Getting the Right Right -
Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-Communist Europe

Seán Hanley*

Abstract

Existing literature on the centre-right in Eastern and Central Europe is small and fragmentary. This contrasts with the voluminous, detailed and often sophisticated comparative literatures on the left and the far right in the region. This article reviews and synthesises the existing literature and to suggests the outline of a definition of the right and centre-right in the region, which can both accommodate its diversity and provide a shared framework for analysis. It argues that centre-right should be understood neither an atavistic throwback to pre-communist past nor a product of the straightforward assimilation of Western ideologies. Rather, it is a product of the politics of late communism, domestic reform, European integration and post-Cold War geo-political realignment, which has powerfully re-shaped historical influences and foreign models

Introduction

The existing literature on the centre-right in Eastern and Central Europe is small and fragmentary. Current published research amounts to an edited collection, one book length treatment, which largely reviews prospects for democratisation, several monographs on national cases, and a small number of comparative papers. A number of other works discuss the centre-right in the region as a subsidiary theme within accounts of topics such as economic transformation and the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Critical, left-wing scholarship has also sometimes focused on East and Central centre-right as the key political vehicle for the restoration of capitalism and agent of transnational capital after 1989. The paucity of literature on the centre-right in post-communist Europe contrasts with the voluminous, detailed and often

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sophisticated comparative literatures on the left – usually focused on communist successor parties and, to a lesser extent, the far right. In this article, I therefore seek to bring together the fragmented existing literature and to suggest in outline form the basis of a workable definition of the right and centre-right in Central and Eastern Europe, which can both accommodate its undoubted diversity and provide a common framework for analysis. Broadly speaking, I will suggest that the centre-right in the region can be understood neither an atavistic throwback to pre-communist past nor a straightforward assimilation of Western identities and ideologies. Rather, it is a product of the politics of late communism, domestic reform, European integration and post-Cold War geo-political realignment, which has powerfully re-shaped historical influences and foreign models.

Defining the Centre-Right
As Hanley and Szczerbiak suggest in the introduction to this special issue, one of the greatest stumbling blocks is the lack of a clear, agreed and operationisable definition of what the political ‘right’ is. Leaving aside definitions, which view the Right as a set of enduring philosophical tenets or inherent psychological pre-dispositions, the most coherent accounts of the development of left and right in Europe have been constructed by scholars working on parties and party systems. These stress the national and cultural specificity of parties (and party families) which make up competing blocs of ‘right’ and ‘left’ in any given party system, based on comparative analysis of their historical and social origins.

Historically, the emergence of the political Right in Western Europe and North and South America can be associated with distinct property-owning classes, the defence of social institutions such as the Catholic Church and the rise of a bourgeois civil society
linked to the development of capitalism. The same linkages can be identified in the re-emergence of the Right in new or restored democracies such as West Germany, Italy and France after 1945 or Spain after 1975. However, in East Central European countries the emergence of an organised political Right after 1989 largely preceded the laying of social bases and the ‘transition to capitalism’, making class and cleavage-based definitions problematic. Moreover, in one case, that of Poland, the right had a substantial working class base, having largely emerged through the Solidarity movement. As noted in the introduction to this special issue, analysts using a historical sociological approach, such as Kitschelt, have resolved this difficulty by re-conceptualising ‘cleavages’ into terms of state-society relations derived from regime-opposition dynamics and patterns of socio-economic modernisation. However, whereas families of communist successor parties on the ‘left’ can be easily identified through organisational continuities with former ruling parties, parties of ‘right’ pose considerable problems of definition and conceptualisation.

Comparativists have identified three groups of parties in the region as ‘right-wing’. 1) mainstream centre-right parties with ties to West European centre-right, which Vachudová terms the ‘moderate right’ and others subdivide into traditionalist conservatives and liberal-conservatives; 2) broad populist-nationalist groupings, which played dominant role in the politics of new nation-states, such as Slovakia and Croatia in 1990s - termed the ‘independence right’ by Vachudová; and 3) former ruling communist parties, with a ‘chauvino-communist position’, combining
nationalism, social conservatism and economic populism - termed the ‘communist right’ by Vachudová and ‘communist conservatives’ by Chan.

Moreover, actors across the region have themselves generated their own national discourses of ‘rightness’, which represent a further set of definitions to be considered. In the Czech Republic, for example, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of former Prime Minister (and newly elected President), Václav Klaus, defined itself not only in terms of economic liberalism and anti-communism, but also as bringing the ‘tried and tested’ neo-liberal approaches of the Western right to a provincial society overly inclined towards collectivism.\textsuperscript{13} In states such as Hungary and Poland, by contrast, ‘right-wing’ politics are understood at both mass and elite level in terms of Christian, conservative-national, national-populist or radical anti-communist positions, with free market parties constituting as a distinct ‘West of centre’, liberal camp.\textsuperscript{14}

Similar problems are posed by small agrarian parties, which were a feature of both the Hungarian and Polish party systems during 1990s, and recently made important electoral gains in Croatia, Estonia and Latvia. As the Scandinavian experience demonstrates, agrarian formations have the potential to evolve into ideologically distinct, centre parties.\textsuperscript{15} In Romania and Bulgaria the initial dominance after 1989 of ‘chauvino-communist’ former ruling parties - or groupings that emerged from them - saw the ‘right’ emerge as heterogeneous ‘democratic’ alliances of traditionalist nationalists, historic parties, liberals and radical anti-communists.\textsuperscript{16} A similar pattern seems observable in Serbia. However, here the oppressive nature of the Milošević regime and a historic split between liberals and traditional nationalists made
opposition alliances more unstable and thus lacking even a loose ‘right-wing’ identity.  

Meanwhile, in new national states such as Slovakia and Croatia, despite the existence of strong nationalist, liberal and Christian forces, a self-identifying discourse of the right was largely absent from party politics in 1990s. Instead, political competition was polarised around a single set of issues relating to national autonomy/national statehood and its stewardship by Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) what Vachudová terms the ‘independence right’. A similar pattern can be detected in the Baltic states, where despite not enjoying the degree of dominance of HZDS or HDZ conservative nationalists have tended to present themselves as champions of recovered national independence against a Russophone ‘left’.  

Interestingly, however since losing power in 1998 and 2000 to broad coalitions of parties with more conventional ideologies of left and right, both HZDS and HDZ have expressed a desire to reinvent themselves as West European-type, Christian Democratic ‘People’s Parties’. However, Christian Democratic and liberal groupings in the opposition alliances, which displaced them also claim to be on the centre-right and have links with centre-right groupings in Western Europe.  

Moreover, as both Zake’s study of the neo-liberal People’s Party (TP) in Latvia suggests, new centre-right parties with more conventional programmatic appeals can make significant electoral breakthroughs, partially realigning such party systems away from ethnicity and issues of state-building. Similar trends may be observable in the emergence of the liberal, business-oriented Alliance for the New Citizen (ANO) as a parliamentary force in Slovakia in 2002 and of the conservative NGO-cum-party Res Publica as Estonia’s largest party in 2003. However, the recent electoral
breakthrough in Latvia another technocratically-led, pro-market party, ‘New Era’ led by former central bank President Einars Repse, emphases the instability of such party systems.\textsuperscript{23}

A number of provisional conclusions emerge from this survey. Firstly, it is clear that the ‘right’ is a culturally and historically contingent category that has (re)rooted itself in the political discourse of many, but not all, post-communist societies. In the main, these societies appear to those geographically and historically closest to core West European states. However, while local understandings of the political ‘right’ are important, serious comparative analysis clearly requires a more stable and worked out framework. The identification by both Vachudová and Chan of such a variety of ‘right-wing’ forces is valuable in pointing up different patterns of post-communist development and the way nationalist and conservative discourses were appropriated by different forces in different contexts. However, in other respects it is confusing and unsatisfactory. ‘Chauvino-communist’ former ruling parties, for example, while clearly ‘conservative’ in reacting against change, fall most comfortably within the comparative study of communist successor parties. Parties of the ‘independence right’ such as the Croatian HDZ and Slovak HDZ – despite the nostalgia of a radical nationalist fringe for wartime clerico-fascism – are regarded by most other scholars as simply populist or nationalist.\textsuperscript{24} This reflects their inconsistency or indifference towards issues unrelated to state-building and the possibility that their dominance may prove transitory, ultimately giving way to more conventional patterns of programmatic competition. The most recognisable centre-right forces from a West European perspective are the group of moderate conservative or liberal-conservative parties, all of which define themselves as (centre) right formations and have been accepted into the main organisations of the European centre-right.\textsuperscript{25}
As Vachudová notes, while their relationship with pre-communist right-wing traditions varies, these parties have a common historical and organisational origin in opposition to communist regimes before 1989 or mobilisation against them in 1989-90. They must, therefore, be understood as essentially ‘new’ political forces, shaped by late communism and the subsequent politics of post-communist transformation, rather than a simple throwback to the authoritarian conservatisms and integral nationalisms of the past. At the same time, however, contrary to the assumptions of some writers, the (neo-)liberal and (neo-conservative identities and ideologies adopted by such forces are more than hasty borrowings from the West or diktats from international financial institutions. Even where, as in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, Western neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologies were consciously imported, this was already being undertaken in 1970s by dissident and technocratic counter elites – usually in response to the failure of reform communism or a means of modernising national political discourses. Systematic underestimation of the role of domestic social and political forces in creating the East and Central European centre-right, and consequently its broader legitimacy and appeal, is characteristic of much critical left-wing scholarship on the region.

The need, in some cases, to consider (social-) liberal and agrarian parties as forces outside the East Central European centre-right appears a complicating factor, given that the defence of agricultural interests and economic liberalism are part of the broad centre-right in most West European party systems. To some extent this problem is offset by the limited electoral support of such parties, and the trend, over time, for them to become aligned with (or absorbed into) broader centre-right or centre-left blocs, Hungary being the clearest example of this tendency. However, we should also note the success of new centrist, liberal groupings in rapidly reoccupying the political
space vacated by older, discredited (neo-)liberal groupings. Such newly ascendant liberal centrist parties include the Freedom Union (US) in the Czech Republic, which entered parliament in 1998, or the Civic Platform (PO) in Poland, which did so in 2001. Similarly, while in Hungary the Independent Smallholders (FKGP) have disappeared as an electoral force and been absorbed into the dominant centre-right grouping FIDESZ, the unstable Polish party system now contains two agrarian parties – the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) and the radical-populist protest party, Self-Defence). This suggests that patterns of competition that separate the liberals and agrarians from the broader centre-right are more durable than individual parties themselves. Underlying, is arguably a distinct pattern of East and Central European party and party system formation, in which the centre-right, in the absence of a strong class base, lacks the broad appeal and integrative ability of their West European counterparts. In certain respects, this is comparable to the historic pattern of party formation in Scandinavia, where weak, sectorally and regionally divided bourgeoisie produced an array of weak conservative liberal, agrarian and denominational parties, rather than a unified centre-right.

A further issue of definition is that of delineating the centre-right from the extreme right. In West European party systems, although the nature of the extreme right is disputed, this distinction seems empirically and conceptually clear. Most West European centre-right parties draw on the historic cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan and on the experience of post-1945 re-democratisation. Extreme right, ‘new populist’ parties, by contrast, emerged only in the 1970s in response to cultural and social shifts in advanced capitalist societies. It is, therefore, possible to define the extreme right in terms of a family of parties with its own distinct origins and characteristics.
In post-communist, East and Central Europe, it has been suggested, the distinction between the centre-right and the far-right is conceptually considerably less clear. This reflects both the legacy of the integral nationalism, authoritarian conservatism and collaboration with fascism that defined the right historically in many states of the region\textsuperscript{38} and the fact that both centre-right and extreme-right are products of post-1989 democratisation. In many cases, however, it appears possible to make a clear empirical distinction, identifying the centre-right by its larger and broader electorate (generally in the range of 20-45%), catch-all electoral appeal and status as a (potential) participant in government and membership in European groupings of mainstream conservative and Christian Democratic parties. However, in Poland, where the dominant centre-right grouping, Solidarity Election Action (AWS) collapsed as an electoral force in 2001, to be effectively replaced by number of new conservative/Christian parties with a more radical rhetoric of protest and medium-sized electorates of around 10\%,\textsuperscript{39} such empirical yardsticks seem difficult to apply. One possible conceptualisation is to view the centre-right as seeking to reconcile liberal-capitalist modernisation with traditional moral values and specific local and national identities, and the extreme right as seeking to mobilise a radical minority behind alternatives to such modernisation.\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{Ieologies of the East Central European Centre Right}

Some have argued that the prominence of social-cultural divisions in the politics of both key post-communist states and more established Western democracies has subverted and voided older notions of ‘left’ and ‘right’ rooted in the class politics and distributional conflicts of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{41} Others have suggested for CEE state in particular that the constraints of globalisation and and conditionalities
European integration – or shared goals of post-communist modernisation - have robbed ideology of any significance for practical policy-making in the region, providing only an illusion of choice and alternation. Such issues are beyond the scope of this paper. What does seem certain, however, is that ideology plays an important role in both framing political action and giving cohesion and identity to political organisations. This is, arguably, particularly the case in periods of far-reaching social and political change, such as post-communist transformation, when structural determinants may be weaker, levels of uncertainty higher, and political identities less well defined. The ideologies of East and Central Europe’s new centre-right(s) combine both historic discourses and newer ideas imported from Western contexts or developed locally during post-communist transformation. These ideologies can broadly be broken down into three key strands: anti-communism, conservatism (including for the purpose of this discussion nationalism and populism) and (neo-)liberalism. Anti-communism is one of the few ideological tenets shared almost without exception across the diverse East Central European centre-right. Calls for radical decommunisation - often linked to vaguer aspiration of speeding up reform through decisive action - were among the most characteristic demands of emergent right-wing forces in Eastern and Central Europe in the early 1990s. In many states in the region decommunisation was also a key issue promoting differentiation in broad anti-regime coalitions and prompting the foundation of political parties, including parties of the centre-right. Centre-right parties have subsequently been among the keenest advocates of lustration procedures intended to screen those holding high public office for past collaboration with communist security apparatus (and in some cases to debar them). At a deeper level, however, anti-communism has been used by many centre-right
parties to frame left-left competition, which is depicted as a continuation of the struggle for regime change (‘thick’ or ‘permanent’ transition, struggle against ‘Third Ways’). Centre-left opponents are thus viewed as continuing communist ideology in an attenuated form, ensuring the dominance of elites drawn from nomenklatura structures, or themselves personifying links with the communist past. At the same time, however, decommunisation has been a divisive issue within the emergent centre-right in the region, given the conflicting imperatives of historical justice and broader socio-economic reform. Although in most cases traditional liberal or conservative agendas won out over the demands of small, vocal groups of radical anti-communists, in at least one instance - that of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in Bulgaria – the division proved crippling for much of the early 1990s.

A further ideological faultline is that between liberals – including both the established civic-minded intelligentsia and neo-liberals influenced by Western economic and public choice theory – and conservatives, usually committed to of moral order rooted in traditional discourse of the Nation (or the People) as a historic community. Most large, established centre-right parties in Western Europe combine (neo-) these conflicting elements both in their ideologies and in the range of sub-groups and factions represented within them. As many observers, have, however, noted there is, especially at times of marked political and social change, often a tension between the two. The relationship between liberal and conservative ideas - and liberal and conservatives actors - can therefore be seen as highly significant for the consolidation and development of East and Central Europe’s centre-right. This is particularly the case, given that in a number of states in the region, there is historic cleavage between liberal and conservative-national (national-populist) camps, which appears to have weakened non-socialist forces. In Poland, for example, the coalition government
formed in 1997 between the liberal Freedom Union (UW) and the larger, conservative-national Solidarity Election Action (AWS) bloc proved fraught and collapsed in 2000, ultimately resulting in the electoral demise of both parties.\textsuperscript{47} Similar, although less acute, tensions are currently emerging in Slovakia’s governing centre-right coalition between the liberal, pro-business Alliance for the New Citizen (ANO) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) over proposed changes to the country’s abortion law.\textsuperscript{48}

Nevertheless, such divisions, however historical or structural in origin, cannot be regarded as set in stone. As Hall notes, where such cleavages were ultimately reflected in post-1989 party systems, even under late communism there were often observable, if and often abortive, attempts at intellectual rapprochement between liberals and conservative-nationals (or national-populists). These usually entailed liberals rethinking their earlier rejection of the importance of historic questions relating to the nation.\textsuperscript{49} This tendency can be seen to have resumed in the mid-1990s in the growing nationalisation of key (neo)liberal forces in the region. In Hungary, the disintegration of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the main political vehicle of the national-populists and winner of the first post-communist multi-party elections, after a difficult period in office, created important opportunities for realignment. These opportunities were taken by the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) – under the leadership of Viktor Orbán. Originally an anti-communist youth party considered to be in the liberal camp, FIDESZ was successfully repositioned by Orbán in 1994-5 as a right-wing formation, combining aspects of its earlier liberalism and anti-communism with the traditional nation- and family-centred agenda of the national populists.\textsuperscript{50} The resultant FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) is the dominant party of the Hungarian right, having successful drawn
in Christian, rural and nationalist electorates of smaller parties is, and, in electoral terms, the strongest centre-right party in the region.

Similarly, in the Czech Republic, for much of the 1990s Václav Klaus’s governing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) presented itself as a neo-liberal party inspired by the British and US New Right, albeit with a nationalist subtext stressing the congruence of the Czech character and the free market. As such, it explicitly rejected traditional Czech political thought, including its conservative, liberal and nationalist strands, both as provincial, collectivist, messianistic and irrelevant to contemporary society.

However, after losing office in November 1997 and being outpolled by the centre-left in elections in 1998, the party – still under the leadership of Klaus – realigned itself, moving away from a stress on free markets towards a more nationalist stance stressing the need to defend Czech national interests. This, in part, represented an intensification and elaboration of the party’s eurosceptic stance (see below), but was also notable for its revival of the nationalist paradigm, juxtaposing the interests of the Czech nation to those of Germany and the German-speaking world. This was made explicit by the party’s resolute defence of the legal status of the ‘Beneš Decrees’ - post-war emergency measures expelling Czechoslovakia’s 2.5 million ethnic German population and some ethnic Hungarians. Many Austria and German politicians, as well as much of the Czech liberal intelligentsia, considered that the Decrees should be repealed or modified before Czech EU entry. However, ODS dismissed such claims as a threat to Czech statehood. In its 2002 programme, the Civic Democrats also took up new, socially conservative themes such as the need to restrict immigration. The Czech case is interesting and potentially significant, because, unlike in Hungary, in the Czech lands there is no deep historical divide between a commitment to liberalism and a commitment to nationalism and ‘national’ values. There was
apparently no strong electoral incentive for Klaus and his party to adopt a more traditionally nationalist inflection. Indeed, is arguable it may even have lost them support). Many journalistic commentators have suggested, that the revival of historic issues such as the Beneš Decrees by right-wing politicians in the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria and Hungary marked a return to regional traditions of petty chauvinism and populist nationalism. However, beyond the electoral opportunism of certain politicians and parties, they gave little explanation has to why such a revival might be taking place. Others have identified the beginnings of a Central European form of ‘alpine populism’ seen in Northern Italy, Switzerland and Austria during 1990s based the defence of small, provincial, relatively prosperous societies against migration from poorer neighbouring states. However, ‘alpine populists’ such as Italy’s Northern League or Austria’s Freedom Party were protest parties, which successfully preyed upon established centre-right parties in long-standing clientelistic or cartel-like arrangements, rather than key players in national party systems like the Czech ODS or Hungary’s FIDESZ.

*The challenge of Europeanisation and globalisation*

Many centre-right parties in Western Europe emerged on the basis of cleavages associated with classical socio-economic modernization and national state formation. Centre-right parties in post-communist East and Central Europe have, by contrast, formed against a background of social, cultural and technological changes that can broadly be termed ‘post-modernisation’, many of which call into question the importance of the national state. Of these globalisation and the related process of European integration are by far the most significant. These processes not only they aggravate historical sensitivities in a region where the
formation of national states was historically belated, contested or incomplete, but pose particular challenge to many parties of centre-right in the region. Although few centre-right formations are actively opposed to EU membership, early comparative research on party-based euroscepticism has highlighted a tendency for them to be more eurosceptic than their counterparts in Western Europe. Many dislike the far-reaching transferal and restriction of national sovereignty required by EU membership; the bureaucratic centralisation and likely power of large West European states (in particular, Germany) in an enlarged EU; the marginalisation of local businesses and elites; and the erosion of national and local identities under the competitive pressures of the Single Market. Parties, with strong free market commitments, such as the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) have also argued that the EU is over-regulated and ‘socialist’ or ‘collectivist’ in its economic thinking. Beyond a loosely, shared set of eurosceptic concerns, however, centre-right parties in the region seem to have differing geo-political and European orientations, reflecting both ideological differences and older historical alignments. Both the Czech ODS and the Bulgarian ODS have tended to view themselves as conservative parties on British or US lines and are strongly Atlanticist. In the Czech case this also arguably reflects historic anxieties about German domination of the Central European region at the expense of Czech interests. Conservative national parties, by contrast, – if they have a vision going beyond the preservation of national distinctness and independence– have closer affinities with Gaullism and German Christian Democracy. They are more suspicious of the US role in Europe and, notwithstanding reservations over European political integration, show a greater willingness to accept the Franco-German axis. In the case of Hungary’s FIDESZ, this again be seen as continuing historic national alignments, in this case Hungarian co-operation with Austria and Germany. The war
in Iraq threw these divisions into sharp relief. Conservative nationalist formations such as FIDESZ-MPP in Hungary and the League of Polish Families (LPR) opposed both US-British intervention and own their governments’ political, logistical and military support for it. \(^6^2\) Liberal, anti-communist, centre-right groupings, by contrast, such as the Bulgaria’s ODS and – with the notable exception of their ex-leader President Klaus – the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) firmly supported the Coalition and criticised their governments’ stances on Iraq as lukewarm and half-hearted.

*The Eclipse of the Post-Communist Centre-Right?*

Already by mid-1990s, some broad centre-right groupings such as the national-populist Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Romania Democratic Convention (CD) had experienced electoral and organisational disintegration.\(^6^3\) 2001-2 saw the electoral failure of centre right parties in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. In the three Central European cases, social democratic parties outpolled their main centre-right rivals and formed centre-left coalition with smaller agrarian or liberal parties.\(^6^4\) In the fourth, Bulgaria, the 2001 elections saw both the incumbent Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and the Bulgarian Socialists swept aside by the National Movement - Simeon II (NDSV), an *ad hoc* reform movement headed by Simeon Simeon Saxecoburgotski, the former king, who had spent the communist period living abroad as an exile. In two of this cases – that of Poland’s AWS and Bulgaria’s SDS – electoral defeat was also accompanied by partial or total party collapse. The re-election of Slovakia’s centre-right coalition was an exception to this trend, although, as noted above, this may be explained as a continuation of the pattern of competition – broad coalitions mobilising against a dominant nationalist party – characteristic of some new national states in the region.
In all four states where the centre-right was defeated, far-reaching discussions are now under way about the nature and future of the right in the region. While in Poland the issue seems one of the right seeking basic programmatic and organisational cohesion, elsewhere discussion has focused on broadening the centre-right’s electoral appeal and acquiring a deeper level of social implantation - a strategy often depicted by its advocates as a move towards to the West European Christian Democratic model. In the wake of its election defeat Hungary’s FIDESZ, for example, has sought to reinvent itself as ‘civic movement from below’ - connected to sympathisers in local communities through a network of ‘civic circles’ - which would be open to right-wing voters of small, weakened or defunct Christian, agrarian and extreme right parties. Accordingly, it has renamed itself FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ - MPSZ) and wishes, according to its leader Viktor Orbán, to become a ‘People’s Party’ on the West European (Christian-Democratic) model.65 Similar ideas have been circulating since at least the mid-1990s in the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and were most recently championed by the unsuccessful leadership contender Petr Nečas.66

Although the importance of electoral cycles should not be underestimated, it may also be necessary to consider whether there are underlying factors behind the recent decline of the East Central European centre right. It is, for example, possible that the origins of many centre-right parties as engines of regime change leave them vulnerable to ideological exhaustion and crises of party identity, as the fundamental institutional and political choices of post-communist transformation recede in importance as issues. It might also be the case that the social structure of East and Central European states and in particular distributions of transition ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ – is now making it difficult to sustain strong centre-right parties in the region,
leaving nationalist mobilisation, euroscepticism and anti-communism as (generally unsuccessful) default strategies. In this respect, the underlying parallel with the Scandinavian experience – a structurally weak and divided centre-right with a limited support base – may be instructive. Alternatively, there may be broader factors at work affecting not only the mainstream right in the region, but also the far right which has suffered a parallel, but much more precipitate decline. Still more broadly, one could speculate that the problems of the East and Central European centre right may be part of a broader political malaise affecting the mainstream right across many Western democracies rooted in globalisation, cultural shifts and the adaptive capacities of the centre-left.

Conclusions

The comparative study of centre-right parties in post-communist East and Central Europe represents a significantly under-researched field, but one that poses considerable challenges to scholars. Notions of the ‘right’ have varied both historically and cross-nationally as well as in popular and academic usage and require considerable clarification. This paper has suggested the ‘centre-right’ in the region should be broadly understood as a set of parties seeking broad electoral support for programmes fusing elements of (neo-)liberalism and conservatisms, which balance the demands of post-communist social transformation, modernisation and Europeanisation with older historical identities and ideologies.

However, even comparative analysis of the centre-right thus understood faces significant methodological difficulties. In contrast to post-communist successor parties, parties of the new East Central European centre-right represent not only a diverse range of outcomes, but seem to lack a single identifiable, common point of
origin. Nevertheless, this paper has argued, it is significant that the origins of most electorally successful centre-right parties in the region, such as, for example, Hungary’s FIDESZ, Bulgaria’s SDS or the Czech ODS, seem to lie in opposition to and mobilisation against communist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The success of parties across such a range of cases - and indeed the failure of centre-right in countries with such a rich history of anti-communist opposition as Poland - calls into question the explanatory power of the influential structural-historical literature on party system formation. Rather than a stress regime legacies and state-society relations, it appears that a renewed focus on the political strategies during late communism and the early transition period may be necessary to explain the varied success of the centre-right in the region.

In some states in Central and Eastern Europe, however, although discourses of the centre-right – and, indeed, attempts to build broad centre-right groupings– can be found, no consolidated centre-right appears to exist. This, taken in conjunction with recent electoral defeats of major centre-right formations in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria raises questions as whether the centre-right in the region may be facing a structural crisis. However, although there are a number plausible hypotheses to account for such a structural decline - centre-right parties’ origins as engines of regime change; absence of pre-existing propertied classes or the challenge of Europeanisation to nationalist and conservative ideologies - further research is clearly needed. An interesting and significant counter-trend to this apparent decline seems to be found in newly created national states, such as Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Croatia. Here the eclipse of broad nationalist movements defined by issues of
independence and statehood, is offering electoral opportunities to a range of new centre-right groupings with more conventional programmatic appeals.
Table 1: Key Centre-Right Parties in Selected States in C and E Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% vote (last national election)</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>International affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)</td>
<td>18.2% - 2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP/EDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Civic Democratic Party (ODS)</td>
<td>24.5% - 2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP/EDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Coalition’ between Freedom Union (US) Czechoslovak People’s Party – Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL)</td>
<td>14.23% - 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EPP/EDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Union for the Republic – Res Publica (RP)</td>
<td>24.6% - 2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estonian Reform Party (ER)</td>
<td>17.7% - 2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz – MPP)</td>
<td>41.1% - 2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP/EDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>New Era (JL)</td>
<td>23.9% - 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia’s First Party (LPP)</td>
<td>9.6% - 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People’s Party (TP)</td>
<td>16.7% – 2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNKK)</td>
<td>5.4 % - 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives (TS)</td>
<td>8.6% - 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS)</td>
<td>17.3% - 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Union - Social Liberals (NS)</td>
<td>9.6% - 2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (AWSP)</td>
<td>5.6 % - 2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>9.5% - 2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>League of Polish Families (LPR)</td>
<td>7.8% - 2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>12.7 % - 2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>National Liberal Party (PNL)</td>
<td>6.9% - 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanian Democratic Convention 2000 (CD)</td>
<td>5.0% - 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Movement of Slovakia (KDH)</td>
<td>8.3% - 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EDU/EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU)</td>
<td>15.1% - 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance for the New Citizen (ANO)</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS)</td>
<td>36.3% – 2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ELDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenian People’s Party (SLS)</td>
<td>9.6% - 2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EDU/EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SocialDemocratic Pty of Slovenia (SDS)</td>
<td>15.9% - 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Slovenia-Christian People’s Party (NSI)</td>
<td>8.6% - 20000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Typologies of ‘Right-wing’ Parties in Post-Communist Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vachudová</th>
<th>“Communist Right”</th>
<th>“Moderate Right”</th>
<th>“Independence Right”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chan</td>
<td>“Communist-Conservatives”</td>
<td>“Traditional Conservatives”</td>
<td>“Liberal Conservatives”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>“Post-Communist”</td>
<td>“Conservative”</td>
<td>“Liberal-Conservative”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Hungary   | Hungarian Democratic Forum (1990 – 94)
FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Party* |  | none |
| Poland    | Solidarity Election Action (1996 – 2001) |  |  |
| Czech Republic |  | Civic Democratic Party (ODS) |  |
| Slovakia  |  | Move for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) |  |
| Croatia   |  | Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) |  |
| Serbia    | Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) |  |  |
| Romania   | Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR) | Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR)** |  |
| Bulgaria  | Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) | Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)** |  |
| Russia    | Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) |  |  |

*Categorised by Paul Lewis as ‘liberal-conservative’ in Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe.

**Lewis’s categorisation in Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe.

Earlier versions of this paper were presented to an informal seminar on ‘at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 20 June 2003 and published as a Sussex European Paper. I would like to thank all participants their comments and observations. I would also like to thank Prof. George Schöpflin for his thoughtful written comments.


5 See K. Chan, ‘Strands of Conservative Politics in Post-Communist Transition: Adapting to Europeanisation and Democratisation’ in P. G. Lewis (ed.), *Party


9 Such an approach is taken by most contributors to R. Eatwell and O’Sullivan (eds.) *The Nature of the Right: American and European Politics Since 1789* (London: Pinter, 1989).

10 F. Wilson (ed.), *The European Center-Right at the End of the Twentieth Century*,

11 Wenzel, ‘Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza “Solidarność”. An Attempt at Reviving the Legend’.


13 Hanley, ‘New Right in the New Europe’.


20 Indeed, following the disappearance of its social-democratic component from the Slovak parliament in the 2002, many Czech and Slovak commentators now refer to Slovakia’s current governing coalition of liberal, Christian Democratic, pro-business parties as ‘right-wing’.

21 Zake, ‘The People’s Party’.


25 These parties also co-operate regionally and have in the last three years attended an annual conference of Center Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe. The last such conference took place on 27 – 29 September 2002 and adopted a common declaration. See http://www.zahradil.cz/html/4.html (accessed 10 February 2004).

26 See Held, Right-Wing Politics.


28 Callincos, Revenge of History; ‘Eastern Europe, Western Power’.


30 Callincos, Revenge of History; ‘Eastern Europe, Western Power’; Saxonberg, The Fall, pp. 387-95; for a broader critique of neo-Marxist analyses and the decline and


For an example of this perspective in its Hungarian variant by a Budapest-based British sympathiser of FIDESZ, see J. Sunley, ‘Old ideas for new elites: Hungary and the politics of permanent transition’, OpenDemocracy.net, 12 June 2003 (accessed 1 June 2003).


See Szczerbiak, ‘Poland’s Unexpected Political Earthquake’. As Wenzel notes the fact that even Catholic-national groups in Poland were only able to unite on the basis


This tendency was also arguably obscured both by the ideological breadth of opposition initiatives and by the fact many prominent liberal opposition intellectuals, such as Jacek Kuroń and Janos Kis came to liberalism via reform communist or radical-left positions. 

50 Kiss, ‘From Liberalism to Conservatism. I am grateful to Brigid Fowler for numerous helpful discussions concerning some of these points. 


54 Orbán and FIDESZ supported calls for the cancellation of the Decrees.


Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism* and Taggart, ‘New Populist Parties’.


However, as Zake suggests, particularly in small states with open economies, globalisation and Europeanisation can open opportunities for new parties of the (centre) right, by creating new social constitutencies with an interest maximising integration into the global economy. Zake, ‘The People’s Party in Latvia’.


62 *RFE/RL Newsline* Part II, 21, 24 March and 6 May 2003.


65 ‘Fidesz facelift aims to broaden appeal’, *Budapest Sun*, 6 February 2003 and *RFE/RL Newsline* Part II, 7 February, 15, 24 April and 19 May 2003


67 Given the pressures of Europeanisation and globalisation, however, it seems unlikely that centre-left governments in the region will have the resources or the opportunities to pursue projects of national welfare capitalism

68 Mudde, ‘Another One Bites the Dust’.