Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity?
Reflects on the degree to which the courts should approach public interest issues by way of deference to Parliament and other governmental bodies in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. Examines Lord Hoffmann's approach to the meaning of the term "deference" in R. (on the application of Pro-Life Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corp and the distinction between the roles of the courts and Parliament drawn in R. (on the application of Holding & Barnes Plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. Discusses whether Lord Hoffmann's deliberations in Pro-Life Alliance help to clarify the necessary approach to the question of judicial deference. Considers the status of the democratic principle under the 1998 Act and the limits on the courts' institutional capacity. Notes the different judicial approaches to the issue of deference by Parliament and the broadcasting authorities revealed in Pro-Life Alliance.
|Title:||Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity?|
|Additional information:||Sweet & Maxwell publication available with subscription|
|Keywords:||Abortion, broadcasts, freedom of expression, judiciary, political parties, public interest, separation of powers, television|
|UCL classification:||UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Laws|
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