Maxwell, N;
(2009)
Muller's Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
, 40
(1)
103 - 114.
10.1007/s10838-009-9081-5.
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Abstract
For over thirty years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to demonstrate that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Muller's Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10838-009-9081-5 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9081-5 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com |
| Keywords: | Standard Empiricism, Constructive Empiricism, Aim-Oriented Empiricism, Metaphysics, ad hoc theories, Scientific Realism, F. A. Muller |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Maths and Physical Sciences UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Maths and Physical Sciences > Dept of Science and Technology Studies |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/105617 |
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