man's mind and God's spirit. In English, understanding, reasoning and judgement are not always clearly distinguished; and Prichard, too, confused them. In German, by contrast, due not least to Immanuel Kant, the terms "Vernunft" and "Verstand" are endowed with different meanings.  

In 1835, Prichard surrendered to physical causes both the emotions and the understanding, i.e. "the intellectual" and "the ethical or moral department of the mind": both might be perverted by external impressions, be they of a moral or a physical nature. But he believed that the faculty of judgement was in a certain way removed from the influence of external stimuli: "The individual can reason soundly on all subjects, only he can never be brought to doubt or to exercise his faculty of judging and reasoning on the subject of this false impression". As in 1822, he argued that this faculty was only mediately connected to the external world. He referred to the recent publications of the French philosopher Pierre La Romiguière who, employing Kant's philosophy, had asserted the independence of the faculty of judgement from the operations of the senses. The notion that the judgement could judge everything except itself was a characteristic element of German Idealist philosophy.

Starting with the Lancet in 1835 and down to the present, commentators have tended to believe that moral insanity was developed merely within the framework of common-sense philosophy. This, however, is at best half the truth. It was only by virtue of the German
Idealist philosophy of mind, which assigned judgement its special cognitive position, that Prichard could accept the notion of unbalanced mental faculties such as perverted emotions and deranged understanding, without consigning the soul to the realm of physical causation. And this in turn enabled him to associate the emotions with the bodily constitution, whence he derived a theory of psychical disorder which was designed to defy the phrenological system.

Hitherto, many historians have regarded the intellectual struggles over the relationship between the body and the mind in the 1820s and 1830s mainly as of a binary opposition between two camps, the physicalists or somatists versus the spiritualists - as they are called in France - or the mentalists as they are referred to in England. Indeed, Maximilian Jacobi was in his time the spearhead of the somatists who attributed the aetiology of mental diseases exclusively to the body, and he was deeply embroiled in quarrels with the rival faction of the psychicists, represented by Heinroth.

However, their skirmishes must not be translated into the handy dichotomy between "materialist" somatists and "pious" psychicists. As Verwey has rightly stressed, the quarrels between the two factions did not amount to the simple antagonism between body-centered and mind-centered explanations for insanity. It is true that both camps argued with each other over whether the aetiology of mental diseases should be placed in the body or in the soul. This difference was mirrored in their politics: the somatists tended towards liberalism, while the followers of Heinroth harboured more a conservative outlook which led them to view mental disorder as a product of immorality. But they all spoke as one when it came to fighting "the one-sided, physically-oriented, 'mind-less' medicine of the Aufklärungs era". In the desire to leave the realm of the immaterial soul untainted by physicalist theory, the Nasse school applied, as it were, the mind-body dualism to the relationship between parts of the body itself. While materialist physiology had chosen the brain as its stronghold, the
somatists focused on the rest of the body as the realm which was expressive of, and governed by, forces which were neither rational, nor even connected to the organ of rationality. But they were not materialists. In the end the very notion of an organism whose parts, through the mechanism of sympathy, were all linked to each other as well as to the soul, contradicts this interpretation.

Jacobi's insistence on physical sources of madness did not aim to reduce the operations of the mind to physical causes. Rather he was defying the attempts of Pinel and Heinroth to explain all mental phenomena through occurrences of which the individual was conscious or could at least give an account. He rejected Heinroth's emphasis that madness was the outcome of sin. And he poked fun at Pinel's assumption that a madman himself might be able to explain what plunged his mind into disorder. Pinel too regarded inflammation of the viscera as a source of mental disorder. But, in Jacobi's opinion, Pinel had made a bad choice when he rejected the diagnostic system of humoralism in favour of the practice of asking his patients whether they had experienced "distress or misfortunes". This was a naive and ludicrous approach to diagnosis: "Who has not experienced distress or misfortunes?", Jacobi asked rhetorically. If madness struck, it was the result of the disposition and constitution of the individual, not of problems which were part of human life.

Despite opposing this psychological approach to diagnosis, Jacobi was not against psychological explanations in general. But, for him, that part of man's mental framework which was open to medical treatment was mediated through the bodily constitution. After all it was here where sentiments made themselves felt: anxiety infested the stomach, sadness infected the heart, here "madness lights up the candles which create the illusions that lead the understanding into the wrong". In the theories of the somatists, physiological tenets joined with the repertoire of Romantic
criticism. To regard madness primarily as a disease of the viscera was a corollary of the fact that Romanticism considered the understanding as the poorer, merely instrumental part of the human character. Accordingly, the brain as the instrument of the understanding was of lower transcendental value than those organs which were in bilateral intercourse with the emotions. As Jacobi put it, "the holiest powers of man which constitute his actual value, his humanity, reside in his sentiment [Gemüt]".\textsuperscript{103} In short, for the German somatists, the visceral organization of the body had more to do with the transcendental nature of man than had the brain, and this was what the idea behind Jacobi's quip that "there are certain morbid changes in the organisation" which ultimately lead to an impairment "of moral freedom".\textsuperscript{104}

So far, the doctrines which Prichard shared with the Nasse school can be summarized thus.\textsuperscript{105}
1. They saw insanity as an organic disorder with, quite often, its primary seat in the viscera and not in the brain.
2. They referred to a modernized form of humoralism to establish a matrix which made emotions nosologically amenable. This went together with a new interest in the systematic exploration of human psychology. The emergent discipline of psychology was intertwined with anthropology and medicine. Man's psychological framework paralleled, on a higher level, animal instincts. The individual human psyche was the result of the interaction between the individual (humoral) constitution and the external environment. Hence the faculties of rationality and emotions could no longer be regarded as purely spiritual.
3. Their theories of madness accounted for the perversion of the emotions and the understanding. In so far as they referred mental faculties to material nature, they advanced theories akin to materialism. But unlike materialists, they assigned the faculty of judgement a special position: it remained aloof, being principally separated from the realm of nature.
4. They formulated theories of madness which reflected their dismay about contemporary materialistic tendencies. And they strove to defy the phrenological threat through the combined efforts of their anthropological and physiological endeavours. In general, their scholarship was imbued by the metaphysical project to validate the transcendental nature of man within the language of science.

C. Conversion to Jacobi's Theory
Although Prichard followed Jacobi's theory in many particulars, in the 1830s he was not ready to admit a relationship between the concept of moral insanity and Jacobi's doctrines of the pathology of madness. This was due to the materialistic connotations of somaticism. Prichard disowned the brain as the seat of the emotive faculties, so that it could not be taken as the seat of the soul. However, nor he was not prepared either to let in materialism through the backdoor by admitting that all mental states were ultimately the result of bodily conformations. This was what, in the eyes of many of his contemporaries, Jacobi's somaticism amounted to. As we have seen, Jacobi was very pious. Nonetheless, many objections to his position in the physicalist-mentalist debate were raised by religious critics. Also, his claim that madness was a non-cerebral disorder agreed in some particulars with the views of Broussais who was condemned for his materialism. In 1835 Prichard was sceptical about Broussais's attempt to refer insanity to "irritations ... in the digestive organs", that was "a position which, before it can be admitted, requires proof; and no such proof has been afforded". For the same reason, Prichard denounced Jacobi's nosology as "extreme". At the same time, however, he was intrigued by the idea of referring mental diseases to the gastro-enteric system.

Another theory which strove to explain madness as a disease of the viscera was Pinel's "manie sans délire". Like Prichard's moral insanity, it conceived of a form of madness which did not involve a derangement of
the understanding. But unlike Prichard, who conceived extreme eccentricity as a typical symptom of moral insanity, Pinel had characterized "manie sans délire" as a frenzy of the passions, involving great rage and violence. Prichard could not reconcile himself to the idea that simple disorders in the bowels could induce "that intense excitement of malevolent propensity which leads to murder and suicide".109

In his view, all extreme positions based on ambiguous pathological investigations were suspect. It was wrong to define madness as a function of cerebral disorder, and equally mistaken to attribute it merely to the viscera. As a safeguard against that position Prichard retained the brain as the organ which mediated between the external world and human conscience. He favoured the notion "that particular conditions of the brain are intermediately and instrumentally co-operative, and interposing themselves between the disorder of the organ primarily affected, and the state of mind or temper which is traced as its manifestation or accompaniment".110 In so doing, Prichard repeated his theory from 1822.111 He introduced the Belgian alienist Joseph Guislain as an authority who had set out the same idea. As we have seen, Guislain was also the author to whom Prichard referred in order to differentiate between the faculty of judgement and other mental faculties.112 The correlation illustrates Prichard's tendency to have philosophy determine over anatomical assumptions. As for the anatomical evidence itself, he relied on the theories of Achille-Louis Foville whom he understood to have combined the idea of insanity as cerebral inflammation with the notion that in some cases the disease was located in the viscera.113

Prichard tried to steer a middle way between all possible positions. Nonetheless, even to him the results were not altogether satisfactory: moral insanity in particular posed a problem. Why should a type of disorder which did not involve the understanding but only the emotions leave its imprint in the anatomical make-up of the brain? Indeed, Prichard concluded that
"the instances of mental disorder which leave the greatest doubt with respect to the presence of disease in the brain are those of moral insanity". Had Prichard designated the brain as the locus of the passions and the sentiments, he would not have had this problem. But his theoretical opposition to phrenology, which induced him to see the sentiments as part and parcel of the overall bodily constitution, necessarily led him into this aporia. In other words, he had devised moral insanity in order to fight the phrenologists, but once the forces of the body were unleashed, they appeared to threaten his dualist world view.

It was between the late 1830s and the early 1840s, that he finally made up his mind and yielded to the theories of the Nasse school, accepting moral insanity as a disease of the viscera. In 1844 Prichard published a brief article reporting a typical case of moral insanity and revising his former position.114 Now he praised Jacobi whole-heartedly: his "various works on subjects connected with insanity, equally remarkable for the practical sense as for the deep philosophical investigation which they display, entitle their author to the highest rank among the living writers of this class".115 Neither Prichard nor Jacobi had changed his theoretical approach to insanity. Nor had Prichard read texts by Jacobi which presented the German alienist in a new light. The truth is that Prichard had come to see Jacobi through other eyes. We have seen that he founded his views on the participation of the brain in mental disorder on a publication by Guislain. Jacobi had, in 1830, argued against Guislain's theory. Prichard had taken notice of it, without, however, assigning any importance to Jacobi's criticism.116 By 1844, in contrast, this was exactly the passage which Prichard summarized in order to point out the similarity between his views and those of Jacobi. He wrote:

Jacobi has not expressed his opinion precisely in this manner; but it would appear ... that he looks upon effects produced upon the sensorium and the mind, through the medium of the stomach, or any of the viscera
of physical life, as not less immediately brought about by the action of the material organism on the intellectual or sensitive power, than the impressions produced in the mind by a blow on the head, or by any powerful agency exerted immediately on the brain.

The sequence of events as Jacobi saw it was, Prichard continued, intimately related to his own theory of moral insanity. More expressly than before, he presented moral insanity as a disease whose very existence proved phrenology wrong:

The phenomena of moral insanity, or of a disordered state of the affections and moral feelings, without any corresponding lesion of the understanding, or of the reasoning faculties, furnishes, or appears at least, prima facie, to furnish a firm ground whereon to maintain the negative position in regard to the participation, or, at least, the primary influence of the brain, in the development of an extensive series of psychological phenomena.\textsuperscript{117}

If we ask why Prichard finally recognized the kinship between his ideas and those of the Germans, an explanation may be found in his frustration with the French medical scene. Alienists such as Pinel and Esquirol had been interested in the relation between men's passions and mental derangements. But this phase lasted for only two decades. After Esquirol's death in 1840 his pupils who, much more than Esquirol, employed physicalist theories which were not tempered by religion, took over the field of the debate. By the 1830s, French theorizing upon madness was dominated by the anatomical approach and the attempt to depict correlations between cerebral lesions and mental disorder.\textsuperscript{118} Even Foville, whom Prichard had relied on in his 1835 Treatise, proved an enthusiastic phrenologist.\textsuperscript{119} Prichard did not conceal his exasperation with contemporary trends in anatomy. In 1844, he regretted that "in England and France, the principal, if not the almost undivided attention of anatomists has been directed to the discovery of morbid changes in the brain". The Germans, even though they were generally neither "more practical" nor "sound", had at least taken "a
different course": "the school of Nasse, in particular, directed the attention of pathologists to connections which are often to be traced between the different manifestations of insanity and various morbid phenomena discovered after death in the organs subservient to physical life", that is, the viscera.\textsuperscript{120}

After Esquirol's death, there was no French alienist left who stood in Prichard's favour. In other respects, too, the links between his theories and those of the French had been severed. It had been Esquirol himself who had constantly rejected Prichard's definition of moral insanity. In his last publication, Esquirol insisted that in Prichard's "folie morale ... intelligence is more or less disturbed".\textsuperscript{121} Esquirol also had stressed that Prichard's moral insanity had nothing to do with Pinel's "manie sans déìre", and that, as Prichard noted, an "outbreak of furious madness without delusion' ... is very distinct from that form of mental derangement which I have described under the term 'Moral Insanity'".\textsuperscript{122} Thanks to Esquirol's correction, Prichard finally learned to distinguish between moral insanity and "instinctive madness". "It was observed by M. Esquirol", he wrote with approval, "that this affection is totally distinct from that which I have described first in the Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine". Instinctive madness comprised disorders involving violent fits of anger.\textsuperscript{123} Moral insanity, by contrast, was in general by far less violent.

Prichard re-considered his stance towards Jacobi after he lost sympathy for the French scene. I should like to suggest that the persistent menace of phrenology helped to drive Prichard into the arms of the Nasse school. He retained his assumption that the brain was a mediator between impressions of the mind and the body, but now he conceded that "the most important thing, in a practical point of view, is to establish the fact that the principal and fundamental cause of insanity is, in many instances, to be sought, not in the brain, but in some other region of the body". Jacobi was credited with assenting to Prichard's theory of moral insanity, i.e., "that a
mental disorder exists, fully to be recognised by particular trains of symptoms, in which the moral, not the intellectual, part of the human mind is essentially disturbed". Prichard's little article from 1844 concluded the issues which have been discussed so far, namely his defiance of the phrenologists through the theory of moral insanity, and the notion that moral insanity was tied to a disorder in the viscera and thus to the entire constitution of the body.

How deeply the theory of moral insanity was informed by implicit belief systems which stood in an indirect and complicated relationship with medicine itself may become evident in the following example. Prichard presented the pathological findings in question as if he had only been waiting for anatomical evidence to prove that moral insanity arose from a disease of the viscera.

He cited the case of "a lady highly accomplished, and of great mental endowments, pious, affectionate, and sincere" who suddenly became "low-spirited and hypocondraical". At the same time she refused to eat. When her friends and family urged her, she complained about pains in the abdomen. "Her whole temper and character became changed. Formerly devoted to her duties, and to works of benevolence to others, she now thought only of herself, and her complaints". Finally, she was sent into an asylum where she "was induced, though not without great difficulty, and a constant threat of compulsion if she resisted, to take a moderate quantity of the most nutritious and digestible food". Subsequently she died. The dissection showed that her intestinal canal was beset with ulcers and tubercles. Now, instead of concluding that this woman was not mad, but did indeed suffer terrible pain and therefore had reason to reject food, Prichard took the morbid evidence in the abdomen as testifying to the truth of his theory on moral insanity:

...the perpetual complaints made by the patient of pain and suffering in the abdomen had an organic cause, and were not unreal, as it had been
sometimes suspected. As these complaints had been uniform, and had continued from the commencement of the disease, it may be inferred as highly probable that the organic disease in the intestinal canal had been coeval with the mental disorder, and the foundation of the whole train of morbid symptoms. The history of this case furnishes, on this view, an example of insanity mainly dependant on a diseased state of organs very remote from the brain.\textsuperscript{125}

It is significant that Prichard described the patient as being obsessed with herself - "she now thought only of herself". To identify self-centredness as a feature of insanity was common also among the members of the Nasse school. Thus Jacobi wrote that the "forces of selfishness" strive in man "against revelation"; only by overcoming the "forces of nature" could man's soul liberate itself. But time and again, nature proved stronger. Jacobi concluded: "Nothing can stop man in this temptation, which threatens shattering and extinction, but the firm belief in the Truth ... of revelation".\textsuperscript{126}

Unlike Esquirol's pupils in France, the somaticist branch of German Romantic physiology explicitly and persistently referred to metaphysical convictions; in their understanding, insanity was concomitant, as it were, with a break-up of the ties linking an individual to his transcendental nature.\textsuperscript{127} In that sense, Prichard and Jacobi made common cause. Both of them partook seriously in the anxieties of their age, the uprooting of traditional hierarchies, subsequent social upheavals, a burgeoning acquisitiveness hitherto unknown, scientific materialism - it all was indicative of far-reaching moral depravity. In a speech in 1835, Prichard sighed about "these days, when intellect is deified and worshipped as the sole divinity".\textsuperscript{128} The country which seemed to furnish ample reason for misgivings was France. In the wake of the revolution, religious observance had reached an all-time low. Selfish passions were no longer held in check. Jacobi implicitly conflated socially egoistic behaviour with the exaggerated self-centredness of the insane. In the end, both were attributed to loss of
religion. Prichard saw things similarly. He translated a passage from Jacobi on the moral debasement of the French: "the generality of men have their understanding impaired through the influence of lower passions, and of vices" which Jacobi considered as "so much the more prevalent" as the Christian moral standard was on the decline.  

For Britain, the writing was on the wall. In 1831, Prichard's hometown of Bristol was shaken by a riot of labourers and paupers. The major public buildings were burned down, troops were called in. In the end, not only were the chief rioters put on trial but also a military captain, the mayor and aldermen were arraigned for their "apathetic" conduct during the upheaval. In short, it seemed that nobody, neither the poor nor their betters, had lived up to their civic duties. Not only France, but Britain too gave reason for concern.  

Esquirol, in his time the greatest and most influential authority on alienation in France, was politically conservative enough to provide Prichard with rich quotes on the detrimental effects of moral decline. But unlike Jacobi, Nasse, and Prichard, Esquirol engaged with French positivism, and his theories did not evolve around notions of redemption and life after death. Hence Esquirol's misgivings as to the contemporary state of morality were tied rather more to the course of civilization than to the individual's readiness to transcend his own self.  

By the time Napoleon had been safely despatched to St. Helena, it was permissible for conservatives to cite Rousseau. For Esquirol, backed by Rousseau, it was evident that civilized man had so far departed from propriety and decency that madness must be on the rise. Prichard chose Esquirol's texts to express his own misgivings: "During the last thirty years", Prichard said through the words of Esquirol, "the changes which have taken place in our manners in France, have been productive of more cases of insanity than our political torments". With the demise of religious observance in France, Esquirol stated, "demonomania and superstitious
madness have disappeared". But instead of ushering in an epoch which was mentally saner, this change caused the reverse to happen. The pivotal role of religion for the sustenance of social order was a commonplace in the early nineteenth century. Esquirol had established what happened in a country with weak religious foundations: "The influence of religion over the conduct of the people being weakened, in order to keep men in obedience governments have had recourse to police". This had dire consequences: now "it is the police which haunts weak imaginations. Asylums are filled with monomaniacs, who, fearing this authority, have gone mad upon the subject, and believe that they are constantly pursued".\textsuperscript{134}

Esquirol deplored the substitution of selfishness for ethics: "A cold egotism has dried up all the sources of sentiment: there no longer exist domestic affections, respect, attachment, authority, or reciprocal dependencies; every one lives for himself; none are anxious to form those wise and salutary provisions which ought to connect the present age with those which are destined to follow it".\textsuperscript{135} The Burkean overtones in this passage are evident. But Burke's target, the revolution, was history. Esquirol was talking about another kind of social lesion, he called it "perfect selfishness",\textsuperscript{13h} Jacobi called it "Selbstsucht"\textsuperscript{137} - it was the disease of the age of capitalism. Many contemporaries perceived that they were living through a phase of change. The way in which they theorized this is indicative of their political standpoints as well as of their ontology.

Some attributed the apparent change of manners to a reorganization of society as a whole, or to a changed mode of production. Others would not follow the turn to sociological analysis which, as they saw it, played down morality, ruling it out as explanatory category. The notion of alienation was widespread. But some philosophers - most famously, of course, Karl Marx - came to see this as a socio-economic phenomenon, whereas philosophizing physiologists such as Prichard, Jacobi, and Esquirol regarded it as a
phenomenon which was staged within human consciousness. It expressed itself in terms of a separation between men's social identity and their metaphysically grounded morality.

The whole movement delineated so far, as well as Prichard's reliance on German theoreticians, characterizes not just his medicine, but also his anthropology. Prichard accounted for the different varieties of mankind by linking humoralism and environmentalism. Thus he could reject the notion of distinct human races, while at the same time eschewing the pitfalls of external, i.e. "materialistic", determinism. In both anthropology and medicine, Prichard was concerned to combat the growing importance attached to the brain and consequently the construction of hierarchies along the lines of increasing cerebral complexity. The latter amounted in his eyes to an erosion of individual moral responsibility.\textsuperscript{138}

Prichard's deep piety was tied to the framework of natural theology. In all his writings Prichard was involved in a scientific theodicy, questioning why it had pleased God to inflict man with madness. We have seen how Prichard took his views on this matter from Thomas Hancock's \textit{Essay on Instinct}, and how he explained insanity as part of the human constitution and as a necessary corollary to the human ability to entertain fear for the future. It was, however, not just the "anticipation of wants" which was implanted in the human soul, but also the expectation of "a state of existence after death".\textsuperscript{139} Human beings were endowed with foresight in order to survive during their earthly existence. Equally, the awareness of the Fall and of a future day of judgement was given to them so that they could govern their behaviour in such a manner as to deserve redemption on the day of atonement. Indeed, Prichard conceived of an inherent and eternal fear which was constitutionally implanted into men's mental fabric: "there is one feature common to them all", he wrote, "their prevailing character is gloomy ... A persuasion of moral demerit or a consciousness of guilt has been deeply impressed upon the minds of men in all ages".\textsuperscript{140}
It was certainly no accident that the word "gloom" appeared also in the context of insanity. In his contribution to Alexander Tweedie's *Library of Medicine*, Prichard mentioned melancholy as characteristic of patients suffering from moral insanity: "persons in this state have no relish for the enjoyments of life; they express no feelings of consolation or happiness in the prospect of a future existence; they view everything through a medium of gloom".\(^{141}\) If gloom, then, tormented the sound as well as the unsound, what was the difference between the two states of mind other than a question of degree?

When Prichard said that a disposition to madness was part of the human constitution, this must be understood as his way of saying that mankind paid with madness for the Fall. Without anxiety, fear, and gloom, men would not behave as they should in order to ensure their survival and redemption after death.\(^{142}\) But these very qualities were, so to speak, too much for the human constitution. Hence, in each individual case, the exciting causes which led to the outbreak of madness were merely the last straw. Mental sanity did not prevent the sound-minded from sharing in the gloom of damnation with which the diseased were inflicted. The difference was only that the sane managed to pull themselves together and fulfil their daily duties, while the morally insane "remain ... moping and silent in their beds".\(^{143}\)

This interpretation of Prichard's thoughts on mankind and madness is in line with the fact that he was very reluctant to incorporate religious madness into his nosology. He shared Heinroth's belief that piety was the best preventive against insanity. For Prichard, true Protestant belief simply could not plunge people into lunacy; in his opinion, it was not the prevalence but rather the loss of Christianity which made people prone to insanity. He defended this stance against the statistics which seemed to illustrate the contrary.\(^{144}\) And although he firmly rejected Heinroth's notion that madness was a disease of the immaterial mind, he sympathized
with the idea that "moral depravity was the essential cause of madness". Heinroth's view had, for Prichard, "some foundation in truth ... Vices, inordinate passions, and the want of mental discipline" indeed tended "to increase the prevalence of insanity".145

D. The Social Significance of Moral Insanity

It has been shown that moral insanity must be understood as a corollary of Prichard's conservatism in a struggle which was taking place on many levels: reform versus counter-revolution; materialist physiology versus organismic holism of body and soul; purely sociological versus "moral" or psychological explanations; secularization versus metaphysics. In this light I suggest that it does not make sense to interpret moral insanity as the concomitant of Prichard's endeavour to bolster the status of his profession. He did not aim at medically curbing the lower classes by putting forward moral insanity; nor did he devise the concept in order to facilitate a medical distinction between the good and the bad, the sound and the mad. Of course, there are non-medical origins of moral insanity, but these are to be found primarily in Prichard's moral convictions.

Stocking has repeated the suggestion, raised by Carlson and Dain, that Prichard's choice of the term moral insanity simply referred to "a weakness or disease of the moral sense".146 Against this allegation other historians have stressed that Prichard's use of the term "moral" had no ethical allusions.147 In fact, however, both propositions have a point. For Prichard, moral insanity was a moral perversion in both senses, leading to a dislocation of the moral sentiment as well as of morality. Prichard knew that ethics had nothing to do with medicine, and yet he could not help finding some truth in Heinroth's theory that insanity rose out of sin. It linked up with his belief that the causes of moral insanity were, more often than not, of a moral rather than a physical kind.148 Moral insanity was Prichard's way of theorizing what appeared to him as the moral degeneracy
of his age. Hence, it may be doubted that Prichard had all that much in common with alienists, such as Heinroth, who conflated immorality with disease, or those, such as Thomas Mayo, who suggested that workhouses should be introduced for disobedient children and other morally deficient individuals. An appropriate way to resolve this question is to look at the implications which the theory of moral insanity had for the mechanics of certifying patients.

In the late 1820s, the practice of confinement had become highly controversial, culminating in a scandal which involved the well-known alienist George Man Burrows who had issued certificates without even personally inspecting the alleged patients. These events stirred up controversies about the validity of theories on madness. Part of the problem was the wide gap between the definition of insanity as it was accepted in the courts, and its actual exegesis in the practice of certification. For the courts the test of mental unsoundness was hallucination and delusion. But quite often people were subject to certification whose mental frame failed to display that sort of extreme mental aberration.

One of the medical men who took up the issue was the young alienist John Conolly. In 1830, he published a treatise which strongly criticized contemporary abuses in the mad-business. Nowadays, Conolly is deemed as the prototype of a medical reformer: young, radical-minded, at the fringes of the London establishment and an adherent of craniology as a useful instrument for mental pathology. One of the prime features in his Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity was his condemnation of the indiscriminate confinement of people who were merely eccentric or depraved.

It has been shown that Prichard understood the disposition to madness to be a necessary part of human nature. Moral insanity in particular constituted an extension of the definition of madness which makes - in theory - an infinitely greater number of people eligible for the
diagnosis of madness than the traditional notion had allowed for. The question which must be raised in this context is whether moral insanity was meant to resolve the theoretical ambiguities around the practice of the mad business in such a manner as to boost asylumdom. As will become clear, this was not so. No less than Conolly, Prichard favoured confinement in all appropriate cases. Following Esquirol and the long tradition of British associationism, he thought that insane patients needed to be distracted from their usual surroundings, so that their minds could leave their morbid tracks of thought. He endorsed a combination of the humane form of moral treatment and the traditional physical treatment of bleeding, purging, vomiting, etc. But in cases of moral insanity, Prichard assumed a very careful stance towards confinement. He acknowledged that it was difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition of lunacy for diagnosis. "The precise limitations of insanity and eccentricity of character is very difficult to discover", he wrote, and referred his readers to Conolly's book.

One of Conolly's examples of an eccentric who must not be confined is a man whose only madness consists in his belief that his legs are made of butter. As long as they could somehow carry on in life, Conolly thought, men were free to think what they wanted, mad or not. As for Prichard, his typical borderline case was a morally insane individual whose awkward behaviour was due to deranged emotion. But, no less than Conolly, Prichard took it for granted that mere eccentricity of character was no reason for locking a person up. Even in cases of people who were so morally insane as to be unable to fulfil their civil responsibilities, Prichard did not suggest confinement. He wrote:

There are probably many individuals who are wholly incompetent, through a habit of thoughtless extravagance resulting from disease, to administer their own estates, or manage their domestic affairs, and in whose condition there is yet nothing that requires confinement in a madhouse.
It is, therefore, wrong to see Prichard as a man who was enthusiastic about confinement. In fact, he agreed with Conolly’s exhortation for care in these matters.¹⁵⁹

Prichard saw it as his duty to deal with the medico-legal side of madness. In 1842, he dedicated an entire book to the subject in which he covered both sides of the problem: criminality arising from insanity as well as circumstances in which civil law could deal with insane behaviour. This dual perspective notwithstanding, his interest focused mainly on those aspects of insanity which came under civil rather than criminal law.¹⁶⁰ He emphasized that the question of certification was a matter which could not be solved categorically:

The question which jurors will have to determine is, not whether the person whose case is under examination is afflicted with insanity according to any abstract definition, or general notion, as to the nature of that disease, but whether his mental state is individually such as to render him unfit to be at large, and to be entrusted with the care of himself and his property.¹⁶¹

Instead of deriving the criteria for certification from medical nosology, Prichard recommended that an alleged madman’s social behaviour should be the criterion for his possible certification. This pragmatic advice originated with John Haslam. In 1817, after he had ignominiously lost his post as apothecary to Bethlem hospital, Haslam had made the very same recommendation.¹⁶² In his case, his unorthodoxy might be seen as a response to his shameful experience. But Prichard’s cautious attitude towards confinement fits perfectly with his views of human nature. He had interpreted the doctrine of predisposing causes in such a manner as to stipulate that the disposition to madness was part of the human fabric. The consequence was that every kind of peculiar behaviour was, for him, a sign of mental disorder. At least once Prichard asserted that all eccentricity, however harmless it might appear, was a sign of madness. He wrote: "If ...
we are obliged to discuss the question, whether eccentricity is in general allied to madness, and even a modification of that state or not, there is no doubt that the decision would be in the affirmative".  

This statement is crucial. Nobody in Prichard’s time would have doubted that eccentric behaviour was a very common feature in many individuals. Conolly, therefore, strove to occlude the links between eccentricity and insanity; Prichard, by contrast, made them even stronger. The reason why he did not recommend treatment or certification for all individuals who were, in his understanding, mad is simply this: had this policy been implemented, a substantial part of the population would have had to be certified.

His personal attitude as a doctor sustains this interpretation. As a practitioner as well as in his capacity as a Commissioner in Lunacy, he exercised his duties with modesty, like a craft whose effectiveness was limited.

He presented himself in his writings very differently from medical authors such as Burrows or Esquirol in whose texts we can perceive the grand authoritative gesture of the expert. Prichard did not underline his personal achievements, he did not dwell on his role in personal encounters with patients. Nor, for that matter, was he interested in the patients telling their stories. Rather, the diagnosis of moral insanity must rely on the testimony of people who had known the patient for some time, because one of the salient characteristics of the disorder consisted in a change of character.

This brings us to the social implications of moral insanity. When Prichard discussed the expediency of confinement, he said: "Confinement is unnecessary for such a person, who is in no way dangerous to society. If the management of his property - for such individuals are generally possessed of property - could be so settled as to ensure his having the usual supports of life, this would be sufficient". Buried in this sentence is a decisive side of
moral insanity. It was usually a disorder of the affluent. And it was a disorder which was a lot more respectable than other ideas about unsoundness of mind. In a way, moral insanity served to create a class of patients who were not liable to be confounded with beastly imbeciles and the debilitated.

The notion of a civil disease for the refined strata of society can be seen as linking up with Prichard's hesitation to recommend confinement: it all pandered to the attitudes of an educated class of possible clients. Asylums had in those days a poor reputation with the general public, and it was very much in the interest of an alienist to play down the importance of confinement.¹⁶⁶

Hence Prichard's claim that in some forms of moral insanity it was sufficient to take the management of his property out of the hands of the disturbed individual. To see moral insanity in this manner, as a somewhat polite form of madness, was a concomitant of Prichard's assumption that the disorder was characteristic of civilization. Brute men - savages as well as peasant folk - were not refined enough for the "cold egotism" which held sway in modern life and which was to a large extent responsible for the rising numbers of madmen. Also, the particular type of anxieties modern men suffered from, loss of fortune or professional ambition, were not to be found in primitive societies. Prichard commented:

The apparent increase is everywhere so striking, that it leaves on the mind a strong suspicion ... that cases of insanity are far more numerous than formerly.... It is encouraged by the reflexion that the state of society is, in most countries, such as appears likely to multiply the existing causes of madness. ... Sufficient evidence has arisen to confirm in a great measure the remark made, many years ago by M. Esquirol, that insanity belongs almost exclusively to civilized races of men: it scarcely exists among savages, and is rare in barbarous countries.¹⁶⁷

What applied to insanity broadly speaking and to different stages of civilization, was true for moral insanity as well. Given that Prichard
considered all his contemporaries to be liable to moral insanity, he logically assumed that the "more civilized" strata of society were more endangered than the lower classes. The aetiology of moral insanity covered many symptoms which were not dependent on social status. Yet, an old tradition had it that the refined classes as more susceptible to feeling than the ordinary strata of society. Moral insanity, defined as a disease of the passions, was therefore especially prevalent among refined and propertied people.

With moral insanity, Prichard devised a model disease which explained in psychiatric terms the despicable moral corruption of his times and, in particular, of the affluent, who had the means to indulge in "moral debasement" until they were mad. Paradoxically, this very aspect of the disease was apt to make it more palatable to the public. The creation of the concept could be called a cunning selling strategy, except that its formulation was a result of Prichard's views on human nature and his despair with the moral depravation of his time.

There is yet another respect in which the consideration of property was pivotal in Prichard's thought: he put forward his pleas for confinement in certain cases, first of all, in the name of social order: "Of all these arrangements the maintenance of public order is the principal object, and the second is the preservation of the property belonging to the lunatic and the interest of his family".168 It is notable that Prichard's concern circled around notions of property and the avoidance of social upheaval. Esquirol, by contrast, had put much greater emphasis on propriety.169 Esquirol's theory was suitable for post-revolutionary French society where the aristocracy as well as the high bourgeoisie tried to re-establish distinct social hierarchies. For him, much more than for Prichard, nymphomania and satyriasis were diseases concomitant with civil society.170 Property was not one of the topics which specially preoccupied Esquirol. For Prichard, however, it was not social hierarchy but the preservation of peace and order.
which was at the centre of his concern. Legal interference was needed, when a mentally disturbed person threatened to harm himself, other people or their property. Society had not only the right, but the duty to interfere with persons who, like Symonds's gentleman patient, squandered their possessions and threatened to throw their families into poverty.171

Insanity was, for Prichard, a prevalent menace. It was not an exceptional misfortune, but rather a predicament society had to live with. All eccentric behaviour was indicative of a deranged mind. Since many eccentrics did no harm to anybody, their behaviour could be tolerated. But for the sake of social cohesion society had to defend itself when its law and order were attacked. This is why Prichard chose the preservation of social order, of property and personal safety, as the criteria for certification.

To conclude: moral insanity arose primarily out of Prichard's theological interest in sustaining the doctrine of the immaterial soul. The concept was expressive of his views on the precarious morality of modern man rather than of his desire to draw definite dividing lines between the sound and the unsound. For Prichard, man's mental health was ultimately tied to his religion. As we have seen, he was a medical dualist who thought that medicine was not much to do with the mind. Insofar as madness was excited by physical disease, medicine could cure. That failing, it could aid the law in preserving social order. Ironically, the course of events took a direction which was directly opposed to Prichard's designs. His zealous endeavour to sustain the doctrine of the soul against contemporary forms of medical materialism inadvertently supported another form of secularization of the mind. Prichard had referred the mechanisms of psychology to the body in order to preserve the soul's untainted immateriality. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as Michael Clark has shown, alienists would enlarge upon ideas which formed the physicalist part of the Prichardian anthropology.172 The notion of atonement, however, which included the whole of humanity, was lost.
While Prichard had fought phrenology, his successors were to combine moral insanity with phrenology. In the later decades of the nineteenth century, theories about hereditary mental degeneration were spreading. Accordingly, men were doomed by birth, not metaphysically but in terms of their physical heritage. How easily these notions could be combined with moral insanity is exemplified in the articles of John Kitching who, in the 1850s, served as the medical superintendent of the York Retreat. In his contributions to the *British Medical Journal* he applied doctrines of phrenology and hereditary degeneration to the concept of moral insanity. Madness was for him solely a question of "disordered functions of the brain". Moral insanity was the "arrested development in those parts of the brain, which are concerned in the due performance of the moral and instinctive faculties".\(^{173}\)

In legal practice, by contrast, moral insanity failed to become an accepted category. Prichard's attempt to help the legal enforcement of morality proved fruitless. The McNaghten rules of 1842 confirmed the persistence of the orthodox definition of madness which presupposed outright delusion.\(^{174}\) In the end, Prichard's endeavours were stifled. British law did not acknowledge moral insanity as he had hoped. Victorian alienists misinterpreted it.\(^{175}\) While Prichard had managed to hold a careful balance between the organic sources of the disease and its effects on man's morality on the one hand, and the organic implications of man's metaphysical framework on the other hand, subsequent generations confined moral insanity entirely to the physical sphere. Moral insanity, Prichard's legacy to medical psychiatry, was employed in conceptualizations of madness which overrode the transcendental nature of man. References to the soul were to become at best the philosophical superstructure in the belief systems of individual alienists. But on the whole, metaphysics were severed from medical theories - a development which would have confirmed Prichard's worst misgivings, had he lived to witness it.

2 Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity, and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind, London (Sherwood), 1835.

3 Ibid., 48-50.

4 Prichard's collected his cases where he could find them. He used material sent to him by his colleagues, excerpts from medical literature and personal experience.

5 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 6, 23-24. In 1840 he enumerated ten salient features of moral insanity, they include "a state of excitement ... alternate with corresponding depression", "the propensity to make extravagant purchases", "garrulity", "melancholy"; see: Prichard, "Insanity", in: Alexander Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 8 vols, London (Whittaker and Co.), 1840-1842, vol. 2, 102-142, p. 112-113 (Prichard's emphases).


For Benjamin Rush see: Richard Hunter, Ida Macalpine, Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry, Hartsdale (Carlisle Publ.), 1982 (1963), 665.


12 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 15. In 1831 he paid a visit to Esquirol at his hospital at Ivry near Paris; see his article on "Temperament", in: Forbes et al. (eds), The Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, vol. 4, p. 172


15 Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 114.


17 Prichard, A Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System, Part the First: Comprising Convulsive and Maniacal Affections, London (Thomas and George Underwood), 1822, 42-43. (The fact that the second volume never appeared is indicative of Prichard's changed attitudes towards insanity.)

18 Ibid., 119 (Prichard's emphasis). Following common-sense philosophy, Prichard divided the mental faculties into judgement and reasoning on the one hand and the passions, appetites, propensities, and volition on the other hand. At the beginning of his Treatise he attempted to prove why these innate mental faculties could be affected by disorders of the nervous system such as madness only in so far as the bodily framework was instrumentally important for the operation of the mind; see: ibid., 1-40.

19 Ibid., 37-38, 128-132.

20 Ibid., 128.

21 Cf. Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles, 192, 276. As to the survival of Locke's theory in general see ibid., chs 2 and 4.


23 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 3-4.

24 Ibid., 6, 11. Prichard talks about "disordered" or "disturbed" faculties.

25 Idem, Diseases of the Nervous System, 50-55. See also: Prichard's letter to


27 Notions of the soul and the mind were not entirely congruent. But when it came to criticising the phrenologists and other anatomists' endeavours to locate the soul within parts of the brain, the critics did not neatly distinguish between the two. Oehler-Klein has emphasized that Gall tried to eschew the materialist epithet; cf. Sigrid Oehler-Klein, Die Schädellehre Franz Joseph Galls in Literatur und Kritik des 19. Jahrhunderts (= Spemannerr Forschungen, 8), Stuttgart (Gustav Fischer Verlag), 1990, 106-114. For the varying treatments of the mind and the soul see Edwin Clarke, L. S. Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts, Berkeley (Univ. of California Press), 1987; very helpful is: Michael Hagner, "The Soul and the Brain Between Anatomy and Naturphilosophie in the Early Nineteenth Century", Medical History, 36 (1992), 1-33.


29 Gall, Spurzheim, Anatomie et physiologie du système nerveux, vol. 4, 256, the volume was written by Gall alone and published in 1818.

30 Prichard, Diseases of the Nervous System, 1-40.

31 Ibid., 13. Prichard wrote: "...whether the brain is allowed, or not, to be the organ of sensation and perception, no physiologist has yet contended, or will ever, I presume, venture to dispute, that some portion of the nervous system is instrumental to these operations".

32 Ibid., 242, 323.

33 For the development of neurological anatomy see W. F. Bynum, "Varieties of Cartesian Experience in Early Nineteenth Century Neurophysiology", in S. F. Spicker, H. T. Engelhardt (eds), Philosophical Dimensions of the Neuro-Medical Sciences, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1976, 15-33; see also Clarke, Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts. Excellent for the French context is Goldstein, Console and Classify.

34 Ibid., 253.

35 Etienne-Jean Georget, De la folie ou aliénation mentale, Paris (Rignoux), 1823.

36 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 214.
37 The quotation is from Georget himself, cited in Goldstein, *Console and Classify*, 256. According to Goldstein the influence of Gall "was pervasive" among the members of the Esquirol circle, ibid., 179-180, 256. For Georget's phrenological stance see Georget, *De la folie*, 47.


40 Idem, "Observations on the Connexions of Insanity with Diseases in the Organs of Physical Life", *Provincial Medical and Surgical Journal*, 7 (1844), 323-324, p. 323. Very odd, indeed, is Berrios's recent remark that "Pinel, Esquirol and Georget" were Prichard's "only sources", see his *The History of Mental Symptoms*, 426.


44 Hunter, Macalpine, *Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry*, 1014.

45 The American alienist Pliny Earle saw it as the first German journal on insanity of any standing. "The influence of the Journal was", as Earle put it, "favourable to the cause of the insane, as it ... awakened in its readers ... an interest in the improvement of hospitals". Cf. Pliny Earle, *Institutions for the Insane in Prussia, Austria and Germany*, New York (Wood), 1854, 5-16, 19-26, 28-29, quoted from: Hunter, Macalpine, *Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry*, 1015.

46 Prichard, "Beobachtungen über die Beziehung des Gedächtnisses zum Gehirn", *Zeitschrift für die Anthropologie*, 7 (1824), 243-250.


49 For Jacobi's theory see Dörner, *Bürger und Irre*, 270ff; Verwey, *Psychiatry in an Anthropological and Biomedical Context*, 27-30. Biographical data can be found in the otherwise totally unacceptable Johannes Herting, *Carl
51 Ibid., 330-331, 289.
52 Ibid., 259.
54 Maximilian Jacobi, "Beobachtungen über die Pathologie und Therapie der mit Irreseyn verbundenen Krankheiten", in: idem, Sammlungen für die Heilkunde der Gemüthskrankheiten, 3 vols, Elberfeld (Schönian'sche Buchhandlung), 1830, vol. 3, 359. Cf. also: ibid., vol. 1, 43-45. The Sammlungen combined three texts of Jacobi's from 1822, 1825, and 1830. His main work dates from 1830; as Dörner notes, the cornerstones of Jacobi's theory were already developed in 1822, see his Bürger und Irre, 277.
55 Prichard praised authors defiant of phrenology, he quoted only German names, see his "Temperament", in: Forbes et al. (eds), The Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, vol. 4, 159-174, p. 168-169.
56 Jacobi, Sammlungen, vol. 1, 38, 52.
57 Ibid., 44. Quoted in Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 29-30.
58 Jacobi, Sammlungen, 43 ("...und erst nachdem die Gemüthsstörung zur Wirklichkeit gekommen ist, und auch die Phantasie ... erkrankt ist, tritt Verstandesstörung ein. Dieses Ursprunges sind alle Hauptformen der Seelenstörungen, die man daher mit Recht Gemüthskrankheiten nennt...").
59 Ibid., 58.
60 Ibid., 34 (Jacobi talks about "kranlkhafter Wechsel in der Materie und Veränderungen in der Organisation").
62 Jacobi, Sammlungen, vol. 1, 70.
63 Prichard stressed that "a certain peculiarity of natural temperament or habit of body is a necessary condition for the development of insanity"
(Treatise on Insanity, 157), he adopted a classification of madness derived from humoralism (ibid., 168-169).

64 Prichard, "Temperament", in: Forbes et al. (eds), The Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, vol. 4, 159-174.


67 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 17. Roger Smith has rightly pointed out that this phrase lent itself to subsequent misinterpretations of moral insanity; he does not, however, link Prichard's opinion to the humoral tradition (Smith, Trial by Medicine, 114).

68 In general terms, this interpretation is supported by S. W. Jackson, "Galen on Mental Disorder", Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences, 5 (1969), 365-384, p. 382. Jackson notes that "certain" of Galen's "views and practices seem to have kinship with modern psychogenic theories and psychotherapies".

69 Jacobi, Sammlungen, vol. 1, 137.

70 Ibid., 64-66.

71 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 169-170, 461-480.

72 John Addington Symonds, Some Account of the Life, Writings, and Character of the Late James Cowles Prichard, Bristol (Evans & Abbott), 1849, 7. For details of Hancock's biography see ch. 5, section A.


74 In his translation of Buffon's Natural History, Smellie had made this point. Afterwards many conservative-minded naturalists refuted the idea. See, e. g., H. C. Trenchard, "On the Distinction Between Instinct and Reason", Bath and Bristol Magazine, 3 (1834), 147-155. See also Hancock, Essay on Instinct, 11-13.

75 Hancock, Essay on Instinct, ch. 6, "The Ascending Scale of Instinctive or Unconscious Motions".

76 Ibid., 109.

77 Ibid., 55, 59.

78 Ibid., 192, 173.

79 Ibid., 315 and ch. 9 ("Of the Divine Spirit in the Soul").

80 Ibid., 196 and 197ff (Part II "Of the Moral Relations of Instinct").

81 Prichard, A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle, as Maintained by Some Writers on Physiology with Observations on the Causes of Physical and Animal Life, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1829, 63 ("the relations which the faculties of brutes bear to those of man have been admirably illustrated by Dr. Hancock, in his Essay on Instinct"); idem, Researches into the Physical History of Man, 5 vols, London (Sherwood, Gilbert, Piper; John and Arthur Arch), 1836-1847, vol. 1, 174; idem, Treatise on Insanity, 189; Prichard quoted a title slightly different from Hancock's original. Since, as far as I know, Hancock published on the subject only the above mentioned book, it is unlikely that Prichard had in mind a publication other than Hancock's Essay.

82 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 174.
83 Ibid., 157.
84 Ibid., 189.
85 Ibid., 350, 189.
86 Philippe Pinel, *A Treatise on Insanity*.
88 Traditional British nosology was based on the differentiation between the "active" and the "intellectual" powers of mind (cf. Smith, *Trial by Medicine*, 38). But as Prichard's 1822 Treatise illustrates, this division introduced no genuine differentiation in the analytical treatment of the two. Spurzheim was one of the first to assign two different seats - both of them, of course, situated in the brain - to the emotive and the intellectual faculties respectively; cf. Oehler-Klein, *Die Schädellehre Franz Joseph Galls*, 330.
89 For a contemporary English account of Kant's terminology see the glossary in A. F. M. Willich, *Elements of the Critical Philosophy: Containing a Concise Account of its Origin and Tendency; a View of all the Works Published by its Founder, Professor Immanuel Kant ...*, London (Longman), 1798.
91 Ibid., 120.
92 In his time, La Romiguière was interpreted in very diverse ways. Prichard learnt about his theories through the Belgian alienist Joseph Guislain, cf. Prichard, *Treatise on Insanity*, 118-119.
93 An anonymous reviewer of the *Treatise on Insanity* wrote: "Let Dr. Prichard, however, confess that nearly all this new light on the subject of moral insanity has burst on M. Esquirol, on himself, and on the Scotch metaphysical school, since the appearance of Gall's immortal work on the anatomy and functions of the brain"; cf. *Lancet*, 1834-1835, no. 2, 703-705, p. 705. See also note 7 above.
94 A good treatment of Kant's role in the German alienist tradition is in Dörner, *Bürger und Irre*, 185-328. For the impact of Kant's philosophy on the natural sciences see: Frederick Gregory, "Kant's Influence on Natural Scientists in the German Romantic Period", in Robert Visser et al. (eds), *New Trends in the History of Science. Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of Utrecht*, Amsterdam (Rodopi), 1989, 53-66; Guenter Risse, "Kant, Schelling and the Early Search for a Philosophical 'Science' of Medicine in Germany", *Journal of the History of Medicine*, 27 (1972), 145-
145-178; idem, "Philosophical' Medicine in Nineteenth-Century
Germany: An Episode in the Relation Between Philosophy and Medicine", 

95 See e. g. Dörner, Bürger und Irre, 266; Goldstein, Console and Classify, 
242ff; Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions, 216-231; Smith, Trial by 
Medicine, 40ff.

96 Dörner has emphasized the liberal politics of the "somatic school" among 
German alienists some of whom indeed came to sit in the parliament of 
the Paulskirche in 1848. He does not, however, give their religious ethics 
its due; see his Bürger und Irre, 273-279.

97 Verwey, Psychiatry in an Anthropological and Biomedical Context, 8. L. 
S. Jacyna, too, has pointed out that the juxtaposition of "moral" theories 
of insanity and a physicalist aetiology is "over-simple"; see his "Somatic 
Theories of Mind and the Interests of Medicine in Britain, 1850-1879", 

Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens oder der Seelenstörungen und 
ihrer Behandlung vom rationalen Standpunkt aus entworfen, Leipzig 
(Vogel), 1818.

99 Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, 17.

100 For Pinel’s renunciation of humoralist diagnostic see Dora Weiner, "Le 
geste de Pinel: The History of a Psychiatric Myth", in: Mark S. Micale, 
Roy Porter (eds), Discovering the History of Psychiatry, Oxford (Oxford 


102 Ibid., vol.1, p. 43. Jacobi wrote: "...im Herzen zündet der Wahnsinn die 
Lichter an, durch welche die Trugbilder entstehen, die den Verstand irre 
leiten; im Herzen keimt die Narrheit auf...; im Herzen schlägt die 
Melancholie zuerst ihre dem Leben verderblichen Wurzeln".

103 Ibid. The old spelling of "Gemüt" is: "Gemüth".

104 Ibid., vol. 1, 34. Jacobi believed "dass Wechsel und Veränderungen der 
Materie und Organisation in einem ausserordentlichen Grade statt 
finden können, ohne dass die Außerung der Freiheit nur im mindesten 
dadurch beschränkt wird. Auf der andern Seite lehrt indessen die 
Erfahrung ebenfalls, dass es gewisse krankhafte Wechsel in der Materie 
und Veränderungen in der Organisation gibt, während deren 
Vorhandenseyn die moralische Freiheit oder das Wirken der Vernunft, 
durch ein bedingtes Leiden der Gemüths- und Verstandeskräfte 
gebunden erscheint" (my emphases).

105 In some respects the following catalogue is true for Esquirol as well. The 
basic rift between Prichard and the Nasse school on the one hand and 
Esquirol on the other lies in Esquirol’s "straightforwardly 'physiological"' 
approach, his penchant towards sensationalism and positivism, and his 
rejection of psychology as a discipline, see Goldstein, Console and 
Classify, 247, 249, 257.

106 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 246, "however, probable it may be thought 
by some persons that the passions and propensities are seated in the brain, 
or that modifications which the mind undergoes in respect to these
phenomena are connected with instrumental changes in the brain, the fact has never been proved”.

107 Ibid., 113-114, 242.
108 Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, sect IV.
109 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 246, 114.
110 Ibid., 246.
111 He himself referred to his 1822 Treatise on this point; Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 148. Cuvier had advanced the same opinion before the Académie des Sciences when he read out his judgement on the system of Gall and Spurzheim; see Clarke, Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts, 276.
112 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 117.
113 Prichard praised the "remarkable accuracy" of Foville's pathological researches. See his "An Address Delivered at the Third Anniversary Meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, July 23d, 1835", Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, 4 (1836), 1-54, p. 18-19. Indeed, Prichard thought that in Foville he had found a fellow-combatant against phrenology, believing that Foville was "at issue with the followers of Gall", cf. his Treatise on Insanity, 480. This was totally erroneous. In fact, Foville - no less than the bulk of the Esquirol circle - was intrigued by phrenology; cf. Goldstein, Console and Classify, 256. With regard to Foville's opinions on the viscera, it seems that Prichard exaggerated the former's statements. A reviewer of the Treatise on Insanity pointed out that Prichard had not quite grasped Foville's theory, see: [anon.], "Greco, Farr, Crowther, &c. on Insanity", British and Foreign Medical Review, 7 (1839), 1-55, p. 31. Indeed, Foville tried to prove that the cerebellum was the seat of sensation; see Clarke, Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts, 297-298.
114 Prichard, "Observations on the Connexions of Insanity with Diseases in the Organs of Physical Life".
115 Ibid., 323.
117 Prichard, "Observations on the Connexions of Insanity with Diseases in the Organs of Physical Life", 323 (orig. emphasis).
118 Weiner, "Mind and Body in the Clinic", 388.
119 In 1840 Prichard's former praise of Foville had given way to a detached and even sceptical evaluation; cf. Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 127.
120 Prichard, "Observations on the Connexions of Insanity with Diseases in the Organs of Physical Life", 323-324.
121 Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol, "Monomanie", 5.
122 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 93; Prichard quoted from p. 63 in Esquirol's "Monomanie".
123 In 1842 Prichard treated instinctive madness and moral insanity separately in chs 5 and 9 of On the Different Forms of Insanity, in Relation to Jurisprudence. Designed for the Use of Persons Concerned in Legal Questions Regarding Unsoundness of Mind, London (Baillière),
1842. So far, no historian who has dealt with Prichard's moral insanity has been aware of this distinction. Joel Peter Eigen is the most recent example, see Eigen, Witnessing Insanity, 77-79. This is important because Eigen interprets Prichard's moral insanity as related to the notion of disorders of the will. Had he heeded Prichard's emphasis that instinctive mania and moral insanity were two different nosological categories, he might have come to another conclusion.

124 Prichard, "Observations on the Connexions of Insanity with Diseases in the Organs of Physical Life", 323.

125 Ibid., 324. Prichard added that "Serous effusion, indeed, existed within the skull; and this is known to be a very frequent phenomenon in cases of insanity", but he suggested that this might be "regarded rather as an effect than a cause" of madness.

126 Jacobi, Sammlungen, vol. 2, 314 ("die selbststähtigen Triebe ... streben gegen die Offenbarung").


128 Prichard, "An Address Delivered at the Third Anniversary Meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, July 23d, 1835", Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, 4, 1836, 1-54, p. 39.

129 Jacobi, Sammlungen, vol. 1, 24; quoted in Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 196.


131 Martin Wiener has depicted the great Victorian anxiety that the demise of traditional hierarchies would inevitably lead to the loss of public order: Martin Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830-1914, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1981.

132 See note 105 above.

133 Especially when religious issues were touched upon, Prichard often expressed his own views by quoting others.

134 The passage was quoted in: Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 115. The original is in: Esquirol, "De la lypémanie ou mélancholie", in: idem, Des maladies mentales, vol. 1, 398-481, p. 401.

135 The quote is from Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 192. The original is in Esquirol, "Monomanie", 49.

136 It was one of the ten salient characteristics of moral insanity, see: Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 113.

138 This was an important factor in his attitude to racial theories, see ch. 6.


141 Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), *The Library of Medicine*, 113 (my emphasis).


143 Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), *The Library of Medicine*, 113.


147 Walker and McCabe refer the misinterpretation to Prichard's usage of the word 'moral'. Their views were adopted by later scholars. Walker, MacCabe, *Crime and Insanity in England*, 208; Hunter, Macalpine, *Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry*, 838; Smith, *Trial by Medicine*, 114.


150 This has been demonstrated in Akihito Suzuki's paper "The Structure of the Psychiatric Bedside", given at the conference "Voices from the Past: Source Materials for the History of Psychiatry" at the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine on 10. Feb. 1995.

151 Prichard himself was aware that given the unsatisfactory state of legal practice, expediency would occasionally overrule the law, see the case which he described in his *On the Different Forms of Insanity*, 226-227.


153 John Conolly, *An Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity, with Suggestions for the Better Protection and Care of the Insane*, London (John
Taylor), 1830.

154 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 341.

155 Conolly, An Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity, 173; Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 383. Prichard had not always been an adherent to moral treatment, see his "Remarks on the Treatment of Epilepsy, and some Other Nervous Diseases", Edinburgh Medical Journal, 11 (1815), 458-466, p. 465.

156 Conolly, An Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity, 136, 173.

157 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 23-24, 45.

158 Ibid., 402.

159 Prichard thought very highly indeed of Conolly. See his letter to the Barrister Arthur James Johnes, 24. 7. 1843, Crossley Papers, autograph collection, vol. 3, Manchester Central Library.

160 This was due to the fact that murder was not a typical manifestation of moral insanity. It is notable that Prichard failed to give any attention to the famous trials which had agitated British discussion about forensic medicine since the turn of the century, and he was duly criticized for this. See: [anon.], "Prichard, Winslow, &c. on the Plea of Insanity in Criminal Cases", British and Foreign Medical Review, 16 (1843), 81-110, p. 87.

161 Prichard, On the Different Forms of Insanity, 65.


163 Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 112.


165 Idem, Treatise on Insanity, 402 (my emphasis).

166 Two parliamentary inquiries and the subsequent popularizations of their findings could not fail to make the public wary of mal-practice in the asylums. See, for example, Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions, 115-146; see also Peter McCandless, "Liberty and Lunacy: The Victorians and Wrongful Confinement", in: Andrew Scull (ed.), Madhouses, Mad-Doctors and Madmen. The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era, Philadelphia (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press), 1981, 339-362.

167 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 350, see also p. 175 where Prichard discusses the truth of this hypothesis. Esquirol frequently suggested that madness was a typical disease of civilization, see his Des Passions, considérées comme causes, symptômes et moyens curatifs de l'aliénation mentale, Paris, Didot Jeune, AN XIV (1805), 15. As to historiographical accounts of the dangers of civilization see: Mark D. Altschule, "The Concept of Civilization as a Social Evil in the Writings of Mid-Nineteenth

168 Prichard, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 135.

169 Henriques has shown that property was the rationale for British post-Napoleonic ideology. See: Ursula R. Q. Henriques, Before the Welfare State: Social Administration in Early Industrial Britain, London, New York (Longmans), 1979.

170 In his doctoral thesis Esquirol explained in physiological terms why the sexual passions were so particularly delicate, see Esquirol, Des Passions, considérées comme causes, symptômes et moyens curatifs, 12.

171 Exaggerated thrift and "the propensity to make extravagant purchases" were only two among a wide range of symptoms for moral insanity. Nonetheless, they play an important role in Prichard's aetiology. See Prichard, On the Different Forms of Insanity, 2; idem, "Insanity", in: Tweedie (ed.), The Library of Medicine, 112 (his emphasis).


174 Eigen has shown that the attempts of consulting alienists to introduce the concept of moral insanity in the courtroom were on the whole unsuccessful; Eigen, Witnessing Insanity, 149-152. According to Smith, "the terms impulsive and moral insanity... were rarely helpful to the defence strategy"; Smith, Trial by Medicine, 123.

PART II

THE RESEARCHES
INTO THE PHYSICAL HISTORY OF MANKIND
4. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY - THE PHENOMENON OF SIMILARITY

A. Introduction

Prichard's entire anthropological work was carried out in the name of one overarching goal: he wanted to prove monogenism, that is the assumption that all human tribes were genealogically related to each other and could in the last event be referred to the same primeval pair of ancestors who within his theological framework were, of course, Adam and Eve.

Prichard spent more than forty years trying to pull the carpet away from underneath the polygenist argument which denied the common origin of mankind. Having started out as a medical student, trying to explain the origins of a change in skin colour, he later turned into Britain's foremost ethnologist who endeavoured to establish ethnology as a distinct science. Given that he applied himself to the subject of anthropology for more than four decades his physiological views of mankind changed remarkably little.1

Prichard always remained a disciple of Enlightenment philosophy who theorized on the relationship between civilization and human physiognomy. But he also became acquainted with the depths of human psychology. The older he grew the more he believed that the mind could not be explained through reference to rationality and utilitarian expediency alone. Nor was it sufficient to blame "passion" - this eighteenth-century goblin-like twin-brother of prudent rationality - for
deviations in behaviour and thought. When he was in his fifties, Prichard suspected that the mind was an abyss of "gloom" and darkness. Whatever the polygenists claimed, Prichard was convinced that it was precisely this side of the human character which proved beyond doubt the unity of mankind - Prichard's psychology is not only the most outstanding new feature of the third edition of the Researches, even within the broad spectrum of British philosophizing on the human mind it holds an important place.

A contemporary explained Prichard's adherence to monogenism as a duty owed to his Quaker father. Prichard himself wrote in the first edition of the Researches (1813) that it had been Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) who inspired his anthropological interests during his student years and incited him to deepen his "inquiry into the physical history of mankind".

To prove monogenism, he grappled with problems from all the natural and human sciences: anatomy, physiology, biology, ethnology, palaeontology, archaeology, mythology, and philology. Referring humanity to a common lineage, Prichard was obliged to support some hereditary theory which guaranteed the unity of species while leaving room to account for its diversities. Beginning with his doctoral dissertation, this was the problem which engaged him throughout his life. Prichard's Researches into the Physical History of Man was published in 1813. In two subsequent editions (1826 and 1836-1847) he changed "Man" into "Mankind", thereby stressing that it was man as a biological species - the natural history of man - he was dealing with. In these two editions, each more than twice as voluminous as the preceding, he added to and amended his findings in the light of the latest scientific discoveries and the increasing body of travel literature. The third edition was divided into one volume, dealing with theory (1836), and four volumes dealing with the "ethnography" of mankind in Africa (1837), Europe
(1841), Asia (1844), Oceania and America (1847). Structurally the arguments in the *Researches* do not change. In all editions, as well as in Prichard’s M. D. dissertation and in his *The Natural History of Man* (1843) a disquisition on the unity of mankind is followed by ethnological descriptions and remarks on the history of languages.

There were not many currents of research which Prichard left out. A discussion of his sources is difficult given the immense range of his learning. In fact it is easier to point out the gaps in Prichard’s knowledge than the sources he knew. Among the marked absences in his choice of sources ranks Charles Darwin’s *Beagle Journal* (1839). Also, Karl Ernst von Baer’s embryology is not taken into account. Lyell, though quoted, is far from assuming a central position. Stocking has pointed out that the first edition of the *Researches* was marked by the absence of references to French Ideologues and Scottish Enlightenment philosophers. This, however, is not true. Prichard frequently referred to the "Revolutionary legislator" Constantin-François Chassebeuf de Volney and to Baron Larrey who had accompanied Napoleon to Egypt. As for Scottish Enlightenment philosophers Prichard took their tenets in many respects for granted. His philosophical views were shaped by them. He occasionally referred to Dugald Stewart, William Robertson, and Lord Kames, albeit not always by name.

On the whole, Prichard’s reading was sometimes rather idiosyncratic. There are several explanations for the striking omissions which have been mentioned above. Prichard’s interests were very different from those of twentieth-century historians of evolution. Secondly, the mass of material he had to master was so great that he sometimes simply missed out on certain important publications. And thirdly, Prichard’s reading list was in many instances dictated by what was available: it may safely be assumed that Prichard read what he could lay his hands on.
The result was that he knew many arcane books while he missed out on other important - especially foreign publications. As August Wilhelm Schlegel would put it in a review: "German learning and literature are not foreign to the author, however there are many things boldly asserted and refuted in Germany ... of which he does not seem to have heard of".\(^{14}\) Even if he had had the means to acquire all books he wanted to read, many of them - i.e. old editions and foreign publications - would not have been readily available. Prichard's correspondence with Colonel John Washington, the secretary of the Royal Geographical Society from 1836 to 1841, illustrates his difficulties in obtaining the books he needed.\(^{15}\) Since he enjoyed the privilege of receiving loans from the Society's library he sometimes tried to talk Washington into buying particular items in the hope that they might finally end up on his desk.\(^{16}\)

A certain degree of accidentality in his reading lists notwithstanding, Prichard had obviously particular preferences characteristic for himself. Thus he never gave up quoting the canon of classical literature. It was not just the sagacity of pagan Roman authors which he cherished but their closeness to the antiquity of mankind. Another subject matter he followed was travel literature which provided him with much desired ethnographical information. The breadth of Prichard's knowledge of travel literature may be illustrated by the example of those books which John Barrow, later president of the Royal Geographical Society, reviewed between the foundation of the \textit{Quarterly Review} in 1809 and 1824. In that period Barrow alone published more than fifty reviews of travel literature. At least half of the books he referred to were quoted by Prichard.\(^{17}\) Prichard was not choosy with respect to the philosophical or political attitude of a travel writer.\(^{18}\) Yet he had a predilection for the accounts of missionaries. Stocking pointed out that Prichard trusted the accounts of missionaries more than those of naturalists, because the former tended to stay for years with a tribe, while
naturalists were merely passing by. As Prichard put it, "through long residence ... and by a thorough acquaintance with the language and habits of the inhabitants" missionaries were "well qualified" to form themselves an opinion.

Other fields in which he was well read were comparative anatomy and natural history. Prichard was well versed in the theories of the Paris schools of Geoffroy and Cuvier. Even though he rarely explicitly referred to transmutationist doctrines and French materialists, he knew them well enough to be thoroughly opposed to them. Equally, he was familiar with German physiological writings in the vein of Naturphilosophie and he often quoted famous physicians such as Johann Christian Reill (1759-1813), Carl Asmund Rudolphi (1771-1832), anatomists such as Samuel Thomas Soemmerring (1755-1830) and Friedrich Tiedemann (1781-1861). Until the second edition of the Researches Prichard was also very interested in literature on the distribution of plants, animals, and man across the globe: he became acquainted with works by biogeographers such as Eberhardt August Wilhelm Zimmermann, Professor of experimental Philosophy (1743-1815), Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle (1778-1841), or Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859). Moreover, he had expertise in German, French and British anthropological literature. And even though he often quoted British authors the prevalence of other nationalities incited critics to scorn him for deriding British scholarship.

As a youth Prichard had already learned French. Between 1815 and 1819 he acquired a proficiency in German. Like Thomas Beddoes, Alexander Crichton, William Lawrence, Thomas Carlyle and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Prichard perceived a command of German as a sine qua non. The influence of German literature on his works is striking. For the subject of anthropology, in particular, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) became his idol. Later, Christian Carl Josias Bunsen, the
philosophical philologist, and the geographer Carl Ritter (1779-1859) also served as Prichard’s principal reference authors.

In the following, the structure of Prichard’s *Researches* will be delineated: starting with Prichard’s M. D. dissertation, all his inquiries "into the physical history of mankind" were built around the same theoretical core. Prichard divided the monogenist hypothesis into two necessary propositions which he tried to prove one after the other: firstly that all mankind, in terms of their nature, belonged to one species, and secondly that they were referable to one single place of origin. Prichard’s principal questions were:

1st Whether, through the organized world in general, it has been the plan or method of Nature to produce one stock or family, in each particular species, or to call the same species into existence by several distinct origins, and then to diffuse it at once generally, without waiting for the slow method of propagation from a single root? In other words, whether all the organized beings of each particular species can be referred with probability to a common parentage?

2dly Whether there is more than one species of men in existence? In other words, whether the physical diversities of the several races of men, are such as have probably arisen by variation from one primitive type or form: or must on the contrary be considered as permanent characters, and therefore as constituting distinct species?

After Prichard had thus broken down the hypothesis of monogenesis into two questions, he proceeded to delineate his "methods of inquiry". He grounded the doctrine of the unity of mankind on four arguments.

a. all functions of the human organism happened according to the same "principal Laws of the Animal Economy", including the duration of life, the period of uterogestation, the number of progeny, etc.

b. All mankind were prone to same diseases.

c. Prichard believed that Buffon’s criterion of hybridity was valid: only animals of one and the same species could procreate with each other, thereby engendering fertile offspring. Since mixed marriages between
individuals of all human tribes fulfilled the prerequisite, all mankind was one species.

d. Reasoning "from analogy", Prichard investigated the natural history of animals and plants: what applied to them was, ceteris paribus, true for mankind as well. Since variations within one animal species were often a lot greater than those to be found within mankind, Prichard inferred the unity of the human species. In the third edition of the Researches he applied the "analogical method" not only to physiognomical characteristics and the animal economy but also to psychology. These arguments did not have equal weight. Since the argument of hybridity (point c.) was attacked by many naturalists, Prichard relied heavily on analogical reasoning. This was his contribution to the problem of man's place in nature. Having adopted it from Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, he was its foremost proponent in Britain.

After having explained his arguments in favour of the species unity of mankind, Prichard set out to prove that all humans originated in one quarter of the globe. It was clear that he had the old Biblical terrain in mind. Prichard relied on three methods of investigation to demonstrate the truth of monogenism:

a. he engaged in the distribution of organized beings, showing that each individual species came from one centre of creation.

b. Prichard ventured into philology to show that all human languages were related and thence referable to one stem.

c. He showed that the myths of all human tribes were so similar that they all necessarily had to share into the same primeval history.

All three editions of the Researches followed this outline. With respect to The Natural History of Man, however, he departed in certain aspects from the pattern. Published in 1843, the book was intended as a summary of the Researches more easily accessible than the five-volume opus into...
which the work had grown. In *The Natural History of Man* the emphasis of the argument lay on biology. Systematic comparisons between mankind and the animal realm assume proportionally more space than in the *Researches*. The sections on philology, by contrast, are considerably shorter. While the second and third editions of the *Researches* start off with a delineation of the distribution of plants and animals, *The Natural History of Man* begins with a detailed discussion of the causes of variations in animals and mankind. Hence, for instance, the issue of changes in instinct is given a very prominent place in *The Natural History of Man*, while in the *Researches* it is treated less concisely, less daringly even.

The discussion of Prichard's anthropology must necessarily focus on particular topics. It would be fruitless meticulously to follow up each of the above-mentioned points. Philology and mythology, will be dealt with in individual chapters. The topics which will be addressed here are the "analogical method"; Prichard's notion of the animal economy and disease patterns of human tribes; the heavily contested argument of hybridity; and Prichard's theories of distribution.

In addition come two further points to be discussed in the fifth chapter: since Prichard prided himself on having introduced the criterion of psychology into ethnology, it will be worthwhile to investigate what he understood by psychology. Another topic is Prichard's attitude towards the Bible. Was it true, as has been contended, that he, despite all his devoutness, could not evade the increasing pressure of secularization? Before all these questions can be addressed, however, it will be necessary to explain his ethnological terminology and to sketch out the background of the polygenist-monogenist struggle between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. We will start off with the latter.
B. The Concept of Monogenism and Prichard's Terminology

Discussing the *Researches* means discussing the notion of monogenesis. Wilhelm E. Mühlmann identified all monogenists as bibliomaniac reactionaries; the polygenists were praised as progressive spirits. Harris, by contrast, argued that Lamarck's transmutationist theory was "merely an extension of the evolutionary mode of thought" common to most monogenists. These somewhat anachronistic assertions were soon set straight. Curtin, Duchet, Stocking, Jay and many others consider the quarrel between monogenists and polygenists mainly in view of the problem of the theory of race and the question of how far polygenism went hand in hand with the assertion that some races were endowed with inbred superiority. This focus owes its spur to the fact that in the nineteenth century in many countries, and especially in the United States, the theory of polygenism was used to justify slavery and to assert that blacks were constitutionally not fit for self-government. Stanton has pointed out that it does not make sense to equate monogenism with antiracism since there was at least one American monogenist who also supported the notion of an innate cultural hierarchy. And polygenism did not necessarily go hand in hand with racism and the defense of slavery, as the examples of the German anatomist, Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, and the English doctor, Charles White, show. This exception notwithstanding, Stocking's assertion is plausible that there "is both logical and historical continuity between the modern antiracist and the nineteenth-century monogenist traditions".

There are two traditions of natural history which can roughly be referred to monogenist and polygenist beliefs respectively. On the one hand, there were all those authors who, rejecting the Chain of Being, supported the idea that species unity was a question of lineage, that is, of genealogical descent. On the other hand, there were those authors who retained the notion that all species were arranged along a hierarchical
scale. Their taxonomic interests easily led them to arrange different human varieties along that scale as if they were different species. W. F. Bynum has shown to what extent the shedding of the Chain of Being was a concomitant of monogenist, sometimes philanthropical opinions.\textsuperscript{30} Phillip Sloan has also maintained that a species concept based on the notion of lineage, instead of that of resemblance, supported the doctrine of monogenism. The idea that not "resemblance" but lineage was the criterion for species unity went back to Buffon.\textsuperscript{31} To throw some light on the nature of Prichard's monogenism it will be useful to describe the background of the debate as it had developed to the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The question whether mankind had been brought forth in one act of creation or whether God had peopled the earth in several creative acts went as far back as 1520 when the doctor Theophrastus Paracelsus (c. 1593-1541) asserted the plurality of the races of mankind.\textsuperscript{32} In 1655 the French Protestant, Isaac de La Peyrère (1594-1676), published a book - Prae-Adamitae - in which he argued that there had been humans before Adam was created. It was from this tribe of 'preadamic' humans that Cain chose his wife after he had been expelled by his people for the murder of Abel. By the eighteenth century, however, these ideas were largely forgotten.\textsuperscript{33} Oliver Goldsmith, William Robertson, Dugald Stewart, Samuel Stanhope Smith, Thomas Winterbottom, John Hunter, Immanuel Kant, Buffon, Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, Blumenbach and Petrus Camper all explicitly asserted monogenism.\textsuperscript{34} As for Cuvier, he was a special case, adhering to monogenism and at the same time promoting a theory of strong racial differences. Faced with this abundance of monogenists, Urs Bitterli has suggested that "the idea of the unity of mankind was hardly contested during the eighteenth century".\textsuperscript{35}

Yet there were eighteenth-century authors who nonetheless came back to the concept of polygenism. Three trains of thought paved the way
for this development: Linnaeus had distinguished between the human species, anthropoid troglodytes and other creatures located between the ape-type and mankind as it was created in the image of God. The existence of a hierarchy leading from man to anthropoid creatures to apes was easily reconcilable with the notion that non-European peoples, in particular the blacks, constituted a specific branch of the human family ranging somewhere between the white man and apes. Authors such as Edward Long (1734-1813), who wrote a History of Jamaica (1774), or the Manchester doctor Charles White (1728-1813) advanced theories of this type.

The other train of thought which led to polygenism was famously supported by the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782). A polygenist doctrine was Kames's solution to the debate on the dispersion of human and animal tribes raging in the Scottish philosophical scene in the second half of the eighteenth century. Instead of believing that mankind had miraculously (or via a land-bridge between America and the old continent) spread across the globe, Kames preferred to scrap the miracle and believe in different acts of human creation. He was very well aware that his assumption contradicted Scripture. Though he paid lip-service to the Biblical story of the tower of Babel he left no doubt that this was not what he actually believed. A third train of argument which led to polygenist assumptions was tied to Rousseau's daring suggestion that apes developed into man. Long before Lamarck an eighteenth-century author like James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714-1799), referred to that theory, stipulating the existence of man with tails. Equally he believed that the orang-utan was human. The idea was in line with Linnaeus' taxonomy which referred both man and apes to the class of "quadrupedes". Defenders of monogenism initially directed their arguments against outright polygenist theories as well as attempts to conflate the dividing lines between mankind and
other animals. In part it was this tendency to show mankind as all too "natural" that critics of Linnean taxonomy had in mind when they chid it as too "artificial" and "arbitrary"."41

Yet another new source of polygenist thinking rose in the early 1800s in the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim's phrenology: if individual faculties were innate and heritable, the same must hold for racial characterization as well.42 By assigning "human understanding" to the realm of natural history the phrenologists underscored the process of levelling the special status in natural history which mankind had been assigned of old.43 Scientific iconoclasts declared man an animal. At the same time human varieties were hierarchically classified according to their supposedly natural and innate faculties. For Linnaeus the Troglodytes could assume the role of "lesser" humans. For many nineteenth-century polygenists a majority of all non-European "races" held that position.

Prichard supported monogenism against several enemy theories. There were the French "materialist" doctrines of sensationalism. There was Rousseau's developmentalism, which seemingly rejected the idea that mankind had been created perfect. And there was the phrenological system. By the 1830s the cast of his immediate theoretical enemies comprised eight principal figures.44 It included the travelling surgeon Johann Baptist von Spix (1781-1826) and the naturalist and later Professor of Botany at Munich University, Carl Friedrich Philip von Martius (1794-1868). On the orders of the Bavarian king these two had accompanied an Austrian expedition to Brazil from 1817 to 1820. In their report they painted a colourful picture of the abject customs of the Indians.45 At the same time they asserted that there were similarities between the Brazilians and the Chinese. If this remark appeared to Prichard, in 1826, as a helpful hint elucidating the unity of mankind, by the third edition he openly regretted Spix and Martius's polygenism. Meanwhile von
Martius's essay On the State of Civil and Natural Rights among the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Brazil had come out. Now Prichard understood that the travellers, far from supporting his opinions, were advocates of original differences within the human family, Martius describing in "a very strong - and, as it appears to me, in an exaggerated - manner" the "inhumanising" (Prichard's translation for "Entmenschung") of the Brazilians. As his esteem for Spix and Martius flagged, Prichard came to doubt even the monogenist morality of a man like Alexander von Humboldt. Humboldt, too, had travelled to South America. In 1836 Prichard surmised that Humboldt might share the other Germans' opinions.

With respect to the eminent physiologist and anthropological writer Carl Asmund Rudolphi (1771-1832), however, Prichard was not mistaken: "I do not expect a Rafael or a Kant from the Australian Negro", Rudolphi grumbled, "but at least he could have ventured into science". After all, Rudolphi added, "there was a time when we were Barbarians, too". He believed that the differences between blacks and whites were so striking that botanists and entymologists would be very often glad about having "so obvious characteristics as we find in the Negro and others".

Other people on Prichard's list of polygenists included the French traveller Jean-Baptiste-George-Marie Bory Saint Vincent (1780-1846) as well as the doctor Julien-Joseph Virey (1775-1846) who advanced the idea that mankind was originally divided into the white and the black "species" taking Monboddo's conjectures concerning the development from the orang-utan into man for a "literal scientific truth". Louis-Antoine Desmoulins (1794-1828) also belonged to Prichard's adversaries. Initially, he had been a protégé of Cuvier (1769-1832) at the Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle. But in the early 1820s he fell out with his mentor. Vexed and stubborn as he was, he sealed his fate by publishing in 1826 his Histoire naturelle des races humaines in which he asserted the existence of no less
than 16 originally different human species. Not only was the number exceptional: Desmoulins detected racial distinctions in the history of civilized Europe itself.\textsuperscript{53} That a disciple of Cuvier should have published these ideas did not appear all too curious to Prichard: Cuvier himself was after all on his black list of polygenists.

In his "Discours préliminaire", prefixed to the Discours sur les révolutions de la surface du globe, Cuvier had maintained that a few human individuals had fled from the Deluge into three different directions, their posterity developed into the "races caucasiques", the "races altaïques" and the "nègres".\textsuperscript{54} Cuvier considered the Caucasian variety as superior to other humans. It comprised the Chaldaens (these being the ancestors of the Hebrews), the Indians, and Egyptians.\textsuperscript{55} The "nègres" in Africa were "la plus dégradée des races humaines".\textsuperscript{56} Finally, there were the Mongols whom Cuvier characterized as "talking in monosyllables and writing arbitrary hieroglyphics".\textsuperscript{57a} He believed in the existence of human races - "on y remarque de certaines conformations héréditaires que constituent ce qu'on nomme des races"\textsuperscript{57b} - though he did not embrace polygenism. Still, Prichard took Cuvier for a polygenist.

Conversely, he did not seem to understand the polygenist undercurrents in Samuel George Morton (1799-1851), the Professor of Anatomy at Pennsylvania College, and William Frédéric Edwards (1776-1842), the French physiologist and ethnologist. As late as 1843 Prichard praised Morton for his "judicious" delineation of American nations.\textsuperscript{58} This misjudgement was certainly reinforced through Prichard's Quaker friend, the doctor Thomas Hodgkin (1798-1866), who harboured the same misconception concerning Morton's increasingly polygenist perspective.\textsuperscript{59}

As for William Frédéric Edwards, both Hodgkin and Prichard were not clearly aware of the character of his research interests. Like Morton, Edwards was exceedingly well reputed among the medical faculty. And
since he, like Morton, refrained from outright polygenist publications, Prichard praised him highly, considering him as one of the very few authors who had proposed to investigate the physical nature of mankind. Hodgkin had co-translated an earlier work of Edwards, *On the Influence of Physical Agents on Life* (1832). When the Ethnological Society of London was set up in 1842, it was modelled on Edwards's Société Ethnologique de Paris.

Among British religious writers it was commonly assumed that the assault on the unity of species was a typical product of French Enlightenment materialism. Voltaire's outright polygenism and his contempt for religion were regarded as two sides of the same coin. In 1836 the future Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman remarked that Prichard's polygenist opponents were "to be found chiefly among French naturalists, who unfortunately are yet, in part at least, unreclaimed from the sceptical theories of the last century". Prichard himself believed by the early 1840s that he had been driven into a corner: the influence of French materialism had made itself felt in Britain as well. As he saw it, only Germany was not yet swallowed up by anti-religious tendencies.

In some people's eyes the Enlightenment had become a scapegoat for all that went amiss in the nineteenth century. Prichard's attitude towards the Enlightenment was more complex: on the one hand, and largely through his formation at Edinburgh University, he was a product of the Enlightenment approach to the natural history of man. And if over time his theories appeared increasingly old-fashioned or "conservative" as one reviewer expressed it, this was because Prichard always thought along the lines of those problems which had been posed in the eighteenth century. But on the other hand, and insofar as he identified the Enlightenment with materialism, he castigated it. Prichard shared the Romantic disgust with Enlightenment materialism, carrying in himself the Romantic sorrow over the loss of a unified world-view in which the
one and the many, reason and feeling, God and science had been united. In his discussion of the fight of the ideologies, juxtaposing "equality" to "organicism", Frank Manuel has described the rival outlook within which early nineteenth-century contemporaries had to locate themselves:

If man is primarily a rational animal and the highest form of reason is mathematics, the Turgot-Condorcet egalitarian ideal of rational units behaving in accordance with mathematicized social rules is comprehensible. But if humanity is a composite whose various manifestations include the predominantly activist or religious as well as rationalist, the social structure, reflecting and embracing the variety and diversity of men, will be organismic, a harmony of complex, different, and essential parts.65

Prichard never belonged to those people like Carlyle or Coleridge who annoyed their countrymen by referring them to the complexities of German philosophy, which in Britain were widely perceived as metaphysical jabbering. Nor did he relentlessly underline the organic make-up of society.66 If he likened the growth of nations to that of the individual it was not so much within a biological metaphor but within the language of the metaphor of education that drew a parallel between individual education and a nation's rise to maturity. His fight against polygenism unified his aversion to all the various tendencies which embodied the dangers of the age, materialist physiology, physical determinism, sensationalism, and the praise of reason at the expense of faith. Prichard was convinced that all these traits were concomitants of polygenism. He always rejected the idea of different human races. But for him any racialist thinking was tied to polygenism. Therefore he was not able to see that, later in the nineteenth century, racial theories would come up which would not argue with the doctrine of monogenism. People like Samuel George Morton (1799-1851), Josiah Clark Nott (1804-1873) and George R. Gliddon (1809-1857) discussed phenomena of race outside the religious context, they simply were not interested in the
question whether monogenism or polygenism was true. Whether races had been created as such or whether they had been formed shortly after the Deluge, was a matter of little importance for these authors. It was one of the reasons why many people around the middle of the century believed that they could not learn much from Prichard.

Monogenism was obviously a crucial Christian doctrine. Scholars took this for a matter so self-evident that histories of early anthropology do not bother to pay any regard to the exact theological context. It was elucidated most clearly by a man who departed from orthodox belief: in his account of his personal religious strife Francis Newman (1805-1897), brother of the Catholic convert John Henry Newman, explained the pernicious religious implications of polygenism: it defied the theory of one original couple, Adam and Eve. It ran counter to crucial Biblical tenets, including the Noachian as well as the Abrahamitic covenant, the doctrine of original sin, and the universal moral submission of mankind under the Christian dispensation. Yet, after a phase of religious qualms Newman emerged as a polygenist whose creed had become much more liberal than that of the Anglican church. In Phases of Faith (1850) Newman described how Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby school who had occasionally clashed with orthodox Anglicans, sowed the seed of doubt into his heart:

I had become aware of the difficulties encountered by physiologists in believing the whole human race to have proceeded in about 6000 years from a single Adam and Eve; and that the longevity (not miraculous, but ordinary) attributed to the patriarchs was another stumbling-block. The geological difficulties of the Mosaic cosmogony were also at that time exciting much attention. To my surprise, Dr. Arnold treated all these questions as matters of indifference to religion; and did not hesitate to say, that the account of Noah's deluge was evidently mythical, and the history of Joseph 'a beautiful poem'. I was staggering at this. If all were not descended from Adam, what
became of St. Paul’s parallel between the first and second Adam [i.e. Christ], and the doctrine of Headship and Atonement founded on it? If the world was not made in six days, how could we defend the Fourth Commandment [to sanctify the Sabbath] as true, though said to have been written in stone by the very finger of God? If Noah’s deluge was a legend, we should at least have to admit that Peter did not know that: what too would be said of Christ’s allusion to it? I was unable to admit Dr. Arnold’s views; but to see a vigorous mind, deeply imbued with Christian devoutness, so convinced, both reassured me that I need not fear moral mischiefs from free inquiry, and indeed laid that inquiry upon me as a duty.67

Newman drew the conclusion that it was impossible to hold orthodox Christian beliefs and be, at the same time, conscientious in scientific inquiry. He published his book two years after Prichard’s death. Prichard had considered him as a friend.68 Yet the forebodings of Newman’s changing views of religion must have pained him however much he, too, asserted that inquiries into all those subjects “open to the ordinary methods of investigation” should not be silenced “by an appeal to the Scriptures”.69 It was, perhaps, one of the many last straws which brought Prichard to the conclusion that he was after all isolated with his views in the English scene.

For Prichard, the rise of racial theory was made possible through materialist philosophy. If it was kept alive by so many physiologists and natural historians, one of the reasons for this was linguistic confusion. From the second edition Prichard was very much aware of the terminological deficiencies and he carefully explained what he understood by the words he used.

Indeed, natural historians of the eighteenth century had done without clear-cut definitions of crucial terms such as “genus”, “species”, “variety”, and “race”. As Goodfield and Toulmin have stressed, in the eighteenth century “species was an intellectual fiction, not a reality”.70 Within the Linnaean taxonomy, “species” was reduced to “resemblance”.

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Then came Buffon who combined the criterion of resemblance and genealogical lineage, emphasizing the dominance of the latter. This paved the way for an essentialist species concept whose main elements have been summarized by Mayr: "1. species consist of similar individuals sharing in the same essence, 2. each species is separated from all others by a sharp discontinuity, 3. each species is constant through time, 4. there are severe limitations to the possible variation of any one species".71

Prichard was not the only author who perceived the desirability of clear definitions. He himself referred to two definitions of species offered by the phytogeographer Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle (1778-1841) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) respectively. With Cuvier's definition, in particular, Prichard was not quite content: it took account of Cuvier's notion of the four "embranchements" - vertebrates, molluscs, articulata (insects, worms), and radiata (including jelly-fish and starfish) - modelled on a common plan.72 In Prichard's translation it reads: "We are under the necessity of admitting the existence of certain forms which have perpetuated themselves from the beginning of the world, without exceeding the limits first prescribed: all the individuals belonging to one of these forms constitute what is termed a species". Prichard criticized this definition because it was "not without an allusion to the favourite speculations of some of his contemporaries".73 He thought, in other words, that it was unduly pandering to transmutationism. His own definition of species deviated from Cuvier's in that it strove to eliminate all possible traces of an affinity to transmutationism:

The meaning attached to the term species in natural history is very definite and intelligible. It includes only the following conditions, namely, separate origin and distinctness of race, evinced by the constant transmission of some characteristic peculiarity of organization. A race of animals or of plants marked by any peculiar character which has always been constant and undeviating, constitutes a species; and two races are considered as specifically different, if they
are distinguished from each other by some characteristic which the one cannot be supposed to have acquired, or the other to have lost through any known operation of physical causes.\textsuperscript{74}

While "species" were explained according to the criterion of lineage, the denomination of "genus" was rather a question of resemblance: "a genus is to be considered as an assortment of tribes, on a principle merely of resemblance, and it may, therefore, include more or fewer species, according to the particular views of the naturalist".\textsuperscript{75} The delineation of a genus was given to the taxonomic taste of the naturalist. Species, by contrast, were, as it were, natural facts. The same applied to varieties: "Varieties, in natural history, are such diversities in individuals and their progeny as are observed to take place within the limits of species. Varieties are modifications produced in races of animals and of plants by the agency of external causes; they are ... hereditary, or transmitted to offspring with greater or less degrees of constancy".\textsuperscript{76}

The last crucial element of Prichard's terminological set-up refers to the notion of "permanent varieties". By the term he did not understand populations but a specific form of hereditary trait: "permanent varieties are these which having once taken place, continue to be propagated in the breed in perpetuity. The fact of their origination must be known by observation or inference".\textsuperscript{77} Prichard's assertion of "permanent varieties" has been used to depict him as a man who gave in to the increasing tide of racialism. Thus Horsman writes: "Prichard had so defined 'permanent variety' as to make it in practical terms little different from the 'race' of the believers in polygenesis".\textsuperscript{78} But the allegation does not hold. First of all, Prichard's term does not designate groups of living beings so much as single traits. Secondly, he had always, albeit implicitly, assumed the existence of permanent varieties. Otherwise he could hardly have followed and amended Blumenbach's delineation of five human varieties.\textsuperscript{79} In order to make his viewpoint abundantly
clear Prichard added, immediately after his definition of permanent varieties, the reason why he thought that "race" was a category which must not be employed by the natural historian of mankind:

The instances are so many in which it is doubtful whether a particular tribe is to be considered as a distinct species, or only as a variety of some other tribe, that it has been found by naturalists convenient to have a designation applicable in either case. Hence the late introduction of the term race in this indefinite sense. Races are properly successions of individuals propagated from any given stock; and the term should be used without any involved meaning that such a progeny or stock has always possessed a particular character. The real import of the term has often been overlooked, and the word race has been used as if it implied a distinction in the physical character of the whole series of individuals. By writers on anthropology, who adopt this term, it is often tacitly assumed that such distinctions were primordial, and that their successive transmission has been unbroken. If such were the fact, a race so characterised would be a species in the strict meaning of the word, and it ought to be so termed.

Prichard's ideas about which part of the human constitution was least liable to variation, changed over time. In the first edition of the Researches, he believed that skin colour was rather fixed. In the second edition he had come to consider the "animal economy" of mankind as the most stable part. In the third edition he had added human psychology. The important point, however, is that fixity of species, for Prichard, implied the existence of a certain range of variation. And "permanent varieties" were merely the crystallization of some of these. They were typological, in a way part of the realm of the "artificiality" which Prichard and so many others rejected in Linnaeus. Time and again Prichard emphasized that all kinds of bodily conformations could spring up in all varieties.

Therefore, Prichard rejected the word "race" which was tied to the notion that specific biological characteristics were to be found in all
individuals appertaining to the respective group. Prichard very early on had a perception of the genuine distinctions between collective characteristics and behaviour on the one hand (including family resemblances and national or typological characteristics), and individual traits on the other hand. In 1813 he wrote: "It appears that the principle in the animal oeconomy on which the production of varieties in the race depends, is entirely distinct from that which regards the changes produced by external causes on the individual." The word race, as he understood it, blurred these distinctions.

This insight of Prichard's implied two assumptions. On the one hand, it rested on the practical notion that a definition was valid only if it applied universally. And on the other hand, it was founded on some Platonic streaks in his natural philosophy, a wishful thinking, that is, that hidden behind the diversity of nature there were universalist principles at work which guaranteed the unity of the phenomena.

Buffon and Blumenbach believed that the individual need not conform in all peculiarities to the definition of its type. Blumenbach's defence of the intellectual potential of blacks rested on a few examples of black literati: in his eyes a few righteous, so to speak, were enough to save the lot. His definition of five human varieties, the Caucasians, Mongols, Ethiopians, Americans, and Malay, was based on skull measurements. But he refrained from stipulating close connections between skull formations and mental capacities.

Prichard agreed with this approach. His writings, even more than Blumenbach's, are marked by the assumption that the typical characteristics of any human variety were merely a kind of guide-line for the anthropologists: in reality individuals might deviate in all aspects from the characterization of their tribe. In that sense Prichard's anthropology rested on implicit Platonic underpinnings. These are revealed also in a certain sympathy Prichard harboured for Etienne
Geoffroy Saint Hilaire's (1772-1844) anatomical transcendentalism. He loathed the doctrine of species transmutation. But since he believed in ordering principles in nature, the transcendentalist notion of a "unity of type" was appealing to him.87 This was very remarkable for a man who considered Cuvier's definition of species as too loose. However, it must not be forgotten that Prichard contemplated transmutationism with respect to the species belonging to a genus. He was, in other words, toying with an idea which went back to Linnaeus.

The Swedish naturalist had suggested that God had created merely genera which, in the course of time, developed into a vast amount of differing species.88 Hybrids of different species were the propagators of yet other species.89 Linnaeus could not be accused of materialism. If his tenets had to be treated with caution it was because the doctrine of transmutationism was based on Linnaeus' idea that the great number of different species had risen from "a few natural orders".90

Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) and Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) had presupposed the action of a faculty of "appetancy" in the individual animal which enabled it to develop its bodily structure according to the nature of the environment. All variations, that is, occurred post natum. When Prichard was contemplating the unity of type, he admitted the idea that only genera had been created. However, when he came to the point where he would have been compelled to discuss how these genera had then branched out into species he denied the possibility, retreated from his transmutationist speculations, and insisted that all species had been created as such. Prichard's notion of "type" and his attitude towards the transcendentalist concept of unity of type have to be addressed in detail:

In 1813 Prichard quoted Blumenbach as having spoken about the original physiognomy of the Egyptians in terms of an "if I may so call it, ideal archetype".91 He himself referred to the Indian "prototype".92 These
terms indicate a certain Platonic penchant in Blumenbach as well as in Prichard. In his *Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte* Blumenbach had delimited the cognitive bridge between natural fact and the interpretation of the naturalist: "For all the accounts on that point which one adopts, even with the most critical judgment possible, from others, are in reality, for the truth-seeking investigator of nature, nothing more and nothing further than a kind of symbolical writing, which he can only so far subscribe to with a good conscience, as they actually coincide with the open book of nature". Prichard subscribed to this assumption: empirical description made it almost impossible to define the range of typical forms; the variability of nature precluded this. Prichard's frequent references to notions of "type" account for his need to create a space where his idea of empirical observation and his quest for order could meet. For Blumenbach and Prichard the notion of "type" was a loose classificatory unity. It offered the possibility of classifying without obliging the naturalist to subsume the totality of any observed population under any typological heading.

For every Lockean philosopher Platonism was unacceptable. But as we have seen before, Prichard adhered not to Locke but to Reid and Stewart's philosophy of inbred faculties. Thus, his opinions were open to a Platonic undercurrent and even to related aspects of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's theories. Geoffroy's concepts, too, were founded on the notion of "types" in natural history. This distinguished his doctrines from those of Cuvier. (As Rupke has pointed out, Cuvier did not expressly refer to "type" - his four "embranchements" were "not the ideal types of the transcendentalists". As we have seen, Prichard did not take sides in the quarrel raging between Cuvier and Geoffroy in the 1820s. He rejected Geoffroy's penchant towards Lamarckianism. But that did not prevent him from referring to Geoffroy's publications as often as he referred to Cuvier's. There were two instances when he at least toyed with the
transcendentalist viewpoint: in 1826 he discussed Linnaeus' perception of genera, pondering whether, perhaps, Linnaeus had been right in assuming that the genera had been created first, and that the evolution of species was a subsequent development:

We are unacquainted with any physical causes, the operation of which is capable of producing those differences of structure which distinguish the several species of one genus from each other. There must, indeed be some principle on which the phaenomena of resemblance, as well as those of diversity, may be explained; and the reference of several forms to a common type, seems calculated to suggest the idea of some original affinity.98

Such a theory had also been put forward by Pyramus-Augustin de Candolle (1778-1841).99 In the last event, though, Prichard shied back from pursuing this path any further, stressing that the "physical causes" of these "differences of structure" between various genera were unknown and therefore had to "be kept out of sight when our inquiries respect matters of fact only".100 In another instance he rejected the suggestion, insisting that all species had been created as such.101 Still, he was to come back to the idea. The prevalence of species "nearly akin to each other" at "a particular spot" was so remarkable that Prichard could not but reiterate his bewilderment: "When particular species are compared with each other, the various forms refer themselves in a remarkable manner to one type of organization. The slighter differences which mark the species individually, seem to lose themselves in the sameness of form belonging to the genus, and even suggest a suspicion that they all proceeded from one original".102

Prichard could not readily discard the idea of species transmutation within a genus because he believed that "the phaenomena of resemblance must have had their sufficient reason as well as those of diversity".103 If species resembled each other then it was conceivable that
they were, indeed, related to each other. Again in 1836 Prichard grappled with the problem: "a reference of several slightly varied forms to a common type, cannot fail to suggest the idea of original affinity", he wrote and referred in a footnote to Geoffroy and Marcel Serres. But, as in 1826, Prichard did not go beyond the vague suggestion, lest he might seem to support transmutationist doctrines. It was the Platonic trait of his thought and his desire to establish conceptual order which incited him to his speculative romance with anatomical transcendentalism, his opposition towards transmutationism was unaffected by it.

As we have seen above, Prichard's criteria for species unity in general were tied to a theory of hybridity and a theory of the laws of the animal economy. Since there were some authors who asserted that one and the same species could have originated from various geographical quarters, Prichard also attempted to prove that this was wrong, and that all species came, indeed, from one centre of creation only. These three subjects will be considered in the next sections, starting with the "analogical method" and Prichard's theories of hybridity.

C. The "Analogical Method" and the Argument from Hybridity

In the Linnaean tradition theories of hybridity were neatly intertwined with deliberations on the natural origin of species. On the assumption that the world was originally peopled only by "genera", Linnaeus was compelled to believe that all species were engendered by way of hybridization. Crossbreeding animals of different genera brought forward new species, these in turn were the propagators of yet other species.

In the eighteenth century this idea did not have many followers. Only figures as eccentric as Lord Monboddo and Jean-Jacques Rousseau would "bend the stubborn neck of man down to the earth" and toy with the idea that mankind had sprung from apes, their nearest neighbours in Linnaeus' taxonomy of quadrupeds. In order to defy their allegations
Blumenbach resorted to exempting mankind from the genus of quadrupeds, assigning to them the denomination of "bimana". Other naturalists corrected the Linnaean natural philosophy by means of re-interpreting the theory of hybrids.

Instead of accepting hybridization as the means for species evolution, Buffon (1707-1788), John Hunter (1728-1793), Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729-1799), the Italian physiologist, as well as Eberhardt August Wilhelm Zimmermann (1743-1815) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) adopted cross-fertility as species criterion. Those animal tribes belonged to one species, their argument ran, which could procreate with each other and engender fertile offspring. Soon after this theory was put forward it was heavily contested: the British naturalist Thomas Pennant (1726-1798) and the German Peter Simon Pallas (1741-1811) denied it.

The difficulty of properly classifying nearly related animals, such as the dogs, wolves, and jackals, or the horse, mule, and ass, gave rise to manifold speculations concerning conspecificity of dogs and the fertility of mules. Dubious reports about fertile hybrids were circulating. Those favouring the argument of hybridity were also the first to question its truth. Blumenbach, for instance, doubted that all dogs belonged to one species. He, therefore, suggested to bolster the monogenist doctrine with additional arguments. Thus, the "argument from analogy" came into play. The issue of the natural analogy will be discussed first, followed by a view at Prichard's opinion on the argument of hybridity.

"Analogy" is the term of a rhetorical figure. As such it was early on appropriated by scholars writing on theories of the mind and on the soul. Some linguistic theories of the eighteenth century explained the origin of metaphors, for instance, with an "analogical faculty" in mankind. Other authors insisted on the categorical difference between the two. As the divine Peter Browne put it in 1733: "analogy and metaphor differ: Metaphor is altogether Arbitrary, and the Result merely of the
Imagination; ... . But Analogy being built on the very Nature of Things themselves, is a Necessary and Useful Method of Conception, and therefore of Consideration in Physics and Metaphysics".111

The term "analogy" was used to denote the relationships between Heaven and the earth. In 1736 Joseph Butler (1692-1752) published his famous The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature, founding a theodicy on the orderliness of the natural creation; nature itself was, as it were, a visible analogue for the inscrutable wisdom of God. Another much-used analogy compared the mechanisms of the animal economy to that of national economies. Naturalists working in the Linnaean mould founded natural taxonomies on the criterion of resemblance. Yet, the discovery of morphological or functional analogies came increasingly into fashion.112 Departing from Newton's method of setting out "axioms", reasoning from analogy was deemed as congenial to nature, mitigating the gap between the human mind and natural creation.113 With the rise of comparative anatomy, the "analogical method" proved its viability; comparative anatomy was, as it were, a specific branch of the analogical method.

From the end of the eighteenth century there were many warnings against too much analogising. The Scottish common-sense philosopher Thomas Reid avidly insisted that the realms of mind and body could not be linked-up by means of analogy, lest it could be asserted that the mind was seated in the body.114 As Olson has shown his Scottish pupils reiterated his misgivings while freely reasoning "from analogy". Reid had counted analogical reasoning among the inductive methods. Within a few years, analogizing became the inductive method per se. Reid's followers built up a theory of scientific method "in which analogical reasoning - always carefully monitored and controlled - became one of the principal keys to advancement in all the sciences".115 Foremost
among them was Dugald Stewart at Edinburgh University whose lectures on moral philosophy Prichard attended as an undergraduate. Stewart rejected analogizing between physical and mental phenomena. Yet, he spoke about the analogies between the ancients and the moderns and about those between different departments of nature as well as those between the material and the moral worlds.

The analogical idea was conceptually beautiful for two reasons: it presented the world as a harmonious network of interrelated phenomena, and it seemed to provide the method for an understanding of the book of nature. The analogical method sustained the central idea of Archdeacon Paley's Natural Theology, namely that everything in the world was for the best. At the same time it was catering to scientific curiosity, intimating the perfection of the world through reference to the multi-dimensional parallelisms permeating all spheres of the cosmos. Having studied at Edinburgh University, Prichard was well versed in this view of the world, a view later exulted by his friend Thomas Hodgkin who praised "the doctrine of analogies, and of an unity of plan pervading the whole animal kingdom", a doctrine "in itself extremely beautiful, and even sublime" that "affords a happy explanation of many remarkable phenomena in the organization of animals."

In his Bridgewater Treatise Peter Mark Roget enthused over "that unity of design and identity of operation" pervading "the whole of nature" - "In examining the manyfold structures and diversified phenomena of living beings we cannot but perceive that they are extensively, and perhaps universally connected by certain laws of Analogy: in principle, the recognition of which has given us enlarged views of a multitude of important facts". The analogical make-up that was its secret and the method for its discovery at the same time!

Thanks to his Edinburgh training Prichard did not need Blumenbach to teach him how to employ the "analogue method". But
Blumenbach's *De generis humani varietate nativa* occurred to him as a fulfilment of its philosophical potential. Applied to the question of monogenism the "method" worked in the following manner: if any characteristic differences between human tribes could be found to exist within one animal species, it was inadmissible to evoke it as a proof for polygenism. Therefore, Prichard delved deeply into animal physiology, convinced that he could understand human nature only through the pathology as well as the observation of animals.

Whether all humans belonged to the same species could be answered only through knowledge of the animal realm. What were the criteria for species unity in the animal realm, was one question. The other was: did the result apply to mankind?

When Prichard took up Buffon's theory of hybridity he aimed to by-pass the question whether mules were fertile. Instead of brooding over "instances" that "are quite sufficient to shake our confidence in the doctrine of Buffon and Hunter", he asserted "the opposite opinion": if different species could interbreed, the world might present "a scene of confusion". Since that was apparently not the case there must be "some principle in nature which ... maintains the order and variety of the animal creation". Prichard wrote:

> The fact seems to be, that the tribes of wild animals are preserved distinct, not by the sterility of mules, but by the circumstance that such animals are never in the state of nature brought into existence. The preservation of distinct species is sufficiently provided for by the natural repugnance between individuals of different kinds ... Animals which, in their natural state, are not kept asunder by any instinctive repugnance; but on the contrary frequently and habitually propagate together, are to be considered as of one species.

In his anthropological publications Prichard stressed that all human tribes were devoid of that sort of repulsion. Certain cultures decidedly
preferred spouses from foreign tribes: "It is said, indeed, that the Turks and other people of the East, choose Negro women for their harems, and it is well known that black men often prefer white women". The latter could be perceived even in England: "Indeed, most of the black men who come to England from the West Indies as domestic servants, and continue to reside here, contrive to get English wives" - at this point a polygenist might have interrupted, suggesting that it was small wonder if blacks had a taste for superior species. Nipping the objection in the bud, Prichard continued that the penchant of black men towards white women "is a proof, not only of their own good taste in this respect, but also that our countrywomen, the lower orders of them at least, have no invincible repugnance to the Negro race". In the discussion of Prichard's attitude to insanity we have seen that he drew genuine anthropological distinctions between different classes of society declaring them disposed to different sorts of mental illness. Here we find the same kind of class-conscious anthropology at work. It did not reflect the self-consciousness of nineteenth-century capitalist society but age-old beliefs in the differences between higher and lower orders.

In the third edition of the Researches and in the Natural History of Man Prichard devoted an entire section to the topic of "mixed human races" (even though he denied any scientific significance of the term "race", he would use it interchangeably with "tribe", "nation", or "people"). In this context, he mentioned not only Mulattos and Creoles but also exotic peoples such as "Griquas" or "Cafusos". Intermixture between human tribes was not only possible: it was desirable. Experimenting animal breeders had found out that to keep up the quality of a horse breed it had to be crossed. The idea had been put forward by Peter Simon Pallas who held, as the New Quarterly Review was to put it, "all our domestic animals to be strictly mongrels, combining the good points of numerous independent wild species". A similar remark was
made by the Spanish naturalist Felix de Azara (1742-1821), whom Prichard frequently quoted in the second and third edition of the *Researches* to illustrate his assertion that "the intermixture of varieties is well known occasionally to improve the breed in both the vegetable and animal kingdoms".\(^{128}\)

Nature's providential make-up, Prichard believed, prevented intermixture of species. Crossbreeding of varieties, by contrast, was a wholesome process. It was not all that easy, however, to maintain the good standards thus acquired: "Human care and interference are perpetually necessary in order to originate and maintain the existence of such breeds. Without this interference they would never have existed, and when called into existence would speedily have disappeared".\(^{129}\)

In the third edition, more than in the second, Prichard's argument aimed specifically at intermarriages between different human tribes. Again it was Azara to whom he referred: "in Paraguay, the mixed breed constitutes, according to Azara, a great majority of the people termed Spaniards or white men; and they are said to be a people superior in physical qualities to either of the races from which they have sprung, and much more prolific than the aborigines".\(^{130}\) The same was true nearer home: the intermixture between Celtic, Slavonic, and "German or Teuton" tribes "has produced breeds physically superior to the majority of either ancestral race".\(^{131}\) This is a remarkable statement, indeed. While European men of letters were launching into speculations concerning the comparative value of their "races", Prichard simply denied that Europe was populated by pure racial groups. By and large, contemporary Europeans were superior to most ancient tribes (probably excepting the ancient Greeks and Romans), precisely because they were of mixed blood. At this point it is worth stressing again that Prichard never systematically embarked on thinking along racial lines. In all likelihood he was unaware of the racial connotations in the above sentence. His use of the
term "race" in that context is synonymous to the meaning of "national character". That peoples had national characters was a commonplace in Prichard's time, as it had been in the preceding centuries. In the eyes of the contemporaries, this had nothing to do with what was perceived as scientific or biological concepts of race.

Prichard tried to silence objections against the argument from hybridity, without, however, succeeding. Instead, in the third edition, he had to concede that hybrids of different species were brought into existence, and that these were occasionally even fertile. Horticulturalists were successfully crossing plants with each other. Pichard relied on Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle, who asserted, in his *Physiologie végétale* (1832), that the greater number of thus created plants was infertile. However, the combined efforts of Buffon, Anders Sparrman (1747-1820), the Swedish botanist, as well as Cuvier, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Treviranus, and Rudolphi had yielded so many instances of fertile animal hybrids that Prichard could no longer reduce all of them to the realm of results of sloppy investigations. Rudolphi, in particular, had amassed a long list instancing all the fertile hybrids known in natural history. Thus Prichard admitted that "the exceptions to the supposed law of nature rendering sterile all hybrid productions, are very numerous". But this was no reason for him to recede from his position. He had one trump card: providence, or, as he also (cautiously) called it a "principle of nature". Given the argumentative burden this principle had to bear, Prichard's conclusion on the beneficial set-up of nature was even more emphatic in 1836 than it had been ten years earlier:

If there is no principle in nature which impedes the unrestrained intermixture of species, how is the order and at the same time the variety of the animal creation maintained? ... if animals of different species mixed their breed in the ordinary course of things, and hybrid
races were often propagated, the animal world would soon present a scene of strange confusion: its various tribes would become everywhere blended together, and we should, at length, scarcely discover any genuine and uncorrupted races. It may rather be affirmed, that this universal confusion of all organized tribes would long ago have been effected. But how opposite is such a state of things from the real fact. The same uniform and regular propagation of species holds still throughout all nature, nor are the limits of each kind less definite than they are supposed to have been some thousand years ago. It is plain that in some manner the preservation of distinct tribes has been secured, and that universally, or throughout all the different departments of the organized creation.136

Prichard was content to leave the matter at that. For want of properly "scientific" explanations he resorted to natural theology. He did not consider this as a retreat, on the contrary, it was his declared method: investigate scientifically what is open to "the ordinary methods of investigation", and leave the rest to God's almighty powers.137

Prichard's question - how had animal species up to now survived - was eventually surpassed by another one posed by later writers: under what circumstances would they survive? Interestingly, Prichard was more concerned with the past than with the future. How present nature had come into being was all he desired to know. (The conjectural history of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy had done the same: the four stages theory is, as it were, a backward prophecy, for there was no further improvement envisioned applying to the stage of commerce.138)

As for Prichard's hybridity argument, it was one of the least emulated features of his works. After the 1840s, those who supported the idea of physiologically different races either denied the validity of the argument of hybridity, or - in giving a twist to Prichard's notion of sexual repugnance - evoked the argument in order to point out that, indeed, this kind of repugnance was prevalent in the relationships between different races.139
George Morton put a particular effort into rejecting Prichard's idea. The Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal published in 1947 - a year before Prichard’s death - an article in which Morton asserted the existence of genuinely different human races by means of refuting the argument of hybridity. Morton quoted Prichard’s remark, made already in 1826, that domesticity, changing the "natural propensities", suppressed the natural repugnance in individuals against mating with members of different species. "Now", Morton concluded, "since man possesses this aptitude [of domesticity] in the highest degree, being, as Blumenbach expresses it, the most domestic of animals, it would be nothing singular if he possessed the power of fertile hybridity, even if the human family should prove to embrace several distinct species". At the same time, however, "natural repugnance" could be observed in men as well as in animals: "for the repugnance of some human races to mix with others, has only been partially overcome by centuries of proximity. ... Not only is this repugnance proverbial among all nations of European stock among whom Negroes have been introduced, but it appears to be almost equally natural to the Africans in their own country, towards such Europeans as have been thrown among them".

The assertion of natural repugnance was the first step to an argument which became central to the racial theories from the middle of the nineteenth century, namely, the idea that it was detrimental to racial development if this supposedly natural barrier between the races was overcome. Purity of race became an important criterion for authors who thought along the lines of biological racialism. Arthur de Gobineau, for example, believed that the infusion of alien blood had been the reason for both the development of European culture and the subsequent degeneration of the European races. The Scot Robert Knox was even blunter, considering racial mixture as "monstrosity of nature" destined to extinction. Contrast these notions with Prichard's insistence that
intermixture among human varieties was good, and that the Europeans owed their favourable physical and mental endowments in no small part to it.

D. The Geographical Origin of Mankind and the "Caucasian Hypothesis"

After having established the unity of mankind, Prichard went on to show that all human varieties had been engendered in one geographical location. He did not doubt that they had survived in an ark and that they had subsequently dispersed across the globe during many centuries of migratory movements. With respects to animals, however, this belief was heavily contested already during the eighteenth century: there were so many tribes whose living abodes lay much too far away from the region where Noah supposedly had built the vessel - how could they have entered the ark? How was it possible that they after their release did not immediately fall prey to each other? E. A. W. Zimmermann had claimed, in 1777, that the story of the ark could hardly be true. The German traveller and naturalist, Peter Simon Pallas (1741-1811) also rejected it, assuming instead that all living beings came from different centres of creation. The same argument was reiterated by the Spanish naturalist Azara and by Cuvier's follower, the polygenist Julien-Joseph Virey, who maintained that there were six originally distinct human races each of which came from a different centre.

Christoph Meiners (1747-1810), the Göttingen Professor of Philosophy, evoked the analogical method to support polygenism: if it was granted that animals were created in different locations the same was certainly true for men. Having mitted himself to the "analogical method" Prichard was obliged to show that mankind and the larger land-animals were descended from one particular location.

In 1813 his account of animal dispersion encompassed only land animals. He concluded that Buffon was right in maintaining that animal
species "have particular local relations, and were placed by the Creator in certain regions for which they are in their nature peculiarly adapted". No "one animal", he stated, "was originally common to the warm parts of the Old and New World". (With respect to the cold tracts of northern Asia and America Prichard conceded that one and the same species was found on both continents, he suggested that "the opposite points of Asia and America were formerly joined").

By the second edition Prichard had extended his investigations into the distribution of animals to encompass all organized beings and not just, as in 1813, the mammals. He maintained somewhat boldly: "No writer, as far as I know, has yet brought together the various facts which are likely to illustrate the distribution of organized beings. I found it indispensable to the future progress of my work to consider the question discussed in this chapter".

As Philip Rehbock has stated, ecology and biogeography "were almost nonexistent" in Britain in the 1830s. On the Continent, however, there were many naturalists who endeavoured to find out the correlations between geography, physiognomy and physiology, to unravel the laws governing over the distribution of organisms, and, as Janet Browne has put it, "to describe and delimit particular living associations as a first step to ascertaining the environmental factors specific to each area".

The history of biogeography has been told by Janet Browne, Philip F. Rehbock, James Larson and others. Prichard was certainly not altogether wrong when he said that the great synthesis had not yet been delivered. His own contribution to the subject, however, was so eclectic that it did not constitute a valuable addition to the history of biogeography. His findings were a collation of other writers' insights and opinions. As a work of eclecticism, however, the accumulation of biogeographical data in the Researcnes is quite impressive. An
alphabetical list of Prichard's authors may illustrate the effort which he
invested in the matter discussed on some eighty pages in the second and
third editions of the Researches: Felix de Azara, Blumenbach, Robert
Brown, Christian Leopold von Buch, Buffon, Cuvier, Everard Home,
John Fleming, Georg and Johann Reinhold Forster, Geoffroy St. Hilaire,
Johann Friedrich Gmelin, Oliver Goldsmith, Johann A. Güldenstadt,
Alexander von Humboldt, John Hunter, Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck, Pierre
Antoine Latreille, William Lawrence, Jean-Baptiste Leschenault, Carolus
Linnaeus, Lucretius, Peter Simon Pallas, Thomas Pennant, François
Péron and Charles Alexandre Lesueur, Pliny, John Ray, Hans Sloane,
Benjamin Smith Barton, Kurt Sprengel, Charles Tournefort, Karl
Willdenow, E. A. W. Zimmermann.

Prichard followed Linnaeus' and Buffon's example, believing that
there was a close link between - in Janet Browne's words - "the structure
of an animal and its physical surroundings". Emulating theories put
forward by Buffon, Zimmermann, and Willdenow, he believed that each
genus of plants and animals had been created for a particular geographical
location. (It was in this context that he asked whether genera were the
original population of the earth.)

By the 1820s Prichard had come greatly to admire Alexander von
Humboldt (1769-1859) whose theoretical network of correlations between
climate, topographical station and animal physiology had done much to
build up a modern systema naturae. At the beginning of the century
Humboldt appeared as a front-runner in meteorology explaining
vegetable distribution as a result of an interplay between climatic
influence and plant physiology. Humboldt's writings demonstrate, as
Michael Dettelbach put it, "the emergence of natural science out of
natural philosophy". Humboldt's correlations between altitude and
specific natural organisms proved very important for Prichard, (although for many years he felt ambivalent about the German
suspecting him of polygenism). The other author who together with Humboldt "pioneered the technique of 'botanical arithmetic'" and who was very important for Prichard's biogeography was the Humboldt-follower Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle, mentioned above. In fact, what Humboldt and Candolle did for the vegetable realm was what Prichard wanted to do for man. In Britain, Robert Brown (1773-1853) took up the task. He, too, is much quoted in the Researches. For Prichard, Humboldt formulated the method, while Candolle and Brown executed it.

The natural history of plants and animals had a very clear-cut role for Prichard: all individual species originated in exactly one geographical centre. By analogy Prichard concluded that the same was true for mankind. While other natural historians explored biogeography for its own sake, Prichard invested all his efforts to make analogical inferences with regard to the human species. Alexander von Humboldt and Robert Brown were convinced that there were some teleological principles permeating nature which ensured that there was a dialectical principle at work, accounting for the fact that particular organic structures were especially fitted to specific geographical stations. As we will see below, the second edition of the Researches differed from the first in that Prichard more full-heartedly than before embraced the idea that organisms went through processes of adaptation to their surrounding environment. If in 1826 Prichard had fewer qualms about endorsing such an idea it was certainly thanks to the ultimately teleological nature of the researches by Humboldt, Candolle, and Brown.

Prichard's deep plunge into biogeographical literature furthered the desired result: Pallas was wrong, Azara and Virey were wrong - mankind was created in one spot only. Prichard confidently repeated in the second edition what he had already concluded in 1813. The difference was simply that, in 1813, he had investigated merely the mammals, while
in 1826 he took the entire animal and vegetable creation into consideration, ploughing through accounts of the distributions of plants, insects, birds, marine animals, quadrupeds and reptiles of the land.\textsuperscript{163}

In the third edition he spent less time on the subject, adding only a few references to Edward Forbes and other writers who meanwhile had appeared on the scene. The results of his inquiry, however, remained the same. In both editions Prichard contemplated the question how animals had arrived at distant islands which never could have been connected to the mainland (the answer was that, by and large, remotely located islands were devoid of large quadrupeds). And he pondered on the possible influences which a change of climate might have exerted on the dispersion of animals. At the end of all his deliberations he concluded:

Each species had only one beginning in a single stock; probably a single pair, as Linnaeus supposed, was first called into being in some particular spot, and their progeny left to disperse themselves to as great a distance from the original centre of their existence, as the locomotive powers bestowed on each species, or its capability of bearing changes of climate and other physical circumstances, may have enabled it to wander.\textsuperscript{164}

Prichard drew the inference that "we are, a fortiori, at liberty to apply this conclusion to the instance of the human species".\textsuperscript{165} The result of his biogeographical endeavours were three hypotheses:

- Linnaeus was wrong in assuming that all animated beings had been created in one spot. There were several centres of creation spread across the globe.
- There was a marked correlation between the bio-climatic conditions of these centres and the physical conformation of the organized beings dwelling in the area.
- Each species had only one original habitation.\textsuperscript{166}
It signifies both Prichard's scientific pedantry as well as his zeal that his biogeographical system was not taken up by other scholars. The only exception was Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) who delineated "the natural relations between the different types of man and the animals and plants inhabiting the same regions". Rejecting environmentalism and disregarding migratory theories - so important for Prichard - Agassiz drew the conclusion that there were human races different ab ovo.167

There remains one issue which has not yet been addressed and which for Prichard himself lay beyond the problem of distribution properly speaking. The question was: where precisely did each individual species originate? With respect to plants and to the "lesser" animals as well as to easily travelling fish and birds, Prichard had no great problems. He simply assumed that the wind and the waters had carried them across the globe, enabling them to settle where the climatic and geographic circumstances were favourable.168 Crucial was this question only with respect to the larger land animals and mankind - the creatures, in other words, which supposedly had survived the Deluge in Noah's ark. Hence we can understand why Prichard frequently expressed his adherence to the theory of Buffon and others who maintained that, as he put it in 1813, "the more perfect tribes of animals belong chiefly to the old world".169

On the assumption that the large quadrupeds had been created in the old world and that they had survived the Deluge there, it made perfect sense to assume that they had contracted in size and vigour by the time their "locomotive propensities" had carried them (across an Asian-American land-bridge) to far-away America. Again in 1826 Prichard stated: "it has been observed, that those tribes of quadrupeds which have the most powerful and perfect structure belong chiefly to the Old World. Those of the New have, in general, a character of organization which places them lower in the scale of animated beings".170

Prichard did not explicitly refer to the Garden of Eden as the place
from which mankind originated. But he located the original station of mankind at "the banks of the Euphrates" - in ancient times at the mouth of the Euphrates there lay the city of Ur in the land of Chaldaea, Abraham's birthplace; moreover Genesis indicated that the Garden of Eden was crossed by four rivers one of which was identified as the Euphrates. Not embarrassing himself by displaying outright Biblicism, Prichard would not mention the Garden of Eden, though he endorsed the theory, formulated by Saint Augustine, that mankind "sprang from the family created on the banks of the Euphrates, which was preserved in an ark, and survived upon the mountains of Armenia". To Prichard's great dismay, however, this was not universally agreed upon: many scholars thought that they knew better than the Bible. By the beginning of the nineteenth century there were many theories which located the origin of mankind in various geographical areas other than Mount Ararat.

Indeed, the theories were so diverse that it would be too complicated to give a proper overview. Still, a few indications may be made. Mixing up different Biblical stories, Linnaeus had maintained that all species had been created in single pairs on a mountain-top. It was, as Brooke has said, "a conflation of the creation and flood narratives ... It was a flood without Noah". For Linnaeus that mountain had been Ararat. Later other mountains were suggested. On the basis of Buffon's *Les Epoques de la nature* (1776) many authors concluded that mankind must have begun to flourish in Asia. Buffon believed that life on earth had been swallowed up by a wave of heat. In the process of cooling the northern half of Asia was the first to reach bearable climatic conditions. It was the same region which the mythographer Jacob Bryant had indicated as the origin of the so-called Hyperboreans whom Bryant designated as the first bearers of civilized knowledge. Another theory which referred the origin of mankind to Asian mountains was
founded on the story of the Deluge: when the waters of the Flood subsided, the mountain chains of the Himalaya being the highest on earth, it was this region where terrestrial life started to develop first.177 The astronomer Jean Bailly had yet another idea. In 1775 he maintained that human civilization originated in the Delta of the Ganges with "l'ancienne dynastie des Brahmanes".178

Some of these theories were so fanciful that they did not survive the turn of the nineteenth century. Only a few of them kept thriving. One of them was what Thomas Huxley later called the "Caucasian mystery", also known as the "Caucasian hypothesis".179 According to this theory the Europeans came from the Caucasus. To many this appeared all the more plausible as the philologist Sir William Jones had shown the relationship between Sanskrit and the European languages. In the wake of his findings, Europeans started to praise the culture and religion of ancient India.180 Especially in Germany, but also in Britain and France, Sanskrit was deemed wonderfully fascinating - and with it the whole of ancient Indian culture.181 Tacitus had described the Germans of his day as Barbarians. Now, many of those who regarded themselves as their descendants were pleased to see that their roots led back to the old Indian civilization which they were happy to designate as the oldest on earth.

Biblical Higher Criticism had already questioned many aspects of the Biblical narrative. The romance with Sanskrit and the Brahmins could unfold on the background of the assumption, held by many, that the "Jewish fables" (Christoph Meiners182) were no more historical than the Vedic epics. With rising nationalism, many scholars delved into Sanskrit studies in order to establish the exclusivity of the Indo-European or of the Germanic-Indian cultures. Some authors maintained that the Indian and/or Caucasian tradition was superior because it was primordial, describing the earliest aspect of God's creation. Others believed that India was the cradle of humanity because the Bible itself had
told that the Garden of Eden was located in a region towards the east: "and a river went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads". Rejecting the idea that one of these rivers was the Euphrates, Johann Gottfried Herder stressed that the Euphrates "never emerges together with three other streams from one common source". The only river fulfilling this prerequisite was, as Herder pointed out, the Ganges.

Whatever its precise understanding, all variations of the Caucasian hypothesis had one thing in common: they were not in line with the letter of Scripture. They rejected the notion that the ancient land of the Hebrews was the region of the primeval seat of mankind, and that the Hebraic traditions were by far the oldest historical facts on record.

Quite a few twentieth-century scholars, including the orientalist Raymond Schwab, the judaist Léon Poliakov, the historical linguist S. Timpanaro, and the political scientist Martin Bernal, interpret the rise of the "Caucasian hypothesis" as a foreboding of nineteenth-century anti-semitism and European racial self-indulgence. The question is too complicated to be broached here. As far as Prichard was concerned, it is irrelevant since he favoured the Euphrates anyway.

Since he was so opposed to all anti-Biblical theorizing Prichard had to take issue with the Caucasian hypothesis. One version of it appeared especially pernicious to him because it seemed to support polygenism: Georges Cuvier's geological studies had incited the great French naturalist to stipulate that there was not one original centre of mankind but three. Geologists had shown that there were sea-shells to be found in high mountaneous regions. Cuvier regarded this a proof of a universal inundation of the earth. Immersing himself in studies of the fossil records, Cuvier came to the result that there might have happened many catastrophes of that kind, culminating finally in the Deluge to which the Sacred records as well as many mythological narratives bore testimony.
Despite his strong Protestant faith Cuvier did not believe that the ark had become stranded on Mount Ararat. Instead he thought that there were three resting places for human beings who had managed to rescue themselves from the Flood. They were to be found in the mountain chains of Caucasus, Atlas, and Altai. Cuvier believed that the Mongol races came from the Altai, "Negroes" from the Atlas, and civilized nations from the Caucasus.186

This assumption went back to, of all people, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. In his attempt to classify human tribes Blumenbach chose the formation of the skull for the most undeviating and most reliable criterion. Unlike the anatomist Petrus Camper,187 Blumenbach did not measure the facial angle, but the "breadth of the horizontal section of the vertex", that is, he measured skulls as seen from above. On the result he founded his system of three main varieties - Caucasian, Mongolian, and Ethiopian - as well as two intermediate varieties, the American and the Malay. What he called the "Caucasian" skull he deemed the most beautiful type, thus legitimating the very usage of the word Caucasian.188

It would be wrong, however, to accuse Blumenbach of having deliberately sparked off the vast array of speculations on the Caucasian origin of mankind. For it did not occur to him that his theory might deviate from Scriptural doctrines: in the Bible the ark was said to rest on Ararat.189 Regarding Ararat as part of the Caucasus chain, Blumenbach came up with the "Caucasian" type. He was far from replacing Mount Ararat with Mount Caucasus.190 This was a twist of the argument which Cuvier imposed on Blumenbach's theologically impeccable hypothesis. It is interesting to see how a contemporary, William Frédéric Edwards, the specialist for questions of race, summarized Cuvier's approach:

On peut envisager les races sous les rapports du physique et du moral. Les rapports physiques sont la base de la science, mais les rapports moraux lui appartiennent également. Voilà pourquoi Cuvier a
cherché des différences dans ces derniers, et il les a prises dans les langues et dans quelques traits historiques.
Il a pu distinguer par ces procédés un assez grand nombre de races qui appartiennent aux deux premières variétés de Blumenbach, les Caucasiens et les Mongoles, qui occupent tout l'Europe et presque tout le continent de l'Asie.
Il s'est peu étendu sur les Malais, et quant aux races de l'Afrique et de l'Amérique, comme leurs langues étaient aussi peu connues que leur histoire, il en dit à peine quelques mots.
Ainsi Cuvier a eu le mérite de sentir qu'il y avait infiniment plus à faire que Blumenbach ne l'avait imaginé...

Cuvier's "successeurs immédiats", Edwards added, mentioning Virey, Bory Saint-Vincent and Desmoulins, were struggling with the same problem.191

After the age of Enlightenment had faded polygenism was largely a French phenomenon. The type of French anthropological learning which was flourishing from the 1790s, proved to nurture a sort of theory conducive to racialism. Contemporary German polygenism rose rather from political and cultural philosophy. In England, it was hardly extant at all. France was singular in that the rising occupation with physical anthropology from the beginning was linked to the attempt at racial differentiation.

Cuvier's theory greatly annoyed Prichard's sense of historical truth. He rightly perceived that the "Caucasion hypothesis" was a mongrel of ill-understood philological and anatomical tenets, "a mixture of somewhat vague notions, partly connected with physical theories, and in part derived from history, or rather from mythology". Cuvier had not invented it; still, he was the first to formulate it in a "decided and complete manner".192 Not only did Prichard disagree with the assumption of three centres of human civilization, but also he believed that Cuvier's choice of the Caucasus meant betraying the Bible: "I cannot remember any tradition among the fabulists of historians of Greece,
which admits of a construction answering to the hypothesis of M. Cuvier or deducing the human race from Mount Caucasus", he wrote in an essay contributed to the first volume of the Reports published by British Association in 1833.\textsuperscript{193}

Cuvier's assumption bothered him not a little. In 1844, in the fourth volume of the Researches, Prichard concluded his criticism of Cuvier with the statement: "The authentic narrative of the Hebrews lead [sic] us certainly to Mount Ararat, in Armenia, for the resting-place of the ark; but that is far from Caucasus".\textsuperscript{194} As a matter of fact, however, Mount Ararat and the chain of the Caucasus are only some 180 miles away from each other. Compared to the great distance between Ararat and Israel, the distance from Ararat to the Caucasus was negligible. The entire region to the east of the Caspian Sea is very mountaneous. In picking the name of the Caucasus chain Blumenbach and Cuvier had chosen the highest and most prominent of mountain chains in the area. In the framework of the story of the Deluge this made sense. The quarrels between the Biblicists and the supporters of the Caucasian hypothesis were, indeed, not about geography, but about concepts of cultural hierarchy.

Prichard did all he could to deflate the "Caucasian hypothesis". In the fourth volume of the Researches, in which he dealt with "the History of the Asiatic nations", he asserted that the Georgians were "not part of the Indo-European family", they were "an ever barbarous and unintellectual race".\textsuperscript{195} It was another attempt to dissociate Blumenbach's Georgian proto-type of the Caucasian variety from the Europeans. But Prichard did not get through with his criticism. When the third edition of the Researches appeared, Cuvier's suggestion had already been taken up by many French physiologists dabbling in anthropology. Bernard de Lacépède, otherwise a specialist on fish and reptiles, as well as the polygenists Jean-Julien Virey and Louis-Antoine
Desmoulins, were well known French supporters of the idea that the Europeans came from Mount Caucasus. In Britain, quite a few of Prichard's peers on the field of anthropology adopted the idea, including William Lawrence (1783-1867) whom Prichard principally considered as his ally in scientific matters.  

E. The Animal Economy of Mankind

Johann Friedrich Blumenbach was the scholar from whom Prichard adopted the idea that the animal economy was more decisive for species characterization than anatomical peculiarities. We have seen to what extent Prichard's adherence to the "analogical method" was inspired by Blumenbach. The title of Prichard's dissertation already indicated how much he was influenced by the German Professor of Anatomy: *Disputatio inauguralis de generis humani varietate*. However, the importance of the animal economy for species characterization played no particular role in both the dissertation and the first edition of the *Researches*. Perhaps it was due to the fact that Prichard learned German only in the latter half of the 1810s - around the same time as Thomas Carlyle, later than the surgeon William Lawrence.

As early as 1807 Lawrence had published a translation of Blumenbach's *Handbuch der vergleichenden Anatomie* (1805); and his *Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology and the Natural History of Man* (1819) were dedicated to "my friend" Blumenbach. Once Prichard had learned German he became at least as ardent a follower of the German anatomist as Lawrence.

Blumenbach widely publicized the notion that it was the general habitus which, more than all other characteristics, typified a species. The same idea was promulgated by Buffon who emphasized the importance of habits, temperament, and instinct. The notion was in line with the late-eighteenth-century conviction that it was not anatomy alone which
gave insights into animal physiology, but that the physiological mechanisms of the living organisms themselves had to be taken into consideration. Under the influence of Blumenbach Prichard dropped the idea that colour was more permanent than characteristics of figure. Moreover, he scrapped the emphasis which he had laid on physiognomical particulars. From the 1820 his analysis aimed at both "structure and habitudes" of living beings.

Like Blumenbach, Prichard claimed that the similarity of the functions pertaining to the animal economy was a sure indicator of the unity of mankind: "the great laws of the animal oeconomy are the same in their operation on all. There are deviations in some respects, but these deviations are not greater than the common degree of variety in constitution which occurs within the limits of the same family".

Among the criteria which were part of the animal economy Prichard counted:

the circumstances connected with reproduction, the times and frequency of breeding, in mammalia, the period of utero-gestation, and in birds that of sitting upon eggs, the number of progeny brought forth at a time, and the period of suckling or watching over the young. The process of physical development and decay is likewise ordained by nature to take place in each species according to a certain rule. The periods at which individuals arrive at adult growth, the different changes which the constitution undergoes at particular ages, the periods of greatest vigour and of decline, and the total duration of life are given, though with individual exceptions and varieties, to every species of animals.

There were authors opposed to this opinion: Linnaeus had assumed that the catamenia of women in Lapland were less copious than that of Swedes. Benjamin Rush had claimed that the catamenia of American Indians set in later than that of Europeans, he also believed that the pulse of Americans worked more slowly than that of whites. Edward Long, the
polygenist historian of Jamaica, repeated Montesquieu's old tenet that the women in hot latitudes "attain earlier to maturity, and sooner decline, than in the northern climates". Felix de Azara maintained that women in Paraguay were less fecund than their sisters in the Old World and "that the sexual affections among these people are less powerful". But against these and other evidences Prichard enlisted wide support from other travel writers, physicists, and anthropological writers. Among them was Dr Rollin, the surgeon who had accompanied the explorer Jean François de Galaup, Comte de La Pérouse (1741-1788), on his expedition to the Pacific and who was lucky enough to survive the trip that ended with La Pérouse's death and the wreck of his ship. Prichard also frequently referred to medical statistics, a sub-discipline which grew out of the relatively newly risen governmental policy of promoting public hygiene.

What applied to the functions of the animal economy was true for its malfunctions as well. In 1813, Prichard had merely speculated on the usefulness of disease patterns as a criterion of conspecificity. By 1826 he had firm opinions on the subject. He cited Blumenbach, Thomas Winterbottom (1765-1859, a colonial doctor in Sierra Leone), the Edinburgh-trained physician Benjamin Rush, and the traveller William Keating, in order to establish that, within a certain geographical latitude, all mankind were prone to the same diseases: "If we inquire into the history of the diseases which infect the different races of men, we find nothing which seems to indicate a specific distinction in these races, but on the contrary, a number of facts which render the unity of species the more probable conclusion". In 1836, referring to the "pathological history of species", he reiterated his opinion.

In conjunction with his theory on "permanent varieties" Prichard admitted that the German doctor Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland (1762-1836) was right in stipulating the existence of particular "racial
diseases". But, again, he insisted that white and black populations were infested by the same ills, be they afflictions of the body or of the mind. Differences existed only in respect to the degree to which any particular disease was spreading in a given population. In his *A Treatise on Insanity, and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind* (1835) Prichard discussed the prevalence of madness at different times of history, endorsing the attempt of the German psychicist J. C. A. Heinroth who "has taken pains to collect instances in the early fables of Greece" to prove the spread of religious insanity in antiquity.

So far we have been dealing with the physical side of the human habitus. However, in the age of Romanticism the notion of the habitus had far-reaching implications for the mental make-up. The main theoretical link was the doctrine of humoralism (already addressed in the context of Prichard's theory of moral insanity). The tenets of humoralism were closely intertwined with Blumenbach's concept of the habitus, and Buffon's notion of habits, temperaments, and instincts. The statistical material of Esquirol from which Prichard quoted extensively referred different human temperaments and constitutions to the character matrix of humoralist medicine, ranging from the sanguine to the melancholic. The publications of German medical men also abounded with references to humoralism. Prichard's own classification of human temperaments was moulded by the paradigm set out by Esquirol in France, as well as by the doctor Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742) and, later, Maximilian Jacobi in Germany. (Thus Prichard wrote that "persons of choleric temperament, or those who have black hair and eyes, with warm vigorous constitution, become violently maniacal, ...; the sanguineo-phlegmatic, or persons of fair, pale complexion, with flaxen hair, fall more readily into a chronic disease...".)

Humoralism was used as an explanatory device, not only for peculiar physical constitutions but also for the mental framework: the body
was seen as the window of the soul. It was widely believed that changes in the soul were reflected in the physical conformation which in turn exerted an influence on the mental state. The impact of the internal constitution on the physical conformation was widely acknowledged. Even though the doctrine was proffered by Prichard and others to defy the materialism of phrenology, an anti-vitalist and sensationalist physiologist like Pierre-Jean-George Cabanis also adhered to the system of humoralism.215

One of the medical authors and adherents to humoralism whom Prichard frequently cited was the German alienist Maximilian Jacobi. Being a pious Protestant, Jacobi believed that a thing as significant as religious conversion could not fail to leave its traces on the body: "Mahometans and Christians have certain recognizable bodily characteristics. When a Mahometan turns into a Christian, bodily too he becomes a new man".216 Prichard himself never expressly pondered on the physical influences of monotheism, or Christianity. But wherever the reader opens any of his anthropological books, there are illustrations to be found for Prichard's more or less implicit assumption that beauty came with civilization, and that civilization accompanied true religion.217

What has been shown with respect to Prichard's theories of madness applies to his doctrines of the animal economy as well: his discovery of psychology for anthropology arose out of his occupation with Romantic humoralist physiology. Following Blumenbach, Prichard believed that "structures and habitudes" provided the criteria for investigating human nature. According to Romantic medical philosophy, habitudes were a question of internal and external conformation. Thus psychology was introduced into Prichard's anthropology:

Facts daily observed afforded convincing proofs that the real constitution of the human mind is far other than it was thus represented to be, that not only the powers of the understanding are given naturally in different proportions, but that peculiar moral
dispositions and propensities belong in different degrees, by original
distribution, to different individuals".218

Interestingly, in turning to psychology Prichard also meant to rescue it and
the entire philosophy of the human mind from the fangs of the
phrenologists. As an adept of the physiology of the human mind he was
intrigued by phrenology. He wrote: "I have had my attention directed to
this inquiry for many years, and have omitted no opportunity that has
presented itself of gaining information on the subject". The result of his
labours was deep-seated doubt in the "truth" of organology, a doubt so
profound that it inspired Prichard to some of the rare ironical outbursts of
his publishing career.219

Since Montesquieu it had been taken for granted that moral habits
followed physical surroundings. The Romantic age related moral habits to
particular physical conformations of the body. The interplay between
human physics and the natural surroundings afforded a certain latitude of
development: due to different human constitutions the same
environmental stimuli had different effects on different sorts of characters.
There was, Blumenbach wrote, "a discrepancy of different organs, and of
the same organs in different individuals, according to age, sex,
temperament, idiosyncrasy, habit, mode of life" which led to the
production of "diversified effects of the same stimuli upon different
organs".220 Within the humoralist framework the constitution of different
organs had an impact on the mental constitution, enhancing the unfolding
of particular sentiments while suppressing others. Cabanis was derided by
many in Britain for providing the physical basis for the idea that
"intellectual phenomena were but modifications of feeling".221 Still, his
ideas of the influences of physical agents on the human body were shared
even by his avowed enemies. Prichard was initially against Cabanis's
system, asserting that affections were not dependent for their function on
physical stimuli. However, as we have seen, his attitude to somatism gradually changed. Within the humoralist patterns of Romantic medicine, the interplay between body and psyche was seen as an intricate network of physico-psychological dependencies.

The phrenological system, by contrast, seemed to provide a shortcut, ruling out the influence of the bodily organs and concentrating on the craniological conformation for explaining the prevalence of particular sentiments, passions, and talents. Prichard's metaphysical objections against phrenology have been addressed in the preceding chapter. Here we come back to it because of its anthropological implications, and because Prichard's understanding of psychology was formulated in conscious opposition to the science of mind supported by the phrenologists.

Prichard saw the attractiveness of phrenology: it combined the attempt to explain the degree of intellectual capacity through the cranium, with an endeavour to locate the entire emotive and instinctive system in the brain, thus connecting the science of mind to anthropology. In an article on "Temperament", a contribution to the Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, Prichard described what singled out Gall and his followers among other scholars theorizing on the brain:

with Gall originated the attempt to discover in the brain the local seats of all those properties which constitute the principles of action, the whole psychical nature of all tribes of animated beings; to trace the social, domestic, personal characters of man within his cranium, and to find corresponding parts with which the phenomena of animal life peculiar to each lower tribe, all their wonderful instincts and specific habits are equally connected.222

Gall, in other words, referred the higher and the lower principles of action to the organs of the brain; without making any principal division between their status, he treated them methodically and philosophically as a unity whose mechanisms in man he wanted to elucidate through the
comparison with the propensities and affections of the animal realm. Prichard admitted that Gall had founded nothing more and nothing less than "comparative psychology": the human psyche was explained on the grounds of analogical comparisons to the animal realm. It was, on the whole, the same sort of analogical reasoning which had been suggested by the supporters of the analogical method, Buffon, Blumenbach and Prichard himself. He wrote:

The point of view in which Dr. Gall and the phrenologists have contemplated the mental faculties may be termed that of *comparative psychology*. ... it discovers analogies in psychical phenomena between the brute tribes, and traces in them the rudiments of those properties which in the highest degree of development and taken collectively form the human character, and which in lower degrees and various relations constitute the distinctive nature of each of the inferior kinds. This is a new view of the mind and its powers, founded on a principle analogous to that which comparative anatomy applies to the structure of the body.

So far, Prichard had no quarrel with Gall. He himself believed the latter's approach "seems to hold out the prospect of discovering curious and interesting relations". The trouble with phrenology was that it stipulated that the individual psychological conformation could be deduced from the shape of the cranium which indicated the degree of development of the several "organs" of the brain. Thus phrenology provided a useful tool in the hands of the polygenists. We have seen that Prichard defied phrenology in the name of the immateriality of the soul. In addition to this he had to prove the system wrong in order to safeguard the method of comparative investigations into the animal economy for his monogenist cause.

Any analogizing between mankind and animals must necessarily bridge the ontological gap between animals and humans. Prichard summarized the philosophical problem thus: "We must, then, either
elevate the brutes or lower the superiority of mankind\textsuperscript{226} To his great annoyance the phrenologists seemed to do the latter. He himself chose to see it the other way round: instead of referring mankind to the animal realm he contended that animals, too, had souls, insisting "that a psychical principle, or a principle in its nature distinct from organized body, exists in all sentient beings\textsuperscript{227} Gall and Spurzheim, by contrast, treated the faculties of mankind as if they were on the very same level as instinctive animal behaviour. "It was a novel and amusing speculation", Prichard explained, "to trace the fundamental laws of political society, not in the higher principles where Aristotle or where Hooker have sought them, but in analogies with the economy of the ant or of the bee. There is sound reason in the observation that the Author of man's existence formed also the inferior orders of the creation, and that extensive analogies may and do exist in the different departments of his works" - but that gave the phrenologists no right to talk about human achievements as if they were the product of unconscious drives located outside the realm of morality. Prichard's judgment on "organology" was about as vitriolic as he could possibly get:

As it did not enter into the view of the phrenologists to assume the existence of a psychical principle coextensive with conscious or sentient being, the only resource left was to connect the series of animal properties developed by their system of comparative psychology, with some part of the corporeal organization that should be found common to mankind and the lower animals. Here the brain and the nervous system came in as having the best claim\textsuperscript{228}

The cultural inferences of the phrenological system were appalling and, as Prichard thought, proof enough for the hideousness of the entire approach:

Shall we say, after tracing the operations of a constructive instinct so wonderfully displayed by the beaver, or in the cells in which the bee lays up its honey, that an impulse to action precisely similar gave origin to the pyramids of Egypt or to the building of Constantinople?
Shall we venture to affirm that the tunnel under the Thames owes its existence to a burrowing propensity resembling that of the rabbit or the mole? Shall we conclude that Parry and Franklin sought the regions of the north impelled by the instinct of the migratory rat, and that Magellan and De Gama traversed the southern oceans directed by an influence analogous to that which moves the flight of swallows?²²⁹

It was as ludicrous as the opposite idea that animals were endowed with reason. It was, Prichard concluded, simply wrong to see human and animal actions such as travelling or building houses in analogy to each other. Mankind and animals were comparable, although not in view of particular abilities and designs, but in respect of the general make-up of their psychology, the changes it underwent and the connection it bore to the rest of the animal economy.

Still, even though Prichard put so much stress on his view that there was no point in comparing the cultural products of human rationality to the natural creations of animal instinct, he did not consider the existence or absence of reason as the great divide between animal and human nature. The point will be illustrated in the next chapter when the role of psychology within Prichard's anthropology will be discussed. In that respect he departed entirely from the philosophical framework of Blumenbach and the great majority of all other eighteenth-century commentators of human nature.
1 As we have seen in ch. 1, Prichard used both words, anthropology and ethnology, only from the 1830s. He established the science of ethnology in Britain. Yet, in this dissertation he is presented as anthropologist because that discipline comprised the natural history of man and the philosophy of the human mind.

2 See ch. 3.

3 Thomas Hodgkin, "Obituary of Dr. Prichard", Journal of the Ethnological Society of London, 2 (1848-1850), 182-207, p. 186. Since there are hardly any personal manuscripts of Prichard available, it is impossible to decide whether Prichard was driven to embrace monogenism to make up for his bad conscience for having left the Quaker sect in 1808. In any case, some such psychological speculations tend to oversimplify.

4 James Cowles Prichard, Researches Into the Physical History of Man, ed. by George Stocking Jr, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1973 (1813), ii.

5 Prichard, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind, 2. ed., 2 vols, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1826; the third edition appeared under the same title, 5 vols, London (Sherwood, Gilbert, Piper; John and Arthur Arch), 1836-1847.


It is doubtful whether Prichard knew anything about it. If he wanted to develop a theory of heredity it would have been wise for him to keep abreast with the school of von Baer. As Atran has pointed out: only in embryology it was possible to link the problem of speciation to generational processes, see: Scott Atran, \textit{Cognitive Foundations of Natural History. Towards an Anthropology of Science}, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), Paris (Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme), 1990, 262.


Nicholas Jardine, Emma Spary, "The Natures of Cultural History", in: Jardine et al. (eds), \textit{Cultures of Natural History}, 3-13, p. 3.


For Robertson see: Prichard, \textit{Researches}, 1. ed., 213. For Kames see: Ibid., ii. For Stewart see ch. 3 of this dissertation.


Letter to Washington from 18. 3. 1840, ibid.


Barrow himself was frequently quoted on the Hottentots - although the Admiralty Secretary supported plantation owners against the abolitionist movement. For Barrow see: Michael T. Bravo, "Ethnological Encounters", in: Jardine et al. (eds), \textit{Cultures of Natural History}, 338-357, p. 342. Many years later the ethnologist John Lubbock furnished a list of all those authors who gave evidence that certain aboriginal tribes had no religion. Among them were: Joseph Beete Jukes (1811-1869), \textit{Narrative of the Surveying Voyage of H.M.S. Fly, 1847}; William John Burchell (1782?-1868), \textit{Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa, 1822}; John Ross (1721-1790), \textit{A Voyage of Discovery ... for the Purpose of Exploring Baffin's Bay, 1819}. Significantly, Lubbock's account did hardly rely on travelling missionaries whose writings, as we will see in ch. 5, belonged to Prichard's most important sources. See: John Lubbock, \textit{The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man}, 5. ed., London (Longmans, Green and Co.), 1889 (1870), 213, 215.


[Anon.], "Prichard's Retrospect Address", Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, 4 (1837), 159-160, p. 160 (for a full quote cf. note 18 in ch. 1).

Ibid., 2. ed, vol. 1, 10; Prichard inserted a diagram to illustrate what he meant, see ibid., 98. Cf. also: 3. ed., vol. 1, 9.


Lilienthal, "Soemmerring über Rassenunterschiede", 49.

Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", note on p. cix.


32 See A. C. Haddon, *The Story of the Sciences*, 52. Blumenbach mentioned Paracelsus in this context; see his *Contributions to Natural History*, 299.

33 Urs Bitterli, "Auch Amerikaner sind Menschen", 25.


35 Urs Bitterli, "Auch Amerikaner sind Menschen", 25.

36 For Linnaeus's anthropology see: Gunnar Broberg, *Homo Sapiens*


41 For an argument against "artificial arrangements" see: [a non.], Zimmerman’s [sic] Geographical History of Man, Monthly Review, 1. series, 80 (1789), 678-690, p. 679. Prichard made "the arbitrary classification of Linnaeus" responsible for "this most absurd hypothesis, that the Negro is the connecting link between the white man and the ape", see: Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., note on p. 67. Prichard’s teacher at Edinburgh University, Daniel Rutherford, also warned his students to


44 In 1813 his main target had been Kames (see: Researches, 1. ed., ii). In 1826, too, he had not yet made up his polygenetic black list. Even Bory de Saint Vincent, Virey and Desmoulins whose publication preceded the second edition were not mentioned.


46 Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 494-496. See the review of Martius' book in: [anon.], "On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Brazil", Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 2 (1832), 191-227, esp. 204.

47 Prichard was delighted when a few years later he discovered that, at least as far as Humboldt was concerned, his misgivings had been unfounded. In his Kosmos Humboldt even quoted Prichard: Alexander von Humboldt, ΚΟΣΜΟΣ. A General Survey of the Physical Phenomena of the Universe, trans. Augustin Prichard, 2 vols, London (Bailliére), 1845, vol. 1, 386-387. Despite his praise for Prichard's anthropological insight, Humboldt had trouble with the Prichard family: Augustin Prichard's translation which Bailliére published in 1845 displeased Alexander von Humboldt no end: he found the translation abysmal. Why Bailliére had commissioned Augustin is unknown. Nor do we have any idea of what Prichard thought about his son's accomplishment. Humboldt himself stressed that he had had no
idea of the translation project and he was distressed at the prospect that his work of many years should sink like a stone in England, just because of an inadequate translation. Augustin was a medical man. He had spent some time as a medical student in Berlin. But there was no sign at all that his range of interest was as wide as that of his father. It appears somewhat unlikely that it was his own idea to translate the Kosmos. Augustin Prichard was not up to the task. The Quarterly Review wrote that the translation was "on the whole, decently executed", albeit "of course" it would have been more advantageous had somebody else, such as Colonel Sabine, fulfilled the task. Humboldt himself lamented the fate of "my poor Cosmos [sic]", which in English "is devoid of all liveliness, sounding like Sanskrit". However, Humboldt was lucky. Christian Carl Josias Bunsen, the Prussian minister and influential scholar in London, exerted his diplomatic faculties, convincing Longman and Murray that Colonel Sabine ought to execute a proper translation as it had been planned. Humboldt was overjoyed: "I am lacking the words to tell you, my dear friend of many years, how grateful I am". See: [anon.], "Humboldt’s Cosmos", Quarterly Review, 77 (1846), 154-191, note on p. 160. Alexander von Humboldt, Briefe an Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen, Leipzig (Brockhaus), 1869, 68-70, 73, letters from 18. 9. 1845 and 4. 1. 1846.

48 Carl Asmund Rudolph, Beiträge zur Anthropologie und allgemeinen Naturgeschichte, Berlin (Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften), 1842, 158.
49 Ibid., 167.
51 Jean-Baptiste-Geneviève-Marcellin Bory de Saint Vincent was an influential contributor to the science of man in early nineteenth-century France. He published: L’Homme (homo). Essai zoologique sur le genre humain, 2 vols, 2. ed., Paris (Ray et Gravier), 1827. And he contributed the entry on "Espèces du genre humain" to the Dictionnaire classique d’histoire naturelle, vol. 8, Paris, 1825, 375, 390. His career having taken off during Napoleon’s reign, Bory de Saint Vincent belonged to those who were later criticized for their imperial leanings.
53 Louis-Antoine Desmoulins, Histoire naturelle des races humaines du nord-est de l’Europe, de l’Asie boréale et orientale, et de l’Afrique australe, d’après des recherches spéciales d’antiquités, de physiologie, d’anatomie et de zoologie, Paris (Tretsull), London (Wurtz), 1826. The text was ill-received among the members of the Musée as well as in Britain. See: [anon.], "Natural History of the Human Race", Monthly Review, new series, 3, 1826, 505-515. See also: Antje Sommer, "William Frédéric Edwards, 'Rasse' als Grundlage europäischer

54 Georges Cuvier, *Recherches sur les ossements fossiles de quadrupèdes où l'on rétablit des caractères de plusieurs espèces d'animaux que les révolutions du globe paraissent avoir détruites*, 4 vols, Paris (Deterville), 1812, vol. 1, 106.


56 Ibid., 1. ed., 105.

57 Ibid., 106. For the philological context see ch. 8.


59 In the early 1840s Hodgkin promised Morton to send him a skull of an American, having perhaps no clue to what extent his American colleague deviated from his own ideas. See: Louis Rosenfeld, *Thomas Hodgkin. Morbid Anatomist and Social Activist*, Lanham, Maryl. (Madison Books), 1992, 176. For Hodgkin see also: Amalie M. Kass and Edward H. Kass, *Perfecting the World. The Life and Times of Dr. Thomas Hodgkin 1798-1866*, Boston (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1988. In 1839 Morton had published his *Crania Americana; or. a Comparative View of the Skulls of Various Aboriginal Nations of North and South America; to Which is Prefixed, an Essay on the Varieties of the Human Species*. Rosenfeld has suggested that Hodgkin kept supporting Morton because "he did not shy away from reading the controversial writings of other scientists and frequently referred to them in his own publications". My reading of the occurrences is rather that Hodgkin and Prichard were not aware that Morton was gradually defecting into the polygenist camp. In *Crania Americana* Morton did not outrightly embrace polygenism. He pointed out, as Prichard summarized it, "that the American race differs essentially from all others". But his usage of the word "variety" in the title must have appeared reassuring to Prichard. Cf.: Prichard, "Morton's Crania Americana", *Journal of the Geographical Society*, 10 (1841), 552-561.


62 William Frédéric Edwards (1776-1842), a half-brother of the naturalist Henri Milne-Edwards, was born in Jamaica. When the shock-waves of the French revolution reached the region, giving rise to slave mutinies, the family quit the colonies, settling in Belgium which was at the time
under French rule. Edwards studied medicine in Paris, acquired the French nationality and became a respected member of the Paris medical faculty. In 1839 he founded the Société Ethnologique de Paris. His interest in physical anthropology was derived from two sources. On the one hand, he was a member of the republican movement which challenged the legitimacy of the "Frankish" Bourbon family (see ch. 8). On the other hand, he was obsessed with the question how the environment acted on organisms. His On the Influence of Physical Agents on Life aimed to put the environmentalist theory on a physiological footing. Antje Sommer is correct in saying that he was no biological racist. Yet, in his desire to unravel the European past by means of following the histories of European "races", he founded the basis of the nineteenth-century "scientific" racialism, including a set of laws allegedly governing the mechanisms of racial mixture. Sommer has ignored the physiological component of Edwards's learning. See: Sommer, "William Frédéric Edwards", esp. 367. A better interpretation of Edwards's racial theory is provided by: Claude Blanckaert, "On the Origins of French Ethnology. William Edwards and the Doctrine of Race", in: George Stocking (ed.), Bones, Bodies, Behavior. Essays on Biological Anthropology (= History of Anthropology 5), Madison (Univ. of Wisconsin Press), 1988, 20-55. For the medical approach to ethnology in post-revolutionary France see: Williams, The Physical and the Moral, 224-233.

63 Cf. Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire, 288 ("le polygenisme est au centre de l'anthropologie Voltairienne").


66 For that particular Romantic kind of German anthropology see: Karl J. Fink, "Storm and Stress Anthropology", History of the Human Sciences, 6 (1993), 51-71.


68 For Newman's philological exploits see also ch. 8.


70 Stephen Toulmin, June Goodfield, The Discovery of Time, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1965, 171.

71 Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, 260.

74 Ibid., 105. See also: ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 90-91.
75 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 92.
77 Ibid., 109.
79 Prichard's earliest concept of "variety" appears to have been the same as Buffon's understanding of "race". Duchet described it: "les 'races' sont des 'variétés de l'espèce', dont les caractères sont devenus héréditaires, par l'action constante et continue des causes qui sont à l'origine des 'variétés individuelles'", see: Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire, 273. As we will see below Prichard was incited to use the term "permanent variety" thanks to the influence of W. F. Edwards.
80 The English term "race" is derived from the French. Originally it designated the royal families who governed France from the middle ages. By the eighteenth century the term was often employed as one of many synonymous translations of the Latin words 'gens' and "genus": Other translations included the terms "stock" and "tribe", "family" and "nation". During the Enlightenment the word "race" was unproblematic because the Latin texts, in which its meaning largely resided, merely distinguished between nations as political entities and tribes or families as natural entities. The ambiguity of the nineteenth-century understanding of the term "people", with its cultural, genealogical and political connotations, was not at issue in the Latin texts which lay at the basis of pre-modern learning. Still in 1841 the Penny Cyclopaedia referred under the entry "Race" to "Man"; see: Penny Cyclopaedia, 27 vols, London (Charles Knight and Co.), 1833-1843, vol. 19. For the construction of meaning of the term "race" see: Michael Banton, Racial Theories; idem, The Idea of Race, London (Tavistock), 1977, 18; Claude Liauzu, Race et civilisation. L'autre dans la culture occidentale, Paris (Syros), 1992, esp. 387-388; Robert Miles, Racism, London, New York (Routledge), 1989, ch. 3. Especially helpful is: Antje Sommer, "Entstehung und Entfaltung des Rassebegriffs", in: Otto Brunner, Reiner Konze, Reinhardt Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 5, Stuttgart (Klett), 1984, 137-146.
81 This is discussed in detail in ch. 6.
82 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 194.
83 Contemporary Platonic leanings have been detected mainly in transcendental anatomy. But they can be found in Blumenbach as well, as Lenoir has shown: Timothy Lenoir, "Generational Factors in the Origin of Romantische Naturphilosophie", Journal of the History of Biology, 11 (1978), 57-100. For Aristotelianism versus Platonism in the
nineteenth century see: David Newsome, Two Classes of Men, Platonism & English Romantic Thought, London (John Murray), 1774.

84 Buffon used the term "proto-type" referring to the archetypical pattern on which all individuals of a species were moulded, see Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, 261. Prichard characterized Blumenbach's classification of skulls as a tentative endeavour: Blumenbach "seems in fact to have regarded the classification of skulls, proposed by him as affording a very broad outline, to which the different tribes of men might be referred, with a view of affording merely a general idea of their character of organization, without drawing any inference as to their consanguinity, or relationship to each other" (Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 172).

85 Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, 305-312.

86 English historians tend to misrepresent Blumenbach in view of his classification of human varieties: accounts of his system tend to overlook the fact that he used "degeneration" in a neutral manner, it was his synonymous expression for "Ausartung" which merely means "deviation". The result is that scholars relying merely on secondary literature fall into the trap of presenting Blumenbach almost as a racialist. See e.g. Bernal: "According to [Blumenbach] the white or Caucasian was the first and most beautiful and talented race, from which all others had degenerated"; in: Martin Bernal, Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, 2 vols, London (Vintage), 1991 (1987), vol. 1, 219. Already in 1840 Prichard defended Blumenbach against the view that he might have paved the way for Cuvier's racial division of mankind, see Prichard's letter to Washington, 23. 5. 1840, Prichard Papers, Royal Geographical Society.

87 Neve's statement that Geoffroy was but a "distressing figure" for Prichard appears to be mistaken: Michael Neve, "Natural Philosophy, Medicine and the Culture of Science in Provincial England: The Case of Bristol, 1780-1850, and Bath, 1750-1820", Ph. D. diss., University College London, 1984, 280. In the great debate between "form" and "function" Prichard had no stake. For the background of the two positions see: E. S. Russell, Form and Function: A Contribution to the History of Animal Morphology, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press, repr.), 1982. For the notion of type in general in the early nineteenth century see: Paul L. Farber: "The Type Concept in Zoology During the First Half of the 19th Century", Journal of the History of Biology, 9 (1976), 93-119; Timothy Lenoir, "Generational Factors in the Origin of Romantische Naturphilosophie", 60-80; idem, "Morphotypes in Romantic Biology", in: Andrew Cunningham, Nicholas Jardine (eds), Romanticism and the Sciences, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1909, 119-129; Williams, The Physical and the Moral, 93-105, 170-174, 221-223. The term "type" was embraced especially whole-heartedly by transcendental naturalists who through the assumption of some basic unity of all types strove to bolster the unity of the natural system. See: Rehbock, The Philosophical Naturalists, esp. Part 1 on the "Idealist approach to nature". However, it was not just transcendental anatomy which employed the notion of type, it rather appealed to a whole range of scholars and philosophers.
who aimed to explain, laws of nature and history by means of subsuming otherwise loose and atomistic phenomena under greater entities, this very act conferred meaning to otherwise disparate facts and events.

88 Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, 259. Linnaeus conceived this idea only in 1766. Before then his theory was fashioned according to the doctrine "nulla species nova".


91 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 386. Buffon had used the word "prototype", see Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, 261.

92 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 395.

93 Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, 298.

94 Michael Banton asserted that Prichard's usage of the word type contradicted his own scientific creed: "he would have been only consistent had he rejected it as redundant". See Banton, Racial Theories, 31. From what I have said it is clear that I take Banton's judgement for an anachronism.

95 For Prichard's esteem of Geoffroy see his Researches, 1. ed., 90 (the "enlightened labour of Geoffroy"). In the second edition Prichard used Geoffroy in order to prove that one species was not common to two different continents (p. 69). Geoffroy is oftentimes quoted in all of Prichard's writings on natural history. Rupke agreed with Ospovat maintaining that "during the pre-Origin period, and certainly during the pre-Vestiges years, the primary issue that divided British naturalists was not 'pro- or contra transmutation', but 'form or function'; see: Dov Ospovat, The Development of Darwin's Theory. Natural History, Natural Theology & Natural Selection 1838-1859, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1981, 7-8. Nicolaas A. Rupke, Richard Owen, Victorian Naturalist. New Haven (Yale Univ. Press), 1994, 69. Prichard's attitude, however, does not bear out this interpretation. He was against transmutationism, but not necessarily against settling out an anatomical theory of nature which was organized according to form rather than to function. Another man who was influenced by the French brand of transcendental anatomy was Charles Lyell, see: Pietro Corsi, "The Importance of French Transformist Ideas for the Second Volume of Lyell's Principles of Geology", British Journal for the History of Science, 2 (1978), 221-244. For the influence of anatomical transcendentalism in Britain between the early nineteenth century and the 1860s see also: Adrian Desmond, Archetypes and Ancestors: Palaeontology in Victorian London, 1850-1875, London (Blond and Briggs), Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1982; L. S. Jacyna, "Scientific Naturalism in Victorian Britain: An Essay in the Social History of Ideas", Ph. D. diss., Edinburgh Univ., 1980; Ospovat, The Development

96 Rupke, Richard Owen, 111, 114. In 1812 Cuvier was still willing to consider morphological relationships between species within the same embranchement. But he was to leave that position fairly soon.


101 Ibid., vol. 2, 269. Prichard wrote: "Shall we suppose that at the first production of a genus, when it grew into existence, some slight modification in the productive causes stamped it originally with all these specific diversities? Or is it most probable that the modification was subsequent to its origin, and that the genus at its first creation was one and uniform, and afterwards became diversified by the influence of external agents? We know nothing of the origin of beings, but the former of these suppositions is the conclusion to which we are led by all that can be ascertained respecting the limits of species, and the extent of variation under the influence of causes at present existing and operating".


103 See note 98 above.


105 For the topic of hybridity and crossbreeding see: Dougherty, "Buffons Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des anthropologischen Denkens im Deutschland"; François Jacob, La logique du vivant; Nicholas Russell, Like Engend'ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Modern England, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1986; Sloan, "The Gaze of Natural History", idem, "From Logical Universals to Historical Individuals".


108 For Pallas see: Dougherty, "Buffons Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des anthropologischen Denkens im Deutschland", 232. For Pennant
see Slotkin (ed.), Readings in Early Anthropology, 186.

109 Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, 292. Blumenbach assumed that there were several species of dogs. He himself accepted the argument of hybridity as a species criterion, however. See his Handbuch der Naturgeschichte, 4. enl. ed., Göttingen (J. C. Dieterich), 1791, parag. 14.


111 Peter Browne, Things Divine and Supernatural Conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human, Bristol (Thoemmes Antiquarian Books), 1990 (1733), 3-4.


115 Ibid., 52.

116 J. Borthwick, "Notes from A Course of Lectures on Moral Philosophy. Delivered by Dugald Stewart Esq. 1806-7", 8, 46; Edinburgh University Library, Special Collections, MSS Gen. 843.

117 Olson, Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 116-118.


122 This was a view thoroughly different from that of a medical writer like Johann Christoph Girtanner who found it much easier to write on human varieties than on those of plants and animals as all travel reports would put great weight on describing ethnological peculiarities, see: Querner, "Christoph Girtanner", 125.

123 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol.1, 97-98. Interestingly Prichard believed that this natural instinct of repulsion was overcome in the state of domestication, when breeders brought different species
together (ibid., 97). It is important to notice that, thereby, Prichard did not mean to say that the domesticated state gave rise to new varieties, while the natural state would not. He distinguished between those varieties that were a product of intermixture and those resulting from an inbred propensity for differentiation in the parent stock. This topic will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

124 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 128-129.

125 For the assumption that social classes had different ways of perception see: Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth. Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England, Chicago, London (The Univ. of Chicago Press), 1994, chs 5 and 6. See also: Banton, Racial Theories, ch. 5 ("Race as Class").

126 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 147-150; The Natural History of Man, 18-26 ("Of Mixed Races of Men").


129 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 128.


131 Ibid., 149.

132 Though Buffon promoted the argument of hybridity he was quite aware of the examples which seemingly contradicted the theory, see Bowler, The Environmental Sciences, 183.

133 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 139-142.

134 Carl Asmund Rudolphi, Beyträge zur Anthropologie, 160.


136 Ibid., 142.

137 Ibid., 7.


139 See ch. 10.

140 Samuel George Morton, "Hybridity in Animals and Plants, Considered in Reference to the Question of the Unity of Species", Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal, 43 (1847), 262-287. Prichard never alluded to it. It is quite possible that he knew of the article, since the Journal was one of the main outlets for the type of natural historical investigations Prichard was pursuing. Yet there is no evidence that he read Morton's text.

141 Ibid., 287.

Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology, 116.

Knox, The Races of Men, 88.


J.-J. Virey, Histoire naturelle du genre humain, nouv. ed., 3 vols, Paris (Crochard), 1824, vol. 2, 202ff. Félix de Azara, Voyages dans l'Amérique Méridionale, vol. 1, 371. "Il ne paraîtrait donc pas sans fondement, dans la supposition d'une création instantanée, de s'imaginer que chaque espèce de la zoologie provienne de plusieurs couples primitifs qui, quoique parfaitement semblables, et réduits à une unite spécifique, auraient été créés dans divers endroits...". Azara's point was that only in this manner could the weaker animals have survived the greed of the carnivores.

Christoph Meiners, Untersuchungen über die Verschiedenheiten der Menschennaturen (die verschiedenen Menschenarten) in Asien und den Südländern, in den Ostindischen und Südpazifik, nebst einer historischen Vergleichung der vormahlichen und gegenwärtigen Bewohner dieser Continente und Eylande, 3 vols, Tübingen (J. G. Cotta), 1811-1815, vol. 1, 11. "Da die Natur unlänglich allen Erdtheilern ... ganz eigenthümliche Pflanzen, und Thierarten geschenkt hat; so muß man der Analogie der Natur gemäß annehmen, daß sie wenigstens einem Jeden der ... Erdtheile auch eigenthümliche oder ursprüngliche menschliche Bewohner schenkte".

Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., note on p. 101. Here he used the Linnaean term "genus" with the designation of "species". In 1826 he corrected himself, even though he did not say that he had formerly been wrong, see 2. ed., vol. 1, 91.

Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 133-134. Buffon's conclusions on the relations between the Old and the New World were severely attacked by Cornelius de Pauw, see: A. Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World;

151 1826, vol. 1, note on p. 42. The system of natural distribution is delineated in chs 2 and 3.

152 Rehbock, The Philosophical Naturalists, 125.

153 Browne, The Secular Ark, 41.


155 Browne, The Secular Ark, 23.


158 Humboldtian environmentalism allowed Prichard to explain skin colour as a corollary of climatic influences: irrespective of the geographical latitude, the climate was cold at a great height. This explained why mountain-peoples in tropical latitudes had light skin colour. - It was not the only explanation Prichard gave. Humboldt's theory was not the clue to the entire problem. But Prichard used it as one important element.

159 Browne, "Biogeography and Empire", 315. See also: Browne, The Secular Ark, 58-85.

160 Rehbock, Philosophical Naturalists, 120.

161 Prichard's efforts were later continued by Edward Forbes. In the third edition of the Researches, Forbes's works were among Prichard's most-used sources. For Forbes see Rupke, Richard Owen, 224.

162 There is a logical contradiction between the "centres of creation" theory and the theory that the distribution of plants and animals depended on the climatic circumstances. Ospovat claimed that Prichard did not adhere to a theory of climate. He cited correctly, yet he has overlooked the broader context of Prichard's theory (Ospovat, The Development of Darwin's Theory, 28; Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 50-51). Indeed, as we will see in ch. 6, Prichard's attitude to the forces
of climate was extremely ambiguous.

166 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 37, 27, 40.
170 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 62. Note the echo of the Chain of Being in this quote. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the concept has been obsolete, yet the notion of a hierarchy of organisms has survived until the late twentieth century.
172 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 89.
173 These theories were concerned with the origin of civilized mankind. How and whence the Australian and American aborigines had reached their abodes, was for some authors an altogether different question. As far as I know there is no monograph covering the theories of the origin of mankind, which spread between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century. For early anthropology it is still worthwhile to consult: Margaret T. Hodgen, *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Philadelphia (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press), 1964. The problem is sketchily dealt with in: Léon Poliakov, *Le mythe Aryen. Essai sur les sources du racisme et des nationalismes*, rev. ed., Bruxelles (Editions Complexe), 1987 (1971), ch. 3. See also: Bernal, *Black Athena*, vol. 1, ch. 5. However, having adopted most of his relevant information from Poliakov, Bernal's book is in this respect little more than an echo of *Le mythe Aryen*. In the works of historians of biogeography there are always a few scattered references to the topic.
175 Bowler, *The Environmental Sciences*, 184. Cf. Buffon, *Les Epoques de la nature*, ed. by J. Roger, Paris (Editions du Muséum), 1988 (1962). The theory had very old origins - as Prichard remarked, they were already known at the time of the Roman author Iustinus "who supposed the northern tract of Asia to have been the region of the world first inhabited". Iustinus copied from another historian, Pompeius Trogus who during the reign of Augustus wrote a universal history, *Historiae philippicae*. Directed against the political ideology of the Augustan age his history was not written along the lines of Roman history but following the vicissitudes of the Macedonian realm. Consciously opposing the reigning spirit Pompeius Trogus shifted not only the political centre of the world but also the origin of mankind geographically towards the east; see the entries for Iustinus and Pompeius Trogus in: Paul Kroh, *Lexikon der antiken Autoren*.
Stuttgart (Kröner), 1972. For Prichard's citation of Iustinus see his *Researches*, 2. ed., vol. 1, note on p. 87; 3. ed., vol. 1, 102. In The *Natural History of Man* he claimed that the theory which referred the origin of mankind to Asia was even older than Iustinus (p. 134).

176 Jacob Bryant, *A New System; or an Analysis of Ancient Mythology Wherein an Attempt is Made to Divest Tradition of Fable and to Reduce the Truth to its Original Purity*, 3 vols, London (T. Payne), 1774-1776.

177 Poliakov, *Le mythe Aryen*, 210-211.

178 Ibid., 211.

179 To my knowledge there is no work which delineates the origins of the "Caucasian hypothesis". Bernal claimed that "Blumenbach was the first to publicize the term 'Caucasian'" in 1795 (Bernal, *Black Athena*, vol. 1, 219). But he did not give any evidence for it. Even if it was true, it is extremely unlikely that Blumenbach alone was responsible. In the contents list of the second edition of the *Researches*, Prichard himself referred to the "Caucasian variety" (see vol. 1, bk. 2, ch., 3, sect. 5). As long as he adhered to Blumenbach's classification of skulls he could hardly avoid it. Only when he, in the third edition, developed his own tripartite division of types of skulls, would he no longer use the term "Caucasian variety".

180 This topic is discussed at length in ch. 9.

181 Scholars like W. von Humboldt and A. W. Schlegel thought that German scholarship was up to no good as long as vast numbers of ignorant dilettanti kept dabbling with Sanskrit studies. As Humboldt wrote: "It is high time to put a stop to this nonsense of etymologizing, speculating, and struggling in the dark" ("Es ist wirklich Zeit diesem etymologisierenden, Rathenden und im Blinden tappenden Unfug ein Ende zu machen"); Wilhelm von Humboldt, August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Briefwechsel*, ed. by Albert Leitzmann, introd. by B. Delbrück, Halle (Max Niemeyer), 1908, 113, letter from Humboldt to Schlegel, 30. 12. 1822.

182 Meiners, *Untersuchungen über die Verschiedenheiten der Menschenarten*, 6 (diese "jüdischen ... Fabeln").


184 Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*, 3 vols, ed. by Julian Schmidt, Leipzig (Brockhaus), 1869 (1784-1791), vol. 2, 161. Interestingly, Herder remarked that the Hebrews originated in the "high mountains of Asia" as well. For this reason alone it would be unjust to accuse him of having formulated a cultural theory with anti-Semitic leaning. Quite unacceptable is Bernal's remark that Herder's "concern with history and local particularity, and the disdain for rationality or 'pure reason' apparent in his views ... provided a firm basis for the chauvinism and racism of the following two centuries". (Cf. Herder, *Ideen*, vol. 2, 15; Bernal, *Black Athena*, vol. 1, 206).


186 Georges Cuvier, Recherches sur les ossemens fossiles de quadrupèdes, vol. 1, 106.

187 Camper's "facial angle" referred to the angle between one imaginary line from the forehead to the nose and another from the nose to the chin. Camper stipulated that the degree of intelligence grew proportionally with the volume of the forehead. Blumenbach rejected the idea: Camper's system discredited itself by implying that the owl was more intelligent than most human beings. According to Miriam Claude Meijer and Claude Blanckaert, Blumenbach was responsible for Camper's later reputation as an early racialist. As a matter of fact, however, he invented the facial angle, first of all, to teach his anatomy classes how to draw. See: Blumenbach, A Short System of Comparative Anatomy, trans. William Lawrence, London (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme), 1807 (1805), 56; Claude Blanckaert, "Les vicissitudes de l'angle facial' et les débuts de la craniométrie (1765-1875)", Revue de synthèse, 108 (1987), 417-453; M. C. Meijer, The Anthropology of Petrus Camper, Ann Arbor (UMI Dissertation Services), 1991, 307-315.

188 Blumenbach, De generis humani varietate nativa, 268-276. Blumenbach used the term "Caucasian" for the first time in the third edition of his De generis humani varietate nativa of 1795 (see: Blumenbach’s Contributions to Natural History, Bendyshe’s note on p. 303). Already in 1850 the ethnologist Robert Gordon Latham, a disciple of Prichard’s ethnology, hinted at the confusion ensuing from the fact that the measurement of Blumenbach’s Caucasian type had been drawn from the skull of a female Georgian, while all the other skulls were male. Latham was sure that this had distorted the results. But by the time this criticism was made, the phantasies of the contemporaries were already filled with images of Caucasian beauty. It was too late to mend the error. See: [anon.], "The Natural History of the Varieties of Man", Prospective Review, 6 (1850), 449-458, p. 456. Moreover, Latham replaced the "Caucasian hypothesis" by a theory which, indeed, was not much better: in Man and his Migrations (1851) he simply denied the Eastern origin of the European nations (see ch. 10 and Poliakov, Le mythe Aryen, 240). Londa Schiebinger suggested that Blumenbach’s choice of a female Caucasian skull as the model of human beauty was inspired by the old stereotype of female slaves from the Levant as being exceptionally beautiful, see: Londa Schiebinger, Nature’s Body. Gender in the Making of Modern Science, Boston (Beacon Press), 1993, 131.

189 1. Genesis, 8. 3.

190 For the Biblical origins of Blumenbach’s choice of the term "Caucasian" see: Frank W. P. Dougherty, "Christoph Meiners und Johann Friedrich Blumenbach im Streit um den Begriff der
Menschenrasse", in: Mann et al. (eds), Die Natur des Menschen, 89-111, p. 107; Schiebinger, Nature's Body, 131. For Blumenbach himself see: idem, Contributions to Natural History, 269.


192 Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 133-134.

193 Here Prichard laid down for the first time that philology was a necessary element of researches into the natural history of mankind. See: Prichard, "Remarks on the Application of Philological and Physical Researches to the History of the Human Species", Report of the First and Second Meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science: at York in 1831, and at Oxford in 1832, London (John Murray), 1833, 529-544, p. 542.


197 Compare this to Blumenbach's De generis humani varietate nativa.

198 Blumenbach, A Short System of Comparative Anatomy.

199 Cf. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, 262. As, e.g., Dougherty showed, the notion of the habitus was already in Buffon fully established, see his "Buffons Bedeutung für das anthropologische Denken in Deutschland", 234-235. As will be demonstrated below the notion of the habitus linked up tightly with the doctrines of humoralism, Prichard adhering to both bodies of tenets. Carlos López-Beltrán is wrong in asserting that Prichard pursued a solidist, anti-humoralist philosophy, see his "Human Heredity 1750-1870; the Construction of a Domain", Ph. D. diss., King's College, London, 1992, 110.

200 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 85.
201 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1., 17; vol. 2, 570.
202 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 125. Cf. also the 3. ed., vol. 1, 137. For the whole argument see ibid, 114-137.
204 The examples are all from Prichard's Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 111,
117; for Long see the note on p. 118, Prichard quoted from Long's History of Jamaica.


207 ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 119-125, the quote is from p. 119. For the same idea in Blumenbach see his De generis humani varietate nativa, 150-151.


210 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 162-163. Prichard insisted that all human varieties knew the plight of madness, savage and barbarians as well as civilized peoples. Cf also his Treatise on Insanity, 349 and his A Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System, Part the First: Comprising Convulsive and Maniacal Affections, London (Thomas and George Underwood), 1822, 376.

211 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, note on p.190; see also ch. 3, section C.


213 Blumenbach explained black skin colour with the production of an abundance of black bile, see his De generis humani varietate nativa, 210-212.

214 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 169.


216 Maximilian Jacobi, Sammlungen für die Heilkunde der Gemüthskrankheiten, 3 vols, Elberfeld (Schöllian'sche Buchhandlung), 1830, vol. 2, 327; "Mohammedaner und Christen sind an ihren Körpern erkennbar. Wenn ein Mohammedaner Christ wird, wird er auch körperlich ein neuer Mensch".

217 For a detailed discussion of this notion see ch. 6 and section A of ch. 7.

218 Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 465.

219 Ibid., 463-464. Johann Caspar Spurzheim later extended Gall's list of 19 positive and negative mental faculties to 39 faculties, all of which
were positively connoted. Owsei Temkin, "Gall and the Phrenological Movement", Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 21 (1947), 275-321, p. 308-309. Prichard did not draw any difference between the different moral bias of Gall's and Spurzheim's faculties. He was sure that his diatribe applied to Spurzheim and "most of the converts to phrenology" (see his Treatise on Insanity, 467).

Blumenbach, The Institutions of Physiology, trans. from the Latin by John Elliotson, 2. ed., London (printed by Bensley for E. Cox), 1817 (1810), 24. (The original appeared in 4 editions between 1798 and 1828). Elliotson (1791-1868) was a physician in Cambridge and later founder of the Phrenological Society, known as the first who, in the 1820s, discarded kneebreches and silk stockings as "orthodox dress" of the physician (see DNB, vol. 17).

Temkin, "Gall and the Phrenological Movement", 289.


Young pointed out that Gall rejected traditional sensationalism, instead trying to replace the "epistemological psychology" of the sensationalist with "a biological one"; Robert M. Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1970, 15. Gall was, as Cooter put it, "the first to treat mental phenomena as well as the human passions ... as purely organic problems of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology"; Roger Cooter, The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science. Phrenology and the Organization of Consent in Nineteenth-Century Britain, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1984, 3.

Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 465 (emphases in the original).

Ibid., 468.

Ibid., 468.

Ibid., 466. Prichard had adopted the notion from the late Bishop of Bristol, Joseph Butler. In the early nineteenth century Butler's Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed (1736) had a shining return. It served Prichard's anthropological aspirations particularly well since it helped to reconcile the spiritual and the natural sphere, science and religion, nature and culture. Hilton has suggested that Butler's Analogy was so successful during the first decades of the nineteenth century "because he managed to combine the Scottish and evangelical doctrine of conscience with the utilitarian doctrine of consequentialism - put conscience into the machine, as it were"; Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement. The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795-1865. Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1988, 179-180.

Prichard, Treatise on Insanity, 468, 466-467.

Ibid., 468.
5. ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE MIND, MORAL ASPECTS OF 
PRICHARD'S NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN

A. Prichard's Discovery of Psychology
B. Prichard's Attitudes Towards the Bible

A. Prichard's Discovery of Psychology

Long before the term "psychology" was universally applied, similar interests inspired philosophical and physiological writers. It is commonly believed that psychology "originated in the slow shift in emphasis from the soul's spiritual to its temporal and material relations" which during the nineteenth century led to the foundation of psychology as proper discipline. If it be assumed that the earlier psychological authors were themselves aware of this shift, then Prichard could not properly be supposed to have pursued psychological studies. For in so far as his psychology defied phrenology it was an immediate result of his desire to defend the realm of the immaterial soul.

Viewing the eighteenth century, Gary Hatfield has repudiated an understanding of psychology which presupposes that the study of mind could take its rise only on the ruins of religious ontology: "in the standard narrative, the heroes of the Enlightenment are materialists. If psychology is to be made a science, the story goes, mind must be equated with matter and thereby rendered subject to empirical investigation". The problem is, Hatfield added, "that no one bothered to tell the early practitioners of natural scientific psychology that they had to be materialists". According to Hatfield psychology was compatible with religion. And as Prichard's example shows this contention is also valid for the nineteenth century. Perhaps, the history of psychology is better told along the lines of the varying purposes which psychological studies
fulfilled, than in view of the secularizing tendencies which some historians take to be the necessary condition for the rise of psychology as a discipline.

Some authors wanted to show the relationship between body and soul; others made psychological theories subservient to a general interest in political science; others again, people like Prichard, that is, pursued psychology as part of the natural history of man. In this context Hatfield has pointed out another prejudice, albeit less common, surrounding the history of psychology, namely, that the subject can be met with only where it was known under this very term. Against this notion Hatfield has emphasized that the study of psychology had many names, including "the science of the mind", "Seelenlehre", and "pneumatic". Focusing on that branch of psychological investigation which was being carried out in the name of anthropology we find that, from the end of the eighteenth century, references to the "psyche" and "psychology" increasingly superseded other denominations.

Yet Prichard's systematic usage of the term for that part of the mental constitution which was responsible for feelings, sentiments, and notions, in animals as well as in men, was new. As we will see, Prichard used the term "psychology" because it enabled him to refer to the human and to the animal soul at the same time. He regarded the human mind as composed of those thoughts which were the products of rationality and of those thoughts and feelings which flowed from emotive instincts. The latter were shared by both animals and mankind. In the third chapter it has been explained why Prichard believed that moral insanity resided in the distortion of the innate emotional framework. It was a lesion in that part of the mind which Prichard in his anthropological writings referred to by the name of "psychology". This section will explain what exactly Prichard understood under the term. He bolstered man's psychological nature as a crucial criterion for the unity of mankind; their "common
psychical nature" became one of the cornerstones of his anthropology.\(^5\)

In the early nineteenth century the study of the natural history of mankind was perceived as a very new science. The three figures contending for the role of founding father in France, Germany, and Britain respectively were Buffon, Blumenbach, and Prichard. Montesquieu's inquiries into human nature had laid the emphasis on the physical nature of man, on the one hand, and on the perception of man as *zoon politicon*, on the other hand.\(^6\) The Ideologues prolonged this tradition, the Société de l'Observation de l'Homme (1799-1805) was working, by and large, within the confines of Montesquieu's approach.\(^7\)

Through Scottish Enlightenment philosophy this attitude towards the study of man was passed on to Prichard. In Germany, by contrast, things stood slightly different. There, the tradition of social sciences had never quite caught on. The nearest the Germans had got to approaching Montesquieu's system or Scottish "conjectural history" was August Ludwig Schloezer's *Staatswissenschafften*.\(^8\) In his admirable study, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, Henri Ellenberger has given the impression that modern psychology grew largely under the influence of German thinkers of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. Ellenberger assumed that "Romanticism originated in Germany".\(^9\) Since he also believed that the modes of thought prevalent in the Romantic age predisposed the contemporaries to an interest in "understanding" the hidden forces in the individual, it was only logical that he should depict psychology in its inception as a German science.

Whatever one may think of Ellenberger's theory, it is true that Prichard's turn to psychology can be explained, at least in part, by his acquaintance with German authors. Initially, German scholars did not theorize on psychology in order to establish genuine differences within mankind. Being part of anthropology, German psychology, as Hatfield has pointed out, "considered the whole human: mind, body, and their
union”. Consequently, many anthropological writers who contemplated mankind also under the aspect of mental diversity, embedded their research within a framework that presupposed the unity of mankind.\(^\text{10}\) This was also the starting point from which Prichard delved into pondering the psyche.

His approach differed markedly from the attitude of French physiologists around the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, many of whom were interested in the mental distinctions within mankind rather than in unifying similarities. In his discussion of phrenology Roger Cooter has counted Gall among Cabanis, Bichat, and Pinel - among those, that is, who supplied "the basis for undermining the reigning Lockean-based paradigm of men's equality".\(^\text{11}\) They replaced it with the notion that the human psyche, like the body, was subject to environmental, i.e. physical, influences.\(^\text{12}\) French authors were convinced that mankind could be classified in view of their physical as well as their mental capacities. The abundance of outspoken polygenists in France goes back to this particular approach to the study of man.

Another French typicality was a Cartesian attitude towards the question of animal suffering: animals had no souls, Descartes had taught, hence they could not feel as humans did. As we have seen in the preceding chapter. Prichard thought very differently. He assumed that animals had a soul, or rather a "sentient principle of an immaterial nature". This had nothing do to with the notion of an afterlife.\(^\text{13}\) Prichard merely wanted to say that there was some principle in animals (and man) which was not reason, and which was yet part of the mental faculties. As he explained in 1822: "When I speak here of soul, I have no reference to the theological doctrine of a principle necessarily immortal and indestructible. If there were any other word in the English language expressive of my meaning, I should prefer it".\(^\text{14}\) In 1829 Prichard expressed himself more clearly: "it is, that in supposing the immaterial
principle to co-operate with the bodily structures in the performance of all
the animal or conscious functions, we are extending the endowment of
such a principle to the brute creation'. In 1829 he was aware that this
principle existed in man and animals alike. But he had still no word for
it. Not until 1836 did he find the term he was looking for: psychology.

In the third chapter we have seen how Prichard’s medical theories
of madness changed under the influence of both German theories and
Thomas Hancock’s *Essay on Instinct*. With respect to Prichard’s theory of
psychology Hancock (1783-1849) played a crucial role as well. He helped
Prichard overcome his inhibitions towards admitting criticism of
Lockeanism.

The Irish-born Thomas Hancock was a Quaker who, unlike
Prichard, did not forsake his creed. Both men had completed their studies
in Edinburgh. Hancock moved to London where he worked as physician
to the City of London and Finsbury Dispensaries. He participated in the
medico-philosophical debates of the London medical establishment,
publishing articles on medical and other subjects which gained him the
reputation as a "philosophic" mind. His entry in the *DNB* notes that
Hancock tried to reconcile Locke’s philosophy of the human mind with
common-sense philosophy. As a matter of fact, Hancock criticized Locke
profoundly, especially for having prepared the field for Hume’s
scepticism. Hancock rejected Locke’s idea that the mind was initially a
tabula rasa. At the same time, however, he admitted that it was
unrealistic to assume that the mental faculties of man, and in particular
the moral sense, were fully developed as of the beginning of each
individual life. Instead he introduced a metaphor into the philosophy of
mind through which he hoped to delimit the notion of inbred faculties.

The metaphor Hancock chose was that of the "seed". Seeds were, so
to speak, archetypical objects of the Romantic era. A philosophical
outlook which laid more emphasis on "becoming" than on "being" was
liable to consider the notion of the "seed" as highly interesting. In his Essay on Instinct and its Physical and Moral Relations Hancock wrote: "It can hardly be doubted that the enlargement of the intellect and the development of the mental capacities bear some analogy to the evolution, growth and expansion of the several parts of the ovum and of a seed or germ". He thought that it was wrong to deny the existence of innate faculties. They just had to unfold themselves:

as the growth of a plant proceeds from one degree to another by its inherent powers, without human assistance (which may, indeed, aid or retard but cannot give the powers themselves); so in the development of the mind, the internal seeds, faculties, or talents, may be gradually unfolded, by native tendencies or principles of thought and action, which if they may not be strictly called innate, are nevertheless not introduced, though they may be excited from without.

For decades the question how a dry seed of corn came to life had stymied chemists and physiologists. But transferred into the philosophy of the human mind, the germination of the seed posed no problem to Hancock: it simply was a potential faculty, a characteristic in virtu whose actualization depended on the kind of life which an individual led.

Based on this assumption Hancock put forward a philosophy of the moral sense which, first, dissociated morality from reason, and, then, went on to show that the seed of the moral sense was implanted in every human being. Whether it developed to perfection or not depended on external influences. "Art may ripen, but it does not implant the seed" which was "implanted by the Creator, in every mind". If man preferred "virtue" to "vice" it was not thanks to the inscription through education on a "cold and insensible marble tablet" but it was "the effect of sacred immutable obligation, or rather of warm original impulse in the mind".
Hancock's philosophy aimed to reinterpret the notion of instinct. It had a great impact on Prichard's understanding of the human mind and its dysfunctions. Hancock did not only help Prichard to grasp in what respects the moral sense of man could be diseased. He also provided him with the words and concepts to express his ideas on psychology. Unlike most eighteenth-century philosophers, Hancock did not believe that instincts were the animal counterpart of human reason. Nor did he agree with Erasmus Darwin who asserted that animal behaviour gave proof of animal rationality. He argued that Darwin had unduly conflated many varying affections and abilities: "The error seems to lie in confounding all the motive powers and faculties of brutes together, so that instinct, and sensation, and memory, and imitation, and feeling as gratitude and revenge, are all resolvable into reason". More important, however, was his conviction that the importance of rationality was greatly overestimated. In dictating man to choose vice over virtue, human conscience was not so much equivalent to rational deliberation, but flowing from the existence of a divine principle in man:

how rarely does enlightened reason, setting aside the higher influence of moral duty, determine the conduct of man. In common with the brutes we have our instincts, our imitative powers, our natural senses perfect or imperfect according to their use, our capabilities of improvement by discipline and education, our animal propensities and passions, our feelings benevolent and malevolent, our faculties of remembering and of comparing or judging.

For Hancock, "Conscience", the "Moral Sense", "Light of the World", "the Divine Principle of Truth", and the "Spirit of God in the Soul" were all the same. In short, human morality was an inbred seed, implanted into the human fabric as the instincts were ingrained into an animal.
He noted "with pleasure" a quote from a footnote on the "Soul" which Prichard had appended to his Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System. "It seems", Prichard had said in 1822, "that a certain persuasion of moral demerit, of delinquency, has been an universal impression upon the minds of men in all ages... With this is intimately connected the idea that they are accountable beings, and that there are certain unseen powers, before whose tribunal they may, and probably will, be arraigned". Prichard had applied himself to the Treatise after he had finished a long study on Egyptian mythology and its relations to the religion of the Hindus and also to Christianity. During his researches for that book Prichard was struck to discover how deeply that Christian sense of demerit was ingrained even in pagan Greeks. As will be demonstrated in a later chapter, his An Analysis of the Egyptian Mythology (1819) gave abundant testimony to Prichard's willingness to discover traits of monotheism in the religion of the ancient Hindus and Egyptians. But when he treated the subject on a systematic scale in the third edition of the Researches, he changed the argument: from the analytical discussion of particular rites, Prichard changed to regarding the very existence of any rites as a significant indicator. This shift was brought about or, at least, facilitated by Hancock's stimulating insights in the subject of human instincts. Thanks to him Prichard could consider the inbred faculties of man by analogy to animal instincts.

While a man like Erasmus Darwin had set out to prove that animals were endowed with rationality, Prichard followed Hancock in playing down the importance of rationality. It was in line with both, Quakerism and evangelicalism to believe that the essence of religion could be grasped not so much with the intellect, but with the heart. Hancock expressly denied that the "moral sense" in man had anything to do with rationality. As for Prichard, he thought that rational behaviour was no ethnological category. It is, indeed, striking how little emphasis
Prichard placed on cultural attainments. Like Hancock, he found the main instinctive driving force in man in the universality of a moral sense. This instinct was, so to speak, a secularized form of the "inner light" of the Quakers.

For Prichard the use of fire and of arms, artificial clothing and the art of domesticating animals were no categories for the comparison between human and animal instincts, because the existence or absence of these "more variable traits of human action" was largely a question of the environment and other cultural stimuli which had nothing to do with the instinctive make-up. He aimed at the "uniform traits in human nature", at the instincts, or, as Hancock called it, the "ηγεμονική of human action". "I shall attempt to pursue this investigation, adapting it to my own particular point of view, which is ultimately the comparison of human races with each other", Prichard added.

We have seen that Hancock argued against Locke and tried to found the universal prevalence of a seed of morality on a principle in mankind analogous to animal instincts. It was a common assumption that animal instincts degenerated in the state of domestication. Equally it was taken for granted that civilized man had a depraved sense of morality. Too much civilized refinement impeded the development of that seed of pious morality ingrained in the human fabric. Thanks to the concept of the seed, however, Hancock was not logically driven to embracing the Rousseauvian idea that primitive men were better off than the civilized. Proper education helped to develop the seed of morality. Still, there was no necessary link between morality on the one hand, and culture on the other. Hence Hancock could conclude that there was no intrinsic difference between the morality of heathens and that of civilized Christian nations.

The dividing line between Christians and heathens was rather that "Christians profess to have their rules laid clearly before them, and hence
are less excusable than some others" when acting against their prescriptions. Yet, despite their better knowledge Christians had excelled in the past in atrocities: "enlightened England, having all the advantages of the outward letter of the revealed law, has seen a great part of the nation vindicating the propriety of burning and enslaving the bodies of men for reasons they would now be ashamed to own".30 Despite the crimes English Christians had committed in the process of colonization, they, of course, had a "moral principle or conscience" - but on the same grounds "the Carib" could lay claim on it, too, despite the fact that he "eats the flesh of his enemy". The point was simply that moral conscience was not a matter of rationality and its conscious evocation. God had given it to mankind, to the whole of mankind, that is: "notwithstanding all these things", Hancock said with reference to the abject habits of savage nations, "some instinctive irradiations do now and then break forth in the moral gloom of the most barbarous climes; and sparks of superior light may occasionally be discovered, kindling, as it were, in the bosom of savage nature".31

These expressions are ripe with allusions to the particularities of Quaker belief: for a man like Hancock the internal "light", God's grace, was a religious principle more important than the Scripture itself.32 The metaphor of the seed was his way of converting his belief into secularized terminology. Having grown up as a Quaker, Prichard understood very well what Hancock was aiming at. His evangelical Anglicanism was nearly related to the beliefs of the Quaker sect. Most elements of Hancock's philosophy of the human mind can be traced in Prichard as well. Why the latter adopted the criterion of psychology only in the third, and not already in the second edition of the Researches, must remain a matter of speculation. But it appears quite likely that his ideas of psychology ripened together with his theories of madness. Prichard never referred to contemporary philosophers of psychology such as Maine de
Biran, Victor Cousin, Thomas Brown, or Sir William Hamilton. His notion of psychology was, indeed, not derived from philosophy but from theorizing on instinct. Maximilian Jacobi, too, made ample connections between animal instincts and human morality. In the second edition of the Researches there is no reference to him, while in the third Prichard highlighted Jacobi’s achievements in elucidating the correlation between bodily structure and instinctive constitution:

In laying down, as a law of nature, the general observation that each species has its given instincts universally characteristic of it, we must not omit to take into our account the fact, that variations are likewise to be traced, though of a more limited extent, in the psychical manifestations of particular tribes. Such variations, as it has been fully shown by Jacobi, bear everywhere a close relation to corresponding varieties in bodily structure.33

Prichard was very proud of his idea to compare the mental framework of animals and man and those of varying human tribes. Odom acknowledged the novelty of the approach declaring that Prichard "was one of the first to conceive the possibility of a comparative psychology".34 Prichard himself said that he had chosen the term "psychology" because the reference to animal "minds" would have meant to "take a liberty in the use of words that would hardly be tolerated". "Psychology", by contrast could be applied to man and animals without causing any offense.

An interest in animal instincts had long been on the agenda. Medical authors as well as travelling naturalists had dabbled with the problem. James Gregory, John Hunter, Erasmus Darwin, the Göttingen physiologist Christoph Girtanner, Cabanis, Blumenbach, Felix de Azara, the physician François Désiré Roulin, Franz Joseph Gall and many others had voiced their opinions on the role and definition of instincts. We have seen in the last section that Prichard credited Gall with having been
the first who built a comparative psychology on similarities between the instinctive principles of animals and those of mankind. But while Gall had taken skull conformations as the basis for his works, Prichard opted for comparing the faculties by their functions. While Gall's organology presupposed a set system of affections extant in animals and mankind, Prichard believed that there were faculties typical of particular species: "All the tribes of animals are characterised by dispositions, habits and instincts appropriated to particular species". Dogs, for example, uniformly displayed "the inclination ... to associate themselves with man". Just as the physiognomy of each tribe was perfectly adapted to its living circumstances, the distribution of psychological characteristics followed the same teleological principle: "The psychical endowments of each tribe are perfect in relation to the sphere of existence for which it is destined".

Prichard wanted to find those psychological characteristics which were, on the one hand, characteristic of man only, and, on the other hand, prevalent in all human tribes. In a chapter entitled "General Remarks on the Psychical History of Different Species" he clarified the terminology: under "psychology" he understood "the whole of the sensitive and perceptive faculties of animals, their intellect, or what in them approaches most nearly to the nature of intellect, as well as their instincts, feelings, propensities, and habitudes of action; all that corresponds in the lower orders of the creation, to the powers and attributes of the mind in man".

This definition goes beyond Hancock's treatment of the moral sense. Prichard added an "intellectual principle" to the "moral principle" intending to disarm the polygenists who propagated the idea that intelligence was unevenly spread among human races. Influential physiologists and travellers, from Samuel Thomas Soemmerring and Charles White to William Lawrence and J.-J. Virey asserted that black
tribes were endowed with less intelligence than whites: much as the faculties necessary for survival under rude conditions were great, the intellectual capacities were small in proportion. Prichard by contrast followed Blumenbach in asserting that there were "some Negroes whose mental faculties fully attain the standard of European intellect" - he dismissed all categorical distinctions as unfounded.

What Prichard had in mind by referring to the intellectual faculty was the notion that no tribe was principally barred from cultural achievements on the grounds of its alleged lower intelligence. In 1826 he wrote: "it may also be remarked, that instances are not rare in which Negroes have been elevated by the superiority of their mental endowments above the degraded condition in which they are placed, and, in spite of so many political and social disadvantages, have been distinguished as men of science and literature, and poetical genius". In the third edition this argument was reiterated. Intelligence was, like morality, a universally spread faculty among mankind.

Yet, when Prichard explained in what respects precisely human psychology was unified, he did not put much emphasis on intelligence. It appears that he was not quite sure about its role in the animal realm. Also in another respect intelligence was a problematic subject, for Prichard was sure that there were correlations between the shape of the cranium, living conditions, and the intelligence of a tribe. Intelligence, that is, was only to a certain extent a primary faculty; there were variations. And even though Prichard did not believe that they were innate characteristics, there were many who loudly asserted it. How Prichard countered their arguments will be addressed in a later chapter. With respect to the discussion of psychology it suffices to say that Prichard relied more on the "moral sense" than on intelligence when it came to proving monogenism. The inbred sense of morality was tied to religion. It is a very important aspect which bears being cited in full:
If we could divest ourselves of all previous impressions respecting our nature and social state, and look at mankind and human actions with the eyes of a natural historian or as a zoologist observes the life and manners of beavers or of termites, we should remark nothing more striking in the habits of mankind, and in their manner of existence in various parts of the world, than a reference which is everywhere more or less distinctly perceptible to a state of existence after death, and to the influence believed both by barbarous and civilized nations to be exercised over their present condition and future destiny by invisible agents, differing in attributes according to the sentiments of different nations, but universally believed to exist. The rites everywhere performed for the dead, the various ceremonies of cremation, sepulture, embalming, mummifying, funeral processions, and pomp following the deceased, during thousands of successive years in every region of the earth - innumerable tumuli scattered over all the northern regions of the world, which are perhaps the only memorials of races long extinct - the morais, pyramids, and houses of the dead, and the gigantic monuments of the Polynesians - the magnificent pyramids of Egypt, and of Anahuac - the prayers and litanies set up in behalf of the dead as well as of the living, in the churches of Christendom, in the mosques and pagodas of the East, as heretofore in pagan temples - the power of sacerdotal or consecrated orders, who have caused themselves to be looked upon as the interpreters of destiny, and as mediators between the gods and men - sacred wars, desolating empires, through zeal for some metaphysical dogma - toilsome pilgrimages performed every year, by thousands of white and of black men, through various regions of the earth, seeking atonement for guilt at the tombs of prophets and holy persons - all these and a number of similar phenomena in the history of nations, barbarous and civilized, would lead us to suppose that all mankind sympathize in deeply impressed feelings and sentiments, which are as mysterious in their nature as in their origin. These are among the most striking and remarkable of the psychical phenomena, if we may so apply the expression, which are peculiar to man, and if they are to be traced among races of men which differ physically from each other, it will follow that all mankind partake of a common moral nature, and are therefore, if we take into the account the law of diversity in psychical properties allotted to particular species, proved, by an extensive observation of analogies in nature, to constitute a single tribe.
This passage is impressive: theologically generous, Prichard granted true religious feelings to tribes usually chid for their idolatry and desultory paganism. Men, this passage says, are psychologically unified by virtue of their common belief in an afterlife, supreme forces watching over their existence before and after death, and the idea that in some manner they were responsible to these forces. Thus Prichard bolstered the foundations of religion by arguing for the unity of mankind: the ontological proof of God's existence and the case of monogenism were mutually supportive.

When discussing phrenological theories, Prichard had poured scorn on the idea that the "constructive instinct" of the bees and beavers might be comparable to the "impulse to action" which inspired the Egyptians to build the pyramids. Interestingly, he did not have recourse to eighteenth-century theories of taste, instead he derived the art of architecture from the natural impulse to religiosity.

A feeling of respect for ancient architectural monuments was a common thing. Constantin-François Chassebeuf de Volney had exulted over their grandiosity. But his Les ruines, ou méditations sur les révolutions des empires (1791) ultimately aimed to give a secular account of the hidden laws which presided over the rise and fall of great powers. Prichard by contrast conjured up architecture, rites, habits widely referred to as superstitious, in order to show "feelings and sentiments, which are as mysterious in their nature as in their origin" and which, grosso modo, are reminiscent of Hancock's suggestion that the existence of moral conscience in human tribes implied religious obligation: "If a Conscience is set up and calls to account for certain actions - whether these actions in themselves be blameworthy or not - it is plain that religious obligation including the reference to a moral governor, follows as a matter of course".

"Savage" peoples were sometimes denied the ability to rise to Christianity, be it on the grounds of moral or of intellectual deficiency.
Against this assumption Prichard asserted that, on the contrary, all human tribes were in principle able to receive Christian instruction and gain understanding in the Christian dispensation. The universality of intelligence entered, once again, into his scope.

Prichard's usage of the term "intelligence" is interesting. He employed it to denote a measurable entity indicative of mental potential. Thus he explained that Camper's technique of measuring the facial angle "has been supposed to afford, ... a criterion for estimating the degrees of intelligence and sagacity which Nature has bestowed on all those animals possessed of a skull and brain". It is generally assumed that only in the last decades of the nineteenth century did "intelligence" become a measurable category. As Prichard's quote shows he employed the term in this understanding already in the 1830s, though he did not enlarge on the concept. While other authors were keen to range all humans into an ascending scale of intellectuality, Prichard jumped the problem by means of stipulating that an understanding in the sacral and complicated tenets of Christianity was proof enough of common intellectual potential. (All other variations he referred to external circumstances, such as life-style and education.)

To establish this point Prichard chose physiognomically most diverse primitive tribes: if they all showed themselves open to the Christian message, then, he argued, this was a very strong proof for the unity of mankind. Prichard chose three groups: African Hottentots, Greenland Esquimaux, and African Negroes (whom Prichard classified as a different human variety from that of the Hottentots). Based on the reports mainly of missionaries Prichard described the spread of Christianity among these heathen nations. A corollary result was that culture came after Christianity. It was, so to speak, a necessary consequence of the refinement of mind brought about by the introduction of Christian doctrines. This is exemplified in a passage on
“the Introduction of Christianity among the Hottentots”. Prichard reported:

So rapid has been the spread of civilization around the settlements of the United Brethren ... as to have given rise to a general notion that the missionaries of that church direct their endeavours in the first place to the diffusion of industry and social arts, and make religion a secondary object of attention. This, however, they uniformly deny.49

If conversion to Christianity automatically brought about cultural refinement, other monotheistic creeds such as Islam had the same effect. Indeed, Prichard believed that all those "Negro nations who have embraced Islam, are in a very different state of society" from the other tribes who were "still idolators" and "completely savages".50 After Prichard had rendered a number of conversion stories among the Esquimaux and Negroes, he concluded "that races so nearly allied and even identified in all the principal traits of their psychical character, as are the several races of mankind, must be considered as belonging to one species". 51

So pleased was Prichard with his psychological theory that we find him stipulating that the "peculiar psychical qualities ... are even more distinct, and therefore more characteristic of particular species, than peculiarities of bodily structure".52 In a letter to his friend, the Quaker doctor Thomas Hodgkin, Prichard made a remark which shows how far he had departed from Locke assimilating Hancock’s suggestions: "the Anti-Lockean system of innate principles", he wrote, "seems to have been almost established as matter of fact, by the remarkable analogy, and almost uniformity, which has been traced among nations the most widely separated, in sentiment and in belief and in some of the most recondite and mysterious phenomena of the human mind".53

One of these "mysterious phenomena" was the prevalence of "gloom". The discussion of Prichard’s theories of madness has already
brought out how much Prichard was struck by the phenomenon of "gloom" which he - far from regarding it merely as a sign of melancholia - singled out as one of the main traits of man's mental constitution.54 Already in 1822 he had referred the universally bleak outlook of all mythologies and superstitions to an inbred trait of the human conscience. His description of the phenomenon evokes the concept of original sin: "It would be very interesting to inquire, what is the origin of this prevailing apprehension of evils in contemplating the imagined scenes of future existence? There seems to be no obvious cause for it in the nature of circumstances". Why was it that penal sufferings were so central to the representations of the ancient mythologists?

The solution of this problem appears to be, that the superstitions of mankind have not been merely the creations of the fancy, but principally of the conscience. It seems that a certain persuasion of moral demerit, or delinquency, has been an universal impression upon the minds of men in all ages. With this is intimately connected the idea that they are accountable beings, and that there are certain unseen powers, before whose tribunal they may, and probably will, be arraigned.55

Prichard concluded that these sentiments were so prevalent in all societies because "they are the result of principles deeply laid in the constitution of human nature".56 This view determined Prichard’s anthropology and psychology, although he proposed to treat the history of mankind "as if the testimony of the Sacred Scripture were altogether indifferent" to it.57 Prichard was aware that he was - to use a locution of Matthew Hale - "discoursing in the outward court of the Gentiles". Yet he regularly mentioned the Bible in the Researches. In all three editions he pointed out in which instances Scriptural tenets were either refuted or supported by other sources. The next section will address the question whether his attitude towards the Bible changed between the first and the third edition.
B. Prichard's Attitudes Towards the Bible

In the first half of the nineteenth century Biblical tenets were under attack from various sides. Geologists such as Cuvier and Charles Lyell explained why a few thousand years did not suffice to measure the interval between the creation of the earth and the present. Biogeographers pointed out that many species existed and had existed which were not mentioned in the Bible and which could not possibly be referred to the region of Mount Ararat. Biblical critics hinted at a great number of inconsistencies, irregularities, and improbabilities in the Masora, the Septuagint, and the Vulgate. Some of the issues involved in the problem of the accuracy of Scripture will be addressed in the chapters dealing with Prichard's philology and mythology. This section will focus on what Prichard expressly said about Scriptural truth and how he reconciled science with the Scriptures.

In his Ph. D. thesis W. F. Bynum claimed that Prichard's attitude towards the Bible "became increasingly flexible". George Stocking maintained that Prichard's "tone" changed over the course of years; Prichard would have been so intent on proving monogenism that "the argument for human unity, although originally based on religious motives, developed ultimately a kind of functional autonomy in Prichard's work". In Stocking and Bynum's reading, Prichard's increasingly relaxed attitude towards Scripture illustrated that he was unable to uphold his strict theological position. And this would have stimulated him into abandoning several theological positions previously held. However, as I hope to show in the following, Prichard's attitude towards the Bible did not change all that much. Firstly, he never was a rigid literalist. Compared to a journal like the British Critic that prided itself of defending the letter of the Bible, he was even almost daring. Secondly - exceptions notwithstanding - he remained faithful to those tenets which he had chosen to believe as a young man.
Four topics will be addressed:
- Prichard's self-professed attitude towards the Bible
- the narrative of the Deluge
- the story of the tower of Babel
- Moses's role as author of the Pentateuch.

Prichard approached science and religion within the framework of natural theology. Accordingly, nature was illustration and proof of providential wisdom. The very fact that there were natural laws, which the scientist could trust, was regarded as proof of His benevolent wisdom. The world was endowed with immanent rules and "principles of nature" whose operations ensured that creation could not fall prone to turmoil and chaos.

There are three propositions forming the cornerstones of Prichard's scientific natural theology. All of them were mentioned in the text Prichard presented at his first important public appearance, namely in the dissertation he delivered at the Edinburgh Royal Medical Society. In spring 1807 Prichard spoke about "the Varieties of the Human Race". The three doctrines in question are: 1st, "Nature ... never labours in vain"; 2d, if the scientist could not find an immediate answer to his problems he should not refer to Providence, but "leave them for the attempts of future inquirers"; and, following Newton, scientists were urged to find not more causes than were absolutely necessary to explain a phenomenon. In this sense it was "unscientific" to credit the environment with the power to influence mankind in such a manner as to fashion different varieties. Contrary to this doctrine Prichard asserted that the principle of variation lay in man himself. There was an "established law prevailing throughout the animal kingdom, according to which each species has a tendency to deviate from its original colour, and assume varieties of hue".
The notion of such established "laws" was very important for him: in the fourth chapter we have seen that Prichard's delight in "principles" led him to sympathize with Geoffroy's transcendental anatomy, to come up with the idea of "permanent varieties", to embrace the idea that there was "some principle in nature" which prevented the propagation of hybrids, and, on the whole, to claim the existence of "some principle on which the phaenomena of resemblance, as well as those of diversity, may be explained". When Prichard had the choice between assuming some natural principle and toying with the unproven hypothesis of a physico-chemical process, he always preferred the teleological explanation.

In the introduction to the first edition of the Researches he assured his readers of having made "no reference to the writings of Moses, except with relation to events concerning which the authority of those most ancient records may be received as common historical testimony, being aware that one class of persons would refuse to admit any such appeal, and that others would rather wish to see the points in dispute established on distinct and independent grounds".

Prichard proposed to refer to the Mosaical accounts only as he would quote any other ancient historical source. In the second edition he stated again that scientific writers ought not to have recourse to the Scriptures when their own understanding failed. In the third edition he alleged that those constantly referring to Scripture were lacking in true belief. He reaffirmed "my design of making in this work no appeal to the authority of the Scriptures". In The Natural History of Man he complained that he had been attacked by both, scientists and Biblicists. For some he was not scientific enough, for others he was lacking in Scriptural orthodoxy. On the whole, the Germans were the "most learned" of all, "a nation among whom my researches have ever been more favourable estimated than among my own utilitarian countrymen", Prichard lamented in the dedication of the book to C. C. J. Bunsen.
A perusal of the reviews of Prichard's works does not quite bear out the scope of the complaint: the reviewers tended to think that Prichard was rather too religious than too scientific. A devout natural theologian like Nicholas Wiseman was all in favour of Prichard's attempts to reconcile science and religion. Even the orthodox British Review wrote as early as 1815 that Prichard's *Researches* had "a most powerful tendency to confirm beyond the reach of contradiction, the truth of the Mosaic history, and we therefore consider that the volume before us may have a beneficial tendency in repressing the idle speculations of theorizing sciolists, and to crush the petulant objections of superficial infidels". Only Prichard's professed scientificity and his affirmation "that the truth of the Scripture is not involved in the decision" met with criticism. It is possible that Prichard was terribly sensitive. Equally possible it is that his above-mentioned complaint referred not only to reviews but also to comments he heard in a private context.

In the 1810s Prichard was engaged in a discussion over the implications of modern geology for theology. His suggestion to interpret the six days of creation as six long epochs was dismissed by an anonymous orthodox theologian. The geological researches of Georges Cuvier did not yet influence Prichard's views; presumably he had not yet heard of Cuvier's *Discours sur les révolutions de la surface du globe* (1812, prefixed to his book on fossil bones). From the second edition of the *Researches*, however, Prichard adhered to Cuvier's several cataclysms. In 1826 he wrote: "it seems to have been fully proved by geological researches, that repeated creations have taken place, and that the organized tribes in existence have more than once perished, to make room for a new order of beings". It appeared "evident" to Prichard that these epochas, or revolutions in nature, have been accompanied or preceded by inundations and other catastrophes. Such events may have contributed to prepare the earth for supporting new tribes of
organized creatures. After each of these changes in its physical condition, it has given birth to races different from those which before existed, and adapted to the circumstances of its new state.\textsuperscript{76}

The Cuvierian interpretation of the fossil record did not defy Scriptural interpretation: it did not preclude the assumption "that this Deluge was strictly universal",\textsuperscript{77} it did not interfere with the doctrine that mankind and a number of animals were rescued on an ark which landed at the top of Mount Ararat when the waters finally began to subside. Cuvier's geological researches were not only clad in a pious garb, but were, indeed, dealing only with those eras in nature not covered by the Scriptures. As for Prichard, he was, on the whole, more concerned with the history subsequent to the Deluge than with pre-diluvial geological history. How did mankind survive? Where did they survive? What had happened to animals? How were they distributed across the globe after their survival?

In the first edition of the Researches, Prichard had simply assumed that the distribution was effected by the same kind of miracle which had also ensured that pairs of all animals were collected. Already in 1813 he had suggested that "each insulated region had originally a separate stock of animals". And for all those of his readers who might believe that "this position is at variance with the Mosaic record of the universal deluge, according to which all the animals on the earth were collected together in one spot", he added a footnote in which he explained that the Deluge was just "as miraculous" as "the collecting of animals from all distant parts of the world". And equally miraculous was the subsequent re-distribution of the animal tribes: "they certainly were conveyed by the same supernatural means which had collected them, into their former abodes, or into those situations for which their structure was originally contrived".\textsuperscript{78}

In the second edition Prichard deviated from the above assumption in that he now believed that Pennant and Linnaeus had been
decidedly wrong in their conjecture that all existing land-animals "descended from a stock that was preserved in Noah's Ark". There was a lot of evidence in the fossil record that many animal species were peculiar to the past histories of certain territories only: their bones and fossils were found on foreign continents, but not in the area between Egypt and Persia. In a section entitled "Comparison of the preceding Remarks with the History of Mankind and the Deluge, contained in Genesis", Prichard concluded, that they might never have lived there, from whence he made the inference that not every species extant at the time of the last universal Deluge had survived the cataclysm in Noah's ark. Cuvier had shown that there were several proper "renovations" of the living world, each of them bringing forward new species, more complete, more akin to the present forms. Prichard wrote:

At successive periods, the nature of animals became more complete, or rather more complicated, and more approaching to the appearances of those at present in existence. It has been thought possible ... to distinguish that class of organic remains which are the product of the last great catastrophe sustained by our planet: these are, therefore, to be looked upon as relics of the age before the Flood: and hence, some knowledge has been obtained of the character of the animal world during the antediluvian period.

It seemed to him that pachydermes abounded before the Flood, while carnivora were formed only subsequent to the Deluge. Those inferior prediluvial animals, Prichard averred, were not saved in the ark, giving way to species that were more complex and more perfectly adapted to the new environment. He also believed that mankind had not yet become disseminated across the entire globe when the Deluge happened. Summarizing his views on the Deluge and the subsequent recreation Prichard wrote:

Mankind escaped by the means which are recorded in the sacred, and in many profane histories, and with them were saved the stock of
animals peculiar to the region in which before the flood they had their dwelling, and of which they, and most of the early domesticated animals, are in all probability the native inhabitants. After the Deluge, when new regions emerged from the ocean, it is probable that they were supplied with organized inhabitants, suited to the soil and climate of each district. Among those new races, Man, and the tribes which had survived with him, and which were his companions, spread themselves in a later time. Such is the hypothesis which I am inclined to adopt, in order to reconcile the facts ... with the Scriptural History. Some persons will object to it that it assumes positions not laid down in the narrative, such as a partial creation subsequent to the Deluge.

A partial creation was not defying the Bible. It was merely telling of matters not mentioned in it: "it was of no importance for men to be informed at what era New Holland began to contain kanguroos, or the woods of Paraguay anteaters and armadilloes".

Since Prichard did not change his opinions on biogeography between the second and the third edition he did not change his views on the role of the ark either. "Is it to be presumed", he asked rhetorically in 1836, "that the sacred Scriptures contain an account of all that it has pleased the almighty to effect in the physical creation, or only of his dispensations to mankind, and of the facts with which man is concerned?" The Bible, he explained, "refers to the stock of animals peculiar to the region inhabited by men before the deluge, which were, perhaps, chiefly the domesticated kinds, and the clean, or those used for sacrifice in the patriarchal institutions". These species survived, presumably because mankind relied on them, the rest gave way to a new creation.

On the one hand, it certainly was a retreat from Scripturalism to assume a partial creation. Yet, already in the 1810s when engaging with the history of geology, Prichard's orthodox concerns were confined to post-diluvial natural history. He did not think that speculating on the
history of pre-diluvial dead stones and extinct species amounted to impingeing on theology.

Interestingly, Prichard’s ideas about the distribution of human tribes were tied to the story of the Deluge and not to the story of the tower of Babel. In the first edition of the Researches, he ignored the tower of Babel altogether. Instead he presented a theory akin to the "conjectural history" of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers: he divided mankind according to their cultural stages into "roaming savages", "hunters" and "shepherds", and, thirdly, those tribes who having developed agriculture, were living under "political order" and had established a "governing or military class" and "a sacerdotal class". As for the savages, their languages were rude because "they went forth when language was as yet imperfectly formed".

The second class of people, the hunters and shepherds, had left the centre of growing civilization at a later time to roam through the steppes of Asia until one of their tribes, the Huns, finally conquered Rome. Only those staying in the region of the Mediterranean and ancient Persia acquired full civilized habits. This classification of mankind according to the state of their civilization is central to Prichard’s ethnology. It did not very well fit to the story of the tower of Babel.

In the second edition of the Researches Prichard made a long-winded statement on the subject, asserting "that I find for my own part no great difficulty in adopting the common and obvious construction of the narrative" - after all, was not the creation of man the greatest miracle of all?

After contemplating this phaenomenon, we shall find no difficulty in allowing that events which would now be so extraordinary that they might be termed almost incredible, our confidence in the continuance of the present order of things having been established by the uniform experience of so many ages, would at one time have given no just cause for wonder or scepticism. In the first ages of the world events
were conducted by operative causes of a different kind from those which are now in action; and there is nothing contrary to common sense, or to probability, in the supposition, that this sort of agency continued to operate from time to time, as long as it was required, that is, until the physical and moral constitution of things now existing was completed, and the design of providence attained.\textsuperscript{91}

A similar idea was reiterated in the third edition.\textsuperscript{92} Again, as so often, the supposition of some ordering principle helped out when processes in nature otherwise could not be understood. "Operative causes of a different kind from those which are now in action" were not easy to grasp or even to acknowledge. But the reference to a hidden goal, "the design of providence", was sufficient to reconcile him with the lack of direct understanding into the nature of the process.

We may conclude that Prichard never was a dogmatic literalist. His orthodoxy began and ended with the Scriptural account of things concerning the natural history of mankind. There is, indeed, only one instance in which his change of mind concerning a Scriptural doctrine can be seen as detrimental to theological orthodoxy: by the third edition Prichard no longer assumed that the authors of the Bible had been in all particulars under the influence of divine inspiration.\textsuperscript{93} In response to well-founded criticisms Prichard modified his earlier views of Biblical chronology. Faced with the task of adding a few hundred years to the age of the world in order to leave enough time for the varieties of animals and human tribes to develop their particular physical features, he restructured the time-scale of the Bible. Part of that operation was to deny the longevity of the Patriarchs: it fitted ill with Prichard's doctrine that the animal economy in mankind was undeviating and constant in all human tribes.\textsuperscript{94} Since the Bible placed so much emphasis on the old age of Sarah, Abraham and some of their descendants, there was no way in which Prichard could reject it without putting the infallible reliability of
the Mosaical account into doubt. Moreover, he needed to add "one or two thousand years" between "the Deluge of Noah and the origin of the Great Asiatic monarchies". Hence he agreed with other writers who had doubted whether Moses had been the actual author of the Pentateuch. Secondly, Prichard declared "that the Biblical writers had no revelation on the subject of chronology, but computed the succession of times from such data as were accessible to them".

W. F. Bynum and George Stocking have suggested that it was highly significant that Prichard denied Moses's role as author of the Pentateuch: he would have failed in his endeavour to reconcile science to the Bible. It is true that in 1813 Prichard would not question that Moses had written the Pentateuch. Still, it is doubtful whether that particular argument is sufficient to depict him as a man overwhelmed by the trend to scientific secularization.

Moreover, Prichard's critical stance towards the Bible was not a late development in his thoughts. As early as 1819 he had referred to the "fiction" of the story of Jacob's ladder. Then already he had taken it for granted that Moses chronological computation was based on secular records: "It has often been supposed that some memorials of the history of the world, and of the most remarkable dispensations of Providence to the human race, had been preserved from very remote ages, particularly by the Patriarchs of the Hebrew stem; and that Moses, in composing the introduction to the Pentateuch, availed himself of such authentic documents".

At the same time, Prichard was more of a Scripturalist than a representative of Anglican theology like William Paley (1743-1805). It was all in line with eighteenth-century Biblical understanding to assume that not every single word in the Old Testament was inspired. William Paley had laid down that the "Jewish history" of the Old Testament was not totally trustworthy: ever since Voltaire had attempted to attack
Christianity "through the sides of Judaism" people like Paley tried to preserve the integrity of the New Testament through assigning parts of the Old to the realm of the fabulous. In his *Evidences of Christianity* (1794) Paley rejected the notion "that the attestation, which the Author and first teachers of Christianity gave to the divine mission of Moses and the prophets, extends to every point and portion of Jewish history".\(^{100}\)

Compared to Paley Prichard was an enthusiastic Scripturalist. As late as the 1840s he accepted the bulk of the Old Testament as historically correct. He amended single points, but never generally doubted the truth of the Hebraic traditions. He made concessions, but within limits.

As to Moses's authorship itself, it was not even part of Biblical doctrines. Generations of Protestant theologians had simply assumed that he had written the Pentateuch because this explained best why the author knew about the intimate conversations between Moses and God. As to the question of divine inspiration, Prichard did not altogether deny that the Biblical authors were inspired. He merely argued that with respect to chronology they had apparently erred. Stocking has pointed out that Prichard "abandoned 'the received chronology', that is "the short biblical chronology of man".\(^{101}\) He has presented this as an important instance to illustrate his general claim of "changes in the role of [Prichard's] religious assumption".\(^ {102}\)

But a thorough look at what Prichard actually said about chronology, shows that he went out of his way to safeguard the credibility of the Scriptural account as much as possible. Prichard was in need of more time. Yet, through some sophisticated operations he managed verbally to uphold the short Biblical time-scale, he even switched from the chronology of the Septuagint to that of the Hebrew version which was, on the whole, a lot shorter than that of the Greek version.

Ironically it was precisely this change of the book of reference, which provided Prichard with a large chunk of the required amount of
years: the Masora ("tradition" in Hebrew) admitted a considerably greater interval "between the age of Abraham and the Exode" than the Septuagint. Since Prichard had declared that the Biblical compilers had no revelation on the subject of chronology he was free to choose what he needed from both versions. Even though he claimed in 1847 to prefer the Masora over the Septuagint he retained the larger time-scale of the latter in all those instances where the Masora had less to offer. In addition Prichard believed "that generations have certainly been omitted in the early genealogies" of all Biblical versions.103

Thus, by grabbing a few hundred years here, and a few generations there, he managed in the end to enlarge Biblical chronology without departing from it. That was in itself a deed almost as miraculous as the miracles of the Scriptures. But it certainly does not justify the assertion that he was abandoning the Biblical time-scale. On the whole, Prichard's chronological operation was not at variance with Biblicism. It certainly does not justify the allegation that Prichard's attitude to the Bible became more flexible in the sense that he was giving in to the secularizing tendencies of the mid-nineteenth century. The problem of Prichard's views of Biblical chronology is thus not exhausted yet. It will be resumed in the chapter which deals with his investigations in Egyptian mythology. What this section has shown is that Prichard remained a faithful pupil of Biblical tenets. For him Scriptural faith was never tantamount to taking every single doctrine of the Bible at face-value.


4. Ibid., note 14 on p. 220.


6. This is described in: Claus-Peter Clostermeyer, *Zwei Gesichter der Aufklärung. Spannungslagen in Montesquieus "Esprit des lois"*, Berlin (Duncker und Humblot), 1983, esp. 51.


12. The idea is expressed in many titles of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. See e.g.: Cabanis, *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme* (1802); W. F. Edwards, *De l'influence des agents physiques sur la vie* (1824); and Benjamin Rush's article "The Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Faculties" (1786).

13. Prichard admitted that it was in line with a similar doctrine of the Bishop of Bristol, Joseph Butler, see his *A Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System. Part the First: Comprising Convulsive and Maniacal Affections*, London (Thomas and George Underwood), 1822, 8; and his *A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle, as Maintained by Some Writers on Physiology with Observations on the Causes of Physical and Animal Life*, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1829, note on p. 62-
63. Space limitations preclude a detailed treatment of the vital principle. Suffice to say that Prichard's work on the book helped him to clear his mind concerning the relationship between the material and the immaterial in the natural history of man.

14 Ibid.
17 It would be worthwhile to study the metaphorical usage of the term "seed" systematically. Thomas Arnold, for instance, was "looking anxiously round the world for any new races which may receive the seed (so to speak) of our present history into a kindly yet a vigorous soil..."; see his Introductory Lectures on Modern History, Oxford (John Henry Parker), 1842, 28.
18 Thomas Hancock, Essay on Instinct and its Physical and Moral Relations, London (W. Phillips et al.), 1824, 230. Hancock also said: "It seems, therefore, to be perfectly consistent with the phenomena, to consider the mind in its original state, as a living principle possessed of inherent powers, or germs of thought and feeling each of them capable of astonishing enlargement. And these are precisely the properties we ascribe to a germ or seed. Or, if we rise from a vegetable to an animal similitude, we may compare the mind to the ovum (ibid., 279-280, emphasis in the original).
19 Ibid., 263-264 (emphases in the original).
20 Ibid., 334, 228, 293.
21 Ibid., 106.
22 Ibid., 111.
23 Ibid., 406.
24 Ibid., 406; Prichard, A Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System, 375.
25 Prichard, ibid., 374.
27 Ibid., 174-175.
28 Ibid., 175.
29 Hancock, Essay on Instinct, 423.
30 Ibid., 423-424.
31 Ibid., 425.
33 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 166. He cited the first volume of Jacobi's Sammlungen für die Heilkunde der Gemüthskrankheiten.
36 Ibid., 277.
37 Ibid., 170.
38 Ibid., 165.
41 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 178.
43 "Morais" is a common nineteenth-century spelling of "marae": on his voyage to Tahiti and other Polynesian islands, Captain Cook discovered the local custom of erecting altars or sacred enclosures, at which human sacrifices were offered; see OED, vol. IX. It is striking that Prichard included this archetypical example of human savagery in the list.
45 The book was translated as The Ruines: or a Survey of the Revolutions of Empires, With Notes Historical, Geographical, and Explanatory, to Which is Annexed the Law of Nature, London [?] (A. Seale), 1795 [?].
46 Hancock, Essay on Instinct, 420.
47 See note 18 in ch. 4.
49 Ibid., 183.
50 Prichard, "Observations on the Races of People who Inhabit the Northern Regions of Africa", paper read on 25. 5. 1825, in: "Abstracts of Papers, & c Read Before the Philosophical and Literary Society Annexed to the Bristol Institution. Beginning With the Paper Read at the Evening Meeting on 6th January 1825", compiled by the Philosophical and Literary Society, Bristol, no date, Bristol Public Library, B 12361, see the entry for 6. 1. 1825.
56 Ibid.
59 Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", xcvi.
60 Prichard, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", "Records of the Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh", 58 (1807-1808), 87-134 (the volume begins in the month of April. Prichard's was the third dissertation. He must have presented it in spring 1807).
61 Ibid., 88. Prichard had adopted the idea from John Hunter.
62 Ibid., 101.
64 Prichard, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", 100. The question of the causes of variation will be discussed in ch. 6.
65 This holds good for his critique of the vital principle as well: life was ultimately referable to a principle called "energy of the deity", see note 35 in ch. 2.
67 Ibid., note on p. 472.
69 Ibid., vol. 2, 595.
70 Prichard, *The Natural History of Man: Comprising Inquiries into the Modifying Influence of Physical and Moral Agencies on the Different Tribes of the Human Family*, London (H. Baillière), 1843, "Dedication". In 1843 Prichard wrote a letter to the barrister and amateur ethnologist, Arthur James Jones, thanking him for a book Jones had written and then sent to Bristol. See: Letter to Johnes, 7. 1843, Crossley papers, autograph collection, vol. 3, Manchester Central Library. In this letter Prichard endorsed Jones's monogenism, adding that "every foreigner who takes the question in hand or alludes to it whether he be German, French or American, decides peremptorily on the otherside [sic], or takes it as a thing granted and almost self evident that there are many distinct human races". Doubtless Prichard had been attacked for his contemptuous remarks on British scholarship. Therefore, he may have felt the need to indirectly apologize to Jones. At the same time, he never publicly reverted from what he had written in the dedication of *The Natural History of Man*. 

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71 See ch. 10.


74 See the exchange of letters between Prichard, an anonymous, who signed as F. E...s, and another contributor called Andrew Horn, under the title "On the Cosmogony of Moses", The Philosophical Magazine, 47 (1816), 9-11; 110-117; 241-243; 258-263; 339-344; 346-348; 431-434. See ibid., 48 (1816), 18-22; 111-117; 201; 276-278; 300.

75 This has been pointed out already by Bynum, see his "Time's Noblest Offspring", 94.


77 Idem, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 82. Prichard did not always spell "Deluge" with a capital "D".


79 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 81.

80 Ibid., 81-89.

81 Ibid., 84.

82 Ibid., 82.

83 The term was also used in the 1830s: ibid., 3. ed., vol. 1, 101.

84 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 82-83.


86 Ibid., 99.

87 See note 83 above.


89 For a overview over the role of the story of the tower of Babel in historiography, theology, and the study of language see: Arno Borst, Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker, 4 vols, Stuttgart (Hiersemann), 1957-1963 (Prichard is not mentioned).


92 Ibid., 3. ed., vol. 2, 225. In a footnote Prichard wrote: "I have purposely avoided all reference to the Biblical account of the confusion of languages, about which so much dispute has taken place. For my own part I find no difficulty in admitting such an event as supernatural in
an age when so many events must have happened which were out of
the present course of nature".

94 For a more detailed discussion of this point see ch. 9, section E.
96 Ibid., 557.
97 See note 58 above.
98 Prichard, *An Analysis of the Egyptian Mythology: To which is
Subjoined a Critical Examination of the Remains of Egyptian
Chronology*, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1819, 209.
99 Ibid., 127.
(printed for Charles Daly), 1835, 141. For Paley see: D. L. LeMahieu, *The
Mind of William Paley. A Philosopher and his Age*, Lincoln (Univ. of
Nebraska Press), 1976; Frank M. Turner, "The Secularization of the
Social Vision of British Natural Theology", in: idem, *Contesting
101 Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", xcvii.
102 Ibid., xcv.
6. ENVIRONMENTALISM AND HEREDITY IN THE RESEARCHES - THE PHENOMENON OF VARIETY

A. 1813 - the First Edition
B. 1826 - the Second Edition
C. 1836-1847 - the Third Edition

"There must, indeed, be some principle on which the phaenomena of resemblance, as well as those of diversity, may be explained", Prichard wrote in 1826.1 Finding out about the principles of resemblance was not so difficult. The phenomena of diversity, by contrast, were, defied his monogenist theory. Diversity existed on several levels: the individual deviated from the type of the family. Whole families or tribes deviated from the archetype of the species. The first was acknowledged by Prichard;2 as it did not immediately touch upon the problem of monogenism, he did not give much thought to it. The second, however, was of immense importance. Any natural history of man deserving that name had to account for the origins of variations.

A. 1813 - the First Edition
In their studies on Prichard's anthropology Bynum and Stocking have asserted that his desire to prove monogenism led him from a strictly hereditary argument put forward in the first edition, to traditional environmentalism, the theory, that is, which referred the varieties of mankind to the influences of climate, nutrition, and habits of life. Bynum and Stocking interpret Prichard's environmentalism as a retreat into traditional doctrines, reflecting his inability to sustain his argument within the nineteenth-century framework of biology.3 I doubt, however, whether this is a fair representation of Prichard's thought. This section wants to argue that Prichard's views did not change as markedly as Stocking and
Bynum suggest. In particular, it will seek answers to the following questions:

- What was the nature of Prichard's theory of heredity in 1813, and what were the purposes it was meant to fulfil?
- In what manner and why did his notions change over the years?

Prichard followed Buffon, John Hunter, Blumenbach and Georges Cuvier in examining the natural history of mankind as analogous to the natural history of animals and plants, and in comparing animal domestication to human civilization. Against this backdrop Prichard modelled his biological views of heredity, the environment and civilization. In the following Prichard's attitudes towards these issues will be traced through the three editions of the *Researches*. We will see how Prichard accommodated new information within his system and how this led him sometimes into contradictory statements. But, then, his principal starting point had a paradoxical side to it: how could one believe in the unity of species given that human beings looked so different from each other?

We have seen that Prichard himself referred his interest in the varieties of mankind to Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) whose course on moral philosophy in the academic year 1806-1807 Prichard had attended. Stewart, a pious Whig, took offence at the notorious polygenist theory of Henry Home, Lord Kames, who suggested that God might have peopled the earth with various species of man at various locations. In his lecture Stewart attacked Kames's theory. His counter-arguments were formulated along the lines of Scottish environmentalism. Accordingly Stewart thought that mankind was one, and that all differences were referable to external influences which, through some rather obscure physiological process, left their stamp on physiognomy. A corollary of this theory was that acquired characteristics - such as the scorching of the skin by the sun - could be passed on to the progeny.
For Stewart and Prichard, as for the great bulk of Enlightenment philosophers, the main variation among human tribes was the colour of the skin. Along the lines of Hippocratic medicine it was assumed, throughout the eighteenth century, that it was a function of climatic circumstances. It was believed that the white colour was the "normal" type while all dark human varieties had their skin "burned" by the sun. An alternative theory suggested that dark skin colour was due to a superabundance of black bile, traces of which gave a dark tint to the skin. The influence of climate went together with the particular nature of each geographic station: in that respect Scottish Enlightenment philosophy prolonged the tradition of Montesquieu's proto-sociological philosophy which traced correlations not only between climate and skin colour, but between the entire nature of environmental surrounding, on the one hand, and customs and habits of its inhabitants on the other hand. At the end of the nineteenth century this theory was known as "environmentalist theory". Up to then it had been referred to sources as various as the theory of Hippocrates, Sir William Temple, Montesquieu, or Buffon, sometimes it was known simply as "the theory of climate".

Systematic theories of heredity were not part of Scottish Enlightenment notions on the development of societies and the physical characteristics of human tribes. According to an age-old tradition it was taken for granted that all new traits could be inherited, the sole prerequisite was that the impact of the exciting influences was strong enough to call forth a change in the hereditary fabric. This idea referred not only to bodily characteristics but also to moral qualities. When Dugald Stewart evoked the time-worn theory of climate to refute Kames, he applied the notion of hereditary procreation of particular characteristics to the whole of civilized manners.

The Jewish practice of circumcision was one of the examples by means of which Stewart aimed to illustrate the hereditary nature of
national traits. Jewish baby-boys, Stewart explained, were by birth endowed with the feature: "nature", it is delicately phrased in a student's lecture-notes, "has saved Art the troubles of performing that operation which chiefly peculiarizes the Jews". If Jewish babies were born already bearing the traces of circumcision, this was, Stewart believed, a clear proof that they had inherited the characteristic from their circumcised fathers. Peculiar as this example may appear, for Stewart it was convincing: he had found it in one of the most eminent sources for the discussion of human varieties, namely, Blumenbach's De generis humani varietate nativa.

Stewart's example shows that the question of the relationship between heredity and artificial or environmental influences intrigued not only the medical faculty. But the ways in which Prichard's teacher supported his opposition to Kames invited criticism. Stewart was right in criticising polygenism, but as a medical student Prichard harboured misgivings concerning Stewart's lay views of heredity. As Prichard saw it, the professor had totally overlooked the fact that there was a natural law preventing artificial alterations from becoming hereditary.

Already in 1807 Prichard rejected the idea that any characteristics which an individual acquired during his life time could become part of the hereditary framework. "The artificial state" of circumcision, Prichard insisted in 1813, coming back to Stewart's argument, "has not become natural". If acquired characteristics could become hereditary, he argued, then the whole universe of living creatures would be utterly chaotic, for every single alteration in individual features would have given rise to tribes and families who displayed the same peculiarities:

If it were not for it, the evils of all past ages would be perpetuated, and the human race would in every succeeding generation, exhibit more abundant examples of accumulated misery. Every species would have become at this day mutilated and defective, and we should see nothing
but men and animals, destitute of eyes, arms, legs, &c. The whole creation, which now displays a spectacle of beauty and happiness, would present to our view a picture of universal decrepitude and hideous deformity.\textsuperscript{14}

In fact, however, there was some order in creation. As a student Prichard did not yet attempt to assemble the natural principles that accounted for the "spectacle of beauty and happiness" which he was later to evoke. Initially, his theory of human varieties turned around a more simple question: why did different human tribes have different skin colours? In his doctoral dissertation this was the salient criterion of human diversity and also that characteristic of mankind which was most "permanent".

If in his earliest writings - including the first edition of the \textit{Researches} - he was obsessed with colour, this was in part because the different colours of mankind were more striking than all other differences. When as a boy Prichard had been strolling along the dockyards of Bristol, it must have been the aspect of dark-skinned people which impressed him most. Another part of the answer lies in the fact that his medical interest directed him towards theories which accounted for the diversity of complexion - most of which struck him very early on as false. It appeared wrong to him to refer black colour to an abundance of black bile, or to the scorching effects of the sun. It was of course true that the sun burnt the skin of the peasant or of the traveller who explored tropical regions. But did this mean that it was so thoroughly integrated into the individual constitution that the offspring of these individuals were born with the same trait without ever having seen the sun? Prichard believed not. The sun had an effect, but that was not hereditary. That was the medical idea upon which Prichard built his M. D. dissertation on human varieties.

Being convinced that there was a difference between changes in the individual and changes in entire populations Prichard saw himself
compelled to make some comments on the phenomenon of heredity - a subject for whose treatment he could not rely on any doctrines of his teachers. As we will see in the following Prichard's theory of heredity was but clear. It was precisely by virtue of its vagueness that he has been praised as one of the "forerunners" of Darwin.

Having rejected Stewart's notion that acquired characteristics could become hereditary Prichard set out to explain what heredity was about. He wrote: "It appears that the principle in the animal economy on which the production of varieties in the race depends, is entirely distinct from that which regards the changes produced by external causes on the individual". Of course, there were variations within the human race which were heritable. However, these variations were not externally induced but part of the human constitution. They were, Prichard asserted, "connate", i.e. ingrained into the human fabric before birth.

In order to prove monogenism Prichard had to explain how the primeval parents of mankind had branched out into physically differing individuals and tribes. Unlike Buffon and the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, he did not believe that the development was due to "the gradual influence of climate, of situation and peculiar customs". Instead, he referred these variations to alterations in the connate fabric of the parents, claiming that "every part of the corporeal structure has a tendency to become hereditary". For the coloration of skin and hair the same applied: from John Hunter, Prichard adopted the conviction that there was an "established law prevailing throughout the animal kingdom, according to which each species has a tendency to deviate from its original colour, and assume varieties of hue". Prichard transposed the doctrine onto mankind. Humans, like animals, had a "hereditary disposition of accidental varieties". They were spontaneous and did not require to develop gradually as the environmentalists believed. Prichard wrote: "this deviation is not a change gradually produced by the action of
the same causes exerting their influence thro' a long series of generations. Such an imperceptible progress is clearly foreign to its nature. It generally becomes fully established in one generation."^21

In conclusion, Prichard believed that nature advanced in leaps, giving rise to accidental variations. Accidental variations, he stressed, were a matter of suddenness, but once they had sprung up they persisted in the offspring. Mentioning some peculiar connate varieties - such as a supernumerary finger on one hand or the callous skin of the famous "Porcupine"-family - Prichard postulated: "if these varieties had occurred in a different period of society, and among circumstances conspiring to favour their distinct propagation, which is obviously possible, we should have found races of men much more different from ourselves than any which now exist".^22 If they had not occurred it was due to luck - or providence, the discussion of which lay beyond the realm of strict scientificity which Prichard had imposed upon himself.^23

It may appear surprising that Prichard shed the comfortable theory of environmental influences, basing monogenism on a new scientific theory which he had collated from the doctrines of John Hunter, James Gregory and others who had written on the animal economy. Why, we must ask, did Prichard divert from traditional views? The answer is not surprising, yet so far nobody has suggested it: he was defying the transmutationist form of epigenesis, put forward by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin, which stipulated that animal species deviated into each other as a result of climatic influences and an internal drive which Darwin termed "appetancy".^24 Darwin's Zoonomia excited Prichard's scorn: he never said so explicitly,^25 but it can be gleaned from his work that it was Darwin whom he considered in 1813 as his adversary. Prichard informed his readers that "the opinion we are opposing" had taken its rise "from an absurd theory of generation". In a footnote he added that he had Buffon's theory of molecules in mind. In the same context he
rejected the idea that dogs whose tails had been trimmed gave birth to dogs with the same characteristic. "The authors who have brought such examples as these in defence of their opinions, would not probably have thought them worth recording, ..., if they had not happened to coincide with the systems they were advocating".26 Who were "the authors"? The example of the tail-less dog came from Buffon, but the man who referred to it was Erasmus Darwin who quoted Buffon's remark in conjunction with a theory of climate, aiming to show that acquired characteristics were generally heritable. From this Darwin concluded that the influence of climate did not only further new varieties but also new species: "many of these enormities of shape are propagated, and continued as a variety at least, if not as a new species of animal".27

In 1813 Prichard's attack on Darwin elegantly omitted to mention his adversary by name. In 1829 this was different. In his book on the doctrine of the vital principle Prichard expressed his opinion on Darwin's theory very clearly: "what can be more absurd than the notion which this scheme presents to us? - that men and toads descended from the same original parents, and became different through a constant appetency to become so, or through the agency of the different media which surrounded them".28

If Prichard set out to establish a system of heredity which defied the theory of the influence of climate, he did it in the desire to cap the theoretical roots of Darwin's transmutationism. Therefore he rejected the influence of climate as a formative agent and was inclined to believe that new human variations sprang up suddenly and not over a long stretch of time (for time was a factor which was requisite for the transmutation of new species). As W. F. Bynum has pointed out, Prichard rejected the theory of the Chain of Being because it brought man and apes into too great proximity.29 Transmutationism did the same, it was even more dangerous than the Chain of Being because it implied a genetic
relationship instead of a mere classificatory one.

As we have said: for the sake of monogenism Prichard was obliged to explain the rise of different varieties, but he had to do it in a manner which precluded the mechanisms underlying Darwin's theory. This is the reason why Prichard's biological theories are a balancing act of sorts. Prichard resorted to regarding the varieties of mankind as the result of a mixture between total predetermination plus a limited degree of accidental variation. In the following Prichard's attitude towards climate and heredity will be discussed in detail.

We have seen that he considered only "connate" characteristics as inheritable. These characteristics were defined by the particular "disposition" with which an individual was born. Traditionally, medical authors had claimed that climate exerted an influence on the disposition since it altered the amount of secretion which, in turn, determined whether an individual was of a sanguine, a choleric, a melancholic or a phlegmatic nature. Each of these four states was linked up with a particular complexion - the European countenance, for example, characterized by white skin, light hair and fair eyes was referred to the sanguine disposition. Prichard, as I have mentioned before, retained the humoralist doctrine. In respect of different types of complexion he wrote:

"It appears that a peculiar state of the vessels producing these secretions, must be the proximate cause of the varieties". This was confirmed by fact that "the vigour of constitution is generally proportionate" to the colour of the skin and hair.

His adherence to humoralism notwithstanding, Prichard was not ready to admit that any post-natal change in the humoral disposition could be passed on to the offspring, thus altering the colour of the skin and hair. And he criticized authors like Blumenbach and the Philadelphia physician Samuel Stanhope Smith for having explained dark skin colours as a result of too much black bile - as if, Prichard mused,
"all black people" were labouring "under an inveterate hereditary jaundice".32 Blumenbach and Stanhope Smith's error lay in the fact that they had regarded the secretive process as a pathological result of external stimuli.

Prichard, by contrast, held it for a natural and healthy bodily activity: the "Cutaneous Reticle" was built up as a capillary system which "contains fluids of different shades in black and tawny people".33 The nature of these liquids Prichard never tried to define. But he was convinced that their composition and amount determined the colour of the skin and hair. As to other bodily features, Prichard did not put forward any particular theory in his early writings. He simply referred to the above mentioned natural law according to which "every part of the corporeal structure has a tendency to become hereditary".

So far it has been established that Prichard rejected external causes as the reason for the rise of particular human varieties because he preferred to see the human constitution itself as the source for differentiation. And he believed that human varieties resulted from a sudden rise of a particular characteristic in the individual which, by definition, had the tendency to become hereditary. Even though, in principle, all different kinds of alterations were possible Prichard took it for granted that their range was held in check through natural laws which admitted monstrous aberrations only to a very limited extent.34 Moreover, he believed that the course which the physical history of mankind had taken was unilinear, aiming at the production of increasingly beautiful varieties. In other words, Prichard was convinced that the course of nature guaranteed the development of black ugliness into white beauty. This notion lay at the centre of his theory of human variations as it was put forward in 1813.

Prichard's model of variability was built on the analogy to natural history. The famous London surgeon John Hunter had established two
axioms which proved vital for Prichard's theory. Hunter had claimed that, firstly, the tendency for variation in animals led always from darker to lighter varieties, the reverse was virtually impossible since the original conformation of most animals was dark rather than light. Hunter had stipulated that, secondly, the predisposition to the production of variations was a lot more developed in domesticated tribes than in their rude counterparts. Prichard applied both notions to mankind, concluding that "the process of Nature in the human species is the transmutation of the characters of the Negro into those of the European, or the evolution of white varieties in black races of men". When Prichard used the term "evolution" he, of course, employed it in its eighteenth-century understanding: "evolution" was the development of characteristics ingrained in the human fabric. Even though Prichard conjectured that the original colour of man might have been black, he saw whiteness as a quality which in one way or other was within the compass of mankind's preordained physical destiny. After all, God's creation had been perfect, albeit only in the sense that He had envisioned the surge of mankind to beautiful whiteness.

The analogy between vegetable cultivation, animal domestication and human civilization led Prichard to believe that the standard of taste prevalent in individual human populations played a role in the development of white varieties. He explained it by reference to the example of domesticated animals. The production of new varieties in domesticated creatures was a matter of nature. But it was given to man to decide which of the accidental varieties was to survive. What applied to plants and animals had to be true for mankind as well. This was the point where Prichard's famous theory of sexual selection came into play. From the analogy between cultivation, domestication, and civilization Prichard concluded that humans exerted their selective tastes also on their own kind: according to the prevalent taste in any given community.
some varieties were regarded as more comely. Individuals endowed with these highclass features were quickly selected as marriage partners and hence did not fail to procreate their particular characteristics. Paying due tribute to the fact that all civilized peoples were white, Prichard stipulated that "the general complexion of savages is black or a dark hue", while "wherever we see any progress towards civilization, there we also find deviation towards a lighter colour and a different form, nearly in the same proportion".37

Prichard did not consider blackness as accidental. He asserted that "dark races [of man] are best adapted by their organization to the condition of rude and uncivilized nations". By this he did not mean to say that their features had developed as the result of an adaptive process which enabled them to survive under harsh environmental conditions.38 At this stage in his career this would have amounted for him to embracing those theories of external formative influences which he so fervently denied. Instead he thought, that blacks had been, perhaps, created as such. Prichard, indeed, suggested that "the primitive stock of men were Negroes".39 There was one and only one adaptive variation which Prichard allowed in the development of the human species: savages did not develop, civilized men did.

All living creatures knew two materially different stages: rudeness and refinement. Being artificial the latter removed humanity from the natural economy under which they had been placed by creation. Mankind's natural history properly speaking commenced only with the history of civilization. For "nations of savages, would never be changed materially in complexion by the influence of climate alone".40

W. F. Bynum and George Stocking have laid great stress on Prichard's assumption that the predominance of white skin colour in civilized countries was due to the fact that civilization led to a refinement of taste which in turn made white individuals more eligible
for marriage than swarthy ones. In Bynum’s interpretation Prichard "could not suggest" that major human variety sprang up as the result of sudden "accidental variations" of the connate fabric. But this was exactly what Prichard claimed. Due to a law of nature "light varieties" were "appearing in dark races". And if civilization was enhanced enough, dark people considered these varieties as more beautiful and, therefore, ensured their procreation. Moreover, following John Hunter Prichard thought that the state of civilization greatly enhanced the predisposition to "the production of varieties in mankind". (The contrasts between the first and the second edition of the *Researches* are due to the fact that this particular feature of his theory had become problematic for Prichard. But this is a topic which will be addressed later.)

It is important to notice that, in 1808 and 1813, Prichard did not believe that new varieties were the immediate products of civilization. Having rejected the influence of external agents Prichard could not possibly discuss the influence of civilization on the same level as the environmentalists did. Instead he believed that the civilized state was particularly conducive to the rise of new varieties in the connate fabric. He considered these alterations not as adaptations to the natural surroundings, for such an assumption would have played into the hands of the transmutationists.

Instead he ascribed it to the teleological essence, the "beneficial tendency" of nature, that the new varieties to which civilization gave rise were "more fitted for their new condition". The process of human differentiation was not of an adaptive nature, but once new varieties were produced they appeared to be wonderfully adapted to their respective abode. After having established that it was primarily civilization which predisposed mankind to branch out into new varieties, Prichard admitted that climate might exert a similar influence: "it is not improbable", he wrote, "that the effect of climate when
conjoined with other causes, as in nations advancing towards a state of civilization, would be more considerable". When he referred to the prevalence of white furs and plumage in animals inhabiting "arctic countries", Prichard added: "It is scarcely to be imagined that climates have no effect in exciting these variations". Something similar applied to mankind - albeit on a much smaller scale, since "mankind is defended by so many arts against the influence of the elements". In summary, Prichard's attitude to climate was governed by his desire to refute traditional environmentalism. But as a factor which predisposed to the production of connate varieties, the influence of climate was not disclaimed.

B. 1826 - the Second Edition

In 1813 Prichard did not explain how the principle of heredity was supposed to work. Which characteristics were connate and which were not was, for him, a question of empirical investigation. Principally, his views on heredity were shaped along the lines of an "evolutionist" or preformist theory of generation which entailed the notion that species developed only within very narrow confines. Adaptation was not part of Prichard's explanatory framework. By the second edition of the Researches, published in 1826, Prichard had changed his views in certain respects.

Stocking and Bynum have pointed out that there is a considerable discrepancy between the first edition and its subsequent remakes. Stocking detected a return to eighteenth-century environmentalism in the second edition of the Researches. Bynum, by contrast, referred such a return rather to the third edition while "Prichard's attacks on environmentalism were most explicitly expressed" in the 1820s. At the same time he asserted that the second edition contained "the plastic creature of environmentalism". Bynum's remarks were intended to
appear contradictory. For, Prichard's own attitude towards the environmentalist argument was, indeed, rather paradoxical.

The second edition was double the length of the first. Prichard's ethnological material was greatly enlarged; the philological sections of the work included inquiries into the history of living languages. Prichard's biological views diverged in several respects from those previously held. They are summarized in the following points: most important in our context is Prichard's acknowledgement that the tribes of mankind might vary in response to environmental conditions. Environmentalism gained legitimacy in Prichard's eyes because most of the important biogeographers of his day employed themselves to find correlations between climate and structure. Moreover, Prichard had discovered a theory of generation which enabled him to reconcile a concept of adaptation with his claim that acquired characteristics could not become hereditary. A corollary of his new position was the shedding of Hunter's theory that the domesticated state predisposed to the production of new varieties. These alterations notwithstanding, Prichard upheld his general concerns: his argument still aimed at proving monogenesis and disclaiming transmutationism. Although he had troubles with the concept, he retained the theory that new varieties sprang up suddenly and not necessarily in a gradual process. And his opposition to Darwin's and Lamarck's transmutationism was unmitigated.

The two volumes from 1826 were dedicated to Johann Friedrich Blumenbach whom Prichard admired for having founded the "natural history of mankind" as an individual discipline. The Göttingen anatomist advocated many tenets to which Prichard adhered as well: he was in favour of monogenesis and discarded the Linnaean classification which comprised apes and man under the category of bipeds, instead he referred to humans as "bimanous". Blumenbach had a decidedly non-racialist approach to the natural history of man which suited Prichard's
monogenetic morality. It was, not least of all, thanks to Blumenbach that Prichard had turned to the "analogical method": the application of rules, derived from the natural history of animals, to the natural history of man. This method enabled both, Blumenbach and Prichard, to establish species relationships without necessarily having recourse to Buffon's criterion of hybridity.51

When Prichard discussed the theory of human variation in 1826 he was harbouring doubts concerning one particular of his hereditary theory of 1813, namely, his allegation that all new varieties sprang up accidentally and suddenly. In 1826 he thought that it was questionable "whether the degeneration or variation of animals is in fact a mere accidental phaenomenon". It is easy to see why Prichard felt uncomfortable with this idea: accidentality smacked of contingency; the teleological nature of his hereditary theory of 1813 had rested entirely in his confidence that human tribes might have the taste for those features which thrived under civilized circumstances. The providence of nature's laws, that is, depended on human fashions.

In Prichard's presentation of the problem, Blumenbach appeared as the writer to inspire these doubts. Prichard quoted Blumenbach's remarks on the dog tribes: "many individual breeds (as the terrier for example) have a fabric of body so peculiar, and so evidently constructed and adapted for certain ends, or particular habits, that I can scarcely persuade myself to look upon this as a mere accidental consequence of degeneration, and not rather as an intentional contrivance of the wise Creator".52 The immediate context of this remark was the question whether all varieties of dogs constituted actually one species. Reflecting on the origins of genera, species, and varieties, Prichard asked, whether the purposefulness which was generally assigned to the particular conformation of species extended, perhaps, to varieties as well:
Is it not probable that the varieties which spring up within the limits of particular species, are further adaptations of structure to the circumstances under which the tribe is destined to exist? Varieties branch out from the common form of a species, just as the forms of species deviate from the common type of a genus. Why should the one class of phaenomena be without end or utility, a mere effect of contingency or chance, more than the other?53

In 1813 he had simply identified the accidentality of variation with the transcendent "beneficial tendency" of nature. However, he had not explained what this "beneficial tendency" actually was. Deliberations such as Blumenbach's led Prichard to ponder "whether the varieties in nature" were a result of external influences "modifying the structure and constitution of races, and adapting them to the physical circumstances under which these races may be destined to exist", or whether they were "only the casual effect of degeneration".54

The solution which he presented in the 1820s was that both were true. Even to Prichard that appeared contradictory. But thanks to a hereditary theory which he derived from Blumenbach and Kant55 Prichard managed to square the circle and reconcile both theories. As his A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle (1829) clearly shows, in the 1820s he was grappling with the relationship between immanent and transcendental explanations. He was trying to find a theory of heredity which explained the mechanism of accidental variations and the fact that new varieties were "more fitted for their new condition" without paving the way for transmutationism. As he said in 1829 with respect to the development of germinated seeds and ova: "the whole series of phaenomena" could not "be philosophically resolved into a simple law of Nature".56 The germ theory which Blumenbach and Kant had developed furnished a way out of the dilemma.

From A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle we know that Prichard was fascinated by Blumenbach's theory of the "nisus
formativus", the force, that is, which governed the development of the germ and assured the continuity of the species.\textsuperscript{57} It is true that Prichard regarded the "nisus formativus" sceptically: he insisted that in the last event only God's power was responsible for the creation of life, and that no secondary force - not even the vitalistic principle of the "nisus formativus" - was accountable for it (in that respect he preserved the preformationist element of his previous position).\textsuperscript{58} This objection notwithstanding, Prichard, taken in by that side of Kant and Blumenbach's theory which explained how external influences could slightly alter the hereditary physiognomy and constitution of the offspring, without changing its specific character. For, the significant alterations exerted their influence only if they affected the germ or ovum of the parents.

Kant had been the first to assume that each species had a determinate number of hereditary "germs". The specific traits of each given species, inscribed onto these germs, would without fail develop. But apart from these there were other characteristics of minor importance whose development was open within a certain range. They unfolded according to external stimuli.\textsuperscript{59} This was the theory which Prichard adopted in the second edition of the Researches: "We may remark in general", he wrote with respect to the relative fixity of species,

that each individual being, through the animal and vegetable worlds has certain laws of organization impressed upon its original germ, according to which the future development of its structure is destined to take place. These inbred or spontaneous tendencies, governing the future evolution of the bodily fabric, cause it to assume certain qualities of form and texture at different periods of growth. From these predispositions are derived the characteristic differences, and the peculiarities of individual beings.\textsuperscript{60}

Thus Prichard claimed that "the organization of the offspring is always
modelled according to the type of the original structure of the parent". It was the pattern of the parental type which guaranteed the continuation of species; and yet there was room for variation: "this law of hereditary conformation exists with a certain latitude or sphere of variety, but whatever varieties are produced in the race, have their beginning in the original structure of some particular ovum or germ, and not in any qualities superinduced by external causes in the progress of the developement".

For Prichard "type" did not refer to racial types, but simply to the particular hereditary conformation which the father passed on to his offspring. Variations, by contrast, were induced by the mother. For the purpose of this distinction Prichard even - albeit hesitatingly - adopted Erasmus Darwin's notion that "impressions on the mind of the mother" could influence the form of the foetus: "at, or soon after the time of conception, the structure of the foetus is capable of undergoing modification". This is how the transcendental principle of providence was reconciled to immanent physiology: the father embodied the fixed type of the species as it had been coined by the Creator, the mother represented the moment of change and variation, induced through climatic influences and other sensations which left their impressions on her connate disposition.

Thanks to this theory of generation Prichard managed to retain the accidentality of new variations, but he physically relegated it into the maternal disposition which was susceptible to external influences. The exact mechanism, however, by which processes of adaptation took place, remained obscure to him. He did not outspokenly depart from his earlier assumptions that it all had to do with the amount of secretion. He just preferred to leave the problem for "future generations" to solve. "How, by what influence, and in what manner, the antecedent circumstances affect in any instance the parents, so as to give rise to the production of
some new appearance in their offspring", he wrote, "we shall perhaps
never be able to ascertain".66

The aforesaid illustrates why the notion of adaptation lost its
odious reputation for Prichard. If deviations from the original type were
by nature limited because their occurrence was dependent on the range of
variation implanted within the constitution, then embracing a theory of
adaptation no longer amounted to endorsing transmutationism. This
notwithstanding, Prichard upheld his earlier assumption that there was
"a general law of the animal economy, according to which, acquired
varieties are not transmitted from parents to their offspring, but
terminate in the generation in which they have taken their rise".67 His
definition of species was formulated accordingly: "two races are
considered as specifically different, if they are distinguished from each
other by some peculiarities, which one cannot be supposed to have
acquired, or the other to have lost, through any known operation of
physical causes".68

Human tribes - in particular the civilized - who changed their
abodes, Prichard insisted, did not acquire another tint according to the
changed climatic conditions. He was very well aware that his newly
adopted theory of adaptation - which accounted for the change of skin
colour in response to a change of climate - coincided ill with his older
conviction:

there is some difficulty in reconciling with these conclusions the facts
alluded to ..., indicating the permanent transmission of a white or
black complexion, in certain races, which have changed their abode
from one climate to another, the fact, for example, that the descendants
of white settlers, in the West Indies, are still white, and that the
progeny of Negroes, in Europe or America, have continued for some
generations black.69

But he found no solution to the problem. Much as he disliked the idea
that external influences changed the human hereditary framework he could not "conceive any other way of accounting for the general appearance of any particular character in the whole race [of man] found in a certain situation, but the supposition, that the local circumstances have a tendency to call it forth in the breed, or predispose the parents of the stock, to produce offspring marked by the character in question".70 Still, Prichard tried to stay away from purely deterministic environmentalism and save his notion from 1813 referring the changes of physical nature to a mysterious law in the animal economy which previewed the sudden rise of accidental varieties. Accordingly, he contemplated "whether the deviations in general, which appear to follow a change of climate, are not founded on a law of the animal economy, which gives rise to an alteration in the breed calculated to fit the race for its new abode".71

In Prichard's understanding the force of adaptation acted in two directions. On the one hand, lack of adaptation led to extinction: "Individuals and families, and even whole colonies, perish and disappear in climates for which they are, by peculiarity of constitution, not adapted".72 Generally, however, the environment exerted an influence in the course of which adaptation took place: "it appears probable that those local circumstances, which are most congenial to particular races, do in fact promote the appearance of those varieties which are best suited to them, or tend to give rise to their production in the breed".73 This was valid for dark varieties as well as for human tribes of fair or (as he put it) "xanthous" hues. "In the appearance of the xanthous variety of our species, or that which is characterized by red, yellow, or light hair, and blue or grey eyes, we may perceive a manifest relation to climates. It springs up in almost every race which is spread over cold and temperate climates".74

Environmentalism gained further credit through the great number of naturalists who were endorsing it: biogeographers such as the Swiss
Augustin de Candolle, the German Alexander von Humboldt, and the Scotsman Robert Brown; nineteenth-century zoological observers such as the French naturalists Lacépède and Georges Cuvier; the German scientific travellers Johann Baptist von Spix and Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius; the English residents in Jamaica, Edward Long and Bryan Edwards - they all confirmed observations by Buffon, Blumenbach, and Samuel Stanhope Smith which Prichard formerly had rejected.\(^75\) As Browne, Larson, and Rehbock have shown, the biogeographers pursued the project of ascertaining in what manner the natural world gave evidence of a dynamic notion of adaptation in which all species in their creation as well as in their development were related to their geographical surroundings.\(^76\)

For Prichard the geographer and natural historian Felix de Azara (1742-1821) was of particular importance. Of Spanish origin, Azara had moved to Paris during the time of Napoleon's consulate. Since he had already made himself a name with a natural history of Paraguayan quadrupeds he was welcomed among the French naturalists.\(^77\) In 1809, he published his *Voyages dans l'Amerique Méridionale* which was a very important source for the second edition of Prichard's *Researches*: travelling through Paraguay, Azara had observed that only wild tribes of animals were liable to variation, while "domestic breeds undergo no alteration".\(^78\)

That was the opposite of what John Hunter had said. The latter had believed that new varieties sprang up mainly under the condition of domestication. In that state, Hunter argued, animal breeds were "predisposed" to produce alterations. Azara's observation, by contrast, supported the theory that new varieties were brought about by environmental influences. Azara and Hunter agreed only in respect to the original colour, which they imagined to have been dark rather than light.\(^79\)
Since Prichard's approach to the natural history of man was based so largely on applying to man what was true for animals, Azara's theory enthralled him. It suggested that it was not civilization which predisposed to human variations but the rude state of mankind. Prichard wrote in 1826: "it may be noticed, in general, that fewer variations occur in races of white than in those of darker colour". The idea was principally in line with Prichard's assumption from 1813 that peoples dwelling in rude conditions were more exposed to climatic influences. Although Prichard had disclaimed the influence of climate on the hereditary fabric in 1813, he had asserted this opinion with full vigour only with respect to civilized nations who were sheltered against climatic inclemencies. In 1813 he had believed that new varieties rose mainly among domesticated tribes. Under the influence of Azara he departed from that theory. What was left was the idea that climate had an influence on the constitution of wild tribes.

Prichard would, probably, not have followed Azara had he not been ready to alter his opinions anyway. But since that was the case, Azara's observation brought it about that Prichard's previous theory of the hereditary forces of civilization was wiped out in one stroke. It had, as it were, evaporated. Prichard did not have to argue it away, nor did he have to deny it, it simply disappeared under the impact of Azara's findings that domesticated animals did not engender new varieties, while wild tribes of animals did.

In 1826 new discoveries on the natural history of animals, environmentalism and Blumenbach's hereditary theory were mutually supporting each other. Under their combined impact Prichard turned expressly towards environmentalism. His germ-theory went together with his Platonic notion of human types. The type was the standard with which individual features were more or less congruent according to the nature and quality of the living conditions. In consequence, Prichard
maintained that good living conditions brought each of the various human types to its full potential. This was exemplified in the complexion of black slaves working on the plantations: field slaves had a dusky hue, while those working in the house were a lot blacker. The reason was simple: "the better a Negro is fed and clothed", Prichard wrote, "and the more healthy he is, the darker is the colour of his skin".81

At first sight, the example seems to show how much Prichard had distanced himself from his former ideas. The replacement of civilization by climatic agencies has been regarded as a major shift in Prichard's theory of the formation of human varieties. Both Bynum and Stocking believed that Prichard "capitulated into the environmentalist camp".82 In the end, both consider it as a kind of defeat. As I have tried to explain, however, the rejection of old environmentalism was not Prichard's prime concern. It merely resulted from his urgent desire to dissociate himself from transmutationism. The second edition of the Researches suffered from the flagrant contradiction between an endorsement of environmentalism and the notion that acquired characteristics could not become hereditary - the latter being the one pocket of resistance against the transmutationist assault which Prichard upheld. It was only in the third edition that this theoretical bastion fell as well.

C. 1836-1847 - the Third Edition
In the fifth volume of the third edition Prichard summarized his whole endeavour. With respect to the phenomena of hereditary variation he wrote:

the principal object of these researches has been to furnish the groundwork of a comparative inquiry into the physical and psychological characters of various races, with a view of determining how far these characters are permanent or subject to change, and whether they are in their nature specific distinctions, or merely accidental or acquired and transmutable varieties.83
What was true for the second edition, applied to the third as well: Prichard drew an analytical distinction between "accidental" surges of new varieties which were completed more or less within the first generation, and the notion that some characteristics were acquired under the impact of climatic and living conditions. In line with the first proposition he maintained

that the changes alluded to do not so often take place by alteration in the physical character of a whole tribe simultaneously, as by the springing up in it of some new congenital peculiarity, which is afterwards propagated and becomes a character more or less constant in the progeny of the individuals in whom it first appeared, and is perhaps gradually communicated by intermarriages to a whole stock or tribe.8

Thus Prichard had preserved not only his notion of sudden accidental varieties but also the idea that these were propagated through marital selection. However, like in the second edition, he deviated in certain respects from his previous theories. Before this issue can be addressed a short recapitulation of the general framework of the third edition may be helpful.

The structure of the entire work followed the outline of the first and second edition. The first volume provided a theoretical presentation of Prichard's arguments concerning the question of monogenism from a biological point of view. The remaining four volumes contained a host of ethnological information, ranging from physical anthropology to philology. Among the criteria which proved the unity of mankind Prichard then also counted the human psychological make-up including the intellectual capacity which was, as he insisted, the same all over the globe: for the pious Prichard the main common feature was the belief in a universal Creator, the notion of an after-life and the feeling of guilt which he detected in all the tribes which he surveyed in his Researches.
He concluded "that the same inward conscious nature and the same mental faculties are common to all the races of men".85

Hand in hand with the incorporation of the psychological criterion came Prichard's conviction that external features, namely those of the integuments, were unreliable, because highly mutable, indicators for an anthropological typology.

Already in 1826 he had made the same point with respect to skin colour: "the variety of colour is generally thought to be of less importance as a distinction of races, and to afford less difficulty of explanation, than the variations of structure".86 It is one of the salient distinctions between the first edition of the *Researches* and Prichard's later works that he turned away from the assumption that skin colour was the most deeply rooted and the most permanent determinant of human varieties. In 1836 he made the point even more strongly than he had done in 1826:

> It is in the external and less essential parts that varieties principally take place. In the texture and coverings whether hairy or woolly of the skin, the absence or presence and the size of horns and other appendages, the colour or complexion, and in some instances in the number of fingers and toes; - in all these particulars, varieties frequently spring up within one and the same species, to the transmission of which there is a strong tendency in the animal economy.87

Since these characteristics were so much liable to change they did not furnish any stable information on which to found a classification of mankind. Following the famous German physical geographer Carl Ritter, who had developed a system of geographical conditions which in varying degree were conducive or detrimental to civilization, Prichard classed mankind according to their geographic stations.88 In keeping with Ritter's delineation of the main geographical regions of the globe, he distinguished seven human varieties, or rather: seven typological varieties. For in reality the physical characteristics of these varieties,
which resided mainly in a particular conformation of the bony structure, could spring up in individuals of all races.

A discussion of Prichard’s attitudes towards environmentalism, civilization and the rise of variations, as they were expressed in the third edition, must begin with the great change which Prichard himself considered breathtaking. We have seen that by the second edition he accepted the basic tenets of environmentalism while at the same time emphasizing that characteristics acquired post natum could not become hereditary. By the mid-thirties, however, this again had changed. Prichard more than once hinted at the discovery of Cuvier’s pupil François Désiré Roulin (1796-1874). In a paper, presented to the Paris Académie des Sciences, the French natural historian proved with the examples of dogs, horses, and cows two striking points.

Firstly, he showed that some animals passed on to their offspring "instincts" which they had artificially acquired. Habits which had been imparted "with care and art upon their ancestors" were transmitted to the posterity. This was true, for example, for barking: "wild dogs do not bark", Prichard noted, "they only howl". Roulin had shown that barking was an "acquired hereditary instinct".

His findings corroborated an observation of John Hunter as well as a theory of the zoologist and horticulturist Thomas Andrew Knight who in 1807 had asserted "an instinctive hereditary propensity" in animals, suggesting that at least some animals could pass on acquired abilities to their offspring. In 1837 Knight was to re-iterate his hypothesis. He was a venerable man, the President of the Horticultural Society. However, being a true Gentleman-philosopher, he based his scientific papers on observations which he made, literally, while hunting. Prichard took notice of his publications. But only once Roulin had put forward this theory, linking it to a theory of adaptation, did Prichard discuss its consequences.
By 1836 he thought that not just individuals, but races had to "acclimatize" to new environmental surroundings. This process brought about "certain permanent changes produced in the constitution of animals", albeit as Prichard insisted "in a limited range". - So far Prichard had agreed with Roulin already in 1826.

But there was another aspect to Roulin's theory of acclimatization. It was this second point which - within the framework of the analogical method - potentially controverted the basis of Prichard's theory about the nature of civilization. On a voyage through New Grenada and Venezuela Roulin had observed that tribes of cows, abandoned by the first colonizers more than a century ago, had lost their ability to provide an abundance of milk, having reverted in their constitution to the original state. As Prichard put the point: "a restoration of domestic animals to the wild state causes a return towards the original characters of the wild tribe".92

He himself held this for a major new insight. Indeed, it overturned Prichard's previous views on the variability of wild and domesticated animals. First Prichard had assumed that the domesticated or civilized state might give rise to new variations (1813), later he had believed that domesticated animals and civilized men no longer changed (1826). Both hypotheses were reconcilable with Prichard's biological interpretation of civilization as a unilinear process. Now, however, the possibility loomed that civilization was - like domestication - a reversible state. Prichard considered Roulin's results as extremely significant. In 1829 he stated: "The facts related by M. Roulin respecting the effect of a change of climate, and the return to a wild state of domesticated races which had been transported to South America, are highly important".93 Nowadays, Roulin is hardly known, but at the time his findings were warmly praised by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire.94 Being a protégé of Cuvier, Roulin was a scientist not to be ignored. The idea that domesticated animals might revert in their instincts to the original state was not new for Prichard.95
But until Roulin's publications Prichard contemplated it rather in a hypothetical manner, he was not obliged to incorporate it into his analogical comparison between the laws of the animal economy in mankind and animals.

In consequence, Prichard abandoned the idea that acquired characteristics could by no means become hereditary. Obviously, they could. This being so, Prichard also diluted his idea that all variations made their first appearance suddenly, due to an immediate surge in one individual germinated ovum. He did not discard this theory, but he added another one to it, namely, that the environment might act slowly and gradually on all individuals of a given tribe at once, thus fashioning the tribe according to the exigencies of the surrounding. 96 It was this argument which induced George Stocking to remark that Prichard had "returned" to environmentalism. But was it really a return?

Eighteenth-century environmentalism had considered the variations in skin colour as well as the structure and colour of the hair as a salient, if not the most essential feature of human tribes. However, as has been noted, Prichard relegated the character of the integuments to a secondary position. 97 Within his system, his explanations of coloration were, therefore, of relatively minor importance and unproblematic. Moreover, there is a difference between eighteenth-century environmentalism and the Prichardian version: Enlightenment philosophers envisioned that climate formed human tribes, at the same time they would agree that these tribes were perfectly adapted to their surroundings. For Prichard, by contrast, the two were not the same: the African climate, that is, had no effect in "transmuting other races into Negroes", but "the constitution of the Negro is, in a peculiar manner, adapted to tropical climates". 98 Prichard saw the adaptation of the human constitution as a desideratum for survival, it happened only within a certain range whose scope was implanted in the connate fabric of the
species. He also retained the notion that rude physical features were a result of cultural underdevelopment. For example, if nomadic tribes were darker than agricultural nations because they had no houses to shelter them, was their complexion a result of climate or of their relatively low degree of civilization?

It is questionable whether it really makes sense to pit Prichard's environmentalism against his notion of culturally enhanced physical variations because he himself saw the inside and the outside, i.e. bodily constitution and living habits, as mutually constituting each other, stating that the "psychical manifestations of particular tribes ... bear everywhere a close relation to corresponding varieties in bodily structure".99 Sometimes the introduction of civilized manners led to improvement of physical features - such as in the case of the Nubians residing at the borders of the Nile.100 Sometimes the "nature and climate" of particularly dreary regions "and the methods by which the natives procure their subsistence, necessarily preclude the introduction of many arts of civilized society" as was true, e.g., in the case of the Esquimaux.101

Since Prichard had assimilated Roulin's spectacular paper, he admitted that adaptation to climatic circumstances was a beneficial institution of nature, enabling all human tribes to bear the particular circumstances of their living conditions. The idea that adaptation could, indeed, bring about the loss of improved features, was confirmed by "an excellent paper on the population, &c. of Ireland" which Prichard had read in the Dublin University Magazine. Its author asserted that native Irish who were in the seventeenth century "driven into the mountains" had, after "two centuries of degradation and hardship", acquired a "physical condition" which reflected their general "deterioration". The skulls of their descendants had approached to the least civilized, the prognathous form, "their advancing cheek-bones and depressed noses
bear barbarism on their very front”. On the whole they displayed "the worst effects of hunger and ignorance, the two great brutalizers of the human race”. Prichard was not anti-Irish. On the contrary, he praised the Irish for their early civilization: "after their conversion to Christianity" the ancient Irish were "one of the most intellectual nations in Europe, and were the civilisers of a part of it". His point was rather that civilized human tribes, thrown back into most destitute living conditions, survived through their physical adaptation to the changed environment. Another instance of this was the story of the Bushmen whom Prichard took for "the remains of Hottentot hordes, who subsisted originally like all the tribes of southern Africa, chiefly by rearing sheep and cattle, but who have been driven by the gradual encroachments of European colonists, and by internal wars with other tribes, to seek for refuge among the inaccessible rocks and deserts of the interior". Quoting from the Africa-traveller John Barrow Prichard added: "they have been treated as wild beasts, until they have become assimilated to wild beasts in their habits and dispositions" - any reproach for their miserable condition, hence, had to be directed not against them but against those people who drove them into their miserable state.

Until the late 1820s, Prichard had not given much thought to the idea that domestication or civilization might be, or might not be irreversible processes. To accept the idea that civilization was reversible would have potentially an enormous impact on the work of the natural historian: the task could no longer be to establish the genealogy of an ascending line towards civilization and refinement, but to explain ethnological features within a framework of deviations.

In the second edition Prichard had considered the development of varieties mainly under two aspects: either they were "deviations" from a "common standard", a "common original", a "common character", a "primitive type", a "general character", and a "common type". Or they
were deviations "towards a lighter shade", towards "a lighter and
different hue".\textsuperscript{106} This way of expressing himself mirrored his opinion
that "fewer variations occur in races of white than in those of darker
colour".\textsuperscript{107} By the third edition, the term "deviation" was no longer
pointing simply into the direction of increasingly light skin colour. Since
Prichard had adopted the notion of "permanent varieties", the deviations
he described did no longer refer to the original type of mankind. Instead
Prichard employed the word mainly to indicate differences. He spoke of
deviations in "structure", or in "form and structure".\textsuperscript{108} Organisms
principally deviated in both directions, towards the development of
refined features, as well as towards a rude physiognomy.

Even though Prichard played down the role of skin colour as a
reliable anthropological indicator, it still was crucial for his
understanding of refinement and rudeness of physical features. Thus he
pointed out that the Lapps "deviate from the usual characters of the
European races, and approximate to the Mongolian".\textsuperscript{109} Another
example were the peoples of the "Indo-Chinese" type, who deviated "on
the one side to the character of the European, and on the other to a
conformation of body very similar to that of the African".\textsuperscript{110} As to the
Africans, Prichard emphasized that there were many peoples of the
African type, deviating in colour and physiognomy "towards a lighter
hue", "with a figure and features" like "Europeans". It could often be
observed, Prichard stressed, that "the descendants of genuine Negroes are
no longer such: they have lost, in several instances, many of the
peculiarities of the stock from which they sprang".\textsuperscript{111}

Like the degeneration of the Irish and the Bushmen, the deviation
towards the "African" type was regarded by Prichard as a degenerative
process. But since it was reversible Prichard must not be mistaken for a
racial degenerationist (indeed, he tended to use the term "deviation"
instead of "degeneration"). The question will be discussed in detail later.
For the moment it must suffice merely to hint at the reasons why Prichard was not falling in line with contemporary theories of race: his notion of "deviation" or "degeneration" was modelled on the concepts of Buffon and Blumenbach; it was not racist but biological. It was developed on the background of a rather Platonic understanding of the nominalist character of original types. Moreover, Prichard believed that all human tribes possessed a certain potential for development either towards rudeness or towards refinement. External influences, whether climatic or cultural, largely determined to what extent human characteristics and faculties developed. We have seen above that it peculiarly characterizes Prichard's anthropology that he came very near to considering civilization as an epi-phenomenon of Christianity, and that he regarded religion on the whole as an element of the instinctive or psychological propensities of mankind. In this respect he differed markedly from mainstream Enlightenment anthropology, for which civilization was primarily a work of artifice and reason. Prichard, by contrast, took the belief in an after-life as well as the capability "of being converted from savages into civilised men" for elements of human psychology. By means of locating morality as well as the capacity for civilization within the instinctive disposition of mankind, he managed to reverse the causal chain of the phrenologists: a well-shaped oval skull was rather the consequence than the source of civilized manners. He was convinced that the universality of all human features was so overwhelming that the differences between human tribes were comparatively unimportant. He was far from believing that there was any inherent flaw in the hereditary fabric of some tribes: all human varieties could become civilized, all had essentially the same intellectual capacities, all had the capability to adapt to new surroundings.

Up to the third edition Prichard saw no reason to question his belief that the course of history led from rudeness to refinement, in
manners as well as in bodily shape. It was through Roulin's observations that the unilinearity of the process was threatened. And the potential consequences of Roulin's findings were massive: driving the concept of a return to the wild state to its full consequence would have meant that white Europeans could revert to the physical features of jet-black Negroes. We have seen above that Prichard tended to believed that originally mankind had been black. Hence it would have made sense to suggest that, under very adverse conditions, half civilized tribes of mankind could return to that same state of jet-black rudeness. But this was precisely the conclusion Prichard avoided: "it will not immediately follow that the climates of Africa are capable of transmuting other races of men into Negroes or Hottentots", he insisted.

Stocking and Bynum have suggested that Prichard dropped the idea of original blackness of mankind in the second edition. Even though he never publicized it as triumphantly as in the first edition, it is nonetheless evident that he was not prepared to altogether let go of it. This becomes clear in a sentence where he argued that African blacks might have been "endowed from their first creation with peculiarities which render them fit for their abode". Elsewhere Prichard opined that the "melanous" (in his nomenclature "dark" or "black") colour might "be looked upon as the natural and original complexion of the human species". Accordingly, African features were not the result of a degenerative development, instead the respective tribes had been created as such. Applied to mankind Roulin's argument would have meant that a return to that very African rudeness was possible. But Prichard was not disposed to say that.

We have seen that in the third edition Prichard's usage of the term "deviation" changed in so far as he explicitly conceded that deviations from "civilized", light features to rude, dark physiognomies were
possible. Under these circumstances, all attempts to trace back the physical history of human tribes were doomed if it was not sure how often these tribes had changed from rude to refined features and back to rudeness. Prichard's response to the challenge was two-fold: on the one hand, he intensified his philological researches: the more he pursued his philological studies the more he was convinced that there lay the key for the recovery of the human past anterior to the existence of proper historical records. On the other hand, he emphasized the continuity of the inward nature of mankind as well as the relative permanency of human varieties.

This, however, raised yet another problem: Roulin had shown the impermanence of animal tribes. Prichard's idea of "permanent varieties" implied the idea that Roulin's findings did actually not apply to mankind, and this meant that the analogical method did not apply in respect of the eminently important question to what extent the rise of new varieties was possible. As Prichard put the problem: "If human varieties are more permanent than those of the lower species, it will be said that the analogy fails in this particular". He posed himself the question: "are the varieties in mankind more permanent than in the lower tribes?" His answer was that there were so many different degrees of species permanency in the animal realm itself that it was futile to compare animals to mankind in that respect. Thus he got himself off the hook in view of the disconcerting consequences which an application of Roulin's theory to the variations in mankind would have had. In the Researches, Roulin's name was not even mentioned.

But when Prichard wrote The Natural History of Man he came back to the Frenchman's investigations into the hereditary changes in animal instincts, suggesting that one might "discover in the psychological characters of human races changes similar in kind, but infinitely greater in degree". If Prichard mentioned Roulin in The
Natural History of Man, instead of ignoring him as he had done in the
Researches, it was at least in part an act of politeness. The French edition
came out in 1843, in the very same year as the English original appeared.
Prichard may have referred to Roulin's scientific contributions in order
to flatter his translator. Still, even in The Natural History of Man,
Prichard found a way to rule out the consequences flowing from Roulin's
theory of instinct. He wrote: "the influence of the mind must be more
extensive and powerful in its operations upon human beings than upon
brutes. And this difference transcends all analogy or comparison".123
According to Prichard's own standards this argument was weak: it was
not sustained by any further reflections, and it defied the principle of the
analogy which Prichard had extended in the third edition of the
Researches to encompass a comparison between the psychology of
mankind and animals. Prichard had a very subtle understanding of the
different forces of the mind. One part of it, human psychology, was in
analogy with animals instincts. Another one, the supreme faculty of
rationality, was not. But when he discussed Roulin he did not bother to
differentiate. His argument, therefore, was none. It may be fairly said that
Prichard did not rise to the challenge encountered in Roulin's theory.

In conclusion, Prichard's attitude to Roulin was extremely
ambiguous. He believed Roulin's assertion that animal instincts did
change under external influences, he also believed that these changes
were heritable; he could not help accepting the allegation that a return to
the originally rude state was possible. But he refused to admit that all this
might be true for mankind as well.

Yet, in some respect even that side of Roulin's theory can be found
in Prichard's views. In 1813 he had unequivocally supported the idea that
civilization signified the move from savagery and rudeness to
refinement, and also from paganism to Christendom. By the 1830s and
1840s, however, and irrespective of all environmental considerations, the
process itself appeared increasingly problematic to Prichard. Civilization no longer implied moral superiority per se. This was certainly not thanks to Roulin. Rather it reflected Prichard's increasing exasperation with his times, with his countrymen, and with Christian nations, on the whole. He was truly and utterly dismayed by the brutality with which the colonists treated the indigenous populations of foreign territories. Not least in the light of their behaviour Prichard was increasingly convinced that civilization was not a good in itself, and all their knowledge and their lip-service to Christianity did not deter the white man from behaving at least as atrociously as the rudest cannibals.

Prichard's opinion surfaced even in his discussion of the origins of skin colour. In the third edition of the Researches he maintained that a light complexion was an effect of comfortable living conditions - "persons at ease", he said, who were sheltered from the climates, acquired a lighter tint. Those who lived in "hardship" and were continuously exposed to the sun, by contrast, were dark. Back in 1813 Prichard had rejected the theory of climate by pointing out that "man is defended by so many arts against the influence of the elements" - there was no mention of life-style. By the 1830s, that was different. Now, the source of civilized physical features was assigned a negative connotation. For, being "at ease" was certainly no ethical achievement. Prichard made the point quite obvious when referring to the variations within the Malayan tribe: the lower castes, he said were dark, being "continually exposed to the agency of the climate". By contrast, "the chieftains and the people of a higher grade in the same islands lead an indolent and luxurious life. They have attained the average stature of Europeans, and in some instances exceed it...".

Civilized life, he let his readers know, was accompanied by "an indolent and luxurious life". The explicit comparison between European and Malayan features mirrored what Prichard thought of the Europeans
themselves. Numerous were the instances in the 1830s when he referred to the abject morality of civilized society. Civilization had as it were two "appearances", an internal and an external. The first implied a vision of true religion, the second, by contrast, Prichard identified with "wealth and conveniences", furthering indolence, moral depravity, and selfishness. Prichard thought that this second face, the decadent image of civilization was increasingly outstripping the first. In their perfect egoism, European colonizers brought about the death of innumerable human beings. In fact, civilized men worked at the destruction of creation. The idea was most dramatically expressed as early as 1830 in one of Prichard's contributions to the Bristol Quaker journal The Friends' Monthly Magazine. In an article on the natural history of the African tribes he wrote:

The institutions of nature, or rather of Providence, tend to the preserving and multiplying of tribes, and to their renovation when partially decayed. But the destroying demon is the selfishness and cruelty of men. It is only by the hand of man that any race of human beings has been exterminated; and perhaps we may add, that it is only by christian nations that such a work of total extermination has ever been thoroughly accomplished.

These were strong words. In Prichard's view civilization was not only, as Roulin's theories implied, a passing event; moreover, it was no longer morally unequivocal. Roulin's discoveries came, as it were, as the scientific confirmation, or at least as a scientific concomitant, of the outrage and moral pessimism Prichard had come to harbour. In this light, the question whether Prichard referred to Roulin or not was tantamount to the question to which degree Prichard was ready to admit the dubious nature of domestication and civilization.

On the whole, and to conclude this section, it is remarkable to what extent Prichard managed to preserve beliefs which he had entertained in
1813. He never quite forsook the idea that mankind had been created black. He never totally let go the idea that the origin of light varieties was the accidental production of individuals with fair skin whose features were considered by their darker peers as so beautiful that they managed to permeate them in their offspring until they became the leading characteristic of their tribe. Also, Prichard always fought transmutationism. At the same time, however, his whole system became more diverse. He added new concepts to the old in accordance with new discoveries in the field of natural history. The additions which he had made to his theory to save the phenomenon prevented him from embracing any of the old tenets really wholeheartedly. In the second edition of the Researches he had already admitted that his rejection of the inheritability of acquired characteristics seemed to be rebutted by the fact that the environment seemed to exert some influence on the progeny. In the third edition he conceded that acquired characteristics could become inheritable. But he could not face the full consequences of this assumption. The discrepancies in Prichard's theory mirror his relentless hope to bring the increasing mass of evidence into correlation and under the umbrella of some unifying natural laws. Seen in this light, the third edition is not so much a defeat but evidence of the struggle which Prichard fought in good faith, trying to give science its due.

2 See note 82 in ch. 4.


5 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., ii.


7 Herbert Spencer has been credited with having coined the term 'environmentalism'. See: Armin Hajman Koller, The Theory of Environment, an Outline of the History of the Idea of Milieu, and its Present Status, Menasha, Wisc. (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1918, 5.

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Wien (Braumüller), 1978.

9 J. Borthwick, "Notes", 375.


11 Indeed, medicine was considered as that branch of the anthropological sciences which dealt with the individual, see: Axel Bauer, "Bemerkungen zur Verwendung des Terminus 'Anthropologie' in der Medizin der Neuzeit (16.-19. Jahrhundert)", in: Eduard Seidler (ed.), Medizinische Anthropologie, Beiträge für eine Theoretische Pathologie, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, Tokyo (Springer), 1984, 32-55.


13 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 199.


16 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 194.

17 Ibid., 25; cf. also: idem, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", 98.


19 Ibid., 103; cf. also his Researches, 1. ed., 25-27.

20 Idem, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", 109. Cf. John Hunter, "On the Colour of the Pigmentum of the Eye", in: idem, Works, vol. 4, 277. It must be stressed that Prichard did not make an effort to delineate a system of physiognomical characteristics. At the beginning of his career he was dealing mainly with the phenomenon of skin colour.

21 Prichard, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", 97.

22 Ibid., 98; the quote is from: Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 72. Wells has pointed out that Prichard's concept of spontaneous variation repeated "ideas of Henry Baker, whose account of the peculiar skin of the "Porcupine" family Prichard had read in the Philosophical Transactions (1755), see: Kentwood D. Wells, "Sir William Lawrence (1783-1867). A Study of Pre-Darwinian Ideas on Heredity and Variation", Journal of the History of Biology, 4 (1971), 319-361, p. 326. Interestingly, what for Hunter were monstrous aberrations, Prichard considered as "normal" deviations: he did not seem to see the Porcupine family as monstrous. Cf. by contrast Hunter's view in: Cross, "John Hunter", 34-35.

23 See: Researches, 1. ed, iii.

This is the reason why Wells explicitly denied that Prichard might have discussed Lamarckian ideas, see: Kentwood D. Wells, "Sir William Lawrence", 359.

idem, "Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species", The British Journal for the History of Science, 12 (1979), 109-153.


29 Bynum, "Time's Noblest Offspring", 70.


31 Prichard, "Of the Varieties of the Human Race", 100. This explained also why whites were generally more frail than hardy black savages.


33 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 159-160. Carlos López-Beltrán has rightly stressed that Prichard depathologized the question of skin colour, see his "Human Heredity", 108. For a study on theories of skin colour see: Renato Mazzolini, "Anatomische Untersuchungen über die Haut der Schwarzen (1700-1800)", in: Gunter Mann et al. (eds), Die Natur des Menschen, 169-187 (Mazzolini is currently working on a comprehensive study of the subject).

34 As has been noted above, Prichard did not address the problem of monstrosity. In this respect he followed Maupertuis and J. F. Blumenbach's demystification of the phenomenon, see his Researches, 1. ed., 75. For "monsters" see: Evelleen Richards, "A Political Anatomy of Monsters, Hopeful and Otherwise: Teratogeny, Transcendentalism, and Evolutionary Theorizing", Isis, 85 (1994), 377-411; Dudley Wilson, Monstrous Births from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, London (Routledge), 1993.


36 Cf. also Bynum, "Time's Noblest Offspring", 87. Such a theory had already been put forward by the Edinburgh-trained Philadelphia doctor Samuel Stanhope Smith in his An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species (1787).

37 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 236-237. He also wrote: "The more civilized people have a larger stature a better form and a lighter complexion" (ibid., 545). Theories about the race-forming capacity of marital selection were prevalent among Scottish Enlightenment philosophers. Prichard's novel approach lay in the combination of this theory with laws of natural history. How original his notion becomes clear when we compare it to John Hunter's explanation of variations in animals. "Education", he had written, "can produce no change in the colour, form, or disposition of the animal, yet it is capable of producing a principle which becomes so natural to the animal that it shall beget young different in colour and form", see: Hunter,
"Observations Tending to Show That the Wolf, Jackal, and Dog, are all of the Same Species", 330.

38 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 235.

39 Ibid., 233. The point is of particular importance for Bynum, see: "Time's Noblest Offspring", 101-104; cf. also Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", liv, lxxv-lxviii.

40 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 222-223.

41 Bynum, "Time's Noblest Offspring", 87-88.

42 Ibid., 99.

43 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 234.

44 Ibid., 234, the quote is from p. 204.


46 Ibid., 222.

47 Ibid., 207.

48 Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", lxxx (but compare Stocking's remark on p. lxxxii that, in the third edition, "Prichard returned on several issues to positions he had advanced in the first edition", one of which Stocking identified as the "renewed emphasis on the role of civilization").

49 Bynum, "Time's Noblest Offspring", 77, 106.

50 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, vi.


52 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 2, 568. He was quoting from Blumenbach's Beyträige zur Naturgeschichte, 1. part, Göttingen (J. C. Dieterich), 1790.


54 Ibid., 575. For Prichard's usage of the term "degeneration" see section C below.

55 Blumenbach himself said about his theory of generation that it constituted "the union and intimate coexertion of two distinct principles in the evolution of the nature of organized bodies, - of the PHYSICO-MECHANICAL, with the purely TELEOLOGICAL". See: Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, The Institutions of Physiology, trans. from the


57 He considered the German's theory on generation as "highly interesting". In his discussion of the vital principle Prichard included a long excerpt from Blumenbach's work on generation. See: *A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle*, 213-224, the quote in this note is from p. 224. For an excellent account of Blumenbach's "nisus formativus" see: Lenoir, *The Strategy of Life*, 17-35. Lenoir admirably explains the two-faced role of the Bildungstrieb: being at once teleological and indebted to materialist explanations of physiological processes, it was bound to confuse Prichard. After initially having criticizing the concept, he later converted to it; see his *The Natural History of Man: Comprising Inquiries into the Modifying Influence of Physical and Moral Agencies on the Different Tribes of the Human Family*, London (H. Baillière), 1843, 60.


59 For the generation theory of Kant and Blumenbach and the points where they did not meet, see: Phillip R. Sloan, "Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species". For Kant in particular see: Peter McLaughlin, *Kant's Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation*, Lewiston (E. Mellen Press), 1991.


61 Ibid. Cf. also: idem, *A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle*, 139. Prichard did not name Blumenbach as the source of this theory. In 1813 Prichard had merely referred to "the general law, which has ordained that the offspring shall always be constructed according to the parental and primitive constitution of the parents", see: ibid., 1. ed., p. 231.


63 Ibid., 551 ("children resemble in feature and constitution both parents, but I think more generally the father").

64 Ibid., 551-555, the quote is from p. 555.

65 Prichard's writings do not invite interpretations aiming to delineate conceptions of gender differences. Still, it is obviously in line with contemporary notions of masculinity that it is the man who ensures the constancy of species.
67 Ibid., 532. Prichard explicitly extended this law to "acquired varieties of constitution", see: ibid., 547.
68 Ibid., vol. 1, 90.
69 Ibid., vol. 2, 582.
70 Ibid., 559 (my emphasis). For Prichard's attempts to find correlations between climate and physical character see: ibid., 558-583.
71 Ibid., 566. Though, he admitted that "it does not appear to be very important in respect to the general conclusion to be drawn [= monogenism], whether the deviations we observe are found to display themselves at once in strongly marked examples, or take place by slow and imperceptible degrees". This means that he did not deem it necessary that a particular complexion sprang up at once in a tribe. It was conceivable that it was the result of a process comprising several stages; ibid., vol. 1, 102.
72 Ibid., vol. 1, 362-363.
73 Ibid., vol. 2, 581-582.
74 Ibid., 581.
81 Ibid., 536. Again, Prichard was not consistent, in general he treated jet-black skin colour as a sign of utter rudeness.
82 Bynum, "Time's Noblest Offspring", 107; Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", lxxx.
84 Ibid., 550.
85 Ibid., 548, see also p. 612 and for the equality of intellectual potential see: ibid., vol. 1, 215.
In writing this Prichard was influenced by W. F. Edwards's *Des caractères physiologiques des races humaines*, 1829, see ch. 7.


For Prichard's reception of Knight's theory see his *The Natural History of Man*, 70-72 (he did not mention Knight's theory before having come across that of Roulin). Cf. Knight, "On the Economy of Bees. In a letter ... to the Right Honourable Sir Joseph Banks", read May 14, 1807, *Philosophical Transactions*, 97 (1807), 234-244, p. 241; idem, "On the Hereditary Instinctive Propensities of Animals", Read May 25, 1837, *Philosophical Transactions*, 127 (1837), 365-369. See also Hunter's "Observations Tending to Show That the Wolf, Jackal, and Dog, are all of the Same Species", interestingly, Prichard ignored the article.

Prichard, *The Natural History of Man*, 39-40. The question whether domesticated tribes could return to the original variety had been treated at length by John Hunter. Although Prichard knew Hunter's writings well, he did not discuss them in depth, relying rather on first-hand experience by contemporary naturalists.


Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, "Rapport fait à l'Académie des Sciences sur un mémoire de M. Roulin...du 8.12.1828", *Annales des sciences naturelles*, 16 (1829), 34-44.


In 1813, by contrast, he had maintained that skin colour was more
permanent than most other physical characteristics (see his

98 Ibid., 2. ed., vol. 1, 361.

99 Ibid., vol. 1, 166.

100 Ibid., vol. 2, 181.

101 Ibid., vol. 1, 195.

102 Ibid., vol. 2, note on p. 349.


106 Ibid., vol. 1, 357; vol. 2, 454.

107 Ibid., vol. 2, 583. As late as 1834 he had claimed that "it would be
difficult to point out any clearly ascertained fact which proves that the
descendants of a white stock have ever become black" while the
contrary was very common. See the abstract of Prichard's "Three
Lectures on Egyptian Mummies, Egyptian Antiquities, and the Rosetta
Stone", held on 31. 3., 2. 4., and 4. 4. 1834 at the Bristol Institution,
Richard Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, p. 650, Bristol Public Record
Office, Bristol Public Record Office, 35893 (36) k. i.

108 Ibid., 3. ed. vol. 1, 242, 246, 110. Deviations were occurring in "the
canacter of a parent-stock", in "the original or the prevalent character
of each tribe", in "the peculiarities of the stock from which" an


110 Ibid., vol. 5, 285.

111 Ibid., vol. 2, 341, 343.

112 It has been argued that Buffon entertained a theory of racial
degeneration: Phillip R. Sloan, "The Idea of Racial Degeneracy in
Buffon's *Histoire naturelle". Indeed, Prichard himself ascribed to the
idea that "the races of animals which have the most powerful and
perfect structure belong chiefly to the old world" (*Researches*, 2. ed.,
vol. 1, 63; 3. ed., vol. 1, 77). However, Prichard refrained from applying
Buffon's notion to American human tribes. As for Blumenbach's
attitude which was explicitly anti-racialist see: Dougherty, "Christoph
Meiners und Johann Friedrich Blumenbach im Streit um den Begriff
der Menschenrasse".

113 See ch. 5, section A.


115 Ibid., vol. 2, 340. In the second edition Prichard had put forward the
same idea, see: vol. 1, 359-361.


117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., vol. 1, 220. Admittedly, Prichard did not defend this opinion
consistently. In 1826, for instance, he intimated in a footnote that "the
African countenance" was brought forward in a historical process, see his Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, note on p. 328-329.

119 Prichard underlined the supreme role of philology in the pursuit of ethnology in various instances. see., e.g., The Natural History of Man, 132; idem, "On the Relations of Ethnology to Other Branches of Knowledge", Anniversary Address delivered at the Anniversary Meeting, 22.6.1847, of the Ethnological Society, Journal of the Ethnological Society of London, 1 (1848), 301-329, p. 304.

120 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 373.

121 Ibid., 373-374. In this context Prichard quoted Thomas Andrew Knight.

122 Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 75.

123 Ibid.

124 See Prichard Researches, 3. ed., vol. 3, 341, vol. 5, 282; the quote is from vol. 4, 238.

125 Ibid., 1. ed., 209.


127 Ibid., vol. 2, note on p. 34; cf. also: Prichard, "Letter to Dr. Hodgkin", Extracts from the Papers and Proceedings of the Aborigines Protection Society, 1, no. 2 (1839), 56-58, p. 57. This topic is further explored in ch. 7, section D.


130 A writer who went the whole way deriving a theory of racial degeneration from his pessimistic views of civilization was Joseph Arthur de Gobineau; see: Michael D. Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology. The Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau, London (Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 1970.

131 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 4, 194; idem, The Natural History of Man, 245.

A. The Origins of Mankind - was Adam Black?

Prichard's investigations into human ethnology past and present were based on physiological and anatomical considerations, on the one hand, and on historical inquiries, on the other hand. Among the latter he counted the work of historians proper, as well as "popular traditions, poetry, mythology, remains of ancient art, such as architecture, sculpture, inscriptions", including sepulchral relics "consisting of embalmed bodies, or more often the mere skulls and skeletons of the ancient inhabitants", finally the "history of languages and their affinities". In his ambition to delineate the "natural history of man" Prichard plunged back deep into time. Ideally, his task was to trace back all human tribes to the first primeval couple. Prichard always knew that this was impossible, the Deluge having eradicated the remnants of human culture. But even going back as far as the Deluge proved to be impossible. The path lost itself in the mists of the past, that is, as Prichard admitted, between "the Deluge of Noah and the origin of the Great Asiatic monarchies".

In the early nineteenth century it was still the pastime of many British divines and interested lay-men to penetrate the mists of history and mythology in order to show how they and their human brethren were connected to the peoples of the Biblical narrative. The search for the ten lost tribes of Israel was still occupying the minds of some. Even
prediluvial man was not excluded from the scope of inquiry. At the outset of his publishing career, Prichard still trusted the conjectures of contemporary philologists and ancient historians who asserted genealogical links between most distant peoples. But as time went on he had to revise his youthful speculations.

In all three editions of the *Researches*, Prichard's investigations led him from the present back into the darkness of historical past of the few centuries before the birth of Christ. Tacitus wrote *Germania*, his accounts of the ancient Germans, in the year 98 C.E. Prichard decided that the dialects of the ancient Germans and the Celts must have formed during "the first millennium before the Christian era". While the epoch when "the Sanskrit, Latin, Greek and Mæso-Gothic were developed from a common original, must have a much earlier date" - Prichard suggested the second millennium B.C.E. This must be taken for the time when he thought that great migrations had taken place. Vague as these assumptions from the 1830s were, in the first edition of the *Researches* Prichard had not even gone as far as to decide in which millennium language formation and the first great migrations had taken place.

In terms of historically recorded time, Prichard believed that down to around 1000 B.C.E. the relevant facts of the occurrences between the Mediterranean and the Nile were known. As for the centuries anterior to the well-recorded Roman and Greek polities thriving as of 500 B.C.E., he referred to the Biblical chronology which was corroborated by the Egyptian king Ptolomy I (b. 367-366 B.C.E.). As Ptolomy was a contemporary of Alexander the Great, his history of the latter's conquests was generally deemed to be reliable. Even though Ptolomy's text itself was lost, it survived in a later history of Alexander by the Roman poet Arrian. Prichard's summary of the *terra cognita* of ancient chronology shows that he was rather satisfied with the state of the records as far back as the tenth century B.C.E., to the era of King Solomon:
The chronology of Greece, Rome, Persia, reaches back to the fifth century BC; that of the Israelites to the tenth. ... We have thus a complete series of dates through four centuries of the Jewish history, and the exact era when this series terminates is ascertained and adjusted to the history of the Persian empire and the chronology of Greece by means of Ptolemy's canon, which contains the names and reigns of the king of Babylon mentioned in the second book of Kings.

As for the peoples of other continents, Prichard conjectured that they had branched off from the Noachic stem before the Indo-European family of nations had broken up into European and Asiatic nations. This explained why the languages of far-off nations were so different from the Syro-Arabian and the Indo-European dialects. Beyond historical commonplace dates Prichard never attempted to indicate when exactly which people had left their abode to travel into other regions. But he did not doubt that at some time some peoples had left the region of Asia minor in the direction of India, while others had turned towards Europe. At the stage anterior to that epoch the centre of human civilization was located in the countries between the Ganges and the Nile. The northern limit of this area was the Caspian Sea, at the south there was the Indian Ocean. In these confines lay "the region in which mankind first advanced to civilization". It was, Prichard conjectured in 1813 "the primitive abode of our species". In 1837 he wrote much the same:

the cradles or nurseries of the first nations appear to have been extensive plains or valleys traversed by navigable channels and irrigated by perennial and fertilizing streams. Three such regions were scenes of the most ancient cultivation of the human race, of the first foundation of cities, of the earliest political institutions, and of the invention of arts which embellish human life. In one of these, the Semitic nations exchanged the simple habits of wandering shepherds for the splendour and luxury of Nineveh and Babylon. In another an Indo-European or Japetic people brought to its perfection the most elaborate of human dialects, destined to become in later ages under different modifications the mother tongue of the nations of Europe. In
a third, the land of Ham, watered by the Nile, were invented hieroglyphic literature and the arts for which Egypt was celebrated in the earliest ages of history.8

Prichard believed that there was a time when mankind branched out into the posterity of Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Following Genesis, the peoples of the globe were distinguished into the Japhetic or Japetic, the Shemite, Shemitic, Semite or Semitic, and the Hamite, Hamitic, Chamite or Chamitic tribes.9 As we will see below, his physio-anatomical classification of mankind had nothing to do with the three groups of Shemite, Hamite, and Japhetic tribes. The relevance of the passage lies in the assertion that at some time there were three centres of population.

Yet another step further backwards, there were only two: the Biblical realms of Elam and Edom at the era of Abraham. "The subjects of the first were the Indo-Persians or Hindus; the inhabitants of the second were the Egyptians". "In the first ages", Prichard argued, these nations were "possessing contiguous countries".10 There was not such a thing as a Japhetic kingdom.11

He never reverted further than to the realms of Elam and Edom. "As to the quarter whence [mankind] first ramified, the cradle of the stock and perhaps of the human race", he said, "we have no data in history".12 He never did attempt to bridge the gap between the era of their rise and the Flood. Nor, for that matter, did he ever try to trace back the history of contemporary Jews to that of the chosen people. For, any such attempt would have compelled him to enter into a discussion of Scriptural history which was no longer sustained by any secular records. Yet, as it has been mentioned before, he had conjectures about the primitive physiognomy of mankind.

Prichard believed that primitive men were black. In 1813 he wrote: "In short: the primitive stock of men were Negroes".13 That was not a very common assertion for a naturalist, but any reader versed in the field
knew that Petrus Camper, Peter Simon Pallas, John Hunter and the Bishop of Calcutta, Reginald Heber, had suggested the same. W. F. Bynum concluded from this that Prichard had envisaged Adam as a black man. Odom, Bynum and Stocking maintained that Prichard had relinquished the idea in his subsequent publications. The same was asserted in 1850 by Henry Holland, in his review of the Researches, and by John Addington Symonds in his obituary memoir read at the meeting of the Bath and Bristol branch of the British Association in 1849. I have already explained why I hold that this was not the case. Still, the argument needs to be explored a bit further. Whether Prichard really believed that Adam himself was black also has to be addressed.

He himself never mentioned Adam's name. At first sight his claim that primitive men were black appears to suggest that Adam was black too - especially as Prichard never said in his publications anything to the contrary. But when his Researches came out in 1813, his readers did not necessarily read it like that.

During the first decades of the nineteenth century all anthropological knowledge was still very much informed by Biblical doctrines. The sixth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica referred, under the entry of "language", to the human state before the fall. The question was whether language was given to man by God, as theology had it, or whether it was a natural development, as Condillac and the sensationalists believed. The encyclopaedia was in favour of the former hypothesis: "The oldest book extant contains the only rational cosmogony known to the ancient nations; and that book represents the first human inhabitants of this earth, not only as reasoning and speaking animals, but also as in a state of high perfection and happiness, of which they were deprived for disobedience to their Creator".

Even the French Ideologues accepted that mankind was reduced to destitute rudeness after the Deluge. Manuel has described how the idea
had gained ground in the seventeenth century. Later the great Buffon himself had taken it up, pitying - as Frank Manuel wrote - "the shivering savages who had endured the early revolutions of the globe". Was not the state of the world after the Deluge comparable to the wild and death-ridden state into which Adam and Eve had sunk after their expulsion from paradise? This was the view which the Encyclopaedia Britannica promulgated.

And so did the Cambridge physician John Elliotson when he published a translation of Blumenbach's Institutions of Physiology. In the notes appended to the second edition of the translation (1817) Elliotson discussed the notion of natural perfection. In that context he mentioned Prichard's theory of original blackness approvingly, affirming that the supposition of original blackness was "rendered extremely probable by the analogy of animals, among which Mr. Hunter remarked that the changes of colour were always from the darker to the lighter tints". Then he added: "If we believe that he [man] was created in perfection, we must believe that after the fall his nature experienced the general change; that he became destitute and wretched, and destined to reach perfection by slow degrees". A similar notion was asserted by the Bristol printer, self-styled scholar and active member of the Bristol Literary and Philosophical Society, John Mathew Gutch. In 1827 he gave a paper at the Institution, pointing out that Adam's "faculties would be greatly weakened by the Fall" and that the destruction of the tower of Babel would throw mankind into a "state of barbarism".

As far as Prichard was concerned, this view fell readily in line with his general conceptions about the course of nature and natural laws. He believed that the these laws operated differently in the infancy of the world and the human race than they were known to do in his own time:

In the first ages of the world events were conducted by operative causes of a different kind from those which are now in action; and there is
nothing contrary to common sense, or to probability, in the supposition, that this sort of agency continued to operate from time to time, as long as it was required, that is, until the physical and moral constitution of things now existing was completed, and the design of providence attained.22

One may assume that Prichard took the fall as well as man's subsequent moral restitution for a part of this design. Thence it would be logical to conclude that the causes in operation after the fall of man were as strong as the event was decisive. Hence it would have been very plausible that Prichard held the fall to have been the most powerful "brutalizer" imaginable. What makes this suggestion even more plausible is the fact that he had applied a similar argument to the posterity of Noah after the Flood. In 1813 he described them as mere savages. In a footnote he explained:

Perhaps some persons may think it scarcely consistent with the skill displayed by Noah in building the ark, to represent his posterity as Savages. But this was altogether a supernatural event, and was doubtless brought about by uncommon means. And whatever improvement might have been acquired by men in the ten generations which had passed before the flood, it must speedily have been lost from the destitute condition of the earth immediately after that event.23

According to the logic underlying this deliberation, Adam would have been created white, and then through the fall would have lost his "civilized" features. In the subsequent centuries mankind advanced a little bit towards a more civilized state, which in turn was lost again after the Flood. Then the arduous process began in the course of which mankind diversified, leaving each single human tribe to develop and improve on its own, until one day the entire world population would be all white and civilized. In conclusion, if Prichard believed that the original complexion of mankind was black, it was most unlikely that this
referred to Adam and Eve as well. In the following we will turn to the question how this notion developed during the two later editions of the Researches.

Prichard did not indicate when the first humans lost their dark tint of skin colour. Reports of Herodotus and Pindar indicated that the Egyptians had been all black. But Prichard believed that the trait had been prevalent long before. Again, the great Blumenbach in Göttingen had showed the way to solve the question. In a memoir which was re-published in 1794 by the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Blumenbach had set out that three different physiognomical types were to be perceived in the Egyptian mummies and sepulchral paintings: the Berber type, the Ethiopian type, and the Indian type. This was grist to Prichard's mill. In 1813 he wrote, referring to Blumenbach, that "the general complexion was black, or at least a very dusky hue", but "a part of the population of Egypt resembled the modern Hindus". This notion fell in line with his theory that civilization whitened: "The Egyptians were a civilized people and we should expect to find examples of a fair complexion among the better orders at least".

What applied to Edom was true for Elam as well: Prichard believed that the ancient Hindus were just as black as the Egyptians. While the Egyptian evidence had rested on sepulchral remains, in the case of the ancient Indians the evidence was provided by sculptures found in ancient temples. "There can be no doubt", he wrote in 1813, "that the prototypes from which they were designed, were either Negroes properly so called, or that they were possessed of physical characteristics similar to those of the natives of Africa". The comparison of Indian and Egyptian mythologies as well as the fact that old Indian pagodas had a significant "pyramidal" shape induced Prichard to aver, firstly, "that the inhabitants of ancient Egypt and of India were separated portions of one kindred
stock, and that there probably was a time, when if they were not so united as to be properly called one nation their connexion was scarcely less absolute". Secondly, he declared to have found "full and sufficient evidence that both these races possessed originally the characters of the genuine Ethiopians or Negroes". The Indians were related to the Egyptians who in turn were "the same race of people" as the Ethiopians.

In 1813 Prichard summarized the result: "Such appear to have been the physical characters of the oldest nations of the East. They have been gradually softened down by the variation in the bodily structure which the human race is naturally disposed to assume, and which we have generally remarked to be promoted by the condition of our species in civilized life". The prevalence of white and brownish varieties among these originally black races indicated that nature took, as it were, an experimental run in creating all different forms from rude blackness to civilized whiteness.

That the Indians, Ethiopians, and Egyptians were nearly allied, was always one of Prichard's pet theories. But as far as the problem of skin colour was concerned he had difficulty in upholding the notion that it was just a function of varying degrees of civilization. Moreover, he later admitted that Blumenbach had been clearly wrong in asserting that the Indian type was to be found in the variations of Egyptian physiognomy. Criticisms of Blumenbach's analysis had been numerous. The sudden abundance of English specialists of the complexion of the ancient Egyptians was brought about by a great exhibition which the would-be archaeologist Giovanni Belzoni (1778-1823) put together in London in 1821.

What was known as the "Egyptian fever" had taken its rise with Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798-1799. As a by-product of the Anglo-French wars both powers settled permanently in Egypt. Pascha Muhammad Ali, born in 1769 (in the same year as Napoleon), had the
ambition to modernize the country after the European example. He invited the French government to help him in building up a modern system of governmental administration. During the 1810s he was also entertaining friendly relations with Britain. By 1822 Egypt was a very different place from what it had been before the French invasion. The Albanian, Muhammad Ali, had no particular reverence for the ancient Egyptian antiquities. If the Europeans brought him knowledge, he was happy to have them despatch tons of old stones to their countries. It was a time when dare-and-do men could thrive. One of them was the Italian athlete Giovanni Battista Belzoni. Through the agency of Henry Salt, the British consul in Cairo, he had been entrusted to collect as many ancient artefacts as he could grab and to escort the gigantic stonern head of a statue of Ramesses II from Abu Simbel to London. In 1820 he travelled to Britain to present his finds (although not the head). He brought along many sepulchral artefacts from his own excavations near Thebes (Luxor) and from the huge temple sites of Philae and Elephantine, dating back to the reign of the Ptolomies in the fourth century b.c.e., in southern Egypt. The bulk of his goods were 182 life-size copies of Egyptian monuments as well as 800 copies measuring one to three feet. He arranged to have his objects exhibited in the "Egyptian Hall" erected in 1812 at Picadilly whose Egyptian design incidentally fitted the occasion perfectly. The exhibition was inaugurated on May 1st 1821, staging the opening of a mummy in front of a select audience of medical men and the press. Belzoni's greatest achievement was a complete reproduction of a burial chamber, including all the wall paintings and statues. In wax and papier maché the outer burial chamber of Sethy I (father of Ramesses II, he died ca. 1300 b.c.e.) arose. It was open for a year and proved an enormous success.

Thus all London could form their own ideas about the physiognomy of the ancient Egyptians. It was pointed out that the colour of the figures depicted on the exhibits was simply dark brown. The
ethnologist William Frédéric Edwards who visited the exhibition later described the prevailing complexion as "très foncé". But the figures in the images had "ni la couleur, ni les cheveux crépus du nègre". Edwards concluded that they must be Ethiopian Negroes.41

The same was reiterated by a contributor to Fraser's Magazine. The anonymous author rejected Prichard's theory of the original blackness of man as "not ... substantiated" because "On the tomb of an ancient Egyptian king figures of dark-brown complexioned men are drawn, but they have not the hair which peculiarly characterises the Negro race of the present age".42 Obviously, the author presupposed a notion of the black type which was modelled according to his cliché image of the Negro. This distinguished him from Prichard who regarded the features of human varieties always separately from each other. Belzoni's own comments, published in a catalogue accompanying the exhibition, agreed: he referred the three different types of skin colour - reddish, dark, and whitish - to Egyptians, Ethiopians, Jews and Persians respectively.43

The reviewer of the Quarterly Review stressed that one bas-relief was "singularly interesting". It showed a triumphal procession "with three different sets of prisoners, who are evidently Jews, Ethiopians, and Persians ... each distinctly and characteristically marked in feature, colour and dress".

The librarian and paleographer Jean-Jacques Champollion-Figeac (1778-1867), brother of the famous Jean-François (1790-1832), later corrected the English interpretation: the bas-relief did not depict "les nations soumises au sceptre des Pharaons", but "on a voulu y représenter, d'après la légende même, les habitants de l'Égypte et ceux des contrées étrangères". The pictures showed "des diverses races d'hommes connues des Egyptiens, et nous apprenons en même temps les grandes divisions géographiques ou ethnographiques établies à cette époque reculée".44
By the 1820s Prichard himself was no longer all that convinced that Blumenbach had been right in stipulating the existence of three different Egyptian types (he never mentioned Champollion-Figeac). The Göttingen professor had based his theory not on investigations of mummified skulls but on his interpretation of Egyptian paintings. However, for all Prichard knew about Egyptian tombs by the 1820s, they did depict only two different types: "the tawny Ethiopians" and the "comparatively fair Egyptians" (see plate III), apparently he ignored the famous bas-relief of Belzoni's tomb. Also in another respect Prichard deviated from his previous theory: In 1813 he had believed that the most common complexion of the Egyptians had been black. In 1826 he corrected this, it was not black but "a chocolate, or a red copper colour".

If the Egyptians, whose history was almost as old as human history itself, were so relatively light in their complexion, was it possible for Prichard to uphold his allegation that the original colour of mankind was black? There was at least one instance favouring this theory. For "a very curious circumstance" had been discovered in the temples of Philae and Elephantine, interpreted by Lord Elgin's secretary William Richard Hamilton (1777-1859) in his Account of Antient and Modern Egypt (1809). Prichard summarized:

In the temple of Philae, the sculptures frequently depict two persons who equally represent the characters and symbols of Osiris, and two persons equally answering to those of Isis; but in both cases one is invariably much older than the other, and appears to be the superior divinity. Mr. Hamilton conjectures that such figures represent the communication of religious rites from Ethiopia to Egypt, and the inferiority of the Egyptian Osiris. In these delineations there is a very marked and positive distinction between the black figures and those of fairer complexion; the former are most frequently conferring the symbols of divinity and sovereignty on the latter.

Hamilton - whose book nowadays is deemed "authoritative but
extraordinarily dull"⁴⁹ - was not interested in ascertaining how the dark and the light varieties of man were related, he merely suggested vaguely that they might symbolize the "devolution of sovereignty from father to son, or the communication of religious mysteries from Ethiopia to Egypt".⁵⁰ For Prichard, by contrast, the statues had an ethnological meaning: "it is plain", he argued with respect to the paintings, "that the idea meant to be conveyed can be nothing else than this, that the red Egyptians were connected by kindred, and in fact were the descendants of a black race, probably the Ethiopian".⁵¹

In 1826 he still believed that light human varieties originated from black ones. Since Egyptian history reached as far back as that of the Hebrews and was, therefore, necessarily almost as old as human history, the described development was not just any example but a very strong hint that it indicated the course of human history. When, in the third edition, Prichard came back to the topic, he repeated his central notion.⁵²

His concept of the black type was very different from the "Negro" type of other naturalists. We have seen that the ancient Ethiopians were characterized as black people with lank hair - for the author of Fraser’s Magazine that was a sign that they were not part of the black type properly speaking. Prichard, by contrast, separated colour from structure of hair. Frizzy hair was a feature of the "Negro" type but not a necessary characteristic of what he called the "melanous" or black type. This evidence notwithstanding, in 1826 he did no longer trumpet the theory that mankind was originally black. He retained it though, albeit with a modification: he no longer believed that the stereotypical "Negro" type of mankind was necessarily the origin.⁵³

In 1836, like in 1813, he suggested that the "melanous" may be the "original" colour of mankind.⁵⁴ Still, even this toned-down version of his theory of original blackness was prone to invite criticism. Unfortunately, Scripture itself did not seem to support the idea: "in all
the intercourse [the Hebrews] had with Egypt, we never find in the sacred history, the least intimation that the Egyptians were Negroes". Prichard added that this was not the case even "on the remarkable occasion of the marriage of Solomon with Pharaoh's daughter. Were a modern historian to record the nuptials of an European monarch with the daughter of a Negro king, such a circumstance would surely find its place".55

Prichard did not say why he was so sure that the Hebrews themselves were not black. As to the contemporary descendants of the "Syro-Arabian" nations amongst whom he counted the Jews, he referred to many travel reports which depicted them as brown. They had, in other words, a complexion not too different from the figures on the Egyptian tombs. Prichard must have realized that he was not able to ascertain the original complexion of man. Even though the paintings at Elephantine and Philae seemed to indicate that the Egyptians stemmed from the Ethiopians, it was impossible to make the case of original blackness watertight. Prichard was in need of an example, evincing the development of one ancient people from blackness towards whiteness. In 1813 he had thought that this was established in the case of the Egyptians. From the 1820s he no longer could use that argument. Therefore, he never again made his point as forcibly as he had done in 1813.

But the difficulties he encountered in his attempt to show that mankind had been originally dark led him to change the emphasis of his strategy. Not that he had to face a great amount of criticism. John Elliotson and the Bristol printer John M. Gutch were all in favour of the idea of original blackness. The earliest instance when it was sneered at is to be found in William Frédéric Edwards who in 1829 considered the idea as "thèse singulière".56

Prichard's later endorsements of his theory were muted because he himself had become aware of the fact that it was only a conjecture. Neither the ancient inhabitants of India, nor the old Egyptians appeared
to have been altogether black, and even the Africans themselves were in their great majority not properly of the "Negro" type. It is all the more remarkable that he again and again came back to his hypothesis. Instead of focusing on the original colour of mankind he kept indicating how dark human varieties had developed into lighter ones. The analogy of nature suggested that the original colour was the "chestnut brown" which de Azara had indicated to be the prevalent colour among horses. Still, within Prichard's triadic matrix of colour - melanous (dark), xanthous (yellow), and leucos (light) - brown was still part of the "melanous" variety.

Prichard's views of human variability have been explained. His notions of the original state of mankind have been delineated as well. In the following it remains to be shown which criteria he chose to delimit human variations, and what his anthropological classification of mankind actually looked like.

B. Classification of Mankind. The Argument of "Geography" and the Argument of "Race"

In Prichard's time the inductive method was deemed the correct approach to all scientific questions. Professing adherence to induction signalled the readiness of the scientist to have himself guided not by preconceived principles but only by evidence and experiment. Prichard favoured proper inductive studies over "the lucubrations of Herder and other diffuse writers" which are not conceived in the same design or directed towards the same scope. Their object is to portray national characters as resulting from combined influences, physical, moral, and political. They abound in generalisations, often in the speculative flights of a discursive fancy, and afford little or no aid for the close induction from facts, which is the aim of the present work.

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Interestingly Prichard chose Herder as the scapegoat, and did not even mention Montesquieu or his Scottish followers. Of course, in the early nineteenth century Herder's theory of national character was heatedly discussed. His rejection of Herder's philosophy of "peoples" had less to do with method than with the different underlying interests of the two writers: we have seen that Prichard willy-nilly came to embrace the doctrine of environmentalism. If he still dismissed Herder it was because the "spirit" of a people did not mean as much to him as it meant to Herder and his disciples.61

The "anti-rationalistic"62 concept of "Volk" was an approach to anthropological matters Prichard did not share. The German was philosophizing about history, he was concerned with biology. The former spoke, albeit with reverence, of the Bible as an "old lore ... a national tale".63 The latter considered the Bible as a supernatural document. It was no wonder that Herder's theories appeared to the British doctor vague and speculative.

Prichard, that is, was not interested in theorizing on national characters; and the passion with which Herder had enlarged on the idea of the "people" left him unimpressed. Unlike the followers of Herder, he did not consider ethnological characteristics as an almost spiritual entity testifying to the special endowments of his own kin (be they the Welsh or the English). The German philosopher had pursued national or philosophical interests in discussing national character, while Prichard did it in the name of the unity of mankind and a natural classification of human tribes. In short, he thought that Herder was not a proper scientist.

The previous chapter gave a summary of Prichard's earliest socio-cultural concept of the different states of civilization which distinguished between wild roaming savages, hunters, shepherds, and agriculturists. These different groups were defined according to their economic subsistence, in other words, within the framework of Scottish conjectural
history. In the following Prichard's division will be explained more amply.

He always had a two-fold approach to the problem of human variations. Firstly, he followed an environmentalist philosophy which helped to explain some of the most distinct human characteristics. Yet being aware that many features did not have any obvious function, he took it for granted that they were the result of pure accident.

This was the basis for his second approach to anthropological classification: he presupposed a number of physical and mental characteristics within which individuality unfolded. From the 1830s his analysis of diversity focused on the form of the skull, the form of the pelvis, and the language spoken by the tribe. He considered each individual population in view of each of these three characteristics.

The result was not one anthropological typology, but three. They were incompatible with each other, this being exactly what Prichard intended to show: it was impossible to divide mankind into a certain number of different varieties because the main characteristics on which the description of each single variety was founded obliged the researcher to devise different classificatory systems. If all human varieties were "shading" into each other, as Prichard put it, then there was no point in asserting the existence of distinct human races.

The topics mentioned so far will be explained in this chapter. Beforehand, however, we must address the problem of "permanent varieties". For despite his dismissal of races, Prichard acknowledged that there were seven relatively permanent, distinguishable human varieties who "differ so strikingly from each other, that it would be improper to include any two of them in one section, and there is no other division of the human family that is by physical traits so strongly characterised". These varieties were:

(1.) the "Europeans", including all the nations between the Indian
subcontinent and the Atlantic, as well as those nations which Prichard
called Syro-Arabians which included the Semitic nations, Arabs,
Egyptians and some African nations.
(2.) Kalmuks, Mongols, and Chinese
(3.) "Native Americans" (excluding the Esquimaux)
(4.) Hottentots and Bushmen
(5.) Negroes - comprising all African tribes which were not classified
under (1.) or (4).
(6.) Papuas in Polynesia
(7.) Alfourous and Australians.

These seven varieties, Prichard argued, mirrored the historically
grown "division of the human family". Prichard had emulated the
Anglo-French naturalist William Frédéric Edwards (1776-1842) in
adopting the notion of "permanent varieties" in the human species and
in renouncing the "integuments" as useful criteria for biological
classification. In 1829 Edwards had become famous with his Des
caractères physiologiques des races humaines considérés dans leurs
rapports avec l'histoire. It was the first attempt to class European nations
into differing races, this term being understood as a biological category.
But while Edwards implicitly promoted a kind of polygenism, Prichard -
who was apparently unaware of Edwards's attitude - cleansed the concept
of permanent varieties of all polygenist connotations. In his
interpretation "permanent varieties" were based on characteristics that
were more stable than the integuments. Even though Prichard endorsed
the idea of permanent varieties he established so many genealogical links
between his seven human "divisions" that the notion of permanency
was greatly relativized and reconciled to the doctrine of monogenism.

We have seen how bitterly Prichard fought the idea of the
Caucasian origin of mankind. This was mirrored in his refusal to refer to
a "Caucasian" category of mankind. Instead he followed Sir William
Jones in calling all those peoples included under (1.) "Iranians". Iran was Jones's name for the eastern country of Elam, where Prichard located the Indo-Persians. "Iranian" by definition included also the Semitic and Hamite peoples. It designated the core of the old world. Those peoples situated further to the north-east Prichard referred to as "Turanian". This term was derived from the Göttingen-trained geographer Carl Ritter.

In 1817-1818 the Frankfurt teacher published two volumes on a discipline which he called "physical geography". It was conceived in direct analogy to anatomy. Ritter set out to delineate a system of geography in which national character was explained as a function of climatic surroundings. As Hanno Beck has explained, Ritter's Die Erdkunde im Verhältniß zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen, oder allgemeine vergleichende Geographie (geography and its relations to nature and to the history of man, or: a general system of comparative geography, 1822-1843) was highly acclaimed as the first comprehensive system accomplishing for mankind what the biogeographers had tried to do with respect to animals.

Like the transcendental anatomists, Ritter aspired to finding some "basic forms" in geography. He tried to show why and how particular geographical circumstances shaped human culture. Ritter's mixture of an environmentalist thrust of argument and an insistence on the human capacity to improve has been termed "possibilism". His firm religious convictions prevented him from assuming a determinist position. He has been called one of the last physico-theologians of early nineteenth-century Germany. All these elements endeared him to Prichard. In addition came Ritter's readiness to acknowledge the specifically fortunate geographical circumstances of the old Biblical areas: within his physico-geographical philosophy it was no mere accident that the circumstances in the ancient homeland of the Israelites were ideal for the development of spiritual excellence. Ritter asked what the Israelites had made out of
their geographical possibilities. He believed that other peoples might not have attained the degree of spiritual cultivation which the ancient Israelites had acquired. As for the cultivation of uncivilized African tribes, Ritter rejected colonization as a method. Instead, he advocated missionary activity and the transmission of cultural know-how. As Peter Kremer has said, Ritter "did not regard the Africans as an inferior race born to be slaves, but advocated the opinion that they had not yet reached the same level of civilization as Christian Europe simply because of unfavourable geographical conditions." This was a way of thinking which was altogether in line with Prichard's adult ideas about the interplay between providence, environment, and human agency.

Prichard did not refer to Ritter in the second edition of the Researches. In the third edition, however, he frequently quoted him. His delineations of several geographical regions followed closely Ritter's geographical system. This part of Prichard's anthropology was based on environmentalist theory. Like Ritter, he believed that the lack of civilization was to be explained through adverse geographical conditions. Africa in particular was deemed to be the most unfortunate of all continents. In 1837 Prichard wrote:

Among the circumstances which have contributed to retard the progress of civilization in Africa, one of the most important and influential is the compact and individed form of the African continent, and the natural barriers which render access to the great regions of the interior so remarkably difficult. It has been observed by Professor Ritter, that the civilization of countries is greatly influenced by their geographical forms, and by the relation which the interior spaces bear to the extent of coast. While all Asia is five times as large as Europe, and Africa more than three times as large, the littoral margins of these latter continents bear no similar proportion to their respective areas. Asia has seven thousand seven hundred geographical miles of coast; Europe, four thousand three hundred, and Africa only three thousand five hundred. ... Therefore the relative extension of coast is four times as great in Europe as in Africa. ... [Quoting Ritter Prichard
added:] "In Europe ... from the different relation of its spaces, the condition of the external parts had much greater influence on that of the interior. Hence the higher culture of Greece and Italy penetrated more easily into the interior, and gave to the whole continent one harmonious character of civilization, while Asia contains many separate regions which may be compared individually to Europe, and each of which could receive only its peculiar kind of culture from its own branches." Africa, deficient in these endowments of nature, and wanting both separating gulfs, and inland seas, could obtain no share in the expansion of that fruitful tree, which, having driven its roots deeply in the heart of Asia, spread its branches and blossoms over the western and southern tracts of the same continent.82

The compactness of the African continent prevented the expansion of cultural knowledge and civilization. Whatever the particular talents of the African nations were, their geographical surrounding was the primordial determinant of their cultural station.83 With respect to human physiognomy things stood somewhat differently: in part these were corollaries of the prevailing living conditions. In particular such linkages applied to the form of the cranium. Like Blumenbach, Prichard rejected Camper's "facial angle". But he did not adhere to Blumenbach's bird's eye-perspective either. Instead he followed the anatomist Richard Owen in considering "the view of the basis of the skull" as decisive.84 According to Owen, who upheld the natural theological approach to science, Prichard devised three different types of skulls each of which was, by and large, analogous to one of Blumenbach's three types. Unlike Blumenbach, however, Prichard maintained that the formation of the skull was indicative of a particular stage of civilization.

The hierarchy of cultural stages, which were defined according to the means of subsistence, was derived from Scottish Enlightenment philosophy. In the early nineteenth century it was certainly not extravagant to assume that refinement of manner brought about refined physiognomical features. This notion, present in Montesquieu and
Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, had diffused through learned Europe. But that this theory should be applied to the bony structure of the skull was pretty original at a time witnessing the ever growing success of phrenological doctrines. This is what Prichard did, attempting to show that civilization brought about the beautiful oval features of Blumenbach's "Caucasian" variety as well as of his own "Iranian" one.

First, there was the "symmetrical or oval form, which is that of the European and western Asiatic nations". The head is "rounder", the forehead "more expanded", the shape "oval".

Secondly, Prichard described the "narrow and elongated" shape most unmistakably displayed by "the Negro of the Gold Coast". This type, called prognathous, was the stereotypical picture of the black savage. It was evoked by all those who cherished the idea of a link between black people and apes. Yet, Prichard never intimated such a proximity. He insisted that it was not a universal feature, distinguishing black populations from other human varieties. There were many blacks, he said, whose features did not conform to the prognathous type with projecting cheek-bones and a "lengthened" upper jaw.

His third skull formation was that of the "broad and square-faced" Turanian type, comprising Mongols as well as Esquimaux. These skulls were slightly prognathous. Since their base was broader than the forehead, Prichard called them "pyramidal". For Prichard all three types indicated the relative preponderance of the sentient or the rational faculties. The prognathous as well as the pyramidal formation showed that the intellectual faculties were only moderately well unfolded.

Civilized peoples alone, who had fully developed their intellectual potential, had oval skulls. The next stage further down in Prichard's scale designated nomadic tribes: they displayed the pyramidal form. The "rudest tribes", Prichard wrote, represented the prognathous type. These were the totally uncultivated. In The Natural History of Man he wrote:
the greater relative development of the jaws and zygomatic bones, and of the bones of the face altogether, in comparison with the size of the brain, indicates, in the pyramidal and prognathous skulls, a more ample extension of the organs subservient to sensation and the animal faculties. Such a configuration is adapted, by its results, to the condition of human tribes in the nomadic state, and in that of savage hunters.88

Since Prichard had laid so much emphasis on the significance of skull formations he was, of course, obliged to bring his theories on this field in line with his universal assumptions about the natural history of man. It was assumed by many, most famously by Georges Cuvier, that the three human variations which were normally referred to as the Shemite, Hamite, and Japhetic tribes, displayed the three main different features of skulls as they had been laid down by Blumenbach. The reference system was simple. The Hamites had prognathous, uncouth features; the Japhetic and Shemite races shared into the two other shapes which were distributed according to the pro- or anti-Biblical leanings of the author, traditionally the Shemite peoples being deemed the most beautiful. But, by the middle of the nineteenth century, some proponents of Indo-European excellence referred Shemite features to the far East, identifying the Chinese with the posterity of Shem.89

As for Prichard, he would have none of this, as the admission of original differences among the sons of Noah amounted to acknowledging some sort of polygenist theory. Instead, he assumed that all ancient peoples, including the Ethiopians, Egyptians, Persians, and Hindoos, had had oval skulls. He argued that "they were neither nomads nor savages, nor do they display in their crania either of the forms principally belonging to races in those different states of existence. They had all heads of an oval or elliptico-spherical form, which we have observed to prevail chiefly among nations who have their faculties developed by civilisation".90 Prichard did not explain why these ancient peoples had
"civilized" skulls while their skin colour was not uniformly white (and, therefore, "civilized"). We have seen that, in the third edition of the Researches, he relieved skin colour of any particular anthropological significance. Still, the contradiction remains, bearing testimony to Prichard's unconventional and philanthropic attitude to black peoples.

It was quite original to maintain in the 1830s that the ancient Ethiopians had had the same skull formation as the ancient Persians and Indians. The matter was made even more complicated by Prichard's drawing of dividing lines between these peoples, while at the same time rejecting differences in their skull formations.91 We have seen above that he distinguished three hotbeds of culture, associated with the Shemites, the Indo-Europeans, and the Hamites.92 Prichard did not found a biological classification on this triad. But many of his readers misunderstood him or did not pay any heed to his words.

Shortly after his death his friend and medical colleague, John Addington Symonds, gave an address in his honour, which was not based on Prichard's later ethnological works but on the second edition of the Researches. In that edition Prichard had still followed Blumenbach's classification of skulls, which included "Caucasian" and "Mongolian" varieties. Symonds ignored the fact that Prichard had later entirely changed his mind. Given that in the 1830s and 1840s Prichard explicitly condemned the usage of the terms "Caucasian" and "Mongolian", Symonds's summary from 1850 did no good service to the deceased. In recent years Léon Poliakov committed the same error, believing that Prichard had outlined "la division tripartite classique entre race chamite ou 'égyptienne', race sémite ou 'syro-arabe', et race japhétique ou 'ariane'".93 In truth Prichard did his best to shun this interpretation as soon as he had realized the close conceptual links between the "Caucasian" hypothesis and Blumenbach's "Caucasian" crania. It is true that he adopted the term "Arian" in 1843.94 But following the Roman
historian Strabo, he understood by that denomination many more peoples than the later racialist definition allowed for, including Persians, Medes, Baktrians, and Sogdians\textsuperscript{95} (see plates XI-XIII and the explanations in section B*). Indeed, a reviewer pointed out that "the term Aria, used by Dr. Prichard", was "objectionable" on these very grounds.\textsuperscript{96} Prichard also strictly denied that mankind could be classified as Poliakov suggested: "We cannot regard these three divisions of the ancient civilised world as representing the three great departments of mankind, as these departments are discriminated by the forms of the skull".\textsuperscript{97} And the skulls, as we have seen, were the same in all tribes of the ancient terra cognita.

Prichard did not consider skull formations as sure indicators for anthropological classifications as Blumenbach had done. He held that the bony structure of the skull was one of the longest lasting indicators of genealogical descent. Yet, when it came to classifying, it was outbalanced by other physiognomical and cultural criteria, including the languages spoken by particular families of nations. On the one hand, the form of the skull provided important information; on the other hand Prichard refused to use it as a criterion of anthropological classification. He regretted how misleading Blumenbach's distinction between the "Caucasian", "Mongolian", and "Ethiopian" had proved to be: "The inconvenience which has arisen from the terms thus used", he remarked in 1838, "is the hypothesis to which it has given rise, that these three varieties of form are characteristic of three distinct human races of mankind". This was the error to which Cuvier had fallen prey. Prichard, by contrast, had a very different idea of the natural bonds and divisions between human tribes.\textsuperscript{98}

If there ever was a nineteenth-century author who was writing in the vein of eighteenth-century anthropological theory, it was Prichard. The degree of civilization and the geographical circumstances were his
ultimate reference points of anthropological explanation. He rejected Cuvier's classification of three main human varieties because it was based on the notion that mankind survived the Flood on three different mountain tops none of which was Mount Ararat as mentioned in the Bible. But that was not all: as Prichard saw it, Cuvier's classification was singularly confused. "Nothing", Prichard wrote, "can be more vague and conjectural than Baron Cuvier's notices of African ethnography. He not only considers the limitations of races as much more strongly and permanently defined than they really are, but makes the most singular mistakes in grouping and identifying tribes".

Cuvier had ignored the fact that not all Africans had "narrow and compressed skulls", thus excluding the Egyptians and even "a great number of the black and woolly-haired natives of Africa, who have expanded foreheads and well-formed features". Prichard admonished Cuvier for having advanced a definition of the Negro features which was in line with European ideas of the great ugliness of black Africans. In reality, the doctor believed, there were many African Negroes endowed with handsome traits. He was convinced of this idea, exemplifying it throughout the Researches.

Another instance where he impatiently railed against Cuvier concerned the latter's distinction between Mongols and Caucasians. Prichard considered it to be "absurd" that within this scheme the Esquimaux had to be classed as Mongols, while Cuvier's Caucasians included the Indo-Europeans and the Shemites, all of whom would have originated in the Caucasus chain. But the Caucasus, Prichard wrote, "has been the immemorial seat of tribes proved by their languages to be entirely distinct from the Indo-European as well as from the Semitic nations".

So far we have seen which criteria Prichard admitted for the classification of mankind, and into how many departments he divided
the human species. And it should have become clear that he was emphatically opposed to racial classifications. But since Poliakov, Hugh MacDougall, Stuart Gilman, Reginald Horsman and Stocking claimed that Prichard was - to use Stocking's phrase - retreating "in the face of racialism", it may be helpful to explain why Prichard was, indeed, adamant and unwavering in his rejection of racial classifications.101

Nineteenth-century racial theory102 combined several elements: the first was the notion that mankind was divisible into a certain number of "races" whose characteristics were fixed, at least in the sense that they defied the modifying influences of external circumstances (as distinct from changes produced by miscegenation). Secondly, it contained the idea that the intellectual and moral capacities were unevenly spread within the various human races. Thirdly, it advocated the notion that mental endowments were bound up with certain physiognomical specificities which, being defined as racial characteristics, were considered to reveal the inward nature of the individual or the population in question. This basic definition of modern racial theory was accompanied by the idea that "race" was the be-all and end-all of history.

Certain aspects of Prichard's anti-racialism have been explained already. Thus, his rejection of the word "race" as a meaningless term in anthropology has been pointed out as well as his claim that dark-skinned peoples were not naturally inferior in intelligence to the Europeans.103 The admired Blumenbach had defied the notion of polygenism on the grounds that there were no clear-cut boundaries between different human varieties. His delineation of different human varieties was on the borderline between ideal-typical abstraction and empirical description. In the third edition of his work on the varieties of mankind the Göttingen scholar had maintained that every single characteristic of the Ethiopian variety was to be found in other varieties as well.104 "We must never forget", Blumenbach declared
that there is not a single one of the bodily differences in any one
variety of man, which does not run into some of the others by such
endless shades of all sorts, that the naturalist or physiologist has yet to
be born, who can with any grounds of certainty attempt to lay down
any fixed bounds between these shades, and consequently between
their two extremes.  

This was exactly Prichard's attitude. With respect to the form of the
pelvis, the form of the skull, the colour of the skin, and all other human
characteristics he maintained that "specimens of each kind are to be
found in different races of men; whence is to be derived the important
conclusion, that no particular figure is a permanent characteristic of any
one race".  

Prichard was convinced that there were no abrupt leaps within the
gradation of human physiognomies, and that all peoples of the earth
were linked to each other through imperceptibly changing signs of
resemblance. The most "savage" and the most "civilized" looking
human tribes were connected to each other through the multifarious
peoples whose features combined traces of rudeness and refinement, of
northern and southern climatic influences, of good and abject living
conditions:

The different races of men are not distinguished from each other by
strongly marked, uniform, and permanent distinctions, as are the
several species belonging to any given tribe of animals. All the
diversities which exist are variable, and pass into each other by
insensible gradations; and there is, moreover, scarcely an instance in
which the actual transition cannot be proved to have taken place.  

Prichard went out of his way to show that the European features were not
particular to Europeans alone: "the oval or European shape [of the skull]
with European features display themselves in individuals, and often
become the characteristics of tribes". Already in the second edition of
the Researches he showed how many African nations had acquired partly
European features. Not every African, Prichard insisted, was a "Negro" in the proper sense of the term. Some had lank hair, others had a European skull or light skin colour. The Kaffirs had "a great resemblance to Europeans", while the Souhaili had "jet-black complexities and woolly hair, without the thick lips or protruding mouth of the Negro". "The form of the skull in the natives of Mosambique recedes considerably ... from the type which is considered as proper to the Negro tribes". The "tablier" of the "Hottentot Venus" was not an organ absent in other human tribes. The hair of blacks was not wool, whatever travellers asserted. And so it goes on.

According to the mentality of his time Prichard had an idea of perfect ugliness, which was personified by a certain sort of physiognomy of blacks (very dark skin, curled hair, and the so-called protruding jaw). But unlike all those authors, including Cuvier, who identified black peoples in toto with that type, Prichard differentiated, striving to show that in reality this type was more or less confined to equatorial regions. Given that Britain was engaged in warfare against some of the tribes whose culture Prichard and other philanthropical ethnologists were vindicating, the theoretical engagement on behalf of these peoples was running counter to contemporary phantasies of the ferocious savages who were attempting to slaughter righteous Britains. For example, the tribes at the South African Cape, which were known in Britain indiscriminately as Kaffirs, fought intermittently between 1817 and 1879 against British soldiers. Prichard, by contrast, making distinctions between individual tribes among "the Kafir [sic] nations", praised some of them as exceedingly civilized. This defence of British enemies was out of step with pro-colonial opinions of the British public.

While Prichard ascribed European features to African nations, he found features of the "Negro" type in European nations. In the third edition of the Researches he stated that there were many people who
were not blacks by descent and skin colour and yet remarkably resembled
the Negro physiognomy. Prichard wrote: "It may be observed, on the
other hand, that individuals among other races are frequently seen who
strongly resemble the more characteristic form of the African, and that
examples might easily be found in which all the peculiarities of the
Negro countenance are discernible in the persons of Europeans".114
Instead of establishing one hierarchical scale according to which all
peoples of the earth were measured and assigned their relative value,
Prichard was operating within a different sort of matrix, believing that all
different aspects of all human types had the tendency to occur within all
permanent varieties. We have seen that, in the first edition of the
Researches, Prichard repeated Blumenbach's assertion that the ancient
Egyptian nation comprised the Ethiopian, the Berber, and the Hindu type.
In the same vein he later argued that, for instance, the "American races,
instead of displaying an uniformity of colour in all climates, show nearly
as great a variety in this respect as the nations of the old continent"; the
same applied to their "figure and countenance".115 Nature had a certain
variety of choice in store, and by virtue of environmental stimuli or
accidental creation of mutations, these forms came into being throughout
all her realm.

Since the blacks were in Prichard's time widely regarded as either
the bottom of human creation, or as the most abused and most insulted
members of the human species, he concentrated his repudiation of racial
arguments on discussing the nature of black-skinned humans. The
matter was discussed under the page-heading "Intellect of the African
nations not inferior".116 In a previous chapter we have investigated the
topic of intelligence as an a priori psychological faculty. But Prichard also
discussed intelligence as an ethnological characteristic. After having
established that in terms of form and skeleton no genuine differences
between blacks and other people could be found, he addressed the topic of
intelligence: "many celebrated writers on natural history, and particularly on that of man, have regarded the natives of Africa as inferior to Europeans in intellect and in the organization contrived for the developement or exercise of the intellectual faculties".

Prichard enumerated Camper, the German anatomist Samuel Thomas Soemmering, Cuvier, William Lawrence, the Manchester doctor Charles White, Julien-Joseph Virey, and Jean-Baptiste-George-Marie Bory Saint Vincent as claiming that "Negroes make a decided approach towards the natural inferiority of the monkey tribe". Against this assertion he claimed, as Blumenbach had done fifty years earlier, that the existence of one clever person among a tribe of blacks who might otherwise live as thoughtless savages, was sufficient to prove that his kin were not naturally inferior to whites. And, Prichard added, if this was so, then "the Negro ought to occupy a different situation in society from that which has been declared to belong to him by the British government and we may add, by the unanimous acclaim of the British nation". (These lines were published in 1837, four years after slavery had been abolished by Act of Parliament).

At the same time he could not avoid admitting that black tribes were generally living under culturally inferior conditions. But that was due to climatic circumstances. An unfortunate climate and the ensuing backwardness of a nation prevented it from developing its intelligence. He believed that the state of civilization had a long-term effect on the shape of the skull which in turn determined the degree of intelligence in an individual. Still, this concept was the very opposite of phrenological theory or the position of polygenetic anatomists who claimed that the capacity for civilization was dependent on the shape of the head. As Prichard put it:

there is nothing more probable than the supposition, that the average degree of perfection in the developement of the brain as of other parts
of the system, differs in different nations with the diversities of climate and the elements of the external condition, and with the degrees of social culture. It is probable that the condition of men in civilized society produces some modification in the intellectual capabilities of the race. But without going into any of these conjectural discussions, it will be quite sufficient for my present argument, if it is allowed, that there are some Negroes whose mental faculties fully attain the standard of European intellect.\textsuperscript{120}

But Prichard did not leave it at that. Black populations, too, he insisted, had had their cultural acme. Prichard referred to ancient Egypt. And for those among his readers who discounted the theory that there had been blacks among the ancient Egyptians, he named the African Mandingos\textsuperscript{121} who were, in his view, more civilized than many European tribes had been in antiquity: "the civilization of many African nations is much superior to that of the aborigines\textsuperscript{122} of Europe during the ages which preceded the conquests of the Goths and Swedes in the north and the Romans in the southern parts".\textsuperscript{123}

These words defied contemporary racialists as well as the famous footnote of the scepticist David Hume who, in his Essay "Of National Characters", had made the very opposite remark, claiming that only white peoples could become civilized and that barbarian Tartars and Germans were still culturally high above all peoples of colour.\textsuperscript{124} While nowadays some scholars perceive, so to speak, a conceptual gap between Hume's enlightened scepticism and his racialist remark,\textsuperscript{125} for Prichard both were readily reconcilable: where there were the signs of infidelity there was injustice towards creation. Being diametrally opposed to Hume's ignominious footnote, Prichard's thought was yet neatly embedded in the intellectual background of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy. This was the methodical reason why Prichard's way of practising physical anthropology did actually not permit him to think in
terms of the biological racialism to which so many of his contemporaries were drawn: the environmentalist tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment could account for correlations between physicality, living habits, mental outlook, and environment. But it had no mould to accommodate biologically founded racial doctrines. Hume had praised the relatively better civilization of the Germans and Tartars, at the expense of dark-skinned peoples. Prichard was to turn the argument around, emphasizing the relative superiority of contemporary black tribes. Yet on the whole, his approach to anthropology was very much in tune with the eighteenth-century philosophy of man: "In the character of the Fins [sic]", he wrote, "we contemplate the earliest civilisation of Northern Europe. The investigation of their history is interesting, since it affords an opportunity of comparing the primitive inhabitants of this part of the world with the aborigines of remote countries in other continents".126

He enlarged the cultural predicaments of the traditional "four stages theory" to include the whole of cultural, physical, and mental characteristics: comparing "the ancient people of Europe ... with the natives of Sulimana, or Dahomeh, or Ashanti, or with some of the nations of Southern Africa, we shall be struck with the resemblance which in some points displays itself. In a few particulars we shall admit that the people of the North have the advantage, while in many they are decidedly below the Africans".127

The preceding passages show that Prichard was not a racialist. Of course, he had to account for the fact that it was Europe which colonized Africa, not the other way round. It was Europe which had developed ocean-going ships, weapons and the urge to conquer foreign nations not advanced enough to defend themselves. Many nineteenth-century anthropologists concluded from this that those nations were meant to serve.128 Prichard did not. He admitted that the backward condition of
black tribes was owed to unfavourable climatic conditions. But this was no reason for him to assume the intrinsic inferiority of blacks.

**B** The Iconography of Prichard's Ethnology

The second and third editions of Prichard's *Researches* as well as *The Natural History of Man* boast many accomplished pictures showing natives of foreign tribes. The third edition of the *Researches* contains 40 engravings on steel and 90 engravings on wood. The *British and Foreign Medical Review* praised the "admirable manner in which [The Natural History of Man] is illustrated", adding that its high price of half a crown per installment of 48 pages was justified (the price for the entire book was £1, 10s).129

The idea that illustrations were vital for ethnographical descriptions had already been emphasized by Blumenbach. In his *Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte* (1790 and 1811) five engravings illustrate the features of Blumenbach's five human varieties.130 The differences between these illustrations from the end of the eighteenth century and those of the 1820s are striking: in the *Beyträge* the five varieties were characterized not so much by their specific physiognomy, but by their surroundings. The Ethiopian variety, for example, was represented by a family in a kraal, the Americans in an imagined American landscape (plate IV). The Caucasian variety was placed into a lavishly furnished room: a couple, dressed in oriental garments reclines on cushions, waiting to be served with refreshments.

In the second edition of the *Researches*, by contrast, the varieties of man were removed from their cultural backgrounds, the figures are depicted mostly from head to waist only. Plate V shows a "Negro of Mozambique".131 Plate VI depicts a Kaffir, member of an African nation whom Prichard considered as comparatively civilized (note the lean face of the man).132
PLATE IV
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's Ethiopian and American varieties of mankind. From his Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte, 1. part, Göttingen (Dieterich), 1790. (By courtesy of the Wellcome Institute Library, London)
PLATE V
"Negro of Mozambique".
(By courtesy of the Wellcome Institute Library, London)
PLATE VI
Prichard struggled hard to find appropriate artists. The second edition of the *Researches* dedicated to Blumenbach contained a few coloured portraits and some pictures of skull formations. In the dedication Prichard thanked Blumenbach "by whose eminently successful labours, the physical history of mankind has been chiefly illustrated". Plate VII shows Blumenbach's three basic skull formations.

As a frontispiece of the book Prichard had chosen a picture of an Abyssinian monk, the famous Abbas Gregorius (plate VIII). Blumenbach had mentioned the picture from 1691 in his *Beyträge* "as a specimen of the Abyssinian physiognomy". In the volumes published in the aftermath of the Napoleonic expedition Prichard came across another portrait of an Abyssinian that appeared to him as "a better exemplification of the Ethiopian physiognomy". He had an engraver take a copy of the picture of a "Bishop of Abyssinia" (plate IX). Unlike Abbas Gregorius, the bishop did not display the stereotype Negro features. "In a general point of view" Prichard counted the Abessynians "among black races". But he believed that originally they had been "a colony from Arabia". This explains why he preferred the features of the "Bishop" to the flat-nosed, dark-skinned physiognomy of Abbas Gregorius. The work was signed by two engravers, the Englishman Alexander Day (1773-1841) and the Belgian painter Louis Haghe (1802-1885). Their workshop provided exactly what Prichard needed. A comparison between the "Bishop of Abyssinia" and the original "Evêque d'Abyssinie" shows that the English version had "Europeanized" the picture. The picture of the Kaffir from the second edition, signed by Haghe alone, shows a black man whose complexion was verging towards whiteness (the reproduction is in this respect defective: in the original the man is a lot paler).

It is difficult to tell whether both Day and Haghe contributed to Prichard's books. The picture of the "Negro of Mozambique" of the
PLATE VII
"Negro" - "Georgian" - "Tongusian"

The skull formations of Blumenbach's three principal human varieties, published in his De generis humani varietate nativa, 3. ed., Göttingen (J. C. Dieterich), 1795. The picture was reproduced in the 2. and 3. editions of the Prichard's Researches and in The Natural History of Man.
PLATE IX
second edition is signed only by Haghe. In the first three volumes of the third edition of the *Researches*, most pictures are signed by "Day & Haghe". After Day died in 1841 Haghe, too, no longer appeared with new etchings in Prichard's works. Instead there two other names occurred: J. Harris and J. Bull. In addition there were many pictures taken from other publications. Among these were George Catlin's portraits of American Indians, published first in his *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Condition of the North American Indians* (1841). Prichard also took a few pictures from Johann Baptist von Spix and Carl Friedrich Philip von Martius's account of Brazil. The *Natural History of Man* contained many engravings in black and white from William Charles Linnaeus Martin's *A General Introduction to the History of Mammiferous Animals, With a Particular View of the Physical History of Man* (1841). Thanks the etchings of the artist William Harvey in this work Prichard was able to demonstrate the mechanisms of the natural analogy.

Some portraits were even drawn from life models: when Ramohun Roy came to Bristol he was accompanied by "his secretary", Ram Ruttun, a fair skinned Brahmin. Prichard remarked that a Bristolian amateur had made of drawing of him. When a Mandingo (a member of a people living in the region of the Niger) was brought to London, and Prichard was unable to see him, he suggested to John Washington, the president of the Royal Geographical Society, that the artist whom Thomas Hodgkin employed might take the native's likeness.

Not all pictures in Prichard's ethnological works are significant. There were relatively few pictures in the *Researches*, but many in the popular *Natural History of Man*. Especially the coloured ones were there to please and to introduce the public to the topic. In most cases Prichard refrained from making any comments. Many pictures were included simply because others were not available. In adopting a picture from the
polygenists Spix and Martius Prichard did not endorse their theories. It was simply the only picture of a Brazilian native he could lay his hands on. Equally, The Natural History of Man abounded with portraits of American Indians not because Prichard believed that these pictures conveyed special messages, but because they were there. If, by contrast, portraits - like those of Ramohun Roy (3. ed., 1. vol.) of Abbas Gregorius (2. ed., 1.vol.) or of the "Bishop of Abyssinia" (3. ed., 2. vol.) were chosen as frontispieces it is obvious that they reflected Prichard's ideas. The portraits of Alexander Day also appear to reveal his wishes and intentions.

If he collected his pictures from other works, his own books, too, were used by other authors as sources of illustrations. Many of the pictures in the 3. edition of Cuvier's Le règne animal were taken from Prichard's The Natural History of Man (see plate X for examples of the Ethiopian variety).

The third edition of the Researches was accompanied by a slim folio volume containing ethnographical maps. Prichard had put great effort into them. "Only one imperfection" remained, he admitted, "it is impossible to represent in one map the positions of nations in periods of time very distant from each other". His map of Europe, "entirely of new construction", showed the "earliest positions of all the great European races" (see plate XI). The map of Asia was based on the map printed in the Sprachatlas appended to Asia polyglotta (1823-1829) of the German philologist Heinrich Julius von Klaproth (1783-1835). But Prichard had made alterations. He did not refer to "Arian" races. Instead the peoples of the area were divided into Turks, Armenians, Iranians, Afghan, Hindu and other races (plate XII). He used the term Arian only on the map of Polynesia which depicted the connections between Asiatic and American nations (plate XIII). Yet, here as well as on the map of Asia the Georgians and the Caucasians were represented as two altogether different tribes.
PLATE X
PLATE XI

"Ethnographical Map of Europe". From: Prichard, Six Ethnographical Maps With a Sheet of Letter-press. An Illustration of his Works, London (no publ. given), 1843. Note the distinction between "Celtic" Britons and "Belgic" Britons in Britain, as well as between continental "Belgae" and the "Celtic Family of Nations". Europe is partitioned, from West to East, into Celtic, German, and Slavonian nations.
PLATE XII

"Ethnographical Map of Asia".

From: Prichard, Six Ethnographical Maps.
Note the differentiated treatment of "Caucasian tribes" and the "Georgian race". Note also that Prichard did not use the term "Arian" - the area south of the Caspian Sea was the habitat of the "Iranians".
PLATE XIII
"Ethnographical Map of Polynesia". From: Prichard, Six Ethnographical Maps. This plate reproduces part of a map which Prichard titled "Polynesia". He subsumed the Asiatic plains under the term "region of the five great nomadic races" (Turks, Mongols, Ugrians, Tungusians, and Samoiedes). Here he used the term "Arian" to refer to the peoples inhabiting the region from the Black Sea to the Indian Subcontinent. The "Arian" nations comprised Armenians, Iranians, Afghans, Hindus, reaching as far as to the region of the Turks. Prichard remarked that the map had been "constructed from notices collected from sources too numerous for reference". His usage of the term "race" follows from the customs of other cartographers. In some cases the term "nation" was employed (e.g. "Caucasian nations"), often any such expression was avoided (e.g. "Chinese"). Significantly, the Caucasians and the Georgians were excluded from the "Arian race". To judge from the evidence of a map like this, Prichard cannot be considered as having paved the way for an Aryan theory of race.
distinct from both the Iranian and the Arian nations. His maps make it obvious that Prichard cannot be counted among the supporters of the Caucasian hypothesis. Nor must he be confused with the Euro-centric or Germano-phile supporters of an Arian theory of race.

C. White and Black: the Example of Rajah Ramohun Roy
Since Prichard did not travel he had only very limited first-hand experience of foreign tribes. Racial theoreticians such as William Frédéric Edwards and Robert Knox underlined that they missed no opportunity to search peoples' faces for their genuine racial features, Edwards travelling for the purpose through the south of France, Italy and Switzerland, and Knox looking "attentively at the population of Southern England". Prichard's obituarists later endowed him with the same sort of interested gaze, stressing that he even as a child was fascinated by the different human varieties at display in Bristol harbour. To compensate for his lack of personal observation Prichard relied on travel literature. But there was at least one instance which enabled him to verify salient aspects of his theory: in 1832-1833 the Indian Rajah Ramohun Roy travelled to England, spending several months in Bristol. His appearance was a great event and accompanied by much excitement.

In the history of anthropology there are several individuals who as objects of science gave rise to many anthropological and physiological speculations. The so-called Hottentot-Venus is one. Other examples are the "wild boys" who served as specimens for the alleged "original condition" of mankind. Amongst these lost individuals who were not able to express themselves Rajah Ramohun Roy forms a rare exception: the British acknowledged his high social status, he spoke English, he enjoyed a certain amount of respect. Yet he, too, was used, so to speak, as a specimen. This section will deal with the history of Ramohun Roy and its entanglement with Prichard's theory of the origin of skin colour.
We have seen in previous chapters that Prichard tended to see the development of white varieties as a result of domestication and civilization in animals and mankind respectively. We have also seen that he referred the rise of new variations, including that of white colour, to different sources and mechanisms. On the one hand, Prichard believed that the rise of new varieties was due to the sudden development of a new form which survived through subsequent generations, increasingly disseminating among a given population until it became, perhaps, a dominant feature. On the other hand, he thought that there was a reciprocal relationship between the environment and the adaptive faculties of mankind. The first was a process which took place in individuals only. The second affected whole tribes and was known as "acclimatization".

Although in the third edition of the Researches Prichard gave skin colour a place of secondary importance, classing it with the quick-changing "integuments", he was yet obsessed with pigmentation. All the naturalists of his time were consciously or unconsciously overdeterminating the topic of complexion. Prichard was no exception in this, even though we may allow that he really believed that the colour of the skin was no reliable source of information for the historical ethnologist.

Having laid out the idea that civilization (and Christianity) furthered a white complexion, Prichard must have been thoroughly stunned when Bristol was visited by a man who was civilized and Christian and yet all black: Rajah Ramohun Roy (ca. 1772-1833\textsuperscript{150}), an enigmatic figure in the first third of the nineteenth century. He was an Indian prince who grew up in Bengal, one of the British domains in India.\textsuperscript{151} The father sent the boy off to learn Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit in various autonomous provinces of the Indian subcontinent. His education as well as his acquaintance with the British way of life and
Christian religion drove the adolescent into opposition against Indian traditions. As a teenager he fell out with his father. Accommodating himself to the culture of the victorious colonizers, he embraced Christianity, declaring Hinduism "an idolatrous system". In a sketch of his life he later stated: "the consequence of my long and uninterrupted researches into religious truth has been, that I have found the doctrines of Christ more conducive to moral principle, and better adapted for the use of rational beings, than any other which have come to my knowledge; and have also found Hindoos in general more superstitious and miserable, ... than the rest of the known nations on the earth".\textsuperscript{152} By that time Ramohun had become reconciled with his father who resigned himself into having a son adhering to the Unitarian version of Christianity.

Ramohun Roy's ambition was to be at a par with European scholars. He learned Hebrew and Greek, studying the Old Testament with a Rabbi, and the New with Christian divines. Participating in the European "Sanskrit-mania", he translated parts of the Vedas into English.\textsuperscript{153} In the early 1820s he and a Biblical scholar at Serampore College engaged in theological disputes on the Trinity which became so heated that the Baptist Missionary Press, hitherto Ramohun Roy's connection to European academia, refused to print his second contribution. Indefatigable, Ramohun Roy bought types and started an independent printing press.

Meanwhile Britain had asserted her rule over almost the whole of India. The young Brahmin worked in the service of the collection of the revenues in Rungpoor, polishing his English. Finally he became an envoy of the petty King of Delhi, who had himself called an Emperor. In 1831 the king sent Ramohun Roy to Britain to contest "certain encroachments on his rights by the East India Company". He arrived at his destination in April 1831.\textsuperscript{154}
Ramohun Roy has been seen as exemplifying anti-Hindu sentiments among the Indians which were diagnosed at the time as signs of a cultural "decomposing" of Indian society. Others attribute to him "the first Indian initiative for education after a Western pattern". At his time, some of his British acquaintances regarded him as somewhat odd, too intent to please his European hosts, not authentic in his personality. Staunch Trinitarians took him probably more seriously than most, angrily dismissing his Unitarian arguments. When first news of the noble Indian convert reached England, he was depicted as a gentleman. Part and parcel of the description was the hint that the Rajah’s looks were agreeable to the European standard of taste. As it was summarized in the Monthly Review, "he is particularly handsome, not of a very dark complexion, of a fine person, and most courtly manners". When the Rajah finally arrived he gave a very different impression. Prichard described him thus: "the countenance of a very dark Brahman. Ram-Mohun-Roy was much darker than many Africans". Despite, or rather because, of his black skin, Prichard chose a picture of the Rajah as the frontispiece of that volume of the Researches dedicated to the European nations (it is also the frontispiece of this thesis).

In 1833 after a journey to France, the Rajah became feverish. His last weeks he spent in Bristol, where he was treated by Prichard’s brother-in-law John Bishop Estlin and by Prichard himself. Ramohun Roy stirred up great debate in Britain, religious, political, and anthropological. Particularly interesting is the opinion of the phrenologists: they regarded him as the personified proof of their theories. The Phrenological Journal stated triumphantly that Ramohun Roy had finally proved the theory of climate wrong: "in different climates identical characters can be found", it stated. The colour of the skin did not matter so much as the form of the head, the Journal declared. Quoting William Lawrence the anonymous author maintained that "white people ... have distinguished
themselves in all climates, every where preserving their superiority".\textsuperscript{162} And why was this so? The phrenologists knew the answer: "if the brain be large, healthy, and of good quality, the mind will display itself vigorously in every part of the world".\textsuperscript{163} Ramohun Roy had a strong mind, but it was defective in one respect: the phrenologists contended that, thanks to Indian rules of politeness and to his particular character, "the anxiety to please" indicated an exaggerated development of the faculty called "love of Approbation". "Had the brain of Rammohun Roy been of diminutive size", the reviewer wrote, "the circumstance would have done more to extinguish Phrenology than the whole amount of misrepresentation and abuse which it has been doomed to endure".\textsuperscript{164} But, luckily for the phrenologists, they could state the contrary: the brain of Ramohun Roy was well shaped and showed equally well what "the Rajah's chief failing" was.\textsuperscript{165}

Prichard, no less than the phrenologists, used the example of Ramohun Roy to bolster his theories. Before we can come to the particular role the Indian prince played in his system a few words on the problem of skin colour will be necessary.

Many eighteenth and nineteenth century authors were struck by the observation that the members of high castes in India tended to have lighter skins than those of the baser social strata. The general obsession with skin colour induced many authors to speculate on the reasons for this phenomenon. Discussing the Indian caste system, some authors, such as the German Hermann Ludwig Heeren, suggested that the Brahmans had originally been a northern tribe, invading the Indian subcontinent where they had subdued the resident population whose skin colour was browner than their own. Subsequent racial segregation would have led to the preservation of skin colour in the respective castes.\textsuperscript{166} A varying theory was put forward by Bishop Heber (1783-1826) of Calcutta who undertook long expeditions through his enormous see
during the 1820s. Focusing on the Indian Pariahs, Heber suggested that at least some of them might be remnants of the aboriginal Indian population.\(^167\)

Prichard discarded both versions.\(^168\) In his endeavour to expose the fault of racialist argumentation he was not inclined to regard the light Brahmins as a different race than the lower Indian castes. And he rejected the notion that extremely rude "castes" such as the Pariahs and the Bushmen in South Africa were aborigines. In *The Natural History of Man* he wrote:

> The fact of a tribe of people in a better condition, and looking upon themselves as of higher caste and dignity, having in its vicinity hordes of a lower state, a sort of ... 'mixed multitude', descended probably from refugees and outcasts, and more or less mingled with foreigners and vagabonds from various quarters, is a thing likely to have occurred in other parts of the world besides South Africa, and the supposition of its existence may tend to explain many phenomena in history or ethnology. In India, for example, it cannot be doubted that many a tribe of obscure origin living beyond the limits, or on the outskirts of civilised communities, owes its existence, in a great part at least, to the shelter which woods, and fastnesses, and mountainous tracts afford, from time to time, to persons whose character and habits of life are such as to unfit them for the observation of laws, and for submission to regal and priestly ordinances.\(^169\)

As Prichard saw it, not original racial difference but social exclusion accounted for growing discrepancies among parts of the population. Dark-skinned people were the wretched of the earth. Exposed to the skies, bereft of comfort and shelter, they were impeded from developing a civilized countenance. We should assume that Ramohun Roy's arrival in Bristol challenged this theory. And, indeed, in the third volume of the *Researches*, published in 1841, eight years after the Rajah's death, Prichard commenced his summary of Ramohun Roy's unwitting contribution to anthropology with strong doubts concerning his own
theories: "this whole system of conjecture falls to the ground, or must be so modified as to change entirely its bearing on the physical history of the race". This concession to evidence notwithstanding, Prichard chose to save his views by presenting the Rajah as a special case:

The Brahmans are generally of lighter colour than the low castes, but this is subject to exceptions. The agency of external causes on breeds of animals, and on races of men, is not uniform if we regard individuals. The influence of external conditions is more favourable to the development of one variety than another, and its operation is perceived on a large scale, but not in every individual instance.170

In a footnote he referred to Ramohun Roy. The frontispiece of the volume on the ethnology of Europe depicted the black Rajah in profile. The choice is highly significant, the black Indian prince being presented as typical representative of European and Asiatic peoples.171

In the end, Ramohun Roy did not overturn Prichard's theories. Besides, the fact that some Brahmins had dark skin colour was not all that new, Bishop Heber having mentioned it already in the account of his travels.172 The point was that the Rajah's presence made irrefutable what hitherto had been merely a matter of hear-say. Prichard could rely on the evidence of the Rajah's complexion to reject racialist explanations for physical differences between higher and lower Indian castes. On the other hand, Ramohun Roy's appearance plunged him into a certain amount of trouble. Since his student days his theory of heredity contained the notion that new varieties started with variations of the hereditary fabric in individual organisms. Yet, in some manner he always had aimed to show that variations occurring were in line with a developmental telos. Nature followed laws, preventing the production of chaos and preparing for adaptive processes. If skin colours changed according to geographical station and mode of life, this showed the hidden wisdom of nature's system. A wholly different matter, however, was the assumption that
there were no laws at all governing the development of mankind. Ramohun Roy’s example suggested that skin colour was a meaningless feature. The Rajah was erudite, polite, he was Christian. If he was black while so many other Brahmins were white, it was gratuitous to search for underlying rules. Apparently there were none. In previous chapters we have seen that Prichard put increasingly less weight on the analysis of skin colour. He maintained that this, like all other integuments, had no great ethnological meaning since it was changing too quickly to be called a stable feature. This theory was put forward first in 1836. It is quite likely that it was Ramohun Roy’s appearance that inspired Prichard to his highly original theory: no other anthropological observer would renounce the importance of skin colour. Prichard was all alone in the suspicion that in many individual cases there was neither system nor meaning to the development of a certain colour.

In the context where he mentioned Ramohun Roy he also contemplated whether the entire white variety of mankind might have sprung up accidentally. He reminded his readers of the description of Albino girls in India - they were deemed beautiful by the local people, their white skin might one day dominate the complexion of the region. As a travel writer had suggested: "It is easy to conceive that an accidental variety of this kind might propagate, and that the white race of mankind is sprung from such an accidental variety. The Indians are of this opinion, and there is a tradition or story amongst them in which this origin is assigned to us". Prichard quoted this story not only in the *Researches* but also in *The Natural History Of Man*.173

Ever since he had met Ramohun Roy his thoughts oscillated between two wildly different concepts: either there was a meaning to skin colour, and its tint resulted from the surrounding climate and way of life. Or skin colour was simply and only a question of *lusus naturae*. Yet, Prichard avoided a strict decision. He never stopped theorizing on skin
colour and never dropped his allusions to the notion that mankind might have been originally black. At the same time he played down the ethnological significance of colour. On the whole, his views were so complex and meandering that it was - and is - hard to follow him. Still, through his engagement in scholarly societies and the foundation of the Ethnological Society of London Prichard managed to influence the young science of ethnology decisively, as we will see in the subsequent section.

D. Ethnology as a Science
Ethnology in Britain undoubtedly rose out of the colonial endeavour. In Prichard's time the imperial effort was gaining in vigour, the supervision of colonial affairs having been transferred in 1794 from the Board of Trade and Plantations to the Secretary of State for War. This administrative change was an outcome of the war against France. Subdued peoples all over the world challenged the British domination. Prichard's ethnological career unfolded against the backgdrop of military campaigns against non-European tribes. From 1817 South Africans rose against the British. The India army was engaged in Burma (1824, 1853), Afghanistan (1838-1842), the Sind (1843), and the Punjab (1845-1846 and 1848-1849). Troops were sent in against the Maoris in 1846. China was attacked in 1839. As British colonization was engulfed by tensions, the philanthropical movement thrived and spoke on behalf of the suppressed. It was largely dominated by Christian dissenters, Evangelicals and Quakers in particular.

The abolitionists compelled the government to ban the slave trade in 1808. In the wake of the Reform Act slavery was banned in 1833. In 1835 a Parliamentary Select Committee was installed on behalf of the Aborigines, coming to the conclusion "that the effect of European intercourse has been, upon the whole, a calamity to the heathen and savage nations." There was a certain amount of public outrage.
Remedies were called for. According to Stocking "the impact of humanitarian sentiment on colonial policy was greatest in the 1830s". From the middle of the 1830s the influence of the Evangelical movement made itself felt in the Colonial Office.

In the wake of the agitation for abolition, two experimental colonies of free blacks had been set up in Africa: Sierra Leone (1787) and Liberia (1822), both being keenly observed by abolitionists and proponents of slavery alike. While the former tended to praise discipline and order in the black settlements, the latter regarded them as a proof for the blacks' inability for self-government. Liberia and Sierra Leone were set up as philanthropic ventures. Yet, as no European philanthropist was quite sure how "civilized" black communities would work, the settlements were, from the viewpoint of the early ethnologists, comparable to the attempts to educate the so-called "wild" children, which were being carried out around the same time.

Though the colonial enterprise paved the way for the pursuit of ethnology, each individual traveller and author had of course his own motives for engaging with ethnography. It would be misleading to reduce the rise of ethnology to the role of a mere corollary of political and economic aims. Scientific interest was oftentimes independent of national political exploits, as was illustrated by the French order, issued to the captains of the French fleet during the Anglo-French wars, to spare the ships of Captain Cook in order not to "hinder the advance of human knowledge". Sometimes in the wake of the army, sometimes on their own, scientific travellers, merchants, and missionaries published their observations and scientific explorations. By the middle of the nineteenth century it was widely perceived that the mass of material was overwhelming.

If British ethnological endeavours gradually turned into a science it was due to a large extent to Prichard. Stocking has pointed out that,
between the 1820s and the 1840s, ethnology in Britain was "primarily associated" with Prichard's name. The first and second editions of his *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind* mapped out the questions and paradigms within which British ethnology was moving at the period of its inception. As for the terms "ethnology" and "ethnography", Prichard had adopted them from German sources. Justin Stagl has shown that these words and their German translations were introduced to the German language by the Göttingen scholars Johann Christoph Gatterer (1727-1799) and August Ludwig Schloezer (1735-1809) in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Prichard employed the terms first in the third edition of the *Researches*.

The institutionalization of ethnology was a gradual process, starting off with the infiltration of other societies. As soon as the Bristol Institution was set up, Prichard began giving lectures on ethnology. In 1839 the Aborigines Protection Society was founded, Prichard's friend Thomas Hodgkin (1798-1866), being one of the driving forces behind the undertaking whose motto was "ab uno sanguine". Already in the 1820s Thomas Hodgkin was acquainted with William Frédéric Edwards, the doctor who was to publish the first attempt to relate the history of European nations to the concepts of biologically different races. Shortly after the foundation of the Society Hodgkin went to Paris to meet Edwards again. Allegedly inspired by the British Quaker, Edwards set up, in 1839, the Société Ethnologique de Paris. According to Stocking, the Paris Société had the same aims as the Aborigines Protection Society. Its minutes reveal, however, that the predominance of scientific interests over philanthropic engagement was prevalent from the beginning.

For the development of ethnology in Britain, the example of Edwards's Paris society was very important. Another place where ethnological matters came increasingly to the fore was the British Association for the Advancement of Science. As of its founding in 1831,
Prichard was a member. He delivered several papers at its annual meetings: beginning with one long paper in 1832 in Oxford on "the Application of Philological and Physical Researches to the History of the Human species". At the meetings in the following years he joined Section E of the British Association, that is, "Anatomy and Medicine". Yet, as of the late 1830s he devoted all his energy in the British Association to ethnology. In 1839, at the ninth meeting of the British Association in Birmingham, he convinced the assembly to set up a committee to draw up a manual of ethnological questions. These queries were destined to be sent out to missionaries, explorers, and governmental employees "who may travel or reside in parts of the globe inhabited by the threatened races".

To achieve this goal Prichard gave a lecture, "On the Extinction of Human Races" (it was subsequently published in the Edinburgh New and Philosophical Journal), in which he described in gruesome terms the imminent demise of many endangered human varieties. If Europeans condemned these peoples to death and extinction, Prichard argued, the least they could do was preserve a memory of their languages and cultures. The questionnaire he wanted to draw up should be designed to accumulate first-hand ethnographical information on indigenous tribes. Initially the British Association voted only £5 to cover the printing costs. But the idea caught on. Ten years later Prichard was invited to write another manual on "Ethnology". Forming part of A Manual of Scientific Enquiry, Prepared for the Use of Her Majesty's Navy and Adapted for Travellers, it urged captains and travellers to send ethnographical information to the British Association. However, as Stocking has pointed out, both ventures yielded hardly any results.

In the British Association ethnology was not initially recognized as a proper discipline. Morrell and Thackray have argued that this was due to its close links to the anti-imperialist position of Hodgkin's Aborigines.
Protection Society. The British Association was not disposed to give too much of a platform to the crusading philanthropists of the Society. The committee founded to draw up a questionnaire for travellers was, as Morrell and Thackray put it, "starved of funds". Moreover, the British Association refused to acknowledge ethnology as a proper science, recognising the discipline only in 1842 as a part of Section D - Zoology and Botany. In 1844 Richard King, who was largely responsible for the foundation of the Ethnological Society in 1843, advocated the institutionalization of a proper section called "Ethnology" at the British Association. But his request was spurned. (Not until 1846 was the discipline finally admitted as an independent subsection).

As Prichard complained: in some parts of the Continent and in the United States of America there were societies "exclusively devoted to this pursuit". The British Association, he went on, did not permit a similar thing on the assumption "that the natural history of man is a part of the natural history of living creatures". But this was wrong. It was, Prichard said,

easy to shew that the main purport of ethnological inquiries is one distinct from zoology; and the reference of both these subjects to one section of the British Association can only have arisen from inadvertence. ... Ethnology is the history of human races, or of the various tribes of men who constitute the population of the world. It comprehends all that can be learned as to their origin and relations to each other. It is distinct from natural history, inasmuch as the object of its investigations is not what is, but what has been. Natural history is an account of the phenomena which Nature at present displays. It relates to processes ever going on, and to effects repeated.... Ethnology refers to the past. It traces the history of human families from the most remote times that are within the reach of investigation, inquires into their mutual relations, and endeavours to arrive at conclusions, either probable or certain, as to the question of their affinity or diversity of origin.
This is Prichard’s definition of the aims of the science of ethnology. It is rather striking that he so much emphasized the character of ethnology as a science of the past. It was due to the fact that he held the main period of human formation to be over, since man as well as nature and languages had basically ceased to develop many centuries ago.

To round off his argument he admitted that the study of ethnology involved “many topics which are within the province of natural history”.193 However many others, such as philology, mythology, or archaeology had nothing to do with it. If geology was assigned its own position, Prichard argued, then ethnology had the same right, for "Geology, as every one knows, is not an account of what Nature produces in the present day, but of what it has long ago produced".194

The passionate philippic against the British Association from 1847 was all the more self-assured as Prichard delivered it in his capacity as representative of the Ethnological Society of London. Set up in 1843, the Society owed its existence mainly to endeavours of Richard King, a pupil of Thomas Hodgkin and member of the Aborigines Protection Society, who felt that the natural history of man was underrated in Hodgkin’s society. In summer 1842 King had a prospectus printed. In 1843 the new society was established. Prichard became a member and was a few years later made first Vice-president and in 1847 President of the Society. As George Stocking has pointed out, the Society was initially not very successful. Until 1848 it did not even publish its own journal. However, it served as basis and stronghold for Prichard and like-minded men.195

Thanks to members such as Prichard, his pupil Robert Gordon Latham, and Richard King, the philanthropic commitment was initially rather strong - less so, however, than that of the Aborigines Protection Society. The Ethnological Society was, after all, a scientific congregation. Its proclaimed goal was to inquire "into the distinguishing characteristics, physical and moral, of the varieties of Mankind which inhabit or have
inhabited the Earth; and to ascertain the causes of such characteristics". George Stocking has suggested that philantropical engagement receded behind the scientific ambition of its members. He singled out Prichard as a man for whom "the scientific impetus outweighed the humanitarian". In 1839 Prichard had written a letter to Hodgkin to apologize for his absence at the Anniversary Meeting of the Aborigines Protection Society. As Stocking put it, "he made only a quick bow" to humanitarian goals. His real aim, according to Stocking, would have been to urge for the collection of as much ethnological material as possible, as soon as possible, since so many so-called aboriginal tribes were threatened with extinction. However, this interpretation seems to exaggerate Prichard's cold-blooded scientific curiosity. In the very same letter which was subsequently published by the Aborigines Protection Society Prichard wrote:

> what a stigma will be placed on Christian and civilized nations, when it shall appear, that, by a selfish pursuit of their own advantage, they have destroyed and rooted out so many families and nations of their fellow creatures ... . For such a work, when it shall have been accomplished, the only excuse or extenuation will be, just what the first murderer made for the slaughter of his brother, and we might almost be tempted to suppose, that the narrative was designed to be typical of the time when christianized Europeans shall have left on the earth no living relic of the numerous races who now inhabit distant regions; but who will soon find their allotted doom if we proceed on the method of conduct thus far pursued, from the time of Pizarro and Cortez, to that of our English Colonists of South Africa.

It is true that Prichard pleaded to collect ethnological material. But there is no reason to discard his philanthropy as a meaningless affectation. Bearing in mind that he was a Christian with firm evangelical convictions, we may understand that it was certainly no light-hearted whimsy to put forward the parallel between stigmatized Cain and white Christian nations. As a matter of fact, the crimes committed by civilized
Christians against "defenceless" primitive tribes bothered Prichard enormously.

People like the transcendental anatomist Robert Knox and the nostalgic Arthur Comte de Gobineau regarded the ruthless face of imperialism as a necessary evil attendant upon a world dominated by what came to be known as the struggle for survival. Both authors are exemplary for a mixture of fatalism and racism which was no longer held in check by Christian morality. If peoples died out, in Knox and Gobineau's eyes, they deserved it as a natural punishment for their weakness. Prichard's outlook did not have much in common with this attitude. He, too, believed that some peoples were inferior to others. Unlike racial theoreticians, however, he did not refer this to the natural constitution of these peoples but to their defective state of civilization which left them defenceless against the colonizers.

The paper Prichard read in Birmingham in 1839 exuded the same spirit as his letter to Hodgkin. The immediate aim of his lecture "On the Extinction of Human Races" was, of course, the ethnological questionnaire. But as this chapter wants to argue, it was not mere rhetoric when Prichard evoked the growing number of tribes who were erased from the face of the earth because of brutality and carelessness of the civilized man.

In front of his Birmingham audience Prichard enumerated several peoples who had died out during the course of history, or who were to die out pretty soon unless the Europeans changed their behaviour towards them. In a great historiographical sweep he bracketed the long-gone Guanches of the Canary Islands as well as contemporary Charreias, the victims of Spanish conquerors, of whom he had seen "three surviving individuals" when visiting Paris. Moved and outraged, Prichard did not succumb to historicization and the stipulation of powerful historical powers that determined the rise and fall of peoples.
He did not explain the extinction of human tribes as a "normal" historical fact. It was, so to speak, not history but man, civilized man, that is, who eradicated other peoples. He declared:

a similar process of extermination has been pursued for ages in South Africa, formerly the abode of numerous pastoral nations of Hottentots, a peaceable and inoffensive race, who wandered about with numerous flocks, in a state of primitive simplicity, and whose descendants are now found in the miserable and destitute Bushmen, condemned to feed upon vermin and reptiles, and rendered savage and cruel by the wretchedness which their Christian conquerors have entailed upon them. Wherever Europeans have settled, their arrival has been the harbinger of extermination to the native tribes. Whenever the simple pastoral tribes come into relations with the more civilized agricultural nations, the allotted time of their destruction is at hand; and this seems to have been the case from the time when the first shepherd fell by the hand of the first tiller of the soil.201

His horror was even greater since it was Christian nations who committed these crimes. "It is only by christian nations", Prichard wrote in 1830, "that such a work of total extermination has ever been thoroughly accomplished".202 Talking about the Guanches he wrote: "the extermination of this race of people is one of the many fearful tragedies which modern history, the history of Christian nations, represents".203 - In the story of Cain and Abel it was the sacrifice of the shepherd which had been accepted favourably by God, not that of the agriculturalist.

Interestingly, there was no trace of this sentiment in the second edition of the Researches. By 1830 Prichard's writings mirrored that something had happened to his views of civilized men. It was as if he had lost his faith in them. The article in the The Friends' Monthly Magazine is the first instance of the ambiguous attitude towards civilization characteristic of Prichard's later years. Civilization brought refinement, but not necessarily virtue. Driven to its full consequence, the parallel between Christian nations and Cain suggested that the European
nations were not redeemed or redeemable in the eyes of God. "In the mean time", Prichard wrote, "if Christian nations think it not their duty to interpose and save the numerous tribes of their own species from utter extermination, it is of the greatest importance, in a philosophical point of view, to obtain much more extensive information than we now possess of their physical and moral characters". These are not the words of a morally short-sighted scientist, but those of a man who spent his life as an observer and antiquary. Prichard's psychological make-up did not predispose him, philosophically speaking, for a vita activa. His duty was that of the recorder, a chaplain of His creation. Still, in his paper "On the Extinction of Human Races" he urged the members of the British Association to take action on behalf of the threatened indigenous populations and "to do something more than merely to record the history of the perishing tribes of the human family".

Since the Ethnological Society did not publish any material until as late as 1848, it is very difficult systematically to assess Prichard's impact. The writings of the young member John Crawfur'd, for instance, show that the Society accommodated at least one person with a predilection for racial theorizing. But the preponderance in the first two volumes of the Journal of the Ethnological Society of articles written in the vein of Prichard's morals, suggests that he was very influential. Moreover, there is negative evidence: a comparison between the London Ethnological Society and the Société Ethnologique de Paris shows that the latter was, already in the 1840s, imbued by a discourse of race, reflecting William Frédéric Edwards's interest in racial inquiries.

John Burrow has stressed that the aims of the Ethnological Society were "for the most part purely classificatory and historical, or even merely descriptive". Not being interested in finding laws of progress and development, the society was, as Burrow put it, "diffusionist rather than evolutionist". In that respect Prichard's ethnology is said to be
genuinely different from the type of social evolutionism which, developing in the second half of the nineteenth century, attempted to uncover the laws according to which societies progressed.²⁰⁸

Burrow and Stocking delineated how the Ethnological Society was increasingly polarized. Under the guidance of the doctor James Hunt (1833-1869), some members broke off in 1863 to found the Anthropological Society of London.²⁰⁹ As Stocking put it, Hunt set up the new Society "driven largely by the need to create an active, vital organization as a forum for his own racialist views".²¹⁰ Both Burrow and Stocking have emphasized that the members of the Ethnological Society pursued their investigations "chiefly by philological evidence".²¹¹ This appears, however, as an exaggeration. Philology was a very important ingredient of Prichard's methodological reservoir. But he believed that anatomy and physiology, too, were crucial ethnological techniques.²¹² As this matter will be discussed in the context of Prichard's philology, it will not be set out any further here. Suffice to say, by way of a summary, that Prichard's monogenist ethnology was profoundly Christian, and that its great impact on British opinion was, at least in part, due to the fact that, in the 1830s and 1840s, natural theology was still the dominant attitude in the sciences. The great publication project of the Bridgewater Treatises witnesses to this effect as well as the influence of Evangelicalism and other Christian sects in bodies of public charity, represented by figures such as the evangelical Lord Shaftesbury, president of the Lunacy Commission founded in 1845,²¹³ or Lord Glenelg and James Stephen, "two heirs of the Clapham sect", who ran the Colonial Office as of the second half of the 1830s.²¹⁴

Significantly, one of those harbouring doubts concerning the role of Christian values in public life was Prichard himself. This is the dramatic momentum of his ethnological endeavour. Beyond a very close circle of like-minded combatants, Prichard did not trust his own
countrymen. The difficulties he encountered in institutionalizing ethnology as a science at the British Association may have confirmed his apprehensions. Still, unlike Hodgkin or his brother-in-law, the abolitionist agitator John Bishop Estlin, Prichard was no crusader. His way of doing the works which the Bible demanded was his minute registration of ethnological details. We must not see him as an old-style antiquarian. It was probably not so much the joy of amassing facts which kept him going, but rather a feeling of duty which characterized the set of evangelicals brought up in the conceptual tradition of guilt, atonement, and redemption.

In the moral antinomy of civilization - culture versus luxurious self-indulgence - the balance seemed increasingly to sink down on the side of national self-aggrandisement, utilitarian materialism, and the reckless exploitation of foreign territories. In principle, civilization should enable man to have an understanding of his moral obligations. The truth, however, was quite different. While Prichard felt that true Christianity was on the wane, he launched himself more deeply into collecting ethnographical details, having in mind that later generations might, perhaps, need to rely on his compilation, in a future age when a great number of the present aboriginal peoples would have perished, "when christianized Europeans shall have left on the earth no living relic of the numerous races who now inhabit distant regions."


3 The Meso-Goths were a Gothic tribe, living in Mésia, an area corresponding to the modern Bulgaria and Serbia, around the fourth and fifth century c.e; see: OED, vol. IX.

4 Ibid., vol. 2, 224.

5 For Ptolomy and Arrian see: Paul Kroh, Lexikon der antiken Autoren, Stuttgart (Kröner), 1972.


7 Ibid., 1. ed., 554.


9 Prichard's use of some or other of these terms was not consistent. I have chosen to use the term "Shemites" in the context of ethnology, and to employ the term "Semitic" when the subject of language formation is at issue.


11 Later Prichard stopped referring to the kingdoms of Elam and Edom, using the names "Iran" and Egypt instead.


16 [Henry Holland], "Natural History of Man", Quarterly Review, 86
(1849-1850), 1-40, 33-34; John Addington Symonds, Some Account of the Life, Writings, and Character of the Late James Cowles Prichard, ... being the Substance of a Memoir Read at the Meeting of the Bath and Bristol Branch of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, in March 1849, Bristol (Evans & Abbott), 1849, 17.


Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods, Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard Univ. Press), 1959, 149. The same was true for Vico and Boulanger who "unveiled a postdiluvian world that was a veritable apocalypse of violence" (ibid., 140-141).


John Mathew Gutch, Observations or Notes Upon the Writings of the Ancients Upon the Materials which they Used, and Upon the Introduction of the Art of Printing: Being Four Papers Read Before the Philosophical and Literary Society, Annexed to the Bristol Institution, at their Evening Meetings in 1827, Bristol (J. M. Gutch), 1827, 12.


Ibid., 2. ed., vol. vol. 1, 316.


Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 388.


Prichard, Researches, 1. ed, 392.

Ibid., 395.
30 Ibid., 397.
32 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 472. Prichard's usage of the term "gradually" does not contradict the idea that variations sprang up suddenly: he did not mean to maintain that white skin colour rose suddenly, but that any change of colour came about suddenly in the connate fabric of the parent.
33 Ibid., 385-387.
35 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 324.
37 [John Barrow], "Belzoni's Operations and Discoveries in Egypt", Quarterly Review, 24 (1820-1821), 139-169, p. 162.
39 Though, when Belzoni tried to sell his authentic artefacts to the British Museum for £ 8000, the directors declined: they had just acquired the Elgin marbles for £ 35000 and were not disposed to make further expenses, see: Fagan, The Rape of the Nile, 243.
40 Prichard was an exception: he preferred to rely on reports of the original sites, where "the colours are preserved in a very fresh state" (Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 320).
41 The fact that the tomb was erected in London is mentioned by William Frédéric Edwards who visited it. See: Edwards, Des caractères physiologiques des races humaines considérés dans leurs rapports avec l'histoire: Lettre à Amédée Thierry, Paris (Compère jeune), 1829, 19.
43 [Anon.], Description of the Egyptian Tomb, Discovered by G. Belzoni, London (John Murray), 1821, 12. On the whole, however, Belzoni was not concerned by the natural history of man, see: [anon.], "Belzoni's Discoveries in Egypt and Nubia", 230-262, p. 259, this is a review of Belzoni's travel accounts in a collection of tracts at the British Library, shelfmark 7704. e. 10 (2).
Jean-Jacques Champollion-Figeac, L'univers. Histoire et description de tous les peuples anciennes. Égypte ancienne, Paris (Firmin Didot), 1839, 30. How wrong the British observers were is revealed also in John Barrow's review that dated the bas-relief in the reign of Psamtik II (fl. 595-589 b. c. e.), see Barrow, "Belzoni's Operations and Discoveries in Egypt", 160-161.

Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 322.

Ibid., 321.

William Hamilton, Remarks on Several Parts of Turkey. Part I. Àgyptiaca, or some Account of the Antient and Modern State of Egypt as Obtained in the Years 1801, 1802. London (printed for T. Payne, Cadell and Davies), 1809.

The paragraph was largely copied from Hamilton's book, see: ibid., 51. Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 322.

Fagan, The Rape of the Nile, 127.

Hamilton, Àgyptiaca, 51.

Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 323.

However, he no longer referred to the London exhibition which by that time was long ago. Cf. his Researches, 3. ed., vol. 2, 227-232.

Prichard distinguished three different types of human skin colour: melanous (dark), xanthous (yellow), and finally the "leucos" (3. edition) or albino (2. ed.) variety.

See note 118 in ch. 6. See also his The Natural History of Man, 121-122. Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 320.

W. F. Edwards, Des caractères physiologiques des races humaines, 18.


Ibid., vol. 1, 341.

The inductive method was eulogized by William Whewell. See: Richard Yeo, "William Whewell, Natural Theology and the Philosophy of Science in Mid Nineteenth Century Britain", Annals of Science, 36 (1979), 493-512.


Prichard always employed the words "nation", "tribe", and "people" interchangeably. As a young man he had not hesitated to discuss the "political history" of various nations. But once he was convinced that ethnology was a discipline with its own laws and a particular combination of methods, he no longer referred to the political side of national life.


Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit, 3 vols, ed. by Julian Schmidt, Leipzig (Brockhaus), 1869 (1784-1791), vol. 2, 164.


According to vol. 1 of the OED the Alfuro (as they are spelled nowadays) are "a race or a group of races" [!] in Celebes and the surrounding islands, neither pertaining to the Malay nor to the Negrito populations in the area.
Prichard acknowledged that not all peoples of the earth fitted into this matrix. Though, that did not bother him much: by the 1830s he had come to conceive of the existence of many aboriginal tribes who remained outside his ethnological taxonomy (ibid., 275).


For the cultural implications of Edwards's theory see also ch. 8.

For the concept of "permanent varieties" see ch. 4, section B.

Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 261-262. Burrow has suggested that the term 'Turanian' was a philological category. However, as far as I can trace it, the term was first employed by the geographer Carl Ritter who in turn had derived it from Herodotus. Its provenance seems to be rather physical geography than philology. See: John Burrow, "The Uses of Philology in Victorian England", in: Robert Robson (ed.), Ideas and Institutions of Victorian England. Essays in Honour of George Kitson Clark, London (Bell), 1967, 180-204, note on p. 197. Carl Ritter, Die Vorhalle Europäischer Völkergeschichten vor Herodotus, um den Kaukasus und an den Gestaden des Pontus, eine Abhandlung zur Alterthumskunde, Berlin (G. Reimer), 1820, 8.


Beck, Carl Ritter, 93.
Ibid., 76. For Ritter's cultural anthropology see also: Beck, "Carl Ritter als Geograph"; K. E. Müller, "Carl Ritter und die kulturhistorische Völkerkunde", Padeuma, 11 (1965), 24-57.

Manfred Büttner, "Geographie, Theologie und Philosophie im Denken Carl Ritters", 83.


Presumably he had not heard of the Frankfurt scholar who came to great fame only from the 1830s when his multi-volume geography began to be published.

Prichard and Ritter inspired each other mutually, albeit Ritter was more important for Prichard than vice versa. For Ritter's reliance on Prichard's ethnology see: Kremer, "Carl Ritters Einstellung zu den Afrikanern", note 30 on p. 145.

Prichard shared this notion with Carl Ritter. We have said that the latter was no determinist, but in order to explain the cultural backwardness of African nations Ritter did not mind having recourse to geography.

Against all those anatomists asserting the contrary, Prichard cited Owen's examinations of the skulls belonging to humans and simiae, resulting in the conclusion that the "transition from mankind to the simiae is much more gradual" than these anatomists assumed; see his The Natural History of Man, 113 and 116-117; see also Prichard's Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 172, 280-289.

For a very good account of the growing European perception of Chinese "yellowness" see: W. Demel, "Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden", Historische Zeitschrift, 255 (1992), 625-666. I should like to thank Prof. Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum for the reference.

One example is Prichard's disciple Robert Gordon Latham. See the review of his Natural History of the Varieties of Man (1850): [anon.], "The Natural History of the Varieties of Man", Prospective Review, 6 (1850), 449-458, p. 453. This way of refusing the Semitic peoples common ancestry with other Europeans was one of the foundations of late nineteenth-century antisemitism.
Another criterion which he pursued with a certain degree of persistence was the shape of the pelvis. Prichard did not attempt to show in how far the form of the pelvis answered to the requirements of civilized life. M. I. Weber, Professor of Comparative Anatomy at Bonn University, had published on the form of the pelvis: Die Lehre von den Ur- und Racenformen der Schädel und Becken der Menschen (1830). Based on this book Prichard maintained "that every form of the pelvis which deviates from the ordinary type, in whatever race it may occur, finds its analogues in other races of mankind". According to Weber "the most frequently occurring form among Europeans is the oval shape of the pelvis; the most frequent in the American nations is the round; the square in people resembling the Mongolians; and the oblong in the races of Africa"; see: Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1 330-333. Having said this Prichard did not further elaborate on the question. Being one of the marks of difference between apes and humans, the shape of the pelvis was a common criterion of anatomists, but Prichard himself did not consider it as very meaningful - perhaps because it was rather difficult to establish any relation between the exigencies of the environment and the particular shape of that part of the human skeleton.

Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 2, 192; see note 8 above.


94 Prichard employed the term first in his The Natural History of Man, 162, 165, 184. He always spelt it in the German fashion: with an "i". Most probably he had derived the term from Carl Ritter. Bunsen, too, employed it. For the term "Arian" see: Joan Leopold, "British Applications of the Aryan Theory of Race to India, 1850-1870", English Historical Review, 89 (1974), 578-603 (note that Leopold did not name Prichard as one of the proponents of Aryan racialist theory); Hans Siegert, "Zur Geschichte der Begriffe 'Arier' and 'arisch'", Wörter und Sachen, n. s., 4 (1941-1942), 84-99.

95 Medes, Bactrians and Sogdians were the inhabitants of three provinces in ancient Persia. Prichard's notion of "Arian" peoples was obviously geographically grounded in the extensions of the ancient Seleucidan realm.


97 Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 138.


The biologically founded racial theory, developed in the nineteenth century, lasted well into the twentieth century, culminating in the racial ideology of the German National Socialists. In recent years there have been attempts to revivify pseudo-scientific notions of racial theory. Serious scholars have approached the question through a systematic genetic analysis. Their investigations have yielded the result that it is useless to talk of "human races" unless one is prepared to take the existence of many thousands of races into account: specific genetic configurations can be discerned in various populations, but they are by far more diverse than racial theoreticians would have it. See: L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, Alberto Piazza, The History and Geography of Human Genes, Princeton (Princeton Univ. Press), 1994. Popkin had "modern racism" begin in the fifteenth century. Arguments about periodization always end in splitting hairs. Nevertheless, I would prefer to make a distinction between the so-called "scientific" racialism of the nineteenth century and earlier forms of racism (see: Richard H. Popkin, "The Philosophical Bases of Modern Racism", in: Craig Walton, John P. Anton (eds), Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts. Essays Presented to H. W. Schneider, Athens, Ohio (Ohio Univ. Press), 1974, 126-165). For a historical analysis of the terms "race" and "racism" see: Robert Miles, Racism, London, New York (Routledge), 1989. For a history of racism and racial theory see: Jacques Barzun, Race: A Study in Superstition, revised ed., New York (Harper and Row), 1965; Michael D. Biddiss (ed.), Images of Race, Leicester (Leicester Univ. Press), 1979; Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race, London (Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1971; Paul B. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Press), 1986.


Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, in: Bendyse (ed.), The Anthropological Treatises of Blumenbach and Hunter, 277-340, p. 297-298, see also ibid., 300.

Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 331. The quote applies to the form of the pelvis. For the skull see a similar quote in: ibid., 285. For skin colour see ibid., 343.

Idem, The Natural History of Man, 473.

Ibid.


See the anonymous review of Prichard's anthropological works in: British Foreign and Medical Review, 24 (1847), 49-81, p. 71. See also Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 360.

114 Ibid., 234-235.
115 Ibid., vol. 1, 269.
117 Ibid., vol. 2, 346.
118 Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, 305-312.
120 Ibid. (emphasis in the original). Compare the 1. ed., p.54: "It appears thus that the sensitive powers are greater in the other races of men, than in the European, but that the intellect is proportionable less, is not so fully evident; though it is probable from the structure of the head, considered with reference to the analogy of other species".
121 The Mandingos are a large group of peoples living in the region of the Niger.
122 Prichard did not mean to say that these peoples had been "created" in Europe, but that they had invaded the continent long before the Indo-European migrations had taken place, cf. Researches, 3. ed., vol. 3, 284.
127 Ibid.
128 See ch. 10.
130 Blumenbach, Beyträäge zur Naturgeschichte, 1. part, Göttingen (J. C. Dieterich), 1790, iii-ix and 126.
131 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 2, 321
132 Ibid., 291.
133 See the dedication in Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1.
134 It was reproduced in the 2. and 3. edition of the Researches and in The Natural History of Man. It was originally published in: Blumenbach's De generis humani varietate nativa, 3. ed., Göttingen (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht), 1795.
In the first three volumes of the third edition of the Researches, most pictures are signed by Day and the Belgian painter Louis Haghe (1802-1885). Yet their contributions to the Researches ceased after Day had died in 1841. It is, therefore, most likely that he, and not Haghe, did the engravings. For Day see: Samuel Redgrave, A Dictionary of Artists of the English School, London (Longmans, Green and Co.), 1874.


I have not been able to trace these two engravers. There was a J. Harris who was a specialist of objects of natural history, but he died in 1831; see, e. g., Redgrave, A Dictionary of Artists of the English School. And as to J. Bull, there was no known artist in the nineteenth century of that name.


Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 170-171.


Prichard, Six Ethnographical Maps With a Sheet of Letterpress. An Illustration of his Works, London (no publ. given), 1843.


The name comes in various spellings. I have chosen to follow Ramohun Roy's biographer: B. N. Dasgupta, The Life and Times of Rajah Ramohun Roy, New Delhi (Ambika), 1980.

The account of his life relies on a contemporary article: [anon.], "On the Life, Character, Opinions, and Cerebral Development, of Rajah Rammohun Roy", Phrenological Journal, 8 (1832-34), 577-603. The article relied in part on: Lant Carpenter, A Review of the Labours, Opinions, and Character of Rajah Rammohun Roy; in a Discourse, on Occasion of his Death, Delivered in Lewein's Mead Chapel, Bristol ..., London (R. Hunter), 1833.

Ramohun Roy was versed enough in European scholarship to know about the theories which perceived the notion of a supreme being in the most ancient Indian literature. His translation was published as "the most celebrated and revered work of Brahminical theology, establishing the unity of the Supreme Being...", see: ibid., 583. (Prichard, incidentally, was one of those scholars who advocated the idea that the ancient Indians had a grasp of God as supreme governor and creator of the world).

According to his own account, see: "On the Life ... of Rajah Rammohun Roy", 588.

Raymond Schwab, La renaissance Orientale, Paris (Payot), 1950, 208; see also the introduction in: Laird (ed.), Bishop Heber in Northern India.

See the anonymous review of Ramohun Roy's Translation of an Abridgement of the Vedant in: Monthly Review, 2. series, 92 (1820), 173-177, p. 177.


His treatment involved even a scandal, as another doctor publicly claimed that Prichard was guilty of malpractice. The allegation remained without any consequence, excepting Prichard's letter in which he severed all ties between him and the other doctor. See: Richard Smith, Manuscript Memoirs, 684, Bristol Public Record Office, 35893 (36) k. i.

[Anon.], "On the Life ... of Rajah Rammohun Roy", 577.

Ibid. William Lawrence thought, indeed, rather little of all non-white peoples, see his Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man, 3. ed., London (printed for James Smith), 1823 (1819), 412-423; for the phrase quoted by the Phrenological Journal see ibid.
417.

163 [Anon.], "On the Life ... of Rajah Rammohun Roy", 578-579.
164 Ibid., 592.
165 Ibid., 593.

166 The philological implications of the question are discussed below, see ch. 8.


168 Herder, too, had rejected the opinion pointing out that the Brahmins most likely had not subdued the lower castes because, first of all, "they were not the bellicose tribe of the [Indian] nation". Moreover, their pride was "not founded on somesuch device". Their folklores did not even tell of war and subjugation of the lower castes; (see Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, note on p. 497-498; 3. ed., vol. 4, note on p. 147). As we have seen, Prichard did not take to Herder's writings. Herder's rejection of the national origins of the caste system were the only idea for which the doctor was ready to grant the German philosopher some credit.

169 Prichard, The Natural History of Man, 598.


171 The third volume of the Researches deals only with European nations, yet Prichard understood it as the first part of his treatment of European and Asiatic nations.


173 It was derived from a history of Ceylon of the physiologist and anatomist John Davy, brother of Humphry Davy and an army surgeon who published in 1821 An Account of the Interior of Ceylon. See: Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 3, 194. See also The Natural History of Man, 245.


175 James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 190.


183 See ch. 2.


186 Prichard, "Remarks on the Application of Philological and Physical
Researches to the History of the Human Species", in: Report of the First and Second Meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science; at York in 1831, and at Oxford in 1832, London (John Murray), 1833, 529-544.

187 See the introductory page in: J. E. Gray, Thomas Hodgkin, J. C. Prichard, Queries Respecting the Human Race, to be Addressed to Travellers and Others, Drawn up by a Committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Appointed in 1838, London (Richard and John E. Taylor), 1841.


189 Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, 79.


192 Prichard, "On the Relations of Ethnology to Other Branches of Knowledge", Anniversary Address delivered at the Anniversary Meeting, 22. 6. 1847, of the Ethnological Society, Journal of the Ethnological Society of London, 1 (1848), 301-329, p. 302. Given that Prichard's arch-enemies, the phrenologists, too, considered the human understanding only as "a subject of natural history", it is plausible why Prichard was so intent on changing the status of ethnology within the BAAS.

193 Prichard, "On the Relations of Ethnology to Other Branches of Knowledge", 302.

194 Ibid., 303.

195 Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, 245. See also Morrell and Thackray who contended that the Ethnological Society was set up "as a result of a split in the Aborigines Protection Society between crusading
evangelicals and disinterested recorders"; Morrell, Thackray, *Early Years of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 285.


200 Prichard [sic], "On the Extinction of Human Races", *Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal*, 28 (1839-1840), 166-170, p. 169. For the visit to Paris see note 1 in ch. 1.

201 Ibid.


204 Ibid., 169-170.

205 Prichard, "On the Extinction of Human Races", 170 (my emphasis).


207 Burrow, *Evolution and Society*, 122. The point was also made by Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", lix.

208 Burrow, *Evolution and Society*, 123.

209 Ibid., 118-127; Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, 245-248.


211 Burrow, ibid; Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", ciii.

212 See ch. 10.


PART III

PRICHARD AS CLASSICAL SCHOLAR
A. Philology After 1800

In the wake of scientific differentiation during the early nineteenth century, philology also too was to change its character. Apart from economics and physiology, it was one of the three fields which Michel Foucault has designated as the locus of epistemic change. In linguistics, the increasing emphasis of grammatical comparison necessarily went hand in hand with a departure from old etymological endeavours. Foucault wrote: "it was being discovered that in two different languages there was a constant relation between a determinate series of formal modifications and an equally determinate series of grammatical functions, syntactical values, or modifications of meaning". That is, in the new episteme, the emphasis lay on the continuity of structure, while words and their meanings were open to change:

what makes it possible to define a language is not the way in which it represents representations, but a certain internal architecture, a certain manner of modifying the words themselves in accordance with the grammatical position they take up in relation to one another; in other words, its inflectional system.

The necessary development of human tribes according to the "four stages theory" was no longer believed; universal grammar gave way to a
preoccupation with the history and development of particular languages. Equally, the question of the origin of languages retreated behind the concern with languages as they existed. Foucault's influential publication has meanwhile been subjected to criticism. Even though the facts of linguistic history may not bear out thinking in terms of "episteme", Foucault's approach furnishes a good summary of tendencies in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century language studies.

Philological investigations went together with various affiliated researches. One of these was Biblical criticism which arose from the desire to know whether Scriptural tenets were historically reliable. On another level of analysis the Bible was scrutinized as one of the most important sources of primitive poetry. Johann David Michaelis, Friedrich Heinrich Wilhelm Gesenius, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, Robert Lowth, and Hugh Blair all added to the historicization of the Scriptures, defending the Hebraic traditions, polity and poetry, against the accusations of those who in the "querelle des anciens et des modernes" had taken the side of the enlightened moderns, as well as against those who thought that ancient Greece embodied everything worthy of admiration.

It was the particular Romantic side of German philology to draw parallels between the cultural stages of a people and its language. That was by no means new, Leibniz having already dealt with the question. The difference was that - following Herder - each language was seen in its historical specificity and that varying degrees of perfection were not regarded as indicators for some unchangeable national characteristics. The eighteenth century had considered cultural supremacy as a necessary accompaniment of political power: it came and waned in the course of the rise and fall of great powers. In restoration Germany, the notion of cultural achievement was - much more than Montesquieu's system had allowed for - an entity which depended on a nation's spirit.

In various respects, early nineteenth-century Britain was
attentively looking towards Germany. As E. S. Shaffer has put it: "The literary relations between England and Germany are illuminated by just the nexus of Biblical criticism, the new historical outlook, and the interest in folk literatures". The awakening of a Romantic fascination for classical antiquity which became institutionalized in the "Altertumswissenschaften" also spurred philological interests. In the hands of many Romantics philology was an extremely useful tool in reconstructing the history of the human mind: language was the most immediate expression of a people's mental character, the Romantics perceived a dialectical relationship between a language and those who spoke it.

The eighteenth-century quarrels between Celticians and Gothicists, Hebraists and Modernists were continued in the nineteenth century: classicists argued against Sankrit scholars, British Celticians against British Gothicists as well as French Gallophiles, German Gothicists against German classicists. The "Irish", the "Celtic", the "Scythian", the "Caucasian" and the "Indo-European" hypotheses were competing answers to the question which people had been the earliest to populate Europe. Indeed, the term "Indo-European" was contested by the German version "Indo-Germanic". As we have seen, debates about these issues easily branched out into the natural history of man where the issue of polygenism versus monogenism was being discussed.

In order to locate Prichard in the context of these interlacing and overlapping issues it will be useful to give a short introduction into the state of philology in Britain and Germany after the turn of the century; then, Prichard's general views about philological affinities will have to be discussed, followed by the attempt to explore his interpretations of the Hebrew and the Celtic languages in particular. Finally, the immediate social and political context of his philological endeavour will be mapped out.
The modernized form of philology had been introduced by Sir William Jones (1746-1794) during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. After having gained a proficiency in classical languages, Jones studied law. At his own request, in 1783, he was installed at the High Court of Calcutta. His political views which grew out of Enlightenment liberalism went hand in hand with a great interest in Indian culture. He was regarded as being unbiased and devoid of all contempt for the Indian population. His discovery of the relationships between Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, and their offspring introduced the new method of historical-comparative grammar.

In Britain, philology was, well into the nineteenth century, a science pursued by gentleman scholars and the clergy. The members of the Calcutta-based Asiatick Society (later known as the Asiatic Society of Bengal) which had been founded in 1784 by Sir William Jones, employed themselves to expand his findings. One of the exotic trophies they brought home from their stay in India was an interest in the culture and language of the country. On the Continent, Paris became a centre of Sanskrit studies; many of the ancient oriental manuscripts were hoarded there, attracting not only French savants but scholars from all over Europe (and increasingly the United States). In 1821 the Societe Asiatique de Paris convened for the first time, two years later Le journal Asiatique was set up.

In Germany, philology was initially to a large extent a gentleman's science. Neither the brothers von Humboldt nor the brothers von Schlegel were very well off, but they were widely travelled and felt as much at home in Paris as in their native towns. Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) and his brother August Wilhelm (1767-1845) spent their lives as literary critics, scholars, and poetical writers. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) was Prussia's reform minister of education, later on he served as ambassador in Vienna. His brother Alexander (1769-1859) spent a few
years travelling, before settling in Paris. Once his private funds were exhausted, he consented to return to Berlin to become a member of Friedrich Wilhelm III's privy council as well as tutor to the crown prince.

The generation of these men was followed by a breed of philologists of a more humble background, Jacob Grimm (1785-1863) and Franz Bopp (1791-1867) were university professors whose interest in philology stemmed from books rather than from a fascination instilled in the course of travelling and the acquaintance of other eminent scholars. In the early nineteenth century German universities had an excellent reputation. The example of Göttingen was being followed by other universities. After Wilhelm von Humboldt's Prussian university reform, the alma mater of Berlin became particularly important. Thanks to the influence of Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Franz Bopp and Jacob Grimm joined the philological faculty - Berlin turned into a centre of linguistic scholarship.

After Sir William Jones had got the ball rolling, the main philological impulses came, indeed, from German scholars, namely the brothers Schlegel, Franz Bopp, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Jacob Grimm. The only non-German philologist who has been accepted in the linguistic hall of fame is the Dane Rasmus Kristian Rask who published, in 1814, a book on the origin of the old northern languages. All of them were part of what is referred to as the Romantic movement, their understanding of language implied an organicist philosophy: languages were considered as "living" bodies whose laws of generation and decay were to be uncovered. They were intimately connected with the history of man. By virtue of this connection, philology was a historical science and thus on one level with other historical sciences such as geology and Cuvier's comparative anatomy. On the other hand, and in so far as philology was an analytical science, it was comparable to chemistry: where the one was engaged to explain the composition and
decomposition of elements, the other tried to show how - through processes of "agglutination", "fusion", "synthesis", and "crystallization" - languages changed their characters. Philologists referred to chemistry, geology, and anatomy in order to clarify their theories. Indeed, during its early formation, philology was, in the expression of E. F. Konrad Koerner, "a pirate-science" which by means of terminologically aligning itself with other sciences strove to gain from their reputation.

The history of British philology in the early nineteenth century has been dealt with most extensively by Hans Aarsleff who, in 1967, published his *The Study of Language in England, 1780-1860* which must still be regarded as the standard publication on the subject. Aarsleff advanced the thesis that English philology was lagging behind continental developments; in a rather Whiggish locution he lamented the "deplorable state of philology in England". According to Aarsleff, it was only in the 1830s that the stimuli of the German philological school were being taken up by Mitchell Kemble who had studied with Jacob Grimm in Göttingen. Aarsleff acknowledged the merits of Sir William Jones for comparative philology. Yet, in his view, the generation after Jones failed to follow their illustrious preceptor. Instead, early nineteenth-century British philologists would have taken up the linguistic philosophy of Horne Tooke, hence they would have stuck to the old method of investigating and comparing the etymology of words as well as the functions and possible antiquity of grammatical particles.

According to Aarsleff, British allegiance to this method would have impeded English philology from modernizing itself. He demonstrated convincingly that Tookian philology was genuinely utilitarian: based on the philosophy of sensationalism, Tooke wanted to show that philosophical entities such as the notions of right and wrong, were a question of language and not of ethics - a position which, of course, was taken to be undermining metaphysics.
Given that Tooke’s philology was in this sense politically biased, it appears all the the more surprising that there should have been no opposition to his approach. What about all those philologists who would not serve under the flag of utilitarianism? Aarsleff seemed to think that there were none. Focusing on those philologists who were among the first members of the Philological Society of London (founded in 1842), Aarsleff has ignored the others who did not happen to be members of the Society. Moreover, he largely disregarded British Sanskrit studies. Thus he mentioned Jones’s follower, Henry Thomas Colebrooke, only cursorily. He also neglected Jones’s other influential disciples: Charles Wilkins, secretary of the Asiatick society and the first to produce a translation directly from the Sanskrit; H. H. Wilson, the first possessor of the Boden chair of Sanskrit studies in Oxford and the author of a Dictionary, Sanskrit and English (1819); and John Jamieson, author of the Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language (1808).31 John Gibson Lockhart, a German student, admirer of Schlegel, acquaintance of Goethe and editor of the Quarterly Review, does not figure at all in Aarsleff’s account, nor does the Scottish Indian officer, Vans Kennedy, who was a member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and had read the works of comparative linguists such as Adelung, Schlegel and Abel Rémusat.32 An eminent non-utilitarian author is mentioned only once and also merely in passing: Prichard.33 He, for one, was extremely eager to keep up with German linguistic scholarship.

In 1981, Arno Beyer filled the gaps Aarsleff had left open. He systematically inquired into the British reception of the historical-comparative method developed by the Germans, he included Sanskrit scholars as well as classical scholars and old-style grammarians. Unlike Aarsleff, Beyer did not philosophically contextualize his results. Perhaps this is the reason why he came up with a rather surprising find. While he reaffirmed Aarsleff’s opinion that German philology gained ground in
Britain only from the 1830s, he highlighted Prichard's exceptional role. According to Beyer there were only three British scholars in the first half of the nineteenth century who did not confuse philology with other fields of interest, but regarded it as an "independent" subject: Nicholas Wiseman, Cardinal and Archbishop of Westminster, the Revd William Balfour Winning, and Prichard. Beyer's selection is odd. As will be shown in this chapter, Prichard's philology was thoroughly subservient to other interests of his, namely those of ethnology and theology. If Beyer could misconceive his writings so grossly as to present him as a prototype of the modern British philologist, this is probably due to the screening out of the historical context and to the almost systematic neglect of those passages in Prichard's publications which revealed the author's philosophical convictions.

This example illustrates to what little extent even recent historical linguistics has been interested in contextualising the canon of the great philologists. Many facets of the sub-texts of philological writings are still left to be uncovered. In general, neither linguists nor historians have found it worthwhile to write the history of Indo-European philology from the perspective of the history of political ideas. It is no accident that the rather recent Romanticism and the Sciences does not tackle the issue of philology. Conversely, the protagonists of linguistic studies have hardly been regarded as part of intellectual history on the whole. More often than not, works on Franz Bopp - who is together with Rask deemed to have introduced the pursuit of philology "for its own sake" - emphasize his objective, scientific approach to philology: many accounts of Franz Bopp depict him simply as the representative of modern philology and do not attempt to see him in the historical context.
B. Prichard's Reaction to Germanic Philology and his Views About the Classification of Languages

For Prichard, much as for his contemporaries, the capacity for speech was one of the seminal distinctions between man and animals.\(^4\) It has been pointed out variously that Prichard employed philology as a tool for proving the unity of the human race.\(^5\) But in order fully to grasp his philology we must juxtapose it to the teachings of other scholars, in particular to those whom he himself admired. Prichard adopted the methods suggested by Bopp, Grimm, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. But this did not necessarily mean that he followed all their philosophical assumptions. Only by putting him in perspective vis-à-vis his peers, can his philology be understood. No historian has so far undertaken a detailed investigation of Prichard's philology. Yet, the enterprise is well worthwhile.

Already in his doctoral dissertation from 1809 Prichard considered the merits of philology for the business of tracing human genealogies.\(^6\) The method prevalent before the publications of Rask, Bopp, and Grimm was to compare varying sets of vocabularies. It was a mixture between old etymology and the new method of comparative analysis. Based mainly on the publications of Sir William Jones, Prichard inferred that the languages of all human tribes dispersed over the globe must originate in one common arch-language - from this he concluded that all human varieties sprang from one and the same ancestral tribe.

In the first edition of the *Researches* he enlarged the philological argument he had already set out in his doctoral dissertation.\(^7\) He depicted how in terms of language affinities the peoples of antiquity were related to each other. In addition to Jones he had recourse to the Scottish surgeon and orientalist, John Leyden, the orientalist and employee of the East India Company, William Marsden, and the French Orientalist
Abraham Hyacinthe Anquêtil du Perron (who translated parts of the Zendavesta). Jones, du Perron and Leyden had proved that "the ancient Persians and Indians were branches of one kindred stock" and that the Sanskrit was in turn related to the European languages.

Having asserted that the "Persians and Indians were in their origin branches of one nation," Prichard went on to point out that "in the days of the patriarch Abraham two great monarchies existed in the world, the empire of Elam and the kingdom of Egypt. The dominions of the former bordered on the territories of the latter". The implication was that ancient Persia was the cultural bridge between ancient Egypt and India. Prichard tried to establish their kinship by means of comparing the mythological reservoirs of the Egyptians and the Indians.

As to the American languages, he referred to Benjamin Smith Barton, a Professor of Materia Medica and Natural History at Philadelphia, who "has proved that the languages of the American tribes are connected with those of the Eastern Asiatics". Chinese was a derivative of the central Asian languages (Prichard referred on this point to Sir William Jones), and the same applied to the inhabitants of the Southern islands.

From William Marsden he gleaned that "one general language prevailed (however mutilated and changed in the course of time) throughout all this portion of the world, from Madagascar to the most distant discoveries eastward". The Malays, too, were incorporated into this department as the compilation of comparative tables of vocabularies by William Marsden and Sir Joseph Banks had proved. Prichard thought it "probable, that these tribes are branches of one race, which migrated in remote times from the Indian Continent". As to the affinity between the Egyptians and the Indians, he admitted that philology was here not of much use, in order to trace their age-old relationship mythology must come into play.
Prichard’s debt to Sir William Jones was huge. However, there was one issue which Jones - in Prichard’s view - had failed to tackle: in his “Third Anniversary Discourse”, Jones had pointed out that the Indo-European language group most likely included the Celtic: "...there is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the Gothick and the Celtick, though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanscrit; and the old Persian might be added to the same family". To Prichard’s regret, Jones never endeavoured to demonstrate his claim. Thus the infamous contentions of the geographer John Pinkerton were left undisproved: positioning himself opposite the admirers of James McPherson and his Ossianic odes, Pinkerton had maintained that the Celts were entirely distinct from the rest of mankind, that they were "mere radical savages, not yet advanced even to a state of barbarism".

Prichard’s Celtic researches were directed, not least of all, against this bout of Celtophobia. Being half Welsh himself, he must have felt insulted when he read John Pinkerton’s books. Stocking was perhaps right in regarding Prichard as a member of the Celtic revival movement. But unlike other admirers of Celtic history, he was not interested in turning the tables and praising the Celts for those virtues which Pinkerton had ascribed to the Goths. His aim was rather to vindicate and celebrate the Celtic language and contemporary Welsh which he considered as the purest descendant of the ancient Celtic. The plan must have formed quite early in his head, for already in 1809 he suggested to count the Celts among the Indo-Europeans, on the grounds of "the similarity of language".

In 1813, Prichard came back to the topic, announcing "an attempt to supply the deficiency, which I intend shortly to make public". However, it was only 18 years later, in 1831, that his The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations finally appeared. One of the reasons that kept him from
publishing his research earlier was his inquiry into Egyptian mythology which he published in 1819 (and which will be discussed in the next chapter). Another lies in the fact that he became convinced that without taking the results of German philology into account he could not possibly rise to his task. Between 1806 and 1817 appeared Johann Christoph Adelung and Johann Severin Vater's Mithridates.\textsuperscript{54} It signified a departure from the old grammatical tradition. Adelung proposed to "penetrate the internal and external structure of all languages" by means of comparing "root syllables", the smallest units to which words could be reduced. Only on the basis of that comparison, he wrote, "can parentage and difference of language be discerned".\textsuperscript{55} When William Whewell later referred to "the great works which have appeared on glossology", he mentioned foremost the "Mithridates of Adelung and Vater" as containing "for their largest, and hitherto probably their most valuable part, the phenomenal portion of the science, the comparison of languages as they now are".\textsuperscript{56}

When he wrote the first edition of the Researches, Prichard was not yet proficient in German. Medical texts such as those of Haller or Blumenbach had been accessible to him in Latin. But the 1810s witnessed the publication of many important German works in the field of philology: Franz Bopp's Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache appeared in 1816.\textsuperscript{57} In 1818 Rasmus Kristian Rask's influential grammatical work came out in a German translation as well as the first volume of Jacob Grimm's Deutsche Grammatik.\textsuperscript{58} In Britain the importance of German philology was highlighted in two reviews, published in 1813 and in 1815.\textsuperscript{59} From then on, one erudite publication on Indo-European philology followed the other. But none of the authors seemed to be interested in the Celtic.\textsuperscript{60} When Prichard's Eastern Origin appeared, the second edition of the Researches had already been published. The two volumes proved to what extent he had assimilated
German studies. He took up some of the classificatory devices by means of which the brothers Schlegel, Franz Bopp and others were depicting the specificity of any given language as a corollary and precondition for varying mental developments and cultural achievements of nations. More than the Germans, however, Prichard used philology as a historical science, employing it to uncover the history of human descent, rather than the laws inherent to growth and decay of languages. Nonetheless, he adopted many of the general assumptions of the philologists whom he quoted. From 1826 Prichard's views about philological matters remained stable; new arguments resulting from his further reading fit in with his general, preformed assumptions.

In the second edition of the Researches Prichard underlined that merely comparing varying sets of vocabulary was not sufficient for establishing affinities of language. Instead the philologist ought to rely on analogies in "grammatical structure". He referred to Friedrich Schlegel's Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (1808). "The study of Philology has been heretofore pursued in so vague a manner", he added, "and so many visionary speculations have been raised upon casual or partial resemblances, sometimes upon uncertain etymologies, that many persons of sober judgement have been inclined to distrust all conclusions respecting the history of nations which are founded upon analogies in language". He pointed out the merits of Johann Christoph Adelung and Johann Severin Vater, of Friedrich Schlegel, Franz Bopp, and Heinrich Julius von Klaproth for the advancement of Indo-European philology; amongst the British, it was only Alexander Murray and John Jamieson whose works deserved as much praise as those of the German avant-garde. Also Sharon Turner, classical scholar and author of the Sacred History of the World, was mentioned with approval. As to Sir William Jones, Prichard still regarded him with respect, although this did not prevent him from referring to Jones's "oriental tales". Jacob Grimm, however,
was left out: it seems that, by 1826, Prichard had not yet ploughed through his voluminous Deutsche Grammatik.

Prichard was particularly pleased to find that Friedrich Schlegel too was advancing the idea that Sanskrit and the ancient Persian language were related, a suggestion which had been made by Sir William Jones. At the end of the second volume of the Researches Prichard delved extensively into the varying relations which languages could bear to each other.

The division which he outlined there, was basically the same to which he stuck in all subsequent publications on language. He devised the following taxonomy:

1. "Classes of languages" which have no connexion in their vocabularies but are analogical to each other in view of the "laws of their grammatical construction". Under these Prichard included (following the works of the American philologist Jean-Etienne du Ponceau of Philadelphia) "the idioms of the aboriginal nations of America" as well as the Chinese and Indo-Chinese dialects.

2. Those languages which have "little or no resemblance in grammatical structure, but an extensive correspondence in the vocabularies". Discounting the idea that such relations could have sprung up many years after the original formation of these languages, Prichard assigned particular importance to those terms which "are expressive of simple ideas and universal objects", words, that is, which came into existence as early as the peoples who spoke them. Amongst these he counted, for example, the ten numerals and words denoting family relations such as "mother" or "father". This category of resemblance applied in the case of "the vocabularies of the Semitic and Indo-European idioms". In this context one of Prichard's most eminent authorities was Julius Klaproth (1783-1835) who had, at the invitation of the Tsar, travelled across the Russian empire and whose language
compendium *Asia polyglotta, ou classification des peuples de l'Asie d'après l'affinité de leurs langues* (1823-1829) gave an overview over the northern Asiatic languages, classified according to the criteria of comparative linguistics.

3. Cases which left absolutely no doubt concerning the genealogical affinity of the respective nations were those in which both of the above mentioned characteristics convened. The Indo-European languages were an example in case.

4. A fourth relation consisted in the absence of any of the above: "there is neither any analogy in grammatical forms, nor any correspondence in words, sufficient to indicate a particular affinity". Those languages which in both respects were distinct from each other, were, as Prichard wrote, not of "the same class, or family, and they generally belong to nations in other circumstances remote from each other". Yet, the lack of grammatical and etymological similarities was no proof for the absence of all historical connections. "Is it not possible", he asked, "nay probable, that in other instances both of these indications of ancient affinity may have been lost?" Later, he suggested that "such are the phenomena of connexion which M. Klaproth hypothetically terms antediluvian", it was the type of relationship which Sharon Turner perceived between the Anglo-Saxon, Arabic, Chinese, Malay, Japanese, Turkish, and Tongan idioms.

As this enumeration shows, Prichard was more interested in classifying the relationships between languages than in classifying languages themselves. Yet, he had fully adopted the distinction which Friedrich Schlegel had made. Schlegel divided languages according to their capability for inflections. Opposed to the higher, more philosophic languages whose grammatical forms were expressed through inflections, were those languages which were devoid of inflection and expressed their grammatical specificities merely through the addition of other words.
Schlegel came up with a three-fold differentiation:

1. Monosyllabic languages consisted of words whose roots had only one syllable, and which were devoid of grammar. Schlegel's prime example was the Chinese.

2. There were monosyllabic languages which expressed time, number, and persona through inflections. These were, in Schlegel's view the most advanced languages, he called them "organic". This type was epitomized in the Indo-European idioms.

3. Schlegel's third group included languages which engendered their grammatical particulars not by means of inflection, but through the agglutination of other word particles. Under this category fell also the dissyllabic languages, that is, the Semitic languages, including e.g. the Hebrew and the Arab.69

As Mária Tsiapera has pointed out, Schlegel's understanding of inflection was slightly blurred, since "he called inflection both the secondary parts adhering to the root to constitute the grammatical word and the alternation of root-vowels".70 (It was Wilhelm August Schlegel who assigned the term "agglutinative" to those languages whose grammar involved separate suffixes with separate semantic identity.71) For the Schlegels as well as for Franz Bopp, these languages as well as the non-grammatical ones were merely "mechanical", they lacked the ability to develop.

Prichard followed Schlegel in differentiating between inflective and non-inflective languages. But, as he was not interested in an organicist philosophy of language, he did not arrive at establishing a kind of hierarchy among the world languages, as it resulted from the German approach. Timpanaro stated that the distinction between "organic" and "agglutinative" led in its ideological extrapolation to a "divine"/"feral" dichotomy which aimed to draw deep and genuine dividing lines between some large language families.72 Koerner, by contrast, argued that
this interpretation was exaggerated as it overlooked the fact that Schlegel, indeed, had the desire to prove the communal origins of all languages on earth.73

A similar quarrel has taken place in respect of Humboldt's philosophy of language. Not only Adelung, Friedrich Schlegel and Bopp, but also Wilhelm von Humboldt had projected eighteenth-century views about of the stable state of the Chinese polity on the Chinese language.74 Implicitly, their philology reflected (and added to) current explanations why European culture had during the course of centuries overtaken the Chinese, the Arab, and the Indian civilizations. Humboldt assigned one of the reasons to the structure of languages: the more complex a language was, the more it instilled intellectual genius.75 This is the reason why Hans Aarsleff has accused Humboldt of racialism.76 The German, indeed, was involved in a debate with the French orientalist Jean-Pierre-Abel Rémusat (1783-1832)77 as well as with the American philologists William Charles Pickering (1805-1878)78 and Jean-Etienne Duponceau (1760-1844), who both rejected slavery. Yet, in his famous 1836 work on the language of the Malayan Kawi tribe he took great care to distance himself from the allegation that he was believing in a linguistically founded racial hierarchy.79

Prichard acknowledged the monosyllabic character of the Chinese, and also took the line that inflectional languages were further advanced than others. In 1826 he wrote that "the monosyllabic speech of the Chinese" was "as different from the rude but polysyllabic languages of the northern Asiatics, as from the polished idioms of the Indo-European nations".80

But he was nonetheless in no doubt that the Chinese "popular dialect" was related to others, namely the Mongol, German, and Celtic.81 To make this point, he again referred to the ancient John Leyden, as well as to Humboldt's scholarly adversary Abel Rémusat.82
Moreover, the quotations Prichard's selected from Humboldt's work on the Kawi language indicate that he had no interest in establishing cultural hierarchies between languages. He translated Humboldt's remarks on the relations between thought and language almost literally as long as they contained positive tenets about the Chinese: "The Chinese leaves the perception of these relations [of words and ideas expressed in grammatical forms] to be the work of the mind. Much greater exercise of the understanding is therefore called for in a conversation carried on in the Chinese language than in the Sanskrit". The very "absence of all grammatical forms" in the Chinese "tends to enforce acuteness of the mind". If Prichard was not disposed to pursue any further the investigation of cultural diversities based on language, this was not only due to his monogenetic outlook but also to a set of philological assumptions which seemed to point into another direction than the progressivist perfectionism which Humboldt and the Schlegel's adhered to.

Franz Bopp's morphology of languages had not only presupposed the way by which languages gained in complexity, but also how they - within a given class - came in the end almost full circle. Bopp's degenerationist language theory implied that the historical course of the Indo-European languages led from the development of the inflectional system towards its dissolution. While in the classical Indo-European languages the verbs carried their pronominal denominations in themselves, later developments released the pronouns and turned them into individual particles which had to be added in every sentence.

Yet, Bopp's morphological philology was not linked to cultural misgivings about the course of civilization. Rather he was concerned with the recuperation of the original language, in other words he wanted to find "the ultimate origin of grammatical forms". The role of the pronouns was, in this context, for him of supreme importance.
degeneration of language signified a return to primitive forms from which - if historical development could be trusted to be continuous - another ascent towards complexity could come forth at a later stage. It is unclear to what extent Bopp was talking not merely figuratively but in explicit theological terms when he said that the pronouns were, "as it were, parts of the prediluvial epochs of language". But, doubtless, a reader like Prichard, would acknowledge the theological connotation.

C. The Hebrew Problem

For Schlegel, the roots of words contained the philosophical capacity of a language. Schlegel wrote: "In the Indian and Greek languages each root is actually that which bears the signification, and thus seems like a living and productive germ, every modification of circumstance or degree being produced by internal changes". As to languages which did not fulfil the organicist prerequisite, Schlegel wrote: "Those languages, on the contrary, in which the declensions are formed by supplementary particles, instead of inflections of the root, have no such bond of union: their roots present us with no living productive germ".87

In his distinction between monosyllabic languages without grammar, monosyllabic languages with proper inflections, and dissyllabic languages without proper inflections, Schlegel had ascribed the Semitic languages to the third category. This means that he excluded the Hebrew from the group of truly philosophical languages. Not that Schlegel was entirely dismissive of Hebrew: "The Hebraic lore and literature", he wrote, "is the body, whose soul is divine revelation". But since the ancient Hebrews were living under oriental climatic conditions, Schlegel followed the traditional environmentalist criticism put forward by his intellectual forebear Sir William Jones: the Hebrew literature, being the product of uncontrolled imagination as it prevailed in hot latitudes, was lacking in refinement.88 Hence, Schlegel, von Humboldt and their
followers came to believe that language reached its own fulfilment not in the Hebrew but in the Indo-European idioms.

The British philologist Revd John William Donaldson (1811-1861) was one of the first to point out the inconsistency in this evaluation: he took it for granted that the Greek alphabet originated in the Semitic. If this was so, he asked, how could the two languages belong to different linguistic families? Otto Jespersen later pointed out that Schlegel was outrightly wrong and that the grammar of Semitic languages was indeed based on the mechanisms of inflection. (Nowadays, the number of root syllables is no longer a decisive factor since the concept of the unity of the syllable itself has been put into doubt).

Something similar is true for Franz Bopp who like Schlegel had referred the Semitic language to the class of dissyllabic languages devoid of inflections. The Hebrew proved the stumbling block for Bopp's linguistic method grounded in his quest for the origins of roots. With respect to the Semitic roots, however, he was, in Verburg's words, "at a loss": written Hebrew does without vowels. Generally, vowels are added in the mind of the reader who, so to speak, thus invests the sequence of consonants in each word with meaning. But since, for Bopp, all words and all roots represented thoughts to which further meaning was added by prefixes and suffixes, the non-discursive root structure of the Semitic languages landed "his method in aporia".

Prichard, for one, had no problems of the kind that were troubling Bopp. Nor did he follow him and Schlegel in considering the Semitic languages as second-rate. On the contrary, in 1836, he wrote: "Perhaps the Semitic people were the only race whose language displays a purer or more metaphysical conception."

The central question was the Semitic dissyllabism, also known as triliteralism. It had proved mind-boggling for quite a few Biblical critics of the eighteenth century who wanted to assign Hebrew its deserved place.
among the great languages of classical poetry. The easiest way of solving
the problem was to declare that Hebrew, too, was a monosyllabic
language. This was, what, for example, Julius von Klaproth suggested. He
explained dissyllabism as an invention of the medieval ages, when the
Jews "avaient la tête remplie de rêveries cabalistiques, et se conformaient
à un plan vicieux, leurs traités de grammaires ne présentent qu'une foule
de subtilités philosophiques et de folies pédantesques".95 Even superficial
knowledge, Klaproth contended, would be sufficient to recognize that the
alleged dissyllabic words were in fact composita of two individual ones.96
A thorough investigation would yield that the original monosyllables of
Hebrew roots were in fact nearly analogous to the respective words in the
Sanskrit.97 This was an assertion which in principle would have been
very welcome to a linguistic monogenist. However, even though
Prichard approved of Klaproth in general,98 he did not approve the idea
that Hebrew was monosyllabic. Prichard quoted Wilhelm von Humboldt
for support: "It appears on the whole to have been the opinion of M. de
Humboldt ... that the Shemite language consisted in its original material
of roots principally dissyllabic". This was exaggerated. Humboldt had
simply said that the dissyllabic Semitic languages might have developed
from a system in which monosyllabic and dissyllabic roots had been
mixed.99 It was not the only occasion where Prichard, keen to make his
point, slightly misread another author.

In the course of its history, Prichard explained, Hebrew had adopted
many roots of foreign origin "cognate with Sanskrit or Greek or other
primitive words". But in dealing with them, the genius of the language
displays itself."Before they became Semitic words they were turned into
dissyllables, according to the structure of the language".100 The reason
why he insisted on the dissyllabic character of the Syro-Arabian
languages, lies in the fact that this very difference, for him, was most
significant.
What can be called Prichard's linguistic creed was put down in the fourth volume of the *Researches*, in a chapter called "Of the Syro-Arabian Nations". The chapter deals mainly with what other philologists referred to as the Semitic or Shemite nations. In the nineteenth century there were many, mainly continental, philologists who would no longer explicitly refer to Noah's sons. In many cases, their classifications deviated from Biblical anthropogeography or Biblical genealogy.

Prichard himself undertook to point out the misleading connotation of the "Semitic" category as these philologists understood the term: the very denomination of "Semitic" was not in line with the Scriptures. He referred to the Biblical critic Gesenius as the first scholar who had demonstrated that the so-called "Semitic" language family also included some Hamite languages (which in turn were related to the Egyptian and engendered the modern African languages). Hence the choice of the term "Semitic" was unfortunate. Prichard explained: "The Hebrew language appears to have belonged to the Canaanitish or Hamite branch, the Syrian to the Shemite". In order to avoid confusion and be yet genealogically correct, he coined a term based on the geographical region where the respective languages were spoken. Hence, the Semitic were for him the "Syro-Arabian" languages. As in this chapter Prichard said a lot not only about philology, but also about his theological beliefs, it is worthwhile to quote extensively from it:

Nothing in reality is more illustrative of the psychological difference between the Japetic and Shemite branch of our races than the conceptions which both have formed of the nature and attributes of the Divinity. ... The Shemite people alone appear to have possessed of old sufficient power of abstraction to conceive the idea of a pure and immaterial nature, and of a governing mind distinct from body and from the material universe. Their conceptions were more pure and sublime, their sentiment of devotion more intense, their consciousness of guilt expressed itself in more significant and more definite acts, than those of the Japetic nations, with whom mythology...
began, and who in Greece and in India and elsewhere delighted to clothe the few original principles or elements of human belief with a splendid garb of imagery. ... There is no particular in which the perfective character of the Shemite nations has been displayed more remarkably than in the singular character and construction of their language. While all other human idioms appear, if we may use the expression, to have grown up by the gradual superposition of supplementary syllables upon monosyllabic elements, ... the Shemite language, ... displaying in its very framework a deep conception and design, consists of dissyllabic roots, of which the three consonants express the abstract meaning, the essential and leading sense or import, while all the relations of ideas to past and future time, to personal agency or passion, the possible or real, and even the differences of nouns and verbs, are denoted by changes in the interior vowels, changes which the words themselves were obviously intended in their original formation or construction to undergo, - a contrivance which implies a conception and previous contemplation of all that words when invented can be thought capable of expressing. ... The foundation of poetry among the Greeks, Latins, and Hindoos is, as everyone knows, rythm [sic] and quantity, an arrangement of syllables producing a certain modification of sound, selected perhaps originally for the sake of harmony and a cadence pleasing to the ear, but in part designed to assist the memory in the long oral recitations practised before the invention of written signs. Far more intellectual and more indicative of reflection was the poetry of the Shemite nations.104

The reading of eighteenth-century literary critics such as Lowth or Michaelis had borne fruit with Prichard. He had bound up accepted knowledge about poetical style with his personal views of the Hebrew grammar, and linked the whole to the action of divine providence. Even though he adopted Schlegel, Bopp, and Humboldt's classification of languages, he did not make the progressivist inferences the German authors drew. Moreover, his language system classified inflected languages together with non-inflected ones such as the polysyllabic idioms of America. They all had developed through the "gradual superposition of supplementary syllables upon monosyllabic elements".
This division followed the prevalent philological value system which placed "organic", "synthetic", "inflective" languages above "analytic", "agglutinative", "mechanic" ones. Yet Prichard did not share the prevalent philological opinion that the Indo-European was the most advanced and the most philosophical of all languages.

In the passage cited above he explained that the Syro-Arabian languages were constructed in such a manner as to predestine the Shemite tribes for monotheism, he made it clear that this was due to divine providence which had singled out one particular people for the monotheistic revelation. Prichard's inferences were based on the widespread claim that languages were illustrative of the mental state of a people. He had obviously adopted this element of the German Romantics' approach to philology. It included and transcended the custom of Enlightenment philosophy to regard languages as characteristic of the prevalent state of civilization.

Indeed, Prichard's explanations as to why Hebrew was mentally so advanced, were derived from Humboldt's philosophy of language: the particular advantage of the Hebrew lay in the fact that "the greater compass which the formation of roots by three consonants afforded" might have incited, as Prichard thought, the habit of expressing "shades of meanings and the modifications of time and mode" through "changes of vowels", which in turn led to the conception of more elaborate roots which lent themselves to such complicated mental operations. Unlike Humboldt, however, Prichard saw the development of Sanskrit and other Indo-European languages as a Janus-faced process. On the one hand, polished perfection was obtained. On the other hand, dissyllabism was given up and thus the capacity to conceive the tenets of monotheism. Thus his views of civilization were expressed also on the level of philology. Like civilized men, the Indo-European languages were refined, yet not necessarily "moral".
Humboldt left no doubt that he considered the Hebrew as inferior to the Sanskrit: it was less "free" in its constructions. He granted inflections to the Hebrew, but these were, in his system, of an inferior kind, since he (wrongly) believed that declinations as well as pronouns were expressed through additional particles instead of changes in the verbal roots. And what Prichard held for the great strength of the Hebrew, its resistance to compound words, Humboldt saw rather as a deficiency. Yet, Prichard quoted none of this. While Humboldt acknowledged certain advantages of the unloved Hebrew, he conceded that the Indo-European languages carried the germ for triliteral forms of roots which the Semitic languages displayed in perfection: but in languages such as the Sanskrit or the Greek, their origination had to be "attributed to accident or to the unremitted and momentary efforts of the mind, and to the occasional development of a few original elements". It was only in the "Shemite languages" that "the artifice of construction is so deeply inlaid in the very original elements of the [...] language, and the principle of expression so refined and, if we may so speak, metaphysical, as to bear the appearance of a premeditated plan". Hebrew (or some parent-language of it) was the God-given language.

Prichard's clear preference for the Syro-Arabian type of languages proves him to be far away from all those linguists who during the era of Romanticism, discovered the cultural superiority of the Greeks over all other civilizations. Around the turn of the century some clergymen assumed that the New Testament had orginally been written in Greek; much as the Septuagint was superior to the Old Testament, Greek stood above the ancient Hebrew. Later in the nineteenth century the poet Heinrich Heine was to say "that all men were either Jews or Greeks"; the critic Matthew Arnold named "Hellenism and Hebraism as the two points between which the human spirit must for ever oscillate"; the politician and philologist Christian Carl Josias Bunsen (1791-1860)
declared that "everywhere the Semitic and the Japhetic mind assist and complete each other" (the latter being "nationally always the higher" and the Semitic being endowed with "the power of a great individuality") - within this ideological dichotomy Prichard was clearly on the Hebrew side.112 And while it became increasingly fashionable to play down the antiquity and influence of Hebrew,113 Prichard implied, as late as 1844, that it was nearest to the language with which God had endowed mankind.

This was a point which, at his time, was conceived as fairly archaic. Leibniz already had asserted that Hebrew was rather unlikely to be the primeval language. And so did the orientalist Vans Kennedy in a voluminous work on Indo-European linguistics. Kennedy, who was knowledgeable about continental philology, quoted Adelung and Klaproth to the same effect.114 Johann Gottfried Herder had spoken of the Hebrew as of "the mother of all languages", but he had refrained from speculating about its possible links to any prediluvial language. Even Sir William Jones had resigned himself to the supposition that the first language from which all others derived might be "irretrievably lost".115-ff

Thomas Young spoke for the majority of language scholars when he wrote: "It will be recollected that, although we did not positively deny the existence of something like a connexion between all languages without exception, we asserted the total want of evidence of such a connexion with respect to a great number, which are tolerably well known".117 If against similar assertions, Friedrich Schlegel was to revive hopes concerning the recovery of the original first language, he nonetheless did not go so far as to tie them to the question which idioms were spoken before the Deluge.118 In this light it appears understandable that Prichard hedged his views about the "prediluvian" or the "original" language on earth (two terms, which were not necessarily synonymous).
Like the German historian August Ludwig Schloezer (1735-1809) and the Biblical scholar Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827), Prichard distinguished between the languages of Shem, Ham, and Japheth. However, his distinctions were more complex and less obvious than those of Schloezer and Eichhorn. As we have seen, he complained that the other scholars’ definition of Semitic languages included some idioms which were part of the Hamite stock: when and how the Shemites and the Hamites came so near to each other as to confuse their languages, was an open question for Prichard, since the Hebrew expansion into Africa preceded the "dawning of history". But he hoped that the problem might be solved.

He believed that the story of the tower of Babel was involved in the spread of languages. In the fifth chapter we have seen that Prichard legitimized the story of the tower of Babel through a reference to an anti-uniformitarian philosophy of historical development. Those among his readers, however, who were unwilling to rely on providence, to account for the development of languages, could content themselves with a more naturalistic explanation:

in general, the number and diversity of languages is nearly in proportion to the barbarism of nations. Where we find the human race most degraded, morally and physically, we discover the greatest difference of languages. Savage people, roaming about the banks of rivers, or the sea-shores, or wandering through forests in quest of a scanty subsistence, are necessarily divided into very small companies; in their almost solitary existence they have little use of speech, and their scanty vocabularies soon deviate from each other and lose all traces of resemblance.

On the presumption that the languages of the earth had developed from one common ancestor, it was in conformity with the doctrines of geology as well as with the organicist philosophy of languages to assume that a dead language like the Hebrew was likely to be one of the oldest, if not the
oldest language on earth. Furthermore, the Hebrew was "the depository ... of the oldest literature".

Discussing Prichard's Biblicism, we have mentioned that he relinquished the idea that Genesis had been penned by Moses himself. Johann Christoph Adelung had argued that the existing versions of Genesis could not be original since, had this been the case, the Hebrew would not have undergone any development "in a period of 1000 years, from Moses to Malachi". As in this ancient period all the languages of the world were still evolving, Prichard himself thought it improbable that the Hebrew alone should have remained stable. Hence he gave in to Adelung's argument. But the way in which he did so, makes it clear that he was inclined to regard some precursor of the known Hebrew as the original and ante-diluvian language: "The Hebrews originated among the Chaldeans; Terah, the father of Abraham, having been a native of Ur, or Edessa, beyond the Euphrates; they adopted the language of the Canaanites, among whom they led a nomadic life, till their residence in Egypt, which must probably have had some effect in modifying their language".

Prichard disclaimed all ventures, such as that of Michaelis, to prove that the Hebrews originally spoke *no Semitic language at all*. Moreover, he went out of his way to show that the place from which, after the Flood, mankind took its second rise, was not the Asiatic chain of Caucasus.

Not just anatomists and physiologists, but also great philological scholars approved the "Caucasian hypothesis". The traveller and philologist Julius Klaproth (1783-1835) unwittingly supported the theory, as he tried to prove that the Indo-German was widespread already before the time of the Deluge, expanding into Europe from the heights of Caucasus, and into Asia from the tops of the Himalaya where in his opinion the prediluvial Indo-Germans had survived the Flood.
Prichard was an avid reader of Klaproth's publications. However, he was anything but delighted about Klaproth's new term "Indo-Germanic" which supported contemporary attempts to praise the Indian civilization and its origins on Asiatic mountains at the expense of the Hebraic and Egyptian traditions. He considered Klaproth's influential scheme as "visionary and fanciful". In his view the German gave himself an unnecessary "great deal of trouble to point out the particular groupes of mountains where each of the Asiatic languages was preserved": even if the geographical circumstances of Asia afforded as many mountain tops as there were separate Asiatic languages, Klaproth's theory was "wholly inapplicable to other parts of the world, as to Africa, America, and the Austral countries, where the number of distinct languages is much more considerable, and where it would be still more difficult to find an insulated mountain to serve, as an imaginary refuge, for every little family of people".127

Prichard was particularly annoyed about Klaproth's rejection of the story of the ark.128 When he formulated his attack in the 1820s, Klaproth's theories were already rather outdated: not least thanks to the researches of the famous geographer Carl Ritter, the history of Asian ethnology was rewritten.129 Still, the "Caucasian hypothesis" kept thriving.

In his attempt to deflate it and to assert monogenism with the Hebraic as the oldest cultural tradition, Prichard had to show that Hebrew and Sanskrit were related, or rather that the Sanskrit had developed from the Hebrew. Schlegel had insisted that it was impossible to show any affinities between the two language families. And the efforts of Gesenius and Georg Heinrich August Ewald notwithstanding,130 the gap between them remained great. It was in the Celtic that Prichard thought he had found a missing link connecting the two.
D. The Celtic Question

The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations was Prichard's one unique contribution to philology. Years before Adolphe Pictet, Franz Bopp, and Lorenz Dieffenbach\textsuperscript{131} he tried to prove that Celtic and Sanskrit were derived from the same linguistic stock: "the main object which I have had in view in the composition of this work has been, to institute such a comparison of the Celtic dialects with the languages allowed to belong to the Indo-European stock, as may tend to illustrate the relation of the Celtic people to the rest of mankind".\textsuperscript{132}

As we have seen, he had announced the project already in 1813. Then, he had learned German. Other publications got in the way.\textsuperscript{133} By 1831, when the Eastern Origin was published, it appeared to him that Celtic scholarship had hardly advanced since the beginning of the century. German philology had made gigantic steps ahead, but as the Germans were "little acquainted with these provincial idioms of the British isles",\textsuperscript{134} Celtic scholarship had been neglected.

While in the eighteenth century many works had appeared which tried to depict the Celts as one of the ten lost tribes,\textsuperscript{135} nineteenth-century British scholars seemed to fall in with the opposite extreme.\textsuperscript{136} It may have to do with the fact that Napoleonic France had seized upon the "Celtic Revival". In 1805, the Académie Celtique was founded in Paris. Celticism and French nationalism having been amalgamated, the Academy served the purpose to bolster notions of French superiority.\textsuperscript{137} Constantin-François Chassebeuf de Volney, in combining classicism with French patriotism, suggested even that the ancient Punic might be a Gaelic dialect. Prichard discarded the idea as "chimerical attempt".\textsuperscript{138} In this light, it is no wonder that even a Scotsman like John Jamieson should be dismissive of Celtic culture.

Down to the usage of the word "chimerical" Prichard's account of the evil effects of eighteenth-century Celtomania followed closely an
essay which Wilhelm August Schlegel published in 1834. According to Schlegel the "Celtomaniacs had peopled the whole of Europe with ancient Celts". In the corrupted jargon of a small populace in Brittany, they believed that they had discovered the original language of the ancient Celts. "They pretended that Latin and Greek were derived from this language, as well as the German and many others", Prichard wrote. What Schlegel had termed "tours de force étymologiques" could not last, but, as Prichard saw it, they undermined serious science.139

By 1831, Pinkerton's barrage of abuse against the Celts was still unforgotten. Prichard summarized: "In the most positive terms", Pinkerton had asserted, "that the Celtae were a people entirely distinct from the rest of mankind", and that their mythology "resembled, in all probability, that of the Hottentots, or others of the rudest savages, as the Celtae anciently were, and are little better at present, being incapable of any progress in society". "What a lion is to an ass", Pinkerton had said, "such is a Goth to a Celt".140 More moderate writers, such as John Jamieson would simply underline the links between the Goths and the Greeks - at the expense of the Celts.141 Vans Kennedy pointed out that the Celtic - like the Hebrew - had nothing to do with the Sanskrit, and that hence neither of the two could be regarded as the original language.142

Over some such claims Prichard had grown mildly paranoid. The very fact that Cuvier in his Lecons d'histoire naturelle had omitted to mention the Celtic in connection with the Sanskrit, seemed to indicate to him that, "perhaps [he] regards them [the Celts] as Aborigines".143

In the Eastern Origin, Prichard took the side of the anti-Pinkerton faction. By means of referring to the opinions of George Chalmers, he tried to vindicate the bad reputation of the Celts.144 This is why he must be classed within the movement of the Celtic revival, although neither his personal moderation nor his theological taste allowed for the glorious exultations of the pagan Celtic virtues which characterized some
eighteenth century Celticists. Despite their varying attitudes, however, Prichard quoted John Jamieson favourably.\(^{145}\)

The book was dedicated to Jacob Grimm and the Reverend William Daniel Conybeare (1787-1857). Grimm had not been quoted in the second edition of the *Researches*. Conybeare being one of the founders of the Bristol Institution and a bigwig in the BAAS, his friendship was valuable to Prichard.\(^{146}\) The dedication to Jacob Grimm, by contrast, was basically the result of scholarly admiration. It is likely that Prichard got to know the Deutsche Grammatik only in the second half of the 1820s.\(^{147}\) No mention of the work was made in the second edition of the *Researches* (while, e.g., Franz Bopp was variously referred to). In the *Eastern Origin* Prichard quoted extensively from Grimm's first two volumes.

Prichard presented two methods for the study of languages: "to examine, in the first place, the relations between their respective vocabularies or stocks of primitive words or roots; and secondly, the peculiarities and coincidences in their grammatical structure".\(^{148}\) Grimm's law, which prescribed the investigation into changes of vowels and consonants proved most helpful for his task.

In the third chapter of the volume, Prichard presented a comparison of various sets of vocabulary. He chose the first ten numerals, and elementary expressions which designed family relationships and other terms required even under the most basic of civil conditions. Thus the word signifying "star" was in Sanskrit "tera", in Greek "τετράνυ", in Welsh "seren", in Armorican "steren", in German "Stern", in Gothic "stairno", in Persian "sitauren", in Latin "stella".\(^{149}\)

Prichard concluded that all these languages were built up on one original set of vocabularies. This part of the book was not just the product of the collecting process on which he had embarked between his doctoral dissertation and the composition of the first edition of the *Researches*. It
was also meant as a refutation of Vans Kennedy who had tried to show that it was futile to deduce the relationship of Celtic and the Indo-European from a comparison of their vocabularies.150

With respect to the argument from grammar, things were slightly more difficult. Prichard accepted Bopp's philological doctrines which put verbal roots and the pronominal denominations into the centre of all investigations.151 The application of Grimm's law as well as Bopp's linguistic morphology to the Celtic - which he had studied for the purpose of composing the book - opened the door to probing deeply into the relationship between Celtic and Sanskrit. If one could show how in the process of time the positions and forms of pronouns changed, this might furnish a key to the history of languages. Thus, one chapter of the book discusses the comparison in relation to the inflection of verbs through tenses and moods. Another chapter does the same with regard to the personal pronouns and the personal terminations of verbs.152 Here, Prichard attacked one of the unresolved questions of the time: what were the origins of the Sanskrit ending of "nti" and of the Latin and old German "nt" in the plural form of the third person? His answer was ingenious: the pronominal suffixes "nti" and "nt" were none other than the residues of the Celtic pronoun "hwynt" - "they".153 And this, in turn, had itself once been a suffix of Celtic verbs, which, over the course of time, had turned into an individual word.

Prichard managed to prove even to the satisfaction of his stern critic Richard Garnett (1789-1850), who was a curate and schoolmaster and a specialist of Welsh in his own right, that the "personal terminations in Welsh are pronouns, and that they are more clearly and unequivocally so than the corresponding endings in Sanscrit or its immediate descendants".154

Another grammatical point of comparison between the Sanskrit and the Celtic in particular was the way in which both these languages
afforded the change of consonants in particular words according to the beginning or ending of other words with which they were brought into conjunction. Full of admiration, the Eclectic Review summarized Prichard's argument:

In the Greek, Latin, and German dialects, the mutation of consonants is observable chiefly in the formation of compound terms. But in the Sanscrit, words merely in sequence have an influence upon each other, in the change of terminations, and sometimes of initial letters, according to rules which the Sanscrit grammarians term sandhi, conjunction, and which forbid the meeting of consonants of different orders. These rules have been supposed to be in great measure peculiar to the Sanscrit. It is, however, Dr. P. [sic] has shewn, a remarkable fact, that in the Celtic dialects, and more especially in the Welsh, permutations in many respects analogous are constant and indispensable in the formation of sentences.155

Through this and other arguments Prichard attempted to show that the Celtic language was at least as old - if not older - than the Sanskrit, and that it hardly changed since the Celts had migrated into Europe. The course of his inquiry led him to the desired result, namely, that the Celts were the first of the Indo-European tribes to have peopled the continent. He concluded: "It is probable, that several tribes emigrated from their original seat in different stages of advancement in respect of civilization and language; and we accordingly find their idioms in very different degrees of refinement; but an accurate examination and analysis of the intimate structure and component materials of these languages, is still capable of affording ample proofs of a common origin".156 This was the same opinion which Alexander Murray had set out many years earlier, however, without proving it.157 Prichard's book came to fill the gap.

In many respects, his approach fell in line with the modern way of pursuing the study of philology.158 Prichard's principal argument, the
unity of the Celtic and the Indo-European was acceptable in the eyes of his critics. In the *Quarterly Review* the Revd Richard Garnett, who was to become an active member of the Philological Society after its foundation in 1842, praised him for that part of his book.\textsuperscript{159} Prichard's comparison of vocabularies, however, was not universally well received. While the *Eclectic Review* approved it, August Wilhelm Schlegel was quite dismissive. Prichard's error would have consisted in his choice of late Celtic imports of Latin words to prove original affinity:

M. Prichard fait entré beaucoup de mots des rapprochemens contre lesquel les objections se présentent au premier abord. Il met en regard le verbe Latin *credo*, le Galois *credu*, et l'Irlandais *credeim*. A-t-il pu oublier que ce mot, étant le premier du formulaire de la foi, redigé en Latin, que tous les néophytes devaient apprendre par coeur, a du s'imprimer dans la mémoire des habitans?

Prichard was right in inferring the unity of Celtic and Indo-European, but his method of proceeding was flawed: "Je conclus de tout ceci que la ressemblance entre un certain nombre de mots réputés Galois ou Irlandais, et des mots Latins, Romans, Saxons, Scandinaves, ne peut nullement prouver une affinité primitive avec la famille Indo-Germanique".\textsuperscript{160}

Methodological objections apart, some of Prichard's tenets were simply too fanciful for the contemporary taste: his criticism of "Celtomania" notwithstanding, he believed that the Celts were the earliest people to have invaded Europe time out of mind. From this idea he jumped to daring conclusions. Not only was the Celtic related to the Indo-European, but it also had special affinities to the Sanskrit which no other Indo-European language possessed. In fact, it was the remainder of a language older than all other Indo-European idioms. To make this point Prichard had to claim that once, in the remote past, the Celtic possessed proper inflections. None of the authorities of philology would
have supported this idea. In 1840, the Eclectic Review objected to the hypothesis, pointing out "the very great difficulty of supposing that the Celtic family could ever have spoken with the verbal and nominal inflections of the Greeks".

The reviewer endorsed the assumption that the Celts had been among the first tribes to arrive in Europe. But while Prichard had proposed a degenerative process which the Celtic language had undergone until it ended in the coarse Welsh, Erse and other contemporary dialects, the reviewer opined that the Celtic had remained in its rude state for centuries, due to the relative isolation in which the Celtic tribes had dwelled in their European abodes. If the current remains of the Celtic represented the state of language in ancient times, and given that the Celtic was related to the Sanskrit, then the Sanskrit, obviously, had evolved from another language which had been exceedingly coarse and rude. This was not in line with the theological notion that God had endowed Adam with a perfect language, but it was in conformity with the Scottish four stages theory. Thus, Prichard's pro-Celtic theory was amended in such a manner as to retain Sanskrit's role of philosophical and linguistic supremacy. Prichard's way of historicizing the generation of languages was replaced by another one: "The early ancestors of the copiously inflecting Hindoos and musical-tongued Greeks must once have jabbered an indigested interjectionary speech", the reviewer of the Eclectic Review stated, "... The language must have begun from a savage unformed state, and proceeded towards a certain perfection, developing itself in different countries by various methods and with various success".161

Indeed, Prichard did not have much success with his idea about the Celtic inflections. In the Quarterly Review, Richard Garnett objected adamantly: "The Doctor", Garnett groaned, "regards the Welsh as having lost its inflections: we are inclined to think that it never had them".162
Again, the crucial point was that Celtic could not conceivably ever have been as beautiful as the Sanskrit. Moreover, Garnett found Prichard's comparisons between Sanskrit and the Semitic languages utterly unconvincing. At the core of the problem stood the question of the linguistic forms in which the pronominal denominations were couched. Horne Tooke had asserted that all rude languages were devoid of pronouns, for, unrefined civilizations required words for actions and for things only. It had been Franz Bopp who considered, on the contrary, that the pronouns led the historical linguist more deeply into the womb of time than any other grammatical form. It had also been Bopp who said that there had been an Indo-European language before the Sanskrit which was even more perfect than the Sanskrit itself. And even though, at the end of the day, Bopp's morphological method was to dominate over Tooke's philosophy of language, Prichard's version of the "Celtic hypothesis", fashioned along the lines of Bopp's suggestion, was to lose out no less than Tooke's etymology.

Based on his analysis of the pronominal suffixes of the Celtic, Prichard established an affinity not only to the Sanskrit but also to the Hebrew or Chaldaen. This led him to the most daring of his conclusions: "It must be allowed, that the Semitic dialects constitute a very distinct department of languages, which can by no means be associated or brought into the same class with the Indo-European idioms". And yet, he went on, it would be wrong to deny all "traces of connection between the two classes". The "system of pronominal suffixes" was "one point in which the Celtic, at the same time that it appears to be the least artificial and grammatically cultivated of the Indo-European languages, forms an intermediate link between them and the Semitic, or perhaps indicates a state of transition from the characters of one of these classes of languages to those of the other".

This assertion was spectacular, it went way beyond Bopp's
morphology of languages which aimed to analyse the varying classes of languages without making any historical connections between them. It defied Schlegel and Humboldt's hierarchy of languages. It flew in the face of all endeavours to prove that Sanskrit was unique. Prichard, in a great stroke, tried not only to historicise Indo-European philology, but also to refer - via the Celtic - the whole stem back to the Hebrew. Such devout attempts were still frequently made in early nineteenth-century Britain as Beyer has shown. It must not be overlooked, however, that Prichard relied mainly on continental philology. And on the Continent, there was little support for this type of metaphysical linguistics. Prichard himself noted that continental scholars gave little room to proving the unity of the Hamite, Semitic, and Japhetic language families.

In his endeavour to show how these language stems were related, Prichard never went so far as to map out geographically as well as historically how languages evolved and how in the course of human migration they spread across the earth. He deduced affinities, he traced back the wanderings of some tribes, such as the Celts, but he did not construct a systematic plan of the history and development of languages. The surviving historical evidences simply did not allow for a reconstruction of these developments: "It seems vain to attempt by means of historical or philological researches to lift up the veil which conceals the original condition of nations and the revolutions of human society of the first ages of the world".

This was certainly prudent. And yet, for those who were at home in continental scholarship, Prichard's endeavours were already too bold to be successful. One of them was the Revd Richard Garnett, who remarked drily: "We cannot, however, refrain from expressing a wish that he had omitted the parallel between the Indo-European and the Semitic languages, in which, we fear, he succeeds no better than the multitudes who had made the same attempt before him".
accused Prichard of the stupidest of all faults: he would have overlooked the triliteral organisation of the Hebrew roots. Although Garnett endorsed Prichard's theory which interpreted the personal endings in the Welsh as pronouns, he unequivocally dismissed the inferences as to the historical succession of Hebrew, Celtic, and Sanskrit: "we do not, however, believe that the Sanscrit or Latin forms were derived from the Celtic."

E. The Politics of Philology

To venture a comparison: for Prichard, the content of The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations was as central as the doctrine of evolution was for Darwin. Darwin linked man and apes, Prichard linked Hebrew, via Celtic, to Sanskrit. In contrast to The Descent of Man, however, Prichard's book was a failure. It did not stir up much interest, and when later the reviews set in, they failed to acknowledge his achievement.

Either by dint of the reviews, or else through his own insights, Prichard learned his lesson: he never came back to the Eastern Origin. He did not quote it, nor did he repeat its theologically most consequential tenets. At least, he had the satisfaction that the main secular, ethnological hypothesis of the book - that the Celts were part of the Indo-European family - was by the end of the 1830s no longer contested. Independent from each other and from Prichard, Franz Bopp in Germany and Adolphe Pictet in France had established the fact beyond all doubt. And if Prichard's book went largely unnoticed, these two had sufficient public impact and support to make the thesis known.

As the history of languages continued to be explored, the debate became more refined. It was discovered that, long before the Germans and even before the Celts, there had been two other tribes who had branched out from the Indo-European stock and migrated to Europe. One of them were the ancestors of the modern Irish. The others were the Finns.
and Lapps, the ancient Lithuanians and the Prutenians (ancient Prussians) who settled in the north-eastern parts of Europe. Philological investigations had to adapt to the archaeological and craniological findings of ethnologists who marked "two or three successive periods in the population of Europe": in the new system, the Indo-Europeans including the Celts had arrived relatively recently in Europe. Other tribes had been a lot earlier.

Prichard did not involve himself in the debate about who in ancient times had conquered whom, thus proving culturally superior. He mentioned that the pastoral Ugrian tribes, being "the perpetual foes of the Teutonic tribes", had been subdued in the course of centuries to such an extent that only one people descended from the Ugrian stem had managed "to found an independent state, or to take any part in the affairs of the civilised world". These were the Hungarians. They were the only ones not be driven to the northern outskirts of Europe or to be entirely extinguished. Prichard noted it because many philologists were puzzled by the question where the Hungarian language came from. Yet, he refrained from exploiting this fact; he simply was not interested in ranging the European nations into any kind of hierarchy. Once he had established that "Ugri" "corrupted" into "Ungri" and "Hungarians", he was happy to leave the matter there.

His reluctance to take part in contemporary political-cultural quarrels was to no small extent due to the fact that he saw the history of language and of language-change running parallel to the natural history of mankind. The spectrum was simply too vast to accommodate comparably trifling present-day discussions.

In eighteenth-century Germany philology had an important political function. Through the institutionalization of philological scholarship an atmosphere was created which endowed "the future
teachers, directors, professors and administrators with a progressive sense of self-identity, freedom of interpretation and critique commensurate with the rigid and confined social reality, while supporting the Ständestaat and the possibility of its gradual reform.¹⁷⁹ For Britain whose linguistics were longer dominated by the tradition of gentlemanly scholarship, Leventhal's analysis holds less true. Aarsleff refers the backwater state of English philology to the fact that British universities favoured traditional forms of treating the subject rather than attempts to catch up with continental insights.¹⁸⁰ If we accept for a moment the dividing line between "traditional" and "modern" philology, it might be tempting to refer the transition to the fact that German philology was increasingly being exerted by middle-class scholars, such as Bopp and Grimm, rather than by aristocratic dilettanti.¹⁸¹

Philology had always been subservient to other, sometimes immediately political interests. In the nineteenth century it was used as an aid in nationalistic self-assertion. In the 1830s the first drops were to be seen of what later became a flood of nationalistic literature. Prichard, however, was rather immune against the temptation to boost his favourites, be it the Celts or any other nation. It was not that he would have lacked an occasion. It arose in the 1820s.

In those years a group of "bourgeois" French scholars, including the historians François Guizot, Adolphe Thiers and the brothers Amédée and Augustin Thierry as well as the physiologist William Frédéric Edwards, tried to outmanoeuvre the mobility historiographically. Traditionally, almost the entire French aristocracy and royalty was referred to the Franks who had invaded the country in the 5th century, while the original French populace was said to be of Gallic or Celtic origin. Based on this assumption French republicans tried to challenge aristocratic rule: being merely foreign intruders, the Bourbons had no right to govern the descendents of the original population of
France. In the context of this discussion interest in the Celts was rekindled.

In 1825 Augustin Thierry described the history of the Norman conquest. He depicted the fight between "Saxons" and "Normans" as a racial struggle. Parallels to the present were insinuated. Three years later, Amédée Thierry described how the entirety of France, inhabited by a Celtish tribe, the Gaël, had been subdued by the Romans. Only in Brittany, a small tribe had remained independent. The population there had come over from Britain. Their national disposition or, as it came to be said, their racial character being of a sterner make than that of the French, they retained their independence. They were the only ones to uphold the spirit of freedom amongst the suppressed Gaëls. William Frédéric Edwards, physiologist and admirer of Thierry, summarized the gist of the Histoire des Gaulois: "C'est à eux [the inhabitants of Brittany] qu'on doit l'indépendance du pays; car il est évident que s'ils n'y étaient pas descédus, ce territoire occupé par les Gaëls aurait subi le même sort que le reste de la Gaule, et aurait été subjugué par les Francs".

In the 1830s it was seen as an established fact that in ancient times the east of Europe had been peopled by "Ugrian" tribes; central and northern Europe had been populated by the Teutons or Goths; and the west was the territory where the Celts had branched out into several peoples. For the sake of French historic nationalism, Amédée Thierry and his followers divided the French population into the Celtic Gaëls and the Belgic inhabitants of Brittany.

Prichard never mentioned the developments in France. From time to time, there arrived news of further revolutions from across the channel. They went down to the sediments of his misapprehensions towards civilization. Otherwise, contemporary politics had no seeming effect on his "scribbling habit". If the French form of patriotic Celticism displeased him, it was due to the fact that, in his view, Thierry...
drew dividing lines between peoples who actually belonged together: Prichard perceived that Thierry was driving a wedge between the "Gaël" or Celtic Gaul's here, and the Belgae or Welsh there. It appeared to Prichard as if Thierry had reserved the Celtic denomination for France (what, in fact, he had not done), excluding the inhabitants of Great Britain from the Celtic stock.

From the 1830s, the "Germanic" hypothesis became fashionable in England: John Mitchell Kemble asserted that the British were of "Northalbingian", that is, of Germanic origin. Prichard's over-interpretation of Thierry's book was, perhaps, unavoidable since he read it in the light of Kemble's "Anglo-Saxon" hypothesis. Prichard was no Celtic agitator, and yet he was not prepared to give up the assumption that many ancestors of contemporary Britons had been Celts. The notion that many centuries ago Celtic tribes had wandered from the east towards western Europe, suggested that both, the French and the British, were at least in part referable to a common Celtic stock.

The method by which Prichard tried to prove Thierry wrong was derived from Wilhelm von Humboldt. In 1821 Humboldt had shown that the Celts were not the first tribes to have arrived in Spain. A linguistic examinations of the names of villages and other geographical landmarks yielded the result that the Basque language was not related to the Celtic and that, as Prichard was to summarize it, "the Euscarian or Biscayan language was common to all the tribes of the Iberian race". To the very same sort of endeavour Prichard submitted the topographical names in France, Belgium, and Britain with the result that "the Celtic were the people of Gaul, and of Britain". Any attempt to pit the Celts of Brittany against those of Britain was futile. What mattered was alone the great antiquity of the entire Celtic stock (see plate XI on p.336).

Prichard was very far from crusading on behalf of some notion of Celtic supremacy. For him, another issue was at stake. It is figuratively
ancient Palestine, or one of Egypt, in which all the local terms are marked down correctly, would find no difficulty in recognising the Hebrew or Egyptian name wherever they appear. Egypt and Palestine, the country of infamous idolism vis-à-vis the land of righteousness! Did Prichard want his readers to identify France with Egypt, and Britain with Palestine? He did not say, but given that his literary style was characterized by the absence of metaphors and a sobriety verging to unimaginative dryness, the reference to Egypt and Palestine is certainly significant. The quotation reveals the internal map of his scholarship. Irrespective of the issues over which his contemporaries got heated, Prichard's theoretical point of departure was the Bible, the Hebrew language, ancient Canaan, and the question how the chosen people had degenerated into the contemporary varieties of mankind.

And this aspiration overruled most other issues. Humboldt's work on the Basque language had impressed Prichard enormously, not only in view of its methodological merits, but also in terms of its content: the Basque was, as Humboldt had shown, the remainder of another much older language not related to the Celtic. It belonged to a people which had entered Spain long before the Celts. We have seen that Prichard cherished the Celtic language because of its great antiquity. Once it turned out that there were other peoples whose languages were even older, even more primeval, he did not hesitate to endorse the fact. On the one hand he was happy to deduce that the modern descendant of the ancient Celtic was the Welsh language.

His historical theories of language surprised many, not least of all the French: "extraordinaire", William Frédéric Edwards remarked, employing a term whose English analogue would be the contemporary "ingenious". Edwards's comment on Prichard suggests that from the doctor's entire learned construction he picked up only one fact: Prichard had denied the existence of the Gaëls - "il pense", Edwards declared, "qu'il
n'y a pas de Gaëls en France". As a matter of fact, Prichard had claimed nothing of the kind. Both authors, Prichard and Edwards, overstated each other's tenets. Talking about the Celts was apparently a delicate matter. Antje Sommer is correct in referring the emphasis of racialist distinction, which was introduced in the 1820s and which gained in strength after the change of government in 1830, to political, republican interests.

An analogous movement in England was kicked off with the investigations into the Anglo-Saxon culture by John Mitchell Kemble who had studied philology in Munich and with Grimm in Göttingen. Jacob Grimm combined a notion of "Volkskunde" with philological erudition. As Dockhorn has pointed out, Kemble's philological works were part of contemporary British self-asserting patriotism. Much as Grimm underlined ancient Germanic religiosity and the stereotype of the Germanic need of freedom, Kemble emphasized the same qualities in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Grimm conjured up ideas of "völkisch" unity and "freedom" to attack the absolutism exerted in the German petty states. Kemble's understanding of Anglo-Saxon freedom was explicitly directed against the studies of Francis Palgrave (1788-1861) who had tried to prove that the existence of feudalism and a central monarchical power was a leading feature of the entire British history. Grimm lost his chair at Göttingen because of his liberal political views. Kemble was equally ill reputed; his patriotic rhetoric was too radical for the British government. As for Prichard, he did not refer to Palgrave's Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth (1832). Nor did he comment upon German eulogies on the ancient Germanic tribes. His heart was beating neither for the Teutons nor for the Anglo-Saxons. And he did not participate in the ensuing disputes.

In part this may have been due to the fact that he was not wholly participating in the philological debates of the capital. In favouring the Celtic hypothesis, and opposing Thierry as well as Barthold Georg
Niebuhr and Thomas Arnold, he revealed himself as being practically and mentally situated in the British provinces. As has been made clear, he took up German scholarship at a very early point. But he did not follow the continental tendencies to aligning philology to political interests. Prichard's theologically determined outlook also defied the notion of cultural progressivism and the attempt to pursue, what may be termed, patriotic philology. Another reason why he did not join the chorus of nineteenth-century nationalists, lies in the fact that he simply had no interest in the concept of the "people".

F. Responses to Prichard's Philology

The notion that British philology had remained overly long in the shadows of the German school was widespread in nineteenth-century Britain. The British Quarterly Review noted that "the establishment of an English school of philology dates no further back than the opening of the London University in 1828". The London chair of Oriental languages was given to Friedrich August Rosen who - having studied under Bopp in Berlin - personified German scholarship in England. By the 1840s, the independent scientific status of philology was institutionally cemented. In 1842, and at the initiative of Connop Thirlwall, Thomas Arnold, and a group of scholars around the German-born orientalist Friedrich August Rosen, the Philological Society was founded. Prichard, however, did not become a member. By 1842 he had come to see himself as an ethnologist, not so much as a philologist. Even though he venerated Rosen's scholarship, and could not possibly bypass influential figures like Hare, Thirlwall, and Arnold, it seems that his social relations were not extensive enough to make him slide automatically into the society. He had not much contact with the English scene and met only a few German visitors. Bopp, Schlegel, Lassen, Rosen, Burnouf - "all spent some time in this country, copying manuscripts at the East India
House, and receiving assistance from Wilkins, Colebrooke, Wilson, and other distinguished members of the old Indian Civil Service”, Friedrich Max Müller told his students in 1861. Prichard was quite aware of their importance: he quoted heavily from their texts. But there is no hint that he made their acquaintance.

Prichard did have his public stages, though. Especially important for the spread of his fame were the annual meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In 1847 the convention took place in London. Prichard chaired the section of ethnology. At this occasion Christian Carl Josias Bunsen, the Prussian Ambassador in London, had been invited to give a paper. Not without reason, Bunsen expected to meet no little amount of opposition. Germany did not enjoy much favour among the British general public. German metaphysics were ill-regarded in England, and German theology was deemed to be confused and verging on materialism. Many devout British philologists mistrusted the German school of Biblical criticism, represented by authors like Michaelis, the historian of the Roman Empire Barthold Georg Niebuhr, and - even worse - the christologist David Friedrich Strauss. Their works were seen by many as positively revolutionary. The tendencies of pietism and the movement of “Erweckung” which the critical movement developed out of the new criticism were largely disregarded. And the fact that Bunsen entertained good relations with the liberal Anglicans of the broad church - to whom he also introduced the 25-year old Müller - did not help either.

At the convention matters were not made easier through the presence of Prince Albert whose “Germanic intensity”, as David Cannadine has pointed out, "was generally frowned upon". Bunsen was aware that his appearance would not be universally acclaimed. Canvassing for scholarly support he urged two Germans, Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), an expert on Sanskrit, and the Celtologist Friedrich
Karl Meyer to join him. They met, indeed, outbursts of hostility. Not only Bunsen, but also Friedrich Max Müller was sniped at. Luckily for him, Prichard in the chair came to his rescue: "it was he", Müller recalled later, "who protected me most chivalrously against the somewhat frivolous objections of certain members, who were not over friendly towards Prince Albert, Chevalier Bunsen, and all that was called German in scholarship".

For the English anti-German opinion, it did not matter much that Bunsen himself criticized certain tenets of the critical school. In particular he regretted that it was not interested in the relations between Hebrew and Sanskrit and the question "if the Japhetic and Semitic nations are of the same stock". He said: "the ruling critical school, reducing everything to, and deducing everything from Sanscrit, turned a deaf ear to such questions". In his long talk, which Aarsleff rashly and unjustifiably has dismisses as "a welter of mutually contradictory facts and authorities", the Prussian scholar made many crucial points of which Prichard greatly approved.

Bunsen perceived his own philology to be philosophical. He scorned materialist philology. Though, he equally rejected Schlegel's "absolute spiritualism" for it "contradicts nature, as materialism contradicts mind". Not being based in any concrete body, it led to distortions of truth. It devised the history of language as a process of descent "from the height of consciousness to a state of decline". The result was the ill-founded dismissal of those languages which were reckoned to be most natural and the "decaying fragments of nobler formations": "The African languages in particular protest against such an unholy divorce in the human race". It was all an outcome of Schlegel's purely abstract distinction between "organic and atomistic languages" which Bunsen deemed to be "decidedly unhistorical". What he instead suggested was the gradual development of languages from perfection to
decay and back to perfection, following a succession of national "crises": "language changes by the very action of the national mind upon it".\textsuperscript{221} On these grounds Bunsen asserted 1. monogenesis of man and language; 2. an affinity between Sanskrit and Hebrew which he saw exemplified in the Egyptian language; 3. a development of types of languages, leading from the Hamitic over the Semitic to the Japhetic.\textsuperscript{222} This linguistic progression was independent from racial character. Bunsen vindicated the African languages on the grounds that these had advanced to the stage of Japhetism. Moreover, the Herderian notion of Volk, to which he subscribed was - as Frank Manuel has stressed - "not a biological one" but cultural and derived from Genesis.\textsuperscript{223} Nonetheless, the Germanic was seen by Bunsen as "the element which carried on the great stream of universal history".\textsuperscript{224} Bunsen's philosophy of language was, at one and the same time, patriotic, Euro-centric, and universally philanthropic.

In his approach to Bunsen (as to Grimm and Thierry) Prichard gave no attention to the concept of a dialectical process between national greatness and linguistic supremacy. If Bunsen's philology appealed to him it was because of its unified view of languages, developed on the background of Christian doctrines. Like Prichard, Bunsen aimed to demonstrate historical links between the doctrines of Christianity and the ancient religions of India and Egypt\textsuperscript{225} - a claim which the British doctor had made himself in his \textit{Analysis of the Egyptian Mythology} (1819) which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Prichard was happy to be able to count Bunsen among his allies, especially as, in the 1840s, he saw the British acceptance of monogenism crumble.\textsuperscript{226} He did not give up deducing the unity of mankind from linguistic arguments. However, the task was a lot more complex in the 1830s and 1840s than it had been in 1813. Thanks to the researches of his friend Francis William Newman (1805-1897), Prichard felt free to postulate relationships between the African idioms and the Semitic.\textsuperscript{227}
Thanks to Bunsen, the Semitic and Egyptian were linked to the Sanskrit. Thanks to Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Sanskrit was connected to the Polynesian languages.\textsuperscript{228} Prichard stipulated that some of the greatest language families were in one way or other related to each other: "1. The idiom of the Shemite nations: 2. the languages of North-Eastern Asia, akin to the Turkish, Mongolian, and Tungusian: 3. The Coptic: 4. Several African languages".\textsuperscript{229} Elsewhere he mentioned that a relationship between the Chinese and the Egyptian had been established.\textsuperscript{230} The American languages, finally, were added to this happy union thanks to the works of Jean-Etienne du Ponceau.\textsuperscript{231}

Among those with whom Prichard came into contact, Bunsen was one of the very few who believed that it might be possible to provide the missing link between the Sanskrit and the Hebrew. He even went so far as to accuse those who spoke against this - namely Bopp and Schlegel - of methodological deficiency,\textsuperscript{232} Prichard cherished Bunsen a lot. He dedicated \textit{The Natural History of Man} (1843) to him. Bunsen, for his part, certainly respected the quiet scholar whose erudition was, if somewhat pedantic, also deep and comprehensive. He admired Prichard as an ethnologist.\textsuperscript{233} As to Prichard's philology, he was less enthusiastic.\textsuperscript{234} At the BAAS meeting Bunsen delivered his paper after Prichard had spoken (the doctor had, once more, deduced monogenesis from the genealogy of languages). Bunsen underlined his merits for ethnology, but when talking about the Celtic language, he did not mention Prichard at all.\textsuperscript{235}

How little, in effect, the Prussian thought of Prichard's philology came out shortly after the latter's death in 1848. In his \textit{Christianity and Mankind} the Baron surveyed the history of philology. It was telling that he classed Prichard together with Adelung among the predecessors of truly modern scholars such as Schlegel, Bopp, and Grimm. The section in which Prichard's philological merits were discussed comprised the years from 1700 to 1807. Bunsen stressed that Prichard himself would not think
of himself as a philologist: "Prichard had no such pretension: he was not a scholar in any language, except Kymri (his own native tongue) and English; but he had a sound knowledge of Greek, Latin, and German, and good taste in selecting and naming his masters, and in learning where he could not teach".236

Bunsen was one of Prichard's most important acquaintances.237 But the relationship between the socially influential diplomat and the provincial scholar was rather unbalanced. Bunsen, indeed, knew Prichard so little that he thought that his native tongue had been Welsh. Such an error was a bit much for Prichard's peers. At a subsequent session of the Ethnological Society the president John Conolly, the famous alienist, remarked: "I cannot omit to notice an injustice to Dr. P. [sic]". Conolly noted that Prichard was a scholar, being not only of one, but "of both universities" (Oxford and Cambridge). And he stressed Prichard's achievements in Celtic studies.238

A survey of the responses to Prichard's philology shows that he was being acclaimed by general reviewers.239 William Whewell believed that philology did for ethnology what geology did for the history of the earth: "to execute such a design as [Prichard's], we must combine the knowledge of the physiological laws of nature with the tradition of history and the philosophical comparison of languages".240 The specialists, by contrast, tended to react like Bunsen: they admired Prichard's ethnology. As for his philological endeavours, their praise was muted.

Müller counted among those who praised Prichard's ethnology and stayed silent over his philology.241 John Mitchell Kemble and Jacob Grimm would not refer to Prichard in their correspondence.242 Equally, Bunsen and Alexander von Humboldt made no mention of him in theirs.243 In Wilhelm August Schlegel's huge library, none of Prichard's books figured other than a translation of the Egyptian Mythology.
which Schlegel had contributed a critical foreword. Berthold Delbrück did not mention Prichard in his *Introduction to the Study of Language* (1880). Paul Broca found noteworthy only the fact that Prichard rejected the term "Semitic" in favour of "Syro-Arabian" because he was "se plaisant au point de vue biblique". Theodor Benfey recorded Prichard's book on the Celtic language, but he left no doubt that Bopp's work was by far more advanced.

Shortly after Prichard's death, it became increasingly customary to denounce philology as an aid in the attempt to prove monogenesis. It was a coincidence, in part, perhaps, attributable to the fact that Prichard had disappeared from the scene. No longer were his reviews to be read. Nor did he sit on the panels of the Bristol Institution, the BAAS, and the meetings of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association. His place was filled by men who did not necessarily share his views. After his death he was deemed an example of the saying "a prophet is not without honour save in his own country".

In 1857 a second edition of Prichard's *Eastern Origin* was published, annotated by Prichard's former disciple, the ethnologist Robert Gordon Latham (1812-1888). Latham advocated a combined approach of philology and physiology to ethnological research. Otherwise, he believed, the picture of a nation's historical origins was liable to be distorted:

> A common language is *prima facie* in favour of a common lineage. But it is by no means conclusive. If naturalists and anatomists have laid undue stress upon differences in the way of physical conformation, and, so doing, have disparaged the phenomena of speech, philologues and scholars, ignorant of physiology, have too often overrated them.

It would not have occurred to Latham to question the doctrine of monogenism. Yet, in other respects he diverted from Prichard's
opinions. "It is, clearly, easier for a Negro to be converted into a Frenchman in the matter of language, than in that of colour", he remarked, thus denying the emphasis which his teacher had laid on the fact that skin colour was one of the ethnologically least meaningful characteristics. In fact, choosing Latham as an editor of *The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations* amounted to subjecting Prichard's book to severe criticism: Latham was famous for controverting the very thesis that was expressed in the title of the book: he denied that the Indo-European nations, including the Celts, originated in the region between India and the Caspian Sea.

In the decades after Prichard's death there were many philologists who assumed that the study of languages proved monogenism. Joan Leopold has claimed that "from 1850-70 perhaps the majority of comparative philologists accepted the principle that in the classification of contemporary human 'races' linguistic criteria were the most reliable and should supersede as yet scarcely formularized ethnological criteria such as hair, eye and cuticle colour or cranial and skeletal measurement".

But there were important philologists who do not fit Joan Leopold's Bill. The polygenist August Friedrich Pott (1802-1887), for example, a Professor of comparative philology at the University of Halle, believed that it was not admissible to base a proof of ethnological unity on the argument of linguistic affinity. Accordingly, he did not attempt to deduce his polygenist notions from philological arguments. Gradually the opinion spread that ethnology could and must not rely on the study of language. Friedrich Max Müller, for example, had come to this conclusion already by 1860:

The problem of the common origin of languages has no necessary connection with the problem of the common origin of mankind. If it
could be proved that languages had had different beginnings, this would in nowise necessitate the admission of different beginnings of the human race. ... The science of language and the science of ethnology have both suffered most seriously from being mixed up together.255

Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century and after Darwinism had gained ground, ethnology and philology had become separated. So it is all the more interesting that Prichard's approach has recently been revived: since the 1960s the historian of genetics Luca Cavalli-Sforza has been trying to establish correlations between genetic affiliations and linguistic affinities.256
Even though the terms "philology" and "linguistics" have slightly different meanings, I have used the words interchangeably so as to avoid unpleasant repetitions.

See ch. 1


Ibid., 237.


It has been shown that the characteristics of nineteenth-century philology were already extant earlier, and that the approaches of the eighteenth century survived well into the nineteenth century. It seems that Foucault has unduly neglected the ancient distinctions between Platonism and Aristotelianism: the Platonic notion that ideas lay at the basis of words was upheld even in the nineteenth century. And in so far as nineteenth-century Idealists tried to reassert their standpoint, their age-old arguments would not give way to a new "episteme". See Salmon's assertion that morphological investigations began already in the eighteenth century: Paul B. Salmon, "The Beginning of Morphology: Linguistic Botanizing in the 18th century", Historiographia Linguistica, 1 (1974), 313-339. Grafton has pointed out that nineteenth-century philology was rooted in older classical traditions: Anthony Grafton, "Polyhistor into Philolog: Notes on the Transformation of German Classical Scholarship, 1780-1850", History of Universities, 3 (1983), 159-192.


9 Tullio de Mauro, Lia Formigari, Leibniz, Humboldt and the Origins of Comparativism, Amsterdam (J. Benjamins), 1990.


12 Shaffer, "Kubla Khan", 13.


15 August Wilhelm von Schlegel, Julius von Klaproth and Christian Carl Josias Bunsen preferred to speak of "Indo-Germanic" languages. Most other scholars, and especially those outside Germany referred rather to the "Indo-European" languages. The distinction entailed views about the origin of civilization in Europe.


18 For the institutional development of French philology see: Raymond Schwab, La renaissance orientale, Paris (Payot), 1950, 89-92.


20 Cf. For Humboldt's contribution to creating a scientific community in Berlin see also: Hubert Laitko et al., Wissenschaft in Berlin, Berlin (Dietz), 1987.


32 The Scot Vans Kennedy (1784-1846) was a major-general in India with a profound interest in Sanskrit and Persian. He was seen as a "reclusive, self-denying" scholar, who in the course of his military career was English-Persian interpreter to the Peshawa's subsidiary force. He contributed several papers to the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (cf. DNB, Supplement, 1901, vol. 3; for Lockhart see DNB, vol. 34).

33 Aarsleff, The Study of Language, 208.

34 Beyer states that German methods of philology began to influence British linguistics only in the second half of the nineteenth century; see: Arno Beyer, Deutsche Einflüsse auf die englische Sprachwissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, 22. A similar opinion was put forward by Patrice Bergheaud, apart from Aarsleff certainly one of the greatest experts of English philology; see his "De James Harris à Horne Tooke", 38. While these authors see the scholarly tide changing in the


Beyer, *Deutsche Einflüsse auf die englische Sprachwissenschaft*, 73, 89, 113. For Wiseman see also Dockhorn who points out that Wisemann undertook to put modern philology in line with old-style orthodoxy (*Der Deutsche Historismus in England*, 270). Beyer also (wrongly) credits Prichard for having introduced the term "Indo-European" into the English language (see p. 75 and note 33 on p. 99 in Beyer's book; for the correct attribution see note 49 below). Despite the great merits of his book, Beyer's references to Prichard are somewhat sloppy: His middle name is distorted to "Cawley", and Beyer takes the first and second edition of the *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind* to be two volumes of one edition (see p. 73).


He mentioned Sir William Jones as well as William Marsden (a British orientalist, author of a History of Sumatra who served with the East India Company in Sumatra) and Peter Simon Pallas (the compiler of vocabularies of Asian languages). Prichard, Disputatio inauguralis de generis humani varietate, Edinburgi (Abernethy and Walker), 1808, 85, 134-135, 138, 142, 146, 89, 93-94.

Prichard, Researches. 1. ed., 460-463.

Ibid., 469.

Barton had published, in 1798, a book called New Views on the Origin of the Tribes and Nations of America, see: Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 549.

Ibid., 544, 252, 276, 315.

See ch. 9..

Sir William Jones, "The Third Anniversary Discourse, delivered 2 February, 1786", in: idem, Discourses Delivered at the Asiatick Society: 1785-1792, ed. by Roy Harris, London, Tokyo (Routledge, Thoemmes), 1993, 24-46, p. 34. According to Joan Leopold, Thomas Young was the first British author who used the adjective Indo-European "to designate Eurasian languages, including Semitic and Dravidian", see: Leopold, "Applications of the Aryan Theory of Race to India, 1850-

50 John Pinkerton, Dissertation on the Origin and Progress of the Scythians or Goths, being an Introduction to the Ancient and Modern History of Europe, London (John Nichols), 1787, 69. Pinkerton's tract excited much outrage. Demandt has stated that Pinkerton was already advancing "a sort of Indo-Germanic hypothesis", for he took Greeks and Romans to be of Germanic origin; cf. Alexander Demandt, Der Fall Roms. Die Auflösung des römischen Reiches im Urteil der Nachwelt, München (Beck), 1984, 132.

51 In his dissertation he quoted Pinkerton several times; Prichard, Disputatio inauguralis, 93, 105, 143.

52 Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", lxiii.

53 Prichard, Disputatio inauguralis, 137 ("similitudo linguarum congenerum populorum maximum argumentum est").


55 Adelung, Mithridates, vol. 1, x, xiii.


57 Franz Bopp, Ueber das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache in Vergleichung mit jenem der griechischen, lateinischen, persischen und germanischen Sprache..., ed. by Karl Josef Windischmann, Frankfurt (Andreäische Buchhandlung), 1816.

58 Jacob Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, Göttingen (Dieterich), 1818. An amended version of the first volume came out in 1822, a second volume in 1826, altogether the work comprises four volumes. But the groundwork was set down by 1826.

59 [Anon.], "Adelung's History of Languages", British Review, 6 (1815), 476-523; [Thomas Young], "Adelung's General History of Language", Quarterly Review, 10 (1813), 250-292. Prichard had read the latter, see: Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 492.

60 Prichard made a remark to that effect in his Researches, 2. ed., 1826, vol. 1, 492.

61 Ibid., vol. 1, 490, 501.

62 Ibid., vol. 1, 492-493, vol. 2, 168. John Jamieson (1759-1838) was born in Glasgow. At the age of 22 he became a dissenting minister. His spare time was devoted to inquiries into the antiquities of the Scottish language. Alexander Murray (1775-1813) was the son of a shepherd whose intellectual distinction acquired him a place at Edinburgh university; in 1812 he was (against considerable opposition by Dugald
Stewart) appointed professor of oriental languages in Edinburgh. Cf. DNB, vols 29, 39. In The Eastern Origin Prichard would also refer often to the works of the Celtologist George Chalmers (see note 136 below).

63 Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 2, 2. Turner set out to show the affinities between Anglo-Saxon, Arabic, Chinese, Malay, Japanese, Turkish, and Tonga, cf. Aarsleff, The Study of Language, 169. Turner (1768-1847) is one of those scholars who showed themselves "completely impervious to the new German criticism", see DNB vol. 57.

64 Prichard quoted a long passus from Schlegel’s Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier in which Schlegel asserted that the similarity consisted not just in similar vocabularies, but also in "the innermost structure and grammar" ("die innerste Structur und Grammatik") from which Schlegel concluded that the affinity must be due to common descent, see: Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 2, 501-502.

65 Ibid., 606-609.
66 Ibid., vol. 2, 611.
67 Idem, The Eastern Origin, 10f.
69 Jespersen, Language, 32.
71 Koerner, "Friedrich Schlegel", 280.
72 Timpanaro, "Friedrich Schlegel and the Beginnings of Indo-European Linguistics in Germany", xxxivf. The same point is taken up by Bernal who, moreover, contends unjustifiably that Schlegel was a linguistic polygenist. Bernal's argument is ill-founded: Schlegel simply refused to acknowledge contemporary speculations about the affinity between the Sanskrit and Arabian languages. From this, Bernal wrongly concludes that Schlegel was a polygenist. See: Martin Bernal, Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, 2 vols, London (Vintage), 1991 (1987), vol. 1, 231. Schlegel, Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier, London, Tokyo (Routledge, Thoemmes), 1995 (orig. 1808), 85 (all quotes are from this edition if not otherwise stated).
73 Koerner, "Friedrich Schlegel", 277.
74 For Adelung see Wyss, Die wilde Philologie, 100. Cf. also Schlegel, Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier, 52; Wilhelm von Humboldt saw the "arrestation" of a development of language merely as "seeming"; the question, then, was when and how a language, such as the Chinese would continue to evolve, see his Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus und ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts, London, Tokyo (Routledge, Thoemmes), 1995 (1836), 184. The text serves as Introduction to Humboldt's work on the Javanese Kawi language. How the European perception of China changed over time is well depicted in: W. Demel, "Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden", Historische Zeitschrift, 255 (1992), 625-666. For an overview of Sinologist philology

75 Humboldt discussed the "Hauptunterschied der Sprachen nach der Reinheit ihres Bildungsprincips"; he stated that "thought and language add to mutually perfecting each other"; see his Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus, 184-190, 279.


77 See Wilhelm von Humboldt, Lettre a M. Abel-Rémusat, sur la nature des formes grammaticales en général, et sur le génie de la langue chinoise en particulier, Paris (Dondey-Dupré Père), 1827 (the letter is dated 7. 3, 1826). Abel Rémusat studied medicine. But his interests lay with philology. In 1814 a chair of Chinese studies was founded for him at the Collège de France. In 1822 he founded the Société Asiatique in Paris. Like Prichard, he thought that philology was a key to ethnology; cf. Nouvelle biographie universelle, vols 39 and 41.


79 See Sweet's review in Historiographia Linguistica, 16 (1989), 387-392, p. 390. Du Ponceau had studied law, he pursued a military career. He was a scholar of American Indian idioms and the Chinese language.


81 Ibid., 3. ed., vol. 4, 481.

82 Ibid., 3. ed., vol. 4, 480-482.

83 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 4, 541-542. In Humboldt's work the original passage had ended: "Wie paradox es daher klingt, so halte ich es dennoch für ausgemacht, daß im Chinesischen gerade die scheinbare Abwesenheit aller Grammatik die Schärfe des Sinnes, den formalen Zusammenhang der Rede zu erkennen, im Geiste der Nation erhöht..."; see: Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus, 324. Prichard had adopted Humboldt's thoughts about the interdependency between development of language and development (or absence) of letters; see his Researches, 3. ed., vol. 4, 542-543.


85 The notion that German itself was already a degenerate form had
already been put forward by Herder; cf. Jespersen, *Language*, 29. It was endorsed by August Wilhelm Schlegel; cf. Arens, *Sprachwissenschaft*, 190f. Humboldt too stated that the fertile principle of languages, their flexions, was more abundant in the youth of a language; see his *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die U bewohnter Hispaniens vermittelst der Vaskischen [sic] Sprache*, Berlin (Dümmler), 1821, 282.


87 Schlegel, *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 50f ("In der indischen oder griechischen Sprache ist jede Wurzel wahrhaft das, was der Name sagt, und wie ein lebendiger Keim, denn weil die Verhältnißbegriffe durch innre Veränderung bezeichnet werden, so ist der Entfaltung freier Spielraum gegeben, die Fülle der Entwicklung kann ins Unbestimmte sich ausbreiten, und ist oftmals in der That bewunderungswürdig reich"). The English translation is quoted from: Tsiapera, "Organic Metaphor", 580.

88 See Dyck, *Athen und Jerusalem*, ch. 6, Schlegel's quote is from p. 91.


90 Jespersen, *Language*, 32ff. That the Semitic languages were inflective, too, had also been mentioned by Humboldt. Still, he considered them as imperfect compared to the Indo-European ones; cf. Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus, 307.


92 Tsiapera, "Organic Metaphor", 582.

93 Verburg, "Linguistic Conceptions of Bopp", 454, 449.


96 Ibid., 212. Klaproth added: "même une connaissance peu étendue de ces idiomes suffit pour renverser la doctrine des racines de trois consonnes ou de deux syllabes, et pour démontrer que ces prétendues racines ne sont réellement que des mots composés d'une syllabe de deux consonnes et d'une voyelle intermédiaire, et d'une autre consonne finale, laquelle modifie l'idée primitive de la racine" (ibid. 213-214).

97 Similar views had been advanced by Johann David Michaelis, by the German Biblicist and Hebrew philologist Friedrich Heinrich Wilhelm

98 Klaproth's *Asia polyglotta* was particularly valuable for him, see: Prichard, Researches, 2. ed., vol. 1, 2-3, 493; vol. 2, 10, 30, 193, 216; 3. ed., vol. 2, 216; vol. 3, 276; vol. 4, 52. After the highly admired geographer Carl Ritter had declared Klaproth to be outdated, Prichard took liberty to criticize Klaproth where his findings would not conform with Prichard's. See Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 3, 131, 398. Still, Prichard relied often and heavily on Klaproth.


100 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed. vol. 4, 554-555.

101 Ibid., 457ff.

102 Ibid., vol. 3, 209.

103 Ibid., vol. 4, 547.

104 Ibid., 549-551.

105 The opposition between "synthetic' and "analytic" languages goes back to August Wilhelm von Schlegel, who, unlike his brother, applied it to the Indo-European language group, to languages, that is, which belong to one and the same family. Cf. Arens, *Sprachwissenschaft*, 189-191.


107 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 4, 555. Prichard translated Humboldt's phrase: "Der bei drei Consonanten mögliche Syllbenumfang lud gleichsam dazu ein, die mannigfaltigen Beziehungen der Wörter durch Vocalwechsel anzudeuten...". Cf. Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus*, 307-315, esp. 308-309. It is interesting to compare Prichard's praise for the Hebrew with the words of cardinal Wiseman. While the former cherished Hebrew for its complexity, Wiseman celebrated - more in the tradition of Lowth and Eichhorn - its primitiveness: "the Semitic family, destitute of particles and grammatical forms suited to express the relations of things, stiffened by an unyielding construction, and confined by the dependence for words upon verbal roots to ideas of outward action, could not lead the mind to abstract or abstruse ideas; and hence its dialects have been ever adapted for the simplest historical narratives, and for the most exquisite poetry" (Wiseman, *Twelve Lectures*, 139).


109 Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus*. 441
312, 313-314, 315.


111 A movement greatly enhanced through the writings of Johann Christian Winckelmann, see Alex Potts, Flesh and the Ideal, Winckelmann and the Origins of Art History, New Haven, London (Yale Univ. Press), 1994, 160. See also: Bernal, Black Athena; Raymond Schwab, La renaissance orientale.

112 Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece, 69; C. C. J. Bunsen, "On the Results of the Recent Egyptian Researches in Reference to Asiatic and African Ethnology, and the Classification of Languages", in: Bunsen, Charles Meyer, Max Müller, Three Linguistic Dissertations. Read at the Meeting of the British Association in Oxford (from the Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science for 1847), London (Richard and John E. Taylor), 1848, 254-299, 270.


114 Vans Kennedy, Researches into the Origin and Affinity of the Principal Languages of Asia and Europe, London (Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green), 1828, 216.

115 Jones, "Discourse the Ninth on the Origin and Families of Nations, delivered 23 February, 1792", in: idem, Discourses, 185-204, p. 199.


117 [Thomas Young], "Jamieson and Townsend on Ancient Languages", Quarterly Review, 14 (1815-1816), 96-112, p. 96-97.

118 Koerner, "Friedrich Schlegel", 277-278.


120 See the quotes mentioned under notes 91 and 92 in ch. 5.


122 Nonetheless, Prichard was puzzled about the fact that the Hebrew appeared "extinct"; cf. ibid., 3. ed., vol. 4, 575-576. Obviously, the language survived among Jewish communities, but that was a circumstance to which Prichard paid no attention.

123 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 5, 235. See also ch. 5, section B.

124 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed. vol. 5, 235. There had been theories which claimed that Chaldean was not only independent from the Hebrew but also of greater antiquity. See Paolo Rossi, The Dark Abyss of Time, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Chicago, London (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1984, 133. As this quote reveals Prichard declared the Chaldeans and the Hebrews to be of the same stock.


126 See ch. 4, section D; ch. 7, section B.

128 Ibid., 604-605.
129 See ch. 7, section B.
131 Franz Bopp, Die Celtischen Sprachen in ihrem Verhältnisse zum Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Germanischen, Litthauischen und Slawischen, Berlin (Dümmler), 1839; Lorenz Dieffenbach, Celtica I. Sprachliche Documente zur Geschichte der Kelten; zugleich als Beitrag zur Sprachforschung überhaupt, Stuttgart (Imle & Liesching), 1839; Adolphe Pictet, De l'affinité des langues celtiques avec le sanscrit, Paris (Benjamin Duprat), 1837.
133 Even the second edition of the Researches stayed silent over the Celtic question. As Prichard was later to explain: "The extent which my work necessarily assumed, and the apparent incongruity of filling up any considerable part of a physiological essay with glossaries or remarks in grammatical forms" had kept him from applying himself to the subject; see his The Eastern Origin, 23.
136 Cf. also: [Walter Scott], "Ancient History of Scotland", Quarterly Review, 41 (1829), 120-162. Pinkerton was depicted as a very influential author. The cultural eminence which he assigned to the Goths over the Celts was retained by the Glaswegian John Jamieson (1759-1838), the author of a dictionary of the Scottish language. Another of the more famous philologists of the early nineteenth century was George Chalmers (1742-1825) who, according to Walter Scott, "raised a banner against Pinkerton". Unlike Jamieson, Chalmers stayed unaffected by the anti-Celtic atmosphere as well as by modern trends in science, and did his best to defy Pinkerton.

138 Prichard, *Researches*, 3. ed., vol. 2, note on p. 25. The question was tricky, though; for Prichard thought the Punic to be "pure Hebrew", in *The Eastern Origin* - as we will see - he did his best to prove that Hebrew and Celtic were related.


140 Prichard, *The Eastern Origin*, 20f. Prichard quoted Pinkerton's remark that the Celts were "natural savages"; see his *Researches*, 3. ed., vol. 3, 189-190. It would be tempting to interpret Pinkerton's anti-Celtic scorn as a reaction to the "Celtic" peril from across the channel. Yet, such an assertion would be anachronistic: Pinkerton's contempt was mainly directed against the Irish and the Highland Scots.


142 Kennedy, *The Principal Languages of Asia and Europe*, 215.


145 See note 62 above.

146 Indeed, Prichard enjoyed Conybeare's favour. Also with respect to their theological views, the two men had much in common. What Conybeare did for geology, Prichard had set out to do for ethnology and philology. In a certain sense it can be said that William Whewell's programmatic announcements about the affinities between philology and geology were prefigured by the fact that Prichard's philological work was dedicated to a geologist. Finally, it is conceivable that the book came out not least thanks to Conybeare's connections, this would at least explain why it - unlike Prichard's other works - was published in Oxford.

147 There is no evidence that Prichard was acquainted with Jacob Grimm.


149 Ibid., 70-71.

150 The *Eclectic Review*, an avowedly Christian journal, was convinced by Prichard's argument and quite elated about the fact that he had thus


152 The Eastern Origin, chs 6 and 5.

153 Ibid., 124-133; [Richard Garnett], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", Quarterly Review, 57 (1836), 80-110, p. 100. The fact that this review appeared only in 1836 makes it appear likely that it was motivated by the appearance of the first volume of the third edition of the Researches.

154 [Garnett], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", 93.


157 In the introduction to his work he had explained why the Celtic was so far removed from the bulk of the Indo-European languages: it was due to the fact that the Celts had peopled Europe so much earlier than all the other tribes, or, in Murray's words: "...before any of the European races parted from the original stock, the language had attained a state of composition, and had begun to be inflected. The Celtae brought from the East the language in that condition, but the long wanderings, and the savage solitude, which they experienced in the West, destroyed the finer parts of their original speech, and corrupted it by a careless and slovenly articulation". Quoted from: [Thomas Young], "Jamieson and Townsend on Ancient Languages", 111.

158 The Eclectic Review said that Prichard "addressed himself" to the problem of the Celtic dialects "in the spirit of the great continental etymologists". Prichard was praised as the first to have worked "on just philosophical principles"; cf. [anon.], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", 1840, 33. (The journal dedicated a second review to The Eastern Origin because Bopp's Celtic researches had appeared in 1839; see: Beyer, Deutsche Einflüsse auf die englische Sprachwissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, 178.)

159 The same sort of approval came from the Eclectic Review; [anon.], "Prichard on the Celtic Nations", 145-157.

160 A. W. Schlegel, 'De l'origine des Hindous", 442-444. This statement was reiterated a few years later by William Donaldson, who otherwise respected Prichard's philological endeavours. William Donaldson, The New Cratylus, 35 (for his praise of Prichard's ethnographical inferences from philology see p. 43).


162 [Garnett], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", 85.

163 This was, in Garnett's view, obviously wrong: "it being well nown
that the barbarous South-Sea islanders have many more [pronouns] than the most cultivated Europeans"; cf. [anon.], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", 109.


165 Prichard, The Eastern Origin, 107-108. Prichard remarked that in both, Hebrew and Celtic, the third person of the future tense equalled the root of the verb. As Kliger has shown, attempts to show relationships between Celtic and Hebraic idioms were very old, employing a source as old as Flavius Josephus's History of the Jewish War; see: Samuel Kliger, The Goths in England, 291-293.

166 Prichard, The Eastern Origin, see: "Note on the Semitic Languages" at the end of the text.


170 [Garnett], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", 86.

171 Ibid., 87 (emphasis in the original). Indeed, Prichard's discussion of the Hebrew triliteralism which was mentioned above, was published only in 1844 - it is unlikely that he having studied Michaelis and Eichhorn was not aware of triliteralism. But it was only after he had read Humboldt's great linguistic work from 1836 that he discussed it.

172 [Garnett], "Prichard on the Celtic Languages", 93, 100.


174 See note 131 above.

175 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 4, 603-605. Prichard mentioned with a certain amount of disapproval that Wilhelm August Schlegel had referred these "Ugrian" tribes to the Celtic stem (see Schlegel, "De l'origine des Hindous", 440). Lithuanians and Pruthenians in particular spoke a language which, in Prichard's words, "differed considerably from the other Eastern European dialects, and preserved the forms of the Sanskrit in a much purer and less altered state. It must be considered as a branch springing more immediately from the original stock"; see his Researches, 3. ed., vol. 3, 460f. Nowadays, the classificatory term of "Ugrian" has been given up. Instead the languages of North-Eastern Europe and of the area around the Ural, including the Hungarian, Finnish, Lapp, and Estonian are referred to as "Uralic-Yukaghir"; cf. L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, Alberto Piazza, The History and Geography of Human Genes, Princeton (Princeton Univ. Press), 1994, 99, 263.

176 Cf. Prichard, "On the Recent Progress of Ethnology", Anniversary Address for 1848 to the Ethnological Society of London, Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal, 46 (1848), 53-72, 69-70. The same point was

177 Ibid., vol. 3, 267.

178 Ibid., 327, 266-267. Prichard drew heavily on Ferdinand Heinrich Müller, Der Ugrische Volksstamm, oder Untersuchungen über die Ländergebiete am Ural und am Kaukasus in historischer, geographischer und ethnographischer Beziehung, Berlin (Duncker und Humblot), 1837. Concerning the Finnish, he frequently referred to Friedrich Rühns, Finland [sic] und seine Bewohner, Leipzig (Göschen), 1809. The Ugrian peoples belong to a division of what nowadays is being referred to as the Ural-Altaic peoples, the term is of Russian origin and refers to peoples east of the Ural mountains (see "Ugrian" in the Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 8).


181 The correlations between social standing and the preference for particular historiographical notions in the period before the 1850s is as yet hardly explored, especially as far as the British context is concerned. For a few insightful remarks on the subject see: Tom Shippey, "Slaying, Pillaging, Burning, Ravishing, and Thus Gratifying a Laudable Taste for Adventure", London Review of Books, 8. June 1995, 16-17.

182 Augustin Thierry, Histoire de la conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands, de ses causes, et de ses suites jusqu'à nos jours, en Angleterre, en Écosse, en Irlande et sur le continent, 3 vols, Paris (Firmin Didot), 1825. Amédée Thierry: Histoire des Gaulois depuis les temps les plus reculés jusque’ à l’entiëre soumission de la Gaule à la domination romaine, 1828. William Frédéric Edwards bolstered Amédée Thierry's opinion when he emphasised how few people were necessary to accomplish a conquest: 60 000 men could conquer Britain, but they would not be able to change the racial stock of the British; see his 'Fragments d’un Mémoire sur les Gaëls", Mémoires de la société ethnologique, 2 (1845), 13-47, p. 40f; see also: Edwards, Des caractères physiologiques des races humaines considérés dans leurs rapports avec l'histoire, Lettre à Amédée Thierry, Paris (Compère jeune), 1829.

183 Edwards, "Fragments d'un mémoire sur les Gaëls", 23. John Burrow has pointed out that the same movement was taking place in Italy under the intellectual guidance of Sismondi; see John Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 178.


187 Ibid., 54.

188 Ibid., 112. For the source of the quote see Wilhelm von Humboldt, Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens. Interpretations of this work are to be found in Hans Helmut Christmann, "Wilhelm von Humboldts Schriften zum Baskischen und sein Begriff der Analogie", in: Francisco J. Oroz et al. (eds.), Vincula Tubingensis. Studia in honorem Antonii Tovar, Tübingen (Narr), 1984, 85-88; Jean Rousseau, "Les trois méthodes de la comparaison chez Wilhelm von Humboldt", in: Aarsleff et al. (eds), Papers in the History of Linguistics, 461-464.

189 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 3, 55; idem, "On the Recent Progress of Ethnology", 72. Prichard was proud to follow Humboldt in the application of this method. Klaus Dockhorn has praised Mitchell Kemble for having been the first to take up Humboldt's method. Erroneously so. Prichard, it must be said, came first. See Dockhorn, Der Deutsche Historismus, 125.


191 Humboldt, Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens, esp. 177, 179.
198 Sommer, "William Frédéric Edwards, 'Rasse' als Grundlage europäischer Geschichtsdeutung?".
201 There was even a German philologist who attempted to show that Latin was derived from the Germanic; see: Ernst Jäkel, Der Germanische Ursprung der Lateineschen [sic] Sprache und des Römischen Volkes, Berlin und Breslaw (Johann Friedrich Korn), 1831. Kemble published a review of the book: "Notice of E. Jäkel's Germanische Ursprung der Lateineschen [sic] Sprache", Foreign Quarterly Review, 10 (1832), 365-411.
204 [Anon.], "Ethnology - The Unity of Mankind", British Quarterly
205 Aarsleff, The Study of Language, 177-178, 211-263.

206 See the list of members in the Proceedings of the Philological Society, vol. 1, 1844.


208 What it was that prevented Prichard from joining the Society is, unfortunately, a matter of pure speculation. But it is telling that he was not mentioned in the articles published in the Proceedings of the Society between 1842 and 1848.


206 See the list of members in the Proceedings of the Philological Society, vol. 1, 1844.


214 Friedrich Max Müller, My Autobiography. A Fragment, London (Longmans, Green), 1901, 198-199, 203-205. Müller remembered: "Of course I did not know what sort of thing this British Association was, but Bunsen said he would explain it all to me, only I must at once sit down and write a paper. ... Bunsen ... wanted Fr. Karl Meyer and myself to support him, the former with a paper on Celtic Philology, and myself with a paper on the Aryan and Aboriginal Languages of India. ...'we must show them what we have done in Germany for the history and philosophy of language,' he said, 'and I reckon on your help.' I was fearfully nervous, for, as Prince Albert was to be present, ever so many distinguished people had flocked to the meeting, and likewise some not very friendly ethnologists, such as Dr. Latham, and Dr. Crawford, known by the name of the Objector General ...".

215 Müller, My Autobiography, 204.

216 Bunsen, "On the Results of the Recent Egyptian Researches in Reference to Asiatic and African Ethnology, and the Classification of Languages", 271.

ethnological term "Turanian" to Bunsen (ibid., 99): Bunsen himself
professed to have adopted the term from the historian Arnold
Hermann Ludwig Heeren und the geographer Carl Ritter (see his
"Recent Egyptian Researches", 296). Broca later ridiculed Bunsen's
ethnology; see: Paul Broca, "La linguistique et l'anthropologie",
Bulletins de la société d'anthropologie de Paris, 3 (1862), 264-319, p.
269-271.

218 He was following Schlegel and Humboldt, and as Burrow has pointed
out: Hegel, see his "The Uses of Philology", 195.

219 Bunsen, "Recent Egyptian Researches", 286.

220 Ibid., 265, 298-299, 286.

221 Ibid., 277, 291-292. "Every language", Bunsen said, "has in itself an
element of progress, which in a crisis may become the element of
death to the old, and of life in a new one. ... A new language and a
new nation are so far identical, as a new language cannot originate
without the dissolution of an ancient nationality". His
contemporaries noticed how much weight Bunsen put on the
exchange between language and nationhood. See: [William
Donaldson], "Bunsen on Egypt", Quarterly Review, 78 (1846), 145-174,
esp. 149.

222 Bunsen, "Recent Egyptian Researches", 255, 295.

223 Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods,
Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard Univ. Press), 1959, 291-292. For Bunsen's
theology see also: Ortrud Mass, "Das Christentum in der
Weltgeschichte. Theologische Vorstellungen bei Christian Carl Josias

224 Bunsen, "Recent Egyptian Researches", 297-298.

225 Quoted from Aarsleff, The Study of Language, p. x. For Bunsen's
scholarly outlook see: Burrow, "The Uses of Philology", 195-196.

226 Prichard's and Bunsen's opinions were split in view of the question
how far Scriptural chronology had to be extended, Bunsen dating the
Deluge at 10 000 b. c. e. Otherwise, however, Prichard could not agree
more with Bunsen; for Bunsen's timescale see: Bynum, "Time's
Noblest Offspring", 404; for Prichard's criticism of Bunsen see his

227 Francis William Newman, the brother of John Henry, spent a few
years in Bristol, teaching at Bristol College. Even though he
increasingly lost faith in the ability of philology to prove the unity of
mankind, he delved extensively into linguistic comparisons between
African idioms and Hebrew. It proved a fruitful approach: nowadays
the Semitic and the African languages are comprised under the head
of "Afro-Asiatic" idioms (see Cavalli-Sforza et al., The History and
Geography of Human Genes, 99). To the 4. volume of the 3. ed. of the
Researches Prichard had appended an essay by Newman: "On the
Hebraeo-African Languages" (for Newman see also ibid., 587-588).


230 Ibid., 231.
231 Ibid., 306. For du Ponceau see note 79 above.
232 Bunsen, "Recent Egyptian Researches", 273, he said: "The method, so successfully applied by Bopp in the narrow family circle of the Indo-Germanic nations, cannot be applied to any further research. The inflexions and formative words in the other two families are exactly not the same as the Sanscritic".
233 Bunsen referred to Prichard's "lucid survey of the general ethnological results of comparative philology"; see his "Recent Egyptian Researches", 261.
234 Ibid., 257, 265.
235 Most probably it was thanks to the effort of Bunsen that, in 1848, his essay as well as those by Müller and Meyer were published in a separate edition, in addition to the Report of the BAAS. Bunsen obviously trusted German scholarship more than that of his British hosts. Müller later noted that it was "a pity that [Bunsen's speech] was buried in the Transactions for the British Association for 1847". He did not mention the separate publication, see his My Autobiography, 204.
236 Christian Carl Josias Bunsen, Christianity and Mankind, 4 vols, London (Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans), 1854, vol. 4, 47. Bunsen did not write the work entirely on his own, but I have not come across any hint that the respective passage was not composed by him.
237 See: Prichard's letter to Colonel John Washington, the secretary of the Royal Geographical Society from 1836 to 1841, 15. 10. (no year), 3. 4. 1840, Prichard Papers, Royal Geographical Society of London.
238 John Conolly, Address to the Ethnological Society of London, Delivered at the Annual Meeting on the 25th May 1855, London (Watts), 1855, 15. Correcting Bunsen's verdict, Conolly added: "Dr. P. was born at Ross, and was well and highly educated before he proceeded to Cambridge and Oxford, for he was of both universities". The convention of the Society took place in 1855.
239 Since Prichard's philological excursions where tied up so heavily in his ethnology, most reviews considered his philological arguments only as part and parcel of the general line of reasoning. Several reviews mentioned Prichard's philological achievements: [anon.], "Prichard's Researches on the Physical History of Man", British Critic, 3 (1815), 292-300; Thomas Hodgkin, "On the Progress of Ethnology", Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal, 36 (1843-44), 118-136; [anon.], "Dr. Prichard on the History of Mankind", British Foreign and Medical Review, 24 (1847), 49-81; see also the anonymous notice in the London Medical Gazette, 4 (1847), 248-249; [Henry Holland], "Natural History of Man", Quarterly Review, 86 (1849-1850), 1-40. There were also several American reviews: [anon.], "The Value of Linguistic Science to Ethnology", New Englander, 26 (1867), 30-52; [anon.], "The Unity of Language and of Mankind", North American Review, 73 (1851), 163-189. Friedrich Max Müller deplored that "the science of language and the science of ethnology have both suffered most seriously from being mixed up together". Philology had nothing to do
with ethnology, and, what is more, the physical unity of mankind was an open question. If Genesis in this respect should happen to be wrong, then "Humboldt, Bunsen, Prichard, and Owen" were wrong as well; see Müller's Lectures on the Science of Language, 332-333, 348. Otherwise Prichard is not mentioned in Müller's Lectures.


241 Müller, My Autobiography, 205.


243 It is remarkable that Humboldt should not have mentioned Prichard, given that he complained heavily about the abysmal translation of his Cosmos, which Prichard's son Augustin had botched (see note 47 in ch. 4). See: Alexander von Humboldt, Briefe an Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen, Leipzig (Brockhaus), 1869. Equally, Prichard's name does not come up in: Alexander von Humboldt, Briefwechsel und Gespräche Alexander von Humboldt's mit einem jungen Freunde, Aus den Jahren 1847-1856, ed. by anon., Berlin (Franz Duncker), 1861; Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm und Alexander von Humboldt, Briefwechsel, ed. by Ludwig Geiger, Berlin (Bondy), 1909; Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, Unbekannte Briefe der Brüder Grimm, ed. by Wilhelm Schoof, Bonn (Athenäum), 1960; John Stuart Mill, The Earlier Letters, 1812-1848, 2 vols, ed. by Francis E. Mineka, London (Routledge and Kegan Paul), Toronto (Univ. of Toronto Press), 1963; Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D., 2. vols, London (Fellowes), 1844. A. W. Schlegel und Wilhelm von Humboldt mentioned Prichard; in their correspondence they discussed a translation error of Prichard's which enticed him to assume that the ancient Egyptians had whipped their Gods, see Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm von Humboldt und August Wilhelm Schlegel, ed. by Albert Leitzmann, Halle (Max Niemeyer), 1908, 106, 155, 162.


245 Berthold Delbrück, Einleitung in das Sprachstudium, Leipzig (Breitkopf und Härtel), 1880.

246 Paul Broca, "La linguistique et l'anthropologie", Bulletins de la société d'anthropologie de Paris, 3 (1862), 264-319, p. 279.

247 Theodor Benfey, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland seit dem Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts mit einem Rückblick auf die früheren Zeiten, München (Cotta), 1869, note 3 on p. 510, 655.

248 Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, 12. ed., Edinburgh, London (Chambers), 1884 (1844), 351. Cf. also: [anon.], "The Races of Man", Prospective Review, 6 (1850), 48-59, esp. p. 55-57 (the text is a review of John Pickering's The Races of Man, and their
Geographical Distribution, 1849); see also ibid.: [anon.], "The Natural History of the Varieties of Man", 449-458, p. 457 (this text is a review of Richard Latham's book of the same title). According to the Wellesley Index, the author of both reviews is quite likely to be Francis William Newman who spent a few years as a teacher at Bristol College (see ch. 2). As we have seen in section B of ch. 4, Newman lost his belief in monogenesis; see also his Phases of Faith; or, Passages From the History of my Creed, London (John Chapman), 1850, p. 112.


251 Ibid., 33.

252 See ch. 10 where Latham's views of the Eastern migration is delineated.

253 Joan Leopold, "Applications of the Aryan Theory of Race to India", 579.


256 Cavalli-Sforza et al., The History and Geography of Human Genes. For an evaluation of Cavalli-Sforza's undertaking see: Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus, London (Penguin), 1991, 32-41. Gould has pointed out that the greatest opposition against Cavalli-Sforza's approach has been voiced by linguists.
9. The Uses of Mythology for the Study of History

A. Introduction

Egyptian culture had for many centuries intrigued the imagination of erudite Europe. In the course of the eighteenth century the time-worn euhemerist interpretation of myth as a select representation of historical and religious truths for the masses was toppled. Instead, it was increasingly widely believed that mythology was the outcome of uninformed, superstitious attitudes towards nature and religion. This Enlightenment interpretation gave a new tincture to the theological approach to mythologies, the Egyptian in particular. The wisdom of the ancient Egyptians had always fascinated Biblical scholars since the Pentateuch was seen to give a historical account of Egyptian-Hebrew cultural exchange. If the Egyptian priests were not endowed with some superior, hermetic knowledge, if on the contrary they were as superstitious as ordinary folk, then the relationship between Moses and the Egyptians required renewed consideration.

Eighteenth century interest in ancient relics was given a great boost by Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798-1799. During the reign of the Europe-friendly Muhammad Ali many relics of Egyptian culture were exported to Europe. In the early 1820s even the Bristol institution was presented with two mummies by Thomas Garrard, the chamberlain of the city. The pyramids and their contents were as great a mystery as hieroglyphics. Jean-François Champollion (1790-1832) and the physician
Thomas Young (1773-1829), the scion of a Quaker family, who had studied in Edinburgh and Göttingen, were competing in the quest of unravelling the secret. Prichard had put his stake on the latter. Young had been the first to publicize the achievements of Adelung in Britain. It was not least of all a matter of patriotic pride to support the English scholar.

In January 1825 the room of the Bristol Philosophical and Literary Society was packed: one of Garrard's mummies was opened under Prichard's scholarly supervision. Based on the findings of Young, who "had ascertained the meaning of upwards of 200 characters, before Champollion entered into the investigation", Prichard suggested that "most ancient alphabets" like those of the Hebrews and Phoenicians had derived from hieroglyphics. Pointing at the elaborate method of embalming and Young's interpretations, he enlarged on the idea that the ancient Egyptians had believed in "resurrection" and life after death.

At the close of the meeting the Revd Conybeare burst out with the news that "a new work of M. Champollion, of the most important character, had been put into his hands a few hours since". It was Jean-François Champollion's *Lettre à M Dacier*, containing the key to the understanding of the hieroglyphs on the Rosetta stone. We do not know whether Prichard was embarrassed about the fact that he had supported Young's erroneous schemes. In 1834 he gave three lectures "on Egyptian Mummies, Egyptian antiquities, and the Rosetta Stone" at the Bristol Institution. Their content is lost. In his other writings he mentioned the Rosetta stone only once in respect of a question of secondary importance. His views on the Egyptian Mythology did not change significantly after the publication of his book in 1819, *An Analysis of the Egyptian Mythology*, and this in turn was based on a chapter in the first edition of the *Researches*.

When his *An Analysis of the Egyptian Mythology* appeared it was regarded as an influential treatise by all those of Prichard's
contemporaries who were pious enough to endorse his theological considerations and who were, nonetheless, secular-minded enough to be interested in heathen complements of the Scriptural account. Within our history of Prichard's thought the book is decisive: more explicitly than in most other publications, he came near to discussing tenets which stood in direct relation to his religious outlook. Furthermore, the Egyptian Mythology helps us to understand his general attitude to history.

Prichard's aims in investigating Egyptian mythology were threefold:

1. Once more, he wanted to prove monogenesis.
2. He tried to show how Egyptian mythology exemplified the distortions which revelation was exposed to in pagan culture.
3. He believed that he had found "a clue" for the reconciliation of the long time-scale of the Egyptian chronologies and the rather shorter time-scale of Scriptural chronology.10

The method he chose was to juxtapose Egyptian mythology to "the superstitions of the East".11 Several scholars before him had tried without great success to establish genealogical links between Greek and Egyptian or Indian and Egyptian cultures. Being well aware of their failure, Prichard set out to show parentages between Egyptian and Indian mythologies from which he deduced a genetic relationship. This in turn enabled him to compare Greek and Egyptian mythologies by means of substituting Indian for Egyptian data whenever the Egyptian relics were either not expressive enough, or when they were contradicting his monogenetic views of mythology. In the course of his investigations, he took up many of the questions which had engaged generations of classical scholars before him, and which have been summarized by Arnoldo Momigliano, namely: how polytheism came to replace primitive monotheism; what had been the relation between Mosaic law and the institutions of surrounding nations; and what sort of confirmation, if any, could be found for Hebrew and Christian truth in pagan texts.12
The **Egyptian Mythology** was a big book, more than 500 pages long. Prichard had mastered a huge array of sources, including pagan histories of antiquity, patristic writings, Biblical criticism, chronologies and mythographies from all ages, as well as the studies of many orientalists and Egyptologists. After an introduction on Egyptian theology and mythology in general, Prichard delved into a detailed discussion of individual Egyptian Gods and the philosophical doctrines of Egyptian esoteric learning. Once the basis was established, he attempted "to illustrate the Egyptian Mythology, by comparing it with the superstitions of the East". He compared Egyptian and Hindu mythology as well as the role and significance of the individual gods of both systems. Finally, he explained the exoteric, that is, the supposedly "popular" side of Egyptian idolatry, as it was expressed mainly in the custom of animal worship. This led to a disquisition on the relationship between the Mosaic legislation and Egyptian civil and religious laws. His discussion of chronology was appended as an independent text at the end of the volume. The book provided a historical evaluation and theological interpretation of mythology. Its author was not much interested in Egypt's merits as one of the first civilized nations. Egyptian science, culture and statecraft were not his concern.

So far, no historian has had much interest in Prichard's views on mythology. On the whole, nineteenth-century views on ancient mythology have excited little interest during the last thirty years. What may be called a disdain for the subject is certainly due to the fact that, in the nineteenth century, ancient mythologies were studied as a corollary to theology. Nowadays, the history of nineteenth-century approaches to mythology is normally subsumed under varying historiographical aspects. Anthropologists, general historians, historical linguists, historians of religion, or literary theorists have dealt with the subject from their respective angles.
In view of the appreciation of pagan mythologies in Britain, traditional scholarship has advanced the same criticism which Hans Aarsleff has applied to British philology. Richard Chase, for example, has maintained that "the nineteenth century almost uniformly treated myth either as natural philosophy or as nature poetry". James Kissane, by contrast, has tried to vindicate the Victorian approach to mythology by means of pointing out the "open-minded inclusiveness rather than dogmaticism" characteristic of writers of the latter half of the century. "This moderate spirit", Kissane added, "can perhaps be understood as a reaction against the fanaticism that characterized the interpretation of myths during the early years of the century". Kissane, that is, tried to save the reputation of the later part of the century. As for the first three to four decades, Feldman and Richardson, too, have pointed out that "there is no English equivalent of Herder's pioneering theories, of Friedrich Schlegel's explicit mythopoetic program, or of Schelling's philosophy of mythology". Though Walter Scott and Samuel Taylor Coleridge may form exceptions, it is certainly true that, for the great majority of British Romantics, mythology simply stands for the "corpus of past myth they had always drawn on for allusion or story".

It is difficult to conceive of Prichard as a "fanatic" of Kissane's description; yet, the latter's general verdict certainly includes him as well. He was a perfect example of a theoretician who, in the words of Feldman and Richardson, strove to "recover in the mythological deeds of antiquity the detailed but disfigured history of all that happened among the Hebrew people". But while many other British authors simply ignored the publications of German Higher Criticism, Prichard was drawn into its aura.

There were several reasons for his adherence to German learning: since the end of the eighteenth century word had spread in Britain that there were German classical scholars of great merit: in their Biblical
studies Johann Salomo Semler, Johann David Michaelis, Ernst Friedrich Carl Rosenmüller and many others discriminated between "the truth of revelation" and mere "historical truth". This attitude annoyed strict theological orthodoxy, but for a man like Prichard, who was versatile in Scottish Enlightenment theories of civilization and who saw some elements of religious faith as anthropological universalities, German scholarship provided an approach which combined piety with historical insight. In the 1830s Nicholas Wiseman explained this approach in the following words: "The Germans were laying the foundation of that system which, though not matured, so early, was the only true and solid method of proceeding". Instead of laying out a "full and comprehensive system of grammar", they were interested "in illustrating particular points, whether from the cognate dialects, or by a collation of numerous passages in the Bible itself".

The writings of famous eighteenth-century German Biblical scholars such as Michaelis or Johann Gottfried Eichhorn were translated into English. For Prichard, their value lay partly in the fact that their publications were simply more erudite than most British works. Moreover, their approach to scholarship was imbued by an anthropological interest. Eighteenth-century German theology and philology were constructed around the explicit notion that "anthropology" was central to all human sciences - a thrust which proved very valuable for Prichard.

In the last chapter we have seen how much his philology was influenced by German publications. Friedrich Schlegel, in particular, was one of those philologists who also dabbled with mythology. Prichard was so intrigued by his theories that he included an entire chapter of Schlegel's On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians in his Egyptian Mythology. In the light of his debt to German Romantic theory, it will be interesting to see how Prichard used "modern" scholarship in order to
sustain "old" orthodox doctrines.

In order to appreciate his views on mythology, we will start off with a short outline of eighteenth-century theories on mythology and the presentation of those authors who shaped Prichard's own approach to the subject. This will be followed by a detailed investigation of his *Egyptian Mythology* and his views on chronology. The chapter will conclude with a summary describing how his mythological tenets were received. A claim will be made that Prichard, despite (or, rather, because of) his orthodox religious stance, strove to defend mythological tenets against those scholars of his time, who - like Georges Cuvier - dismissed Indian and Egyptian mythology as unhistorical bogus.

B. The Mythological Background

One of the salient elements of German Romantic theory was the re-evaluation of mythology as a true expression of poetical spirit. The critic was no longer seen as the impartial judge of truth and value, but rather as the voice of poetry itself. These views linked up with Schelling's transcendentalist philosophy, which led German contemporaries to regard "man" as "the great creative word spoken by the earth". While Christian orthodoxy had referred the term "inspiration" solely to those humans who had received the message of revelation, German Romantic critics considered poetry as an outcome of inspiration. Johann Gottfried Herder, in particular, had helped to remodel the cognitive status of mythology. He regarded myth as "a mode of knowing, a function of the imagination". Thus the mythological spirit was seen as influencing the present; the dividing lines between Scriptural tenets and mythological imaginations became blurred.

In eighteenth-century Germany, Biblical criticism was pursued from two different angles: one was philological, while the other illustrated Scriptural tenets "from analogous circumstances in the laws
and government of other nations”. Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791) and Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729-1812), as well as their pupils Eichhorn and Gabler brought Biblical studies in line with other historical researches. There was a long-standing tradition which tried to squeeze historical truth - i.e. facts which fitted the Scriptural account - out of mythological narratives. In France, Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil du Perron (1731-1805) had come to honours in this manner. In late-eighteenth-century Britain it was most famously Sir William Jones and Jacob Bryant who pursued this path.

Although Prichard was an avid recipient of German scholarship, the endeavours of Heyne seem to have escaped his attention. He was introduced into mythology through his acquaintance with texts by Sir William Jones and Jacob Bryant. Jones was one of the many British writers who, in the eighteenth century, tried to reconcile Biblical and pagan chronologies. He endeavoured to explain how the various mythical traditions of exotic peoples could be referred to one hypothetical communal source. In 1785 he read his discourse "On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India" to the members of the Asiatick Society, where he tried to prove that the deities of these three cultures were construed in perfect analogy and in conformation to one universal pattern. Jones established parallels between the Scriptural Deluge and a similar account in post-Vedic literature. The text in question was known as *Institutes of Menu*. Menu or Manu was, according to Indian theogony, the son of Bramah and the supposed author of the *Institutes*, a collection of laws and prescriptions (actually dating back only to the 5th century b.c.) which appeared to Scriptural chronologists as the Indian version of Genesis. Jones found Indian parallels to the Deluge and to Noah in the text. The difference was merely that in the Indian tradition Noah was called Satyavrata, or the "seventh Menu". These correlations seemed to indicate that Egyptian and Indian mythologies might be related.
Jones greatly approved of the findings of the mythographer Jacob Bryant who also had tried to demonstrate the historical account of the Deluge through the enumeration of similar events related in non-Christian mythologies. In the first edition of his *Researches* Prichard noted that his own results were in conformity with those of Bryant, albeit "built on entirely different principles".36 By then the mythographer's fame was already on the wane. In 1815 the *British Review* altogether brushed aside his merits: "so much learning... so completely thrown away".37 By 1826 Prichard had adopted the same attitude, in passing he referred to Jacob Bryant's "learned dreams".38

If Prichard engaged with Egyptian mythology, it was mainly due to the writings of Paul Ernst Jablonski (1693-1767). Between 1750 and 1752, the German oriental scholar had published *Pantheon Aegyptorum*. In these three volumes, Jablonski collated patristic and classical sources in order to describe "the sex worship" prevalent at the borders of the Nile.39 Jablonski aimed at severing all links between Greek mythology which he cherished and Egyptian worship which he despised. When the Edinburgh philologist Alexander Murray (1775-1813) published an edition of James Bruce's *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile*, he quoted from Jablonski's work. The Scottish scholar misrepresented Jablonski's ideas to the effect that the German had wanted to present Egyptian culture as altogether indigenous. In the new edition of Bruce's *Travels*, Murray added a commentary in which he described the Egyptians, as Prichard put it, as "a race peculiar to Africa, and originally distinct from the posterity of Noah and of Adam". This ran counter to Prichard's deep-seated belief in the unity of mankind. It "contradicts", he wrote, "the testimony of the Sacred Records, the earliest memorials of mankind, and is at variance with the general observations that result from a survey of the organized world, and the distribution of species over the globe".41 Prichard undertook to set the matter straight and to show that Egyptian mythology...
- be it ever so "atrocious" - was, indeed, not only connected to Greek mythology, but also to Indian traditions, and, for that matter, to Christian doctrines.

But it was not just Jablonski's book against which Prichard felt the need to argue. In the *Egyptian Mythology*, he rejected that strand of eighteenth-century Egyptian scholarship - epitomized by William Warburton (1698-1779), Bishop of Gloucester - which tried to depict an ascent from barbaric ancient customs to true religion.

The peculiarly rude side of Egyptian mythology, namely animal worship, had been accounted for in various ways. Charles de Brosses (1709-1777) had interpreted it as a universal stage in the growth of religious consciousness (*Du culte des dieux fétiches, ou parallèle de l'ancienne religion de l'Egypte avec la religion actuelle de nigrerie*, 1760). This notion was tied up with de Brosses's belief that the origin of speech lay in the utterance of almost brutish original sounds. A similar theory had been put forward by David Hume and William Warburton, who imagined that primitive languages were "concrete and pictorial before they became abstract and ideational."

Warburton's theory of language was an attempt to refute the opinions of free-thinkers who asserted that the notion of the future state was not given to man through revelation. Instead they had maintained that it arose independently, particularly in the philosophy of the Egyptians which they considered as "universal and primordial". Spinoza in particular had forcefully maintained that the Jews, for their part, had no idea of the immortality of the soul. Warburton also wanted to disclaim the doctrine of the followers of the so-called Hermetic tradition who assumed that the Egyptian priests were possessed of some original knowledge which they strove to disguise through the invention of hieroglyphics.

In the seventeenth century, John Spencer (1630-1693) and John
Marsham (1602-1685) had claimed that Moses had adopted many Egyptian laws when he founded the new Hebrew polity during the exodus. Against this theory Herman Wits (1636-1708), an orthodox Protestant divine of Utrecht, had advanced the contrary opinion. In his treatise *Aegyptiaca* (1683), he suggested that the monotheistic elements of Egyptian beliefs were derived from the Jews. It was a less-than-ideal solution which was historically rather unsatisfactory. For those who did not follow Wits - amongst them Warburton - there remained the pressing question, whether Moses had adopted any civil laws from the Egyptians, and if so, how this could be reconciled to his particular role as a law-giver and mediator between the Hebrews and God.

Warburton had no qualms about endorsing Spencer and Marsham's belief that Moses had learned from the Egyptians. But he remained adamant that the prophet's role as divine legate had been bestowed upon him directly from God. He cleverly refuted Spinoza's idea by means of endorsing it: the very lack of reference to the future state in the books of Moses indicated that God himself had established "a theocracy". There was no need for Moses to mention the after-life since God himself was governing His people.

Warburton held that the hieroglyphics did not contain any hidden wisdom. They were merely a ruse of the priests who wanted to make the populace believe that they were invested with superior knowledge. This was proved by the fact that the signs, according to Warburton were invented after the spread of alphabetical writing. He argued that Moses had learned the alphabet from the Egyptians, and only later did the priests supplant the alphabet with their obscure hieroglyphics. Warburton believed that the Egyptian worship of brutes went back to the deification of local heroes which had been introduced by political leaders. Since their names were depicted in the hieroglyphs of which only the priests knew the proper meaning, the populace came to take the signs for pictures of
the deities themselves. It was the beginning of animal worship.\(^{54}\)

Warburton's *The Divine Legation of Moses* was the subject of a heated discussion which extended until the end of the eighteenth century. Evans has shown that the opinions on the *Divine Legation* were extremely diverse. Some authors, such as Gibbon and Samuel Johnson, considered Warburton to be paradoxical and amusing. Others, such as Edward Coplestone (1776-1849), Bishop of Llandaff and Professor of Poetry at Oriel College, Oxford, praised his deep theological insight.\(^{55}\) Reading Warburton's tract, Prichard thought that the relationship between Moses and the Egyptians deserved renewed consideration. He was particularly discontented with Warburton's ideas about language and scripture: for Prichard these were divine gifts too. Not the Egyptians, but God had given language to Adam.\(^{56}\)

Murray's polygenist misunderstanding of Jablonski's learning had illustrated that there was not much of a common ground of mythological studies. Even though the Egyptians did not belong to the "Abrahamidae", the descendants of Abraham, they were, after all, among the offspring of Noah and thus they were at least included in the Noachian covenant.

Prichard wanted to rectify Warburton's theories as well as those of his sources. As he saw it, Moses had adopted only a very small number of religious rites from the Egyptians. He thought that the tenets of Egyptian mythology reached so far backwards into history that it was not altogether out of the question to find in Egyptian superstition the vestiges of a purer form of worship as it might have been preserved in the first generations subsequent to the Flood. Hence he set out to re-position the Egyptian religion within the historical development of mythology. He undertook to prove, first, that Egyptian mythology was linked to Indian and Greek mythologies, and second, that it had preserved some core knowledge of Revelation.\(^{57}\)
C. History and Myth in the *Egyptian Mythology*

Tremendously important for Prichard's approach was Friedrich Schlegel. He helped him not only to the key to his understanding of Egyptian mythology, but also to the method of explaining Egyptian tenets through their alleged Indian counterparts. We have seen that Schlegel was a protagonist in the development of German linguistics. His approach to mythology was much the same as that to language. In both fields he strove to explain the essential tenets lying at the grounds of historical differentiation. He asserted that "like language, mythology is founded on an inner structure, a basic network whose constancy is indicative of a common origin, despite all external variations of development". Thus, Schlegel was, in Prichard's eyes, not only one of the few authors who dealt with Hindu mythology; he even seemed to have the same argumentative thrust.

Nowadays, Schlegel's *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians*, published in 1808, is interpreted in the light of his religious struggle which led to his conversion to Catholicism in the very same year. Leslie Willson diagnosed in Schlegel "an intensification of religious longing for India, a longing which mirrored a religious crisis in himself".

During the first years of the nineteenth century, when he was dwelling in Paris, Schlegel hoped to find in Indian mythology more than pagan superstition. Willson has shown how Schlegel grew more disappointed with Indian culture the more he learned about it. If at the outset Catholicism and Indian mythology seemed to offer two possible ways to spiritual fulfilment, by 1808 Schlegel's disillusionment with Indian mythology was, according to Willson, complete. The publication from 1808 was already imbued with Schlegel's disgust vis-à-vis the system of pantheism; "the idealized image of India", had "begun to disintegrate". This is supposed to "come to the fore" in the treatment of
Indian philosophy. Since this is the section which Prichard included almost in its entirety in his *Egyptian Mythology*, it is important to know to what extent Schlegel had indeed lost patience with Indian paganism. Schlegel divided Indian mythology into four principal eras. Prichard rendered them in the following manner:

1. The era of doctrines of the emanation and transmigration of souls, "which seem", as he wrote, "to be the foundation of the oldest system of philosophy prevalent in the East".

2. "Astrolatry, including the barbarous worship of nature, of the visible elements, and heavenly bodies".

3. "The dogma of two principles, or of the warfare between light and darkness, between the good and evil genius".

4. The "age in which the doctrines or representations of the Eastern schools acquire a more refined and metaphysical description"."62

While Schlegel despised the fourth stage, which he equated with pantheism, he had genuine sympathy for the earliest of these epochs. The view that all souls were "emanations", that is, flowing "from one soul of the universe"63 was, in Schlegel's eyes, at once deeply pious and philosophical: "The system of emanation is seen in the most favourable point of view, when we contemplate it as the doctrine of restitution. From the divine origin of man, it takes occasion to remind him of his restoration, and set before him a reunion with the divinity".64

Emanation was related to metempsychosis or the doctrine of transmigration of souls, which in turn linked up with the notion of the resurrection of the soul. It involved the belief in some form of universal judgement after death and subsequent redemption or damnation.65 In his reading of the Vedas, Schlegel projected Christian doctrines on Indian mythology. And, even though he disliked Pantheism, he saw at least the earliest stages of Indian philosophy as imbued with truly Christian notions. "This law of progressive debasement and regular deterioration,
and the sentiment of inward sorrow and remorse connected with the consciousness of guilt and the expectation of death, are the foundations of the oldest sagas". Guilt as one of the ingrained traits of human nature is a topos which crops up again and again in Prichard's work. In this instance, it is expressed through the mouth of Schlegel and as a sign of the intimate relations between Christian and pagan religions.

It would be an overstatement to conclude from Willson's admirable analysis that Schlegel had nothing but contempt for Indian religion: "Greatly as this doctrine has been corrupted by the wild fictions of a poetical imagination... yet we cannot refuse to admit that the ancient sagas of India possessed some idea of the true God". The true God was, of course, the Christian God. In his translation Prichard gave a certain twist to the argument. Schlegel was less occupied by the notion of corruption than he was: Schlegel merely spoke of "very great errors" where Prichard employed the theologically laden word "corruption".

In Schlegel's (and Prichard's) understanding Brahma was considered as the supreme God, "the eternal soul, the infinite being, king and ruler of all nature, or, as he is called in scriptures of a later date, Father and Lord of the Universe". That Prichard had more than just a cultural interest in Schlegel's words is illustrated by the fact that, here again, he overstated what Schlegel actually had said. Instead of the German equivalent for the Biblical locution "Father and Lord", Schlegel had employed the German words "Vater und Ahnherr" whose correct translation would be "father and progenitor".

Willson is certainly right in suggesting that Schlegel's studies "drove him to Roman Catholicism". Nevertheless, his work on Indian mythology is still full of praise for the deep religious insights of early Indian religion. According to Schlegel, it was only later in the history of Indian mythology that the system of emanation gave way to the depraved religious forms of polytheism and pantheism. "In one word", Schlegel
concluded, "the Indian system of emanation cannot be explained as the natural development of reason; if, however, it is seen as misunderstood revelation, then everything appears altogether understandable".\(^72\) This was, remarkably enough, one of the very few passages which Prichard omitted in his translation. The reason is simple: a "misunderstood revelation" was, for the evangelical temperament, a contradiction in terms. For Prichard, who had not immersed himself in the paradoxes of Schelling's philosophy and the poetic side of Romanticism, revelation was tied to truth. Thus there simply could not be any such thing as "wrong" revelation.

The preceding quotes may suffice to give an overview of the basic elements of Schlegel's views on Indian mythology. The German shared one of Prichard's central beliefs, namely, the notion that the most ancient religions, just as the earliest language, had been pure and pious: mythological tenets were not the starting point of a development which led to true religion, as de Brosses had seen it, rather they were degenerate, "corrupted" versions of true religion. Prichard wrote:

If the earliest religion were the production of the human faculties, - if it has been elaborated by the reason and imagination of men, we should doubtless observe it in the grossest and most sensual, in the rudest and most imperfect state, in the first periods of society: it would be found to assume a more refined character, as the human mind became more cultivated. But the very reverse of this is true in point of fact. The earliest faith was pure and simple, exhibited comprehensive and exalted conceptions of the Deity, and contained the most awful and impressive sanctions of morality. In subsequent periods it appears to become continually more depraved and sensual.\(^73\)

William Warburton had explained the propensity to the Christian religion as a capacity which developed in the course of civilization. "The Doctrine of the Metempsychosis", in his view, "signified a moral Designation of Providence".\(^74\) This exegesis was, as Prichard saw it, only half the truth: emanation and metempsychosis were not just part of
providential typology, but rather significant elements of the "holier belief" which characterized the early ages of mankind. As for civilization, it served rather to disguise and distort true belief than to help man to a better understanding of revelation.

For Prichard, ill-founded philosophy was, if anything, rather more pernicious than the ignorance of the Egyptian priests: "The first step of corruption of this simple form of theology seems to have been the attempt to adorn it with the figments of philosophy, according to that style of philosophizing that was suited to the genius of the age". One instance was the primeval "doctrine that the world was created by the voluntary agency of the Supreme". This idea, Prichard said, was apparently "not enough to satisfy curiosity, and we find it often blended with some fanciful analogies derived from natural processes that are daily observed".

The doctrine of emanation was gradually superseded by polytheism and pantheism. "The former", Prichard wrote, "naturally degenerates into the latter, while the pantheistic representation of the divinity involves or leads inevitably to the deification of material beings, and particularly of the more striking and conspicuous objects in the visible universe", including "personifications of the most remarkable powers of nature, the consecration of emblems, some of them the most obscene", and "the decorated pomp and gorgeous superstitions of the pagan world".

After he had established the nature of Indian religion and mythology, Prichard proceeded to compare the Egyptian gods and the Indian gods described in the "Institutes of Menu". Since the Egyptian religion displayed superstitions which appeared a lot grosser than those of the Indian system, Prichard concluded that "the whole" of it had to be referred to the third and the fourth period in the history of Eastern doctrines. It was only "in more recondite parts of the Egyptian mythology
... that we trace any resemblance to the older doctrines of the Hindoos, respecting the creation of the world, and the emanation of subordinate beings from the essence of an eternal spirit.\textsuperscript{79}

He addressed five major principles: the existence of a supreme god; the notion of a religious triad comparable to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; the occurrence of the Deluge; the doctrine of a future state; and the belief in the existence of the soul.

Both the Egyptians and the Hindus shared in "the belief in the existence of a Deity, in the sense in which that word is understood among Christians and European philosophers in general": the creation as well as the end of the world lay in the hands of a powerful individual being. Prichard wrote, quoting Schlegel: "It appears that the priests and sages of the Egyptians, as well as those of India, in the earliest ages which fall within the reach of profane history, acknowledged one eternal principle as the source whence all other beings had originally emanated, and with which all or a part were destined, after intervals of greater or shorter duration, to become again in some manner re-united".\textsuperscript{80}

Both mythological systems, the Egyptian as well as the Indian, possessed notions of "a triple distribution of divine attributes, or the dogma of a triad of persons or manifestations of divinity". In the seventeenth century the German mythographer Athanasius Kircher had stipulated that the Egyptians had an idea of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{81} The idea resurfaced in Friedrich Schlegel's interpretation of the Indian notion of emanation. Prichard adopted it.

As he saw it, Egyptian and the Indian traditions contained "a triple personification", representing "the generative, the destructive, and the restoring powers of nature".\textsuperscript{82} The notion linked up with another doctrine which Prichard (as well as the fourth-century Christian scholar Eusebius) detected, namely, "that the elements themselves were animated".\textsuperscript{83} He found it "repugnant to reason, and to the testimonies
of the ancient writers, to suppose that [the Egyptians] paid adoration to inanimate bodies, regarding them as such". Like other "barbarous nations" they "regarded storms, winds, and the moving bodies in the heavens, as animated and guided by genii". And, he added, "the same superstition, decorated and reduced to a system of mystical representations, appears to have been the popular religion of the most cultivated nations of antiquity". He was at pains to avoid the impression that he was attempting to relate this "obscure tradition" of the Egyptians to the "Divine Nature and the modes of its subsistence, which distinguish Christian theology". But the very rejection of the idea could hardly conceal the point that, in a historical sense, this was exactly what he had in mind.

It was well known that pagan mythologies included the notion of catastrophes brought about by fire as well as those of a flood. In Prichard's view, mythology was vindicated insofar as all mythological accounts contained the description of an event which was akin to the Biblical story of the Deluge. "Fortunately ... for the history of mythology", he wrote, "the same dogma may be traced in the antiquity of several nations, who, if they obtained it not from Egypt, certainly derived it from some common source; hence, by comparing the various forms in which we find it, we are led to some conclusions respecting its origin, and the ideas with which it was connected in the cosmology of the Egyptians". The comparison between the stories of the Stoics "respecting the catastrophes of the world" and those of the Vedic tradition proved the intimate relation between Egyptian and Indian traditions.

Then there was the doctrine of the future state: Prichard maintained that "a very important feature in this ancient system of philosophy is the conspicuous place it assigns to the immortality of the soul, and the firm and implicit faith with which this dogma was received". In this context, he reminded his readers explicitly of Schlegel's
finds. To demonstrate the Egyptian belief in the existence of the soul he referred to the Pythagoreans who "have left us a more particular account of the notions entertained respecting the Soul than those that we receive directly from the Egyptians".

He acknowledged that the philosophical tenets of the former, in certain respects, contradicted Egyptian mythology. The problem could be solved, he suggested, through a reference to Indian mythology: "the ideas of the Hindoos respecting the metempsychosis, and the final state of the soul, which bear a manifest resemblance to the Egyptian tenets, seem likely to account" for some contradictions "in the notions of the Greek philosophers and Egyptian priests". Thus the three systems together - those of the Greeks, the Hindoos, and the Egyptians - "afford an outline that may unite the different fragments of their doctrine into an uniform and not wholly unconnected system".

Christian doctrines permeated the oldest known systems of mythology, namely the Egyptian and the Indian. These, Prichard concluded, possessed "not only speculative philosophy; but a system of religion in the proper sense" of the term. "It contemplated in the Deity, not merely the author of the universe, but a moral governor of the world, whose dispensations were so arranged as to reward the virtuous and take vengeance on the guilty".

Traditionally, the starting point for pagan mythological studies had been the question as to how idolatry had come into the world. Basically, there were three different approaches to a solution. Either it was seen as proof of religious corruption; or, it was taken to derive from "gratitude and reverence for distinguished individuals" (an explanation to which Warburton adhered); or, it was assumed "that mankind originally worshipped the elements or physical powers of nature" and only later came to develop the notion of individualized gods. Prichard's approach drew on the first possibility. But he turned the argument around: instead
of following up the development of idolatry, he looked for the survival of monotheistic vestiges. Ancient religious systems had come to be "directed towards physical objects or the departments and powers of nature". Over time the masses had lost the ability of "accurately discriminating the cause from the effect". They confused, for example, a river with a deity itself.

Prichard took Egyptian and Indian mythologies for the outcome of religious corruption. But at the same time he strove to find those elementary parts of the original religion which were retained even under adverse cultural conditions. Their role was slightly ambiguous: on the one hand, they were the remainders of the Noachian creed, on the other hand Prichard presented them as characteristic of the human psyche. The term "psyche" does not crop up in the Egyptian Mythology, nor does "anthropology". But his insistence that "the religion of the first ages" as well as "the consciousness of guilt and the expectation of death" had framed "the whole national and personal character" of most diverse peoples, amounts to the assumption of a religious sense ingrained in human nature. He wrote:

We are permitted to regard those principles which are common to nearly all the ancient systems of mythology, as the original possession of mankind, we must allow the doctrine above described, for a species of theism nearly resembling it, to have been among the elements of the primitive faith, or the first system of religion that prevailed; for we trace the same, or very similar tenets, in the religious creed of all those nations who have possessed sufficient art and refinement to preserve any memorials of early times. To the Hindoos and the Egyptians we may add the Persians, the Chinese, and the Scandinavians, the Celtic people, or those tribes subjected to the authority of the Druids, and several other nations.

Prichard's entire argument, as it has been delineated in the preceding paragraphs, rested on a mistaken syllogism. He chose his own criteria of
comparison, that is, the main Christian doctrines; then he projected them back on ancient pagan mythologies. Where Egyptian mythology defied this operation, Indian traditions came into play. At the end, he concluded triumphantly that the existence of the main Christian doctrines in the earliest stages of all ancient mythologies proved that they all had sprung from one common source.

Prichard performed for Egypt what Schlegel had done for India. Both found proto-Christian beliefs in ancient mythologies. But while Schlegel was content with establishing their existence in early Indian religion, Prichard, first, proved them to imbue Egyptian religion as well, and then deduced the doctrine of religious monogenesis from his discovery. In his book, the existence of Christian doctrines in pagan religions was central to his argument in two respects: it was the core of his hypothesis, and it was, at the same time, the proof through which he showed the historical account of Genesis to be correct: he proved the truth of Genesis through Genesis.

The history of religion was not just one of steady ascent to truth. Rather it happened in a circular motion, starting with the prevalence of true piety, followed by a period of corruption and a subsequent recovery of truth. Prichard harboured a cycle-theory to account for large-scale developments of history.

In the previous chapter, we have seen how much he was interested in the Celtic language. One of the reasons why he was so optimistic about the possibility to uncover its links to primeval human idioms lay in the widespread predilection for comparing the Celtic institution of the Druids to the caste system of the Hindus. The eighteenth-century antiquarian William Stukeley had already conjectured that Kircher’s Trinitarian theory was applicable not only to the Egyptians but also to the Celts. Stukeley maintained that the Celtic druids had received Abraham’s religion from Phoenician priests who had, at the time of the
patriarchs, established a colony in Britain. At the end of the eighteenth century this theory was very common.95 Friedrich Schlegel, too, mentioned it.96 Prichard probed further into this tradition. A caste system, as it was to be found in India, which differentiated the strata of a population according to their profession, into priests, warriors, and peasants or herdsmen, could be discerned in Celtic traditions as well as in Egyptian relics.97 He even surmised that Wotan might be historically linked to Buddha, "though it is not easy to conjecture how so gentle a person as the Hindoo sage, who made it a crime to kill a fly, could be metamorphosed into the sanguinary god of our Pagan forefathers". Like the Egyptians, the superior castes of the Celts had subjected the common populace to servitude. In 1826 he wrote: "The rest of the nation had no share in public affairs, and were little better than slaves, being, for the most part in a state of vassalage to the superior classes".98 This rather critical attitude towards Celtic customs modifies the image of Prichard as a Celtic revivalist: he aimed at rehabilitating the Celtic tradition, however, without idealizing it.

He rejected the theory of the German historian Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren who had referred the Indian caste system to the bellicose encounter of different tribes on the Indian subcontinent which left the victorious populace as the eternal masters of the inferior tribe. Since Prichard did not know of any incident in Egyptian history which might testify to the subjugation of one part of the populace to another, he thought Heeren's theory to be disproved:

The people of Egypt are constantly described as one unmixed and undivided nation. We have not the slightest hint that there existed among them any diversity of race or of language, and we have grounds for concluding that the idioms of the several castes, as well as those prevailing in the various districts of Egypt, were not remarkably different from each other.99
In 1826 Prichard was more decided on the matter: the ruling castes in Egypt and India, i.e. the priests and the Brahmins, were no conquerors. And hence their languages, Sanskrit and hieroglyphics respectively, were the very ancient original idioms of these peoples, having been preserved by the literate classes. It was on the stipulation of this historical assumption, then, that Prichard based his hypothesis of the genealogical unity of languages. For, if the Brahmins were not a "band of conquerors, but descended from the same stock as the rest of the Hindoos, and only a body elevated from the community by favour of political circumstances, their classical idiom, the Sanscrit, must be looked upon" as the "proper language in Hindustan". Whoever had doubted that the Indians were related to the Europeans via the Sanskrit was thus refuted. As we have seen above, the appearance of Rajah Ramohun Roy in Bristol confirmed this theory. As for the relations with the Celtic language and Celtic culture, in the *Egyptian Mythology* Prichard did not enter further into the topic. He left this task for *The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations*. But his few remarks on the subject reveal his inclination to refer social hierarchies to the civil organisation of a polity rather than to racial differentiations. In the next chapter we will see how these views evolved once racial theorizing became fashionable.

In another respect, too, civil institutions came into focus in the *Egyptian Mythology*. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, any occupation with Egypt involved an interpretation of the relationship between Moses and the Egyptians. It was asked whether Moses's familiarity with Egyptian customs had influenced legislation. In the 1830s this question was still to the fore. It is, therefore, not surprising that Prichard took it up in 1819. While he tried to sustain the status of pagan mythology as stores of historical information, he followed in many respects the traditional approaches of Biblical scholarship.

He repeated the tenets of those who had presented the Egyptian
priesthood as a class whose greed for power incited them to distinguish between an exoteric and an esoteric body of knowledge. The former was simple and destined for the general population; the latter the priests shared only among themselves. Relying on material gleaned from John Spencer and Johann David Michaelis, Prichard extended this interpretation in view of the social make-up of Egyptian society. He investigated the relationship between the Mosaic law and Egyptian legislation under three headings: in view of "theology, or religious doctrine; with reference to social and political regulations; and with respect to rites and ceremonies, and all the external performances of religious and sacerdotal discipline".102

Theologically, he did not discover any similarities between Egyptian doctrines at the time of Moses and those which the Jewish lawgiver put in place. He surmised that "the Egyptian religion perhaps acquired most of its corruptions at an era subsequent to that of Moses". But, even if "the Egyptians retained in any great measure, the simple faith of the patriarchs, at the epoch to which we refer, we have still stronger reasons for believing that it was preserved in a state not less genuine among those pastoral nations [= the Hebrews], the simple and unvaried tenour of whose existence precludes all great innovations in manners and sentiments". Prichard followed here the eighteenth-century view that any non-refined society was more natural than its civilized counterparts. In particular, he had taken on board the opinion of Warburton who had seen no theological danger in the fact that Egyptian culture might have been more developed than that of the Hebrews: faith had nothing to do with civilization.103

Michaelis had dwelled at length upon the correlations between the social state of the Egyptians and the Mosaic law. He, too, had suggested that the "Policy of Moses is rather of Egyptian origin".104 But again, just as with respect to theological doctrines, Prichard rejected the idea.
the teachings of Spencer, Marsham, Warburton, and Michaelis he affirmed that Moses "was neither guided by the lessons nor influenced by the examples of his Egyptian instructors".105

In view of the social make-up of the polity, in particular, the very opposite was the case: the cultivated Egyptian priesthood was intent upon preserving its power. "Hence", Prichard wrote, "the complicated system of subordinate ranks, which consigned the lower castes, with their posterity, to a state of perpetual servility and abject degradation". Under the Mosaic regulation, by contrast, there was no hereditary hierarchy, neither politically, nor socially: "the prophets of the Hebrews were men raised up from any tribe, without distinction, and the most illustrious were not descended" from the priestly family of Levi.106 In saying this, Prichard opposed himself to many classical and modern authors, most notably John Spencer who in his De legibus Hebraorum ritualibus (1686) had praised the legal system of the Egyptians and had seen many parallels between Egyptian and Mosaic legislation. But since he himself despised the Egyptian hereditary hierarchy, which "degraded the mass of the people into a most servile condition, and sacrificed them to the interests of the privileged order", he denied all links between Moses's moral legislation and Egyptian law: "We look ... in vain for any mark of consent between the morality of Moses and that of his predecessors".107

He agreed, however, with that part of Warburton's theory which dealt with the future state: since "Moses had declared, in the outset, that God had promised to govern Israel as its immediate sovereign, with temporal rewards and punishments", there was no need for him to make a "reference in his laws to the dispensations of the invisible world". Moreover, Moses had not only rejected the hereditary class system, he even made sure that the entire population had equal access to learning and religious understanding.108

We have come to see Prichard as a conservative. Therefore, it
should appear as striking that he seemed to adopt rather liberal, or even egalitarian, views when he was discussing the Mosaic polity. At second glance, however, the apparent radicalism dissolves itself. Everything he said about the civil and social constitution of the Hebrew polity was derived from Michaelis. Leventhal has described the "progressive sense of self-identity" and "freedom of interpretation" prevalent in Göttingen in the second half of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{109}

Johann David Michaelis, professor of philology at Göttingen university, was one of the protagonists of this spirit. He was a great admirer of Montesquieu whose social "laws" he applied to the Hebrew polity. As he put it, "the knowledge of the Mosaic law" was "useful in philosophising on law in general, as Montesquieu has done".\textsuperscript{110} His Commentaries were perfectly reconcilable with the ideology of the German Ständestaat, and yet, compared to Prichard's excerpts, they sound rather radical.

Prichard's own political position is revealed not so much in those passages which he quoted but in those which he omitted. Michaelis pursued social analysis with a lot more enthusiasm than Prichard. For Michaelis, the pastoral state of the Mosaic polity implied that "there was no Bourgeoisie, or distinct class of Citizens". He conceived of Moses as the first democrat in history: "This equality of all citizens, without a class of nobles, properly so called, could not but give the Israelitish state a democratic tendency; and we need not wonder that on such a foundation, Moses should have established a democracy, and not a monarchy".\textsuperscript{111} This theory was cheeky, but not radical. It certainly was not a threat to the Hanoverian government: following Montesquieu, Michaelis interpreted government as a function of the state of subsistence. His theory was perfectly open to the stipulation that commercial societies required to be governed by a king. From a theological viewpoint, Michaelis was daring, but in a strictly political sense he was rather inoffensive. Nonetheless, the
mere mentioning of democracy was too much not only for Prichard but also for others. For example, in the introduction which the clergyman Alexander Smith prefixed to his translation of the Commentaries, he distanced himself from Michaelis's "political castles in the air".112

For Prichard the only true parallels between Egyptian and Mosaic regulations were those that he discovered in ceremonial law. He was particularly intrigued by the custom of circumcision. This had been practised by the Egyptians as well as by the Israelites. But Prichard was far from claiming that Moses had copied the custom from the Egyptians simply out of habit. Nor, for that matter, did he agree with Warburton who had stated that "the Pagans might indulge themselves in the Imitation of Jewish rites".113 He followed Michaelis who had presented the introduction of circumcision as pragmatic expediency. Prichard wrote: "to attempt to govern the opinion and sentiments of men by a system of machinery which had no hold on the habits and character of the people whom it was designed to controul and edify, would betray a total ignorance of the constitution of the human mind". Hence he thought that Moses had adopted circumcision as a "purifying rite" from the Egyptians. There was, however, one great problem connected with this interpretation: according to the Bible, it had been God who urged Abraham to implement the custom.114 And He certainly would not act as a scheming legislator à la Montesquieu. In order to resolve this difficulty, Prichard compared circumcision to baptism. The prevalence of lustration by water in non-Christian religions had been explained of old within the framework of theological typology as a preparation for the gospel.115

When he was discussing the practice of circumcision, Johann David Michaelis had applied the doctrine of typology to the Mosaic custom of sacrifices: "I consider the sacrifices prescribed by Moses as typical of Christ". The offerings of sheep and goats were, in other words, "types of Christ", forebodings of the agnus dei and his crucifixion.116
Prichard quoted this passage from Michaelis. He himself applied the doctrine of typology to circumcision. Then he drew a parallel between circumcision and baptism. "If such ideas", he explained, "had not pre-existed in the opinions of men, the ordinance of baptism by John the Baptist, and by our Lord, would have been devoid of all meaning and effect". Just as baptism was known as a rite of "inward purification", the coarse imagination of the Hebrew tribesmen would connect similar ideas with the custom of circumcision, precisely because circumcision symbolized purity in Egyptian custom. In order to make this explanation more plausible, Prichard expressly adopted Michaelis's suggestion that, in Egypt, it had been the priests who were circumcised. This explained why the custom had sacral connotations for the Hebrews when it was introduced by Moses.

Prichard was certainly not following orthodox paths when he took Michaelis as his guide on this aspect of Egyptian-Hebrew relations. The English edition of Michaelis's Introduction to the New Testament (1793-1801) had been purified by its translator Herbert Marsh. When, in 1814, a translation of Michaelis's Commentaries on the Laws of Moses appeared, the translator, a divine called Alexander Smith, justified at length why he had not altered the text. Michaelis had not only outlandish political opinions, but he also "indulged himself occasionally in a latitude of speculation and conjecture, which, with all his ingenuity and learning, could hardly be admitted, and seemed to demand the application of somewhat of that precautionary chastening, which Dr. Marsh has so judiciously applied to the Introduction to the New Testament". Smith wished to amend Michaelis's text in that respect, but his translation had been overtaken by the Anglo-French war, Britain was blocked from the Continent, and hence Smith had not been able to avail himself of the "books necessary to be consulted for such a purpose".

One of the main reasons why Michaelis offended the British
divines lay in his great admiration for Montesquieu he referred the sacred history to profane traditions as if there was not a genuine difference between the nature of these texts. Still, insofar as Michaelis applied himself to "illustrating" the Scriptures "from analogous circumstances in the laws and government of other nations", his scholarship was admired. It was all a question of the direction which the comparison took: the Bible as a starting point was admitted, while the contrary was not acceptable. Prichard was very well aware that it was extremely delicate to choose Michaelis for a scholarly ally. But then, Michaelis had given an account of circumcision which was not only historically plausible but also theologically sound.

We have seen that Prichard did not take every single tenet of the Bible by the letter. In former centuries, an Athanasius Kircher or a Jacob Bryant could thrive on comparative mythological historiography. This had been admissible as long as world history was accommodated within sacred history. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century, such an approach appeared to the traditionalists as dangerous and anti-religious. Prichard was always painfully aware that he exposed himself to possible theological attacks.

D. The Egyptian Chronology

Prichard's remarks on chronology constitute an appendix to the Egyptian Mythology. He conceded that his animadversions on the subject were not "closely connected with the scope of the preceding work". If he entered into the discussion this was partly due to his proud belief to have "discovered a clue" through which he hoped to prove that ancient Egyptian history was "far within the era assigned by the chronology [of the Bible], for the second origin of mankind". For many centuries, chronology belonged to the most intricate problems of theology. Scriptural chronology itself was thoroughly ambiguous.
Following the conventional understanding of the Septuagint, some 5400 years had elapsed between the creation of the earth and the birth of Christ; following the Masoretic text, however, the interval was 1440 years shorter.\(^{126}\) Moreover, Biblical chronology differed considerably from numerous other chronological accounts, those of the Egyptians and the Indians being considerably longer than their Christian counterparts. With respect to Egyptian tradition, the two most important computations were the account of Manetho, the Egyptian priest and historian of Egypt (fl. 280 b.c.e.), and the historical work of the Greek philosopher Eratosthenes (ca. 276-194 b.c.e.) who served as the director of the great library in Alexandria.

In medieval times, it was customarily believed that 4000 years had passed between the creation of the world and the birth of Jesus Christ. Later authors modified the figure, the range reaching from 3947 to 5868 years.\(^{127}\) Theoretical warfare raged between those who favoured the chronology as it was given by the Hebrew or Masoretic text and those who preferred the computation provided by the Septuagint.\(^{128}\) Newton, following the latter, was of one many authors who tried to reconcile the Egyptian and Biblical chronologies: he declared that Osiris, Bacchus, Sesostris, and Sisa were merely different names for one single person, namely, the lawgiver who had introduced civilization in Egypt, roughly two generations before the Trojan war.\(^{129}\) In Newton’s view this sufficiently explained the greater Egyptian time-scale. But since his computation was based on the assumption that the reigns of Egypt were more recent than even Scripture allowed, Bishop Warburton rejected the theory fervently.\(^{130}\)

During the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth, it was the English chronologist John Marsham (1602-1685) and the French philologist Joseph-Juste Scaliger (1540-1609) whose interpretations were widely accepted as the best way to reconcile the Egyptian with the Christian time-scale: they assumed that, as Georges Cuvier put it, the
priest and historian "Manéthon n'aurait donc pas compris lui-même les listes qu'il copiait". In their interpretation, Egypt was, in its antiquity, divided into several kingdoms. Not being aware of this basic fact, Manetho had just added up their respective chronicles, having one kingdom follow another instead of seeing that they belonged to the same epoch. Prichard presented his own speculations on chronology as a refutation and replacement of Marsham's theory. Theologically satisfying as it was, he realized that there was no historical proof available to affirm it. As for the Indian chronology, its records did not go back as far as those concerning the Egyptian time-scale. Sir William Jones, for one, had explained away many hundred years from the Indian chronology by means of assigning the first three ages of the Hindus to the realm of mere mythology, while "the fourth, or historical age, cannot be carried further back than about two thousand years before Christ."

In the Discours préliminaire prefixed to his Essai sur la théorie de la terre, Cuvier endeavoured to set geology and Biblical chronology into relation. He repeated Jones's assertion: "Il n'y avait point d'histoire ancienne à Babylone, à Ecbatane, plus qu'en Egypte et aux Indes; et au lieu de porter la théologie dans l'histoire, je suis d'avis qu'il faudrait reporter une grande partie de l'historie dans la mythologie". In her biography of Cuvier, Dorinda Outram has maintained that the Preliminary Discourse "detached both science and the savant himself from the concerns of scriptural geology", implying that Cuvier was actually not all that interested in the Bible. It is certainly true that Cuvier wanted to establish geology as a science and that he believed that thousands and thousands of years might have passed between the creation of the earth and Scriptural Deluge. Some such ideas, however, had been entertained already by patristic writers. It was, therefore, theologically seen, not all too daring to join this notion to geology. As Francis Haber has shown, the French naturalist was not the only scholar
to link his geological science to the age-old doctrine of restitution which stipulated that "many great changes had taken place between the 'beginning' and the actual creation of the world". But this does not mean, as Outram implies, that Cuvier was altogether uninterested in upholding the truth of Genesis. As a matter of fact, for the sake of Scriptural chronology Cuvier discounted the chronologies of the Hindus and Egyptians. The way in which he did it was quite opposed to Prichard's undertaking: the French scholar referred to mere fanciful myth what the latter took as a starting point for a historical comparison.

When Prichard set out to solve the question of chronology, he started not so much from the viewpoint of absolute figures and numbers of years, but in terms of the chronological relations between historical events. This was common practice. As the example of Cuvier shows, Prichard was not the last author, nor even the last "scientifically" minded author, to address the problem. Other Britons who dabbled with the riddle were Nicholas Wiseman (the later Cardinal), who published a tract on the question (Horae Syriacae, 1828), and the Revd Daniel Guildford Wait (1789-1850) who asserted "that the Israelitish institutions are not to be referred to [Egyptian customs], but rather to the Patriarchal remains remodelled and enlarged at the delivery of the law of Mount Sinai". Prichard was acquainted with Wait, both men probably had met in 1809 at Oxford. In the Egyptian Mythology Prichard recommended Wait's erudition, but the latter's publication came too late for him to comment on it.

Zealous to correct Marsham, Prichard had two main tasks: to bring the historical account of Manetho and of the later Greek philosopher, Eratosthenes, into line, and to solve the problem of how to reconcile Scriptural and Egyptian chronology. As to the first question, his argument was basically that both historians had used the records of different cities, which led them to assign varying names to the same kings. Manetho's
time-scale was exorbitantly vast because, as Prichard suggested, he would have counted prefects and provincial governors as kings, thus adding several imaginary Pharaonic reigns to the historical records.\textsuperscript{142}

The real problem, however, was the second question, i.e. how to reconcile Manetho's chronology with the Scriptural account. When Abraham visited Egypt - according to the Septuagint around 2000 b.c.e. - the Egyptian polity was thriving.\textsuperscript{143} The question was, how far back its history reached. Prichard believed that Manetho - in his position as Egyptian priest - "must be supposed to have possessed the most accurate information". Prichard chose to follow a rationale that combined ancient learning with the methods of Higher Criticism. It was well known that the Bible contained different accounts of one and the same event. Most conspicuously there were those passages which referred in one version to God by the name of "Elohim", and in another by the name of "Jehovah".\textsuperscript{144} Prichard assumed that similar overlapping narratives might be found in the history of Manetho. On the assumption that Manetho had committed minor errors and that later transcribers of his chronology had shown "carelessness in copying", Prichard managed to refer two accounts of the conquest of Egyptian territory to the same era, namely the age of the Shepherd kings.\textsuperscript{145} It was his way of shortening the Egyptian timescale: there were not parallel kingdoms, as Marsham and Scaliger had had it, but parallel narratives. Manetho, in other words, was less incompetent than Cuvier or Jones had presumed. Like the authors of the Bible, he had given varying descriptions to one of the most decisive events in Egyptian history, namely, the incursions of the Shepherd kings. These Shepherd kings were, as Prichard explained, none other than the Israelites. Manetho himself, he added, "certainly considered the Shepherds as identical with the Hebrews; for he mentions that they retired from Egypt by treaty, and built Jerusalem and the temple".\textsuperscript{146}

On the basis of this assumption Prichard devised an Egyptian
chronology which was in line with the chronological account of the Septuagint. In 1813 he had already emphasized how "totally irreconcilable with many parts of history" the Hebrew version was.\textsuperscript{147} He praised the divine and mathematician William Hales (1747-1831) who had published an apologia in three volumes in favour of the chronology in the Septuagint (1809-1812).

His account of Egyptian chronology had the advantage of being bound up with one of the most decisive events in the history of the Hebrews. And it took Egyptian tradition seriously, which in turn enabled him, in his capacity as ethnological writer, to treat Egyptian traditions on the whole as an at least semi-reliable source. His book on \textit{Egyptian Mythology} presupposed and sustained the notion that pagan accounts contained some sort of distorted historical truth. Otherwise, the whole endeavour of using mythology in order to prove the genealogical parentage between Egypt and India would have been impossible. And this in turn would have proved disastrous for the project to demonstrate the unity of mankind.

\textbf{E. Public Reception of the \textit{Egyptian Mythology}}

The treatise on \textit{Egyptian Mythology} was successful within a certain segment of its readership. However, for those uninterested in the theological implications of Egyptian history, it was too much imbued by religious considerations. For the defenders of Christian orthodoxy, by contrast, the book was too free-spirited. The members of the Bristol Institution fell between these two groups. They were happy to acclaim Prichard as an Egyptian scholar in their midst.\textsuperscript{148} Others too were favourable. David Guildford Wait, the friend from old Oxford days, welcomed the book as "one of the best and most elaborate inquiries into the subject, that has appeared of late years". He recommended it "for an additional demonstration of the analogy between the Egyptian Hindù
[sic], and Classic systems". Thomas Hodgkin remarked that Prichard's speculations on the Egyptian chronology were later corroborated by Bunsen.

In 1820, the *Monthly Review* published a very positive account of the book. Prichard, the reviewer concluded,

> ascends by a copious induction of particulars to the grand and primary truth which, if not the exclusive object, is at least the principal result of his labours. We mean the purpose of shewing that a belief in the existence of a Deity and of a future state, as those words are understood among Christian divines and philosophers, is a principle of the earliest religion of India and of Egypt. Under all its depravations, this primitive spark has been kept alive; and this is no mean argument, we should conceive, for its divine origin.

The reviewer had a sure grasp of Prichard's motivation and ambition. But in another respect his interpretation went beyond the former's intentions. He wanted to delineate a historical movement which Prichard himself had not envisaged, namely the direction which "the stream of pure religion" took in the course of history: "An attentive perusal of Dr. Prichard's treatise will qualify us, though the author seems not to have had this object in view, to trace that stream of pure religion flowing from the East where the belief of 'one living and true god' was first deposited, through Hindustan to Egypt, and from Egypt to Greece."

The reviewer acknowledged that Prichard had merely wanted to show "that a sensual and corrupt religion ... is almost peculiar to refined and cultivated periods". But he filled in that part of history which Prichard never ever spelt out: if all mankind were related and if they had spread themselves by migration across the globe, the question was which routes the migrating hordes had taken. Prichard was too cautious to risk speculations on this subject. But to his contemporaries it appeared as a desideratum.

There was yet another aspect in which the reviewer went beyond
the scope of the *Egyptian Mythology*: as the above quotation shows, his impression of Greek mythology was more favourable than Prichard's, which did not dwell upon the beauty of Greek allegory. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Prichard acknowledged the refinement of the Greek language, but it was not central to his intellectual agenda, no more than Greek aesthetics on which he always remained remarkably silent.

He knew that he had to make provision for an ascent in history towards refinement and cultivation as well as towards the expansion of Christianity, but this progressivist streak in his thought was of a rather modest nature. Basically, he believed that the state of universal harmony between man and God was over. And he was not inclined to take up the Romantic teachings which regarded the concrete, pictorial expressions of early texts - including the Bible - as more natural and hence more beautiful. Prichard did not recognize either beauty or philosophy, unless he could subsume them under truth.

While the *Monthly Review* endorsed Greek mythology, it was not very willing to bestow praise upon the Indian tradition: "the Vedas", the reviewer wrote, "are not so old as the Homeric age". Prichard, as well as Friedrich Schlegel and many other "Oriental literati" were greatly overestimating their importance: "if we are not deceived, it is an epidemic error among those who are addicted to Oriental studies". Another point of criticism referred to Prichard's lengthy disquisitions on the Egyptian animal gods. This appeared to the reviewer altogether confused, too rich in detail and impenetrable.

If the liberal *Monthly Review* tended to approve of Prichard's book, the review in the *British Critic* was scathing. Its author started out with a declaration of puzzlement: "We are at a loss what to say about this book. It displays a good deal of learning, joined to no small portion of research; and yet we cannot help thinking, that the author has thrown away his time on a very unprofitable subject". The attempt "to blend
all religions in one" was "mystical nonsense". The British Critic understood itself as an orthodox Christian journal, adverse to all anti-Christian thoughts and reckless speculations. The reviewer admitted that Prichard had displayed proper deportment in view of Christian doctrines: "as Dr. Prichard has carefully eschewed the impieties and scepticism of modern mystagogues, we have nothing at issue with him, on the head of religious belief". Then the reviewer, reluctantly, summarized Prichard's system of the parallels between the gods of Indian and Egyptian mythology, but only to conclude that "little as we have said, we are completely tired of it; a feeling which ought not to be neglected by him who expects any body to read what [Prichard] writes". The reviewer declined to enter into a discussion of the chronological animadversions in the Egyptian Mythology. But he considered that chapter as "the best part of the book", no doubt in part because Prichard upheld the framework of Scriptural chronology.159

In 1830 appeared the first volume of Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology.160 It was Lyell's attempt to perform for Britain what Cuvier had tried earlier in France, namely, to establish geology as a science independent from Scriptural accounts. While Cuvier's reference to pagan mythologies had complied with the prerogative of sustaining Biblical chronology, Lyell made wholly different use of it. He employed pagan mythology in order to illustrate the superstitious beliefs which were handed down from "barbarous and uncultivated" epochs "through all the progressive stages of society, till they exert a powerful influence on the mind of the philosopher".161 Prichard's demonstration of the image of the Flood in Egyptian and Indian mythology was, for Lyell, merely instancing the preservation of superstitious wisdom under civilized circumstances.162 He wrote: "The connexion between the doctrine of successive catastrophes and repeated deteriorations in the moral character of the human race, is more intimate and natural than might at first be
imagined”. According to Lyell, Prichard’s *Egyptian Mythology* demonstrated that "the identification" of the objects of geology "with those of Cosmogony has been the most common and serious source of confusion". Prichard himself made hardly any comments on geology and did not attempt to disprove Lyell’s approach which reduced pagan cosmogonies to the realm of the fabulous.

In 1837 the German orientalist Wilhelm August Schlegel, Friedrich’s brother, criticized Prichard for what to him appeared as pitiable orthodoxy. Schlegel did not altogether reject *Egyptian Mythology*, though. For him, its value lay in its original contribution to the study of mythology. Schlegel had read the book shortly after its publication. Like Prichard he was interested in discovering the possible "bridges" between Eastern and European as well as Egyptian cultures. The endeavour "to build the bridge from India to Egypt" intrigued him. A few years later Schlegel made Prichard’s acquaintance. He described him as "a man of intellectual esprit and erudition". When in 1837 a German translation of the *Egyptian Mythology* appeared, Schlegel contributed an introductory evaluation.

He certainly was not convinced of Prichard’s argument. The theory of chronology, in particular, seemed rather obscure. Schlegel remarked that it was a worthy undertaking, but that it was impossible to follow Prichard "through a labyrinth of numbers and names". Moreover, he regretted the Briton’s fixation on theology: "If we occasionally miss frankness and impartiality, we have to consider the position of an English author towards his audience. We claim the right of historical scholarship to total autonomy, that means, that on this field no foreign authority, however honorable it may be, must interfere. There is still a long way to go until this principle will be universally accepted in England". Prichard’s views on chronology were for Schlegel just as ill-founded as those of Marsham. In that respect, Prichard was no better than
"the harmonists who in the preceding centuries have tried in vain to reconcile the contradictions between so-called profane history and the sacred tradition".\textsuperscript{168}

Schlegel was sympathetic towards the main hypothesis of the book, namely, that polytheism was a later development of religion which, in its earliest infancy - at least among cultured peoples - was founded on "a purer worship of the supreme being". However, Schlegel had severe methodological objections: it was an error to start off from a comparison of mythologies in the first place, for: "mythology is the latest and most variable part of ancient religions".\textsuperscript{169} On the whole, Schlegel believed that Prichard was "paradoxical, but erudite",\textsuperscript{170} and not always up to date: there were some important German publications which the Englishman did not even mention in his text. On the other hand, Schlegel conceded, this deficiency might have had the advantage of preserving Prichard a certain freedom of spirit - a quality which was appreciated in the age of Romanticism.\textsuperscript{171}

Schlegel's criticism did not dissuade Prichard from his chronological computation. In the second volume of the third edition of the \textit{Researches}, he gave a short summary of the contents of his \textit{Egyptian Mythology}. In that context he even referred to "the assent given by M. Schlegel to my conclusions".\textsuperscript{172} Later he admitted having expressed himself "somewhat too decidedly" in that respect. Still, he could not see any grave difference between Schlegel's views and his own: "My conclusions will indeed be found to connect very closely the early mental culture of the Egyptians and of the Indians. Their tenour is not, however, ... irreconcilable with [Schlegel's] views" since the German himself believed that the Egyptians and the Indians had certain religious and philosophical principles in common.\textsuperscript{173}

If Prichard slightly modified his view, this had less to do with theological arguments but with his contributions to anthropology. In 1846
the *New Quarterly Review* pointed out to him that he could sustain his notion of the climatic influence in skin colour only at the expense of Scriptural chronology.¹⁷⁴ By that time it was generally assumed that a change of skin colour in any given race was, if it was possible at all, brought about only within a long lapse of time. The American doctor Samuel George Morton (1799-1851) had become famous with an essay on Egyptian mummies in which he divided the ancient Egyptians into four races of varying skin colour.¹⁷⁵ In his *Primeval History* John Kenrick had discerned Asiatic, Egyptian, and Negro human types on the paintings in Egyptian tombs, dated 1000 to 1500 years b.c.e.¹⁷⁶ Anyone wanting to prove that these different complexions were induced by climate, had to envisage a time-span since creation long enough for the Egyptians to differentiate into white, brown, and black varieties.

Prichard acknowledged the problem. 848 to 1348 years between the era of the Noachian Deluge and these Egyptian works of art were not long enough for such a significant development.¹⁷⁷ Based on the authorities of Michaelis, Rosenmüller, and Baron Bunsen, he explained that Scriptural chronology was incomplete. The detailed historical account of the Bible reached back only to the time of the story of the tower of Babel.¹⁷⁸

He had recourse to the doctrine of restitution to solve the problem: in his *Philologia sacra* (1776) the German philologist Johann-August Dathe (1731-1791) had shown that there was no reason not to assume that mankind had been created only a few thousand years after the creation of the world. As we have seen above, this theory went back to the writings of the patriarchs. Prichard professed his adherence to Dathe's findings which corroborated the theory of several creations with philological means: in Dathe's interpretation the Hebrew 'יִהְיֶה' ('iyyeh'), normally translated as "became", needed to be read as "had become". Hence, when the process of creation began it was not that "the earth was", but that "the earth had become without form and void".¹⁷⁹ If a proper study of the Bible yielded
the result that the letter of Scripture admitted the passing of innumerable years, of course similar things might be said about later epochs. Prichard advanced the rhetorical suggestion that it was, indeed, impossible to ascertain from historical evidence how much time had passed between the creation of man and the first historiographical information which the Bible gave. The Bible was historically accurate as far back as ten centuries before the birth of Christ. How many years human history had lasted before that date, however, was largely a matter of speculation:

the Hebrew chronology may be computed with accuracy to the era of the Building of the Temple [under Solomon ca. 966-926 B.C.E.], or at least to that of the Division of the Tribes. In the interval between that date and the arrival of Abraham in Palestine it cannot be ascertained with exactness, but may be computed with a near approximation to truth. Beyond that event we can never know how many centuries nor even how many chiliads of years may have elapsed since the first man of clay received the image of God and the breath of life.180

Incidentally, this was exactly the same opinion Prichard had put forward in 1815, in his contribution to the Annals of Philosophy and The Philosophical Magazine.181 By 1847 he had come full circle: in 1815 he had approached the question from the viewpoint of geological theory; now he came back to it on behalf of ethnology. The Bible had "omitted" a few generations, and had instead exaggerated "the longevity" of the patriarchs. It was not Prichard's aim to declare the history of mankind to be measured in millions of years; he thought it sufficient to consider "one or two thousand years [as] the period of time supposed to have intervened between the Deluge of Noah and the origin of the great Asiatic monarchies".182 He referred to the Assyrian empire - comprising Babylon (as of 1137 B.C.E.) and later Ninive (ca. 700 B.C.E.) - as well as to the kingdoms of the Medes (9. to 6. century) and the Persians (6. - 4. century) which were known to be of newer origin than the Egyptian and Indian cultures.183 The oldest of all was in his view, of course, the
Hebraeo-Chaldean tradition. The doctor always insisted that the Bible was by far more accurate than Egyptian and Indian chronologies: "the whole duration of time from the beginning must apparently have been within moderate bounds and by no means so wide and vast a space as the great periods of the Indian and Egyptian fabulists."

At first sight, Prichard's "note on chronology" appended to the fifth volume of the Researches looks like a concession to secularizing trends. That it must not be read as his growing retreat into secularization has been set out in the fifth chapter. The extension of the timescale was in conformity with Christian tradition. Prichard changed his opinion on biblical chronology in so far as he gave up strict adherence to the Septuagint. While he had based his previous argument on Hales's authority, he now referred to Michaelis. The partial switch to the Masora had great implications for the period between the "age of Abraham and the Exode", for that span "the Hebrew text allows a much longer space than the Septuagint."

This amendment in his chronological interpretation went hand in hand with Prichard's conviction - gained from the writings of the orientalist and theologian Ernst Friedrich Carl Rosenmüller (1768-1835) - that pre-Abrahamitic humans were not endowed with exorbitant longevity. In early modern times it was assumed that the posterity of Noah reached a vast old age - and thus had sufficient time to engender a great amount of offspring. The phenomenon was good to account for the growth of the earth's population. But it was not of help in accounting for the development of different human varieties. In the fifth chapter we have seen that the supposed longevity of the patriarchs was difficult to reconcile with the idea of a uniform animal economy of mankind. But if Prichard dropped it, this had more to do with the other problem, namely, the rise of different human varieties. That process required not just time, but also the succession of several generations of men. Hence Prichard
maintained, without much ado, that several "generations have certainly been omitted in the early genealogies". Another advantage of this concession was that the Biblical chronology could be brought in line with that of the Egyptians. He cited Michaelis who was also "embarrassed by the shortness of the interval between the Noachic Deluge and the period at which the records of various nations commence". The insertion of a few hundred years, however, reconciled Egyptian chronology with the Scriptural account.

Prichard concluded his comment upon chronology in 1847 with frank words: "I might have avoided the discussion, had it not been pointed out as one which is necessary for the support of my argument, and for establishing the probability of the main conclusion that all mankind are the offspring of one family". This declaration is decisive: if he had to choose between maintaining the foundations of Genesis on the one hand, and comparatively trifling chronological details on the other hand, he opted for the first. It is noteworthy that it was not the movement which may be comprised under the label "scientific progress" which led him to do without certain tenets of the Bible. Instead, it went back to the very specific problem of the origin of human varieties.

When Prichard started out on his studies of pagan mythology and chronology, he did it in order to sustain the unity of mankind. His last words on the subject were written down in the name of the same objective. Over the years, his interpretation of Egyptian and Indian mythology changed as little as his views about the beginnings of human history. He was all but a progressivist. He had a notion of the ancient Hebrews as an uncultivated nomadic people, yet their government was near to God and a glowing example of righteous paternalism.


4 "Abstracts of Papers, &c Read Before the Philosophical and Literary Society Annexed to the Bristol Institution. Beginning With the Paper Read at the Evening Meeting on 6th January 1825", compiled by the Philosophical and Literary Society, Bristol, no date, entry for 6. 1. 1825, Bristol Public Library, B 12361, see the entry for 6. 1. 1825.

5 Jean-François Champollion, *Lettre à M. Dacier, Secrétaire Perpétuel de l'Académie royale des inscriptions et belles-lettres, relative à l'alphabet des hiéroglyphes phonétiques*, Paris (Firmin Didot), 1822. Note the great delay between the publication date and the moment when the text arrived in Conybeare's hands.

6 Smith, *Manuscript Memoirs*, 644, Bristol Public Record Office, 35893 (36) g. i. Prichard co-authored the lectures with G. T. Clark.

7 Prichard, *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, 3. ed., 5 vols, London (Sherwood, Gilbert, Piper; John and Arthur Arch), 1836-1847, vol. 2, 200. Prichard asserted that "the native population of Egypt" was "for the most part ignorant of Greek".

8 Prichard, *An Analysis of the Egyptian Mythology: To which is Subjoined a Critical Examination of the Remains of Egyptian Chronology*, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1819.


11 Quoted from: Ibid, 221.


14 For a recent overview which is divided into the systems of world religions see: Jean Holm with John Bowker (eds), *Myth and History*, London, New York (Pinter), 1994.

15 See, e.g., Burton Feldman, Robert D. Richardson, *The Rise of Modern


21 Feldman, Richardson, Modern Mythology, 365.

New York, Paris (Peter Lange), 1987; Peardon, The Transition in English Historical Writing, esp. ch. 8 ("Romanticist History, 1800-1830).

23 Feldman, Richardson, Modern Mythology, 365.

24 Ibid., 171.


27 This is fully explained in: Mareta Linden, Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts, Bern (Herbert Lang), 1976.

28 Thus the writer Joseph Görres, quoted in: ibid., 299.

29 Ibid., 227, 199.


32 Jacob Bryant, A New System; or an Analysis of Ancient Mythology Wherein an Attempt is Made to Divest Tradition of Fable and to Reduce the Truth to its Original Purity, 3 vols, London (T. Payne), 1774-1776. See also: Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods, 274-275.

33 Prichard mentioned Heyne for the first time in 1826. See: idem, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind, 2. ed., 2 vols, London (John and Arthur Arch), 1826, vol. 2, 67. But his unspecific reference suggests that it was adopted from another publication and did not come from first-hand acquaintance with Heyne's theories.

34 Jones, "On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India", esp. 287.


36 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 558.

37 [Anon.], "Townsend on the Character of Moses as an Historian", British Review, 6 (1815), 26-50, p. 32. Cf. also Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", xlii, lxvi.


40 James Bruce, Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile in the Years


Prichard referred this term to Egyptian animal worship, not to Egyptian mythology on the whole. See: Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, v.


Rossi, *Abyss of Time*, 238. The whole explanation of Warburton's theory is greatly indebted to Rossi's lucid account.

Rossi, *Abyss of Time*, 236.

For Spencer see: Heinrich Meyer, *The Age of the World. A Chapter in the History of Enlightenment*, Allentown, PA. (Muhlenberg College), 1951, 45-46. According to the DNB, Spencer "may justly be said to have laid the foundations of the science of comparative religion", see the entry for Spencer in vol. 52.


Ibid., 348.

Rossi, *Abyss of Time*, 245.

Rossi, *Abyss of Time*, 244.


For Prichard's comments on hieroglyphics see: Idem, *Egyptian Mythology*, 415.

Since Greek pantheism was regarded as the legacy of Egyptian mythology, Prichard also devoted many pages to prove that "the rites and attributes, and even many of the names, of the Grecian gods, may have been originally derived from a mythology, founded on very different principles from the deification of men". In the context of this chapter, however, which is interested more in the sources than in the historical offspring of pagan theology, there is no room to dwell upon
the Greek side of the problem. For the quote see: Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 49. As John Burrow has remarked, Prichard's aim was not very original at his time; see his "The Uses of Philology in Victorian England", p. 190.


61 Ibid., 199-220; the quote from p. 213.

62 Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 223-224. The fourth stage Prichard set deliberately into a better light than Schlegel had done. For Schlegel, the fourth age was signified by the abject system of pantheism. Prichard had no sympathy for pantheism, but the researches which H. T. Colebrooke had carried out after the publication of Schlegel's book had shown pantheism to be present even in the first epoch of Indian mythology. Since Prichard shared Schlegel's praise for the early system of Indian religion he was obliged to see pantheism in a better light than the former had done. The second amendment Prichard applied to Schlegel's theory of mythological epochs concerned the second stage of the fight between light and darkness: this principle, which Schlegel had derived from Schelling, had no particular appeal for Prichard, wherefore he omitted it from his list of the four ages. See: ibid., 253-254 and 262.

63 Quoted from ibid., 208; and from Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 101.

64 Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 233; for the German original see: Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 110.


67 Cf. chs 3, section C; ch. 5, section A.


69 Ibid., 102.

70 Ibid., 102; Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 232.


75 Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 257. Prichard had mentioned metempsychosis already in 1813, see: idem, *Researches*, 1. ed, 343. But then, he had not described the theological background of the doctrine.


77 Ibid., 298.
Prichard had become acquainted with the text through the publications of Sir William Jones.

Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 265-266.

Ibid., 293, 291.


Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 84, 270.

Ibid., 295.

Ibid., 34-35.

Ibid., 295, see also 84. The respective Indian gods are Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. The Indian triad was a common trope; see: Willson, *A Mythical Image*, 42.


Ibid., 14, 217.

Ibid., 294.


Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 34.

The reviewer of the *British Critic* misunderstood the intricate make-up of Prichard's theory. He bluntly referred Prichard's opinion to the third point on the list of explanations. See: ibid., 60.

Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 296, 231. This topic has been discussed in ch. 5, section A.

Ibid., 293-294.


Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 112.


Cf. [John William Donaldson], "Bunsen on Egypt", *Quarterly Review*. 

504
78 (1846), 145-174.
105 Prichard, *Egyptian Mythology*, 408.
106 Ibid., 408-409.
108 Ibid., 412, 415. Michaelis had advanced a similar theory about the future state, see: idem, *Commentaries*, vol. 3, 45-47.
111 Ibid., 206, 225.
112 Ibid., vol. 1, xxi. Smith's disdain aimed also at Michaelis's speculations on why Moses had no interest in inciting a commercial spirit in his people: intercourse with other nations would have exposed the Hebrews to idolatry. Moreover, the Israelites were not supposed to indulge in "foreign luxury", see: ibid., vol. 1, 215-216.
119 Ibid., 426. Cf. Michaelis, *Commentaries*, vol. 3, 76. August Wilhelm Schlegel was later to say that Prichard's assertion that in Egypt only the priests were circumcised was not convincing. Apparently, Schlegel was unaware of Prichard's source, cf. Schlegel, "Vorrede", in: Prichard, *Darstellung der Aegyptischen Mythologie verbunden mit einer kritischen Untersuchung der Ueberbleibsel der Aegyptischen Chronologie*, trans. L. Haymann, Bonn (Eduard Weber), 1837, i-xxxiv, p. xxiii.
120 Marsh was an English divine who had studied at Leipzig and whose translation of Michaelis's Introduction into the New Testament, 1793-1801, helped to introduce German scientific method into English biblical criticism. Cf. Peardon, *The Transition in English Historical Writing*, 163.
121 Michaelis, Commentaries, vol. 1, xxif.
122 Ibid., vol. 1, Michaelis's introduction.
123 Ibid., xx. Smith quoted this description of Michaelis's achievements from Eichhorn.
124 Prichard, Egyptian Mythology, vif, note on p. 49. Cf. Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", lxii.
126 Rossi, Abyss of Time, 145.
128 Rossi, Abyss of Time, 145-149.
132 Prichard, Egyptian Mythology, 96.
134 Ecbatana was the capital of Media during the centuries before the armies of Alexander the Great invaded Persia.
135 Cuvier, Discours. 211. In the third edition Cuvier's discussion of chronology had swollen from some twenty pages in the first edition to over a hundred pages (see ibid., 180-280). This great concern of Cuvier's to prove the superiority of Scriptural chronology cannot simply be explained as a theological fig leaf for his scientific interests. Had this been so, he would have considered it unnecessary to greatly increase the number of pages devoted to the subject. For the chronological discussion in the first edition see: Cuvier, Recherches sur les ossements fossiles de quadrupèdes où l'on rétablit des caractères de plusieurs espèces d'animaux que les révolutions du globe paroissent avoir détruites, 4 vols, Paris (Deterville), 1812, vol. 1, 87-109.
136 Dorinda Outram, Georges Cuvier, Vocation, Science and Authority in Post-Revolutionary France, Manchester (Manchester Univ. Press), 1984, 143.
137 Haber, The Age of the World, 203.
Sandra Herbert's dictum seems to be more to the point. What she called the "Cuvierian synthesis" was the outcome of Cuvier's finding "a way of combining what he termed civil history, much of it drawn from sacred narrative, with his profoundly original understanding of the history of the earth", see: Sandra Herbert, "Between Genesis and Geology: Darwin and Some Contemporaries in the 1820s and 1830s", in: R. W. Davis, R. J. Helmstadter (eds), Religion and Irreligion in Victorian Society. Essays in Honor of R. K. Webb, London, New York (Routledge), 1992, 68-84, p. 69. Oddly, Herbert professes to follow in her interpretation the book of Dorinda Outram (ibid., note 7 on p. 81). There is a difference, however, between the two approaches: while Outram's bias is to play down Cuvier's religious engagement, Herbert aims at Cuvier's capacity of synthesizing geology and religion. (The different attitudes are reflected in each author's opinion on Francis Haber: Outram forthrightly rejects his book, Herbert endorses it).


Daniel Guildford Wait, Jewish, Oriental, and Classical Antiquities; Containing Illustrations of the Scriptures, and Classical Records from Oriental Sources, Cambridge (printed by J. Smith to the University), 1823, 295.

I have found no other reference to Wait in Prichard's writings excepting the one in Egyptian Mythology, note on p. 131. For Wait see DNB, vol. 59.

Cf. Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 432.

Idem, Egyptian Mythology, 160 and 128, for the difference between Elohim and Jehovah Prichard referred to Eichhorn.

Ibid., note on p. 52, 79-80.

Ibid., 85-86. To demonstrate the identity of the Shepherd kings and the Israelites Prichard cited the renowned liberal and anti-Catholic Göttingen orientalist Georg Heinrich August Ewald (1768-1835).


85 In 1825 Prichard was invited to give a talk on Egyptian mythology, see: "Abstracts of Papers, &c Read Before the Philosophical and Literary Society Annexed to the Bristol Institution. Beginning With the Paper Read at the Evening Meeting on 6th January 1825", compiled by the Philosophical and Literary Society, Bristol, no date, Bristol Public Library, B 12361.

Wait, Jewish, Oriental, and Classical Antiquities, xi.

Thomas Hodgkin, "Biographical Notice of Dr. Prichard", British Foreign and Medical Review, 27 (1849), 550-559, p. 557.

Ibid., 230.
Ibid., 231
[Anon.], "Prichard on the Egyptian Mythology", 238-239. Presumably, the reviewer had Colebrooke in mind, who had dated the earliest Vedas several hundred years before the birth of Christ, cf. Henry Thomas Colebrooke, "On the Ve'das [sic], or Sacred Writings of the Hindus", Asiatick Researches: or Transactions of the Society, Instituted in Bengal, 8 (1805), 369-476, esp. p. 469, 474.
[Anon.], "Prichard's Analysis of Egyptian Mythology", 55.
Ibid., 56, 69.
Ibid., 5-20, esp. 9-10.
Ibid., 10, 4.
In the third edition of the Researches, Prichard commented on the concept of successive creations, without distinguishing between Cuvier's catastrophism and Lyell's uniformitarianism: "Now if it be allowed to have been a part of the order of things in remote ages of the world, that the creation of organized beings, either partially or universally, should be renewed at different periods, as the sequel of some great cataclysms, or, perhaps, in consequence of some physical changes in the surface of our planet, which had rendered it an appropriate habitation for beings of a different organization from those which had previously existed in it, there is nothing remote from this analogy in the supposition, that after the last great deluge ... a similar renovation should have taken place"; see his Researches, 3. ed., vol. 1, 102; see also the second edition, p. 83-84, where Prichard professed his allegiance to Cuvierian geology.
How little he was affected by Lyell's theory was revealed in the 3. ed. of the Researches where Prichard came back to "the remarkable history of the flood" preserved in ancient Vedic literature; see his Researches, 3. ed., vol. 2, 198.
I have not been able to find out where the two men met. It might have been in Paris. Schlegel used to travel there frequently. Prichard recorded having visited the city in 1831 (see see note 1 in ch. 1). There is no indication that Prichard ever travelled to Germany. As long as Prichard's personal letters are unavailable, the matter will remain undecided.
167 Schlegel, "Vorrede", i.
168 Ibid., xxxii.
169 Ibid., xvi.
170 Humboldt, Schlegel, Briefwechsel, 155 (see Schlegel's letter to Humboldt dated 19. 5. 1823).
171 Schlegel, "Vorrede", x.
172 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., 2. vol., 197-199, the quote is from p. 219-220.
173 Ibid., note on p. 370.
175 Samuel George Morton, Crania Aegyptiaca, Philadelphia (J. Pennington), 1844.
177 Ibid., 552-553.
178 Ibid., 552-570.
179 Ibid., note on p. 553 (Prichard's emphasis).
180 Ibid., 570, see also p. 555-556.
181 See notes 114 and 115 in ch. 2.
182 Ibid., 554.
183 Prichard, Researches, 1. ed., 444.
184 Ibid., 554, 570.
185 Ibid., 554
186 Prichard, Researches, 3. ed., vol. 5, 560. See section B of ch. 5 for his combination of tenets from the Masora and the Septuagint.
187 Ibid., 570.
188 See e.g.: Matthew Hale, The Primitive Origination of Mankind, Considered and Examined According to the Light of Nature, London (printed for William Shrowsbery), 1672, 145, 169.
190 Ibid., 553-554.
191 Ibid., 553.
John Stuart Mill said famously that every Englishman was "by implication either a Benthamite or a Coleridgian", the one representing Utilitarian realism and efficiency, the other a penchant towards theories of German Idealist philosophy and German Romanticism as well as a yearning for mystical historical times permeated by poetical veracity. Bentham lived in London, Coleridge spent a great part of his life in Bristol; their juxtaposition implies also the antagonism between life in the capital and provincialism. It is time to put Prichard into the picture and to assess his place in early nineteenth-century culture as well as his significance for later decades. Mill's witty observation may serve as our starting point: the fact is that Prichard's views did not coincide with those of either Coleridge or Bentham. We have seen that he relied heavily on German Romantic theories of madness as well as on German Romantic linguistics, and German Biblical criticism. Yet he stopped short of embracing the wider philosophical tenets generally associated with the epoch and its German avant-garde. If Elisabeth Jay is right in stating that "the Romantic movement as such had passed the Evangelicals by", it is true to say about Prichard that he snatched from it what he could use - but nothing more. His total lack of interest in aesthetics has been addressed in ch. 2. His more than sceptical appreciation of non-religious philosophy has been mentioned in ch. 9. He did not care for the Herderian or Hegelian underpinnings of the comparative historical method and used it only for bolstering traditional religious views. Biblical criticism, in Prichard's hands, was turned into an instrument of theological conservation, as has been shown in chs 8 and 9.

Prichard's religious doctrines did not permit him to embrace all facets of Romanticism. In Peter Allen Dale's blunt description, Romanticism entailed the "effort to find in poetry and art an alternative
means for doing what religion and philosophy traditionally had done.\(^3\)

In its preoccupation with beauty and poetry the post-Kantian Idealist movement unwittingly demolished its own theological basis. Prichard, by contrast, was never in danger of doing the same. Within his post-Quaker, evangelical frame of mind, the "eternal, invisible church" assumed a supreme position,\(^4\) and this was a feeling which he did not dilute by diverting it into artistic channels. Reversing Feuerbach's dictum, it could be said that, for Prichard, all anthropology was theology, as he took the universal belief in life after death for a sign of the uniformity of human nature. The human penchant for culture and embellishment was not even mentioned by Prichard. Unlike Coleridge or Schlegel, he did not take up the speculative potential of Naturphilosophie. Coleridge applied Hegel's dialectical trinity to nature, juxtaposing peoples who represented "thesis", "antithesis", and "synthesis".\(^5\) Schlegel's philosophy of language was imbued by Naturphilosophie. None of this can be found in Prichard. Equally he did not join in the Romantic veneration of the "people" as the bearer of the spirit of history. In that respect he adhered rather to the discipline of Staatswissenschaften developed by August Ludwig Schloezer (1752-1827) at Göttingen University, than to Herder's philosophy of history.\(^6\)

Duncan Forbes and John Burrow have described the elements of racial theory that can be found in the views of Whig Anglican historians.\(^7\) Prichard's interest in peoples was that of a natural historian, at times that of a sociologist, but he missed out on the patriotic euphoria for tracing the historical forefathers of his "race", present in so many of his contemporaries, including Bunsen and Jacob Grimm, Thomas Arnold and Kemble, Guizot and Thierry.

During the nineteenth century the notion of race was increasingly employed in order to set up a new hierarchy among mankind where previously social status had served as classifying principle.\(^8\) Prichard,
however, adhered to eighteenth-century concepts, relying on the notion of caste or social status to account for human physical diversities. He believed that everywhere the upper classes tended to have a fairer skin than the lower orders. As we have seen in ch. 7, the distribution of skin colour according to the social stratification of the Indian caste system served as his prime example to support this theory. All the more Prichard was surprised when he encountered the black Brahmin Ramohun Roy; subsequently he stressed "that great varieties of colour exist within the limits of the same caste". The example of the Rajah added to his conviction that psychology was more indicative of man's innermost nature than external characteristics such as skin-colour. At the same time Prichard stuck to his old doctrine that a comfortable and civilized lifestyle brought about white skin colour. This attitude towards anthropology was in line with the fact that, in his writings, Prichard was not concerned with rising industrialism, Malthus's theory, or the plight of the working classes. His aim was to sustain the unity of the human species by means of showing its variability. It was only in this context that anthropological notions of class came to prominence. Prichard's insistence on social status as a basis of natural classification was striking at a time of blossoming racial theories and growing numbers of adherents to phrenology. It was the theoretical mainstay of his conservatism and belonged rather to the eighteenth-century context of social theory than to his own age.

If Prichard ignored the more intricate elements of Idealism, he outrightly hated utilitarianism. As Mill stated, a "utilitarian doctrine" was initially "the favoured theory" of the Church of England and the defenders of theological orthodoxy. Scottish Enlightenment social science, in particular, drew an analogy between the ends in nature and moral ends. As late as 1839 Revd William Donaldson maintained: "we have all of us a bias towards the practical and immediately profitable, generated by our mercantile pursuits, which make all of us, to a certain
extent, utilitarians". By that time Utilitarianism had long come into disrepute among strict Anglicans and the politically conservative minded. Jeremy Bentham had developed his Utilitarian philosophy which supported political radicalism. Against what had become the "deadly heresy" (Mill) of Utilitarianism, the defenders of orthodoxy turned towards German metaphysics, taking its speculativeness for a lesser evil than home-grown materialism and political radicalism. Richard Jenkyns described "the distinctive tone in English life which we call Victorian" more broadly as a result of the anti-utilitarian critique of British literati striving to reclaim poetical truth from the fetters of utilitarian expediency. At Cambridge's Trinity College, the classical scholars Connop Thirlwall and Julius Charles Hare as well as William Whewell and Adam Sedgwick pitted German metaphysics against the utilitarian evil. Thomas Carlyle sought "deliverance from the fatal incubus of Scotch or French philosophy, with its mechanisms and Atheisms". Coleridge, too, railed against "utilitarian notions of education" and Archdeacon Paley's notion of expediency.

Prichard was not alone in rejecting the drab views of "my own utilitarian countrymen". Yet, while Dickens, Ruskin, and Thomas Arnold fought Utilitarianism not least of all in the name of poetry, Prichard insisted on morality. While the anatomist Robert Knox pitted naturphilosophische transcendental anatomy against Paley's "animal mechanics", Prichard used German philosophy to accommodate common-sense doctrines to his spiritual concerns. Then, there was another, clear-cut motive: Prichard needed theoretical assistance to defy phrenology. In ch. 3 we have seen that Thomas Hancock's theories assumed the role of mediating between common-sense philosophy and German medical theory, enabling Prichard to conceive of the moral sense as a faculty that was prone to disease and largely independent of the cerebral make-up. Thus he drove a wedge into the phrenologists' theory.
of the nervous system which came so very close to the assertion that the brain was the organ of the soul and which, in W. F. Bynum's words, "made polygenism an obvious conclusion". Prichard's notion of man's moral conscience, which was addressed in ch. 5, unified his theories of madness and of anthropology. The emphasis he placed from the 1830s on man's inward moral nature, went hand in hand with the notion that the integuments - hair, feathers, and skin colour - did not have any significance for natural classifications.

This preference for internal over external characteristics was in line with the insistence of Quakers and Evangelicals alike that faith was a question of inner conviction rather than of nominal Christianity. It also fitted with Prichard's opinion, delineated in chs 3 and 9, that worldly hierarchies were a superficial, albeit necessary, outward order. Among the ancient Hebrews the invisible church of the faithful had been properly instigated with God as the supreme ruler. There had been no need for a worldly government, all men were equal under the rule of God. The more mankind distanced themselves from that state, the more order and survival had to be promoted by other means. A sense of moral demerit had been implanted into man's conscience. Prichard stressed that this sentiment, being prevalent in all human tribes, was a strong indicator for the unity of mankind. It had not only a religious but also a worldly rationale: the feeling of worry and anxiety was part and parcel of man's ability to anticipate (and cater for) future wants; at the same time it was liable to produce mental perturbation, delivering the individual to moral insanity. Thus, Prichard's anthropology and his theory of mental illness were built on and unified by his notion of the anthropological role of the feeling of "gloom", which, for Prichard, was a sign of a moral instinct implanted in the human fabric. As Greta Jones has stated "all the theorists of instinct began their work with an explicit renunciation of utilitarianism and the tabula rasa". In this light, Prichard's theories
surely were a product of his time. Though, his reluctance to embrace most of the philosophies characteristic of Romanticism and the early Victorian age corroborated the impression of many reviewers that his ideas were conservative.\textsuperscript{21}

It was no accident that he, like many, chose Sydenham as his medical authority, as we have seen in ch. 2. In relying so much on Sydenham, he followed an eighteenth-century tradition. In other aspects, too, he adhered to eighteenth-century notions. Most prominent among these is Prichard's sense of historical progress: in line with the outlook that Duncan Forbes described as \textit{The Liberal Anglican Idea of History} Prichard held a cyclical rather than a linear concept of historical movement.\textsuperscript{22} He rejected late eighteenth-century primitivism\textsuperscript{23} and spurned the Ideologue assumption that a primitive tribe might progress "of itself from barbarism" to civilization.\textsuperscript{24} His notion of progress and civilization resided in his religious views. It entailed two important tenets: firstly, even basic arts, such as the faculty of language and "the use of fire, of artificial clothing, of arms, and the art of domesticating animals" could be lost if circumstances were unfavourable. This notion, held already in 1813, culminated in the assertion that these cultural attainments were "variable traits of human action". Subjected to change, they were not of much value for an ethnological classification.\textsuperscript{25}

The second crucial aspect of Prichard's views of civilization was his belief that primitive tribes achieved a more civilized stage only through the influence of more refined peoples. This conviction did not justify imperialism, but it certainly vindicated missionary activities. Prichard emphasized that this theory did not apply to contemporary savages only, but also to the former primitive population of Europe. When dealing with "the history of the nations of Asia & Europe" (see the third and fourth volumes of the third edition of the \textit{Researches}) his aim was to show that Europe owed its civilization to the influx of other tribes from
the east. "I shall endeavour to shew that these races", he wrote to his friend Hodgkin, "were & probably would have remained but for the communication of external aids, in a state of Society - as Barbarous as that of the most Savage Africans". Unlike Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, Prichard did not believe that the intermixture of "new" blood was important for cultural progress.

His ideas were more akin to Jacob Bryant's theories - or "learned dreams" as Prichard called them later - of the Hyperboraeans. Bryant had envisioned that mysterious tribe as the Promethean people of antiquity whose learning had spread gradually over Asia and Europe. Indeed, Prichard's philosophy was a lot nearer to Bryant's views than to those of Scottish developmentalists like Adam Ferguson or John Millar. This had a repercussion on his physiology: while a man like John Hunter fashioned his theory of heredity along the lines of the Scottish notion that "education" was productive of new hereditary traits, Prichard initially rejected this concept, replacing it with his idea of marital selection. The latter, too, was a tenet of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy. But it drew on the notion that the environment had an oblique influence on the formation of a people (namely, by determining the standard of life); the idea that the environment might have an immediate physiological effect was not central to this approach.

Just as Prichard omitted to set out his views of civilization, he never indicated where his chain of cultural fertilization was meant to end. His ethnological writings left it to the reader to think of Adam who had been endowed with superior wisdom by his Creator. The notion of a cyclical theory of history could, in principle, support degenerationism. But Prichard did not turn that way. As we have seen in ch. 6, he thought that civilization was a reversible progress, and he even believed that human physiognomy changed as the cultural conditions changed. Still, this notion was tied to his environmentalism whose development we
have traced in chs 4 and 6.

Prichard did not pave the way for racial degenerationism - a theory which arose in part as the result of the desire to make sense out of a world which appeared to many out of joint. The social hierarchy being under threat, a racial hierarchy was put into its place. Prichard's ethics, however, were still so deeply rooted in Christianity and a Christian notion of patriarchy that racial theory was not an option for him, as shown in ch. 7.

Prichard rose to fame during the 1830s, no doubt thanks to his prominent role in the British Association and other learned societies. People as diverse as Bunsen, Conybeare, Henry Holland, Thomas Hodgkin, Alexander von Humboldt, and Nicholas Wiseman appreciated Prichard's arguments for the unity of mankind. Even Robert Chambers mentioned Prichard favourably. The first edition of the Researches had been greeted as a work "of much amusement and information" by the Monthly Review. The British Critic was mainly concerned with its theological virtues. The more voluminous the Researches grew in subsequent editions, the more difficult it was for the reviewers to discuss the work, one author simply resorting to the verdict that the book was "not susceptible to abridgement". The second edition was less reviewed than the first (when leaving Edinburgh, Prichard had left behind his acquaintances who would ensure that a review would be published). The third edition was deemed "a vast store of highly interesting facts and speculations". Prichard's attempts to convince through a coherent argument foundered in the sheer bulk of the material he presented. Despite all his efforts to disprove the "Caucasian hypothesis", the British Quarterly Review concluded that Prichard's "craniological division of mankind corresponds, in most respects, with the geographical classification of Baron Cuvier". "He occupies himself wholly with the collection of ethnographical matter", the Prospective Review
complained, "the primary object appears almost to have vanished from his view". The New Quarterly Review meant well when it wrote "that the value of the work before us by no means depends on the question whether the writer has or has not proved, either that man is one species, or that this species descends from one pair. It is in fact a storehouse of information concerning the whole controversy". This was surely not what Prichard wanted to achieve.

From the mid-thirties to the mid-forties Prichard's books were much reviewed, and praise was almost universal. The third edition of the Researches was considered as "superior", as "a masterly-drawn scheme", "an exceedingly valuable contribution", "as a work of reference and authority in its own department, we know of none that can compete with it", in short, it was a "classical work" by a "powerful authority". Many authors agreed that Prichard was a traditionalist. The New Quarterly Review stated: "the results at which he arrives may be described as (in the general) conservative; that is, they are mostly in favour of older rather than newer views". The British and Foreign Medical Review praised the Researches for being "undertaken and executed in the spirit of former days, when men devoted their lives to the prosecution of one subject" and were "thinking of the attainment of truth alone".

Nobody could ignore the great amount of time and learning Prichard had invested. Therefore, "as a work of reference", the Researches and The Natural History of Man were valuable. Many reviewers endorsed Prichard's claim that physiognomy was a corollary of civilization, and that manners did not only make the man, but also human variety. Objections were raised mainly during the late 1840s, when Prichard's religious viewpoint went out of fashion. The New Quarterly Review and the Prospective Review, amongst many, criticized the brevity of Prichard's timescale. Prichard had been so desirous to stick
to Biblical chronology that he conflated the Septuagint and the Masora, thus devaluing both. "Conservatives", it said in the Unitarian Prospective Review, "occasionally become the greatest destructives". Morality, the reviewer asserted, was not involved in the quarrel over monogenism. But the existence of races who did not descend from Adam would discount the theory of original sin and thus "clear the Divine character from the imputation of the most odious injustice".

Yet, arguments rarely hinged on theology alone. The theory of hybridization was often attacked. The monogenist William Benjamin Carpenter conceded in the Edinburgh Review that there were "many who maintain that the limits of hybridity are much wider than Dr. Prichard supposes". The New Quarterly altogether rejected the benefits of intermixture: "Dr. Prichard overrates the hardihood of mixed races". The North British Review even maintained that "on the whole, other races keep distinct from the true Negroes". Other objections were raised against Prichard's hypothesis of the uniformity of the animal economy: for the North British Review it was evident that intermixture between human races produced a "generally short-lived hybrid".

Sometimes Prichard's entire endeavour was criticized. "On reviewing the whole argument", the New Quarterly stated, "we cannot shake off a feeling that the result might have been attained with far less effort. For what have we proved? that men have actually descended from common parents? No: but that they may have so descended; out of which is educed (by the author) the idea of 'common species'". Writing in Blackwood's Magazine, the natural scientist William Robert Grove was equally unconvinced: "differences in external condition may effect remarkable changes in tribes of human beings, and yet the collective body may be made up of different races". A future president of the British Association and an influential member of the Royal Society, Grove was an important representative of scientific opinion. The editors of the New
Quarterly, by contrast, added a footnote to an article on Prichard, distancing themselves from the polygenist leanings of the reviewer.\textsuperscript{59}

If most British reviewers of the 1840s were willing to accept at least some sides of Prichard's argument, foreign observers tended to judge more harshly. As early as 1824 the polygenist Julien-Joseph Virey dismissed Prichard's monogenism, the idea that black tribes might engender white varieties appeared ludicrous to him. And Prichard's claim that all human tribes were prone to the same diseases was in his opinion unfounded.\textsuperscript{60}

In 1829 William Frédéric Edwards rejected Prichard's idea that civilization might exert an influence on human physiognomy, maintaining that human diversities "peuvent s'expliquer plus naturellement par le mélange des races sur le même sol".\textsuperscript{61} Gustave d'Eichthal spoke for most members of the Société Ethnologique de Paris when he criticized Prichard's religious stance and his environmentalism:

\begin{quote}
M. le docteur Prichard ne s'est pas toujours rigoureusement conforme à la loi du juste-milieu qu'il a voulu s'imposer, et que l'autorité des traditions bibliques ne lui a pas laissé à cet égard toute sa liberté: presque toujours il a préféré attribuer à l'influence des agents extérieurs, et à des circonstances climatériques, des variations qui, dans l'opinion du rapporteur, s'expliqueraient d'une manière plus naturelle par une différence typique des races ou bien par l'influence d'un croisement.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

Gobineau mocked Prichard "a mediocre historian and even more mediocre theologian" who was not interested in knowing the truth, but only in serving his deluded philanthropic ideals.\textsuperscript{63} Paul Broca looked at Prichard's "point de vue biblique" without enthusiasm and rejected the argument of hybridity.\textsuperscript{64}

If French anthropological writers were tired of the Scriptural argument, the Americans attacked Prichard's natural history. William Frederick van Amringe (1791-1873)\textsuperscript{65} criticized what he called Prichard's "speculative analogy". According to van Amringe "the anatomical and
physiological structure and functions of the different races of men are sufficient to constitute distinct species”, skin colour was of tremendous importance, the argument of hybridity fanciful nonsense: “it has been a favorite theory with some visionary philanthropists, that intermarriages of the different species would be highly favorable to the race; but we have never heard of any of them who was willing to commence the practice in their own families”.66 The example of ant colonies, van Amringe stated, proved that slavery was a natural institution. God had “made four distinct species of men soon after the flood; the Shemitic, the Japhethic, the Ishmaelitic, and the Canaanitic”.67 But for their survival the Canaanitic Negroes would need the infusion of Shemite blood, by which van Amringe understood the Europeans. This amalgamation, however, would "destroy the Shemitic race" in degrading it to the Canaanitic. Prichard’s idea that black races evolved into white races appeared to van Amringe to be ridiculous: if the white species were indebted to blacks for their existence "we should sometimes, at least, if not often, find children of white parents born black", but this was obviously never the case.68

Van Amringe’s objections were founded on arguments drawn from natural history. Not being free of Scripturalism himself, he did not criticize Prichard on that account. Yet, in his book we find all the elements characteristic of nineteenth-century scientific racialism: the notion of purity of blood as well as the assertion that some races were not fit to survive. Even more disparaging than van Amringe were Josiah Clark Nott (1804-1873) and George R. Gliddon (1809-1857). Living in Mobile, Alabama, the former was a surgeon, well known in the southern states of the American federation; the latter was an archaeologist, adventurer, and representative of an insurance company; he was of English descent and came to live in America after he had served as American consul at Cairo. In 1854 these two men published in collaboration with other authors their influential Types of Mankind.69 In
the introduction it was pointed out that hitherto the monogenism of Blumenbach and Prichard had been attacked from a theological point of view, rather than on the grounds of scientific facts. Types of Mankind endeavoured to expose their scientific shortcomings. Prichard, "the grand orthodox authority with the advocates of a common origin for the races of men", was credited with having published "one of the noblest monuments of learning". Yet, his Scripturalism would have prevented him from any insight into the natural history of man: the constant changes of his opinions, his "special pleading", and his cool suppression of adverse facts, leave little confidence in his judgment or his cause. ... We behold him, year after year, like a bound giant, struggling with increasing strength against the records which cramp him, and we are involuntarily looking with anxiety to see him burst them asunder. But how few possess the moral power to break through a deep-rooted prejudice!

Prichard had failed: Nott and Gliddon were amused by his "extraordinary performance" of asserting the truth of the Pentateuch while denying "its genealogies; ... its chronology; ... all its historical and scientific details". "One of the main objects of this volume", they continued, "is to show, that the criterion-point, indicated by Prichard, is now actually arrived at; and that the diversity of races must be accepted by Science as a fact, independently of theology, and of all analogies or reasoning drawn from the animal kingdom". Like van Amringe, they believed in the existence of several human races, they rejected environmentalism as well as the argument of hybridity, and prophesied the extinction of the Negro race.

In the Introduction to this thesis we have seen that George Stocking has explained the rise of evolutionary theory as a synthesis of two contradicting paradigms which he called the "biblical-ethnological" and the "polygenist-physical anthropological" paradigm. The former would have been represented by Prichard, the latter by scientific racialists who "were more interested in describing, measuring, and classifying the
physical 'types of mankind' than in the reconstruction of its 'physical history'.75 Accordingly, in their writings anatomy and physiology would have dominated over history and its sub-sciences. Oddly, Stocking's implicit reference to "Types of Mankind" invalidates his own assertion: the argument of Nott and Gliddon was all but centred on ahistorical physiology.

Nott and Gliddon emphasized that "we seldom quote works on the Natural History of Man; and simply for the reason, that their arguments are all based, more or less, on fabled analogies, which are at last proved by the monuments of Egypt and Assyria to be worthless".76 They professed to "turn, unshackled by [theological] prejudice, to the monumental records of Egypt as our best guide".77 They expressly relied on historical data for what they perceived as the last word on the question of human races. The only scientists they credited with having paved the way for an objective treatment of the topic were William Frédéric Edwards, Amédée Thierry, and Samuel George Morton (1799-1851) who had discerned the features of four different human races in ancient Egyptian paintings78 (the opinion derived from images like that represented in plate XIV). All combined historical research with physiological and sometimes even philological assumptions.

Citing from Morton, Nott and Gliddon wrote: "We examine the venerable monuments of Egypt, and we see the Caucasian and the Negro depicted, side by side, master and slave, twenty-two centuries before Christ",79 (see plate XV80). Many of the pictures in Types of Mankind had been taken from the works of Jean-François Champollion (1790-1832) and his older brother Jean-Jacques Champollion-Figeac (1778-1867). The latter, in particular, had furnished Nott and Gliddon with the cue for their doctrine "that the ancient Egyptians had attempted a systematic anthropology".81

Insisting on the permanency of human features, they were, of
The ancient Egyptian division of mankind into four species—fifteenth century B.C.

The above figures, which may be seen, in plates on a folio scale, in the great works of Belzoni, Champollion, Rosellini, Lepsins, and others, are copied, with corrections, from the smaller work of Champollion-Figeac. They display the Rot, the Namu, the Nahu, and the Tamhu, as the hieroglyphical inscription terms them; and although the effigies we present are small, they portray a specimen of each type with sufficient accuracy to show that four races were very distinct 3300 years ago. We have here, positively, a scientific quadripartite division of mankind into Red, Yellow, Black, and White.

PLATE XIV

The Egyptians as "ethnologists". Four different human "types".

From left to right: "Egyptian", "Semitic", "Negro", "Japhetic".

We next present (Fig. 173) one of the many proofs that Negro slavery existed in Egypt 1500 years B.C. An Egyptian scribe, colored red, registers the black slaves; of which males, females, and their children are represented; the latter even with the little tufts of wool erect upon their heads; while the leopard-skin around the first Negro's loins is grotesquely twisted so as to make the animal's tail belong to its human wearer.

"... one of the many proofs that Negro slavery existed in Egypt...". From: Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 252; the picture was taken from: John Gardner Wilkinson, Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, 1837-1841.
course, not interested in delineating a physical "history", and they more or less denied that there was such a thing apart from the history of racial mixture. But equally, in setting out the project of their book there was no mentioning of works focusing entirely on physiology or anatomy. Moreover, Nott and Gliddon had recourse to philological arguments and praised the chronological researches of the German Egyptologist and philologist Karl Richard Lepsius (1810-1884). All this shows that there was no neat distinction analogous to Stocking's paradigms. The argument is sustained by Robert Gordon Latham's remark that Prichard had been the "first to combine" philology and physiology. The difference between Prichard's treatment of physiology and that of his adversaries consisted in the great weight he put on the "analogical method".

What distinguished scientific racialism from earlier assertions of polygenism is its final departure from theology and, in particular, the renunciation of the consanguinity of European and Shemite peoples. We have seen that van Amringe still endorsed the theory that the Europeans were Shemites. Nott and Gliddon, by contrast, rejected it. In their view, white races were "Japhetic", yellow races "Shemitic". Accordingly, the later Egyptian dynasties, who by others were associated with the Shemite tribes, were considered as an "amalgam of foreign (chiefly Asiatic) stocks". Denying genealogical links, so prominent in Prichard's ethnology, between the ancient Asiatics or Shemites and the ancient Europeans or Japhetic nations, they rejected the theory of the Eastern origin of the European nations. Summing up what appears to us as an imperialist doctrine of racialism, they wrote:

The World now advances in civilization more rapidly than in former times, and mainly for the substantial reason that the higher types of mankind have so increased in power that they can no longer be molested by the inferior; and the white races, or Iapetidae, have
commenced the career of oriental conquest, and already "dwell in the tents of Shem".90

The basis of this view was not uniquely American. Prichard's own disciple, the ethnologist and philological amateur Robert Gordon Latham professed shortly after Prichard's death similar opinions on ethnology. While upholding monogenism and the notion that mankind originated in "intertropical Asia",91 he denied that the ancestors of the Europeans had come from as far as India: "all the theories suggested by the term Indo-Europeans must be either abandoned or modified".92 He equally rejected the idea that the Shemites were related to the Indo-European stock. Unlike Nott and Gliddon, however, he classified them together with black peoples under the heading "Atlantidae" (Latham's other principal groups of classification were the "Mongolidae" and the "Tapetidae").93

Invalidating Prichard's attempts to include the Celts among the Indo-Europeans, Latham remarked that "the Celts have a skull of their own just as they have a language".94 Finally, and despite his monogenism, he used the term "race", contemplating over laws of racial mixture and enlarging on the concept of "pure" races.95 It was a thing Prichard had never done.96 He weighed the effects of intermarriage against those brought about by migration. But only very rarely did he use the terms "purity of race" or "pure race". And he did not assign any particular cultural significance to the concept itself. On the contrary, he believed that intermixture was a healthy process. And Latham distorted his teacher's views when he wrote: "From what I collect from Prichard, purity of blood is the rule rather than the exception".97 An approach to the topic of race couched in chemical terminology of blood mixture, amalgamation, or fusion was typical of nineteenth-century scientific racialism. The advantages and disadvantages of pure and mixed blood respectively stood at the centre of the best known works of racialism:
Charles Hamilton Smith’s *The Natural History of the Human Species* (1848), Robert Knox’s *Races of Men* (1850), Nott and Gliddon’s *Types of Mankind* (1854), and Joseph Arthur de Gobineau’s *Essai* (1853-1855).

We have seen above that many reviewers saw Prichard’s greatest merits in his having amassed so much material. As Latham’s example shows, his theories were easily contorted. It is no accident that Symonds muddled up Prichard’s account of skull formations in his obituary address of 1850. In 1868 the ethnologist Richard King maintained that Prichard gradually turned into a polygenist himself, he alleged “that Dr. Prichard had at one time contended for the unity of the human race, but that latterly he had changed his opinion, and said that as a philosopher he could not agree to that opinion, but that as a Christian he must”. There is no evidence to support this opinion. What the quote illustrates, however, is the prevalence of polygenism during the 1860s. Prichard never appeared more anachronistic than in those years. Edward B. Tylor highlighted his achievements, without, however, drawing on Prichard’s theories. When he was quoted, as in John Lubbock’s *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man* or in Gobineau’s *Essai*, it was only for factual evidence. William Swainson mentioned him when discussing the story of the ark. Not least thanks to Tylor, Prichard became the acknowledged “founder of British ethnology”.

The entry on him in the *DNB* endorsed his knowledge, without naming specific merits. “Had he not divided his energy” between philology and ethnology, Daniel Hack Tuke wrote, “he would doubtless have achieved results in one of them that would have entitled him to a place among the greatest men of science”. Tuke conceded, however, that Darwin’s “doctrine of development rehabilitates his discussion of the races of man as varieties of one species” - thus, continuing the history of misunderstandings, the myth of Prichard as the precursor of Darwin was
It was mistaken on two accounts: not only was Prichard's research programme entirely different from that of Darwin, but there is also no reason to assume that Darwin was much concerned with Prichard's publications, nor for that matter was Herbert Spencer.

This thesis has explored Prichard's opinions on all disciplines pertaining to the emergent understanding of anthropology. In his endeavour to assess man's nature Prichard dealt with the philosophy of the human mind, with ethnology, physical anthropology, and the historical sciences in so far as they contributed to the natural history of man. The thrust of his arguments changed remarkably little during the forty years of his intellectual career. His commitment to traditional notions of patriarchy and his religious involvement determined not just his opinions, but also his approach to the subject of man's place in nature. Even though a notable traditionalist, Prichard was not simply a man of the past. In his ambition to reconcile science and religion he made himself familiar with the newest trends of early nineteenth-century science. Ironically, however, he was able to use potentially anti-theological disciplines such as German comparative philology and Biblical criticism to bolster his own orthodox viewpoints. The Prospective Review considered Prichard as a man who unwittingly destroyed the theological foundations of modern science. But if his theological casuistry struck his contemporaries as odd it was not because of its secularizing force. Rather, it was because they projected onto Prichard's views their own distance from the letter of the Bible. This thesis makes the case for another Prichard who was not the conservative-minded, unwitting revolutionary of the Prospective Review, but rather a "revolutionary" conservative who subjected new scientific methods to orthodox goals.

In terms of philosophical allegiance he adhered to earlier writers rather than to those of his own time. Indeed, in his science he cannot be seen as having "anticipated" any theory prevalent in the nineteenth
century; even his concept of moral insanity has very little to do with what a later generation made out of it (as has been demonstrated in ch. 3).

Prichard's views of "race" have more in common with the antiracialism of the latter half of the twentieth century than with previous theories of race. And his idea that historical philology provided a key to the classification of human tribes is comparable not only to the endeavour of Sir William Jones but also to that of a group of twentieth-century geneticists, headed by L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza. To many of his own contemporaries Prichard appeared increasingly outdated. Boyd Hilton has shown that from the middle of the nineteenth century the evangelical occupation with guilt and the atonement was increasingly superseded by an emphasis on the Incarnation of God the Father in God the Son.104 Religion became, as it were, emotionally more comfortable. Yet, Prichard was a man of the old days who was haunted by the notions of guilt and gloom. Consequently, he felt isolated faced with the forebodings of the shift in religious perceptions. On top of this came the feeling of personal rejection: much as he was acclaimed, he never got the desired professorship. Prichard realized, of course, that he did not manage to convince the world of monogenism; he might have noticed that his adversaries rejected his doctrines as the prejudiced opinions of an anachronistic philanthropist. Yet he could not know that shortly after his death even his followers would begin to distort his theories so that within a few years his memory had not much to do any more with the ideal he stood for.


6 For the antagonism between the two see: Justin Stagl, A History of Curiosity. The Theory of Travel 1550-1800, Chur (Harwood Academic Publishers), 1995, ch. 6. According to Stagl "the original context in which these names [ethnology etc.] were coined was history, and especially the sciences auxiliary to it, to which geography and Statistik also belonged"; ibid., 267.


8 With respect to the racial theory of Joseph Arthur de Gobineau this has been shown by Michael Biddiss, "Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) and the Illusions of Progress", in: John A. Hall (ed.), Rediscoveries, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1986, 27-45, esp. p. 41.


10 John William Donaldson, The New Cratylus, or Contributions Towards a More Accurate Knowledge of the Greek Language, Cambridge (J. and J. J. Deighton), 1839, 3. For the prevalence of utilitarian doctrines in eighteenth-century British thought see note 17 in ch. 1 of this thesis.


14 Quoted from Adrian Desmond, Archetypes and Ancestors. Palaeontology in Victorian London 1850-1875, London (Blond and Briggs), Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1982, 43.
17 Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece, 245.
20 Greta Jones, Social Darwinism in English Thought: The Interaction Between Biological and Social Theory, Brighton (Harvester Press), 1980, 135.
21 See below.
23 For primitivism see Thomas Preston Peardon, The Transition in English Historical Writing 1760-1830, New York (Columbia Univ. Press), 1933, 103-126.
24 See the abstract of Prichard's "Observations on the Races of People who Inhabit the Northern Regions of Africa", in: "Abstracts of Papers, &c Read Before the Philosophical and Literary Society Annexed to the Bristol Institution. Beginning With the Paper Read at the Evening Meeting on 6th January 1825", compiled by the Philosophical and Literary Society, Bristol, no date, Bristol Public Library, B 12361. The paper was read on May 25. 1825.
26 Letter to Thomas Hodgkin, 23. 6. 1838, Hodgkin Papers, Rhodes House Oxford, Miss. Brit. Emp, S.18, press mark C. 122/51; see also the abstract of Prichard's paper "Observations on the Races of People who Inhabit the Northern Regions of Africa".
28 He never quoted Ferguson and Millar, while he mentioned Bryant in 1813 with some approval. See ch. 9, section B.

29 Hunter himself used the word "education" in this context, see note 37 in ch. 6.

30 Glacken has singled out Montesquieu, Hume, George Wallace, and Malthus as adherents to this type of environmental theory. These authors were "emphasizing not the elements of climate or the physical differences in environment but the limitations which the environment as a whole imposes on all life"; Clarence Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century. Berkeley, Los Angeles (Univ. of California Press), 1967, 710.

31 See for example: [anon.], "Dr. Prichard on the History of Mankind", British and Foreign Medical Review, 24 (1847), 49-81, p. 75-77.

32 For Bunsen see chs 8 and 9; Conybeare considered Prichard as "one of the very ablest men I know", see his letter to W. V. Harcourt from Sept. 8. 1831, in: Jack Morrell, Arnold Thackray (eds), Gentlemen of Science. Early Correspondence of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. London (Royal Historical Society), 1984, 59; [Henry Holland], "Natural History of Man", Quarterly Review, 86 (1849-1850), 1-40; for Hodgkin see section D in ch. 7; for Humboldt see note 47 in ch. 4; for Wiseman see note 72 in ch. 5.


35 [Anon.], "Pritchard's Researches on the Physical History of Man", British Critic, new series, 3 (1815), 292-300, esp. 292-293.

36 [Anon.], "Dr. Prichard - Physical History of Mankind", British Critic, 3. series, 7 (1828), 33-61, p. 47.

37 One review was published, however: ibid.


42 [Anon.], "Dr. Pritchard on the Physical History of Mankind", British and Foreign Medical Review, 3 (1837), 365-376, p. 376; see also the short notice in ibid., 5 (1838), 543-544.

43 See the notice in: Gentleman's Magazine, new series, 27 (1847), 398.

44 [Anon.], "Pritchard's Physical History of Mankind", 134.

45 See the notice in: London Medical Gazette, 4 (1847), 248-249.

46 See the notice in: British and Foreign Medical Review, 12 (1841), 519.
48 [Anon.], "Prichard's Physical History of Mankind", 106 (original emphasis).
49 See the review in: British and Foreign Medical Review, 12 (1841), 519.
50 [William Benjamin Carpenter], "Ethnology or the Science of Races", Edinburgh Review, 88 (1848), 429-487, p. 440; [Henry Holland], "Natural History of Man", 24; see also the review in: British Quarterly Review, 413-414.
51 [Anon.], "Prichard's Physical History of Mankind", 123, 134; see also the review in: Prospective Review, 362.
52 Ibid., 368-369.
53 [Carpenter], "Ethnology or the Science of Races", 460.
54 [Anon.], "Prichard's Physical History of Mankind", 126.
55 See the review in: North British Review, 189-190.
56 Ibid., 190.
57 [Anon.], "Prichard's Physical History of Mankind", 130 (emphasis in the original).
61 William Frédéric Edwards, Des caractères physiologiques des races humaines considérés dans leurs rapports avec l'histoire: Lettre à Amédée Thierry, Paris (Compère jeune), 1829, 35.
62 Gustave d'Eichthal, "Mémoire sur l'anthropologie ou de l'histoire naturelle de l'homme", procès-verbal de la séance du 26 mai 1843, Mémoires de la société ethnologique, 2 (1845), xxxvii-xl, p. xxxvii. D'Eichthal came from a wealthy family, he entertained a correspondence with John Stuart Mill and, in the 1830s, became a Saint-Simonian.
65 Van Amringe does not figure in any of the standard bibliographical...
His only other publication is a work on The Nature and Origin of Heat and the Forces of the Universe (1869).

William Frederick van Amringe, An Investigation of the Theories of the Natural History of Man, by Lawrence Prichard, and Others Founded Upon Animal Analogies; and an Outline of a New Natural History of Man, Founded Upon History, Anatomy, Physiology, and Human Analogies, New York (Baker and Scribner), 1848, 360, 395, 713.

Ibid., 311, 217.

Ibid., 713-714, 360, 424.

Josiah Clark Nott, George R. Gliddon et al., Types of Mankind: or, Ethnological Researches Based Upon the Ancient Monuments, Paintings, Sculptures, and Crania of Races, and Upon Their Natural, Geographical, Philological, and Biblical History: Illustrated by Selections from the Inedited Papers of Samuel George Morton, M.D., and by Additional Contributions from Prof. L. Agassiz, W. Usher, and Prof. H. S. Patterson, London (Trübner), 1854. Nott, incidentally, also provided an Appendix to the partial translation of Gobineau's Essai published at Philadelphia in 1856.


Ibid., 54-55. They grossly exaggerated Prichard's scientific critique of the Scriptures.

Ibid., 56.

Ibid., 63, 74, 67.


Ibid., ci.

Nott, Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 56.

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Samuel George Morton, Crania Aegyptiaca, Philadelphia (J. Pennington), 1844.


Nott, Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 86. See: Champollion-Figeac, Egypte ancienne, 30.

And mongrel races counted as lacking in strength; mulattos, for example, were described as "the shortest-lived of any class of the human race", see: Nott, Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 373.

Ibid., 234, 275, 60.

It is true that some anthropological authors pitted philological against physiological arguments, Latham was one of them, see the quote in note 250 in ch. 8. But this does not justify the notion of conflicting "paradigms".


See section B. of ch. 4.
87 Ibid., 229.
88 Ibid., 88-89.
89 Ibid., 96.
91 Latham, *Man and his Migrations*, 145, 218-219, 225, 248, the quote is from p. 249. This interpretation differs from that of Carol MacCormack who has recently contended that "Prichard's views were further developed" by Latham; see her "Medicine and Anthropology", in: W. F. Bynum, Roy Porter (eds), *Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine*, 2 vols, London (Routledge), 1993, vol. 2, 1436-1448, p. 1429.
92 Latham, *Natural History*, 14, 112.
94 Idem, *Natural History*, 517, 555-557; see also his *Man and his Migrations*, 97. His stance was that "differences should only be attributed to so independent and so impalpable a force as race when all other things are equal"; ibid., 204 (his emphasis).
95 Of course, Prichard would mention "the pure race of the Euskaldunes" or "Brahmans of high and pure caste". But these designations were purely descriptive, he did not believe that "purity of race" had any ethnological significance other than what the expression said; see his *Researches*, 3. ed., vol 3, 48; vol. 4, 237.
96 Idem, *Natural History*, 517.
97 See ch. 7.
99 Stocking, "From Chronology to Ethnology", x.
103 In his early writings there is only one reference to Prichard, see: Charles Darwin, *Metaphysics, Materialism, and the Evolution of the Mind*, *Early Writings of Charles Darwin*, ed. by Paul H. Barrett, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), 1980 (1974), 193; Darwin wrote: "female genital organs. - make abstract on this subject from Lawrence, Blumenbach & Prichard".
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