JEHIEL, P and MOLDOVANU, B (1995) NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES MAY CAUSE DELAY IN NEGOTIATION. ECONOMETRICA , 63 (6) 1321 - 1335.
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Abstract
We study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity-dependent, negative externalities. The unique equilibrium of long, finitely repeated generic games can either display delay-where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline-or, in spite of the random element in the game, a well-defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES MAY CAUSE DELAY IN NEGOTIATION |
| Keywords: | BARGAINING, EXTERNALITIES, DELAY |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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