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A bi-level model of the relationship between transport and residential location

Chang, JS; Mackett, RL; (2006) A bi-level model of the relationship between transport and residential location. TRANSPORT RES B-METH , 40 (2) 123 - 146. 10.1016/j.trb.2005.02.002.

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Abstract

This paper explores a bid-rent network equilibrium model which represents the relationship between transport and residential location. The relationship is examined in terms of the competition of decision-makers for locations. The model discusses difficulties in addressing the characteristics of locations, particularly heterogeneity and indivisibility. A hedonic interpretation is included as a way to resolve these challenges. The model investigates the process in which households make their decisions. This process is shown as an n-player noncooperative game, following the Nash equilibrium for this game, which is defined as well. The game is accompanied by the systematic interactions between transport and land-use. A mutual adjustment process represents these interactions. The three components are structured by a bi-level mathematical program. The final formulation is interpreted as an oligopolistic Cournot game of which consequence is an approximation of the n-player non-cooperative game. The functional relationship between the decision variables of the upper and the lower levels of the bi-level program produces endogenously-determined transport impedance and locational attractiveness. The endogenous network performance indices of the model are expected to overcome the lack of a realistic network equilibrium description in the existing models. A path-based heuristic algorithm and a simple numerical example are presented. Finally, some concluding remarks are given. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Type:Article
Title:A bi-level model of the relationship between transport and residential location
DOI:10.1016/j.trb.2005.02.002
Keywords:oligopoly, Cournot game, Nash, bid-rent, network equilibrium, bi-level, TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM, MULTINOMIAL LOGIT, GAME-THEORY, CHOICE, WILLINGNESS, PERFORMANCE, NETWORK, MARKETS, UTILITY, DEMAND
UCL classification:UCL > School of BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering

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