Short Oxford History of Europe

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Edward Bispham
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The Roman Empire from Augustus to Diocletian
Benet Salway

Superficial comparison of the political structure and geographical extent of the Roman Empire at the death of Augustus (AD 14) and at the accession of Diocletian (AD 284) gives an impression of remarkable stability. This is in striking contrast to the great changes in the Roman state over the equivalent span of time from the First Punic War to Augustus’ acquisition of unchallenged control. The foundation of this relative stability was laid in a fifty-year period of rapid transformation in Rome’s political, administrative, and social structures between the assassination of Julius Caesar and the death of his adopted son, Augustus. This phase of radical change was followed by two-and-a-half centuries during which developments were generally more gradual, even if the system was periodically convulsed by political crisis and stretched almost to collapse over the last half-century before the reign of Diocletian.

Much of the initial success of the Augustan political ‘settlement’ as a system of government can be attributed to the continued representation of the Roman state as a republic rather than the personal fiefdom of a monarch. This stance is reflected in the complexity of the nomenclature used to describe the emperor’s position. We might call Augustus and his successors simply ‘emperors’; but when Gaius Aurelius Diocles was elevated to the throne at Nicomedia in November 284 he adopted an elaborate string of names, titles, and powers
(Imperator Caesar, Augustus, pontifex maximus, tribunicia potestas, proconsul, pater patriae) to signify the imperial office, most of which had been developed or gradually acquired by Augustus as part of the establishment of a monarchy that dared not speak its name. On the surface the behaviour expected of an emperor also remained similar across the period. Diocletian assumed Rome’s chief magistracy, the consulship, just as Augustus and most intervening emperors had done, and even went as far as adjusting his own name to make it sound more noble and ‘Roman’ (appending the Latin suffix ‘-ianus’ to his Greek personal name). Nevertheless, the imperial ‘office’ he assumed had developed considerably from the special personal position occupied by Augustus. For, as the position of the emperor had become increasingly embedded in the structures of civil and military society, it had also become more much like a constitutional office. This development was in fact taken to its logical extreme by Diocletian’s own eventual innovation—the termination of his reign by voluntary resignation so as to end his life in retirement, a private citizen once again.

The political balance between the elements that comprised the state ruled by Augustus was also quite different from the balance in that ruled by Diocletian. Augustus’ chief political constituencies were, in the city of Rome, the senatorial aristocracy and urban plebs and, largely in the provinces, the now fully professionalized armed forces. He derived no small part of the authority that facilitated his rule from his connections by birth, adoption, and marriage alliance with two families of long-established nobility (the Julii and the Claudii). In addition, despite his accumulation of powers, the Senate as a body, the traditional magistrates, and most particularly the senators as individuals fulfilled significant roles in the government of the empire. Diocletian inaugurated his reign by taking as his partner in the consulship a Roman senatorial aristocrat, but he himself was of non-senatorial, provincial origin, and elevated to the throne directly from professional, full-time military service. For, by the later third century, credible candidates for the throne no longer needed to have been born into the senatorial class or to have progressed through the magistracies of the city of Rome. Nor did senators any longer enjoy a near-monopoly of the most important positions in the government of the empire. Moreover, with the military exigencies and political fragmentation of much of the third century making emperors a rare sight in the city of Rome, the political voice of its masses ceased to be heard. The same pressures had further concentrated political power into the hands of the army, which made it ever more necessary for an emperor to be, above all else, a credible military leader in order to establish and maintain legitimacy (Chapter 5). Not that this transformation had taken place without resistance; the tensions caused by these developments had come to a head violently nearly half a century before Diocletian, in AD 238, a year of no less than six emperors, as provincial landowners, the Senate, and the urban populace promoted different candidates in turn against the incumbent supported by the Rhine legions.

In terms of geography, the empire that Diocletian came to rule over had recognizably the same shape as that bequeathed by Augustus to Tiberius, and was slightly larger, although not quite matching up to the territorial high point reached at the death of the emperor Trajan in AD 117. For this entire period the Romans could claim that their empire stretched from the North Sea, in the north-west, to Aswan in Egypt, in the south-east. For the most part this huge territory was subdivided into a tessellation of provinces, each commanded by a governor answerable to the central government. Although very hard to estimate, the empire’s population was almost certainly higher under Diocletian than it had been under Augustus, but perhaps still lower than the peak reached in the second century before successive plagues swept across the Mediterranean world (see also Chapter 6). However, the populations ruled over by Augustus and Diocletian were quite dissimilar in terms of composition. The slave population, whose size at any time is difficult to estimate, remained a consistent feature; it was amongst the free inhabitants of the empire that there had been the most significant changes. Under Augustus, aside from the Italian peninsula itself where most freeborn people had full citizen status, Roman citizens had existed as a privileged minority. Moreover, under Augustus Italy as a whole had enjoyed freedom from submission to provincial governors. In contrast, most of the free inhabitants of Rome’s provinces were merely subjects, classed in the eyes of Roman law as ‘foreigners’ (peregrini). By Diocletian’s reign, however, these inequalities had largely disappeared. The vast majority of the free population was now of citizen status and, conversely, Italy had ceased to be accorded a special status within the empire, as its regions began to be organized into provinces. Certainly some of the expansion in provincial citizen numbers between Augustus and Diocletian was the
result of incremental growth in the first two centuries AD. This was achieved through a number of relatively controlled mechanisms, such as the freeing of slaves by Roman citizens or the enfranchisement of non-citizen veteran soldiers. Nevertheless, most of the increase is to be accounted for by the extension of citizenship to almost all free subjects by the emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus (Caracalla) in AD 212 (the Constitutio Antoniniana). Yet the political privileges of citizenship had long been rendered meaningless by the demise of the free Republic. For, although certain types of election continued on at least into the early third century, the emperors effectively controlled both legislation and choice of magistrates. Even those judicial privileges that attached to citizen status had been largely whittled away before Caracalla’s dramatic gesture. Despite this devaluation of the citizenship, the emperor’s action still had profound consequences in the longer term for the way the descendants of the newly enfranchised perceived their Roman identity. These were really only just beginning to be felt by the time of Diocletian’s accession.

Europe in the empire

‘Europe’, as a label for the area that we would understand by the term, certainly featured in the Romans’ geographical vocabulary. The Roman view of their world (the orbis terrarum) was ultimately derived from the Greek notion of the oikoumenē (habitable world) as defined by Eratosthenes in the third century BC. According to this view the habitable world was divided into three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa ( Libya in Greek), surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, and in turn surrounded by the outer ocean ( Oce anus). By the end of Augustus’ reign Roman power had encompassed the entire Mediterranean world, to the extent that it was easy enough for Romans to pretend that their empire was synonymous with the orbis terrarum. Of the three names of the continents, both Asia and Africa also served emblematically as labels for the provinces occupying the portions of those two continents nearest Rome, where her first footholds had been gained in the second century BC (Chapter 2). Despite the currency of ‘Europe’ as a geographical concept, however, the term did not generally feature in the Romans’ political geography (at least not until after our period) as either a provincial or regional designation.

After all, given the physical location of Rome and Italy on the European continent, Europe could not usefully serve to distinguish any provincial territory from the empire’s ‘home counties’. It is no surprise, then, that there is no evidence for any consciousness of a common European identity amongst Rome’s subjects on the continent.

Nor did the geographical concept of Europe coincide with any significant contemporary cultural or economic fault-lines. Rather, two significant lines of distinction bisected the European portion of the empire, one horizontally, so to speak, the other vertically. Culturally, the most significant distinction was between the Latin-speaking West and Greek-speaking East or, to be more precise, between those areas in which the language of Roman government was Latin and those in which it was Greek. On the North African coast this divide separated the eastern and western arms of the Gulf of Sidra (modern Libya) dividing Greek Cyrenaica from Latin Tripolitania. On the northern shore of the Mediterranean the Latin–Greek divide ran roughly east–north-east through south-eastern Europe from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, dividing the Latin provinces of Dalmatia, Moesia, and Dacia from Greek Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace.

The second major divide in the Roman Empire was that between the provinces of the Mediterranean littoral and those provinces orientated towards the great rivers of mainland Europe, the Rhine and the Danube. The fundamental basis of this divide was ecological. It distinguished those provinces whose agricultural system comprised to a significant extent the classic Mediterranean polyculture of wheat, vines, and olives, and those whose climate meant that beer and butter took the place of the latter two crops (also Chapter 6). The Romans’ own perception of the centrality of wheat, wine, and olive oil to Mediterranean life achieves no more eloquent expression than in Diocletian’s famous Edict on Maximum Prices of AD 301, in which these products comprise the first three categories listed. The wine—beer and olive oil—butter divide also had important cultural resonances; it largely coincided with the distinction between those areas that had a civilization comprising urban communities, literate culture, and coined money long before the imposition of Roman authority, on the one hand, and those where these Mediterranean-style features were a direct result of the impact of Rome, on the other (see also Chapter 8).

In Europe this broadly distinguished most of the Iberian peninsula, Gallia Narbonensis (modern Provence), Italy, Dalmatia, Greece,
Macedonia, and Thrace from northern Gaul, Britain, Germany, and the provinces along the Danube from Raetia to Moesia. Also, in Europe, this dichotomy happens roughly to distinguish those provinces that had formed part of the empire under the Roman Republic prior to the 50s BC (Chapter 2) from those acquired after that decade by Julius Caesar, Augustus, and their successors.

More significantly, this divide also represents an economic dichotomy. The urbanized provinces around the shores of the Mediterranean benefited from agricultural techniques long developed to maximize the yield in that climate, which in turn supported a higher population density (Chapter 6). This translated into a proportionally higher tax-yield from these provinces, most notably Africa, Asia, and Egypt, in comparison with the non-Mediterranean European provinces. While the Mediterranean ‘core’ provinces produced the bulk of the imperial revenues, the chief object of imperial expenditure, the professional army, was concentrated in the peripheral provinces facing the Rhine, Danube, and Euphrates frontiers. So that, although all provinces paid taxes (with the partial exception of land in Italy, free from direct taxation on property since 167 BC: Chapter 2), those of the Mediterranean core were net exporters of state revenues, those of the periphery net beneficiaries.

Despite benefiting from this redistributive effect, that subset of European provinces west of the Latin–Greek linguistic frontier and north of the Mediterranean–non-Mediterranean divide represented in the Romans’ own eyes the most backward area of the empire under Augustus, both culturally and economically. Through the deliberate fostering of urban civilization and the gradual development of agricultural techniques suited to the heavier soils of northern and central Europe, this gap had been narrowed by the late third century (Chapters 6 and 8). By all contemporary measurements, however, this remained the most backward area of the empire under Diocletian, just as it had been under Augustus. An index of ‘backwardness’ is the poem cataloguing the empire’s ‘noble cities’ (Ordo urbium nobilium) composed by the Aquitanian littérateur Ausonius, tutor to the emperor Gratian in the later fourth century. Even allowing for an expected Gallic bias, it is notable that, of the seventeen cities listed, only two (Trier, location of an imperial court, and Bordeaux, Ausonius’ home) belong to non-Mediterranean provinces, and, with the exception of Constantinople, Ausonius’ top five comprise the same names that one would have expected in a poem written 400 years earlier: Rome, Carthage, Antioch, and Alexandria. The first 300 years of the empire did witness a flourishing of Latin literary culture outside Italy, latterly and most notably in North Africa, but the cultural level of the non-Mediterranean provinces of the Latin West continued to be scorned by the aristocracy of the city of Rome. The noble Symmachus (Letters 1. 14) mocked Ausonius’ attempt to dignify the Gallic River Moselle in Latin poetry, insincerely praising him for having rendered it more noble than the Tiber itself. In terms of cultural production, Symmachus’ view is to some extent justified by the fact that, archaeology aside, very little of the material used to write the political history of the Roman Empire originates in the non-Mediterranean provinces of Europe. Symmachus’ snobbishness is, however, revealing of the author’s deeper anxiety that the traditional political order had been upset, inverting the proper priority of Italy over her transalpine provinces.

For, despite the cultural and economic handicap under which Europe’s non-Mediterranean provinces laboured, by the reign of Diocletian there had been a decisive shift, whereby political initiative had moved from the empire’s Mediterranean heartland to its traditional periphery. A combination of factors explains this development, above all the gradual specialization in the organs of imperial government and the shift in the balance of priorities that pushed military considerations to the fore. Accordingly, a distinct military cadre emerged that largely dominated the selection of emperors from the third quarter of the third century onwards (see Chapter 5). This favoured imperial candidates from the provinces of the Rhine–Danube frontier, which served as both principal military recruiting-ground and launch-pad for imperial power, thanks to the concentration of military deployment along that line and the relative proximity of these forces to Italy. So the story of Europe in the political history of the Roman imperial period does have its own particular trajectory, although it is not in any way sensibly separable from the mainstream narrative of Roman history. The European provinces, both Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean, performed different roles as part of an integrated political system within the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, even though the European provinces did not have a recognized common identity distinct from the rest of the empire, the story of Europe is distinctive as the arena in which the inversion of the balance of political
power between the empire's traditional core and periphery was largely played out.

The sources

We are not able to write a political history of the entire period from Augustus to Diocletian in a uniformly detailed manner or from a consistent perspective. There is no unbroken sequence of comprehensive chronological narrative accounts in either Latin or Greek. This is in part owing to the accidents of survival, but in part also to changes that eventually made the centres of political decision-making and court intrigue remote from the kind of people minded to write histories in the mould of Sallust or Livy. Moreover, only a small proportion of the surviving accounts covers contemporary affairs or is written from an eyewitness perspective. In the imperial period writing about the past was politically less risky as an occupation than writing about the present; the historian Tacitus flattered Trajan by claiming that his reign provided an atmosphere without danger for the writer of contemporary history (Histories 1.1). Nevertheless he, like others, took the precaution of terminating his narrative before Trajan's accession.

The fullest surviving account of the transition from republic to empire is actually provided by an early third-century source. Cassius Dio, a Roman senator from Nicaea in Bithynia (modern İzmir in Turkey), wrote a history in Greek of Rome from its origins to his own day, rather immodestly culminating in AD 229 when he was consul for the second time along with the emperor Severus Alexander. Although some parts remain only as Byzantine abridgements, most of Augustus' reign survives in Dio's original text. It is to be remembered, however, that it was written with 200 years of hindsight and is occasionally demonstrably anachronistic on minor details. For most of the first century AD our prime source is the Latin writings of Cornelius Tacitus, a Roman senator probably from Gallia Narbonensis. Besides biographies of his father-in-law Agricola, a successful general, Tacitus wrote two historical works at the end of the first and the beginning of the second century: the Histories, originally running from the civil wars of AD 68–69 to the death of the emperor Domitian (AD 96); and the Annals, covering the Julio-Claudian emperors from Tiberius to Nero (AD 14 to 68). Neither, however, survived intact. Tacitus' account is complemented by the work of his younger contemporary Suetonius Tranquillus. He was also a provincial, probably from Hippo Regius (modern Annaba) in Africa, and although not a senator, still very much part of the Roman social elite as a member of the equestrian order (see Chapter 2), and an insider on the corridors of power as a secretary to the emperor Hadrian. This position allowed Suetonius to exploit the imperial archives in writing a series of biographies of the 'Caesars' from Julius Caesar to Domitian. Because the style is very much more 'lifestyle' than 'lives' of the Caesars, however, it is of limited utility for reconstructing a political narrative. These sources generally comment on the imperial system from the slightly jaded perspective of the inhabitants of the gilded cage of Roman elite society. This perspective is generally urban, aristocratic, and infused with elements of nostalgic republicanism: it is a powerful lens, through which we receive our image of the early imperial system. We should remember that it is not necessarily representative of contemporary non-elite and provincial opinions.

Parallel with Dio's account for the period from Commodus (AD 180) to the 220s, the Greek history of Herodian is our main guide to political history from Severus Alexander to the end of AD 238. Little is known about Herodian's background, except that his name suggests an origin somewhere in the Levant; the partiality of some of his comments suggests that he worked in a provincial tax-collection department. Often ill-informed and confused compared with Dio, Herodian certainly was not close to the centre of events. Thereafter, apart from a few fragments of Greek histories and traces of contemporary accounts in later potted imperial biographies in Latin, there is little evidence of much historical writing in either language until the later fourth century. The gap was filled retrospectively by the anonymous Historia Augusta. Although written by a single author in the late fourth century, this work purports to be a set of biographies for emperors up to 285, by a series of authors writing soon after that date. The author's deliberate mischievousness aside, the fact that for the middle decades of the third century its factual content scarcely extends beyond the emperors' last names is testimony to how little could be recovered in the next century.

Other than the legends on imperial coinage, the survival of overtly political material issued by the organs of Roman central government is a rare occurrence. The emperor Trajan's replies, preserved in
the correspondence of the younger Pliny, sometimes reveal general principles of his administration, but most such material survives in the documentary rather than the literary record. The prime example is Augustus’ political testament, his Achievements (Res Gestae), published posthumously on bronze plaques outside his mausoleum in Rome, but surviving today only in copies inscribed on stone in the province of Galatia (central Turkey). Other significant surviving inscriptions are the text of the Senate’s decision in the trial of Cn. Calpurnius Piso, who stood accused of treason and murdering the heir to the throne in AD 19, and Claudius’ speech of AD 48 to the Senate arguing for the recruitment of senators from the provinces of Gallia Comata (‘long-haired’ Gaul). Both serve as complement and corrective to the relevant accounts by Tacitus.

Inscriptions add to our knowledge in other ways too. A genre that became increasingly common in the first two centuries of the empire is the honorific text, often inscribed on the base of a statue, listing an individual’s public offices and achievements, a fashion previously confined to epitaphs (funerary texts). Analysed en masse, these texts allow modern scholars to perceive patterns of office-holding amongst the Roman elite. This invaluable category of evidence suffers a catastrophic downturn in the political and economic turmoil of the mid-third century, unfortunately coinciding with the hiatus in our reliable narrative histories.

The acquisition of Egypt as a Roman province generated a significant further category of evidence: documents on papyrus. This was the ‘paper’ of the ancient world, made from the reed-like papyrus plant native to Egypt; papyrus documents survive in large quantities because of the extremely dry conditions of the Egyptian desert. Amongst these papyri, just as significant as the remnants of the provincial administration’s paperwork, are the scores of humble customs receipts and donkey-drivers’ contracts, whose dating clauses can provide precious nuggets of information on who was in power for otherwise poorly documented periods.

In all these categories of evidence the viewpoint is predominantly a male one (see also Chapter 4). Those writing political history were men, writing for a male audience and treating a sphere of life they considered ought to be a male preserve—hence the generally hostile representation of women when they appear as actors on the political stage.

From triumvir to princeps

Through a series of shrewd manoeuvres, the once obscure 19-year-old Gaius Octavius adopted as his heir by Julius Caesar, and now going under the novel name of Imperator Caesar Divi filius (‘Commander Caesar, son of the deified [Julius]’ but generally referred to in modern literature as Octavian), had by 36 BC made himself the dominant player in the western Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Mark Antony, his colleague as triumvir rei publicae constituentiae (‘one of the three men charged with the establishment of public affairs’) had been focusing his efforts on avenging Crassus’ defeat by the Parthians (Chapter 2). Antony’s political alliance and personal liaison with Cleopatra was a propaganda gift to the young Caesar, allowing him to present the final showdown between him and Antony in 31 BC as a patriotic war against a traitor allied to a foreign queen. The naval victory won at Actium on the west coast of Greece left Caesar undisputed master of the Roman state, after which Antony and Cleopatra were hunted down in Egypt, itself then transformed into a Roman province. So by 30 BC he had not only re-established his adoptive father’s monopolization of political power within the Roman state, but also extended Rome’s empire significantly by the absorption of the last serious independent power in the Mediterranean. The acquisition of Egypt also further reinforced the identity of the empire as just as much an Asian and African as a European power.

Although the normal process of election to high office had been supplanted by appointment under the triumvirs, the politically ambitious nevertheless could still choose between alternative patrons. The cementing of sole rule meant a further narrowing of the field of traditional politics. Now that there was only one patron, competition for office effectively meant competing for his favour; political opposition focused on his removal, or on deliberate refusal to participate in the regime. Tacitus lamented the stultifying effect this change was to have on the production of political oratory (Dialogue on Famous Orators 36 ff.). The young Caesar’s political dominance was guaranteed by his monopolization of military command (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, his adoptive father’s fate was sufficient demonstration that Roman aristocratic culture would not tolerate overtly monarchic
tendencies for long. The young Caesar was not about to throw away his hard-won political dominance, but he could not rule alone; for the sake of long-term political stability a semblance of power-sharing was desirable. Accordingly he effectively wrong-footed critics of his regime by a well-choreographed piece of political theatre acted out in 28–27 BC. As Cassius Dio relates it, Caesar stunned the Senate by renouncing his command over the provinces and handing them all over to its care, though this was not a complete abdication of power, since he remained consul. The senators’ response was to urge him to reconsider, and a compromise was reached. The near-contemporary account of the Greek Strabo (Geography 17. 3. 25) summarizes the outcome as the granting to Caesar of the ‘foremost position of leadership’ and the ‘responsibility for war and peace for life’, and his division of the empire into two portions, one remaining in his care, the other allotted to the people. Transfer to the public domain of the most peaceful and prosperous provinces (with the significant exception of Egypt) satisfied senatorial honour. The political risk of this arrangement was mitigated by the fact that Caesar retained command of the vast majority of the armed forces, since his portion comprised those provinces (initially Gaul, Spain, and Syria) requiring garrisoning because of their frontier location or potential rebelliousness. In any event, Caesar and his successors reserved the right to redistribute provinces between the two shares as necessity demanded. Elections for magistracies were also re instituted. In the words of the inscribed calendar set up in the forum of the Italian town of Praeneste, the settlement marked the ‘restoration of the res publica (public affairs) to the Roman people’ or, as a contemporary coin legend puts it, ‘he [Caesar] restored the laws and rights to (or of) the Roman people’ (British Museum, Department of Coins and Medals, accession no. 1995.4-1.1).

In recognition of this benefaction, amongst other honours, some senators suggested that Caesar be called ‘Romulus’, but, preferring to avoid a title with such openly monarchic connotations, he accepted instead the epithet ‘Augustus’. The word was appropriately evocative of respect and religious sacrosanctity, because the connotation of the straightforward meaning ‘majestic’ was compounded by a supposed etymological link with augury (Chapter 7); the Greek translation of the title, sebastos (‘worshipped’), was less subtle. None of this fundamentally altered the basis of Augustus’ power, which remained his control of the legions. Nor was the settlement of 27 BC the end of the process of negotiating a constitutional definition of his position. Nevertheless, the whole charade symbolized the striking of a tacit bargain between Augustus and the senatorial aristocracy, whereby the senators would not challenge the emperor’s authority as long as he used his military power to provide security, agreed to mask the monarchic nature of his position, preserved their privileges and opportunities, and maintained the prestige of their social status. Thus was born the ‘principate’—that is, a political system dominated by one pre-eminent individual (princeps).

The fact that Augustus managed to die in his bed peacefully at the age of 76 is testament to the success of his political arrangements. In formal constitutional terms, between 31 and 23 BC his executive power rested in his tenure of a continuous series of consulships. Yet his annual occupation of this magistracy frustrated the ambitions of others. So in 23 BC Augustus arranged that he be made a personal grant of enhanced proconsular power (imperium proconsulare maius), which allowed him to intervene in the public provinces as well as his own, and the power of the tribunate of the plebs (tribunici a potestas), with its right of veto over other magistrates and legislation, and ability to summon the Senate and assembly of the plebs. The annual renewal of this power became a way in which emperors measured the length of their reigns. On the death of his erstwhile triumviral colleague Lepidus, in 12 BC, Augustus was able also to step into the chief religious office of state, that of pontifex maximus. He seems to have been proudest, however, of the honorific title pater patriae (‘father of the homeland’) bestowed on him by the Senate and people in 2 BC, perhaps because he felt that it acknowledged his transformation from party politician to statesman.

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**Government: city and empire**

The establishment of the Augustan principate provided Rome with a head of state whose political horizon was considerably wider than that of the elected magistrates who enjoyed their offices for only a year at a time. The extended time-frame of the rule of the princeps allowed solutions to be evolved for some long-standing systemic shortcomings in the running of the Roman state. Although essential symbols of the continuity of the res publica under the emperors, Senate and
magistrates found their roles profoundly altered as part of the process of organizational reform. Under the republic the provinces of the empire had continued to be administered through the organs of city-state government. The growth in the size of subject territory had put increasing strains on the system, to the detriment of the proper administration of both Rome and the provinces. Augustus maintained the basic sequence of magistracies (*cursus honorum*; Chapter 2), progression through which augmented a senator’s standing (*dignitas*). Many senators may have been satisfied that the restoration of the regular schedule of elections and observation of the established intervals between offices constituted sufficient evidence of the proper working of the *res publica*. In the highly rhetorical preface of Justinian’s law of December AD 557, redefining senatorial membership, the emperor’s chief legal officer, Tribonian, reflected on the role of the Senate under the principate:

Indeed, after the rights of the people and Senate of Rome had by the republic’s good fortune been transferred to the emperor’s majesty, it came about that those, whom they [the senators] themselves chose and appointed to administrative posts, did everything that the imperial voice enjoined upon them. Provincial commands were placed under them and everything else made subject to their ordinances; while the remaining senators passed the time at rest. And after the administrators laid down the tasks entrusted to them it was reserved to the emperor’s will whether he wished to free them from the burdensome belt of office and send them back to the security of the Senate, or to assign them to other tasks.

*(Justinian, Novel 62)*

Although an oversimplification, Tribonian’s description encapsulates some of the key features of the Augustan system in a recognizable manner. As he implies, most public posts remained in the hands of senators, whether occupying their positions in their own right as traditional magistrates and pro-magistrates, or acting as imperial deputies. For, in appointing subordinates to represent him in his provinces, Augustus was in general careful to respect existing conventions. Accordingly, he appointed his deputies (*legati*) in the provinces from amongst those senators who had reached the upper echelons of the hierarchy of public magistrates (the *praetorship* and *consulship*). Just as tenure of the *consulship* was the qualification for entering the lottery for the proconsular command of one of the two great public provinces (Africa and Asia), so the emperors also reserved their senior legateships for ex-consuls. In fact, the most significant innovation of the Augustan regime was to have the ‘ordinary’ consuls step down during the year and be replaced by sequences of extra pairs of consuls (*suffecti*), precisely in order to create sufficient candidates for these legateships.

Mindful of the well-being of the urban populace, Augustus also created new positions devoted to the everyday administration of the city, many of which were linked to stages in the traditional *cursus*. These included curatorships for Rome’s infrastructure and amenities (for example, public buildings, riverbanks, and drainage), held at praetorian or consular level, and the post of urban prefect (*praefectus urbi*), the head of Rome’s civic government, to which the emperor appointed only the most senior consuls. So, while the traditional public magistracies were deprived of much of their effective power by the development of an alternative administration for the city, and by the emperor’s monopolization of both executive authority and legislative initiative, they nevertheless retained their desirability because their tenure remained an essential prerequisite for appointment to positions of real responsibility in the city or the empire.

The Augustan system preserved a number of principles of Republican government. First, a public career was not intended to be a full-time profession. It was understood that public service was simultaneously a privilege of, and a duty incumbent upon, the socioeconomic elite. The *cursus honorum* was not a seamless sequence of positions of responsibility: it entailed a considerable number of fallow years, time to be devoted to cultured leisure (*attain*). Second, provincial governorships combined both civil and military responsibilities, so it was appropriate that a young senator’s training should include experience of both spheres. The aristocratic ideal esteemed the gentleman all-rounder above the technical expert. To this end, for the aspiring senator, the nursery slopes of a public career comprised a stint as one of the twenty junior magistrates (*viginti quinqui*100) and service in the legions as a military tribune, before election at age 25 or above to the quaestorship, which afforded a seat in the Senate for life. As Tribonian mentions, however, the imperial appointments were not constrained by defined periods of office. The emperor might extend or curtail the tenure of the urban prefect or one of his legates as he wished. An extreme example
is C. Poppeus Sabinus, who served as legate of Moesia (including Achaia and Macedonia) for twenty-four years under Augustus and Tiberius (AD 11–34). Only death finally released him from his responsibilities.

The career of any one senator would typically involve a mixture of posts in the direct service of the state as well as in the service of the emperor, both in the city and abroad, and it was marked out by progression through the urban magistracies. The career of the historian Tacitus can be taken as a fairly representative (if above averagely successful) example. As we now know from fragments of the epitaph from Rome (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 6. 41106), he began his career in the 70s AD in the vigintivirate as one of the ten men assigned to judging civil cases (decemvir alii iudicandis). A spell as tribune of the soldiers in one of the legions probably followed. He entered the Senate proper in 81, in the especially honoured position of quaestor to the emperor Titus. Under Domitian he went on to serve as one of the now purely decorative tribunes of the plebs, and then, in 88, became praetor and member of the college of fifteen priests for the performance of sacred rites (quindecim vir sacris faciundis; Chapter 7). Between 90 and 97 Tacitus spent most of his time away from Rome again, probably serving as legate of a legion and then governing a province as an imperial legate. Under Nerva, Tacitus was back in Rome as one of the suffect consuls of 97, before leaving again to serve Trajan as legate of a strategically significant province (perhaps Lower Germany) for some years up to c.105. His known public career culminated in his being allotted the prestigious proconsulship of Asia c.112–13. Tacitus' career illustrates how, as long as senators were able to convince themselves that they were free agents serving the res publica rather than subjects of a monarch, it was possible to reconcile nostalgia for the Republic with active participation in the imperial regime.

The role of senators as administrators may have been easily accommodated to the imperial system, but the Senate as an institution was a different matter. As an authority for the conferment of titles, renewal of imperium, and the passing of judgement on whether an emperor was worthy of posthumous deification, the Senate helped maintain the pretence of the independent existence of the res publica. The position of the Senate as an active deliberative body, however, posed more of a dilemma. While the emperor was expected to consult, the expression of genuinely independent opinion could be problematic, as epitomized by an exchange between Vespasian and a dissident senator. Epictetus reports (Discourses 1. 20) that, when asked to be less outspoken, Helvidius Priscus retorted: 'Don't ask me my opinion and I'll keep quiet.' To this the emperor responded: 'But I must ask you your opinion'; 'And I must say what appears just,' Priscus replied. Ironically, with the authority of the emperor behind them, the Senate's decrees (senatus consultum) became unchallenged sources of law, even if in reality they might amount to no more than the verbatim repetition of an imperial proposal. The Senate also conveniently functioned as the supposedly impartial venue for political show trials, such as that of Cn. Fiso in AD 20, whose proceedings were then published in major cities and military camps throughout the empire.

Here the Senate was essential in providing the appearance of open government. It was imperative that the emperor Tiberius be seen to be doing something to satisfy the outpouring of public emotion at the death of his nephew Germanicus and dispel the popular conspiracy theory that he had engineered it. Not only the soldiers but also the general populace in Rome lamented the charismatic prince's death. For, although effectively politically disenfranchised, through sheer weight of numbers the urban populace could make life very uncomfortable for an emperor in Rome, menacing him, for instance, with hostile chanting at public gatherings. After all, the armed forces immediately available to restore order were limited to the praetorian guard, and the cohorts of the urban prefect and of the night-watch (vigiles), a considerable concentration of troops, but still small in relation to the urban population.

The governing class

Julius Caesar had presided over an influx of Italians into the Senate. Augustus' reign saw a further widening of the net, but at the same time the Senate itself, which had expanded to about a thousand members, was pruned to 600. Augustus also changed the economic definition of the highest class of Roman society. Hitherto a property qualification threshold of 400,000 sestertii had defined membership of the class of equestres, and was a prerequisite for standing for
political office. Augustus created a separate senatorial class as a subset of this equestrian class by introducing a higher threshold of 1 million sesterces for office-holding. By a combination of censorial powers and targeted endowments, Augustus and his successors were subsequently able to control entry to the senatorial order to some extent. Within a century the families of republican nobility, other than those who had been absorbed into the imperial family, had almost entirely died out in the male line or dropped out of the senatorial order. As a result, the senatorial class became almost entirely a creation of the imperial regime. Nevertheless, as the example of Tacitus illustrates, the ethos of the Senate survived the change of personnel. Indeed, the widening geographical origins of senators should not be taken to imply any real change in the cultural outlook of that body. By AD 48 the political and cultural identification of the Gallic elite with Rome was sufficient that the emperor Claudius might appeal for the Senate’s approval for recruitment of its members from beyond Provence. The emperor prevailed despite the strong prejudices of the existing senators. The bronze tablet that preserves the text of Claudius’ speech (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 13, 1668) was probably originally displayed at the national altar of the imperial cult outside Lyon, the meeting place of the Council of the Gauls (the annual assembly of the provinces of Gallia Comata).

The changing geographical origins of the emperors themselves can be taken as one barometer of assimilation. The Flavians (AD 69 – 96), the dynasty established after the demise of the Julio-Claudians, came from central Italy; Trajan and Hadrian (98 – 138) originated from southern Spain, the Antonines (138 – 92) from Narbonensis—all, no doubt, of émigré Italian ancestry. So the European provinces were in the vanguard, but with the Severans (193 – 235) the baton passed to families of indigenous origin from Africa and Syria, not European—but still Mediterranean. It was not until Decius (249 – 51) that a senator from a province of the northern frontier (Pannonia Inferior) acceded to the throne. Britain, even more remote from the Mediterranean core, is never known to have provided even senators. All the while Italians certainly remained the single biggest element in the Senate, and a common identification with Italy was encouraged by Trajan’s ruling that provincial senators should invest a third of their wealth in Italian land. Moreover, it was considered better that men did not govern their province of origin after the usurpation of Avidius Cassius in Syria in 175. On the other hand, there is little evidence of senators (as opposed to armies) banding together on the basis of a shared provincial or regional origin in our period. In the civil war of AD 193 – 4 the Numidian Ti. Claudius Candidus, legate to the proconsul of Asia, did opt to support his fellow African Septimius Severus, then governor of Pannonia Superior, while his superior declared for Pescennius Niger in Syria. Candidus’ decision, however, might equally have been motivated by the calculation that Severus not only had more legions at his disposal than Niger but was also closer to Rome.

The corollary to Augustus’ creation of a separate senatorial order was the redefinition of the equestrian order as a second tier in economic and political terms. As well as continuing to supply the commanders of the auxiliary troops and subordinate officers of the legions, members of this order found employment in new prefectures (posts in public service as appointees of the emperor), all of which were opened up positions without formally defined powers and not governed by traditional rules. They were used for key, politically sensitive positions that, if occupied by a senator, might form a basis for challenging imperial authority. The first to be established was the prefecture of Egypt, strategically significant as the source of grain for distribution to the citizens of Rome. This post was complemented at the Roman end by the prefect of the grain supply (annona). Augustus considered the command of the emperor’s “military headquarters” (praetorium) too sensitive to entrust to a single individual, so established it as a collegiate office to be shared by two praetorian prefects. The general principle enshrined in these arrangements is that the political risk associated with the effective power of these posts was offset by appointing to them men whose social dignity ought to disqualify them from seeking political power for themselves. Nevertheless, the praetorians and their commanders were frequently to exercise their political muscles in making or breaking emperors. Along with the prefecture of the sigils, these posts gradually coalesced into the top rungs of a hierarchy of equestrian offices on the model of the senatorial cursus honorum.

The third significant group in imperial government was the emperor’s own private household staff, comprising slaves and freedmen who acted as the secretarial support staff in the administration of the empire, and as overseers of the emperor’s assets. Although in essence
no different from the staff of any aristocratic household (Chapter 4),
the emperor’s slaves and freedmen came to exercise quasi-public roles because of the extraordinary economic and political influence of his household. In Rome imperial secretaries might use their special access to the emperor to wield political influence, a fact resented by the senatorial aristocracy when their de facto power was acknowledged with public honours, as happened most notably under Claudius. In the imperial provinces the emperor’s procurators not only collected rents from the tenants of imperial estates but also the public taxes. Given the procurators’ direct connection with the emperors, the provincials often treated them as representatives of the Roman state, and in some cases they were appointed to the command of provinces. Moreover, the taxes from all the imperial provinces were centrally pooled in a holding account (fiscus), from which any surplus, minus necessary expenditure, ought technically to have been transferred to the public treasury. In reality, the extent of the emperor’s private income, combined with control of the fiscus, enabled him to dispose of financial resources that far outstripped those of the state itself. Another formidable element within the imperial household was the emperor’s womenfolk. Removal of politics to the private arena of the imperial household gave the women of the family an influence in political affairs that the chauvinist Republican political tradition would not allow them.

Together these elements formed, already at the beginning of the principate, the nucleus for an alternative to the traditional system of senatorial government. This position was tolerable to senatorial opinion as long as the social conventions that guaranteed their privileged status were not transgressed. As early as the reign of Tiberius, the limits of acceptable behaviour were being explored. With Tiberius in retreat on the island of Capri, Seianus, having established himself as sole praetorian prefect and conduit between Senate and emperor, had received honorific senatorial titles and forged a marriage alliance with the emperor, before gaining election to the consulship for AD 31, despite his equestrian status and continued occupation of the prefecture. This last promotion was too much, and a whispering campaign convinced Tiberius to engineer his downfall within the year. No equivalent transgression of convention was attempted until Plautianus under Septimius Severus over 170 years later (below). The socially offensive character of the powers of imperial procurators and secretaries was mitigated by the gradual transfer of these posts to freeborn equestes, so assigning the posts to men of a dignity appropriate to their quasi-public role. By the early second century the senator Pliny the Younger found the honours that had been offered to Claudius’ freedman Pallas incredible (Letters 7. 29. 8. 6).

Nevertheless, although highly stratified, it is wrong to think of Roman political society as divided horizontally into impermeable layers. In fact, with sufficient resources and the right connections, remarkable social mobility was possible. At the death of Commodus on 31 December 192, that the throne should fall to P. Helvius Pertinax—as one of the most senior senators around—seems unremarkable until one considers that he was the son of a freedman. This origin did not prevent him from rising from the local municipal elite, through lengthy public service: first he spent fifteen years as an equestrian officer; then, co-opted into the Senate, he rose eventually, over twenty years and a long string of provincial commands, to the urban prefecture and a prestigious second consulship (with Commodus) for 192. The uncontroversial nature of his ascent contrasts with Seianus’ attempt to leapfrog the entire cursus honorum in one jump.

The emperor and the army

A key factor in providing stability, both financial and political, was Augustus’ reorganization of the Roman army, by which he managed an awkward transition from the ad hoc professionalized army of the civil wars to a permanent professional standing army see further reading Chapter 5. Since soldiers’ wages were always the biggest item of the state’s budget, the demobilization of superfluous forces after Actium permitted a reduction in expenditure of about 50 per cent. Still, the extended commands of the 50s, and the emergency situations of the 40s and 30s BC, had meant unpredictably prolonged periods of service and an increasing reliance on recruitment from the landless peasantry and urban poor. The need of commanders to reward these soldiers on demobilization had been a significant feature in the political landscape of the last decades of the Republic (Chapter 2). Traditionally
they had been rewarded with parcels of farmland. In Italy, however, this became increasingly scarce and politically difficult to acquire, and the veterans' need could only be partly satisfied by the planting of colonies in the provinces; a sustainable solution was required. A regular fixed term of service was eventually established for legionaries, completion of which was rewarded by a cash lump-sum retirement bonus (*praemium militiae*). This scheme was funded not from regular provincial taxation but from indirect taxes for which only Roman citizens were liable, perhaps to remind them that they were the chief beneficiaries of the move from legions of conscripts to professional volunteers. Of course, as Tacitus tells us (*Annals* 4. 5), the citizen legions only accounted for about half of the armed forces, the rest being composed of units of non-citizens (the auxiliaries). These too were given an incentive for long-term loyalty to the imperial regime. A tradition inherited from the late Republic, whereby commanders might reward the service of non-citizen soldiers with Roman citizenship, was developed by Augustus' Julio-Claudian successors into a regular system of awarding the citizenship to auxiliaries after twenty-five years' service.

The changes in military organization wrought by Augustus transformed the relationship of the soldiers to political affairs, but certainly did not reduce their political significance. Mutual self-interest bound the soldier and the emperor together. Professionalization engendered a heightened group identity in the soldiery as against the empire's civilian subjects, and they perceived their loyalty to lie in the first instance with that man whom they acknowledged as their supreme commander. As a creation of the imperial system, it is scarcely surprising that the professional army was not a badge of republican sentiment. An emperor might lose the respect of the Senate and people of Rome and of his provincial subjects but, as was to be repeatedly demonstrated, gaining and maintaining the respect of a sufficient proportion of the army was a crucial factor in keeping him on his throne. Since the vast majority of the army was posted in the provinces far from Rome, it was clearly the case that an emperor might be made or broken outside the capital. Still, it would be wrong to make an artificial distinction between the army's respect for the emperor and that of the Roman senatorial and equestrian elite, since these two classes supplied its senior officer grades, a group significant in the formation of opinion.

Augustus certainly justified his retention of the vast majority of the armed forces by living up to the role of defender of the state in the years after 27 BC. Following the pattern of the pro-magistrates of the late Republic, he sought to build up his political capital through military glory. Indeed, after 19 BC the honour of a triumph was reserved to members of the imperial family alone. Augustus personally commanded campaigns of conquest in north-western Spain and, through subordinates, extended the frontiers of Roman power elsewhere in Europe (in Germany and along the Danube) as well as in North Africa and Egypt. He even managed to negotiate a favourable peace-deal with the Parthians, Rome's rivals to the east of the Euphrates, involving the return of the standards lost by Crassus. Augustus' success in delivering peace, both internal and external, was trumpeted by the dedication in 9 BC of the Altar of Augustan Peace (*Ara Pacis Augustae*) on the Campus Martius at Rome. The centrality of this function in justifying the emperor's place in the political system is illustrated by one of the sculpted relief scenes decorating the ceremonial approach to the imperial cult building at Aphrodisias in Caria (south-western Turkey). It suggests the superhuman accomplishments of the emperor in the military sphere by depicting him as a heroic nude, one hand resting on a trophy of victory beneath which crouches a female figure personifying a subdued province. That this does not symbolize the selfish pursuit of glory but a service rendered to the Roman state is indicated by the fact the emperor is himself crowned by a male figure in a toga, perhaps representing the Roman people or the Senate.

By the end of the first century BC Roman power in Germany had been extended far to the east of the Rhine. The extent to which this area was being transformed into a normal province was doubted until the archaeological discovery of a Roman town at Waldgirmes confirmed Cassius Dio's account (56. 18. 1) of the founding of cities beyond the Rhine (von Schnurbein 2003). The loss of this territory in AD 9, after Augustus' legate, P. Quinctilius Varus, perished in an ambush along with three legions, seems to have been a psychological blow from which the emperor never fully recovered. In Lower Germany Roman forces fell back permanently to the line of the Rhine. By contrast, in Upper Germany the frontier was eventually extended under Domitian to close off the angle between the Rhine and Danube (Chapter 10). Nevertheless, the Varian disaster
did spell the end of continuous expansion, and according to Tacitus (Annals 1. 11), Tiberius claimed that Augustus had left him with the advice not to extend the empire beyond its current limits. Over the course of the first century AD there was a general consolidation of vassal states (for example, the kingdoms of Mauretania, Judaea, and Thrace) into Roman provinces, but significant territorial extensions of Roman power were limited: Britain under Claudius, Dacia under Trajan, Mesopotamia under Septimius Severus. In Europe there is some evidence to suggest that the line along which the Roman frontier came to rest approximated more or less to that dividing those pre-Roman Iron Age societies organized into units with fixed central administrative places from those without such structures (see Chapter 10). The former provided a foundation on which Rome was able to encourage the development of its city-based administrative system. The latter required the permanent attention of the armies in their forward positions along the Rhine and Danube, taking an overtly aggressive stance as much for internal political consumption as to ward off external enemies. To judge by the balance of legionary deployment along the frontiers, the primary threat was perceived as coming from across the Danube. By the reign of Septimius Severus twelve of the empire’s thirty-three legions were stationed in the Danubian provinces, as opposed to ten in the eastern provinces facing Rome’s sophisticated Parthian rivals, only one in Egypt, and a further one facing the Sahara in Numidia. A solitary legion garrisoned the mountains of north-western Spain and Severus placed another to overlook Rome from the Alban hills. When the four Rhine legions, backed by three in Britain, are taken into consideration, it is clear that the European frontier accounted for nearly half of all Rome’s military forces. This distribution helps to explain the tendency for the allegiance of the European frontier forces to dictate the outcome of civil wars.

Despite the essentially static pattern of the army’s deployment from Augustus onwards, the emperors of the first and second centuries maintained an ideological commitment to the idea of the reassignment of military units at short notice through a ban on soldiers marrying. By the second century, however, resistance to upheaval was such that recourse was increasingly had to forces composed of detachments (tæxillattones) from disparate units in order to meet new demands. By the time Septimius Severus conceded the right to legal marriage,

the integration of the soldiery with the local population of the areas in which they had been stationed for decades or centuries was far advanced thanks to generations of local recruitment and the formation of de facto families. The strength of these regional loyalties was an important factor behind the fissiparous tendencies of the later third century.

The transmission of power: Tiberius to the Antonines

By the late 20s BC it was abundantly clear that Augustus was not intending his political dominance to remain simply personal; that is, he was not going to emulate Sulla’s retirement once the job of reform was done (Chapter 2). But how was his delicately constructed position to be transmitted? The self-representation of the regime as the restoration of a republican system of government made it impossible explicitly to legitimize hereditary succession as the exclusive means of transmitting imperial power. In default of natural sons, candidates were singled out by adoption as heir to Augustus’ not inconsiderable personal fortune, and by early advancement to public offices. When premature death deprived him of his grandson, he was compelled to fall back on his stepson Tiberius. Nevertheless the army was regularly to remind Augustus’ successors of the fundamental underpinning of their power. When Augustus’ arrangements were put to the test in AD 14, the legions in Pannonia and Lower Germany flexed their political muscles by mutinying in the hope of extracting better pay and conditions. The eccentricity of Tiberius’ successor Gaius (Caligula) provoked his assassination, and the senators were debating the restoration of the republic when Claudius’ acclamation by the praetorian guard decided the issue (Chapter 5). Their mutually beneficial deal was commemorated in two coin types: one showing Claudius’ entry into the camp, the other the emperor shaking hands with a guardman. Again, it was the declaration of the praetorian prefect for Galba more than the fact of provincial rebellion itself that prompted Nero’s suicide. Galba in turn succumbed to the praetorians’ suborning by Otho. The provincial armies, however, were not going to let the praetorians in Rome dictate the entire course of events. The
Rhine legions descended on Italy to impose Vitellius on the Senate, swiftly followed by their colleagues on the Danube fighting on behalf of Vespasian, who remained out in the East. Nero’s death had brought an end to simple family succession to the principate. The law passed to ratify Vespasian’s powers (the so-called lex de imperio Vespasiani) marks an important stage in the formalization of the principate as defined office, a process exemplified by the definitive transformation at this stage of Augustus’ personal names—Imperator Caesar Augustus—into titles of office. The surviving clauses of the law show it to be an enabling rather than a limiting act, simply establishing a baseline for the emperor’s powers with reference to those held by his respectable predecessors: Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius.

Vespasian’s own dynasty came to an end with the assassination of Domitian in 96: his paranoid tyranny was too much for the senators. There was, however, no talk of a return to a republic, and the elevation of the venerable and childless Nerva looks like a stopgap measure, designed to buy breathing-space in which a consensus candidate with a longer-term future could emerge. But again the praetorian guard forced the pace by bullying Nerva into adopting an heir. His choice of the militarily experienced Trajan proved a wise one. It also inaugurated a series of succession by adoption (those of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Lucius Verus). This provided Rome with its greatest period of political stability and economic prosperity, the golden age of the Antonines that Gibbon took as the high point from which to trace the empire’s decline and fall (see further Chapter 9). This succession policy, however, was forced by the accident of childlessness, not the triumph of meritocracy over heredity; and, when opportunity afforded, the hereditary principle reasserted itself. In 180, since Commodus was already co-Augustus with his father Marcus Aurelius, his accession to sole rule was a smooth transition. As with Caligula and Domitian before, so Commodus’ erratic conduct led to his assassination at the end of 192. Again, as in 96, the praetorians seem to have resented being cut out of the selection process by the Senate’s choice of Pertinax. The largesse promised by Didius Julianus persuaded the guard of the rightness of his cause but, as in 69, the provincial armies threw up their own candidates, this time simultaneously: the legions of Britain and the Rhine, Clodius Albinus; the Danube legions, Septimius Severus; and the Syrian legions, Pescennius Niger. Once again the Danube legions’ candidate was triumphant. Geographical position and superior numbers favoured Severus, who first made common cause with Albinus while his ‘Balkan army’ picked off Niger, before turning on his erstwhile ally. In both cases the ‘showdowns’ came on European soil, at Byzantium and Lyon. This three-way split and subsequent reunification also prefigures the course of events of the 260s and 270s.

Centre and periphery

The provincial units into which the subject territory of the empire was divided generally had some ethnic or cultural rationale. In some cases these preserved the identities of pre-existing entities subsumed into the Roman system, most famously the kingdom of Egypt or, in Europe, the kingdoms of Thrace and Noricum, for example. Nevertheless, in the empire’s Mediterranean core the city-state rather than the province remained the primary unit of political organization and interaction with the ruling power. The self-governing nature of these communities meant that the Roman government could focus on two tasks: the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes. Accordingly, Rome exported this model of political organization to its non-Mediterranean territories, frequently mapping it onto indigenous tribal units (Chapter 8). The limited aims of central government allowed the number of administrative personnel (and therefore costs) to be kept low. Indeed, in its small scale and limited ambition the Roman government of the principate has been likened to the Thatcherte ideal of ‘government without bureaucracy’. As the surviving correspondence of the Younger Pliny with Trajan demonstrates, this did not translate into administration without paperwork. The simple existence of the emperor’s overarching authority encouraged a tendency on the part of governors to refer anything that might conceivably be considered a policy decision to the emperor. Judicial matters might also be referred up to the emperor’s hearing. Add to this the petitions from communities and individuals seeking some special grant or privilege, and it is easy to see how the emperor came to be besieged by people and letters demanding a share of his attention.
During the first two centuries of the imperial regime, when emperors spent most of their time based in Rome, this traffic ended up there. Under an emperor with a taste for travel, however, such as Hadrian, or when military campaigning demanded the emperor’s presence on the frontier, then the imperial court might present a moving target. For those areas where the court came to rest, its presence could be something of a mixed blessing. On the one hand it offered the opportunity of direct access to the emperor and profits to be made from servicing the needs of his entourage; on the other, the commandeering of lodgings and the requisitioning of supplies might put a considerable strain on the hosts. For petitioners chasing the imperial whirlwind, considerable time and expense might be involved in tracking down the eye of the storm. For example, the city of Ephesus in Asia honoured one of its citizens for winning the city’s case (for primacy in the province over its rival Smyrna) before the emperor Macrinus in Syria, and for having previously been its ambassador and advocate before Severus and Caracalla in Rome many times, in Britain, in Upper Germany, at the sanctuary of Apollo Grannus in Gaul, Sirmium, Nicomedia, Antioch, and Mesopotamia (Inscriptionen von Ephesos 802 = Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum 17. 505). The envoy’s journeys demonstrate how from the 170s onwards heightened levels of military activity, both aggressive and defensive, turned the political geography of the empire inside-out. The emperor was increasingly likely to be found not in Rome but in one of the frontier provinces. So it was that Marcus Aurelius came to spend the last years of his life at Carnuntum on the Danube, and Septimius Severus his last months at York.

Not all areas of the empire were of equal status in the eyes of the Roman government. Italy was not a province, and was subject neither to governors nor, as previously mentioned, to the payment of direct taxation, a status briefly extended to the province of Achaea (southern Greece) under Nero. This grant of freedom reflects Nero’s special relationship with Greek culture, held—unlike those of other peoples—in unquestioned esteem by the Romans. Thus, while the Roman government communicated with its subjects in the western Mediterranean provinces and those of the Rhine and Danube frontiers in Latin, Hellenophone communities across the Greek East corresponded with Roman authorities (both central and provincial) in their own language. The anonymous Ephesian no doubt delivered his petitions and gave his speeches in Greek, even when appearing before the emperor in faraway Britain. The reasons for this differential treatment were both historical and cultural. The Greek East comprised the native and long-established Greek-speaking areas of Greece and the Aegean rim, as well as those Hellenized territories in the Levant and Egypt that Rome inherited from the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms which had succeeded to the break-up of Alexander the Great’s empire. Although the region was home to some far more venerable literate cultures, across this area as a whole Greek had become the lingua franca and language of government and administration before the arrival of Rome. Its position was maintained and even reinforced because of the perception of the cultural superiority of the Hellenic over barbarian tongues (including Latin), a perception shared equally by the Romans and the Hellenophone provincial elites. The Latin West too contained some ancient literate cultures, notably Punic in North Africa, but Romans did not hold them in the same regard. Thus, while Neo-Punic might remain a language of local civic government (as, for instance, at Lepcis Magna in Tripolitania), there was never any question of central government communicating with, or accepting communications from, such communities in anything other than Latin. For provincials in the West acquisition of Latin culture was an acceptable marker of civilization in Roman eyes, but those who aspired to the highest cultural status needed also to gain a familiarity with Greek literature. The position of Greek at the acknowledged pinnacle of the cultural hierarchy of the Roman world had some advantages for Rome’s Greek subjects. Numbers of Greek-speaking provincials did gain Roman citizenship and enter the equestrian and senatorial orders, reaching the consulship by the early second century. At the same time, however, the relative disdain for Latin felt by the Hellenophone elites of the cities of the Greek East did create a barrier that prevented a political involvement on their part in the running of the empire fully commensurate with their cultural and economic potential.

Indeed, it was the historical glory of Greece rather than the achievements of the contemporary Greek world that were prized by the Romans. Accordingly, when Hadrian established a supra-provincial league of Greek cities, the Panhellenion, not only was it centred on Attica, but the admissions criteria included foundation by one of the
cities of Old Greece. This effectively limited membership to cities in the provinces of the Aegean rim: Crete with Cyrenaica, Achaia, Macedonia, Thrace, and Asia. In excluding Macedonian and later Hellenistic foundations, Hadrian’s vision of Greekness left out some of the most significant Greek centres of the time, including Antioch and Alexandria.

One Hellenistic phenomenon that the Romans did adopt was ruler cult (Chapter 7). Its role in the trials of Christian martyrs, however, has perhaps tended to exaggerate its centrality to assuring loyalty and to providing religious and ideological underpinning to the principate. After all, when faced with a cash crisis in the mid-330s the emperor Maximinus confiscated the endowments of the temples of the deified emperors in Rome, no doubt because there was no popular attachment to them, making them politically expendable. Although it was acceptable to honour only deceased emperors as gods in Roman state cult, worship of emperors both living and dead was tolerated in other contexts. The phenomenon of the ‘imperial cult’ was transplanted to the West and made the focus of national or provincial shrines, for instance, at Lyon (above). The imperial government fostered the creation in the West of provincial assemblies, on the model of Greek federal leagues, which met at the annual festivals of the provincial cult of the emperor. These meetings became the opportunity for the gathered delegates to pass judgement on the conduct of outgoing governors, who might receive honorific decrees or alternatively be indicted for maladministration. In fact, the ending of costly competition for magisterial offices had reduced the necessity for systematic extortion by governors. So, while this mechanism might not have secured many convictions, it may nevertheless have offered sufficient appearance of accountability to serve as a safety-valve for the release of feelings of discontent. In fact, taxation was the chief cause of unrest; its imposition and unwarranted harsh exaction were common factors in the provincial revolts that occasionally erupted in the north-western provinces in the first century of the empire. Despite the singular success of the German revolt of AD 9, however, the European provinces remained quiescent after AD 70, in contrast with the Jews of the Greek East, whose opposition to Roman rule was not finally crushed until the 130s.

The Augustan settlement renegotiated

After the defeat of Albinus, Severus did not display the magnanimity or clemency of Augustus after Actium towards the supporters of his erstwhile colleague. The legacy of distrust was compounded by a second major purge of the Senate fifteen years later by his son Caracalla, anxious to root out any who lamented his assassination of his brother and co-Augustus Geta. Dio’s version (77 [76], 15. 2) of Severus’ deathbed advice to his sons—to care only for each other and the soldiers—reflects how little valued the Senate felt itself to be in the Severan monarchy. The soldiers certainly benefited from bonuses and pay-rises, rewarding their loyalty in the civil wars of 193–7, and again on Geta’s death in 211; on top of which Severus also added three extra legions to the military establishment (Chapter 5). It seems that the imperial budget of the first and second centuries had been finely balanced, because these extra costs could not be borne by existing revenues. One solution employed was debasement of the currency in order to make the amount of silver available to the imperial government go further (Chapter 6). This measure, which brought only short-term benefit, was resorted to repeatedly during the rest of the third century, and eventually rendered the silver denarius effectively a bronze coinage. Moreover, Dio claims (78 [77], 9. 4 f.) that Caracalla’s grant of citizenship to most free subjects (above) was a direct response to the increased level of military overheads, since it spread the net of liability for the indirect taxes that flowed into the military treasury. Several structural changes were also made: the large military provinces that had produced Severus’ rivals (Britain and Syria) were subdivided, the praetorian guard that had elevated Julianus disbanded, and its traditional recruitment from Italy ended. Instead, it was now selected from veterans of the Danube legions, presumably to encourage common interest between the two groups. At the same time one of the newly raised legions was stationed at Albanum overlooking Rome, perhaps as much to act as a counterbalance to the praetorians as to increase imperial security in the capital. The other two legions garrisoned territory newly conquered from the Parthians. All three new legions, and the new provinces of Osroene
and Mesopotamia, were put under equestrian prefects rather than senatorial legates.

In fact the Severan age witnessed a general advance in the profile of the senior equestrian officers, spearheaded by Severus' fellow townsman Fulvius Plautianus. He surpassed the infamous example of Seianus, combining sole prefecture, consulship, and being father-in-law to Caracalla, before similarly falling from grace. Plautianus even had the unprecedented honour of having his first consulship in 203 considered a second tenure on the basis of previously conferred consular insignia—an infringement of protocol that outraged Dio (79 [78], 13. 1); generally, the senior equestrian prefects were awarded honorary senatorial rank. More significantly, the seeds of the destruction of traditional senatorial government were sown by the occasional employment of provincial equestrian procurators (technically only as stand-ins) in place of senatorial legates. Each such appointment had a ripple effect: social etiquette would not contemplate the appointment of senatorial legions legates and military tribunes in the province of an equestrian governor. Deprived of such military experience, a senator would cease to be a credible candidate for the command of a military province later in his career, entailing further reliance on equestrian substitutes.

These policies suggest some distancing between Senate and imperial court. Indeed, the accession of the praetorian prefect Macrinus, after Caracalla's assassination near Carrhae (Harran in south-eastern Turkey) in 217, may reflect a dearth of suitable senatorial candidates on the spot in the imperial entourage. Not only did Macrinus' elevation offend senatorial opinion, but he exacerbated the offence by assuming various titles without waiting for the traditional senatorial confirmation. Questionable legitimacy in the eyes of the Senate was one thing, but his rule was fatally undermined by the machinations of Caracalla's Syrian-born aunt and her daughters, who were able to pull the rug of legionary support out from under him by winning over the Syrian army to a local candidate tangentially related to the Severan dynasty—M. Aurelius Antoninus (Elagabalus). His eccentricity proved a liability, but the dynasty achieved stability with his cousin, Severus Alexander. Senatorial opinion was mollified by discontinuance of the granting of senatorial honours to serving equestrian prefects, but the precedent of Macrinus could not be completely undone.

Despite some success on the eastern front, the Rhine legions were less impressed by Alexander's reputation as a 'mother's boy'. When he was deposed and killed at Moguntiacum (Mainz) in 235, an equestrian officer from the lower Danube, C. Iulius Maximinus, was elevated in his place. That Maximinus stuck to the job of defending the northern frontier ought to have been to his credit, but this was offset by the negative publicity of the tax increases needed to fund his doubling of the soldiers' pay. Indeed, it was an uprising instigated by disgruntled landowners in Africa that triggered the dramatic sequence of events of 238, narrated by Herodian (7. 4. 1–8. 8. 8), that led to his downfall. Lacking troops and faced with an improvised army of tenants, the octogenarian proconsul and his son (Gordian I and II) took the path of least resistance in accepting acclamation as emperors, which gave them the authority to remit taxes. Although swift, their suppression by the governor of Numidia and his legion did not take place before they had been acknowledged as legitimate by the Senate at Rome. Once galvanized, the opposition to Maximinus gained its own momentum, and the Senate put up two of its own senior members as co-emperors, Pupienus Maximus and Caecilius Balbinus. This hour of glory was tempered by the fact that the Roman populace, preferring the hereditary principle, menaced them into associating the 13-year-old grandson of Gordian I with them as Caesar. Meanwhile Maximinus, marching south to quash his rebellion and meeting tough resistance at Aquileia, seems to have lost his nerve. Detachments of the second Parthian legion with Maximinus calculated that his assassination was preferable to risking the lives of their families at Albanum in fighting their way through to Rome. The praetorians, loyal to their Danubian colleague but until now penned into their camp by the Roman populace, took their revenge by assassinating Pupienus and Balbinus. Thus, quite unusually, all three elements—army, Senate, and people—played their part in putting Gordian III in power. Although Gordian's praetorian prefect and father-in-law, Timesitheus, was the power behind the throne, he courted no extraordinary public honours. Consensus appeared to have been rebuilt on the understanding that the senators would not complain about the ceding of increasingly large areas of government to equestrian officials as long as traditional differentiations of social status were maintained. Indeed, despite the examples of Macrinus and Maximinus, the Augustan vision of
senatorial government was far from dead. Gordian may have been replaced on the throne by one of his later praetorian prefects, Philip, but he in turn was to be replaced by the senator Decius. For the time being, senatorial and equestrian careers had been established as alternative pathways to the imperial throne.

The principate in crisis

Had the problems of the empire been entirely governed by internal factors, then perhaps the political instability of the 240s to 280s might have been averted. As Alexander’s and Maximinus’ almost continuous preoccupation with frontier warfare from 230 onwards shows, however, external pressures were a factor of growing significance. The supplanting of the Parthians by an aggressive and ambitious Persian dynasty, the Sassanians, shattered Rome’s relative security on the eastern front. At the same time, the advantages that Rome had enjoyed over the barbarians in Europe had been eroded by three centuries of close contact. The fragmented German tribes had coalesced into larger confederations and, as a result partly of this process and partly of migration, Rome was faced with increasingly sophisticated groups along its Rhine and Danube frontier: the Franks, Alamans, and Goths (Chapter 10). Given the slowness of communications, the centralization of executive decision-making in the hands of one emperor proved a liability. The military situation continually required the personal attention of the emperor. If he was preoccupied on another front or his reaction was deemed too slow or ineffective, the frontier armies were liable to put decision-making powers into the hands of their local commander by acclaiming him emperor. Treating such acts as rebellion involved distracting and costly civil conflicts that only exacerbated the financial and military problems of the state. Such already was the nature of the gathering clouds that overshadowed the celebration of Rome’s millennium in AD 248. His role in staging this event as urban prefect had perhaps led Q. Decius Valerinus to muse on the possible cause of the systemic malaise. He diagnosed a collapse in traditional piety and, when thrust to the fore himself by the Danube legions in 249, he decreed an unprecedented universal order for sacrifice to the traditional gods. Their goodwill towards the Roman

state could only be assured if all its citizens—now, of course, the vast majority of the empire’s population—participated. Although the policy died with the emperor, it did focus particular attention on the Christians as a nonconformist group within society, who would be singled out again under Valerian. Decius’ order put the Christian church and Roman state on a collision course that culminated in the Great Persecution under Diocletian, from which both sides were eventually to emerge fundamentally transformed (Chapter 7). Decius’ death in battle (in 251) against the Goths in Lower Moesia marks one of the low points in Roman fortunes, and was followed by a couple of years of extreme instability. While attentions in Europe were split between internece conflict and stabilizing the situation on the Danube, the Sassanian Persians took advantage to ravage the eastern provinces.

The joint reign of the father-son duo Valerian and Gallienus (253–60) provided an interlude of relative political stability, as they took separate responsibility for the European and eastern frontiers respectively. However, the capture of Valerian by the Persians in 260 was a major blow to Roman morale, and in the ensuing political crisis the empire fractured into three sections: the eastern provinces looked to the dynasts of the frontier city of Palmyra to contain the Persians; Gallienus retained control of the Danube legions and the central portion of the empire, including Africa; to his rear, the legions of Britain and the Rhine pledged their support to the governor of Lower Germany, M. Cassianius Latinius Postumus, whose names suggest an origin in the Gallic provinces. The background to this latter event has been recently illuminated by the discovery of an altar erected to Victory at Augusta Vindelicorum (Augsburg) in Raetia. This celebrates the vanquishing of the Luthungi, a Germanic tribe, by an ad hoc force comprising the provincial garrison, reinforced by detachments from the Rhine armies and, significantly, Italian prisoners liberated from the barbarians (Année épigraphique 1993: 123b). That the troops involved recognized Postumus’ authority suggests that his usurpation may have resulted from a perception that Gallienus was unable to respond adequately to emergencies on this front. Still, the interception of the Luthungi on their way back out of the empire would have been cold comfort to the victims of their raiding in Italy. That this was cause for celebration says a lot about the changed circumstances. Moreover, this was but an isolated victory in a litany of defensive
failures throughout the European provinces. Even core areas such as Italy, Greece, and Asia Minor were now vulnerable to external attack. Many cities received new walled circuits, including eventually Rome itself (Chapter 9).

In conditions where the military initiative had passed to Rome’s enemies, its armed forces were required to be more mobile than the traditional model of static forces and local provincial military command permitted. Gallienus and others assembled more or less permanent mobile forces ready to react to threats wherever they might present themselves. These were commanded not by provincial governors but specialized military commanders (duces) with spheres of responsibility that might extend across several civil provinces (Chapter 5). This gradually put an end to the republican tradition of combined military and civil authority, and led to increasingly divergent civil and military career paths for equestrian officers; it had the advantage of putting military operations in the hands of professional soldiers. The deposition of Gallienus in 268 by his cavalry commander marks the beginning of the domination of the throne by these equestrian military officers, predominantly of Balkan origin. One of these, Aurelian, was between 272 and 274 able to restore the political integrity of the empire by a mixture of military force and diplomacy. The reintegrated empire was not quite what it had been before 260. The Persians had retaken part of Mesopotamia, but the difference was most apparent in the European provinces. Having become the front line between the realms of Postumus and Gallienus, the Agri Decumates had been abandoned as the opposing forces fell back to the older Rhine–Danube lines. Aurelian now took the difficult decision to withdraw from Dacia in order to shorten the defensive line on the lower Danube. He was not successful in restoring political stability, however, and he succumbed to assassination by the soldiers in 275. Despite Aurelian’s efforts to restore the silver coinage, pay concordas may be at the root of his downfall. The fact that by the 270s retail price inflation had finally taken off, in response to the long-term debasement of the silver coinage, eroded the purchasing power of the soldiers’ pay. This was compensated for by free rations of basic food and personal equipment extracted by new requisitions, and an increasing reliance upon special bonuses to celebrate accessions and significant anniversaries as a regular part of the soldiers’ income. Although costly, an emperor could not afford to forgo such generosity. Intended as a measure to secure and reward loyalty, these payments became a perverse incentive for the soldiers to increase the rhythm of imperial events. The hiatus that followed Aurelian’s murder suggests that many, not unreasonably, perceived imperial office as a poisoned chalice. The rapid succession of emperors over the next decade proved them right. There was nothing in the circumstances of Diocletian’s elevation to indicate any prospect for improvement in this situation. Indeed, the Dalmatian army officer Diocletian, having being raised as a usurper in Asia, secured his unchallenged tenure of the imperial throne only after he had defeated the emperor Carinus on European soil, in the strategically important Danubian arena.

The empire at the accession of Diocletian

Chronic political instability suggested that the structures of the Roman state required some fundamental reconfiguration to take account of changed circumstances. Clearly, the continual cycle of assassinations and usurpations driven by the soldiery needed to be broken. In the second half of the third century, however, emperors scarcely ruled long enough to engage in anything but crisis management. Nevertheless, structural changes had taken place. A significant legacy of the 260s and 270s was that the political partition of the empire had necessitated regional fiscal independence. In this situation the privileged status of Italy was no longer sustainable. The peninsula was progressively normalized by the imposition of direct taxation and provincial governors. Political fragmentation and defensive priorities had led to the eclipse of Rome as the regular base of imperial operations, in favour of other centres strategically positioned within striking-distance of the frontiers: Trier in Gaul, Milan in Italy, Sirmium in the middle Danube region, and Antioch in Syria (Chapter 9). The three-way split of the 260s also suggested that even two simultaneous emperors might not be sufficient at times of particular crisis. Conversely, this fragmentation actually demonstrated the durability of the Roman empire as a concept. Despite the breakdown of central political control, each of the separate regimes had prioritized external defence above elimination of internal rivals, and no region attempted to liberate itself from Roman rule. In the West the ‘Gallic’ empire of Postumus never
represented itself as anything other than Roman, and in the East the Palmyrenes positioned themselves as representatives of Roman authority.

In some respects the elements of the Augustan principate had survived to a surprising extent. In outward form the imperial office was no more explicitly a monarchy than it ever had been, even if the Senate no longer played any real role in conferring the apparatus of titulature developed by Augustus; and, despite a tendency to prefer hereditary succession, legitimacy did not require it. Institutional continuity with the Republic was still demonstrated by the annual succession of ordinary consuls giving their names to the years. The senatorial aristocracy still occupied the pinnacle of the social hierarchy and, even if reduced to little more than the proconsulships of Africa and Asia, the public provinces still existed. It was from the increased imperial portion that the senators had been displaced; though the provincialization of Italy under senatorial governors was to compensate for this to some extent. The starkest change was in the background of the dominant ruling group that provided candidates for the throne. Under the Julio-Claudians this still comprised the noble families of the Republic; by the 280s the high commands were dominated by military officers of no long-standing social eminence from some of the empire's most economically backward provinces. Some might lament the passing of possession of the throne from those steeped in the gentlemanly ethos of the cultured aristocrat, but the commitment of the career soldiers to public service cannot be doubted. There was no longer any scope for the self-indulgence of a Gaius, Nero, Commodus, or Elagabalus.