Reinventing the Russian Monarchy in the 1550s: Ivan the Terrible, the Dynasty, and the Church*

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The mid-sixteenth century saw dramatic transformations in the image of the Russian monarchy. In 1547 Ivan IV the Terrible (1530–84) adopted a new title, that of tsar. Powerful images of the tsar and his realm also appeared in Russian works of art, architectural monuments, literary texts and court rituals. The historian David Miller sees court art and ritual as attempts to build a new national political culture.¹ Miller is correct in that these court ceremonies were efficient instruments of integration, but whom were they intended for? ‘Nation’ and ‘national’ are concepts too vague for the sixteenth century. The court rituals were obviously significant for its participants, members of the court elite. Much has been written on the role of various elite clans and of particular courtiers in official receptions, royal marriages and pilgrimages.²

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At the same time, the cultural projects of the 1550s were equally important for another element of the Muscovite political system, the dynasty. Only few studies of Muscovy have treated the dynasty as a special political agency with its own concerns, ambitions and mythology. This article focuses on the political and cultural priorities of the Danilovichi dynasty in the middle of the sixteenth century. The ‘dynasty’ is understood here as the expanded family of Ivan IV, including his brother and cousin. In a wider historical context, the deceased patrilineal ancestors of Ivan IV also belonged to the dynasty. The ‘royal family’, which was of course part of the dynasty, was the nuclear family of Ivan IV, which included the monarch himself and his children.

The main source of Muscovite ideas associated with royal power was the Orthodox church. Church bookmen created literary and pseudo-historical texts which glorified the tsar by means of colourful religious rhetoric. Church art provided numerous analogies between Biblical personages and members of the dynasty. Many specialists believe that the Russian Orthodox church imposed the Byzantine model of imperial power on Ivan IV’s monarchy. The contacts between Moscow and the patriarch of Constantinople indeed became more intensive in the 1550s. What was the relationship in the triangle ‘the dynasty — the Russian Church — the patriarch of Constantinople’? How did each of these agencies contribute to the new image of the Russian monarchy? To answer these questions, I will first examine the role of the head of

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the Orthodox church in the formulation of the concept of the tsar’s power. Second, I will look at how the relations with the patriarch of Constantinople affected the development of notions associated with rulership in Muscovy.

Ivan IV and Metropolitan Makarii

The international status of the ruling family declined dramatically during Ivan’s minority.\(^5\) In 1543 the court made requests for a bride for Ivan. Russian envoys to Poland were allowed to release information about the search for a royal bride. Nevertheless, later the official chronicle reported that Ivan did not want to marry a foreign woman because he feared incompatibility.\(^6\) Apparently, the chronicler tried to conceal the failure of all attempts to find a foreign wife for the ruler.

This fiasco meant that Ivan was still a single man without heirs by the time of his coronation in January 1547. Ivan’s marital status seriously weakened his dynastic ambitions, which is evidenced by the chronicle redaction (CR) of the description of his coronation.\(^7\) It is typical that CR is very vague about such an essential issue for Ivan as the succession of power from his father Vasilii III. It does give some quasi-historical justification for Ivan’s power through the dynastic legend on the imperial gifts which were allegedly received by Vladimir Monomakh from Byzantium and now were inherited by Ivan. Ivan also visited the tombs of his ancestors in the Archangel Cathedral during the coronation. At the same time, the ritual of coronation lacks any mechanisms for transferring power from one member of the dynasty to another. CR does not mention Ivan IV’s father Vasilii III and says nothing about who would succeed to the throne after Ivan himself.\(^8\)

\(^6\) Shornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, 59, St Petersburg, 1887 (hereafter, Shornik RIO), p. 228; Pobne sobranie russkih letopisei (hereafter, PSRL), 13, 2, p. 450.
\(^8\) A later anachronistic description of the coronation includes references to Vasilii III and Ivan IV’s heir Ivan Ivanovich. See Catalano, L’idea, pp. 78–95.
To stabilize his position on the throne, Ivan had to rely on the Orthodox church. The traditional historiography saw the court priest Sil’vestr as a mentor of Ivan IV and as an ideologist of the political regime of the 1550s. However, according to recent studies, Sil’vestr was an important and well-connected figure, but did not play a decisive role in the shaping of the notion of royal power in the 1550s. Unlike Sil’vester, Metropolitan Makarii, head of the Russian church, occupied a prominent place in many cultural and ‘ideological’ activities in the 1550s. Historians often describe Makarii’s political and aesthetic views as ‘Makarii’s school’, which included various cultural projects carried out in Moscow, allegedly under Makarii’s supervision. However, there is still much uncertainty about the dating of some of these projects, like the frescoes of the Dormition cathedral, the Golden chamber of the royal palace, and the icon ‘Church Militant’. Others, like the frescoes of the Archangel cathedral and the Book of Royal Genealogy (Stepennaja kniga), were created in the last years of Makarii’s life and even after his death. Makarii’s role in these projects also remains unclear. N. E. Andreev even thought that Makarii’s approach to icon-painting was contradictory and sometimes superficial.

It seems thus more appropriate to examine Makarii’s impact on dynastic politics from the perspective of his participation in such public events as the coronation of Ivan IV and the Stoglav church council. Makarii presided over the ceremony of Ivan IV’s coronation in the Dormition cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on 16 January 1547.


10 See O. I. Podobedova, Moskovskaia shkola zhivopisi pri Ivane IV, Moscow, 1972; Archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov), Zhizn’ i trudy svyatitelia Makariia, mitropolita Moskovskogo i vseia Rossi, Moscow, 2002 (hereafter, Zhizn’), pp. 275–83.


During the ceremony, Makarii invested Ivan with the new title of tsar, which was reserved earlier for Christ, Biblical kings and the mightiest secular rulers known to the Muscovites, the Byzantine emperor and the Mongol khan.

Makarii was familiar with the Byzantine ritual of coronation. He was also aware of the importance of anointing monarchs in the Christian political tradition. Anointing was a crucial element in late Byzantine and most Western coronation rituals. It created symbolical links between the anointed person and Christ, whom ‘God anointed with the Holy Ghost’ and who ‘has made us kings and priests’ (Acts, x, 38; Rev., 1, 6; v, 10; xx, 6). Anointing thus turned a lay person into a sacred figure endowed with divine transforming power. According to CR, in his prayer at the coronation Makarii likened Ivan to David, ‘whom God anointed to be king over the people of Israel’. Makarii also resorted to the metaphor of anointing when he said that God had consented to anoint Ivan with the ‘oil of gladness’ (eleom vozradovania). Nevertheless, judging by CR, Ivan IV was not anointed in 1547. Why did Makarii stop short before implementing these comparisons and metaphors by performing the ritual of anointing during the coronation? The most logical answer seems to be that Makarii had carefully planned the coronation in accordance with his views of the relationship between the church and the crown.

In his prayer at the coronation Makarii stressed that Ivan could ascend to the Heavenly Kingdom only if he became the guardian of the church. This theme was further developed in the documents of the One Hundred Chapters Council (Stoglav). This convocation of hierarchs, presided over by Makarii and attended by the tsar, gathered in Moscow in 1551 to discuss vexing issues of church rituals, discipline, church administration and finances. The Stoglav documents discuss these problems through the rhetorical device of harmony and cooperation between the church and royal power. The idea of harmony was interpreted, however, as furthering the interests of the church. The prelates were prepared to invoke the authority of the tsar only when they had insufficient power on their own to deal with particular problems as, for instance, tackling pagan practices, reading apocrypha,
venerating non-canonical icons, gambling and drinking. According to the Stoglav, the tsar urged the clergy not to hesitate to oppose him if he transgressed the divine commandments. In his turn, Makarii stressed that it was his moral obligation as head of the church to oppose the tsar and his boyars if they pressed him to act against divine law.

Some historians have assumed that at the Stoglav Ivan voiced the programme of the non-possessors, who denied the church’s right to own land. Makarii, in turn, allegedly defended the views of the possessors and thus was an opponent of the tsar. However, modern studies show that the Stoglav was not a forum for political struggle over secularization. The discussion of monastery landowning at the Stoglav was focused on corrupt practices in the acquisition of lands and on the failure of monks to perform their spiritual duties. The Stoglav thus treated the issue of church landowning in the context of its main aim, to improve ecclesiastical life through co-operation between the church and the tsar. The higher clergy, including the metropolitan, gained in terms of finances from the decisions of the Stoglav. The Stoglav reaffirmed the autonomy of the church from royal power in judicial matters. The church hierarchs defended and even extended the rights of ecclesiastical courts, dues from which provided most of their revenue.

In exchange for their financial stability, the hierarchs agreed to enhance the status of the Russian monarch. Ivan’s coronation as tsar had complicated his relations with neighbours, especially with Sigismund II of Poland and Lithuania, who was worried about the growing political ambitions of the Muscovite ruler. After the coronation, ecclesiastics worked hard towards raising the status of the Russian dynasty. The church councils of 1547 and 1549 established liturgies in honour of some canonized ancestors of Ivan IV such as Aleksandr Nevskii and the

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princes of Murom. The members of the Stoglav sanctioned a revision of recent dynastic history in the interests of the monarch by including a penitential address of Ivan IV to the council in Chapter Three of the Stoglav. In his address Ivan blamed the boyars for the deaths of his uncles, Iurii Vasil’evich of Dmitrov and Andrei Vasil’evich of Staritsa, during his minority. The main aim of these propagandistic statements was to remove any responsibility for the death of the princes from Ivan’s mother, Elena Glinskaia.

Makarii’s spiritual authority was also essential for the consolidation of the dynasty. In his capacity of metropolitan Makarii blessed dynastic weddings, including the marriage of Ivan and Anastasia Romanova-Iur’eva, member of a local boyar family in February 1547. Edward Keenan and Nancy Kollmann see royal weddings through the prism of court politics. According to these scholars, the main issue of court politics, in which the monarch played a passive ceremonial role, was which boyar’s daughter should be married to the tsar. A royal wedding was thus the culmination of court politics.

This view of Muscovite politics, which has been epitomized by the tricky phrase ‘façade of autocracy’, assumes that the male members of the dynasty had no interests different from those of the boyars. However, for Ivan, his marriage to Anastasia was to an extent a last resort. The editor of Ivan IV’s official chronicle (the Illustrated Chronicle

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24 Emchenko, Stoglav, p. 246. Unlike other addresses attributed to Ivan in the Stoglav, the address in chapter three contains a direct reference to his personal involvement in its written text. Even if the address was later edited, Ivan obviously participated in its preparation, since its original was ‘in the tsar’s own hand’, i.e. written or signed by him. There are of course sceptics who hold that Ivan was illiterate. However, even the staunchest of them, Edward Keenan, now concedes that Ivan’s father, Vasilii III could write on the basis of references to Vasilii’s hand in a text written by another person, i.e. on the basis of evidence of a similar nature to Ivan IV’s address in Chapter Three of the Stoglav. See Edward L. Keenan, ‘Ivan the Terrible and Book Culture: Fact, Fancy, and Fog: Remarks on Early Muscovite Printing’, Solanus, 18 (new series, 2004), pp. 28–50. Keenan’s article is marred by hopeless confusion over the kinship ties among Ivan IV’s ancestors and their correspondence (ibid., p. 35).


Compilation, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod* [ICC], 1570s to early 1580s) even claimed that one disloyal boyar accused Ivan of marrying a slave woman (*roba*). According to the editor, the boyars refused to serve the new tsaritsa because she was their ‘sister’, i.e. because she was from a boyar family. 27 The editor’s additions to the chronicle are too biased to attribute these words to a particular individual. However, the editor, who was a contemporary of Ivan IV, is an important figure in our understanding of the dynastic culture of the day. 28 Despite the fact that Ivan’s ancestors occasionally married local elite women, Ivan’s wedding was obviously beneath his status as a monarch because of Anastasia’s non-royal pedigree. 29 This explains why till the end of his life Ivan dreamed about a wife from a foreign royal house. The royal marriage did not save Anastasia’s relatives from disgrace in the mid-1550s. 30

The most obvious benefit of marrying Anastasia was the prospect of siring an heir. Anastasia became a prominent figure in the mythology of the royal family first of all thanks to her fertility. 31 The wedding also gave Ivan the status of a married man and strengthened his bonds with other members of the dynasty. At Ivan’s wedding, his brother Iurii occupied the most important place at the table, that of the groom’s

27 *PSRL*, 13, 1, p. 237 note 5. There is much uncertainty about the dating of editorial additions to the chronicle. A. A. Amosov and V. V. Morozov assert that the chronicle was edited soon after 1585: A. A. Amosov, V. V. Morozov, ‘*Metodika isledovaniia ili zadanost´ vyvodov? Razmyshleniia po povodu datirovki rukopisei Litsevogo letopisnogo svoda Ivana Groznogo*’, in L. I. Kiseleva (ed.), *Materialy i soobshcheniia po fondam Otdela rukopisei i redkoi knigi Biblioteki Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk*, 1990, St Petersburg, 1994, pp. 54–117 (pp. 89–94) (hereafter, ‘Metodika’); S. O. Shmidt (ed.), *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod XVI veka*. Moskva, 2003 (hereafter, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*), p. 41; V. V. Morozov, *Litsevoi Svod v kontekste otechestvennogo letopisaniia XVI veka*, Moskva, 2005 (hereafter, *Litsevoi Svod*), p. 80. However, some of these editorial corrections were copied in the part of the chronicle that was written, according to Kloss and Amosov, in the second half of the 1570s. This is why Kloss’s dating of the additions to the mid-1570s seems to be more probable. B. M. Kloss, *Nikonovskii svod i russkie letopisniia XVI–XVII vekov*, Moskva, 1980, pp. 223–26, 253; A. A. Amosov, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod Ivana Groznogo. Kompleksnoe kodikologicheskoe isledovanie*, Moskva, 1998 (hereafter, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*), p. 175.

28 According to Amosov and Morozov, the editor criticized the Romanov boyars because he supported their opponent Boris Godunov and his sister Irina, who became the wife of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich. Amosov, Morozov, ‘*Metodika*’, pp. 92–94; Shmidt, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*, p. 41; Morozov, *Litsevoi Svod*, p. 80. It would be risky to explain the editor’s comments on Anastasia Romanova-Iur’eva in terms of his antipathies against or sympathies for one or another boyar family. The critical comments about Anastasia’s background were harmful for any tsaritsa from a boyar family, including Irina Godunova.

29 Not every East Slavic woman was local from the Muscovites’ point of view. Ivan III’s marriage to Maria of Tver’ (1452) was of a dynastic and diplomatic character since Tver’ was then an independent principality. Similarly, Vasili III’s second wife Elena Glinskaiia came from an émigré family. On Ivan IV’s preference for a foreign bride over a boyar woman, see also Shomnik *RIO*, 38, St Petersburg, 1893, p. 6.

30 Pavlov, Perrie, *Ivan*, p. 89.

proxy father. Princess Evfrosinia of Staritsa, the wife of Ivan IV’s deceased uncle Andrei of Staritsa, received the place of the proxy mother. Her son Vladimir Andreevich of Staritsa acted as the thousandman (tysiatskii). Unlike Ivan’s coronation, his wedding emphasized the continuity of power from Vasiliy III to Ivan IV in the dynasty. The documents of Ivan IV’s wedding stress that it had to be staged in the same manner as that of his father Vasiliy III.33

The symbolic unity of the dynasty is also prominent in the rituals of two other royal weddings that followed soon, the wedding of Ivan IV’s brother Iurii Vasil’evich (November 1547) and that of his cousin Prince Vladimir of Staritsa (May 1550). Isabel de Madariaga has noted that Vladimir of Staritsa was allowed to marry even though Ivan still had no male heir.34 This is in stark contrast to Ivan’s father Vasiliy III’s attitude to the Staritsa family. Only at the end of his reign and after the birth of two sons did Vasiliy III allow his brother, Andrei of Staritsa, future father of Vladimir, to marry.35 Ivan’s leniency toward Vladimir means that in the late 1540s the tsar did not see his cousin as a dynastic rival. The weddings raised the marital status of the young men from the dynasty and thereby enhanced the prestige of the dynasty as a whole. The rituals also strengthened Ivan’s position as the head of the dynasty. At the weddings of Iurii and Vladimir, it was Ivan who performed the role of the groom’s proxy father. Both weddings took place at Ivan’s palace.36

Similar motives of family unity are also prominent in the rhetoric that accompanied Ivan IV’s victorious campaign against Kazan’ in 1552. As well as praising Ivan as glorious victor, Makarii also extolled his closest relatives, including his wife Anastasiia, his son Dmitrii, his brother Iurii, and his cousin Vladimir of Staritsa.37 The victory over Kazan’ thus marked not only the triumph of Orthodoxy but also the ultimate success of the dynasty united around its head, Tsar Ivan IV.

Soon after the victory over Kazan’, the stability of the dynasty was threatened by the sudden illness of the tsar in March 1553. As Ivan’s direct successor Dmitrii was still a minor, fear of Ivan’s death led to

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34 de Madariaga, Ivan, p. 55.
furious feuds at the court over the issue of succession. The official chronicle of the 1550s (Little Chronicle on the Origin of Tsardom, Letopisets nachala tsarstva) describes Ivan’s illness in purely rhetorical terms: God punished the tsar for the proud words of Russians, who became swollen with pride (osoby mudry byti) instead of being grateful to God for the victory over Kazan’. In ICC, the rhetorical account of the illness of 1553 was replaced by a new description which presented the positions of various courtiers during the crisis from the tsar’s point of view. ICC concludes that the tsar’s illness caused animosity between Ivan and his cousin Vladimir, who allegedly wanted to seize the throne. Vladimir indeed had to produce a written oath of allegiance on 12 March 1553, i.e. immediately after the dynastic crisis. However, the terms imposed on Vladimir were similar to previous agreements concluded between Ivan’s parents and representatives of collateral branches of the dynasty: wishing well to the monarch, supporting him and avoiding any co-operation with his enemies, etc. The fact that the tsar exacted a written oath of loyalty from Vladimir does not necessarily mean that Vladimir had plotted against the monarch. Vladimir’s oath could have been part of the procedure of securing the succession for Ivan IV’s heir Dmitrii. Contrary to the implications of ICC, there was no profound hatred between Ivan and Vladimir immediately after the crisis. In the summer and autumn of 1553 Vladimir and his troops loyally participated in the manoeuvres of the tsar’s army with the aim of fending off possible attacks of Tatars. Ivan’s recovery and the existence of his heir led to a relatively peaceful resolution of the crisis. Throughout the 1550s Vladimir took part in military campaigns alongside the tsar. In turn Ivan IV supplied Vladimir with experienced foreign craftsmen for construction projects at Staritsa.

None of the chronicles say anything about Makarii’s attempts to resolve the dynastic crisis in March 1553. This is why many scholars

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38 PSRL, 13, 1, p. 231.
41 RK 1475-1598, pp. 141, 143.
believe that in 1553 Ivan changed his attitude to Makarii, who was passive or may even secretly have supported the tsar’s opponents during the crisis.43 This was not the first time Makarii refrained from active intervention in a court conflict. In the early 1540s Makarii flexibly used his power to defeat his enemies, the prominent clan of the Shuiskii princes. In December 1543 Makarii refrained from intervening on behalf of A. M. Shuiskii, who suffered a humiliating death after being thrown to the court kennelmen.44

It is thus plausible that Makarii also had his own agenda during the 1553 crisis. The immediate reasons for Makarii’s evasiveness are practically impossible to determine because of the rhetorical character and strong bias of the chronicles. What is more important is how Ivan IV reacted to Makarii’s position during the dynastic crisis. Some scholars have assumed that Ivan’s dissatisfaction with the metropolitan’s stance in 1553 soon manifested itself in the secretary Ivan Viskovatyi’s criticism of the new paintings created in the Kremlin cathedrals after the fire in 1547. Viskovatyi claimed that the new icons did not fully correspond to Orthodox canons. Since it was Makarii who was generally responsible for these renovations, these historians think that Viskovatyi’s attack on the new images was instigated by the tsar.45 However, at the church council that gathered to discuss the ‘Viskovatyi affair’ in November 1553, Makarii acted as supreme judge and even interrogator, demanding that Viskovatyi name his supporters. In turn Viskovatyi never questioned Makarii’s authority and humbly asked for his explanations and instructions regarding new icons. The secretary also accepted Makarii’s harsh judgment of Viskovatyi’s intrusion into theological matters and a three-year penance imposed by the council. The main question on the council’s agenda was obviously icon-painting. This is apparent, among other things, from the fact that Makarii eventually ordered some icons to be corrected as Viskovatyi requested.46


44 PSRL, 13, 1, p. 145; Bogatyrev, ‘Ivan’, pp. 243–44. Many scholars have sought to detect various political alliances behind the Viskovatyi affair. All these attempts are purely speculative since they lack documentary evidence. N. E. Andreev, ‘O dele diaka Viskovatogo’, Seminarium Kondakovianum, 5, Prague, 1932, pp. 191–242 (pp. 213–14); Miller, ‘Viskovatyi Affair’, p. 302; Graia, Ivan, 132; Pouncy, ‘The Blessed Sil vestre’, p. 557; Shaposhnik, Tserkovno-gosudarstvennye otosheniia, pp. 220–21. Carolyn J. Pouncy claims that ‘the documents describing the “Viskovatyi affair” of 1553–54 […] were published in 1836 from an unidentified manuscript “from the Solovetsky Monastery” and have not been seen since’. Carolyn J. Pouncy, ‘Missed Opportunities and the Search for Ivan the Terrible’, Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 7, 2006,
In sum, nothing indicates that the tsar plotted against Makarii in late 1553 and early 1554. The Viskovatyi affair was part of the trial for heresy of Matvei Bashkin in the autumn of 1553, in which the tsar participated jointly with the metropolitan.\footnote{Continued} In August 1554 Makarii took part in the celebration of Ivan’s birthday at the residence of Kolomenskoe.\footnote{PSRL, 13, 1, p. 232.} The tsar also consented to the metropolitan’s plea to save the life of Prince Semen Lobanov-Rostovskii after his ill-fated attempt to flee to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1554.\footnote{Ibid., 29, p. 229.}

Thus the dynastic crisis of 1553 did not affect the balance of power between Ivan IV and Makarii which was manifested during the coronation in 1547. The settlement was based on the assumption that Ivan’s title of tsar was blessed by God and sanctioned by historical tradition. Accordingly, the tsar’s military actions now received ideological justification and inspiration as acts in defence of the Orthodox faith. In his writings and ritual activities Metropolitan Makarii also actively propagated the idea of dynastic unity. In turn, the metropolitan retained his power as supreme judge in ecclesiastical affairs and matters of faith, including the arts. He guarded the judicial autonomy and material interests of the clergy. Such ambitions of the hierarch might have well been threatened by the ritual of anointing, because anointing would have turned Ivan IV into ‘tsar and priest’ (tsar i sviaschennik, rex et sacerdos). Anointing could therefore have disrupted the subtle balance of royal and church power envisaged by Makarii.

《The ‘Greek Project’ of Ivan IV》

In summer 1553 Ivan IV’s infant son Dmitrii died in an accident during a pilgrimage. Dmitrii’s death marked a new stage in Ivan IV’s dynastic politics. Members of the ruling branch of the Daniilovichi dynasty had tried to develop primogeniture (linear succession from father to son).\footnote{Ibid., 13, 1, p. 238.}
However, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the tradition of primogeniture was still relatively new and required constant adjustment. Ivan IV’s father Vasili III received the throne only thanks to the redefining of vertical succession by Ivan III ‘to a pattern from father to eldest surviving son’. Ivan IV’s minority was marred by constant fear that his uncles would usurp the throne. As has been shown above, the coronation of 1547 did not introduce any clarity into succession.

After the death of Dmitrii, the birth of another healthy son became absolutely crucial for sustaining continuity of power in the royal family. Fortunately, in March 1554 Ivan IV sired another heir, Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich. From the moment of the tsarevich’s birth, the tsar sought to secure the succession for him. In April to May 1554 Ivan imposed new obligations on the Staritsa family. Vladimir of Staritsa had to swear to remain loyal to the tsar’s son Ivan or, according to a later version of the oath, to any other son of the tsar who should inherit the throne. This stipulation suggests fear of the possible death of the infant Tsarevich Ivan.

Of particular interest is one clause in the oath sworn by Vladimir obliging him to support Ivan IV’s heir should any ‘brother by blood’ (rodnoi brat) oppose the heir. R. G. Skrynnikov has misinterpreted this provision by assuming that it refers to Ivan IV’s brother Iurii Ivanovich. However, the wording of Vladimir’s oath shows that the tsar had in mind his future sons and possible conflicts among them:

If any brother by blood becomes an enemy of your (Ivan IV’s) son, who is reigning in the realm, and betrays him, I (Vladimir of Staritsa) will not enter into an alliance with that brother and will not be in contact with him. And if your son who is reigning in the realm sends me against his brother who has betrayed him, I will go against him and act against his brother without any reservation.

Ironically, it was the fertility of Anastasia, who gave birth to four children between 1547 and 1554, that caused Ivan IV’s concern about relations between his sons in the future. Since Anastasia could bring

51 Ibid., p. 333. Ivan III, grandfather of Ivan IV, was married twice, to Maria of Tver and Sophia Paleologue. His first heir was Ivan Ivanovich the Younger, son of Maria. After Ivan Ivanovich’s death, Ivan III initially crowned Ivan Ivanovich’s son Dmitrii (known as Dmitrii the Grandson) as grand prince (1498). Later Ivan III changed his mind in favour of his son Vasili by his second wife Sophia Paleologue. Vasili inherited the throne after Ivan III (1505) and later fathered Ivan IV (1530). Dmitrii the Grandson died in prison in 1509.
52 PSRL, 15, 1, p. 239.
53 SGGD, 1, pp. 462–68.
54 Skrynnikov, Tsarstvo terrora, p. 110.
55 А хотя которой брат родной учинитца недругом сыну твоему, которой будет на государстве, и отступит от него, и мне с тем его братом в дружбе не быти, ни сыныться с ним. А пошлет мя сын твой, которой будет на государстве, на того своего брата, которой от него отступит, и мне на него и ти и делать над тем его братом дело всякое дело без хитрости (SGGD, 1, p. 466).
Ivan IV more boys, he sought to ensure the leading position of his eldest surviving son Ivan among his future brothers and to secure the wellbeing of his heir. In the royal family, an heir was symbolically initiated into statecraft when he turned three. As Tsarevich Ivan was nearing this age, the tsar made several symbolical gestures to win divine protection for his heir. In September 1556 the tsar and his family visited the monastery of St Nikita of Pereiaslavl', devoutly prayed there, and made generous donations to the monks. The cult of Nikita became associated with the successful birth of Tsarevich Ivan as a result of the royal couple’s visit to the saint’s shrine in Pereiaslavl’ after the death of Dmitrii. In November 1556 the tsar and his family took part in the consecration of a new church dedicated to John Climacus, patron saint of Tsarevich Ivan, in the principal court monastery of the Miracle of St Michael the Archangel at Chonae (Chudov). The association of the new church with the royal children was enhanced by creating in the church a chapel dedicated to Evdokiia the Hosiomartyr, a patron of Ivan’s newborn daughter Edvokiia (1556–59). According to the dynastic tradition, after an heir turned three, the prince of Moscow would order a lofty helmet for his small son, to symbolize the idea that the boy would eventually become a mighty sovereign. The royal helmet would probably have been used during the ritual of mounting the heir on horseback. Following this tradition, in 1557 Ivan IV ordered a helmet for Tsarevich Ivan. Decorated with the dynastic emblems of double-headed eagles, the helmet symbolized continuity of power within the royal family.

Concerns about his heir also affected Ivan IV’s policy towards the patriarch of Constantinople. For almost ten years following the coronation in 1547 Ivan’s relations with Constantinople remained stagnant. Two missions from Patriarch Dionisii visited Moscow during that period, in 1550 and 1556. The main purpose of both missions was

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56 Ivan Ivanovich’s birth was apparently marked by erecting the Church of the Intercession and chapels on the site of the future Saint Basil’s cathedral. See Michael S. Flier, ‘Filling in the Blanks: The Church of the Intercession and the Architectonics of Medieval Muscovite Ritual’, in Kollmann, Kamen’, pp. 120–31 (p. 130).
57 PSRL, 13, 1, p. 274.
58 On the cult of St Nikita in the royal family, see Thyrêt, Between God and Tsar, p. 55.
59 PSRL, 13, 1, pp. 239, 265, 276, 299–300. Both Tsarevich Ivan and Tsarevna Evdokiia were baptized at the Chudov monastery.
traditional — securing material aid from Moscow. Relations between Moscow and Constantinople were seriously hampered by a lack of people with sufficient command of languages and expertise in diplomatic affairs. Consequently, until the middle of the 1550s Moscow did not pay attention to the patriarch’s flattering references to Ivan as a patron (ktitor) of the prestigious patriarchal church in Constantinople. In his letter of January 1551 to the patriarch Ivan only asked him to implore God to grant the tsar and his army victory over his enemies and keep Christianity at peace. The fact that in his 1551 letter to the patriarch Ivan said nothing about his coronation shows that initially he did not think that his new title required any confirmation from Constantinople.

In 1557 Ivan suddenly changed his attitude toward Constantinople. In January of that year he sent Archimandrite Feodorit, former head of the Saviour-Evfimii monastery, to the patriarch in Constantinople with a request that the synod of Orthodox hierarchs bless his title of tsar. What caused Ivan to approach the patriarch? N. F. Kapterev saw here a manifestation of the Moscow — the Third Rome theory. However, this theory was never mentioned in the documents of the mission. According to Vladimir Val‘denberg, there was no political need for confirmation. Ivan was only showing his respect to the patriarch of Constantinople. Ivan’s persistence in obtaining confirmation shows that there was something more than just courtesy. Modern Russian scholars emphasize the fact that Ivan requested confirmation of his new title after the taking of Kazan’ and Astrakhan’. It is therefore

61 See the patriarch’s complaints about a lack of experienced cadres for sustaining relations with Moscow in S. M. Kashtanov (ed.), Rossiia i Grecheskii mir v XVI v., Moscow, 2004, 1 (hereafter, Rossiia), p. 208. The problems in communication between Moscow and Constantinople are illustrated by the confusing Russian translation of the patriarch’s letter of June 1549 preserved in the Russian diplomatic records. To improve the situation, Ivan IV sent a servitor to study Greek in Constantinople and Mount Athos, who later worked as an interpreter for the Russian court (ibid., pp. 173–74, 193, 213, 233, 247, 279).
63 Ibid., p. 192. Ivan also sent alms to the patriarch.
64 Ibid., p. 213.
65 N. F. Kapterev, Kharakter otvoshenii Rossii k Pravoslavnomu Vostoku v XVI i XVII stoletiakh, 2nd edn, Sergiev Posad, 1914, pp. 26–30. Steven Runciman shared similar ideas, though he noted that it was difficult for Russian clergy to retain allegiance to Constantinople after the acceptance of the Third Rome theory. Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence, Cambridge, 1968, p. 328.
67 Catalano, L’idea, pp. 1, li (comments by N. V. Sinitsina); A. I. Filiushkin, Tituly russkikh gosudarei, Moscow and St Petersburg, 2006 (hereafter, Tituly), pp. 119, 120. Filiushkin also cautiously assumes that confirmation of Ivan’s title by the patriarch of Constantinople could have been useful in the diplomatic controversy over the title of tsar between Russia and the Catholic powers (the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, Poland). It is, however, unlikely that the opinion of an Eastern Orthodox hierarch would make any difference to the Catholics.
assumed that the victory over the Tatars was a decisive factor in Ivan’s diplomatic struggle for his new title. For the American historians Michael Cherniavsky and Donald Ostrowski, references to the annexation of the Tatar khanates are evidence of Ivan’s claims on the political heritage of Chinggis Khan.\(^{68}\)

It is true that Muscovite officials evoked the taking of Kazan’ as a justification for assuming the title of tsar by Ivan IV. However, such arguments had always been of a secondary nature in comparison with the main dynastic arguments: the legends about a coronation of Vladimir I as tsar by the Byzantine emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople and about the imperial gifts received by Vladimir Monomakh from Byzantium.\(^{69}\) Charles Halperin rightly notes that generally there was no room for Chinggisid succession in the Muscovite dynastic tradition.\(^{70}\)

Furthermore, Muscovite diplomats interpreted the taking of Kazan’ and Astrakhan’ as a triumph of the true faith. It is important to note that Ivan referred to Kazan’ and Astrakhan’ in the context of exterminating their ‘blasphemous tsars’ by his sabre, converting some of them to Orthodoxy, and liberating Orthodox prisoners.\(^{71}\) Such an interpretation of Ivan’s victories allowed the Muscovite diplomats to withstand the diplomatic pressure of their Western Christian neighbours, Poland and Sweden. The Poles and Swedes repeatedly declared the need for peace among Christian rulers, including Ivan, for the sake of struggle with the Muslims. Whether sincere or not, this rhetoric allowed the Western kings to assert their religious superiority over Ivan by implying that only an enemy of Christianity could reject such pious proposals.\(^{72}\)

In the eyes of Muscovite diplomats, Ivan’s taking of the Tatar states

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\(^{69}\) This is evidenced by the official instructions given to the Russian ambassadors to Poland in 1554. The ambassadors had to explain Ivan’s assumption of the title of tsar with references to the examples of Vladimir I and Vladimir Monomakh. Only if the Poles would say that their king had the right to his title because he owned his kingdom would the ambassadors have to reply that Ivan similarly should be called tsar, since Russia and Kazan’ were ancient tsardoms. *Sbornik RIO*, 59, p. 437. On the foundation legends employed by the Muscovite dynasty, see R. P. Dmitrieva, *Skazanie o kniaz’akh Vladimirskikh*, Moscow, Leningrad, 1955; M. E. Bychkova, ‘The Notion of Power and Citizenship in Genealogical Literature of the 15th–16th Centuries’, *Istoricheskaia Genealogiia/Historical Genealogy* (hereafter, *IG/HG*), 2, Ekaterinburg, Paris, 1993, pp. 4–9; Ostrowski, *Muscovy*, pp. 171–76 (contains a review of the historiography).


\(^{71}\) Kashtanov, *Rossiia*, p. 213.

\(^{72}\) *Sbornik RIO*, 59, pp. 494–499, 500; 531–38; 129, St Petersburg, 1910, p. 5.
became a powerful confirmation of his adherence to the Christian cause. ‘Captured’ by the Muslim sultan, the patriarch of Constantinople should have appreciated the news about Ivan’s victories over the Muslims. Ivan was thus not a Chinggisid successor, but a liberator of Orthodoxy from Islam.

Ivan’s request for confirmation of his new title from Constantinople can be explained in the context of his own family affairs. The mission of his envoy Feodorit was a response to the arrival in Moscow of Metropolitan Joasaph of Europus and Kyzikos in the autumn of 1556. Borys A. Gudziak has perceptively noticed that Joasaph’s mission marked a new phase in relations between Moscow and the Christian East. Prior to Joasaph, lay monastics and ordained monks predominated among the visitors to Moscow from the Orthodox East. Unlike them, Metropolitan Joasaph belonged to the higher clergy. His status thus raised relations between Moscow and Constantinople to a higher level.

The political significance of contacts with the patriarchate of Constantinople grew in the light of the dynastic problems faced by Ivan after the death of Tsarevich Dmitrii. In the context of these family affairs, it is easy to understand why Ivan welcomed Metropolitan Joasaph’s information that the patriarch had established daily prayers for and commemoration of Ivan and his father ‘Tsar’ Vasili in Constantinople together with other pious tsars. Ivan thus joined the elite group of tsar-donors of the prestigious Church of the Dormition in Constantinople and the patriarch’s monastery, which was known as the ‘mother of all churches’. Muscovites took the message very seriously. Both the official chronicle and Ivan’s letter to the patriarch mention the fact of regular commemoration of the tsar in Constantinople.

For Ivan as the head of the dynasty, the commemoration of his family in Constantinople offered attractive prospects for securing the succession within his family. During his stay in Moscow, the patriarch’s emissary Metropolitan Joasaph actively participated in court rituals aimed at assuring succession by Tsarevich Ivan. Together with the tsar and his kin, Metropolitan Joasaph was present at the consecration of the new church of John Climacus in the Chudov monastery. Metropolitan Joasaph and his clerics also attended services in the metropolitan’s principal Dormition Cathedral in the Kremlin.

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73 Ibid., 59, pp. 506, 519.
74 PSRL, 13, 1, p. 275; Kashtanov, Rossiia, p. 209; p. 213.
76 PSRL, 13, 1, p. 275; Kashtanov, Rossiia, p. 213.
77 PSRL, 13, 1, pp. 277, 278.
was subsequently asked to deliver to the new Patriarch, also called Joasaph (II), Ivan’s request to pray for him and for his family, particularly for his heir Tsarevich Ivan.\footnote{Patriarch Dionisii died in or after August 1555. Moscow authorities were informed about the death of Dionisii during the stay of his emissary Metropolitan Joasaph in Russia, probably between 1 October 1556 and 30 January 1557. See Kashtanov, *Rossiia*, pp. 212, 224, p. 310 commentary to no. 84, p. 393 note 39, p. 384.} This was the first mention of Tsarevich Ivan among royal relatives to be prayed for by the Eastern Orthodox hierarchs. From 1557 onwards Ivan IV repeated such requests on a regular basis. The Eastern Orthodox prelates enthusiastically responded to the tsar’s requests. In 1560 the patriarch of Jerusalem even called the tsar’s children saints.\footnote{Ivan IV’s requests: ibid., pp. 244, 245, 246, 248, 253, 281. Hierarchs’ replies: ibid., pp. 230, 232, 234, 257 (letter of the patriarch of Jerusalem of 1560), 259, 260, 261, 269.} The renewed contacts with Constantinople thus allowed the tsar to use the authority of Greek Orthodox hierarchs for his dynastic policy aimed at securing continuity in the royal family. It was against this dynastic background that Ivan IV decided to ask the patriarch to bless the new title of tsar.

What was Makarii’s part in all these events? According to E. Golubinskii, during his contacts with Constantinople Ivan acted in full agreement with Makarii.\footnote{E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 2, Moscow, 1900, 1, pp. 845–46.} Ostrowski and Michael S. Flier also see Ivan’s 1557 petition to the patriarch of Constantinople as a sign of a reduction in the tensions between the Russian Orthodox church and Constantinople since the former became de facto autocephalous in 1448.\footnote{Ostrowski, *Muscovy*, pp. 139–41, 238; Michael S. Flier, ‘Till the End of Time: The Apocalypse in Russian Historical Experience before 1500’, in Valerie A. Kivelson, Robert H. Greene (eds), *Orthodox Russia: Belief and Practice under the Tsars*, University Park, PA, 2003 (hereafter, *Orthodox Russia*), pp. 127–58 (p. 156).} Officially, harmony indeed prevailed. In his letter to Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod of February 1557 Makarii wrote about the joint prayers of the metropolitan, the tsar, and the Greeks in the Moscow Kremlin for delivering Novgorod from the starvation that had struck the city.\footnote{Makarii (Veretennikov), *Zhizn’,* p. 430.}

However, a closer examination of the sources reveals that old frictions did not fully evaporate. In his letter to Pimen, Makarii forgot to mention that the Greek prelates in fact took no active part in the liturgy. At the same time, the official chronicle intended for intimate court circles emphasizes that it was Makarii and the Russian clerics, not the Greeks, who served in the presence of the tsar.\footnote{PSRL, 13, 1, p. 278. I am grateful to Boris Uspenskii for clarifying the canonical statuses of Orthodox hierarchs during their common prayer (H-EarlySlavic List, <http://www.h-net.org/~ess/>), posting of 12 September 2005 [accessed 16 February 2006]).} The arrival of a
top-level Greek hierarch in Moscow and his warm reception by the tsar may well have caused concerns about the autonomy of the Russian church on the part of Russian hierarchs. This is why Moscow-based Russian clerics ensured that their supremacy over the Greeks was properly recorded in the chronicle. In his capacity as metropolitan, Makarii persistently tried to justify the way he was installed in office by the Russian higher clergy, of course, without the consent of the patriarch of Constantinople. Makarii commissioned a special addition to the Metropolitan’s Pilot Book justifying this practice.\(^84\) He also actively promoted the cult of Metropolitan Iona, the first Russian metropolitan appointed without the sanction of Constantinople in 1448.\(^85\) Makarii thus had his reasons to be suspicious about Ivan’s attempts to obtain confirmation of his title from Constantinople. Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand why Makarii’s participation in the relations with Constantinople was minimized. Makarii’s gifts to the patriarch look most miserable in comparison to the lavish gifts sent from the tsar.\(^86\) It is also most strange that the metropolitan did not send his own letter to the patriarch regarding Ivan’s coronation, in which Makarii had so actively participated in 1547.\(^87\)

In a way Makarii’s worries were not groundless. Joasaph’s mission gave the Muscovite secular authorities room for manoeuvre between two centres of Orthodoxy, the Russian church and the Greek. The patriarch’s plain offer to glorify Ivan and his dynasty in Constantinople (for money, of course) was apparently more attractive than Makarii’s attempts to limit the power of the tsar with numerous admonitions.

Moscow’s response to the patriarch’s initiative was very ambitious. In early 1557 Ivan sent the patriarch a long list of royal ancestors and relatives to be commemorated in Constantinople. The list included over 150 names of grand princes of Kiev and Vladimir, appanage princes, princes of Smolensk, Tver’, Polotsk, Chernigov and Riazan’, as well as grand and appanage princesses. This is the first time that


\(^{86}\) Ivan sent sables worth 1,000 roubles, his brother Iurii’s gifts cost 200 roubles, Makarii and Prince Vladimir of Staritsa sent 100 roubles each (Kashtanov, *Rossiia*, pp. 223, 224). Archimandrite Makarii’s assertion that Metropolitan Makarii sent relatively small gifts because of his modesty seems to be naive. Makarii (Veretennikov), *Zhizn’,* p. 169.

\(^{87}\) There is no such letter from Makarii in the materials of the metropolitan’s chancellery or in the archives of the Foreign Chancellery. S. M. Kashtanov, ‘Sostav i soderzhanie dokumentov “grecheskih” posol’skih knig No. 1 i 2’, in Kashtanov, *Rossiia*, pp. 8–40 (pp. 16–19).
official court propaganda clearly spelled out claims to continuity of power in the dynasty, from Kiev onwards, in such great detail. The list thus added prestige to the ruling Russian dynasty and stressed its claims to be regarded as on a par with other Christian dynasties. The preamble to the memorial list justifies Ivan’s title of tsar by stressing that all these ‘most Orthodox [blagovernye] tsars and grand princes of Russia’ belong to the dynasty of Tsar and Great Prince Ivan Vasil’evich. In fact, none of Ivan’s ancestors had assumed the title of tsar officially. To enhance the links between the deceased members of the dynasty and Ivan’s immediate family, the Muscovite authorities included the names of Ivan’s late children Dmitrii, Anna and Maria in the list. Finally, the prestigious dynastic connection with Byzantium was highlighted by including the names of ‘Tsar’ Vladimir Monomakh, whose mother was from the Byzantine imperial family, and the Greek Princess Anna, wife of Vladimir I.

The compiler of the memorial list had a rather vague idea about the history of the canonization of Russian saints. This means that the list was prepared not in the metropolitan’s scriptorium, but in one of the court chancelleries. According to Donald Ostrowski, in the 1550s the secular authorities did not perceive Muscovy as the successor to the Byzantine Empire or Kievan Rus’. However, the memorial list compiled at a court chancellery shows that the Muscovite court was in fact perfectly aware of the genealogical connection with both Byzantium and Kiev. Furthermore, the court functionaries saw these links as crucial and decisive evidence of Ivan’s right to the title of tsar.

The exchange between Constantinople and Moscow thus stimulated the interest of the tsars’ secretaries in royal genealogy. In a wider cultural context, official royal genealogy was modelled after the Biblical genealogy of Christ, which was visually represented in the iconography.

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89 Many saints, including SS Boris and Gleb, are erroneously called in the list ‘recently canonized’ (novoiavlennye), though in fact they were canonized long before the sixteenth century (Kashtanov, Rossiia, pp. 396–97).
90 Ibid., p. 397. The list is written in a typical chancellery hand and is included in the registry of chancellery documents (posol’skaia kniga) on relations with the Greek Orthodox church from 1509 to 1571. Kashtanov believes that the registry was compiled almost simultaneously with the preparation of the diplomatic documents. However, S. N. Kisterev has persuasively argued that the existing registry was prepared on the basis of earlier chancellery documents after the 1571 fire of Moscow. See S. N. Kisterev, ‘Sbornik drevneishikh dokumentov o sviaziakh Rossii s jerarkhami pravoslavnogo Vostoka’, in Chitienia pomiatu professoa Nikolaia Fedorovicha Kaptereva, Moscow, 2003, pp. 16–21; id., ‘Novoe izdanie dokumentov o Rossii i Grecheskom mire v XVI v.’, in Ocherki feodal’noi Rossii, 9, Moscow, St Petersburg, 2005, pp. 311–54 [pp. 333–34] (hereafter, ‘Novoe izdanie’).
91 Ostrowski, Muscovy, pp. 176, 187.
of the Tree of Jesse (Drevo Ieseevo) in the Annunciation court cathedral as early as 1405. It was the new rapprochement with Constantinople that gave this Biblical pattern a fresh topical dimension focused on the continuity of power in Ivan’s dynasty.

The ‘Greek project’ of the Muscovite court brought mixed results. In 1561 Russians received the official acceptance of Ivan’s title by the patriarch of Constantinople. At the same time, the Greek and Russian versions of the patriarch’s letter are so confusing that historians still argue whether the patriarch demanded a new coronation of Ivan IV at the hands of the patriarch’s representative. Whatever the patriarch’s position was, the Muscovites picked up from the communication with Constantinople the confirmation of Ivan’s title.

As for Metropolitan Makarii, he apparently retained mixed feelings about the reinvented history of the Muscovite dynasty till the end of his days in 1563. This is obvious from the Book of Royal Genealogy (Stepennaia kniga), a quasi-historical work on the dynasty, which was prepared in the metropolitan’s chancellery in the early 1560s. On the one hand, the Book of Royal Genealogy clearly follows the tsar’s memorial list in its attempts to present an uninterrupted history of the dynasty from ancient times to contemporary rulers. At the same time, it consistently silences the role of Constantinople in the formulation of the doctrine of Ivan IV’s power. In particular, the Book of Royal Genealogy mentions neither Ivan’s request for the confirmation of his title by the patriarch of Constantinople in 1557 nor the receipt of such confirmation in 1561.

The compiler of the Book of Royal Genealogy was reluctant to mention the contacts with Constantinople because of

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92 The iconography of the Tree of Jesse was linked with royal genealogy in Serbia in the thirteenth century. See I. Ia. Kachalova, N. A. Maiasova, L. A. Schennikova, Blagoveshchenskii sobor Moskovskogo Kremlia. K 500-letiui unikal’nogo pamiatnika russkoi kul’tury, Moscow, 1990, pp. 38–40. The Muscovite dynasty was connected with Serbia through Ivan IV’s mother, Elena Glinskaia, whose mother Anna was a daughter of the Serbian voevoda Stefan Iakshich. Anna’s sister Elena married Jovan, Despot of Serbia. See de Madariaga, Ivan, p. 31. The dynastic connections with Serbia were manifested in the images of Serbian saints created in the Kremlin Archangel Cathedral under Ivan IV. See T. E. Samoilova, Kniazheskie portrety v rospisi Arkhangelskogo sobora Moskovskovo Kremlia, Moscow, 2004, p. 150. Michael Cherniavsky believed that royal genealogy was modelled after Mongol traditions. According to Daniel Rowland, the royal family followed here the genealogical practices of boyar clans. Michael Cherniavsky, ‘Ivan the Terrible and the Iconography of the Kreml Cathedral of Archangel Michael’, Russian History, 2, 1975, 1, pp. 3–28 (p. 12); Daniel Rowland, ‘Two Cultures, One Throne: Secular Courtiers and Orthodox Culture in the Golden Hall of the Moscow Kremlin’, in Kivelson, Orthodox Russia, pp. 33–58 (p. 56).


the metropolitan’s concerns about the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox church.\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{Conclusion}

In the late 1540s a new generation of the dynasty entered the political scene. Represented by young single males deprived of fathers, this generation had a very low prestige abroad, and probably at home too. The royal marriages of the late 1540s to 1550s raised the marital status of members of the dynasty. The weddings also resulted in the proliferation of the dynasty. This could have complicated the succession, which had never been properly defined in Muscovy. Royal wills were not guarantees against quarrels and even military conflicts over succession, as the civil war of the mid-fifteenth century and the dynastic crisis of 1553 show. The first cry of a baby boy born into the tsar’s family brought concern about securing the physical and political survival of the heir.

In the late 1540s to 1550s Ivan IV thus faced two interrelated challenges: strengthening the prestige of the dynasty and securing succession for his heir. Ivan’s choice of people capable of resolving these tasks was very limited. Dynastic politics gave priority to blood relationship over kinship that occurred from a marriage. In other words, the throne had to remain in the hands of the male members of the Daniilovichi dynasty. As long as the dynasty continued (and it was in theory immortal), succession by a boyar was out of question. This is why the boyars had very little, if any, voice in working out a mechanism of succession.

In terms of political and military support, Ivan IV counted in his dynastic politics on his cousin Vladimir of Staritsa. Contrary to widespread opinion, in the 1550s the main source of concern for Ivan IV was not Vladimir of Staritsa, but his own sons. Prior to the establishment of the Oprichnina, Ivan IV saw Vladimir more as a guarantor of peace between the tsar’s heir, Ivan Ivanovich and his future brothers than as a dynastic rival.

In search for sources of legitimacy, Ivan and his ‘spin doctors’ had to resort to the cultural resources of the church. However, Metropolitan Makarii had his own agenda as the head of the church. Makarii masterminded the 1547 coronation and the Stoglav council as public manifestations of a delicate compromise between secular and ecclesiastical authorities. The reopened contacts with the patriarch of Constantinople weakened Makarii’s monopoly on the mode of political expression in Muscovy. Using relations with the Orthodox East, the

\textsuperscript{95} The compiler revealed his tendentiousness in his approach to the story of Metropolitan Klim Smoliatich (12th-c.) The Book of Royal Genealogy includes a version of the story that justifies the elevation of Klim without blessing from Constantinople. \textit{PSRL}, 21, 1, p. 191. See also Bushkovich, \textit{Religion}, p. 28.
court functionaries launched an ambitious dynastic project which was focused on the antiquity of the Muscovite dynasty, the confirmation of Ivan’s title of tsar by the patriarch, and the commemoration of members of the dynasty in ancient centres of Orthodoxy. It is almost certain that the project was initiated and actively supported by Ivan. The ‘Greek project’ of Ivan the Terrible was a major step in turning the Muscovite monarchy into a dynastic state. The reinvented history of the dynasty highlighted the main priorities of Ivan IV’s dynastic politics: the prestige, continuity and succession of the power of his family.