Education and Conflict Review

Theories and conceptual frameworks in education, conflict and peacebuilding

Editor Tejendra Pherali
With Arran Magee
About Education and Conflict Review

Education and Conflict Review is an open-source journal published by the Centre for Education and International Development, University College London. It focuses on debates about broad issues relating to education, conflict and international development and aims to provide succinct analyses of social, political, economic and security dimensions in conflict-affected and humanitarian situations. It provides a forum for knowledge exchange to build synergies between academics, practitioners and graduate students who are researching and working in these environments.

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In the last two decades, there has been a growing body of literature, examining multifaceted interactions between education and conflict. As education is increasingly being recognised as an important player in preventing conflict, building resilience and promoting peace, the field of education and conflict has received significant attention both within academic domains and humanitarian-development sectors. Universities across the world have also expanded their research and teaching portfolios in recent years to critically engage in the burgeoning scholarship and enhance professional development of researchers and practitioners in the field.

However, the evidence around the most effective approaches to education delivery in conflict and protracted-crisis is still meager and there are significant research gaps in policies and practice in tackling issues of access and quality in crisis settings. In recognition of these tensions, funding for education and conflict research has also increased lately (e.g. Education Cannot Wait, Global Challenge Research Fund, UK Department for International Development and Dubai Cares). In this conjuncture, researchers, policy makers and practitioners are constantly seeking relevant theoretical tools that support their research, inform policies and improve educational practice in conflict-affected contexts.

Education and Conflict Review is an open source publication focusing on debates about education, conflict and international development, providing succinct analyses of interactions between education and social, political, economic and security dimensions in conflict-affected and humanitarian situations. It is a forum for knowledge exchange between academics, practitioners and policy makers to build synergies in addressing educational challenges.

This special issue of *Education and Conflict Review* attempts to assemble theories and conceptual frameworks that are dispersed across a wide array of academic publications and often inaccessible to those who need them the most, particularly to the education and conflict researchers and practitioners in low-income contexts. The contributions in this issue provide a critical review of theories, conceptual frameworks and analytical tools that can support research and practice in this field.

I hope this special issue would serve as an important theoretical contribution to the field of education and conflict.

Finally, I am grateful to all contributors and reviewers of these papers.

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Education and conflict: Emergence, growth and diversification of the field

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Abstract

The debate about education in conflict-affected contexts is fundamentally caught between 1) rights-based claims about access to quality learning; and 2) complexities around contexts, histories and politics of education.

In this paper, I review some of the current debates in this rapidly expanding field to demonstrate how education interacts with different dimensions of violent conflict and then, argue that education should be conceptualised both as a process of dismantling conflict-inducing structures in society and, as a process of promoting critical inquiry, respect for diversity, social justice principles and skills for civic and political engagement.

Key Words

Education and conflict
Peacebuilding
Education in emergencies
Peace and social justice

Introduction

In the last two decades, the interdisciplinary field of education and conflict has grown exponentially, departing from the original idea of ‘the two faces of education’ (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000) and the pioneering theoretical work by Davies (2004) that analyses the complex interaction between education and conflict using complexity theory. Although the central arguments still broadly feature the role of education in conflict and peace, new theoretical frameworks and analytical approaches have also emerged lately to engage with multidimensional interactions between education and ‘humanitarian interventions’, Islamist insurgencies, the ‘war on terror’ and refugee situations (Davies, 2008; Gereluk, 2012; Novelli et al, 2017; Lopes Cardozo and Shah, 2016; Pherali and Turner, 2017). In this paper, I attempt to introduce some of the emerging themes and conceptual ideas that have enriched the field of education and conflict in recent years. This is, by no means, a comprehensive review of multifarious themes that are claimed within the field but a perfunctory overview of debates that could serve as a point of departure for researchers and practitioners who are interested in theoretical debates that shape the field of education and conflict.

The expansion of the field and complexities

Educational experiences in conflict-affected settings are too diverse and multidimensional to be presented as a single review (Sommers, 2002) and the field that was once portrayed as ‘in its infancy’ (Tomlinson and Benefield, 2005: 5) has developed as a distinct sub-discipline consisting of research, professional and academic training, policy analysis and practice. This expansion is well attributed to the advocacy work mainly led by the Inter-Agency
Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). The fact that this field emerged out of urgent needs to provide educational solutions in contexts of insecurity, extreme poverty and social and emotional breakdown of populations whose lives were shattered by emergencies, the research and policy analysis is often tasked with not only the promotion of theoretical innovations but also providing practical solutions that could improve practice. Broadly speaking, global debates about education and conflict, research priorities and questions regarding professional practice in the field can loosely be organised under two main areas: 1) the provision of education in conflict and protracted crises; and 2) the role of education in fuelling conflict or promoting peace.

Firstly, the world has experienced a historic level of mass exodus since the WWII. By the end of 2017, 68.5 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide and the refugee population, including the 5.4 million Palestinian refugees under the mandate of UNRWA, reached 25.4 million (UNHCR, 2018a). Out of six million primary and secondary-aged refugee children under the UNHCR’s mandate, 3.7 million are out of school and refugee children generally are five times more likely to be out of school than non-refugee children (UNHCR, 2016). As compared to the global primary enrolment of 90 percent, only 50 percent of the primary-aged refugee children have the same opportunity (UNICEF, 2017). Merely 22 percent of refugee adolescents have access to lower secondary and dismally 1 percent of refugees attend tertiary education compared to 34 per cent globally (UNHCR, 2016). Refugee host countries are too stretched in their capacities to cope with large movements of people. In order to tackle the crisis, the United Nations General Assembly has recently endorsed the Global Compact on Refugees to ease the pressures on host countries; enhance refugee self-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity (UNHCR, 2018b). The compact makes a commitment to support education of refugees from pre-primary to university levels by adopting ‘humanitarian principles, such as humanity, impartiality and neutrality, and development principles, such as national ownership, capacity development and sustainability’ (ECW, 2018: 13). Despite these global efforts, education for refugees is hugely under-funded; existing provisions are failing to meet the demand of access and quality and most importantly, the education systems are not refugee friendly in terms of admissions, curriculum, language of instruction and accreditation of learning.

Secondly, education is an integral part of the national and global political and economic agenda. These interests influence the processes of educational governance and policies such as, educational goals, access, quality and equity among children representing diverse social groups, distribution of educational resources, questions about gender equity, language of instruction, pedagogy, curriculum and assessment (Novelli et al, 2014). Stewart (2002; 2008) argues that multidimensional inequalities between culturally defined groups, defined as horizontal inequalities, that determine resource access and outcomes predict political instability and violent conflict. Along the same theoretical lines, the societies with greater educational inequalities between culturally defined groups have substantially higher risk of conflict and particularly, the prevalence of high education inequality between ethnic and religious groups doubles the likelihood of experiencing violent conflict (FHI 360 Education Policy and Data Center, 2016). However, governments in conflict-affected and fragile societies tend to embrace market-based neoliberal policies that show little enthusiasm towards reconfiguration of unequal socioeconomic structures and to address problems of inequalities. Consequently, development interventions in such contexts are likely to be complicit in maintaining the hegemony of the privileged political class rather than transforming them, whilst the global inequalities are also rising amidst the unjust, divisive and environmentally destructive global capital system (Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). As Duffield (2007) argues development is increasingly practised under the notion of security biopolitics in which ‘the West has both a security ‘interest’ and a ‘values-based’ desire to ‘secure’, to ‘develop’, to ‘protect’ and to ‘better’ the Other, whose insecurity threatens the security of Western consumer society as the instabilities associated with conflict, poverty and alienation threaten to spill over into and to destabilise the West’ (cited in Chandler, 2008: 269). Education aid and programming are largely implicated within
these broad development aims and processes and hence, it is pertinent that the role of education and development be critically scrutinised within these frameworks.

**Right to education in crisis-affected contexts**

**Education as a human right**

The inception of the field of education in emergencies is predicated on the idea that education is a human right; children have the right to education even during times of crises; and the provision of education must not stop under any circumstances. Education is also ‘commonly seen as a conduit for rights, a necessary prerequisite to the exercising and defending of one’s own and others’ rights’ and individuals hold certain rights ‘within the educational experience or institution’ (McCowan, 2012: 70). In conflict-affected and protracted crises, education serves as the only hope to escape from the predicament. The guiding framework for this conviction is based on the principles of 4As that education is available for free and supported by necessary infrastructure; accessible to all including the most marginalised; acceptable in terms of its content, cultural appropriateness and fairness; and adaptable to meet the needs of children who live in crisis context (ECW, 2018: 13; Tomasevski, 2001). There are three main motivations for promoting education as a human right. Firstly, children are often victims of war and education serves as a mechanism of child protection as guaranteed by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989). Secondly, it helps build an international solidarity to advocate for educational rights of vulnerable and most marginalised populations. Finally, without guaranteeing an uninterrupted access to good quality education for all, including, in contexts of conflict and refugee crises, it would be impossible to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 4 on education by 2030.

**Attacks on education**

Schools, children and teachers are often targeted purposely by conflicting groups in many parts of the world. In 74 countries in the last four years, schools and universities, their students and teachers, have been intentionally targeted for attack, or education facilities have been used for military purposes, of which 28 countries experienced more than 20 violent attacks on education (GCPEA, 2018). As educational institutions represent the state and the government in power, rebel groups target schools to challenge state authority; to defy certain education policies (e.g. curriculum and language policies); or to challenge education’s core principles (e.g. girls’ education) (Pherali, 2016). Attacks on schools and children also serves as a propaganda tool for extremist groups. For example, in April 2014, 329 Nigerian girls were kidnapped by Boko Haram, an extremist group that is resisting the provision of ‘modern education’ that is perceived as a repression of Islamic values and culture. In 2015, Al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group attacked Garissa University College in Kenya, killing 148 students as revenge for the Kenyan government’s military deployment in Somalia. Similarly, the attack by Tehrik-i-Taliban on the Army Public School in Peshawar, Pakistan, in December 2014 killed 149 people, including 132 children. In Afghanistan, schools are targeted by the Taliban and Islamic State fighters to undermine the state control of public services such as education (Pherali and Sahar, 2018).

These brutal attacks on schools suggest that advocacy on mass schooling and ‘modern education’ without ensuring security can only increase security risks on children and communities, suggesting that ‘…contrary to expectation, schools are not always safe places for children’ UNHCR (2009: 24). Additionally, ‘schools can be spaces of bullying; racial, ethnic, linguistic, and gender discrimination; sexual exploitation; natural and environmental hazards; corporal punishment; and attacks, including abduction and recruitment into armed forces’ (Dryden-Peterson, 2011: 32). Hence, both protection of education from external violence as well as violence prevention within education systems are crucial for promoting peace.

**Education as the foremost wealth**

In emergencies, education serves as an enabling space to improve children’s health through school vaccination and nutritional programmes; schools can be used to provide clean water, sanitation and shelter; and organise peace education and conflict resolution programmes as well as education for disaster risk reduction (Winfthrop and Matsui, 2013). A continuous progression with quality outcomes in learning prepare young people with relevant knowledge and skills to get employment and gain stable livelihoods; enable them to access transnational opportunities; and facilitate their involvement in social, economic, cultural and political life of the society.

For refugees whose lives are shattered by forced displacement and ongoing adversities in exile, education serves as the main hope for a better future.
Irrespective of their future trajectories – integration in the host country, relocation in the third country, or return to the country of origin – education serves as a valuable portable asset for refugees. It is one of the very few domains of refugee lives that helps them carve their ‘unknowable futures’ (Dryden-Peterson, 2017). An old Sanskrit verse signifies the importance of knowledge that is gained through educational processes as:

\[Na chora haaryam na cha raja haaryam, 
Na bhraturbhajyam na cha bhaarakaari. 
Vyaye krute vartht eva nityam vyadha dharm samvedanam.\]

[Knowledge is such that a thief cannot steal, king or government cannot snatch, siblings cannot ask for a share; it is never a burden (you do not have to carry it as a burden) and it only increases after spending it; therefore, the wealth of knowledge is the foremost of all other wealthy possessions.]

Education is a basic necessity and therefore a fundamental right of human beings. But education systems represent power, ideology and hegemonic control for which learning spaces can turn into battlefields. Even though the type, processes, contents and goals of education may be contested, the essential notion of ‘education as learning’ or as a means to gain knowledge is undeniable. The rights-based approach is an effective mechanism to advocate for educational access and its protection in times of crises whilst critiquing the contested role of education is crucial to promote peace.

Politics of education in conflict-affected contexts

There is a growing recognition that the provision of education in conflict-affected settings needs to account not only for the technical challenges such as the lack of school buildings, textbooks, trained teachers and institutional capacities, which are undoubtedly crucial, but also broader security and political economy factors involving, ‘the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’ (Collinson, 2003: 3). In this domain, the education and conflict field can be loosely portrayed under five main thematic areas: education as conflict-hardening process; securitisation of education; education and violent extremism; education for liberation; and education for peacebuilding.

Firstly, education is a process of cultivating national identity and collective imaginations among citizens through which loyalty towards national ideals (e.g. national sovereignty, territorial integrity, linguistic and cultural distinction and glorified national histories) is reproduced. Education can be complicit in producing ‘virulent’ and ‘exclusionary’ nationalism that ‘inspires devotion to one’s community or love of country, for others it is linked to feelings of fear, anger, revenge and resentment’ (UNESCO, 2018: 2). In conflict-affected contexts, as Ben-Porath (2006: 11-15) argues, citizen identities are recreated as ‘belligerent citizens’, ‘as a response to perceived threats to national and personal security’. Here, the notion of democratic citizenship is reinterpreted in three main domains. Firstly, the nature of civic participation during periods of conflict is securitised and shifted from open and voluntary civic engagement to directed and mandated participation, in which citizens are expected to be compliant and contributing to the war and security measures.

Secondly, violent conflicts fuel ‘overpowering patriotic unity’ and undermine tolerant pluralism. In this process, democratic contestations are compromised in the name of national solidarity and patriotism. Finally, public debates on controversial social and political issues are discouraged; public agendas are often dominated by security issues; and commitment to free speech diminished in the name of national security. To transmit these values to learners and legitimately ‘enhance the civic commitments of future citizens’, civic education is particularly used as ‘the institutional tool’ (Ben-Porath, 2006: 36). Hence, education is complicit in hardening uncritical solidarity with violent response to conflict.

Educational systems that are insensitive to social inequalities often play a socially destructive role by maintaining unequal access and quality to education among different social groups, offering a segregated and unjust educational provision, manipulating history and textbooks, denying education to certain social and ethnic groups, and repressing minority languages and culture (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). For example, Lall (2008) shows how educational resources including textbooks often glorify military victories and engage in collective demonization of their opponents, which serves as a political machine to manufacture ideological consent in favour of the state.
Secondly, since the events of 9/11, education has been hijacked as a battle tactic to win hearts and minds of the people in conflict zones. The Western countries engaging in conflict in Islamic states such as, Iraq and Afghanistan have pursued a politically motivated ‘development’ agenda that legitimises the use of education aid to strengthen national ‘defence’ and ‘diplomacy’ (Novelli, 2011). The outcome of this approach is that the decision about aid allocation is likely influenced by security interests of donor countries (Duffield, 2007) rather than educational needs of children in the poorest countries. The military involvement in dispersing education aid, as observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a worrying trend, which has blurred the lines between security and development work, consequently increasing risks to school children and aid workers in conflict zones; undermining the goals for poverty reduction; and skewing education aid towards ‘frontline’ states (UNESCO, 2011).

Thirdly, extremism is increasingly becoming a global concern due to its links with religious fundamentalism and terrorism, and formal education is inadequately equipped to provide learners with critical skills to analyse fundamentalism, or to prevent violent actions that are inspired by extremist ideologies (Davies, 2008). Atran (2015) notes that violent extremism is ‘…the use of violence in line with an ideological commitment to achieve political, religious, or social goals’. In this process, education is implicated in a number of ways, including, educational spaces being used to spread extremist ideologies; or formal education failing to challenge the views that learners are exposed to outside the school (e.g. the internet, social media and community settings); institutions implementing Prevent strategy1 and being legally required to identify and report signs of radicalism to the authority; and most importantly, education as a safe space to debate controversial issues, promote diversity and plurality of views (Gereluk, 2012; UNESCO, 2018). The drivers of violent extremism are often presented as push factors, the conditions that are conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges (e.g. lack of opportunities, ethnic and regional marginalisation, absence or weak governance of legitimate state, protracted conflict, collective sense of persecution) and pull factors, the individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action (e.g. social networks and peer pressures, sense of identity/purpose, ideological attraction, employment, promise of justice) (INEE, 2017). Even though education is perceived as mitigation to push factors, the relationship between the ‘lack of education and structural development’ and ‘violent extremism’ is empirically unfounded.

Lately, even though the state-driven strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) have been criticised by some scholars as securitisation of schools systems (Novelli, 2017; Mattsson and Säljö, 2018), there is an extensive response of international organisations and agencies such as UNESCO, United Nations, European Commission, and Council of Europe to challenge extremism and radicalisation (Davies, 2018). International agencies, particularly the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), through its ten different working groups of grassroots practitioners, including, teachers and youth workers across Europe works with people who have been radicalised or are vulnerable to radicalisation (European Commission, 2019). Similarly, the Hedayah Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, based in Abu Dhabi engages in training and has produced extensive literature to promote an understanding of CVE (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Hedayah, 2013).

Fourthly, critical education involves the process of praxis involving reflexivity, theorising and transformative action through which learners understand and facilitate change in the world they live. Critical pedagogy is a philosophy of education which ‘unapologetically’ embraces education as a political process to nurture the struggle for democracy; and is primarily ‘concerned with the relationship between education and power in society and, thus, uncompromisingly committed to the amelioration of inequalities and social exclusions in the classroom and society at large’ (Darder, Mayo and Paraskeva, 2016: 1). As learners and educators engage, realise and reflect on their lived experiences, disruptive modes of thinking can also emerge within what Freire (1974) would term as ‘the banking model’ of education (see Magee and Pherali in this issue). The process of ‘conscientisation’ through critical education enables learners to challenge social injustices and oppressions (Freire, 1974). From this perspective, conflict, as a process of resistance to hegemonic structures is a ‘development success’ (Rappleye, 2011) and an opportunity to promote social transformation.

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1Prevent is a UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, which aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. See the guidance for authorities in England and Wales: www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance
Finally, education is a crucial domain for building sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. At structural levels, educational reforms that promote equity and social justice can contribute to building ‘positive peace’, a societal condition that is free from not only physical violence but also structural violence and conditions of war (e.g. poverty, discrimination, exclusion and unequal life chances) (Galtung, 1976). The following theoretical frameworks offer some modalities for peacebuilding through education:

1) Social justice reforms in education
As inequalities in education are likely to perpetuate social injustices and trigger violent conflict (FHI 360 Education Policy and Data Center, 2016), disruptive educational policies, based on the 4Rs framework (redistribution, representation, recognition and reconciliation) can promote social justice and build conditions for peace (Novelli et al, 2017).

2) Global citizenship education
Within institutional settings, the provision of Global Citizenship Education can help learners develop skills for critical inquiry in ‘order to dissect claims that do not stand up to rigorous scrutiny, logic and rational inquiry’ and enhance their civic and political participation (UNESCO, 2018: 9). Education should provide learners with critical skills for civic and political engagement through which learners adopt dialogue and discussion as constructive and peaceful means to find cooperative solutions to conflicts in society.

3) Promoting political citizenship education
As Davies (2008: 181-182) proposes, an educational model of ‘critical idealism’, as opposed to conventional tolerant multiculturalism, can help tackle violent extremism. Anti-extremism education should primarily be concerned with critical political education that enables youth to cast doubts on ‘ideals’ and to reject uncritical acceptance of single truths. Political citizenship education can promote critical thinking and dialogic skills to enable people to critically engage with dominant cultural, political and religious ideologies and develop dynamic citizen subjectivities.

4) Improving integrative complexity
There is an emerging body of work on ‘integrative complexity thinking’ out of University of Cambridge, claiming that educational interventions that help increase cognitive complexity can improve learners’ abilities to deal with conflict peacefully (Savage et al, 2014; Liht and Savage, 2013). It is claimed that low cognitive complexity characterised by simple, narrow, categorical ways of thinking is a predictor of violent conflict whereas, high cognitive complexity, as manifested through broad flexible thinking and value pluralism is capable of appreciating multiple dimensions and perspectives. Based on the assumption that violent extremism is an outcome of a constricted view of the world, the integrative complexity model can help learners to improve cognitive complexity to question their own beliefs and counter extremist ideologies.

5) Democratising ‘belligerent citizenship’
Ben-Porath’s (2006) expansive education model outlines three critical aspects of education to combat the ‘belligerent citizenship’ that is created during the wartime. She argues that schools should diversify the conceptions of patriotism in their civic education; promote inclusion of diverse social perspectives and of dialogue as a form of pedagogy; and form student identity on the basis of a ‘shared fate’ in the society (Ben-Porath, 2006: 114).

Conclusion: Towards a framework of peacebuilding education
In conclusion, education and conflict has grown as a distinct field of research, theory and practice that, at its core, has the moral obligation to produce knowledge and understanding that help reduce human suffering caused by conflict and protracted crises. Research agendas have also diversified due to the nature, scale and geographies of conflicts and protracted crises; and there is constant pressure to continuously produce policy-relevant evidence for educational work in contexts of fragility, acute emergencies and post-conflict educational rebuilding (Burde et al, 2015). In a broad sense, the basic plea of education in conflict-affected contexts is concerned with its potential contribution to peace and social cohesion. I would argue that there are two levels of interventions in and through education for promoting peace in conflict-affected societies.

Firstly, from a critical standpoint, education should rupture societal conditions that reproduce structural violence and systemic inequalities. To this effect, educational systems should undergo radical shifts in governance structures, resource allocation, curricular revisions, language policies, pedagogies and teacher development in order to redress educational grievances of marginalised communities. Even in contexts of protracted crises such as internal displacement and refugee situations, education must be provided equitably to prevent fuelling inequalities; to provide a sense of care and dignity to displaced populations; and minimise the loss of important social qualities such as, good health,
public self-esteem and hope for the future. However, as an integral part of the national political system, the provision of public education is often defined in terms of political rights and citizenship of the beneficiaries. Unless there is a strong political commitment to reconfigure conventional power structures or in humanitarian situations, the state’s willingness to bear humanitarian responsibility, transformative policies, as suggested in the 4R framework (Novelli et al, 2017), are difficult to transpire. But the post-conflict policy landscapes often render crucial policy innovations to establish peacebuilding mechanisms which have the opportunity to respond to educational needs and aspirations of the communities at the social and political periphery. This is only achievable through influential grassroots movements, progressive political leadership with social accountability; and in most cases, support from humanitarian and development partners.

Secondly, education’s role in promoting the culture of peace is of utmost importance in societies that inherit legacies of violent conflict. Hence, teaching and learning about peace should be a core component of the school curriculum but should not be restricted to formal educational settings, instead, it should be equally championed through non-formal educational programmes, public debates and civil society activities. Respect for diversity, critical political citizenship, skills for civic and political engagement, global citizenship education and critical inquiry are some of the key tenets of peacebuilding education which should form the basis of post-conflict educational discourse. The success of educational interventions in promoting peace may well depend upon the nature and effectiveness of the reforms as outlined above.

Author Bio

Tejendra Pherali is Associate Professor in Education and International Development at UCL Institute of Education, University College London. His research and teaching focuses on education in contexts of forced displacement, post-conflict educational reforms and the role of education in peacebuilding. He is also interested in social movements, political economy of education and critical pedagogies. Tejendra is the research theme leader on ‘Education, Conflict and Peacebuilding’ at the Centre for Education and International Development and the editor of Education and Conflict Review. He is currently involved in research in Afghanistan, Nepal and Lebanon.

References


Societal security and education in deeply divided societies

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Abstract
This paper seeks to demonstrate the often-conflicting agendas that are bestowed on education in deeply divided societies. In doing so the paper seeks to promote a more nuanced understanding of the significance conferred on education, in order to better articulate the way in which education can interact with conflict.

Key Words
Education
Conflict
Segregation
Security

Introduction
Over the past decade, the international education agenda has shifted toward a more nuanced understanding of education’s relationship with power and conflict. Scholarly debate now reflects education’s peacebuilding potential, emphasising the positive impact of creating more inclusive education systems that contribute to social change (Novelli, 2015; Smith et al, 2011; Paulson, 2011; King and Monaghan, 2016). Correspondingly, the understanding of conflict in international relations has been broadened to include an understanding of education’s role in promoting security (Ghosh, 2017; Swimelar, 2013; Waever, 1993). However, while the growth of these fields would appear to be mutually reinforcing, there are actually marked differences in how each sector conceptualises education. Consequently, there is a noted disconnect between these two disciplinary approaches and how they interact. This paper attempts to address this disconnect by merging the exploration of societal security (and its extension into securitisation) in the field of international relations with the relevant theoretical literature on education in conflict affected societies. In doing so the paper will seek to promote a more nuanced understanding of the significance conferred on education, in order to better articulate the way in which education can interact with conflict.

Societal Security
The concept of ‘security’ within international relations has undergone a conceptual evolution over the last few decades. It is no longer defined solely by neorealist interpretations of national or interstate security. Critical security scholars have expanded security studies to include a disparate body of scholarship. That is to say that the ‘security’ issues are no longer confined to domains relevant to...
only to the objective survival of a state. Both sites of ‘threat construction’ and sites of ‘defence’ have been expanded to include a variety of social domains. Consequently, security interests can create a mechanism through which social functions and practices are co-opted under the necessity of security concerns (See Buzan, 2006; Novelli, 2010 and Nguyen, 2014).

This paper draws on what the Copenhagen School referred to as ‘societal security’ (Buzan, 1991; 1993; Buzan and Waver, 1998). Societal security is defined as ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or acute threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’ (Waever, 1993:23). Societal Security therefore goes beyond the traditional notion of the defence of territory to consider the character of the society being defended, and the critical functions of that society which must be secured for that character to persist. The identity of community (its ‘we’ identity) (Roe, 2004), rather than the sovereignty of state, therefore becomes the referent object of security in its own right.

It is important to note, therefore, that threats to societal security ‘span from the inhibition of its expression to the prevention of its continuation’ (Waever, 1993:24) and are not just found in the physical acts of war. Thus, threats to societal identity can be found outside of the realm of physical security and ethnic cleansing. By suppressing an identity and thereby preventing it from replicating or reproducing itself, the identity cannot be transmitted effectively from one generation to the next and a group’s societal security is threatened (Buzan, 1993: 43). Such acts of aggression can be referred to as ‘cultural cleansing’, acts which are committed against manifestations of group identity rather than populations themselves. For example, restrictions to religious and educational establishments strike against the very core of societal identity.

For societies that perceive a threat to their identity, whether the threat is real or imagined, a clear defensive strategy is to strengthen societal security. As Waever et al (1993b: 191) note ‘this can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that society reproduces itself correctly.’ Waever argues that culture can be defended ‘with culture’, and that - ‘If one’s identity seems threatened... the answer is a strengthening of existing identities.’ (Weaver, 1993: 68). The strengthening of identity can be achieved through the pursuit of what has become known as ‘cultural nationalism’. Hutchinson (1994) describes the purpose of cultural nationalism as the re-creation of their distinctive national civilisation. Furthermore, he emphasises the establishment of ‘cultural societies and journals’ that educate communities of their common heritage ‘of splendour and suffering’ (Hutchinson, 1994:124) stressing similarities such as language, religion and history.

Education can serve as a medium through which culture and identity can be strengthened. Education systems provide an obvious vehicle to transmit cultural practices, historical accounts, religion, language and even geographical interpretations of homelands to the next generation of a community (Bush and Salterelli, 2000). A school ethos can be created that expresses a pride in identity and belonging to the group through honouring ethnically specific poets and artists and commemorating historical achievements. Each aspect of the curriculum provides an opportunity for education to be used as a means of societal defence and strengthen culture with culture.

Furthermore, in addition to being a space for defensive action, education is also a site in which threats to societal security can be interpreted. If opportunities to harness education for the purposes of cultural reproduction are perceived to be inhibited, this can be inferred as a threat to a community’s ability to reproduce itself and hence a threat to its societal security and very existence. For example, the denial of language rights in the education system can be viewed as a direct attack on group identity as it is ‘through its language, a given group expresses its own culture, its own societal identity; languages are related to thought processes and to the way the members of a certain linguistic group perceive nature, the universe and society’ (Stavenhagen, 1996: 68). In this sense, a security focused call for access to mother tongue education would move beyond highlighting the merits of improved learning outcomes and reinforcing a child’s self-esteem, to include the positive impact in terms of a community’s manifestation of group identity.

When education in conflict affected contexts is viewed through a security lens, we can see that it takes on an additional purpose, that of reinforcing a group identity to ensure a group’s continuation in
uncertain terms. In this sense education becomes a non-military weapon used to attack (restrict the identity of others) and defend (protect one’s own identity) societal security. Therefore, in divided fragile contexts, it is possible that ‘ethnic survival’ can be added to the list of factors driving calls for ethnically appropriate education (alongside pedagogical advancements and rights-based representation).

Conceptualising education in this way raises questions about the different ways in which education is harnessed to create peace and security. Here, education is understood to contribute to a group’s security by reinforcing the distinctiveness at the exclusion of others. However, peacebuilding education narratives often stress education’s transformative nature and its ability to facilitate inclusivity in fragile contexts (for example the UNICEF Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) Programme). This inconsistency highlights an inherent paradox in the way in which education is understood by different actors. The following section will unpack some of the dangers that can arise if we do not recognise this conceptual contradiction.

Securitisation

In order to further understand the implications of education's use as a defence mechanism for societal security, we need a framework that enables us to ascertain the extent to which education can become a societal security issue. For this we can turn back to the Copenhagen School and their concept of securitisation (Buzan et al, 1998). The Copenhagen School posits a spectrum along which issues can be plotted with regard to their status within the security realm. The spectrum ranges from those issues that have been politicised but can be managed within the existing political system, to those issues which require action beyond the state’s normal political procedures and have therefore been securitised.

Therefore, the issue is only placed at the securitised end of the spectrum when emergency measures have been adopted. Hence to declare that an issue has become securitised ‘is to not only claim that it has become a security issue but also that the elite (or community representatives) have responded by adopting emergency measures’ (Collins, 2005: 573).

To securitise something, an actor has to present the issue as an existential threat to security, in this investigation, a threat to societal security. A securitising actor can come from any sphere of life, but the overall recognition is that if a securitising actor has been elected to represent a community within a certain domain, as long as the securitising move is within their remit, then the actor has legitimacy (Collins, 2003: 571). The threat perceived by the actor must be deemed significant enough to require ‘emergency measures’. It must be presented to the audience with the presumption that ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or be free to deal with it in our own way’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 24). By suggesting that an issue is an existential threat to societal security, the actor is therefore asking permission to take action which takes ‘politics beyond the normal rules of the game’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 24). If the actor is successful, then an emergency measure to tackle the issue will take place outside of the usual arena and therefore the issue will become securitised. However, not all issues presented in this way will necessarily be successful; some issues may just experience ‘securitisising moves’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 23), securitisising speech and politicisation, without becoming securitised.

To provide a clear example of how this would work in the education sector we can turn to two examples. The first is illustrated by the conflicts between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. When faced with the state’s assimilationist education structures which prohibited teaching programmes in Albanian, Albanian communities chose to open their own ethnically affiliated schools (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), as such ‘defending culture with culture’. By refusing to send their children to the state-run schools and favouring the non-accredited parallel schools, treated by the Government as illegal, the Albanian community took emergency action to tackle the perceived threat to their societal security. These schools were outside the state system and the normal arena for education policy and practice. All three stages of the process were met in this case and access to ethnically affiliated education became securitised for the Albanians in Kosovo. Community leaders presented the threat from state education to the group’s societal security, the audience accepted the presence of the threat and emergency action was taken in the form of non-accredited, non-state school provision.

A second example can be drawn from Iraq where a lack of funding for ethnically appropriate education resources for minority groups lead to securitisising moves by community actors. When faced with a lack of linguistically appropriate textbooks the Turkmen community framed the issue as an attack on their continued presence in the region, parents accepted
this threat and emergency action was taken in the form of accepting education resources from actors outside of the state education system. Resources and funding were accepted from a range of local ethnically affiliated political parties and international donors (Shanks, 2015).

When a community enables an actor to take these emergency measures, they grant the actor extraordinary power over that issue. The labelling of a problem as a ‘security issue’ may result in little or no assessment or regulation imposed on the implementation of the emergency measures taken (Grayson, 2003). Collins (2005:571) states that ‘there exists, therefore, the danger that having granted the actor the right to implement extraordinary measures, the audience forfeits its authority to determine the legitimacy of future actions undertaken by the actor’. As such, by securitising the issue the audience and actor have jointly contributed to placing it ‘beyond the realm of reasonable public scrutiny’ (Collins, 2005:572). Grayson (2003) provides a valuable analogy involving Frankenstein’s monster to caution how precarious securitisation can be. Collins (2005:571) states that it is a valuable metaphor for securitisation because ‘it not only captures the loosening of constraints on the actor that allows them to act almost with impunity, but it also visualizes just how powerful the securitizing actor can become.’ In this respect, granting external actors power within the education arena raises a number of serious considerations. The possible abuse of power and authority can lead to negative outcomes in terms of curriculum content and classroom delivery. Without public scrutiny education content can be manipulated to serve the interests of political elites or religious extremists, fostering a divisive ethno-centric ethos (rather than strengthen and celebrate culture). If emergency measures are granted within the education arena and that power is abused, it can lead to wider repercussions for the rest of society and inter-ethnic relations.

Counter measures
Framing education within the security narrative also enables us to capture the tensions and contradictions of competing security agendas. That is to say that how education is operationalised to enforce security differs between actors, and these understandings can be in opposition with one another. There are inherent challenges posed by the differing objectives of groups within a society. For example, central governments may see the proliferation of ethnic schooling, not as the strengthening of communities, but as a threat to the security and integrity of the state. As such counter measures may be sought to encourage or enforce ‘integration’. Such attempts can fall across a spectrum of intentions, from mass assimilation (denial of societal through education to integrationist strategies (representation of identity in diverse environments). To illustrate these counter measures, we can look to the enforced assimilationist attempts of the Ba’ath party in Iraq (Shanks, 2005) and the management of Kurdish education rights in Turkey (Hassanpour et al; 1996) and the post-genocide education policy in Rwanda, which has prioritised national unity that embraces being ‘Rwandan’ as opposed to ethnic difference (Rubagiza, 2016).

Within the societal security framing we can see that such ‘counter-measures’ by the state may in turn lead to the further securitisation of education by ethnic groups. To understand this process of action-reaction, we can draw on the concept of ‘security dilemmas’ (Posen, 1993). In essence, the security dilemma defines a situation whereby actors actions lead to further insecurity by provoking fear in neighbouring actors. Therefore, any attempt an actor makes to increase its own security will cause neighbouring actors to act in kind therein actually decreasing its security. As a result, a spiral of action and reaction is manifested in which each side’s behaviour is seen as threatening (Roe, 2004). This paper suggests a utility in applying this to the action reaction process in the education arena.

Key to this understanding of security dilemmas is how a threat is constructed, in this case; how does ethnically separate homogenous schooling pose a threat to state unity? This question returns us to the issue of nationalism within schools. As previously noted, ‘cultural nationalism’ is often the defensive tool used by those wishing to protect societal security. While this objective does not pose a direct risk to the state (or other communities), ‘ethnic nationalism’ potentially does. Roe (2003) suggests that it is actually the ambiguity of nationalist projects and movements that can prompt conflict in multi-ethnic states. As such, the undistinguishable nature of ‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalist projects within schools can create irresolvable uncertainty regarding the intended use of education.

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1 As the central political tenet of ethnic nationalism is that each ethnic group is entitled to self-determination.
Therefore, any use of nationalism in schools may prompt a central government to fear actions within education that may lead to a decrease in their political or territorial control. This creates what can be seen as inherent paradox, the use of cultural nationalism within school to increase societal security by ethnic groups is met with counter measures by the state, which in turn creates opportunities for education to be further securitised and open to external influences and actual ethnic nationalism.

**Conclusion**

By acknowledging the significant pool of literature on societal security protection and the concept of protecting culture with culture, the paper has sought to demonstrate the often-conflicting agendas that are bestowed on education in deeply divided societies. Repressive education policies and failure to support minority representation are often presented as a denial of rights that leads to assimilation and grievance. Yet the societal security framing of education presents a more nuanced understanding of the impact of denied education rights, highlighting the often-neglected reactions of education community actors to such restrictions.

By understanding the significance conferred on education in terms of societal security protection, we can better articulate the way in which education and conflict interact. This paper proposes that in order to truly harness education's potential for peacebuilding, educationalists, political scientists and security theorists must engage in more inter-disciplinary explorations of education's purpose in conflict-affected contexts.

**Author Bio**

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Analyzing donor conceptualizations of state fragility

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Abstract
This paper analyses how international development organisations conceptualise and operationalise the concept of state fragility. We identify two principal dimensions within donors’ definitions of state fragility: one distinguishes between a focus on development outcomes such as poverty reduction and the legitimacy of the government while the other differentiates conflict and security from the capacity of the state.

Key Words
State fragility
Education
Measurement
Multi-dimensional scaling

Introduction
The rise of state fragility as a framework for understanding the role of the state in development processes has been well-documented and well-studied (Bertoli and Ticci, 2012; Jones and Rodgers, 2011; Nay, 2010). Most of this literature lends credence to Grimm’s (2014: 252) observation that ‘there are significant variations in how various donor governments and international agencies define ‘state fragility’ and in which countries they include in their lists of ‘fragile’ states’. Thus, while it is widely acknowledged that international development agencies define and measure state fragility in different ways, the ways in which various conceptualisations and measurements relate to one another remain largely uncharted. Given that the conceptualisation and measurement of fragility holds direct influence over how donors distribute funding (for example in the World Bank’s International Development Association Resource Allocation Index, World Bank, 2018), understanding these variations in greater depth is a clear priority for international development research.

The purpose of this paper is to better understand how state fragility is conceptualised and operationalised by international development organisations. To achieve this goal, it employs a mixed methods analysis of 1) textual definitions of fragility taken from the extensive literature produced by development organisations and 2) indices used by these organisations as measures of fragility. Both of these data sources are analysed using multidimensional scaling, which creates a conceptual space that demonstrates similarities between definitions and measurements and establishes key organising dimensions of the fragility discourse. The results of the analysis are used to identify key
dimensions that organise the ways in which donors understand fragility. It is hoped that the exploratory analysis presented here will be used as a framework for empirical studies that relate these dimensions of fragility to development outcomes.

**Literature review**

State fragility terminology first emerged in the years following the 9/11 attacks mainly in relation to Western donor concerns about the security risks posed by countries with unstable, or authoritarian governments and a history of violent conflict (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq). However, the concept draws upon a longer tradition dating back to concerns about ‘failed’ states following the Cold War and the implicit nation-building goals in modernisation approaches to development (Call, 2011; Marquette and Beswick, 2011). The fragility terminology grew in prominence in the decade that followed 9/11, spurred by the first publication of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) - which was quickly appropriated as a measure of fragility (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2008) - and a good deal of ‘grey literature’ that situated the concept of fragility squarely in donors’ agendas (Nay, 2010: 327).

Much of the literature from development organisations has at its core an understanding of fragility as ‘institutional deficits that permit repeated cycles of violence’ (World Bank, 2011: 22), with the idea that the two phenomena (fragility and violent conflict) arise through mutual causation and feedback cycles. Other commonly cited features of fragile states include a lack of security, an inability to meet the basic needs of the population, ‘horizontal inequalities’ and ethnic tensions, and poor use of development funding (Davies, 2011, Stewart and Brown, 2010; François and Sud, 2006). By providing examples of the large number of people living in countries defined as fragile and their disproportionate share of development problems (e.g. poverty, limited access to education, etc.), fragility is constructed as a pressing concern and implicitly positioned as a cause of these problems (e.g. OECD, 2014; USAID; 2014; World Bank, 2011).

However, beyond this common core, there exists considerable divergence in how development organisations understand fragility; Cammack et al (2006) highlight how definitions of fragility range from understanding fragility in terms of ‘functions of the state’, ‘outputs’ of fragility (e.g. poverty and violence) and as a relationship with donors’. The concept has been further muddied through its conflation with conflict, with common phrases such as ‘fragile and conflict-affected’ often implying that the two phenomena are one and the same. The concept is also weakened by the wide variety of ideas and contexts it seeks to incorporate, almost paradoxically spanning very weak states - those with failing governments and lack of territorial control (e.g. Somalia) - and very strong states - those with authoritarian control and no democratic accountability (e.g North Korea).

Due to these conceptual shortcomings, the concept of fragility has attracted criticism from academic research, mainly focusing on its weakness as an analytic concept and framework for understanding states’ development (Bertoli and Ticci, 2012; Binkerhoff, 2014; Nay 2010, Paulson and Shields, 2015). These critiques approach the topic from a number of different angles: some studies accept the overall conceptual premises of state fragility - or at least parts of it - but critique the way it has been defined and implemented, often suggesting reforms or posing alternatives. For example, research has suggested alternative approaches to measuring and classifying fragile states (e.g. Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2008; Grävingholt et al, 2012).

In contrast, other studies reject the concept of fragility as a form of discursive power and control that primarily serves the interests of international organisations and/or developed countries (Nay, 2010). In line with Fairclough’s (1995: 2) view that power lies in the ability ‘sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over other alternative practices’, international development donors are able to promote and maintain representations of ‘fragile states’ as deficient and in need of interventions, consistent with Escobar’s (1995) larger critique of discursive power in international development. Taking this critique further, the fragility discourse silences and obscures the global and the geopolitical power dynamics, from colonial legacies to neocolonial development practices, that sustain and perpetuate poverty and conflict (Nay, 2010).

From this perspective, quantitative measurements of fragility, taking the form of indices and rankings published by numerous international development agencies and think tanks (e.g. the World Bank’s
CPIA and Brooking Institute’s Index of State Weakness), also form a part of the fragility discourse. In line with the assertions of Said (1978) and Escobar (1995) that the production of knowledge and establishment of new fields of study (e.g. ‘orientalism’, area studies, development economics, etc.) was essential to colonial regimes, these measurements confer a pseudo-scientific status and appearance of objectivity to the fragility discourse in a neo-colonial order in which the funding mechanisms of international organisations are a key form of power. Quantitative studies of the indices themselves provide a nuanced understanding of these measurements, revealing that correlations between indices, which purport to measure the same thing, actually range from 0.10 to 0.94 (Mata and Ziaja, 2009). This variation suggests that the measurement constructs and the underlying understandings of fragility employed by respective organisations are inconsistent. Nevertheless, fragility measurements are used to determine significant allocations of development funding, often through complex formulas in which initial measurements based on ‘minor bureaucratic practice’ are transformed and decontextualised (Siqueria, 2014).

However, despite the healthy levels of criticism, there is also a good deal of literature that accepts and reproduces the general assumptions of the discourse (e.g. the co-constitutive problem of weak institutions, violent conflict and poor development outcomes), and has played a key role in legitimising the discourse on state fragility (Nay, 2010). In many academic studies, state fragility and its measurement are accepted as objective fact, with the assumption that one can define a state as fragile just as easily as one can determine it is landlocked. Others temper critique of how fragility is understood, defined and measured among development donors with cautious optimism that the concept holds some potential to explain development outcomes and inform policy (Ipke, 2007; Patrick, 2007). From this perspective, the potential of fragility as concept is limited with the realisation that ‘current definitions of fragility are not useful aggregations to predict, monitor and explain development progress using MDG indicators’ (Harttgen and Klassen, 2013: 134). Thus, in order to arrive at a more fruitful, relevant and conceptually valid understanding of state fragility, scrutiny and careful analysis of existing definitions of fragility is necessary. In this study, we share a critical orientation to the emergence of a fragility discourse and its functions of maintaining geopolitical power dynamics by locating the causes of conflict and poverty in the ‘fragile’ states of the global south. We also share the commitment to careful analysis of existing definitions, less as an effort to rescue the conceptual validity of fragility and more as an endeavour to better understand the features of the fragility discourse, including its inconsistencies, and to present a framework with which future research might critically the mobilisation of fragility discourses.

**Methods**

In order to better understand how international development organisations conceptualise and operationalise state fragility, we undertook a mixed methods study of how the concept of state fragility is defined in these organisations’ literature, and the indicators that development organisations use to measure fragility. This study uses codings of fragility definitions to create a conceptual mapping of how these organisations understand state fragility by using multidimensional scaling (MDS), a technique for exploratory analysis of multivariate data.

We analysed definitions of state fragility produced by international development organisations. These definitions are taken from documents that are authored and published by the organisations and contain a clear and explicit definition of fragility. The organisations include bilateral donors (e.g. DFID, USAID), publications from their respective governments, multilateral donors (e.g. the World Bank) and multilateral organisations that coordinate work among donors (i.e. OECD). We do not include research reports commissioned by the organisations, academic research papers, or documents from non-governmental organisations and charities. In total, we analysed 17 definitions from 8 organisations, spanning the years 2002 to 2014 (Table 1); ranging from 17 to 113 words in length. These definitions were coded using a set of codes created on the basis of the literature review and preliminary review of the definitions (a list of codes and their frequencies is included in the online appendix). We coded each definition using a literal approach, in which a code was applied to a given definition only if the actual text – or a close variation thereof – appeared in the given definition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document Title</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Framework for working in fragile and conflict-affected states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Fragile states: Defining difficult environments for poverty reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>An EU response to situations of fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>The Challenge of fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (Foreign Ministry)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Dutch Security and Development in Fragile States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Whole of government approaches to fragile states</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations: From fragility to resilience</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The state’s legitimacy in fragile situations: Unpacking complexity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Measuring fragility: Indicators and methods for rating state performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Ending extreme poverty in fragile contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (WB)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Fragile states: Good practice in country assistance strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank (WB)</td>
<td>2007b</td>
<td>Aid that works: Successful development in fragile states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Source documents for definitions

The coded definitions were transformed into a similarity matrix - a table in which each cell represents the distance between a pair of definitions or measurements. For definitions, the similarity is based on the number of common codes the definitions share\(^1\). The similarity matrix was then transformed into a two-dimensional Euclidean space using classical multidimensional scaling (MDS). The MDS algorithm creates a space with a structure that most closely resembles the similarity matrix, such that definitions or measurements that are most similar are closest to one another. The space can then be analysed to find patterns of clustering (i.e., groups of similar institutions) as well as organisational dimensions – continua along which definitions and measurements are spread, which vary independently of one another (Everitt and Hothorn, 2011).

\(^1\)This is calculated using a distance function, so common codings (i.e., both coded with a given code or both not coded with a given code) are considered closer, while differing codings (one coded while the other is not) are coded differently. This compensates that some definitions have more codes than others, often due to the differing lengths.
It is important to keep in mind that this space represents definitions of fragility and not states themselves; there is no claim that individual states can or should be interpreted as representing particular points in our conceptual space. The focus of our analysis therefore differs from other studies that apply latent variable analysis to state fragility (i.e. Grävingholt et al, 2012), which focus on identifying clusters of similar countries based on a range of indicators. While both approaches illustrate the affordance of understanding fragility as a latent variable - i.e. a construct that is not directly measured but observed through multiple indicators – they address different but related research questions. Once analysed, the conceptual spaces provide a useful framework for understanding the organizing principles and dimensions in donors’ approaches to measuring and operationalising state fragility.

Findings

Results from the analysis of fragility definitions are shown in Figure 1. Several interesting features emerge from a general overview: First, there is a general tendency for organisations’ definitions to cluster relatively close to one another. For example, definitions from the World Bank are grouped together in the middle of the figure, while those from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (USDoS) are towards the bottom of the figure. While this is not surprising, it is in establishing the validity of the analysis. There are also chronological patterns: the OECD’s definitions from 2007 and 2008 are located in the centre of the figure, while more recent definitions (2010 and 2013) are towards the upper right. This change indicates a conceptual shift - primarily through the adoption of ‘resilience’ into the definition of fragile states. Finally, one the most commonly cited definitions of fragility – from the OECD-DAC 2007, is located relatively close to a large number of other definitions (interestingly – some of which precede it chronologically). This clustering is good evidence of a strong ‘consensus’ that –

States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their population.

(OECD/DAC 2007: 2)

Focusing on the distribution of codes across conceptual space, provides further insight into the key dimensions to differences in organisations’ understandings of state fragility.

Development outcomes versus social contract perspectives

One key dimension to the analysis is the distinction between definitions that focus on development outcomes (coded with ‘aid resources’ and ‘poverty reduction’) and those that are concerned with aspects of the social contract between the state and its citizens (coded with ‘state-society relations’ and ‘legitimacy’). As shown in Figure 2, earlier definitions,
particularly those from the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development, were primarily concerned with development outcomes, whereas, more recent definitions, including those from other national donors, focus more on the legitimacy of the government and its relationship to citizens, often using the concept of a social contract.

**Functions and capacity versus conflict, peace and security**

Another key dimension to the analysis is the distinction between the functions and capacity of the state (i.e. its ability to deliver services and maintain a social contract) versus issues related to conflict, peace and security. This is illustrated along the vertical axis of the conceptual space, and the groups indicated in Figure 3 show those definitions that utilise these perspectives as well an overlap in which definitions use both sets. Particularly noticeable in these groupings are those more recent definitions from the OECD, which focus on the concept of resilience as a counterpoint to fragility.

![Figure 2: The horizontal dimension distinguishes between development outcomes and the social contract](image)

![Figure 2: The vertical dimension differentiates between capacity of the state and conflict](image)
Discussion and conclusion

This paper has analysed how state fragility is defined among international development donors. It was motivated by literature that showed how state fragility is ambiguously defined and how different definitions have political implications. Through exploratory and inductive analysis, we have highlighted two primary distinctions in how state fragility is defined: one between poverty reduction and state functions, and another between state capacity and security. These dimensions provide a framework for thinking about state fragility, and it could be used to contextualise particular definitions or to analyse donor policy and funding in greater detail. The paper therefore contributes to future research on fragility by showing the differences in specific meanings it may hold; it contributes to policy and programming on fragile states by offering a framework for thinking about what the concept of fragility might mean in a more concrete sense.

However, these dimensions do not establish which of these understandings if more valid or useful. On the contrary, because definitions vary across this conceptual space, our analysis highlights the ambiguity inherent in the concept of state fragility, and where such ambiguity exists there is an opening for politicisation. Donors, aid recipients, and other actors in the education sector may discursively and rhetorically position themselves strategically within this space depending on their political and financial agendas. Careful consideration of such manoeuvring may provide greater insight into the political economy of aid and its relationship to conflict and education.

Author Bios

Robin Shields
Robin’s research investigates the globalization of education, using quantitative methods to examine global trends in educational policy and practice. He has worked across a number of different contexts and topic, including privatization of education in South Asia, education and conflict, and international higher education.

Julia Paulson
Julia’s research focuses on education, peace and conflict. She works to understand the ways in which educational transformation and change might contribute towards peace and justice by understanding and seeking to repair past injustices. Her research focuses on relationships between education and transitional justice, education and memory production, and education about difficult pasts. I am interested in knowledge production and the ethics of collaborative research in education in emergencies.
References


The need for contextualisation in the analysis of curriculum content in conflict

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Abstract

Westernised peace-promoting curricula have been increasingly imported in conflict-affected countries, but they have limited capacity to adapt to local contexts and address unique issues relating to war-related trauma, political contentions and displacement of teachers and families. In this paper, I argue that this disconnection could be manifested in incoherence and failures to contribute to stability against contradictory positioning of liberal and more radical schools for competitive ideological dominance at the national level, which could potentially serve as drivers of conflict.

Key Words

Peacebuilding Education
Somaliland
Conflict
Fragility

Introduction

Since the 2011 Arab Spring, the designs and contents of education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts in the Middle East, North Africa and West Asia have drawn much academic and practitioner attention, as part of a growing concern about regional radicalisation (Fábos and Isotalo, 2014). Here radicalisation is thought of as a process through which young people adopt increasingly extremist views, contrary to mainstream principles necessary for the promotion of peace and social cohesion (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter, 2015). In light of the growing global interest in conflict, much of the literature on radicalisation in recent years has examined the processes through which young people have been drawn into overt violent actions through exposure to extremist ideologies (Christmann, 2012). There is deliberate research attention on Muslim identities, given a broader securitisation of Islam in the international media and political discourses (Choudhury, 2007). At the same time, there has been an operational focus on single-action programmes, designed to promote stability through the implementation of peace education (UNICEF, 2011). Such peace education is introduced to young people in order to transform them into agents of positive change, but the impact of projects developed under this framework may be restricted or undermined in those cases where peace education operates in parallel with multiple rival curricula that promote opposing values, or where countries lack the capacity to train teachers to effectively deliver these learning resources. I draw upon preliminary findings of a small scale research project, based on interviews with Somali teachers, Ministry employees, education practitioners,
teacher-trainers and students. They report complex conflict dynamics which are observed in school playgrounds when students within the same school clash over competing ideologies taught to them by different teachers, offering small microcosms of processes that may be happening at a broader, regional level.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how teachers in conflict-affected states translate and interpret liberal and peace-building curricula, and what impact this process of adaptation has on wider peacebuilding. It finds that teachers are more likely to make significant alterations to a curriculum if they deem it to be inappropriate to the local context, or too challenging for students to engage with. These insights emerge from my research in Somaliland over the past eight years where curriculum reform is introduced by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education through support from the international community in order to enhance the role of peace education. Here, success is often measured through the distribution of physical resources, the consolidation of new curricula, and distribution of new textbooks. In my latest research I interviewed 42 people including staff from Ministry of Education and Higher Education, teachers, teacher-trainers, UNICEF and Save the Children education specialists, journalists, and students in Hargeisa, Somaliland, in collaboration with local partners. I found that textbooks produced through reforms do not always reach all public and private schools, and that some teachers do not utilise them even when they do have access, relying instead on their own lesson plans and teaching strategies. While mostly well-intentioned, the un-sanctioned teaching of history, literature and religion, or the omission of these topics, can serve to reinforce antagonistic clan narratives in Somaliland and aggressive clan politics, which have led to violence in the past. Meanwhile, those who do teach from a sanctioned curriculum take the view that only the officially recognised version of history is legitimate, where competing narratives prioritising clan identity become viewed as radical or illegitimate by teachers and students alike.

Based on these experiences, I argue that, in conflict affected states, where central monitoring capacities are weak in education, graduates of Western-facing, liberal education systems are put in direct conflict with graduates of systems that condemn these values; my interviewees reported cases of liberal students refusing to engage in debate with traditionalists on matters relating to politics, religion and culture as well as violent clashes in which liberal and traditionalist students fought in playgrounds, or, more seriously, cases in which radical and extremist organisations like Al Shabaab targeting liberal schools for attack. There are no immediate or obvious solutions to this challenge, but the ideological battles that contradictory curricula generate may antagonise the drivers of conflict within a society if children are given competing information about how to act and behave by their textbooks, teachers, communities and peers.

**Education as pacification**

Due to the centrality of education as a conduit for shaping hearts and minds, there has been an increasing international practitioner and academic awareness of the role of education in peace and conflict promotion (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), and on the potential of education to act for peacebuilding, owing to the idea that education is a transformative ‘process’, ‘product’ and ‘discipline’ (Ukeje, 1966: 375). Education is acknowledged to be a way of imparting normative values (Ducasse, 1958). Thus, education can theoretically be used to reinterpret through classroom learning those ‘factors that allow war to be considered normal’, in order ‘to enhance people’s consciousness of the mechanisms supporting a war culture’, and help them ‘to challenge those mechanisms through empowering people for transformation’ (Burns and Aspelsagh, 2013: 7). More broadly, education may also hold the key to redressing structural socio-economic inequalities, so as to produce a fairer society and address the underlying causes of conflict by reconciling and improving access to learning and livelihood opportunities across competing groups. However, this likely requires systematic and coherent educational reforms. Yet most practitioners are locked into working on a single school, single-curriculum, or single-intervention basis, limiting the scope of any potential change. In conflict affected societies, the limited capacity of governments to provide access to quality education leads to the emergence of a plethora of charitable, non-profit, faith-based, secular and private schools alongside state schools. Consequently, as it is observed in
Somaliland, this leads to teaching diverse and sometimes, contesting curricular and pedagogical provisions, the relationships and outcomes between which are difficult to discern. Even where integrated curricula are introduced, these may not necessarily reflect the values of teachers and school governing boards, who may manipulate the contents to promote their own ideological positions. In Somaliland, for example, where a new consolidated curriculum has been introduced, teachers would rip pages out of textbooks that they disagreed with, or compensate for perceived gaps in the curriculum with their own understandings of history and identity, which are frequently influenced by clan affiliations and media literacy. These educational processes potentially have far-reaching implications in terms of the way that children’s views about the world are shaped.

To date, while much has been written on the difference between peace education and peacebuilding education (Burns and Aspeslagh, 2013; Smith, 2010), as well as the relationship between education and conflict (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), more research is needed on how peace-facing education reforms impact societies in which multiple rival curricula or multiple interpretations of the same curriculum operate simultaneously. Indeed, peaceful societal transformation through education may not be achievable through project-based educational interventions, particularly when new curricula are introduced that do not take into consideration the broader context of learning and the capacity of the state to deliver necessary teacher professional development.

On the universality of education

As a basic human right, the provision of education is characterized as a universal good that practitioners need to ensure is available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable (Tornesevski, 2005) both in humanitarian situations and more stable development settings. However, universality should not be confused for neutrality, where the translation of rights into compulsory schooling is divisive (McCowan, 2010). Education is a political endeavour, where the contents and delivery of education are fundamentally connected to the core power structures of a society. The focus on peace-promoting education, which has been promoted through conditional donor funding in education in the Middle East and North Africa (Williams, 2015), has been partly linked with a counter-terrorism and democratising agenda (Carapico, 2002; Bodenstein and Faust, 2017). This approach has accentuated the role of education in promoting allegedly liberal narratives that reject Islamist Fundamentalism, promote women’s empowerment, and discredit racial and religious discrimination. Williams (2015: 16) summarises that ‘educational ideas from the West and the North carry greater policy weight than ideas from the South, because the model of schooling is Western, and because the West and North have greater coercive, projective, and cultural power’ as well as greater financial power in the internationalisation and globalisation of education. The counter movement to this has been the growth of radical organisations that combat Western-style education, including the emergence of the Nigerian group, Boko Haram, in West Africa, whose name famously translates as “Books” (as a shorthand for Western-style education) “are forbidden”. It has also fuelled attacks against education in a range of conflict-affected contexts, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Syria, where attacks against teachers and students are justified in defence of local, indigenous and religious values of education.

Once again, drawing upon research in Somaliland, the importation of foreign curricula into contexts that deal with legacies of violent conflicts, with only minimal adaptation to the local context, causes confusion in classrooms. Illustrations and contents in textbooks might be frequently inappropriate: a small girl may be shown playing with a dog in a society where children in general are prohibited from doing so, a drawing of a house might be shown to be built in a Western style with resources and technologies that communities do not have access to, a song about Old MacDonald and his farm may describe a farmer with multiple animals in a society where pastoralists would only ever own either camels or goats. As a former Somaliland faculty member lamented: “The stories are not ours, the geography is not ours, the history is not ours, and the identity is not ours”. Thus, many textbooks are unrepresentative of the local identity, and this delegitimises the education sector as a whole, contributing to societal division between those who continue to value the importance of liberal education
and those who reject it as a neo-colonial institution. Perceptions of outside interference in curricula decisions are also pervasive, with another faculty member commenting:

“Basically, there are international organisations in the system, pushing for more reforms, even though there have already been reforms. When I look at the Somaliland curriculum, in a nutshell, it is more like a cut-and-paste job. The curriculum that we have is simply a dictation from UNICEF and UNESCO.”

(A faculty member from a Somaliland University)

The immediate solution to this challenge for the international community, who rightly feel the urgency of the need to strengthen the education system in Somaliland, is not apparent. However, a direct consequence of the delegitimating of any imported curricula is that teachers and students will not always take for granted that the materials they are being taught are valid, particularly in an environment where multiple donors and private financers teach rival lessons, even when working from the same textbooks.

Education as an ideological battleground

Around the world, in conflict-affected states, education has in many ways become an ideological battleground, where the politicisation of education agendas align with donors’ interests and in Muslim-majority societies, education has been associated with Islamophobia and securitization of Muslim identities (Cesari, 2009). Educators working in these contexts need to be self-reflexive and critical of their role in exacerbating or mitigating this divide. Not all international programmes are guilty, but many are under pressure to securitize in accordance with counter-radicalisation objectives. Specific associations of radicalisation with Islam have polluted definitions of violent extremism and terror in Western media and Western politics, refocusing them on Muslim violence in a discourse that has been criticised as ‘highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and largely counter-productive’ (Jackson, 2007: 395). The Western preoccupation with ‘Islamic’ radicalisation has led to a corresponding funding focus on education and development as weapons in the War on Terror (Novelli, 2017). It has situated counter-radicalisation for the international community as a war of ideas, in which “the “war on terrorism” is fought principally (ideally) against the myriad components of the Salafii-Jihadi culture (Salafiyya Jihadiyya) that birthed al-Qaeda’s campaign against “far” and “near” enemies’ (Cozzens, 2006: 2).

Unsurprisingly, in this war of ideas, education becomes a strategic resource, where ‘winning will entail… gaining the upper-hand in a moral, narrative duel’ (Cozzens, 2006: 3). The war will likely be won or lost in schools, and so the purpose of schooling has been critiqued and contested by organisations like Boko Haram and Al Shabaab as a neo-colonial and anti-Islamic initiative. Muslim conflict-affected states that rely on external assistance to provide education are caught between these two positions, with implications for the effectiveness of their programming.

Conclusion

The introduction of Westernised peace-promoting curricula in conflict-affected countries has the potential to aggravate conflict drivers by positioning liberal and more radical schools against each other in national-level competitions for ideological dominance. This does not mean that the promotion of liberal values should be abandoned in education programming in conflict-affected states, but rather than operating on small, short-term scales, or on a project by project basis, without analysing how the introduction of new curricula would impact on communities educated to opposing ideals, could cause more violence in the short term. Inherently, the needs of peacebuilding education require long-term funding commitment, and perhaps a push for consolidated education reform, that addresses the divisions between different education systems. However, reform for the sake of reform is insufficient, unless it is combined with meaningful and long-term support to teachers and teacher training. While more research is needed to compare across conflict-affected states, a greater emphasis should be placed on the role of the teacher in interpreting the official curriculum for their students, as well as on the importance of contextualisation in peace education. The two go hand-in-hand: the role of the teacher in a classroom is to help guide students through new concepts and complex ideas, and they do this by translating those ideas into terms that they deem relevant to their students, to ease...
understanding. The more alien a curriculum seems to a teacher, the more aggressive the translation process is likely to be. These decisions are rarely made with the intention to harm students or to obstruct their learning but unless this process is understood, the gap between an intended liberal curriculum and what is actually taught may have far-reaching unintended impacts that harm (rather than support) the peace process, particularly when students graduate from these systems and are confronted with a divided political society that does not share their views.

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References


Evidence hungry, theory light: Education and conflict, SDG16, and aspirations for peace and justice

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Abstract
This paper explores two alternatives for supporting the idea that education is essential for building peace: 1) to prove this idea through empirical evidence; and 2) to substantiate it theoretically. It concludes that privileging evidence over theory can fail to specify how education must change in order to build peace and justice, allowing for the circulation of the idea that any and all education will necessarily build peace, which is currently unsupported either by empirical evidence or theoretical argument.

Key Words
Education in emergencies
Evidence
Justice
SDGs

Introduction
Since the early 1990s, there has been considerable work to draw attention to the urgency of educational need during and after conflict and to increase resources to education in conflict recovery. This stems from the conviction that education can and will contribute towards building peace. Efforts to build the case for education have often focused on finding evidence to support, even to demonstrate, this conviction. There were and remain efforts to find and synthesise existing research that might provide evidence to support the ways in which education can prevent conflict and build peace as indicated in the renewed interest in a Strategic Research Agenda to guide the education in emergencies community (e.g. Mendenhall, 2019). However, there is a considerable body of social theory that raises questions about this conviction. The sociological cannon – Marx, Gramsci, Bourdieu, Foucault, Du Bois, and others – all offer explanations of the ways in which education maintains and even deepens unequal power relations. If these theorists are right, generating evidence about the ways in which education might build peace could be an impossible task.

In this short paper, I want to explore the two alternatives for supporting such a conviction. The first is by gathering evidence to demonstrate its veracity and effectiveness. This is arguably the path that the Education in Emergencies (EiE) community has pursued, privileging studies and, where possible, randomised controlled trials. The other is by engaging with the theoretical ideas that can underpin such a conviction – those ideas that seek to illuminate how education might change from something that is unjust and perpetuates injustice to something that isn’t and doesn’t. The implications of these ideas suggest changes that
education might require in order to build peace. To outline these two alternatives, I first look at a key piece of statistical evidence that is currently profiled by the Global Partnership for Education in their work to direct more resources towards education in conflict. This striking statistic raises a number of questions, including around the nature of education that EiE actors should promote and the goals for promoting that form of education. Then, I turn to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) agenda and the theoretical ideas about peace and justice that are and are not present there, exploring the pathways that these open and close for education to contribute towards peace. The paper argues that in absence of theoretically informed pathways for change, both EiE work and SDG goals can fail to specify how education must change in order to build peace and justice. This allows for circulation of the idea that any and all education will necessarily build peace, which is currently unsupported either by empirical evidence or theoretical argument (e.g. Harber, 2019).

**Making a case for education: Demonstrating conviction with evidence**

The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) (2018) recently announced on twitter that ‘each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by 20%.’ Following GPE’s tweet questions were immediately raised by researchers. So, five years of education means a 100% reduction of conflict, asked Robin Shields. Prachi Srivastava recalled one of the early insights in education and conflict research, that the content of education can just as easily foment conflict as it can prevent it, urging the recognition that not all and any education can prevent conflict. I asked, where does this figure come from? What is the evidence to support such a statement? When I investigated further, exploring the ‘Data and Results’ page of the GPE’s website where this claim is again stated, I found a single reference. The reference was to a 1999 report written for the World Bank by the Oxford economist Paul Collier. The report builds on his earlier quantitative multi-country research into conflict and its causes, from which he and colleague Anke Hoeffler (1998, see also 2004) advance their controversial greed versus grievance thesis. In this work Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004) test economic (‘greed’) versus grievance (real or perceived inequalities, problems, or injustices in a society that might unify a group in rebellion) motivations for conflict, using a series of proxy variables for each. Greed proxies include: the availability of primary commodities (proxy for ‘lootable resources’), the proportion of young men between the ages of 15-24 in a given society (since they are considered those most likely to join a rebel force) and years of schooling/ ‘endowment of education’ (which is used a proxy for the income earning opportunities of young men in order to try to understand the degree to which they have other opportunities aside from joining a rebellion). Proxy variables designed to represent grievances include the degree to which a society is fractionalised by religion and by ethnicity, measurements of income and asset (land only) inequality, regime type (as proxy for access to political rights), and the rate of economic growth in the last few years (as a proxy for government economic competence). With these variables as potential predictors of war, Collier and Hoeffler develop an empirical model, using data on the outbreak of conflict between 1965-1995, to test the explanatory power of greed and grievance variables for the outbreak of conflict. The dataset includes 24 civil wars for which the researchers have full data, which they use in a first model, and a further 16 for which minor estimations or assumptions can complete the data set, which they add to a second analysis. As Collier (1999: 4) summarises, ‘the results overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic arguments as opposed to grievance’, the outbreak and maintenance of conflict is motivated more by economic incentives than by ‘group grievances beneath which inter-group hatreds lurk, often traced back through history’ (1999: 1). The youth and education related variables are important for arriving at these results, supporting the argument that opportunity costs matter – when young men have limited opportunities they will ‘greedily’ pick up arms as an opportunity for personal gain. Improve their educational opportunities (and the overall educational endowment of a society) and this greed motivation will decrease along with the opportunity costs of warfare. The 20% reduction in conflict with each additional year of education, highlighted by the GPE, comes from regression analysis using means across variables (or, in other words, playing with hypotheticals within the predictive model): ‘at the mean risk of civil war, a one year increase in education per head reduces the risk of civil war by 20%’ (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999: 12).
It is interesting that this hypothetical finding, nearly twenty years old still seems convincing enough to support the messaging of an influential organisation like the GPE. The greed versus grievance argument has been heavily disputed in economics, political science, and development studies (e.g. Ballentine and Sherman, 2003; Burdel, 2003; Murshed and Tadjodeddin, 2008; Justino, 2009). Indeed, a general absence of educational opportunity for young people, or a situation in which inequalities in access and/or outcome disadvantage particular groups in society can itself be considered a grievance. Researchers exploring horizontal inequalities as drivers of conflict adopt this approach (e.g. Stewart, 2008; Østby, 2008). For example, Østby (2008) explores the effects of vertical inequality (inequalities between individuals) and horizontal inequality (inequalities between groups). In Østby’s model, years in education is an indicator of horizontal social inequality and she finds this to be positively related to the outbreak of conflict, therefore finding support for the grievance hypothesis in contrast to Collier’s work.

In addition to the leaps from hypothetical to actual and the academic argument around Collier’s conclusions, the 1999 observation around increases in education and decreases in conflict is not supported by the actual global developments in education and rates of conflict over the last twenty years. Levels of education have increased substantially at a global level since the late nineties (e.g. UNESCO, 2015). This increase in education has not been accompanied by a reduction in armed conflict, which has been increasing in recent years. Rates of armed conflict did fall over the 1990s and 2000s. However, the escalation of several conflicts in the mid-2010s combined with the outbreak of the Syrian conflict meant that since 2014 there was both an increase in the number of armed conflicts around the world (the highest since 1999) and in the number of battle related deaths, with 2014 seeing the highest numbers in the post-1989 period (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).

The fact that Collier’s work is still quoted is indicative of the appetite for statistical evidence about education and conflict in donor and international agencies. The statistic, and others like it, serve an important function for the EiE community – demonstrating the urgent need for education for those affected by conflict and emergency and also ‘proving’ that investment in education in such contexts can make a positive difference. Research evidence such as Collier’s has been crucial for building a confident, outward looking EiE community who have been successfully raising the profile of EiE on international agendas (Winthrop and Matsui, 2013). However, this case has largely been built on the power of numbers, the impact of statistics that can show both the scope of the problem and the degree to which education can help. The GPE’s statement, and the wider donor case for EiE, is a largely atheoretical engagement both with the statistical evidence that drives it and with the debate around the production of that evidence. In this example, the theoretical assumptions that lead to education becoming a proxy variable matter. For Collier (1999), education is conceptualised at the level of individual opportunity cost and ‘greed’, whereas for Østby (2008) education is seen as an entitlement, around which inequalities may create or exacerbate cleavages amongst social groups. Policy makers attending to these findings while seeking to support education in conflict prevention and recovery are therefore faced not just with competing statistics but with different implications for the purposes of education – to enable individual opportunity versus to remedy inequality – and for the forms of education to be implemented – education that delivers optimal outcomes for individuals, particularly in terms of their earnings and assets, versus education that tries to level playing fields and provide an equality of opportunity and outcome.

SDG16 and aspiring for peace and justice: Using theories of justice to reach a conviction

Alongside the EiE community’s hunger for evidence, and the atheoretical engagement with it, is a wider, well-documented and growing production of indicators within international development, intensified since 2015 and the launch of the SDGs, with its expanded menu of targets (e.g. King, 2017; Fukuda-Parr and McNeill, 2019). Peace and justice, which were never explicitly part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) agenda, are included within the SDGs, in which SDG16 calls for peace, justice and strong institutions. However, the text and targets for SDG16 give little indication of how either peace or justice are conceptualised. For instance, the most definitive statement about what peace and justice are in the introductory text is that ‘…to build
more peaceful, inclusive societies, there needs to be more efficient and transparent regulations put in place and comprehensive, realistic government budgets’ (UN, 2018: np). Regulations and budgets seem meagre against Galtung’s (1969) conceptualisation of positive peace as the absence not just of physical forms of violence but also of structural and cultural violence. The current ‘lead indicator’ for measuring progress against the attainment of the SDG16 goal is ‘the number of victims of intentional homicides per 100,000 population, by sex and age.’ While intentional homicides are clearly part of violent, conflictive and unjust societies, their reduction alone is not equivalent to peace, justice or inclusion.

Peace, justice and inclusion are all richly theorised concepts, with competing theoretical approaches offering quite different visions for their fulfilment. What we can see implicitly in the SDG16 text are indicators (the lead and several that follow it) focused around measuring a negative peace (the absence of violence), rather than a positive one (the presence of the justice). The argument could be made that this is a problem of measurement, that the presence of justice, though clearly something we would have reason to value, is difficult to measure or even ‘immeasurable’ (Unterhalter, 2017; Biesta, 2011; King, 2017). As well as a problem of measurement, this is also or perhaps even more so, a problem of lack of engagement with theory. Justice is seen as immeasurable because the SDGs name it as an aspiration but don’t engage in any substantive discussion about what it might be.

Justice has been thoroughly theorised and debated – doing so is arguably one of the principle preoccupations of social theory. The 10 SDG16 targets go some way to specifying how justice is envisioned within the SDG agenda – in addition to mobilising security and negative peace oriented reductions in violence, the targets seem to mobilise a Rawlsian concept of justice (as a social contract between individuals) as they seek to ‘promote the rule of law’ (target 16.3) and measure some aspects of legal and institutional mechanisms for due process, such as proportions of unsentenced detainees within prison populations, and compliance with Paris Principles around independent human rights organisations.

Targets and indicators also show evidence of conceptualisations more oriented towards social justice that prioritise representation and participation of marginalised groups; for example in indicator 16.7.1 which measures ‘proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups) in public institutions’ and target 16.8 to ‘broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance’. Readers will be aware, however, that social justice theorists like Nancy Fraser (2003) do not detach representation and recognition from redistribution of resources and opportunities. Note that developing countries are expected to participate more, but not also to receive more, as redistributive justice would require. Nor are they afforded space to create and shape agendas as reparative and epistemic justice frameworks might enable.

Reparative, or historical justice embodies principles of redress and repair for past wrongs, such as those of slavery and colonialism (e.g. Rudolph, Srirprakash and Gerrard, 2018), while epistemic justice would seek to restore the damages done by the exclusion of individuals and groups as knowers and of their knowledges as valid (e.g. Fricker, 2007) and by the dominance of western epistemologies (e.g. de Sousa Santos, 2014).

So, within SDG16 we can identify theories legalistic, retributive and social justice (with a particular focus on recognition and representation), but do not see conceptualisations of redistributive, reparative, or epistemic justice. Engagement with these theoretical ideas might enable the SDG16 agenda to move beyond its current aspirations, which seem confined to a negative peace.

**Opening possibilities for aspiring towards (and measuring) peace and justice**

Returning to the idea of possible educational indicators for progress towards these forms of justice, it is not impossible to imagine measuring the redistribution of educational opportunities and outcomes (redistributive justice) by focusing on resource allocation to the most disadvantaged and on transforming inequalities in educational outcomes across advantaged and disadvantaged social groups (already the focus of some of the indicators for SDG4). Indicators of progress towards reparative, historical and epistemic justice in education might focus on recognition of past injustice in curriculum, and in opening possibilities for historically disadvantaged groups shape and create new
curricula. Other possibilities include explorations into the legacies of educational institutions in benefiting from and perpetuating inequalities, and reparations to individuals and groups for educational exclusions, along with others.

The point here, is that these multiple ways of theorising justice beyond the legalistic and retributive are not necessarily or inherently unmeasurable.

Especially, if like Unterhalter (2017), we embrace the idea of measurement as an exercise of negative capability, an exercise that sits with and acknowledges uncertainty, while trying to make practical contributions towards capturing social realities. Seen in this light, measurement is not an end in and of itself but a way of capturing collective aspirations and attempts to move towards achieving them. It is imperfect but worth attempting for the beauty of the goal rather than the precision of the indicator. If we can mobilise the resources to track the number of people and businesses who paid or were asked to pay a bribe (as SDG indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2 require), it is not impossible to imagine or operationalise an indicator that tracks the degree to which a curriculum affords opportunities for epistemic justice or the proportion of educational resources dedicated towards redressing inequalities in outcomes for the most disadvantaged and historically excluded. These measures are bound to be imperfect, as are most if, not all, of the current SDG indicators, but they would be illustrative of a theoretically grounded aspiration for forms of justice that open opportunities for more than a negative peace. This would also offer a new form of evidence to the EiE community, moving away from the need to demonstrably prove that education can prevent conflict and build peace, towards the ongoing, aspirational process of educational change towards justice.

**Author Bio**

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Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Education as a separate dimension of horizontal inequalities

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Abstract
The current paper focuses on the relationship between group-based or so-called horizontal inequalities (HIs) and the emergence of violent conflict. Given the importance of educational HIs as both a direct and indirect driver of (violent) group mobilisation, we argue that it is important to conceptualise educational HIs as a separate dimension of horizontal inequalities.

Key Words
Horizontal inequalities
Violent conflict
Educational inequalities & drivers of conflict

Introduction
Throughout history, the linkages between inequalities and the emergence of violent conflicts have been studied intensively by scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds. Around the turn of the century, research focusing on the inequality-conflict nexus was rekindled by the introduction of Frances Stewart’s (2002) theory concerning horizontal inequality as a cause of conflict. She hypothesised that countries with severe inequalities between culturally-defined or ethnic groups – i.e. horizontal inequalities (HIs) – were more likely to experience conflict because of grievances caused by those inequalities (see Stewart, 2002; 2008). Since then, a large body of empirical research has substantiated the link between HIs and the emergence of violent conflicts.

At the same time that the HI-theory was introduced, an increasing number of conflict and educational scholars started re-thinking and re-assessing the role of education in fostering more cohesive and peaceful societies. In particular, Bush and Saltarelli (2000) argued that while education could help to bring about more cohesive and peaceful societies, it could also contribute to societal tensions and reinforce conflict dynamics. Moreover, educational inequalities in particular can cause and/or aggravate conflict (e.g. FHI 360 EPDC, 2015). While some educational scholars have approached inequalities in education through the prism of HI-theory (see e.g. King, 2015), many do not employ -and are possibly not familiar with- this concept. Conversely, within the HI-literature, educational inequalities are often only used as an indicator for approximating social HIs (see e.g. Fjelde & Østby, 2014). In the current paper,
we examine the role of education within the HI-theory of conflict and critically review the empirical evidence linking HIs in education to conflict, thereby bringing together two strands of literature that have so far hardly communicated. Given the important direct linkages between educational HIs and conflict, as well as the indirect effect that educational inequalities may have through their impact on political, social, economic and cultural status HIs, we conclude that educational HIs should be conceptualised as a separate dimension of horizontal inequalities, and not just a proxy for social HIs.

In the next section, we define the concept of HIs. Section 2 reviews when and under which circumstances (educational) HIs are theorised to lead to violent conflict. Section 3 then reviews the empirical evidence concerning the relationship between (educational) HIs and violent conflicts. Section 4 concludes.

Defining horizontal inequalities

The concept of ‘horizontal inequality’ focuses on inequalities between culturally-defined or ethnic groups. HI differs from so-called ‘vertical inequality’, ‘which lines individuals or households up vertically and measures inequality over the range of individuals’ (Stewart, 2002: 3). HI is a multidimensional concept and can pertain to economic HIs (i.e. inequalities in ownership of assets, incomes and employment opportunities), social HIs (i.e. inequalities in health, social and educational outcomes), political HIs (i.e. inequalities in the distribution of political power and positions as well as opportunities and access to state or parastatal institutions and the judiciary), and cultural status HIs (i.e. differences in recognition and status of different groups’ cultural norms and practices) (Langer and Stewart, 2014).

Until now, education has not been conceptualised as a separate dimension within the HI-framework. Indeed, in most empirical studies, inequalities in terms of educational access and attainment are usually used as an indicator for social HIs (see e.g. Murshed and Gates, 2005; Østby, 2008). In addition to worsening the prevailing social HIs, educational HIs may however also play an important role in sustaining and/or reinforcing the existing economic, political and cultural status HIs (see e.g. Brown, 2011; FHI 360 EPDC, 2015). In this respect the following points are worth noting. First, an ethnic group’s return to education – which depends on having access to education in the first place – determines to a large extent a group’s future economic opportunities and hence socio-economic status in society (Brown, 2011). Second, the education system may also play an important role in sustaining and perpetuating cultural status HIs. In particular, school curricula and textbooks often marginalise minority and/or non-dominant groups by exclusively reflecting the history, culture, values and traditions of the dominant group(s) in society (Al-Haj, 2005). Third, educational HIs may also influence the prevailing HIs in the political-administrative sphere. On the one hand, in situations characterised by severe educational HIs, large proportions of disadvantaged groups may not have the required qualifications or may be facing unfair competition from advantaged groups in society with regard to gaining access to public employment and/or obtaining senior political, administrative and judicial positions. Often, certain educational qualifications are stipulated for such positions. While it is understandable and indeed seemingly appropriate to require certain minimum educational qualifications for specific political-administrative and judicial positions (e.g. an advanced law degree seems to be an appropriate educational prerequisite for a judge), members of disadvantaged groups are less likely to have these qualifications, especially in cases where there are severe educational HIs, and hence are likely to be under-represented in these positions – at least in the absence of some kind of positive discrimination or affirmative action. Further, in some countries, electoral eligibility criteria may bar many people from educationally disadvantaged groups from standing in elections. For instance, in Azerbaijan and Turkey, presidential candidates need to have completed higher education in order to be eligible to participate in the presidential elections. On the other hand, educational HIs may also indirectly affect the prevailing political HIs, in particular perceptions of political HIs. Indeed, in cases where there are sharp educational HIs, which is often associated with less inter-group contact and interaction in the educational sphere, it is likely that group identities become more salient. As a consequence, people particularly from disadvantaged groups may perceive their group’s political exclusion and marginalisation to be worse than in cases where group identities are less salient.
Hence, educational HIs can clearly cause severe grievances by themselves. From a conflict or mobilisation perspective, it is important to note that group grievances caused by severe educational HIs will arguably most acutely be felt by the younger generation in society, because they are the ones most directly negatively affected by these inequalities.

**Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict**

Stewart (2002; 2008) theoretically linked the presence of HIs to the outbreak of violent conflict via a grievance-based discourse. In particular, she argued that HIs are likely to cause profound frustrations and severe grievances among the relatively disadvantaged ethnic groups, which in turn may encourage these groups to mobilise along ethnic lines in order to redress their situation. In the same vein, Cederman et al. (2011: 481) argued that ‘objective political and economic asymmetries can be transformed into grievances through a process of group comparison driven by collective emotions’, which in turn could ‘trigger violent collective action through a process of group mobilization’.

The HI-theory has clear parallels with Ted Gurr’s (1970) theory of relative deprivation, which explains which individuals are most likely to join a rebellion. Later, Gurr (2000) adapted his theory in order to explain which minority groups were most likely to mobilise politically. In particular, he argued that when resentment caused by perceptions of relative deprivation were combined with a sense of cultural group-belonging, minority groups were more likely to mobilise politically, whether violent or not, against the dominant group(s) in society (Gurr, 2000). It is worth noting here that while the ‘relative deprivation theory does not explicitly focus on interpersonal or intergroup wealth comparisons’ (Cederman et al., 2011: 479), the HI-theory ‘explicitly hypothesizes that if there are sharp inequalities between different groups in society, these inequalities may directly lead to violent conflict because the relatively disadvantaged groups will feel aggrieved about their inferior position’ (Langer and Demarest: 2017).

In addition, the HI-theory hypothesises and has empirically shown that it might be the relatively advantaged groups – instead of the relatively disadvantaged or deprived groups – who initiate violence in order to maintain or safeguard their relatively advantaged position in society (Stewart, 2008). Importantly, the emphasis of the HI theory on linking group inequalities via a grievance-based narrative to violent conflict does not preclude the view that violent group mobilisation might be more ‘feasible’ in certain political, economic, regional and geographical contexts and settings (Langer and Stewart, 2014). Moreover, the HI-theory is largely complementary to the conflict feasibility-hypothesis, which draws attention to the feasibility or opportunity of rebellions rather than insurgents’ motivations (see e.g. Collier, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

Recently, a new analytical framework was introduced, which has clear parallels with the HI-framework. The so-called 4R-framework identifies four spheres of influence: Redistribution, Recognition, Representation and Reconciliation (Novelli et al., 2017; see also in this special issue). With the exception of the fourth R (Reconciliation), the 4R-framework largely overlaps with the HI-framework. In particular, inequalities in the distribution of educational resources and opportunities clearly speak to the sphere of redistribution, while grievances over cultural status inequalities seem to overlap with issues of recognition. Further, representation is about whether or not different groups can participate on an equal footing in educational decision-making processes, which points to issues and dynamics of political HIs (Novelli et al., 2017).

**Evidence supporting the link between horizontal inequalities and conflict**

Since Stewart’s (2002) seminal article, many studies have empirically analysed the linkages between HIs and the outbreak of violence, both quantitatively (e.g. Besançon, 2005; Murshed and Gates, 2005) and qualitatively (e.g. Thorp et al., 2006). Research has focused on different types of conflict, including civil war (Gubler and Selway, 2012; Østby, 2008), ethnocommunal conflict (Cederman et al., 2011; Hillesund et al. (2018).

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1This section heavily draws on Langer's earlier work concerning the linkages between horizontal inequalities and violent conflict. We particularly draw on Langer (2005), and Langer and Stewart (2014).

2For a comprehensive literature review on the relationship between horizontal inequalities and violent conflict, please see: Hillesund et al. (2018).
Fjelde and Østby, 2014) and separatist violence (Brown, 2008; Østby et al., 2011). While many studies have studied particular countries and/or regions, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa (see e.g. Fjelde and Østby, 2014; Langer, 2005) and South-East Asia (see e.g. Østby et al., 2011; Murshed and Gates, 2005), other studies have had a global focus (e.g. Cederman et al., 2011; Cederman et al., 2015). These empirical studies show that both advanced and backward ethnic groups are more likely to experience conflict (Cederman et al., 2011); that internal conflict is most intense in the more disadvantaged districts or regions (Murshed and Gates, 2005); and, that particularly regions where the largest ethnic group is severely disadvantaged compared to other groups are more prone to communal conflict (Fjelde and Østby, 2014). It has further been established that countries where the same ethnic groups are politically excluded as well as socio-economically disadvantaged are more at risk of having violent conflict, arguably because in these situations both the political ‘elites’ and ‘masses’ of the relatively deprived groups have strong incentives to mobilise along ethnic lines (Langer, 2005).

As mentioned earlier, in the HI-literature, disparities in access to education and educational attainment levels are often used as a proxy for social HIs. Interestingly, these educational inequalities are positively related to the outbreak of civil conflict (Østby, 2008; see also Besançon, 2005). The likelihood of violent conflict further seems to increase when absolute levels of education are lower (Østby et al., 2009). And, conflict intensity also appears to go up as the gap in schooling between a district and the capital widens (Murshed and Gates, 2005). Yet, to our knowledge, the research by FHI 360 Education Policy and Data Center (2015) is the only study to have explicitly and systematically examined the causal link between HIs in education and violent conflict, using a dataset spanning five decades and almost 100 countries. The study finds that countries where group differences in educational attainment are high are substantially more likely to experience violent conflict – particularly since the 2000s (FHI 360 EPDC, 2015). These findings suggest that over time exclusion from education has become more consequential.

Thus, there is ample evidence to support the hypothesised relationship between HIs and violent conflict. Empirical support for the effect of HIs in education on violent conflict also seems to be growing (e.g. FHI 360 EPDC; Østby, 2008). Yet, so far, research examining the latter issue has remained largely limited to assessing the impact of unequal access to education. Disparities in access to education and/or attainment levels are however just one part of the puzzle. In an effort to meet the Millennium Development Goals, global primary school enrolment levels have overall gone up, suggesting a reduction in inequalities in access to education. Yet, a reduction in overall educational inequalities might well be accompanied by a worsening of group-based inequalities concerning the quality of education. More generally, we argue that applying a HI-perspective to the educational sphere requires going beyond analysing and assessing disparities in access to education and educational attainment levels. While these indicators are extremely important, it is also important to analyse, among other things, whether different groups are included in educational decision-making processes, to what extent different groups are represented among the teachers corps, how different groups are represented in textbooks, to what extent vernacular languages are being recognised as official languages of instruction, and to what extent different groups are able to translate their education into income (i.e. returns to education) and social status in society.

Conclusion: Education as a separate dimension of HIs

The HI-theory of conflict offers an extremely useful framework for analysing conflicts and for understanding when and under which circumstances conflicts and violent group mobilisation are most likely to occur. Since the early 2000s, the theory has been widely supported by empirical evidence linking the presence of horizontal inequalities to violent conflict onsets. Educational HIs have also been increasingly linked to the emergence of violent conflict. Indeed, we have argued that education and, in particular, educational HIs may contribute to

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3. Given that educational HIs are often highly correlated with the level of income, and the level of income in turn is known to be an important explanator for the emergence of violent conflicts, it is crucial to control for countries’ levels of income in any statistical analysis aimed at establishing a relationship between educational HIs and the risk of violent conflict. It is important to note that all the quantitative studies referenced in this paragraph did indeed controlled for different countries’ levels of income.
conflict in at least four ways: (1) Educational HIs may engender severe grievances among disadvantaged groups which in turn could fuel (violent) group mobilisation; 2) Educational HIs may create, maintain or worsen existing socio-economic divisions and inequalities between groups; (3) Educational HIs may both directly and indirectly worsen disadvantaged groups’ access to political-administrative power and position as well as their perceptions of the prevailing objective political HIs; and (4) Education may also contribute to conflict by failing to accommodate cultural diversity (Brown, 2011; see also King, 2015). On the basis of our analysis, we draw the following two conclusions. First, given the importance of educational HIs as both a direct and indirect driver of (violent) group mobilisation, we conclude that it is important to recognise educational HIs as a separate dimension of horizontal inequalities. Thus, rather than conceptualising educational HIs as a sub-dimension of social HIs, we argue for separating it from other aspects of social inequalities, and putting it next to the economic, political and cultural status dimensions. Second, while it is important to empirically analyse and investigate how disparities in access to education and educational attainment levels are associated with the onsets of different types of conflicts, it is crucial, we argue, to broaden and deepen this analysis by also investigating and studying how far different groups are involved, represented and included in educational institutions, decision-making processes and teaching materials. We conclude that there is clear potential here for a cross-fertilisation between the HI-framework and the field of education, peace and conflict.

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Abstract
In this article, we introduce some of the key tenets of Paulo Freire’s pedagogical vision of education for peace, social justice and democracy, and some limitations in terms of its application. In doing so, we aim to demonstrate its relevance and importance to conflict-affected contexts.

Key Words
Conflict
Critical pedagogies
Social transformation
Freire

Introduction
While Paulo Freire did not use the term ‘empowerment’ directly, his emphasis on education as a means to critical consciousness and transformation for social justice provides an important backdrop for social activists concerned with empowering the poor and marginalised (Rai et al., 2007). At its heart lays a pedagogy for empowerment and transformation, with relevance to all those seeking to tackle social injustice in its various forms (gender, race, ethnicity, class, caste to name but a few). As Mayo (2013: 36) suggests, ‘it is an education that is dynamic and which prepares people for a world not as it is, but as it should be’. This alternative vision of education, we believe, can offer a useful tool to engage in educational research, policy making and practice in conflict-affected contexts.

In this article, we will introduce some of the key tenets of Freire’s pedagogy and its relevance to education in conflict-affected contexts, before highlighting some of its limitations. It is not an attempt to present Freire’s vision as a comprehensive or coherent whole, a framework or method. Freire was often the first to deny it could be such a thing (Freire, 1998). Instead, it aims to present some of the key concepts of Freire’s pedagogy and its evolutions under later scholars, to highlight fundamental themes we believe to be relevant to conflict-affected contexts today.

Freire in theory
Central to Freire’s work is the emphasis on the political nature of education. For Freire, education is always for either domestication or liberation.
Traditional education approaches are seen adopting what Freire terms ‘banking education’, where codified knowledge chosen by those who control power in society is inculcated uncritically in learners who are treated as passive recipients (Freire, 2000). Through this process, education can domesticate and normalise political, social and cultural views that serve reproduction of existing power relationships and ideologies of the ruling class (Bourdieu, 1984; Freire, 2000). These processes of indoctrination prevail equally in authoritarian, progressive and democratic societies. Liberal Western education has been criticised for disconnecting learners from the basic principles of humanity such as love, compassion, mutuality and social justice in favour of commercial, market orientated based learning (Bourdieu, 1984; Pherali, 2016). In these contexts, education becomes a means of depositing neo-liberal agendas that serve the capitalist model of society. In contrast, Freire (2000) suggests education can liberate individuals from their acceptance of the status-quo and their inability to effect social change. The educator’s role is to create a learning environment where learners are active and equal participants in a democratic learning process. Knowledge is not possessed by the educator, but co-constructed and co-investigated between participants. Through this process, participants aim to move beyond ‘banking education’ and engage in critical dialogue to raise awareness of social realities (Freire, 2000); or as Ira Shor once put it, ‘extraordinarily re-experiencing the ordinary’ (Shor, 1979). Freire terms this new awareness ‘conscientization’, and believes that with it, individuals can recognise their potential and take action according to their new understanding (Freire, 1974). The goal of conscientization therefore, is not just to deepen understanding, but to invoke ‘praxis’; that is, informed action understood to have the power to challenge oppressive structures (Freire, 1974). Learners then observe and reflect on the impact of their action, drawing on their evolving knowledge, self-efficacy and ability in order to revise their actions in a continuous cycle of learning and engagement (Bajaj, this issue).

Praxis therefore, by its very nature, will manifest in disparate forms, directed by individual’s evolving conscientization and newfound agendas. While at the heart of Freirean pedagogy lay a political agenda for social justice, the conceptualisation of that justice and the means of achieving it lay in the hands of the participants who are encouraged to draw on wider contexts outside the educational setting (Biesta, 1998; Mayo, 2004).

Freire in practice

Freire outlines a literacy method to be used in practice, which can be instrumental for both educators and learners in conflict-affected contexts. The educator’s role is initially to gain knowledge of the community through immersion, interviews and observations. The educator then codifies the information gathered under a number of themes that relate to the participants’ lives. Questions may, for example, orientate around the availability of education, health care, an ongoing conflict or forced migration. Educators then facilitate investigation of these topics, assisted by indirectly related pictures that allow participants to explore the realities of these situations and become gradually aware that the problems in their lives have causes which can be addressed through action. Through a second phase, participants will deconstruct a series of ‘generative words’ that relate to the themes in order to begin to learn the mechanics of the studied language (Taylor, 1993; Freire, 2000). One of the most accessible and extensive resources for its practical implementation today is Reflect (Archer and Cottingham, 1996), a development programme underpinned by the Freirean philosophy of conscientization. Key to the Reflect approach is creating a space of learning where people can feel comfortable to meet and discuss issues relevant to them with the aim of improving their meaningful participation in decision-making and practical action.

Freire in conflict-affected contexts

A number of scholars have highlighted a role for critical pedagogies in a range of disciplines, including globalisation and ecology (Bowers and Apffel-Marglin, 2006), health education and wellbeing (Wallerstein, 2006; Wiggins, 2012), gender (Weiler, 1988), the mitigation of extremism (Davies, 2009) and youth education (McInerney, 2009). One we believe to be particularly relevant to current initiatives in conflict-affected contexts is peace education.
Since the end of the Second World War, peace has often been referred to as the prevention of inter-state conflicts in which education is viewed as a crucial process in socialising young people (Lerch and Buckner, 2018). Today, education is increasingly recognised as key to creating a culture of peace through the transformation of societal divisions and conflict into peaceful and sustainable relationships (UNICEF, 2011). It highlights the importance of not only ceasing violence (negative peace) but challenging the root causes of violence (positive peace); that is, dealing with the structures and cultures that reproduce unequal power and conditions of life chances (Galtung, 1990). These approaches are underpinned by the transformative agendas proposed by Freire (2000) and others in order to enable collaboration and engagement in socially transformative efforts to curb violent and oppressive attitudes, behaviours, knowledge paradigms and social structures, which are key to peaceful coexistence (Gill and Niens, 2014; Bajaj, 2015).

Subsequently, there has been increasing calls over the past decade for a critical peace education. Rooted in a Freirean analysis of consciousness raising it attends to power, local meanings, and enabling voice, participation and agency through the peace education process (Bajaj, this issue).

Critiques and challenges of Freire in conflict-affected contexts

Freirean pedagogies face both theoretical and practical challenges (Blackburn, 2000). We have chosen to focus here on six challenges we perceive to be particularly relevant to conflict-affected contexts today. First, Freire’s binary concepts, such as oppressed vs oppressor, and banking vs liberation, have been challenged as a simplistic understanding of reality that can hide the far more complex lived experience of difference (Taylor, 1993). Pherali (2016: 193) for example, critiques the concept of banking education, suggesting ‘the idea that pupils and educators are passive recipients of hegemonic curricula imposed by the state and can therefore do nothing about the role of education in reproducing social inequalities is essentially flawed’. Instead, therefore, it is important to recognise that resistance to the structural determinants of the education system can also emerge within the autonomy of a school, while simultaneously recognising oppression as an active phenomenon affecting learners’ incentive and ability to constructively do so (Apple, 1995; McLaren, 1998; O’Brien and O’Shea, 2011).

Second, the concept of dialogue as a tool to overcome oppression is criticised for overlooking the potential for open forums to become a microcosm of more complex lived experiences, where intersecting inequalities such as wealth, gender, race and ethnicity exclude or submerge the voices and agendas of the marginalised and in turn risk reinforcing rather than challenging injustices (Ellsworth, 1989; Burbules, 2000; Choules, 2007).

Third, is the possibility that educators may be unable or unwilling to use their position for liberation, instead manipulating those over which they (potentially) have power (Burbules, 2000). For these critics, the assumption that dialogue serves democracy, promotes communication across difference, and enables the active co-construction of new knowledge is contested by its potential to be hijacked in order to promote agendas under the guise of empowerment.

Fourth, despite the development of numerous frameworks for attempting to measure or understand empowerment processes (Zimmerman and Zahniser, 1991; Naraya, 2005; Peterson et al., 2011; Oxfam, 2017), there is still a belief that ‘human agency is indeterminate and hence, unpredictable in a way that is antithetical to requirements of measurement’ (Kabeer, 1999: 462). Yet donors, governments and other stakeholders insist on measurement and translation of programme outcomes into metrics that serve those competing for scarce resources (Kabeer, 1999; Natsios, 2011). Subsequently, practitioners are at risk of being driven towards manipulation of transformative programming into its more measurable ‘banking’ counterpart or are deterred from the implementation of such pedagogies at the outset.

Finally, empowerment programmes underpinned by Freirean pedagogies may be unrecognised and unaccredited, which can compromise learners’ ability to gain access to work or further education and training (Singh, 2018; UNESCO, 2018). As has been the case with Syrian refugee youth, without accreditation and recognition...
of qualifications, prospects for progression into further education or employment opportunities can be diminished and subsequently learners are less likely to engage in non-accredited empowerment programmes (Ahmadzadeh et al., 2014). When learners do enrol in accredited programmes, previous research has found that learners can view critical reflection as antithetical to the goal of gaining accreditation, leading to the manipulation of the programme into its uncritical, banking counterpart (Magee and Pherali, 2017).

Conclusion
This paper has highlighted some of the key tenets of Freire’s vision for an alternative pedagogy, its relevance and importance to conflict-affected contexts and some caveats in terms of its application. It is not intended as a framework or method, but an introduction to some of the principles of a liberatory education aimed at encouraging further exploration of Freirean pedagogies and their interrelated concepts; many of which are introduced in this special edition. By presenting some critiques and challenges to the approach, it has also aimed to highlight areas for future research and action required to realise a Freirean vision of education for peace with social justice.

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References


Refugee education: Backward design to enable futures

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Abstract
This essay explores the use of backward design in classrooms and as an analytic tool for research. Drawing on examples of classroom and research experiences, it proposes a planning template for the use of backward design in refugee education policy and practice, as a way to enable policy and practice to facilitate the futures that refugee young people imagine and aim to create.

Key Words
Refugee education
Backward design
Education policy
Migration

The need for backward design
I remember sitting in a giant ballroom, deep inside a large hotel on the outskirts of Boston. It was just a few months after school had begun for the year, in my first year of teaching. The room was filled with teachers, pencils poised for a day of professional development. Hard to admit, even to myself, was that I was grateful not to be in my own classroom that day. I had a class of grade 6 students who were years behind in their learning, and I was determined to help them become stronger and more confident learners. I did what I had been taught to do during my teacher training and what I reflected on as good practice from my own experiences as a student. I painstakingly planned out each moment of each lesson, created my own materials from primary sources (I was a history teacher), had specific learning goals for each student, took time to get to know each of them, and established spaces for community-building among peers. But no matter how prepared I thought I was, moment to moment I could not predict what might happen that would take me off my charted course and throw me into a situation I did not know how to handle. Several times a day, Markus would stand up, shake his arms out to the side, and sing, at the top of his lungs. Jerome wrote in his journal about a shooting he witnessed the weekend before, just down the street from his house. Keira worried constantly about being evicted from her apartment. And Amaya wished her parents would take her back home to Barbados where at least the sun shone.

As I sat in this ornate ballroom for my professional development, I listened to Grant Wiggins describe his theory of “backward design.” Wiggins was asking

1 All names are pseudonyms.
me to think about my work as a design process, a process that begins by envisioning the end. He asked me to pose questions such as “What should students know, understand, and be able to do? What is worthy of understanding? What enduring understandings are desired?” (Wiggins and McTighe, 1998). I began to wonder how I might use this framework to move from the kinds of questions I had been asking – how do I control what Markus does in the next moment? – to more productive ones. What enduring understandings do I want to work toward with Markus this year? How do they connect to his future aspirations? And what do I think, and what does he think, is worthy of understanding over the long-term?

These questions, inspired by backward design, have become core for me in my work in the field of refugee education, as a teacher, a researcher, and as part of policy discussions. In this essay, I explore the use of backward design in classrooms and as an analytic tool for research. In synthesizing classroom and research experiences, I propose a planning template for the use of backward design in refugee education policy and practice, as a way to enable policy and practice to facilitate the futures that refugee young people imagine and aim to create.

Mindset shifts in the classroom: Now-oriented to future-oriented and system-focused to student-focused

The framework of backward design allowed me, as a teacher, to make two critical, and related, mindset shifts vis-à-vis where to begin my thinking and planning. It prompted me to begin with a future orientation and trace back what that future meant for my decisions and actions in the present. It also prompted me to begin with the student and then situate them within broader systems that influenced their learning.

Beginning with a future orientation

Backward design enabled me to prioritize a future-oriented mindset, situating my simultaneous now-oriented mindset within it. How could I keep forefront in mind my long-term goals for Markus’ learning? Of course, I could not ignore that in order for everyone – himself included – to participate and learn he could not sing at the top of his lungs at any moment. But backward planning allowed me to keep in mind that this singing was one small part of a much larger and more important future-oriented vision for Markus’ learning. When seen in the context of one day, his singing seemed insurmountable as an obstacle to his successful education. When seen in the context of an educational trajectory that spanned several decades, it seemed less consequential and allowed both he and I to have the mental space to address the underlying challenges.

Beginning with a student focus

Backward design enabled me to synthesize a system-focused mindset with a student-focused mindset. How could I plan my lessons in a way that pushed Keira toward meeting society’s standards for what she needed to know and be able to do while at the same time ensuring that, for her, they seemed worthy of understanding, despite the constant threat of eviction? My inclination had been to begin with the curriculum standards for the state and see how I could make Keira fit them. Backward planning helped me to hone my vision on Keira, and beginning from this student-focused place allowed me to see how I could shape the state standards to fit her.

Backward design as an analytic tool for research in refugee education

Fifteen years later, backward design continues to guide my thinking as a teacher, and also my work in research on refugee education. The concepts of beginning with a ‘future orientation’ and beginning with a ‘student focus’ have both emerged from and also served as analytic tools to guide my research.

Beginning with a future orientation

I began doing research in Uganda on refugee education in 2002, not long after my year with Markus, Jerome, Keira, and Amaya. When I spoke with newly arrived refugees, they had energy only to focus on just getting through a day, with conviction that soon they would be returning home. They engaged in what a participant in Cindy Horst’s study in Dadaab, Kenya called ‘don’t die survival’ (as cited in Hyndman and Giles, 2011).

In refugee education policy and practice, the approach was similar, focused on creating
“normalcy” for refugee children, quickly enrolling them in school to create familiar routines (INEE, 2004; Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003). Under this approach, children’s experiences in school, I observed, were remarkably similar to my own first year of teaching. I had been focused on how to get Markus not to burst into song at unpredictable moments. Refugee education at this time focused on passing time safely until refugees could swiftly return home.

In my three-year study following refugee children and their families, I observed families to undergo similar mindset shifts to the ones I underwent as a teacher. Rather than a mindset of “don’t die survival,” over time they began to adopt “future-oriented” mindsets, beginning with an imagined future and planning backwards from there. Central to this mindset shift among refugee families was a changed view of the purposes of education. Rather than a holding ground or just something to do, refugee families in longer-term displacement began to conceptualize education as a central mechanism by which children would create different futures for themselves and their communities (for more on this research in Uganda, see, Dryden-Peterson, 2006a; Dryden-Peterson, 2006b; Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Dryden-Peterson, 2017).

In a recent study of refugee education in 14 countries, we found that actors working at global, national, and school levels identified four possible futures for refugees: resettlement to a distant high-income country, return to the country of origin, integration in the setting of exile, and transnationalism across contexts (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2019). Even though each of these possible futures varies in its likelihood and desirability over time and across contexts, we find that refugee young people both imagine and pursue these multiple futures simultaneously, as an intentional strategy to mitigate the uncertainty of their situations of displacement (see also, Bellino and Dryden-Peterson, 2019; Chopra, 2018; Dryden-Peterson, 2017; Dryden-Peterson, Dahya and Adelman, 2017). Education for refugees needs to account for this volatility and refugee young people’s aspirations within it by enabling refugee young people to develop the skills and knowledge to navigate and create these multiple futures.

Beginning with a student focus

Through our research, we have learned that essential elements of the futures refugee families seek to create are economic livelihoods, social participation, and rebuilding of communities and countries of origin (Bellino and Dryden-Peterson, 2019; Dryden-Peterson, 2017; Dryden-Peterson et al., 2019; Dryden-Peterson and Reddick, 2017). We are particularly preoccupied with what elements of education could enable these futures. Following a backward design approach, we design our research with a student-focus. For example, in one recent study, we decided to begin with one aspiration refugee families identify as enabling the other aspirations outlined above: completing secondary school. Rather than start from the systemic barriers we know from other research impede success, we decided to begin with the students. We wanted to understand how refugee young people achieved this aspiration – with implications both for student actions as well as systemic actions. We thus created a sample of Somali refugee secondary school graduates in Dadaab, Kenya – those who had achieved the aspiration – and asked them about the factors that they perceived to have enabled their success in school (Dryden-Peterson, Dahya and Adelman 2017). Just like in the classroom with Keira, our findings enabled us to document ways in which the system might accommodate to the needs of students, rather than students accommodating to systems. In addition to well-defined structural dimensions of education such as infrastructure, class size, and teacher training, refugee students in our study focused on relational supports as key to their success in school. They described to us the ways they have created diverse networks of support, drawing on local relationships with UN agency and NGO staff members, peers, and teachers as well as global relationships with peers who have migrated elsewhere and other members of Somali diaspora. Students use these relationships to seek guidance on a wide range of topics such as expectations for academic writing, chemistry topics not covered in class but yet examinable, and strategies to negotiate housework and schoolwork, especially among young women. These global relationships of support are virtual, often using Facebook and WhatsApp, and usually beginning as face-to-face relationships, shifting in geography and mode of communication over time.
By framing our research around the question of what factors can enable students’ success in school and examining processes that led to that success, we have been able to identify different and important kinds of academic support that systems are not currently set up to provide in refugee camps but that refugees have accessed in other ways. Beginning with the future-oriented aspirations of graduating from secondary school and synthesizing it with a student focus, our research was able to identify kinds of support that refugee education policy and practice could productively leverage and further create for current and future refugee students.

**Implications: Backward design as an analytic tool in refugee education policy and practice**

The ways in which refugee young people shape their own educational trajectories toward their envisioned futures echo both the theory and substance of Richard Elmore’s work on backward design in policy implementation (1980). He argues that resources directed ‘at the lowest level of the implementation process’ (Elmore 1980) are likely to have the most effect, in particular because “the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control, but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate” (Elmore, 1980). Policymakers and teachers can use backward design both to forward this student focus and enable the kind of education that adopts the future orientation refugee young people and their families espouse.

Figure 1 provides a backward design planning template of questions that policymakers and teachers can ask themselves towards these goals. One of my Masters students, when reflecting on a class session where we discussed backward design, commented that “[b]ackwards seems more forward to me.”² It does to me, too. In asking and seeking to answer all of these future-oriented and student-focused questions for all of the possible futures that refugee young people imagine and work toward, refugee education research, policy, and practice can enable refugee young people to pursue these futures even in the face of on-going uncertainty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backward Design Questions</th>
<th>Possible Futures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future-oriented and student-focused</strong></td>
<td>Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are this students’ aspirations vis-à-vis this possible future?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely is this possible future?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What enduring understandings would enable this possible future?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What practical decisions about curriculum, pedagogy, language, and certification would enable this future?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Planning Template for Refugee Education to Enable Possible Futures

²Anonymous student response survey in course A816 Education in Armed Conflict, Harvard Graduate School of Education, October 2015.
**Author Bio**

**Sarah Dryden-Peterson** leads a research program that focuses on the connections between education and community development, specifically the role that education plays in building peaceful and participatory societies. Her work is situated in conflict and postconflict settings and with Diaspora communities. She is concerned with the interplay between local experiences of children, families, and teachers and the development and implementation of national and international policy. She is on the faculty at the Harvard Graduate School of Education.

**References**


Education, conflict, peace-building and critical realism

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Abstract
Critical realism helps to resolve contradictions between positivism and interpretivism, to analyse levels of reality and of being human, and to research transformative change over time. It is important to take children seriously as active contributors to their communities.

Key Words
Children’s agency
Dialectics
Research theories
Transformative change

Introduction
Critical realism helps to structure international research, and connect the local to the global, and individuals’ lives into their political, economic and geo-historical contexts. Education, conflict and peace-building are processes with interacting causes and effects that occur over time. This paper briefly summarises a few critical realist approaches that are useful to researchers who are analysing these kinds of transformative change. The approaches include: resolving contradictions between neo-positivism and interpretivism; analysing three levels of reality; and working with dialectics beyond dichotomies, on the four planes of social being and through four stages of dynamic change.

On a slightly different topic, the paper ends with a note on the importance of taking children seriously as active contributors in many societies.

Critical realism is not a version or method of sociology, but a philosophy of the social and life sciences. Philosophy might seem to be irrelevant to many researchers, while they hurry to complete practical research and reports on time. Yet sorting out research theories, the basic work of philosophy and sociology, can be the most useful way to raise standards of research (Porpora, 2015).

Until the 1970s, much research was sexist and racist. And because many researchers did not question their own negative underlying beliefs but assumed their theories were natural and inevitable, the theories dominated their work. Feminist and post-colonial critics had to point out the problems, and promote new research theories of greater equality and respect. This paper reviews current taken-for-granted theories, and shows how critical realism helps to identify and resolve the problems they raise.

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**Positivism versus interpretivism**

The problems and limitations of these two main approaches in social research have been widely debated (Alderson, 2013; Moore, 2013; Bhaskar, 1998; Porpora, 2015). Positivist or, as they are often now termed, neo-positivist or post-positivist surveys may be criticised as misleadingly simplistic when they are based on yes/no answers to complex questions. Attempts to measure the effects of a single cause or variable overlook how we live in open systems of countless interacting causal influences. Questions may be poorly worded or irrelevant, and the reported answers may be distorted and misleading. Sampling may not be representative, and individuals become lost within large anonymous groups. Translations between different languages may miss subtle cultural meanings.

These and other problems of positivism lead interpretivists to claim that all meanings are socially constructed through language. Meanings emerge from local contexts and only make sense within them. Data are not independent, with the same intact meaning in any time and place, as suggested in positivist reports, but they are contingent. Interpretivists therefore concentrate on individuals’ narratives set within their context.

However, interpretivism also raises problems. If meanings are truly only locally understood, what is the point of conducting and publishing research internationally? What sense would the reports make to readers in other countries? And if each research site can only be understood in its own terms, how can they be compared, or how can lessons learned from one site be applied to any other site? ‘Cultural relativism’, it is claimed, cannot accept universal rights and values of justice and respect, or universal human experiences of suffering and wellbeing, because local values and experiences are too diverse. Yet this is not cultural but moral relativism, which suspends all universal values (Lukes, 2008). Cultural relativism does respect universal values, although researchers do not assume that their own nation sets the gold standard, and they are as ready to criticise their homeland as any other country. Margaret Mead (1928), for instance, referring to universal concepts of wellbeing, thought that young people in Samoa were happier than those in her native USA. Nevertheless, many neo-positivists and interpretivists still aim to conduct ‘value-free’ research.

**Critical realism: three levels of reality**

Social researchers aiming to promote the values of peace and justice need to convince policy makers and the general public that their work is valid and reliable in its analysis of the causes of social problems and how to prevent and remedy them. When social researchers who work with either generally positivist or else interpretive approaches disagree and cannot convince one another, they are unlikely to impress anyone else. The social researchers who combine fact-based approaches with constructionist paradigms tend to ignore the contradictions between them.

Critical realism helps to resolve these contradictions and other difficulties (Bhaskar, 1998, 2008). First, it recognises 1) the empirical (our thinking-talking responses including narratives, social constructions, facts and statistics) as truth claims; and 2) the actual (events, people, things, structures) as two partial complementary levels of reality. Interpretivists work mainly at the empirical level, concerned with people and events only as they are constructed through narratives. Positivists take the second actual level seriously, but they still reduce it into their empirical reports and graphs. Positivist and interpretive approaches both attend to observable effects (evidence) and they overlook what is termed as 3) unseen causal mechanisms. These are at the third more generalisable level, where deeper critical comparisons, potential remedies and alternatives can be considered (see Table 1).

An example from physics illustrates the three levels: we empirically observe falling objects; the objects are actually falling; the unseen cause is gravity, only known in its effects. An example from peace-building involves: we talk about peace-building (the empirical); we actually work on a dispute, such as restoring houses and land to the people who were evicted from them during recent conflict (the actual); we are driven by our unseen values and longings for peace and justice, which are only seen in our activities (the real). Other groups may believe that the restoration is unfair and that it wrongs them, when they are driven by a different version of justice. Peace-building depends on all concerned reaching enough agreement on their values and on what justice as a causal mechanism actually means in this dispute. Critical realism highlights the importance of values, which...
are central to all social relations (Sayer, 2011), and so is the too-often neglected third level of unseen real causes or causal mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1998). Detailed micro studies can be informed by and nested within macro reports of the political economy that pervades daily life. Both can reveal the effects of hidden causal mechanisms, such as how the World Bank’s policies result in classes of up to 100 children in Tanzania, with pressure on teachers to control them through violent punishments (Yoshida, 2011). All the levels make more sense when examined in relation to one another. Similarly, individual agents and social structures are recognised as different but interacting (Alderson and Yoshida, 2016). Social structures are latent powers and positions (including power, dependency and inequality) that only exist and work through human agency, although human activities are often limited, inadvertent and counterproductive. Small-scale studies enrich broader political analysis, which indicates their wider relevance. Critical realism’s four planar social being helps to organise their inter-connections. The four planes are: 1) human bodies in nature and, for example, how climate change and pollution affect health and survival and can incite migration and conflict; 2) interpersonal relations through which human agents work for peace or conflict; 3) social structures that can be used to incite violence or restore peace; and 4) psychological inner being, and the values and emotions that drive genuine peace-building. All these interacting levels are powerfully involved.

Table 1: Three levels of reality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three levels of reality</th>
<th>Social constructionism/interpretivism</th>
<th>Positivism/post-positivism</th>
<th>Critical realism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical</strong>, talking, recording, stating facts, stats (epistemology, thinking)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual</strong>, events, things, people, structures (ontology, being, doing)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real</strong>, unseen causal mechanisms (gravity, peace, (in)equality, (in)justice, class, gender, values);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dialectical critical realism

Critical realism resolves dichotomies and contradictions into dialectic. For example, positivism and interpretivism, so often seen in contradiction, can work together towards larger pictures of peace-building. For millennia, dialectic has been a dynamic philosophical approach to investigating and discussing truth (Molyneux, 2012). First a thesis or idea is proposed; then antithesis presents disagreements and criticisms; these are resolved into synthesis. Dialectic seeks to combine opposites and resolve contradictions, and so is vital in peace-building, unlike the more usual research method of highlighting dichotomies. Dialectical critical realism involves four stages, but before these are explained, a few of the useful concepts related to dialectic and transformative change over time will be mentioned (Bhaskar, 2008). These include seeing that difference (such as, a new different government) differs from the real alteration of transformative change (the government really does redistribute resources more fairly). Absence allows the empty space and time necessary for movement and change, and powerfully draws us out of the past and into the future. Absence is a driving motivator of human agents in their longing for absent peace and justice. All caring work begins in response to the absences of need, lack and deprivation. Absent events, such as melted glaciers no longer flowing into the Tigris and Euphrates, or the monsoons failing to arrive, have massive effects. These can
be traced through emergence, as when through drought the crops fail and herds die, hunger compels the people to migrate, conflicts begin over scarce resources, politicians attempt to manage migration peacefully, or exploit it to win populist votes. Each stage is more clearly understood as part of the continuing yet also changing emergent chains of events.

Dialectic critical realism works over four stages to research complex dynamic change (Alderson, 2016; Bhaskar 2008; Norrie, 2010). First, as with anthropology, there is the search for underlying meanings, problems and influences, such as the origins of mass displacement. Second, interventions are made or observed, intended to resolve the problem of forced displacement, to help the displaced people and preserve peace. The third stage examines the larger international context to see how famines or wars force migration, which can only be prevented when these origins are addressed. Fourth, there is reflection on how everyone’s inner being, their beliefs and values, can promote or block change. The great need for this careful analysis is shown when politicians intervene at stage two, with plans to send migrants home, or build a wall, and ignore the other three vital stages in real peace-building.

Researching childhood in conflict-affected contexts

On the topic of re-examining taken-for-granted theories, this final section looks at how dominant theories of childhood also need to be revised. In Uganda and Niger, the median age is 15 years. These societies depend on many children being active workers alongside the adults. Campaigns against child labour cannot help children who are able to attend school only if they can earn enough to pay for their food and school fees. Researchers and young workers are, therefore, together promoting the children’s rights to work with dignity, not to be abused or exploited, and to be able to attend both school and work (https://www.childrenandwork.net/resources/).

This important form of conflict prevention helps children: to be both educated and employed; to gain skills and contacts likely to help them for years to come; to avoid the extreme poverty, hunger and deprivation that fuel violence and conflict; and to avoid needing to join an army as the best way to earn an income. Many children report being pleased to help to support their family, and in Rajasthan, for example, working children organise their own evening schools (John, 2003). If researchers are to understand and support the children’s best interests, they have to re-theorise childhood, to take children’s own views seriously and respect even young children as competent research participants. Researchers of childhood studies (who criticise traditional child development theory) have been doing so for over 30 years (Alderson, 2013; 2016).

Critical realism is not a method. It helps researchers to analyse the theories and beliefs that underlie their range of research methods, qualitative or quantitative, interpretivist or more positivist/realist. Van Ingen (2017) shows how critical realism helps researchers to resolve the ‘crisis of theory and practice’ in conflict studies and neo-positivism, to engage with contexts, and to develop more sophisticated and coherent understandings of causality. This brief review highlights the relevance of critical realism in the field of education, conflict and peace-building and I hope, it will encourage readers to consider how it might assist in their research.

Author Bio

Priscilla Alderson has worked in children’s services and advocacy since the 1960s and in sociological research since the 1980s. Her research interests include children’s rights, wisdom, competence and consent. Her books include those mentioned in the references and also Young children’s rights: Exploring beliefs, principles and practice (2008, Jessica Kingsley/Save the Children, 2nd edition), and with C Goodey Enabling education: experiences in special and ordinary schools (2018, Tufnell Press, 2nd edition). The revised fourth edition of The ethics of research with children and young people: A practical handbook (with Virginia Morrow, Sage) will be published in 2020.
References


Achieving educational rights and justice in conflict-affected contexts

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Abstract
This paper conceptualises how ideas of rights and justice can be brought together in relation to education, with a focus on conflict-affected regions of the world. In doing so, it seeks to highlight how to support transformative solutions and guarantee the rights of millions of children currently lacking meaningful access to schooling, we must move beyond seeing these two concepts as separate discourses, but rather, as deeply intertwined.

Key Words
Peacebuilding
Rights
Social justice
Education

Introduction
Since the founding of the UN following World War II, successive international declarations, covenants, and conventions—such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)—have established a legal commitment on the part of individual nation-states to ensuring that all children have access to quality education free of bias and discrimination. Several criticisms have been raised of such commitments, however, including the fact that such commitments have proven hard to operationalise, with no clear mechanism for ensuring accountability or political will to such ambitions (Colclough, 2005; McCowan, 2011).

Passage of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) sought to rectify this by creating time-bound, specific targets which set a minimum expectation in terms of how such a right could be realised—namely through universal enrolment in primary schooling. Subsequent years saw increasing numbers of students attending school, but often in situations where education remained inadequate to the needs of learners, their communities, and societies as a whole; a product of the narrowing of the expansive agenda for education set out in earlier commitments, to a minimalist agenda which focussed on a one-size-fits-all model of education through formal schooling (see for example, Robeyns, 2006). This reductionist view of the expansive rights-based framework, and the absence of a social justice framework for education provision, was (and still is) particularly problematic in conflict-affected context (CACs) where the nature, quality and perceived (ir)
relevance of education service provision acts as a driver for conflict (see for example Shah and Lopes Cardozo, 2015).

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which give explicit focus to educational quality and equity, in addition to access (Goal 4), as well as a separate goal for peaceful and inclusive societies (Goal 16), have provided opportunities to resolve this to some degree by recognising the intersectoral nature of sustainable development (UN SDG Knowledge Platform, 2018). Complementing this idea, the Incheon Declaration, specifies that ‘education is essential for peace, tolerance, human fulfilment and sustainable development,’ but stops short of specifying how or whether this is always the case. These global goals, however, are not legally binding, and are rather short on detail about how this might be achieved.

In light of this renewed mandate at the global level to understand the relationship between education and sustainable, peaceful and equitable development, we aim in this short article to conceptualise how ideas of rights and justice can be brought together in relation to education, with a focus on conflict-affected regions of the world. In doing so, we work from an understanding of peacebuilding that sees specific attention to ideas of educational access, equity and relevance as necessary to build sustainable peace—or positive peace—defined as the absence of structural violence, the presence of social justice and the conditions to eliminate the causes of violence (Galtung, 1975, in Smith, McCandless, Paulson and Wheaton, 2011: 12–13).

An expanded notion of access to education

One of the most significant challenges with the narrow definition of access to education defined under the MDGs was that it failed to recognise the individual and contextual circumstances which enable or constrain individuals to fully realise such a right. A strong and valid critique of rights-based provision to education, as enacted, is that while it helps to establish education as a fundamental entitlement for all citizens, it may lack recognition of other entitlements and preconditions which might be necessary for individuals to exercise such a right (see for example Bonal, 2007; Nussbaum, 2004). As McCowan (2011: 287) rightfully contends, ‘The existence of a citizen’s right to education, therefore, is inadequate if citizens are viewed as disembodied political subjects: factors of gender, social class, race/ethnicity amongst others have a strong impact on the ability to construct, exercise and defend rights’. In CACs, specifically, poverty, gender, ethnicity, and geography – amongst other aspects—all have a role in determining levels of educational deprivation in such circumstances (UNESCO, 2011). In other words, to ignore horizontal and vertical inequalities in society, and presume that provision focused on universalism is appropriate is problematic at best, and dangerous at worst—in terms of fueling alienation and false hopes for education (Novelli and Smith, 2011).

Likewise, it does not sufficiently consider the differential needs, aspirations and expectations individuals have for education—or the valued functionings—that education may serve as an end in itself or as a means to other valued functionings (Sen, 1999). Katarina Tomaševski (2001) put forth the argument of the indivisible and interdependent nature of rights in relation to education and argued that this ‘right’ must be teased apart in different directions. It includes: (a) the right to education (relating to access), (b) rights in education (protection of and respect for all learners) and rights through education (development of capacities for exercising human rights). In other words, individuals must not only have access to education, but also have their full rights upheld, and capacities for exercising their rights strengthened.

Tomaševski’s (2003) 4As framework—based on concepts of availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of education—helps us to understand what meaningful access to education might look like. It enables a more comprehensive look at critical areas of concern and potential niches for innovation in relation to the role of education in conflict-affected settings. Availability for example means that education is free (government-funded) and that there is adequate infrastructure, a safe environment and trained teachers to support education delivery. Accessibility refers for instance, to a system of education which for all learners is unencumbered by any type of barrier—meaning that it should be free of discrimination, safely accessible to all, free and/or affordable depending on the circumstances of the community—and that proactive steps are taken to include the most marginalised. Acceptability translates into content of education
that is relevant, non-discriminatory, culturally appropriate, and of quality. Finally, adaptability means that education can evolve with the changing needs of society and contribute to challenging inequalities, such as gender discrimination, and that it can be adapted locally to suit specific contexts (Newman, 2011: 24).

**Justice through and with education**

It is important to identify what distinguishes education serving a positive and transformative, rather than a reproductive, role in CACs, particularly if the goal is to build a lasting peace. We believe this necessitates specific engagement with multiple barriers to meaningful access for individual learners and communities, in light of the limitations noted with the universalism ascribed by the rights-based discourse to date. Concomitantly, we argue that any educational framework that attempts to seriously work towards an objective of building sustainable peace through education would need to prioritise considerations of equity rather than equality, prioritising the concept of social justice.

Nancy Fraser’s (2005: 73) 3R framework asserts that in order to reach ‘parity of participation’, the economic solution of redistribution should be targeted, and socio-cultural remedies of better recognition and political representation are necessary to ensure ‘participation on par with others, as full partners in social interaction’. Fraser (1995: 82, 86) also characterises two types of remedies to social injustices including ‘affirmative remedies’, which correct outcomes without changing structural frameworks; and ‘transformative remedies’, correcting outcomes by restructuring the underlying generative framework. Reflecting on this work, Keddie (2012: 15) claims that ‘Fraser’s model should not be offered as an ideal of justice that is static and uncomplicated but rather as a productive lens for thinking about and addressing some of the key ways in which different dimensions of injustice are currently hindering the schooling participation, engagement and outcomes of marginalised students’. Furthermore, Tikly and Barrett (2011: 3–4) argue how in developing contexts a social justice approach, drawing on the work of Nancy Fraser and Amartya Sen, ‘can provide a fuller rationale for a policy focus on education quality than that provided by a human capital approach with its emphasis on economic growth or by the existing human rights approach with its emphasis on the role of the state in guaranteeing basic rights.’

Combining Fraser’s theory with various insights of scholars working on the relation between education and social justice, we have argued in earlier publications (see Shah and Lopes Cardozo, 2015; Lopes Cardozo and Shah, 2016; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2017) that there are four interrelated goals to ascertain education’s contribution towards social justice/peacebuilding agendas in CACs. These are:

1. **Redistribution**
   To ensure equitable access to safe and secure educational opportunities and resources for all;

2. **Recognition**
   To acknowledge and support diverse perspectives, identities, communities and individuals through a relevant and adaptable learning opportunities;

3. **Representation**
   To ensure fair and transparent representation and responsibility for educational decision-making and resource allocation;

4. **Reconciliation**
   To acknowledge and support (educational and public) debate about the past and its relevance to the present and future, enhance levels of trust (in government and between groups).

In these previous publications, we have explored what this might look like and why these dimensions are important. As we discussed in these publications, and in other work developed through the Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding, it is often a lack of recognition, insufficient representation, and unequal distribution of resources which fuels grievances of citizens against the state or other education service providers, and stands in the way of reconciliation.

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1. See [https://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/rp/research-consortium-education-and-peacebuilding](https://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/rp/research-consortium-education-and-peacebuilding) for the full list of resources produced under this consortium.
Bringing these ideas together

The 4Rs provides a more expansive view of what we mean when we discuss equity in education. Yet, one of the challenges we face at present is that inequities in education are oftentimes reduced to matters of distribution, either in relation to inputs (access) or outputs (learning outcomes). This, according to Unterhalter (2014: 865), yields a social policy environment which then struggles to understand how inequalities are multidimensional in nature. She argues for improved ‘knowledge resources… for gathering information or reflexively engaging with complex inequalities,’ of which we believe a combined 4Rs and 4As model might provide a useful starting point for analysis.

Yet, this expanded notion of rights, when brought into a social justice framework such as the 4Rs, cannot be conceptually mapped in a correlational way. In other words, concepts of accessibility extend beyond the notion of (re)distribution, and also have embedded notions of recognition and representation. Similarly, adaptability, while having a strong link to the concept of recognition, is equally relevant to ideas of (re)distribution and representation. The table below is an attempt to map these interrelationships, with specific attention to education in conflict-affected contexts. In doing so, we draw on key actions from across the INEE Minimum Standards (2010) to suggest what this might look like. We acknowledge that the seemingly separate categories, distinctions, and boundaries between concepts presented in such a table are artificial in nature, with each of these concepts and associated action very much interconnected (illustrated by the dotted lines separating the cells in the table). In addition, while useful for this analytical exercise, we observe that these Minimum Standards place most emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of communities and local actors, while from a 4Rs (and 4As) perspective, there is clearly also a shared responsibility for governmental institutions.

What such an analysis does is that it allows us to recognise that thinking through educational access and equity concerns concurrently requires both an intersectional as well as intersectoral lens, respectively acknowledging the intersectional, hybrid dimensions of opportunity and disadvantage (including geography, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexuality, social class, and so forth, Crenshaw, 1991) and the multiple sectors involved in sustainable processes of peacebuilding. For example, Tomasevski (2003) stresses that availability is about education being available as a political, social, economic and cultural right. What this means is that availability extends beyond ensuring sufficient (economic) resourcing, to also make sure that the form of education that is available recognises the (socio-cultural, e.g. religious) needs of learners, and sufficiently engages and has the community viewpoints represented in key decisions about the form and shape such provision takes. Similarly, accessibility is more than just ensuring that students have a right to go to school, but also to ensuring that the learning they access is safe, inclusive, protective and reinforced through community engagement and support. This necessitates education being suitably adaptable to ensuring that for all individuals in the system, including those belonging to marginalised groups in society, their human rights are safeguarded and enhanced. Finally, we believe that only when learners, their families and their community accept the education which is provided—which is promoted through effective mechanisms of redistribution, recognition, and representation—will it serve to strengthen rather than erode the social contract between citizens and the state, and support reconciliation towards envisioning and developing an alternative, more just future.

Conclusion

We contend that only when education is meaningfully accessible to all, and is provisioned in ways that are equitable rather than equal, can it effectively contribute to what Fraser (1995) termed a ‘transformative remedy’. Bringing the 4As and 4Rs together, helps us to focus on the intersectional and intersectoral dimensions of opportunity and disadvantage which cannot be solely understood by singular classifications or disaggregation of groups by location, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexuality, social class, or other identify markers, or by seeing education as an isolated sector disconnected from other socio-cultural, economic and political developments. When connecting the 4As to the 4Rs, it also lends to advocacy for comprehensive and longer-term educational interventions in conflict-affected environments, to ensure that the restoration and expansion of access goes hand in hand with considerations about equity and appropriateness, and towards imagining a different future for the potential of education in society.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applying 4As and 4Rs</th>
<th>Availability</th>
<th>Accessibility</th>
<th>Acceptability</th>
<th>Adaptability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Redistribution</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient resources are available and ensure continuity, equity and quality of education activities</td>
<td>Barriers to enrolment, such as lack of documents or other requirements, are removed</td>
<td>A representative committee selects teachers and other education personnel based on transparent criteria and an assessment of competencies, taking into account community acceptance, gender and diversity (in all forms)</td>
<td>A range of flexible, formal and non-formal education opportunities is progressively provided to the affected population to fulfil their education needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognition</strong></td>
<td>Teachers and other education personnel acquire the skills and knowledge needed to create a supportive learning environment and to promote learners’ psychosocial well-being</td>
<td>Schools and learning spaces are linked to child protection, health, nutrition, social and psychosocial services</td>
<td>Curricula, textbooks, language of instruction and supplementary materials are appropriate to the age, developmental level, language, culture, capacities and needs of learners</td>
<td>The education programme in refugee contexts is recognised by the relevant local education authorities and the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient, locally procured (and produced) teaching and learning materials are provided in a timely manner</td>
<td>Through sensitisation and training, local communities become increasingly involved in ensuring the rights of all children, youth and adults to quality and relevant education</td>
<td>Parents and community leaders understand and accept the learning content and teaching methods used</td>
<td>The community contributes to decisions about the location of the learning environment, and about systems and policies to ensure that learners, teachers and other education personnel are safe and secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconciliation</strong></td>
<td>Promoting protection and emotional, physical and social well-being by including psychosocial support for learners and teachers, facilitators and care-givers.</td>
<td>Depending on the context and security concerns, communities or community education committees may take responsibility for the protection of schools (e.g. provide escorts, identify trusted community or religious leaders to teach in and support schools).</td>
<td>Conflict resolution and peace education content and methodologies may enhance understanding between groups, by providing communication skills to facilitate reconciliation and peacebuilding. Care is needed in the implementation of peace education initiatives to ensure that communities are ready to address contentious or painful issues.</td>
<td>In civil conflicts, community members may help promote negotiations with both sides of the conflict to develop codes of conduct that make schools and learning sites safe sanctuaries or ‘zones of peace’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Author Bio

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References


Conceptualising critical peace education for conflict settings

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Abstract
This article explores the conceptual frameworks of critical peace education and their relevance for scholars and practitioners working in conflict settings. Insights and frameworks for analysing violence are offered from existing theoretical models and built upon to address the complexity of contemporary conflicts and the role of education within them.

Key Words
Conflict Education Peace Agency

Introduction
At the intersection of peace, conflict and education lie many potential realities, including (1) education for indoctrination and the perpetuation of violence; conversely, (2) education contributing to peace, human rights and social justice; and, (3) instances in which educated members of a society, or schools in particular, come under attack from non-state actors or are targeted by state violence. Initiatives towards peacebuilding through education exist across the globe with differing conditions, orientations, and objectives. In order to contribute to the ongoing global conversation on peace education, this article explores the following question: what can the conceptual frameworks of critical peace education offer to scholars and practitioners working in conflict settings? The term ‘conflict settings’ used in this article is inclusive of armed conflict, protracted conflict, post-conflict, and underlying forms of social, economic and political conflict that have not erupted in widespread violence. This article first charts the conceptual underpinnings of peace education followed by a discussion of the rise of critical peace education and insights from this subfield for scholarship and educational practice in conflict settings.

Critical peace education in context
Peace education is a field of scholarship and practice that utilises teaching and learning not only to dismantle all forms of violence, but also to create structures that build and sustain a just and equitable peace (Bajaj and Hantzopoulos, 2016). Since World War II, peace education has formally emerged as a field of scholarship and practice that is global in scope. One seminal moment in the field’s early creation was at the 1964 convening of peace studies.
scholars through the International Peace Research Association at which a call was issued for ‘peace research, peace action, and peace education,’ noting the important role that education can play in dismantling structures of violence and promoting peace (Galtung, 1973: 317).

Betty Reardon, a pioneer in the field of peace education, has highlighted the need to teach about peace as well as to teach for peace. In other words, peace education requires ‘the transmission of knowledge about requirements of, the obstacles to, and possibilities for achieving and maintaining peace; training in skills for interpreting the knowledge; and the development of reflective and participatory capacities for applying the knowledge to overcome problems and achieve possibilities’ (Reardon, 2000: 399). Peace education thus requires transforming content, pedagogy, structures, educational practices, relationships between educators and learners, and the systems by which we measure the outcomes of education as well.

Scholars have importantly distinguished between two core concepts in the field of peace studies, namely ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’ (derived from the work of Galtung, 1969). Negative peace is defined as the absence of direct, physical violence. Direct violence is exemplified by torture, war, militarism, rape and other forms of aggression; efforts to promote negative peace include disarmament and peacekeeping initiatives. Positive peace requires the absence of structural and cultural violence and emphasises the promotion of human rights to ensure a comprehensive notion of social justice. Indirect violence, according to seminal peace studies scholar Johan Galtung (1969), refers to structural and cultural forms of violence—systems such as racism, sexism, colonialism, culturally-condoned exclusion, among others—that privilege some to the marginalization of others. The identification and analysis of the many forms of violence—through critical and participatory education and dialogue—offer a necessary prerequisite to any efforts to interrupt violence in all its forms and prevent its further spread. Education further plays a significant role in promoting both negative and positive peace by equipping individuals with the knowledge, skills and values required to interrupt and transform historical modes of domination that permeate the education system.

Birgit Brock-Utne (1989) identifies different levels at which violence must be addressed from a feminist perspective, distinguishing between the ‘organized’ level, referring to state involvement or negligence to act despite knowledge of violent acts, and the ‘unorganized’ level, highlighting violence that occurs in micro-structures, such as in families and communities (Bajaj and Hantzopoulos, 2016). One such example of the latter is Galtung’s concept of cultural violence, which often occurs at the unorganised level through practices that are culturally legitimised (and often strongly tied to structural inequalities) (1990). For example, while illegal across all of India, the practice of female infanticide remains rampant in many parts of the country. A recent article noted that when the value of gold increases (and hence raises the expectations of the dowry amount by an eventual groom’s family, although dowry is also technically illegal), the rate of female infanticide increases (Bhalotra, 2018). This example demonstrates how ‘cultural’ practices are also deeply informed by economic realities and unequal social relations that render girls’ lives disposable in conditions of scarcity. By understanding the root causes and manifestations of different forms of violence, peace education—through analysis, critical thinking and informed action—seeks to disrupt and dismantle them.

In recent years, there has been a rise in critical approaches to peace education that both bring in theory from a variety of disciplinary frameworks, as well highlight marginalised voices and histories to inform peace education theory and practice (Bajaj, 2008; 2015; Brantmeier, 2011; Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011; Bajaj and Hantzopoulos, 2016). As Brantmeier and Bajaj (2013: 145) have argued:

**Critical approaches offer peace educators and researchers the contextual and conceptual resources for understanding the structural impediments to advancing the possibility and promise of peace education in diverse locales across the globe. Rather than status quo reproduction, critical approaches in peace education and peace research aim to empower learners as transformative change agents (Freire, 1970) who critically analyze power dynamics and intersectionalities among race, class, gender, dis/ability, sexual orientation, language, religion, geography, and other forms of stratification.**
Critical peace education in particular considers the ways in which human agency dynamically interacts with structures and forms of violence; and, in turn, contemplates the potential for educational spaces—formal and informal—to be sites of individual and collective transformation (Brantmeier, 2011; Bajaj, 2008; 2015). What distinguishes critical peace education from ‘regular’ peace education are some key underlying principles. First, while all peace educators draw from analyses of violence, critical peace educators pay attention to how unequal social relations and issues of power must inform both peace education and corresponding social action. Second, critical peace education pays close attention to local realities and local conceptions of peace, amplifying marginalised voices through community-based research, narratives, oral histories and locally-generated curricula. Lastly, critical peace education draws from social reproduction theory (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1976) and critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970) to view schools as both potential sites of marginalisation and/or transformation (See also, Hantzopoulos, 2015). Further, it considers multiple spaces within and outside of state-run schools—which often serve as forces of exclusion—as conduits for possibility, liberation, and social change (Bajaj, 2015; Bajaj and Hantzopoulos, 2016). Critical peace education is similar to transformative human rights education in this way as they both question the normative prescriptions offered in each field, and suggest more sustained attention to local context and knowledge generated by communities and social movements (Bajaj et al., 2016).

When examining the root conditions of violence, as critical peace education requires before designing any type of intervention, the conflict triangle developed by Galtung (1969) offers a useful tool and a holistic assessment mechanism that forces us to look beyond the surface-level of direct violence. In this modified conflict triangle for critical peace education in Figure I, Brock-Utne’s (1989) levels of violence are added in and the forms of violence are deliberatively historicised to take into account legacies of colonialism, genocide, forced displacement and other forms of exclusion that endure long past their official end.

Figure 1: Galtung’s conflict triangle reconfigured

Applying Galtung’s triangle, it becomes evident that there are always larger historical and structural forces that cause manifestations of direct violence. Through such an analysis, most societies are indeed ‘in conflict,’ not just those experiencing outbreaks of direct or armed conflict (indeed, the United States is a prime example of a conflict-ridden society where police brutality, state-sponsored violence and disregard for international humanitarian law are rampant, though it is rarely considered a ‘conflict zone’ in conventional analyses). In the following section, the analytical tools of critical peace education offer useful frameworks for exploring conflict and its causes.

Insights from critical peace education for conflict settings

When examining violence (structural, cultural or direct), several tools emerge from peace education and its critical variant. As Figure I demonstrated, analyses of violence require not only different understandings of forms, but also levels, as well as historical tracing of the roots of violence. Tailored efforts to intervene in conflict, and studies of them, constitute much of the field of peace education with varying degrees of knowledge about the context. In Figure II, the Core Competencies for Critical Peace Educators and Learners that I developed in 2014 are slightly modified for conflict settings to situate the learner and researcher within a holistic framework for analysing violence and possibilities for peace (Bajaj, 2015).
Conflict mapping
What are the historical roots of this conflict? Who benefits from conflict? What power relations and asymmetries in material conditions contribute to this conflict?

Agency and social location
What forms of individual and collective agency might be possible given the conditions? What factors and strategies are needed for such agency to be sustained and long-lasting?1

Critical thinking and analysis: What narratives are being presented (in the media, textbooks, etc.)? What are other narratives? Who controls the production of narratives? How might we interrogate received notions of identity and unequal forms of citizenship?

Participation and solidarity
What forms of participation are possible and meaningful? How might trauma influence the forms of participation that can be taken, and what forms of individual and collective healing might be required before action is possible? What solidarities are needed for the advancement of peace and human rights in this context?

Each of the elements listed above may contribute to the preparation of the learner-actor who is equipped with the skills and capacities to teach for comprehensive visions of peace in a variety of settings. Critical peace education efforts would do well to engage in Freire’s (1970) cycle of praxis wherein action is taken, reflected upon and analysed, then revised for new action in a continuous cycle of learning and simultaneous social and political engagement.

There are many more competencies that may be elaborated depending on context, and the educator should undertake a situational analysis attending to the power dynamics in a particular setting before engaging in any form of peace education.

Concluding thoughts
Critical peace education offers frameworks for conflict analysis that can provide a foundation for any effective intervention or research endeavour in what we consider emergency contexts and other contexts that are not engaged in violent conflict. Ahistorical and short-term projects that do not attend to the roots of conflict offer band-aid ‘solutions’ that may actually exacerbate violence rather than contribute to its mitigation. The questions posed above under the competencies in Figure 11 can be useful for guiding further scholarship in critical peace education by utilising such analyses for inquiry and research. For example, a recent dissertation completed by Ion Vlad at the University of San Francisco (2018) draws on critical peace education to understand the narratives, intentions and pedagogical approaches of peace and human rights museums in North America. Another recent dissertation by Katie Zanoni at the University of San Francisco (2018) examines continuities and disjunctures between peace education discourse at the national level in Kenya and local-level practice through a school for girls focused on educating for peace and leadership.

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1I have theorised notions of agency and social location more extensively in my multi-year research on human rights education in India (Bajaj, 2012) and also discussed its role in education for peace, human rights and social justice in a recent article (Bajaj, 2018).
(Zanoni, 2017). Such forms of scholarship—neither of which in a context of armed conflict, but where diverse forms of conflict drive extreme inequalities and disparate social conditions—contribute to the larger field, as well as informing practice on the ground and offering reflections on the possibilities of such work as well as potential contradictions and constructive reflections for the practitioners involved.

Critical peace education aims to better align the promise of education for peace and greater justice with more effective tools for inquiry and practice in order to better realise this expansive vision. The frameworks offered here can contribute to discussions of education in conflict and emergency education, as well as in other settings, and such a dialogue between fields is indeed necessary and generative. As international initiatives and funding streams, such as through DFID, USAID, Dubai Cares, etc., continue to concentrate necessarily on education in conflict and emergency contexts, attention must be paid to research and practice grounded in local knowledges and to expanding sites and opportunities for transformative education for social change.

Author Bio

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References


The ‘4 Rs’ as a tool for critical policy analysis of the education sector in conflict affected states

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Abstract
In this text, we discuss the 4Rs framework that we have designed as an analytical tool that allows researchers, policy-developers and practitioners to grasp the interconnected dimensions that shape and drive education systems, practices and outcomes in conflict affected contexts. The framework’s central normative position is that inequalities and injustice (including within the education system) are important for understanding the reasons for the outbreak of violent conflict (the drivers of conflict) and that addressing inequalities (including in education), and the legacies of conflict, are necessary to bring about sustainable peace and overcome the legacies of conflict.

Key Words
Sustainable peace
Social justice
Conflict
Education

Introduction
Since 2000, there has been a growing recognition of both the importance of working in conflict-affected contexts and the growing evidence of the very particular effects of conflict on educational access and quality and vice versa – the importance of education in driving conflicts or building peaceful societies (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008). This has also led to an interest in understanding the particularities of the educational challenges faced in conflict-affected contexts, and to a growing recognition that policy makers, donors and practitioners working in the education sector in conflict-affected contexts are faced with huge and distinct challenges and priorities requiring new and innovative ways of funding, planning, governing and evaluating education policy interventions.

As a result of this rising interest, the literature on education and conflict has expanded greatly over the last decade (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith, 2003; Novelli, 2014). There is also interest in better understanding the relationship between education, conflict and peace and the way education systems might become more conflict sensitive (Novelli and Smith, 2012). Linked to this is interest in political economy research in the sector, and a mushrooming of political economy tools to facilitate policy development and planning (Novelli et al., 2014).

In this paper, we want to outline one such tool – the 4Rs Framework. This framework was developed with colleagues from the University of Amsterdam and Ulster University and applied to date in research in eight conflict-affected contexts (Pakistan, Rwanda, South Sudan, Kenya, Myanmar, Uganda, etc.).
Rwanda and South Africa) to examine educational governance and policy in relation to education, conflict and peace. The framework’s central normative position is that inequalities and injustice (including within the education system) are important for understanding the reasons for the outbreak of civil wars (the drivers of conflict) and that addressing inequalities (including in education) is necessary to bring about sustainable peace and overcome the legacies of conflict.

When reflecting on inequalities, we had a strong sense that we needed to go beyond the economic. For this reason, we drew on a version of Nancy Fraser’s theory of social justice, exploring educational inequalities more broadly in terms of Redistribution, Recognition and Representation (Fraser, 1995; 2005). In our understanding of these concepts they were linked respectively to economic inequalities relating to the funding and management of education (Redistribution); inequalities and injustices related to cultural representation and misrecognition (Recognition); and finally, inequalities linked to participation and democratic deficits in the governance and management of education (Representation). These 3Rs helped us to explore different dimensions of educational inequalities (economic, cultural and political) – as drivers of conflict, in education. We also added a 4th R (Reconciliation), which allowed us to explore not only the potential drivers of conflict, but also the legacies of conflict and how education might bring communities together through processes of healing and psycho-social interventions and transitional justice (truth, justice and reparations).

We believe that there is a dialectical relationship between the drivers of conflict and the legacies of conflict and that we need to reflect carefully on the balance between addressing inequalities and developing processes that build trust within and between communities affected by conflict. That is to say that a political discussion is needed to balance the needs of historically marginalised communities who demand reforms to redress inequalities and the need for policies to be inclusive of both victims and perpetrators who would need to live side by side and reconstruct new relationships out of the violence and pain of war. The ‘4Rs’ approach thus allowed us to develop a theoretically informed heuristic device to explore the multi-dimensional ways that education systems might produce or reduce educational and societal inequalities and in so doing undermine or promote sustainable peace and development in and through education.

As with much of the work in our field of inquiry, we sought to develop a tool that was policy relevant – but one which was unashamedly informed by ideals of promoting peace with social justice – which we continue to believe is the only way that long term sustainable peace can be achieved in countries affected by conflict. We developed the 4Rs approach as a heuristic device to support the process of design, data collection, and analysis in order to reflect on the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in supporting the positive role that education might play in conflict affected contexts. Our aim is that this framework becomes a diagnostic tool that will spark a dialogue among key stakeholders and be adapted in ways relevant to different cultural, political, and economic contexts (see Figure 1).

While the approach and its application remains a work in progress, it already allows for a much sharper focus on the complex ways that inequalities within education, in their multiple and varied manifestations, might be linked to conflict drivers. Furthermore, it allows us to go beyond the narrow ‘access’ and ‘quality’ debates prevalent in the field of education and international development – both from a human capital and a rights-based perspective - and allow us to reflect more holistically on the education systems’ relationship to economic, social, cultural and political development processes and its role and relationship to the production of inequalities that fuel the grievances that often drive conflicts.

**Recognising the tensions within and between social justice and reconciliation**

Building on Fraser’s (2005) work, we position the potentially transformative role education can play as inherently connected to and embedded in processes of social justice and societal transformation. Fraser, a philosopher by training who departs from but is not limited to a critical feminist perspective, asserts that a socially just society would entail ‘parity of participation.’ She argues further that, to ensure ‘participation on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction’ (Fraser, 2005: 73), one should adopt the economic solution of redistributing resources and opportunities and include sociocultural remedies for better recognition and political representation.
It is important to note that, in keeping with Fraser’s line of thought, while the dimensions of the 4Rs are separated for analytical purposes, they are actually closely interlinked. We also need to acknowledge how internal relations between these ‘Rs’ can be reinforcing or conflictive. For example, recognising formerly excluded ethnic languages in education and redistributing resources to train teachers and develop material to enhance this process could lead to greater representation of ethnic minority graduates in decision-making positions at the school governance level or later in political positions. However, opening up to diverse languages also might hinder the reconciliation process, as some minority languages might be included as a language of instruction while others are not, thus creating resentment among various groups of students.

Similarly, addressing and redressing inequalities that drive conflicts is not necessarily a win-win process, and previous/current dominant social groups might feel threatened by redistributive policies that seek to rebalance societal privileges in favour of oppressed groups. This is where tensions might emerge between those who want to emphasise social justice and those who seek to emphasise peace and reconciliation. For example, while treating everyone the same – such as equalising the per capita education spending on all children might work as a mechanism for ‘Reconciliation’ where all citizens feel they are being treated the same regardless of their race, ethnicity, gender etc – this equality of treatment in a highly unequal society, might be inadvertently reproducing the historical inequalities that underpin social injustice. Such an approach to education policy might give the illusion of change without any real transformation.

Applying the 4Rs to analyse the relation between education and peacebuilding

So, what does this analytical framework mean in terms of examining the relationships between education, armed conflict and peace, whether in research projects or when designing or reviewing policy-related or programmatic work? Sustainable peacebuilding should not be conceptualised just as a means ‘to’ education (access) but also ‘in and through’ education. It should consider how teaching and learning processes and outcomes reproduce certain (socioeconomic, cultural, and political) inequalities (Keddie, 2012) and thus can stand in the way of, or reinforce, processes of reconciliation and foster education’s negative, or positive, face.

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**4Rs Framework – Novelli, Lopes Caradozo and Smith (2017)**

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We also see the 4Rs model as a possible approach to design and structure (research, programmatic) projects, whereby starting from a comprehensive 4Rs-inspired context-and-conflict analysis informs the choices made. The 4Rs framework has also been applied to analyse and examine the way specific interventions positively or negatively impact sustainable peace outcomes on various fronts.

To do justice to education’s full potential, the model aims to move away from narrow technical approaches to understanding, designing, and implementing education in conflict-affected regions, and toward a model that allows for the examination of and positive engagement with a wider range of conflict drivers and legacies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Redistribution (addressing inequalities)</th>
<th>To what extent is education contributing to sustainable peacebuilding (4Rs)? Potential “indicators” for a mixed-methods approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative analysis of existing data to examine vertical and horizontal inequalities relevant to education inputs, resources, and outcomes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of macro education reforms or policies to see if they are redistributive; for example, the impact of decentralisation, privatisation, and how they impact different groups and affect conflict dynamics.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition (respecting difference)</th>
<th>Language of instruction polices.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of cultural diversity through curriculum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of religious identity and religious diversity in teaching practices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Re)production of gendered relations and norms in the education system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, civic, sexuality, and history education in relation to state-building.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation (ensuring participation)</th>
<th>The extent to which education policy and reforms are produced through participation (local, national, global).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of political control and representation through the administration of education.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>School governance, school-based management, involvement in decision-making (teachers, parents, students, civil society).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The extent to which education system supports fundamental freedoms, including equal gender representation.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconciliation (dealing with the legacies of the conflict)</th>
<th>The extent to which the historical and contemporary economic, political, and sociocultural injustices that underpin conflict are redressed in/through education (e.g., quota systems, school relocation, textbooks, teacher allocation).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of how education contributes to integration and segregation (social cohesion, shared or separate institutions).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching about the past and its relevance to the present and future.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dis)connection of educational activities to the work of truth and reconciliation committees, when available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of trust—vertical (trust in schools and the education system) and horizontal (trust between different identity-based groups).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Applying the analytical framework to understand education’s role in peacebuilding
A number of important aspects emerge when exploring the four interrelated Rs. An important aspect of redistribution (not limited to this dimension) is all students having equal access to a safe journey to and through their learning environment. Within education, the inclusion of all students—regardless of age, gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, race, language, class means including formerly marginalized or disadvantaged groups. This aspect is also connected to reconciliation. The affirmation and recognition of learners’ diversity and everyone’s learning needs in educational processes, structures, and content can be defined as “curricular justice” (Connell, 2012). This aspect of recognition is strongly related to the redistributive aspect of equal opportunities and outcomes for children and youth of different groups in society. The structure and content that feed into pedagogical processes are again connected to both reconciliation (e.g., if/how history is taught or if attitudinal change is part of an educational initiative) and representation (e.g., whether learners are made aware of their various rights and responsibilities as citizens, and if/how/why (certain) political and conflict-related issues are discussed/negated). Issues around representation extend further into the actual ‘equitable participation’ of various stakeholders, including teachers, students, youth, parents, and community members of all genders at the grassroots level. The actual decision-making power is often related to the allocation, use, and (re)distribution of human and material resources (Young, 2006; Robertson and Dale, 2013).

Conclusion: Theory-building in progress

In this short piece, we have shared the 4Rs analytical framework, calling for a peace with social justice and reconciliation approach to education systems affected by violent conflict. While aspects of the model are potentially relevant across different contexts, it must be tailored to the specific needs of each area of research or intervention. This will allow researchers and practitioners alike to produce high-quality, relevant understanding of the challenges, roles, and possibilities of education’s contribution to promoting sustainable peace.

We are conscious that like any research tool it is the skill of the researcher(s) that will determine whether its application is open enough to capture the complex interactions between the different R’s and that the research is grounded in sufficient depth and knowledge of the particular historical, political, economic, social and cultural conditions of the research context. We therefore hope it is treated as a starting point for critical reflection rather than a normative and simplistic endpoint.

We hope to refine, develop, sharpen, and transform the framework so it can more accurately reflect the combined knowledge that emerges from the ongoing research process. In that sense, we approach theory-making as a non-static process that is informed and reshaped through empirical fieldwork and findings—hence we see this framework as theory-building in progress.
Author Bios

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References


Introduction

Recently I completed a major international review of ‘what works’ in the area of education for preventing violent extremism (PVE-E), looking at 23 countries and identifying 20 different entry points (Davies, 2017a). Multiple organisations are involved and there are many interesting initiatives, but some are short lived. I extracted eight principles which characterised those programmes which had some evidence of success and were more sustained. While evaluation is notoriously difficult, successful initiatives prevented students thinking in black and white terms, made them less prejudicial towards ‘others’ and made them less likely to support violence as a means to an end. They work when –

• a programme is embedded in a whole school policy, curriculum and way of life;
• teachers have sound preparation in teaching controversial issues;
• a multitude of ‘drivers’ of extremism is acknowledged, not just ideology;
• a full set of recipients is targeted (students, teachers, family, community);
• there is wide consultation (police, religious leaders, social workers);
• there is not just learning about ‘other’ faiths/cultures but a political understanding of conflict, including religious conflict;
• a programme is not moralistic, but critical; and
• there is a practical and visible outcome – civic engagement, campaigns, production of counter-narrative materials, citizen research.

Abstract

We are beginning to get some understanding of what works and what does not work in educational initiatives in preventing violent extremism across a range of countries. Complexity and chaos theory provide the insights which explain such findings: non-linear change, resisting simple cause-and-effect, seeing turbulence and conflict as normal, increasing connectivity across diverse agents, and providing structures of rules, rights and enabling constraints.

Key Words

Extremism
Complexity
Violence
Rights

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What does not work is:

- Messages of love and harmony;
- Individualistic ‘inner peace’;
- Religious counter-narratives by (western) governments, telling Muslims what is in the Quran;
- Single one-off interventions, however striking and fun;
- Strategies that appear to stigmatise one religious group; and
- Suppressing free speech rather than allowing uncomfortable views to be aired.

To understand these workings at a theoretical level, complexity theory provides significant insights. The field (industry?) of PVE-E is a burgeoning one, with a mass of conferences, dialogues and calls to action as well as research, theory and training interventions. Complexity theory helps us to understand the false trails. These include simple cause and effect regarding vulnerability to radicalisation (broken homes, school dropout, psychological predispositions) and equally simple solutions (moral calls for love and peace, or pointing out positive messages in the Quran). As long ago as 2004, I was arguing for complexity theory in order to understand the role of education in conflict (Davies, 2004), and returned to this in Unsafe Gods: Security, secularism and education (Davies, 2014), examining the role of religion in conflict and extremism and arguing for a dynamic secularism in order to promote security. For this brief article, I want to highlight just a few aspects of complexity as a taster.

**Complexity and chaos theory: How things change**

Firstly, in the social world, change is rarely linear. It occurs because of a range of intersecting factors in particular moments of time, where turbulence starts to generate new patterns. Prediction is difficult, because a small input can have a big impact (the ‘butterfly effect’). Chains of amplification and polarisation can be set off (for example, by rumours and fake news.). The economy is not linear, in that millions of individual decisions to buy or not to buy can reinforce each other, creating a boom or recession (Waldrop, 1992). Development models have failed because of reliance on command-and-control methods which ignore internal dynamics that involve vast numbers of interactions in a country (Rihani, 2002). Evolution occurs through trial and error: ‘evolution is not a rush to the nearest summit but a leisurely process of exploration of possibilities’ (Rihani, 2002: 9). The (understandable) mistake in PVE has been to search for cause-and-effect, pinpointing the ‘pathways’ into radicalisation, which will enable prediction and therefore prevention. In terms of ‘push’ we now know that there is no one route, only sometimes mystifying combinations. We do know a lot about ‘pull’ factors – i.e. what is enticing in the lure of extremist movements (status, mission, call of duty, sense of importance) but we cannot predict who might be resilient to these lures and who is vulnerable.

Our social enterprise ConnectFutures took part in a European research project called Formers and Families that, through interviewing former extremists and their families, had the aim of identifying family patterns which made children vulnerable to radicalisation (Davies et al, 2015). In our UK sample, however, we were unable to establish any such patterns. Families can help perhaps in preventing radicalisation or afterwards supporting a journey to deradicalisation, but it is crucial to avoid a causal view which attributes blame. The focus on individual psychology or on ‘dysfunctional’ families is a blind alley in PVE strategy. Effects are not additive but interactive. We cannot add something into a system (moral education) and predict an impact. Similarly, we cannot subtract something (biased textbooks) and assume this will be even part of a solution. This does not mean we do nothing, but we have to approach change in a different way.

PVE-E therefore cannot borrow from or just extend peace education, or any of the programmes which focus on transforming or sedating the individual – whether character education, Buddhist inner peace or mindfulness. It is the wrong starting point. PVE is what within complexity science is called a ‘wicked problem’. This means not only that there are many legitimate ways of framing each question, but that any solution has unintended consequences that are likely to spawn new problems. Wicked problems have no ‘stopping rules’. Permanent solutions cannot be found – all that is possible is that the problem space is loosened so that a wider range of options for action emerges (Rogers et al, 2013). At its best, education can be part of this loosening of the problem space. But to contemplate change, we have first to look at systems – in particular the complex adaptive system (see Waldrop, 1992; Byrne, 1998; Woodhill, 2010).
Complex adaptive systems
Evolution occurs when a complex adaptive system (CAS) - whether the brain, the immune system, the world economy or an ant colony – responds to its environment to survive, with redundant features dying out and new ones tried and then developed. A CAS has to reach ‘criticality’ or ‘the edge of chaos’ before emerging into something new. A degree of turbulence is essential – a stable equilibrium means the death of a complex system (Davis and Sumara, 2006; also, see Alicia Juarrero’s vimeo https://vimeo.com/128934608).

The brake on evolution and change are what are called ‘frozen accidents’ (for example, the Qwerty keyboard, the 24-hour clock), phenomena that become so embedded that change is inconceivable. Many education systems (as do some religions) exhibit features of the frozen accident, locked into ways of operating and relating which do not reflect current dynamics. (These deep freezers include not just outmoded pedagogy, but the whole idea of a predictable and efficient trajectory through competitive memory based examinations to future employment and social productivity). In contrast, extremist groups exhibit many features of a CAS – they adapt, develop, morph, have intricate networks and, like the brain, have no single controller. While they have linear views of the end-time, and are regressive in their values, they have branched out into a range of financial business models (drugs, arms deals, territory, oil revenues), which start to take on a life of their own, so that ideology becomes if not secondary then at least operating in parallel. You do not tackle them by picking off individuals, however key.

Education is seen by all major agencies as the key to building resilience to extremism. In contrast to military action and cyber-surveillance, this is soft power, the power of the human mind. Yet, if education wants to be a player, it has to emerge from any frozen accident mode of one way transmission or moralising and have a different theory of change, adaptation and socialisation. Four aspects are key here: turbulence, conflict, connectivity and rights.

Turbulence
The first task is introducing turbulence and risk into the system. This means socialising children into habits of questioning, not obedience. It means them expressing views, however unsavoury, and having them challenged. It means shifting from black and white categorisations, friend and foe, good and evil. Programmes of ‘integrative complexity’ (Liht and Savage, 2013) in countries as far apart as Scotland and Pakistan use the introduction of ‘hot topics’ with young people to start the process of generating a range of viewpoints: the aim is being comfortable with a range of perspectives while retaining one’s own core principles. Complex thinking entails ‘holding one’s strong opinions lightly’ (Rogers et al, 2013: 6). Initially, this means stepping outside one’s comfort zone. The idea of ‘living with more than one truth’ characterises what I have termed ‘justice-sensitive’ education (Davies, 2017b), which, in history and social science, takes a more complex view of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ and tries to understand a conflict from multiple viewpoints. In education, this might mean introducing turbulence into official versions of history and who constituted ‘enemies’. Complexity theory allows us to see how cycles of revenge and retribution occur: of importance is understanding how violence becomes normalised, that is, how violence becomes a path dependent response to perceived injustice or offence.

Conflict as normal
Much discourse on peace implies the binary opposite to conflict, when in fact relative stability may simply be a different way of managing or even disguising conflict. A strong argument, particularly within complexity theory, is that conflict is not only normal, but is necessary to achieve a functioning society (Andrade et al, 2008). Different forms of democracy require conflicting agendas to be constantly brought to the fore, so that evolution and emergence occurs. Democracy is not an antidote to conflict, but something that builds on ‘natural’ tendencies for disputes over resources, and finds a mechanism to ensure that conflict is not entirely destructive. The term ‘positive conflict’ has often been used in this regard (see Davies, 2004 Chap 12; Davies, 2005). In PVE-E, it is essential that young people understand conflict and the broad issues of structural causes of inequality and hence ethno-political grievance. (This is often not popular with governments who prefer to blame conflict on people ‘not getting on’). Yet conflict management is not just about interpersonal conflict resolution, but requires an understanding of how conflicts over ideology, land and resources amplify, or conversely can be managed at the level of society and governance.
Information, connectivity, encounters, networking

A third aspect of a complexity approach to PVE-E is the power of networks in a CAS. What has been learned from the way that the Arab Spring developed is that horizontalism is the key to change. Network theory shows us how the more people that use a network, the more useful it becomes to each user (Mason, 2012). While there are Facebook followers, networked interaction is not about singular leaders or heroes. This was well captured by Marc Sageman in his book Leaderless Jihad (2008). The power and speed of networks makes us rethink what we understand by empowerment. It could be that the ways we currently conceive of giving children power (school councils, representation on committees, etc.) do not match the way they currently network and use social media to influence others. School walls are increasingly permeable.

Extremist groups simultaneously use social media across a vast range of targets and narrow the networks available to recruits, distancing them from former ties.

In contrast, successful PVE programmes widen the space, stretch the horizons and generate encounters with a large range of people of different ethnicities, religions, sexual orientation, ages and social positioning (we have worked fruitfully on bringing a range of disadvantaged young people together with the police to problem solve). This is the ‘strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973), i.e. that you learn more from acquaintances than from friends. It is not just about bringing people together to learn about their ‘different’ cultures, but in contrast working towards some common end, in order to temporarily bracket their heritage and find shared purpose.

There are a growing number of international networks for young people to counter extremism (more of which in Davies (2017a). In theory, there is clearly a huge possibility space for networks of schools and teachers across the globe to mount a rearguard action. Nobody knows exactly how many schools there are in the world, but estimates are around 6 million. The problem is identifying a concrete goal: mass on-line campaigning and action needs a reward, just as violent extremism offers rewards. We await some sort of virus that can spread non-violence.

Rules and rights

Value pluralism is not the same as cultural relativism. A framework is needed within which to make judgments, however provisional. Complex systems do not have an ‘invisible hand’ directing activity. But one component is structure. In physical terms, these might be molecules or physical laws of gravity. In social terms, there are what is usually referred to in complexity theory as ‘institutions’ - the human element, the way people work within structures, the ‘rules’ that make ordered society possible, such as language, currency, marriage, property rights, taxation, education and laws. Institutions help individuals know how to behave in certain situations. They are critical for establishing trust in a society.

But complexity theory does not tell us who should decide the rules. A CAS has no morality as such, simply what works. Religions have constituted longstanding systems of rules, although their record in preventing extremism is to say the least questionable. Religious frameworks of morality derive from sacred texts which do not easily invite critique or independent adaptation. A more dynamic and inclusive framework is that of human rights, a structure which cuts across all religions and none.

Rights are what are sometimes called ‘enabling constraints’, enabling people to plan their lives on the basis of some guarantees of law (Davis, Sumara and Luce-Kapler, 2008). Rights are multi-layered, however, for instance in the necessary distinction between absolute, limited and qualified rights, which enable us to make judgments on competing rights, for example when the right to privacy in the home is superseded by the right to freedom from harm if a child is being abused. Current counter-terror legislation in many countries has generated important debates on rights, for example rights to citizenship and freedom of movement or association; and more public education on rights may be indicated. In terms of religious extremism, people need to understand what constitutes a right – for example, that there is no right in international law not to be offended, and that religions do not have rights, people do. Critique is not against the law, unless it becomes hate speech.

At school level, awareness of rights becomes central to supporting structures of trust in a society. A good example is UNICEF’s Rights Respecting Schools in UK (RRS), a whole school approach founded on every participant in the school (students, teachers, support
staff, governors, parents) knowing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and being bound by it. This is a very obvious example of an ‘enabling constraint’: research has shown that children learn better, because they understand that they have the right to learn, and that misbehavior infringes others’ right to learn. Everyone has the same rights, and there are no outsiders. This does not mean conformity, but a basis for challenge: one RR primary school in London mounted an impassioned project on female genital mutilation, educating their relatives and the community, with the slogan ‘My Body, My Rules’. RRSs are cited favourably in a DfE report (2011) on teaching approaches to counter extremism.

To sum up, while resilience to extremism implies some sort of hardening, complexity teaches us that what is actually needed for an emergent response is more openness and flexibility to tackle what comes: turbulence, myriad encounters, value pluralism, controversy and willingness to take risks – all while upholding rights. It can be done.

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References


Abstract
In this article, we build on our 2015 review of ‘what works’ in education in emergencies research (EiE) to assess the recent trajectory of the field. We identify significant growth in areas that include refugee education, girls’ education, social-emotional learning, and tertiary education for conflict-affected populations; emerging research that includes protecting education from attack and ‘preventing violent extremism’; emerging trends that promise to focus on inclusive education for children with disabilities and early childhood development; and a striking absence of research on education and disaster risk reduction, despite the fact that the effects of climate change disasters dwarf those of conflict. We argue that the areas of programming and research that have grown most rapidly within EiE have done so because of a confluence of security and humanitarian interests.

Key Words
Education
Conflict
Political violence
What works

Introduction
This article builds on our rigorous literature review of ‘what works’ in education in emergencies (EiE) research. In that review, we identified access, quality of learning, and wellbeing as the three primary pathways toward positive education outcomes, based on evidence collected to date (see Burde et al., 2015). Our recommendations included calling for an increase in rigorous research in EiE that focused particularly on subgroups (e.g., refugees, girls, children with disabilities) and programmes (e.g., early childhood development, preventing violent extremism) that had not yet received sufficient research attention. We noted the dearth of research on education and disaster risk reduction and called for additional work on disasters and education in conflict-affected countries.

We update our review here, assessing the recent trajectory of EiE research, the extent to which our recommendations were taken up, and why. We find first, consistent with our recommendations, that EiE scholarship continues to privilege access, quality, and wellbeing. Also consistent with our recommendations, we identify significant growth in areas that include refugee education, girls’ education, social-emotional learning, and tertiary education for conflict-affected populations; emerging research that includes protecting education from attack and ‘preventing violent extremism’; and emerging trends that promise to focus on inclusive education for children with disabilities and early childhood development. Several of our practical

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1 We use this phrase because it is common in the literature, but we also acknowledge the controversy that surrounds its selective use as well as its lack of analytical clarity.
recommendations were taken up, including our call for greater support for academic/practitioner partnerships and an increased focus on technology. However, a striking finding of this updated review is the continued absence of research on education and disaster risk reduction, despite the fact that the effects of climate change disasters dwarf those of conflict (Oxfam International, 2007). We attribute this in part to the lack of political will among strong states, particularly the US, to take the consequences of climate change seriously and address them systematically, rather than to treat them as isolated events. This stands in contrast to the approach to education in countries affected by conflict that are perceived as threats to the West. We agree that security interests after September 11, 2001, spurred strong states to increase their overseas development aid and engage in a greater number of education development projects in contexts they perceived to be fragile or hostile to Western states’ security (Novelli, 2010). Taking this relationship into consideration, and based on our current review, we argue that the areas of programming and research that have grown most rapidly within EiE have done so because of a confluence of security and humanitarian interests.

Not just security interests: Humanitarian priorities also benefit

State militaries, UN peacekeeping forces, and multilateral security organisations are often the first to arrive when intergroup tensions escalate into a violent conflict or after a natural disaster. Among these organisations, Western militaries figure heavily in stabilisation projects, which contributes to the militarisation of aid (Novelli, 2010: 456). Citing challenges to impartiality and neutrality, humanitarians often object to what they perceive as strong states’ security-minded encroachment and co-optation of the role of NGOs in lifesaving work (Novelli, 2010: 456). However, strong states’ security operations in conflict and crisis contexts draw attention and funding to humanitarian priorities, which often is impossible to do through NGO efforts alone (Bell et al., 2013: 402). Security forces make it physically possible for humanitarians to do their work. They open ports of entry to countries in conflict, allowing humanitarian personnel and supplies to enter and making it possible to distribute food or medicine, and they make travel safer by securing roads. Militaries provide intelligence about credible threats and may protect aid workers and their operations (Seybolt, 2008). Our findings in this review underscore the fact that, despite humanitarians’ discomfort with strong states’ security interests, these interests may facilitate and contribute to humanitarians’ own aims.

Moreover, some humanitarians offer a check on the behaviour of strong states. NGOs have more horizontal organisational structures, greater decision-making manoeuvrability, and specific expertise about the country or region where they work (Bell et al., 2013: 402). As a result, NGOs often are able to steer programming in a direction that they believe makes sense to their humanitarian sensibilities; for example, some use states’ security interests in youth and education to develop important new programming and research into the mechanisms that promote civic engagement and prosocial youth behaviour.

Methods

As in previous reviews, we conducted searches in multiple academic databases such as ERIC, ProQuest Central, PsycINFO, JSTOR, Google Scholar, and Worldwide Political Abstracts (Burde et al., 2015; Burde et al., 2017). We prioritised peer-reviewed academic journals and empirical research that employed experimental, quasi-experimental, or rigorous qualitative or observational designs and included grey literature from INEE, International Rescue Committee (IRC), the World Bank, UNESCO, and J-PAL. We selected studies based on their relevance to EiE, whether they presented clear research designs and methods (quantitative, qualitative, or mixed), and year of publication. Our 2015 review included 184 studies, and in 2017 we reported on 121 studies. For this article, we reviewed an additional 76 studies published between 2015 and 2018 and included 29 here on education programs from both

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2Of course, we do not know what the outcomes would have been absent our recommendations, but articles like ours often serve to advance collective understanding and sharpen the focus on issues that many may already have been considering, therefore adding to the likelihood that they will be taken up by policymakers, researchers, and political actors (see, e.g., Mallett, Hagen-Zanker, Slater, and Duvendack, 2012).
conflict-affected and disaster-related crisis settings. Given space constraints, we prioritised articles that investigate the effectiveness of interventions in ongoing crises. To identify emerging trends, we included both work that recently received significant funding and topics that recently received attention in international conferences.

Of course, employing a literature review to understand what works is only as good as the data available; in other words, there may be many effective programme interventions that simply have not yet been studied. Additionally, scholars continue to debate what constitutes rigour in research (see Burde et al., 2015; Burde et al., 2017). We rely on authors’ descriptions of their research designs, methods, and analyses to assess rigour. Although we maintain that observational designs offer critical insights into many aspects of EiE and include them here, we privilege experimental and quasi-experimental designs for assessing cause-and-effect relationships.

Trends in access: Girls’ education, refugee education, and attacks on education

The recent literature continues to focus on girls’ and refugee education, showing persistent gaps in access for girls and older children, as well as new tools to improve access for refugee populations. The expansion in the scholarship on refugee education within this work is consistent with our hypothesis that the confluence of security and humanitarian interests have driven growth in particular areas of EiE, as funders have focused on displaced populations and offered support to neighbouring countries to keep refugees near their countries of origin.

Since our review in 2015, evidence shows that access to education remains sensitive to conflict (e.g., Ullah, Khan, and Mahmood, 2017), that improving access for girls requires attention to the dynamics of communities, and that changing behaviours remains challenging. Two studies found that education enrolment dropped significantly in regions affected by the conflicts in Nepal (Silwal, 2016) and Ivory Coast (Ouili, 2017). In Ivory Coast, boys’ and girls’ enrolment were similarly affected, while enrolment in Nepal was disproportionately lower for girls and girls there had lower passing rates on completion exams. Girls’ enrolment also dropped in some conflict-affected areas in Afghanistan, despite the strong support that parents—especially mothers—offer to their daughters’ education (Burd and Khan, 2016). Even when girls successfully transition back to school after a conflict, as many did in Karamoja, Uganda, which was ravaged by the Lord’s Resistance Army, dominant gender norms present ongoing challenges. An RCT showed that gender sensitivity training (n=299) increased teacher knowledge about gender equality and improved attitudes about gender roles, yet it did not quantifiably change teacher behaviours compared with a control group (n=313) (Chinen et al., 2017). Moreover, behavioural changes were not significant among teachers who received text messages to reinforce the training (n=304), which highlights the need to involve communities in such efforts.

The proliferation of journal issues on refugee education reflects the increase in research on the topic. For example, five academic journals announced refugee education volumes that are planned for 2019 or were published within the last two years. The plight of refugees from Syria and quality higher education opportunities feature prominently in this scholarship. In one qualitative study, both Syrian refugees and their host communities in Iraqi Kurdistan supported sharing local university facilities with refugees, suggesting that this kind of inclusion may build tolerance (Rasheed and Munoz, 2016). Improved infrastructure and information communication technologies (ICTs) in refugee camps have been accompanied by research on technology to support higher education. Online surveys across Somali diaspora communities (n=248) and interviews (n=21) with refugees from the Dadaab camp in Kenya found that ICTs (mobile technology and online social networks) enhanced higher education access, support, and persistence, particularly for women (Dahya and Dryden-Peterson, 2017).

Finally, emerging work by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (Kapit et al., 2018) describes and disaggregates the ways violence affects students, schools, and education personnel during armed conflict. These data offer a point of departure for exploring new questions related to patterns of attack and perpetrators’ motivations.

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Although the significant increase in attention to refugee education detailed in this section reflects the political priorities and interests of strong states, it also represents an important advocacy position among many humanitarians. Because humanitarians respond to the demand for education among refugees, they often find common ground with strong states.

**Trends in quality: Measurement, language, promoting peace, and preventing violence**

We identify similar trends in educational quality that are supported by attention from security interests and humanitarians. Since 2015, studies have focused on ways to measure learning, the significance of language barriers, and language of instruction, particularly for refugee populations, as well as strategies for promoting tolerance in postconflict settings and for preventing youth from participating in political violence.

Scholars and scholar-practitioners are increasingly concerned with measuring learning outcomes. For example, in South Sudan, a study using the Early Grade Reading Assessment and Early Grade Mathematics Assessment with 2,415 first-grade students in 112 non-formal schools revealed that the majority of students lacked the basic language and numeracy skills to begin first grade. Students with lower socioeconomic status, girls, and students with low proficiency in English scored disproportionately lower on both assessments (Raza, Kabir, and Rashid, 2017). Similarly, IRC (2017) found that Syrian refugee students are not gaining crucial literacy and math skills, which may be partially attributable to language of instruction policies. Indeed, language of instruction is a fulcrum for assessing the quality of education delivered to Syrian refugee students (Madziva and Thondhlana, 2017). Educators interviewed in Turkey noted that language barriers, limited training, sparse classroom resources, and a mainstream curriculum that does not take into account the needs and expectations of the Syrian students hampered instruction (Aydin and Kaya, 2017). However, programmes with sufficient resources may hold promise. A study of 147 Syrian refugee children ages 9-14 who were randomly assigned to participate in an online learning programme found that Turkish language acquisition, computer and cognitive skills, and hopefulness increased among participants (Sirin et al., 2018).

Language learning is key to refugees’ and newcomer students’ ability to learn in a new place; it can also intensify or relax intergroup tension, depending on whether the linguistic groups feel excluded or welcome.

Strong states have promoted their interest in the effects of education on social cohesion and state stability, and several studies have examined how keeping peace through transitional justice bears on education quality (e.g., Shepler and Williams, 2017). For example, a qualitative study in Guatemala argued that innovative teacher practices that include addressing colonial and indigenous local histories helped promote tolerance by cultivating a shared identity (Rubin, 2016). A rigorous ethnographic study in Guatemala similarly emphasised a transitional justice approach to postwar education reforms. Without this direction, segregated learning and educational narratives focused on divisions between groups, thereby perpetuating societal discord (Bellino, 2016). Yet challenges persist, even in countries where peace education is formally incorporated into the schools. For example, an ethnographic study of Muslims and Tamils in Northern Sri Lanka revealed that formal peace education in secondary schools failed to promote reconciliation, particularly along religious divisions (Duncan and Lopes Cardozo, 2017). Non-formal community education, however, showed potential for encouraging social cohesion.

Understanding how to prevent violent extremism has received significant attention from multigovernmental organisations (UNSC, 2015; UNGA, 2016) and governments seeking to stabilise regions perceived as contributing to radicalisation. Mercy Corps’ rigorous experimental research found that vocational education in Afghanistan was tied to statistically significant increases in trainees’ rate of employment, earned income, economic optimism, and cross-tribal economic activity. However, only increased economic optimism showed a statistically significant relationship to a lower propensity for political violence (Mercy Corps, 2015). In Somalia, however, youth participating in secondary education through Mercy Corps’ Youth Learners Initiative (YLI) were 48.2 percent as likely as out-of-school youth to report a willingness to support an armed insurgency. Furthermore, when learners in the YLI were also offered civic education, the combined effect was a significantly lower propensity among these students...
to support violent political opposition than among out-of-school youth and youth who only received secondary education (Tesfaye et al., 2018: 18). Thus, employing education to dissuade youth from political violence is not just about access and resources; it also depends on the type and nature of educational content in relation to promoting peace or conflict.

**Trends in wellbeing: Factors affecting learning, training trauma-informed teachers, and providing creative outlets**

The body of EiE research on wellbeing produced since our 2015 study focuses almost entirely on refugees. Studies highlight discrimination as a risk factor for mental health and learning, creative arts and online learning as useful for fostering a sense of belonging (Crawford, 2017; Crea and Sparnon, 2017), and the importance of teacher training and wellbeing in supporting student outcomes. Studies that address how to support children most effectively following disasters are still scarce.

Discrimination in host countries poses a significant barrier for refugee students. According to a systematic literature review of 34 studies, discrimination, trauma, and language barriers are significant risk factors for refugee students’ learning and wellbeing, while support factors include high personal and educational aspirations, parental and peer support, appropriate academic placement, and teachers’ cultural and language awareness (Graham, Minhas, and Paxton, 2016). Qualitative interviews and focus groups with Burmese refugee teachers in Malaysia suggest that discrimination, trauma, and insecurity were major inhibitors in classroom management and learning (O’Neal et al., 2018). Similarly, a longitudinal qualitative study with 47 refugee adolescents who resettled in Australia revealed that age of arrival and experiences of discrimination were major determinants for completing secondary school (Correa-Valez et al., 2017).

Two studies focused specifically on supporting the wellbeing of teachers as a pathway to promoting wellbeing and learning in students. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, researchers conducted an RCT that included 346 teachers in 64 primary schools to investigate the effects of a teacher development program aimed at promoting teachers’ wellbeing and enhancing practices in math, reading, and social-emotional learning (Wolf et al., 2015). While motivation increased for the least experienced teachers, there were no effects on motivation or burnout for the sample as a whole. Among women teachers, job dissatisfaction increased, indicating that they may have been marginalised within the programme. A recent trauma-informed teacher training programme in Australia and New Zealand emphasised the importance of providing teachers with knowledge and strategies on how to support student wellbeing following disasters (Le Brocque et al., 2017), and two thought papers called for evaluating interventions that support children after natural disasters (Kousky, 2016; Feng, Hossain, and Paton, 2018). However, empirical research on coping with disasters and disaster risk reduction remains limited.

**Security, humanitarian action, and 2015 recommendations**

We argue above that one of the primary reasons for the recent growth in EiE research and programming is also one of the most controversial aspects of EiE: that attention from strong states for what many humanitarians consider nefarious reasons has had the (positive) effect of promoting EiE on the world stage in a way that was not possible before these interests emerged. The research areas in which there has been the most recent growth reflect this. Given the substantial and productive research that has emerged on topics that are crucial to EiE, such as refugee education, we also argue that, simply because some of the reasons for this growth come from motivations that many educators and humanitarians would choose to distance themselves from, does not mean they cannot—or have not—benefited from this attention.

Although the EiE scholarship published since 2015 continues to foreground access, quality, and wellbeing, new trending topics and areas of inquiry have arisen within each of these pillars. We conclude with a few remarks below on how the EiE subfield has consolidated and become more formalised within the past three years.

Although we were unable to identify studies related to children and youth with disabilities, funders, practitioners, and researchers are mobilised to launch new research, as evidenced by the recent well-attended Global Disability Summit sponsored by DFID in July 2018 (https://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/summit). The UK Secretary of State for International Development has pledged to ‘put disability at the centre of everything we do’ (https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2017/12/
dfid-pledges-to-put-disability-at-heart-of-its-work). Continued UK government support and financing offer an opportunity to educators working on humanitarian programmes to find common ground with this initiative and to make significant progress on promoting inclusive education. We wrote that actors in the subfield should ‘invest in conducting a systematic review of existing EiE interventions in countries and regions affected by crises in order to identify the most common programmes in a given context, map where there is a dearth or preponderance of data, and (continue to) fund practitioners and academics to work together to conduct rigorous research in these locations’ (Burde et al., 2015: 6). We recommended funding practitioner/academic partnerships. Several of the articles we reviewed above do include academic assessments of programme interventions, and one project—Education in Emergencies: Evidence for Action at New York University (NYU)—aims to establish research-practice partnerships to improve children’s mental health, stress regulation, executive functioning, and literacy and numeracy skills in emergency contexts. Notably, with regard to our recommendation for greater research on early childhood development (ECD), a $100 million award from the MacArthur Foundation to Sesame Workshop, IRC, and NYU included significant funding for ECD research (Yoshikawa et al., n.d.). Finally, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies continues to set the standard for the field and offer checks on the behaviour of all actors—strong states and educators alike. The organisation launched thematic papers and guidance notes on psychosocial support and social-emotional learning (INEE, 2016, 2018) and on ‘preventing violent extremism’ (2017), in addition to its updated minimum standards for education provision in crises (2010) and research through the new INEE Journal on Education in Emergencies (JEiE). Standards like those from INEE for EiE programmes in contexts in which humanitarians frequently work adjacent to security forces and sometimes in tandem with them, and rigorous critique of EiE field work like that published in JEiE, help maintain distance between security interests and non-governmental organisation partners.

Author Bios

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**Heddy Lahmann** is the Senior Managing Editor of the Journal on Education in Emergencies, and a PhD candidate in New York University’s International Education program. Her research focuses on the use of creative arts for youth identity development and peacebuilding in conflict and crisis-affected settings. Her mixed methods study on the Bond Street Theatre program with youth in Afghanistan employs diverse data collection methods, including a quasi-experimental quantitative survey design coupled with in-depth qualitative and arts-based interviews. Her research has appeared in the Harvard Educational Review and she has co-authored rigorous reviews on what works in EiE settings for DFID.

**Nathan Thompson** is the Deputy Managing Editor of the Journal on Education in Emergencies. His research interests include the role of education in transitional justice and reconciliation, collective memory and memorialisation, and democratic political movements. He has facilitated quality intercultural exchange among students engaging with food and water sustainability topics through Global Cities, a project of Bloomberg Philanthropies. Previously, he worked as a Project Manager for Saylor Academy, an open access online course provider, where he developed higher education modules with pathways to inexpensive college credit. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Education from New York University.


