The Role and Significance of Judges in the Arab Middle East:

An interdisciplinary and empirical study

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Submitted for the degree of PhD

September 2018
Declarration: ‘I, Sara Saosan Razai, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.’
Abstract

Judges and courts play a vital role in the development of law and politics in the countries of the Arab Middle East. But, despite their importance, there is a gap in legal scholarship about the significance and function of judges across the region. The small amount of previous research on Arab judiciaries has focused primarily on formal descriptions of the judicial role, particularly from a comparative perspective with Western judiciaries. This research aims to address this gap in scholarship by:

(1) Developing a new typology of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East, reflected in the judicial systems Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan;
(2) Surveying Arab judges across the region about their role perceptions, attitudes to law and politics and their personal experiences as judges.
(3) Profiling Arab judges, based on information on LinkedIn, to assess their educational background and professional experiences prior to appointment.

The thesis encompasses three inter-related studies. The first study draws on primary and secondary material to map and create a typology of representative judicial systems in the region. This draws on existing typologies of judicial systems in Western democracies but develops this further by identifying whether there are unique elements to judicial systems in the region. The second study is an online survey of 65 judges from six Arab countries exploring their judicial role. This is believed to be the first-ever survey of Arab judges to explore these issues. The third study profiles the educational and professional experiences of 112 judges based on their profiles obtained from the online professional platform, LinkedIn.

The three studies provide for an initial insight into the significance of an important group in the Arab region that has traditionally not been the subject of empirical research. The thesis explores Arab judicial systems and judicial roles through an interdisciplinary prism, drawing on methods found in political
science, sociology, social psychology and law. The thesis also explores how
the role and significance of Arab courts and judges fit within the wider
scholarship on judicial behaviour and role perceptions.
Impact Statement

Despite their essential societal role in imparting justice, little is known about judges in the Arab Middle East, in particular, how judges perceive their role and how this perception might affect their decision-making. What little previous research there is on judges in the region has not focused on judicial role conceptions, and there has been little to no work that takes a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective on this topic. Exploring the judicial role therefore provides for a broader understanding in an otherwise under-developed area of judicial studies and Arab Middle Eastern law.

This research is an inter-disciplinary and empirical work on judges in the Arab Middle East and the findings offer a first insight into the role of Arab judges. It is believed that the knowledge, analysis, discovery and insight provided in this thesis could be put to a beneficial use within academia and beyond. This study is able to:

- Describe the interactions between judges, including their interactions with other parts of the political system;
- Explore possible behavioural regularities within the community of judges, as well as the formal and informal requirements of behaviour;
- Provide an understanding of the differences and similarities that judges have in the perception of their role;
- Provide an understanding of Arab judges’ role outside the legal system;
- Shed light on the similarities and differences of judicial role perceptions within the Arab region and between judges in the Arab region, in civil law jurisdictions and common law jurisdictions.

Academic impact

The insights provided in this research highlight the need to promote, deepen and widen academic scholarship on the judiciary in the Arab region that is empirically grounded. This research significantly advances academic knowledge of Middle Eastern law and society from an inter-disciplinary approach. The research begins to build the necessary evidence-based
knowledge to further judicial studies in the Arab region and beyond. Specifically, this research will help to enhance academic links between the Arab Middle East and the West on judicial research.

**Wider impact**

Generally, this research will help to further intercultural dialogue and increase understanding of the justice sector in the Arab region. This research also has the potential for impact, regionally and internationally. From a policy perspective, the research will enable those interested in the region to understand the values, attitudes and significance of the judges in the region.

This research will also equip policy-makers, third sector organisations and practitioners with solid and evidence-based knowledge about judges and courts that can guide future policy making and activities in the region. The findings from this research will be disseminated beyond academia through policy-papers, briefing reports and articles in the mainstream media.
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<td>Labour courts</td>
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<td>Maḥakem al-'amma</td>
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<td>Al-Majlis al-'adli</td>
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<td>Maḥakem al-aḥwal al Shakhsīa</td>
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<td>Al Qaḍā’ al-‘adi</td>
<td>The ordinary judicial branch</td>
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<td>Maḥakem al-'askariyah</td>
<td>Military Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banū ʿUmayya</td>
<td>Clan of the Quraysh tribe descended from Umayya ibn Abd Shams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-Beaeyah</td>
<td>Environmental Courts</td>
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<td>Dawa’er</td>
<td>(lit. “circuits”). such as the appeal circuits in Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Maḥakem al-dinīah</td>
<td>Religious courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dīwān al-mazalem</td>
<td>(lit. the “Board of Grievances”). Refers here to the Saudi administrative judicial branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maḥkmah al-dostoriah al-'ulīah</td>
<td>The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-ebtidaīah</td>
<td>Courts of first instance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-eqtisadīah</td>
<td>Economic Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghoraf al-ibtidaīah</td>
<td>Primary court chambers in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥadīth</td>
<td>Prophetic traditions; reports of what the Prophet had said, done and or tacitly approved. Constitutes the second source of Islamic law and after the authority of the Qur’ān, the holy book of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haīya al-qaḍā’īa al-dawla</td>
<td>The State Lawsuit Authority (as in Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥakam (pl. Ḥukkam)</td>
<td>(lit. “arbiter”, “umpire”, “judge”). Also referred to the pre-Islamic tribal arbiter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ḥanafi</td>
<td>One of the four Islamic Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence named after the scholar Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān (699 – 767)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥanbalī</td>
<td>One of the four Islamic Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence named after the scholar Ahmad bin Muḥammad bin Ḥanbal (780–855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥatt-ı hümâyûn</td>
<td>An official document or note composed by an Ottoman Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḫukum ‘ashaīrī</td>
<td>Bedouin tribal law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥkamat al-idarīah al-‘Ulhā</td>
<td>The High Administrative Court in Saudi Arabia and Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-idarīah</td>
<td>Administrative courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijtihād</td>
<td>Islamic legal term referring to the process of legal reasoning and hermeneutics through which the jurist (mujtahid) derives or rationalises law on the basis of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-Isti’naf al-idarīah</td>
<td>Administrative Courts of Appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem- al-isti’nafiah</td>
<td>Ordinary Courts of Appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem isti’naf al-jamarek</td>
<td>Jordanian courts of appeal dealing with custom and income tax disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istiḥsān</td>
<td>(lit. “to approve”, “to deem preferable” Relates to the juristic preference of exercising personal opinion in order to avoid rigidity and unfairness that may result from literal enforcement of the existing law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥkamat al-Jenhāt</td>
<td>Criminal courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-khassa</td>
<td>Special courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhhbah</td>
<td>Referred here as a doctrinal school of Sunni Islamic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majlis al-dostorī</td>
<td>The Constitutional Council (as in Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majlis al-shura</td>
<td>The Advisory Council (as in Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition/Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majlis al-qādā</td>
<td>A court or place where judicial activity is performed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mālikī</td>
<td>One of the four Islamic Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence named after the scholar Mālik ibn Anas 711–795 CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecelle-’i Aḥkām-ı ‘Adliye, “Mejelle” (Turkish)</td>
<td>Civil code of the Ottoman Empire entered into force in 1877. The Mejelle was the first attempt to codify a part of the Shari’ah-based law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moḥafazat</td>
<td>Lit. Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥākim al-mukḥtalīṭah</td>
<td>Egyptian Mixed courts 1875-1949 in which international judges and heard disputes by Egyptians and foreigners. The Mixed Court Codes were mainly based on civil law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nā ‘ib</td>
<td>Lit. “Representative,” “delegate,” “deputy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥkamat al-naqṭh</td>
<td>Egyptian Court of Cassation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥakem al-Nizamyieh</td>
<td>Ordinary (&quot;secular&quot;) courts (as in Jordan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizamyieh Courts</td>
<td>The secular court system introduced within the Ottoman Empire in 1864 as part of the Ottoman reforms, the Tanzīmāt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaḍā’</td>
<td>Judgeship, encompassing the entire range of a judge’s judicial activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qāḍī</td>
<td>Arabic word for a judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qāḍī al-Quḍāt</td>
<td>Chief justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiyās</td>
<td>A fourth source of Islamic law often referred to be the process of deductive analogy in Islamic jurisprudence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥkamat al-quthaa al-idari</td>
<td>The Egyptian Court of Administrative Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra’y</td>
<td>(lit. “opinion”). In Islamic law, refers to a discretionary opinion or reasoning based on precedent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shafi’ī</strong></td>
<td>One of the four schools of Sunni Islamic law and jurisprudence named by Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (767-820)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maḥakim al-shari’ī’a</strong></td>
<td>Sharī’a Courts (as in Saudi Arabia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sharī’ī’a</strong></td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunnah</strong></td>
<td>Second most important source of authority for Muslims and which the bulk of Islamic law derives from. Sunnah refers to the practices, customs and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad See also Hadīth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maḥakem al-sulḥ</strong></td>
<td>Jordanian Magistrate Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maḥkamat al-tamwīz</strong></td>
<td>Supreme Courts (as in Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanẓīmāt-i Hayriye, “Tanẓīmāt”</strong> (Turkish)</td>
<td>(lit. “the auspicious reorganisation”). A series of reforms promulgated in the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876. The reforms were influenced by European ideas and intended to fundamentally modernise the Empire from an old theocratic system to a modern state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maḥakem al-tejareeya</strong></td>
<td>Commercial courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Maḥkama al-ʿuliyah</strong></td>
<td>The High Court (as in Saudi Arabia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maḥakem al-usra</strong></td>
<td>The Family Courts (as in Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uṣūl al-fiqh</strong></td>
<td>(lit. “roots of legal philosophy, law”). The body of principles and investigative methodologies through which practical legal rules are developed from the foundational sources of Islamic law (the Qurʾān, the Sunnah (Hadīth), Ijmāʿ (scholarly consensus), and Qiyās (analogy).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

I consider myself a fortunate person who, during the course of my doctoral research, have had immense support from several people at UCL Laws and beyond.

Having good supervisors can sometimes be a gamble, yet I have been lucky to have worked under the supervision of two excellent academics, Professor Cheryl Thomas and Professor Ronan McCrea. Both Profs Thomas and McCrea believed in me and supported my research since its inception. I would also like to thank UCL and the Faculty of Laws for their generous scholarships that made this research possible (for the UCL-Yale and FRS awards).

My deep gratitude goes to my primary supervisor Professor Thomas for her unwavering support and for always believing in me, even at times when I did not believe in myself. Despite the difficulties I faced in conducting this research, she was always there to whole-heartedly provide me with her help and valuable insight. Under Professor Thomas’ supervision, I have matured and developed as an empirical researcher.

Sincere thanks is also owed to my dear colleague and friend Amr Soliman and the individuals and organisations who helped me with access to judges. I would like to thank in particular Mr Edward Donnelan, Ms Lama Karamé, Dr Tom Daly, l’Institut d’Études sur le Droit et la Justice dans les Sociétés Arabes, Ms Anna-Maria Balthnas and Ms Natacha Bracq at the International Bar Association, and the International Legal Assistance Consortium for their immense help.

I am most grateful to all the judges who participated in this study (whose names I cannot reveal for anonymity purposes). I thank you for making this study possible and for providing an insight into your honourable work.

Peace to all,
Sara
Chapter 1. Introduction

Judges in the Arab region (like any judges) are not mechanical appliers of the law.¹ By virtue of the social roles they occupy, they are inextricably linked with their societies. This is especially true for states with complex social and political histories; judges cannot be regarded as de-historicised figures of authority “when the rule of law is infused with rival visions of social relations”.² It is against this backdrop that this thesis examines the nature of the judicial role in Arab countries, and the extent to which “judicialisation” is occurring in the Arab Middle East. This thesis presents an inter-disciplinary inquiry into the roles Arab judges occupy, their background and experiences, their own views and perceptions of the power and significance of judges in the Arab Middle East.

Judges as political actors

The fundamental objective of this thesis is to embark on an agenda of empirical research that is oriented towards a better understanding of Arab judges. Specifically, the aim is to unite well-established theories of judicial politics and empirical data in order to explore Arab judicial roles and their political significance. This study relies primarily on judicialisation of politics from which hypotheses can be deduced and empirical data against which to test the validity of these hypotheses. A central purpose of this research is to take a phenomenological approach where subjective perceptions, in addition to formal descriptions, of judicial roles are considered. With this approach, the thesis aims to arrive at a more systematic and realistic understanding of the judicial functions in the Arab region.

Judicial politics³ is concerned with the study of courts and judges as political actors. Early 20th scholars, most notably in the US, began to argue that since

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¹ Ibid. p. 150.
² Ibid. p. 152
³ Judicial Politics is one of several labels that refers to the role and political significance of judges. See Whittington KE, Kelemen RD and Caldeira GA, Overview of Law and Politics the Study of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2011)
Courts and judges are part of the government, they are naturally part of the country’s political process: “the court is part of politics even if it is a court of law, because all law is part of politics”. The basic premise of judicial politics adopts the Aristotelian definition of politics, i.e. politics is understood as the affairs of the community in which citizens participate. Along these terms, politics does not refer to ideologies or rationalisations of the will of the majority. Rather, politics is understood as involving the creation and the pursuit of a moral community where law becomes an instrument and a product of this pursuit:

“The political jurist begins with what any fool could plainly see if his eyes were not beclouded by centuries of legal writing, that judges and courts are an integral part of government and politics [...] and are, therefore, first and foremost political actors and agencies”.

From this premise, law and legal institutions are understood as cogs of the political apparatus; and its actors - judges - are conceived of as political actors. Judges’ functions’ and outputs, therefore, are of importance as they directly or indirectly participate in the political sphere, because “law is a product of politics and judges are governors”. This participation is magnified at the highest courts since supreme (or apex) courts are the “titular head of the legal-political apparatus of the government”. It would therefore be erroneous to understand judges as mere mouthpieces of the law since they are part and parcel of the political process. Even if we were to perceive judges as law-interpreters, the judge will nonetheless participate in creating it. As Kelsen writes: “judicial decisions are not and can never be purely declaratory of the law”.

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Studies of courts and judges have grown rapidly in recent years and have begun to acquire international dimensions. According to Whittington et al., questions similar to those previously asked in the American judicial context are now being asked in democratic and non-democratic regimes alike: how do law and courts fit into the political and social environment?\textsuperscript{11} Although researchers have traditionally focused on explaining variation in judicial decision-making, contemporary judicial research is increasingly taking a broader approach to understand the political character of courts. Judicial politics research now involves analysing macro, meso and micro factors (both legal and extra-legal) that may have an impact on judicial activities (political significance). This thesis fits with this research trend in order to explore judicial functions and their political significance (in Aristotelian terms). It seeks to explore Arab judicial functions by utilising the theoretical framework of judicialisation of politics.

“Judicialisation of Politics”

“Judicialisation” of politics (or the politicisation of the judiciary) refers in general to the involvement of judges in regulating, influencing and creating political decisions. According to Vallinder, judicialisation has two core meanings. The first sees judicialisation as the process by which the powers of courts and judges expand and increasingly begin to dominate the making of public policies (that have previously been made by other branches of government).\textsuperscript{12} The second meaning refers to the process by which non-judicial decision-making forums become dominated by legal/judicial terminology, rules and procedures.\textsuperscript{13} Both meanings are a type of judicialisation that is “inextricable from law’s capture of social relationships and popular culture, and its expropriation of social conflicts”.\textsuperscript{14} As a consequence, courts and associated legal processes become a preferred venue for and are relied upon to offer solutions to the public. When the right circumstances exist, courts will have the

\textsuperscript{11} Whittington KE, Kelemen RD and Caldeira GA, \textit{Overview of Law and Politics the Study of Law and Politics} (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 6
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. p.13.
upper hand when the legislature is too fragmented to react.\textsuperscript{15} According to the “rights hypothesis”\textsuperscript{16}, courts can protect a wide range of values against political abuse mainly through “ordinary” constitutional rights jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{17}

While judicialisation may have first been explored in the American context, the social and political significance of the judiciary has now used to analyse the role of courts in contemporary modern democracies.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, judicialisation appears to be a phenomenon in states with a transitional democracy. For instance, several high courts in Latin American states have in recent years cast themselves as defenders of rights and chosen to intervene in significant political controversies.\textsuperscript{19} As for non-democratic states, the prevailing view seems to suggest that judicialisation is difficult to imagine. While recognising that the expansion of judicial power is on the rise around the world, Tate and Vallinder hold steadfast to the idea that a democracy is a prerequisite: “Perhaps the most important of these conditions is the presence of liberal democracy.”\textsuperscript{20} The belief is that in authoritarian regimes, it would be highly unlikely to even nominally allow independent judges to increase their participation in the making of major public policies or to tolerate judicial decision-making processes which place emphasis on legalistic procedural rules.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} For instance Guarnieri and Pederzoli write that “a democracy with strong judicial power is unquestionably a stronger democracy, since it is a polity where the rights of citizens are better protected[…] while it is not a new phenomenon in the United States, in recent years it has taken on increasing significance in European democracies, such as Britain and Germany, and especially in Latin European Countries such as France, Portugal, Spain, and Italy see Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.78.
\textsuperscript{19} Although judicialisation unfolds in a context that is in important ways different from that of developed countries with longer histories of centralization of power, resort to courts has been increasingly used by activists throughout the region as a “portal through which to import favorable international norms” see Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan Angell (eds), The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan 2005). p.5
The presence of democratic government therefore appears to be a necessary condition for the judicialisation of politics. The existence of written constitutional provisions for example, would facilitate judicialisation in terms of judicial protection of rights and liberties. This is because the effectiveness of rights provisions in contributing to social change in any given polity is largely contingent upon the existence of a support structure for legal mobilisation, and more generally, socio-cultural conditions that are hospitable to judicialisation. These are usually understood to prevail only alongside democratic governments.

**Judicialisation beyond Western liberal democracies**

Recent literature suggests that judicialisation may in fact be regarded as a worldwide phenomenon and may exist despite the authoritarian character of some states. According to Hirschl, there is an increasing reliance on judges and courts to deal with core political controversies, including in non-democratic states. He terms this the “judicialisation of mega-politics”, where he distinguishes between judicial involvement relating to procedural justice issues (basic “judicialisation”) and judicial involvement in substantive moral dilemmas affecting the whole nation (“mega-politics”). “Judicialisation of mega-politics” is a type of judicialisation that takes on an extreme shape that “exceeds any previous limit”. Hirschl calls this a “juristocracy” in which courts decide on watershed political questions that face a nation. Hirschl’s concepts arguably describes a form of judicialisation that is un-democratic in character. Hirschl’s concept of “juristocracy” or “mega-politics” may capture some cases of judicialisation in the Arab Middle-East, particularly the role played by Egyptian

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22 Peter H Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes” (2007) 60 World Politics, p.122
23 Hirschl lists subcategories of this type some of which relates to a judicialization of electoral processes; judicial scrutiny of executive branch prerogatives; Judicialization of formative collective identity, Hirschl argues that this is the most problematic type of judicialisation from a constitutional theory standpoint. See Ran Hirschl, “The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide” (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 721,
24 Ibid. p.723
25 Ibid.
courts during the so-called Arab Spring. Brown for example describes the Egyptian judiciary along the lines of Hirschl’s juristocracy where:

“the judiciary went beyond resisting partisan oversight and tried to make itself self-perpetuating to a degree that undermined democratic mechanisms. Judges had the means not merely to defend against encroachments on judicial turf by parliament and the presidency, but to undermine these institutions by striking at their legal basis.”  

The recent political and social conflicts in many Arab states did not arise in a vacuum, nor were they the first instances of protest in the region. Historical experiences of occupation and colonialism, followed by varying efforts of independence, have made a lasting impact on the political and legal orders of a number of Arab states. Although the political character of courts may have been exacerbated during the Arab Spring, their political role and significance was not a phenomenon arising out of it. The impression that the Arab Spring constituted a judicial rupture fails to capture the complexity of judicial roles in the region.

A critical question examined in this study is whether there are other less controversial examples of judicialisation that can be seen in Arab states. Specifically, the aim is to explore whether or not judges and courts in the Arab Middle East have “political” dimensions attached to them as a result of the historical, religious, social and cultural developments of the region. In doing so the thesis explores the following questions about judicialisation in the Arab Middle East:

- Is the judicial role in Arab jurisdictions different from Western judges?
- Have courts in the Arab region always been a preferred venue for and relied upon to offer solutions to the public?

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27 Sultany for example, argues that there was no qualitative change in terms of judicial tasks before and during the Arab Spring, and that the difference has been one of “degree rather than kind” Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017, p.150
• Is it possible that the socio-cultural conditions in Arab states have always been hospitable to judicialisation, despite the lack of a liberal democratic government?
• If so, does this suggest that judicialisation is not exclusively a trait of contemporary democracies or is it a new phenomenon arising out of the "rights hypothesis"?

This thesis sets out to examine the various strands of judicialisation that may operate within the Arab region, the sources of such powers for courts and judges in the region and whether the way Arab judges view their role provides further evidence of judicialisation in the Arab Middle East.

Research questions
As mentioned above, this thesis is intended to contribute to our understanding of Arab judicial roles as political actors. It draws on established research procedures found in judicial studies that has sought to study courts as part of the political system and to investigate individual behaviour of judges. In other words, the thesis sets out to explore judges and courts in the Arab region by using three modes of analysis found in judicialisation of politics: institutional, functional and behavioural. The foundational research questions of this research are as follows:

1. Does the composition and organisation of courts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan indicate a judicialisation of politics?
2. Does judicial selection, training, career, and discipline in the Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, Lebanese and Jordanian judiciaries promote or impede judicial activism?
3. What are judges prior (and concurrent) career experiences and sources of individualisation?
4. How may these affect judicial role perceptions of Arab judges?
5. What norms and expectations might Arab judges have about their jobs as judges?
6. To what extend does individual judges identify themselves as part of a judicial collective?
7. What norms and expectations might Arab judges have towards their peers within the judicial community and towards non-judicial actors?

Assessing the political significance of judges

It has been argued that three key elements affect the political significance of the courts: (1) the structure of the judicial system in which judges operate\(^{28}\), (2) judicial career structures\(^{29}\) and (3) judicial role conceptions.\(^{30}\) This thesis provides the first detailed examination of each of these three elements in relation to the Arab Middle East.

Judicial system

The aim of this thesis does not seek to explore judicial roles in isolation, but rather, Arab judicial roles in context. In order to do so, the context in which judges are found, the judicial system must also be considered. In particular, how the institutions are arranged and the limits placed on judicial activities:

> “Institutions typically have formal and relatively explicit informal expectations that are reinforced through incentive and sanctioning mechanisms. Institutional expectations always serve to limit choice and discretion on the part of the members of the institution.”\(^{31}\)

According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, a political system can use two different sets of instruments to exert influence on courts.\(^{32}\) One mechanism is an indirect strategy aimed at reducing the impact of judicial decisions by limiting court jurisdiction, and thereby restricting judges’ role in the resolution of political disputes.\(^{33}\) The second element that affects judges’ scope for political participation is the actual organisation of the judicial system.\(^{34}\) For instance, the greater power supreme (or apex) courts have in promoting greater


\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.


\(^{32}\) Ibid. p.79

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
coherence in the judicial system, the greater the likelihood is of that court being politically significant.

Generally, jurisdiction over cases can be described as either concentrated into a **unitary** system of courts or **fragmented** into a plurality of different courts with their own separate hierarchical structures.\(^{35}\) Rather than a unified system of courts with far-reaching jurisdictional scope, fragmented systems have exceptional courts running alongside the regular courts in which politically sensitive cases are channelled.\(^{36}\) As Guarnieri and Pederzoli explain, this type of fragmentation strategy usually limits the sphere of judicial action and is often adopted by authoritarian regimes to prevent ordinary judiciaries from direct involvement in political cases.\(^{37}\) In these types of situations, judicial autonomy only exists alongside a lack of political significance. The fragmentation of the judicial system can therefore be seen as a means of politically neutralising ordinary courts while preserving their institutional independence. As Toharia notes, here judges become “independent, because they are powerless”\(^{38}\).

A second element affecting judges’ scope of political participation relates to the actual organisation of the judicial system, including the existence (or non-existence) of judicial review of legislation.\(^{39}\) Conventionally, there are two models for the organisation of courts: (1) **co-ordinate systems** where lower and intermediate courts make the majority of decisions, and (2) **hierarchical systems**, where a substantial proportion of lower court decisions are re-examined by a final appellate court.\(^{40}\) The two models highlight the role of supreme (or apex) courts and the institutional mechanisms in place to reinforce

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35 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
their authority. A strong decision-making court at the top that is centripetal in nature will be better equipped to ensure the consistency of judicial decisions, and therefore the final court is more likely to be politically significant. By contrast, a court of final appeal with a centrifugal dynamic tends to reduce internal consistency by promoting autonomy of lower and intermediate courts – but resulting in lower political significance for the apex court itself.

This thesis maps the approaches to the jurisdiction and organisation of courts in four Arab Middle Eastern countries as a first step in exploring whether the actual structure of the judiciary may indicate a form of judicialisation.

**Judicial selection and career**

A second element that may affect the growth of judicial power relates to individual judges themselves, including the actors that may influence their guarantees of judicial independence. These are known in Western democracies to have a direct bearing on the interactions between the judiciary and its political environment. The institutional position of those in charge of selecting, training, and promoting judges will also have a bearing on the guarantees of judicial independence and thus the extent to which courts have political significance. Judicial selection and career patterns have an impact on judicial growth in at least two ways. First, the way judges are recruited affects the social and professional composition of the bench. Second, the structure of judicial recruitment can indicate as to what relationships the judiciary has with actors outside the judiciary. Here, emphasis is placed on the institutional mechanisms governing elements important for the independence of judges.

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41 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the relationship between courts and the relative strength of the highest courts in each of the four countries explored reflect different, but equally important, forms of political significance. A prime example of this in the Western context is the UK and France. Although the organization of courts and the interrelationship between courts in each country is structured differently, they reflect, albeit different, forms of judicialisation.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. Chapter 2 “Legal System”.

In the Western context, a distinction is generally made between two patterns of judicial recruitment: the bureaucratic model and the professional model of recruitment. The two patterns are said to reflect the continental European (civil law) and Anglo-American (common law) approaches, respectively. The bureaucratic model tends to recruit young candidates into the judiciary with little or no prior professional experience. In the bureaucratic model, socialisation is described as achieved almost exclusively from within. Upon entry into the judiciary candidates will learn the required norms and approved organisational behaviours in order to effectively participate in the judiciary. Career advancement under the bureaucratic model is competitive and granted according to formal criteria of seniority and merit where hierarchical superiors have a wide discretion. By contrast, in the professional model, entry into the judiciary is usually confined to individuals with extensive professional practice and experience in the law. Under the professional model, candidates have been socialised outside the judiciary and, although a degree of “resocialisation” can occur within the judiciary, candidates are more likely to bring values and experiences from outside the judiciary into their working life as judges. Candidates are also likely to maintain ties with their former colleagues in the legal profession. Under the professional model, there are no formal criteria for advancement and they occur less frequently compared to career advancement under the bureaucratic model. In addition, higher-ranking judges tend to exert influence in the promotion of judges from lower ranks.

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46 Ibid. p.81
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. p.66.
Guarnieri and Pederzoli argue that in both models courts are not insulated from the political environment.\textsuperscript{53} For a professional judiciary, “influence of the political system is channelled primarily through the appointment process”\textsuperscript{54}, whereas in a bureaucratic judiciary, the “political influence is filtered through the hierarchical structure and procedures for career advancements”.\textsuperscript{55} To gain a fuller understanding of judicial selection and career patterns, this thesis sets out, for the first time, the variety of approaches used in four Arab Middle Eastern judiciaries. The two traditional models of recruitment are compared and contrasted with those in the region in order to assess whether they can be accurately used in the region.

**Judicial role conceptions**

Judges’ willingness to take on a politically significant role is also a key factor in the political significance of courts. This third element falls under the framework of role theory, and it relates to individual judges themselves and how they conceive of their roles as judges. It includes individual judges’ beliefs about the qualities, behaviours and characteristics suitable for a judicial role.\textsuperscript{56} Within this framework, judges’ role perceptions relate to the subjective aspect found in the mind of the individual judge.

In this study, how Arab judges subjectively understand and conceive of their roles is explored in three ways. The first element examines judges’ own **personalities and capacities**, which relates to the processes through which attitudes, values and role conceptions are acquired.\textsuperscript{57} The second element involves an examination of the possible **objectives** judges perceive as important in the performance of their judicial roles. Included in these objectives

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\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. p.64.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. p.66.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Central to role theory is the idea of role expectations which is understood to be the beliefs concerning the qualities, behaviours, and characteristics suitable to a specific social role. See generally Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979)
\textsuperscript{57} James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.26
are norms that guide their behaviour. By extension, they also include the individual judge’s internalised impressions of societal norms and expectations of what constitutes the role of a judge. The third element relates to individual judges’ expectations of what constitutes proper judicial behaviour in relation to other judges (judicial peers) and other politically significant people outside judiciary (non-judicial actors). In this thesis all three elements are examined for the first time from the individual Arab judge’s viewpoint as a further step in seeking insight into the political significance of judges and courts in the region.

Are judges human? The development of judicial behaviouralism

This thesis fits within the body of judicial scholarship that sees judges not as mechanical appliers of the law but as human beings. During the first half of the 20th century, American legal and political scholars increasingly began to challenge the traditional understanding of judges as “value-free technicians who do no more than discover the law”. Early works viewed the judicial process as “situated in a political context and saw judicial decision-making as influenced by overtly political factors”. This view was based on the premise that the unique features of the American common law tradition rendered judges and courts susceptible to political pressure.

58 “Generalised other” is George Herbert Mead’s term for the collection of roles and attitudes that people use as a reference point for figuring out how to behave in a given situation. See generally George Herbert Mead, Charles W Morris and George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Univ of Chicago Press 2000).
61 For Haines who was a legal realist, judicial decisions were political acts by virtue of the law itself which was a ‘process for constructing political values and legal interpretation was always influenced by dee political forces that shaped judicial attitudes at the affective and cognitive level’ Because elected institutions ‘believe they may be able to achieve their aims through judicial decisions, often on much better terms than via other branches’. See Cornell W Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (University of Chicago Press 1999), p. 21.
Early empirical studies, such as those of Haines and Pritchett⁶² drew inspiration from psychological and sociological theories on human behaviour in order to challenge the mechanistic model of judging espoused by legal formalism.⁶³ As Haines wrote:

“And a complex thing like a judicial decision involves factors, personal and legal, which carry us to the very roots of human nature and human conduct. Political prejudices, the influences of narrow and limited legal training with antiquated legal principles and traditions, or class bias having little or no relation to wealth or property interests, are more likely to affect the decisions of judges than so-called ‘economic interests’.”⁶⁴

The “behavioural revolution” of the 20th century generated numerous studies of judicial and court behaviour in the U.S, exploring whether policy preferences and partisan influences were related to judicial voting behaviour⁶⁵. In analysing U.S Supreme Court decisions, scholars began to recognise that “decisions made by judges appeared to be correlated to extra-legal attributes such as background, training and personality”.⁶⁶ Maveety argues that this behavioural revolution of the 1940s and 1950s was the most important point in the development of the discipline of political science.⁶⁷ This new movement endeavoured to understand judges as political actors and centred around “judges’ concern with the content of their decisions” aimed at discovering

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⁶⁵ American judges have been affected by the evolution of the American political system. The unique features of the American common law judicial system, and in particular the political nature the judiciary, have made the judiciary susceptible to political pressure because elected institutions “believe they may be able to achieve their aims through judicial decisions, often on much better terms than via other branches. Nancy Maveety (ed), The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (University of Michigan Press 2003), p.9.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p.3.

⁶⁷ The “behavioural political science” movement was directed towards a more scientific and positivist practice of political inquiry. It marked a break from the traditional doctrinal school of thought that sought to emphasise theory and method and was, in Dahl’s words, “a protest movement against traditional political science”. See Robert A Dahl, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest” (1961) 55 American Political Science Review, p.763.
“political values that underlie judicial decisions”.68 Scholars have taken different approaches and used different methods in seeking to explore what judges do and why they do it. Although this has contributed towards scholarly understanding of judicial decision-making, no single approach or comprehensive theory has emerged as definitive in explaining the role and significance of judges.

**Understanding the role of judges in the Arab Middle East**

Social constraints and the types of expectations society will have on judges are partly determined by the particular attributes of the society in which the judge works. In other words, the judge’s role is determined by his/her society’s reality.69 Understanding the social context in which Arab judges operate is a complex endeavour. Behind the impression of a seemingly homogenous region, Arabic-speaking countries are both diverse and similar. The region is usually characterised by two common attributes: the dominant use of the Arabic language and the predominant adherence to the Islamic religion. However, on closer inspection, these attributes are themselves diverse. Islam varies widely across the region in several respects, such as practice, legal and theological orientation.70 Moreover, the religion’s role and significance in government and society differs from one Arab society to the next.71 The Arabic language spoken by 250 million people across the world is also dialectically different in its everyday usage.72 Modern “Arab countries” are divided along ethnicities, religious beliefs and culture. They are a result of a mixture of African, Hellenic, Roman, Ottoman and European influences.73 And the legal environment in the region reveals a similar complexity. Arab legal systems have never remained static: they have been subject to constant transformation.

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71 Ibid.
72 James Lane, “The 10 Most Spoken Languages In The World” [2016] *Babbel Magazine*.
73 Leila Rezk, “Monde Arabe et Diversité Culturelle -Les Enjeux de La Diversité Culturelle Au Nord et Au Sud” p.4
and re-development.\textsuperscript{74} To explore the political significance of Arab judges and courts requires an understanding of this diversity of legal approaches and histories in the region.

**Western conceptions of the Arab judge**

The Arabic word for a judge is \textit{Qāḍī},\textsuperscript{75} and for over 1400 years the \textit{Qāḍī} has occupied an important social role in Arab societies\textsuperscript{76}. But Western conceptions of the Arab judge have often been clouded by a false perception of the Muslim \textit{Qāḍī}. In 1906 American legal scholar Roscoe Pound\textsuperscript{77}, warning of the implications of widening judicial discretion, wrote:

> “The judge, bound hand and foot by a code and the maxim that law is best which leaves least to the discretion of the judge, is our natural goal, not the oriental cadi administering justice at the city gate by the light tempered by the state of his digestion for the time being.”\textsuperscript{78}

In 1949, US Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter invoked a clearly pejorative view of the \textit{Qāḍī} to argue that the Supreme Court was a court of review and not a tribunal unbounded by rules: “We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency”.\textsuperscript{79}

This image of the Muslim \textit{Qāḍī} dispensing “oriental justice” as whimsical and unbound by rules is not uncommon. Throughout the 19th century and well into the present century, the \textit{Qāḍī} has served as a yardstick for assessing the nature of judicial discretion. When Western jurisprudence shifted away from concern with natural law to emphasise procedure, code, and appellate

\textsuperscript{74} This transformation and re-development of Arab legal systems is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 5.
\textsuperscript{75} There are different Latin spellings of \textit{Qāḍī} such as “cadi”, “kadi”, “kazi”. The study however will use \textit{Qāḍī} throughout.
\textsuperscript{76} The history and significance of the Islamic \textit{Qāḍī} is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{77} Roscoe Pound (1870 –1964) was one of the leading figures of 20th century American legal and jurisprudential thought.
\textsuperscript{79} 337 U.S. 1 (69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131) \textit{Terminiello v. City of Chicago}. No. 272. (1949). Here Frankfurter was echoing Lord Justice Goodard of the English Court of Appeal.
hierarchy, so too did the idea of natural justice. Perhaps the most famous usage of “Qāḍī-Justice” was attributed to Max Weber. Surveying other forms of law and legal thought, Weber found in Islamic law a failure to generate a system of general rules and, in Qāḍīs, a lack of resort to an established body of legal doctrine. Qāḍī-justice, in other words, had no rational rules of decision, and predictability was at a minimum.

The term “Qāḍī-Justice” still appears in use today in legal scholarship. Klabbers writes that the use of the term “Kadi justice” usually carries a pejorative meaning. It is thought of as the “impoverished cousin of true justice”, whereas true justice has something to do with the rule of law:

“whatever its contents, [true justice] has to be rule-based. The Kantian legacy exercises a strong hold on legal and philosophical minds alike. Kadi justice, by contrast, is explicitly not rule-based, and therewith considered somehow less useful in our day and age.”

The colouring of the Qāḍī in a negative hue is an unfortunate description of judges’ work in the Arab region, and it results in the role of Qāḍī being erroneously portrayed. It ignores more than five centuries of judicial practice that is characterised by diversity in opinion as well as practice. Not all Western jurists have ignored this rich history. In “Are Judges Human?” Jerome Frank noted that the use of “Kadi-justice” has become something of a curse. He admitted that while he knew little about the administration of justice by Qāḍīs, he knew that:

“[R]ules and the like play much the same part in the theory of Mohammedan justice as in our own; that no more than in France, Germany, England or the United States, is the judge in Mohammedan countries supposed to decide cases arbitrarily.”

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82 Ibid, p.823
84 Ibid. p.7.
85 Frank continues “…and if someone happens to say in his presence that of course judges are incurably human and that their background and personality affect all their thinking and therefore their decisions, the Dicksonian will pronounce with Pound and Dickinson, the fatal
“Rules and the like” have been, and continue to be, equally important in dispensing justice in the Arab Middle East, including for Qāḍīs, whether they are religious or state judges. On this basis, this thesis aims seeks to offer a more nuanced view of judicial roles in the region, including how they perceive their functions.

Thesis aims and organisation
The main aim of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the political significance of judges and courts in the Arab Middle East. In order to do so it has three more specific objectives:

- To develop a typology of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East that highlights the political significance of courts and judges, and explore the extent to which this typology differs from existing typologies of judicial systems in Western democracies;
- To understand how the selection, training and careers of Arab judges may affect their political significance, drawing not just on formal explanations of these processes but also on the actual experiences of Arab judges based on new empirical research; and
- To develop an understanding of Arab judicial role conceptions (including their political role) through the first survey undertaken of judges across the Arab Middle East on this topic.

The next chapter, Chapter 2, considers literature on judicial role conceptions and how judicial role conceptions can be important for the political significance of judges. The chapter also explores “ideal” qualities and attributes of Arab judges found in the region’s cultural, religious and legal principles.

Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of the development of the judicial role and function in different countries of the Arab Middle East. The chapter

explores distinct long-term historical processes of judicial development that eventually resulted in the adoption and accommodation of two main judicial role conceptions: a religious-based conception of the judge and a “secular” based conception. With varying degrees, both role conceptions have contributed to the present judicial function in the region. Two formative phases in the evolution of the judicial role in the region are covered. The first phase traces the historical development of Islamic-based conceptions of the judicial role. The second phase explores the evolution of the Arab judicial role during the Ottomans and the colonial and post-colonial periods. The two phases are important historical factors for understanding the origins of the concept of a judge in the region, and they set the stage for the following chapters which explore current Arab judicial roles.

Chapter 4 outlines the different elements of the mixed methods approach adopted in this thesis. First, it sets out how the unique mapping and characterisation of Arab judicial systems was developed in this thesis. The chapter then sets out the empirical methods used in profiling the background of judges in the region, and it then explains the conceptual basis for and the empirical methods used in the survey of judicial attitudes on role conceptions in the Arab Middle East.

Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 all present results of the research. Chapter 5 sets out a new typology of Arab judicial systems. It focuses primarily on the judiciary in four Arab states: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan. The chapter argues that these four judicial systems reflect the range of different judicial models in the region that affect the political significance of judges and courts.

Focusing on the four Arab states identified in Chapter 5 as judicial system “models”, Chapter 6 examines judicial selection, career and discipline in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan as a means of exploring socialisation

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86 A “secular” judicial role is in itself a problematic concept, particularly in the Arab region where secularism is often associated with Western legal thought. However, in this study, a secular based conception of the judge encompasses several concepts that originate within the Arab region as well as those influenced from the West.
patterns that occur within these judiciaries. To understand the nature of judicial selection and career for Arab judges, the chapter draws on primary source documents from the region. But given the limited nature of official information sources on this topic, the chapter also draws on additional information gathered specifically for this thesis through an analysis of over one hundred Arab judges' professional profiles obtained from the online professional social network, LinkedIn.

Chapter 7 explores the personal background of Arab judges; in particular, their prior education and professional experience before entering the judiciary. The chapter uses primary data from the analysis of Arab judges' professional profiles on LinkedIn. The results in this chapter are meant to provide an initial insight into the educational and professional background of Arab judges in the absence of any other sources of information on this issue.

Chapters 8 and 9 examine Arab judicial role perceptions, predominantly of judges from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon, based on findings from an online survey of Arab judges (the Arab Judges Survey) conducted for this thesis. Chapter 8 focuses on how Arab judges perceive their role in relation to the law and public policy, exploring the extent to which these judges appear to adopt positions of judicial activism or judicial restraint. This chapter also compares these findings from the Arab Judges Survey with similar studies of judicial role perceptions in common and civil law jurisdictions.

Chapter 9 further explores Arab judicial role conceptions by examining Arab judges' views of what constitutes the "proper" behaviour of a judge towards two key groups in their respective countries: (1) their judicial peers and (2) important non-judicial actors such as the executive, religious authorities and the public. The findings in this chapter are from the Arab Judges Survey conducted for this research.
The final chapter (Chapter 10) attempts to synthesise all the research findings to address the central question in this thesis: how can we begin to understand the role and significance of judges in the Arab Middle East?
Chapter 2. Judicial role conceptions and the political significance of judges

Judges have a social function that is interdependent with their society.87 This manifests itself in complex arrangements such as judicial systems, judicial roles and judicial identities.88 Therefore, any understanding of the judge and the judicial function (in the Arab Middle East and elsewhere) ought to consider the assumptions widely held within a particular society about judges.89 This chapter explores how and why the way judges’ see their role (judicial role conceptions) are important for the political significance of judges.

Judicial roles

Like any jurisdiction, there are social norms, rules and demands that prescribe the role of judges in the Arab Middle East. The judicial systems across the region exercise a degree of institutional control over judges.90 Despite this control, roles are occupied by individuals who play an active part in the innovation and creation of their own judicial roles.91 An individual judge’s own

87 According to the sociologist, Berger, society is understood as a product of human activity that has eventually attained the status of objective reality. See Peter L Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion* (Penguin 1973) p.21.
88 Berger writes that, by extension, social roles and institutions are representations of these objectivised meanings. They are also manifested in the roles that the individual is expected to play because “the objective description of the role so dictates”. Peter L Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion* (Penguin 1973) Ibid.
89 According to anthropologist Ruth Benedict, this is because “human behaviour will take the forms those institutions suggest, even to extremes of which the observer, deep-dyed in the culture of which he is a part, can have no intimation.” See Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (1st Mariner Books ed, Houghton Mifflin 2005) 207. See also Bruce J Biddle, *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors* (Academic Press 1979) p.98.
91 The term “socialisation” is often understood as referring to the ongoing process by which individuals learn “the values, norms, and required behaviours that allow them to participate as members of organizations”. However, this definition is narrow in scope and fails to account for individuals who actively innovate and create roles for themselves within the organisation. See Porter et al., for instance, coin the term “individualization” where socialisation experiences “result in creativity, innovation, and contributions to the organization (as opposed to passive
personal attributes and experiences may therefore help to shape his/her judicial role. For instance, the values and knowledge judges acquire from educational and professional experiences before entry to the judiciary may affect the extent to which an individual judge actually shapes his/her judicial role.

Part of the judicial role conception includes those objectives individual judges perceive as important for the judicial office. Included in these objectives are all the norms that guide individual judges’ behaviour. By extension, they also include judges’ internalised impressions of societal norms and expectations of what constitutes the role of a judge. These impressions are the individual judge’s own understanding of the kind of behaviour they should exhibit in the performance of their duties. In other words, they relate to a judge’s subjectively held beliefs of what he/she “ought to do” as a judge.92

These judicial objectives and role conceptions are important to explore because of the insight they may provide into the inner workings of a court. For instance, judges often work in groups where they must agree on basic norms in order to carry out their judicial functions. At the minimum, there must be a “singularity of purpose” among judges in a court, which would be disrupted without the existence of some acceptance of rules regulating an individual judge’s treatment of his/her judicial colleagues.93 Judicial role conceptions may also influence judges’ interactions with other people external to the judicial system. As Glick points out: “believing that one of his purposes as a judge is to be active in community affairs, for example, may predispose a judge to develop a close relationship with certain non-court personnel”.94

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94 Ibid. p.47.
Individual judges’ objectives may also provide insight into what methods they deem appropriate in the realisation of those objectives. This goes back to what is assumed to constitute the core element of any judicial function: adjudication and case-disposition. Judges’ decisions through adjudication are the activities that have the greatest tangible effect outside the legal system. And it is, therefore, crucial to identify what the main criteria are for a judge in reaching his/her decision in court:

“Judges invariably feel constrained by previous decisions taken by other judicial decisionmakers. Some judges, however, feel more constrained than others. Some believe that adequate precedents exist for all potential problems that may be brought to them. Others feel that they must use additional considerations in order to make their rulings, including such factors as the needs of society as well as their own sense of justice.”

Judges’ value preferences during decision-making are assumed to be inextricably linked with their overall objectives, and the factors they consider as important during the decision-making process may have tangible effects outside the justice sector. Glick, for instance, argues that judicial decisions are vital channels through which the court interacts with actors in the political process. This means it is important to identify what values direct and influence judges’ decision-making for two reasons. First, they may uncover what objectives they have as judges and, second, because they set the tone for judicial interaction in the political process.

One prevalent approach to studying the judicial role has been to measure judges’ role orientations on the basis of specific role perception categories. The underlying purpose behind the role orientation categories is to identify the degree of judicial creativity judges may afford themselves in the performance of their roles. The orientations are distributed along a continuum (see Figure

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1) that ranges from judicial restraint at one end of the spectrum (following precedent, strict construction of constitutions and deference to legislative intent) to judicial activism at the other end of the spectrum (insubordination of precedents, statutes, and deference to personal attitudes, values, and goals). 98

Figure 1. Judicial role orientations by elements of judicial creativity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judicial restraint</th>
<th>Judicial activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law, precedent, legal rules</td>
<td>Public attitudes, policy considerations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three key studies

The study of Arab judges’ role conceptions in this thesis draws on three earlier studies of judicial roles: Ungs and Baas; 99 Flango et al.; 100 and Guarnieri and Pederzoli.101 What these studies have in common is that they disregard the traditional distinction between civil and common law judges. In particular, the results of empirical studies by Ungs and Baas and Flango shows that different role orientations are found in judges in both civil and common law jurisdictions. This challenges the view that some role orientations are particular to the civil tradition and others are particular to the common law tradition.

In a 1975 study, Ungs and Baas examined judicial role perceptions among lower court judges in the American state of Ohio. The authors assessed judges’ role orientations based on four distinct categories they derived from analysing literature and judicial opinions. These were: “Law interpreter”,

“Administrator”, “Adjudicator” and “Law maker”. They found all four orientations among their sample of American state judges, but they found that the “law- interpreter” role was the dominant orientation. ¹⁰²

With the aim to widen the field of judicial behaviour beyond the common law traditions, Flango et al. conducted a (postal) survey of 97 German-speaking mid-level appellate judges in Austria (48 judges) and Switzerland (49 judges). In the survey the authors repeated questions from a number of previous role theory studies of American judges. In their analysis of the survey findings, the authors identified two clearly distinguishable orientations for judges: (1) toward precedent and (2) toward the public judges serve.¹⁰³ The Flango study found that both dimensions appeared to be present among the Swiss and Austrian judges that took part in the survey. The authors also combined these two dimensions to create four distinct role orientations among their sample of European civil law judges: “Law-applier”, “Law-extender”, “Mediator” and “Policy maker”. Austrian and Swiss judges demonstrated both similar and different role orientations to American common law judges, and the findings called into question “the traditional assertion that civil and common law judges regard their functions differently”.¹⁰⁴

A more recent study by Guarnieri and Pederzoli on the power of judges in Western liberal democracies argues that the trend towards expanding the political significance of courts (judicialisation) has helped to weaken traditional judicial role conceptions.¹⁰⁵ In their view, the trend towards judicialisation has

¹⁰² Through their analysis, the authors "discovered" two other orientations not included in the original typology: the "trial judge" and the "peacekeeper", which according to Scheb is a hybrid containing features of several of the originally posited types. See John M Scheb, "Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: Q- Technique Study of the Florida State District Courts". p.93
made it more difficult to disregard the growing freedom judges enjoy in relation to the law and the legal system. With the aim to examine the relationship between courts and the broader political system, the authors set out a typology of four judicial role orientations based on two distinct dimensions. The first dimension, “judicial creativity”, relates to the extent to which judicial decisions are taken “on the basis of pre-existing substantive laws”\(^{106}\). The second dimension relates to the degree of judicial autonomy from political institutions\(^{107}\). From these two dimensions, Guarnieri and Pederzoli identify four distinct judicial role orientations, which they argue are useful for identifying the range of roles found inside any Western judiciary: the “Executor”, “Delegate”, “Guardian” and “Political” judge.

**Judicial role categories used in this study**

Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s terminology is adopted in this study of Arab judges’ role orientations. Although the judicial role orientations are labelled differently by the three key studies, they remain conceptually similar. This section describes the conceptual basis of the distinct judicial role orientations used by Ungs and Baas, Flango, and Guarnieri and Pederzoli, and Table 1 below shows how the different role terminologies compare.

**Table 1. Judicial role orientations and terminology used in three studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Orientation</th>
<th>Guarnieri &amp; Pederzoli (and this thesis)</th>
<th>Flango et al</th>
<th>Ungs &amp; Baas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Judicial Roles</strong></td>
<td>Restrained</td>
<td>Precedent</td>
<td>“Executor”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>“Delegate”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Guardian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Political”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{106}\) Ibid. p.69.

\(^{107}\) Ibid.
Executor judge

The first role orientation is considered as an ideal conception of the judge. Flango describes this judge as a “Law applier” and defines it as someone who does not consider the societal needs or the social consequences of judicial decision-making. For this judge, the judicial task “is expected to be focused on the legal prerequisites and skills of a judge”. Flango’s orientation is conceptually similar to Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s “Executor” judge. The “Executor” judge is described best according to Montesquieu’s definition of a judge: a passive executor of the legislative will or a mouthpiece of the law (bouche de la loi). This orientation is traditionally associated with judges in civil law traditions.

According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this judicial role was historically developed in conjunction with the institutional transformations of the French revolution and Napoleonic legal reforms. But the “Executor” role has also been found in common law jurisdictions. In their study of US state judges, Unger and Baas label this role “Law interpreter”, meaning a judge who characterises the judicial function as “involving only the interpretation of the law”. Moreover, the “Law interpreter” takes the view that legal precedent is the major criteria in decision-making and therefore “advocates judicial self-restraint as a necessary control over reading personal predilections into law”.

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109 Ibid. p.282.
114 Ibid. p. 346.
Delegate judge

Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s “Delegate” judge recognises the existence of judicial creativity, but this is only exercised “within the space left open by the political branches”.115 They describe this judicial role as a more realistic version of the “executor” judge; arguing that while a “mechanistic” judicial role might be desirable, it does not reflect an accurate nature of present judicial roles:

“[L]egal norms are not independent from the process of interpretation: they do not pre-date interpretation but assume meaning through the very process of interpretation, a process in which the judge obviously plays a strategic role.”116

The “Delegate” judge is similar to Flango’s “Law extender”. This type of judge, like the “Law applier”, “believes that nearly all cases can be decided using clear and relevant precedents as guides.”117 However, the “Law extender” is also conscious of the societal consequences of his/her judicial decisions. Seen in this way, the “law extender” is both "public regarding" and "law regarding."118 The “Delegate” and “Law extender” judge are also closely aligned with Unger and Baas’ “Administrator” judge. This type of judge pays close attention to judicial procedures, since they are as important as the decisions themselves.119 Unger and Baas describe the “Administrator” judge as someone who “disclaims reliance on abstract ideas of right and justice”.120 And while the “Administrator” judge recognises that precedent is significant: “its importance is measured less as the required criteria for decision than as a means to assure reliability and certainty in decisions so that litigants can have faith in the continuity of the law”.121

116 Ibid.
118 Ibid. p. 282.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
Guardian judge

The “Guardian” judge is closer to the “judicial activism” end of the spectrum than the “judicial restraint” end. This orientation describes the role of a judge as a “moral force in the community”. For Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this orientation exists where courts have powers of judicial review, and “where the main task of the judge is to defend individual or minority rights from abuses by the political branches and the majorities in control of them.” Flango calls this role a “Mediator”, and describes it as someone who places less confidence in the possibility of finding a clear and relevant precedent for every case encountered. The “Guardian” judge is also similar to Unger and Baas’ “Adjudicator” judge, where the “prototype goals” of the judge are to balance contending principles, evaluate the conditions in society, and act as a decision maker to achieve the welfare of society. In achieving these goals, the “Adjudicator” judge seeks to understand and appreciate the changing social forces and environments that guide the judge in his/her decisions.

Political judge

The “Political” judge is clearly positioned at the judicial activism end of the spectrum. Guarnieri and Pederzoli describe the “Political” judge, as someone who is independent from both the political and legal system, and this strengthens his/her capacity for political intervention. Judges belonging to

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122 This role conceives the judge as someone who protects the people from external threats or unwise values. According to Glick, the judge will at times even protect the people from themselves. The general justification for this orientation is that social peace and constitutional government require a judicial orientation in which the judge performs a function as a protector of social norms and, where necessary, is a creator of them by using the procedural mechanisms available. See Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A Study of American State Judges. (PhD Tulane University 1967), p. 60.
126 Ibid. p. 347.
this role “act as true policy-makers developing rules based on judgments of social benefit”. The qualitative distinction between the “Guardian” judge and the “Political” judge is that the “Guardian” relies on available procedural mechanisms in deciding cases, whereas the decision-making of the “Political” judge often involves the judge’s personal views. Flango labels this orientation as a “Policy-maker”, where the judge is unfettered by deference to precedent:

“Because precedents are often available to support both sides of any controversy, this type of judge may believe that he cannot help ‘making law’, and in doing so must necessarily be guided, in part, by a personal conception of justice.”

Ungs and Baas label this judicial role orientation the “Law-maker”, where attitudes and experiences of the individual judge form part of the judge’s primary function (judicial decision-making and case-disposition). Ungs and Baas describe this judge’s goals as usually defined “in terms of the pursuit of his own conception of justice as applied to particular cases.”

**The ideal Arab judge**

An important part of official laws associated with the judicial role is the basis they create for an “ideal judge”. According to Glick, they form an important part of consensual norms because they “establish fundamental personal characteristics which are the bases of more specialized interactions on the court”. The four Arab countries examined in detail in this thesis have laws and official provisions that regulate judicial conduct within and outside the legal system. Formal enactments provide for skeletal definitions for judges in the Arab region, and there are also informal “but no less important rules” of judicial

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128 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
While little empirical information exists about Arab judges’ views of their appropriate relationships with each other or with important political non-judicial actors, there are numerous sources that set out the principles of ideal judicial behaviour.

Cultural and religious principles provide an important source of information about qualities and ideal attributes of Arab judges. One principle which is still in use and is quoted by judges and judiciaries extensively relates to the message of the Second Caliph of Islam, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, conveyed to his governor, Abū Musā al-Ash’arī, on the conduct of a judge.\(^ {134}\) The letters were written around 17-29 years after the Prophet Muḥammad’s death and remain a template for judges in the Arab region:

“Act impartially between the people in your audience-room and before you, so that the man of noble status be not greedy for your partiality and the man of inferior status despair of justice from you;

Let not a judgment which you judged yesterday, but over which you re-consulted yourself and were guided to your rectitude, prevent you from retracting to justice, for nothing can invalidate justice. You must realise that retraction to justice is better than long persistence in a thing invalid;

Have care to avoid [anger] [concern] and annoyance with the litigants in the battlefields of justice in which God confers reward and makes goodly store […]”\(^ {135}\)

These are only some of ‘Umar’s instructions, which today are still highly esteemed and often quoted and adhered to by judges across the Arab region and in the wider Muslim communities.\(^ {136}\) In this way, principles of equality,
Impartiality and justice can be said to be deeply entrenched in the Muslim and Arab legal history that regulates judicial conduct.¹³⁷

In addition to the national codes that regulate judicial ethics, the 2007 Sharjah Convention is a regional document intended to be a morally guiding document for judges.¹³⁸ The Convention was drafted by a five-member committee composed of Heads of Judicial Inspectorates in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt. Part of the preamble translates as follows:

“Society has accorded the judiciary with dignity and a certain degree of sanctity. Judges are given important and serious powers where they issue binding decisions that impact the social order, the lives of individuals and their freedoms, dignity, property, money, obligations and duties. […]”¹³⁹

According to the Convention, with the evolution of the judiciary’s competences and powers, “norms, values, customs and traditions have been developed and broadened in order to strengthen their independence from other branches in the State.”¹⁴⁰ The Convention also draws inspiration from international instruments on judicial conduct, pre-dominantly from the 2002 Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.¹⁴¹ Intended to establish standards for the ethical conduct of judges, the Bangalore Principles include six core values:

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¹³⁷ Similarly, “Letter 53” of the fourth Caliph, Imam ‘Ali Bin Abi Talib (601 – 661 CE) contains specific advice on the selection of judges to Egypt’s governor, Malik al-Ashtar: “Beware! The utmost carefulness is to be exercised in its selection: for it is this high office which adventurous self-seekers aspire to secure and exploit in their selfish interests. After the selection of your chief judge, give careful consideration to the selection of other officers. Confirm them in their appointments after approved apprenticeship and probation. Never select men for responsible posts either out of any regard for personal connections or under any influence, for that might lead to injustice and corruption.” See generally Ali Paya and Hamid Tehrani, “Imam “Ali”s Theory of Justice Revisited” (2013) 6 Journal of Shi’ā Islamic Studies 5.


¹³⁹ Preamble, Sharjah Convention 2007.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid.
Independence, Impartiality, Integrity, Propriety, Equality, Competence and Diligence. The Sharjah Convention list all of these values with the exception of “Equality”. In addition to the Bangalore Principles, the Sharjah Convention include four more principles: Courage, Humility, Honesty and Honour.\(^{142}\) In the Sharjah Convention, each of the 8 values consist of several subcategories and descriptions. These are set out in Table 2.\(^{143}\)

\(^{142}\) The values in the Sharjah Convention are further reflected in some of the national codes of ethics, particularly for Jordan and Lebanon. The Jordanian Code of Judicial Ethics was issued by the Judicial Council in 2017 and replaced the 2014 Code of Judicial Ethics. The Code forms part of the Judicial Independence Law No. 29 of 2014. Lebanon’s Code of Judicial Ethics was adopted by the Ministry of Justice in 2005 as part of Resolution No 77/1.

\(^{143}\) An additional source of judicial ethics and behavior that is relevant in the region is in Chapter 1, Book 16 of the Ottoman Mejellet al Ahkam al Adilya (1876)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 1:</strong></td>
<td>• Strengthen the laws of the judiciary;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>• Strengthen the confidence in the judiciary;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Exercise the judicial functions in a way that promotes confidence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refrain from, and confront external pressures and influences;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Knowledge and application of the law;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have personal freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 2:</strong></td>
<td>• Impartial and neutral treatment of litigants, lawyers, fellow judicial colleagues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality and</td>
<td>• Endeavour to enhance confidence in the judicial role;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>• Recusal when there are serious grounds to believe that impartiality and fairness is compromised;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Respect the principles of fair trial and the right to defence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refrain from engaging in financial and commercial activities that may impair impartiality and integrity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Do not step down during the course of a trial or seek to withdraw judicial colleagues sitting in the same court;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitor personal behaviour and practice strict self-control, in court and in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 3:</strong></td>
<td>• Possess integrity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>• Take every effort to ensure that behaviour is free from suspicion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strive to be a role model for fellow colleagues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Always stay alert and cautious for anyone seeking to benefit from the judge because of the judicial tasks exercised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 4:</strong></td>
<td>• Respect the prestigious nature of the judicial role and make sure that behaviour will not undermine trust in the judicial institution;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriety</td>
<td>• Refrain from expressing personal, religious and political views;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refrain from publicly commenting on judicial decisions issued that would undermine the court's judgment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preservation of personal reputation and personality;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refrain from complaining about the nature of the judicial work;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Keeping court deliberations secret.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 5:</strong></td>
<td>• Be self-confident in declaring the law;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>• Possess conscience and wisdom;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Look to senior judges and jurists as models for behaviour;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Confront difficult and complex cases courageously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 6:</strong></td>
<td>• Distancing oneself from vanity, arrogance and hypocrisy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humility</td>
<td>• Avoid strong emotions such as anger, rage, and enthusiasm;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continuously strive to acquire more knowledge;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Refrain from boasting about the judicial office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 7:</strong></td>
<td>• Stay committed to the content of the judicial oath;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty and Honour</td>
<td>• Be honest towards colleagues, (particularly senior judges) and the parties to a dispute;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Avoid misinformation and exaggeration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle 8:</strong></td>
<td>• Qualified to perform his duties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence and</td>
<td>• Development of general knowledge beyond the law;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diligence</td>
<td>• Continually engage in legal research;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure that all judicial tasks are completed in the best possible manner;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Be active in judicial role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Relationships with other judges

One theme that arises from the Sharjah Convention concerns judges’ appropriate relationships with other judges. According to the Convention, judges must strive to be role models for their colleagues. Judges have a duty to encourage integrity among their peers and confront them when their integrity falters.145 A judge must be honest towards his/her judicial colleagues, particularly senior judges.146 Similarly, the Jordanian Judicial Code states that a judge must interact with superiors, colleagues and subordinates with respect and cooperation “that reflects the prestige of the judiciary and its reputation.”147

In addition to integrity, according to the Convention, Arab judges must self-monitor their behaviour in their professional and private lives. They must practice strict self-control within the court as well as in public in order to gain the confidence and respect of litigants, their agents (lawyers) and the public.148 Because judges are representatives of the judiciary, they must make sure that the judiciary is not distrusted or questioned. Judges should be careful not to place themselves in precarious situations and engage in behaviour that harms the judge’s and the judiciary’s reputation. This includes the judge expressing opinions on political, religious and ideological matters. Judges must also refrain from publicly commenting on judicial decisions.149 Judges are expected to be purely objective in the decision-making process at all times. The duty to maintain objectivity extends beyond the court, and judges are expected to isolate themselves from influences that might affect the image of justice and the dignity of the judicial profession.

These principles are not confined to the Arab region only; they form part of internationally accepted norms on judicial ethics. For instance, the Bangalore Principles endorses strong statements of impartiality and unbiased judging

146 “Principle 7: Honesty and Honour”, Ibid.
147 Art. 30, “Code of Judicial Conduct” 2017 (Jordan)
149 “Principle 4: Propriety”, Ibid.
inside the courtroom and in the wider public. A judge "shall ensure that his or her conduct maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."150

Although the national, regional and international codes of judicial conduct are laudable aspirations, there is a fundamental problem with them. They promote an unrealistic vision of judicial activity, and this is a vision that fits the conceptual role of the “Executor” judge as mere mouthpieces of the law.151 As discussed earlier, the “Executor” is an ideal conception of the judicial role. It espouses a well-defined and acceptable role conception of what a judge ought to be, that is: someone who does not consider the societal needs or the social consequences of judicial decision-making.152 The “Executor” judge “advocates judicial self-restraint as a necessary control over reading personal predilections into law”.153 This role is, however, widely recognised as unrealistic. This thesis attempts to empirically assess the extent to which Arab judges can in reality be categorised as “Executor”, “Delegate”, “Guardian” or “Political” judges.

**Speaking with one tongue**

Because judges often work in groups where members share the same role, there must be some minimal level of “working consensus”.154 Such working consensus may be based on two norms. The first set of norms relate to written prescriptions such as laws and rules of procedure that direct judges about how they are expected to act in certain situations. The second norm relates to unwritten but informally understood rules, which Wahlke et al. call “rules-of-the-game”.155 Taken together, these two norms indicate what the expected

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150 “Principle 2: Impartiality and Neutrality”, Ibid.
153 Baas and Ungs “Judicial Role perceptions: A Q-Technique”, p.345
155 Ibid. p.144
relationship with the individual judge vis-à-vis her/his colleagues should be according to the judicial collective.

Judges’ working in a group such as collegial court must agree on basic norms in order to carry out their judicial functions. According to Glick:

“The actual internal workings of the court could be disrupted, though, without the existence of some acceptance of rules regulating an individual's treatment of his fellow court members. With disagreement here, it might be very difficult for judges to move to the more specific area of agreeing on the way decisions should be reached.”156

Although the true internal workings of collegiate courts may be hidden from view by an artificial image of court unity (often promoted by the judiciary as a whole), judges sitting in the same court must agree on basic norms of conduct. “[Group norms] serve as points of reference or anchors from which [judges] can evaluate events”.157

**Actors beyond the legal community**

Other types of actors can play an important part in how judges think about their own role. In order to fully explore the judicial roles (and their significance) in the region, how judges perceive of those actors they are in frequent interaction with is also important. In role-theory, the relationship between role-holders (judges) and those holding counter-positions (“non-judges”) is taken into account. Just as judges may have expectations of their judicial colleagues and these help form their own role orientations, judges may also have expectations of other (non-judicial) actors and these also form part of judges’ role orientations.158

157 Ibid. p.113
158 A full exploration of judicial roles in the region would also seek to understand the expectations non-judicial actors have of judges’ role and function. This however is beyond the scope of this thesis.
An important characteristic of role theory is that it assumes the existence of interpersonal relations. While the overwhelming bulk of a judge’s work is within the confines of court and with his/her judicial colleagues, no judge is isolated from the outside world. Judges’ relationships with actors in the legal community is supposed to be conducted according to strict legal standards. According to Glick, judges are expected to decide the case in purely objective terms. Furthermore, judicial objectivity is also supposed to operate when judges are not sitting on the bench and judges are expected to “isolate themselves from influences which might affect their image of justice incarnation or which might skew their determination of a case”. As seen in the Sharjah Convention, judges are considered representatives of the judiciary and must therefore make sure that the dignity of the judiciary is not compromised when interacting outside court. However, contrary to the myth of absolute judicial isolation, judges do interact with actors beyond the legal community, through their decision-making and other activities. This is particularly true for judges in Arab states that have witnessed social and political upheavals in recent years. In Sultany’s view:

“The judiciary that upholds the rule of law is not an impartial arbiter because it is divided along political and professional lines that relate to political disputes and competing visions of the social order and the revolution. Thus although the judiciary provides a form of institutional continuity, given the lack of judicial reform, the law is intertwined with politics, and the judicial resolution of political disputes is contestable and not merely contested … [emphasis added].”

For Sultany, judges in states with revolutionary upheavals cannot be neutral because they form part of the social and political struggles they are supposed to regulate. While the type of external non-judicial actors may vary from

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161 Ibid. p.233
162 Under the third principle of integrity, integrity is described as the judge’s effort to strive to strengthen people’s confidence of the judiciary which is a top priority. “Principle 3: Integrity”, Sharjah Convention 2007.
country to country and the importance judges place on their relationships with external actors may also vary, three types of non-judicial actors are in particular considered and explored in this study: the wider public, religious authorities and the executive branch.

**Judges and the public**

An important relationship for judges that forms part of their core duties is their interaction with the public. In principle, judges are required to keep a distance from the community. For instance, under the fourth principle of the Sharjah Convention, judges are instructed to maintain a balance between their judicial duties and their engagement in society.164 According to Guarnieri, a judge cannot "deny justice", and in principle every citizen has the possibility to go to court with the legitimate expectation of receiving a judgment.165 Theoretically, this makes the judiciary a more accessible institution than the political branches. A recent study by the World Justice Project in 2018 found that 49% of 1000 Lebanese and 46% of 1001 Tunisians had experienced a legal problem in the past two years.166

How non-judicial individuals and groups perceive judges and the utility of courts can be an important factor in regulating interactions between the two.167 For instance, social and economic costs of litigation, delays in processing complaints and the existence of quasi-judicial institutions that can effectively process conflicts may foster court avoidance and thus promote a negative view of judges and courts. Although not true of all the Middle East, this may be particularly relevant where, in addition to the state courts, tribal mediators are

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164 “Principle 4: Propriety”, Sharjah Convention 2007
used for dispute resolution. In some countries, they also complement the civil legal system in several countries.\textsuperscript{168}

A 2017 study conducted by the Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) surveyed the public about its confidence in judges and courts in three countries in the Arab Middle East. Data included responses from approximately 6000 participants in each of three studies in Tunisia\textsuperscript{169}, Jordan\textsuperscript{170} and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{171} Table 3 below presents Hiil’s findings on the overall level of trust in courts across the three countries.\textsuperscript{172} In Jordan and Lebanon, respondents had similar levels of trust in informal justice mechanisms. In Jordan, trust in informal justice mechanisms such as tribal justice scored 3.9 out of 5 among the respondents and courts scored 3.8 out of 5. In Lebanon, trust in informal justice mechanisms scored 2.82 out of 5, and trust in courts scored 2.85 out of 5. In Tunisia there were higher levels of trust in courts (3.27 out of 5) than in informal justice mechanisms (2.84 out of 5).

\textsuperscript{168} For instance, tribal principles and processes of dispute resolution are used across Jordan, both in rural and urban areas. Among 6000 Jordanians surveyed for the HiiL report in 2017, the majority indicated that their solutions were achieved via a mediator/ conciliator or a decision of an adjudication authority.

\textsuperscript{169} Rodrigo Núñez, Martin Gramatikov, Sam Muller, Kavita Heijstek Ziemann, Martijn Kind, Nadja Kernchen, Roger El Khoury, Nicoleta Balau, “Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Tunisia” (The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiIL) 2017) Data and Impact

\textsuperscript{170} Rodrigo Núñez, Martin Gramatikov, Sam Muller, Kavita Heijstek Ziemann, Martijn Kind, Nadja Kernchen, Roger El Khoury, Nicoleta Balau, “Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Jordan” (The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiIL) 2017) Data and Impact.


\textsuperscript{172} In the three studies by HiiL, respondents were asked to rate five institutions by indicating to what extent they agreed with the following statement: “I trust [INSTITUTION] in [COUNTRY]”. The score range was from 1 (“Disagree strongly”) to 5 (“Agree strongly”).
Table 3. Average trust in informal justice and Courts on a score range of 1-5 (HiIL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal Justice Mechanisms</th>
<th>Jordan 173</th>
<th>Tunisia 174</th>
<th>Lebanon 175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=6001)</td>
<td>(n=6770)</td>
<td>(n=6000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same study also explored perceptions of courts across the three countries. Findings from Jordan and Lebanon are illustrated in Table 4 below where answers of “Agree strongly” and “Agree” are combined.

Table 4. Perceptions of courts in Jordan and Lebanon (HiIL) 176

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courts generally protect the interests of the rich and powerful</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts generally treat the people with respect</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts make fair, impartial decisions based on the evidence before them</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts generally explain their decisions and actions when asked</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=6001)</td>
<td>(n=6000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The public perception of courts in Jordan was more positive than in Lebanon, with two-thirds of respondents (67%) agreeing the courts generally treat the people with respect, over half (59%) agreeing courts are fair and impartial and explain their decisions (54%) and just under a majority (48%) agreeing that courts protect the interests of the rich and powerful above those of ordinary people. 177 In Lebanon, perceptions of courts were less positive with only a

173 (n 160) p.146
174 (n 159) p.178
175 (n 161) p.96
176 HiIL’s study in Tunisia did not explicitly indicate whether these three statements were part of the survey as in Jordan and Lebanon. Tunisia is therefore not included in Table 4.
minority saying that courts treat people with respect, make fair decision and explain decisions.\textsuperscript{178}

This thesis provides an additional perspective on the relationship between the public and judges in the Arab Middle East, by exploring the role of the public in judicial decision-making from the perspective of Arab judges themselves.

**Judges and the media**

Another (perhaps more controversial) relationship judges may have is with the media. Maintaining the dignity of the judiciary is a cornerstone in several Arab states. For example, a central theme in the Sharjah Convention focuses on the preservation of the dignity of the judicial community vis-à-vis the public and other branches of government.\textsuperscript{179} Under the third principle of integrity, judges must not “be drawn into futile arguments that are ill-suited to the honour of the judiciary”.\textsuperscript{180} Some national judicial codes of conduct in the region include similar principles. The Jordanian Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to exercise freedoms, provided that such activities do not compromise the reputation of his/her fellow judges and the dignity of the profession of the judiciary and its independence.\textsuperscript{181} In Egypt, judges must avoid any behavior (even if it is legal) that contradicts the dignity of the judiciary, privately and in his/her official capacity.\textsuperscript{182}

Several high judicial councils in the region have taken a strict approach to judges and the media, often under the guise of upholding the dignity of the judicial office. In Lebanon, the High Judicial Council has assumed the responsibility for scrutinising media outlets and issuing instructions in relation

\textsuperscript{178} Martijn Kind, Martin Gramatikov, Rodrigo Núñez, Roger El Khoury, Nadja Kernchen, “Justice Needs in Lebanon: Legal Problems in Daily Life” (The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact. p.97


\textsuperscript{180} “Principle 7: Honesty and Dignity”; Resolution No 77/1 “Code of Judicial Ethics”, 2005 (Lebanon) and; Chapter 1, Book 16 of the Ottoman Mejellet al Ahkam al Adilyia (1876)

\textsuperscript{181} Art 27, “Code of Judicial Conduct” 2017 (Jordan)

\textsuperscript{182} Art. 72 Law No 35/1984 (which amended Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), Egypt
to the coverage of the judiciary. For instance, the Council issued a statement calling for “necessary action” to be taken by the Public Prosecutor's Office in response to comments made by a satirical television show that, according to the statement, offended the Public Prosecutor and the judiciary.\(^{183}\) The Council stated that the show’s remarks were “an insult” to the judiciary and had the greatest repercussions on the reputation and prestige of the judiciary. The Council added that the protection of the dignity, reputation and prestige of the judiciary is paramount.\(^{184}\) According to Saghieh, this will “pave the way for broad interpretations based onimpeding freedom and transparency in the name of dignity, and for turning the [Judicial Council] into the guardian of judges’ reputations”.\(^{185}\)

The Egyptian Constitution states that interference in judicial affairs or in its proceedings is a crime to which no statute of limitations may be applied.\(^{186}\) The provision has been applied on several occasions particularly in relation to negative media coverage of the judiciary. In 2017, the Egyptian Judicial Council ordered a restriction on the publication of news related to judges and the judiciary in media outlets. Violating this decision, the Council stated, would lead to “disciplinary measures” and possible referral to other government entities. The Council has so far referred three violations to the prosecutor for alleged judicial misrepresentation.\(^{187}\) Senior Egyptian judges have also on occasion adopted a confrontational attitude towards media outlets. One notable example is the statement made by the chairman of the Egyptian


\(^{184}\) Ibid.


Judges’ Club, Ahmed el-Zind, in 2015. When asked in a television interview about a protest in which images of judges were burned, el-Zind commented: "We [judges], on the soil of this nation, are masters, while others are slaves. We will burn the heart of anyone who burns a judge's photograph."188

**Judicial links to the government**

The final actor that has generated considerable scholarly interest in the Arab region is judges’ relationship with the executive branch. Particularly, judicial reform projects that seek to modernise the administration of justice have often been of the view as having strong relationships with the executive. For instance, in its report on Arab judiciaries following the Arab Spring, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network summarises the nature of eight Arab judiciaries as follows:

“The hegemony of the executive authority over judicial authority: in spite of the fact that the constitutions of all the countries of the region have stipulated an article or more on the independence of judiciary [...] The legal mechanisms of this hegemony take place via the prerogatives given to the Ministry of Justice over the role of judicial councils in most of the countries (notably Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco)."189

Despite the existence of formal statements of judicial independence from the political branches in the Arab region, there appears to be a general understanding that Arab judges, in comparison with Western judiciaries, enjoy less independence.

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189 The report continues: “In this relationship, we find the executive authorities, mostly through the role of Minister of Justice, controls appointment, disciplinary actions against judges, judicial inspection, salaries, promotion, retirement, transfer or permission to work abroad (especially that the rich Gulf area countries ‘borrow’ judges from Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan in particular) or permission to be seconded to work as legal advisors with other government bodies; this situation gives the executive authorities a huge leverage on the judges’ economic and professional situation.” Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), “The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of Arab Spring” (2012), p.8
For Guarnieri and Pederzoli, judges often play a significant role in Western democracies by virtue of how the judicial system is organised, how judges’ conceive of their role and the increasingly political role assigned to judges by virtue of the structural set up of the judiciaries.\textsuperscript{190} In civil law judiciaries, the Higher Judicial Councils are intended to be self-governing bodies, but they have provided a conduit through which the judiciary’s representatives may develop new relationships with the political system.\textsuperscript{191} When this happens, according to Guarnieri and Pederzoli: “the connections between judges and the political system do influence judges’ reference groups, their conception of their judicial role, and therefore their decisions”.\textsuperscript{192}

This thesis explores the relationships between Arab judges and the political system through an assessment of court powers (Chapter 5) and socialisation processes, such as selection, training, evaluation and disciplinary proceedings (Chapter 6), educational and professional experiences obtained before joining the judiciary (Chapter 7), and Arab judges’ views of the importance of and appropriate role of government in judicial decision-making (Chapter 9).

**Summary**

Little is currently known about judicial roles in the Arab Middle East or about inter-judicial and extra-judicial relationships. As discussed in Chapter 1, Western perceptions of “Qāḍī justice” have long implied that Arab judges have little concern for precedent or legal rules in their decision-making, and that their decision-making is arbitrary, personal and expedient. This thesis sets out to understand the reality of the judicial role in the Arab Middle East, and this chapter has set out the conceptual background to understanding judicial role conceptions. Chapter 4 sets out the methodology this thesis adopts in attempting to understand judicial role conceptions in the Arab Middle East, and how these compare with what is already known about judicial roles in civil and


\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.p.52

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.p.68
common law judiciaries. It also sets out the methodology used in this study to
examine the expectations Arab judges have about the appropriate nature of
their relationships with other judges and important non-judicial actors in their
countries. Before discussing the methodology used to analyse the Arab judicial
role, the next chapter provides important historical background information
about the evolution of the role of the judge in the Arab region.
Chapter 3. Judiciaries in the Arab Middle East: A complex history

This chapter examines the historical evolution of the judicial role in the Arab Middle East in order to highlight the possible influences that exist today on judicial roles in the region. Drawing on secondary source materials, two phases in the evolution of the judicial role are covered in this chapter. The first phase traces the historical development of Islamic-based conceptions of the judicial role. The second phase explores the evolution of the Arab judicial role under the Ottomans, and the period following the independence of Arab states from primarily British and French colonial rule.

The chapter situates present judicial roles within an historical context and sets the stage for the following chapters in this thesis. In this chapter, focus is placed on the Arab Sunni legal tradition and its contribution to the judicial role in the Arab Middle East. The thesis is concerned with developments that are directly concerned with the origins of law and judicial practice in four countries whose judiciaries are examined in greatest detail in this thesis: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. The chapter’s focus on the Sunni legal tradition also means there is less attention paid to the contribution of the Shi’a (and other) schools of Islamic law to judicial roles during the course of legal history in the Middle East.

The legal history of the Arab region spans over a millennium and any attempt to cover this in one chapter cannot capture all the historical complexities and will necessarily be limited and to a large degree, superficial. Islamic (and other) legal developments have been vast and have extended beyond the Arabic-speaking region. There were also equally important non-Arab developments and periods (such as the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo between 1261 – 1517).

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193 The literature in this area is vast with diverging opinions on the historical development of law and judicial function in the Arab region. The aim of this chapter is limited to introduce and situate present Arab judicial roles within a historical context. It does so by focusing on overarching regional trends that, are considered by most scholars in this field to have had an impact on present law and judicial practice arising from internal developments as well as those factors stemming from outside the region (with particular focus on the West).
that made their own marks on the Islamic conceptions of the judicial office (e.g., the Safavids and Mughals amongst others) that are not covered in this chapter. In addition, the chapter only briefly covers the historical role of tribal judges (particularly in relation to early pre-Islamic arbitration). In many parts of the Middle East Ḥukum ʿashaīrī, tribal laws and customs (albeit Islamized\textsuperscript{194}), continue to operate and coexist alongside the state’s judiciary. As Watkins rightly points out, the lack of scholarly attention paid to the contemporary application of tribal laws in the Middle East encourages the impression that it is archaic.\textsuperscript{195} However, this is far from the truth. But tribal law and adjudication is a complex topic which deserves full exploration on its own and is beyond the scope of this thesis.\textsuperscript{196}

**Law and legal systems in the Arab Middle East: beyond binary terms of traditionalism and modernity**

In light of the above, a core purpose of this chapter is to provide for a more nuanced insight into the historical development of judicial culture in the Arab region:

“A large number of societies view law with indifference and many, particularly those we term primitive, consider the birth and development of law as a misadventure. In these societies, which set themselves against law, law appears with difficulty, evolves but little, and if one attempts to transfer law born and nourished elsewhere, the result is usually failure”\textsuperscript{197}


\textsuperscript{196} This omission should not be regarded as the author’s failure to acknowledge that tribal justice continues to operate in the region today, sometimes alongside state judges and courts. The role and use of tribal justice and their adjudicator deserves a full exploration, as it is part of a rich legal heritage, but this is not within the scope of this study. See generally Jessica Watkins, “Seeking Justice: Tribal Dispute Resolution And Societal Transformation In Jordan” (2014) 46 International Journal of Middle East Studies 31; Frank H Stewart, “Tribal Law in the Arab World: A Review of the Literature” (1987) 19 International Journal of Middle East Studies 473; “The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control”, 64 Middle East Journal, 1.

Descriptions of the evolution of law and legal systems in the Arab region tend to be described in binary terms of “modernity” and “tradition”. On the one hand, modernisation efforts are often the focus of scholarship which is concerned with the desire to move towards a more Westernised legal conception based on “contractual relationship between free individual wills”. On the other hand, a focus on “tradition” in Arab law is concerned to highlight legal systems based on kinship where the community “defines the individual”. Alliot for instance considered that “man is a servant of the past in traditional societies, and forges the future in Western societies”. But to describe the evolution of law and judiciaries in the Arab region using binary terms is factually misleading. Efforts at modernising judicial practice in line with Western legal influences form only one historical aspect of the region’s legal history. Similarly, looking at the role of tradition in law and judicial practice will only provide for a partial picture, in part because there is no uniform understanding of tradition across the region. What constitutes as “traditional” is contested and there are several competing values which have been established as legitimate traditional values within each Arab country as well as in the region. The present role of the Arab judge is complex and cannot be understood simply through the narrow lens of modernisation and traditionalism.

198 Usually underlying this distinction is Max Weber’s binary distinction between two concepts, “traditional authority” and “rational-legal authority”. These are refuted in this thesis because they are simplistic and generalising.
201 For Rouland, the reconciliation between these binary concepts can only be achieved with difficulty: “The transfers of law from modern to traditional societies are unlikely to be fully accomplished without serious repercussions. When they take place willy-nilly, imposed by colonialism and taken up by newly independent states, it is at the price of an acculturation in which the state may ultimately be the loser”. Norbert Rouland, *Legal Anthropology* (Athlone Press 1994) p.295.
202 The tendency to view history as an “opposition between the European contractual state and Oriental despotism is no more than a scholarly fiction”. See Sultany, *Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring* (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017) p.20.
This chapter is set out in two parts. **Part one** traces the historical development of conceptions of the Islamic judicial role by briefly discussing three historical periods:

1. Pre-Islamic judicial practice of arbitration among the Arab Bedouins (-622 AD) from which the institutionalised, Islamic judge would emerge;
2. Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 AD) and the formal creation of the Islamic judicial office;
3. Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 AD), which allowed the Islamic judicial function to mature.

These three periods are important for understanding the origins of the concept of a judge from the perspective of early Islamic legal developments and transformations of the judicial role.²⁰³

**Part two** explores the judicial role in the region from the 19th century, focusing on the impact of the Western law to the region with emphasis on the Ottoman legal reforms in the Arab region between 1839 – 1876 and the period following the Ottoman decline in the 20th century. The chapter then explores how these two historical phases have contributed to current understandings of the judicial role in the four main Arab countries analysed in this thesis (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon).

**Part 1: Origins of the Arab judge: tribal, Islamic and non-Islamic influences**

The term Qāḍī is used primarily in two contexts in Arabic. First, it refers to the generic function of any judge anywhere (within and outside the region). A Qāḍī is concerned with Qaḍā', encompassing the entire range of a judge’s judicial activities including the engagement with “the art of adjudication”. The second

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²⁰³ As explained above, the legal history of the Arab region spans over a millennium which cannot be captured in one single chapter. The purpose of this chapter is simply to shed some light on the complexity of law and judicial practice in the region through the broad historical lenses of western and Islamic developments in two periods. This does not suggest that other periods such 1258-19th did not make important contributions or influences.
use specifically refers to a judge in the Islamic religion. A Qāḍī in the religious sense is a revered religious figure whose office is a symbol of divine justice (Sharīʿa), pre-dominantly occupied by men.  

But the origins of the Qāḍī predates Islam. The context from which Islam emerged was deeply rooted in the traditions of the Bedouins in the Arabian Peninsula (which today corresponds to the whole Gulf region, Yemen and parts of Jordan and Iraq). The Arab Bedouins were in possession of two sets of laws: one set served sedentary, agricultural and commercial needs, and the other set supported nomadic tribal conditions. Both sets of laws were heavily dependent on normative legal custom, which was reinforced and legitimised by public opinion. The intercessor (both female and male) between parties to a dispute was called Ḥakam (lit. “arbiter”, “umpire”, “judge”). Although not binding in the strict legal sense, the Ḥakam’s verdict (Hukm) was normally considered to be authoritative and final. The role and function of the Ḥakam was not only confined to issuing verdicts; the Ḥakam was also a lawmaker. With no centralised judicial system, the Ḥakam applied and developed legal custom.

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204 When the role of Qāḍī became institutionalised, opinions differed on whether women could act as judges. Although women did act as tribal adjudicators in pre-Islamic Arabia, the issue has been a point of contestation. The majority of Islamic legal scholars have held the view that women cannot be judges. However, a strong minority of famous jurists such as Imam Abu Ḥanifa (the “founder” of the Ḥanafite school of law), Ibn Ḥazm, and Imam al-Tabari are of the opinion that women can be judges. Despite this, there have been a few notable female Qāḍīs. One historical example was the mother of the Abbassid Caliph Muqtadar Billah who acted as an appeal judge. See Nadia Sonneveld and Monika Lindbekk (eds), Women Judges in the Muslim World: A Comparative Study of Discourse and Practice (Brill 2017); Noriani Nik Badli Shah and Yasmin Masidi, Women as Judges (Rev ed, Sisters in Islam 2009). Recent developments in Saudi Arabia suggests that this may change See (n516).


206 Ibid.p.18. See also Nathalie Najjar, Arbitration and International Trade in the Arab Countries (Brill Nijhoff 2018) p.31.

207 Ḥakam comes from the root Ha- kaf- mem which refers to the attribute of judging, being wise, passing a verdict and preventing or restraining people from wrongdoing. (pl. Ḥukkam).
The Islamic Prophet, Muḥammad, was very much part of this society and was a *Hakam* himself. In later years, Muḥammad’s actions as a *Ḥakam* became an ideal model for the Islamic judge, and the *Ḥakam*’s function continued throughout the Prophet’s lifetime. Instead the aim was to remind and teach men and women the moral obligations required to pass the reckoning of judgment day. By the time of Muḥammad’s death in the year 632, Islam had a large following, but concepts of law and judicial practice in accordance with the newly established religion remained undeveloped.

**Age of the Arab-Muslim Caliphates**

Substantial developments in the judicial role occurred during the next 500 years, which is generally referred to as the age of the Arab-Muslim Caliphates and is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

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208 In the year 622, Muhammad was invited to be an impartial arbiter, *Hakam*, between Medina’s warring factions that had lasted for around a century. He was to settle their disputes on the basis of tribal custom. See PM Holt and others, *The Cambridge History of Islam* (2008) p.39


212 Ibid.
During the greater part of the first century, technical aspects of law were a matter of indifference to the early Muslims. The pre-Islamic system of arbitration and custom continued under the first successors of Prophet Muḥammad, the Caliphs of Medina ("Al-Rāshidun" in 632–661). Judicial appointments were made mostly of men deemed to be in possession of experience in arbitration, wisdom and charisma to whom tribesmen could resort to adjudicate their disputes.\textsuperscript{214} With the ensuing military (and later cultural and religious) expansion of Islam, the monotheistic religion found in the Arabian Peninsula eventually transitioned into a politico-religious Islamic

\textsuperscript{213} Following the Siege of Baghdad by the Mongol Empire in 1258, the Abbāsids’ power was drastically reduced. The Abbāsids would later rule, albeit superficially, under the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo between 1261 – 1517 until they were finally overthrown by the Ottomans in 1517

\textsuperscript{214} According to Hallaq, qāḍīs under the first Caliphs were recruited from ranks of pre-Islamic arbitrators. Wael B Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2004), p.35-37.
In order to adapt to Islam’s new political reality, the Ḥakam’s role would have to be redefined in order to accommodate this new reality.

**The Umayyads (661 – 750 AD)**

The Banū ʿUmayya, (“Umayyads”), were a prominent Meccan clan of the Quraysh tribe to which the Prophet Muḥammad also belonged. Before Muḥammad’s death, the clan converted to Islam and several members of the clan would hold leadership roles: ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan became the third Caliph of Medina between 644-656 AD, and Muʿawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan; (602 – 680 AD) became the second Caliph from the Umayyad clan.

At its height, the Umayyad Caliphate claimed dominion over North Africa, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Iberian Peninsula and Sicily. The centralisation of Umayyad legal administration appears to have begun during the last years of the first century, and this marked a change in the nature of judicial appointments. Although the Umayyad legal system was a patchwork of legal sources, law had begun to acquire its own independent character separate from tribal arbitration. The Arab Ḥakam was supplanted by an institutionalised Islamic judge who was a deputy of the governor. In addition to rendering judgments, Umayyad judges performed a multitude of functions such as collecting taxes and acting as police chiefs, and this led to subsequent descriptions of them as “proto-Qāḍīs.” Tyan, for example, describes the

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215 Immediately after Muhammad’s death, Islam experienced significant splits in its polity over the issue of political authority. The majority Sunnis believed that sovereignty passed to those caliphs who were companions of the Prophet and elected from the leadership of the Quraysh, the Prophet’s tribe. But others, those who became the Shi’a Muslims, insisted that ‘Ali, Muhammad’s nephew and son-in-law, was the rightful caliph and that rulership should pass after ‘Ali to the children born of his wife Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. See generally PM Holt and others, The Cambridge History of Islam (2008).

216 The Prophet Muḥammad belonged to the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe.


Islamic judge under the Umayyads as a delegate and representative (Nāʾib) rather than a judge in his own right.219

According to Tyan, under the Umayyads, there was no distinction between judicial activity in litigation and activities outside litigation.220 The court (Majlis al-qādā) was not confined to a physical space. Rather, it was a manifestation of the judge himself (or herself) and an extension of the judicial personality. Hallaq contrasts this with civil and common law systems in Western countries, where the court tends to be less dependent on the judge and more on the purpose of the law. In the West, the court is a building occupied and appropriated according to the law for the holding of trials. Whereas Hallaq explains that the Islamic judge was not obliged to conduct his sessions in a specific place. Hearings were frequently held in the mosque, but they could also be held in the judge’s private residence, in the market place and even in the public streets.221

Introduction of foreign legal concepts and maxims into Islamic society

The Umayyad’s were influenced by conquered territories and legal knowledge from non-Arab converts to Islam. Hallaq describes this as a “process of infiltration” 222, where the introduction of non-Islamic and non-Arab legal concepts and maxims into Islamic society was made possible through non-Arab converts to Islam. In addition, the Umayyads adopted concepts and principles from Byzantine (Roman), Sassanian (Persian) and Hellenic (Greco-Macedonian) laws, and they also drew inspiration from religious legal practices found in Canonical and Rabbinical laws.223 Islamic judges favoured local custom in their judicial interpretations by reinforcing and preserving local

220 Ibid.p.236
traditions. More specifically, they were expected to give judgment according to sound opinion (raʿy). Judges based their decision-making on the customary practice of the community under their jurisdiction, as well as combining it with the letter and spirit of the Qurʾān. Through this judicial practice, Byzantine and Sassanian laws (amongst others) came to be integrated into Islamic legal practice, introducing considerable legal diversity within which religion was “secondary.”

The variety of functions attached to the Umayyad Qāḍī had drawbacks that were further aggravated by the judge’s subordination, not only to the central executive authority, but also to various regional authorities. Judgeship was considered an extension of caliphal authority, where a judge was only a delegate of the person who had appointed him. Suspicion of political power and those associated with the judicial function grew particularly strong during the late Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyads were blamed for the loss of religious ethos in Islamic jurisprudence by focusing on worldly ends. For Islamic jurists, judicial appointment entailed a moral risk and a calamity for anyone who received it because the role was an inherently political, “worldly” and “secular” in function. Asserting the truth, God’s truth, was in direct eschatological opposition with the judicial functions prescribed by the Umayyads. The judicial role involved determining right and wrong, and taking rights from some and granting it to others, involved a delicate and sacrosanct activity. Failure to judge by God’s command and instead relying on temporal laws amounted to unbelief and oppression.

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Jokisch B, Islamic Imperial Law: Harun-Al-Rashid’s Codification Project (de Gruyter 2007) p. 54


Jurists were reported to have avoided judicial appointment even at the cost of punishment by the authorities. See Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi Arabia (Harvard University 1993) p.139.
Following unrest and several rebellions, the Umayyads were overthrown in the year 750 by the ‘Abbāsids, a rival clan to the Umayyads. The ‘Abbāsids shared the same clan of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Banu Hashim clan, and claimed caliphal authority by virtue of the closer bloodline than of the Umayyads. In addition, the ‘Abbāsids distinguished themselves from the Umayyad’s who were criticised as an “Arab Kingdom” because of the secular nature of the Umayyad state.

“The ideology of a restoration of primitive Islam, with variants reflecting different trends, had conquered the masses, and, with the support of a majority of the learned men, became part of the programme of all, or nearly all, the leaders of parties. It triumphed when the ‘Abbāsids adopted it as their slogan.”

The ‘Abbāsids (750- 1258)

Despite the new rulers’ promise to inaugurate a new era of justice and piety, the ‘Abbāsids, like their predecessors, had to administer and rule a complex, multi-cultural realm. Two important legal developments took place under the ‘Abbāsids which would make a lasting mark on the Arab judicial role. The first development was the creation of jurisprudential schools of Islamic law (Madahib). The second development was the creation of the Islamic judicial office, which in part was due to the new jurisprudential schools and in part to the increasing power of Islamic jurists granted by the new caliphs.

Doctrinal schools of law

By the early Abbāsid period, law had become more comprehensive in coverage and jurists began to develop their own legal assumptions and legal methodology. Unlike the Umayyad’s who had given leeway to local customs, under the Abbāsids laws became the exclusive domain of jurists to interpret and formulate. The emergence of Islamic jurisprudence influenced by the 8th

229 The ‘Abbāsids descended from their founder, Al-Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566–653 CE), who was one of Muḥammad’s uncles. The Banu Hashim clan, the Hashemites now rule Jordan under King Abdallah II.


231 PM Holt and others, The Cambridge History of Islam (2008), p.103
century jurist, Shafi’ī’s, principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-fiqh*). Shafi’ī formulated the fundamental paradigm for Islamic law between the years 815 and 820. Of the several juristic schools that existed, only four from the Sunni branch were raised to the level of doctrinal schools during the ‘Abbāsid era. The schools were named after their respective “founders”: Shafi’ī, Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālikī and bin- Ḥanbal. According to Vogel, the survival of these doctrinal schools was “influenced by communal and regional conformities, as well as official endorsement through financial and political support.” Table 5 below summarises the key characteristics of each of the schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrinal school</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Period (^{235})</th>
<th>Present reach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ḥanbalī</td>
<td>The most source-oriented of the four schools with the least room for analogical reasoning.</td>
<td>780–855 AD to Present</td>
<td>The Gulf, predominantly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mālikī</td>
<td>Places special emphasis on the actions of the people of Madinah shortly after the Prophet's death as a source of law (thinks of the residents of Madinah as &quot;living Ḥadīth&quot;).</td>
<td>711–795 AD to Present</td>
<td>Popular in North and West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafi’ī</td>
<td>Slightly less emphasis on analogical and reasoning; more focused on evidences and methodological approaches. Traditionalist inspired. “Prefers a weak tradition to a strong analogy”</td>
<td>767–820 AD to present</td>
<td>Popular in Egypt, and Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥanafī</td>
<td>Use of Analogy (<em>Qiyās</em>) and Taqlid (lit. imitation) is central to the Hanafī school. It is the method in conforming to legal precedent, traditional behaviour and doctrines often set or used by mujtahids.</td>
<td>699 – 767 AD to present</td>
<td>The most widespread school in Islamic law, followed by roughly one-third of the world’s Muslims.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{232}\) Shafi’ī was born around 767 and died in 820 AD.

\(^{233}\) Other “schools” eventually died out or were subsumed by the four surviving ones. The survival of the four Sunni schools was, in addition to popularity, influenced by communal and regional conformities as well as official endorsement through financial and political support. See Frank Vogel, *Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia* (Brill 2000); Abd-Allah, U. (2013). *Mālik and Medina*. Leiden: Brill, p.510

\(^{234}\) See Frank Vogel, *Islamic law and legal system studies of Saudi Arabia* Ph.D. Harvard University, 1993, p.126

\(^{235}\) Because these schools were tied to their respective founders, the years indicated relate to the lives of each of the four founders.
The three other schools found ways to accommodate Shafi‘ī’s dogma, combining interpretation and application of legal principles they claimed could override the authority of the Ḥadīth. For the Ḥanafī school, this was the strength of “juristic preference” (Istiḥsān). According to Kamali, this is a rationalist doctrine that consists of giving preference to one over many possible solutions to a particular problem, and “the choice of one or the other of these solutions is mainly determined by the jurist in the light of considerations of equity and fairness”\textsuperscript{236} The Mālikī school’s benchmark was the credibility of “the consensus of the Medina scholars”\textsuperscript{237} because the city of Medina was the centre of Islamic teaching and where the Prophet Muḥammad’s companions resided. The Mālikī school would, therefore, come to be characterised by its reliance on the customary practice of Medina as a source of law.\textsuperscript{238} The adherents of the Ḥanbalī school remained strictly traditionalist, but would later accept the jurisprudential necessity of analogy.

\textbf{Development of the Islamic judge}

The second important development under the ‘Abbāsid rule was the evolution of the judicial role. Unlike the Umayyad period, judges increasingly distinguished themselves from political power.\textsuperscript{239} During the ‘Abbāsids, the office of a chief justice was established (Qāḍī al-Qudat).\textsuperscript{240} His role was to act primarily as an adviser to the Caliph in the appointment and dismissal of judges. Through the increasing institutionalisation of the judicial office during this period, a clear role for judges had begun to emerge:

“Judges established themselves as the intercessors between the populace and the rulers. Even outside the courtroom, jurists and judges felt responsibility toward the common man, and on their own often initiated action without any petition being made.”\textsuperscript{241}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{236} Mohammad Hashim Kamali, \textit{Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence} (3rd rev and enl ed, Islamic Texts Society 2003.), p.4
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid. p.372
\item \textsuperscript{239} Majid Khadduri and Herbert J Liebesny (eds), \textit{Origin and Development of Islamic Law} (Lawbook Exchange 2008) p.260
\item \textsuperscript{240} Hallaq, W. (2011), \textit{The origins and evolution of Islamic law}. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, p.79-80
\item \textsuperscript{241} Ibid. p.183
\end{itemize}
While the responsibility of the Islamic judge was primarily judicial, he was also charged with certain quasi and non-judicial responsibilities.

**Significance of the Arab-Muslim Caliphates on the role of the Arab judge**

Prior to the Arab expansion in the name of Islam, disputes in the Arabian Peninsula were largely settled with arbitration based on legal custom. The role of the Ḥakam made important contributions to the development of the Islamic judge. With Islam’s territorial expansion and the establishment of an Islamic polity, the Islamic judicial office began to take shape. Its development, however, was not confined within the framework of Arab formulated Islamic principles. It would have been difficult if not impossible for the Arab caliphs to administer a complex, multicultural realm without the advantages offered by conquered territories. For the Umayyads, the advantages included assistance in establishing and laying the groundwork for the judicial office, drawing inspiration from neighbouring judicial systems as well as monotheistic religious laws. Their contribution, however, did not escape criticism and suspicion. Islamic jurists disapproved of the Umayyad rule in several respects, particularly in relation to the Umayyad tendency towards executive interference. They also disapproved of the infusion of secular laws with the early developments of Islamic law. Under the ‘Abbāsids, this changed substantially, and the judicial function became more autonomous and distinct from the ruling class. Judges began to rely on established bodies of law formulated by jurists in accordance with the newly established schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

**Part 2: Western influences on the development of the Arab judge**

The end of the Arab Muslim Caliphates marked a new beginning for the development of the judicial role. Earlier developments had refined and developed a judicial role that was religiously legitimised, only to undergo

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further refinements throughout the later centuries. This time, its development would be overseen and authorised by neither ethnically nor linguistically Arab Muslim rulers:

“In the seventh century the Arabs created a new world into which other peoples were drawn. In the nineteenth and twentieth, they were themselves drawn into a new world created in Western Europe.”

Secular notions of law and justice from predominantly civil legal traditions made their mark on the Islamic judge. Two important periods are associated with the introduction and eventual synthesis of Islamic laws with ideas from different Western legal cultures. All of this would have a marked effect on the judicial office. The first period relates to the final years of the Ottoman rule (1839-1922), and the second, to the establishment of Arab independence following the British and French mandates (mid-20th century). For Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, these two periods of regional legal trends set the course for the development of their present-day legal systems, including the role of judges in their respective countries.

**The Ottoman judicial reforms (1839 -1876)**

The Ottoman dynasty was founded in the late 13th century in north-western Anatolia. Under Selim I (1470 –1520), the Empire rapidly expanded into the Middle East. Following the seizure of the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina, Ottoman claim of caliphal authority was solidified. The Ottoman stronghold would remain, at least officially, until the Caliphate’s defeat and loss of its territories in the Middle East to the Allied Powers in the aftermath of the first World War.

By the late 19th century, the Ottoman empire officially controlled all of the Levant region (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine) and Iraq. The Ottomans also claimed dominion over most of North Africa, Egypt and the Arabian

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244 The conquered Middle Eastern territories were divided between the United Kingdom and France under the “Asia minor Agreement” in 1916, also referred to as the Sykes – Picot Agreement.
Peninsula. In practice, however, the regions enjoyed varying degrees of self-
rule. The territory that now corresponds to Saudi Arabia was under the direct 
rule of Arab tribal leaders. Despite Ottoman claims to the entire Peninsula, 
central rule was limited to strategic areas such as Hijaz, the two Islamic 
sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina. In the 19th century, Egypt was technically 
an Ottoman province but in practice enjoyed a degree of autonomy. Modern 
day Lebanon dates back to the Ottoman Mount Lebanon Principality. In 
1860, Mount Lebanon became part of the Ottoman province, with political 
institutions based on power sharing among its various religious groups under 
an Ottoman-European consortium protectorate.

The Ottomans began an unprecedented period of reforms between 1839 – 
1876. The empire sought to reform and modernise its institutions and 
society in line with the prevailing cultural, legal and political dominance of 
Europe. Libertarian ideas of the French Revolution found a favourable milieu 
among educated urban Ottomans, and the empire was called on to give way 
to the new philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment. Between 1839 and 1876, 
a series of reforms were promulgated in the Ottoman empire. These reforms, 
called the Tanẓīmāt, were intended to modernise the empire from an old 
theocratic system into a modern state similar to European states.

The Tanẓīmāt reforms would require universality and a direct contact with the 
Ottoman citizen without regard to religion or ethnicity. As Hanioğlu describes,

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245 Jasmine Moussa, *Competing Fundamentalisms and Egyptian Women's Family Rights: International Law and the Reform of Shari'a-Derived Legislation* (Brill 2011), p.120
246 Zahar writes: “The principality’s autonomy was premised on subservience to its Ottoman masters; the Emir (prince) was required to maintain social order and deliver required taxes and other obligations to the Sultan in Constantinople”. See Roeder PG and Rothchild, DS (eds), *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Cornell University Press 2005) p.219
247 Ibid. p.219
the vision “was a significant first step toward the transformation of hitherto Muslim, Christian, and Jewish subjects into Ottoman”. To achieve this, law and legal administration required substantial reforms, especially the *Şarî’â* dominated courts which were run by Islamic judges. Mirroring Western legal developments, Ottoman Islamic law and practice would have to move away from natural justice and to emphasise procedure, code and appellate hierarchy. The dominant judicial paradigm was legal formalism, and the Ottomans wished to introduce this to their own empire. This required replacing doctrinal interpretation, custom and, more importantly, judicial discretion with a rigid and mechanical application of a comprehensive set of laws. To achieve this, a series of centralised reforms were inaugurated, including the introduction of the *Nizamîye* courts chiefly modelled on Napoleonic laws and judicial structures.

The *Nizamîye* courts were three tiered and covered civil, criminal and commercial disputes. The civil *corpus juris*, the *Meyelle*, was a comprehensive compendium of Islamic law and was also codified in with western structures in mind. The *Meyelle* was to be administered in the new civil courts and applied by judges trained in secular legal methodologies. Penal law, traditionally based on Islamic law (and codified in early 19th century), gave way to an adaptation of the French penal code of 1858, also applied by the new criminal courts. *Şarî’â* courts continued to operate alongside the *Nizamîye* courts, but their jurisdiction was reduced to adjudicating on endowments and personal status laws for Muslims only.

**Influence of Ottoman Tanźîmât in the Arab region**

Despite these centralising reforms, Ottoman suzerainty in the Arab region was implemented in a piecemeal fashion. By the start of the 19th century, Ottoman hegemony ranged from existent to non-existent in the jurisdictions covered in

252 The “*Meyellet al Ahkam al Adilyia*” was issued in 1876
The Tanẓīmāt influenced some places profoundly, and others only superficially. For instance, Egypt, technically an Ottoman province, managed to acquire a degree of autonomy in the law throughout the 19th century. Even if the country generally followed Ottoman legal developments, such as the Mejelle, the pace and content of the Tanẓīmāt were largely informed by the country’s own juridical developments. The establishment of the Egyptian Mixed Courts in the 19th century had an international dimension that went beyond the modelling of the Nizamieh courts. Dictated by foreign powers, the Mixed Courts were a hybrid series of courts, particularly established to deal with disputes between foreigners and Egyptians. Judges sitting in the Egyptian Mixed courts had considerable experience and came from a variety of nations, including France, England, Italy, Scandinavia and the USA, as well as Egypt. The increasing number of British and American judges serving in the Egyptian courts, especially after the British Occupation in 1882, resulted in the, albeit limited, introduction of Anglo-American common law elements which came to be a source of influence on Egyptian judicial decision-making in later years. Central Arabia (present day Saudi Arabia and Yemen) and rural areas inhabited by Bedouin tribes also saw little of Ottoman legal influence. Instead, Shari’a, tribal law and custom remained in full practice, and an Islamic version of Hakam remained the intercessor in disputes.

Despite the varying degrees of influence of the Tanẓīmāt, the Ottoman reforms had – directly or indirectly – made an influence in the Arab region in one important respect: the Mejelle. The Hanafi-based Islamic law had been the official school of law throughout the centuries-long Ottoman rule, and by the late 19th century this school acquired a new status once it became codified. Legal norms were no longer valid merely because eminent Muslim jurists had developed them. In the new context, the validity of Islamic jurisprudential

254 Hamad., M. When the Gavel Speaks: Judicial Politics in Modern Egypt, Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of Utah, (2008) Introduction chapter.
norms “came to depend on the fact that they were state law, legalized by state legislation.”

Some regions however, managed to evade this development completely. It was wholly rejected in parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Prior to the conquest of Hijaz in 1926, the judicial systems of the various Saudi regimes in the Arabian Peninsula were simple and largely based on the Hanbali school of Islamic law and tribal custom. On the verge of extinction, the Hanbali school was revived in the 18th century with the help of a religious and political movement brought together by a tribal alliance headed by a judge, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Sa'ud (this alliance eventually led to the creation of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom).

Significance of the Ottoman period on the role of the Arab judge

In the pre-modern period, Islamic judges had jurisdiction over an entire gamut of legal norms. Following the Ottoman caliphal claim, Islamic judicial practice would be conceptualised according to the Ottoman favoured Hanafi school of Islamic law for centuries. With the diminishing of Islamic law in favour of secular laws in the 19th and 20th century, the Islamic judge’s jurisdiction were reduced and replaced by those of secular Ottoman judges. The Ottoman embrace of modernism, inspired by European thought, envisioned that law and the judiciary would eventually move away from the “old” and make way for the “new”. Instead, a certain duality of legal culture ended up characterising the legal system across the region. The western civil courts in many areas of the region came to coexist uneasily side-by-side with the traditional Islamic law courts, a phenomenon that would later imbed itself in many Arab jurisdictions. The dual character of religious judges and secular judges also

continued to serve as a framework for, and inform the development of the judicial role in several Arab states following independence.

**Influence of British and French hegemony and post-colonial legal reforms**

In the late 19th and early 20th century, following the fall of the Ottoman empire, the Arab Middle East underwent critical changes that affected the region’s legal systems. Ottoman rulers were replaced by European rule. Territories taken from the Ottomans were divided between the United Kingdom and France as per the “Asia Minor Agreement” in 1916 (also referred to as the Sykes – Picot Agreement).

Although the extent of European colonial hegemony in Arab legal systems varied across the region. The imposition, adoption and imitation of European models of legislation varied across the region. For instance, the British applied a diverse body of laws during their mandate in Iraq (1920 -1932), which Lowry writes was “culled from Ottoman, French, and Anglo-Indian colonial laws, while tribal customary law was applied in the countryside”.258 In Transjordan and Iraq, Ottoman legislation remained partly in effect. In Palestine (1922-1948), English judges applied the Mejelle as well as British law.259

Following the French and British mandates, newly established Arab nation-states renewed their efforts at modernising their respective laws and judiciaries.260 Egypt was at the forefront of this process through the work of the French-educated Egyptian jurist, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī. Al-Sanhūrī was a member of all three legislative committees charged with the revision of the Egyptian Code in 1930s.261 Sanhūrī developed a deliberate reformist agenda

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258 Ibid. p.79
259 Ibid.
260 In addition to the British and French colonies, Italy colonised modern day Libya (taken by the Ottomans in 1912), and it remained Italian until it was replaced by French and British occupation until Libya’s independence in 1951. In relation to judicial practice and legal system, the Italians had a minor influence. Libya is not one of the main countries that form the focus of this study.
261 Together with Edouard. Lambert, a French scholar in comparative law, as the only other member of the third committee formed in 1938, proposed a completed draft of the new code.
by conceptualising Egypt’s law in a more progressive and egalitarian way. He modernised Islamic law by “applying the insights of sociological critiques of classical legal thought.”

His scholarship was motivated by a desire to harmonise and develop the Ottoman codifications of Islamic law with modern positivist conceptions of law inspired from the West (primarily from Swiss, French, English and American laws). Islamic law and Western laws, Sanhūrī believed, were not antithetical. Rather, Islamic law had a “contemporary relevance in other than a fundamentalist or recidivistic sense.”

Sanhūrī incorporated both Islamic and Western legal values in the 1949 Egyptian Civil Code which “became the basis of a new standard of legal justice.” The new Code devised a unique, empowered role for Egyptian judges. According to Bechor, Sanhūrī’s code expanded judicial discretion beyond the limits of classic French law. In his explanatory notes to the proposed Egyptian Code, Sanhūrī wrote:

“Let no one imagine that a judge who rules in accordance with a frozen basis and whose hands are shackled by a narrow text can adapt the legal provisions for just application in changing circumstances. For he will then either bring justice, but break the shackles of the law, or remain committed to the limits of the law, and bring only partial justice.”


Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017.), p. 22

According to Sanhūrī: “As regards the application of the principles of Islamic law, we have seen that this great legal system has fallen into a state of stagnation because it has not undergone the necessary changes. It therefore seems indispensable to us, before we can think of putting the principles into practice, to bring about a revival of Islamic law, distinguishing between its religious part and its temporal part. The current state of civilization demands a continuous relaxation of the last of these two parts so that all the citizens, Muslim or not, are in presence of rules of law which can also be applied to them.”, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al Sanhuri (Sanhoury), Le Califat (Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner 1926). p. 571


Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Johns Hopkins University Press) p. 207

Ibid. p. 296.

For Sanhūrī, the Code required flexible criteria that could anticipate future developments and change. Developing this idea, Sanhūrī wrote that the provisions of the Code became tools in the hands of the judge “so that he can develop the Code on an ongoing basis, and, with the help of these tools, meet changing circumstances and conditions.”

For this reason, Bechor argues, the Egyptian code brought about a dual loyalty for the Egyptian judge. The first loyalty was owed to society that granted the judge power and authority. The second loyalty was to the Code itself, which granted the judge discretion within the designed limits. Where tensions between the code and society emerged, the judge was required to “adjust, weigh and balance his steps.”

The quest for Arab (legal) unity

Although the Egyptian Civil Code influenced several civil codes in the region for the next three decades, the three other countries under study were (with varying degrees) an exception. In Lebanon, the Mejelle was repealed under the French Mandate and replaced with the 1932 Lebanese Code. The Code

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268 Ibid. p.293
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid. p.160-161
271 Ibid. p.293

272 In 1962, Sanhūrī wrote: “I believe that Arab unity is a natural thing as the Arab peoples are one nation; ... the strongest support of Arab unity is cultural unity, and the most important basis for unifying culture is a unified legal culture”. al-Sanhūrī “al-Qanun al-madani al-‘Arabi” ("The Arab Civil Code"), al-Qada' (Baghdad) 20(1) (1962), p. 7. Translation provided by Hill, E. (1988), "Sanhūrī and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of ‘Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad Sanhūrī, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar", 1895-1971. Arab Law Quarterly, 3(1) [part II] 207, (Sanhūrī, (1952), p.207

273 Arabi describes Sanhūrī as “the principal architect of the present Civil Codes of Egypt, Iraq and Syria: “As a major figure of the intersection of traditional Islamic culture with modernity, al-Sanhuri has left an indelible mark on contemporary Arab societies. Besides his pioneering work in lawmaking and codification and its far-reaching consequences, al-Sanhūrī’s colossal efforts extended to the critical explication and justification of legal precepts, resulting in decisive contributions to modernist Arab and Islamic jurisprudence.” OUSSAMA ARABI , Al-Sanhuri’s reconstruction of the Islamic law of contract defects Journal of Islamic Studies 6:2 (1995) p. 154. See also Amr Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative Law in the Arab World (Or How Sometimes Losing Your Asalah Can be Good for You), in Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law 152 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).

274 For example, Sanhūrī began working on the Syrian Civil code in 1946 which was enacted in 1949. In 1943 Sanhūrī completed his draft for a revision of the Iraqi Civil Code which was enacted in 1951. According to Stigall, In the case of the Libyan and Syrian Civils were directly drawn from Sanhūrī’s work and the codes echo “of Sanhūrī and each contains much of the substance and structure that are the hallmarks a Sanhūrī code.” See Dan E. Stigall, The Civil Codes of Libya and Syria: Hybridity, Durability, and Post–Revolution Viability in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, 28 Emory Int’l Rev. 283 (2014)
was drafted by a French jurist and later revised by Lebanese jurists to reflect local legal culture (including the incorporation of some provisions of Ottoman and Islamic law).\textsuperscript{275} Jordan continued to apply the whole of the Ottoman Mejelle until 1976, when the Jordanian Code was introduced.\textsuperscript{276}

**Four different Arab approaches to law and judges**

Placed in this historical context, particularly from the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan responded differently to the overarching legal developments in the region which came to shape the legal systems and set the judicial role onto distinct paths of developments. In 1962, Sanhūrī wrote that there were three types of legal experiences in the Arab region. First were states that continued with an uncodified version of the Islamic Sharīʿa best exemplified by Saudi Arabia and the Ḥanbalī school. Second were states under Ottoman control during the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, where the Mejelle was applied and remained after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of the French and British mandates. Third were those jurisdictions which borrowed French law, such as Lebanon.\textsuperscript{277} With Sanhūrī’s own contributions, a fourth type of legal experience emerged in the region.

These four different legal experiences shed some light on today’s diverse legal cultures in the region. These have also had an impact on the judicial role (illustrated in figure 3 below).

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Each historical influence conceived a particular role for the Arab judge. Early Islamic-based conceptions of the judge adopted a different notion of what the judicial role should be compared to the mechanical judicial function favoured by the Ottoman Tanẓīmāt. Even Sanhūrī’s conception of the Egyptian judicial role sought to reconcile two seemingly contradictory ambitions of “socialising modern law” and “modernising Islamic law”.  

**Summary**

This chapter sought to situate present judicial roles in the Arab region within an historical context. This brief historical review reveals a complex interaction of competing notions of law and judicial practice in the region. To classify the historical periods as an interaction between religious and secular notions of law and judicial practice would be an oversimplification. The conception of the Islamic judge, or Islamic Qāḍī, evolved from pre-Islamic Arab Bedouin judicial practice. The different schools of Islamic law also devised different roles for the Islamic Qāḍī. The Islamic judge would eventually be replaced with the

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278 Nimer Sultany, *Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring* (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017)., p. 21
secular Ottoman judge, only to be later replaced with Sanhūrī’s conception of the judicial role. It is in this context that the present day Arab judge operates. How these historical experiences inform the way today’s Arab judges perceive their roles (and whether they consider it within their role to be political) forms the main focus of the research in this thesis.
Chapter 4. Research approach and methods

This chapter explains the analytical approaches and research methods used in this multi-part study of judicial power and role conceptions in the Arab Middle East. An overall research approach used here can be described as “law in practice”. This thesis adopts an approach that not only considers formal laws and legal rules, but also examines what actually happens in practice. Information arising out of empirical research into the reality of the role of Arab judges forms an important element of the thesis, as it provides details about the judicial role that cannot be found in official legal documents about Arab judiciaries.

Research approach
Based on the unique characteristics of Arab states it was decided that this research would focus on three main themes which may affect the political significance of courts and judges. The first was the institutional, that is, the extent to which the composition and organisation of courts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan would indicate a judicialisation. This also includes the prescribed judicial role, i.e. the formal and informal expectations, mechanisms and procedures that facilitate or impede judicial activism within the judicial organisations particularly in relation to factors that directly affect the professional status of the judge. The second theme was pre-appointment attributes i.e. career experiences and sources of individualisation of Arab judges and whether such extra-legal attributes have an impact on their current functions. The final theme was the subjective, i.e. understanding the expectations individual judges perceive as applicable to their judicial function including their expectations towards actors within the judicial community and outside. The three themes were decided to provide for a window through which to better understand Arab judicial roles and the extent to which they may be politically significant. In relation to these themes, this study attempted to answer the following questions:
Legal system and individual status within the judiciary

1) Does the composition and organisation of courts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan indicate a judicialisation of politics?
2) Does judicial selection, training, career, and discipline in the Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, Lebanese and Jordanian judiciaries promote or impede judicial activism?

Career experiences and sources of individualisation

3) What are judges prior (and concurrent) career experiences and sources of individualisation?
4) How may these affect judicial role perceptions of Arab judges?

Expectations and attitudes of the judicial role

5) What norms and expectations might Arab judges have about their jobs as judges?
6) To what extent does individual judges identify themselves as part of a judicial collective?
7) What norms and expectations might Arab judges have towards their peers within the judicial community and towards non-judicial actors?

The research primarily consisted of two main components. The first component was to textual analysis of legal documents to identify the structure, operation and powers of the judiciary in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. The second component was to empirically explore and obtain information and insight from Arab judges about their: a) background and experiences as judges and; b) their attitudes to their judicial role including their attitudes towards actors within and outside the broader judicial community.

Based on this general approach, three studies were conducted to understand the role and political significance of Arab judges:

1. A mapping of judicial systems in the region to assess the political significance of Arab courts and judges (Research questions 1 and 2);
2. A **profiling** of Arab judges’ education and career experiences based on empirical research (**Research questions 3 and 4**);

3. A **survey** of Arab judges’ attitudes to being a judge and their judicial role conceptions (**Research questions 5,6 and 7**).

**General obstacles to accessing data from the region**

The Arab Middle East carries significant complexities for any one that wishes to undertake research. While each country poses different challenges, the following sections discuss risks and obstacles that relate to the whole region that may occur when trying to conduct empirical research.

**Elite groups**

Individuals belonging to an elite group are understood to hold some form of leadership position in powerful public institutions. According to Hoffmann-Lange, elites can be found in any social system and are defined by their influence on decisions that shape living conditions in a society:

> “Elite research is devoted to studying the characteristics of politicians and other holders of leadership positions in powerful public institutions and private organizations who are distinguished by their regular participation in (political) decision-making.”

Because members belonging to the elite are in high profile positions, their actions are typically subject to public scrutiny, which according to Nir, “may harbor justifiable fears of injuring their reputations or public personas”. This is particularly true in relation to Arab judges who have traditionally shied away from academic research.

Judges are moreover legally obliged to abide by rules of judicial independence and seek to uphold the dignity of the judiciary at all times. Like judges in several

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280 Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, *Methodological Developments in Elite Research* (Dept of Political Science, University of Bamberg, Germany 2006), p.1

281 Ibid.

jurisdictions, Arab judges can be said to be hidden behind a “purple curtain” that obscures their decisional processes and perpetuates the myth of judicial objectivity.\textsuperscript{283} The judicial systems examined in this thesis, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon, tend to emphasise that judges “speak with one tongue”.\textsuperscript{284} The Higher Judicial Councils in these countries, in particular, have taken on a paternalistic role and made considerable efforts to conceal judges from media and academic research. Further complexities can also arise in relation to Arab judges, such as social and cultural barriers, general suspicion towards Western research and security concerns.

**Security risks and political instability**

Security concerns can exist for the elite group as well as for the researcher. Especially since the “Arab Spring”, the political situation in the region has heightened the security risks in conducting academic research. In Egypt, the country seems to be tightening its control on any research related to governmental branches, and the tragic death of Cambridge PhD student Giulio Regeni highlighted the risks posed to anyone who conducts field research in the country.\textsuperscript{285} In addition, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior in 2016 warned Egyptian citizens against taking part in surveys or polls by stating it was a threat to national security.\textsuperscript{286}


\textsuperscript{284} See Chapters 2 and 9 for a fuller discussion.


\textsuperscript{286} The law on Non-Governmental Organisations passed by the Egyptian Parliament on 29 November 2016 adds a further obstacle to any fieldwork. While it specifically targets NGOs banning them from conducting fieldwork or polls without the approval of the government, the understanding is that any type of research conducted within the country needs a security approval which can only be obtained on-site. Amina Ismail, “Egypt Warns Citizens from Participating in Foreign Polls” (Cairo, 29 November 2016) <https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKCN1LF21C-OZATP> accessed 30 August 2016.
In Saudi Arabia, judges are almost exclusively men, and difficulties can arise due to the society’s strict gender separation policy, which poses practical difficulties for female researchers. An added difficulty particularly in the Saudi context relates to the political and religious tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which have in recent years heightened significantly. This means that a researcher’s name that is Iranian or Shi’a sounding is likely to generate caution or suspicion.

All of these factors had to be taken into consideration in deciding how to go about conducting the empirical parts of this research into the political significance of judges in the Arab region.

**Study 1: Factors in Arab judicial systems likely to affect the political significance of judges**

In their analysis of Western judicial systems, Guarnieri and Pederzoli argue that two structural variations found in judicial systems may be conducive to political significance of courts and judges (i.e., the judicialisation of politics). The first variation relates to the territorial dimension of court systems and whether these are diffused. The second relates to the relationship between the different layers of courts, their internal dynamics and the role of the supreme courts in each country. This framework provided by Guarnieri and Pederzoli possesses a unifying capacity for explaining judicialisation of politics in general, and allows for the concept of the judicialisation of politics to be used comparatively. In light of this, two research questions were set for this first study:

1. Whether Arab judicial structures are fundamentally different from Western democratic structures?

2. Whether Arab judicial structures fit within any existing typology of judicial structures that are known in Western states to either promote or hinder judicialisation?

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Study 1 approach: Creating a typology and mapping judicial systems in the region

The judicial structures in Arabic-speaking states are set out in formal legal texts. Therefore, the first stage of the study was devoted to mapping the judicial structures of a wide range of Arab states, based on readings of original legislative texts and other official documents. The research began with eight countries in the Arab region, looking at their respective legal history, regional trends, the concept of the judiciary in each country and possible dimensions that may indicate judicial activism. The initial analysis was descriptive in order to establish the scope of basic differences and similarities amongst Arab states. It was felt that to omit this descriptive research would make for uninformed assumptions. Specifically, the following factors were considered:

- Jurisdictional scope of officially recognised courts;
- Interrelationship between courts;
- Legal history and legal adaptations, primarily from Western legal traditions;
- Political system.

A detailed tabulation was produced with key information relating to structural and institutional facts for eight Arab countries: Bahrain; Egypt; Jordan; Lebanon; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tunisia; and the United Arab Emirates. This created an outline of the key similarities and differences between countries. What emerged from this initial mapping exercise were four distinct models of judicial structures that seemed best represented by four Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. (Appendix 1 provides a table with key variables for the remaining four countries).

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288 The following countries were considered: Bahrain; Lebanon; Jordan; Egypt; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates.

Following the creation of this typology, an in-depth analysis of the structural set ups of the judiciaries in these four countries was undertaken. The data derived from primary sources of laws in Arabic, and secondary sources where official information was not available. The inquiry was done in three stages. The first stage set out the jurisdictional scope of courts. The second stage, evaluated the interrelationship between the various courts. Based on this inquiry, the final stage sought to analyse the extent to which judicialisation of politics might be promoted. The results are presented in Chapter 5 and include descriptions of each country’s judicial system along with detailed diagrams of the four archetypal judicial systems, which were constructed specifically for this research, and represent the first attempt to create a typology judicial systems in these Arab states.

Limitations of comparative study

The principal function of comparison is that of developing, testing and refining a theory. Comparative approaches usually allow for two types of analysis, the “explorative type” which aims at identifying relationships which may be conducive to theory formation, and “theory type” which aims at testing causal relationships and corroborate and develop theories further. This study is exploratory in nature and aims to further formulate the theory of judicialisation.

Although diversity, “historical particularity, specificity and locality” have been taken into account in the study, there may be limitations in terms of generalisation. The legal systems under review are not identical, but they are considered to be similar to the extent that they can be analysed using the variables as established by the conceptual framework employed in this research. Conscious efforts to consider every unit (judicial system) was made in light of the four factors described above, and initially in isolation from each other. However, like any other study, this study “begins with certain, tacit or

outspoken, assumptions about comparability of the chosen units”. Another important limitation relates to the issue of representation (a limitation that is relevant for the whole thesis). In relation to Study 1, the comparative study is confined to a small number of jurisdictions and therefore constitutes a limitation and should not be considered representative of the region as a whole.

Reliability and Accuracy

The judicial structures in Arab states are set out in formal legal texts, and this study was devoted to mapping the judicial structures of a wide range of states based on readings of original legislative texts and other official documents. Attempts were made to keep up to date with new developments in the four legal systems and ensure that the information provided was accurate and most recent. However, there may be new developments that have not been covered because the four states are currently undergoing several reforms in the justice sector.

In terms of the illustrative figures created for this study, the purpose was to provide for a broad overview of the judicial structures in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, especially in relation to the elements thought to be conducive to judicialisation. Although the figures have been reviewed and approved by judges from the four countries under study, they have not been officially approved by the judiciaries in the countries, and they must therefore be considered as unofficial.

Advantages

Despite these limitations, the classification of the various judicial systems in the region into four judicial “families” provides for a useful taxonomy. It helps to explain the diversity of Arab judicial systems and serves as a way of understanding the organisation of the various courts and their jurisdictional scope in each country. Moreover, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia

292 Reza Azarian, “Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science” (2011) 1 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 113, p.120

293 An additional purpose in classifying Arab legal systems into four models is to provide for an understanding of legal culture from a comparative point of view.
share sufficient similarities and differences that would make a regional comparative study viable. Specifically, the legal and judicial systems under review are not identical, but considered to be similar to the extent that they can be analysed using the variables as established by the conceptual framework employed in the study. This in turn helps to provide a reliable comparative framework within which to pose questions about judicialisation.

**Study 2: Profiling Arab judges’ education and career experiences**

The judiciary, like any institution, has mechanisms aimed at assimilating new appointees. According to Waldeck and Myers, traditional approaches to socialisation view new members as “blank slates, ready to be written upon by institutional procedures, norms, and existing culture that effectively allows organizations to shape their attitudes and behaviors”. In this approach, the individual is conceived as a recipient, where a set of institutionally prescribed behaviours are induced. However, this approach fails to account for individual judges being active in creating roles for themselves within the judicial organisations. For instance, judges may attempt to individualise and influence as well as negotiate their role throughout their judicial career, drawing on values and knowledge acquired from prior professional and educational experiences.

According to Gibson, research about judges tends to rely on “implicit assumptions about the nature of the linkages between demographic attributes, attitudes and values”. In order to understand the role and potential

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294 Comparative study usually allows for two types of analysis: (1) the explorative type, which aims at identifying relationships which may be conducive to theory formation, and (2) theory type, which aims at testing causal relationships and is necessary to corroborate existing theories and develop them further. The latter type is employed in this research.


296 Ibid., p.324

297 Ibid.

298 Ibid., p.329

299 James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7., p.21
significance that Arab judges play, it is important to consider the processes through which judges’ attitudes, values and role orientations are acquired. The second study is an empirical exploration of Arab judges’ professional and academic backgrounds; it treats social and professional background attributes of Arab judges as “surrogates for other variables”, which help in understanding their judicial role perceptions (then examined in Study 3).

**Study 2 approach: LinkedIn and Arab Judges Survey**

Access to information about the personal background of Arab judges is limited. No such information is available from any official government or judicial organisation in the Arab states covered in this thesis. As a result, two sources of information were used to provide an initial assessment of the personal and professional backgrounds of Arab judges: LinkedIn and a voluntary online survey (the “Arab Judges Survey” explained in detail below under “Study 3”).

**LinkedIn analysis**

The first source of data on the personal and professional background of Arab judges was obtained through biographical information freely available from judges on the online platform LinkedIn. LinkedIn is an online business and employment-oriented service. With over 500 million members, the platform is intended to connect professionals with colleagues, and to increase the number of business connections and networks within an industry. Users of LinkedIn provide professional, resume-like profiles on their LinkedIn page showing their professional and educational experience in order to allow other site members to learn more about their professional background. LinkedIn operates through a “gated-access approach”, which means that contact with any professional requires either an existing relationship or the intervention of

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300 The basic functionality of LinkedIn allows users (workers and employers) to create online profiles that typically consist of a curriculum vitae (CV), which describes and outlines work experience, education and training, and skills.


a third party as contact. This system is intended to build trust among the service's users.

LinkedIn does not provide information on the total number of members that are judges, in part because of the global and decentralised nature of the platform. In light of this, a non-probability snowball sampling technique was used. Three steps were taken in order to investigate the profile of Arab judges' on the platform:

1. Identify judges’ profiles through open search on LinkedIn in French, Arabic and English.
2. Once a potential profile was identified, an invitation to connect was sent to the user.
3. If accepted, the professional network of the new connection was explored in order to identify further potential judicial profiles to connect with.

For a profile to be included in the primary investigation, it was considered that the following information had to be available:

- Country of origin and current residence
- Current judicial status
- Type of court
- Gender
- Domestic and/or foreign education

On this basis, 163 profiles on LinkedIn were reviewed. Because the main purpose of the study was to explore the social and professional attributes of Arab judges, the 163 profiles were analysed for the following additional background characteristics of the judges:

- Professional experience prior to joining the judiciary
- Prosecutorial experience (if any)
- Whether any non-judicial job held concurrent with a judicial post

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Indications of lateral professional mobility and lateral recruitment were also taken into account. For lateral mobility, judicial secondment, extra judicial activities, and professional experiences made in between the judicial office were considered. For lateral recruitment, experiences prior to judicial appointment was considered.\(^{304}\)

In total, 112 profiles were considered to have sufficient elements to make an analysis viable. These profiles of judges were in a mix of Arabic, English and French. Most judges in the LinkedIn study came from Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.\(^{305}\) Table 6 below presents a breakdown of the 112 profiles by country, types of judges, years in post and gender.

**Table 6. Sample of LinkedIn profiles and Jordanian Constitutional Court judges (n=112)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of court</th>
<th>Years in judicial office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Trial Only</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Specialised</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Appellate and</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trial</td>
<td>12-16 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appellate</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trainee</td>
<td>17-20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21- 30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than 30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not listed/Not clear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Limitations of LinkedIn data

There are several limitations to the data available on LinkedIn. First and foremost, not all Arab judges are on LinkedIn, so this cannot be considered a representative sample of all Arab judges. In addition, data is not consistent for all judges, with some judges providing more information than others.

\(^{304}\) The Jordanian Judicial Council website also provided some information on this issue for current members of the Jordanian Constitutional Court as well as the educational and professional experience of each member of the Court. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - Constitutional Court, “Constitutional Court Members” <http://www.cco.gov.jo/en-us/Constitutional-Court/Court-Members> accessed 30 August 2018.

\(^{305}\) In addition, nine other profiles were considered from judges in Bahrain, Palestine, UAE, Tunisia and Sudan. Because of the scarcity of judicial profiles from these countries, these were omitted from the analysis.
Furthermore, it is not possible to verify whether the information posted on LinkedIn is accurate in terms of judges’ actual educational and professional experience. Because LinkedIn is an employment led website, there may be incentives on the part of users to misrepresent their actual experiences in order to appear more attractive to employers.\textsuperscript{306} Despite these limitations, LinkedIn provided a source of information on the background of Arab judges in the absence of any other sources. As such the results presented in Chapter 6 should be seen as a limited, initial attempt at exploring the background attributes of judges in the region, and not as a definitive assessment.

**Study 3: Arab judges’ view of the judicial role**

Role theory emphasises the controlling power of an individual’s immediate social environment.\textsuperscript{307} It also examines how behaviour is shaped by the demands and rules of others, as well as by the individual’s own understanding and conceptions of what his/her behaviour should be.\textsuperscript{308}

“A role conception is determined by social norms, demands and rules; by the role performances of others in their respective positions; by those who observe and react to their performance and by the individual’s particular capabilities and personality”.\textsuperscript{309}

Central to role theory is the idea of role expectations; these are beliefs about the qualities, behaviours, and characteristics suitable to a specific social role.\textsuperscript{310} Judges are part of an identifiable social group, the judiciary, and they

\hspace{1cm} 306 Social desirability bias may be an additional limitation of this sample. As discussed in relation to the Arab Judges Survey below, there is a strong likelihood that the profiles used in this study have been overreported by the judges to appear in a more favourable light.

\hspace{1cm} 307 Rather than one theory, role theory is a set of concepts and interrelated theories found in anthropology, social psychology and sociology. Its agreed-upon set of core ideas is that human beings behave in ways that are different and predictable depending on their respective social identities and the situations. The theory aspires to understand, predict and control particular phenomena included in its domain of study. See for example, B. J. Biddle, “Recent Developments in Role Theory”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 12 (1986), pp. 67-92; James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior” (1983) *5 Political Behavior* 7; Bruce J Biddle, *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors* (Academic Press 1979); Bruce J Biddle (ed), *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (Nachdr, Wiley 1970).

\hspace{1cm} 308 Bruce J Biddle (ed), *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (Nachdr, Wiley 1970)., p.4

\hspace{1cm} 309 Ibid.

\hspace{1cm} 310 According to Nugent, role expectations are understood as “beliefs concerning the qualities, behaviors, and characteristics suitable to a specific role; [they] could be conveyed to the role’s
therefore have social roles. Judges, like others with social roles, can change their behaviour to fit the expectation both of themselves and other judges. Study 3 attempts to examine the role conceptions and expectations of Arab judges. It does this by directly asking Arab judges their views about the judicial role, based on five conceptual categories. These categories are based on an existing framework in judicial role theory provided by Wahlke et al., and they are illustrated in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4.** Conceptual categories in judicial role theory

- **Category 1: "Consensual norms"**
  - Official and unofficial rules of conduct regulating the judge's behaviour

- **Category 2: "Purposive norms"**
  - The purposes and aims of the individual judge

- **Category 3: "Representational role"**
  - Methods the judge deems appropriate in pursuing purposes and aims

- **Category 4: "Clientele-role sector"**
  - Judge's behaviour in encounters with occupants of non-judicial roles

- **Category 5: "The self"**
  - Background and personal attributes including socialisation patterns


312 Biddle categories roles into three categories. The first category is written rules and conduct. The second category is spoken injunctions that provide for models of behaviour. Rules of conduct amongst small-group members, for example, prescribe certain norms and members may be judged by either conforming to them or not conforming to the injunctions that have been stated for their behaviour. The final extension of the dramaturgical analogy involves the concept of the “mind of the performer”. Here the role-holder acts the in a particular way: “not because written instructions have been given to him [her], nor because of injunctions spoken by others, but rather of his [her] own internalised standards”. According to Biddle, the last category involves a difficult assumption: that individual role-holders are aware of their expectations and can state them if asked. Bruce J Biddle, *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors* (Academic Press 1979) p.117
The first category, “consensual norms”, includes all those formal as well as informal “rules of the game” that judges work within. The second category, “purposive norms”, are those objectives judges perceives are important for judges. The third category, the “representational role”, is interlinked with the purposive norms. The representational role is understood as an instrument that judges use in order to realise their purposive norms. A clear example of when the representational role is being used is through judicial decision-making. Exploring the methods and decisional criteria judges’ resort to during the process of decision-making may indicate what purposive norms are being pursued.313 The fourth category, “clienteles-sector”, is the relationship between judges and the judiciary as an institution, and all relevant persons, groups and events outside the judiciary. This can have an important effect on how judges think about their own role.314 Finally, individuals occupy roles and in order to arrive at a complete understanding of the judicial role, individual judges’ own backgrounds and personal attributes should also be taken into account. This is referred to here as “the self” and was covered above in the discussion of “Study 2”.

Study 3 approach: Judicial attitudes and role perceptions (Arab Judges Survey)

In order to develop an understanding of Arab judicial role conceptions within the framework of role theory, an online survey, the Arab Judges Survey, was created. As far as is known, this is the first survey undertaken of judges across the Arab Middle East. The survey explored judicial roles primarily in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and explored these judges’ own interpretation and understanding of their judicial roles in their respective countries.

The survey was created and administered via the online survey tool, Opinio, UCL’s online survey research tool. Opinio is freely available to UCL researchers, is generally thought to be reliable and provides several reporting functions that made it preferable to other web-based survey tools.\(^{315}\)

In order to measure Arab judges’ internalised impressions of their roles, a closed-question survey was considered the best approach. This was corroborated by the fact that similar survey techniques have been used by previous studies in this field. For example, Ungs and Baas, Flango et al., Glick and Becker amongst others used forced-response questions in order to measure how judicial roles may operate in individual judges mindsets and to determine which types of roles dominated in the courts they investigated.\(^{316}\) The Arab Judges Survey drew on many of the questions used in these previous surveys in order to carry out the first comparative assessment of judicial roles amongst Arab judges and judges in a range of other jurisdictions.

**The Survey**

**Survey languages**

The survey was drafted first in English and then translated by the researcher into Arabic and French.\(^{317}\) Although the working language in Arab courts is always Arabic, English and French are used interchangeably with Arabic in court and in society.\(^{318}\) Bearing in mind the sensitive nature of the topic and the research population, translating the Arab Judges Survey in the local language was also thought to have a symbolic effect which according to

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\(^{315}\) A useful function of Opinio is that surveys can be delivered by invitation to a specified list. In addition, Opinio supports surveys in several languages which was crucial for this study.


\(^{317}\) I speak, read and write French, Arabic and English fluently. My translations were later reviewed and approved by trilingual and bilingual judges and academics.

\(^{318}\) This is in part due to the legacy of the British and French colonial presence in the region.
Harzing et al. may influence response rates as it demonstrates to the respondent that the researcher has gone through the effort and expense to make responding as easy as possible.\textsuperscript{319} In order to ensure that the meaning of concepts in the translated questionnaire were conceptually equivalent to the original version, simple sentence structures as well as clear and familiar wording was used much as possible.\textsuperscript{320} Furthermore, the translations were reviewed and approved by bilingual and trilingual judges and academics during the pilot testing. Despite this, some key concepts may have been “lost in translation” and the different survey versions may compromise the comparability between the countries and the survey versions.\textsuperscript{321}

Judges in the survey used the different languages in their responses. As listed in Table 7 below, out of all of those who participated in the survey, 42 used Arabic version, 42 used the English version and 7 judges used the French version in their responses.

Table 7. Number of respondents according to language of the Arab Judges Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survey recruitment**

In a cover letter to the survey, the reason for conducting the survey was explained to judges (Appendix 3). The survey was described as seeking to explore individual judges’ experiences and views of being a judge in order to

\textsuperscript{319} Harzing A.W., Reiche S., Pudelko M Challenges in International Survey Research: A review with illustrations and suggested solutions for best practice, European Journal of International Management, 2013 Vol.7 No.1, p. 17


\textsuperscript{321} According to Ackerman and Harzing the language of the questionnaire can impact respondents’ attitudes and behaviours and give rise to systematic bias. The authors argue that it is therefore crucial to ensure an overall conceptual equivalence and also consider vocabulary, idiomatic and syntactical equivalence. These were seriously considered in the drafting of the English version of the Arab Judges Survey. Akkermans, D., Harzing, A.W., and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2010) ‘Cultural Accommodation and Language Priming. Competitive versus Cooperative Behavior in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game’, Management International Review, Vol. 50 No. 5, pp. 559-584.
help increase understanding and knowledge of the work of judges in the Arab region. In addition, judges were told that the survey was voluntary and completely anonymous, and participants were assured that any information provided in the survey could not be traced back to any participant. This assurance was given in writing by the researcher and UCL, with an explanation of how anonymity was ensured through the security settings in Opinio. To further protect their anonymity, judges were specifically asked not to include their name anywhere in the survey. In order to reach as many Arab judges as possible respondents were encouraged to share the survey link with judges they thought would be interested in participating. A shorter version of the cover letter was also included in e-mail requests sent to judges. (An English version of the e-mail is provided in Appendix 3.)

Survey questions

The survey questions mainly contained closed single choice, multiple choice, rating and ranking questions. The survey included 33 questions covering the following general themes:

- Current judicial post
- Background questions including judges' professional and educational experience
- Being a judge in the respondent's country
- Judicial qualities
- Judicial decision-making
- Judges and the law

All 33 questions had a comment section for judges to elaborate on their choices/answers should they wish to.

In order to explore Arab judges’ purposive norms and representational roles Survey questions 12-14, 19-26 and 28 covered:

- Judges' characterisation of their judicial role
- Judicial attitudes towards the public
- Judicial attitudes towards precedent
• Judges’ views of justice and the rule of law

Since role theory places value on the role-holders’ expectations, the survey examined judges’ expectations of what is proper judicial behaviour for themselves and what their relationship was with both judicial colleagues and other non-judicial actors. This relates to the “consensual norms” and the “clientele-roles sector”. Survey questions 9-11, 15-18, and 27 covered:

• Arab judges’ expectations about what constitutes proper behaviour on his/her part toward other judges in the same position;
• Arab judges’ perceptions of what other judges’ expectations are of the judicial role;
• Arab judges’ perceptions of what constitutes a proper relationship with the public, media and the executive;
• Arab judges’ perceptions of what the public, the media and the executive’s expectations are of the judicial role;
• How Arab judges perceive the judiciary; and
• How Arab judges feel they are perceived by the public.

The survey was constructed so that judges were not required to answer all the survey questions. Taking into consideration the sensitivity of surveying Arab judges, especially on some difficult and controversial issues, it was felt that by allowing the judges the freedom to choose what questions they wanted to answer they might be more inclined to take part. As a result, some questions will have a higher response rate than others. This is made clear in the findings in the following chapters by including response rates in all results.

**Survey timeline**

The survey period was between October 2017 – May 2018. This included both the piloting stage and the full survey stage. The piloting stage occurred in early October 2017. The stage included a general review of the questions and their relevance by judges from the region. Second, the piloting stage also included a review of the translated versions of the survey in order to make sure that they were correct.
A number of judges and professionals from Jordan, France and Saudi Arabia were asked to review the survey and comment on the questions and provide feedback to further improve the survey, particularly in relation to the translated versions in Arabic and French. The piloting stage was very helpful for this study particularly in relation to Saudi judges. During this stage, it became clear that Saudi judges were apprehensive to participate. It was previously assumed that this was due to the strict gender separation in Saudi culture. However, this turned out to be a misconception. The apprehension, as explained by one senior Saudi judge who promised to distribute the survey among his colleagues, was due to my surname (“Razai”) which is a common Iranian name. The view was that judges would be suspicious of a survey being run by someone with this name, considering the political and religious tensions between the two countries. To mitigate this factor, I was advised to use a (Sunni Muslim) surname. Thus, an identical copy of the Arab Judges Survey was created for the Saudi judge to share with his colleagues where with a more Sunni sounding surname.

The survey was launched on 17th of October 2017 and closed on the 1st of May 2018. The survey was open to all judges from across the Arab region.

**Sampling method**

As described earlier in this chapter, the research conditions were suboptimal because of the politically sensitive nature of the region coupled with the elite nature of judges as a research population. This meant that choosing a research methodology that conformed to the conventional notions of random selection and representativeness was inapplicable. Nonetheless, Arab judicial attitudes was considered an important topic to explore even if access to information is limited.\(^{322}\) In light of this, a snowball sampling method was

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\(^{322}\) According to Kircherr and Charles, researchers grounded in quantitative thinking may consider non-probability sampling methods, such as snowball sampling, “when confronted with difficult-to-reach populations, particularly if the dismissal of snowball sampling would mean that no research could be conducted at all” Kirchherr J, Charles K (2018) Enhancing the sample diversity of snowball samples: Recommendations from a research project on anti-dam movements in Southeast Asia. PLoS ONE 13 (8): e0201710., p.3
deemed the only feasible method to find participants for the Arab Judges Survey.323

Snowball sampling is defined by Atkinson and Flint as a technique for gathering research subjects through “the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide the names of other actors”.324 The snowball sampling method is used as a method where the research population is hidden, hard to reach and when other preferred methodologies are not feasible because of obstacles found in the research environment.325 The method therefore is usually not “and should not be the first choice of research methodology when a more representative sampling method is available”.326

The conceptual framework of judicialisation of politics, including the research questions stemming from it, was the central strategy used for the sampling method. Furthermore, in the absence of a sample frame, the following pathways were taken to ensure a degree of sample diversity:327 Personal and professional contacts of judges and key figures in the judiciary; academia; legal profession and local and international organisations collaborating with Arab judiciaries and judges. These contacts helped to generate new contacts throughout the distribution of the Arab judges Survey. Distribution of the survey through different avenues in order to ensure that the initial set of respondents were sufficiently varied.328 The survey was distributed via the following avenues:

323 Although the intent of the study is not to generalise Arab judges, but to explore whether there may be a variety of judicial role conceptions in the region, the conclusions made in this research cannot be claimed to constitute valid and reliable research findings as required by quantitative principles.
326 Ibid.
328 According to Kirchherr and Charles, “the best defence’ against a lack of sample diversity is to begin the sample with seeds that are as diverse as possible.” Similarly, Etikan et al argue that it is “compulsory for the researcher to ensure that the initial set of respondents is
• LinkedIn
• Suggestions from academics and professionals with contacts in the judiciary in the region
• Organisations contacted with requests to distribute the survey through their mailing lists
• Judicial Councils (Yemen, Palestine and Lebanon)
• Key figures within the Arab judiciary identified by the researcher
• Arab judges already known to the researcher

Reminders were sent after three weeks from initial contact. Out of all the avenues, LinkedIn, suggestions from individuals with contacts in the judiciary, and existing relationship with judges proved the most successful. This was in part because many judges who were contacted had already accepted my invitation to connect on LinkedIn as part of Study 2 of this thesis. As anticipated, the Judicial Councils in the three countries refused to distribute the survey. With the help of the International Bar Association (IBA), the Tunisian Team for the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) posted a link to the survey on 30 November 2017 to one of ILAC’s private Facebook groups, which has almost 600 judges from Tunisia (Figure 5).

Given the subjectivity of the selection mechanisms inherent in this sampling method, there are limitations in relation to the data obtained, its analysis, interpretation and presentation. In this study, judges were not collected randomly as expected by pure sampling principles. Participation in the Arab Judges Survey depended on referrals from other judges as well as their willingness to participate. Therefore, the sample of judges in this study may be more biased towards more cooperative participants.

Survey responses

In total, 91 judges participated in the survey. These were represented by: Egypt (28); Saudi Arabia (25); Lebanon (22); Tunisia, (9); Jordan (4); Palestine (2) and; Syria (1). Table 7 below presents a breakdown of the 91 judges according to gender, country, status, type of court and years of experience.
Table 8. Sample profile in Arab Judges Survey (n=91)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Type of court</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years in court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Full time</td>
<td>Trial only</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Trial and Appellate</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Appellate</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>7-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Appellate</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>12-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>17-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>21-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>26-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than 30 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 91 judges, 48 judges fully completed the survey.331

Limitations of the survey

Representativeness

This study was a first explorative attempt to obtain the views and experiences of Arab judges about their role as judges. For the reasons explained earlier in this chapter, the working assumption was that the survey would not generate large numbers of responses from judges across the Arab Middle East. For reasons also explained at the outset of the chapter, the size and the nature of the sampling used in this study meant that it would not be possible to assess the representative nature of the responses.

The relatively small number of responses to the survey (91 responses, with 48 complete responses) was, therefore, not surprising. Although many previous surveys of judges in other jurisdictions have also had small numbers of responses, these earlier studies were usually confined to a few courts in one

329 Forty-two 91 respondents did not indicate their gender in the Arab Judges Survey.
330 One respondent from Jordan did not state how many years of court experience he/she had.
331 These were represented by Egypt (15 judges), Saudi Arabia (15 judges), Lebanon (11 judges), Tunisia, (3 judges), Palestine (2 judges) and Jordan and Syria with one judge each.
Judges that participated in this survey come from across the Arab Middle East, mostly represented by Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the respondents came from different courts within their respective judicial systems. Therefore, the single variable that unites them is that they hold a judicial post in the Arab region, and that they come from the region. And although judges constitute a peculiar, homogeneous subgroup within any national population, the issue of representation is a significant methodological limitation of this study.

Limitations in the survey question approach

There are basically two types of survey questions that could be used in a survey such as this: open-ended and closed-ended questions. Both pose reliability and validity problems. One method used in defining the judicial role has been to ask the participants (judges) to define their own roles by using open-ended questions. An issue that arises of this approach is that it inevitably involves some subjectivity on the part of the researcher and respondent. Nisbett for example, argues that the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor that any introspective access is limited because:

"[S]ubjects sometimes cannot report on the existence of influential stimuli and as a result, any verbal report by subjects about the cause of their responses would be at least partially in error."


333 Leslie, for instance, argues that: “researchers surveying issues directly related to homogeneous groups should not be overly concerned about the percentage of questionnaire returns. Representativeness will most likely be excellent. This presumes, of course, that enough responses are gained to meet statistical assumptions.” Larry L Leslie, “Are High Response Rates Essential to Valid Surveys?” (1972) 1 Social Science Research 323., p.332

To overcome the problems of open-ended questions, some researchers have used closed-option questions when surveying judges. This presents the judge with a finite list of possible answer options, and responses may present more limited information than the open-ended approach. One way that this survey attempted to address this was to also provide the answer option of “other” and provide judges with the opportunity to write in another answer or elaborate on their closed-option answers.

In studying judicial role conceptions, a number of researchers have used the closed-option questions in order to categorise judges into specific judicial role types. But Flango, early on, acknowledged that some limitations also exist with this approach:

“[W]e do however, wish to point up the difficulties experienced in the past in defining judicial role through a neat categorization of judges into distinct ideal types with arbitrary labels. There is a general problem of getting direct information about judicial attitudes and orientations that might work as determinants of judicial decisions.”

The Arab Judges Survey had the aim of exploring and comparing Arab judges’ role orientations with previous research on this topic, and as a result the survey included many of the same questions used in previous surveys of judges in the US and Europe. This means it is possible that some of the survey questions might have been understood differently by Arab judges. This possibility is heightened by the availability of the online survey in three different languages. Efforts were made to word the questions in a simple and concrete manner as well as avoiding ambiguous words. While the translations were reviewed and approved by French and Arabic speaking judges, some key elements may have been “lost in translation”. As Ungs and Baas acknowledged in their study:

“In the final analysis, it is the judge who, in ranking the statements, gives them meaning...”\textsuperscript{336}

Furthermore, the Arab Judges Survey drew on many of the questions used in previous surveys in order to carry out a comparative assessment of judicial roles amongst Arab judges and judges in a range of other jurisdictions. The chosen approach carries some important limitations particularly in terms international comparisons. As mentioned above, this was a first attempt at studying the role perceptions of judges in the Arab Middle East. It was therefore considered important to follow the same pattern of earlier studies by borrowing their questions (that had the same explorative purpose) and follow precedent where possible.

Furthermore, although these precedents relied are now decades old, they have been, and continue to be used by judicial behaviourists to measure the several aspects of potential role orientations and to understand judicial decision-making. The questions are reflective of recent studies into the role of judges: they are designed to investigate judges’ expectations about the purposes or objectives they should adopt and how they perceive decision-making to operate on the court.\textsuperscript{337}

**Social desirability bias**

In addition to the limitations discussed above, another nuisance factor of the survey responses relates to social desirability bias. The bias is understood to arise when sensitive topics are assumed to generate response errors and have an effect on the data quality.\textsuperscript{338} Unpopular answers such as executive

\textsuperscript{336} Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, "Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of Ohio Judges" (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p.351


\textsuperscript{338} Social desirability bias occurs when respondents distort their answers by either underreporting socially undesirable behavior and/or overreporting socially desirable behavior in order to maintain a socially favourable self-presentation. Respondents willingness to provide truthful answers therefore may be compromised in surveys if the topic is perceived to be undesirable, intrusive, sensitive or if the answers carry the risk of being disclosed to third
interference with judicial work may have been under-reported by the judges who participated in the survey. Equally, favourable answers such as impartiality, judicial independence and strict adherence to the law may have been overreported. Despite attempts at containing the situational determinants that may exacerbate the bias (such as embedding sensitive questions with more general questions and assuring participants of confidentiality and data protection)\(^{339}\), there is a strong likelihood that judges may have overreported or underreported on some of their answers to appear in a more positive light.

**Benefits of the survey findings**

The limitations of comparative analysis by using a partial and nonprobability sample cannot be overstated. The intent of the study was not to generalise Arab judges. Rather, the objective was to explore whether there may be a variety of judicial role conceptions in the region. Therefore, the conclusions made in this research cannot be claimed to constitute valid and reliable research findings as required by quantitative principles. This study does not include all judges, nor does it assess the probability of the data because of the small and partial sample size. Despite these limitations, the Arab Judges Survey still provides important and unique information about judicial role conceptions in jurisdictions where this issue has not been empirically explored before. The survey is a first of its kind in the Arab region and as a result, it

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\(^{339}\) Social desirability bias could be reduced by appropriately tailoring the survey design. According to Krumpal “The literature review of the recent research indicates that cognitive psychologists, social scientists and survey statisticians have made some progress in reducing measurement errors due to deliberate misreporting on sensitive topics, principally by increasing the anonymity of the question and answer process (e.g. via the randomized response technique or self-administered interviews), by decreasing the respondent’s concerns in admitting to some taboo (e.g. via confidentiality assurances or clever wording and framing of the sensitive item)” \(^{3}\), Krumpal I, ‘Determinants of Social Desirability Bias in Sensitive Surveys: A Literature Review’ (2013) 47 Quality & Quantity, p.2041. See also See Anton J. Nederhof, Methods of coping with social desirability bias: a review, European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 15, 263-280 (1985); Robert J. Fisher, Social Desirability Bias and the Validity of Indirect Questioning, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Sep., 1993), pp. 303-315
helps to begin to shed initial insight of Arab judges’ understanding of their role within the framework set by earlier Western judicial studies.

Summary

The three studies conducted in this thesis aim to examine the role and political significance of Arab judges by:

1. Mapping the jurisdiction and powers of courts and judges in 8 Middle East countries, which resulted in the identification of a new typology of judicial systems in the region centred around 4 main types of judicial systems, exemplified by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia;

2. Profiling of the educational and professional backgrounds of Arab judges across the region, primarily through an analysis of 112 LinkedIn profiles of Arab judges and supported by additional information obtained through a voluntary online survey of Arab judges; and

3. Undertaking an assessment of judicial role conceptions of Arab judges through the first ever survey of Arab judges. This survey explores the experiences and attitudes to being a judge, relationships with other judges, the public, media and government. The Arab Judges Survey, in turn, enabled a comparative analysis of judicial role conceptions in the Arab region compared with previous empirical work with American and European judges.

The study also offers initial insights into how Arab judges understand their judicial roles, including how these judges perceive both the formal and informal norms within which they operate.
Chapter 5. Four judicial systems in the Arab Middle East

This chapter undertakes an assessment of Arab judicial systems by looking at the official laws regulating the organisation, composition and jurisdiction of courts in four Arab states. In this chapter, focus is placed on two structural variations that, according to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, are conducive to the judicialisation of politics (at least in Western legal systems).\(^{341}\) The first variation relates to the **territorial dimension of court systems.** The second variation relates to the **relationship between the different levels of courts,** their internal dynamics and the role of apex courts in each country. This chapter applies these principles to four Arab judicial systems, assessing how the organisation of courts may affect the political significance of the judiciary in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Although diversity, “historical particularity, specificity and locality”\(^{342}\) have been taken into account in the choice of the four countries, there may be limitations in this mapping exercise. The legal systems under review are not identical, but they are considered to be similar to the extent that they can be analysed using the variables as established by the conceptual framework employed in this research.\(^{343}\)

**The role of judicial systems in judicialisation**

In order to explore Arab judicial roles as fully as possible, both macro and micro influences are important to consider: “What judges prefer to do and what they think they ought to do are not necessarily compatible with what they are encouraged or allowed to do.”\(^{344}\) This chapter (and the next chapter) explores the formal institutional machineries of the Egyptian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian judiciaries. The chapters set the stage for the following

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\(^{343}\) Conscious efforts to consider every unit (judicial system) was made in light of the four factors described above, and initially in isolation from each other. The comparative study is confined to a small number of jurisdictions and therefore constitutes a limitation and should not be considered representative of the region as a whole.

chapters (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) which aims to explore what Gibson refers to as judges’ “informal norms that lubricate” the institutional machineries.\textsuperscript{345} As explained in Chapter 1, a political system can use two different elements to exert influence on courts.\textsuperscript{346} The first element aims at limiting court jurisdiction so that the impact of judicial decisions (and therefore a judge’s role in the political process) remains restricted.\textsuperscript{347} The second element which may affect judges’ scope of political participation relates to the actual organisation of the judicial system and the interrelationship between courts.\textsuperscript{348}

Jurisdiction over cases in Western democracies are generally described as either concentrated into a unitary system of courts, or fragmented into a plurality of different courts with their own separate hierarchical structures.\textsuperscript{349} In contrast with a unitary system of courts with a wide dispersal of jurisdictional powers, fragmented systems tend to have exceptional courts that run parallel alongside regular courts.\textsuperscript{350} The actual organisation of the judicial system may also influence judicial participation in the political process.\textsuperscript{351} Two models are used to describe the organisation of courts: co-ordinate systems where lower and intermediate courts make the majority of decisions, and hierarchical systems where a substantial portion of lower court decisions are re-examined by a final appellate court.\textsuperscript{352} Both models highlight the role of supreme (or apex) courts. A strong decision-making court at the top that is characterised as centripetal is assumed to be better equipped to ensure that judicial decisions are consistent, and therefore the final court is more likely to be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{345} Ibid. p.28
\item \textsuperscript{347} Ibid.p.79
\item \textsuperscript{348} Ibid.p.80
\item \textsuperscript{349} Ibid.p.80
\item \textsuperscript{350} See Damaška’s Chapter “Organization of Authority: The Hierarchical and the Coordinate Ideals”, in \textit{The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process} (Yale Univ Press 1986).
\item \textsuperscript{352} Damaška, Mirjan R., “Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure” (1975) 84 \textit{Yale Law Journal} 480., p.484
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
politically significant. By contrast, a court of final appeal with a centrifugal dynamic tends to reduce internal consistency by promoting the autonomy of lower and intermediate courts – which lowers the political significance for the apex court itself.

**Identifying four types of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East**

As described in Chapter 4, the research began by examining eight countries in the Arab region. Each country was examined in light of three elements: the jurisdictional scope of courts; the interrelationship between courts; and the nature of the political system. On the basis of these elements, a taxonomy of four legal systems was constructed that arguably represents four distinct models of judicial structures in the Arab region within the framework of judicialisation of politics. The four judicial structures are represented by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as illustrated in Table 8 below.

**Table 9. Classification of four Arab judicial structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification based judicial structures</th>
<th>Political System</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual religious court system</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Saudi-Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly fragmented and hierarchical system</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented constitutional System</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-unitary constitutional System</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A new approach to understanding Arab judicial systems**

Arab Middle East jurisdictions are often categorised by legal scholars as inherently similar in terms of legal and judicial culture. States within the region

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354 Ibid.p.81
355 The following countries were considered: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and the UAE.
356 The legal and judicial history was – albeit broadly- also considered (See Chapter 4)
are said to reveal “strong trans-religious legal patterns”. To a certain degree, there is an inter-connected legal heritage that deserves attention (some of which was explored in Chapter 2). However, there are also important national differences across the Arab countries and these extend to their legal systems. The judicial systems assessed in this chapter reveal a complex organisation of different, contrasting and unique institutional arrangements. This also illustrates a spectrum of variations present in the Middle East court systems under study.

Having identified the four Arab countries that are models of the range of judicial systems present in the region, the remainder of this chapter focusses on these four judicial systems. The analysis are presented in two ways. First, textual descriptions of each country’s courts are derived from the original laws in Arabic (and secondary sources where necessary). Second, detailed diagrams were constructed specifically for the purposes of this research, which are also drawn directly from the primary legal source material in Arabic.

Comparing and contrasting the four different court structures with each other in this way, enables characteristics which shape contemporary judicial structures in the Middle East to be identified. It also allows for a comparative analysis of Middle East judicial systems in relation to the existing research on Western judiciaries. The result of this diagrammatic mapping exercise and the analysis of court jurisdiction is the creation of a new typology of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East. It draws on the conceptual framework from Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s work, The Power of Judges.

The analysis in this chapter includes a preliminary assessment of the extent to which Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s framework is applicable to judiciaries in the Arab Middle East, and therefore the extent to which the judicialisation of politics exists in these countries. The focus here is on three main factors which

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357 Chibli Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law (Oxford University Press 2007). p.23
358 The purpose of the illustrative figures presented in this chapter is to provide for a broad overview of the judicial structures in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, especially in relation to the elements thought to be conducive to judicialisation.
Guarnieri and Pederzoli argue are likely to influence the political significance of courts:

- Legal provisions that relate to the composition and organisation of courts;
- The manner in which the four legal frameworks grant jurisdiction to courts; and
- A basic overview of the judicial structures.

The three factors help to illustrate the interrelationship between the different layers of courts within each Arab legal system. The factors also help to shed some light onto the internal dynamics of each judicial system, including the degree of importance attached to courts at the apex of the judicial pyramid(s) in each country.

**Egypt: Fragmented constitutional system**

Egypt's court system retains much of the fragmented civil law system design from the Ottoman and colonial period, with four distinct set of courts: ordinary, administrative, military and specialised courts. However, this is only partially accurate. The Egyptian court system (Figure 6) reveals additional features typically found within a unitary court system, particularly in relation to the tools and jurisdictional scope granted to the highest courts in the country. The wide reach of decisions rendered by these courts may, in part, be explained by Egypt's distinct legal and judicial history.

**Mixed system history**

Although Egypt was technically under Ottoman sovereignty, in practice it enjoyed a degree of autonomy.\(^{359}\) For instance, the pace and content of Egyptian legal reform differed from the overarching Ottoman Tanẓīmāt reforms especially after the 19th century.\(^{360}\) One notable example was the foreign introduction of “Mixed Courts” (Maḥākim al-mukḥṭaliṭah) in 1875, which

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made an important impact on the modern Egyptian legal system.\textsuperscript{361} The Mixed Courts were a hybrid series of courts, established to deal with civil and commercial disputes between foreigners and Egyptians. Judges in these courts came from a variety of Western nations, including France, England, Italy, Scandinavia countries and the US.\textsuperscript{362} This international dimension went beyond the model of Napoleonic and French courts.\textsuperscript{363} According to Hamad, this also introduced the principle of judicial discretion when the National Courts were established in 1883:

“The Egyptian judiciary developed beyond the strict application of the law that usually characterizes the civil law and bureaucratic judiciaries to include the latitude in the decision-making process which common law judges usually enjoy.”\textsuperscript{364}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\textsuperscript{361} Hoyle for instance argues that it is impossible to understand the modern Egyptian legal system without a knowledge of the Mixed Courts, Mark SW Hoyle, \textit{Mixed Courts of Egypt} (Graham & Trotman 1991)., p.83

\textsuperscript{362} Judge Brinton, who himself was an American appellate court judge in the Egyptian Mixed Courts, wrote that “each of the seven great Powers, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Germany, France and Austria, should be entitled always to one seat in the upper court” see Jasper Y Brinton, “The Mixed Courts of Egypt” (1926) 20 \textit{American Journal of International Law} 670, p.626.

\textsuperscript{363} Hamad., M., \textit{When the Gavel Speaks: Judicial Politics in Modern Egypt} (University of Utah 2008). p.60

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
Figure 6. Organisation of Courts in Egypt

Supreme Constitutional Court
المحكمة الدستورية العليا

Supreme Court of Military Appeals
المحكمة العالى الطعون العسكرية

Central Military Court
المحكمة العسكرية الجزائية

ORDINARY COURTS
القضاء العادلى

ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
مجلس الدولة

INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL BODIES
هيئات قضائية مستقلة

MILITARY JUDICIAL BRANCH
هيئة القضاء العسكري

Other courts:
the Ethics Court,
the State Security Court,
the Emergency Court
Ordinary courts (Al-Qaḍā’ al-‘adi)
Today, the “ordinary judicial branch” in Egypt is three-tiered and deals primarily with civil and criminal matters. The lower tier of the ordinary courts are divided into summary courts (Maḥakem al-ebtidaīah). In each court of first instance, there are a number of divisions headed by a presiding judge. And there are also a number of summary courts, where one judge hears cases of contraventions, misdemeanours and less serious civil issues.

Egypt’s courts of appeal (Maḥakem al-isti’nafiah) have three main powers:
- Examine and review awards issued by lower courts;
- Review and examine questions of fact and law; and
- Act as a court of first instance for capital crimes (Maḥkamat al-Jenaīat).

They are located in Egypt’s largest cities, and each court of appeal is divided into a number of divisions with each responsible for handling specific disputes. If found necessary, cases may be convened in another place within or outside the territorial jurisdiction (following the request of the chief judge of the court of appeal and subject to approval by the Minister of Justice).

Court of Cassation
The highest court in the ordinary court structure is the Court of Cassation (Makhkamat al-naqth), which in principle, is only accessible if a breach of law is claimed as a basis of final appeal. The Court has over 30 divisions to review criminal, civil, personal status laws and other cases flowing from the courts of appeal. The Court has over 400 judges, with roughly 100 out of these 400 judges seconded to other countries in the Arab Middle-East, primarily to the Gulf region. The Court is headed by the Chief Justice, who also serves as

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365 Art 14, Law No. 46/1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt)
366 For example, the North Cairo Court of First Instance has 169 summary divisions with each division responsible for reviewing specific types of legal disputes.
367 Art 14, Judicial Authority Law (Egypt)
368 Art 6, Judicial Authority Law (Egypt)
369 Art 8, Judicial Authority Law (Egypt)
the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, along with a number of Deputy Chief Justices and Associate Justices. A special panel of 11 senior judges decides cases involving jurisdictional conflicts between two or more circuits. Similarly, in felony trials where the Court has earlier reversed criminal court judgments on two occasions, a third and final trial can be conducted by a special panel of five judges.\textsuperscript{371} In addition to considering disputes by parties (or disputes presented by the Public Prosecutor), the Court is also entrusted to review lawsuits based on a judge’s actions. The law grants the Court the power to revise court decisions and to set out general principles and rules relating to the interpretation of laws. In addition, the Court of Cassation is empowered to review the legitimacy of membership of the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly.\textsuperscript{372} Article 87 of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution states that: “The Court of Cassation decides on the validity of membership for the members of both chambers; any challenge is to be submitted within thirty days.”\textsuperscript{373}

\textbf{Administrative courts}

Separate and parallel to the Egyptian ordinary courts are the administrative courts introduced in 1946. Article 190 of the Egyptian Constitution defines the administrative branch as an independent judicial body exclusively competent to adjudicate in administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals. The administrative judicial body is also competent: “to issue opinions on the legal issues of bodies to be determined by law, review and draft bills and resolutions of a legislative character, and review draft contracts to which the state or any public entity is a party”.\textsuperscript{374} The administrative judicial branch is composed of:

- Administrative Courts (Maḥakem al-idarīḥah);
- Disciplinary Courts (Maḥakem al-taʿdībah);
- Courts of Administrative Justice (Mahkamat al-quthaa al-idari); and
- Supreme Administrative Court (Maḥkamat al-idarīḥah al-ʿUlīḥah).\textsuperscript{375}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{372} Art. 82, Part three “The Public Powers”, Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of 2012.
\item\textsuperscript{373} Art. 87, Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{374} Art. 190, Egypt’s Constitution of 2014
\item\textsuperscript{375} Law no.47/1972, “The State Council Law”, (Egypt)
\end{itemize}
The Administrative Courts serves as a first instance court and have exclusive jurisdiction over administrative disputes involving government personnel and disputes involving administrative contracts. The Administrative Courts of Justice are composed of circuits, each with three judges. Similar to the courts of appeal in the ordinary judicial branch, they serve as an appeals court from the Administrative Courts and Disciplinary Courts. They have jurisdiction over the validity of administrative decisions concerning public officials. The Administrative Court of Justice also acts as a court of first instance for disputes that falls outside the jurisdictions of Administrative and Disciplinary Courts. There are two types of Disciplinary Courts: one court deals with disputes involving high-ranking public officials and the other with lower ranking public officials. Both are courts of first instance.

The Supreme Administrative Court (Maḥkamat al-idarīḥah al-‘Uliyā) sits at the top of the administrative judicial hierarchy and is chaired by the President of the State Council. The Court has jurisdiction over challenges against decisions issued by Administrative Courts of Justice, the Administrative Courts and the Disciplinary Courts, and there is no possibility for appeal from the Supreme Administrative Court. The Court is composed of several divisions, each chaired by five judges.

**Courts with special jurisdiction**

In addition to Egypt’s ordinary and administrative judicial branches, there are several courts with specialised jurisdictions:

- Family Courts (Maḥakem al-usra);
- Economic Courts (Maḥakem al-eqtisadiaḥ);
- Military Courts (Maḥakem al-‘askariyah)

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376 Ibid.
377 The family courts are embedded in the ordinary court branch.
378 Egypt had, until recently, a dual system of State Security Courts; one formed under the Emergency Law No. 162 (1958) and the another which was regulated by Law No. 50 (1980). The Permanent Court was competent to look into crimes violating the decisions of the military governor under the state of Emergency. As stipulated by law, individuals tried were not entitled to due process. Although the state security courts were formally abolished in 2003,
• Environmental Courts (*Maḥakem al-Beaeīah*); and
• The Supreme Constitutional Court (*Maḥkmah al-dostoriah al-‘ulīah*).

**The Supreme Constitutional Court**

The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) has the sole power of judicial review, provided that any court of merit forwards the case to the SCC on a question of constitutionality. If any court in the course of deciding a concrete case finds that a law being applied may be unconstitutional, it can suspend proceedings and forward the case to the SCC for review. Alternatively, a party in a lawsuit can challenge the constitutionality of legislation, provided that the lower court finds the challenge plausible. If so, the lower court will allow the party a three-month period to file a case before the SCC.\(^{379}\)

In addition to the traditional powers of review of legislation, the SCC has the authority to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between different judicial bodies.\(^{380}\)

It is also empowered to provide a definitive interpretation of legislation and legal decrees if a divergent interpretation has emerged during the course of their application.\(^{381}\) Following the constitutional amendments in 2005, the SCC is now empowered by law to review legislation prior to its promulgation, which effectively grants it wide powers of judicial review.\(^ {382}\) The SCC is composed of a court president, who is officially nominated by the President of the Republic, and a number of judges.

**Judicialisation and the Egyptian judicial system**

Egypt can be characterised as a *fragmented constitutional system* in the sense that it has two or more judicial pyramids coexisting and forming autonomous subsystems.\(^ {383}\) Despite the shared characteristics of a

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\(^{379}\) Law. No. 48/1979 “Supreme Constitutional Court Law” (Egypt)

\(^{380}\) Art. 25 Ibid.

\(^{381}\) Ibid.

\(^{382}\) Nimer Sultany, *Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring* (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017), p.93

continental civil law system, Egypt differs in several respects, especially in relation to the role played by the highest courts in the country. The horizontal nature of the judicial system, the strong role played by the three top courts in the country (Supreme Administrative Court, SCC, and the Cassation Court) is best described as a hybrid between the two models that traditionally describe Western legal systems. The jurisdictional scope of the highest courts in the country are not strictly distinct from each other and have in the past engaged in “inter-court” dialogue. For instance, at the request of the legislature, the Court of Cassation has in the past ruled on the legitimacy of the People’s Assembly, and in turn requested the Supreme Administrative Court to determine the legality of political parties under the Political Parties Law. Both these Courts may also refer a political party to the Constitutional Court on the basis of contested constitutionality. The role played by these courts in particular appears to promote judicialisation in Egypt, where a number of important political issues are delegated by the legislature to the final decision-making bodies of the judiciary.

384 Law No. 40 of 1977, “The Political Parties Law” Amended by Law No. 177/2005 (Egypt)
385 Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017), p.94
Saudi Arabia: Dual religious court system

The judicial system in Saudi Arabia is unique in several respects, particularly within the region. The country’s judicial system is perhaps best characterised as a dual religious system. The organisation and composition of both judicial pyramids are set out in the Judicial Authority Law and the Law of the Board of Grievances, promulgated in 2007 as part of the Kingdom’s legal reforms.\footnote{Royal Decree No. M/78 on 19 Ramadan 1428H (October 1st, 2007), “Law of the Judiciary 2007” (Saudi Arabia).} While the internal dynamics of these courts might also be characterised as hierarchical, the majority of cases seem to be heard by the intermediate and lower courts, which indicates a centrifugal dynamic where a small number of complaints reach the top of the judicial pyramid.\footnote{Ibid.}

Although the judicial system in Saudi Arabia has some similar features to the civil law system, the Kingdom’s legal system makes it unique to the Arab region. According to Article 7 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance (1992):

“The government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this law and the other laws of the State.”\footnote{Art. 7, The Basic Law of Governance, Royal Order No. A/90, (27/8/1412H, Mar. 1, 1992). (Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, Article 44 of the Basic law provides that the three branches of government “will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this Law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.”}

Saudi courts and judges predominantly rely on Hanbali jurisprudence, and the judicial process reflects a classical form of Islamic adjudication.\footnote{The Hanbali school of law is the predominant school of the judiciary, as it was selected to be considered as first among all the schools. Saudi Arabia created its own methodology for judicial analysis in 1928, and the laws in Shari’a Courts remain un-codified. See Al-Hay’a al-Qadā‘iyya [Judicial Board] Decision No.3 (17/1/1347/ June 25, 1928), approved by the Royal Decree of 24/3/1347 - Sept. 8, 1928. A translated version is provided by Haitham H. Osta, “Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring Predictability in Law in Shari’a Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016).}

Use of Ijtihād in Saudi courts

As discussed earlier, the doctrine of stare decisis is not widely practiced in Saudi Arabia, in part because of the concept of Ijtihād. As described in Chapter

\footnote{\textit{Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring Predictability in Law in Shari’a Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016).}
3, *Ijtihād* forms part of one of the four sources of Islamic law and is used where the two primary sources, the *Qurʾān* and *Sunnah*, are silent on a legal issue. Although authority is primarily sought within the Ḥanbalī school of thought, Saudi judges are free to practice the creative power of *Ijtihād* – independent legal reasoning. According to Hanlon, the Saudi legal system supports a judge’s freedom of *Ijtihād* which in turn restricts the scope of appellate review.\(^{390}\)

In Saudi Arabia, *Ijtihād* operates under the principle of “mutual acceptance”; that is, all *Ijtihāds* are equal and no *Ijtihād* “weighs more than the other”.\(^{391}\) The scope and decentralised nature of “judicial *Ijtihād*” was implemented by the High Court of Mecca in 1962 where the Court stated that, provided a judge’s decision does not differ with the sources of law, judgments cannot be reversed and must be respected: “… [N]o judgment requiring reversal shall be reversed except by the trial judge who issued it, as long as he does not refuse; if he refuses, the appeal court has to reverse it.”\(^{392}\)

According to Hanlon, Saudi judges’ independence and law-making powers are thoroughly respected in the Saudi legal system, even if this entails a slowing down of the decision-making process. The relationship with the lower courts are characterised by dialogue and guidance in order to seek clarification “to encourage and broaden the *ijtihad* of the trial courts”.\(^{393}\) In Hanlon’s view, “the Saudi appeal system differs from any continental (French) court of appeal system”.\(^{394}\) Though there have been several attempts at codifying the Hanbali

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391 Haitham H. Osta, “Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring Predictability in Law in *Shari'a* Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016), p.72

392 Royal Decree No. 16-3-3136, Articles. 6 and 7, and quoted in Frank E Vogel, *Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia* (Brill 2000), p.95.


394 Ibid. p.877
Islamic Law by progressives, the prevailing view has been that codifying it would lead to an abandonment of Sharīʿa and “kill the creativity of judges”.

According to Osta, this opposition has a political dimension that relates back to the foundation of the Saudi Kingdom, which was formed under the tribal alliance between the political ruling house of Al Saʿud and the religious house of al-Shaykh: “the governance in Saudi Arabia is understood, although silently, to be similar to a Catholic marriage between the two wings. Saʿud rules the country in political and administrative matters while paying respect to the family of al-Shaykh, who rules in matters related to religion, such as the judiciary… Within this understanding, codification can be looked at as a limitation of a power that has been enjoyed by one of the two ruling wings –that is the power of judiciary.” See Haitham H. Osta, “Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring Predictability in Law in Sharīʿa Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016), p.86
Figure 7. Organisation of Shari'a and Administrative courts in Saudi Arabia
Sharīʿa Courts (Maḥakem al-sharīʿa)

In the Saudi system, the Sharīʿa courts are the ordinary courts that deal predominantly with civil and criminal matters. Under the Judicial Authority Law, first-degree courts are divided according to the type of dispute at hand:

- General courts (Maḥakem al-ʿamma)
- Criminal, courts (Maḫkamat al-jenaʾa)
- Courts of personal status (Maḥakem al-ḥawal al shakhsīa)
- Commercial courts, (Maḥakem al-tejareeya)
- Labour courts (Maḥakem al-ʿamaliah)

Decisions rendered by first level courts may be appealed to appeal circuits (Dawaʾer), each circuit corresponding to the given jurisdictions of the first instance courts. The appeals circuits usually review cases without holding hearings.396 Final judicial authority lies with the Supreme Court (Maḥkamat al-tamwīz), located in Riyadh and performing several legislative, consultative and judicial roles. Under the 2007 law, the Supreme Court replaced the Supreme Judicial Council’s primary role as the highest authority in the ordinary Sharīʿa branch. In addition to hearing legal disputes, the Supreme Court supervises the implementation of the Kingdom’s laws and regulations. The Court is also empowered to review the following:

- Judgments issued by the intermediate courts that involve cases of serious crime and/or the death penalty;
- Court of Appeal judgments alleged to be contrary to Islamic Sharīʿa or any other laws; and
- Matters relating to jurisdiction, impropriety of court and/or decisions.397

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397 Law of Judiciary and the Board of Grievances promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/78 on 19/09/1428H corresponding to 1 October 2007 (Saudi Arabia).
Board of Grievances (*Dīwān al-mazalem*)

Parallel to the Ordinary/Shari'‘a court system is the administrative judicial pyramid, or Board of Grievances. The administrative judicial branch is three-tiered and consists of the following:

- High Administrative Court (*Maḥkamat al-idarīḥah al-'ulīḥah*)
- Administrative Courts of Appeal (*Maḥakem al-Istiʿnaf al-idarīḥah*)
- Administrative courts (*Maḥakem al-idarīḥah*)

The 2007 law created the High Administrative Court (composed of a president holding the rank of minister, being appointed directly by a royal decree or on the recommendation by the Administrative Judicial Council). The High Administrative Court exercises its jurisdiction through specialised circuits. In addition, the Court has a General Council, presided over by the chief of the High Administrative Court, and including all sitting judges within the administrative judicial branch. If an administrative circuit deems it necessary to depart from an interpretation (adopted by either the same or a different circuit of the same court), the case is referred to the chief of the High Administrative Court who will then refer it to the General Council for a decision.

“A system within a system”

Like several other states in the region, Saudi Arabia there are specialised tribunals external to the ordinary judicial system. For instance, in mid-2017, the Ministry of Justice launched the opening of Commercial Courts in three commercially important cities. The establishment of these courts is intended

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398 Ibid.
399 Ibid.
to serve as a forum for dispute resolution and to “increase judicial efficiency and enhance investor confidence”. But according to Marar:

“[…] a duality in the legal system has been created because the general Islamic law [was] by no means displaced in whole by these laws. Instead, a “system within a system” has been created contributing to the inefficiency of the financial system.”

Saudi model: one end of the Arab judicial spectrum

In relation to its neighbours, Saudi Arabia can be placed at one extreme end of the judicial continuum in the Middle East. Judicial decisions of Saudi judges are valid law to the parties and cannot be overruled unless they conflict with a plain meaning of the primary sources. In the event the judge of the lower court persist with the original judgement, final decision will fall to the appellate courts to refer the case to another judge or panel of judges in the lower court level. On the one hand this type of individual autonomy downplays the internal consistency of the judiciary to a certain degree and may reduce the political impact of the judiciary as a whole, particularly because the King sits at the top of the legal system and “acts as the final court of appeal and as a source of pardon.” On the other hand, this approach elevates the importance of decisions of individual judges and therefore provides the conditions that can promote the politicisation of individual judges. One potential exception to this relates to the newly rearranged courts and tribunals as part of the ongoing legal and judicial reforms in the kingdom. Although it is too early to assess the practical implications of these specialised courts, their creation will at the very least, promote the fragmentation of Saudi courts.

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404 Royal Decree No M/1 of 22/1/1435 H (corresponding to 25 November 2013 G)


406 “Legal and Judicial Structure” (U.S Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).

407 Ibid.
Lebanon: Highly fragmented but hierarchical system

The judiciary in Lebanon is fragmented into four main court systems, with each branch having a hierarchical structure (Figure 8). The judicial structure has a secular ordinary court system, but it places emphasis on religious diversity within this system. The Lebanese judicial system has an elaborate system of religious courts for each religious confession. These are deeply embedded in the judicial system and combine with other elements derived primarily from the French civil law system.

“A house of many mansions”408

Lebanon’s judicial system reflects the country’s multi-confessional society, which dates back for centuries.409 Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was placed under the French mandate (1920-1943). According to Mallat, it was under French control that Lebanon acquired the main elements of its legal and judicial systems: “The system is dominated legally by the centrality of codes, following the pattern of the so-called ‘civil law family’, as opposed to common law as in the United Kingdom and the United States.”410

Still in force today, the Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contracts was promulgated in 1932 (during the French Mandate). While largely patterned on the French Civil Code, the Lebanese Code differs in one important respect: legal matters related to personal status and family are governed by a separate

408 The expression comes from Kamāl aṣ-Ṣalībī, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Repr, Tauris 2003).
409 Following the first Lebanese civil war in 1860, the Règlement Organique transformed the principality into a fully autonomous Ottoman province. The province’s political institutions were based on power sharing among the various confessional sects under an Ottoman-European consortium protectorate. The legal system applied in Lebanon was similar to the rest of the Empire: Islamic law as formulated by the Hanafi School and separate religious courts for non-Muslims in matters of family and personal status. See Zahar., M-J., “Power sharing in Lebanon: foreign protectors, domestic peace, and democratic failure” in Philip G Roeder and Donald S Rothchild (eds), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Cornell University Press 2005). p.29
set of laws for the different sectarian communities.\textsuperscript{411} The Lebanese Code was initially drafted by a French jurist, but was subsequently revised by Lebanese jurists to incorporate some provisions of Ottoman and Islamic law and “to reflect local legal culture”.\textsuperscript{412} The structure and scope of the Lebanese judicial system is primarily governed by the “Judicial Organisation law”.\textsuperscript{413}

\textsuperscript{411} Dwight F Reynolds, \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Modern Arab Culture} (2015). p.78
\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.p.79
\textsuperscript{413} Decree Law No. 7855 of 1961 (Lebanon)
Figure 8. Organisation of Courts in Lebanon
Ordinary Courts

Ordinary courts in Lebanon are arranged in a three-tiered hierarchy and are subdivided into criminal and civil departments. At the base of the structure are the courts of first instance (Ghoraf al-ibtida'ah), where cases are heard either by a single judge or a three-judge panel. These first instance courts examine all civil, criminal and commercial disputes of minor importance and/or value.\(^{414}\)

Judgments from the courts of first instance can be appealed to the Lebanese Courts of Appeal (Maḥkem- al-isti’nafiyyah), which are also empowered to examine requests for dismissing judges in the lower courts.\(^{415}\) There are six courts of appeal in the country, located in six different districts (Moḥafazat). The courts are composed of specialised chambers, with each chamber presided over by a chief judge. In addition, each court has a public prosecution department headed by an attorney general.\(^{416}\)

The Court of Cassation, (Maḥkamat al-tamwīz), located in Beirut, sits at the apex of the ordinary courts and reviews points of law. The Court is comprised of several chambers, and each chamber has a specific jurisdiction headed by a president and two consultative judges.\(^{417}\) In its entirety, a “First President” heads the Court of Cassation. The Court is entrusted to settle any jurisdictional conflicts arising between:

- Two judicial courts;
- A judicial court and a religious court; and
- Between two religious courts.

The Court also has the authority to object to a final judgment issued by a religious court, its jurisdiction or the merit of the decision.\(^{418}\) In circumstances

\(^{414}\) Article 86 Civil Code on Procedure (Lebanon)  
\(^{415}\) Ibid.  
\(^{416}\) Law No. 150 1983 (Lebanon)  
\(^{417}\) Chibli Mallat, “The Lebanese Legal System”  
\(^{418}\) The Lebanese Court of Cassation has often intervened in reconciling between individual rights and rights of the religious communities. See “Extending the Power of the Constitutional
of jurisdictional conflict between the administrative and civil jurisdictions, a tribunal is formed called a “Court of Conflict Resolution”. The tribunal is composed of judges from the Cassation Court and the State Council, and solves the issue of competence.\textsuperscript{419} The First President of the Court of Cassation also heads a specialised court, the “Supreme Judicial Council” (\textit{Al-Majlis al ‘Adli}),\textsuperscript{420} which has final and original jurisdiction over sensitive criminal offences of a political nature.

**Administrative Court branch**

Following the abolition of the Special Administrative Tribunal in Lebanon in 1975,\textsuperscript{421} a new law provided for the establishment of first instance administrative tribunals in each region of the country.\textsuperscript{422} However, the legal provisions relating to these courts are yet to be implemented.\textsuperscript{423} In effect, the only administrative court in the country in operation is the State Council (\textit{Majlis al-Shura}), which sits in Beirut.\textsuperscript{424} The State Council has five “judicial chambers”;\textsuperscript{425} it supervises and monitors the functioning of administrative courts and also adjudicates administrative disputes.

**Religious courts**

The Lebanese judicial system includes an elaborate system of religious courts for each confession, and the religious court branch is subdivided according to the State’s officially recognised denominations.\textsuperscript{426} Ecclesiastical Courts

\textsuperscript{419} See the Lebanese Ministry of Justice website: https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/21/1

\textsuperscript{420} The First President heads the Supreme Council of Justice, the Judicial Council, the General Assembly of the Court of Cassation, the Disciplinary Council for judges and the Supreme Council for prosecuting presidents and ministers. Lebanese Ministry of Justice: https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/6/1

\textsuperscript{421} Article 144 of Law No. 10343/75 and amended by Law No 227/2000 (Lebanon)

\textsuperscript{422} Amendment Law No. 227 (2000) (Lebanon)

\textsuperscript{423} Lebanese Ministry of Justice: https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/20/1

\textsuperscript{424} Created in 1924, and currently regulated by Law No.10434/75 (Lebanon)

\textsuperscript{425} Lebanese Ministry of Justice: https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/20/1

\textsuperscript{426} Article 4 of Legislative Decree No. 60 (1936) recognises the existence of all religions to freely organise and manage their own affairs within the limits set by the law. Furthermore, Article 9 of the National Reconciliation Accord “Ta’ef Agreement” (1989) ensures its citizens freedom of conscience, and grants the heads of legally recognised communities the right to
consist primarily of Christian Courts, and are established by decrees issued by the religious authorities of each Christian denomination.\textsuperscript{427} These Courts chiefly decide matters related to Personal Status and Family laws. Judges sitting on these courts are religious lay judges and do not have the same status as civil judges, placing them outside the statutes that govern the judiciary and the authority of the High Judicial Council.\textsuperscript{428} Catholic courts are made up of a unified first instance tribunal for the entire Lebanese territory and one Court of Appeal.\textsuperscript{429} Final appeals either are presented before the civil division of the Cassation Court, or before the Rota courts in the Vatican.\textsuperscript{430} Similarly, Christian Orthodox courts have a unified first instance tribunal in each region and one court of appeal for the entire Lebanese territory.\textsuperscript{431} Final appeals may be presented before the civil division at the Cassation Court.

Unlike Ecclesiastical courts, Shariʿa\textsuperscript{432} and Madhabi Courts\textsuperscript{433} can decide on matters relating to succession. For each of the three denominations (Shiʿa, Sunni and Druze), there is a first instance tribunal in each district and a separate appeal court in Beirut. Final appeals are heard by the Plenary Assembly of the civil chamber of the Court of Cassation. Judges at Shariʿa Courts are appointed by a decree of the Council of Ministers, but they too are not subject to the authority of the High Judicial Council.

**Specialised tribunals**

In addition to the religious courts in Lebanon, there are a number of specialised tribunals, including Labour Courts, State Audit Courts, Juvenile Courts, Financial Courts and the Supreme Judicial Council. As described earlier, the

\textsuperscript{427} Law on the Powers of Christian and Jewish Religious Authorities (1951) (Lebanon)
\textsuperscript{428} Lebanese Ministry of Justice: \texttt{<https://www.justice.gov.lb>}
\textsuperscript{429} Catholic Courts Law No.1 (1991) (Lebanon)
\textsuperscript{430} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{431} Orthodox Law No. 1 (2003) (Lebanon)
\textsuperscript{432} Law for Sunni and Shiʿa (1963) (Lebanon)
\textsuperscript{433} Decree No. 3473 (1960) (Lebanon)
Supreme Judicial Council is a specialised tribunal tasked with reviewing serious crimes of a political nature. Lebanon also has a separate military judicial branch, which deals with matters involving the armed forces.\footnote{The branch consists of the Military Cassation Court, the Permanent Military Court and courts presided over by individual judges in the Lebanese provinces. Lebanese Ministry of Justice: <https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/20/1>}

**Constitutional Council (Majlis al-dostori)**

The Constitutional Council is described as “an independent constitutional body of judicial nature”.\footnote{Art. 19, Lebanese Constitution 23 May 1926 (Lebanon)} The Council was established in 1993 and is tasked with reviewing constitutional challenges as well as challenges relating to electoral matters involving the President of the Republic and Parliamentary elections.\footnote{Art. 19 the Lebanese Constitution, Law No. 250, 14 July 1993, amended by: Law No. 305, 21 March 1994; Law No. 150, 30 October 1999; Law No. 650, 4 February 2005; Law No. 9 June 2006; Law No. 43, 3 November 2008; and Law No. 242, 22 October 2012 (Lebanon)} The Council is a ten-member committee that consists of judges (ordinary, administrative and financial); academics (in law, political science, or administration) and; lawyers.\footnote{All members of the constitutional council must have had at least 25 years’ experience. Art 3, Law No. 43 of 3 November 2008 (Lebanon)} Five members are appointed by the Parliament and the other five by the Cabinet.\footnote{Georgi Azar, ‘Lebanon Elections: 17 Appeals Submitted to Constitutional Council’ An-Nahar (Beirut, 6 June 2018) <https://en.annahar.com/article/814847-lebanon-elections-17-appeals-submitted-to-constitutional-council> accessed 9 August 2018.}

The Council has the sole jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of draft laws.\footnote{According to Articles 1 and 18 of the law establishing the Council, and Article 1 of its internal statutes.} No other court has the jurisdiction regardless of whether a challenge is based on an indirect or direct claim. In contrast with several Arab states, the powers of the Constitutional Council of Lebanon are limited, particularly in terms of access.\footnote{See generally Antoine Nasri Messara, “Rapport national du Conseil constitutionnel du Liban” (2017).} First, the Council cannot act on its own initiative and individuals cannot refer a case to the council, nor can a court in any of the court branches. Those who can file a constitutional review are the heads of
the government (President of the Republic, the Prime Minister); the Chief of Parliament, or a minimum of 10 members of Parliament and; the heads of religious communities for challenges involving a religious nature.

**Lebanese model: The other end of the Arab judicial spectrum**

Lebanon can be characterised as hierarchical to the extent that the country’s legal system have two or more judicial pyramids coexisting, forming autonomous subsystems. Administrative cases follow their own appeals structure, while the remaining special courts - ordinary, military and religious - may be appealed to the Court of Cassation. There are also several judicial bodies operating within the ordinary judicial structure of Lebanon. The jurisdictional boundaries of the Lebanese courts, councils and committees are broad in nature, but the law can be appealed before the courts of appeal and finally, before the Court of Cassation. Despite the unique nature of the Lebanese legal system, particularly in relation to the religious branch, it resembles the fragmentation strategy as seen in the French model.

However, the hierarchical model fails to incorporate the institutionalisation of religious courts that in some instances goes beyond the judicial structure. The Ta’ef Agreement that put an end to the second civil war sought to accommodate the several religious groups in the Republic. The organisation of courts in Lebanon is a clear reflection of an attempt to ensure the representation of each religious group in the country – not only in the form of religious courts but also within the secular judicial branches. The Lebanese judicial structure highlights a secular ordinary court system but places emphasis on religious diversity. As opposed to the Saudi judicial structure where religious minorities are subject under the Islamic laws, Lebanese courts have an elaborate system of religious courts for each confessional minority. The mix of hierarchy and fragmentation on the one hand appear, to hinder the

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441 Some of these bodies are regulated under the Urgent Proceedings and Land Court Law No. 186/1926; Arbitration Council Decree No. 54/422; The Customs Committee Decree No. 59/2868; Labour Arbitration Council Labour Law (1946); Expropriation Commissions Law No. 58/1991; Customs Court Customs Law (1974); Court for Liquidation Matters Decree No. 79/1663; and High Banking Committee Decree No. 67/28.
politicisation of the judiciary among the judicial branches to a certain extent particularly in relation to constitutional rights and the limited powers of the Constitutional Council. On the other hand, the Court of Cassation’s wide powers in relation to settling jurisdiciional issues, particularly in relation to the religious courts may foster politicisation. The Cassation Court is furthermore empowered to create a council for ministers for grave crimes.

**Jordan: A quasi unitary – constitutional system**

Similar to Lebanon, Jordan’s judicial system can be characterised as hierarchical as has two or more judicial pyramids forming autonomous subsystems (Figure 9).\(^{442}\) Furthermore, while there courts are divided into three branches, which may appear hierarchical, the branches are not completely separate from each other, as the Court of Cassation is the final court of appeal for all of them.

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy and bases its governance on the 1952 Constitution, its subsequent amendments (including most notably the 2011 amendment following a series of popular unrests) and other laws that establish specialised courts\(^{443}\). Following the promulgation of the Jordanian Civil Code in 1976, Islamic *Hanafi* jurisprudence remains a part of the Code.\(^{444}\) Article 99 of the Jordanian Constitution divides courts into three categories: ordinary courts (*Maḥakem al-Nizamyieh*), religious courts (*Maḥakem al-dinīah*) and


\(^{443}\) Another aspect of law widely practiced in (but not exclusive to) Jordan is the exercise of tribal dispute resolution. Although the Jordanian tribal courts were officially abolished in 1976, tribal custom still continues to complement the civil legal system and is subject to state oversight. Tribal customs are undertaken with the agreement and on the initiative of the conflicting parties without the intervention of the state.

\(^{444}\) Saleh writes that the drafters of the Code elevated Islamic jurisprudence “to a more pervading and active role”. They, Saleh writes, “have rendered the code unique compared to earlier civil codes of the area by enhancing the position and status of the Shari’ah based on the Mejelle”. Nabil Saleh, “Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The Sanhuri Codes” (1993) 8 Arab Law Quarterly 161. p.164
special courts (*Maḥakem al-khassa*). Religious courts form part of the special courts.

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445 Article 99 Jordanian Constitution (1952) and amended in 2012
446 Law of non-Muslim religious denominations No. 22/1938 (Jordan); Law of the Composition of Shari’a Courts No. 19/1972 and amended in 2001 (Jordan)
Figure 9. Organisation of Courts in Jordan
Ordinary courts

Ordinary courts are three-tiered with the magistrate courts (Maḥakem al-sulḥ) and courts of first instance (Maḥakem al-ebtidaīḥah) at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy. The magistrate courts are presided over by one single judge for civil cases and two judges for criminal cases. They adjudicate on all civil, commercial and criminal cases of minor monetary value or possible sentence not exceeding two years. First Instance Courts have also the capacity to act as a primary court of instance for misdemeanour cases, and it receives appeals against magistrate court rulings.447

There are three regular courts of appeal (Maḥakem- al-isti’īnafīah) and two courts of appeal specifically dealing with custom and income tax disputes (Maḥakem isti’īnaf al-jamarek). Each court is presided over by a three-judge panel of civil judges. The courts adjudicate primarily on questions of law and fact and have jurisdiction over appeals submitted against rulings issued by the lower courts.

The Jordanian Court of Cassation (Maḥkamat al-tamwīz) is the highest judicial body in the country.448 The Court is composed of 24 judges and 67 administrative officers. The President of the Court serves as the country’s Chief Justice. All seven judges of the court sit in full panel in cases deemed sensitive or important. For most appeals, however, only five judges rule on the cases. The Court primarily considers appeals of felonies in criminal cases where the law gives a right of appeal, and in civil cases where the sum exceeds a certain amount. The Court may consider cases regardless of amount if deemed complex, concerns the public or authorised by the Chief Justice.449

447 Article 8, Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts No. 17/2001 (Jordan)
448 Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts No. 17/2001 (Jordan)
449 Art. 10 Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts No. 17/2001 (Jordan)
The new administrative courts

Until 2014, there was only one administrative court in Jordan, the High Court of Justice. The Court was abolished by the Administrative Courts Law of 2014 and was replaced with a two-tiered court system for administrative disputes. The new courts are the Primary Administrative Court and the High Administrative Court located in Amman. According to the new law, administrative judges in the two courts fall under the Jordanian Judicial Council and are bound by the same laws as judges in the ordinary and judicial branches.

Within the ordinary and specialised judicial branches are several autonomous courts, which further diffuses the judicial structure. While decisions of the High Criminal Court and the Juvenile Courts may be appealed to the Court of Cassation, other courts do not have the option of appeal.

Religious courts

Similar to Lebanon, the Jordanian religious courts deal with matters relating to personal status and family law. Each religious denomination has its own court system (except for Christian Protestants whose matters are dealt with by civil courts). Shari’a Courts comprise a Shari’a Court of first instance and the Shari’a court of final appeal. Similarly, Catholic and Orthodox Courts are made up of a first instance and appellate court. Depending on the case at hand, the case may be appealed to any civil court in the ordinary court structure.

Jordanian Constitutional Court

A recent addition to the special court branch is the Jordanian Constitutional Court, issued by law No. 15 of 2012. Following protests in 2011, King Abdullah

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450 Article 26(b) Law No. 12/1992 (Jordan)
451 Law No. 27 /2014 (Jordan)
453 Art. 15, Law of non-Muslim religious denominations No. 22/1938 (Jordan)
Il promulgated the constitutional amendments in a decree establishing a new Constitutional Court, with all nine members directly appointed by the King. The Court is described as an independent and separate judicial body, and it oversees the constitutionality of laws.\textsuperscript{454} The Court of Cassation is the only judicial body entrusted with the exclusive power to raise the question of constitutionality.\textsuperscript{455} Similar to several European constitutional courts, the Jordanian Constitutional Court may be described as having a hybrid role between justice and politics in which the “guardians are mainly chosen by the very institutions they have to guard”.\textsuperscript{456}

Somewhat similar to Lebanon, Jordan can be characterised as hierarchical to the extent that its court system has two or more judicial pyramids coexisting alongside each other. Albeit separate, the judicial pyramids are not entirely autonomous from each other and it appears that cases from these judicial branches can be a matter for the ordinary civil courts, particularly the Court of Cassation.

\textbf{Arab judicial structures and the political significance of courts}

Continental European systems usually have clear divisions between ordinary, administrative and specialised courts with the purpose of containing the potential reach for judicial-decision making. In the French model, the judiciary is not intended to limit the power of the popular majority. According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, popular sovereignty and parliamentary supremacy, instituted in the wake of the French Revolution, were intended to act as powerful checks over external controls over legislation, particularly for judiciaries:

\begin{quote}
“continental systems have often presumed that the judiciary itself is a power to be checked. The memory of the abuses committed by the courts of the \textit{ancient régime} and the general fear of ‘government by judiciary’ have helped to shape constitutional
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{454} Art. 4, Law Creating the Constitutional Court No. 15/2012 (Jordan)
\textsuperscript{455} Nimer Sultany, \textit{Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring} (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017), p 271
frameworks based on a rigid separation of powers, rather than on checks and balances".  

In addition, a limited court jurisdiction may also be the result of the executive branch seeking to reduce the potential impact of judicial decisions. The more fragmented the judicial system, the more likely courts are to be “politically neutralised”. Solomon calls this type of executive control the “Spanish Solution”; during the later decades of the Franco regime, ordinary courts were independent because they lacked power and the government created a special set of tribunals staffed with politically appointed judges.

Regardless of any formally stated goals, the creation of a separate autonomous set of courts inevitably curtails the scope of “ordinary” courts, especially over politically sensitive issues. Although this type of jurisdictional fragmentation is typically attributed to continental European judiciaries, similar patterns are found in the Arab context. The Arab judicial systems covered in this chapter roughly resemble the European continental judicial systems, with separate and autonomous judicial pyramids. Considering the historical influence of the French civil law model on the region (particularly during the late 18th to 19th century), it is perhaps not surprising that the following characteristics are (to varying degrees) visible in the judicial systems of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia:

- A three-tiered hierarchy of ordinary courts hearing both criminal and civil cases;
- A set of separate administrative courts, dividing the judicial community; and
- Specialised courts for issues that are considered to be exceptional (religious, military or national security).

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458 Peter H Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes” (2007) 60 World Politics 122. p.126

459 Ibid.

However, reviewing *how these characteristics are manifested* in each of the four Arab judicial systems helps to explain why the nature of the judicial system in each country can have a bearing on the political significance of courts.

**Centripetal and Centrifugal Dynamics: Judicial Review**

As described in the beginning of this chapter, in Western democracies the organisation of courts has been described by two judicial system models: co-ordinate and hierarchical systems. The difference between the two models relate to the system’s internal dynamics and the role supreme courts play in ensuring consistency in judicial decisions. According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, a centrifugal dynamic often described as a feature of continental judicial systems, tend to promote autonomy of lower and intermediate courts and thereby reduces the internal consistency of the judiciary as a whole. While this may undermine the certainty of law and the coherence of the system, such “pluralist jurisprudence” may also strengthen the perception that individual and lower-ranking judges are impartial and less influenced by supreme court ruling.\(^{461}\) This in turn may enhance the political significance of individual judges. In contrast with a centrifugal dynamic are judicial systems that have a strong decision-making court at the top have a centripetal dynamic which may increase the political significance of the judiciary. This dynamic is often represented by the English and American judicial systems.

One way in which the centripetal dynamic of a judicial system is manifested relates to judicial review of legislation. Generally, the most visible difference between European continental and Anglo-American court systems relates to judicial review, “which in continental Europe is entrusted to separate constitutional courts” and tends to be limited.\(^{462}\) According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, at least three elements need to be taken into account in order to assess whether the institutional position of organs entrusted for judicial review have scope for politicisation:

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\(^{462}\) Ibid.
Whether constitutional adjudication is “centralised” or “diffused”;  
The actors allowed to initiate constitutional litigation and the instruments available to them and;  
The point at which constitutional adjudication can be initiated, i.e. whether the review is a priori or a posteriori.  

In Western legal systems, the differences between centralised and diffuse review often relate to the divisions between the common and civil law legal traditions. In several civil law jurisdictions, centralised review is entrusted to a single and separate court “in order to remove inherently political issues from ordinary courts”. By contrast, “diffuse review” is spread across the entire judicial system and all courts can declare a law unconstitutional. This type of review is represented by the U.S court system where any court can review legislation on the basis of constitutionality. However, only the U.S Supreme Court has the power to null and declare a law void.

The second element relates to accessibility and what actors are allowed to present challenges directly before the constitutional courts. At least three forms of access are important for the political significance of courts. The first relates to “incidental proceedings” where litigants may challenge the constitutionality of the law applied in their case. In these circumstances, the court in which the dispute is being hears must assess whether there are sufficient grounds to refer the challenge to the constitutional court. According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this approach allows the ordinary judiciary to become “an unavoidable part of the process of constitutional review”, even if the initial purpose was to confine constitutional issues to a separate specialised court:

“[O]rdinary courts may raise constitutional issues on their own volition in the course of a particular case, and such proceedings can then become a vehicle for ‘judicial polities’. By asking for a constitutional court ruling, such actions can be a means of

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463 Ibid.
464 Ibid. p.143.
465 Ibid. p.144
promoting the personal values of individual judges and even those of their reference groups.\textsuperscript{466}

The third element which indicates the degree to which judges may intervene in the political process relates to the point in time where review may be initiated. Courts that have a priori review can only review legislation in a short time span between the law’s passage by parliament and its promulgation whereas a posteriori review allows for the constitutional court’s intervention to review and validly enacted laws on the basis of constitutionality.\textsuperscript{467} For instance, the French Conseil Constitutionnel can only engage in a priori review (e.g. review the law’s passage by parliament but before it is promulgated by the President of the Republic).\textsuperscript{468} By contrast, a posteriori review allows for a greater scope of political intervention because the constitutional court can protect constitutional rights against their alleged violation by a validly enacted law.

**Constitutional and judicial review in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia**

The four Arab countries studied in this research demonstrate differences in relation to constitutional and/or judicial review. The most visible differences relate to the three elements of constitutional review discussed above. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, all countries assessed here have constitutional courts in the legal system. These are presented in Table 9 below.

\textsuperscript{466} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid. p.143
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid. p.89
Table 10. Characteristics of Constitutional courts/councils in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supreme Constitutional Court</strong></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordanian Constitutional Court</strong></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Constitutional Council</strong></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of members</strong></td>
<td>Ten, all of which are judges</td>
<td>Ten sitting members (Cassation judges, professors of law, and senior lawyers)(^{469})</td>
<td>Ten-member committee (judges, academics and lawyers)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appointment</strong></td>
<td>Since 2017, SCC selected its own chief justice and other justices, and even decides how many justices will serve on the court.(^{470})</td>
<td>Directly appointed by the King</td>
<td>Five members appointed by Parliament and five members by the Cabinet</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of judicial review</strong></td>
<td>A posteriori</td>
<td>A posteriori</td>
<td>A priori</td>
<td>Decentralised judicial review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct appeal by individuals</strong></td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect appeal through judiciary</strong></td>
<td>Yes, cases transferred from courts of merit</td>
<td>Courts can only refer through Court of Cassation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions able to initiate review</strong></td>
<td>Courts of merit</td>
<td>The Court of Cassation, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers</td>
<td>The President of the Republic, the Chief of Parliament, the Prime Minister, at least 10 MPs and the heads of religious communities</td>
<td>All courts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{469}\) Art 6, Law Creating the Constitutional Court No. 15/2012 (Jordan)

In Egypt, the SCC can engage in *a posteriori* review, which allows the constitutional court to review validly enacted law.\footnote{471} This power, absent in the French context, accords constitutional courts greater scope for political intervention. According to Sultany, this renders Egypt one of the “most developed instances of judicial review in the Arab world.”\footnote{472}

Although not as pervasive as in Egypt, the powers of the Jordanian Court of Cassation appear wide. Decisions rendered by the Jordanian State Security Court are subject to appeal before the Jordanian Court of Cassation,\footnote{473} and the Court of Cassation has a gate-keeping role in relation to constitutional challenges. The Court of Cassation is the only judicial body empowered to assess whether there are grounds to refer a case to the Jordanian Constitutional Court. This suggests a possibility in which the Court itself may

\footnote{471} One notable example relates to the recent legal and political controversy with regards to the executive’s decision to transfer the sovereignty of the strategically important Islands of Sanafir and Tiran to Saudi Arabia in 2016. The decision sparked a judicial controversy and involved the Ordinary and Administrative Courts and the SCC. Since the executive decision was made public, the various courts have adjudicated on the legality of the decision with court cases filed back and forth across the judicial branches. The recent judgment of the SCC put an end to the case, which has been described as a “tense, multilayered political and legal battle that has been waged in both the [ordinary] and administrative court systems.” The SCC ruled in favour of the executive decision and wrote that: “no judicial body should interfere in the procedures for the conclusion of treaties. Once a treaty is issued and has passed into law, judicial oversight then falls under the purview of the SCC”. “Tiran and Sanafir: Developments, Dynamics, and Implications” \(<https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Tiran-and-Sanafir-Developments-Dynamics-and-Implications-web.pdf>\) accessed 1 September 2018.

\footnote{472} Nimer Sultany, *Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring* (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017), p.93


For instance, in 1993, the Court of Cassation reversed a State Security Court judgment on the grounds that their confessions were abstracted under torture: Decision No. 74/1994 of the Court of Cassation, issued on 13 March 1995. The case related to a decision of the State Security Court convicting a group of army cadets of conspiring to murder the late King Hussein Bin Talal. See Sufian Obeidat, “Rule of Law Quick Scan Jordan” (The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiIL) 2012) \(<http://www.hiiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/QuickScan_Jordan_191212_GK.pdf>\) accessed 3 June 2015.
become a vehicle for judicial politics: “by asking for a constitutional court ruling, such actions can be a means of promoting the personal values of individual judges and even those of their reference groups.”\textsuperscript{474} By virtue of its direct access to the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation constitutes a direct channel into Jordanian politics.

In contrast, the Lebanese Constitutional Council, although described as judicial, is separated from the legal system and access to it is limited. According to Messarra (a member of the Lebanese Constitutional Council), despite efforts by the Council, the powers of the Council are constrained; which is contrary to the general trend in the world and even in the surrounding Arab countries.\textsuperscript{475} Constitutional adjudication in Lebanon is likened to the French \textit{Conseil Constitutionnel}, in that its powers are narrow (abstract review only) and constitutional challenges cannot be initiated by citizens. Despite this, judicialisation may still be fostered through the Constitutional Council. As Shapiro notes in the French context, abstract review has in the French context, enabled the transfer of political conflicts from the Parliament to the judiciary which has tended to act “as a true third chamber”.\textsuperscript{476} According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this has changed the relationship dynamic between parliamentary forces:

“The mere possibility, if not the open threat, that a law will be referred to the \textit{Conseil Constitutionnel} has forced the parliamentary majority to pay much more attention to legal implications when drafting bills in order to head off potential constitutional challenges”.\textsuperscript{477}

\textsuperscript{476} Martin M. Shapiro, “Judicial Review in France” (1989) 6 \textit{J.L. & Pol.}, p.538
In Lebanon, constitutional challenges raised by both the Parliament and the executive have changed the political landscape. The possibility that a law may be referred to the Council means more attention is paid to constitutional issues and political discourse increasingly adopts legal language.\(^{478}\) As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the key indications of judicialisation according to Vallinder is when non-judicial decision-making forums become dominated by legal/judicial terminology, rules and procedures.\(^{479}\)

Unlike other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia does not have a formal written constitution. Instead, the Saudi government adopted basic laws in 1993 where the judicial, executive and regulatory authorities “cooperate in the performance of their functions” and where “the King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities”.\(^{480}\) Unlike other Arab countries that have constitutional provisions that declare Islamic Shari’a as a source of legislation, governance in the Kingdom is based on Islamic Shari’a and Shura (consultation).\(^{481}\) Courts apply rules of the Islamic Shari’a in cases that are brought before them, according to the sources of Islamic law.\(^{482}\) At the top of the legal system is the King, who acts as the final court of appeal and as a source of pardon.


\(^{480}\) “The Authorities of the State consist of: The Judicial Authority; The Executive Authority; The Regulatory Authority. These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this Law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities” Art. 44, No: A/90, “Basic Law of Governance”, 27th Sha’ban 1412 H (1 March 1992)

\(^{481}\) Article 8 states that: “Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, Dhura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Shari’a.” In the other three countries in this study, the importance of Shari’a law is different. For example, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution (2014) provides that “The principles of Islamic Shari’a are the principal source of legislation”. Article 2 of the Jordanian Constitution (1952 and its amendments through 2016) states that Islam is the religion of the State. Islamic Shari’a, however, is a matter for the specialised Shari’a courts for Muslims. (Article 103). In Lebanon, Article 9 of the Constitution guarantees absolute freedom of religion and conscience (1926 and its amendments through 2004).

\(^{482}\) Art. 48 “Basic Law of Governance” (Saudi Arabia)
According to Al-Jarbou, constitutional review in Saudi Arabia does not follow a decentralised model in which all courts participate in constitutional review. Nor does it follow a centralised model, where review is exercised by a separate constitutional court. Statutes and laws cannot be directly challenged before the Sharī‘a Courts or the Administrative Courts. Despite this, a form of judicial review exists by virtue of the powers of Sharī‘a and the ability of the Administrative Courts to apply and review Sharī‘a law. According to Al-Jarbou, this is a form of judicial review exercised by courts “to maintain the supremacy of the Islamic Sharī‘a.” Saudi courts have no powers to nullify laws or regulations: “They may only notify the legislative authority vested jointly in the King, the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, and recommend amending the regulations.”

A centrifugal dynamic can be said to exist in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the unique nature of the law applied in the two court systems and the available judicial tools. As described earlier, the nature of ijtihad tends to reduce the internal consistency of the judicial system as a whole. The recent judicial reforms have sought to change this by introducing separate courts that apply codified laws. For the Sharī‘a and Administrative courts, however, this may undermine the certainty of law and the coherence of the system as a whole by virtue of a “pluralist” jurisprudence. With regards to the political significance of judges, individual and lower-ranking judges are afforded more autonomy and are less influenced by the Saudi Supreme Court who in theory acts as an advisor.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight key features in these four Arab judicial systems where the political significance of courts may be

484 Ibid.
485 Ibid.p 51
promoted based on court jurisdiction and the relationship between courts. The chapter is largely based on a formal legal analysis of judicial structures, interpreted in the light of existing theories of judicialisation. The next chapter explores more judge-specific aspects of the judicial systems in the Arab region, particularly the way judges are selected and trained, and how their careers are managed. This is the second element that may help to explain the political significance of judges in the Arab region.
Chapter 6. Arab judges: selection, career and status

This chapter describes socialisation patterns of judges in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Socialisation patterns are important forms of control exercised by the judicial systems in each country. The forms of institutional controls may, in turn, constrain judicial activism and affect the role perceptions of Arab judges.

In this chapter, focus is placed on four types of socialisation patterns for Arab judges: (1) judicial selection and recruitment; (2) judicial training; (3) career advancement and (4) judicial discipline and sanctions. As well as official laws and secondary materials that set out the judicial selection and career advancement process, this chapter includes information gathered directly from Arab judges about their personal experiences of selection and training as part of the Arab Judges Survey conducted for this thesis. The analysis in this chapter will in turn provide a basis for exploring judicial role perceptions of judges in the four countries in subsequent chapters.

Judicial socialisation from within

Alpert, Atkins and Ziller define socialisation for judges as “the adjustment to life on the bench, including the adoption of new roles in response to new environmental demands.”\(^\text{486}\) It is a form of adaptation where the judge is integrated into the judicial organisation. In this regard, socialisation is understood from an institutional aspect: the institution that the individual enters into has a set of mechanisms aimed at assimilating him/her. The individual is conceived as a recipient, where a set of institutionally prescribed behaviours

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are induced. At the individual level, conformity to the “collective reality” of judges often stems from a social obligation or professionalisation.

Furthermore, it might be in the individual judge’s self-interest to conform to the behaviour of the organisation. For example, disregard of well-established rules set by the judiciary may alienate judges who fail to conform to the rules and may hamper ambitions of career advancement or, in worse cases, result in sanctions. The institutional norms that guide judges may furthermore affect the willingness of judges to intervene in the political process. Glick suggests that criticism by colleagues, legal organisations and other groups can be viewed as sanctions “which limit the adventures of certain judges”.

489 Whether judges obey a social norm generally depends on two types of expectations: empirical and normative. Empirical expectations relate to the individual judge’s expectation that the norm is to be followed by the majority of judges in the appropriate circumstances. Empirical expectations to conformity are necessary but may not be a sufficient or compelling reason for individual compliance. According to Biccheri, this is because social norms usually prescribe behaviour that may be in conflict with narrow self-interested motives. For judges, a straightforward reason may relate to career advancement. This introduces the second type of expectation, that is a normative expectation which involves the individual judge’s belief that he/she has an obligation to comply. Provided empirical and normative expectations are met, individuals must in addition have a conditional preference for following a particular norm. For some individuals, recognising the legitimacy of others’ expectations might be enough (when combined with empirical expectations) to induce a preference for conformity. Others might require further inducements, such as the threat of sanctions by those who expect and want their conformity, such as the judicial collective. See Cristina Bicchieri and Erte Xiao, “Do the Right Thing: But Only If Others Do So” (2009) 22 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 191.
491 Guarnieri and Pederzoli for example relate this to the degree of independence judges enjoy within the system. For the authors, it is impossible to speak of judicial intervention in the political process without judicial independence. Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.18.
Two distinct patterns of judicial selection and recruitment

To become a judge generally requires the approval of the judicial system. Biddle calls this a social selection, where the organisation exercises a degree of control over those who are allowed entry. Entry requirements, such as educational qualifications and work experience, are “filters” that are put in place and are especially relevant for roles in a society that are considered important and difficult to perform, like judging.

A distinction is generally made between two patterns of judicial recruitment: the “bureaucratic model” and the “professional model” of recruitment, often represented by the continental European (civil law) and Anglo-American (common law) respectively.

The bureaucratic model tends to recruit members into the judiciary with little or no prior professional experience. Candidates enter the competition shortly after graduation from law school, and are selected through written and oral examinations aimed at testing their legal knowledge. In theory, socialisation under this model is achieved almost exclusively from within: candidates are generally young and inexperienced. Upon entry, they will learn the required norms and approved organisational behaviours in order to effectively participate in the judiciary. Candidates are placed at the bottom of the judicial pyramid, and are regularly supervised by senior judges who exercise a degree of power over their professional status. Furthermore, professional training and experience are often acquired within the judicial organisation, where judges are expected to remain until their retirement.

494 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
By contrast, in the professional model, entry into the judiciary is usually confined to individuals with an extensive amount of prior legal professional experience, which means that those who become judges are often at the middle to end of their careers in legal practice. Although a degree of “re-socialisation” can occur within the judiciary, these individuals are more likely to bring values and experiences from outside the judiciary into their working life as judges, and continue to maintain ties with their former colleagues in the legal profession.\(^{499}\)

**Judicial recruitment in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia**

The judicial systems in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia include elements of both the professional and bureaucratic models. In all the four countries, young inexperienced individuals as well as individuals with extensive legal experience may be admitted to the bench. Value is placed on previous professional legal experience such as legal advocacy and legal scholarship. In each country, Judicial Councils formally govern judicial recruitment, transfer, discipline and career. In practice, however, judicial selection also involves other actors external to the judicial branch. The following sections describe the methods of recruitment and training in each of the four jurisdictions based both on official laws and evidence of what actually happens in practice obtained from empirical research.

**Formal and informal judicial selection requirements**

Table 10 below sets out the official qualifications and entry requirements for judges in each of the 4 Arab jurisdictions. All require formal legal qualifications and have age restrictions.

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Table 11. Entry requirements to the judiciary in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Age restriction</th>
<th>Educational Requirement</th>
<th>Exam</th>
<th>Probation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Not younger than 30</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree in Law and the license to practice law</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Not older than 40</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree in law and license to practice law, or an awarded Judicial Diploma</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Not younger than 22</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree in Law</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Not older than 35</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree in Law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the official process of judicial selection and recruitment in the four countries provides for only a partial picture. In addition to formal requirements, entry into the judiciary is also facilitated (or impeded) by extra-legal backgrounds, status and personal relationships with those who can influence the decision-making process. The judiciary may exercise certain forms of control by requirements or practices that are not made explicit. Individuals that belong to a particular social group, for example, may find it easier (or more difficult) to be selected to the judiciary.

**Egypt: Quasi professional and bureaucratic judiciary**

The approach to judicial appointment in Egypt is neither strictly bureaucratic, nor strictly professional. Judicial recruitment in Egypt reveals a hybrid system with a strong preference for individuals who have prior prosecutorial experience. To a certain extent, Egypt is similar to Italy and France where judges and members of the public prosecution coexists within the same organisation, and judges and prosecutors can move between the two

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500 Art. 38 of Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi Arabia)
501 Art. 10 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)
502 Art. 31 of Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi Arabia)
professions. Law graduates that join the Egyptian Public Prosecution are eligible for judicial appointment once they reach the age of thirty, and judges are free to work as public prosecutors even after they have worked in the judiciary.

There are no public competitions or examinations to become a judge in Egypt. Applicants are required to submit a written dossier that sets out their educational, professional and social background. Once checked and cleared by security organs, applicants are invited for an interview with the Judicial Council’s “Seven Board Committee”. Those that pass the necessary requirements are appointed by the Judicial Council (followed by a Presidential decree). For administrative judges, the State Council is in charge of appointments with a similar procedure of dossier submission followed by an interview. In addition, there are also lateral forms of judicial recruitment in Egypt; the Judicial Authority Law requires that a quarter of judges in Egypt are appointed without any prior prosecutorial experience but with previous legal experience.

In practice, according to Sultany, judicial appointments in Egypt are based on connections rather than just formal qualifications and merit. Such connections include “hereditary judicial offices” where judges “bequeath” their judicial office positions to their children or other family members. This also applies to prosecutors wishing to become judges. See Art. 15 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt).

In the Survey conducted for this research, one Egyptian judge explained that “one of the paths to become a judge in Egypt is to first be appointed as a public prosecutor and when you reach age of 30 you get the post of a Judge”. Comment from Judge 2081484 (Arab Judges Survey).


The “Seven Board Committee” (Lagna-al-Sobaiya) consists of Egypt’s most senior judges, including two of the most senior prosecutors and is presided over by the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation. See Art. 77 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt).

Ibid.

Ibid.
to their relatives. The preference for individuals from favourable social and economic backgrounds has also been reflected in public statements made recently by two former Egyptian Ministers of Justice, Mahfouz Saber, and his successor, Ahmed el-Zind. In 2015, Saber publicly stated that the judiciary was not a suitable career option for the “offspring of rubbish collectors and other modest occupations” because “a judge must hail from an appropriate environment”. His successor as Minister, Ahmed el-Zind, has also been reported to favour individuals from a particular social standing. According to Hendawi, the now former Minister has defended a “decades-old practice” that favours and prioritise children of judges and other members of the judiciary.

**Lebanon: largely bureaucratic judiciary**

Judicial recruitment in Lebanon aligns itself closer to the European continental bureaucratic model, even though some lateral forms of recruitment exist. Most judges in Lebanon are recruited at a very early age by examination run by a board of examiners of the Judicial Council. This board, made up exclusively of judges, reviews applications and invites successful applicants to take a written examination, followed by an interview. For candidates that apply to administrative judicial posts, similar procedures apply except that the relevant body in charge is replaced by the Council of State. Occasionally, a lateral form of recruitment exists where candidates are chosen from the

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512 “Anti-Brotherhood Judge Named Justice Minister” *San Diego Union Tribune* (20 May 2015) <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-anti-brotherhood-judge-named-justice-minister-in-2015may20-story.html> accessed 8 November 2018. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the dossier application is devised in order to help with the selection of candidates from favourable social and familial backgrounds. Comments from several judges that took part in an exploratory stage of this research suggested that this practice was also visible in relation to lateral recruitment, where positions are often allocated to individuals that have connections within the judiciary.

513 Individuals with a doctorate in law are exempt from the general entrance examinations. Article 68 of Decree Law No.150/83 (Lebanon)

514 Art. 59 Ibid.

515 Art. 60 Ibid.
members of the Lebanese Bar. One Lebanese Appeal Court judge, who had been a practicing lawyer before being recruited this way, described his selection process as a “tough examination”.

In practice in Lebanon, the selection of judges is also dependent on the religious denomination of the candidate. If a certain religion or sect is under-represented in the judiciary, a candidate’s religion will be considered in the selection process. This reflects the sensitive nature of power sharing between the Muslim, Druze and Christian communities.

**Jordan: interweaved bureaucratic and professional judiciary**

Unlike the Egyptian and Lebanese judicial recruitment process, it appears that there is an equal opportunity for both inexperienced law graduates and experienced legal professionals to enter the Jordanian judiciary. Judges in Jordan are officially appointed by a royal decree, but the appointment process is overseen and managed by the Judicial Council. For those that are recruited without any legal practice experience (bureaucratic model), applicants are required to have obtained at least a bachelor’s degree in law. An application form is submitted where the candidate is required to list three references. If successful, applicants are invited to take an entry examination. Those that are recruitment from practice (professional model) must be

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516 It is a practice occasionally exercised by the Judicial Council to fill vacant judicial positions due to retirement or resignation.
517 Comment from Judge 2077935 (Arab Judges Survey)
519 Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution (1926) states that “the principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies shall be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation”. This has, however, not yet been achieved: see International Commission of Jurists, “The Lebanese High Judicial Council in Light of International Standards” (2017) Briefing paper
520 Art 14 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)
521 Art 10 Ibid.
practicing lawyers with at least four years’ experience, and these applicants are exempt from taking an entry examination.  

Saudi Arabia: largely professional judiciary

In Saudi Arabia both inexperienced law graduates and experienced legal professionals may be selected for the bench. One of the main prerequisites to become a judge in Saudi Arabia is the level of education obtained from one of the Shari’a colleges in the Kingdom. Candidates must demonstrate adequate knowledge and understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. Candidates are also required to have a good comprehension of socio-cultural issues. Lateral recruitment exists, and usually depends on the candidate’s previous experience in teaching Islamic jurisprudence and the level of education obtained.

Although the Saudi judiciary system does not specify gender in the requirements to be appointed judge in practice, judicial posts in Saudi Arabia are almost exclusively held by men. The increasing societal and political changes in the Kingdom and recent reports suggest that this might change in future. In 2016, Shaimaa Sadeq Al-Jibran was the first female appointed as a commercial judge. Her appointment was based on the recommendation of and request from a prominent legal advisor. Despite opposition to her appointment from senior figures in the judiciary because of her gender, her appointment was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Court. There are further indications of Saudi women joining the judiciary in the near future with the recent Shura Council issuing a statement in this regard.

522 Ibid.
523 Art. 33 of Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi Arabia).
524 Art. 35 Ibid.
527 Recently, the Shura Council issued a recommendation “to empower competent Saudi women who are legally and religiously qualified to hold judging positions”. According to Habib,
Judicial training in in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia

Acceptance of an individual’s application to become a judge is not always unconditional, and may not guarantee direct entry into the judiciary. As indicated in Table 10 above, judicial appointees in Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia all undergo a probationary period after appointment. In addition, in all four countries, judicial education or training for new recruits is mandatory. The mode and methods of judicial training differ across the jurisdictions and span the spectrum from relatively short induction training (Saudi Arabia) to in-depth training programmes that last many years (Lebanon and Jordan). Table 11 below sets out the basic judicial training requirements in each of the 4 different Arab judiciaries.

Table 12. Judicial Training in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Duration of formal training course</th>
<th>Compulsory for new recruits</th>
<th>On the job training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Cairo’s national centre for Judicial Studies 1-year course (officially)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Judicial Institute in Jordan 3 years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanese institute for Judicial Studies 3 years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Judicial Academy, the Institute of Public Administration 8 weeks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the recommendation was issued by members within the Islamic Affairs and Judicial Committee and called upon the justice ministry to help with the appointment of women as judges stating that there were competent Saudi women to perform the judicial function especially in light of the general shortage of judges in the Kingdom. According to the members “Not appointing women in the judiciary is incompatible with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 which calls for empowering women and investing in their potential and aptitudes”. Habib writes that the recommendation also cited scholarly references that argue that there are no religious texts that bars women from becoming judges. Reference were made to other Arab and Islamic countries that had appointed women as judges such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan “since the 1960s while Jordan appointed its first woman judge in 1996, Egypt in 2003 and Bahrain in 2006”. See Habib, T. “Saudi Arabia could soon appoint women as judges- Shura members argue no “male requirement” for appointment” Gulf News (6 August, 2018) <https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-could-soon-appoint-women-as-judges-1.2262252> [Accessed 7 September 2018]
Similar to most European civil law and Anglo-American common law countries, almost every entry-level judge is required to complete some form of training. This was corroborated by data derived from the Arab Judges Survey where, 62 of 72 judges from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon indicated that they had received judicial training when first appointed to the judiciary. However, the mode and manner is more variable among the four countries. For Jordan and Lebanon, new recruits undergo an initial period of probationary training at the Judicial institute. By contrast, in Saudi Arabia and Egypt judicial training appears to be carried out on the job and is generally supervised by senior judges.

**Institutional socialisation in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia**

For the four Arab jurisdictions, judicial socialisation takes place within and is controlled by members of the judiciary. However, the members in charge differ. For Jordan and Lebanon, socialisation is primarily under the auspices of the judicial institutes. For Saudi Arabia and Egypt, socialisation is through senior judges, which constitutes a less institutionalised relationship.

In Lebanon, successful candidates undergo a salaried three-year traineeship at the Lebanese Judicial Institute which is regulated by the Lebanese Judicial Council. Training includes attending hearings, examining case files and preparing draft decisions that are evaluated by the presiding judge of the court where the candidate is trained. Subject to completion of the training course, the board of the Judicial Institute nominates successful candidates to the Judicial Council.

Similar training occurs in Jordan, where successful candidates undergo a non-academic qualification program for three years at the Judicial institute of Jordan. Established in 1988, the Judicial Institute forms part of the Judicial Council and is the only body responsible for training new recruits in Jordan.

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529 The Jordanian Judicial Institute also trains new judicial recruits from abroad, predominantly judges from the Palestinian Territories. See the Institute’s website: [http://www.jij.gov.jo/](http://www.jij.gov.jo/)
Upon completion, candidates are awarded a diploma that qualifies them for the judicial office.\textsuperscript{530}

In Saudi Arabia, where there are no public competitions for judicial posts and initial selection is by application, successful applicants to the ordinary and administrative courts undergo a training course provided by the Judicial Academy.\textsuperscript{531} Although mandatory, training is brief and appears to run between one or two months. Upon completion, recruits become assistant judges and work under an initial probation period before they receive a permanent position within the judiciary. The probation period is officially for two years, during which time assistant judges shadow senior judges in their work. In the Arab Judges Survey, one Saudi judge described his judicial training as a “three-year on-the-job training”.\textsuperscript{532} According to Al-Najjar, their work is under strict and regular supervision by higher-ranking judges and includes the review and approval of judgments by senior judges.\textsuperscript{533} During the probation period, if assistant judges are considered unfit for the role, they are dismissed for lack of competence.\textsuperscript{534}

In Egypt, judicial training is offered by the National Centre for Judicial Studies where prosecutors and judges are trained together. While the official training period is for one year, in practice this can be from a few weeks to a few months.\textsuperscript{535} The variability in judicial training in Egypt was corroborated by a number of Egyptian judges that participated in the Arab Judges Survey. One explained that he underwent three months’ training at the Judicial institute.

\textsuperscript{530} Admission to the Judicial Institute Diploma program is not limited to Jordanian students, with a proportion of places provided for students of Arab and Islamic countries. Arts 61 and 64 Decree Law No.150/83, (Jordan)
\textsuperscript{531} Established by the Royal Decree No. 4 of 3/12/1385 AH (Jordan)
\textsuperscript{532} Comment from Judge 2013369 (Arab Judges Survey)
\textsuperscript{533} Nathalie Najjar, \textit{Arbitration and International Trade in the Arab Countries} (Brill Nijhoff 2018).
once appointed to the judiciary. But another Egyptian judge wrote that he underwent a “training course for just two weeks”. Furthermore, an administrative judge commented that he “had training twice as a criminal prosecutor and as a judge at the Egyptian Conseil D’état”.

Generally, individuals entering organisations will learn from within the organisation as they interact with one another, and apprehend the norms and the day-to-day contextual nuances. According to Biddle, older members will often be observed “showing the ropes” to, or frowning at, inappropriate judicial behaviour in the neophyte. All four countries subject new judicial recruits to some form of supervision and evaluation by senior judges. This may constitute an additional, albeit less institutionalised, selection process controlled by senior members of the judiciary. This is especially true for younger graduates with little experience. New judges will have to undergo repeated evaluations, which can provide a strong incentive to comply with the norms set by superior judges. This is notably true where career advancement is facilitated or conditioned by the approval of senior judges. This can be an additional form of social control which continues throughout the individual’s professional judicial career.

Judicial career patterns and socialisation post-appointment

Once appointed, judges must rise through the ranks in order to obtain a position with greater authority and responsibility. Career advancement is generally considered competitive: judges are regularly monitored and

536 Comment from Judge 2030119 (Arab Judges Survey)
537 Comment from Judge 2078119 (Arab Judges Survey)
538 Comment from Judge 1980070 (Arab Judges Survey)
541 Ibid.
542 Ibid. p.316.
promotions are granted according to formal criteria which combine both seniority and merit.\textsuperscript{543}

In the strictly bureaucratic model, promotions are the most important way to reach the higher rungs in the career ladder. The longer the judge stays within the career hierarchy, turnover opportunities tend to become fewer. According to Mestitz and Pederzoli, the assumption is that any opportunity would require a basic reconversion of one’s professional knowledge and abilities which tends to diminish over time.\textsuperscript{544} In other words, judges' careers appear to be exclusively regulated by the “mere passing of time”.\textsuperscript{545} By contrast, under the professional model, career advancement is less structured and promotions are usually less widespread.\textsuperscript{546} But while the professional model tends to have less formal provisions of advancement, higher-ranking judges may exert some influence over the promotion of lower-ranking judges.\textsuperscript{547}

**Judicial career patterns in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia**

Career advancement in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia is, in principle, under the auspices of the Higher Judicial Councils. In all cases, however, promotion tends to reflect elements from both the bureaucratic and professional models. On the one hand, merit and seniority appears to be a condition for advancement, at least in principle.\textsuperscript{548} On the other hand, hierarchical superiors play a fundamentally important role for any judge that hopes to rise up the ranks.

Relationship structures such as the newcomers’ relationships with supervisors and colleagues appears to be another important aspect of promotion. Of

\textsuperscript{545} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{547} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid. p 38.
particular relevance is the relationship with judicial supervisors and the existence of informal mentoring. But there are also those beyond the judicial branch that are empowered to supervise and evaluate the work and conduct of individual judges. In all four countries, promotion is closely linked with satisfactory evaluations often made by actors both within and outside the judiciary (Table 12).

Table 13. Elements of judicial career advancement in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution officially in charge of career advancement</th>
<th>Official criteria for career advancement</th>
<th>Role of senior judges/presiding judges</th>
<th>Role of Inspectortates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Supreme Judicial Council</td>
<td>Seniority and merit</td>
<td>Presiding judge in court nominates judges for advancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Judicial Council, Ministry of Justice and Royal Decree</td>
<td>Seniority and merit, once promoted probation for 3 years (higher grades)</td>
<td>Presiding judges in each court exercise administrative oversight over judges in their courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Higher Judicial Council and Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Rank based with automatic advancement every 2 years</td>
<td>Presiding judge in court will submit reports to Judicial Inspectorate for review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Supreme Judicial Council</td>
<td>Seniority and merit (teaching experience)</td>
<td>Reviews are made on a yearly basis, and relate to proficiency and competency made by presiding judges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus here is on two elements that are likely to influence a judge’s aspirations for career advancement. The first element relates to how judges are supervised, which also includes the potential impact hierarchical superiors

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549 Except for assessment of first instance judges.

550 According to Article 55 of the Law of the Judiciary “A department for judicial inspection shall be set up at the Supreme Judicial Council" Royal Decree No. (M/78) 19 Ramadan 1428H - 1 October 2007 (Saudi Arabia).
have on judicial promotions. The second element relates to the role played by inspectorates empowered to supervise and discipline judges. The following sections explore career patterns in each jurisdiction in light of these two elements.

Career advancement for Egyptian Jordanian, Lebanese and Saudi judges

In Egypt, career advancement for administrative and state judges is officially based on age and experience. To move up the career ladder, judges are required to have accrued specific work experience based on their level of court. Generally, when a vacancy arises, the presiding judge in a court will select a judge from a list drawn up by the court’s senior judges. The nominee is reviewed by the Judicial Council and, if the nomination is approved, the Council prepares a decree of appointment (which is signed by the President of the Republic).

At the appellate levels, promotions in Egypt appear to be more political in nature, and there is a degree of executive interference. Under the recent 2017 amendment to the Judicial Authority Law, the President of the Republic can directly appoint chief justices to all the highest courts without approval or review from the Judicial Council or the Ministry of Justice. Prior to this amendment, the relevant law empowered the Judicial Council to choose their own judges and placed the onus of disputing their decision on the President. While seniority and merit typically played a large part in the decisions under the old law, the new amendment does not provide the same clear guidance on appointments. The amendment has been described as an alien

551 The same applies to Administrative judges: see Law no. 47 of 1972 as amended by law no. 136 of 1984. (Egypt)
552 Law No. 13 of 2017 amending Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt)
development within the Egyptian judiciary that will further foster partisanship and factions among high-ranked judges.555

In Saudi Arabia, judges at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy will usually be required to satisfy additional requirements in order to be promoted. They need to have obtained training degrees from the Judicial Academy, teaching experience in Islamic law and work experience in court.556 Subject to satisfactory reports of judges, the Judicial Council usually follows the principle of absolute seniority. When two or more judges have served for equal periods of time, the decision is determined on the basis of the proficiency reports of each candidate. Promotions for lower courts and appellate levels are subject to mandatory review by the Judicial Disciplinary Committee, which forms part of the Saudi Judicial Council.557 Judges may not be promoted unless their work has been inspected at least twice.558 Reviews are made on a yearly basis, they relate to proficiency and competency and are made by both presiding judges and the Judicial Disciplinary Committee. Judges who receive a “below average” rating in three consecutive reports are placed on mandatory retirement.

Similar to Egypt, promotions to the higher courts in Saudi Arabia appear to be more political in nature. The King directly appoints higher-ranking judges by virtue of his constitutional role in overseeing the implementation of Islamic law in the Kingdom.559 But in practice, the King’s promotion powers appear to be

557 According to Article 55 of Law of the Judiciary Royal Decree No. (M/78) 19 Ramadan 1428H - 1 October 2007 (Saudi Arabia), a department for judicial inspection shall be set up at the Supreme Judicial Council.
559 Article 55 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance states that: “… the policy of the nation, a policy in accordance with the provisions of Islam; the King oversees the implementation of Islamic Shari‘ah, the system of government, the state’s general policies and the protection of the defense of the country”.

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more pervasive and include lower courts. For example, in late 2017 and coinciding with an anti-corruption crackdown, the King issued a royal order that promoted twenty-six judges and appointed thirty others at different levels of the judiciary.\textsuperscript{560}

In Lebanon, career patterns are officially rank-based. Judges at the bottom of the judicial pyramid are automatically granted first rank after successful completion of their traineeship at the Judicial Institute. Subject to satisfactory reports, they will be automatically transferred to a higher rank every two years. No further distinction exists between judges regardless of their functions, specialisations or experience. Promotions are also based on the reports of the Judicial Inspectorate, which is part of the Ministry of Justice.\textsuperscript{561} The Inspectorate has a legal mandate to monitor the conduct of judges in administrative and ordinary courts.\textsuperscript{562} They review monthly reports submitted by each court. Based on these reports, the Inspectorate also advises the Ministry of Justice on the number of judges needed in the country. The Ministry uses the information to assign new judges and rotate existing judges.\textsuperscript{563} But appointments to senior judicial positions are, in practice, subjected to a religion-based power sharing agreement. As a matter of established practice, the top judicial positions are shared by religious denominations. For example, at present the First President of the Court of Cassation is a Maronite Christian, the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and President of the Judicial


\textsuperscript{561} Under Decree-Law No. 150/83, the Judicial Inspectorate works under the supervision of the Minister of Justice. The Judicial Inspectorate is composed of a president, four inspectors general and six inspectors, all appointed by Cabinet decree on the proposal of the Minister of Justice, and from among various judicial grades (depending on the position).

\textsuperscript{562} Under Decree-Law No. 150/83 (Lebanon)


In Jordan, the promotion of a judge to a higher rank is officially based on competence and qualification.\footnote{“Royal Decree Approves Promotion, Appointment of Judges” \textit{The Jordan Times} (2 January 2017) <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/royal-decree-approves-promotion-appointment-judges> accessed 11 August 2018.} Judges are promoted to higher levels based on credentials and excellence of service that are assessed by the Judicial Council and according to the reports of inspectors. For promotions in higher courts, judges are required to submit a self-authored legal paper which is reviewed by the Judicial Council. Once a judge is appointed to a higher rank for the first time, they are on probation for a period of three years.\footnote{Art. 20 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)} Following constitutional amendments in 2016, the King now has the sole power to appoint the Chief Justices and other members of the Jordanian Constitutional Court without any countersignature by the relevant government officials (which was the previous practice).\footnote{Sufian Obeidat, “Jordan’s 2016 Constitutional Amendments: A Return to Absolute Monarchy?” \textit{Constitutionnet} (27 May 2016) <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/jordans-2016-constitutional-amendments-return-absolute-monarchy> accessed 8 November 2018.}

\textbf{Judicial evaluation and discipline in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia}

Another aspect closely linked to career advancement is how judges are supervised and disciplined. The nature of judicial discipline can also hamper the political significance of judges. According to Shetreet, judicial disciplinary proceedings are important to explore because they relate to the extent to which individual judges are protected from undue pressures from within the judiciary (fellow judges and, above all, superiors) or externally.\footnote{Shimon Shetreet and International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace (eds), \textit{The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace} (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 637–638.} In the four Arab
judiciaries analysed here, supervision and discipline is greatly dependent on evaluation of individual judges. Hierarchical superiors as well as actors external to the judiciary can play an important supervisory role. There are inspectorates in all four countries that are empowered to hear grievances against individual judges. According to the respective laws of each country, the evaluations take place periodically, and can be initiated on an impromptu basis. Table 13 below summarises how the evaluation and discipline of judges is conducted in the four Arab judiciaries, and it highlights the role of non-judicial actors in judicial evaluation, especially in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Table 14. Evaluation and discipline of judges in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups responsible for evaluation of judges</th>
<th>Frequency of evaluation</th>
<th>Groups responsible for judicial Discipline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Inspection Board (HJC)</td>
<td>Impromptu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(only first tier court judges)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior judges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Senior judges,</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspectorate (HJC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Senior judges,</td>
<td>Monthly reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspectorate (HJC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Senior judges</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial Disciplinary Committee (HJC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Egypt, both the Minister of Justice and the General Assembly are empowered to supervise judges and courts, and the heads of courts have the right to evaluate judges at their will. They are furthermore empowered to

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569 Art. 93 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt)
warn individual judges on their own accord. All three bodies can also refer an individual judge to the public prosecutor for disciplinary actions. The Inspection Board has the right to take undertaken investigations in relation to first tier court judges, but judges at the appeal level and higher are exempt from investigations. Disciplinary actions can be brought against judges who fail to observe obligations associated with the judicial office, and the discipline of judges at all levels is undertaken by a committee composed of the most senior judges.

In Saudi Arabia, the president of each court is empowered to supervise and warn judges if they suspect that a judge has acted contrary to his judicial duties. The president of the court may also alert the Saudi Judicial Council to any concerns. Inspection of members of the judiciary is carried out annually.

The Lebanese Judicial Council can dismiss any judge if it considers that the individual judge is no longer entitled to exercise his/her judicial functions. Provided that eight of the ten members of the Council agree, the Council can dismiss a judge without the need to consult or obtain approval of the Minister of Justice. In Lebanon, the Inspectorate is entitled to take actions on its own initiative, such as visiting courts and examining the work of judges. Judges can be brought before the Disciplinary Council for “any breach of professional duty, honour, dignity or courtesy”.

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570 All three organs can refer to the public prosecutor for disciplinary actions see “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt)
571 Article 78 the Inspection Board appeals to only evaluate lower court judges
572 Art. 98 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt)
573 Article 58 states that: “Without prejudice to the impartiality and independence of the judiciary and the right of the Supreme Judicial Council to supervise courts, judges and their work, the chief judge of each court shall have the right to supervise the judges of his court and notify them of all acts violating their duties or requirements of their positions after hearing their statements” Art. 58 Royal Decree No.: M / 78, date 19/9/1428 Judicial Authority Law (Saudi Arabia)
575 According to the relevant law, breaches include unjustified absence, delay in the adjudication of pending cases, unjustified discrimination between the parties, and delay in delivering judgement.
In Jordan, inspection of members of the judiciary is carried out annually. The Jordanian Inspectorate issues recommendations and submits them to the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation. Judges in Jordan may be disciplined for "any violation of duty and any act that relates to the dignity and honour of the position".

**Promotion as a means of judicial socialisation**

Promotion illustrates a powerful tool of social control that is both centralised and decentralised in Arab judiciaries. Officially, promotion is under the auspices of the Judicial Councils. However, courts also exercise a degree of influence over their judicial colleagues. Similar to the bureaucratic model, salary, prestige and personal influence in the four Arab judiciaries depend on a judge’s position in the hierarchical ladder, which can only be improved by seniority and merit. However, the existence of evaluation reports of judicial conduct and work performance allows for an influence which is similar to the professional model. Promotion relies on these reports that are usually written by senior and presiding judges of the same court, which are in turn reviewed by the judicial inspectorates.

The fusion between the two models will inevitably produce strains in how judges seek career advancement. It also demonstrates a difference of status between lower court judges and high court judges in relation to career advancement. Lower court judges are subject to several evaluations and written reports. This might compel ambitious persons to conform to the established social norms prevalent in the judiciary in order to climb the ranks. For higher court judges, career advancement is not automatic but is more

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577 Article 41 states “the judicial inspection staff is considered related to the Ministry and inspectors present their reports about judges to the Chairman and the Minister.” Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)

578 These include: delays in rendering judgments; failure to set a date for judgment; discrimination between the parties; breach of confidentiality; absence without excuse; and failure to abide by work hours Article 37 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)
political in nature, which may incentivise ambitious judges to seek support from outside the judicial branch.

As mentioned above, because promotions are according to official standards rooted in seniority and merit, proliferation of extra-judicial activities may be an issue. This is seen in Italy and France, where automatic promotion has encouraged the proliferation of part time and fulltime extra-judicial activities. According to Guarnieri, this has grown substantially because such activities do not prevent judges from being promoted or reassigned to their previous position.\textsuperscript{579} This appears to also occur in the Arab context, in particular for Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese judges. The nature of automatic promotions means that, provided the reports are satisfactory, judges may establish relations with other institutions and the broader social and economic environment. Since promotion within the judiciary is “almost always certain”\textsuperscript{580}, this may foster informal links between courts and politics. This in turn, can undermine the autonomy of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other branches of government and increase the political significance of courts.

**Summary**

The analysis in this chapter sets out the first process of socialisation for Arab judges in four judiciaries. The processes of judicial selection, training and career advancement for judges are all forms of social control exercised over individual judges. These mechanisms of control take on different forms and may involve those who can influence the status of individual judges, such as senior members of the judiciary and the executive. The processes further reveal that such social controls in Arab judiciaries are not strictly confined to either the Western bureaucratic or professional models. Both models fail somewhat to accurately represent the way judges are socialised (and controlled) in the four countries. Each Arab judicial system discussed here is


perhaps best described as somewhere in the middle of the bureaucratic-profession continuum depending on the type of control explored. While none perfectly fits the Western-based models, the models provide the basis for understanding some important differences in institutional socialisation across these four countries in the Arab region. The next chapter explores a second source of socialisation for Arab judges: their educational and professional experiences prior to joining the judiciary.
Chapter 7. Pre-appointment socialisation of Arab judges

Professional socialisation and sources of individualisation

The previous chapter explored socialisation through judicial institutions primarily through four types of processes: judicial selection; training; discipline and; career advancement. However, the judicial role in Arab countries cannot be accounted for by only considering institutional socialisation.\textsuperscript{581} The reason is that the concept of institutional socialisation conceives of the individual as a recipient rather than an initiator or co-participant. Institutional socialisation is premised on the notion that the individual's socialisation is successful to the extent that role expectations or behaviours are induced.\textsuperscript{582} According to Waldeck and Myers, such traditional understandings of socialisation view new members as “blank slates”, “ready to be written upon by institutional procedures, norms, and existing culture” which effectively allows organisations to shape individual attitudes and behaviours.\textsuperscript{583} But this fails to account for the active part individuals can play in innovating and creating roles for themselves within the organisation.\textsuperscript{584} For instance, judges may use values and knowledge acquired from their experiences before entering the judiciary to individualise, influence or negotiate their roles throughout their judicial careers.\textsuperscript{585} This in turn may shed some light into whether judicialisation of politics is a product of the judge’s individual experiences as opposed to the structural set up of the legal system the judge operates within (Chapter 5); and/or because of institutional socialisation (Chapter 6).


\textsuperscript{584} Ibid. p.324.

\textsuperscript{585} Ibid. p.329.
This chapter looks at the socialisation of Arab judges based on pre-appointment attributes of individual judges, in particular, their education and professional experience before entering the judiciary. The chapter also offers some preliminary analysis of judges’ personalities that relate to the processes through which attitudes, values and role conceptions are acquired through the lens of self-esteem and the degree to which judges consider belonging to the judiciary is important.\textsuperscript{586} The chapter uses primary data derived from analysing 112 Arab judges’ professional profiles obtained from LinkedIn as well as data from the Arab Judges Survey conducted for this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 4, this empirical research is not meant to provide a representative sample of Arab judges in all Middle East countries. Instead it provides an initial insight into the background of some Arab judges in the absence of any other source of direct information about judges in the region. This in turn provides a basis for exploring judicial role perceptions of judges in the four countries in subsequent chapters.

**Pre-appointment socialisation**

**Legal education**

For many judges, entry into the judiciary is the last step on a path that usually begins as a law student and progresses through different legal professional environments. As a result, the acquisition of experiences and norms may have occurred in the “pre-bench” period.\textsuperscript{587} One of the major types of socialisation outside of the judiciary is law school. Similar to civil-law countries, one of the distinctive features of higher education in Arab states is the weight given to

\textsuperscript{586} James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.26

\textsuperscript{587} Atkins identifies four major stages of socialisation for judges. The first relates to professional socialisation, the period where individuals learn the basic legal norms and values. The second stage involves initiation as well as the stages of adjustment to the specific demands of the new role. The third stage is defined as “establishment”, which Atkins describes as a period of “settling into the judicial institution including the important decision of whether to make a career out of being a judge”. The fourth and final stage relates to commitment, the point at which the decision to remain a judge is made. These stages should be treated as amorphous and by no means static. Yet they help in exploring the nature of individuals that enter into the judicial office. Alpert, Lenore, Burton M. Atkins and Robert C. Ziller, “Becoming a Judge: The Transition from Advocate to Arbiter” (1979) 62 Judicature 325, p.325.
purely theoretical learning with little emphasis on experiential learning. This is notably true for legal degrees where practical legal training is limited in scope.588

Moreover, relatively recent trends in the region opens up questions about the type of law degrees obtained. Legal education abroad is becoming increasingly common among young Arab students. With perceptions of the benefits of international degrees in law, there has been a marked increase in individuals that complete at least part of their university education abroad. In addition to self-funded students from the region, the trend has been fuelled by government sponsorship schemes, primarily from the richer Gulf countries.589 With Arab law students increasingly being educated in other legal systems (and in foreign languages), questions arise as to what types of legal knowledge are being imported back into the judiciary once law students enter the judicial profession. This complexity is further enhanced with post-graduate law degrees that are more research oriented and require advanced skills in analysis, critical evaluation and the student’s ability to solve complex legal problems and concepts.

As discussed in Chapter 6, the four Arab countries analysed here require judicial applicants to have obtained at least an undergraduate degree in law in order to be considered for a judicial post. Table 14 below, presents the results of an analysis of 112 Arab judges’ educational profiles obtained through an analysis of their LinkedIn profiles.


Table 15. Region where Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese judges obtained their law degrees (n=112, LinkedIn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Home university</th>
<th>Other university in the Arab region</th>
<th>University outside the Arab region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The clearest difference overall in terms of where law degrees were obtained is between judges from Jordan compared with judges from Egypt and Lebanon. Egyptian and Lebanese judges in the sample had law degrees only from their own jurisdiction (37) and jurisdictions outside the Arab region (52). In contrast, most Jordanian judges in the sample (14 of 22) had law degrees from a university outside their jurisdiction but in the Arab region.

Figure 10 breaks this sample down further by the specific jurisdiction where the law degree was obtained. Amongst the 112 judges in the sample that obtained a law degree outside their home jurisdiction, law degrees from American universities (24) and French universities (18) were the most prevalent, followed by degrees from other Arabic-speaking countries (14) and the UK (13).
Figure 10. Where judges in 3 Arab countries obtained law degrees (LinkedIn, n=112)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home country</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-speaking region</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Types of law degrees
The majority of Arab judicial profiles analysed indicated a postgraduate degree obtained before becoming a judge. Figure 11 below, shows that of the 112 Arab judges examined on LinkedIn, almost two-thirds (63%) had obtained an LLM (post-graduate law degree), 29% had PhDs and only 8% had an LLB as their highest law degree. However, given the source of the information (LinkedIn), this could reflect a higher education status amongst Arab judges choosing to be on LinkedIn.590

590 In addition, a more international outlook among judges could also be a reason why so many judges had obtained a post-graduate degree. As discussed in Chapter 4, this further reduces the representativeness of this sample.
Looking at the LinkedIn sample by country, most Egyptian judges (53 out of 62) had at least one post-graduate degree, 11 of whom had received doctoral degree in law. In Lebanon, almost half of the sample (13) had obtained a post-graduate degree before they became trainee judges; the other half (15) obtained it during the course of their judicial post. In Jordan, 4 had a doctoral degree, all of which are judges of the Constitutional Court, and these PhDs were all obtained from universities in Egypt.

The fact that a large proportion of the judges in the sample obtained a foreign post-graduate degree may indicate that many of the judges in the sample come from favourable economic background and/or had government support in pursuing costly studies abroad. In addition, legal education is usually specific to the country/region where it is obtained, and the high proportion of Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordanian judges that obtained law degrees outside of their own jurisdiction introduces another possible channel of influence on the judiciary. This is of particular relevance for individuals who obtain their law degrees in American and British universities, where legal education is based on common law doctrines such
as *stare decisis*. Such post-graduate experiences may have an influence over how judges perceive their role.

**Career experiences**

Judges may also bring in external values to the judiciary as a result of their professional experiences prior to joining the judiciary. This will usually be in legal practice as advocates, but it could also be experience in other areas of law such as academia or in government service. 591 According to Gibson, career experiences have a significant impact on the substantive values of judges which they will use once they enter the judiciary. 592 In addition, a prior legal career may weaken the capacity for internal control by the judiciary, as individuals are likely to maintain ties with their former profession. This may suggest that judges are more likely to bring values into the judiciary from other environments and, according to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, can become “an important point of reference for the judiciary as a whole”. 593 Therefore, the relationship between the judiciary and other legal professions, including possible channels that foster professional mobility between judges and other professions need to be considered. 594

Figure 12 below shows the prior professional experience of the 112 Arab judges in the LinkedIn sample. Judges who were prosecutors make up the single largest group (34) amongst the sample of judges, followed by private lawyers (30) and academics (23). There were also a number of judges in the sample who had served in a government (18) or international regional advisory role (17) before joining the judiciary.

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592 James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.21
594 Ibid.
Figure 12. Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian judges’ professional experience prior to joining the judiciary (LinkedIn, n=112)

Amongst the 62 judges from Egypt in the LinkedIn sample, prosecutorial experience was the most commonly held profession prior to becoming a judge (29). The prosecutorial experience ranged from a few months to nine years. A number of the Egyptian judges (11) had experience in private legal practice before joining the bench, primarily in corporate and banking. A few judges (8) had worked as public legal advisors for government branches, and a few (5) judges indicated they had worked with government branches such as the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, Education and Tourism. Two indicated that they had previously been police officers before entry to the judiciary.

Amongst the 28 number of judges from Lebanon in the LinkedIn sample, almost half (11) had academic teaching experience before becoming a judge, and a quarter (7) said they have continued to teach at universities and judicial institutes on a part-time basis since joining the judiciary. Similar to Egypt, prior experience for judges in Lebanon also included work with other branches of

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595 Some of the 112 judges profiled had several different professional roles before joining the judiciary, which is why the total number of judges with professional experience (144) is greater than the sample size (112).
government, such as Parliament, Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Religious Affairs.

In Jordan, amongst the 22 judges in the LinkedIn sample, professional experience was mostly related to private law and legal academia. For instance, of the two-thirds of judges (15) who currently sit on the Constitutional Court, five had previously held ministerial positions and the other half were academics and private lawyers.

Several Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian judges listed work experience with their home Ministry of Justice prior to joining the bench. This work ranged from research assistance to legal advice.\textsuperscript{596}

Information about judges’ professional experience before joining the judiciary was also explored in the online Arab Judges Survey, where judges were asked to indicate what their previous professional experiences encompassed. Judges were asked to select from a list of four options (private lawyer, public lawyer, legal academic, appointed directly from law school), but they were also given the opportunity to write in any other profession. Figure 13 below shows the results of the online survey of Arab judges, which includes responses from 78 judges that were predominantly from Egypt (24); Saudi Arabia (22); and Lebanon (20). Other countries were Tunisia (6), Jordan (3), Palestinian Territories (2) and Syria (1). The majority of judges who answered this survey question (50 out of 78) had some professional experience before joining the judiciary.

\textsuperscript{596} One Lebanese judge had previously been a member at the legislative and consultative body of the Ministry of Justice. He described his work as primarily “advisory in nature” to the ministers.
The most prevalent pre-appointment experience was as a private lawyer (22 of 50 judges), but a substantial number also chose the “Other” category. Experiences here included work in the executive branch. For instance, one Lebanese judge wrote that he held a senior position at the Sharīʿa Council. Two Egyptian judges wrote that they were police officers, one of which explained how he had become a judge after serving as a police officer: “In Egypt, police officers get a law degree and they can apply to join the judiciary (prosecutors first then judges at a later stage)”.

The survey was particularly helpful in understanding the professional background of judges from Saudi Arabia because there were no profiles from Saudi Arabian judges on LinkedIn. Of the 25 judges from Saudi Arabia that completed the online Arab Judges Survey, the overwhelming majority (22) were directly appointed to the judiciary following law school. Only two Saudi judges indicated that they had previously worked as private lawyers, and one judge indicated that he had been a legal advisor before entering the judiciary.

In the Survey, 4 judges indicated that they had two prior experiences before joining the judiciary, which is why the total number of professional experience (85) is greater than the sample size (78).

Comment from Judge 2030119 (Arab Judges Survey)
Prior education and legal practice

According to Heumann, law school and prior civil court experiences do not provide "a realistic perspective on the operations of the criminal court."\textsuperscript{599} He concludes that most newcomers to the bench are "not well prepared for their jobs in the court."\textsuperscript{600} To explore whether prior education and legal practice was sufficient preparation for Arab judges in their work in court, the survey asked judges to indicate the extent to which they felt their previous professional background prepared them for their judicial role.\textsuperscript{601} Figure 14 below presents responses from the 61 Arab judges who answered this question on the survey.

\textbf{Figure 14.} Arab judges’ view of how well prior work prepared them for their judicial role (Survey n=61)

More than half of the judges (35 or 58\%) said that their previous work experience had prepared them to some extent. A third (21 or 33\%) thought that it had “fully” prepared them, while only 6 (9\%) judges did not consider that their prior experiences had prepared them at all. One Egyptian judge commented that his prior experience had given him “great exposure to the


\textsuperscript{600} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{601} Participants were asked to indicate on a 3-point scale of “fully”, “somewhat” or “not at all”.

legal practice from the perspective of a lawyer”. Another Egyptian judge wrote that beginning his judicial career as a public prosecutor “was significant to prepare me for the duties of a judge”.

**Lateral professional mobility**

Another important feature in terms of individualisation for judges is lateral mobility - the professional mobility a judge may have throughout his/her career as a judge and the networks he/she establishes as a result of simultaneously holding jobs inside and outside the judiciary. Based on the information generated from LinkedIn, continued lateral professional mobility was found in 48 out of the 112 Arab judges profiled, especially among senior judges (see Figure 15).

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602 Comment from Judge: 2077920 (Arab Judges Survey)
603 Comment from Judge: 2081484 (Arab Judges Survey)
Figure 15. Lateral professional mobility in Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt judiciaries (n=48, LinkedIn)
The greatest lateral professional mobility was found amongst Egyptian judges, with 25 of 62 holding another job addition to their judicial post. The most common jobs were in academia, government branches and ADR. One Egyptian judge presiding over a first instance court continued to work for the Ministry of Justice. He described his job as helping to "create fields of cooperation and signing protocols with international institutions and organisations". Six of the 28 judges from Lebanon worked for various governmental branches and three were private lawyers. In addition, 7 judges were continuing to teach at universities and at the Lebanese Judicial Institute. One senior judge at the Lebanese State Council listed two additional jobs beyond being a judge: government advisor and professor at a Beirut university. There was some mobility within judiciaries in the region, with four judges (2 from Egypt, 2 from Jordan) seconded to other Arab countries (mostly in the Gulf region).

**Individual judges’ personalities**

Another factor which forms part of the judicial role relates to how individuals internalise the expectations associated with the judicial role. While socialisation is easy to operationalise, exploring such covert expectations is next to impossible for a researcher. It would involve an exploration of the “real” self of the individual judge that may be different from those sets of identities or expectations the individual judge consciously or subconsciously chooses to reveal. However, some judicial behaviourists have argued that there may be certain elements that might provide some insight into how individual judges internalise the judicial role and how it may manifest itself in their performance and interactions within the judiciary and in the broader political system. For

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604 Judge EG50 (LinkedIn)
instance, the impact of personality on behaviour may influence several aspects of judging and the perceived role of a judge. Atkins et al. argue that the influence of personality is mediated by a number of other individual situational and contextual variables:

"[T]he conceptual utility of personality theory in a political context, as in all other personal interactions, lies in the extent to which it provides partial explanations of how an individual's psychological characteristics facilitate or impede interactions with those persons who form the subsystems of politics within which he or she operates."606

Judges' personality attributes determine the manner in how judges deal with expectations and obligations that are associated with the judicial role.607 According to Gibson, one important dimension of judicial personality is self-esteem.608 For instance, willingness to make innovative decisions ("risky shifts") and to dissent may be a function not only of the institutional context of decision-making, but also of the self-esteem of the judges.609 For Gibson, substantive values and role orientations may be, in part, a function of self-esteem where "activist" judges are more likely to have a higher self-esteem than judges that practice judicial restraint.610

In order to explore Arab judges' personalities and capacities, judges were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with two questions in the Arab Judges Survey:

- "As a judge, I feel I provide an important service to society."
- "Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image."

Both statements were intended to assess the degree to which individual judges distinguished between themselves and the judicial role they occupied in line

608 Ibid. p.26
609 Ibid. p27
610 Ibid. p.26
with Gibson’s argument that self-esteem may indicate judicial activism. The statements relate to self-esteem in the sense that they asked individual judges to evaluate their personal contribution in relation to the judicial role.

The answer options were on a 5 point Likert scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. In total, 65 Arab judges responded to both statements, and they came from Saudi Arabia (21 judges), Egypt (20 judges), Lebanon (14 judges), Tunisia, Syria and Jordan (10 judges). Figure 16 below presents judges’ responses to whether they agreed that as judges, they felt that they provided an important service to society.

**Figure 16.** Extent to which Arab judges feel they provide an important service to society (Arab Judges Survey, n=65)

![Pie chart showing responses]

Out of 65 responses, nearly all judges agreed with the statement, with 47 judges indicated that they “strongly agreed” and 17 judges “agreed”. Only 1 Egyptian judge indicated that he “neither agreed nor disagreed”.

Judges’ responses were more varied in relation to the second statement (“Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image”) which is illustrated in Figure 17 below.
Figure 17. Responses to “Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image” (Arab Judges Survey; n=65)

Of the 65 responses to this statement, more than half (42 judges) agreed, with 18 judges indicating that they strongly agreed with the statement. Eight judges disagreed with the statement, 3 of whom strongly disagreed. Just under a quarter (15 judges) neither agreed nor disagreed.611 A few judges offered to explain their choice. For instance, one Egyptian judge wrote that belonging to the judiciary was not important: “It is not very important for my self-image in my case as my status in the Arab legal sphere depends mainly on my publications in the UK, Germany and the MENA region.”612 Another Egyptian judge commented that “One makes his own image, by his manners, intelligence, and then his profession.”613 One Tunisian judge, who also

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611 Most judges in Saudi Arabia (14 of 21), Egypt (13 of 20) and Lebanon (8 of 14) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Three judges from Saudi Arabia and three from Egypt disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

612 Comment from Judge 1980070 (Arab Judges Survey)

613 Comment from Judge 2078058 (Arab Judges Survey)
disagreed with the statement, commented that self-esteem is not only relevant to the function of the judiciary, “but about any job that will benefit the people”.614

Summary

Becoming a member of the judiciary involves at least two processes of socialisation. The first process relates to how the individual judge acquires the knowledge, skills and sense of occupational identity that are characteristic of a member of that profession. The second process of judicial socialisation (individualisation) focuses on the the extent to which the individual judge contributes to the judiciary, as opposed to someone who passively accepts existing norms that the judicial institution provides or imposes.615 Individualisation involves a process where the individual is active in the definition of his/her judicial role within the judicial system.616 Through this process another important element needs to be considered: the individual's own behaviour and self-conception. Taken together with chapter 6, both processes of socialisation demonstrate how several factors, mechanisms and processes, are intertwined and may help to shape how Arab judges perceive their judicial roles:

“When a man [or a woman] becomes a judge he does not forget all that he has done or learned or been exposed to in the past. Judges used to be law student and many used to practice law. they have been trained in the values and expectations which their profession espouses”.617

The information generated from Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordanian judges’ LinkedIn profiles and the online Arab Judges Survey reveals a diverse set of background attributes for Arab judges based on education, as well as their prior and simultaneous professional experiences that are external to the judiciary. Some of these background attributes and experiences may help to

614 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey)
615 Porter et al uses the term “individualisation” to describe socialisation experiences in which the individual is active in contributing towards the organisation. See Lyman W Porter, Edward E Lawler and J Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations (McGraw-Hill 1974).
shape the judicial role beyond institutional controls. What this suggest is that despite these controls, judges are diverse individuals contrary to the idealised picture of mechanical appliers of the law as espoused by the institutions. The next chapter presents the findings of the empirical study of judicial role conceptions in the Arab Middle East, and it explores how these compare with prior studies of judicial role conceptions in the common and civil law worlds.
Chapter 8. Judicial role conceptions

This chapter explores how Arab judges perceive their role based on findings from the online Arab Judges Survey conducted for this research. The main aim of the research presented in this chapter is to gain preliminary insight of Arab judges’ normative expectations about how a given judicial office should be performed.618 As discussed in Chapter 2, previous studies of judicial role conceptions have been motivated by a desire to correlate judicial role orientations to specific types of judicial decision-making. The Arab Judges Survey is the first study of judicial role conceptions in the Arab region. As such the findings are of intrinsic value in themselves, but this chapter also places the findings within the context of earlier studies of judicial role conceptions and approaches to judicial decision-making outside the Arab region. The first part of this chapter presents the results of the Arab Judges Survey. The survey included a number of the same questions about judicial roles that have been asked in earlier studies with European and American judges. The second part of this chapter compares the findings from the Arab Judges Survey with the earlier studies of judicial role perceptions in common and civil law jurisdictions.

Exploring Arab judicial role orientations

Empirical research on Arab judicial attitudes appears non-existent, especially within the framework of role theory.619 This chapter aims to begin to fill this gap and to add to the existing body of research on judicial role conceptions in other jurisdictions. Despite the fact that the survey group of Arab judges is methodologically limited (as discussed in Chapter 4), the survey findings presented in this chapter are able to empirically explore role perceptions amongst Arab judges for the first time and compare these findings with existing scholarship on this issue with judges in other jurisdictions.

619 Following a detailed search, no previous work on judicial role conceptions of judges in the Arab Middle East was found in English language based scholarship or in Arabic scholarship.
Earlier empirical studies have considered three elements as crucial to exploring judicial role orientations: how judges characterise their judicial role; what purposes/goals judges believe they do/should pursue as judges and; the degree to which judges believe legal precedents and public attitudes are important criteria for them in reaching judicial decisions. The three elements are collectively referred to as the “purposive role sector” in role theory, and are described as expectations judges have about their own particular position.

With focus on the purposive role sector, this initial study of Arab judges aims to understand the normative expectations of judges in the region and whether they fit within the framework of four judicial role orientations identified by earlier scholarship: the “executor”, “delegate”, “guardian” and “political” judge.

Survey approach to understanding Arab judicial role conceptions

Three approaches were used in the survey to enable Arab judges to express their views about how they conceive of their judicial role: (1) ranking judicial roles in order of importance, (2) comparing their judicial role to judges in other jurisdictions and (3) stating their view of the importance of precedent and the public in judicial decision-making.

First approach: ranking the importance of judicial roles

In the Arab Judges Survey, judges were asked to rank the following judicial roles in order of importance:

- Applier of the law;
- Administrator of justice;
- Guardian of the community;
- Architect in the country’s body of law;
- Enforcer of legal rules;
- Arbiter of morality.

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621 As Unger and Baas observe, the focus in this chapter is only on the “purposive sector”, but there are other aspects of the judicial role that deserve attention (some of the other aspects will be explored in Chapter 8). Ibid. p.345

622 See discussion of these four judicial role conceptions in Chapter 1
Each answer option presents a distinct conceptual role for judges that was considered relevant to the Arab context. The roles were, in part, based upon closely examining existing literature on judicial role perceptions in other jurisdictions and also in part tailored specifically to Arab judges. The first set of roles (“Administrator of justice” and “Applier of the law”) were considered as generic functions of any judge in any context. It was assumed that “administering justice” and “applying the law” are understood and accepted as principal judicial functions regardless of context. The two roles exclude the non-behavioural characteristics of those holding the judicial post (gender, race, nationality, and religion) as well as the concepts, attitudes, norms, values, sanctions and reactions of individual judges.623

The second set of roles (“Guardian of the community” and “Architect of the country’s body of law”) are borrowed from Glick’s seminal study of American state judges’ role perceptions.624 The two roles conceive of judges as being potentially active and political.625

The third set of roles (“Arbiter of morality” and “Enforcer of legal rules”) were created for this study as possible conceptual roles specifically relevant to the Arab region. These two roles take into consideration the existence of different judicial cultures in the region, dominated to varying degrees by religion, custom and Western influences (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3). These two conceptual roles were broadly defined and sit at opposite ends of the spectrum: at one end is the activist, political, public-regarding role of “Arbiter of morality” and at the other end is the passive “Enforcer of legal rules” (Figure 19).

623 Biddle BJ, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979)
625 For instance, Glick describes the “community Guardian” as a judge who acts as a moral force in the community: “he protects the people from outside threats or unwise values, and he may seem fatherly in his attitude toward the people in his jurisdiction. The judge is looked upon as a chaperone who acts to . . . protect the people from themselves.”. Ibid., p.60
Most important judicial roles among Arab judges

In order to establish a hierarchy of judicial role conceptions in Arab countries, judges were asked to rank all the six options in terms of importance (where “1” is the most important role and “6” is the least important role). Table 16 below presents 60 Arab judges’ assessment of the judicial roles they considered most important in their country.

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626 The question in the Survey read: Which of the following roles do you think are most important for judges in your country? Rank the following in terms of which roles are most important for judges in your country (where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 6 = LEAST IMPORTANT)
Table 16. Arab judges’ ranking of roles in order of importance (n=60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judicial role conceptions</th>
<th>Restraint</th>
<th>Generic</th>
<th>Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank</strong></td>
<td><strong>Enforcer of legal rules</strong></td>
<td><strong>Administrator of justice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Applier of law</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amongst all Arab judges combined, the role that was considered the most important (ranked most frequently as 1) was the more generic role of “Administrator of justice” (27 judges), followed by the other generic role of “Applier of the law” (20 judges) and the more activist role of “Guardian of the community” (10 judges). Twenty-one judges considered the most activist role, “Arbiter of morality”, as the least important role (ranked as 6). When only the top three highest ranked roles are considered, “Applier of the law” was selected most frequently (51 judges). This was followed by “Administrator of justice” (47 judges) and “Guardian of the community” (37 judges). Based on the total sample, roles that were least frequently ranked in the top three were the activist roles of “Arbiter of morality” (10 judges) and “Architect of the country’s body of law” (12 judges).

Figure 19 below presents the top three ranked roles. The roles that correspond to a more activist orientation are presented in different shades of red. Those roles that are more generic/restraint-oriented in nature are presented in blue shades.628

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627 Because the generic roles are broadly defined, “Applier of the law” may also be considered a more passive, restraint-oriented role. However, this is doubtful for reasons discussed in Chapter 10.

628 Given the small number of responses and thus the lack of reliability, a country based analysis in the main text is not provided. Details by country can be seen in Appendix 4.
Figure 19. Arab judges’ view of most important judicial roles (top 3 preferences combined) (n=60)
According to Glick, the “community guardian” is generally a judge who acts as a moral force in the community and someone who protects the people from outside threats or unwise values. Whether judges conceived the “Guardian of the community” in line with this description cannot be definitely established. Nonetheless, the fact that the role was ranked high by many respondents indicates that, at minimum, the guardian role (however understood) was considered as an important role to have.

Second approach: comparing judicial roles between jurisdictions

The survey also asked Arab judges to consider judicial role conceptions from a comparative perspective. This serves a number of purposes, including understanding how judges evaluate and understand their own role. It has been claimed that there are little differences in judiciaries across the Arab region and that the region has strong “trans-religious legal patterns” which renders it more or less the same in terms of law and legal culture. Similarly, Mattei’s classification of the “Western legal tradition” treats the traditional distinction between common law and civil law as a subdivision “within a highly homogenous family of legal systems”. To explore whether Arab judges themselves perceive such similarities, judges were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that their own judicial role was different from the judicial role: (1) in other countries in the Arab region and (2) in Western countries.

Comparing judicial roles within the Arab region

The survey asked Arab judges to agree or disagree with the statement: “The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in other Arab

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630 The limitations of this was discussed in Chapter 4. As Ungs and Baas acknowledged: “In the final analysis, it is the judge who, in ranking the statements, gives them meaning….”. Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of Ohio Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review. p.351

631 One reason often mentioned is that the region reveals strong “trans-religious legal patterns”, which renders it more or less the same in terms of law and legal culture. See generally, Chibli Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007 (reprinted 2009), p.23

countries in the region”. The answer options were on a 5-point Likert scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. Of the 63 responses to this question, just over half (32 judges) agreed that the judicial role in their country was different from judicial roles in the Arab region; just under a quarter (14 judges) disagreed with the statement and just over a quarter (17 judges) neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 20 below).633 One Lebanese judge explained that the judicial role is the same in all Arab countries, but because the laws and procedures differ, “the role of the judge look[s] different in each country”.634 Similarly, one Egyptian judge commented that “the Egyptian legal system has affected most of the Arab legal systems”.635

**Figure 20.** Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries, all responses combined (n=63)

![Pie chart showing responses to the question: “The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries in the region.”](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

633 In Figure 20 the category “agree” includes both “Strongly agree” and “Agree” responses and the category “disagree” includes both “Strongly Disagree” and “Disagree” responses.

634 Comment from Judge: 2003039 (Arab Judges Survey)

635 This comment reflects the view of Sanhuri’s contributions to the region as discussed in Chapter 3. Comment from Judge: 2030119 (Arab Judges Survey)
Comparing judicial roles in Arab countries to those in the West

There was more agreement amongst Arab judges when asked how the judicial role in their country compares with the role of judges in the West (see Figure 21 below). Almost two-thirds of all the Arab judges who answered this question (40 out of 63) agreed that the judicial role in their own country was different from the judicial role in Western countries, with a quarter disagreeing (16 of 63).

Figure 21. Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the judge in Western countries, all responses combined (n=63)

The results indicate that the judicial role in many Arab countries is generally perceived as unique in relation to Western judiciaries. But despite the common view that judiciaries in the Arab region have been historically and similarly influenced by the French civil law tradition, the judges surveyed here do not necessarily share this view. One Egyptian judge commented that there was a general difference in judicial role in Arab systems compared with civil and common law systems.636 Another Egyptian judge saw his role as a hybrid

636 Comment from Judge: 2081484(Arab Judges Survey)
of civil and common law judges. He explained that while the Egyptian legal system tends to operate within the framework of a civil law tradition, “there are also similarities to a common law system”. One Lebanese judge felt that “there are multiple similarities, especially with countries applying written laws or what we call the romano-germanique legal system”. Other judges commented that that the differences related to the manner and mode of the judicial function in their country vis-à-vis Western judges. For instance, one Tunisian judge expressed the view that the workload in Tunisia was more burdensome than Western judges, and that affected the judicial role:

“In view of how the judge works in terms of quantity and quality, the Tunisian judge works with large number of cases beyond the normal size of the Western judge. Often the weekly case-load exceeds a hundred. Due to this, work has become difficult for us in Tunisia”.

Third approach: the importance of precedent and the public

The Arab Judges Survey also included a series of questions that were designed to compare Arab judges’ role perceptions with previous findings on judicial role conceptions amongst three groups of Western judges. This included Becker’s 1966 study of common law state judges in Hawaii and Flango’s 1975 study of civil law judges in Austria and Switzerland. To carry out this direct comparison, the Arab Judges Survey asked judges to respond

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637 Comment from Judge: 2078058 (Arab Judges Survey)
638 Comment from Judge: 2077935 (Arab Judges Survey)
639 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey), translated from comment in Arabic.
640 The now decades-old questions were chosen in order to provide for continuity in terms of empirical investigation into the role of judges. Since this was a first attempt at studying the role perceptions of judges in the Arab Middle East, it was considered suitable to use questions of studies that had the same explorative purpose and follow the same pattern of earlier studies. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are substantial limitations particularly when seeking to compare the results with international studies. However, the questions have been, and continue to be used by judicial behaviourists to measure the several aspects of potential role orientations and to understand judicial decision-making. The questions are moreover reflective of recent studies into the role of judges, i.e. the questions are devised and designed to investigate judges’ expectations about the purposes or objectives they should adopt and how they perceive decision-making to operate on the court. See Carman RV, ‘The Development of the Judicial Role Orientation’ in Raymond V Carman, Making Good Law or Good Policy? (Springer International Publishing 2017); Lee Epstein, Stefanie A. Lindquist ‘The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behaviour’, Oxford Handbooks of American Politics (Oxford University Press 2017)
to 14 statements drawn from Becker’s and Flango’s studies. The 14 statements are split into two categories: (1) those that explore judges’ “precedent orientation” and how this influences their judicial decision-making (6 statements), and (2) those that explore the “public dimension” of judging and reflect judges’ views of the appropriate role of judges in society (8 statements).

Similar to Flango’s approach, the answer options provided to judges in the Arab Judges Survey were categorised into “narrow” and “broad”. For the narrowly-worded options, judges were asked to say how influential a factor was on a four-point Likert-scale (“Very influential”, “Influential”, “Somewhat influential”, and “Not at all influential”). For the broadly worded options, judges were asked to say whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a five-point Likert-scale (“Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Disagree”, “Strongly disagree”).

The survey questions and answer options that explore Arab judges’ “precedent orientation” are presented in Table 1 below. Although the questions were translated for the Arab Judges Survey, the questions reflect the questions used in Flango’s study.

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Table 17. Questions examining precedent orientation (Arab Judges Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precedent orientation questions and answer options</th>
<th>Narrowly worded</th>
<th>Broadly worded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How influential are these to you as a judge?</strong></td>
<td><strong>To what extent do you agree with the following?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Decisions closest in facts to the present case”</td>
<td>“Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Past decisions of the supreme court”</td>
<td>“It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding cases”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Precedent, when clear and directly relevant”</td>
<td>“Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey questions and answer options that explore Arab judges' “public orientation” are presented in Table 18 below.642

Table 18. Questions examining judges' public orientation (Arab Judges Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public orientation questions and answer options</th>
<th>Narrowly worded</th>
<th>Broadly worded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How influential are these to you as a judge?</strong></td>
<td><strong>To what extent do you agree with the following?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“What the public expects”</td>
<td>“Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The social consequences of the decision”</td>
<td>“Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance conflicting interests in society”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Requirements of law and order”</td>
<td>“It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Judges' view of justice in the case”</td>
<td>“It is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of the law be adhered to”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

642 The 6 statements were also deliberately framed as “narrow” and “broad”. For the narrowly worded statements, judges were asked to respond on a four point Likert-scale ranging from “Very influential” to “Not at all influential”. For the broadly worded statements, a five point Likert-scale was used ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.
In total, 48 Arab judges responded to all precedent orientation and public orientation questions the survey: 15 from Egypt, 14 from Saudi Arabia, 11 from Lebanon, 4 from Tunisia, 2 from Jordan, and 2 each from Syria and Palestine.

**Judicial attitudes to precedent and judicial decision-making**

Table 19 below shows Arab judges’ responses to the narrowly-worded statements on the importance of precedent in their judicial decision-making. It shows results for all Arab judges combined.

**Table 19 Arab judges’ assessment of the influence of precedent on their judicial decision-making (n=48)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How influential are the following factors to a judge in deciding a case?</th>
<th>Judges saying very influential or influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Precedent, when clear and directly relevant”</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Past decisions of the supreme court”</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Decisions closest in facts to the present case”</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the narrowly-worded statements on precedent produced general agreement among the Arab judges that these were influential in their decision-making. At least three-quarters of all the 48 Arab judges combined said that the three different aspects of precedent were influential. The most explicit reference to precedent (“Precedent, when clear and directly relevant”) had the highest proportion of all Arab judges combined saying it was influential (83.3%).

Looking further at Arab judges’ view of the importance of precedent, Table 20 shows the number and percentage of Arab judges who agreed with the broadly-worded precedent-oriented statements on how judges approach judicial decision-making. The results are for those Arab judges who said they strongly agreed or agreed with each statement.
Table 20. Proportion of Arab judges that agree with precedent oriented statements (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Level of agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding cases”</td>
<td>34 70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law”</td>
<td>13 27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing”</td>
<td>4 8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison to the narrowly-worded statements on precedent, there were much lower levels of support for these broadly-worded statements about judicial decision-making. Looking at the responses for all Arab judges combined, only one statement was supported by a majority of the judges: 71% agreed that “It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding cases”. There were much lower levels of agreement amongst all the Arab judges for the statement “Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law” (27%). The lowest agreement among judges was for the statement “Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing”.

Judicial attitudes to the role of the public & society in decision-making

Table 21 below shows how the Arab judges who took the survey responded to the narrowly-worded statements about what factors are influential in judicial decision-making, including public and personal views in cases as well as the social consequences of decisions. The results are presented as the proportion of Arab judges combined who said each factor was influential in their judicial decision-making.
Table 21. Arab judges’ agreement with narrowly worded statements on social and personal factors in decision-making (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of influence</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Requirements of law and order”</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Judge’s view of justice in the case”</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The social consequences of decision”</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“What the public expects”</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly all judges regardless of jurisdiction felt that “the requirements of law and order” were influential in their decision-making. There were also high levels of support for the idea that “the judge’s view of justice in the case” was influential (77%). By contrast, few judges considered public expectations as influential (12.5%). Just over half of the 48 respondents said that the social consequences of a decision were influential.

In comparison to the narrowly-worded statements on public and social factors in decision-making, there were more consistent levels of agreement amongst Arab judges across jurisdictions on the more broadly-worded statements about public and social factors in judicial decision-making. Table 22 below shows the proportion of Arab judges combined who said they either strongly agreed or agreed with the statements.
A majority of judges in all Arab countries that took part in the survey agreed with each of the 4 statements, but certain statements had more consistent levels of agreement across the jurisdictions than others. Amongst all Arab judges combined, the highest level of agreement (83%) was for the statement “It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community”. More than two-thirds of all 48 judges agreed that it is important to be in contact with “changing social mores”. The next highest levels of support amongst Arab judges was for the statements “it is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of the law be adhered to”. Most judges across the jurisdictions (81%) agreed with this view. There was greater variability between Arab jurisdictions on the two remaining statements: “Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance conflicting interests in society” (67%) and “Judges...
should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions” (62.5%).

Judicial role conceptions: Arab and Western judges compared

Earlier findings from role perception studies of American and European judges show that judicial roles are more complex than the traditional distinction between judges in civil law traditions and common law traditions suggests. Researchers found that judges in both types of legal systems tend to perceive themselves as “executor judges”, a role commonly associated with the European civil law tradition. For instance, even though Austria and Switzerland shared a civil law tradition in contrast to the American common law tradition, the differences between these European and American judges were less marked than was anticipated. In particular, Austrian and Swiss judges tended to respond in patterns very similar to American judges:

“[…] nearly all of the surveys of judicial role completed to date, except those with very small sample sizes, report that nearly half of the judges interviewed are classified as Law Appliers. This would seem to indicate that the proportion of judges taking this role is not peculiar to the civil law countries of Austria or Switzerland [emphasis added].”

This thesis set out to examine this idea of shared judicial role conceptions further. This section compares the results of the Arab Judges Survey on precedent orientation and public orientation with findings from the study by Becker of Hawaiian judges and Flango’s findings for Austrian and Swiss judges.

643 Scheb writes that the “executor” role draws on an ideal Weberian model within the civil law framework: “Under code law and the administration of justice within the civil law tradition, judges are expected to espouse a well-defined role conception. Like the ideal judge in the Weberian model, the civil law judge is expected to function as a bureaucrat - decisions are to be based strictly on legal principles without the taint of personal predilection or bias.” John M Scheb M John, (1982), Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: A Q-Technique Study of The Florida State District Courts (PhD, University of Florida) p.9


645 Glick and Vines, for instance, found that a little more than half of the judges they surveyed were “executors”. Similar findings were reported by Renstrom, Schubert, and Becker. See Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science 19(2), p.286
judges. The nature of Austrian, Swiss and American judicial roles was expected to be different from judicial roles in the Arab region, primarily because of the traditional distinction between common law and civil law and because Arab legal systems have historically been influenced more by the civil law tradition (see Chapter 3). Comparing the findings from the Arab Judges Survey on precedent and public dimensions with the studies by Flango and Becker, some clear differences do emerge between Arab judges and American and European judges but there are equally as many similarities.

Comparing the relative importance of decision factors

Generally, most Arab judges tended to regard precedent as important and influential, which is similar to the findings of earlier studies with European and American judges (Table 23 below). Similar to Austrian (72.4%), Swiss (93.6%) and Hawaiian judges (92.0%), most Arab judges (83.3%) said that precedent when clear and relevant was an important factor in their judicial decision-making.

For the two other precedent-related factors, the views of Arab judges correspond to the views of non-Arab judges. Arab judges, like Austrian and Swiss judges, also said that “Superior court decisions” were important to judicial decision-making, although Swiss judges were most likely to consider this factor important (97.9%), followed by Austria judges (85.1%) and Arab judges (79.1%).646 A majority of Arab, Swiss and Austrian judges also said that “Decisions made in analogous cases” were more important and influential to their decision-making. But Arab judges were slightly more likely to say this (75.0%) than Swiss judges (70.3%) and both sets of judges were more likely to say this than Austrian judges (54.3%).

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646 “Superior court decisions” was not included in the questionnaire in Becker’s study on Hawaiian judges.
Table 23. Comparison of judges’ perceptions of the most important factors influencing judicial decisions (Arab region, Switzerland, Austria and Hawaii)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decisional guide</th>
<th>All Arab judges combined</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Hawaii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant and clear precedent</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges’ perception of justice in the case</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public needs (requirements of law and order)</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expectations and demands</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social consequences of decision</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior court decisions</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions in analogous cases</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=48 n=49 n=48 n=25

Beyond the precedent factors, a majority of all four groups of judges said a judge’s perception of justice in a case was an important factor influencing judicial decision-making. But clear differences emerged between Arab judges and the three other groups of judges about the importance of “Public needs (requirements of law and order)” when making decisions. Most Arab judges (97.9%) viewed public needs as important but only a minority of Austrian, Hawaiian and Swiss judges (36.1%, 29.1% and 12.5% respectively) felt this was an important factor in judicial decisions.

Further contrasts are found in relation to these different judges’ attitudes to judicial roles. The mean score for Swiss, Austrian and Arab judges in relation

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647 Flango et al used a 5 point Likert scale ranging from “extremely important” to “irrelevant”. The table includes the authors’ findings on “extremely important” (=5), “very important” (=4) and “important” (=3). Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science 19(2).

648 Ibid.

649 Three judges are included in this table that were not included in the article from which this data has been extracted because they did not answer a simulated judicial case. (Theodore Becker, "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations," American Political Science Review LX [September 1966], 677-80.)
to seven statements are presented in Table 24 below.\textsuperscript{650} Arab judges tended to agree “It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community” (4.12) more than Swiss and Austrian judges (3.31 and 3.31 respectively). Arab judges were also more likely to agree that “Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions” (3.39) compared to their Austrian and Swiss counterparts (2.97 and 2.97 respectively). The starkest difference relates to the statement that “judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing” (statement number 7). Arab judges were far less likely to agree with this than their European counterparts. The mean score for Arab judges (1.87) was significantly lower than the Swiss and Austrian judges (3.66 and 3.62 respectively).

\textsuperscript{650} Mean scores were used here in order to allow for direct comparison of results across the three separate studies.
Table 24. Comparison of judges’ responses to judicial role statements (Arab Judges Survey, Switzerland and Austria)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Arab Judges Survey</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 “It is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of the law be adhered to”</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 “It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community”</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 “It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding cases”</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 “Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance conflicting interests in society”</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 “Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions ”</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 “Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law”</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 “Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing”</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n=48) (n=48) (n=48)
In terms of comparability, the expectation was that Arab judges’ responses would be substantially different from common law and civil law judges, particularly in relation to precedent orientation.\(^{651}\)

Areas where significant differences emerge between Arab and non-Arab judges are in factors that relate to the appropriate role of judges in society. The Arab judges surveyed here are more cognisant of social considerations in their decision-making than Western judges. Arab judges are also more likely than their Western counterparts to feel that judges should keep in constant contact with changing social mores. They are also more likely to consider that the requirements of the social order are significant to their decision-making than their Swiss, Austrian and Hawaiian counterparts. Finally, while Arab judges tended to disagree with the description of judges as “merely instruments of the law”, this was a description that Swiss and Austrian judges tended to agree with.

**Arab judges’ orientations to precedent and the public**

In order to further explore these findings, the following section analyses how each Arab judge responded to all statements in the public dimension (8 statements) and the precedent dimension (6 statements).\(^{652}\) Because the statements in this area seek to measure a particular orientation, it was assumed that the more statements a judge responded positively to the higher the judge’s orientation would be to that specific type of role.

For the 6 precedent statements, it was assumed that if an individual judge responded positively (“Agree” and/or “Influential”) to 4-6 statements, they would have a **high precedent orientation**. By contrast, if the judge only

\(^{651}\) It was hypothesised that precedent orientation, particularly among Saudi judges, would score relatively low because *stare decisis* is not as prevalent in the country (as discussed earlier in Chapter 5). However, most Saudi judges surveyed in this study appear to attach significant importance to precedent and it was also considered important by most Egyptian and Lebanese judges. Statements that specifically defined precedent such as decisions in “analogous cases”, “superior court decisions” and “precedent (where clear and directly relevant)” generally invoked agreement among the 14 Saudi judges surveyed.

\(^{652}\) A similar type of analysis was used by Flango et al to measure judges’ orientations towards precedent and public by using the 14 statements.
responded positively ("Agree" and/or "Influential") to 0-2 statements, the precedent role orientation would be low. Agreement with 3 of the 6 statements was considered to only indicate a moderate orientation. Table 25 below presents the number of statements that the 48 judges agreed with and/or found to be influential in relation to precedent.\(^653\)

**Table 25. Categorisation of Arab judges' precedent orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of statements that were agreed with and/or found to be influential</th>
<th>Number of judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High orientation toward precedent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 6 statements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 statements</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 statements</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate – neither higher nor lower</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 statements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low orientation towards precedent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 statements</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 statement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No statements</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most (30 of 48) Arab judges appear to have a high orientation towards precedent. Three judges agreed with or found all 6 statements to be influential. This was followed by 8 judges who responded positively to 5 statements and 19 judges agreed with and/or responded to at least 4 out of 6 statements as influential. Five judges agreed with or found 3 statements as influential. By contrast, only a minority (13) of Arab judges appear to have a low orientation towards precedent. Only 3 judges agreed with or considered one statement as influential, and 10 judges agreed with and/or found at least 2 statements to be influential.

A similar analysis was undertaken in relation to the 8 statements that form the public role orientation. It was hypothesised that if judges responded positively to 5-8 statements, their public role orientation would be high. By contrast, if

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\(^653\) These results combine "very influential" and "influential" as well as "strongly agree" and "agree."
judges only agreed/found influential with 0-3 statements, their orientation to public would be **low**. Judges who responded positively to 4 statements were assumed to have a **moderate orientation** towards the public. Table 26 below, presents the total number of public statements the 48 judges agreed with and/or found to be influential.

**Table 26. Categorisation of Arab judges’ public role orientation (n=48)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of statements that were agreed with and/or found to be influential</th>
<th>Number of judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All 8 statements</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 statements</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 statements</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 statements</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderate- neither high nor low</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 statements</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low orientation towards public</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 statements</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 statements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 statement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No statements</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=48

Based on the data from the survey, it appears that most Arab judges appear to have a **high orientation towards the public** (33 of 48 judges). Four judges agreed with or found all 8 statements to be influential. This was followed by 11 judges who responded positively to at least 7 statements. By contrast, only a minority of Arab judges (15) appear to have a low public role orientation. In this group, most judges responded positively to 3 statements. Only one judge agreed with or considered one statement to be influential. Finally, 6 judges can be considered as having a moderate public role orientation.

Based on this analysis, those judges that participated in the survey can be placed somewhere along two continua of precedent role orientation and public role orientation (Figures 22 and 23).
It appears that among those who participated most Arab judges are found somewhere in the middle of the precedent role orientation spectrum. Furthermore, three judges have a high orientation towards precedent and three judges have a low orientation towards precedent, and most judges are found somewhere in the middle of the spectrum which renders them neither “high precedent-regarding” nor “low precedent-regarding.”

In relation to the 8 public-oriented statements, most judges supported to statements suggesting that public aspects of decision-making were important to Arab judges; most (33) Arab judges can be placed somewhere towards the higher end of public-regarding spectrum and 8 judges appear to clearly have a very high orientation towards the public. By contrast, only 1 judge can be said to have a very low public orientation. In both the precedent orientation and public orientation scale, judges’ overall responses present a nuanced picture, more so in relation to the precedent orientation scale. How this translates into the four judicial role perceptions of “Executor”, “Delegate”, “Guardian” and “Political” is further discussed in Chapter 10.

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654 Where 15 judges agreed with (or found influential) at least 2-3 statements, and 27 judges agreed with 4-5 statements.
Summary

This chapter explored how Arab judges perceive their role in relation to the law and public policy, and the extent to which these Arab judges appear to adopt positions of judicial activism or judicial restraint through three elements referred to as the “purposive role sector”. The findings presented in this chapter relate to how Arab judges characterised their roles from a comparative perspective. Based on their Survey responses, many Arab judges tended to agree that their roles were less similar to the West, including judicial roles in neighbouring jurisdictions. Second, based on the analysis made, those judges that participated in the survey can be placed somewhere along two continua of precedent role orientation and public role orientation. While the findings reflect some variability in judicial role conceptions amongst judges in each Arab jurisdiction that took part in the survey, perhaps most notably the high proportion of judges that also identified themselves with the non-generic “Guardian role”.

The chapter also compared the findings from the Arab Judges Survey with similar earlier studies of judicial role perceptions in common and civil law jurisdictions. A clear difference emerge in relation to public consideration. For instance, the Arab judges surveyed here were more likely to consider society in their decision-making compared to Western judges. The findings made in this chapter provides a distinct and novel insight into Arab judicial roles, which are further discussed in Chapter 10. The next chapter operates within the same framework of role theory and explores how Arab judges see their roles in relation to two sets of actors: their judicial colleagues and non-judicial actors that are influential in the political system.
Chapter 9. Arab judges’ relationships with judicial peers and non-judicial actors

The previous chapter sought to explore Arab judicial role perceptions on the basis of how they view precedent and more public, personal and societal factors in their decision-making. While this analysis provided some new insights about Arab judges and their role conceptions, to understand the judicial role in the Arab region it is also necessary to examine the normative expectations that exist between judges and other key actors. One set of expectations involves a judge’s relationship with his/her judicial colleagues. Another set relates to relationships with those outside the judiciary, for instance legislators and government officials. This can have an important effect on judges’ thinking about their own role, particularly where there is a high level of judicial deference to law-making bodies.\(^{655}\)

This chapter begins by examining the normative expectations Arab judges have of each other. It then examines Arab judges’ perceptions of the relationship between themselves and non-judges important to the political process. The findings are based on the Arab Judges Survey. Two approaches were used in the survey. The first approach was to explore what Arab judges feel are important qualities for judges to have and those they think their judicial colleagues feel are important. The second approach was to explore Arab judges’ views on how much influence non-judges (legal community, public, media and government) do or should have in the judicial decision-making process. For non-judicial actors, this study confines itself to actors that are most important for judges in terms of the political system.

Existing norms of judicial behaviour

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are existing norms of judicial behavior for Arab judges that are based on formal international, regional and national documents. These reflect a myth in which judges are expected to be totally

objective arbiters who always act impartially towards everyone. However, as Glick says, this “myth does not reflect reality”. Norms about the ideal conduct of judges often simplify the judicial role to the mechanical application of the law. But as Herndon explains, judicial decision-making will depend upon the kinds of interactions taking place between the judiciary and other parts of the political system. Therefore an examination of the links between judges and other elements of the political system is necessary.

One way of doing this is to consider the judiciary within a broader structural-functional framework. This was done in Chapter 5, where the organisation of the judicial system and the interrelationship between courts in four Arab states were considered in order to explore judges’ scope for political involvement. An additional way of looking at this is through role theory, exploring judges’ own subjective understanding of links within the judicial community and links in the wider political system. This chapter presents the findings of the Arab Judges Survey, which show how Arab judges perceive their roles in relation to two categories of actors under the framework of role theory: judicial colleagues and non-judicial actors that are politically important.

**Inter-judicial relationships**

The Arab Judges Survey attempted to investigate what judicial norms were important to the judges surveyed. First, the survey explored the relative importance Arab judges attached to other judges. Judges were asked to indicate how important their immediate judicial colleagues and senior figures in the judiciary were to them in their job. A 4-point Likert scale was used (“Extremely important”, “Important”, “Somewhat important” and “Not important at all”). Figure 24 below presents the findings from the 48 Arab judges that answered both of these questions.

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Almost all judges considered their immediate judicial colleagues important (19) or somewhat important (16) to them in doing their job. Seven judges considered judicial colleagues as very important. More Arab judges felt their senior judicial colleagues were important (12) or somewhat important (19) to them in their work than judges who felt they were not important (14). Overall, Arab judges attached more importance to their immediate judicial colleagues than to senior figures in the judiciary.

**Qualities of a good judge**

The survey next examined the rules of consensus which govern Arab judges’ behavior towards each other by examining two key dimensions:

- Arab judges’ views of what constitutes proper behaviour on their part toward other judges who occupy the same judicial position;
- Arab judges’ views of their colleagues’ expectations about the proper judicial role.

The survey questions focused on **judicial qualities** on the assumption that the qualities judges considered most important would in turn indicate what norms form part of the group. Two survey questions drew on the principles found in
the Sharjah Convention on judicial ethics, and the survey presented judges with the following ten categories of “ideal judicial qualities”:

- Personal integrity
- Knowledge of the law
- Strong moral principles
- Dealing impartially with parties to cases
- Intellectual honesty
- Personal conduct in public
- Objectivity in decision-making
- Efficient work habits
- Decision-writing abilities
- Awareness of broader social and political issues

First, judges were asked: “To what extent do you feel the following qualities are important for a judge to have to do their job well?”. Here judges were asked to indicate the level importance for each of the 10 qualities on a four point Likert-scale (“Extremely important”, “Important”, “Somewhat important”, “Not important at all”).

Judges were then asked in relation to these 10 qualities: “To what extent do you feel the following qualities are valued by the judges you work with?”. A four point Likert-scale was used here to indicate value levels (“Valued highly”, “Valued”, “Valued a little”, “Not valued at all”).

**Arab judges’ views of the qualities needed to do their job well**

Table 27 presents the results of the survey for the question that asked Arab judges which of the 10 stated qualities were important for a judge to have to do their job well. Answers of “Extremely important” and “Important” are combined in the Table.
The qualities that were considered by all 52 judges as important were “dealing impartially with parties to cases” and “personal integrity”. Nearly all judges also indicated that “strong moral principles” and “knowledge of the law” were important. Although more than half of the respondents considered “awareness of broader social and political issues” and “personal conduct in public” as important, overall these qualities were ranked lower by Arab judges as qualities important to do their job well.

To varying degrees, a majority of judges said that all 10 qualities were important for a judge to have. As all 10 qualities are recognised in the Sharjah Convention as important judicial qualities, it is perhaps not surprising that all the qualities were considered more or less important to all the Arab judges who took part in the survey. As such, the findings merely corroborate the prevailing idea of the qualities an “ideal judge” should possess. It was hypothesised that since all qualities listed were more or less important for any judge, there would be little variation in terms of importance. However, the other key objective in asking this question of Arab judges was to determine whether Arab judges also thought their judicial colleagues would value these qualities and to the same extent.
Arab judges’ perceptions of how their colleagues view judicial qualities

Arab judges’ views on which qualities were valued by their judicial colleagues and to what extent are presented in Table 28 below.

**Table 28.** Judges’ view of qualities valued by their colleagues (n=52)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualities valued by Judicial peers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the law</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing impartially with parties to cases</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal integrity</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong moral principles</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity in decision-making</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal conduct in public</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual honesty</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-writing abilities</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of broader social and political issues</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient work habits</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there was more variety among the 52 respondents in relation to this question, the qualities most Arab judges thought were valued by their judicial colleagues were “knowledge of the law”, “dealing impartially with parties to cases”, “personal integrity” and “strong moral principles”. In addition to these four qualities, most Arab judges also thought their colleagues valued “objectivity in decision-making”.

Viewing the findings for the two questions side-by-side provides for some useful comparisons between what qualities judges feel are important for themselves and which ones they think their colleagues feel are important (see Figure 25 below).
Figure 25 Comparison of Arab judges’ view of qualities important for judges to have and response of qualities valued by judicial colleagues (n=52)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Important qualities for judges to have to do their job well</th>
<th>Qualities valued by judicial colleagues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dealing impartially with parties to cases</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal integrity</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong moral principles</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the law</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity in decision-making</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-writing abilities</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual honesty</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient work habits</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal conduct in public</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of broader social and political issues</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One obvious difference in the results viewed in this way is that the Arab judges in the survey had lower expectations of their judicial colleagues: they consistently ranked each judicial quality higher in value than the value they felt their colleagues would place on those same qualities. The greatest difference between what judges themselves felt were important qualities and what they thought their judicial colleagues valued were: “Efficient work habits” (83% of judges valued this v 52% of judges thinking their colleagues valued it), “Decision-writing abilities” (90% v 63%), “Strong moral principles” (98% v 77%), “Intellectual honesty” (85% v 77%) and “Awareness of broader social and political issues” (75% v 60%).

**Level of consensus amongst Arab judges on norms of behaviour**

Because judges often work in groups there should be some minimal level of “working consensus”. And there must be some acceptance of norms that regulates individual judges’ treatment to one another. These norms are also important because they may serve as a point of reference from which judges can evaluate events. Based on these findings, several qualities appear to be considered by Arab judges as the most important to do a good job as a judge and most likely to be valued by their judicial colleagues.

The following could be seen as among the more **highly valued and clearly accepted norms** of behaviour for Arab judges:

- **Knowledge of the law**: 98% of judges said it was important and 90% said it was valued by colleagues.
- **Dealing impartially with parties to cases**: 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues.
- **Personal integrity**: 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues.

Other qualities appear to be **generally accepted norms** of behaviour amongst Arab judges, but with some variability between how much judges value them.

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as important to do their job and the extent to which they think their judicial colleagues value them:

- Objectivity in decision-making
- Decision-writing abilities
- Intellectual honesty
- Personal conduct in public

A few qualities are perhaps less widely accepted as both important by judges and valued by judicial colleagues in comparison to the other qualities examined in the survey:

- Efficient work habits
- Awareness of broader social and political issues

**Judicial norms of cooperative working**

As revealed in Chapter 5, many if not most Arab judges sit on multi-member panels in deciding cases. The Arab Judges Survey, therefore, also explored judges’ views of the qualities judges need to work well with other judges. In one question in the survey, judges were asked to rank 8 qualities specific to working with other judges in terms of their importance. The question was phrased: *Which of the following are important qualities for a judge to have when working with other judges* (where “1” is the most important quality and “8” is the least important quality). The 8 qualities were:

- Hold firm views
- Show leadership amongst judges
- Respect the views of others even if you disagree
- Acknowledge the good work of others
- Be receptive to change and persuasion
- Show independence of mind
- Exercise good manners in dealing with others
- Keep arguments moderate
As Glick writes, the qualifications for an ideal judge include “practically an unlimited variety of attributes”. Following discussions with judges in the region during the survey design, the above qualities were considered the most relevant. An added justification is that they are based on the principles found in the Sharjah Convention. Figure 26 below shows how Arab judges ranked the importance of these 8 qualities of cooperative judicial working; the figure presents the results in terms of how often each of the 8 qualities was ranked in the top three of importance by Arab judges.

Figure 26 Arab judges’ ranking of most important qualities for working in a group (n=52)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualities</th>
<th>Rank 1</th>
<th>Rank 2</th>
<th>Rank 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect the views of others even if you disagree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show independence of mind</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise good manners in dealing with others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be receptive to change and persuasion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep arguments moderate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge the good work of others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold firm views</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show leadership amongst judges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judges’ ranking of qualities provides further insight into the informal norms that operate for judges in a collegial setting. For the 52 judges who participated in this question, two qualities emerged as clearly most important to judges in terms of cooperative working and appear to be clearly accepted norms of behaviour were:

- “Respect the views of others” (which had the highest ranking)

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660 “Sharjah Convention 2007”
“Show independence of mind”

Other qualities that showed more moderate consensus were:
- “Exercise good manners in dealing with others”
- “Be receptive to change and persuasion”
- “Keep arguments moderate”
- “Acknowledge the good work of others”

The qualities that appeared to have the lowest level of consensus amongst the Arab judges and were ranked least often in the top three:
- “Hold firm views”
- “Showing leadership amongst judges”

This provides further insight into the informal norms that may operate amongst Arab judges, particularly for judges that work in collegial courts in the Arab region. The findings also illustrate what type of norms individual judges must conform to in order to become part of the group.

External relationships

The second element of judicial role conceptions and norms of behavior explored in the Arab Judges Survey was judges’ relationships with important actors outside the judiciary. This group of “non-judges” includes the legal community, court staff, parties in cases, the public, media, government and religious authorities. The survey explored the following:

- How much importance Arab judges say they place on non-judges when performing their judicial role
- How influential the public and the government are in judicial decisions
- Arab judges’ perception of their role in religious affairs
- How Arab judges think that they are perceived by the public
- What Arab judges believe the public expects of the judiciary
Figure 27 below shows the extent to which the Arab judges say they value specific non-judicial groups in the performance of their job as a judge. In total, 44 judges responded to this question.

**Figure 27. Importance Arab judges attach to various groups (n=44)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In your job as a judge, how much importance do you place on the following?</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Of limited importance</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Authorities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior figures in the judiciary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial colleagues</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties in cases that appear before me</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Religious authorities” were the group that most Arab judges (29) said was not important at all to them in doing their job as a judge. Only 6 judges considered religious authorities as “important”. The next group that were considered by more than half of Arab judges as not important at all, were “Government” (27 judges) and “Media” (26 judges). Only 2 considered the government as “extremely important” in their job as judges. Eight judges considered the government of limited importance. For the media, the largest group of judges (14) said it was of limited importance. No judge who participated in the survey considered the media as “extremely important”.
The largest group that was considered by judges as “extremely important” or “important” in doing their job as a judge was “Parties that appear in cases before me” (31 judges). This group was considered by 15 judges as “extremely important”. Judges also tended to consider “Lawyers” (30 judges) and “Prosecutors” (28 judges) as “extremely important” or “important”. This was followed by “Court staff” and “Judicial colleagues” (25 and 24 judges respectively).

There is a clear trend that shows that judges tend to consider non-judicial actors within the broader legal community as more important than those outside the legal community. The two groups with the most equivocal results were “Senior figures in the judiciary” and “the Public”. With regards to senior judicial figures, 12 judges considered it to be important and 12 did not consider them important at all; only 3 judges considered senior judges as “extremely important” and many judges considered senior figures to have a limited importance (17). Arab judges were also divided over the importance of the public to them in their job: while 16 judges considered the public to be extremely important or important, 21 judges considered the public to be of limited importance and 7 judges did not consider the public to be important at all.

The executive

In the survey, judges were asked two questions that explored their relationship with the government directly. Because the survey was anonymous and could not be traced back to any participant, it was hoped that judges would feel able to express their honest views of a difficult topic. As discussed above, when asked how much importance they placed on the government in their job as a judge, more than half answered that it was not important at all (27 judges.) To further explore judges’ perceptions of the role of government in their judicial role, the survey went on to ask Arab judges how influential they felt the recommendations of government officials were for a judge when deciding a case. The results are presented in Figure 28 below.
Overall, two-thirds of the Arab judges in the survey said that the recommendations of officials were of no influence at all when deciding cases. Only 7 judges considered recommendations as very influential or influential; 11 judges indicated that they considered official recommendations as “somewhat influential”.

For the purposes of this chapter, the aim was to explore whether or not the executive had an influence on judges primarily through the prism of judges’ normative expectations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the executive has been an actor that has traditionally been considered to exercise influence on the role and work of judges in several Arab states. Literature on judges and courts in the Arab Middle East tends to emphasise the role of executive hegemony on the work of judges. See for example Moustafa’s discussion of the Egyptian judiciary in Ginsburg T and Moustafa T, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2008). See also the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), “The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of Arab Spring” (2012).
influence to the executive, they were in the minority. Most judges in the survey indicated that the executive had little impact on their job as judges. The exception was one Syrian judge who agreed that he did serve the community “but the intrusion of the executive branch and the intelligence services” made his work as a judge burdensome and pressured. Drawing on judges’ own answers, it appears that either judges do not want to admit that the executive has influence on judicial decision-making or they may honestly believe that officials do not (whether in fact they do or not).

**Arab judges and religious authorities**

As Figure 27 above illustrates, the group that was considered by Arab judges as the least important in doing their job was “Religious authorities”. Two-thirds of Arab judges in the survey indicated that religious authorities were not important at all. Considering the relevance of religion in the region and the existence of religious based courts in a number of Arab countries, additional questions were included in the Arab Judges Survey about judicial decision-making and religion. Judges were asked the degree to which they agreed or disagreed that: (1) *state judges should be able to interpret religious laws*; and (2) *state judges should be able to develop religious laws*. The results are presented in Figure 30 below (answers of “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” are combined and answers of “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree” are combined).
Fifty-five judges answered these two questions and overall, most judges agreed that state judges should be able to interpret religious laws. Responses were more varied in relation to whether state judges should be able to develop religious laws. While the largest group (25 of 55 judges) agreed with the statement, a large number (18) were not certain and 12 disagreed.

Judges relationship to the public

How judges think they are perceived by the public is an important element in understanding the judicial role. To explore this specific issue further, judges were asked to indicate how much they agreed with a series of statements about the judiciary and the public (see Table 29). The statements relate to Arab judges’ overall perceptions of how the public perceive the judiciary and also what public/societal role judges see for themselves. Judges could respond to each statement on a 5-point Likert scale (from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”).

Figure 29. Arab judges’ view of the role of state judges and religious laws (n=55)
Table 29. Questions about the Public (Arab Judges Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a judge, I feel I provide an important service to society.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a difference between what I think the job of a judge is and the way the public in my country see it.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 31 below shows the extent to which Arab judges agreed that (1) as a judge, they provide an important service to society and (2) there was a difference in how they as judges perceived the role of a judge and how the public perceives it in their respective countries. (In Figure 31 answers of “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” are combined and answers of “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree” are combined).

Figure 30. Judicial vs public perceptions of the judiciary (n=65)

Arab judges in the survey, regardless of country, clearly feel they provide an important service to society. With the exception of one, all judges agreed with this statement. But Arab judges' views were more varied when it came to
assessing whether the public in their country viewed the job of a judge in the same way as judges did. Three-quarters of judges in the survey (49 of 65) said they felt there was a difference between how they as judges perceived the job of a judge and how the public saw it. One senior judge from Tunisia commented that while the judge adjudicates a dispute within the framework of restrictive procedural laws, the litigant seeks justice and nothing else. Another Tunisian judge commented that the job of a judge is inconsistent with the public’s view: “There is always scepticism about the judge's job and people dislike the rulings”.

To examine this issue further, the survey asked Arab judges to respond to four more specific statements about how the public in their country views the judiciary. Figure 32 below presents the results for all 55 judges combined (with “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” combined as “Agree” and “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree” combined as “Disagree”).

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662 Comment from Judge 1938201 (Arab Judges Survey)
663 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey)
Judges tended to generally agree with statements that related to positive traits of the judiciary, with just over half of the judges in the survey agreeing that the judiciary was respected by the public in their country (58% and 53% respectively). For the statements that depicted the judiciary in a negative light, responses were more varied. There was little consensus amongst the 55 judges on the issue of whether the judiciary in their country was thought to be ineffective compared to other branches of government. Roughly 45.5% of respondents (25 judges) disagreed and 36% (20 judges) agreed with the statement. The statement that most Arab judges in the survey agreed with was that the public in their countries thought the judiciary needed to change (67%). One Saudi judge wrote that the judiciary “needs more support”\textsuperscript{664}. One senior Lebanese judge said that: “I think that people are not content with the work of the judiciary. The judiciary's work is not ideal. But unfortunately the other branches of the government are even worse”\textsuperscript{665}. And a Tunisian judge

\textsuperscript{664} Comment from Judge 2013392 (Arab Judges Survey)

\textsuperscript{665} Comment from Judge 1944358 (Arab Judges Survey)
commented that while Tunisia is currently undergoing a democratic transition, the importance of the judiciary as an independent authority has not yet been emphasised to the public.

**Summary**

Apart from the institutional rules and structures that aim to regulate the actions of judges, there are “unofficial norms” that have an impact on judges’ role conception. Judges are a part of the society in which they work, and they are not devoid of an awareness of how they are perceived by members of that society. Based on the survey findings, Arab judges appear to have an awareness of relationships with judicial and non-judicial external actors.

In terms of their judicial colleagues, the survey findings show that Arab judges (at least those in the survey) felt that “knowledge of the law”, “dealing impartially with parties to cases” and “personal integrity” were among the most highly valued and clearly accepted norms of behaviour amongst Arab judges. In addition, the findings strongly indicate that “respect the views of others” and “show independence of mind” were among the accepted norms of behaviour among judicial colleagues. Arab judges tend to consider their immediate judicial colleagues and non-judicial actors within the broader legal community (lawyers, parties to cases, court staff and prosecutors) as more important to their work as judges than those outside, particularly the executive branch, media and religious authorities. Despite the fact that Arab judges did not see religious authorities as important to their work, many did feel that as judges they should be able to interpret and develop religious laws.
Chapter 10. Discussion

The main purpose of this research has been to begin to fill a knowledge gap about the role of judges in the Arab Middle East. This research combined three levels of investigation in order to understand the role and political significance of judges in the Arab Middle East: the social, the cultural and the personal. To do so, an interdisciplinary approach was used drawing on methods from law, political science, sociology, social psychology and anthropology.

Arab judiciaries as institutions

Judges and judicial institutions in Arab states are a product of long and slow growth over time, creating a “maze of rules, procedures, privileges, duties, etiquettes, rituals, informal understandings and arrangements”.666 Added complexities arise when the judiciaries are placed in a historical perspective. Several historical micro and macro trends have come to shape the way Arab judges operate today. Chapter 3 sought to situate present judicial roles in the Arab region within a broad historical context. The purpose was to offer a more nuanced insight into the historical development of judicial culture in the Arab region. Placed in this context, judicial practices in the region embody at least four legal traditions, with each tradition creating a unique role for the judge. The historical review also illustrates the limits of classifying the historical periods as a binary interaction between religious and secular notions of law and judicial practice. In particular, exploring judicial and legal roles in the region as a battle between “modernity” and “traditionalism” is an oversimplification.

Against this historical review, the remaining chapters sought to explore present judicial roles in the Arab Middle East through the concept of “judicialisation”, examining the extent to which Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Saudi judges may play a political role. This was done by focusing on the present institutional arrangements in place that regulate the power of courts, the status

of Arab judges within the institution of the judiciary, and the subjective understandings of individual Arab judges that occupy a judicial role.

**Institutional structures of Arab judiciaries**

First, the institutional settings in which judges operate were explored. In each Arab country, formal boundaries are placed on the functions of judges and courts: “what judges prefer to do and what they think they ought to do are not necessarily compatible with what they are encouraged or allowed to do”.\(^{667}\) By mapping and analysing the structural set up of the various courts in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia it was possible to explore whether the structural variations found in individual judicial systems were conducive to the political significance of courts and judges. The four legal systems share similarities, albeit superficial, with European civil law judicial systems, including separate and autonomous judicial pyramids. However, their structural set up illustrates potentially different manifestations of judicialisation compared to each other, and compared to Western countries.

In Egypt, the three superior courts in particular are argued in this thesis to play an important political role. This is a feature that does not exist elsewhere in the Arab region. Similarly, the powers of judicial review granted to the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court are significantly wider than courts in continental civil systems.

In Jordan, the Court of Cassation is equipped with broad jurisdictional powers in accordance with the relevant law discussed in Chapter 5. This also includes jurisdiction over the separate judicial branches. The Court is the only judicial body empowered to assess whether there are grounds to refer a case to the Jordanian Constitutional Court, making it an instrument for judicial politics.

The initial impression was that the Lebanese judicial structure appear to hinder “judicialisation” because of the fragmented character of courts. But the powers granted to the Court of Cassation through the appeals process as well as the its powers to create a judicial council equips the Court with significant political powers. In addition, the ability of both the parliament and the executive to raise constitutional challenges means that constitutional issues are part and parcel of political life and dialogue, which is a defining feature of judicialisation. The possibility that a law may be referred to the Constitutional Council means that more attention is paid to constitutional issues within the political sphere.

In Saudi Arabia, a unique form of judicialisation can be said to exist despite the fact that judges work in courts typified by the classic continental legal structure, and despite the absence of a strict separation of powers. Judges are accorded a political role by virtue of the significance of Saudi culture and religion. The following description by Vogel captures this unique role of Saudi judges:

“[F]or a Saudi qāḍī, a judgment is not conceptualized as merely a legal outcome triggered by proof of certain physical (and psychological) facts. A qāḍī’s judgment is at once legal and religious (in our terminology), so the facts and their characterization must sound not only in a physical and legal but also in an ethical and religious realm. In this larger realm are necessarily dimensions of judicial activity to which our Western senses are not attuned; only after a certain exposure do we begin to discern those dimensions and that the qāḍī and parties are acting within them”.[Emphasis added].

668 Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi Arabia (Harvard University 1993),. p. 324

The institutional career of the Arab judge

Looking only at the official rules of a judicial system is not sufficient to appreciate all of the complexities of the institution. This thesis argues that it is also necessary to consider the internal institutional mechanisms that affect Arab judges, specifically the way judges are selected and trained and how their career and status were determined. All of these factors help to explain the
political significance of judges in the region, and may affect the willingness of judges to intervene in the political process.

The thesis sought to explore the institutional controls of the four Arab jurisdictions through two models of judicial selection and career: the "professional model" and the "bureaucratic model". The two models are commonly used in Western democracies and have been argued to affect the political significance of the judiciary in different ways. The mechanisms of control in relation to judges’ status in the four Arab countries take on different forms and involve actors found within and outside the judiciary. The processes further reveal that such social controls in Arab judiciaries are not strictly confined to either the Western bureaucratic or professional models. Judicial selection, training, career and control in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are perhaps best described as somewhere in the middle of the bureaucratic-profession continuum, depending on the type of control explored.

Several factors appear to affect Arab judges’ political significance in relation to informal rules and practices that govern who becomes a judge and the future prospects of judges. In Egypt, there appears to be a preference for individuals who have social and family ties within the judiciary, which is further exacerbated by the vetting of candidates’ applications by the Ministry of Justice and the National Security Agency. In Saudi Arabia, a prerequisite is a good comprehension of social and cultural issues by virtue of the religious nature of the judicial office. And in Lebanon the need to ensure religious representation appear to act as an informal qualification for judicial office.

Indications of judicialisation were also found in relation to career advancements. Although all four Arab countries officially adhere to principles

669 For a professional judiciary, “influence of the political system is channelled primarily through the appointment process” whereas in a bureaucratic judiciary the “political influence is filtered through the hierarchical structure and procedures for career advancements”. Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.64-66.
of seniority and merit, in practice promotions illustrate the power of different actors internal and external to the judiciary. Hierarchical superiors play an important role for Arab judges’ career advancement, and promotion is closely linked with how they are evaluated by senior judges. Varying degrees of executive interference also appear to exist, especially for senior judicial posts. In Egypt, this is a recent development with a new amendment to the law of the judiciary formalising external political involvement. In Lebanon, religious representation also plays an important part in the advancement of judges, particularly for senior positions. In Saudi Arabia, royal support plays a major part in judges’ career advancement.

**Arab judges’ prior personal experiences**

Although judiciaries carefully select, train and control judges to meet the institutional requirements of judges, the influence exercised by judiciaries is limited in at least one important respect. Judicial roles are occupied by individuals who may bring prior experiences to the job or hold other positions simultaneously. Predispositions developed and acquired through education and prior professional experiences are important factors which could be powerful influences on how judges act in their roles.670

The findings made from Arab judges’ LinkedIn profiles and the Arab Judges Survey showed that Arab judges have a diverse set of background attributes based on education, as well as prior and simultaneous professional experiences. The findings illustrate several predispositions that may be important for the political significance of judges. For instance, out of the LinkedIn sample, a high proportion of Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese judges obtained post-graduate law degrees from abroad, and in many cases these degrees were obtained in jurisdictions significantly different from their own (in Europe and the US). Legal values obtained through these educational experiences prior to joining the bench (and also during the judicial office) may impact the judicial role if the individual judge believes they are important:

“Judges may decide cases because of predispositions developed through their own socialization and they may adhere to certain legal philosophies for the same reason. Legal orientations internalized as a result of law school training may reinforce previous predispositions”.  

The possibility of social variables affecting Arab judicial role perceptions and practices is further illustrated by the findings on prior professional experiences of Arab judges. The judges surveyed and profiled in this study illustrate a variety of prior professional experiences, such as prosecution, private law practice, academia and in some cases governmental positions. And because lateral recruitment of legal practitioners into the judiciary exists in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, this can foster greater connections with those outside the judicial branch. Arab judges’ education and professional experiences indicate a diverse set of socialisation patterns, which in turn heighten the possibility of judges being politically significant in their judicial functions. Taken together, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 helped to shed light on who Arab judges are, how they may be controlled by their judicial institutions and how individual experiences may shape the judicial role.

**The mind of the Arab judge**

Even within formal legal boundaries that set out the judicial role, judges have some room to define their own objectives. Within the framework of judicial role theory, this thesis explored individual Arab judges’ beliefs about the qualities, behaviours and characteristics suitable for the role they have to perform. Judicial roles can be categorised into three stages. The first stage involves formal written rules of judicial conduct. The second stage involves spoken norms about proper judicial behaviour. The final stage involves the concept of the “mind of the performer”. Here the judicial role-holder acts in a

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671 Ibid.
672 Central to role theory is the idea of role expectations, which is understood to be the beliefs concerning the qualities, behaviours and characteristics suitable to a specific social role. See generally Bruce J Biddle, *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors* (Academic Press 1979)
673 Ibid. p.117
674 Ibid.
675 Empirical research suggests that members whose roles provide for a high level of salience are more likely to adopt normative group beliefs than others.
particular way: “not because written instructions have been given to him [her],
nor because of injunctions spoken by others, but rather of his [her] own
internalised standards”.676

In this study, how judges subjectively understand and conceive of their roles
was explored in several ways. First, Arab judges’ **personalities and
capacities** were examined, including whether individual judges’ personalities
and capacities predispose them to be more political. In Chapter 7 it was
argued that judicial activism may be linked to individual judges’ self-esteem,
and the empirical research explored how individual judges evaluated their
contribution to the judicial role. The research showed that nearly all Arab
judges who participated in the survey felt they provided an important service
to society, and many of them also felt that being a judge was an important part
of their self-image. The findings indicate a general pattern of agreement
amongst Arab judges that the judiciary was an important part of the individual.
Provided that a judge has other values he/she believes are equally important
such as “justice”, “fairness” or “equality”, the combination of the two may serve
as a powerful motivation for the judge to be more activist in his/her decision-
making. The likelihood of this was further reinforced when the objectives of
Arab judges’ was explored.

**Four judicial role perceptions**

As described in Chapter 2, a frequent approach used in judicial research seeks
to measure judges’ role orientations on the basis of four distinct judicial role
perception categories.677 The underlying purpose behind these categories is
to understand the degree of judicial creativity judges may afford themselves in
the performance of their roles. The roles are distributed along a continuum that
ranges from judicial restraint (following precedent, strict construction of
constitutions and deference to legislative intent) to judicial activism

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676 The last stage involves a difficult assumption, that is, that individual role-holders are aware
of their expectations and can state them if asked. See generally Nisbett Nisbett, Richard E.;
Wilson, Timothy DeCamp, ‘Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental
Processes’ (1977) 84 Psychological Review 231

677 See discussion of the different role orientations in Chapter 2.
(insubordination of precedents, statutes, and deference to personal attitudes, values, and goals). There are four distinct judicial role orientations that reflect an individual judge’s approach to adjudication. Figure 33 below illustrates the key features of each of the 4 judicial role categories. Although the role orientations are sometimes labelled differently by researchers, they remain conceptually similar in that they all fall within the continuum of judicial activism and restraint.

**Figure 32** Four conceptually distinct judicial role orientations

**Objective** judges perceive as important in the performance of their judicial roles include norms that guide their behaviour. By extension, they also include individual judges’ internalised impressions of societal norms and expectations of what constitutes the role of a judge. The findings on judicial role orientations in Chapter 8 help to place Arab judges within these four

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679 As discussed in Chapter 2, the four judicial role orientations are: “executor”; “delegate”; “guardian”; and “political”.
680 “Generalised other” is George Herbert Mead’s term for the collection of roles and attitudes that people use as a reference point for figuring out how to behave in a given situation. See generally George Herbert Mead, Charles W Morris and George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Univ of Chicago Press 2000).
established judicial role orientations. Based on the survey data, Arab judges' responses indicated that at least two role orientations are prevalent in the region: the “executor” and the “guardian” judge.

The executor judge

The “executor” role orientation reflects a well-defined and widely accepted role conception of what a judge “ought to be”. The executor judge is someone who does not consider the societal needs or social consequences of judicial decision-making. He/she considers precedent as a major factor in decision-making, and therefore advocates for “judicial self-restraint as a necessary control over reading personal predilections into law”.681 In other words, the executor judge is a passive executor of the legislative will, a mere mouthpiece of the law.682

Some of responses made by Arab judges in the survey indicate that they perceive their roles in terms of the executor role, where a judge's purpose is simply “to apply codified law”683 and “administer justice according to law”.684 As one Tunisian judge commented: “the judge is obliged to apply the legal texts and not the conflicting interests of the community”.685 Overall, Arab judges’ responses tended to favour and rank formalistic and generic roles such as “Administrator of justice” and “Applier of the law”, over roles such as “Arbiter of morality” and “Architect in the country’s body of law”. This tendency was found across the Arab countries represented in the survey, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon.

Formal roles such as the “executor role” are not unique to the Arab judges surveyed, nor is it unique to civil law jurisdictions. One possible reason why so many judges adhered to this role is that it is straightforward and that activities

683 Comment from Judge 1944358 (Arab Judges Survey)
684 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey)
685 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey)
such as “the application of the law” and “administration of justice” constitute directly observable behaviour. As Glick points out:

“Unlike legal scholars, who do not discuss adjudication because it is so obvious to them, judges are constantly confronted with their formal task. When asked to describe their job, they reply with this formal purpose because it is the one most readily apparent.”

At a minimum, judge’s activity is first and foremost about adjudication which is the most straightforward and undisputed role of a judge. Common descriptions of judges such as the “interpreter of the law” and “applier of the law” are the easiest to identify with, which may explain why such a large proportion of judges tend to choose this role. This would also explain why the “executor” role is not peculiar to any legal tradition, it is simply the most straightforward description a judge can provide for a layman.

According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, while a “mechanistic” judicial role might be desirable and the most straightforward description, it does not necessarily reflect a complete picture of the judicial role. Judges, by virtue of applying the law, engage in interpretation: “legal norms do not pre-date interpretation but assume meaning through the very process of interpretation, a process in which the judge obviously plays a strategic role.” This research has shown that Arab judges, as well as American, Swiss and Austrian judges, tend to identify this core-role function as the most straightforward and visible purpose they can have.

**Beyond the “mouthpiece of the law”**

In the Arab Judges Survey, generic roles were ranked by Arab judges as the most important roles to have. However, other findings from the survey cast some doubt on whether the “executor role” really holds true for all Arab judges. For instance, judges’ responses to statements about precedent demonstrate

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687 According to the authors, the “delegate” judge is a more realistic version of the “executor” judge. Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, *The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy*, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.70
a more nuanced picture. Nearly all Arab judges in the survey said that precedent was influential, but judges’ responses to the number of precedent statements tended to vary.

It appears that most Arab judges are found somewhere in the middle of the precedent role orientation spectrum. A minority of the Arab judges (3) were found to have a very high orientation towards precedent and a minority (3) were found to have a very low orientation towards precedent. Drawing on the role concept of the “executor judge”, this would mean that only three Arab judges in the survey may properly be described as “executor” judges. Most judges are found somewhere in the middle of the spectrum which renders them neither “high precedent-regarding” nor “low precedent-regarding.”

An additional factor which further cast doubt on the executor role for Arab judges relates to judges’ answers to whether they agreed that “judges are merely instruments of the law”. Out of 48 Arab judges, only 4 judges agreed with the statement. Figure 34 below shows the overall distribution of judges’ responses to this statement.

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688 Where 15 judges agreed with (or found influential) at least 2-3 statements, and 27 judges agreed with 4-5 statements.
Figure 33 Arab judges' responses to "judges are merely instruments of the law and can and will nothing" (n=48)

According to Glick, judges and courts are “claim granting agencies” that manage demands of individuals and interest groups amongst other.\(^{689}\) This is particularly true in light of the findings from Chapter 8 on judicial role perceptions. For those Arab judges that were surveyed for this study, a high number indicated that they would incorporate community standards into their decision-making. Comparing Arab judges with judges from three Western civil and common law countries, the Arab judges tended to be more cognisant of social considerations than the Western judges (or at least more willing to admit to this).\(^{690}\) This also challenges the myth that Arab judges are “executor” judges and are purely mechanical objective appliers of the law.

The survey results also did not provide a strong indication that a “political” role orientation exists among Arab judges (at least those surveyed). This may be attributed to several factors, including the controversial nature of this


\(^{690}\) See Chapter 8 for a fuller comparison of responses between Arab and Western judges.
particular role orientation. Glick argues that even if judges conceived their roles as political, they would “find it necessary to pay deference to the concept of precedent when questioned by laymen”. Nevertheless, there are clear indications that both judicial “activism” and judicial “restraint” exist among the Arab judges surveyed for this study. They tended to regard both the public and precedent as important in their judicial roles (albeit with more importance attached to the public aspect).

In light of the research findings, another possible role orientation for Arab judges is the “guardian judge”. Contrary to the executor judge, whose sole purpose is to apply the law, the guardian judge acts as a “moral force” in the community. The guardian judge’s goals are to balance contending principles, evaluate the conditions in society and act as a decision maker to promote the welfare of society. In achieving these goals, the guardian judge seeks to understand and appreciate the changing social forces and environments in making his/her decisions. According to Flango et al., the public dimension relates to the difference between judges who rely on their own judgment in making decisions and judges who incorporate community standards into their decision-making.

A substantial number of Arab judges who took the survey indicated that community standards were important to their decision-making. For instance, Arab judges tended to rank “guardian of the community” among the top three important roles for a judge to have in their country. The importance of the public and the community was also reflected in the specific comments Arab

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694 Ibid.
696 10 judges ranked this role as number 1 (i.e., the most important role) and 25 judges ranked this role either “2” or “3”.
judges provided in the survey. For instance, one Lebanese judge said that keeping up with social mores was acceptable when the “change is objectively for the better future of the society”.\textsuperscript{697} Similarly, one Tunisian judge explained that a judge “should bear in mind the effect of his/her judgment”.\textsuperscript{698} In a similar vein, several judges agreed that decisions should be just rather than adhering to the letter of the law. One Lebanese judge, for instance, wrote that law and justice “must be balanced as much as possible” in judges’ judgments and decisions.\textsuperscript{699}

Furthermore, most Arab judges responded favourably to all 8 public-orientation statements, many of which suggested that the public aspects of judicial decision-making were important. Most Arab judges in the survey (33 of 48) have a high orientation to the public. Along this public-oriented spectrum, a minority of Arab judges (4 of 48) appear to have a very high orientation towards the public. By contrast, 6 judges can be said to have a moderate orientation and only 1 judge to have a very low public orientation. Based on the public-orientation dimension, this would arguably place Arab judges somewhere between the “guardian role” and the “delegate role”.

While the two roles are conceptually distinct from each other and can in many respects be seen as two opposites, the research findings suggest that both role conceptions may not be mutually exclusive. It appears that both orientations can operate simultaneously in the minds of Arab judges. This is supported by the findings from the ranking question, where judges were not required to rank all roles, only those they considered most important in their respective countries. Most judges chose to rank all roles, and as one judge commented “ranking might differ from one case to another”.\textsuperscript{700} A similar comment was made by one senior judge from Tunisia:

“If the law (which is the main source of legitimacy) carries fair and equal human rights and justice, the judiciary will be safe in practice. But application of the law assumes that judicial

\textsuperscript{697} Comment from Judge 1920801 (Arab Judges Survey)
\textsuperscript{698} Comment from Judge 1938201(Arab Judges Survey)
\textsuperscript{699} Comment from Judge 1924649 (Arab Judges Survey)
\textsuperscript{700} Comment from Judge 1920801 (Arab Judges Survey)
institutions working with human and material resources are capable of providing the judge with the best conditions for the application of the law, so that the law will not remain a prisoner of obstruction of justice”. 701

Provided the law is just and fair, the judge’s primary objective will be to apply it. But should that not be the case, different judicial roles might be assumed in order to achieve what the law is lacking: justice and fairness. In ideal circumstances, the default purpose of the judge is to be an “objective applier of the law”. Nevertheless, seen within the often politically fraught contexts in which Arab judges operate, their formal purpose may change and assume a more guardian role for the public when necessary. Judges are part and parcel of the political and social reality in which they adjudicate. On this basis, it may very well be necessary for Arab judges to have several role orientations in order to address particular situations.

Arab judicial norms of internal and external behaviour

The research also examined individual Arab judges’ expectations of what constitutes proper judicial behaviour in relation to other judges (judicial peers) and other politically significant people outside judiciary (non-judicial actors). These expectations can also affect the political significance of judges.

 Judicial peers

Arab judges clearly have expectations concerning what constitutes proper behaviour on their part towards other judges who occupy the same role. Similarly, other judges have expectations regarding what a judge should or should not do in dealings with judicial colleagues. As Glick writes, “the sum of the interactions of these two sets of normative expectations taking place between the judge and his/her judicial colleagues defines the judge’s role”. 702

The Arab Judges Survey showed that Arab judges think their judicial colleagues expect them to possess strong knowledge of law, be impartial with

701 Comment from Judge 1938201 (Arab Judges Survey)
parties to a dispute and hold strong moral principles. Arab judges, on the other hand, mostly expect their colleagues to respect the views of others, even when they disagree, but also to show an independence of mind. One Lebanese judge commented on the relationship between the two qualities as follows:

“When a judge is part of a panel it is important to discuss and be receptive to arguments and persuasion. But in the end, if the judge is still convinced with his/her views he should not change his attitude towards the decision to take”.703

According to Scheb, political scientists have traditionally preferred to explore potential conflicts among judges rather than consensus: “Given that their main task has been to explain variation in decision-making”.704 Contrary to common law countries, judicial dissent is not publicised in Arab countries; for instance, courts routinely use one single judgment. However, the lack of split decisions does not mean that there is no variation in view among judges. By exploring what norms of consensus are amongst Arab judges, the research provides for yet another insight to the role of judges in the region. It primarily shows that judges do not act alone and will often need to adhere to certain qualities in order to perform the tasks that comes with the judicial office. The findings also illustrate what type of norms individual Arab judges feel they must conform to in order to become part of the group.

At the outset of this study, it was argued that formal codes of judicial conduct promote an unrealistic vision of judicial activity. They usually seek to limit the role of the judge to the conceptual role of the “executor” judge as mere mouthpieces of the law.705 Based on the research findings, Arab judges appear to categorise some principles higher than others (Figure 35). The most highly valued and clearly accepted norms among Arab judges were: dealing

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703 Comment from Judge 1944358 (Arab Judges Survey)
704 Scheb M John, (1982), Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: A Q-Technique Study of The Florida State District Courts (PhD, University of Florida), p.85
Dealing impartially with parties to cases forms part of the second principle of the Sharjah Convention. In relation to the impartial treatment of parties, judges are instructed to exercise their functions based on their professional appreciation of the facts and the appropriate legal reasons, without external influence, incitement, pressure, threat or interference from anyone. Judges must conduct investigations confidently, respecting the litigant’s right to legal counsel. They must also avoid making remarks that may be harmful, whether in office or during trials. A judge should recuse him/herself from a case if he/she believes that a fairness and impartially may be compromised. According to the Sharjah Convention, practice of equal treatment is manifested when judges are aware that their respective societies include diverse

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706 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues (n=52, Arab Judges Survey)
707 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues, (n=52, Arab Judges Survey)
708 98% of judges said it was important and 90% said it was valued by colleagues, (n=52, Arab Judges Survey)
709 Principle 2: Impartiality and Neutrality “Sharjah Convention 2007”.
710 Ibid.
individuals and groups that have different religions, sects, races, nationalities, sex, age, civil status, physical and psychological capacities.\footnote{711}{Ibid.}

**Personal integrity** falls under the third principle of the Sharjah Convention. The principle refers to a judge's ability to hold him/herself to constant moral and ethical standards. Judges should ensure that their conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer and that their behaviour and conduct must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.\footnote{712}{Principle 3: Integrity “Sharjah Convention 2007”.} Judges with integrity are described to be role models for their colleagues, and they consider themselves as having a duty to encourage integrity amongst their peers and confront them when their integrity falters.\footnote{713}{According to the principle of Integrity “a judge must maintain integrity because it is intertwined with the integrity of the judiciary as a whole” Ibid.}

Finally, **Knowledge of the law** falls under the eighth principle of the Sharjah Convention and also reflects the relevant provisions in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.\footnote{714}{Principle 8: Competence and Diligence “Sharjah Convention 2007”; ‘The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct’ E/CN.4/2003/65} A judge possessing knowledge of the law is described as someone who constantly strives to learn and improve their legal knowledge through research.

The importance of these three qualities may also indicate that should judges fail to conform to them, they will disrupt the working consensus. Because judges often work in groups where members share the same role, there must be some minimal level of “working consensus” where formal and informal norms indicate what is the expected relationship among judicial colleagues.\footnote{715}{John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (John Wiley & Sons 1962) p.145} Although the true internal workings of collegiate courts may be hidden from view by an artificial image of “court unity” (reflected in the single judgement), the findings of this research indicate that certain norms may serve as points of reference for judicial conduct among Arab judges.
Non-judicial actors

A critical issue in assessing the political significance of the judiciary in any jurisdiction is how judges view their relationships with non-judicial actors. Judges’ relationships with actors in the legal community are supposed to be conducted according to strict legal standards. Generally, rules of judicial conduct emphasise judicial objectivity, where judges are expected to “isolate themselves from influences which might affect their image of justice incarnate or which might skew their determination of a case”.$^7$ Judges are considered as delegates of the judiciary and must therefore make sure that the dignity of the judiciary is upheld in relation to their personal and professional conduct.

Here again, absolute judicial isolation presents a skewed picture of reality. Judges do interact with actors beyond the judicial community, primarily through decision-making. While the types of relationship judges have with non-judicial actors may vary from country to country, this research explored how Arab judges viewed their relationships with a wide range of non-judicial actors. And it examined Arab judges’ relationships with the wider public, religious authorities and the executive branch in more detail.

The survey findings showed that Arab judges tended to consider non-judicial actors from outside the broader legal community as less important than actors within the broader legal community. Generally, judges considered parties to cases, lawyers and prosecutors as important. Court staff and judicial colleagues were also considered by many judges as important. In terms of judges’ relationship with the executive, most judges indicated that the executive had little impact on their job as judges. Religious authorities were also considered by judges of minor importance, particularly for their judicial roles. But more varied responses were found when Arab judges were asked about the judicial application and development of religious laws. Most Arab judges agreed that state judges should be able to interpret religious laws and many agreed that judges should develop religious laws.

Judges and public perceptions

Finally, an important relationship for judges that forms part of their core duties is their interaction with the public. In principle, judges are required to keep a distance from the community. For instance, under the fourth principle of the Sharjah Convention, Arab judges are instructed to maintain a balance between their judicial duties and their engagement in society.717 However, in practice judges are not insulated from society: they remain part and parcel of it primarily because of their accessibility. The most visible relationship is through disputes. The two studies made by HiiL in Jordan and Lebanon showed that the public perceptions of courts were divided, and individuals from both countries tended to have different expectations, attitudes, values and beliefs about the judiciary.718

The findings from the Arab Judges Survey provided an additional perspective on the relationship between the public and judges in the Arab Middle East. Arab judges tended to feel that the judiciary was respected and admired by the public, but most also thought the public in their countries wanted the judiciary to change and saw the judiciary as ineffective. The findings corroborate the idea that judges are not isolated from or unaware of public perceptions. While Arab judges who took part in the survey were strongly of the view that they performed an important role in society, they were consciously aware that the public tends to perceive their judicial role differently.

Does judicialisation exist in the Arab Middle East?

At the outset of this study, it was hypothesised that judges and courts in the Arab Middle East have “political” dimensions attached to them as a result of the historical, religious, social and cultural developments of the region. Judicial roles in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia carry important political dimensions which are manifested in the institutional, functional and

behavioural characteristics explored in this study. Based on the insights offered in this thesis, judicialisation is not a new phenomenon arising according to the “rights hypothesis”, nor is it a trait unique to contemporary democracies. Rather, the socio-cultural conditions in Arab states have always been hospitable to judicialisation, despite the lack of a liberal democratic government. It should be noted that although judicialisation can be claimed to exist in the Arab region, this study does not seek to either promote judicialisation or argue against it. The main purpose of this thesis has been to explore whether the phenomenon exists in the Arab region and to test the theory of judicialisation beyond its traditional boundaries of liberal democracies. Whether it is a good or bad judicialisation is beyond the scope of this research.

**Future research**

The exploratory nature of this research was ambitious in its approaches but modest in its aims: and the limitations of the findings cannot be stressed enough. In light of the sampling methods of all three studies and the size of samples, the conclusions drawn in this study are therefore are methodologically limited. Despite these limitations, the three studies provide for important information about judges and courts in jurisdictions where this issue has not been systematically and empirically explored. The findings therefore offer initial insights into the several topics such as role perceptions, background and attitudes of judges. Although such insights are valuable in of themselves, it is hoped that future research will be able to overcome some of the methodological limitations of in this study.

Furthermore, empirical research of the justice sector in the Arab region is scarce and often riddled with value-based analysis. A primary aim of this study was to contribute towards filling the knowledge gap about judicial roles and the administration of justice in the Arab region. The findings of the research in this thesis highlight several areas where future research on Arab judges and justice systems is needed, particularly studies that are empirically oriented and seek to understand how Arab legal systems and judges actually operate.
Assessing the impact of judicial reform projects

Legal cultures are increasingly being imported, most notably through the rise of externally influenced judicial reform projects across the Arab region. Recent decades demonstrate an institutionalist revival of judicial reform projects in several Arab legal systems, often based on international legal models, terminologies and legal cultures. These have materialised into a myriad of initiatives led by international governmental organisations, non-governmental NGOs and trans-national organisations.719 These projects are often based on a “democracy promotion” approach, with the purpose of enhancing institutional capacity and promoting greater transparency and efficiency in Arab judicial sectors. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Prevention (UNODC) lists 32 ongoing projects of “Promoting Integrity and Building Justice” in the Arab region.720 It would be useful to investigate how Arab judges see these projects by exploring how Arab judges perceive the principles underlying the reform agendas, and what their professional and personal attitudes are towards them. More specifically, research is needed in relation to the actual impact these reform projects have on key actors in Arab judicial systems and whether they do bring about a change.

Public perceptions of judges and justice

This thesis provides an insight into how Arab judges understand their role and how they think the public see their roles. An important next step would be to expand this to encompass how citizens themselves in the Arab Middle East see the role of judges and courts in their societies. Further research in this field could continue to explore the judicial sector in the Arab region, but to shift focus from judges to the general public721 and other important actors in each

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721 As noted earlier, the World Justice Project study was only able to include two Arab states in its 2018 survey: Lebanon and Tunisia. Global Insights on Access to Justice Findings from the World Justice Project General Population Poll in 45 Countries’ (World Justice Project 2018) https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Access-Justice_April_2018_Online.pdf
jurisdiction in order arrive at a greater understanding of how Arab judicial institutions and judges are perceived. The findings from the research conducted for this thesis, in particular data from the Arab Judges Survey, indicate that judges in many Arab states feel there is a difference between how they see their judicial function and how the public in their country see it. Empirical research with the public in the Arab region could say whether Arab judges are or are not correct about this. Building on recent empirical studies such as the WJP and HiiL on legal experiences and satisfaction of individuals, future research endeavours should deepen the inquiry about public perceptions of judges and seek to understand the link between the two groups.722

Conclusion: The reality of “Qāḍī justice”

This thesis has sought to shed some insight into the judicial role in the Arab Middle East, which has often been erroneously portrayed as “unbounded as to appear arbitrary and even tyrannical”.723 The thesis has sought to address these misconceptions through three approaches. The mapping of Arab judicial systems highlights the rich and complex nature of judicial power in different Arab states. This showed that there is no singular “qāḍī” justice system, but a multitude of systems informed by complex structural, functional and behavioural elements. Furthermore, the survey of Arab judges also demonstrates that judges in the Arab region have as much concern for rule-based decision-making as their Western counterparts. It is clear that rules and procedures are important, even for Qāḍīs.

For the legal anthropologist Rosen, the Qāḍī was one of those striking “oriental” figures used in the West to measure judicial discretion:


“As in so many other instances the image of the exotic has thus come to serve westerners as a standard against which we measure our supposed advance along the enviable road of civilization”.\textsuperscript{724}

It is hope that this thesis has helped to shed some light onto why the flawed image of the Qāḍī as a whimsical figure in dispensing “Qāḍī-justice” should be abandoned, and that questions about the political significance of judges are as important and complex in the Arab region as they are in Western states.

\textsuperscript{724} Ibid.
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Appendix 1: Judicial Structures in Bahrain, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates according to official laws

**SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC**

Directly influenced by the Ottoman Tanzimat. The Majalla served as a civil code in Syria until 1949, when it was replaced by the Syrian Civil Code of 1949. Largely patterned on the Egyptian Code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First degree courts</th>
<th>Courts of Peace</th>
<th>Courts of First Instance</th>
<th>Court of Assize</th>
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<td>Courts of First Instance</td>
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<td>Court of Assize</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courts of appeal</td>
<td>Thirty Courts of Appeal, three criminal courts and four civil courts located in Damascus and one in every district.</td>
<td>Hears appeals from lower courts. The verdicts can however be nullified by the Cassation court</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apex courts</td>
<td>The Court of Cassation is located in Damascus and is at the apex of the ordinary Judiciary.</td>
<td>The Court is divided into four chambers, each chamber composed of a three-judge panel. Chamber for Canonical, Military, Civil and Commercial, and Criminal. Hears appeals on points of Law and may nullify lower court verdicts. Judgments handed down by the Court of Cassation set precedent for lower courts to apply and has the right to overrule lower court judgments.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Administrative court system is stipulated in the constitution. Both are separate from the courts of general jurisdiction.</td>
<td>There are two levels of courts that hear administrative cases. The Council of State which includes advisory as well as judicial functions and a court of First Instance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special courts</td>
<td>The Shari’a (Muslim), Doctrinal (Druze) and Spiritual Courts (Christian and Jewish) specialised jurisdiction in</td>
<td>The Religious court system is separated into three-tier hierarchies. Each court has its own appellate court, and the final appeal lies within the Doctrinal and Religious branch at the Court of Cassation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Constitutional** | relation to Personal status and family laws  
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)  |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------|
|                    | Mandate to decide on the constitutionality of Laws, review challenges arising from the election of the members of the People’s Council and the President of the Republic, and try the President of the Republic for treason.  
The SCC is composed of 11 members appointed by the President of the Republic. The duration of the term for the judges is set for a renewable period of four years. Judges at SCC are not entitled to hold office at the People’s Council or the Council of Ministers. |

| **Military & Security** | There are a number of other courts with specialised jurisdictions over certain cases.  
**Military field courts.** The Military may establish field courts and try cases referred by the minister of Defence and prosecuted by the Military Prosecutor.  
**Supreme State Security Court** Hears cases related to national security. Its judgments cannot be appealed and are not bound by the same procedures of the ordinary courts.  
**Economic Security Courts.** Established to look into cases involving economic crimes. Jurisdiction because they do include civil judges. Judgments may be appealed before the Court of Cassation. |

| **Appointment** | The court system is overseen by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) is the main organ responsible for the organisation of the judiciary and the court system. The SJC is headed by the Minister of Justice and 7 members including the Head of State.  
The selection process is based on academic merit and examination. Degree in law is required but no explicit requirement of having practiced as a lawyer. Two year training programme for successful applicants and if successful, candidates are appointed as judges to the lower courts, as deputy public prosecutors or investigating judges.  
**Seniority and merit** is the official criteria for career advancement in the judiciary. Court of Cassation judges are appointed by the SJC. |
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

Characterised as a dual court system where courts are divided into two branches: The Civil Law Courts and the Shari’a Law Courts. The legal system of Bahrain is based on several sources, including customary tribal law and schools of Islamic Shari’a law (both Shi’a and Sunni schools) and Civil law which has been influenced by British common law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First degree courts</th>
<th>Court of Minor Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court of Urgent Matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court of Execution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hears cases under of minor value and or misdemeanour cases. Also hears cases concerning repossession of property expropriated in any way. May assist with specific responsibility to hear urgent matters on all claims that need urgent attention except for cases falling under the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts. Court is empowered to execute judgments issues by the Courts of all types and degrees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courts of appeal</th>
<th>Bahrain has two Courts of Appeal; Greater Civil Court and the Higher Appeals Court.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Greater Civil Court is empowered to examine appeals from lower courts. Any judgment issued by this court in its appellate capacity may only be challenged before the Court of Cassation and not to the High Court of Appeal. The Greater Civil Court has jurisdiction-through an administrative department-in settling administrative disputes arising between individuals and between the government or public institutions or organisations, except in cases where the law stipulates otherwise. Serves as a Court of First Instance disputes concerning the Personal Status of Non-Muslims.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apex courts</th>
<th>The Court of Cassation was established in 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Court serves as the final court of appeal for all civil, criminal, civil, commercial and Personal Status of Non-Muslims. Hears appeals on points of Law from judgments passed in the High Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal, resolve jurisdictional disputes between Shari’a and civil courts as well as conflicting judgments.
| Administrative | Bahrain does not have an administrative judicial body. Instead, the civil division at the greater Civil Court has an administrative chamber that hears matters arising from administrative disputes. |
| Religious | Shari’a courts are the second, autonomous branch within the judicial structure regulated by Law No.13 (2002). Courts are divided into three tiers and further divided into Shi’a Divisions and Sunni Divisions. Any matter relating to the Personal Status of Muslims, including matters of Family Law is within the competence of the Shari’a Courts. **First Instance Court** hears all types of maintenance, child support, child custody and conservation, inheritance deeds, and other deeds. **Shari’a High Court** hears disputes that fall outside the First Instance Court. It is in addition empowered to hear appeals. Any judgment issued by this Court in its appellate capacity is final and cannot be challenged. **Shari’a High Court of Appeal**: A three-judge panel. Examines awards issued in the first instance by a Shari’a High Court against which an appeal is made. Final Court of appeal in respect of Muslims. (The Court of Cassation does not have the authority to entertain any appeal against any judgment issued by this Court). |
| Special courts | The Constitutional Court was established the Bahraini Constitution of 2002 The Court supervises laws on the basis of the constitution. Legislators, members of the government may bring a challenge to the court on the basis of constitutionality. The Court consists of a president and six members, appointed by royal decree for a specified time period |
| Other | Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution was established in 2009 with a judiciary arm and an arbitration arm. In the event of a jurisdictional dispute, the Court of Cassation decides. |
**Military & Security**

Military Courts are divided into four tiers: (Special Military Courts; Lower Military Courts; Higher Military Courts; Military Appeals Court).

**Judges status**

The Higher Judicial Council oversees the courts and judges. It recommends the nomination of judges, who are formally appointed by a royal decree.

**Appointment**

Law degree from an officially recognised Arab or foreign university is a prerequisite or, an Islamic Shari'ah authorization that qualifies candidates to Shari'ah judgeship. Legal experience is also needed ranging from 4 – 10 years depending on the level of court.

The National Safety Court was established in 2011

The King chairs the Council, while other members consist of the Chairman of the Court of Cassation, the Attorney General, and at least five members from the judiciary appointed by royal decree, for a membership of three years.

Court of Cassation judges appointed by royal decree and serve for a specified tenure; Constitutional Court president and members appointed by the Higher Judicial Council, a body chaired by the monarch and includes judges from the Court of Cassation, Shari’a law courts, and Civil High Courts of Appeal; members serve 9-year terms.
Similar to the Egyptian move away from the Ottoman Legal impact, Tunisia had a similar experience but less of an impact. At the time the Majalla was promulgated, Tunisia was fully immersed in its own legislative initiatives. With the Treaty of Marsa in 1883, Tunisia became formally under the French Protectorate which in legal terms meant that France was permitted to undertake legislative reforms. The codification of the Tunisian Civil Law was instead drawn from a plurality of legal sources and a synthesis of diverse sources of continental civil law with Islamic law and Tunisian custom headed by the Italian-Tunisian Jurist David Santillana that helped to inform the judicial structure. Tunisian legal development is characterized as a thematic codification as opposed to Sanhuri’s “dual codalism”. It is a synthesis of diverse codes of continental civil laws with Islamic law and Tunisian custom. This was replicated in Morocco and Mauritania. Following the Tunisian Revolution, the judiciary has undergone several reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First degree courts</th>
<th>District Courts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courts of First Instance</td>
<td>District Courts hears cases regarding alimony claims, possessor actions, and urgent reports among other. First instance Courts serve as appellate courts for District courts (final instance with regards to alimony and possessor actions on purely principal grounds). Cases appealed from the District Courts can be appealed to the Court of Cassation. The courts hears all commercial and civil cases regardless of monetary value of claim. These courts also rule on rules on the constitution of companies, dissolution, liquidation, bankruptcy and rectification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courts of appeal</th>
<th>Three Courts of Appeal in Tunisia. Each Court have a criminal and civil division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Courts of Appeal is competent to hear appeals of judgments rendered in first instance by the courts of first instance in its district in relation to civil matters. The courts hear appeals of a criminal nature flowing from the court of first instance. Each court of appeal comprises of at least one indictment chamber with an investigating judge. The courts of appeal are also competent to hear appeals against the decisions of professional bodies such as the Bar Association.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apex courts</th>
<th>The Court of Cassation is Located in Tunis and serves as the final Court of Appeal with civil and criminal divisions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In addition to serving as a final instance court for civil and criminal matters, the Court of Cassation has also jurisdiction over the settlement of judges and the dismissal from one court to another. It is also empowered to ensure the unity of jurisprudence and hears issues that involves conflicting jurisprudence of the lower courts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Pursuant to the new constitution of 2014, Tunisia has an elaborate judicial structure dealing with administrative disputes, administrative courts, and courts dealing with the State budget and abuse of State power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special courts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>There are specialised sections in the civil courts handle personal Status laws and Family laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>Following the Tunisian Revolution, the Constitutional Council underwent several reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>The Military has its own judicial body and managed by the National Defence Ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges status</td>
<td>Judges and prosecutors are part of the same corps. Similar provisions are applicable to both judges and prosecutors in relation to selection, appointment,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
performance, promotion and discipline.

**Appointment**

Judges are appointed by presidential decree with the assent of the High Judicial Council.

The promotion of judges is currently based on the principle of seniority. Appointments to senior positions are made by presidential decree after consultation with the Prime Minister, based on a list of candidates prepared by the High Judicial Council. Judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President of the Republic, the Assembly of People's Representatives, and the High Judicial Council, who each appoint four members for a single six-year term.
**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)**

The law of the UAE is largely codified and operates under a dual legal system based on *Sharīʿa* Law, Custom and legal principles influenced by the Egyptian and French civil laws. In the absences of provisions in the UAE codified law, Islamic principles are applied. With the exception of the Emirates of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, the federal system has jurisdiction in the Emirates. There are three main branches within the court structure: civil, criminal and *Sharīʿa*, or Islamic, law. Two layers of civil courts exist: the federal system and the local systems. The *Sharīʿa* courts are in parallel with the civil and criminal courts. There are also “free zone areas” in the federation where other legal entities operate autonomously such as the DIFC Courts intended to attract foreign investors and businesses.

| **Federal Courts** | Seated in the capital of the Union, the UAE has federal courts of First Instance. As specified by the UAE Federal laws, appeals against judgements by the local judicial authorities in penal, civil, commercial and other cases may be made before the federal courts of First Instance. All or part of a local emirate court’s jurisdiction to be referred to the federal courts of first instance. The Courts hear crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent capital of the Federation personal status actions, civil actions, commercial actions and other actions between individuals which arise in the permanent capital of the Federation. |
| **Federal courts of appeal** | The Federacy have circuits of appeal for hearing criminal, civil, commercial matters amongst other. The Circuits hear appeals lodged against judgments from the federal courts of First Instance and the local judicial authorities. |
| **Apex courts** | The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court in the federal court structure for all Emirates (except for Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah) The Federal Supreme Court acts as an appellate court with respect to the decisions of lower courts, and also supervises lower courts to ensure that they are applying and interpreting the law in a consistent manner. Lower courts must abide by the legal principles set down by this Court. The Court also adjudicates on jurisdictional conflicts between federal judicial authorities and the local judicial authorities as well as jurisdictional conflicts arising from two or more Emirates. In addition, the Court has the jurisdiction to hear disputes between the Emirates, or between Emirates and the Federal Government. It also examines the constitutionality and legality of federal and local laws and Interrogates Ministers |
and senior federal officials on the basis of a request by the Federal Supreme Council. The Court hear crimes directly affecting the interests of the federation; such as crimes relating to internal or external security of the Federation. The judgements of the Federal Supreme Court are final and binding.

**Administrative**

No separate Administrative judicial branch. Heard by the Civil Courts.

**Religious**

Sharīʿa or Islamic courts work alongside the civil and criminal courts in the UAE. The Sharīʿa court is the Islamic court in the UAE and is primarily responsible for civil matters between Muslims only.

Shari’a courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear family disputes, including matters involving divorce, inheritances, child custody, child abuse and guardianship of minors. The Shari’a court may, at the federal level only (excluding Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah). The courts also hear appeals of certain criminal cases.

**Special courts**

Labour Courts handle cases filed by private sector employees or employers against one another. Labour cases can be appealed depending on the value that is being claimed.

Commercial courts handle commercial contracts and commitments, banking processes, commercial papers, bankruptcy and its reconciliation issues.

**Military & Security**

Courts for military personnel and tried in a separate court system.

The Ministry of Justice appoints judges and deals with matters connected with the federal courts of the first instance in respect of their organisation, formation, departments, local jurisdiction, procedures and conditions of judicial service.

Judges are appointed by the federal president following approval by the Federal Supreme Council, the highest executive and legislative authority consisting of
the seven emirate rulers. Judges serve until retirement age or the expiry of their appointment terms.
Appendix 2: English translation of cover letter for Survey questionnaire

Dear Justice X

My name is Sara Razai and I am a doctoral student in Law at University College London (UCL)'s Judicial institute. I am conducting a research in order to help increase understanding and knowledge of the work of judges in the Arab region. I am inviting you to take part in a brief survey. The survey explores your experience and views of being a judge. The survey is strictly anonymous and the information provided cannot be traced back to any participant.

To access the survey please choose and click on your preferred version below:

https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=47482 (English version)
https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=47482&lang=fr_FR (French version)
https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=47482&lang=ar (Arabic version)

Thank you for taking the time to consider my request. Your participation will be extremely helpful to my research and to help understand the valuable work judges in the Arab region do.

Kind regards,
Sara

Sara Razai
PhD Candidate / Teaching Fellow
Judicial Institute, Faculty of Laws
University College London
sara.razai@ucl.ac.uk

Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail. This email, including any attachments, is confidential. If you are not an intended recipient, please inform the sender immediately and destroy this email. Do not use, copy or disclose this email.
Appendix 3: Arab Judges Survey (English version)

The Role of Judges in the Arab Middle East

I would like to invite you to take part in a short survey about the judiciary in the Arab Middle East.

Why I am conducting the survey

My name is Sara Razai and I am a doctoral student in law at University College London (UCL)'s Judicial Institute. I am conducting this research in order to help increase understanding and knowledge of the work of judges in the Arab region.

What the survey is about

The survey explores your experience and views of being a judge. I am inviting all judges in the Arab region to take part, and everyone's views are welcome.

The survey

The survey will take about 5 minutes of your time. It is available in Arabic, French and English - you can choose your preferred language on the top right corner of this page.

Protecting your anonymity

This survey is voluntary and completely anonymous. Your participation in the survey and none of the information you provide in response to any survey question cannot be traced back to you in any way. UCL and I have undertaken in writing to ensure the complete anonymity of any one taking part in this survey. To further ensure your anonymity please do not include your name in any responses to any of the questions in the survey.

Sharing the survey

I am trying to reach as many judges in the Arab Middle East as possible, and if you know of any other judges who may be interested in doing the survey, please feel free to share this invitation to do the survey with them. You can do this by sharing the survey link, which is: https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/e?e=47482

Thank you for taking the time to do the survey. Your participation will be extremely helpful to my research and is very much appreciated.

If you have any questions about the survey, please feel free to contact me at the email address below.

Yours sincerely,
Sara Razai
PhD candidate
Faculty of Laws
UCL Judicial Institute
University College London
London
WC1H 9BT
Email: sara.razai@ucl.ac.uk

Information about the UCL Judicial Institute

The UCL Judicial Institute is the United Kingdom's first and only centre of excellence devoted to research, teaching and policy engagement about the judiciary. For more information about the UCL Judicial Institute please see: www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute
Section 1 - Your Judicial Post

Q1: In which Arab country do you hold a judicial post? If you hold a judicial post in more than one Arab country, please tick the country which you consider to be where you hold your main judicial post.

- Algeria
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Oman
- Palestine
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Sudan
- Syria
- Tunisia
- United Arab Emirates
- Yemen
- Other

If you have chosen “other”, please specify:

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below:

---

Q2: What is your current employment status as a judge?

- Active (full-time)
- Retired
- Other (Please specify)
- Active (part-time)

If you have chosen “other”, please specify:

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below:

---

Q3: In what type(s) of court(s) have you served as a judge?

- Trial only
- Appellate only
- Other (Please specify)
- Trial and Appellate

If you have chosen “other”, please specify:

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below:

---

(1/13)
Q4: What type of legal matters do you deal with in your current judicial role? (Please tick as many options as apply to you)

- Civil
- Criminal
- Family
- Administrative
- Religious
- Constitutional
- Military
- Other (please specify)

If you have chosen "other", please specify:

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q5: How many years in total have you served as a judge?

- Less than 1 year
- 1 - 6 years
- 7 - 11 years
- 12 - 16 years
- 17 - 20 years
- 21 - 25 years
- 26 - 30 years
- More than 30 years
Section 2- Becoming a Judge

Q6: Before being appointed to the judiciary, did you hold any of the following legal posts? (Please tick as many options that apply to you)
- [ ] Public Lawyer (e.g., government lawyer, prosecutor, etc.)
- [ ] Private Lawyer
- [ ] Law Professor
- [ ] I was appointed to the judiciary directly from law school
- [ ] Other (Please specify)

If you have chosen "other", please specify:

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q7: Looking back, to what extent do you feel your previous work experience prepared you for your judicial post?
- [ ] Not at all
- [ ] Somewhat
- [ ] Fully

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q8: Did you have any judicial training when you were first appointed as a judge?
- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below
Section 3 - Being a Judge

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Q9: "As a judge, I feel I provide an important service to society."

○ Strongly Agree ○ Neither agree nor disagree ○ Strongly Disagree
○ Agree ○ Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q10: "There is a difference between what I think the job of a judge is and the way the public in my country see it."

○ Strongly Agree ○ Neither agree nor disagree ○ Strongly Disagree
○ Agree ○ Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q11: "Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image."

○ Strongly Agree ○ Neither agree nor disagree ○ Strongly Disagree
○ Agree ○ Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

(4/13)
Q12: The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries in the region.

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q13: The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in Western countries.

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q14: Which of the following roles do you think are most important for judges in your country? Rank the following in terms of which roles are most important for judges in your country (where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 6 = LEAST IMPORTANT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applier of the law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian of the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator of justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect of the country's body of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcer of legal rules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbiter of morality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

(5/13)
Section 4 - Qualities of judges

Q15: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary in my country is admired by the public</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary in my country is thought to be ineffective compared to other branches of government</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public respect the judiciary in my country</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public think that the judiciary needs to change</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q16: To what extent do you feel the following qualities are important for a judge to have to do their job well?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Of limited importance</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal integrity</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the law</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong moral principles</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing impartially with parties to cases</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual honesty</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal conduct in public</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity in decision-making</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient work habits</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-writing abilities</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of broader social and political issues</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6/13)
Q17: Which of the following do you think are the most important qualities needed by a judge when working with other judges? (Rank the following qualities in terms of their importance where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 9 = LEAST IMPORTANT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual honesty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal conduct in public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity in decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient work habits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of broader social and political issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold firm views</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show leadership amongst judges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect the views of others even if you disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge the good work of others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be receptive to change and persuasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show independence of mind</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise good manners in dealing with others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep arguments moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q18: To what extent do you feel the following qualities are valued by the judges you work with?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Valued highly</th>
<th>Valued</th>
<th>Valued a little</th>
<th>Not valued at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong moral principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing impartially with parties to cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual honesty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal conduct in public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity in decision-making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient work habits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-writing abilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of broader social and political issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

(7/13)
Section 5 - Judicial Decision-Making

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

**Q19:** "Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance conflicting interests in society"

- [ ] Strongly Agree
- [ ] Agree
- [ ] Neither agree nor disagree
- [ ] Disagree
- [ ] Strongly Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below:

**Q20:** "It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community"

- [ ] Strongly Agree
- [ ] Agree
- [ ] Neither agree nor disagree
- [ ] Disagree
- [ ] Strongly Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below:

**Q21:** "It is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of the law be adhered to"

- [ ] Strongly Agree
- [ ] Agree
- [ ] Neither agree nor disagree
- [ ] Disagree
- [ ] Strongly Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below:
Q22: “Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions.”

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q23: When a judge decides a case, how influential do you think the following factors are for a judge?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Very influential</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Somewhat influential</th>
<th>Not influential at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requirements of law and order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges’ knowledge of social and political factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the public expects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges’ view of justice in the case</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair application of law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social consequences of the decision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What officials recommend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following previous decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q24: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Disagree nor Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State judges should be able to interpret religious laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State judges should be able to develop religious laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9/13)
### Section 6 - Judges and the Law

**Q25:** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following definitions of the rule of the law?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law means that a government abides by existing laws</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law means that a government respects judges' rulings</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law means ensuring law and order to protect the lives and property of citizens</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law means equality between citizens</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law means efficient and predictable justice</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law is based on the protection of human rights</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law is based on divine justice</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law does not have a fixed and precise meaning</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The meaning of the rule of law can differ between different legal traditions</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please specify in box below)</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

(10/13)
Q26: How influential are the following factors to a judge in deciding a case?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Very influential</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Somewhat influential</th>
<th>Not influential at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisions closest in facts to the present case</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past decisions of the higher courts</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous decisions, when clear and directly relevant</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

Q27: In your job as a judge, how much importance do you place on the following groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Of limited importance</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The public</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties in cases that appear before me</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court staff</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial colleagues</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior figures in the judiciary</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Authorities</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below
Q28: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding cases</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to past decisions must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below

(12/13)
Section 7 - About you

Q29: Are you:
- Female
- Male

Q30: Please indicate your age group:
- Under 25
- 26 - 30
- 31 - 35
- 36 - 40
- 41 - 45
- 46 - 50
- 51 - 55
- 56 - 60
- 61 - 65
- 66 - 70
- Over 70

Q31: What is your country of nationality?
- Algeria
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Oman
- Palestine
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Sudan
- Syria
- Tunisia
- United Arab Emirates
- Yemen
- Other (Please specify)

If you have chosen "other", please specify:

Q32: What is your religious affiliation?
- None
- I prefer not to say
- Please specify

If you have chosen "other", please specify:

Q33: Finally, is there anything you would like to say about your role as a judge that has not been covered in the survey?

Thank you very much for taking the time to share your views. Your contribution has been very valuable and is very much appreciated.

Should you wish to see the results of this survey please send an e-mail to Sara.razai@ucl.ac.uk and I will share the findings with you when the survey has ended and the results have been analysed.
Appendix 4: Country-based from the Arab Judges Survey  
(Chapter 8)

**Figure 35** Arab judges’ view of most important judicial roles, by jurisdiction (top 3 preferences combined) (n=60)
Figure 36 Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries, by jurisdiction (n=63)

"The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries in the region"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 37 Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the judge in Western countries, by jurisdiction (n=63)

The role of a judge in my country is different from the role of the judge in Western countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 30 Arab judges’ assessment of the influence of precedent on their judicial decision-making, by jurisdiction (n=48)

| How influential are the following factors to a judge in deciding a case? | Judges saying very influential or influential |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Egypt | Saudi Arabia | Lebanon | Other<sup>725</sup> | All Arab Judges combined |
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| “Precedent, when clear and directly relevant” |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | 13 | 86.6 | 13 | 92.8 | 9 | 81.8 | 5 | 62.5 | 40 | 83.3 |
| “Past decisions of the supreme court” |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | 14 | 93.3 | 11 | 78.5 | 8 | 72.7 | 5 | 62.5 | 38 | 79.1 |
| “Decisions closest in facts to the present case” |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | 12 | 80.0 | 12 | 85.7 | 6 | 54.5 | 6 | 75 | 36 | 75.0 |
| n=15 | n=14 | n=11 | n=8 | n=48 |

<sup>725</sup> Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1)
Table 31 Proportion of Arab judges that agree with precedent oriented statements, by jurisdiction (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other(^{726})</th>
<th>All Arab Judges combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding cases&quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{726}\) Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1)
Table 32 Arab judges’ agreement with narrowly worded statements on social and personal factors in decision-making, by jurisdiction (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When a judge decides a case, how influential do you think the following factors are for a judge?</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other727</th>
<th>All Arab Judges combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Requirements of law and order”</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Judge's view of justice in the case”</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The social consequences of decision”</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“What the public expects”</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

727 Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1)
Table 33 Arab judges’ agreement with broadly worded statements on public and social factors in judicial decision-making, by jurisdiction (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other (^{728})</th>
<th>All Arab Judges combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of agreement</strong></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community”</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of the law be adhered to”</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions”</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance conflicting interests in society”</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=15</td>
<td>n=14</td>
<td>n=11</td>
<td>n=8</td>
<td>n=48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{728}\) Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1)
### Chapter 9

#### Figure 38  Degree of importance attached to judicial colleagues, by jurisdiction (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia (n=15)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (n=14)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (n=11)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (n=8)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**How important are judicial colleagues in your job?**
- Not important at all
- Somewhat important
- Important
- Very important
**Figure 39** Degree of importance attached to senior figures in the judiciary (n=48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia (n=15)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (n=14)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (n=11)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (n=8)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 34 Arab judges’ view of important qualities needed to do their job well, by jurisdiction (n=52)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judicial Qualities</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal integrity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing impartially with parties to cases</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong moral principles</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the law</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity in decision-making</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-writing abilities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual honesty</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient work habits</td>
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