The Emergence of ‘Extremism’ and ‘Radicalisation’: An investigation into the discursive conditions that have enabled UK counter-terrorism strategy to focus on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, and a theorisation of the impact of this focus.

From the outset, it is important that I state that my intention for this research is that it support Government efforts to counter political violence. I recognise that efforts to counter so-called ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ that are critiqued here have developed in response to very real acts of political violence. It is, however, my contention that these efforts are counterproductive and actually create real mechanisms by which violence is promoted rather than prevented. It is my hope that policymakers will learn from the work that is carried out here and that this will contribute to a more considered approach to reducing political violence than has been seen over the last decade.

Supervisor: Dr John O’Regan

Department of Culture, Communication and Media

UCL Institute of Education

Intended Award: PhD

Field of Study: Critical Realism and Critical Discourse Analysis

I, Rob Faure Walker confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract
Prompted by Muslim children reporting their fear of the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy, this thesis develops a Critical Realist approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) to describe the violent discourse of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ (RadEx) from which PREVENT has emerged. RadEx describes the increase in the usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in British political discourse since the 1970s and how the words became progressively synonymous with violence between 2009 and 2014. It is theorised that RadEx not only suppresses dissent, but also has the capacity to promote violence. The analysis of parliamentary texts shows that RadEx has emerged from earlier colonialist discourses and the loss of parliamentary calculus, a genre of parliamentary discourse that moderated oppressive policy by the threat that it might solicit the emergence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Aligned with Laclau and Mouffe’s socialist strategy, parliamentary calculus led left-wing politicians to embrace opposition and to use parliamentary calculus and the threat of coming to power to moderate the policy of the ruling party. New Labour’s aspiration to be in power is shown to have been an abandonment of this previous socialist strategy and to have undermined parliamentary calculus. The discursive change that this precipitates in relation to RadEx is theorised in the semiotic helix. As well as contributing to an understanding of the emergence of RadEx, the semiotic helix also contributes to understanding of discursive change over time more generally. Both Dialectical Critical Realism and metaReality are used to explore how RadEx might be surmounted and it is theorised that the Government’s recent expansion of counter-extremism strategy can and should be contested.
Impact Statement

This thesis develops a Critical Realist approach to CDA that seeks to develop upon the work of Norman Fairclough in this area (N. Fairclough, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2010, 2013, 2015; N. Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer, 2007). Roy Bhaskar, the father of Critical Realism, has called for such a development in his work (Bhaskar, 2002, p. 95, 2016a, p. 34) and this thesis is in part a response to that call. It is my hope that the Critical Realist theorisation of Prevent that is carried out in this thesis can make a contribution to the critique of Prevent while also adding to the work of CDA and its use as a methodological tool. An aspect of the theorisation that is presented is the description of the semiotic helix that enables an understanding of discursive change over time, something that I wish to argue has previously been neglected in Critical Realist approaches to CDA. That is not to say that no version of CDA explores discursive change over time and Reisigl and Wodak’s Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016) explicitly looks at discourse in its historical context. However, the approach that is developed here and that is referred to as the Temporal Dialectical Relational Approach (TDRA) develops a specifically critical realist approach to CDA and in doing so offers the opportunity to develop a more explicit ontology for semiotic change over time.

By developing an understanding of discourse in the context of time, the possibilities for transformative praxis that are theorised in the context of RadEx might be repeated for other discourses that we find ourselves trapped in. In an age of neoliberal hegemony, this offers the possibility that we might transcend the crises precipitated by the suffocating embrace of ‘growth’, ‘the market’ and other recent discursive phenomena that deny our agency. This work has been published as a book chapter (Faure Walker, 2018a), articles (Faure Walker, 2017a, 2017b, 2018c), has supported an edited collection of articles on PREVENT (Fernandez, Faure Walker, & Younis, 2018) and I have two articles currently being peer reviewed.

This thesis has also supported my lobbying against the expansion of the PREVENT Strategy and government efforts to counter ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’. This lobbying has taken a number of forms:

- acting as an expert witness for a local government scrutiny committee into PREVENT
- supporting NGOs in writing reports that challenge PREVENT
- providing evidence to critics of PREVENT as an invited speaker to international roundtable discussions that have included senior UN officials
- individual meetings with senior civil servants working on PREVENT and counter-extremism at The Home Office, The Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and The Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU)
- providing information and support to journalists that has led to a number of articles in the national press that have raised awareness of this controversial agenda
- writing and coordinating open letters calling for a review of PREVENT which have been counter-signed by hundreds of academics
- providing published evidence in support of an independent review of PREVENT to parliamentary committees
- providing legal advice to ongoing civil cases
- running workshops to support those impacted by PREVENT

Much of this work has been supported via the PREVENT Digest website and newsletter that I have developed and managed alongside writing my thesis. The PREVENT Digest provides a hub for academics, journalists and private citizens impacted by PREVENT. I am frequently told by fellow academics that the monthly summary that I email subscribers to the website has maintained their interest in the topic and has resulted in their continued production of critical literature on PREVENT and counter-extremism.

My vocal opposition to PREVENT that has been enabled by this thesis has also supported my role as a teacher by repairing relationships with Muslim students who had previously been silenced by PREVENT, the knowledge that I was also a critic of PREVENT giving them the confidence to speak out again. My professional identity has been further supported by this thesis as the laminated ontology that it explores affords me the possibility of fulfilling my professional duty to follow PREVENT while also lobbying against it in the ways described above. From a Critical Realist perspective, the pulse of freedom and metaReality demanded that I struggle against PREVENT, my being depends on it and this thesis is part of this struggle.

Addendum
Two hours after the draft of this thesis that was due to be examined was sent to the printers, the Government announced that a review of PREVENT was to be written into the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. The reviewer is due to be appointed in August 2019.
# Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 2  
Impact Statement ........................................................................................................... 3  
Addendum ...................................................................................................................... 4  
Contents ......................................................................................................................... 5  
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 7  
Chapter 1 - Introduction ............................................................................................... 8  
  1.1. Rationale .................................................................................................................. 9  
  1.2. Aim and Research Questions ................................................................................. 14  
  1.3. Counter-terrorism after 9/11 and the two versions of PREVENT ...................... 16  
  1.4. The Trojan Horse Affair and the PREVENT duty ............................................... 24  
  1.5. Key Terms and Concepts ....................................................................................... 28  
Chapter 2 - Literature Review ....................................................................................... 36  
  2.1. Terrorism Studies (Critical and Orthodox) ......................................................... 36  
  2.2. Literature on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ ...................................................... 37  
  2.3. Orientalism ............................................................................................................ 41  
  2.4. Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Fundamental British Values (FBV) ............. 42  
  2.5. Democracy and debate: Alexander, Arendt, Buber, Derrida, Mouffe, and Przeworski ........................................................................................................... 44  
  2.6. Critical Realism as Critique .................................................................................. 48  
  2.7. Ideology, Power and Discourse ............................................................................. 50  
  2.8. Neoliberalism ....................................................................................................... 53  
Chapter 3 - Methodology ............................................................................................... 55  
  3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) ....................................................................... 55  
  3.2. Supporting CDA with corpus linguistics ............................................................... 57  
  3.3. Critical Realism, CDA and the Semiotic Triangle ............................................... 59  
  3.4. An example of discourse as ontology in the War on Terror ............................. 66  
  3.5. Bringing Time into CDA ....................................................................................... 66  
  3.6. Choosing texts and methodology ...................................................................... 67  
  3.7. Developing a Schema for CDA ............................................................................ 69  
  3.8. Final Schema for CDA ......................................................................................... 72  
  3.9. Discussion of ethics .............................................................................................. 73  
  3.10. Limitations of the Research .............................................................................. 76  
Chapter 4 - Data ........................................................................................................... 77  
4.2. Identifying the Problem ................................................................. 83
4.3. Analyse texts by linking linguistic analysis to interdiscursive and social analysis... 97
Chapter 5 - Defining and Resolving the Problem ...................................... 129
5.1. The Problem .................................................................................. 129
5.2. Ways Past the Obstacles ................................................................. 146
5.3. Unrealised Possibilities .................................................................. 151
Chapter 6 – Reflection ........................................................................... 168
6.1. Self-Reflection ............................................................................... 168
6.2. Challenges to the good society ..................................................... 172
6.3. metaReality .................................................................................. 173
6.2. A brief reflection on CDA and Critical Realism’s contribution to one another .... 179
Chapter 7 – Conclusion .......................................................................... 181
Bibliography ......................................................................................... 190
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

This chapter draws on my experiences as a school teacher to explain why I first became concerned about the impact of the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy on schools. This concern led to me carrying out research into PREVENT for a master's dissertation at the UCL Institute of Education that was submitted in 2015. This earlier work employed critical discourse analysis (CDA) to identify a violent discourse of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ that I referred to as RadEx. RadEx is intimately tied to the emergence and impact of PREVENT and is described in chapter 1.2 and throughout this thesis. Discourse, as described in this thesis, ‘is seen as language viewed in a certain way, as part of the social process (part of social life) which is related to other parts’ (N. Fairclough, 2015). It, discourse, is thus used as a point of entry to understand the emergence of and impact of PREVENT and RadEx. The relationship between discourse, ideology and power is explored and defined in section 2.7, Ideology, Power and Discourse.

In my earlier work, I adopted a Foucauldian approach to theorise some of the mechanisms by which PREVENT might impact the lives of those who it targeted. I subsequently found that this approach was not adequate to support my lobbying work to challenge the imposition of PREVENT. The Foucauldian approach was not adequate as it did not allow for a theorisation of the real mechanisms that resulted in the emergence of PREVENT, nor in the theorisation of generative mechanisms that emerged from PREVENT itself. A focus on these generative mechanisms has led me to adopt a Critical Realist stance in my subsequent work, including in this thesis. Critical Realism is distinct from the earlier Foucauldian approach because of its focus on ontology, looking back on my earlier work from a Critical Realist perspective, I can now see that I tended to commit the epistemic fallacy by focusing on how the world is perceived rather than what is really in the world. This distinction is often a subtle one as our perceptions might also result in actual events. Critical Realism shows us that the world ought to be perceived as the real generative mechanisms that create these actual events and that these events might be empirically observed. While the real must be theorised from our empirical observations of actual events, we should always be cautious that such theorisation might not provide a full picture of the real and should, thus, always be open to revision based on new observations and theorisation. This openness to change is important if we are to avoid adopting dogmatic positions, something that this thesis suggests has contributed to the emergence of PREVENT.

Critical Realism can at times be impenetrable to those who are not familiar with it and this has previously resulted in Bhaskar, the founder of this philosophy, being unfairly accused of being ‘an abominable writer who cared not a jot for his readers’ (Hartwig in Bhaskar, 2016a, p. xii). This accusation is unfair as Critical Realism is necessarily complex as its starting point is to question the foundations of Western philosophy, even as far back as Plato (Bhaskar,
1994). Bhaskar has therefore needed to engage in ‘an immense amount of difficult and complex argumentation and analysis…at the highest level’ (Hartwig in Bhaskar, 2016a, p. xii). Had Bhaskar not done so, he would not have created the firm foundations that Critical Realism now stands on and would have quite rightly been challenged and, perhaps, dismissed as an iconoclast. In defence of the complexity of Bhaskar’s work, Hartwig cites Einstein in saying that ‘things should be made as simple as possible, but not any simpler’ (Hartwig in Bhaskar, 2016a, p. xii)

Adopting a paradigm that is opaque to all but the few who are familiar with Critical Realism could be seen as unnecessary academic navel-gazing, failing to attempt to engage with anyone but ourselves. However, my ontological explorations that have led to this thesis have provided me with a firm footing in my efforts to challenge PREVENT. This firm footing that Critical Realism offers has helped me to hold my own when debating against the need for PREVENT with a former Chief Crown Prosecutor at the Law Society and to persuade civil servants at the Home Office to review the language that they use when writing counter-terrorism policy. This is not to say that the unfamiliar language of Critical Realism needs to be used in these arguments, but it does provide academic foundations that can support real change in the world.

1.1. Rationale

My concern about counter-terrorism discourse developed as a result of my exposure to the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy which became part of my professional duties as a school teacher in 2014. I became concerned that PREVENT was having a negative impact on the school experience of children who I worked with on the day that allegations that British schools were being infiltrated by so-called ‘Islamic extremists’ were debated in Parliament (Hansard, 2014), this became known as the ‘Trojan Horse’ ‘scandal’ (Abbas, 2017). This was on 9th June 2014 and the Muslim students in my form class, many of whom had previously been active participants, withdrew from discussing politics. I suspected that their silence might be associated with the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy, a strategy what was not previously discussed in the school, but which became a frequent topic of conversation at this time as it was adopted by the school. The introduction of PREVENT inferred various duties on schools and teachers and the aspect of the strategy that appeared to be of greatest concern to my pupils and which is discussed below was ‘support for vulnerable people through identification, referral and intervention’ (HM Government, 2011b, p. 29 emphasis added). The discussions about and the implementation of PREVENT were prompted by the schools’ inspectorate (OfSTED) recommending that schools should follow the PREVENT Strategy and a particular focus was placed on the local authority (Tower Hamlets) where I worked (Wilshaw,
This was a year before the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b) and the PREVENT Duty Guidance (HM Government, 2015c) implied that it was a legal duty for schools to follow PREVENT.

As a result of my concerns for the negative impact that PREVENT was having on my relationships with my students, I spoke out against the strategy in school meetings and at local union meetings. This resulted in students learning of my concerns and in feeling empowered to open up a dialogue with me again. Having found their voices, these students frequently expressed their concern that they were being targeted by PREVENT. A strategy that they told me they thought was a racist and overzealous state surveillance operation. They told me that they did not express these views to other adults as they feared that PREVENT meant that doing so would result in their referral to the security services. The concerns that my students expressed have previously been explored by Kundnani in his 2009 report for the Institute of Race Relations, *Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism* (Kundnani, 2009). The Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, more recently confirmed that PREVENT is an intelligence gathering strategy when she told a BBC Question Time audience that,

> [Policing] is not where we get the intelligence from. We get the intelligence much more from the PREVENT strategy. (Rudd, 2017)

After hearing the concerns of my students, I contributed to reports for legal and human rights lobbying organisation that challenged PREVENT on the grounds that it violated the human rights of British citizens (Open Society, 2016; Rights Watch (UK), 2016). Involvement in these reports resulted in my concerns being reported in the national press (Bowcott & Adams, 2016) and led to many more students coming to me to discuss their concerns and this placed me in a privileged position where I learned of concerns that the students did not share with other adults and teachers. These concerns also tended to be associated with a fear that the PREVENT Strategy could result in the students being reported to the security services. The students reported that they were altering their behaviour as a result of these fears and I illustrate this in the following three examples.

*Children’s fear of seeking the support of adults*

A student who would often engage me in theological discussions expressed his concern that PREVENT had prevented him from seeking the support of adults when he became concerned for the safety of one of his peers. He became worried about a 15-year-old friend of his who he said was spending too much time playing violent video games and who he feared was being drawn into the support of Islamic State by exposure to online propaganda that shared the aesthetic of the video games. To provide support, my student told me that he and a group of
his peers had arranged to spend more time with their vulnerable friend, devising a rota to ensure that someone was spending time with him on every day of the week after school. By the time my student discussed the situation with me, he reported that the friend was less socially isolated and that he was no longer concerned by his activity online or that he might be supporting dangerous views and opinion. During this child-led intervention, despite his concerns for his friend’s continued isolation and safety, my 15-year-old student did not seek help from any adults. He told me that he did not seek help as he feared that PREVENT made it their duty to report the situation to the security services and he was concerned that the intervention of government counter-terrorism workers in this sensitive situation would undermine his own successful efforts to help his friend.

PREVENT had prevented a concerned student seeking support for a friend who he believed was being drawn into supporting Islamic State.

Fear of resisting calls for a caliphate

Another student who also showed theological literacy in our frequent conversations explained how PREVENT was preventing him from challenging the views of people who he perceived to be extreme and potentially dangerous. He explained that on a number of occasions outside a mosque, he had been approached by people who were calling for the support of a caliphate and who he felt were misrepresenting the teachings of Islam by their lack of respect and pragmatism with regards to the laws of their home country. However, on every occasion that he was approached by these people, rather than challenging them with his astute and pragmatic views on Islam, he had turned his back and refused to talk to them. He refused to talk to them as he feared that association with these people was likely to result in a referral under PREVENT and that this would result in the security services intervening in his life. As a result of this, he did not engage his extensive theological knowledge to challenge views that he perceived to be extreme and dangerous.

PREVENT was preventing this student from challenging the views of other Muslims that he perceived to be ‘extreme’, undermining a mechanism by which apparently ‘extreme’ views might have been moderated.

Silencing of classroom debate

In 2013, I was a form tutor to a particularly lively class. In our allotted form time every morning and afternoon we would discuss the news of the day. In one particularly heated encounter, a group of students cited the Koran to argue that gay people should be denied equal rights. The ensuing argument became heated and lasted for more than a few days as these views were vehemently challenged by me and by other students. A few months later in July 2013, when
the Equal Marriage Act was being debated in Parliament, the students raised the topic again. This time, arguing that it was surely right and kind to call a union between any people ‘a marriage’, no matter what their sexuality. This was a view that they had heard from me in the earlier classroom debate. I had also learned from them, that they were not trying to be difficult, extreme or radical in their earlier assertions, they were responding in a non-critical manner to what they understood to be received wisdom. A year later a local PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy had been implemented in the school and these same students were among those who informed me that they no longer engage in political debates because they feared being reported under PREVENT. As one of them had quoted the Koran to justify harming gay men in our earlier discussion, their fear that they would be reported may have been justified.

As a result of PREVENT, classroom debates were silenced and a mechanism by which extreme views were being moderated had been disrupted.

The idea that PREVENT shuts down debate has often been challenged by supporters of the strategy who say that the intention of PREVENT is to promote classroom debate. This has happened in the media (Fenton-Smith, 2017) and in my own direct contact with local PREVENT workers and more senior civil servants. In response to this, firstly, the intentions of PREVENT may be different from the outcomes of the strategy at a local level as has been indicated by the experiences of my students. And, secondly, there is some truth to the statement that PREVENT promotes classroom debate and I have spoken to teachers and observed lessons where the discussion of news that students have travelled to ISIS held territory is promoted. However, having an abstract discussion about a story in the news as I witnessed in these classes is different to having a more authentic and dialogic exchange where opposing views are aired and challenged (R. Alexander, 2008). Such an authentic exchange was demonstrated in the aforementioned example of the conversation on marriage equality and resulted in students altering their common-sense beliefs. My experience indicates that these authentic exchanges where students have the confidence to reveal views that others may perceive to be extreme, for example revealing a desire to join ISIS or to harm gay men, are being suppressed by PREVENT. By claiming that PREVENT promotes classroom debate, PREVENT workers are conflating the abstract discussion of a news story with a more authentic, dialogic, exchange of views. This might result in PREVENT workers masking their silencing of authentic exchanges. Exchanges that the aforementioned examples and Alexander (2008) suggest have the capacity to moderate extreme views.

The situations briefly explored above indicated to me that PREVENT was undermining pre-existing mechanisms that moderated views perceived to be extreme. This became the focus of my MA dissertation, A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Prevent Counter-Terrorism
Strategies (Faure Walker, 2015), and this research showed that the usage of ‘radicalisation’ and of ‘extremism’ has changed between the 2008 and 2011 versions of PREVENT. The changed usage made the terms, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, synonymous with violence and enabled the shift in counter-terrorism’s focus from criminal acts and onto so-called ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, often referred to as ‘pre-crime’ (Goldberg, Jadhav, & Younis, 2017; Qureshi, 2016). The analysis that I carried out also indicated that this shift away from criminal acts and onto civil discourse was associated with a Secular agenda that struggled to reconcile the existence of Islam in Europe (Faure Walker, 2015, pp. 11,48-51; Gove, 2007; Mavelli, 2012). My earlier work indicated that this silencing of debate not only affected Muslim students but also affected diverse political views more generally and suggested that this has the capacity to promote rather than prevent violence. The sparse theorisation of this area that was laid out in my earlier work needs to be developed if the mechanism by which violence might be catalysed by counter-terrorism is to be understood. It is hoped that the wider dissemination of this work and of work stemming from it will contribute to the disruption of mechanisms by which violence might be promoted.

My developing expertise in this area led to me being approached by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets who co-opted me as a member the Tower Hamlets Overview and Scrutiny Committee into PREVENT. The Committee was convened in 2015 to investigate how PREVENT, which was by now a controversial strategy, could be better implemented in Tower Hamlets. Running for six months and meeting on average of every 3 weeks, including spending a day meeting the PREVENT team in Birmingham and being briefed by representatives of the security services, the team was made up of local government officials and local residents and I was bought in as an academic and schools expert. In this capacity, I organised focus groups with school students and local government officials from across Tower Hamlets to enable the officials to explore the local impact of PREVENT. The student participants in these focus groups indicated that they, like the students in my classes, thought that PREVENT was changing their behaviour, shutting down debate and undermining the mediation of ‘extreme’ views. This suggested to me that my previous concerns about the impact of PREVENT and the associated discourse in my classroom were representative of a wider trend. A wider trend that may be promoting violence and, therefore, should be investigated further, as is the aim of this thesis. While on the Overview and Scrutiny Committee, I noticed that others discussing ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ led to me thinking that something ought to be done and this led me to question my opposition to PREVENT. I questioned my opposition in spite of mine and the experiences of my pupils indicating that PREVENT was causing more harm than good. This effect of the words ‘radicalisation’ and
‘extremism’ changing my perception or PREVENT led to my focus on the discursive aspect of the phenomenon.

1.2. Aim and Research Questions

Due to my experience as a teacher in the UK education system and as a commentator on counter-extremism in the UK context, the focus of this thesis will be on political discourse in the UK. Thus, henceforth, where reference is made to political and discursive contexts, unless otherwise indicated, these refer to the UK. However, as has been noted by Kundnani (2014), these policies have developed in tandem with the US, and others suggest that strategies to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ have since been exported from the UK and around the world via the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (Fitzgerald, 2016; Ragazzi, 2018). It is, therefore, hoped that while the aims that are described below are specific to the UK context, they may also contribute to understanding of the global context in which counter-terrorism strategies develop. From my professional perspective and experience as a secondary school teacher, the imposition of the duty to report signs of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in my students was counterproductive, as is explored in the preceding section. The analysis carried out in later chapters, specifically Chapter 4 and Figure 12 when theorised in the context of semiotic change over time, indicate that there may be real generative mechanisms for RadEx to be appreciated in the change over time that the graph describes. These are generative mechanisms for the discourse and that emerge from the discourse itself. Following Bhaskar, ‘in social explanation we must in principle understand the relationship between language and the extra-discursive part of social reality as a causal one, with the causality being two-way’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 106). So, it is proposed that these discursive changes might have real effects on the world and these effects are theorised in Chapters 5 and 6.

In my earlier work that is summarised in Chapter 4 I used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to identify a violent discourse of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ (RadEx) in the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategies (HM Government, 2008, 2011b). This discourse, RadEx, is the focus of this thesis and describes,

- the emergence and proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in British political discourse throughout the 20th Century.

and

- the changing meanings of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ since 2008, the words becoming progressively more synonymous with violence between 2008 and 2014.
The emergence and proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ will be investigated in this thesis by the analysis of texts containing these words and this will aim to answer the following question,

**RQ1.** What discursive conditions resulted in the emergence and proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in UK parliamentary discourse.

My earlier work described a change in the meaning of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and this was initially indicated by differences between the texts of the PREVENT Strategy from 2008 and the later version from 2011 (Faure Walker, 2015, 2017b). Having previously observed this change between two documents, this thesis will aim to investigate if this is part of a wider trend. Thus, I also aim to answer the following questions:

**RQ2.** Did ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ tend to be collocated with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence when employed in the first publication of PREVENT (HM Government 2008) and in contemporaneous discourse?

**RQ3.** Has the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence become less prevalent since PREVENT was first published in 2008?

While my previous work described changes to the meaning of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, it did not theorise the causes of nor the impacts of these changes. Thus, the final questions that this thesis aims to answer are,

**RQ4.** What are the causes and impacts of RadEx?

**RQ5.** Can and should RadEx be contested?

RQ1 is addressed in Chapter 4, section 5.1, by employing the online Hansard Corpus to investigate the increasing frequency of both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in the parliamentary record. This is supported in section 5.2 by carrying out critical discourse analysis (CDA) of texts containing these words to explore the linguistic, interdiscursive and social conditions that led to their emergence. It is important that linguistic, interdiscursive and social conditions are investigated at this stage so as to offer a full picture of the emergence of the discourse. Interdiscursivity is more fully described in chapters 1.5 and 3 but, in brief, describes how genres, discourses and styles develop in ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective’ relations with those that precede and follow them (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 35). Fairclough describes how this type of analysis mediates between linguistic analysis of texts and analysis of social events and practices (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 218). The focus in this thesis on the analysis of discourse over time lends itself to this type of analysis.
RQ2 and 3 are addressed in section 5.2 by carrying out a corpus study of government documents that contain the words ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. This corpus study describes changes to the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence since 2008.

Answering RQ4 draws heavily on Critical Realism and will be answered by theorising the real generative mechanisms for RadEx, an ontology of these real generative mechanisms being the primary concern of Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 1994, 2008, 2016a, 2016b). This is addressed in Chapter 4 where links are drawn between the linguistic, interdiscursive and social analysis of the conditions from which RadEx has emerged. In this chapter, the real generative mechanisms for RadEx and which emanate from RadEx are theorised.

Throughout the thesis, the analysis indicates that RadEx has the capacity to normalise oppression and to promote violence. In response to this, RQ 5 will be responded to in chapters, 7, 8 and 9. While the generative mechanisms within RadEx are described as generative of political violence, Wilkinson is followed in taking care not to suggest that these are the ontology of political violence, rather a mechanism amongst many others, an understanding of which might help us to understand and thus to better respond to violence and oppression (Wilkinson in Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017; Wilkinson, 2018).

Chapter 6 reflects on the contribution that this thesis has made to both Critical Realism and CDA by bringing them together and reflects on the recent emergence of a normalised and desecuritised approach to countering ‘extremism’. This is a phenomenon that, following the analysis and theory put forward in this thesis, might be expected.

The sections that follow in this introductory chapter offer an overview of the development of counter-terrorism since 9/11, with a specific focus on the recent emergence of the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the political and bureaucratic mechanisms by which it was imposed on schools in 2014. This is a necessary first step in addressing the aforementioned research questions as,

[T]he PREVENT duty is not just securitising schools and colleges but normalising that securitisation by embedding it within the accepted, everyday practices of school and college staff. (Busher, Choudhury, Thomas, & Harris, 2017, p. 8)

1.3. Counter-terrorism after 9/11 and the two versions of PREVENT

The PREVENT Strategy has had two versions, published first in 2008 by the New Labour Government of Tony Blair PM and again in 2011 by the Conservative led coalition Government of David Cameron PM. The language adopted in these two different documents has been described by MacDonald et al (MacDonald, Hunter, & O'Regan, 2013) as representative of
the progression of post 9/11 government discourses that first promoted multiculturalism, then Citizenship and Community Cohesion (CCC), then Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) (MacDonald et al., 2013; Thomas, 2014). Thomas has since described a progression from policies that promoted multiculturalism to those that promoted community cohesion and, while he does not refer to MacDonald et al, Thomas' descriptions of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘community cohesion’ are closely aligned (Thomas, 2014). More recent Government documentation has described a specific focus on Counter-Extremism (CE) (HM Government, 2013, 2015a, 2015b), as opposed to the PVE described by MacDonald et al. More recently, O'Regan & Betzel (2016) have described the similarity between discourses of extremism and multiculturalism in their paper that explores,

the discursive construction of identities in discourses of extremism and multiculturalism, on the part of Islamists and white supremacists on the one hand and UK politicians on the other, and the way in which cultural essentialism and outsiderness may be seen to dominate the lenses of both discourses. (O'Regan & Betzel, 2016)

This contribution from O'Regan & Betzel is a useful demonstration of the complexity in attempting to define discourses. Even discourses such as those of multiculturalism and extremism that might appear to be distinct and even contradictory to one another may in fact share similarities when submitted to closer analysis. The emergence of this more recent counter-extremism (CE) discourse will be explored further in chapters 4, 5 and the final chapter. But, first the development of post-9/11 counter-terrorism discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ that led to the development of the PREVENT strategies will be discussed by drawing on government reports and academic papers from 2001 to the present.

Riots in the North of England in 2001 led the Government to commission the Cantle Report into Community Cohesion (Home Office, 2001). While the Cantle Report does not refer explicitly to ‘multiculturalism’, criticism of divisions between different communities can be found throughout the report,

Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to

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1 O'Regan was notably one of the authors of the MacDonald et al paper
touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges. (Home Office, 2001, p. 9)

Alongside this criticism, the Cantle Report lauds community cohesion, bemoaning its ‘breakdown’ (p.21) and insisting on its promotion as a solution to the problems that the report describes,

we believe that a commitment to promote community cohesion through the development of organisations from top to bottom is now required. (Cantle, 2001, p. 21)

Thomas suggests that the shift to community cohesion shown in the Cantle Report marked a return to policies of assimilation and signalled the death of multiculturalism and the promotion of multicultural diversity in government policy (Home Office, 2001, p. 9; Thomas, 2014, p. 475). While, in Thomas’ view, the Cantle Report’s focus on community cohesion signals that the Government are stepping away from multiculturalism, it is notably different from later PVE and CE discourses in not using the term ‘radicalisation’, and in the nine times that it uses ‘extremist’ always ties it to the Far Right rather than to Islam, as the later PREVENT Strategy does in 2011 (HM Government, 2011b). It is also of note that the Cantle Report only refers to ‘extremism’ once, ‘extremism on all sides is the result of the absence of dialogue’ (Home Office, 2001, p. 66). Analysis carried out in Chapter 4 will show that recent government discourse has moved away from the Cantle Report’s focus on social factors and the Far Right, to now focus on Islam and ‘extremism’ more generally. This analysis will also indicate that the increasing usage of the words has nominalised ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and, in doing so, hides its causes, this process is discussed in chapters 5 to 8.

In response to the disaffection of Britain’s migrant communities that the Cantle Report describes and the apparent exposure of these communities to ‘organised terrorism overseas’, Mackinlay suggests that British security officials thought ‘that the country had become unusually vulnerable [to terrorism]’ and needed ‘a more unified and convincing national strategy’ (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 210). As an ex-officer in the British Gurkha regiment, defence Fellow of Churchill College Cambridge and teaching fellow at the War Studies Department of King’s College, it would be hard to imagine a more establishment figure than Mackinlay and this may be a reason that he is able to gain access to the architects of PREVENT that is not seen in the work of other academics critiquing post-9/11 British counter-terrorism strategy. In his book from 2009, The Insurgent Archipelago, Mackinlay describes the actions of senior civil servant, Sir David Omand, in 2002 that would ultimately lead to the Government’s focus on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Sir David had recently moved from his role of Permanent Secretary to the Home Office to become Security and Intelligence Coordinator for the Cabinet Office in 2002 when,
On the 22nd October he [Omand] achieved his first organisational objective by convening a meeting of all the involved departments and agencies. His critical mass included parts of the Cabinet Office, Home Office, Treasury, Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence, the Security Services as well as the Metropolitan Police. There were so many attendees that, rather than use the conference facilities in Whitehall, the meeting had to be held at the Civil Service Sports Club. In his opening brief he established himself as national co-ordinator and called on the participants to engage as a whole in helping to construct a national strategy rather than by simply following their departmental priorities. He urged them to cross departmental boundaries and to think nationally. His plan was to create a national structure to address Britain’s vulnerability to attack, improve its ability to respond to an attack and to counter growing disaffection or ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim communities, in addition to supporting the pursuit of the existing terrorist networks at home and overseas. It was intended as an immediate response, a five-year plan, but not as a long-term operation that could support a widely advocated political narrative. (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 211)

The intended short-term nature of Omand’s intervention is confirmed in a recently released confidential Cabinet Office briefing presentation that I gained via a Freedom of Information request. The document from 2004 is named CONTEST: a 5 year UK strategy for countering international terrorism (Omand, 2004). Mackinlay goes on to suggest that Omand had a long-term intention to address the issues laid out in the Cantle Report, to build ‘healthier, more integrated migrant communities at home’. However, he describes resistance from the Education, Local Government and Community Cohesion departments in Whitehall as they did not want to be linked to counter-terrorism. Added to this resistance, the growing architecture that was already referred to as ‘PREVENT’ (Omand, 2004, p. 5) was shrouded in secrecy so as to avoid this new domestic initiative becoming linked to the politically toxic invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 212). The Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) emerged at the time to coordinate the growing architecture that Omand had instigated.

In Whitehall the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) was designed as a hub around which government departments, intelligence and the police coalesced and co-operated. The OSCT’s achievement was to reconcile the actions of a very disparate array of actors and to keep them fixed on the objectives of CONTEST. In the Whitehall hierarchy the OSCT was a subordinate part of the Home Office, but in the context of the operation it was required to reach far beyond its boundaries and draw together officials from the allied departments of Transport, Education, Local Government, Energy and Rural Affairs. The OSCT also had a co-ordinating function for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and the Security Services... Had a campaign of such a scale and complexity been organised by the military there would have been an operational order. (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 213)
Such an operational order was not issued as it would have interfered with the ‘pre-existing modus operandi’ of the police and civil authorities and would, thus, have been seen as ‘intrusive and unconstitutional’ (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 214). This lack of operational order meant that OSCT were unable to ‘steer their efforts at a local level’ (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 214). There is limited reference to the organisational structure of OSCT or of its relation to PREVENT on Government websites but Mackinlay describes OSCT as taking a leading role in the implementation of PREVENT, through the overarching CONTEST Strategy (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 213). OSCT’s connection with PREVENT is corroborated by the business card that I was given by a civil servant within OSCT and that is reproduced below and which indicates that the ‘Prevent Unit’ lies within OSCT.

![Business card linking PREVENT with the OSCT](image)

**Figure 1**: Business card linking PREVENT with the OSCT

Though named in Omand’s 2004 CONTEST presentation (p.5), PREVENT was not developed into or written as a separate strategy until after the bombings in London on 7th July 2005 when it was rapidly drafted and deployed; Thomas describes this rapid conception and operationalisation as a problem that has dogged PREVENT from the outset (Thomas, 2014, p. 476). He suggests that the dual purposes of PREVENT, securitisation and community cohesion, exist as an unhappy marriage. And, in his paper, ‘Divorced but still co-habiting?’, Thomas (2014) shows that these two aspects of the strategy were led by the OSCT and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). He explains that the community cohesion agenda of the DCLG was sidelined by OSCT and quotes a senior civil servant as saying that ‘PREVENT took over cohesion’ as a result of OSCT’s control of funding (Thomas, 2014, p. 481).
As a co-opted member of a local government scrutiny committee into PREVENT in 2016 I saw how the requirement of community cohesion projects to reapply to central government via the Home Office for funding as often as every six months rendered control over this type of community cohesion work to OSCT, particularly as at this time the only projects that could be commissioned had to be selected from a list prepared by OSCT and listed in the PREVENT Catalogue (Home Office, 2015). This short-term funding model was a frustration aired by those providing this work as they were unable to guarantee that projects would be recommissioned and could therefore only offer short-term initiatives rather than developing longer-term and more meaningful projects to support effective cohesion work, this frustration was still being aired by civil servants who I spoke to a year later in October 2017.

The control of the PREVENT agenda on funding was further demonstrated at a local level in a recent discussion that I had with Rizwan Hussain, founder of the London based Jawaab youth group, who described resisting requests to hand over the contact details of the young people on his project to the OSCT PREVENT team and eventually how his continued refusal resulted in his funding from the Home Office being cut off. Hussain’s observation that the funding was tied to intelligence sharing and the lack of interest in effective and longer-term cohesion projects suggests that the focus of these PREVENT projects in 2016 was intelligence gathering rather than the promotion of community cohesion.

Thomas (2014) suggests that from the outset there was a lack of understanding between the OSCT and DCLG on how PREVENT should be implemented and he quotes John Denham MP (Home Office Minister of State responsible for commissioning of Cantle Report) as saying that the DCLG did not understand the model for the implementation of PREVENT. However, rather than demonstrating a lack of understanding, this might better show the different departments’ intentions for PREVENT as the DCLG were more focussed on cohesion than on the securitisation work of OSCT (Thomas, 2014, p. 482). The OSCT and John Denham MP’s focus on PREVENT and PVE is likely to have resulted in the further marginalisation of DCLG, resulting in ineffective cohesion work and reinforcing the OSCT perspective that their securitised version of PREVENT was needed in preference to the apparently failing cohesion agenda of the DCLG. Arun Kundnani’s report, ‘Spooked’ (Kundnani, 2009), publicised the embedding of Police and Counter-Terrorism Units at all levels of PREVENT and decision making in local government and Kundnani’s work is described by Thomas as ‘crystallizing’ the perception that PREVENT was a large-scale surveillance operation on British Muslims (Thomas, 2014, p. 482). This lack of trust in PREVENT caused the 2010 House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee report, Preventing Violent Extremism, to recommend that, ‘If the Government wants to improve confidence in the PREVENT programme, it should commission an independent investigation
into the allegations made.’ (House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010, p. 3)

A PREVENT Review was carried out by the Government in June 2011 (HM Government, 2011a), in the wake of the 2010 general election and the formation of the Coalition Government. In response to this review, the new PREVENT Strategy was released in June 2011 and this moved PREVENT’s focus away from New Labour’s Citizenship and Community Cohesion agenda and on to the Preventing Violent Extremism agenda of the new Coalition Government. The new strategy is categorical in its rejection of the previous version, stating that ‘The PREVENT programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed’ (HM Government, 2011b, p. 1). The primacy of the OSCT’s securitisation agenda over that of the DCLG was confirmed by this new version of PREVENT.

The OSCT aligned securitisation discourse of the new PREVENT Strategy had previously been adopted by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, in his speech in Munich in February 2011 when he proposed that there was a battle for values and ideology playing out in the supposed contest between ‘Western democracy’ and ‘Islamic extremism’. He rejects the importance of social factors such as poverty and grievances over foreign policy and describes his position as ‘muscular liberalism’ (Cameron, 2011, 2017; O’Regan & Betzel, 2016, p. 8). David Cameron’s notion of a battle for ideology is subsequently replicated by the report from the Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism (TREFOR) in December 2013 which repeatedly employs the terms ‘extremist’ and ‘extremism’ without qualification, 79 times over 9 pages, reinforcing the notion expressed by Cameron that this is a problem of ‘extreme’ individuals or ideologies rather than of social conditions (HM Government, 2013). This report was published in the wake of the murder of soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich on 22nd May 2013 when one of his murderers was recorded on a mobile phone attempting to justify his actions. O’Regan & Betzel suggest that both the speech of Lee Rigby’s killers and Cameron’s Munich speech are ‘indicative of contemporary discourses of extremism and multiculturalism on the part of Islamists, white supremacists and conservative British politicians’ (O’Regan & Betzel, 2016, p. 8). By the time the TREFOR report was published in the wake of the killing of Lee Rigby, the PVE agenda of the Home Office and OSCT had been incorporated across central government, even being adopted by the DCLG in their Creating the Conditions for Integration report (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012).

The Creating the Conditions for Integration report (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012) was published in February 2012, a year after the Coalition Government’s new version of PREVENT was published. Like Cameron in his Munich speech,
the report adopts the OSCT's PVE agenda. The report indicates that the DCLG had shifted away from their previous focus on community cohesion by referencing ‘extremism’ or ‘extremist’ an average of more than once for every page of the report. In doing so, the primacy of ‘extremism’ as a barrier to integration is promoted as is also the case in the diagram shown in Figure 2 below which is reproduced from the report. The focus on ‘extremism’ indicates that the discourse of DCLG was moving away from that of the Cantle Report which identified the problem of lack of integration which was described as resulting from the external factors of poverty, deprivation, and lack of opportunity. ‘Extremism’ in the context presented by the DCLG report presents the ‘extreme’ individual and their ideology, rather than society, as the problem to be addressed and this undermines the requirement of community cohesion work by the DCLG. Thomas describes the report as ‘a flimsy and woefully inadequate document’ (Thomas, 2014). However, we might also see that, far from being ‘inadequate’, the report indicates a shift in the agenda of the DCLG. The report demonstrates that the community cohesion agenda was losing the DCLG as its main supporter as the department aligned itself with the PVE agenda of PREVENT and OSCT. The analysis carried out in Chapter 4 will indicate that this shift was also supported by the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, enabling policy to focus on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ rather than their causes.

Figure 2: Creating the Conditions for Integration (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012, p. 4)

Though the PVE agenda of OSCT was adopted across Government departments, it has not always been accepted at a local level and this has been particularly pronounced in the application of PREVENT. In a recent BBC Radio 4 programme, Understanding PREVENT (Fenton-Smith, 2017) - a programme that I also appear on - Sir David Omand, the original
The architect of PREVENT who is referred to above, reflected on the effectiveness of the strategy that he conceived in 2002, saying,

I have some doubts as to whether it [PREVENT] was the right way but I retired in 2005 so am very much an outside observer. The risk in taking that approach [PREVENT] was that it was bringing together two strands of work, one part of counter-terrorism focusing on potential risks of violent crime, the other much more general objective about community cohesion and our values. By bringing those two together the risk was it would be perceived by the Muslim communities in Great Britain as being something that was actually hostile to them. (Omand in Fenton-Smith, 2017)

When asked if he thought that PREVENT has been effective, he responded, ‘If it is not accepted, then it’s not going to be successful’ (Omand in Fenton-Smith, 2017)

The authors cited in this section have suggested that the State’s merging of PVE and community cohesion agendas is problematic and the chapters 6 to 8 will go some way to elaborate on the philosophical foundations of this problem. Analysis of the language that embodies this area of policy and strategy in chapters 4 and 5 will also reveal mechanisms by which the agenda of OSCT has been operationalised at a local level by the creation of common sense. The creation of common sense has enabled the OSCT to embed their agenda across a ‘disparate array of actors’ (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 213) and into local institutions such as schools and hospitals. It has managed this in the absence of an operational order that would have revealed their ‘intrusive’ and ‘unconstitutional agenda’ (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 214).

While the aforementioned language which will also be analysed later reveals a mechanism by which the adoption of counter-extremism (CE) agendas became commonsensical, the Trojan Horse affair that is discussed below shows how counter-extremism agendas were spread via political institutions and the media and how such strategies were adopted at an institutional level.

1.4. The Trojan Horse Affair and the PREVENT duty

The affair that has now become known as the ‘Trojan Horse’ ‘scandal’ (Abbas, 2017) demonstrates that PREVENT was not being followed in schools before 2014 and reveals the mechanism by which it was forced into schools in Birmingham and in Tower Hamlets up to a year before the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b) inferred that it was a legal duty. In a conversation that I had in 2014 with a civil servant who had worked on the earlier, New Labour, version of PREVENT (HM Government, 2008), the official expressed his frustration that the PREVENT training (Workshop to Raise Awareness of PREVENT or WRAP training) that he had helped to develop 7 years earlier had not been adopted by
schools. He told me that it had been his intention that PREVENT and WRAP would be adopted in schools soon after the WRAP training had been produced. It was only with the ‘Trojan Horse’ ‘scandal’ that this was finally achieved.

In March 2014, the Times (Kennedy, Hurst, & Gledhill, 2014) and the Sunday Times (Cavendish, 2014) reported on a letter that had been sent anonymously to the Leader of Birmingham City Council and that described a ‘Trojan Horse’ plot by so-called ‘Islamic extremists’ to take over the management of the schools in Birmingham by infiltrating the schools’ governing bodies. The provenance of the letter is not discussed in either article but has since been referred to by the Government’s Education Select Committee,

The document [the letter] had been sent to the leader of Birmingham City Council in November 2013, with a covering letter (also anonymous) stating that “This letter was found when I was clearing my bosses [sic] files and I think you should be aware that I am shocked at what your officers are doing.” The letter writer adds “You have 7 days to investigate this matter after which it will be sent to a national newspaper who I am sure will treat it seriously” (House of Commons Education Select Committee, 2015, p. 5)

Evidently, the letter did find its way to a national newspaper and this led to a media-orchestrated public outcry which resulted in the extraordinary inspection of 21 of the city’s schools by the UK schools’ inspectorate (OfSTED). The aforementioned Select Committee has since reported that,

No evidence of extremism or radicalisation, apart from a single isolated incident, was found by any of the inquiries and there was no evidence of a sustained plot nor of a similar situation pertaining elsewhere in the country (House of Commons Education Select Committee, 2015, p. 3)

The notion of Islam as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to take over schools has provenance in the then Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove MP, who was previously a journalist at the Times and who had written a book in the wake of the 7/7 bombings in London. In the book, Celsius 7/7: how the West’s policy of appeasement has provoked yet more fundamentalist terror - and what has to be done now (Gove, 2007), Gove presents the relationship between Islam and the West as inherently problematic and one aspect of the problem described is ‘The Trojan Horse’. A chapter in the book titled ‘The Trojan Horse’ describes the existence of Islamic ideology in the UK as a ‘fight’ that is ‘symbolic’ and Gove questions if the UK would be ‘strong enough to defend the idea of Secular space’ (Gove, 2007, p. 101), Gove suggests that the UK needs to do more to defend itself in this symbolic ‘fight’ and this might provide some insight into Gove’s motives for authorising the intervention in Birmingham. Sources at Birmingham City Council have since told me that they did not think that the ‘Trojan Horse’
‘scandal’ was representative of a problem that needed to be addressed, saying that they saw any efforts to incorporate a religious or cultural ideology into the management of the criticised schools as a well-meaning attempt to make the schools representative of the marginalised Muslim communities that they served, a perspective that is shared by the former head of the school at the centre of the ‘scandal’ (Abbas, 2017).

Following the initial revelations of the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter, allegations of the infiltration of schools by so-called ‘Islamic extremists’ were made in the UK media and in Parliament throughout 2014; ‘Trojan Horse: how we revealed the truth behind the plot’ (Gilligan, 2014), ‘OfSTED’s slur on the Muslim community of Park View School’ (Donaghy, 2014), ‘Trojan Horse Debate: We were wrong, all cultures are not equal’ (Pearson, 2014), “‘Trojan Horse 2’ in London’ (Griffiths & Kerbaj, 2014a, 2014b), ‘Extremism & Birmingham Schools’ (Hansard, 2014). The allegations centred on schools in the boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Birmingham, schools that served predominantly Muslim communities and which were exceeding the Department for Education and OfSTED’s expected performance measures in their exams (OfSTED, 2005, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Tower Hamlets, 2013).

In response to the Trojan Horse allegations, the schools’ inspectorate (OfSTED) was instructed by Michael Gove MP (in his capacity as the Secretary of State for Education) to inspect 21 schools in Birmingham. The inspectorate downgraded 15 of the schools from ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ to ‘inadequate’. Sir Michael Wilshaw, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools, claimed that ‘Birmingham City Council has failed to support a number of schools in their efforts to keep pupils safe from the potential risks of radicalisation and extremism’ (Wilshaw, 2014). All of the schools were instructed that they could improve if they implemented the PREVENT Strategy (OfSTED, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). On the day of publication of the reports, the supposed threat to the UK from violent extremism and the threat to Birmingham’s schools from Islam were debated in the same sitting of Parliament (Hansard, 2014). 11 days after this debate, headteachers in Tower Hamlets received a letter offering their schools the services of the Home Office PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Programme in lesson planning (Vickerie, 2014). The head teacher of the school in which I taught expressed concern that these services were at odds with the school’s inclusive agenda but exclaimed that ‘in the current climate we can’t afford to ignore this’ (personal communication). Further discussion revealed that the ‘current climate’ was a reference to the Trojan Horse debate in the media and in Parliament, and the threat of intervention by the schools’ inspectorate, OfSTED.

Soon after this, allegations were made in the press that the infiltration by Islamic extremists was worse in Tower Hamlets than in Birmingham. Griffiths and Kerbaj (2014a, 2014b) quote a ‘senior Whitehall source’ saying that,
Tower Hamlets is expected to be the next Birmingham, but even worse, because the problems surrounding Muslim fundamentalists imposing their views on education seem to be more embedded'. (Griffiths & Kerbaj, 2014b)

These allegations were rebutted by Tower Hamlets Council in a statement published on their website (Tower Hamlets, 2014a) but, in light of these accusations, staff at the school in Tower Hamlets where I was teaching were warned on the day after the article was published to expect an inspection and that the school might suffer a similar judgement to the schools in Birmingham. Weeks later, OfSTED did come to Tower Hamlets and visited Sir John Cass School which is near the school where I worked. Sir John Cass School was criticised by OfSTED for not providing the students with ‘sufficient guidance about how to keep themselves safe from extremism’ (OfSTED, 2014c, p. 7) and the same report downgraded the school from ‘outstanding’ to ‘inadequate’. OfSTED’s first instruction for how they could improve was that they should adopt the PREVENT Strategy (OfSTED, 2014c, p. 3). Soon after the inspection of John Cass School, PREVENT Strategies for the borough of Tower Hamlets (2014b) and for the school where I worked were emailed to all staff. Microsoft™ Word© document properties indicate that both the borough and the school PREVENT strategies were written less than 10 days after 3rd July 2015 when Sir John Cass School was inspected, the spectre of judgement by OfSTED appears to have resulted in the strategy being implemented in schools.

Throughout this period, many Muslim students at the school where I taught continued to voluntarily attend the lunchtime prayer room. During Friday prayers (Jumma) the students had previously given their own sermons but soon after the inspection of Sir John Cass School the students giving the sermons were requested to submit scripts for their sermons to the school for approval. This was no easy task for the students who had previously given oral sermons that were not written down. It was clear from discussions at the time that this change in the running of the prayer room was related to the downgrading of John Cass School by OfSTED and the implementation of the PREVENT Strategy. As a supervisor of the prayer room I was engaged in this censoring process by email but expressed my discomfort and was not required to pass judgement on the children’s sermons. However, a number of sermons were subsequently censored by other teachers and the students were given prepared scripts to read from instead. The PREVENT Strategy, which had previously been ignored, now appeared to be informing the day to day running of the school.

The PREVENT strategy was reinforced 6 months later when on 12th February 2015 the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act made it a duty for schools to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015b, p. 18). This was further reinforced on 12th March 2015 when ‘PREVENT Duty Guidance for England and
Wales’ was published by the Home Office (2015c). Not only does the inclusion of the word ‘duty’ in the title of the document imply that the guidance is not optional but the guidance itself also states the duty of schools to refer pupils who express ‘extremist ideas’ to the Home Office Counter-Terrorism Programme (HM Government, 2015c, pp. 10-11). This strand of the counter-terrorism strategy, a programme referred to as ‘CHANNEL’, is described as ‘a programme which provides support to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015c, p. 7). While the Counter Terrorism and Security Act and the PREVENT Duty Guidance of early 2015 made it clear that PREVENT would now be a duty for public sector service providers such as universities and hospitals, the Trojan Horse affair ensured that it was enacted in schools up to a year earlier. I developed an interest in the PREVENT Strategy as a result of my concern for the impact that it was having on the students in my classes at this time. This concern for my students and the observations made during the earlier-mentioned focus groups that indicated that the impacts of the strategy were being felt further afield have motivated me to write this thesis.

1.5. Key Terms and Concepts

The following list of key terms is necessarily disparate due to the content of this thesis as specialist knowledge of critical discourse analysis, Critical Realism and terrorism studies is required. While convention suggests that this section ought to be towards the end as a glossary, it is hoped that by bringing it to the front, it might support the reader through the rest of the thesis.

Cabinet Office
Described as supporting the Prime Minister and ensuring the effective running of government on UK government websites, the Cabinet Office is of interest to the research carried out here as it takes a lead on counter-terrorism. The Cabinet Office’s leadership of PREVENT can be traced back to Sir David Omand’s move from his role of Permanent Secretary to the Home Office to become Security and Intelligence Coordinator for the Cabinet Office in 2002. Mackinlay describes Omand as conceiving and developing PREVENT in his book The Insurgent Archipelago (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 211). Initially a temporary 5 year strategy (Omand, 2004), PREVENT has since become an apparently permanent feature of the UK counter-terrorism strategy.

CHANNEL
CHANNEL is described in the PREVENT Strategy as a programme which identifies and provides support for ‘for people at risk of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011b, p. 1).
Collocation
Collocation is a term that is fundamental to corpus linguistics and is used to refer to words being located in close proximity to one another in the texts being analysed. In the research carried out here, the collocation of keywords is analysed using Wordsmith Tools software before the impacts of changes to collocations of different words over time is theorised.

Concrete Utopia
Concrete utopianism describes an important aspect of Critical Realist research in which we describe ‘a notional’ eudemonic future. This is a vital stage of emancipatory praxis and will be elaborated in later chapters (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 109; Hartwig, 2007, p. 74)

DCLG
The conflicting agendas of The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) are described by Thomas (2014) as seminal to the shift in PREVENT’s focus from the ‘citizenship and community cohesion’ agenda of DCLG to the securitization agenda of OSCT. (Thomas, 2014)

Depth Struggle
A fundamental aspect of stage 4 of the schema for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that is developed in chapter 5 of this thesis. ‘Depth’ refers to the concept that we cannot know what is beyond our farthest frontier of knowledge; in principle, this depth is limitless (Hartwig, 2007, p. 117). ‘Struggle’ refers to efforts to transcend the master-slave relations that have come to typify society (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 156). This thesis aims to reveal as yet unknown aspects of master-slave relations and to propose ways in which they might be transcended.

Discourse
‘Discourse’, as employed in this thesis, takes one of two meanings. Firstly, it might refer to language in a general sense, including text, spoken word, visual images, body language etc. In this first meaning, ‘discourse’ is dialogically related to other aspects of social life. Secondly, ‘discourse’ might refer to particular ‘discourses’ such as the ‘Third Way’ of ‘New Labour’ which has been the focus of much of Fairclough’s work (N. Fairclough, 2000b, 2003). The violent discourse of radicalisation and extremism (RadEx) that is the focus of this thesis is a ‘discourse’ in this second sense. The connection between ‘ideology’, ‘power’ and ‘discourse’ are discussed towards the end of the literature review in chapter 2.7.

‘Extremism’
‘Extremism’ will be shown in this thesis to be a word that has only recently come into common usage and which progressively changed meaning between 2008 and 2014. Where relevant to the analysis carried out, the associated words ‘extreme’ and ‘extremist’ will also be investigated.

Fundamental British Values (FBV)

The policy to promote Fundamental British Values (FBV) in schools followed David Cameron PM’s call for ‘muscular liberalism’ in his speech to the Munich Security Conference (Cameron, 2011; Crawford, 2017). In this speech, Cameron called for the promotion of liberal values which he said included ‘Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality’ (Cameron, 2011). The values listed by Cameron are similar to those described in the PREVENT Strategy and which have since been published by the Department for Education in the booklet, *Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools Departmental advice for maintained schools* (Department for Education, 2014). Crawford describes the promotion of FBV as contributing to the framing of young British Muslims as a terrorism threat (Crawford, 2017, p. 200)

Genres

Fairclough describes genres as ‘the specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting and interacting in the course of social events’. That is to say, genres guide how discourse unfolds, such as how turn taking is organised, or how a text is patterned to fulfil its producer’s rhetorical purpose. ‘Changes in genres is change in how different genres are combined together. New genres develop through the combination of existing genres’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, pp. 65-66). Job interviews and political speeches are examples that Fairclough gives of specific genres (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 101) though he suggests that it is not that ‘a particular text or interaction is [necessarily] ‘in’ a particular genre – it is likely to involve a combination of different genres’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 66). An example of this can be seen in Tony Blair’s presentation of himself as a political leader and also as a ‘normal person', resulting in him combining the genre of a political statement genre with a conversational genre as a means of conveying sincerity (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 181).

Hegemony

A Gramscian view of politics suggest that politics is the struggle for hegemony, or to achieve consent (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 45). Fairclough is explicit in saying that seeking hegemony ‘is a matter of seeking to universalize particular meanings in the service of achieving and maintaining dominance, and this is ideological work’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 58). Fairclough’s linking of hegemony and ideology implicitly links hegemony to discourse and this is explored
by Laclau and Mouffe in their book, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), which is discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 8.

**Home Office**
The Home Office is the UK’s central government ministry and is headed by the Home Secretary, an office held by three different Labour Members of Parliament from 2006 to 2010 (John Reid, Jacqui Smith and Alan Johnson). Conservative Member of Parliament Theresa May held the office from 2010 to 2016 before becoming Prime Minister and at the time of writing, the office was held by Conservative MP Amber Rudd and then by Sajid Javid, also a Conservative MP.

**Iatrogenic effects**
‘Iatrogenic’ refers to illness caused by medical examination and Mythen, Walklate and Peatfield (2016) use the term to refer to the effects of the PREVENT Strategy. The theorisation of later chapters proposes a mechanism by which these effects may be catalysed.

**Ideology**
‘Ideology’ is seen here as a contested concept that, like ‘discourse’, can have at least two meanings. Firstly, it may refer to a consciously assumed political position such as ‘socialism’ or ‘conservatism’ and may be viewed in a negative or positive light depending on the ideological sympathies of the viewer. Secondly, in line with much of Fairclough’s earlier work, ‘ideology’ also refers to the inculcation of ‘common sense’ which may act ‘in the service of sustaining relations of power’ (N. Fairclough, 2015, p. 108). The connection between ‘ideology’, ‘power’ and ‘discourse’ is discussed towards the end of the literature review (2.7) where it is also explained why this thesis will tend to employ ‘discourse’ in preference to ‘ideology’.

**Interdiscursivity**
Interdiscursivity describes how genres, discourses and styles develop in ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective’ relations with those that precede and follow them (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 35). Fairclough describes how interdiscursive analysis mediates between linguistic analysis of texts and analysis of social events and practices (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 218). The focus in this thesis on the analysis of discourse over time lends itself to this type of analysis.

**Laminated Ontology**
Critical Realism proposes an ontology of generative mechanisms that emerge from one another, a laminated ontology. Later discussion will show that PREVENT might be seen to
have a laminated ontology in *Orientalism* from which the War on Terror emerged and which in turn supports the emergence of domestic security agendas such as PREVENT. It is proposed that RadEx is an additional layer to this laminated system.

**Nominalization**
‘Nominalization’ is when a process requiring the action of an agent comes to be represented as a thing. Fairclough describes this as characteristic of the discourse of ‘New Labour’ and offers examples of nominalisation in New Labour’s description of ‘globalisation’ and ‘the market’, both coming to be represented as entities rather than processes, with the consequence that their emergence as a result of human agency is elided. This in turn has the further consequence that ‘globalisation’ and ‘the market’ are presented as facts of life rather than processes which are subject to the actions of agents, and which therefore might be changed. Nominalization, while necessary and indispensable to our linguistic engagement with the world through simplifying complex processes in speech and in writing, can therefore also ‘obfuscate agency and responsibility’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 220). It is theorised in later chapters (5-9) that the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ by eliding the role of human agency in causing violence, thus limits the ability of government and civil society to effectively address the causes of violence.

**OfSTED**
The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (OfSTED) is a non-ministerial department of the UK government that reports to Parliament and is responsible for inspecting schools and childcare providers. OfSTED’s inspection reports were central to the allegations in Birmingham that became known as ‘the Trojan Horse’ ‘scandal’ and they have faced allegations of ‘Islamophobia’ for their focus on the activities of Muslim communities. At the time of writing, the head of OfSTED (Amanda Spielman) was receiving criticism for her support of schools apparent banning of some pupils from wearing the Hijab (headscarf). Spielman’s support for this apparent ban has continued even after it has emerged that stories of a ban may have been based more on exaggerated media reports than an actual ban (Thomas-Johnson, 2018)

**OSCT**
The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism is the government department that leads PREVENT. Mackinlay explains that,

*In Whitehall the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) was designed as a hub around which government departments, intelligence and the police coalesced and co-*
operated...In the Whitehall hierarchy the OSCT was a subordinate part of the Home Office, but in the context of the operation [counter-terrorism] it was required to reach far beyond its boundaries and draw together officials from the allied departments of Transport, Education, Local Government, Energy and Rural Affairs. The OSCT also had a co-ordinating function for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and the Security Services. (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 213)

Power
‘Power’ as employed here takes a Critical Realist perspective whereby power can take two forms, P₁ and P₂. P₁ is creative, emancipating power while P₂ is its shadow side, of negative coercive power (Alderson, 2015, p. 46). The connection between ‘ideology’, ‘power’ and ‘discourse’ is discussed towards the end of the literature review (2.7).

PREVENT
The branch of the UK government's CONTEST Counter-Terrorism Strategy that’s 'aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism' (HM Government, 2011b, p. 6). PREVENT is the aspect of the government's counter-terrorism efforts that is focused on 'radicalisation; and 'extremism'.

RadEx
‘RadEx’ refers to the ‘violent discourse of radicalisation and extremism’ that is theorised in this thesis. This is a discourse in the second sense referred to above. This discourse, RadEx, refers to the emergence and proliferation of the words ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in the course of the 20th Century and to their nominalization and subsequent shift in meaning, especially between 2008 and 2014, to become progressively associated with and synonymous with violence. It will be suggested in later chapters that RadEx, particularly the nominalization of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, is intimately linked to the discourse of New Labour and governments since then and that it (RadEx) has the capacity to lead to real violence.

Radicalisation
‘Radicalisation’, like ‘extremism’, will be shown in this thesis to be a word that has only recently come into common usage and which progressively changed meaning between 2008 and 2014. This develops an understanding of the contested nature of ‘radicalisation’ that has been explored by Schmid (2013) and Sedgwick (2010), both of whom are discussed in the next chapter. While the focus of this thesis is on ‘radicalisation’, Sedgwick’s example will be followed in allowing the same analysis to the Americanised spelling of ‘radicalization’. And
also, where the analysis demands, extending the analysis to comments on both 'radicalism' and 'radical'.

Styles
Styles are the ways in which people represent themselves in discourse and, thus, how they construct their social identity and personality through the kinds of language that they use and the genres that they adopt. Styles, therefore, also affect how people act and interact with one another. Fairclough has focussed in much of his work on the proliferation of language styles associated with identities such as ‘the Manager’ and ‘the Therapist’ and the kinds of language which (it is ‘imagined’) are associated with them. These styles, like others, thus present linguistic imaginaries concerning what people should say in discourse, and how they should say it. They therefore also affect genres in respect of how people behave and interact with one another. (N. Fairclough, 2003, pp. 159-161)

Text
‘Text’ refers to a wide range of spoken and written communicative practices. In this thesis, it mostly refers to written and printed texts such as government strategy documents and written transcripts of parliamentary speeches. Texts such as these are examples that employ what we might recognise as ‘language’ and any instance of ‘language in use is a “text”’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). However, the definition of ‘texts’ for the purposes of the analysis carried out in this thesis is extended so as to include modes of communication that may be subtler, particularly in reference to absence or silence within a text. For example, the absence of the word ‘violence’ in certain texts is a particular focus of this research and is explored in chapters 4 and 5.

TINA (compromise formation)
TINA compromise formations are named after British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher’s slogan, ‘There is no alternative’ and is intended to highlight the fallaciousness of such an argument in instances where there are clearly alternatives. An ensemble that Bhaskar tells us is frequently encountered in the social world.

The greater role of philosophy and methodology [in the social world] means that false philosophical beliefs impinge on the realm of practice and so we get all kinds of mish-mash compromises with reality by virtue of which a false or otherwise inadequate theory/practice ensemble is able to stumble on. The TINA formation is accordingly a cardinal concept for the metacritique of irrealism. (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 128)
The importance of what is also referred to as TINA syndrome was highlighted when a civil servant said to me in defence of counter-extremism measures such as PREVENT, ‘there is no alternative’. Hartwig suggests that such a fundamental mistake, for there clearly are any number of alternatives, forces us into ‘a series of endless theoretical and / or practical compromises’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 466). This thesis is an investigation into these compromises.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

This chapter explores literature that situates the thesis within the context of academic debates. As such, the areas covered are wide ranging. Attempts are made to explore literature on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, Orientalism, Critical Race Theory, democracy and Critical Realist understanding of critique, ideology, power and discourse. The final brief exploration of neoliberalism offers some insight into the analysis of the final chapters. Exploration of notions of a Clash of Civilisations, in particular the book of the same name (Huntington, 1996) are notably absent. While an exploration of such hawkish interpretations of the West’s supposed encounter with Islam are of note and Mavelli (2012) and Derrida’s (Ilyar, 2014) critique of the subject will be touched on later, the main theorisation of this thesis proposes a self-fulfilling generative mechanism for ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. That is not to say this is not catalysed by racist screeds and right-wing political agendas that vilify Islam. But, while such powerful agendas support government efforts to counter ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, they are easily bought to light and I have often silenced a meeting of civil servants who are intent on challenging Islamism by asking why they have a problem with religion informing political opinion as employees of a church state? The generative mechanisms explored here are subtler and require more than a back handed comment to elaborate.

2.1 Terrorism Studies (Critical and Orthodox)

CDA is ‘critical’ because it not only aims to critique the text but to also provide explanation of how the text ‘figures within and contributes to the existing social reality, as a basis for action to change that existing social reality’ (N. Fairclough, 2015, p. 6), this has been described as ‘the critical impetus’ by Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 6). The term, ‘critical’, can also be used to situate this research within Terrorism Studies, which tends to be divided between Orthodox Terrorism Studies (OTS) and Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) (Jackson, 2016). Policy makers have tended to work within OTS in what has been referred to as ‘the problem-solving approach’ (Johnathan Joseph, 2009, p. 94). They aim to address problems as they see them in the world rather than questioning the social structures that might have contributed to the existence of the problem in the first place, this is more the interest of the CTS researcher. By way of example, the OTS researcher would tend to ask how they can prevent someone committing an act of violence while the CTS researcher would look more deeply to understand why the violent act is happening and, through critique and praxis, aim to contribute to a transformation of the structural conditions that led to the act of violence. CDA offers CTS methodological rigour and a discursive point of entry into its object of research, CTS has previously been accused of lacking both (Johnathan Joseph, 2009, p. 97). The need for rigour in CTS is paramount, as Smyth (2007) has pointed out, ‘these matters [terrorism and its
causes] are not merely a matter of academic interest but are matters of life and death’ (Smyth, 2007, p. 263).

In the same article Smyth offers a withering critique of OTS, suggesting that ‘the crucial question must be to what extent ‘terrorism’ scholarship contributes to the reproduction and normalisation of that dominant discourse [OTS]’ (ibid, p. 261), and going on to question whether it is even ‘feasible to include an emancipatory dimension within such an approach?’ (ibid, p. 262). She insists that it is not and proposes that Critical Realism, which is also the position adopted here, enables the inclusion of the aforementioned ‘emancipatory dimension’.

My interest in CTS arose from my work as a teacher in a Muslim neighbourhood in London when the law changed so that teachers were required to report signs of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in their students to the school authorities, who were then obliged to inform the security services. The new law recast me as an informant, changing my relationship with my pupils, and resulting in the suppression of political debate in the classroom (Faure Walker, 2017a). My interests have, therefore, grown from an awareness of the oppression enacted on my pupils by the current counter-terrorism strategy and this makes Smyth’s central question about having an emancipatory dimension in one’s research vital to my research interests. If CTS aims to emancipate those who are oppressed by counter-terrorism policy and discourse, recognition of the oppressed group may be necessary. However, if the critique demonstrates that a central aspect of this oppression is the social-semiotic construction of the group in question then the researcher is required to ask if he or she can contribute to the emancipation of this group without reinforcing their oppressed position by acknowledging them in the research? Bhaskar’s lifelong work to describe Critical Realism foregrounds an ontology of generative mechanisms, that which creates our actual experience, and this enables the focus to be on the real mechanisms that construct the oppressed group rather than on the constructed group itself (Bhaskar, 1975, 2016a, 2016b). Language is taken to be fundamental to our actual experience and it is for this reason that the research carried out here explores both the words and concepts that are embodied in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’.

2.2.Literature on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’

This thesis extends the analysis of the already extensive literature on ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’ and The War on Terror by theorising the development of discourse focused on both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ throughout the 20th Century, a significant aspect of this development are changes to the discourse since the first publication of the PREVENT Strategy in 2008. Schmid’s assertion from 2013 that ‘radicalisation’ is not a synonym for terrorism (Schmid 2013, iv) is supported but it is suggested in Chapter 4 that the word has become progressively synonymous with violence in the discourse of the UK Government since 2009.
Sedgwick explores the different understandings of ‘radicalisation’ in his paper, The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion (Sedgwick, 2010), that is closely related to the work described in this thesis. Referring to dictionary definitions, he suggests that ‘radical’ should be seen as synonymous with ‘extremist’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 481) and this understanding of both terms is adopted in this thesis. He suggests that there are different understandings of ‘radicalisation’ from different agendas and that this may result in ‘radicalisation’ working to undermine the conflicting agendas of integration, security, foreign-policy and Islam. This occurs as each one of these agendas co-opts ‘radicalisation’ as a means to their own ends. An example that Sedgwick cites is a non-violent organisation that is promoting a conservative version of Islam with regards to homosexuality. Such an organisation may be seen as supporting a security agenda by engaging potentially violent actors in non-violent political activism, but might also be seen to undermine integration in a society such as that found in the UK that has more liberal views towards homosexuality (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 488). ‘Radicalisation’, thus, may be applied to undermine such a group by those supporting an integration agenda, yet the existence of the same group might act in the interests of a security agenda for the reasons described above, so ‘the security and integration agendas not only differ, but actually conflict’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 488). He also uses the example of American Sufi leader Hisham Kabbani reporting to the US State Department in 1999 ‘that 80% of American mosques had been taken over by extremists’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 488). Such an allegation supports Kabbani’s interpretation of Islam and is correct as a relative description from his stance but Sedgwick argues that ‘it was certainly not true that 80% were extremists in any terms other than Kabbani’s’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 488). Sedgwick’s solution to the risk that the line on the continuum from ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ to ‘moderate’ might be drawn at a point to suit any agenda is to ‘recognize the inherently relative nature of the term “radical,” and cease treating “radicalization” as an absolute concept’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). While Sedgwick does not explicitly address ‘extreme’ and ‘extremism’, it is clear that his advice on the relative nature of ‘radicalisation’ should also be heeded with regards ‘extremism’.

Sedgwick uses the appearance of ‘radicalization’ in Google News searches to show that its usage was rare before 2005. This observation will be supported by later analysis in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Sedgwick goes some way to explain this recent explosion in the usage of ‘radicalisation’ by referring to Neumann (director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence in London) who has said that,

Following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, however, it suddenly became very difficult to talk about the ‘roots of terrorism’, which some commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians. Even so, it seemed obvious
(then) that some discussion about the underlying factors that had given rise to this seemingly new phenomenon was urgent and necessary, and so experts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ whenever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’. (Neumann, 2008, p. 4)

This way in which ‘radicalisation’ recently came to be used is something that I have also written about, describing Neumann’s labelling of ‘radicalisation’ as a process of ‘nominalisation’, the description of disparate processes as a single entity (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 220; Faure Walker, 2018c). I have argued that there is a risk that this nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ might hide the causes of violence, both mystifying the causes of and denying human agency to the phenomenon described (Faure Walker, 2018c).

Sedgwick not only demonstrates that different agendas might apply ‘radicalisation’ in different ways, but he also shows how approaches to counter-radicalisation differ between different states as they struggle to decide what their threshold for intervention should be. He describes this as a question of what constitutes ‘threat-radicalisation’.

The question, then, is whether something is threat-radicalism only if it leads directly to violence, whether it can be threat-radicalism even if it does not lead directly to violence, or whether it can be threat-radicalism even if it does not lead to violence at all, and consists only (for example) of opposing pluralism by accepting that somebody may be denigrated on account of their sexual orientation. Since something that leads to violence is certainly a threat, the question is really whether something that does not lead directly to violence, or something that does not lead to violence at all, can be a threat. (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 484).

Applying his analysis to different countries, Sedgwick suggests that Britain uses the broadest definition for ‘threat-radicalisation’ by using circular argument that he summarises as ‘the type of radicalism that is a threat is radicalism that is a threat’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 484). Such a circular argument, when applied to the targeting of a relative concept like ‘radicalisation’ is likely to do little other than make space for pre-existing biases and oppressive forces such as racism and white supremacy and this will be discussed further in the section on critical race theory (2.4).

Two recent contributions to our understanding of racism and the emergence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in educational settings are the books Muslims, Schooling & the Question of Self-Segregation (Miah, 2015) and Muslim Students, Education and Neoliberalism (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017). Miah’s book critiques the framing of Muslims, often young men, as self-segregating and problematic. Suggesting that the promotion of the vague notion of integration has led to the demonisation and pathologisation of Muslims. And, that the London bombings in 2005 ushered counter-extremism strategies into schools (Miah, 2015, p. 6). Referring to Gillborn’s work on Critical Race Theory, Miah suggests that these policies are
a move away from earlier multicultural aspirations to a ‘common school’ and that ‘such approaches to integration will undermine social contact between ethnic groups’ (Miah, 2015, p. 7). By also looking at how racialised perspectives on Muslim students risks hiding class segregation as a more relevant barrier to integration, Miah presents a broad exploration of the securitisation of Muslims in the British education system that provides valuable background to this thesis. The work carried out here is distinct from that of Miah in exploring a specifically discursive facet of this creeping securitisation. Mac an Ghaill and Haywood’s book can be seen as a necessary extension of Miah’s, not only does Miah contribute a chapter, but another chapter by Wilkinson also brings in a valuable Critical Realist critique of the experience of Muslim school students. In the book it is proposed that ‘education is central to current discourses of radicalisation and extremism’ (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017, p. 3) and that this is the culmination of shifts in educational policy over the last six decades. With the focus being on assimilation in the 1960s, integration in the 1970s, multi-culturalism/anti-racism in the 1980s and ‘during the last two decades, we can identify a return to assimilation through the implementation of a neoliberal policy regulation regime across public institutions, including education (Kundnani in Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017, p. 5). The tight focus of the theorisation in later chapters of this thesis, attempting to describe a specific generative mechanism within the semiosis of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is an attempt to direct the gaze away from seeing Muslim students as a social problem. As explored in the previous chapter, my own experience of teaching in a Muslim community indicated to me that it was policy that was framed around this supposed problem, rather than the children, that was problematic.

While the focus of this thesis avoids Muslim students and, by association, their faith, Wilkinson who also contributes a chapter to Mac an Ghaill and Haywood’s book is followed in appreciating that faith, or student’s ‘spiritual dimension’, is as important as any number of other dimensions.

Contemporary theoretical models used to frame research on Muslims-in-education need to be multi-dimensional, non-reductive models that factor in the faith-based identities of young Muslims as at least partially determinate of their life choices and chances. These models need to factor-in faith fairly in articulation with other ‘laminated’ dimensions, without swamping research with faith-based explanatory accounts or naïvely obliterating other explanatory elements such as class, “ethnicity” and gender and the way young people tend to form and perform identity in innovative and hybrid ways. (Wilkinson in Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017, p. 81)

By showing how we might focus on one ontological factor without denying others, Wilkinson’s chapter and book on the same topic (Wilkinson, 2018) aim to do something similar to the aims of this thesis. While Wilkinson’s aim is to understand faith as a real generative mechanism to
be appreciated by research on Muslims-in-education, this thesis explores the real generative mechanisms that might be found in the semiosis of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’.

As well as catalysing pre-existing racism, Mythen, Walklate and Peatfield (2016) warn of the PREVENT Strategy’s ‘iatrogenic effects’ and this thesis goes some way to describe a real generative mechanism for these effects. It is suggested that the language employed in the service of PREVENT and counter-extremism reinforces the need for such policies by describing ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as violent. In Chapter 5 a viscous cycle – the viscous semiotic triangle – that is promoted by these changes in language is theorised. This suggests that as these concepts, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, have become progressively synonymous with violence. This indicates that if we do not take care over the language that we employ, we also reinforce the need for oppressive policies like PREVENT by promoting a mechanism that has the capacity to promote real violence in the world.

Kundnani explores the oppression of Muslims by the security services in the name of The War on Terror in his book, The Muslims are Coming (Kundnani 2014). The research carried out in this thesis suggest that this oppression is even more pervasive than Kundnani proposes, embedded both in the language that we all use and in ‘normal’ social relations. The sections that follow will briefly explore this by looking at how ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ enable and even exacerbate the normal and hidden processes of white dominance that are described by both Orientalism (Said, 1978) and critical race theory (Crawford, 2017; Gillborn, 2005).

2.3. Orientalism

Later analysis, particularly in Chapter 4 will draw on Said’s exploration of Orientalism (Said, 1978), first put forward in his book of the same name. Said proposes that the ‘Orient’ has been constructed as a ‘constellation of ideas’ that exists in spite of any real Orient (Said, 1978, p. 5). He suggests that the relationship of the West, or ‘Occident’, to the Orient is one of power and domination, defining “us” Europeans against all “those” non-Europeans’ (Said, 1978, p. 7). Orientals ‘endowed with a historical subjectivity’ that contributes to the Europeans’ political, intellectual, cultural and moral superiority (Said, 1978, pp. 12,97). While much of this thesis looks at the construction of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in a British context, the analysis of Chapter 4 indicates that RadEx has emerged in part from a colonialist discourse that Said’s work suggests was previously sustained by Orientalism. His book therefore provides a useful foundation for the understanding of the emergence of the discourse that is the focus of this thesis.

Later analysis of parliamentary texts in Chapter 4 will support Said’s observations from 1978 that Orientalism was being applied to the further reaches of the British Empire throughout the early 20th Century (Said, 1978). It will also show that Orientalist conceptions in Parliament
have since crept closer to home as recent parliamentary discourse has Orientalised parts of the population of the British mainland (5.2). This process will be described as an aspect of the global War on Terror. Said has more recently explored the War on Terror in his new preface to Orientalism (Said, 2003, pp. xi-xxiii), suggesting that British and American military intervention in the Middle East has been justified by a continued Orientalism that still contributes to an essentialised view of ‘them’ and that spirits away human suffering and pain (Said, 2003, p. xvi). While the new preface to his book explores how Orientalism has enabled the emergence of the War on Terror, this thesis will explore how RadEx has in turn emerged from the War on Terror; in a Critical Realist conception of RadEx, it therefore has a laminated ontology that includes both Orientalism and the Global War on Terror. In the analysis carried out in Chapter 4, mechanisms that have enabled RadEx’s emergence from this multiple ontology are proposed.

In chapters 6, 7 and 8, the Government’s formation and funding of quasi-independent civil society that supports RadEx is explored and parallels can be drawn between Said’s exploration of the construction of knowledge of the Orient by paid scholars.

A new dialectic emerges out of this project. What is required of the Oriental expert is no longer simply “understanding”: now the Orient must be made to perform, its power must be enlisted on the side of “our” values, civilisation, interest, goals. (Said, 2003, p. 238)

Said continues in this passage to discuss how this power results in the ‘assertion of control’ of ‘the White Man’ over the Orient. More recent scholarship has described this routine privileging of white interests in critical race theory (CRT) and this will now be discussed in the following section.

2.4. Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Fundamental British Values (FBV)

Critical race theory (CRT) is a perspective focused on an examination of the association between race and racism at the intersection of power; in particular, the approach seeks to identify and resist the routine but devastating racism that saturates the everyday world of ‘business-as-usual’ in nations such as the United States, the UK, and Australia. (Crawford, 2017, p. 198)

Crawford presents the above definition for critical race theory (CRT) in her paper, Promoting ‘fundamental British values’ in schools: a critical race perspective (Crawford, 2017). In this paper, she suggests that an agenda to teach fundamental British values (FBV) in British schools is closely related to the implementation of PREVENT. This connection is made by demonstrating that the definition of FBV is taken directly from the UK counter-terrorism strategy’s definition of ‘extremism’, a definition that is repeated verbatim in PREVENT,
Extremism is a vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs (HM Government, 2011b).

Crawford’s paper makes an important contribution to the analysis of PREVENT which she suggests has served to: decivilize Muslim lifestyles and identities; construct ‘white British’ norms and mores as culturally superior; portray young Muslims as pre-disposed to extremist views and violent behaviours; and force the country’s teachers to take up roles as instruments of surveillance and defenders of the white hegemonic order. (Crawford, 2017, p. 197)

She proposes that analysis from the perspective of CRT might offer a number of insights that can contribute to our understanding of PREVENT:

• “‘race’ and ‘racism’ are a product of social thought and power relations’
• ‘the ideology and assumptions of racism are so deeply entrenched in the socio, legal, and political structures of Britain, that it is viewed as “natural” and “ordinary”’
• ‘racism is a “permanent” and “pervasive” feature of society’
• ‘the importance of the experiential knowledge of minoritized groups [to] challenge…the experience of “white” people as normative’
(Crawford, 2017, p. 198)

Crawford’s analysis of PREVENT is embraced by this thesis. Referring to the testimony of my students from the outset is an attempt to bring the voices of the surveilled minority into the rationale for my own research. However, while I agree with Crawford’s elaboration of the agendas behind PREVENT, the CRT perspective will not form the framework for the research carried out here. Rather, this thesis will attempt to describe an equally insipid aspect of state and normative social power, the construction and subsequent violent nominalization of those considered to be ‘radical’ or ‘extreme’. ‘Normative’ for what is ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ other than that which is not ‘normal’? ‘Violent’ for it will be shown in later analysis that the words ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ became progressively synonymous with violence between 2009 and 2014. Thus, while CRT does not form the basis for this thesis, it indicates that the likely targets of counter-extremism and PREVENT will be non-white minorities and this helps to demonstrate that the language underpinning recent counter-terrorism efforts are an example of

the most dangerous form of ‘white supremacy’ [which] is not the obvious and extreme fascistic posturing of small neo-nazi groups, but rather the taken-for-granted routine privileging of white interests that goes unremarked in the political mainstream. (Gillborn, 2005)
Both Miah and Mac an Ghaill and Haywood’s books (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017; Miah, 2015) referred to above are critical of the whiteness of the classroom. Both warning that ‘teachers’ embodied whiteness became a space where class difference could be displaced’ (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017, p. 213), indicating that racism not only acts as an oppressive force, but might also hide other important oppressive forces that ought be understood if they are to be overcome. While the ‘taken-for-granted routine privileging of white interests’ may go ‘unremarked in the political mainstream’, it will be theorised in this thesis that it has very real effects on the functioning of politics at a local and national level. Thus, the following section explores how PREVENT and RadEx might impact local relations in a classroom between teachers and students and how it might affect the functioning of democracy at a national level.

2.5. Democracy and debate: Alexander, Arendt, Buber, Derrida, Mouffe, and Przeworski

A group that is labelled as radical and thus excluded from normal public and political processes may, as a result, be more likely actually to become radical in security terms, since exclusion from normal processes encourages a search for alternative processes. (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 491)

Dialogue is fundamental to any encounter between student and teacher and Alexander has explored this in his work on dialogic teaching (R. Alexander, 2008). He describes the classroom encounter between teacher and student and suggests that all too often it fails to meet the requirement for true dialogue, students more often repeating known answers to their teachers’ questions. A dialogic encounter is one where we do not know the outcome for it is in the encounter, what Buber refers to as the ‘true life of dialogue’ (Buber, 1947), that knowledge is created. The dialogic encounter according to Alexander is therefore the most fundamental aspect of the teacher-student relationship.

Alexander’s distinction of dialogic encounter from other forms of classroom interaction might go some way to explaining the appearance of a TINA compromise formation in the application of PREVENT. This contradiction between theory and practice is revealed by PREVENT workers and other supporters of PREVENT frequently telling me that the strategy promotes classroom debate, an assertion that has been made in every panel discussion on PREVENT that I have been involved in parliamentary committees, think tanks, academic conferences and the media. Meanwhile, others, myself included, report that PREVENT has a chilling effect on classroom debate (Busher et al., 2017; Faure Walker, 2015, 2017a, 2017b). Turning back to Alexander, it is possible to see that this disagreement might come from a lack of distinction between the two forms of classroom encounter. In my professional role as a school teacher, I have seen lessons planned and delivered to fulfil the requirements of PREVENT and these lessons have often prompted discussions. I have witnessed discussions
in which children have criticised their peers who have travelled to Syria to join ISIS and have argued for moderate interpretations of Islam. In these lessons, issues raised are universally agreed with by those engaging in the debate as all students express their opposition to ISIS or to travelling to Syria. The anticipation of expected answers that the students might give in these encounters does not give the impression of dialogic encounters in which knowledge might be created. Meanwhile, as is discussed in the introduction, my own students have revealed that they have withdrawn from debate for fear that PREVENT will lead to them being reported to the security services. The debates that my students described withdrawing from were dialogic as they described debates that change us all - as is discussed earlier, my students had changed their views on gay marriage and I had learned from them. I had learned that they were not trying to be difficult, extreme or radical in their earlier assertions, they were responding in a non-critical manner to what they understood to be received wisdom. By dialogic encounter we were all able to alter our views.

By recognising the differences in the dialogue that Alexander explores (R. Alexander, 2008) – the rehearsed responses of a PREVENT lesson and the dialogic encounter that changes us – we can see that, while PREVENT may deliver on its intention to promote debate, it could also be suppressing genuine dialogic encounter. By interrupting these encounters, even though it may also be promoting other types of discussion, PREVENT might be undermining the process by which apparently ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ views could be mediated. Far from countering-extremism, PREVENT might in fact be disrupting the process by which extreme views would otherwise be moderated.

Alexander’s concern for the importance of dialogue is shared by a number of other theorists who extend the analysis from the classroom and into the political. Mouffe (2005), Derrida (in Borradori, 2004) and Przeworski (1991) all describe the importance of dialogue if violence is to be avoided in a democracy. Belgian political theorist, Chantal Mouffe, has written in her book, On The Political, that ‘it is undeniable that it [violence] tends to flourish in circumstances in which there are no legitimate political channels for the expression of grievances’ and she describes the shutting down of discourse in a democracy as ‘letting death in’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 22). The late French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, in his conversations on 9/11 and other work, has described the ‘autoimmunity’ of liberalism – theorising that the liberal aspiration to consensual politics can result in a violent backlash (Derrida in Borradori, 2004). And, Adam Przeworski (1991) similarly suggests in his book, Democracy and the Market, that a failure to be represented by the democratic process might leave violence as the only option for those excluded.

The suggestion that PREVENT might actually be promoting violence by suppressing dialogue leads to the supposition that the strategy should be resisted. However, since the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b) inferred a legal duty
on all teachers to employ PREVENT, it is possible that resistance might undermine their ability to fulfil their legal duty. Where the call to resist PREVENT is at odds with the law, Arendt might be called on for her efforts to describe the ‘not altogether happy marriage of morality and legality, conscience and the law of the land’ (Arendt, 1969, p. 56). In Arendt’s essay on Civil Disobedience (Arendt, 1969, pp. 59-102) she reflects on the civil rights movement in the US and how it morphed into the movement that opposed the war in Vietnam. In both instances, she suggests that it is unsatisfactory to suggest that the civil disobedience of, for example, the freedom riders or illegal protestors in Washington is purely justified on moral and legal grounds. Moral and legal arguments are not adequate causes as they would lead to the practice of civil disobedience by single individuals and Arendt argues that such individuals would have little effect. She goes on to argue that ‘significant civil disobedience, therefore, will be practiced by a number of people who have a community of interest’ (Arendt, 1969, p. 55).

The ‘decision to take a stand against the government’s policies even if they have reason to assume that the policies are backed by a majority’ thus stems from ‘an agreement with each other, and it is this agreement that lends credence and conviction to their opinion, no matter how they may have originally arrived at it’. Thus, while Arendt describes the need for a community of interest, she quotes Puner in saying that civil disobedience is ‘a philosophy of subjectivity’ that is intensely and exclusively personal’ (Arendt, 1969, pp. 56-57).

My own personal reasons for opposing PREVENT are multiple, having first felt a sense of unease that I was being asked to spy on my students, experience on a local government committee led me to notice that the language of the policy was affecting my perceptions of PREVENT (see chapter 1.1), my research then increased my sense of unease as I started to describe RadEx. In addition to these concerns about PREVENT, there are likely to be countless other sources of unease that I may not even be aware of. While this combination of concerns might be individual to me, I often find that I am aligned with others who are opposed to PREVENT for other reasons. These have included my students, anti-austerity campaigners who are frustrated by increasing counter-terrorism budgets as funding for social services are cut, legal campaigners concerned that PREVENT might undermine human rights legislation, critical race theorists and anti-racism campaigners and, frequently, Muslim rights campaigners. Following Arendt, each of these groups or individuals who are opposed to PREVENT will, like me, have their own deeply personal subjective reasons for this opposition, yet, despite this, we form a single ‘community of interest’. This has resulted in me being asked to speak by and alongside people from all of these groups and in also being supported by people from each of these groups. I have tried to catalyse this supportive process and formation of a ‘community of interest’ by writing articles and by compiling the PREVENT digest website and newsletter.
The PREVENT digest was originally a monthly digest of news, media and events to do with PREVENT, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and is emailed out to members of the previously described community of interest. Originally compiled by Bill Bolloten, I took over compiling the digest in January 2017 and have since developed it into a website (www.preventdigest.co.uk) to enable the publication of commentary from direct contributors. At the time of writing, I have recently formed a steering group with other academics and we are discussing how best to affect policy. One hope is that policy might be affected by mounting a persuasive argument for change. Thus, it is hoped that by elaborating Alexander, Arendt, Buber, Derrida, Mouffe, and Przeworski’s theories in the context of the restrictions of counter-terrorism discourse in later chapters a persuasive case for emancipatory praxis might be made. Critical Realism will enable the description of these theorisations in real ontological terms. The use of these additional theorists is compatible with Critical Realism as it allows us to see their theories as describing potential and real generative mechanisms for violence, mechanisms that will be elaborated in this thesis.

Since the Muslim students in my classes fell silent in 2015 I have been lobbying civil servants from the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) who are responsible for PREVENT about the potential harm of RadEx. I have done this in person, through the PREVENT digest, through my contributions to the work of human rights and legal advocacy groups working in this area (Open Society, 2016; Rights Watch (UK), 2016) and in articles (Faure Walker, 2017a, 2018c) and national radio appearances (Fenton-Smith, 2017). In spite of this, the discourse persists and this might appear to be contrary to Bhaskar’s suggestion that transformative praxis is irreducible to agency and spontaneity in social life (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 131). However, praxis does not necessarily infer that RadEx will disappear; my earlier work on PREVENT for my MA dissertation led to the reporting of my concerns in the media and legal circles (Bowcott & Adams, 2016; Open Society, 2016; Rights Watch (UK), 2016) and ultimately in my students learning of my opposition to the strategy. This resulted in students feeling empowered to speak to me about their concerns that they were being targeted by an overzealous and racist state surveillance policy, concerns that they told me they did not discuss with other adults for fear that they would be reported under the PREVENT duty which had been introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b). My students who had been silenced by PREVENT - a situation that might promote violence according to Mouffe, Derrida and Przeworski – were empowered to speak out again. The real generative mechanisms for violence that emanated from RadEx had been, to a certain extent, disrupted by my description of them as the students acted as spontaneous agents in their decision to speak to me in a way that RadEx and PREVENT had previously prevented.

From a Critical Realist perspective, the power of the PREVENT Strategy and RadEx is real and leads to actual responses. My continued re-evaluation and description of RadEx
will work towards generating reasons to and causes for disrupting the real oppressive aspects of counter-extremism discourse and, in doing so, I hope may make some contribution to the free flourishing of all.

2.6. Critical Realism as Critique

Critical Realism offers the opportunity for a mixed methods approach and has also been indicated as an appropriate paradigm by recent interactions that I have had with civil servants who work in counter-terrorism. Firstly, in the conversations that I have had with civil servants from the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and associated departments, I have been unable to draw them into discussing the silencing of classroom debate that I have observed as being caused by PREVENT. This absenting of debate is of particular interest to Critical Realism which takes absence as *prima facie* to presence and recognises that absence is often ignored or overlooked due to its inadequate theorisation in Western Philosophy (Bhaskar, 2016a; Collier in Hartwig, 2007, pp. 7-14). Preliminary theorisation of the philosophical underpinnings of PREVENT suggest that a failure to recognise absence is indicative of errors that Bhaskar describes as endemic to Western philosophy (Bhaskar, 2016a, pp. 184-191). This fits with Collier's suggestion that 'the absenting of the absence of a concept of absence is shown to resolve most of the traditional PROBLEMS of philosophy' (Collier in Hartwig, 2007, p. 12, capitalisation in original). It is hoped that making absence visible will contribute to the philosophical underpinnings of this research. Secondly, another recent conversation with a civil servant who works in counter-terrorism took a turn that signposted the need for Critical Realist analysis when they told me that 'there is no alternative' to the type of pre-criminal interventions that have become the norm for counter-terrorism. To suggest that 'there is no alternative' in this situation where there are alternatives to current counter-terrorism practice shines a light on the TINA (there is no alternative) compromise formation that forms the foundation of PREVENT. TINA compromise formations as described by Bhaskar and his fellow Critical Realists are a primary target of Critical Realist critique, as will be the aim of this thesis (Bhaskar, 2016a, pp. 4, 38, 93, 128, 133; Hartwig, 2007, p. 465).

The mixing of methods that Critical Realism enables will be shown in the methodology chapter that follows to be necessary for offering a full account of RadEx. Critical Realism also offers ‘the intellectual heavy artillery for simple common decency and good sense’ (Graeber in Bhaskar, 2016a, back cover), a sense and decency that has been lacking from the discussions that I have had with civil servants and professionals working in counter-extremism. In one extreme example, PREVENT workers tried to discredit me on Twitter by saying that I had not met anyone who worked in PREVENT, suggesting that this meant that I did not understand how the strategy worked – at the time, I had had extensive contact with the accusers, both in one to one meetings with them and in meetings with them and other
PREVENT teams around the country. As Graeber writes in his cover note of Bhaskar’s most recent and posthumously published book,

[Critical Realism] gives us a solid ontological grounding for all those intuitions that most of us feel we should be able to justify, but are constantly being told by the reigning intellectual authorities we can’t: that the world, and other people, are real, that freedom is inherent in the nature of the cosmos, that genuine human flourishing can never be at the expense of others’ (Graeber in Bhaskar, 2016a, back cover)

Critical Realism shows us that ‘the free flourishing of each human being is a condition of the free flourishing of all’ (Hartwig in Bhaskar, 2016a, p. xii) and, as such, RadEx not only limits the freedom of those subjected to its gaze, my students included, but it limits the free flourishing of us all. It is hoped that by undertaking a Critical Realist analysis of RadEx, as will be carried out in the second half of this thesis, the philosophical errors that have led to oppressive counter-terrorism discourses will be better understood. Bhaskar proposes that transformative praxis is inevitable (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 131) if we understand errors that he describes as fundamental to western philosophy (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 184), in this case the errors that have resulted in RadEx. The nature of this praxis is unknown from the outset, but it is hoped that the understanding that this research brings will make some contribution to the free flourishing of us all.

While praxis may be inevitable, our agency is also vital to the process and, as such, Critical Realism does not shy away from utopian aspirations. This positive conception of utopianism is referred to in Critical Realist term as concrete utopianism, ‘concrete’ as it is ‘well-rounded and appropriate to the purposes at hand’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 75). Where utopianism is not ‘concrete’, it is taken in its pejorative sense as not grounded in a Critical Realist understanding of reality or the self. In the schema for CDA that is developed at the end the next chapter, self-reflection will be described as vital to appreciating ‘a notional’ and while Bhaskar is not explicit in what he means by ‘a notional’, it is taken here to be synonymous with a concrete utopia. The ultimate aim of this thesis is that the development of a notional that will contribute to the undermining of master-slave P2 relations and will thus contribute to a more eudemonic society. Hartwig explains that the ‘common aspersion that utopian thinking leads to the slaying of ideological nonsense: the “slaughter-bench of history’ (Hegel) is owned and operated by power2 and its slaves’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 75). The research carried out here aims to theorise this notional concrete utopia in the context of the nexus of ideology, power and discourse and this is explored in the section that follows.
2.7 Ideology, Power and Discourse

Ideology is of prime importance to the research carried out in this thesis, so I now explore what will be meant henceforth by ‘ideology’ and by ideological critique. Any theory of ideology demands that one is critical of fixed dictionary definitions so it is accepted, in accordance with Fairclough, that ideology is a contested concept (N. Fairclough, 2015, p. 35). Both Fairclough and Hartwig agree that definitions of ideology fall broadly into two categories. Firstly, following Marxist tradition, a negative conception of ideology aligns it with notions of false consciousness that are abstracted from material circumstances or real processes of geohistory. Secondly, a more ‘positive view’ of ideology sees it as political standpoints that are consciously derived from social theory; for example, socialism, feminism etc. The brief introduction to these two categories of ideology that follows will go some way to explaining that the legitimacy of either form of ideology does not relate to awareness of the ideology but to the ideologues openness to change their understanding based on the evidence that they are presented with. (N. Fairclough, 2015, p. 115; Hartwig, 2007, pp. 252-253)

While it would be tempting, from a classical Marxist position, to explain away the second, ‘positive’, view as false consciousness, this would be inadequate from the Critical Realist perspective adopted here. Firstly, the impact of either form of ideology on our experience is real; by example, I am writing this on a day when fascists and anti-fascists have clashed in Charlottesville, Virginia, USA, resulting in damage to property and at least one person, Heather Heyer, being killed (Gunter, 2017). This example demonstrates that the second view of ideology, consciously derived political standpoints, describes forces that have real impacts in the world and that, thus, cannot be abstracted and ignored. Secondly, by self-consciously choosing a Critical Realist stance, I am adopting a stance that is ideological in the second, ‘positive’ conception of ideology. Hartwig explains that, from this Critical Realist perspective, ‘ideology is correlative to science’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 252). And, following Bhaskar’s idealised scientific method explored in his first book, A Realist Theory of Science (Bhaskar, 1975), and throughout his career, the possibility of false ideological constructs within the Critical Realist theory that is adopted is ever present. Should such constructs appear, they will be revealed as contradictions in theory or between theory and practice (a TINA compromise formation). Should any aspect of the research reveal such a contradiction in the theory adopted, retheorisation will be necessary.

The openness to theoretical revision described above and adopted here means that the Critical Realist stance is, while ideological, not dogmatic. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to be ‘dogmatic’ is to be ‘inclined to lay down principles as undeniably true’. While ‘TINA compromise formation’ is a term that is familiar to a Critical Realist audience, ‘dogma’
might better communicate this concept to a non-Critical Realist audience. The aforementioned civil servant who told me that ‘there is no alternative’ to the type of pre-criminal interventions that are currently seen in counter-terrorism strategy was expressing a dogmatic position. The aim of this thesis will be to present evidence that is persuasive enough that policymakers will see that there is an alternative to the ideology that I will be critiquing, and which guides their work.

To develop the theory of ideology that is employed here further, it will help to explore power, and, from a Critical Realist perspective, power can take two forms, $P_1$ and $P_2$. $P_1$ is creative, emancipating power while $P_2$ is its shadow side of negative coercive power (Alderson, 2015, p. 46). This distinction is vital to exploring and defining ideology which Hartwig describes as,

Produced and reproduced at the intersection of the POWER$_2$ with the discursive / communicative (cognitive) and normative / moral sub-dimensions of the SOCIAL CUBE (the ideological intersect), ideology functions in general to secure social cohesion and moral legitimacy in the context of generalised MASTER-SLAVE-type relations, in which class is seen to play a pivotal role. Fundamentally generated by oppressive and exploitative social structures, and reproductive of them, it is in no way intrinsic to power$_1$, or universal or necessary. (Hartwig, 2007, p. 252, italics and capitalisation in original)

Bhaskar theorises that our everyday carelessness results in us tending to live our lives in a ‘demi-reality’ of master-slave-relations (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 156). Hartwig describing this as a complex web of ‘ideological ignorance (avidya) and illusion (maya)’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 253). Unless we make a conscious effort to move beyond demi-reality, we live in a world of avidya and maya constructed and maintained by oppressive $P_2$ master-slave-relations, ideology being the communicative aspect of these relations. Though he does not use the terms avidya and maya, Fairclough describes how the ignorance and illusion of ideology can be revealed in texts by identifying ‘common sense’ and he describes this common sense (which he frequently writes is synonymous with ideology) as being ‘in the service of sustaining relations of power’, going on to say that,

Texts do not typically spout ideology. They so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts – and reproduces them in the process! (N. Fairclough, 2015, p. 108)

While critique of ideology is of fundamental importance to this thesis, it is not carried out directly by either critical discourse analysis (CDA) or by corpus linguistics. Fairclough explains that, ‘ideology critique is a form of explanatory critique, which is not part of either approach’
and app

reciating this distinction is helped by considering the classic Critical Realist split between,

- the *empirical* data from CDA or corpus linguistics
- the *actual* text
  and
- the *real* generative mechanisms that underpin social processes (discourse being the communicative aspect of this)

(Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 103)

The CDA and corpus linguistics that will be carried out in this thesis gather *empirical* data through normative critique to describe *actual* aspects of the text. The relations between these aspects of the text and the social must be theorised through explanatory critique to bring us closer to an understanding of the *real* mechanisms, in part ideological, that perpetuate counter-extremism discourses and strategies. The *real* generative mechanisms that emanate from counter-terrorism discourses that focus on ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ will also be theorised from the *empirical* data.

Due to the contested nature of ‘ideology’ as explored above and the focus of this thesis on language, I will tend to refer henceforth to ‘discourse’ in preference to ‘ideology’. ‘Discourse’, like ‘ideology’, will take one of two meanings. Firstly, as language in a general sense to refer to text, spoken word, visual images, body language etc. ‘Discourse’ in this sense is dialogically related to other aspects of social life such as events and meaning making. Secondly, ‘discourse’ might refer to particular ‘discourses’ such as the ‘Third Way’ of ‘New Labour’ which has been the focus of much of Fairclough’s work (N. Fairclough, 2000b, 2003). The violent discourse of radicalisation and extremism (RadEx) that is the focus of this thesis is a ‘discourse’ in this second sense.

The theorisation of these relations between discourse, society, the interpreter and the text will be supported by Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TSMA) (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 52, 2016b, p. 33). While Fairclough’s recent developments in CDA have seen him following a Bhaskarean ontology, he appears to rely on Giddens’s structuration model when describing change (N. Fairclough, 2013, pp. 182-183). Like Gidden’s model, throughout his extensive writing on CDA, Fairclough never offers an account of explanatory critique that includes a time dimension. This is not surprising as Bhaskar himself did not distinguish between his and Giddens’s work, initially not recognising that he had included a time dimension in his own work while time was absent from that of Gidden’s. Bhaskar refers to a meeting that he had with Giddens – ‘in a very nice restaurant in Greek Street’ (Bhaskar, 2016b, p. 33) - where they agreed on the similarity of their theories yet it took his colleague
Margaret Archer to point out to him that the inclusion of time in Bhaskar’s TMSA model was a crucial difference between his TMSA and Giddens’s Structuration Theory. The inclusion and distinction of time may appear obvious after the event but Bhaskar tells us that it took Archer ‘years’ to describe this difference (Bhaskar, 2016b, p. 34).

Figure 3: Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (TSMA) (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 52, 2016b, p. 33)

In describing the relationship between society and individuals over time - a relationship that is at least in part discursive - the TSMA will help to appreciate the relationship between changes to and the reproduction of discourses of counter-terrorism and changes to and reproduction of social structures, both discourses and social structures seen as dependent on each other. Appreciating these relationships in constellation and with the temporal dimension that the TMSA offers will contribute to the theorisation of the emergence of counter-terrorism discourses on ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’, increasing understanding of what enables their reproduction, what effects they have and what can be done to promote emancipatory praxis.

2.8. Neoliberalism

Governments of different political complexions take it as a mere fact of life (a ‘fact’ produced by inter-governmental agreements) that all must bow to the logic of the global economy (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 147)

The analysis and discussion of later chapters will explore neoliberalism as a generative mechanism for the emergence of RadEx. As with other factors that have contributed to this emergence and that are explored here, neoliberalism is seen as one of a number of factors that have contributed to the emergence of RadEx. As such, the exploration of neoliberalism is necessarily brief where explored in this section and later in Chapter 5. A fuller exploration of the association of counter-extremism and neoliberalism can be found in the aforementioned collection, Muslim Students, Education and Neoliberalism (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood, 2017). Specifically, as an extension of the new penal logic of neoliberalism that has been explored by Fairclough (2000b, p. 77) and Mirowski (2013, pp. 65-66). Neoliberalism is described by Fairclough as a ‘new order’ or ‘a restructured (‘global’) form of capitalism’ (N. Fairclough,
He cites Bourdieu to describe ‘a political project for the reconstruction of society in accord with the demands of an unrestrained global capitalism’ (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 147). This is marked by states and individuals entering into ‘intense competition to succeed on terms dictated by the market’, resulting inevitably in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 147).

Neoliberal discourse is one of the resources deployed by the ‘winners’ and Mirowski has explored how, even in the face of the global failure of neoliberalism that resulted in the 2008 financial crisis, the neoliberal belief in the primacy of the market led to the protecting of the global elites who had caused the crisis while the losing majority were punished by programmes of austerity (Mirowski, 2013). The new penal logic of neoliberalism has also been explored by Hancox in his study of the oppression of young black men in *The Story of Grime* (Hancox, 2018). The oppression that Hancox describes started under the leadership of Tony Blair and New Labour (Hancox, 2018, p. 217) and continued ‘wounding London’s poorest’ under the next Coalition and Conservative Governments (Hancox, 2018, p. 295). Hancox’s description will be shown in later chapters to bear remarkable similarity to the more recent oppression of Muslims under PREVENT. This is, perhaps, not surprising as the lineage of both the oppression of young black men and the more recent oppression of Muslims is shown in later chapters to have, at least in part, emerged from the neoliberalism of New Labour. New Labour should not only be seen as an adopter of neoliberalism but also as a global promoter of the discourse (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 66). The global proliferation of neoliberal discourse inevitably results in changing networks of practices around the new order and these include changes in genre, as are explored in this thesis.

Fairclough calls for ‘co-ordinated action against neo-liberalism on the part of critical language researchers’ (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 147) and sees Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a resource in this struggle.

CDA can constitute a resource for struggle in so far as it does not isolate language but addresses the shifting network of practices in a way which produces both clearer understanding of how language figures in hegemonic struggles around neo-liberalism, and how struggles against neo-liberalism can be partly pursued in language. It asks: what are the problems facing people, what are they doing in response, how can these resistances be strengthened and coordinated into a plausible alternative, and how specifically does language figure in all this (recognizing the irreducible language factor without exaggerating it)? (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 148)

This thesis aims to make some contribution to this struggle, both by addressing the problem of RadEx and also by developing a Critical Realist schema for CDA in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 - Methodology

The dialectical relational approach is a methodology and not just a method. Methodology is understood as theory in combination with method in the construction and analysis of an object of research (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fairclough, 2010c). In this sense it is not simply a matter of taking a method and applying it to an object of research. The object first has to be theorized itself drawing upon relevant social theories in a ‘transdisciplinary way’, ‘either in research teams which bring together specialists in relevant disciplines, or by engaging with literature in such disciplines’ (Fairclough, 2010c, p.236). In this process the object of research is constructed. (O'Regan & Betzel, 2016, p. 5)

This methodology chapter will give an initial overview of critical discourse analysis (CDA), with a predominant focus on the work of Norman Fairclough whose Dialectical Relational Approach (DRA) informs much of this work. As the above quote indicates, it is only through the development of the methodology that the object of research – the violent discourse of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ (RadEx) – will be theorized. This is achieved by using CDA that is supported with corpus linguistics. The compatibility of these two approaches is supported by a discussion of Critical Realism - the philosophical framework that underpins this thesis - before the importance of time to this analysis is discussed. This leads to the development of Fairclough's DRA to include a time dimension, an approach that is referred to here as the Temporal Dialectical Relational Approach (TDRA). To develop this approach, previous schemas for CDA from Fairclough (2010, p. 235), O'Regan & Betzel (2016, p. 5) and Bhaskar (2016a, p. 109) are drawn on to describe a schema for the TDRA. While other versions of CDA have dealt with discursive change over time, most notably Reisigl and Wodak’s Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016), they have not been approaches that have engaged with Critical Realism. This means that the DHA does not lend itself to the theorisation of generative mechanisms associated with the semiotic triangle, as has been called for by Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 402, 2016a, p. 34, 2016b, p. 64). As Fairclough has developed a Critical Realist approach to CDA, his approach lends itself to this thesis so has been chosen over other versions of CDA to form the basis of the theorisation of discursive change over time that follows in later chapters.

3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Critical discourse analysis...not only works to unpack communication itself along the lines of structures and mechanisms, it also allows for an understanding of how other social structures are maintained and transformed in and through various forms of languages and discourses (or ‘semiosis’ in Fairclough et al’s words). Using CDA to analyse data sources such as policy documents and interview transcripts, for example, critical realists can reconstruct the operation of generative or causal mechanisms at play in particular events. (Jones in Jonathan Joseph & Roberts, 2004, pp. 43-44)
As is discussed in earlier chapters, the silencing of the pupils who I taught suggested that the PREVENT Strategy had impacted on the dynamic of my classroom and was altering the representation of teacher and pupil, this was what my students told me led to the cessation of debate in our classroom. They subsequently told me that they feared speaking out as a result of my new role as an informant under the Prevent Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Preliminary reading of the two versions of PREVENT from 2008 and 2011 revealed significant differences between them that showed changed definitions of ‘radicalisation’ and of ‘extremism’. This led me to analyse the strategies using critical discourse analysis (CDA); a technique that can be adopted to investigate how social agents pursue their strategies semiotically in texts. According to Norman Fairclough, one of the foremost thinkers in CDA, the role of texts is to solicit changes in relations between genres, discourses and styles (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 234 & 427). Genres are ways of acting and interacting, such as a job interview or a political speech. Discourses are ways of representing ourselves and others, for example a particular political discourse such as a certain interpretation of socialism or of neoliberalism. Styles are semiotic ways of being or identities that authors will form of themselves, such as the 'new managerial style' (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 101) or 'expert style' (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 429). Texts, as the foundational artefacts of genres, discourses and styles, can, in Fairclough’s terms, therefore, be used as a discursive point of entry into the object of study in order to reveal the shifting relations that exist between genres, discourses and styles. In this manner, through the analysis of culturally-salient texts it may be possible to bring us closer to an understanding of the nature of the semiotic order as constituted by the dialectical configuration of genres, discourses and styles (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 213). Fairclough suggests that in carrying out CDA we might also reveal taken for granted background knowledge and in doing so reveal aspects of the ideology behind the text (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 31). The analysis carried out here reveals taken for granted knowledge, and theorisation of these findings reveals how this ‘knowledge’ impacts on the semiotic order. A concrete example of such a change in the semiotic order is in the aforementioned recasting of my own professional identity as a teacher to include a duty to surveil my pupils. The analysis of texts that is carried out in later sections of this thesis goes some way to describe the semiotic changes that led to this change in genre.

It might be argued that there are as many different versions of CDA as there are CDA analysts, or even pieces of analysis, but Fairclough and other critical discourse analysts such as Ruth Wodak tend to give prominence to four of these; the discourse historical approach, the sociocognitive approach, the sociosemiotic or multimodal approach, and the dialectical relational approach. Rather than seeing this variety of methods of CDA as an invitation to
choose one, it offers the potential for a diverse approach to the research which aims at an appreciation of the multi-faceted nature of discourse and semiosis. For the context from which the discourse has emerged, we might turn to the discourse historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016). The sociocognitive approach might be used alongside Foucault’s later works to provide an understanding of the production of knowledge and of subjects in discourse (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1988; Jäger & Maier, 2016; van Dijk, 2016). Sociosemiotic analysis can be used to appreciate that many, particularly recent, texts are made up of a relationship between language, visual images and other factors yet to be identified in the research (Jancsary, Höllerer, & Meyer, 2016). And, the dialectical relational approach allows for a consideration of the impact, action, reflexivity and emergence of the discourse (I. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013; N. Fairclough, 2010, 2013, 2015; N. Fairclough et al., 2007).

3.2. Supporting CDA with corpus linguistics

In later chapters, an aspect of CDA employed will be close reading of the texts of the PREVENT Strategies (HM Government, 2008, 2011b). This will show that the definitions of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ have changed between different versions of the strategy and corpus linguistics will be used to demonstrate that some of these changes are part of a wider trend. Using both CDA and corpus linguistics is a potentially controversial mixed methods approach but is appropriate from the Critical Realist paradigm that forms the framework of this work. From a Critical Realist perspective, a distinction is made between the real, the actual and the empirical. The real being the generative mechanisms from which the actual emanates, the actual being what actually happens and the empirical being what we are able to perceive. The empirical data that is gathered from CDA and from corpus linguistics is, thus, seen as emergent from but not reducible to the text, which is in turn emergent from, but not reducible to the real. However, the real may be theorised from these empirical observations. The suggestion that an empiricist methodology such as corpus linguistics does not easily sit with the interpretivist approach of CDA thus, from the Critical Realist’s perspective, relies on a false distinction between the two paradigms.

Mautner suggests that corpus linguistics offers the opportunity to confirm or reject the suspicions of CDA (Mautner, 2016, p. 165). In the CDA carried out in this thesis and that identifies RadEx, it is proposed that counter-terrorism discourse previously tended to use ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ alongside references to violence but that this collocation has since become less prevalent. Collocation is a term that is fundamental to corpus linguistics and is used to refer to words being located in close proximity to one another in the texts being analysed. Following MacDonald, Hunter and O'Regan (2013), Wordsmith tools software is used to carry out corpus analysis and the findings of this analysis that are explored in Chapter
4 support the findings of the CDA, that the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with ‘violence’ has changed over time.

Alongside the observations made by the CDA of the PREVENT strategies, my general reading of media, academic and policy texts around counter-terrorism has indicated that the use of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ to explain acts of political violence has become more prevalent since 9/11. ‘Radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ do not appear in contemporary explanations for the violent acts of 9/11 and a notable example of this is Giovanna Borradori’s book, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror* (Borradori, 2004). In her book, Borradori interviews Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida about the attacks while they are in New York in the 3 weeks following the tragedy. Neither Borradori, Habermas nor Derrida use ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’ in their discussion of terrorism. In the years after 9/11, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ appear in commentary on terrorism, but as political concepts that have no necessary association with violence. An example of this is the PREVENT Strategy from 2008 which creates such a distinction by only using the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ alongside references to violence, associating them but drawing a distinction for if they were synonymous with violence they would not be used together. However, since then, the PREVENT Strategy has been rewritten and in the glossary of the current strategy that was written in 2011, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are defined by their association with violence. These words that previously described relative political stances have become synonymous with violence. In the analysis in later chapters, Wordsmith tools software will be used to test and, ultimately, support the following observations;

- That ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are now more readily adopted as explanations for political violence than they were for acts of political violence before 7th July 2005
- That ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, when first adopted in counter-terrorism discourse, tended to be collocated with violence or a synonym for violence
- That the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence has since become less prevalent

Mautner suggests that there are two main types of corpora, reference corpora and do-it-yourself corpora (Mautner, 2016). The corpus analysis that follows will be carried out on four do-it-yourself corpora and one reference corpus and these will consist of;

- Policy Corpus (2008-2017): UK counter-terrorism policy texts (‘texts’ as used here includes written documents and speeches)
- Parliamentary Corpus (2006-2017): texts from the UK Parliament that refer to ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’
• Critical Studies on Terrorism Corpus (2009-2017): articles that refer to ‘extremism’ in the Critical Studies on Terrorism Journal
• The News Corpus (2000-2017): news articles relating to acts of political violence from 9/11 to the present
• The Hansard Corpus (1800-2005): an online reference corpus of UK parliamentary debates (Marc Alexander et al., 2017)

The analysis of these corpora that is carried out in Chapter 4 supports the findings listed above. To enable an analysis of the emergence of RadEx over time, the documents were coded for analysis by the date that they were authored and Microsoft Excel was used to analyse the resulting data. Alongside a review of literature relevant to this, this corpus analysis contributes to understanding the emergence of RadEx. Following Fairclough (2015, p. 20), corpus linguistics is being used here as a tool that can be used by discourse analysts but not as analysis in its own right. Fairclough’s ‘analysis’ requires further explanation and theorisation of the findings of the corpus study. Thus, this corpus phase of the research is used to test the critique of the CDA but does not provide explanation of the causes of any changes observed. Explanation of the findings comes from careful theorisation and will be understood through a Critical Realist frame.

Both CDA and corpus linguistics are important to the research carried out here as corpus linguistics provides an invaluable tool for the communication of the research to policymakers, yet it is unable to provide a full account of all of the aspects of the discourse identified through CDA. As corpus linguistics is able to quantitively describe aspects of RadEx that are identified with CDA, changes to the discourse over time can be presented as graphs and these provide a useful tool for the easy communication of the findings. This ease of communication has been shown in recent interactions that I have had with civil servants who work in the Counter-Extremism Unit at the Home Office. They have been more willing to engage in discussion of the graphs produced by the corpus linguistics than they had previously been willing to engage in discussion of the more detailed descriptions of texts that CDA offers. Thus, corpus linguistics offers a tool by which policymakers might be encouraged to critically engage with the language that they adopt. As the CDA that I have carried out has previously been dismissed by civil servants as ‘reading too much into the language’, the data created by the corpus study appears to offer a more compelling argument for policy change.

3.3. Critical Realism, CDA and the Semiotic Triangle

Fairclough (2010, 2013, 2015; N. Fairclough et al., 2007; in Jonathan Joseph & Roberts, 2004) has lately adopted a Critical Realist stance in his version of CDA and this will be briefly explored below as the exploration of RadEx that is carried out in this thesis is a development
of this approach. In his last and posthumously published book, *Enlightened Common Sense* (Bhaskar, 2016a), Bhaskar returns Fairclough’s gaze by taking an interest in language and CDA, briefly exploring the connections between linguistic sign and meaning. By learning from Bhaskar’s Critical Realist stance for discourse analysis, we are able to theorise the distinction between the code or text (signifier), the concept (signified) and the object (referent) while paying attention to the ontology of each, their connections, their ontology as a whole, and their ontological basis for other generative mechanisms (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 34, 2016b, p. 64). This relationship is summarised by the semiotic triangle, reproduced as figure 4 below. Bhaskar suggests that the semiotic triangle is the minimum theorisation required for ‘the intelligibility of language use and the possibility of meaning’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 402, 2016a, p. 34, 2016b, p. 64). The semiotic triangle has heritage in the works of Saussure and Ogden & Richards, Glaz describing Saussure’s ‘intimate connection between signifier and signified and Ogden & Richards’ semiotic triangle’ as ‘the most influential models of the linguistic sign’ (Glaz, 2017). As a minimum starting point, the semiotic triangle offers a framework from which we can critique counter-terrorism discourse and also recognise that aspect of the ontology of the oppressed group that is found in the language itself. In doing so, it is hoped that we are able to critique the generative mechanisms of the oppressed group without reinforcing their oppression.

![Figure 4: The semiotic triangle](image)

While Fairclough has begun to develop a Critical Realist approach to CDA, he also agrees with calls for further development of the analysis of semiosis.
Critical realism would benefit from sustained engagement with semiotic analysis. For critical realism has tended to operate with an insufficiently concrete and complex analysis of semiosis. It has tended to take symbol systems, language, orders of discourse, and so on for granted, thereby excluding central features of the social world from its analysis. One consequence of this is that critical realism cannot give an adequate account of the complex semiotic, social, and material overdetermination of the world. (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer in N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 219; Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer in Jonathan Joseph & Roberts, 2004, pp. 38-38)

This concern for semiosis is repeated through Bhaskar’s later works, but was initially explored by him in a discussion with Ernesto Laclau from 1998 that is transcribed in Bhaskar’s book, From Science to Emancipation: Alienation and the actuality of enlightenment (Bhaskar, 2002). Laclau and Bhaskar debate the merits of their respective paradigms, Laclau’s post-structuralist approach to discourse theory and Bhaskar’s approach to Critical Realism. The debate hinges on their discussion of the transitive and intransitive dimensions, whether ‘the intransitive objects of science exist and act independently of our [transitive] knowledge of them’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 263). The debate hinges on Laclau’s insistence that our understanding of the intransitive dimension relies on transitive discourse. Bhaskar recognises this as a point of contestation, but the discussion fails to develop as Laclau is not offered the opportunity to elaborate his argument, even being cut off by Bhaskar towards the end of their discussion when Laclau says,

I’m not saying that global warming did not exist independently of the discourse which called it global warming, because that would be absurd. What I am saying is that global warming is a way of classifying something that is there with… (Laclau in Bhaskar, 2002, p. 94)

Though he is unable to finish his sentence as Bhaskar cuts him off. It appears that, had Laclau been able to present his argument more fully, he and Bhaskar may have found some common ground as Laclau repeatedly indicates his agreement with Bhaskar on many related issues throughout the debate. That is until Bhaskar calls for the intransitive to be extended to include ‘causal laws, the general structure of causality [and] to include what I call transfactual efficacy’ (Bhaskar, 2002, pp. 94-95). It is on this point that Laclau disagrees with Bhaskar and, in doing so, hints at a fundamental distinction between their views on post-structuralism and Critical Realism. And, in his final argument, Bhaskar proposes that their disagreement results from post-structuralism’s failure to account for the semiotic triangle.

I think it is absolutely crucial, and what a lot of post-structuralist theory does not do, is to articulate the concept of what I call the semiotic triangle (not a concept unique to myself), that is to say, clearly distinguish the word, the signifier or the sentence, and its meaning of the signified, on the one hand, from the referent, on the other. And whether the referent exists or
not is an interesting question, and it is not determined by the constitution in the transitive dimension of science of [sic] the signifier or the signified. (Bhaskar, 2002, p. 95)

The theory elaborated in later chapters of this thesis brings together the two concerns of this debate by elaborating the semiotic triangle as a contribution to a Critical Realist approach to CDA. It is proposed that the semiotic triangle that is later theorised is intransitive, in that it exists irrespective of its manifestation in events, also referred to as ‘counterfactual’ (Hartwig, 2007, p. 85). Not only is this approach to CDA following a line of investigation that Bhaskar repeatedly called for but endeavouring to describe an intransitive generative mechanism marks out this approach as Critical Realist. However, the proposal that this mechanism exists as an aspect of discourse could leave the theory open to being seen as post-structural. This is refuted as it is also accepted that there are likely to be many other intransitive factors at play in the emergence of RadEx, many of them being described in the preceding and in later chapters; these include, among others, racism, neoliberalism, the material needs of those who earn a living from countering ‘extremism’. The predominance of semiosis in this thesis is not due to its presumed pre-eminence as a cause of RadEx, many of those causes such as racism and neoliberalism that are explored above may have played a more significant part in its emergence. Semiosis is the focus of much of this thesis as the other causes of Prevent have been explored extensively by others, as referenced in the preceding chapter, and because it is hoped that adopting this theoretical stance that Bhaskar called for, we may learn something more about the emergence of RadEx, Prevent and counter-‘extremism’. Bhaskar explains the need for this approach to CDA by pointing out what can be lost in other forms of analysis,

Typically in Saussurean and Post-Saussurean semiotics, analysis of meaning of language, the referent is dropped so we just have a relationship between the signifier and the signified; in fact, it can be a very complex relationship of the sort that someone like Derrida will analyse but there is no referent there. Without a referent the whole point of language, which is to enable us to coherently steer our way around the world, is lost. I should just add that Anglo Saxon and the American tradition, being linguistics has often made the opposite mistake of assuming a single relationship between signifier and referent so that the signified, the concept, the meaning, gets lost. We need to clearly situate language in the world, a world which exists in large part independently of the uses of that language and so it is situated in the context of the semiotic triangle and the world in which things have become referentially detached from the language we use to describe it, this is the important concept: referential detachment. (Bhaskar, 2016b, pp. 63-64)

The referents explored in this thesis are ‘extremism’, ‘extremist’ and the associated process of ‘radicalisation’. By taking a critical stance, these referents are seen as transitive and the
later description of the semiotic helix describes one real and intransitive generative mechanism for them. Bhaskar explains the importance of such explanation in his last and posthumously published book.

In social explanation we must in principle understand the relationship between language and the extra-discursive part of social reality as a causal one, with the causality being two-way. Thus we see language and discursive processes as being *causally conditioned by extra-discursive aspects of the social reality* (including power, relations, the pre-existing distribution of resources, and so on); and at the same time as *causally efficacious on* the rest of social reality. (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 106)

By taking an interest in language, this thesis might be described as a realist study of relative terms. Thus, this thesis makes a small contribution to the resolution of the disagreement that Laclau and Bhaskar present between a post-structuralist theory of discourse and Critical Realism.

As has already been discussed and as will be shown in the following chapters, the meanings of ‘radicalisation’ and of ‘extremism’ have changed across different versions of PREVENT (2008, 2011b). These changes have resulted in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ becoming conventionally synonymous with support for violence in the pursuit of political ends. By adopting a Critical Realist stance, we can theorise the impact that this change in meaning will have on that which it refers to. An important aspect of this research is the theorisation of how this change creates a generative mechanism or ontology for political violence. As is mentioned in the introduction, a civil servant who holds a senior position in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism told me in 2016 that my research into this area was ‘reading too much into language’, in saying this, he was committing the referential detachment that Bhaskar refers to above. ‘Referential detachment’ because he was demonstrating a failure to appreciate that the signifier and what it refers to might result in actual change to what is signified, connections that are theorised in the semiotic triangle. This thesis critiques the impact of the referential detachment committed by civil servants, politicians and other workers in OTS when they fail to appreciate the impact of changing the meanings of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ by associating them with violence. Theorisation in Chapter 5 will indicate how these changes in meaning result in a real generative mechanism for the genre of the referent, the supposed ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’, to be altered, as might be the genre of the counter-terrorism worker, potentially creating a vicious circle where the need for the policy that reinforces violent identities is justified by the same language that promotes the violent identities. Describing this mechanism goes someway to achieving Joseph and Roberts’ aim for Critical Realism.
Critical realism offers an explanatory critique that moves from criticism of certain ideas to a critique of the institutions and structures that produce them, thus pointing towards the need to understand, explain and perhaps transform such structures. (Jonathan Joseph & Roberts, 2004, p. 3)

And, in the same volume, Jones proposes that a Critical Realist approach to CDA might contribute to the kind of policy analysis carried out in this thesis.

Critical discourse analysis...not only works to unpack communication itself along the lines of structures and mechanisms, it also allows for an understanding of how other social structures are maintained and transformed in and through various forms of languages and discourses (or ‘semiosis’ in Fairclough et al’s words). Using CDA to analyse data sources such as policy documents and interview transcripts, for example, critical realists can reconstruct the operation of generative or causal mechanisms at play in particular events. (Jones in Jonathan Joseph & Roberts, 2004, pp. 43-44)

This collection of works that Jonathan, Joseph and Roberts brought together in 2004 as Realism Discourse and Deconstruction have been referred to above as they point towards the type of analysis that is carried out here. One of the papers in the collection that has not yet been referred to, but might be seen as relevant to later chapters is Dean’s ‘Laclau and Mouffe and the Discursive Turn’ (Dean in Jonathan Joseph & Roberts, 2004, pp. 150-168). In this extremely clearly written paper, the clarity notable in the context of the complex texts discussed, Dean makes sense of Laclau and Mouffe’s original work (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) by interpreting them as referring to the capitalist inducement of ‘unfixity’ and overdetermination. The process of semiosis that is described in later chapters proposes a real generative mechanism for this ‘unfixity’ and is one of many mechanisms that (over)determine RadEx.

A final paper that will be referred to here as relevant to the development of a critical realist approach to discourse analysis is Sims-Schouten, Riley, & Willig’s paper from 2016, ‘Critical Realism in Discourse Analysis: A Presentation of a Systematic Method of Analysis Using Women’s Talk of Motherhood, Childcare and Female Employment as an Example’ (Sims-Schouten, Riley, & Willig, 2016). Their paper develops a systematic approach to critical realist discourse analysis to discern discursive from extra-discursive factors, something that the authors claim has previously been a limitation of critical realism. To achieve this, they carry out a systematic review of literature related to their study. They then interview their subjects and analyse the interviews, suggesting that the literature review enables them to identify extra-discursive factors that have already been seen in their literature review, enabling them to identify discursive factors in those not represented in the literature. This presents a novel, if imperfect, approach to the problem of Critical Realism’s prior inability to make this distinction.
between the discursive and extra-discursive. It is imperfect as they do not account for the possibility that there might be extra-discursive factors as yet unidentified in the literature. Despite this limitation, the attempt to describe and distinguish these categories is useful. However, the research proposed and carried out in this thesis might show an added complexity to this choice between discursive and extra-discursive as it is proposed that there can also be real generative mechanisms within the discourse.

From a Critical Realist perspective, ontology is seen as being composed of generative mechanisms; for example, the aforementioned mechanism by which RadEx suppresses dissent or promotes violence. As has already been discussed, an important distinction that is made by Critical Realism is between the ‘real’, the ‘actual’ and the ‘empirical’. In the exploration of RadEx, the aforementioned generative mechanisms that supresses dissent or promotes violence are ‘real’ and this is distinct from the ‘actual’ text or what ‘actually’ happens when these causal powers are activated and is yet different to the ‘empirical’ which is that which is experienced by actors, in this case, my students’ experience of RadEx or my observations as a teacher and researcher (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 103, 2016b, p. 23; N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 204). This distinction has been more recently explored by O’Regan and Gray,

s1 semiosis/discourse at the level of the real;
s2 texts at the level of actual; and
s3 interpretation of texts at the level of the empirical. (Based on Bhaskar, 2016, p. 103 O’Regan & Gray, 2018, p. 538)

The distinction of the empirical data from actual texts and the real mechanisms that generate them and that the texts also generate enables this research to unashamedly adopt a mixed methods approach, even employing certain methodologies that, from the epistemological perspective of some are not compatible (Stubbs, 1996). Stubbs (1996) asserts the necessity of corpus linguistics to any analysis of language, if it is to provide an adequate account of the world. However, from a Critical Realist perspective, such a distinction between the data from either CDA or corpus linguistics is unnecessary. The important factor to take account of in Critical Realist research is that the empirical data will always offer an incomplete account of the actual text or its real generative mechanisms and any theorisation either of the actual or the real must account for this. Thus, and in anticipation of criticism of this mixed methods approach, to suggest that CDA is not compatible with corpus linguistics is, from a Critical Realist conception of the world, to commit the epistemological fallacy by failing to distinguish the empirical data from the real. This distinction of the real from the data can be seen in the following example that also takes a critical realist approach to the analysis of discourse.
3.4. An example of discourse as ontology in the War on Terror

Fiaz (2014) provides a seminal example of a Critical Realist exploration of ontology and discourse in the War on Terror in her exploration of how the population of Pakistan has been manipulated by the discursive rationalisation of ‘extremism’. Her work provides a useful reference for this thesis as she follows the first two stages of Fairclough’s DRA, critique and explanation. She adopts a Critical Realist stance to critique the rhetoric of Pakistani politicians before demonstrating how this has reproduced the ideological foundations which enable violent interventionist policies by the United States against other countries as part of the War on Terror (Fiaz, 2014). However, the final stage of Fairclough’s proposed CDA, action, is notably absent, and this is highlighted in a more recent article by a fellow Pakistani academic, Muhammad Feyyaz, in which he argues that there is a lack of scholarship that theorises terrorism in Pakistan by Pakistani academics (Feyyaz, 2016). In spite of citing an earlier article by Fiaz (2012), an article that does not adopt a Critical Realist stance, Feyyaz does not refer to Fiaz’s article from 2014, an article that is more relevant to his argument; perhaps a sign that the complexities of Critical Realism have taken it out of the canon of literature on counter-terrorism and the War on Terror. This lack of recognition of Fiaz’s 2014 paper demonstrates the difficulty and, thus, care that should be taken to communicate one’s findings when adopting the metatheory of Critical Realism.

3.5. Bringing Time into CDA

‘CDA combines critique of discourse and explanation of how it figures within and contributes to the existing social reality, as a basis for action to change that existing social reality in particular aspects.’ (N. Fairclough, 2015, p. 6, emphasis in original)

As was briefly explored towards the start of this chapter, the various versions of CDA, including Fairclough’s development of the dialectical relational approach (DRA), do not offer an account of how changes in language occur over time. That is not to say that Fairclough does not describe change, he does. However, the changes described are situated around a specific moment, the marketisation of universities or the appearance of New Labour (N. Fairclough, 2010), rather than theorised as part of a progressive change. In fact, reading through much of Fairclough’s work, theorisation of how changes to language occur over time is absent (I. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013; N. Fairclough, 2010, 2013, 2015; N. Fairclough et al., 2007). As is discussed in the introduction, Fairclough’s reliance on Giddens’ Structuration Theory, a theory that does not employ a temporal dimension, limits his critique. By not employing a temporal dimension, Fairclough only offers an account of how the ideology or discourse that he is critiquing is or was and does not also offer an account of how it became. A contribution of this thesis will be to the theorisation of how changes to the semiotic order occur over time,
the semiotic order being a primary concern throughout Fairclough’s work. The aforementioned Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) (figure 3) will help bring a temporal dimension into the explanation phase of the analysis carried out here. And, to enable this, data must be collected across different time scales at the critique phase and this is explored below.

The approach described here, much of which is drawn from Fairclough’s dialectical relational approach (DRA), brings a temporal dimension into the research so will be described as the temporal dialectical relational approach (TDRA). While other versions of CDA, most notably Reisigl and Wodak’s (2016) DHA, have explored discourse in its historical context, the development of Fairclough’s approach enables the development of a more explicit ontology related to the discourse. Following the DRA, the initial phase of the TDRA is to recognise that there has been a change in the relationships between genres, discourses and styles; in short, a recognition that the semiotic order has changed. This is the ‘critique’ phase and is seen in all of Fairclough’s work and is demonstrated particularly well in his analysis of marketisation of universities and in the emergence of New Labour and the Third Way² (N. Fairclough, 2010). However, while Fairclough often critiques texts from different times to highlight features of the discourses, he does not evaluate how the changes occur over time. Thus, the only distinction between the TDRA and the DRA in the initial critique phase is that the dates when texts were written and published should be collected if carrying out the TDRA. The differences between the two approaches become more pronounced in the theorisation carried out during evaluation phase that follows, the time coded data that has been generated from the texts is used at this phase to develop a theory of how the discourse has changed over time.

3.6. Choosing texts and methodology

While an important stage of any CDA is the selection of relevant texts, it would be more accurate to say that, in this research, the texts were first identified and that observed features of the texts indicated that CDA was an appropriate methodology to employ. Thus, CDA was chosen as a result of the texts, rather than the texts being chosen for CDA. Therefore, this section will first describe how the texts were identified then explain why CDA lends itself to their analysis and, finally, will offer some discussion of how this process might inform other research.

² It is perhaps not surprising that relying on Giddens work has limited Fairclough’s critique of New Labour as Giddens was one of the main architects of the Third Way (Grice, 2002). As well as contributing to the work carried out in this thesis, the introduction of the neglected temporal dimension may also add to the critique of New Labour, potentially revealing more flaws in the Third Way than those that Fairclough has already critiqued.
After political debate in my classroom had been silenced, my exposure to media discourse, and discussion of education and counter-terrorism policy with students, other teachers and with the senior leadership team in the school where I worked led me to suspect that the children had been silenced by their fear of being reported as a result of PREVENT. As is discussed in the introduction, the reporting of my concerns about PREVENT in the media resulted in the silenced students being empowered to discuss their fears about PREVENT with me, fears that they told me were causing them to withdraw from classroom debate, and this supported my initial suspicions. As a result of my growing concerns, I reviewed the strategy to try to understand more and was struck by the first sentence, ‘The PREVENT programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed’ (HM Government, 2011b, p. 1). This indicated that there were likely to be differences between this version of PREVENT and the earlier version that it referred to (HM Government, 2008, 2011b) I surmised that these differences might reveal something of the ideology behind each strategy, the differences shining a light on aspects of common sense views that might otherwise go unnoticed. This possibility of revealing common sense knowledge in the text and, in doing so, revealing something of the ideology behind the texts led me to critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a possible methodology. Specifically, my reading on discourse analysis led me to the work of Fairclough and his interest in ‘common sense’ and ‘ideology’ (N. Fairclough, 2010). This led me to realise that CDA might be a way to systematically analyse texts, with the aim of learning what had caused my students to be targeted by counter-terrorism strategy.

The initial identification of a social phenomenon to be investigated, the silencing of debate in my classroom, aligns this research with the first stages of schemas for CDA that have been developed by Fairclough (2010), O’Regan & Betzel (2016, p. 5) and Bhaskar (2016a, p. 109). It has already been established that the methodology followed here has provenance in the works of Fairclough and of O’Regan & Betzel, and the further inclusion of Bhaskar’s schema offers developments to their work that will be useful to the research carried out here. All three schemas are copied out in full in the following table, before they are all reviewed to show how aspects of each have contributed to the schema employed here and which is written out in full at the end of this chapter.
3.7. Developing a Schema for CDA

The following table includes the schemas for CDA that Fairclough (2010, p. 235), O’Regan & Betzel (2016, p. 5) and Bhaskar (2016a, p. 109) propose. Each schema is written out in full before relevant aspects of each are discussed so that a schema that draws on each can be justified and compiled. In this way, the methodological developments that Fairclough, O’Regan & Betzel and Bhaskar propose are all able to contribute to this thesis.

|-------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1     | Focus upon a social wrong, in its semiotic aspect. | Focus upon a social phenomenon in its semiotic aspect (Draw upon relevant theories about the phenomenon and look for a semiotic point of entry)  
(a) Step 1, Identify the phenomenon you want to research  
(b) Step 2, Theorize the phenomenon in a transdisciplinary way (Use relevant theory). Once you have the theory, you can then look for a semiotic point of entry | Focus on a social problem that has a semiotic aspect |
| 2     | Identify obstacles to addressing the social wrong. | Identify the causes of the phenomenon and (if relevant) the obstacles to changing it (Why is the phenomenon like this?)  
(a) Step 1 Select texts in the light of the object of research and adopt an analytical framework for categorizing and interpreting their features  
(b) Step 2 Analyse texts by linking linguistic analysis to interdiscursive and social analysis | Identify obstacles to its being tackled through an analysis of  
(a) a network of practices within which it is located  
(b) the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the particular practices concerned; and  
(c) the discourse (or semiosis) itself. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>Consider whether the social order 'needs' the social wrong.</th>
<th>Does the social order require the phenomenon to be the way that it is? Who benefits most from the phenomenon remaining unchanged?</th>
<th>Consider whether the social order (network of practice) in a sense 'needs' the problem. Why if at all is the problem 'needed'? What are the mechanisms (somehow) producing and reproducing it? The point here is to ask whether those who benefit most from the way social life is organised have an interest in the problem not being resolved.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Identify possible ways past the obstacles.</td>
<td>Identify ways past the obstacles. Can the dominant discourse be contested?</td>
<td>Identify possible ways past the obstacles. This stage is a crucial complement to Stage 2 – it looks to hitherto unrealised possibilities for change in the way life is currently organised. This is where concrete utopianism, a theory of transition and a relationship to an on-going depth struggle becomes crucial. We can now define a notional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>These unrealised possibilities become the object of an emancipatory practice oriented to the resolution of the social problem or ill, in the context of concrete utopianism and a coherent theory of transition. This will in principle include a moment of self-reflexivity defining a notional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 5* in which we self-reflect critically on our analysis (1-4), including considerations as to the interests and social positionality of the analyst</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each stage adopted in this research draws on aspects of the three schema above and will now be elaborated.

O'Regan & Betzel’s schema offers the most detail for how to proceed at Stage 1 of any of the schemas so their Stage 1 is adopted in full.

At Stage 2, O'Regan & Betzel’s schema is similar to Bhaskar’s but includes an extra instruction related to the selection of texts. This is an important aspect of the research carried out here and, at this stage, care should be taken to select texts from different times so that later analysis can theorise how changes seen happen over time. The Critical Realist stance adopted by this research leads to a preference for some of Bhaskar’s language so the first aspect of O’Regan & Betzel’s stage about choosing texts is included but the second stage is elaborated with Bhaskar’s Stage 2 so as to include a concern for both semiosis and social practice. As is discussed in the introduction, selecting texts from different times means that Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) can later be used to theorise the relationship between semiosis and social practice.

Bhaskar adopts and elaborates O'Regan & Betzel's Stage 3 and his focus on ‘mechanisms’ helps to maintain the focus of the research on the generative mechanisms producing genres, discourses and styles in the text. It is hoped that adopting Bhaskar’s Stage 3 will direct the researcher’s gaze so as to avoid the inadvertent promotion of oppression that is the focus of the critique carried out by this research.

O'Regan & Betzel's and Bhaskar’s Stage 4s are combined and this results in ‘Can the dominant discourse be contested?’ being added to Bhaskar’s Stage 4. This is seen as an important addition for, though a Critical Realist perspective assumes that a dominant discourse can be contested, it focuses the gaze of the research onto real possibilities for emancipation.

Finally, as they are unique to Bhaskar’s schema, Stages 5 and 5* are adopted without change. Bhaskar's final Stage (5*) is of paramount importance to my own research as my professional identity as a teacher is intimately connected to the discourse that I am critiquing. This stage is vital to my understanding of how my professional identity is positioned in the context of my own research findings.

Thus, the following schema is adopted for the purposes of the CDA carried out in this thesis.
3.8 Final Schema for CDA

Stage 1
Focus upon a social phenomenon in its semiotic aspect (Draw upon relevant theories about the phenomenon and look for a semiotic point of entry)

(a) Step 1, Identify the phenomenon you want to research
(b) Step 2, Theorize the phenomenon in a transdisciplinary way (Use relevant theory). Once you have the theory, you can then look for a semiotic point of entry

Stage 2
Identify the causes of the phenomenon and (if relevant) the obstacles to changing it (Why is the phenomenon like this?).

(a) Step 1 Select texts in the light of the object of research and adopt an analytical framework for categorizing and interpreting their features

Having employed close reading of the texts in Stage 1, as is usual for CDA, corpus linguistics is now employed to show how texts and their meanings have changed over time.

(b) Step 2 Analyse texts by linking linguistic analysis to interdiscursive and social analysis

Identify obstacles to tackling the phenomenon through an analysis of

(a) a network of practices within which it is located
(b) the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the particular practices concerned; and
(c) the discourse (or semiosis) itself.

Stage 3
Consider whether the social order (network of practice) in a sense ‘needs’ the problem. Why if at all is the problem ‘needed”? What are the mechanisms (somehow) producing and reproducing it? The point here is to ask whether those who benefit most from the way social life is organised have an interest in the problem not being resolved.

Stage 4
Identify possible ways past the obstacles. Can the dominant discourse be contested?

This stage is a crucial complement to Stage 2 – it looks to hitherto unrealised possibilities for change in the way life is currently organised. This is where concrete utopianism, a theory of
transition and a relationship to an on-going depth struggle becomes crucial. We can now define a notional.

Stage 5
These unrealised possibilities become the object of an emancipatory practice oriented to the resolution of the social problem or ill, in the context of concrete utopianism and a coherent theory of transition. This will in principle include a moment of self-reflexivity defining a notional.

Stage 5*
In which we self-reflect critically on our analysis (1-4), including considerations as to the interests and social positionality of the analyst.

3.9.Discussion of ethics
The methodology employed in this thesis is based on critical discourse analysis (CDA) of government documentation that is in the public domain. Therefore, there will be no human participants directly involved in the research. However, the justification for carrying out the research lies in my interactions with children who I previously taught in a secondary school in Tower Hamlets and in the findings of focus groups that I arranged for the London Borough of Tower Hamlets in 2015. As the only aspects of my thesis that will refer to human participants, both my interactions with my pupils and the focus groups are discussed below. In all instances, I was acting in my capacity as a secondary school teacher and was therefore following the teachers' professional standards as set by the Department for Education and had an up to date criminal records bureau (CRB) check. The focus groups were carried out at the request of the London Borough or Tower Hamlets Overview and Scrutiny Committee into PREVENT and with the full authority of the headteacher in the school where I worked. As all instances referred to took place after I started to take a professional, political and academic interest in PREVENT, I frequently asked my students and those involved in the focus groups if they were happy for me to share our interactions with others. Therefore, I only report instances from my teaching practice and from the focus groups where I am confident that the informed consent of the pupils and participants has been given. I also ensure an extra level of protection to those referred to by only referring to instances where it is not possible to identify individuals.

Interactions with pupils
My concerns for the impact of the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy on school children in the UK has led to my involvement in a number of lobbying activities to challenge the strategy. These have included contributing to Preventing Education for Rights Watch (UK), Eroding Trust for The Open Society Justice Initiative and articles in the mainstream media. As a result of this exposure, many of the students who I taught and some who I had not met before
approached me to express their concerns about PREVENT between 2014-2016. They informed me that they did not speak openly to other adults about these concerns for fear that they might be reported to the security services if they did. Thus, I found myself in a privileged position with children describing to me how they were changing their behaviour in response to PREVENT, concerns that they told me they did not share with other adults. Outside of academia and before commencing my PhD, this led to me increasing my lobbying activities directed at PREVENT by setting up the PREVENT digest website (www.preventdigest.co.uk) and mailing list. The PREVENT digest is a monthly digest of media reports, articles and events related to PREVENT and I am told by some of the academics, policymakers and journalists who it is sent to that it is a valuable resource. My activities in this area led to me being invited to join the Tower Hamlets Overview and Scrutiny Committee into PREVENT in 2015 and it was while on this committee that I arranged focus groups with children from across Tower Hamlets.

**Focus Groups**

The London Borough of Tower Hamlets Overview and Scrutiny Committee into PREVENT was tasked with investigating the impact of and application of the PREVENT Strategy in Tower Hamlets. To this end, I was asked to arrange for the committee of local councillors to discuss PREVENT with local school children. With the approval of the headteacher of the school in which I worked I arranged focus groups to take place at the school. The local PREVENT Education Officer arranged for students from 3 other schools from across the borough to join the students from my school. The children were verbally briefed that they could speak openly with the councillors and that we were there to hear their views on PREVENT. They were informed that they would not be named in future reports but that it was hoped that their testimony would contribute to the broader discussion of PREVENT. Due to the large number of councillors (5) and children (20), the children were arranged into 5 groups and each group was tasked with speaking with one councillor. Prompting questions such as “what do you know about the PREVENT Strategy” were asked of the children by the councillors but the discussions were otherwise unstructured. The groups were asked to note down the findings of their discussions and this formed the basis of a discussion with the whole group which I chaired while also noting down what was said on the interactive whiteboard in the classroom where the focus groups were held.

There were a number of views that were expressed to me by both my pupils outside of the focus groups and were also repeated in the focus groups. These included:

- Muslim children reporting that they were scared to practise their religion at school
• Children avoiding seeking the support of adults in sensitive situations, such as when their peers were being affected by ISIS propaganda
• Children choosing not to engage in political debate at school

Each of these expressed views provides a justification for the research that is carried out in this thesis so have been referred to in the introduction and rationale.

Referring to the informal testimony of my students and to the testimony of students in the focus groups that I ran for the Tower Hamlets Overview and Scrutiny Committee into PREVENT raises a number of ethical questions.

Firstly, many of the pupils expressed their concern that they would receive unwanted attention from the security services if they were to openly criticise PREVENT. To respect these concerns, I only include their testimony where I am confident that they have subsequently given their informed consent for me to refer to our interactions. This consent was gained verbally as, at the time, I habitually asked the children if they consented to me anonymously referring to their reported experiences in my academic and lobbying work. Also, it is important that the pupils’ concerns are respected by ensuring that they cannot be identified. Thus, I only refer to the concerns that children expressed to me where I am confident that they cannot be identified. Where student’s concerns are referred to, I am confident that they cannot be traced back to individuals as they refer to concerns that have been expressed to me by more than one student, both in and outside of the focus groups. Added to this, there is no written record of who attended the focus groups, nor is there a record that connects the concerns expressed by my students to named individuals. I also take care to ensure that other identifying features such as which class a child belonged to are omitted from the thesis.

On three occasions I refer to individual situations that have been described to me and that are relevant to the rationale for this thesis. Two of the occasions refer to scenarios that students have described to me and in both cases, they have given me their verbal consent for their stories to be included in the thesis and other future work. I will only include descriptions of these scenarios where I am confident that neither student can be identified from what I have written. Both scenarios involve students not seeking the support of adults in the past for fear that the PREVENT Strategy would have resulted in the intervention of the security services. Each scenario had passed by the time the students approached me and does not present an ongoing risk to anyone, child or adult, involved. Had I identified any risk as the time, I would of course have reported it in line with my professional safeguarding duties as a teacher and head of department in a state-funded secondary school.

The third situation refers to a youth work provider who had their government funding cut after their continued refusal to hand over the contact details of the children who they
worked with to the Home Office’s PREVENT team. The Chief Executive of the youth group has given me his consent to include his story and has since discussed it openly with other academics and journalists. The inclusion of this story is relevant as it supports the notion that PREVENT is an intelligence gathering strategy, something that is frequently denied by the Home Office in spite of much evidence to the contrary.

3.10. Limitations of the Research

As is explored above, bringing a temporal dimension into CDA is not new. Specifically, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016) explores discourse in different historical contexts. The introduction of a temporal dimension to critical realism is also not new and, as is discussed in section 2.7, Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) is central to critical realism’s understanding of change to societal structures and agency over time. In so far as the Temporal Dialectical Relational Approach (TDRA) that is developed here does make any contribution, it is to our understanding of how discourse might contribute to these changes.

The rationale for this research, as explored in section 1.1, lies in my observation that the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy was resulting in the self-censorship of my pupils, an observation supported by other students in the school where I taught, in focus groups with children from other schools and by other academics, NGOs and Parliamentary committees (Bush er et al., 2017; House of Commons, 2018c; Open Society, 2016; Rights Watch (UK), 2016). Following the schema for CDA developed above, a semiotic aspect of this social phenomenon is explored in later chapters before a generative mechanism for the phenomenon related to the semiotic aspect is theorised. This is not an argument for this being the only ontology for the phenomenon described, but it is argued that the semiotic changes explored indicate that it might be relevant for our understanding of PREVENT, its chilling effect, and mechanisms that could reduce violence.
Chapter 4 - Data

Focus upon a social phenomenon in its semiotic aspect (Draw upon relevant theories about the phenomenon and look for a semiotic point of entry)

(a) Step 1, Identify the phenomenon you want to research

(b) Step 2, Theorize the phenomenon in a transdisciplinary way (Use relevant theory). Once you have the theory, you can then look for a semiotic point of entry

Step 1 is addressed by looking at the phenomenon of the emergence of RadEX, as is initially revealed by contradictions between different versions of PREVENT. This social phenomenon is defined in its semiotic aspect in this chapter and this has been contributed to in earlier chapters, in particular, in the literature review (Chapter 2). This earlier theorisation has contributed to Step 2 of this stage by theorising the phenomenon in a transdisciplinary way. This has resulted in the phenomenon being viewed from the perspective of critical terrorism studies (CTS) and attempts are therefore made to understand the underlying causes of political violence, rather than reacting to so-called acts of terror. Literature on ‘radicalisation’ reveals that this is a contested concept and the emergence of this and ‘extremism’ will be explored by analysis in this chapter which develops a semiotic point of entry for researching the phenomenon. Political and educational theorists from Arendt (Arendt, 1969) to Alexander (R. Alexander, 2008) have described the importance of dialogue if democracy is to successfully prevent political violence and this indicates that PREVENT and RadEx may actually promote rather than prevent violence. Finally, theories of semiosis, ideology, power and discourse have led to a Critical Realist framework for CDA being employed to endeavour to understand the emergence and proliferation of RadEx, a discourse first identified in the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategies. This process of identification is described in this chapter. Theorisation carried out in the literature review has largely addressed stage 2 as is summarised above. Thus, following the analysis of PREVENT carried out in this chapter, the next chapter adopts corpus linguistics to investigate the emergence of this discourse over time and following chapters employ Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) alongside the semiotic triangle to develop a theory of how this discourse has emerged and proliferated.

The more recent PREVENT Strategy that was written by the UK Coalition Government in 2011 starts its second paragraph at line 7 in figure 5 below by stating ‘The PREVENT programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed’ (HM Government, 2011b, p. 1). It was this tension between the current and previous PREVENT strategies that indicated
that CDA might be an appropriate mode of analysis, the tension offering the possibility of identifying differences between the two and of revealing something of each. Thus, I analyse both of the PREVENT counter-terrorism strategies from 2008 and 2011 in order to identify differences in taken for granted knowledge. This reveals something of the ideologies represented in each. Sections of the text of each strategy are reproduced below along with discussion of the findings.

Figure 5: Coalition PREVENT Strategy (HM Government, 2011b, p. 1)

```
1 Intelligence indicates that a terrorist attack in our country is 'highly likely'. Experience tells us that the threat comes not just from foreign nationals but also from terrorists born and bred in Britain. It is therefore vital that our counter-terrorism strategy contains a plan to prevent radicalisation and stop would-be terrorists from committing mass murder. Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from Al Qa’ida inspired terrorism is not.
2
3 The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face: and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that Prevent should have been confronting.
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Figure 6: New Labour PREVENT Strategy (HM Government, 2008, p. 2)

Starting with the first paragraph of each strategy, figures 5 and 6, the more recent PREVENT Counter-Terrorism strategy (fig 5) creates an outgroup by repeatedly making reference to 'us' in the first paragraph; 'our country' (line 1), 'us' (line 1) and 'our counter-terrorism strategy' (line 3). It then makes reference to Osama bin laden (line 4) and Al Q’a’ida (line 5) and while British politicians have since suggested that the strategy is directed towards all types of extremism, this focuses the strategy on British Muslims. While it would be correct to challenge the association of Osama bin laden and Al Q’a’ida with the Muslim community, the lack of
reference to forms of terrorism such as The Far Right or ecoterrorism which are not associated with Islam maintains this focus in the text.

While the later strategy’s (fig 5) focus on the likelihood of a terrorist attack can be seen as tied to the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda described by MacDonald et al and Thomas, the earlier strategy represents the Citizenship and Community Cohesion (CCC) agenda that they also describe (MacDonald et al., 2013; Thomas, 2014). This is demonstrated in the first paragraph where the first line of figure 6, ‘Everyone has a right to live in a safe and welcoming neighbourhood where they feel they belong’, describes community and then proposes services that have made ‘communities safe, strong and prosperous’ (Fig 6, lines 4-5).

Aspects of this earlier text, ‘everyone’ having ‘a right’ rather than ‘the right to live…where they feel they belong’ (lines 1-2, emphasis added) align this text with the alienating epistemology of secularism that was described in chapter 1.4 as being a motivating factor to force counter-terrorism policy onto schools. This alienating epistemology can be theorised in the context of Weber’s iron cage of Secular subjectivity that Mavelli has taken further in his exploration of the European relationship with Islam (Mavelli, 2012, 2014). It should also be noted that the reference to ‘prosperity’ (line 5) is closely related to Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’. Weber’s concern with the disenchantment of the world from the anthropomorphism of Secularism is aligned with the concerns of Critical Realism, so is in line with later theorisation of this area (Weber, 1930).

4.1.1. ‘Radicalisation’

I now turn to the changed meaning of ‘radicalisation’ which can be seen in the glossary sections of each PREVENT Strategy from 2008 & 2011, figures 7 and 8.

**Understanding Radicalisation**

1 We have a growing body of knowledge about the radicalisation process from academic and government research and from case histories of those who have attempted or perpetrated terrorist attacks. From this data it is clear that there is no single profile of a violent extremist or a single radicalisation pathway. There are, however, factors and vulnerabilities which repeatedly appear in different cases and which can leave a person more susceptible to exploitation by violent extremists.

2 These factors are set out below. The list is neither exhaustive nor detailed. It is important to emphasise that the presence of these factors presumes neither radicalisation nor engagement in violent activity.

3 **Radicalisers** – Radicalisation is often a social process, involving interaction with others.

4 Radicalisers may be propagandists, ideologues or terrorists and may be in face-to-face contact with the subject or in dialogue over the internet.

**Figure 7:** HM Government, 2008: 69.
Throughout the earlier New Labour PREVENT Strategy, the term ‘radicalisation’ is collocated with references to violence and terrorism and an example of this can be seen towards the end of the strategy in the section titled 'Understanding Radicalisation' (figure 7). This shows links being drawn between ‘radicalisation’ and violence as the term ‘radicalisation’ is only used alongside references to violence, for example in phrases such as ‘there is no single profile of a violent extremist or a single radicalisation pathway’ (lines 3-4) and ‘the presence of these factors presumes neither radicalisation nor engagement in violent activity’ (lines 9-10). While this links ‘radicalisation’ and violence it also provides a distinction between the two as were it taken for granted that ‘radicalisation’ meant violence it would not be required that both phrases be used together. This is further supported in line 13 where it is proposed that ‘Radicalisers may be propagandists, ideologues or terrorists’ (emphasis added). By including the modal verb, ‘may’, the text of the earlier strategy suggests that it is possible to go through a process of ‘radicalisation’ without supporting violence or terrorism. That this process might be led by ‘ideologues’ and ‘propagandists’, who the text indicates may be other than ‘terrorists’, suggests that, from the perspective of the earlier strategy, it is possible for ‘radicalisation’ to be a non-violent political process.

The more recent PREVENT Strategy (fig 8) provides a specific definition for ‘radicalisation’, ‘Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.’ (HM Government, 2011b). If this latter usage is accepted, ‘radicalisation’ has become explicitly linked to terrorism and acceptance of the glossary definition leads the reader to take it for granted that ‘radicalisation’ will lead to terrorism or the support of terrorism. Thus, the meaning of ‘radicalisation’ has changed to become associated with violence in the second strategy.
4.1.2. ‘Extremism’ and ‘extremist’

As with ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’ and ‘extremist’ also undergo a change in meaning in the documents analysed. In the main text of the earlier strategy, ‘extremism/ist’ is always collocated with ‘violent’, written as ‘violent extremism/ist’ (fig 9 & fig 10: lines 4, 5, 7, 10, 11) and this indicates that the strategy is targeted at reducing violence rather than at all those perceived to be ‘extreme’. As with ‘radicalisation’, the collocation of ‘extremism/ist’ and ‘violent’ associates the two terms but draws a distinction, that it is necessary to use them together indicates that they do not share the same meaning.

The later strategy, however, offers a specific definition for extremism,
Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. (HM Government, 2011b, p. 107)

**Figure 11:** Coalition PREVENT Strategy (HM Government, 2011b, p. 107)

The earlier strategy is opposed to and targets violence yet the more recent strategy targets ‘extremism’ itself; the later broad definition of ‘extremism’ extending to anyone opposing an undefined ‘British’ value system. These values include, but by implication are not exhausted by ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (fig 11: lines 2-3). Extremists in this conception are those who do not follow British values; by failing to provide a precise definition of these values, the ‘extremist’ is defined as the other, i.e. as not British, or sufficiently subscribing to Britishness. The labelling of the ‘extremist’, therefore, offers an opportunity to become or to be more British.

The later strategy includes an additional defining feature of ‘extremism’, ‘calls for the death of members of the armed forces’ (fig 9: line 3). This is similar to the change in meaning of ‘radicalisation’ to be associated with violence as it enables ‘extremism’ to be defined by association with a call for violence. However, while ‘radicalisation’ has become specifically linked to violence, ‘extremism’ can be defined by its otherness to Britishness as well as its association with violence.

4.1.3. RadEx

These changed meanings of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, to become more associated with violence and the support for violence, are indicative of what is described in this thesis as the new violent discourse of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’. Referred to in this thesis as ‘RadEx’.

The wider acceptance of RadEx was demonstrated in a recent judgement from the British High Court in the case of London Borough of Tower Hamlets V B (“London Borough of Tower Hamlets -v- B,” 2016). The judgement in this case stated that the definitions of ‘radicalisation’ and of ‘extremism’ in the most recent Prevent Strategy (2011b) ‘are so much a part of contemporary life they scarcely need definition’ (“London Borough of Tower Hamlets -v- B,” 2016). In spite of this legal judgement, the Government has been unable to legally define ‘extremism’ in a way that will not leave it open to challenge in court, this has been investigated in the press (Hooper, 2017) and was also confirmed to me in September 2017 in a personal communication with a senior civil servant who was working in the Counter-Extremism Unit of
the Home Office. The research carried out in this thesis indicates that the failure to define ‘extremism’ in a meaningful way may not only stem from the existential impossibility of defining ‘extremism’ in a way that is consistent with a functioning democracy, as was explored in Chapter 2, but is also made impossible by the definition apparently changing between different government documents. In this chapter, these differences have been observed between two documents from 2008 and 2011, the following chapter will use corpus analysis to investigate if the changes observed above are part of a wider trend and to also investigate the discursive context from which ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ have emerged.

4.2. Identifying the Problem
Identify the causes of the phenomenon and (if relevant) the obstacles to changing it (Why is the phenomenon like this?)

Research Questions Addressed:

**RQ1.** What discursive conditions resulted in the emergence and proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in UK parliamentary discourse. (sections 5.1 and 5.2)

**RQ2.** Did ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ tend to be collocated with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence when employed in the first publication of PREVENT (HM Government 2008) and in contemporaneous discourse? (section 5.1)

**RQ3.** Has the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence become less prevalent since PREVENT was first published in 2008? (section 5.1)

4.2.1. Corpus Analysis

*Select texts in the light of the object of research and adopt an analytical framework for categorizing and interpreting their features*

*Having employed close reading of the texts in Stage 1, as is usual for CDA, corpus linguistics is now employed to show how texts and their meanings have changed over time.*

A corpus study is now used to establish if the changing characteristics of RadEx, as seen in the two versions of PREVENT, are part of a wider trend. The importance of using both CDA and corpus linguistics is shown below in the analysis of the first corpus. This is a study of government documents that refer to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. As well as revealing more about the emergence of RadEx, this will also show that,

- there are features of RadEx that can only be described by close reading of texts (as is carried out in the preceding chapter)
- there are features of RadEx that can be described by using both close reading of texts and by using corpus linguistics
- there are features of RadEx that can only be described by using corpus linguistics.
Each of these features is explored in the Policy Corpus below.

Corpus linguistics lends itself to studying change over time as the volume of texts required for this kind of study is prohibitive to non-computer based forms of analysis and, where a simple change in the text is being described, large volumes of date coded texts can quickly be used to generate data that can in turn be used to create graphs to visually represent linguistic changes over time.

For the purposes of this research, four do-it-yourself corpora (The Policy, Parliamentary, Critical Studies on Terrorism and News corpora) have been constructed and will be used as well as a reference corpus (The Hansard Corpus) to reveal more of the emergence of RadEx. The distinction between reference corpora and do-it-yourself corpora has been explored by Mautner (2016) and is discussed in the earlier methodology Chapter 3.

- The Parliamentary Corpus (2006-2017) shows a similar but less well-defined change in the usage of ‘extremism’ in parliamentary discourse between 2006 and 2017 than is seen in the Policy Corpus.
- The Critical Studies on Terrorism Corpus (2009-2017) is created using articles from the journal of the same name. This is a journal that has the aim of critiquing the War on Terror (Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & Heath-Kelly, 2017) and, as such, the Critical Studies on Terrorism corpus that spans the years 2009 to 2017 was constructed to investigate the possibility that critique of the War or Terror might itself inadvertently be normalising oppressive counter-terrorism strategy through the use of RadEx.
- The News Corpus (2005-2017) reveals that media discourse tended not to focus on ‘radicalisation’ or on ‘extremism’ when referring to acts of terrorism before 7th August 2005.
  And, finally,
- The Hansard Corpus (1800-2005) shows that ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’ and ‘pre-crime’ have become progressively more common in the parliamentary record since the 1970s.

4.2.2. The Policy Corpus (2008-2017)
This corpus is made up of 974,851 words and 25 documents that come from various government departments and parliamentary committees and they were found by searching government websites for ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’. The earliest document analysed in the corpus is the New Labour PREVENT Strategy from May 2008, the same document that is analysed in the preceding chapter. The most recent document analysed is from 22nd June
2017 and is a published statement from the Home Secretary, Amber Rudd MP, on the series of terrorist attacks in the UK in the first half of 2017. The aim of constructing this do-it-yourself corpus was to see if the change that was observed in the Stage 1, that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ had become conventionally synonymous with violence, was limited to the two versions of the PREVENT strategy or was part of a wider trend within government texts.

Wordsmith Tools was used to investigate the L1 collocation of ‘violent’ with ‘extremism’ in each document. ‘L1’ means that the word (‘violent’) is located in the word space immediately to the left of ‘extremism’ (‘violent extremism’). For each document analysed, Excel was used to calculate how frequently ‘violent extremism’ occurred as a percentage of the total occurrence of ‘extremism’ and this data was used to create the graph below that shows how the usage of ‘extremism’ has changed over time.

Each point on the graph is a government document and the point at 100% represents the 2009 document, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. In this document, ‘extremism’ is only written as ‘violent extremism’ (100% of the time). Over time, the word ‘violent’ has been lost so that all recent documents are clustered around 0%. While the close reading of the text carried out in Stage 1 showed that the usage of ‘extremism’ and its association with violence had changed between two documents, this corpus analysis has enabled the analysis of many more documents and almost one million words. This shows that the observations that first described RadEx in the analysis of two documents at Stage 1 may be part of a wider trend within Government texts. This suggests that the collocation of ‘extremism’ with ‘violent’ has been progressively denuded since 2009.
Figure 12: Collocation of ‘extremism’ with ‘violent’

4.2.3. The limitations of corpus linguistics

As well as showing collocations at L1, Wordsmith Tools can search for collocations in different configurations. For example, ‘R1’ would indicate that the collocated word is found in the word space immediately to the right. Wordsmith Tools allows the researcher to investigate if the words being investigated for collocation are within 25 words to the right (R25) or to the left (L25) and the settings can be altered to test for any L or R collocation between 1 and 25.

It was demonstrated in Stage 1 above that ‘radicalisation’, like ‘extremism’, tended to be collocated with reference to violence in the earlier PREVENT Strategy but that this collocation had since been dropped. It has not been possible to demonstrate this using corpus linguistics. Collocations of ‘radicalisation’ with ‘violent’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorists’ from L1 to L25 and from R1 to R25 were searched for and the result of the collocation of each word and of all of the words combined were analysed but no pattern was found. Over 50 graphs of the different collocations of ‘radicalisation’ were produced by this method and all failed to show a significant pattern, two are reproduced below to demonstrate this.
The collocation of ‘extremism’ with ‘violent’ that was demonstrated in stage 1 (Chapter 4) was always at position L1 and this is easily shown by using corpus analysis as is described above. However, the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ with ‘violent’ and synonyms for ‘violent’, is subtler than the collocation that creates ‘violent extremism’. The associated reference to violence is often within the same sentence but can be further apart; in figure 7 ‘radicalisation’ is 17, 5 and 6-word positions apart from ‘violence’. By searching for collocations further apart, positive collocations may be found where there is not a meaningful link in the text. For example, a
section of a document ending with ‘radicalisation’ that precedes a section with ‘violence’ in the first sentence may yield a positive collocation though the two words are not associated in the meaning represented in the text. This demonstrates the need for both close reading of texts and for corpus analysis in this research. As is discussed in the introduction to this thesis, this is a mixed methods approach that is entirely compatible with a Critical Realist framework.

4.2.4. The Parliamentary Corpus (2006-2017)

This corpus was produced from the archived texts of parliamentary debates that is held by The Hansard Society. The online archive of parliamentary debates was searched with the search term ‘extremism’ and a text document for each debate in which the word appeared was created and coded by date. Parliamentary debates are archived back to the 1700s but they are recorded in different databases that relate to different time periods. Despite attempts to generate data from across different databases that would be comparable, the different cataloguing and search functions of each have meant that this has not been possible. This has not been possible as databases from different times catalogue by date, or by minister or by debate topic and either separate written answers from debates in the chamber or do not. As such, the most appropriate database to use to construct a do-it-yourself corpus of parliamentary debates extends from the present to as far back as 2006. This corpus was analysed in the same way as the Policy Corpus to produce the following graph.

![Parliamentary Corpus (2006-2017), Extremism (L1 "violent") as % "Extremism"

**Figure 15:** Parliamentary Corpus

Similar to the Policy Corpus, the Parliamentary Corpus shows that the collocation of ‘violence’ with ‘extremism’ has also been progressively lost in parliamentary debate between 2006 and 2017. However, the trend is not as defined as that which is seen in the Policy Corpus. Taking
a closer look at the text represented by a single data point on the graph, the point at 0% on 20th November 2006 is taken from a debate that includes the following text,

    We must recognise, too, that we face stark challenges to our values and our way of life from those who foster extremism and do not hesitate to use violence to further their own ends (Hansard, 2006)

Unlike the corpus analysis that suggests that ‘extremism’ is not associated with violence in the text, this quote reveals that the two terms are associated in the actual meaning of the text. As this point on the graph is representative of a text that only included the word ‘extremism’ twice, this misrepresentation of the actual meaning by the corpus analysis has resulted in the point that represents this text being placed at 0% on the graph rather than at 50%. This alters the appearance of the graph and demonstrates why it is important that any conclusions drawn from the analysis of corpus data should be limited to describing general trends, rather than focusing on the meaning of individual points and specific texts.

4.2.5. Critical Studies on Terrorism Corpus (2009-2017)

Critical Studies on Terrorism is a journal that has, for over a decade, critiqued the War on Terror (Jackson et al., 2017). A corpus was thus created from this journal to understand how pervasive RadEx had become. If RadEx were shown to have been adopted by this journal, it might be suggested that even amongst those whose stated aim is to critique the War on Terror, some may be inadvertently fomenting aspects of the violence that they critique. The corpus spans the years 2009 to 2017, is made up of 20 articles (each represented as a different date coded text file) and totals approximately 200,000 words. The texts were selected by using the search function on the journal’s website to search for ‘extremism’, this yielded 155 journal articles that were sorted by relevance. Starting with the ‘most relevant’ article produced by the journal’s search function and working through to less relevant articles, it became clear that after the 20th search result, the articles did not contain the word ‘extremism’, they had been produced by the search function for containing words such as ‘extremely’ so were not appropriate for this study and were not included in the corpus. Thus, the top 20 articles resulting from the search were date coded to create the Critical Studies on Terrorism Corpus.

    As with the Policy and the Parliamentary Corpora, this corpus was searched for the frequency in which ‘violence’ was found in the L1 word position to ‘extremism’ and the data produced was used to create the following graph.
The Critical Studies on Terrorism corpus shows that the trend that is seen in the Policy and Parliamentary Corpora, to progressively lose the word ‘violence’ from its L1 collocation with ‘extremism’ is not seen in the texts of this journal that were analysed. The use of the word ‘extremism’ is however indicative that aspects of RadEx may be reproduced in the journal. However, as a journal that is critical of the War on Terror, it is reasonable to expect that fragments of the policy texts that are represented by the preceding corpora might be reproduced by the journal and represented in the sample.


The News Corpus is composed of articles from the Guardian, The Telegraph and the BBC and it is hoped that this provides an, admittedly limited, cross-section of the British media. Leading articles were selected from each news source on the days following the 17 most recently reported terrorism attacks on the British mainland. The discussion over the definition of a ‘terrorist act’ is an ongoing debate and the work carried out here to question the definition of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is a progression from this earlier debate. As was written in the introduction of the 10th anniversary edition of the Critical Studies on Terrorism journal, ‘CTS [critical terrorism studies] needs to question the term “counterterrorism” in the same way it has questioned the term “terrorism”’ (Jackson et al., 2017). In the absence of any agreed list of terrorist attacks in the UK and in light of the difficulty of defining ‘a terrorist act’, the list of recent attacks was taken from the Wikipedia page titled ‘List of terrorist incidents in Great Britain’. This page lists ‘terrorist’ incidents as far back as the Gunpower Plot in 1605 but a choice was made to only go as far back as 2001 as my extensive reading of news reports describing terrorist attacks had already indicated that RadEx did not enter the discourse used...
to describe these events until after 2005. The lack of any reference to ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’ in the articles analysed from before 2005 supports this observation.

50 documents that totalled 52,609 words were analysed in the News Corpus. Despite the relatively large number of documents analysed (twice as many as the Policy Corpus), the typical brevity of news articles resulted in there being a limited number of words analysed. For this reason, there was not enough data to investigate the collocation of ‘extremism’ with ‘violent’ as was done with the Policy Corpus. However, the data does demonstrate that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ tended not to be used in the media to describe co-called acts of terrorism before 2005 and that their usage has since become more common. This is described in the following graphs.

**Figure 17:** News Corpus (‘extremism’)

![News Corpus, "radicalisation" frequency per Million words](image-url)
4.2.7. The Hansard Corpus (1803-2005)

The Hansard Corpus (Marc Alexander et al., 2017) differs from the preceding corpora in that it is not a do-it-yourself corpus, it is a reference corpus that was created in 2011 by researchers and academics in collaboration with Milbank Systems who manage the databases from which the previous Parliamentary Corpus was drawn. This reference corpus is made up of 7.6 million speeches and 1.6 billion words from parliamentary debates between 1803 and 2005. As such, the Hansard Corpus is used to show changes in language from before the time covered by the Parliamentary Corpus.

The Hansard Corpus has been compiled by a multi-institution academic research project and provides an excellent tool for tracking changes in language in Parliament up until 2005. However, in discussions with technologists I have established that recent advances in technology mean that, were this corpus created today, it could be updated automatically to create an up to date searchable database of parliamentary debate. This would enable the fuller exploration of the emergence of parliamentary language than is currently possible. While this would be an extremely valuable tool for research and advocacy it would be too great a task to carry out in addition to the other work carried out in this thesis. In the absence of such a comprehensive database, the following three graphs have been produced to contribute to an understanding of the emergence of RadEx up until 2005.

**Figure 18: News Corpus (‘radicalisation’)**
‘Radicalisation’ is absent from the record of parliamentary discourse until 1975 when it first appears. It then appears very rarely through the parliamentary record for the next thirty years, only appearing in 1984, 1986, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2001 and 2003. For 23 of the 30 years between 1975 and 2005, ‘radicalisation’ is not recorded in parliamentary discourse at all. There is a sharp increase in the usage of the word in 2005, a 4154% increase on the average usage since it entered the parliamentary lexicon in 1975. This increase in usage corresponds to ‘radicalisation’ first appearing in the Media corpus.

‘Extremism’ first appears in 1919 but is used infrequently until the 1970s, on average 0.2325 times per million words between its first appearance and 1970 when the usage increases and

**Figure 21: Hansard Corpus (‘extremist’)**

‘Extremist’ first appears in 1869 and 1882. However, both instances can be discounted as they represent an archaic usage of the term to mean ‘the most extreme’, as opposed to being used as a noun to describe an extreme person. For example, the first usages are, ‘I hope that the Bill will be dealt with the greatest caution and the extremist care’ and, ‘It required Gentlemen of the extremist hardihood to defend the Bill’. This, again, shows a limitation of corpus linguistics as is carried out here. As such, and for the purposes of this research, ‘extremist’ first appears in the record as a noun in 1902 when Sir Lewis McIver describes one of his political opponents as an ‘extremist’ on account of the ‘very strong opinions’ that he holds.

Like ‘extremism’, the frequency with which ‘extremist’ appears in the parliamentary record then fluctuates and usage of the term peaks between 1918 and 1933, through the 1970s and, with a particularly prominent peak in 1974, and then again in 2005.
4.2.8. Amalgamated Hansard and Parliamentary Corpus (1803-2017)

**Figure 22: Hansard Corpus (‘pre-crime’)**

This final graph has been created by amalgamating the Hansard Corpus with a do-it-yourself corpus of recent parliamentary debate. As such, and as discussed earlier, caution should be taken over the interpretation of this data which is taken from sets of data that are not necessarily comparable. However, what can be derived from the different databases is that the Hansard Corpus shows that ‘pre-crime’ was only referred to once in Parliament between 1803 and 2005 and a search of the current Hansard records reveals that the same word has been recorded in Parliament 711 times between 2010 and 2017. By dividing this number (711) by an approximated number of words that might be expected to have been spoken in Parliament between 2010 and 2017 (180428875.5 – the average number of words previously spoken in Parliament per annum), and then multiplying the result by one million, the frequency of ‘pre-crime’ between 2010 and 2017 was calculated. This result was amalgamated with the single occurrence of ‘pre-crime’ in the six billion words recorded in the Hansard Corpus to create the graph above. Thus, while the Hansard Corpus and the current Hansard records are not internally consistent, it is reasonable to infer that there has been a dramatic increase in the usage of ‘pre-crime’ in recent years.

4.2.9. Summary of Corpus Findings

The Policy and Parliamentary Corpora indicate that the findings of stage 1, that the collocation of ‘extremism’ with ‘violent’ has been progressively lost since 2009, are part of a wider trend within policy and parliamentary discourse. This trend is not replicated in the Critical Studies on Terrorism Corpus but aspects of RadEx, specifically the use of ‘extremism’ and its collocation, or not, with ‘violent’, are reproduced in this journal. In the media texts analysed,
‘Radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ were not used to describe so-called acts of terrorism before 2005 but this has since become more common.

In parliamentary discourse,

- ‘Extremist’ first appears in 1902, there is an increase in usage between 1918 and 1933, again through the 1970s, with a peak in 1974. It is notably rare in the record between 1933 and 1968 and again in the 1990s.
- ‘Pre-crime’ appears once in the parliamentary record between 1803 and 2005 and then 700 times between 2010 and 2017, the mean frequency between 2010 and 2017 being a 20,000% increase on the mean usage for the preceding 202 years.

The ability of corpus analysis to ‘see’ the collocation of ‘extremism’ with reference to violence and the inability to do the same with ‘radicalisation’ demonstrates the need for both close reading of texts as in stage 1 (preceding chapter) and for corpus analysis as is carried out in stage 2 (this chapter). Weaknesses in the data have been shown and indicate that the type of corpus analysis that is carried out here should only be used to draw limited conclusions that describe general trends in language use, rather than focusing on the meaning of individual points and specific texts. As such, in appreciation that corpus analysis does not necessarily describe the actual meanings of the texts analysed, the texts were returned to for close reading to gain a deeper understanding of their meaning. In later chapters, both the meanings of the texts and trends over time that are described above will contribute to a theorisation of the texts, their production and their interdiscursive relationship to other texts and social structures, with a specific focus on how these changes have occurred over time.

Limitations have been discussed that demonstrate that it has not been possible to create an internally consistent corpus of parliamentary discourse that includes debates from both before and after 2005. However, the prolific usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in the parliamentary, Critical Terrorism Studies and New Corpora suggest that there has been a dramatic increase in the usage of the words since 2005. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that their usage has also significantly increased in parliamentary discourse since 2005, as is also indicated by searching the Hansard database of parliamentary texts from 2005 to the present. This observation is further supported by Sedgwick’s analysis that also shows a

4.3. Analyse texts by linking linguistic analysis to interdiscursive and social analysis

Identify obstacles to tackling the phenomenon through an analysis of
a) a network of practices within which it is located
b) the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the particular practices concerned; and
c) the discourse (or semiosis) itself

Fairclough (2010c) refers to the dialectical relation of discourses, genres and styles as one of interdiscursivity and as a component in the analysis of texts: ‘textual analysis includes both linguistic analysis (and if relevant, analysis of other semiotic forms, such as visual images) and interdiscursive analysis (analysis of which genres, discourses and styles are drawn upon, and how they are articulated together)’ (p. 238). An important issue here is that Fairclough sees interdiscursivity as a mediating ‘interlevel’ between the micro-level linguistic analysis of the text (in conjunction with relevant social analysis) and the analysis of social structures. In other words, relations of interdiscursivity via orders of discourse are what connect the analysis of the text with an analysis of social structures. (O'Regan & Betzel, 2016, p. 5)

In the first half of this chapter (5.1), step 1 of stage 2 in the schema, corpus analysis has identified RadEx. Its emergence was briefly explored and can now be separated into two timescales. Firstly, the increasing frequency of the use of the words ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in parliamentary discourse between 1902 and their appearance in the media corpus in 2005, at which point there is a dramatic increase in usage of the words across the corpora. Secondly, the progressive loss of a collocated reference to violence alongside the words ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in political discourse between 2009-2017. The first of these features of RadEx, the increasing frequency of usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ between 1902 and 2005, will now be explored with the use of specific examples of texts to describe the interdiscursivity of RadEx in this period. For each period, this exploration will go some way to achieving an understanding of
a) a network of practices within which RadEx is located
b) the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the particular practices concerned; and
 c) the discourse (or semiosis) itself

Even if all texts that contain a certain word were able to be reproduced here, as is possible in analysis that follows of parliamentary texts containing ‘radicalisation’ from 1800-2005, the texts analysed would not present a full account of the reality behind the texts. That is to say, the texts as empirical data are not reducible to the actual speeches, thoughts or experiences of the politicians in Parliament who generated the texts, nor are they reducible to the real mechanisms that emanate from the texts. Nor, are they reducible to the extra-discursive
factors that have also contributed to the texts. The purpose of the analysis carried out below is, thus, to reveal aspects of the texts that can be used to theorise the networks of styles, genres and discourses that were described as a ‘semiotic order’ in the methodology chapter (3). As the Hansard Corpus is a searchable database of all UK parliamentary speeches it is an appropriate corpus to use here to inform understanding of the development of the political practices, relationships and discourses that have developed around RadEx.

To achieve this, the Hansard Corpus was searched for ‘radicalisation’ and then for ‘extremism’. For each word, each occurrence of the word in the parliamentary record was read chronologically and notes were taken to record recurring themes that further analysis might come to describe as ‘discourses’, these were also related to the corpus graphs in the preceding section to try to relate the texts to peaks in usage and absence of usage of the words. As discourses were identified, the texts were reviewed to see if the discourses were repeated or not and examples of texts that represented this were identified and recorded, these form the texts that are reproduced and discussed below. This section (5.2), step 2 of stage 2, explores the appearance of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ from 1902 to 2005. It appears to be coincidental that 2005 is a significant moment in the development of RadEx – 2005 is when ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ appear in the media corpus for the first time and when the words see a dramatic increase in usage across the corpora - and is also a significant point of discontinuity in the corpus analysis, stemming from the incompatibility of the search functions of the Hansard Corpus which ends in 2005 and other Hansard databases for the subsequent years. As a result of this, however, particular caution is taken over any inferences that are derived from the apparent timing of the appearance of characteristics of RadEx around this time. Though care is taken, this is not seen as a hinderance to the analysis as it is now shown that many of the interdiscursive developments of RadEx appear over many years and that the periods in which they are used inevitably overlap. Indeed, the intention of the analysis of earlier texts as is carried out here is that the features of RadEx that are identified will inform an understanding of the interdiscursive characteristics of RadEx that are still in use today.

In stage 3 that follows in the next chapter, the real generative mechanisms that resulted in the emergence of the discourse and social practices identified will be theorised.

4.3.1. ‘Radicalisation’
While ‘radicalisation’ has been a frequent topic of parliamentary debate since 2005, it only appears in the parliamentary record 14 times in the period covered by the Hansard Corpus (1800-2005). As such, every incidence of ‘radicalisation’ in the parliamentary record from this time will be referred to in the following pages. The infrequency of the word’s usage indicates that any real mechanisms that emanate from ‘radicalisation’ during this period are likely to have been limited. However, the interdiscursivity that can be derived from reviewing these texts will enable the emergence of ‘radicalisation’ to be described and this will contribute to
the later theorisation of the real mechanisms that have resulted in the word’s current usage and in the exponential increase in its use since 2005.

Neoliberalism, the Left and New Labour
‘Radicalisation’ first appears in the parliamentary record in a House of Commons debate on The Army from 17th June 1975 when Mr Julian Critchley, Conservative MP for Aldershot, says,

There was a time when the objective of British foreign policy, like the objective of any country’s foreign policy, was the maintenance of security. In the 1960s that objective changed and became the maintenance of prosperity. In the 1970s we are experiencing the radicalisation of politics, and defence has now to compete for attention with the problems of inflation, unemployment and energy. The Labour Party is the inflation party.

In referring to the ‘radicalisation of politics’, Critchley is aligning his concerns with those laid out in the same year in The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975), a book that bemoans the loss of ‘traditional means of social control’ as a result the increased engagement in the democratic process of citizens of the USA, Japan and Western Europe (Crozier et al., 1975, pp. 8, 165). The book is referred to here as it is described by Chomsky as giving us some insight into the ‘thinking that may well lie behind domestic policies’ of the time in Western Europe, the United States and Japan (Chomsky, 1981). It, thus, provides a useful backdrop to aid understanding of Critchley’s concern for the ‘radicalisation of politics’.

Crozier et al suggest in The Crisis of Democracy that these concerns be addressed by the state imposing ‘discipline and sacrifice’ on the population (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 7). Critchley, however, does not propose that the causes of these concerns be addressed so directly, rather, he states that ‘The Labour Party is the inflation party’. In saying this, Critchley is appealing to the British electorate to support his Conservative Party, arguing that ‘the radicalisation of politics’ might lead to people voting for the Labour Party and that this will imperil the UK economy. The concerns laid out by Crozier et al have recently been described by Chomsky as fundamental to the political project that has since become known as ‘neoliberalism’ (Chomsky in Lydon, 2017) and the similarity of Critchley’s argument around the supposed ‘radicalisation of politics’, from the same year as the publication of The Crisis of Democracy, leads to the supposition that there may be a relationship between ‘radicalisation’ and neoliberalism. Analysis of ‘extremism’ in this context is carried out later in this chapter and leads to the theorisation of an interdiscursive relationship between RadEx and neoliberalism.

It is over a decade later until ‘radicalisation’ reappears when on 10th Dec 1986 Mr Dave Nellist, Labour MP for Coventry South East, coopts the ‘radicalisation’ of the Left as a threat to argue against the erosion of workers’ Rights in a debate on the ‘Termination of Existing Arrangements [for trades union activity and for the remuneration of teachers]’, stating that,
The Right of free collective bargaining, like the Right to strike, the Right to vote and every other
Right in what is supposed to be a democracy—in so far as it can be a democracy under a Tory
Government in the late 1980s—has been won by the struggle of generations of trade unionists,
stretching back at least over a century. For a Tory Government to abrogate one of those Rights
is an attack on a central feature of democracy... It is escalating the radicalisation of the rank
and file in ordinary teachers associations throughout the country... It is worth making one small
point about the radicalisation and the effect of such a draconian measure on the entire
profession and on the youths and students in education... The Bill, particularly clause 1,
removes the basic democratic Right to free collective bargaining... Instead, it substitutes direct
control by the Secretary of State. In that sense clause 1 is an undemocratic and reactionary
clause in an undemocratic and reactionary Bill... its only success will be in radicalising and
politicising more teachers, taking them away from any support that they, as individuals, may
have given to the Tory party and its candidates at election time. In that sense, if what the
Secretary of State intends by clause 1 is a solution to the teachers’ dispute, it will be
counterproductive. (emphasis added)

Nellist is arguing that failure to allow workers to be represented will result in their
‘radicalisation’. Both Nellist and Critchley employ the same meaning for ‘radicalisation’, the
increased support for the Left in response to oppressive policies of the Right. This is an
undesirable outcome as earlier described by Critchley, a Conservative, as he suggests that it
will lead to an increase in inflation. It is implicit from Nellist’s Leftist position that ‘radicalisation’
of the teachers is desirable, as it will lead to teachers supporting his party. However, he also
makes it clear that the ‘radicalisation’ of the teachers will result in a loss of ‘support that they,
as individuals, may have given to the Tory party and its candidates at election time’.
‘Radicalisation’ is thus being used as a threat against the imposition of the policies of the ruling
Conservative Party.

The next occurrence of ‘radicalisation’ in the parliamentary record comes from a House
of Commons Intergovernmental Conference on 5th July 1995 when Hon Douglas Hurd,
Conservative MP for Whitney, is recorded as commenting on the development of the
European Union,

What is taking shape... is not a huge further radicalisation of the European Union or a huge new
concept that will pull up everything by the roots and start something entirely afresh... We have
to look ahead to the expansion eastwards, and to some extent southwards—to Cyprus and
Malta—of the European Union. One aspect that we have to consider to that end is the changes
that will be needed in the common agricultural policy and in the structural funds. No one in their
Right mind would suppose that we could expand eastwards, which is certainly necessary, while
conserving the CAP in its present form as the whole thing would go bust.
Hurd, like the preceding politicians, is using ‘radicalisation’ to refer to political change and, like his fellow Conservative, Critchley, presents it as implicitly undesirable. He refers to ‘changes that will be needed in the common agricultural policy and in the structural funds’ but does not regard these as a ‘radicalisation’ of the European Union. Reasoned political change as described by Hurd is, thus, not ‘radicalisation’ and, as such, ‘radicalisation’ is a pejorative term for ill-considered or unreasonable change. It is also notable that Hurd’s reference to a ‘concept that will pull up everything by the roots’ shows an understanding of the etymology of ‘radicalisation’ in ‘radix’, the Latin for ‘root’; perhaps not surprising from a former scholar to both Eton College and Trinity College Cambridge. Overland has referred to this etymology for ‘radicalisation’ in attempting to connect counter-radicalisation programmes to the targeting of supposedly outdated interpretations of Islam (Overland, 2016). Such attempts to explain language by reducing meaning to etymology is a reductive process in failing to appreciate meanings of language in use so has not been explored in this thesis.

Both Conservative politicians, Critchley and Hurd, are, in line with their Party name, taking on a position whereby drastic political change is seen as undesirable. Critchley taking on a position from which all change is perceived as undesirable. Hurd takes a more pragmatic position where change is ‘certainly necessary’ but as a result an apparently reasonable economic argument. Nellist, a Labour politician, is presenting ‘radicalisation’ as a reasoned response to a Tory ‘attack on a central feature of democracy’. By using the threat of ‘radicalisation’ as an argument against the imposition of Conservative policies, Nellist is positioning himself as part of a socialist movement that is necessarily in opposition, a position that is aligned with the theorisation of socialist strategy as laid out by Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In using ‘radicalisation’ in this way, Nellist is employing dissent as an argumentation strategy, a position that is at odds to the Third Way that is later employed by New Labour. Fairclough describes New Labour’s intolerance of dissent as a New Labour genre of government (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 385). Nellist’s genre, unlike that of New Labour, is to co-opt the threat of dissent as a political tactic.

‘Radicalisation’ of citizens of the Middle East in response to western military intervention

As well as being used to describe Leftist political change and as a pejorative term for unreasonable change, ‘radicalisation’ is recorded in the parliamentary record to refer to the catalysing of political change in the Middle East by Western military intervention.

Will the Right hon. Gentleman try to comprehend the urgency of the need for a debate on what is happening throughout the middle east. We have a unique opportunity in Britain to try to restrain our American allies from their ill-considered interventions in that part of the world. Does he not understand that the more the Americans intervene in any area of the middle east, the more they increase the inevitability of radicalisation of that area, not only in religious but in political terms as well?
It may surprise contemporary readers that this quote does not refer to the heated parliamentary debates that occurred in the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 but is from 8th March 1984 when Mr. Andrew F. Faulds, Labour MP for Warley East, refers to US military interventions in the Middle East in a parliamentary debate on the Iran Iraq War. Faulds’ parliamentary colleague, Sir David Price, Conservative MP for Eastleigh, follows on by saying, ‘Many of us believe that Islamic fundamentalism is probably the greatest threat to peace at present’. In saying this, Price is making the first connection between ‘radicalisation’ and Islam that is recorded in parliamentary discourse. Though preceded by Faulds’ reference to ‘radicalisation’ and its genesis in military intervention, Price’s brief statement fails to repeat this connection or make it implicit that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ occurs as a response to western military intervention. In presenting ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in this way, it is proposed as a threat that is emergent from conditions that are singularly described as ‘Islamic’. This Orientalist view, discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3), essentialises Muslims and disconnects their actions from the material circumstances from which all of our actions emerge (Said, 2003, p. xvi). This disconnecting of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ from political responses is a portent to Prime Minster, David Cameron’s, speech to the Munich Security Conference 27 years later in 2011. In this later speech, Cameron insists that the roots of modern terrorism lie in Islamic ideology (Cameron, 2011).

On 13th January 1993, Mr George Galloway, Labour MP for Glasgow Hillhead, is recorded as arguing, during a debate on ‘The Arab Israel Dispute’, that,

the failure of the secular nationalist leadership of the Palestinian people to obtain any significant concession has led to that radicalisation and Islamicisation of the whole national consciousness in Palestine?

Going on to state that

The radicalisation and Islamicisation that is occurring across the Arab area and the broader Muslim world will be greatly intensified by what will be regarded as western double standards, whereby the west is ready, at a moment’s notice, to pulverise Iraq, but unable, over decades, to do anything about Israel's rejecting and ignoring international law and international standards, or to do anything to save the lives of the tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims who have died in the current campaign in former Yugoslavia.

A week later, on 21st January 1993, he refers to the US and UK coalition’s bombing of Baghdad, equating the bombing campaign to a terrorist attack and saying that,

The attack was a blunder because it has contributed seriously to a wave that will continue for years of further instability, radicalisation and sweeping fundamentalism across the middle east and the broader Islamic arena. I do not know where some of the authorities obtain their
information. On Arab streets, in the slums of Algiers, in Aden, in the slums of Cairo and in the mosques of Saudi Arabia, the attack has led to the beatification—if Muslims can be beatified—of that blood-soaked tyrant, Saddam Hussein. His stock has never been higher.

Believe me, that wave of radicalisation and fundamentalism has been under way in the Arab area for a considerable period. Anyone who is aware of the Palestinian question and who has watched the steady march of the fundamentalist movement, Hamas, gaining ground at the expense of the secular, moderate, nationalist leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, knows exactly the despair and humiliation felt by the Arabs that is leading to the festering problem of fundamentalism.

Like Faulds’ reference to US interventions in the Iran Iraq War, Galloway is exploring the genesis of co-called ‘radicalisation’, which he links to ‘Islamicisation’ and ‘fundamentalism’. In his first contribution from 13th January, he claims that ‘radicalisation’ has emerged from a failure of ‘secular nationalist leadership’ in Palestine, from ‘western double standards’ in bombing Iraq while failing to hold Israel to account over breaches of international law and for failing to prevent genocide of Muslims in Bosnia. Again, on 21st January, he refers to ‘radicalisation’ as a response to the bombing of Iraq, going on to suggest that this is leading to ‘the steady march of the fundamentalist movement…at the expense of the secular, nationalist, leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’. The ‘fundamentalism’ that Galloway refers to is implicitly religious due to its stated emergence from the failure of ‘secular nationalist leadership’ and is partially Orientalist. It is Orientalist as Galloway presents the secular perspective as the acceptable norm and dismisses the ‘instability, radicalisation and sweeping fundamentalism’ that emerges from the failure of the secular. However, it diverges from the purely Orientalist positions stated by Price and Cameron that are explored above as Galloway’s ‘radicalisation’ is described as emerging from western military intervention and the ‘double standards’ of the West towards Israel and the Middle East. Like Nellist, his fellow Labour MP who is quoted above, Galloway is using ‘radicalisation’ as a threat to argue against a course of action proposed by the Government. ‘Radicalisation’ in this conception is describing an undesirable outcome but is being co-opted as a threat.

Like Galloway, Robert Graham Marshall-Andrews QC, Labour MP for Medway, also links ‘radicalisation’ to Western intervention in the Bosnian War when, on 18th May 1999, he is recorded as saying,

The radicalisation of support for Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade has occurred because, although he tells his people many lies, he can tell them with complete candour and truth that the action taken against them by NATO is illegal.
Unlike Galloway who describes ‘radicalisation’ as stemming from the failure to ‘do anything to save the lives of the tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims’, Marshall-Andrews sees the military action that the West did undertake in the Yugoslav conflict as being the cause. Specifically, Marshall-Andrew’s describes the illegality of the actions of NATO as being the cause of ‘radicalisation’. That Marshall-Andrew’s and Galloway could be referring to the threat of ‘radicalisation’ for, respectively, both the lack of military intervention in Bosnia and because of military intervention in Bosnia indicates that it can be used as an argumentation tactic that does not necessarily have a fixed scenario to which it refers to. This fits with Sedgwick’s argument for the importance that ‘radicalisation’ be seen as a relative term and which was discussed earlier in Chapter 2 (2.2 & 2.4) (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479).

On 26th February 2003 the impending invasion of Iraq by the US and UK coalition was debated in Parliament. This invasion of Iraq is an issue that many, including the former head of MI5 (Manningham-Buller, 2010), have subsequently described as catalysing the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslims but it is only the Lord Bishop of Guildford who pre-empts this connection in Parliament at the time,

I return to the anger over what is perceived to be—no matter what we may think about it—American and western imperialism. Will it threaten our social cohesion? Some of my colleagues who live with delicate multi-cultural communities are very worried about the impact of this conflict on social cohesion. We need to think about these matters.

In my sleepless nights over this issue [the impending invasion of Iraq that would occur on 20th March] I have a nightmare that Osama bin Laden is smiling about the prospect of this war in the Middle East. Al’Qaeda works outside the structures of international order and law. Is it possible that a war prosecuted in this way will fulfil its desire to create increasing chaos and disorder; increasing Islamic fundamentalism and radicalisation in the Middle East; and that we will find in this post-Cold War world that we have not yet found a way of living together in peace in the international community? Is there anything this debate can do to exorcise that nightmare, which I suspect is not only in my mind?

The Bishop, like many of the preceding parliamentarians referred to, uses ‘radicalisation’ as a warning as to what might happen if the war proceeds. As the only reference to ‘radicalisation’ in the parliamentary debates leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, an event that would later be regularly linked to ‘radicalisation’, the Bishop’s statement is remarkably prescient.

‘Radicalisation’ of Muslims in the UK

Two years before the above contribution from the Lord Bishop of Guildford, the Lord Bishop of Birmingham commented on the connection between the ‘radicalisation of Muslim youth in UK cities’ and military intervention in Afghanistan, intervention by the same military coalition that would later invade Iraq, stating on 18th October 2001,
I hope that we shall not see yet another demonstration of the impotence of power in the face of a weakness that has little or nothing to lose…I conclude by returning to Birmingham and my conversation with my adviser this morning. He is quite clear that, the longer this conflict [Afghanistan] goes on in its present form, the greater the fear for the radicalisation of Muslim youth in our cities and the more difficult for the voice of moderate Muslim leaders to be heard. I have also heard reports from church-run play groups about the fears expressed by Muslim women—fears for their families and for themselves. One might say that, if the young men are carrying the anger, the women are carrying the fear.

This is the first time in the parliamentary record that ‘radicalisation’ of Muslims in the UK is connected to military intervention abroad. The Lord Bishop of Birmingham is presenting himself, like the politicians in the preceding section, as an insightful actor, someone who knows what is happening at a local level. Like Nellist, the Bishop is using the threat of the ‘radicalisation’ of others as a means of arguing against a certain political tactic. Nellist’s concern was for the imposition of new employment conditions on teachers while the Bishop is concerned by the continuing war in Afghanistan. The Bishop presents himself as a knowing actor who understands what the Muslim youth in our cities’ and ‘moderate Muslim leaders’ want and what emotions ‘the young [Muslim] men’ and women are feeling.

The emergence of laws to prevent ‘radicalisation’

It is not until two years later on 1st March 2005 that government interventions to target ‘radicalisation’ are first recorded as being discussed in Parliament when Baroness Anelay of St Johns, a Conservative peer, says in reference to the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2005),

My Lords, we do not underestimate the difficulty of the problem facing the Home Secretary. There is indeed no difference between us on the determination to protect our public from terrorism. We know that there are no easy answers but, as I made clear last week, we believe that the Home Secretary has settled on the wrong answers, which may sacrifice essential and long-standing British principles of liberty and justice in a way that is unlikely materially to enhance the security of our people. The Government have quite properly, and laudably, put into effect measures to prevent the radicalisation of groups in our society; these laws, and the sense of injustice that they may create, could completely negate those efforts.

The Baroness’s argument, that oppressive counter-terrorism measures, while perhaps well-meaning, may in fact increase the threat of terrorism, is aligned with the argument that is put forward in this thesis. It is, thus, of note that concerns that are expressed in this thesis are not new and are as old as the strategies that they critique. Since the time of the Baroness’s critique, the type of strategies that concern her have become ever more oppressive, with the imposition of the latest PREVENT Strategy (HM Government, 2011b) being the current high watermark for these types of oppressive policies. The argument that was earlier put forward
by Baroness Anelay of St Johns in 2005 and which is now elaborated in this thesis has, thus, become ever more urgent.

This urgency is further highlighted by the final record of ‘radicalisation’ to be found in the Hansard Corpus, on 9th March 2005 when Mr David Triesman, a Labour member of the House of Lords, is recorded as saying in a debate on the UK’s forthcoming presidency of the EU,

The justice and home affairs agenda will be carried forward in the EU's counter-terrorism action plan and the Hague justice and home affairs work programme, particularly to meet the negotiating deadlines on key measures such as the European evidence warrant and data retention. We want to see the completion of the strategy on radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations, and progress towards increasing the security of EU travel documents.

Triesman is indicating that the UK intends to use its Presidency to impose its rapidly developing counter-terrorism agenda (Kundnani, 2009) on the EU, an agenda that will be promoted throughout Europe in the following decade by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (Fitzgerald, 2016; Ragazzi, 2018) and globally by UNESCO (UNESCO, 2018).

Baroness Anelay has, like the preceding politicians, used ‘radicalisation’ as a warning against proposed government policy. In this instance, the strategy that the Baroness employs ‘radicalisation’ to argue against is the strategy to tackle ‘radicalisation’ itself. Triesman’s use of ‘radicalisation’ demonstrates a different genre to his fellow politicians as he does not use ‘radicalisation’ to warn of the consequence of certain political actions. Rather, he calls for the foreign expansion of strategy to tackle ‘radicalisation’. It might be argued that each of the preceding references have nominalised ‘radicalisation’ - see earlier chapters (1.5 & 2.2) for further discussion of nominalisation - and, in doing so, have obfuscated the agency and responsibility behind the process (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 220). Triesman’s proposal for ‘a strategy on radicalisation’, rather than a strategy to address the underlying causes of political violence might be seen as being made possible by this process of nominalisation.

**Summary of analysis of ‘radicalisation’**

Other than the Orientalist conceptions of Conservative politicians that regard ‘radicalisation’ as a pre-modern irrational phenomenon, the causes for ‘radicalisation’ that have been described above at first appear unconnected;

- responses to the erosion of workers’ Rights
- inability of an expanding European Union to maintain payments via the common agricultural policy
- American intervention in the Iran-Iraq War
- weakness of secularism in Palestine
- failure to protect Muslims from genocide during the Yugoslavian War
illegal intervention of NATO in Bosnia
the impeding invasion of Iraq in 2003

While these factors may appear disconnected, there is a common theme that joins them all, ‘radicalisation’ is described in each example as a response to the failure of government. As was briefly discussed in Chapter 2 (2.4), this has been explored by Przeworski in his book, *Democracy and the Market* (Przeworski, 1991). In his book, Przeworski proposes that revolutionary sentiment in a democracy will only be avoided if ‘losing under democracy [is] more attractive than a future under non-democratic alternatives’ (Przeworski, 1991, p. 33).

Each of the scenarios described above as likely to result in ‘radicalisation’ is a scenario where it is explicitly or implicitly argued that continuing under a pre-existing system of government will become less desirable as a result of some described circumstance. The politicians are, thus, in these examples, presenting themselves as knowing actors who are able to advise on what political decisions should be taken to avoid ‘radicalisation’.

While limited in terms of the amount of parliamentary debate that is covered by looking at texts containing such an infrequently used word as ‘radicalisation’, the analysis above does reveal something of the different genres that politicians represent themselves in. In the earliest texts, ‘radicalisation’ is universally described as the call for political change that is to be expected in the face of undesired political strategy, either changes to employment rights at home or military intervention abroad. In all cases, politicians present themselves as knowing actors whose local sources or innate predictive powers enable them to foresee the negative repercussions of policy. By the final quote, the political genre has changed, Triesman does not present himself as a knowing actor. Rather, he presents ‘radicalisation’ as an unquestioned threat that should be tackled by the expansion of policy. In asserting this, it could be argued that Triesman is presenting the much-critiqued genre of New Labour, a managerial genre that by using spin and assertion rather than substance ‘discourages dialogue and debate’ (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 386). Tresiman’s contribution is a textbook example of the New Labour genre that Fairclough describes in his book, *New Labour, New Language?* (N. Fairclough, 2000b).

Every record of ‘radicalisation’ in UK parliamentary debates from before March 2005 has been reproduced and discussed in the preceding pages. This is made possible by the infrequency that this now common word has been used in the thirty years since it first appeared in Parliament in 1975. During these first thirty years, ‘radicalisation’ is recorded on average less than once every two years. The texts that are explored show a shift in the usage of ‘radicalisation’ over this time. Initially, ‘radicalisation’ is connected to the left-wing of British politics, either employed as a warning by Conservative politicians who represent it as an implicit threat or by Labour politicians who use the threat of ‘radicalisation’ as an argument against Conservative, counter-terrorism or military policies; even at the risk of losing votes for
their own party. ‘Radicalisation’ as defined in these debates tends to fall into two categories in debates before 2005. Where employed by Conservative politicians, ‘radicalisation’ often refers to an Orientalist phenomenon that emerges from ‘Islamic ideology’ while other references to ‘radicalisation’ refer to a response to failures of government.

As a harbinger to debates on the Iraq War that will become ever more heated two decades later, ‘radicalisation’ is used in reference to American intervention in the Iran-Iraq War in 1984 and this is also the first time that it is connected to a threat of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. It is only after the tragic and symbolic acts of 9/11 that ‘radicalisation’ is recorded as being used to refer to a phenomenon or process that might affect Muslims who live in Britain and, within 2 years of this, strategies to prevent ‘radicalisation’ are recorded as being discussed in Parliament. While the Hansard Corpus does not extend beyond this time, March 2005, a search of the records of parliamentary debates that are held by Hansard indicate that the discussion of ‘radicalisation’ and strategies to prevent ‘radicalisation’ subsequently become more common in Parliament; for example, ‘radicalisation’ appears 144 times in the parliamentary record for 2016. While the arrangement and search functions of the databases of recent parliamentary records mean that they are not directly comparable to the Hansard Corpus, this certainly represents a dramatic increase in usage.

Critiquing the usage of ‘radicalisation’ in this thesis is not based on an assumption that the phenomenon that it describes is illusory. Rather, my critique follows that of Baroness Anelay of St Johns in 2005 when she warned that laws attempting to prevent ‘radicalisation’ will result in a sense of injustice that ‘could completely negate’ the well-meaning efforts behind their creation.

4.3.2. ‘Extremism’

While it was possible to reproduce the actual texts of each time that ‘radicalisation’ is recorded in the parliamentary record before 2005 when its usage dramatically increases, ‘extremism’ appears 990 times in the parliamentary record between its first appearance in 1919 and the point at which the Hansard Corpus ends in 2005. This is too frequently for the scope of this thesis to attempt to refer to every occurrence. As such, all occurrences of ‘extremism’ in the parliamentary record before 2005 have been read and this results in the interdiscursive emergence of different genres and styles in relation to ‘extremism’ being identified. These changes are reviewed below, with reference to specific examples of texts in which they are represented. The texts are presented chronologically within each section but, as in the preceding section, the times at which the different genres and styles appear inevitably overlap. Some of the genres and styles explored are similar to those described for ‘radicalisation’ but the greater frequency of ‘extremism’ in the corpus enables a geographical trend for the application of ‘extremism’ to also be explored.
‘Extremism’ and The British Empire

‘Extremism’ is frequently used in reference to the break-up of the British Empire and the quotes that follow have been selected as they are indicative of the usage of ‘extremism’ in reference to the loss of British colonies in India, the Middle East, throughout Africa and, finally, closer to home in Northern Ireland. The application of ‘extremism’ from far off territories and towards the UK shows how the word may have enabled an Orientalist view to slowly creep from the remote Orient and onto the population at home.

India

The first reference to ‘extremism’ in the parliamentary record is recorded as being made by Mr Thomas Gibson Carmichael, Former Liberal MP and Member of the House of Lords, in a House of Lords debate on The Government of India Bill on 12th December 1919,

I am in sympathy— more, perhaps, than most who have been in India— with views which are looked upon as somewhat extreme: I am going further to admit that possibly in the definition of what views were extreme and what were moderate: I would go further in the direction of extremism than a great many of my friends would in saying that certain views were moderate: We have all been younger than we now are: Some of us have modified our views— I know I have— on many points; and as we grow older I think we learn a certain amount of sense: One thing which, perhaps, people in this country forget is that in India those who take an interest in politics are on the whole younger than the men who take an interest in politics here

Carmichael attempts to understand and explain what he refers to as ‘extremism’. ‘Extremism’ is a position that he is sympathetic to. ‘Extremism’ is relative and is a position that he appreciates others might view him as having adopted, a view that some might even see as ‘moderate’. ‘Extremism’ is a position that many, including Carmichael himself, will have adopted in their youth. In this sense, he suggests, that the emergence of ‘extremism’ in India under colonial rule is understandable. However, in his final assertion that those interested in politics in India are ‘younger than the men who take an interest in politics here’, he undermines his preceding proclamation of understanding. His arguments that he understands and appreciates ‘extremism’, that he has even moderated his previously ‘extreme’ views, serve to present him in a reasonable and informed position from which he is then able to cast the politics of Indians as youthful exuberance. In doing so, Carmichael undermines his proposed understanding, and thus the possibility that he might respond to the real concerns that have led to the emergence of the ‘extremism’ that he refers to.

Sudan

Four years later in a House of Lords debate about the Foreign Office on 10th July 1924, Viscount Turnour, like Carmichael above, is recorded as attempting to describe the causes of ‘extremism’. His contribution is of note because it is the first example of ‘Islamic extremism’ in
the parliamentary record, a phrase that does not reappear until seventy years later in 1995. Turnour, like Carmichael, recognises the supposed causes of 'extremism' but also uses the word to cast an Orientalist lens onto Muslims, who Turnour refers to as 'Mohammedan',

It was undoubtedly the fact that the Englishmen who worked under the Turko-Egyptian Government in the Sudan at that time did all that they could to improve conditions, but unfortunately they met with very little success: Finally came the appalling catastrophe of the Mahdist revolt: I do not think there is any question as to what were the main reasons for that revolt: It was not merely a fanatical outburst of Islamic extremism, because governors and governed were Mohammedan people: It was; here there will be no difference of opinion—a Sudan national rising against the gross misgovernment of the Sudan by Egypt, and the latter's exploitation of the slave trade.

While Turnour recognises ‘the gross misgovernment of the Sudan by Egypt, and the latter's exploitation of the slave trade’ as a real cause of the ‘extremism’ of ‘the Mahdist revolt’, he takes care to note that Englishmen ‘did all that they could to improve conditions’. Without making any judgement of the veracity of this claim that the ‘Englishmen’ were implicitly better for Sudan than the stated ‘misgovernment’ of the region by ‘the Turko-Egyptian government’, this claim sets the ‘Englishmen’ as superior to ‘the Turko-Egyptian government’. A claim that is aligned with Hochschild’s suggestion that an awareness of the ‘Arab’ slave trade in east Africa was promoted at the time to deflect public scrutiny from colonialist expansion in west and central Africa (Hochschild, 1998). By describing this generative mechanism for the emergence of ‘extremism’ while specifically absenting the emergence of a mechanism from the actions of his countrymen, Turnour uses ‘extremism’ to argue for the superiority of ‘Englishmen’ and the inferiority of the ‘Turko-Egyptian government’ of the area. Thus, though Turnour does explore the causes of ‘extremism’ he also uses it to promote the superiority of ‘Englishmen’ over ‘Mohammedan people’. This perspective is supported by the statement that ‘the Mahdist revolt’ is ‘not merely a fanatical outburst of Islamic extremism’ which works to simultaneously promote and diffuse an Orientalist perspective. Turnour is indicating that he recognises such a thing as ‘Islamic extremism’ and that it might act as a generative mechanism or cause of other ‘revolts’. However, that it is ‘not merely’ a fanatical outburst of Islamic extremism’ (emphasis added) indicates that, at least in the instance that he describes here, the ‘Mahdist revolt’ of the ‘Mohammedan people’ is grounded in an ontology other than the phenomenon of ‘fanatical…Islamic extremism’. The recognition of both ‘Islamic extremism’ and other causes of ‘the Mahdist revolt’ reveals that, Turnour is using ‘extremism’ to cast Orientalist aspersions and to explore other causes of ‘the Mahdist revolt’. Both the words ‘Mohammedan[ism] and ‘Mahdist’ are explored by Said (1978) for their capacity to situate the
western scholar outside of and superior to Islam (Said, 1978, pp. 280-281). Their use in the text described above is, thus, in line with Said’s analysis of Orientalism.

Palestine
Reference to ‘extremism’ in India is found throughout the parliamentary record and increases through the 1930s when it is also accompanied by the citing of ‘extremism’ in reference to Palestine, reference to which continues into the 1940s. The following contribution from Lieut-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, Conservative MP for Hitchin, from the middle of this period, on 21st July 1937, is made notable by the extent to which he attempts to explore the ontology of extremism.

The Government are being urged by Members opposite and by the Royal Commission to resume what we may call strong Government in Palestine—further measures against the Press and against anybody who attempts to disturb the public peace. I see from the “Times” that the Mufti of Jerusalem is in trouble again, and there seems a likelihood that it may be decided to arrest him. I am far from wishing to interfere with the discretion of the Government and its representatives on the spot, but I suggest that there is still time for a brief respite, a locus penitentiae, before we make what is already a very difficult situation perhaps almost incurable by arresting a leader of one side. I say this with reluctance, but I have had the responsibility myself in such a case. I have had a revolution on my hands and have been compelled to arrest and deport ring-leaders who through their extremism had made any moderate expression of opinion dangerous, if not impossible; but I did not find those measures to be, in general, successful. Discontent that is based on sentiment and race is hydra-headed, and little as we have reason to admire the statesmanship or moderation shown by the Mufti of Jerusalem in the past, he is a recognised leader, and I hope His Majesty’s Government will go all the way possible to find some via media short of his arrest and removal.

In this contribution, Wilson is recognising that ‘extremism’ might emerge from repressive actions of the state and this leads him to argue for restraint from the British colonial administration. This analysis is closely aligned with that made by this thesis, that excessive imposition of state power via counter-extremism measures may result in the promotion of the violence that these measures intend to address. It is also of note that the quote above is coming from a military figure, someone who might be expected to propose more draconian measures rather than calling for restraint. As Mackinlay explored in his book, The Insurgent Archipelago, that has been cited in Chapter 1 (1.3), the emergence of the PREVENT Strategy and counter-extremism more generally occurred as responsibility for counter-terrorism moved from the military and into the civil service (Mackinlay, 2009). The transfer of this responsibility has resulted in Mackinley suggesting that the experience of the military in counter-terrorism from before 9/11 had been lost, with the result that OSCT,
did not have the experience to understand that a campaign, which narrowly focusses on the terrorist, tends to obstruct the engagement of the population who are probably supporting the adversary and are therefore the main source of their regenerating capability. (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 235)

This is a particularly important factor in UK counter-terrorism strategy as it means that the extensive knowledge that was generated from decades of military activity in Northern Ireland during the Troubles has been lost. In my own research and advocacy, I have spoken to military officials who served in Northern Ireland during the Troubles and they have universally shown an appreciation of the argument that repressive counter-extremism measures might be counter-productive, an understanding that has been lacking in my interactions with civil servants working in this area. Wilson’s contribution to the parliamentary record, thus, highlights the importance that policy is informed by past successes and failures.

Africa
The first reference to ‘extremism’ from the 1950s appears in a debate on colonial affairs from 12th July 1952 when Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Conservative MP for Wirral, presages 20 years of repeated parliamentary reference to ‘extremism’ in Africa when he says,

> There were doubts whether they were ready for Western democracy in its fullest form. It was said of one side that either we ought to stay and govern firmly or else it would be better to go.

> Another comment was, "Why do you let this small group of extremists dominate the situation?" There was a feeling that we had lost interest; that we were defeatists about retaining our connection with West Africa, and that we were about to make a quick departure in the same way as we had gone from India or Burma. I think it is vital that we should disprove that attitude of mind. We must not allow a small group of extremists to poison the relations between Britain and the Nigerian peoples. I say "peoples" advisedly, because the Right hon. Gentleman knows there is no such thing as a Nigerian people. It is a concatenation of a considerable number of different peoples.

> How are we to deal with this disquiet? I suggest that the first matter to be dealt with is the apparent success of extremism. There is a great feeling that if the extremists shout loud enough they get something. If a time-table laid down.

> I think it is very important that any time schedule for constitutional development should be adhered to.

By asking if ‘they were ready for Western democracy’ without questioning the appropriateness of the UK imposing a system of government on another region, that by Lloyd’s admission is ‘a concatenation of a considerable number of different peoples’, Lloyd removes agency from
those governed and assumes the right of the British to impose a system of government. This non-critical engagement in colonial rule sets the tone of debate on ‘extremism’ in Africa for the next 20 years of parliamentary debate that is explored below. The notion of imposing ‘Western democracy’ on a foreign region also reveals an earlier expression of a political genre that will become a repeated justification for the post-9/11 so-called War on Terror 60 years later when US President George Bush Jnr infamously makes reference to exporting democracy to Iraq and elsewhere around the world (Bush, 2003).

Running through Lloyd’s contribution is an implicit assertion that the British ought to be governing the region that he refers to, reinforcing Lloyd’s Orientalist superiority. The lack of recognition of the causes of ‘extremism’ other than the circular process of encouraging more ‘extremism’ by allowing the ‘extremists’ who ‘shout loud enough’ to ‘get something’ adds to this Orientalist perspective. By citing this circular ontology, Lloyd is failing to seek any further causes of ‘extremism’.

The partial analysis of the causes of extremism that Lloyd offers continues through the parliamentary record from the 1950s and 60s and is further demonstrated by two records from 1960. On 28th March 1960, the Earl of Home, later to be Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home, is recorded in a House of Lords debate on Kenya,

My Lords, how does one outlaw extremism, whether it be the extremism of the European in the South or that of the African Congress in the North—by decree, by law? Surely the best way is to enlist the moderate, sensible, constructive Africans and Europeans who both recognise that each in Africa is indispensable to the successful and prosperous future of the other.

Like many of his fellow peers and politicians cited above, Earl Home is recognising the need for restraint in government to avoid the inadvertent promotion of ‘extremism’ by attempts to control it. However, rather than going on to propose that the root causes of anti-colonialist movements – by definition, colonialism itself - be addressed, he proposes the co-opting of ‘moderate, sensible, constructive Africans and Europeans’. By proposing this solution, Earl Home is suggesting that ideology, in its second (positive) connotation - as political standpoints that are consciously derived from social theory (see chapter 2.7) – is both the cause of and solution to ‘extremism’ in Africa. Thus, while he recognises that ‘extremism’ might emerge from attempts to outlaw it, he does not attempt to seek out and address its root causes.

Earl Home’s partial recognition of the causes of extremism is repeated later in the same year on 4th July 1960 when Viscount Hinchingbrooke, Conservative MP for South Dorset, says in a debate on The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference,

This great concourse of nations, the British Commonwealth, has no future at all in a turbulent world unless it is based upon compassion, tolerance and compromise. In the last few months I
have been very shocked to listen to speeches from hon. Members opposite and to read articles in the Press pleading the merits and cause of black Africa, come what may, and showing a great passion for extremism and for a fierce pace of change. I have wondered whether the results of all these things would not be directed in the end towards tearing the British Commonwealth apart.

In calling for ‘compassion, tolerance and compromise’, Hinchingbrooke is aligned with the calls for restraint from Earl Home and from Lieut-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson that are explored above. However, he discounts the ‘merits and cause of black Africa’ as associated with ‘a great passion for extremism’. Not only is he using ‘extremism’ to demean the cause for African self-government, he is also labelling it as a ‘passion’ and reveals that his initially called for ‘compassion, tolerance and compromise’ is not extended to ‘black Africa’. Hinchingbrooke is dismissing the ‘cause of black Africa’ as secondary to the British Commonwealth. In doing so, he is casting African calls for self-government as irrational and this enables him to dismiss them.

Throughout the preceding quotes that relate ‘extremism’ to opposition to British colonial rule in Africa, there is a position that is implicit and yet is never justified. This unjustified and implicit position is that British rule in Africa should persist. While this position may seem unacceptable by current standards, this ‘taken-for-granted routine privileging of white interests that goes unremarked in the political mainstream’ (Gillborn, 2005) is – according to critical race theory – to be expected. Thus, this outdated and racist conception of ‘extremism’ may have much in common with the current usage described in this thesis.

**Northern Ireland**

By the late 1960s, references to ‘extremism’ in Northern Ireland dramatically increase and make up the majority of references from this time. The following example of this comes from a debate on the Ulster Defence Regiment on 19th November 1969 when Roy Hattersley, Labour MP for Birmingham Sparkbrook, is recorded as saying,

> My hon: Friends who seems [sic] to criticise the very principle of agreement should not do so on the basis that by co-operating with the Government of Stormont we are co-operating with some sort of Ulster extremism: Nothing could be further from the truth: The genuine voice of Ulster extremism was heard in the House this afternoon when the hon: and learned Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham) described the Defence Regiment as a potential hotbed for I:R:A: infiltration: That was the genuine voice of extremism in Ulster:

In this contribution, Hattersley is re-appropriating the language of his opponents. Responding to calls that he is engaging in ‘extremism’, he turns the word on his opponents and recasts them as the ‘extremists’. While, from a Lakoffian perspective, this might be an unwise tactic in repeating the language used to attack him and reinforcing the opposing argument (Lakoff,
In doing this, Hattersley could be seen as reframing the debate and might be revealing a rhetorical device to argue against accusations of ‘extremism’. However, the arguments put forward in this thesis and which are explored in the next chapter might suggest that ‘extremism’, even in this usage, makes an unhelpful contribution to any political debate.

One month later, the formation of the establishment of an Ulster Defence Regiment is again discussed in Parliament when, on 15th December 1969, Lord Winterbottom, Labour peer, is recorded as saying the following during a debate in the House of Lords,

For it is not by this Bill alone, my Lords, that life and meaning will be given to the Ulster Defence Regiment: Parliament may provide the authority, the Government establish the framework; but it is the people of Northern Ireland themselves who must bring this Regiment to life: They alone can make it, as I am confident every one of your Lordships desires, truly part of the British Army: a symbol of resistance to extremism of communal harmony in Northern Ireland, and of the wider unity of the United Kingdom

This contribution is notable as, unlike those explored above, military force is proposed as a response to ‘extremism’; an approach that earlier contributions suggested had failed elsewhere and had, thus, argued against.

In the preceding sections, the proliferation of the word ‘extremism’ to Orientalise political machinations in response to the break-up of the British Empire reveals a progressive application of the term ever closer to home, from the further reaches of the Empire to Northern Ireland. It might be suggested that this progression home has since continued with the recent application of ‘extremism’ being used to describe British Muslims, as is described in Chapter 1. This recent Orientalisation of sections of the British population has been enabled by referring to ‘extremism’ amongst British Muslims via the emergence of a discourse on ‘Islamic extremism’ in the 1990s. This is discussed below and can be seen as a significant step in the development of RadEx.

Islamic Extremism
On 23rd February 1995, Lady Olga Maitland makes the first reference to ‘Islamic extremism’ in the parliamentary record since 1920 when she is recorded as saying the following during a House of Lords debate on the army,

Paul Beaver, who is well known for his work with Jane’s Defence Weekly, in a presentation in the House some weeks ago, identified 44 flash points in areas of British concern for this year. He pointed to the new fighting in regional and ethnic conflicts, the continued regional and ethnic conflicts in former colonies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise in Islamic extremism and the threats to our trade routes.
The nominalisation of ‘extremism’ (in this instance, ‘Islamic extremism’) like many of the preceding examples, hides real mechanisms that are generating the concerns that the speakers are purporting to address. But, while bringing Islam into the discourse separates Maitland’s quote from most of those discussed above, by implying an underlying cause for ‘extremism’, it is similar in nominalising ‘Islamic extremism’. In doing so, Maitland names a single cause for ‘extremism’, Islam, yet still this hides further possible causes.

Later in the same year on 7th November 1995 in a House of Lords debate on Sudanese Human Rights, The Lord Bishop of Southwark says,

My Lords, do Her Majesty’s Government recognise that the continuing extreme poverty of a great many Sudanese people—poverty recently seen by the Archbishop of Canterbury when he visited the area—can create a fertile seedbed for Islamic extremism? Can the Minister say whether the Government will allow non-governmental organisations to engage in development rather than just supplying emergency aid?

The Lord Bishop recognises ‘Islamic extremism’ as a product rooted in causes beyond its own religious ideology. Perhaps not surprising, coming from a religious figure who might be expected to defend against accusations that religion promotes violence. Depending on one’s perspective on religion, this could be seen as a naïve defence of unjustified religiosity or an understanding of the ‘true’ nature of faith. The possibility of these two perspectives, as revealed by the Lord Bishop, shows that it is possible that those who refer to ‘Islamic extremism’ could either be casting themselves as defenders or critics of religion. While Sedgwick (2010) was cited earlier for his call that ‘radicalisation’ should be used as a relative term (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479), this observation indicates that ‘extremism’ should be used as a relative term too.

A further cause of ‘Islamic extremism’ is recognised by Mr Raymond Jolliffe, cross bench hereditary peer, on 18th November 1999 when says in response to The Queen’s Speech,

If international humanitarian law is violated, all of us are affected: Even from a purely Russian perspective, the present course appears self-defeating: I say that because decimating the Chechens is sure to fan the flames of Islamic extremism: Already there are reports of fighters arriving from such countries as Afghanistan and Pakistan to help the Chechens

In recognising a cause of ‘Islamic extremism’, Jolliffe’s words are similar to those of the Lord Bishop cited above. All three references above are similar in referring to ‘Islamic extremism’ abroad. Though both the Bishop and Jolliffe endeavour to understand the causes of ‘Islamic extremism’, the parliamentary record as a whole reveals a somewhat Orientalist perspective in the application of ‘extremism’ to religion tending to be reserved for Islam. By searching the
parliamentary record, one can see that there are very few references to the ‘extremism’ of other religions; there is no reference to ‘Christian extremism’, ‘Hindu extremism’ and there is one reference to ‘Jewish extremism’, from Richard Crossman on 31st July 1946. There is also a notable absence of ‘secular extremism’ in the record. This absence of other religious and secular ‘extremisms’ in the record casts Islam as liable to ‘extremism’ and thus contributes to the creation of an Orientalist lens through which to view the British Muslim population.

On 24th September 2002, Nicholas Soames, Conservative MP for Mid-Sussex, further elaborates the potential causes for ‘Islamic extremism’ during a debate on Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction,

What the Arab world needs particularly—and if there is indeed as a result of these actions to be regime change in Iraq—is a model that works: a progressive Arab regime that by its very existence would create pressure and inspiration for a gradual democratisation and modernisation around the whole region. That would provide an engine to deal with the widespread poverty, ignorance, repression and humiliation that form the lethal cocktail driving Islamic extremism, especially among the young, and whose consequences remain such a terrible danger to us all.

We are living at a time when we cannot predict, as we did in the cold war, how the enemy will react or behave. We face a number of undetectable threats for which we will have no warning. Given what we know of the Iraqi regime and its weapons, and given the necessity to uphold the authority of the United Nations, we must press on and deal with this issue by acting and operating, as Britain always has, within the full authority of international law. This is no time for us to avoid the hard choices that have always placed Britain alongside her allies in doing what is Right and necessary.

In this contribution, Soames describes ‘Islamic extremism’ as a product of ‘poverty, ignorance, repression and humiliation’ and in doing so recognises causes for the phenomenon he describes. And, while these causes reveal an understanding of what might cause ‘Islamic extremism’, going some way to undermine the Orientalist lens, Soames use of ‘ignorance’ asserts his superiority over those who he describes. Having explored the possible causes of ‘Islamic extremism’, Soames goes on to say at the start of the next paragraph that, ‘We cannot predict…how the enemy will react’ and this is of interest from a Critical Realist perspective as it presents a TINA (there is no alternative) compromise formation. A TINA compromise formation, as is discussed in Chapter 1 (1.5) and 2 (2.5-7), is seen where someone’s ‘truth in practice [is] combined or held in tension with a falsity in theory’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. xxiii; Hartwig, 2007, p. 465). This is the case in what Soames is recorded as saying, as he first theorises the causes of ‘Islamic extremism’ before saying that we cannot predict how the same ‘enemy’ will react. In initially offering suggestions as to the causes of ‘Islamic extremism’, he
has already proposed that how the ‘enemy’ might react can be predicted. Thus, his ‘truth in practice’ reveals a falsity in the theory that he goes on to present. This TINA compromise formation will be explored in Chapter 5 as it reveals something of the fallacious foundations of both PREVENT and of counter-extremism more generally.

‘Extremism’, describing Leftism and nominalising opposition

Returning to earlier references to ‘extremism’ in the corpus, ‘Extremism’ first appears in the parliamentary record on 2nd August 1919 when Mr Henry Croft, Conservative MP for Christchurch, says,

And yet we have a member of the Cabinet who went to South Wales and settled the miners’ dispute in the manner I have indicated, with the result that immediately the extremists in the railway world and in the transport world said, "Oh, but the leaders in South Wales, by exercising pressure, have managed to get out of the Government all, or very nearly all, they desire, and you, our leaders, on account of the War, have let the opportunity go by". That was putting a premium on extremism. I hope the Government will not interfere in disputes in the first place again, that we shall not have the Prime Minister going from his task in the Cabinet as a strike conciliator, and that he will not be called in to settle all these disputes over the head of industry.

In this first record, ‘extremism’ is being used to describe the ideology of those who are demanding workers’ Rights for miners and railway and transport workers. Ideology in this sense is, as was described in the introduction, employed in its second, positive, conception; to describe consciously chosen political standpoints. ‘Extremism’ is, thus, described by Croft as akin to socialism or conservatism, though an important distinction should be drawn between these words and ‘extremism’. ‘Extremism’ is also ‘extreme’ and is, as such, when viewed from a normative position, a pejorative term. ‘Extremism’ is described by Oxford Dictionaries as ‘The holding of extreme political or religious views; fanaticism’. And, the dictionary’s example of ‘extremism’ used in a sentence is given as ‘the dangers of religious extremism’. To avoid the conflation of the call for workers’ rights with other political and religious ‘extremism’, Croft could have used any number of terms such as ‘leftism’ or ‘trade unionism’ to describe this political stance. However, to do so would have recognised this as a consciously chosen political position and, in doing so, Croft would have offered more validation than he does of ‘extremism’s’ position on the spectrum of normal politics. To refer to ‘extremism’ as Croft does essentialises this relative political stance. While this works in his political favour by demeaning calls for workers’ rights, he is using ‘extremism’ in a way that Sedgwick would later warn against (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479).

By casting the political position of advocates for workers’ Rights as ‘extremism’, Croft is employing the word as a rhetorical tool to argue against political change. He goes further in his argument by suggesting that negotiating with ‘the leaders in South Wales’ will encourage
others. This is an argument familiar to an audience 100 years later in the Government’s oft repeated assertion that they ‘do not negotiate with terrorists’ for similar reasons (Comments, 2004; Telegraph, 2004; Watts, 2015). Croft’s ‘leaders’ are, presumably, union leaders and it is notable that they are not named as such for to do so would undermine the argument that they are to be ignored as simply being ‘extremists’. Croft’s suggestion that the government agreeing to the demands of ‘extremists’ will encourage others shows that he recognises an ontology for ‘extremism’. However, this ontology is circular in ‘extremism’ being derived from ‘extremism’ and Croft thus fails to explore its underlying causes. In suggesting a singular ontology for ‘extremism’ in the government submitting to the demands of ‘extremists’, Croft’s contribution is similar to that from Selwyn Lloyd that is explored in the preceding pages.

5 years later, on 24th April 1924, John (Walton) Newbold, Communist MP for Motherwell, is similar to Croft in using ‘extremism’ to describe revolutionary left-wing politics. However, while Crofts fails to explore the causes of ‘extremism’, Newbold is explicit in his description of these causes when he says that,

architecturally, and from the sanitary position, Motherwell is a blight upon the landscape, which has produced the condition of affairs that presented me to this House: I am clearly aware that that is the explanation of the extremism which is manifested in the County of Lanark: … the proportion of people living more than two to a room was 70:1 per cent; more than three to a room.

This presents a deeper exploration of the causes of ‘extremism’ than Croft presents as he is describing ‘extremism’ as a product of, or a revolt against, poor social conditions. In doing so, Newbold shows an attempt to understand the deeper causes of ‘extremism’ than Croft.

Two years later, ‘extremism’ is again used to describe left-wing politics, this time by Conservative Prime Minister, Mr Stanley Baldwin, when he says on 8th December 1926,

The great difficulty the Labour party is faced with is that they are on the horns of a perpetual dilemma— an obvious dilemma and a difficult one from which to extricate themselves: They can either throw in their lot with extremism and stir up industrial unrest, or they can cut loose from it.

Though a Conservative politician, Baldwin is describing a debate that would emerge within the Labour party with the rise of New Labour almost a century later. The New Labour position has been described by Fairclough as using spin, polling data and management strategy to be in power rather than to argue for change as effective opposition (N. Fairclough, 2000b, 2010). Political theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have described the other, effective opposition, position proposed by Baldwin in their earlier suggestion that it is the very essence of a socialist movement to be in opposition, a position that some have said the Labour party
has recently returned to (Guardian, 2016). The internal party debates over the role of the Labour Party and their aspiration to be in power or to be effective opposition have tended not to use the word ‘extremism’, perhaps because it would cast negative aspirations within their own ranks. There is one notable exception to this usage by Labour MPs and this is in the maiden speech of Tony Blair MP that is discussed on the following pages. However, Baldwin, as a Conservative politician, uses it not only as a descriptor of this conflict within the Labour Party that would be ongoing 80 years later but as a means of denigrating political standpoints that are in opposition to his Conservative agenda.

Another word used to denigrate political standpoints, in this instance for those related to a single city, is ‘Birminghamism’. ‘Birminghamism’ only appears in a single debate in the parliamentary record but is of note to the research carried out here as it is described as being ‘always distinguished for its extremism’ by Mr Frank Owen, Liberal MP for Hereford, in a debate on 4th November 1930,

Birminghamism was always distinguished for its extremism and Birmingham and Birminghamism have been true to type in this case. Smethwick and Aston have been true to type; and Birminghamism, more rampant and more virulent than ever, has been let loose upon this country.

This quote is of interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, ‘Birminghamism’, like ‘extremism’, is being used as a rhetorical tool to nominalise social and political processes in Birmingham, and in doing so, to obfuscate agency and responsibility. In this instance, presenting ‘Birminghamism’ as a phenomenon disconnected from any cause - only connected, by name, to the city from which it emerges - the agency and responsibility of the people of Birmingham is being removed from the conditions in which they live. In this sense, ‘Birminghamism’ presents an Orientalist view of the people of Birmingham who are seen as disconnected from the social conditions from which they and their politics emerges. Added to this, ‘Birminghamism’ is described as ‘virulent’, a medicalised term that is used to indicate that this apparently disconnected ideology might spread like a virus through the population. Sian (2017) has recently cited Young in her discussions on PREVENT to suggest that ‘Such a lens limits us to seeing crime, deviance, and political violence as merely a pathology to be eradicated’. She suggests that such ‘Orientalist knowledge constructions’ limit the capacity for the political responses that would be required to reduce political violence (Sian, 2017, p. 7). This Orientalist view of Birmingham proposes a foreignness that it might be argued was catalysed by a focus on the city’s Muslim population 90 years later to produce the ‘Trojan Horse’ ‘scandal’ that was discussed in Chapter 1 (1.4).
The previously discussed conflict over the role of the Labour Party, to aspire to be in power or to be effective opposition, reappears on 16th September 1948 when Mr Douglas Jay, Labour MP for Battersea North is recorded as saying,

Nor, finally, can there be any doubt that it is just because we have achieved and maintained this measure of social justice in this country, and because the wage earners have confidence in the fair distribution of our national income, that extremism and Communism make no headway in this country. That is the real lesson of the past two years; and it seems to me something of which all British subjects, and indeed all democrats, might be proud. The hon. Member for South Edinburgh (Sir W. Darling) last night, speaking rather tragi-comically if I may say so, deplored the disappearance of various red patches from the map. He found this humiliating, and apparently took no pride in the achievements which I have tried to recall tonight. Quite frankly, I can feel only pity for anybody whose love of his country is so weak as not to feel pride in these solid achievements of the British people.

Jay is specific in describing ‘extremism’ as emerging from a lack of social justice. He ties it to Communism and, in doing so, he is describing ‘extremism’ as a version of leftism as in the preceding quotes. This quote is distinct from those above and is of interest because Jay actually rejects the notion that the Labour Party should aspire to power and appears to celebrate the loss of support for the Labour Party that he is a member of. Jay’s celebration is a particularly powerful example of the genre that, like Laclau and Mouffe (1985), presents the Labour Party as part of a socialist movement that ought to embrace being in opposition and prioritise change towards more social justice over an aspiration to be in power. The increasing social justice that Jay is celebrating is likely to be tied to the expansion of the welfare state after the second world war by the Labour Government of Clement Attlee. This genre within the Labour Party could be described as aiming to write itself out of politics. Taken to its logical conclusion, Jay’s aim is to achieve a utopia in which the resistance that is the foundation of the labour movement has no more injustice to resist, no more social justice to demand. This need to aspire to a utopia is aligned with Critical Realisms aspirations for a concrete utopia (Bhaskar, 2016a, 2016b). However, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Mouffe (2005) warn that the condition for the resistance of hegemony is the maintenance of antagonistic discourse in the political domain and this will be drawn on in the following chapters to interrogate the wisdom of Bhaskar’s call. This will indicate that the mechanism of agonistic political relationships that are described above might be an aspect of the concrete utopia that we might aspire to and is discussed in chapters 7, 8 and 9.

The explosion of ‘extremism’ in the mid-1970s

The corpus analysis carried out in the preceding chapter showed that the frequency that ‘extremism’ appears in the parliamentary record dramatically increased in the mid-1970s.
Looking at the history of the period helps to understand what might have caused this dramatic increase. While Sandbrook’s book, *Seasons in the Sun*, offers a history of 1974 to 1979, he explores the preceding historical context in the introduction to the book and this provides valuable context for the analysis of this period that he describes as

...a pivotal moment in our recent history. It opens on 4 March 1974, when the unprecedented economic and political crisis created by the OPEC oil shock, the three-day week and the collapse of the Heath government brought Labour’s Harold Wilson back to Downing Street as the head of a minority government. And it ends on May 1979, when, after an extraordinary series of strikes had ripped the heart out of Jim Callaghan’s administration, Margaret Thatcher walked into Number 10 as Britain’s first woman Prime Minister.

By any standard these were extraordinarily turbulent and colourful years: the years of the Social Contract and the IMF crisis, the Birmingham Bombings and the Balcombe Street siege, the Grunwick strike and the Lib-Lab Pact, the Bay City Rollers, the Sex Pistols and Ally’s Tartan Army. They culminated in the industrial unrest known as the Winter of Discontent, which, rightly or wrongly, became the most enduring symbol of the national experience of the 1970s...More than a quarter of a century later, Francis Wheen, who was 20 in 1977, wrote that the ‘defining characteristics of the Seventies were economic disaster, terrorist threats, corruption in high places, prophecies of global economic doom and fear of the surveillance state’s suffocating embrace’. (Sandbrook, 2013, p. xviii)

Sandbrook explores how the Conservative Party and right-wing media have since promoted a ‘caricature’ of the time through ‘haunting images of rubbish piling up in Leicester Square, railway station boards showing a list of cancellations and pickets gathering outside cancer wards’, images that ‘never went away’ (Sandbrook, 2013, p. xviii). This is a caricature that Sandbrook goes on to suggest does not fit with people’s ‘rather better memories of the decade’, nor does it fit with more official measures of the UK’s success,

Jobless figures were generally better than during the Blair and Brown years, let alone the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s...there were fewer strikes per year in Britain than in Canada, Australia or even the United States...most people were better off in 1979 than they had been in 1970. (Sandbrook, 2013, p. xix)

While Sandbrook presents a conflicted picture of what was happening in Britain in the 1970s, there is one certainty painted by him. The conflicting narratives that Sandbrook presents and which endure to this day reveal that the 1970s were a time of deep ideological division for Britain. A time that Sandbrook tells us, `saw the last gasp of an old collective working-class culture and the emergence of individualism as the dominant force in our political, economic and social life. Afterwards, nothing would be the same again’ (Sandbrook, 2013, p. xxi).
Thus, the increase in discussion of ‘extremism’ in the parliamentary record of the time might be attributed to many factors that stemmed from both ideological division within Parliament itself, to the very real ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and nationwide industrial unrest. Multiple examples of each of these factors can be found in the records from the 1970s within the corpus. Examples of texts related to each of these factors can be found throughout this section of the thesis (5.2). Depending on one’s political perspective, this industrial unrest could be seen as a triumph of the British worker against state and corporate power or, as in the *The Crisis of Democracy* (Crozier et al., 1975) that is explored above, as a failure of the state and corporate power to ‘impose discipline and sacrifice’ on the population (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 7). Or, combining these two perspectives, we might see this as a momentary triumph of the British worker before ‘discipline and sacrifice’ was imposed. Not surprisingly, the history that is often written of this time – a history which has been written from the perspective of the neoliberal ideology that underpins *The Crisis of Democracy* (Crozier et al., 1975; Lydon, 2017) - paints the last defeat of neoliberalism as a rather more gloomy time than Sandbrook suggests many remember.

**The hypernormalisation of ‘extremism’**

After the frequency of ‘extremism’ in the parliamentary record peaks in 1974 and 1975, there is a lull in usage until 18 days after the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. In a House of Commons debate on The Economy, Pay and Prices on 22nd May 1979, Denis Healey, MP for Leeds East, critiques Thatcher’s claiming of the ‘extreme centre’

> We are today concluding a debate which, by general consent, marks the biggest reversal of policy that any Government have undertaken for 50 years. The Right hon. Lady opened it last week by laying claim to a position on what she called the extreme centre. Her extremism is clear enough, but where is her centre? Her claim to represent the middle way is almost as bizarre as her choice of a quotation from St. Francis—the humble apostle of poverty and equality—to sanctify a doctrine that glories in the conviction that the only valid motive force for social and economic endeavour is naked materialism and selfish greed.

Healey’s critique of ‘naked materialism and selfish greed’ is aligned with Sandbrook’s observation that this was a time when individualism emerged as a dominant force. This is a time when Sandbrook tells us the Conservative party that was now in power ‘took a decisive step to the Right’ (Sandbrook, 2013, p. xxi). By casting herself in the contradictory position of the ‘extreme centre’, as Healey describes, Thatcher is presenting both a fallacious argument and a shrewd piece of political rhetoric. Her argument is fallacious because it is not logically consistent, one cannot be both extreme and hold the political centre ground, even though the very notion of the ‘centre’ is itself metaphorical (Lakoff, 2011, 2016). Thatcher’s rhetoric is ‘shrewd’ as it recasts her views, that might otherwise be seen as ‘extreme’, as in the centre
and in doing so, might be seen as moving the centre ground of UK politics. The process of moving the ‘political centre’, as may be the aim of Thatcher’s rhetoric has recently been elaborated by a very different politician in the address that Jeremy Corbyn MP, Leader of the Labour Party, made to the Party’s national conference 38 years later in 2017,

Conference, it is often said that elections can only be won from the centre ground. And in a way that’s not wrong – so long as it’s clear that the political centre of gravity isn’t fixed or unmovable, nor is it where the establishment pundits like to think it is. It shifts as people’s expectations and experiences change and political space is opened up. Today’s centre ground is certainly not where it was twenty or thirty years ago.

As well as a tactic to move the centre ground, the fallacious nature of Thatcher’s argument might also be seen as part of a tactic that Adam Curtis describes in his 2016 BBC documentary of the same name, Hypernormalisation.

‘Hypernormalisation’ is described by Curtis as the deliberate promotion of confusion as a political tactic, he argues that hypernormalisation is a tactic that has been used to ultimate effect by Donald Trump in his recent rise to become President of the United States (Curtis, 2016; Laybats & Tredinnick, 2016). Laybats & Tredinnick (2016) explore the aspect of Hypernormalisation that results in emotional responses taking on more meaning than traditional evidence, citing Michael Gove MP’s claim that ‘people in this country have had enough of experts’ as a prime example of this phenomenon (Curtis, 2016; Laybats & Tredinnick, 2016, p. 204; Sky News, 2016). It is, perhaps, not coincidental that Michael Gove MP was the politician at the centre of the ‘Trojan Horse’ ‘scandal’ that was explored in Chapter 1 (1.4), the since discredited allegations creating confusion that might be seen as having enabled the intervention of the security services into schools via the implementation the PREVENT Strategy.

In his earlier quote, Healey is attempting to attack Thatcher’s notion that she can be both ‘extreme’ and at the ‘centre’ of politics but in doing so, he not only repeats her notion of the ‘extreme centre’ but also rephrases it in saying, ‘Her extremism is clear enough, but where is her centre?’ In doing so, Healey is employing a style of argument that Lakoff tells us is likely to fail. As Lakoff tells us in his book, ‘Don’t think of an Elephant’, this phrase is sure to be ineffective if one is attempting to stop people from thinking of an elephant (Lakoff, 1990). By repeating and paraphrasing Thatcher, Healey is reiterating and, thus, promoting her assertion that her ‘extreme’ position that would later become known as ‘Thatcherism’ was, in fact, not ‘extreme’ at all. This appropriation and (hyper)normalisation of ‘extremism’ is the harbinger of the emergence of new usages of ‘extremism’ such as the ‘extremism’ of the Right which is now discussed.
Less than a year after Thatcher first presented her notion of the ‘extreme centre’ to Parliament, ‘extremism’ is used to describe a phenomenon that could be seen as the opposite of previous leftist connotations of the word when Mr John Lee, Liberal Democrat MP for Nelson and Colne, is recorded as saying in a debate on the Northern Region on 21st January 1980,

Rising unemployment in the regions, particularly where there is a significant minority community, provides fertile ground for extremism, whether of the Left or the Right: In Nelson and Colne within the past week we have for the first time been subjected to a considerable leafletting campaign by the National Front, which is a most unpleasant start to the 1980s.

Like many previous contributions to parliamentary debates, Lee refers to the emergence of left-wing politics from unemployment and a lack of social cohesion, but he also refers to the emergence of ‘extremism’ of the Right from the same societal conditions. By referring to ‘extremism’ of both the Left and the Right, we might see the metaphorical centre ground as remaining in the same place, but this would be wrong. It would be wrong because the, absence of reference to the phenomenon of emerging Right wing ‘extremism’ from earlier parliamentary discourse means that its emergence on the apparently ‘extreme’ Right of the metaphorical spectrum of British politics shifts the whole spectrum to the Right. This moves Thatcher’s position - that may have previously been ‘extreme’ - towards the centre.

As has been discussed in the preceding pages, the frequency with which extremism was used increased dramatically in the mid-1970s for a number of reasons; parliamentary division, paramilitary activity and political and industrial unrest. The political division seems to continue through the 1980s as Thatcher’s Government entrenched the ‘naked materialism and selfish greed’ that Healey described. This presents two mechanisms that may have caused the increase in frequency of usage of ‘extremism’ through the 1980s. Firstly, the ideological division that emerged in Parliament at this time and that resulted in MPs accusing each other of ‘extremism’, the divisions running so deep that even Labour MPs appear to speak out against ‘extremism’ in its leftist connotation, as exemplified by Tony Blair, Labour MP for Sedgefield and future Prime Minister, in the following contribution to a House of Commons debate on the Finance Bill from 6th July 1983 which is also his maiden speech to Parliament,

The constituency of Sedgefield is made up of such communities: The local Labour party grows out of, and is part of, local life: That is its strength: That is why my constituents are singularly unimpressed when told that the Labour party is extreme: They see extremism more as an import from outside that is destroying their livelihoods than as a characteristic of the party that is defending those livelihoods.

In one aspect, this contribution from Blair is similar to the quotes cited above. It is similar in aligning ‘extremism’ with leftism. It is different in this being a Labour MP describing ‘extremism’
as a threat to the Labour Party. ‘Extremism’ is also nominalised in this text. By being nominalised, it is denied human agency as it could be said that it is seen as a problem to be addressed rather than an indication of an underlying failure of government. The way in which this alters the genre of Labour politicians, promoting a legislative genre and the way in which this dramatically impacts the calculus of the UK Parliament will be explored in the next chapter. The term ‘calculus’ is used here to describe a theory of ongoing and dynamic change in Parliamentary discourse, something that it is claimed has been undermined by the semiotic changes described by RadEx.

By exploring the way that ‘extremism’ is employed to describe ‘leftism’, in this section the resolution of the generative mechanisms for both ‘extremism’ and for UK parliamentary discourse and politics more generally has been increased. Whether described by Conservative or Labour politicians, ‘extremism’ reveals a schism in understanding how the UK political system works. On one side, politics is seen as being fought in the metaphorical centre ground, with calls for reform of workers’ rights seen as representative of dangerous ‘extremism’. On the other side, ‘extremism’ is seen as a necessary threat against the erosion of equality and social justice. This second conception is best explicated by Mr Douglas Jay, Labour MP for Battersea North, on 16th September 1948 when he describes the loss of Labour votes because of actual political change to support social justice as a desirable outcome. Leftist Labour MPs, thus, present themselves as the ultimate pragmatists in arguing against their own potential to be in power to protect workers’ rights; a position that is not expressed by Tony Blair. This complexity demands that political change that is enacted in the UK Parliament is understood not through an analysis of individual arguments but through a theory of ongoing change – this will be henceforth referred to as ‘parliamentary calculus’. As Critical Realism is a philosophy that is interested in the exploration of an irregular ontology of real generative mechanisms, it lends itself to the development of such a theory and this will be elaborated in later chapters.

Absence
An important focus of Critical Realist research as is carried out here is absence, seen as particularly important as absence is a priori to presence (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 39). The absence of any reference to ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’ from two debates in Parliament is notable. On 14th September 2001, Parliament was recalled from summer recess to debate the ‘International Terrorism and Attacks in the USA’, attacks that were yet to be called ‘9/11’. Four years later, an emergency parliamentary debate on the ‘Incidents in London’ was convened on the same day as the bombings that would later take on similar symbolism and be referred to as 7/7. In both debates it is notable that the words ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ (or any other derivation such as 'extremist') are absent. Perhaps suggesting that the words had not
yet become linked to acts of terrorism, an observation that is supported by the News Corpus that is described in the first half of this chapter (5.1).

Another notable absence is the absence of discussion of the PREVENT Strategy in Parliament before 7th June 2011 when the strategy is discussed in a debate of the same name. This is the debate in which the revised version of PREVENT is presented to Parliament by the Coalition Government that had replaced the New Labour Government in 2010. The prior absence of any debate or reference to the PREVENT Strategy in Parliament indicates that the implementation of the earlier strategy, first discussed by the Cabinet Office of the New Labour Government in 2004 (Omand, 2004) and subsequently published in 2008, was not ever debated in Parliament. This is another example of the genre of New Labour that Fairclough describes as ‘discourag[ing] dialogue and debate’ (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 386). As explored in this section (5.2), there has been a consistent parliamentary discourse on the self-defeating nature of strategies to police dissent. It might therefore be supposed that PREVENT would have faced opposition in Parliament had New Labour allowed it to be debated.

4.3.3. Summary of Analysis of parliamentary texts 1900-2005
This second half of Chapter 4 (5.2) has explored the interdiscursive emergence of RadEx throughout the 20th century, as ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ became progressively more common in the parliamentary record. Analysing parliamentary texts containing both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ shows that a number of different genres have led to the current manifestation of RadEx and the emergence of strategies to counter ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. This heritage can be traced back to the ideological battlegrounds of the 1970s from which neoliberalism emerged, a time when both fears for global instability and ideological differences led to the explosion in usage of the words as was seen in the earlier corpus analysis (5.1). By reading all occurrences of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ from before 2005, it can be seen that these words are originally applied to political opposition to colonialism during the break-up of the British Empire in the early 20th Century, initially attributed to independence movements across Africa, then through the Middle East, before there are extensive discussions of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in Northern Ireland during the Troubles of the 1970s. As the language crept closer to home, the next place for it to be applied was on the British mainland and this is enabled by Parliament next discussing the ‘radicalisation’ of British Muslims, rhetoric that might be seen to have contributed to the emergence of strategies such as PREVENT. The subsequent expansion of these strategies to target many other forms of political opposition, including environmental protesters (NETPOL, 2018), will be discussed in the next chapter. Finally, absence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ from parliamentary discourse in the immediate aftermaths of 9/11 and 7/7 indicates that their current discursive connection to acts of terrorism is a new phenomenon, as was also indicated by the media corpus in the first half of this chapter (5.1). It should not
be seen as coincidental that strategy to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ emerged under the New Labour Government of Tony Blair; nominalisation is described by Fairclough as a defining characteristic of the ‘new language’ of ‘New Labour’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b, pp. 25-28) and, by enabling ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ to be legislated against, may have contributed to the increasing usage of both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Throughout the 20th century, ‘radicalisation’ was described as resulting from failure of government but nominalisation has ultimately led to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ now being described as causes of violence, resulting in policy that is targeted at them failing to address a deeper ontology for political violence.

In the next chapter, the causes and impacts of the emergence of RadEx will be theorised before the final research question - can and should RadEx be contested? - is explored in the final three chapters.
Chapter 5 - Defining and Resolving the Problem

5.1. The Problem
Consider whether the social order (network of practice) in a sense ‘needs’ the problem. Why if at all is the problem ‘needed’? What are the mechanisms (somehow) producing and reproducing it? The point here is to ask whether those who benefit most from the way social life is organised have an interest in the problem not being resolved.

RQ4. What are the causes and impacts of RadEx?

if we get our account…fundamentally wrong and do not correct our mistake, we are consequently forced into a series of endless theoretical and/or practical compromises. The upshot is a cumulative, emergent meshwork of figures and concepts that is incoherent and mystifying yet indispensable to our way of being. (Hartwig, 2007, pp. 465-466)

The changes that are described by RadEx – that result in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ being used to describe causes of violence rather than symptoms of failure of government – have the capacity to elicit changes in the dialectical relationships between genres, discourses and styles. A concrete example of this that was discussed in the introduction of this thesis is in my role as a teacher being recast by PREVENT to include the new and additional role of informant. A shift that became possible as a result of the discursive association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence that is precipitated by RadEx. This instance of change in genre was one of the phenomena that prompted me to carry out the work that has resulted in this thesis. Employing a Critical Realist frame, I aim to describe the discursive aspect of the generative mechanisms for this phenomenon. In this chapter, these mechanisms will be theorised from the analysis carried out in the previous chapter that described RadEx as a product of the end of the British Empire, as a product of nominalisation that is inherent in the ‘new language of New Labour’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b), and, as recently characterised by the progressive association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence. Fairclough’s ‘new language of New Labour’ – that he described nearly two decades ago - is seen as still relevant today as his description elaborates a neoliberal discourse that has since come to dominate politics, both in the United Kingdom and globally. As such, when this discourse is critiqued in the following chapters, this critique might be applied to both the ‘new language of New Labour’ and to neoliberalism more generally.

As was explored in the previous chapter, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ tended to be referred to as the products of failure of government in UK parliamentary texts before the new language of New Labour but have since changed to describe causes of violence and this has
had the potential to undermine the previously explored parliamentary calculus. That is to say that before this change or nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, the words tended to be used by left-wing politicians as warnings against what might happen if the government of the day were to persist with or enact an oppressive policy. That the right-wing politicians who were warned also repeated the warnings to their own party suggests that the warnings were heeded and that they might have resulted in the moderation of policy. This is a process that would have inevitably been undermined by the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as they came to describe abstract threats, resulting in their underlying causes being obscured. The inevitability of the subsequent association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence will be discussed below as attempts are made to describe the mechanisms that are producing and reproducing RadEx. The description of these mechanisms will address questions that are asked at stage 3 in the schema for CDA that this chapter aims to answer. Namely,

- Whether the social order (network of practice) in a sense ‘needs’ the problem?
- Why if at all is the problem ‘needed’?
- What are the mechanisms (somehow) producing and reproducing it?
- Do those who benefit most from the way social life is organised have an interest in the problem not being resolved?

That RadEx will promote violence becomes almost inevitable with the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Before they were nominalised, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ were addressed by resolving the failures of government that were perceived to have resulted in them. Having been nominalised to describe deagentified threats, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ became entities that the government was and is able to legislate against. A call for such legislation was seen in the quote from Mr David Triesman in the preceding chapter (5.2) when he called for the government to complete ‘the strategy on radicalisation’ in his contribution to Parliament on 9th March 2005.

Once the government targets ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, with the threat of the intervention of the security services, as is seen in both PREVENT (HM Government, 2008, 2011b) and in counter-terrorism strategy more generally (HM Government, 2015b), it becomes inevitable that those perceived to be ‘radical’ or ‘extreme’ will withdraw from engaging in debate that might result in them being labelled in the new violent connotation of the words. As was explored in chapter 2.5 with reference to the work of Alexander, Arendt, Buber, Derrida, Mouffe, and Przeworski, this suppression of debate not only undermines mechanisms by which violence might be avoided but also results in the inevitable promotion of violence. To the extent to which this promotion of violence is seen in those perceived to be ‘radical’ or
‘extreme’, the words are in turn likely to become further associated with or synonymous with violence. This process is elaborated later in this chapter.

5.1.1. Whether the social order (network of practice) in a sense ‘needs’ the problem?
The social order in the above question will be taken to mean the genre that calls politicians to legislate against ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and that casts teachers (and those in others civic roles such as doctors) as informants. This role is inferred within policy documentation by a duty that they have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government, 2015c, p. 2). However, such an inference or connection between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, the aforementioned genres and terrorism would not exist without the logic of RadEx that is intimately related to government agendas to counter violent extremism (CVE) and which Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2018) suggest offers a ‘unique selling point [in] the prevention of terrorism through interventions in “radicalisation processes”, before criminal conspiracy occurs (in the so-called “pre-criminal space”)’ (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2018, p. 1). Within the confines of this thesis that investigates the discursive aspect of the promotion of violence by counter-terrorism, RadEx will be taken to be the problem in the question above. It will be shown in this section that the problem (RadEx) has supported the appropriateness of politicians legislating against ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and of casting those in civic roles such as teachers and doctors as informants. The problems that emanate from these genres have already been discussed extensively in previous chapters and the ways in which these problems might be overcome will be discussed in the chapters that follow. Thus, the question asked in this section is if RadEx is required to maintain the legislative and informant genres that are critiqued? An expansion of this question might be, do ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ ‘need’ to be perceived as violent in order to maintain these genres? It is of note that ‘need’ is in quotation marks in Bhaskar’s original schema and this might be taken to show that the meaning of ‘need’ ought to be expanded to understand what it means in this context. ‘Need’ is problematic from a Critical Realist perspective as we might suppose that any social order or network of practices can – and will be – maintained by any number of generative mechanisms. Thus, expanding the question further, we are asking if RadEx is a significant or contributory factor in the maintenance of the genres? The ways in which RadEx might be countered and the extent to which this could undermine the genres in question will be explored in later sections and chapters.

To establish the significance of RadEx in maintaining the genres explored here, we might look for correlation between the emergence of RadEx and the emergence of the genres. However, as ever, correlation does not demonstrate causation and this will need to be established by theorisation as will be done in the following sections of this chapter. Thus, while not a demonstration of causation, the contemporaneous emergence of recent violent
The connotation of RadEx and the genres described above does support the suggestion that RadEx has contributed to the genre of policymakers to legislate against ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and the genre that casts teachers and doctors as informants. Henceforth, these genres will be referred to as the ‘legislative genre’ and the ‘informant genre’. The agenda of policymakers to legislate against ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ marks a transition from the previous genre in which politicians sought to avoid failure of government, so as to limit the emergence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. The new genre sees politicians seeking to legislate against ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and will therefore be referred to as ‘the legislative genre’. Correspondingly, as the nominalised usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as a threat is accepted, a genre in which teachers and doctors accept their role in informing on their students and patients becomes inevitable. This genre will be henceforth referred to as ‘the informant genre’.

So, having established that RadEx might have contributed to the emergence of these genres, the question of whether it was a significant contributory factor remains and leads us to question if these genres could have emerged in the absence of RadEx. As was explored in the preceding chapter, before ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ were nominalised, they were referred to as emergent from failure of government. Any political or legislative focus was, thus, on the failure of government rather than on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Without having been nominalised – as described by RadEx – it is not conceivable that legislation would have been focussed on them rather than on the failure of government and it is therefore reasonable to suggest that the legislative genre would not have emerged.

While the legislative genre resulted in the inferred duty that those working in civil spaces should have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015c, p. 2), it is not clear that such a duty would have led to the informant genre in the absence of RadEx and its association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence. This is quite apart from the fact that the legislative genre would not have emerged in the absence of RadEx and thus would not have imposed the informant genre. Heath-Kelly and Strausz refer to CVE being supported by a supposed understanding of “‘radicalisation processes’...(in the so-called “pre-criminal space”)’ (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2018, p. 1) and RadEx’s description of the progressive association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence shows how these processes may have been progressively justified in language. In section 6.3, the cycle that perpetuates this association of violence and language will be explored.
5.1.2. Why if at all is the problem ‘needed’?

As discussed above, ‘the problem’ describes RadEx. So, the question now being explored is why RadEx is ‘needed’. Expanding ‘needed’ further, why is RadEx a significant or contributory factor in the maintenance of the genres? This requires that we look to the political landscape from which RadEx has emerged and this might be achieved by returning to the analysis of the preceding chapter to explore why the different discourses explored contributed to RadEx.

In the analysis of the News Corpus, there is a pronounced increase in the usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in articles about acts of terrorism in 2005. Any acts of terrorism on the British mainland between 2000 and 2005 had been perpetrated by Irish republicans. The London bombings of 2005 differed in that they were motivated by objection to British foreign policy further afield. Prime Minister David Cameron would later claim that the bombings were caused by an ‘extremist ideology’ in his speech to the Munich Security Conference (Cameron, 2011) but both video left by the suicide bombers (BBC, 2005) and the former head of MI5 claim they were motivated by objection to British foreign policy (Manningham-Buller, 2010). Cameron’s repeated reference to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in his speech made in Munich demonstrate this speech’s emergence from and promotion of RadEx. Another aspect of the emergence of RadEx that has been explored above is nominalisation and having been nominalised, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are able to be used by David Cameron in this speech to describe ‘ideology’ that has caused violence. Thus, even in the face of the London 7/7 bombers speaking from beyond the grave in online videos to tell him that the cause of the bombings was foreign policy (BBC, 2005) – a position supported by the head of his internal intelligence service (Manningham-Buller, 2010) – the nominalisation results in the Prime Minister’s failure to address the causes of violence that could not have been more clearly stated. Having come to describe the causes of terrorism, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ can be seen to be associated with subsequent acts of terrorism throughout the rest of the News Corpus. That the 7/7 bombers were Muslim enabled an Orientalist perspective on them that was shown in chapter 4.2 to be associated with the progressive usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ to describe political opposition at the fringes of the diminishing British Empire. Originally applied to independence movements across Africa then throughout the Middle East, before discussions of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are applied to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. As the discourse crept closer to home, the next place for it to be applied was the British mainland and Parliament next discusses the ‘radicalisation’ of British Muslims. Thus, the discursive focus on ‘extremist ideology’ and ‘a process of radicalisation’ as seen in Cameron’s speech and in recent political discourse more generally might also be emergent from a colonialist discourse that can be traced back to the early 20th Century.
The nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is also emergent from the new language of New Labour (N. Fairclough, 2000b) and the analysis of the preceding chapter revealed that this aspect of the discourse corresponded with a shift in parliamentary calculus as the Left under New Labour gave up their role of perennial opposition. The pre-New Labour positioning of the Left in opposition is in line with Laclau and Mouffe’s exploration of _Hegemony and Socialist Strategy_ from their book of the same name (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In the more recent preface to the second edition of their book, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that there is ‘very little hope’ for the Left so long as they insist on ‘occupying the centre ground’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xix), suggesting that the success of the Left is dependent on them having ‘an adequate grasp of the nature of power relations and the dynamics of politics’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xix). It might be argued that the texts from before the nominalisation of RadEx and the emergence of the new language of New Labour showed that the Left did have ‘an adequate grasp of the nature of power relations and the dynamics of politics’. The nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, however, hides the nature of power relations and the dynamics of parliamentary politics and indicates that the Left have relinquished the hegemonic struggle. It was noted in the previous chapter that the leader’s speech to the Labour Party Conference in 2017 by Jeremy Corbyn MP might indicate Labour’s return to an appreciation of the dynamics of parliamentary politics and Laclau and Mouffe’s socialist strategy.

Fairclough suggests that New Labour was an attempt to ‘re-define a political programme that was neither old left nor 1980s right’ from the perspective of the ‘centre and centre left’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 150). Not only was this emergent from what Fairclough describes as ‘an international discourse of the ‘Third Way’, but, he also describes New Labour as seminal in the export of the Third Way to a global audience.

New labour has been instrumental in setting up a series of international “seminars” on the “Third Way”, attended not only by Blair and Clinton but also by leaders from other countries, including Brazil, Sweden, Italy, and more recently, Germany. (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 66)

As has been briefly explored in earlier chapters (2.7 and 3.5), the Third Way was developed by Giddens (Giddens & Pierson, 1998; Grice, 2002) and provided the philosophical foundations for New Labour and their claiming of the centre ground and abandoning of the perennial opposition that of Laclau and Mouffe describe. As was also explored earlier, the structuration model that underpins Gidden’s work fails to account for change over time. This might go some way to explaining why the new language of New Labour from which the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ emerged fails to account for the nature of power relations and the dynamics of parliamentary politics over time.
As was discussed towards the end of the preceding chapter, Fairclough describes another aspect of the genre of New Labour as ‘discourag[ing] dialogue and debate’ (N. Fairclough, 2010, p. 386). This is seen in the absence of any debate on PREVENT being held in Parliament under the New Labour Government (5.2) and this ensured that it was not submitted to the scrutiny of Parliament. Though the parliamentary calculus that might have challenged PREVENT over the potential repercussions of this oppressive policy was not recognised in the new language of New Labour, it may have been expressed within Parliament more generally. The lack of any debate ensured that such scrutiny was not faced by PREVENT under the New Labour Government that first created it. The nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ ensured that such scrutiny was limited, even when PREVENT was finally debated in Parliament after the formation of the Coalition Government in 2010.

Thus, in summary of why RadEx emerged, it may be seen to have become connected to British Muslims as a result of the London bombings of 2005. The connection emerging from a century’s old colonialist discourse that had migrated home via Northern Ireland and was applied to the mainland via a focus on British Muslims – enabling an Orientalist focus to progressively turn from the further reaches of the diminishing Empire and on to the home population. This shift was enabled by a focus on the British Muslim population that developed even though it was indicated that the bombings had more to do with British foreign policy than the perpetrators’ religious identity. Combined with the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ – a characteristic of the new language of New Labour – this resulted in the causes of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ being obscured, undermining the parliamentary calculus that had previously resulted in politicians of the Left and Right calling for a moderation of policy. This obfuscation of the causes of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is related to the hiding of change over time and may in turn be related to the philosophy of Giddens whose structuration model underpins the Third Way of New Labour (Giddens & Pierson, 1998; Grice, 2002). Giddens’ failure to account for change over time will be investigated towards the end of the next section for its contribution to the emergence of RadEx.

5.1.3. What are the mechanisms (somehow) producing and reproducing it?
To theorise the mechanisms producing and reproducing RadEx, the discourse and the violence that might emerge from it, we return to the semiotic triangle that was previously discussed in chapter 3.3. Bhaskar describes the semiotic triangle as the minimum theorisation required for ‘the intelligibility of language use and the possibility of meaning’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 402, 2016a, p. 34, 2016b, p. 64) and, in this section, it will form the foundations for a theoretical understanding of the emergence of RadEx. Initially, the semiotic triangle for RadEx when the words ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ had not been nominalised will be explored and this results in the following diagram.
In this formation, the previously discussed parliamentary calculus is intact. That is to say that, by being conceptualised as emergent from the failure of government, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ reinforce the need for effective government. In doing so, they restrict government failure as the government are deterred from the creation of oppressive policy by the risk that this might result in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism'. In turn, this restricts the emergence of the words and the phenomena that they describe. This was seen in the analysis of the preceding chapter where parliamentarians were shown to warn against oppressive government policy for the risk that it would foment ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism'. The effectiveness of this mechanism in restricting ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is supported by the corpus analysis that showed the words to be rare before they tended to be nominalised and showed a significant increase in their usage after their nominalisation became common practice.

This interrelationship between the words, concept and that which they refer to collapses when the words are nominalised. This occurs as the nominalisation results in the concepts ceasing to be seen as emergent and results in the following non-dynamic or ossified semiotic triangle.
By ceasing to be dynamic, the feedback loop that encouraged effective government and discouraged failure and the emergence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is ossified. This means that the calculus that restricted the emergence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is no longer effective. As the referent has been deagnetified, it ceases to be seen as emergent from failure of government so no longer acts as a threat against oppressive policy formation. It would therefore be expected that nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ will result in the proliferation of both the words and concepts, as was seen in the analysis of the preceding chapter.

While nominalisation might ossify the semiotic triangle for RadEx, the association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence might set up a new dynamic as is indicated in the following diagram (figure 25). It should be noted that the arrows – in only pointing in one direction – indicate a constant cycle of reinforcement, as opposed to the feedback loop of the first triangle above.
Figure 25: The vicious semiotic triangle of RadEx

In this version of the semiotic triangle, conceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as violent will have a number of effects:

- Subjects may retreat from the expression of views that might associate them with ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ for fear of being perceived as violent
- The perception of the violence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ will result in the state targeting them, as has been seen in the emergence of PREVENT

As has been explored in the introduction to this thesis, the targeting of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ by PREVENT has resulted in the silencing of debate for fear of being reported to the security services. This presents a mechanism by which the reconceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as violent will result in the silencing of debate and – as was discussed in chapter 2.5 – the silencing of debate undermines mechanisms by which peace is promoted in a democracy and might actually promote violence. Thus, as is also theorised in the diagram above, the referent – the political ideology referred to as ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ or the ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ person referred to - may then actually become violent, further catalysing the meanings towards violence. And, by the continuation of this process, RadEx has the capacity to foment the continued catalysation of violence.
The ossification of the semiotic triangle and the corresponding undermining of the parliamentary calculus that is precipitated by the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ may have made the third semiotic triangle that promoted violence inevitable. That is to say that the escalation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ becomes inevitable after their nominalisation for the feedback loop by which they were restricted has been removed. Having lost this feedback loop, the possibility of failure of government increases as the warning against oppressive policy that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ offered has been removed. Thus, there is an increase in the potential for conflict as more oppressive policy is enacted. Ironically and perhaps inevitably, the nadir of such policy at the time of writing is policy such as PREVENT that is aimed at preventing ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Thus, it may be that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ have precipitated violence; though, only as a result of the vicious cycle that was set up by their nominalisation.

While the above theorisation explains the causes of the increase in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ seen in the corpus analysis, it does not explain why the apparently well-established parliamentary calculus that was previously demonstrated by the usage of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was abandoned. An understanding of this might be achieved by exploring and critiquing the philosophical foundations of New Labour and their ‘new language’ from which recent manifestations of RadEx have emerged. As is discussed above, Giddens’ Structuration Theory underpins the approach of New Labour, and this approach has faced a number of criticisms from the perspective of Critical Realism. In chapter 2.7 it was described how Bhaskar did not initially recognise that there was a distinction between his and Giddens’ conception of society (Bhaskar, 2016b, p. 34). However, it is important that this distinction is explored here as Giddens’ Structuration Theory not only informs New Labour’s Third Way but also appears to inform Fairclough’s approach to CDA (N. Fairclough, 2013, pp. 182-183), the development of which is implicit to this thesis.

Bhaskar’s colleague, Margaret Archer, has explored the distinction between Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) and Giddens’ Structuration Theory in her book, \textit{Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach} (Archer, 1995). The main distinction that Archer makes between the two theories is around emergence. She proposes that, in a Critical Realist account of society, structure and agency are emergent from one another and are therefore anterior to one another. Structurationists, Archer tells us, reject emergence (Archer, 1995, p. 14) and she names their mutual constitution of structure and agency ‘elisionism’, also referring to structurationists ‘systemness’ of structure and agency as a singular social practice (Archer, 1995, pp. 96-97). Archer suggests that this singularity of structure and agency is incorrect and that they should be differentiated because of their distinct ‘properties and powers which only belong to each of them and whose emergence from one
another justifies their differentiation’ (Archer, 1995, p. 14). This leads her to describe ‘three differentia specifica’ between Critical Realist and Structurationist conceptions of society that are ‘denoted by the concept of emergence’ (the ‘strata’ that she refers to here are different strata of structure and agency):

- Properties and powers of some strata are anterior to those of others precisely because the latter emerge from the former over time, for emergence takes time since it derives from interaction and its consequences which necessarily occur in time;
- Once emergence has taken place the powers and properties defining and distinguishing strata have relative autonomy from one another;
- Such autonomous properties exert independent causal influences in their own right and it is the identification of these causal powers at work which validates their existence, for they may indeed be non-observables.

(Archer, 1995, p. 14)

Taking each ‘differentia specifica’ in turn to summarise Archer’s distinctions between Structuration theory and Critical Realism, Critical Realist theorisation takes account of change occurring over time, of the relative autonomy of structure and agency from one another and of both structure and agency having the property of exerting independent causal influences in their own right. Though Bhaskar says that he did not initially recognise these distinctions, specifically those related to time (Bhaskar, 2016b, p. 34), each can be appreciated in his theorisation of the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) which distinguishes between the agency of individuals and the structure of society, showing how each is distinct from but effects the other.

![Figure 26: Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (TSMA) (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 52, 2016b, p. 33)](image)

The TMSA might be seen as an approximation of the philosophical underpinnings of the previously explored parliamentary calculus around ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’; Parliamentarians that previously warned against oppressive policy, for it’s capacity to foment an ‘extreme’ response from the electorate, recognising the effect that they as individuals might have on the electorate (society in the TMSA) and that other individuals might have on them
as members of society. As Archer explores, implicit in this understanding of the emergence of agency is that these changes happen over time. Failure to appreciate this change over time, the elisionism of Structuration Theory that Archer describes (Archer, 1995, pp. 96-97), might have precipitated the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and the subsequent inevitable erosion of the parliamentary calculus around the use of the words. A recognition of these errors, a failure to recognise the emergence and relative autonomy and independent causal influence of structure and agency from one another over time, may explain the predisposition of the new language of New Labour to use nominalisation. Other examples of this are New Labour’s use of ‘the market’, ‘change’ and ‘globalisation’ and each – like RadEx – obfuscates agency and responsibility. Thus, in the same way that nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ leaves us subject them, nominalisation of ‘the market’, ‘change’ and ‘globalisation’ also leaves us subject to them. In each case, had nominalisation not occurred, each might be seen as emergent from human agency and we would, thus, not find ourselves subject to them. A future extension of the work carried out here and an extension of that carried out by Fairclough on the new language of New Labour could be to carry out a similar study to that carried out in this thesis but with a focus on other nominalised words to explore if there has been a loss of a moderating parliamentary calculus around these terms too. This might contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms causing us to be subject to ‘the market’, ‘change’ and other aspects of New Labour’s new language and neoliberalism more generally.

5.1.4. Do those who benefit most from the way social life is organised have an interest in the problem not being resolved?

At its most basic level, the question above can be answered by Upton Sinclair’s famous quote ‘It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it’ (Sinclair, 1934). The importance of funding to the proliferation of orthodox terrorism studies (OTS) that support the government’s focus on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ will be a focus of this section. As was explored in chapter 2.1, orthodox (as opposed to critical) terrorism studies tends to address problems as they are seen in the world rather than questioning the social structures that might have contributed to the existence of the problem in the first place (Johnathan Joseph, 2009, p. 94). It is therefore in the nature of OTS that supports the expansion of the policing of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ not to question the extent to which policy has emerged from expanding budgets to tackle ‘radicalisation’ and counter ‘extremism’.

Kundnani and Hayes’ report on The globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism policies (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018) explores the expansion of budgets to tackle ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and they focus on the budget of the European Union (EU) which is due to ‘significantly increase’ from the currently apportioned budget of €400M between 2007 and
consistent funding for the EU Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SCAT), which has established “a network of Member States looking into ways to tackle the national and local communications challenges in discouraging their citizens from travelling to Syria or other conflict zones”. SCAT is modelled on and staffed by former employees and consultants to the Research and Information Communications Unit, which leads the UK’s counter-terrorism propaganda operations. “Counter-narratives”, or as they are explicitly referred to in one of the work programmes for the EU’s security research programme, “counter-propaganda techniques”, (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 25)

This funding has been applied across EU member states, including €314,000 to Cambridge University for the ‘Development, testing and production of de-radicalising educational resources for young Muslims in Great Britain and the European Union’ and €291,000 to the UK’s West Yorkshire Police in 2011 for ‘Social Media Anti-Radicalisation Training for Credible Voices’. (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 25)

Not only does this indicate that a non-critical or orthodox approach to terrorism studies is being promoted in both academic and government fields, but Thompson (2018) has recently shone a light on the ridiculousness of regional police forces’ social media campaigns which appear to be more focused on the promotion of a threat than on addressing a problem.

Like other counter-extremism “initiatives”, Prevent is a state-sponsored political construct that depends upon political marketing to promote it as a security proposition that can be justified by politicians and police as dealing with a real and present danger. (Thompson, 2018)

It might be suggested that these well-funded social media campaigns serve more to promote than to address a threat of terrorism. The police receiving a £50M fund to ‘fight against terrorism’ (PressAssociation, 2017) at the height of austerity might provide a motivation for such online posturing to promote the threat of terrorism.

The expansion of the UK Government’s ‘strategic communications’ – a thinly veiled rebranding of ‘propaganda’ that a Home Office official is reported as describing as ‘sound[ing] horribly cold war’ (Hayes & Qureshi, 2016, p. 11) – is described by Hayes and Qureshi in “WE ARE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT” The Home Office, Breakthrough Media and the PREVENT Counter Narrative Industry (Hayes & Qureshi, 2016). They document the creation of 20 supposedly independent civil society organisations and their close connection to the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU) of the Home Office. This connection is made with compelling evidence that communications specialist Breakthrough Media have been funded by the Home Office to found and provide content and online hosting for these
supposedly independent civil society organisations. It is perhaps not surprising that these organisations that are dependent on budgets to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are also the most vocal supporters of this policy area.

This process of funding of apparently independent organisations to spread a message mirrors the expansion of neoliberalism via the funding of apparently independent think tanks that has been extensively explored by both Mirowski (Mirowski, 2018, p. 46) and Fairclough (N. Fairclough, 2000b, pp. 76-79). Fairclough brings this analogy closer to home by exploring the emergence of New Labour and their spreading of ‘the international discourse of neoliberalism’ via ‘the proliferation of political think tanks’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 78). Mirowski brings this style of proliferation together with the State and security services aforementioned preoccupation with social media when he describes the process of ‘murketing’.

The neoliberals have developed a relatively novel way to co-opt protest movements, through a combination of top-down hierarchical takeover plus a bottom-up commercialization and privatization of protest activities and recruitment. This is the extension of the practice of “murketing” to political action itself. Pop fascination with the role of social media in protest movements only strengthens this development. (Mirowski, 2013, p. 357)

The funding of apparently independent civil society organisations might be seen as a genre of neoliberalism that was employed by New Labour for the dissemination of support for policy to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and which has been maintained under subsequent UK governments. The foundation of these quasi-independent civil society organisations by Breakthrough Media – many like the Quillium Foundation could reasonably be described as ‘think tanks’ – might be seen as a continuation of the expansion of the neoliberal project from which they emerge.

Both Fairclough and Mirowski explain that a tenet of neoliberalism is ‘a new penal common sense’ that supports a ‘retreat from public welfare’ and ‘a punitive stance towards those who are victims of economic change’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 77; Mirowski, 2018, pp. 65-66). Returning to RadEx, one can see that the ‘new penal common sense’ is aligned with the post-parliamentary calculus logic of RadEx. While parliamentary calculus insisted on social security to avoid unrest, neoliberalism calls for the retreat of public welfare and ‘the normalisation of insecurity of employment’ and ‘criminalisation of deprivation’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b). Having abandoned the parliamentary calculus that promoted social justice to avoid ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, a commitment to the loss of public welfare makes the criminalisation of resistance necessary to the maintenance of state power. As Mirowski explains, ‘neoliberal policies lead to unchecked expansion of the penal sector’ (Mirowski, 2018, p. 66). In this context, recent reports of PREVENT being used to target environmental campaigners should be no surprise (Information Rights Tribunal, 2018). Nor should it be a
surprise that the government’s current proposed Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (HM Government, 2018a) that is undergoing parliamentary scrutiny at the time of writing has faced criticism for the risk that it might criminalise opposition to counter-terrorism law itself (House of Commons, 2018c, para. 7-18).

While structurally, as has been explored above, RadEx is inclined towards the oppression of any opposition to the Government, it has tended to be focused towards the oppression of the British Muslim population. This targeting of Muslims is shown in the Home Office’s own data that shows that 65% of referrals to PREVENT were for ‘Islamist extremism’ (Home Office, 2017), an alarming number in light of the Office of National Statistics stating that only 4.4% of the UK population are Muslim (Office for National Statistics, 2012). The analysis carried out in the previous chapter indicates that this disproportionate targeting of Muslims might be related to earlier colonialisit discourses that privileged British interests over resistance to the British Empire and movements for self-government - for example, Viscount Hinchingbrooke’s denigration of the ‘merits and cause of black Africa’ in Parliament in 1960 that was discussed in chapter 4.2. As was explored in chapter 2.4, this routine privileging of white interests is described by Critical Race Theory which Crawford (2017) uses to convincingly explain the emergence of both PREVENT and the Government’s promotion of Fundamental British Values. The decivilizing of Muslim lifestyles and celebration of white British norms as culturally superior that Crawford explores (Crawford, 2017, p. 197) are not limited to PREVENT and the Government’s promotion of Fundamental British Values but are part of a broader Islamophobic narrative in British Society. Recently the Times was criticised by the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) for presenting a ‘misleading’ and ‘distorted’ picture of a Muslim foster family (IPSO, 2018) and the editor of the Daily Express admitted to a parliamentary committee that his newspaper had created ‘Islamophobic sentiment’ (House of Commons, 2018a). These observations suggest that the media has contributed to Islamophobia and their continued promotion of anti-Muslim sentiment suggests that the public has an appetite for it. This might also suggest that the Government’s strategy on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is, like Islamophobic media stories, part of a vicious cycle of vilification of Muslims that precipitates an appetite for their targeting by oppressive policy.

In summary, RadEx has emerged from and contributed to the maintenance of neoliberalism. This is supported by the analysis of the preceding chapter that showed RadEx to have emerged from the discourse of New Labour, an adopter and exporter of neoliberalism. This has been catalysed by increasing budgets to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, creating quasi-independent bodies - in a process that mirrors the expansion of neoliberalism - that constantly reinforce the need for more resources and policy interventions in this area. The Press have faced criticism for their promotion of Islamophobia and the Government might
also have a part to play in this cycle, their vilification and disciplining of Muslims fuelling a cycle that demands the further targeting of Muslims.

Žižek has warned that democratic mandates might lead to the oppression of minorities,

The problem is that democratic elections give such a government a legitimization which makes it much more impervious to criticism by movements: it can dismiss movements as the voice of an “extremist” minority out of sync with the majority that elected the government. (Žižek, 2011, p. 158)

He adds that a strong civil society may be the most effective foil to government power. That the British Government has created a network of pseudo-civil societies to support their nadir of oppressive policy, leads one to question what mechanisms might be left that could moderate the states ever expanding oppressive power. This will be the focus of the following chapters.

5.1.5. Summary of Stage 3

From the analysis carried out in this chapter, it appears that RadEx is a significant factor in the maintenance of the legislative and informant genres. RadEx has emerged from colonialist discourses that have turned inwards onto the UK’s home population by a focus on British Muslims. The proliferation of the discourse has been promoted by the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and this has inevitably resulted in the undermining of parliamentary calculus and changes to the semiotic triangle for RadEx. These changes have inevitably resulted in the promotion of violence and the philosophical underpinnings of this can be seen in Giddens’ failure to account for change over time in his structuration theory, as has been explored above (6.3) and will be further elaborated in the next chapter. Finally, the government’s creation of quasi-independent think tanks and civil society has fuelled the support for strategy to target both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. These strategies are seen as an extension of the new penal logic of neoliberalism and their expansion via these quasi-independent organisations mirrors the global expansion of neoliberalism more generally. The next chapter will present an exploration of the philosophical understanding of the production of violence by RadEx that might offer the possibility of this cycle of violence being transcended.
5.2. Ways Past the Obstacles

Identify possible ways past the obstacles. Can the dominant discourse be contested? This stage is a crucial compliment to Stage 2 – it looks to hitherto unrealised possibilities for change in the way life is currently organised. This is where concrete utopianism, a theory of transition and a relationship to an on-going depth struggle becomes crucial. We can now define a notional.

RQ5. Can and should RadEx be contested?

Elaborating the statement and question above, the ‘obstacles’ that we aim to ‘identify possible ways past’ are obstacles to addressing the problems defined in the preceding chapter (stage 3 in the schema for CDA). The problems defined - all of which emanate from and include the primary problem that is RadEx - are the legislative and informant genres that emerge from RadEx and from the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Nominalisation in this context is emergent from the neoliberal discourse of New Labour that has obfuscated the parliamentary calculus that previously warded off the development of potentially oppressive government policy and the ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ responses that it might solicit. While the parliamentary calculus previously guarded against the possibility of civil unrest emerging, the ‘new penal logic’ of neoliberalism (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 77; Mirowski, 2018, pp. 65-66) aims to address the civil unrest that might be inevitable to post-parliamentary calculus and the logic of neoliberalism. This new penal logic has led to a self-fulfilling cycle of the funding of quasi-independent think tanks and civil society organisations to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. These organisations feed into the logic that drives the support for this ever-expanding area of policy as well as their own even-increasing budgets. That this new logic has been disproportionately focused on Muslims can be traced back to Critical Race Theory (CRT) and a colonialist discourse (5.2) that routinely privileges white interests while decivilizing Muslims (Crawford, 2017). That these obstacles are intimately intertwined and related to one another suggests that their contestation will be a complex task. However, the earlier explored critique of structurationist elision and recognition of emergence indicates that, while still recognising their emergence from one another, each obstacle can also be addressed individually due to its relative autonomy and for its exertion of independent causal influences (Archer, 1995, p. 14). This chapter develops theory to help answer the question of whether RadEx (the dominant discourse) can be contested. Having established that it can, the contestation of the problems that emerge from it will be explored in the next.

As the schema states, ‘this stage is a crucial complement to Stage 2’ that ‘looks to hitherto unrealised possibilities for change in the way life is currently organised’. An unrealised possibility that will be explored is the transcendence of the vicious semiotic triangle that was described in the preceding chapter. This will be achieved by the development of theory that
brings together both the semiotic triangle and Bhaskar’s Transformation Model of Social Activity (TMSA). As explored in the preceding chapter, the semiotic triangle for RadEx suggests a dystopian cycle for the production of violence but the introduction of the TMSA – by bringing in an appreciation of the possibility of change over time – reveals the on-going depth struggle that may in turn reveal a way towards a more utopian future. The depth struggle here relates to what Bhaskar refers to in his book of the same name as *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom* (Bhaskar, 2008).

For to exist is to be able to become, which is to possess the capacity for self-development, a capacity that can be fully realized only in a society founded on the principle of universal concretely singularized human autonomy in nature. This process is dialectic; and it is the pulse of freedom. (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 385)

It is clear from the analysis carried out in the preceding chapter that ‘human autonomy’ is restricted by RadEx and its emergent problems which all act as obstacles to the contestation of RadEx itself. The recognition of the referential detachment that is necessary for the intelligibility of language (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 402, 2016a, p. 34, 2016b, p. 64) and is enabled by the theorisation that will be carried out in this chapter will contribute to,

A meta-reflexivity totalizing situation [that] allows the agent to understand both that her engagement with reality is inexorably linguistic and that reality must be referentially detached from her language use (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 149)

The description of this ‘meta-reflexivity totalizing situation’ will allow for ‘reflexive monitoring of everyday activities’ that Bhaskar describes as a necessary step towards agency which he also refers to as ‘transformative negation of the given’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 149).

In the context of this thesis that is investigating the discourse that is described by RadEx, this notional possibility of meta-reflexivity describes the concrete utopia that might enable us to transcend the violence that is currently precipitated by RadEx. The utopian nature of the notional is adopted unapologetically as Critical Realism’s primacy of the pulse of freedom means that,

The common aspiration that utopian thinking leads to the slaying of millions is ideological nonsense: the ‘slaughter bench of history’ (Hegel) is owned and operated by power2 and its slaves. (Hartwig, 2007, p. 75)

The violence and oppression that emerge from RadEx create a barrier to the dialectic pulse of freedom. By failing to appreciate the dynamic nature of RadEx, we are ‘imprison[ed] in a non-utopian present without historicity or futurity’ (Jameson in Hartwig, 2007, p. 75). The theory developed in this chapter will describe a concrete utopia that will enable us to have a history and future in the context of RadEx and, in doing so, will allow us the possibility of being released from its bonds.

The semiotic triangles described in the preceding chapter all presented a dystopian view of RadEx. Thus, the first task in the utopian endeavour proposed in this chapter is to
describe a notional utopian semiotic triangle for RadEx. The last, vicious, semiotic triangle for RadEx described showed how the conceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as violent resulted in the promotion of violence. This occurred as their violent conceptualisation resulted in the state targeting ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, leading to the promotion of violence by the silencing of dissenting voices. To describe a more utopian semiotic triangle for RadEx, we might start with the concepts and consider the scenario in which they are conceptualised as non-violent. This would result in the state no longer targeting the referent, strategies like PREVENT would no longer be promoted so people would not be silenced by fear that they might be reported to the security services. Added to this, debate would not be silenced for people’s fear that they might be perceived as violent. As explored in chapter 2.5, this enabling of debate creates a mechanism by which the non-violence of the referent can be promoted, resulting in the referent becoming less violent and in the meanings becoming less associated with violence as the utopian semiotic triangle repeats itself. This results in the following diagram for the utopian semiotic triangle for RadEx.

![Utopian Semiotic Triangle for RadEx](image)

**Figure 27:** Utopian Semiotic Triangle for RadEx

While the above theorisation of the semiotic triangle and those in the previous chapter offer an explanation of a number of processes in the development of RadEx, they do not offer a unified theory that links each process and version of the semiotic triangle. To achieve such a theory, we need to first recognise that time is absent from the above theorisations and return to the earlier exploration of the distinction between the Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (TMSA) and Giddens’ Structuration Theory. The semiotic triangles that have
been described, like Giddens’ theory, do not offer an account of change over time; it could be argued that their inexorable cyclical nature sees them stuck in time. To conceptualise the semiotic triangle in the context of time, we need to create a model that not only has a time axis, but which also shows the progression from one triangle to the next as time passes. By drawing on the TMSA which shows the emergence of the structure of society from the agency of individuals and vice versa over time, we can expand and unify the various semiotic triangles into the semiotic helix below.

![Figure 28: Semiotic Helix: bringing time into the semiotic triangle](image)

By bringing time in to the theory like this, we can see not only how all of the preceding semiotic triangles might be linked to one another but it also enables us to imagine how they might be transcended. The earlier versions of the semiotic triangle for RadEx forced us into an endless cycle of the reinforcement of violence. As ever, and perhaps especially, those who are apparently in power as state actors and who are fulfilling the cycle by the state targeting of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are as subjected to the effects of RadEx as anyone else. We might describe the vicious semiotic triangle for RadEx as ‘projectively duplicating a hyperreal world where slaves become masters’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 381). The description of RadEx in the context of time enables us to transcend the projected duplication of the hyperreal world as we can now imagine a notional future outside of the previously theorised cycle of violence. This means that we might now move beyond the master-slave power relations previously theorised to be imposed by RadEx and which currently restrict the pulse of freedom.

Over the preceding two chapters, significant barriers to the transcendence of RadEx have been described – not least, ever increasing budgets for the targeting on RadEx. The way in which these budgets have been used to promote a neoliberal penal logic through the creation of quasi-independent civil society organisations is a significant barrier to
emancipatory praxis. It might be argued that the self-reflexive cycle that these quasi-independent civil society organisations and the logic of RadEx create restricts the dialectic possibility of being by hiding the nature of being behind the aforementioned hyperreal world. And, as ‘being [is] a condition for knowledge’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 385), this also restricts the possibility of knowledge. Lack of knowledge of RadEx creating a vicious cycle that restricts the pulse of freedom. The theorisation of the semiotic helix might allow for an understanding of our relation to RadEx and, thus, the nature of ourselves in a way that was not possible while being restricted by the logic of the vicious semiotic triangle. This knowledge may enable those who have been elided into the suffocating logic of RadEx to be released from its grip and to become. In Chapter 6 this process of becoming will be explored in the context of Heidegger’s work on Being and Time (Heidegger, 1926 (1962)) and might thus be better referred to in the German as Dasein. It must however be recognised that there are other barriers in the way such as the self-supporting pseudo-civil society that has emerged from RadEx and which is supported by the ever-increasing budgets that it calls for. Added to this, Critical Race Theory suggests that the racist targeting of Muslims as is seen under PREVENT is to be expected. As such, the theorisation of a concrete utopian discourse for RadEx does not guarantee the undermining of the oppressive targeting of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. However, in the world of real generative mechanisms that Critical Realism aims to describe, RadEx does appear to have made some contribution to this oppression. By describing RadEx in a way that might transcend the previously described vicious semiotic triangle, this thesis might make some contribution to the dialectical pulse of freedom and to the free flourishing of all. The theorisation of the semiotic helix indicates that RadEx can and should be contested. The possibilities for emancipatory practice in the context of the semiotic helix will be explored in the next chapter.
5.3. Unrealised Possibilities

These unrealised possibilities become the object of an emancipatory practice oriented to the resolution of the social problem or ill, in the context of concrete utopianism and a coherent theory of transition. This will in principle include a moment of self-reflexivity defining a notional

RQ5. Can and should RadEx be contested?

The unrealised possibilities of this stage of the schema are taken to mean the possibilities for overcoming the problems described in the last chapter. These possibilities emerge as the preceding chapter has shown that we do not need to be trapped in the perpetual promotion of violence that was previously described by the vicious semiotic triangle for RadEx. The possibilities will take on two forms, ways in which the problems described in the preceding chapters can now be surmounted and emergent emancipatory praxis that is yet to be realised. Both types of possibilities will be oriented towards the resolution of RadEx and the problems that emerge from it, creating a concrete utopian theory of transition from the current oppression that RadEd precipitates. Self-reflexivity in this context is vital to informing a notional future in which the problems might be transcended.

The first half of this chapter will address the possibilities for surmounting the problems described in earlier chapters. Each of these is listed below before being addressed in turn by exploring the notional possibilities for transcending the problem. As has been explored in earlier chapters, the problems are all connected by their emergence from one another but they might be addressed separately due to their relative autonomy and their exertion of independent causal influence (Archer, 1995, p. 14). Towards the end of the chapter, I will self-reflexively explore how I might address these problems before I will reflect on my positionality as an analyst in the next chapter.

5.3.1. Problems that are associated with RadEx

The research carried out in this thesis points towards a number of generative mechanisms for RadEx and that emerge from RadEx. These are summarised and explored in this section, but it should be noted that, while attempts have been made to consider different aspects of the laminated ontology of RadEx, the results will inevitably be an incomplete list of causes. Despite this, a description of these ‘problems’ even though partial, is seen as a useful endeavour as it contributes to our understanding of RadEx, its potential to foment change in the world, and what our possible responses to RadEx might be. Attempts to describe these problems result in the following list:

- Nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’
- Loss of parliamentary calculus
• Neoliberalism
• New Penal Logic
• Legislative genre
• Informant genre
• Description of the semiotic helix
• Quasi-Independent Civil Society and supporting budgets
• Vicious cycle of racialised targeting of Muslims

Some of the suggestions made throughout this chapter – when taken in isolation – might appear to hold little chance of success. As Fairclough points out,

The Government will not, I imagine, be that eager to take up these recommendations. Nevertheless, we must keep emphasising this: the way things are does not exhaust the possibilities for the way things could be. (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 160)

However, taken as a totality of emergent possibilities for the transcendence of RadEx, these isolated suggestions that the Government and their well-funded quasi-independent civil society may not want to hear suggest possibilities for the way things could be. The pulse of freedom demands that we explore and act on them.

Nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’
The nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of RadEx that needs to be addressed if the problem is to be surmounted. It is fundamental as it hides the underlying causes of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and, thus, prevents them from being addressed. This means that both policymakers and those subjected to policy to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are limited in their ability to address the problem. There is unlikely to be a silver bullet for the transcendence of this problem, but it is hoped that continuing to highlight it might lead to enough awareness of the problem to support the words being employed in a different way. I have tried to raise awareness of this issue in my own writing and media engagement (Faure Walker, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018c; Fenton-Smith, 2017) and in the support that I have given to others (House of Commons, 2018c; Open Society, 2016; Rights Watch (UK), 2016) and it is my intention that this thesis will form the foundation of more published work that I will use to further disseminate the understanding of this problem.

Loss of parliamentary calculus
The loss of parliamentary calculus is not just an issue that is specific to RadEx. The nominalisation that is inherent to the new language of New Labour and that has come to dominate political discourse since the demise of New Labour obfuscates the causes of and the human agency behind other issues such as change, the market and other facets of life (N.
Nominalisation, thus, masks any alternative visions for the future and this is aligned with Laclau and Mouffe’s critique of the centrist left lacking ‘a vision about what could be a different way of organising social relations’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xix). Laclau and Mouffe propose that the Left go ‘back to the hegemonic struggle’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xix) and this indicates that the parliamentary calculus that was first described in Chapter 4 might not simply be a historical relic in the parliamentary records but could be something that we ought to aspire to return to. We should aspire to return to this moderating calculus as not only is it proposed as a solution to the excesses of government by Laclau and Mouffe but the analysis of previous chapters suggests that it does work to moderate power and to promote social justice and that it should, therefore, be returned to. This is, however, easier said than done but Fairclough’s suggestion for the promotion of ‘real dialogue and debate’ (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 159) might go some way to supporting this. My hope for this possibility has recently been encouraged in meetings with civil servants who have shown an apparent interest in engaging with critique of RadEx. Whether this will be translated into broader debate and whether this will extend into parliamentary discourse remains to be seen.

Neoliberalism

The seminal tome on the expansion of neoliberalism in the second half of the 20th century that has been referred to here is Mirowski’s Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste (Mirowski, 2013). Mirowski does not offer any solutions to the neoliberal problem that he describes – one reviewer noting that he ‘is careful, perhaps too careful, not to suggest any kind of positive alternative to the economics he derides. The book stays firmly at the level of critique.’ (Pryke, 2015). However, Mirowski’s exploration of the flaws and fallacies of neoliberalism might indicate what alternatives might look like. In fact, engaging with such a critique of neoliberalism reveals deeper parallels with RadEx than have already been explored above. In the aforementioned review, in summarising what critique Mirowski does engage in, Pryke indicates an alternative when he writes,

The parlous state of academic economics meant that it was intellectually ill equipped to engage in any form of critical self-reflection. The absence of a rigorous methodology and the banishment of history and philosophy from the discipline, whilst simultaneously constantly proclaiming its scientific credentials…meant that economists quickly lost control of explanation of the crisis. (Pryke, 2015)

When compared to Qureshi’s exploration of the The ‘science’ of pre-crime: The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning PREVENT (Qureshi, 2016) in his report of the same name, the parallels between neoliberalism and RadEx can be seen to run deep. Both lack methodological rigour, are historically and philosophically unfounded and, in spite of each of their repeated reference to their scientific basis, rely on too precarious a set of beliefs to be
able to engage in self-reflection. In the same way that each of these traits meant that economists were ill-equipped to deal with the financial crisis of 2008 (Mirowski, 2013, p. 357), the counter-terrorism industry built around the targeting of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, holds little hope of effectively engaging with the problem of political violence.

While Mirowski is careful not to offer solutions or – to use the language of the schema, ‘possible ways past the obstacles’ that he describes – we might extrapolate and bring together two of his observations to form a possible solution. The first is the overarching thesis of his book which is summarised when the writes,

Since economists were caught off-guard during the onset of the crisis, both journalists and the general public had initially to fall back on vernacular understandings of the disaster, as well as cultural conceptions of the economy then prevalent. (Mirowski, 2013, p. 357)

The second is Mirowski’s observation that neoliberals ‘win by taking advantage of “the exception” to introduce components of their program unencumbered by judicial or democratic accountability’ (Mirowski, 2013, p. 358). The ‘vernacular understandings’ and ‘cultural conceptions’ of the first quote might, when applied to RadEx, be taken to mean the pseudo-science of pre-crime (Goldberg et al., 2017; Qureshi, 2016) that has been promoted by recent governments by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and also the routine privileging of white interests that Critical Race Theory (CRT) anticipates. Both of these might be described as ‘vernacular understandings’ and ‘cultural conceptions’ and might be expected to be fallen back on in exceptional times. The notion of terrorism being exceptional and therefore demanding an exceptional response has been debated extensively, the debate perhaps receiving the most interest when Max Hill QC (The Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) faced criticism in the Press (Gibb, 2017; McCann & Ensor, 2017) for warning ‘against any future instances of “knee-jerk something must be done” lawmaking’ (Max Hill QC, 2017, p. 18).

Bringing these two problems together, we must be vigilant against falling back on ‘vernacular understandings’ and ‘cultural conceptions’ of RadEx and the pseudo-science that connects ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ to terrorism, especially in exceptional times. These exceptional times may refer to the aftermath of an act of political violence but the ever-expanding problem of RadEx might also be seen to be placing us in ever-exceptional times; the association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence suggesting that political divergence from the norm might always be exceptional due to the presumed violence that is imbedded in the language. An understanding of the history of RadEx may defend against this and further underlines the need for the dissemination of the ideas explored in this thesis.
New Penal Logic

As was discussed in Chapter 5, this new penal logic is internally consistent with and necessary to the maintenance of neoliberalism. It is necessary as the neoliberal submission to the ‘justice’ of the market dictates that there are necessarily losers, who must by extension be controlled (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 147). Mirowski cites the adage of Benjamin Constant, ‘The government, beyond its proper sphere ought not to have any power; within its sphere, it cannot have enough of it’, as a favoured quote of neoliberals (Mirowski, 2013, pp. 65-66). As such, Mirowski suggests that the ‘unchecked expansion of the penal sector’ is a characteristic of neoliberalism (Mirowski, 2013, p. 65). This may show a further way in which RadEx is also emergent from neoliberalism. The transition from this ever-expanding penal logic must therefore be part of the broader political project to respond to the neoliberalism that was promoted by Thatcher and has since been dramatically expanded under New Labour.

New Labour’s abandoning of the parliamentary calculus of old Labour arguably opened the door to the unchecked expansion of this new penal logic. Where parliamentary calculus restricted government oppression and ensured the maintenance of social justice, neoliberalism left social justice to the market and required the new penal logic to control those who the market would inevitably fail.

It would be naïve to anticipate that this thesis and the writing that it supports will result in an effective challenge to neoliberalism. However, as was discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the current leader of the Labour Party may have shown an appreciation of the pre-New Labour parliamentary calculus in his speech to the Party’s national conference in 2017. This indicates that the Left may be going ‘back to the hegemonic struggle’ as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. xix) have called for and this may mean that there is some hope that the problem of the new penal logic might be challenged. This thesis adds support to calls for the return to the struggle.

Legislative genre

The legislative genre is an aspect of the new penal logic of neoliberalism and RadEx. However, a notional possibility to overcome this problem might be more specific than the possible responses to neoliberalism and RadEx explored above. While the strength of the legislative genre lies in legislation, the protocol that accompanies any legislation also opens up the possibility for the problem to be challenged. Such a possibility was recently realised in response to the most recent manifestation of the legislative genre and RadEx. This most recent manifestation can be seen in the Government’s proposed Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (HM Government, 2018a). The bill that at the time of writing is being scrutinised by parliamentary committees – as is required of any legislation – proposes the expansion of counter-terror powers and the aforementioned Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Max Hill QC, has, along with others, criticised the expansion of powers that the bill proposes (House of Commons, 2018c).
As part of the scrutiny that any bill must undergo as it progresses through Parliament, parliamentary select committees make public calls for evidence in relation to the proposed bill. In response to a call for evidence related to the proposed Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (HM Government, 2018a) from the Joint Committee for Human Rights (JCHR), I submitted evidence related to the proposal that the PREVENT Strategy be expanded (House of Commons, 2018c, p. 24). By focusing my evidence on these aspects of the bill, I was able to submit evidence within the parameters of the call for evidence but also to repeat calls from other individuals and organisations for a full and independent review of PREVENT. At the time of writing, my evidence has been cited in a section of the JCHR’s report that makes the following recommendation,

We are concerned that the Prevent programme is being developed without first conducting an independent review of how the programme is currently operating. We are also concerned that any additional responsibility placed on local authorities must be accompanied by adequate training and resources to ensure that the authorities are equipped to identify individuals vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. We reiterate our recommendation that the Prevent programme must be subject to independent review. (House of Commons, 2018c, p. 25)

The JCHR, like other parliamentary select committees, is made up of members of the different political parties. While it is not possible to know if the above recommendation would still have been made without my evidence to the committee, the citation of my evidence - ‘a number of stakeholders have reiterated this call for an independent review’, with a footnote referring to the evidence that I had submitted from Prevent Digest (House of Commons, 2018c, p. 25) - in the section that leads to this recommendation suggests that it may have made some contribution. That the JCHR report has been written by a number of MPs with the aim of informing parliamentary debate indicates that it may have made some contribution to the scrutiny of PREVENT in parliament.

The legislative genre has been theorised to have emerged from New Labour and Fairclough suggests that the problems of New Labour and the genres that it promotes might be transcended by promoting debate (N. Fairclough, 2000b, p. 159). The work of this thesis contributed to the evidence that I submitted to the JCHR and, in as far as it might promote parliamentary debate as described above, has made some contribution to the debate that may thus help to overcome this problem.

Informant genre

Related to the legislative genre, the informant genre casts teachers and other public sector workers as informants. While the legislative genre has resulted in legislation – in the form of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b) and the proposed Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (HM Government, 2018a) – to enforce the informant genre,
the informant genre preceded the legislation. This was discussed in chapter 1.4 where the possibility that the genre also emerged from RadEx was explored. That the informant genre preceded legislation to enforce it via the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b) and the PREVENT Duty (HM Government, 2015c) indicates that there is at least one generative mechanism for the genre alongside the legislation from which it also emerges. Referring back to the preceding chapters, the additional generative mechanisms that have been proposed here are related to the progressive association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence. This was described in Chapter 5 where it was theorised that this association created a vicious cycle for the perpetual promotion of violence. This cycle, by promoting the association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence, in turn promotes the informant genre by making it commonsensical that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ – in their violent connotation – should be targeted by civil society and the security services. For the informant genre to be challenged, it is therefore essential that the association of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with violence also be challenged.

This association can be challenged in one’s own language use and also by critiquing the language of others. In my own work, I always place ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in ‘scare quotes’ to indicate that their meanings may be more complex than they first appear. I have also tried to explain this problem to a wider audience in my own writing (Faure Walker, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018c) and in other public forums (Fenton-Smith, 2017; Khaldun, 2018). Whether these efforts will result in a successful challenge to the informant genre or not remains to be seen but the semiotic helix theorised in Chapter 5 suggests that the vicious cycle of RadEx need not inevitably promote violence nor support the informant genre. Efforts to challenge and transcend the genre may, therefore, not be in vain. A concrete example of the genre being transcended in my own classroom will be reflected on towards the end of this chapter.

**Description of the semiotic helix**

It is a matter of, on the one hand, recognising that it is often social theorists who produce the most interesting critical insights about language as an element of social life, yet, on the other hand, challenging them and helping them engage with language in a far more concrete and detailed way than they generally do. (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 204)

It may seem that the problem of describing the semiotic helix is somewhat more abstract than the other problems explored in this chapter. However, from a Critical Realist perspective, the real generative mechanism that is described by the semiotic helix is no less real. In the previous chapters, it was theorised that failure to appreciate the philosophical foundations and history of RadEx that the semiotic helix describes was sustaining the vicious semiotic triangle for RadEx that might be promoting violence. The description of the philosophical foundations
and history of RadEx – as might be done by describing the semiotic helix - therefore becomes vital to the transcendence of violence.

Fairclough has explored,

that the language element has in certain key respects become more salient, more important than it used to be, and in fact a crucial aspect of the social transformations which are going on – one cannot make sense of them without thinking about language (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 203).

He writes this in reference to his discussion of the work of Bourdieu and Wacquant on neoliberalism (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001). While Fairclough’s work might be seen as being critical of Bourdieu and Wacquant for the extent to which he describes it as performative of ‘the very realities it claims to describe’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 204), Fairclough writes that he intends for his work to be ‘an appreciation of their work and critique, in the spirit of dialogically working with it’ (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 204). Going on to describe the dialogic relationship in which CDA can enhance the social sciences and in which CDA is also enhanced (N. Fairclough, 2003, p. 204). It is hoped that this has been achieved throughout this thesis where the theorisation of RadEx has drawn on Critical Race Theory (CRT) and terrorism studies and has, perhaps, made some contribution to them via the work that has stemmed from it (Faure Walker, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018c). Chapters 6 and 7 have also made a contribution to understanding the spread of neoliberalism that, as was Fairclough’s aforementioned intent for CDA, adds to the work of Bourdieu and Wacquant in this area.

While it may be desirable that CDA contributes to the social sciences more generally and that the social sciences contribute to CDA, this might be seen as a navel-gazing exercise as the academy looks in on itself. However, Haith-Cooper and Bradshaw (2013) offer a model for how CDA might have an impact beyond the academy in their paper on midwives’ perspectives on asylum seekers (Haith-Cooper & Bradshaw, 2013). In the paper, they use discourse analysis to identify discourses that they suggest result in refugee mothers being seen through a criminalised lens (Haith-Cooper & Bradshaw, 2013, p. 1010). When they introduced alternative literatures to trainee midwives, some appeared to question the criminalising discourses (Haith-Cooper & Bradshaw, 2013, pp. 1011-1012). While this does not offer a solution of how to best communicate the semiotic helix and challenge RadEx, it does suggest that the creation of alternative literature that is critical of the linguistic connection between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and violence is a potential step towards challenging RadEx.

Alongside my writing that has emerged from this thesis and which I refer to throughout this chapter, my other small contribution has been in the cataloguing of academic, parliamentary and NGO reports that are critical of PREVENT and RadEx. I have done this on
the PREVENT digest website (Faure Walker, 2018b) that I manage and I share the catalogue with fellow academics, journalists and policymakers in a monthly email that they have subscribed to via the website. While not a comprehensive response to RadEx, this is a way that I help to catalyse the proliferation of alternative discourses to RadEx. By doing so, this creates a real generative mechanism for the catalysing of alternative understanding that is required to appreciate the philosophy and history that underpins RadEx and that is described by the semiotic helix.

Quasi-independent civil Society and supporting budgets

The funding, formation and support of quasi-independent civil society by the government presents a significant problem for the surmounting of RadEx, perhaps the greatest problem to be explored in this chapter. It might appear to be a more mundane problem than the other problems explored and which may rightly be seen as referring to a depth struggle (Bhaskar, 2008), but the reasons for this being one of the more challenging problems will be explored here. This challenge is made great by the problem lying at the nexus of a mundane and a philosophical problem. The mundane was referred to in the aforementioned quote from Upton Sinclair, ‘It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it’ (Sinclair, 1934). As was explained in the preceding chapters, the growing budgets to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ provide a strong incentive for those who benefit from the quasi-independent civil society to not understand the problems on which their funding depends.

The, perhaps, more philosophical problem is described by Bhaskar as a There Is No Alternative (TINA) compromise formation. The TINA compromise formation in this context is emergent from the linguistic connection that has been made between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and violence. This is the categorical error that the quasi-independent civil societies support and which also supports their existence via funding and support from the government. Thus, the perception that there is no alternative to the government’s targeting or ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as was said to me by a civil servant and is described in chapter 1.5, is not only based on a categorical error but has also resulted in ‘the multiply mediated compounding of categorical error upon error’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 363) as the funding for quasi-independent civil society that supports RadEx results in cycles of further support for RadEx and further funding.

Bhaskar proposes dialectic – which he defines as ‘argument, change and freedom (and each rationally presupposes its predecessor)’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 377; Hartwig, 2007, p. 124) – which will ‘expand the universe of discourse so as to remove the contradiction between the erstwhile contraries’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 363). In a world that is dominated by master-slave relations (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 156), it may appear that there is little hope that more discourse will result in the triumph of the pulse of freedom but Bhaskar argues that any false metaReality
must be emergent from a more fundamental and true order (Bhaskar, 2012, p. 228). While resistance to a well-funded quasi-independent civil society whose existence supports the fallacy upon which it is based and which maintains an ever-increasing policy agenda and budget may seem futile, we should remember,

That the emergent, false or oppressive level (of social being, i.e. demi-reality, which might also be called Tina-reality), is unilaterally dependent on the more basic, true, and autonomous order, even though it may dominate and even threaten its existence, just as it typically mystifies, occludes and denies it. (Bhaskar, 2012, p. 228)

The current oppression is contingent on the ‘more basic, true and autonomous order’ so should not be cause for dismay.

Vicious cycle of racialised targeting of Muslims
The targeting of Muslims by PREVENT is the nexus of numerous historical and sociological factors. Outside of the various vicious cycles for the catalysing of oppression theorised here, Critical Race Theory (CRT) offers some frame of reference from which to understand this routine privileging of white interests and the corresponding dehumanisation of Muslims (Crawford, 2017). The privileging of white interests can be seen throughout history and literature such as Michelle Alexander’s *The New Jim Crow* (M. Alexander, 2010) explores this in the American context to show how the shackles of slavery have morphed into racist drug laws and a racist justice system. Closer to home, Hancox’s book, *Inner City Pressure: The Story of Grime* (Hancox, 2018), sees the vilification of grime (a genre of black music) as connected to a long history of racialised policing in the UK that was – like the vilification of Muslims – stoked by ‘the burgeoning New Labour disciplinary regime’ (Hancox, 2018, p. 90). The parallels with Hancox’s story of the racist policing of grime and more recent strategies such as PREVENT run deep; both resulted in the controversial targeting of minority ethnic communities in an effort to reduce violence; both failed to address any underlying causes of violence; both emerged from the new penal logic of neoliberalism and New Labour, forcing an outgroup to conform or face sanction; and, both were manifested in state surveillance that did untold damage to community relations and individuals within the communities targeted.

The harm done by recent targeting of Muslims in the name of the War on Terror is investigated by Qureshi who makes repeated reference to *The New Jim Crow* (M. Alexander, 2010) in his exploration of the harm done by the trauma associated with the state targeting of generation after generation of a community (Qureshi, 2018). In the face of the extensive literature and testimony to the harm that these racist structures cause, we might ask why they persist? Qureshi offers an answer.
Without an enemy, without an outsider to feed those flames, those in power will lose their position of control. (Qureshi, 2018, p. 46)

The analysis of Chapter 4 added to this picture by drawing a connection between colonialist discourses of over a century ago and the current targeting of Muslims. The targeting of Muslims having enabled the oppression that Britain had meted out to ‘foreign’ people under its Empire to turn inwards and onto Britain’s home population. The focus on Muslims might have been further catalysed by European identity and Derrida is credited with exploring the need for Europe to have an outsider – Islam – to sustain its own identity. (Isyar, 2014, p. 153)

With such strong historical precedents, the surmounting of this problem might – like the others discussed in this chapter – seem impossible. However, Alexander ends her book with a quote from James Baldwin’s advice to his young nephew that offers hope. It offers hope by elaborating an argument that is closely aligned with the Critical Realist argument made at the end of the preceding section,

those innocents who believed that your imprisonment made them safe are losing their grasp on reality. But these men are your brothers – your lost, younger brothers. And if the word integration means anything, this is what it means: that we, with love, shall force our brothers to see themselves as they are, to cease fleeing from reality and begin to change it…We cannot be free until they are free. (Baldwin in M. Alexander, 2010, p. 261)

5.32. A Moment of Self-Reflexivity
A fundamental tenet of Critical Realism is that ‘social phenomenon only ever occur in open systems’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 80). Thus, having explored how the various problems associated with RadEx might be resolved, it is important to now reflect on other aspects of the alternative concrete utopia that might enable us to transition from RadEx. As a moment of self-reflexivity, this will involve considering the choices that I might make to contribute to this concrete utopia. This self-reflexivity will initially involve reflecting on each of the problems explored above and an exploration of the choices that I might make in response to each. There will also be a brief exploration of unintended consequences, both those that come to be desired and those that are not.

Nominalisation was the first problem discussed above and it was problematic for the way in which it hid the underlying causes of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and, in doing so, prevented their discussion and eventual resolution. Describing the underlying causes of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and bringing them back into the debate is a contribution that I aim to make and this is discussed above. However, I have experienced barriers to doing so and this was exemplified in a public debate that I recently took part in (Khaldun, 2018). The debate had been organised by a community group with the support of the Home Office to enable people in the London Borough of Slough to discuss PREVENT. Audience members
directed questions to a four-person panel that I was on alongside a local PREVENT worker, a representative from the Home Office’s Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and the local Chief Inspector of Police. As the event proceeded, the audience became palpably frustrated with the representative from the Home Office’s failure to engage with their concerns. The concerns that they raised included frustration with UK foreign policy and the marginalisation of Muslims due to austerity and PREVENT. These concerns might be seen as describing failures of government as were explored in chapter 4.2 and that the analysis suggested could lead to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Halfway through the debate, I attempted to mediate by describing how nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was masking their causes. I was careful to situate my description in my research and described examples that are also in Chapter 4. The representative from the Home Office persisted in his ignorance of the causes of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, even in the face of their repeated description by the audience. He had not responded to my suggestion that the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was problematic as he continued to use the words to describe deagentified phenomena. In response to my description of my research, he said that my concern was ‘academic’ and, in saying this, was inferring that it ought to be ignored as inconsequential. A number of audience members approached me after the event to discuss their frustration that he had dismissed my research in this manner. This wilful ignorance of research and expertise is similar to Michael Gove MP’s infamous proclamation that ‘we’ve had enough of experts’ (Laybats & Tredinnick, 2016, p. 204; Sky News, 2016). Both Gove and the aforementioned representative from the Home Office’s disparaging of expertise presents a considerable challenge to the dissemination of academic and expert arguments as they are not appealing to any rational argument. Rather, they are relying on a fallacious proclamation in the same way that Thatcher did in her catchphrase, ‘there is no alternative’ and which Bhaskar describes as a TINA compromise formation.

The aforementioned disparaging of expertise are examples of ‘a truth in practice [that] is held in tension with a falsity in theory’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. xxiii; Hartwig, 2007, p. 465) as in both examples, the individuals decrying of expertise demonstrate a contradiction in their practice which relies on those who they decry as ‘academic’ or ‘experts’. Gove in his reference to economic forecasts – presumably made by experts - in the same interview that the earlier quote is taken from and the Home Office representative in referring to other research in his arguments during the same debate – albeit, research that he either misrepresented or which was from the aforementioned quasi-independent organisations. We might thus refer to both arguments as ‘TINA compromise formations’. However, there is an additional layer to the argument used in these two examples, ‘a wilful blindness to evidence, a mistrust of authority, and an appeal to emotionally based arguments often rooted in fears or anxieties’ (Laybats & Tredinnick, 2016, p. 204). That Laybats & Tredinnick (2016) go on to explore how this type of
‘post-truth political discourse’ has been exacerbated by social media. That it is discussed above how the government have led social media campaigns to create and support their own echochamber via quasi-independent civil society results in it being evermore urgent that the fallaciousness of these proclamations be called out. Perhaps from a Critical Realist perspective when we are told that we’ve ‘had enough of experts’, we should respond by asking if we’ve also had enough of reality?

The analysis of Chapter 4 that first described parliamentary calculus showed how over the last century, the threat of the left had acted as a foil for oppressive policy from the right. As a description of a real generative mechanism for the moderation of oppression, parliamentary calculus describes a concrete utopia, for it is a real mechanism by which oppression is discouraged and, thus, by which the pulse of freedom is supported. However, as the moderation that parliamentary calculus encourages relies on responses to oppression, oppression is a necessary aspect of the calculus described, and in might therefore be described as less than utopian. Thus, while parliamentary calculus is certainly a real contributory factor to the depth struggle, its dependence on master-slave (power2) oppressive forces indicates that its description does not get to the more fundamental and true order from which it emerges (Bhaskar, 2012, p. 228). So, while recognising parliamentary calculus as an important mechanism to limit oppression, we should not hold it as sacred. For true emancipation, parliamentary calculus must perhaps itself be transcended.

Neoliberalism and its associated new penal logic has been presented as banal by Thatcher’s proclamation that ‘there is no alternative’, an argument that was repeated by subsequent Prime Ministers, Blair and Cameron, as they persisted in the expansion of neoliberalism and its associated punitive trends (Bell, 2014, pp. 489-490). In chapter 1.5 I made reference to this catchphrase also being used to justify the PREVENT Strategy. While the aforementioned political leaders have presented it as banal in its presentation as the only option, neoliberalism is anything but banal for those on the margins who are impacted by its punitive logic. Hancox explores how the neoliberal agendas of New Labour that drove the gentrification of poorer areas of London was accompanied by repressive policing of the original residents who were often forced out of their own homes by the increasing property prices and developments that neoliberalism delivered (Hancox, 2018). For the young black men who are the focus of Hancox’s book, the neoliberal penal logic that resulted in the loss of their homes (Hancox, 2018, p. 304), surveillance of their families (Hancox, 2018, p. 93) and the suppression of their music (Hancox, 2018, pp. 170-173) was anything but banal. The story that Hancox presents is all too familiar to the experience of my Muslim students who were targeted by the same new penal logic via the PREVENT Strategy, as was explored in Chapter 1. Many of my students also having lost their homes due to the gentrification of East London as well as the reporting that they felt surveilled.
While leading politicians have fallaciously claimed that there is no alternative to these punitive neoliberal agendas, Bell (2014) argues that there are in her paper, There is an alternative: Challenging the logic of neoliberal penalty (Bell, 2014). She describes this as no small task as ‘Delegitimizing neoliberalism and seeking to undermine its key logics will allow a greater focus to be placed on achieving social justice’ (Bell, 2014), arguing that this might be achieved by ‘moving away from populism and becoming truly popular’ (Bell, 2014, p. 501). Suggesting that this might be achieved by not only engaging policymakers ‘but also with all those affected by the penal system, be they offenders, victims or onlookers’ (Bell, 2014, p. 501). As has already been extensively discussed, the government’s creation of a pseudo-civil society has the capacity to drown out genuine community concerns. However, as well as describing the marginalisation of young black men in London, Hancox also describes how their engagement in the political process contributed to the resurgence of the left in UK politics. He quotes grime MC JME,

I’m alright if the NHS gets privatised. I’ll just spit two bars [make some music], get a bit of money and go fix my ribs. But people that grow up with nothing – like I did – I’m doing it for them. I thought: “you know what? I’m gonna make them have a voice” (Hancox, 2018, p. 287)

JME did make ‘them have a voice’. When Theresa May PM called a snap election in April 2017, the Labour Party was 24 percent behind her Conservative Party in the polls and Hancox describes how such a margin threatened to ‘wipe out the British left for decades’ and might provide a motivation for May having called the election at this time (Hancox, 2018, p. 282). However, JME and his fellow grime MCs and DJs who had been born into the oppressed fringes of neoliberalism had other ideas.

Their aptitude for social media had been nurtured by a decade of having to market their music without the support of major record labels and this enabled them to reach millions who, like them, had been disenfranchised by neoliberalism. Not surprisingly, they were motivated by and threw their support behind the first major party leader to offer an alternative to the ideology that had marginalised them. Their campaign, epitomised by #grime4corbyn, made a difference by engaging those who Bell describes as ‘affected by the penal system’ (Bell, 2014, p. 501).

It had been an election in which grime could very plausibly be said to have made a difference. Turnout nationally was at a 25-year high – and this was driven by an unprecedented surge in young and BAME voters. Ipsos Mori polling suggested the 18-24 vote increased 16 percentage points on 2015, while turnout among BAME Britons increased 6 points: the substantial majority of new voters, those who had not voted in the 2015 election, had chosen Labour. (Hancox, 2018, pp. 285-286)
Labour in this election, unlike those under New Labour, presented an alternative to neoliberalism. In response to the injustice that had been meted out to young BAME voters by neoliberalism, they voted for change. The resurgence of the left indicates how – when given a left of genuine opposition – parliamentary calculus can function. Whether the response to this will be a moderation of oppressive policing or an extension of neoliberal penal logic is yet to be seen.

While the *modus operandi* of #grime4corbyn was an example of the civil society that the Home Office has tried to imitate, there were more formal modes of engagement proposed during the discussion of the legislative genre above. This was demonstrated in my own evidence being published by the Joint Committee for Human Rights (House of Commons, 2018c), a process that anyone could emulate and that, therefore, offers the opportunity for engagement in policy formation. Raising awareness of these systems of governance should therefore be a priority and at the time of writing, I am involved in discussions with the Home Office to try to ensure that their recently launched ‘evidence drive’ via the Commission for Countering-Extremism (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018b) reaches those who have already been marginalised by the governments efforts in this area. The lack of legislative protocol from the Commission is critiqued in the following pages.

The exploration of the informant genre is, perhaps, the most pertinent to me due to my role as a teacher being recast in this genre. As is discussed in the introduction, it was my being cast in this new role that first prompted me to take an interest in ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. To paraphrase the research question being addressed in this chapter, we must ask if the informant genre can and should be contested? Critical Realism helps in efforts to answer this question as there are different levels at which it can and should (and, can’t and shouldn’t) be contested. As a professional requirement for teachers that is enforced by both OfSTED and The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015b), PREVENT must be followed by teachers. ‘Must’ as it is a legal requirement and overt refusal to follow PREVENT could result in teachers losing their jobs. However, it is possible for this genre to be contested in less overt ways. This was seen when my lobbying against PREVENT led to students – who had previously been silenced by the fear that the genre would lead to their being reported to the security services – being empowered to re-engage in political debate with me (see chapter 1.1).

A broader example of this mechanism to undermine the genre might be seen in The Royal College of Psychiatrists position statement on Counter-terrorism and Psychiatry (The Royal College of Psychiatry, 2016). The statement is written so as not to suggest that PREVENT is not followed – presumably to avoid accusation of undermining a legal duty – but a comprehensive critique and call for review of PREVENT is proposed. In the same way that my vocal opposition to PREVENT went some way to undermining the genre in my classroom,
it is possible that this statement from The Royal College of Psychiatrists might do the same in the consulting rooms of psychiatrists.

The difficulty in describing the semiotic helix was the next problem explored above. While the helix is used here to describe changes to the semiotic triangle over time, the predominant concern is an appreciation of change over time. This might be achieved with or without an awareness of the helix; though, it is proposed here that the helix might be a helpful way of understanding this. Thus, perhaps the priority should not be so much that we learn from history. Rather, to learn that we are in history. Doing so reminds us that we are engaged in an ongoing depth struggle against master-slave relations and such recognition is necessary if we are to realise our concrete utopia.

While quasi-independent civil society and their supporting budgets are described above as ‘perhaps the greatest problem to be explored in this chapter’, the discussion also suggested that argument might lead to change and freedom by revealing ‘the more basic, true, and autonomous order’ (Bhaskar, 2012, p. 228). The most recent manifestation of the Government’s quasi-independent organisations is the Commission for Countering Extremism. While the Commission presents itself as ‘a transparent body operating independently of government’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018a), it has faced much criticism from those who see it as anything but independent and Commissioner Sara Khan has, like the aforementioned quasi-independent civil society (Hayes & Qureshi, 2016), faced particular criticism for being a creation of the Home Office in articles such as, ‘Choice of new UK anti-extremism chief criticised as “alarming”’ (Grierson, 2018) and ‘New counter-extremism tsar Sara Khan faces calls to quit’ (BBC, 2018).

In a recent statement that expressed the concerns of over 100 academics about the Commission and that I drafted and convened (Islam21c, 2018; The Gulf Times, 2018), concerns were raised that the Commission had not engaged with recent criticisms of PREVENT that had been expressed by the Joint Committee for Human Rights (House of Commons, 2018c). In this context, it might be suggested that the commissioner’s evidence drive is a political tactic; with the Joint Committee for Human Rights having gathered evidence from genuine civil society organisations and this leading them to repeat calls for an independent review of PREVENT (House of Commons, 2018c), the Commission’s formation might be seem as a cynical move to gather evidence that is more aligned with the government’s agenda than the findings of the Joint Committee for Human Rights. While this might be a cynical move, the Commission’s attempt to emulate the legislative genre has led to ways in which it might be challenged and, perhaps, co-opted to lobby against the expansion of strategy to counter-‘extremism’ and this is now discussed.

The Commission for Countering Extremism’s charter is published on the government website and in a section titled ‘How it will work’, it is stated that the commission will ‘advise
and agree with the Home Secretary the Commission’s work programme and the remit and terms of reference for the studies it proposes to undertake’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018a). In a recent meeting that I had at the Home Office, I was assured that these terms of reference would ensure that any evidence submitted to the Commission would be published in their final report. This assurance was offered to encourage me and other critics of PREVENT that this was not a cynical exercise and that we would be heard and, therefore, should engage with the Commission. However, following subsequent discussions with civil servants, I have established at the time of writing that these terms of reference ‘are not yet finalised’. While the Commission may appear to be in the style of the legislative genre, this further investigation revealed that this may simply be a veneer as the Commission only proclaims to be following the expected protocols of the legislative genre. At the time of writing, I am in ongoing discussion with civil servants from the Home Office regarding the Commission and have explained that the genuine critics of PREVENT – many of whom are referred to in this thesis – have said that they are unlikely to engage in the Commission if they are not given enough time to scrutinise the terms of reference. Failure to follow the charter and agree the terms of reference might also be a way in which the Commission might be exposed as a sham and, at the time of writing, I am in discussions with politicians about raising these issues in Parliament.

Such detailed focus might be dismissed as pedantry but Qureshi explores the importance of such knowledge. His focus is on his work to expose the pseudo-science of pre-crime (Qureshi, 2016) which has been discussed above and about which he says,

Highlights how important knowledge is. We should not simply accept generalised assumptions that are made within the security context, especially, without a thorough investigation of what the terms being used are, and what science or knowledge base underpins those assumptions. (Qureshi, 2018, p. 191)

Going on to say,

Knowledge, as a site of resistance, permits us to re-own our identity, as well through language and narrative. Faux-knowledge, when applied to communities, serves only as a weapon to harm them (Qureshi, 2018, p. 192).

Thus, while perhaps pedantic, focus on the construction of ‘faux-knowledge’ via these quasi-independent organisations must be a constant focus for resistance of oppression. In the next chapter, the contribution of this ‘faux-knowledge’ to a concatenated crisis, ‘the crisis system’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205), will be explored in the context of my own activism and it will be proposed that appealing to metaReality might help resolve some of the crises and problems that have been explored.
Chapter 6 – Reflection

6.1. Self-Reflection
In which we self-reflect critically on our analysis (1-4), including considerations as to the interests and social positionality of the analyst

RQ5. Can and should RadEx be contested?

The various crises feed into each other: the ecocrisis exacerbates the economic crisis, which produces ethnic and political tensions, which threaten the international political structure or system; so that we have in effect the concatenation of the crises in such a way that they mutually reinforce one another. (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205)

The analysis of the preceding chapters might lead to the conclusion that I, along with others, are subject to the various logics of RadEx. That we are trapped in the vicious cycle of RadEx or under the constant threat of the New Penal Logic. While this is true, we are to a certain extent trapped, Critical Realism and the theorisation that has been carried out in this thesis indicates that these powers are not inexorable. The oppressive structures of power relations are not inexorable as they hide and are dependent on a deeper truth, as has been explored in the context of the dialectic pulse of freedom (Bhaskar, 2008). While inevitable, the pulse of freedom is in a dialectic with the master-slave relations that hide it and is thus not always realised. Bhaskar has suggested that we are stuck in a crisis system and this is what results in the apparent lack of a pulse of freedom and predominance of oppressive forces in the world now. He explores the ‘concatenated global crisis’ of ecological, ethical, economic and existential crises. Going on to elaborate an aspect of the existential crisis in ‘violence and war, terror and the threat of terror’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 204). This thesis has explored some of the generative mechanisms for the concatenated crises of the above quote and has investigated how they are mutually supportive and emergent from one another. However, it has also been shown that they are not inevitable and that the pulse of freedom demands that they be overcome. This chapter will therefore focus on what this means for my position as an analyst, activist, teacher and human being.

6.1.2. Crisis System
Described as ‘the crisis of the e’s’, ecological, ethical, economic and existential crises, each represents a crisis on one of the four planes of social being (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 204). They, therefore, provide a framework by which my own positionality (as a social being) might be understood, so each crisis will now be explored in turn.
Ecological crisis

While the research described in this thesis may not at first appear to be related to ecological crisis, there is some connection via my own positionality. Before I developed concerns about PREVENT and RadEx, my political activism was focused on environmentalism. I had taken part in mass protests against government policy that I perceived to be harmful to the environment,

Dozens of cyclists blocked a London bridge in protest at the government’s environmental policies…Protester Rob Faure Walker, 27, a teacher from north London, said the government was failing “in any way” to plan to reduce carbon emissions…Mr Faure Walker spoke out against the building of new coal-fired power stations and the expansion of Heathrow airport…”People have to realise that they can't live their lives the way that they have become accustomed to," he said…"We can't fly short-haul whenever we want." (BBC, 2009)

Taking part in these mass protests had bought me into contact with oppressive aspects of state power as I was attacked by and bore witness to the physical assault of protesters by the police,

Rob Faure-Walker, 27, a teacher who witnessed the alleged assault and has given evidence to the IPCC [Independent Police Complaints Commission], said police and protesters had been talking and joking amicably before the sergeant arrived. "He just burst through the police cordon, pushing a couple of police out of the way," Faure-Walker said. "He picked [Surridge] up off her feet and threw her to the ground. It is my opinion that she was lucky not to have been more seriously injured than she was. She had her back to him at the time, and was talking to someone else, when it happened. I've no idea why he did it. Even other police officers looked shocked at what happened." Faure-Walker demanded the officer's badge number, which was attached to his shoulder. "He walked around looking agitated for the next few minutes before I lost sight of him." Separately, a journalist demanded the officer's number after noting what he saw as the aggressive treatment of demonstrators around the same time. By the following day, when he was filmed striking Fisher, the sergeant's badge number was concealed. Faure-Walker said he recognised the sergeant as the officer who had thrown Surridge to the floor when he saw footage of the attack on Fisher broadcast on the news. (Lewis, 2009)

The incident described above led to my contribution to legal campaigns against oppressive police tactics (Al Jazeera English, 2009). As well as the more physical policing of protests, oppressive police tactics at the time included the undercover monitoring of protest groups and individuals. This was a frequent topic of conversation – and paranoia – at the time and these concerns were realised by later media reports that revealed that the police had been monitoring members of the same protest groups that I had been part of (Hattenstone, 2011). This surveillance of protest groups and individuals has had a part to play in the lineage of
PREVENT. This is of particular note following recent reports that PREVENT has been used to target environmental protestors (Pidd, 2018).

Thus, PREVENT has not only shut down protests against ecological crisis but has also distracted me from the very same struggle. This presents me with a visceral ethical crisis over how to proceed in the face of these multiple problems in which the pulse of freedom urges me to engage.

**Ethical crisis**

The ethical crisis is experienced as a sense that I am not able to do enough to respond in an ethical manner to the crises that I am faced with. As is discussed above, I was previously engaged in environmental activism, I saw it as a mark of some success when commitments to environmental protection made their way into mainstream politics as all of the main political parties made pledges to environmental protection in their manifestos for the 2010 general election. My concern for the environment was also a motivation for becoming a school teacher, training as a geography teacher so that I might be able to teach others about the importance of protecting world around them. This gave me a sense of ethical fulfilment. In Critical Realist terms, engaging with the ‘inherent value of nature’ (Calder in Hartwig, 2007, p. 186) through dialogic engagement in the problem of ecological destruction was my concrete utopia, was an expression of the pulse of freedom and enabled me to be. Given the importance that this thesis has placed on time, it might be more appropriate to refer to this in the German, *dasein*. *Dasein* is the word that Heidegger uses to refer to being and he dedicates a whole chapter of his seminal book, *Being and Time*, to the importance of temporality and historicality (Heidegger, 1926 (1962)). Though perhaps not an expected ally of Critical Realism, the importance of understanding language and meaning in the context of being in history that is theorised in this thesis might be seen as contributing to our understanding of Heidegger’s *Dasein* in the context of discourse and Critical Realism.

In recent years, my efforts have been diverted to engage in another ethical challenge as I have tried to lobby the government against the oppressive forces that are described in this thesis. While the work that I have carried out has led to an ever-greater understanding of the problem, and has in some ways helped to contest it, it has also created more frustrations and one of these is the aforementioned ethical crisis. This crisis has come about as I have disengaged from my previous environmental activism to engage in the work described in this thesis. While I have disengaged from environmental activism, my concern for the environment has not diminished. Though, perhaps an empirical manifestation of my own western upbringing, this leads to a sense of guilt and even hopelessness at times. This is how the ethical crisis is felt as I am unable to respond to all of my concerns as a result of my own limited resources.
An aspect of the ethical crisis, as described by Bhaskar, are life chances and opportunities (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 204) and these might be seen as closely related to the economic crisis that is now discussed.

**Economic Crisis**

Described by Bhaskar as, ‘the economy becoming disembodied from social structure’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205), the economic crisis has hit me along with other teachers in recent years and PREVENT compounds another economic crisis that teachers were already experiencing. Mansell (2007) has explored the recent obsession that governments around the world have with exam data and an aspect of this has been teachers being forced – in response to the precariousness of their employment – to focus solely on their pupils’ exam results, rather than on their holistic education. As Mansell (2007) and the House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee report on Testing and Assessment (House of Commons Children Schools and Families Committee, 2008) have explored, there is a fundamental difference between what is taught, what is learned, what is tested and what the test score is. Such a laminated ontology for test scores is, perhaps, obvious from the perspective of Critical Realism. However, the failure of policymakers to make these distinctions has resulted in teachers being compelled to focus on the test score. This compulsion is a financial one as teachers’ salaries are judged by the test scores of their pupils in the form of performance related pay (Mansell, 2007, p. 10) and school budgets are determined by the number of pupils in the school, their parents’ decision about which school to send them to largely guided by the test scores (Mansell, 2007, p. 116) – which are only in part related to the educational experience of the pupils and the proficiency of their teachers and, in any case, are presented to parents in such a way as to lack the statistical significance that would be required for parents to make informed decisions (Leckie & Goldstein, 2011). Thus, the money that teachers receive has become ‘disembodied from the real economy’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205), presenting a very real existential crisis for teachers.

I have been experiencing this existential crisis for the majority of my teaching career, constantly torn between providing my students with what I regarded to be a valuable education and coaching them to pass national tests – these two tasks are not always in alignment. This means that the compulsion that I and other teachers coach our students to pass national tests presents a very real existential crisis to my role as a teacher. That this pre-existing existential crisis is now accompanied by the informant genre that has been imposed on teachers by PREVENT only serves to compound this crisis as the interpersonal relationships between teacher and student that are seen as so vital to educationalists such as Buber (1923, 1947), Dewey (1916), Freire (1970) and White (2017) are undermined.
Existential Crisis

The existential crisis stems from teachers no longer being paid for providing an education to their students. As discussed above, teachers are now dissuaded from engaging in their students’ education, in favour of a narrow focus on improving their students’ ability to perform in tests, while also acting as informants on their students to the security services. The teacher or pedagogue has been replaced by a narrow-focused bureaucrat and informant. Callahan (1962) warned of this trend away from education and towards testing as far back as 1962 in his book, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Callahan, 1962). He describes this regime of teaching to the test as emergent from early management consulting of the 1910s to 1930s and the desire to measure. Mansell’s more recent work (Mansell, 2007) and my own experience show that these same forces are driving teachers away from a focus on the education of the child and onto the test score. The teacher and the education that they could provide is being tested and measured out of existence. While the interpersonal relationship of teacher and pupil might have previously been a sanctuary from this harm, it too is now threatened by the surveillance of PREVENT and the informant genre.

While trends in education more generally, alongside the PREVENT Strategy and the informant genre present an existential crisis for the teacher, the creation of the quasi-independent civil societies presents an existential crisis for the state. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, this quasi-independent civil society is drowning out the voice of real civil society. This means that the quasi-independent civil societies, which were presumably set up with the intention of supporting the state, actually destroy a mechanism by which the state would otherwise be kept democratically accountable. They are contributing to the destruction of the democratic state. The way in which this undermining of democratic engagement might contribute to violence has been discussed in the preceding chapters.

6.2. Challenges to the good society

Related to the crises discussed above are challenges to a good society and Bhaskar describes four ‘impediments to the realisation of the good society’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205)

1. the domination of the personal by the social, of enablements by constraints and of power by power;
2. the current imbalance between freedom and solidarity and the concomitant weakening of – and deficit in – solidarity and the sense of solidarity;
3. the atrophying of the public sphere; and
4. the increasing lag of moral evolution of the species behind its technological evolution.

(Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205)

Examples of each of these have been discussed above. (1) is seen in the undermining of interpersonal relations between teacher and pupil. (2) is self-evident for PREVENT would surely have been universally opposed and should never have emerged were there not a deficit
in solidarity. From the existential crisis of teachers, to the undermining of authentic civil society, to the rise in violence in response to the silencing of decent, the public sphere does appear to be under threat as is stated in Bhaskar’s third point (3) above. The forth point (4) has not yet been discussed here so will now be briefly explored below.

One of the most infamous online scandals in recent years has been the unmasking of the data and marketing company, Cambridge Analytica, and their possible illegal and immoral influence on elections (HM Government, 2018b). Accused of illegally using Facebook data to predict and influence the behaviour of voters in elections around the world, they came under scrutiny in the Press (Guardian, 2018) and this led to the questioning of a whistle-blower, Christopher Wylie, by Parliament’s Digital, Culture; Media and Sport Committee in 2018. Wylie’s testimony is relevant to this thesis as he reveals practices to influence voters that might be seen as morally questionable within a democracy. This is shown when he reveals possible connections between Cambridge Analytica’s parent company (SLC) and PREVENT, inferring that the government might have been engaging in morally questionable technological practices via PREVENT,

There is a quote from somebody who until very recently ran the Prevent programme... that doesn’t mean that [SCL] work on Prevent but I know that people who have worked on Prevent have also worked with SCL on projects. It is a question to maybe ask the Home Office. (HM Government, 2018b)

While not definitive, Wylie’s evidence suggests that there may be a nexus between PREVENT and the morally questionable technological practices of Cambridge Analytica, something that might be expected to be seen within the crisis system that Bhaskar has theorised (Bhaskar, 2016a, pp. 204-205)

Bhaskar writes about the ‘drive to freedom’ being ‘clearly identifiable throughout the world today’. He cites examples of the Arab Spring in 2010 and the Egyptian revolution of 2011 as examples of this. That these pulses of freedom have since been faced down by ‘imposing counter-forces’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 205) should not lead to a denial of their existence and Wylie’s evidence against the moral crisis might be seen as another example of the pulse of freedom.

The possibility for totalising depth praxis in the face of these concatenated crises will now be explored by drawing on Bhaskar’s final development of Critical Realism, metaReality.

6.3. metaReality

6.3.1 Transcendental Critical Realism

Up to this point, this thesis has tended to focus on dialectical Critical Realism as Bhaskar described in Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (Bhaskar, 2008). While this offers an effective challenge to the demi-real world of master-slave power relations that we tend to inhabit,
metaReality proposes that there is a deeper world of ‘non-duality’. Bhaskar initially explored metaReality in *The Philosophy of MetaReality: Creativity, Love and Freedom* (Bhaskar, 2012) but offers a more recent exploration in his posthumously published *Enlightened Common Sense* (Bhaskar, 2016a). MetaReality offers us a deeper understanding of the nature of being, so we might consider that there are ‘three kinds of domains of being’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 156):

(i) non-duality (metaReality)
(ii) duality (as explored by dialectic Critical Realism)
(iii) demi-reality (master-slave relations)

PREVENT and RadEx inhabit the world of demi-reality, sustained by similarly demi-real neoliberalism, the new penal logic and a pseudo-civil society. The critique that has been carried out so far in this thesis has tended to rely on dialectical Critical Realism, suggesting that dialectic or sustained logical argument will result in freedom from master-slave relations. However, there is a risk that the approach followed so far might serve to reinforce ‘the illusion that [we] are not fundamentally free’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 156); in particular, Chapter 5 may do little more than remind us of the nine concrete problems that are associated with RadEx and which oppress us. Thus, while dialectical Critical Realism offers arguments for the overcoming of these problems, it may also reinforce our own oppression by focusing on the problems themselves. MetaReality offers the possibility to transcend the problems by looking inwards to the metaReal self. Thus, I will first offer some explanation of what the metaReal self is.

The idea of metaReality had its inception in my reflecting on the moment of absolute transcendence of transcendental identification in scientific discovery or indeed in any process of learning or discovery – the eureka or “aha” moment. (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 157)

Bhaskar uses this example of an insight coming ‘out of the blue in a moment of unthought’, in which thought has been suspended, to show that there must be a deeper ‘meta’ reality than that which we think. This metaReality, or ground state, can be shown in four main forms of transcendence of duality:

a) transcendental identification
b) transcendental agency
c) transcendental holism
d) the transcendental self
(Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 160)

Bhaskar explains that transcendental identification has previously tended to be theorised in respect to ‘a small number of kinds of “peak” experience’ such as when engrossed in a piece of art or in religious observance (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 161). However, he argues that such transcendence can also be seen in more mundane and everyday acts,
But it has not been noticed that a related kind of transcendental identification is normally achieved effortlessly in everyday life and as a necessary condition for our perception and interaction alike (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 161).

He offers examples of transcendental identification in when we engage in a conversation and ‘you’ and ‘me’ disappears to be replaced by our shared consciousness. The same happens when reading a book, watching a play or even when reading this thesis, the distinction between the observer and the book, play or thesis disappears. This is even the case if one does not understand what one is reading or observing for the ‘fine structure’ of any interaction and perception demands this unity as is described by ‘transcendental identification’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 161).

Transcendental agency can be seen in basic acts that we do without engaging our consciousness. Examples of these are tying our shoelaces or driving to work; in both instances, we might carry out the task without being conscious of having done so. Our shoelaces are tied (assuming we are proficient at tying shoelaces) without thinking about what we are doing. And, we may be asked about driving to work and be unable to recollect the journey. Both instances lead to the question of what has caused each event or act to happen and ‘transcendental agency’ is the name that Bhaskar attributes to this unknown and unthought process. Similarly, in any act – such as writing these words – we can think and plan what to do but at some point, we must just start to do. Bhaskar calls this ‘spontaneous right action’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 162). In all of the above instances, a substantive act of agency has occurred that transcends our consciousness, and is, therefore, a demonstration of a metaReal ground state.

Transcendental holism is seen in teamwork; whether in a sports team, orchestra or in cooking dinner with a familiar partner, there are instances where we ‘effortlessly supplement each other’s activity’ (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 162). We can also see this on crowded pavements where we manage not to bump into one another, though we have not engaged in any conscious act of communication to coordinate our movement. This phenomenon indicates that our metaReality or ground states are connected, for we have coordinated our activities without consciously engaging in any form of communication.

Bhaskar’s fourth example of transcendence is the transcendental self. Bhaskar, in his concept of metaReality, ‘contends that we all possess three concepts of the self:

(i) as ego
(ii) as embodied personality; and
(iii) as transcendentally real self or ground state.

(Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 163)

The ego (i) is the self conceptualised as not connected to everyone else. Bhaskar explains the importance of this idea in the maintenance of ‘modernity and economic life’. However,
shows that such an idea is illusory for our existence is necessarily dependent on others for our physical needs and on previous generations for our understanding of the world. The embodied personality (ii) is what we experience as our self, it is not fixed as we grow and change with time. It is also ‘contextually variable’ in that our self might include our changing circumstances, desires or needs. The third, transcendentally real self or ground state (iii) is proposed in response to Hume’s assertion that there is no such thing as the self. Hume (1740) makes this claim in his Treatise of Human Nature, saying that as he has looked everywhere and can’t find it, there can’t be a self (Hume, 1740). Bhaskar asks in response to this, ‘who is saying that there is no self?’ Similarly, if someone is experiencing a fractured self and is ‘hearing ten voices’, we might ask who is hearing the voices? The answer is the transcendental self or ground state and Bhaskar suggests that this ‘gives an anchor or basis on which the healing of the split can begin’. (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 163)

The four examples of transcendence; transcendental identification; transcendental agency; transcendental holism and the transcendental self; are used by Bhaskar to argue for the existence of a deeper ground state or metaReality. As with all aspects of Critical Realism, this reality must be theorised from our actual experiences as has been done in the preceding paragraphs. Bhaskar proposes that the self,

must be analysed in a tripartite way as consisting in an absolute ground state, a relative and shifting embodied personality and an always illusory ego. This sets human beings the twin goals of achieving (or restoring), first, consistency between the embodied personality and the ground state and, second, elimination of the illusory ego. (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 206)

Achieving this consistence and eliminating the ego is a necessary step in overcoming the domination of the demi-real over metaReality. And, if we regard the demi-real as actual, the metaReal acts as ‘immanent criti[que] or a standing indictment’ of the actual (Bhaskar, 2016a, p. 207). Such an immanent critique of the problems described in this thesis; the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’; the loss of parliamentary calculus; neoliberalism; the new penal logic, the legislative genre; the informant genre; the description of the semiotic helix; quasi-independent civil society and its supporting budgets and the vicious cycle of racialised targeting of Muslims
exist within a demi-real world of master-slave, power relations. They are all contingent on a lack of trust, a lack of solidarity, a lack of understanding and the presumption of violence over peace.

Neoliberalism and the new penal logic are sustained by the acceptance of the predominance of the market and the need for winners and losers (N. Fairclough, 2000a, p. 147). Both the legislative and informant genres and the racialised targeting of Muslims relies on a lack of trust and solidarity and a presumption that violence will emerge if not controlled. The creation of quasi-independent civil society is an extension of this demi-real logic. While it has been argued in the previous chapters that there is a need to describe the semiotic helix and, in doing so, to promote understanding of the nominalisation of RadEx and the loss of parliamentary calculus, metaReality proposes that ‘universal solidarity’ is primary to these problems (Bhaskar, 2016a, pp. 206-207). Recognition of metaReality thus functions as imminent critique (of these problems), without necessarily having to appeal to the problems themselves,

The immediacy of hearing, perceiving, understanding, intuiting, reading, and so on, and more generally of ‘just seeing or getting’ a point is irreducible in social life. The semiotic triangle collapses in these moments, and reflecting on this we see that being is intrinsically meaningful and valuable and enchanted. (Bhaskar, 2012, p. 317)

As was discussed towards the end of the preceding chapter, I have previously faced criticism from a civil servant who worked on PREVENT for being ‘academic’ in my arguments against PREVENT and the discussion of metaReality here might reasonably be open to such arguments. They do, however, serve to reinforce the need to challenge the oppressive problems that have been described here.

Implicit in our understanding of metaReality is that there is a real world beyond that which we directly experience. Recognition of this helps to see beyond Weber’s iron cage of secular subjectivity (Weber, 1930) and, as the secular has been described in chapter 1.4 and 4 as a contributory factor in the emergence of RadEx and PREVENT, this may also be a further contributory factor in the undermining of the oppression described here.

6.3.3. Implications for the (metaReal) self
This chapter has explored how RadEx has reinforced my place in the crisis system. It has distracted me from environmental concerns, which has created an ethical dilemma as I struggle to respond to all of my ethical considerations. Economic incentives promoted through precarious employment and a focus on exam scores already presents a very real existential crisis for me and other teachers as we are forced to value test scores over pedagogical relationships with our students. This crisis has been deepened by PREVENT and the informant genre that inevitably further erodes these relationships.
The challenging of these problems is made difficult by the imposition of demi-reality, my time and resources are limited and the impositions explored above compel me and other teachers to follow PREVENT. While this presents a very real existential crisis to my role as a teacher, Critical Realism’s recognition of an ontology of multiple generative mechanisms enables the proposal of a concrete utopia in response to the crises. This is made possible by distinguishing between demi-reality and metaReality. In this context, this means engaging with PREVENT as is required professionally (demi-reality) while at the same time arguing for the dissolution of PREVENT (metaReality). Thus, while enacting PREVENT requires a split between one’s embodied personality and ground state, recognition of the distinction between the two might allow us to function within both of these apparently contradictory planes of reality. This functioning on both planes of reality has already been shown to be emancipatory and is now referred to.

As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the fundamental problems that emanates from PREVENT and which prompted my concern was that my students had been silenced because they feared that PREVENT meant that speaking out could result in their referral to the security services – they were being silenced by the demi-real world of PREVENT. My subsequent lobbying against PREVENT – perhaps prompted by the solidarity of metaReality or my ground state – undermined these oppressive forces and resulted in my students re-engaging in political discussion as they were emboldened by the knowledge that I was also a critic of PREVENT. While this example does not show that metaReality will necessarily always triumph over demi-reality, it does show that it is by no means defeatist to engage in contradictory projects within demi-reality and metaReality at the same time. Indeed, given the predominance of metaReality over demi-reality, this might not only be necessary but could also create a real generative mechanism for the expression of the pulse of freedom. While I was not able to boycott PREVENT due to the oppressive forces of my demi-real professional responsibility, I was still able to appeal to the universal solidarity of metaReality. Following this, perhaps ‘academic’ exploration of metaReality, results in the more mundane proposal that – to paraphrase the motto of a well-known sports brand – we should do what we can.
6.2. A brief reflection on CDA and Critical Realism’s contribution to one another

I have sought to show that work on a CRCDA [Critical Realist critical discourse analysis] is unfinished and requires more attention. Norman Fairclough’s CDA is the most advanced critical conceptualization of semiosis as a social entity and is in many ways in line with CR. Yet it remains insufficiently aware of its own metatheoretical foundations. (Flatschart, 2016, p. 49)

In the process of theorising an ontology for RadEx, this thesis has engaged with a problem that has also recently been explored by Flatschart (2016). In his paper, *Critical Realist Critical Discourse Analysis: A Necessary Alternative to Post-marxist Discourse Theory* (Flatschart, 2016), Flatschart critiques Fairclough’s Dialectical Relational Approach (DRA). While recognising Fairclough as the most progressive proponents of CDA (Flatschart, 2016, p. 40), particularly in view of being ‘the only major figure of CDA to explicitly work with CR [Critical Realism]’ (Flatschart, 2016, p. 23), Flatschat follows a similar critique of Fairclough’s work as is made here. That is that he suggests that Fairclough’s approach, in focusing on social relations, fails to engage in a historicity of discourse.

Fairclough’s ambiguous conception of social practice as ‘intermediate positioning [...] between structures and events, structures and agency,’ which persists throughout his CDA, can be understood as an attempt to address an important problem that CR faces — how to bring in historicity and hence how to relate social theory proper with philosophy of science. Fairclough’s concept of social practice thus seeks to address the desideratum of all dialectical theory — how to adequately acknowledge the fact that things (structures and agents) must be internally related in order to establish a societal totality, and how to address the fact that this necessitates a concept of a specific historic materiality that establishes the social synthesis necessary for such an internally related whole. The problem of historicity understood as such does however require a more general, elaborate and explicit treatment than the one deployed by Fairclough. His take on the dialectical internal relation of social practices does not refer to the character of the social totality and therefore offers no clue for a proper theorization of historicity. (Flatschart, 2016, pp. 28-29)

This criticism of Fairclough’s approach is maintained by Flatschat showing that the ‘analytical duality’ of the DRA is focused on structures and events, rather than structure and agency (Flatschart, 2016, p. 26). Flatschat argues that, as structures ‘may actualize themselves in events and become empirically visible…we find no analytical dualism’ (Flatschart, 2016, p. 26).

Working with Fairclough’s DRA, this thesis has theorised a semiotic ontology for RadEx and, in doing so, has presented a model by which discourse acts to ‘mediate the relationship between events and structures’ (Flatschart, 2016, p. 27). It is therefore contended here that, while there is more to be added to Fairclough’s theorisation of a Critical Realist account of CDA, Flatschat’s efforts to criticise Fairclough might be better directed towards
theorising the ‘mediating relationship’ that Fairclough points towards. This is the work that has been carried out in this thesis. So, where Flatschat says that ‘it is hard to see how and why it could be at the same time both a ‘social practice’ (and thus dialectically related to ‘social structures’) and a ‘mediating entity’ as such’ (Flatschart, 2016, p. 27), this thesis has explored and theorised what this ‘mediating entity’ might look like. And, in doing so, has theorised a possible real generative mechanism in the semiotic helix. This goes some way to answering Flatschat’s problem of the underdevelopment of ‘dialectical historical mediation’ (Flatschart, 2016, p. 28).

Due to Fairclough’s failure to theorise the real generative mechanisms that are discussed here, Flatschat describes his work as being ‘in the line of the Marxian concept of fetishism’ (Flatschart, 2016, p. 29). Referring back to the work of Foucault, Althusser and Laclau & Mouffe, who Flatschat claims Fairclough’s work has developed from, Flatschat’s critique focuses on the intellectual foundations of Fairclough’s work to suggest that the flaws of poststructuralist irrealism have been inherited by Fairclough. This seems a particularly reductive approach, particularly when trying to explore a Critical Realist ontology. Flatschat criticises Fairclough for the lack of historicity in his work but, in only looking backwards, might himself be criticised for his focus on the history of CDA, rather than on an understanding that we are in this history, as has been explored in this thesis.

Chapter 3 bought together Fairclough (2010, p. 235), O’Regan & Betzel (2016, p. 5) and Bhaskar’s (2016a, p. 109) respective schemas for CDA. Fairclough’s schema came first and he had started to develop a realist approach for CDA, in part, by his focus on ‘social wrongs’. This was developed further by O’Regan & Betzel (2016) who elaborated Fairclough’s work into a more comprehensive schema in their work that, like this thesis, looked into ‘extremism’. By bringing these three schemas together, it is hoped that this thesis has presented a rigorous theorisation and demonstration of a Critical Realist approach to CDA. O’Regan & Betzel contributing to the analysis of texts in chapters 4-6 and Bhaskar contributing to a theory of emancipatory praxis in response to the analysis and which can be seen in chapters 7-9. Bringing time into the analysis has added to Fairclough’s work, that may have been held back by a reliance on Gidden’s and his failure to describe change over time. This has resulted in bringing the semiotic triangle and Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (TMSA) together to form the semiotic helix. In Chapter 5, this showed a deep ontology and structure to RadEx. It is hoped that bringing time into Fairclough’s approach to CDA, to develop the methodology that is described here as the Temporal Dialectical Relational Approach (TDRA), this thesis has made a contribution to our understanding of RadEx and of discourse more generally.
While this thesis has made a contribution to our understanding of discursive change over time, the approach developed is not the only approach that attempts to do this. Reisigl and Wodak explore discourse in its historical context in their Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016), but the development of Fairclough’s Dialectical Relational Approach (DRA) here enables the theorisation and description of a more explicit ontology for discursive change over time. As critical realism attempts to describe change to the structure of society over time in the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA), the proposal made here that we need to understand change over time is not new to critical realism and has been explored in earlier chapters. However, by developing an understanding of semiosis, it is hoped that this thesis has made some contribution to our understanding of the ontology of the change described in the TMSA.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion
To conclude, each of the research questions is addressed in turn to summarise the arguments of the final chapters before recent developments in countering ‘extremism’ are reviewed.

**RQ1.** What discursive conditions resulted in the emergence and proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in UK parliamentary discourse.

‘Radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ emerged from a number of different discourses that were traced in the analysis carried out in Chapter 4. The words were rare in the UK Parliament until 1975 when ideological differences amongst politicians and the Troubles in Northern Ireland led to them being used more frequently. It is suggested that this was a time when neoliberalism first came to dominate parliamentary rhetoric and the prevalence of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ emerged from the ideological battleground that formed from the last gasp of the Left against the ‘discipline and sacrifice’ (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 7) of neoliberalism that was imposed by Thatcherism by the end of the decade. As well as emerging from the conflict between the Left and Neoliberalism, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ also emerged from colonialist discourses, initially applied to those calling for independence at the fringes of the diminishing British Empire, the words came to be applied closer to home via Northern Ireland and made the final leap across the Irish Sea and onto the British mainland by their application to the British Muslim population. While a focus on ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was revealed to be a concern of the highest levels of government as early as 2004 (Omand, 2004), the words were notably absent from parliamentary debates in the aftermath of 9/11 in 2001 and 7/7 in 2005. In response to 7/7, the PREVENT Strategy to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was rapidly drafted and deployed (Thomas, 2014, p. 476) but was not submitted to parliamentary scrutiny by the New Labour Government who had deployed it. This absence
of debate is a relevant trait of the discourse of New Labour as it ensured that the parliamentary calculus that might otherwise have resisted PREVENT’s deployment was not engaged.

The possibility of a strategy to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was contingent on the words’ nominalisation, a further trait of the discourse of New Labour that led to processes becoming described as entities. It is only having been described as entities that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ were able to be legislated against. Previously, they had tended to describe failures of government, so their use compelled the moderation of oppressive policy. By their nominalisation, they were able to become the object of legislation and, thus, precipitated the emergence of a legislative genre as politicians have since proposed that ‘radicalisation’ and extremism’ should be subject to legislation. This genre is further supported by the words having become progressively synonymous with violence and both the legislative genre and the inferred violence have resulted in the formation of an informant genre as doctors and teachers have been compelled to report signs of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in their patients and students to the security services.

The proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in Parliament under New Labour has been described as emergent from New Labour’s embrace of neoliberalism and as having subsequently enabled the unchecked expansion of a neoliberal logic by undermining parliamentary calculus. The style in which strategies to target ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ have been proliferated by New Labour and subsequent governments mirror the proliferation of neoliberalism via the control of funding to quasi-independent NGOs and think tanks and this has resulted in the formation of a government controlled pseudo-civil society that is undermining the foundations of British democracy.

**RQ2.** Did ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ tend to be collocated with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence when employed in the first publication of PREVENT (HM Government 2008) and in contemporaneous discourse?

**RQ3.** Has the collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence become less prevalent since PREVENT was first published in 2008?

Research questions 2 and 3 are now answered together as the analysis revealed a clear trend in the loss of collocation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with ‘violence’. Initially described in Chapter 4 where it was shown that the first version of PREVENT tended to collocate ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ with ‘violence’ or a synonym for violence, while the more recent version of the strategy did not. In Chapter 4, these observations were supported by corpus analysis that indicated that the loss of collocation of ‘violence’ or its synonyms with ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ was part of a wider trend in government documentation between 2008 and the present.
**RQ4. What are the causes and impacts of RadEx?**

RadEx describes the ‘violent discourse of radicalisation and extremism’ and refers to the emergence and proliferation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ from the early 20th Century to the present, and their nominalisation and shift in meaning to become progressively synonymous with violence between 2008 and the present. In this thesis, it has been proposed that RadEx – and other discourses – should be conceived in the context of time that theorisation of the semiotic helix enables. This means that the causes and impacts of RadEx can be understood as emergent from one another. This might be said of the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’; the loss of parliamentary calculus; neoliberalism; the new penal logic of neoliberalism; both the legislative and informant genres; the government’s creation of a pseudo-civil society; the racialised targeting of Muslims, and the previous failure of a theory of discourse to account for change over time. All of these problems have been described in Chapter 5 as both causes and impacts of RadEx.

**RQ5. Can and should RadEx be contested?**

The description of the nominalisation of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ and their theorisation in the context of time that is enabled by the semiotic helix shows that they might best be described as an aspect of demi-reality and in Chapter 6 it was proposed that they are part of a system of concatenated crises. While the demi-reality that has manifest these crises has come to dominate the universal solidarity of metaReality, it was shown that the demi-real world is necessarily emergent from a truer metaReality. This means the oppressive demi-reality from which RadEx has emerged, even in its suffocating dominance of our daily lives, is proof of the existence of the metaReality to which we must appeal. This is the pulse of freedom and it demands that RadEx can and should be contested.

At the time of writing the final chapters of this thesis, on 11th July 2018, the Commission for Countering-Extremism launched their ‘evidence drive’ into the Government’s approach to countering-‘extremism’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018b). In response to this announcement, a number of academics and activists who I am in frequent contact with expressed the view that they did not have enough trust in the Commission to engage with them and to submit evidence. Their fears resulted from a concern that the Commission had been set up to sell, rather than critique, the Government’s approach to this controversial policy area. It was felt that the Commission’s findings might have already been decided and that, as such, our engagement might be used to support a cynical exercise to create evidence to support and normalise countering ‘extremism’ in the face of mounting opposition from professional bodies (National Union of Teachers, 2016; The Royal College of Psychiatry, 2016), NGOs (Open Society, 2016; Qureshi, 2016; Rights Watch (UK), 2016), and
parliamentary committees (House of Commons, 2018b, 2018c). Seeking reassurance about the Commission's intentions, I approached and met with civil servants at the Home Office to discuss our concerns and was assured that the soon to be published terms of reference for the Commission’s ‘evidence drive’ would offer us the assurance that we would need in order to engage.

This meeting was in July 2018 and, in spite of the aforementioned assurance and the Charter of the Commission having announced months earlier in March that they would ‘agree with the Home Secretary the Commission’s work programme and the remit and terms of reference for the studies it proposes to undertake’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018a), the Commission was already 2 months into their ‘evidence drive’ in September and had still not published their terms of reference. This was in spite of the continued communication of my and others’ concerns to relevant civil servants at the Home Office that the terms of reference should be published as soon as possible. The Commission's continued failure to stick to their Charter and to publish their terms of reference led me to approach various members of Parliament and of the House of Lords to raise our concerns more formally.

On 13th September and at my request, the Bishop of St Albans raised a number of written questions for the Government, his position as a member of the House of Lords compelled the Government to offer an immediate response. The Bishop’s questions referred to the Commission’s lack of transparency and failure to publish their terms of reference. The Commission published their terms of reference on 20th September, 7 days after the Bishop’s questions were raised.

Having been told that they would offer assurance that would engender trust in the Commission, I reviewed the terms of reference on the day that they were published. The promised assurances that would have been needed for other critics and I to engage with the Commission were lacking and the terms of reference further dissuaded me from engaging for reasons that are explored below.
The questions above are taken from the terms of reference and raise more concerns than they address. Most of the questions are framed around the idea that ‘extremism’ is a harm that is to be understood. They ask about the harm that ‘extremism’ might cause and how it might be better tackled. This means that the questions that the Commission will ask do not address concerns for those who are harmed by counter-extremism, including the concern that the government’s agenda to counter ‘extremism’ might make us all less safe as has been explored in this thesis. As has also been explored in earlier chapters, the expressing of ‘extreme’ views may be a mechanism by which they are moderated and, in doing so, reduce the risk of violence. The Commission’s uncritical support for countering ‘extremism’ is, thus, supporting a government agenda that may be making us less safe.

In the forward to the Terms of Reference from the Lead Commissioner we are told that, ‘the first step is addressing the absence of consensus’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018c, p. 5). This seems a strange intention from the perspective of many of the political theorists who have been explored in earlier chapters. Arendt (1969), Derrida (in Borradori, 2004; in Isyar, 2014) and Przeworski (1991), among others, suggest that the absence of consent is what our democracy thrives on. The Commissioner goes on to say that the Commission will do this by, ‘building the evidence on extremism’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018c, p. 5). In saying this, the Commissioner is demonstrating a complete disregard for the scientific principles that should underpin this ‘evidence drive’ and which would demand that this ‘evidence on extremism’ be tested.

The scope of the Commission, we are told, is to ‘learn the lessons from previous and existing counter terrorism policies, including those under Prevent’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018c, p. 12). However, there is also a clearly stated intention not to review the
Prevent Strategy, ‘As outlined in our Charter, we will not be reviewing the Government’s Prevent Strategy or the proposed Integration Strategy’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018c, p. 6). In the context of Parliament’s Joint Committee for Human Rights (JCHR) recent criticism of PREVENT and the Government's approach to counter-extremism (House of Commons, 2018b, 2018c), the terms of reference make it harder than ever to see the Commission as anything other than a cynical exercise to gather alternative evidence in the face of criticism of their counter-‘extremism’ agenda from Parliament.

The Commission tells us that ‘It will help everyone do more to challenge extremism by building public understanding of its harms and impact’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018c, p. 7). When combined with their dismissal of the need scientific rigour for their study, this leaves the impression that the Commission is engaged in the promotion of ‘extremism’ as a threat, rather than in an audit of government policy.

Page 8 of the terms of reference list 6 different definitions for ‘extremism’ and this indicates that many of the aforementioned questions also need further definition. This is necessary before questions like, ‘What are the harms caused by extremist incidents?’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018c, p. 4) can be addressed. Yet the Commission does not show any commitment to seek the necessary clarity on what they mean by ‘extremism’.

The final question that the terms of reference tell us that the Commission aims to address, ‘What could a positive, inclusive vision for our country look like?’ might have been a good starting point. Such a study would show the importance of promoting dialogue and of helping everyone have access to public services. It would have had the possibility of finding that the Government’s promotion of Countering Extremism, Countering Violent Extremism and associated strategies like Prevent are silencing debate and reducing access to education and healthcare. They would have found that there is a risk that these approaches are marginalising the very people who they purport to support and, in doing so, may be promoting the violent threat that they say they are preventing.

Given the Commission’s failure to engage with these issues, their failure to adopt a stance that is a fundamental requirement of scientific knowledge and their commitment to the promotion of a counter extremism agenda that undermines our democracy and might promote violence, neither I nor other academics and activists who I was in contact with were offered the assurance that we needed to engage in the Commission’s ‘evidence drive’.

As has been referred to above, Parliament’s Joint Committee for Human Rights has been critical of Prevent and the Government’s approach to countering ‘extremism’. A central factor in their criticism has been evidence to the Committee form Max Hill QC, the Government’s Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation. Max Hill QC has been cited above as a vocal critic of the Government’s continued expansion of legislation in this
area (Gibb, 2017; Max Hill QC, 2017), so his contribution as the ‘terror watchdog’ might be seen as a valuable foil to the discourse that has been critiqued throughout this thesis. While it is not possible to know the Government’s motivation for recently promoting Max Hill to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), his tenure as ‘terror watchdog’ of only of one year is considerably shorter than his predecessors who respectively served for 10 and 6 years, and removes one of the Government's most vocal critics at a time when they are trying to pass the particularly controversial Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2017-19 through Parliament, a bill that further expands government efforts to counter-'extremism’ (HM Government, 2018a).

**Figure 29:** Tweet from Max Hill QC (Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation)

As well as from Max Hill QC (House of Commons, 2018c, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2017-19 (HM Government, 2018a) has also faced recent criticism from 9 NGOs who released a joint statement criticising the Bill’s approach to ‘radicalisation’ and suggesting that,

> The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill would restrict freedom of expression and press freedom, threaten the protection of journalistic sources, and undermine academic research in Britain. It would limit the right to access information online and it would sneak in a new, harsh border regime for Northern Ireland. (Index on Censorship, 2018)

Despite the well documented criticism of the Government’s attempts to expand legislation in this area, until recently, the Bill had received little challenge in Parliament, neither from MPs nor from the Lords; other than the aforementioned contribution from the Bishop of St Alban’s. On the day of writing, however, the Lords did offer some challenge in the publication of the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s report on the Bill (The House of Lords Constitution
Chairman of the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Baroness Taylor of Bolton saying that,

The Bill fails to respect important constitutional principles. Broad definitions for offences, excessive reliance on Government assurances, and barriers to proper parliamentary scrutiny are all deeply problematic. We urge the Government to think again, considering both the recommendations from this Committee and those of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. (Lords Select Committee, 2018)

This intervention from the Lords Select Committee is welcome as, following the analysis carried out in this thesis, we might expect there to be a lack of critique as the notion that we ought to legislate against ‘extremism’ is supported by the legislative genre that was theorised in previous chapters. The normalisation of counter-extremism that is theorised also suggests that we might expect this policy area to continue to be de-securitised as it is moved from the responsibility of the security services and to civil society, as is proposed in the Bill. This was also seen in PREVENT and the theorised informant genre and the further expansion of this logic can be seen in the Government’s rebranding of counter-extremism under the new banner of ‘Building a Stronger Britain Together’,

The Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) programme supports civil society and community organisations who work to create more resilient communities, stand up to extremism in all its forms and offer vulnerable individuals a positive alternative, regardless of race, faith, sexuality, age and gender. The programme allows organisations that share these aims to bid for in-kind support and grant funding for specific programmes that deliver goals set out in the Counter Extremism Strategy. (Home Office, 2018)

At the time of writing, the Government’s BSBT website publishes a link to the ‘Partnership Support Programme’ leaflet that is co-authored by the Home Office & MC Saatchi (Building a Stronger Britain Together, 2017). The Programme describes ‘in-kind support and grant funding for specific programmes that deliver goals set out in the Counter Extremism Strategy (Building a Stronger Britain Together, 2017) and they describe how they can provide this support with ‘strategy packages’, ‘website builds’, ‘training packages’, ‘casestudy films’, ‘printed assets’ and ‘social media campaigns’ (Building a Stronger Britain Together, 2017). This programme might be seen as a development from the more clandestine activites of RICU that Ben Hayes and Asim Qureshi describe in their report, We are Completely Independent: The Home Office, Breakthrough Media and the PREVENT Counter Narrative Industry (Hayes & Qureshi, 2016), and which is discussed in Chapter 5. While RICU’s work operated in the shadows to create quasi-independent civil society, at a time when the legislative and informant genres were still in their infancy, Building a Stronger Britain Together is coopting pre-existing
civil society into countering ‘extremism’ through ‘in-kind support and grant funding’. At the time of writing, Building a Stronger Britain Together had co-opted 124 civil society organisations to their agenda (Home Office, 2018). As it appears that the Commission for Countering Extremism is a cynical move to collect evidence to suit a questionable government agenda, it is perhaps not surprising that their recent ‘evidence drive’ has been directed towards engagement with the aforementioned co-opted civil society organisations, as is seen in figure 30 below, where ‘#BSBT’ refers to ‘Building a Stronger Britain Together’.

**Figure 30:** Tweet from Commission for Countering Extremism

Far from being an example of evidence led policy formation as we might hope for in a functioning democracy, the imposition of RadEx might better be viewed as a case study for policy led evidence. As was discussed in Chapter 2, this is of particular concern with regards to this policy area as ‘these matters [terrorism and its causes] are not merely a matter of academic interest but are matters of life and death’ (Smyth, 2007, p. 263).
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