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PREFACE

This volume is the second in the series of publications of documents relating to British–Hungarian relations, a project which was launched under the agreement signed in 1988 by Professor Michael Branch, Director of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, and Dr Ferenc Glatz, Director of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest. The work was funded by a twelve months’ scholarship grant from the British Council and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Without this, and also some additional finance provided by the School and by a private donor, the research in London which lasted well over a year, could not have been completed.

The editor, Miklós Lojkó, of the English Department, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, carried out extensive research in the Public Record Office, as well as in private collections, including the Lloyd George Papers. In compiling and annotating the documents the editor combined meticulous scholarship with critical intelligence. The result is a volume of documents which will be the authoritative work of reference on the subject for many years to come. The introduction, by the editor and Dr Tibor Zsuppán, places the documents (as a good introduction should) in their wider political context.

László Péter
Chairman, British–Hungarian Relations Documentation Project
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the following copyright owners for their permission to quote documents under their copyright:

The Copyright Officer of the Public Record Office for documents (which are Crown copyright and reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office) held in the Public Record Office at Kew;

The Clerk of the Records at the House of Lords Record Office and the Trustees of the Beaverbrook Foundation for the Lloyd George Papers;

Churchill College for Lord Hankey’s papers held in the Churchill Archives at Cambridge;

Mrs Lorna Headlam-Morley for J.W. Headlam-Morley’s papers in the Churchill Archives;

and Mrs Katharine Cobbett for A.W.A. Leeper’s paper in the Churchill Archives.

Finally, I must express my gratitude for the indispensable and generous help I received from my supervisors, Dr F.T. Zsuppán of the University of St Andrews and Professor László Péter of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of London. I also received valuable assistance from the archivists of all the archives in which I worked. Special thanks are due to Christopher Seton-Watson for helping me with some of the difficult biographical material. I am grateful to Radojka Miljević of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies for her essential help in preparing the manuscript for publication with great philological expertise. No part of the work would have been possible without the facilities provided by the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and the financial support I received from the British Council and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. I also thank my colleagues at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest for allowing me to be here on leave for one and a half years to work on this project.

Miklós Lojkó
EDITORIAL NOTES

Two hundred and thirty-seven documents have been selected for this volume from a much larger number of available documents from the period. My foremost aim in choosing them was to present a representative cross-section of opinion reflected in the sources. As, however, the decisions were made by one individual, it is inevitable that others would have selected different documents.

Notable documents are given in full. In order to save space I omitted those parts of the text which did not relate to the subject of the volume, or have been quoted as part of another document. These omissions are indicated by the note ‘extract’ in the title, and the sign ‘[....]’ in the text.

The documents are quoted in strict chronological order. When their exact date cannot be ascertained, they are printed with the latest probable date. The treatment of the spelling of foreign (non-English) biographical and geographical names presented some difficulty. Misspellings have not been corrected or indicated in the text when a justifiable alternative spelling was used (these may be outdated, non-standard, or foreign versions, e.g.: ‘Buda-Pesth’ instead of ‘Budapest’, or ‘Bratiano’ instead of ‘Brâțianu’) and when diacritic marks were irregular (e.g.: ‘Bela Kun’ instead of ‘Béla Kun’ or ‘Benes’ instead of ‘Beneš’). In the Index, however, the correct spelling was used.

When a letter is missing from a proper name in the original document, it is inserted, as in ‘Phil[l]potts’. If the wrong character(s) is (are) used in the original, the whole word is repeated with the correct spelling in square brackets, e.g.: ‘Béla Kun [Kun]’ or ‘Haupricht [Haubrich]’. When there is an evident misspelling throughout the text, the note ‘[sic]’ is used, e.g.: ‘Cunningham [sic]’ (for Cuninghame).

These conventions have also been applied in the case of English or French spelling and grammatical mistakes.

The minutes that often follow the documents have been copied from the covering folders of the files. In a few cases the document is quoted from a different file than the accompanying minutes, because the one on which the minutes have been written is truncated or less legible and a better copy was available. This is indicated before the minutes concerned.

I have often been unable to identify the author of a minute, either because it was left unsigned, or because the signature is illegible. In some cases, however, the author could be surmised with reasonable certitude. These cases are indicated by a question mark after the name of the presumed author.

The treatment of the biographical data of persons in the text falls into three categories:

1. Persons who play a significant role in the volume are treated in a short biographical summary in the Biographical Glossary at the end.
2. If a person only appears a few times in the text, and did not play a prominent role either, he is briefly described in a footnote.

3. No biographical data are provided about persons who are mentioned very marginally in the text, regardless of whether they are otherwise important figures or not.

All persons mentioned in the text appear in the Index.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS DENOTING ARCHIVAL SOURCES:

BALF     A.J. Balfour’s papers in the Department of Manuscripts of the British Library
CAB      Cabinet papers in the Public Record Office
FO       Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office
HDLM     J.W. Headlam-Morley’s papers in the Churchill Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge
HNKY     Lt.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey’s (later Lord Hankey) papers in the Churchill Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge
LEEP     A.W.A. Leeper’s papers in the Churchill Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge
LI. G.    D. Lloyd George’s paper in the House of Lords Record Office
PRO      Public Record Office (Kew branch)

ABBREVIATIONS DENOTING PUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY SOURCES:

LINK


GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS:

The following is a list of the most frequent abbreviations that occur in the text. *Some simple short forms*, which are in everyday use, have not been included. Cases where the meaning of the abbreviation remains in doubt for the editor have been indicated by a question mark.

- **A.D.C.** Aide-de-Camp
- **A.R.A.** American Relief Administration
- **Battn.** Battalion
- **Brig.-Gen.** Brigadier-General
- **C.B.O.** Contraband Office (?)
- **C.I.G.S.** Chief of the Imperial General Staff
- **C.O.S.** Chief of Staff
- **D.D.** Doctor of Divinity
- **D.S.O.** Distinguished Service Order
- **D.M.I., Dirmilint** Director of Military Intelligence
- **G.H.Q.** General Headquarters
- **G.O.C.** General Officer Commanding
- **grp.** group (in deciphers)
- **G.S.** General Staff
- **I.A.T.C.** Inter-Allied Transport Commission
- **Intd.** Initialled
- **I.R.M.** Initial Release Memorandum (?)
- **K. Kr.** Kronen [crowns]
- **Lt.-Gen.** Lieutenant-General
- **M.F.A.** Minister for Foreign Affairs
- **M.I.** Military Intelligence
- **M.L.** Motor Launch
- **M.R.** Military Representative
- **P.I.D.** Political Intelligence Department (of the Foreign Office)
- **P.O.** *Par ordre*
- **Q., Qu.** Query, suggested reply?, for action?
- **R.A.M.C.** Army Medical Corps
- **R.N.** Royal Navy
- **R.N.V.R.** Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
- **S.E.C.** Supreme Economic Council
- **Sig.** Signor
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<td>S.W.C.</td>
<td>Supreme War Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>tel.</td>
<td>telegram</td>
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<td>undec.</td>
<td>undecipherable</td>
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<td>W.O.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The documents in this selection cover Anglo-Hungarian relations between October 1918 and August 1919, complementing E.L. Woodward and R. Butler's Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, volumes I and VI in the First Series. The first quoted document dates from 1916, and the last from 1924. However, the bulk of the volume focuses on the period of the unsuccessful Károlyi régime, October 1918-March 1919, followed by the dictatorship of Béla Kun, the first Soviet republic outside Russia, which maintained itself for 133 days until August 1919. The period between the collapse of Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1918 and the establishment of the Horthy régime two years later witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activity, which is unparalleled in the history of Anglo-Hungarian relations, hence the importance of these documents.

The end of the Great War found the victors filled with expectations about the promise of a ‘New Europe’. The defeated, like Hungary, could only hope that this promise would be based on the high principles proclaimed by the Allied leaders, and spelled out so eloquently in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

The relations between Great Britain and Hungary, however, were not solely defined by the outcome of the First World War. Before 1918, Hungary, a part of the Habsburg Monarchy, had no separate diplomatic representation in London. But official contacts existed between the Hungarian government and, after its establishment in 1872, the British Consulate General in Budapest. British-Hungarian relations were friendly during the long ascendancy of the Hungarian Liberal Party in the late nineteenth century. They started to cool off after the turn of the century, and especially after 1905. This was because of the change in British foreign policy, which put Hungary into the camp hostile to Great Britain in the new political division of Europe. Also, the overall assessment of Hungarian internal politics changed in London. In 1905 the long domination of the Liberal Party in Hungarian politics came to an end and new forces appeared on the scene, such as the Independence Party, which questioned the Dualist system, weakening the stability of the Monarchy, which Great Britain and France considered vital for the balance of power in Europe. Changes in Hungary coincided with changes in the Foreign Office in London. A young generation of diplomats, who no longer shared the attitudes generated by the stability of the Victorian era, took over. They were ready to espouse the grievances of the non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary against the government’s attempts at
Magyarization. Hungary’s image as a country in which national minorities were oppressed was only enhanced by the scarcity of accurate reporting in the foreign press. But those who studied the question, the travelling Scotsman (Scotus Viator), R.W. Seton-Watson, and the Vienna correspondent (later Editor) of The Times, H. Wickham Steed, wholly embraced the case of the non-Magyar nationalities.

The War only strengthened these attitudes. Those who argued against the integrity of Austria-Hungary frequently referred to the oppression of the nationalities there. The Tyrrell-Paget memorandum, dated 2 August 1916, No. 2 in the volume, in advocating the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, brought this attitude for the first time into the realms of official policy. In contract, the scheme proposed by Count Mihály Károlyi of the Independence Party, arguing for a separate Hungarian peace with the Entente in return for a guarantee for Hungarian territorial integrity, was never considered by the officials of the Foreign Office.

There was no general consensus among the British politicians and economists about the virtues of the emerging peace settlement in Central Europe. The settlement was, in theory, dedicated to the granting of self-determination to the various ethnic groups which for centuries had constituted the large multi-ethnic empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey, the empires which had received their coup de grâce at the end of the War. However, the admixture of peoples in the region makes a clean-cut solution along national lines impossible. Virtually no homogeneous ethnic state can be created without a sizeable minority of another nationality within its borders. This was only beginning to dawn on British politicians after the theory behind the peace had been accepted by the victors. A few, including Gen. J.C. Smuts, J.W. Headlam-Morley, J.M. Keynes and L.S. Amery, had serious misgivings about the proposed peace settlement. Many also held the view that the newly created small nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe would eventually have to combine in a new form of economic and political confederation in order to survive in Europe (Docs. 27, 72, 124 and 179). This idea, however, could never get off the ground, as its advocates, both in the West and in the countries concerned, were unable to reconcile the many conflicting interests inherent in these plans.

Initially the British showed little official interest in Hungary, as the War Cabinet Minutes (Docs. 9, 10 and 13) show. By centralising the political decision-making processes, David Lloyd George considerably lessened the weight of the Foreign Office in forging Britain’s foreign policy (Doc. 8). Had the War not necessitated these changes, and had the Foreign Office retained more control, things might have been different.

In the event, however, the French went ahead with the establishment of their Mission in Budapest in November 1918, whilst the British were content with a Military Mission in Vienna only, headed by Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame, the former Military Attaché. The
French Mission in the Hungarian capital was led by Lt-Col. Fernand Vix, who encountered enormous difficulties in representing the Allied Powers in Central Europe, an area where revolutionary and nationalist movements brought to the surface tensions which had been smouldering under the surface for decades, and which received less attention in the capitals of the victorious nations than would have been justified by the complexity of its problems. On 18 December 1918 Vix received a telegram from his superior, General L. Franchet d'Esperey, which described Slovakia’s southern boundary three weeks before the opening of the Paris Peace Conference. Vix protested: such arbitrariness “was the first serious transgression of the [military] convention”. Meanwhile, in Paris, the members of the British Peace Delegation had not even heard of the Belgrade Armistice or Convention, which had come into effect on 13 November 1918 and was meant to be the basis of the relationship between the Allies and Hungary before a proper peace treaty had been signed. They would not do so until the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic on 21 March 1919. This curious state of ignorance about the Belgrade Armistice may have been due to the increasing Franco-Italian rivalry, or to French efforts to establish faits accomplis before the convening of the Peace Conference.

The attempt by Count Mihály Károlyi’s coalition government — which came to power after the swift and almost bloodless collapse of the dualist system on 31 October 1918 — to break out of the diplomatic isolation of Hungary by the Entente provided the first impetus for the Foreign Office to examine more closely the situation in Hungary and the role that Károlyi’s administration could play (Doc. 19), instead of their earlier held conviction that there was no need for contacts with the defeated nation until a proper peace treaty with Hungary had been signed. Károlyi’s note, addressed to the Entente powers via Stockholm on 26 November 1918, “begged all Governments of the Allied Powers to give them the possibility of renewing direct relations”. According to Károlyi, the Entente would benefit by recognising Hungary, since this step would in turn aid the Károlyi government “in keeping the young Republic of the People within the limits of democratic order which has always been proclaimed by the Allied Powers as one of their most important war aims”. Failure to recognise Hungary, the note added, would undermine the new democracy, as attacks by Czech, Romanian and Serbian troops, food shortages and disrupted communications made it increasingly difficult to control the situation. The responses given at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919 to Károlyi’s messages to the representatives of the Entente were, however, negative. The Entente could not prejudice the approaching peace talks by entering into diplomatic contacts with any of the defeated nations. The British Foreign Office endorsed R.W. Seton-Watson’s view, which had gone even further in explaining Károlyi’s rejection, saying that “there can be no further question of attempting to preserve the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary as Count Károlyi is
even now urging [...] for his declared policy, both in the past and in the present [has been] the complete incorporation of the other nationalities in a Magyar State”.

It was fairly late in the day, on 17 February 1919, that a member of the British Peace Delegation, Lewis Namier, proposed “giving any support we can to the Centre bloc [of the Socialists, Károlyi’s Independence Party and the Radicals] as far as purely Magyar affairs are concerned”, but without giving the impression that the British government “encouraged Magyar Imperialism” (Doc 33, minutes). Namier’s was the only voice, however, and the reports that kept arriving from and about Hungary, indicating that Károlyi’s authority was about to collapse, still failed to evoke a sympathetic response. On 27 February 1919 A.W.A. Leeper of the British Peace Delegation remained inclined to regard Károlyi and his colleagues as instigators of “agents [...] creating Bolshevik agitators among the Romanians and Yugoslavs.”

The reference to Bolsheviks who would pose a threat to Central Europe instilled fear in Paris, a fear that would grow into panic for many politicians on both sides of the Channel in the months to come. As the position of the French, Greek and Romanian interventionist army in the Ukraine began to deteriorate, a French recommendation, at the meeting of the Romanian Commission on 17 and 19 February 1919, for the establishment of a neutral zone on the western side of Transylvania (i.e. east of the largely Hungarian inhabited Great Plain) was accepted (Doc. 36). Although informed by the British Section of the Supreme War Council about this plan, the British government did not react to it, thus being less prescient than some of their American colleagues. Temporarily laid aside amid the Paris Peace Conference’s business, and after a pause that many historians still find difficult to explain, the scheme for this neutral no man’s land reappeared on 15 March 1919. Apparently the Entente Powers suspected that the implementation of the neutral zone plan would not take place without difficulty. They realised that in Hungary the zone would be interpreted as a means by which the French wished to help their Romanian allies to attain their coveted Western boundary, i.e. the River Tisza. In Belgrade, the Allied Commander on the Danube, Admiral Troubridge, placed his monitors in readiness (Doc. 47).

The Note on the establishment of the zone was handed over to the Hungarian government by Lt-Col Vix on 20 March 1919, with the requirement that it be accepted or rejected within twenty-four hours. The Hungarian government bitterly protested against the imposition of the new Zone which they feared represented the new political boundary. The Note was handed over in the presence of Allied officers, but the British were not represented among them. Members of the British Peace Delegation in Paris had to make do with interviewing Captain Nicolas Roosevelt, an officer of the United States Army, in an effort to ascertain what had taken place (Doc. 61).
On the following day the Hungarian Soviet Republic was declared in Budapest. Count Károlyi resigned (he left Hungary in May), and the Social Democratic and Communist Parties fused into a new Hungarian Socialist Party. Béla Kun, the organiser of the Communist Party in Hungary, formally People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, became in fact Hungary’s new ruler. The first actions of the new government were to declare an alliance with Soviet Russia (whose army was on the east bank of the River Dniester), and to reject the Vix Note, as it became known after the French officer who had communicated it. At the same time, the new Bolshevik administration tried to avoid the formal rupture of relations with the Peace Conference (Docs. 51-56).

In spite of the quick succession of these events, it would be wrong to assume that the Bolshevik take-over in Hungary took the Western peacemakers wholly by surprise. They had been expecting such an upheaval somewhere in Central Europe since the Spartacist putsch in Berlin in January 1919. It was to a large extent the perceived imminence of some such event that had prompted the British peacemakers, at least briefly, to entertain the idea of recognising the governments of Germany, Austria and Hungary in the middle of March 1919, in spite of the fact that no peace treaties had yet existed with these countries. On 19 March, two days before the Communist take-over in Hungary, Sir Maurice Hankey, the British Cabinet Secretary, had pointed out to David Lloyd George that the new small states which were about to be established were unlikely to constitute “a line of resistance” to Bolshevism as “neither the history, nor the disposition, nor the present attitude of these peoples offers any hope that they will combine to form an effective barrier against Bolshevism” (Doc. 49).

While some British officials in Paris automatically blamed the Hungarian politicians for the crisis following the delivery of the Vix Note — calling the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic the “most disgraceful instance of blackmail” — Lord Hardinge and Sir Maurice Hankey in Paris, and Winston Churchill in London, regarded the Hungarian events as symptomatic of the “Allies drifting without a policy” (Minutes by Lord Hardinge, Doc. 51). It was with such antecedents that Lloyd George and Hankey prepared the Fontainebleau Memorandum of 25 March 1919 (Doc. 58), which potentially could have been a watershed, containing as it did the suggestion “that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications, which can usually be adjusted by other means”.

In pursuance of the concepts advanced at Fontainebleau, Lloyd George managed to convince the Big Four that General J.C. Smuts should be sent on a mission to Hungary. It was intended that the South African soldier-politician should repair the damage caused by the delivery of the Vix Note (Docs. 67-71, 73, 76, 80-84 and 86).
However, as with the discussions on Bolshevik Russia earlier, the Hungarian 'jolt' to the proceedings of the Peace Conference was short-lived. It appears that General Smuts' mission was largely pre-empted. In spite of the British Prime Minister's suggestion that a more compromising attitude be adopted, the British Peace Delegation returned to the idea of a peace settlement without direct talks with the defeated nations. Given this background it is not surprising that the proposals, made by General Smuts on his return, were shelved. His recommendations contained the important provision that the preliminaries of peace (the basic principles of the future settlement) be decided first with the participation of the affected parties in Paris (Doc. 84).

At the beginning of April the Paris Peace Conference was entering its crucial phase. The onerous task of preparing the draft Peace Treaty with Germany was on the agenda, and the sense of urgency to deal with Bolshevik Hungary, or indeed with Bolshevism in general, dissipated, leaving the impression that the sores created by this ideology posed no imminent threat to the work of the Conference, and that they could be addressed by diplomatic or military means when the resources became available. At the same time, President Wilson's illness caused consternation and disrupted some of the proceedings. Bolshevik Hungary was put on the back burner for a while in Paris.

Soon, however, it looked as though Hungary had made a return at the Conference. An invitation (rumours of which had leaked out) to the ostracised Hungarian Bolshevik régime to attend the Peace Conference in order to accept their draft peace terms was sent from Paris. However, the invitation was not delivered, and it seems that the episode was due to an administrative slip-up (Docs. 104, 106, 108-109, 112-113 and 115). In the event, Hungary was not invited to the Peace Conference until 1 December 1919, by which time a régime more acceptable to the Entente Powers was about to be established. In contrast, the treaties with Germany (28 June 1919) and Austria (10 September 1919) were successfully accomplished, both countries having managed to achieve at least a partial mitigation of the conditions imposed on them in the draft treaties with regard to their borders, and the war reparations they would have to pay.

Hungary’s absence, however, led to the sanctioning of the *faits accomplis* created by its neighbours, even though the outcome fell short of their maximum demands. Thus, around three million Hungarians were assigned to the Successor States, those in Transylvania representing the largest national minority in post-war Europe. The British peacemakers were undoubtedly aware of the risks involved. Thanks largely to the incisiveness of J.W. Headlam-Morley, the inclusion of provisions in the peace treaties securing the basic cultural rights of minorities was made a precondition to the coming into effect of the new boundaries (Doc. 132). Still in 1919, however, the endeavours of the Scottish Churches to help
maintain the property and religious rights of Protestants in Transylvania had relatively little effect (Docs. 32, 44 and 66).

Contacts between the British and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, as well as various Hungarian émigré political groups in Vienna, such as those later forming the provisional government in Szeged, were not restricted to the official dialogue so far discussed. The day of 21 March 1919 was to herald a new approach by the British in the form of clandestine intelligence gathering by Secret Intelligence. The departure from Budapest of the French Military Mission together with the United States military personnel, in protest against the declaration of the Soviet Republic, left Hungary open to Italian foreign political ambitions aimed at counterbalancing the French preponderance in the Danubian region. With no permanent representative in Budapest, the British now stationed a naval officer, Lieutenant-Commander Friedrich Williams-Freeman, in the capital, outwardly to safeguard the Entente’s interests there. In fact he was engaged in the systematic collection of information on all aspects of Béla Kun’s régime. The scope and importance of Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame’s activities, as Head of the British Military Mission in Vienna, and a contact for Commander Freeman, also increased.

Almost simultaneously, using information reaching London on Hungarian developments — to which British reports from Budapest contributed — the Head of the Directorate of Intelligence and the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch, Sir Basil Thomson, began to take interest in the events in Hungary. In a memorandum of 31 May 1919, titled “The Communist Revolution in Hungary” (Doc. 133), which the Home Secretary circulated to members of the Cabinet, he emphasised that for the first time in Europe itself the Communist ideology was in a position to toy with its “experiments on a machine in full working order”. It would appear that Thomson referred to the fact that the Soviet Republic in Hungary had taken over a state with its administration intact (unlike in Russia, where the old state had been destroyed). For him, the lessons to be learnt were applicable to Britain (he was particularly concerned with Clydeside). The stormy events in Hungary had little intrinsic interest for him. Thomson naturally noted the significance of the Hungarian Red Guard Order of 26 March, and its establishment of a Secret Service to be used by the Bolsheviks to suppress “political intrigues”. Thomson, in preparing the memorandum, however, could only draw on information sent from Hungary before 14 April 1919. He was not yet aware of the continued build-up of the Hungarian Secret Police, though the latter caused increasing concern to the two British intelligence officers in the field: Williams-Freeman in Budapest and Montgomery-Cuninghame in Vienna.

Only a few months earlier, the British intelligence service had failed to change the course of events in Russia in the West’s favour (its failure marked by the arrest of R. Bruce Lockhart by the Cheka in Moscow). The
Hungarian circumstances were significantly different. Béla Kun’s Communists (whatever lessons they might have learnt in their early days in the service of the Russian revolution) could no longer openly defy the Entente. They would find that the affairs of Hungary could not, unlike those of Russia, be managed while ignoring the wishes of the victorious powers. Thus, on 27 March 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic undertook to guarantee the physical safety, freedom of movement and right to display flags and other insignia of the Entente’s observers sent to Hungary (Doc. 84). In the meantime, however, Ottó Korvin’s Secret Police and József Cserny’s ‘terrorists’ (or ‘Sons of Lenin’ as they were known) were always at hand to observe and monitor the activities of Entente officers in Hungary.

Amongst those seemingly, and perhaps surprisingly, unmolested by the Bolsheviks were the Hungarian trade union leaders who had established contacts with Entente representatives, most notably with F. Williams-Freeman. They had taken a passive attitude to politics after 21 March, but their strategy was about to change. For by the second half of April, large scale hostage-taking had started by the Secret Police, and the old blue banknotes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank had disappeared, while the Communists and left-wing Social Democrats virtually barricaded themselves in the Hotel Hungaria on the bank of the Danube behind machine-gun emplacements. These developments prompted the leaders and hundreds of shop-stewards of the Iron and Metal Workers, Printers, Bookbinders and Woodworkers Unions to discuss the possibility of replacing Béla Kun and the Communists by a Social Democratic government supervised by the trade unions. Initial contacts having already been made with Williams-Freeman, a mass meeting of shop-stewards on 29 May 1919 authorised a delegation to be sent to him to ascertain whether the Paris Peace Conference would recognise a Hungarian government formed and supported by the trade unions (Docs. 135, 142, 164 and 176). Kun, fully informed about these manoeuvres, disclosed that should the working class wish him to resign, he would not cling to power by terror. He endorsed counter-measures, however, to effect internal divisions among the Iron and Metal Workers’ shop-stewards and manipulate information published in the Socialist paper Népszava. Meanwhile, Vilmos Böhm, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army, appealed for unity lest the Army’s morale collapse. Kun was also helped by the fact that Williams-Freeman was unable to obtain from the Entente any response to the trade unions’ proposals. The union leaders made no further attempts to seek outside help to change the government until the end of July when things came to a head as Kun’s régime looked less and less likely to survive (Docs. 209 and 210). However, these efforts during April and May to replace the Communist/left-wing Social Democratic alliance also changed the way the British Military Intelligence perceived the Hungarian political situation. As if to signal the end of attempts to replace the Hungarian
Soviet government through local initiative, Williams-Freeman left the country on 18 June 1919 (Doc. 164). Subsequent British intelligence involvement in Hungarian events would henceforth be directed by Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame from Vienna. Montgomery-Cuninghame tackled the issue more vigorously and with more enterprise than his colleague before him. He drew the conclusion — which proved to be correct — from the generally passive attitude in Paris to Hungarian affairs, that, if needed, he could rely on his own initiative, and act without specific authorisation from his superiors.

The view of Hungary from Vienna was coloured by the presence of various Hungarian dissident circles there. The flux of events that had taken place in Hungary drove hundreds of opponents of the régime (like Counts István Bethlen and Pál Teleki) abroad, many to Vienna. A group of these émigrés, encouraged by Montgomery-Cuninghame, moved to Arad and later to Szeged in south-eastern Hungary to set up an alternative government.

Szeged at the time was under French occupation. No objection was raised by the French to a government-in-exile establishing itself there under the premiership of Count Gyula Károlyi, a relation of Count Mihály Károlyi. (Admiral Miklós Horthy, who was as yet politically unknown, became Minister of War.) The existence and political aims of this government were brought to light by a British journalist, and adventurer, C.B.E. Ashmead-Bartlett of the Daily Telegraph. Barely a month before his appearance at Szeged, he had been involved in the sacking of the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna, organised by opponents of Béla Kun’s régime in exile in the Austrian capital, and had taken his share in the booty. From Szeged, Ashmead-Bartlett brought to London the appeal and memorandum of the provisional Hungarian government, which emphasised that the Szeged government represented all sections of Hungarian society, that, once in office, they would be ready to comply with the Entente requirements: disarm Hungary to the level set by the Peace Conference, acknowledge Hungary’s new boundaries, and hold free, democratic elections. The usual rhetoric, demanding more favourable treatment of the question of Hungary’s future boundaries, was missing from this document (Doc. 140).

Instead of being passed from one Foreign Office clerk to another, the normal fate of such missives, the appeal and the memo were taken immediately to Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s political secretary, and from him to the Prime Minister himself. It looked as though, through the Szeged group, a solution was found for the crisis caused by the Bolshevik take-over in Hungary. Further negotiations after 23 July with Hungarian Social Democrats in Vienna were mainly regarded by the Entente as a means of gaining time while the Romanians crossed the River Tisza, and gradually advanced towards Budapest. To make the Romanian operations as rapid as possible, Montgomery-Cuninghame in Vienna was supplied with a remarkable mass of intelligence material by the Hungarian Red
Army Command, who were led to believe that they were thereby helping the establishment of a government by the trade union leaders. In the event, the trade union government, set up after the fall of Béla Kun’s régime on 1 August 1919 under the leadership of Gyula Peidl, lasted a mere six days.

Documents relating to events after 3 August 1919 (the date of the Romanian Army’s occupation of Budapest) can be found in Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, volumes I and VI. By way of an epilogue, however, and because they shed light on the subject of this volume, the editor has chosen to add a few documents dated after the historical period examined here. Docs. 234 and 235 bring J.W. Headlam-Morley’s reflections to the reader on the tumultuous days of 1919 from the early 1920s, when he served as Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. The last two documents take us to the first half of the 1920s, the period in which Miklós Horthy’s conservative Regency consolidated its political and economic base in the country.

So traumatic and chaotic were the effects of the Communist débâcle, that the construction of anything permanent in its place could not be undertaken without repeated involvement by the Entente Powers. There were Admiral Horthy’s Szeged Nationalists, Romanian occupiers east of Budapest, and a Habsburg loyalist, István Friedrich, briefly emerging as the head of a government in Budapest. Almost as if repeating General Smuts’ mission, Sir George R. Clerk, a high-ranking British diplomat was sent by the Paris peacemakers to Hungary in October 1919. Under his auspices, on behalf of the Entente, a coalition government was established there with the participation of the Social Democrats. In the middle of November, Admiral Horthy, commanding the only regular military force in Hungary, entered Budapest. His régime, which came into existence with British help, soon made Budapest, the seedbed of the Soviet Republic, atone for its sins. In Westminster, the Liberal-turned-Labour MP, Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, frequently asked questions as to whether HM Government was aware of the atrocities committed by various armed groups under the new régime in Hungary. The ministerial replies indicated that the government was reluctant to join in the general condemnation of these excesses. British military figures and diplomats were almost solely restricted to pleading for the lives of Socialists such as J. Haubrich and P. Ágoston, who had supplied information for the Entente during the rule of the Soviet government. Other prominent participants of the upheavals that ensued after the sudden collapse of the Dualist system, like Count Mihály Károlyi and Vilmos Böhm, were treated with mistrust by the Foreign Office throughout the interwar period, either for their part in those events, or for their suspected (and the suspicion was not entirely unfounded) association with Communism.

The agreement that Sir George Clerk reached with the various Hungarian political groups between 2 and 24 November 1919 reflected a policy that had derived from dispatches received by the Foreign Office in
London and the British Peace Delegation in Paris over a period of several months. The fiasco of the Hungarian Communists, and the fact that they had created instability in Central Europe, would not be forgotten. The Socialists were not to be trusted alone with the formation of a government. The Entente’s earlier support for the establishment of a democratic government melted away. While the British government, like other Entente governments, insisted that the election of the National Assembly in Hungary be based on universal suffrage, the main purpose of this close attention paid to the establishment of an internationally recognisable government seems to have been the need for the speedy formation of a government which would sign the Peace Treaty. The subsequent restrictions of the suffrage by ministerial order, in March 1922, elicited no reaction in Britain (Doc. 236).

As Hungary gradually assumed all the functions of a sovereign state, further interference in its internal affairs on the part of Great Britain or other Western Powers was no longer seen as desirable. After all, as the last document, from 1924, indicates, the régime established under Miklós Horthy, in spite of its excesses, proved to be a stable element in the new Europe. The British diplomats and intelligence gatherers had aimed at nothing more. As for the region as a whole, the events that followed the First World War in Central Europe found the victorious powers to a large extent unprepared and bewildered. The New Europe offered solutions, conceived in the circumstances of the war, and in the conference rooms later, which created at least as many problems as it settled, and in the long run could not provide the peace and security that its architects had hoped for.

F.T. Zsuppán
M. Lojkó
**DIGEST OF DOCUMENTS**

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<td>1</td>
<td>Sir E. Grant-Duff (Berne) to Lord Hardinge (London). Telegram. (No. not known)</td>
<td>2 August 1916</td>
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Reports Count M. Károlyi’s visit to Switzerland: requests further instructions. Minuted by Lord Hardinge, Sir R. Graham and one unidentified official.

| 2   | Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir R. Paget (Foreign Office). Memorandum. (Extracts) | 7 August 1916 | 3    |

The memorandum, the first of its kind prepared during the war, contains detailed proposals for an eventual peace settlement throughout Europe, which would serve both British interests and be conducive to a lasting peace. The specific areas discussed in the paper are: Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine, Heligolad, Schleswig-Holstein, Poland, Bulgaria, Thrace, Greece, Romania, Albania, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro and Dalmatia. It also contains sections on the ways of achieving post-war disarmament and on British responsibilities in the event of an inconclusive peace. As with other lengthy documents in this volume, for reasons of space only passages relevant to Austria-Hungary or Hungary could be retained from the original. Minuted by Lord Hardinge and Sir R. Graham.

| 3   | Lord Bertie (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (London). Letter. (Extracts) | 24 August 1916 | 5    |

Reports his conversation with King George V on 17 August, during which Lord Bertie expressed his views regarding the difficulties of concluding a separate peace with Hungary.

| 4   | L.B. Namier for the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. Memorandum. | 11 May 1917 | 6    |

“Memorandum on Austria-Hungary’s Inner and Foreign Policy.” Elaborates on the reasons why the establishment of a system of small, independent states in East-Central Europe would be in Great Britain’s interest. Minuted by L. Oliphant and A. Randall (?).
Accompanying notes to an advance copy of a report (not printed) regarding separate peace negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Encloses his memorandum titled: "The Austro-Hungarian Problem", in which he sets out his proposals for the creation of a Danubian Confederation in Central and South-Eastern Europe after the war. Minuted by L.B. Namier, A. Randall (?), and three unidentified officials.

Relates his conversation with L.B. Namier regarding arrangements concerning the Austro-Hungarian Army in case negotiations take place with Austria-Hungary about an armistice.

Expresses his views on the diminished responsibility of the Foreign Office for the conduct of British foreign policy under the contemporary constitutional structure.

Records a discussion about the question whether to employ a British division under General Milne's command in the Danubian area to counterbalance the French military presence there.

Reports that the Austro-Hungarian Government is seeking permission for their Legation in Berne to get in touch with the Mission of the Allied and Associated Powers there in order to discuss economic matters. Minuted by C.H. Smith, Sir E. Crowe, L. Oliphant and Lord Hardinge.

Records the War Cabinet's negative reaction to a telegram, which indicates that orders have been given by General L. Franchet d'Esperey for British troops from General Milne's command to occupy Vienna and Budapest.
12 War Cabinet Minute. No. 506. (Extract) 22 November 1918 22

Records discussion on, and the ultimate rejection of the French proposal that British troops should be dispatched to Vienna and Budapest together with French army units to maintain order in the two cities.

13 War Cabinet Minute. (No. not known.) (Extract) 25 November 1918 24

Records the Prime Minister’s expression of regret over the War Cabinet’s decision not to send troops to Vienna and Budapest: a resolution is made for further consultations with G. Clemenceau on the subject.


Reports the decision made by the French President not to proceed with the dispatch of French troops to Budapest, while the question of sending them to Vienna is left undecided.

15 Political Intelligence Department (Foreign Office). Memorandum. (Extracts) early December 1918 25

“South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans.”
Describes the existing situation and sets forth the British desiderata regarding the political and territorial settlement in South-Eastern Europe. Annex I was prepared as a separate memorandum by R.W. Seton-Watson. Minutes by J.W. Headlam-Morley, addressed to Sir W. Tyrrell.

16 From a French source to the Foreign Office (London). Telegram. (No. not known) 15 December 1918 39

Quotes General H.M. Berthelot’s telegram, which states that Hungarian emissaries are encouraging Bolshevism in Transylvania: following the disturbances that have taken place on the boundary between Hungary and Transylvania, Romanian troops have been authorized to take up positions beyond the limits fixed by the Armistice. Minuted by L.B. Namier.

17 M.I. lc agent, code named “G. 65” (Geneva) to the Political Section of Military Intelligence (War Office, London). Letter. 17 December 1918 40
Gives a detailed description of both the internal and the external aspects of Hungary's political situation, especially with regard to Count M. Károlyi's role.

18  G.B. Beak (Zurich) 19 December 1918 43
to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne).
Letter. (Extracts)

Reports his recent interview with visitors from Vienna and Budapest regarding the weakness of Count M. Károlyi's Government.

19  Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) 19 December 1918 44
to A.J. Balfour (London)
Letter. No. 972. (Extract)
With enclosure. (Extract)

Transmits O. Sargent's memorandum, regarding his conversation with two emissaries sent by Count M. Károlyi, who asked the Entente to get into direct contact with Count Károlyi to discuss Hungarian affairs: O. Sargent assumes that such contacts are unlikely to take place as they would anticipate the Peace Conference.

20  A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 20 December 1918 45
to R.W.A. Leeper (London)
Letter. (Extract)

Reports that, according to information received from R.W. Seton-Watson, the Ruthenes of Hungary asked for their inclusion in the Czechoslovak state.

21  Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) 20 December 1918 45
to A.J. Balfour (London)
Telegram. No. 2518.

Reports information received from the British Military Attaché's Department in Berne regarding the growing social and racial tensions in Hungary.

22  J.W. Headlam-Morley 28 December 1918 46
to Sir M. Hankey.
Letter.

Urges action with regard to the adverse economic conditions that have developed in Central Europe, though recognizes that he should not address the Secretary of the Cabinet directly.

23  Sir M. Hankey 28 December 1918 47
to J.W. Headlam-Morley
Letter.
Acknowledges J.W. Headlam-Morley's letter of the same date: while promising help if he gets the opportunity, he expresses his determination not to encroach on the responsibilities of Government Departments.

24 L.B. Namier
for Sir W. Tyrrell.
Memorandum.

Encloses a detailed report by J.E. Thornton regarding the situation in Hungary in November-December 1918, with special emphasis on Count M. Károlyi's role and the need for economic assistance from the Entente for Hungary. Minuted by J.W. Headlam-Morley.

25 R. Kimens (Vienna)
to the Foreign Office (London).
Report No. 6.

Reports his recent interview with Count Gy. Andrássy, in which the latter explained why he believed that supporting a newly federated Austria-Hungary was a British interest; he also appealed for troops to be sent to Budapest to protect it against Bolshevism. Minuted by H. Nicolson, A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowe.

26 Lord R. Cecil.
Memorandum.

Records his interview with Sir W. Beveridge, who, during his recent visit to Vienna and Budapest, formed the opinion that Great Britain should play a more active role in the economic and political reconstruction of Hungary: Lord R. Cecil considers that Sir W.'s opinion is excessively pro-Hungarian. Minuted by Lord Hardinge.

27 Sir W. Beveridge. Interim Report
for the Inter-Allied Commission for
the Relief of German Austria. (Extracts)

Considers that a movement towards an "Economic Confederation of the Danube" would be financially and politically desirable for the Allies; describes the fears of Bolshevism and disorder in Central Europe and proposes measures to be taken by the Entente.

28 H. Nicolson and A.W.A. Leeper.
Minutes on a memorandum
(not printed).

Contests statements contained in a memorandum, sent by Professor G.D. Herron, regarding the dangers facing the Hungarian Protestants in Transylvania.
Refers to Polish and Czechoslovak affairs as being only remotely of British interest.

Gives his views and impressions on the situation in Budapest, especially with regard to the inadequacies of the Government and the chances of revolutionary disturbances. Minuted by C.H. Smith.

Analyses the situation in Hungary, especially the difficulties resulting from social tensions and the unresolved territorial issues.

Calls the attention of the British Government to the dangers facing the Reformed Church of Hungary, as a result of the emerging peace settlement.

Reports information received on 8 February regarding political developments in Hungary consequent to the violation of the terms of the Belgrade Armistice by Serbian, Romanian and other Allied troops. Minuted by L.B. Namier, who, addressing himself to J. Tilley, stresses the advisability of supporting the ruling Centre bloc in Hungary.

On receipt of a communication from the F.O. to the effect that he should refrain from publishing his memorandum regarding British policy on Hungary, he reiterates his views on the subject. Minuted by L.B. Namier.
Contests statements in a memorandum written by Count M. Esterházy, dated 26 January 1919 (not printed), which claim that Count M. Károlyi’s Government is the near dictatorship of the Socialist Party, and urges the sending of British troops to relieve the situation.

36 The Romanian Commission at the Paris Peace Conference. Note. 19 February 1919 69

A note read by General Alby before the Romanian Commission: describes the proposal adopted at a session of the Commission on 17 February regarding the establishment of a Neutral Zone between the Hungarian and Romanian armies in Transylvania.

37 Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall to General H. Wilson? Letter. 22 February 1919 70

Accompanying notes to a map (not printed) showing the British proposal for the Neutral Zone to be established in Transylvania.

38 Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (London). Letter. No. 115 24 February 1919 71

Reports the content of a letter, dated 2 February 1919, sent by Count M. Károlyi to Count P. Pálffy, regarding the social and economic crisis in Hungary. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowe.

39 Unidentified F.O. official to Earl Curzon. With enclosure. 26 and 73 27 February 1919

Quotes and comments on an American source reporting alleged statements made by Col. T. Cuninghame to Socialist members of the Hungarian Government regarding Allied impatience with the way the question of Bolshevism is treated in Hungary. Enclosed is the American Aide Memoire.

40 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to the Foreign Office (London). Letter/Memorandum. No. T.C. 118. 27 February 1919 74


41 General W.H. Greenly (Bucharest) to I. Malcolm (?Paris). February 1919 80

Reports that Romanian leaders believe that undue sympathy is shown by the Allies, and especially Great Britain, towards the wishes of the Hungarians and the Bulgarians. Urges steps which would alter this image.
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<td>Sir C. Kennard (Stockholm)</td>
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<td>to Earl Curzon (London)</td>
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<td>Reports an interview with Dr J. Ludwig, representative of the National Council of the Hungarians of Transylvania, who stressed the need for a statement by the Governments of the Entente indicating that they are in favour of establishing a representative government in Hungary. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and an unidentified official.</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites</td>
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<td>to Lord Hardinge.</td>
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<td>Memorandum.</td>
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<td>Reports his and the British General Staff’s objections to the inclusion of the Island of Grosse Schütt (Csallóköz) in Czechoslovakia. Minuted by H. Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe and Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall.</td>
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<td>L. Mallet (Paris) (for A.J. Balfour)</td>
<td>8 and 13 March 1919</td>
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<td>to Earl Curzon (London).</td>
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<td>Letter. No. 199. With enclosure.</td>
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<td>Suggests reply to be given to an earlier communication received from the General Presbyterian Alliance regarding the dangers facing the Reformed Church of Hungary. Enclosed is the reply sent from the F.O. to the General Presbyterian Alliance, signed by G.S. Spicer.</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).</td>
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<td>Letter.</td>
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<td>Reports information obtained privately regarding contacts between the Hungarian and Italian Governments.</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>T. Fullham’s answers to two questionnaires prepared by M.I. 3. b.</td>
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<td>Answers questions relating to the Hungarian Army; Count M. Károlyi; the idea of a Danubian Confederation; territorial questions; the popularity of the British; and the stability of the Government in Hungary. Minuted by C.H. Smith, L.B. Namier and an unidentified official.</td>
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<td>Letter. (Extract)</td>
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<td>Reports information conveyed to him by the French Chief of Staff about instructions that have been received from the Peace Conference regarding the establishment of a Neutral Zone between Romanians and Hungarians in</td>
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Transylvania, and comments on the part that the British are required to play in connection with this plan. Minuted by an unidentified member of the Political Intelligence Department.

48 G. Spicer (London) (for Earl Curzon) 18 March 1919 90
   to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
   Letter/Memorandum. No. 1473. (Extracts)

Agrees with the content of one of Col. T. Cuninghame’s telegrams, and advises that the Entente should recognize the Governments of Austria and Hungary, as that move would be an effective deterrent against the spread of Bolshevism; proposes ways of resolving the conflicts between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowe, and initialled by Lt.-Col. J. Cornwall.

49 Sir M. Hankey to D. Lloyd George. 19 March 1919 92
   Memorandum. (Extract)

Wars that the system of independent, small states, which is to be established in Central and South-Eastern Europe, is unlikely to act as a successful line of resistance against the spread of Bolshevism. Annotated by Lord Hankey in 1951.

50 Unidentified writer. Notes for the c. beginning of 93
   War Cabinet. March 1919

“Notes regarding the demarcation line between Hungary and Roumania in Transylvania.”

51 General L. Franchet d’Esperey (Constantinople) to Marshal F. Foch (Paris).
   Telegram. Nos 746, 747, 748. (Extract)

Reports the resignation of the Hungarian Government after receiving notification of the new demarcation lines imposed on Hungary by the Peace Conference; the Hungarian Right presented an alternative proposal: alliance with the Entente against the Russian Bolsheviks, while the present lines of demarcation are kept, or the Hungarians ally themselves with the Bolsheviks. Minuted by A.W.A. Keeper, Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge and Maj.-Gen. Thwaites. Also enclosed is a minute by L.B. Namier on a memorandum (not printed).

52 War Office. Summary of Intelligence. 22 March 1919 96
   19th Series, No. 16. (Extract)

Reports on the prospects of a Bolshevik take-over in Hungary.
53 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London). Telegram. No. 116. 22 March 1919 97

Reports that Count M. Károlyi's Government has fallen, and a Soviet Government has been formed in Hungary.

54 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to Captain V.H. Haggard (Budapest). Letter. No. 299. 22 March 1919 97

Briefs Captain V. Haggard about the situation in Hungary, and gives him instructions for his mission to Budapest, where he is to ensure the safety of the Allied Missions.

55 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London). Telegram. No. 117. 24 March 1919 99

Reports that the revolutionary government at Budapest has declared Bolshevik war against Serbia and is said to have opened the frontiers with Russia.

56 War Office. Summary of Intelligence. 24 March 1919 99
19th Series, No. 17. (Extracts)

Reports the circumstances of the recent political changes in Hungary, and provides a brief description of some of the members of the new government. Minuted by Brig.-Gen. (?) Thomson and an unidentified official.


Reports heated discussion in the War Cabinet about the question of equipping the Romanian Army.

58 D. Lloyd George and Sir M. Hankey. Memorandum. (Extracts) 25 March 1919 102

"Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms"; also known as the "Fontainebleau Memorandum". States that while large Irredentas remain, peace and resistance to Bolshevism cannot be achieved in Central and Eastern Europe.

59 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London). Letter. (Extract) 25 March 1919 103
States that Hungarian Bolshevism is not disinterested, but rooted in nationalism.

60 Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (London). 26 March 1919 104
Telegram. No. 533.

Reports that Professor H. Lammasch shares the view that the Bolshevik takeover in Hungary is the result of a nationalist manoeuvre engineered by Count M. Károlyi. Minuted by C.H. Smith and G. Spicer.

61 Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites. 27 March 1919 105
Memorandum.


62 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Admiralty (London). 27 March 1919 108
Telegram. No. ?923.

Seeks permission from the Peace Conference to proceed to Budapest and implement a scheme there, whereby he hopes to check the further strengthening of the Bolshevik system. Minuted by an unidentified official.

63 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty (London). 28 March 1919 109
Letter. No. 322. With enclosure.

Reports on Captain V. Haggard’s mission to Budapest. Enclosed is a message received on board the monitor “Enns” on 23 March 1919 from a representative of the Bolshevik Government in Budapest.

64 Sir W. Townley (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (London). 28 March 1919 112
Letter. No. 81 (Extract)

Reports Dr. Leipnik’s impressions of the situation in Hungary after his recent visit there.

65 Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to A.J. Balfour (London) 28 March 1919 113
Relying on British sources, reports on the circumstances of the fall of Count M. Károlyi’s Government, and the events that immediately followed the change in leadership.

66 An unidentified clerk. 28 March 1919 113
Minutes on a document.

Suggests reply to be given to two memoranda received from the United Free Church of Scotland on 19 March 1919 regarding the welfare of, and assistance to be given to the Hungarian Reformed Church.

67 Sir M. Hankey to A.J. Balfour. 29 March 1919 114
Memorandum. With enclosure.

Encloses an Aide Memoire presented by Béla Kun to Prince Borghese in Budapest on 24 March for communication to the Peace Conference, and reports the Prime Minister’s suggestion that General J.C. Smuts could be sent on a mission to Hungary.

68 General J.C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George. 31 March 1919 116
Letter.

Enquires whether his envisaged mission to Budapest might not also be used for discussions with representatives of the Russian Bolsheviks.

69 Sir M. Hankey (Paris) 1 April 1919 117
to Earl Curzon (London).
Letter. (Extract)

Reports the Council of Four’s decision to send General J.C. Smuts on a mission to Hungary.

70 Council of Four. Resolution. 1 April 1919 118
Resolutions and instructions to General Smuts with regard to his mission to Hungary.

71 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) 1 April 1919 119
to R.W.A. Leeper (London).
Letter. (Extracts)

Writes about the preparations for, and his personal feelings about General Smuts’ forthcoming mission to Hungary.

72 Sir W. Townley (The Hague) 1 and 5 April 1919 120
to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram No. 15.
With enclosure.
Forwards a message from Dr. Leipnik for Lord Hardinge concerning a scheme that Dr. L. has discussed with Count M. Károlyi, which is directed at the preservation of the economic unity of the former territories of the Dual Monarchy, and which enjoys the support of Béla Kun’s Government as well. Minuted by E.G.F. Adam, Sir E. Crowe and Lord Hardinge. Enclosed is a telegram sent to General Smuts, forwarding the above dispatch and asking his views about it.

73  Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to  General J.C. Smuts (Vienna and Budapest)  
     Telegram. Nos 1 and 2. With enclosure.

Communicates amended instructions to General Smuts for his mission to Hungary. Enclosed is a letter from Sir M. Hankey to General Smuts, explaining the background of the amended instructions.

74  Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London).  
     Telegram. No. 138.

Reports contacts between Béla Kun and the Allied Headquarters, which reveal that the new Hungarian Government’s policy is not based on the principle of territorial integrity. Minuted by an unidentified official.

75  I. Brătianu to M.P. Dutasta.  
     Letter. With enclosure.

Encloses a telegram from Bucharest, dated 31 March 1919, asking Dutasta to bring it to the notice of the Supreme Council: the telegram calls for the enforcement of the newly established demarcation line on Hungary so that Romania can maintain her resistance against Russian Bolshevism in the east.

76  A.W.A. Leeper (Vienna) to R.W.A. Leeper (London).  
     Letter. (Extracts)

Writes about his experiences and impressions from General Smuts’ mission on the eve of their departure for Budapest.

77  Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty (London). Letter. No. 332.

Gives an account of Captain V. Haggard’s mission to Budapest (22-26 March 1919), and comments on the weak position of the new Hungarian Government.

Reports Allied proposals for dealing with the situation in Hungary, and stresses the need to support Romania as it is an important factor in the fight against Bolshevism.

79 I.C. Brătianu to D. Lloyd George. Letter.

Expresses his disappointment at not having been informed about the plan to send General Smuts on a mission to Hungary, and about the intended extension of the mission to Romania.


Gives an account of his negotiations with Béla Kun.

81 General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 3.

Reports his further negotiations with members of the Hungarian Government.


Orders General Smuts to proceed to the French and Romanian headquarters.

83 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London). Letter. (Extract)

On his return from the Smuts Mission, relates how the Mission missed the telegram ordering them to Bucharest, Belgrade and Constantinople.


85  General de Lobit?  
Memorandum.  
10 April 1919  
151  
Discusses internal and external aspects of the Bolshevik transformation in Hungary, and urges the Entente to support the Szeklers in their effort to overthrow the Government in Budapest. Minuted by Major H.W. Temperley and Sir E. Crowe.

86  A.W.A. Leeper (Paris)  
to R.W.A. Leeper (London).  
Letter. (Extract)  
13 April 1919  
153  
Believes, with hindsight, that General Smuts' mission was a failure.

87  G.N. Barnes to D. Lloyd George.  
Letter. (Extract)  
c. 13 April 1919  
153  
Suggests that General Smuts' recent mission to Hungary could be exploited further to arrange contacts with Russian Bolsheviks.

88  Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade)  
to the Secretary of the Admiralty.  
Letter. No. 388. With two enclosures.  
14 April 1919  
154  
Forwards two reports by Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, regarding the situation in Hungary after General Smuts' mission.

89  Brig.-Gen. E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade)  
Letter. (Extract)  
15 April 1919  
159  
Reports his conversation with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, held on 13 April, during which the latter envisaged a personal role for himself in organizing the removal of the Government in Budapest.

90  Lord Derby (Paris)  
to the Foreign Office (London).  
Telegram. No. 631.  
16 April 1919  
159  
Forwards a telegram received from Bucharest, dated 13 April, concerning the discontent in Romania with the continued non-compliance by the Hungarians with the Allied note regarding the demarcation line in Transylvania, and with the proposals that General Smuts made during his recent visit to Hungary.

91  Earl Curzon (London)  
to A.J. Balfour (Paris).  
Telegram. No. 2323.  
17 April 1919  
160
Enquires whether the Foreign Secretary approves of a French proposal for the supply of coal to Budapest. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe, H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, B. (?) Hanson and H. Nicolson. The minutes enquire how the results of General Smuts’ mission are relevant to the question raised in the telegram.

92 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 19 April 1919 162

to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 218.

Reports his contacts with anti-Government forces in Hungary seeking the tacit support of the British Government to recognize peasants against Communists. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper and Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall.

93 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 20 April 1919 163

to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 557x.

Reports information received from Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman regarding plans for a counter-revolution in Hungary, the organizers of which seek recognition by the Allies. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe and Lord Hardinge.

94 Béla Kun (Budapest) 21 April 1919 164

to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram.

Offers to accept full responsibility for the fulfilment of an agreement reached with General Smuts regarding property owned by foreigners.

95 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 22 April 1919 164

to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 240.

Reports the visit of a Hungarian Minister to Vienna, who invited him to go to Budapest to discuss the situation there: he is planning to leave for Budapest the next day. Minuted by H. Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, and an unidentified official, who all discourage his planned visit to Budapest.

96 A.J. Balfour (Paris) 24 April 1919 165

to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna).
Telegram. (No. not known)

Forwards an order from Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, calling Col. Sir T. to refrain from becoming involved in the political power struggle either in Vienna or in Budapest. (Signed by Lt.-Col. J.H.M. Cornwall on A.J. Balfour’s behalf.)
Forwards reports by Sir C. Kennard (Stockholm) regarding the effects that General Smuts' mission has had in Hungary.

Comments on the Romanian advance in Transylvania, and criticizes the American Relief Administration for overriding the Allied military authorities.

Proposes the withdrawal of the last four British battalions from the Italian theatre. Minuted by Sir E. Crowe, Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, Lord Hardinge and an unidentified official. Maj.-Gen. Thwaites announces that the Prime Minister has ordered the Fiume battalion to remain in Italy.

Forwards Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman's report from Budapest, sent to Admiral Troubridge, about the deteriorating situation in Budapest and Béla Kun's readiness to give up power to moderate Socialists.

Reports quiet in Budapest, but continued unrest in the Hungarian countryside.

Reports Béla Kun's statement to a British agent regarding his willingness to accept a Socialist government. Minuted by H. Nicolson.
Reports preparations for a possible Allied advance on Budapest; the mining of the Danube by the Hungarians, and comments on the importance of Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s presence in Budapest. Enclosed is a message from the Hungarian Government, informing Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman that the clearing of the Danube of mines has already started.

104 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 3 May 1919 174
   to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
   Telegram. No. 264.


105 C. Gosling (Prague) 3 May 1919 176
   to the Foreign Office (London).
   Telegram. No. 77A.

Reports that Czech detachments have crossed the demarcation line with Hungary in the south.

106 General Sir H. Wilson (Paris) 4 May 1919 177
   to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna).
   Draft telegram.

Orders Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to take no action with regard to the invitation of the Hungarian delegates to the Peace Conference without further instructions from Paris.

107 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 4 May 1919 177
   to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
   Telegram. No. 267.

Reports Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s telephone message from Budapest regarding the situation there, and Professor P. Brown’s departure to Szolnok to mediate between Béla Kun and the Romanian authorities.

108 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 5 May 1919 178
   to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
   Telegram. No. 268.

Reports negotiations between an Italian representative and Béla Kun regarding a proposal for the occupation of Budapest by Czech troops under an Italian officer: Béla Kun refused the proposal; Major Borrow arrived in Budapest with the invitation to the Hungarian delegates, but will not present it without orders from H. Allizé.
Reports recent developments in Hungary, and the fact that he has received instructions from H. Allizé to order Major Borrow to present the note of invitation to Hungarian delegates the next day, unless instructions to the contrary are received from Paris. Minuted by H. Nicolson.

Reports Col. J. Wedgwood’s private notice question in the House of Commons regarding British policy on Hungary, especially the alleged suppression by Allied troops of the revolutionary Government, and requests answer to the question. Minuted (in London) by C.H. Smith, and (in Paris) by H. Nicolson, who suggests a reply to be given, Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, A.J Balfour and P. Kerr. H. Nicolson’s reply is based on the false presumption that Béla Kun’s Government has fallen.

Forwards a telegram received from Bucharest regarding the reasons put forward by the Romanian Government for advancing to the line of the River Tisza, and their demand for the occupation of Budapest by Allied troops. Minuted by C.H. Smith and H. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

Reports that the invitation for Hungarian delegates to the Peace Conference has not been presented.

Reports that Major Borrow returned from Budapest, leaving the note of invitation for Hungarian delegates with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman; other aspects of the unfolding situation in Hungary are also commented on.
Records the impressions he gained during his recent visit about various aspects of life in Budapest: lays stress on the deteriorating political and economic situation, and recounts how the Government exploited the Peace Conference's apparent wish to invite Hungarian delegates to Paris. Minuted by Sir M. Hankey and General J.C. Smuts.

115  A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London). 8 May 1919 186
     Letter. (Extract)

Relates that the invitation for a Hungarian delegation is held up until a government which can be recognized by the Allies is formed there.

116  Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites for General Corvisart. 10 May 1919 186
     Note. No. ? E.L.S. 6404

Forwards a report by General L. Franchet d'Esperey on Professor P. Brown's talks on behalf of Béla Kun with Allied military leaders in south-east Hungary.

117  Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 10 May 1919 187
     Telegram. No. 11.

Forwards Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman's report from Budapest regarding Béla Kun's recent negotiations with a Czech Socialist Minister in Komárom, and other internal developments in Hungary.

118  Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna). 10 May 1919 188
     Memorandum. (Extract)


     Letter. (Extracts)

Reports views expressed by T.G. Masaryk and V. Šrobar with regard to the territorial settlement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper.

120  Austrian Relief Commission Report. 13 May 1919 191
     Sent by Sir W. Goode? (Vienna?)
Suggests that the Entente should make a statement to the effect that the blockade will not be lifted from Hungary while the Bolsheviks are in power, and reports on the disunity among Bolsheviks and Socialists: proposes the dispatch of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to Budapest to detach the Socialists from the Communists, and to facilitate a change of administration.

121 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 13 May 1919 192
Telegram. No. 17.

Reports the stiffening attitude in the Hungarian Army towards acts of insubordination. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper.

122 Lord Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (London). 14 May 1919 192
Telegram. No. 721.

Forwards a telegram received from Allied Representatives in Bucharest, dated 6 May, regarding overtures by the Government in Budapest to conclude peace with Romania: the Romanian Government gave no response to these proposals, as they believed these were delaying tactics on the part of the Hungarians, who only wanted to reconstitute their army and forge a strong alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks. Minuted by H. Nicolson and A.W.A. Leeper.

Telegram. No. 2.

Reports information received from the Spanish Consul in Budapest regarding secret negotiations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments. Minuted by H. Nicolson and Sir E. Crowe.

124 Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 19 May 1919 195
Letter. (Extracts)

Reflects on an alleged French plan for the creation of a Danubian Confederation, and the hostile Italian attitude to the plan.

125 Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty (London). 22 and 14 May 1919 196
Letter. No. 513. With enclosure.

Encloses a report by Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, sent from Vienna, summarizing the political, economic and military developments in Hungary between 3 and 14 May. Minuted by C.H. Smith and an unidentified official.
126 Sir W. Goode (Vienna) 22 May 1919 200
to the British Peace Delegation (Paris).
With enclosure.

Forwards a telegram received from C.K. Butler (Trieste), urging Allied military action to remove the Government in Hungary, as a pre-condition to the economic relief of the region. Enclosed is Sir W. Goode’s reply: he is taking up the issue with H. Hoover and the highest Allied authorities. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites.

127 C. Gosling (Prague) 22 May 1919 201
to Earl Curzon (London).
Telegram. No. 100.

Expresses doubts concerning reports about contacts between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments, and reports the diplomatic activities of H. Allizé and Croatian agents.

128 R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) 26 May 1919 202
to J.W. Headlam-Morley (Paris).
Letter.

Reports his interview with Semjan, an unofficial Czechoslovak agent posted in Hungary, with regard to the situation in Hungary and its effects on Czechoslovak politics. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Sir E. Crowe and Lord Hardinge.

129 General J.C. Smuts 27 May 1919 207
to D. Lloyd George.
Letter.

Expresses his opposition to the official line regarding war reparations to be demanded from countries which were formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and, therefore, declines the post offered to him on the Commission for Austrian Reparation.

130 C. Gosling (Prague) 28, 20 and 208
to Earl Curzon (London).
Letter. No. 65. With two enclosures.

Encloses a report by Dr V. Tusar, Czechoslovak representative in Vienna, on various political and ethnic questions affecting the settlement in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and a memorandum by Gy. Smrecsany, former Prefect of Pressburg, regarding the political situation in Hungary, and Czechoslovak plans to participate in military operations to suppress the Bolshevik régime in Budapest. Minuted by C.H. Smith, A.W.A. Leeper and an unidentified official.

Suggests that the final transfer of the new territories to Romania should be made only on condition that Romania provides clear guarantees as to the observance of the rights of the minorities in these territories. Minuted by Sir M. Hankey.

“The Communist Revolution in Hungary.” A Special Report, containing facts, data and analysis regarding the Communist Government and life under the new system in Hungary.

Replying to a telegram from General L. Franchet d’Esperey, records the formal disapproval of the Council of Allied and Associated Powers regarding the decision of the Romanian High Command to march on Budapest.

Reports his recent interview with Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, who urges immediate answer to be given to the Hungarian trade unions’ proposals regarding intervention by the Entente in Hungary. Enclosed is a memorandum by Lt.-Commdr. Williams-Freeman, in which he gives an account of his conversation in Budapest with a deputation of Hungarian trade union leaders. Minuted by Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, H. Nicolson and Sir E. Crowe.
Reflects on the prospect of the trade unions ousting the Communists in Hungary, and ruling over a united country with a victorious army, capable of opposing the wishes of the Entente.

137 F. Rattigan (Bucharest) 6 June 1919 234
to the Foreign Office (London).
Telegram. No. 314.

Warns about the dangers of the policy of non-intervention in Hungary, and, once again, urges action. Minuted by an unidentified official.

138 G. Clemenceau (Paris) 7 June 1919 235
to the Hungarian Government (Budapest).
Telegram.

Informs the H. Govt. that the Hungarians are launching their attack on Czechoslovakia when the Allies are about to invite Hungary to the Peace Conference; the Allies will use extreme measures if the Hungarians do not comply with their demand to cease the attack; an answer has to be sent to the telegram within forty-eight hours.

139 The Military Representatives of the 7 and 6 June 1919 236
Supreme War Council. Joint Note No. 43.
(S.W.C. 419. Extract) With enclosure.

"Military Measures to be Taken with Regard to Hungary". Enclosed is an extract from a memorandum (originally attached to the Joint Note) by General T.H. Bliss, the American Military Representative, recording his reservations with regard to the recommendations of the Military Representatives contained in Joint Note No. 43.

140 E. Ashmead-Bartlett. 7 June and 239
Memorandum. (Extracts) 29 May 1919
With enclosure.

"Memorandum on the Position in Hungary". Describes the situation in Hungary, its social and military aspects, gives an account of the counter-revolutionary movements, and proposes that the Entente should co-operate with the Szeged based counter-revolutionary government in bringing down the régime in Budapest. Enclosed is a declaration signed by Count G. Károlyi and Baron G. Bornemisza in the name of the Szeged Government regarding the policy of a future counter-revolutionary government in Hungary.

141 Count Gy. Károlyi (Szeged) 7 June 1919 247
to General P. de Lobit (Belgrade).
Letter.
Announces the establishment of a provisional Hungarian government in Arad on 5 May 1919 and its subsequent transfer to Szeged; sends a list of its members and outlines its political aims.


Seeks urgent answers to the recent offer made by delegates of the Hungarian trade unions to Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman. Minuted by H. Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and initialled by Lord Hardinge. Enclosed is A.J. Balfour’s draft reply to Col. Cuninghame’s tel. No. 49 (No. 135).

143 Lt.-Col. B. Coulson (Prague) to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris). Letter.

Describes the grave situation created by the Hungarian military successes, and asks for immediate help for Czechoslovakia from the Entente.

144 Béla Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris). Telegram.

Expresses satisfaction with the Allied decision to invite Hungary to the Peace Conference, but denies that Hungary attacked Czechoslovakia: to the contrary, he argues, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania are committing aggression against Hungary; he would like to settle these differences with representatives of the three countries at a conference to be convened in Vienna.


Describes the grave military situation as the Hungarian offensive succeeds against Czechoslovakia, and urges prompt help for Czechoslovakia from the Entente. Minuted by Sir E. Crowe, Lord Hardinge, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and J.W. Headlam-Morley; initialled by A.J. Balfour.

146 A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London) Letter. (Extract)

Criticizes the Council of Four’s telegram of 7 June to the Hungarian Government, which gives the impression that this Government has been recognized, and has been invited to the Peace Conference.
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>C. Gosling (Prague)</td>
<td>11 June 1919</td>
<td>256</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to A.J. Balfour (Paris).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Telegram. (No. not known, repeated to the F.O., London, as No. 118.)</td>
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Reports that in spite of Béla Kun’s positive reply given to the Entente’s recent ultimatum, the Hungarian attacks against Slovakia are still continuing.

| 148 | C. Gosling (Prague) | 12 June 1919 | 256 |
|     | to the Foreign Office (London). |
|     | Memorandum. Enclosure to Letter No. 76. |

Reports his interview with Dr. Boh. Vydra, who relates what he learnt about Bolshevik plans for the domination of Europe from the leader of the Silesian Bolsheviks while he was held by the Germans in the same prison with him at Ratibor.

| 149 | G. Clemenceau (Paris) | 13 June 1919 | 257 |
|     | to the Hungarian Government (Budapest) |
|     | Telegram. |

In two parts: General and Special. Communicates an ultimatum requiring the Hungarian Government to withdraw behind the newly established frontiers and, at the same time, carries a pledge that as soon as the Hungarian troops have evacuated Czechoslovakia, the Romanian troops will be withdrawn behind their new borders.

| 150 | Captain G.H.L. Fitzwilliams (Vienna) | 15 June 1919 | 258 |
|     | to C.K. Butler (?Trieste). |
|     | Letter. (Extract) |

Describes the precarious position of the Hungarian Government, as, in spite of the military successes in Slovakia, discontent continues to grow against it.

| 151 | Béla Kun (Budapest) | 16 June 1919 | 260 |
|     | to Lenin (Moscow). |
|     | Telegram. |

Intercepted telegram: states that the Hungarian Government is in treaty with the Entente by wireless, and requests the sending of Bukharin to Budapest to help inaugurate a foreign policy, which would be to the advantage of both Russia and Hungary.

| 152 | Béla Kun (Budapest) | 16 June 1919 | 260 |
|     | to G. Clemenceau (Paris). |
|     | Telegram. |

Promises to accede to the demands of the Entente, but requests more time to carry them out; expresses strong criticism regarding the newly established
borders of Hungary both from the economic and the ethnic point of view; seeks the help of the Entente in establishing contacts with Czechoslovak and Romanian representatives with a view to resolve the conflict between Hungary and the two aforementioned countries.

153 Sir M. Hankey 16 June 1919 262
to General T.H. Bliss.
Letter.

Communicates the Council of Four’s invitation to General T. Bliss to express his views on the latest telegram from the Hungarian Government proposing a meeting between the military representatives of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Minuted by H. Nicolson.

154 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 17 June 1919 263
to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 616.

Forwards the translation of a communique by the Hungarian Chief Command announcing that the Hungarians have taken the necessary measures for the suspension of hostilities: nevertheless, attacks by Czech forces are continuing, and this forced the Hungarians to take energetic measures for defence; according to the official Hungarian news agency the Slovak Republic of Councils has been declared. Minuted by H. Nicolson and Sir E. Crowe.

155 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 17 June 1919 264
to General Sir H. Wilson (Paris).
Letter. (Extracts)

Relates his efforts in Vienna to prevent the spreading of Bolshevism from Hungary to Austria; comments on the alleged support given by the Italian Mission to the Hungarian Government, and on some of the international implications of the unfolding political situation in the region.

156 Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) 17 June 1919 265
to Earl Curzon (London).
Letter. No. 103.

Reports the visit to Belgrade of Vice-Admiral M. Horthy and Count P. Teleki, members of the anti-Bolshevik Government at Szeged.

157 Sir S. Hoare (Prague) 19 June 1919 266
to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Letter.

Reports the impressions he gained during a fortnight’s visit to Prague and Slovakia: warns of the dangers of allowing the Hungarians to continue to
occupy Slovak territory, and urges military action against them. Minuted by Lord Hardinge.

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<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>19 June 1919</td>
<td>Lenin (Moscow)</td>
<td>to Béla Kun (Budapest)</td>
<td>Telegram. Warns against trusting the Entente, whose only aim is to crush the Hungarian and Russian Bolshevik Governments.</td>
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Reply to No. 158; expresses his pride in being one of Lenin’s best pupils, but believes he is superior to Lenin in the question of bad faith when it comes to negotiations with the Entente.

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<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>21 June 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)</td>
<td>to A.J. Balfour (Paris)</td>
<td>Telegram. No. 80. Reports that orders issued by V. Böhm for the Hungarian Army to retire in the north were not carried out because nationalists and Bolshevik extremists are opposed to the idea of compliance with the demands of the Entente. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper.</td>
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Reports the proceedings of the session of the Congress of Councils in Hungary on 21 June, where they discussed the political and military position of the country.

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<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>24 June 1919</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites</td>
<td>for Lord Hardinge. Memorandum. Recapitulates the events since 30 May, concerning contacts between the Peace Conference and the Hungarian Government, and the political and military developments in Hungary, which lead him to the conclusion that a military intervention would be the best way of dealing with the threat posed by the Communist régime in Hungary. Minuted by Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites, Sir E. Crowe and an unidentified official.</td>
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<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>24 June 1919</td>
<td>F. Rattigan (Bucharest)</td>
<td>to H. Nicolson (Paris)</td>
<td>Letter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finds the Peace Conference’s attitude to the Hungarian problem utterly incomprehensible and detrimental to British interests, and reports on the Hungarian situation as it is perceived from Bucharest. Minuted by A.W.A. Leeper, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss, Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites and J.W. Headlam-Morley.

164 Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams Freeman (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 24 June 1919 275
Letter. With enclosure.

Reports the events of his last weeks in Budapest: his negotiations with trade union leaders, sessions of the Congress of Councils and his necessitated departure. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and C.H. Smith. Enclosed is a petition (undated), presented to Lt.-Commdr. F.W.-F. by the Society of Awakening Hungarians, denouncing the Bolshevik system and seeking British help.

165 G. Clement-Simon (Prague) to S. Pichon (Paris). 24 June 1919 280
Telegram. (No. not known)

Describes a recent exchange of messages between General M. Pellé and Béla Kun, in which the latter agreed to conform to the wishes of the Peace Conference regarding the evacuation of Czechoslovak territory by the Hungarian Army.

166 H. Allizé (Vienna) to S. Pichon (Paris). 25 June 1919 280
Telegram. (No. not known)

Reports the recent publication of a telegram by Béla Kun to G. Clemenceau, in which additional guarantees are demanded before withdrawal from Czechoslovak territory; quotes the results of the elections at the Congress of Councils.

167 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). 25 June 1919 281
Telegram. No. 623. (Extract)

Reports the difficulties facing the Communist régime in Hungary resulting from the rift between the nationalists in the army and the Socialists.

168 Marshal F. Foch to G. Clemenceau. 25 June 1919 281
Letter. No. 3128 (?).

Points out that the Romanian Army will be defenceless against a Hungarian attack after its retirement from the Theiss, and, therefore, the Romanian withdrawal should be made contingent on the strict application of all the

169 C. Gosling (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 34.

Reports General Pellé’s statement, according to which, in spite of the cessation of hostilities, the Hungarians are not intending to withdraw from occupied territory, and that — in view of the bad faith that they have shown — they are not to be trusted, and force will have to be used against them. Accompanying letter by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

170 Béla Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris). Telegram.

Protests against a Romanian attack on Hungarian positions in spite of the cessation of hostilities by the Hungarians: the Romanians do not respect the decisions of the Peace Conference. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

171 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to the American Relief Administration (Paris). Telegram. (No. not known)

Reports a recent counter-revolutionary attempt in Budapest, and argues for Entente intervention in Hungary in spite of the Hungarian compliance with the Entente’s demands regarding the cessation of hostilities against Czechoslovakia, as the Bolshevik Government continues to be a destabilizing factor in Central Europe.

172 Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies. Letter. (Extract)

Proposes that the Prime Minister should see Lt.-Commdr. F. Williams-Freeman, and reports his recent interview with an ex-Austro-Hungarian officer.

173 L.B. Namier. Minutes on a memorandum (not printed).

Defends Col. T. Cuninghame against accusations made in a memorandum received from an unidentified Czechoslovak source.
174 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 626.
Reports the details of a counter-revolutionary coup attempt in Budapest on 24 June 1919.

175 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 84.
Reports that Béla Kun is willing to resign if he can find a pretext; an Italian Civil Commission arrived in Budapest; three counter-revolutionaries have been executed, and hostages have been released.

"Memorandum on the Situation in Buda Pest and Hungary". Describes the difficulties faced by moderate Socialists and trade union leaders, who endeavour to put an end to Communist rule, expresses his views regarding the damage caused by the Bolshevik Government in Budapest inside and outside Hungary, and argues for Entente intervention.

177 C. Gosling (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 35.
Reports that General M. Pelle has received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Army, stating that the Hungarian Government has ordered the immediate withdrawal of the Army from all the occupied territories.

178 Sir W. Goode. Memorandum. (Extracts)
"The Hungarian Situation and Its Effect on the Restoration of Public Order and the Rehabilitation of Economic Life in Central Europe." A memorandum based largely on British information.

179 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris).
Letter. No. T.C. 573. (Extracts)
Reports increasing dissent among the political and military leadership in Budapest, a change in the attitude of the Italian representatives in Hungary, and O. Bauer's views on the idea of a Danubian Confederation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author/Recipient</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>1 July 1919</td>
<td>Béla Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris).</td>
<td>Telegram.</td>
<td>Reports and protests against a Romanian attack on Hungarian positions near Tiszalúc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>2 July 1919</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour.</td>
<td>Memorandum.</td>
<td>Records his farewell interview with I. Brătianu, during which the latter indicated that it would be impossible for the Romanians to abandon the line of the River Theiss until Hungary has been disarmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>2 July 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).</td>
<td>Telegram. No. 88.</td>
<td>Reports his recent interview with a special agent returning from Budapest, who gave an account, among other things, of the impression that Béla Kun has realized that he could not keep the Red Army idle; in a speech made on 30 June Béla Kun said that troops would be used against Romania across the Theiss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>5 July 1919</td>
<td>Telegram from Vienna, communicated by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss to the British Peace Delegation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports Hungarian preparations for an offensive against Romania.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reports the issuing of a manifesto by the Hungarian Government to soldiers of the Red Army, declaring, among other things, that although they had to withdraw from the Czechoslovak territories, the country will receive more territories on the other side of the Theiss, and that they do not renounce their claim to a single inch of Hungarian-speaking territory.

187 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 7 July 1919 304
to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 93.

Gives an account of a meeting of the Allied Military Representatives in Vienna, where it was agreed that the Entente should make clear their intention of removing the Government in Budapest.

188 Major H.A. Cartwright (Prague) 8 July 1919 305
Letter. (Extract)

Gives an account of his recent journey in Slovakia, where he acted as an umpire during the retirement of the Hungarian army.

189 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 8 July 1919 308
to H.C. Hoover (Paris).
Telegram. No. HAM 779.

Transmits information from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, revealing that Béla Kun is about to arrange a counter-revolutionary disturbance in Budapest, using agents provocateurs, in order to upset the Socialists.

190 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) 8 July 1919 309
to H.C. Hoover (Paris).
Telegram. No. HAM 785.

Transmits Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram, who reports his interview with a high Staff Officer of the Hungarian Red Army regarding various aspects of the political and military situation in Hungary, including the position of the extreme Left and the Socialists in the government; as long as the Red Army remains armed, peace is impossible: the army cannot be kept idle or cannot be disarmed by the existing government.

191 A.J. Balfour (Paris) 9 July 1919 310
to Earl Curzon (London).
Telegram .No. 1137. (In two parts.)

Discusses the two options open to the Entente with regard to the Government in Budapest: one is to do nothing, which is neither very dignified nor very safe, the other is to compel it to accept the terms of the Conference, but the
military force available may not be sufficient to pursue the latter course. Minuted by an unidentified official.

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<td>Transmits an account of the situation in Budapest given by the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Red Fourth Army Corps: the reason why Béla Kun does not resign is that he himself is terrorised by the terrorists, believes in the spreading of the revolution, and he is not the kind of man to resign voluntarily; the Entente alone is able to restore order in the country, and this it would be able to do within one week.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>193</th>
<th>Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris). Telegram. No. 796. (Extract)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Forwards Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s dispatch: reports the reasons for the resignation of Col. A. Stromfeld, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army, and the decision at the Hungarian Headquarters to take the offensive against the Romanians. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.</td>
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<tr>
<th>194</th>
<th>D. Lloyd George (Criccieth) for A. Bonar Law (Paris). Telephone message.</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Believes that, in regard to Béla Kun, the difficulty is a good deal due to the Romanian advance to the Theiss in defiance of the Peace Conference: the decrees of the Conference must be enforced against friend and foe alike. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.</td>
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<tr>
<th>195</th>
<th>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris.) Telegram. No. 638.</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Reports the publication of a statement in Vienna, indicating that the Hungarians are planning to attack the Romanians if the latter do not retire from the Theiss.</td>
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<tr>
<th>196</th>
<th>D. Lloyd George (Criccieth) to P. Kerr (for A.J. Balfour, Paris). Telephone message.</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Considers that the Peace Conference should insist on a Romanian withdrawal from Hungarian territory with simultaneous compliance by the Hungarians with the terms of the Armistice, as a condition precedent to peace, the same way as they insisted on the Hungarian withdrawal from Czechoslovakia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 13 July 1919

Calls the attention of the Peace Conference to the fact that Béla Kun is in possession of a secret telegram, dated 3 July, from G. Clemenceau to General Hallier, in which it is expressed that a purely Socialist Government would be more agreeable to the Entente than the one based in Szeged: remarks that the Szeged Government includes ex-Socialist functionaries as well.

Reports alleged acts of violence carried out against peasants by the Bolsheviks in Hungary. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

Forwards Captain B. Weiss’s memorandum, originally written for A. Halstead, American Commissioner in Vienna, on the situation in Hungary, including an account of his recent interview with Béla Kun, and an assessment of the reasons for the survival of the Communist Government in Hungary.

Forwards Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s report regarding a statement in V. Böhm’s farewell speech, made on his resignation as Commander-in-Chief, indicating that, if the Red Army took the offensive against the Romanians, the national socialists in the Szeged Government, under Count Gy. Károlyi, would leave the White side and join the Reds.

Reports and reflects on the preparations for the forthcoming offensive of the Hungarians against the Romanians. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

P. Kerr (Paris) 16 July 1919

Letters. (Extracts)
Transmits A.J. Balfour’s reply to an earlier communication from the Prime Minister, expressing the view that the terms of the Armistice have to be enforced on Hungary before any other measure is taken with regard to the situation there.

203 Lord Acton (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 226. 17 July 1919 326

Reports that Count M. Károlyi is in Milan, where he is endeavouring to gain the support of Italian Socialists in order to recover power in Budapest.

204 Sir M. Hankey. Memorandum. (Extract) 17 July 1919 327

“Towards a National Policy”. Expresses the view that no great British interests will be involved in Central Europe in the foreseeable future.

205 W.S. Churchill, A. Bonar Law, D. Lloyd George and General Sir H. Wilson. Notes. ca. 18 July 1919 328

Draft proposal for obtaining an undertaking from the Romanians that they will retire to the line prescribed for them by the Peace Conference as soon as the Hungarians have disarmed.


Reports his discussion with O. Bauer about the opportunities created by the nomination of V. Böhm as the new Hungarian Minister in Vienna.

207 D. Ábrahám and Count P. Teleki (Szeged) for the British Government. Memorandum. (Extracts) 18 July 1919 330

They comment on the character of the Communist régime in Hungary, and seek assistance from the Entente to overthrow it. Minuted by W.L.O. Twiss, and initialled by H. Nicolson.

208 F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 366. 22 July 1919 333

Reports a Hungarian attack on Romanian positions on the line of the River Theiss.
209 Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris).
Telegram. No. HAM 911.

22 July 1919

Transmits Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram, who reports his forthcoming meeting with V. Böhm: he believes that this amounts to the acceptance by Béla Kun of the necessity of stepping down if an agreement between the Entente and the Socialists can be reached. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

210 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 102.

23 July 1919

Reports his negotiations with V. Böhm, during which he proposed that Böhm, with J. Haubrich and P. Ágoston, should overthrow Béla Kun’s Government, create a military dictatorship, and call the assistance of a strong Entente Commission to adjust and control; Böhm is prepared under certain guarantees to take steps; the scheme will be discussed with Entente representatives on 23 July. Minuted by H. Nicolson and Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

211 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 104. (In two parts.)

24 July 1919

Part I: transmits Captain T.T.C. Gregory’s dispatch to H. Hoover, which includes an eight-point formula, submitted to V. Böhm for the removal of Béla Kun’s Government. Part II: reports V. Böhm’s provisional acceptance of the plan, and seeks Entente authorization for its prosecution. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss and an unidentified official.

212 General E.L. Spears.
Telephone message. (Extract)

25 July 1919

Transmits a report received from General L. Franchet d’Esperey on 22 July, regarding the lack of co-operation between the French and Romanian armies in south-eastern Hungary.

213 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris).
Telegram. No. 105.

25 July 1919

Reports his negotiations with V. Böhm: Béla Kun is apparently not opposed to the negotiations; Böhm thinks everything depends on the outcome of the Hungarian attack on the Romanians: if the Romanians hold their own, he can intervene successfully, if they are pressed back, it will be more difficult.
214 The Supreme Council. 26 July 1919 340
Statement.
Released to the press and wired
to Hungary at the same time.

Declares that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot lift the blockade from,
and cannot make peace with Hungary, while the country is led by an
unrepresentative Government, whose authority rests on terrorism; they think
it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungary will cease as soon
as the terms of the Armistice have been satisfactorily complied with.

215 A.J. Balfour. 27 July 1919 341
Memorandum.

"Armies and Economics Being Reflections on Some Aspects of the Allied
Situation on July 27th, 1919". Reflects on the results of the diminished
military capability of the Allies with regard to the enforcement of armistices
and peace treaties; considers aspects of applying economic sanctions on
defaulters.

216 H. Allizé (Vienna) 28 July 1919 343
to S. Pichon (Paris).
Telegram. (No. not known)

Expresses his lack of confidence in V. Böhm, as every time, when Béla Kun's
régime finds itself in difficulty, it tries to negotiate with the Entente;
nevertheless, a government presided over by Böhm would certainly show less
resistance to the peace conditions offered by the Entente than a counter¬
revolutionary, nationalist government, like the one in Szeged. Minuted by Lt.-
Col. W.L.O. Twiss and General C. Sackville-West.

217 Marshal F. Foch 29 July 1919 344
to G. Clemenceau.
Letter. No. 3599 (?).

Presents the Czechoslovak, the Serbian, and the Romanian views with regard
to participation in a military intervention in Hungary.

218 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) 29 July 1919 345
to Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss (Paris).
Letter. No. T.C. 704. (Extracts)

Reports on the progress of his negotiations with V. Böhm, and the forming of
a Peasants' Organization in Hungary; relates his personal role in warning the
Romanians of the Hungarian attack, and summarizes the latest developments
in the latter conflict. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.
219 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 106. 31 July 1919 345

Reports his recent conversation with V. Böhmm, during which the latter said that the pressure on Béla Kun was not yet sufficient to induce him to yield, though he (Böhmm) is fairly confident of eventual success; he also gave his assessment of the military situation in the conflict between Romanians and Hungarians.

220 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 107. 1 August 1919 348

Reports his recent interview with the Chief of the Budapest Workmens' Council and V. Böhmm: they seemed to think that Béla Kun could be forced out if the right movements were chosen; Böhmm is secretly in touch with the Government in Szeged.

221 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 686X. 1 August 1919 348

Transmits the identifications of various units of the Hungarian Red Army in the conflict with Romania.

222 Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris). Telegram. No. 687X. 1 August 1919 349

Reports the fall of Béla Kun's Government on 1 August, and its replacement by a wholly socialist government under Gy. Peidl; the Romanians are reported to have crossed the Theiss, and are advancing; the Red Army is in rout.

223 G. Clemenceau (Paris) to Lt.-Col. G. Romanelli (Budapest). Telegram. (No. not known) 2 August 1919 350

Acknowledges the receipt of Lt.-Col. Romanelli's dispatch of 1 August regarding the fall of the Republic of Councils in Hungary, and informs him that the Supreme Council does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary, and does not consider itself bound by the proposals recently put forward by members of the Allied Missions in Vienna: the relations between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary are based exclusively on the Armistice of 13 November 1918 and the Note issued by the Peace Conference on 13 June 1919.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Telegram No.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>2 August 1919</td>
<td>Captain T.T.C. Gregory (?)</td>
<td>American Relief Administration</td>
<td>(No. not known)</td>
<td>Extract Reports the forthcoming arrival of fugitives from Budapest; suggests that the new Hungarian Government should be given a chance to consolidate its position; believes that the Conference should not allow the Romanians to occupy Budapest; reports further developments concerning a child feeding programme for Budapest, the fate of former members of the Hungarian Government, and the Romanian advance towards Budapest. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226</td>
<td>3 August 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>Reports his recent interview with Reuter's correspondent, who returned from Budapest on 2 August, and who states that there would have been excesses on the part of extreme elements, had it not been for the declaration by the Entente, published on 27 July, which enabled the trade unions to control the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>3 August 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>Transmits the programme of the new Hungarian Government as received from V. Böhm and J. Weltner, who also asked that the Romanian advance should be stopped, the Theiss made a demarcation line, and the blockade be raised immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>3 August 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>Reports events related to the continued advance of Romanian troops towards Budapest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>3 August 1919</td>
<td>J. Gorvin for</td>
<td>Sir W. Goode.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Two telegrams and commentary.</td>
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Two telegrams and commentary.
Copy for Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. Transmits two telegrams sent by Captain T.T.C. Gregory to H.C. Hoover, transmitting the new Minister of War, J. Haubrich’s, message asking that the Romanian advance be stopped; Gregory suggests that Admiral Troubridge should proceed to Budapest with monitors, backed by French and Italian detachments, to stabilize the situation; Haubrich has already started to comply with the Armistice; Gorvin reports an Allied plan to send Admiral Troubridge up the Danube with monitors.

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<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>4 August 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour</td>
<td>Telegram. No. 692X</td>
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<td>231</td>
<td>5 August 1919</td>
<td>Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour (Paris)</td>
<td>Telegram. No. 694X</td>
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Reports the formal occupation of Budapest by the Romanians; the Government are in doubt whether they will be able to remain; the Czechs and the Serbs are also advancing; General R. Gorton is in Vienna on his way to Budapest. Minuted by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss.

Reports negotiations between the existing Government and the Szeged Government: the arrival of E. Garami in Vienna is expected to facilitate these contacts. The Romanians in Budapest are reported to have pacifying influence.

Gives an account of the recent political changes in Hungary, and reports the steps that are being taken to bring about a coalition between the Socialists and the Szeged Government; he is also active in helping to form a Peasants’ Organization in Hungary.

Transmits a parliamentary question by Col. J. Wedgwood scheduled for 11 August, asking whether the Entente have demanded or intend to demand the surrender of Béla Kun from Austria, and if so, why. Minuted by H. Nicolson and Sir E. Crowe, who reply in the negative.

“Note on the Austrian Treaty”. A critical assessment of the way in which the Foreign Office and the Paris Peace Conference treated questions relating to
Austria and Hungary towards the end of the war and during the Peace Conference.

235 J.W. Headlam-Morley 27 June 1922 366
Memorandum. (Extracts)

"Peace Settlement Memoranda, Reparation": Chapter IV/I of an unpublished history of the Paris Peace Conference. Describes the vengeful attitude adopted by the smaller Allied states towards the smaller defeated states after the war, and considers that this was modelled on the similar attitude of the Great Powers towards their former enemies; believes that this spirit, if not checked, must be fatal to the future of Europe.

236 A. Ponsonby. 16 February 1924 367
Memorandum.

Points out the undemocratic nature of various aspects of the Hungarian political scene, including the electoral system, rights of expression, the form of government, trade union laws and judicial processes. States that some of these are in contravention of the agreement that the Hungarian political parties made with Sir G. Clerk in November 1919. Suggests possible ways of amending this situation. Minuted by M.W. Lampson, and commented on in part of a memorandum by the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

237 T.B. Hohler (Budapest) 26 March 1924 370
to R. MacDonald (London).
Letter No. 137.

Reports his recent conversation of a private nature with Count I. Bethlen, in which the latter explained that the agreement reached between the Hungarian political parties and Sir G. Clerk in November 1919 served solely the purpose of forming a government which could be recognized, and with which the Allies could negotiate a treaty of peace, and that no long-term engagements were entered into for the future. They also discussed the question of recent restrictions imposed on the franchise in Hungary. Minuted by C.H. Smith, H. Nicolson, M.W. Lampson, Sir E. Crowe and A. Ponsonby.
No. 1

Telegram from E. Grant-Duff (Berne) to Lord Hardinge (London. Received 2 August 1916)

No. not known. [PRO FO 371/2602 No. 150294/16]

Berne, 2 August 1916

Private and Secret

Count Karolyi of Independent Party in Hungary is in Switzerland. He has sent me a message through Mrs. Barton asking for an interview. He did not say what his object was but gave impression that he wishes to discuss Hungarian peace terms. Mrs. Barton replied that she would not move in the matter unless he produced written credentials. He replied that it would be easy to obtain these. He is accompanied by member of General Staff.

He seemed particularly anxious to see me as distinct from other Allied Chefs de Mission. Should he produce credentials what attitude do you wish me to adopt?

------------------------

Minutes attached to the document:

Count Karolyi, with a following of some 25 members, has just resigned from the Independent Party and announced a 'democratic' policy. The first doubt is therefore whether his credentials, even though backed by a member of the General Staff, would be good enough to warrant any sort of discussion with him. Had Hungary really wanted to put out feelers, another emissary would have seemed more suitable.

The next point is that, whether Count Karolyi is acting for himself or really representing the bulk of Hungarian feeling, any overtures are due, just as at the beginning of 1915, to fears of imminence of Roumanian intervention, as to which Buda-Pesth must be well informed.

This leads to the position that, though we cannot be on with the new love before we are off with the old, we could use the fact of advances from Hungary to show M. Bratiano that he may easily delay too long. I think however that it would be fatal to suggest this at Petrograd just now, or M. Stürmer's2 attitude would be stiffer than ever.

In my humble opinion, Mr. Grant Duff might be authorized to listen to anything Count Karolyi has to say, but to make it clear that he cannot enter on any discussion or give any expression of opinion.

G.D.[?]C. 2/8/16

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1 The report that Count Mihály Károlyi was in Switzerland was the result of a misunderstanding on the part of Mrs. Barton, and was wholly unfounded. (Source: Tibor Hajdu, Károlyi Mihály, Budapest, 1978.) The telegram is quoted here for the sake of the reaction that it elicited from the Foreign Office.
2 B.V. Stürmer, Russian wartime Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior.
The above instrns. [instructions] would, I think, present some risk, if the information reached the Russian & French Govts. I doubt if Count Karolyi would be able to produce satisfactory credentials, but if he wd, the only place where such an interview could take place would be in Mrs. Barton’s house. Mrs. Barton is a Miss Peel, daughter of Sir R. Peel and lives in Switzerland.

Lord H[arding].

Instruct Mr. Grant Duff to have it conveyed to Count Karolyi that the utmost he could do would be to transmit to H. M. Govt. anything that Count Karolyi might have to say & that for this purpose it ought to be in writing or in some definite form such as a memorandum.

That if the communication refers to terms of peace, H.M. Govt. would not be able to take it into consideration except in consultation with their Allies to whom they must be free to communicate it.

If after this is conveyed to Count Karolyi he still desires an interview, it should not be at the Legation, but at some non-official place such as Mrs. Barton’s house.3

Give to French, Russian & Italian Ambassadors here a memorandum stating the nature of the communication made to Mr. Grant Duff from Count K. and giving the first two paragraphs of the instructions to Mr. G.D. adding it verbally when giving memo: that we do not see how this is to lead to anything; but that it could perhaps be desirable to say nothing to the other Allied Ministers at Berne, as, if it becomes subject of discussion there, Count K. will probably go away without saying anything.

Point out also that if a real peace overture is received, it may quicken the decision of M. Bratiano to join the Allies.

[Sir R.] G[raham].

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3 Instructions were sent to E. Grant-Duff in the way indicated here, in Lord Hardinge’s name, on 2 August 1916.
Memorandum by Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir R. Paget (Extracts)¹

[PRO FO 371/2804 No. 180510/W39]

Foreign Office, 7 August 1916

His Majesty's Government have announced that one of their chief objects in the present war is to ensure that all the States of Europe, great and small, shall in the future be in a position to achieve their national development in freedom and security. It is clear, moreover, that no peace can be satisfactory to this country unless it promises to be durable, and an essential condition of such a peace is that it should give full scope to national aspirations as far as practicable. The principle of nationality should therefore be one of the governing factors in the consideration of territorial arrangements after the war.

The end which the Jugo-Slavs have in view is the liberation of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from the domination of Austria-Hungary or any other Power and their union into one State.

The Jugo-Slavs desire that the boundaries of their prospective Confederation shall be determined on ethnological lines, and upon this basis they lay claim to extensive territories. These would include, in addition to Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, portions of Carinthia and Styria, the whole of Gorizia, Carniola, Istria, and the coast, together with islands down to the Albanian frontier. The northern frontier of their State would run approximately from Graz in a south-easterly direction along the Drave, then north of the provinces of Baranja, Backa, and the Banat, along the Moris River to Arad, thence south past Temesvar to the point where the Roumanian western frontier joins the Danube.

Although these claims may appear extravagant at first sight, the Jugo-Slavs maintain that in all these localities the population is predominantly Slav (vide Appendix III).

APPENDIX III

In Austria-Hungary the Jugo-Slavs are subordinated to two dominant State organizations, viz. the German and the Magyar. Their territory is broken up into ten provinces; they are politically oppressed, socially persecuted, and in every way hampered and menaced in their intellectual, economic, and national development.

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Under the Magyar domination there are 3,100,000 Jugo-Slavs, viz. 2,300,000 in Croatia-Slavonia and 900,000 in Southern and South-Western Hungary (in the Medjumurje, along the Styrian frontier, in the Baranja, Backa, and Banat).

A joint Austria-Hungarian Administration controls the 1,900,000 Jugo-Slavs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[...]

The future of Austria-Hungary will, of course, depend very largely on the military situation existing at the end of this war. If the situation should be one which enables the Allies to dispose of its future, there seems very little doubt that, in accordance with the principle of giving free play to nationalities, the Dual Monarchy, which in its present composition is a direct negation of that principle, should be broken up, as there is no doubt that all the non-German parts of Austria-Hungary will secede. [...]

Assuming the Allies, for purely political reasons, contemplated the keeping alive of an independent Dual Monarchy, they would have to consider very seriously whether it would be possible to secure the real independence of Vienna from Berlin. In the light of past events we do not hesitate to come to the conclusion that whether the Central Powers are victorious or not, Austria-Hungary will remain, to all intents and purposes, subservient to its ally.

[...]

To sum up, we should say: let the Slav provinces of Austria constitute themselves into a Southern Slav State; let the German provinces of Austria be incorporated in the German Empire; let Bohemia be linked up to Poland; and let Hungary be formed of the purely Magyar portions of the country into an independent State with the fully secured commercial outlets to the Adriatic at Fiume, and by means of the Danube to the Black Sea. This solution promises permanency, as it will be based on the national and economic elements of the countries affected by this settlement.

Were it proposed still to maintain an Austrian Empire, in the hope that it might eventually free itself from German influence, the arrangement which we have indicated would be open to the objection that Austria is entirely cut off from the sea, and some provision would have to be made to afford her a commercial outlet of her own. But in view of the conclusions which we have ventured to set forth above this is now of no consequence, and the question of securing from Italy concessions on behalf of Austria at Trieste does not arise.

With these considerations before us the boundary we suggest for the Jugo-Slav State would be approximately a line coterminous with the Italian frontier as laid down in the Agreement of the 26th April, 1915, [...]

This boundary, while conceding all the Jugo-Slav demands in Austria proper, excludes the Hungarian provinces of Baranya, Backa, and the Banat, to which they also desire to lay claim. If, however, Hungary is to be an independent State with any chance of vitality it would be inexpedient to deprive it of territory beyond that which is necessary in order to conform to the principle of nationality. This boundary has the further recommendation of being in accordance with the Serbian strategical requirements for possession of the country on the north bank of the Danube opposite Belgrade, and of not conflicting with the Roumanian claims.

The above settlement may at first sight appear somewhat academic, being as it is mainly in accordance with national aspirations, but we quite appreciate that it may have to be modified in deference to the views of Russia, geographical configuration, military considerations, &c. Our main object at present was to devise a scheme that promised permanency from the national point of view.
In putting forward the above considerations we have endeavoured to approach the settlement, after the war, mainly from a political point of view. We have attempted to draw up a scheme which is not confined to the promotion alone of British interests as regards either territorial acquisitions or the establishment of British spheres of influence. We have tried to work out a scheme that promises permanency; we have aimed at a reconstruction of the map of Europe intended to secure a lasting peace. We have been guided by the consideration that peace remains the greatest British interest.

Minutes attached to the document:

This is an interesting report requiring a good deal of digestion.

I would suggest that copies be distributed to the War Committee. It seems premature at present to express any decided opinion.

[Lord] H[arding].

I have not yet had time to read the whole of the report. It seems to me to be very ably done. It must be kept very confidential & should be circulated in first instance to War Committee with a notice saying it is most important that no copy should be allowed to go astray & that the (nature) existence of the report should be kept very secret.

[Sir R.] G[raham].

No. 3

Letter from Lord Bertie (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (London. Extracts)

[Li.G. E/3/14/6]

Paris, 24 August 1916

My dear Hardinge,

At an audience which I had of the King on August 17th, His Majesty gave me an account of certain statements made by the President of the Republic when the King received him at the British front in France. They were to the effect that [...] he believes Hungary to be anxious to come to terms with the Allies independently of America and Germany; that advantage ought to be taken of this desire on the part of Hungary; [...] I told the King that I thought that [...] as a great part of the dominions of Hungary have been parcelled out on paper to Italy, Russia, Serbia, Roumania might be expected to claim a share in the Hungarian spoils; it would be impossible to devise any scheme which Hungary could accept unless completely crushed;[...].

On my return to Paris I paid a visit to Briand on August 21st in order to sound him on the subject of the statements made to the King by Poincare [...].

[...] as to coming to separate terms with Hungary, Poincare does not seem to realise the difficulty of doing so without dissatisfying Italy, Serbia, Roumania, Russia [...].
Poincare talks of detaching Hungary from Germany and Austria by a separate peace, but is it conceivable that Hungary would have peace at the price of losing a great part of her dominions to Serbia and to Roumania if she joins the Entente Allies and to Italy, and are the Powers who have been promised the spoils of Hungary and particularly Italy likely to forego them?

Bertie

No. 4

Memorandum by L.B. Namier for the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information

[PRO FO 371/2862 No. W3/97435]

Department of Information, 11 May 1917

MEMORANDUM ON AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INNER AND FOREIGN POLICY

Austria-Hungary is bound to remain in international politics dependent on Germany because Germany is the only Power which defends the basis on which the Habsburg Monarchy rests — German preponderance in Austria and Magyar domination in Hungary; and this is the only basis on which the Habsburg Monarchy can exist. If as a consequence of the war Austria were to lose Galicia, the Bukovina and some strips of Italian land, any such losses would merely serve to transform the German preponderance in Austria into absolute dominion, because it would give its Germans a clear numerical majority over the non-German nationalities within the Western half of the Monarchy. The very condition would result which the Austrian Pan-Germans wished to create by means of a constitutional exclusion of Galicia. But if the Polish, Little Russian and Italian provinces are left to the Habsburg Monarchy and continue as parts of it alongside of a new Poland, a free Russia and Italy, this would add three more irredentist claims and movements to those of the Rumans and Jugo-Slavs and will render the Habsburgs still more dependent on the protection of Germany. Germany has it both ways: a decrease in the proportion of irredentists in Austria means so much more influence to the Germans within it; but the more there is of irredentist feeling and claims, the more the Habsburgs depend on the support of Germany in international politics.

These are the fundamental facts of Austria-Hungary's existence:

(1) That the Austrian-Germans are Germans in feeling, that they will never admit an anti-German tendency in Austria's foreign policy [cf. their attitude in 1870], that they are determined to render closer in every way the connection between the Habsburg Monarchy and Germany and that they are prepared to forgo direct inclusion in the German Empire only at the price of being conceded a dominant position in Austria. "If Austria is reconstructed on a federal basis," wrote in 1866 Count J. Andrassy (the Elder) in a secret memorandum for the Emperor, "the cry of pain of the German provinces would soon be heard in Berlin and Munich...."

1 Brackets in the original.
That the Magyars will never admit the territory of the Hungarian State being merged with Austria in one single State (Grossösterreich), that absolutely every single one of them denies the very existence of such a State (die Gesammtmonarchie) and that without such a change neither the Czecho-Slovaks, nor the Jugo-Slavs, nor the Little Russians nor the Rumans would obtain national unity even within the limits of Austria-Hungary. But the very fact that their lands, though geographically continuous, remain divided within the Habsburg Monarchy between two States is the most eloquent proof of their being subject to two dominions (German and Magyar) and not being equals of these races.

That the Czecho-Slovaks will never abandon the idea of a Bohemian State endowed with the same rights of independence as Hungary obtained in 1867 — their “böhmsche Staatsidee” and their “böhmisches Staatsrecht”; that this claim runs counter to the very constitution of the Dual Monarchy and will never be admitted either by the Germans or the Magyars. The Czecho-Slovaks are as unlikely to give up their claims as the Irish, and the Germans and Magyars are as unlikely to grant them as would the Orangemen if the decision rested exclusively with them.

That the Rumans, Jugo-Slavs and whatever other nationalities are left within the Habsburg Monarchy whilst national States of their own exist just across the border, cannot be granted full liberty and equal rights in Austria. Liberty implies the choice of allegiance. Once this choice is denied, equal rights, even in other matters, cannot be conceded because this implies a share in the direction of the State and its policy both in internal and in international matters. But can such a share be conceded to people whose heartfelt allegiance is not with Austria-Hungary?

The scheme of national autonomy which would assign national matters as far as possible to non-territorial bodies analogous to religious communities would no longer satisfy any of the subject nationalities even within Austria, and of course would not touch the problems involved in the separate existence of Hungary. The Austrian Socialist Party which had adopted that scheme in the so called Brünner Programm (1899) has broken up since into national groups, some of which fight each other, and the programme finds now its only supporters in the German group. But the bulk of the German Socialists in Austria now forms only the least aggressive portion of the German Nationalists. The war has proved that self-determination in foreign politics is essential to every nation, great and small; otherwise it may, like the Czechs in the present war, be forced to fight for a cause to which it is directly hostile. Where problems of that kind are liable to arise even equality which implies the rule of the majority fails to supply an acceptable basis for a united and centralised State.

As long as Austria-Hungary continues to exist there must be German preponderance in Austria and Magyar domination in Hungary; there must be intense dissatisfaction and disloyalty among the Czecho-Slovaks and all the other subject races; there will be claims raised by the neighbouring states which are allied by language or race to the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary. And as long as this is the case the Habsburgs will remain in constant danger from possible hostile coalitions and will have to look somewhere for support.

This support they cannot find with Russia even if her national claim to Eastern-Galicia is satisfied. The Magyars cannot give up the Little Russian districts of Hungary; by doing so they would hand over to Russia the main part of the Carpathian wall from Dorna Vatra to the Dukla. A Little Russian irredenta must remain. Further, the Pan-Slav feeling in Russia, even if dimmed for a moment by the internal issues of the
revolution and by blind hatred against all reminiscences of the ancien régime, is certain to revive with even greater force in a free Russia. "Il grido di dolore" of the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs will always find an echo in it.

(8) The support of Italy (should her own irredentist claims be satisfied) on an anti-Jugo-Slav basis, and in spite of conflicting interests in the Balkans, in the Adriatic and in the Eastern Mediterranean, would not be sufficient if Austria-Hungary were not certain of Russia.

(9) The claims of Serbia and Rumania can be settled only by the virtual disruption of Austria-Hungary or the inclusion of these two States within it. But such an inclusion, if it could be imagined at all, would never be admitted by the Magyars, because even then the settlement of the Rumanian and Jugo-Slav question would imply the dissolution of the Magyar State in a Habsburg "Gesammtmonarchie" (cf. e.g. Count J. Andrássy's article against further acquisitions of Serb territory in the "Neue Freie Presse" of April 23, 1916, "Guter und Schlechter Friede").

(10) The only Power on whose support Austria-Hungary can always rely is Germany. Austria-Hungary, just because she is entirely dependent on Germany is her natural ally. She puts at Germany's disposal the forces of more than 30,000,000 Slavs and Latins who might otherwise enter into hostile combinations against Germany. She opens and holds for Germany the road to the Balkans and the over-land route to Asia. She is her economic dependency. She is the inheritance and the backbone of German Imperialism in Europe. She is dear to the Germans even for sentimental reasons — to treat at the present day the bickerings that occur between the Austrian Germans and the Prussians as a factor in international politics is to repeat Napoleon III's mistake of 1870 and emulate the miscalculations committed by the Germans with regard to Ulster in 1914.

(11) The Magyar "scheme" in international politics has remained the same ever since 1848. One can put the writings and speeches of Julius Andrassy (the Elder) and of Koloman Tisza,2 of forty or fifty years ago, beside those of their sons and there is hardly a difference between them. Their fundamental axiom is the existence of a Magyar State in Hungary, independent in the fulness of its sovereign rights. Both for historical and strategic reasons not an inch of its territory can be ceded to any one. Nothing, however, must be added or the national balance within Hungary might be upset. Austria should be a centralised State ruled by its Germans; by restraining her Czechs, Little Russians and Jugo-Slavs she is to enable the Magyars to crush the fellow countrymen of these nations within Hungary. This task is to keep the Germans in Austria busy and prevent them from attempting any schemes of "Grossösterreich" as has been tried by Bach and Prince Schwarzenberg. The conflict with the non-German nationalities in Austria is also to prevent them from taking an indiscreet interest in the Hungarian Germans. For these very reasons Austria is never to form part of a Great Germany (Grossdeutschland), because then Hungary, a State of 21,000,000 inhabitants containing 2,000,000 Germans would border on a German Empire of 90 to 95 millions and would be at its mercy. Poland, whose interests nowhere clash with those of the Magyars, is to be free and receive a definitely anti-Russian interest by free play being given to Polish Imperialism in Lithuanian, White Russian and little Russian lands. Russia is the arch-enemy because she can never be expected to forget or abandon the Slavs who surround from the north-east, the north-west, west and south the 10,000,000 Magyars who

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2 Kálmán Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, 1875-90.
inhabit an open, indefensible plain. Germany is the ally which Providence itself has
given to Austria-Hungary, because Germany alone has an interest in restraining the
Slavs within Austria-Hungary and in defending by arms the existence of the Austro-
Hungarian State.

(12) There are people who oppose the disruption of Austria-Hungary because the
10,000,000 Austrian-Germans set free by its disruption would have to go to Germany;
there are others who oppose the disruption of Austria-Hungary because it would
strengthen the Slavs and might increase Russia's influence in East-Central Europe. But
these two arguments neutralise each other; if the disruption of Austria-Hungary
strengthens both the Slavs and the Germans the balance of power remains
approximately the same, but the clash of interests between Germany and Russia
becomes sharper and more direct. Hitherto the Germans and Magyars in Austria-
Hungary have done Germany's dirty work. Germany could disclaim before Russia all
responsibility for the position of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary. If there is no Austria-
Hungary all threats and action will come direct from their source.

(13) As a matter of fact a system of small states in East Central Europe, of States
sufficient in their size and also in their number to keep up their separate independent
existence but each of them too weak to form any imperialist schemes, lies even from the
point of view of cynical Realpolitik in the interests of Great Britain. Both the German
and the Russian Empires will be deprived of access to the Eastern Mediterranean.

(14) For military or naval reasons the Entente may be compelled to accept the
continued existence of Austria-Hungary, but it is clear that this means a definite victory
for Germany. The strength of the German nation, as far as it is based on its own
numbers, cannot be destroyed, but Germany can be deprived of its auxiliary States. It
cannot be deprived of the support of these auxiliary States, at least not of the support of
Austria-Hungary, by diplomatic negotiations — such negotiations Germany can watch
with the greatest complacency, or even encourage in secret. The Germans know that if
only the links of the chain are left in existence the chain will be reconstructed without
fail. Moreover Great Britain cannot detach Austria-Hungary from Germany without at
the same time detaching her own Eastern Allies from her own cause. Russian
democracy will fight if it is clear that we are fighting for the right of every nation to
shape by its own will its future destiny and that the same right which they themselves
have conceded to the Poles is now demanded from the Central Powers for every
nationality within Austria-Hungary. But the Russians will not continue to fight
Germany either for the sake of the Poles (who are organising a State of their own and
an army under the auspices of the Central Powers) and against their will (because what
the vast majority of the Poles want is immediate peace); nor will they fight Germany for
the sake of defeating the German nation — this in itself will not be an aim to them.
They know that the enemy sword directed against a nation can only consolidate it
internally, and that a self-governing, united nation can be freed only from within. If the
Entente declares the right of self-determination for every single nationality to be its war
aim and this demand of ours is refused by the Central Powers, then, and then alone, can
we hope to see the sincere democratic and revolutionary elements in Germany rise on
our side and against their own government. We should then have a principle in
common.

Each of the above points is a summary for which evidence is supplied partly by
history but foremost by the events and developments which have taken place during the
present war.

L. B. N[amier].
Minutes attached to the document:

I am not sure whether the Intel. Bureau is for the collection of news only or whether its duties are also advisory.

In this and (99689) [not printed] there are passages which are of the latter character. If such items are sent direct to the Private Sect. of the Prime Minister, it opens up a possibility of the S[ecretary]. of S[ate]. for F[oreign]. A[ffairs]. not always being the channel of communication and of advice to the Prime Minr. on foreign affairs.

As the Intelligence Bureau has only lately been started, I venture to point out the matter now.

L[ancelot]. O[lyphant]
19/5/19

I do not myself see any objection to papers on the lines of this one nor do I think the Prime Minister is likely to be unduly influenced by them. But if we note false deductions we should call attention to them.

R[andal]l [?]
Dear Drummond,

In Tyrrell’s absence I am sending you an advance copy of a Report on the events which are now taking place in Austria-Hungary.¹ You will doubtless have noticed the Proclamation by the Jugo-Slav Club in Vienna published in the “Times” beginning “The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is not competent to take any peace steps on behalf of any nationality save the Germans and Magyars”. This agrees presumably with our policy to which we are committed by our agreements with the Czecho-Slovaks, etc. The corollary obviously is rightly drawn that no peace negotiations could be begun with the Austro-Hungarian Government which could in any way be interpreted as implying the claim of that Government to be the channel through or with which negotiations take place as to these nationalities.

I assume that we may take it that the President,² whose line of action is apparently parallel with ours, will have his mind fully open to the danger of taking any step by which he might eventually find himself committed to peace negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Government (except so far as it represents the Magyars and the German Austrians). In view of the fact that he has in his Note to the German Government stated that he proposes to make a separate reply to the Government of Austria-Hungary, might it not be desirable that a message should be sent conveying to him the point of view that in the opinion of the British Government the position of Austria-Hungary is completely different from that of Germany, and that the British Government would not be prepared to negotiate with the Government of Austria-Hungary regarding peace terms as they apply to the Slavonic peoples and districts of the Empire. The object of such a communication would be to draw the attention of the President to the very difficult situation which might arise unless his answer was so worded as positively to exclude its being used by the Austro-Hungarian Government as admitting their claim to participate in peace negotiations as representatives of these peoples, with whom we shall have to deal direct.³

Yours very truly,

[J.W. Headlam-Morley]

¹ The report referred to is not enclosed in the file.
² The President of the United States.
³ The communication suggested here has not been traced by the editor.

Foreign Office, 15 October 1918
No. 6

Letter and Memorandum by L.S. Amery to A.J. Balfour

[PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223/W3]

22 October 1918

Dear Mr. Balfour,

President Wilson's setting of the Czecho-Slovak claim in the forefront of his reply to Austria\(^1\) has suggested the enclosed notes, which bring out some of the difficulties of the question. His action may have been quite right at the moment, but I can't help feeling that when it comes to the Peace Conference we shall have to face the Middle-European situation in a constructive, and not merely in an anti-German spirit. Otherwise we shall simply turn Central Europe into a new Balkans.

Yours sincerely,

L.S. Amery

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 6

Memorandum by L.S. Amery

The Austro-Hungarian Problem

20 October 1918

President Wilson's declaration that the Czecho-Slovak National Council should be the judge of what will satisfy its aspirations — that is in effect what his reply to Austria amounts to — has probably put an end to all question of an armistice with either Austria or Germany. The similar demand on behalf of the Yugoslavs might conceivably have been yielded by both Austria and Hungary, inasmuch it involves no subjection of German or Magyar population to a foreign rule, and no serious impairment of the territorial integrity of Hungary proper. But the satisfaction of the Czecho-Slovak demand is something which neither Germany nor the Magyars are likely to agree to without a further struggle.

It is necessary to realise precisely what the Czecho-Slovak demand comprises. It consists firstly of the demand that the Czechs shall be set up as an independent sovereign state in the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. This involves the subjection to Czech rule of over three million Germans living mostly in a compact belt of territory on the borders of Bavaria, Saxony and Prussian Silesia. It is a claim based, not on ethnographical “self-determination” but on historic, economic and strategical — in other words what are now called “Imperialistic” — grounds. The Czechs are no more prepared to accept a Bohemia without the German districts, than the Irish nationalists are prepared to accept Home Rule without Ulster. The second part of the Czech claim, namely that the northern regions of Hungary, where the Slovak speaking peasants are in a majority over the Magyar upper classes, should be cut off from Hungary and attached to Bohemia, is based on precisely that ethnographic principle which the Czechs reject in Bohemia.

\(^{1}\) In connection with President Wilson's note to Austria, and the Czecho-Slovak claims, see Wilson's letter to T.G. Masaryk, dated 21 October 1918, in *LINK*, vol. 51, p. 395.
President Wilson's support of the Czecho-Slovak claim, involving as it does the subjection of a large German population to what they would regard as an aggressive and intolerant alien Government, bent on de-nationalising them, is calculated to unite all Germans, whether in Austria or Germany, in uncompromising resistance. It is equally calculated to put an end to any ideas that may have been entertained by a section of the Magyars that Hungary might secure peace by detaching herself from Austria, and will convince them that their only chance of saving their independence now, or regaining it hereafter, lies in the German alliance.

But, whether President Wilson's reply to Austria causes the breaking off of negotiations or not, it will be necessary to face the Austro-Hungarian problem eventually, and to decide the principle on which we are going to settle it. To settle it on the principle of simply using our victory to satisfy the ambitions of our friends will inevitably create a state of unrest and instability which will sooner or later lead up to another war. There can be no talk even of a League of Nations if the Czecho-Slovak claim is granted as it stands.

There are two principles on which we might attempt to create a lasting settlement. One is the ethnographic principle. On this basis German speaking Bohemia would either be allowed to join Germany, or form part of German Austria, as suggested in the Emperor Charles's recent proclamation. Hungary would then be carved up, the north-western part going to the Czecho-Slovak state, the north-eastern to the Ukraine, the eastern to Rumania, the south to Serbia, the west to German Austria, and an irregular block in the centre being left to the Magyars. But the new Czecho-Slovak and Magyar states would obviously be incapable of a really independent existence, either from the economic or the defence point of view. They would have to enter into some sort of close federal union with their neighbours. In the case of Hungary the union might be with Yugoslavia and Rumania, or with Yugoslavia, German Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. In the case of Czecho-Slovakia its geographical position would make it practically impossible for it to be in any federal system which did not include either Germany or German Austria. In other words the ethnographic solution leads us back to the necessity either of creating a new Austro-Hungary, though not necessarily a Hapsburg Austro-Hungary or one based on German-Magyar supremacy, or else of creating a new Danubian confederation, including Magyars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and possibly Bulgars, leaving Czecho-Slovaks and German Austrians to attach themselves to Germany.

The other, and probable [sic] more practical basis is to take history and economics as well as ethnography into account and create states capable of a greater degree of real independence, making special provision for the "cultural" rights of minorities. On that basis one might break up the present Austria Hungary into four states (excluding Galicia and Bukovina which would be divided between Poland, the Ukraine and Rumania): viz. Bohemia, including German Bohemia and Moravia, but excluding the Slovak districts of Hungary; German Austria comprising all the German speaking districts not in Bohemia or Hungary; Hungary as at present but minus Slavonia and Croatia; the latter together with the Slovene districts of Austria, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia would form the new Yugoslavia. Even these states, however, would still have to enter into federal relations with their neighbours, though possibly not quite so close as under the other scheme. And the necessity for this would be strengthened by sentimental considerations. A Bohemia which included German Bohemia could only command the patriotic interest of the German element if it was politically closely linked up with German Austria and Germany — just as South Africa can only enlist the unanimous patriotism of its population of both white races if it remains in the British Commonwealth. Hungary similarly could only hope to reconcile its Rumanian minority if it entered into some intimate and permanent pact with
BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY 1918-1919

Rumania. To satisfy Czecho-Slovak sentiment it ought also to be closely associated with Bohemia and so with German Austria and Germany.

On this basis then a position of permanent stability and prosperity could best be secured by a new Danubian Confederation comprising German Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and probably also Bulgaria. Such a confederacy would no longer be under German Magyar domination. But the presence in it of a large German element would make its close association or even economic and defensive alliance with Germany almost inevitable in the long run. An alternative but probably less satisfactory solution — especially for the Czecho-Slovaks — would be to let German Austria and Bohemia join the German federation — to which they both once belonged — and let the others set up as a separate Danubian Confederation.

The essential thing to realise is that whatever basis is taken for the creation of new units in the area now covered by Austria-Hungary, they cannot really be independent units. To attempt to create artificial sovereignties, especially on the basis of “spoils to the victor”, is only to create a new and more troubled Balkan Peninsula. The wisest course is to aim at securing the fairest and most workable rearrangement on national lines, but at the same time actively to encourage the idea of a new union, preferably one which would include the whole of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire (excepting Galicia and Bukovina), and Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria as well. In such a union the different nationalities would find the solution of their nationalist rivalries and an ample field for prosperous development. That such a union would largely work in co-operation with Germany is also a fact which we should accept with a good grace. The co-operation will be of a very different character from the league between Hapsburg and Hohenzollern in the past.

The fact is that “Middle Europe” is an inevitable and necessary outcome of this war whatever the actual issue of the struggle or the terms of peace imposed by the victors. In the long run the economic and defensive factors which make the whole of this region a natural unit in the present conditions of the world, are bound to prevail over the exaggerated nationalism — German, Magyar, Serb, Bulgar, Czech — which has been at the root of this war. There is no possible solution which can wholly satisfy that nationalism, any more than there is any possible solution which can wholly satisfy Irish nationalism. But nationalism, at any rate in the exaggerated form in which it is represented by the class of parliamentarian whose political life consists in working it up, is not a permanent factor. The German variety of it is already in process of being cured by defeat. The wave of Bolshevism which threatens to submerge Ukrainian and Polish nationalism as soon as the support of German bayonets is withdrawn, might conceivably obliterate all the minor nationalisms of Austria-Hungary, even before this war is over, in the more elementary, and possibly more permanent, struggle between Bolshevik and Anti-Bolshevik. In any case the various nationalities of Central Europe are also interlocked, and their racial frontiers are so unsuitable as the frontiers of really independent states, that the only satisfactory and permanent working policy for them lies in their incorporation in a non-national superstate. We can delay but we cannot prevent the eventual coming of that superstate.

To commit ourselves unreservedly to nationalism at the Peace Conference, and to ignore the inevitable coming of the larger non-national super-state, would be to commit precisely the errors which our grandparents committed at the Congress of Vienna, when they settled Europe on the basis of legitimism, on which the war had been fought and argued, and not on the basis of the new nationalist forces which the war had called into being. A League of Nations based on the principle of nationalism might soon find itself as much of an anomaly and an obstacle to progress as the Holy Alliance in its day. In any case a lasting League of Nations cannot be built up on a chaos of independent sovereignties of every sort and size. The reduction of the present total of states to a limited number of groups, federations or “super-states” is an essential stepping-stone
towards any higher integration. For the purposes of the war we have rightly backed up Czecho-Slovaks, Yugoslavs and every anti-German and anti-Austrian movement we could find. But for the purposes of a lasting settlement we must regulate the satisfaction of these national aspirations by the need of creating, or recreating, a larger supranational in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

L. S. A.[mery]

Minutes attached to the document:

I am in considerable sympathy with Capt. Amery's views. Unless we can induce the small states we are setting up to federate with one another the last state of Europe may well be worse than the first.

This paper should be considered in the War Dept. with skilled technical assistance of the P.I.D.

R[obert].C[ecil].

[To] Sir R. Graham.

Please see Lord R. Cecil's minute on 177223 herewith.

Mr. Namier & I have concerted the annexed minute.

H.G.N[icolson].

Captain Amery appears to have been somewhat prematurely disturbed by the political conditions which will evolve from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He sees a multitude of States arise and fears that their future political and economic rivalries may lead to a Balkanisation of Central Europe. He then urges that the only remedy for this danger exists in some form of federal union or unions.

One wonders whether he clearly visualises the fact that the disruption of Austria-Hungary will not add to the number of States in Europe, but merely render their frontiers more reasonable, and that the entire problem which he has raised reduces itself to that of the Czecho-Slovaks and Magyars. Jugo-Slavia will take the place of Serbia whilst Transylvania will go to form a Greater Roumania, and neither of them will constitute a new problem for the future. The emergence of Poland and the Ukraine is due, not to the disruption of Austria-Hungary, but to the collapse of Russia, and the dangers which are to be apprehended as between these two States do not arise out of East Galicia alone, nor can we expect them to be solved by any kind of confederation between these two States.

As regards German Austria, it must be remembered that the great mass of German Austrian opinion has now come to regard the disruption of the Empire as an unpleasant amputation perhaps, but at least as an accomplished fact, and their eyes are turned with a feeling of something akin to relief away from the hereditary incubus of a Slav or Magyar connection to their congenital home in Germany. It is unthinkable that the German Austrians could contemplate reuniting on equal terms in however loose a form with their former Slav compatriots. They might perhaps agree to a reunion if a predominant position were conceded to them in the new federation, which would then be but the old Austria under a new name. To its recreation the other nationalities have no reason whatsoever to agree, nor would it be to our interest for, so far from restoring
the balance against Germany, an Austrian federation under German leadership would merely increase the difficulties caused by the collapse of Russia.

There remains, therefore, only Hungary and Bohemia, and it is indubitable that the problems which will arise between these two will be acute and pregnant with future friction. It should be observed, however, that we are at present entirely in the dark as to what is happening either in Hungary or Bohemia, and that it is impossible at the present stage to forecast what will emerge from the present acute confusion in both countries. It would surely be wiser for us to form no settled policy, or even opinion, as regards the future status of these countries and their relations towards each other and their neighbours until they themselves have evolved some national principle and are in a position to provide us with a definite scheme representing the views of some more or less permanent organism. It is surely unnecessary and imprudent to embark on conjectures as regards the future Central European Federation when the political leaders in the States of Central Europe are not as yet certain in regard to their own wishes.

As regards the Czecho-Slovaks, however, there are certain principles which have a less remote application. At present they confuse the claims of legitimacy, of paramount interests and of self-determination, and combine a plea for their historic and strategic frontiers in the west and north with a plea for their ethnographic frontiers in the south and east. The incorporation of Germans in the Czecho-Slovak State will be a weakness to it, and the Czechs in their own well understood interest should avoid as far as possible the inclusion of German districts in their State. If in some particular districts, as seems to be really the case, the paramount strategic and economic interests of the Czechs, though contrary to the national principle, are such as cannot be disregarded, we must make clear to them that the doctrine of self-determination, not being merely an excuse for anti-German map-making, overwhelming reasons will have to be adduced for any infringement of that principle whomever this may concern.

In a word, it would be unwise to allow ourselves to be frightened by the kaleidoscopic changes in the map of Europe into attempts to recreate federations which might prove unnatural and contrary to the wishes and real interests of those concerned. Self-determination will inevitably lead to much confusion and rivalry, but the League of Nations should do much to localise the danger and eventually to stabilise the situation.

L.B. N[amier].
7/11/18

I agree. This seems very sound and a copy of it should be sent to Capt. Amery.

R[andal]l [?] B?

Remarks on Captain L.S. Amery's Paper on the Austro-Hungarian Problem, October 22nd, 1918

Captain Amery's remark that in Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs base their claims on an historic basis, whilst in Slovachia [sic] they change to that of ethnography is incontestibly correct. With this kind of shifting of ground in accordance with the one that suits them better we meet in every single one of these small nationalities. It is in the same way that the Poles claim Posnania on grounds of ethnography and everything they can get hold of in the east on grounds of history. I certainly agree that such a
procedure is by no means legitimate, but it must be admitted that in the case of the Czechs there is some sense in it and more justification for it than in most other cases. Certain parts of German Bohemia are absolutely essential to the Czecho-Slovak State, and if after this war international relations continue on a basis which makes strategic or economic securities necessary, the Czechs cannot possibly admit an ethnographic partition in Bohemia. On the other hand, their claims to Slovakia are not merely claims to a wider frontier — they involve the very existence of an entire nation, the Slovaks. This, I think, is a question which deserves some attention: whether the disregarding of a certain national claim affects merely a branch of the nation or the nation as a whole. Should even a few million Germans be included in the Czecho-Slovak State, there will still exist in the world a powerful political German nation which in every respect renders the life of those not included in that German State more tolerable. Should, however, the ethnographic Slovak claim in north-western Hungary be disregarded, the Slovak nation would not exist anywhere in the world at all.

Still, should it prove possible to cut off certain parts of German Bohemia from the Czech State and unite it to Germany, I think this should be done even though the Czechs might violently protest against such an "amputation".

As to Captain Amery's far-reaching and no doubt interesting speculations about the future of the different nationalities, I do not believe it would be of much profit to enter into them in the abstract. Jugo-Slavia and a Great Roumania can exist on their own even better than the small Serbia and the small Roumania have hitherto existed. The Austrian Germans will determine their own fate, and it is hardly profitable for us to discuss what they should do whilst they themselves probably do not yet know what they intend to do. It is just for this reason that I feel it to be so futile to develop at the present stage plans for the future Danubian Federation. So that in the last resort the questions raised by Captain Amery may be reduced to two: (1) to the question of the Czecho-Slovaks (2) the question of the Magyars — what frontiers are to be given to these two nations, ethnographic or historic? And what is to happen to their States once they are constituted within such frontiers?

The problem of the bigger super-national units which Captain Amery raises in his paper hangs closely on the question of the League of Nations, and I do not presume to pronounce any judgment upon it.

But these are two questions of interest which emerge from the paper and which we had better consider in a fundamental manner: (1) Are we in the peace settlement going to practise equal justice and with an even hand apply certain principles for which we profess to stand or are we going to take the view that in all doubtful cases our enemies — the Germans and Magyars — have to suffer? (2) Have the new States which we propose to create be created on bases strategically and economically such as were required previous to this war, or is the League of Nations going to become something real which will change the face of European politics just as the introduction of a municipal or Government police has made it possible for people to do away with iron shutters in their houses?

[Unsigned] [H. Nicolson?]  

This is a very interesting letter, and requires careful thought: It should perhaps be examined as soon as possible by the P.I.D.

[Unsigned]  
25/10/16
No. 7

Memorandum by J.W. Headlam-Morley to Sir W. Tyrrell

[HDLM ACC 727/16]

Foreign Office, 30 October 1918

I saw Mr. Namier last night. He pressed very strongly that if there are negotiations for an armistice with Austria-Hungary, one of the conditions to be imposed should be that all regiments should be returned to the territories to which they belong. The Austrian regiments are territorial; the result of this would be that the Croatians should go back to Croatia, the Czechs to Bohemia, etc. This is very important to get the organised strength of the army available for the establishment of the provisional governments in the different parts of the Empire, and to prevent a professional army movement against a dissolution. I do not know whether you will think it worth while passing this on.¹

¹ No further trace of this idea has been found by the editor.

No. 8

Letter from J.W. Headlam-Morley to H.G. Wells (Extracts)

[HDLM ACC 727/36]

Foreign Office, 2 November 1918

Dear Wells,

I was reading with much interest the account of your speech the other day, but there is one passage in it which perhaps you will allow me to animadvert. You said that the Foreign Office did nothing itself and prevented anybody else from doing anything. This I think I shall probably be correct in connecting with the short conversation which took place at the Committee last Tuesday.

Now the point I should like to make is this, which I should have thought is now pretty well known, that it is unfair to blame the Foreign Office for delays which take place because the Foreign Office is not ultimately responsible under the present substitute for a constitution for the conduct of foreign affairs. Everything of importance has to be referred to the War Cabinet of which the Secretary of State is not even a member, and the Foreign Office cannot act until it has received the permission of the War Cabinet.

[....]

I know how tempting it is to assume that mistakes and delays which may occur are the natural consequence of the indifference and incapacity of old established Government Departments; I think it is too often forgotten that the work of a Department is necessarily conditioned by the superior control. Myself I have never been able to understand how one could expect an able and vigorous conduct of foreign affairs under the present system by which the final control is vested in a body of men, none of whom...
have given any special attention to, or got special experience of international relations, and of which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is not even a member. Successful conduct of foreign affairs, just as successful conduct of a war, requires that the full responsibility should be put in the hands of some man who has a well organised staff under him; nothing but disaster can come of a system in which the control and responsibility is divided.

Yours very truly,

[J.W. Headlam-Morley]

No. 9

War Cabinet Minute No. 501 (Extract)

[PRO CAB 23/8]

13 November 1918

MOVEMENTS OF BRITISH TROOPS IN EUROPE

(a.) The Balkans

[...] The Chief of the Imperial General Staff\(^1\) said that there were one or two questions as to which he desired War Cabinet authority, regarding the movements of British troops in Europe. In the first place, there was the question of General Milne's command in the Balkans. General Wilson said that the Roumanians were proposing to move into Transylvania, and that the French were anxious to obtain a hold on Roumania, and wished, in that connection, to employ one of our divisions. He himself was opposed to the policy of our becoming involved in these operations, and would like to remove the 26th Division away from that theatre. He suggested that we should inform the French Government that, in view of the fact that military operations were now over, we propose to take General Milne away from General Franchet d'Esperey's command.

The First Lord of the Admiralty,\(^2\) on the other hand, pointed out that, from a political point of view, it might be undesirable, by withdrawing British troops, to leave the French with a free hand in that part of the world, and, more particularly, to allow French influence to predominate on the Danube. Unless the British flag were shown there, the people on the spot would infer that we had abandoned our interests there.

The War Cabinet decided that---

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff should telegraph to General Milne, informing him that the Secretary of State for War was shortly going to Paris, and would discuss with M. Clemenceau the question of the employment of British troops in Roumania, and that, in the meantime, General Milne should delay sending the 26th Division to that destination pending further instructions.

---

2 Sir Eric Campbell Geddes.
Très urgentes.

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat,

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Vienne a fait connaître au Gouvernement fédéral que c'est avec satisfaction qu'il verrait les missions diplomatiques des puissances associées, résidant à Berne, recevoir l'autorisation d'entrer en rapports directs avec la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie auprès de la confédération suisse, aux fins de traiter toutes questions d'ordre économique et de ravitaillement.

Considérant qu'il est dans l'intérêt de l'Europe entière que ces questions soient solutionnées aussi tôt que possible, mon Gouvernement me charge et j'ai dès lors l'honneur de soumettre, par le très aimable intermédiaire de Votre Excellence, la proposition dont il s'agit au Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat, les assurances de la plus haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être

de Votre Excellence
le très humble,
obéissant serviteur

J. B? Isler

Minutes attached to the document:

The Contraband Dept. ask for opinion of War Dept. in first instance.
As regards relief the proposal wd. appear sound, but I would imagine there wd. be strong political objections. I agree. [L. Oliphant]

(1) The Austrian Legation at Berne does not represent any Govt. at the present time, or does it represent all?
(2) The Austrians wd. endeavour to play off the Allies against each other and provoke friction.
If the proposal is adopted the meetings shd. I submit, be under Swiss chairmanship.

Q. Enquire views of French, U.S. and Italian Govts. indicating above mentioned difficulties,
and copy [to] D.M.I.
and circulate to War Cabt. in translation.

C.H.Smith.
18/11/18

1 Swiss Minister in London.
I agree to the procedure suggested. The proposal seems to me unacceptable.

E. Crowe
20/11/18

The French Govt. are opposed to any direct & official relations with the Austrian Legation until peace has been signed. They consider that such questions should be treated with the Swiss Govt., who are in charge of Austrian relations, and that Austrian technical delegates could be attached to the Swiss Govt. for the purpose.

M. de Fleurian\(^2\) gave me a note today in the above sense. I think we should conform to it.


\(^2\) French Chargé d'Affaires in London.

No. 11

War Cabinet Minute No. 503 (Extract)

[PRO CAB 23/8]

18 November 1918

ARMY OF OCCUPATION: STATUS OF GENERAL MILNE

[...+] The attention of the War Cabinet was called to a telegram which had been received, indicating that orders have been given by General Franchet d'Esperey for British troops from General Milne's command to occupy Vienna and Budapest. Apparently General Franchet d'Esperey was under orders to proceed to these cities, and the action contemplated was being taken without consultation with His Majesty's Government.

It was pointed out that such action would be interpreted in this country as an interference on behalf of a particular form of government, that there would be opposition in Labour circles, and that it would elicit a protest from the public, who were anxious to see the soldiers return home at the earliest possible moment. No representations had been made that the advance proposed was necessary in order to enforce the terms of armistice, and it was most undesirable that we should let ourselves be dragged into a selfish exhibition by any of our Allies.

The Director of Military Operations\(^1\) referred to the status of General Milne, and the desirability of making his command independent of the French command.

The Secretary of State for War\(^2\) said that he was strongly opposed to involving the British troops in the Central European operations unless it was necessary in order to preserve order, but there was no necessity whatever for the Allies to be called upon to preserve order in Vienna and Budapest.

\(^1\) Major-General P.P. de B. Radcliffe.

\(^2\) Lord Milner.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs³ said he feared that these projects of the French Government were likely to cause trouble. There were already signs of trouble in another quarter, between the Italians and the Serbians. In his opinion, the proposed advance into Austria-Hungary was a matter for Allied decision, and if a decision were given in favour of the advance, then the British Army should be represented, even if only by a small contingent. He thought it probable that the French would argue that the enterprise was a military operation required in the interests of the effective carrying out of the armistice, and that it was entirely under the control of Marshal Foch.

The War Cabinet decided that---

The Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, should send a telegram to the French Government (a) stating that General Milne could not be allowed to send troops with the proposed expedition to Vienna and Budapest (b) that His Majesty’s Government had learned the proposal with surprise, and wished to know what objects it was intended to serve; (c) asking for information as to the number of troops Marshal Foch was likely to require as the British contribution to the Army of Occupation.

³ A.J. Balfour.

No. 12

War Cabinet Minute No. 506 (Extract)

[PRO CAB 23/8]

22 November 1918

PROPOSED DESPATCH OF BRITISH TROOPS TO AUSTRIA

[...] The War Cabinet had under consideration Lord Derby’s telegram No. 1357, reporting that the French Government had been asked by the Emperor of Austria, as well as by the Government of Austria-Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, to send troops to Vienna and Budapest to ensure order. The French Government were determined to comply with this request, and were anxious that British troops should participate equally. In any case, French troops, probably to the extent of some two or three divisions, would be sent.¹ In M. Clemenceau’s opinion there was no question of their being engaged in military operations, and he thought that they would meet with a very friendly reception.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs² read a letter supplementary to the above telegram, which he had received from Lord Derby. The latter said that M. Clemenceau attached great importance to complying with this request, and had impressed upon Lord Derby that it was not a military operation, but merely a march of honour, at the invitation of the authorities in Austria and Hungary. Mr. Balfour said that he himself did not see how the French were going to find all the troops necessary for purposes of

¹ For further developments regarding the sending of French troops to Vienna and Budapest see No. 14.
² A.J. Balfour.
occupation. There had already been many desertions in the French Army, especially among the older classes. There was no diplomatic or political reason for complying, except to please M. Clemenceau. He thought it was an intolerable position for British to be called upon to act as police in the Austrian capitals. It was not our business to interfere in internal matters in the Central Empires. The French Government's present suggestion was a very different matter from the proposal to send British troops with the Italians to Fiume and elsewhere in order to prevent disturbances between the latter and the Yugo-Slavs. A dangerous feeling already existed, and he strongly favoured sending small bodies of British troops — with whom he very much hoped that American troops would be associated — to keep the peace. There was a further point: if there was to be a march of honour in Vienna, why should there not also be one in Berlin? Otherwise the Germans might say that their allies had been defeated, but that they themselves had not.

The Secretary of State for War said that he would regard the further use of British troops as simply disastrous. Our military liabilities had already reached appalling dimensions, while every day brought storms of applications for further releases. Troops were required for Baku, Batum, Archangel, the Balkans, Fiume, Italy, Mesopotamia, and so on. To meet the present demands would reduce our army in two months by one-half, and he strongly deprecated any further commitments. He quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that there was a distinct reason for our associating ourselves with the Italians in order to prevent trouble arising between them and the Yugo-Slavs, but the present Austrian proposal was a very different matter, and we could have no idea what it might involve. We were already arranging to send food to Austria, and he thought that that was a much better way of showing her kindness than by so-called “marches of honour.” If peace conditions obtained, and the Austrians had really got a settled Government, it might be a different matter; but Austria at present was in a state of raging chaos, and it was the wrong moment for formal acts of display. The despatch of our troops might even lead to a great fiasco.

Lord Curzon said he understood that the idea was that the French and ourselves should show troops in the two capitals in order to give a feeling of security and to restore order. He himself saw no great objection to this, subject to three provisos:—

(a.) That the number of troops sent was limited.
(b.) That the period for which they were to remain should be short.
(c.) That the objects for which they were sent were clearly defined.

It might possibly be desirable, if the French were going, that we should also show our flag.

Mr. Barnes thought that it would be generally represented as an unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of Austria. The political effect in this country of sending troops to Russia was bad.

Lord Reading said that he was afraid that by sending troops we might be led into complications, the result of which we could not foresee.

General Smuts doubted whether this was very probable, if it were true that the Austrians and Hungarians were now really friendly to us.

The War Cabinet decided that—

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should inform the French Government in the sense that the British Government are unwilling to co-operate in the despatch of troops to Vienna and Budapest.

3 Lord Milner.
THE OCCUPATION OF VIENNA AND BUDAPEST

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he regretted the decision of the War Cabinet that British troops should not take part in the occupation of Vienna and Budapest. (War Cabinet 506, Minute 7) He felt that the outward and visible sign of conquest was occupation and if French and Italian troops were utilised mainly for the occupation of Austrian territory, it would leave behind the impression that the French and Italians had been mainly responsible for the Allied victory. As a matter of fact, the British Empire had been mainly responsible for our victory, and the tendency was for us to leave it to M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch and Colonel House to get the credit and to settle the fate of the world.

LORD MILNER said that he was apprehensive that we might get into serious difficulties by the occupation of Austrian territory. Already immense demands were being made for British troops in all parts of the world — Archangel, Murmansk, Siberia, the Caucasus, Turkey, &c. Moreover, very large numbers of men were being brought home in connection with demobilisation, coal, and for other purposes. All these demands fell on the fighting men. Although the British Army abroad numbered some 1,700,000 men, only a proportion of these were fighting troops, and he did not want to see them scattered too widely.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there were advantages in not demobilising too quickly, as it would be difficult to absorb all the men at once. This strengthened his argument in favour of taking part in the occupation of such places as Vienna and Budapest. He did not ask that the War Cabinet should reverse their decision, but he thought that they should reserve their final judgment until they had heard M. Clemenceau's arguments in favour of occupying these places.

LORD MILNER agreed that it would be desirable to have a conversation with M. Clemenceau on the subject.

1 See No. 12.
2 See No. 14.
No. 14

Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to the Foreign Office (London.
Received 27 November 1918)

No. 1618. [PRO FO 371/3139 No. 195380]

Paris, 26 November 1918

Urgent.

I saw President of the Council\(^1\) this afternoon. Following is position with regard to
sending of French troops into Austro-Hungary. Foch had taken initiative in ordering
troops to go to Budapest. Question of sending them to Vienna had not been decided.
President of the Council is of opinion that troops would receive an enthusiastic
welcome at Vienna but would not be so welcome at Budapest, as he recognises that we
are doing something very disagreeable to Hungary when taking Transylvania from her
to give to Roumania. President of the Council thinks sending of a comparatively small
body of French troops to Budapest might put them in a very unpleasant position. He
has therefore this morning stopped the whole movement and has asked Foch to
reconsider the question of occupation of Budapest by French troops. If he considers it
necessary for military reasons movement is to proceed, but if not troops are to wait to
see how situation develops.

\(^1\) G. Clemenceau.

No. 15

Memorandum prepared by the Political Intelligence Department (Foreign Office.
Extracts)

[PRO CAB 29/2]

Foreign Office, December 1918

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS

SOUTH AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

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Synopsis of British Desiderata

General

[....]

1. To obtain a just and permanent settlement based on the principles of nationality,
self-determination, security, and free economic opportunity.
2. To frame this settlement in such a way as (a) to leave no \(\square\) avoidable cause for
future friction in South-Eastern Europe, and thus to prevent as far as possible a
combination between Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania against Greece and Jugo-Slavia; (b) to liberate the main economic routes and outlets in such a way as will draw the trade of Central Europe to the Mediterranean, while at the same time laying the foundation for a future Customs union.

3. To make full provision for the rights of minority nationalities in the new States.

4. To include the whole settlement in the Final Act of the Congress, thereby to give it the sanction, if not the actual guarantee, of the League of Nations.

5. To permit no secret understandings and agreements between the countries of South-Eastern Europe, and to secure that public opinion in these countries realise that the settlement is imposed by the League of Nations and will be permanent.

[....]

Treaties

1. Austria-Hungary

(a.) The authorities who are recognised as the successors to the former Austro-Hungarian Government to renounce all claims to the territories inhabited by the liberated peoples as defined within the frontiers recommended, and to recognise the right of these peoples to determine their own future status and governance.

A Joint Commission to be established to delimitate the new frontiers.

(b.) The successors of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire to undertake to enter into treaties with the States formed by, or representing, former Austrian subject races in regard to such questions as national minorities, concessions and State succession. These treaties to be submitted to, and approved by, the Congress at Paris, and to be embodied in the Final Act of that Congress.

The question of the future responsibility of the liberated peoples for the Austro-Hungarian war and pre-war debts to be referred to a Mixed Commission.

(c.) Provisions for the maintenance and safeguarding of British commercial and private interests, concessions, claims and contracts in former Austro-Hungarian territory.

[....]

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA

Jugoslavia and Serbia

Proposed Frontiers

2. The Hungarian Frontier.— This is roughly formed by the line of the Drave to its confluence with the Danube, though, as we have seen, in Baranja Slav populations are found to the north of the Drave. The line of the Danube may again be used almost as far as Baja. From there to the Theiss, just west of Kikinda, an artificial line must be drawn in which geographical and economic considerations must be taken into account.

Both in the case of the German and Magyar frontiers, due notice must be taken of the fact that German and Magyar minorities will be left within the frontiers of the new State; Germans, especially in the Gottschee district of Carniola, and scattered around Esseg and throughout Bačka, as well as in the Serbian Banat; Magyars in very large numbers in the north of Bačka. These minorities must be considered as coming under the head of minorities demanding favoured treatment under international arrangement.

3. The Rumanian Frontier.— Under the Treaty with Rumania of August 1916 the whole of the Banat was to pass to Rumania. Apart from people of wholly officialised mentality, it is now realised by Rumanians that this is not only unjust, but impossible. The result of unofficial or semi-official conversations between competent and moderate
representatives of both sides has been to arrive at an arrangement by which the greater part of the county of Torontál and the south-west corner of Temes shall be incorporated in Jugoslavia. The rest of the Banat, with the possible exception of the extreme north-west corner, where there is a Magyar majority, shall unite with Rumania. No arrangement can be reached on purely racial lines. Not only are there very large German, and not negligible Magyar, minorities throughout the Banat, for which, as we have seen, special provision must be made, but Serbian and Rumanian populations are in many cases inextricably interlocked.

[...]

Rumania

The Rumanian Question

The Treaty of August 1916 recognised as Rumanian not only the whole of Transylvania, the Banat, and practically the entire Bukovina, but a very considerable area of Hungary proper (the greater part of it, indeed, Rumanian in character), and in many points allowed Rumanian demands to be in excess of what they were justified in putting forward on racial or any other grounds. This treaty, it has been ruled by His Majesty's Government, is no longer binding since the conclusion of peace by Rumania with the enemy Powers, and we are thereby relieved from obligations the execution of which would undoubtedly have caused intense difficulties with the Jugoslav, Magyar, and Ukrainian populations of Austria-Hungary. Quite apart from this fact, the basis of the treaty, viz., acknowledgment of Rumania's right to annex certain parts of Hungary, was radically wrong even in the eyes of the Rumanians of Hungary themselves; as we have seen, it is not annexation but free union which they will support.

Its Difficulties

The Rumanian question is in certain respects more difficult than the Jugoslav question. No territorial line can be drawn in Hungary which will not, in uniting Rumanian territory with Rumania, at the same time enclose a very considerable and in some cases compact Magyar and German population. The Rumanian territories are not, as are the Jugoslav territories, inhabited by people almost exclusively of one race, nor are they bounded by natural frontiers such as we have seen in the case of Jugoslavia. It goes without saying, therefore, that the frontier line must be largely an artificial one, and secondly, that the question of the minorities of alien race passing under Rumanian rule must be carefully noted as one for special international arrangement.

Rumania's Annexations under the Treaty

The territories handed over to Rumania by the Treaty of August 1916 included the whole of the Banat, following the line of the Danube and the Theiss from Orsova to Belgrade, and thence to Szegedin. From there the line went north-east in rather arbitrary fashion, passing through, to take the chief points, Hodmező-Vásárhely [Hódmezővásárhely], Békés[سا], just east of Debreczen, up to the Theiss again at Vásáros-Nameny [Vásárosnamény]; thence following the line of the Theiss through Huszt to Máramaros-Sziget, and soon after that turning north, and subsequently north-east, it enclosed the whole Bukovina except the small angle of it beyond the Prut.
Justified Rumanian Claims

In the greater part of this area, indeed, the Rumanian population is in a considerable majority. In Transylvania, even according to Hungarian statistics (notoriously falsified against the Rumanians), the Rumanian percentage is 55 per cent; while the minority is a mixed one of Magyars, Germans, and other nationalities.¹

Suggested Arrangement

The arrangement suggested in regard to the Rumanian-Jugoslav frontier on the Banat has already been dealt with in the section devoted to Jugoslavia. (see [above]).

There is little doubt that a friendly agreement can be reached between the Jugoslavs and Rumanians over this. The sole part of the Banat which theoretically ought to be excluded from this arrangement is the extreme north-west corner in the angle formed by the Maros and Theiss, which is purely Hungarian in character, and faces the Hungarian city of Szegedin. Whether the Jugoslavs and Rumanians can be brought to leave this district to Hungary remains to be seen, but the attempt ought, perhaps, to be made. North from this, the line of the frontier between Rumania and Hungary should certainly run east of that drawn by the 1916 treaty. In the districts of Ugosca [Ugocsa], Szatmár, Szilágy, Bihar, and Arad, certain sub-districts assigned to Rumania should be reconsidered. These have been tabulated in the memorandum by Dr. Seton-Watson hereto annexed,¹ and it is therein suggested that a “grey zone” between Magyars and Rumanians should be created, including certain of the districts named. Even when this has been done it is, of course, clear that, though the territories joined with Rumania would contain a considerable and adequate Rumanian majority, amounting even according to the Hungarian statistics, to 57.5 per cent., the Magyars would possess, again according to their own figures, 27.7 per cent., and the Germans 11.5 per cent. The actual figures of the population according to the Hungarian census of 1910, would be for the whole territory united with Rumania 4,789,175, of which 2,756,211 would be Rumanian, 1,333,509 Magyar, and 552,023 German. These are obviously very considerable minorities and must be given an important place in the consideration of the question of racial minorities in general. The Transylvanian leaders express themselves as perfectly willing to allow cultural autonomy to these minorities, providing for the use of their language in primary schools. For the Szekler counties, where the population is almost entirely Hungarian, a measure of administrative autonomy may be obtained.

Transylvanians and Bessarabians

It cannot be argued too strongly that, alike in the case of the Rumanians of Hungary and the Rumanians of what was formerly Russia, there can be no question of our appearing to allow, or of the populations accepting, out-and-out annexation by Rumania. The time for this has passed, and for Transylvanians and Bessarabians alike (in the case of the latter they have made their independent standpoint perfectly clear both at the time of their union with Rumania and since) union must depend on the free choice of the accredited representatives of the people. Such a preliminary choice can be made

¹ Some of the counties just to the west of Transylvania are equally Rumanian in character. Szilágy, for instance, possesses, according to Hungarian statistics, a Rumanian percentage of 59; Arad has about an equal percentage. But in certain parts, for instance, the county of Csanád and the parts of the county of Békés allotted to Rumania under the treaty the population is really practically purely Magyar, and the Rumanians have no racial claim.

¹¹ See below.
by the existing representatives: in Bessarabia the present Diet, in Transylvania the National Council, into which the executive of the Rumanian National Party of Hungary seems to have developed. It is clear that the Bessarabians and Transylvanians alike will play a great part in the reconstruction of the new Rumania. Possibly they may not demand conditions of entry into the Rumanian State, but what they will undoubtedly demand is the recognition of the fact that they enter that State as free agents, not as annexed subjects. While no such acute differences as have arisen between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee ought to arise between Rumania and the Transylvanians, grave danger is to be foreseen of a similar situation being created should politicians of so old-fashioned a type as M. Brătianu come into power again and put forward the Treaty of 1916 as the basis of Rumanian unity.

Rumanian Representatives at the Peace Conference

It is important that the delegations from Rumania shall be so constituted that it will be, and be accepted as, fully representative not only of the Rumanians of the Rumanian kingdom but also of the Rumans of Hungary and Bessarabia.

The Czecho-Slovak State

Introductory Summary

1. THE population of the three Czech provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, amounts to over 10 millions, of Slovakia to about 2,250,000. If certain feasible frontier rectifications are carried out in the Czech provinces the population of the future Czecho-Slovak State will amount to about 12 millions, of which 8,300,000 will be Czechs and Slovaks, almost 3,500,000 Germans, and about 150,000 Magyars. Some 600,000 Czecho-Slovaks would remain outside the boundaries of that State, in Lower Austria and Vienna and in small enclaves in the Magyar plain.

6. No re-federation between the Czecho-Slovak State and German Austria is possible, as it would imply an indirect connection with Germany. Nor can the Czecho-Slovaks federate with the Magyars so long as any trace is left of the old Magyar imperialism and the old Magyar oligarchy. An alliance between the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland seems desirable, but can hardly be secured unless the Poles abandon altogether their aggressive imperialist schemes against Russia, and give up their anti-Russian attitude.

3. The German Problem in the Czecho-Slovak State

Nor is it fair to draw an analogy between the mountain fringe of Bohemia and the Carpathian frontier of Hungary, and say that if the Czechs refuse to abandon the German districts of Bohemia they forfeit their claims to the Slovak districts of Hungary: (1) If Slovakia remained part of Hungary the entire Slovak nation would be refused a political existence, which obviously does not apply to the Germans and Bohemia. (2) In the Czecho-Slovak State, if certain admissible frontier rectifications be made, the alien element will hardly amount to one-third of the population, whereas if the Carpathian frontier were left to Hungary, in Hungary proper (excluding Croatia) the Magyars would form at the utmost half the population. Their own statistics, which give them 60 per cent. of the population of Hungary, are notorious forgeries. (3) Slovakia is
not economically bound up with Hungary as German Bohemia is with Bohemia. (4) Lastly, the Magyars have had their chance, and so far from conciliating the non-Magyar nationalities, have alienated them by the most brutal persecutions; should the Czechs engage on a similar policy towards the Germans the settlement would undoubtedly have to be reconsidered.

The Czechs [...] are likely to prove to us the greatest asset in Central and Eastern Europe. It would be most deplorable should they leave the Peace Conference disappointed and with a feeling of having been abandoned to the Germans or Magyars.

4. Czech Claims to Territory outside the Czech Provinces and Slovakia

[...]

Early in the war the idea was put forward by Professor Masaryk of a territorial connection to be established between the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs through German and Magyar territory. The distance which separates the Czechs from the Jugo-Slavs amounts to about 100 miles, and their enclaves in that territory are practically negligible. Such a “corridor” through these territories would seem of small practical value; in time of war it would probably be found strategically untenable; in time of peace economic relations between the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs can, if necessary, be safeguarded by means other than a direct territorial connection. Lastly, even on political grounds it would seem unadvisable to press that demand under the new conditions created by revolution. Such a violation of German and Magyar national rights would re-create a common cause between the Germans and the Magyars, whereas at present there is at least some hope that the complete breakdown of Magyar imperialism, and, which is still more important, the overthrow of the Magyar oligarchy by the revolution, may in time obliterate the memory of that common interest which up till now had rendered the Magyar-German connection indissoluble.

Recently another idea of the same kind has been mooted in the Czech and Rumanian circles, namely, to make Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian territory meet in north-eastern Hungary. There the distance between them is slightly smaller, though yet about 60 miles. The intervening territory is mountainous and densely wooded, and it would seem doubtful whether one slope of a high mountain range without the plain below (which is Magyar) would be of any real value as a connecting link either in peace or war. The country which intervenes between the Slovaks and the Rumanians is inhabited by Little Russians (otherwise called Ruthenians or Ukrainians), who in these districts, however, have shown so far but weak national tendencies. Where they exist they are of the “Russophile” rather than of the “Ukrainian” type, i.e., the people consider themselves an integral part of the Russian nation, and not a separate nationality. There is just a possibility of these Ruthenes voluntarily choosing to join the Slovaks should the Ukrainian Separatists prevail in East Galicia and the Ukraine, and prevent, even if only temporarily, their union with Russia. But anyhow, the Czechs are perfectly decided not to anything in this matter which might cause friction between them and Russia.

[...]
posts under the government. They despised the Slovak peasant nation and were hated by them in turn. Even the liberation of the Slovaks from Magyar rule, political and social, will not close up the abyss between them, unless the Magyar nation is profoundly transformed by social revolution. Should they remain an essentially aristocratic nation, there can be no amity between them and their peasant neighbours, their late serfs. But if social revolution sweeps away the Magyar oligarchy and a peasants' and workmen's government takes its place, the Magyars will be able to approach their neighbours in a very different spirit. Until then the relations between the freed Slovaks and their late masters must remain cool, to say the least.

[....]

ANNEX I

THE FUTURE FRONTIERS OF HUNGARY

(Note by Dr. R.W. Seton Watson.)

THE future frontiers of Hungary can only be drawn in accordance with the principles---

(a.) That Czecho-Slovak, Rumanian, and Jugo-Slav unity are the bases upon which the new States of Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania are to rest.
(b.) That special linguistic guarantees in church, school, and law court must be assured to all racial minorities living within the newly-drawn frontiers of each of these States.

For the delineation of the frontiers of these new States it will be necessary to constitute boundary commissions, consisting of representatives of the two countries directly concerned and delegates appointed by the Peace Conference, or by the League of Nations, if already constituted.

With a view to allaying inter-racial friction in the meantime it may be helpful to establish certain “gray zones,” which are generally admitted to be matters of dispute between parties, and which should be administered under international control until the boundary commission shall have completed their enquiries. Only thus would it be possible to avoid intensive propaganda and intrigue and the “incidents” which this would inevitably provoke.

On the territory of Hungary it would be necessary to establish three such “gray zones”:

(a.) Between Magyars and Slovaks;
(b.) Between Magyars and Rumanians;
(c.) Between Magyars and the Jugo-Slavs.

The problems of the future frontier between Hungary and the Ukraine, and between Hungary and German-Austria stand somewhat apart, since economic and geographical

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considerations play an even greater part in these two cases than in the three principal cases already specified.

(A.)---The Magyar-Slovak Frontier

(a.) In Slovakia there are seven existing counties (Komitat-Megye) which are incontestably Slovak—the only noticeable minorities being German rather than Magyar, and then only amounting to a very small proportion. These seven counties (for convenience we adhere throughout to the Magyar names) are Trencsén, Túróc, Arva, Liptó, Zólyom, Szepes, Sáros. With regard to them there can be no discussion, and they should from the first be regarded as integral parts of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

(b.) The border counties between Slovaks and Magyars are nine in number (from west to east):
Pozsony (Pressburg), Nyitra, Bars, Hont, Nógrád, Gömör, Abauj-Torna, Zemplén, Ung. These nine, however, fall into two categories:---

1. Counties which are in the great majority Slovak, but from which certain amputations can and should be made in favour of Hungary.
2. Counties which are distinctly mixed, and where the line of demarcation cannot follow purely ethnographical lines. To the latter belong Hont, Gömör, and Abauj-Torna.

In the case of the two south-western counties — Pressburg and Nyitra — special circumstances must be considered. The city of Pressburg, which according to Magyar statistics contains 32,700 Germans, 31,700 Magyars, and only 11,600 Slovaks, is indispensable to Bohemia as providing it with a suitable Danubian port. The whole district to the north, as far as the very suburbs of the town, is purely Slovak. Its possession by Bohemia is further necessary in order to ensure the regulation of the river March, a problem of first-rate importance to Moravia and Slovakia.

Just east of Pressburg the Danube divides into two channels, and most of the rich territory lying between the two, known as the “Grosse Schütt”, belongs to the county of Pressburg, and its population is overwhelmingly Magyar. It is to be expected that the Czechs will claim this island, in order to obtain a certain stretch of the Danube as their southern frontier. Thus the first point for decision by a boundary commission will be whether the frontier should follow the southern and main arm of the river, or the northern and small arm.

In the case of the county of Nyitra, all the northern and central districts are Slovak, but there is a small, purely Magyar district in the south, round the small town of Érsek Újvár, which Hungary would be entitled to claim. On the other hand, this would leave the mouth and about 15 miles of the lower reaches of the River Vág — otherwise a purely Slovak river — in the hands of Hungary. The Czechs are certain to put forward the view that the whole river to its mouth in the Danube (which coincides with the reunion of the two arms of the main river) must be included in Bohemian territory.

If, however, this latter claim were admitted, it would be necessary to extend the Danubian frontier of Bohemia as far as the mouth of the River Garam, thereby including portions of the counties of Komárom and Esztergom, whose populations are almost exclusively Magyar.

From the river Garam, north-eastwards as far as the Carpathian frontier between Hungary and Galicia, the new frontier Magyars and Slovaks will inevitably disregard the boundaries of the existing frontiers; it will be necessary to find a compromise between the natural ethnographic line of division, and a geographical line corresponding approximately to the division between mountain and plain (it being obvious that a
certain portion of the foothills, and in particular the outlying spur of the Tokay [Tokaj] hills, must remain in Magyar hands).

To sum up, the “gray zone” between Magyars and Slovaks would be composed roughly as follows:---

1. The Grosse Schütt.
2. The district of Őrsek Újvár, in the county of Nyitra.
3. The portions of the counties of Komárom and Esztergom, lying north of the Danube.
4. In the county of Bars, the sub-district (Járás) of Léva.
5. In the county of Hont, the three sub-districts of Ipolnyék, Szob, and Vámosmikola.
6. In the county of Gömör, the sub-districts of Rimaszécs, Putnok, and Rozsnyó.
7. In the county of Abauj-Torna, the sub-districts of Kassa (Kaschau) and Tüzér---the town of Kassa being assigned to the Slovaks.
8. In the county of Zemplén, the sub-district of Nagy Mihály.

It is suggested that everything to the north-west of this strip of territory should be regarded as indisputably Slovak; and everything to the south-east as indisputably Magyar.

It is to be born in mind that the small Magyar minorities in the districts described as indisputably Slovak will diminish by a natural process, owing to the disappearance of the numerous imported Magyar officials. The proportion of real Magyar populations in these districts is very small; even among them a considerable number are really magyarised Slovaks. Meanwhile it will in any case be necessary for the Slovaks to sacrifice very considerable colonies which are situated in the indisputably Magyar territory of Hungary, e.g., numerous wealthy villages scattered along both banks of the Danube between Esztergom (Gran) and Budapest, and also the large Slovak oasis of Békés-Csaba in the great Hungarian Plain.

(B.)—Magyar-Rumanian Frontier

The “gray zone” between Magyars and Rumanians would run from the River Tisza (Theiss) in the north to the River Maros in the south, and would contain roughly the following territory:---

(a.) In the county of Ugocsa, the sub-district of Tiszántúl.
(b.) In the county of Szatmár, the sub-districts of Szatmár and Erdőd.
(c.) In the county of Szilágy, the sub-districts of Tosnád [Tasnád], then Szilágy Cseh, then Szilágy Somlyó, and Kraszna.
(d.) In the county of Bihar, the sub-districts of Érmihály Falva, Székelyhid, Margit[ta], Szálárd, Nagy Várad (Grosswardein), including the town of this name, Cseffa, Nagy Szalonta, and Tenke.
(e.) In the county of Arad, the sub-districts of Kísjenő, Világos, Elek, and Arad.

To the west of the zone there are isolated Rumanian settlements, but the overwhelming majority of the population is Magyar. To the east of this zone there are considerably larger Magyar settlements, even apart from the solid block of Székely population (numbering roughly 500,000) which occupies the extreme south-eastern corner of Transylvania, and cannot under any conceivable circumstances be excluded from a united Rumanian State.
It is to be remembered that nowhere has the falsification of the census been carried to such lengths by the Magyar authorities as among the Rumanians of Transylvania; and therefore it may be safely assumed that in the event of an impartial census anything between 10 and 20 per cent. would fall to be deducted from the total Magyar figure. Moreover, in addition to those Rumanians who have been fraudulently included in the census as Magyars, there are large numbers of other Rumanians who have yielded to political and personal pressure, and enrolled themselves as Magyars in order to curry favour with the local authorities. Under a new régime all these weaker brethren will once more come out as Rumanians. A further percentage falls to be deducted in view of the large (indeed quite needlessly large) numbers of Magyar administrative officials in Transylvania, who will automatically tend to migrate back to Hungary proper.

(The best indication that there is something wrong with the Magyar statistics is to be found in the following fact: The entire Orthodox and Uniate population of Hungary is either Roumanian, Serb, or Ruthene, with the exception of a few thousand who have been Magyarised. None the less, though the total Rumanian, Serb, and Ruthene population in Hungary is given in the Hungarian statistics as 3,800,000, the total Orthodox and Uniate population is given as 4,300,000. The half-million unaccounted for are presumably non-Magyars who have been included in the racial census tables as Magyars.)

None the less, even on the most favourable assumption, it will probably be necessary to include between 600,000 and 700,000 Magyars in Greater Rumania. For them it will be necessary to produce a definite charter, assuring to all certain definite linguistic rights in church, school, and law courts, and to the compact mass of Székelys perhaps a definite measure of local autonomy, similar to that which the Saxons of Transylvania are entitled to claim.

(C.)--The Magyar-Jugo-Slav Frontier

Starting from the Western frontier Between Austria and Hungary, the new Jugo-Slav frontier against Hungary at first follows a clearly-defined course — namely, the river Mur to its junction with the Drave, and then the river Drave to its junction with the Danube. The only districts to the north of this line which could conceivably be claimed by the Jugo-Slavs are---

(a.) The district of Mura Szombat, running along the Austrian frontier north of the Mur; and
(b.) That portion of the county of Baranya lying in the fork of the Danube and Drave to the south-east of Pécs (Fünfkirchen).

The former can only be considered in connection with the question of the so-called “Corridor” between Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia, which it is not proposed to discuss here. Unless such a “Corridor” were created, this district must obviously remain with Hungary. The latter is largely inhabited by Serbs, but the disadvantages of creating yet another artificial frontier are so great, that it would seem better to retain the river frontiers as far as possible.

In the case of the Banat, Serbian and Rumanian claims may for the moment be regarded as identical in so far as the frontier against Hungary is concerned. (The question of the future Serbo-Rumanian frontier in the Banat must be reserved for special treatment.)

The northern frontier between Serbia-Rumania and Hungary can only be the river Maros, from a point near the town of Arad westwards. The only portion of the Banat

3 See above.
which could be treated as a “gray zone” between Serbia-Rumania and Hungary is the extreme north-west corner lying in the fork of the rivers Maros and Theiss, and facing the Magyar city of Szeged. This triangular piece of territory corresponds almost exactly with the two “Járas” of Törők-Kanizsa and Nagy-Szent-Miklós, or, from a geographical point of view, with the course of the Aranka River (an old channel of the Maros). It will undoubtedly be contended by the Magyars that this triangle is predominantly Magyar, and is necessary to the development of Szeged as the second city of Hungary.

Between the Banat and the Baranya lies the Bácska district, which must in any case be regarded as the principal “gray zone” between Magyars and Jugo-Slavs. This zone may fairly be regarded as identical with the large county of Bács-Bodrog, which contains a mixed Magyar-Serb-Slovak-German population.

Foreign Office,
December 13, 1918.

HUNGARY
[...]

What is “Hungary”?

Until the political situation in Hungary is fully cleared up it is difficult to discuss our dealings with a State as to the future extent, character, and intentions of which we are at present in the dark. A National Council was set up, under the presidency of Count Károlyi, on the 30th October, when the last attempts of King Charles to form a Coalition Government had failed. On the 31st October the King entrusted Count Károlyi with the formation of a Government. The declared object of this Council and Government was a complete break with Germany and Austria and a policy of Hungarian independence. The possibility of maintaining the dynasty was at first contemplated, but this seems now to have been abandoned and a republic decided on. Realising that a great part of their Jugoslav territories have been lost for ever, Count Károlyi’s Government did not hesitate to recognise the separation of Croatia from the territories of the Crown of St. Stephen, and to insist on their willingness to live in cordial relations with the new State. With regard to the nationalities in Hungary generally, however, Count Károlyi has not adopted a similar policy. He claims that the Slovaks, Ukrainians, Rumans, and Serbs of the Banat and Bácska must remain in the Hungarian State as integral portions of it. This claim was at once strongly repudiated by the Slovaks, who have pronounced themselves in favour of an independent Czecho-Slovak State, and have summoned the Czech armies to their aid against the Hungarians. Similarly, the news now comes to hand that the Rumanians have set up a National Council, denounced their connection with Hungary, and appealed to an international decision based on self-determination. Their leaders have already arrived in Iaşi to ask for union with Rumania. As to the attitude of the Jugoslavs of Southern Hungary there can be no question. Their representatives have already declared in favour of Jugoslav union. The position of the Ukrainians of North-East Hungary is for the moment obscure.
BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY 1918-1919

British Policy

The attitude of His Majesty's Government and the Allied Powers towards these different nationalities varies in the particular cases. Our recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Government commits us to acceptance of the separation of the Slovak population within territories yet to be determined from Hungary. In the case of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians we have not gone so far, but we have both declared and shown our interest in the aspirations of these two peoples to union and independence. The union of the Jugoslavs has practically been achieved. In the case of the Rumanians, political events have postponed but cannot long prevent it. It may, then, be taken for granted that the only “Hungary” which His Majesty's Government can recognise is roughly that portion of the former Kingdom of Hungary which is inhabited by compact Magyar majorities.

Suggested Frontiers

Under “Jugoslavia,” “Rumania,” and “The Czecho-Slovaks,” some suggested frontiers with Hungary have been submitted. There remains only (1) the question of the 400,000 Ruthenians of Northern Hungary which will be treated under Czecho-Slovaks, and (2) Hungarian frontier with German Austria.

As regards (2), a demand has now been put forward by Vienna for the incorporation in German Austria of the compact German populations in the north-western corner of the new Hungary (Counties of Wieselburg, &c. [...]).

The new Hungarian Republic from which these territories have been detached will be a land-locked State. The chief problems, then, which will confront us are (1) the access of this territory to the sea, and (2) its relations with its neighbours.

(1) Access to Fiume is a vital interest to Hungary. Fiume must be included in the list of seaports which will be the object of special consideration as passing into the political possession of a Power other than that to which its economic importance is vital. Like Trieste, Salonika, Danzig, and others, international arrangements must secure for Hungary, in the case of Fiume, every facility for transit of goods and export. Similar facilities should be given to Hungary on lines already built, or yet to be built, through Jugoslav and Rumanian territories towards the Aegean and the Black Seas.

(2) To secure the friendly acquiescence of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians to such an arrangement it is necessary that we should have positive guarantees that the old régime in Hungary is for ever abolished. It will be difficult to secure through Count Károlyi, for instance, any confidence on the part of the newly constituted National States, for his declared policy, both in the past and in the present, is the complete incorporation of the other nationalities in a Magyar State. There must be clear recognition on the part of the Hungarian Government, whatever they may be, that there can be no further question of attempting to preserve the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary as Count Károlyi is even now urging. When this has been secured, the case for concessions on the part of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians will be enormously strengthened. These concessions will be: (1) the economic facilities already referred to, and (2) the assurance of full personal and cultural liberty for the Magyar populations necessarily included in the Jugoslav and Rumanian States. Especially in the case of the Székely counties of Transylvania, as has been already noted under Rumania, some measure of administrative autonomy seems not only just but feasible.
Minutes attached to the document:

[From:] [HDLM ACC 727/16, Extracts]4

[To] Sir William Tyrrell.

Herewith are the Memoranda drawn up by Sir Ralph Paget based on material supplied by Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Allen Leeper on the Balkan States and Hungary.

[...]

There are two general points of principle which arise in all the Memoranda on which a decision is necessary. These are—

(a) Securities for the cultural autonomy of minorities belonging to one race included in a State of another nation.

(b) Provision of access to the sea at ports such as Fiume, Salonika, Kavala, for States which are either completely without seaboard, such as Hungary, or excluded from convenient access to certain portions of the sea, such as Serbia and the Aegean.

(c) The inter-mixture of the inhabitants throughout the Balkans makes it impossible to draw a frontier which will not leave considerable communities amounting sometimes to three or four hundred thousand individuals under the government of an alien nation. The intense feeling of national animosity which unfortunately exists in these districts necessarily arouses serious apprehensions as to the treatment of these minorities, for they are left without any kind of guarantee. This raises a very difficult and a most serious principle. Generally speaking, it seems to be a matter of paramount importance that if any kind of League of Nations is established, it should not claim any form of interference in the internal affairs of the Sovereign States of which the League will be constituted, and I should urge most strongly that this country should not enter into any League unless this principle was laid down as one of the fundamental principles of the constitution of the League. This is the only way in which we can be sure of avoiding difficulties about Ireland, and we certainly do not wish that people such as the Catalonians in Spain should have any right to appeal to the League as to the matters at issue between them and the Spanish Government.

We must however recognise [sic] that the situation in regard to these Balkan States is in fact a very different one and some means will have to be devised to get over this. There are two ways in which this might be done. We might frankly recognise what is the fact, that these States, especially those which are being newly constituted, such as Yugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia cannot at once claim full and complete status of the older States and in their case special conditions might be imposed upon their recognition as members of the European family of States; one of these conditions would be that they should give international guarantee for the just treatment of these minorities. There might also be included in this category those Balkan States, such as Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, which, though previously existing are in fact very new; [...]

The Memorandum on Hungary seems to require some additions and alterations, especially the last paragraph. This ignores the fact that Hungary is a State with which we are at war; the recognition by the Hungarian Government of the separation from Hungary of those territories which will be acquired by other States will of course be

4 These notes had been written before the memoranda to which they refer were printed, and presumably before Annex I was attached. The extracts from these memoranda, which are reproduced in the main section, are based on the printed version, and show no signs of the kind of alterations suggested by J.W. Headlam-Morley.
part of the terms of peace which will have to be made with Hungary; the particular point as to, for instance, Count Karolyi's opinion is, from this point of view, completely unimportant; the whole is written as if it was the duty of Rumania and Yugo-Slavia to obtain the necessary concessions from Hungary. This is not their business, it is the business of the Allies.

This leads up to a very important and complicated question which does not seem hitherto to have been dealt with at all, viz: the forms that will have to be adopted for the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In the case of Germany and Bulgaria where the nation continues there will presumably be a Treaty of Peace in the ordinary form. Will this be possible with regard to Austria-Hungary? Someone ought to be instructed to draw up a memorandum on this point. It is only necessary here to point out that whatever might be the case with regard to the other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in the case of the Kingdom of Hungary there will continue to be a State and a Government which we shall be able to regard as the legal inheritor of the rights and obligations of the previously existing Magyar State, a State which it must be remembered as [having had?] a continuous history for a thousand years. This being the case[,] a formal Treaty of Peace can be made with this State and it would be an essential part of any such Treaty that in it they should formally renounce all claims of any kind over those districts which it is determined shall be separated and also it will be possible to include in the Treaty the assumption by the Magyar State of a portion to be determined of the debt of the Dual Monarchy. In this Treaty there will also necessarily be included securities which the Magyars will require for free access to the sea at Fiume and for free access to and participation in the navigation of the Danube.

[J.W. Headlam-Morley]  
5/12/18
No. 16

Telegram from a French Source to the Foreign Office (London. Received 27 December 1918)

[PRO FO 371/3139 No. 211756]

15 December 1918

Secret.

POSITION IN HUNGARY.

General Berthelot wired on 15th December¹ that the Hungarian Emissaries in TRANSYLVANIA are acting precisely in the same manner as would revolutionary agents, and are encouraging Bolshevism in order to counteract Allied action.

Consequently disturbances have taken place on the boundary between HUNGARY and TRANSYLVANIA. Roumanian troops have, therefore, been authorised to occupy certain strategical points beyond the limits fixed by the armistice.

If Bolshevism develops in HUNGARY the military occupation of this country will be necessary. The Hungarian Government is encouraging Bolshevism and anti-Roumanian manifestations.

Minutes attached to the document:

If there is any Magyar Bolshevik propaganda in Transylvania, it certainly does not come from the present Hungarian Govt., nor is it in the Magyar interest, as the Magyars form an unproportionately large part of the upper classes in Transylvania & wd. stand to lose most shd. Bolshevism break out there. This seems to me only another example of how the cry of “Bolshevism” is exploited nowadays by anyone who wishes to obtain a hearing and prejudice the case of his opponents.

L.B.N[amier].
30/12/18

¹ Gen. H.-M. Berthelot’s headquarters were in Bucharest at the time, so presumably the telegram was sent from there.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN HUNGARY

Count Karolyi’s Position

The political situation in Hungary has not the satisfactory features which characterises [sic] the situation in German Austria. In the latter country the temporary coalition government is the expression of popular will in so far as its members were nominated by the temporary national assembly — in reality the old Reichsrat — in proportion to the membership of the respective parties. The democratic character of the Austrian voting system has therefore given the members of the government an authority which the various governments in Germany and the Government at BUDAPEST entirely lack.

The Hungarian Government consists in reality of one man, COUNT KAROLYI, who governs, if one may say so, under politically false pretences. COUNT KAROLYI, an otherwise estimable man and honest politician, has to a marked degree the Hungarian characteristic of egoism. He definitely promised the Hungarian people that “with KAROLYI as Prime Minister the Entente governments would at once treat HUNGARY favourably.” This promise indiscretely enough was made by COUNT KAROLYI in the initial stages of the revolution and had a great deal to do with the unanimous way in which the Hungarian public summoned him to office. Newspapers like the “PESTER LLOYD”, which had violently criticised the Count’s earlier activities, and violent political opponents accepted, in common with the mass of the population, his assurance and with a somewhat childish optimism awaited its fulfilment. Put quite frankly COUNT KAROLYI has so far failed “to deliver the goods” and the dissatisfaction which prevails seems likely to provoke at an early date a political crisis which COUNT KAROLYI and his party will probably find difficult in overcoming.

His political opponents are already beginning to draw a contrast between the early promise and its lack of realisation, and several Hungarian newspapers have begun against him one of those violent press campaigns which have no exact parallel in other European countries.

COUNT KAROLYI himself realises that the delay which the country gave him to make the promised peace will soon expire and that failure on his part to do so will mean his downfall.

In a long interview which I had with him he made no secret of the bitterness and disappointment and the unreadiness of the Entente to make him favourable proposals. In a long pro domo statement which he made he emphasised repeatedly his antagonism against Germany during the war, and his old-time sympathies for Great Britain and America. He added that if the Entente would not, in view of his past, give to him more favourable terms than to his rivals his position as Hungarian Prime Minister would become intolerable.

The same point of view found even cruder expression from the other members of the KAROLYI Cabinet whom I saw. The somewhat irritating view was frequently expressed that the Entente governments should give HUNGARY preferential treatment because of the sympathetic personality of its present Prime Minister.
COUNT KAROLYI's most loyal and energetic supporter is the COUNTESS KAROLYI, a highly intelligent lady of 25 years of age who is using all the social and political influence she possesses at home and abroad to consolidate the position of her husband. The Countess leaves for Switzerland on Saturday next presumably to take part in a conference in the interests of prisoners of war, but, as I understand, to endeavour to put the point of view of her husband before authorised representatives of the Allies in that country. COUNT KAROLYI himself believes that if some opportunity were given him of frankly outlining the Hungarian standpoint the peace terms which the Entente Governments would offer her (Hungaria) would be less severe than their present attitude seems to suggest.

During my recent stay at BUDAPEST the Government and newspapers declared that the Count had received authority to go to Berne to put the Hungarian case before the Allied Governments, but when I questioned him on the point he admitted there was no grounds for the report. Its publication was probably part of the conspiracy to make the people believe that COUNT KAROLYI's maintenance in office is necessary to Hungarian interests.

In emphasising this aspect of the political situation in Hungary I do not want to cast doubt on COUNT KAROLYI's sincerity or the very real value his authority may have for the Entente governments. All I mean to point out is that COUNT KAROLYI governs for the moment because HUNGARY believes he is the man who can save from the disintegration and disaster which loom so menacingly and so near ahead.

Hungarian egoism prevents politicians at BUDAPEST from seeing the situation as it really is. In this respect they are not in touch with the realities of the moment in the way that, for example, the members of the German Austrian government are. Thus when I asked HERR OTTO BAUER, the German-Austrian foreign secretary his point of view on the question of Serbian compensation he readily agreed with the principle of payment, but maintained that all the countries which previously made up the dual monarchy should share in it. The same question put to COUNT KAROLYI and to his Minister of Finance, PROFESSOR SZENDE, provoked expressions of pain. The idea that Serbia should be compensated and that necessarily by her aggressors, was quite novel to them. Compensation to Serbia probably meant payment by Hungary, a probability which from the Hungarian standpoint was extremely unpleasant and could not readily be entertained.

The conditions of peace which Hungarian official circles would regard as satisfactory are partly negative, partly affirmative in nature. They are: (1) that TRANSYLVANIA should not be given to ROUMANIA but should remain part of HUNGARY; (2) that the Slovak territories North of Budapest should not be ceded to BOHEMIA; (3) that an international treaty should guarantee the use of a port on the Adriatic to HUNGARY and generally regularise conditions of commerce and traffic among the nations which previously constituted the dual monarchy.

On her side HUNGARY would agree to complete autonomy being granted to the lesser nationalities under her rule, if necessary such autonomy to be guaranteed by the Entente Powers.

The question of TRANSYLVANIA is the one which to the exclusion of all others agitates official circles and the population generally at BUDAPEST. The claim is made alike by COUNT KAROLYI and PROFESSOR JASSY [Jászi] that the 26 counties claimed by ROUMANIA have willingly formed part of the Hungarian kingdom for one thousand years and that the non-Roumania[n] population — Hungarians, Germans and Slovaks — exceed in numbers the Roumanian population.

COUNT KAROLYI and other members of the Government repeatedly insisted not only on the ethical claims of Hungary to Transylvania but also on the economic disaster which they contend would overtake Hungary if it were deprived of a province which supplies it with coal, wood, water-power, salt and, to a lesser degree, gold. The
admission of the pretensions of Roumania and Bohemia would mean, they further contend, the economic ruin of Hungary and the reduction of a great country of high culture to the restricted geographical area of BUDAPEST and the surrounding plain.

As indicated the sacrifice of the territory claimed by the Slovaks would be consented to, very grudgingly but still consented to, if Transylvania were retained and if an economic confederation of states were agreed to. The idea of a Danubian confederation of states — to include German Austria, Hungary, Bohemia and the new Yougo-Slav kingdom is a favourite conception of ministers at both BUDAPEST and KONIA. The proposal is represented as an economic necessity for all the countries concerned, although it is frankly agreed that the nationalistic tendencies of the newly constituted and naturally exuberant states of Bohemia and Yougo-Slavia will retard the realisation of this conception.

More than is the case in Germany and German Austria, Hungary is undergoing a grave moral crisis provoked by the catastrophe which faces her. The national sentiment is still very strong, and the present temper of the people is such that any settlement which cuts athwart that sentiment would create wounds which would take many generations to heal. If Germany looks to President Wilson, if not to champion her claims at any rate to display a sympathetic comprehension of her point of view, Hungary looks in the same way towards Great Britain. There is much talk about the possibility of the new national assembly declaring in favour of a monarchy and as a consequence the crown being offered to an English prince. The name of the Duke of Connaught is mentioned in this connection in both official and popular circles. When questioned by me on the point one of the members of the KAROLYI Government frankly admitted that the main reason underlying the proposal which is still in an extremely vague state was that the offer of the crown to an Englishman and still more his acceptance of it would win the sympathies and support of the British Government for Hungary.

For the same purpose of enlisting British (and American) sympathy a committee of Hungarian protestant clergymen has been formed the object of which will be to plead the cause of the large section of the German-Hungarian protestant population in Transylvania who, if Roumanian claims are endorsed by the Allies will be necessarily handed over to the orthodox authorities. It is claimed that protestantism of a Calvinistic type is a very vital force of religion and culture among this population; and that it would be a great scandal were they to be placed at the mercy of an ignorant and fanatic Orthodox authority. A propaganda to be carried on from neutral countries will be conducted by the committee mentioned.

In spite of the statement of COUNT BETHLEN which follows in detail\textsuperscript{1} I think that Bolshevism as a doctrine or a theory has so far gained [?]little support in BUDAPEST, or indeed, in Hungary generally. The soldiers' councils, as in Austria, are very harmless organisations which make very little attempt to meddle in politics. In the country districts a certain amount of lawlessness certainly prevails and bad economic conditions or even an unsatisfactory peace from the political standpoint might produce disorders and a certain amount of temporary chaos. On the other hand the middle-class elements seem stronger than in Germany and the absence of any really numerous industrial population renders their resistance to any attempt to introduce Soviet government efficacious.

Great preparations are being made to hold the elections for the new national assembly as soon as possible. The middle of January is mentioned in this connection. It is probable that were the Entente to indicate that the personality and career of the present Prime Minister are likely to secure for Hungary more favourable peace terms than she might otherwise hope for an enormous majority for the KAROLYI parties — the

\textsuperscript{1} The statement referred to is not appended to the original file.
radicals and the socialists — will be obtained. On the other hand failure to do so would provoke an uncertain political situation.

In short, so far as politics are concerned the situation in Hungary is extremely fluid. The country is out to cut its losses and any policy likely to help that end would be speedily and blindly followed.

The curious feature is the complete indifference felt for the Hapsburgs. The King and the royal family have passed off the Hungarian stage unsung and unwept.

If there is one positive conclusion to be drawn from the present condition of Hungary it is that the last Hapsburg has worn the crown of St. Stephen. The clergy and the peasants seem to have accepted the new situation if without enthusiasm at any rate without regrets. The new agrarian law, by which through a system of the taxation of land value it is expected to make the large landowners sell their property, appeals to the peasants who expect to divide the spoils among themselves.

The aristocracy has concealed itself from view. High finance mainly in the hand of Jews adopts a waiting attitude. Admiration for England is largely genuine and it is astonishing to note the influence of English thought upon Hungary. Politically and socially in that the virus of Bolshevism has not corroded the national spirit the situation in Hungary though at present unsatisfactory is hopeful. If Russian emissaries really are active in Budapest their efforts have so far been singularly unsuccessful.

No. 18

Letter from G.B. Beak (Zurich) to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne. Extracts)

[HDLM ACC 727/35]

Zurich, 19 December 1918

Dear Sir Horace,

Within the last two or three days I have had visits from two Austro-Hungarians, one of whom recently left Vienna, the other Budapest. Their accounts do not, I think, throw very much light on the situation at those places, but I will endeavour to repeat them for what they may be worth.

[...]

At Budapest it is thought that Karolyi's tenure of office will be very brief owing mainly to the fact that he cannot, apparently, maintain order. No one appears to know at present, however, who is likely to succeed him.

My Budapest informant states that the British have made a good impression at Budapest, and the Italians at Innsbruck, whereas the French, he says, are generally disliked. I was rather surprised to gather from him that the idea of the Duke of Connaught becoming King of Hungary was taken quite seriously by the Hungarians.

[...]

Yours sincerely,

G.B. Beak
No. 19

Letter from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (London. Received 23 December 1918. Extract)

No. 972 [PRO FO 371/3138 No. 210629]

Berne, 19 December 1918

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a memorandum recording a conversation which Mr. Sargent had on the 15th instant with Count Mich[a]el Esterhazy and Monsieur Elemer Balogh.

I should explain that, in accordance with the verbal instructions given me by you in Paris, I have received Austrian and Hungarian subjects with a view to obtaining information from them which might be of use to His Majesty’s Government. I confined myself to listening to what they had to say. But I declined of course any attempt to enter into any discussions whatever with de facto or unofficial representatives either of the German-Austrian or Hungarian Governments.

The proposal that the Entente Governments should enhance the prestige of Count Károlyi’s Government in the eyes of the Hungarians by consenting to enter into unofficial communication with him or his representatives, is so naive as to strengthen the impression that Count Károlyi is not really fitted for the rôle he has assumed.

[....]

I have, &c.,
Horace Rumbold

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 19

Memorandum by O. Sargent (Extract)

19 December 1918

Count Mich[a]el Esterhazy and Monsieur Elemer Balogh, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université à Budapest called on the 15th instant at the Legation and presented credentials from Count Károlyi showing that they were acting on his behalf, and stated that they wished to make enquiries of the British Legation on the two following points:

2. They stated that it was essential, if anarchy was not to break out in Hungary, that Count Károlyi’s government should be able to retain its prestige in the eyes of the Hungarian people, and in order to accomplish this end Count Károlyi was most anxious that the Hungarian people should realise that his government had the approval and support of the Entente Governments. In order to give Hungary a clear demonstration of this fact Count Károlyi is anxious to show that he is in unofficial communication with the Entente governments, and Count Esterhazy and his friend were sent to enquire whether representatives of the Entente would consent to see Count Károlyi in the event of his coming to Switzerland to discuss Hungarian affairs. He would come accompanied by a small party of international lawyers and “Scientists” who would
explain the economical and ethnological conditions which must determine the future of Hungary.

Count Esterhazy also pointed out that a further reason why Count Károlyi wished to get into direct touch with the Entente governments in Switzerland was to be found in the fact that the Hungarian Government were finding it very difficult to reconcile the two armistices which they had negotiated, one with General Diaz and the other with General Franchet d'Espéry, the terms of which were to a large extent contradictory. Count Esterhazy acknowledged that the Hungarian Government were able to get into touch with General Franchet d'Espéry through the commission which he has sent to Budapest, but he pointed out that there is no such channel for communicating with General Diaz, who has no representative in Budapest.

In [sic] undertook to submit both these enquiries to you, but I pointed out that I doubted whether the Allied Governments would be prepared, pending the Peace Conference, to enter into communications with the Hungarian Government by any channel other than that provided for by the Armistice. For the same reason it was unlikely that they would be willing to discuss with Count Károlyi the future of Hungary, since by doing so they would be anticipating the Peace Conference.

Count Esterhazy was going to return to Hungary the next day, but Monsieur Balogh is remaining on at the Bellevue here.

No. 20

Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract)
[LEEP, Folder 2]

Paris, 20 December 1918

[...]

Does Namier know (S.W. [R.W. Seton-Watson] told me) — that the Hungarian Ruthenes have asked for inclusion in the Æcho-Slovak state. If this is true, it simplifies many things.

[...]

No. 21

Telegram from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (London. Received 4 January 1919)

No. 2518 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 2374]

Berne, 20 December 1918

An agent of the Military Attaché's Department learns from a Hungarian now in Budapest that on the 2nd instant the date of writing order was still maintained in the town though in the country districts there was a certain amount of unrest. The present Government though nominally non-socialistic, is really in the hands of the Socialists in whose power it lies to overthrow them. The Jews [sic] who predominate in the Cabinet are arousing bitter hatred among the population, and there is consequently a danger of a series of pogroms.
Dear Sir Maurice Hankey,

I should like to have seen you to speak about a matter which seems to me of the most extreme urgency, viz: the general economic condition of Central Europe. We are constantly getting accounts, both from other sources and from Englishmen, who have returned from different places, as for instance Austrian Silesia, Vienna, Budapest. Every one says the same thing. At present order is being maintained under difficulties better than might have been expected, but the economic condition is extremely serious and what is to be anticipated is that in a very short time, under pressure of want of food, coal and raw materials for starting work, there will be a complete collapse of society, the consequences of which will be disastrous. From every part of Germany and of Austria-Hungary we get the same request; they ask for Englishmen to be sent to enquire into the conditions on the spot and that, as soon as possible, such provisions as appear after enquiry to be necessary, shall — so far as possible — be available. At present there is a complete want of confidence and security. The Allies keep up the blockade, but since the armistice nothing apparently of any kind has been done in order to make provision for the consequences which must inevitably arise if the blockade is continued and arrangements are not made for the admission of the necessary materials and provisions. The factories cannot start working; men will not work; nobody knows what to do. We have a definite personal request from Karolyi; we have similar requests from the present Government at Berlin, from Vienna and elsewhere.

We have been waiting week by week to hear the result of the negotiations for meeting this situation; nothing is done, no intimation as to the probable action of the Allies is given, and it will soon be too late. This matter is far more important than questions to be discussed at the Peace Conference, because if we are not careful a state of things may arise throughout Europe which will make anything which is determined at the Peace Conference abortive and might conceivably even make the meeting of the Peace Conference itself almost impossible.

I should like to urge in the strongest way that this matter should be given precedence over everything else. I do not of course know what has been done in conversations with President Wilson, but I cannot but feel that if the matter was put before him and the Prime Minister in the way in which it appears to those whose duty it is to watch what is taking place in Europe, they would find a way out of any difficulties there may be and see that the necessary action were taken immediately.

If it is not done all the results of the war may be lost and the responsibility for this will rest upon the British and the American Governments.

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1 For Sir M. Hankey's answer to this letter see No. 23.
I am attaching to this copies of some papers which I am sending forward in the Foreign Office. If it can be of any use my seeing you or anyone else, I shall be here all this afternoon. Of course it is rather out of order that I should address you directly and not through the Foreign Office, but the urgency of the matter is, I think, sufficient justification.

Yours very truly,
[J.W. Headlam-Morley]

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2. The papers referred to are not enclosed with the original document.

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No. 23

Letter from Sir M. Hankey to J.W. Headlam-Morley

[HDLM ACC 727/35]

28 December 1918

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Mr. Heedlem-Maley,

Many thanks for your letter of 28th December, marked Private and Unofficial, and which I shall treat accordingly. You hit the right nail on the head in the last sentence of your letter. If there is one thing about which I have to be more careful than another if I am to do any useful work, it is to avoid trenching on the responsibilities of Departments within their own sphere. This is a matter which I conceive to be wholly in the sphere of the Foreign Secretary. If he agrees in your point of view it is up to him to advise the Cabinet in that sense. Nevertheless, what you say in your letter is useful and helpful, and if, in an unofficial way I get an opportunity to help, I will not neglect it.

Yours sincerely,

M.P.A. Hankey

J.U. Heedlem-Maley, Esq., &c., &c., &c.,

FOREIGN OFFICE.

1 Reply to J.W. Headlam-Morley's letter, reproduced in No. 22.
2 It is difficult to account for this misspelling of Headlam-Morley's name. It may have resulted from a misreading of his signature.
No. 24

Memorandum by L.B. Namier for Sir W. Tyrrell

[PRO FO 371/4354 No. 161 (file52)]

Foreign Office, 31 December 1918

[To] Sir William Tyrrell.

I enclose an extremely interesting report on conditions in Hungary which I have received from a certain Mr. J. Edward Thornton, an Oxford graduate and a cousin of the Master of Balliol. He has spent some seven or eight years as a teacher in some of the leading families of Hungary and has been there throughout the war. He left Budapest on December 14th last.

Count Károlyi’s proposal that an Entente commission should be sent to Budapest with a view to helping in regulating economic problems, seems sound and reasonable, and nothing could be more desirable than that an end should be put to the exclusive management, or rather mismanagement, of East European affairs by the French. I venture, however, to suggest that the food control or any other control of ours should not envisage the territory of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire as its basis; the late Austro-Hungarian Empire is a reminiscence which had better be forgotten, and we ought not to deal or think in units other than the new States now established.

If a mission goes out to Hungary I should think Mr. Thornton might usefully be employed in that connection. I know from him that he is seeking employment. I do not know him well personally — our entire acquaintance consists of one meeting in January 1913 and several conversations during the last week. As far as I can judge, he seems to me a very sound, level-headed man; he has no undue pro-Magyar bias, and although he unfortunately does not speak Magyar, his personal acquaintance with leading people in Hungary might prove useful. If necessary, further personal references about him might be obtained from the Master of Balliol.

With Mr. Thornton’s report I enclose a few papers dealing with Hungary which I have received from M.I.1c and which seem of interest.¹

L.B.Namier.

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 24

Memorandum by J.E. Thornton

Oxford, 29 December 1918

Report

On the Situation in Hungary in Nov.-Dec. 1918

It was not till the surrender of Bulgaria that Hungary realised she had lost the war. For months previous to this date the political leaders had been aware of the

¹ One of these is printed as No. 17.
hopelessness of the situation, but the Press was under a drastic censorship, and the fiction of victory was maintained. Even five days later when Count M. Károlyi uttered, for the first time in Parliament, the fatal words: “We have lost the War” he was greeted with a storm of indignation both in the House and in the Press. On the following day, however, the late Count Stephen Tisza had the courage to make a similar statement, though he qualified it by adding that Hungary had lost the War “in the sense that she could no longer hope to win it and must therefore open negotiations for concluding peace” — or words to that effect.

Such a declaration from the mouth of such a man was conclusive. There was a moment of dumb surprise followed by a violent movement of resentment. The Government lost its head, violent scenes occurred in Parliament, the King hurried to Budapest and there followed ten days of negotiations and combinations. The people, realising they had been hoodwinked by the war-party, turned spontaneously to Károlyi as the one man who had consistently opposed the war-policy of the late Government. Each day’s delay increased the popular demand for Károlyi, but the King still hesitated. Then suddenly came the Revolution of October 31st which brought Károlyi to power, as the leader of a revolutionary people’s Government.

Count Károlyi’s popularity was extraordinary. His photograph was exposed in every shop-window of the town, his name was on everybody’s lips, and he was regarded, not only by the people but by his own fellow aristocrats, as the prime mover and organiser of the Revolution. As a matter of fact he was nothing of the sort. He did not want a revolution and tried to prevent it; still less did he desire the change from the monarchical to the republican form of government, which took place later. And if the King had had the courage to nominate him Prime Minister ten days earlier it is probable both events could have been avoided.

Throughout the War Count Károlyi had consistently opposed the war ambitions of Germany, especially in regard to “Mitteleuropa”. He had in consequence to suffer severe repression, both as regards his person and his Press. He told me he had finally to forbid his paper to publish any leading articles, as it was impossible to express any criticism of Government policy without risking having the whole paper confiscated. The surrender of Bulgaria opened the people’s eyes to the fact that the war part had deceived them, and they instinctively turned to Károlyi as their champion. Thus it was that Károlyi became the champion of a cause he would never willingly have espoused, and that the Revolution and the proclamation of the Republic became associated with the name of the man who had laboured to prevent their accomplishment.

Count Károlyi is just over forty. He is intelligent, well-informed and quite fearless. He possesses great personal charm and it is impossible to talk with him for any length of time without being convinced of his sincerity and transparent honesty of purpose. But he is full of contradictions. Himself by birth and character an aristocrat of aristocrats he is intellectually a convinced Socialist of the moderate type. He desired the autonomy of the nationalities, yet wished to preserve the integrity of the Hungarian State. And at the same time that he wished to maintain Magyar ascendancy he condemned the alliance with Germany by which alone it was and could have been preserved. He is greatly impressed by President Wilson and has always been an admirer of Lloyd George. I remember him asking me at the time of the famous Budget, to procure for him from England any books dealing with Lloyd George’s reforms.

During the War the Count and I never once met, as was natural. I saw him again shortly after his assumption of power. He told me he was in a most extraordinary position. He had promised to end the War, and would keep his word. But though the order had been sent for the army to lay down their arms, the Higher Command refused to obey the order or communicate it to the troops. Moreover, the emissaries he had sent to negotiate the Armistice terms were not allowed through to the enemy lines. Three aeroplanes he had sent to establish connection with the French Headquarters had not
reached their destination. He then announced his intention of starting off himself in a special train south, and flying over the two armies himself, to the Headquarters of General Franchet O'Esperey [sic]. This adventurous journey never took place, for the Higher Command agreed that same afternoon to the surrender of arms.

The demobilisation of the army took place in disorder. For over three weeks the soldiers, who had been half-starved at the front, were left to make the best of their way home. They arrived on crowded trains, hanging on to the steps, sitting on the roofs, without any provision for food either on the journey or on their arrival in Budapest. All day and all night streams of these poor fellows could be seen making their way across the town from one station to another. It was a sad home-coming after the long years at the front.

The disorder at the time of demobilisation and at the time of the Revolution would have been much greater had the leaders not had the happy idea of proclaiming at the same time the separation of Hungary from Austria. The day of the Revolution became the feast of Hungary's emancipation from the hated yoke of Austria, and even weeks after, as the soldiers straggled home, it was the idea of national freedom which served to veil the bitterness of national defeat.

When the rush was over trouble began all over the country. The soldiers had arrived home filthy, hungry, and in rags. They started looting for food and clothes. They cleared out the nearest villages; they went deer-stalking in the rich preserves of the Magyar aristocracy; they shot cows and sheep in the meadows. Bullets from service rifles were whizzing all over the country. Many castles were plundered, some few were burned to the ground but these cases mostly occurred where the landowner was an absentee landlord. Where the Lord of the Manor was known and respected no harm was done to his goods. In one case known to me personally the peasants commandeered all the horses and carts on the property, carried off all the food and fodder supplies, divided the loot amongst the village (giving their due share to the Count's servants) and next day brought back and stalled the carts and horses! There was trouble of a more serious kind on the Croatian frontier where a band of some 10,000 deserters organised under a capable leader terrorised the country for miles round for some weeks. It was no uncommon thing for travellers by train from Fiume to arrive in Budapest stripped not only of their money, but of their clothes! But by the time I left Hungary (December 15th) the country-side was orderly enough, and the disturbances were never more than spasmodic in character.

Hungary is a land of peasants and the Hungarian peasant is a hard worker. His thirst is for the land, and he has no conception of political issues. For the moment he refuses to work. He worked last year from morning to night, he says, and all he produced was taken from him. But with returning security and peasant-ownership he may be relied upon to settle down again to orderly productive life.

It was a misfortune from more than one point of view that the war came to an end in the autumn. As most of the manhood of the country were at the front the agricultural labour was largely supplied by the Russian and other prisoners of war. These at once dispersed at the time of the Revolution with the consequence that a large part of the late potato and sugar-beet crops was left in the ground, where it is now hard frozen. But beyond the fact that the peasant is helping himself to his lord's venison and cutting down his lord's forests for fire-wood, he is behaving on the whole very well.

In Budapest itself order was restored the day after the Revolution and has been maintained ever since. The people were in a good humour. The War was at last ended: Hungary was at last free: those two facts were enough for the crowd. But order could

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2 The words in italics were marked with a broken line by L.B. Namier, who also recorded the following notes on the margin: ‘? That “yoke”, as far as Hungary was concerned, was clearly a mere reminiscence & a legend. L.B.N.’
never have been maintained without the "working man". His attitude was one of the surprises of the situation. Many of the large factories in Ujpest, outside Budapest, are employed in the production of provisions for the troops. There were attempts made to plunder some of them, but the workmen met the plunderers with rifle-fire. The owner-manager of one of these factories, when he had recovered from his astonishment, called his men together and thanked them. He was met with derision. They explained they had defended the factory because it was theirs, and did not belong to him any longer! This method of appropriation cannot be denied the advantage of directness and extreme simplicity. In some cases, where the owner was popular, the men offered to keep him on as manager at a monthly salary: where the owner was unpopular he was simply kicked out.

I observed a similar spirit among tram-men. Trams are few, and Budapest is overcrowded so that for months past it has been a struggle to get on a tram. The girl ticket-collectors had grown tired of forcing their way through the crowded cars, and it was the exception rather than the rule to have to pay for your ride. After the Revolution all this was changed. Drivers and ticket-collectors suddenly showed a renewed zeal in the matter of payment. Especially were they remorseless with the soldiers, who had taken the habit of using the trams free of charge. I heard one driver delivering a veritable speech to a delinquent soldier and reminding him that the workmen were not disreputable bands like the soldiers! The reason is the same as with the factory workers — the trams now belong to them, and they do not intend to allow the public to defraud them.

Another notable and ominous development in the life of Budapest is the sudden and artificial raising of the workmen's wages. This is out of all proportion even to the high price of commodities. A captain of police known to me had his salary raised from K.7000 to K.18000 (£240 to £720) a year. He said he would have been delighted to have had K.1200 (£480). (Ordinary policemen were raised from K.150 (£6) to K.700 (£28) a month.) All officials have been raised double or more: an ordinary day-labourer gets £3 a day. With great "protection"3 I managed to obtain a ton of fourth-grade coal, which cost £4. But to cart it to the house (a matter of half-an-hour) cost £6. A well-known doctor complained to me that he had to pay his chauffeur £32 a month and provide him with a flat into the bargain! The Government has been spending millions in salaries during the last few weeks, and everyone knows it cannot go on. It is true that it is all paper money, but even paper money cannot be produced in this reckless fashion indefinitely. The exchange is bad enough as it is. A K.100 note is now worth little more than a £1, instead of £4. On K.10,000 I lost over £250 on the exchange in Budapest. In London no one will touch [touch] Austro-Hungarian notes and it is impossible to change them.

Another feature of Budapest life is the apathy in regard to work. This is a phenomenon common to all defeated countries. The soldiers say they have done four years' toil for their country and have nothing but misery to show for it. It is up to their country to do something for them. When I left (December 15th) the police calculated there must be between 20 to 25 thousand disbanded soldiers, most of whom have arms, living in idleness in Budapest. In spite of the enormous wages offered it is difficult to induce any one to work.

The Government, for instance, cannot persuade any one to enlist in the army. After three weeks' strenuous effort the War Minister, Bartha,4 resigned the task as hopeless. The few who have joined are boys attracted by the high wages and are innocent of any sort of discipline. The streets of Budapest remain unswept, the dustbins unemptied. Exhaustion is everywhere.

3 L.B. Namier remarked above this word: "(backing)".
4 Albert Bartha, Hungarian Minister of War, November–December 1918.
The aristocrats maintain a brave face, and their spirit is admirable. All of them expect to be ruined and await with remarkable calm a future that can bode no good for them. The rich Jewish merchants, some of whom have amassed incredible fortunes during the war, keep as much as possible to their houses. If the storm of Bolshevism bursts on Hungary the Jews will be among the first to be swept away. But up to my departure from Budapest, although great lack of order was everywhere evident, there was little actual disorder, in the sense of rowdism, to be observed.

The Church has, rather late in the day, made the great sacrifice and thrown its vast lands into the melting-pot. But it would be a mistake to regard the Church as given over in a body to reaction. A very powerful section, under the leadership of Bishop Prohászka is quite alive to the needs of the times. Prohászka, as early as 1916, came forward with a programme for distributing the Church lands among the wounded soldiers who returned disabled from the War. And the peasant-priest in the village has always been in favour of the distribution of the Church lands. But the part the Church may play in the problem of reconstruction is as yet but ill-defined.

I saw Count Károlyi for the last time on December 12th, shortly before I left Budapest. He was looking tired and complained that he could neither sleep nor eat. His position, he said (he was in a despondent mood), was becoming impossible — indeed almost comic. The Entente seem disinclined to make any distinction between himself and the late Count Tisza, and he felt he could be of no use to his country. He would gladly resign, but there was no one to whom he could hand his resignation! He was President and Premier rolled into one. His endeavour would be to hold the elections for the Presidency as soon as possible and then hand over his task to some one else. But he was anxious to make a final effort, and had sounded Paris as to whether he should come in person to talk things over. “Just think,” he said, “the people here now think I want to run away and I have just received a report that the ‘Nemzeti Tanács’ — the National Assembly — would arrest me on the frontier if I tried to leave for Paris.”

The Count then asked me if I would undertake to carry despatches to London. I replied I could not do so. He pressed me and explained that it was not the political but the economic question that was so urgent. I then said I should be willing to report what he told me on this point. He said: “Our greatest need is coal. In Budapest we have been living for weeks past in regard to coal from day to day. We have more than once had less than two days’ supply in the town. We may at any time find it impossible to light the city at night. The lack of coal also hinders us from sending what food and other commodities we have to places where they are required. Moreover, the Czechs, Roumanians, Serbians etc., as they advance from the frontiers towards Budapest, are appropriating whatever supplies they find — potatoes, coal-mines, grain, rolling stock etc. If this process of disruption continues — and we are powerless to prevent it — the country is faced with starvation, and its inevitable result, Bolshevism, before the winter is over.”

Count Károlyi suggested a remedy. It was that the Entente should send out a commission to take an inventory of the food and other essential commodities available in the countries of Central Europe, with power to control the equal distribution of such commodities as between the various countries, according to their individual needs. In the Count’s opinion, even with the best possible control and distribution serious trouble is inevitable owing to food-shortage in the spring: without such Entente control nothing can save the country from the impending starvation and consequent anarchy.

Count Károlyi would regard a military occupation of the country as greatly tending to help reconstruction, but he does not ask for it. In general Budapest would welcome the
arrival of Entente troops with great relief. But the Count presses for Entente control in regard to food distribution.

In my opinion Count Károlyi’s suggestion is valuable. I believe that if a commission for food control and distribution were sent, and especially if the scarcity of food were helped out by contributions from Entente resources, it would enormously tend to relieve the situation not only in Hungary, but over all Central Europe. The fact that the Danube is under Entente control, and that both Budapest and Vienna could be dominated from it, would tend to give the Commission the necessary authority and support. But I do not believe any military intervention, or threat of it, would be wanted. Provided an absolutely frank statement of the food situation were published, and the Press were organised to back the work of the Commission and popularise the measures necessary to meet the situation, it is my belief that the people would rally round it.

It is unnecessary to emphasise the menace of Bolshevism. In Hungary it is already present, though in a bloodless form. Count Károlyi repeated to me more than once that that was his chief concern. “The political questions can await the decision of the Peace Conference — in any case we shall have little voice in their settlement — but what calls for immediate solution is the problem of how to feed the people and maintain order during the months that must elapse before these world-negotiations are concluded. Hungary is defeated. The Entente can do as they like with her. But our State is over a thousand years old and was for centuries the outpost of Europe. It cannot surely be the wish of the victorious Entente — it is not even in their interest — to crush us absolutely to the ground, and make it impossible for us to combat the spreading menace of Bolshevism.”

At parting Count Károlyi added that he did not expect to maintain himself over the New Year. I think his judgment is here at fault. His popularity is still great: the people know that the difficulties of his situation are none of his making; but especially there is no one else to represent Hungary at the Peace Conference. For these reasons I believe he will be still in power — unless he insists on resigning — when the Conference meets.

(signed) J. Edward Thornton

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Sir William Tyrrell

This useful paper is by Mr. Thornton; I have already sent you a note of interview with him. The last part deserves special and urgent attention.

I agree with Mr. Namier as to the advantage of using him if it was desired to send someone to Hungary.

J.W.H[eadlam-].M[orley].
2/1/19
Having read in the papers of our presence in Vienna, Count Julius Andrassy travelled up from Hungary and invited us, through a member of the Polish Legation, to visit him to-day, as he wished to make a statement to us.

We called on Count Andrassy to-day at the house of his sister, Princess Esterhazy. He was anxious, first, that we should at once send a small force, say 20,000, safe troops to Budapest, where the situation is not only serious but critical. He fears an outbreak of Bolshevism may occur at any moment. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that the Allies should take immediate steps to check the further advance of the Bolshevist movement; as, given Hungary, the Bolshevist wave would sweep to Italy and France.

We are most anxious, said Count Andrassy, to know what the Entente propose to do with us; but we hear nothing from them. We only know that, on the one hand, the Tcheko-Slovaks state that the Entente have promised them a large part of Hungary, not only that inhabited by Slovaks, but also districts which are inhabited exclusively by Hungarians. On the other hand, Rumanians state that, for their part, they have been promised the Rumanian part of Hungary. Further we gather that Croatia is also to be detached from Hungary. This would leave Hungary a small, purely agricultural country, deprived entirely of its rich mining and industrial districts. Under these circumstances Hungary would be a country which could not live, but at the same time it would refuse to die. “If England pronounces this sentence of death upon us”, said Count Andrassy, “I for one shall be a revolutionary. I am and shall remain a Hungarian, and shall seek to defend Hungary so long as I live.”

I admit, said Count Andrassy, that my policy has been a German policy. Foreseeing the Slav danger, we had to seek a strong Ally against Russia, and Germany was naturally the Power to which we turned. But I wanted also a rapprochement, as did my father, between England and Germany, as I could not see why these two nations should quarrel. England is now the strongest European power and, in the future, will be forced to come to an agreement with Germany, as a divided Europe would be a standing temptation to an aggressive imperialist America or Japan. We want, above everything else, an understanding with England — that is, if we are to exist at all, — and it seems...
to me that the best development would be a federation with Austria, as Austria must be linked on to some power, and England surely would prefer a friendly Austria-Hungary to driving Austria into German hands. I assume that England, now the strongest power in Europe, will restore and keep order in Constantinople; but the time is certain to come when both Bulgaria and Serbia will raise objections to England's presence in Constantinople. Surely, in that case, a friendly Austria-Hungary will be an invaluable Ally. Further, given a Hungary which can continue to exist, we must come to some agreement with Poland, which again will be to England's interests.

To revert to the subject of Bolshevism: The position of Hungary is now so uncertain that the whole country is in a state of nerves, and, consequently, a fit subject for Bolshevist propaganda. It must be remembered that we have in Hungary Tcheko-Slovak and Rumanian troops, and Hungarian agents, working from patriotic motives, are preaching Revolution in Tcheko-Slovakia and Rumania, as a means of getting these troops withdrawn from our country. At the present moment everything tends to the development of Bolshevism, which is a danger for all of us.

Help for us in the form of troops for Budapest and a definite statement that Hungary is not to be annihilated, will not only save our country, but will help to protect Western Europe against Bolshevism.

We, of course, made no statement or comment whatever to Count Andrassy.

R. Kimens

Rowland Kenney

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Minutes attached to the document:

This is further indication of the efforts being made by the Magyars to capture British sympathy. Count Andrassy appeals to our humanity, our vanity & even our cupidity (e.g. Constantinople).

Harold Nicolson
16/1/19

The admission (last line of p. 2) [5th paragraph] that Bolshevik agents in Rumania & among the Čecho-Slovaks are supported by Hungarians "for patriotic motives" is very important & interesting. So long as the Hungarian authorities continue this policy it is hard to see why the Rumanians & C-S.'s shd. adopt a conciliatory attitude towards them over food supplies.

A.W.A. Leeper
16/1/19

Count Andrassy still moves on the old diplomatic plane on Metternich's plan. To appeal to us by promising Austro-Hungarian support against Serbia and Bulgaria vocals [?] a frame of mind which should not encourage us to enter into political discussions or bargains with Hungarian politicians.

E. Crowe
16/1/19

2 The editor has not been able to establish further details about this second signatory of the document.
[...] Mr. Kimen's report of January 9 from Vienna (paper No. 142) illustrate[s] opportunely the absurdity of the Hungarian complaint, voiced by Sir R. [W.] Beveridge,\(^3\) that the Hungarians have been quite unable to place their views before us.

In fact, of course, we have been inundated with every Hungarian's views for many months past.

E. Crowe
16/1/19

\(^3\) See Nos. 26 and 27.

No. 26

Memorandum by Lord R. Cecil

[LI. G. F/49/3/1]

British Delegation,
Paris, 16 January 1919

Sir R. [W.] Beveridge who has just returned from a visit to Vienna and Budapest, where he went on a mission on behalf of the Food Controller in connection with the proposed relief scheme, came to talk to me at length to-day on the result of his mission.\(^1\) He appears to entertain the most extended views as to the action to be taken by the International Food Commission, and appeared very insistent on the necessity and advantage of utilizing the situation in those countries as regards food and raw materials, for the purpose of all sorts of political and politico-economical schemes, which in my opinion go far beyond what should be the scope of any relief scheme. He is strongly imbued with the idea that peace is already practically concluded and all trade restrictions as between Germany, Austria and Hungary on one side, and the territories liberated from Austria-Hungary on the other, ought to be promptly removed, and that we ought to encourage the several new States to enter into an economic Union with Austria and Hungary. He also made himself the spokesman of all sorts of Hungarian grievances, in particular the complaint that the Hungarians were not allowed to place their side of their case before us. To this end Sir R. [W.] Beveridge recommends either (a) that regular, practically official, relations should be established with some Hungarian Representation to be at Christiania, or (b) that a regular F.O. Representative should be sent to Budapest, or (c) that he himself (Sir R. [W.] Beveridge) should return there in connection with the Relief Scheme with authority to enter into political discussions with the Hungarians.

I confess that all this seems to me altogether wild and injudicious. Sir R. [W.] Beveridge, whilst he talked with great assurance, did not give one the impression that he had any real understanding of the political situation; he seemed to make himself the advocate of all purely Hungarian interests, and dwell much on the necessity of our conciliating Hungarian opinion and feelings.

\(^1\) For extracts from Sir W. Beveridge's report, prepared after his return from the mission, see No. 27.
I trust that none of his three alternative proposals will be approved or encouraged. It may be useful and desirable to attach to the Relief Mission when it returns to Austria-Hungary, some competent observer who can furnish us with reliable information on what is going on not only in the economic, but also in the political, field. But I feel strongly that Sir R. [W.] Beveridge would not be a competent or reliable adviser on political matters and that, should it be decided to send some one, another selection should be made in consultation with our Political Intelligence Department.

Meanwhile, I understand, Sir R. [W.] Beveridge proposes to put his suggestions direct before the Prime Minister. If so, I think it would be well to let the Prime Minister or his private secretary know that Sir R. [W.] Beveridge's political ideas want checking.

I ought to mention that Sir E. Howard, Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Seeper (?) [Leeper] were present at the interview. I regret that Sir E. Howard did not appear to share my views on the political situation, being rather attracted by Sir R. [W.] Beveridge's ideas. But I remain convinced that they are not on the right lines, and could not safely be pursued at this juncture.

(Intd.) R[obert]. C[ecil].

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Minutes attached to the document:

Hungary is just as much an enemy country as Germany, Bulgaria &c. and I see no reason why official political relations should be established with her rather than with other enemy countries. It would be useful to know rather more than we do as to what is going on at Pesth.

(Intd.) H[ardinge].

No. 27

Report Written by Sir W. Beveridge (Extracts)

[Li. G. F/197/5]

17 January 1919

Interim Report by the Inter-Allied Commission on Relief of German Austria

[...]

At any rate the most hopeful outlook for Vienna (and so, for its creditors) lies in restoring its importance as a transport and trading centre: this in turn probably depends upon restoring as much as possible of the previous economic unity of Austria-Hungary, despite its political dismemberment. A movement for an “Economic Confederation of the Danube”, which would also be for German Austria a movement

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1 For the reaction of senior officials in the Foreign Office to Sir W. Beveridge's proposals, see No. 26.
away from Germany, may thus be both financially and politically desirable from the point of view of the principal Allies; whether the feeling between the different states that must compose such a confederation is such as to allow of its being realised in any reasonable period of time is another question.

[...]

Fear of Bolshevism and Disorder

Wherever the Commission went — but particularly in Prag and Buda-Pesth — they found a constantly repeated expression of fear of Bolshevism arising, both out of the hardships to which the workmen were being subjected and as the result of agitation fostered from Russia.

The expression of the fear was generally followed by a request for the presence of allied troops. M. Kramarsch (whom we interviewed on the day before he was shot at) was extremely emphatic in his fear, and President Masaryk was also prepared to welcome such intervention. Buda-Pesth, at the time of our visit, was in the throes of a political crisis, and though the issue there did not concern the Bolshevists properly so called (but was an issue between the bourgeois and the social democratic parties) the spectre of Bolshevism was always present to the minds of everybody. The only publicly armed force in Hungary now is entirely in the hands of the Social Democrats and entirely undisciplined. The Minister of War, M.[S.] Festetics,2 told me that he very seldom issued an order now because every order issued by him was submitted by the soldiers to a Soldiers Council to consider whether or not they would obey it. At any moment there is fear that the extremer social democrats may become Bolshevists or the soldiers themselves may go over to a party of robbery of [or?] violence. There seems indeed little doubt that if Buda-Pesth is left to itself it will sooner or later explode and the only difference of opinion that I have heard is as to whether the explosion was likely to take place in a few days or in a few weeks.

I recognise that the remedy of military occupation is not one that should be lightly adopted, but it is difficult to feel any security without it.

I am inclined to suggest for consideration that at any rate an appreciable force of Entente troops (say 5000 or 10,000) should by agreement with the Czechs be sent to Czecho-Slovakia, which may be regarded as an island of allied feeling and comparative stability surrounded on all sides by disorganization and threats of disorder. Troops sent to Czecho-Slovakia would be, from there as a base, able to deal rapidly with disorder in the neighbouring districts (Eastern Silesia, Buda-Pesth, Galicia) and a small stiffening of Entente troops would enable the Czech troops themselves to be employed to a considerable extent by increasing their prestige.

Any permanent safeguard against disorder must clearly be sought, not in military occupation, but in the restoration of economic security: that is to say in the immediate provision of the minimum food, clothing and fuel and in the resumption at as early a date as possible of ordinary industrial activity.

[...]

Conclusion and Recommendations

The cessation of war without the restoration of peace in Austria Hungary, combined with its political dismemberment has produced a state of general economic paralysis. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that in order to prevent a collapse of the social order comparable to what has occurred in Russia, the Allies must practically if not formally treat the war with all parts of Austria as finished, and must give positive help in reconstruction there. The reason for this is not that the Hungarians or German

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2 Count Sándor Festetics, Minister of War in Count M. Károlyi's cabinet, December 1918–January 1919.
Austrians deserve special consideration, or have a claim to avoid suffering as Northern France and Belgium did. The real grounds are twofold:-

(i) The war is in fact so completely finished, as far as these countries are concerned, and they are so completely smashed, that war-time standards of inhumanity are no longer applicable.

(ii) The further spread of disorder in Europe is a danger to the Allied countries themselves.

A third ground was advanced by representative men both in German Austria and Hungary. In each case they stated that if they were left alone and on unfriendly terms with their immediate neighbours (Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania), since it was impossible for them to stand alone — with their reduced territories and economic impoverishment they would be bound to fall into close relations with Germany, which would thus get a material accession of strength. If on the other hand German Austria and Hungary could enter on reasonable terms into a close economic relation with their neighbour states — an “Economic Confederation of the Danube” — the whole might form a group of connected states too clearly differentiated in character ever to join Germany as a whole, yet with sufficient internal cohesion to prevent any one member of the group breaking off to Germany. A permanent equipoise would be produced in the South to German power in the North. No doubt both German Austria and Hungary would have ideas as to their respective positions in such a group and as to territorial questions which are not likely to be realised.

This argument touches the fringe of very large and much debated questions, and I only give it for what it is worth. In the mouths of most of those who used it, it was certainly not a threat but an expression of their own desires. The making, in effect if not in form, of an earlier economic peace in the whole of Austria-Hungary and thus leaving Germany alone to the last would be a simple continuance of the strategy which terminated the war, by a succession of armistices at different dates.

Assuming, however, that, whether with this in view or not, the Associated Governments are prepared to treat the war as ended so far as is necessary to prevent both extreme privation and disorder, the following programme of action is suggested.

Proposals for Action

A: General

1. Two general principles should be accepted and publicly announced by the Associated Governments of France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, irrespective of the peace negotiations, viz.

   (a) That all the territories formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be enabled and assisted to obtain the indispensable minimum supplies of food, fuel and other primary commodities up to the next harvest.

   (b) That without prejudice to political claims there should be an immediate resumption of supply and interchange of such commodities between all those territories, irrespective of any terms of military occupation under the armistice.

[...]
No. 28

Minutes on a Memorandum by H. Nicolson and A.W.A. Leeper

[PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/375]

[These minutes precede a memorandum sent by Professor George D. Herron on 10 January 1919 from Geneva, reporting that a plea has been placed before him by a visiting commission representing the Protestant Churches of Hungary with regard to the dangers facing the Protestant community in Transylvania as a result of the emerging peace settlement.]

More Hungarian propaganda!

H.G.N[icolson].
21/1/19

An extraordinary mass of misstatements; e.g. that 1 out of the 2½ million Transilvanians [sic] are Protestants is absurd. Similarly the suspicions of Rumanian intolerance here put forward are, so far as we know, quite unjustified both by past & present attitude of the Rumanians towards the German & Magyar Protestants, who will be given complete equality, cultural & religious. (The Székler are mainly Roman Catholic). Profr. Herron was speaking to me this morning of the various attempts of this kind made by Hungarian religious & political persons to get in touch with Paris.

A.W.A. Leeper
23/1/19

1 For documents regarding a request by the General Presbyterian Alliance (Edinburgh) for help for the Reformed Church of Hungary see Nos. 32 and 44.

No. 29

Letter from Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to Lady A. Hankey (London. Extract)¹

[HNKY 3/24]

Quai d'Orsay,
Paris, 29 January 1919

[... ] This afternoon Poles and Tseco-Slovaks are droning out their interminable “revendications” and explanations of their national desiderata. They are only remotely a British interest, and Ll.G. has been getting more and more restive. As I write these words, he has burst in to try and stop what is the most infernal waste of time. [....]

Acting upon the instructions received from you at Semlin I immediately proceeded to Buda Pest and arrived there during the night of the 20/21 January.

I immediately got into touch with people who could give me reliable information on the local situation and the state of unrest in this country. I also had conversation with Colonel Vyš on the subject. My wire to you was the result of these 3 days observation and conversations. From accounts I had received before my arrival here I expected to find Hungary and Buda Pest especially in an awful state. I had been told that it was not safe to be out of doors after dark and that Communism was rampant etc. There appears to have been good reason for anxiety for some time and it looked as if things might have been very nasty. The French received threatening letters and for a while, I understand, they had the “wind-up”. The papers published articles against the Entente,— The situation had already improved when I reached Buda Pest. This was due to various causes but mainly to the defeat of the disruptive elements in Berlin and the death of the Bolshevik leaders there. The turn of events in Germany for a while damped the ardour of the ringleaders in Hungary. How long the truce will last it is difficult to say. At present the enemies of order and law are organizing themselves: they have papers, offices in different parts quarters [sic] of the city and carry on a very active propaganda but excepting a few instances there has been no bloodshed in Hungary so far.

There is some sort of a Government in the Country but they have not got the country behind them. The members are mostly Jews with no status. They dare not move a finger lest the Council of Workmen and soldiers should turn them out. The Army demobilised itself and the 8 divisions allowed them by the terms of the Armistice are not in existence. In the event of any serious disturbance happening the Government are powerless to keep order as they have no organised force to depend upon There is no telling what would happen then. The workmen in Budapest and the peasantry are armed. As the Army was not demobilised the Authorities could not collect all the arms and ammunition; as a result of this there are thousands of rifles all over the country with a very large number of machine guns. The German soldiers of Mackenzen's [Mackensen's] Army also sold their arms to the peasantry. The cause of discontent & the ensuing unrest is economic rather than political. Food is very dear and scarce, clothes are beyond the reach of the poor people. There is enough food in the country for the whole of the population but the industrial and commercial life of Hungary is almost at a standstill and the distribution of food is very bad. I do not think that the Bolsheviks really mean business on the Russian lines. In my opinion the workmen will only resort to brigandage if they are driven to it by famine. The scarcity of coal has forced 50% of the factories to close down and reduced the output of the others considerably. There are hundreds of thousands of workmen idle. The Government passed a decree some time ago according to which all persons who had no work would be given between 15 and 20 Crowns a day. The effect of this decree was deplorable, as nobody wants to work

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1 The letter was transmitted by Maj.-Gen. W. Thwaites to Lord Curzon in London, where it arrived on 18 February 1919.
now. In the country conditions are even worse — a large portion of the year's harvest has not been gathered: potatoes, beet, etc., remained in the ground, immense quantities of maize have not been brought in. Famine thus stares everyone in the face and revolution will follow as a consequence. The whole force including the police which the government possess to enforce order total 23,000 men. They admit that they cannot trust these men as Communistic and Bolshevik doctrines have spread among them. There is no discipline in the Army and the men obey their officers only when it suits them to do so.

The trouble, when it comes, will be directed mainly against the moneyed classes — the rich landowners and the Jews. The latter number 500,000 in Budapest alone. The movement as a whole is not directed against foreigners. The American[s] and British are not disliked. The French on the other hand are not liked, owing to the fact that their Colonial troops which occupy part of the country have behaved rather badly, I am given to understand. I have made arrangements in conjunction with the Spanish Consul for the embarkation of the Allied subjects in case of a Revolution breaking out.

The situation may be summed up thus:- There is a real danger of an outbreak in Hungary, in Budapest especially. The present state of unrest among the workmen and peasants alike is due to the very high cost of living, scarcity of clothes and lack of work. The output of coal which is available is not sufficient to keep the factories, railways etc., going. The Bolshevics are not Bolshevics in the real meaning of the term. There are a few leaders who profess Communist and Bolshevik doctrines but the mass of the people are a rabble without much in them. They are a discontented crowd who would welcome the return of normal conditions, if circumstances and a Government worthy of the name could get the country out of the rut in which it has fallen. This government does not exist here. The majority of the Ministers are a lot of upstarts, men who know nothing and have no idea as to how a country ought to be run. They are simply driving the whole nation to ruin and disaster.

(signed) J.G.L. Pommerol.

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Minutes attached to the document:

The position is clearly very bad, but it is for the French who are on the spot to take measures.
[....]

C.H.S[mith].

[HDLM ACC 727/11 Folder 2]

Foreign Office,
London, 1 February 1919

[...]

From the latest Austrian papers I gather that the situation in Hungary is becoming rather tense, that labour troubles are breaking out in the Magyar towns and mining districts, but the Magyar government seems incapable of any positive work. To some extent this is due to the uncertainty of frontiers. The Rumanes, Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks were continually advancing, in many cases into indisputably Magyar territory. The Magyar upper classes, on the other hand, have not given up all hope of being left even with certain non-Magyar territories and do not want to accept the narrow basis for final work. As Count Karolyi said on one occasion — “Five Comitats are not a country.” Worst of all this uncertainty of basis renders elections for a new Hungarian Assembly practically impossible. They cannot elect new members in the disputed territories or any territories under occupation, they do not want to assemble a “Rump Parliament” as they would call it, they can hardly appoint new members for the disputed areas and they cannot summon the old Magyar members from them because this would give the Conservatives an undue preponderance. Under these conditions even the moderate bourgeois parties are very much hampered in their work, a fact which has to be faced and acknowledged whatever we may think of the Magyar claims as such. For Hungary, as for all parts of Eastern and Central Europe, it is essential that the Peace Conference should hurry up.

The army in Hungary seems to be entirely under the control of the moderate Socialists to the exclusion of the bourgeois parties, though not altogether of the Bolsheviks. Among the bourgeois Radicals the demand has been recently put forward for much stronger action against the Bolsheviks. The moderate Socialists are opposed to such action, and over this question very serious differences had arisen in the Karolyi Cabinet. Karolyi’s own bourgeois followers were moving to the Right in favour of a bourgeois coalition, which reacted on the Socialists by making them move to the Left. Karolyi demanded that the coalition should remain intact and answered his bourgeois followers that he would not agree to governing to the exclusion of the Socialists. On the other hand he offered the Socialists to retire and to leave the entire government to them, which the Socialists refused. Finally a compromise was patched up enlarging the influence of the Socialists in the government. Karolyi, who had hitherto been something between a president of a republic and a Prime Minister, was moved, I believe on January 14th,1 into the position of a temporary President of the Republic. But all these changes seem to me of very little importance because all these politics hang in the air. There is no Parliament, no popular mandate and no definite territory which would enable any one to get it.

1 Count M. Károlyi was declared temporary President of the Hungarian Republic by the Executive Committee of the Hungarian National Council on 11 January 1919.
No. 32

Letter from the Reverend R. Dykes Shaw et al. of the General Presbyterian Alliance (Edinburgh) to A.J. Balfour (London)¹

[PRO FO 371/3529 No. 22101/W3]

General Presbyterian Alliance, Edinburgh, 3 February 1919

Memorial Regarding the Reformed Church of Hungary

Sir:-

We are instructed by the Eastern Section of the General Presbyterian Alliance respectfully to submit the following Memorial for your favourable consideration.

The Alliance is an "Alliance of Reformed Churches throughout the World holding the Presbyterian System", and includes about ninety Presbyterian Churches and Missionary Organisations, representing a Christian community of about thirty millions. Its Executive Commission is in two Sections — the Western, which embraces the Presbyterian Churches of America and Canada, and the Eastern, which embraces the Presbyterian Churches of the United Kingdom and the Colonies, a number of the Reformed Churches on the Continent of Europe, and others in various countries in the Eastern World.

In the Eastern Section the largest Church is the Hungarian Reformed Church, with a membership of not less than two and a half millions.

This Church has had a most honourable history since the very dawn of the Reformation. It has again and again nobly maintained itself when its very existence was assailed by the persecuting intolerance of Austrian Roman Catholicism on the one hand, and by the onslaughts of Turkish power on the other. It has not swerved from its fidelity to the principles of Western Protestantism, and indeed has often been a bulwark to the Western Churches themselves, especially in the early days of the Reformation when they were engaged in struggles for their own life and liberty. On the other hand it has frequently received countenance and help of the most practical and effective kind from the Western Powers, and not least from Great Britain, whereby it has been delivered from crushing edicts launched against it by reactionary forces in Austria. Its bonds with this country as a leading Protestant Power have for the last two or three centuries been close and strong, and during the past fifty years its associations with the Western Presbyterian Churches have become increasingly intimate, largely owing to the influence of the "Scottish Mission" in Hungary, and to the fact that nearly one hundred Hungarian students have studied for longer or shorter periods at Presbyterian Theological Colleges in Great Britain, Ireland, and America. It is natural therefore that it should look to us again to support it with our strength in the day of threatening peril to its unity and to its free and unfettered development as a Church of the Reformed Faith.

It is further our conviction that help rendered to this Church in the present critical juncture of its history would have a beneficial effect on the settlement of affairs in

¹ A letter signed by J.C. Tilley was sent to the General Presbyterian Alliance on 13 February, acknowledging the receipt of their communication, and informing them that the subject of their memorandum had been referred to A.J. Balfour in Paris. The letter was referred to Balfour on 17 February in dispatch No. 682. For the reply given by L. Mallet in the absence of A.J. Balfour see No. 44.
Eastern Europe, ministering, as it would, to the peace that ever finds its surest foundation in conditions of religious and intellectual liberty such as the Hungarian Church undoubtedly stands for.

It is in the interests of this sister Church of ours, and in response to an earnest appeal from it, that we now address you.

It appears possible that, as a result of the Peace Settlement, large portions of territory may be transferred from Hungary and put under the rule of some other Power or Powers. In the territory that it is feared may be thus affected the Hungarian Reformed Church has two Theological Colleges, one thousand Congregations, and over a million members, about half the total strength of the Church. It has also, in the Transylvania district alone, educational institutions of various grades, numbering, with primary schools, more than six hundred in all.

The Hungarian Reformed Church is moved with the greatest anxiety lest it should be called upon to face so serious a disruption, and lest the parts thus lost to it should come under a domination that would be alien to them in sympathy, and that would force upon them repressive laws such as they have suffered from in former days of religious enmity and persecution.

ACCORDINGLY the Eastern Section of the Presbyterian Alliance very earnestly prays that, whatever changes the Peace Conference may deem it wise and proper to make, you will lend the great weight of your influence to conserve the interests and unity of this historic Church, to secure free opportunity for the development of its spiritual and intellectual life, and to safeguard it in the full exercise of its religious liberty.

(Signed)

William Park D.D., Chairman of the Section, and President of the Alliance.

R.R. Simpson Kt., Vice-Chairman of the Section.

J.N. Oglivie D.D., Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and member of the Section.

R. Dykes Shaw D.D., General Secretary of the Alliance.

Robert J. Drummond D.D., Moderator of the General Assembly of the United Free Church of Scotland, and member of the Section.
No. 33

Telegram from O. Phillpotts (Vienna) to Sir H. Rumbold (Berne.
Received 12 February 1919)1

[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 21459]

Vienna, 11 February 1919

BUDAPEST February 8th:-

KAROLYI informs us that conservatives here are using the violation of terms of the
BELGRADE armistice by SERBIANS, RUMANIANS and sailors [?] of Allies in
agitating against government and present regime. They declare Allies regard present
government as too socialistic and semi-Bolshevik and Allies would treat more
favourably any government composed of men of more conservative Parties.

KAROLYI points out that socialistic element absolutely necessary in any government
which hoped to maintain itself for a single day as their's the only party with organized
followers and therefore able to keep order in BUDAPEST.

Present regime coalition BOURGEOIS and socialists and only (group mutilated)
possibly without civil War. Socialists work against BOLSHEVIKS who are not
dangerous provided the coal supply can be maintained. He urges ENTENTE should tell
HUNGARY what they wish her to do and should also give HUNGARIAN
government opportunity to explain its view.

(Signed) PHIL[L]POTTS.

(Note by M.I.1.c: This telegram badly mutilated.)

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Minutes attached to the document:

(From) [PRO FO 371/3514 No. W3/21459]

[To] Mr. Tilley.

From all the information we have I should think Karolyi's statement accurate and his
request reasonable, barring of course discussion of problems which the Peace Congress
alone can decide.

The Left wing of the Karolyi party has broken with the Conservatives, and in
exchange the Social Democrats have broken with the Bolsheviks. These two parties, the
bourgeois Radicals and the moderate Socialists, now form together a Government bloc
resembling that of Democrats and Majority Socialists in Germany, and represent the
only combination through which Hungary can escape civil war. If the power passed
either to the Right of it or to the Left, civil war would start automatically. Nothing is
better calculated to lead to anarchy than the intrigues of the old Magyar oligarchy such
as are reported in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch of February 3rd (No. 59; Austri-

1 This telegram was sent from Berne to Military Intelligence, War Office, London, on 12 February and
was received there on 13 February.
Hungary No. 21459). In these circumstances it would seem advisable for us, short of active interference, to give any support we can to the Centre bloc as far as purely Magyar affairs are concerned, which of course excludes anything affecting territorial claims and anything which might in any way be misconstrued into an encouragement of Magyar Imperialism.

One of our representatives in Hungary might be instructed to ask Count Karolyi what subjects these are which he wishes to discuss, and moreover state to him in a form which might be used for publication, that H.M.G. does not mean to interfere in internal Magyar affairs and certainly entertains no prejudice against the existing Magyar Government.

L.B.N[amier].
17/2/19

2 See No. 35.
3 The asterisk was inserted by an unidentified F.O. official, who remarked in a footnote on 17 February: “I do not know how far this is in accord with our policy. Count Michael Esterhazy at any rate is far from convincing.”

No. 34

Letter from Major C. Goetz to V. Wellesley

[PRO FO 371/3514 No. 23948/W3]

11 February 1919

Sir,

I am obliged by your letter of yesterday's date, in view of which I shall of course refrain from publishing any of the information to which you refer.1

I regret Lord Curzon's decision in the matter, as the only point in which anything I had to say might be said to show bias, was that I feel that the good treatment of all British subjects interned in the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire during the war, entitle those countries to more consideration than is merited by other enemy nationalities.

In view of your statement that Lord Curzon personally considered the notes I gave to Lord Acton when I passed through Berne, I should be glad for him to be informed of the grounds upon which I based my conclusions.

These were as follows:

1 That all the Hungarians claim at present is that their country should not be dismembered until the Peace Conference has decided on their ultimate fate.

2 That the racial questions in Hungary are the result of immigration into the ex-Kingdom of Hungary by foreign races.

3 That the dismemberment of Hungary would entail precisely the same racial questions, in which the Magyars would be the aggrieved parties.

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1 The reference is to a memorandum sent by Major Goetz to the Foreign Office in late 1918, which he also intended to publish in The Daily Telegraph. The Foreign Office decided that the memorandum should not be published because of its pro-Hungarian bias.
4 That this state of affairs would result in a most ardent & irrepressible Irredentism — the Magyars are perhaps the only patriotic and warlike people in that portion of Central Europe which constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire,

5 That whatever the faults of an enemy country have been, it should not be deprived of the means of existence.

6 That while one thing at present desired in Hungary is a predominating British influence, the result of dismembering the country might be to drive it into the arms of some anti-British combination.

7 That the economic possibilities of Hungary are such that it would be very much in our interests to prevent its dismemberment —

I have etc., etc.,

Charles Goetz

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Minutes attached to the document:

Major Goetz says that "the racial questions in Hungary are the result of immigration into the ex-Kingdom of Hungary of foreign races." It is not clear what practical conclusion he wishes to draw from this fact but it seems quite clear that he is not aware of the fact that the Slavs have been in Hungary for centuries before the Magyars came.

L.B.N[amier].
18/2/19

No. 35

Minutes on a Memorandum by L.B. Namier and H. Nicolson

[PRO FO 371/3514 No. W3/21459]

[These minutes are preceded by a memorandum written by Count M. Esterházy during his visit to Berne on 26 January 1919, and forwarded by Sir H. Rumbold on 3 February 1919. In it, Count Esterházy claims that Count Károlyi’s Government is the near dictatorship of the Socialist Party, and urges the sending of British troops to relieve the situation.]

Count Th. Batthianyi [Batthyány]1 belonged to the right wing of the Karolyi Party which has now broken entirely with the Government. The present Govt. is no more Bolshevik than the bloc of Democrats & Majority Socialists in Germany. Count Esterházy states that the Magyar Socialist party represents only 240,000 labourers — but this is a lot in a nation of 9-10 millions in which the peasants are the strongest element. Now the peasants support the present Govt.; the Minister in charge of the agrarian reform, Szabo is one of their most prominent leaders. The reason why Count Estehazy & Co. ask for Entente troops is that they have no real following among the Magyar people and would like us to carry out for them a coup d'État.

1 Count Tivadar Batthyány was Minister of the Interior in Count M. Károlyi’s first cabinet.
It is interesting to note that Budapest now lies on the line London — Persian Gulf. In the past it was always in Hungary Berlin — Budapest — Baghdad.

L.B.N[amier].
17/2/19

I am inclined to think we had better take no action for the present, especially as it is presumably quite out of the question to think of sending any troops.

H.N[icolson].
18/2/19

No. 36

Note Read by General Alby before the Romanian Commission of the Paris Peace Conference

[PRO CAB 25/117]

19 February 1919

Dans la séance du 17 février, la Commission des Affaires Roumaines, a proposé de fixer une zone de non occupation militaire (1), entre Hongrois et Roumains en vue d'éviter les conflits armés qui se produisent actuellement entre eux en Transylvanie.

La Commission des Affaires Roumaines, envisage l'occupation éventuelle de cette zone par des troupes alliées en vue de maintenir l'ordre contre de possibles tentatives Bolchevistes.

..........................

Ces propositions appellent les observations suivantes:

A) Il s'agit, en fait, de dénoncer la Convention militaire signée à Belgrade le 13 novembre avec le Gouvernement hongrois et de fixer une nouvelle ligne de démarcation.

Il y aurait lieu tout d'abord pour éviter toute fausse interprétation de spécifier que l'ancienne ligne est maintenue à l'ouest de Szegedin inclus et que la nouvelle ligne ne concerne que la Transylvanie au nord d'Arad.

B) En ce qui concerne la ligne proposée pour le retrait des forces hongroises, aucune objection n'est à formuler.

C) Mais les propositions de la Commission en ce qui concerne la limite d'occupation des troupes roumaines laissent dans la zone de non occupation les localités de Grosswardein, Nagy-Karoly et Szatmar-Nemeti.

Or ce point, comme l'a déjà fait observer plusieurs fois le général Berthelot, sont des noeuds de voies ferrées d'une extrême importance, puisqu'ils commandent toutes les communications en Transylvanie. Il est donc impossible, si l'on veut assurer la vie économique et par suite maintenir l'ordre et éviter les conflits de ne pas occuper ces localités dans une région où s'exercent les intrigues Bolshevistes.

"Or si Arad est actuellement et peut rester occupée par des troupes françaises, il est impossible d'envoyer des éléments français plus au nord, (Grosswardein, etc....) étant donnée la pénurie des effectifs de l'armée Henrys dont une division devra sans doute
être bientôt dissoute et de l'armée Berthelot qui a à faire face à de nombreuses missions et qui doit être conservée disponible pour un emploi éventuel en Russie méridionale.

"Il est donc nécessaire de permettre l'occupation de la ligne Grosswardein, Nagy-Karoly et Szatmar-Nemeti, localités inclus, par les troupes roumaines et de la choisir comme nouvelle ligne de démarcation pour celles-ci.

Toutes réserves pourraient d'ailleurs être faites pour que cette occupation ne préjuge pas de décisions de la Conférence de la Paix, pas plus que l'occupation de têtes de pont sur la rive droite du Rhin par des troupes françaises n'en signifie l'attribution ultérieure aux alliés.

Conclusion

"En conséquence, on a l'honneur de proposer ce qui suit:

"Le général Franchet d'Esperey, chargé de l'application de l'armistice sur le front hongrois, notifiera au gouvernement hongrois, de la décision suivante:

"1° — les troupes hongroises se retireront dans un délai de ....... à 10 Km à l'ouest de la ligne de Vazaes-Nameny [Vásárosnamény], confluent des deux Koros [Körös], Algyo [Algyő] (N. de Szegedin).

2° — à l'ouest de Szegedin, il est créé une zone neutre limitée à l'ouest par la ligne définie au paragraphe 1, au sud et à l'est, par la ligne Szegedin, Make [Makó], Arad, Grosswardein, Nagy-Karoly, Szatmar-Nemeti — ces localités étant occupées par les troupes alliées à l'ouest d'Arad inclus, roumaines au nord d'Arad exclu[sic]."

1 For further details of the history of the establishment of the Neutral Zone referred to in the document see Nos. 37, 47, 50 and the Enclosure with No. 139; "Minutes of the Supreme War Council", S.W.C./379/1, PRO CAB 21/129; and FRUS PPC, vol. IV, pp. 59-61, 145-147, 157-158, 172; vol. VII, pp. 179-180.

2 The map accompanying the original document is not printed here.

No. 37

Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel J.H.M. Cornwall for General H. Wilson (?) [PRO CAB 25/117]

British Peace Delegation, Paris, 22 February 1919

Dear General,

I enclose a map1 showing our proposal for the furthest eastward & northern limit of the Rumanian occupation. It is drawn mainly with the idea of giving the Rumanians free use (with 10 kilometres to spare for safety) of the VERSECZ-TEMESVAR-ARAD railway & also the NAGYVARAD-SZATMAR-NEMETI-NAGYBANYA line, which is necessary for their effective occupation of the foothills. This line is the nearest approach to the ethnic boundary, so it is fair on that score.

1 Not printed.
In the BANAT of course the ethnic problem is insoluble, & the Serbs (probably also the French) may squeal over our proposal. Magyar troops should be ordered to respect a 25-kilometre neutral zone west of the line indicated.²

Yrs,
H.M. Cornwall

² For further details of the establishment of the Neutral Zone referred to in the document see No. 36 and note 2 to No. 36.

No. 38

Letter from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 28 February 1919)

No. 115 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 32986]

Berne, 24 February 1919

My Lord,

The Military Attache's Department has obtained perusal of a letter dated 2nd instant and written from Budapest by Count Karolyi to his cousin Count P. Palffy who was employed in the Military Attache's Department of the former Austro-Hungarian Legation at Berne and who continues to reside in Switzerland. The object of the letter is to furnish Count Palffy with arguments in favour of the Hungarian case, for use in conversation with nationals of Entente states.

The line of the reasoning is roughly as follows:- The Bolchevist movement in Hungary is not a Russian importation. It is the direct result of the economic situation produced by the policy of the Entente. The dearth of coal is the main cause of distress, most of the Hungarian mines being in the hands of the new states. The position is so desperate that there is barely sufficient coal to run the trains which should supply the capital with the little which remains of that commodity. The closing down of countless factories has in addition created a mass of unemployed labour and to these elements of hungry malcontents must be added large numbers of disbanded soldiers and liberated prisoners. The only method of combating native bolchevism consists in the palliative of state assistance to the necessitous. To conciliate and reassure the masses it has been found necessary to form a coalition Government into which socialists have been admitted who enjoy popular sympathy and inspire confidence in virtue of the doctrines they hold.

Hungary has fought not only to her last drop of blood but to her last pound of grease. For this reason it would be far better if instead of drawing supplies from America the Allies were to organize an equitable distribution of urgently needed commodities on the spot by compelling the new states to release their resources and come to the assistance of Budapest and Vienna.

In Karolyi's opinion Bolchevism will never be vanquished by force of arms, as the danger of fraternisation is too great. Nor will the Entente succeed in disposing of
Russian Bolchevism by means of economic pressure — for starvation breeds anarchy and the last state will be worse than the first. Hungary does not ask for military aid from the Entente for the repression of anarchy. She asks for such economic measures as will appease the elements of unrest and thereby indirectly serve the cause of the Allies themselves.

The letter concludes by explaining that the socialist party in Hungary have purged themselves of all Bolchevist stigma, and that Bolchevist agitators have been expelled from Hungary. The same course has been pursued in regard to officers tainted with Bolchevism on their return from Russian captivity. These have been handed over to the French military mission and their funds have been seized.

Karolyi insists on the fact that a socialist government is alone capable of combating Bolshevism, since an administration recruited from the bourgeois parties would excite the angry mistrust of the working classes were it to endeavour to cope with the unruly elements of the population.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to the British Delegates at the Peace Conference.

I have, etc., etc.,
Horace Rumbold

Minutes attached to the document:

(From) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/2969]

I would submit

(1) That there seems no justification for the idea that the Allies “should compel the new States’ (themselves short of almost every necessary of life) “to release their resources & to come to the assistance of Budapest & Vienna”.

(2) That Count Károlyi is playing a peculiarly characteristic Magyar role in endeavouring to enlist our sympathies against Bolshevism in Hungary at a time when his agents are — as I have received documentary proof from Dr. Vaida, the Transylvanian Minister — being subsidised by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior to create Bolshevik agitations among the Rumanians & Jugoslavs.

A.W.A. Leeper
27/2/19

We should have no touch with the Hungarians. Count Karolyi has, as it is, no reputation to lose.

E. Crowe
1/3/19
Mr. Franklin Gunther, First Secretary of the United States Embassy, called this evening and gave me the annexed Note with regard to the alleged conduct of Colonel Cuninghame, the British Military Representative at Vienna. It will be seen that Baron Podmanisky [sic], of the Hungarian Foreign Office, states that Colonel Cuninghame declared to certain Socialist members of the Hungarian Government that unless Bolshevism was immediately stamped out in Hungary the Roumanians, Czechs and Serbians would be allowed to enter the country and take possession of it in the interest of peace and order. Colonel Cuninghame is alleged to have said that he represented the Allied Powers and the United States.

I asked Mr. Gunther to whom Baron Podmanisky [sic] had made this statement. He answered that it had been to an official member of the American Mission at Vienna. I said that we would certainly take steps to enquire into this allegation, but that it seemed to me inconceivable that Colonel Cuninghame could have used any such language as that attributed to him. Hungarian association with the Germans had probably enabled them to acquire the old German trick of endeavouring to sow dissension by repeating alleged statements which had either never been made or else had been skilfully garbled. In no country has this trick been more persistently used and more clearly exposed than in the United States.

[Unidentified official]

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 39

Aide Memoire Prepared by the United States Embassy in London

26 February 1919

Aide Memoire

It has just been stated by Baron Podmanisky of the Hungarian Foreign Office that, in accordance with Colonel Cunningham's [sic] express wish a meeting was arranged between him and Messieurs Garami, Bohn and Peidl, Social Democrat members of the Government; that this meeting occurred before Colonel Cunningham [sic] left for Vienna, and lasted until three in the morning, in the course of which Colonel Cunningham [sic] made many enquiries as to what was being done to suppress Bolshevism, and stated in conclusion that he represented the Entente Powers and the United States, and in their name warned the three Ministers that, unless Bolshevism was immediately stamped out in Hungary, the Entente would the Roumanians, Czechs and Serbians to enter Hungary and to take entire possession thereof in the interest of peace and order.

1 Baron Tibor Podmaniczky.
Baron Podmanisky also stated that Colonel Cunningham [sic] informed the Ministers that if the Hungarian Government would take energetic steps to suppress the Bolsheviki at once, he would go in person to President Masaryk and get them coal. Baron Podmanisky added that the Hungarian Government was much upset by this demand which appeared to them somewhat peremptory, and that his Government was anxious to ascertain on what authority such a statement was made in the name of the Associated Powers.2

2 The documents in the original file are followed by an F.O. note, dated 4 March 1919, requesting an investigation into the background of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's alleged statements. No document has been traced by the editor which refers to the result of this investigation. Col. Sir T. Cuninghame later reflected on the allegations, saying that the reports were distorted and exaggerated: see Sir Montgomery-Cuninghame, “Between the War and Peace Treaties. A Contemporary Narrative”, Hungarian Quarterly, V, No. 3 (1939), pp. 421-422.

No. 40

Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to the Foreign Office (London. Received 21 March 1919)

No. T.C. 118 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 44286]

Vienna, 27 February 1919

A Note on the Political Situation of Hungary

In Hungary the moral breakdown of authority is more complete than in Austria, and the difficulties which confront the Government are accordingly of a more complex and grave character. The succession of events which led to the formation of the present Coalition Government are too well known to need repetition. Since the 23rd October upon which day the Socialist Party in conjunction with the Karolyi group in the House of Representatives brought down the past administration by a coup d'état, the Conservative Deputies have lost all influence in the country and are not likely to reappear upon the political stage for some time to come.

The aim of the Karolyi Party in taking over the responsibility for the Government at this juncture was to obtain from the Entente the most favourable terms by instant desertion of German Imperialism and the Austrian alliance. In this the party have suffered disappointment and it is not easy to sympathise much with them on that account, in as much as the mode and method of their desertion took no account whatever of the desperate situation of their ex-allies. It is, however, fair to point out that the Conservative leaders cannot be acquitted either of leanings towards the Nationalistic policy which developed towards the end of the war, which paved the way for the eventual desertion of Austria and for the break up of the Army. It is certain that pressure had been brought to bear upon the Austro-Hungarian joint Command to strip the Piave front for the benefit of pure Hungarian defence before the events of October 23rd, and after the defection of Bulgaria, all that the various party leaders seemed to think about was the direct defence of Transylvania oblivious to what might occur in the principal theatre of war. Before the crisis of October 23rd the joint Foreign Secretary
Baron Burian\(^1\) was occupied with the reply to the note of President Wilson concerning the settlement of the Nationalistic questions in Austria and Hungary, and the subsequent and simultaneous declaration of independence by the Czechs in the north and the Croats in the south forced the Manifesto of October 31st from the Emperor. To this decision however the desire of all parties in Hungary to bring the Ausgleich of 1867 to an end, and to cut free from Austria, notably contributed. Although the Manifesto contained an appeal to soldiers to be true to their oath, its principal effect was to destroy the common Army altogether and to release the Hungarian Honved for the purpose of Home defence, for which it was deemed necessary by the politicians of Hungary. Discipline founded on the soldiers' oath could not be maintained when the oath itself was removed by imperial decree.

The first transfers of troops however from the Piave antedated this decree, and the Austrians covered these by the improvisation of emergency formations, but when on the accession to power of the Karolyi Government the whole Hungarian Army was ordered to march to Transylvania, a collapse was inevitable.

The Karolyi Party did not however content themselves with the recall of the Army, but proceeded to independent negotiations for an armistice with the Entente, and further to the immediate dissolution of all existing Hungarian forces. A certain Colonel Linder\(^2\) — an unpractical idealist — was hastily appointed Minister of War. The Armistice was signed with General Franchet d'Esperey on November 8th\(^3\) and the order was immediately given for the demobilization of the Army. At this time the bulk of the Army was on its way home. One complete division was however cut off by the Italians in their advance. Most of the remaining divisions seemed to have reached their places of assembly in Hungary in fair order, but arrived there, discipline collapsed, and the whole force degenerated into an anarchistic mob dispersing to their homes and taking their small arms with them.

In accepting the terms of the Armistice Karolyi seems to have considered that he would get better terms by disbanding the army, and does not seem to have contemplated the break up of Hungary by the Entente-Powers, although as a practical policy it had been long advocated by a certain set of political journalists in England, notably by those who control the “New Europe”. He threw himself in fact entirely upon the mercy of the Entente, and, while stipulating for a line of demarcation beyond which he expected no Entente forces to come, made no preparations whatever to resist the passage of any forces that might for any reason attempt to do so. This line of demarcation was confined to the southern and eastern frontiers of Hungary; — invasion by Czechs in the north being apparently altogether outside his calculations. Even within the occupied zones he stipulated that the civic control of the Hungarian officials should not be interfered with.

When later, therefore, in all the occupied zones, the Allied Forces removed the Hungarian officials, when the Czechs occupied Slovakia and when the Roumanians penetrated into the country wide to the west of the line of demarcation the people in Hungary considered that the Entente were guilty of breach of contract. When it becomes realised in Hungary that the Entente do not recognise the validity of civil stipulations in a military convention, and when further they recognize that no attempt was made to secure from the Entente any guarantee for the integrity of Hungary, Karolyi will lose the last remaining shreds of influence that remain to him and will fall.

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\(^1\) Count István Burián, Foreign Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, April–October 1918.

\(^2\) Colonel Béla Linder, Minister of War, 9 November–12 December 1918, Military Attache in Vienna during Béla Kun's régime, May–August 1919.

\(^3\) The Belgrade Armistice was signed on the 8th, but it only came into effect on 13 November 1918.
From the first it was evident that in any coalition between the Karolyi Party and the Socialists, the policy to be pursued by the Government would be determined by the latter, as they already controlled the trade unions. The Socialists before the coup d'état of October 23rd held no single seat in the Parliament and govern therefore rather as a Directorate than as a Parliamentary Group. After the proclamation of the Republic and the election of Karolyi as President of the State, the old Parliament was dissolved with the power left in the hands of the Socialist Extremists, who consisted of a group of fanatical Jews, who drew support for their communistic programme both from the working men's councils of the trade unions and from the soldiers' councils which were formed in the army. Behind these organizations stood the armed mob.

It soon became obvious that the extreme Socialists in the Cabinet either could not or would not be content with the moderate policy favoured by the better men of the Socialist Party and by the bulk of the Karolyi Party. The moderates were forced to resign including Mr. Lovaszy, Count Batthyany and Mr. Bart[h]a who had succeeded Col. Linder as Secretary for War. Further than this the Socialist Party either took steps, or were obliged by the proletariat behind them to take steps, to stop all meetings of other party groups.

Whether this was necessary or wise is a matter for later investigation but it must be remembered that on the one hand authority had universally broken down and on the other that the communistic sentiments inspired by Bolshevist agitators from Russia and the Ukraine, were a factor which had to be reckoned with. The mere fact that an order was given by an authority was reason for disobedience. The problem then was to restore the idea of civil authority and to expell the counter-notion that individual whim backed by armed force was the determining agent in matters of conduct. The problem was only soluble by two methods. Either by the use of force by the authority itself, or by exploitation of the machinery of the trade unions. The objection to the first alternative was the absence of any home made force, and the refusal of the Entente to supply the deficiency by armed occupation of the country. The second alone could therefore be used.

The trade unions are organised as in England and not on any zonal or area system. It was necessary as a preliminary that the disbanded soldiers rejoining them should render obedience to the union officials, and to ensure this workmen's councils were formed, composed of confidence men (Vertrauensmanner) elected by the workmen themselves, whom all by force of public opinion were bound to obey. A similar organization was instituted in the army where the soldiers' councils acted in a similar manner: initially as a bridge to secure the reacceptance of the principle of deference to authority, and subsequently as a safety valve for complaint. These soldiers' councils as far as their organization is concerned are by no means "Soviets", their functions not extending to initiation of movement or to Authority.

The Trades Unions had of course been in existence for some time, but the Army, as reformed after the collapse of November 1918, was a new institution, and upon its tendency the Socialists considered that much depended. They desired to make a popular force, which the Government could use for the maintenance of order, but which could be at the same time of service to the Nation in times of difficulty in which the Hungarians were likely to find themselves. They wished in fact to copy the example of the Austrians in forming a Socialistic Volkswehr free from reactionary elements, but desired to escape the State [sic] of helplessness caused by the possession of a force.

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4 Mr. Lovasz, Minister of Religion and Public Education, October–December 1918, Minister for Foreign Affairs in I. Friedrich's government, 15 August –11 September 1919.
5 See No. 35, note 1.
6 See No. 24, note 4.
7 People's Militia, the name adopted by the new regular armed forces in Austria.
incapable of use as a Military instrument, but which by its presence prevented the formation of any other.

The principal difficulty was the instilling of sufficient discipline into the newly raised force, under the circumstances, and with so peculiar a view of the functions of a National Force. The terms of Armistice permitted the retention of Six Infantry and of two Cavalry Divisions but nothing was said as to the War Establishments to be maintained. At first in order to find the personnel for these Divisions the men of the five junior year Classes were retained with the Colours and from these three fairly complete Divisions were formed. But it was found that discipline could not be maintained under this system, consequently it was determined to dismiss the two youngest Classes, to hold the remainder as a temporary Volkswehr and to replace them all by the gradual enrolment of a professional element voluntarily enlisted from ex-soldiers of and over the age of 24. This process is now being carried out and will be complete by March 26th. It is to be understood that this organization is itself only temporary, but will serve to maintain the internal order and to provide the Government with that moral force which will prevent unlimited provocation at the hands of exterior Enemies. Comparing the Hungarian Force with the Austrian, it should be realised that the former will be concentrated and mobile, whereas the latter is dispersed, immobile, and unprovided.

When the Army was in its Volkswehr State, the question of the formation of Soldiers Councils arose, and the method of their institution cannot be separated from the career and aspirations of the Communist leader Pegany [Pogany], who, when the Socialist[s] first seized the Power, constituted himself Commissary of the Soldiers Councils and formed them on lines entirely his own, and not represented, so far as is known, in other Armies. In order to recover the idea of Military Obedience it was considered necessary to form Councils, but in order that they themselves should not dissipate the force of Authority they were not given any regulating powers at all. They were formed as a separate branch of the War Department with a function of inspection and report only, but they were also charged with the administration and lodgment of the force they served. Thus they acted primarily as a bridge for the recovery of Authority and finally as an escape valve for complaint. When the Army was in its original State there is no doubt that the Commanding Officers were too much under the thumb of the Soldiers Councils, and it has yet to be seen how far this undesirable result will be bettered when the reorganization is carried through.

The main point of interest will in any case revolve round the subservience of the Army to the Socialist Party. The War Minister denies that even at present there is any subservience at all, simply in fact a guarantee that the Army shall be thoroughly democratic and therefore free from prejudiced attack by the Communistic Political Elements.

With regard to the Communists it must be realised that the political aims of the Socialists and of the Communists are identical. The difference between them is one of method and not of aim. In disturbed times like the present this difference is obviously more than nominal. The Socialists wish to attain their ends by pacific means, step by step, and in conformity with the general rate of progress of neighbouring States. They wish for an international recognition of the advantages of Socialism as they see them: they wish neither to compromise them by hurried legislation of their own contrary to Public sentiment, nor by isolated action of their own country without the support of similar legislation over their borders. The Communists on the contrary, are aggressive and prepared to take advantage of all opportunities, local or general, to bring about what they deem to be the Social Millenium. It is thus easy for a Communist to be absorbed into the ranks of the Socialist Party, as the surrender of excessive activity, not the surrender of political faith, alone is demanded. It would not then be correct to assume that the Socialist Party is on the one hand anxious for power in all
circumstances, nor would it be correct to assume that any refusal to take Office has any other motive than Party advantage. The Socialist Party would sooner occupy a position permitting unrestrained criticism than be responsible for Government under circumstances so difficult that popular censure is inevitable.

This is now the position of the Socialist Party in Hungary. They have absorbed the majority of the Communists and are interested for the moment in keeping them quiet, but they are not independent of them in any way. Nor are they in the least anxious to continue the Government of the Country themselves for any lengthy period at this juncture, or willing either to see the Communists hold it. They desire a Coalition which while ratifying past legislation, enables them to explain to their Communist adherents that they are not responsible for what is done by the Government.

The Karolyi Party are equally anxious for a Coalition which may tide over a difficult time for them and enable them later to escape altogether from the paramount influence of the Communist element. Accordingly an arrangement has been engineered by which the “Small Peasant” Party from the Opposition has been won over to the Government group by the Land Reform Bill, the leader of this latter Party, by name Szabo [Szabó] having been entrusted with its conduct and practice.

Thus there are in the Government of Hungary at present 4 main groups namely, The Socialists and Communists, still undivided, the Karolyi Party, which is a type of Whig Party, the Small Peasants, and the Radicals. The latter party has no following whatever in the Country and consists merely of a few enthusiastic fanatics of the ultra intellectual type. The practical result of this Government deal is the pooling of all resources for the coming election, in order to secure the necessary ratification for the acts of the existing Directorate. For it must be remembered that the Socialists in the last Parliament held no seat whatever, and having governed since their seizure of power, without a Parliament, may see their work undone if they fail to secure a majority. When the Parliament was dissolved it was not anticipated that the period of Armistice would endure long. So long as this was so no special effort were made to hold Elections. But when it became obvious that the Socialists would be held responsible for what occurred throughout the period of difficulty, with economic distress on the one side and continued invasion by Enemy forces on the other, the necessity of seeking a mandate became clear to all.

Consequently the Government approached the Entente Powers for permission to hold Election in the Occupied Provinces, and received, as no doubt they expected, a reply in the negative. Now they are about to hold elections in the unoccupied Provinces, and as aforesaid are going to pool their resources with those of the other Governmental Groups. The Elections will be on the Belgian plan. Each Party will nominate a list of Candidates for a whole Electoral District. Each list must be supported by 500 nominators. Each Elector will vote for the whole list of the Party he supports.

The Conservative and Burgher Elements are likewise organized in four groups. The purely Conservative elements are represented by the Clerical Agrarian Group led by Mar[ks]graf Pallavicini and by Count Aladar Zichy. The dissenting rump of the Karolyi Party led by Lovasz[Lovászy] and the Burgher Group of Heinrich

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9 Marquess György Pallavicini. Member of the Counter-Revolutionary Committee in Vienna during Béla Kun’s régime.

10 Conservative politician, president of the Szeged-based Hungarian National Committee from 4 August 1919.

11 See note 4.

12 Ferenc Heinrich, Vice President of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry during the First World War. Minister of Commerce in the governments of István Friedrich and Károly Huszár,
represent the Industrial Element while the fourth group is a small party of politicians 
who carry on the traditions of the Tisza Party, and have as a matter no following 
whatever in the Country. The nominal Chief of this Party is Count Bethlen, a Schekely 
[Szekely (Szekler)] Noble, who bases his claim to popularity on his intense anti-
Roumanian attitude. The latest reports from Hungary indicate that these four opposition 
groups will now also pool their resources and fight the Government Group on rather 
better terms. But it would appear that the Government must obtain a large majority. 
Whether the right of free speech and protection against interference in Electoral 
campaigns will be secured is not at all certain. The Moderate Socialists are in favour of 
a policy of non-interference. The argument that appeals to them herein is that if a 
tyranny is projected or maintained, the inhabitants of the occupied territories may 
express a desire to remain under the permanent rule of their present occupiers. 
The Communist Party are simply awaiting the results of affairs in Germany. The 
effect of the partial recognition by the Entente of the Bolshevist Regime in Russia has 
had an immense effect on them. They consider that if the Spartakists win in Germany 
the Entente will be equally obliged to recognise them and then they will come out in 
their true colours and will bring an immense following with them out on a patriotic 
ticket. For it must be remembered that the Hungarian Socialists are to a man determined 
to recover for Hungary the ancient frontiers, and if they cannot do it in any other way 
they will attempt to do it by means of international Socialism, whose fiat they deem will 
eventually override that of the Paris Conference. The leaders of the Communists 
therefore, especially Pegany [Pogany] are careful always to play up to the patriotism of 
the rank and file, and as a result of their efforts in this connection the feeling between 
the forces opposite the Roumanians is intense. Thus it may happen that a Communist 
victory over the Government may provoke an outbreak of hostilities between the 
Magyar and the Roumanians, and on the other hand an outbreak of hostilities may mean 
a coup d'état by the Communists. 
The principal reason for restraint is the fear of famine. All Parties know that 
widespread and long continued disturbance must hinder the incoming of Supplies. The 
effect of the proposed Land Reform in this connection should not escape notice. 
However wisely it is applied it is certain to result in a greatly lowered output of cereals 
during the initial years. Its application, and even the threat of its application, in Spring 
Time, restricts enterprise on the part of those who stand to lose estate. The want of 
Land and Equipment, of Machinery for Cooperation, and the difficulties of Division, 
drainage, and finance, can have no other result than a comparative shortage, sufficient 
only perhaps for local consumption and insufficient for export. This may oblige the 
Enterente to continue for an indefinite period the task of feeding Austria and even Buda 
Pesth. 

(Sd.) T.M. Cuninghame, Lt.Col., 
British Military Representative at Vienna.

Minutes attached to the document:

[...] 
On the whole Col. Cuninghame's report agrees with information derived from other 
reliable sources or gathered from the press. But whilst he renders full justice to the 
moderating influence of the Socialists and to their desire to maintain order, he

August–September 1919 and November 1919–March 1920. Established the Hungarian Burghers' Party 
in 1918, the National Centre Party in 1920, and the National Burghers' Party in 1922.
occasionally, when he comes to deal with the persons of their leaders, describes them as “communists”, the Hungarian equivalent for Bolsheviks. Thus at the bottom of p. 3, [p. 63, para. 4] Col. Cuninghame speaks of “extreme socialists” in Count Karolyi’s first Cabinet. As a matter of fact its only socialist members were Garami, one of the most moderate of Hungarian socialists, and Kunffy [Kunfi], also a fairly moderate man. Nor does the account of the crisis which occurred in Dec. 1918–Jan. 1919 give a full picture of what actually happened. The Karolyi party comprised a socially conservative wing which had joined it on issues of foreign policy. In his social views Count Batthyány [Batthyány] differs comparatively little from the late Count Tisza or Counts Esterhazy, Andrassy or Apponyi. By the end of the year stronger measures against the Bolsheviks had become necessary but with Batthyányi [Batthyány], Lovaszy &c. even the moderate socialists wd. not have agreed to taking them for fear of a complete swing to the Right. An agreement was thereupon reached whereby the bourgeois radicals of the Karolyi Party broke with their right wing & the moderate socialists in exchange broke with the Bolsheviks, forming a block which can be compared to the coalition of Majority Socialists & bourgeois radicals in Germany. — Nor is it correct to describe Pogany as a “Communist” (cf. p. 5) [p. 64, para. 4]. — Lastly Col. Cuninghame seems to attach undue importance to the fact that in the last Parliament “the Socialists held no seat whatever”. They probably are over-represented in the present Govt., but the last Parliament supplies no criterion. The franchise was extremely narrow — only about 6% of the population had votes. Judging by these standards one could never have guessed that the 8 members of the subject races in a Parliament of 413 members represented 40% of the population of Hungary.

L.B.N[amier].
22/3/19

He evidently regards the difference between Socialists & Communists as one of degree only.

[Unidentified]
22/3/19

No. 41

Letter from General W.H. Greenly (Bucharest) to I. Malcolm (?Paris. Extracts)

[BALF, Additional 49749]

Bucharest, February 1919

[....] [The Roumanian leaders] also believe (and I regret to say much has come to my notice to support the view though I know it is not true) that undue sympathy is being given to Hungarian and even Bulgarian wishes: and that the Allies, especially Great Britain, are pro-Bulgarian and pro-Hungarian.

What the Government really wants in order to strengthen its hands and position generally is some manifest expression of support and confidence of Allies:

(a) When Treaty 1916 is definitely stated to be abroged a clear public statement that the Allies fully recognise that Roumania had no possible choice except to make peace, that they fully recognise her great efforts, great sacrifices and great help, and that she
did her duty to the full. Also that there is no intention of “doing her down”, and that she will be generously treated and that Allies certainly will not let her interests suffer in any way to the benefit of those of her enemies, Bulgaria and Hungary.

(b) Recognition of her undisputed Sovereign Rights in the Dobruja by allowing her troops to re-enter it — Keeping them out of a small stretch in the south is a separate question but now they are not allowed anywhere in Dobruja.

(c) Allow advance in Transylvania to line asked which is not beyond ground of majority of Roumanian nationality and presumably certain finally to be allotted to Roumania at Conference.

[...]

[A new agrarian law and Jewish enfranchisement have been passed in the Romanian Parliament.]

Roumania is still very oriental and doubtful how fast steps towards more democratic methods can wisely be taken.

M. Bratiano himself here is very down in his luck and feels very isolated and the “despised and rejected of men” he certainly pictures things as regards Roumania’s future far too black.

[...] [Mr. Balfour should make a statement encouraging the Romanians.]

This seems to me all the more important as he [Bratiano] and I think Roumania generally seems convinced that we, Great Britain, are the chief cause of the abrogéeing of Treaty and present neglect.

[...] [W.H. Greenly]

No. 42

Letter from Sir C. Kennard (Stockholm) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 12 March 1919)

No. 82 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 39386]

Stockholm, 3 March 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that Dr. Ludwig Jenő, the representative of the National Council of the Hungarians of Transylvania, called at the Legation to-day to urge the extreme urgency that some measures should be taken at Buda Pesth.

He expressed the views:-

1. That if it were found impossible to send British troops to Buda Pesth (the number required he estimated at 10,000) improvement in the situation could nevertheless immediately be brought about by

2. Some intimation that the Associated Governments were in favour of the establishment of a representative Government.

Dr. Ludwig stated that Count Esterhazy, who was recently sent to Switzerland by the National Council, but who was not allowed to proceed, announced on his return to Buda Pesth that he had gathered indirectly that this was the case. This mere rumour, Dr. Ludwig stated, caused a crisis in the present Government.

On behalf of Gabriel Ugron, the President of the National Council of Transylvania, Ludwig urged that the interests of the Associated Governments would be served by their granting to Hungary an opportunity at the present juncture to establish a parliamentary constitution.
The forces of Bolshevism were growing, but a mere announcement that the Associated Governments desired to see such a Government established would have an immediate and far reaching effect. The first necessity was that a General Election should be made possible.

I have etc., etc.,
Coleridge Kennard

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Minutes attached to the document:

We are already suggesting to the Peace Delegation, the advisability of recognizing the Austrian, Hungarian & Bohemian Govts.

G.[?] H.[?]
13/3/19

(From) [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/2/4477]

[...]
How had Count Esterházy “gathered indirectly that this was the case?”
The Hungarian Transylvanians would be acting more wisely in thinking about Bucarest than Budapest.

A.W.A. Leeper
17/3/19

No. 43

Memorandum by Major-General W. Thwaites for Lord Hardinge

[PRO FO 608/7 No. 35/1/5/3815]

British Delegation, Paris, 6 March 1919

Lord Hardinge,
I note in today’s Bulletin that the British Delegation has agreed to the inclusion of the Grosse Schutt in the Czecho-Slovak state. This is not in accordance with the views of the General Staff, and I feel very strongly that our point of view should be considered before a final decision is made. The strategic character of this region will be affected if Czecho-Slovakia is made into a Danubian state by the inclusion of a large Magyar enclave within its frontiers. General Mance is also of opinion that this large extension of the southern frontier of Czecho-Slovakia is unnecessary from the point of view of transportation.

May I ask you to be good enough to allow our views to be considered before a final decision is made which may lead to great difficulties in the future, in which we shall certainly be involved in one way or another.

W. Thwaites, Maj.-Gen.
for Chief of the Military Section
The Czecho-Slovak Committee unanimously decided to recommend that the Grosse Schutt should be given to the Czechs. A proposal to this effect will appear in the report of the Committee to the Supreme War Council, and it will, of course, be for that Council to take whatever suggestions or criticisms they desire before the report is adopted.

The decision of the Committee was governed by economic and political considerations, but it was also felt that from a strategic point of view the Main Danube would give the Czechs a better frontier against the Magyars than the Little Danube. This view was advanced and supported by General Le Rond, but if our own General Staff feel that the Grosse Schutt should not, for strategic reasons, be given to the Czechs, it would be of value if they could furnish us with precise indications as to why, from the military point of view, the inclusion of the Grosse Schutt is strategically dangerous. The political disadvantages of incorporating so compact a Magyar population in Czecho-Slovakia were carefully examined by the Committee but it was in the end decided that the economic considerations involved outweighed the other aspects. If therefore the question is to be re-opened before the Supreme Council, it will be better to confine our arguments to the purely military aspects of the case which may throw new light on the whole question.

Harold Nicolson
10/3/19

I would suggest that an officer be directed to confer with General Le Rond on the subject of the strategical aspect of this question.

E. Crowe
10/3/19

The military objections to transferring the Magyar population of the Grosser Schütt to Czecho-Slovakia are based mainly on the unsettling effect which this transfer is likely to have on the balance of military power in Central Europe, as it may tempt the Czechs to further territorial aggrandisements in the Danubian region.

In view however of the unanimous decision of the Czecho-Slovak Committee, the General Staff do not desire to reopen the matter.

J.H.M. Cornwall  Lt. Col.
11/3/19
My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 682 (22101/W3) of the 17 February and similar correspondence enclosing protests in regard to the future of the Reformed Church of Hungary, I have the honour to suggest that a reply should be returned to all such protests in the sense that His Majesty's Government will not lose sight of the legitimate interests of the Reformed Church of Hungary, which there is no reason to suppose will be jeopardised. I leave it to Your Lordship's judgment to decide whether it would be of value to add to such acknowledgement a statement to the effect that all reports which are received in regard to the treatment of the dignitaries and members of the Reformed Church emanate to a very considerable extent from Magyar propagandist sources.

I am, etc., etc.,

Louis Mallet (for Mr. Balfour)

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 44

Letter from G.S. Spicer (Foreign Office, London) to the Reverend R. Dykes Shaw (Edinburgh)

Foreign Office, 13 March 1919

Sir,

With reference to the letter from this Department of the 13th ultimo relative to the question of the conservation of the Reformed Church of Hungary, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that a despatch has been received from Mr. Balfour at Paris stating that the Delegates of His Majesty's Government at the Peace Conference will not lose sight of the legitimate interests of the Reformed Church of Hungary which there is no reason to suppose will be jeopardised.

I am, etc., etc.,

(signed) G.S. Spicer

1 See No. 32.
2 See No. 32, note 1.
Dear Mr. Balfour,

It may be interesting for you to know — in the event of your detecting any special tenderness towards Hungary on the part of the Italians — that I have heard privately that an emissary from Karolyi has been here¹ and that he saw Orlando and also Cardinal Gasparris. I think the Italians will wish to maintain good relations with the Hungarians and so have some contact with Central Europe on the other side of their uncomfortable Jugo-Slav neighbours. There was, in the earlier phase of the war, an emissary from Karolyi’s party here,² who came through Switzerland, and mooted the question with Sonnino of a rising in Hungary to insist on a separate peace, just when Roumania was about to enter the war. The price, however would have been Transylvania remaining Hungarian, and things had gone too far then for this question to be entertained. I shall try to pick out more about this visit, and perhaps de Salis³ will have heard something.

Sincerely yours,

Rennell Rodd

¹ In February 1919 Barna Buza, Head of the Hungarian National Propaganda Committee, sent two university professors, Alajos Zombra and Tibor Gerevich, and a grammar school teacher, László Kőszegi, on a mission to Italy to the cities of Bologna, Florence and Rome. The reference here is probably to one of these negotiators.

² This is probably a reference to János Török, a Greek Catholic priest, and confidant of Count M. Karolyi, whom Károlyi often sent on foreign missions to represent his views.

Neither Magyar troops nor Magyar police will fire upon Magyar citizens for political reasons. As long as the supplies of food and coal and unemployment pay can be guaranteed nothing but spasmodic outbursts may be expected.

II. Infantry.

The relations between officers and men are friendly. In some cases they follow the usual lines of cleavage, — social distinction, money, education &c. In the majority of cases there is a strong bond of fellowship, cemented by common misfortunes and national peril.

The practice of saluting, discontinued in November has been revived.

Soldiers' Councils: Moribund from their inception. Will develop into Officers' Clubs or die painlessly. The whole thing is a question of psychology.

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Questionnaire

**M.I.3.b., 10 March 1919**

3. What is your opinion of Count Karolyi?

Son of the friend of King Edward. Probably the richest man in Hungary admiration of England and France, determined his intervention in politics. Steadily opposed that trend in politics which would have made of Hungary a pawn in the game of Mittel Europa. Strongly anti-German, he was anti-Austrian only in so far as a lively fear of the Slav peril — the century old obsession of the Magyar — could be affected by the counter-irritant of the sapping of Magyar independence vis-a-vis Austria herself. That is to say he would risk the Slav rather than the German absorption.

During the course of the war his activities in conjunction with those of his press organ "Magyarorszag" were so insistent and marked that he became the bugbear of Tisza and the object of personal persecution and espionage by Major Kouston, head of the German Secret Service in Budapest. This became, at length, the subject of debate in the House.

For weeks before the debacle Count Kerolyi [sic] made most incessant and determined efforts to rescue the weak-minded King Karoly (Karl) from the hands of Hohenlohe, Windischgraetz and the Camarilla. His popularity hourly increased until at length he formulated a programme, engineered the Revolution and took the helm.

Count Karolyi is not a leader of men in any sense. Events have forced him up: Events and the declared wish of the Entente keep him in position. But it is much to be feared that he has become the unconscious puppet of the Hebrew-Socialist combination which rules Budapest and imagines that it represents Hungary. Count Karolyi stands for the British connection.

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1 Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Austrian aristocrat. Held various ministerial posts in the Austrian government and the joint government of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

2 Prince Louis Windischgraetz, Austrian aristocrat. Minister of Public Feeding in the Hungarian Wekerle Government, and in the last days of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Head of Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Count G. Andrassy, the Younger.
4. Do you think that his administration makes towards normal conditions of law and order?

A: Emphatically Yes. To such an extent is he the master of the situation that he represents the only hope of the Magyars. Karolyi is the one man — failing a Napoleon — whose name, wealth prestige and Entente connections — are guarantees against dissolution.

5. If so, how can he be best supported by the Allies?

A: An extremely delicate question. Support of Karolyi could take one of the following forms:
(a) Concession to strong national sentiment.
(b) Official declaration that the “piratical” activities of Rouman, Czech and Jugo-Slav do not establish a final settlement.
(c) Occupation.

NOTE: I am firmly of opinion from long study of the psychology of the Magyar that the most effective move on the part of Gt. Britain would be the despatch of two Squadrons of Life Guards in guard-mounting order and one battalion of Highlanders in Kilts — and I most strongly commend this obvious solution to H.M. Government. Kismet!!

6. How far is the Government able to cope with the Bolshevistic tendencies?

A: Bolshevism is totally alien to the prevailing Oriental tinge in the Magyar character. [...] His instinct is monarchical and I do not see how the eventual return of a purely Magyar Monarchy is to be prevented. The forces of Order are as deeply rooted as in England and the Magyar is far too inherently conservative to care about Bolshevism as a system. Sporadic disturbances and looting, due to want of food and fuel should not be confounded with a settled desire to place society upon an experimental basis.

The whole thing is ridiculed even amongst common soldiers and working Socialists.

7. How far has it succeeded in disarming the population?

A: A system of house-to-house visitation and systematic searching of private individuals in places of public resort has well served the purpose. Any arms secreted are either personal trophies or the stand-by of the timid in case of imaginary upheaval. Prohibition extends even to revolvers.

12. Did you hear any views expressed about a DANUBE CONFEDERATION?

A: In view of the fact that I myself, before Masaryk, was the original pioneer of this idea, that I have discussed it with countless Magyars, of the old régime, now snowed under, and that I am called upon, subjectively, to review my own political hobby objectively, anything I may say must bear the taint of pre-possession.

In olden days the oligarchs who represented numerically .0005 of the population would not hear of this idea. They stood for Magyar hegemony on the basis of ancient settlement, continuous administration, cultural superiority, natural pride and native arrogance, always with an eye to the Kiegyezes (Ausgleich) of 1867 and the court connection.
At the time of the debacle the ruling chiefs vanished. They are now hibernating. The Socialists and Jews who rule a third of Budapest and imagine themselves Hungary receive the idea sympathetically, but I am driven to suspect as the lesser evil, a bid for the integrity of the country. If Hungary can be preserved intact upon a Federal or other basis, she would have no objection to seeking a modus vivendi with Czech, Rouman and Jugo-Slav, as a unit, perhaps the directive unit in a Danubian Confederation.

Q: 16. Do you consider that the average Hungarian has English sympathies?
A: If so, how could they best be cultivated?

This admiration of England is due partly to moral partly to historic causes — the parallel political development of the two States, sympathy of our unofficial classes in '48; the reception of Kossuth, but it is chiefly due to education; knowledge and perspective; later impressions caused by the policy of Campbell-Bannerman in Africa, Morley and Kitchener in India and the Soudan respectively and the social schemes of Lloyd-George have merely deepened a settled admiration.

As a Prince, King Edward was loved and admired: as a King he was held to be the wisest, most intrinsically powerful and most diabolically wonderful statesman that ever appeared upon the European stage, whilst the relationship of Queen Mary to some Magyar families is a source of national pride and gratification.

It is characteristic of the psychology of the Magyar that he should be profoundly grateful for sympathy in national disaster. If the exigencies of the political situation should allow of official England intervening on his behalf the result would be incalculable.

Anglomania is the prevailing passion of the Magyar. It is for us to appraise the political value of Hungary as a coadjutor and then to act at once overtly, assuming of a course, that other factors do not discount his values.

Magyar sympathy needs no cultivation. It is inherent. As long as Britain pursues that path which destiny and experience have marked out for her so long will the passive sympathy of this people be assured.

It would take little to place these countries upon the footing of Old Russia and Old Bulgaria. If England could find it politically, that is economically worth while to place herself on the same footing vis-a-vis Hungary that she occupied successively vis-a-vis Portugal, Greece, Naples, Savoy and Belgium, the same results, but intensified would accrue.

It is the fashion to assume that sentiment and psychology do not count as international factors: the war itself disproves this.

It would be an error to assume superficially that the movement in favour of calling an English Prince or Noble to the Throne was dictated by any hope of mitigation of sentence. It was a reasonable and acceptable way out of a blind alley. Naturally I ridiculed the movement. What about guarantees, the question of unanimity, the instability of Europe, the language question? It is by no means improbable that the question will be revived always remembering that the sentiment of Hungary — save for that of the Socialist-Jewish clique in Budapest — is essentially and historically monarchical.
It is a point of immense significance that at a critical juncture England had no Franchet d’Esperey — another that France had. And Hungary remembers.

I suggest some kind of tentative propaganda. Any agent, fortified with definite assurances, however slight would bind Hungary to the side of England. But these assurances should be positive in character. [....] Another reason. It was said by a prominent Italian statesman upon the occasion of Gladstone’s death that if in any question of international moment the moral presumption lay in favour of England this result would be found to be the result of his influence. That holds. Hungary knows that England stands, roughly for justice. I seriously commend these rather disjointed observations to your notice. They are objectively true.

[....]

Minutes attached to the document:

Interesting from the point of view of a Hungarian enthusiast.

C.H.S[mith].
27/3/19

I should say there was a great deal of truth in it.

D. [?] 27/3/19

Mr. Fullham is violently pro-Magyar & anti-Slav & he does not even try to disguise the fact. [....] [The late subject races of Austria-Hungary and not the Hungarians were Britain’s allies in the war, and Britain agreed to go by ethnic numerical majorities in drawing frontiers.] These are facts on which one cannot go back, and Mr. Fullham’s statements in defence of the Magyars, even where accurate, seem irrelevant.

As to the activities and methods of General Franchet d’Esperey & Col. Vix, hardly any criticism would seem too severe.

L.B.N[amier]. 28/3/19

No. 47

Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extract. Received 22 March 1919)

[PRO FO 371/3508 No. 44850]

Belgrade, 15 March 1919

My dear General,

The French Chief of Staff this morning told me that instructions had been received from Paris Conference to the effect that in a few days time the Hungarians were to be informed that they were to retire to a line considerably further to the West, and that a
zone, of which the line Debreczin — Bekes-Csaba is about the Centre, is to be occupied by French troops in order to keep Roumanians and Hungarians at a distance from each other.

Admiral Troubridge is going to employ some of the monitors under his command under British and French flags to show a force on the Danube, for the French divisions of the Armée d'Hongrie are mere skeleton divisions and the French want at any price to avoid shots being fired.

Under these circumstances the Chief of the Staff said it would be a help if a British Officer could be attached to the Headquarters of the French General Commanding the troops to be employed. The French Chief of Staff said he would like the officer we nominated to be “a serious man”, and I am sending to Brigadier General Gordon at Fiume to ask for the services of Col. Sir H. Waechter whom he mentioned to me as being a suitable officer for other work of the same nature. I have not as yet received definite instructions from the French but they expect to inform me in two or three days time.

[...]

Minutes attached to the document:

Reports in today's papers show the result of the enforcement of the neutral zone.¹

[Unidentified official]
24/3/19

¹ I.e. the fall of the Hungarian Government and the proclamation of a Republic of Councils.

No. 48


No. 1473 [PRO FO 608/6 No. 34/2/1/4749]

Foreign Office,
London, 18 March 1919

Sir,

[...] you will have received my despatch No. 1254 of the 8th instant¹ enclosing [...] a copy of a further telegram from Sir T. Cuninghame in which the latter advocates that the Governments of Austria and Hungary should now be recognised by the Allied Powers.

3. I am now inclined to agree with Sir T. Cuninghame's suggestion since in my view it is at this stage, and in the very grave circumstances at present existing, unnecessary to insist too strongly upon matters of form since if Bolshevism obtains a further hold

¹ Not printed.
upon Austria and Hungary it is evident that there will be no Governments in existence in those countries with which Peace may be finally concluded.

4. I would accordingly suggest for your consideration that a proposal on the following lines might be made to the assembled Delegates at Paris, in the manner set out below.

5. The Peace Conference would address a telegram to all the States in question, namely Austria, Bohemia and Hungary, indicating that the various differences which have arisen between them render it increasingly difficult for measures to be taken to feed and to give economic assistance to the various States and that the Peace Conference have therefore decided to send to Vienna a Commission (on which would be included economic and financial experts) which would be empowered to effect settlements of outstanding differences for the general good. These settlements would not, of course, prejudice in any way the final settlements of territorial claims which can only be reached in the Treaty of Peace.

6. Sir T. Cuninghame would at the same time be instructed to draw up a list of the more important of the differences outstanding between the various States, and on their arrival in Vienna the Commission would summon representatives from the various States and endeavour to reach a modus vivendi which would put an end to the continual disputes between these States.

7. It will no doubt occur to you that a settlement would be most promptly arrived at if the proposed Commission was limited to British and American members but it will no doubt be necessary to include on it representatives both of France and Italy.

8. It is my opinion that when this Commission is constituted and sitting at Vienna the various States will realise that it is in their interest to cooperate rather than to continue their present policy of aggression and mutual distrust.

I have, etc., etc.,
(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)
Gerald Spicer

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Minutes attached to the document:

There is unfortunately no Govt. in Hungary either to recognise or to co-operate with. The old Magyar regime did not encourage the growth of liberal elements or develop any political capacity in the average citizen. Hence the present state of affairs which seem for the moment to destroy any chance for Interallied Commission proposed.

A.W.A. Leeper
26/3/19

Moreover Sir T. Cuninghame is a far from reliable guide in such matters. His judgment has rarely been proved sound.
So far as I know there is already an allied military mission at Budapest.

[To] Military Section
E. Crowe
28/3/19

[J.H.M.] Cornwall
 Lt. Col. G[eneral]. S[taff]. 31/3/19
Villa Majestic,
Paris, 19 March 1919

[To] Prime Minister:

5. These series of States [the planned system of independent small states in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe] form the outpost line against the spread of Bolshevism. Is there any ground for the belief that the outpost line can be also a line of resistance? The answer must be given in the negative. Materially every one of these States is weak. They are apparently incapable of compensating for their weakness by effective combination. There has not been the smallest sign of any serious attempt at combined effort to resist the Bolshevists among them. On the contrary, they show all the worst qualities that we have become accustomed to in the Balkan States. Already, while the Great Powers in the full flush of victory, with great armies still mobilised, are sitting in solemn conclave to settle the peace of the world, these nations are fighting among themselves. The Poles, who ought to be reserving all their efforts to resist the Bolshevists, are fighting with the Ukrainians and threatening to drive the Ukrainians into the arms of the Bolshevists. At Teschen the Poles have fought with Czecho-Slovaks, and recent telegrams show the position there to be still very serious. The Roumanians have only been prevented from fighting with the Magyars by the interposition of the Allies. The Jugo-Slavs and the Italians are ready to fly at each others throats. A project has just been put forward for the Roumanians to attack the Ukrainians. Neither the history, nor the disposition, nor the present attitude of these peoples, offers any hope that they will combine to form an effective barrier against Bolshevism. When attacked they will just whine for assistance from the Allies and go on fighting each other. If they have not the physical force which they might attain by combination to resist the very moderate power of the Bolshevists, they almost certainly have not the moral force to resist an effective propaganda. Moreover, as General Sir Henry Wilson points out, the configuration of these States, which shuts Russia completely off from the sea on every side, except the Black Sea (where the development of the Ukrainian State may equally exclude them), provides a real and justifiable excuse for the Bolshevists to attack and overwhelm them.

6. If the outpost line is a weak one, lacking cohesion, what is there behind?

7. In former days, before the War, we should have said that there was a safe and solid line. In spite of some of their detestable characteristics, the Germans were a solid, patriotic, reliable, and highly-organised people. The Austrians, less solid and less patriotic, were nevertheless a great force. Germany and Austria between them might have been relied upon to stem the advance of Bolshevism had it come in those days.

8. The position now is very different. Austria has completely collapsed, and Germany is rapidly falling to pieces. The Peace Treaty, as it is now developing, holds out no prospect that this process of disintegration will be stayed.

[....]

M.P.A. Hankey
NOTES REGARDING THE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROUMANIA IN TRANSYLVANIA

1. Armistice line.

This is shown Blue on the attached map.¹

In accordance with the Military Convention drawn up on Nov 13th 1918 the Hungarian troops withdrew N and W of this line, and evacuated the regions of THERESSIOPEL [Mari-Theresiopel] (SZABADKA) BAJA and FUNFKIRCHEN. These latter are now held by French troops.

The civil administration remained under the local Hungarian Government, who were allowed sufficient police forces to maintain order and guard the railways. The Allies reserved for themselves the right to occupy any strategic points and to maintain troops at any time throughout Hungarian territory.


General Berthelot reported on January 9th that the most advanced Roumanian troops had occupied the line NAGYBANYA–KLAUSENBURG (KOLOZ[S]VAR)–DEVA (KARLBURG) (shown in Red on the attached map) on strategic grounds. He also stated that Hungary had violated the terms of the Armistice (in allowing part of Mackensen's Army to get away and arms & ammunition to be sold) which he suggested should be denounced and that Roumanian troops should be allowed to proceed to the western limit of the territory claimed by Roumania. (Viz the 1916 Treaty line shown in Black on the attached map) French troops to occupy such points as ARAD, GROSSWARDEIN and DEBRESIN [Debrecen].

Gen. Berthelot ordered the Hungarian troops to withdraw to a line about 75 kms W of that held by Roumanian troops (at Red line).

¹ Not printed.
3. Opposing forces.

**Roumanian** In Transylvania there are

2 Infantry Divisions
2 Light Inf[antry].”

Total 39,000 men

**Note.** A Russian wireless of Feb 18th stated that owing to an uprising in Bessarabia a large portion of the Roumanian troops in Transylvania had been moved to the former country. There is little reason to believe this is true.

**Hungarian.** According to the Armistice terms Hungary was allowed to maintain six Infantry and two Cavalry divisions.

The Hungarian War Minister\(^2\) stated on January 10th that there were 3 Hungarian Divisions on the Transylvanian frontier. They consist of the youngest classes (1916-1918) and form a total of 30,000 men and according to him are well disciplined.

This latter statement is hardly justified by reports. Considerable difficulty is experienced by the War Ministry in dealing with the self-constituted Soldiers' Councils; Employing only the youngest classes not answer, and efforts are being made now to get older men to volunteer. Officers who do not belong to the Social-Democratic party either cannot or will not serve in the Army.

Nevertheless the War Minister\(^3\) stated that by the end of March 6 divisions total strength 66,000 men wd. have been formed.

\(^2\) Count Sándor Festetics.

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**No. 51**

*Telegram from General L. Franchet d'Esperey (Constantinople) to Marshal F. Foch (Paris. Extract. Received 24 March 1919)*

Nos. 746, 747, 748 [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/2/5089]

Constantinople, 22 March 1919

1° - Décision Congrès Paix\(^1\) lui ayant été notifiée le 19 mars, gouvernement hongrois a démissioné, déclarant ne pouvoir ni la recevoir ni faire mesures prescrites. Il demande que sa décision soit communiquée d'urgence à conférence Paix, à 19 heures Colonel Vix a reçu de représentants parti bourgeois déclaration proposant ou bien alliance avec entente contre les bolchevicks russes à condition que lignes démarcation actuelle soient maintenues et dans ce cas alliés devraient envoyer 15,000 hommes à Budapest pour permettre d'exister à Gouvernement ordre, ou bien en cas de refus de l'entente, feraient alliance avec bolchevicks.

\(^1\) This refers to the decision by the Peace Conference to establish a Neutral Zone between the Hungarian and Romanian forces in Transylvania. For further details see Nos. 36, 37, 47 and 50.
2° - Général commandant armée Hongrie\(^2\) rend compte que Gouvernement Hongrois aurait donné ordre attaquer à partir de 18 heures ce 21 mars sans que front attaque soit spécifié.

3° - D’après les renseignements parvenus antérieurement Hongrois disposeraient front Transylvanie de 25,000 hommes environ, disciplinés et résolus.

4° - Général Berthelot prévenu ainsi que Voivode Mitchitch [Vojvoda Mišić]\(^3\) et Général Pellé.

5° - Je donne l’ordre à armée la Hongrie et Voivode Mitchitch [Vojvoda Mišić]\(^3\) grouper forces région nord Belgrade et Banat de façon à avoir 2 D.I.\(^4\) françaises et 3 D.I. serbes prêtes à toute éventualité et s’abstenir si pas attaquées toute intervention jusqu’à nouvel ordre.

6° - Je vous demande instructions sur attitude à prendre [...]. (Fin).

Minutes attached to the document:

The most disgraceful instance of blackmail, worthy of the past & present rulers of Hungary. The position is extremely serious & justifies the repeated requests of the Roumanian & Chekho-Slovak authorities for immediate assistance.

A.W.A. Leeper
24/3/19

[....] The situation certainly appears most threatening, and the case of Roumania especially desperate as she is exposed to the attack of the Hungarians and the Russian Bolshevists at the same time.

It seems hardly possible for the 5 allied & associated govts. to look on inactively whilst the cause of Roumania is in great jeopardy. We should be accused of having abandoned Roumania for the second time.

[....]

Qu:

Telegram to Lord Curzon expressing hope that the War Cabinet will without delay decide upon all possible measures for relieving the situation.

[To] Sir H. Wilson at Military Section E. Crowe 24/3/19

It is serious, but the situation everywhere is deteriorating rapidly and in favour of the Bolsheviks, owing to the Allies drifting without a policy. It is difficult to know what measures can now be taken to relieve the situation but a policy is needed in the first instance.

H[ardinge].

\(^2\) Gen. P. de Lobit.

\(^3\) Vojvoda (civilian and military leader) Živojin Mišić, the Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Army.

\(^4\) Infantry Divisions.
[To] Lord Hardinge

[...] Joint action by the Allies under unity of Command seems to be necessitated.

W. Thwaites Maj. General D.M.I. 25/3/19

(From) [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 55622]

[These minutes are attached to a memorandum by Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) (not printed) on the events associated with the Communist take-over in Hungary after the fall of Count M. Károlyi’s Government on 21 March 1919, dated 31 March, received in Paris on 10 April.]

The territory from which Col. Vix ordered the Magyars to withdraw their troops was not in Transylvania as stated on p. 1 of the despatch but well in the Magyar plain.

L.B.N[amier]. 15/4/19

No. 52

War Office, Summary of Intelligence, 19th Series, No. 16 (Extract. Received by the Supreme War Council in Paris 26 March 1919)

[PRO CAB 25/117]

22 March 1919

[...] Hungary. ---Bolshevik activities.--- If recent reports are to be trusted, the number of adherents to the Bolshevik movement in Hungary is smaller than was originally supposed. Information obtained about the 25th February put the number of Bolsheviks among soldiers of the Budapest garrison at 650. The number of workmen holding Bolshevik views is said to be about 2,000; but not more than 500 have been counted at the various unsuccessful attempts at insurrection. “Bolshevik anti-semitism” is not increasing, for the reason that many of the leaders of the movement, including Béla Kun, are themselves of the Jewish faith. Kun was reported in the press to have been lynched on or about the 22nd March [?]February, but this lacks confirmation.

The Hungarian Government is doing what it can to check the movement. On the 3rd February the editorial offices of four Bolshevik news-sheets were raided by the police, on the ground that the paper restrictions had been disobeyed. One of the four newspapers, however, the Vörös Ujság (Red News), appeared again on the 5th February. The Government are not taking active measures against the movement; indeed they are hardly in a position to do so. The liberty of the press and the right to hold meetings are freely exercised. Yet the police are alert and efficient and keep the Bolshevik leaders under strict supervision.

It is thought by a reasonable observer that the prospects of any great number of men being converted to Bolshevism is small, in spite of the discipline of the army being at a
low level. The organization is still sketchy, the number of adherents insignificant; provided food and coal were available this observer thought that the danger might pass. It is believed, however, that revolutionary outbreaks will be attempted in the near future; and the Bolshevik organizations, if short of men, can at the same time dispose of a large number of rifles and machine guns, most of which were bought from men of Mackensen’s army or stolen from transports.

[...] 

No. 53

Telegram from Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London.
Received 24 March 1919)

No. 116 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. W3/45473]

Belgrade, 22 March 1919

Very Urgent.

We hear that Count Karolyi’s Government has fallen on refusal to accept peace conference’s directions to withdraw from Transylvania and a Soviet Government has been formed.

All Missions are being withdrawn from Budapest.

Admiral Troubridge has sent two Monitors up the river to insure safety of Allied Missions.

Repeated to Astoria.

No. 54

Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to Captain V. Haggard (Budapest)

No. 299 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 59528]

Belgrade, 22 March 1919

According to my latest information the situation at Budapest is changing hourly and will probably continue to do so. I am therefore only able to lay down on general lines the scope and intention of your mission.

You will have arrived at Budapest today, and doubtless have taken such measures as seemed proper to you to carry out the instructions contained in my telegram of 21st

1 For Admiral Troubridge’s reports to the Admiralty, London, concerning Captain Haggard’s mission to Budapest, see Nos. 63 and 77. The present document originally appears as Enclosure No. 2 to the Admiral’s letter No. 322 to the Admiralty, dated 28 March, printed as No. 63.
March\textsuperscript{2} to ensure the safety of the Allied Missions and at the same time the safety of the ships, while avoiding hostile action.

My information, to 2.30 a.m. 22nd March, is to the effect that the Hungarian Soviet Government is interning subjects of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Serbia, preparatory to declaring war on those countries. These countries are our Allies and so far as is possible you should endeavour to procure the safety of their people equally with that of subjects of other Entente countries.

The instructions at present preclude the use of military action on your part except as is necessary to ensure the safety of the ships under your command, which must under no circumstances be permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy.

It is, however, clear that, if the information received from Budapest is accurate, Hungary has broken the armistice conditions, and, in spite of declarations that her hostile action is limited to Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Serbia, Hungary has actually, in so breaking the armistice terms, resumed the conditions prevailing prior to the signature of the armistice on 13th November 1918, and is actually at war with the Entente Powers.

Unless, however, or until, this condition of affairs is recognised in Paris, I cannot myself give you instructions upon those lines, and must confine myself to directing you on the lines previously determined, namely to ensure the personal safety of Allied Missions and subjects according to your own discretion.

It is evident that by the time you receive these orders\textsuperscript{3} the situation may be completely changed, or that I may be able to convey further directions to you through Budapest or by other means.

You should endeavour to set up communication with Baja by telephone or telegraph, and so to keep in touch with me, if necessary sending an M.L. down to Baja or to the nearest telephone or telegraph office to keep me informed of your actions.

You should remember that the High Authorities at Paris will use their utmost endeavours to avert an outbreak of hostilities in which all Europe may well be involved. No action on your part, therefore, should precipitate hostilities.

At the same time the will of the Paris Conference must, it is plain, be enforced upon the Hungarian Government sooner or later, and firmness of action without vacillation is condition demanded of All Allied Officers in their dealings with recalcitrant nations, such as is Hungary at this moment.

Immunity from Allied hostile action was granted to Hungary on 4th November 1918 upon certain conditions. That advantage should have been taken of such immunity to prepare forces, and ultimately resume hostilities against the Allies, is the outstanding fact with which the High Authorities at Paris have now to deal. Consequently you must be prepared for all emergencies, including hostile action with the force under your command against the enemy and also attack by the enemy.

I am confident that in this difficult situation I can rely upon your discretion as you can rely upon my support.

(Sd.) E.T. Troubridge

Admiral

Commanding on the Danube.

\textsuperscript{2} Not printed.

\textsuperscript{3} The editor has not been able to trace when Captain V. Haggard received this letter.
No. 55

Telegram from Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 24 March 1919)

No. 117 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 46092/W3]

Belgrade, 24 (?) March 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.\textsuperscript{1} Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{2} informs me that Revolutionary Government at Budapest has declared Bolshevik war against Serbia and surrounding countries, and is said to have opened frontier towards Russia.

From another source I hear that Belakoun [Béla Kun] has become dictator, and has got into wireless communication with Lenin announcing that he has proclaimed war against all external enemies.

There has been some skirmishing at Szegedin between French troops and Hungarians.

1 See No. 53.

2 The person referred to is most likely to have been Mihailo Gavrilović, Serbian historian and diplomat, appointed Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1917, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1918. Envoy of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom to London, 1919-1924, but only took up his post in London in 1921.

No. 56

War Office, Summary of Intelligence, 19th Series, No. 17 (Extracts. Received by the Supreme War Council in Paris 27 March 1919)

[PRO CAB 25/117]

24 March 1919

Hungary.—Resignation of the Government.—On the 22nd March\textsuperscript{1} Lieut.-Colonel Vyš, head of the Allied Military Mission in Budapest, presented to Count Károlyi a note laying down a new line of demarcation between Roumanian and Hungarian troops,\textsuperscript{2} considerably farther west than that previously held. Károlyi forthwith resigned the presidency of the Republic, and issued a proclamation, in which he handed over the government to the proletariat.

Representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Hungarian Communists (Bolsheviks) decided to combine both parties under the name of the Hungarian Socialist Party, and this organization has taken over the administration of the country.

1 The note was presented to Count M. Károlyi on 20 March. The Government resigned on the same day, and the Republic of Councils was proclaimed on 21 March.

2 The following remark is recorded on the margin of the original beside these lines by an unidentified official: "presumably the neutral zone".
Martial law has been proclaimed and the council has decreed the socialization of large estates, mines, big industries, banks and transport. Further, it declares complete accord with the Russian Soviet Government, and is said to have offered to conclude an armed alliance with proletarian Russia. A Vienna message adds that a state of war is considered to exist between the Entente and Hungary; though it is the desire of Hungarians to conclude an early peace which will assure the well-being of the Hungarian labouring classes and the possibility of their living in harmony with their neighbours.

Sándor Garbai has become President of the new Government.

The new War Minister is József Pogány, who has been acting as liaison between the Soldiers' Councils and the late Government. He was formerly President of the Soldiers' Council, but appears to have been afterwards taken into the Ministry of War. He succeeded in obtaining the release of Béla Kun, in December; but took a leading part in the reform of the army, and one of the official party accompanying Count Károlyi on his presidential tour at the beginning of March.

Béla Kun, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, was formerly a prisoner of war in Russia, where he is reported to have done secretarial work for Lenin. He has been leader of the Communist (Bolshevik) movement in Budapest since December. He is a Jew (see the Summary for the 22nd March).

Vilmos Böhm, War Minister in the late Government, now appears as People's Commissary for Socialization. He was an Under Secretary of State for War in November, 1918, and became de facto Minister of War under Károlyi on the resignation of Bartha, on the 16th December, and actual Minister on the 20th January on the resignation of Count Festetics. He has shown himself to be a capable departmental chief with a strong character. His personality was most clearly revealed in the reception of deputations from Soldiers' Councils, which he told bluntly to go away and not waste the time of the Government. [...]

Note.—The resignation of the Károlyi Government was only to be expected, if the Roumanians and Czechs continued to alter the lines of demarcation laid down in the original Military Convention with Hungary. [...] The Bolshevik movement has hitherto not received any great measure of support, and the present conditions might easily have been avoided if the Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak governments had taken up a more reasonable attitude [...].

Minutes attached to the document:

[The following minutes were originally attached to “War Office, 'A' Branch Summary of 28/29 March 1919 (not printed)]

[To] C.O.S.

The “Note” at the foot of page 2 under “Hungary” is practically a literal quotation from the War Office Blue Summary of Intelligence of 24th March, 1919. From this it would appear that the War Office is unaware of the existence of a neutral zone in Hungary between the Roumanians and the Hungarians, since the note in question refers

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3 See No. 52.
4 See No. 24, note 4.
5 See No. 27, note 2.
only to the Military Convention with Hungary drawn up by General Franchet d'Esperey in November, 1918. *I am not aware that Gen. Franchet d'Esperey ever fixed a frontier in Czecho-Slovakia.*

In view of the fact that this note is most misleading as to the real state of affairs in Hungary, would it not be desirable to draw the attention of the War Office to the proceedings of the Military Representatives' meeting at Versailles on 25th and 26th February, 1919, (S.W.C. 379/1).

M(?) Thomson(?)
Brigadier-General, G.S. 31/3/19

The War Office Summary is rather misleading but the first paragraph under the heading "Hungary" must, I think, refer to the neutral zone established on the recommendation of the MR’s [Military Representatives].

H.C.O.S. [Chiefs of Staff?] 2/4/19

6 The note in italics was inserted in handwriting into the text after its completion, presumably by Brig.-Gen. Thomson. See note 8.

7 Not printed, see PRO CAB 21/129.

8 The editor has not been able to establish the identity of the signatory of this document beyond doubt. It may be Sir B.H. Thomson (see Glossary). On the other hand, there is the following record in the relevant British Army List: "THOMSON, Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Andrew Graham. 1st grade General Staff Officer. Retired in February 1919."

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No. 57


[HNKY 4/11]

London, 24 March 1919

[...]

There was heated discussion at the War Cabinet this morning (War Cabinet 450 Minute) on the question of equipping the Roumanian army as you will see by reading between the lines of the very full minute.

Churchill grew very hot and prophesied vast and immediate disaster as the result of the dilatoriness of the Peace Conference. Curzon took much the same line. Bonar Law was most unwilling.

1 Not printed.
SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE BEFORE THEY
FINALLY DRAFT THEIR TERMS

What I have said about the Germans is equally true of the Magyars. There will never be peace in South Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar Irredenta within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications which can usually be adjusted by other means. [...]

If Germany goes over to the spartacists it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolshevists. Once that happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly three hundred million people organised into a vast red army under German instructors and German generals equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe. This is a prospect which no one can face with equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary yesterday shows only too clearly that this danger is no fantasy. And what are the reasons alleged for this decision? They are mainly the belief that large numbers of Magyars are to be handed over to the control of others. If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism.

[...] It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and far-sighted peace with Germany. If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism we must make the League of Nations into something which will be both a safeguard to those nations who are prepared for a fair dealing with their neighbours, and a menace to those who would trespass on the rights of their neighbours, whether they are imperialist empires or imperialist Bolshevists. An essential element, therefore, in the peace settlement is the constitution of the League of Nations as the effective guardian of international right and international liberty throughout the world. [...]

1 The full memorandum is printed in *LINK*, vol. 56, pp. 259-270. Also see the minutes in No. 49.
Paris, 25 March 1919

[....]

The Hungarian situation is trying. Of course it’s not disinterested Bolshevism, but largely obstructive, anti-Rumanian & — Chekh Magyar tactics. If we had troops available we could settle it quickly. But have we?
[....]
No. 60

Telegram from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 27 March 1919)

No. 533 [PRO FO 371/3514 No. 48000]

Berne, 26 March 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

In speaking of situation in Hungary, Professor Lammasch shares view, apparently held by a considerable section of Entente Press, that accession by a Bolshevik Government to power at Budapest is result of a nationalist manoeuvre engineered by Count Karolyi.

I am informed that Hungarian Minister here who is a nominee of Karolyi expresses himself as well satisfied with turn of events in Hungary.

Sent to Peace Conference No. 44.

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Minutes attached to the document:

I think it is now clear that the position in Hungary is not Bolshevist in the accepted sense of the term, but nationalist Magyar.

C.H.S[mith].

27/3/19

Which however may develop in the direction in the direction of ordinary Bolshevism, if matters are allowed to drag on too long.

G.S[picer].

28/3/19

¹ Not printed.
Captain Roosevelt, of the United States Army, had a long conversation with Colonel Cornwall and myself late this afternoon. Captain Roosevelt only arrived yesterday from Buda Pest, where he had been attached to the Political Section of the American Military Mission and had witnessed the outbreak of the revolution.

About this he told us several very interesting details. He was himself, as were his colleagues, not ill-treated by the revolutionary authorities or their supporters, allowed to remain in his hotel and subsequently to leave with four other members of the Food Mission; and on one occasion the new People's Commissioner, Verga [Varga], interfered to prevent Red Guards arresting a member of the American staff on the ground that no Americans or British were to be interfered with.

Captain Roosevelt was strongly of opinion that the revolution was not a spontaneous outburst of Bolshevism, but was considered a trump card by Hungarian authorities to force the Entente powers to withdraw from their plans to assign non-Magyar portions of what they considered the historic State of Hungary to other peoples. Feeling was intensely bitter against the Tchecho-Slovaks and Rumanians — the Tchecho-Slovaks because they were feared, the Rumanians simply because they were disliked. He observed no animosity against the Serbs. We asked him whether in his position it was fair to suppose that the opportunity of the presentation of the new military ultimatum had been chosen because it served the purposes alike of Magyar Nationalists and Bolsheviks, and whether it was rather the Nationalists who were using the Bolsheviks or the other way round. He was inclined to think that the cause of the outburst was above all Nationalist, but that the Nationalists, feeling that there was no other way of protesting, hoped to put pressure on the Entente to withdraw its decision by releasing the pent-up forces of disorder in Buda Pest.

When asked what, in his opinion, was the situation in Buda Pest and the country generally before the outbreak of the revolution, Captain Roosevelt replied that as a result of various conversations with Count Karolyi at intervals of three weeks, he observed that Count Karolyi had become desperate. He impressed him as a man worn out mentally and physically. The Government had, however, succeeded in keeping a fairly tight hold over Bolshevik agitation in Buda Pest up till that date. In the country, so far as he had been able to judge, there was no enthusiasm for Bolshevik theories, and the peasants were even, in many cases, largely hostile to communist ideas and to the splitting up of the big estates. Bolshevism seemed practically unknown except in Buda Pest and other large towns.

Captain Roosevelt was inclined to discredit altogether the stories of a Russian Bolshevik invasion of Hungary over the Carpathians, or of any active co-operation between the two; and he told us that every hour new wireless messages were coming in

1 For Captain N. Roosevelt's own account of the take-over, and his analysis of the first few days of the new régime in Hungary, see Capt. N. Roosevelt to Prof. A.C. Coolidge, Memorandum, 20 March 1919, FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 413-416, and Capt. N. Roosevelt, Memorandum, 27 March 1919, LINK, vol. 56, pp. 331-334.

2 Presumably Jenő Varga, People's Commissar for Social Production.
to the effect that Lemberg, Jassy and various other important centres had been occupied by the Bolshevik forces. He regarded it all as merely inventions to impress opinion generally. (In the course of some very interesting remarks on the situation among the Ruthenians of Hungary, Captain Roosevelt pointed out that it was most unlikely that real acceptance of the revolution should come from such a quarter where it is alleged that the Russian Bolsheviks have been welcomed.)

Captain Roosevelt had been in close relations with British officers present in Buda Pest. Among these were Commander Freeman, R.N., Captain Pommerel [Pommerol] and a Major whose name he could not remember, who had casually arrived at Buda Pest the morning of the revolution, coming from Warsaw. The Allied Missions are said to have left Buda Pest on the 26th. Captain Roosevelt did not know anything further about their movements. Colonel Granville Baker, of the British Food Mission, disappeared on the night of the revolution and had not been heard of since.

Captain Roosevelt had seen something of the Italian representatives in Buda Pest. The chief of these was Major Pentamalli and Prince Borghese, the new Italian Minister to Belgrade, who — it will be remembered — had left the country because the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government were not prepared to accept the footing on which he wished to be accredited. Prince Borghese impressed Captain Roosevelt has [as] having anticipated the outbreak of the revolution and as not being particularly displeased at it. It appeared to Captain Roosevelt as though the Italian representatives had inside information of what was coming. Prince Borghese was extremely opposed to the idea of the Allied Mission leaving Buda Pest and urged that if necessary the good offices of the Italians might be used, as benevolent “neutrals”. Captain Roosevelt did not disguise the fact that in his opinion the Italian representatives were favourably inclined to the Hungarians and not over-anxious to see the territorial integrity of Hungary tampered with. The idea was tentatively put forward from the Italian mission that in the event of an Allied occupation of Hungary being necessary, they would have no objection to sending Italian troops. In passing Captain Roosevelt remarked that Prince Borghese's presence in Buda Pest was somewhat mysterious, as he admitted he had no official mission there and it was obviously not the most convenient route from Belgrade to Italy.

Captain Pommerel [Pommerol], in saying goodbye to Captain Roosevelt, expressed the opinion that 10,000 Allied troops would be adequate to deal with the situation. This was also Captain Roosevelt’s opinion. He felt strongly that these troops should, if possible, be British. Next to these he would put French, Italian and Serbian in that order. In no circumstances, in his opinion, should Tchecho-Slovak or Rumanian troops be employed as their presence would simply make matters worse. He felt that vigorous and immediate measures would certainly be successful, as the revolution was largely of artificial origin and should not be allowed time to gain hold of the country.

Copies to C.I.G.S.

W. Thwaites

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3 This presumably refers to a Major Peters, whose further identity the editor has not been able to ascertain.
Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Prime Minister

Mr. Balfour

{ }

Of great interest and importance.

M.P.A. Hankey
29/3/19

(From) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/5544]

What has happened in Hungary has been foreseen & predicted. Karolyi sent messages in December saying that this would happen, & asking for help & advice. The only thing that surprises me is that he has held things together so long.

J.W.H[eadlam-].M[orley].
28/3/19

This confirms the impression that the Hungarian appeal to the Bolshevists is nothing but a black-mailing manoeuvre. Count Karolyi was never worth anything.

The activity of Prince Borghese (until recently Italian councillor of embassy in London) at Budapest is most significant. He has strong family ties with Hungary through his mother, and has never made any secret of his strong pro-Magyar sympathies.

In all the frontier commissions here, the Italian delegates openly take the Hungarian side wherever there is an opening. It seems to me exceedingly likely that there is a secret understanding between the Italian Govt. and the Magyar party in Hungary.

E. Crowe
28/3/19

[To] Prime Minister.

A.J.B[alfour].

H[ardinge].
No. 62

Telegram from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Admiralty (London. Received 16 April 1919)

No. 923 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 59082]

Belgrade, 27 March 1919

Allied Mission arrived at Belgrade tonight Thursday from Budapest. Captain Haggard and two Motor Launches remained at Budapest to organise withdrawal of Neutrals if necessary. In my opinion there is still time to prevent Hungarian National Movement becoming purely Bolshevist; if I could be authorized by Paris to go to Budapest immediately with an outlined policy as regards territorial delimitation; also allowed to carry out my plans for amelioration of economic conditions by means of Navigation of Danube transport of coal and relief stores and general resumption of Normal conditions throughout Hungary. I am convinced of possibility of arresting a Movement which will otherwise involve all Europe in Military operations on a large scale.¹

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Minutes attached to the document:

We cannot deal with this matter here.

D. [?]
16/4/19

¹ No immediate reply has been traced for Admiral Troubridge's request to be allowed to proceed to Hungary. However, shortly after the fall of Béla Kun's régime, in early August 1919, Admiral Troubridge was posted in Budapest for a period as one of the organizers of the Allied relief programme and the effort to re-establish trade among the Danubian countries. In connection with this see No. 229, note 4.
No. 63

Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty (London)¹

No. 322 [PRO FO 371/3535 No. 59528]

Belgrade, 28th March 1919

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch of the 18th instant, No. 290,² I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of their Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on the morning of the 20th instant General de Lobit, Commanding the Allied Armies in Hungary, informed me that he had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Vix, Chief of the Allied Mission at Budapest, to hand to the Hungarian Government an ultimatum requiring them to withdraw their army in Transylvania to a new line of demarcation.

The General was apprehensive of the result of this communication on the fate of the Mission. I suggested I should send two monitors to be at the disposal of the Mission upon which they could if desirable, embark. He did not, however, at that time agree, but the next morning, 21st March, upon learning of the cold reception of the ultimatum by the Hungarian Government, he asked me to send the monitors without delay to Budapest.

I accordingly directed Captain Vernon Haggard, R.N., commanding a small flotilla then lying at Baja, 100 miles South of Budapest, to proceed to Budapest.³

The flotilla under his orders consisted of:-

Monitor “BOSNIA” — Senior Officer, flying the British flag.
  2nd in command Commander Bozidar Mazuranic.
  Lieutenant Henry B.S. Beresford R.N. on board.

Monitor “ENNS” — Flying the French Flag. Lieutenant Mate Marusic in command. Second
  Maitre Le Bohec. on board.

Motor Launch 210 — Lieutenant R.S. Bird, R.N.V.R.

Captain Haggard proceeded with the above force at 4 a.m. in the morning of 22nd March. His telegraphic orders are attached. His further orders are also attached.⁴ These latter he did not himself receive in time. I include them as defining the policy I desired should be followed in so far as it was possible at the time to define a policy under the confused conditions and with the uncertain intelligence of which I possessed.

¹ This formal address probably refers to the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, Sir Oswyn A.R. Murray.
² Not printed.
³ In connection with Captain V. Haggard’s mission see dispatches by Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge on 22 March and 3 April in Nos. 54 and 77 respectively. In No. 77 Admiral Troubridge gives a significantly different account of Captain Haggard’s mission to Budapest. In the absence of clear evidence it is suggested that the version given in No. 77 may be the more accurate one, as it was based on more up-to-date information. See also No. 77, note 2.
⁴ None of the orders mentioned are printed, but their content is similar to that of Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge’s letter to Captain V. Haggard, dated 22 March, printed as No. 54.
Approaching BUDA FOK, 10 kilometres South of Budapest, during the afternoon, the ships were fired upon by soldiers. Commander Mazuranic, 2nd in Command, was severely wounded. The soldiers were dispersed by fire from the monitors.

Captain Haggard proceeded up the river; arriving at Budapest he passed up beyond the railway bridge and anchored off the Citadel.

In order to fulfil the first part of his Mission, namely to place himself in communication with the head of the Allied Mission, Captain Haggard landed in M.L. 210 but was presently arrested by Revolutionary Guards. He was, however, released by the Minister of War and returned on board for the night.

The following morning, 23rd March, he again landed and was again arrested. By noon he had not returned.

Commander Mazuranic, who was now in command, being desirous of establishing communication with Captain Haggard, demanded that a deputation be sent to him from the Government; and an officer and some men having been sent, he procured from them a safe conduct for Lieutenant Beresford and Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander L.F. Cope to visit Captain Haggard and return.

During the day persons came on board and endeavours were made to seduce the crews from their allegiance. The enclosed proclamation was received on board by W/T. Further, it was observed that military preparations were being made to prevent the flotilla leaving: guns were placed in position in the Citadel, boats were observed placing mines, while infantry were posted on the adjacent shore and on the bridges.

The officers duly returned on board, bringing orders from Captain Haggard for the monitors to leave during the night (copy enclosed).

Commander Mazuranic, who was in bed with his wound which had caused paralysis of both legs, directed the necessary preparations to be made. Slips were put on the cables, steam raised for full speed, and preparations made for blowing the ships up should a mine be struck and the ship beached, while the masts, which should have been lowered to enable the ships to pass under the bridge, were kept standing to avert suspicion.

After 1 a.m. on 24th March the enemy's searchlights, which had continuously been kept on the ships, became fitful and presently ceased. The infantry guards remained.

At 3 a.m. Commander Mazuranic caused himself to be carried on to the bridge and at 3.15 the cables were slipped, the ships turned, and the flotilla proceeded at full speed towards the bridge.

As they passed down the river there was much shouting and rifle fire, but the noise of the masts of the leading ship crashing against the bridge speedily cleared the infantry away from the vicinity and the vessels passed through without loss. The rapidity of the movement doubtless preventing the use of the enemy's artillery.

The flotilla then proceeded as directed to Baja, where they anchored at 10.45 a.m.

Captain Haggard remained at Budapest with Motor Launch 210 at his disposition. Lieutenant-Commander F.A.P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., also remained, and is still at Budapest organising the withdrawal of members of the various communities.

Captain Haggard and the two Motor Launches arrived at Baja on 27th March, the Allied Mission having been permitted to leave Budapest and his presence being therefore no longer necessary there.

I beg you will acquaint Their Lordships with my satisfaction at the correct conduct of the officers and men engaged in this affair.

Captain Haggard acted with admirable judgment and discretion in the execution of his orders, under circumstances of great difficulty.

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5 V. Böhm.
6 Not printed.
I approve of the conduct of Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman, who insisted upon receiving the same treatment as the French officers, with whom he declared the solidarity of the British, to their great satisfaction.

I particularly desire to bring to the notice of Their Lordships the gallant conduct and sustained devotion to duty of Commander Mazuranic, of the Royal Serbian Navy, Second in command of the Flotilla. Owing to the scarcity of British or French Officers, I employ these Serbian Officers in ships flying the British or French flag, and look on them as our own; they conduct themselves on His Majesty's service with the greatest zeal and loyalty.

Wounded severely on the afternoon of the 22nd instant by a tracer bullet fired at 100 yards and causing paralysis of both legs, he nevertheless in the absence of Captain Haggard took charge, from his bed, of the situation, for which his intimate knowledge of these waters particularly fitted him: he made the necessary preparations for breaking the blockade with great professional judgment, and at the moment of departure caused himself to be carried on to the bridge, when he directed the manoeuvres of the flotilla with high courage and skill.

To indicate the severity of his injuries, it is worthy of observation that the tracer bullet with which he was wounded was extracted at Belgrade on 27th March, and upon extraction burst again into flame. He is still paralysed in both legs.

I beg to recommend this gallant officer to Their Lordships for some mark of distinction.

All the Flotilla is now assembled at Baja, with the exception of the Monitor "KOROS" [KÓRÖS], which I have despatched to Szergedin [Szeged], in the river Theiss, to act in co-operation with the French army.

I have, etc., etc.,
(Sd.) E.C.T. Troubridge
Admiral
Commanding on the Danube.

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 63

W/T Message Received on Board Monitor “Enns” at Budapest, 23rd March 1919.

Comrades — Sympathizers:

We call upon you in friendly fashion to give peacefully back the ship which was robbed from us by the Imperialistic Entente. Every attempt to escape is useless. Think well what you do and do not rush into misfortune. We do not wish for your lives, we wish to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Therefore we warn you to abstain from any attempt at flight and to give back the ships won by politics of the Imperialistic Entente without bloodshed and sacrifice of life. We ask you to communicate this appeal to our Jugoslav and English brothers. We await an answer.

The Commander of the Fleet. WULFF.

Enclosure No. 3 with letter No. 322 in the original file.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that Dr. Leipnik, who, as your Lordship was informed in my No. 53, Confidential, of the 27th ultimo,¹ has recently been to Hungary, has just returned to The Hague. He tells me that he did not take up the work in connection with the Fiume Food Distribution Commission, which was the reason for his going to Hungary, because he found that the conditions were such that he did not think that he would be able to do useful work.

He says that he had numerous interviews with Count Karolyi, from whom he gathered the impression that the French demands, put forward in a highly dictatorial way by Colonel Vix, were the cause of the upheaval which has just taken place. Dr. Leipnik says that all Hungary was deeply incensed by the dragooning attitude adopted by Colonel Vix, which has made France hated in Hungary, where the British are proportionately popular. He is of opinion that the movement in Hungary is in no sense a Bolshevist one, but thoroughly national, with the full support of all the leading aristocratic parties.

Count Karolyi told Dr. Leipnik that he had been forced to resign because he felt that the limit of Hungarian patience had been reached, and because Colonel Vix continued to put the frontier back daily, in violation of the conditions of the Armistice, until at length Hungary was becoming so squeezed between the claims of Roumania on the one side and those of the Czecho-Slovaks on the other that she felt she had no economic breathing-room left. The national spirit of the Hungarians then asserted itself, and the people were determined to die rather than surrender all that is best of their country. Dr. Leipnik says that he rather gathered, though he has nothing but an impression to go upon, that some sort of arrangement has been made with the Serbians.

He says that the French are as bitterly hated in Austria as they are in Hungary, and he much doubts if the French Mission, which has just been sent out, with M. Allizé, the French Minister here, at its head, will have much success. He thinks that a British or an Anglo-American Mission might succeed, but only if it were made quite clear that such a mission was not in any way subservient to the French Mission. He thinks that the trend of the peoples who formed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire is to reunite themselves into a confederation of independent States, and he does not believe that the Austrian-Germans have any wish to unite themselves with Germany.

[....]

I have, etc., etc.,
Walter Townley

¹ Not printed. The editor has not been able to learn more about the identity of Dr. Leipnik.
No. 65

Telegram from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 April 1919)

No. P.202 [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/2/5964]

Belgrade, 28 March 1919

Following for General Thwaites, repeated to General Bridges.

Major Peters and Captain Pommerol arrived Belgrade report as follows:- On March 30th [?20] Delobit [de Lobit] note showing new demarcation line in Transylvania was handed to Hungarian Government for reply by 6 p.m. March 21st. Karolyi and Government called in Communists with whom they conferred all 21st. Karolyi resigned misrepresenting Delobit [de Lobit] note as permanent frontier and calling on Proletariat of world to help. Communists played on patriotic fervour of country and established Government on pretence of resisting further encroachment [of] Czechs and Roumania. Later Allied Mission denied Karolyi's statement as to frontier in all daily papers. This calmed people vast majority of whom including even Red Guards are anti-Communist. Their action results from lack of clothing coal and therefore of unemployment also they are in a fever of patriotism [sic] owing to seeing their country gradually engulfed by Roumania and Czechs. They expect to lose Transylvania proper and Slovakia but not such purely Hungarian places as Pressburg and Komarom. Majority of country would welcome English American or French troops with open arms especially two former. There is movement in West and South-West to overthrow Communists and quick support of this is essential. Some help and food from us would suffice — latter is most important of all. If present distress in Hungary is alleviated they shortly overthrow Bolshevism themselves. At present they hope to get food by spreading Bolshevism in all countries and so washing out Peace Conference and all consequences of defeat.

Pommerol leaves (?April 9th) for Paris to report to you.

No. 66

Minutes on Two Letters by an Unidentified Clerk in the Foreign Office

[PRO FO 371/3529 No. 45259/W3]

[These comments were attached to two memoranda received from the United Free Church of Scotland on 19 March 1919, regarding the welfare, and assistance to be given to the Reformed Church of Hungary. They specifically asked for assistance from the British authorities in delivering relief supplies to the Reformed Church in Hungary.]

When the second letter was written the situation brought about in Hungary by Count Karolyi's resignation had not arisen. I gather from the first letter that the Jews as well as members of the Reformed Church allege that excesses have been committed

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1 The letters are in the same file, but are not printed. For other documents concerning the welfare of the Hungarian Protestant Churches, also see Nos. 28, 32 and 44.
against them by the Rumanians & others. Whether this is so or not it is apparent that the relations between Rumanians & the members of the Reformed Church are far from friendly, and that the Reformed Church probably inspires a good deal of Magyar nationalist sentiment which is markedly hostile to Czecho-Slovakia & Rumania. For these reasons alone the despatch of goods to people whose chief aim is the support of the Reformed Church is a matter requiring careful consideration unless we are to run the risk of giving offence to our allies. When one adds to these considerations the present state of Hungary, the wisdom of sending these goods is even more open to doubt, particularly as it would appear that the allied missions in Buda Pesth are interned there & that there is nobody to supervise the disposal of such goods on arrival. In these circumstances I venture to suggest that we cannot afford the United Free Church of Scotland the facilities desired.\(^2\)

W.H.B. (?)  
28/3/19

\(^2\) A reply was sent to the United Free Church of Scotland along the lines here suggested.

**No. 67**

*Memorandum by Sir M. Hankey for A.J. Balfour*

[BALF Additional 49704]

British Delegation,  
Paris, 29 March 1919

Secret and Personal

Dear Mr. Balfour,

I enclose a copy of a very important communication in regard to the situation in Hungary handed round by M. Orlando at the Meeting of Four this afternoon. The Prime Minister asked me to let you know that he, personally, was rather inclined to ask General Smuts to go. Perhaps I ought to mention that M. Clemenceau seemed to feel doubt about General Smuts. No decision was taken.

The question is to be raised again on Monday and in the meanwhile each Prime Minister is to consult his foreign Minister on the subject.

President Wilson, at M. Clemenceau's suggestion, undertook to consider the name of an American who might perhaps go to Buda Pesth to make enquiries on behalf of all the Allies.

I ought to make it clear that there is no question, at the present moment, of entering into diplomatic relations with Hungary but merely to probe the matter further in order, if possible, to prevent them falling into Bolshevism. I think the idea is to send a sort of Lockhart.\(^1\)

Yours sincerely,

M.P.A. Hankey

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\(^1\) This is a reference to R.H. Bruce Lockhart, an unofficial British envoy, sent to Russia by D. Lloyd George at the end of February 1918. After having been arrested and deported by the Bolsheviks, his mission ended at the beginning of October 1918.
P.s. I meant to see you about this this evening but had no time.

M.P.A.H[ankey].

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 67

Aide-Mémoire for Prince Borghese

Budapest, 24 March 1919

The New Government of Hungary, the Council of the Commissioners of the People, recognise the validity of the Treaty of Armistice signed by the former Government and do not think that the non-acceptance of the note presented by Colonel Vix has infringed it.

By asking Russia to enter the alliance with the Republic of the Councils of Hungary, the Government has not thought that this step might be interpreted as an expression of its desire to break all diplomatic intercourse with the Powers of the Entente, and still less as a declaration of war on the Entente. The alliance with Russia is not a formal diplomatic alliance, it is at the most — if we may use the expression — an “entente cordiale”, a natural friendship justified by the identical construction of their respective constitution[s], which in the thought of the Hungarian Government does not in any way imply an aggressive combination. The new Hungarian Republic, on the contrary, has a firm desire to live in peace with all the other Nations and to devote its activities to the peaceful social re-organisation of its Country.

The Hungarian Socialist Party has been driven by the force of the events to take hold of the executive power. It wishes to organise a new social State, a State in which every man will live of his own work, but this social State will not be hostile to other Nations. It wishes on the contrary to co-operate for the great human solidarity.

The Government of the Republic of Councils of Hungary declare themselves ready to negotiate territorial questions on the basis of the principle of self-determination of the People, and they view territorial integrity solely as in conformity with that principle.

They would gladly welcome a civil and diplomatic mission of the Entente in Budapest and would guarantee to it the right of extraterritoriality and undertake to provide for its absolute safety.

Béla Kun

Commissioner of the People for Foreign Affairs

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2 Communicated to the British Prime Minister by V. Orlando on 29 March 1919. The Aide Mémoire is also reproduced in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 18, and LINK, vol. 56, pp. 242-243. For the debate on 29 and 30 March following the reading of the communication in the Council of Four, see FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 16, or LINK, vol. 56, p. 414.

3 It is not clear whether the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918, or the Armistice of Belgrade of 13 November 1918, is meant here. The Editors of FRUS, PPC are probably correct in assuming that it is the former. For the significance of the difference between the two see No. 73, notes 3 and 4.
Dear Prime Minister,

If you are thinking seriously of sending me to Buda-Pest to probe into the situation, may I make a suggestion which I hope will give the mission a chance of even greater usefulness? It is that the Russians also should be invited to meet me at Buda-Pest within the next fortnight to discuss the situation in a similar way to the Austro-Hungarian. I feel sure that, unless Bullet [?Bullitt] misread the Russian situation, I could make recommendations to you after meeting the Russians which will also lead to peace with Russia and thus round off the work of this Peace Conference. And without a Russian peace our work here will be but half done. I might therefore be entrusted with the double mission.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. Smuts

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1 This letter is also reproduced in W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers, vol. IV, Cambridge, 1966, No. 927.

2 This reference is most likely to be William C. Bullitt, a member of the American Peace Delegation, who was sent on a mission to Russia, 8–25 March 1919. In Hancock and Van der Poel, op. cit., the text here reads as “Butler”, and a footnote suggests: “Probably C.K. Butler.” C.K. Butler was a British member of the Allied Relief Commission in Austria, and is unlikely to have been referred to by Gen. Smuts here.
Dear Lord Curzon,

The aide memoire for Prince Borghese\(^1\) communicated in my previous letter was considered last night by the Council of Four with the four Foreign Ministers, with the result that it was agreed that General Smuts should be sent to Hungary on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers.\(^2\)

Last night Mr. Balfour drafted the instructions, which were passed this morning by the Council of Four.\(^3\)

[...]

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1 See the enclosure with No. 67.
3 See No. 70.
No. 70

Resolution by the Council of Four

[PRO FO 608/11 No. 6113]

Villa Majestic, Paris, 1 April 1919

RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY

The following action is agreed to:-

(1) That General Smuts should be invited to undertake, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, the following Special Mission:-

To proceed to Hungary in order to examine the general working of the armistice concluded at Villa Giusti on November 3, 1918, and in particular the arrangement made by the Supreme Council for providing a neutral zone between Roumanian and Hungarian troops in Transylvania. In this connection it will be the duty of General Smuts to explain to the Hungarian Government the reasons for which the zone was established, and to make it clear that the policy was adopted solely to stop bloodshed and without any intention of prejudicing the eventual settlement of the boundaries between Hungary and Roumania. This subject has not yet been adequately considered, and will not be finally settled till the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

General Smuts may make any adjustments in the boundaries of the neutral zone or the method of its occupation by allied troops which he thinks will further the objects of the allied and associated governments.

It will further be the duty of General Smuts to investigate the treatment of the Allied Missions in Budapest since the recent change of Government.

General Smuts has full discretion to proceed to any place whether in Hungary or elsewhere, and to take any steps which may enable him to carry out these objects or others closely connected with them.

He will report fully to the Supreme Council.

(2) That M. Clemenceau shall write a letter, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, authorising General Smuts to undertake this Mission.

(3) That M. Clemenceau shall notify the scope of General Smuts' Mission to the General Officers Commanding the Allied troops in South Eastern Europe, and shall instruct them to comply with such directions as he may give for adjustments in the boundaries of the neutral zone, or in regard to the method of its occupation by Allied troops, and generally to give him every facility for carrying out his Mission.

(4) That M. Orlando shall instruct Prince Borghese to inform the Hungarian authorities of General Smuts' Mission.

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1 A shorter version of the resolutions is also reproduced in LINK, vol. 56, pp. 465-466. For the amended instructions to Gen. Smuts see No. 73.

2 For the text of the Armistice of Villa Giusti see FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 175.
Paris, 1 April 1919

Dear Weego,

I'm leaving Paris tonight with Smuts, Harold & a party. Objective — Vienna, Budapest, Bucarest & Heaven knows where. We'll be away about a fortnight — perhaps more. I don't suppose you'll hear from me at all, so don't feel anxious if you don't. Isn't it an extraordinary adventure? I simply don't know what to make of it. Hardinge summoned me this morning & told me. I was most fearfully surprised & thrilled. The whole idea is to see what can be done, & at once, to put the situation right in Hungary & elsewhere. I suppose Smuts has full powers. You may imagine I have many misgivings as well as many hopes; my hopes are that Harold & I together may keep things straight.

It's not yet absolutely certain Harold is coming. I do hope he is.

Later

Now (3 o'clock) it seems to be certain. Laus deo! Not merely for my own pleasure, but because together we may do something. We start at 9 o'clock for Vienna, whether after that we go to Bucarest or Budapest, no one knows. I hope Bucarest first because there we shall see Madge from whom I had most interesting letters last night — of which I send you a copy.

The party is: Smuts, Capt. Lane (A.D.C.), Dr. Engelberg [Engelenburg] (his medical attendant), Col. Heywood (a very nice fellow), Harold, I, Butler (Food Mission), a decypherer & perhaps some soldier servants.

Hardinge spoke to me about the possibilities of my talking with both Hungarian & Russian Bolsheviks. I was very shy about it. Keep this & everything about the mission absolutely to yourself. It's supposed to be very hush, tho' I daresay the papers will get hold of it.

[....]

Crowe was an angel to let us both go. It's an awful bore to him: Vansittart will do our work.

[....]

Later 4 p.m.

It's not yet certain that Harold is going. Mr. Balfour feels that he may be needed for the critical work here.

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1 The members of the Smuts mission were: Lt.-Gen. J.C. Smuts; Colonel T.G. Heywood of Military Intelligence; Cyril K. Butler of the Food Control Commission; A.W.A. Leeper; Harold Nicolson; Captain E.F.C. Lane, a Financial Officer, Gen. Smuts's aides de camp; Captain C. Grant; Dr. Engelenburg, Gen. Smuts's medical attendant; Lieut. L.S. Law, a cipher clerk; an American officer; an Italian officer; and a French officer. (PRO FO 371/3515 No. 55028)

2 Edward W. Madge, personal physician to Queen Marie of Romania. Also interested and well-informed in Romanian politics, Secretary of the Anglo-Roumanian Society (set up in 1917). Frequently discussed various issues with R.W. Seton-Watson. A close friend of Take Ionescu, and a severe critic of I.C. Brătianu.
5 p.m.

Hooray: he is going.

Best love.

Allen

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No. 72

Telegram from Sir W. Townley (The Hague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 April 1919)

No. 15 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/5989]

The Hague, 1 April 1919

Secret.

Following for Lord Hardinge from Leipnik.¹

I recently discussed with Count Karolyi at Buda Pesth a scheme for providing for a friendly solution of Hungarian questions on basis of important cessions of territory to Roumanians Jugo Slavs and Czechs provided economic unity of late Austria [sic] Hungarian Monarchy except Galicia be maintained. All details of this scheme were agreed to by Hungarian Government and I was authorized by Count Karolyi to submit it to Entente with request for appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission to preside over a meeting of members of late monarchy to be summoned for the purpose of settling whole Austria [sic] Hungarian problem. In view of new situation created by revolution in Hungary I caused a telegram to be sent to Bolshevik leaders in Buda Pesth asking whether they were prepared to act on scheme.

My object was to discover if present Government were seriously bent on introducing Bolshevism or whether their action was merely intended as a threat. Leaders replied that Inter-Allied Commission indicated would be welcome. I have details of scheme extending over all questions economic financial and political. They are at your disposal and I am ready to explain them to you and answer all questions if desired. I believe if Allies would consider appointment of a Commission new Government might take place of present Bolshevik rule.

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Minutes attached to the document:

This, if serious, confirms the news that the revolution was primarily a political manoeuvre.

It wld be presumably unwise as yet to instruct Sir W. Townley to inform Leipnik confidentially of the despatch of General Smuts' mission and we must wait until we can communicate with the latter.

E.G.F. Adam
2/4/19

¹ See No. 64, note 1.
The scheme obviously offers no basis for a settlement. There is no means of preserving the economic unity of the several new States which, together, formerly composed the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Nor does the phrase “important cessions of territory” to the neighbouring States reveal any intention to accept the complete territorial rearrangement contemplated by the allies.

I do not think we should accept the suggestion of an inter-allied commission presiding over an assembly of Austro-Hungarian delegates.

Qu:
So reply.

E. Crowe
2/4/19

I think we should repeat this to General Smuts as soon as we hear of his whereabouts, and ask his views pointing out that we do not consider that the proposed scheme meets the intentions of the Allies.

H[ardinge].

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 72

Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts (Budapest. Nos. 7 and 8)²

Paris, 5 April 1919

While we do not consider that the proposed scheme meets the intentions of the Allies, we should be glad of your views.

² No trace has been found of Gen. Smuts receiving this telegram. Most probably he never received it, as it was dispatched from Paris at 11 p.m., and the mission left Budapest around 8 p.m. on the same day, 5 April.
No. 73

Telegram from Sir M. Hankey (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts (Vienna and Budapest)

Nos. 1 and 2 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 6113]

Paris, 3 April 1919

No. V.M. 27. Amended instructions signed by Council of Four are being sent you by Major Bonsol [Bonsal] who leaves Friday evening. The only alteration is the addition in the first sentence after “November 3, 1918” of the following words:

“and of the military convention of November 13, 1918”.

This is a military convention concluded by General Franchet d’Esperey with the Hungarian Government and is the actual document on which his relations with the Hungarian Government have been based. The clause in this convention pertinent to your mission reads as follows:

“Right of occupation by the Allies of all localities or all strategic points which the General Commanding in Chief of the Allied Armies shall have the right to fix permanently.”

The text of this convention is being sent to you by Major Bonsol [Bonsal]. This alteration makes no substantial difference to your mission. So far as I can learn this convention was never communicated to Allied and Associated Powers. I saw it for the first time this morning.

1 For the original instructions see No. 70.
2 2 April 1919.
3 For the text of the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918 see FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 175; for the text of the Military Convention (also Armistice) of Belgrade of 13 November 1918 see FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 183.
4 The editor feels it necessary to contest this argument. The Supreme Council resolved to establish a Neutral Zone between the Hungarian and Romanian forces in Transylvania on 26 February 1919. This was necessitated by the advance of the Romanian army north-westwards from the River Maros. The latter move was explained by various acts of provocation against the Romanians on the part of the Hungarians. The River Maros, till its confluence with the River Tisza, formed part of the line behind which the Hungarian army was required to withdraw according to Article I of the Belgrade Convention of 13 November 1918. The advance of the Romanian army beyond this line, presumably with the aim of occupying Transylvania and districts west of it up to the line established in the Treaty of Bucharest of 17 August 1916, was regarded by the Romanians as compatible with Article IV of Section “A” of the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918, i.e. that “armies of Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order”. The Romanians considered themselves an Associated Power at the end of the war. This, at first, met with resistance from the Big Four. Their resistance was gradually dropped by about the late summer of 1919. Therefore, from at least the Romanian point of view, the latter Article significantly differed from the relevant clause of the Belgrade Convention quoted in Sir M. Hankey’s telegram in that it did not specifically require the consent of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, i.e. Marshal F. Foch, for actions by an Allied army of the character described in the text of the Armistice of Villa Giusti, and, in fact, no such specific undertaking had been issued by Marshal Foch before the move in question was made by the Romanian army.
My dear General,

I think it will be as well to send you a private letter in explanation of the curious alteration in your formal instructions which I have communicated to you officially by telegram and by letter.

General Albi [Alby], the Chief of Staff at the French War Office, came to the meeting at President Wilson's house with M. Clemenceau this morning to insist on the insertion of the words which have been added. The question of this addition was remitted to me to discuss with General Albi [Alby] and I made some rather curious discoveries. In the first place I had never seen the Convention of November 13th. Moreover, I have looked up the Cabinet Minutes (I had influenza at this time) and I can find no trace of it. In fact, I do not think it ever was officially communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers and Count Aldrovandi, the Italian Secretary, confirms this. So far as I can make out, General Franchet d'Esperey did not like negotiating on the basis of the Villa Giusti Armistice of November 3rd, because this was signed only by Italians on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. Consequently, he concluded a separate Armistice or Convention with the Hungarians. You know enough of Franco-Italian relations to understand what animated this. Anyhow, it is on the Armistice of November 13th, and not on that of November 3rd on which General Franchet d'Esperey has conducted all his business with the Hungarian Government.

I have carefully looked up the records of the Quai d'Orsay Meetings to see if I could find any reference to it. I find only one. It was referred to in the original draft of the Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles, when they recommended the zone between the Roumanian and Hungarian Armies. In the final report, however, as approved by the Council of Ten, all reference to this Armistice was excised on the motion of Marquis Salvango Raggi, the Italian Representative. Aldrovandi thinks that the reason for this was that the Italians did not recognise the Armistice of November 13th.

By carefully examining the document I ascertain that the addition of these words would make no material difference whatsoever to your negotiations. Moreover it seemed to me absolutely indispensable that you should have this document since, according to General Albi [Alby], General Franchet d'Esperey has worked entirely on this document and has ignored the Villa Giusti Armistice. Hence, if your instructions were only to examine the Villa Giusti Armistice, which neither General Franchet d'Esperey nor the Hungarian Government have been working on, serious misunderstandings might arise and your Mission might become abortive.

The Italians had first objected to any mention being made of the Armistice of November 13th but they agreed to the reference to it provided it was termed a Military Convention and not an Armistice.

I think this gives you all the information in my possession on the subject.

Wishing you every success in your enterprise.

I am,

Yours very sincerely,

M.P.A. Hankey

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5 See note 4 above.
No. 74

Telegram from Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 11 April 1919)

No. 138 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 56548]

Belgrade, 3 April 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹
Telegram referred to states report given to Belakun [sic] by go between² who came to Belgrade and had an interview with General Officer Commanding³ has convinced Hungarian Government of existence of misunderstanding as to communication made to Karolyi by order of Paris Conference having been taken as final decision as regards frontier.
Telegram adds that Hungarian Government are therefore quite ready to negotiate on whatever basis may be proposed by Allies. Referring to Banat telegram says present Hungarian Government have entirely broken with policy of former Government and their own policy is not based on principle of territorial integrity as they view question as one for Banat itself (i.e. no doubt for a plebiscite).

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Minutes attached to the document:

This tel. is dated Ap. 3 & is therefore prior to Genl. Smuts' visit to Budapest.

G. [?].
12/4/19

¹ Not printed.
² Prof. P. Brown.
³ Gen. P. de Lobit.
No. 75

Letter from I.C. Brătianu to M.P. Dutasta

W.C.P. 466 [PRO CAB 21/150]

Romanian Delegation, Paris, 3 April 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copy of a telegram received from Bucharest regarding the action of the Bolshevik troops at Odessa, and the urgent measures to be taken in Hungary.

I beg that you will be so kind as to bring this telegram to the notice of the Supreme Council of Allied and Associated Prime Ministers.

I have, etc.
(Signed) [I.] C. Bratiano

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 75

Telegram from Bucharest

Bucharest, 31 March 1919

A new powerful attack by Bolshevik troops has taken place 80 kilometres north east of Odessa. French and Greek troops at Berezov have been forced to retire after resistance.

It is absolutely indispensable to hasten the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops beyond the neutral zone established by the Peace Conference, and to insist on their complete demobilization.

This is the only way in which Roumanian troops can usefully operate towards east.

1 The original is a translation from the French.
Vienna, 3 April 1919

Dear Weego,

[...]

After a quite uneventful journey we got to Vienna this morning at 10.30. We were very comfortable on the train — about eight of us: I shared a wagon-lit compartment with Heywood & slept quite well both nights. Very good meals on the train! I had a long talk with Smuts, who is charming, & also with Hillard (Times man going to Transilvania [sic] & Bucarest), Flueraș (a Transn. Socialist with whom I had a long conversation in Rumanian) & Profr. Coolidge, head of the American Mission of Enquiry here.

[...]

We leave by the 10 o'clock train to-night for Budapest. The Hungarian “Bolshevik” Ambassador here2 accompanies us & I gather they're keen to receive us & talk with us. I think a good deal can be done by assurances of food supplies, self-determination & guaranteed rights of minorities. Hungary hasn't really gone Bolshevik at all yet except in Budapest. The peasants are fairly hostile & the Govt. is very cautious towards them & not attempting to confiscate their lands. I wish we'd march in British & American troops & occupy the country — only 30,000, I believe wd. be required — but unfortunately that seems to be out of the question. The French are, unfairly, very unpopular & the Italians doing pro-Magyar intrigues. Perhaps we can do something on the lines I say. If so, we shall also have to go to Prag, Bucarest & Belgrade — at least I hope so (& Smuts agreed with me it wd. be worth while). Then I may see Madge3 & Roland!4 We're to live in our train — three saloon carriages & I suppose will not go about Budapest at all. As for wider schemes, I daresay you feel anxious. But you know my views (which are yours): Harold & Heywood are the same. I don't think therefore you need feel anxious. Of course we are under orders & must & will loyally carry them out but you can be sure we'll see that the truth is found out & no mere plausible assurances accepted. That's all I can say.

I don't know how long we shall be away — perhaps a fortnight, perhaps a month. Intensely interesting, though pretty tiring because a bit of a strain. But I wdnt miss it for worlds. I wish you were in Paris to hear the news quicker. I hope I don't have to meet Russian Bolsheviks in Budapest. I hope not Litvinov, for instance. How I dislike them.

Well, we'll do our best. Best love Weego old thing. Be discreet about things I tell you. [...]. Don't expect to hear from me except very irregularly.

Your loving brother
Allen

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1 See No. 71, note 1.
2 E. Bolgar.
3 See No. 71, note 2.
4 Reference to Roland Bryce, son of the 1st Viscount Bryce, formerly James Bryce, a Liberal M.P. A Serbophil, who later became secretary of the Anglo-Jugoslav Society. In 1919 he was serving at the British Legation in Belgrade, and in 1920 acted as British observer of the elections in Montenegro.
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty

(London. Copy received by the Foreign Office 18 April 1919)

Belgrade, 3 April 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the circumstances attending the seizure, by revolutionary guards at Budapest, of H.M. Motor Launches Nos. 210 and 228, and of the arrest by them of Captain Vernon Haggard, R.N., Commanding the Flotilla, and of Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., R.N., of my staff.

On the 22nd March, in the early morning, Motor Launch 228, Lieutenant O.T. Bauscher, R.N.V.R., in command, was lying alongside at Budapest embarking the personnel attached to Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman; she was suddenly rushed by armed Revolutionary Guards and some of the machinery was removed and a guard put on board.

Captain Haggard arrived at Budapest with two monitors (despatch No. 322 of 28th March), proceeded alongside in M.L. 210, and landed. He explained his mission to the leaders of the mob consisting of armed soldiers, sailors and civilians wearing red badges, insisted that the guards should leave the boats, that the stores should be returned, and pointed out the serious consequences of the insult to the flag.

He was told that no disrespect was intended, that the guards were for protection only, and that the Motor Launches must stay where they were.

Proceeding to an hotel, representatives of the People's Commissary visited Captain Haggard, to whom he explained his mission, and notified that any outrage to the flag would be deeply resented, and demanded freedom of movement for the Motor Launches.

A reply was received that the mob was not yet in hand, that the outrage was regretted, that the guards would be removed and the Motor Launches not be molested.

Captain Haggard later returned to the Motor Launches and found the guards had been removed and the stores and arms sent back to M.L. 228.

On 23rd March, during the forenoon, the Red Guards again invaded the two Motor Launches and insisted that they were subject to danger and must remove to the harbour of O-Buda, 4 miles above the town.

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1 See No. 63, note 1.

2 For Admiral Troubridge's previous dispatches on the same subject see Nos. 54 and 63. In No. 63 Admiral Troubridge gives a significantly different account of Captain Haggard's mission to Budapest. In the absence of clear evidence, it is suggested that the version given here provides a more accurate picture of the events, as it is based on more up-to-date information. The major difference between the two accounts concerns the detention of Captain Haggard. On this point, though without decisive clarity, and without mentioning Captain Haggard by name, Section 2 of Enclosure 5, dated 8 April, of Gen. J.C. Smuts's Report of 9 April 1919 (see No. 84) says the following: “On the 23rd, two British motor launches which still remained at Budapest were rushed by armed sailors and an order was shown from the Government that the boats were to be taken to a point above Budapest. This order the officers and sailors on board refused to obey, and the Hungarian sailors thereupon appear to have disembarked the British crews and to have interned them in the Ritz Hotel.”

3 See No. 63.
Captain Haggard, who was now at the headquarters of the Mission, on learning of this gave orders that the Motor Launches were not to move, but hearing again that they were leaving for O-Buda, demanded an audience with the Minister of War, and proceeded to the Ministry in company with Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman at 5 p.m.

Captain Haggard related the incident, protested most strongly against the outrage and demanded the return of the boats and assurance for the future. The Minister of War replied that he would be sorry to insult the British flag, that he had been informed that the boats were moved at the request of the crews who did not want to fight the Hungarians, and that the boats would return.

By 3 a.m. 24th March the boats were once more returned, intact and with ensigns flying. Nothing had been touched.

On 25th March Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman accompanied the Chief of the Allied Mission, Colonel Vix, to interview with Bela Kun, head of the Revolutionary Government prior to the departure of the Mission.

During the interview he formally protested against the outrage on the British flag and the interference with the crews.

Mr. Bela Kun replied regretting the circumstances and expressing his apologies, while stating that they had not control of the Red Guards and civilians who were in revolution, and that was the cause of the incident.

On 26th March Captain Haggard sailed with both Motor Launches at 1 p.m., leaving Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman behind to arrange for the evacuation of neutrals or Allies desirous of leaving Budapest.

I am of opinion that Mr. Bela Kun gave the true reason for this incident. There was evidently no control over the revolutionists in the streets, soldiers, sailors or civilians, during the first days of the revolution, and Captain Haggard and Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman acted with a proper judgment in the matter in recording their strong protests to the Government authorities, who on their part expressed their regret.

I have, etc., etc.,
(signed) E.C.T. Troubridge

Admiral
Commanding on the Danube

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4 V. Böhm.
My dear General,

[...]

Unfortunately we cannot take the course which would probably be welcomed by all Hungarians, that is, to send a British Division, or failing that an American Division, to Budapest. Practically everyone I have spoken to here agrees that such a measure would be welcomed by the Hungarians and would do much to settle the difficulty. Lt. Col. Granville Baker a member of the Inter-Allied Food Mission at Trieste, recently came through here from Budapest with the Inter-Allied Mission of which Colonel Vix is Chief. The plan which he and the French advocate is to advance slowly as soon as possible from the line Baja-Szeged-Arad, and to bring up behind the troops supplies to feed the population, thus showing that though we intend the Hungarian Government to accept our decisions, we have no hostile intentions towards the inhabitants. It is rather like holding out a piece of sugar to get a canary back into its cage, but in the absence of a considerable force here there is not much else that we can do.

[...]

Your information also about Roumania is probably more up to date than mine, but a watch on the Roumanian situation is carefully kept by men here who know the Balkans. For Roumania is generally regarded as the weak point in the front against Bolshevism, owing to her exposed position and to the unfavourable condition of the peasants as compared with Serbians and Bulgarians. If Bolshevism got a hold in Roumania it would mean a severe menace to Serbia, and consequently, in spite of all they have done for us and important as I think it is for us adequately to equip the Serbian Army, I advocate in the first place sending locomotives, food, and clothing and equipment to Roumania. When the Roumanian army is in a position to make a firm stand against Bolshevism, the Serbians should be helped as rapidly as possible. But this is of secondary importance in my opinion, for Serbia stands in the second line of defence against Bolshevism with a weaker country in the first line.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) E.A. Plunkett
No. 79

Letter from I.C. Brătianu to D. Lloyd George

[LI. G. F/57/8/5]

Romanian Delegation,
Paris, 4 April 1919

Sir,

As I have let you know, the communication you were kind enough to send me after our last meeting has rendered me confident as regards the possibility for Roumania of avoiding the danger of a new disaster.

I read now in the papers that the Conference have sent General Smuts in a mission to Hungary and — it is added — also to Roumania.

I can not believe the second part of his mission should be accurate, unless the head of the Roumanian Government and representative of this Government at the Peace Conference should be informed of this mission.

However, encouraged by the friendly interest you have shown in my country during our last conversation, I beg leave to call your attention upon the fact how serious the advantage would be if Roumania would not be ignorant of the measures dictated by the situation in Hungary which depends so directly on the attitude taken in time by the Allies towards that country.

I am hopeful that in order to soothe the anxiety which will produce in Roumania the character ascribed by the newspapers to General Smuts' mission at Budapest you will be good enough to give me some information about it.

Thanking you beforehand
I have, etc., etc.,
Ion I.C. Bratianu

No. 80

Telegram from General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris.
Received 5 April 1919)

No. 1 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6429]

Budapest, 4 April 1919

I arrived at Budapest this morning and had long conversation with Bela Kuhn who in consequence of change in Hungarian Government yesterday is now Chief Commissary both for War and Foreign Affairs and probably most important man in Government. I pressed him to order withdrawal of troops to line notified by VIX and I explained

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1 A paraphrase of this telegram is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, pp. 41-43, and in LINK, vol. 57, pp. 77-79. For Gen. Smuts's further report from Budapest see No. 81.
selection of that line was not (grp. undecipherable)\(^2\) political frontier and that withdrawal and creation of neutral zone under allied occupation would not in any way prejudice Hungarian case but was necessary for maintenance of peace and good order. He replied that withdrawal was impossible mainly for two reasons. First; defence of territory in question was conducted by local troops who were mostly Szekler (group undecipherable) and over whom hold of Budapest Government was but small. Government could not enforce order to withdraw which could not be obeyed. They could not therefore undertake liability which they knew they were not in a position to fulfill [sic]. I have ascertained from many reliable sources that authority of Government is confined in main to town of Budapest and is but slight (?) in provinces and above difficulty against evacuation is probably well founded.

Secondly although present Hungarian Government did not attach much importance to territorial boundaries large section of population did, and compliance with VIX's orders would mean immediate fall of Government just as mere demand proved fatal to Karolyi Government.

If Entente insisted on withdrawal Government would resign and chaos would ensue as there is no party capable of forming another Government Entente must in case be prepared to occupy not only neutral zone but also Budapest and other parts and run country on their own responsibility. I pointed out advantages to Hungary of removal of blockade and establishment of friendly relations with Entente Powers which would give country chance to live and recover. But armistice had to be carried out and final political frontiers could be settled at later stage. Bela Kuhn said they adhered to armistice and wished for friendly relations with Powers but evacuation at present stage not possible for above reasons. With regard to future territorial boundaries Hungarian Government did not adhere to former Hungarian Imperialist (and former?) ideals of territorial integrity.

They recognised that Wilsonian principles of nationality and popular self-determination should govern situation. But instead of yielding to constantly growing demands of evacuation they preferred to have whole question of frontiers definitely settled at meetings of Governments of Hungary, Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Serbia and Roumania under say my presidency.

To such meeting Hungarian Government would come in accommodating spirit and be willing to make territorial concessions. Karolyi suggested Prague or Vienna for meeting. He further pointed out that for Hungarian Government frontiers were not as important as food and similar questions with which meeting should also deal the economic position of new countries would probably necessitate some arrangement of Danubian States, such as Masaryk had advocated.

As it will be necessary in any case before signing of Preliminaries of Peace to (group omitted?)\(^3\) Germans, Austrians and Hungarians to Paris for the purpose it appears to me that Bela Kuhn's suggestion would conveniently be at once acted upon and all parties concerned in partition of former Austria Hungary be called together for the purpose of settling definite boundaries or at least principles on which they should be decided ultimately and Preliminaries of Peace could be signed on that basis. As all other parties are already represented at Paris Conference I would suggest that meeting be held forthwith in Paris and representatives of German Austria be invited to Paris for the purpose. Hungary is naturally very anxious to appear at a Conference and would probably swallow much and submit to terms which it would be difficult to make her agree to otherwise.

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\(^2\) Gen. J.C. Smuts attached a paraphrased version of this telegram to his final report of the mission, prepared on 9 April 1919, (see No. 84) as Enclosure 3. There, the missing group is given as “permanent”.

\(^3\) Given in the version described in note 2 above as: [invite representatives of].
Invitation to Austria and Hungary might be merely to state their case to Peace Conference if there is objection to fuller invitation.

If proceedings are expedited it might be possible to sign this preliminary Peace at same time or even before, preliminary German Peace is signed.

There is nothing further to be achieved by my continuing here and I therefore request leave to return to Paris on receipt of this telegram, I await an answer here or in Vienna.

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Minutes attached to the document:

But if this Hungarian Govt. cannot enforce its will in the country districts, there seems no reason to suppose that any frontier lines which its representatives might accept in Paris would be accepted by the population affected and it would still remain necessary to enforce evacuation on the latter.

(Incidentally the Szeklers though Magyars are scattered in the midst of the Transylvanian Roumanian population on the extreme eastern frontiers of Hungary).

E.G.F. Adam
7/4/19

I have sent up to Mr. Balfour an advance copy of this tel. with a minute, pointing out the dangers involved in approving General Smuts’s proposal.

E. Crowe
7/4/19
No. 81

Telegram from General J.C. Smuts (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 7 April 1919)¹

No. 3 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6581]

Vienna, 6 April 1919

Very Urgent.

For Mr. Balfour. In continuance of my telegram of April 4th.² I remained in consultation with Hungarian Government yesterday April 5th associating also Garbai Prime Minister and Kunfy [Kunfi] Commissary for Education with Conferences as two important members of Government. At one time I had practically succeeded in persuading them to accept a new armistice line behind which Hungarian troops should withdraw, not so far West of Colonel VIX's line but still far enough to more than cover all the territory attributed to Roumanianin [sic] report of territorial Sub-Committee of the Peace Conference. Agreement was drafted and ready for signature but after further consultation their other colleagues Hungarian Ministers said signature would mean civil war along neutral zone and immediate downfall of their Government and they therefore declined to sign. They handed in instead document which agreed to new line only on condition that Roumanian army withdrew behind line of Maros river which had been line of withdrawal in Franchets (? group omitted)³ of November 13th and the occupation of whole of neutral zone by Great Powers. This I refused to accept as it would lead to immediate trouble with Roumania. Hungarian attitude is that they are at peace with Great Powers and wish to remain so, that they wish Blockade removed and facilities given for importation of most urgent necessities such as coal and fats and this I had undertaken to recommend to Great Powers in lapsed draft of agreement. They adhere to armistice of November 3rd, and military convention of November 13th and have so far obeyed increasing demands for withdrawal of their line. VIX line however or even one proposed by me which was necessary to satisfy fair Roumanian territorial claims was impossible for them to carry out owing to opposition of their Scekler [Szekler] troops on frontier or to accept without Nationalist reaction and downfall of Government. They continue however to assert that as (2 groups undecipherable.) stable Government they are more interested in Economic than territorial questions and will come in accommodating spirit to any Conference of neighbouring states under presidency of Great Powers before which they would lay their case before final decision. I am convinced that attitude of Hungarian Government is not unfriendly to Great Powers. But they are weak, internally divided and heading for an early fall and they are too frightened to agree to line unless on conditions insulting to Roumania. Hungary if wisely handled is by no means (? hostile) to Allies and on the whole consideration of case I am still of the opinion that wise course is to decide final political frontiers after hearing Hungarian statement at Paris or elsewhere instead of provoking what may be unnecessary conflict over armistice terms. Without raising Blockade at present trainload of fats bought and paid for with our consent but now held up by Allied authorities at Agram should at once be allowed to go to Budapest as earnest of Benevolent intentions of Great Powers as Economic questions are so important to

² See No. 80.
³ The reference is to Gen. L. Franchet d'Esperey. In the original, the word “Convention” is written in handwriting above “(? group omitted)”.


future of Hungary. I proceed to-day to Prague to exchange ideas with Masaryk and shall leave for Paris as soon as possible.4

4 For Gen. Smuts's notes of his conversation with President T.G. Masaryk in Prague on 9 April 1919 see FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, p. 669, or F. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, New York, 1942, pp. 431-432. The original is in Li. G. F/197/2/1. For excerpts from the minutes of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held on 3 May 1919, where Gen. Smuts's notes of this conversation were discussed, see F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 432-433.

No. 82

Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to General J.C. Smuts

No. 9/10 [PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6581]

Paris, 7 April 1919

Urgent.

Following from Prime Minister to General Smuts:

Your Telegram No. 1,2 was considered by the Supreme Council to-day.3 It was agreed that you should visit the French and Roumanian headquarters and ascertain the whole situation in all aspects before returning.

Repeated Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.

1 Also printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 39. See also FRUS, PPC, vol. V, p. 59, where D. Lloyd George expresses his hopes that this telegram will reach Gen. Smuts at a meeting of the Council of Four on 8 April 1919. However, the telegram arrived too late to be received by Gen. Smuts. (See No. 83.)
2 See No. 80.
3 For the discussion in the Supreme Council see LINK, vol. 57, p. 73. During the discussion on the 7 April both of Gen. Smuts's telegrams (dated 4 and 6 April, Nos. 1 and 3, here printed as Nos. 80 and 81) were examined. D. Lloyd George expressed the view that the Smuts mission had failed as the Government in Hungary had no authority.

No. 83

Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract)

[LEEP Folder 2]

Paris, 9 April 1919

Dear Weego,

We got back by special train from Vienna at 9 o'clock this morning, safe & sound, after an exceedingly interesting week. I've dictated a long letter to you which you must be careful to lock up in some very confidential place as it deals with all our negotiations
& my opinions on them.¹ We had bad luck in starting just before the wire arrived ordering us on to Bucharest, Belgrade & Constantinople.² I tried hard to get the General to go there but he felt he ought to get back.

I am more than satisfied & much relieved with our result. I hope it may do great good. It was an intensely interesting experience. We were an extraordinarily happy party — all twelve of us — & there wasn't a single hitch in the whole thing. Above all one is glad of having got to know such a splendid man & such a thoroughly able one as Smuts. He is really a wonderful person.

[...]  

Your loving brother

Allen

¹ There is no trace of this letter in A.W.A. Leeper's papers.
² See No. 82.

No. 84

Memorandum by General J.C. Smuts¹  
[PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/6836]

Paris, 9 April 1919

THE MISSION TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

(Report by General Smuts.)

The mandate which I had from the Great Powers was principally concerned with the working of the two Austro-Hungarian Armistices of the 3rd and 13th November, 1918 and the regulation of a neutral zone between the Hungarian and Roumanian forces. It was, however, impossible to enquire into these subjects without hearing and seeing much about other matters more or less closely connected with them. The advance of Bolshevism into the territories of former Austria-Hungary, the position and attitude of the new Governments, and the urgent economic questions arising out of the carving up of the old Empire and the drawing of new economic and political frontiers — all these and similar matters were continually pressed on my attention. As I was asked to report generally I shall therefore, in this report, deal as briefly as possible with all the matters which are of special interest to the Great Powers, or which call for urgent action.

I left Paris on the 1st April, spent the 3rd April in Vienna, mostly in discussions with the Allied Military Missions, and spent the 4th and 5th April in Budapest, holding five meetings with members of the Hungarian Government, besides seeing the Allied

¹ This memorandum is printed, without the enclosures, in LINK, vol. 57, pp. 165-175.
Representatives still remaining in the Hungarian capital, and many other people. On the 6th April I was again in Vienna making further enquiries during which the Chancellor, Dr. Renner, and the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Bauer, came to see me; on the 7th April I saw President Masaryk at Prague, and had a very helpful exchange of ideas with him; and on the evening of that day I left Vienna for Paris, after having an interesting conversation with Dr. Schumpeter [Schumpeter], the Finance Minister of the Austrian Government. All my time was thus fully occupied, mostly in conference by day and travelling by night.

I. The Armistices and the Neutral Zone

When I left Paris it was not quite certain what had become of the Allied Missions at Budapest after the accession to power of the Communist or Soviet Government, and whether the new Government was at war with the Allies or still adhered to the Armistices of the 3rd and 13th November. On these questions I was soon reassured. Our Missions had mostly left Budapest, and those members who had remained behind were quite safe and still in communication with the new Government. A memorandum on the treatment of the Allied Missions prepared by the members of my staff from information collected at Budapest, as also a memorandum regarding the political conditions in Hungary, is annexed hereto. (See Enclosures V and VI.) The Government considered itself as still at peace with the Allies and professed to adhere to the two Armistices, but was in considerable doubt and fear as to the future attitude of the Allies towards the Soviet Government and whether war would not be declared against them. They were, therefore, very much elated and even amazed that an emissary of the Great Powers had come to speak to them, and as the fact was obviously of great significance to the new Government they have in their numerous Press communiques exploited it to the full. This risk was, however, well worth running, as it is certain that an important change has been brought about in the attitude of the new Government.

Before my arrival they were seriously apprehensive of the attitude of the Great Powers towards them, and although they had concluded no alliance with the Moscow Government, they were leaning heavily towards Russia for support against a possible hostile movement by the Great Powers. Now that this fear has been removed from their minds they are obviously more inclined to stand well with the Great Powers, and the danger of their joining with the Russians in an attack upon Roumania has not only been minimised but probably definitely removed.

The Hungarian Government are anxious to attend conferences with us, and to work out their future relations under our aegis, and have probably by our wise and conciliatory attitude been definitely deflected from any pro-Russian course. It is also certain that we could by wise counsel considerably modify the excesses of their communist policy, and thus prevent them from doing too much harm during the more or less short period of their power in Hungary. For there is no doubt that they will have to go. As a Government they are weak. They consist entirely of Jews and do not represent more than the large Jewish proletariat of Budapest. Outside the capital their authority is very small, if not practically non-existent, and in Budapest itself they represent only a minority.

Hungary is not a Bolshevist country, and with wise handling on the part of the Great Powers will not long persist in a Bolshevist policy. The Government is sharply divided into a moderate Socialist element and an aggressive Communist section, of which Bela Kuhn [sic], at present Chief Commissary both for War and Foreign Affairs, and a personal friend of Lenin, appears to be the leader. The Communists are in the ascendant.

2 See No. 81, note 4.
for the moment, but the excesses of their confiscatory policy in Budapest are already leading to a change of feeling, and a reaction is certain to follow, although perhaps not before the Communists have tried their hands at some more disastrous social experiments. In spite of these temporary aberrations and excesses, however, it seems to me clear that the wise course for the Great Powers to pursue is to keep Hungary in hand and away from Russia, and this can best be done by the steady following of the policy initiated by my Mission.

The bourgeoisie and moderate elements are cowed to-day, but they are sure to revive; and if we remain on the spot this revival will come all the sooner and be all the healthier.

After these general remarks I proceed to deal with the Armistice negotiations. As I have said, the Hungarian Government appear to adhere to the two Armistices, and more particularly to that of the 13th November which especially concerns them. Indeed they assumed throughout the discussion that they were bound by the Armistices, and the only difficulty with them was as to the extent of our constantly growing demands for further withdrawals of the Hungarian forces culminating in the final request of Colonel Vyx which precipitated the fall of Count Karolyi. The Vyx line had been settled by the Military Representatives at Versailles after hearing the Roumanian case. But it was drawn so far back in national Hungarian territory, and included so much more than the Powers are ever likely to demand from Hungary, that I was prepared to curtail it considerably in order to arrive at a fair and reasonable settlement.

I therefore took as my basis the future political frontier between Hungary and Roumania which had been agreed upon in the Territorial Sub-Committee of the Peace Conference dealing with these questions, and drew a line well to the west of this frontier, and thus covering all the Hungarian territory which the Powers are likely to demand for cession to Roumania. To this line I induced the Hungarian Government to agree, and I also agreed to their insistent request that the neutral zone thus created should be occupied not by Roumanian but by French, Italian, British and, if possible, American contingents. On this basis an agreement was drafted and ready for signature. At the last moment, however, the three Ministers negotiating with me (Garbai, Prime Minister, Kunfi, Commissary for Education, and Bela Kuhn [sic]) asked for time to consult the remainder of their colleagues.

The result of this consultation was that on the evening of the 5th April they returned to me with a document, which, while agreeing to the proposed line and neutral zone, made it a condition of their withdrawal that the Roumanians should also withdraw to the line of the River Maros which had been provided for in the Armistice of 13th November. The Roumanians had, as a matter of fact, advanced far beyond this line, and my acceptance of this condition would have meant trouble with the Roumanians. I could not possibly agree to it; and I declined therefore to accept the document preferred by these Ministers. They have since published it, and I annex a copy, together with a copy of my draft agreement which was not agreed to (see Enclosures 1 and 2). I also annex copies of my telegrams of the 4th and 6th April (see Enclosures 3 and 4) which explain the course of my negotiations with the Hungarian Government.

Although no agreement was thus reached in regard to the central zone, it is clear that the Hungarians agreed to it, but attached an irrelevant condition which I could not accept as being insulting to the Roumanians.

It is, therefore, probable that if the ultimate political frontiers were fixed along the lines advised by the territorial sub-committee, which follow the ethnological line as closely as possible, we shall have no great difficulty in inducing the Hungarians to accept it.

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3 These do not follow here as they are printed as Nos. 80 and 81.
They are, however, very much upset at our continually increasing demands under the Armistice which, while thoroughly antagonising their people, appear at no stage to approach finality and therefore combine all possible disadvantages. They prefer a definite and final settlement once for all of political boundaries, so that they may know the worst and adjust themselves to it.

I consider this attitude in all the circumstances justified, and would recommend that steps be immediately taken for the settlement of the future political frontiers between Hungary and Roumania.

In order that what has happened may not appear like a rebuff to the Great Powers I would — subject to the reservation mentioned below — be in favour of the policy embodied in my draft agreement being carried out, in spite of the refusal of the Hungarian representatives to sign it. That is to say, I would favour the occupation of the zone adopted by me by troops of the Great Powers, but not by Roumanian troops, and the raising of the blockade as soon as the zone has been occupied. The trainload of fats now held up at Agram should be allowed to proceed to Budapest as an earnest of our benevolent intentions. The Hungarian Government in that case to be notified that the draft agreement is being carried out as an Armistice measure, but that political boundaries will be settled by the Peace Conference at Paris. If it could be added that the Hungarian case would first be heard, so much the better.

I am, however, loth definitely to recommend the execution of the draft agreement and the occupation of the new neutral zone because I am not conversant with the local military situation, nor do I know what troops would be required for the operation, and whether, apart from the Roumanian forces, the Great Powers have sufficient troops left on that front to undertake the operation with safety. I, therefore, make the reservation that this question should be submitted for the advice of the Allied High Command at Constantinople.

II. — An Economic and Territorial Conference

The Hungarian Government were at great pains to explain to me that, as a Soviet Government, they were not so much interested in territorial questions. Hungary had had an imperialist policy in the past which was one of the causes of its present downfall, and the national sentiment among the people was still strong. The present Government, however, occupied a somewhat different standpoint, and would prove more accommodating on the question of territorial boundaries than a Government inclining more to the Right could be expected to be. They were, however, profoundly interested in the economic questions which were arising from the great territorial readjustments. As it was now proposed to cut up Hungary, the country would cease to be an economic entity and would, indeed, become economically impossible, unless its position was safeguarded by economic arrangements with the neighbouring States. They were completely cut off from the territories occupied by the Czecho-Slovak, Jugo-Slav, and Roumanian forces, and both from a food and an industrial point of view the position was becoming impossible.

They, therefore, pressed very strongly that the settlement of political frontiers should be accompanied by a simultaneous arrangement of urgent economic questions, and they pointed out that an economic settlement would help to render the territorial settlement palatable. This view was so obviously reasonable and sound that I was not surprised to find the members of the German-Austrian Government, who saw me, urgently pressing for it. I therefore decided to go to Prague in order to ascertain the views of President Masaryk. He agreed that a settlement of urgent economic questions would be most necessary, and that a Conference of the neighbouring States, comprising the former territories of Austria-Hungary, should be called immediately for the purpose. President
Masaryk considered it, however, essential that this Conference should meet under the aegis and presidency of the Great Powers.

In view of this general agreement, the necessity for such a Conference needs no further argument from me. It is, indeed, not only Hungary's position which will become economically impossible under the new territorial arrangements. German Austria is in as difficult a plight, and unless she can obtain suitable economic arrangements with her neighbours she must inevitably be driven into the arms of Germany. Besides the drawing of new lines across the old Austria-Hungary, and the prevention of intercourse and communications in which the various States are freely indulging, destroy all chance of the resumption of normal industrial and commercial life, strangle the economic life of these large areas, and by rendering impossible all production and industry, are making it a sure breeding place for Bolshevism and anarchy. As it is both the duty and interest of the Great Powers, without any further delay, to put an end to this intolerable situation, it is incumbent upon them to call the economic Conference for which these States are clamouring.

By assuming their proper rôle of guidance and help in this grave emergency the Great Powers will not only contribute to the salvation of the suffering peoples of this part of Europe, but they will establish their moral authority and enhance the prestige of the League of Nations, which will in its early stages be mostly an expression of the joint action of the Great Powers.

The question is what form this Conference should take. As I have said, the Hungarian Government were most anxious that economic arrangements should be settled and announced pari passu with territorial frontiers, and they, therefore, asked that the neighbouring States should be called together under the presidency of a Representative of the Great Powers to discuss both boundary and economic questions. They suggested Vienna or Prague as the place of meeting.

The Great Powers will have to decide whether and where such a Conference should be held. To my mind, the balance of convenience is in favour of Paris as the meeting-place. In the first place, the Hungarian and Austrian Representatives will, in any case, have to be invited there for the signature of the Peace Treaty. In the second place, the Prime Ministers of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, as well as the Representatives of Jugo-Slavia are Delegates to the Peace Conference, and it would in many respects be inadvisable to call them away from their duties at Paris in order to attend a Conference at, say, Vienna. In the third place, this meeting should be held not only under the presidency of a Representative of the Great Powers, but also under their influence and general control, and for that purpose Paris is obviously the only suitable place.

If the Conference idea is accepted I would suggest that business be expedited by the parties being called together not in a general debating conference but in pairs (Roumania and Hungary, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, German Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, &c., &c.) with the Representative of the Great Powers as chairman and umpire, and that all questions be rapidly disposed of. The countries represented would state their respective territorial cases, and in the absence of agreement between them the chairman or the Great Powers on reference from him could finally decide on all points of difference. The economic questions could, at the same time, be agreed upon between the parties and could probably be announced simultaneously with the signature of the Peace Treaty. The economic questions to be dealt with should be those of most urgent necessity, such as freedom of inter-communication and exchange of necessary raw materials and urgent currency questions.
III.- A Mandatory of the Great Powers for Austria-Hungary

I have said enough to show that a sufficient community of interests will remain among the new States arising from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire to call for a common handling of them by the Great Powers. The new Governments are mostly weak, and some of them are sadly deficient in administrative experience. The peoples are actuated by old historic feelings of hostility towards each other. Without the helping hand and the wise guidance of the Great Powers, I am doubtful whether any of them would achieve success in the immediate future, and their failure will involve grave dangers to the peace of Europe. I, therefore, consider it advisable that for the present, and for some time to come, the Great Powers should, in addition to their individual Representatives with the several States, have a common representative of high standing, under whom all the missions of the Great Powers should work, and who would be responsible for advising the Great Powers and later on the Executive Council of the League of Nations, on all important questions involving the common interests of the new States. Such an official would not only represent the Great Powers, but also be the symbol of the surviving unity and the common interests which would continue to bind together the new States. His experience and authority would be necessary to help them to solve the very difficult questions of common concern which otherwise might well prove beyond their powers. He would inaugurate a policy of Conferences between them to discuss common interests which, while teaching them new habits of cooperation, would help to allay the old historic bitternesses which still survive.

In that way German Austria might be kept away from union with Germany, and Czecho-Slovakia might thus be secured from the danger of being outflanked by such a union. Co-operation among the new States under the beneficent unifying guidance of the Great Powers would raise a happier temper among the peoples, and in this atmosphere the load of despair, which is now one of the most fruitful sources of Bolshevism, would be lifted from the minds of the peoples. Nothing has impressed me more in all my enquiries on this Mission than the urgent need of common action by the Powers in all these countries and of their joint representation through a mandatory of wide experience and authority.

On a number of special points brought to my attention in the course of my enquiries I shall circulate separate notes.

I summarise the foregoing report by making the following recommendations:

I. - (1.) That subject to (2) a force representative of the four Great Powers should at once be sent to occupy a neutral zone as defined in the draft agreement with the Hungarian Government.

(2.) That the military question whether, apart from Roumania, the forces of the Great Powers available on that front are sufficient for the purpose should first be submitted to the advice of the High Command at Constantinople.

(3.) That the Hungarian Government should be notified that this occupation is being carried out as an Armistice measure without prejudice to the future political frontiers. It should, if possible, be added that the Hungarian Government will be given an opportunity of stating their case to a Conference before their frontiers are finally laid down by the Great Powers.

(4.) That, as an earnest of our good intentions, the trainload of fats now held up at Agram should at once be sent to Budapest.

(5.) That so soon as the occupation of the neutral zone has been pacifically accomplished, the blockade against Hungary should be raised by the Allied Powers.
II. - That a Conference should at once be summoned to meet, preferably in Paris, under the direction and guidance of the Allied Powers, at which the component States of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should meet together to discuss territorial adjustments and to arrive at an agreement regarding mutual economic and financial problems.

III. - That apart from their respective representatives in the several component States of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Allied Powers should be represented by a joint representative of high position and experience under whom all the Missions of the Great Powers would work. This representative to advise the Great Powers and later on the Executive Council of the League of Nations on all important questions involving the common interests of the new States, and to assist the States themselves in reaching and maintaining agreement on questions of mutual interest and necessity.

J. C. SMUTS

ENCLOSURE NO. 1

Draft Agreement submitted to Hungarian Government

[Budapest, 5 April 1919]

1. THE Hungarian Government agree to withdraw all Hungarian troops and armed forces west of a line drawn as follows:

Leaving the River Maros 3 kilometres east of Mako, passing 3 kilometres east of Totkompos, 3 kilometres east of Bekescsaba, 3 kilometres east of Bekes, 3 kilometres east of the road junction at Berettyoszentmarton, 15 kilometres east of Debreczen, and from there in a north-easterly direction passing 5 kilometres west of Nagyeczed and reaching the river Szanos [Szamos] to the north of the latter place.

2. All Roumanian troops will be ordered not to advance beyond the positions which they now occupy.

3. The area between the line described in paragraph 1 and the line now forming the front of the Roumanian Army is to be considered a neutral zone, and is to be occupied by an Allied force composed of representative contingents of Great Britain, France, Italy, and, if possible, America.

4. The Hungarian Government accepts and adheres to the terms of the Military Convention concluded by the late Hungarian Government with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the 13th November, 1918, as well as those of the Armistice concluded on the 3rd November, 1918.

5. It is clearly understood that the line of demarcation now agreed on is without prejudice to the territorial adjustments which may be embodied in the eventual Terms of Peace.

6. General Smuts will recommend to the Great Powers assembled in Paris that the blockade against Hungary shall be removed forthwith and that facilities be given for
the immediate importation into Hungary of commodities of urgent necessity, particularly fats and coal.

7. General Smuts will further recommend to the Great Powers assembled in Paris that before the political frontiers of Hungary are finally settled in the Peace Treaty, accredited representatives of the Hungarian Government shall be invited to state their case as regards those frontiers and any economic arrangements arising therefrom at a meeting, to be held under the chairmanship of a representative of the Great Powers, with representatives of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and German Austria.

ENCLOSURE NO. 2

Note handed in by Hungarian Government, but returned to them by General Smuts

General,

ON behalf of the Revolutionary Soviet Government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, we give expression to you of our gratitude for the distinguished way and the good feeling with which you have conducted with us the negotiations authorised by the Entente. However, we feel constrained to make the following declaration: —

The conditions submitted to us are of such a nature that those who were willing to undertake the Government of the country under those conditions could only accept them as a command; meanwhile, encouraged by the good feeling shown to us in such an unusual way by the General, we request you to put before the Governments of the Entente Powers the following proposals:

The present Government of the Soviet Republic of Hungary also is prepared to institute a neutral zone, but only in the case that the frontiers of the neutral zone will be extended not only to the west of the present line of occupation indicated by the General, but also to the east to the Maros line, which has been indicated by the Military Convention of November, 1918, as the line of demarcation, which line has been arbitrarily and one-sidedly put aside through Order No. 938 of General Besan to the irreparable damage of our economic life. (Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel Vix, No. 384 D.D., 16.12.18.)

(a.) In this part of the neutral zone which should be evacuated by our troops and should be according to the proposal of the General a line occupied by International, i.e., by English, Italian, French, eventually American, troops, the constitution of the Hungarian Soviet Republic remains in force, and no interference in any form whatever in the thereby shaped economic and social conditions will follow. It is understood, naturally, that at Szegedin and Arad the constitution of the Soviet Republic is to be reintroduced. In accordance with the principles underlying the constitution of the Hungarian Soviet Republic there can, of course, be no objection against the administration of the country being conducted in the language of the population.

4 Not printed.
(b.) Complete intercourse, free of any limitation, from the territory of the neutral zone in the direction of the Hungarian Soviet Republic as well as of the Kingdom of Roumania.

(c.) Free transit communication in the Siebenberger [Siebenbürger] territories occupied by the Kingdom of Roumania.

2. We request the simultaneous and complete raising of the blockade and the providing of the Soviet Republic with coal and fats.

3. We request the calling together of the Conference, as recommended by us and also proposed by the General, which Conference should sit parallel with the negotiations of the Peace Conference, and should consist of representatives of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Bohemia, Roumania, Serbia, Jugo-Slavia and German Austria, and should be held, if possible, in Prague or in Vienna, and should urgently meet in order not only to settle the political frontiers but also the whole complex of economic questions which may arise between these countries. In connection with this we decidedly state that the Hungarian Soviet Republic is based not on the foundation of the principle of territorial integrity, but takes position only against the solution of territorial problems on the ground of imperialistic conquest.

4. We request that it might be made possible to us to maintain in the above-named as well as in the other countries an economic representation, and we at the same time request that the above-named countries will also take measures for their respective economic representation in the territory of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

5. We request that the Entente Powers will immediately take measures to put a stop to the barbaric persecutions to which the different types of labour activity in occupied countries are being subjected. Whilst respectfully submitting all the above, we take the liberty to attract the attention of the General to the circumstance that our Government has not only promulgated a Regulation on the special protection of the personal security of foreign subjects, but has also shown itself prepared to extend particular protection to the property of foreign subjects.

We pray you, General, to accept the sincere expression of our particular respect.

KUHN [KUN],
People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

GARBAI,
President.
Apart from certain minor incidents, such as the seizure of wireless apparatus, the stoppage of telephone and telegraph communications, which can be attributed rather to the general confusion and excitement prevailing than to any ill-intention on behalf of the new Government, the main causes of complaint centre round the capture of certain French detachments on the Transylvanian frontier, the treatment of the British motor boats in the Danube, and the difficulties which were placed in the way of the French Mission when they signified their intention of leaving Hungary.

1. — The Capture and Internment of Certain French Units

On the 25th March, a French troop train proceeding from Eszek [today Osijek] to Arad was led into an ambush and forced to surrender. On the same day, an armoured car detachment proceeding along the Maros was also surrounded and the men taken prisoners. Both these detachments, in all 600 strong, were forced to surrender their arms and equipment, and were taken up to Budapest, where they were interned on reduced rations. An attempt was made by the Hungarian Ministry of War to separate the men from the officers, and it was evidently hoped that the men would throw in their lot with the Communist Authorities. These French troops remained apparently some six days in internment, and it was only upon the energetic protest of M. Noiseux, a prominent French resident in Budapest, to whom Colonel Vytx had entrusted the unofficial charge of French interests after his departure, that the Government consented to release them. After considerable procrastination on the part of the Hungarian Government, the detachments left with their officers for Bekes Szaba [Békéscsaba] on the night of Monday, the 31st March.

2. — Treatment of British Motor Boats in the Danube

3. Departure of the Allied Military Mission

On the 21st March Colonel Vytx informed the new Government that it was impossible for him to stay in Budapest and be subjected to the indignities to which he and his officers were being exposed. The Government answered that they would consider the matter, but no answer was returned for two days. On the 23rd March, however, an officer came on behalf of the Government to request the Mission to remain in Budapest. This Colonel Vytx refused to do, and demanded that immediate and adequate arrangements should be made for the departure of the whole Mission. On the 24th March M. Bela Kun, accompanied by two other Commissaries, called upon Colonel

5 Enclosure Nos. 3 and 4 are not printed, see note 3 above.
6 Edmond Noiseux, Count M. Károlyi's one-time French teacher.
7 The text of this paragraph is not printed. The account of the British motor boat mission to Budapest (22-26 March 1919) is given in Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge's letters to the Admiralty, dated 28 March and 3 April. The latter are printed in Nos. 63 and 77 respectively. Also see No. 77, note 2, where the present (not printed) paragraph is partially quoted.
Vyx and handed him a note apologising for the incidents which had arisen, throwing the blame on the unruly elements of the population and guaranteeing full protection and facilities if the Mission would consent to remain in Budapest. M. Kun even stated that the Government were themselves prepared to accept the wishes of the Allies in regard to the demarcation line in Roumania, but that the Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Councils would not empower them to do so. They added that no alliance with Russia existed, but that as the two Governments had been formed on an identical basis, they were naturally in full sympathy and agreement. The Hungarian Government, however, wished to remain in the closest touch with the Allied Governments, and it was for this reason that they were anxious that the Allied Mission should not depart. Colonel Vyx replied that although he was quite prepared to believe in the good intentions of the Government, yet he mistrusted their ability to give effect to their promises, and he again pressed for facilities for departure. After a further delay of 48 hours a train was eventually provided, and the Allied Mission left on the 26th March without, however, having recovered all the material which had been confiscated in the first days of the revolution.

4. — Mining of the Danube

It will be evident from the above that it was the desire of the Hungarian Government to avoid all possible friction with the Entente Mission, and that the incidents above recorded were due, in the first place, to the behaviour of the Szekler troops on the Roumanian frontier, and, in the second place, to independent action on the part of the Danube sailors. They merely go to prove that the Budapest Government is not in a position to have its orders or wishes obeyed.

A more serious matter, and one in which the responsibility of the Government appears to have been more directly involved, was that connected with the mining of the Danube. On the 23rd March, Lieut.-Commander Williams-Freeman was informed by an agent that the Danube was being mined below Budapest. An official protest to the Minister of War met with no answer, but a further protest addressed by Lieut.-Commander Williams-Freeman on the 31st March, giving particulars as to where the mines had been laid, was answered by the Hungarian Government that the mines had been laid as a precaution against interference with the Danubian shipping and as a protection against a possible Allied disembarkation at Budapest. On the 4th April, after the arrival of General Smuts in Budapest, a further official note was addressed to Lieut.-Commander Williams-Freeman, reporting that orders had been given for all mines to be removed and for all ships flying the British flag to pass undisturbed.

5. — Position of Foreign Subjects and Citizens in Budapest

The present position of foreign nationals and interests in Budapest gives cause for some anxiety. In the first place, the general policy of communism affected Allied interests and nationals in the same way as it affects Hungarian citizens, and the several British and foreign residents in Budapest are exposed to the confiscation of their personal property and to the violation of their domicile. General Smuts took occasion during his conversations with Bela Kun to protest most energetically to him in regard to the treatment being accorded to foreigners in Hungary, and to inform the Hungarian Commissary that unless he would undertake that no foreign subjects or interests should be molested he could scarcely hope that the Allies would treat with him on any amicable basis. Bela Kun professed his entire readiness to accept General Smuts’ point of view, and agreed even to sign the general undertakings annexed at the end of this memorandum. Copies of these undertakings on the part of Bela Kun were at once
communicated to the Swiss and Spanish consuls at Budapest, to M. Noiseux, and Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman. It must be admitted, however, that only a limited importance should be attached to the fact of Bela Kun having signed these undertakings, and that it will be inevitable that foreign interests in Hungary will suffer severely from the course of recent events and from their future development.

The services rendered in circumstances of exceptional difficulty to Allied interests in Hungary by M. Noiseux, the Swiss and Spanish consuls at Budapest, and Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman, merit special commendation.

[Copy.]

[Budapest, 4 April 1919]

The Government of Hungary undertake that all foreign subjects at present resident in Hungary will, if they desire to do so, be given every facility for leaving the country. They will not be molested, and will be permitted to take with them all money, valuables, securities, personal effects, and other movable property which they may possess.

Foreign subjects who elect to remain in Hungary will be guaranteed security of life and property and will not be molested. Foreign banks, commercial undertakings, and companies will not be liquidated by the Government pending an economic convention between the Government and the foreign Governments concerned.

In acceding to the above arrangements, the Hungarian Government accept responsibility for all acts committed by the forces or authorities under their orders, whether Red Army or others.

The Hungarian Government undertake to publish in the public Press a summary of the undertakings above recorded.

G. [?] BELA KUN

ENCLOSURE NO. 6

OBSERVATION ON GENERAL SITUATION IN HUNGARY

1. — Causes which led to the Fall of the Karolyi Government

It is at first sight somewhat surprising that in a town like Budapest, with its large proportion of propertied classes, a Communist Government could have established itself in the space of a few hours, and have been accepted, apparently without opposition, and certainly without bloodshed.

It must be remembered, however, that long before Count Karolyi’s fall the extreme left wing had already gathered into its hands the reins of Government, and that the Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Councils were already acting independently of any central

8 See note 6 above.
9 On 13 April 1919 Lt.-Cmdr. Williams-Freeman reported that the Hungarian Government did not comply with this agreement (see No. 88). On 21 April, in a telegram to Paris, Béla Kun offered once again to comply (see No. 94).
authority. At the same time, the more moderate and experienced elements in Budapest felt themselves absolutely incapable of coping with the economic, industrial and national problems which threatened to overwhelm their country, and they saw no other course but a complete confusion of the issues by a surrender to Bolshevism. Their motives were not, however, merely those of despair and hopelessness, since they cherished also the conviction that through Bolshevism alone could they exert pressure on the Entente Powers.

This somewhat cynical attitude requires, perhaps, some further explanation. It must be remembered that when Count Karolyi declared a Hungarian Republic in November last, the general opinion in Budapest was that the Western democracies would welcome this final breach of Hungary with Austria and Germany under the leadership of a statesman who has always been known for his Entente sympathies. The people of Hungary felt confident that they would now be treated not as enemies, but at least as neutrals, and that they could expect an unbiased application to their case of the doctrines of self-determination and the rights of every nation to full economic vitality. It was not long, however, before this optimistic attitude was succeeded by an increasing wave of disillusion and discouragement. The apparent slowness and disunion of the Conference of Paris, the constantly increasing military pressure exercised under the Armistice Convention, the stern behaviour of the Allied Military Missions, and the frequent rumours of Czech and Roumanian pretensions and arrogance, all tended to increase this reaction and to produce a feeling bordering on despair.

The situation was precipitated towards the end of March by two unfortunate incidents, full details of which have as yet to be elucidated. The first of these events was the publication of the alleged intention of the Entente Governments to hand over to the Czecho-Slovaks the whole Danubian fleet between Pressburg and Baja. The second was the decision of the Paris Conference to allow the Roumanians to extend their Armistice line in Transylvania, and the statement said to have been made by Colonel Vyv, of the Allied Military Mission, that this extended line was not merely a temporary military arrangement but represented the final political frontier.

It was this latter request which furnished the immediate occasion for Count Karolyi's resignation, as will be seen by the terms of the proclamation issued by him in the Press (see Annex to this memorandum).

2. — Composition and Political Opinions of the Commune

As has already been indicated, the present Communist Government of Budapest came into power in a general atmosphere of apathy and despair, but the circumstances of their accession rendered, and still render, it necessary for them to profess the tenets of patriotism and nationalism, with which tenets they do not themselves by any means sympathise.

They were obliged, therefore, at first to proclaim a nationalist policy in apparent alliance with Russia, and it is only now when they have nearly completed the disarmament of the bourgeois[s]e that they have dared to modify their programme by referring to the Russian alliance as of a spiritual nature only, and by disclaiming any insistence on the territorial integrity of Hungary.

The real political inspiration of the present Government is based on the most complete communism. They have already decreed the nationalisation of all private property whatsoever; all dwellings, shops, personal effects, labour, education and experience are regarded as State property, and in order to enforce this they are constituting the absolute dictatorship of the proletariat.

To this extent, their tenets are identical with those of the Russian Socialists, but they differ from the latter in two important aspects, which, from a purely Socialist point of view, cannot but constitute a weakness. In the first place, they are bound, as has already
been said, to adopt at least the semblance of a nationalist policy. In the second place, they are at present determined to refrain, if possible, from actual bloodshed or wholesale executions. For the first they are without an army and have little prospect of being ever able to create one. For the second, their complete communistic programme can only be put into complete effect by the exercise of the most extreme terrorism of the great antagonistic mass of small property holders and the agricultural population.

Apart from the above internal weakness of the Communist Government, the economic situation is extremely menacing. The peasants no longer bring their produce into Budapest in view of the low prices established by the Government, and it is estimated that the city only possesses supplies for one month more. At the same time, the Government is enrolling with no practical success a large number of unemployed into the Red Guard, and the terms offered for this enrolment are sufficiently attractive to entice a large number of unemployed to the capital, who, having once received their enrolment fees and clothes, immediately disband and constitute a permanent and increasing element of disturbance.

3. — Future Development

It can be confidently stated that none of the present Communist leaders possess either the force or the genius necessary to cope with the present chaos and famine. For the present the power rests chiefly with Bela Kun, but even he does not appear to be in the least capable of coping with the vast economic and industrial problems with which he is faced. It is probable, therefore, that the Government will shortly take a new direction, either to the right or to the left. For the moment, Bela Kun, Kunfi, and Böhm appear to be supreme, but according as the existing economic chaos increases it is probable that Samuelli [Szamuely], an avowed terrorist, will render his influence predominant.

It is generally agreed by competent observers that the Government have only the support of some 20 per cent. of the Budapest population, whereas their authority in the Provinces is almost negligible. There are also many indications of an impending counter-revolution on the part of the middle class and the ex-officers, but the general disarmament effected by the Government has been so complete that it is doubtful whether any such counter-revolution could materialise without outside assistance.

Although, therefore, it is not probable that the existing Government will be able to maintain itself for much longer, yet there is small prospect of any early or successful coup on the part of the more stable elements, and it is probable that the present Jewish clique will surrender their power only to the more extreme members of their own faction.

As regards the extent to which the Hungarian Communists are in touch with the Bolsheviks of Russia, it is clear that this connection is by no means as close or effective as might have been supposed. It is true, of course, that Bela Kun is on intimate terms with Lenin, and it is probable that frequent communications by wireless and other means are maintained between them. It is not, however, likely that any active or practical alliance exists between the two Governments, although their relations are necessarily intimate owing to the identity of their ideals and the similarity of their methods.

The Hungarian Communists are extremely optimistic in regard to the propagation of their doctrines abroad. They have, indeed, instituted an elaborate department for propaganda in Central and Western Europe, and they openly maintain that Austria, Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia, and Roumania will come over to them within the next few weeks, and that Italy and France will also succumb within a short period. The Minister of War\(^\text{10}\) admitted recently to a British correspondent that all his British

\(^{10}\) V. Böhm.
propaganda was now complete, and that he had obtained an enormous quantity of forged British and French banknotes for this purpose. He also boasted that the war had been won by Communism, and that the Entente Powers, who had beaten the Germans in the field, were afraid even to tackle the Communist problem.

ANNEX TO ENCLOSURE NO. 6

Count Karolyi's Proclamation

[Budapest, 22 March 1919]

To the Hungarian People.

THE Government has resigned. Those who until to-day have governed by the will of the people, and with the support of the Hungarian proletariat have realised that the compelling force of circumstances requires a new direction.

Continued production can only be guaranteed if the proletariat takes the power into their own hands.

In addition to the impending chaos in production, the external situation is also critical. The Paris Conference has secretly decided that practically the whole territory of Hungary shall be militarily occupied. The Entente Mission in Budapest has declared that it henceforward regards the line of demarcation as a political frontier.

The obvious aim of this further occupation of the country is to make Hungary the base of offensive operations against the Russian Soviet forces on the Roumanian frontier. The territory robbed from us will be the compensation paid to the Roumanian and Czech troops, by means of which it is hoped to destroy the Russian Revolutionary Army.

I, therefore, the Provisional President of the Hungarian Republic, in face of this decision of the Paris Conference, appeal to the proletariat of the world for justification and assistance. I resign and give the power into the hands of the proletariat of the Hungarian people.

Minutes attached to the document:

Harold Nicolson
10/4/19

This report which I understand is now being considered by the Council of Four, might meanwhile with advantage be printed.

Copies should go to Lord Curzon as soon as possible.

E. Crowe
11/4/19

Copy should go before being printed.

11 V. Böhm in his Két forradalom tüzében (In the Fire of Two Revolutions), Budapest, 1923, [1946], pp. 198-199, asserts that this proclamation has never been signed by Count M. Károlyi, and was written and published against his will.

12 The report was not officially endorsed or repudiated by the Supreme Council. Its recommendations, however, were refused. It died a natural death as some of its clauses could not be reconciled with official policy, and events on the field eventually overtook many of the proposals contained in it.
[To] Mr. Balfour

I trust that General Smuts' proposal to start meetings with German and Austrian Representatives in Paris at once, without waiting for the definite decision of the Allied and Associated governments as to the terms of peace to be demanded, will be categorically rejected.

If it were adopted, the utmost confusion would be created and the door opened wide to every form of intrigue.

Moreover it could drive the Roumanians, Czechs, and Yugo Slavs really to despair if the Great Five, after refusing to admit the Representatives of those countries to the deliberations in which their future frontiers are discussed — and intended to be settled — were now to admit that the settlement was to be negotiated with the enemy before the allies have arrived at any conclusions.

Nor would the effect of such a decision when it became known, be calculated to have any but the most deplorable effect on public opinion both in France and in England.

E. Crowe
10/4/19

Seen by Mr. Balfour.
10/4/19
No. 85

Memorandum by General de Lobit (?)¹

No. 2. 649/2B. [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8112]

Army Headquarters,
Armee de Hongrie, 10 April 1919

La genèse du bolchevisme en HONGRIE peut être donnée en exemple de la façon dont le parti bolcheviste international, sous les ordres de LENINE, semble vouloir opérer pour s’implanter dans un pays.

Après une révolution accomplie sous le prétexte de créer une anarchie telle que les décisions du Congrès de la Paix ne puissent être appliquées un Ministerère Communiste présidé par l’ancien secrétaire de LENINE, BELAKUN [sic], a pris virtuellement le pouvoir. Des la Début grande incertitude. Une armée rouge est créée sans grande consistance car elle est mêlée à l’ancienne armée qui n’est pas bolcheviste. Les soviets locaux se fondent, mais au début n’ont aucune autorité et agissent timidement. Des conversations T.S.F.² en clair puis par chiffres s’engagent entre BELA KUN et LENINE.³

Tout à coup l’organisation générale prendre de la consistance. Un envoyé de LENINE, SZAMUELY, vient à BUDAPEST soutenir de ses conseils le Gouvernement. Il aurait avec lui de nombreux agents qui ont appris dans une école spéciale établie à MOSCOU la Doctrine du bolchevisme et la façon de l’appliquer. Ces agents le répandent dans tous les centres importants et fortifient les soviets locaux.

A BUDAPEST, sous l’égide du Gouvernement, se crée un embryon d’armée rouge internationale autour de laquelle s’incorporeraient également les Hongrois volontaires. Le Gouvernement Communiste Hongrois cherche avant tout, pour constituer la base que doit être son armée, la qualité plutôt que la quantité.

Il s’en suit que le mouvement qui dès l’abord avait eu le bolchevisme comme point d’appui du mouvement nationaliste tourne nettement au communiste pur.

Le Gouvernement de BUDAPEST dirigé par LENINE veut se constituer méthodiquement un réseau de Commandement administratif bien assis, obéissant à une même doctrine, ainsi qu’une armée sur laquelle il pourra compter.

Pour cela il lui faut gagner du temps et ne pas entrer en conflit direct avec les alliés, c’est pour cette raison que les délégués envoyés par BELA KUN avec l’intention de traiter avec nous refusent de répondre catégoriquement à toute question relative à l’occupation d’une zone neutre, proposant simplement l’envoi d’autres délégués qui essaieront eux-mêmes de gagner quelques jours.

Il ne faut à aucun prix faire le jeu du Gouvernement Communiste Hongrois. Par ailleurs, il est nécessaire d’agir vite, sinon le bolchevisme s’implanter comme en RUSSE; débordera en Roumanie, en AUTRICHE, en YOUGO-SLAVIE et au-delà.......l’heure actuelle, au contraire, il est facile, si on le veut réellement, de tuer le serpent dans l’œuf, et ceci pour les raisons suivantes:-

D’abord, la liaison effective n’est pas encore réalisée entre les CARPATHES, entre Hongrois et Ukrainiens bolchevistes.

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to the British Peace Delegation in Paris by Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett on 18 April 1919, and was received there on 23 April.
² Télégraphie sans fil (wireless telegraphy).
³ Examples for such telegraphic communication between the two communist leaders can be found in Nos. 151, 158 and 159.
D'autre part, le fond de la population hongroise n’est pas bolcheviste et ne demande qu’à secourir le joug à condition qu’on l’y aide. Une contre révolution est mûre.

Enfin, une partie des troupes hongroises, représentée principalement la division SHECKER [SZEKLER], est reste fidèle aux anciennes idées, et se déclaré prête à marcher sur BUDAPEST pour y rétablir l’ordre. Cette force est pour le moment supérieure aux forces bolchevistes organisées. Si l’on attend elle deviendra inférieure. Il sera trop tard et il n’y aura [aura] plus remède. L’opinion unanime des officiers français qui connaissent la question, et de tout les Hongrois, civils et militaires, qui veulent sincèrement rétablissement de l’ordre dans leur pays est la suivante: la Hongrie, sauf une minorité est prête à accueillir les Alliés qui voudraient rétablir l’ordre et à les y aider par tous les moyens, mais à une condition expresse que les roumains n’avancent à aucun prix et que les hongrois qui ne peuvent vivre sans une partie des ressources industrielles de la TRANSYLVANIE soient admis à défendre leur cause au Congrès de la Paix. Si l’on continue à abonder dans le sens de tous les désirs roumains sans vouloir se mettre en face de la situation réelle et de la vérité, la catastrophe sera inévitable et le bolchevisme s’implantera en HONGRIE et en débordera. Il faut donc choisir entre la complète satisfaction des appétit roumains et le danger bolcheviste.

Et pour faire le choix les minutes comptent car il sera bientôt trop tard. En particulier les SHEKLERS qui représentent le seul élément organisé hongrois susceptible de rétablir l’ordre ne marcheront pas si on ne leur donne pas l’assurance absolue de l’arrêt des roumains. Même dans ce cas ils s’opposeront par le force, ce qui serait loin d’être négligeable, aux efforts faits par les Alliés pour réaliser les décisions de Congrès de la Paix. Or si cette division SHEKLERS est solide et bien encadrée les forces alliées sont uniquement représentées par les serbes qui hésitent à marcher, des roumains et des tchèques qu’il est impossible de faire avancer sous peine de soulever le pays et enfin par deux divisions françaises. Celles-ci ne comprennent chacune que 6 bataillons a 90 fusils par compagnie; les groupes sont de deux batteries malservies, mal encadrées, et n’ayant que 240 coups par pièces sans rien derrière à l’heure actuelle l’aviation se réduit à un avion pour toute l’armée. En résumé si, sortent enfin des hésitations et des études, on veut réellement arrêter le bolchevisme il est nécessaire:-

1. De donner l’assurance au peuple hongrois et en particulier aux SHEKLERS que les roumains n’avancèrent pas, au moins jusqu’à ce que les premiers aient été entendus.
2. De permettre aux SHEKLERS, ainsi libérés de la crainte des roumains, de marcher sur BUDAPEST pour y rétablir l’ordre.
3. De prescrire aux forces alliées, à l’exclusion des roumains et des tchèco-slovaques, d’opérer une diversion menaçante en occupant une grande partie de la zone neutre et de rentrer ainsi en liaison avec les SHEKLERS.
4. De renforcer par les moyens les plus rapides les forces alliées en hommes, matériel, munitions et aviation.
5. De se rappeler enfin que toute minute perdue pour l’accomplissement de ces mesures est un pas de plus vers le consolidation du bolchevisme qu’on ne pourra plus étouffer.

P.O. le Chef d’Etat-Major.
Minutes attached to the document:

It seems highly dangerous to encourage movements like the Szekler — or to give any encouragement to any anti-Roumanian elements.

H.W. Temperley Maj. G.S.
24/4/19

This was written on April 10, since then the situation has materially altered. We need take no action on this and can await any communication which the French may wish to address to us hereon.

E. Crowe
25/4/19

No. 86

Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract)

[LEEP Folder 2]

Paris, 13 April 1919

[...]
I can’t understand how you haven’t yet got the long letter I sent by confidential bag. Perhaps, however, it arrived yesterday. I hope so. It was a very long & detailed account of all we’d done.¹ You don’t need to convert me to your views. You know I share them fully. Harold’s² & my one aim (which was realised) was to prevent a disastrous result. I daresay the whole mission³ was bad but at least by going we prevented it ending in catastrophe.

¹ See No. 83, and note 1 to No. 83.
² Harold Nicolson’s.
³ Gen. Smuts’s mission to Vienna, Budapest and Prague (1-9 April 1919).

No. 87

Letter from G.N. Barnes to D. Lloyd George (Extract)

[Li. G. F/4/3/11]

British Delegation,
Paris, cca. 13 April 1919

[...] General Smuts has recently been to Hungary where he met the Bolshevist leaders. Nobody seems any the worse for it. Probably if he went again he could improve upon the occasion by getting something said by the Hungarians on behalf of, or from, their
fellow Bolshevists in Russia. If we can meet the one, I see no reason why we should not treat in respect to the other so long as the approach is made to appear to come from the other side. By that means it seems to me there might be found a way of protecting the sections of the Old Russian Empire which have been co-operating with us, for the settling down of Russia into ordered life and the bringing away of our own men in safety and, as I think, with honour.

G.N. Barnes

No. 88

Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty

(London. Received 8 May 1919)

Belgrade, 14 April 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith a report on the condition of affairs at Budapest. Lieutenant-Commander F.A.P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., has been at Budapest since December 1918 as my representative on the Armistice Commission and also for the Navigation of the Danube. He is in close touch with all the authorities at Budapest, with whom he has considerable influence. His actions in relation with affairs are characterised by judgment and determination, and his presence at this junction [sic] is valuable.

He returns this day to Budapest. He has full permission to leave the city at his own discretion.

I have, etc., etc.,

(Signed) E.C.T. Troubridge

Admiral
Commanding on the Danube

I See No. 63, note 1.
Letter from Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman to Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge

Belgrade, 13 April 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I left Budapest on 11th [?10th] April, and to forward the following report:

Present situation at Budapest.

The communisation of every sort of property actively continues. All banks have been seized by the Government, who are now taking away all foreign money, valuables, negotiable securities, etc., from the safes. No-one is allowed to possess foreign money, jewellery, etc., above a value of 2000 kronen, the remainder has to be given up without compensation. Searching of houses for valuables by the Red guards is commencing and leading to robbery, pillage and violence.

Arrests of so-called counter-revolutionaries on the information of agents are getting more numerous. These are supposed to be tried by tribunals from which there is no appeal, and proceedings are secret. Executions are beginning, but I can only obtain certain evidence of two executions — one for spreading rumours of an Allied advance on Budapest and the other for counter-revolutionary activities.

A large majority of the population are anxiously awaiting Allied Intervention and occupation.

The town is generally quiet.

Effect of General Smuts' visit.

The Government made a very great deal of capital out of this visit. All the papers, who are of course under very strict Government control, published long articles to the effect that the Proletariat Government had been recognised by the Allies, who now no longer gave them orders but were willing to treat with them, a thing that Karolyi had been trying to accomplish for six months and which they had done in 10 days. Messages were sent to the same effect to Germany, Bavaria, etc., pointing out the advantage at the present time of declaring Proletariat Governments and the Allies' fear of them.

The same capital was made out of the arrival of a train of fat on 8th April.

Both these facts strengthened the Government's position in Budapest.

Laying of Mines in the Danube.

Thirty-six mines were laid in the Danube, about 23rd March at Deneskei Pus[z]ta, and 32 more were laid later near Uszod. Many protests were made, and I was informed on 2nd April, by the People's Commissary for War (Pogany), that orders for their immediate removal had been given.

Up to date a channel extending from the right bank of the river for 80 metres towards the centre has been swept in the Deneskei minefield, but the lower one has not been touched.

I am informed by a reliable agent that Mr. Tombor (Chief of General Staff to Ministry of War) has stated in a report to the Government that nothing less than an ultimatum from the Allies should induce them to remove these mines.
I am unable to say what the final intentions of the Government with regard to these mines will be, but their policy, as in all other matters concerning the Allies, is one of delay.

Military situation.

The Czekler [Szekler] troops are certainly not Bolshevist, and I think it probable that if the Roumanians and Tchecs were held rigidly where they are at present, the Hungarian Czekler [Szekler] troops would themselves march against Bolshevist Budapest.

I have not been able to obtain sufficient information about the Red troops in the country, but they are short of ammunition and all materiel, and it is unlikely that they would put up any serious resistance to an Allied advance.

In Budapest the recruiting for the Red Guard has been a failure and they consist of only about 5000 men. Possibly there are about another 8000 workmen who have arms but are quite unorganised. As a fighting force the Red Guards and workmen are negligeable [sic].

The exact numbers and disposition of Hungarian troops on 2nd April I gave to Colonel Heywood, who accompanied General Smuts, on 5th April. This information was accurate and was copied from a report made out by the then Minister of War (Pogany).

The majority of the population of Budapest await and hope for an Allied intervention. It is very unlikely that any serious opposition would be met with by troops advancing from the South.

Bolshevism is at present confined to Budapest and the country is practically untouched by it.

In Budapest the French are for the moment unpopular, but the British are very popular.

A British military command of Budapest would be welcomed by a large majority of the people. They wish for a British occupation which would control police services, etc., and when everything is again ordered, to hold proper elections, which would certainly establish a stable social Government with which the Bourgeoisie would join.

A counter-revolution is ready to break out at any moment, but owing to their almost complete lack of arms, and difficulty of organising to an adequate extent, it is not certain of success without Allied assistance, and unless its success be immediate and complete it would lead to a very great deal of bloodshed and pillage.

Only a minority of the people in Budapest are Communists of Proletariats, and the majority, and a fairly large proportion of the Government, are Socialist and not Communist.

I have, etc., etc.,
Sd. F. Williams-Freeman Lt.Cdr., R.N.

ENCLOSURE 2 WITH NO. 88

Letter from Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman to Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge

Belgrade, 13 April 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report of my proceedings since the departure of General Smuts from Budapest on the evening of Saturday, 5th April.
On Saturday, 5th April, General Smuts left, his negotiations about the neutral zone having failed of acceptance by the Hungarian Government. Bela Kun had, however, signed a declaration to the effect that foreigners wishing to leave Hungary would be given facility to do so, and could take with them all their moveable property, and that banks, commercial undertakings, etc., would not be liquidated pending an economic convention between the Hungarian Government and the foreign Governments concerned. This agreement the Government later in effect repudiated.²

The departure of General Smuts immediately the negotiations had failed caused keen disappointment to Kun and the Government, but was looked on in the town as a happy augury of early Allied intervention.

After the departure of the General, on arrival back at my hotel at about midnight, I found a dinner had been given by the Government to the foreign newspaper correspondents, Boehm, Pogany and Szanto, amongst others, being present, and at that time were all rather drunk.³

On Sunday, 6th April, I received information that two steamers belonging to the Francis Canal Company, which had been used during the war as patrol boats, were being re-armoured and re-armed with machine guns. I saw Mr. Argoston [Agoston] and protested, and received his assurance that the work would be stopped. This order was in fact given but was not obeyed or enforced. It caused considerable annoyance to the Proletariat sailors, who wanted to immediately arrest me. Hearing of this I went to the barracks and told the Chief of the Sailors' Council that I was very annoyed with these rumours and hoped they had no foundation in fact. They were very surprised at this manoeuvre but it was very successful and has made me very popular with this element.

I also again asked for the immediate removal of the mines in the Danube, and received from Mr. Kun the usual reply that it was being done, but owing to technical difficulties was not completed. I seriously doubt the Government’s intention of clearing the lower minefield. They are, however, extremely anxious to re-open the navigation of the Danube, for the revictualling of Budapest, and to give employment to the 8000 river employees. This wish I intend to exploit to the utmost, to obtain the removal of the minefield, and all obstructions on the river.

Monday, 7th April. Owing to the unlikelihood of the “GISELLA”⁴ arriving in the near future, I made arrangements for a special train to leave Budapest on Saturday, 12th April. The Government begins to place every obstacle in the way of Allied and neutral subjects leaving, chiefly by means of objections to their taking away money, clothes, etc., and the most unnecessary delays and difficulties over passports. They use every endeavour to get me to leave the 200 odd passports in their hands, using the most childish excuses to induce me to do so, and their intention is very obvious, viz: that they wish to lose or otherwise make use of them for getting their agents into the various countries.

In the evening, about 7.30 p.m., a detachment of 12 Red Guards arrived at the Hotel Dunapalota to search all rooms for valuables, money, jewellery, etc. The two top floors were searched and all jewellery confiscated. The men then returned to the kitchens for supper, leaving sentries on the two lower floors. They apparently got drunk over their meal and went to sleep, the sentries getting tired of their watch joined them, and the search was never completed.

² See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5.
³ A detailed account of this dinner is given in E. Ashmead-Bartlett, The Tragedy of Central Europe, London, 1923, pp. 110-121.
⁴ The name of a depot ship for officers and mines (see No. 103).
Elections took place during the day, which was therefore declared a holiday, to elect the “soviets” of the various districts. Lists of 40-60 names were given to each proletariat soldier or worker (Bourgeoisie class etc., were not allowed to vote). Each would cross out what names he wished and the lists were handed in to the various centres. No check of any sort was kept on the voting, most of the names were quite unknown and little or no interest was taken in the ‘election’.

Tuesday, 8th April. The Austrian Consul informed me that Kun had repudiated his agreement5 ‘property which they may possess’ would be interpreted by the Government to mean the ‘Property which they actually had on them’, and that no money, securities, etc., could be drawn from the bank. I informed the Government that this was not the interpretation of the Allied Governments, and coupled with the no-execution of the rest of the declaration amounted, in my estimation, to a repudiation of the declaration. (Protocole of the above was forwarded on 10 April through Vienna).6

Owing to my having received no communication since 4th April, and my inability to send any, I decided to proceed to Baja, on the pretext of making arrangements for the re-opening of navigation on the Danube, in order to get into communication with Belgrade.

Thursday, 10th April. Left Budapest at 6 a.m. in a motor car, accompanied by Liaison Officer, Colonel Dormandy People’s Commissary for Shipping, Mr. Zerkovitz, and the Proletariat Commanders of the Danube Flotilla, an ex-naval stoker and an ex-seaman gunner.

Budapest

Friday, 11th April. Arrived at Baja at 11 a.m. and received orders to proceed to Belgrade.7

I have, etc., etc.,

(Signed) F. Williams-Freeman
Lieutenant-Commander, R.N.

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5 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5.
6 Not printed.
7 Sir C. des Graz had a conversation with Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman during the latter’s absence from Budapest, at which the same information was conveyed to him as in the present two enclosures. Sir C. des Graz in his telegram No. 162, dated 14 April, sent an account of this conversation to Paris (PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/8254). H. Nicolson recorded the following minutes on the file on 25 April: “I fear that this means that Bela Kun realizes his departure is imminent.

Qu. (1) Bring up again on May 1, by which time we may see more clearly what government is likely to establish themselves at Buda Pesth.

(2) Publish this reply through our Press Bureau.

General Smuts to see this [....]."


D[?]”

On another summary of the report (PRO FO 371/3715 No. 60660) another unidentified official in London recorded on 22 April: “General Smuts’ visit has doubtless been of much assistance to the bolshevist party in Hungary.”

See also No. 89.
No. 89

Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extract. Received 24 May 1919)

Belgrade, 15 April 1919

Yesterday (13th) I had a long talk with Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman who has been at Budapest throughout all the trouble. His views may be summed up as follows:-

(a) A small contingent of British troops under a senior officer would be welcomed now in Budapest. The Commander would be able to organise the Hungarian Police Force, take military command of the town, restore order and supervise distribution of food supplies sent. A British contingent, if sent, might be supported by French and Serbians following in rear, but these troops should not approach the town until the British have assumed complete control.

1 This part of the letter, therefore, was written on 14 April.

No. 90

En Clair Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to the Foreign Office (London. Received 19 April 1919)

Paris, 16 April 1919

BY BAG.

Following identical telegram from four Ministers at Bucharest1 April 13th:-

"Le Président du Conseil par intérim nous a fait savoir que, sur la demande du Conseil National Transylvannien, le Gouvernement a donné l'ordre aux troupes roumaines d'occuper les territoires de Transylvanie, dans la limite de la décision de la Conférence de Versailles du 16 Février, afin d'y protéger les populations roumaines contre les violences hongroises.

"Depuis quelque temps, l'impunité des attentats Hongrois et leur aggravation constante soulèvent une profonde émotion dans tout le pays. Une délégation des femmes de toutes les parties de la Transylvanie s'est rendue à Bucarest pour exposer au Roi, au Gouvernement et aux ministres alliés la situation intolérable faite à leur pays et nous demander une protection immédiate.

"La Mission du Général Smuts à Budapest où, d'après les radiogrammes, il a négocié avec le Gouvernement Hongrois Bolchévique et lui aurait proposé des concessions au

1 Representatives of the four principal Allied and Associated Powers.
BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919

détroit des roumains a produit ici la plus déplorable impression, et les roumains on
ont conclu qu'ils n'avaient plus rien à attendre que d'eux-mêmes. Cette impression a été
aggravée par le fait que, contrairement aux assurances qui avaient été données, le
Général Smuts est rentré à Paris sans venir en Roumanie. On récuse donc les conditions
de cette enquête unilatérale. Nous attirons une fois de plus l'attention de nos
Gouvernements sur la situation très critique où se trouve le Roumanie par suite de
l'action évidemment concertée des Bolchéviks Russes et Hongrois.”

Communicated to Peace Delegation.

No. 91

Received 18 April 1919)

No. 2323 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/9/7682]

Foreign Office,
London, 17 April 1919

Immediate.

Earl Curzon of Kedleston presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the Earl of Derby’s despatch, No. 384, of the 9th
instant, relative to the steps taken by the French Government to ensure the supply of
coal to Buda Pesth, has the honour to enquire whether Mr. Balfour sees any objection
to the Hungarian Government being approached, through Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame,
in the sense of the Note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs of April 5th,
enclosed in Lord Derby’s despatch under reference.

Minutes attached to the document:

It is not quite clear whether Lord Curzon’s proposal aims at a separate step on the part
of HMG. or whether a joint Franco-British démarche is intended. If the latter, there
would appear to be no objection. Budapest badly needs coal & to supply it is a means
of restoring normal economic conditions there but it would seem strange to confer these
benefits on the Soviet Govt. at a time when they have taken no steps towards carrying
out the Allies’ demands. I am unaware whether the proposals of Gen. Smuts in this
connection² are approved or have been considered.

A.W.A. Leeper
19/4/19

1 Not printed.
2 For Gen. Smuts’s report, containing his recommendations after his mission to Hungary, see No. 84.
Refer to the Supreme Economic Council.
[To] Mr. Hugessen.

E. Crowe

[To] Mr. Hanson³

H. K[natchbull-].H[ugessen].

[To] Mr. Hugessen

Genl. Smuts was to have made a statement about Hungary to the Supreme Economic Council yesterday, but he was unable to be present, and that Council has nothing before it on the subject.
Can Genl. Smuts' proposals³ be produced and referred to the S.E. Council?

B. [?] Hanson³ 
23/4/19

I annex 56/1/1 6836, which gives General Smuts' report including his proposals for dealing with the Hungarian situation.⁴ I understand that these proposals were discussed by the Council of Four but were not accepted. Presumably therefore the S.E.C. cannot act on them.

[To] A.W.A. Leeper. Is this right? H. K[natchbull-].H[ugessen].

24/4/19

Yes, in view of the fact that Gen. Smuts's proposals for food relief followed & depended on his demand for an acceptance by the Hungarians of a new demarcation zone — which they have not done — I would urge that it is impossible to proceed further in the matter at present without authorisation from the Council of Four. Moreover the present hapless state of the Red Sovyet Government at Budapest hardly justifies our support of them.

A.W.A. Leeper
24/4/19

I agree.

Harold Nicolson
24/4/19⁵

⁢ The editor has not been able to establish further details about the identity of Mr. Hanson.
⁴ See note 2.
⁵ The editor has not been able to trace A.J. Balfour's answer to this communication by Earl Curzon. See, however, LINK, vol. 57, p. 398, where Balfour, in a report dated 16 April 1919, views the question of economic assistance to Hungary essentially in agreement with the minutes quoted here.
No. 92

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour
(Paris. Received 20 April 1919)

No. 218 [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/7895]

Vienna, 19 April 1919

Hungarian group representing all parties including Socialists wish to know if His Majesty's Government will tacitly support enterprises by Hungarians to recognise peasants against Communists. Immediate needs are permission to separate for [?from] Yugo Slavs from Pees [Pécs] and Zombor. Grants of arms and ammunition and food release of officers and other ranks prisoners of war held in Italy.

I informed French Commissioner 1 of this request who requested me to consult French General 2 and draw up proposal in detail for submission. This will be done tonight.

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Minutes attached to the document:

I am not clear as to what “tacit support” means. No doubt we should prefer to see the Communist regime in Budapest overthrown, but this is likely to happen in any case & no decision appears to have been taken as to what steps, military or otherwise, the Allied Powers are able to take.

A.W.A. Leeper
23/4/19

Col. Cuninghame has been instructed to restrict his political activities at Vienna & Budapest to observation and report.

Cornwall
24/4/19

1 H. Allizé.
2 This is probably a reference to Gen. Hallier, member of the French Military Mission in Vienna.
No. 93

*En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 21 April 1919)*

No. 557x [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/7974]

Vienna, 20 April 1919

Commander Freeman arrived here from Budapesth states counter-revolution Budapest planned for Monday, or Tuesday\(^1\) night if leaders escape arrest. Military situation in Hungary desperate no resistance to any advance of Allies possible. Vital to know if Government will recognize counter revolutionary Government which will be socialist liberal and will help them retain power if attempt initially succeeds. Counter revolutionary leaders intend to ask H.M. Government for military mission to control police in Budapesth.

Please reply by clear line telegram ends.

Addressed Astoria repeated D.M.I.

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Minutes attached to the document:

A decision of the Allied Govts seems urgently required. A small Allied military mission might be able to control re-establishment of order as suggested.

A.W.A. Leeper 21/4/19

I do not see how we can give in advance an assurance that some nebulously foreshadowed government that may or may not establish itself at Budapest, will be recognized by the Allies.

As for an English military mission to control the local police, we should certainly have to wait for the request which it is intended to make for our assistance.

Proposals are, I believe, under consideration for sending a British Representative of standing to Vienna. If this will [be] done, I think we should get a clearer insight into the situation than can be gathered from Sir T. Cuninghame's telegrams.

E. Crowe 22/4/19

Sir T. Cunningham [sic] is not a person in whose discretion one can have much confidence. How can we help a counter-revolutionary Govt. to retain power? I would suggest that no reply be sent.

H[ardinge].

\(^1\) 21 or 22 April 1919.
No. 94

Telegram from Béla Kun (Budapest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 22 April 1919)

[PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/8254]

Budapest, 21 April 1919

In reply to your telegraphic message dated April 10th[1] I desire to state that Hungarian Soviet Government accepts full responsibility for fulfilment of their undertaking to permit foreign citizens to withdraw their money and securities from Banks in Hungary and to refrain from taking over foreign commercial establishments and Banks. If any incident has occurred contrary to this undertaking the Hungarian Soviet Government is ready to (make)[2] redress. Suggest that Entente Economic Commission be sent to Budapest to discuss and settle question referred to.

(Sd.) People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs

Bela Kun

1. The communication referred to (see PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/7354) is dated 18 April 1919 (not 10th). In it, A.J. Balfour reminded Béla Kun of the responsibilities of the Hungarian Government under the agreement they had signed with Gen. J.C. Smuts (see Section 5, Enclosure 5 to No. 84) with regard to the safeguarding of the property of foreigners in Hungary. The agreement was repeatedly reported to have been broken by the Hungarian Government.

2. This telegram is also located in PRO FO 608/16 No. 56/1/1/8436, where this missing word is given as: “offer redress”.

No. 95

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 23 April 1919)

No. 240 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8126]

Vienna, 22 April 1919

Hungarian Minister[1] who left Buda Pest yesterday came to me and gave me to understand that Hungarian Government are much concerned at events and desire British Representative to go to Buda Pest to discuss situation.

He gave me the impression that Kun Bela does not hope to be able to continue Government.

Commander Freeman, Professor Brown of the American Mission, and Austrian Minister[2] return by special train to-day.

1. E. Bolgár.

2. Baron Hans Cnobloch, the representative of German-Austria, as it was then officially called in Hungary. Béla Kun’s régime was only recognised as the legitimate government of Hungary by Austria and Soviet Russia.
I am going to Buda Pest to-morrow night.
Addressed to D.M.I.

Minutes attached to the document:

Sir Thomas Cuninghame intends, apparently, to leave for Buda Pesth tonight. I venture to suggest that, if possible, he should be told to defer his visit & that in any case he should be intimated [?] by telegraph to confine his action to observation and report.

Harold Nicolson
24/4/19

I agree.
E. Crowe
24/4/19

Ask Mily. Auths. to tel. urgently to him to defer his visit till he receives further authority.

H[ardinge].

Telegram in the above sense instructing Col. Cuninghame to restrict his activities with political parties in Vienna & Budapest.

[Unidentified]

No. 96

Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna. Extracts)

No. 8 (?) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8126]

Paris, 24 April 1919

Very Urgent

Following from General Thwaites.

Reference your 240 of 22nd inst.¹ You should defer your visit to BUDA PEST until you receive authority from PARIS.

You should confine your action to observation of situation and reporting same to me. You must refrain from becoming involved in or being party to any negotiations or arrangements with political parties at VIENNA or BUDAPEST.

[... ] I do not wish you to take action on the lines suggested in your No. 222² or 218.³

Cornwall

¹ See No. 95.
² Not printed.
³ See No. 92.
No. 97

Telegram from Earl Curzon (London) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extracts. Received 25 April 1919)

No. 553 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8350]

Foreign Office, London, 25 April 1919

[...]

Following is summary of reports received from Buda Pest this week by Sir C. Kennard[...][...]

10 to 12 million Hungarian population disarmed under armistice terms continue to be terrorized by dictatorship supported by 20 to 30 thousand armed guards, leaders of political parties have been nearly all arrested.

Dictatorship have informed General Glets [Smuts] who has been negotiating with then [sic] that Peace Conference has recognised them, and consequently development of Bolshevism has been rather advanced than otherwise. Dictatorship assert that Peace Conference attempted a compromise but that all overtures had been refused by them. Bulk of population had hoped in consequence to see strategical occupation stated to be necessary commenced by Allies at once or further Allied negotiations. When no such steps were taken they lost confidence, and are almost prepared to believe statement of dictatorship that they are recognised by the Peace Conference. In Hungary it is also believed by people that Serbian, Czech, Italian and Roumanian Governments view the growing prestige and power of dictatorship with approval, believing that if Hungary is captured by Bolshevism it will be easier to annex her territories.

[...]

No. 98

Letter from Brigadier-General E.A. Plunkett (Belgrade) to Major-General W. Thwaites (Paris. Extracts, Received 7 May 1919)

[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9273]

Belgrade, 25 April 1919

NOT SENT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

My dear General,

[...] The Roumanian advance through Transylvania has been successful so far, and goes to prove that action on our part would not have been opposed while it would undoubtedly have had a salutary effect.

The Jews running the Hungarian Government are not great men. They are reported to be extremely nervous about their own safety and a military advance on Budapest would probably result in the whole lot bolting.

[...] The tame retreat of the Sechlers [Szeklers], supposed to be the best Hungarian troops remaining, before the Roumanians whose military reputation is none too high
would seem to show that the Hungarians have no discipline left. This is the Serbian point of view.\(^1\)

[...]

In my opinion steps should be taken to control the American Food people and prevent them from over-riding the military. Just after the outbreak of the revolution at Budapest, the French Command held up a train load of food bought from the Americans and destined for Budapest. Hoover's representative fought the question and got his way; the food went to Budapest.

Now we have clear proof that the arrival of this train load of food was a great help to Bela Kun, whose position was not at that time very secure, for it was first food the Hungarians had got from the Entente. A nice object lesson for incipient Bolshevists.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) E.A. Plunkett

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\(^1\) More light is thrown on the role of the Szeklers at this juncture by a telegram from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to A.J. Balfour, dated 21 April 1919 (received 22 April): “Austrian War Office informed me that they have positive information that Szekler division is now marching with Roumanians against Hungarian Government. [....]” (PRO FO 608/9 No. 45/1/5/8066)

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No. 99

*Letter from General Sir H. Wilson to A.J. Balfour*

[PRO FO 608/8 No. 39/1/1/7262]

British Delegation, Paris, 2 April 1919

[To] Mr. Balfour. (through Lord Hardinge)

In March 11th I asked for permission to withdraw a Battn. we have at Fiume. This proposal was not agreed to.

Now I want to raise rather a larger issue. We have still 4 Battalions under Commando Supremo. Is there any reason why all these should not be withdrawn? I understand all the American troops have been withdrawn although they are not required for other theatres whereas I may be called on for troops at any moment for Turkey or Egypt and I have no Reserve available in any theatre except in Italy. May I not therefore be allowed to copy the example set by the Americans?

Henry Wilson
C.I.G.S
Sir Henry Wilson proposes to withdraw the last 4 British battalions from the Italian theatre.

It is not for me to judge of the military requirements necessitating such a withdrawal. It seems to me, however, unfortunate to proceed with this before we have come to a clear understanding with Italy as to

(a) the territorial settlement on the Adriatic coast, including Fiume;
(b) the general policy to be adopted toward Austria and Hungary in the matter of supporting the forces operating, or capable of operating, against the Bolsheviks who are using those countries as bases of an offensive against our allies.

E. Crowe
8/4/19

This should innly [?] [? instantly] go to the Supreme War Council. — The policing of Middle Europe during the transition period is a burden common to all the Associated Powers. Are the Americans having their fair share?

[Unidentified]

[To] Lord Hardinge

The P.M. has ordered the Fiume battalion to remain and a wire has been sent to W.O. to that effect today.

W. Thwaites
26/4/19

I am very glad to hear this.

H[ardinge].

1 This is only a selection of the various comments recorded on the original file.
No. 100

Telegram from Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to A.J. Balfour (Paris.
Received 28 April 1919)

Unnumbered [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8618]

Belgrade, 26 April 1919

Very Urgent.

Following sent to Foreign Office today No. 182.

Lieutenant-Commander Freeman has communicated to Admiral T[roubridge] by wireless today that situation at Buda Pest is rapidly becoming critical.

There have been (?) been) two thousand arrests and about 20 executions of Bourgeoisie. Bela Kun is seeking to give up Government to more moderate Socialists but extreme element make it difficult to do so without further bloodshed.

Commander Freeman considers Roumanian offensive should continue and that advance from south should be made and that serious resistance by Hungarians is impossible.

Admiral has informed Admiralty and General officers commanding French and Serbian troops. Military Attaché requests above may be communicated at once to War Office.

1 The text of Sir C. des Graz's telegram No. 994 (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8914) is very similar to that of the present one. There the end of this sentence reads: "... of the Bourgeoisie in the last 4 days".
No. 101

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 28 April 1919)

No. 249 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8597]

Vienna, 27 April 1919

Commander Freeman, R.N. reports night of April 26th quiet in Budapest.
Special agent returned from Pecs\(^1\) states villages in neighbourhood are inflamed against communists owing to murder, theft and pillage by Red Guard detachments. Only waiting for advance of Allies to rise against Communists.

Strong anti-Soviet feeling arising in Western Hungary. Communist leaders in Budapest continue to make speeches inciting crowd to murder political prisoners in the event of Allied advance.

Addressed Astoria, D.M.I. & General Greenly.

\(^1\) The word “Pesth” is inserted above “Pecs” [Péc] in the original.

No. 102

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 29 April 1919)

No. 254 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/8708]

Vienna, 28 April 1919

This afternoon Bela Kun stated to Phil[l]potts here that Bolsheviks were considering the following. Acceptance of Socialist Government with two portfolios for Burghers and two for moderate Communists, cessation of propaganda, security for political prisoners, freedom of the press, calling of National Assembly, cessation of robbery from banks.

Addressed D.M.I. London.

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Minutes attached to the document:

I doubt whether the extremist group (Mr. Samuelli [Szamuely] & Co) will allow Bela Kun to move to the right in this way.

Harold Nicolson
30/4/19
No. 103

Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty¹
(London. Received in Paris 24 May 1919)

No. 442 [PRO FO 608/8 No. 36/2/1/10887]

Belgrade, 2 May 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the situation on the Danube.

A Flotilla is assembled at Baja, 100 miles South of Budapest, under the command of Captain Vernon Haggard, Royal Navy, consisting of the following ships:-

“Bosnia” (Monitor)
“Save” (Monitor)
“Enns” (Monitor)
“Barsch” (Scout)
“Gisella” (Depot ship for Officers and mines)
Armed tugs
Motor Launches

On 7th April, 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in South Eastern Europe² came to Belgrade. At a conference held on that day he requested me to keep the Flotillas at Baja ready to co-operate with his armies should he be ordered to advance on Budapest. Further, he desired me to organise services for the evacuation of wounded; supplying the army with provisions and ammunition; and for the transport of troops, all these by river. These services have been organised, as also a mine-sweeping service, the Hungarians having mined the river in many places. The arrival of 20 officers from England has enabled me to organise these services with such efficiency as the materiel at disposal permits.

It is reported that the Hungarians have armed and protected 6 Tugs which were similarly used during the war. They have at Budapest a number of Officers and men, late of Austro-Hungarian Navy, who are now actively employed in these operations of mining and preparing extemore war vessels.

In the river Theiss are the monitors “Koros” and “Temes”.

Should an advance be ordered, the Flotillas in the Danube will support the wings of the Allied Armies which rest on the Danube, moving with the armies while clearing the mines before them.

The monitors in the Theiss will act in co-operation with the right wing of the French Army that is situated between the Danube and the Theiss.

I am requested to keep the Flotillas in readiness for these operations until further orders.

British Monitors.

¹ See No. 63, note 1.
² This is probably a reference to Gen. L. Franchet d'Esperey, the Commander of the Allied Armies in the Orient.
The "Ladybird" is at Belgrade, but will proceed to Baja shortly. The "Aphis" is proceeding to Novi Sad. The height of their funnels preventing these ships passing under the bridges, I am having them, and the masts, made moveable, as are the masts and funnels of all the river craft on the Danube. They will then be able to proceed to Budapest or to Vienna if necessary.

Navigation of Danube.

Lieutenant Commander Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., R.N., my Flag Lieutenant, is at Budapest. On 12th April he returned to Belgrade via Baja. Three officials of the Hungarian Revolutionary Government accompanied him, as a "Parlementaire", Mr. Zerkovitz People's Commissary for Navigation, the Secretary to Mr. Bela Kun, and a Colonel Dormandi [Dormány], Liaison Officer.

They urgently desired to meet me to invite me to come to Budapest and open the navigation of the Danube in Hungarian waters.

On 15th April I returned with Lieutenant Commander Williams Freeman to Baja and interviewed these representatives.

I had already received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief that Hungary is subjected to a rigid blockade. I confined myself to informing them that there could be no navigation of the Danube so long as they kept it mined contrary to the conditions of the Armistice, and informed them of the blockade orders. They returned with Lieutenant Commander Williams-Freeman to Budapest.

I have since received a communication from Mr. Bela Kun through Lieutenant Commander Williams-Freeman. It is of interest as illustrating the attitude of the Revolutionary Government and their presumption in demanding terms of the Allies on the question of the mines.

The situation is complicated by the advance of the Roumanian Army into Hungary. Hungary is in fact engaged in active operations of war against all the Allies.

Mr. Williams-Freeman reports there is great discontent with the Revolutionary Government in Budapest. If the country is isolated he believes that the extremists will be replaced by a Socialistic Government of a more reasonable nature.

At present it is purely a Red Guard Government by force and terrorism, based on the fact of the population being without arms and therefore easily subjected to the will of the armed few.

Lieutenant Commander Williams-Freeman has full liberty of movement. He is furnished with a certificate as a "First Class Workman", which entitled [entitles] him to every privilege, to provisions, cigars, free entry into theatres, etc. etc. and carries passes to permit him to have money and to be immune from searching and interference.

The restoration of a normal condition of law and order in Hungary is so important to Europe, and is so closely allied with the question of the navigation of the Danube, by means of which coal, food and raw materials can be received in Budapest, that his presence there is very valuable. Should the evolution of the political conditions, by means of a counter-revolution, permit, at any moment, of the Allies resuming relations with Hungary, the whole question could be rapidly changed by the opening of navigation, to the great advantage of peace in South East Europe.

The section of the Danube from the mouth to Turnu Severin, under the French and Roumanian authorities, is now working. Admiral Exelsmans, of the French Navy, has been appointed to control it and also as French representative on the Danube Commission. His instructions are to act in close co-operation with me.

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3 For Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman's own account of his departure from Budapest, see Enclosure 2 with No. 88.
The section under my control, from Turnu Severin to Baja, is also now completely organised. Navigation is thus actively progressing from Sulina to Baja. It is remarkable how unrest is allayed, and tranquility prevails, in all the territories contiguous to the Danube and tributaries within which normal fluvial communications and commerce are instituted.

Directly I can open the Upper Danube, through Hungarian and Tcheco-Slovak waters, to Vienna, I anticipate with confidence a similar result. But while at war with Hungary, and the Danube is mined, it is necessarily inevitable that that section remains closed.

I have, etc., etc.,
(Sd.) E.C.T. Troubridge
Admiral,
Commanding on the Danube.

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 103

Note from the Hungarian Government to Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman

Budapest, 19 April 1919

Sir,

We have the honour to inform you, that the clearing of the Danube of the mines had been already ordered and this work is going on.

In connection with these orders given by the Hungarian Government of Councils [sic] we have the honour to ask you whether you are in a position to give [sic] us sufficient guarantees that:-

1st. Armed vessels of the Allied Danubian Flotilla shall not trespass the line of demarcation.

2nd. that the Allied Danubian Flotilla has no hostile intentions against the Hungarian Republic.

3rd. that commercial ships hired by the Allied Powers from the Hungarian Republic, have to sail under British flag, and ought to be at the disposal of the Hungarian commerce and supplying of foods.

(Sd.) Bela Kun
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs

Yours truly,
(Sd.) Bohm
Commissioner of War.
Urgent.

Brown and Freeman report that situation in Budapest is fast becoming critical. Organized element will do best to maintain order but extreme element may get out of hand, and start massacre if driven to desperation. Government have asked that I on account of personal knowledge and influence with leading men should go to Budapest to maintain order (2 groups undecipherable). Reference to your Cipher telegram No. 8 April 24th\(^1\) I have told Freeman (?) that I cannot [proceed to Hungary ?] unless (a) matter urgent and of immediate necessity.

French Commissioner has asked me to deliver invitation for Hungarian delegates to attend Peace Conference to Government at Budapest as he cannot send French officer and cannot make Demarche here as Hungarian representative\(^2\) has left Vienna for unknown destination.

I am sending another officer as courier.

M. Allize requests me to instruct them if necessary to postpone for 24 hours presentation of invitation if, as seems likely, fall of Government is imminent.\(^3\)

Instruct me by priority telegram.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Advance copies to

Prime Minister
Mr. Balfour
Sir M. Hankey
Mr. Campbell

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\(^1\) See No. 96.

\(^2\) E. Bolgár.

\(^3\) For the further history of the invitation which was stated to have been issued for Hungarian delegates to the Peace Conference see Nos. 106, 108, 109, 110 minutes, 112, 113, 114, 115, 127 and Enclosure 1 with No. 130; *FRUS, PPC*, vol. IV, pp. 693-695; vol. V, pp. 392-393, 406, 427, 451, 494; vol. XII, pp. 368-369, 455-456; *LINK*, vol. 58, pp. 264-265, 283-284, 315, 369-370, 415 and 486; Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame, *Dusty Measure*, London, 1939, pp. 335-336. From No. 110 minutes; *FRUS, PPC*, vol. IV, pp. 693-695 (notes of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 9 May 1919) and Cuninghame, *op. cit.* it appears that the invitation was the result of a misunderstanding. Cuninghame writes: "Next morning [presumably 3 May] [...] the French Commissioner, M. Allize, came to me and told me that he had been ordered by Paris to invite the Hungarian Government 'tel qu'il soit' to St. Germain-en-Laye to receive the Treaty of Peace. As this treaty was for Austria only it was evident that some bright spark in Paris had mixed up Austria and Hungary with Austria-Hungary."
(1) As regards Sir T. Cuninghame's desire to proceed to Buda Pesth, I submit that his presence there would be of little advantage. Either the moderate elements will maintain order, or the reds will break loose. If the first, Sir T. Cuninghame's presence will be unnecessary. If the second, his "personal influence" will certainly be of no avail.

The question is, however, largely for the Military Section to decide.

(2) As regards the postponement of the invitation to the Hungarian Government, I venture to urge that this invitation should certainly be deferred, not only for 24 hours, but "pending further instructions".

The situation at Buda Pesth is evidently in process of liquidation, and whether a stable or an anarchical government emerges, the existing Ministry will be sure to dissolve.

Harold Nicolson
3/5/19

[To] C.I.G.S.

We have no official representative in Vienna & any action would therefore have to be taken through Col. Cuninghame; but Mr. Balfour thinks that in view of the Press reports today Col. Cuninghame should be instructed to take no action as regards the invitation till the situation is clearer & can be reconsidered tomorrow morning by the Supreme Council.

A.J.B[alfour].
3/5/19

War Office

Very Urgent.

[To] Mr. Balfour (through Lord Hardinge)

I am not sure whether you have a diplomatic representative in Vienna. If you have I will wire to Colonel Cuninghame that all political invitations to Paris or conversations on other matters must be done through such representatives. If on the other hand you have no such person and wish to employ Colonel Cuninghame in that capacity, will you let me know what answer I am to send to his telegram.5

H.W[ilson].
C.I.G.S. 4/5/19

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4 In early May false press reports were released in Paris about the fall of the Government in Hungary, and the occupation of Budapest by Romanian forces. (See H. Nicolson's minutes in No. 110, and notes 1, 3 and 5 to 110.)

5 For Gen. Sir H. Wilson's answer to Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's telegram No. 264, see No. 106.
I understand that the Hungarian delegates are not being invited. But as I am not any authoritative information either on what has been done or what it has been decided or intended to do, I cannot account for the request of the French Commission to Sir T. Cuninghame.

[To] Military Section  
E. Crowe  5/5/19

[to] Sir Eyre Crowe

Col. Cuninghame, on arrival at Vienna of an Assistant (Capt. Barber), has wired expressing his opinion that it is essential for him to come to Paris to explain the situation to D.M.I. Sanction has been given.  

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut.Col.  
5/5/19  G.S.

For Col Sir T. Cuninghame's own account of his subsequent visit to Paris see Cuninghame, op. cit., pp. 336-338. After describing how he failed to obtain a fair hearing from various British leaders in Paris, Col. Sir T. Cuninghame relates the conclusions that he arrived at by the end of his visit: “[...] I had by that time realized that there was so much buzzing going on inside the Paris hive, that nothing outside it had a chance of getting a hearing. I felt that, far, far away in Vienna, I could do as I pleased as long as I did not stir up too much dust. I determined to act accordingly.”

No. 105

Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to the Foreign Office (London. Received 14 May 1919)

No. 77A. [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 73481]

Prague, 3 May 1919

Czech detachments have advanced South across line of demarcation and have occupied a line roughly through following places.


They have met Roumanian detachments at Munkac[s] and Aban(?)szanto.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 77 repeated to Paris. Please repeat to Military Intelligence Branch War Office from Captain Cartwright No. H.C. 19.

1 The telegram was only dispatched on 4 May.
No. 106

Draft of a Telegram from General Sir H. Wilson (Paris) to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)

[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9061]

Paris, 4 May 1919

Priority.

To Col. Cuninghame re No. 264 May 3rd

from C.I.G.S.

Take no action with regard to invitation to Hungarians without further instructions from here.

Meanwhile you should remain at Vienna but transmit urgently any reliable information you can obtain as to situation at Budapest.

Astoria

1 See No. 104.

No. 107

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 5 May 1919)

No. 267 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9187]

Vienna, 4 May 1919

Commander Freeman telephoned last night situation in BUDAPEST calm, politically very strained fall of Government still expected. Professor Brown of American mission has gone to ZZOLNOK [Szolnok] as envoy to extract answer from Roumania to last note of BELA KUN which has so far been left unanswered.1

1 In connection with Prof. P. Brown’s talks with Allied military commanders see Nos. 116 and 122, note 1 to No. 116, as well as note 1 to No. 122.
Commander Freeman reports evening May 4th. Begins. Italian Colonel\(^2\) sent by General Segre Vienna formally asked Kun if he would consent to occupation by Czech troops under Italian officers of Budapest but Kun refused. Professor Brown could not get in touch with Roumanians at Szolloik [Szolnok] and is going to (groups undecipherable). States that east Theiss Roumanian advance was stopped.

Communists much elated at stopping of Allies, unwilling to agree to change of government and state will maintain as centre for working propaganda for Bolshevism what is left of Hungary.

Inhabitants of Budapest surprised at turn of events and maintain (sic) Communist terror. Presentation of note of invitation will increase this effect.

Major Borrow arrived with note at Budapest but will not present it until he receives direct orders to do so from M. Allize. Ends.

Effect of stoppage of advance and recognition of Communists will be? itself very serious in Vienna and will be certain to lead to renewed outbreak in? German Austria of Bolshevist effect which has lately ceased. Strongly urge that presentation of note of invitation be postponed if possible having in view especially the present political crisis in the existing coalition.

Repeated D.M.I.

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1. The receipt of this telegram was acknowledged in Paris on 7 May.
2. This is probably a reference to Lt.-Col. G. Romanelli.
No. 109

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 May 1919)

No. 272 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9268]

Vienna, 5 May 1919

Commander Freeman reports at noon to-day Budapest quiet.

“Bela Kun gone to Komarom to speak with Czech representative. Arrest of hostages continue and their condition, treatment and state of mind is such as to demand the interest of the Entente in their fate and some warning to Bela Kun as to their security.”

Ends.

M. Allizé has directed me to order Major Borrow to present the note of invitation at noon May 6th unless instructions to the contrary are received from Paris.

Repeated to D.M.I.

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Minutes attached to the document:

This means, I suppose, that the invitation has been given.

Harold Nicolson
9 [?10] /5/19

1 The receipt of this telegram was only acknowledged in Paris on 7 May.
2 In connection with Béla Kun’s negotiations with Czechoslovak representatives also see Nos. 117, 123 and 127.
Telegram from Earl Curzon (London) to the British Peace Delegation (Paris)

No. 629 (R.) [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 68411]

Sub-Committee.

Colonel Wedgwood asked a private notice question today in the House: Whether any information could be given as to alleged suppression by Allied troops of Revolutionary Government in Hungary and whether Count Apponyi was the Allied nominee for head of the new counter Revolutionary Government.\(^1\)

We could only reply that we had no official news. Colonel Wedgwood intends to put another question to the same effect on Thursday and is not unlikely to raise the question on the adjournment if not satisfied with answer.\(^2\)

Please furnish any information available as to actual position and policy of Allied Governments.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Colonel Wedgwood's Question.

As no reply had come from Paris this morning I telephoned to Mr. Nicolson to enquire.\(^3\)

I understand from him that there is practical ignorance as to what is happening in Hungary, but that so far as is known the Bolchevist Govt. is still in existence. The whole difficulty has arisen over the question of the invitation of the “Austro-Hungarian” Govt. to send delegates to Paris to receive the peace terms on May 13th. The Council of three agreed to this being done, and an invitation has been sent to the Austrians, but that to Hungary has been held up owing to the anomalous position in that country, and thus no one knows whether they will come.

It appears, however, that there is no doubt that the Govt. of Bela Kun in [is] still in power in Buda Pesth, and this is borne out by the mysterious telegram from Col.

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1 The question originated in false press reports published in the West in early May 1919. See note 5 below.
2 Col. J. Wedgwood raised the same question in the House of Commons on Thursday, 8 May 1919, and received the following answer from C.B. Harmsworth, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: “So far as my information goes, the revolutionary government in Buda Pesth is still in power. I am not aware of any ground for the suggestion in regard to Count Apponyi.” (The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 115, London 1919, columns 1095-1096.) Col. Wedgwood accepted the answer.
3 The delay of the reply was due to the mutilation of the telegram as it was transmitted to Paris, and also the need to clarify the situation in Hungary. See H. Nicolson’s minutes, and note 5 below.
Cuninghame, which cd. not be explained yesterday.\textsuperscript{4} The best reply would therefore be something as follows:-

“So far as my information goes, the Revolutionary Government in Buda Pesth is still in power. The second part of the question does not, therefore, arise.”

C.H.S[mith].
8/5/19

(From) \textit{[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9233]} (F.O. to Astoria No. 629)

Urgent

This telegram, especially the last paragraph, is extremely obscure. It was only by telephoning to London that I could make certain that Hungary was the country referred to:\textsuperscript{5}

Qu. Reply: - (by telephone)

“There is no confirmation of the alleged occupation of Buda Pesth by the Rumanian forces. The fall of Bela Kun's government was due entirely to the fact that he had ceased to command the confidence of the country.”

The Allied Governments have no intention, so long as the requirements of the military situation are met, of interfering with the liberty of the Hungarian people to choose their own form of government.”

Harold Nicolson
6/5/19

I think we must ask the Prime Minister to answer this question. No-one else knows what we are doing or intending, or instructing our agents to do.

E. Crowe
6/4/19

I do not think the reply suggested above will do. We have so far neither encouraged nor discouraged the Roumanians, but Bela Kun's Govt. was losing ground all the time.

H[arding].

\textsuperscript{4} This is probably a reference to Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's telegram No. 268 from Vienna, dated 5 May 1919 (see No. 108).

\textsuperscript{5} See notes 1 and 3 above. At the time when H. Nicolson recorded his minutes false press reports were current in Paris and London about the fall of Bela Kun's Government. (For the background of these reports see Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman's report to Admiral Troubridge, dated 14 May, in the Enclosure with No. 125.) The process of clarifying the reports may also have contributed to the delay in answering the Foreign Office's telegram. It seems that both C.H. Smith from London and H. Nicolson from Paris made telephone calls, and by the time of C.H. Smith's call a clearer picture of the situation in Budapest had been obtained, i.e. that the Government had not fallen. As can be seen from the minutes below, H. Nicolson's suggested answer was not sent to London. The only reply was conveyed through the telephone conversation referred to by C.H. Smith above.
[To] Prime Minister

A.J.B[alfour].

No knowledge.

P.H.K[err].

We are — fortunately — dispensed from answering Lord Curzon's request owing to the lapse of time.

This paper has come back with Mr. Philip Kerr's dictum today.

E. Crowe
13/5/19

No. 111

En Clair Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to the Foreign Office (London.
Received 8 May 1919)

No. 692 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 70055]

Paris, 6 May 1919

By bag.

Following identic telegram received from four Ministers at Bucharest:\(^1\)

Par une note dont nous envoyons le texte par le courrier, le Gouvernement roumain expose les raisons qui l'ont obligé à chasser les hongrois de la Transylvanie et à les poursuivre jusqu'à la Tisza. Il signale en même temps l'intérêt qu'il [sic] y a à profiter [profiter] du désarroi actuel des troupes hongroises pour faire occuper Budapest par les troupes alliées.

Cette opération qui, dit-il, ne présenterait aucune difficulté, aurait l'avantage considérable d'empêcher la reconstruction de l'armée hongroise, de prévenir toute coopération entre elle et les bolcheviks russes, et enfin de permettre à l'armée roumaine de concentrer tout son effort sur le Dniester, où la situation peut devenir rapidement menaçante.

Afin d'avoir toute liberté d'action de ce côté, le Gouvernement Roumain demande outre l'occupation de Buda-Pesth, par les troupes alliées, le désarmement de la Bulgarie. Cette mesure dit-il, est nécessaire pour prévenir la Roumanie contre le danger d'une attaque dans le sud, alors qu'elle a besoin de toutes ses forces pour lutter contre les Bolcheviks russes. Il déclare d'ailleurs que le désarmement est pleinement justifié par les violences dont la Roumanie aurait été l'objet de la part de la Bulgarie.

\(^1\) See No. 90, note 1.
Minutes attached to the document:

This throws some light on the situation. Apparently the Roumanians have stopped their advance at the Theiss owing to the situation in Bessarabia, but they suggest that the Allies shd. continue and occupy Buda Pesth. I can only assume that the American professor Brown went to encourage the Roumanians to proceed and failed to get into touch with them: but on whose instructions this was done is not clear.

[....]

We can get no information from Paris as to the policy which is going to be adopted towards Hungary, and I would suggest reminding Astoria again with ref. to this telegram.

C.H.S[mith].
8/5/19

The Roumanian proposal to be allowed to occupy Budapest seems hardly in keeping with the invitation to the Peace Conference of Hungarian Represes [Representatives].

H.K[natchbull-].H[ugessen].
8/5/19

No. 112

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 May 1919)

No. 277 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9299]

Vienna, 6 May 1919

Reference your number F.O. 9061.¹
Invitation has not been presented. Major Borrow has been ordered to return to Vienna. M. Allize has been informed and acquiesces.
No further action will be taken until further instructions received.

¹ See No. 106.

No. 113

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 8 May 1919)

No. 1 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/9474]

Vienna, 7 May 1919

Major Borrow returned to Vienna this day leaving note of invitation with Commander Freeman. Borrow reports that Bela Kun much stiffened by Reuters report from Paris that Hungarians have been invited streets are placarded to this effect.
Non-Bolshevist dismayed as they believe that an anti-Communists [sic] administration is marching with the Roumanians.

In spite of constant arrests there is still important counter-Communist Party at Budapest who are expected to act shortly.

Arch-Duke Joseph received reply from H.M. the King. He is ill and will be arrested soon as hostage. His son Joseph Franz already arrested whereabouts not known.

Count Albert Apponyi reported to have escaped. Italian Mission in Budapest now consists of 9 officers more are being sent.

Troops sent to the front desert in great numbers, on their return are disarmed as far as possible but sufficient retain arms to make situation in town and country perilous to ordinary citizens.

News that Szolnok has been retaken by Roumanians has been withheld by Bela Kun. Bela Kun expresses his determination to resist to the end if necessary and to fall back into hilly country east of Lake Balaton as this country is anti-Communist he is sending advanced parties to prepare the way by terrorizing the peasants. Further he is sending special party Agram with false passports and money.

Yugo-Slavs have been informed of names.

Number of hostages reckoned now 800 disappearances are of daily occurrence. Repeated D.M.I.

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No. 114

Letter/Memorandum by Major E. Borrow (Extract)

[LI. G. F/23/4/65]

Vienna?, 7 May 1919

I have just returned from a visit to Buda-Pesth, where I gathered much information at first hand which will be of the utmost importance to the efforts of this Commission\(^2\) in sealing the Austro-Hungarian frontier. I went partly on behalf of Col. Cuninghame, taking letters to Lt. Commander Freeman at Buda-Pesth.

The situation in Buda-Pesth is for the moment appalling and reminds one of stories of the French Revolution in 1789; the organization of the Terror Battalion, the utter ignorance of everybody as to the intentions of the Powers in regard to Hungary and as to whether the Czechs, Roumanians and French Colonials are going to continue their advance to Buda-Pesth — all make the situation desperate for anyone unhappy enough to belong to the bourgeoisie or who may be suspected of anti-bolshevik tendencies. The "Battalion of Terror's" nightly house-to-house visits have caused the arrest of some 800 hostages, (or, as Kun Bela prefers to call them, political prisoners) and disappearances after arrest are frequent; for this super- "Red Guard" there are no laws of humanity; with impunity they murder and rob, so when the crisis arrives, as arrive it must before long, the fate of the hostages is not enviable.

To the amazement of everybody in Buda-Pesth who still pin their faith on the Entente to save them from death and destruction, the Buda-Pesth papers yesterday announced

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\(^1\) Both in the Lloyd George Papers and the Public Record Office this memorandum is preserved as an extract from a letter written by Major E. Borrow on 7 May 1919, presumably to Sir William Mitchell-Thomson, member of the British Blockade Delegation in Paris. The copy in the Lloyd George Papers was originally sent by Sir W. Mitchell-Thomson to Sir M. Hankey on 19 May 1919.

\(^2\) Major E. Borrow was British Representative on the Inter-Allied Commission in Vienna.
and later placarded the walls in the town with the announcement that the Entente had invited the Hungarian Bolsheviks to Paris to discuss the Peace Terms ... As some non-Bolsheviks pointed out there is another Government in Hungary other than Bolshevik, i.e. in Eastern Hungary, now in possession of the Roumanians; this non-Bolshevik government was founded at Arad some time ago and is reported to have declared for a Kingdom of Hungary with the popular Arch-duke Joseph of Hungary as their sovereign. I went to see the Arch-duke and found him ill in bed, confined to two rooms and under perpetual surveillance in his own house which had been robbed by them of everything of value; his fortune of Kr. 30,000,000, lodged in the Credit Bank at Buda-Pesth, had of course vanished in the same way; his son Joseph Franz, a 20 year-old boy, was taken prisoner a week ago, present whereabouts unknown, and the Arch-duke himself, though ill, expected to be arrested to-day. Fortunately my companion, Lt. Commander Williams-Freeman, R.N., D.S.O., managed to distract the attention of the detective who accompanied us, so that I could again slip upstairs to the Arch-duke's room for a private interview with him and the Arch-duchess. His situation is pitiable in the extreme, but, Hungarian to the backbone and beloved by the Hungarians, he still does not wish to leave Hungary, but desires with all his heart the occupation of the country by the Allies, as does everyone else except the Bolsheviks. He impressed on me the necessity of instant action, otherwise the whole country would be reduced to the present condition of Russia. I may add that Lt. Commander Freeman had considerable difficulty in securing permission from Bela Kun to visit the Arch-duke, but as Freeman had an official errand he insisted; we later heard that part of the delay was caused by the necessity of returning to the Arch-duke one of the 30 uniforms they had stolen from him, in case he should be well enough to get up.

Italian Mission in Buda-Pesth. There are now in Buda-Pesth 9 Italian officers and more are expected. Their Colonel informed Freeman last night just before I left that they were there to secure the occupation of the city by the Czechs under Italian command before the French or British got there; there are however no British nearer than Italy or Imst; their eventual object is of course to so occupy the country as to take the Jugo-Slavs in the rear. But as regards Buda-Pesth, although Italo-Czech occupation is repulsive to all Hungarians, even this would be preferred by them to the present state of affairs — with no security to life, no right to possess property, no food or employment unless one is a Bolshevik; and compulsory enlistment to fight for the Bolsheviks whether you want to or not. This Italian Mission will also no doubt develop into a trade mission, as soon as a responsible government has been established, as has been the case with Bulgaria and Austria.

Food in Buda-Pesth is scarce, scarcer than in Vienna, but the Bolshevik Government is looking ahead; I saw a huge pig-farm just outside Buda-Pesth containing thousands of pigs “for next winter’s fat” as I was told; the crops are coming along much better than I thought possible and unless the minority Bolshevik Government is overturned within a month they may get too strong a hold, as I think there will be much more food in the summer. Can you therefore prevent any wavering of the resolution to exclude food from Hungary? The admission of Entente food trains just now would be [?] of course be an irretrievable disaster.

Much of this letter will not interest you as the British Representative on the C.B.O., but it will I trust, give you some idea of the conditions on the other side of the frontier.

(Sd.) Edward Borrow
Major.
Minutes attached to the documents:

[To] Prime Minister

Very interesting.

[Sir M. Hankey]

29/5/19

(From) [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/l/7/10442]

Major Borrow’s letter appears to me very hysterical, nor does his information tally with what Professor Brown of the American Service has just brought from Buda Pest. Best for us is to await developments and keep out of counter-revolution plans.

J.C. Smuts

23/5/19

No. 115

Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract)

[LEEP Folder 2]

London, 8 May 1919

[...]
The invitation to the Magyars is held up temporarily pending the constitution of a proper government there.

[...]

No. 116

Note by Major-General W. Thwaites for General Corvisart

No. ? E.L.S. 6404 [PRO FO 608/13 No.46/1/12/10704]

War Office, 10 May 1919

General Franchet d'Esperey reports that American Professor Philip Brown “Attached to the American Commission for the Negotiation of Peace” presented himself at the

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1 A copy of this memorandum is also located in PRO FO 371/3515 No. 74873/W3. It was received in Paris on 23 May, and in London on 17 May 1919. The editor has not been able to establish any further details about the identity of Gen. Corvisart.
advanced posts of the Allied Army in HUNGARY, before SZEGEDIN; he had come from BUDAPEST as an Ambassador of Bela-Kun, and was authorised to put the following questions.

(a) What were the intentions of the Entente towards the Communist Government on the subject of the previous proposals (recognition of national aspirations and the territorial demands of ROUMANIA).

(b) What guarantees would be given that neither he nor the members of the Communist Government should be disturbed, in particular by the Roumanian Government.

If such a guarantee could be given, KUHN [sic] would be ready to lay down office, otherwise he would advocate resistance to the end and it would be difficult to prevent the Red Guard from committing excesses.

Professor Brown declared that a prompt occupation of BUDAPEST by the Allies was desirable, and that it would be easy and welcome to the Socialist workmen.

Professor Brown intended to return to BUDAPEST, where there are with him the members of the American Mission, also Major [Lieutenant-Commander] Freeman and Prince Borghese.

The General Commanding the Allied Army in HUNGARY asked Mr. Brown to come to BELGRADE and discuss the matter with him.

2 Gen. P. de Lobit.
3 For Prof. P. Brown's own report on his mission, written for Prof. A.C. Coolidge, dated 12 May, see FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 462-468. The report also includes points on Col. Sir T. Cuninghame's negotiations with various parties in Hungary, and Prof. Brown's endorsement of Gen. J.C. Smuts's recommendations after the latter's mission to Hungary (see No. 84).

No. 117

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 11 May 1919)

Vienna, 10 May 1919

Commander Freeman reports from Buda Pest.


In return offered present demarcation line as final boundary (1 grp. undecypherable) and promised to treat Slovaks as foreigners under declaration given General Smuts on April 4th.

Also offered 300 locomotives in return for 300 trains of coal.

Czechs apparently promised to send coal at the rate of one train per day.

Bela Kun not satisfied but accepted this.

1 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5.
Italians are very active, wish to establish Italian Commandant de Ville and are promising to send through motor cars, tyres, food and clothes.

Also offered to recognise army and production of munitions of war.

Counter revolution preparing under great difficulties may yet be attempted. Government ignorant of Bela Kun-Smuts declaration as regards foreigners property and commercial undertakings.

Hostages still being taken and imprisoned. Hostages still fairly well treated but great danger of their being killed by Republican guard in the event of counter revolution. Hostages in country badly treated and frequently murdered.

Repeated D.M.I.

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2 In the original "ignoring" is inserted in handwriting above "ignorant of".

3 For the text of the declaration see No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5. See also No. 94 for Béla Kun's telegram to A.J. Balfour, dated 21 April 1919, in which the former undertakes to abide by his obligations under the agreement after repeated remonstrations regarding the Hungarian Government's failure to comply with the terms of the declaration.

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No. 118

Memorandum by Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Extract. Received in the Foreign Office 14 May 1919)

Vienna, 10 May 1919

1. Relations of Hungary and Austria

If Kun Bela can be overthrown the Peace of Austria can be maintained without any great difficulty.

If Kun Bela is not overthrown it will be excessively difficult to save Austria from riot.

Kun Bela can be overthrown -

(a) By negotiation

(b) By force.

(b) has the disadvantage of involving in all probability the massacre of hostages of which there are about 800.

(a) can be secured by a simple authoritative statement that the Allies will not treat with an usurping authority such as the Hungarian Communist Regime.

(b) has the further objection of obliging the Communist Army to base itself upon Easter Austria, that is the regions of Wiener-Neustadt, Glognitz, Graz, Kapfenberg etc. which are the seats of Austrian Communism and which therefore are now being attacked by intensive propaganda.

The Buda Pesth Government has recorded its intention of abandoning Pesth and falling back into Western Hungary in case of necessity.

This involves the danger of co-operation by the Austrian Communists and provocation of a conflict between the armed peasants of Austria and the armed proletariat of Austria.
The Communist element in Hungary responds to no political need of the country; is based upon no expressed desire of any section of the community, but is the tyrannical expression of a Jewish Mafia.

There is a universal desire in Hungary for its abolition, but self deliverance is impossible owing to lack of arms, lack of organization, and lack of courage on the part of the oppressed people.

In addition the situation in Western Hungary is an international scandal. The peasants are being murdered, robbed, forced into military service against their will, and their women are subjected to rape at the hands of the returning Red soldiery. And on account of this, since there are many German Austrians in Western Hungary, there is an appeal to Austria for aid, which the Austrian Government in face of the public indignation may not long be able to resist.

There is great tension between the two Governments.

The Christian Socialists are in favour of the invasion of Western Hungary. The Socialists fearing the defection of the Communist Bolsheviks hesitate to do anything that would justify the accusation of destroying a Workmen's Government.

If the Entente would declare against the Hungarian Communists, the Socialists of Austria would be freed from this difficulty and would act.

[...]

Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section.

(1) Sir T. Cuninghame suggests that we should rid ourselves of Bela Kun by publicly declaring that we cannot treat with him. Such a method would spare us the disadvantages of military intervention & would react favourably upon Austria.

(2) The suggestion is a good one, & might be strengthened by a simultaneous declaration that the blockade will be raised so soon as a properly constituted Hungarian Government have accepted our terms.

(3) The one thing not to do, is to defer action.

Harold Nicolson
16/5/19

I have already submitted minutes recommending action on the above lines.

E. Crowe
17/5/19

[To] Prime Minister

A.J.B[alfour].

P.H.K[err].

Since when is Mr. Philip Kerr the Prime Minister?

E. Crowe
23/5/19
The Hradčany, 
Prague, 11 May 1919

Dear Headlam,

M[asaryk]. has of course always been quite frank about the Ruthenes, whom he regards as a burden to the C. state, but would accept in order through them to obtain a common frontier with Roumania & probably Russia.

I hope it is known in Paris, among those inclined to be impressed by the Magyar “elder statesmen”, that Count Apponyi has addressed a formal petition to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, asking to be allowed to become its citizen, and promising, not only formal loyalty, but that he will make public profession of his good resolves. This to me is simply disgusting, in view of his previous record. N.B. His castle is in the Grosse Schütz.

My first glimpse of Slovak government was distinctly favourable, but I am not going to express myself as yet.

Yours sincerely,
R.W. Seton-Watson

One quite definite impression I already have — that all serious Slovaks want as few, not as many, Magyars as possible, & that the definite policy between M[asaryk]. & Šrobar (Minister for Slovakia, with virtually the powers of a P.M. & 13 “Referents” or heads of departments, under him) is, when once the Treaty is an accomplished fact, to negotiate with the Magyars direct & to cede back most of the border Magyar districts in return for various concessions.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Exceedingly interesting — not least the postscript.

A.W.A. Leeper
15/5/19
1. The Bolshevik Regime in Buda Pesth is an outpost of ‘Leninism’, and means to attack, and is attacking, other countries.

2. When the Blockade of Austria was lifted, “Bolshevistic Russia” and “Hungary” were excluded. But it was not made sufficiently clear that the reason for this exclusion in the case of Hungary was Bolshevism. A statement to this effect is required.

3. The Administration of Bela Kun will fall when it is made clear beyond any doubt that the Allies will not treat with him, and will not raise the Blockade, as long as he remains in power.

4. The Trades Unions are opposed to him, as are all industrial and commercial groups. The Socialists, who originally joined him from patriotic motives, can now be detached.

5. The continuation of Bolshevism in Hungary is dangerous to Austria, where there is at present a political conflict between the Peasantry and the Proletariat. Should this develop into armed action the Workmen and the Volkswehr will unite with Hungarian Bolshevists.

6. It is therefore suggested —

(a) That an authoritative statement be made to the effect that the Blockade of Hungary will be maintained until the ‘Lenin’ Communists retire.

(b) That an emissary — preferably Sir T. Cuninghame — be sent to Buda Pesth to detach the Socialists from the Communists, and to facilitate a change of Administration.
No. 121

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 14 May 1919)

No. 17 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9972]

Vienna, 13 May 1919

Austrian War Office reports only artillery activity on Theiss front.

Hungarian Soviet Headquarters have issued orders to the effect that former instructions with regard to discipline are cancelled and Unit Commanders in future may use arms to put down acts of insubordination.

Minutes attached to the document:

Bela Kun’s control of his own troops has practically ceased.

A.W.A. Leeper
15/5/19

No. 122

En Clair Telegram from Lord Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 14 May 1919)

No. 721 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/9952]

British Embassy, Paris, 14 May 1919

By Bag.

Following identic telegram from British, French, Italian and United States Representatives at Bucharest, dated May 6th:

“Le Gouvernement bolchevik de Budapest a fait au Gouvernement roumain des ouvertures de paix. En même temps, le commandement hongrois a envoyé des parlementaires pour négocier un armistice. Le Gouvernement roumain ne compte faire aucun réponse aux ouvertures de Budapest. Elles n’ont d’autre objet, dit-il, que du gagner du temps jusqu’à ce que les troupes hongroises aient pu se reconstituer et assurer une coopération plus étroite avec les bolchéviks russes.

Cette coopération en effet est démontrée par l’ultimatum que les bolchéviks ukrainiens viennent d’adresser au Gouvernement roumain et par les documents qui viennent d’être saisis sur un courrier russe chargé de la liaison avec la Hongrie.

1 This telegram can also be found in PRO FO 371/3515 No. 73688.
"Quant à l’armistice, le commandement roumain, a formulé des conditions qui impliquent le désarmement complet de la Hongrie et dont l’exécution comporterait une occupation plus étendue du territoire hongrois.

"Le Gouvernement roumain considère que l’occupation de Budapest qui actuellement s’accomplirait sans difficulté est nécessaire pour obtenir le désarmement de la Hongrie: mais en raison de la menace des Russes sur le Dniester, où des agressions locales se sont déjà produites, il hésite à entreprendre par ses seuls moyens cette opération, tout en déclarant qu’il s’empressera d’y participer si elle est décidée par les Alliées. Notre collègue d’Italie télégraphie à son gouvernement dans le même sens."

Copy sent to Peace Delegation.

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Minutes attached to the document:

This telegram explains many points where we are in doubt.

Harold Nicolson
14/5/19

The first sentence of the last para. contains the only practical proposal possible for dealing with the situation in Hungary, according to the opinion of Prof. Brown who has just come from Budapest. Prof. Brown insisted on the necessity (1) of an immediate Allied military occupation (presumably French) of Budapest: this would, in his opinion, require extremely few troops & the occupying forces would be welcomed by all sections of the population — Socialist & “bourgeois” alike; (2) of the coincident despatch of an Allied political mission, under a British officer,2 to report on the political situation & the value of the new Govt. which succeeded the Bolsheviks.

Profr. Brown confirmed the fact that the bourgeois at Debrecen had welcomed the Rumanian army.

A.W.A. Leeper
15/5/19

2 Prof. P. Brown held the view that Gen. J.C. Smuts would be the most suitable person for this task. Prof. Brown, Gen. J.C. Smuts and A.W.A. Leeper had a conversation about the situation in Hungary on 16 May 1919 in Paris (LEEP Folder 2, A.W.A. Leeper to R.W.A. Leeper, 15 and 16 May 1919), where A.W.A. Leeper also voiced his strong support for the use of Allied troops to occupy Budapest, but it is not known whether this conversation resulted in any concrete agreement or proposal.
No. 123

Telegram from D.E.M. Crackanthorpe (Madrid) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 16 May 1919)

No. 2 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/10086]

Madrid, 15 May 1919

Minister of State communicated to Mr. Crackanthorpe this morning following telegram received from Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna:-

"Spanish Consul at Buda-Pest has informed me that Hungarian Government is engaged in secret Peace Negotiations with Czecho-Slovak Government and that former would be disposed to grant every kind of concession if it could thereby remain in power. Hungarian Government is offering inter alia to hand over 300 locomotives in exchange for a daily train-load of coal for provisioning of Hungary. Further if Government at Prague recognised Bela Kun latter is prepared to accept frontier line fixed in Armistice. Consul stated above conditions have been revealed to him for private communication to Freeman as representative of Entente. He has not however communicated with Freeman but has telegraphed them to me for transmission to you." 2

Spanish M.F.A. informed Mr. Crackanthorpe that he was entirely ignorant of source whence Spanish Consul derived above information and that Spanish Consul had evidently refrained from communicating with Freeman through desire not to involve Spanish Government in matter. Minister of State begged no mention should be made of Spanish Consul’s name in connection with above information.

Repeated to F.O.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Commander Freeman is not in Buda Pesth at present. 3
Qu. Repeat to Prague, asking for observations. 4

Harold Nicolson.
16/5/19

E. Crowe
17/5/19

1 This telegram can also be found in PRO FO 371/3515 No. 74784.
2 For other reports concerning the negotiations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments see Nos. 109, 117 and 127.
3 Lt-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman was in Vienna from 14 till 23 May 1919.
4 For C. Gosling’s dispatch from Prague, dated 22 May, concerning the question of negotiations see No. 127. Gosling could not confirm the reports.
At present there is, only second to the excitement about Fiume, a very strong feeling here against the supposed French design of a Danubian Confederation which is regarded as a sort of resuscitation of Austria — the Italian Delegates are being attacked for having accepted the principle of vetoing the union of German Austria to Germany. Of course all the arguments which can be made available to show that this is a violation of the principle of self determination are brought forward, but there is little real attempt to disguise the real reason for the dissatisfaction with that veto. It is felt that German Austria cannot stand alone, and that the alternative to joining Germany is a gravitation towards Jugo-Slavia, and a powerful Danubian combination which will be hostile to Italy, and which will become a channel for German penetration into the Slav States and towards the East.

While the Italian Delegates are secretly criticised for their passive attitude it is realised that they have definitely accepted the decision to veto the union of Austria with Germany and cannot go back on it. But they are enjoined to oppose vigorously anything tending to facilitate an Austro-Slav rapprochement.

I think if one looks a good way ahead there is much to be said for the argument that such a Danubian confederation, so far from segregating and isolating Germany, as is perhaps contemplated by the French, would only become a channel for Germany to penetrate once more, as economic relations must eventually develop across frontiers which are contiguous.
Letter from Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade) to the Secretary of the Admiralty (London. Received in the Foreign Office 14 June 1919)

No. 513 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 88784]

Belgrade, 22 May 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter, and report on the conditions prevailing at Budapest, forwarded to me by Lieutenant-Commander Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., R.N.

This officer has been at Budapest as my representative since December 1918, with the exception of four weeks in January–February 1919. He returns there on 23rd instant.

I have, etc., etc.,
(Sd.) E.C.T. Troubridge
Admiral
Commanding on the Danube

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 125

Report by Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman (Vienna) for Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge (Belgrade)

Vienna, 14 May 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the attached report. I propose remaining at Vienna until orders are received from you.

I feel that my presence at Budapest is valuable in the way of keeping in touch with the situation, trying to obtain the execution of the Kun-Smuts declaration, exercising a restraining influence with regard to hostages, prisoners &c.

I also feel that as an Italian mission has arrived and is remaining at Budapest that it would be a mistake to leave the whole field open to them without knowing what exactly they are doing.

I have, etc., etc.,
(Sd.) F. Williams-Freeman.
Lieut. Comdr.

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1 See No. 63, note 1.
2 Lt.-Cmdr. Williams-Freeman’s report was also sent to Paris (see PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13094), where it arrived on 20 May 1919.
3 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5.
On May 3rd owing partly to the Roumanian advance and the idea then prevailing that it was an allied offensive and partly to the disappointment occasioned by the comparative failure in other countries of expected outbreaks on May 1st, it was seriously discussed at a full meeting of the Government whether the actual Government should resign and place the power in the hands of a purely socialist Government. This at one time appeared probable, but Kun prevented it by a speech in which he pointed out the indecision of the Allies, weakness of the Roumanians, and said that it only required 2 or 3 weeks to produce Bolshevism in the neighbouring countries (including Roumania) and pointed out the almost certainty of Bolshevism breaking out in Germany when she received the peace terms.

The Government then decided to remain in power and this decision they of course easily made the council of Soviets confirm.

The Roumanians did not continue their advance beyond the Tisza and the Government has gradually got stronger and continues to do so, not because it is in the least degree more popular but because its organisation is getting better and the most casual or slightest expression of disagreement is mercilessly punished, and its terror becoming more general. The Socialist element is by force of circumstances becoming more communistic and I consider that there is now little chance of eliminating the extreme and communistic element without a total change of Government. A definite statement that the Allies were going to occupy Budapest would bring about this change, but the statement should be followed quickly by the occupation.

Propaganda is being most actively carried on and very large sums mostly in gold and foreign money are going out of the country. This money is being taken from the banks as required. The present Government are absolutely without scruples, no lie or subterfuge is too mean for them, and no circumstance is neglected if by untruths or subterfuge it can be turned to their advantage in making their position more strong or delaying in any way any interference. The Kun-Smuts declaration is not being carried out, and as regards foreign commercial undertakings the Government have no intention of carrying it out. Hostages and Political prisoners have been taken and are being kept without charge or reason in large numbers. — In general they are fairly well treated, but there have been many cases of the grossest abuse. In Budapest few of them have been murdered (probably only 3 or 4) but in the country and on their journey from the country to Budapest a good many more have been killed, always by Red Guards and “terror” or “Sons of Lenin” troops who have got out of control. In addition to this there have been a certain number of disappearances. In the country where communism and the present Government is universally detested many counter revolutions have broken out, and have always been followed 4 or 5 days later by arrival of red troops when the heaviest reprisals and murders take place.

The great object of the Government appears to be to at all and any cost save time and so enable them to consolidate their position, and get their roots into Budapest, the meanwhile developing their propaganda to an intense degree in the neighbouring countries and also the rest of Europe. They greatly fear an Allied occupation which would be very popular (most especially if it were British) in the whole country and also in Budapest itself.

In short the Government is a Government of adventurous opportunists who are quite untrustworthy in the smallest matter and impossible to deal with.

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4 See note 2. For Béla Kun’s telegram, dated 21 April 1919, undertaking to abide by the terms of the declaration, see No. 94.
Propaganda

A large Propaganda Department has been organised and working since the revolution and is most active. — Large numbers of agents and money are continually being sent out of the country, and being used in the country districts. Some poor samples of their Propaganda leaflets are attached.5

On April 11th, a man employed in the Foreign Office as typist and secretary to an Under-Commissary approached the Persian representative in the Spanish Consulate and eventually offered him any sum he asked for original foreign Passports, most especially American and English. Their efforts are especially directed against the French Troops round Szeged, Croatia, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania.

Military

The Military position of the Hungarians is improving principally owing to the cessation of all offensives against them, all ex Officers and men are forced to join the Army, and discipline is gradually improving.

A most important point is that all the ex Officers are very anti-communist and only join by force of circumstances. Few of them would fight against any offensive of the Allies, and the administrative and supply staffs would all cease work en bloc immediately an offensive known to be authorised and approved by the Allies commenced.

They have little artillery (about 120 field guns, 7.30 cm. howitzers — 12.15 cm. howitzers) but very little ammunition. At this moment there are 4000 men on the south front between the Danube and Tisza and 18 field guns.

The fighting quality of these troops is very poor as a large proportion of them are very much against the present regime. — They would make little or no resistance to an Allied offensive most especially if they were informed that it was the Allies[‘] intention to occupy Hungary while a Government representing the wishes of the people was established.—

The Government are at present concentrating as many of their forces as possible against the Czechs near Salgotarian [Salgótarján] (coal mines) and also wish to retake Miskolcz.—

The counter revolutionary element in the Army is quite strong enough to ensure little opposition to an Allied occupation, and is probably strong enough to prevent serious killing, looting and pillaging in Budapest during the last two days before the troops entered.

A counter revolution organization exists in Budapest. It is not very well organised as yet, and it is realized that its certain success depends on what assistance can be obtained from the Allies. The assistance of the counter revolution element can be obtained in any direction or detail desired, and could undoubtedly be very valuable to the Allies if it was only known what the policy and desires of the Allies were.

Economical

The food situation in Budapest is becoming very bad. There is probably enough flour to last another 6 weeks but meat fat, eggs, milk are very scarce. The peasants refuse to send food into the town because they are against the present regime and also because they cannot use the money obtained for their goods.

5 These are not enclosed with the original file.
Large quantities of 200 Kronen and 25 Kronen “white” notes are being printed, but they are universally regarded as false money. In the country they are not accepted at all and in Budapest, despite the regulation that they are to be accepted their presentation usually elicits the reply that the shopkeeper has no change.

Almost all shops are closed, and only the munition factories on Czeppel [Csepel] Island are working. All men with previous military experience have to join the Army, as well as all unemployed men.

There is a shortage of coal and all railway service is greatly restricted, but Budapest is still fully lighted, the trams are running, theatres are open, and there is always hot water in the hotels.

Order in Budapest has on the whole been well maintained though there have been many abuses, in isolated cases. The revolutionary tribunals consisting of 3 workmen administer summary “justice”, their power extending to the death penalty. Their sittings are secret. No counsel for the defence is allowed and no witnesses may give evidence at the “trial”, all the material for prosecution and defence being supposed to be collected before hand by the Public Prosecutor whose evidence cannot be questioned, examined or disputed.

The vast majority of the population is eagerly awaiting an Allied intervention, and the whole are expecting it and unable to understand why it is so long delayed.

During the last week it has been confidently believed in Budapest that a British occupation of Hungary for $1\frac{1}{2}$ years has been decided upon, and this has given great satisfaction.

The British are universally popular, the French not so popular but would be welcomed as a relief from the present regime. The Italians are not trusted. A mission of about 10 Italian Officers arrived in Budapest on May 5th and tried to persuade the Government to accept an Italian occupation of the town. This was not accepted and they are now trying to do this by peaceful penetration. They are having considerable dealings with the Government and there is strong evidence of their trying to supply the Hungarian Government with materials even to the extent of ammunition and artillery.

The whole situation demands immediate action by the Allies and a statement of policy.

It would be impossible to recognise the present Government as it does not in the least represent the wishes of the people and it cannot be trusted in any way.

The present inaction of the Allies strengthen the Government, exasperate the people, will undoubtedly lead to fighting and revolution in a few weeks.

(Signed) F. Williams-Freeman.
Lieut.Comdr., R.N.

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Minutes attached to the document:

This letter only recounts events prior to May 14th and is thus a little out of date. Since then Bela Kun consolidated his position and has attacked the Czechs. It is interesting to note that the Italians were suspected of coquetting with the Bolshevists even at this date.

C.H.S[mith].
16/6/19
The report is interesting if rather old, & shows the futility of trying to have any dealings of any kind with Bela Kun.

[Unidentified]
17/6/19

No. 126

Telegram from Sir W. Goode (Vienna) to the British Peace Delegation (Paris)

[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/10675]

Copy of a cablegram received from Butler, Trieste, 22 May 1919.
In code “Priority” A. Despatched from Trieste 21 May 1919.
Number 100.

May 21st. Following from Butler, Vienna [Trieste?]. The whole economical [sic] position in this country would be materially helped by some further military action being taken in Hungary. Consider that if military advance the position in Buda-Pest would at once clear up and that would improve the position for traffic. Can you bring pressure on Hoover to take up this matter. Gregory and I are in full agreement on this subject.

Butler

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 126

Telegram from Sir W. Goode (Vienna) to C.K. Butler (Trieste)

Vienna, 22 May 1919

Number 120.

Your 100. Am taking this up with Hoover and our highest authorities.

Goode.

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Minutes attached to the document:

This view was also strongly urged by Profr. Brown, the representative at Budapest of the American Commission of Inquiry. He was of opinion that in the present state of incertitude & despair even Rumanian troops (to take an extreme instance) would be welcomed with relief by the bulk of the population. British & American military representatives should however accompany any army of occupation. I venture to urge that in the interests of a speedy peace, of the Hungarian people themselves & of the

1 The date of dispatching and reception of this telegram is not marked on the original file.
relief of the prevalent distress, everything possible should be done to facilitate such occupation, whether carried out by (preferably) French or by Rumano-Chekh troops.

A.W.A. Leeper
23/5/19

Everyone is agreed; but nothing is done. The matter is supposed to be in the hands of Marshal Foch.

E. Crowe
24/5/19

[To] D.M.I.

I attach a letter from Mr. Butler, confirming his telegram to Sir William Goode. In my opinion the immediate overthrow of Bela Kun’s Government is of the greatest importance, and the continuation of a Bolshevik regime at Budapest constitutes a serious danger to the peace of Europe.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.
28/5/19 General Staff

[To] C.I.G.S.

I am in entire agreement as long as British troops are not concerned. It is entirely a matter for Marshal Foch.

W. Thwaites Maj. General
28/5/19 D.M.I.

2 This letter is not enclosed in the original file.

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No. 127

Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to Earl Curzon (London.
Received 26 May 1919)

No. 100 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 79539]

Prague, 22 May 1919

Very Confidential and Urgent.

Your telegram No. 40 May 20th. I do not believe there is any truth in report that Czech Government is accepting negotiations with Bolshevik Government of Belakun [sic]. The only member of

1 The telegram was only dispatched on 26 May 1919.
2 Not printed.
3 For examples of these reports see Nos. 109, 117 and 123.
Saryks [Masaryk's] Government who might lend himself to intrigue of this nature is Monsieur Vrbensky Minister of Food Supplies who is I believe (?) a Jew and was formerly anarchist. I have however no reason to believe he is implicated in any such movement and I should be disposed to think that report in question has been circulated by Bolsheviks with intention of prejudicing Czech Government.  

Czech Government received yesterday report from their representative in Vienna to the effect that agents of new Magyar Government which is being formed at Arad are attempting to obtain Czech support against Hungarian Bolsheviks. Allisé [Allizé], French representative in Vienna, is in touch with Smercsany late Hungarian Governor of Pres[s]burgh [sic] and other agents of new Hungarian Government which it is reported he is contemplating inviting to Peace Conference. 

The Croatians are stated to be taking active part in this movement with it is said object of (?) the object of which is either overtaking Government of Karupenorgschz [Karadordević] in Croatia and forming a separate Croatian Slovene Republic (?) or a federation of three Yugo Slav Republics. Kloboucvicecz an (?) agent is stated to be prominent in this movement. Doctor Gagliardi a friend of Kloboucvicecz has visited Presspresg [Pressburg] with object of conferring with Doctor Srobar, the Czech Governor of that city and of inducing Czechs to give military aid to new Magyar Government. This will be refused in all probability as (?) is definitely opposed to any military intervention outside this Republic against Bolsheviks owing to strong opposition of Socialist party here. I will forward when possible documents relating to above by messenger but would again urge the necessity for regular courier between Paris and Prague as I do not consider it is prudent to send confidential matter under present system. (Group undecypherable) my telegram No. 97 of May 20th. 

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Paris (group undecypherable).

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4 C. Gosling's impressions are wrong. Negotiations did take place between Béla Kun and Dr. Vavro Šrobár, Minister for Slovakia in the Czechoslovak Government, mainly concerning economic questions, in Komárom on 5 May 1919. They, however, could not come to an agreement, as the Czechoslovak Government refused to rule out their participation in a future intervention against the Hungarian Soviet Republic. 

5 In the original "? turning" is written in handwriting above "overtaking".

6 See No. 130.

7 Not printed.

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No. 128

Received 29 May 1919)

[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/11210]

The Hradčany,
Prague, 26 May 1919

Dear Headlam,

I have just returned from a week’s tour in Western Slovacia, most agreeably impressed with what I found there. Of this anon. I have just time in this letter, which will leave this afternoon, to tell you the result of a long & interesting conversation I had with Mr. Semjan, the unofficial confidential agent of the Czecho-Slovak Government in
Budapest, who had come over to Bratislava (Pressburg) under a special safe conduct, to confer with Dr. Šrobár, and who returned yesterday. He holds the very definite view that unless the Entente makes an end of the Kun regime within the next 4 to 5 weeks, it will be able to survive till December or so, thanks to the harvest, which though probably never so bad in Hungary since Turkish times (40 p.c. less than usual is under cultivation, according to serious calculation* in the original] will stave off absolute starvation. He considers the only possible solution to be an Entente military dictatorship in the 1st instance, supported by civil advisers drawn from those Roumanians, Slovaks & Yugoslovians who are acquainted with the Hungarian language & conditions.

I ought to add that though in the abstract everyone here has an interest in avoiding further warlike complications, especially on the South border of the Republic, yet in the concrete there is much to be said for the view that the longer Hungary's misfortunes continue, the more assured will be the position of Czecho-Slovakia & especially Slovacia finally be. Some of the best men among the Slovaks quite seriously consider that Hungary's recent misfortune has been Slovacia's salvation. The Slovaks are not Chauvinistic, & I found this view among the most moderate, & those who had had the closest relations with honest Magyars. I am convinced that this view is just. Hungary's present plight has frightened the Clericals (the only party who could make trouble for the Republic), rallied the Socialists (not numerous anyhow) to their Czech colleagues, discredited the Magyaronces & Jews even further & above all provided the plain man with a flagrant contrast between his own & his neighbour's position.

I hold very strongly that if the present situation is allowed to continue (& only outside interference can improve it, for the old governing classes are for the moment down & out) Hungary will be reduced to a state of such complete ruin & exhaustion as to be scarcely capable of a separate existence. In short, only her worst enemies can wish her to be left to her fate. Little as I love the Magyars or regret the fate they have brought on themselves, I do not wish to see them destroyed altogether, and at present their whole resources are being squandered ruthlessly in every department of social & political life.

Another point is quite clear to me as a result of my conversations with Semjan & others. Anti-Semitic feeling is growing steadily in Budapest (which is not surprising considering that not only the whole Govt. save 2 and 28 out of the 36 ministerial commissioners are Jews: preponderance of in the Hungarian government; large proportion of the Red officers). S. & others are convinced that a Pogrom in Budapest in the not very distant future is certain & that it will far outdo Russian records. The Jews themselves — the rich middlemen & war profiteers, the smaller shopkeeping class and the freebooters who are now in control, but have taken care to send abroad large sums for their own use when the crash comes — are keenly alive to this & getting more & more anxious. Here again only intervention (under Allied control) can save the situation. I would put it to those international cryptic elements which are at least credited with so much influence behind the scenes, that they have a special interest in hindering such a development. Personally I do not think that anything on earth can stop the Anti-Semitic movement in Hungary but sheer massacre at least can be stopped.

S. hopes that it is realised in Paris that as soon as the Entente troops get near Budapest, they will be joined by the 5000 odd ex-police who have been dismissed & by considerable numbers from the old gendarmerie: that all the numerous lower post office officials in particular are hostile to the Bolsheviks, & that the iron-industry workers, the best organised & wealthiest of the Hungarian working class, are also anti-Bolshevik, though of course Socialist.

* in the original] This contrasts most happily with Bohemia & Slovacia, where every field is in use & where harvest prospects are on the whole admirable. Studeni Maj, stodola raj. Cold May, Paradise of granaries. [The last sentence is R.W. Seton-Watson's translation of the previous one, which is a Slovak proverb.]
He is anxious that the pro-Magyar activity of an American representative in Budapest should be put a stop to. According to him Brown is making a policy of his own. One concrete grievance adduced against B. is that he used his influence successfully to prevent the Slovaks of Budapest being included in the category of Allied citizens whose property must be respected.¹

He tells me that army discipline, which was altogether hopeless, has now distinctly improved, as the result of wholesale terror (disobedience being punished by death) and the abolition of election of officers. They are now nominated by the colonels, the latter being nominated by the High Command.

It is known that Pogany (one of the chief members of the Govt.) and Heltai were the actual murderers of Tisza.

In certain other directions there is an increase of order. Alcohol is rigorously forbidden, & this rule is really enforced, drunkards being punished with 2 years' imprisonment. A "Sperrstunde" has been enforced, & no one can be in the streets after 10 p.m. without a special pass. Large patrols of Red guards enforce this & arrest anyone not provided with the necessary pass.

Morgary [Morgari] the Italian Socialist deputy, is working actively in Budapest; & there is talk of an alliance between Bolshevist Hungary & Russia & Italy. This is doubtless fantastic, but provides certain interesting clues. I am assured that Capronis arrive every few days from Italy in Budapest, & although Prince Borghese is no longer there, intigues of some kind still go on.

There is extreme bad feeling under the surface between the Czecho-Slovaks & the Italian officers, despite the fact that Gen. Piccione himself is very popular & has played the game thoroughly. There have been fresh incidents 2 or 3 days ago at Košice (Kaschau), the Italian officers being boycotted, with the exception of General Zinconi. In Lučenec (Losoncz) there was another incident, the CS.'s having captured locomotives and trucks from the Magyars & being ordered the Italians in command to restore them!! This they evaded by spiriting them all away in the night to other parts of Slovacia. And so on. Now the Italians are being bowed out with extreme politeness & I was present at the review in Piccione's honour, to which Klofač as War Minister came officially from Prague.

In Budapest there is great fear of the Roumanians, as they have so much to avenge, and also (though less) of the Serbs, whose treatment of their Magyar prisoners is known to have being [sic] quite tolerable. A Czecho-Slovak occupation would — from this particular angle — be the least objectionable, but I find no eagerness whatever on their part to undertake such a responsibility, tho' many regard it as inevitable. Personally I should like to see the Czechs involved as little as possible, in their own interests.

I am strengthened in the view which I already mentioned to you, that the great majority of Slovaks do not want any superfluous Magyars — especially in the Miskolcz district — tho' some are tempted by the Salgotarjan coalfield & the Tokaj vineyard and salve their conscience with the (perfectly true) argument that these districts were Slovak one (or sometimes 2) generations ago. But most of them freely admit that these Magyarised districts S.E. of the ethnographic line offer a tougher problem than those of Nitra which will very quickly recover their Slovak character, or even Schütt

¹R.W. Seton-Watson, in a letter to J.W. Headlam-Morley from Prague, dated 29 May 1919, wrote that there was indignation in Czechoslovakia also about the activities of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, the British Military Representative in Vienna, who was thought to have moved on the old plane of Austrian–German–Hungarian supremacy in the area rather than embracing the new system of independent states: "In this connection Sir T. Cunninghame's [sic] activity in Vienna is highly mischievous & causing considerable uneasiness here." (R.W. Seton-Watson Papers, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Archives, General Correspondence.)
Island where the inhabitants are pure Magyar but desire union for economic reasons. Please tell Nicolson that I am converted on the subject of Schütt.

You may remember that 3 weeks ago or so Bela Kun made a speech criticising the Army & declaring also, "My business is to lie, when I speak with the bourgeoisie. I lie in the interest of the proletariat, & sometimes I must blush at my own statements". This was formally denied a little later on. But Semjan tells me that he himself was actually present & heard Kun make this statement.

S.'s information is that there is a lot of smuggling from Serbia into Hungary — even of tyres, munitions & clothing. I am sceptical, but it ought to be investigated. Otherwise his information seems to me extremely reliable.

Last week numerous Budapest workmen declined to accept the new Hungarian money ("white notes"): but when S. left, the matter was not yet settled, & he expected them to be terrorised into submission for the time being. He says there are enough black flour & sugar for 3 months in Budapest, & meatcards providing 30 deca. per week per head (but meat is not available). He says that at Raab (Győr) they have 1500 guns & are capable of finishing 10 a day, with the exception of gun carriages (but these also are being turned out more slowly), & that handgrenades are plentiful and machineguns fairly numerous.

I have collected interesting 1st hand gossip about Kun & his colleagues, but this will keep. You don't need to be told that they are many of them thieves & brigands in the most literal sense of the word.

One characteristic detail. On 1st May the whole city was draped with red, & the cloth, (mainly imported from Vienna in return for pork!!) is estimated to have cost 20 million crowns. This must obviously be absurd, but gives some idea of the lavish scale & of the way in which figures grow! Needless to say, my informant neither guaranteed nor believed the estimate.

In all this I have confined myself to Hungary, and being pressed for time (the bag leaves in half hour) have merely tossed out my information haphazard, without waiting to reduce it to order.

The gist of it all is — impress upon people in Paris the fact that to leave Hungary to her fate may be in the momentary interest of her neighbours as assuring them against her political or financial recovery, but will endanger her whole future by sapping the very foundations.

Yours very sincerely,
R.W. Seton-Watson

Don't take the rioting here on Thurs. and Fri. too seriously! It is not a sign of real Bolshevism at all tho' hooligans came in the 2nd day (& Prague has been famous for 60 years for its hooligans). It was a very natural outburst against the altogether outrageous profiteering prices. I gather our Legn. [Legation] is unduly jumpy, of this anon.

CP [Cf. ?] Gosling's alarmist reports
608/16/48.2.1/10866, 11347
Minutes attached to the document:

I am not sure if Mr. Semjan is right about Professor Brown. Otherwise the letter contains extremely valuable information & I venture to submit that the proposed policy towards Hungary is the only way of saving that country.

A. W. A. Leeper
29/5/19

It is most unfortunate that it seems impossible to decide on any action in Hungary. Whenever the question is raised of encouraging the Roumanians or Serbs or Czecho-Slovaks to enter Budapest, or even of finding a small detachment of French, Italian, or British troops, we are told that Marshal Foch is studying the question. But no decision ever emerges.

The situation at Budapest calls for action and all our information goes to show that on the slightest sign of determined allied intervention, Bela Kun’s government will totally collapse.

E. Crowe
30/5/19

It seems difficult to imagine how negotiations for peace with Hungary are to be carried on unless there is some change in the political situation in Buda-Pesth; & if there is to be a change there, surely it ought to be provoked at once. Otherwise the Peace Conference must continue indefinitely.

H[arding].
Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter of yesterday, which makes your policy quite clear. But I feel that, however much we may affirm abstract principles of liability in respect of the countries carved from the former Austria Empire, we shall in effect get from them just nothing but trouble, friction, and economic floundering. And we are fast shaping a policy which must drive all afflicted Central Europe into league with Germany against us in future.

If my advice had been followed after my visit to Austria-Hungary, and an Economic Conference of all those States had been called (as they were unanimously asking for), we would today have had a scheme, evolved on the spot, on which a statesmanlike basis could have been laid for the economic co-operation and reconstruction of those countries. A Customs Union of those States might have emerged, and part of the proceeds of their external tariff might have gone into a Reparation Fund. Now we are working absolutely in the dark, with the risk that any scheme adopted in a hurry may prove nugatory, except as a source of friction and economic paralysis.

It is clear to me from the tenor of your letter that our representatives on this Commission should be the same as our representatives on the Supreme Economic Council, who have the economic facts as regards these countries before them, and who are actually working with the representatives of other Powers at a scheme for the rehabilitation of credit in these countries. I would, therefore, suggest that Lord Robert Cecil be substituted for me on this Commission. However willing to help, I fear I shall be the wrong man on this Commission. I come to this conclusion with great regret.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) J.C. Smuts

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1 This letter is also printed in W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers, vol. IV, Cambridge, 1966, No. 995.

2 See W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, op. cit., No. 994, in which the Prime Minister elaborates on the reasons why war reparations are to be paid by countries which were formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

3 Gen. Smuts made his position even clearer in connection with the emerging German Treaty at the end of a letter to D. Lloyd George, written 4 June 1919: “This Treaty breathes a poisonous spirit of revenge, which may yet scorch the fair face—not of a corner of France, but of Europe.” (Ll. G. F/45/9/41, or W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, op. cit., No. 1011.)

4 Also see Gen. Smuts’s letter to D. Lloyd George, dated 26 May 1919, which is very similar in content, and which ends with: “I have discussed the matter with [J.M.] Keynes who appears to be exactly in the same position as myself.” (W.K. Hancock, Jean van der Poel, op. cit., No. 993.)
No. 130

Letter from C. Gosling (Prague) to Earl Curzon (London)

No. 65 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 90551]¹

London, 28 May 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my Telegram No. 10079539.² of May 22nd I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a report sent by Dr. Tusar, Czecho-Slovak representative at Vienna to his government; also a memorandum by Monsieur Smerecsany to Dr. Svehla, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, etc., etc.,

Cecil Gosling

ENCLOSURE 1 WITH NO. 130

Report Written by Dr. Tusar for the Czechoslovak Government

Vienna, 20 May 1919

The question of the Hungarian chaos stands in the forefront of interest here. I already reported that the Germans intend to support with their troops, the separation of the Comitats of Western Hungary from the Magyar Republic. These Comitats would for the present declare themselves independent, but would later join German-Austria. It was ascertained that German-Austria is mobilizing; it seems that the mobilization is to serve the above purpose. It was also ascertained that a train-load of arms and machine-guns was sent to the Hungarian frontier from Graz.

The Magyars are making attempts to get our support against the Bolșevist Government. An influential landowner and manufacturer of Raab came to us last Thursday with Dr., a Czech lawyer of Vienna, and asked our Government to equip two thousand Magyar officers living now in Vienna and allow them to attack the Magyar Soviet Republic from Slovakia. This Magyar in presence of Dr. A. also stated that he presented a memorandum to the French Representative Allisé [Allizé], giving a plan of how to bring about an overthow of the present régime in Hungary, and asking that the Czecho-Slovak Government be given the mandate to attack in the direction of Raab and lead Magyar troops to Budapest. Allisé [Allizé] is said to have sent this memorandum to Paris and also to have told its contents to General Pellé, but answered the Magyar in the negative, adding that “Les Tchécoslovaques n'osent pas bouger”. In the meantime our representative received the Magyar Socialist, Mr. Deneš and arranged an interview of Mr. Deneš with Minister Šrobar. The interview will take place in Bratislava in the next few days.

Agents of the new Magyar Government, which is being formed in Arad, are developing a strong agitation in Vienna. They are in communication with Allisé [Allizé] and the British. Smerecsany [Szmrecsányi] declared that Allisé [Allizé] has in his hands an invitation to the Peace Conference for the Magyar Government, that he will keep it

¹ The enclosures with this document can also be found in PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13312.
² See No. 127. (The Foreign Office reference number was inserted by hand.)
back for some time, so as to avoid a necessity of presenting it to the Bolshevist Budapest Government. He asked the Magyar politicians here to have the new Government establish itself on a place of really Magyar territory, so that he can present the invitation to this new Government.

It appears that in this affair the Croatians also take an active part, namely that fraction, which is working here in Vienna for the overthrow of the Government of Karageorgevichs in Croatia, and the formation of either a separate Croato-Slovenian Republic, or a federation of three Jugoslav Republics. The Magyars obtained one Klobucevich, a Croatian, to plead for them with us, to enable them to depart for Prague. Later Klobucevich came with Dr. Gagliardi.

Both — under the impression that I am a particular friend of the Croatias idea — stated that the victory of the Magyar plan would mean also their victory, as they have a promise of Magyar aid to carry out their plans.

Dr. Gagliardi invited me to dine with him in Hotel “Sacher”, where he brought the former Pressburg Governor /Nad-ispan [Nádorispán ? sic?]/ Smerecsany [Szmrecsányi].

The latter made an exposition of the plans of the new Magyars [sic] Government; he declared that the government which was established in Arad, is only provisional, and will, as soon as the Bolshevist régime falls, and Budapest is taken, call both Houses of “Parliament, as they were before the Armistice, i.e. the deputies of all Hungary, including the parts of all Hungary, which the Magyars consider to be under Occupation”, — Slovakia, Transylvania, etc. The parliament will then appoint a new Government from the delegates of all parties. Smerecsany [Szmrecsányi] is also to be in the Government, as the representative of the Christian Socialist Party. Smerecsany spoke to Mr. Stodola a few days ago, and tried to prove to him that the Czechoslovak Government should take interest in the success of the prepared change in Hungary, as its failure would mean a strengthening of Bolshevism in general. At the same time the Czecho-Slovaks have a rare opportunity to gain the respect and friendship of the Magyar nation, by getting it out of the terrible situation. In concrete he asked that we allow the 2000 Magyar officers of whom mention was already made, to gather at some convenient point in Slovakia and from here with our support, or under our leadership to attack the Soviet Government, he is convinced that they will be received everywhere with joy. They are even willing that Budapest be occupied by the Czecho-Slovak or any other troops, and the commander of the army of occupation turn over the civil administration of the German Austrians to occupy the three western Comitats of Hungary, which fact would create enmity between the Germans and the Magyars and a favourable situation for the Czechs. Smerecsany [Szmrecsányi] also asked that we allow them to send arms to Slovakia. In this connection he indicated that the Poles are informed of the whole affair, as he said, when asked how they would get the arms out of here, that they would go as a Polish transport. Smerecsany [Symrecsányi] is the centre of a widely spread agitation in Vienna, and has large sums of money at his disposal. It seems that the Vienna Entente representatives, with the exception of the Italians, are taking an active interest in the matter, only they cannot get the support of their respective Governments, so that the attack from Slovakia remains the only way of action against the Bolshevist Government. Smerecsany [Szmrecsányi] asked why he is so distrusted by the Czecho-Slovak government and said that, should his person in any way be the reason for our refusal to help, he is willing to declare that he would not accept a post in the Government that is to be appointed by the Parliament after the occupation of Budapest. Asked how the new Government imagines the future of the

3 See No. 127.

4 Kornél Stodola, referent responsible for Railways and Posts in the regional Slovak administration led by V. Šrobar. A close associate of the Slovak politician, Milan Hodža.
Magyar State to be, he answered, that if, according to his view, the Magyar State is to be confined to the territory delimited by the present lines of demarcation, it would be far better to divide the whole of Hungary among the newly formed National States. Otherwise it seems that they, together with the British and French, will work for the formation of a Danube Federation; only the Italians are against such a federation.

The Croatians are working in Vienna against the present regime in Jugo-Slavia. They follow the Magyar action with great interest, as they hope that if the Magyars are successful they will help them to emancipate themselves from the Serbian influence.

Smerecsany [Szmrecsányi] stated that he received the former Vice-President of the Austrian Lower House, Zazvorka, who declared that although he was not coming officially on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government, he has sufficient influence to be able to render considerable service to the Magyar cause. He asked the three gentlemen who are taking part in the preparation of the new action in Hungary, [to?] call in Prague where he will prepare ground for them and try to have the Czecho-Slovak Government support their military operations. From what Dr. Gagliardi said, it appears that the Croatians who are opposed to Jugoslavia hope to gain the support of the Montenegrins and Bulgarians against the Serbs.

ENCLOSURE 2 WITH NO. 130

Memorandum by Mr. Smerecsany

The formation of a Government by Count Julius Karoly[i] at Arad has caused much pleasure, and it may now be expected that the Allied Powers will invite Hungary to the Paris Peace Conference.

Magyar politicians, many of whom are residing now in Vienna, have worked for the recognition of this Government and support it by every possible means.

The first task of Karoly[i]'s Government is to prepare order and after that to arrange for the elections of the National Assembly.

The formation of the Government has been very much discussed; the constitutional way would be the best, because the Government would acquire better reputation if it was started on a constitutional basis.

There are many Magyar politicians, who are so persecuted at home, that they have been forced to fly to Vienna. There are doubtful elements who announce that they are political refugees but misuse this title; to stop this, it was decided to establish an office of concentration in Vienna, which has started work already to collect evidence about all refugees. By this work, help is given for the military operations against the Soviet Government.

As it was impossible to use the German-Austrian territory as a starting point for military action, and there was no possibility of organising a military action from here on Hungarian territory, it was decided to ask the Czecho-Slovak neighbouring state, which has an imminent interest in the suppression of Bolševism, to place at their disposal, concentration ground on the occupied Slovak territory; at this place, the army which is going to be recruited against the Soviet Government, all the personnel and munitions should be concentrated.

The acting Committee is prepared to give the Czecho-Slovak State all guarantees that the forces, concentrated on the Czecho-Slovak territory, should only be used for the

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5 This memorandum was presented by Dr. Gagliardi to Dr. Švehla, the Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior on 21 May 1919.
6 In connection with the establishment of this government, see No. 141.
suppression of the Soviet Government; the whole organisation should be under Czecho-Slovak control. This action is not the result of any chauvinistic standpoint.

If the Czecho-Slovak Government would be willing to support the military operations against the Soviet Government, the acting Committee is prepared to give every desired guarantee, which would put the coming Government under obligation. The Vienna Committee has the approval and support of the Allied Missions for its intended action, so that no complications can arise from this side.

The following plans for the intended military action may be stated herewith:-

1. All war material will be procured by the Acting Committee. The Vienna Committee will control recruiting for the first military operations.
2. The Czecho-Slovak State will control the transports in their own territory and will allow the recruited Magyar officers and non-commissioned officers to concentrate at the appointed district.
3. The Czecho-Slovak Government will nominate the officers and trustees who have control of this action.
4. The Czecho-Slovak Government will determine the place where the auxiliary army, recruited against the Soviet Government, shall concentrate.
5. The Czecho-Slovak State will also support this action by supplying war-material.
6. It is expected that after operations begin, legionaries will be recruited in the districts freed from Bolșevist régime and that these reinforcements will help in the military operations.
7. If the Czecho-Slovak State will allow recruiting of Magyars in the occupied territory, this action would be a great help.

An immediate decision is necessary that this action may be carried out at once if it is to be successful.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Extraordinarily complicated. Vienna now seems to be the centre of all intrigues, including the Croat-Slovene separatist movement. Since this was written the Bolshevists have defeated the Czechs and we have not heard what the effect of the Allied reaction from Paris addressed to Bela Kun has been.

C.H.S[mith].
18/6/19

The effect has been nil.

[Unidentified]
19/6/19

(From) [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13312]

The Czechs would be ill-advised to support this Arad Government which is composed of Magyar Chauvinists. Once Bela Kun is got rid of Hungary can settle itself.

A.W.A. Leeper
23/6/19
No. 131

Letter from Captain B.H. Barber (Vienna) to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts)

No. T.C. 480 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/1164]

Vienna, 29 May 1919

The defeat of the Czech troops in Slovakia has greatly elated the Hungarian Red Army and constitutes at the present moment a real danger for German Austria.

The force available in Hungary consists of 7 tried Divisions and certain garrison and reserve troops. Against regular forces the standard of efficiency cannot be rated high, but this army at the present moment is under the impression of a danger escaped, and of national enemies defeated, and is therefore comparatively speaking formidable.

Of these 7 Divisions, 4 are concentrated against the Czechs, 2 are facing the Roumanians across the Theiss, and one is in reserve. Against the Jugo-Slavs and facing Austria are at present only garrison troops.

The Czechs have admitted the necessity for the abandonment of the important centres of Kaschau1 and Miskols [Miskolc] and from reliable information it is clear that their troops have shown a disinclination to fight against the Communists. Further there have been serious nationalist risings in Slovakia against the administration of Prague, and moreover the Czech forces in Slovakia are much strung out in a country poorly provided with communications.

The present plight of the Czech army is to be attributed for the most part, to the disjointed nature of the attack by the Roumanians and Czechs. The former stopped on the Theiss, when the Red Army was in full flight, and gave time for the latter to rally and to make use of the interior lines to concentrate against the Czechs.

The plans and dispositions of the Roumanians, and of the Franco-Jugo-Slav Group were betrayed to the Red Army by Italian agents, allowing the Hungarians to count upon the inactivity of the Southern Entente forces.

[...] It is desirable, in order to direct the attention of the Hungarian divisions from the North, to encourage the Franco-Jugo-Slav group, which are disposed in the Szeged and Arad area, to march to the North, and generally to recommend military operations against the Hungarian Army with a view to the occupation of Budapest; otherwise there may be an unwelcome and serious extension of the Bolshevist area, including not only Styria and Lower Austria, but possibly also Czecho-Slovakia.

(Sd.) B.N. [H.] Barber. Captain, for Lieut.-Col., Genl. Staff.

1 The name of this town is “Kaschau” in German, “Košice” in Slovak, and “Kassa” in Hungarian.
Five weeks ago the Hungarian Army was demoralised, and the Bolshevik Government at Buda Pest on the verge of collapse. The Rumanians had reached the Theiss, and could have taken Buda Pest in a few days — when their advance was stopped.

The present situation is: —

(a) The Rumanians still have 5 Divisions inactive on the Theiss. Meanwhile the Russian Bolsheviks have crossed the Dniester, & are advancing into Bessarabia, where there are French & Greek troops, who do not appear to be offering much resistance.

(b) The French and Serbians are inactive in Southern Hungary.

(c) The Austrians are reported to intend joining the Hungarians if their peace terms are too severe.

(d) For the last 3 weeks the Hungarians have been conducting offensive operations against the Czecho-Slovaks. These operations have been attended with a good deal of success, mainly owing to the inefficiency or treachery of the Italian Mission with the Czecho-Slovaks.

(e) Reports from various reliable sources show that the Italians are intriguing with the Hungarians, & are supplying them with food, arms and ammunition.

(f) The Hungarian Red Army has had 5 weeks to refit and re-organise. This respite, together with the successes against the Czecho-Slovaks, Italian help and the natural fighting value of the Magyar, has greatly raised its morale and efficiency. Bela Kun has now at his disposal a compact force of 7 divisions. He is in close touch by wireless with Lenin and Trotsky.

The continued existence of Bela Kun's Government is a real danger to Europe at the present stage.

W.L.O. Twiss  
Lieut. Col.  
General Staff  
4/6/19

[To] Lord Hardinge

You have already sent a memorandum on the Hungarian question to Mr. Balfour. This appears to be an additional argument for early action.

W. Thwaites  
Maj. General  
4/6/19  
D.M.I.

Everything points to the necessity of occupying Buda-Pesth & of upsetting Bela Kun's Govt.

H[ardinge].
It appears that at the Plenary Meeting yesterday M. Bratiano, speaking in the names of the Governments of Greece, Poland, Serbs-Croats-Slovenes, Czecho-Slovaks and Rumanians, asked for a delay of 48 hours so that they might look closely at the clauses interesting each of them.

In connection with this request it is necessary to call attention to the correspondence, copy of which is attached. From this it will appear that M. Bratiano was asked by M. Berthelot, Chairman of the Commission for the Protection of Minorities in the New and other States, what proposals the Rumanian Government had formulated for dealing with this matter. In answer M. Bratiano stated in general terms that Rumania “guaranteed to all her citizens without distinction of race or religion full equality of rights and of political and religious liberty”, and would apply similar principles to the districts to be annexed. He concluded in his letter, however, with the following paragraph:

“In a general way Rumania is prepared to accept any provisions which all the States which are members of the League of Nations would demand as applying to their territories in this connection. Under other circumstances Rumania could not admit the interference of foreign governments in the application of her internal legislation.”

This answer is a clear refusal on the part of Rumania to accept any such special provisions for the protection of Minorities as have hitherto, as for instance in the Treaty of Berlin, been applied to New States or to existing States in the East of Europe when they received considerable accession of territory. In view of the past record of Rumania, it is clearly impossible to accept general expressions of good intentions if they are accompanied by a refusal to accept the necessary guarantees for their performance.

In consequence, the Commission for the Protection of Minorities in New and other States communicated the correspondence to the Council of Four and asked them to insert in the Treaty with Austria a clause binding Rumania, similar to the clause 293 in the Treaty with Germany binding Poland, to grant the necessary guarantees. The Council of Four sent instructions to the Drafting Committee to insert this clause and I presume it has therefore been inserted and will be read by the Rumanians when they receive the draft of the Treaty.

It is probable, therefore, that at the Plenary Session tomorrow, the Rumanians may bring up the matter and deliver a vigorous protest, and it is possible that there may be associated with them in this the other States concerned. If they adopt this procedure a very serious situation will arise for which it is necessary to be prepared.
I venture to suggest that it is absolutely essential that the principles adopted should be maintained at whatever cost. In a general way the Allies have incurred a very serious responsibility in handing over these very large Minorities of Alien and hostile peoples to the Government both of the New States and of old States such as Rumania and Greece, and they must insist on having special guarantees. It is clear that these guarantees to be effective must be put under the protection of the League of Nations; it is however of the utmost importance that it should be understood that the League of Nations in being asked to undertake this duty does so in virtue of its general functions to provide means for the peaceable solution of international difficulties and the maintenance of Treaty obligations, and does not undertake a general responsibility for the good internal government or the observance of the principles of justice in all the States of the League.

In this connection it is important to lay stress on the point that the principle is not a new one; all that is new is the machinery by which the principle is to be enforced. I think in every case in recent years when new States have been established in Eastern Europe, obligations of this kind have been imposed upon them. In the old days, however, the guarantee for the fulfilment of the obligations was, as has been proved by experience, extremely unsatisfactory; all that we are doing is to improve the machinery.

As regards Rumania, it must be pointed out that under the Treaty of Berlin, clause 43 makes the recognition of the independence of Rumania conditional on the observance of general principles of religious liberty. It is necessary that Rumania should be reminded of these clauses by which she is still bound, for no doubt she will strongly protest against any proposal to bind her as regards not only the new, but the old territories. She is in fact bound as to the old territories. It might then be pointed out that it is obviously indicated that at the time when she accepts the new procedure, she will be released from this clause in the Treaty of Berlin. We shall therefore not be imposing new obligations on an existing State but changing the form of existing obligations.

Supposing that Rumania, as is to be anticipated, still shows herself obdurate, it would then be necessary to refer to the notorious fact that she has succeeded in evading her obligations under clause 44 of the Treaty of Berlin. On this point a very strong case could be made against her. It would be desirable not to have to use this weapon, but it should be made clear that we are prepared to do so, and a public discussion on this matter would clearly be very detrimental to the reputation of the Rumanian State and the Rumanian Government.

In matters of this kind, though one hopes that the necessity will not arise, it is always desirable to keep clearly in mind what are the ultimate sanctions and forces which we have. If necessary Rumania would have to be reminded that the cessions of territory have not yet been made and that it is still always open to the Allied and Associated Powers to alter the terms of the draft Treaty with Austria so as to transfer the Bukowina not directly to Rumania but to the Allied and Associated Powers; it would be necessary also to remind them that the future boundaries of Hungary have not yet been irrevocably determined and the final decision might have been adversely affected if the Rumanian Government refused to accept such conditions of transference as the Allied and Associated Powers consider necessary.

J.W. Headlam-Morley

by them. G. Clemenceau and President W. Wilson urged them to accept these provisions. As no decision was reached, it was agreed that further discussions were necessary to resolve the differences.
Information and documents have now been received from Budapest on which an estimate can be formed of the real aims of the new Communist Government and its chances of stability. With the exception of the brief and partial experiment in France in 1848 [? 1871], it is the first time in history that the modern Communist doctrinaire has been put in a position to try his experiments on a machine in full working order; for when the Bolsheviks assumed control of Russia, the machine was already dislocated. The experiment, therefore, deserves to be studied with care.

The Communists believe that Germans were behind the Buda Pesth riots as agents provocateurs. Three weeks before the Revolution sham agitators provoked a storm at one of the newspaper offices. They were repulsed by Government troops, but seven of the Police were killed and forty-seven persons wounded. There was immediately a demand that the Communists should be imprisoned as a public danger, and thirty were arrested, including Bela Kun, [Gyula] Alpari, and Bela Vago. These three men were seized by the Police and beaten with the butt end of rifles. Vago and Kun were thought to be dead when they were carried to the cells.

It was, however, soon established that the outbreak had nothing to do with the Communist Party, and there was a revulsion of feeling in their favour. They were removed to a better prison and later were released.

Three days before this report was compiled the Directorate of Intelligence had prepared its “Weekly Review of the Progress of Revolutionary Movements Abroad”. The following is an extract from the introductory summary of that review: “While the Bolshevik Government in Russia is hard pressed and the Spartacists are under control in Germany, the Bolshevik disease appears to be taking root in more distant countries wherever the soil is congenial.

The position in Europe this week is certainly more stable. In Norway, Holland and Switzerland no immediate outbreak is probable. In Bohemia, where it was thought that the example of Hungary might be infectious, Hungarian Communism has had the opposite effect, and though Bela Kun’s Government appears for the moment to be more secure, it has certainly lost such popularity as it ever had. […]” The section dealing with Hungary reads as follows: “Information regarding the Communist Government in Hungary will be given in a special report this week [i.e. the present document]. The little Oligarchy in Budapest is probably stronger than it was a month ago in its power to hold on, and weaker in respect of the violent dislike it has excited in all classes. This dislike has been the most effective anti-Bolshevik propaganda in Bohemia. At the same time, no one seems to have the spirit to organise a counter-revolution, nor the courage to carry it out, but if a Roumanian or any other force were to invade Hungary, it is believed that the greater part of the Red Army would go over to the invaders.

The country is undergoing an epidemic of strikes. One is no sooner settled than another breaks out. The cost of living is constantly rising.” {PRO CAB 24/80 (G.T. 7368)}

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When Count Karolyi resigned, he had really no other course open to him than to hand the country over to the Socialists. He is a vain and rather stupid man, who was regarded as so pro-Entente that at one time he was suspected of being an Entente agent. He came into power on promises that he could not perform, and when he could no longer face the storm of public criticism he took the line of least resistance. The Socialists declined office unless they had the co-operation of the Bolshevik leaders, and these men, having accepted office, at once went in for a Communist Government in its most extreme form.

To do them justice, the Communist leaders made no secret of their aims. As in Russia, they poured forth a flood of declarations of policy, propaganda and legislation. Their main scheme was simple enough: the State was to take over the ownership of all public and private property, every citizen was to receive a fixed wage and to pay a fixed rent and a fixed price for every commodity; no one was to be persecuted. On the other hand, since it was necessary to have a “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” until people had ceased to yearn after the old order, or, to use the words of Alpari — a member of the Government — “until they had ceased to be blinded by the glorious light of the new free life”, there must be unquestioning obedience to the Government on the part of every citizen on the pain of death. Thus, as will presently be seen, the workman must do the work prescribed for him rapidly and efficiently without idling or striking; the civil servant must be content with his salary and with such promotion as might come his way; the shopkeeper must make a faithful inventory of his stock and turn it over to the Government; the bourgeois must take what was allowed him out of his former income and be thankful for being allowed anything at all.

Three or four weeks ago, the new Communist “Ten Commandments” were placarded all over Budapest. They were as follows:-

1. Defend the power of the Proletariat, which has led you out of the land of captivity, from oppression by counts, bankers, factory owners and generals.

2. Have no foreign ideals and do not make to yourselves idols. Fight for Red Hungary always that it may be as strong and perfect as possible.

3. Honour the Republic of Soviets and follow its commandments. The Republic of Soviets is working for you and you must fight for the Republic.

4. Do not lose courage. On the day when you lose courage, your former oppressors will regain their strength.

5. Do not disturb order. If you step out of the ranks you are a mere drop of water, your enemy can destroy you with two fingers of his hand. If you remain with your comrades you are a victorious sea that swallows up the old world and brings on the new one.


7. Do not forget that you are surrounded by enemies within and without. March with strong feet, grip your weapons with strong hands, and the sword shall fall from the hands of your adversaries and national frontiers be swept away.

8. Do not allow in your ranks anyone who incites you to riot, for he is speaking the speech of the enemy.

9. Do not allow in your ranks any disturber of order or provocateur.
10. Do not take away the rich man’s house, his ox, his land or his jewels; let this be the business of the Council. Only thus can everything be yours and your brethren’s — the inheritance of the working men and the agricultural poor.

THE PERSONNEL OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Attached to this report are photographs of the Communist Office Holders, of whom 25 out of 32 are Jews. It will be observed that several Commissaries are assigned to each Department. It may be well here to give a brief account of the more important of them:

BELA KUN

Bela Kun, though so prominent in the newspapers, is perhaps the least important member of the Government. He is described as a clever self-advertiser. In the hope of impressing the workers that in the eyes of the world the issue of the revolution hangs upon his life, he is always to be seen with a personal bodyguard of six armed soldiers, an armed guard is made to stand outside his bedroom door day and night, and a machine-gun motor is posted outside his hotel. The more serious Ministers smile at this play-acting, for Kun’s life is in no danger whatever. Some of them apologised for him, saying that he was an illiterate man and deserved great credit for having done as well as he has with no equipment but that of a third-rate orator. They are nervous and uncomfortable when Kun goes to see foreign Ministers by himself; he likes it but they dread it, for he gets into difficulties when he tries to explain the Communist doctrines.

EUGEN HAMBURGER

This man is believed to be an Emissary of the German General Staff, but is now the principal Commissary for Agriculture. He is a German from the Virchow Institute, Berlin, and he first came to Hungary two years ago. He settled in a small village in Somogy, where he preached the simple life and doctored people for nothing. Later he worked as a doctor on the troop trains, but having taken part in a mutiny, he was imprisoned until the Armistice. Though not a declared Communist, he started a peasant rising a fortnight before the Communist Revolution and helped to seize one of the big estates. At this time, the other leading Communists were in prison.

GEORG LUKACS

Georg Lukacs was formerly Professor of Philosophy at the Heidelberg University and is also an art critic, now Commissary for Education. Being the son of a banker, he

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3 Not printed.
4 Compare this description of Béla Kun with that provided by Prof. P. Brown in his letter to Prof. A. Coolidge, dated 17 April 1919 (FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, p. 437), where he is described as outwardly “unimpressive” and “even repellent”, but more credit is given to his intellectual abilities and political integrity: he is characterized as being “shrewd” and “not a terrorist”.
had a fortune of some three millions, which he spent on the Communist Party or gave up under the new laws. He is the author of the ambitious education scheme, under which children are removed from their parents and educated in the confiscated palaces until they are twenty-four; he tried to compel nine or ten thousand bank clerks out of employment to act as schoolmasters. He is an amiable dreamer.

JOSZFEG POGANY

Jo[zs]ef Pogany, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, is now openly accused by the Red Army of being a sham Bolshevist in the pay of the German General Staff. He was Commissary for War until a few weeks ago four of five thousand soldiers assembled outside the War Ministry for the purpose of lynching him. They accused him of intending to overthrow the Revolution by bringing back the entire Staff of the Officers of the old regime. They were pacified with difficulty, and Pogany was made Commissary for Foreign Affairs. This was done to show the mob that the lynching of Commissaries, whenever an adverse rumour of their conduct was circulated, must be discouraged. The other Commissaries admitted, however, that some incidents in Pogany's career did require explanation, and that they were watching him.

JULIUS HEVESI

This man was formerly an engineer in an electric light factory. He is in an advanced state of consumption. He has always been full of academic theories about Socialism, and now, as Commissary for Social Production, he has an unique opportunity for putting them into practice. His ideas are that qualified engineers are the salt of the earth, the real kings of creation, and that the revolution is really to rest upon their shoulders. These men now are strutting about the factories clothed in authority and bursting with self-importance.

JOSEPH SAXE [SACHSE]

This Hungarian Jew was a member of the Socialist Party at seventeen. He spent three years in Berlin as correspondent to a Hungarian Socialist newspaper, and about 1904 he was appointed London correspondent to the “Vorwaerts”. He spent ten years in London, and left a little before the outbreak of War. He has an extraordinary belief in his powers. He was very active at the Socialist Conference at Berne, and was also in Amsterdam at the time of the Communist accession to power. On his return to Buda Pesth he found that the Communists had telegraphed to Holland for him, and he described himself as being in the quandary because he did not wish to tie himself up in Hungary when there was a chance of his being offered an important post in the British Cabinet on the outbreak of revolution, which he believed to be imminent. After some consideration, he decided to take office in order to gain experience, and after a week or so he was good enough to confess his surprise at finding that departmental administration had had surprises for a man even of his intellectual calibre. Saxe [Sachse] hopes before long to come to London. Probably if he knew that under no circumstances would this be allowed, he would desert the Communists and try to rehabilitate himself. He is now the Press Propagandist and Controller of the Telegraph Bureau of the Communist Government.
TIBOR SZANINELLY [SZAMUELY]

Tibor Szaninelly [Szamuely] is one of the Commissaries for War. He is a friend of Lenin and was one of Lenin’s organisers in Russia.

KARL VANTUS

Commissary for Agriculture. He came from Russia with Bela Kun.

EUGEN VARGA


ALEXANDER GARLIO [GARBAI]

This man surprised his friends by coming out as a Bolshevik. He was former leader of the Socialist Party and always kept himself in the background.

PETER AGOSTAN [ÁGOSTON]

Commissary for Foreign Affairs; was formerly a University Professor.

ZOLTAN ROMAI [RÓNAI] and EUGEN LANDLER

These men were both lawyers.

THE EXECUTIVE

There is a “Directorate of Five”, consisting of Bela Kun, Bela Vago, Sigmund Kunfi, Joseph Pogany, and another whose name is not known.5 The Secretary to the Directorate is ALPARI, of whom no photograph has been obtained. He is the brain behind Kun. He is a Jew of idealist views, and so extreme in his programme that he was expelled from the Hungarian Socialist Party before the War. He was also deported from Germany on account of his intimacy with Liebknecht, and he served several terms of imprisonment for his views. He freely admits what he calls “the ingratitude of the masses towards the Communists who had removed from them all causes of worry.” These ingrates now turned on the Communists, accusing them of having removed all the zest and hope in life. This, he explains by saying that they have lived so long in the dark that they are “blinded by the glorious light of the new free life.” In their ignorance they were agitating to go back to their “former state of slavery.” What the Communists intended to do was to eradicate capitalism so entirely that there would be no slave-

5 The fifth member of this inner circle was Jenő Landler. This information, however, is dated, as the body referred to was reorganized and renamed on 11 April. After that date, it was called “Political Committee”, and included Béla Kun, Vilmos Böhm, Sándor Garbai, Rezső Fiedler and Jenő Landler.
owners to whom they could return. Then they would be happy. His great scheme is housing, of which details are given below.

The following is a list of the Commissaries as given in “Pester Lloyd” and the “Neues Pester Journal”:-

President.......................... Alexander GARBAI (?)

*People’s Commissaries:*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For the Interior, Railways</td>
<td>Eugen LANDLER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Navigation</td>
<td>Bela VAGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Agriculture</td>
<td>Eugen HAMBURGER, Georg MYISFTOR [NYISZTOR], Karl VANTUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Military Affairs</td>
<td>Bela KUN, Wilhelm BOEHM, Rudolf [Rezső] FIDLER [FIEDLER], Anton [József] HAUBRICH, Bela SZANTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Justice</td>
<td>Zoltan RONAI, Stefan LADAI, Moritz ERDELYI (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Public Feeding</td>
<td>Arthur ILLES, Bernhard KONDOR, Sigmund KUNFI, Georg LUKACS, Alexander SZABADOS, Tibor SZAMUELLY [SZAMUELY]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Education</td>
<td>Sigmund KUNFI, Georg LUKACS, Alexander SZABADOS, Tibor SZAMUELLY [SZAMUELY]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Labour and National Welfare</td>
<td>Anton GUTH, Desiderius BOKANYI, Heinrich KALMAR, Bela SZEKELY, Julius LENGY[EL].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Germans</td>
<td>Heinrich KALMAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Finance</td>
<td>Bela SZEKELY, Julius LENGY[EL].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Russians</td>
<td>August [Ágoston] STEFAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Social Production</td>
<td>Eugen VARGA, Mathias RAKOSI, Anton DOVCSAK, Julius HEVESI, Jos[ze]f KELEN.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I have a translation of all the laws passed up to the second week in April. The following is a general summary:

**The Constitution**

Supreme authority is vested in the National Congress, whose members are chosen by the Councils of Comitats and towns on the basis of one member for every 50,000 inhabitants. The working people of each village elect for their Local Council one member for each hundred, (in towns, on member to each five hundred). The Local Council is limited to fifty for a village and three hundred for a town. The Central Council sits at Buda Pesth, and is limited to five hundred members. Each Council selects an Executive Committee of not exceeding five for a village and twenty for a town. The eighty members of the Executive Committee at Buda Pesth are *ex officio* members of the National Congress. The Local Councils have executive powers in local matters, but are bound to carry out the orders of the superior Councils, who have also power to vary or annul the resolutions of a subordinate Council.

**The Franchise**

The right to vote is limited to the workers of both sexes who are eighteen years old and are actually working. The following are disqualified:

- Employers of labour,
- Persons with private incomes,
- Merchants,
- Priests,
- Lunatics,
- Criminals.

**Control of Land**

There is a rather large number of laws on the taking over of the land by the State and the control and farming of large estates. The effect of these laws is to give a fixed wage to the peasant farmer, while the State takes all the profits. There is also an instructive class of enactment dealing with the suppression of disturbances and with persons who assume authority unlawfully or confiscate property in the name of the State. The following is an example:

"The Revolutionary Councils' Government gives notice that anyone acting arbitrarily in affairs belonging to the sphere of the Revolutionary Councils' Government, of the individual People's Commissariats or the authorities subordinate to them, will be tried by the Revolutionary Court.

Anyone unlawfully making use of an armed force (guard or military) is liable to a special penalty. The Revolutionary Councils' Government may also enforce a death penalty",

or again:

"During the last few days it has happened repeatedly that armed individuals, wearing military uniform, and also other persons, have methodically visited dwelling-houses and business premises, have stated that they were functionaries..."
acting on behalf of the Authorities, and have requisitioned dwelling accommodation or business premises, or have extorted provisions and other articles from the alarmed inhabitants”.

For this the penalty is announced to be:-

“Hard labour up to ten years, a fine up to 50,000 kronen, or, in especially grave cases, death”.

Restrictions on Travelling

Travelling abroad or to other parts of Hungary is forbidden indefinitely, unless upon urgent and necessary business. Travellers are searched at the stations to prevent them from removing money or food, and a small sum is only allowed to them.

Censorship

All letters for foreign or home postage must be posted in open envelopes. Foreign representatives, diplomats, and others on official missions are to be accorded every courtesy and their dwellings and flags respected.

The Food Laws

The food laws are very much what one would expect. All raw material belongs to the State and is allotted by the Government, who also allots food supplies for hotels. Alcohol is forbidden. There are detailed laws for the cultivation of tobacco and sugar beet, which is compulsory in certain cases. The seed must be obtained from the Government and paid for, and all private stores of seed have to be surrendered. Heavy penalties are prescribed for the sale or giving away of tobacco. Agricultural machinery has to be surrendered and re-allotted by the Government. As in the case of other industries, all profits go to the State, and workers are paid a uniform wage.

Transport

All means of transport such as cars, accessories, and a proportion of horse transport, have been commandeered. The cars, in particular, are a great delight to the Commissaries, of whom each is allotted a car and a driver free, as well as free meals and lodging in the best hotel, and 1,000 kronen a month more than anybody else. With 3,000 kronen a month, a free motor-car, and no expenses, it is not surprising that the Commissaries are thoroughly enjoying themselves. They are, in fact, the only class in Hungary of whom this can be said.

The Administration of Justice

Until the reorganisation of the Administration of Justice, the Commissary for Justice had power to suspend Judges and lawyers and to entrust “any persons whatsoever” with the provisional direction of Courts of Law and of the legal profession. Revolutionary Tribunals are to be set up wherever necessary. These consist of a President and two members, together with minor officials appointed by the Soviet Government; “such appointment shall not be dependent on any kind of qualification. There shall be no right of appeal against or any other legal means of contesting the

6 Dotted line in the original.
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verdict of a Revolutionary Tribunal”. Not only is there no right of appeal, but even petitions for mercy are made futile, for we read, “A petition for pardon of a condemned person, made no matter by whom, shall not suspend the execution of the sentence, which shall be executed immediately after the announcement of the verdict”. As to procedure, the accused and his Counsel have the right of the last word. The verdict is given by secret vote after a secret deliberation, and for death sentence this vote must be unanimous. Accused persons are to be brought before the Tribunal immediately after arrest. There is to be no formal indictment, and whenever possible the whole proceedings are to be carried through at a single sitting.

There is a power of “preventive arrest”, which is vested in the Commissary for Prosecutions, all People’s Commissaries, and the Political Commissaries with the Red Guard.

The Labour Courts

Courts for settling Labour disputes must have two Judges from the working class, and there is no appeal against their decision.

Housing

Something was said above about Alpari’s Housing Scheme. The laws include many enactments on this subject. All houses belong to the State, and everyone must pay rent. Moreover, no-one can have more or less than the number of rooms allotted according to the number of the family. The proletariat is placed first on the list for allotment as far as the Statute is concerned, but in practice Government officials take good care to house themselves before considering the proletariat. The principle of allotment is ‘One man, one room’, and for families of over eight, four rooms are allotted. There are, however, qualifications in respect of rooms used for professional purposes, such as doctors’ consulting rooms, etc. Even the former owners have to pay rent. The only people excused are workmen inhabiting houses which are their own property. These pay Land Tax only. When rooms are allotted in a house, the new tenant has the use of the furniture and joint use of the kitchen. The Housing Committee stands no nonsense in collecting rents. The rent must be paid within three days on pain of fine or imprisonment. Landlords are not allowed to make any enquiries about prospective tenants. They must put up with what comes.

There were apparently some hitches in the working of the Housing Commission, for on April 8th the “Dwelling Office” announced a suspension of applications for three days, and added that “anyone who tried to introduce a new tenant into a dwelling, or requisition it forcibly, will be tried by the Revolutionary Court according to Martial Law”, but with this went an “Appeal to Buda Pesth Homeless Proletarians”, which promises to abolish the Dwelling Office of the “mad and mean Bourgeoisie Government” (Karolyi’s), and appeals to “Comrades” to have patience till the Revolutionary Council can get to work. “Comrades! The dwelling misery and the abuses of requisitions and confiscations of dwellings have of late attained such inconceivable dimensions that they must be met with the whole intensity of the power of the revolutionary proletariat”. The whole document is written in this oratorical strain, but if one seeks for facts or guidance one is disappointed. Alpari’s great scheme is to cover the hills round Buda Pesth with workmen’s villas and picture palaces. This, he thinks, will make everyone contented. There are to be nineteen to the acre as against thirteen in the English Scheme. All houses are to be on the same fixed plan:-
The rent for these houses is to be 600 kronen a year (present rate £7. 10s. 0d.). Later on they hope to build houses at 1,000 kronen a year, with an extra bedroom and a bathroom. The rents are calculated at $2^{1/2}$% on the cost of building, which is estimated at 25,000 kronen per house (present rate £312 a year). They hope to build 500 to 600 of these houses at once, and eventually 20,000. Repairs are to be carried out by the State. “House Commissions”, composed of “confidential persons” elected one for every twenty-five dwellings, are to be established. They will buy provisions for their constituents, and certify every citizen who wishes to buy for himself clothing (including house linen), extra furniture, crockery, and eating utensils. The certificate must say that the proletarian has a real need of the article he wishes to buy. This buying permit must be produced to the shopkeeper before he is allowed to sell. It never appears to have occurred to the legislators that the “confidential person” may be open to monetary persuasion.

Education

Education is free. All schools have been taken over by the State, Workmen’s Universities are to be founded, and young workmen are to receive technical instruction at fixed times during working hours. “Culture is a property of the working classes”, and to ensure that it reaches them, most of the theatre tickets will be retained for the active working classes, and sold to them at moderate prices through the Trades Unions. School teachers are to be taken over with the schools, and their appointments confirmed, subject to “an examination as to their social views and capacities”. Provided that they undertake to “adapt themselves to the fellowship and spirit of the Republic”, and that ecclesiastics consent to become secular, all shall be employed and well treated. The law for the “Protection of the Proletarian Youth” (no other youth is recognised) provides for an examination, with a view to classing them for workshops. Once classified, they are to be quartered according to category in houses connected with the workshop. An important part of the Education Scheme is the Palace Scheme of Georg Lukacs. The State is to convert all the palaces, Royal and private, into luxurious schools which are destined to become very much like reformatories, since every child is to be taken away from its parents and kept in these Palace schools until he is twenty-four, if he shows aptitude, until 18 if he is dense. Schoolchildren are to have free dentistry; every dentist must give two hours daily to this work on his own premises and with his own instruments. He will be paid 1,000 kronen a month, and an allowance for material. If he refuses his diploma will be withdrawn.

Labour

The power of the Central Government over the workers is a power that would not be tolerated for a moment in any other country. Under Enactment 12 miners may not change their trade nor leave their places of work. They may not even enlist in the Red Army. No worker is allowed to throw up his job or strike. “When a difference of opinion occurs between the Workers’ Council of the Works and the ‘Commissioner for
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Production', the Council must not act independently, though it may lodge a complaint with the People's Commissioner for Social Production, who will thoroughly investigate it and make an immediate decision. This decision is binding, and until it is arrived at, every order from the Commissioner of Production is to be observed”. The Commissioner for Production is appointed by the Central Government to manage the Works. Any breach of this enactment is apparently to be dealt with by the Red Guard. In other words, the Army is to be called in to settle trade disputes.

There is compulsory insurance, half paid by the State and half by the worker, on a scale graduated according to pay. (Sick benefits are also graduated). Labour is compulsory, and, conversely, there is a right to employment. All unemployed or physically unfit persons must work where work is available, but are supported by the State. The rate of wages is as follows:

Agricultural labourers live rent free and have milk and bacon free. The men receive 25 to 30 kronen a day, and the women 20 to 25; girls and youths from fifteen to eighteen, 12 to 15 kronen a day, children under fifteen, 8 to 10 kronen a day. 20 per cent extra is given for special garden work and 10 per cent extra for harvesting. Wages in towns and factories range from 5 to 18 kronen an hour. A skilled labourer on piece work can earn from 2,000 to 2,500 a month. At the ordinary flat rate he earns 1,800 kronen in theory, but he can always make 2,000. The pay of the Red Army is really pocket money, because the men are housed, fed, and clothed by the State.

FINANCE

The financial adviser to the Government is a bank clerk, who admits quite cheerfully that he knows nothing of finance, but that this does not matter in the least because when the World Revolution is an accomplished fact, finance will be no more needed abroad than it is at present in Hungary.

The first act of the New Government was to place 32 leading banks under the control of this Commissary. Any person may draw 10% from his current account up to a maximum of 2,000 kronen monthly; the remainder of his income goes to the State. In case of illness, an additional 1,000 kronen a month may be drawn. Land holders, provision dealers and certain central offices are allowed to draw more, with the consent of their respective Commissaries. Bank directors are limited to a salary of 3,000 kronen a month, and provided they are not dismissed by the Government, they must continue to perform their duties. On the other hand, for the wages and salaries of officials, money to an unlimited amount may be drawn, and generally speaking, banks are bound to comply with any demand from a People's Commissary.

All private safes in banks have to be opened in the owner’s presence, and if he refuses the key, the safe will be broken open and all the contents confiscated. If he opens it, the value of any money in foreign currency or gold is credited in Hungarian money to his current account, but all specie and foreign notes are handed over to the Central Banking Office. This is probably designed to steady the rate of exchange.

TRADE

All shops employing more than ten people and all wholesale businesses, as well as factories and warehouses have been taken over by the State, which pays the salaries of the employees. The business is carried on by the Commissary for Social Production, and the employees elect a council from among themselves to “establish working discipline, protect the property of the community, and control the methods of business”. All shops employing ten persons or less have to furnish an inventory of their stock, and if the inventory is incorrect, the shop is seized by the State and the former owner sent to
a factory. The State allows the small shopkeeper a proportion of the profits, provided that he sells only to persons producing tickets. Shops selling only luxury articles are to be closed, and it is illegal to sell luxuries of over a certain value. Each business may have a current cash balance of 2,000 florins, and no profits are to be made beyond the small percentage over cost price allowed to defray actual expenses. The penalty on a shopkeeper for concealing goods is death. The State claims all gold and silver articles and jewellery over the value of 500 kronen.

It may be asked what safeguard there is against over-production, which proved the downfall of the municipal workshops in Paris. The answer given by the Commissaries is that a boot factory would only be permitted to make boots up to a stock sufficient to allow two pairs to every person. Boots are not to be graded, all of them must be of the best quality. When this stock is reached, the factory would be switched off on to making saddles or, if necessary, the workmen dispersed in other factories making leather goods.

THE RED ARMY

The men are to be recruited from among organised labour, excluding miners, on the recommendation of the Trade Union. On the 4th April, all men of the old regular army, including officers, were called up unless specifically exempted. Officers, from Company Commanders upwards, are appointed by the Military Commissary; subordinate officers are elected by the men. Nearly all the officers belong to the old Army. The candidate’s name is published, and within a week anyone is free to lodge information as to his “individuality, past career and political reliability”. A political representative is posted to each Unit by the Military Commissary.

The Reserve consists of “Workmen’s Reserve Battalions”, whose officers are chosen exclusively from proletarians, under the instruction of officer-instructors, who have not the right to command or bear arms.

In addition to the ordinary Red Army is a body called “The Red Guard”, whose duty it is to maintain internal order. It supersedes all police forces and its personnel is interchangeable with that of the Red Army. According to a proclamation by the Government, the Red Army is an arm of the Revolution of the Proletariat; founded on the principles of revolutionary discipline, it is the class army of the Proletariat. In this connection, it is interesting to note from the published scale of pay that there is a daily allowance of 10 kronen for “service outside the garrison (i.e. the suppression of disturbances and enforcement of laws)”. One of the duties of the Red Army is to deal with workmen who strike in defiance of the orders of the Labour Court. It is in fact a punitive battalion rather than a blackleg battalion.

Clause 7 in the Red Guard Law dated 26th March sets up a Secret Service (Investigation Department) as a measure against “political intrigues”.

The Commissaries say that the invitation to the old officers to rejoin was given on the advice of Lenin. They were assured on the one hand that if they refused, their allowance of 2,000 kronen would be stopped, and if they consented they would be treated with “perfect kindness and respect”. The men were enjoined to respect their officers and, in some particulars, the officers have fared better than they did under the old regime. They wear officers' uniform, but without the badges of rank; they are saluted on parade, but not in the streets, because the officers discard the distinguishing armlets of their rank when off duty. They are, of course, anti-Bolshevik, but so, it is believed, is the rank and file, now that the men have been disillusioned after learning what Bolshevism really

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7 R.W. Seton-Watson, in his letter to J.W. Headlam-Morley, dated 26 May 1919 (see No. 128), reported that the practice of electing the officers in the Hungarian Army had stopped.
means. Nevertheless, it is not believed that any military rising against the Commissaries is to be looked for. The Hungarian newspapers have advertised so widely the outrages of the Russian Bolsheviks against counter-revolutionaries that all classes are thoroughly cowed. The poor dispossessed nobles scurry into their houses—or rather the rooms that remain to them, like frightened rabbits. The place is full of rumours of the arrest of counter-revolutionaries and no one trusts his neighbour. Experience seems to show that the Red Army will desert to the other side rather than fight an invader. If the mass of the people thought that the Allies had abandoned the idea of intervention, they would be in despair, for intervention is their great hope.

CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA

The Commissaries declare that they are in direct telegraphic communication with Lenin three or four times a week if not oftener; that Lenin is consulted about every detail, and that it is to Lenin that the Intelligenza [sic] owes its safety. He seems to have been insistent on this point, saying that he himself made the mistake of imprisoning them, until he found out too late that the workers could not do without them. This does not accord with the views of men like Saxe [Sachse], who would like to see them all killed, but Lenin insists that starvation would be the result. They must be coaxed into the Government, but in such a way that the people do not get suspicious. The name of Lenin carries enormous weight; when a rumour spreads that Lenin's theories are to be put into practice, everyone shivers with fear.

According to a wireless message received this week, Lenin has declared that Buda Pesth cannot become the centre of the World Revolution; that must be Moscow, and all other centres must obey her. Russia (that is the Soviet Commissaries) is deeply disappointed with the Hungarian Revolution, and considers Bela Kun greatly to blame. So far from being contagious, the Hungarian variety of the Bolshevik virus seems to have cured the early stages of the disease in Bohemia. A week after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Communists in Prague were about to have a trial of strength with the Majority Socialists, but the crowd of fugitives—workmen, peasants and soldiers—escaping from Bela Kun's Government over the Bohemian frontier, seems to have caused a great revulsion of feeling all over Bohemia.

The same thing has happened in Vienna. During the week of April 4th to 11th, when packed meetings were held by Hungarian agitators, everyone felt that Bolshevism would sweep the country and a revolution was expected about April 14th. The Commissaries in Buda Pesth were on the tiptoe of expectation, but when the news of what really happened in Vienna reached Buda Pesth, they were bitterly disappointed, for all that happened was a badly planned Bolshevist riot which was easily put down.

LIFE IN BUDA PESTH

The best hotel in Buda Pesth is, of course, occupied by the Commissaries, and they live there at the public expense. At the second best hotel you may have a bedroom and morning tea at 10/6 a week (43 kronen); lunch in the restaurant costs from 20 to 30 kronen. A cab, even for the shortest distance, costs 25 kronen. The rate of exchange is at present 120 kronen for a £1 note; living is thus much cheaper in Buda Pesth than in Prague.

The hotel staff tries to show its best side to visitors, though the waiters are disappointed men. They had been promised a division of the profits, but all they can get is 12% of the restaurant takings, and this is less than they were getting before the Revolution. All over the restaurant appear notices making it a penal offence to give or receive a tip, with a penalty of a long term of imprisonment, and each waiter is afraid to accept a tip lest a comrade should inform against him. The Soviet Administration makes
it impossible for them to steal anything from the hotel, for all the food that goes in has to be accounted for. Only one bath is allowed a week, owing to the lack of coal.

No religious habits are seen in the streets. The Priests went into secular clothes or disappeared, and it is only lately that the churches are re-opening and that Communes are allowed to appoint Priests at their own expense. Army chaplains have been abolished.

Life in the streets is perfectly safe, and there appears to be no open robbery; motor cars are to be seen rushing up and down carrying Commissaries and Government officials.

The Commissaries complain that the upper-class have acquired some moral power over the workers. They found to their disgust that if you allow working men to choose between a Socialist leader and an educated bourgeois, they elect the latter, and until you eliminate the bourgeois they will always do so.

On the question of the franchise they are quite explicit; a universal suffrage would not suit them at all. "If you allow everyone to vote you will have a sort of Kerensky Government. You have only to say that you are limiting the vote for a period of six months, and people will be satisfied". It does not appear to occur to them that it may be difficult to satisfy people who are denied a vote, just at the time when their future destinies are being decided. The election of the present Government is not a conspicuous example of free institutions. A list of possible Commissaries was made out, about twice as long as the number of offices to be filled. Only Trade Unionists were allowed to vote; they were not allowed to add any names; all they could do was to elect from the list given them. Seeing the present office holders, one is inclined to wonder who the unfortunates were who failed to be elected.

At any rate, there is one happy class in Hungary to-day, though it is a small one; the Commissaries are enjoying themselves to the full. They are exactly like a lot of mischievous schoolboys let loose in a shop of a scientific instrument maker, for it is remembered that they have the whole personnel and machinery of the old Civil Service to play with. The result is exactly the material that Lewis Carroll and Gilbert would have loved — a sort of compound of "Alice of the Looking-Glass" and a bad dream, and, like a dream, it will pass.

B[asil].H.T[homson].
No. 134

Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (London.
Received 3 June 1919)

No. 996 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 83063]

Paris, 2 June 1919

Following sent to-day to Bucharest.

In reply to telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey reporting decision of
Roumanian High Command to march upon Budapest Council of Allied and Associated
Powers have telegraphed to effect that they formally disapprove of this decision.
A similar notification has been addressed to Monsieur Bratiano.

Addressed to Bucharest No. 6.¹

¹ For F. Rattigan's reply to this telegram from Bucharest see No. 137. In connection with the Allied
attitude to the Romanian decision referred to in the telegram also see Appendix I to notes of a meeting of
the Council of Four on 31 May 1919, FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, p. 133.

No. 135

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)
 to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 4 June 1919)

No. 49 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/11746]

Vienna, 3 June 1919

Urgent

Freeman returned from Budapesth, explains urgency of immediate answer to
proposals of Hungarian Trades Unions if Entente desire to intervene.¹

¹ For A.J. Balfour's reply to this telegram see the Enclosure with No. 142.
Commandement du Danube,
Budapest, 30 May 1919

From: Lieut. Comdr. Williams Freeman
R.N.

To: Col. Sir Thomas Cuninghame
Vienna

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the following deputation visited me today.

Mr. Mor Preusz
Mr. Samu Jaszai
Mr. Karolyi [Károly] Peyer
Mr. Ferencz Miakitz [Miákits]
Mr. Imore [Imre] Szabo

Printers Society
General Workmens Society
Miners
Iron & Metal Workers
Carpenters Society.

These men represent over 900,000 workmen in Budapest. A general precis of the conversation is attached.

A general discontent with the present Government is beginning to manifest itself, and the attached conversation shows on what lines this is developing.

There is undoubtedly a great deal of force behind this movement, but it is too early yet to say how this will develop.

The general situation here is strained. The food is very bad and scarce, and the Government are making the most strenuous efforts to ameliorate it.

I consider it most important that the English General you mentioned to me (? Gorton), should be prepared to come here at a moments [sic] notice.

Can the following questions be answered...

1. What would be the immediate action of the Entente if a Counter Revolution should succeed, or the Government be made to fall.
2. Would the Entente accept a Social Democratic Government, and help them by immediately sending food, raw materials, and a strong English Mission.
4. How much and in what time could Food be sent.

Military information of importance is attached.²

It comes direct from Army Head Quarters, and is certainly accurate.

The information both in regard to the attack towards Miskolc and Kassa would appear to be certainly serious, and immediate.

Please transmit to Belgrade as before.

Lieut. Comdr.
R.N.

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² The information referred to is not enclosed in the original file.
Notes

of conversation between Lt. Commander Freeman and Messrs... representing the Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions (over 1,000,000 organized workmen).

The gentlemen declared that they had appeared with the knowledge and approval (through the Confidential Committees of the respective Unions) of the Federation as a whole and with the knowledge of the present Sovjet Government of Hungary, to ask whether Commander Freeman was in a position to give them information respecting the feeling in Entente circles towards an eventual formation of a Government of members of the Trade Unions they represented.

Commander Freeman informed the gentlemen that the conversation was unofficial, for the only forum authorized to negotiate officially was the Entente Mission in Vienna, but that he was willing to open the way for such negotiations provided it were understood that the following four points were essential:

1) immediate cessation and disassociation with all propaganda movement carried on in foreign countries against the wishes of the people of those countries;
2) immediate disassociation with the Bolshevism of Russia, which had proved to be no practical basis of Government and economically ruinous to the welfare of the country;
3) as soon as complete order was restored and the situation made such a step feasible, a return to a Parliamentary system of representative Government approximating to that in force in England;
4) restoration of the principle of private ownership as a "sine qua non" of economic consolidation, with power to tax private property as high as required by the situation.

The Hungarian gentlemen asked whether Commander Freeman could assure them of a reception by the Entente Commission in Vienna, whether the said Commission would support a new Government in settling the problems of food and raw materials, and whether the Entente would so regulate the question of political frontiers as to ensure the new Hungary the possibility of independent existence.

Commander Freeman said that he would telephone Vienna and ask for the deputation to be received there, and thought that every possible support would be given to a Government that could produce guarantees that they represented a power equal to carrying their programme through in the spirit of the four points above detailed. As regards frontiers, he could not give any definite information, as he did not know the latest decisions of Paris, but believed the situation was improved as against that of last February. He would point out however that any such deputation going to Vienna should request that the control be in British hands.

The gentlemen said that the latter was their own wish too, individually and they believed, that of the organisation they represented. They pointed out however, that there were to be held, on June 12th, a Congress of the Socialist Party of Hungary and on June 14th a Sovjet Congress; and they could not well anticipate events.

Commander Freeman thought the events would be a good test.

The gentlemen then asked whether a settlement of the transitional period by compromise with the present Government would be agreeable to the Entente.

Commander Freeman thought it might, provided the said four points were insisted on, and provided the colour of the new régime did not suggest to the outside world anything in the way of Bolshevism.

The gentlemen thanked Commander Freeman for receiving them, asked him to regard the conversation as unofficial, and assured him that had they anything to tell him, they would call on him again. They took cognisance that the Entente would require
assurance that the negotiations were serious and were being carried on [in] the name of factors possessing the will and the power to take over Government on the principles detailed above, and that within a reasonable time names of probable leaders would have to be submitted to serve as a guarantee for the seriousness and permanency of the change, there is to be no bloodshed, no unnecessary upheaval or disturbance.

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Minutes attached to the document:

[...]  

[To] Lord Hardinge

Entirely a question of higher policy, after the determination of which the military aspect of the case can be presented.

W. Thwaites  
6/6/19

The purposes of the Trades Unions appear to offer a very reasonable basis of settlement.  
But surely the question is one which the Council of IV alone can decide.

Harold Nicolson  
7/6/19

There is, so far as I know, no Hungarian policy, and all my efforts to solicit any instructions or guidance as regards our attitude towards Hungary have remained fruitless.  
I can therefore offer no comment or suggestions.

E. Crowe  
7/6/19

No. 136

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)  
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extract. Received 5 June 1919)

No. 53 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/11822]

Vienna, 4 June 1919

[...]  

On the other hand if attempts by trade unions in Buda-Pest to get rid of communists succeed, Hungary will be united and in possession of victorious army capable of opposing wishes of Entente in Vienna then many people will be ready to seek aid of Hungarians who now decline to act with Bolshevists.  
Only escape from dilemma is to uphold economic equilibrium of Austria to expel Bolshevik element of Hungary and disarm both countries before it is too late.

Addressed Astoria and D.M.I.
No. 137

Telegram from F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to the Foreign Office (London. Received 11 June 1919)

No. 314 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 87230]

Bucharest, 6 June 1919

Urgent.

Paris telegram No. 6 to Bucharest.²

Rapid recrudescence of Bolshevists strength in Hungary since cessation of Roumanian advance is viewed with gravest apprehensions not only by Roumanians but also by British and French Military Authorities here.

There is no doubt that at time of Roumanian advance Bolshevism was in desperate plight and only small effort was needed to crush them definitely. Now they have regained strength and courage sufficiently to inflict severe defeat on Czecho-Slovaks near Tokay [Tokaj]. Not only Allied Military Authorities but also my French colleague, United States Minister and myself are unanimously of opinion danger of leaving Bolshevists alone is incalculable. Czecho-Slovaks have asked Roumanians to join advance on Budapest and latter would be ready to accept if (? permitted).

General Greenly tells me Lenin has published an order to Red troops to treat kindly in future all prisoners and that this has already had bad effect in causing serious desertions from Kolchak's Army. If these continue he thinks latter may go to pieces and Bolshevists would then be free to deal with Roumania. For this reason he considers it essential to crush Hungarian Bolshevists before this can happen. In the circumstances I venture again to ask if some combined movement could not be made, such as I understand was recently proposed by General Franchet d'Esperey. Combined Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian forces would in opinion of Military Authorities be sufficient in themselves at present for occupation of Budapest so that only a few French and possibly Serbian troops need be associated in movement to prove itself of representative character. My French and United States colleagues are (? telegraph-)ing in same sense to their Governments.

I realise of course inadvisability of making enemy of Hungary but distinction can be made between Bolshevists and majority of Hungarians. From what one can ascertain here better elements in Hungary itself would welcome suppression of Bolshevism and in no sense be alienated by proposed action especially if latter is of representative character.

Minutes attached to the document:

This seems unanswerable, and we have never had [? known] any reason why Genl. Franchet's proposals were negatived.

I think we must leave this to be dealt with by the by the P[eace]. D[elegation].

[Unidentified]
12/6/1

¹ The telegram was dispatched on 7 June.
² See No. 134.
Les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés sont sur le point de convoquer les représentants du Gouvernement Hongrois à Paris devant la Conférence de la Paix pour y recevoir communication des vues qui concernent les justes frontières de la Hongrie. C'est à ce moment même que les Hongrois prononcent contre les Tchéco-Slovèques de violentes attaques non justifiées et envahissent la Slovaquie.

Cependant les Puissances Alliées et Associées ont déjà manifesté leur ferme volonté de mettre un terme à toutes les hostilités inutiles, en arrêtant à deux reprises les Armées Roumaines qui avaient franchi les limites de l'armistice, puis celles de la zone neutre et en les empêchant de continuer leur marche sur Buda-Pest,— en arrêtant les Armées Serbes et Françaises sur le front sud de la Hongrie.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement de Buda-Pest est invité formellement à mettre fin sans délai à ses attaques contre les Tchéco-Slovèques, faute de quoi les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés sont absolument décidés à avoir immédiatement recours à des mesures extrêmes pour contraindre la Hongrie à cesser les hostilités et à se conformer à la volonté inébranlable qu'ont les Alliés de faire respecter leurs injonctions.

Réponse au présent télégramme doit être faits dans un délai de quarante huit heures.

signé: Clemenceau
Président de la Conférence de la Paix.

[On the day, 7 June 1919, when G. Clemenceau's telegram (see No. 138) was sent to Hungary, the Supreme War Council received from its Military Representatives Joint Note No. 43, titled: "MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO HUNGARY." The Military Representatives were charged on 5 June to examine what action could be taken by the Allied Armies to put an end to the hostilities between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak forces. At the beginning of their Note they considered that the occupation of a part of Czechoslovakia by the Hungarian Red Army would hinder the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Hungary, which is clearly contrary to the aims of the Allied and Associated Powers. The Czechoslovak Army was in no position to carry on the fight against the Hungarians, therefore, they recommended that the Allied and Associated Powers should take measures to put an end to the Hungarian attacks. To achieve this, they suggested the strengthening of the Czechoslovak Army in various ways; the Note then continues:]

[The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council are of opinion:]

(3) That, should military operations against the Hungarian Army be decided on by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the general lines of action might be the following:

(a) The initiative would be taken by the Roumanian and Serbian Army supported by the French Army of Hungary.

(b) The Serbian Army would take as a general objective the Hungarian capital of Buda-Pesth.

On its right the Roumanian Army of Transylvania to cross the Theiss and operate in the general direction of Miskolce [Miskolc] and Gyongyes [Gyöngyös], an important district on account of the numerous railways and roads which cross it and which equally serve as the Hungarian Army's communications.

The French Army of Hungary to support this movement by linking up the Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Army and taking as general objective the railway junction of Hatvan (40 kilos: N.E. of Buda-Pest).

(4) That to ensure the success of this operation it is indispensable that the troops to operate against Hungary should be under a single command which should be given to the General Commanding-in-Chief the Armies of the East,2 the only Commander who at the moment could give the necessary orders in time.

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1 This document, together with its enclosure, is reproduced in full in LINK, vol. 60, pp. 255-260.
2 Gen. L. Franchet d'Esperey.
NOTE:-

The American Military Representative has submitted the reservation contained in the Note attached.

The Italian Military Representative accepts these reservations with the addition of the following remarks:-

"In accordance with information received from a sure source by the Italian G.H.Q., the Czecho-Slovak Government originally ordered its troops to cross the Armistice line with a view to the occupation of territories which the Magyars had been compelled to evacuate on account of the Roumanian advance.

The violence of the Hungarian reaction may be fully explained from the fact that the Czecho-Slovak advance threatened the whole of the region lying to the South of the metal bearing mountains where are to be found the last mineral resources which, together with the coal basin of Pecs, remain to the new State of Hungary.

This violent Hungarian counter-attack would not have taken place if the Czecho-Slovaks had not in the first place advanced, especially as a large portion of the territory of the new State of Hungary had already been invaded by the Roumanians.

Taking the above facts into consideration, it may be doubted whether military action is absolutely necessary and it is a question whether political action alone would not be sufficient, combined with a guarantee to Hungary that the armistice line of demarcation, or the probable future boundary line of the new State of Hungary, shall be respected."

Military Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council.

Sd. C. Sackville-West.
Military Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council.

Sd. Ugo Cavallero.
Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.

Sd. P.D. Lochridge.
Military Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War Council.

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 139

Memorandum by General T.H. Bliss (Annex to S.W.C. 419. Extract)

Hotel de Crillon,
Paris, 6 June 1919

MEMORANDUM

[...]

3. If the wish of the Supreme Council to put an end to the attacks of the Hungarians against the Czecho-Slovaks is to be realised by military force, there appears but one way in which to accomplish it; i.e., the prompt military occupation of Hungary by Allied forces. But, the occupation of this territory by a force consisting largely of Roumanian and Serbian troops may have far-reaching political consequences. If these consequences are regarded by the Council of the Powers as of minor importance, the American Representative offers no objection to military occupation that would be
composed of these Roumanian and Serbian forces assisted by a French force; but the Council of the Powers should have the following facts in mind.

At the time of the original armistice a line was fixed by General Franchet d'Esperey, commanding the Allied Army of the East, beyond which the Roumanians were not to advance. In defiance of this, the Roumanians continued their advance, with resulting disorders. General Franchet d'Esperey attempted to hold them on a second line. This attempt also they defied and continued their advance. Thereupon the Council of the Powers in Paris intervened and by their direction a neutral zone was established on February 26th last averaging about 50 kilometre in width. The Roumanians defied the Council of the Powers and continued to advance until now their forces are on the eastern bank of the River Theiss, which is west of the western limit of the zone which the Council of the Powers established with instructions that they remain on the eastern side of that zone. It was the establishment of this zone which caused the downfall of the Karolyi government, the only Hungarian government that has been friendly to the Allies. Therefore, the Council of the Powers will note the fact that the military force of a nation which hitherto has defied every effort to keep it within imposed limits may, in case it is allowed to occupy a considerable part of Hungary, prove equally recalcitrant if, at some future time, it is directed to withdraw. This is also true of a [?] Serbian force which, like Roumania, is a claimant for partition of Hungarian territory. The Council of the Powers shall also keep in mind the possibility, if not the probability that the invasion of what has hitherto been considered as undisputed Hungarian territory may solidify that people in a resistance which otherwise would not occur.

If these considerations appear of minor consequence to the Council of the Powers, I concur in the general plan of the occupation of Hungary by an Allied force consisting largely of Roumanians and Serbs supported by a French force, because, if military force must be used it must be used promptly and, therefore, by the only forces promptly available.

4. In the absence of instructions from his government, the American Military Representative makes a general reservation as to participation by the United States in the occupation of Hungary.\textsuperscript{3}

(Sd.) Tasker H. Bliss
American Military Representative.

\textsuperscript{3} For the proceedings in the Supreme Council with regard to military measures to be taken against Hungary to enforce the terms of the Armistice between 5 and 18 July 1919, see No. 187, note 2.
No. 140

Memorandum by E. Ashmead-Bartlett (Extracts)¹

[BALF Additional 49749]

7 June 1919

MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITION IN HUNGARY

[...]

II. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

[The Hungarian Bolshevists have been recently strengthened for the following reasons:]

The Rumanians having been badly beaten about two weeks ago, the Czechs announced their intention to the Soviet Government of advancing to take up the new line of demarcation which I understand they were authorised to do by the Delobit [de Lobit] Armistice Note. They were shockingly handled by the Italian General —— [?Piccione] and moved in inadequate numbers. Bohm's Red Guard Army² was waiting for them three divisions strong. The Czechs were badly hammered, lost two thousand prisoners and fled some twenty five kilometres, being attacked in the rear by the Slovaks.

This unfortunate incident has led to the break up of the alliance between the Czechs and the Slovaks. The former are in a state of panic and openly talk of being obliged to abandon Pressburg. The Red Army of Bohm is continuing its victorious march into Moravia which will shortly be turned into an independent Soviet Republic. In this connection it is interesting to recall the words of Bohm and Pogany on the night of April 4th at the dinner given to the Foreign Press in Budapest on the occasion of General Smuts's visit,³ when, very much to worse for drink, they announced their future policy vis à vis to [sic] the neighbouring states which formerly comprised the old Habsburg Monarchy. These views are contained in the long memorandum presented by me to General Smuts.⁴ Bohm speaking said, “We are going to turn all our neighbours in [? to] Bolshevists. We shall start with the Czecho Slovaks. Don't you see what a wonderful position Hungary is in geographically as the starting place for Bolshevism. We are surrounded by discontented peoples all ready to adopt our principles. The Czecho Slovaks, once we have kicked them out of Hungary will become Bolshevists right away.”

[...]

¹ Copies of this memorandum, together with its annexure, were sent to several leading British politicians, including D. Lloyd George and A.J. Balfour.
² V. Böhm was Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army from 5 May 1919 till 14 July 1919.
³ See No. 88, note 2 (for Enclosure 2).
⁴ The memorandum referred to has not been traced by the editor, however, see note 3 above.
III. DANGERS TO THE FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE

[....]

The Bolshevist Army which will soon number two hundred thousand men or even more, as general conscription has been decided on, is completely triumphant in the field. That army is for the time being being ringed in by French, Rumanian, Czecho-Slovakian and Jugoslav troops who are pursuing the policy of doing nothing.

The Bolshevists have, however, very foolishly from their standpoint shown their hand prematurely by their invasion of Slovakia which will probably force the Entente to intervene. It was their original intention to play for time and not to arouse reprisals by indulging in military operations against their neighbours. But they have become emboldened by their successes against Rumania and the Czechs by the inactivity [sic] of the French Army and by the immense moral and material support given by [? to] them to [? by] the Italians. They intended to remain quiet to seek recognition and then to commence their immense propaganda campaign against their neighbours as soon as peace had been signed, the French withdrawn, and the troops of their immediate neighbours demobilised. Their full programme would take too long to state in this memorandum, but it is set out in great detail in the memorandum presented by me to General Smuts after the dinner of the night of April 4th, of which copies are available. Part of that programme in so far as it affects Czecho-Slovakia has already been realised.

Now unless Bolshevism is eliminated [sic] from Hungary before peace is signed and the French armies withdrawn, it will most certainly spread all over Eastern Europe. The frontiers of all the neighbouring states will then be open and a swarm of Bolshevist agents will descend like locusts to devour the new Constitutional Democracies armed with unlimited money and propaganda. An even greater danger has come into existence during the last two months. The Hungarians now have the strongest Army in Eastern Europe and unless this Army is disbanded before peace is signed and the French troops withdrawn they will start immediate military operations to kick the Rumanians out of Transylvania and the occupied Hungarian Hinterland. This they can do with consummate ease. I would also point out at this stage that if the Conference is hesitating to act in Hungary from a reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs of another nation, they now have a fresh explanation with which to satisfy the extreme Socialist elements in England, France and the United States, namely this, quite apart from questions of Bolshevism, Hungary, as a hostile power opposed to the Entente in the war, has broken the terms of every armistice, commencing with the Diaz armistice signed on November 3rd, 1918, by raising and keeping in the field at least four times as many troops as she is allowed by the conditions contained therein. This is an open defiance of the Entente which constituted a fatal example not only to all the states of Eastern Europe, but also to Germany.

IV. THE ONLY REMEDIES AND THE AVAILABLE MEANS

There is in fact only one policy to be pursued at any cost by the Entente, namely, to smash Bolshevism and to establish a Constitutional Government in Hungary before the final peace is signed and the troops withdrawn. This in reality can easily be done. It only requires a simultaneous advance of the French, Rumanian, Czecho-Slovakian and Jugoslav troops under certain definite well defined provisions; viz: (a) It must be made clear to the Hungarian people that only French troops will be allowed in Budapest and kept there until General Elections have been held throughout the country. (b) That Hungary will be given a fair hearing at the Conference of Paris before her future political frontiers are definitely settled. (c) Any Anti-Bolshevist Government which

5 See note 4 above.
receives the Entente's support must definitely promise to refrain from all reactionary
measures and to offer a sound Land Reform Policy to the Hungarian peasants.

With these provisions the war would immediately cease to be regarded by all except
the Red Guard Extremists as a national one and all experts are agreed Budapest could
be occupied almost without opposition. We have received in fact the definite promise of
innumerable officers now serving in the Red Guard Army including the majority of
those on the General Staff, that they will never oppose a French advance and will at
once join forces with any Constitutional Government supported by the whole of the
Entente.

VI. WHAT IS CERTAIN TO HAPPEN

The position in Hungary is so delicately poised that it requires extremely little
pressure to turn the scale against Bolshevism in spite of its outward appearance of
strength. The situation of the government in Budapest in [is] extremely bad owing to
the shortage of food, the bad paper money in which the workmen and soldiers are now
being paid, and the general discontent produced by misery, conscription and terrorism.
In the country the peasants are disgruntled by the failure of the Government to carry
through the promised land policy, that is to say, one of individual ownership as
opposed to communism. Bolshevism can in fact only thrive by making freak conquests.
Left in isolated areas it consumes itself and nothing is left but the bare ashes of anarchy,
bankruptcy and terrorism. They are for the most part cowards at heart and would
eagerly surrender the reins of power if their personal safety could be assured. It is
absolutely certain that if the Entente authorises a general advance they will immediately
make proposals to this effect. It may be wise, to prevent disorders in Budapest and a
possible massacre of hostages, to come to an arrangement whereby the Entente
guarantees the personal safety of some of the leaders provided they leave Hungary
altogether. When this situation arises it is of paramount importance to have an
alternative provisional government ready to take over the administration of the country
until the people have been given the opportunity of definitely deciding on their future
form of government by the holding of free General Elections. I will now deal in detail
with the political elements from which an alternative government must be formed.

VII. COMPOSITION OF SOCIETY IN HUNGARY

Hungary is a country which suffers from the misfortune of possessing no national
middle class highly trained in politics and business and in consequence the available
material from which men trained in state affairs can be drawn is extremely limited.
There is however, a fairly numerous body of efficient permanent officials. The social
strata of the state may be roughly divided as follows:- (1) the aristocracy and the great
landowners, (2) the Jews who control all the finance and industries of the country and
who take the place of the Middle Class in England, (3) the peasants, who must be
divided into three categories (a) the rich peasant proprietors who farm their own land,
(b) small peasant proprietors who cultivate from two to four acres for their own use and
who also work on the large estates, (c) the labourers who are without land.

Up to the downfall of Count Tisza the entire political power was in the hands of the
nobility and great landowners who were divided into two bitterly opposed hostile
groups, the Tisza and the Andrassy parties. It was the quarrels of these two parties
which discredited the old regime in the eyes of the people. Strange to say there was no
powerful opposition from any Socialist Party and the end of Tisza was brought about
by the constant abuse which the Andrassy party hurled at him from the platform and in
the press.
 VIII. THE KAROLYI REGIME

Count Mich[a]el Karolyi, the first President of the New Republic found his chief supporters amongst the small Jews of Budapest. He obtained a temporary and transitory popularity amongst the people by his colossal scheme of Agrarian Reform, the expropriation in fact of all the great estates and Church lands which were offered to all and sundry whether skilled in agriculture or not at a price which really amounted to confiscation of all property. By this ill devised scheme which would have lessened the agricultural production of Hungary by some fifty per cent he aroused the cupidity of the peasants and working classes and let loose on the country a flood of ill digested revolutionary schemes and ideas which have brought Hungary to her present state of ruin and chaos. Karolyi, a man of feeble intellect and devoid of principles, endeavoured to stave off Bolshevism by constant concessions to the ever increasing popular demands. He was in fact from the first merely a tool in the hands of the extremists who used the first opportunity which came their way, namely the presentation of the Delobit [de Lobit] Note, on the new lines of demarcation, to dismiss him from office and to seize the reins of power. Thus the entire power fell into the hands of the Kissjeddo [Kis zsidó] (small Jews) trained in the school of Russian Bolshevism. The whole of the would be constitutional parties in Hungary surrendered without a fight. A kind of mental inertia settled over the former rulers of the country and they allowed themselves to be driven from office and terrorised over without raising a hand to help their country. It is almost impossible to explain this strange phenomenon, but it was probably due to the exhaustion produced by the war and to the crushing effects of the assassination of the only strong man in the old regime Count Tisza. On the downfall of Mich[a]el Karolyi the landowners fled the country or retired to their estates and the rich Jewish Bankers and industrial magnates did likewise. Thus the field was left free for the inauguration of the full programme of Bolshevism in its most virulent form. Even at this stage the constitutional elements might have rallied had the Entente occupied Budapest with a few troops a move which all parties wished for and if General Elections had been held throughout the country it is almost certain the constitutional elements would have found themselves in the majority. But the reign of terror and confiscation which was immediately started by the Soviet Government completely destroyed all organised opposition.

 IX. PRESENT POSITION OF BOLSHEVISM

Budapest has been stripped bare. Everything has in fact been taken from the private houses and either stolen by individuals or confiscated for the use of the state. All money has been taken from the banks and valuables from the safes. The discontent amongst the mass of the people in the capital grows day by day but as the entire population has been disarmed there is little hope of a successful counter revolution in Budapest until assistance is forthcoming from outside. There have, however, been frequent demonstrations against the Soviet Government made by the organised Unions of Metal and Iron Workers and Ammunition Makers, who grew extremely rich in the war and who have no desire to see their property communised. Up to the present the Soviet Government has been able to hold its own chiefly owing to the causes I have already named [....] but on several occasions it has been on the verge of resigning. The discontent in the capital is daily augmented by the ever growing shortage of food for the peasants will not send in supplies from the country district[s] to be paid in paper money issued by the Government.
X. FEELING IN THE COUNTRY DISTRICTS

The evils produced by Bolshevism have not been felt to the same extent in the country as they have in Budapest. The Hungarian peasant is highly conservative at heart and is bitterly opposed to communism in any form. He was undoubtedly attracted by the Karolyi Agrarian programme because under it he would have obtained land for nothing. But after a short time a reaction set in and many peasants openly declared they would be unable to live by cultivating estates of ten acres, and would prefer to receive high wages by continuing to work on the great estates. The Soviet Government’s attempt to abolish individual ownership and to communise the land led to such a wave of discontent that it had to be immediately abandoned, as did also their proposed scheme of abolishing freedom of religious worship. [....]

All classes of peasants are discontented with [the] Soviet Government for three reasons (a) The General unrest throughout the country; (b) Being forced to the colours by conscription; (c) By the bad paper money in which they are now paid. It is as well to note at this stage that during the last three weeks there have been over one hundred counter revolutions started in various villages in Western Hungary. But the rapid mobilisation of the Red Guards and the control of the railways it has been easy to suppress these isolated efforts which has been done with much bloodshed.

XI. THE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES

The reign of terror in Budapest forced almost all the old political leaders who were able to get away to flee the country. The majority succeeded in reaching Austria and have established themselves in Vienna together with many hundred[s] of officers. The latter are an excellent class, patriotic and disinterested, who only wish to see some form of constitutional Government established in their country and who are prepared to offer their service to any party which can bring this about. It was extremely hard at first to get the counter revolutionists to unite on any fixed programme as the Hungarians unfortunately thrive on jealousies and petty quarrels amongst themselves. But now under the stress of sheer necessity these dissensions have passed away in fact it may be said that all the old parties have completely disappeared and that only the individuals who led them remain. It was the original intention to set up a counter revolutionary Government in Vienna but owing to the opposition of Bauer and the Austrian Bolshevist elements insurmountable difficulties prevented this. It was also almost impossible to communicate with the officers and political chiefs in the districts occupied by the French, Rumanians and Jugo-Slavs and thus for some time no co-ordinated action could be brought about. Under these circumstances Count Duyla [Gyula] Karolyi, a distant cousin and bitter enemy of Michæl Karolyi, inaugurated a provisional government at Arad under the protection of French troops, with Bornemisza as his Foreign Secretary. Duyla [Gyula] Karolyi is a big provincial magnate who has never played a prominent part in politics, but who has proved himself to be an excellent governor of province. He is quite disinterested and without any political ambitions, and of all the Hungarian leaders he is the one who impresses me the most favourably. He has established a provisional government mostly of men previously unknown in Hungarian political life all of whom are pledged to resign on the occupation of Budapest. The whole of the Hungarian political leaders now assembled in Vienna including Bethlen, Batthyani [Batthiany], Duyla [Gyula] Andrassy, Albert Apponyi, Paul Teleki, Dyuri [Gyuri (György)] Pallavicini, and a host of lesser politicians and all the military officers have now sworn adherence to the Karolyi Government and are pledged to support it to the utmost of their power. Gorami

6 In connection with the establishment of the provisional government, see No. 141.
[Garami], who is now in Switzerland also telegraphed his assent provided the new government is pledged to moderate Social-Democratic programme.

The Karolyi Government issued a modest and sensible proclamation pledging itself to eliminate Bolshevism and to restore constitutional government. It has wisely refrained from embarking on a full political programme at this early stage.

XII. PRESENT POSITION OF THE KAROLYI GOVERNMENT

The Karolyi [Government] is now established at Szeged in Southern Hungary under the protection of the French troops. It has in fact been recognised as the only Counter Revolutionary Government by the French Generals who have promised to support it by every means in their power. Bauer has now changed his attitude in Vienna and is allowing all Hungarian officers and political leaders to go to Szeged to join Karolyi. Thus for the first time there is unity both of action and thought.

XIII. PLANS OF THE KAROLYI GOVERNMENT

The immediate programme of the Karolyi Government is to raise a force of some fifteen to twenty thousand men which could be easily done if arms and ammunition are only forthcoming from the Entente. A loan is also badly needed. This force could then act as the spearhead of a advance of the Entente troops between the Danube and the Tisza. This advance would take place over a flat country with two lines of railway leading direct to the capital. Szeged is 165 kilometres from Budapest so the distance to be traversed is extremely short. An advance of the Counter Revolutionary troops and the French would immediately turn all the Red Guards positions facing the Rumanians on the line of the Tisza, and would enable the latter to cross that river to co-operate in a general move in which the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav troops should also be employed. As I have already said there is no probability of any serious fighting as the majority of the officers and men in the Red Army are quite prepared to come under the conditions already named.

XIV. KAROLYI'S GOVERNMENT AND THE SOCIALISTS

The Karolyi Government is the only alternative one for the Entente to support at the present time as there is no other party in the field. It represents in fact every shade of Hungarian political feeling. It must be clearly understood that there is no united socialist party in Hungary. The so-called social democrats in the Soviet administration have long since become openly Bolshevist and have participated in the robbery, confiscation and terrorism which have brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Any attempt to reconstruct a social-democratic government from the political elements now assembled in Budapest would be a farce and would be unacceptable to the mass of the Hungarian people. The Karolyi Government may be said without exaggeration to represent some four fifths of the Hungarian people. It is pledged to a liberal programme of Agrarian Reform the exact details of which are now being worked out. But such is the ignorance in these matters that urgent help is required from experts versed in these matters from Entente countries.

XV. [THE] KAROLYI GOVERNMENT AND THE ENTENTE

The attitude of the Karolyi Government vis à vis to [sic] the Entente is contained in the signed declaration brought by me to Paris and attached to this memorandum.
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 140

Declaration by the Szeged Government

(From) [Li. G. F/197/4/5]

Szeged, 29 May 1919

Strictly Confidential

QUESTIONS THAT WILL BE ASKED IN PARIS.

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(1) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to accept as final and absolute the decision of the Conference of Paris in regard to the future political frontiers of Hungary, after the Hungarian case has been properly heard in Paris?

Yes, because we are fully convinced, that we will find justice, after our case has been properly stated.

(2) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to accept without reserve the principles of a 'League of Nations' as laid down in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with the German Empire?

Yes.

(3) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to refrain from entering into any alliance either political, military, fiscal or economic with the German Empire for a period of twenty years from the time of the signing of peace?

Yes.

(4) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to enter into an economic and financial zollver[e]in with its neighbours, who lately composed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, viz, Austria, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia in the event of the Conference of Paris deciding in favour of such a plan? (Free Trade within the old Empire).

Yes, it fully covers our intentions.

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7 In the original the questions are typed and the answers are given in handwriting.
(5) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government which will be constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to accept the decision of the Conference of Paris in regard to all questions of indemnities, armament shipping material etc.?

Yes.

(6) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared, in the event of French or other military intervention to pay the full cost of all military operations necessary for the elimination of Bolshevism and the restoration of Constitutional Government in Hungary and to make this a first charge on the finances of the state?

Yes.

(7) Is the new government of Count Karolyi, or the government constituted from it in the event of the occupation of Budapest, prepared to re-establish constitutional government in Hungary on a basis commensurate with the democratic ideals of France, England and the United States, and to leave it to the free choice of the people to decide at a general election the future form of government under which they will choose to live?

Yes.

Count Gyula Károlyi

Bornemissza [Baron Gyula Bornemisza]
No. 141

Letter from Count G. Károlyi (Szeged) to General P. de Lobit (Belgrade)\(^1\)

[PRO CAB 21/150]

Translation.

Szeged, 7 June 1919

Monsieur le Général,

I have the honour to inform you that I constituted on 5th May 1919 at Arad a Hungarian Government of a provisional character which announced as its aim the combating of Bolshevism in Hungary, the re-establishment of order and the taking of measures to prepare and render possible later a legal and constitutional administration. This Government wished to begin to enter on its functions at Szeged, and consequently left Arad on May 9th in order to proceed thither. In the course of this journey the members of the Government were arrested by order of the Roumanian military command and interned at Mezohegyes for two weeks. Owing to this delay, the Government only arrived at Szeged at the end of the month of May, where it set itself up:

It is composed as follows:

President of the Council and
Minister of the Interior
Minister for War
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance
Minister of Commerce
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Religion and
Public Instruction
Minister of Justice
Minister of Public Welfare
Minister of Food

Count Jules Karolyi.
Dr. Aladar Balia
Gen. Sándor Belitska
Jean Kintzig.

vacant
reserved for the Socialists.
ditto.\(^2\)

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1 In the original file this letter is enclosed in a letter by Gen. L. Franchet d'Esperey, dated 24 June 1919, forwarding it to G. Clemenceau.

2 As reported by Col. Watts to the British Peace Delegation on 24 July 1919 (PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/16194), the Szeged Government was reorganized on 17 July 1919, which resulted in the following redistribution of the offices:

President of the Council and
Minister of Finance
Minister of the Interior and
Minister of Justice
Minister of War
Minister of Commerce
Minister of Food
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Minister of Agriculture

Dezső Ábrahám
Dr. Aladár Balla
Gen. Sándor Belitska
Dr. Lajos Varjassy
Lajos Pálmay

Count Pál Teleki
In order to publish its aim and duties the Government issued the annexed proclamation. The Council leans on all parties and all fractions of the country desirous of fighting Bolshevism and re-establishing legal order in Hungary. I wish to indicate by the very composition of the Government the fact that it does not represent one party or one political tendency only, but the whole country without distinction of party politics or religion and ardently desires the re-establishment of legal order. I have not hitherto been able to win over the Socialists to collaborate usefully with me but I hope to succeed, and two places are reserved for them in the Cabinet.

Seeing that the object aimed at by the Government is in agreement with the interests and intentions of the Entente Powers, who likewise desire the suppression of Bolshevism, the re-establishment and maintenance of order, and that moreover the Government of Hungary does not only rely on some political parties but on the entire country, and proposes to pursue a liberal and democratic policy, I am of opinion that it may be hoped to be recognised by the Entente Powers and to obtain their assistance in the organisation of an armed force.

The Government formed under my leadership will accept the decisions of the Paris Conference as soon as Hungary obtains a hearing thereat and has the opportunity of expressing her views, for that Government is firmly convinced that after we have been heard, such decisions can only be just and equitable.

I beg therefore that you will be so good as to communicate the substance of this letter to the competent authorities, and

I have, etc., etc.,
(Sd.) Count Jules Karolyi

3 Not enclosed in the original.

Minister of Public Assistance
and
Minister of Public Instruction } Mihály Dömötör.

There was positive reaction among members of the Entente to these changes, it was generally regarded that the newly constituted Szeged Government was more representative of Hungarian society.
No. 142

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 8 June 1919)

No. 59 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/12011]

Vienna, 7 June 1919

Delegates from Trade Unions in Budapest ask urgently for answer to projects made to Commander Freeman detailed in my despatch T.C. 503 June 2nd. Moment critical. Freeman still in Vienna.

Repeated to D.M.I.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Advance copy sent to Major Webster, Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, Sir Maurice Hankey.

The proposals of the Trades Unions are still “on”. I gather that the Council of IV were to discuss the Hungarian question this morning.

Harold Nicolson
9/6/19

The question of the Hungarian trades unions could not be answered without committing the allied govt. to a definite policy towards Hungary. I do not believe that such a policy can be formulated at present, but the previous telegrams in which the question was raised, have been submitted and have not yet returned.

Technically, of course, the Hungarian Trade Unions are not entitled to any answer from the allied governments.

E. Crowe
9/6/19

[To] Lord Hardinge

Copy of proposed reply is attached for your approval.2

W.L.O. Twiss Lt.-Col.
General Staff for D.M.I. 10/6/19

H[arding].

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1 Not printed: for a similar dispatch see Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram No. 49, dated 3 June 1919, printed as No. 135.

2 Instead of the draft, the Enclosure contains the actual telegram sent to Vienna, which is also attached to the original file.
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 142

Telegram from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)

Paris, 11 June 1919

Priority.

Reference your telegram No. 49 June 3rd (Hungarian Trade Unions). See No. 135.

No. 143

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel B. Coulson (Prague) to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris)

[Li. G. F/8/3/62/(b)]

Prague, 8 June 1919

Dear Twiss,

The situation here is very grave: everywhere the Magyars are advancing, the resistance offered by the C.S. Army is most feeble and the general morale exceedingly low.

I know that General Pellé is most anxious and does not think that the enemy can possibly be driven back without aid from the Entente, and this must not be delayed too long, as the most we can hope for is to hold them, and up to now, we have not been successful in this. The fall of Kosice, the crossing of the Danube at Parkany and steady advance towards Pressburg will illustrate the gravity of the situation. There is a terrible lack of rifles, ammunition and war material of every description, there are no reserves and the factories are only now commencing to cope with this lack.

Can nothing be done? It is so very bad for the prestige of the Entente, naturally people here cannot understand it's [sic] attitude towards an Ally. Something should be done quickly, there is the Roumanian Army and two French divisions who would create a diversion to the East, which would immediately relieve the situation here as at present about three-quarters of the Magyar force is employed on the western front.

We need not point out the danger of German-Austria becoming Bolshevist should the Magyar successes continue, and, above all, should Pressburg fall.

Luckily we have General Pellé. He is the greatest asset, but he is quite frankly not optimistic and has a terribly hard task before him largely owing to the late Italian Command.

I am afraid that this is not a cheerful letter, but I can assure you that I am not unduly pessimistic.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Basil I [J].B. Coulson

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1 In the Lloyd George Papers this letter appears as the second enclosure with a letter, dated 13 June 1919, sent by Winston S. Churchill to D. Lloyd George.
Very Urgent.

It is with satisfaction that the Government of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils takes cognizance of the intention of the Governments of the Allied & Associated States to invite Hungary to the Peace Conference in Paris. The Republic of Hungarian Councils harbours no hostile feelings towards any nation and desires to live on terms of peace and friendship with everybody, all the more so as it does not take its stand on the point of view of territorial integrity; it did not mean to attack and in fact did not attack the Czecho-Slovak Republic with which it has always desired and still desires to live in terms of peace and friendship, and it always respected the lines of demarcation fixed by the Allied States, while acting in conformity with the clauses of the Military Convention of November the 13th.

However, it has been obliged with regret to take note of the fact that the troops of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and of the Kingdoms of Jugo-Slavia and Roumania, acting under cover of the prestige attached to the Allied States and contrary to the Military Convention of November 13th, have broken into the territory of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils and have already threatened to strangle us, when, compelled by supreme necessity we had to take up arms. We take cognizance with satisfaction of the fact that the Allied States have ordered the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Kingdom of Jugo-Slavia and Roumania to cease their attacks against us, but we are obliged to note that the above mentioned States did not obey the Allies’ demand and their offensive was only checked by our counter-offensive and that their troops are still posted beyond the lines of demarcation fixed by the Convention of November 13th.

In order to avoid useless bloodshed the Government of the Councils of the Hungarian Republic again declares itself ready at once to stop hostilities against all those States, so that the Allies may be enabled to see that their orders are obeyed by the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Kingdoms of Jugo-Slavia and Roumania. With a view to the cessation of hostilities, the execution of the clauses of the Military Convention of Nov. 13th as well as to the settlement of the questions connected with it, and to the provisional solution of the economic questions, it seems necessary to us that the States concerned should send delegates to Vienna and that a committee consisting of these delegates should meet at once under the presidency of the representatives of one of the Allied States. The Government of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils are open to

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1 This dispatch is a reply to G. Clemenceau's telegram to the Hungarian Government, dated 7 June 1919, printed as No. 138.
anything liable to promote a just and rightful peace and mutual confidence among nations and that will put an end to bloodshed for ever.²

Bela Kun
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils


The controversial issues mentioned in Béla Kun’s telegram remained unresolved until the fall of his Government at the beginning of August 1919. On 15 July G. Clemenceau received a long telegram from Béla Kun (date not indicated, see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 11, Appendix A). The telegram is very similar in content to the one printed here. On a copy received by the British Peace Delegation, A.W.A. Leeper recorded on 17 July: “As usual Béla Kun argues quite skilfully: no doubt the line of the Rumanian occupation was extended far beyond that of Nov. 13. He avoids however answering the Allies’ demand that he shall at once reduce his forces to the number permitted.” (PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15428)

No. 145

Telegram from R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 10 June 1919)

Unnumbered [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12258]

Prague, 9 June 1919

Following for Mr. Headlam-Morley:-

Military situation grave. Absolutely vital that all General Pelle’s wishes regarding guns, munitions and military exports should be fulfilled with minimum of delay.

Magyars selected psychological moment when French had scarcely taken command and when moral of Czech army had been undermined by prolonged and deliberate Sabotage on the part of Italian officers.

My suspicions of actual treachery find confirmation in highest political and military circles.

Magyars unquestionably exaggerated recent Prague riots and reckoned on Bolshevist outbreak in Bohemia, also hoped to provoke local troubles in Slovakia behind front and cut main line at Rutteme by the help of Magyar railway officials.

Widespread (group undecypherable) Budapest on part of Jewish population throughout Slovakia, only natural since new regime means end of their exploitation of peasantry.

Signs are not wanting that Magyar action is part of far bigger design.

Supreme attempt to establish connection with Russian Bolsheviks extends to Galicia and Anatolia across Carpathians and if possible establish contact with (Russian
Bolsheviks extends to Galicia and Anatolia across Carpathians and if possible establish contact with) Silesian mining districts.
For the moment White and Red Guards are fighting side by side against Czechs. Attitude of the neighbourhood not satisfactory.
Cracow Poles especially Bilinski Daszy.

NOTE by cyphers — The last part of this telegram is unintelligible, we are trying to make something of it, if we are unsuccessful will ask for repetition.

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Telegram from R.W. Seton-Watson (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 10 June 1919)

Prague, 9 June 1919

Following for Mr. Headlam-Morley.
Continuation of telegram dated June 9th.
(Daszy) ski intriguing with Budapest and Rome, Warsaw too weak to stop them.
Polish stoppage of Galician Oil consignments greatly complicates Slovak military situation. Budapest Government's attitude here regarded as equivocal.
Vienna's refusal to supply munitions to Czechs has complicated situation and led to refusal of coal as reprisal.
Please use utmost influence to secure, firstly, immediate (group undecypherable) definition of Czech's bid against (group undecypherable) on moderate lines; secondly, open declaration of Entente's solidarity with this republic; thirdly, stiff note warning Budapest.
All this necessary to restoration of Entente prestige and destroy prevailing suspicion successfully (group undecypherable) disclosure of intrigue with Magyars.
Naturally Czechs would also welcome immediate advance of General Franchet [Franchet].

My view of internal situation optimistic, but only if Entente gives prompt material and moral support.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Sir Eyre Crowe first

1. The situation, militarily is clearly desperate.

2. Politically, the policy of choosing this moment to make up to Bela Kun and practically disarm our allies who are defending themselves against Bolshevism, is bound to lead to the complete failure of the design to set up free and independent States as a counterbalance to a German–Bolshevik combination.

3. The triumph of the Bolshevist terror in Hungary, with the blessing of the Allies, will put an end to all hope of setting German Austria on her legs again.

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1 Gen. L. Franchet d'Esperey.
4. The treachery of the Italians ought to be brought to notice. It is an outrage to the Allied cause that Baron Sonnino should sit at the conference without being confronted with the disloyalty of his policy.

E. Crowe
11/6/19

The situation is undoubtedly serious, and one wonders whether it is appreciated by the Council of Four. To give official countenance of the Allies to Bela Kun will be the death-blow to all anti-Bolshevist efforts in Europe and encouragement to Lenin and his scum.

I agree also with Sir E. Crowe's remarks about the underhand proceedings of the Italians which are the same everywhere.

H[arding].

[To] Political Section (Sir Eyre Crowe)

We are in full agreement with these views, & are doing our utmost to get military action taken against Bela Kun and his associates.

Mr. Seton-Watson is wrong in his statement re Magyars acting "when French had scarcely taken command"; their offensive began while the Italians were still in charge, which was no doubt one of the principal causes of the Czecho-Slovak defeat.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut.Col.
19/6/19 G.S.
Advance copy to Mr. Headlam-Morley.

[To] Sir Eyre Crowe.

This contains in a complete form 14 telegrams from Mr. Seton-Watson of which the first portion was sent to you yesterday.

J.W. H[eadlam-].M[orley].
12/6/19

Unfortunately the Council of Four have — so I understand — decided upon a policy diametrically opposed to the conditions which Mr. Seton Watson considers essential to a satisfactory settlement.

E. Crowe
12/6/19

A.J.B[alfour].

H[ardinge].

2 Most of these seem not to have been preserved in the Public Record Office.

No. 146

Letter from A.W.A. Leeper (Paris) to R.W.A. Leeper (London. Extract)

[LEEP Folder 2]

Paris, 9 June 1919

[....]
We're waiting for Council of Four decisions in order to plunge into the Hungarian & Balkan questions. Meanwhile the four have sent what I consider a most disastrous telegram to Bela Kun1 giving him the chance of saying he is being recognised and invited to Paris. I don't think that was at all their intention but I'm afraid it'll be the result.2

1 See No. 138.
2 After Bela Kun's reply to G. Clemenceau's telegram had been received in Paris (see No. 144), A.W.A. Leeper wrote in a letter to his brother on 11 June 1919: “This Hungarian business is as putrid as ever. Naturally, Kun Bela is delighted with his invitation. It's insensate & heart-breaking.” (LEEP Folder 2)
No. 147

Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 12 June 1919)

No. not known. [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12375]

Prague, 11 June 1919

I am informed by General PELLE that in spite of Bela Kun's reply\(^1\) to ultimatum of Entente,\(^2\) period of 48 hours granted has elapsed and Magyar attacks against Slovakia continue with much increased violence.

He appears to wish to obtain decisive decision.

General PELLE seems very anxious concerning situation which he regards as extremely grave.\(^3\)

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 118.

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1 See No. 144.
2 See No. 138.
3 Many more reports were sent to Paris and London until 21 June 1919 suggesting bad faith on the part of the Hungarian Government regarding the withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. These are two characteristic dispatches from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to A.J. Balfour:

1. "New Hungarian Minister [Emö Czobel?] stated reply of Kun [No. 144] was to delay matters until Austrian [sic] turned Soviet and added forces to those of Hungary." (Telegram No. 62, dated 13 June 1919; PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/12497. Extract.)

2. "Speech of BELA KUN in BUDAPEST on June 12th shows that he has no intention of abandoning invasion of Czecho-Slovakia.

He said he would negotiate but not obey command of Entente who were afraid to interfere. He hoped that Vienna, PRAGUE and Germany who have joined with a (? groups omitted) concentration of Red Troops is taking place in the neighbourhood of ESTERGON [ESZTERGOM] preparatory to attack on Pressburg." (Telegram No. 68, dated 17 June 1919; PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12928.)

Also see No. 148.

No. 148

Memorandum by C. Gosling (Prague), Sent to the Foreign Office (London. Received 12 June 1919)

Enclosure to letter No. 76 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 90558]

Prague, 12 June 1919

Dr. Boh. Vydra, who was investigating ethnical problems in Upper Silesia, arrested by the Germans and held in prison at Ratibor for almost three months, states the following:-

In the first half of May, about three weeks before my release from prison, which I left on the first of June, I had numerous talks with the leader of the Silesian Bolshevists, Horst Froehlich, who was in one cell with me. In one of such discussions Froehlich told me that the Bolshevists have their plans for domination of all Europe completely
worked out. The action is to begin by the attack of Magyar troops on the Czecho-Slovak front, which must be broken to enable the Magyars to establish a connection with the Russians. In the meanwhile a revolution is to break out in Germany, which is to do away with the Ebert-Scheidemann[n] Government, and set up a Bolshevist Government; after that a combined Bolshevik attack from the East and West against Poland is to take place, and the defeat of Polish armies serve as a signal for an attack against Western Europe. The Bolshevist Paradise is to prevail over the whole of Europe in a few years.

Froehlich was generally well informed of the conditions in the neighbouring countries, especially Bohemia, but did not believe the present order of things would last.

No. 149

Telegram from G. Clemenceau (Paris) to the Hungarian Government (Budapest)\(^1\)

[PRO CAB 21/150]

Paris, 13 June 1919

GENERAL

In their telegram of June 7th,\(^2\) the Allied and Associated Powers expressed their “firm determination to put an end to all useless hostilities”. To this determination they adhere; and they expect and require all Nations and Governments concerned to assist them in carrying it out.

They have reason to think that the chief motive animating those responsible for what would otherwise seem senseless bloodshed is the belief that the future frontiers of the New States will be modified by the temporary accidents of military occupation. This is not so. No state will be rewarded for prolonging the horrors of war by any increase of territory; nor will the Allied and Associated Powers be induced to alter decisions made in the interests of Peace and Justice by the unscrupulous use of military methods.

They desire therefore to declare:-

1. That the frontiers described in the accompanying telegram\(^3\) are to be the frontiers permanently dividing Hungary from Czecho-Slovakia and from Roumania.
2. That the armed forces of these States must immediately cease hostilities and retire without avoidable delay within the national frontiers thus laid down.

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\(^1\) This telegram is part of a series of telegrams sent to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments, notifying them of the decision reached by the Allied and Associated Powers regarding the settlement of the territorial dispute between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia on the one hand, and Hungary and Romania on the other. All the telegrams are reproduced in FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 411-416; the telegram quoted here is quoted on pp. 411-412. For the debate in the Council of Four concerning the difficulties of drafting this telegram see LINK, vol. 60, pp. 529-530. For the reply sent by Béla Kun see No. 152; for I. Brătianu's reply see DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 47, note 2.

\(^2\) See No. 138.

\(^3\) Not printed.
The Allied and Associated Powers are aware that in certain places these frontiers cut railways necessary for the economic service of both the coterminous States: and also that there are a certain number of small frontier adjustments which can only be finally settled by impartial investigation on the spot. Provision for both these cases is made in the Treaty of Peace; and in the meanwhile, they should not be allowed to stand in the way of the policy insisted on by the Allied and Associated Powers. With the smallest goodwill they are capable of local arrangements; and, if differences should arise, these should be referred to Allied Officers on the spot, whose award must be treated as binding until Peace is finally declared.

HUNGARY (SPECIAL)

In accordance with these general principles the Hungarian Army now fighting in Czecho-Slovakia is required immediately to withdraw behind the assigned frontier of Hungary, within which all other Hungarian troops are required to remain. If the Allied and Associated Governments are not informed by their representatives on the spot within four days from mid-day on June 14th, 1919, that this operation is being effectively carried out, they will hold themselves free to advance on Buda Pesth, and to take such other steps as may seem desirable to secure a just and speedy Peace.

The Roumanian troops will be withdrawn from Hungarian territory as soon as the Hungarian troops have evacuated Czecho-Slovakia. The Allied and Associated Powers must insist that, during this operation, the Roumanian troops shall be unmolested, and that no attempt shall be made to follow them across the Roumanian Borders.

G. Clemenceau

No. 150

Letter from Captain G.H.L. Fitzwilliams (Vienna) to C.K. Butler (Trieste (?).
Extract. Received 21 June 1919)

[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13216]

Vienna, 15 June 1919

[...]

That the [Hungarian] Government is in a precarious condition is to be seen by the growth of the Anti Communist movements instanced at every meeting of each workmen Guild and the fact that the members of the Government speaking at these are changing in tone. Further there are signs for the first time of union of these guilds which had formerly lacked and showed demonstrations of an Anti Jewish character. The suppression of the religious houses is causing local consternation and is starting the religious outburst directed against the Jews (of the Government members 34 in number 32 are Jews and even of the remaining two one an educated member and a Professor of the University is said to have now resigned.)

The money question is a further cause of unrest. Sheets of notes 42 to a sheet are printed with the same serial number and white money now in forced circulation in the City is refused outside. All shops have been shut and private plundering is punished by public execution. Government requisitions have emptied all stores for use of Red
Troops and Communist people. Food is not to be bought except at price of joining the Red Army or working for Government and people who go out of town to country are allowed to bring only 50 kilos at a time and exchange and barter system prevails, matches, linen, leather and clothes. Money in country must be blue and this can with greatest difficulty only be obtained in the town. As an example of prices a goose costs 1,600 blue Kronen.

Discipline of Gendarmerie. The mounted Troops are in excellent order still beautifully mounted and under their old officers (the Commandant is a personal friend of mine). The infantry is less so, and the Soviet Body Guard (Lenin soldiers about 1000 mixed Russian and gailbirds [sic]) are out of hand the latter are quartered in the Parliament House and a source of danger and the Commandant de Ville (Hauptricht [Haubrich]) is powerless to control or disarm.

The Government last week recommenced the taking of hostages and it is most significant that this time these were not chosen only from the Intelligence [sic] but also from the Workmens Guilds.

The Rising in West Hungaria, it is stated, was started prematurely and possibly by a trick and was suppressed by an excess of bloodshed and cruelty. The railway strike which held up communications wholly in some places and partly in others for 8 days was suppressed by shootings and on other side in Budapest by concession in blue money.

In my opinion the Government position is such that it might at any time be overthrown. The match only is required but it lacks a man to strike it. Any one found playing with the political matchbox would be shot at once without trial. If the Government falls two separate things may happen (and that separate only at the commencement)

1st. If the Police under Hauptricht [Haubrich] do not hold, a pogrom will start and spread, massacre of the Jews on a scale hitherto unprecedented.

2nd. If they hold, an unstable Social Democratic party requiring immediate outside assistance best rendered by food support and to do this properly a well organised relief train with food supplies and property filled up with military soup kitchens capable of being started at work within 6 hours of arrival should be held on the frontier.

I am, etc., etc.,
Gerald H.L. Fitzwilliams
Capt. R.A.M.C.
No. 151

Telegram from Béla Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow)

[B. G. F/197/4/4]

Budapest, 16 June 1919

It would be of the greatest importance if Comrade Bucharin were to come here. Now that we are in treaty with the Entente, although for the present only by wireless, we might, with Bucharin, inaugurate a foreign policy which would be of the greatest immediate advantage to Russia as well (as ourselves). I should require however, for this purpose, a man at hand like Bucharin. The matter is one of such great interest that I apply direct to you with this request. Please answer me personally.¹

¹There is, apparently, no record of either the receipt of this message in Moscow, or any reply to it received in Hungary.

No. 152

Telegram from Béla Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris.

[FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 518-520 (Appendix II to CF-73)]

Budapest, 16 June 1919

(Translation from French)

M. Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference, Paris.

We acknowledge receipt of your telegram sent in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.² The Government of the Hungarian Republic of the Councils expresses once more its satisfaction at the decision taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to put an end to all needless hostilities. We declare solemnly that our Government will help you with all its power to translate this intention into fact. The Hungarian Republic of the Councils, whose people has accomplished the greatest revolution in its history without, so to speak, having shed (literally “spread”) blood, has never been and never will be the cause of useless bloodshed. The Hungarian Republic of the Councils was not established for the purpose of making military conquests or oppressing other nations; its object is to suppress all kinds of oppression and exploitation. We are firmly convinced that it is not the momentary events of military conquest but the great interest of humanity — the common interests of the solidarity of workers — which will decide the frontiers of the new States, until the walls separating the peoples fall. Having made our fate depend on the fraternal solidarity of the workers

¹ This telegram is also reproduced in LINK, vol. 60, pp. 596-598.
² See No. 149.
of the whole world, nothing is further from our mind than a wish to prolong the horrors of war; every measure taken in the interest of Peace and of Justice will find a sure support in the Hungarian Republic of Workers. The Government of the Hungarian Republic of the Councils declares without hesitation, frankly and openly that not only will it satisfy but has already satisfied absolutely the demand of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to cease hostilities immediately; it is not we who are the cause of the bloodshed which was continuing (sic) but the troops of the Czechoslovak Republic which, taking advantage of the fact that we forthwith suspended operations of war at the bidding of the Allied and Associated Powers, took the offensive; we were only able to repel that offensive by counter offensives the object of which was to render it impossible for them to continue their advance. In order to prove that we are not responsible for the bloodshed, we need only recall the fact that in the zone occupied by the Roumanians we have made no advance whatever nor even any attempts in this direction, the Roumanian army not having resumed its attacks against us. Nevertheless we must affirm that in view of the present Czecho-Slovak situation, the possibility of giving orders and carrying them out, the recall of our troops and the evacuation of the territories mentioned cannot be carried out within the period fixed by your telegram. We are still less able to do so in as much as we only received the telegram on June 15th at noon, although it was marked “Very urgent”. In order to carry out the recall of the troops and the evacuation of the territories without bloodshed, both on our part and on that of the Roumanians, we have to-day requested the Governments, that is to say the Commanders-in-Chief of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and of the Kingdom of Roumania to send to our Headquarters, or to a place to be designated, military Delegates furnished with full powers who will be instructed to settle in agreement with our Chief Command the methods of evacuation. Nevertheless, we are bound to observe with regret that the Allied and Associated Governments have not yet given us the opportunity to let them know directly the vital desires of the Republic of the Councils in both political and economic matters, and that they have only partially let us know even the frontiers. We now observe that these frontiers, contrary to the declaration of the Allied and Associated Governments to the effect that military conquests could not serve as a basis for the frontiers of the new States, seem to us to be frontiers drawn solely with a view to the right of the strongest. Within these frontiers it is absolutely impossible to create a normal economic existence and productivity, since it is impossible, in view of the present economic situation of the world and of the international traffic to ensure the mere subsistence of the population living in the delimited territories. We await the occasion to demonstrate before the Peace Conference, with the support of full proof, the truth of this assertion. At the same time we call your attention to our demand contained in our last message to summon together the Governments of the Peoples of the former Monarchy to a Conference where they will be able to discuss the liquidation of the former Monarchy as parties equally interested. We do not accept the principle of territorial integrity, we leave on one side the fact that territories inhabited exclusively by Magyars are to be robbed from our Republic of the Councils as a consequence of the drawing of the frontiers: we only ask to emphasize one point, namely that under such conditions even a system of Government with foundations as solid as ours could not possibly prevent the struggle for existence degenerating within these frontiers into a war of every man against every man. We declare once more that not only have we stopped all aggressive operations on our side but also have taken the necessary measures to order our troops to act in accordance with your bidding and to make the technical preparations for that purpose; and we beg you to be so good as to take the necessary action with the Governments of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and of the Kingdom of Roumania so that they may accede to the demands we have addressed to them in this sense; we beg you to instruct the above mentioned Governments to come into direct communication with us for the purpose of carrying
out your orders and in particular to stop on their side also all needless bloodshed and all aggression, which only serve to prolong the horrors of war.

Bela Kun

Commissary for Foreign Affairs
of the Hungarian Republic of the Councils

No. 153

Letter from Sir M. Hankey to General T.H. Bliss

[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13136]

Paris, 16 June 1919

My dear General,

I was asked this afternoon by President Wilson to let you know that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had decided to invite your views in regard to the proposal in the latest telegram from the Hungarian Government, dated 16th June noon, of which I enclose a copy,¹ that a meeting should be arranged between the Officer commanding the Hungarian forces, on the one hand, and the Officers commanding the Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian forces, on the other hand, in order to arrange for the means of withdrawal behind the frontiers decided on.

The Council would be glad if you would consult the Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian Delegations in Paris on this subject and report the result.

To assist you in this enquiry, I enclose copies of the whole of the telegrams which have passed between the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Hungarian, Roumanian, and Czecho-Slovak Governments on this subject.²

Believe me,
Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) M.P.A. Hankey

¹ See No. 152.
² Not printed. For the Council of Four’s views on arranging a meeting between the Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak and Romanian commanding officers see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 513-514; or LINK, vol. 60, pp. 594-596. For E. Beneš’s telegrams to Gen. T.H. Bliss, dated 17 and 18 June, putting forward counter-proposals, i.e. that the Czech forces remain on the lines which they were then occupying, while the Hungarians retire, see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 555-557. For Gen. T.H. Bliss’s final report, dated 19 June 1919, see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 552-555. In his report Gen. Bliss calls the demands made in Béla Kun’s telegram (No. 152) reasonable, nevertheless, he accepts E. Beneš’s proposal for a Hungarian withdrawal within a prescribed time limit, followed by a Czecho-Slovak advance to the new frontiers. In return, he promises that the Entente will secure the withdrawal of the Romanian troops from Hungarian territory in the same manner.
Minutes attached to the document:

Meanwhile the Hungarians are concentrating against Pressburg.

Harold Nicolson
21/6/19

No. 154

En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)
to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 18 June 1919)

No. 616 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/12926]

Vienna, 17 June 1919

Following is translation of communique by Magyar Chief Command dated June 17th. At the direction of the Allied Powers we have taken the necessary measures for the suspension of warlike operations. Nevertheless the Czechs have resorted to attacks with considerable force along the entire front and are ignoring the instructions of the Allied Powers regarding the suspension of hostilities under such circumstances our troops were forced to take energetic measures for defence. Vehement fighting is going on west of Eperjes in the Sajo valley in the Rima valley and in the neighbourhood of Leva. According to official Hungarian agency the Slovak rate Republic [Republic of Councils] has been declared.1

Addressed Astoria and D.M.I.

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Minutes attached to the document:

This shows how important it is for Col. Coulson to be at the Czech front. I much doubt whether the Hungarian statements are true.

Harold Nicolson
19/6/19

Nobody but an Italian would be likely to credit them.

E. Crowe
19/6/19

1 A very similar dispatch (telegram No. 617) was sent by Col. Sir T. Cuninghame to Paris on 18 June. That, however, was accompanied by a copy of a telegram sent by the Czechoslovak Government to the Hungarian Government, accusing the latter of a similar degree of non-compliance with the wishes of the Peace Conference. (PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13240)
My dear General,

I thought perhaps that you would like to have a private line from me on the situation at Vienna.

We had a very serious crisis this week owing to a very determined effort by the Hungarian agitators to push the local Volkswehr into rebellion against the Socialist Administration.

As soon as I returned I was able to discover the lines upon which they were working. There were two ostensible reasons given why the Volkswehr should side with the Communists, beside the moral general inducements comprised in the success of the Bolshevist Army in Slovakia, the impression made by the nature of the Peace terms and the appearance of recognition of a Bolshevist Regime by the Entente. These two reasons were first the demand of the Entente to reduce the Volkswehr by June 15th and secondly the continued residence in Vienna of Hungarian Counter-Revolutionaries.

So I set myself to get rid of both these reasons before the day of crisis. I managed to get reinforcements to remove out of Vienna more than 2,000 Hungarian refugees including the dangerous elements represented by the politicians and ex-officers. They had acquired the habit of holding meetings of all sorts in offices and Hotels, they had carried out a raid against the Hungarian Legation, and an attempt to get into Western Hungary. Also a succession of attempts at gun running and risings in Western Hungary, all of which were so stupidly and inefficiently arranged, that the matter was becoming an open scandal and a target for Communist action.

The Italian Mission did not like to tackle it officially but were glad that I should use my private influence to remove them which I successfully accomplished.

Then I got all the Missions to agree to a postponement of order to diminish the Volkswehr, which removed that cause of complaint.

Finally I managed through the Police and the Landeshauptmann of Vienna to get the Workmen's Councils harangued against any inopportune attempts at a coup. The Communists found no backing therefore in either group, and the Hungarian agitators having spent large sums of money gave it up in disgust. The Viennese themselves are opposed to all disturbance. The idea of making a “coup” at 3 a.m. did not appeal to them on Sunday morning, and they wouldn't [sic] do it in the evening because they had to take their girls to the Park. This does not appear therefore to be a formidable crowd to deal with, but their very indifference and passivity makes them victims of more energetic interlopers. There was a certain amount of shooting on Sunday all the same, about 12 being killed and nearly 100 wounded. But the Socialists were so incensed against a Communist plot to kidnap the leading members of the Socialist Party that they will probably squash all further attempts for some time to come:-

I am greatly puzzled at the Italian game. We know that they received 50 million crowns from Kun's Government of which 15 million (£150,000 at current rates) was in gold. The principal evidence as to this was given by a German Count (Basselet de la Rose) to the Vienna Police. He stated that the money was for food “to be delivered after

1 See No. 40, note 7.
the raising of the blockade”. Now Butler our Food Controller says that the Italians have no food, and certainly could not send 50 million crown’s worth. We know that a lot of arms of all sorts have found their way into Hungary and the Italians are suspected of complicity (though no case has as yet been definitely proved). As matters stand to-day, Kun — if he really does cave in, will lose his money and get neither food nor arms. The amount of money which the Bolsheviks have spent is stupendous. Great sums have been spent in Slovakia especially among the Slovaks, also in Yugo-Slavia. We know of the 135 millions taken in the Hungarian Legation here, and that probably is only a drop in the bucket, the police have evidence of hundreds of people paid sums ludicrously large for the slightest of services, and I am quite sure myself that the men of the Italian Mission have not escaped contamination. We know that General Picciorni [Piccione] who commanded at Pressburg went frequently to see Kun Bela. [...] I think the French view that there is secret co-operation between Germany, Italy, Hungary, Austria and German Bohemia has certainly an element of truth, but it seems a perilous game for the Italians in view of the possibility of non-signature by Germany and a resumption of hostilities.

I still hope that we shall find it possible to hold up Austria and to expel the Internationale from Hungary, otherwise we are in for trouble. Meanwhile Kun seems to have yielded, but he is very subtle, and I hope will not be trusted.

Yours, etc.,
(Sd.) T. Cuninghame

No. 156

Letter from Sir C. des Graz (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (London. Received 25 June 1919)

Belgrade, 17 June 1919

My Lord,

TWO members of the Hungarian anti-Bolshevik Ministry formed at Szegedin, of which Count Julius Karolyi is the head, have paid a short visit to Belgrade and called on me yesterday.

They were Vice-Admiral de Horthy, of the former Austro-Hungarian navy, “Minister of War” of the Szegedin Administration, and Comte Paul Téléli [Teleki], on whose card was written “Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Ministère de Szegedin.”

These gentlemen gave a moving and terrible account of the horrors of Bolshevism which had been let loose in their country, and Comte Téléli gave very painful details of murderings often preceded by torture. Incidentally, he spoke of the present policy of the Italian Government in Hungary (and also Austria), which seemed not only incomprehensible but inconceivable, and of their action in supporting the Bolshevik régime and supplying them with both ammunition and cannon. Of this, he said, clear proof had been furnished to the British Military Representative in Vienna.¹ Both gentlemen also laid stress on the requisitions and lootings of the Roumanians in the part of the country occupied by them.

¹ Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame.
Admiral Horthy and Comte Télész told me that they had come here to enlist the sympathy of this Government and to obtain certain facilities of transit which would enable them to make a start in operations against the Bolsheviks. From Szegedin the difficulties were too great, whereas the country to the west of the Danube would be the most favourable “jumping-off” ground. To reach that from Szegedin, however, the use of the Serbian—Jugo-Slav railway by way of Szabatka [Szabadka] and on was necessary. Though with comparatively few men at present, they hoped, and indeed appeared to count on a very considerable number of officers and men, now forced by circumstances and threats from odious reprisals against their families to serve in the Bolshevik ranks, coming forward to meet and join them.

I thanked these gentlemen for their visit, and confined myself to expressing fullest sympathy felt so universally with victims of Bolshevik terrorism.

I hear that they were received by the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was able to assure them on the part of the Government of all the sympathy against Bolshevism. I gather that this Government would acquiesce in the granting of such facilities, like those suggested, as would be approved of by the Commander of the French troops in that part of the country, feeling sure thus that the French General would only act in accordance with the desire and policy of the Allies.

I have, etc., etc.,
Charles des Graz

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2 Mihailo Gavrilović. Also see No. 55, note 2.

No. 157

Letter from Sir S. Hoare to A. J. Balfour

[BALF Additional 49749]

Paris, 19 June 1919

Dear Mr. Balfour,

I understand from Ian Malcolm that if you had not been called to the Allied Conference you would have seen me for a few minutes. I should then have ventured to say to you the following.

1. The essential condition of peace in Central Europe is the destruction of Bela Kum’s [Kun’s] Government at Buda Pesth.

I have just returned from a fortnight’s visit to Masaryk, and have had the opportunity both on the Slovak front and in Prague of gauging the position.

My conclusion after conversation with, I think every representative man in Prague, official and otherwise, and with General Pelle, the French Commander-in-Chief, is that Bela Kun [sic], having begun as an insignificant adventurer, is with the help of Magyar chauvinism consolidating his power. This power is of a doubly dangerous character. In the first place, it is an offshoot of Russian Bolshevism, its chief object being to link up

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1 A longer letter, similar in content, was sent by Sir S. Hoare from Prague to Winston S. Churchill on 10 June 1919. Churchill forwarded the letter to the Prime Minister on 15 June. It is now in L.I.G. F/83/63.
with Lenin through Galicia. In the second place, it is Magyar, and on that account Chauvinist in the extreme, its object being to restore Magyar domination by the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia.

2. **Both as an anti-Bolshevist bloc and an anti-Magyar power it is essential to maintain the strength and prestige of Czecho-Slovakia.**

The Magyar invasion has greatly shaken Czecho-Slovak prestige. Even more have the Allied communications to Bela Kum shaken it. Further negotiations with Bela Kum make it appear that Paris is prepared to recognise his Government. This will be an incalculable stimulus to Bolshevism first at Vienna and secondly in Slovakia.

At present Bohemia and Moravia are strongly anti-Bolshevist. No one can, however, say what would be the effect of the strengthening of Bela Kum’s position through Allied negotiation and recognition.

3. **The Allies should insist without further delay on the Magyar evacuation of Slovakia.**

This must not be subject to negotiations between Masaryk and Kum. Masaryk will not negotiate with the Bolshevist adventurer as he knows that such negotiations would shake the prestige of the Anti-Bolsheviks in Czecho-Slovakia.

Within a fix period — 2 or 3 days — after Kum’s withdrawal Foch can order Pelle to withdraw the Czecho-Slovak forces to a determined line.

If the Allies are satisfied that Bela Kum was the aggressor — and in my view the documents and evidence conclusively prove this — Bela Kum must be held responsible for the full cost of the Slovak invasion.

4. **If Bela Kum refuses, Franchet D’Esperey should be ordered to march on Buda Pesth with all the forces available.**

If no forces are available, the French, Americans and ourselves should pour munitions into Czecho-Slovakia, and leave it to Pelle to finish with the Magyars. In my view Pelle could organise a force large enough to do this.

5. Prague is in my view the most important centre for Eastern and Central European questions. On this account I regard it as a calamity that we are not properly represented. Our whole Legation Staff is one Chargé d’affaires, who is not only useless but positively harmful, and one Secretary. If no Minister is available, I consider it of vital importance that you should at once send a first-class Chargé d’affaires, another secretary, and one or two Consuls or vice-Consuls. I am quite ready if you wish to elaborate this opinion to Curzon in London. I have, however, so often complained of inadequacies of our Foreign Service abroad that I am not much inclined to start a new campaign against it! Please, however, if you are not satisfied with the view I express, take steps to find out what is the real position of our Prague Mission, and if you agree with my criticisms, send a Chargé d’Affaires in the next few days.

I have written very hurriedly — but I hope not incoherently.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Samuel Hoare

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2 The reference is to C. Gosling, who was British Chargé d’Affaires in Prague, 13 January 1919–24 January 1920. The first British Ambassador to be posted to Prague was Sir G. Clerk in 1920.
Minutes attached to the document:

The appointment of a new Minister to Prague has already received the approval of the S. of State but I do not know how far the appointment of Sir G. [?C.] Young\(^3\) has been carried out by Ld. Curzon.

H[arding].

\(^3\) This is likely to be a reference to Sir Charles Alban Young, Bart., who became British Ambassador in Belgrade in September 1919 until his retirement in September 1925, and was not appointed to serve in Prague.

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No. 158

*Telegram from Lenin (Moscow) to Béla Kun (Budapest. Extract (?). Received in Paris 26 June 1919)*\(^1\)

[Li. G. F/46/10/5]

Moscow, 19 June 1919

It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be better able to crush you and us.

Try and organise postal communication with us by aeroplane.

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\(^1\) In the original file, this wireless message, together with Béla Kun's reply (see No. 159), is enclosed with a letter from Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, for the information of the Prime Minister. An extract from the letter is printed as No. 172. The telegrams are preceded by the following comments: "The following correspondence has passed between Bela Kun and Lenin. We have obtained the information from a secret agent employed in the Hungarian Ministry at Buda Pest, whose reliability we are in a position to guarantee. It is essential to maintain secrecy as to this source of intelligence." The message from Lenin is also preceded by the note: "(Includes the following)...".
No. 159

Telegram from Béla Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow)¹

[LL. G. F/46/10/5]²

Budapest, 21 June 1919

Dear Friend Lenin,

I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils, but I think that in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of "mala fides". I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur, but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.

Yours sincerely,

Bela Kun

¹ Reply to Lenin's telegram, dated 19 June, see No. 158.
² Also in LL. G. F/197/4/4.

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No. 160

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 22 June 1919)

No. 80 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13266]

Vienna, 21 June 1919

I am informed from reliable source that order issued by Bohm on June 17th and June 18th to retire the Hungarian Army Corps to the line (? east of) Van [?Hatvan], Mischolz [Miskolc] was genuine but could not be carried out owing to opposition of Hungarian nationalists [nationalists?] and all idea of compliance with Entente demands is abandoned. Extremists hold position led by Samuelly [Szamuely] and orders have been issued to push attack as far as Brunn leaving Pressburg to north. Magyars crossed Neutra [Nyitra] yesterday but were set back again.

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Minutes attached to the document:

Magyar Bolsheviks & Nationalists have been accomplices on many occasions lately.

A.W.A. Leeper
23/6/19
June 22nd. At yesterday’s sitting of Hungarian Soviet Congress devoted to consideration of Military situation Commander-in-Chief Boehm declared that despite succession of victories of Red Army present situation was not rose-coloured. Although yesterday Czechs were defeated near Margitfalu and put to flight north of Leva and although Red troops already standing far beyond Csisa and were advancing in direction of Aranyosmarot, victorious troops were not in high spirits as they were not properly supported by hinterland. Defaitism [sic] in Budapest circulation of wild rumours defective provisioning and bad treatment of soldiers’ families by new Bureaucracy were unfavourably influencing mood of troops. Attacks threatened from other directions apart from Czech Front. Hungary must make further preparations as with present small army war could not be waged on all fronts.

Bela Kun remarked it was not object of Entente to bring peace to Hungarians but to throttle them therefore utmost must be done for maintenance of dictatorship of proletariat. During debate one member declared introduction [of] general compulsory military service would meet difficulties in province owing to defaitist and counter-revolutionary agitation another member saw in frontiers fixed by Entente death warrant for Hungary and People’s Commissary Vago demanded continuation of war against Czechs, Roumanians, and everyone attacking Hungary.

Finally resolution unanimously adopted that as strong Red Army was only guarantee of rule of proletariat Congress ordered general mobilisation entrusting Government with execution [of] details.

No. 162

Memorandum by Major-General W. Thwaites for Lord Hardinge

[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/13493]

Paris, 24 June 1919

Lord Hardinge.

1. On May 30th, the C.I.G.S.¹ pointed out the dangerous situation which had arisen in Central Europe owing to the Hungarian offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, and recommended that immediate military action should be taken to overthrow the existing Bolshevik regime in Buda Pest.

2. An exchange of telegrams then took place with Bela Kun, and on June 14th he was told by the Supreme Council that, if the retirement of Hungarian forces had not commenced by noon, June 18th, the Allied and Associated Governments would hold themselves free to advance on Buda Pest. On June 16th, Bela Kun replied in terms which, in the opinion of the C.I.G.S., constituted a flat refusal of our ultimatum. Other counsels, however, prevailed, and our relations with Bela Kun have been re-opened, in spite of the fact that six days have elapsed since the expiration of the ultimatum on June 18th and that the Hungarian attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks have continued on the whole front, with redoubled vigour. A new Division has been put into line, and a concentration of Red troops is taking place in Western Hungary, with the apparent object of attacking Pressburg, and possibly with a view to an ultimate advance on Vienna.

3. The gravity of the situation has been pointed out repeatedly by our military and political representatives in Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Germany, Rumania and Jugo-Slavia, as well as by the political and military sections of the Peace Delegation in Paris. The position has now become far more serious, for the following reasons:

(a) The morale of the Czecho-Slovak troops is low, and they are short of arms and ammunition.

(b) The town of Pressburg, containing the only Czecho-Slovak powder factory, is menaced, and its capture by the Hungarians is reported to be imminent.

(c) The Hungarians have occupied a large portion of Slovakia. A Bolshevik Republic has been proclaimed there, and is in communication with Lenin.

(d) Conditions in Austria, especially in Vienna, are dangerous, and the country may turn Bolshevik at any time, even without armed Hungarian intervention.

(e) The Hungarian forces are well armed and equipped. Their factories are working at full pressure, turning out large quantities of guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunition.

(f) The value of the Hungarian army has increased enormously. Its strength has doubled, i.e. has risen from 110,000 to 220,000 men in the last 7 weeks. In organization, discipline and morale, it has improved beyond all recognition. Nationalism has reconciled many Hungarians to Bolshevism, and the whole spirit of the people is changing.

4. From a military point of view the potential danger of the situation is very great. Our information shows that the Italians have been assisting the Hungarian Bolsheviks: Bela Kun has defeated the Czecho-Slovaks and, if his power is not soon destroyed, will be in a position to crush the Rumanians and Jugo-Slavs in detail: there is the possibility of combined action between Germany, Austria and Hungary which, in view of the risk of a Polish-German conflict and of the Bolshevik peril further east, is a serious consideration: lastly, the political and economic settlement of Europe is being seriously delayed and even jeopardised by our failure to put an end to Bela Kun's régime.

5. There is no evidence of any intention on the part of the present Hungarian Government to accept our terms. At a sitting of the Hungarian Soviet Congress, held on June 21st to consider the military situation, Bela Kun asserted that the object of the
Entente is not to give peace to the Hungarians, but to throttle them. Amongst other speeches, all in a similar strain, was one by Vago, one of the Jewish Army Corps Commanders, demanding continuation of the war against the Czecho-Slovaks and Rumanians. As a result of these speeches a resolution was unanimously adopted authorising the Congress to order an immediate general mobilization, the Government to be entrusted with the execution of the details.

6. In view of these considerations, I again urge the necessity of military intervention. It is more than likely that, as soon as the Hungarians realise that orders for a military advance on Buda Pest have actually been given, they will surrender, and yield to us the obedience which the despatch of telegrams has not succeeded in extorting.

W. Thwaites

Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Lord Hardinge

I think the P.M. ought to see this.

W. Thwaites
D.M.I.
24/6/19

A just decision on the part of the Council of Four seems urgently required.

E. Crowe
25/6/19

This seems to me to be now out of the hands of the civilians. Foch is in command.

[Unidentified]

[To] Sir Maurice Hankey

Please bring this to the notice of the Prime Minister.

W. Thwaites
26/6/19

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2 See No. 161.
No. 163

Letter from F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to H. Nicolson (Paris. Received 3 July 1919)

(PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/14217)

Bucharest, 24 June 1919

My dear Nicolson,

I have been trying to reply to your letter for some time but have been so busy that I trust you will excuse me.

In my opinion, by far the most important question at the moment is the attitude of the Conference towards Hungary. To us here it is utterly incomprehensible. Presumably it is admitted that it is not exactly good for the health of Europe to have the open sore of Bolshevism so near its vitals as Hungary? A month or two ago, when Bela Kun's imitation of Red Russian methods in Transylvania goaded the Roumanians into their advance, the the whole cancer of Bolshevism could have been cut out with one turn of the wrist. For some — to me inexplicable — reason the victorious Roumanian troops were stopped on the Theiss, when Bela Kun and his Bolsheviks were literally at the last gasp. I have authentic information as to the latter being unable to credit the news of the Allies' prohibition to Roumania, as being too good to be true. Knowing their own intentions they could not believe that the Allies could be so foolish as to protect them from their impending fate, and give them the necessary time to organise for the carrying out of the nefarious schemes they had in hand. I wonder does any one in Paris have an idea of what Bela Kun's ideas are. You are no doubt aware — it was reported from here — that a secret courier between Lenin and Kun was seized by the Roumanians. On him were found papers proving conclusively that the two Bolshevik leaders were acting in close accord. The idea is that as soon as Bolshevik Hungary is properly organised she should attack Vienna and install a Bolshevik Government there. An Austro-Hungarian Red force will then move towards Italy, where, according to Lenin, the country is ripe for Bolshevism, and is only awaiting such an opportunity as would be afforded by the approach of a Bolshevik force. The Russian Red forces are to look after Roumania, and Bulgaria is to do her part in this. Serbia will not be able to do more than look after herself, as trouble can, and will be arranged for her by means of the Croats. The latter are claimed to be well on the way to conversion. Czecho-Slovakia is very weak and may safely be neglected, especially if previously overawed by a few proofs of Bolshevik strength.

Please don't think there is any doubt about this scheme. It may not be realisable, though I think that, thanks to the infatuation for Bela Kun at the Conference there is now a fair chance of its success, especially if the Bolsheviks are given just a little more time. But that it is the firm intention of Bela Kun and Lenin to carry it out, I am convinced.

Thanks to our kindness, the Hungarian Army is now reorganised and trained by German officers, and according to prisoners' reports there are already 12 battalions composed almost entirely of German troops from Mackensen's late army. The suppression of the Hungarian Bolsheviks is, therefore, a very different proposition now from what it was even a month ago.

The folly of allowing this state of things to come about appears so stupendous that one is absolutely bewildered by it. I can only suppose that the Conference has been influenced by considerations of which I can have no knowledge.

Of course Hungary has, no doubt, a non-Bolshevik majority. But one is making a very great mistake if one thinks that this majority can assert itself for some time to come
without outside assistance. Anyhow I should be most grateful to you if you could let me know what are the considerations which have influenced the Conference in taking up their attitude towards the Hungarian question. At present I am absolutely at sea, as the urgent necessity for the suppression of the Bolshevik element in Hungary appears to everyone here so patent, as to be hardly worth while pointing out.

I have no time to write anything on the internal situation, but no doubt you know all about this, and you probably see my despatches on the subject. If Take Ionesco can unite with Maniu I think they should be able to establish a strong Government. Especially if we strengthen their hands by omitting the hated foreign minorities clause, and giving them certain concessions of a financial and economic nature. We should, of course, make it clear that we are only doing this on account of the more reasonable attitude taken up by these three leaders in regard to Roumanian claims than has been shown by the present Government.

Yours ever,
Frank Rattigan

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Minutes attached to the document:

Mr. Rattigan’s information agrees with other information received: the para about Mackensen’s troops requires confirmation.

A.W.A. Leeper
3/7/19

[To] D.M.I.

Although I think Mr. Rattigan has exaggerated the number of German troops serving in the Hungarian army, the remainder of his letter is interesting, and it is easy to understand his point of view. We have, for 2 months, worked hard to overthrow the Bolshevik regime in Hungary, & to restore law & order, but our recommendations have not been adopted. The situation is far more difficult now than it was.

W.L.O. Twiss
Lieut. Col. G.S.
4/7/19

And the situation will continue to get worse as time is wasted in coming to some decision as to how to deal with it.

W. Thwaites
4/7/19

The point as to the Minorities is being dealt with separately.

J.W.H[endlam-].M[orley].
8/7/19
Sir,

I have the honour to forward the following report on my departure from Budapest.

For several weeks I have been in touch with the leaders of the various Trades Unions, meeting them openly in order to discuss with them their opinions on the policy and practical working of the present Government. This was necessary and of great value as there existed amongst the Trades Unions a large and rapidly growing dislike of and distrust in the future of the actual Communist Government. These men represented various Unions comprising approximately 700,000 men in Budapest and another 500,000 in the country. They wished the overthrow of the present Regime and the establishment of a Socialist Government on moderate lines. They willingly and at once admitted:

1) The complete disassociation of [?] from the Bolshevist Government of Russia.
2) Stoppage and disassociation with all forms of propaganda.
3) The re-establishment of the economic principle of private property.
4) The establishment (immediately the country was in a state to ensure free and secret vote) of a house of representatives and, as they suggested and insisted on, a constitutional Government on the lines of the British Government excepting that their upper house should not be hereditary but elected or chosen from the leading men in all professions.

They could not, however, throw out the present Bolshevist Government and establish this moderate Socialist Government without some assistance, or at least definite assurances of assistance, from the Entente, as the general terror established by Kun regime was too real and too great. Also if the Socialists did throw over the Government, the difficulties of straightening out the appalling tangle and disorganization produced by three months of Bolshevism was beyond their powers, unless they could receive very definite assurances of assistance from the Allies. These circumstances I reported personally and in writing to Col. Sir Thomas Cuninghame, and endeavoured through him to obtain some of the Allies' policy with respect to these conditions. I was not however able to obtain anything definite.

I have also for the last two months been obtaining and forwarding to Col. Sir T. Cuninghame important information on military subjects and operations, and to Major Vischer\(^1\) in Vienna equally important informations with regard to Bolshevistic agents, activities, and propaganda. I attached very great importance to these informations and I am informed by Sir T. Cuninghame that they have been of the utmost value. During the last two months the Hungarian Government have shown a growing disinclination to

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\(^1\) The editor has not been able to identify this person beyond doubt. A (temporary) Major H. Vischer appears in the British Army List for February 1916 as a 3rd grade General Staff Officer.
BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919

respect foreign property and even foreign subjects and as the attempt to enforce this respect has always been my principal work, this attitude of the Government has given rise to continual trouble.

At the beginning of June an order was issued and circulated confidentially by the Government that Kun's declaration to General Smuts of April 4th regarding foreign property could be considered void, and that these persons and property were to be treated as Hungarian; and also all possible obstructions were to be placed in way of my attempts to uphold the rights of foreigners. My communication with Vienna were entirely obstructed and I had to organize such methods of communication as were possible.

On June 5th I was placed on the political police list as "a known spy who holds communication with Anti-Communist elements, under continual surveyance." All the above circumstances made my position at Budapest which has always been undefined, and without practical backing, almost untenable, and increased my work to such a degree as to be impossible of execution. I was however particularly anxious to remain at Budapest until after the preliminary Soviet Council of June 12th and 13th and the General Soviet Council of June 14th onwards, when I hoped the Socialists would elect an entirely Socialist and non Communist group of Soviet Leaders. This actually occurred on June 12th, but was negatived by a trick and threat on the part of the Government. On the first vote (secret) all the Soviet Leaders (II) were Socialist and non Communist. The Government immediately declared this vote a "formal error" and a group of the terror guard or "sons of Lenin" were introduced into the hall and another vote taken by a show of hands, so that, as Bohm said, the wishes of the voter might be seen. This vote then elected 75% Communists, and it is interesting to note that most of the principal men who voted Socialist were arrested that night. The Government after saying that they were unauthorized arrests by unauthorized persons, had not however released them by June 18th. At the General Soviet Council a very large quantity of pointless and unimportant speeches have been delivered and it is interesting to note that in nearly all these speeches it is admitted that the present regime is quite unpracticable without a world revolution. Kun by his various speeches and non compliance with the orders of the Entente, has many times shown that he has no intention of carrying out these wishes.

The general public in Budapest who are dearly longing for Entente intervention, have almost lost all hope of any defined Allied policy in that direction and are exasperated at the Entente's weak policy in allowing a small party of despicable and unscrupulous Jews to ruin Hungary financially and economically, and so disturb the commercial, political and economic situation of the whole of S.E., if not the whole of Europe, as to retard the development of the new small nations and the resumption of normal conditions to a most serious degree.

On June 15th an order was issued by the Government that, as I was dangerous to the existence of the Dictature of the Proletariat, I was to be arrested as soon as any excuse could be found. The day after I learned from a sure source that this order coupled with the name of Oberlieutenant Groidl (who has been since December my liaison Officer) was communicated to the terror guard. The rather frequent disappearances of late have been all due to this troop. As my utility did not, I consider, warrant my remaining I decided to leave by the first opportunity consistent with dignity. On June 18th I had a train leaving for Vienna, with horses and cars (ex Vix Mission) and 150 refugees and I managed to leave quietly by this train without the Government being aware of my departure. I regret I could not inform anyone of my leaving, as this undoubtedly involved unnecessary risk of incident. Oberlieutenant Groidl succeeded in getting away disguised.

2 See No. 84, Enclosure 5, Section 5.

* [Colonel Gica Domanciu]
I have been unable to report continuously and fully to you, but I have been so carefully watched, even to the extent of microphones in my room, that communication with Col. Sir T. Cuninghame was all that I could manage. I do not wish to give you the impression that my presence in Budapest was generally unpopular. This was very far from the case. Throughout I have always been very well known, liked, and very well treated by everyone in Budapest. From all points of view, (except personal comfort), my necessitated departure is unfortunate.

I have, etc., etc.,
(Sd.) F. Williams-Freeman
Lieut.-Cmdr.

Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

We have of course had all this information, and you have seen Commander Williams-Freeman. We have forwarded a report on his work, which, from our point of view, has been excellent.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut.-Col.
25/7/19 G.S.

(From) [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 104873]3

Lieut. Commander Freeman has done wonderfully well, and we can only hope that this report will have some effect with the Peace Delegates. Mr. Balfour has already received a full exposition of Ld. Curzon's views. See 101018.4

C.H.S[mith].
21/7/19

3 The report was received in London on 18 July 1919.
4 See No. 184.
ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 164

Petition Presented by the Society of Awakening Hungarians
to Lieutenant-Commander F. Williams-Freeman (Received in Paris 21 July 1919)\(^5\)

(From) [PRO FO 608/11 No. 46/1/1/15745]

PETITION

addressed by the “Society of Awakening Hungarians” to
Lieut. Commander Freeman, as Chief of the Entente Mission in Budapest.\(^6\)

Honoured Sir,

The “Society of Awakening Hungarians” has the honour to request you, in view of
the utter devastation brought about in Hungary by Bolshevism, as well as of the
despairing cry of an overwhelming majority of her people, to take immediate steps for
the deliverance of Hungary and Budapest, and for the occupation of that country by
British troops.

In explanation of our respectful request, we beg leave to recall the following
circumstances:

The Hungarian National Anthem, National Colours, cockade and white flowers were
the emblems of the Revolution of 31st October, 1918, therefore it was only natural that
the entire “magyarsag”\(^7\) became inspired with the spirit of revolution; moreover, as
Count Michael Karolyi inscribed on his banner, the principles of independence, defence
of our frontiers, separation from hated Austria and the dissolution of the German
alliance.

Count Michael Karolyi will have to answer before the tribunal of history for his
infidelity to all these principles, and for daring to gamble away the whole of Hungary as
if it were his own personal property.

On Bela Linder, Minister of War, lies the responsibility for the breaking up of the
Army, one of the reasons for the tide of disaster which has swept upon us.

The Ministers Barnabas Buza, Sigismund Kunfi and Oscar Jaszi are also to be held
responsible for the grievous sins committed against the nation.

From the very moment it assumed power, the Karolyi Government began to prepare
the way in a well-planned out manner for Bolshevism, until on the 21st March, 1919,
after a coup d’etat unparalleled in history, the reins of Government passed into the
hands of the Bolshevists.

This manner of gambling with power explains to the whole world the no doubt
incomprehensible circumstances that contrary to the will of the people, Bolshevism
assumed rule in the country without one drop of blood being shed.

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\(^5\) The date of this document is uncertain, though presumably it was written before 18 June 1919, the date
of Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman’s departure from Hungary. The petition, as received by the British
Peace Delegation in Paris, was accompanied by two similar petitions, one of unidentified origin, and one
by the National Central Trust Company in Budapest. Both associated themselves with the principles and
aims of the Society of Awakening Hungarians, and were signed by fifteen and twelve persons
respectively.

\(^6\) Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman was not Chief of the Entente Mission in Budapest. His status was
never defined precisely, and this may have given rise to the incorrect use of the title here. He was
formally the representative in Budapest of Admiral Sir E.C.T. Troubridge, President of the Inter-Allied
Danube River Commission, based in Belgrade.

\(^7\) Magyarság: Magyardom or Hungariandom, the whole Hungarian people.
Furthermore, Count Michael Karolyi went so far as to utter the falsehood that the Social-Democratic Party and Communist Party, united under the title of the Socialist Party, were prepared if necessary to defend the territorial integrity of Hungary by force of arms.

As soon, however, as the Bolshevists took over the Government, they announced officially that they were no longer in support of the principle of territorial integrity. Their first action was to disarm the bourgeoisie, and arm the misguided proletariat, literally surrounding themselves with a rampart of bayonets, and employing the most unimaginable system of terror and espionage to further their aims.

We shall not attempt to describe the sufferings and destruction brought upon our country, already in a state of utter exhaustion, by Bolshevism. Let it suffice to state that the losses sustained by us during four and a half years of fighting for foreign ambitions, pale when compared with them, and that conflagration, floods and earthquakes could not have brought the country to such a state of devastation.

The immense and irremediable harm caused to life and property are as nothing, however, when compared with the moral injury inflicted on the youth and uneducated classes of Hungary by the dictatorship and official propaganda of the Bolshevists.

It is already an established fact that the destruction with which the whole world is threatened is due to the machinations of international Jews, whose policy is to stir up discord between the classes and set whole countries ablaze solely with a view to filling their own coffers.

"After us the deluge", declare the Jews by whom the principles of Bolshevism are interpreted as follows: "What's yours is mine, but what's mine is my own; what you may do I may do, but what I may do, you may not do".

All classes of society throughout the entire country hold the Jews responsible for the sufferings which have already gone beyond endurance, and feel instinctively that alone, England, the most powerful and noblest of nations, can save us from complete ruin.

This, honoured Sir, is the desire and general opinion of the people, which the "Society of Awakening Hungarians" considers it incumbent on it to bring to your notice.

The "Society of Awakening Hungarians" is not a political party; it is the throbbing heart of the Hungarian nation beating high above all political parties and Jewish terrorism.

We make an honourable request; liberate us before it is too late, and we on our part will do all we can.

In addition to this letter, a fresh petition, bearing the signatures of hundreds of thousands of our people, will shortly be placed before you, in which the wish will be expressed that England should take Hungary under her protection and establish political, economic, industrial, commercial and cultural ties between the two countries. Such a connection would be equally advantageous on both sides. We have been plundered of everything, but our soil is fertile and our bodies strong.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of our esteemed respect.

8 No such petition has been traced by the editor.
No. 165

Telegram from Clement-Simon (Prague) to S. Pichon (Paris. Received 25 June 1919)

No. not known. [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13764]

Prague, 24 June 1919

Conformément aux instructions du Maréchal Foch, le Général Pellé a adressé à Bela Kun communication lui indiquant le délai et les conditions de l’évacuation. Celle-ci devait commencer ce matin 24 juin à 5 heures; les premières nouvelle que l'on reçoit de l'armée font penser que les Hongrois se retirent en effet. Bela Kun dans sa réponse à la communication de M. Pellé avait d'ailleurs fait connaître qu'il acceptait de se conformer à la procédure prescrite par le Général. Dans ces conditions, des négociateurs tchèques se rendront demain à midi à Presbourg avec les (délégués) Hongrois pour régler les détails, c'est à dire déterminer les points qui doivent jaloner la limite d'occupation de chacune de deux armées. Bela Kun semblait avoir voulu conclure dans les négociations les questions intéressant la Roumanie et aussi les questions d’indemnités. Le Général Pellé très sagement a répondu que pour les deux objets il ne pourrait que transmettre à la Conférence de Paris les communications qui lui seraient faites par les Magyars.

Clement-Simon.

No. 166

Telegram from H. Allizé (Vienna) to S. Pichon (Paris. Received 26 June 1919)

No. not known. [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13764]

Vienna, 25 June 1919

Le Gouvernement Bolchevik hongrois fait publier ici une dépêche au Président de la Conférence de la Paix indiquant qu’il n’évacuera pas les territoires tchéco-slovaques occupés sous prétexte qu’il veut des garanties supplémentaires de l’Entente. Cette nouvelle nous confirme l’opinion générale sur la mauvaise foi de Bela-Kun et la nécessité où les Alliés se trouveront de procéder à son égard par la (force).

Le Comité exécutif central des Congrès des Soviets hongrois a procédé au renouvellement des Commissions du Peuple.

Les élections ont écarté (2 gr. fx) socialistes marquant: GARBAI, KUNFI, BOEHM, RONAY [RÓNAI], SZABADOS, BOKANYI qui sont remplacés par des communistes, ALEXANDRE GAR (BA) I, ancien maçon et depuis vingt ans à la tête du mouvement socialiste en Hongrie, avait été le premier Président du Gouvernement révolutionnaire. (2 gr. tronqués). Le Docteur KUNFI commissaire du peuple pour l'instruction publique socialiste la plus (forte) personnalité du parti socialiste hongrois, avait d'abord approuvé l'établissement de la dictature du prolétariat et la création d'une armée rouge, mais il s'était prononcé depuis quelque temps contre la tendence communiste et surtout contre l'influence exagérée de Lénine et des bolcheviks russes sur Bela-Kun et le mouvement hongrois; Guillaume Boehm généralissime de l'armée.
hongroise et ci-devant Ministre de la Guerre, apprécié pour ses qualités d'organisation, était devenu suspect aux yeux de Bela-Kun, de favoriser l'influence purement socialiste au sein du Gvt. des Conseils. Romay [Rónai] (gr. fx) était commissaire du peuple pour la Justice et s'opposait à une politique de terrorisme. La réduction des commissaires du peuple de 36 à 11 ne laisse au pouvoir que 3 des anciens dirigeants socialistes des plus obscurs et de tendance extrémiste (extrémiste) (gr. fx.) Pogany, Landler et Varga.


Allizé.

1 It was later revealed that Antal Dovcsák had not been taken prisoner in Russia. (Source: György Borsányi, Kun Béla, Budapest, 1979, p. 55.)

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No. 167

Telegram from Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Extract. Received 26 June 1919)

No. 623 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/13652]

Vienna, 25 June 1919

[...:] No news from Hungary later than 21st when position of Communists between national feeling of the army led by Stromfeld on one side and of Socialists under Kunfi on other as causing great difficulty to the administration not known yet what political effect of compliance with Entente demands will be.

No. 168

Letter from Marshal F. Foch to G. Clemenceau

No. 3128 (?) [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14178]

Paris, 25 June 1919

Les Télégrammes adressés par le Conseil Suprême des Alliés, le 13 et le 21 juin dernier, aux Gouvernements Hongrois et Roumain,1 prévoient que les troupes roumaines seront retirées du Territoire hongrois aussitôt que les troupes hongroises auront évacué la Tchéco-Slovaquie.

1 For the telegram sent to the Hungarian Government see No. 149.
Il y a lieu de penser que la Roumanie se conformera scrupuleusement aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix. Mais on ne saurait se dissimuler que, dans les circonstances actuelles, la Roumanie se trouverait placée dans une situation difficile à la suite du retrait de ses forces de la THEISS, si ce retrait n’était pas subordonné à quelques mesures de précaution indispensables.

Obligée de maintenir sur le Dniester et en Bukovine la majeure partie de ses forces pour tenir en échec le bolchevisme russe, elle ne peut, en effet, disposer sur ses frontières que d’un nombre limité de Divisions, et ce nombre ne peut être augmenté pour le moment, en raison des événements de Galicie où la poussée bolchevique menace de rompre la liaison établie entre polonais et roumains.

Grâce à l’obstacle de la THEISS, l’Armée roumaine de l’Ouest suffit à couvrir efficacement la Transylvanie, mais retirée sur la frontière qui vient d’être fixée pour la Roumanie et où aucun obstacle sérieux ne permet de renforcer la défense, elle serait incapable de s’opposer à une offensive de l’Armée hongroise, libre de porter vers la Transylvanie tout l’effort des huit divisions qu’elle a mobilisées en violation de l’Armistice du 13 Novembre [1918].

Pour mettre la Roumanie à l’abri du danger hongrois, et pour éviter de compromettre l’œuvre de l’Entente en Europe Sud-Orientale, il importe donc de subordonner le retrait des forces roumaines à l’Est de la THEISS à l’application intégrale par la Hongrie des clauses de l’Armistice du 13 Novembre, c’est-à-dire de lui imposer une démobilisation immédiate, la réduction de son armée à six division sur pied de paix, et la répartition de ces divisions sur son Territoire dans des conditions qui excluent toute menace d’offensive contre ses voisins.

J'ai l’honneur de soumettre cette question à votre examen, afin que vous puissiez proposer à la Conférence de la Paix l’adoption des mesures nécessaires.

Signé: Foch.

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Minutes attached to the document:

It is to be hoped that Marshal Foch’s conditions can be realised.

A.W.A. Leeper
3/7/19

[To] Lord Hardinge (for Mr. Balfour)

The Hungarians have placed themselves entirely in the wrong by violation of the terms of the armistice of Nov. 13th, 1918. It is logical & essential that they should disarm before the Roumanians quit their present strong positions, covered by the formidable obstacle of the Theiss with broken bridges.

A retirement to the new frontier line, which presents no military strength, in the face of a strong Hungarian Army, with a rascal like Bela Kun in power, would invite disaster.

W. Thwaites Maj. General
4/7/19

(1) [in the original] - L’armistice du 13 Novembre fixait à 6 D.I. [Division d’Infanterie] et 2 D.C. [Division de Cavalerie] sur le pied de paix le maximum des forces à maintenir sous les armes par la Hongrie.
[To] D.M.I.

You have already discussed with me the danger of a Rumanian withdrawal, whilst the Hungarian forces are at their present strength & efficiency. As long as the Rumanian army is protected by the Theiss, it is fairly safe, but once it retires to its frontiers, it certainly couldn't hope to offer a successful resistance to the Hungarians.

The Hungarian army is now over 200,000 strong & is steadily increasing. Since the telegrams in question were sent, general mobilization has been ordered, & the army has risen from 150,000 to over 200,000. It is essential to enforce reduction of the Hungarian army to the strength allowed under the armistice of Nov. 13th '18, under Allied control, before the Rumanians retire.

In view of:-

(a) The known bad faith of Bela Kun's Government.

(b) The breaking by the Hungarians of the Armistice conditions.

(c) The announcement of general mobilization on June 21st.

We have good reasons for delaying the withdrawal of the Rumanians till the Hungarian strength has been reduced.

W.L.O. Twiss   Lt. Col.
4/7/19   G.S.

(From) [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14334]²

As regards the Roumanian forces, any advance on their part has been forbidden by the Supreme Council. They are not, however, obliged to begin their withdrawal till the Magyar Communist forces have evacuated the whole of Čecho-Slovakia & in this connection the weighty considerations urged by Marshal Foch must be taken into account.

A.W.A. Leeper
4/7/19

² The main document in this file is printed as No. 180.
No. 169

Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 26 June 1919)

No. 34 [Ll. G. F/46/10/6]¹

Prague, 25 June 1919

No. 122. Addressed to F.O.

At a meeting to-day at French Legation of Foreign Representatives at Prague, General Pelle made an exposition of military situation in Slovakia. He stated as follows:- in spite of cessation of hostilities on both sides the Magyar army shows no signs of intending to withdraw from occupied territory. In view of bad faith which Magyars have constantly shown General Pelle considers that Magyars are not to be trusted and that they may concentrate on weak spot of Czech line and attack; in which case as they are superior in men, arms and ammunition disaster to Czech forces might ensue.

General Pelle definitely stated that in his opinion Magyars will not withdraw their troops unless force is brought to bear upon them by (? entente) (group undecypherable) in the event of defeat of Czech arms whole of Slovakia might become actively Bolshevist and that Vienna, Roumania and Italy might be affected in same manner.

Most of the fertile lands of Slovakia are in the hands of Magyars and crops are due to be cut in fifteen days while food is much needed in Budapest.

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[The following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies precedes the above telegram in the original file:]

British Delegation,
Paris, 27 June 1919

My dear Davies,

General Thwaites asked me to send you this telegram, for the information of the Prime Minister. I believe the Hungarians are now likely to refuse to withdraw, on the plea that they have no guarantee that the Rumanians will retire,

Yours sincerely,

W.L.O. Twiss

¹ The telegram is also located in PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/12/13700.
Monsieur CLEMENCEAU, Président de la Conférence de la Paix, Paris -

Nous regrettons n'avoir pas reçu de réponse à notre question que nous avons adressé à vous au sujet des garanties à offrir par les roumains. Nous avons cessé les hostilités, nous avons satisfait au désir de la Conférence de la Paix de mettre un terme à toute effusion de sang et, alors que nous avons arrêté les hostilités et avons interdit à nos soldats tout[e[s] opération[s] de guerre, les troupes roumaines profitent de cette attitude de notre armée pour nous attaquer à KIRALYHELMEC. Les roumains ont ainsi de nouveau enfreint d'une manière flagrante l'ordre formel de la Conférence de la Paix de mettre fin à toute inutile effusion de sang, et, comme ils ont prouvé par ce fait qu'ils ne respectent nullement les décisions de la Conférence de la Paix, qui est-ce qui nous garantira qu'ils retireront leurs troupes des territoires occupés ainsi que Monsieur de [sic] Président [sic] promis au nom des Puissances Alliées et Associées?

En attendant votre réponse.2

(Sd.) Bela Kun

Commissaire des Affaires Étrangères de la République des Conseils Hongroise.

Minutes attached to the document:

As far as we know, there was no Roumanian attack. The story is probably a mere pretext to delay withdrawal & to avoid compliance with our terms.

The situation may change, now that the Germans have signed the Peace Treaty. Bela Kun no doubt hoped that this would not happen, & will realise that, now that this stage has been reached, the Allies will be more free to deal with him.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.
1/7/19 G.S.

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1 The English translation of this telegram is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, p. 706, and in LINK, vol. 61, p. 196.

2 For the discussion of this dispatch in the Council of Four see FRUS, PPC, vol. VI. pp. 701 and 758, or LINK, vol. 61, p. 195.

In view of this fact if some Entente action is taken, it would be appropriate time. Entente is in difficult position to ask Czechs or Roumanians, in view of the fact that the Hungarians have just complied with demand to retire, and therefore some demand would have to be made to put Entente in position to make request for Czechs, Roumanians and Serbs to advance. As Hungarians never have delivered up, as required by Armistice, guns and ammunition of Mackensen's army which they are using and which they had planned to use for the disturbance of peace in Central Europe, they should be required, within a definite short time, and as they will not do this, then Entente could arm and munition Czechs, and a combined advance, at same time distributing statements from aeroplanes so that the people could not be fooled by government statements.

If peace concluded with Germany and Austria without stabilizing Hungary, it is not a settlement of war over here. Now that Germany is settled do you not think this business can receive favourable consideration? Local Austrian Volkswehr is being strongly propaganda by money sent from Hungary and 41st Battalion already outspokenly red and government afraid to take away their arms, with others ready to follow same course. With direct communication between Bolshevik headquarters, Budapest and munition arsenals here, when the move is made to attack Wiener-Neustadt on frontier line south of Pressbourg there will be no force capable of withstanding attack because of internal dissension here. Effect of Hungarian Army and its prepared attack here known to Government which feels almost hopeless in the matter. This was brought to me late yesterday from one of their highest officials, and if nothing is done at Paris the people cannot protect themselves and local Bolsheviks, who are becoming increasingly active, know it.

T.T.C. Gregory

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1 24 June 1919.
2 See No. 40, note 7.
No. 172

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss to J.T. Davies (Extract)¹

[LL. G. F/46/10/5]

British Delegation,
Paris, 27 June 1919

My dear Davies,

[....]

It would be a great thing if the Prime Minister could see Williams Freeman for 1/4 hour. General Pershing saw him this morning, with the result that the Americans are now getting really busy. I have just been talking to an ex-Austro-Hungarian officer from Baja, S. of Buda Pest, where there is now a Serbian division; he says both the French and Serbians are anxious to advance, in order to put an end to the war & get peace, but that the Hungarian population are far more anxious for the advance to take place, in order to escape from Bolshevist tyranny.

Yours sincerely,

W.L.O. Twiss

¹ This letter accompanies the copy of a reported exchange of telegrams between Lenin and Béla Kun, printed as Nos. 158 and 159.

No. 173

Minutes on a Memorandum by L.B. Namier

[PRO FO 371/3515 No. 92856]

The reports are most probably true. But from what I know, I do not believe the memo, altogether fair to Col. Cunningham [sic] & our Mission in Vienna. I understand

¹ The memorandum is printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 33.
² Robert Fitzgibbon Young, an Inspector of the Board of Education with a scholarly interest in Bohemia, temporarily transferred to the Intelligence Service for work with the Czechs, especially their communities living in the U.S.A.
that our Mission is on equally good terms with the moderate strongly anti-monarchist Socialists of the Renner group as with the conservative Christian Socialists. It is hardly fair to speak of them & the French in one breath. I know e.g. that Mr. Phil[potts does not believe in the possibility of a Danubian Confederation. But our Vienna Mission is not popular with the Czechs because on several occasions when the Czechs were in the wrong, it has stood out for the German Austrians.

I therefore venture to suggest:

1. that in transmitting the memo. something shd. be said in defence of our Mission.

2. that however at the same time the D.M.I. shd. be asked to impress on Col. Cunningham [sic], who has old personal connections with the Viennese & the Magyar aristocracy, to avoid anything which might create the appearance of his sympathizing with or supporting the monarchists & rightly distasteful to the Czechs & Yugo-Slavs.

3. that Mr. Young shd. be asked from whom he received the memo. & who is its author. He might take us into his confidence.3

L.B.N.

3 R.F. Young received the memorandum from E. Beneš (see the introductory remarks), the actual origin of the document, however, is not known.

Regarding the Czechoslovak assessment of Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s activities also see DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 58 for C. Gosling’s dispatch from Prague, dated 23 July 1919, which was in fact prompted by a copy of the memorandum mentioned above, and in which he summarises his interview with President T.G. Masaryk on the subject. During the interview the President did not deny the hostility that existed, but “stated that he had himself received a short while ago reports concerning Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame’s work which placed his activities in a very favourable light.”

No. 174

En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 29 June 1919)

No. 626 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/13964]

Vienna, 28 June 1919

Urgent.

Counter Revolutionary coup at Budapest last Tuesday1 seems to have failed, Engels Artillery Barracks, Ludovica Academy2 and three Danube Monitors were centres of movement. Monitors fired several shells upon Hotel Hungaria, now called Soviet House, which is Headquarters of Bolshevik Government. Land artillery fired upon some public buildings and fifty cadets of Ludovica Academy made raid upon one of principal telephone stations, latter was recaptured by Red Guards after short fighting. Revolt in Artillery Barracks was suppressed as men soon left Officers in lurch, but three monitors escaped.

1 24 June 1919. Also see T.T.C. Gregory’s telegram, dated 26 June, on the same subject, in No. 171.

2 An officer training academy in Budapest.
Apparently part Bourgeoisie took active part in coup as reported that shots were fired from windows of some private house. It is particularly significant that section Social Democrats, like hands of Muthner's Weaving Mill sided with Counter Revolutionaries. These workmen were disarmed by Red Troops and their ringleaders arrested and according to one report already executed like six officers of Artillery Barracks and Academy. Government announces punish with capital sentence any counter revolutionary act and who seized with arms in hand is shot on spot. Central Executive Committee instructed Governing Council suppress counter revolution by all means force. Chief of Italian Military Mission in Budapest, Colonel Somanelli [Romanelli] called upon Soviet Government to spare lives of hostages and political prisoners even if caught with arms in hands and treat them like war prisoners, and declared that members Government would be called to account by Allied and Associated Government if forcible means actually used. Kun in reply expressed great indignation at this threat and protested against interference with internal affairs Hungary and against recognition of men as belligerents who in interest Counter Revolution want murder women, children and exterminate Jews; he also declared Hungarian Government would display greater humanity in dealing with Counter Revolutionaries than those Governments which conjured up barbarous war and are starving women, children by blockade.

Counter Revolution also broke out at Kalocsa and neighbourhood; White Guard formed there was dispersed by Szamuely after two days fighting. If Communist papers Budapest are reliable, White Guard who possessed two guns and several machine guns, lost three hundred killed in engagement with Red Forces at Dunapately [Dunapataj].

For revised figures concerning those punished for participation in the counter-revolutionary attempt, see No. 175.

No. 175

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 30 June 1919)

No. 84 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/14025]

Vienna, 29 June 1919

Hungary. I learn from reliable sources that Bela Kun would be glad now to go if he could find a pretext.

Italian civil commission proceeded to Budapest on June 27th. Romanelli acted on orders from General Segre so far only three counter revolutionaries have been hanged and I think hostages have been released.
MEMORANDUM ON THE SITUATION IN BUDAPEST AND HUNGARY

Bela Kun’s government whilst maintaining itself in power by very real terrorism and oppression is in reality much disliked by the great majority of the inhabitants of Budapest and by the whole of the remainder of the country.

When the communists first assumed power by a coup on March 21st the majority of people in Budapest did not know what form of a Government it was. When it was realised that it was a communist and Bolshevist Government it encountered immediate opposition from many quarters which it at once suppressed. It had however at that time the support of most of the trades unions and working classes. The great majority of these now realise that the country is being very quickly completely ruined and are consequently now much against the Kun régime. They wish to overthrow the actual government and establish a moderate socialist government.

The leaders of all Trades Unions have repeatedly approached me and told me this. For some time they tried to get the workmen themselves to give expression to their wishes by demonstrations, etc., but found this to be impossible for the following reasons. Each section (or shop stewards section) has a man from the government attached to it with the result that immediately any anti-government views manifested themselves in that section 4 or 5 men of that section were arrested by the ‘Terror Guard’ and ‘disappeared’ and so it became impossible to co-ordinate the movement.

Furthermore, as these men expressed it it is very hard to un-scramble eggs and if the Kun Government was overthrown and replaced by a socialist government, the new government would find itself faced by an appalling state of ruin and disorganisation produced by three months of Bolshevism. They would therefore require some assistance from the Entente to re-establish order and the economic life of the country.

Kun has no intention of obeying the Entente’s commands with regard to the evacuation of Slovakia or permanent cessation of hostilities. He has declared publicly that he ‘will lie and lie to the Entente till even he blushed with lying’. His evasive answers to all the Entente notes and ultimatums have all in reality been flat refusals, and he has repudiated his declarations with regard to the safety of foreigners and foreign property.

It would be a sheer impossibility to make peace with a government of this type most especially as it does not in the least degree represent the country.

The continued existence of a state Bolshevism forcibly imposed on Hungary is preventing the making of peace in that part of the world and entirely preventing the resumption of commerce in Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Transylvania, and to a large extent, Jugo-Slavia. This resumption of commerce is of the utmost and most vital importance.

1 Minutes on the file indicate that the document was communicated by “Commander” Fuller of the Naval Section. He is probably Captain C.T.M. Fuller, the Director of the Plans Division of the Naval Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.

2 Also in PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16812.
Kun has repeatedly violated and continues to violate all the terms of the armistice conventions of November 3rd and 13th, and it has proved to be Kun's army which were the original aggressors against the Czechs and Roumanians. He has been able to form this army by means of forcible recruiting, lack of food in Budapest, and total lack of employment. (Every man who when ordered to do so does not join the red army is removed from the proletariat societies, all food tickets for himself and family are taken away, etc.) This army is fairly well disciplined. It will fight against Czechs and perhaps Roumanians individually, both of which nations the Hungarians hate and despise, but it will most certainly not fight the Entente or orders of the Entente.

If the Entente would therefore send a demand to Kun immediately to accept and abide by the terms of the above armistice, and saying that in accordance with this armistice convention Budapest would be temporarily occupied and that any resistance to this occupation would become untenable. The French troops would march from Szeged, would meet no resistance, and would be welcomed in Budapest for the vast majority of Hungarians are longing for Allied intervention and delivery from present tyranny.

Budapest must of course be informed of this demand by leaflets from aeroplanes.

The Government would fall immediately the French commenced their advance and would be replaced by a temporary directorate. The Entente would assume military command of the town and elections would be held as soon as possible. These would produce a stable and moderate socialist government.

There exists a very great and universal liking and admiration for the English and if a British General could be placed in command of the town it would have an extremely good effect and be very popular. This is realised and accepted by the French authorities in Szeged, Belgrade and Vienna.

It is a mistake to suppose that the last three months in Hungary have been bloodless. This is very far from the fact. The official executions in Budapest itself have only been 40 or 50 but there have been a considerable number of 'disappearances' which are in reality official murders by the 'Terror Guard' or 'Sons of Lenin' troops. In the country the numerous outbreaks in the village[s] have been quelled in the bloodiest manner. In one small village near Szombathely of under 400 inhabitants I saw over 30 bodies hanging from trees and the body of the priest hanging from the porch of the church. I was told that many other people had been killed in this village and buried.

If the present state of affairs is allowed to continue at Budapest it is certain that counter revolutions will break out there and the country will gradually be brought to the same conditions as Russia, with a terrible danger to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

The complete blocking of the Danube above Baja due to the state of affairs at Budapest and the mines in the river is having a paralysing effect on Vienna and Pressburg and is causing the greatest hardship and unrest.

F.Williams-.Freeman. (Initialled).
30/6/19
No. 177

Telegram from C. Gosling (Prague) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 July 1919)

No. 35 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14120]

Prague, 30 June 1919

General Pellé informs me that he has received a telegram from C. in C. of Magyar army\(^1\) in which he states that he has received orders from Hungarian Government for immediate withdrawal of their army from all occupied territory. Evacuation is to commence at 5 a.m. June 30th.

Addressed to Foreign Office 124.

\(^1\) V. Böhm, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army, 5 May–14 July 1919.

No. 178

Memorandum by Sir W. Goode (Extracts)\(^1\)

[LI. G. F/197/6/3]

Late June or early July 1919\(^2\)

THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND ITS EFFECT ON THE RESTORATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND THE REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

All reports are confirmatory of a situation of extreme gravity which is rapidly developing within the boundaries of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. This situation is the direct result of Bela Kun's activities in Hungary and the policy of non-interference being followed by the Allied and Associated Powers. The Danube River, which is one of the great economic arteries of all this territory, is mined at one end not far from Pressbourg and at the other end immediately above Baja. In this portion of the river practically all the shipyards and river repair shops are located and held under the complete control of Bela Kun. In addition more than one half of the lighters ordinarily used on the Danube River between Galatz and Pressbourg as well as sixty per cent of the river tow boats, are held under the complete control of Bela Kun. This river

\(^1\) This memorandum was compiled by Sir W. Goode from various — mainly British — memoranda for discussion by the Supreme Economic Council. A discussion of many of the subjects raised in the memorandum also took place at a meeting of the Council of Five on 5 July 1919, to which Sir W. Goode was invited. For the minutes of this meeting see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3.

\(^2\) The original copy is undated. From a reference to the counter-revolutionary attempt on the 24 June in the last but one paragraph as having taken place "as late as last Tuesday", the date of the writing of the memorandum can be put between 25 June and 3 July 1919.
equipment and these shipyards and repair plants are tied up and idle along the river banks and therefore contributing in no way to the economic rehabilitation of the Riparian territory.

During the recent advance of the Roumanian Armies to the Tisza River the Bela Kun Government was able to withdraw before the advancing Roumanian Armies the bulk of the railway equipment in that territory. When it is considered that this railway equipment included not only that normally operated in this particular territory, but also a large proportion of the Roumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak equipment, which has been taken out of these latter countries by the Germans, it is easily understood how seriously and vitally this affects the rehabilitation of the economic life of these adjoining countries.

The railway equipment is for the greater part economically inactive and resting idle on the main railroad lines, in no way contributing to the solution of the economic problem. As an example of this state of affairs reliably informants state that practically the whole line of railway, Szekesfehervar-Bicske, is completely filled by a more or less continuous string of empty freight and oil cars and locomotives.

We have been attempting by various means to arrive at a solution of this Hungarian question and have gone to the extent of negotiating both directly and indirectly with Bela Kun. The head of this so called Hungarian Government. Certain of our advances to Bela Kun have been based on the assumption that we were dealing with an honourable man and perhaps even the honest leader of a wronged people. During his recent military operations against the Government of Czecho-Slovakia we demanded in an honourable way that he cease this attack and withdraw his troops within the boundaries as fixed by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. This he answered with a more or less evasive acquiescence and it is understood for a certain time he actually ceased his attacks on the Czecho-Slovaks, but the fact remains that he has not yet complied with the demands addressed him and apparently has no intention of so doing.

He has a great quantity of war material belonging to the Mackensen Army, which he is today actually using and planning to use for the disturbance of peace in Central Europe. Under the terms of the Armistice this war material should have been turned over to the custody of the military representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. He has ignored all demands to turn over this material.

Bela Kun is carrying on a most active bolshevist propaganda in all the surrounding countries and particularly in Austria. [...]

The result of any success of Bela Kun in Austria, will only be followed by similar efforts on his part to expand into adjoining territories. The more territory he gets, the more difficult becomes the rehabilitation of economic life and the restoration of order, and easier it becomes for Bela Kun to recruit his supporters amongst the idle workmen and disorderly elements in this new territory and to thus expand his rule of terrorism.

The following very late messages between Lenin at Moscow and Bela Kun at Budapest have been received through certain representatives in Poland.

It is difficult to present more damning evidence of the real character and policy being pursued by Bela Kun. This exchange of notes clearly demonstrates the absolute futility of any endeavor to deal with Bela Kun on the basis of our past efforts; they also clearly emphasize the fact that some means must be found to place the economic destiny of not only Hungary but the surrounding nationals in some other hands than those of Bela Kun. As confirmatory of this same policy of “mala fides” a speech or interview of Bela Kun’s was published in the newspapers of Budapest some few weeks ago. During the course of this speech, as reported, in those Hungarian newspapers, Bela

3 An exchange of wireless messages between Lenin and Béla Kun follows here in the original. These are printed as Nos. 158 and 159.
Kun in referring to past and prospective negotiations with representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, stated in effect as follows:

"I lie and lie and lie to the Entente until even I myself blush with my own lies."

This statement was subsequently denied, but the fact nevertheless remains that in these days of terrorism in Budapest no newspaper would have dared to publish it without its having been a fact, this conclusion being confirmed by the fact that this article appeared in more than one of the Budapest newspapers, which are all necessarily Bela Kun organs.

A reliable agent, who for obvious reasons will be referred to as "X", has returned from Budapest after passing three or four months in that capital. *His observations and reports confirm the previous reports that Bela Kun adherents represent but a small minority of the Hungarian people, which he roughly estimated as eight per cent in the city of Budapest and not two per cent in the surrounding country*. He confirms many preceding [sic] reports that Bela Kun is maintaining his power only by violence and terrorism.

"X" was approached and had relations with representatives of the various labor unions in Budapest, including the following:

- Iron Metal Workers,
- Coal Miners and Coal Workers,
- Printers,
- Clerks and Indoor Workers,
- Dock Workers and River Workers,
- Bakers' Unions,
- Federated Trade Unions Council.

These representatives, whose names cannot, of course, be given, speaking with the authority of their various unions and councils, report the present situation as intolerable. The population of Budapest is now swollen to nearer two million than 1,300,000. This is due to the concentration in Budapest of large numbers of soldiers and refugees. Under the present system of laws of the Bela Kun Government food distribution and important civilian rights are based on union membership.

[...]

"X" reports that it was the primary idea of Bela Kun to prohibit all religious worship, irrespective of creed. However, due to the fact that a great many of the Hungarian people are of the Roman Catholic faith, this line of action was deemed inexpedient. A compromise was therefore made which while permitting worship irrespective of creed in churches, such worship is confined strictly within the church; it is illegal for a priest to go to the bedside of a dying Roman Catholic for the purpose of administering the last communion.

During the early days of Bela Kun’s Government a law was drafted for the communization of women. This law was never passed, as it was deemed inexpedient. It has, however, been followed by other laws affecting family life, which are note worthy as indicative of the social ideals of Bela Kun and his followers.

Marriage is a purely contractual relationship which can be broken at the will of either of the individuals concerned and with practically no formality. Either one of the contracting parties can leave the home whenever they elect and live with another person. After a period of six months' cohabitation with their new partner, they have the right to

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4 This is most probably a reference to Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman.
elect to return to their original partner or to enter into contractual relations with the new one. The announcement of their election to stay with the new partner automatically breaks the old contract and this without responsibility.

Houses of prostitution have been closed primarily as being economically at variance with communistic ideas and also for the purpose of propaganda. The reports so frequently made by “parlor socialists” as to the improvement of public morals, due to the closing of the houses of prostitution, under communistic principals, are shown by impartial observers to be without basis of fact.

The desire in this statement is not to present the existing social situation in Hungary but the existing intolerable economic situation in Central Europe, due to the activities of Bela Kun and the blocking of communications incident to this political situation. The evils of the social situation have not, therefore, been to the extent they warrant. The effort is to show as clearly as possible the policies, character and social ideals of Bela Kun and his terroristic minority, and their connection with the economic question. The Budapest situation may be accurately described as one in which a small faction, directed from Russia, maintaining its control by bloodshed and terrorism is economically paralyzing south-eastern Europe today. Tomorrow, if the situation is allowed to go on, it may spread over the surrounding countries with results which each for himself must picture.

The Danube, a vital artery for trade, is paralyzed. The railways, telegraph and postal services are paralyzed. Czecho-Slovakia and Vienna are prevented from obtaining Roumanian oil; food supplies available in certain rich agricultural centres cannot be moved into cities and manufacturing centres where they are needed; barges with metal ores necessary to put manufacturing into operation have been waiting at Baja for months and cannot be moved. The Balkan countries are unable to obtain coal, tools, sugar; manufactured products which are waiting in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia cannot be exchanged for food and oil. The pre-war and even wartime economic situation of old Austria-Hungary is completely arrested.

The unrest at Budapest is threatening to burst out into a civil war of the bloodiest character. As late as last Tuesday an attempt of this character was made against the Soviet Government at Budapest which succeeded in capturing three monitors and two smaller river craft. These monitors shelled the Government officials in the Hungarian [Hungaria] hotel. We have no reports as to the final phases of this incident, but announcements from the Soviet Government indicate that this movement was stopped and the leaders arrested. The effect of this threatened civil war in Hungary will be to throw the latter into a state of disorder only comparable to that which has occurred in certain portions of Russia, or to drive the Bela Kun regime into a desperate attempt to fortify itself by undertaking military aggression against Vienna and Czecho-Slovakia. Such aggression, although probably not likely to preserve the Bela Kun Government for long, might easily throw Austria and Southern Czecho-Slovakia into confusion. This state of affairs, with the further continuance of the present policy of non-interference, might easily lead to additional and much more vital confusion elsewhere.

— Competent military authorities are of the opinion that by some joint military action on the part of the Allied troops now in this territory, Bela Kun, with his terroristic minority, can be squeezed out like a pimple on the face, and this with little, if any, bloodshed. They all are in accord that this measure today would be simply a police operation. If, however, Bela Kun is permitted to go along expanding and growing in strength, his ultimate elimination, which will be forced, will necessitate a serious and expensive military operation.

5 24 June 1919.
No. 179

Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts. Received 5 July 1919)¹

No. T.C. 573 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/14468]

Vienna, 1 July 1919

My dear Twiss,

[....]

Returning to the necessities of the moment. I desire once more to emphasise the advantage of demanding instantly the disarmament of the Hungarian Red Army. I have already pointed out that it will facilitate the disarmament of the Austrian forces (Volkswehr² and peasants), and indeed is a necessary preliminary for the consent of the rival groups in Austria to part with their weapons. But not only this. It affords an excuse for an action which will probably be fatal to Kun. There was a telegram published in the newspapers to the effect that such a demand had already been made, but I gather that it is not founded on fact. It made however a great sensation as it was realised that Bolshevism without a Red Army to support it was too odious a tyranny to persist in. In support of this I can quote the opinion of the Socialist leader “Kunfi”, who is now in Vienna, who told Bauer, that the position of Kun was becoming impossible, that all the Trades Unions, as well as the Socialists, were against him, and that it would only need the national feeling of the returning soldiers to raise an overpowering opposition to the continuance of his usurpation.³ I realise that it is desired that Bolshevism should kill itself rather than be killed by any outside instrument, but I do think that now, on the eve of Peace, that a means of bringing to an end a Bedlamite and non-national form of Government, which does not represent in any sense the wishes of any section of the populace might be used, the more so as it would effectively prevent further extension of the disease.

I have also to chronicle in this connection a distinct change in the attitude of the Italians in Hungary towards the Bolshevik Government. Prince Borghese having extracted all the monetary resources in return for a promise of “food and other articles to be delivered after the raising of the blockade” has ceased to be so amiable to the administration of Kun, and now I learn from a well founded informative [sic] that the Italians are taking interest in the Szeged Government. This “volti [sic] face” is to be attributed to the view generally held in Buda Pest that the Socialists — even if they returned — could not maintain order. Kunfi in his interview with Bauer maintained this view and agreed that only a military dictatorship, or some control temporarily of a reactionary character, would avail. Kun makes great use of this argument in his speeches pointing out to the people the only alternative to his rule. None the less, the Italians, who know the situation very well are so certain that the Communist Regime is drawing to an end, that they are looking round to make friends with all possible successors. I learn from General Segre that Sig. Cerruti (who used to be Secretary of Embassy in Vienna before the war) left last Friday to undertake negotiations for the withdrawal of Kun, but that these came to nothing, owing mostly to the fact that the Socialists who might succeed, such as Kunfi, Böhm, and Peidl, are too much

¹ This letter is printed in full in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 3.
² See No. 40, note 7.
³ For the opposition of the Socialist leaders to the continuation of Béla Kun’s Government also see Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s telegram, dated 30 June 1919, in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 2.
compromised with the Communists for independent action at present. They joined the Communists after the fall of Karolyi, in the expectation of being able to control events, and later to reject the extremists, but it was the other way round. And until the position is even more hopeless than it is at present they are important. There are many speculations as to the exact position of Stromfeld (Chief of Staff to Böhmer). It seems certain that it was he who planned the attacks on Pressburg, Vienna and Wiener Neustadt, but his object in doing so is not clear. One version is that he meant to push the Hungarians into open breach with the Entente and the very open way in which he telephoned his orders, as well as his public announcement of the “Brunn line” as ultimate objective of the offensive enterprise, lends colour to this view. Further it is established that he personally induced Kun to withdraw but without effect. As things are, we are justified in hoping that this nightmare is nearly through, and provided that the Entente will refrain from further parley with Kun, and will maintain the blockade, we ought to see a change within a fortnight. But nothing will help to accelerate the process more than a peremptory demand to disarm the Red Troops.

I questioned Bauer as to his own position and he told me that if he could be assured of a Danubian Confederation as a working proposition he would work for it and support it. He considered that at present the attitude of the Czechs made it impossible and agreed that Deutsch Böhmen was still the ‘key’ to the problem. He thought that Masaryk and Tuzar [Tusar] would both be willing to grant the German Bohemians that measure of autonomy which was necessary to pave the way for a combination of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, but he doubted if they would ever be able to overcome the national sentiments of the Kramarsch [Kramár] group.

My own information from Prague points to the correctness of his view, but no doubt you know more of that from Mr. Gosling. It seems that Masaryk is willing to give autonomy to the Deutsch Böhmen “if they ask for it”. Now there are two groups in Deutsch Böhmen, the one led by Lodgman who would accept, the other by Langenhahn who wants the “Anschluss” and will not ask for anything.

As to this, I will write fuller next mail, but meanwhile end by saying that I don’t think that Bauer is pushing the Langenhahn group.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) Tom Cuninghame

4 Vlastimil Tusar, leader of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party.
5 British Chargé d’Affaires in Prague.
No. 180

Telegram from Béla Kun (Budapest) to G. Clemenceau (Paris)\(^1\)

[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14334]

BUDAPEST, 1 July 1919

Monsieur le Président,

Le Commandant en Chef de notre Armée, Monsieur BOEHM, vient de nous rapporter que les roumains sont passés à l’aube du 1\(^{er}\) juillet par la THEISS et attaquèrent près de TISZALUCZK [TISZALUC] nos troupes qui, conformément à la convention conclue, étaient en train de se retirer. De pareilles agressions des roumains sont de nature à troubler la retraite des troupes hongroises; d'autre part, elles font douter si les roumains obéiront aux ordres de l'Entente et s’ils se conforment aux stipulations les concernant de la Convention bi-latérale. Enfin, de telles agressions nécessitent des contre mesures de la part des troupes hongroises et, en définitive, ne sauraient que retarder la retraite. Les troupes roumaines ont, en outre, endommagé la ligne de téléphone ce qui enfreint également aux dispositions contenues dans les télégrammes de Monsieur le Président interdisant toute sorte d'exces, de pillage ou d'endommagement. Je vous prie, par conséquent, de protester énergiquement auprès des roumains contre ces violations de la convention contraires à tout droit international et d'exiger qu'ils cessent toute agression; de plus, qu'ils fassent des préparatifs nécessaires de retraite à leur tour.

Le Commissaire du Peuple
aux Affaires Etrangères,

Bela Kun

\(^1\) An almost identical telegram was sent by V. Böhm to Gen. M. Pellé on the same day, to which Gen. Pellé replied that he would transmit the text of the telegram to Marshal Foch.

The day before, on 30 June 1919, V. Böhm telegraphed to Gen. Pellé protesting against the persecution of officials who had acted in the name of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by the Czechoslovak authorities on the territories given up by the retiring Hungarian army. Gen. Pellé replied that he had forwarded the protest to the Czechoslovak Government.
Monsieur Bratiano called upon me this morning with Monsieur Misu, in order to say good-bye. Our conversation was not very prolonged, neither was it very satisfactory. Monsieur Bratiano clearly indicated that in his view it would be impossible for the Rumanians to abandon the line of the Theiss and retire to the frontier marked out for them by the Allies, partly because this last frontier was much less easily defensible than the one they are now occupying, partly because Bela Kun, acting in harmony with the Russian Bolshevists on the East of Rumania, would be able to throw against this weak frontier a stronger force than the Rumanians fighting on two fronts, would be able to oppose to them. Additional cause for anxiety to the Rumanian Government was the present position of Bulgaria, a country which he declared was overflowing with ammunition and small arms, and still possessed, in spite of disarmament, a considerable number of guns. His conclusions, as I understand him, were that until Hungary has been disarmed, it would be suicidal for Rumania to give up at the bidding of the Great Powers its present strategical advantages. It was useless for the Great Powers to give orders to nations whom they were unable to protect while carrying them out.¹

A.J.B[alfour].

¹ In this connection also see a note by P. Kerr, dated 16 July 1919, of his conversation with N. Mișu on 15 July in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 47, where references are made to A.J. Balfour’s quoted interview with I. Brătianu. On an original copy of the document (PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15423) Major H.W. Temperley recorded the following minutes on 19 July: “I saw Mișu today [....]. In the course of his remarks he referred to the question of retirement from the Theiss and left me very doubtful as to whether the Roumanians really meant to retire.” On the history of the Romanian advance to the Theiss, which started on 16 April 1919, and the attitude of the Supreme Council regarding Romanian policy in this respect, see No. 149, note 1, and DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, minute 1, note 3.

The Magyar army is retiring on the whole front according to the orders of General Pellé, up to date no acts of pillage committed.
Clear the line.

Special agent returned from Budapest on July 1st has given me convincing proof that supposed counter revolutionary [effort] on June 27th was organized by "agents provocateurs". Bela Kun had feared political action by Socialists but now his position is stronger.

Nevertheless he realizes that he cannot maintain the Red Army idle and on July (sic ? June) 30th he made a speech saying that troops would be used against Roumania across the ---[The]iss. Agent had outlined Stro---[m]feld plan which is to withdraw the 7th division from Slovakia and coveringg Budapest from south to concentrate behind The---[iss] between Mischolz [Miskolc] and Szolnok. Nothing was to be feared from Czech army. General mobilization to be maintained and fresh divisions organized in Western Hungary. Attempt to seize arms at Weiner [Wiener] Neustadt to be renewed. Agent states that he is convinced that there will be no peace till army is disbanded and that certain (2 groups undecypherable) Bela Kun. Suggest that General Pelle should demand of Austro-Hungarians at least proportionate disarmament complying with terms of November armistice otherwise all surrounding countries will have to maintain troops prepared to resist armed enterprises by reds.

Addressed Astoria and D.M.I. London.

1 The text here is uncertain.

No. 184

Notes on a Memorandum by L.B. Namier for Sir W. Tyrrell 1

[PRO FO 371/3515 No. 101018/(1193)]

3 July 1919

Sir William Tyrrell.

Commander Freeman, just returned from Budapest, came to see this morning and gave me an account of the present political and military situation in Hungary.

1 The document to which L.B. Namier's notes were originally attached is an account, given on 7 July by G.S. Spicer, of his conversation with Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman, with an introduction by J.A.C. Tilley, dated 10 July. The document is printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 32. It is clear, therefore, that L.B. Namier's minutes had been prepared before the file to which they were attached was created. For Lt.-Cmdr. F. Williams-Freeman's own views on the situation in Hungary following his departure from there, see Nos. 164 and 176.
The Bolshevik Council has no hold on the country outside Budapest. The army at the front fights the Czechs because this is in accordance with its national spirit and traditions. Even its chief commander, Boehm, is not at heart a Bolshevik. Neither he nor his army would fight against troops of the Western Powers. Boehm, who has risen from the trade unions and is a Socialist rather than a Bolshevik, would most probably himself turn against the Bolsheviks.

In the life of the villages the soviets have made very little difference. The village commune continues as before. But the agrarian reform inaugurated by Count Michael Karolyi has come to stay. In many cases the peasants carry on the management of the big estates in co-operation with their late managers without breaking up the land into small lots. The peasants are hostile to the Bolsheviks but would have to be given proper guarantees that the new government does not mean a return to the old agrarian system.

In the town of Budapest itself the organised working men are Socialist but not Bolshevik and are strongly opposed to the Bolshevik regime. The Bolsheviks, however, alone have more considerable armed forces in the town and moreover have developed an organisation of espionage and control which precludes the possibility of any effective rising against them. The army at the front naturally does not interfere with matters in Budapest. From Commander Freeman's account one gathers that the position is more or less that of France in the concluding days of the Revolution when the Jacobins had a free hand in Paris though the armies at the front were by no means of their political persuasion.

I asked Commander Freeman about the “White” Hungarian government at Szeged under Julius Karolyi and Paul Teleki. He informed me that these men had tried to get Garami, the most prominent of the moderate Socialists, to join them, and that they themselves are prepared for a moderate Socialist government with agrarian reform as foreshadowed by Count Michael Karolyi’s government while it was in power. I called Commander Freeman's attention to the intrigues which the old aristocratic Magyar gang was carrying on against Count Michael Karolyi while he was still in power, and to the fact that when asking at that time for an Entente occupation of Hungary these men schemed to set up an oligarchic government of the pre-war type which, having practically no following among the population, would have had to rely on external support. I further called his attention to the fact that in those days these aristocrats planned to get us into Hungary also with a view to intrigueing against Roumania, the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs — in short that they were out to re-establish their old Hungary both geographically and politically and politically. Commander Freeman considers that both these ideas are by now a matter of the past.

I am quite prepared to believe that the Magyars have by now recognised the impossibility of preserving Hungary's “integrity” and that they have practically abandoned that part of the scheme. I am not, however, prepared to believe that any of the big feudal lords, if they once more feel force behind them, especially in the form of foreign bayonets, will not, unless very closely watched, try to re-establish their own social dominion. But if they try to do that, or even if merely a serious suspicion arose of their trying to do so, we should undoubtedly have all the workmen and all the peasants against us. In other words, if any intervention has to come, it must start from the very outset in conjunction with people who have the confidence of the country — the moderate Socialists and radicals in the towns and the peasant radicals in the villages. The presence of a Count Julius Karolyi or a Count Teleke [Teleki] would merely be a handicap to us.

Commander Freeman considers that the French forces now available for Hungary would be sufficient to overthrow the Bolsheviks if merely it were made clear that their advance does not mean any further encroachments on Magyar territory, but that the Allied and Associated Powers mean to establish a regular Magyar government which they will no longer treat as an enemy power but help politically and economically. He
thinks that then the Bolshevik government, which maintains itself by skilful self-advertisement and by make-believe, would collapse like a pack of cards. Of all the Allies the British are by far the most popular in Hungary, and Commander Freeman strongly recommends that a British general should be put in charge of the reconstruction of political government in Hungary. i.e. of the administration, until a properly elected assembly is convened. From my own knowledge of the Magyars I can fully confirm Commander Freeman's opinion that it would be in every way most desirable that the general put in charge should be British and not French. An Italian of course would be out of the question. I asked Commander Freeman whether the French would agree to a British general being in charge of Budapest whilst the French troops did the work. He believes, indeed asserts, that they would — which seems to me rather optimistic.

Finally I should like to add that Commander Freeman made on me the impression of a thoroughly competent, very intelligent and energetic man, though perhaps slightly too optimistic and too much inclined to trust people to learn the lessons of events or stick to the views which they held when they were down when once more in luck. This, however, does not in any way impair the value of his statements of fact which are clear and business-like. If action in Hungary is decided upon, he would most certainly be a very valuable assistant to any one put in charge of it.

L.B.N.

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 184

Further Minutes on the Same Memorandum

(From) [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15008]

Lt-Comm. Williams-Freeman has always held these views & stated them most clearly & convincingly. It is now perhaps a more difficult military problem to overthrow Bela Kun than it was two months ago, but the need for such decisive action remains the same.

A.W.A. Leeper
11/7/19

The question is now before the Council of Five.

E. Crowe
12/7/19

The memorandum is not printed, see note 1 above. A.W.A. Leeper and Sir E. Crowe's minutes are quoted from another copy of the same memorandum from the Peace Delegation files (FO 608).
No. 185

Telegram from Vienna

[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14930]

Vienna, 5 July 1919

Bela Kun is preparing an offensive against Rumania. At this moment he is massing his troops on the Theiss between (? Miskolcz) and ..(jammed) [? Szolnok]. If the Rumanian troops do not hold out on the Theiss the Hungarians are in sufficient force to oblige them to retire to the Carpathian passes.

1 The exact source of this wireless message is unknown. It was communicated to the British Peace Delegation, together with a wireless message dispatched from Budapest on the same date (see No. 186), on 9 July 1919 by Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss. This copy is marked: "Copy to Mr. Balfour."

No. 186

Telegram from Budapest

[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14930]

Vienna, 5 July 1919

The Soviet Government have issued a manifesto to all the soldiers of the Red Army. They have not retired, the manifesto declares, before the Czechs or the Rumanians, but these are not the only enemies. They have to free their country from the noose which the British, French and American money kings are trying to slip round its neck. Although they have had to withdraw from Czecho-Slovak territories, the Proletarian Fatherland will receive much more fertile and larger territories on the other side of the Theiss, which the Rumanian boyars have to evacuate at the command of the Entente. They do not renounce their claim to a single inch of Hungarian-speaking territory [....]2 and try to place upon their necks the double yoke of exploitation and suppression of their racial brothers.

1 This wireless message was received together with the one in No. 185. Also see No. 185, note 1.
2 Apparently a part of the text has been lost here.
No. 187

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received on 9 July, Repeated 15 July 1919)

No. 93 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/15340]

Vienna, 7 July 1919

Priority.

Meeting of Allied Military representatives took place on July 6th under presidency of Captain Gregory American Mission. President having explained that Hungarian questions have been referred to military section in Paris and decision deferred to July 8th, it was resolved to send following joint telegram:-

Military occupation committee of Allied officers assembled on July 6th at Vienna are of opinion that -

(1) Directly it becomes clear to the present Hungarian Government and to the Hungarian people that the Entente will proceed to the overthrow of the present Bolshevick Régime in Hungary if their demands are not met, the Government of Hungary will submit. The Bolshevicks will give way to the Socialists.

(2) It is therefore necessary, (a) to make the essential authoritative statement in explicit terms; (b) commence movement of British and Italian troops; (c) to indicate the intention of the Entente to the people of Budapest and the rest of Hungary by aeroplane; (d) to advise the Austrian Government of their [the Entente’s] wishes; (e) to immediately prepare for simultaneous advance of all troops now on the border. In the event of Hungary turning recalcitrant, to continue the transport of British troops from the Rhine to Slovakia and of Italian troops to south Hungary. But with the publicity of purpose and combined iron troops in the field with initial movement of

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1 This telegram is also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 20. Also see the “Note by Cypher Dept.” below.
2 For the attempts of the Peace Conference to enforce the terms of the Armistice on Hungary in early June see No. 139. For the discussion on the subject of intervention in Hungary in the Supreme Council on 5 July 1919 see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3, minute 2. The report of the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council on the measures to be taken regarding Hungary was prepared on 8 July (S.W.C. 438, see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 7, Appendix B). Gen. Pellé sent a report on the subject of intervention from Prague to G. Clemenceau on the same date (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 9, Appendix D). A discussion of the report by the Military Representatives took place in the Supreme Council on 9 July (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 7, minute 6). The subject was then further discussed in the Supreme Council on 11 July in the presence of Marshal Foch and Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav representatives (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 9, minute 7). Marshal Foch then prepared a report on the subject on 17 July (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 13, Appendix B). That report was discussed on the same day in the Supreme Council with Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav delegates (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 13, minute 3). In many ways the final discussion in the Supreme Council on the issue took place on 18 July, during which the idea of sending four Allied Generals as an International Committee of Inquiry was first suggested by G. Clemenceau (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 14, minute 5). After this date the discussions focused on the question of sending this Committee of Inquiry, and the negotiations of Allied representatives in Vienna with Hungarian Socialists opposed to Béla Kun’s régime, rather than on direct military intervention.
British and Italian troops it is firmly believed the military movement required will be of small size and short duration.

Repeated D.M.I.

Note by CYPHER DEPT. This telegram was received undecypherable. Repetition received to-day. (July 15th 1919).

No. 188

*Letter from Major H.A. Cartwright (Prague) to Oliver? of the British Peace Delegation (Paris. Extract. Received 21 July 1919)*

[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15831]

British Legation, Prague, 8 July 1919

My dear Oliver,

I've just come back from a week in Slovakia and am going to try to tell you anything which may interest you of what I saw there.

I went to act as umpire in the Hungarian retirement for the sector immediately North of the Danube, where the Eipel flows into it. It was very interesting and would have been much more so if I'd has some spare motor tyres, but as I hadn't I was confined to the one railway — Nove Zamky—Parkan [Parkány] — after the first two days and could only use that when I could get the use of the one and only engine. I also wasted a night stuck in a bog, and most of the next day being towed home by a pair of buffaloes.

My first HQ was with a French Brigade commander at Nove Zamky (or Ersekujvar or Neuhausel) where I saw and learnt a good deal about the Czech army, but I'll come to that later.

Practically the whole country from Pressburg to Parkan[y] is undoubtedly Magyar and also the country running Northwards from Parkan[y] along the Eipel with a few small pockets of Slovaks, whose position is not unlike that of the Germans in Bohemia. My chauffeur, who was also my interpreter, used the Magyar language the whole way from Pressburg to Parkan[y] and we stopped about and talked to people in almost every village. The Czechs explain this by saying that the people are really Slovaks who have been forcibly Magyarised, the late Hungarian government having suppressed all except the Magyar language in the schools. There is probably some truth in this as one does notice that the Slovak language is used to a certain extent by the older people while the younger generations speak only Magyar. (Many of the better class of peasants can speak German, which is very much not the case in Bohemia, but that is by the way.)

However it may have been brought about the vast majority of the people of this country are undoubtedly Magyar by sentiment and speech. I talked to a great many people and am convinced of this feeling wherever I was.

They do not want Czech rule, they might tolerate Slovak rule and they would welcome Magyar rule but have absolutely no use for Communism.

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1 The editor has not been able to establish the exact identity of the addressee of this letter, though it is likely that it was someone associated with the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss in particular.
The country which I saw is very rich agriculturally and the peasants are well off. There appears to be no lack of food there. I got good bread, eggs and milk everywhere and from the smallest cottages. There are enormous flocks of geese, ducks and chickens and large herds of swine in every village and a good lot of cattle about the country. Our old pal the water buffalo is much in evidence looking just as if he’d stopped straight out of an Indian village. Every cottage has a large garden, well cultivated, and I think every peasant produces his own maize as well.

The Magyars behaved fairly well in their retirement and I couldn’t hear of much pillage anywhere except in the track of an “international battalion” where it was the work of individual thieves. (There are two Frenchmen and three Englishmen in this battalion.)

The people I questioned nearly all seemed to resent being asked if the Magyars had stolen or driven away cattle and replied quite heatedly in many cases that they had stolen nothing and only bought enough for their immediate needs. Probably the very day of the departure of the Magyars was not a good time for asking these questions as the people cannot have been sure that they had really gone, but I really believe that they took very little. Padres, schoolmasters and large proprietors in most places told me that they had taken a few horses and cattle and a few loads of grain but they didn’t seem a bit annoyed about it.

The Magyars completely cleared out every railway station. They took all the furniture and all the electric signalling, telegraph and telephone instruments and smashed anything they couldn’t take away. The last troops to leave were Bolschevists pure and simple which accounts for the wanton destruction.

One large proprietor whom I called on told me he had had 3 good horses and two farm wagons taken from him for which the Magyars had paid him 16000 Krone in paper “money”. The money was marked valid up to 30th June and the payment was made on July 2nd. He used it as spills. The Czechs took some horses from him in their retreat for which they did not even give a receipt.

I visited the Bolschevics three times altogether. On the first occasion I came up with the rear guard of their army a couple of miles W. of Parkan[y]. I was in my car and flying a flag of truce. I was halted by a very soldierly patrol, who, when I told them my business, allowed me to pass through their lines with one of their men on the front seat. I went on in search of someone in authority, but was almost immediately halted by a patrol of the real genuine article, a mob of soldiers and sailors who crowded round me and pointed pistols at me and howled horrible threats; they had a “commissioner du peuple” among them who seemed to be particularly annoyed with the Entente. I managed to get through them by being very haughty and shouting louder than they did, but with a Bolschy on the first seat instead of the genuine soldier I had started with. In the town of Parkan[y] I was surrounded by an enormous mob of people and had the greatest difficulty in getting anything done but did at last manage to get them to telephone to Es[z]tergom for the commander of the VIII Division but it was doubtful if he would turn up that night. Then the car went phut and I had to throw myself on the mercy of the Bolschis to get it repaired. This they proceeded to do, at a price. It was getting dark and I had a longish journey before me so I asked if there was a pub where I could get something to eat and they took me to the only hotel where I sat down to feed and two Bolschy officers, who both claimed to be the town commandant and nearly came to blows about it, sat down at the same table and fed too. I thought it was going to be interesting but they were too much of the tub-thumping screaming variety and did nothing but rave about the joys of communism and liberty, equality, fraternity, and the 14 points of Vilson [sic], who seemed to be their hero (do tell him, perhaps he didn’t know!) So I was terminating the entertainment as quickly as possible when a brigade commander from Es[z]tergom came and said he was the representative of the G.O.C. VIII division, who had gone to Buda Pesth. This man was an officer of the old
Austrian army, no Bolschevist, and I think quite content to fight against the Czechs or any other friend of the Entente. We had a talk about various things but there was practically nothing of importance to discuss as the Magyars were almost behind their final line two days ahead of time. The roads are what we call droves in Somerset and having no good light the car ran into a Bog and remained there until daylight. Then I did 10 miles behind buffaloes until we found a road that had once been macadam and got home at 10 am. (I was hurrying for all I was worth as I was afraid I should be reported “missing chez les Bolschis”, but though I had gone out at noon the day before to find the Bolschis and had made arrangements to telephone to HQ at 8 pm. the same night, the Czech commandant with whom I lived hadn’t missed me.)

On two occasions I talked with LAGOSH (spelling uncertain) the commander of a regiment which he raised himself from the workmen of the factory in which he worked. He hung all those who refused to join before the eyes of the remainder. He struck me as being the most perfect type of all that one would expect a Bolschy to be but I believe he’s an absolutely sincere fanatic, and firmly believes himself to be one of the savours of the world.

On the last occasion a staff officer from the ? army corps came to meet me on the bridge at Parkan[y]. He was also an officer of the old army. The only questions of importance which he raised were, one about the fishing in the Danube, which I referred to General Pelle, and, two about the traffic on the Parkany bridge. This last I settled with the local French commandant, who, much against his will I persuaded to allow anyone who wanted to to depart to the Magyar side within 24 hours on the understanding that they could under no circumstances return and vice versa, subject to police permission. A young cavalry officer came with his staff officer who interested me very much. He was an obvious gentleman and had two Bolschy sailors obviously told off to watch him. I managed to tell him that I wanted to talk to him and he replied “for God’s sake don’t.” He managed to have a few words with a young Czech officer whom he told that he was compelled to serve by threats against his mother and sisters and said that if he had talked English to me he would almost certainly have been immediately shot or hanged.

As I was approaching Parkan[y] on the first occasion someone pooped off a round at me from the corn; it was probably a Bolschy straggler who had not the least idea what he was shooting at. After that I didn’t a bit enjoy my night alone in the car!

Coulson’s despatch after his visit to Slovakia told you a good deal about the Czech army and I’ve very little to add to that except that what I saw only assured me of the accuracy of all he had written. It really is a most deplorable army. The first time I went through their lines the French Commander showed me exactly where I should find their outposts on the road and advised me to approach them slowly. I never saw any trace of them at all either on the outward or return journey. I saw one of their columns starting out to follow up the Magyars, this was the order of march. First a long column of transport headed by a fat sergeant in a cab, then a company of infantry marching “go as you please” in no formation whatever, then about 500 infantry in approximate fours and finally a small detachment of cavalry. This was the day after the departure of the Magyars from their front lines.

(That young cavalry officer I spoke of also told the Czech officer that the monitor, it was really a small torpedo-boat, in which they came to see me was the last that remained in their hands, all the others, he said, were in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. I’ve heard no confirmation of this.)

Both sides seem to have gone in a bit for “frightfulness”; in one villages which I entered with Czech troops I was told by my orderly who was told by an American-

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2 The editor has not been able to identify the dispatch referred to, though for a letter from Col. B. Coulson of the nature indicated, dated 8 June 1919, see No. 143.
speaking Czech, that they had just shot two men without any form of trial. I myself stopped them from shooting a man whom they said was a deserter, without trial, but they whipped up some sort of a Court Martial and disposed of him in a few minutes. This man told me of a couple of atrocities which he had witnessed when he was among the Bolshis, but as he couldn't tell us where to find the bodies we could do nothing to prove this story.

I am certain that the question of Slovakia is no more nearly settled than it was when the country was in the hands of the Magyars. It is a country waiting to be colonised but the Czechs have a lot to learn before they'll be acceptable rulers to the people of the those parts, whatever you like to call them. The Magyars, without communism, would be welcomed with open arms. The Czech advance was not greeted with the enthusiastic welcome of their official reports, but with shuttered houses and shops and empty streets.

[....]

Yours ever,
Henry A. Cartwright

No. 189

Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Received 10 July 1919)

No. HAM 779 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/14934]

Vienna, 8 July 1919

FOR ASTORIA, HAM 779 FROM Cunningham [sic] British Military Representative Vienna quote reliable news from Budapest dated seventh states that Kuhn [sic] will arrange on Thursday next¹ a counter revolutionary disturbance in Budapest using agents provocateurs in order to upset Socialists stop Socialists desire to fly from Budapest and have made application to British for protection unquote. Copy to Hoover.

Gregory

¹ 17 July 1919.
Have spoken with high Staff Officer Hungarian Red Army who reports that ninety five per cent of people desire entry of Entente stop does not think Kuhn [sic] will cede until he gets ocular demonstration of intentions of Entente but will then give in stop does not believe that Hungarians will fight against Entente troops stop if they do maximum number of rounds per rifle is two hundred stop total number of guns is five hundred of all calibres in army with one hundred rounds per gun stop no gas masks stop no fortifications round Budapest stop Commander of Budapest Corps will not make resistance being a Socialist and opposed to Kuhn stop terrorist group round Samueilly [Szamuely] consists of four hundred men and Kuhn inclines to Samueilly [Szamuely] and to terrorist policy stop Bohm Landler Haubrich and Vildner [Weltnner] oppose it stop informant states so long as Red Army remains armed peace is impossible as army cannot be kept idle and cannot be disarmed by existing Government stop in country repressive measures have been taken in many towns Kaloc[a] Steinemanger [Steinamanger] Sopron Ves[z] prem Szolnok and other places and the peasants are held powerless by terror of Red Guards total number of executions of which he has knowledge is two hundred stop increasing famine in Budapest is bringing anarchy every day nearer stop informant gives following details concerning army Stromfeld has been dismissed from position Chief of Staff and is succeeded by Julier stop Politowsky [Politovszky] is no longer Chief of Staff of First Corps stop Corps Headquarters as follows First Vago Czegled Second Pogany Plattensee Third Landler Misckolcz [Miskolc] Fourth comma Budapest Garrison comma Haubrich Pesth Fifth Fiedler not known stop informant confirms position of divisions as given in this morning's report but does not know where the fifth division is. Copy to Logan.

Cuninghame

1 Also in PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14964.
2 Probably a reference to Major Géza Lajtos, Chief of Staff of the 4th (Budapest) Army Corps, under the Commander of the Corps, J. Haubrich, who, being an uneducated iron-worker, and a notorious drinker, was not in a position to give information to a foreign officer.
3 The German name of Szombathely, a town in western Hungary.
4 The German name of Lake Balaton.
5 In PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/14964 the text of this telegram is preceded by: “Ham 785 Following from Cunningham [sic] for Astoria quote...”, and is followed by: “…unquote Gregory”. “Copy to Logan” is left out.
No. 191

Telegram (in 2 parts) from A.J. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (London. Received (Part I) 9 July, (Part II) 10 July 1919)¹

No. 1137 [PRO FO 371/3515 No. 100494]²

Part I.

Very Urgent.

We are now in presence of clear cut situation in Hungary. Bela Kun in defiance of Armistice is daily augmenting forces which are all ready [sic] far in excess of those he has a right to maintain. He is also reported to be manufacturing guns, aeroplanes and ammunition. There seems to be only two possible policies open to us. First is to do nothing and hope that crimes and follies of Bela Kun will soon bring his Government to an end without further effort on our part. This is however neither very dignified nor very safe. It is a public profession of impotence by Allies which will convince every recalcitrant State, small or big, that we may be defied or ignored with impunity. It will leave Hungary as a focus for Bolshevik propaganda; and commit Bela Kun to contrive with Lenin what mischief he pleases. His propaganda is already a cause of great disquiet in neighbouring Republics: and it seems that his propaganda may soon be re-inforced by war. Are we to allow Austria or Bohemia to be attacked? If so, League of Nations will be hopelessly discredited before it is legally born.

Part 2 follows.

¹ Both parts of this telegram are printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, Nos. 30 and 31.
² Also preserved in PRO CAB 21/150, where the following minutes are recorded on the file: "Very Impt", and separately: "Mr. Bonar Law wishes P.M. to phone his views."
³ The text, as sent from Paris, here reads "permit".
Part II

Very Urgent.

Are we to permit Hungarians to retain territories which we have assigned to other states? This is impossible. Are we to leave Hungary out of Peace settlement for an indefinite period? This not only inconvenient but it means economic disaster for Central Europe which, as Mr. Hoover tells us\textsuperscript{4} can never resume a normal economic life till it can make free use of Hungarian railways and waterways.

In the circumstances it would seem that proper course is to compel Hungary, as we should have compelled Germany, to fulfil armistice which she has signed. If this were done (\text? Bela Kun) would be disarmed and once disarmed could easily be dealt with and would soon fall. Unfortunately the Versailles soldiers have reported in somewhat gloomy terms upon military aspect of question.\textsuperscript{5} They are not sure that Roumania and Czech soldiers (\text? and omitted) French who\textsuperscript{6} are on the spot would be sufficient to (\text? ensure) success. They are not clear how they can be reinforced. They are going to consider matter again but if this is done to any purpose and if I am to handle question (group undecypherable)\textsuperscript{7} the C.I.G.S. out here with full information as to views of Cabinet.

Minutes attached to the document:

[...\text] Hungary seems to be a weak point in Bolshevism now & a strong line there would have a good effect all round.

[Undated and unsigned]

\textsuperscript{4} See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3, minute 2.
\textsuperscript{5} See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 7, minute 6 and Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{6} The text, as sent from Paris, here reads: "...that Roumanian, Czech, Serbian and French soldiers who...".
\textsuperscript{7} The text, as sent from Paris, here reads: "...to handle the question I must have the C.I.G.S....".
No. 192

Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Major-General W. Thwaites
(London. Received in Paris 24 July 1919)

[PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/16075]

Vienna, 10 July 1919

To: - The Director of Military Intelligence,
    War Office,
    London.

The attached account of the situation in Budapest given by the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Red Fourth Corps\(^1\) is herewith forwarded.\(^2\)

(Sd.) T.M. Cuninghame, Lieut. Colonel\(^3\)
    General Staff
    British Military Representative in Vienna

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 192

Major G. Lajtos’ Account of the Situation in Budapest

Vienna, 9 July 1919

The situation in Budapest is terrible. There are no foodstuffs, as the peasants hate their Jewish rulers, nor any industrial other goods. Consequently, the shops are closed, commerce and trade have ceased to exist. The workmen are dissatisfied, but they are under the terrorism of their factory directorates and the workmen and soldiers’ councils.

The reason why Bela Kun does not resign is that he too is being terrorised by the terrorists, that he hopes that Bolshevism will spread to German-Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, and that he is not the man voluntarily to renounce the power which he has.

The supporters of the Government are:

- The terror troops, officially called detective detachment of the Home Office, about 400 men, 1 armoured car, several minethrowers (about 30), machine guns (some mounted cars). As to artillery 16 guns were demanded from the high command last week, but it appears these guns have not been given them.
- The proletarians acting as officials, but doing no work, in the different state offices, driving about in automobiles and leading a gay life. There are about 10,000 such civil servants in Hungary.
- Portions of the Red Army and the Red Guard. The forces of the Red Army are all under the terrorism of the political commissaries of whom one is detailed with all headquarters of units from the battalion upwards.

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1 Major Géza Lajtos. Also see No. 190, note 2.
2 For Col. Sir T. Cuninghame’s account of his interview with Major G. Lajtos (letter No. T.C. 623, dated 8 July 1919) see DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 21.
3 The formal rank of Sir T. Cuninghame was major, temporary lieutenant-colonel.
The workmen and soldiers' councils.

Although 95 per cent of the population including workmen are opponents of the Government nothing can be done by counter-revolutionary quarters in Budapest because the arms are in the hands of terrorists and because the workmen are closely watched. A coup attempted by the Army or an advance of the White Guard from Szeged is likely to lead to civil war.

The Entente alone is able to restore order in the country and this within one week. The English are most respected and their arrival in the country would be greatly welcomed by the majority of the population, who would also be greatly pleased if Hungary should become an English dominion.

The Red Army consists of nine divisions of which the 4th has been disbanded. The fighting strength of the divisions is very small, e.g. the strength of the 9th division does not exceed 2600 to 3000 men.

In order to free Hungary from the Communists within one week 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armoured cars as possible would be sufficient. Propaganda leaflets and handbills should be dropped from aeroplanes simultaneously with the offensive action.

The propaganda literature should promise food for Budapest, coal for Hungary, economic and financial support by the Entente, better frontiers than the present demarcation line, red-white-green flags in lieu of the present red ones, disbandment and disarmament of the Red Army.

Three divisions would be sufficient as garrison troops in the country. During the military dictatorship a Hungarian national army (police, frontier security troops, about 4 to 5 divisions) should be formed and elections take place.

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No. 193

Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Extract. Received 16 July 1919)\(^1\)

No. 796 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15425]

Vienna, 10 July 1919

[...]

Colonel Stromfeld resigned yesterday. He is replaced by Colonel Lt. Julier who was formerly Chief of Staff of the third division army corps. Yesterday Colonel Stromfeld had a long talk with the Italian Colonel Romanetti [Romanelli] at Hotel Ritz. He rendered himself to Gyor [Győr] where his family lives. Reason: he declined to agree to the retreat from northern Hungary. This is the official issue. In reality he had lost confidence in the possibility of military success and felt too weak to assume the military dictatorship with a disorderly retreating, unreliable army. Intentions of headquarters: it is decided to take the offensive against Roumanians. [...]

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\(^1\) The telegram transmits text received from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame.
Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. [H] Nicolson)

The strength of the Red Army, at any rate as regards the larger formations, seems to be less than we had supposed. I feel sure that the withdrawal from the Czecho-Slovak front must have affected their morale & discipline.

W.L.O. Twiss  Lieut. Col.
18/7/19  G.S.

No. 194

Telephone Message from D. Lloyd George (Criccieth)1 to A. Bonar Law (Paris. Received 11 July 1919)

[PRO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15222]2

In regard to Bela Kun, our difficulty is a good deal due to the Roumanian advance to the Theiss in defiance of the Peace Conference and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and this is accentuated by the present refusal to withdraw from Hungarian territory as they were asked. If the decrees of the Peace Conference are to be enforced, they must be enforced against friend and foe alike. It seems clear that the Western Nations are not willing to supply the necessary force. Further, it is impossible to foresee when the Allied Forces could be withdrawn if once committed to the occupation of Hungary.

In view of the very strong declaration made by M. Clemenceau of July 5th (I.C.201A)3 which was supported by Tittoni, it is clear that the main burden of action would fall on us.

In the circumstances it is surely unnecessary for the C.I.G.S. to go to Paris.

Ends.4

Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section

The military plan of operations was put forward by Marshal Foch at yesterday’s meeting of the Supreme Council,5 who are discussing the political aspects to-day.6

W.L.O. Twiss  Lieut. Col.
18/7/19  G.S.

1 The Prime Minister was on holiday at Criccieth at the time.
2 Also in II. G. F/24/1/1, and printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, Enclosure with No. 38.
3 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 3, minute 2.
4 For D. Lloyd George’s telephone message to A.J. Balfour on 13 July on the same subject see No. 196.
5 See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 13, minute 3 and Appendix B.
No. 195

En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 12 July 1919)

No. 638 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15133]

Vienna, 11 July 1919

Priority Clear the Line.

Reports from Budapest indicate that efforts are being made to rearm and reform the demoralized workmens battalions of Hungarian Red Army. Journals here publish statement by Bohm to Pelle that if Roumanians do not retire they will be attacked. This corroborate previous information that attack is planned in any event for July 15th. Therefore though there may be doubt whether Government can induce army to fight there is no doubt as to their aggressive intentions. An informing Czech and Roumanians intentions [Am informing Czechs and Roumanians about Hungarian Government's intentions]. Am informing Czech and Roumanians representatives. Addressed Dirmilint.

No. 196

Telephone Message from D. Lloyd George (Criccieth) to P. Kerr (Paris)

[PRO CAB 21/150]

Criccieth, 13 July 1919

Following from Prime Minister to Mr. Balfour.

I have Mr. Kerr's note of 11th July, but do not understand proceedings at Paris in regard to Bela Kun. Policy of Allies was first to insist on retirement of Bela Kun from Czecho-Slovak territory to be followed immediately by a retirement of Roumanians from Hungarian territory, after which peace negotiations with Hungary would commence. According to Report of Military Representatives, Versailles, dated 8th July, evacuation of Czecho-Slovak territory by Hungarian troops has been carried out within the time limit prescribed. Although Bela Kun has carried out his undertaking to the Allies, and complied with their demands, the Roumanians, who are our Allies, resolutely refuse to retire. When a foreign enemy occupies nearly half of the Magyar territory and remains within striking distance of their capital, and refuses to withdraw, even at the request of their own Allies, is there no justification for the Magyars, under such conditions, keeping a large force to protect what is left of their territory, or even to

1 Also in L.G. F/24/1/1; and printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 39.
2 The editor has not been able to trace this document.
3 The editor has not been able to trace this document.
drive⁴ the invader out of what is acknowledged even by him to be Magyar territory. The fundamental fact remains, and this seems to be the dominant fact in the situation, that the Roumanians broke the armistice; their breach of the armistice supplies a certain justification for the action of the Magyars. But surely the first step is to deal with the Roumanians. If we insist on doing what is obviously unfair, I am afraid that is the way to make Bolshevism and not to destroy it. The evidence is overwhelming that the Roumanian advance has strengthened Bela Kun's position, and that young officers, who belong to the Hungarian aristocracy, have joined Bela Kun's army to resist the Roumanian advance. If we insist on disarming them at the mercy of the Roumanians, will not that have the effect of putting the Hungarian national spirit behind Bolshevism? A fatal error. Who would accept the word of the Roumanians that they would not advance beyond the Theiss if the Hungarian army were disarmed? They could easily find some pretext, and their past proves that they are quite capable of inventing one. If they advanced, could we stop them? We have already tried to induce them to retire, and they pay no heed to our behests.

Is not the proper course to pursue the original policy and to insist on Roumania withdrawing forces from Hungarian territory, making a simultaneous demand to Bela Kun to comply with terms of armistice as a condition precedent to peace?

The decrees of the Conference must be enforced against the defaulter, whether friend or foe.⁵

⁴ In DBFP (see note 1) instead of the word “drive”, the word “bribe” appears here. Other, slight, differences also occur between the two texts, which are apparently based on two different versions of the original.

⁵ For A.J. Balfour's reply see No. 202.
In French secret cypher telegram 141[?] Tower 3, July 3rd, from Clemenceau to General Hallier the following sentence occurs, begins:

If Bela Kun makes up his mind to cast off Bolshevism idea (group undecypherable) would form a Socialist Government (3 groups undecypherable) the Entente, in my opinion would be to suddenly (2 groups undecypherable) a Socialist Government would be more agreeable to us than that of Szeged. A Bourgeois Government would not long remain in power and in this case we should be compelled to intervene once more. Ends.

It is important that Paris Conference realises that Bela Kun has text of this telegram. He will certainly use it for his own purpose and the bonafide of any political (1 group undecypherable) suggested by him should be asserted accordingly. I presume Conference knows that Szeged Government includes ex-Socialist functionaries and has a (1 group undecypherable) with the....Dicaliarbis in Budapest, whereby if Szeged Government is acknowledged by Entente and placed in power Socialist representation is fully secured. As in Austria so in Hungary the peasants are becoming alarmed and indignant at the perpetual neglect of their interests by the working class population of the towns and there can be no question that the peasant vote at present will be Anti-Socialist and a wholly Socialist administration will not bring internal peace in Hungary.

1 The text here is uncertain, the number is either 14189 or 14199.
2 In his telegram No. 96, dated 13 July, Col. Sir T. Cuninghame reported to A.J. Balfour that the Hungarian Legation in Vienna had decoded a number of French secret cipher telegrams, which he was in possession of, "[...] These documents of which I possess decypher give full details of the attitude and intention of Allies towards Bela Kun.

I have (?) "told" omitted French some time ago their cyphers were compromised but will not tell them I have their documents unless you direct me to do so." (PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/7/15335) He also asked for confirmation that new keys had been issued for his own dispatches. Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss minuted on the document on 18 July that these had, in fact, been issued. Regarding the French telegrams, however, no answer from the British Peace Delegation has been traced by the editor.
Vienna, 13 July 1919

The continued report of ill-treatment of peasants by Bolsheviks of Hungary is causing great indignation in Austria. At Kalocsa 19 were hanged under circumstances of grossest barbarity. At Szekszard 60 are reported to have been hanged or shot. Similar acts at Sopron [Sobron] and Szombathely have already been reported to you.

Chief of Staff of Budapest garrison\(^1\) informed me that he knew of 200 deaths and asserted total in Hungary at 2000.

Chief of Austrian peasant league informs me constant appeals made by Hungarian peasants to Austrian peasants to release them from existing tyranny requests league to put forward a resolution in Austrian Parliament on July 14th condoning with Hungarian peasants and protesting against continued acts of murder coarseness and plunder.

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

I wonder if it would not be a good thing to give Mr. Mair\(^2\) some of these details for propaganda purposes.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.
18/7/19 General Staff

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\(^1\) Major Géza Lajtos. Also see No. 190, note 2.
\(^2\) H.G. Mair was on the Press Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.
Letter from Captain B.H. Barbe, (Vienna) to Major-General W. Thwaites (London. Received in Paris 24 July 1919)

[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16088]

M.I.3.b.,
Vienna, 15 July 1919

The attached referring to conditions in Hungary was given me by the American Commissioner\(^1\) here.

(Sd.) B.H. Barber, Captain,
for Lt. Col. [Sir T. Cuninghame]

British Military Representative
in Vienna

ENCLOSURE WITH NO. 199

Memorandum by Captain B. Weiss\(^2\)

10 July 1919

To American Commissioner, Vienna

SUBJECT:- Conditions in Hungary

Interview with Bela Kun

In this interview Bela Kun showed that he is confident as ever of retaining the present form of government, even though he admits that a large part of the farmers, who own their land, are positively against the present form of government, as well as all of the bourgeoisie, but he insists that the farm hands, especially of the co-operative farms, and also the Socialists are in favour and support the present government. According to his statement about six or seven million acres of land are being tilled by these farm hands, who do their best to produce large crops. He stated that he hoped in this way to get his supplies for Budapest and other cities so he could be independent of the small farmers. When asked how he would take care of the sick and protect the health of the children

\(^{1}\) A. Halstead.

\(^{2}\) This memorandum is also printed in *FRUS, PPC*, vol. XII, pp. 606-609.
this coming winter in view of the coal shortage, he answered that the Entente may change its policy and lift the blockade thus allowing Hungary to get the necessary supplies. I then asked him “If the Allies do not raise the blockade, what then?” His answer was that under any circumstances they would be able to survive for at least a year or year and one half in spite of all blockades. He hopes that in a few months time Germany and Czecho-Slovakia will turn Bolshevik, when Russia, Germany, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia will form an Entente of their own, and exist as such until the rest of Europe joins them. In other words, he is just as confident to-day in spite of all the [counter-]revolutionary movements, as he ever was.

Upon asking him concerning conditions in Russia, he answered that naturally conditions are far better and consolidated than in Hungary, since they had started so much earlier. He further stated that by the time Hungary becomes consolidated, America will be in the same condition as Hungary is to-day.

Conditions in Hungary

As one passes through the country districts one sees the crops ripening, but not being cut, and there is great fear that even after being cut it cannot be threshed owing to the shortage of coal. The country seems to be fairly well supplied with food, in fact there is a surplus but the peasants refuse to give up any food for Budapest. This is due to the fact that they do not sympathise with the present form of government, and refuse to accept the white or Bolshevik money, which is not accepted in any other country. It also seems that the farmers have plenty of money on hand, but cannot buy anything for it as there is no commerce at all, which displeases them.

In different parts of the country there are sporadical outbreaks of counter-revolutions, one suppressed and the other commences. On these occasions terror troops are sent to suppress the counter-revolution and after suppressed a number of the leaders are hanged, the town stripped of all cattle which are sent to Budapest, by which means the city is being nourished. In addition to this the town is assessed for sums from five to ten kronen, which is to be paid in blue money within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, in case of failure the lives of a number of citizens is forfeited. These cases are so numerous that it makes it unnecessary to mention the time and places. Eleven of the leaders of the last counter-revolution were sentenced to be shot, but so far this sentence has not been carried out.

The Red Army

In order to accomplish the desired end in the last offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, the soldiers were allowed to carry the tri-colour, and in this way the soldiers' national spirit was aroused, and they put up a good fight and succeeded. No sooner than the fight was over and the army had to withdraw by orders of the Entente, the tri-colour was replaced by the red flag. This caused much dissatisfaction among the troops, and one of their political leaders named Landler made repeated requests to Commander Boehm for the replacement of the red flag by the red, white, and green. This, however, was not done. The soldiers being disappointed, partly by this act, and partly by the fact that they received letters from their families, saying that they are hungry and suffering at home, and to a great extent to the influence of propaganda employed by the white guard. Many units returned from the front of their own free will. The government being afraid to have these troops armed, they placed machine-guns on either side of the railroad tracks in the vicinity of Budapest which were manned by the Bolshevik troops, and in this manner disarmed the returning troops. The discipline is declining from day to day, and the army is falling to pieces. According to some reports in order to keep the
Army intact a new offensive was planned for the 15th of June against the Roumanians, due to the fact that they did not evacuate the territory indicated by the Entente. It is also rumoured that there might be a similar attack against the Czecho-Slovaks on the pretext that the Entente did not live up to their promise in making the Roumanians evacuate the occupied territory.

The fighting troops are estimated at about fifty or sixty thousand: cannon about 350: small arms munitions about 40,000,000 rounds and well supplied with machine guns. A number of the army aviators crossed the border with their machines to the white guard in the vicinity of Szegedin and did not return, so that at present they do not allow officers to fly, but instead the communistic enlisted men are doing it.

Life in Budapest

Life in Budapest is very depressing the people being in a nervous state of mind, practically all stores are closed, commerce has ceased entirely, and shortage of food is marked. The workmen are getting about three ounces of meat daily, but the bourgeoisie has to subsist on vegetables and very little of that. Fat is absolutely unknown, and the government does not make any effort to remedy the condition of the bourgeoisie, all they want and care for is the proletariat, and of those the communists come first. The city is in a continuous state of alarm, the wildest rumours being circulated, so that practically every day the government has a number of red guard in readiness to suppress a possible counter-revolution. Many of the original labour battalions have been disarmed due to lack of confidence, and in their stead many young and old men, who are supposed to be communists, were armed, and in this way they tried to make up for the military losses. A Socialist leader has informed me that the number of true communists is very small, and that the only reason for being [able] to keep up the present system is due to the following reasons:-

1. True communists numbering about two or three thousand in Budapest.
2. Number of labourers who gained high positions through this system, who wish to stay in power.
3. Fact that many Socialists fear the return of the old system of government, consequently they remain passive or assist the present government.
4. Number of intelligent class who could not make a living under previous government and at present hold leading positions.

According to information received from a number of Socialists they desire military intervention from the Allies, at the same time making the following proclamation to the people:-

1. Allies intention not to remain in the country, but to occupy it in order to restore order.
2. Allies willing to support Social Democratic Government formed by Garami (Minister of Commerce in Karolyi Cabinet and well liked by all classes, and now in Switzerland).

3 “June” is underlined, and “July ?” is written on the margin by hand in the original.
4 The word “able” appears here in the version printed in FRUS, PPC, see note 2 above.
3. Immediate lifting of blockade with shipment of food supplies at the earliest possible moment so as to show the beneficial influence of changing governments.

4. Amnesty granted to all taking part in the present government and prevention of white guard terror.

If the above were done the general belief is that the Allied troops, preferably British and if possible some Americans, could march into Budapest without any fighting whatsoever.

It is reported that Michael Karolyi and family have left Hungary and are supposed to have gone to Italy.

According to reliable information the rifles of the unoccupied portion of Hungary at the end of March, 1919, amounted to 87,000. The factories are capable of turning out about 300 rifles a day which would make an additional 30,000 during this time. However, the red government was able to arm 200,000 men by the middle of June, showing that about 100,000 rifles have been imported into the country from somewhere. The same thing holds true with ammunition, for hardly any was at hand at that time, and even at the present time they have 40,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The army had about 40 to 50 guns at the end of March, while according to reliable information the number at the present time is about 350. They manufacture about four guns a week in their factory, which would show that about 250 have been imported.

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

Interesting, but contains little that is new.

W.L.O. Twiss  Lieut. Col.
26/7/19   G.S.
Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Extract. Received 16 July 1919)\textsuperscript{1}

No. 844 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15438]

Vienna, 15 July 1919

[...]

in a farewell speech\textsuperscript{2} to Army Headquarters Bohm said that if Red Army took offensive against Roumanians then National socialists who were with Julius [Julius] Karolyi I [?] would leave White side and join the Reds this seems to imply that offensive was still considered possible on that day if offensive does take place it will probably start about July twentieth Landler who succeeds Bohm is a Jew a lawyer and was considered a bad one signed Cuninghame.

Gregory

\textsuperscript{1} Forwards text received from Col. Sir T. Cuninghame.
\textsuperscript{2} V. Bohm was replaced in his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army by J. Landler on 14 July 1919.
Vienna, 15 July 1919

My dear Twiss,

I have been much exercised in my mind over the forthcoming offensive of the Hungarians against the Roumanians.

The latter of course are in a very awkward position. They are not strong along the Theiss anywhere. But their position posted on the river is much better than it would be if they gave up the river line and fell back to the Entente Frontier line. For in the latter case their right flank would be completely isolated in the air.

I therefore repeat what I have already said in a telegram that before the Roumanians can be asked to withdraw, the Hungarians ought to be compelled to disarm.

As for the offensive itself, the unknown factor is the temper of the men. Apparently both Böhm and Stromfeld warned Kun that he could not leave one front (under threat from the Entente) to concentrate on another, without stampeding the moral[e] of the Army. Kun insisted and both Böhm and Stromfeld have resigned in consequence. The expected stampede actually seems to have taken place. The Infantry of the 8th Division insisted on returning to Western Hungary and have declined to participate in any further adventures. The Workmens Battalions which include practically all the Infantry of the 4th Division walked back to Budapest, Stragglers Posts to disarm them had to be instituted in Hatvan, Waitsen¹ and Es[z]tergom, and these were formed from the improvised 9th Division, a group recruited from the iron workers of Budapest. The intention of Kun to turn against the Roumanians was in no degree weakened, and as my reports will have shown you the Military preparations for the necessary concentrations were continued. But whether this scheme will actually be put into execution is at present impossible to say.

However, I have kept the Czechs and the Roumanians fully informed step by step, and have urged them not to make the same fault of disunited action which nearly wrecked the whole show last time, and the Czechs now tell me that General Pellé is taking steps to avoid this by calling Roumanian Officers to his conferences. I have also sent Col. Watt down to see Admiral Troubridge in order to give him a full exposition of the situation in Western Hungary, and they have kept their own Military preparations up to date in case the mad dog should make a rush Westwards.

[...]

I have been much warned against “Agoston” the new Hungarian Minister. In Pest they call him a reactionary, in Vienna he is said to be “worse than Csobel [Czóbel]² and much more dangerous”. We shall see. It would also relieve the situation here if the Hungarian problem could be settled.

[...]

Yours sincerely,

T. Cuninghame

¹ The German name of the northern Hungarian town of Vác.
² Ernő Czóbel, Hungarian Minister in Vienna in July 1919.
Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

You should see this letter. I very much doubt if the Hungarians will venture upon an offensive against the Roumanians; their army does not seem strong enough to force a river like the Theiss in the face of well-armed & organised troops.

The situation in Austria has improved a great deal in the last month, thanks to the modifications made in the peace terms.

W.L.O. Twiss
Lieut. Col.
19/7/19
G.S.

No. 202

Letter from P. Kerr (Paris) to D. Lloyd George (Criccieth. Extract)

[LI. G. F/89/3/4]

Paris, 16 July 1919

Prime Minister.

I gave your message in regard to Hungary to Mr. Balfour.¹ He agrees with you in thinking it essential that the Roumanians should be made to comply with their undertakings.

Mr. Balfour, however, wants me to say that he thinks the situation is not at all easy. The Roumanians have not been guilty of any technical breach of the Armistice so far as Hungary is concerned, for the Armistice entitled the “armies of the Associated Powers to occupy such strategic points at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.”² The Roumanians advanced to the Theiss only in contravention to the Allied military line. They did so immediately after the Bolshevik outbreak in Budapest. This was a provocation to the Magyars, but not a breach of armistice. On the other hand, Bela Kun has not only broken the Armistice by enormously increasing his forces and proclaiming a general mobilisation, but he has broken it also by interrupting the navigation of the Danube and the East and West railway traffic through Budapest which is essential to the economic life of Central Europe. Further Mr. Balfour was considerably impressed by the statement made by M. Bratiano³ to the effect that the Magyar army after withdrawing from Czecho-Slovakia was concentrating against the Roumanians, and that the only defensible line which the Roumanians could hold was the line of the Theiss because the new frontier line simply ran across the middle of the Hungarian plain and presented no sort of strategic frontier

¹ See No. 196.
² This is a quotation from the Armistice of 3 November 1919. The Military Convention of 13 November 1919 is worded differently. For a comparison of the relevant points in the two Armistices see No. 73, note 2.
³ For A.J. Balfour's memorandum on his farewell interview with I. Brătianu at which the subject of the Romanian retirement from the line of the River Theiss was mentioned, see No. 181.
whatever, and that if the Roumanians, who were compelled to maintain troops also in Russia and Bulgaria, were to withdraw from the line of the Theiss, they would be in an impossible position unless the Hungarian army were first reduced to the limits proscribed [sic] by the Armistice. This opinion has been confirmed by the British Military section here.

Accordingly Mr. Balfour's view is that whatever else we may do we must concentrate on forcing Bela Kun to comply with the Armistice. At the same time he has informed the Roumanians that the decision that they too must retire, still holds, & he has obtained an assurance from them that they will withdraw behind their frontier directly the military situation permits it. At the present moment he is awaiting Foch's opinion on the military problem. He is very anxious for the C.I.G.S.' advice before taking any decision.4

Josh Wedgwood has just blown in from Budapest where he has been living in the Soviet House. He says that Budapest is entirely in the hands of the Jews, that Soviet rule is a hopeless failure, that the peasants are utterly against it, and that it stands entirely through the use of Terror troops, clad in black leather. He calls himself an anarchist!


No. 203

Telegram from Lord Acton (Berne) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 17 July 1919)

No. 226 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/15654]

Berne, 17 July 1919

Following sent to-day to F.O. No. 93.

I am informed by my usual informant on Hungarian affairs that Misael [Michael] Karolya [Károlyi] is at present at Milan where he is endeavouring to gain support of Italian Socialists for purpose of recovering power at Buda Pesth. Repeated to Rome.
[Germany will be weak for some time to come.]

Hence, our guarantee to France is not that is likely to call for any very great scale of military preparation for the present. If Germany is exhausted, this is even more true of Austria and Hungary¹ Bulgaria and Turkey. Hungary, under Bela Kun, continues to exhaust herself, and, when the present phase has passed, will be equally innocuous. No doubt there will be disturbances and alarms, and flickerings of flame in Central Europe for some time to come. But the material for another blaze is burnt out. These local disturbances will probably remain localised. No great British interest is involved, and our policy will presumably be confined to such diplomatic action as will be best designed to secure this object.

¹ Crossed out in the original.
No. 205

Notes by W. S. Churchill, A. Bonar Law, D. Lloyd George and General Sir H. Wilson

[Li. G. F/89/3/5]

cca. 18 July 1919

(Draft message from [J.T.] Davies to [P.] Kerr in Churchill's hand. n[o]. d[ate].)

Davies to Kerr

Prime Minister
to Mr. Balfour [?]

Tell Kerr

that we have

Having discussed this matter with Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr. Bonar Law

inclined to suggest an arrangement

& are agreed in suggesting action

H. Wilson & Churchill

we are inclined to suggest an arrangement on the following lines subject to your views. But promptitude is essential as otherwise the forces at our disposal may melt away.

1 These two sets of notes (in reverse order in the archives) were sent by P. Kerr to the Prime Minister on 18 July 1919, the day when the Supreme Council (in the absence of D. Lloyd George, President Wilson and V. Orlando) discussed at length the problems of Romanian withdrawal from Hungary and Hungarian disarmament (see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 14, minute 5; and No. 15, minute 5). For another discussion of this same subject see A.J. Balfour's telegram to the Prime Minister, dated 18 July 1919, in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 52.

The words are crossed out as in the original, and the preceding comments are quoted from the House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers Catalogue.

2 In the archives catalogue (see note 1), the remark: "Not indicated." is attached in a footnote here. However, the editor suggests that "following lines" refers to the second set of notes (see below).
a definite undertaking

The proposal is that an agreement should be obtained from the Roumanians that they to the Paris line will retire beyond the Theiss as soon as the Hungarians have disarmed in accordance with the following conditions

with the Armistice. We should then make the demand on Bela Kun to disarm & guarantee to him that in that case the Roumanians will retire.

3 These comments are quoted from the House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers Catalogue.
4 Footnote from the original archives catalogue: “Not indicated.”

No. 206

Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extract. Received 21 July 1919)¹

No. T.C. 692 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/15821]

Vienna, 18 July 1919

My dear Twiss,

Since I wrote last, the news of most importance is the nomination of Böhm ex Commander in chief of the Red Army to the Post of Minister of Hungary in Vienna.² I saw Bauer today about it and asked him if the appointment indicated that the preliminaries for conversations between him and Böhm relative to a change of Government in Budapest had failed, and he replied that on the contrary it indicates that Böhm had so far got his way that he had been placed in a Post which qualified him to undertake negotiations. Bauer continuing said that Böhm's position was now stronger than Kun's and that he had reason for the view that Kun would give way and consequently that Böhm would have against him only the Szamuely extremist group. He thought that Böhm was now quite secure from molestation by any political opponent and it only remained to see how far he was able to carry the Budapest Trades Unions with him. Bauer asked me particularly whether I would prefer to deal with Böhm direct, but I said I thought that it would be better for Bauer to sound him first and orient me in the particular difficulties to be encountered before any direct conversations took place. I pointed out to Bauer particularly how important it was for Austria that there should be no delay in settling the Hungarian question as it was essential that the coal and food difficulty should be got over before the Autumn, otherwise he would be faced here with the prospect of a disastrous winter. I advised him therefore to see to what extent the advice of the Vienna Arbeiter Rat would influence the Budapest Trades

¹ Printed in full in DBFP, 1/vol. VI, No. 51.
² V. Böhm was appointed to this post on 17 July 1919.
Unions. We agreed that it was essential that all Russian Orientation of Policy and Association should be ended forthwith, and all measures of terrorism instantly abandoned. Also that the Communists should be dismissed and the rights of property reasserted. Further than this we did not go. Bauer expects Böhm on Monday or Tuesday morning, and will take up the matter direct and inform me without delay. So far I have informed only the Americans of what is in the wind: i.e. both Gregory and Halstead, but if things go further we shall have to take in Borghese; as he has already several times tried the same lay without success, and may resent being left out in the cold. But Bauer pressed me not to approach anybody else prematurely as he said that Böhm had made a special point of dealing with me only.

Yours sincerely,
T. Cuninghame

3 21 July 1919.
4 For the story of further contacts between O. Bauer, Col. Sir T. Cuninghame and V. Böhm see Nos. 209, 210 and 211.

No. 207

Memorandum by D. Ábrahám and Count P. Teleki (Szeged) for the British Government (Extracts. Received in Paris 30 July 1919)

[PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16653]

Szeged, 18 July 1919

CHAIRMAN of the COUNCIL,
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

To:- The Supreme Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas and of the Indian Empire.

[...] Bolshevism in Hungary is a tissue of lies and has made use of Colonel Vix's note of 22nd March as a cloak to introduce terror into the country. Thanks to that lie, several hundred Bolsheviki, the majority of whom were not even of Hungarian nationality, organised a coup d'état at Budapest under the protection of ex-prisoners of war returned from Russia. They deceived the Socialists, who themselves do not form 5% of the population, and carried out their plot all the more easily as the Government of Count Mich[a]el Károlyi had purposely disorganised the army and disarmed the bourgeoisie

1 The rival government based in Szeged. For the origins of this government see No. 141.
and peasants. When our unhappy country came to its senses again and the deluded Socialists saw too late into what a trap they had fallen, a scant thousand of terrorists had gagged the nation.

[...]

We, a few unarmed men, began our arduous task some weeks ago. On our way, which is thick with obstacles, thousands of our fellow country-men have cast in their lot with us in the struggle against Bolshevist tyranny. Aviation officers took refuge at Szeged and one single aeroplane has enabled us to send news to our brethren in distress. They received it with the greatest enthusiasm, they await their liberation from us. On receipt of the first message taken by aeroplane, the Staff of the Red Armies between the Theiss and the Danube joined us, as well as the 26th Jäger Regiment with all its equipment, arms, machine-guns, train and baggage. Flying the national flag, the three monitors left to us out of the whole flotilla bombarded the Soviet building at Budapest, but before they could even put themselves at our disposal had to surrender to the British flotilla, moored at Baja.

[...] We do not ask the Allied Powers for help, only for permission to organise ourselves within territory to be delimited later on. We also ask for free communication, permission to transport war material, and that Red troops coming over to our ranks may not be disarmed.

We do not wish to dispute the right of the armies of occupation to disarm troops crossing the line of demarcation, but wish to draw the attention of the competent authorities to the fact that under those conditions and if the above requests are not granted, we shall never succeed in beginning military action against the Communists, we shall never be able to end this terrible reign of a terrorist minority, we shall not be able to restore freedom of opinion and the people will not recover their right of self-determination.

The disarming of troops who were forced into the ranks of the Red Army and who now come to join us is, by preventing all action against them, equivalent to a régime favouring the Bolsheviks. Such a procedure would not correspond to the spirit of neutrality. If soldiers forcibly incorporated in Red regiments support our cause and cross occupied territory to join us, that can only be considered the passage of volunteers through neutral territory, allowed by the law of nations and frequently occurring during the recent war.

Similarly, according to this principle the arms and equipment of soldiers are national property and arms destined to oppose the Bolsheviki are consequently entitled to transit via neutral territory.

This right was enforced by neutral States during the war, all Russian war material being brought from America; the Entente has, moreover, adopted the same point of view with regard to Kolchak.

As regards the case in point, this procedure would be in conformity with the principle of neutrality, and might even result in re-establishing the balance between our forces and those of the Bolsheviks. Further, it might restore the equilibrium disturbed by the treatment we have received from the Entente, which differs so widely from their attitude towards the Soviet Republic.

The Entente Powers have not hitherto recognised either the Hungarian Government or the Soviet Republic.

A few weeks ago, this movement was started by a few unarmed individuals; now, however, we are certain of being able successfully to oppose the Bolshevist armies with a force of over 100,000 men.

The Communist Government, on the other hand, has succeeded in getting the power into its hands by inciting the country to revolution; since when it has given itself up to rapine and murder. It has even had the impudence to attack the Czech army (although
BRITISH POLICY ON HUNGARY, 1918-1919

the latter had not taken the offensive), and has pushed it back a considerable distance, leaving everywhere seeds of Bolshevism in its wake. Not only are the munition factories in its hands, but it is able to obtain guns and other war material from abroad.

With the exception of the re-establishment of the line of demarcation, no coercive or retaliatory measures were taken by the Entente against these aggressions and abuses, notwithstanding the fact that by merely advancing the line of demarcation (a procedure already adopted on more than one occasion) the lives and property of numerous peaceful inhabitants might easily have been saved. If the territory in question had been occupied by French, English, American or Italian troops, its population would have been free to settle its own destiny.

Nevertheless, as we have already had the honour to state, we are not asking the Entente Powers to send us troops; we content ourselves by asking them merely to observe a benevolent neutrality, and to grant us [various facilities, including legal provisions and material (including military) supplies.]

The said 4 1/2 to 5 skeleton divisions would open an offensive against the Soviet Army at Budapest.

In the course of the advance, the ranks would be filled by the levée en masse of the population and by the Soviet soldiers who would desert to us. In this manner, the strength of the divisions would be brought up to war footing.

(Sd.) Desire d'ABRAHAM,
President of the Council.

(Sd.) Count Paul TELEKY [TELEKI],
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 Cf. No. 106.
3 Towards the end of July 1919 the British Peace Delegation in Paris received numerous reports regarding the Szeged Government. The following are a few examples: On 21 July Sir C. des Graz sent a telegram from Belgrade reporting the visit to Belgrade of Count P. Teleki (Foreign Minister) and A. Balla (Minister of the Interior) of the Szeged Government. The last sentence reads: "If their [the Szeged Government's] aid were accepted by the Allies the Szegedin Government could then count on the assistance of the Jugo-Slav Government in move against Bolsheviks." (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16213) On 22 July Lt.-Col. S.C. Peck, the Commander of the British Military Mission at Fiume, reported information he had obtained from E. Meugnier, son of the Spanish Consul in Fiume. Point 7 of the dispatch reads: "It is said that Lt. Col. HAUBRICH, Commanding the Bolchevic troops in BUDAPEST, is friendly to the Counter Revolutionaries and will join them as soon as a definitive move is made. [....]" Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss recorded the following note on this document on 1 August: "I doubt if this information is accurate or valuable." (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16454)
Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

This has lost much of its interest owing to the fall of the Bela Kun regime.

W.L.O. Twiss
Lieut. Col.
2/8/19
G.S.

H.G.N[colson].

No. 208

Telegram from F. Rattigan (Bucharest) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 25 July 1919)¹

No. 366 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16708]

Bucharest, 22 July 1919 ²

Very Urgent.

Bela Kun appears to have realised Allies have at length decided to deal with him and has evidently resolved to get in first blow. Consequently Hungarians attacked Roumanians yesterday on line (? Theiss) and have I understand already advanced (?some) 15 kilometres east of Szolnok.³

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¹ Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 56.
² The telegram was only dispatched on 23 July.
³ On 21 July 1919 Bela Kun sent a telegram to G. Clemenceau, announcing that the Hungarians had no other choice but to attack the Romanians (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 16, Appendix B). For the discussion in the Supreme Council of this telegram see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 16, minute 2.

On a dispatch, sent on 21 July and apparently not preserved in the original file, presumably warning of the impending Hungarian attack, Lt.-Col. W.L.O. Twiss minuted on 23 July: "I don't think an offensive against the Roumanians on a large scale is likely to take place, in view of the present morale of the Hungarian army. If it does, it should not meet with much success." (PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/15945)

On a memorandum, sent by V. Cerruti to T. Tittoni on 16 July 1919 about the political and military situation in Hungary, Lt.-Col. Twiss recorded on 24 July: "Now that the Hungarians have begun their offensive against the Rumanian forces on the Theiss, the time would seem ripe for the combined offensive against Bela Kun. But time presses, & we should move at once, and not wait until the Rumanians have been utterly defeated." (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/15973)

F. Rattigan in a telegram, dated 24 July, reported the following from Bucharest: "[...] I learn that Roumanian General Staff are confident that they can deal with Hungarian attacks. They state that it will take three days to re-establish the situation and after that Roumanian counter offensive may be launched. French authorities agree that Roumanian optimism is justified." (Printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 63.) On the original, Lt.-Col. Twiss recorded the following on 5 August 1919 (after the successful Romanian counter-offensive): "Yes, in attacking the Rumanians, the Red army was taking on a very different proposition than their offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, under Italian leadership. Once the Hungarians withdrew from the Czecho-Slovak front, they had little chance of success in offensive operations, for they were certain to lose much of their morale in such a retirement." (PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16924)
No. 209

Telegram from Captain T.T.C. Gregory (Vienna) to H.C. Hoover (Paris. Received 23 July 1919)

No. HAM 911 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16147]

Vienna, 22 July 1919

For Astoria Ham 911 repeat to Dirmilint London 663 X July 22 AAA I saw foreign secretary today he had seen Bohm who will see me this afternoon and state his case1 AAA Speaking generally it amounts to acceptance by Kun of necessity of disappearing if agreement between entente and socialists can be reached AAA Bohm confirmed news of attack and success of red army east of Szolnok AAA in matter of cession of three western counties of Hungary to Austria Bauer told Bohm Austria would hold a plebiscite and Bohm agreed that majority in favor of Austria would today be overwhelming AAA no danger of dispute between two countries as yet but if red get further successes and can detach themselves from Roumanians to concentrate in western Hungary such danger may arise later Cunningham [sic] end.

Gregory

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson).

The present time appears most favourable, both from a military & political point of view, to commence operations against Bela Kun with Franco-Serbian & Czecho-Slovak armies. We know that Bela Kun is building on the supposed fear of the Entente for any military intervention & this has led to his placing his army in a most unfavourable position — in full confidence of our doing nothing.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.
26/7/19 G.S.

1 See No. 210.

For the preliminary arrangements between Col. Sir T. Cuninghame and O. Bauer concerning the negotiations with V. Böhmb see No. 206.
I saw Bohm to-day.\(^2\) After much discussion and after mutual explanation as to entirely unofficial character of conversations I proposed that Bohm should overthrow Bela Kun Government and with Haubrick [Haubrich] and --Ostmatte [? Ágoston] create a military dictatorship in Buda-Pesth calling to assist a strong Entente Commission to adjust and control. Communism and Leninism to be repudiated and terrorism ended. Arbeiter Rat to be maintained partially and peasants and burghers council to be successively added to governing body by co-option. Finally a National Assembly to be called. Period of their development [sic] to be matter for discussion. Bohm thought scheme might succeed and provided Entente indicates interests in it, is prepared under certain guarantees to take steps.

On July 23rd Allied, American and Italian representatives will meet\(^3\) to discuss scheme, and will report to Paris.\(^4\)

Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Col. Twiss.

This is quite hopeful.

Harold Nicolson.
25/7/19

[To] Hon. H. Nicolson

Yes, unless Hungarians are able meanwhile to obtain important successes against Rumanians. Böhm's manoeuvres, even if sincere, must take some time, & meanwhile there is a serious danger of the Rumanians being crushed whilst the French, Serbians &

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1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 57.
2 This indicates that the telegram was probably drafted on 22 July (see No. 209).
3 See note 2 above.
4 See No. 211.

On 23 July Captain T.T.C. Gregory sent the following telegram from Vienna to H.C. Hoover: “For action. Ham 935 for Logan. Am sending important message which would like to know if acceptable at once as working basis for business about which we have been talking stop Head of affair would be General Boehm who accepts principle stated and believes can arrange business along these lines at once.” (PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16314)
Czecho-Slovaks look on. We are now allowing the Hungarians to attack our Allies in detail, though it would be easy to defeat them by concerted action.

W.L.O. Twiss  
Lieut. Col.  
26/7/19  
G.S.

No. 211

Telegram (in 2 parts) from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received (Part I) 25 July, (Part II) 28 July 1919)²

Vienna, 24 July 1919

Part One. Urgent

From Gregory to Hoover. The former Hungarian C.-in-C. William Boriom [Böhm], the most powerful factor in the old Hungarian army and himself a Socialist and present representative of Hungary in Vienna, having approached the British Military representative with a view to ascertaining upon what terms the Entente would be willing to come again into relations with the people of Hungary. A conference of the representatives of France, America, Italy and Great Britain took place in Vienna on July 23rd. As a result of which the following formula was submitted to him as a plan of action for the removal of the existing Communistic régime [sic] in Hungary and as a means whereby a transitory Government which the Entente would be willing to support might be instituted. 

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² This telegram (both parts) is also printed, in a slightly different version, as it was sent by Captain Gregory to H.C. Hoover, in DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 18, Appendix A.

After H.C. Hoover's presentation of V. Böhm's preliminary offers to the Peace Conference, but before the receipt of this telegram, there was a debate in the Supreme Council in the morning of 25 July as to what attitude the Allies should adopt with regard to these offers. During the debate A.J. Balfour pointed out that trusting the overthrow of Béla Kun to V. Böhm's scheme rather than proceeding with the military intervention had a great advantage: “In each of our countries there are sections of opinion which, without being actually Bolshevik, have none the less a certain sympathy for Bolshevik programmes. These portions of the public were most strongly opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks. All these disadvantages would be avoided by proceeding through General Boehm.” Towards the end of the debate Balfour observed that he “would like to know what was the decision from the point of view of international law in which Hungary now stood in regard to the armistice. She had accepted the Allies' conditions, and yet at the present moment was attacking one of the Allied Powers, and he felt that in acting thus she had re-opened hostilities against the Allies.” In the end the decision regarding the action to be taken by the Conference was postponed until next day in view of new information received from V. Böhm. (Presumably Part I of the present telegram.) (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 17, minute 1.) When the debate was continued on 26 July, they resolved that, in view of the situation resulting from Böhm's offers, as well as from the Hungarian attack on Romanian positions, A.J. Balfour and H.C. Hoover should confer in the preparation of a public statement to be sent to Hungary (see No. 214), which should be presented to the Council on the same day. (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 18, minute 3.)
Formula begins.

1. Bohm to assume a dictatorship in which complete powers of Government are vested. Names of associates to be discussed Haubrich Agoston Garamy [Garami] suggested.

2. Dismissal of Communist Kun Government, repudiation of Bolshevism and complete cessation of Bolshevist propaganda.

3. Dictatorship to bridge over period until formation of Government representative of all parties.

4. Immediate cessation of all Terroristic acts, confiscation and seizures.

5. Immediate calling of Entente Advisory Bodies.

6. Raising of Blockade and immediate steps to be taken by Entente to supply food coal minerals assistance in opening up the Danube.

7. No political prosecutions.

8. Ultimate determination respecting Socialization to be left to permanent Government.

Formula ends.
Repeated D.M.I.

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Part II.

Bohm having considered the formula has accepted it provisionally as a basis while reserving the final acceptance until after a consultation with his associates. Matters having proceeded so far it is essential that the Entente representatives should be informed whether the Entente is in general agreement with the principles of the formula so that matters in the event of final acceptance by the Hungarian representative may proceed further. It is understood that a Mission of four generals is about to be sent to Hungary to report upon possibility of finding a solution to the existing situation and it is therefore recommended if the Entente is prepared to authorize the prosecution of the plan herein elaborated that the departure of this Mission should be delayed until the final answer of Bohm is received, otherwise the position on [sic] the Kun régime would be once more strengthened by the impression that the Entente will eventually be willing to recognise them and the chance of success for Bohm would be seriously diminished.

Copy sent to War Office by bag.
Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

There are two points on which I lack information:

(a) Have any instructions been given to our representatives in Vienna re their dealings with Böhm, & in confirmation of the formula given in Cuninghame's No. 104 (Part I, 16255) of July 24th?

(b) What instructions, if any, have been given to the 4 Generals? Our General Gorton is now in Czecho-Slovakia, settling frontier questions etc. between the Czecho-Slovaks & Magyars.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.
1/8/19 G.S.

Kun has fallen — so that in any case these instructions are out of date.

H.G.N[icolson].
2/8/19

No. 212

Telephone Message from General E.L. Spears for the British Peace Delegation
(Extract)

[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16332]

Paris, 25 July 1919

(1) Report from General Franchet d'Esperey dated July 22nd.

Roumanian left and French right have lost touch. French are covering R. Maros between Szeged and Nagylak, but are not in any way assisting Roumanians.

Roumanian High Command have given no information whatever to the French re their intentions or the existing situation, which they have had to find out by means of their own liaison officers. A portion of the population in the Theiss neighbourhood have risen against the Roumanians owing to their exactions.

[....]
Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 26 July 1919)

Vienna, 25 July 1919

I spoke to Bohm again to-day. The Socialist Veldner [Weltner] the head of the Budapest Arbeiter Rat arrives in Vienna to-day. Bohm has also summoned Garami from Switzerland. Bela Kun made no objection to the coming of Veldner which indicates that he is not opposed to the idea of negotiations. Bohm thinks everything will depend on success of Roumanians. If they hold their own he thinks he can intervene successfully. If Roumanians are pressed back it will be more difficult.

Repeated D.M.I.

Minutes attached to the document:

I don't trust either Böhm or Bela Kun, who are probably working in harmony.

W.L.O. Twiss  
1/8/19  
Lieut. Col.

G.S.

1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 64.
The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian People, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a Government which represents the hungarian [sic] people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.

1 Also printed in DBFP, I/vol I, No. 19, minute 2.

The statement was released to the press late in the afternoon of 26 July, and wired to Hungary at the same time. It was published in the British press on 28 July. The text was drafted by A.J. Balfour in consultation with H.C. Hoover, and was accepted with slight alterations by the Supreme Council. For the debate in the Supreme Council relating to the statement see DBFP, I/vol I, No. 19, minute 2.

A. Halstead, U.S. Commissioner in Vienna, in a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, R. Lansing, dated 5 August 1919, wrote that this note played a fundamental role in bringing down Béla Kun's Government, adding, that informal negotiations with the internal opposition were equally important in this connection. In his view the Government would have fallen without the Romanian advance, which followed the failure of the Hungarian attack on Romanian positions on the Theiss. (See FRUS, PPC, vol. XII, pp. 627-628.)
ARMIES AND ECONOMICS BEING REFLECTIONS ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED SITUATION ON JULY 27th, 1919

It must be obvious to everyone who has followed contemporary developments that Allied diplomacy is being seriously embarrassed by Allied Military weakness. Ever since peace with Germany seemed in a fair way to be established, it has been a race between the Great Powers which should demobilise the fastest. Italy indeed, for reasons of her own, has lagged behind her Allies. But this makes little difference since, according to Signor Tittoni, her Government no longer dares to send troops beyond her own frontiers for fear of revolution!

I am not concerned here to justify this procedure. It has the best of all justification — it is inevitable. But I must say a word about its consequences, for these have to be faced.

We have at present two kinds of military obligation; the one imposed by Treaty, the other by policy. Neither of these should seem very formidable to the States which only a few months ago had, I suppose, some fifteen million men under arms. But so rapidly have our Armies melted away that both are burdensome, and both lead to unedifying recrimination in the Conference Room about the share which the different Allies are taking in the common burden. Upper Silesia, for example, has by Treaty to be occupied till a plebiscite is held. The soldiers say, or did say, that a division was required for the purpose. Where is it to come from, and how is it to be composed? It is to come, says the soldiers, from the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. It is to be composed, says M. Clemenceau, of Allied troops in equal proportion. The discussion is not yet concluded, but I conjecture that in the end this arrangement will prove inconvenient or impracticable; that if a division be really required, it will have in the main to be French, and that if so, M. Clemenceau will loudly complain of the hardship thus inflicted upon his country. This is precisely what he is doing with regard to the occupation of Bulgaria and the control of Hungary. “What is Bulgaria to me?” he exclaims. “Why should France keep troops to further the interests of Greece? Why should France, and, among the Great Powers, France alone, risk her divisions in compelling Hungary to obey the Armistice? This is equally the duty of Britain and America and Italy. But there are apparently no British or American troops to send; and though there are Italian troops. Italy dare not send them. What is he to say to the French ‘Chambre’? How is he to justify himself to the French People?” — and so on.

These little controversies are harmful, but doubtless they can be arranged. Indeed, if I could only find out exactly what are our Military commitments and our own military resources, I should not despair of coming to some clear understanding, at least between France and ourselves. But there is another aspect of the problem not so easily dealt
with, the aspect which relates to our small Allies and our small enemies. The former, one would suppose, would obey us through gratitude; the latter through fear. But the gratitude is being rapidly worn away by our persistent efforts to prevent the nations we have saved or created from cutting each other's throats and seizing each other's territory; while the fear cannot easily survive the continued spectacle of our obvious Military weakness. Greeks, Roumanians, Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, (I say nothing of the Italians), have all at different times disobeyed our explicit instructions. The Hungarians at the present moment are breaking the Armistice with impunity. The cases are many in which a Division or Brigade or even a Battalion would have made a situation easy which is now difficult, and have effectually smoothed the diplomatic path to Peace. But asking the War Department of a Great Power for soldiers is like asking a medicant for a thousand pounds, and you get much the same reply. The Conference is therefore compelled to talk when action is required. Even the threat of action is denied us; for so notorious is our impotence that we cannot afford the bluff.

I assume that this disease is incurable. In the absence of any full and authentic information on the Military situation I cannot do otherwise. But if we have no soldiers wherewith to help and shepherd our friends, or control, and perhaps coerce our foes, have we any substitute? I know of none but the economic weapon. But the economic weapon is unfortunately not very easy to use; and, except in the crude form of blockade, has not, so far as I know, been systematically employed on a large scale as an engine of diplomatic persuasion. I plead for a closer study of its capabilities.

I admit the difficulties in the way of its employment are manifold. In the first place, it necessarily consists in withholding, or threatening to withhold, something which would otherwise be given — and the Allies, except America, are so impoverished that they have very little to give; while America, even if a willing helper, is hampered at every turn by her Constitution. Still, it is clear that in the economic reconstruction of Europe, Britain, poor though she may be, is going to play a leading part; and President Wilson, though he cannot give money, can apparently give food. But there comes in the second difficulty, which is apt to impede the use of the economic weapon. It often inflicts direct and obvious injury on women and children; and it often produces some injurious economic reaction on the Powers that use it. Philanthropy boggles at the first consequence; self-interest at the second. But I do not think these objections are necessarily fatal. Of course no universal principles can be laid down. Each case must be considered on its merits; and with regard to every country where we are likely to have trouble, we ought to examine how, by exciting economic hopes or fears, we can successfully act upon its rulers. Where the results of such an examination are satisfactory we may be well content to lack Military force; though even at the best we cannot hope that the remote threats of economic ills will always give pause to greedy Governments or peoples intoxicated with a perverted patriotism. There are many nations at this moment who understand no argument but force; and on them the sight of a British Battalion would have a more immediate effect than the remoter prospects of poverty and want. I greatly fear that the inevitable tragedies of the coming winter may change the current of their thoughts. In what direction I cannot tell. But surely they will think less of War.

(Sd.) A.J.B[alfour].
No. 216

Telegram from H. Allizé (Vienna) to S. Pichon (Paris. Received 30 July 1919)

No. not known. [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16654]

Vienna, 28 July 1919

Je réponds à votre télégramme du 26 juillet.¹
Les Chefs des Missions anglaise et italienne ont confiance en M. Boehm et estiment qu'il est en mesure de renverser le Gouvernement de Bela Kun.
En ce qui me concerne je n'ai aucune confiance dans M. Boehm ni dans les autres personnalités hongroises qui seraient disposées à lui prêter leur concours. Chaque fois que le Gouvernement des Soviets s'est trouvé en difficultés il a essayé de négocier avec l'Entente.
Toutefois, nous ne risquons rien à prendre vis-à-vis de Boehm les engagements demandés pour le cas où il serait de bonne foi et où il réussirait.
Je crois que nous devons perdre aucune occasion d'essayer de résoudre pacifiquement le crise hongroise. D'autre part un Gouvernement présidé par Boehm opposerait sans doute moins de résistance à nos conditions de paix qu'un Gouvernement contre-révolutionnaire et nationaliste comme celui de Szeged.

signé: ALLIZE.

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To] M[ilitary]. R[epresentative].

You should see M. Allizé's opinion of Boehm.
Though we may make use of him, I think we ought not to trust him too much, or expect great things from him. Cuninghame thinks he is acting in good faith, but there is always the chance that he is still in collusion with Bela Kun.

W.L.O. Twiss  Lieut. Col.
1/8/19  G.S.

[....] I agree with A about B.

C. Sackville-West  M.R.

¹ The editor has not been able to trace this telegram.
Au cours de la réunion des Chefs des Délégations des Cinq Grandes Puissances, tenue le 26 juillet, il a été décidé que je continuerais les pourparlers avec les Délégations “serbe-croate-slovène, roumaine et tchéco-slovaque, pour faire préciser leur point de “vue quant aux garanties demandées par elles pour l’intervention militaire en “Hongrie.”1

J’ai l’honneur de vous faire connaître que je dispose dès à présent, au sujet de cette question, des renseignements suivants:

Tchéco-Slovaquie.

Le Gouvernement de la République Tchéco-Slovaque a mis à la disposition de l’Entente, pour l’action éventuelle contre la Hongrie, la totalité des forces dont il dispose. Il n’a demandé en échange aucune garantie spéciale.\(1\) [in the original]

Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Serbe a posé comme condition de sa coopération l’appui bienveillant de l’Entente, en vue d’obtenir:

- d’une part la cessation de toute cause de friction avec l’Italie;
- d’autre part, la protection des territoires serbes contre les troupes et Comitadjis bulgares.\(2\) [in the original]

Il est à remarquer que la première garantie implique une démarche des Gouvernements Alliés auprès de l’Italie; quant à la deuxième, elle est déjà donnée au Gouvernement Serbe dans toute la mesure du possible, par suite de la présence en Bulgarie des 30\textsuperscript{e} et 156\textsuperscript{e} Divisions françaises.

Roumanie.

Le Roi de Roumanie a autorisé l’armée roumaine à donner aux Alliés le concours le plus complet pour rétablir l’ordre dans l’Europe Centrale.

Indépendamment des desiderata d’ordre militaire relatifs aux conditions dans lesquelles le Haut Commandement Roumain désirait voir régler la participation de ses

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\(1\) See DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 19, minute 2.
\(1\) [in the original] - Tél. du Général Pellé du 15 juillet.
\(2\) [in the original] - Voir lettres des 15 et 22/7 du Général Pechitch (P.N° 2). [Not enclosed in the original.]
troupes aux opérations projetées, (3) [in the original] la Roumanie a demandé seulement comme garantie de sécurité:

- d'une part, l'envoi urgent des munitions et du matériel commandés en France et en Angleterre, en vue de recompléter ces stocks;

- d'autre part, l'expédition en Roumanie de locomotives permettant d'intensifier les transports et d'effectuer, en cas de besoin, les déplacements de réserves du front du Dniester vers le front de la Theiss. (4) [in the original]

Ces deux questions ont été mises à l'étude par les services intéressés.

(Signé) FOCH.

(3) [in the original] - Voir lettre du 23 juillet. (Pièce N° 3). [Not enclosed in the original.]

Ces desiderata qui paraissent acceptables, visent l'organisation du Commandement, la participation des forces roumaines à l'occupation éventuelle du pays, le droit de réquisition, etc...

(4) [in the original] - Tél. du Général Graziani du 18 juillet (Pièce N° 4). [Not enclosed in the original.]

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**No. 218**

*Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Extracts. Received 1 August 1919)*

*No. T.C. 704 [PRO FO 608/10 No. 41/1/10/16382]*

Vienna, 29 July 1919

My dear Twiss,

[...]

As far as Austria is concerned, much the most important event is the retirement of Dr. Bauer. His pro-Italian pro-German policy broke down under French resentment. [...] I think what we have now to anticipate is a “German policy directed towards the reformation of a Danubian Confederacy beginning with Austria-Hungary and Croatia made in accord (more or less) with Italy, on the assumption that fusion with Austria, and the wrecking of the Czecho-Slovak state can be carried out at any time convenient to Germany, and that mere fusion with Austria alone is not worth the trouble, at any rate at this confused moment. I think myself that we should be more secure if we brought about the “fusion” and made a clear cut national line, by so doing excluding the countries of East Central Europe.

[...]

The next most important thing is the provision of food and coal for Austria for the forthcoming winter. [...] My own attitude towards the Budapest question is largely conditioned by the fear of coming trouble in Vienna in winter. If it was really necessary to let Budapest “flop”, with Bolshevism as an awful example, there are at least arguments for allowing it to proceed to the other extreme, which from what I can judge

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1 Printed in full in *DBFP*, I/vol. VI, No. 70.
is hardly yet, but on the other hand if its continuation involves the constant fear of further extensions it is in the world’s interest desirable to end it at once. [...]

Coming now directly to the question of Hungary, as you are now aware, the ex-Commander in chief William Böhm came to see me, to put out feelers for the purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the Entente Governments towards the existing régime in Pest and towards any succeeding Governments. My telegrams will have informed you of the process of events. On the 23rd July he [we] had a conference of Entente representatives and defined our attitude, and asked the Entente for an opinion. Personally I have heard from Paris nothing on the subject. But my colleagues have kept me informed of the replies which they have received. From them I gather that M. Allize made some comments in the telegram which he sent to his Government concerning the capacity of Böhm to carry out the task which he himself suggested, doubting in fact if he was the man, and accusing him of “playing for time”. I certainly don’t think that the letter [sic] accusation is well founded as no one knows better than Böhm that the situation in Pest grows worse every day. But there is this to be said: Böhm is very tired physically (but not insane or more so than others in Hungary) also the terror in Budapest is now so acute that everybody’s nerves are affected, and fears for his head if his coup fails. But if he can get round him a few good men, and if in particular the majority of the Pest Trades Unions support him, then he will recover his old force and energy.

M. Allizé apparently preferred “Garami” who is more of a Socialist and less of a Spartacist than Böhm, and certainly the choice of Garami would evoke less opposition. But he is a rich man, without any great fund of energy and has no standing with the army. Still we are trying to get him to Vienna so that the Bethlem [Bethlen] counter-revolutionary groups can if they please get into touch with him, as at present the Böhm group refuse to have anything to do with the Szeged people and vice-versa. Various other representatives of the Pest workmen came to see me including Veldner [Weltner], the head of the Arbeiter Rat and one was conscious of the same thing throughout, namely the impression of the terror inspired by the extremist groups of Szamuely, and the impression caused by a series of unsuccessful attempts to throw off the communist yoke. They wished to ask from us many guarantees relating to the provision of food, coal and clothing but I declined to enter into any such matters pending a more definite proposal for action from them. As matters stand Agoston goes back to Pest today to report to Kun. Böhm follows on Friday (unless Agoston warns him that it is too unsafe) and the others return tomorrow. We shall see what will happen.

Meanwhile there are two important developments to which I wish to draw your attention. Firstly the progress of the Peasants Organisation in Hungary, and secondly the advance of the Rumanian Army. The first is taking place obviously under extreme difficulties, but is making progress. I placed the organisers in close touch with the organisers of the Peasants League in Austria, from whose experiences I judged that they could derive benefit, and told them what is essential is that they should be ready and prepared to take full advantage of the first opportunity to enter Pest, and to join their county and commune organisations with the minimum of delay. They will be dealing with a situation in which general disarmament will be an outstanding feature and so they will labour under difficulties greater than those with which the Austrians had to contend, for the only real means of recovering the moral confidence of the peasants will be in arming them, but this will be clearly impossible. But a great deal can be done in the way of political suasion by effective organisations and if it is done really

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2 See Nos. 206, 209, 210, 211 and 213.
3 See No. 211.
4 See No. 216.
5 1 August 1919.
efficiently it will not matter what intervening group holds the Government after Kun, as finally the peasants will elect their own representatives. In western Hungary the process is already well on the way to realisation, and everywhere some progress is reported.

As for the Rumanian operations, my telegrams give you the gist.\(^6\) Was able to send a Press Representative to Bucharest in time to warn the army of what was coming with the plan of enemy concentration and the Rumanian Representative here has expressed his gratitude to me for my assistance which he states was of value. The question is now whether the Rumanians can cross the Theiss and I am hourly expecting information on this point. All I know at present is that the bridge head east of Szolnok was stormed by the Rumanians yesterday and that the Red International Regts. at Tisza Fured were annihilated. I am told that the Theiss is exceptionally low and I don't see why the Rumanians should not be able to get over. If so they may settle the question of Budapest quickly, but I fear that the advance upon Budapest involves the danger of massacres for the Pest Bourgeoisie. I have sent you the latest distribution list of the Hungarian army, also the situation in western Hungary. These have been given to all Entente representatives here.

There is much more to say which I will prepare for next mail, including the situation in Slovakia which is of particular interest, but as the bag is now closing I must stop.

It is very satisfactory that we have now a clearcut repudiation of Kun,\(^7\) which ought to assist the opponents very materially.

Yours sincerely,
Tom Cuninghame.

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To M[ilitary]. R[epresentative].\(^8\)]

You will, I think, like to see this letter from Cuninghame, which is interesting & important; Sir Eyre Crowe should also see.

I hope we shall treat the Austrian counter-proposals kindly, when they come; otherwise Austria will be forced to join Germany or to go bankrupt.

Re the “Anschluss” question, I can’t see Cuninghame’s argument: surely it would be better for us to keep Austria from Germany, & to get her join a Danubian Confederation.

Cuninghame emphasises the necessity, from the economic point of view, of settling the Hungarian question without delay. I rather doubt if much reliance can be placed in Böhm’s promises or suggestions; he is, after all, merely Bela Kun’s envoy to Vienna, & is possibly, even probably, working in direct collusion with him. The defeat by the Rumanians of the Red Hungarian army offers the best chance of the overthrow of Bela Kun, though the counter-revolutionaries are terrorised by Szamuely & his agents.

W.L.O. Twiss
Lieut. Col.
1/8/19

G.S.

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\(^6\) These military dispatches are not printed, for later ones of a similar nature see Nos. 221, 222, 228 and 230.

\(^7\) See No. 214.

\(^8\) Gen. C. Sackville-West.
No. 219

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A. J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 August 1919)\textsuperscript{1}

No. 106 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16886]

Vienna, 31 July 1919

I saw Bohm to-day who had spoken to Bela Kun yesterday. He gathered the impression that the pressure upon Bela Kun was not yet sufficient to induce him to yield. The socialists who were with Bohm have proceeded to Budapest to ascertain the actual situation in more detail and will report. Bohm is fairly confident of eventual success. He said that Red Army is not much disorganised by retreat though some changes in disposition of troops have been necessary. Roumanians have made no serious effort to cross the Theiss. Small groups crossed near Tokay [Tokaj]. The 80th brigade was practically annihilated and remnants are collected at Poroszlo. The river is low.

Addressed D.M.I. London.

\textsuperscript{1} Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 73.

No. 220

Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna)\textsuperscript{1} to A. J. Balfour (Paris. Received 1 August 1919)

No. 107 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16912]

Vienna, 1 August 1919

Chief of Budapest Workmen’s Council\textsuperscript{2} came to see me in company with Bohm. He seemed to think Bela Kun could be forced out if right movements were chosen, states he would not attempt anything in the nature of a coalition government. But I hear privately that he is in touch with the Szeged Government secretly. He asked for (special) financial and economic promises from Entente. I said that I would represent his view to Paris.

Repeated D.M.I.

\textsuperscript{1} Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 74.
\textsuperscript{2} J. Weltner.
No. 221

En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 August 1919)

No. 686 x [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/16995]

Vienna, 1 August 1919

Following identifications of Red Army. 23rd Regiment dissolved.
Majority of cavalry including elements of 1st, 7th & 9th Hussars surrendered to Roumanians. Bridge-head division Budapest Corps dissolved anti-aircraft guns sent forward to Theiss. From 4th Division 7th or 9th regiment transferred to Western Hungary for mutiny. End.
Also addressed to Dirmilint.

No. 222

En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 August 1919)

No. 687x [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/16994]

Vienna, 1 August 1919

Austrian Foreign Office report Kun Government fell to-day and replaced by wholly socialist Government under Peidl including Garamy [Garami] Haubrich and Agoston. Report is also current that Roumanians have crossed Theiss and are advancing on Ujrzasz [Újszasz]. Red Army in rout.
Addressed Dirmilint.¹

¹ Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 75.
² The Supreme Council was first informed about the fall of Béla Kun’s Government on 2 August 1919 from Lt.-Col. Romanelli’s telegram, dated 1 August (see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, Appendix A). In the telegram Lt.-Col. Romanelli reported: “Le Gouvernement Hongrois de la République des Conseils a donné aujourd’hui ses démissions et a été remplacé par un Gouvernement qui a déclaré d’accepter les propositions des Puissances Alliées, telles qu’elles ont été arrêtées à Vienne le 25 juillet par M. le Prince Borghese, Ministre Plénipotentiaire de l’Italie, et Monsieur le Colonel Cunninghame [sic], Chef de la Mission Militaire Britannique à Vienne. [...]” The “propositions” referred to are contained in No. 211. In return for the acceptance of the propositions by the Hungarian Socialist Delegates, Prince Borghese and Col. Cuninghame appear to have made an undertaking that in the event of the envisaged change of government in Hungary, the Allies would require the Romanian Army to stay on the line of the River Tisza, which would be the demarcation line of a new provisional armistice till the Peace Conference procured a final settlement. In the debate which followed the receipt of Lt.-Col. Romanelli’s telegram in the Supreme Council (see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 26, minute 1) A.J. Balfour said “the Council about the 13th of June, had ordered the Roumanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own frontiers. [See FRUS, PPC, vol. VI, pp. 411-412, 413 and 416.] They had not done so. Their excuse had been that as the Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the armistice, it was impossible for them to risk giving up a defendable line for one which was strategically far worse. Under the present circumstances, he thought that the Roumanians should be ordered to withdraw to the line originally laid down for them.” To this T. Tittoni answered that he thought that “for the time being [...] the Roumanians should be ordered to stop on the positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave
J’ai l’honneur de vous accuser réception de votre radio du 1er août annonçant la démission du Gouvernement de la République des Conseils, la formation d’un nouveau Gouvernement hongrois et les déclarations faites par ce dernier qui ont été portées à la connaissance du Conseil Suprême.

Le Conseil des Alliés estime qu’il n’a pas à intervenir dans la politique intérieure de la République hongroise et à ce titre n’a pas à faire état des propositions suggérées par deux membres des Missions Alliées à Vienne.1

Les seules bases reconnues des relations des Puissances Alliées et Associées et de la

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1 For the origins of this dispatch see No. 222, note 2. The English translation is printed in FRUS, PPC, vol. VII, pp. 490-491.
2 Reference to Prince L. Borghese and Col. Sir T. Cuninghame.
Hongrie sont: 1° — l’armistice du 13 novembre 1918, dont les conditions doivent être respectées par le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois, tout particulièrement en ce qui concerne la démobilisation de l’armée; 2° — la notification de la Conférence de la Paix en date du 13 juin pour la fixation de la ligne sur laquelle doivent être maintenues les troupes hongroises du côté des frontières tchéco-slovaques et roumaines.

Le Conseil des Alliés demandera seulement au Gouvernement roumain d’arrêter ses troupes sur les positions qu’elles occupent actuellement à la suite de l’agression dont elles viennent d’être l’objet du fait de l’armée hongroise et ne le priera pas de les retirer jusqu’à la ligne fixée le 1er juin avant que le nouveau Gouvernement de Budapest ne se soit strictement soumis aux clauses de l’armistice.

Les Puissances Alliées et Associées attendent le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois à ses actes, elles espèrent que l’avènement d’un Gouvernement qui exécutera ses engagements et représentera le peuple hongrois hâtera le moment du rétablissement de la paix et de la reprise des relations économiques régulières.

CLEMENCEAUE

3 For the text of the (Belgrade) Armistice of 13 November 1918 see *FRUS, PPC*, vol. II, p. 183.

Note 13 to *DBFP*, I/vol.I, No. 26 suggests F. Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, New York, 1942, p. 478 for the English translation of this present dispatch. At this point the text there reads: “... (1) the armistice of November 3, 1918...”. The editor has not been able to account for this difference beyond doubt, but it seems likely, as *FRUS, PPC* also cites “November 13”, that Clemenceau referred to the Belgrade Convention of 13 November 1918, and not the Armistice of Villa Giusti of 3 November 1918, and that the mistake, therefore, is in Deák, *op. cit.* For the significance of the difference between the texts of the two armistices see No. 73, note 2.

4 See *FRUS, PPC*, vol. VI, pp. 411-416; partially printed in No. 149.

5 See *FRUS, PPC*, vol. IV, pp. 814-815 (minutes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 11 June 1919), or *FRUS, PPC*, vol. VI, p. 416 (part of the Allied note sent to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania on 13 June 1919).

No. 224

*telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuningham (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 2 August 1919)*

No. 688 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17034]

Vienna, 2 August 1919

Kun Bela arrived in Vienna and is interned by Police. Report is current that Samuely [Szamuely] was stopped by Austrian frontier authorities when trying to cross into Austria with quarter million crowns and committed suicide.

Addressed Astoria and Dirmilint.

1 Also printed in *DBFP, I/vol. VI*, No. 80.
Vienna, 2 August 1919

[...] I propose to start immediate shipments from Banat to Vienna on Danube and want to try some Hungarian cars to divide with Austria on coal shipments. Have also taken steps to get special wire to Budapest and immediate connection with Belgrade. [...] Two train-loads of fugitives from Pest is en route to Austria. First carrying women and children, members of families former Bolshevist leaders. Question now is what to do with them here. Agreed to have them put in decent cold storage at border and await determination of final disposition. Will send you some independent stuff as to details of meeting which B.K. out [? resulted in the ousting of Béla Kun?]. Understand reason for this stop. Most important thing to do now is to stop Roumanian advance. Borghesi [Borghese], Austrian Govt., Cunningham [sic] and I all agree that this Govt. should be left alone to work things out. Roumanian further advance or occupation of Pest will surely cause lots unnecessary trouble and stir up nationalist feeling which is so strong and which would unite all parties against them. You must do something on this at once. They may not have sense enough themselves. Have just received visit from Hungarian minister who asks about food blockade and child feeding. I believe blockade should be suspended not withdrawn pending developments. [...] What will Chief do about child feeding Budapest? Not necessary in country but would justify some expenditure and should react favourably on rest of Bolshevist places which are eagerly watching this situation. We have personnel enough within reach to handle this. Torrey could take charge.

Will probably have some trouble about gold but will go after it. Borghesi [Borghese] is working OK and Cuningham also, so that we will get this gold working. Ippen, [Austrian] Foreign Minister, who succeeded Bauer, has called just this moment and tells me that Kuhn [Kun], Landler and Por are here in Vienna and have just been interned, as will about ten others, who are on the way. Present Government Pest

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1 Neither the sender's name, nor the exact addressee of this telegram is indicated on the original file. The date of dispatch can only be deduced from the content, as it cannot be inferred unambiguously from the title. The copy was received by the British Peace Delegation on 4 August 1919 with the title: "COPY OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION, AUGUST 2nd, 1919." Therefore it is possible that the American R.A. received the telegram on 2 August. From the text it is very likely that the writer is Captain T.T.C. Gregory.

2 V. Böhm.

3 This is probably a reference to H.C. Hoover, Director General of the American Relief Administration.

4 The editor has not been able to establish further details about the identity of this person, who was probably a member of the American Relief Administration.

5 Ernő Pór, Head of the International Propaganda Bureau of the Hungarian Bolshevik Government with the rank of Deputy People's Commissar, where he was later replaced by G. Alpári. Helped in the establishment of the short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic.

6 As a result of an agreement signed by V. Böhm and T. Ippen on 2 August, the Austrian Government initially allowed the entry into Austria of B. Kun, J. Landler, E. Pór, B. Vágó, J. Pogány, M. Rákosi, E. Madarász, J. Hirossik, J. Varga, and G. Lengyel, all functionaries of the fallen Government.
wanted to get them out of the country. They will be in custody of police and not permitted to talk people. Austrian Govt. will turn them over at entente request or later send them back to Hungary. Should make soap out of him but that's later story. Sameuli [Szamuely] killed himself at noon to-day at Weiner Neustadt [Wiener Neustadt]. There is important question whether present socialist government should be recognised or whether other elements should be brought in. Paris should proceed with present government, giving them chance to turn round, but with understanding that agricultural and other elements should be brought in, as soon as possible. Received telegram few minutes ago from man I sent Pest last night that Roumanians still advancing and great source of danger and trouble if they enter Budapest, which is now in excellent order and under strong control. Will try get by phone from Pest exact location, if known, of Roumanians but the principle applies just the same. Causey is itching to get into Pest and grab hold of railroad situation which is so important in coal and Banat movements just now. Prince Borghesi [Borghese] is Italian Ambassador who has been in Hungary and has good head. Kuhn and his associates will be interned somewhere in country not in Vienna.\(^7\) Just received report from my man in Pest that best information is Roumanians forty or fifty kilometres from Pest. Quick action is necessary. Hutchinson\(^8\) just advises Czechs have to-day signed coal contract with Austria, copies being forwarded here to-day.

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Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

I doubt the genuine character of the new government. I don't trust a single Bolshevik, especially if he's a Jew, and the new Cabinet contains several of these. The sooner we disarm the Red army, the better. The next thing should be elections, & appoint a real Hungarian Government, representative of the nation, & to eliminate all Jews. I can't believe that the Magyar people wants to be ruled by Böhm, Peidl, Garami etc.

W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.
4/8/19 G.S.

I agree.

Harold Nicolson.
4/8/19

The Council of Five have dealt with this.

E. Crowe
5/8/19

\[\text{-----------------------------}\]

\(^7\) Béla Kun was interned in Karlstein and in Stockerau.

\(^8\) Member of the American Relief Administration.
No. 226

En Claire Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 3 August 1919)

No. 698 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17127]

Vienna, 3 August 1919

Have just seen Reuter’s correspondent who left Budapest 8 p.m. last night. He reports that all was quiet. He states, however, that there would undoubtedly have been excess on the part of the extreme element had it not been that the declaration of the Entente published on July 27th\(^1\) enables the trade unions to control the situation.

Repeated Dirmilint.

\(^1\) See No. 214.

No. 227

En Clair Telegram fro Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 4 August 1919)\(^1\)

No. 690 [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17146]

Vienna, 3 July 1919

Bohm and Veltner [Weltner] informed me to-day they had received instructions from Budapest Government to lay before representatives of the Entente programme of new Hungarian Government.

I first made it clear that the suggestion which formed basis of conversation between the Allied representatives and Bohm (referred to in Romanelli’s telegram to Clemenceau)\(^2\) have been superseded by wireless from Allied Government[s] of July 27th.\(^3\) They said they fully understood this. The chief points of programme are as follows, begins.

1. General election for constituent national assembly will be held at the earliest possible moment. For technical reasons preparations will probably take eight to ten weeks.

2. Orientation to Russia abandoned and relations with Communist Russia broken off. Orientation to Entente instead.

\(^1\) Also printed in DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 81.

\(^2\) See No. 222, note 2.

\(^3\) See No. 214.

5. [sic] All political prisoners have already been released.

6. General political amnesty.

7. Re-establishment of democratic liberties including press speech and meetings.

8. Question of extent of socialization will be decided by National Assembly.

9. Foreign Property respected. Hungarian and Austrian experts will meet to discuss matters immediately. Ends.

Bohm and Veltner [Weltner] asked that Roumanian advance should be stopped and Theiss made demarcation line and blockade be raised immediately. They urged in particular that thirty-six waggons of paper in Vienna might be allowed to go to Budapest in order that Newspapers may continue to appear and enable the Government to explain new position to the people. British delegate of I.A.T.C. informs me export of ten car loads of rotation paper has been authorized by that commission without instructions from Paris. At my request Bohm promised to induce his government to raise immediately mines laid in the Danube. I raised the question of taking representatives of bourgeois and peasants class into the government. Bohm considered this would be dangerous at present but could be reconsidered in eight to ten days. Telegram ends.

Repeated Dirmilint.

No. 228

*En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 4 August 1919)*

*No. 691 [PRO FO 608/14 No.46/1/12/17140]*

Vienna, 3 August 1919

(8 p.m.)

Italian Mission here heard by telephone at 17.30 August third that one Roumanian cavalry Brigade with artillery was on eastern outskirts of Budapest. Colonel Romanelli had given commander copy of M. Clemenceau's wireless telegram stating that the advance of the Roumanians would be stopped.\(^1\) Brigade commander had replied that he was unable without direct orders from his divisional general. Romanelli asked that troops should not actually enter the town pending reference to higher authority and will telephone when he has an answer. If Roumanians do enter, mayor will hand over functions to Romanelli. All quiet so far in Budapest. Ends.

Repeated to Dirmilint.

\(^1\) See No. 223.
No. 229

Copy of Two Telegrams Sent by J. Gorvin to Sir W. Goode with Commentary

[PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/17199]

Supreme Economic Council,
Food Section,
Paris, 3 August 1919

[Cop[y for] Col. Twiss.

The following telegrams were received by the American Relief Administration at 11.
am. this morning regarding the Hungarian position:

“To Hoover from Gregory. Roumanian advance guard 18 or 20 km. from Budapest
main body about forty. Minister of War Haubricht [Haubrich] requests me transmit
message asking advance be stopped on fear of trouble in occupation by Roumanian
troops”.

“To Hoover from Gregory. Exceedingly anxious and request small detachments of
Entente soldiers of different kind not more than a regiment in all which would greatly
stabilise local forces. This I would suggest could be done by having Troubridge come
with monitors also some French and Italian detachments who are close by.1 One of Old
Red Guards shot one of Roumanian advance party and there is apt to be further unrest
and trouble of same sort. Haubricht [Haubrich] has already started to comply with
Clemenceau’s telegram on conditions of armistice”.2

Col. Logan, who handed me the telegrams, informs me that Mr. Hoover will take up
the question of childrens’ [sic] feeding in Hungary, referred to in yesterday’s
telegrams,3 on his return this evening.

I understand that Mr. Balfour agrees that the Roumanian advance be stopped.

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1 In this connection also see Lt.-Col. Romanelli’s telegram to G. Clemenceau, dated 3 August 1919,
printed in DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 27, A.
2 See No. 223.
3 See No. 225.
You will note that it is suggested that Admiral Troubridge should be sent up the Danube with monitors.\(^4\)

(Sd.) J. Gorvin,  
for Sir William Goode.

\(^4\) Shortly after the dispatch of these telegrams Admiral E.C.T. Troubridge was posted to Budapest for a period as one of the organisers of the Allied relief programme and the effort to re-establish trade among the Danubian countries. His critical attitude to the Romanian occupation of the city at the time occasioned protests from I.C. Brătianu on 19 and 30 August 1919 (see DBFP, \(I\) vol. VI, Nos. 124 and 148). Later, at a meeting of the Supreme Council on 15 November 1919, G. Clemenceau, while acknowledging the value of Admiral Troubridge's services in Budapest, called attention to allegations about the Admiral's Habsburg sympathies, especially his alleged friendship with the Archduke Joseph, who played a prominent role in the intensive power struggle that followed the fall of Béla Kun's régime. (See No. 232, note 4.) Clemenceau added that "he wondered if it were not advisable for the British Government to take this situation into account all the more so because the Admiral's influence throughout Hungary was considerable." (See DBFP, \(I\) vol. II No. 23, minute 6.) On 15 November Sir E. Crowe sent a telegram to the Foreign Office in London, informing Earl Curzon of these allegations. In a letter, sent on 19 November 1919 to Walter Long, First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Curzon transmitted Sir E. Crowe's telegram and added: "I should be the first to express appreciation of the services which are being rendered by Admiral Troubridge and the effect of the presence of the monitors under his command on the situation in Hungary. But I feel that the delicacy of the present situation in that country cannot be too strongly impressed on the Admiral, as also the importance of not acting in any way which might give the outward appearance of favouring any of the political parties in Hungary." (\(PRO\) FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/20516.)
Reports from Budapest indicate that Roumanian troops are still coming into the city, which has now been formally occupied. Government are apparently in doubt whether they will be able to remain. Hungarians complain of acts of violence by Roumanians, including many arrests of officers and men. Americans report that Ministry is under impression that Czechs and Serbs are also advancing and that occupation by various nations who did not come in until after the working men and trades unions had overthrown the government may make serious difficulty in the way of reorganization. Americans advise provision of an Entente Commission in Budapest which can be found from the Entente personnel present. General Gorton is here and is proceeding immediately to Budapest. Ends. Addressed Dirmilint.

Minutes attached to the document:

[To] Political Section (Hon. H. Nicolson)

The position now appears to be aggravated by the presentation by the Rumanians of extremely harsh terms to the Hungarian Government; these terms were handed to the Hungarians yesterday evening, the latter apparently being given only 4 hours to reply. A copy of the terms (in French) has just been received through the Americans, sent by Gen. Gorton, & Cols. Romanelli & Causey from Buda Pest, & Gen. Sackville-West is placing it before Mr. Balfour at this morning’s conference. W.L.O. Twiss Lieut. Col.

6/8/19 G.S.

1 See No. 232, note 3.
2 For the text of the Romanian note see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 29, Appendix B. For the discussion in the Supreme Council on 6 August about the note and the telegram sent by the Conference to the Romanian Government in connection with the note see DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 29, minute 2.

The Peace Conference was formally opposed to the Romanian occupation of Hungarian territory, and issued repeated requests to the Romanian authorities to comply with the resolutions of the Conference. The Romanians withdrew from Budapest and its surrounding areas in November 1919, completing their withdrawal from the whole territory of Hungary by June 1920. In conjunction with the Romanians, the Czechoslovak army in the north and the Yugoslav army in the south kept parts of Hungary under occupation; these armies were also withdrawn at around the time of the Romanian withdrawal.
No. 231

*En Clair Telegram from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 6 August 1919)*

*No. 694x [PRO FO 608/12 No. 46/1/5/17253]*

Vienna, 5 August 1919

Negotiations between the existing Budapest Government and the Szeged Government are proceeding with object of bringing about a coalition. The arrival in Vienna of Garami in whom both sides are prepared to trust is hourly expected and on his arrival no further difficulties will remain. A correspondent coming from Budapest to-day states that conduct of the Roumanians in the town is good and that if they are sent away before international control is established outbreaks of extremists who regard Socialist Government as reactionary and refuse to have anything to do with Szeged Government may yet take place. News of collapse of Bolshevism has had most favourable effect in Vienna and prospect of cessation of all funds has put complete end to communist agitation. Ends. Addressed Dirmilint.

No. 232

*Letter from Colonel Sir T. Cuninghame (Vienna) to Lieutenant-Colonel W.L.O. Twiss (Paris. Received 9 August 1919)*¹

*No. T.C. 713 [PRO FO 608/14 No. 46/1/12/17581]*

Vienna, 5 August 1919

Since I wrote last things have moved quickly and in a manner such as we more or less anticipated. The Red Army on the Theiss collapsed before the Roumanian counter-offensive and by August 1st was already in a hopeless condition. Accordingly the Rote [Rate] republic² was constrained to yield to the demands of the Trades Unions and to dismiss. The negotiations which we had conducted in Vienna through Bauer Bohm and Veldner [Weltnner] came in very opportunely to prevent anything in the nature of a last stand by the Budapest garrison, as well as all attempts at pillage by the extremist element. It was scarcely to be hoped that the advance of the Roumanians could be checked but the arrival of General Gorton³ in Vienna made it possible to send down at once a British Representative to prevent excesses on the part of the Roumanians. Before he left however, he managed to take the first steps towards effecting a coalition of the Szeged and Budapest Governments which will be the best means of averting serious outbreaks in the country districts. The Buda Pesti Government have exaggerated notions as to the strength of the “white forces” in Hungary, who are in reality only

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¹ Also printed in *DBFP*, I/vol. VI, No. 87.
² The republic of the workers' councils.
³ The British member of the Allied Military Mission to Hungary. The other members were Gen. Jean-César Graziani (France), Gen. Harry Hill Bandholtz (U.S.A.) and Gen. Ernesto Mombelli (Italy). The plan of sending four Allied Generals to Hungary was suggested by G. Clemenceau at a meeting of the Supreme Council on 18 July 1919. For the details see *DBFP*, I/vol. I, No. 14, minute 5.
about 1200 strong. Consequently the Socialist groups are ready to do anything to prevent their advance and to prevent the propagation of "white terrorist" agitation. The Szeged representatives are, however, very recalcitrant (perhaps not unnaturally) and so I called Bethlen to confer with Bohm before me, since I knew that if they met alone nothing would come of the meeting. Gorton and Phil[l]otts were also present and we got them to agree to hold their hands until the arrival of Garami — the Socialist whom all parties agree to accept. Bethlen sent a message by aeroplane to Teleki of the Szeged Government to refrain from all that might tend to excite civil war pending news as to the chances of a coalition.

If the coalition comes off all will be well — otherwise I fear that the town will get up against the country and vice versa and trouble and misrule will last long.4

4 The Socialists could not form a coalition with the Szeged Government, and the Socialist administration set up under the premiership of G. Peidl did not last long. On the evening of 6 August a group calling itself "The White House" entered the Prime Minister's residence and forced the Government to resign, while the building was surrounded by units of the Romanian Army. The Habsburg Archduke Joseph became Governor of Hungary and appointed I. Friedrich as Prime Minister.

This event prolonged the political instability in Hungary, which formally ended on 1 March 1920, when the National Assembly, under considerable pressure from the military, elected Admiral Miklós Horthy, as Regent. In fact the uncertainty lasted until about the mid-1920s, by which time the economic and social consolidation of the new system was achieved under the premiership of Count I. Bethlen.

With regard to the resignation of G. Peidl's government Sir C. des Graz reported from Belgrade on 10 August 1919 in his telegram No. 227 (received 13 August): "Rumour circulating here yesterday that Socialist Administration at Buda Pesth has been replaced by Government with the Archduke Joseph at its head caused a flutter. Idea is distasteful here if means possibility of reunion of Hungary with Austria under a Habsburg and creation anew of a stronger State on the borders of Jugo-Slavia. I heard last night that it was thought that the Szegedin Government would join new Government at Pesth and it is said that forces under orders of former — about 3 battalions — are already on their way to Pesth." (DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 101, note 1.)

Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, in his letter sent to Sir R. Graham on 28 August from Vienna (received 2 September), writing about the feared re-emergence of a monarchist movement in Austria, which would provoke a corresponding Socialist, or even Communist counter-movement, remarked: "The intervention [in Hungary] of the Archduke Joseph cannot be considered otherwise than as very unfortunate and inopportune from this point of view [...]" (DBFP, I/vol. VI, No. 147.)

The Peace Conference paid less attention to the internal developments in Hungary after the fall of Béla Kun's Government, while the primary objective remained the signing of a Peace Treaty with Hungary at the earliest possible date. As this could only be done with representatives of a stable, and preferably representative, government, the Conference sent Sir G. Clerk on a mission to Hungary in October 1919 to facilitate the creation of a coalition government. The Peace Treaty, however, was only signed on 4 June 1920.

The fall of G. Peidl's government was reported to the British Delegation in Paris by Sir C. des Graz with a three day delay. The Supreme Council briefly commented on the change at their meeting on 18 August. F. Polk said that "Mr. Hoover's conclusion was that this [the one that replaced G. Peidl's] Government should not be recognised as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognise him he would fall, and he could then be replaced by a Coalition Government." S. Pichon asked "whether there was any proof that the Roumanians had supported this Government." F. Polk replied that "they of course deny it. The information received was to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party." A.J. Balfour reiterated the above points when he proposed a draft for a telegram to be sent to the Allied Generals in Budapest (see note 3 above) informing them of the views of the Conference. (DBFP, I/vol. I, No. 36, minute 1, and Appendix C.)

It is interesting to note that Col. Sir T. Cuninghame, in his letter to Sir R. Graham on 28 August (see above) attributed the take-over by the Archduke Joseph to an intervention by the representatives of the Vatican in Budapest. Though he claimed to have evidence for this, he did not reveal it in his letter, and the
I gave Gorton all the information I had at my disposal and I have already heard that he has arrived in Buda Pesth and is working in accord with Borghese[,] Romanelli and the Americans. The whole affair is an immense relief to Vienna as you can imagine. Already the Communists have found their money supplies cut off and consequently their houses, clubs and institutions are being closed. They are greatly dejected at the course of events, and we have nothing more to fear from them for a spell.

Equally the chances of opening the Danube and getting food and coal in have cheered up people a lot.

The next thing to do is to form in Hungary a Peasants' Organization similar to that in Austria and I have already taken the necessary preliminary steps. When that is potentially powerful, I am convinced that a belt will be drawn South of Czecho-Slovakia which will prevent the collapse of that state into similar political experiments.

Generally in fact, the political situation has much improved.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) T. A. Cuninghame.

No. 233

En Clair Telegram from Earl Curzon (London) to A.J. Balfour (Paris. Received 9 (?) August 1919)

No. 1067 [PRO FO 608/13 No. 46/1/7/17567]

London, 8 August 1919

Very Urgent. By bag.

Parliamentary question for August 11th asks whether Entente have demanded or intend to demand from German-Austria the surrender of Bela Kun; and , if so why.

I assume that there is no such intention. Please telegraph reply as soon as possible.

1 The question was raised in the House of Commons on 11 August by Col. J. Wedgwood, and was answered by A. Bonar Law in a manner which had been suggested by Sir E. Crowe (see minutes to the document). Colonel Wedgwood then asked: "May I take it from that that the Council of Five will not attempt to extradite members of the late Soviet Government in Hungary who have committed no crimes against humanity?" A. Bonar Law answered: "I hope the hon. Member will not ask to say more than I have — that the matter is not under consideration at present." (The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Hansard), Fifth Series, vol. 119, London, 1919, column 874.)
Minutes attached to the document:

So far as I am aware there is no such intention. It is possible, of course, that the new Hungarian Government may ask for Bela Kun’s extradition for offences against criminal law.

Harold Nicolson
9/8/19

Reply:

"The question has never been raised or considered by the Council of Five."

E. Crowe
9/8/19

Telephoned to F.O. 10.30. a.m. Aug. 11. I.R.M.

No. 234

Memorandum by J.W. Headlam-Morley (Extracts)

[HDLM ACC 727/I]

ca. end of 1919, or later

NOTE ON THE AUSTRIAN TREATY

The whole procedure with regard to the Austrian Treaty has been, as is now generally agreed, singularly unfortunate and it seems desirable to place on record what I know personally as to this matter and to give some account of the attempts which I made to get a revision of the Treaty at the last stage.

Owing to the great importance of the questions connected with Germany, at the first stage, after the Armistice, little or no attention seems to have been given in the Foreign Office to the problems which would arise owing to the dissolution of the Austrian Monarchy. In the Political Intelligence Department I had always been disturbed by the fact that we had no one on whom we could place complete reliance, whose chief duty it was to keep in touch with the developments in Austria. In Victoria Street Seton Watson had charge of this Department. He was of course very capable and had great knowledge, but even as regards his work the criticism might fairly be made that he looked at the Austrian problem too much from the point of view of the Southern Slavs. Though he knew everything, he was scarcely the person we should have chosen to present an account of things from the Viennese point of view. But for a real

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1 In the first part of the memorandum the term “Austria” is used to denote “Austria-Hungary”, whereas, towards the latter part, it refers to the new state of “Austria”.

2 A colloquial name applied to the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information.
appreciation of what was going on, this point of view wanted representing just as much as that of the Croatians and the Serbs and the Czecho-Slovaks. This applies also to Hungary, for there was some danger that Hungarian problems might be looked upon too exclusively from the point of view of the Croatians, the Slovaks and the Rumanians. Sound policy however requires that we should be fully informed as to the point of view of the enemy as well as of that of our friends.

When the Intelligence Department moved to the Foreign Office, Seton Watson left. No one was appointed to take his place. I repeatedly drew attention to this and tried to find some efficient substitute. The best I could get hold of was Philipotts, but he was sent on a mission to Vienna. It is characteristic that though he was sent out apparently by the Foreign Office, he is absorbed into Military Intelligence, and we seem to have no information from him. I had the greatest difficulty even in finding out when he went to Vienna. The most suitable person in the Foreign Office would have been Max Muller, who knew both Austria and Hungary and had been working on it throughout the war, but there were difficulties connected with standing in getting him into the P.I.D. He however gave occasional advice. The work about Austria had therefore to be done chiefly by Namier. I got occasional help from Randall as regards Tyrolean and German Austrian matters. Namier had great knowledge and ability, but he had a great deal to do in connection with Poland, and again his interpretation could not be relied upon as being unbiased. During the summer of 1918 at the request of Lord Robert Cecil, we drew up a joint memorandum about the policy to be adopted in case of a revolution in Austria; in doing this, I got a great deal of assistance from Seton Watson.

It obviously was of the highest importance when the revolution actually took place to have someone watching the events with the greatest care; what should have been done is to have a weekly report giving a concise narrative and drawing attention to any political conclusions. It was quite impossible to get anything of the kind done.

After the armistice we had to occupy ourselves with drawing up memoranda preparatory to the work of the Peace Conference. At once we were confronted by the difficulty of dealing with Austria. I got a memorandum by Namier which contained much valuable material, and at my request Seton Watson wrote an additional memorandum on the Hungarian situation and on the legal aspects of the revolution. These memoranda were not nearly sufficient; they might however have formed the beginning for consideration of the very serious problems which obviously would arise. I have, however, never seen any indication that anyone read them or took any notice of them at all. Their very existence appears to have been ignored as well as the fact that there were any problems to be considered in Austria. In the distribution of work for the Peace Conference, Sir Ralph Paget was appointed in charge of the Austrian and Baltic sections; his staff consisted of [A.W.A.] Leeper and Nicolson, both of them very able and well informed, but both of them by their previous work interested rather in the Balkans than in the Austrian section. So far as I know no initiative with regard to Austria came from Sir Ralph Paget.

On his appointment as Ambassador to Brazil, Austria together with the Balkans was transferred to Sir Eyre Crowe. The result was that one man was put in charge of the whole of Europe with the exception of the Northern and the North-Eastern sections. He was given no addition to his staff, except [A.] Akers Douglas, who was specially charged with matters concerning Western Europe. It seems to have been generally

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3 25 March 1918.
4 This memorandum has not been traced by the editor.
5 See Annex I in No. 15, and note 2 to No. 15.

The revolution referred to is the take-over, and the declaration of the Republic, by Count M. Károlyi in Hungary in late October, early November 1918.
assumed that Austria should continue to go with Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but in fact, as before, no one seemed to take any interest in the matter and again no initiative or suggestions of any kind came, so far as I am aware, from Sir Eyre Crowe.

When we came to Paris, the same condition of things continued. Sir Eyre Crowe was in charge with Akers Douglas, Leeper and Nicolson working under him. Akers Douglas was chiefly responsible for Germany, Belgium, etc., Nicolson and Leeper for the South-East; [...] The same state of things continued in the P.I.D. I succeeded from time to time in getting information and memoranda from Namier and Randall, both of whom were very willing and capable, but I do not think that in a single case did I receive either enquiries, suggestions or instructions from anyone in authority.

Meanwhile, as the Conference got to work, the Committees were appointed to draw up the frontiers of the new States. We had therefore a Czecho-Slovak Committee, a Rumanian Committee, a Yugo-Slav Committee, a Polish Committee. Each of these approached the problems of the frontiers from the point of view of the new State or the Ally; the questions which they had to discuss naturally affected Austria and Hungary, but no one was charged with the duty of watching their conclusions so as to see what sort of effect they would have when put into force as regards Austria and Hungary themselves.

During the first months of the Conference, no steps of any kind seem to have been taken towards considering the political problems which would inevitably arise when the time came for drafting the Treaty of Peace with Austria. During the first months the work was often not great in amount and there were many people in the Political Section who had as a matter of fact hardly anything to do. The Council of Four was established, the Council of Foreign Ministers continued to sit, and it was their duty to deal with matters not dealt with by the Four. As the Four were completely occupied with the German Treaty, there was an admirable opportunity for the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider or to cause to be considered in the various delegations the Austrian problems. No discussion on these matters, as far as I know, took place in the Council of Foreign Ministers, and meanwhile, they complained that they had nothing to do, and no reference was ever sent to the Political section of the British Delegation authorising to occupy themselves with the matter. The general result was that all the valuable time in which there might have been opportunity for serious discussion of the matters was completely wasted.

Then at last instructions were sent out that we were to get on with the Austrian Treaty. I do not know what precise form the instructions took but we may say certainly that there were no instructions to the Political Section to consider whether there were special political problems connected with Austria and to give advice to the other sections who dealt with more strictly technical matters. This was certainly the case in the British Delegation. When, therefore, the different sections and Committees turned their attention to the Austrian Treaty, what they did in fact was to adopt almost en bloc the clauses of the relevant sections of the German Treaty and apply them to Austria simply eliminating the word “Germany” and putting in “Austria”. The result was lamentable. In the first drafts sent up by the different sections there was no attempt on any basis to meet the peculiar problems arising from the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In mere matters of drafting the words Austria and Austria-Hungary were used without any discrimination; again the Treaty was drafted on the lines that there were two kinds of States, enemy on the one hand, allies on the other. Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia were Allies; therefore there was given to them and their nationals as against Austria all the rights which, for instance, Frenchmen and Englishmen acquired as against Germany. This entirely ignored the fact that a State such as Czecho-Slovakia, although it had technically become an Ally, and therefore an enemy of Austria, at the time of the armistice was in fact not an enemy of Austria, but a part of Austria. This led to such impossible conclusions as that the property of Austrian
citizens in Czecho-Slovakia was liable to confiscation without compensation in the same way as that of Germans in Great Britain or France. This is the most extreme case of the injustice in the Treaty, but there were many other classes similar in character and they all arose from the fact that the political aspect had never been thoroughly investigated. There also had been no discussion as to such a point as what was the legal status of the new Republic of Austria. Was it legally identical with the Austrian Empire, or was it a new State arising out of its dissolution.

[...]

I succeeded with Hankey's help in making an opportunity of presenting the matter to the Council of Four. I explained to them briefly the reasons why it seemed to me in accordance with facts, just and desirable to recognise that Austria was not identical with the old Austria, but a new State. Apparently these observations made considerable impression upon them. I drafted a preamble based on these lines, which was included in the draft Treaty, and the Council of Four themselves ordered to be inserted the words that Austria should be recognised as a new and independent State. These words were actually written in by President Wilson with his own hand.

[...] It was very difficult to get attention paid to these matters [related to the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy]. I had the impression from one or two brief conversations that Lord Hardinge agreed with me, but he did not give any support; Sir Eyre Crowe also in a general way agreed, but nothing effective was done through the regular official channels. However, I sent a copy of my memoranda to Philip Kerr; he mentioned it to Mr. Balfour and I was asked to go to lunch with him to talk over the matter. In fact practically nothing was said about it, but at the end I received very brief instructions to work out the matter in detail.

I therefore began a very careful examination of some of the sections. [...]

The most important points were questions of nationality, economic clauses, ports and waterways.

The whole question of Nationality was constantly coming up both in connection with the New State Treaties and in the committee appointed to consider the special Italian clauses. [...]

The greatest difficulty was caused by the Economic clauses. [...] Again, it was agreed that many matters which were left over must be referred to special conventions to be concluded between the inheriting States; I insisted that I could be no party to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers giving their sanction to such special conventions unless Austria was allowed to come in on equal terms. I succeeded in this and eventually a clause to this effect was inserted in the Austrian Treaty.
A large part of the minutes of the committee consists of memoranda put in by the smaller States — Poland, Greece, Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Serbia — estimating the amount that might be obtained, not from Germany, but from other enemy Powers, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. With these we are at present not concerned, but nobody who reads them can fail to see how serious was the influence of the attitude assumed by the Great Powers upon the smaller States; every one of these memoranda contains suggestions first of all for stripping their former enemy bare of every kind of realisable wealth, and then, after this had been done, of subjecting them to the payment of a very exorbitant sum as a permanent tribute. The spirit they showed, which was the natural reflex of the spirit of the greater Powers, was one which, if not checked, must be fatal to the future of Europe. Nothing would have been more wholesome than that these memoranda should be circulated among the leading statesmen in order that they might see how the action to which they were themselves being committed appeared when it was put forward by others. But who can blame the jackals that follow the example of the lions?

1 Sir J. W. Headlam-Morley's memoirs of the Paris Peace Conference (A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919) were published in 1972 in London edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala. The passage quoted here is not included in the volume.

2 It is not indicated which committee is referred to.
The political Constitution of Hungary is for the time being merely parliamentary in appearance. As a matter of fact the rule of the Bethlen Government is based on counter-revolutionary methods. Even though article 13 of the fundamental law of 1920 lays down that the re-election of the National Assembly should be carried out under the same basis as that of the First National Assembly, Count Bethlem [Bethlen], by Order in Council issued in February 1922, ignoring this provision, deprived one-third of the electors of their right of vote and abolished secret ballot in rural constituencies. The result was that the election, in 80% of the constituencies was carried out by open vote.

It appears herefrom that the present National Assembly is lacking all legal basis.

As opposed to the agreement made with the Hungarian political parties, including the Social Democrats, by Sir George Clerk as representative of the Allied Powers in November 1919, according to which the form of Government should be decided by plebiscite the National Assembly declared Hungary to be a kingdom. Republican propaganda is forbidden and the republicans are prosecuted. On the other hand, legitimist propaganda, in spite of the fact that the Hapsburgs have been dethroned in the meantime, is freely allowed and the members of the Hapsburg family enjoy royal privileges.

Though under law No I of 1920, the Regency has been only provisionally established, still no time limit has been set. So that the Regent can only be discharged by decision of the National Assembly, and there is very little likelihood, under the present circumstances, of such a decision being arrived at. This undecided form of government is the source of uncertainty and unrest.

The war measure based on DORA (Law 63 of 1912) is to a great extent still in force. The exercise of civil rights (liberty of press, freedom of the [sic] assembly and association) is limited at the discretion of the Government. The formation of New Trade Unions, not only depends on the Government[s] decision, but s uch [?] is entirely forbidden whenever railway, trams service, civil and municipal employees are concerned.

Numerous murders and atrocities committed by counter revolutionaries, particularly by the so called 'awakened' Magyars remain unpunished. These received amnesty when the crimes were committed for “patriotic” reasons without any trial having even taken place. On the other hand, very minor offences, committed by Socialists and Liberals, are punished with two or four years imprisonment. Administrative internment of individuals politically suspect is still valid, so that the personal liberty of the citizen is in the hands of the Government and the police.

We still have censorship of letters and telegrams and telephones for which there is no legal basis.
Trial by jury is still suspended and there is still an extraordinary procedure, without appeal, in force for those called 'Communists'. Judges, civil servants, being the chief supporters of the present regime,¹ show special clemency towards the Right whereas towards the Left, even [where] there is only the mildest opposition, they are rigorous to an extent which is strongly opposed to traditional practices, so for instance, an Editor of an extremely reactionary paper (A Nép) has been sentenced to one day's imprisonment for seditious libel; the contributor to the Socialist paper “Népszava”, Szakasits, has been sentenced to two years' imprisonment for the same crime.

SUGGESTIONS

It would scarcely be feasible to revert to the Clerk agreement of 1919, though this has never been carried out. It would be possible and desirable however to enforce Articles 55, 58, 76, 355, of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, which grants protection to personal liberty, minority rights (repeal of the so-called Numerus Clausus Act)² and Labour. This would be all the more justified as the Peace Treaty contains many unjust clauses, oppressive to the Hungarian people, which clauses have been carried out in their entirety. The repeal of the special measures which are part of the war measures, should automatically result with [sic] the carrying out of the Peace Treaty. It is strongly desirable that Great Britain should be represented in Budapest by a member of the Labour Party, or somebody in sympathy with Labour who would use his influence with the Hungarian Government for the abolition of counter-revolutionary measures, and who would be kept informed by the Opposition Parties as well.

In realising the Loan³ care should be taken that the burden does not fall on the shoulders of the poorer classes. We recognise the importance of the Loan for the improvement of economic conditions. In connection with the Loan it should be taken into consideration however that the granting of the Loan without the necessary precautionary measures⁺(in the original) would mean rather the support of the Hungarian reactionaries than the support of the people.

Minutes attached to the document:

[Excerpts from a minute]

We cannot actually find any undertaking given to Sir George Clerk which corresponds exactly to that quoted in Mr Ponsonby's minute. The nearest we can get to it is paragraph 2 in his report to the Supreme Council of November 29, 1919 (C.157685—flag J). It runs as follows:- “The main condition was that such a Government must include representatives of the different political parties in Hungary. It also must be such as to satisfy the Supreme Council that it was able to maintain law and

¹ The comment: “Yes, not the feudal landlords.” was written in handwriting on the margin of the original document beside this passage.
² The Act restricted the number of students of Jewish origin who could attend higher educational institutions.
³ This is a reference to the financial loan that the Hungarian Government had requested from the League of Nations, and which the League granted to Hungary later in 1924.
⁺ (in the original) [Comments in handwriting:] “The League should provide for very strict control & an able & strong American as Commissioner-General delegate.” [The Commissioner-General referred to was the American financier Jeremiah Smith.]
order, to hold elections based on universal suffrage, in a free impartial and democratic manner, and be prepared to send delegates to Paris to negotiate the peace with the Allies”.

It is very questionable whether by agreeing to this condition it was ever contemplated that the Hungarian Government were entering into a servitude for all time both as regarded themselves and their successors in office as to the nature of their suffrage law. And though nothing is easier than to draft instructions to Mr Hohler, as directed in Mr Ponsonby’s minute, yet it is only right that the Department should indicate that this may involve us in an acrimonious discussion with the Hungarian Government who may accuse us of intervening in the internal affairs of their country. That the enquiry may be resented is shown by the inquiry recently made of Mr Hohler by the Hungarian Prime Minister⁴ (see his despatch no. 81 just in--C.2915)⁵ “whether it was a fact that M. Peidl has been seeking to obtain the intervention of the British [sic] Government in the internal affairs of Hungary”.

[...] Draft to Mr. Hohler submitted herewith.

M.W. Lampson
22/2/24

[A memorandum was prepared by the Central Department of the Foreign Office on 22 February 1924, which also partly dealt with A. Ponsonby’s memorandum of 16 February. The following are excerpts from this memorandum.]

From: [PRO FO 371/9902/ C 3619]

[...] The facts stated in the memorandum attached to Mr. Ponsonby’s minute are, though perhaps in places slight[ly] coloured and exaggerated, substantially accurate and have been reported by Mr. Hohler in various despatches and annual reports. But the question of direct intervention by the British government opens a vista of so many complications that it would be well to consider the matter carefully before embarking on such a policy.

In Mr. Ponsonby’s minute it is suggested that Mr. Hohler should inform the Hungarian government that we attach importance to the fulfilment of the undertaking said to have been given to Sir G. Clerk in 1919. There is no trace in the Foreign Office archives of that particular undertaking having been given or required, and it is remarkable that, were it in fact given, Sir G. Clerk should have made absolutely no mention of it in his report to the Supreme Council. [...]⁶

It must moreover be borne in mind that the government, elected on the basis of universal suffrage as agreed above, was itself responsible for the passage into law of some of the measures complained of, and that those measures which were in force prior to its advent to power were in the course of its two years of office allowed to remain on the Statute Book. All things considered the Department are bound to point out that unless His Majesty’s Government are prepared to embark on and pursue a policy of

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⁴ Count I. Bethlen.
⁵ Not printed.
⁶ Here the passage from Sir G. Clerk’s report of 29 November 1919, quoted in M.W. Lampson’s minute above, is reproduced again, and it is remarked that Hungary, by agreeing to those points, cannot be considered to have entered into perpetual servitude vis-à-vis the Allies.
direct intervention in the domestic affairs of Hungary, it may be of doubtful wisdom to endeavour to hold them to the condition laid down in 1919.

[...]

Central Dept.
22/2/1924

No. 237

Letter from T.B. Hohler (Budapest) to R. MacDonald (London. Received 31 March 1924)

No.137 [PRO FO 371/9902/C 5341]

Budapest, 26 March 1924

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. of the 12th instant\(^1\) and your despatch received No. 97 of the 3rd instant,\(^2\) I have the honour to report that although I have not yet received from you a copy of Sir George Clerk's report to the Supreme Council of the 29th November, 1919, yet I thought that the quotation from it given in your despatch above mentioned\(^3\) supplied me with sufficient material to go on, and I was unwilling to defer any longer carrying out your instruction. I therefore sought an interview with Count Bethlen this morning and explained to him that I wished to speak to him in your name in a most serious but entirely private manner. I began by reading to him such parliamentary questions as have been sent to me by the Foreign Office, in order that he might understand the atmosphere, and I then read to him your abovementioned despatch.

Count Bethlen paid the greatest attention to its contents and took notes of several points. He at once replied to me in the most courteous manner, but with very great firmness, to the effect that he was glad to notice that your observations were of a private nature, and he laid great stress on the fact that he could only reply to me in a purely private manner, as he could not admit that any foreign country was justified in any kind of interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. He said that this point had been specially laid down in the Treaty of Trianon, which regulated the relations between Hungary and Great Britain, as between Hungary and all other foreign Powers; its complete independence and sovereignty were further guaranteed by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and had been further confirmed by the first of the two protocols just concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and signed by all the countries concerned. He then went on, again laying emphasis on the fact that his words were to be regarded solely in the light of private explanation, to state that the agreement that Sir George Clerk made in November 1919 was solely with the Hungarian political parties; there was, in fact, no Government which was recognised at that time, and the engagements then come to were of an ad hoc character, come to solely in order to form a Government which might be recognised and with which the Allies might be able to negotiate for a treaty of peace. It was impossible that any one party could or would have

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\(^1\) Not printed.

\(^2\) Not printed.

\(^3\) The quotation mentioned can be found in No. 236.
accepted an engagement for the future; Count Bethlen said that he had often discussed the whole question with Sir George Clerk, and the idea had never been mooted that any undertaking was being entered into which would restrict the unlimited rights of Hungary to arrange for herself her own internal affairs. This was proved by the first paragraph of the quotation which you have sent me from Sir George Clerk's report: "The main condition was that such a Government must include representatives of the different political parties in Hungary." Was it suggested that from that date henceforward any Government that might be formed must include representatives of the different political parties?

Passing to the question of universal suffrage, Count Bethlen dwelt on the statements very currently made concerning restrictions alleged to have been imposed on the number of voters, by which one million voters were disfranchised. He said that the decree under which what we may call the "Clerk elections" were held was in virtue of a law passed by the Government of M. Friedrich, which had legal duration for two years; within those two years a new Bill was to be introduced, and, in fact, such a Bill was introduced; the committee of the House busied itself with it and accepted it with certain modifications, which had been suggested by the Opposition. The Chamber did not pass this Bill in plenary sitting, as a factional obstruction was made by the Opposition, so that a vote could not be taken before the expiration of the period for which the Assembly had been elected, though it was perfectly certain that the majority of the House were in its favour just as the majority of the committee had been. Count Bethlen, who just then acceded to power, found himself faced with three possible ways out of the dilemma. The first was to adopt the Friedrich Law; but that had already been rejected by the House in committee, and it was quite unquestionable that the majority of the Chamber was opposed to it. Secondly, a decree might be passed under the Constitution adopting the new Bill, which had been accepted by the committee, although it had failed to pass the Chamber. Finally there was a third, and the only true legal, way, namely, to go back to the law of 1918; but this law was far less liberal in its nature than the Friedrich Law, which had granted the franchise to much wider classes of people. The first alternative was undoubtedly opposed by the majority; the third, although the only legal solution, would leave the country under a far too reactionary régime. He had therefore decided to choose the second alternative, adopting by decree the Bill which had already been accepted by the committee. No statistics, he said, existed of the number of persons enjoying the franchise under the Friedrich Law, so that it is impossible to say what number might have been disfranchised by it. At all events, at the present time 60 per cent. of the population, whether male or female, enjoyed the privilege of the vote.

His Excellency was good enough to express his thanks for the friendly character of my communication, whilst reiterating that I must regard his words as a purely private communication, as the question was one which he must refuse to discuss with me officially.

I have, &c.

T. B. HOLLER

Minutes attached to the document:

Count Bethlen adopted the attitude we expected, which indeed was the only one he could take up, and he was very friendly.

C. Howard Smith
2/4/24
Yes, but he gave no satisfaction at all to our enquiry,\textsuperscript{4} & has left the matter just as bad, if not worse, than it was before.

Harold Nicolson
2/4/24

I took advantage of Sir George Clerk's presence this morning to ask him about this, though I had not at that time seen this despatch or I should have shown it him. He entirely confirmed what Count Bethlen now says, as recorded by Mr Hohler. The condition as to universal suffrage applied only to the election of the Constituent Assembly of 1919. Sir George Clerk was categorical on the point. And after all it stands to reason that no government, Hungarian or otherwise, could bind its successors in such a way.

Incidentally not even in this country have we got universal suffrage.
Perhaps the matter may now be allowed to drop? I do not think that we shall gain anything by pursuing it.

M.W. Lampson
2/4/24

I agree.
E. C[ro]we
2/4/24

I agree.
P[onsonby].
7/4/24

\textsuperscript{4} The inquiry regarding newly imposed restrictions on the franchise in Hungary, including the introduction of voting by open ballot in rural constituencies, and other limitations on political rights. For A. Ponsonby's memorandum concerning these issues, see No. 236.
The biographical data provided here concentrate on the period covered by this sourcebook. Where no dates are indicated for the function or appointment of a particular person, the period dealt with by the book applies. Regrettably, the editor has been unable to find dates of birth and death for all entries. Names marked with an * are treated as entries elsewhere in the Glossary.


ADAM, Eric Graham Forbes (1888–1925). British diplomat. 3rd Secretary in the Diplomatic Service for the period of the Paris Peace Conference, served on the Political Section of the British Delegation at the Conference.

ÁGOSTON, Péter (1874–1925). State Secretary for Internal Affairs in Count M. Károlyi’s* régime. Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Republic of Councils. Formerly Professor of Law at the Law School of Nagyvárad (today Oradea). British diplomats and military officials interceded on his behalf during the reprisals that followed the fall of Béla Kun’s* régime. A freemason. Died in France in 1925.

AKERS-DOUGLAS, Aretas. British diplomat. Held various posts in the Middle East and Europe. Transferred to Bucharest on 1 April 1914. Appointed to the Foreign Office in London in 1915, became Deputy Head, for a period, of the Western European Section of the Political Intelligence Department. On the Political Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Appointed Diplomatic Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in August 1919. British Ambassador in Vienna from 1921.

ALBY, General. Chief of Staff (Chef d’Etat Major) at the French War Office.

ALLIZÉ, Henri. Head of the French Military Mission in Vienna. (Ministre plénipotentiaire en Mission à Vienne.)

ANDRÁSSY, Count Gyula, the Elder (1823–90). Actively participated in the Hungarian revolution and war of independence in 1848–49. Was sentenced to death and executed in effigie by the Austrian authorities in 1851. Later, however, became one of the chief architects of the Compromise of 1867 with Austria. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 1867–71, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1871–79. Resisted attempts to transform the Monarchy into a Trialist state by the inclusion of Bohemia as an equal partner. Forged a close alliance between Germany and Austria–Hungary with an anti-Russian and anti-French bias. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 gained authorization for the Monarchy to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Resigned in 1879 as a result of the difficulties arising out of the occupation.

ANDRÁSSY, Count Gyula, the Younger (1860–1929). The last Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy. He lived in Switzerland during the political upheavals of 1919.


BALOGH, Elemer (1871–1938). Professor of Law at the University of Budapest. A confidant of Count István Tisza, a member of the Protestant Council of Hungary. After 1919 one of the chief figures of the Revisionist cause in Hungary.

BARBER, Captain (temporary Major in the Army) Basil Hastings. British General Staff officer, 2nd grade. Attached, as 3rd Secretary, to H.M.'s High Commissioner in Vienna in October 1919.

BARNES, George Nicoll (1859–1940). Minister without portfolio, member of D. Lloyd George's* War Cabinet.


BEAK, George Bailey (1872–1934). British diplomat. Held various posts in Africa and Europe. In charge of the Consulate-General in Zurich towards the end, and immediately after the First World War.


BERTHELOT, General Henri-Mathias (1861–1931). Head of the French Military Mission to Romania, 1916–18. Reorganized the Romanian Army in 1917. An Army of the Danube was created under General H.-M. Berthelot at the end of October 1918. Army units were assigned to it by General L. Francet d'Esperey*
from the southern Russian front. Not having exact instructions from Paris, the theatre of operations for both armies remained imprecise. Until 14 March 1919 General H.-M. Berthelot was in charge of the French operations in South Russia. From 14 March General L. Franchet d'Esperey* took over the Russian command, and Berthelot was charged with overseeing that Allied decisions were carried out with regard to Romania. His headquarters were in Bucharest. He was recalled from Bucharest to Paris on 11 April 1919.


BOLGAR, Elek (1883–1955). Hungarian lawyer and historian. Ambassador to Austria during the Hungarian Republic of Councils, 26 March 1919–early May 1919, then a member of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat.

BONAR LAW, see LAW.


BORGHESE, Prince Livio. Roving Ambassador of Italy after the First World War. On missions in Belgrade, in Budapest, and in Paris. He worked on improving trade relations between Hungary and Italy during Béla Kun's* régime.

BORNEMISZA, Baron Gyula (1873–1925). Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the provisional Hungarian Government established in Arad.


BÖHM, Vilmos (1880–1949). Precision tool-maker by profession. Left of Centre Social Democratic leader in Hungary. Minister for War in Dénes Berinkey's (Prime Minister under Count M. Károlyi's* presidency, January–March 1919) Government, Commissar for War and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces...
during Béla Kun’s* régime, from which posts he resigned on 17 July 1919. From then on he was Hungarian Minister in Vienna until 3 August 1919.


BRIAND, Aristide (1862–1932). Prime Minister of France for two short periods before the war, and again from 1915 till 1917, when he formed a small War Cabinet with Lyauty as Minister of War. He was out of office at the time of the Peace Conference. After the Peace, he pursued a conciliatory policy as Prime Minister in 1921–22 and 1925–26. As Foreign Minister (1925–30) he worked closely with Stresemann during the Locarno period. He also strengthened the Little Entente, and negotiated the Briand-Kellog Pact.


BROWN, Professor Philip Marshall. Professor of International Law at Princeton University. Member of the Coolidge* Mission, stationed in Budapest. Also attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.


BUTLER, Cyril Kendall (1864–1936). Attached to the British and Allied Relief and Food Control Commissions in Austria.

CAMPBELL, Ronald Hugh (1883–1953). British diplomat. Held various posts in Europe. 2nd Secretary in the Diplomatic Service while in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference from January 1919. Private Secretary (personal) to the Superintending Ambassador (Lord Hardinge of Penhurst).* Appointed Private Secretary to Earl Curzon of Kedleston* (July 1919–December 1919).


CERRUTI, Vittorio. Italian Secretary of Embassy in Vienna before 1915. Accompanied Prince L. Borghese on various missions during 1919. Secretary for Political Affairs to the Italian Military Mission in Budapest after June 1919.


CLEMENT-SIMON, Gustave. French Minister in Prague (Ministre Résidant de France à Prague), 1918, and in Belgrade in 1921.


COOLIDGE, Professor Archibald Cary (1866–1928). Professor of History at Harvard University. Member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and Director of the Special Commission of Study in Austria.


COULSON, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil John Blenkinsop. British Military Attaché at Prague, and from April 1919 Chief of the British Mission to Czechoslovakia. He resigned from this post in November 1920.


CROWE, Sir Eyre (1864–1925). Took part in leading reforms at the British Foreign Office, 1903–06. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1912–20. Member of the Phillimore Committee, which considered proposals for a League of Nations. Minister Plenipotentiary, and on the Political Section, while in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference. Head of the Western European Section of the Political Intelligence Department, and after the appointment of Sir R. Paget* as Ambassador to Brazil, he took over the responsibility for the former territories of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy as well. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1920–25. He died in April 1925.

CUNINGHAME, Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel), Sir Thomas Andrew Alexander Montgomery-, 10th Baronet (1877–1945). Served in the Boer War,
received D.S.O. in 1900. Appointed Military Attaché to the British Embassy at Vienna and the Legation at Cettinje (capital of the Kingdom of Montenegro), with the temporary rank of Major in 1912. Appointed to the General Staff at the War Office in 1914. Temporary Military Attaché at the Legation at Athens in 1915. Relinquished the latter appointment in 1916. Graduated from the General Staff College in 1918. British Military Representative in Vienna, 1918–19.


DAVIES, John Thomas (1881–1938). Private Secretary to D. Lloyd George* 1912–22.


DÍAZ, General Armando (1861–1928). Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army from November 1917. In 1918 he won a decisive victory over the disintegrating forces of the Austro-Hungarian Army near the Piave front, and signed an armistice with the Austro-Hungarian High Command in Padua on 4 November 1918. According to the terms of the armistice, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy surrendered unconditionally and withdrew behind its pre-war borders. The Entente did not recognize the validity of this armistice. Diaz became Minister of War in Benito Mussolini’s first government, 1922–24.


DUTASTA, M.P. French Ambassador in Berne. Secretary-General of the Paris Peace Conference. He performed the formal functions, but was rather forced into the background by the energetic Sir M. Hankey.*

ESTERHÁZY, Count Mihály (1884–[?]). Son-in-law of Count Tivadar Batthyány, who was Minister of the Interior in the first cabinet of Count M. Károlyi.*

FOCH, Marshal Ferdinand (1851–1929). Chief of the French General Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, 1918.

FRIEDRICH, István (1883–1958). Had belonged to the conservative wing of the Hungarian Independent Party. State Secretary for War in Count M. Károlyi's* government in 1918. Hungarian Prime Minister 7 August–25 November 1919. Secretary of State for War in Károly Huszár's (Prime Minister November 1919–March 1920) government. Resigned from his government post, and in 1922 united with the Legitimist group of Count G. Andrássy, the Younger,* creating the Associated Christian Opposition.

FULLHAM, Townley. A British national interned in Hungary throughout the First World War.


GARBAI, Sándor (1879–1947). Stonemason by profession. Hungarian Social Democratic leader. Member of the National Council after October 1918, and Government Commissioner for Housing in Count M. Károlyi's* Government. President of the Revolutionary Directorate during the Hungarian Republic of Councils. A figurehead, rather than a real leader, as B. Kun* was the de facto head of the régime. Minister of Public Education under the premiership of G. Peidl,* 1–6 August 1919. Later emigrated to Austria, and then to France. In emigration he represented the Austro–Marxist view. Finally, he renounced his connections with the labour movement altogether.

GOETZ, Major Charles E.G. Officer of the Special Reserve of Officers, Militia Territorial Force, or Volunteers. Released from Austria, acquainted with the situation in Hungary, had been treated as a civilian enemy.


GRAHAM, Sir Reginald William (1870–1949). British diplomat. Held various posts in Europe and the Middle East. Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from January 1919 during the absence of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst,* who was delegated to the Paris Peace Conference. British Ambassador to the Netherlands from September 1919, transferred to Luxemburg in November 1919.


GREGORY, Captain Thomas Tingey Craven (1878–1933). Chief of the Central European Division of the American Relief Administration. In 1919 he was based in Vienna. A lawyer in San Francisco in civilian life.


HALLIER, General. Member of the French Military Mission in Vienna.

HALSTEAD, Albert. Member of the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace. Led a fact finding mission to Central Europe.

HANKEY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Sir Maurice P.A. Later Lord Hankey (1877–1963). Assistant Naval Secretary and afterwards Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1908–14. During the First World War Secretary to the War Council, to the War Cabinet and to the Imperial War Cabinet. During the Peace Conference Secretary to the British Empire Delegation, British representative on the Secretariat of the Council of Ten, and after 19 April 1919 Secretary to the Council of Four. His minutes of the Peace Conference are reproduced in FRUS, PPC, 1919. After 1919 he became Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet and formed the Cabinet Secretariat. In his various functions he produced a large amount of notes and memoranda for the information of the participants of the Peace Conference. In many of these memoranda Hankey effectively gave advice to his superiors in diplomatic and military questions.


HAUBRICH, József (1883–1939). Commander of the 4th (Budapest) Army Corps (Military commander of Budapest) during Béla Kun’s* régime. Subsequently Minister of War in G. Peidl’s* Government, that succeeded Béla Kun’s* régime on 1 August 1919. Leader of the Hungarian Steelworkers’ Union.
HEADLAM-MORLEY, James Wycliffe (1863–1929). Afterwards Sir James H.-M. Classical scholar, permanent staff inspector under the Board of Education, 1904–14. On the outbreak of war transferred to Wellington House, a propaganda organization, under the direction of the Liberal politician, C.F. Masterman. On the Section dealing with Germany in the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. Responsible for questions relating to Germany in the Western Europe Section of the Political Intelligence Department. On the Political Section of the Intelligence Clearing House of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference. In an undated document, bearing the title "Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Instr. 1., Preparation for the Peace Conference", in HDLM, 727/11, which deals with the organizational framework of the Political Intelligence Department as it was planned before the start of the Peace Conference, the following passage shows the important role J.W. Headlam-Morley and Sir W. Tyrrell* played in the P.I.D. during the Conference:

The procedure for dealing with the memoranda will be as follows:

As soon as a draft is completed, it should be sent on to Mr. Roxburgh for entry in a jacket and registration; it will then be sent through Mr. Headlam-Morley to Sir William Tyrrell for his observations and approval and will be forwarded to the head of the [particular] section who, if he approves, will order it to be printed.

J.W. H.-M. was Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1920.

HENRYS, General Paul Prosper. A commander of the French Army of the Orient.

HERRON, Professor George Davis (1862–1925). American clergyman, lecturer and writer. To a certain extent, he enjoyed President Wilson's* confidence. He was nominated as one of the American representatives to be sent to the proposed Prinkipo conference with the Russians. In January 1919 President Wilson* used him in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve an agreement in the question of the revision of Italian claims under the Treaty of London.


JONES, Thomas Hugh. Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet. Secretary to the Economic Advisory Council.


KERR, Philip Henry. Later Lord Lothian (1882–1940). Together with Lionel Curtis, he founded the Round Table (1910), and was its first Editor. Private Secretary to D. Lloyd George*, 1916–22. Took part in negotiations with Austro–Hungarian peace feelers during the First World War. He served the Prime Minister in this capacity at the Paris Peace Conference. Principal author of the Preface to the Treaty of Versailles. Became a member of R. MacDonald's* Cabinet in 1931.


KUN, Béla (1886—1939). Of Transylvanian origin. Had a journalistic and clerical experience in the Hungarian Social Democratic Party before 1914. During the First World War suffered shell-shock on the Russian front, and became a prisoner of war there. While in captivity, he got involved in Bolshevik propaganda in Russia, and was hand-picked by Bolsheviks for more trusted work in Moscow in 1918. Returned to Hungary with Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, and founded the Communist Party of Hungary in November 1918. Their skilful organization and well-timed propaganda action made the Communist Party attractive to the impoverished classes of the country. Kun founded the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in collaboration with Centre and Left wing Social Democrats in March 1919. De facto leader of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, or Republic of Councils, in which he ultimately relied on “terror” detachments, secret funds and a secretive Communist network to counter resistance by the old ruling classes and social democratic wavering. His personality gave vent to parallel traits of cruelty and generosity. After the downfall of his régime at the beginning of August 1919, he was given refuge in Austria before being handed over to the Russians, who elevated him into membership in the leading circles of the Third International. In the 1930s he most probably became a victim of Stalin’s terror campaign. He died in captivity in the USSR in 1939 in circumstances that have not been clarified to the present day.

KUNFI, Zsigmond (1879—1929). Born in the border region of Transylvania. Active in the Social Democratic Party whilst pursuing a teacher’s career. From 1906 he moved to Budapest, where he was editor of the Socialist theoretical organ, Szocializmus. After having been elected into the Social Democratic leadership, he endeavoured, with the “bourgeois radicals” to capture the allegiance of the intellectuals. Held ministerial posts in Count M. Károlyi’s government. In March 1919 he decided to support Béla Kun’s* Republic of Councils, and became People’s Commissar for Education, but soon became sickened by the dictatorial methods of the Communists. Went into exile in Austria in the autumn of 1919, and was a leading journalist of emigre social democratic papers. As M. Horthy’s* régime became consolidated after 1924, Kunfi lost his faith in the feasibility of social democracy in Hungary. Committed suicide in 1929.

LAMMASCH, Professor Heinrich. The last Prime Minister of Austria in the Dual Monarchy, October—November 1918. Formerly President of the Hague Tribunal.


LANDLER, Jenő (1875—1928). Lawyer. Left-wing Social Democrat, later Communist. People’s Commissar for Commerce, and later for the Interior during Béla Kun’s* régime. One of the top leaders of the government. Commander of the
3rd Red Army Corps, and later Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Red Army. Emigrated to Vienna after the fall of Béla Kun's* régime, where he continued to play a leading role in organizing the Hungarian working class movement.


LE ROND, General. A member of the French Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Played an important part in the territorial settlement, especially in Eastern Europe. French expert on the Polish Commission. Member of the Commissions on Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav affairs.


LENIN (Ulyanov), Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924). Russian Communist revolutionary.


LOGAN, Colonel James Addison, Jr. (1879–?). H.C. Hoover's* chief assistant in relief work.


MALLET, Sir Louis du Pan (1864–1936). Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey. Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State. On the Political Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. On the Middle East Section of the Political Intelligence Department.

MANCE, Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Henry Osborne (1875–1966). Director of Railways and Roads (Class B) at the Department of Movements and Railways of the War Office from 1916. On the Military Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.

MASARYK, Tomáš Garrigue (1850–1937). The chief founder and first President of Czechoslovakia (1918–1935).


MIŞU, Nicolas. Romanian Minister in London and a Delegate Plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.

MÜLLER, Max. British Consul-General in Budapest before the war. From 1914 he was writing regular reports on the economic condition of Germany and Austria–Hungary, which were circulated to the Cabinet and to interested departments. In charge of Far Eastern affairs from 1919.

NAMIER, Lewis Bernstein (1888–1960). Appointed temporary Clerk in the Foreign Office, March 1918. On the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information, dealing with East and Central Europe, till 25 March 1918, when the Bureau was incorporated into the Foreign Office as the new Political Intelligence Department. At the new Department he was an adviser on Poland and former territories of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy.

NICOLSON, Harold George (1886–1968). British diplomat. Held various posts in Spain and Turkey. Transferred to the Foreign Office in 1914. Second Secretary from April 1919. He was responsible for questions relating to the Balkans together with A.W.A. Leeper in the South-Eastern Section of the Political Intelligence Department, often contributing to work done in connection with the former territories of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy. Deputy head of the South-East European Section of the Department under Sir R. Paget.* On the Political Section of the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Participated in General J.C. Smuts's* Mission to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in April 1919. Seconded for service under the League of Nations, October 1919–May 1920. Promoted 1st Secretary in January 1920. Promoted Counsellor of Embassy at Teheran, 1925.


PAGET, Sir Ralph. Held various diplomatic posts in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1913. British Commissioner for the Co-ordination Relief Work in Serbia from 1915. British Ambassador in Copenhagen from 1916. Head of the Austrian and Baltic Sections of the Political Intelligence Department. Appointed Privy Councillor and British Ambassador to Brazil, 1918.


PICCIONE, General Luigi. Italian commander of the Czechoslovak forces in Slovakia until May 1919.


POMMEROL, Captain J.G.L. Member of the British Mission in Budapest.

Sheffield, Brightside division, 1922. Was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January –November 1924.


ROOSEVELT, Captain Nicholas. Member of the Political Section of the U.S. Military Mission in Budapest.


SACKVILLE-WEST, General C. Military Representative on the British Section of the Supreme War Council.

SARGENT, Orme Garton (1884–1962). British diplomat. Acting 2nd Secretary in the Diplomatic Service at Berne from 1917. First Secretary from April 1919. In July 1919 attached to the Peace Delegation in Paris, on the withdrawal of which, in December 1919, he was attached to the British Embassy in Paris for the work of the Conference of Ambassadors. Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1946–49.

SEGRE, General Roberto. Italian Army general. Head of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Vienna.

SETON-WATSON, Robert William (1879–1951). Educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford. Scholar, outstanding expert on Central European affairs. Editor of the weekly The New Europe, which advocated the establishment of independent nation-states on the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Worked in, and was later in charge of the section dealing with East and Central Europe, especially Austria-Hungary, at the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. After the incorporation of the Intelligence Bureau in the Foreign Office as the new Political Intelligence Department, on 25 March 1918, he was commandeered to work in the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, commonly known as Crew House. When the Department
was dissolved after the Armistice with Germany in November 1918, he continued to act as an adviser and independent observer at his own expense to the Foreign Office and the British Peace Delegation in Paris with reports and advice sent from Paris, Czechoslovakia and Britain.


SMUTS, Lieutenant-General, later Field-Marshal, Jan Christiaan (1870–1950). Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. Joined the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. Began to attend meetings of the British War Cabinet on 4 June 1917. Resigned from the War Cabinet in 1918. Helped to formulate British policy throughout the war and during the Peace Conference. He was commissioned by D. Lloyd George* to prepare the British “case” for the Peace Conference. Acted as special envoy to receive the peace offers of Austria–Hungary on two occasions, in 1917, and in 1918. Headed a Special Mission to Budapest and Prague in April 1919. He was much concerned with the shape and the future of the League of Nations, and was a critic of the policy of exacting exorbitant reparations from the defeated countries as a part of the peace settlement.

SONNINO, Baron Giorgio Sidney (1847–1922). Italian Foreign Minister in V. Orlando’s* cabinet, 1914–19.


SPICER, Gerald Sydney (1874–1942). British diplomat. Held various posts in Europe. Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1903–06. Counsellor of Embassy while in attendance at the Paris Peace Conference. Assistant to Sir E. Crowe* in the Western Department. Later Head of the American Department. Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office from April 1919. Seconded to the Cabinet Secretariat to take charge of the League of Nations Branch, October 1920.

STROMFELD, Aurél (1878–1927). Staff Officer of the Austro–Hungarian Army. Colonel at the end of the First World War. State Secretary for War, January–March 1919 during Dénes Berinkey’s premiership (under Count M. Károlyi’s* presidency). During Béla Kun’s* régime Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Red Eastern Army, 19 April–3 May 1919, and later of the entire Hungarian Red Army, 4 May–29 June 1919. Executor of the Army’s rapid advance into Slovakia, 30 May–10 June 1919, and planner of simultaneous attacks towards Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) and Vienna in the west, as well as against the Romanians in the east. Resigned on 29 June in protest against the decision to withdraw from Slovakia as it was demanded by the Peace Conference in Paris. On 3 July F. Julier* was appointed as Stromfeld’s successor. At the beginning of M. Horthy’s* regency he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for his part in organizing and leading the Hungarian Red Army.

SZAMUELY, Tibor (1870–1919). Deputy People’s Comissar for War and chief of a special disciplinary commission during Béla Kun’s* régime in Hungary.

SZMRECSÁNYI, György (1876–1932). Hungarian politician. Prefect of Pozsony and Pozsony Comitat before the end of the war. Later one of the leaders of the Vienna-based Anti-Bolshevik Committee.


THOMSON, Sir Basil Home (1861–1939). Head of the British Directorate of Intelligence, and Head of the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police. Attached as Security Officer to the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.


TYRRELL, Sir William George (1866–1947). British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918–25. Member of the Phillipmore Committee on the League of Nations in 1918 and Head of the Political Intelligence Department. At the Paris Peace Conference he was the British representative on the Polish Commission. Assistant to the Superintending Ambassador (Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*) at the Peace Conference. In 1925 he succeeded Sir E. Crowe* as Permanent Under-Secretary of State.


VIX, Lieutenant-Colonel Fernand (1872–?). French Head of the Allied Military Mission in Budapest, November 1918–March 1919.


WEISS, Captain Bernath. Member of the American Halstead* Mission to Central Europe.


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