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Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim

Letsas, G; (2009) Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim. In: Law and Philosophy. Oxford University Press

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This chapter argues that the differences between Dworkinian interpretivism on one hand, and positivism and natural law on the other can be located not on the question of law's connection to moral justification, but rather on different types of moral justification in general. It focuses on what Liam Murphy has called monist and dualist theories of practical principle. It shows that what Gardner takes to be an inconsistency within Dworkin's interpretivism can be explained away under non-monist theories of practical principle. It identifies a non-monist interpretivist position that stands on its own as a separate view even if it cannot be attributed to Dworkin.

Type: Book chapter
Title: Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim
ISBN-13: 9780199237159
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.003.0003
Keywords: Dworkin, Gardner, Liam murphy, Moral justification, Natural law, Positivism
UCL classification: UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Laws
URI: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/11802
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