Social justice and citizenship education: reflective equilibrium between ideal theories and the Brazilian context

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I, Gabriel Goldmeier, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

Taking as a starting point the belief that Western societies live a period of normality/stability with regard to their general understanding of justice (based on consensual ideas of equal liberty, communal/national responsibility and democracy), the present thesis appeals to a reinterpretation of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as the approach to improve justice in Brazil. An ideal-non-ideal equilibrium is outlined by this thesis; in addition, the developments of certain knowledge about civic virtues and how to cultivate them through formal education serve as important tools to favour the theoretical-practical equilibrium, only achieved in the public sphere. The debate on justice is structured upon the idea of (non-idealised) hypothetical social contract. Through appealing to economic, cultural and decision-making dimensions, this debate outlines an equilibrium between philosophical ideals of justices and historic, biological, economic and sociological empirical observations (as on human natural and cultural developments, as on specificities of Brazilian society). From this, a feasible theory of how to improve justice in Brazil is proposed, and seven important civic virtues to be cultivated in Brazilian people are suggested. Then, a new ideal-non-ideal equilibrium between philosophical ideals of how to develop five different levels of citizenship curriculum and empirical observations about how this curriculum is actually carried out in three different Brazilian schools is also outlined.
Acknowledgments

To the previous, current and next generations of human beings that are within me and give me knowledge and passion to go through this painful but also beautiful journey.
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PART ONE: THESIS’ STRUCTURE
1. Introduction

The practice of democracy can stimulate people’s reflections on justice. And, the more people’s desires become fundamental for determining the destiny of a nation, the more their civic virtues become important. After the Second World War, in Western Europe, the US and Latin America (though, in the latter, with oscillations), the victory of democratic regimes over totalitarian ones forced governments to increase their respect for individuals’ wishes, and liberal theories of justice gained importance as they represented this growing aspiration. From 1971, the reinsertion of the idea of (hypothetical) social contract by Rawls put individuals’ desires once again at the centre of political reflection, which replaced a more “totalitarian” view. However, this turn was understood by many as a “super-individualisation”\textsuperscript{1} of society. As a reaction against this tendency, community values and civic engagement arose in political theory, and, later, in the public sphere. For example, in England, the introduction of citizenship education as a mandatory subject in schools in 2002 showed a movement aiming to reflect a spirit of community – strong at the end of the Second World War and arguably lost after decades of peace and individualisation of society. This thesis agrees with what seems to be a current perception of these Western nations’ policymakers that individual rights and communal responsibilities are unbalanced, and that citizenship education can be a good tool to re-establish this balance. Thus, it defends the position that a feasible idea of justice in democratic nations is inextricably linked with a feasible idea of citizenship curriculum. Researching each one of these fields can occupy a whole academic career. However, the present work aims to outline this connection by investigating both fields through philosophical and empirical perspectives focused on the Brazilian reality. This introductory chapter presents how this project is organised and justifies such an ambitious choice. At the beginning, (1.1) the motivations behind the present work are presented. Then, (1.2) the main questions which orient this investigation are exposed. Next, (1.3) different research methods and the approach applied by this thesis are summarised. After this, (1.4) all chapters are briefly introduced and linked. Finally, (1.5) this thesis’ weaknesses and strengths are presented.

1.1. Motivations behind this thesis

\textsuperscript{1} The doc-series Century of Self, directed by Adam Curtis and produced by BBC, is one example of this narrative.
Situating the discussion, this thesis takes as its starting point the evident Brazilian institutional crisis. In 2016, the impeachment of the re-elected president Dilma Rousseff led by the congress divided the country and questioned the strength of Brazilian democracy. Moreover, according to \textit{Latinobarómetro Corporation}, in 2010, though in a period of reasonable political stability, Brazilians had the lowest level of trust in their institutions in Latin America, the top region in the world in terms of people’s distrust in their institutions (EFE, 2011). Brazilians’ distrust in their politicians is justified. Scandals of corruption exist amongst almost all political parties. The mass media, a private oligopoly, in turn, is very partial and, according to many, is associated with the private sector which rules the country in order to influence people’s political views and maintain the status quo (Souza, 2017, p.213-4). Moreover, private relations invade the public sphere which results in partiality and injustices of public decisions (Holanda, 1955). Nevertheless, the resigned behaviour of Brazilian people towards improving social justice makes mobilisation for changes difficult\footnote{Few times, as in 1985 and 2013 mass mobilisations, Brazilian people appeared to show a less resigned behaviour. However, this behaviour did not seem enough to really change the political scenario.} (Carvalho, 2002).

Taking this scenario, two different ways to change the Brazilian reality can be considered: maintaining the main structures of Brazilian democratic institutions; or through a revolution. This work is committed to the former. A revolution only makes sense when the political crisis is so intense that a complete change in the institutional structures is the only way to advance the fostering of justice. This does not seem to be the case in Brazil. Moreover, it may be naive to think that a revolution would solve institutional problems in a short period, since, usually, such an extreme attitude may cause many problems for almost everyone for a long time before promoting positive results – which are not guaranteed. Nevertheless, avoiding appealing for a revolution does not mean accepting the status quo. Though Brazilian institutions are potentially just, their tendency to benefit the few people who control them justifies the need to improve individuals’ social awareness – which, in turn, helps promote social progress – through civic education.

In order to lead this process, it is important to identify the main social practices that Brazilian people consider just, and ways to implement them. In this respect, this thesis defends that Brazil is embedded in Western values historically built which are founded in broad ideas of equal liberty, communal responsibility, and respect for democratic procedures (chapter 2).
Obviously, Brazil has peculiarities that differentiate it from other Western countries (Huntington, 1996), and these peculiarities are also taken into account.

The Brazilian 1988 Constitution strongly endorses these values and considers that one of the two aims of education is to cultivate citizenship: “Education, a right of all and a duty of state and family, will be promoted and encouraged with collaboration of society, aiming at full development of the person, his/her preparation for the exercise of citizenship and his/her qualification for work” (Article 205). Regarding this, it should be noted that citizenship can and should be taught/learned in different spheres of society: by parents, peers, mass media, advertisements, etc. (Levinson, 1999, p.7). Following this point, it is possible to say that “[t]here is a profound difference between education in general and schooling in particular, in that the latter represents only one small part of the former” (Levinson, 1999, p.7) However, though education is very broad, this thesis focuses on formal curriculum (or schooling) as a way to fully explore at least one educational sphere.

Thus, based on these reflections on Brazil’s political situation and focusing on schooling, it seems evident that justice and education are mutually dependent. Actually, there is a belief shared even by anti-interventionists like Galston that “[l]iberal democratic citizens are made, not born” (2002, p.15). This claim is founded on the idea that people’s behaviours and opinions about justice are not totally predetermined, and can be oriented towards different directions (Bloom, 2013). However, “education can function as a substantive, directed practice only if it is embedded within a broader practice or set of goals” (Levinson, 1999, p.4) From this perception, it is possible to say that even alleged neutrality in education is not neutral (Freire, 1970a; Gutmann, 1987). Avoiding cultivating civic virtues in schools does not imply that children will have a neutral education on these regards. If these virtues are not cultivated in a school, something related to them will be cultivated by parents, media and friends, etc. Thus, a kind of idea of justice, even if diffuse, always orients the cultivation of civic virtues from different societal actors. However, looking from the opposite perspective, it is impossible to develop a theory of justice without starting from a certain idea on how citizens think and behave in this regard. Philosophers build their theoretical arguments presupposing certain virtues in the individuals who constitute their imagined society. Rawls (1971, 1993) departs from certain values associated with a sense of justice towards co-

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3 All translations from Portuguese to English are made by me.
citizens; Gauthier (1986), from an accepted egoism. But, considering that even egoism/individualism is partially constructed, it seems true that individuals are not born with all civic virtues printed in their DNAs (Bloom, 2013). Thus, education is part of the reasoning behind philosophical ideas related to this.

Regarding this, the first half of this thesis investigates Western (particularly Brazilian) societies’ organisation towards justice, while the second examines citizenship curriculum in formal education. Indeed, the evolution of the debate on justice in the last five decades makes evident the connection between these two fields. In 1971, Rawls published *A Theory of Justice*, the most important reference in twentieth-century analytical philosophy debate about the theme. The book presents innovative and elegant reasoning based on social contract theory defending the idea that liberty is the good that should be equally distributed in a just society. However, mainly during the 1980s, the apparent excess of individualism of Rawlsian ideas promoted several reactions of a new group of philosophers broadly called communitarians, for example, Sandel (1982). In general, they accused Rawls of paying little attention to an important attribute of human beings, namely, their attachment/belonging to communities. The debate between egalitarian liberals and communitarians had positive effects resulting, in the 1990s, in a successful junction of these views. What emerged at that time was something usually referred to as “citizenship theory” (Kymlicka, 2002, p.284). Thus, though since Plato there has been a long debate about citizenship and education, the current liberal-communitarian debate started paying attention to philosophers like Galston and Macedo and how they propose ways to cultivate/teach citizenship and keep liberal values in order to build a just society. These debates are currently strong in most philosophy and education departments in the Western world, particularly in Europe and North America.

However, few researchers try to balance ideal proposals with empirical observations of reality and people’s opinions about justice and citizenship education, though Levinson’s *Demands of Liberal Education* (1999) is one notable exception. This is exactly the aim of the present thesis. In order to foster a more just society, it is fundamental to reflect on the possibilities and limitations of citizenship education in loco, in the case of this work, in Brazilian schools. Furthermore, an important way to think about this is through a dialogue between theoretical ideas on justice, the citizenship curriculum and current observations about how people and curricular planners understand these ideas. In this sense, this thesis involves the exploration of theoretical approaches to justice and curriculum, as well as
empirical data collection. Naturally, combining both methodologies implies various challenges, but the main strength of this attempt is precisely to avoid focusing only on top-down theories – avoiding listening only to experts about how a just state and a good educational system should be – or only on bottom-up ideas about these topics – avoiding simply following most people’s “wishes” for these ideas.

Thus, drawing on the curricular transposition framework (McCowan, 2009), this reflection considers four distinct stages of investigation: (i) what an ideal society would be like (ideal end); (ii) what a citizenship curriculum would be like (ideal means); (iii) the way these curricula work in practice (real means); (iv) the way society thinks about justice (real end). This reflection depends upon a dialogue between ideal projects on what a just society and a citizenship curriculum should be and an observation of how these things really take place in Brazil. It is precisely this “reflective equilibrium” (chapter 2) – a concept proposed by Rawls (1971) and further explained in 1.2 – which allows possible improvements in our society.

An outline of the connections between these four different stages is presented in the conclusion. For now, as an introduction to the explanation developed in 1.3, it is important to highlight two main differences between McCowan’s and the present thesis’ approaches. Firstly, while the former proposes a linear development from an ideal end to an ideal means, then to a real means, and finally to a real end (McCowan, 2009, p.90 – Figure 1), this thesis develops knowledge about justice and citizenship curriculum in a different way. As seen in the conclusion, in the first stage, “feasible” theories of justice and curriculum are developed through the dialogue between their ideal and real approaches. Only at the end, a dialogue between these two “feasible” theories is established. Thus, the order is not linear. Moreover, it is suggested that there is an intermediary stage between the ideal and the real reflections of justice and curriculum. This stage is called ideal-real. These two differences can be identified in figure 2:

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4 In this thesis, “feasibility” is understood in its ordinary meaning. For example, Oxford Living Dictionary defines “feasibility” as “the state or degree of being easily or conveniently done” (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/feasibility). As developed during the thesis, mainly in the conclusion, a feasible theory (of justice or of citizenship curriculum) is a theory built by ideal suggestions that gives the opportunities to advance on these ideas, but, at the same time, are not too idealistic, taking into account learning and restrictions from observations of reality. The attention for these issues make the proposals quite “easily or conveniently” achievable.
This less linear approach does not mean that a theory of justice has no priority over a theory of curriculum. A just society is “the end” of this reasoning, while designing a good curriculum is only “the means”. This thesis, then, agrees with Hirst’s (1974) defence that a curriculum can only be effective if it starts from a set of clear aims and Levinson’s claim that, “[f]rom a liberal perspective, modern education policy should be led by liberal theory, not vice versa” (1999, p.5). However, through establishing a multidirectional dialogue between justice and education, the role of the curriculum in this process can be emphasised. It is made clear in the conclusion that improving social justice depends in part on improving formal education.

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5 Areas of study developed in each part: PHI = philosophy; HIS = history; SOC = sociology; PSY = psychology; ECO = economy; EDU = education.
In addition, observing these two areas of reflection (justice and curriculum), it is possible to say that the reality reduces the possibilities of idealistic changes, and ideals challenge the reality. Thus, what this thesis outlines in its conclusion is something in between ideal and actual practices. In this sense, the present work proposes an innovation of actual practices of justice and education, which is less radical than propositions from several academics (for example, Pateman (2007) in the field of justice and Freire (1970a) in the field of curriculum), specifically seen in the social sciences. As explored in chapter 6, throughout history, Brazilian society has been oriented towards conservatism on moral values and towards the capitalism of ties (chapter 6). On the other hand, most theses in political philosophy and, even more so in education, at least in Brazil, are oriented towards avant-garde moral values and against neoliberal ideas. This thesis, however, positions itself between these two tendencies. On one hand, it calls attention to the need to promote social justice and improve the citizenship curriculum in Brazilian society, but it also aims to question academics on the feasibility of their desired achievements and that many achievements already conquered have to be celebrated.

One of the main characteristics of this work is its constant effort to reach middle grounds, spaces for dialogue, agreement and, ultimately, consensus. It is defended that some important elements of citizenship education are shared by almost all individuals that reflect upon them, even if they have widely different political positions on economics, cultural values or even democratic procedures. This thesis understands that only those who deny reflecting about these matters in order to maintain their privileges, or those who believe only in a revolution led by “enlightened” people, are not fully convinced by the attempt of improving societies through a pacific process.

1.2. Research questions

After this introduction, it is possible to present the main question behind this thesis:

*How can a dialogue between “feasible” ideas of justice and the citizenship curriculum contribute to building a more just society (in Brazil)?*

As mentioned above, this work aims to present a coherent connection between academic and ordinary ideas of justice and citizenship curriculum. The thesis is built upon egalitarian
liberalism and citizenship education literature, analyses of research on human ideas and behaviours regarding justice, and observations about how citizenship is already being taught in Brazilian schools. Thus, it proposes to develop feasible ways to improve justice and the citizenship curriculum in Brazil from a dialogue between theoretical ideas and real people’s understandings of these ideas.

However, this main question is very broad. To better understand the aims of this thesis, it is important to divide it into some sub-questions (SQs) that orient the present investigation:

**SQ1: In what ways does the development of ideal proposals and empirical studies contribute to build “feasible” ideas of justice and citizenship curriculum?**

The present work aims to answer this question using two different procedures. In 2.2, this idea is justified theoretically through defending that stability is usually fundamental to the development of knowledge. Complementing this theoretical reflection, the rest of this thesis focuses on presenting a possible way to explore theoretical and practical areas regarding these two subjects and link them in a reasonable way. Showing the richness and complexity of these different areas and a possible connection between them (in the conclusion) is a powerful way to justify such an effort.

**SQ2: What are the basic characteristics of “feasible” ideas of justice and the citizenship curriculum?**

Theories of justice and citizenship curriculum proposed by scholars have an intrinsic characteristic: they present an ideal situation to be reached – even when they start from a non-ideal position, like in Mills’ (2005) proposal developed in 3.8. In this way, these normative (philosophical) theories aim to orient people’s reflections regarding the directions of their practices (chapters 3, 4, 8 and 9). However, individuals and societies are often not motivated by their reasons, and the understanding of these natural and social characteristics behind their behaviours (chapters 5, 6 and 11) is also important in order to identify “feasible” ideas of justice and curriculum. Therefore, descriptive studies on biology, psychology, history, sociology, economics, etc. are added to normative reflections aiming to balance normative proposals.
Evidently, reflections on how a just society should be are important to orient the identification of civic virtues, such as critical thinking and compassion, expected from its citizens. In chapter 8, these virtues are presented, marking the transition from a discussion of justice to a discussion of the citizenship curriculum. Since the identification of such virtues consequently allows a discussion about the citizenship curriculum, the reflection on justice improves the reflection on curriculum. On the other hand, since in democratic societies, important decisions regarding justice are influenced by ordinary people’s and policymakers’ practices in the public sphere, the development of their civic virtues through formal education is fundamental for improving justice. Through this dialogue, this thesis intends to showcase ways in which reflections on both areas can improve the other.

1.3. Methodological approach

Having presented the main questions which orient the thesis, the methodologies behind it are now introduced. “Methodologies” is presented in its plural form, since different chapters deal with distinct areas of knowledge, each requiring their own methods of finding knowledge. Some are normative and very theoretical; others descriptive and based on empirical analyses about people’s opinions and practices on justice and education. These empirical analyses, in turn, are sometimes quantitative, other times qualitative. They are obtained through primary data, but also through secondary data.

The reflection on methodologies starts by presenting how to link different areas of knowledge which sustain this thesis. In the above mentioned method of curricular transposition, McCowan (2009) proposes that reflections on justice (end) and citizenship curriculum (means) are interconnected. Moreover, he suggests that ideal discussions on these two subjects must be directly connected with their real practices. McCowan designs three leaps that should be analysed in the following order: from ideal end to ideal means, from ideal means to real means; from real means to real end.

However, even through this analytical lens, McCowan considers that these four stages are further interconnected, and therefore, their linearity does not work so easily in practice. He
then introduces and defines a concept named “seamless enactment”, “an approach to the curriculum in which there is a harmonious movement between ends and means, and between the ideal and the real, both in terms of the underlying principles and the human agents involved” (2009, p.180). Following Dewey (1916), McCowan’s normative attitude is based on the idea that ends and means in education do not necessarily have a unidirectional relationship (2009, p.93).

This thesis’ approach that orients interactions between different methods of analysis of reality is inspired by the analytical effort of differentiation (curricular transposition) and by the interdependence of ideal and real, means and ends (seamless enactment). Firstly, as discussed above, such an approach considers that discussions of justice (end) and citizenship curriculum (means) improve each other through refining possibilities and limits of developing civic virtues. Balancing ideal and real is more sophisticated and demands the development of two different reflective equilibria in the fields of justice and citizenship curriculum: one between normative and descriptive understandings of society; another between theory and practice. In fact, the concept of reflective equilibrium created by Rawls (1971) guides the main reflections on justice, whilst Dewey's similar ideas are mostly oriented towards reflections on education.

Specifically, this thesis appeals to two types of reflective equilibria, one named “ideal-non-ideal” and another named “theoretical-practical”, a similar division named by Rawls (2001) as wide and general reflective equilibria. However, this thesis’ equilibria make two main departures from Rawls’. First, unlike Rawls, in this work such equilibria are explored not only in debates on justice but also in debates on the citizenship curriculum. Second, the definition of ideal-non-ideal equilibrium is distinct from Rawls’ wide equilibrium, and is based on Mills’ (2005) proposal. As is developed in 2.6, ideal-non-ideal equilibrium intends to promote a dialogue between philosophical ideas and empirical studies about people’s opinions and practices on justice and citizenship education. Wide equilibrium, on the other hand, is only concerned with comparisons between different philosophical theories of justice (Rawls, 2001), not with the dialogue between philosophical and empirical findings. However, if Rawls’ wide reflective equilibrium and this thesis’ ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium are different, the same cannot be said about Rawls’ general reflective equilibrium and the

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6 This expression is taken from Mills’ non-idealised theory that is opposed to Rawls’ idealised theory.
equilibrium referred to here as theoretical-practical, both of which defend the importance of dialogue between theories and people’s/state’s actual practices in public sphere (Rawls, 2001).

Regarding how these two equilibria are related, it important to call attention, as discussed in 1.5, that only an outline – that summarises a broad view on this subject represented by the analogy of the world map, introduced below (another original contribution of this thesis) – of the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium is achieved by this thesis. *Theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium is not developed by this thesis, since it can only be done in public sphere*. Even so, it can be said that the outline of the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium is a first step to the implementation, in the public sphere of the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium. The outline of the former and its connection with the latter are the main original contributions of the thesis.

In summary, the ways in which theory and practice, ideal and non-ideal theories about justice and citizenship curriculum balance and correct each other orient the approach behind this thesis.

This distinct approach allows the use of different research methodologies. This format, among other things, challenges the classic format of empirical theses – literature review, research design/methods, and data analysis – since many different approaches are applied. Even the process of writing was non-linear, since the idea of reflective equilibrium was also applied during this back and forth processes of improving ideas from new “discoveries”. In other words, though the empirical research was oriented by theoretical ideas, some ideas that came from the former also oriented further research on topics developed in the latter.

In philosophy, there is a clear and structured method to how research is conducted. Certain themes are elected by the researcher, and normally, a tradition of thought is chosen as the main bibliographical source. Then, a reasoning which clarifies some concepts and defends some ideas through rational arguments is developed. This reasoning is based on reading the most important scholars and secondary literature in those areas. Thus, the philosophical components of this thesis (chapters 3, 4, 8 and 9) clarify concepts and use them to build the main arguments. Regarding the debate about justice, the ideas of equal liberty, communal responsibility and democracy are clarified and some interpretations are used to present a
more accurate description of how a just society should be. Regarding the debate about education, reflections on the ideas of citizenship and indoctrination, the absence of citizenship education giving room for other types of education and on the limits of the rights of parents, state and children in this field are also discussed. Additionally, the philosophical activity can also accomplish the task of defining new concepts. Thus, other original contributions of this thesis are certain new categories to deal with reflections about justice (economic, cultural and decision-making dimensions) and citizenship curricula (supra official, wide official, narrow official, unofficial and hidden), as well as a list of civic virtues (civic knowledge, critical thinking, cognitive empathy, compassion, fighting for justice, following rules and competition in a cooperative system) that serve as conceptual tools to build the main arguments presented. (Particularly, the tripartite division of reflections about justice favours a double gain: firstly, it makes easier to develop a theoretical analysis of what is fair; consequently, the understanding of this multiplicity also avoids a polarisation of the political debate and increases the possibilities of dialogue in public sphere, as discussed in 4.1).

Different methods were used to conduct the empirical analyses covered in this thesis. In order to describe people’s opinions and behaviours associated with their ideas of justice, the present work opted for secondary data, since conducting a research study to obtain this data would be overly demanding and there was neither the time nor the material resources to do so. Thus, conclusions about people’s opinions and behaviours towards justice are based on historical, psychological, biological, sociological and economic analyses of Western (particularly Brazilian) individuals and societies.

Regarding reflections on moral development (psychology/biology) and on empirical social choice (economics), thinkers like Bloom (2013; 2016) and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2010) analyse several empirical types of research (normally quantitative) and put psychology/biology and economics in dialogue with philosophical theories of justice. However, this thesis does not consider that such empirical research is enough to describe people’s actual practices. Careful observations of the dynamics of the public arena are also fundamental. Thus, the history of Brazilian society’s political development and the current laws, policies, public opinion and structure of the Brazilian state are presented in chapter 6 through analyses of historical and sociological data. Both chapters, thus, produce data that allow the achievement of the above mentioned ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium.
In the previous topic, only reflections on methods for dealing with empirical knowledge about justice are presented. However, this thesis is also interested in empirical data about formal citizenship education. Thus, it is necessary to describe empirical research achieved to understand school communities’/state’s opinions and practices towards the application of citizenship curriculum. This part of the thesis draws upon primary data collected through qualitative research. Such a methodology was adopted because there is a belief that a precise choice of few schools and school actors could provide an in-depth and contextualised perspective that would be impossible with broad quantitative research. Moreover, the fact that different types of schools are being observed captures some of the diversity of the Brazilian educational system. In this sense, this empirical research offering primary data on how citizenship education happens in Brazilian schools, is also an original contribution of this thesis. (Here, this empirical research is only briefly described, since chapter 7 is almost exclusively focused on explaining in detail the methodology behind this study.)

1.4. Chapter structure

The present work is divided in four parts. The first one presents the main structure of the thesis. The introduction is obviously important for this, however, it is in chapter 2 that the approach behind this thesis is presented and justified. Chapter 2 introduces this thesis’ metaphysical-epistemological understanding of reality. It explores and supports the idea of reflective equilibrium and its association with pragmatism. A parallel between studies of natural sciences and of justice is established and the importance of finding paradigms to develop them is defended. A historical analysis of the Western world is undertaken in order to identify its current paradigm: a broad belief in equal liberty, communal resposibility, and democracy. Finally, citizenship education is deemed fundamental to mediate people’s dynamics through the refinement of this paradigm.

The second part of this thesis reflects about justice. Chapter 3 clarifies the main concepts discussed and defends that they are somehow consensual. In parallel, it defends that the hypothetical social contract and social choice theory are the best available frameworks to theoretically structure Western societies. However, despite these consensual ideas, others are quite disputable. Chapter 4 reflects on these disputable ideas. In this way, different theories that can be classified as reasonable are presented. This aims to favour a view that, if these
ideas are well justified, it is possible to achieve a dialogue amongst them that keeps stability and improves justice. Chapter 5 approaches the discussion of justice from a different perspective. Whilst the previous chapters focus on philosophical discussions of justice, this chapter explores empirical data about real human practices towards justice based on their natures and cultures. However, since it equally identifies that people’s rationality helps to determine these practices, this chapter puts real and ideal understanding of justice in dialogue. Discussions of natural selection and moral psychology are central. Chapter 6, in turn, focuses on descriptive elements of Brazil’s peculiar history related to its people’s development of their sense of justice and civic values. Moreover, historical and current data about inequalities are analysed.

The third part of the thesis discusses the citizenship curriculum. Chapter 7 explores the different methodological elements which structure the other chapters: the reasons behind the choice of a specific list of virtues; the unusual division of the curriculum; the choice of laws and policies analysed; and, mainly, how the qualitative research based on primary data was developed. Thus, after discussing these methodologies, chapter 8 marks the middle point between reflections on justice and citizenship education, and represents an effort to identify a list of civic virtues to help to fill this gap between ideal and real practices towards justice. The ground for further discussions in the educational field on how to cultivate these virtues is, thus, prepared. Chapter 9 turns the discussion towards citizenship education from a philosophical point of view. Reflections on ways to deal with political debates, limits for teachers’ and parents’ interference in the cultivation of virtues in students, students’ autonomy, and other issues. Chapter 10 analyses the history and the current situation of laws and policies that orient the citizenship curriculum in Brazil. Laws and policies, since they are based on ideal theories but equally aim to have an impact on reality, are identified in between ideal and real. Chapter 11 describes the previously mentioned three schools’ actual dynamics towards citizenship education. Thus, their educational structures, projects and effectiveness of the teaching-learning processes are analysed. Chapter 12, on the other hand, is focused on collecting school communities’ opinions on how citizenship education should be. It has a dual intention: to better understand the views of head teachers, teachers and students on how citizenship education should be conducted in order to enrich the understanding of the real process; but also to produce new ideas that are normally lost if only ideas produced by academics, often distant from school realities, are followed. Thus, chapter 12 is also in between ideal and real.
Finally, the forth part (the conclusion) outlines a connection amongst all these ideal and real perspectives on justice and education, and delineates feasible and interdependent theories in both fields. Moreover, such a chapter allows the establishment of the interdependence between reflections on justice and education, which is hardly presented in liberal egalitarian literature. In this way, the conclusion is the room for a reflection about the integration of different ideas presented in the previous chapters, all of them almost expressed as independent papers. This integration between chapters is illustrated in Figure 3. Through this new schema (a development of Figure 2), it is possible to identify the role of each one of the chapters in the main structure of this thesis.

1.5. Weaknesses and strengths of this thesis

Reflecting on the weaknesses and strengths of the present project, it is worth comparing it to other theses. PhDs normally deal with very specific issues, something justifiable, since current societies demand precise and specialised knowledge. However, overall knowledge is also needed. Some may say that, even if very wide research is needed, it is inappropriate to

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7 It is important to reinforce that only the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium is developed by this thesis, though achieved in two different moments – through putting in dialogue reflections of justice and citizenship curriculum from ideal and ideal-real points of view (A and C), and the results of these reflections and exclusive observations of reality (B and D). The theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium is only developed in the public sphere. This idea is further developed in chapter 2.
PhD studies. Such research should be a lifetime project and/or developed collectively. The lack of time and experience of a PhD student would make this kind of attempt methodologically weak and without any scientific value. I partially agree with this. Since the beginning, I was aware that it would be impossible to explore deeply most issues discussed in each chapter. This can be perceived throughout the text, since counterarguments for any point taken as correct are almost always briefly developed. Moreover, important elements that connect these different areas are not investigated. The main absence is related to studies on real people’s ideas about several central elements that allow a deep understanding of what the population consider fair. For example, no statistics of Brazilians’ current opinions on redistribution of resources, cultural issues and democratic practices is presented. Parents’ opinions on citizenship education are also absent.

However, I have two strong reasons to insist on the matter. First, PhD research usually orients academic careers. In my personal experience, the main example is the exaggerated specialisation of the Philosophy Department at my university in the South of Brazil (Federal University of Rio Grande de Sul, considered to be one of the most reputable Brazilian universities, ranking in the top five in the country⁸). This fact seems to generate a lack of internal discussions and interactions with other departments. For example, publications produced by this department in association with sociology, psychology, history, economics, education, etc. are rare. In my view, this is related to the fact that almost all lecturers/professors have written very specific theses and this has oriented their careers. My impression is that something similar happens in most other departments in Brazil and unfortunately this causes very narrow interpretations of social dynamics. Thus, opting for a different path, I hope that the wide knowledge acquired through this process will help me and other people to connect different fields during our entire careers.

The second reason is based on an effort to create new ways to connect different areas. Theoretically, philosophers of science like Kuhn, pragmatist educators like Dewey and political philosophers like Rawls defend developing knowledge from the dialogue between theory and practice. The idea of reflective equilibrium explored above summarises this point. However, it is uncommon for research to fully explore both sides. There is an attempt here to further the application of reflective equilibrium, though it cannot be fully applied in a PhD

thesis, since theoretical-practical equilibrium depends on the interchange between theoretical ideas and real people’s and policymakers’ opinions and attitudes in the political arena, as discussed in 2.6.

In addition, it is important to say that the attempt to fully connect so many areas related to reflections on justice and citizenship curriculum is highly demanding, and can be considered naive. However, though “by nature” incomplete, the present work makes more evident to the readers which gaps have to be filled. Thus, it is at least a guide for future research that can depart from the literature and ideas (some likely wrong) presented here. In the same way, the structure of this thesis is only a suggestion of how to organise the debate about justice and citizenship curriculum. Through reflecting on this approach, by comparing this thesis with their own structure of thinking, the readers can at least identify with more clarity their own ideas about the discussed point.

In order to reinforce these justifications, it is interesting to mention that the connection between philosophy and education is rarely found in research on citizenship education in Brazil. Using the Scielo journal article database and CAPES database of theses, several works from 2004 to 2014 were found. However, most of them are only concerned with research about practices of citizenship education. In most of these, citizenship is directly associated with health (Ferreira et al, 2014; Guimarães & Silva, 2010), sustainability (Kondrat & Maciel, 2013; Reigota, 2008), culture (Silva, 2014; Gruman, 2012); and with work (Tanji et al, 2010; Geisler, 2006; Lima, 2006). Regarding philosophical theories behind this discussion, it was possible to find a limited number of works. Some of them only analyse public policies (Piassi, 2011; Mangue, 2008), a few try to present a dialogue between theoretical ideas and practices (Maia & Pereira, 2014; Silveira, 2013; Gorgen, 2013; Jacobi, 2008; Jimenez, 2007; Rodrigues, 2006) but, even amongst these, none tries to connect practical discussions with a deep philosophical investigation of the idea of egalitarian liberalism, one of the most prominent political theories of our time.

As a final observation, the idea that studies on very specific subjects are unimportant is obviously not one supported in this thesis. They are and must be stimulated. Nevertheless, it is being claimed that the proportion of wide investigations connecting different areas have to increase, otherwise, holistic views – central for political decisions – will be relegated to a second plane. Academia has the task of providing technical support for such decisions, and
these holistic views can provide some orientation to collective research that combines different areas and can have significant impact in the public sphere. This observation is particularly important in the Brazilian context, where educational projects are mostly linked with political parties’ projects. In this context, the voices of more impartial experts are not given room. Thus, consensual subjects are rare and sustainable advancement on these discussions are hardly accomplished. This thesis tries to help reach this consensus.

Regarding the weaknesses and strengths of this holistic approach, an analogy with cartography can be used. There is no doubt that maps with different scales are important for dealing with distinct situations. A friend walking in Estrela, a beautiful city of Brazil, who wants to find the house of my grandmother will use the map of Figure 4, while a pilot who wants to go from São Paulo to Johannesburg will use the map of Figure 5:

![Figure 4](image1)

![Figure 5](image2)

Obviously, in the map of Figure 5, it is very difficult to see even huge rivers like the Amazon. On the other hand, in the map of Figure 4, it is impossible to situate Estrela in its state or country. In other words, both maps have advantages and disadvantages when compared with each other.
Moreover, when the first cartographers (not necessarily the great ones) started designing world maps, they presented distorted views. Yet, erroneous maps were quite important for the whole process of designing the actual maps, since, based on those first drawings, the next cartographers could fix the problems and present improved ideas. In this sense, the 500 A.D. map of Figure 6 was important for the evolution in cartography and for the design of the 1620 map of Figure 7:

![Figure 6](image1)

![Figure 7](image2)

This analogy is useful for representing this research. Probably with similar imprecisions to those presented in Figure 6, the present thesis connects studies in philosophy, history, sociology, psychology, biology, economics and education in order to allow the future researchers – cartographers – to better design these connections.

As a final issue related to the analysis of weaknesses and strengths of this thesis, considering the fact that personal characteristics somehow influence thinkers’ ideas, I briefly describe myself and my personal experience. I am a white middle-class able-bodied cis heterosexual man. This means that I am undoubtedly someone who is very privileged in a society which carries elements of structural racism, classism, homophobia and sexism. Some people may think that this thesis proposes a self-interested model of society in which I can retain some of my privileges. However, I can at least promise that this is not my conscious intention. My
aim is to work towards reducing injustices in a way that seems effective. Nevertheless, maybe because I do not feel the injustices discussed in this work in my everyday life, I am not able to describe them properly. Thus, perhaps this less radical proposal is yet another reinforcement of the status quo, even if it is not my conscious desire.
2. Political revolutions, paradigms, and reflective equilibrium

The defence of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium as the best procedure to reach a more just society and a partial achievement of such a procedure is the main contribution of this thesis. The theoretical reflection about this is presented in this chapter. In this way, it starts by exploring (2.1) the possibilities and limits of an analogy proposed by Rawls between the improvements of sciences and just societies. This analogy is the first step towards his understanding of reflective equilibrium. However, to better explain such a concept, (2.2) Kuhn’s project regarding the development of science is summarised: natural scientists, in periods of normality (unlike moments of crisis usually followed by scientific revolutions), accept certain paradigms and their sciences are developed through a reflective equilibrium between theory and personal observations. This fact reinforces the idea that sciences are developed from a “deliberative consensus” (eventually broken). (2.3) Dewey’s pragmatism is, then, associated with this idea and some important virtues of an intelligent way to develop science are presented to escape from post-modern criticisms of it. Then, a shift from natural to political sciences is made: it is suggested that, (2.4) in a very broad sense, Western contemporary societies, after a long political revolution, live under the paradigm based on the main ideas of equal liberty and communal responsibility developed based on democratic procedures. This fact is far from meaning that Western societies are just. Thus, (2.5) a brief reflection about several remaining injustices in the post-revolutionary period is presented. From this, finally it is proposed that (2.6) Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium between theories (based on equal liberty and communal responsibility) and people’s considered opinions (obtained by democratic procedures) is even more important in developing a just society than a similar method is for developing natural sciences. At the end, (2.7) only as an indication of an idea which is developed in the following chapters, a proposal of civic education (later in this thesis, also developed through a kind of reflective equilibrium), is presented as the means to helping people to improve their judgments about justice (based on the aforementioned Western values) and better contribute to democratic decisions reinforcing a communal spirit.

2.1. The developments of sciences and just societies
Rawls opens *A Theory of Justice* saying that “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (1999[1971]: p.1). The obscure nature of this sentence requires further investigation. Thus, in order to develop some ideas honouring the Rawlsian project – restated in *Political Liberalism* (1993) and *Justice as Fairness* (2001) – this thesis suggests rephrasing and dividing the sentence in two parts: (i) “looking for justice is the first virtue of societies, as looking for truth is the first virtue of scientific communities”; (ii) “promoting a well-ordered society (stability for the right reasons) is the first virtue of social institutions, as promoting a situation of normal science (for the right reasons) is the first virtue of systems of thought”.

The main aim of the first rephrased sentence is making clear that virtuous societies – and not virtuous social institutions – are those that look for “justice”. Social institutions have a different function, as explored in the next paragraph. This comparison shows how Rawls (and this thesis) understand justice. “Looking for justice”, that is, “trying to treat all individuals in a just way”, is a characteristic of a virtuous society, not of a virtuous individual. Of course, ordinarily, individuals are classified as just or unjust. However, here, “just” is a quality exclusively related to social decisions. In this sense, “justice” means “social justice”. Moreover, societies can look for other virtues, like efficiency, but justice is considered as the most important one. Nevertheless, since well-ordered societies are composed of individuals who take decisions in the public sphere, to be just, these societies depend on individuals with certain virtues. One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate such virtues and how to cultivate them.

The second sentence serves to explain, through another analogy, the role of virtuous institutions in Rawls’ project. According to him, virtuous social institutions are those which preserve conditions for a society to progress politically towards “justice”, exactly as, according to Kuhn, virtuous systems of thought are those in which knowledge progresses towards “truth”. In 2.2, it is shown that, in Kuhn’s view, a virtuous system – a virtuous paradigm – is associated with a period of normality. In these moments, scientists have a basis

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9 Other approaches can claim that, for example, eliminating oppression or suffering, increasing average welfare, or perpetuating the culture are more important than promoting justice. However, as explored in chapter 4, these ideas are somehow contemplated by the current proposal.
10 The same distinction can be applied for scientific communities and scientists.
11 “Truth” and “justice” are mentioned between brackets, because, for pragmatism (the metaphysical-epistemological approach behind this thesis), they only exist within a consensual context. This idea is explored in 2.2.
of common beliefs which allow them to collaborate towards producing new methodologies and data, creating plenty of new knowledge. It is claimed here that, according to Rawls, virtuous institutions are those which guarantee social stability. Such a moment allows citizens to live in a system of social cooperation, which helps them to develop just societies in a well-ordered way (2001, p.27-8).

Though this analogy seems interesting, there are also some limits to it. Firstly, the development of natural sciences requires a different type of precision from what is needed in social sciences. Actually, the identification of a paradigm in social sciences is much more difficult and controversial than in natural sciences. Furthermore, it is far from obvious that some specific values associated with the idea of justice are shared by individuals in Western contemporary societies. Even so, 2.4 presents the historical development of a shared belief in broad ideas of equal liberty, communal responsibility and democracy.

Reflecting specifically on theories of justice, two other limits can be identified. Invariably, theories of justice – unlike theories about the natural world – do not intend only to describe phenomena, but also to actively influence the way societies are organised and individuals behave. Finally, as explored in 2.2, the range of consensus in natural sciences is quite small, since the agreement is expected only between “principal” researchers’ theories centred in specific fields and “minor” researchers’ findings. On the other hand, political consensus, as aimed by Rawls (1993; 2001), is general, that is, such equilibrium has to reach (almost) all society – something much more difficult. This depends on a dialogue between principal and minor researchers from different areas (philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, economics, etc.) and the translation of their ideas to the population; at the same time, people’s ideas have to reach academic debate (this point is explored in 2.4). This dialogue is essential for refining ideas and solving political puzzles. More than this, since political discussions are much less precise than scientific debates (and, as discussed in 2.3, scientific ethos seems to be more developed than social ethos), mechanisms for dealing with dissensus in political theory are imperative. It is also possible to say that, following Honig (1993) and Mouffe (1993), dissensus is inherent to (democratic) politics. Actually this idea is also explored by Alnes (2017) in his reflection about the room of dissensus in Rawlsian idea of overlapping

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12 This concept is presented in a broad sense: they are not necessarily those who lead funded research projects.
consensus (2.6). Then, it is not expected that equilibrium in politics is based on the same level of consensus as in natural sciences.

Having presented initial possibilities and limits of investigations in natural sciences and political philosophy, it is also interesting to show that the inspiration behind the Rawlsian idea of reflective equilibrium comes directly from reflections on the development of sciences. Though this expression was invented by Rawls, it is based on Goodman’s works on philosophy of science (1999[1971], p.18). Through proposing such equilibrium, Rawls tries to capture the idea of a “virtuous circle” between basic ideas and justifications proposed by Goodman to solve a problem about how sciences are developed. As discussed in 2.2, this proposal is closely connected with Kuhn’s and Dewey’s ideas on the development of knowledge.

2.2. Entrenched paradigms, crisis and revolutions

Before Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), two different ways of theorising how science is developed were considered: the standard empiricism that understands science as an accumulation of knowledge about reality; Popper’s defence that science is a process of falsifying ideas that were otherwise accepted as true (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.50). Despite this difference, both approaches believe that the scientific process is somehow linear. That is, they suggest that sciences are developed without “clashes”.

Kuhn (1962) proposes something different. Based on historical observations of different areas of natural sciences, he claims that they progress through the interchange of two completely distinct moments. Most of the time, a certain paradigm is accepted by the scientific community and almost all researchers in that area follow those ideas. In these cases, researchers’ work attempts to advance these ideas. Kuhn calls this period “normal science”. Paradigms are based on two elements: basic principles and methods of research. Nevertheless, anomalies are sometimes identified: the development of such ideas begins to reveal inconsistencies within the paradigm, phenomena forecasted by the theory are refuted, equipment built based on its principles do not work, etc. When situations like these accumulate, the scientific community slowly starts to suspect that such a paradigm is wrong. A moment of crisis arises until a new paradigm, through a “scientific revolution”, replaces
the previous one. After this new paradigm is established, scientists progress again within a period of normality.

The Copernican Revolution, in which the geocentric paradigm shifted to the heliocentric paradigm, is one of many historical cases when this process of paradigm-crisis-revolution-(new)paradigm has occurred within the natural sciences. In 1543, Copernicus proposed to replace the idea, systematised by Ptolemy, that Earth is the immobile centre of the universe. The fact that many important astronomers at the time recognised that the Ptolemaic paradigm was failing was a prerequisite to Copernicus’ quest for another paradigm (Kuhn, 1996[1962], p.69). The redefinition of the concept of “planets” as “objects that turn around the Sun” – instead of “objects that turn around the Earth” – made the concept of a planet much simpler and could solve all the astronomical problems of that time.

Based on this, science can be understood as a social construction which supports a certain paradigm. However, this social basis sometimes changes its view and starts endorsing a new paradigm. In summary, according to Kuhn, sciences are developed under a consensus, which is then eventually broken. For the purposes of this thesis, it is fundamental to understand the centrality of scientists’ behaviour during the period of normal science in Kuhn’s proposal, behaviour that counters Popper’s “falsificationist” understanding of the development of science. Lakatos’ (1970) suggestion that science is developed by “research programmes” supports Kuhn’s idea. He argues that “scientists may be justified in holding on to their basic propositions, or hypothesis (the ‘core’ of the programme) in the face of apparently adverse evidence”. Otherwise, a constant doubt about their findings would create excessive instability and difficulty in advancing knowledge (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.62-3). As developed below, this idea is also found in the foundations of Dewey’s pragmatism.

This thesis does not explore the main arguments in favour of epistemological and metaphysical ideas against Kuhn’s and Dewey’s proposals. The main point here is to show how useful this approach is to frame reflections about two specific subjects: justice and citizenship curriculum. Thus, an analogy is proposed between Kuhn’ idea of development of normal science and Rawls’ idea of development of a theory of justice in a stable (for the right reasons) society. In order to do this, it is important to start by observing two characteristics of the Kuhnian approach to the progress of science that challenge the usual idea, based on a linear development of it: the rejection of the distinction between the context of creating new
ideas and the context of justification; the conclusion that science is never neutral, but that a “democratic” development of it can mitigate this biased process. The first point is associated with Goodman’s understanding of the development of science, and both points also connect Kuhn’s project with Dewey’s pragmatism.

Reflecting on the first point, it can be said that the new idea that Earth and other planets turn around the Sun was not only a new “fact”, but it changed the way scientists viewed the scientific process itself. For example, rather than thinking that entities naturally move towards the Earth (as Aristotle proposed in his Physics), the movement of objects were thought about in relation to their mass. This discovery subsequently helped to challenge the notion that the natural world has an “intention”, changing the way that scientists looked at the world around them. The scientific community, based on this new paradigm, was stimulated to build new tools and to think of new experiments to discover new “facts”. For example, after Copernicus, many observatories of astronomy were built, and the observations achieved in these places gave reliability to the new paradigm. In summary, changes in what the scientific community considers to be “facts” change the method of justification for these “facts” (and vice-versa).

By examining the history of these processes, one notices that some concepts modify their meanings over time. Reflecting again on the Copernican Revolution, the definition of “planet” changed from “entities which revolve around the Earth” to “entities which revolve around the Sun”. The explanation for such a change is neither logical nor scientific. What happened was that, after such revolution, the second concept merely became more entrenched, that is, it started to make more sense to notice the same “pattern” among these “new” planets than among the “old” ones. This was because, in the sixteenth century, the only way to keep the basic idea that Earth is the immobile centre of universe was to admit that patterns of movement of some considered “planets” were very weird. Questioning these weird patterns of movement made scientists question their former definition of planets. For example, as Figure 8 shows, the observations at that time allowed scientists to imagine the movements of Earth (E), Sun (S) and Mars (M) in two different ways: the first (I), in which Earth is immobile; the second (II), in which the Sun is immobile. Over time, scientists changed their views from (I) to (II), for two reasons: the second could explain better different phenomena, and its taxonomic division seemed to be much more intuitive – in (II), “planets” turn “circularly” around the Sun; in (I), some of them (in the figure, Mars) turn around Earth.
in a “weird” way. Respectively, these changes in the basic idea of what a planet is and the justification of their movements supported each other, that is, together, they made the new concept of planet more entrenched. This made the new theory – and the law of universal gravitation (1687), developed by Newton more than 100 years later – more projectable by establishing more valid rules of justification.

![Figure 8](image)

The connection between the entrenchment of concepts and the projectability of theories was presented by Goodman (1955). According to him, these ideas are extra-logical notions based on people’s (in this case, scientists’) habits. In this sense, a concept (basic idea) is more entrenched if it is more projectable by the valid general rules of justification used by science. (In the case of the movement of “planets”, the circular trajectory made much more sense as a justification than the weird trajectory as observed for Mars.) However, if it is impossible to precisely identify the Uniformity of Nature (1983[1955], p.ix), what are valid general rules of justification? Surprisingly, Goodman’s answer is that they are the rules of justification which are historically practised in science. There is an evident circularity here, but, as Putman says, “What we have in Goodman’s view […] are practices, which are right or wrong depending on how they square with our standards. And our standards are right or wrong depending on how they square with our practices. This is a circle, or better a spiral, but one that Goodman, like John Dewey, regards as virtuous” (1983[1955], p.ix).

This virtuous circularity – or spiral movements – between basic ideas and justification shows that the epistemology based on this equilibrium is associated with a metaphysical project that understands “truth” not as the correspondence with reality – as proposed by Aristotle (Metaphysics, 1011b26-27) – but as a consensus of the community about the best way to explain phenomena and forecast new events. This association is at the core of Dewey’s pragmatism which rejects the “idea of knowledge as a mirroring of an eternal, static reality. Instead he took his point of departure in the ever-changing organism-environment
transaction. Knowing is not outside of this process but part of it” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p.55). In this way, according to Dewey, a claim is true if it is accepted by a certain community. As he says, “reality […] for pragmatism is still in the making” (1908, p.99).

In this sense, for a pragmatist like Dewey, truth is associated with context and has a practical function. In Dewey’s words, “[t]he agreement, correspondence, is between purpose, plan, and its own execution, fulfilment” (1907, p.84). This idea deciphers the connection between Dewey’s pragmatism and Kuhn’s and Goodman’s ideas:

For Dewey, therefore, truth is not about the correspondence between descriptions of reality and reality itself. The correspondence, in other words, is not static or descriptive. For Dewey the correspondence is active and temporal; it is included in the cycle of action-reflection-action. (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p. 69)

This suggestion is in accordance with the idea of reflective equilibrium between basic scientific ideas and their justification. It is important to notice that, from this process, new scientific puzzles are suggested and new approaches to solving them are tested (Kuhn, 1996[1962], p.38-9). In this sense, reflective equilibrium is an approach that endorses the correlation between ideal theories and empirical studies – both of which are dependent on their proper methods of research.

2.3. Pragmatism and Enlightenment

Such a virtuous circularity between basic ideas and justification is oriented towards the understanding that there are no theory-neutral observations in science. An alternative to the positivist aspiration towards neutrality is, then, presented (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.14). This alternative to the attempt to be neutral admits that our observations are always biased by what the scientific community claims as “true” (the paradigm). However, given the fact that knowledge is always biased, it seems fundamental to follow Dewey’s suggestion that the scientific community’s agreement has to be built in an intelligent way. This begs the question: what should be done to develop consensual knowledge “intelligently”?

Reflecting on this, it is important to start by recognising that, many times, consensual ideas are established by agents other than those in the scientific community. It is quite common for
external factors to promote a stable situation that would otherwise not be consensual. In this
sense, such external factors can sometimes slow the progress of science. Contextualising the
period before the Copernican Revolution, “[b]ecause the astronomical tradition was
repeatedly interrupted from outside and because, in the absence of printing, communication
between astronomers was restricted, these difficulties were only slowly recognized” (Kuhn,
1996[1962], p.68-9). In this case, the Catholic Church had for a long time boycotted much
research opposing its own “scientific” dogmas. This is a typical example in which consensual
“truth” was determined by certain structures of power.

Thus, Dewey considers objectivity/clarity and the democratic interchange of plural ideas
fundamental characteristics of intelligent habits (Bieta & Burbules, 2003, p.70). “Objective
and democratic ethos”, thus, mitigate problems linked to self-interests and external interests
which bias scientific research. In scientific debates, then, access, clarity and plurality must be
stimulated. In general, the influence of structures of power over knowledge as denounced by
Foucault is only mitigated if widespread ideas are equally considered. For this reason, though
the positivistic dream of “the neutrality of science” is a chimera, scientific knowledge
currently appeals to the basic ideals of Enlightenment, that is, the incessant search for
clarifying ideas.

Even so, Foucault’s criticisms against the negative impacts of power structures over the
development of knowledge cannot be ignored. Concerning political ideas, authoritarian (and
pseudo-democratic) regimes maintain control over individuals not only through physical
oppression, but also through manipulation of their thoughts. A summary of Foucault’s ideas
on this is: “agency and subjectivity [are] constituted and manipulated by relations of power.
So there is little space in [Foucault’s] account for agents to acquire and exercise autonomous
agency” (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.49). In this sense and in partial agreement with Marx,
Foucault understands that the social structure alienates the individual (Benton & Craib, 2001,
p.116).

In Animal Farm (1945) and 1984 (1949), Orwell creates metaphors for these two types of
control. However, he suggests that reinforcing clarity and objectivity of ideas is the way to

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13 In Animal Farm, manipulation comes from the pigs’ domain of written language and the oppression from
their control over the dogs’ army; in 1984, manipulation comes from the tactics of double-thinking and the
overcome authoritarian manipulation: “[f]reedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows” (1949, p.81). The importance given by Orwell to clarity and logics which is viewed as fundamental to human liberty sets the tone of this thesis. The incessant search for the meaning of “justice”, despite its unreachable nature, permeates this entire work and, thus, a pragmatic attitude towards it is proposed. In this sense, even given the importance of Foucault’s warnings about manipulation, post-structuralist relativism about the idea of justice is denied, since relativism impedes the evolution of debates about this concept. In the end, the belief in Enlightenment seems to be the way to continue developing knowledge about sciences and justice:

[t]rying to abandon vast and complex bodies of thought […] cannot be done. One cannot think new thoughts from nowhere, and critiques of the Enlightenment can only come from within the Enlightenment and be based upon Enlightenment principles. [Post-modernist and post-structuralist thinkers] argue for their positions; in other words, they employ reason, the very reason they are criticising, and they are thus placed very firmly within the tradition they are criticizing, while the radical politics that some of them uphold – notions of democracy, tolerance, multiculturalism, the equality of sexes – all of these things can be argued for from within the traditions they criticize and in many cases these ideas are generated from these traditions. (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.171)

Whilst objectivity and democratic interchange in the development of science is fundamental, Dewey also defends the idea that, in some degree, it is intelligent to take very seriously established knowledge:

Although there is no guarantee that “old” knowledge will be successful for the solution of the problem at hand, it can at least suggest a variety of different approaches for understanding the situation, interpreting observations, and possible action. (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p.61)

In this sense, the existence of some ground is important for developing science (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p.67). As claimed in 2.2, Kuhn, by saying that scientists normally insist on established beliefs, sees in this kind of attitude an important element towards progress of science.

oppression from torture. Orwell also wrote Politics and English Language (1946) in which he presents examples of manipulation in real politics.
2.4. Communal/national responsibility and equal liberty (basic ideas) and democracy (basic method)

The development of scientific knowledge is taken as a good archetype for the development of just societies. Following Dewey’s suggestion about developing knowledge in an intelligent way, it is important to identify current established political values/knowledge (main ideas) about justice and procedures (main method) in order to refine them. In this thesis, only Western values and procedures are analysed, since, widely speaking, there is a belief that it is possible to find some consensus towards basic values and procedures in Western societies that are not necessarily shared by the non-Western world.\(^\text{14}\) It does not mean, however, that values and procedures of other societies are wrong or inferior. In this thesis, they are only considered different and less useful as foundations for improving the idea of justice in Western socio-political organisations. Thus, from a historical investigation, it is defended that contemporary Western individuals consent in defending the values of equal liberty and communal/national responsibility, and take democracy as the best way to improve justice\(^\text{15}\).

The stability and legitimacy of political decisions in these societies come from the respect of this tripod. These things are directly related to what Harari (2012) calls “imagined orders” or “imagined communities”, and the importance that he gives to “devised scripts” in such processes, something developed below. To clarify these points, 2.5 presents a brief narrative of Western societies’ historical ideas of justice which culminated in political revolutions that solidified these three pillars.

Before starting to present this historical narrative, it is important to say that, even though it is very difficult to define Western societies, it is possible to broadly understand them as societies that have their roots in Greco-Roman civilisation and Christianity (Perry, 2012), with strong influences of Enlightenment thinking (Kurth, 2003, p.5). Obviously, Western

\(^{14}\) Obviously, it would be problematic if, aiming at studying improvements regarding justice and education in Brazil, this thesis only focuses its analysis on “Western values”. Though it is possible to find some elements of homogeneity in this idea, many Western countries also have influences of other cultures. Specifically, Brazil has influences of indigenous and African values. On the other hand, it is equally true that Brazil is fundamentally based on Western values. The existence of other influences, nonetheless, obliges a careful look at the development of a multiplicity of values and practices through Brazilian history. In this way, chapter 6 is written to accomplish this analysis.

\(^{15}\) Different lists of characteristics which define Western societies can be found. Ferguson (2011), for example, identifies six institutions that made Western countries dominant in the world: competition, scientific revolution, property rights, modern medicine, consumer society, and work ethic. This thesis, however, is interested in finding some general ideas that orient the participation of Western citizens in public sphere. Some important elements highlighted by Ferguson – competition, property rights, consumption, and work ethic – call attention for the capitalist ethos associated with the idea equal liberty developed throughout this thesis.
history is much more complex, but this reductionism is helpful in identifying a few consensual ideas that defend the suggested shift in the political paradigm and the stability of the current one. Additionally, aiming to present a more concrete idea of West, Huntington’s (1996) proposal of world territorial division in different civilisations seems promising. This proposal includes under the concept of Western societies most European countries (excepting Russia and some areas under its influence), and places that received vast number of immigrants from Europe, such as countries in North America and Oceania. Huntington considers Latin America and East Europe different civilisations, but admits that they can also be considered part of Western civilisation. In this thesis, some Latin American countries (especially Brazil) are taken as part of Western civilisation. First, they were colonised by Western Europeans, native peoples and African slaves were catechised by the Christian doctrine. Moreover, their country’s independence was rooted in Enlightenment values. That is, broadly speaking, Western values are shared by Brazilian people.

Moreover, it is also important to make a differentiation. The present reflection identifies political values and procedures that sustain the current Western political paradigm. This does not mean that these values and procedures should be universalised – even less that they are already universal and definitive, as Fukuyama (1989) claimed through declaring “the end of History”. It is not even being said that the current Western paradigm is permanent. In fact, agreeing with Huntington’s (1996) idea of the current “clash of civilisations”, it is difficult to believe in such a universalization, at least for the time being. Besides, the tensions in Western societies symbolised by Brexit and Trump’s election threaten the stability and legitimacy of the Western paradigm, something that possibly threatens the rationale of this thesis as a whole.

However, putting aside for a while the analysis of Western societies’ current challenges (these challenges are investigated in 2.5), the first aim is to present a historical investigation that shows the existence of a unified narrative in the West that resulted in a fundamental political shift with the liberal revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, this investigation starts at the birth of Western civilisation placed in Ancient Greece and Rome.

Scholars agree that Ancient Greece and Rome fundamentally shaped some key values that continue to orientate Western societies’ political organisations. First, it is widely known that
the Ancient Greek development of rationality strongly influenced thought during the Renaissance, and Athens’ practice of democracy was fundamental for the development of the idea of liberty, even if only the liberty of political participation (Constant, 1819). Moreover, the sense of duty towards the city identified in Greek communities is at the root of the idea of citizenship explored by the Enlightenment (Guarinello, 2003, p.46). Second, the Roman development of a legal system detached from religion is at the root of Western secular states (Siedentop, 2014). Ironically, as discussed below, the roots of current secular states are in the recovery of the Roman legal system by the Catholic Church’s canon law. It is defended that this process is at the root of the establishment of strong nation-states and individuals’ feeling of attachment with their co-citizens.

However, it is also possible to observe characteristics of these societies that go against the current Western paradigm. The most relevant one is that, in Ancient Greece and Rome, individuals possessed “naturally” different social statuses (Siedentop, 2014, p.51). Greek societies were politically organised in city-states, at the beginning nothing more than associations of landowners (Guarinello, 2003, p.32). During those times, there was a clear distinction between public and domestic, rather than the current idea of separating public and private. This fact favoured inequalities within the family, since the state did not interfere in unequal domestic structure (Siedentop, 2014, p.18). In their public affairs, city-states were also extremely unequal and, even in Athens’ democratic experience, few people were considered citizens and allowed to take part in the democratic process – only men who did not belong to subordinated groups or were not personal slaves (Guarinello, 2003, p.35). Roman city-states had the same characteristic until Rome became a powerful empire, in 27 BC. In that time, it reached one million inhabitants (Guarinello, 2003, p.42), and its social organisation was much more complex, but a strong social divide remained. In its apogee, differently from Athens, almost all were considered citizens and theoretically were under the same legal system. Even so, this was only so in theory, since few had access to justice system and received benefits from the government (Guarinello, 2003, p.44). The sense of community was not behind this idea of citizenship anymore. Thus, though Greek societies were very unequal, the model that inspired Enlightenment thinkers was the Greek sense of belonging towards city-states and not this “extended and amorphous citizenship of Roman Empire” (Guarinello, 2003, p.46).
During the Roman empire, however, the spread of Christian doctrine reached the socially and economically marginalised and developed in them a communal feeling of attachment. Christianity has its roots in Judaism, a religion that had, two thousand years ago, a characteristic that was new in Western world: “the conception of a God that was not satisfied in helping armies, but that demanded an ethical behaviour [based on solidarity] of their followers” (Pinsky, 2003, p.16). However, Christianity was more comprehensive: “while synagogues only helped Jewish, Christian communities welcomed anyone” (Hoornaert, 2003, p.92)\(^{16}\). In this way, Christian doctrine about the primacy of being a son or daughter of God over unequal social roles was fundamental in changing the previous notion of natural inequality (Siedentop, 2014, p.62). Associated with this, the idea that “God had created ‘rational creatures endowed with the faculty of free choice’” (Siedentop, 2014, p.70) was central in Christian doctrine and opened room for people, based on their own will, to become followers of God. This spirit of solidarity and openness that protected the worst-off made Christianity spread very quickly around the Western world (Hoornaert, 2003, p.94)\(^{17}\).

However, in medieval times, with the fragmentation of the Western Roman Empire, this process of spreading the idea of equality amongst the sons and daughters of God and their free will did not have a linear development. Different feuds used to have their own organisations, thus “legal systems” developed independently of each other (Siedentop, 2014, p.253). These systems did not necessarily consider all individuals to be equal. Even so, given the fact that Christian doctrine continued to spread, centuries later, the Catholic Church developed a unified legal system based on its canon law:

> Drawing on Roman law, and under the patronage of the papacy, canon lawyers from the late eleventh century began to create a system of law for Christians founded on the assumption of moral equality. This system was to privilege the conception of what has been called ‘subjective rights’, that is, rights inhering in the individual, starting with the claim to freedom. That claim amounted to a rejection of the ancient assumption of natural inequality. (2014, p.357)

\(^{16}\) Islam is a dissidence of Christianity and, at least regarding this point, works based on the same logics.

\(^{17}\) Obviously, it is possible to find passages in the Bible that give the idea of different types of unequal treatments. For example, sexism is quite common: “But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God” (Corinthians, 11:3 – King James’ version: http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/). In response, it is possible to say that the main idea of its words is a defence of equality amongst individuals. Interestingly, Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed for these words in his fight for equal civil rights in 1960s (Karnal, 2003, p.151).
This unification of canon law made all Christians feel ruled under the same law. Such a feeling is at the root of Absolutism, which was based on the idea of equal subservience to the same king’s commands – that is, the same nation. In the Ancient world, the situation was completely different, since the unequal family sphere had much more importance. In this way, during absolutism, “equal subjection” to a sovereign was perceived not as loss but as gain regarding claims of equal treatment (Siedentop, 2014, p.346). The seeds of national commitment under the protection of the same king were, then, planted.

Of course, though the idea of equality was spread by Christian doctrine, the very hierarchical organisation of the Catholic Church somehow maintained the idea of natural inequalities amongst people. For example, “in 1198, [Pope] Innocent III declared that he was “lower than God, but higher than man”” (Siedentop, 2014, p.322). During absolutism, the higher members of the Church were partners of the royalty in keeping the political superiority over the plebe. Thus, the canon law mentioned before, though based in the Christian doctrine of equal liberty, kept the privileges of those considered and accepted as superior beings.

However, during the Renaissance (the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), this hierarchical state of affairs suffered internal and external criticisms (Mondaini, 2003, p.115) that prepared the terrain for the political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These criticisms are linked with the faster and more democratic spreading of information, which had previously been mostly restricted to the Church’s circles. The main symbol of this change is the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg (1439). In this context, the internal criticism came from a priest, Martin Luther (1517), who fought against, amongst other things, the fact that biblical words were deliberately hidden by the Catholic Church from the faithful, and demanded that Bibles were printed in a language that the faithful could read (Karnal, 2003, p.140). This was one of the challenges of the Reformation, which also required that the practices of the Church be realigned with the words of the Bible. Externally, the rise of scientific methods and of the bourgeoisie – a new social class that developed economic power through expansion of commerce, though did not have the same political status as the clergy and royalty – also lobbied for change. They argued for rationalisation and were against birth privileges, forcing the secularisation of socio-political relations (Mondaini, 2003, p.115).

18 In the same period, Magna Carta (1215), the first secular document that guaranteed a series of individuals’ “civil rights” against arbitrary decisions of a powerful king, was signed. However, this document was not totally embodied in that time, being recovered by the Glorious Revolution (1688) (Hindley, 2008).
19 In this year, he engraved into the door of All Saints’ Church, in Wittenberg, his 95 theses.
The ideas of equality and free will came, then, from the resumption of original Christian doctrine that was in accordance with a new capitalistic ethos in which hierarchical society and inequality based on God’s will were not accepted anymore (Mondaini, 2003, p.116). Moreover, the invention of the printing press, the capitalist perception of the profit of selling books and the limited market of Latin language readers, solidified distinct modern languages in different regions of Europe (Anderson, 2006[1983]).

Such elevation of the importance of local languages as languages of power in absolutist states contributed to decline of the “imagined community” of Christendom, which was based on the Latin language (Anderson, 2006[1983]). The linguistic diversity in distinct feudal societies was huge, though some languages were similar. Thus, via documents that started being printed in local languages, people who spoke different English (or French, etc.) dialects “became capable of comprehending one another” (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.44). This printing process “gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.44). This was increased, during the Renaissance, with the growth of printed poems and epics, which spread among people the idea of “a sociological organism” moving through time, in opposition to Medieval times, when people had no idea of history and lived in instantaneity. The rise of printed literature helped to establish in people the idea of an imagined nation moving through history (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.26).

The terrain for a political revolution towards equal liberty and based on communal/national responsibility was prepared. However, for a while, it was useful for the bourgeoisie to accept absolutist regimes and their hierarchical structure not because they considered inequalities as natural, but because they felt protected by the King from their “enemies” (internal and external). Thus, royalty members had more socio-political rights, not based on natural/ontological differentiations, but for practical reasons.

This incongruence is identified in Hobbes’ social contract theory. In Leviathan (1651), he abandons the ontological differentiation among individuals, but maintains the justification of a regime in which people have to be differentiated – a politically superior king is considered fundamental for maintaining the order. This is a perfect example of the mismatch between an idea of ontological/natural equality among individuals and an unequal way to take political
decisions based in the absolute power of a superior being, the King. As mentioned in 2.2, increasing incongruences in between the idea of geocentrism and its justifications resulted in a scientific revolution; the incongruence mentioned in this paragraph, in different political revolutions.

The absolute power of the King was, however, ending. Following Anderson (2006[1983]), absolutist states were not the locus of the formation of communal responsibility, what he calls an “imagined political community”. In absolute states, kings had the monopoly of decisions and their “legitimacy derived from divinity, not from people” (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.19). Thus, though an imagined nation formed by people that do not know each other was basically established during absolutism, an imagined political community based on people’s sovereignty – as opposed to “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynasty” – and on their cooperation based on a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.7) was not yet established. It was only possible with the liberal revolutions.

Thus, the Glorious Revolution (1688) was the first liberal/bourgeois/capitalist victory over absolutism (Mondaini, 2003, p.116) in which a secular Bill of Rights (1689) limiting the power of the King was implemented in England (Mondaini, 2003, p.129). No doubt, this document, inspired by the Magna Carta and that remains one of the pillars of British legal system, presented limitations: for example, it gave power only to landowners; however, it was also the first consistent step to overcome the idea that individuals had only duties towards the King, since, from this, they also have rights (Mondaini, 2003, p.131).

Improving this change in political consciousness, Locke’s (1690) and Rousseau’s (1750) developments of social contract theory do not appeal to the Hobbesian figure of a king politically (though not naturally) superior. In this way, they were theoretical inspirations for the American (1776) and French (1789) Revolutions. Both theoretical ideals and real movements, through neglecting the need for a king and reducing the importance of the Church, established the first formulation of contemporary secular democracies.

Regarding this, Nussbaum justifies why the new idea of the social contract was so important in that period:
The tradition [of social contract] thus bequeaths to us a procedural understanding of political society in which the equal worth of persons and the value of reciprocity among them are central features. This understanding of political society is a prominent part of classical liberalism’s assault on feudal and monarchical traditions. (2006, p.10-1)

Somehow, it is possible to say that the Glorious, French and American Revolutions were the symbols of the culmination of a long shift in the socio-political paradigm in Western societies. The three main pillars that sustain current Western ideas of justice were finally joined in comprehensive political organisations: the main political value passed from an accepted natural inequality to the overall accepted idea of equal liberty; the political unity passed from patriarchal families’ commitment to their city-states and feudal societies to individuals’ sense of belonging to their nation-states; the political way to take decisions about public issues passed from different types of totalitarianisms to democracies.

Only as a last observation, regarding the communal ties inherited from Christianity, it is fundamental to say that, if this doctrine reinforced communal and national spirits, it did not change significantly another very strong value of these societies: family ties. In parallel to the idea of community, the centrality of the family is still present. Actually, as also defended from a biological point of view (5.1), human beings are mammals and very dependent on their connections with their parents, especially with their mothers. Thus, family ties are hardly ignored by any real society. In the case of the Christian tradition, weddings are one of the most important celebrations, marriages are expected to be respected for all life, parents have special responsibilities towards their children (and vice-versa), etc. However, families are not considered any more monolithic blocks in which, for example, aggressions inside them are accepted by the rest of the community. The separation is now in between public and private (a space for special affection, for privacy, etc.), rather than in between public and domestic (a space where total inequality was the rule, at least until a recent past).

2.5. Injustices in the post-revolutionary period

However, against this idea of paradigm shift, the first criticism is quite obvious: the two main documents of that time – the US Constitution (1787) and the Declaration of Man and of the Citizen (1789) in France – were very restrictive regarding the scope of people they protected. For example, the US Constitution allowed slavery and denied political participation to
women and non-land owners. It seems the same type of restriction identified in Ancient societies. Nevertheless, the spirit of those documents allowed these minorities to invoke a type of society in which they have the same rights as affluent white men (Karnal, 2003, p.144). In the same way, it was based on the respect of Christian values and the respect of the Constitution that Martin Luther King, Jr., claimed, in the 1960s for equality of rights (Karnal, 2003, p.151). Equally, it can be said that Enlightenment ideas inspired (at least the first and the second wave of) the feminist movement (Pinsky & Pedro, 2003, p.266).

Thus, the claim that a political shift was completed after the three liberal revolutions mentioned does not imply that all ideals sustained by the new paradigm were (or are) fully applied in real Western societies. The idea of the individual in the eighteenth century was very abstract and real injustices were far from being eliminated (Karnal, 2003, p.143). However, an analogy with the Copernican Revolution is, once more, useful. When Newton consolidated this scientific revolution through presenting the law of universal gravitation (1687), he did not solve all astronomical challenges of that time. Many centuries of consistent advances of scientific knowledge in this area followed Newton’s “discovery”20. The same is happening with advances in the three political pillars above mentioned: problems regarding social commitments, strong inequalities of liberty and inefficiency of democratic processes are evident in Western societies.

In this way, though it is obvious that several injustices still have to be fixed within this paradigm, it is also true that this is an ongoing process. Analysing specifically English socio-political development after the consolidation of this new socio-political order, Marshall (1950) presents an interesting portrait of the evolution of civil, political and social rights that are directly related to this. After the Glorious Revolution, the development of modern national consciousness in the eighteenth century consolidated the idea of equal civil rights. Of course, this did not mean that a just society was fully reached. However, it started to represent a sense of “loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law. Its growth is stimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won” (Marshall, 1950, p.41).

20 Actually, such a progress culminated in the Einsteinian Revolution, but this is another story.
According to Marshall, it was the first “logical” step towards a long journey from civil to political and then social (still ongoing) equal consideration in the public sphere. The nineteenth century was the century of the fight for political rights. Gradually, after the American and French Revolutions, both linked with the idea of democracy, the range of people allowed to vote in Western societies was increased. However, only after a strong fight for universal suffrage, at the beginning of the twentieth century, did European democracies include women and poor people in the democratic sphere. In the US, racial segregation further delayed the process, and only in the 1960s did the Civil Rights movement see progress for black people’s real political rights, since they previously suffered several practical restrictions on access to voting.

Finally, in the twentieth century, Marshall identified a logical movement based on popular participation in public decisions towards increasing social rights and reducing inequalities. In his words, “a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and the less fortunate” (1950, p.56). Thus, the twentieth century was the century of the fight for social rights, what some call the century of citizenship (Coggiola, 2003, p.311). The idea of the welfare state was born in England in 1911 (Singer, 2003, p.237), though truly achieved only after the Second World War as a response to demands for compensating war efforts and pressures of socialist ideas (Singer, 2003, p.237-9). Thus, the 30 years between 1945 and 1975 were considered the golden age of social rights, the UK National Health System becoming a model of equal protection of all citizens’ health for all Europe (Singer, 2003, p.251).

From this development of social rights, it is possible to say that the idea of equality of opportunities, a concept developed in 4.1, has been consolidated in Western societies. For example, in UK, when the Prime Minister Theresa May, in the 2016 Conservative Party convention, reflected on the situation after Brexit, she appealed for the increasing of equality of opportunity for British citizens (of course, excluding immigrants)\(^21\). Representatives of the Labour party, in turn, disagree with her policies: they, for example, claim that the rich have many more opportunities than the poor, but they agree that equality of opportunities is one of the most important aims to be promoted by the state. In the US, it is in the basis of the “American dream”. This expression was coined by Adams, who said that it means “that

\(^21\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OuH3zgz_1xQ
dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement” (1931, p.214). The point, then, is not about the value defended, but about what equality of opportunities really means and how it should be implemented.

According to this narrative, it is possible to identify the process of refinement of the main ideas that have founded the current Western paradigm. However, it is quite obvious that, though this narrative presents a logical development, none of these rights have been fully implemented in most of Western societies. Moreover, this picture is not sufficient for guaranteeing that this ongoing process is stable in its improvement. Thus, it is interesting to observe possible regressions related to these different rights and, in parallel, to reflect on whether the pace of the eventual advances is tolerable or if more drastic interventions are needed.

Regarding this, it is fundamental to analyse how social rights were (not) developed from the 1980s. For example, in the UK, after the mentioned golden age of social rights (1945-1975), a new era led by Thatcher (1979-1990) and her so-called “neoliberalism” is considered by many as a regression in these rights. According to some interpretations (Coggiola, 2003, p.339), these new policies – which were implemented at the same time in the US by Reagan (1981-1989) and spread to many Western countries – provoked a regression in social rights. Some other understandings that disagree with this idea (Singer, 2003, p.256), at least consider that neoliberalism made social rights’ progress much slower (Singer, 2003, p.253).

Actually, it seems a matter of fact that big multinational corporations pressure governments to reduce social rights. Governments, afraid of “capital flight” from their borders, follow these corporations’ “orders” (Coggiola, 2003, p.335). From this perspective, global neoliberalism would be a regression, since it eliminates the ethical dimension of social life (Luca, 2003, p.490).

However, since political structures are still based on national sovereignty, this type of globalisation is creating several internal problems in Western societies. Nationalist discourse is joining left and right supporters, or, even worse, is making workers disbelieve in any political discourse. The idea of people’s attachment to their nation is part of the current Western paradigm. Nonetheless, even Fukuyama, who, in 1989, claimed that liberalism had
won, now sees that bellicose nationalisms can challenge this order. Currently, Fukuyama is quite concerned with demagogue/populist nationalist leaders’ promises that are beyond their scope of actions. In his view, taking the recent American elections, workers do not feel represented either by Republicans (committed to neoliberalism) nor by the Democrats (basically committed to identity minorities such as women, black people, the LGBT community, etc). In this scenario, an anti-establishment leader like Trump becomes the workers’ symbol of hope[^22].

Despite these regressions related to neoliberal or populist agendas, it is important to realise that political debates are still being grounded broad on Western ideas of equal liberty, communal/national responsibility and democratic procedures. Yet there is a mismatch or gap between ideal and real. Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, after being asked about the project of Western civilisation, Gandhi joked that “it would be a good idea” (Fonseca, 2016, p.66). This mismatch is a source of instability and contributes to the apparent lack of legitimacy of Western regimes. For this reason, besides improving public policies, identifying civic virtues needs to connect ideal and real (chapter 8) and reflect on ways to cultivate them (chapters 9 to 12). This is fundamental in order to not stay paralysed by Gandhi’s provocation.

2.6. Reflective equilibrium and democracy

After presenting these remaining injustices in the post-revolutionary period, Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium between theories (based on equal liberty and communal responsibility) and people’s considered opinions (obtained by democratic procedures) seems an important way to improve these theories and considered judgments sustainably, through keeping stability. Regarding the pursuit of stability, Rawls considers stability for the right reasons – rather than based on oppression or brainwashing (1993, p.xiii), “in other words, not by mere habit or grudging acceptance, but because of a real endorsement of the principles and institutions of the society” (Nussbaum, 2013, p.8-9) – fundamental for the improvement of justice. According to him, analogously to natural sciences, which in periods of normality are developed based on scientists’ trust in their paradigms, the development of justice depends on finding consensual (paradigmatic) political values and procedures. It is people’s perception of

[^22]: https://www.ft.com/content/6a43cf54-a75d-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1
the respect of the institutions for these values and procedures that guarantees stability for the right reasons, and, therefore, legitimacy. In Western societies, there is a consensus towards equal liberty, communal/national responsibility and democratic processes, and this consensus makes reflective equilibrium even more fundamental than it is for the development of natural sciences. In sciences, reflective equilibrium between the main theories and ordinary scientists is a tool to protect the development of knowledge from the imposition of powerful interests (2.2). In the case of politics, listening to people’s opinions is not only a powerful tool but also consensually accepted as the just process to develop political decisions. Based on this, Rawls’ contribution to this reasoning is presented below and, in the conclusion, one type of equilibrium is achieved.

To fully understand how Rawlsian reflective equilibrium is applied to discussions about justice, it useful to observe a shift in Rawls’s political project. In *A theory of Justice* (1971), he imagined that, in essence (metaphysically), all individuals believe in and look for liberty in their public and private lives. However, in his latter works, he changed substantially the basis of his proposal and assumed that, in people’s private lives, they do not necessary follow liberal values. Rawls’ new argument takes as its starting point what he considers two political facts. The first one is that Western societies are reasonably plural, that is, people have different comprehensive beliefs which are equally strong and reasonable (2001, p.25). For instance, some believe in religious principles (Christian, Islamic, etc.), others have certain metaphysical but non-religious convictions, etc. The second political fact is that, though individuals do not share the same comprehensive doctrine that gives meaning to their lives, they (at least citizens in contemporary Western societies) are reasonable and share the belief in democracy as a method to cope with these differences (2001, p.25) – again, a secular shared belief of Western people in consonance with what above is presented. In this way, they agree with the idea that all reasonable individuals have to be free to present their own opinions in the public debate. For this reason, it makes total sense to consider decisions made by democratic processes as more justified than those imposed by a dictator.

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23 This point does not contradict the claim made above that Western values were built over, among other things, Christian values. One thing is the history behind building Western political values, another is the fact that different cultures live in Western countries now and have to be respected. Obviously, since there is a reasonable consensus around what was historically built, all doctrines in Western countries have to conform to these minimal demands of equal liberty, communal/national responsibility and democracy.
These two ideas are closely related. The fact that most people are reasonable guarantees the proper functioning of democracy and makes them believe that democracy is the best political procedure. The spread of reasonableness is, then, fundamental for the consensus regarding democracy. Even assuming that people have different views on several things does not negate this. For example, a defender of the ontological superiority of a race or religious group is not part of a reasonable consensus and should not be admitted in the political debate – in the same way that a “mad scientist”, for example, an alchemist, is not legitimated in debates in the natural sciences. This “transcendental consensus” provides the basis for a reasonable political debate that, for instance, counterposes Rawls’ idea of justice and the mere aggregation of people’s preferences. (The centrality of this idea is discussed in 3.7.)

It is within the realm of consensus, based on a broad idea of being responsible for guaranteeing co-citizens’ equal liberty and reinforcing democratic processes, that – as in normal science (2.2) – new political puzzles can be created and solved. Social scientists can think of new experiments, and new social demands about specific political ideas can be clarified. People can also express their ideas more clearly. It is quite obvious that, if people want to advance the promotion of a more just state, it is not enough to accept vague ideas of community and equality of liberty. Chapter 4 proposes some directions for such a theoretical development. Here, the intention is only to defend the idea that democracy is the method which constitutes a virtuous circle with the basic ideas of communal responsibility and equal liberty – similarly to what is suggested by Goodman regarding natural sciences.

In 2.2, it is suggested that science in general is not neutral and that “democratic” procedures which guide scientific activities can mitigate biased processes. Reflecting specifically on the contemporary Western values of communal responsibility and equal liberty, the appeal of democracy seems even more obvious. In order to consider peoples’ communal responsibilities and equal liberty of all, societies have to have an open, equal space for all to effectively participate in public decisions.

Rawls’ first theoretical project, however, underestimated the actual democratic process. His first metaphysical assumption was that all citizens possess the powers of reason and reasonableness and, after achieving an individual back-and-forth reflective process (wide reflective equilibrium), would share the same considered judgments on how their society should be organised. Based on this, only a simulation of this democratic process of decision-
making would be needed in order to design the basic structure of society. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls assumes that almost all individuals are reasonable and possess a sense of justice: they “have the ability, the opportunity, and the desire to reach a correct decision” (1999[1971], p.42). Thus, in that stage of his research, this internal back-and-forth reflective process (wide reflective equilibrium) was considered enough to give practical foundation to his theory. In his mind, he was using the same method as in natural science: the mitigation of biased research through openness to different theories.

Nevertheless, Rawls realised that this wide reflective equilibrium did not favour a general social consensus, given the fact that societies are much more plural than he had originally considered and differing significantly from scientific communities. Thus, since a comprehensive doctrine cannot be imposed and since a consensus is a necessary condition for just stability, Rawls expanded his proposed dialogue between theory and practice, introducing the idea of a general reflective equilibrium. Through this, his aim was to reach stability for the right reasons. It is suggested above that almost all people consider that societies should be democratic. Then, accepting this and the fact that Western contemporary societies are very plural, Rawls’ latter work proposes that political theories and the considered judgments of people should be balanced in two different ways: theoretically, through a reflection about different theories (wide reflective equilibrium), and in the public sphere, through a dialogue, based on the theory, between reasonable people (general reflective equilibrium) (2001, p.31).

Rawls, thus, introduces into his theory this theoretical-practical sphere of dialogue, since he realises that the opinions of reasonable people, though based on different comprehensive doctrines, have to be balanced by theoretical reflections. If this real discussion is led in the right way, he thinks that the acceptance of what he calls “public reason” can be developed in all reasonable citizens. Scanlon defines this Rawlsian proposal as “a norm of political justification: a specification of the kind of justification that citizens must be able to offer in political discussion when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at issue” (2003, p.160).

Reducing his demands for agreement, Rawls understands that the overlapping consensus between reasonable individuals (the majority of the population) is increased and guarantees a
stable public space for discussions. In this way, it is wrong to imagine that Rawls is proposing the existence of a total consensus in the public sphere:

[D]espite the impression to the contrary, encouraged by the term “overlapping consensus” and other reasons, political liberalism does not exclude or even unjustifiably restrict politics, and that it is consistent with politics of dissensus’s empirical-historical and less normative approach to politics (Alnes, 2017, 838).

Through this, Rawls’ proposal is in accordance with a field of studies which says that “[d]issensus instead of consensus then becomes the raison d’être, the conceptual condition for the intelligibility of parliamentary [but also ordinary] politics” (Palonen et al, 2014, p.2). Thus, it is important to realise that “political liberalism gives a model for the logic and limits of deliberation and it is not a consensus theory of politics” (Alnes, 2017, p.838).

Of course, total consensus is impossible and even unhealthy. Expecting this agreement is defending the existence of (or the hope for) a “super” comprehensive doctrine, something denied by Rawls. Moreover, societies evolve from disagreement, which is a standard norm in the political sphere. Rawls, getting closer to the famous argument of Mill, says:

[T]he ideal of public reason does not often lead to general agreements of views, nor should it. Citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason, they instruct and deepen society’s public culture (1996[1993], p.lvii).

Obviously, many times, disagreements happen because one side is simply wrong about an issue. Rawls, however, thinks that the right side has to develop ways to understand people’s limitations on seeing the “truth”. In his view, political knowledge is very complex and there are burdens of judgment (1993, p.54-8) that have to be understood. When Rawls analyses discussions related to the just redistribution of goods, for example, he says that this is far from being simple, since it is not easy to identify the best way to improve the lives of the worst-off – in his view, the correct criterion of redistribution. A further reflection on criteria of redistribution of goods is explored in chapter 4, but it is already possible to agree with the importance of taking seriously people’s difficulty to judge correctly (burdens of judgment) in order to develop a healthy democracy.
On the other hand, constitutional bases have to be consensual. Thus, Rawls understands that all contemporary Western societies need constitutions based on these values (1993, p.227). As developed in 3.2, he proposes that, within the public sphere, individuals have to respect both basic constitutional values and a reasonable pluralism about other less consensual ideas. Constitutional values come directly from the established paradigm. Other disputed ideas are transformed through laws and put into practice depending on what is decided democratically in the public sphere, the space in which theories and people’s beliefs are in dialogue through this wide and general reflective equilibrium. As explored in 2.6, this Rawlsian approach seems to be less idealised than the kind of deliberation proposed by Habermas (1981; 1998). The latter suggests that, if the deliberative process is well achieved, consensus is always reachable. Rawls sees consensus about some values, but admits that there are many issues that belong to a sphere in which dissensus is always present.

However, though the approach that sustains this thesis is inspired by the Rawlsian proposal, it suggests a slightly different understanding of these two reflective equilibria. Following Mills (Pateman & Mills, 2007), it is claimed that wide reflective equilibrium, instead of only taking into account different theories of justice exclusively based on normative approaches (utilitarianism, egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, etc.), should consider sociological, psychological, economic and historical understandings of the society analysed. In this sense, this balance is named here “ideal-non-ideal” reflective equilibrium. This balance is different from the general or, as named by this thesis, “theoretical-practical” reflective equilibrium, which puts in dialogue the results of this first equilibrium and people’s and governments’ positions about justice in public sphere. Figure 9 is useful to clarify how these two equilibria are understood by the present work:
Mills (2005) suggests developing the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium through taking into account empirical knowledge in the theoretical reasoning and, then, enriching public debate. The importance of this idea is explored in 3.8 and some empirical data are presented in chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless, this agreement also depends on how the methodology associated with theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium is presented. For the purposes of this methodological analysis, Sen’s ideas regarding the improvement of social choice theory and Habermas’ idea of deliberative democracy are investigated. As also shown in 3.7, reflections on these ideas are essential for the development of the back-and-forth process of reflective equilibrium and democracy.

Actually, the idea of this thesis is to develop some theoretical reflections from ideal reflections and empirical observations in order to help ordinary people’s and policymakers’ real reflection on justice. In addition, the aim is also to propose ways to develop in these ordinary people and policymakers civic virtues that help them to better reflect on justice. In this way, when applied, the proposed theories of justice and citizenship curriculum end up establishing a virtuous circle which serves to improve both.

2.7. Education and theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium

The reflection on how to create equilibrium between theory and practice orients the discussion towards identifying civic virtues that make this dialogue possible (chapter 8). People’s good will towards promoting justice is not enough if individuals do not have clarity...
and determination to improve social institutions. In democratic states, changing unjust institutions depends on people’s perception of these injustices and their initiative to act towards changing them. On the other hand, though states are founded by potentially just institutions, if their individuals have not developed important civic virtues, these institutions are in danger, and injustices are perpetuated in practical situations. For example:

If white and black people (or Protestants and Catholics, long-time residents and recent immigrants, etc.) tolerated but did not respect each other, for example, then they would ‘live and let live’, but presumably not hire each other, attend similar private schools, or socialize together. (Levinson, 1999, p.103)

Assuming that there is a consensus regarding the importance of avoiding this, and supposing that these virtues are, at least partially, not innate, the task is thinking of how to cultivate them. Civic virtues are cultivated in different ways: through family, media, community’ interactions, schooling, etc. (Levinson, 1999, p.7) Sandel, for example, calls attention to the importance of public spaces in this process (2009, p.267).

This thesis restricts its investigation to how schools can contribute to this. Levinson connects the idea of sharing spaces with two points presented above, the importance of active public participation and peoples’ internalisation of values defended theoretically and institutionally. Moreover, she considers that this intervention is fundamental to guarantee the stability of Western regimes based on a communal spirit and equal liberty in which public decisions are taken democratically (1999, p.101-2). This thesis agrees with this point and with Levinson’s claim that, since “civic identity is ‘thick’” encompassing “a complex combination of commitments, practices, beliefs, rituals, etc.”, “a common curriculum, including a common language or languages, history, and literature, a common civic identity” is needed to guarantee the social integration referred to above (1999, p.133). Formal civic education is, thus, fundamental.

Having introduced the importance of schooling for cultivating civic virtues, and given the fact that the approach of reflective equilibrium is discussed in this chapter, it is important to

24 Reflecting specifically on the Brazilian reality, as discussed in chapter 6, there are many issues regarding social integration that have to be discussed. Though, in Brazil, a vast majority of people speaks the same language, this country presents an obvious problem of integration associated with a huge socio-economic gap, lack of common spaces, and lack of knowledge about historical reasons behind inequalities.
note that reflective equilibrium also inspires the way that this thesis reflects on civic education. Knowledge about how to cultivate citizenship can be seen as something in between knowledge about natural sciences and about justice. Then, since it is defended that reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to develop knowledge about natural sciences and justice, it is also defended that knowledge about citizenship curriculum should be developed through this.

It is suggested in 2.2 that, in the natural sciences, reflective equilibrium happens between principal and minor researchers. In 2.4, on the other hand, it is defended that theoretical-practical (or general) reflective equilibrium about justice has to happen between experts, policymakers and ordinary people. Regarding knowledge about citizenship education, this thesis also defends a dialogue between experts and a larger group of people involved with the process. However, it is proposed that the group of “non-experts” has to be larger than the group of minor scientists, but smaller than the whole population. Observing school communities’ dynamics and interviewing its members (head teachers, teachers, students and parents) seems to be a good way to balance what theories about citizenship curriculum propose. Subsequently, a feasible theory of curriculum can be proposed.

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Chapter 2 proposes an analogy between Kuhn’s proposal of scientific revolutions, a certain understanding of the development of sciences, and the development of ideas of justice in Western societies. From this analogy, it is proposed that Western societies live a period of normality/stability with regard to their general understanding of justice. The history of the development of these societies is presented in order to claim that this stability is based on three pillars: communal/national responsibility and equal liberty (basic ideas) and democracy (basic method) that are the result of the liberal revolutions. This does not mean that there is nothing to be improved. However, the existence of this paradigm favours the improvement of these ideas through achieving the two reflective equilibria proposed: an ideal-non-ideal equilibrium outlined by this thesis, and a theoretical-practical one achieved in public sphere and favoured by certain knowledge proposed here. This is the approach that orients the development of the next chapters.
PART TWO: JUSTICE
3. Foundations of egalitarian liberalism: the hypothetical social contract and reflections about democratic procedures

After reflecting on what are the main values that define the Western ethos, this chapter investigates how they are assimilated by political philosophy by showing that hypothetical social contract theory is in consonance with people’s right to equal liberty and their communal/social responsibility towards co-citizens, and that social choice theory and deliberative democracy help to develop democratic procedures. Thus, initially, (3.1) equality is defended as prior to liberty in reflections on justice, though liberty is presented as the good that has to be equally distributed in a just society. From this, (3.2) classical social contract theory is proposed as a strong candidate to ground the understanding of principles which give basis to constitutional principles. Then, different criticisms against this theory are put in dialogue with Rawls’ defence of the hypothetical contract. Firstly, (3.3) the defence of maximisation of utility and Rawls’ response based on people’s individual rights are presented. Next, (3.4) Rawls’ incorporation of the communitarian claim towards a “holistic” view of society based on people’s duties towards co-citizens is discussed. Then, (3.5) Sen’s opposition to closeness and parochialism of contract theory and (3.6) to Rawlsian transcendentalism are presented and responded to. However, though these criticisms are arguable, there are two improvements from the capabilities approach that must be considered. On the one hand, (3.7) Sen’s social choice theory and Rawls’ and Habermas’ vindications of deliberation in the public sphere are seen as fundamental to improve democratic processes to sustain the liberal project. On the other, (3.8) Mills’ defence of non-idealised theories, which highlights the importance of expanding the observation of factual injustices in order to build a theory, is considered as a very important development of Rawls’ idealised theory. This reflection orients the conclusion that (3.9) transcendental and political liberties are those that, consensually, have to be equally guaranteed for all citizens.

3.1. Priority of equalising liberty

Regarding the principles of liberty and equality, it is common sense to consider them as rivals. From the Russian Revolution to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world was divided by two economical models: capitalism and socialism. The free market and the planned economy symbolise their extremes. Roughly speaking, free market supporters consider individual
liberty of entrepreneurship as the fundamental value to be preserved within a society. In this model, the government must have minimum interference in people’s lives allowing them to exercise their free will. Defenders of the planned economy, also presented in a simplified way, sustain that the correct social organisation must be founded on the promotion of equality of material resources among citizens and that the government should have a strong and centralised role in this process. However, the former can say that they are also concerned with equality, since the free market guarantees that the free will of all is equally respected, while the latter can say that they truly promote liberty through guaranteeing to people the minimal material conditions to be free. In between these two extremes, it is possible to identify several models that try to balance some redistribution of wealth and opportunities to people, also allowing free enterprise, as discussed in 4.2.

However, is the integration of equality and liberty a matter of gradation? Sen does not think so. According to him, it is possible to solve this dispute between equality and liberty by realising that they are not opposite principles, but rather inter-related ones. Sen claims that:

strictly speaking, posing the problem in terms of [the contrast between liberty and equality] reflects a ‘category mistake’. They are not alternatives. Liberty is among the possible fields of application of equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty (1992, p. 22-3).

Moreover, Dworkin claims that, at least for those committed to the values of contemporary Western societies, there is an evident priority of equality over liberty (2000, p.128). An intuition based on historical orientation of moral and civic values makes Sen also claims that “every normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems to demand equality of something” (1992, p.12), a rephrased way to mention his famous idea of “equality of what” (1980). According to him, “[t]he absence of such equality would make a theory arbitrarily discriminative and hard to defend” (1992, p.17). Regarding this, Sen adds:

[T]he need to justify disparate advantages of different individuals in things that matter […] frequently takes the form of showing the integral connection of that inequality with equality in some other important – allegedly more important – space. (1992, p.18-9)
As explored in 2.4, “[u]ntil the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature – i.e., that there was a natural human hierarchy. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right and its assumption of an equality of natural order among all human beings” (GOSEPATH, 2007).

Several theories of justice are anchored in different ideas of distribution of distinct specific goods. The most simplistic thesis claims that everyone should have the same income. The famous communist motto quoted by Marx, “[f]rom each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (1891, p.11), goes in this direction, though takes into account the proportionality of people’s needs. On the other extreme, there is a theory that supports that only civil and political liberties should be equally guaranteed by the state. According to libertarians, such as Nozick (1974), there is no reason for limiting legal and civic liberties, but any attempt to redistribute goods is against people’s natural right over their property. In between these two extremes, substantive equality of opportunities that tries eliminating (or at least reducing considerably) natural and social differences is proposed. The liberal egalitarian tradition (Rawls, 1971; 1993; Roemer, 1998; Dworkin, 2000; Sen, 2009a; Nussbaum, 2011, and so on) presents different formulations to this.

From this analysis, it seems that all theories already presented, from different perspectives, are concerned with guaranteeing equal liberty for all. Why should equal income be guaranteed if not to allow people equal liberty to do what they want? Why should more be given to the most needy if not for the same reason? Why should property be protected if not to guarantee the equal liberty of people to do what they want with their goods? Why should equal opportunities be promoted if not for giving to all people equal liberty to decide their own destinies? Why should equal political participation be assured if not to give all the same voice (equal liberty) in public affairs?

Thus, different theories are compatible with the historical analysis presented in 2.4 that there is a consensus amongst Western individuals that “liberty” must be the “good” equally distributed in society. The importance given by people to liberty, however, can be questioned. Dostoyevsky (1880) reflects on this through the fable of The Great Inquisitor. This passage of The Brothers Karamazov describes a hypothetical meeting between an

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25 This claim is strong. Transcendental liberty, the type of liberty that should be equally distributed, is better defined in 3.9.
inquisitor of the Catholic Church and Christ in the fifteenth century. In this meeting, the inquisitor accuses Christ and God of making human beings desire liberty without being able to deal with it. Thus, the inquisitor defends that the Church’s “brainwashing” is good for humankind, that clergymen are the real humankind saviours. In his words:

Oh, never, never will [human beings] feed themselves without us! No science will give them bread while yet they are free, but the end of it will be that they will bring us their freedom and place it at our feet and say to us: ‘Enslave us if you will, but feed us.’ At last they themselves will understand that freedom and earthly bread in sufficiency for all are unthinkable together, for never, never will they be able to share between themselves! (2007[1880], p.277)

This description puts a choice between liberty and food. However, when Rawls talks about justice, he considers that such a choice does not exist. According to him, a theory of justice only makes sense under circumstances of “moderate scarcity” in which “[n]atural and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down” (1999[1971], p. 110).

However, though this extreme situation is discarded and liberty is taken as the good to be equally guaranteed, this concept is very complex and allows different understandings. Thus, it is not simple to define in which direction a society should go in order to promote an equal distribution of liberty. The following sections advance on this point.

3.2. Social contract and constitutional principles

In 2.4, equal liberty, communal responsibilities and democracy are presented as ideas historically developed in Western countries (not necessarily only in these countries) and align with “very strong” principles, normally expressed by their current constitutions. It is very difficult for individuals (or their representatives) to change this situation. That means that constitutional principles are not changed by ordinary democratic processes. These processes eventually serve to change governments, but not to change the main principles that orient the nations.

Of course, throughout history, several constitutions have been rewritten or amended. Such processes, however, are exceptional and normally demand strong popular mobilisation.
Unlike ordinary laws, constitutional principles are based on tradition and, though they are not totally above current political debate (it is unusual, but shared beliefs can change with time), they tend to be agreed upon by different political groups – which, mostly only interpret these principles differently.

As equally investigated in chapter 2, the existence of a consensus (paradigm) is as helpful in sciences as it is in politics, since it guarantees the stability needed to refine, respectively, “truth” and “justice”. Regarding reflections on “truth” in natural sciences, Kuhn (1962), defends that periods of normality, when a paradigm is widely accepted by a scientific community, are beneficial for the improvement of that area. Through the agreement of a main theory, scientists can join forces in order to refine the knowledge that comes from it. In Rawls’ theory (1971, 1993, 2001), this stability comes from an “overlapping consensus” of basic ideas, though he admits lots of dissensus regarding several important discussions, from abortion (1999b, p.169) to redistribution of wealth (1993, p.229-30). In this sense, constitutions – the symbol of overlapping consensus – give stability for the current political debate.

Having said that, it is necessary to better understand the meanings of equal liberty, communal/social responsibility and democracy, upon which Western constitutions are founded. This section associates such values with a strong theoretical idea. Social contract theory claims that fair states are founded on some type of consensus of free people, rather than being grounded on arbitrary principles (or based on the wishes of one dictator).

The three founding fathers of the social contract theory are Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690) and Rousseau (1750). Locke basically endorses a seminal idea proposed by Hobbes:

Men being, […] by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. (Locke, 2003[1690], p.141-2.)
However, despite this common idea, Locke differs significantly from Hobbes, since the latter starts with the premise that human beings are egoists, while the former considers that individuals are concerned about the good of the others (Nussbaum, 2006, p.35). Rousseau (1750), suspicious of individuals’ behaviour in society, suggests that a “general will” should be developed in order to avoid egoism and allow people to cooperate in a way that benefits all, through defining common goals. For this reason, democracy and moral education play a central role in his project. Thus, Rousseau’s (1762) particular defence on how to educate and control people is considered “non-liberal”, and philosophers like Nussbaum say that he does “not conceive of the social contract as a contract among independent individuals” and is therefore in opposition to “liberal theorists [like] Locke and Kant” (2006, p.25).

In fact, Rawls and other contemporary sympathisers of social contract like Nussbaum establish some limits to the liberal project. Equal liberty, communal responsibility and democracy – central ideas in their view of social contract theory – are combined through cultivating civic virtues, that is, through avoiding neutrality regarding moral/civic education. In other words, according to these social contract theorists, a just social organisation is the result of mutual agreement among all citizens, based on their freedoms of choice and their sense of belonging to a communal project, both built through the educational process. This claim indicates that the social contract is dependent on people’s civic virtues, something presented in order to answer certain criticisms against the idea of contract.

3.3. Utilitarianism and hypothetical contract

However, before exploring how the acceptance of social contract theory is dependent on people’s possession of civic virtues, it is interesting to analyse several criticisms of its classical format and some of Rawls’ reinterpretations of social contract. It is possible to start such an analysis by understanding the distrust in the applicability of tacit contract and the solution offered by utilitarianism to it. Of course, people are born in states already constituted and they do not have the option to disagree with them. “In fact, all major social contract theorists – Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – rely in different ways on arguments based on tacit consent. Here the central thought is that by quietly enjoying the protection of the state one is giving it one’s tacit consent” (Wolff, 1996, p.46). Hume (1748), however, claimed that this tacit consent with the state’s laws does not make sense, since common people do not have a real alternative of abandoning their original states if they disagree with them. In Hume’s time,
as today though to a much lesser extent, it is difficult for an individual to move away from their country of birth. Thus, to say that people agree with the idea of a social contract, additional reasoning is needed.

This lack of guarantee that people tacitly agree with the social contract gives way to a solution beyond tacit consent. Bentham (1780) introduced classical utilitarianism, a theory that dominated philosophical discussions for two centuries – and, at least in the field of economics, still has many supporters – and relegated social contract theory to a secondary role. This new theory, in its classical format, presented two main characteristics. First, utilitarianism considers pleasure (well-being, happiness, etc.) and not liberty as the main good human beings look to achieve. Moreover, because of this, people’s consent on the state’s decisions is also considered less important (actually, this is not a Bentham’s real concern). Thus, classic utilitarianism is focused on the maximisation of pleasure and not on consent about how the state should be organised. Rawls summarises classical utilitarianism by claiming that its “main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it” (1999[1971], p.20). Thus, classical utilitarians do not demand that such social arrangement be promoted democratically, since it is most important for them to increase the average satisfaction of individuals. In this sense, the problem of consent is solved and there is no need to create conditions for people to abandon their states, since the best situation for all would be guaranteed.

However, amongst political philosophers, this theory started losing sustainability, as it allows obvious injustices and does not present a real concern with social stability. According to classical utilitarianism, some people, at least theoretically, could be made slaves (or receive very low salaries, etc.) if doing so improves people’s average well-being. This obviously promotes an unacceptable lack of consideration of individuals’ dignity. Moreover, this practice would promote social instability, since oppressed people would develop awareness of their lack of liberty and dignity and eventually not accept this situation.

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26 Classical utilitarianism is being mentioned instead of investigating more complex utilitarian proposals. Mill, for example, inserts demands on liberty and democracy in his theory and takes “utility in a largest sense, grounded on the permanent interest of men as a progressive being.” (1859). (A further reflection aligns Mill’s ideas with virtue ethics (Sandel, 2009), but such analysis is out of the scope of this thesis.)
Giving this scenario, Rawls (1971) reinserts the central idea of equal liberty associated to social contract theory, but adds something new to the notion of people’s free agreement. Instead of developing a reasoning based on the tacit agreement among real people, he defends a theory based on a hypothetical contract. His innovative proposal suggests that people should imagine themselves in a fictional original position of putting their own life plans into practice, though they are covered by a “veil of ignorance” which inhibits them from knowing their positions in society (1999[1971]). Thus, this idea takes into account the two main current Western political values investigated in 2.4 that sustain all this reasoning: equal liberty, since all people are morally allowed to seek their own life plans; and communal responsibility, since, by accepting institutions built through this veil mechanism, all people agree to not only defend their own privileges. These two values ground theories of justice, while democracy is the political procedure accepted in West to guarantee the effectiveness of these values. Through respecting people’s right to follow their own life plans, their liberty and dignity are guaranteed and stability is reached.

3.4. Communitarianism and hypothetical contract

However, there are criticisms against social contract theory closely related to a problem identified by communitarians. They defend a “holistic” view of the ontology of societies through which social organisations are taken as organic wholes, rather than an “atomistic” understanding of societies, in which societies are seen as a mere aggregate of individuals (atoms) (Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1995a). Communitarian thinkers such as MacIntyre (1981) and Sandel (1982) defend that the feeling of belonging to a community (eventually a nation) comes before the consent of individuals. In this sense, communitarians are not necessarily against the idea of a social contract, but they consider that people’s attachments to their communities come prior to the idea of contract. Actually, this idea converges with the suggestion that communal responsibilities are the basis of Western contemporary shared beliefs.

More radically, Pateman27 sees the metaphor of the contract as useless to describe social relations based on justice, as she criticises the identification of social contract with something similar to the atomism mentioned above. Aligned with Hegel’s (1820) description of civil

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27 Pateman is not clearly identified with communitarianism. However, her point against classic social contract is based on typical communitarian interpretation.
society in opposition to the state, Pateman understands contracts as simulations of consents of self-interested people. Thus, “[c]ontract has a valuable commercial place, but […] it should be kept in that place […] and to insist that ‘contract’ is the metaphor for a free society is a very narrow view of humans and what they create” (Pateman & Mills, 2007, p.15). According to Pateman, the excessive individualism symbolised by the idea of contract is the main problem of this theory.

Contractualists like Hobbes surely sustain their theories in an atomistic view. Certain readers of Rawls identify the same characteristic in his project. The two main reasons for this understanding are: Rawls’ definition of a just society as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (1999[1971], p.4); and the suggestion that, under the veil, individuals seek self-advantage (1999[1971], p.123). In this sense, Rawls would be departing from a similar premise used by Hobbes. Nevertheless, this understanding is wrong. According to Nussbaum (2006, p.64), the “Veil of Ignorance is intended as an abstract model of benevolence. [Rawls] explicitly says that, by combining self-interest with ignorance, he hopes to get results that approximate to what we would get from benevolence with full information (TJ 148–149)”. In order to avoid this confusion, in Rawls’ Political Liberalism (1993), “the locution ‘a cooperative venture for mutual advantage’ is replaced by ‘society as a fair system of cooperation over time’ (14 and elsewhere), and mutual advantage is not mentioned” (Nussbaum, 2006, p.59)

Gauthier (1986), a neo-Hobbesian, through denying this Rawlsian abstract appeal to benevolence, imagines that individuals would accept to cooperate based only on their self-interest, because, in the end, the result of cooperation would be good for them. Nevertheless, in a society where only self-interest is stimulated and civic values are not considered, some individuals or groups would probably be excluded. It is easy to imagine – and identify in our realities – obviously unjust societies in which rich people live in luxurious gated communities, while poor people live without any social benefit. Regarding this problem, Rawls proposes something different. His theory appeals to an intuition of the idea of justice – with historical roots – that respects people’s life plans but limits their self-interest. This appeal makes Rawls’ theory dependent on a certain sense of compassion/benevolence linked with a communal responsibility. This dependence can be better understood through the development of these concepts in chapter 7.
Thus, Rawls’ reinterpretation of the social contract embodies the communitarian claim to consider people’s communal attachment before the idea of contract. It is this attachment that produces the feeling of benevolence towards co-citizens. Only if individuals somehow feel responsible for their co-citizens they will accept to imagine society covered by the veil of ignorance. The idea of contract, however, serves to respect people’s liberty to define their life plans. In this sense, it provides a reasonable answer to Pateman’s accusation that the metaphor of contract is always associated with pure self-interest. For example, the appeal to the veil of ignorance in political reasoning allows arguments for protecting poor people from self-interested individuals who are only concerned in locking themselves in gated condominiums ignoring the rest of the society.

3.5. Impartial spectator and contract focused on the nation

Sen, contrary to the previous criticisms, appeals to a bipartition between two groups of Enlightenment thinkers to criticise the idea of contract. According to him:

The [contractarian] approach has two distinct features. First, it concentrates its attention on what it identifies as perfect justice, rather than on relative comparisons of justice and injustice. […] Second, in searching for perfection, transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on getting the institutions right, and it is only indirectly concerned with the societies that would ultimately emerge. […] In contrast to the social contract approach, a number of other Enlightenment theorists took a variety of comparative approaches that were concerned primarily with removing identifiable injustices in the world – such as slavery, or bureaucracy-induced poverty, or cruel and counterproductive penal codes, or rampant exploitation of labor, or the subjugation of women. (2009b, p.xv-xvi).

This distinction allows Sen to present two criticisms against contractualism: closeness to “other people’s interests”; and “underscrutinized parochialism of values and presumptions in the local community” (2009b, p.xviii). In order to understand these criticisms, it is important to reflect on how Sen appeals to Smith’s idea of impartiality, also defined here as fairness. Impartiality/fairness, at least in Western cultures, is strongly associated with the Christian golden rule “as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise” (Luke
During the Enlightenment, Smith and Kant gave slightly different interpretations of this principle. Kant kept the idea of social contract, while Smith proposed his impartial spectator to guarantee such fairness.

Sen sees an advantage in Smith’s proposal, since its impartiality/fairness is open, while social contract restricts this concept to a certain culture. This attitude would expand people’s concerns towards foreigners and present a plurality of ideas that go further than parochial notions of justice. Through the impartial spectator device, we would “view our sentiments from ‘a certain distance from us’ […] scrutinizing not only the influence of vested interest, but also the impact of entrenched tradition and custom” (2009a, p.45). Appealing to this basic principle of justice, Sen intends to deal with issues not contemplated by social contract theory.

However, Sen’s point against what he calls closed impartiality of Kantian/Rawlsian social contract can be countered by saying that some closeness is needed, since the heuristic device behind the reasoning about impartiality/fairness aims to simulate the establishment of constitutions that are restricted to local nations. In the end, decisions are taken within nation-states where people pay taxes, vote and receive benefits. Since most individuals’ political actions happen within the nation-state sphere, it makes sense that the theoretical reasoning regarding justice takes the nation as the main limit for reflections in this way. Challenging this view, cosmopolitans say that people’s political actions should reach the whole of humankind. However, even if they have a moral point associated with a philosophical idealism, this goes against some world social structures based in nation-states built in the last centuries (4.3).

Regarding this, Ben-Porath claims that “nations are not a philosophical necessity, but a political reality that philosophers who focus on politics must contend with”, because the “nation-state provides a unique set of opportunities [of belonging] that neither global nor subnational forms of membership currently provide” (2013, p.81-2). She departs from a factual observation in order to derive normative political implications. The idea is that individuals have to feel some commitment towards their national co-citizens, not because

28 King James’ version: http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
29 This claim does not mean that other cultures do not have different narratives to defend the same principle. For example, “When Confucius was asked for a single word that summed up morality, he responded, ‘Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.’” (Bloom, 2013, p.212)
they have some natural duty associated with the same religion, ethnicity, etc., but exactly because they are gregarious, and were accidentally born within the same political structure. Ben-Porath calls this accident a “shared fate” and argues that “by understanding citizenship as a matter of shared fate, we can achieve a rich view of commonality while simultaneously respecting the depth diversity in a pluralistic democracy” (2013, p.84).

Nussbaum’s criticism against the exclusion of foreigners in social contract supports the view of those who consider her a defender of cosmopolitan citizenship (Callan, 2004, p.77-80). However, even Nussbaum recognises the relevance of patriotism, which she defines as “a strong emotion taking the nation as its object […] It is a form of love, and thus distinct from simple approval, or commitment, or embrace of principles […] This love involves the feeling that the nation is one’s own” (2013, p.208). As she understands it, the love from which patriotism derives is important because it inspires people to “support the common good in ways that it involves sacrifice” (2013, p.209). According to her, “good patriotism” is based on a kind of compassion that makes individuals “stand for the well-being of all people” (2013, p.210), within the nation’s frontier or outside it. In this sense, Nussbaum acknowledges the major importance of patriotism for the health of nations and democracies and advocates that people should be educated so they may develop good patriotism. Agreeing with this, the present thesis defends that patriotism, if properly cultivated, is the key to the development of communal responsibilities which are important to improve the lives of people within the nations.

Of course, it also makes sense to think of global justice and moral duties towards foreigners. However, world justice is far from being reached and it is not clear on which basis it should be founded. Thus, problems as climate change, human trafficking, fiscal paradises, however important to be known by global citizens, are not under the scope of this thesis. Different ways to expand people’s concerns towards foreigners have been proposed. Nussbaum (2013) talks about cosmopolitan education. Sen (2009) appeals for the idea of the impartial spectator. On the other hand, the debate above is focused on theoretical justifications for constitutional principles, and an idea of world constitution is far from being a reality.

Besides this discussion on the importance of patriotism, it is possible to reply to Sen’s criticism against the closeness of social contract by saying that it does not necessarily generate parochialism. World-wide communication is a reality and the hypothetical contract
does not demand that nations only follow their internal practices. In this way, ideas outside Western cultures – for example, less consumption and more connection with nature – can improve Western societies’ principles of justice. In the information technology era, people from the most diverse parts of the world – including from non-Western cultures – are connected. Information spreads quickly and, now more than ever, it is possible for people from different cultures to share their own values and customs and to somehow be close to each other. Modern world Western nations are not isolated from the rest of the world. Thus, the idea of a hypothetical contract does not exclude the possibility of viewing and considering distant points of view.

In addition to these responses to Sen’s criticisms, it is also possible to address a criticism against how Sen uses the idea of the impartial spectator. The exercise of the impartial spectator requires individuals to engage in an impossible process of constant scrutiny of their moral judgments, since it entails people continually judging their own moral decisions as if they were not part of their own community or nation, in other words, as if they were an outsider. On the other hand, a collective decision that inspires the model of hypothetical contract, which is also founded on an impartiality device – the veil of ignorance – seems to be a more effective approach. Through simulating real-decision-making practices, such a device allows people to understand their societies’ foundations and their rights and duties towards their co-citizens.

3.6. Transcendentalism

Related to his previous point, Sen also criticises what he calls “transcendental theories of justice”. Sen understands that “transcendental” theoretical projects pay little attention to people’s real understandings of this issue (2009a, p.xi-xii). Then, Sen focuses his ideas on how to improve democratic processes and to address obvious injustices. Thus, he is concerned with presenting a set of basic rules (impartiality) and a theoretical approach (social choice theory) behind the idea of equal liberty. In this way, it is correct to say that Sen does not develop a theory, unlike Rawls and Nussbaum, who propose, respectively, three principles of justice and a list of ten central capabilities30.

30 Nussbaum is more aligned with Rawls. In her words, “[t]he primary task of my argument will be to move beyond the merely comparative use of capabilities to the construction of a normative political proposal that is a partial theory of justice” (2010, p.6).
However, it is possible to defend Rawls (and Nussbaum) by remembering that his (and her) project is sustained on the idea of reflective equilibrium. In his view, since some political issues are consensual in Western countries but other issues are disputable, a public debate to improve people’s views about these issues is needed. If an effective back-and-forth process – in which people’s opinions and political theories are balanced – is established, practices towards justice can be refined and social stability guaranteed.

Roughly speaking, this process defined by Rawls (1993, 2001) as general reflective equilibrium (chapter 2) depends on the development of two different things. On the one hand, ordinary people must ultimately decide the destinies of their states. Since democracy is a shared value in Western contemporary societies, it is important for the stability of these states that people participate in public decisions. On the other hand, political thinkers have an important role in designing theories in order to help the real political debate, offering ordinary people possible strategies to tackle political affairs. This is because, on average, people do not have the time to delve into questions about justice, since they are consumed by daily life activities. In this sense, the intellectual work of thinkers who dedicate their professional lives to these questions – in academia or not – is fundamental. Santos (2004, p.31-6) and McCowan (2009, p.89), for example, claim that academic institutions should help nations design their own national projects.

Taking this into account, Sen’s criticism underestimates the role of transcendental theories, since theoretical principles are useful to help individuals in the political sphere take real decisions. Regarding this, it is important to say that agreeing with the importance of transcendental theories is not the same as agreeing with a specific transcendental proposal. Actually, a plurality of theories makes reflective equilibrium more powerful, since such plurality enriches the real political sphere with different theoretical ideas.

3.7. Social choice theory and deliberative democracy

These different defences to Rawls’ ideas against the criticisms presented above do not mean that his social contract theory does not have failures or limits. Actually, though transcendentalism is useful/necessary to develop people’s ideas of justice – making Sen’s criticism exaggerated – it is important to defend Sen’s claim that transcendental theories are
not sufficient (2009a, 98-101). Thus, Sen’s appeal to social choice theory – the study of the link between “the aggregation of interests, or judgments, or well-beings, into some aggregate notion of social welfare, social judgment or social choice” (Sen, 2008, p.579) – is welcomed, as it complements Rawls’ project through developing the democratic dimension of general reflective equilibrium. Actually, such a complement ameliorates Rawls’ theory through introducing reflections on how democratic decisions should happen. Through appealing to social choice theory, Sen correctly attempts to design a system of decisions in a context in which complete consensus is impossible. Thus, he helps to advance the practical (democratic) aspect of general reflective equilibrium.

Regarding this, Sen’s main concern is to develop ways to deal with challenges to democracy introduced by Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1963[1951]), explained in an oversimplified way, a development of Condorcet’s paradox of voting (1785). Condorcet (and Arrow, in a more sophisticated way) proves that, in an election, majorities can prefer A over B, B over C, and C over A, that is, partial preferences (which, in this case, exist) may not represent the preference of the whole society (which, in this case, does not exist). Regarding this paradox, Sen claims:

[T]he demonstration of [Arrow’s] impossibility has opened up investigations of the various limitations that constrain the format of traditional welfare economics (e.g., the avoidance of interpersonal comparisons of well-being). One result of this has been to draw welfare economics closer to moral philosophy. (2002, p. 344)

In his own attempt to overcome Arrow’s impossibility result, Sen (1969; 1970; 2002) pointed out some important problems with Arrow’s formulation. Sen’s main criticism is related to the fact that richer informational spaces can provide different results in elections. One of the main reasons presented by Sen to justify the inadequacy of Arrow’s formulation to a wide range of policy-concerned problems is the possibility of voting rules based on majority decisions being incompatible with minimum requirements of individual liberty and, consequently, of minority rights – Sen’s (1970) “liberal paradox”. An example of this kind of problem can be found in societies that prevent some minorities – such as the LGBT community – from having basic rights – for example, same-sex civil unions. Although it is possible that, in many cases, the majority of people in these societies would agree in restricting the civil rights of these minorities, there is a broad superior consensual idea, at
least in Western societies, that these people’s individual preferences, choices and freedom to lead the life they value should be respected regardless the opinion or preferences of others.

Thus, the main issue for Sen is how to aggregate individual choice in such a way that generates social choice concerned with these broad superior notions of justice. In this sense, Sen (1970; 2002) claims that, if individuals only pay attention to their personal preferences when taking decisions on a political and policymaking level, it can produce distorted results, especially regarding issues concerning important matters such as poverty and civil rights. As Sen explains:

To try to make social welfare judgments without using any interpersonal comparison of utilities, and without using any nonutility information, is not a fruitful enterprise. […] Once interpersonal comparisons are introduced, the impossibility problem, in the appropriately redefined framework, vanishes. […] Such comparisons are staple elements of systematic social welfare judgments. (2002, p. 273)

Through appealing to individuals’ concern with inequality to solve this impossibility theorem, Sen introduces the need for founding individuals’ choices on moral judgments and not only on their personal preferences. Thus, although Sen does not establish a set of desirable moral values, he affirms, in his attempt to understand to what extent majority rule could produce results that harm individual liberties, that “[t]he ultimate guarantee for individual liberty may rest not on rules for social choice but on developing individual values that respect each other’s personal preferences” (1970, p. 155-156). There are many different ways of developing these values. Sen’s (2009) appeal to broader individuals’ knowledge about other people’s life conditions is one option. Other scholars, such as Nussbaum (2010; 2013), go further and propose cultivating not only knowledge about other people’s preferences but also other civic knowledge, skills and values (chapter 7). How to do this through formal education is explored in chapter 9.

Defenders of deliberative democracy, propose a different way to improve democratic processes, even though they are also concerned with developing democratic individuals’ awareness of other citizens’ interests. They understand that citizens “cannot simply state their preference in public dialogues; they have to be prepared to provide reasons and arguments in support of their points of view” (Leung, 2012, p.25). Habermas (1981; 1998) believes that the
“force of better argument” can minimise one-sided opinions. “Ideally speaking, in Habermas’s communicative theory [1981], consensus can be achieved in distortion-free conditions by long lasting debate by responsive citizens” (Leung, 2012, p.37). The “second” Rawls (1993; 2001), through appealing to his general reflective equilibrium (chapter 2 and above in this chapter) also puts a heavy weight on the importance of public deliberation by understanding “that public reason should filter the political arguments within society and lead those based on the interest of the common humanity of free and equal citizens to form the basic social structure for liberal democracy” (Leung, 2012, p.45). Kymlicka describes this as an “important shift in contemporary democratic theory, from ‘vote-centric’ to ‘talk-centric’ theories of democracy” (2002, p.290). Leung sees three positive aspects of stimulating deliberation: it “can enhance citizens’ understanding of public debates”; “is more capable of comprehending complex problems than individual contemplation”; “helps transcend the language of interest to the language of reason” (2012, p.25).

Those who support the centrality of deliberation consider that it is a better way to reduce problems of aggregation – like the dictatorship of majority – than through simply cultivating civic knowledge (Sen), skills and values (Nussbaum). Nonetheless, of course, when conflicts are unsolvable, voting is needed. Those who are suspicious of deliberation consider that minorities are manipulated in the deliberative process (Young, 2000; Levinson, 2003). Thus, sceptics argue that this process has to be avoided and ordinary people only have to learn how to identify representatives who fight for their rights. In this way, even these critics of deliberative democracy would agree that, in a second moment – the legislative sphere – deliberation achieved by representatives is needed. The point defended by this thesis, nonetheless, is that, since deliberation in higher levels is unavoidable, and it can be useful in lower levels, such a practice has to be stimulated in all levels of political debate. The importance of cultivating critical thinking and democratic knowledge, skills and values is presented in chapter 8, and, from chapter 9, this thesis investigates how schools (should) cultivate these values.

3.8. Non-idealised theories

While Sen claims that people should observe real injustices to improve their participation in the democratic sphere, Mills, in order to deal with the other side of reflective equilibrium, proposes that thinkers should observe real injustices to improve their theoretical reflections
on this issue. Although a defender of the hypothetical social contract, Mills criticises idealised elements of Rawls’ proposal. As he says:

In modelling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved (2005, p.170).

Mills is not against abstract theories tout court, but against Rawlsian and alike “deficient abstractions of the ideal-as-idealized-model kind” (2005, p.173). Thus, he claims that past and present patriarchy and white supremacy (heteronormativity, etc. can also be added) have to be seen by theories as central vectors of current injustices. Unlike Rawls, who does not mention historical gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. inequalities, Mills proposes to design a theory of justice “starting from an already-existent non-ideal unjust society, to prescribe what ideally would be required from rectificatory justice. Nonetheless, such correction requires factual characterisation of past and present injustices, that is, a description” (Pateman & Mills, 2007, p.232-3). In Mills’ view, the elimination of racism is under the current overlapping consensus (Pateman & Mills, 2007, p.121). He seems right, since this prejudice, though it is still being practiced, is not legally tolerated in any Western country. Thus, since this problem, consensually condemned, still exists (mostly through unconscious practices but also through shameful conscious behaviours), such a description of structural racism has to be considered in the hypothetical contract – the same can be said about structural sexism and homophobia. Mills’ improvement of Rawls hypothetical social contract is, then, welcomed.

Rawls’ proposal is only focused on creating an ideal way to redistribute wealth and political power, and thus cannot “capture the essentials of the situation of women and nonwhites” (Mills, 2005, p.173), and additionally other minorities, such as the LGBT community. However, constant vindications from women, black people, the LGBT community, etc. in the

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31 The question of sexism seems to be similar. Much more discussion regarding how homophobia is being treated by law in Western countries is needed. However, at least in UK, the Equality Act 2010 was implemented in order to protect people against discrimination in education, employment and provision of goods and services based on at least one of nine different characteristics (age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion and belief, sex, and sexuality). This act is directly associated with equality of opportunity, something within Western people’s consensus.
last half-century show that these prejudices are still felt and social tensions are far from being solved. Thus, in order to guarantee social cohesion, developing policies towards eliminating prejudices against women, non-whites, the LGBT community, etc. is as important as increasing the material conditions of the poorer members of society.

Mills, then, is not against ideal aims towards justice, but he “suggest[s] that a non-ideal approach is also superior to an ideal approach in being better able to realise the ideals, by virtue of realistically recognising the obstacles to their acceptance and implementation” (2005, p.181). In the same way, Nussbaum suggests that “we must scrutinize Rawls’s account of primary goods, with its commitment to measuring relative social positions (once the priority of liberty is fixed) with reference to wealth and income, rather than by some more heterogeneous and plural set of indices, such as capabilities” (2006, p.64). Thus, Nussbaum’s (2011, p.33-4) list of ten central capabilities is an attempt to go further than the principles of justices presented by Rawls and to be more specific about social injustices.

3.9. Transcendental, ordinary and political liberties

Returning to the analysis of social contract, it is possible to further discussions through endorsing Nussbaum’s positive view of its hypothetical form. She writes:

The idea of basic political principles as the result of a social contract is one of the major contributions of liberal political philosophy in the Western tradition. In its various forms, the tradition makes two signal contributions. First, it demonstrates clearly and rigorously that human interests themselves – even if we begin with an artificially simplified conception of such interests – are well served by political society, a society in which all surrender power before law and duly constituted authority. Second, and even more significant, it shows us that if we divest human beings of the artificial advantages some of them hold in all actual societies – wealth, rank, social class, education, and so on – they will agree to a contract of a certain specific sort, which the theories then proceed to spell out. Given that the starting point is in that sense fair, the principles that result from the bargain will be fair. (2006, p.10)

Following this idea, hypothetical contract intends designing the basic structures of a cohesive society based on liberal ideas.

32 The ten central capabilities are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; control over one’s environment. (2011, p.33-4)
It is fundamental to this reasoning that hypothetical contract is associated with people’s defence of transcendental liberty, an ideal liberty that is beyond real circumstances associated with individuals’ class, gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. Transcendental liberty can be defined by opposition to ordinary liberty, since the former is based on “[a]n ‘ideal’, or ‘inner’, or ‘higher’, or ‘rational’, or ‘true’, or ‘transcendental’, or ‘noumenal’ or ‘moral’ self”, while the latter on “an ‘empirical’, or ‘lower’, or ‘irrational’, or ‘emotional’, or ‘phenomenal’ or ‘base’ self” (Swift, 2014, p.61).

This transcendental definition of self tries to respect a certain way that societies understand how individuals should make choices in the personal and social spheres. In this sense, some constitutional constraints even to democratic practices are justified. Swift illustrates this as follows:

Imagine two societies. In one, there is a democratic vote on what religions people are to be permitted to practice. In the other, there is a constitution granting every individual the right to practice the religion of her choice. Which society is better? The second. Which is more democratic? I think the first. (2014, p.18)

According to the current Western paradigm, liberties of religion, of sexuality, and so on, are fundamental for people’s self-determination. Thus, these liberties have to be guaranteed by constitutions even in contexts where the majority considers some religions or sexual practices wrong. On the other hand, also respecting current Western paradigm grounded on democratic procedures, constitutions have to protect some practices that are fundamental to guarantee the health of democracy. This attempt to combine transcendental liberty – which gives room for people freely chosen their religions, sexualities, etc. – with democratic liberty – which guarantees free association, expression, etc. – summarises the foundational elements of Western constitutions.

Constant (1819)\(^{33}\), somehow keeping this distinction, counterposed the understandings of liberty of ancient Greek democracies and of his contemporaries – French, British and American peoples, the “moderms”. According to him, the ancients desired the liberty to rule

\(^{33}\) This famous lecture was presented when the political situation in France was a bit more “stable”, after the Revolution and Napoleonic Era.
social affairs while moderns were looking to protect free decisions within the personal sphere. Constant summarises the virtues and vices of the understanding of liberty in the two historical moments saying that, “among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations”, and “[a]mong the moderns, on the contrary, the individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the freest of states, sovereign only in appearance” (1819).

Though Constant sees virtues in the ancient idea of liberty, he also considers that certain social changes made its instantiation impossible in his time. The nineteenth century (and current) states were and are much more populous than Greek city-states. In this way, each person individually has less power of decision. Moreover, because individuals no longer have slaves and since women also participate in civic and public life (though with restrictions from double shifts, less economic resources, etc.), all citizens have less time to participate in politics. Thus, it was and is impossible to achieve the ancient times’ political liberty in the nineteenth century and current societies.

However, Constant was not resigned to the nineteenth century attitudes of neglecting ancient liberty. According to him, “[p]olitical liberty, by submitting to all the citizens, without exception, the care and assessment of their most sacred interests, enlarges their spirit, ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of intellectual equality that forms the glory and power of a people” (1819). This claim is similar to the Aristotelian view presented in Nicomachean Ethics idea that “man is a political animal”; that is, that politics is a condition for people flourishing as individuals. Moreover, contrary to those who consider that a dictatorship can guarantee liberty for individuals to achieve their personal life plans, Constant says that private liberty is dependent on political (the social sphere) liberty. Since these two liberties are essential (and even interrelated) and since Constant identifies the importance of fully preserving both, he proposes the representative democratic system as the solution to their symbiosis.

Following Constant, it seems currently consensual that institutions have to be designed in order to guarantee individuals’ liberty in the personal and social spheres. Constitutional principles and current ideas related to equality of opportunities, of cultural recognitions and of democratic participation go in this way. In the next chapter, these points are developed
through the presentation of alternative dissent ideas and some consensual limits on these regards.

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Chapter 3 presents a hypothetical social contract based on transcendental liberty as the best theory to explain how the ideas of equal liberty and communal/national responsibilities have founded current Western societies. Social choice theory and deliberative democracy serve as bases to think of improvements of democratic processes, and a non-idealised approach of the contract is defended as the best way to appeal to this theoretical tool. This hypothetical social contract is presented as consensually accepted by Western individuals. Thus, it serves as the starting point to investigate the possibilities of dialogue and limits of the ideas of justice presented in chapter 4.
4. Investigating justice from economic, cultural and decision-making dimensions

The ideas of equal liberty, social responsibility and democracy defended previously are complex. This complexity allows different proposals on how to refine laws and social practices in order to design social institutions which truly represent them. This chapter focuses on mapping this debate by observing different dimensions related to social justice, and establishing some limits to alternative proposals associated with each of these dimensions. Thus, at the beginning, it is defended that (4.1) the debates on justice should turn around three central and independent dimensions. Then, each one of these dimensions is analysed separately. (4.2) From the economic point of view, planned economy and free marked are seen as opposite theories. (4.3) The cultural dimension counterposes conservative and avant-garde views about social practices. Finally, (4.4) regarding how decision-making processes are conducted, systems based on direct democracy and on experts’ decisions are taken as rival paradigms.

4.1. Disagreements on justice

As presented in 2.5, Marshall (1950) identifies in the development of Western liberal states – after the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ revolutions – progressive equalisation of civil, political and social rights amongst all individuals. Thus, equal civil rights represent an avoidance of arbitrary differentiation guaranteed by a solid rule of law (1950, p.41). The equalisation of political rights comes from universal suffrage, and equal opportunity of people being elected (1950, p.20-1). In Marshall’s view, equalisation of social rights also comes from the reduction of the gap of life conditions and of inequalities of opportunities between the more and less fortunate (1950, p.56). In this way, being a citizen is being an individual who has these three rights guaranteed. Recent constitutions include these three types of rights, while old ones are usually restricted to the first two, neglecting issues of social rights. The Brazilian Constitution (1988), which guarantees (at least theoretically) these three spheres of rights for all, is called the “Citizenship Constitution”, an indicator that citizenship is currently associated with promoting equal civil, political and social rights. The American Constitution (1787), promulgated two centuries before, focuses only on civil and political rights. Still, though not represented in the Constitution, equality of opportunities and
other ideas related to social rights are also consensual amongst American people, as indicated by the notion of the “American dream”, a narrative that focuses upon equality of opportunities (Adams, 1931, p.214), which depends on some social rights, such as access to good education.

Whilst Marshall has identified previous advances in equalising civil, then political, and finally social rights, there are disagreements on how much these rights have been equally shared. Reflections on social rights still lead to oppositions between “left” and “right” supporters – groups that disagree about how to produce and redistribute social goods. While pressures towards the expansion of democratic practices culminated in the universal suffrage at the first half of twentieth century, claims for guaranteeing effective voice for different minorities in the political sphere are constant. In the second half of the twentieth century, women, ethnic minorities, LGBT members and other groups increased their struggles for social recognition, something that is still in course. This historical summary of Western reflections on justice presents three different dimensions of the debate that, though empirically correlated, keep fundamental distinctions and make the discussions about this issue much more complex. These dimensions counterpose: free market and planned economy; conservatism and avant-gardism; the defence of decisions based on specialists’ expertise and on direct democracy.

Thus, different concerns about justice are contemplated. Largely, through the twentieth century, thinkers focused the debate on justice around the opposition between the capitalist model, based on liberty of entrepreneurism but inequality of life conditions, and the socialist model, based on centralisation of production and an attempt to equalise life conditions. Western societies, where capitalism has been the production model/system since the establishment of nation-states, are influenced by socialist practices and have made central discussions on social rights associated with collecting and redistributing material goods. The opposition of the liberal egalitarian/welfarist project (Rawls, 1971; Roemer, 1998; Dworkin, 2000) and libertarian/neoliberal ideas (Hayek, 1960; Friedman, 1962; Nozick, 1974) grounded this debate.

However, it seems simplistic to reduce reflections on justice to different proposals on how societies should deal with material goods. In the last third of the century, discussions on women and ethnic minorities’ rights, symbolised by the sexual revolution and civil rights
movement, were introduced at least in the US and Europe. Walzer (1983) expanded the debate on justice through claiming that reflections on this subject have to take into account different spheres of distribution such as: “membership, power, honor, ritual eminence, divine grace, kinship and love, knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and punishments, and a host of goods more narrowly and materially conceived” (1983, p.3). Also, considering that debates on justice at the end of the twentieth century were excessively focused on how to share material resources, Fraser (1996; 2000) proposes two fronts for reflection: how material goods should be redistributed and how individuals’ social practices should be recognised.

Young (1990), rather than proposing different types of distribution of goods, “focus[es] most of [her] discussion on three primary categories of non-distributive issues that distributive theories tend to ignore: decision-making structure and procedures, division of labor, and culture” (1990, p.22). Walzer deals with all these three issues, but without making them central. Redistribution of labour duties and attention to cultural issues are directly contemplated in Fraser’s proposal, but decision-making structure can be seen only as a by-product of her proposal. However, according to Young, “the [current] decision-making structure operates to reproduce distributive inequality and the unjust constraints on people’s lives” (1990, p.23). For this reason, she displaces “the distributive paradigm in favor of a wider, process-oriented understanding of society, which focuses on power, decision-making structures, and so on, likewise shifts the imagination to different assumptions about human beings” (1990, p.37). Young is concerned with social atomism (3.4) of the distributive paradigm “inasmuch as there is no internal relation among persons in society relevant to considerations of justice” (1990, p.18). Following Heller (1987, pp. 180-2), she claims that the distributive paradigm implicitly defines human beings as primarily consumers, desirers, and possessors of goods” (1990, p.36).

These three proposals explore the main elements of reflections on social justice but none of them tries to combine theoretical understandings of justice with reflections that happen in real democratic processes. As explored in 2.6, the “second” Rawls (1993; 2001), through adding general reflective equilibrium to his theory, goes in this direction. This improvement on his idea of reflective equilibrium turns decision-making structures into one of the central points of his proposal, but keeps also the centrality of reflections on distribution, which differs from Young’s position. However, as discussed in 3.8, through disregarding differences of social
statuses of minority groups like women, black people and LGBT members (Pateman & Mills, 2007), Rawls does not give enough attention to injustices related to lack of recognition. Thus, in order to join all these proposals, the present thesis reflects on justice from three different perspectives: economic, cultural and decision-making. In 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, these perspectives are explored in more detail. From this, a certain consensus that establishes limits over extreme proposals is presented and some non-consensual ideas are broadly defended.

The classical free market versus planned economy debate about collecting and redistributing material goods serves to introduce reflections on the economic dimension of justice. In the one extreme, free market defenders consider that the state should not participate in this process; in the other, planned economy supporters understand that the state should actively regulate it. Both opposite theories claim to be in favour of equal liberty. Defenders of free market economics consider that, through minimal intromission of the state over the lives of its citizens, no one would be impeded to put his/her life plans into practice; that is, all individuals would be formally free for deciding what to do with their gains (equal formal liberty) and, in this oversimplification, there is no state redistributive practices. On the other hand, planned economy supporters understand that only with equal material conditions guaranteed by the state people would have access to goods that allow them to put freely their life plans into practice (equal effective/material liberty)\textsuperscript{34}. In between these two extremes, different shades of liberalism can be identified, which dispute how best to balance formal and effective/material liberty. Regarding this, Western societies can be more oriented towards more neoliberal policies that give greater importance to formal liberty or welfare policies that focus more on promoting effective/material liberty. The amount and progressivity of taxes collected associated with comprehensiveness of health and educational services provided by the state define this difference. Figure 10 organises the different positions:

\textbf{Figure 10}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure10.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{34} It is important to notice that this is only one way to understand the socialist proposal. It can be said that socialism is being presented through using liberal capitalist principles. Another interpretation of socialism defends that its difference in relation to capitalism is not only in a more effective allocation of resources for fulfilling individual life plans. It is about a decentring of individual life plans in favour of a collective interest.
However, apart from material resources, individuals’ liberties depend on how the culture in which they live is organised (cultural constraints). This second dichotomy is about how much societies should conserve their moral values based on cultural practices or implement avant-garde cultural changes based on rational individual/human rights. Some people are very attached to traditions; others think that, if it is rationally possible to identify superior moral values than the current ones, then they should be implemented. For example, currently, religions are against same-sex marriage, however it is almost impossible to oppose homosexual relationships based on reason. This situation confronts religious/conservative positions based on the majorities’ practices and secular/rational positions which protect individuals (minorities). There is an extensive debate regarding the extent to which cultural beliefs should be respected. It seems, nevertheless, obvious that the weight of rationality in public debates that protects individuals over cultural practices – at least until the rising of post-truth era – was increasing. The expansion of LGBT rights seems a proof of this. Thus, in between these two extremes, some people, though quite sure about the rationality of their positions, accept that implementing them depends on public deliberation. These people are also avant-garde, but more moderated. They are in favour of same-sex marriage, but understand that the implementation of these demands requires a transitory process. There are others who think that, since, regarding many controversial issues like abortion, it is not possible to present a rational answer, and that conservative arguments that respect traditional practices have to be taken seriously into account. Figure 11 below presents these distinct positions:

![Figure 11](image)

The two previous reflections – on redistribution of goods and cultural recognition – are related to the contents of justice. Reflections on democracy, on the other hand, are related to the best procedures to implement justice. Simplifying the debate, in the one extreme, certain people defend that majority’s will should be strictly respected. The extreme opposite idea

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35 Hans-Georg Gadamer, in *Truth and Method* (1975[1960]), proposed this differentiation. Instead of counterposing conservatism and progressivism, the choice for counterposing conservatism and avant-gardism seems more accurate, since the idea is to avoid presenting any of the extremes as something necessarily good. The term “progress”, however, has this connotation.
considers that societies should be designed by a few specialists, not by listening to the majorit"y"s will. Specialists capable of identifying what is the common good should take the decisions instead of consulting these heterogeneous people"s opinions. In this direction, some people even believe that a strong leader (a benevolent dictator, a philosopher king, etc.) are needed to decide how the nation should be organised. A series of problems are generated from both extreme views. In order to analyse them, these views are called here direct-democracy-based and specialist-based approaches. Of course, similarly to the previous debates, the present discussion has intermediary positions in between extreme direct democracy and total trust on specialists. These people consider that certain decisions should be only discussed by specialists but others should be discussed publicly. Figure 12 illustrates these opposed ideas:

![Figure 12](image)

After introducing these three oppositions, it is interesting to explore their correlation. This thesis suggests that all these combinations of opinions regarding these three dimensions are possible. Thus, it is defended that, at least theoretically, someone could support different positions. Individual “A” could be extremely pro planned economy (A1), slightly conservative (A2), a defender of decisions taken by specialist (A3); an individual “B” could be pro free market (B1), extremely avant-garde (B2), and slightly in favour of direct democracy (B3). Thus, it is accepted that people"s political positions are multidimensional, and spread in any of those points of the three dimensions’ graph presented below\(^\text{36}\) (figure 13):

\(^{36}\) The inspiration of this proposal is a website called “The Political Compass” (www.politicalcompass.org/)
This different way to present the debate about justice suggests the existence of many different possible combinations of political views (each of them being distinct points in the three-dimension graph of the figure 13). Through this, it is possible to help people’s understanding of their political views and the establishment of a more fluid and less polarised debate. Thus, individuals can think better, agree on certain points and disagree on others. This different way to debate has the power to change a real-life phenomenon, such as reducing the formation of “tribes” of individuals that agree on everything – by taking their agreed ideas as the truths – and disagree with all ideas of the opposite pole.

4.2. Economic dimension

As mentioned above, issues related to collecting and redistributing material goods are central in the debate about justice. In Western capitalist societies, it is consensual that people should not keep all their wealth and that part of it (though, for some, a small amount) ought to go to the worst-off. Thus, certain radical theories, such as extreme free market (which is against any intervention of the state in the redistribution) but also extreme planned economy (which considers that the state should collect and redistribute all goods), are disregarded. In between these two extremes, neoliberals and welfarists basically disagree on how the state should collect and redistribute material goods. In this regard, though neoliberals and welfarists are both concerned with equalising civil and political rights37, named by Swift as “formal liberty”, welfarists are much more concerned with reducing inequalities of material/effective liberty (Swift, 2014, p.64).

37 These rights are summarized by Constant (1819): “the right to be subjected only to the laws, […] to express his opinion, […] to come and go, […] to associate with other individuals, […] to profess the religion […] to exercise some influence on the administration of the government”.

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This disagreement is present in reflections on how to consider merit (equality of opportunities, rewarded effort), to improve society’s material goods, to respect property rights, and to protect the most vulnerable. Thus, some questions arise: is equalising opportunities prior to increasing the goods of all? If not, should at least the socially disadvantaged have to be protected? To what extent should people keep the goods produced by or transferred to them? All of these questions are connected with two different understandings of the ontology of societies (3.4). Neoliberals are usually against any duty of solidarity/compassion towards co-citizens (even those who donate to charity, since they consider that they do not have any duty to do so). They support an atomist social ontology and defend that people should not be forced to care about the whole society. The holist idea behind welfarism, on the other hand, indicates that, in some measure, people have social duties/responsibilities towards their co-citizens.

This disagreement introduces a reflection on the extension of people’s rights of enjoying the goods they produce. Neoliberals consider that people have the right to decide how to spend the money they receive (Hayek, 1960; Friedman, 1962; Nozick, 1974). Welfarists, on the other hand, usually consider this view too individualist and defend partial redistribution grounded on the ideas of holism and solidarity. However, regarding the protection of the worst-off, most neoliberals agree with welfarists that very vulnerable people should receive at least some health care and education from the state. Some neoliberals have remnants of belief in solidarity and consider that the better-off have minimal duties towards the worst-off. Others simply think that the lives of all are improved through establishing this threshold of protection.

However, only protecting the worst-off is not considered enough for welfarists. They demand that equality of opportunities is also promoted (or, at least, highly increased). Regarding this, neoliberals give more weight to personal achievement, while welfarists think that external conditions have much more implications on people’s life achievements. According to many neoliberals, being rich or poor is much more a matter of effort and choice of what to do. According to welfarists, it is much more a matter of circumstances, whether they be natural (being born with more or less skills) or social (being born into a wealthy or poor family) circumstances.
Roemer (1998) claims that neoliberals defend a non-discrimination principle in which equality of opportunities should take place only at the formal-legal level. Following the non-discrimination principle, individuals’ capacities should be judged only by relevant attributes – for example, in a process for selecting a judge, individuals’ knowledge about the law should be taken into account, rather than the colour of their skin or their gender. Roemer, however, defends that equality should also be applied through the “level playing field principle”. This principle is based on equalising individuals’ backgrounds: for example, the rich and the poor should have access to the same educational level so that, in the future, they could compete in real equal conditions. Roemer (1998) opens his most important book on this subject quoting Ortega y Gasset: “Yo soy: yo y mi circunstancia” (I am: me and my circumstances). This quotation explicitly indicates that Roemer’s theoretical construction is based on the assumption that an individual is not determined only by his/her free will (yo) and that factors beyond his/her control are fundamental in the determination of who he/she is (mi circunstancia).

Dworkin, going in the same direction, makes clearer this point through distinguishing choice and circumstance. People’s “choices reflect their personality, which is itself a matter of two main ingredients: ambition [tastes, preferences, and convictions as well as his overall plan of life] and character [application, energy, industry, doggedness, and ability to work now for distant rewards]”. People’s circumstances are personal resources such as “physical and mental health and ability” and impersonal ones as “wealth and the other property [they] command, and the opportunities provided to [them]” (2000, p.322-3).

If societies eliminate inequalities caused by natural and social circumstances (personal and impersonal resources) but not those caused by choices, only more or less effort and willingness to perform hardworking or non-pleasurable jobs (such as being a brain surgeon or a garbageman) would be rewarded and individuals would no longer accuse their societies of being unjust with them. Once this difference is addressed, the individual bears exclusive responsibility for their actions.

Dworkin, thus, understands that promoting equality of opportunities means eliminating natural and social luck, and accepting that the only criteria that justify people’s differing earnings are their choices and their effort to achieve their jobs. His proposal partially fits with neoliberals’ defence of rewarding choices. Neoliberals, however, almost disregard influences
of circumstances in their reasoning. Thus, though they usually appeal much more than welfarists to a certain view of equality of opportunities, by disregarding differences in people’s background, neoliberals do not propose a true meritocratic society where everyone has equal opportunities.

Nevertheless, regarding this discussion, it is interesting to observe that even a perfect equality of opportunities can be criticised. Young (1973), who coined the term “meritocracy”, claims that even those societies that truly try to eliminate all social and natural differences amongst individuals to create a field for fair competition are deleterious to the development of solidarity and care amongst people. In his view, when competition is stimulated, even if fair, individualism – rather than holism – is stimulated\(^{38}\). This claim shows how complex is the association in between meritocracy – even in its most perfect instantiation – and welfarism.

This reflection makes evident that an eventual defence of meritocracy and equality of opportunities has also to be balanced with the defence of the improvement of social goods of all. The reflection associated with the fair attitude beyond this discussion is related to the fact that certain people are born with natural characteristics that, if developed, can increase significantly the goods of all. This situation seems to give rise to a dilemma: either talented people are more stimulated than the average (with scholarships and so on) or equality of opportunities, in which natural and social differences are eliminated, is promoted.

Defenders of neoliberalism are normally those who consider that in between increasing the goods of all and equalising circumstances, the former has priority. Swift (2014) goes deep into this reflection on the functionality of inequalities to economic growth. He claims that not only do the most talented have to receive economic stimulus to achieve their skills, but all people who have jobs that demand study and dedication, and produce stress. For example, following this reasoning, societies gain overall by paying a brain surgeon (and a garbageman) more than a poet. It is this better payment that makes the former sacrifice himself/herself to achieve a much more demanding job\(^{39}\) (2014, p.27-8). (Welfarists normally agree with this idea of differing gains and opportunities, but to a lesser extent.)

\(^{38}\) Thus, his text about meritocracy is a satire.

\(^{39}\) This reasoning rests on a set of assumptions about human rationality and motivation, which themselves are, arguably, linked to a view of “homo economicus” and have been challenged both empirically and theoretically (notably by Marx.)
This reasoning can be related to the determination of the size of the state. Neoliberals believe that diminishing the size of state (and, in turn, reducing direct duties of rich towards poor) is good for everyone, since, through this, proactivity/effort of everyone is stimulated: “ambitious” people make effort and choose highly paid, but not necessary enjoyable jobs, because they want to gain more and more; “non-ambitious” people are obliged to make some effort, otherwise their own situation would be bad. In the end, more goods are produced and everyone benefits. Interestingly, this argument in favour of free market, though based on atomism, is also based on some idea of the common good – the increasing of Gross Domestic Product, a classic utilitarian argument. According to utilitarianism, it is more important to increase the measure of happiness, in this instance national wealth, than to try to equalise distribution of it.

4.3. Cultural dimension

The second dimension of reflections on justice is related to cultural recognition, rather than to collection and redistribution of material goods. Though some thinkers consider the debate on recognition less important than reflections on redistribution (Swift, 2014, p.99), many others see equalisation of cultural recognition as one of the key aspects of reflections on justice. As discussed in 3.8, Mills (2007) defends that, though currently everyone aims towards building a society in which all cultures are equally recognised, neutrality in this regards does not guarantee justice. He correctly claims that some minority groups have suffered historical oppression and neutrality does not nullify this situation. Thus, based on actual circumstances, rectifications have to be promoted in order to reduce oppression over groups such as women, black people, ethnic minorities, the LGBT community, disabled people etc.

Depending on how the state deals with this situation, individual liberties can be increased or decreased. As introduced in 4.1, on the one extreme, conservatives defend that the state should only preserve cultural values historically built by the society, while, on the other, avant-gardists consider that the state should defend values that are rationally superior and protect the individuals regardless of their difference in cultures. In between these ideas on how to deal with moral values, there are intermediary positions that combine respecting tradition and protecting individuals through observing reason.
Two types of communitarianism defend that peoples’ traditions have to be respected. One, named “republicanism” or “republican communitarianism”, supports patriotic traditions that encourage communal/social responsibility. The other, named “multiculturalism” or “multicultural communitarianism”, sees that the fact of people identifying themselves with certain communities is enough justification for the state doing something in order to preserve these communities and to make other people recognise and respect them. From a perspective that does not focus on conserving cultures, though that not necessarily is against preserving patriotic spirit or encouraging minority cultures, it is possible to reflect on cultural values only based on rational individual rights. This perspective normally considers individuals less determined by their cultures and more by their self-consciousness.

Chapter 2 defends the idea that, since the seventeenth and eighteenth century liberal revolutions, a certain tradition was solidified and refined in Western societies. This tradition has been grounded on the ideas of equal liberty, social responsibility towards unknown members of the nation and democratic participation of all. Identifying this, however, is different from defending that patriotic traditions have to be reinforced by the state. Even so, given the fact that political systems are based on nation-states structures – something called by Ben-Porath (2013) as “shared fate” (3.5) – it seems helpful to stimulate people’s feeling of social responsibility towards their co-citizens. In this sense, cultivating patriotic traditions is a powerful way of establishing such a connection. Thus, as republicans like Taylor (1995a) propose, a somehow holistic view of society is more aligned with Western values than a view based on a simple aggregation of individuals (atoms).

Obviously, patriotism can be very dangerous. Associated with this idea, nationalistic attitudes can be degenerated towards isolationism, cultural imposition and xenophobia. A first problem of patriotism is, then, that, in a world in which the economy is progressively globalised and the effects of public policies are not restricted to national borders, these issues orient debates on global justice. Thus, any patriotic feeling has to take into account the existence of these dynamics. The challenge is of how nations should see their neighbours: either as “players” whose interests can conflict with theirs, something that demands certain compromises; or as “brothers and sisters” whose interests are also theirs and whose destiny inexorably goes to the formation of a global society? These reflections on global justice are out of the scope of this

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40 Some do not classify Taylor as a republican. However, at least in the mentioned paper, his defence of societies in which people have strong responsibilities with unknown co-citizens is evident.
thesis, since this thesis’ main aim is to think of how to better guarantee stability within Western nations. It is questionable if stimulating patriotism is good or bad in order to develop cosmopolitan values and, if the premise is accepted that cosmopolitanism should be cultivated, this point has to be further explored.

Moreover, it is quite common through history that the dominant groups impose their values over the others. Thus, it is a challenge for republicans to create the conditions that stimulate a sense of belonging and solidarity/compassion among co-citizens without oppressing minority groups. Based on this, certain conservative attitudes towards preserving minority cultures within the nations have to be cultivated. Regarding this, Taylor (1995b, p.249) complains against the fact that liberalism calls itself “blind to cultural values”, though Christian values are evident in its everyday Western policies. This fact oppresses other religious groups within these nations. More room for minority religions should be opened and/or the participation of Christian practices and symbols should be reduced. In the same way, as is explored in the final chapters, it is so important that the history of minorities is also taught in Western schools, as black history is in the US and Brazil. As Taylor says, “enlarging and changing the curriculum is therefore essential not so much in the name of a broader culture for everyone as in order to give due recognition to the hitherto excluded” (1995b, p.251). In this way, based on the need to stimulate social responsibility and, at the same time, respect people’s self-identification, a room for different types of cultural conservatism has to be guaranteed in state practices.

However, many times, dominant and minority cultures cultivate values that oppress some of their members. It is true that black people (for example, in US and Brazil) or indigenous peoples (in Chile and Australia) are subjugated by the white majority. However, it is also true that women and LGBT people suffer discrimination regardless of whether they belong to dominant or minority groups. Being all cultures sexist and homophobic (though in different degrees), women and LGBT people fight for equal recognition appealing not to the respect of the tradition, but to rational individual rights. Interestingly, such an appeal is directly related to the development of the idea of equal liberty from the Western liberal revolutions. Okin takes exactly these Western consensual values to defend gender equality based on reason and criticise the extreme appeal to multiculturalism:
Women in more liberal cultures are, at the same time, legally guaranteed many of the same freedoms and opportunities as men. In addition, most families in such cultures, with the exception of some religious fundamentalists, do not communicate to their daughters that they are of less value than boys, that their lives are to be confined to domesticity and service to men and children, and that their sexuality is of value only in marriage, in service of men, and for reproductive ends. (1999, p. 17)

In this sense, Okin’s criticism focuses much more on cases in which women have their individual rights violated by practices of certain cultural groups. According to her, advocates of violence and oppression against women often support their points by building “cultural defences” which, among other things, support polygamy, abortion ban, sexual abuse, violence against homosexuals and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).

Kymlicka’s solution to this conflict balances multicultural demands and human rights derived from Enlightenment ideas. According to him, following a multiculturalist demand, different cultures must be protected from external threats such as the imposition of a dominant culture; however, following a requirement of defenders of individual/human rights, this protection should be limited by internal constraints, by ensuring protection to the weakest members of the culture against the oppression of the members who are in a position of superiority (2002, p.342-3).

4.4. Decision-making dimension

If 4.2 and 4.3 reflect on certain ways that governments have to treat individuals to promote justice, here, the political process of determining what is just is analysed. As introduced in 4.1, the third opposition on how a just society should be organised has, on the one extreme, a model of society ruled by few specialists (technocracy) and, in the other, a proposal that avoids interference of specialists in democratic processes. Through history, however, both models were exceptional, since societies used to be ruled by the most powerful without any popular participation in the decisions. And, though most states were grounded on totalitarian regimes, few appealed to optimisation of efficiency to justify such practices. Direct

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41 This dichotomy can be found, for example, in Rancière (2014[2005], p.96)
democracy was also rare – certain cities in ancient Greece are some of these exceptions\textsuperscript{42}, where city-states were sufficiently small, there were not complex decisions to be taken (compared with current sophisticated issues related, for example, to the globalized economy) and citizens had time to deliberate and vote (only free landowner men (in Athens, 30,000) were considered citizens, and slaves and women used to do the ordinary work (Thorley, 2005, p.74)).

This thesis, however, is focused on Western contemporary democracies. In 2.6, t is claimed that democratic procedures, which somehow presuppose people’s participation in states’ decisions, are the consensual means to apply and refine certain principles of justice. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to realise that Western states have characteristics that make direct democracy impossible: they are formed by millions of people, all of them with an equal right to vote and with very complex problems to solve. Thus, in local, regional and national levels, certain people are chosen (and paid) to spend time thinking and debating in order to find the best alternatives for solving the problems of the societies they represent (representative democracy). They, through deliberation and aggregation of interests (two ideas discussed below) elaborate laws and policies, and check executive power (theoretically) on behalf of their voters.

Thus, a healthy representative model depends on people’s trust in the political class. However, two recent phenomena from countries where this system seemed to work well have been considered important threats to representative democracy: in the UK, against most MPs’ and specialists’/experts’ opinions, people voted for Brexit. A comment of Michael Gove, a former Education Minister and an important leader of Brexit, makes it evident: “people in this country have had enough of experts”\textsuperscript{43}; in the US, Trump, as discussed below, appealed to the same rhetoric. Interestingly, in both cases, amongst many other things, it is possible to identify a strong desire of unarticulated people, who normally do not belong to the central political system (the “establishment”), to question these centralised decisions.

Thus, neither extreme direct democracy, nor extreme specialist-based governments seem plausible, and the real alternatives are the different combinations of ordinary people’s

\textsuperscript{42} Other non-Western examples, but also related to small communities, can be also identified (Graeber, 2004; Barclay, 1996; Clark, 2016)

\textsuperscript{43} https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c
opinions and specialists’ knowledge in decision-making processes. On the one hand, as presented in 3.7, peoples’ opinions obtained through democratic processes are important for two reasons. First, currently, it is consensual in Western societies that all individuals should participate in the public decision-making. This consensus gives legitimacy for democratic governments and, then, stability for the society. Second, based on the debate on social choice theory, since many specialists have difficulty in understanding people’s wills, consulting people’s opinions seems to be the best way of identifying important characteristics of the common good.

On the other hand, specialists are important in order to ensure that democratic decisions are not simply aggregations of individuals’ will. Specialists help to refine theories, translate them to ordinary people, and guarantee the respect of entrenched constitutional principles. Through reinforcing these principles, a common good is favoured and the danger of a dictatorship of majority groups is significantly reduced. Thus, some people have to be designated to think on what is just. They are, in the theoretical domain, humanities academics, opinion-makers, etc. and, in the practical domain, policymakers. They are deliberately hired by the society to develop ideas that individuals in their ordinary lives do not have time or interest to develop.

In this way, academics and opinion-makers work towards increasing consensus, though often it is not produced: obviously, there are many disagreements amongst specialists, but, through theoretical debate, they look for consensus (even if they never reach it). In debates on justice, academics look forward to reaching minimal agreement that at least sustains constitutional principles. Voters and their representatives deal with dissensus. When debates reach the public sphere, it is because it is being accepted that consensus was not possible and people’s opinions have to be consulted. Of course, through debates in the public sphere (pre and post elections), sometimes consensus is produced, though, many times, disagreements result in disputes ended by voting.

Thus, certain states’ practices towards justice are guaranteed by constitutions, while others come and go through democratic decisions. Throughout history, societies developed very

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44 Nichols (2017) differentiates experts (knowers) from policymakers (deciders). For the present discussion, this differentiation is not relevant, since policymakers are taken as specialists in governance. However, it is important to differentiate between deciders that are specialists in governance (and are chosen because of these qualities) from those who are only born into privilege (and are chosen because of their political influences). Many people consider that the deciders are far from being specialists in governance and, then, completely distrust them.
different ways of combining direct participation and certain mechanisms of limiting majority will. They are usually differentiated by the higher or lower importance given to central power in comparison to local power, by more or less direct connection between the leader and the voters (the dispute between presidentialism versus parliamentarism symbolises this), and by the ways that representatives are chosen.

An way to reflect on how to give voice to the people in spite of the size of the nation is through comparing presidentialism and parliamentarism. Each system has advantages and disadvantages depending on people’s level of trust in their local representatives. When this trust is low, it may be preferable that people choose directly the president, since they feel that, at least the choice of the president is based on their will, and, then, their voice is listened to. However, presidentialist regimes are normally based on the image of the leader as a saviour and get close to totalitarian practices. From this, undemocratic actions achieved by a bureaucratic establishment are recurrent. On the other hand, when people feel represented by their MPs, the channels of dialogue with the government, parliamentarism may be a better option, since representatives are in superior position to support but also to supervise and criticise the prime minister. Thus, the process of representatives’ choice also deserves reflection.

Since a representative system seems essential to current democratic practices, it is important to identify good ways to achieve it. Three alternatives are, then, briefly compared. District representation is a system in which the nation (also municipalities and states) is divided in districts where citizens choose a single candidate for representing them. The most positive element of such a system is the stronger ties established by the candidate and the voters (Strom et al, 2006). In proportional representation systems, on the other hand, citizens vote for a party, rather than for a specific candidate. The main advantage of this system is that people vote based on a national project, that is, on a broader project, rather than basing their choices in local concerns. Group representation (Young, 1990) is a type of affirmative action that aims to guarantee some seats in parliament for groups historically excluded (for different reasons) from political representation. There is a long debate in these regards, but it seems that these three alternatives can be combined, being such a combination the best alternative to improve the efficacy of the representative system.

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Chapter 4 examines and shares the current Western debate about justice in three dimensions (economic, cultural and decision-making). This analytical option favours a more focused observation of different views of justice, and reduces the polarisation of the debate about justice. It is not the aim of this chapter to defend “the” just practices related to each dimension, but only to identify some reasonable limits on these regards. These limits added to empirical observations about human behaviours (chapter 5), especially Brazilian people’s (chapter 6), help the identification of civic virtues that make people participate more effectively in the public sphere (chapter 8).
5. Natural and cultural developments of ideas of justice

Chapters 3 and 4 develop reflections on justice from a theoretical point of view. However, many times, theories of justice are excessively idealistic and present proposals that are not perfectly compatible with real people’s practices. Observing how human beings feel and are predisposed to act in the social sphere help to define how a just society should be. The focus of the present chapter is to dwell upon this reflection, from the empirical side of reflective equilibrium. Thus, it starts investigating (5.1) the role of natural selection and cultural practices in the development of people’s notions of justice. Then, (5.2) humans’ rationality and reasonability to advance from what is determined by nature and cultures is then presented. This reflection orients the discussions related to (5.3) moral developments of people towards both more concrete and more abstract ideas of justice. Finally, (5.4) this reflection on human nature and cultural constructions is organized through the three dimensions of justice introduced in chapter 4.

5.1. Natural and cultural influences

Constructivists/non-essentialists and essentialists/naturalists represent two opposite views on how to understand the way that people actually form their ideas of justice (Winsor, 2003; Amundson, 2005; Bloom, 2010; Berg-Sorensen et al, 2010). The former understand that individuals’ ideas of what is socially fair or unfair are mainly based on social constructions. On the opposite side are those who believe that these ideas are basically printed in their DNAs. Of course, there are those who believe that individuals are partially defined by their genes, partially by their cultures. It seems a more reasonable position and it is adopted in this thesis, as the further discussion makes evident. Related to this debate, a distinct opposition is explored here: are people’s ideas and actions towards what they consider fair or unfair oriented by their rational capacities or by their feelings?

According to thinkers like Hume, sentiments have a central role in this process: “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” (1817, p.106). This view is classified as a sentimentalist theory of justice in opposition to rationalist theories (Frazer, 2010). The two previous chapters focus on the latter, which defends certain features of just societies grounded on current Western values derived from rational reflection. People’s natural
feelings and predispositions for action are not deeply analysed. However, Haidt, following Hume, claims that “moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (2001, p.834). Haidt says that moral intuitions based on emotions are superior to moral reason by saying that a series of experiments show that people insist with their ideas based on their emotions even when they do not have any rational reason to support them (Goya-Tocchetto, 2014, p.113).

Supposing that Haidt is at least partially right, it is possible to investigate the origins of people’s feelings. Do they come mostly from human beings’ biological development, from the way that their cultures have been developed, or from a combination of both? Here, this is investigated. However, considering that Haidt is not completely right, it can be claimed that individuals are also rational and this fact establishes some limits to the consideration of their sentiments in trying to identify the basis of people’s ideas of justice. As explored in 5.2, if people simply followed their natural predispositions or their cultural tradition, they would keep reinforcing gender inequalities, prejudices against other races and homosexuals, and would not care about strangers. However, currently, even those who “benefit” from these social practices built throughout history are (in higher or lower degrees) against them, since rationality also has a place in people’s understanding of justice.

Nevertheless, before exploring the impacts of rationality in people’s understanding of justice, their feelings are investigated. The idea is roughly to identify to what extent Haidt’s claim towards the priority of feelings over reason is correct. As Haidt, Bloom considers that “developmental psychology, supported by evolutionary biology and cultural anthropology, favors the view […] that some aspects of morality come naturally to us” (2013, p.5). Focusing most of his studies on babies and children, Bloom shows that “[o]ur natural endowments include […] some capacity to distinguish between kind and cruel actions” and to feel “empathy and compassion – suffering at the pain of those around us and the wish to make this pain go away” – “a rudimentary […] tendency to favor equal divisions of resources”, and “a rudimentary […] desire to see good actions rewarded and bad actions punished” (2013, p.5). In summary, what he says is that “certain moral foundations are not acquired through learning […]; they are instead the products of biological evolution” (2013, p.8).
This understanding identifies some natural roots in people’s practices related to justice, and therefore that not all of these practices are socially constructed. In this way, the first point explored here is to what extent the “natural endowments” mentioned above orient actions that are beyond self-protection. It seems that it is exactly when people, based on different motives, stop only protecting themselves and start taking others into consideration that the idea of justice emerges. Concerns towards others can be investigated in evolutionary/natural and in reflective/rational terms. The former, explained here, is related to certain behaviours’ natural/instinctive orientation. The latter, investigated in 5.2, is related to conscious decisions taken by individuals.

The first reflection associates natural altruism, a type of altruism related to natural selection, with the interest in taking others into consideration. From this, by now, “[a]ltruistic behavior is defined, in the evolutionary sense, as all behavior that simultaneously involves a cost to the donor and a benefit to the recipient” (Goya-Toccheto, 2014, 70). Opposing such an altruism, egoism is an attitude that implicates benefits for the agent and costs for the recipient. Regarding this, it is possible to expand this definition through imagining that some altruistic attitudes can involve short term costs to the donor but long term benefits to him/her.

Firstly, reflecting at the individual level, Alexander (1987) claims that an altruistic/beneficent individual, though having some costs, has more chance of spreading genes, since such an individual would be rewarded by the community and have more chance to find partners, and his/her attitude would help the success of the whole group and, as a consequence, his/her own success. The first reason for altruism is based on the direct advantages that an altruistic individual could have. In other words, it presents some advantages of altruistic over egoistic individuals in spreading their genes. The third reason deserves more reflection, since it is related to certain sacrifices for the group’s good.

Regarding this third reason, several puzzles of Game Theory show that in a group interaction, the ideal schema for optimisation of individual’s profit/advantage is one in which everyone else cooperates and he/she does not (Harrington Jr, 2009). In this scenario, egoistic individuals would have an advantage. This would make them more prone to survive than altruistic individuals. However, as soon as these egoistic individuals proliferate, their societies would be weaker than societies in which individuals, through cooperation, sacrifice part of their personal gains to favour the group. Thus, the latter societies have much more
chance of surviving. The same happens in societies in which individuals care more about their offspring, since, mainly amongst primates, young individuals are very fragile and would die without extra care. Thus, individuals naturally programmed to dedicate themselves to their offspring have a better chance to perpetuate their genes. In the same way, in-group protection makes the group stronger and the perpetuation of genes is equally favoured.

It is, thus, being suggested that the feeling/propensity to act partially towards the other members of the community can be something natural in human beings, that is, it can have evolutionary explanations. In this way, sympathy and compassion (concepts defined below) can be rooted in such a development. However, it is also possible to say that people’s rational skills allow them to learn that they should care about the others. Studies in primatology give interesting clues about the rise of this process. Fleck & De Waal (2002), through studying habits of food sharing amongst some primates as a broader system of mutual obligations that generates mutual benefits, defend the “reciprocity hypothesis” (Goya-Tocchetto, 2014, p.68).

In some sense, this claim is still strongly related with evolutionary advantages that make cooperative individuals more likely to transmit their genes. However, it is being said here that the most prone to survive are those individuals that have the capacity to learn that cooperation gives an advantage for them. Fleck and De Waal identify in these practices that a proto-social system based on “[prescriptive] rules that are generated when members of a group learn to recognize the contingencies between their own behavior and the behavior of others, are formed. The existence of such rules and, more significantly, of a set of expectations, essentially reflects a sense of social regularity, and may be a precursor to the human sense of justice.” (2002, p.9) In the same way, “proto-empathy” and “proto-sympathy” arise in this context, that is, a “proto-morality” (Goya-Tocchetto, 2014, p.67) Related to this, analysing small groups as hunter-gatherer communities, it is possible to identify, as a result of such cooperation, a reduction of material inequalities (Boehm, 1999).

It is possible to identify in these small communities the roots of an idea of justice through associating them with natural selection. However, these communities, though “egalitarian when it comes to relationships between adult males”, are “hierarchical otherwise: parents dominate their children and husbands control their wives”. Moreover, these “societies are hyperviolent – there’s violence against women, violence between men competing for mates, and violence against rival groups” (Bloom, 2013, p.67). In addition, it is possible to say that
rejecting malformed offspring is a common practice aligned with natural selection (Bloom, 2013, p.143-4). Harari (2012), observing the long journey of development of Homo Sapiens, agrees with these three claims. Thus, if human beings are partially naturally altruistic, they naturally also disrespect current basic principles of justice.

Moreover, apart from in-group practices against the idea of justice, it is even clearer that natural selection does not explain why individuals should care about those who belong to other groups. People’s “natural reaction when meeting a stranger is not compassion. Strangers inspire fear and disgust and hatred” (Bloom, 2013, p.103). This claim is supported by Diamond’s observation in the small-scale societies of Papua New Guinea: “to venture out of one’s territory to meet [other] humans, even if they lived only a few miles away, was equivalent to suicide” (1992, p.229, Apud. Bloom, 2013, p.102-3). Bloom says that:

While the force that drives the evolution of morality toward kin is genetic overlap, and the force that drives morality toward the in-group is the logic of mutual benefit, the force that drives morality toward strangers is … nothing. (Bloom, 2013, p.177-8)

Thus, based on natural selection, individuals do not have reasons to care about unknown people. In this way, it is possible to identify that babies have rudimentary development of compassion, but “while we do see all sorts of spontaneous kindness by babies and young children – soothing, sharing, helping, and the like – these are directed toward family and friends” (Bloom, 2013, p.178-9). In this respect, if natural selection can be seen as the first source of morality, it is not enough.

Actually, respecting members who do not belong to in-group seems a practice that was not developed through an evolutionary process – the same can be said, for example, to the promotion of gender equality. In this way, individuals and societies achieve these practices after reflecting about the fairness of them. That is, such practices depend on rationality, a type of consciousness about equality that is beyond instinctive characteristics.

Though unfair, it is possible to understand that inequalities amongst men and women within the group, preferences towards healthier and attractive individuals and towards in-group members are based on natural selection. Firstly, if someone is programmed to protect his/her genes, putting more effort in protecting the healthier (or the attractive, those who look like
they are healthier) offspring seems a correct attitude. Moreover, as discussed above, in-group protection has the same natural justification. However, there are two types of attitudes that are against the current ideas of justice and, at the same time, do not produce gains from a natural selection perspective. They are racism and homophobia.

Regarding racism, Bloom used to consider that natural selection provokes repugnance towards other races – or at least selective empathy only towards those of the same race (Bloom, 2013, p.108). However, from the perception that people raised in mixed-race environments do not develop such prejudices, Bloom concludes that racism has no relation with biological development. Actually, what individuals really protect are their in-group members (rejecting their out-group), not necessarily their own race (2013, p.109). Thus, according to him, racism is only based on cultural values conditions transmitted across generations.

If racism, though unnatural, can be associated with in-group protection that helps genes preservation, homophobic behaviour does not have even this justification. Actually, regarding individual advantage, homosexual men make it easier for heterosexual men find female partners. In this way, only women who want to spread their genes should be bothered by the existence of homosexual men (and men, by the existence of homosexual women). Regarding the collective advantage of enlarging the whole group, only female homosexuality should be condemned, since few men are enough to guarantee that a large group of women have children. From this reasoning, basically only lesbian practices should be disapproved of (Bloom, 2013, p.143-4).

It is being said that homophobic individuals have more biological disadvantages than advantages. While lots of feelings like (at least) small scale altruism are useful for individuals’ and genes’ survival, homophobia does not have the same effect either in individual, or in group levels. Thus, if there is an explanation grounded in people’s nature, it has to be different. Currently, behaviour psychologists are finding the roots of homophobia in the feeling of disgust (Dasgupta et al, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro & Bloom, 2009). Thus, homophobia “is a biological accident. It just so happens that evolved systems that keep us away from parasites and poisons respond in a certain negative way to [homosexual] activity” (Bloom, 2013, p.153).
However, as Bloom claims, the association of homophobia and disgust is only at the beginning of such a prejudice: “Over the course of history, this aversive reaction has been reinforced, directed, and sanctified by various cultural practices, including religion and law” (Bloom, 2013, p.153). Bloom actually claims that “assessment of gay people might be influenced by bad smell in the room, and this supports a certain theory of the relationship of disgust and morality […]. But it’s hardly clear that this matters much when people interact with one another in real world” (2016, p.225). Thus, if there is a biological explanation, though accidental, for the historical prejudice against homosexuals, cultural practices seem to feed much more such a prejudice. This argument gains further support, of course, from the fact that at different periods in history (for example, ancient Greece), homosexuality was not the subject of moral disgust/disapproval.

Regarding this “dispute” between nature and culture related to homosexual relationships, Harari claims that the superiority of equal consideration over in-group protection does not have biological roots:

The handful of millennia separating the Agricultural Revolution from the appearance of cities, kingdoms and empires was not enough time to allow an instinct for mass cooperation to evolve.
[…]
While human evolution was crawling at its usual snail’s pace, the human imagination was building astounding networks of mass cooperation, unlike any other ever seen on earth. (2012, p.115-6)

As already mentioned in 2.4, this is linked with the facts “that humans created imagined orders and devised scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological inheritance” (Harari, 2012, p. 149).

Regarding this, it is important to highlight that, for Harari, “[t]he imagined orders sustaining these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups, arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones suffered from discrimination and oppression. Hammurabi’s Code, for example, established a pecking order of superiors, commoners and slaves.” (2012, p.149)
This thesis, on the other hand, believes that these facts helped people’s development of their rationalities and reinforced a certain idea of justice explored in 5.2. However, certain cultural practices go against this ideal. In this way, such oppressions and prejudices mentioned above that still exist in the West simultaneously clash with the Western tradition which is based on rational ideas of equal liberty in the social sphere.

5.2. The role of reason

It is suggested above that natural characteristics and cultural practices have influence over individuals’ behaviour. Even so, their rational capacity also has influence over this. Regarding this, differently from Haidt (4.1), Bloom says that “innate preferences do not define us: we are rational, as well” (2016, p.8). According to him, for example, “[w]e often favour those who are adorable more than those who are ugly. This is a fact about our minds worth working. But we can also recognize that this is the wrong way to make moral decisions” (2016, p.229). In the same way, Bloom claims that:

our moral circle has expanded over history: Our attitudes about the rights of women, homosexuals, and racial minorities have all shifted towards inclusiveness. […] But this is not because our hearts have opened up over the course of history. We are not more empathic than our great-grandparents. […] [O]ur concern for others reflects more abstract appreciation that regardless of our feelings, their lives have the same value as the lives of those we love. (2016, p.239)

Thus, without disagreeing that emotions have impact on people’s notions of justice, Bloom suggests that reason also has an impact on how people understand justice.

In this regard, it is important to say that, according to Bloom, reason does not mean self-interest. In his view, it is rationality that makes individuals capable to adapt themselves, to learn from what is developed in their cultures. Rationality, however, goes in a different direction to self-interest only if associated with compassion:

Evolution […] [gave] rise to sentiments such as compassion for those who suffer, anger at cheaters and free riders, and gratitude to those who are kind. These are inspired solutions, evolved over millennia, to the problems that faced us as humans living in small groups. As
individuals who now live in a much different world, we can build from this, stepping away from our own specific circumstances and developing and endorsing moral principles of broad applicability. Such principles reflect values that, as rational and reflective beings, we are willing to sign on to. This deserves to be called wisdom. (2013, p.156-7)

It is the possession of rationality and compassion that grounds Rawls’ claim that most people are not only rational, but also reasonable: in his view, when people reflect about justice, they agree that they have to go further than self-interest and have to respect some duties towards the others (3.4). This is associated with the idea of social responsibility, a widespread Western value as defended in 2.4.

This reflection on the idea of reasonability orients the reflection towards the impacts of empathy and compassion over individuals’ sense of social responsibility. Empathy is a central concept for Smith’s “theory of moral feelings”, though he used to call it “sympathy”. Bloom, following Smith’s understanding, defines empathy as “the act of coming to experience the world as you think someone else does” (2016, p.16), something similar to the popular phrase “putting oneself in other people’s shoes”. Empathy has been presented by many as the type of feeling that orients social responsibility (De Wall, 2010; Baron-Cohen, 2012). This is a “common sense” idea and, for example, Baron-Cohen says that evil is the deficiency of empathy.

Bloom, however, considers that empathy does not make the world a better place. Actually, he presents data proving that high empathy does not increase good behaviour and does not reduce aggressive behaviour (2016, p.83-4), and that empathy works as a spotlight narrowing people’s minds (2016, p.87). One interesting example is that, if individuals feel more concretely the difficulties of a certain person, they tend to wish that that specific situation is solved, rather than defend a more abstract idea of justice.

Despite this, Bloom is not against cognitive empathy, the capacity to understand other people’s feelings, something that, in his view, is an amoral skill, similar to intelligence (2016, p.37). However, this does not mean that Bloom considers that only reason makes people being fair. His “alternative to emotional empathy includes compassion for others, so any

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45 Actually, Smith goes further and includes the notion of impartiality in his understanding of sympathy, something different from the current understanding of empathy. This idea is further explored.
rational decision-making process would take happiness and thriving and suffering into account” (2016, p.138). Bloom borrows the differentiation between empathy and compassion from Buddhism, which considers that “sentimental compassion” causes exhaustion, while “great compassion”, “more distant and reserved, and can be sustained indefinitely” (2016, p.138).

Obviously, it can be said that what Bloom does is much more to mix empathy with reason than denying the former skill. The result of this mix would be compassion, something that moves people to act towards others, but wisely. Chapter 8 explores deeply this debate, and suggests knowledge, skills and values that individuals should possess in order to improve justice. Additionally, in 5.3, this point is further developed through the analysis of the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan regarding people’s “correct” moral development through their lives.

Before exploring individuals’ moral development, it is interesting to explore how the notions of reason, compassion, impartiality, and equality of opportunity are linked. The reflection presented above defends the idea that the natural process of protecting genes and some elements of what different cultures transmit across generations make it difficult for people to be impartial in their ordinary practices. However, people’s rational capacity added to the feeling of compassion towards strangers orient them to understand that, in the social sphere, they have to be impartial and that it is fair to defend state impartial attitudes. The moral development of individuals seems to go in this direction as Kohlberg further claims.

As discussed in 4.2, the idea of equality of opportunities seems to represent people’s notion of impartiality/fairness. And, though different peoples understand luck in distinct ways, it is consensual that equalising opportunities is related to reducing the role of luck in disputes for jobs, good earnings, etc. Several empirical studies investigate which factors ordinary people consider acceptable and unacceptable with these regards. Through developing ideas proposed by Freiman and Nichols (2011), Goya-Tocchetto shows that ordinary people “tend to find social advantages and disadvantages to be much more problematic than genetic advantages and disadvantages” (2016, p.171), that is, they tend to consider unfair differences in earnings based on social luck, but accept differences based on natural luck. Following a similar reasoning, Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) also appeal to empirical data, and advance in one point. While they find that ordinary people think that differences in resources should be
compensated, they consider that, if different earnings are caused by distinct choices made by individuals, this should not be compensated. In other words, if two people put the same effort to get a good job, but have different educational resources, the one that studied in the worst school should be compensated; on the other hand, if two people put the same effort, but one choses to do something that the society considers less important and is willing to pay less, this person does not deserve to be compensated. Moreover, Gaertner and Schokkaert identified that most ordinary people consider that bad luck should not be fully compensated: “Even in the case of genetic defects, less than 30% of the respondents go for complete equality of the personal contributions. Much more common is what the authors call ‘intermediate compensation’” (2012, p.104).

Though these data show some approximation between philosophical ideas defended in chapter 4 and ordinary people’s ideas on redistribution of goods, they also present some incongruence. This comparison is fundamental to the idea of reflective equilibrium that sustains this whole thesis and is recovered in the conclusion.

5.3. Moral development during people’s aging

After reflecting on the influences of reason and different feelings (empathy and compassion) towards others in the establishment of people’s notions of justice, it is important to think of how individuals develop their personal moral and civic values through their lives. This is different from the historical development of moral and civic values of Western societies analysed in 2.4. Regarding individuals’ moral and civic development, “[t]he capacity for reason takes time to emerge, so the moral life of a baby is necessarily limited” (Bloom, 2013, p.211).

Bloom, aligned with Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s ideas developed below, associates people’s moral/civic maturation with their rational development. Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s studies go further and consider that, through observing their cultures and learning from their parents and community, children start embodying these values and practicing them. This point is associated with the Aristotelian idea presented in Nicomachean Ethics of learning virtues by the habit of practicing them.
Though most of Piaget’s studies are focused on people’s cognitive development, he also investigates their moral/civic developments. Throughout these studies, Piaget (1932) identifies in individuals’ moral developments periods of anomy, heteronomy and autonomy. According to him, anomy is the total absence of understanding of moral/civic rules, something identified in babies and toddlers. It is slowly replaced by children’s perception that the world is full of rules that they have to respect, though they do not understand exactly why. This is the typical period of heteronomy, normally associated with childhood. Later on, people identify in themselves a wish to follow internal rules. When they reach this stage, they are being autonomous. In this context, “a person is morally autonomous if, in spite of changing contexts and the presence of social pressures, he/she remains, in practice, faithful to his/her values and principles of action. Thus, the heteronomous person will be the one who changes moral behaviour in different contexts” (La Taille, 2001, p.16). In Piaget’s view, autonomy is the last stage, reached in adolescence and adulthood, though, in these phases of life, autonomy and heteronomy also coexist.

It is important to clarify that, during Piaget’s stage of heteronomy, when rules are not applied, individuals also consider to follow themselves. However, in this case, they would be following their emotions, desires and volitions, rather than their reason. Autonomous people, on the other hand, follow rational self-imposed rules. Kant’s (1785) moral ideas are the obvious inspiration behind this proposal. However, this moral/civic development, mainly in its heteronomous stage, is also aligned with the above mentioned Aristotelian idea of the cultural transmission of values in which people first conform to duty, and the practice of it (habit) makes them, later, desire that and act by duty.

Reason and habit are also in the basis of Kohlberg’s (1971; 1976) project, a refinement of Piaget’s notions of moral/civic development that introduces the ideas that human beings develop their moral/civic values from pre-conventional to conventional and, finally, to post-conventional periods of moral development. Though the order of these stages is controversial, it is widely accepted that there are different stages of moral/civic reasoning and that cognitive-developmental approaches are useful for understanding them (Kohlberg et al, [47]).

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46 This proposal, actually, goes against Bloom’s idea that babies are born already with some moral ideas in their DNAs.
47 Rawls (1970) somehow also suggests this, but without presenting empirical evidences.
1983, p.2). Thus, it is interesting to understand Kohlberg’s proposal, along with some criticisms of it, mainly from Gilligan, and a certain middle ground solution.

Kohlberg (1971; 1976) investigates different levels of willingness to follow rules. Through developing Piaget’s (1932) concepts he distinguishes three main stages of people’s civic development. These are: pre-conventional (acting thinking of the consequences), normally identified in children; conventional (acting based on what society defines as just), a characteristic of adolescents and many adults; and post-conventional (acting based on a deep reflection about what is just), quite rare, even among adults. Following rules orient the three stages, but in distinct ways. First, rules are perceived as punishment and reward. People do not embody rules, they only try to follow them in order to avoid being punished and to maximise their chance of being rewarded. Later, through a process of habituation – an idea suggested by Aristotle in *Nicomaquean Ethics* – individuals embody the rules, but somehow uncritically. They understand the broad advantages for everyone living in societies ruled by laws, but they do not reflect about the correctness of these rules. Only those few people who reach the final stage transcend this understanding and deeply reflect about the meaning of fair rules. These people live their lives in this way, imposing self-rules and practicing what they consider fair, even when this goes against societies’ rules.

Kohlberg, thus, claims that people, in different stages of their lives, are motivated to follow rules (i) because they identify advantages of following rules; (ii) because “rules are rules”; (ii) because rules promote justice. Kohlberg, considers than that it is a movement towards a less self-centred attitude of individuals motivated first by habits (conventional level) and later by reason (post-conventional level). Interestingly, longitudinal studies have shown that, though it is impossible to guarantee such a progress, regression in this is very rare, that is, very few people become more self-centred throughout their lives (Colby et al, 1983).

It is important to realise that, according to Kohlberg, the idea of social responsibility is composed by different layers. He contrasts social responsibility with duties in the personal sphere. Kohlberg understands the acquisition of these “situation-oriented” virtues as part of the process of development of social virtues that ends with the acquisition of the capacity of abstracting principles of justice (1983, p.22) – a difficult capacity achieved by few.
However, it is not simple to draw a line between virtues in personal/private and social/public spheres. Personal virtues such as care and empathy are many times, as mentioned in 5.2 considered equally important in the social sphere. Gilligan (1982), a student of Kohlberg, agrees that there is a moral development throughout people’s lives, but disagrees that following abstract principles of justice is the highest stage in this development. Opposing this idea, she considers that people who “finish” their civic development behaving based on care and empathy are not less virtuous. According to her, they are only different from those who can abstract principles of justice. Like many others (Baron-Cohen, 2004; Pinker, 2009), she claims that this is a characteristic more associated with women’s behaviour, while abstraction is more related to men’s. Gilligan does not say that one is better than the other, nor that it has any basis in biology. Rather, she proposes that, as important as abstraction and separateness of individuals, it is the moral reasoning located in concrete and integrated situations (Wolff, 1996, 213).

This discussion, however, counterposes two different ways to understand how people should orient their thoughts and actions in the social/public sphere. This is a subject discussed in chapter 8, where certain values expected from Western citizens are presented. That chapter, then, contrasts Kohlberg’s defence that everyone should be stimulated to follow abstract self-imposed moral/civic rules and Gilligan’s view that care ethics is not inferior to this abstraction.

Related to what should be cultivated, it is important to extend the reflection on what is possible to cultivate. Interestingly, Kohlberg understands that, though the stage of abstract moral/civic values is superior, very few people reach it. In this way, the reflection on civic education helps to determine if such values can be cultivated and how it should be done. Gilligan’s attention to care ethics can be an alternative. Chapters 9 to 12 take this discussion forward.

Thus, it is only in the conclusion that this opposition between justice and care ethics can receive a better analysis. There, ideals of justice (ideal end) are compared with real people’s possibilities to build a just society (real end). Citizenship education is presented as the means, and, again, ideal means are compared with real means. It is exactly in this comparison that

48 Gilligan bases her analysis on Chodorow’s (1978) work, which is to do with the social construction of gender through child-rearing practices.
Kohlberg versus Gillingan’s debate is placed. In summary, in the conclusion, their ideals of education for justice and care are compared with the Brazilian reality of citizenship education.

5.4. The three dimensions of justice and the previous empirical observations

The natural and cultural developments of people’s understandings and practices towards justice can be analysed from the perspective of the three dimensions proposed in chapter 4. First, observing the economic dimension, it seems that people indeed have a notion of equality of opportunities, as presented by empirical research studies previously discussed (Goya-Tocchetto, 2016; Freiman & Nichols, 2011; Gaertner & Schokkaert, 2012). However, individuals, even theoretically, do not seem to defend total equality of opportunities, since, though they defend eliminating differences based on social luck, they accept differences based on natural luck. A possible reasoning behind this difference is that they, probably intuitively, perceive that, though unfair, the acceptance by society of this difference produces positive results for all, since “the most naturally skilled” are stimulated instead of refrained.

Observing what is developed from the cultural perspective, the conclusion is that the idea of a nation where people do not have direct contact with their co-citizens, but have some responsibilities towards them, is not natural. People’s natural developments make them care only for in-group members. However, human rationality and compassion (Bloom calls it “wisdom”) can expand people’s empathy towards out-group members. Interestingly, the development of communication of individuals who share a similar narrative helps this expansion, as shown in 2.4. Actually, this is a process developed throughout history and throughout individuals’ aging. In the opposite direction, the oppression of black people and the LGBT community does not have biological origins. Maybe oppression of women, on the other hand, has origins in patriarchal families structured a long time ago upon the natural higher strength of men. Even so, people’s rational development has shown that all of these oppressive structures are unfair.

Finally, this chapter did not develop any observation about how important democracy is for individuals of current Western societies. However, the pressures for universal suffrage, the human rights movement in the 1960s in the US (2.5) and alike can be good empirical indications that the ideals of democracy are also present in ordinary people’s imaginary.
Chapter 5 analyses natural and cultural influences over people’s understandings and practices towards justice. In parallel, individuals’ rationality, also a natural human characteristic, developed through their aging, is also taken as a fundamental on these regards. Added to theoretical reflections about ideals of justice (chapter 4) and observations of the Brazilian society (chapter 6), these characteristics empirically observed serve to identify civic virtues that people can possess to participate of the improvement of justice in their societies.
6. History and current situation of justice and citizenship in Brazil

Chapters 3 and 4 investigate ideal theories of justice and democratic procedures grounded in general Western values. Chapter 5 presents a general view of biological and cultural influences over human beings practices in the social sphere. However, in order to establish a better dialogue between theory and practice, it is fundamental to observe more carefully how Western people – specifically Brazilian people – behave. Thus, the current chapter associates historical and sociological characteristics of Brazilian society with the national development of a sense of justice and citizenship. This chapter starts by exploring (6.1) some important historical factors related to the expansion of the idea of “belonging” amongst Brazilian people. Following this, (6.2) the ideas of patrimonialism and patriarchalism are identified in Brazilian social development. Then, (6.3) Brazilian people’s passivity and lack of capacity of mobilisation is associated with a non-logical development of their rights. Having presented this historical analysis, some aspects related to social justice are further analysed. (6.4) Data about how unequally wealth and opportunities are distributed in Brazil are presented. Finally, (6.5) data on the violence suffered by some minorities, unequal job opportunities and lack of political representation of certain groups are also presented to show that inequalities in Brazil are not restricted to the economic dimension.

6.1. Belonging and citizenship

The previous chapter explores some people’s broad views about the economic and cultural dimensions of justice. People’s views regarding these dimensions depend on, besides their natural development and cultural bias, the way that their sense of unity is established. In order to present a brief historical reflection on how Brazilian people have developed their notion of unity and belonging to the country, this section follows Carvalho’s suggestion that, “[i]n general, the national identity comes from language, religion, and, above all, fights and wars against common enemies” (2002, p.12).

The unification of the language in Brazil (currently, 97% of the population speaks Portuguese) is something remarkable, since the nation was formed through the integration of

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49 In 2013, 194.9 million Brazilians (https://www.publico.pt/culturaipsilon/noticia/ha-244-milhoes-de-falantes-de-portugues-em-todo-o-mundo-1610559) of a total of 201 million
very different cultures (indigenous (natives), Portuguese (colonisers), Africans (former slaves), and other immigrants (Italian, German, Japanese, etc.). Interestingly, until the middle of the seventeenth century, the most spoken language was Tupi-Guarani (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.92), since the huge Brazilian coast, “was inhabited by the same indigenous family, which from north to south spoke the same language” (Holanda, 1995[1955], p.105). However, when slaves, “captured randomly in hundreds of tribes [from the West coast of Africa] which spoke languages and dialects unintelligible to each other”, (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.87) came to Brazil, things changed. It was necessary for the colonisers to establish a common language amongst slaves and Portuguese fulfilled this role (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.74), and such unification of the language was almost completed at the end of the eighteenth century (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.93).

However, a huge number of immigrants, most from Europe, but also from Japan, came to Brazil mainly during the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries to replace slave labour\(^{50}\). In the 1930s, this immigration came to be understood “as responsible for problems and obstacles to the project to create Brazilian nationality” (Schwartzman et al, 1984, p.171-2). As explored in 10.1, the government from that time nationalised schooling, something that shows “the content of the nationalist project of post-1937 period. Conservative and authoritarian in nature, it was marked by the exclusionary character, averse to pluralist and diversified coexistence” (Schwartzman et al, 1984, p.181). Such a model “sought to transform the nation into an organic whole, a moral, political, and economic entity whose ends would be realised in the state” (Schwartzman et al, 1984, p.183). At least regarding the language, it has succeeded.

Reflecting on the impact of religion, there is no doubt that Catholicism was spread in Brazil by the colonisers reaching indigenous and African slaves. However, the process in Brazil has been much more idiosyncratic than in other Latin American countries, also colonised by a strongly Catholic nation, Spain. If Jesuits worked hard to convert indigenous peoples to Catholicism in places colonised by Spain, there was less commitment from the Portuguese Catholic Church, which was subjected to the Monarchy, rather than to the Vatican in that time. This subjection to a non-ecclesiastical power made Brazilian priests more “averse to

\(^{50}\) http://brasilescola.uol.com.br/brasil/imigracao-no-brasil.htm
social discipline and even respect for legal authority” (Holanda, 1995[1955], 118), something that favoured syncretism.

Two other phenomena related to religion deserve attention. One is the dispute within the Catholic Church in the second half of the twentieth century between conservatives and the Catholic liberation theology. As explored below, the first group supported Vargas’ (1937-45) and the Military (1964-85) dictatorships. The second group was (and continues to be) very close to social movements and has been active from the Military dictatorship onwards. The other phenomenon is the enlargement of Neo-Pentecostal churches in the last 40 years. These new churches started working much more closely with poor communities offering help to lonely poor people, normally those who migrated from countryside areas to big cities. Thus, these churches have increased exponentially. Their moral and civic agenda is very conservative and have clashed with avant-garde cultural movements, especially LGBT and feminist (Nunes, 2006). Religion, in this case, has been a matter of political disputes, but still in the domain of reasonable debate, though an increase in fundamentalism can be identified, as explored below.

Regarding the importance of wars as a unifying element of nations, though Brazil has a peaceful history with few minor conflicts. The exception was the Paraguay War (1864-70). Regarding this war, it is important to start by saying that the revisionism about the motivations of that conflict have shown that Brazilian people should not be proud of their victory (Chiavenato, 1985; Doratioto, 2002). Thus, the Paraguay War is no longer cultivated as a memory that makes people proud and unifies the nation – something which is at least partially perceived, for example, in the UK’s education system regarding the First and the Second World Wars memories. Still, the Paraguay War was important in that moment for the development of the idea of the nation: “The national flag began to be reproduced in newspapers and magazines, […] the national anthem began to run, the Emperor Dom Pedro II was presented as the leader of the nation. [...] The press also began to try to create the first national military heroes” (Carvalho, 2002, p.78).

Related to this, it is also worth mentioning Brazilian performance in football as something that has also developed national attachment based on people’s sharing common heroes. Though Carvalho doesn’t include the importance of sports performance in his list of unifying elements (language, religion and wars), at the same time, he says how significant it was, for
the development of patriotism in Brazil, that the country won the third Football World Cup in 1970. It happened during the Military Dictatorship and was massively exploited by the government to agglutinate the nation (2002, p.168).

Additionally, it is worth mentioning the existence of few other examples of athletes who occupied this place of hero, probably the most important being Ayrton Senna, a Formula 1 pilot three times World Champion who died racing in 1994. The commotion because of his death stopped the country. Other aspects of Brazilian culture could also be mentioned, as certain expressions of music and dance. Samba and Carnival, for example, are symbols of national identity and pride, and often cut across social class and racial divisions. A deep reflection on these things is not possible within this thesis.

These different factors allow Ribeiro to highlight that positive aspect of Brazilian unity:

> It is worth saying that, although made by the fusion of such different matrices, Brazil is one of the most linguistic and culturally homogeneous and also one of the most socially integrated peoples in Earth. They speak the same language without dialects. They do not have any vindication for autonomy and are not attached to the past. We are open for the future. (2015[1995], p.331)

Obviously Brazil is a composition of cultures. Even so, black, indigenous, white, mixed-races, direct descendants of immigrants, individuals whose families are in the country from several generations, all of them call themselves Brazilians.

However, only as a final observation about this homogeneity, it is important to highlight that the monopoly of mass media by a specific TV channel (Rede Globo) – though this monopoly has been decreased not simply by the introduction of digital media but also by a political rejection by key political sectors of society – has significantly standardised the way that Brazilian people think of several things. This fact has good and bad effects. On the one hand, for example, its soap-operas, by presenting homosexual relationships as normal, help to challenge conservative values of Brazilian society such as homophobia. On the other hand, Rede Globo has strong influence over people’s political views and this power challenges democracy (Souza, 2017).
6.2. Social gap, patriarchalism and patrimonialism

However, this Brazilian process of building a nation in which people feel attached to their co-citizens has other characteristics that reduces the spirit of national unification. If, as presented above, all Brazilians feel part of the same nation, as explored below, their feeling of attachment with unknown co-citizens is very low. The first reason for this is related to the Brazilian process of colonisation that was quite different from what happened in the US. Thus it produced peculiar types of miscegenation and racism. Holanda presents important characteristics of the origins of this difference:

If the first settlers of English America had been moved by desire of building, overcoming the wilderness, a Blessing community, free from the religious and civil oppression that they endured in their homeland, and where they could finally realise the pure evangelical ideal, the Latin Americans were attracted by the hope of finding in his achievements a paradise made of mundane wealth and heavenly beatitude, offered to them without demanding higher labour, but as a free gift.” (Holanda, 1992[1959], p. xvii, Apud. Fonseca, 2016, p.146-7)

As a consequence of this, overall the Portuguese mingled much more with the indigenous and African peoples than British colonisers, who essentially decimated North-American indigenous people (Cardoso, 2013, p.113). Two main factors were decisive for this difference. Firstly, instead of British colonisers, who travelled to the US with their families, the Portuguese normally migrated alone to Brazil (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.173). Thus, some kind of miscegenation based on sexual needs simply happened. Moreover, the Portuguese, because of geographical and historical reasons, already considered themselves a mixed race, and consequentially were more open to integration, unlike the British, who had the tendency to keep themselves more “pure” (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.54). In Brazil, this “milder” process was the beginning of the “coexistence of the contraries”, something that Freyre (1933) identifies even more in the relation among slaves and their owners.

Slaves came to be brought from Africa to Brazil in the sixteenth century and slavery was abolished only in 1888, with Brazil being the last Latin American (and Western) country to stop this horrendous practice (Villa, 2011, p.21). However, it is possible to say that, in Brazil, slavery was less perverse than in other countries, mainly in the US.\footnote{Obviously, slavery is always perverse, and, also in Brazil, lots of terrible things were also perpetrated.} As mentioned before,
Freyre (1933) calls attention to the fact that the Portuguese felt less racial superiority over African slaves, since they were also quite mixed with Moors (Cardoso, 2013, p.111-2). This allowed a kind of coexistence based on “harmony or balance of contraries” (Cardoso, 2013, p.109-11). It is this “peaceful” coexistence, something not necessarily good, that promotes closer proximity amongst different races in Brazil, something that allows Freyre to propose something that is known as the “Brazilian myth of identity based on miscegenation” (Cardoso, 2013, p.293).

From this interpretation, social problems in Brazil are seen by some as basically related to the huge gap between rich and poor people. Magnoli, for example, cites the Brazilianists Pierson and Wagley, who wrote about Brazil in the middle of the twentieth century. They, though recognising the presence of racial discrimination in Brazil, counterposed “the American panorama, characterized by remarkable mobility classes” and “impenetrable barriers in the race system”, with Brazil, marked by “obvious distances between the social classes, but with diffuse racial boundaries” (2009, p.158).

Cardoso, however, sees the question of racial discrimination from a different point of view. Though he agrees with Freyre, Magnoli, and others that “miscegenation, hybridism, and even (mystification apart) cultural plasticity of coexistence of the contraries are not only a characteristic, but an advantage of Brazil” and “an input letter of Brazil in a globalised world” (2013, p.90), he also sees lots of problems related to this. Following Bastide and Fernandes (1955), Cardoso argues that, after abolition, “colour and racial discrimination completed themselves in order to preserve the slavery times establishment”, and that “colour and racial differences are remade in their cultural meanings to maintain an unequal interethnic situation, potentially violent, highly exploitative, but which are accommodated, based on those cultural redefinitions, avoiding the explosion of that order” (2013, p.197). In this sense, “colour has a role, evidently, but a role of a symbol, that is, a well identifiable criterion, which situates the individual in a certain rung of the social ladder” (Bastide & Fernandes, 1955, p.161). In other words, in Brazil there is class prejudice, and, since most of poor people are black, then, at the end, the class segregation promotes race segregation. Some data analysing this gap between white and black people, as well as between poor and rich, men and women, hetero and homosexuals, are presented in 6.4.
Thus, because of its peculiar process of miscegenation, Brazil developed a huge social gap in which black people are normally in the position of submission, but, at the same time, there are not strong social or racial conflicts in the country. In Bastide’s view, this fact is related to people’s capacity to “accommodate” conflicts (Bastide & Fernandes, 1955, p.11).

Cardoso distinguishes between racial prejudices “of origin”, based on ancestry and common in the US, and “of mark”, occult and dissimulated, based on appearance and common in Brazil. According to Cardoso, because of this:

Black Americans acquired awareness of the oppression that they were subjected, what made them to react and vindicate their rights; in Brazil, on the contrary, racism was consolidated in the hearth of social relations and was incorporated passively by the black people. (2013, p.159)

Pointing to the same direction, and calling this Brazilian tradition as “assimilationist racism”, Ribeiro also identifies the passivity which maintains the status quo in such a society, differently from the US:

The most perverse aspect of assimilationist racism is that it passes an image of greater sociability, when in fact it disarms lack people to fight against the poverty that is imposed on them, and masks the conditions of terrible violence to which they are subjected. (2015 [1995], p.170)

Related to this perverse assimilationism, another historical and anthropological characteristic of Brazilian people is their “cordiality” that diminishes their social/public virtues and produces a “patrimonialist” society. In his classic definition of “cordial man”, Holanda contrasts cordiality, a personal/private virtue, with civility, a social/public virtue:

[T]he Brazilian contribution to civilization will be of cordiality – we will give to the world the “cordial man”. The gentleness, the hospitality, the generosity, virtues so boasted by foreigners who visit us, represent, in effect, a definite trait of the Brazilian character, in the measure, at least, in which the ancestral influence of the patterns of human relations, coming from the rural and patriarchal world. It would be a mistake to suppose that these virtues could mean “good manners,” civility. They are, above all, legitimate expressions of an extremely rich and
overflowing emotive background. An idea of coercion is associated with the concept of civility – civility can be expressed in commandments and in sentences. (1995 [1955], p.146-7)

Holanda, then, says that Brazilian people, in general, do not have social/public virtues sufficiently developed. They actually tend to behave only based on personal/private virtues, even in the social/public sphere:

It was not easy for the holders of the public positions of responsibility [in Brazil], formed by such an environment, to understand the fundamental distinction between the domains of the private and the public. Thus, they are characterised precisely by what distinguishes the “patrimonial” official from the pure bureaucrat according to Max Weber’s definition. For the “patrimonial” official, political management itself appears as a matter of its particular interest; the functions, the jobs and the benefits which they derive are related to the personal rights of the official and not to objective interests, as in the real bureaucratic State, where specialisation of functions prevails and the effort to ensure legal guarantees for citizens prevails. (1995[1955], p.145-6)

Similarly to Holanda, this thesis understands such “cordial” characteristics as virtues in the personal/private sphere, but, vices when practiced at the social/public sphere. The Kohlberg versus Gilligan debate, introduced in 5.3 and developed in 8.5, investigates this difference between the personal/private and the social/public spheres, but, in order to explore this specific characteristic of Brazilian people, the following example is elucidative. It seems quite obvious that the Western people consider it a virtue to care more about relatives and friends in the personal/private sphere, though it is considered a vice to do so in the social/public realm – for example, should a civil servant use his/her position to favour a friend or family member. In Brazil, however, such examples are quite common, as shown in 6.4. More than this, this attitude seems not to be seen as something wrong, since there is a widespread idea that duties towards family/friends are always prior than towards strangers (Holanda, 1995[1955], p.145-6).

Related to this, Fonseca sees an evident split between how the two different strands of Christianity influenced North and South America:

On the one hand, the Catholic Counter-Reformation, with a strong Jesuitical, missionary and inquisitorial accent; the attachment to medieval scholastic coupled with resistance to the
winds, methods and ideals of Enlightenment; the centralised and bureaucratic absolutist Crown; and the parasite mercantilism of a rentier elite. And, on the other, the Protestant Reformation, with strong Puritan and Calvinist waves (“among the things of this life, the work is what most resembles the man to God”); vigorous adherence to the Enlightenment project of science and technology at service to rescuing the human condition through dominating nature and rational action; the institutional monarchy; and the primacy of competitive market and free enterprise as instruments of economic efficiency and capital accumulation. (2016, p.148)

Following this, unlike Freyre, Holanda is much less optimistic about the role of family ties in Brazilian development:

[Holanda] criticised what was valued at his time and still today: the cordial character – emotional, personal – of Brazilians, our cultural specificities. He showed the unfortunate political consequences of the Iberian heritage baked in the sun of the Tropics: personalism, strong leadership, lack of rules and hierarchies that mean much more of an arbitrariness of the masters than comradeship among equals. [Freyre] rarely speaks of equality, and with respect to the notion of “balance between opposites” – essential in its interpretations – passes the impression of accepting inequality, although he reacts against the idea of racial inequality. [Holanda] shows that, without the abstract, formal equality of the law, and without the practical exercise anchored in political culture, there is no democracy. (Cardoso, 2013, p.132)

Here, the main difference between Freyre’s and Holanda’s analyses is that the latter puts much more weight on the need to promote justice based on the notion of civility and abstract rules, whilst the former sees Brazilian historical stability as something much more important.

Thus, if “accommodation of contraries” keeps power relations based on hierarchical structures that have origins in slavery period, Brazil also keeps power relations based on “patrimonial” structures that are perpetuated throughout history. According to Faoro (1958; 1975), from the colonial times until, at least, the Vargas Era (which finished in 1954) more or less the same “caste” of people founded the state and ruled the country, taking advantages for themselves, instead of sharing the goods and giving voice for the worst-off. Faoro considers that this caste is basically located in the public sector:
The State projected itself, independent and autonomous, over the social classes and the proper nation. State and Nation, government and people are distinct realities, which don’t know each other and, frequently, are antagonists. (1958, p.45)

Souza (2017), however, presents strong criticisms against such an interpretation. In his view, this narrative only blames corrupt bureaucrats for the inequalities in Brazil and through this, hides the real responsible for this: rich people from the private sector that inherit unfair advantages since the times of slavery. Souza completely disagrees with Faoro’s historical analysis: “Brazil does not inherit from Portugal its social structure; this heritage comes from slavery, which did not exist in Portugal” (2017, p.200). Actually, “the colonisation of the country was left in the hands of private individuals. [...] The Portuguese State, only very dimly, could impose its will” (2017, p.205)

However, a balanced interpretation of this debate seems more accurate. According to Cardoso, “the plot between the State and bureaucracy, on the one hand, and civil society, classes and market, on the other, is more complex” (2013, p.231). Nevertheless, Cardoso endorses Faoro’s idea that the lack of feudal tradition in Portuguese history made Portugal centralise power before the other absolutist states, and this fact contributed to the transmission of the feudal tradition to Brazil (2013, p.230-4). The US, where civil society was prior to the state, was founded on a pact that gave strong power to the different federations. In Brazil, where the state was prior to civil society, political power is very centralised and the laws of the federations hold no weight (Faoro, 2007, p.13-4).

Moreover, Cardoso agrees that, until now, this element is very present in Brazilian political structure – though the bureaucratic establishment has shifted from the aristocracy to the military and, later, to certain sectors of civil society. In this way, he considers that the private sector is also part of the Brazilian current structure of power. Through a direct criticism of some policies of the Workers Party, which succeeded him in the national government\(^5\), Cardoso says:

> The confusion between governing parties and public machine has control instruments to co-opt both the business sector (via credit and various advantages of concessions), and workers

\(^5\) Cardoso was president from 1995 to 2002.
and dispossessed masses (via union benefits and direct income transfers). (Cardoso, 2013, p.261)

This claim is very controversial for several reasons. First, defenders of the Workers Party policies accuse Cardoso’s government of having done the same kind of co-opting, and of being extremely neoliberal in its policies, something that made urgent this direct income transfer (Bolsa Família) to help such dispossessed people. More importantly, when Cardoso says that the public sector co-opts the private, he seems to put the centrality and protagonism of this process in the former. Souza’s (2017) reverse analysis, however, seems to be more accurate. It seems right to say that rich people who belong to the private sector are those who, throughout history, have unfairly concentrated wealth and only have used the public sector to create laws and policies that keep this unfair structure.

However, though the private sector seems to lead this process, it also seems that private and public sectors depend on each other. Lazzerini (2011), appealing to several data showing the historical and current entrenched relation between private companies and the Brazilian state, demonstrates this. He calls the spurious relation of exchange of advantages between the public and private the “capitalism of ties” (2011, p.38). Such a relation is currently the basis of huge scandals of corruption, one of the main problems of Brazilian society, presented in the introduction and also approached in the conclusion of this thesis.

6.3. Top-down changes

Independently of whether Freyre’s, Holanda’s, Faoro’s or Souza’s narrative is the most “correct” way to describe how Brazil was built, it is a matter of fact that Brazilian people never achieved a proper revolution. Differently from, for example, the US, UK and France, or even neighbouring countries in South America, the six most important changes of Brazilian political regimes – Independence (1822), Republic (1889), the 1930s Revolution (1930), New State (1937), Military’s coup d’état (1964), and Re-democratization (1985) – happened without participation from the general public, strong riots, or large numbers of deaths. These processes were always top-down (Carvalho, 2002, p.26; 95-6; 106; 144; 173)53.

53 It is not being said that there were or are not popular mobilisations in Brazilian history. In the past, there were several unsuccessful attempts to change the regime in local and national levels. At the end of military dictatorship, strong but peaceful demonstrations ask for direct elections for president. At the same time,
It is, then, possible to identify in Brazilian social dynamics what Cardoso, through expanding Freyre’s idea of “harmony of contraries” and appealing to Hegelian categories, calls a “contradiction without dialectic – without properly producing a synthesis” (2013, p.111). This process of harmonization probably made Brazilian minorities less conscious of their situation and their rights. Thus, they were less likely to make a claim for significant cultural, political and economic changes. As also mentioned above, in the US, the lack of this harmonisation of contraries, even though creating a strong segregation, at least allowed black/poor communities to be aware about their situation and fight for their rights. On the other hand, in Brazil, these “harmonisation” of cultures produced usual political passivity and the lack of spirit of indignation in minorities – with few exceptions as 2013 mass mobilizations.

Taking Faoro’s analysis, it is possible to suggest that, in Brazil, centralised power in the bureaucratic establishment is related to the Brazilian people’s passivity. The history of centralisation of power made Brazilian citizens always wait for changes from the top. At the same time, the fact that Brazilian people are not attached to their national institutions results in their lack of feeling of belonging to these institutions, something that opens space for the same groups keep occupying the bureaucratic establishment. Thus, it seems that centralisation reinforces passiveness and vice-versa.

Actually, a comparison of the development of civil, political and social rights between Brazil and the UK reinforces this understanding, and gives some other clues regarding why Brazilian people have been so passive about the neglecting of their rights. Carvalho, based on Marshall ideas (2.5), defends that the sense of citizenship developed in the UK had a “logical” chronology: first, during the eighteenth century, civil rights were established, then, subsequently, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political and social rights were promoted. Carvalho also says that this order can be broken, and that “[i]n theory, [social rights] can exist without civil rights and certainly without political rights. But in the absence of civil and political rights, its content and range tend to be arbitrary” (2002, p.10-1).
Reflecting specifically about Brazil, Carvalho identifies this non-logical development by saying that, in this country, social rights came before civic and politic rights. From this perception, he suggests that it generates lots of problems in the process of incorporating the rights of Brazilian people.

The main problem, as mentioned above, is that the social advances were promoted in general in a top-down way. Through highlighting this point, Carvalho calls attention to the fact that it was exactly during the period between 1930 and 1945, a very authoritarian moment of Brazilian history in which civil and political rights were denied, that social rights, such as laws protecting workers rights, were more developed (2002, p.110-26). Of course, this situation was possible because these social policies were implemented by the dictator of that time, Getúlio Vargas. From 1945, a democratic period was instigated and inspired by the victory of Allies in the Second World War. Civil and political rights were increased, but not social ones.

However, the Brazilian government remained strongly centralised in the executive power. As evidence, parliamentarism was proposed and rejected through a plebiscite in 1963 and 1993. In Carvalho’s words:

This orientation towards the Executive reinforces the long Portuguese or Iberian tradition: the patrimonialism. State is always seen as the all-powerful, at worst hypothesis, as the repressor and tax collector; at best, as a paternalistic dispenser of jobs and favours (2002, p.221)

Carvalho, thus, agrees with Faoro’s point about patrimonialism and adds that this is reinforced by people’s search for a “political messiah”, which promotes “valuation of the Executive and the devaluation of the Legislative” (2002, p.221-2). Cardoso calls this system as “imperial presidentialism”, which remains until the current time (2013, p.130).

Thus, following the same pattern, during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), civil and political rights were lost, but some other social ones, such as more laws protecting workers, were conquered. However, as mentioned before, again, these social advances always happened based on roughly arbitrary decisions by the president. It was only after the re-democratisation, in 1985, that people came to be listened to, and really started participating in the process of deciding their own destinies. Reflecting on the history of Brazilian
constitutions, Villa endorses this point by saying that Brazilian people fought 200 years against the arbitrary state, and that, only from 1988 (with the last Constitution), full democracy was reached (2011, p.9-10). It is worth mentioning that in the other two “democratic times”, the 1930 and 1960 elections, respectively only 7% and 18% of people voted, while, in 1986, 47% did (Carvalho, 2002, p.146; p.167).

This discussion is directly related to the debate about the decision-making dimension of justice (4.4). In these regards, almost all reasonable ideas on what is a good democratic system proposed in that debate are far from being achieved in Brazil. This country has a type of democracy that, at the same time, gives little voice to citizens and to specialists. Only a bureaucratic establishment formed by a cast of politicians and certain representatives of private capital ends up by determining the directions of the country.

6.4. Data about social inequality

In 6.3, historical characteristics of Brazilian society are presented. No doubt, huge current inequalities of wealth and opportunities result from this. Here, some data showing the gap between rich and poor people (men and women, white and black, heterosexuals and homosexuals) in Brazil are presented in order to identify its stage of political development. As discussed in 4.2, one of the dimensions of reflection of justice is associated with economic factors. In this way, per capita Gross Domestic Product\(^54\) (GDP) is sometimes used as an indicator to measure how developed a country is. However, a high GDP per capita does not imply that the wealth produced is fairly distributed amongst the population. Some countries have a high GDP per capita, though only a select few are very rich whilst most are poor – Qatar, is an example\(^55\). In order to deal with this, Gini\(^56\) is a coefficient widely used to measure how well wealth is distributed among citizens. However, it is possible that some developing or underdeveloped countries present a good Gini score, despite its citizens being equally poor – Bangladesh and Ethiopia have a very low GDP per capita\(^57\) and present income Gini index as good as developed countries as Canada, UK and US\(^58\). Then, another

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\(^{54}\) A country’s GDP represents the aggregation of the value of every final good and service produced in the country in a certain period.


\(^{56}\) It is called Gini in homage to its developer, Conrado Gini.


\(^{58}\) Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html
important and, perhaps, more comprehensive index is the United Nations’ Human Development index (HDI\textsuperscript{59}). It is composed of three dimensions: (1) life expectancy at birth index; (2) education index, composed of the average number of years of schooling and of the expected years of schooling for children in school age; (3) Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.

In all these indexes, Brazil does not hold a good position. According to data of the World Bank for 2016\textsuperscript{60}, Brazil’s GDP per capita in current dollars (US$ 8,649.95) is far less than the average for high income countries (US$ 40,677.48) and OECD members (US$ 36,741.36). Brazil’s GDP per capita is lower than China owned territories, as Macao and Hong Kong (US$ 73,186.96 and US$ 43,681.14, respectively), and Russia (US$ 8,748.365). Moreover, Brazil is a highly unequal country: its Gini coefficient in 2014 was 0.518, which shows much more inequality in comparison to developed countries’ average\textsuperscript{61} (IPEA, 2014). In addition, in 2014, Brazil figured only at the 75\textsuperscript{th} position in the HDI rank, after Mexico (74\textsuperscript{th}) and Russia (50\textsuperscript{th}) (UNDP, 2015)\textsuperscript{62}.

Nevertheless, a longitudinal analysis (Figure 14) shows that the income inequality has been reduced in Brazil in the last 14 years, during a period in which a nationwide income transfer programme towards the poorest – 	extit{Bolsa Família} – was implemented. 	extit{Bolsa Família} is a conditional cash transfer programme implemented by the Brazilian government since 2003 that provides benefits up to R$95 (£24) per month to each child of poor families whose monthly per capita income is less than R$100 Brazilian reals (£25) and who are registered in the government unified system. To keep the benefit, families with children in school age must guarantee their minimal school attendance over 85%. The improvement in Gini index from 2003 (Figure 14) has been used to support the importance of such a programme to promote distributive justice throughout the country.

\textsuperscript{59} Sen was a key player in designing HDI.
\textsuperscript{60} https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?year_high_desc=true
\textsuperscript{61} In 2014, the average Gini of OECD countries was 0.318 (OECD, 2016).
\textsuperscript{62} http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI
Nevertheless, even whilst there has been a reduction of income inequalities, the Brazilian educational system perpetuates the unjust socioeconomic structure of society. Undoubtedly, there was an expansion and certain democratisation of the access to basic and higher education in the last decades. This process, however, did not represent significant changes in Brazilian structural inequalities. The inequality of opportunities between rich and poor people remains. An important reason for that gap resides in the fact that poor people still have much less access to a quality school education and, hence, to good universities and to the high skilled jobs. The equation is simple: middle class and upper-middle class young people study in private schools which in general are far more effective than state-run schools; this fact implies that these students are much better prepared to compete for places in the country’s best universities and, therefore, in the job market.

Observing some general data related to this comparison, it is possible to realise that the average school drop-out rate in state-run primary and secondary schools in Brazil are, respectively, 12 and 17 times bigger than the school drop-out rates for private schools (INEP, 2015). State-run schools also present a much higher rate of students who are two or more years older than the standard age for the school year that they are attending (INEP, 2015). Moreover, in comparison to OECD countries, Brazil figures as one of those with the

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63 Data from the Ministry of education of Brazil show that, in 2015, students from private schools performed 45% better in the national standardised exam than students from state-run schools in the final years of the primary school, and 51% in secondary school. (INEP, 2015). As a consequence, students from private schools present a better performance in the national standardised tests that give access to state-run universities, which are, in Brazil, the most prestigious ones.

64 The drop-out rate is 2.4% against 0.2% for primary schools, and 6.4% against 0.4% for high schools, in state-run and private school, respectively (INEP, 2015).
highest percentage (almost 40%) of adults between 24 and 34-years-old who have not completed high school (OCDE, 2015).

Part of the distortion that can be observed in Brazil’s system of education has its origins in its tax system. Differently from European welfare states, Brazilian poor people pay *proportionally more* taxes than rich, and receive, under the form of public services, *proportionally less*. The Brazilian state’s regressive system of tax collection, instead of minimally equalising rich and poor people, works in the opposite direction. This fact goes against the main idea of welfare states, where rich people, through a progressive system of tax collection, pay proportionally more taxes in order to subsidise part of services received by poor people.

Indeed, a significant part of Brazil’s tax revenue (45% in 2010) comes from indirect taxes that are charged over the consumption of goods and services (Afonso, Soares & Castro, 2013) and poor people consume a greater percentage of their earnings than rich people, who expend their earnings in distinct ways (investments, etc.). In the UK, for instance, indirect taxes represent only 26.5% of the government’s revenue, with the major part of the it coming from direct taxes such as income, capital and company taxes (IFS, 2016).

The regressive process of Brazilian tax collection is not the only factor that reproduces inequalities and diminishes the opportunities of those worse-off in relation to the non-poor. According to the World Development Report (WORLD BANK, 2004), in most developing countries, the 20% wealthiest part of the population tend to take more advantages from the government aggregated expenditure, when compared to the 20% poorest, mainly with regards to health and educational services. Policies designed to give advantages for rich people, corruption and poor people’s difficulties to implement their rights favour this scenario.

Analysing Brazilian education policies, it is possible to realise that they concentrate the major part of public investments at tertiary levels of education, predominantly accessed by middle-class and upper middle class students. In 2011, for example, the investment per student in higher education was 5 times higher than the investment per student in basic education (in 2000, this investment was 11 times higher)\(^\text{65}\). Additionally, Brazil’s state-funded health

system (SUS) works against the poor. Expensive treatments, mainly those that demand surgery, expensive medicine or exams, are scarce. They should be distributed based on impartial criteria. However, in practice, two things usually occur. Firstly, some people are able to skip this impartial criterion through patronage and, thus, receive treatment first. Most frequently, these are rich people who know powerful civil servants to help them through patronage. This is not simple to demonstrate, but is easy to observe in Brazilian everyday life. Secondly, some people manage to get their treatment by appealing to lawsuits against the government. Since normally rich people are those have access to good lawyers, they are hugely favoured. These three situations are strong examples of the instantiation of the ideas of patriarchalism and patrimonialism developed above.

The discussion presented at the beginning of this section reflects on some elements of Brazilian general inequalities that promote evident injustices. From the perspective of wealth, access to education and health, the opportunities gap between rich and poor is evident. This analysis of inequalities and injustices, however, can also be achieved with regard to differences in between people from different regions, men and women, white and black, heterosexuals and homosexuals, etc. So many different data can be chosen to show such inequalities and injustices.

Starting with the analysis of regional differences, they can be identified through observing specific data regarding, for example, education. According to the 2000 census, 47.6% of the young people of the Southeast from 15 to 17 years attended high school; in the Northeast this was only 19.9% (Dayrell, 2009). In 2007, enrolment ratio on secondary school students in the South-Southeast was 58%, compared to 33.3% in the North-Northeast (IPEA, 2008). Thus, the opportunities of someone from the North are likely to be lower than of a person from the South.

Associating the discussion presented here with reflections on the economic dimension (4.2), it is easy to perceive that Brazil is far from being a just country. The huge inequality of access of good education and the regressive tax system are two strong reasons for this conclusion. Moreover, as presented in 6.2, free enterprise is not stimulated and this makes economic growth difficult. In this way, Brazil does not promote anything close to the idea of

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a positive balance between equality of opportunities and economic development, either analysed from welfarist, or from a liberal perspectives.

6.5. Injustices against minorities

In 6.4, apart from general inequalities of wealth and opportunities, only regional differences are explored. Here, the intention is focusing the analysis on some specific dynamics of Brazilian society in order to show how certain unfair inequalities are not restricted to the economic dimension. Violence against black people, women and homosexuals, unequal job opportunities and lack of political representation of these groups are, then, used as examples of these dynamics. (Obviously, many other social analyses could be made to show the problem of intersecting inequalities.)

The reflection on violence is useful for this analysis, since urban violence is a massive problem in Brazil, and minorities – mainly black people, women and members of the LGBT community – are the more vulnerable groups. Reflecting on the first issue, the fact that Brazilian history (6.3) shows people’s passivity with regard to political changes could give the impression that Brazil is a peaceful country. However, it is quite the opposite. Actually, people, instead of strongly protesting for social changes, express their violence within the private sphere. This becomes a huge social problem in Brazil, which has the ninth highest homicide rate in the world. These high rates of homicides are characteristics of all Latin American countries. Compared to Europe, Oceania and Asia (continents which have more or less the same homicide rate), Brazil’s rate is nine times higher.

Looking more carefully at this homicide rate, it is easy to show that black people die proportionally more than white people. The first obvious reason is that black people in general belong to lower classes in which homicide rates are much higher. However, studies show that, even excluding differences of age, schooling, place of residence, and so on, black people have 23.5% more chance of being murdered than white people. Regarding how violence impacts men and women differently, men’s homicide rate is much higher than women’s. OMS (2015) informs that around the world 80% of homicides are of men. A first
reading of this data can give the impression that women are safer, however, while most of men are killed in situations that they put themselves into risk, 38% of murdered women are killed at home by their husbands. Observing this situation in Brazil, its feminicide rate is the fifth highest in the world according to the UN. Finally, if compared to a large number of non-Western countries, violence against homosexuals in Brazil is not institutionalised – several African and Asian countries consider homosexual practices illegal and some condemn homosexuals to death (Stewart, 2010). However, this does not mean the violence provoked by homophobia is not a social problem in Brazil. For instance, almost one person per day is murdered motivated by hate against homosexuals.

Regarding job opportunities, black people receive lower salaries, since they start from a poorer position, they do not have the same educational opportunities, they still suffer racism from certain parts of the population, their network means it is difficult to access good job positions in a culture of nepotism, and their self-expectancy about getting good jobs is very low. Reflecting on gender inequalities of income, it is widely known that, around the world, women receive considerably lower salaries than men, even when they exercise the same function. In Brazil, the same happens. Moreover, compared to Western countries, mainly the Scandinavian ones, laws and policies that also implicate fathers in raising their children are very narrow. This situation forces Brazilian women to have double shifts, and consequently earn less in their paid jobs. On the other hand, interestingly some data show that homosexual couples usually earn more than heterosexual ones.

If it is possible to identify huge inequalities in between white and black peoples, men and women, and hetero and homosexuals analysing data about violence and job market, the analysis of the profile of representatives in Brazilian congress shows a similarly and significantly unequal situation. Regarding black people and mixed-races MPs, though these ethnic groups represent slightly more than a half of Brazilian population, only 20% of congress is composed by them. The proportion of women is even lower: only 10%. Finally,
the data related to sexual orientation is the most impressive: of 513 MPs, only one declares himself as homosexual.

However, though it is undeniable that black people, women and homosexuals are more susceptible to violence, have lower salaries and are misrepresented in politics, it is also important to observe some avant-garde laws and policies that aim at fixing this unfair situation have been implemented in Brazil. From the last decade, 50% of places in federal universities (the most reputed ones) are reserved for poor and black people. These affirmative actions, that come 40 years after a similar initiative in the US, are revolutionary in order to give real opportunities to black people to obtain good instruction and further good jobs. In 2010, these policies became part of a Federal Law (12.288) about racial equality. Actually, this law determines several policies towards “guaranteeing to the black population the realisation of equal opportunities, the defence of individual, collective and diffuse ethnic rights and the fight against discrimination and other forms of ethnic intolerance” (Article 1 of the 1988 Constitution) through actions in the spheres of health, education and culture. More directly related to this thesis (and discussed in 10.3) the introduction of black and indigenous history in Brazilian curriculum (Article 11 of the 1988 Constitution) has been determined.

Apart from this law about racial equality, another Federal Law (11.340) known as Maria da Penha, passed in 2006, focused on protecting women against domestic violence, establishing preventive and protective measures, and instituting state assistance for all female victims of such violence. The Maria da Penha law represented a huge advance in terms of women rights in Brazil, not only because of the assistance it establishes, but also because it recognises some fundamental women – and human – rights, including the right to live without suffering from any kind of violence, the right to dignity, to respect, to health, to education.

With regards to homosexuals’ rights, the Brazilian laws and policies are quite insipient. As mentioned above, in many non-Western countries, homosexuals are considered criminals. Brazil’s Constitution, on the contrary, forbids any type of discrimination (Article 5). However, if Brazilian law does not consider homosexuals criminals, on the other hand, homophobia is not considered a hate crime, differently from racism. Even so, at least the Resolution 175 of the National Council of Justice (Conselho Nacional de Justiça – CNJ),

\[76\] A few of them also reserved for indigenous people.
passed in 2013, guarantees same-sex unions and stimulates homosexuals to make official their relationships.

The discussion above focuses on legal changes towards guaranteeing the same rights to these groups. More important than this, is how civil society is mobilising itself to reinforce this process. No doubt, social media gives a fundamental help for members of these groups finding their peers. This brotherhood/sisterhood empowers them. It is mentioned in 6.2 that such an internal protection has been a characteristic of black Americans for a long time. In Brazil, however, social relations were based on the “coexistence of contraries”. This situation has made black people less united and protective. Interestingly, the democratisation of the internet has created this spirit of internal protection also in Brazilian black, female and LGBT communities. It is not the intention of this chapter to go deep into this reflection, nor necessarily endorsing such practice. In the next chapter, a few reflections on the best ways to deal with this cooperation among peers are presented.

Only as a final summary of this subject, it is possible to say that, observing this description from the point of view of the cultural dimension of justice (4.3), on the one hand, avant-garde laws that protect minorities, while incipient, have been implemented in Brazil; on the other, situations of oppression and discrimination against minorities normally motivated by conservative behaviour of several sectors of society are still highly embedded in Brazilian society as the data here presented can show.

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Chapter 6 observes how Brazilian society has been organised. These historical characteristics show that, though culturally unified, this country currently presents several problems regarding strong inequalities, reduced communal responsibilities and an incipient understanding of the democratic process. These facts, in comparison with ideal reflections (chapter 4) and human characteristics (chapter 5), draw attention to the civic virtues Brazilian people should possess in order to participate in the process of improving justice in Brazil.
PART THREE: CITIZENSHIP CURRICULUM
7. Methodology for Part Three

In the introduction, overviews of different methodologies that orient the writing of each chapter and an approach that guides the themes of the chapters and how to connect them – ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium – are presented. Chapter 2, then, explains and justifies this approach. The methodologies behind the next five chapters, however, deserve a bit more attention, particularly the methodology behind chapters 11 and 12, the only ones written based on primary data collected in Brazilian schools. In this way, (7.1) the criteria of choice of the seven civic virtues that should be taught in schools (chapter 8) and (7.2) of the five levels of citizenship curriculum that facilitate the analysis of the curriculum (chapters 9, 11 and 12) are explained. Moreover, it is also important to briefly explore (7.3) how the documents which explain Brazilian policies towards citizenship education were selected. In addition, to make more solid the ideas presented in the empirical chapters, this thesis has to explain how this data collection was undertaken. The present chapter does mainly this. Thus, in 7.4, an overview of the empirical research is presented. Then, it is explained (7.5) how observations were carried. Next, the processes of (7.6) designing and (7.7) executing the interviews are detailed. Finally, (7.8) the process of analysing data and writing the two chapters is explained, followed by (7.9) some reflections on ethical issues.

7.1. The criteria of choice of the seven civic virtues

Chapter 8 proposes a list of seven civic virtues that is central for this thesis’ rationale. The achievement of these virtues serves as the basis for theoretical reflections and empirical observations regarding the five levels of citizenship curriculum (chapters 9, 11 and 12). These virtues, however, are not based on any previous list. Thus, the “methodology” behind the definition of this list is presented in the present section. Moreover, since the distinction of the different levels of curriculum proposed by this thesis is quite unusual, the next section also explains how this distinction was established. Both discussions, nevertheless, are only briefly presented, since the main aim of this chapter is to present the methodology behind the collection of primary data analysed in chapters 11 and 12.

Regarding the definition of the list of seven civic virtues, it departs from an understanding that civic virtues can be distinguished in three groups representing civic knowledge, skills
and values (Kerr, 2003). First, people have to have knowledge related to how their society is constituted and works – its laws and customs. Second, they have to possess certain skills – like thinking critically or imagining other people’s situations (cognitive empathy) – in order to make a good use of the knowledge described. Finally, more than knowing about their societies, thinking critically or imagining the others, people seem to have the duty of possessing certain values: willing the good of the rest of their community, participating in democratic processes, respecting social decisions/laws, and fighting for rights.

However, though this distinction suggested by Kerr exists, no list with civic virtues that citizens should possess has been found in the literature. Several thinkers defend the importance of cultivating civic virtues but do not present any type of list. Nussbaum could be one exception, but her list of ten central capabilities – life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; control over one’s environment (2011, p.33-4) – is not clear regarding the important differentiation between citizens’ rights and duties. Thus, the capabilities proposed by Nussbaum are not virtues in the sense that the term is being used by this thesis. Other thinkers usually focus on specific virtues. Knowledge about constitutional principles, for example, is demanded by Rawls (1993); knowledge about social data, by Sen (2009a); critical thinking, by Dewey (1915) and many others – this is, for sure, the most discussed civic virtue discussed by the literature; democratic attitudes, also by Dewey (1915), Gutmann (1987) and so on; empathy, or at least compassion, is discussed by Baron-Cohen (2004), Rifkin (2009), Bloom (2016). On the other hand, the duty of respecting fair rules is implicit in general ideas of civic values, but was not explicitly found in the literature. Even more difficult is to find some scholar suggesting that it is a duty to fight for justice. In addition, though is implicit since Smith (1759; 1776), willingness to compete fairly is not in the literature on civic values. This list of civic virtues proposed here (civic knowledge, critical thinking, cognitive empathy, compassion, willingness to compete fairly, fighting for justice, following rules democratically created) is therefore a compilation of different proposals found in the literature about this subject. This specific list is unique to this thesis, and the reasons for proposing them, along with their underlying ideas, are presented in chapter 8.

7.2. The criteria of choice of the five levels of citizenship curriculum
Unlike the literature on civic virtues, the literature related to curriculum presents a variety of ways to understand and differentiate types of curriculum. Kelly (2004), for example, distinguishes between official (or planned) and received (or actual) curricula, formal and informal curricula, “conscious” and hidden curricula. The division proposed by this thesis does not follow exactly any of these suggestions, whilst taking into account elements of them. For the sake of the particular analysis achieved here, it considers citizenship curriculum divided into five original distinct elements: supra official, wide official, narrow official, unofficial, and hidden curricula.

In Kelly’s definition, official or planned curriculum is “what is laid down in syllabuses, prospectuses and so on” (2004, p.6). In order to analyse the official curriculum in this way, the present thesis reflects on the need for a specific subject to work with citizenship education, and other alternatives as the introduction of citizenship contents in humanities and even in subjects like mathematics. Certain official schools’ activities such as compulsory involvement with the community are also analysed. This official curriculum, however, is not only limited to subjects, contents and activities linked to them. Such things are associated with a “narrow official curriculum”. Nevertheless, the proper school organisation can be a strong way to cultivate citizenship. The present thesis calls this “wide official curriculum”. Moreover, policies towards the school system’s organisation – that is, how schools’ external influences are embodied in schools’ ethos and how educational resources are shared – equally influences students’ civic virtues. In the present thesis, this is named “supra official curriculum”.

Schools and their subjects, however, are dynamic and also do not usually work as planned. These facts give room for “unofficial curriculum” initiatives. Kelly counterposes the “official or planned curriculum” and the “actual or received curriculum”, the latter being “the reality of the pupils’ experience” (2004, p.6). This thesis presents a distinct opposition. It discusses which types of initiatives teachers and students, apart from the curriculum, could propose. In this way, unofficial curriculum means something different from the received one (though it is equally received), since the latter only pays attention to actual practices, while what is being analysed here is the space that could be occupied by teachers and students beyond the official curriculum. For example, how should teachers deal with their own political views if and when they propose debates about social justice.
Finally, the last dimension of schools’ curriculum that can help or hinder the promotion of citizenship is called “hidden curriculum”. Kelly defines it as:

those things which pupils learn at school because of the way in which the work of the school is planned and organized, and through the materials provided, but which are not in themselves overtly included in the planning or even in the consciousness of those responsible for the school arrangements. Social roles, for example, are learnt in this way, it is claimed, as are sex roles and attitudes to many other aspects of living (2004, p.5).

Given this division, unofficial curriculum is the space for teachers’ (and also students’) creativity towards activities related to civic education. These initiatives are important because, many times, the environment creates so many opportunities for discussions and actions that are unpredictable. A natural disaster can stimulate civil engagement; a terrible murder might prompt discussions about capital punishment, and so on. Hidden curriculum is, somehow, a reverse image of unofficial curriculum. While the latter is related to activities that are not on the curriculum, but are explicitly developed by teachers and students, the former is associated with certain curricular elements which implicitly influence civic knowledge, skills and values, many times with teachers and students remaining unaware of these.

Normally when pedagogues and sociologists of education, for example, Apple (1979) and Ball (2013), write about the hidden curriculum, they appeal to this concept in order to criticise current curricula which, “sneakily”, act as mechanisms to maintain the status quo and power relations. In this way, governments (which would have hidden interests of favouring those who are behind them) would be basically designing curricula in order to cultivate subservience and refrain progressive thoughts and practices. The active role of the teacher in this process is seen as minimal.

However, this seems exaggerated. Teachers and students are much less subservient than certain interpretations make appear. Nonetheless, exactly because unofficial curriculum is the space for individual creativity, by definition, a reflection on an ideal citizenship curriculum will welcome such activities. Also by definition, these hidden intentions are important in the analysis of the real socio-political structure, but do not have space in a discussion about ideal curriculum. However, it is important to discuss these practices in order to make school
communities aware about eventual hidden intentions behind the curriculum proposed. Thus, while the hidden curriculum is frequently associated with top-down practices with spurious/illegitimate intentions, the unofficial curriculum is related to bottom-up initiatives which normally intend to improve positive points that are not reached by the official curriculum.

7.3. The documents behind Brazilian policies on citizenship education

Chapter 9 analyses the history and the current situation of citizenship education in Brazil from the perspective of Brazilian laws and policies. The dynamics of hierarchy and importance of these laws and policies is complex. Thus, the methodology that oriented the selection of documents to be analysed by this thesis deserves some attention. The historical research was based on papers that investigated former constitutions and laws. However, for the present work, current laws, policies and certain documents produced by civil society are more important.

The reflection has to start from the 1988 Constitution (Brasil, 1988). A direct consequence of the Constitution is the 1996 law – LDB, Guidelines and Bases Law (Brasil, 1996, n.9394), a law which almost copied in its Article 2 Article 205 of the Constitution. This law, however, is not enough. A more specific guide to orient policymakers and schools about how to organise their educational system and curricula was needed: the 1997 PCN – National Curricular Parameters (Brasil, 1997). These parameters were strongly criticised by certain sectors of the educational field, and received in 2013 a rereading, the 2013 DCN – National Curricular Guidelines (Brasil, 2013), after the Social Democrat Party (PSDB) was replaced by the Workers Party (PT) in the national government. This rereading did not substantially change the 1997 PCN, and the latter continues to be the reference for academic reflections on citizenship education. Regarding laws and policies currently applied, it is worth also mentioning a local policy – different states define their curricula based on PCNs but differently – implemented in Rio Grande do Sul just before this thesis’ data collection. It was called “Polytechnic Teaching (Rio Grande do Sul, 2011)”. However, after the change of the government in 2015, this Polytechnic Teaching was partially abandoned.

Finally, at least two national government attempts to implement new policies and a civil society reaction to certain practices related to citizenship education deserve to be mentioned
and the documents behind them cited. In 2011, the Brazilian government prepared a series of materials (press publications and videos) defending the acceptance and celebration of non-heterosexual behaviour. This material was called by the government “School Without Homophobia”. In 2015, the same government proposed radical changes in the history curriculum of secondary education through the expansion of studies about African and Indigenous history. Both attempts are still under debate and they are far from being consolidated. The last document that deserves attention because of its repercussions for the debate about citizenship education is a 2015 project of law (n.867) that summarises a current conservative movement against teachers’ presentation of their political positions in classrooms.

7.4. Overview of the empirical research

In order to develop the empirical chapters of this thesis (11 and 12), case study, a method for analysing examples of real-life situations, is chosen. Such a method helps to understand abstract ideas (Nisbet & Watt, 1984, p.72-3) and recognise how complex and entrenched social knowledge is (Adelman et al, 1980). However, this method usually limits the generalisation of its conclusions. Thus, it is important to highlight that the environments selected were information-rich schools, as claimed below. Then, intensity and criterion sampling (Patton, 1990) is employed, something that increases the possibilities of seeing a more general idea about the reality of Brazilian education.

This case study appeals to three different sources of data: semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and school observations. The interviews and questionnaires with school community members demanded much more research than the observations. Thus, the processes of designing, applying and analysing the interviews and questionnaires are presented in more detail. In 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 each one of these processes are developed, while observations are briefly explained in 7.5.

Related to this process of observing and distributing interviews and questionnaires, it is important to say that this gathering of school communities members’ opinions suffered a considerable influence of my previous understanding of justice and my reading on ideal citizenship curriculum, something consistent with the approach proposed. Thus, the interviews and questionnaires were designed based on my notions of justice and curriculum.
Additional questions and even notes taken during the interviews, and all observations also suffered influences of such notions.\textsuperscript{77}

While it is assumed that all the process behind writing these empirical chapters has theoretical influences, the choices of the city and schools where data was collected tried to reduce as much as possible the influences of the environment on the production of an overview about Brazilian citizenship education. Obviously, in one sense, it is impossible to present this overview through qualitative research, since Brazil is a country with almost the same area as Europe, 26 states, 5,570 cities\textsuperscript{78} and roughly 200,000 schools (in 2015)\textsuperscript{79}. Moreover, as explored in chapter 6, there are huge differences in levels of development between South-Southeast and North-Northeast states. Thus, by following the demands of qualitative research design, focusing the analysis on selected places (in this case, three schools in only one city), several details of other places are omitted.

One alternative in order to reduce this problem would be draw on quantitative research methods that normally collect data from a much higher number of cities and schools – sometimes trying covering all. Yet this type of research is also limited. Supposing that the budget is not massive (differently from, for example, state investments in a census), the more the number people’s ideas are collected, the less attention to detail can be accomplished. No doubt, reaching ideas of peoples from different states and many schools could be very interesting and it would give interesting data to be examined. This thesis, however, opted for a more careful analysis of few people from only three schools in order to obtain more focused and detailed data. Even so, the idea is to map, as much as possible, the reality of citizenship education in Brazil. The choice of an information-rich city and schools is therefore appropriate for this.

The chosen city is Porto Alegre, the capital of the southernmost Brazilian state with a population of 1.4 million. Two reasons led to this choice of research site. Firstly, Porto Alegre is the city that I have lived all my life and where I taught for 15 years. Thus, my existing network made it easier to find appropriate schools to develop the research.\textsuperscript{77} This mention to first person possible biases intends to make clear that such an empirical study can suffer from this lack of objectivity and should be read with this filter.\textsuperscript{78} \url{https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_estados_brasileiros_por_n%C3%BAmero_de_munic%C3%ADpios} \textsuperscript{79} \url{https://www.publico.pt/2014/10/10/mundo/noticia/no-pais-dos-50-milhao-de-alunos-e-das-200-mil-escolas-a-luta-continua-1672399}
Moreover, it is an urban area reflecting the lived reality for 76% of the Brazilian population (IBGE, 2017). The main limitation of this choice is that Porto Alegre belongs to the South and, in Brazil, the South-Southeast and North-Northeast realities are very different (6.4). In addition, it is important to highlight the fact that I am familiar with the local reality and that this fact can hindered or blinded me of some routine subtleties. Conversely, my proximity with the local culture made easy my approximation with the interviewees and the whole environments.

All the sample schools are located in Porto Alegre and represent a cross-section of society and schooling types, differing regarding the socioeconomic statuses of their students. Whilst one school houses some of the richest students due to its high fee, another is composed of poor students as it is located near a disadvantaged neighbourhood and is free of charge. The third has its population composed of students with mixed statuses due to its location in a rich area and its lack of fees. In doing this, a quite good map of at least Porto Alegre’s secondary schools can be presented. Actually, students from the second year of secondary education (in average, 16 year-olds in the private school and 18 year-olds in the poor state-run school) were observed and interviewed. Moreover, since most black people are poor (6.2), the number of black students in the rich school is considerably reduced, while this number is proportionally higher in the two state-run schools.

7.5. Observations

Some reconnaissance visits were made from November 15, 2014 to December 23, 2014, when the s of interviews and questionnaires were also applied. The proper observations were carried out from February 22, 2015 tom May 31, 2015. In total, I spent around 200 hours more or less equally distributed in these three schools. This time allowed me to attend 4 days of classes that lasted 4.5 hours in the second year of secondary education of each school. Moreover, the rest of the time was spent in between the teachers’ staff room and the schoolyard, and in the interviews. During this process, around 18,000 words – basically ideas from what I was seeing and hearing (for example, students’ interactions and dialogue) – of

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80 In 2015, monthly fees were around £425, while the Brazilian minimum wage was around £180, considering that currently £1 = R$4.15.
81 Not the poorest ones, since these do not even reach secondary education.
notes were the result of 38 visits to these schools. These notes were taken in a notebook without any kind of specific template or frame.

Differently from the interview and questionnaire, which demanded a long process of preparation that (as mentioned above) suffered influences of my previous ideas of justice and curriculum, thinking of how to execute observations only demanded some reflections on my ethical behaviour (explained in 7.9). In summary, I was silent in classes and had few conversations with students outside classrooms, rather than assume an interventionist attitude, as action research proposes (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007, p.297-315).

Thus, the observations were accomplished following two different strategies. The first month was used to acclimatise to the schools’ environments and collect some important information for applying the interviews. Thus, I tried to identify the more reasonable moments to accomplish the interviews. Moreover, I was able to have an overview of the number of female and male teachers and students and identify possible interviewees following criteria explained below. In the last two and a half months in the field, I analysed more carefully the distinct environments of each school. Though I started taking notes in the first month, the most important ones came from this second phase of the research collection. I was able to identify teachers’ and students’ recurrent practices with more clarity, and the notes became more focused.

7.6. Preparing interviews and questionnaires

As explained above, interviews and questionnaires have a central role in the following chapters. Thus, the processes of designing, applying and analysing them deserve a more detailed description. Regarding the design of the interview and questionnaire, their pilots were elaborated from July, 2014 to October, 2014. In January, 2015, after the pilots of the interview were applied and analysed, some changes were implemented. The changes on the questionnaires, on the other hand, were achieved only after the end of the interviews and schools observations in June, 2015. The reason for this was to identify some important information that other tools did not provide properly.

As mentioned, the interview and questionnaire were designed based on certain readings of theories of justice and curriculum. These readings have been foundational in structuring
chapters 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9. Thus, interview and questionnaires questions touch upon several issues developed in these chapters including questions in which teachers and students could express their opinions about civic virtues that should be cultivated, how to do this and their perceptions on how it is being done. However, since studies for writing these chapters continued after the empirical research, some theoretical ideas that were finally approached in them were not included in the interviews and questionnaires. For example, no discussion on how to deal with political anger was presented. (Interestingly, considering the back and forth process proposed since the beginning of this thesis writing process, some ideas that came from data collection oriented further search for topics developed in the theoretical chapters. Such a writing attitude, aligned with reflective equilibrium, differs from the usual process of building a thesis in only one way: from the analysis of the theory to the practice.)

Thus, oriented by some theoretical ideas, the pilot of the interview was formed by 12 questions. This pilot already presented something in between a semi-structured and structured interview (this idea is explored next). Its format and most of its questions were preserved in the final version. The pilot of the questionnaire, equally oriented by theoretical ideas, was designed with 30 questions which appealed to Likert scale methodology (this idea is also developed next). However, differently from the interview, the format of the questionnaire and most of its questions were changed from the pilot to the final version.

Once the pilots had been applied, few changes were made in the final version of the interview\textsuperscript{82} (Appendix 1). They were focused on avoiding respondents’ misinterpretation of certain questions. Thus, in the end, a hybrid, in between a semi-structured and a structured interview, was designed. This means that, on the one hand, questions were very open, a characteristic of semi-structured interviews; on the other, as structured interviews, questions were thought to avoid an excessive dialogue in between the interviewer and the interviewees (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). This hybrid strategy reduced the influences of the interviewer’s (my) previous ideas (which already oriented the questions) over the interviewees. The result was an interview with 15 quite general questions, and the definition of a procedure that only allow the interviewer’s interventions to clarify some points. Finally,

\textsuperscript{82}In the interviews, few more questions were presented. Being more specific, the definition of “empathy” was inserted in a question about this subject. Moreover, a direct question comparing education for competition and for collaboration was presented. Similarly, a direct question comparing how talent and effort are stimulated in schools was also introduced. Finally, a question aiming to measure the impacts of the Brazilian educational system, which admits the existence of private and state-run schools, on school actors’ civic values was also added.
it is important to say that the interview was designed to be applied in the three schools to two head teachers, six teachers and twelve students, being the students interviewed in focus groups of 4 students. (The questions presented in the interviews and questionnaires are attached at the end of the thesis.)

The process of designing the final version of the questionnaire (Appendix 2) was a bit more complex. It is divided in two moments. First, as with the interviews, it was observed from the analysis of the pilot answers that some questions were not clear to the respondents. For example, it was asked in the pilot if teachers and students consider that “empathy” should be cultivated, but the answers showed that this concept is not taken for them in a standardised way. Second, after the interviews and observations process were finished, several important questions arose, and it was apparent that some of these could be answered through the questionnaire. Thus, from January, 2015 to July, 2015, the pilot questionnaire underwent lots of improvements until the final version was produced. Subjective questions (asking teachers and students to present the three main civic virtues that should be taught) were introduced; objective questions were modified and expanded. At the end, the questionnaire was compounded by three open-ended and 37 multiple-choice questions.

Since these questionnaires were aimed to be applied to around 100 teachers and 500 students, the three subjective questions were designed to require simple answers which should be presented in three words. The objective questions, which appealed to Likert scale based methodology\(^\text{83}\), though applied to a considerable number of people, did not produce results that change it into quantitative research, since no statistical inference about the whole Brazilian schools’ communities is produced from this.

This questionnaire, thus, helps to endorse some of the views presented in the interviews. In one way, information collected through questionnaires is stronger, since it is associated with a larger number of people. On the other, it is weaker, since a deep reflection associated with given opinions is not presented, rather than what happens in the interviews. Though this questionnaire cannot be identified with quantitative research, the comparison presented

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\(^{83}\) Two types of questions with different alternatives were presented. In the first group, the alternatives were: the claim is true; the claim is partially true; the claim is false; I don’t know. In the second, they were: I completely agree; I agree; I disagree; I completely disagree; I don’t know.
reminds the comparison of advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative researches (Smith, 1983).

7.7. Interviewing and applying questionnaires

Data collection through interviewing was carried out in parallel to the second half of the period of observations. As explained below, six head teachers, 18 teachers and 36 students (in groups of four) were invited to participate in interviews after a process of selection from April 1, 2015 to May 31, 2015. As explained above and below, questionnaires depended on an overview of the interviews and observations to be finished. Thus, only after the fieldwork, in August, 2015, questionnaires were answered by 69% (74 in 107) of the secondary school teachers and 48% (285 in 593)\(^84\) of the second year of secondary school students. (The aim was to send these questionnaires to all teachers and students at the sample schools, but different logistical problems have made this impossible.)

The first important observation about the interviews is the way that teachers and students were invited\(^85\). Overall, the research design followed a random selection process since the idea was to avoid only selecting those who already reflected upon the issue of citizenship (for instance, philosophy teachers or highly engaged students) by choosing “average” people. However, at least some criteria were applied to select participants. First, gender proportionality was preserved in the choice of teachers and students. Specifically, regarding teachers, the distribution of age and subjects that they teach was also observed.

Regarding how the interviews were organised and led, participant interviews were scheduled at least one week in advance and usually lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour. Respondents were instructed to develop the answers instead of simplifying them, and few interventions during the process, normally clarifications, were made. Teachers and head teachers were interviewed individually, while students were interviewed in groups of four. This idea of interviewing students in focus groups was successful, since it was created a type of conversation between the students which enabled students to develop points that some had

\(^84\) Some teachers denied answering the questionnaires (around 10%) and others (around 20%) were not found for different reasons (they were sick, had appointments, etc.). Most of students that did not replied were from the two state-run schools (mainly the poorest one) that had partial strikes during that period. Very few students denied answering the questionnaires.

\(^85\) All teachers invited accepted the invitation, and only three students rejected it, due to their embarrassment.
never thought of before. Teachers, on the other hand, usually had some idea about most topics of this research and the interviews with them flowed normally.

All interviews were audio-recorded and I took several notes about the points that called my attention. These notes and some ideas highlighted in the observations were fundamental for doing two different things. First, they oriented several changes in the questionnaires that were applied a couple of months after the end of my fieldwork. Moreover, they serve as one of the basis for defining the codes in the analysis of the interviews that, later, were central in the process of writing the thesis.

As mentioned, questionnaires were distributed following the fieldwork. They were applied with the help of some colleagues of the three schools. Head teachers stimulated the teachers to complete them; some teachers who worked in all high school second-year classes distributed the questionnaires in class-time, encouraged and monitored the students during the process of answering. On average, the questionnaires were answered within 20 minutes, and as such did not demand too much of the participants. They were completed by 69% of secondary teachers and 48% of second-year students.

The first versions of these two chapters were written at the beginning of 2016. However, since more ideas about citizenship curriculum arose after this, these new ideas could not be directly addressed in the observations, interviews and questionnaires. A new reading of these notes allowed the identification of some elements that were not forecasted to be analysed. Maybe the most important one was the lack of concern of observing in which measure school members understood citizenship education as a right, instead of only taking this as a duty. This is because, at the beginning of the presented research, such virtues were only treated as duties, and this previous understanding limited data collection about citizenship education as a right.

A different limitation is related to the scope of interviewees. Due to lack of time and logistic problems, parents, policymakers and civil society’s average members were not listened. Their opinions about citizenship education, however, seemed fundamental in order to design a better picture of the Brazilian education system.

7.8. Organising data and analysing
The final part of developing the empirical chapters was transcribing the interviews, coding the main ideas presented in them and in the observations and writing the chapters. The whole transcribing process was accomplished by me from August, 2015 to October, 2015. After this, the process of coding the transcriptions and observations’ notes was achieved from November, 2015 to January, 2016. Finally, the writings of chapters 11 and 12 were developed more or less in parallel from February, 2016 to April, 2016, and retaken from July, 2017 to August, 2017.

The process of transcribing the interviews was developed through using *Transcribe* tool. All the transcriptions (and the coding process) were made in Portuguese, and only the parts that were included in the empirical chapters were translated to English. This option facilitated the process, since my mother-tongue is Portuguese. It is important to reinforce that all interviews were transcribed by me, since this option made me even more connected to the answers given by the school community members, and allowed me to start highlighting some important points during the process. During this process, there were no translation problems.

After finishing the process of transcription, a huge amount of data was available for the empirical chapters: not only the transcriptions, but also the notes taken during observations. Separating and merging all this data demanded organisation. In order to do this, I made use of *NVivo*. This is a powerful tool, but only one of its resources was used: the possibility of coding written texts and allowing the software join passages marked by the same codes in separate files.

However, one of the problems of this process of coding is defining how to choose the codes. In this research, some codes were determined before the transcriptions, based on the main concepts linked with its theoretical ideas. This included the codes: competition/cooperation, school rules, empathy/solidarity, respect, teachers’ influence, etc. In a second phase, new codes were created from ideas highlighted during the interviews and observations. These included, for example, the split of the concept “respect” into two different ideas: respect for the rules and respect for other people/cultures/habits. Finally, the process of transcribing and reading the transcriptions and other notes allowed the establishment of new codes, such as the

86 https://transcribe.wreally.com
aforementioned theme of rights, expanding on the theme of duty. After defining all these codes (Appendix 3), NVivo was nourished with this information. Then, through NVivo, claims linked to the codes were joined. Different files related to distinct elements of citizenship curriculum were, then, created.

Thus, through associating and differentiating these codes, the structures of the empirical chapters were designed. It was only in this moment that the ideas obtained from this primary data were compared with some secondary data that came from readings of similar researches. From this moment, the writing process became similar to the writings of the rest of the chapters.

7.9. Ethical issues

It is important to finish this reflection on methodology by demonstrating that I undertook all reasonable and expected steps to respect and allow for ethical considerations. Ethical problems in research can arise in different stages:

They may arise from the nature of the research project itself (ethnic differences in intelligence, for example); the context for the research (a remand home); the procedures to be adopted (producing high levels of anxiety); data collection methods (covert observation); the nature of the participants (emotionally disturbed adolescents); the type of data collected (highly personal and sensitive information); and what is to be done with the data (publishing in a manner that may cause participants embarrassment). (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007, p.51)

In this research, however, these problems were significantly minimised, since: (i) different ideas of justice and education, and different practices about how to cultivate citizenship identified in a comparison between rich and poor schools hardly create any type of harm in the communities; (ii) the three schools frequently receive researchers; (iii) the method did not produce any negative psychological effects in the participants; (iv) and there was minimal invasion of their intimacy; (v) questionnaires were applied only with their consent, allowing them to withdraw if they wished to do so; (vi) the research was not conducted with vulnerable people, that is, with those who have special issues and could be warmed by the process; and (vii) the participants’ and schools’ anonymity was guaranteed.
Exploring a bit more items (ii), (iv) and (vi), it can be said that there were minimal risks of harm to the participants of interviews and questionnaires, since questions about their ideas of justice and citizenship education probably did not produce in them any negative psychological effect, such as invasion of intimacy. Even so, during the interviews, situations in which people could be more exposed to feelings anxiety, discomfort or embarrassment, anonymity were feasible and I paid special attention to how best to sensitively approach questions about racism, homophobia, and sexism. Thus, no difficult situation was registered. The same happened during the application of questionnaires.

Specifically regarding item (v), the interview participants were personally invited and received a previous written explanation on how the interviews would be conducted. All participants signed a consent form. Regarding the students’ consent, teachers – in loco parentis – also gave their permission. It was made clear to all participants that it was possible for them to withdraw from research, even after the interview, but no one opted for this.

In addition to these points, some other demands of UCL Institute of Education Ethical Committee 87, which approved the conducting of the research, were successfully accomplished. Disturbance in schools and disruptions of students’ learning were minimal. Teachers responded to the questionnaires in one of their week meetings. Students did this during their normal classes. Both were asked to respond a 20 minutes questionnaire and were left free not to perform such a task. Interviews were achieved in their free times. Observations in schools’ playgrounds were also allowed by the managers, and specific class observations were allowed by the teachers.

Moreover, the data were kept securely in folders in my house (questionnaires) and in digital files (interviews) on my personal computer, and the names of the interviewees were not asked in both processes. These data were not shared with my supervisors or any other person, since I personally accomplished all the transcriptions and tabulations of data. In the findings presented at the final text, participants and schools were not named.

87 Colin (2011) and Wiles (2012) are references for this document.
Finally, my personal contacts in the three schools helped to guarantee full support to my work. Moreover, because of these connections, it will be easier for me to return to the schools’ communities the results of the research. The idea is to organise some talks and other consultancies in order to improve their pedagogical processes of cultivating citizenship.
8. Civic virtues

Up until now, this thesis has counterposed ideal ways to understand a just society, with certain analyses of natural/biological characteristics of humankind and cultural/historical contingent aspects of Western societies – in particular, Brazil – related to people’s understandings and practices towards justice. Aiming to put these two sides of the reasoning in equilibrium, it is fundamental to reflect about what are the necessary but possible civic virtues to be expected from Western citizens (or, more specifically, Brazilian citizens) in order to refine justice in their societies. To develop this discussion, at the beginning, (8.1) citizenship is defined and linked with people’s social rights and duties. People’s rights, however, are presented in chapters 3 and 4, from different perspectives. Thus, this chapter reflects on the virtues that people have to possess in order to be good citizens, their citizenship duties. Regarding this, it is firstly defended that (8.2) people have to possess different types of civic knowledge in order to make a just society possible. Then, (8.3) critical thinking is also presented as a fundamental skill. Next, (8.4) cognitive empathy is considered another important civic skill. Nonetheless, more than knowledge and skills, people have to possess certain civic values. Thus, (8.5) compassion is taken the central civic value. Moreover, (8.6) competitive spirit is considered a civic virtue only if softened by willingness to cooperate, that is, willingness to compete fairly. (8.7) The duty of fighting for justice is also defended as another important civic value, (8.8) however, this is balanced by the need to accept and follow rules democratically created. At the end of the chapter, after reflecting on these knowledge, skills and values, (8.9) the ideas of tolerance, engagement and celebration of difference are introduced in order to conclude whether tolerance is the maximum that can be demanded from citizens or whether engagement and celebration of difference are also necessary attitudes in Western societies.

8.1. Defining citizenship

In order to identify civic virtues, it is central to previously determine the sphere of life in which such virtues are expected. In 5.1, it is shown that individuals’ natural development makes them more prone to care about other people in the personal/private sphere (in-group) and that concerns towards the social/public sphere (out-group) comes from their civic awareness developed through reason. In 6.2, it is presented how difficult it is for Brazilian
people to develop concerns towards out-group members. The difficulty people experience in being virtuous within the social/public sphere is normally caused by a confusion between what personal/private and social/public virtues are. In order to clarify this point, a reflection on the situations in which someone should be impartial is helpful.

When a professor has to choose between two PhD candidates – one of them being his/her friend – he/she should appeal to the social virtue of impartiality/fairness, rather than favouring his/her friend. Through being impartial/fair, this professor would be considered just. However, when the same professor receives two invitations for different birthday parties occurring at the same time – one from a good friend, another from an acquaintance – he/she should appeal to the personal virtue of friendship and go to his/her friend’s party, rather than considering both invitations impartially (and, for example, flipping a coin to decide). In this case, justice is disregarded.88

Following Kohlberg (5.3), social/non-personal dilemmas are associated with the idea of justice. The examples of using or not the criterion of impartiality help to clarify that, in the personal sphere, reflections on justice are not appropriate. People should look for justice only when they are in the social sphere. The professor when has to choose a PhD candidate is nothing more than the personification of a just social act. This is another way to say that justice is the first virtue of societies (2.1), rather than a virtue of individuals. In other words, individuals’ actions in the social sphere are on behalf of the society, and the type of virtue expected from them is different than the type of virtue expected of people acting in the personal sphere: as is the case in the birthday party’s example, i.e., friendship.

However, it is not simple to draw this line between virtues in the personal and the social spheres. Personal virtues, such as care and empathy, are frequently considered equally important in the social sphere. As discussed in 5.3, Kohlberg (1971; 1976) understands the acquisition of these “situation-oriented” virtues as part of the process of development of social virtues that ends with the acquisition of the capacity of abstracting principles of justice – a difficult but superior capacity achieved by few. Gilligan (1982), on the other hand, considers that care and empathy are virtues as important as justice in the moral development

88 In the same way, Taylor, paraphrasing Sandel, says: “to insist punctiliously on sharing expenses with a friend is to imply that the links of mutual benevolence are somehow lacking or inadequate. There is no faster way to losing friends.” (1995a, p.183)
of individuals. In this way, two characteristics that are virtues in the personal/private sphere would be also virtues in the social/public one. This point is explored later in 8.4 and 8.5.

“Citizenship” is, then, a virtue related to the social/public sphere. But, what does this concept mean exactly? McCowan points out that this concept can be understood in two different ways:

Citizenship, at base, refers to membership of a state or political unit. [...] There are two distinct uses of the term. In the first, citizenship refers to an official status: as, for example, in the statements, ‘I am a Canadian citizen’ or, ‘I have dual citizenship’. The second usage, however, refers not to the possession of the official status, but the fulfilling of those expectations associated with membership. So we can speak of ‘good’ citizens as people who, say, participate constructively in political life, or of ‘ineffective’ citizenship when people’s rights are not upheld in practice. (2009, p.5)

Kymlicka, in turn, affirms that “[c]ivility refers to the way we treat non-intimates with whom we come into face-to-face contact” (2002, p.301). Similarly to McCowan, he is also committed to the idea that citizenship is a concept associated with the relations of the individuals with all of society. According to Osler and Starkey (2005), these relations are based on practices, but also on a feeling of belonging that follows Kymlicka’s idea of the expansion from the personal/private to the social/public sphere of a certain sense of intimacy. This line between the personal/private and the social/public sphere is significant and orients several points of the further discussion of this chapter.

Coming back to the examples of the professor in two different situations, it is possible to identify that he/she is confronted with two distinct types of duties, the first is associated with his/her social/public life, the second with his/her personal/private life. Reflections on citizenship are focused on the social/public one, though Gilligan’s ideas make questionable how detached a person acting in the social/public sphere has to be from his/her personal/private values. Once one has identified the sphere in which citizenship virtues are expected, it is also important to reflect about civic rights and duties. The reflection on the normative perspective of citizenship is normally presented as a double-implication of demands of rights and duties (McCowan, 2009; Callan, 2004; Osler & Starkey, 2005).
However, though rights and duties are necessarily connected, they orient different discussions. Chapters 3 and 4 present some ideas on how a just society should be organised. This discussion allows some conclusions on how a state should treat its citizens, that is, what are people’s civic rights. The fulfilment of people’s civic rights by the state, however, demands that individuals fulfil their duties. In this way, the present chapter is interested in reflecting about civic duties.

Through exploring this point, it is possible to identify different civic duties. They represent civic knowledge, skills and values (Kerr, 2003). Each one of them is discussed across this chapter. However, before exploring these virtues, it is interesting to mention that civic knowledge, skills and values are interdependent. For example, the value of compassion is probably dependent upon individuals’ skill in understanding other people’s feelings, desires and ideas, namely cognitive empathy. Compassion is probably also dependent upon individuals’ values of feeling sorrow for the pain or happiness for the success of the others, namely, sympathy. These and other relations are explored in greater depth below.

Apart from this, it is also important to discuss some virtues that could be inserted in the list discussed in this chapter but are not explored by this thesis. An important one is resilience. Actually, in some way, resilience is further taken into consideration. Firstly, although it is different from following rules, these features are associated. Moreover, because resilience “enables [individuals] to appreciate the consequences of [their] actions in the future” (Bloom, 2016, p.235), avoiding that they respond to the first impulse of emotional empathy, something presented below as a vice.

Another one is effort/dedication towards the community. Reflecting on the hypothetical duty of working to promote the development of society and, then, to favour unknown others, it is possible to find some link with the virtues of being compassionate and cooperative. Since society is also composed of people who have special needs, such as blindness, it seems a duty of capable people to produce additional goods for those who cannot achieve the same ends by themselves. However, whilst in a low scale it seems acceptable, an excessive demand for such extra work seems demanding and unreasonable. Boxer, one of the central characters of Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945), is an example of a horse that possesses much more strength than the all others animals, and, because of this, is pressured to work incessantly to achieve the good of his society. Orwell, however, develops this character exactly in order to make it
evident that Boxer should not be forced to do this, that such a demand goes much further than what the group should expect from him, crossing all limits of his liberty of self-determination.

After reflecting on this list of virtues, two opposite views can be presented. Libertarians consider that people should not be obliged to possess most of the civic knowledge and skills mentioned. As explored in 8.6, they think that being ignorant is a right. Republicans, on the other hand, think that being informed and prepared to think critically is a duty. The duty of compassion is even more controversial. Libertarians consider that a true liberal theory cannot demand this value from citizens. Liberal egalitarians, who add to their theories elements of communitarianism, on the other hand, defend that individuals have to be reasonable, that is, rational and compassionate (Rawls, 1993; 2001).

In both cases, libertarians support liberal neutrality with regard to duties in the social sphere. However, this thesis is aligned with Gutmann’s criticism of neutrality. She claims that “[n]eutrality is no more acceptable as a solution to [the problem of bias towards one’s own children] than the use of education to inculcate a nonneutral set of virtues. Neither choice – to teach or not to teach virtue – is uncontroversial” (1999[1987], p.36). It is obvious, though, that those people who do not learn from the state learn from their parents, peers, civil society, etc. However, as Gutmann says, “[c]hildren are no more the property of their parents than they are the property of the state” (1999[1987], p.33). Thus, from the conclusion that children are biased anyway, this agrees of Nussbaum’s defence of:

a type of liberalism that is not morally ‘neutral,’ that has a certain definite moral content, prominently including equal respect for persons, a commitment to equal liberties of speech, association, and conscience, and a set of fundamental social and economic entitlements. (2013, p.16)

Amongst the main values that Nussbaum (2013) considers essential are critical thinking, compassion and (non-nationalist) patriotism. This idea is supported in the previous chapters and explored below.

8.2. Civic knowledge

89 She also strongly defends the importance of developing the skill of thinking critically.
If people realise that their societies’ laws and customs are the result of a communal enterprise, it is easier for them to accept how it is organised. First, through understanding the process of producing their laws and customs, people can see that they have a rationale behind them (of course, assuming that laws are not arbitrarily imposed). This makes people more willing to respect them. Moreover, knowledge about laws and customs associated with knowledge about history make people feel like members of this social project, something fundamental in order to reinforce social ties.

Regarding the importance given by Rawls of knowing (and respecting) the constitution, it is possible to realise that, though being a liberal, he is aligned with a conservative view that certain principles strongly established – constitutional principles – have to be honoured. In the same way, this thesis, though it gives high importance to the liberal ethos, understands that a certain conservative attitude helps to improve justice (as discussed in 4.3). It is why, in the introduction, this thesis claims that if the reader does not believe that it is possible to solve Brazilian social injustices through trusting in institutions that already exist, then he/she will disagree with the reasoning proposed here. He/she will not accept one of the first pillars of this thesis: keeping institutions in order to improve justice.

Besides, it is important to remember that any reasoning starts from certain basic premises. As discussed above, for people developing their ideas of what is fair, it is fundamental that they depart from trustworthy data about their societies. In this way, knowledge of things like history, economic aspects, individuals’ psychology, etc. are fundamental for people to reach their conceptions of justice in a more structured way. For example, many people believe that the main reason for poverty is poor people’s lack of effort, while this is a very superficial psychological understanding of this issue. In addition, many rich people believe that they belong to the middle-class, however their earning put them within a very restricted group of the 10% (or 5% or even less) richest. A reasoning developed by someone does not only depend on his/her critical capacities. His/her knowledge about the subject – and his/her willingness to promote justice90 – are also fundamental. As developed in 3.7, Sen (2009a) defends coherently the expansion of people’s informational basis about people’s welfare or about different states of affairs in order to solve problems related to Arrow’s theorem of

90 Willingness to promote justice is a value explored later.
impossibility. Thus, through endorsing some of Condorcet’s proposals in this regard, Sen claims that people’s more just decisions depend on broadening information and spreading general knowledge, enriching societal statistics and promoting public discussion (2009a, p.94). From this, it is not difficult to extend this idea including knowledge about historical injustices, people’s psychological behaviours, etc.

However, producing knowledge is useless if people do not reflect about it correctly. In the post-truth era, it is not simple to obtain accurate knowledge. Regarding this, part of the fault can be identified in the lack of production of good content. A reduced number of experts and/or their biased procedures can be in the origins of this. Nevertheless, following inaccurate “knowledge” can be caused by a sense of illusory superiority that people with low knowledge have, the so-called Dunning-Kruger Effect:

It suggests that some voters, especially those facing significant distress in their life, might like some of what they hear from Trump, but they do not know enough to hold him accountable for serious gaffes he makes. (Dunning, 2016. Apud. Nichols, 2017, p.213).

From this analysis, Nichols suggests the existence of a “vicious circle” between people’s lack of knowledge and their lack of trust in policymakers and experts:

People know little and care less about how they are governed, or how their economic, scientific, or political structures actually function. Yet, as all of these processes thus become more incomprehensible, citizens feel more alienated. (2017, p.217)

And he says that, “[i]n order to trust on leaders and experts, people have to know a bit” (2017, p.231).

Thus, it is a person’s duty towards others to look for trustworthy information. Against this claim, sentences like “I reserve the right to be ignorant. That’s the Western way of life”, from the best-seller The Spy Who Came In from the Cold, from John le Carré (1963) (Nichols, 2017, p.209), are taken as true for “[m]any people [that] think that it is undemocratic to contradict their ideas, even if they are stupid” (Nichols, 2017, p.232). However, this is not correct. As suggested in 8.3, citizens frequently fail in their reasoning about public affairs because of their lack of information. It is not a moral fault if these mistakes happen
unconsciously. Nonetheless, if they deliberately disregard experts’ opinions, it turns into something morally unacceptable. In this way, people have a civic duty of engaging in a public debate but taking seriously into consideration experts’ opinions, that are, by definition, more qualified than theirs.

Interestingly, the way that Foucault and his followers make any kind of data suspicious of being produced to keep structures of power actually reinforces this post-truth atmosphere which misguides people. The defence of critical thinking is against this Foucauldian suspicion. Associated with the development of rational skills, it is important that people also have the openness for experts’ claims, even when the latter oppose some opinions supported by the former. Of course, democratic regimes, in the end, have to respect people’s opinions. However, this only can be followed if people put into practice their duty of forming these opinions through listening to experts.

8.3. Critical Thinking

Apart from different types of knowledge introduced above, a good citizen has to possess different skills. A central one is critical thinking. Since Socrates, critical thinking has been defended as fundamental for the development of a fair society. However, alongside history, this concept assumes different meanings. Given the fact that Dewey is “widely regarded as the ‘father’ of the modern critical thinking tradition” (Fisher, 2001, p.2), this thesis recurs to his definition of critical thinking:

Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds which support it and the further conclusions to which it tends (DEWEY, 1909, p.9).

In this way, critical thinkers actively take their own conclusions based on reason, rather than only following their feelings or other people’s opinions. Glaser explores Dewey’s ideas defining critical thinking in an even clearer way:

Critical thinking calls for a persistent effort to examine any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the evidence that supports it and the further conclusions to which it tends (1941, p.5).
Constantly reflecting about the evidences that support the reasoning. These are the “grounds” mentioned by Dewey. In 5.1, Haidt (2001) showed that even when undeniable reasons are presented against people’s strong beliefs, it is very difficult for them to change their ideas. Regarding this, it is quite normal to observe people finding reasons only after having made their conclusions. In this way, while possessing logical skills is necessary for thinking critically, departing from reliable sources and willingness to respect the right direction (from the reasons to the conclusion, rather than starting from the conclusion) are also fundamental. Certain people appeal to inaccurate sources of knowledge because they want to support their opinion and are willing to be dishonest about the state of affairs in order to ‘win’ the debate. This is a lack of an important civic value explored in 8.6. However, following inaccurate “knowledge” can be caused by a sense of illusory superiority that people with low knowledge have. This limitation is developed in 8.2.

8.4. Cognitive empathy

Apart from critical thinking, empathy has been strongly considered an important civic virtue. During the eighteenth century, Hume (1748) and Smith (1759) appealed to the current idea of empathy (however calling it sympathy91) associated with impartiality in order to base their reflections on morality. In this regard, they claimed that the individual’s capacity to put himself/herself in other people’s shoes is fundamental virtue of a moral agent who acts in private and public sphere.

Before exploring if Hume, Smith, and many other defenders of the importance of empathy in building a more just society, it is central to distinguish two understandings of such a concept. Bloom (2016, p.39) proposes that there is a difference in between “cognitive empathy” and “emotional empathy”. According to him, “if I understand that you are in pain without feeling it myself, this is […] a form of empathy – ‘cognitive empathy’” (2016, p.17). Based on this definition, he considers cognitive empathy a skill like critical thinking, and, because of this, he says that it is neutral in regards to moral values.

91 Sympathy, differently from empathy, is currently defined as a desire to make other people feel well, usually those who are suffering. This value is investigated in 8.5.
In this way, cognitive empathy differs from emotional empathy. Those who experience the latter have not only an understanding of others’ feelings, but also feel their pain or pleasure. In 8.5, it is discussed if emotional empathy is a positive or negative characteristic. Here, the focus of the analysis is on its cognitive side.

As a positive element of it, Bloom suggests that, if people understand that unknown others also feel pain and pleasure, it can make them see themselves as less special (2016, p.76), and, in turn, more accepting that everyone has the right to have their wishes considered by the state. Of course, only understanding that others have wishes does not make people think that these wishes have to be considered. A sadist can completely understand others’ pain, but simultaneously, and in spite of this, desires to make others suffer. In this sense, a desire to make other people feel well is necessary as a complement to the empathetic capacity. Thus, associated with the capacity to imagine others’ pain (or happiness), a desire to stop (to promote) it is also necessary. This desire is associated with the feelings of compassion and sympathy and discussed in 8.5.

8.5. Compassion

Having defended the importance of cognitive empathy as a civic skill, it is time to analyse if emotional empathy should be cultivated as a civic value. It is widely defended that the more emotionally empathetic someone is, the better this person is towards others (Baron-Cohen, 2004; Rifkin, 2009, De Waal, 2010). Obviously, such a defence considers that someone who feels empathy towards someone else also desires that this person feel well, have success, etc. In this way, it is considered that empathy entails sympathy. However, located empathy and sympathy can be the wrong moral guide for a person who acts in the social/public sphere, since these feelings stimulate someone of paying excessive attention to certain individuals rather than to others or even to some abstract idea of justice.

Bloom supports this idea by saying that individuals’ civic reasoning has to go beyond located empathy and sympathy towards specific other people. He gives different examples regarding this. One is an interesting test that shows that located empathy and sympathy normally produce myopia instead of producing fairness: people after knowing the name and other details of a person in a queue for a treatment – and developing some type of empathy towards this person – increase their wish to pass him/her to the front, something generally considered
unfair (2016, p.86). Regarding the duty of preserving the environment, Bloom claims that this is based on responsibilities with next generations, rather than on empathy and sympathy, since it is not possible to feel something for someone who does not even exist. Thus, in this case, emotional empathy and sympathy are useless (2016, p.23). Another interesting reflection presented by him concludes that, when someone thinks of paying taxes, empathy and sympathy towards co-citizens hardly ever orient such practices (2016, p.22). The tax system demands rational policies and people have to trust in the government’s capacity to manage this. Otherwise, they would have to defend a minimal state in which the reallocation of goods is made in the private sphere.

Bloom also defends that the stimulus of located empathy and sympathy are not good starting points to generalise wide concerns for others. According to him, empathy and sympathy can make people expand certain circles of care, but restrict others. He claims that people tend to donate much more money not for the charity organisations that prove they are helping more people, but for those that make them to feel more attached with the receivers of help. Bloom also claims that it is quite common for politicians to stimulate people’s inaccurate views of reality through overemphasizing certain situations despite a more holistic view of it.

Another criticism Bloom makes is against stimulating located empathy and sympathy in the social/public sphere, which he argues can work against the civilisation process. He suggests that located empathy and sympathy are vectors that transfer feelings of anger and resentment from someone who suffered a certain injustice to other people. Thus, amongst a very empathetic population, such feelings end up guiding public decisions. However, in his view, this is a guide that goes against wise decisions that have been built alongside the development of societies (2016, p.191). Regarding this point, a very interesting dialogue can be found in the film The Ides of March (2011). There, Morris, a fictitious pre-candidate for the US presidency declares in a TV show that he is against the death penalty, but at the same time he says that, if someone kills his wife, he would find a way to kill the murderer. In face of that unusual answer, the interviewer asks: “[If you judge it the right thing to do], why not let society do that?” In this moment, Morris gives an illuminating answer: “Because society has to be better than the individual. If I were to do that, I would be wrong”. The point behind this idea is that strong emotions should not guide public decisions.
Bloom’s reflection on this point orients a last thought. The world is full of sad stories. Very few people, if any, can endure all of them. Thus, the attempt to make people expand their feelings of empathy and sympathy towards a large group can make them burn out (Bloom, 2016, p.138-9). It is possible to imagine that this feeling, instead of helping to build a better society, paralyses people. However, in order to achieve a more just society, citizens need to be actively engaged in positive social practices, rather than only feel discomfort with social injustices.

Nonetheless, whilst it is argued that citizens should avoid following strong emotions, it is simultaneously suggested that citizens should not only appeal to their rationalities when they participate in decision-making processes in the public sphere. As the debate Rawls versus Gauthier developed in 3.4 shows, a just society depends on individuals transcending their rational and instrumental view of unknown others. Nonetheless, this transcendence does not seem to be towards located empathy and sympathy. This seems to be towards a conjugation of feelings of communal/social responsibility and a more diffuse compassion for strangers in general. These feelings are more comprehensive and do not result in a restrictive moral circle of care.

This approximation between communal responsibility and compassion is important. It is mentioned in chapter 2 that the responsibility towards co-citizens, the right to equal liberty and democratic procedures are the three main pillars shared by Western individuals. Such pillars sustain these societies. In this way, it makes sense that compassion is defended as a value that should be cultivated. Here, in addition, it is suggested that to try to expand this responsibility towards all individuals could be interesting, even if they do not live in the same country. This point, however, demands much more debates about how to implement global citizenship education, exceeding the aims of this thesis.

Regarding to this general idea, Bloom defends exactly a conjugation of self-control, intelligence and diffuse compassion as better than emotional empathy in order to orient people’s feeling in the public sphere (2016, p.35). It is possible to think that it would make people engage themselves into politics and support the state’s actions towards fair redistribution of goods (2016, p.103). Helping the less fortunate would be understood as a duty, rather than a favour (2016, p.102). It seems that the main difference between located empathy plus sympathy and public duty plus compassion is that the latter demands a feeling
towards others linked with a rational capacity to understand the big picture, something associated with critical thinking. Thus:

In contrast to empathy, compassion does not mean sharing the suffering of the other: rather, it is characterized by feelings of warmth, concern and care for the other, as well as a strong motivation to improve the other’s wellbeing. Compassion is feeling for and not feeling with other. (Singer & Klimecki, 2016. Apud. Bloom, 2016, p.138)

This point returns us to the Kohlberg versus Gilligan debate (5.3). This thesis is committed with Kohlberg’s idea, but, as discussed below, it does not mean that the cultivation of empathy is not seen as a good way to reach this at a higher level.

Defending the superiority of compassion in comparison to empathy to orient participation in the social/public sphere is not defending that empathy has not to be cultivated. Bloom, as well as Kohlberg, sees that, in the personal/private sphere, the capacity for empathy and sympathy makes people develop strong family and friendship ties, something fundamental for a happy life. Moreover, besides the importance of empathy in the personal/private sphere, it is possible to defend that these kinds of close affections are important for the development of broader and milder feelings of compassion towards strangers. Kohlberg does not disagree with this, but defends that societies have to try to go further and see that, in the end, public decisions depend on abstraction. Thus, if maybe formal education ought to stimulate students’ empathy and sympathy, at the same time, it has to make them more aware about the importance of thinking clearly, and then avoid that their emotions make them blind about what is fair or not.

Further research is required to provide more concrete and also more abstract reflections on this point in order to improve social justice. On the one hand, caring too much for a particular individual can lead to wrong decisions. One good example is a quite common situation in which a judge obliges the state to pay for a very expensive treatment for a specific patient whose life story the judge becomes aware of. The empathy and sympathy felt by the judge makes him/her quite often decide to rule in favour of a treatment that helps that particular person but cannot be made universal (because the state has no budget to offer that treatment to everyone). In this way, his/her decision is unfair.
On the other, it has to be mentioned that the excess of abstraction can promote indifference towards others. Maybe, if decisions in the social/public sphere are only based on rational reflections, the fact that the person who does not receive the treatment will die is simply disregarded. Exclusive rationality could make society blind to people’s real problems. In general, it can be claimed that it is only empathy towards the worst-off that makes elite individuals who rule the state act in order to create a more just society. For example, a white person who cannot imagine how it is to suffer racism, even not being racist, is hardly prone to support laws that effectively combat this situation if they do not develop empathy. This idea is aligned with Mills’ criticism of Rawls’ hypothetical contract defended in 3.8.

8.6. Competition in a cooperative system

The previous reflection about compassion maybe give the false impression that only desiring to help those in lower social positions is enough. However, as Rawls suggests, societies are “fair systems of cooperation over time” (1993, p.14). In this way, as developed in chapters 3 and 4, it is defended that reasonable people consider fair a system that reduces inequalities of opportunities by somehow balancing competition and cooperation. This balance is behind the hypothetical social contract, a contract amongst equally free individuals who understand that they have some responsibility towards their co-citizens (Nussbaum, 2006, p.25). Stability depends on this balance between equal liberty and communal responsibility. Thus, it is supposed that people possess the virtue of being cooperative, not only the desire for competing for obtaining scarce goods.

Even so, humans have not only a natural predisposition to compete (5.1), they take competition also as a right. In Western societies, people’s entrepreneurship and desire to improve their lives are seen as a virtue (Ferguson, 2011). It is consensual that people are free to seek after their own goods. Moreover, when they make effort to improve their lives, in a fair system which distributes part of people’s goods, they improve, as a side effect, the lives of the others. In this way, cooperating with others is not only good for the latter; competing with them in a fair system also is. Willingness to compete, supposing that the competition is fair, is, then, a virtue in welfare state societies, not only in neoliberal societies.

8.7. Fighting for justice
People’s feeling of compassion and willingness to balance cooperation and competition, however, is useless if they do not turn into action. In the private sphere, people help those whom they feel empathy and sympathy for or join in cooperative ventures. In the democratic sphere, the best way to do these things is through supporting and checking the state’s actions. This behaviour depends on engagement in public debates and elections. Regarding this, though citizens’ voice in democratic states is normally considered a right, participating in this decision process is also a duty towards co-citizens, since people are masters of the decisions that have impact upon the lives of all. Thus, a certain democratic behaviour is expected from everyone.

However, regarding many aspects, the democratic system produces decisions that are not just, and democratic processes sometimes seem inefficient to deal with this. In these moments, other instances of political engagement, like the involvement in demonstrations and even the practice of civil disobedience are defended as also being civic duties. Nevertheless, these fights for rights can stimulate people’s anger towards those who seem responsible for promoting injustices. Is anger, in these cases, a vice or a virtue? Does anger help to improve social justice?

From the beginning, it is important to distinguish anger felt at the personal level from political anger, the anger against institutions and individuals that rule society and promote injustices (White, 2012). It is the latter that is in question. Two different views are, then, compared. Nussbaum (2016) considers that people’s anger is counterproductive in order to promote unity and stability for the right reasons. This thesis is committed to the search for social stability. Thus, Nussbaum’s argument that sees anger as a vice is promising. Her reasoning associates anger with a retributive attitude that reinforces a social clash in which one side demonises the other (2016, p.207). Nussbaum mainly based on the way that Mandela led South Africa after the end of Apartheid, says:

Significantly, Mandela frames the entire question in forward-looking pragmatic terms, as a question of getting the other party to do what you want. He then shows that this task is much more feasible if you can get the other party to work with you rather than against you. Progress is impeded by the other party’s defensiveness and anxious self-protection. Anger, consequently, does nothing to move matters forward: it just increases the other party’s anxiety
and self-defensiveness. A gentle and cheerful approach, by contrast, can gradually weaken defenses until the whole idea of self-defense is given up. (2016, p.230)

It is important to reinforce that Nussbaum is not defending that wrongdoing should be simply forgiven. Nevertheless, she express that the development of societies depends on “forward-looking effort of reconciliation”, and that (cognitive) empathy towards those who harm, instead of feel anger towards them, is the best way to unite the whole society in this effort. (2016, p.238) Thus, though Nussbaum agrees that anger has evolutionary roots, she also says that it is partially cultivated. If this is true, societies could cultivate the opposite. In her view, “it seems simply inexcusable to tolerate and even encourage political and legal institutions that embrace and valorize the stupidity of the retributive spirit”, something that, in her view, is in the basis of anger feelings (206,p.249).

Srinivasan (2017), on the other hand, detaches anger from revenge, and identifies such a feeling as a form of appropriate communication for those that, otherwise, never have voice. In this way, she draws attention to the fact that those who defend that avoiding anger is a sign of a more rational and civilised way to lead public debates disregard that certain people are always excluded of the main decisions, and that expressing anger is the only way that they have to express themselves:

The question was whether such men should make themselves into a new kind of man, with the power of a civic ruler rather than a tribal warrior, but powerful nonetheless. […] Invoking the spectre of the raging Achilles, we condemn anger. But in so doing we neglect, as we have always neglected, those who were never allowed to be angry, the slaves and women who have the power of neither the state nor the sword. (2017, p.20)

In her view, these people have the right to feel anger, since forgiving or understanding the oppressors can be excessively demanding, even painful for them. In this way, Srinivasan claims that is wrong to expect that the “primary locus of responsibility for fixing the problem lies with the victim rather than the perpetrator” (2017,p.11). More than this, since she does not expect that the perpetrators of injustices start this process, she understands that expressing anger is a good way for the oppressed to start:
It is historically naïve, after all, to think that white America would have been willing to embrace King’s vision of a unified, post-racial nation, if not for the threat of Malcolm X’s angry defiance. It is perhaps similarly naïve to think anger contains no salutary psychic possibilities for someone whose self-conception has been shaped by degradation and hatred. (2017, p.4)

Regarding this two different points of view, this thesis defends that a certain type of feeling that make people fight for justice is an important civic virtue. As mentioned above, many times protesting is the only way to open a space for dialogue. However, against what Srinivasan says, solid historic changes in Western democracies seem to come from those who protested peacefully. King or Mandela probably felt angry, but they controlled it when they were in the public sphere doing politics. Obviously, it is expected that the dominant class has compassion towards the oppressed and put efforts to improve social justice. However, it is also expected that the oppressed protest, but that they also try to understand that, at the other side, there are people who can be partners in the process of building a better society for all. And anger does not seem the best attitude to establish this partnership.

8.8. Following rules

In 8.2, it is defended that people have to take seriously experts’ claims. In parallel, individuals have to respect other people’s reasonable opinions that go against what they think. When people are defeated in an election, it is obvious that they disagree with the result. However, though these people strongly disagree with the directions of the government’s decisions, they have to cooperate with this government without anger. Obviously, as explored above, protests are legitimate, but with some limits. At the end, it is fundamental to celebrate that people think differently – however, respecting certain limits – and from this a better society can be developed.

Thus, one of the characteristics of a good democratic behaviour is the willingness to respect what is decided democratically. If the process is fair and some legitimate limits of what can be voted upon are established, the laws and policies that result from this process are just. Given this, for democratic societies to work, all citizens have to develop their willingness to respect these laws and policies. Thus, the willingness of following rules is an important civic value, something related to Kohlberg’s (1971; 1976) stages of moral development (5.3).
However, since it is very difficult for people to completely reach the last Kohlberg’s stage of development, the conventional stage is seen by this thesis as a positive stage. In democratic regimes, accepting the rules is an attitude based on the autonomous trust on collective decisions. This has two main advantages. First, if the process is well executed, based on ideas presented in 3.7, there is a high chance that these decisions are right. Moreover, societies where people follow rules are more stable, something that favours the improvement of justice, as suggested in 2.6.

Nonetheless, this defence of the importance of following rules suffers several criticisms, mainly from those who see the societies as fundamentally unfair. In this, it is worth analysing Foucault’s criticisms against social norms. He, through different studies, defends that rules and institutions exist to normalise unfair relations, to keep the status quo in which some have power and others are dominated. Studying different genealogies of unfair power relations throughout history, he suggests, for example, that is not an aim of societies “to punish less but to punish better” (1979, p.76).

However, the present thesis disagrees with this. “Punishing better” is something good. Punishment is important. It is part of the lesson of the passage of the film The Ides of March quoted above: following rules is an important value in Western societies, since, regarding several subjects, these societies developed their civic values more than individuals’ biological capacity to follow them. As mentioned in 5.1, people are not born feeling the necessary commitments towards strangers. Thus, either by habituation/education, or by law, they have to be “indoctrinated” to do this. At least, at the beginning, the existence of laws helps individuals to develop “good” habits. Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1971; 1976) do not consider it wrong that part of the process of embodiment of rules happens in this way. Moreover, when rules are not embodied, in order to make possible societal life, law has to be imposed. Depending on how civic education is conducted, societies need to appeal more or less to the law in order to keep this organisation.

8.9. Engagement and celebration of difference behind civic duties

Individuals’ will to develop civic knowledge, skills and values depends on their acceptance that they belong to a state, an organisation where they have rights and duties. This acceptance
depends on the existence of certain social ties amongst them. The present section investigates these ties through reflecting on whether tolerating other people is enough or if engaging with unknown people and celebrating differences are also necessary attitudes.

Most current political philosophers, if not all, agree that tolerating other individuals is a duty of all citizens. Many of them go further and claim that, somehow, the state should stimulate people to get closer. From this view, people should not only tolerate but also engage themselves with unknown people and be encouraged to share some views with them. In 3.4, Rawls’ defence that individuals have to possess certain civic values that make them morally connected to co-citizens is endorsed, in opposition to Gauthier’s suggestion that no moral duty of individuals towards others should be demanded to anyone. In this way, though being a liberal rather than a communitarian, Rawls cannot escape from appealing to a sense of community in his theory. Given this, it seems fundamental to determine which civic values are needed to guarantee a fair society. Thus, at first, Galston and Macedo, thinkers who disagree about the extension of these values, have their ideas compared in order to clarify if only tolerance should be expected from citizens or if also engagement and celebration of difference should be stimulated.

Galston proposes a very limited intrusion of public policies into the private lives of individuals. He does not expect any sentimental involvement of individuals with other people’s problems, rather merely some consideration for their conditions as human beings. Based on Walzer’s suggestion that even tolerance is rare in our history (1999, p.xi.), Galston assumes that engagement is excessively optimistic. In this way, he proposes a struggle to develop a society based on the principle of tolerance, defined by him as the “refusal to use coercive state power to impose one’s view on others” (2002, p.126). In this sense, it seems that he supports the idea that a government should not interfere in the practices of any specific culture within its state.

Galston, for example, considers acceptable cultures which do not treat equally certain individuals who belong to them (homosexuals, women, etc.). To solve this problem, by assuming “the fact that we are born into certain groups to which we do not choose to belong”, Galston says that all individuals have to be guaranteed awareness of alternative’s lifestyles, assess to them, freedom from brainwashing and chances for leaving their social groups (2002,
In his words, “Securing this liberty will require affirmative state protections against oppression carried out by groups against their members” (2002, p.122-3).

Thus, Galston’s claims seem to be under a minimal consensus. However, there is a main problem that makes such claims incompatible with the limited theory proposed by him. It is impossible to make a society as a whole accepting of these policies without making individuals engage with co-citizens’ issues. For example, it is possible to suppose that, in a small community quite detached from the rest of the society, women are treated as inferior and have much less opportunities to project and implement their life plans. If there is not a social commitment amongst different groups, there is no reason why the rest of the society would care about the internal problems of that small group. The lack of proximity results in lack of knowledge and intimacy amongst groups. It makes the internal unjust inequalities in this small group almost impossible to be fixed by the state.

Individuals care about injustices towards oppressed people – and then feels responsibility in the process of building a legitimate society – only if all citizens feel somehow close to each other. Thus, going further than Galston’s narrow proposal, Macedo says that “a merely ‘tolerant’ community does not really stand out as one that is flourishing as a community. Liberal justice is compatible with forms of community and conditions of human character that fall below what could be considered ‘excellent’” (1990, p.266). He, then, defends that:

> [t]he allegiance of liberal justice in a diverse society should encourage attitudes of tolerance and sympathy among people who disagree. As we come to realize that those who engage in lives different from our own are nevertheless like us in important ways, we may come to sympathize not only with these persons but also with their projects and commitments, with choices different from our own, with careers and lifestyles not seriously considered before (Macedo, 1990, p.267).

Through this defence, Macedo focuses on the importance of stimulating people’s engagement with those that otherwise would not be close to them.

Engagement depends on the establishment of certain limits on private attachments. Necessarily, to some extent, self-interest and the importance of family, small community and friends have to be relegated to a second plan when compared to common good. There is no
doubt that, as discussed in 2.4, family attachments are one of the pillars of contemporary Western societies and there is a consensus that such special ties have to be protected. However, there are two main reasons, also based on shared consensus of Western individuals, to limit families’ and small communities’ special attachments. Firstly, it is a broader attachment that allows societies to build special conditions for stability, something that is in the interest of all. Moreover, as discussed in 4.3, Okin (1999) calls attention to the fact that it is exactly within the family that certain strong kinds of injustice are established. Her analysis examines gender inequality, however, this reasoning can be extended to other injustices against minorities within families and small associations.

In order to advance this reflection, it is important to observe that, though a kind of engagement is needed for developing communal ties, getting people closer is not an easy task. Individuals in plural societies differ from each other regarding several things: gender, race, social class, sexual orientation, faith, political position, cultural tastes, etc. Thus, how should the state act towards creating conditions for these different people living together? Should some differences be reduced? Should differences always be seen as something good and celebrated? Or should they be seen as inevitable and tolerated?

Firstly, it is fundamental to clarify the meaning of tolerance and celebration of difference, the main concepts involved in this reflection. The LGBT community usually demands positive attitudes of people towards lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people. They differentiate between people who only tolerate, from others who also accept and finally from those who celebrate different sexual orientations. These three very useful concepts, however, are barely found in academic papers about this subject. One exception is Riddle’s (1994) work, which proposed an even more sophisticated list of eight different attitudes towards the LGBT community: repulsion, pity, tolerance, acceptance, support, admiration, appreciation, and nurturance. This thesis defends that, more than tolerating and accepting, people should celebrate difference of sexual orientation. (The same idea can be expanded towards other groups, for example, ethnical minorities.)

Obviously, specifically this defence of celebration of different sexual orientations finds resistance in lots of conservative groups, mainly the religious ones. They are not willing to celebrate sexual orientations (for many of them, “options”) different from heterosexuality. They, at most, accept homosexuality. And the number of people with this behaviour is huge.
For example, in a 2012 opinion poll conducted in the US, 42% of people declared that they consider homosexuality immoral (BLOOM, 2013, p.143). On the other hand, there is no doubt that these numbers are decreasing and laws protecting LGBT rights are being multiplied in Western countries. However, is state protection of LGBT rights enough or should it cultivate on people the willing of celebrating such idea?

Regarding this specific point, given the fact that the lack of celebration of LGBT people invades the public sphere and implies lots of unfair inequalities (for example, LGBT people have more difficulties finding jobs, like black people in racist societies), proactive state actions are needed in order to stimulate celebration of plurality of sexual orientations, even if it goes against the beliefs of many people. It is a typical case in which the ideal has to pressure the real. This reflection touches on a central aspect of this thesis, and receives more attention in the conclusion.

However, it has to be done in a very mild way, since a radical attitude towards this can promote clashes in the family and in broader society. Part of this problem is associated with lack of knowledge of people in general, though the other part depends upon democratic decisions in which some groups will be defeated. For example, the allowance of LGBT people to get civil union or adopt children seems to be an immediate consequence of the constitutional right of equal treatment under the law; on the other hand, a hypothetical law obliging churches to celebrate same-sex marriage is something much more difficult to derive from the constitution, and, though it seems fair, the reactions against such decision could be more problematic than the eventual benefits from it.

Regarding this discussion of celebration of differences, in 6.3, it is presented a fundamental difference between how black people historically supported themselves in the US and in Brazil. In the US, the process of miscegenation has been much slower than in Brazil. On the one hand, this fact has made the American society much more racist and divided than the Brazilian one. On the other hand, American segregation had created a stronger sense of brotherhood/sisterhood amongst black people that make them have more conditions to fight for their rights and to celebrate their culture.

In Brazil, this process has been more fluid, the cultures are more mixed, but still black people are occupying the lower positions in society. The mobilisation of the black community, to a
high degree favoured by the democratisation of internet access and by the legal stimulus to
race self-identification that comes with affirmative action, however, is creating a space for
black people to develop this brotherhood/sisterhood atmosphere. Regarding this, it is
mentioned above in several different discussions that this thesis defends that social
integration should be cultivated, since it stimulates social responsibility. However, recovering
the partial defence of multicultural practices developed in 4.3, it can be understood that,
before such integration, people from oppressed groups need to feel pride in their origins in
order to participate in equal conditions of recognition in this process. Chapter 9 and the
conclusion return to this discussion.

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Chapter 8 represents the transition from a discussion about justice to a reflection on
citizenship education. It proposes a list of civic virtues that individuals should theoretically
possess to participate well in democratic processes. A list of seven civic virtues is, then,
presented: civic knowledge, critical thinking, cognitive empathy, compassion, willingness to
compete fairly, fighting for justice, following rules democratically created. From this, a
theoretical debate about ideal citizenship curriculum (chapter 9) and the observation on how
civic virtues are cultivated in Brazilian real curriculum can be developed (chapters 10 and
11).
9. Ideal theory of citizenship curriculum

Chapter 8 presents certain civic virtues that individuals have to possess in order to sustain just societies, based on what is discussed by the previous chapters. Related to this, the present chapter proposes an ideal theory of citizenship curriculum that is linked with the improvement of justice in Western societies, more specifically, in Brazil. This chapter, however, only develops an ideal proposal on this regard, being empirical observations achieved by chapters 9, 11 and 12. It, then, starts by (9.1) showing that, though Western citizenship values are roughly shared, different countries have distinct interpretations of them and this fact produces significant differences in their citizenship education projects. Next, it is shown that (9.2) neutrality in education does not exist. Then, (9.3) the importance of the family in this process is defended, but (9.4) the importance of formal citizenship education is also defended in order to balance the influences of the family, media, civil society over children and youngsters. From this, ideas on how schooling can and should work towards cultivating the civic virtues presented in chapter 8 are developed in the next sections. First the chapter investigates (9.5) how the state should manage, through a “supra” official citizenship curriculum, the whole school system – distribution of educational resources, parental intervention on what is taught, etc. Next, it is proposed (9.6) how a “wide” and (9.7) a “narrow” official citizenship curricula should be designed. Finally, (9.8) a debate between two powerful and partially opposed theories – critical thinking and critical pedagogy – on how dealing with citizenship curriculum is presented in order to make clearer the ideal pedagogical position towards citizenship education defended by this thesis. This chapter is, then, concluded by (9.9) anticipating, still from a theoretical perspective, some limitations regarding the implementation of citizenship curriculum.

9.1. Social justice and citizenship curriculum

Chapter 3 claims that there is a consensus within Western nations towards guaranteeing equal basic civil and political liberties and equality of opportunity for all individuals. Chapter 8 suggests that, more than through toleration, unknown co-citizens should be connected through stronger feelings like engagement with unknown others and celebrate their differences. This balance between public and private is, then, a real challenge.
This balance between private and public spheres resonates in the balance between the ideas of tolerance and engagement. Engagement is a much stronger attitude than tolerance. It is a practice towards connecting unknown people who do not have private ties. It is quite common that the lack of public connection between people increases their differences, something that, in turn, goes against this connection. As discussed in 8.9, there are two different, eventually complementary, ways of reinforcing this connection: by making people accept and celebrate the distinct others; or by reducing the visibility and salience of their differences in public sphere. Chapter 3 presents certain minimal state attitudes related to each practice. Chapter 4 goes further defending deeper policies towards such attitudes. Regarding this, two different Western social dynamics are usually presented as representing each of them: the English\footnote{English and not British curriculum is mentioned here, because there are differences between how education policies are implemented in the different nations that compose UK.} and the French approaches. This also has obvious implications to these countries’ citizenship curricula.

Levinson (1999), Osler and Starkey (2009), and some others appeal to the empirical analysis of English and French social organisations and curricula to present different approaches on how to promote tolerance, engagement and celebration of difference in civil society. These two countries are usually analysed, because they have quite opposite and paradigmatic ways to understand citizenship. While the former is much more focused on respecting/accepting (not necessarily celebrating) different cultural practices, the latter aims to foster a national unity (for some, “forced” engagement) around certain values\footnote{These models serve as paradigms for analytical development of this subject. Their realities are much more sophisticated than presented here. For example, the introduction, in 2010, of the cultivation of “British values” in English schools (discussed below), has moved the English curriculum towards French one.}.

These main differences impact in distinct ways that these two countries foster the idea of citizenship in general. This thesis, however, is interested in one specific practice of the state: formal education or schooling. Regarding this, the French model is seen as top-down, with cultivation of national symbols and values. The English model is (or used to be) bottom-up and “does not require either citizenship or citizenship education to be linked necessarily to nationality.” (Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.340)

Regarding this, citizenship education is something quite new in the English curriculum. It was only in 2002 that citizenship started making part of secondary schools curricula. In
France, on the other hand, such a subject is more than 130 years old (Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.336).

These two different views of unity have implications for how these educational systems foster cultural and socio-economic integration. In England, schools are extensions of communities where students are inserted (Levinson, 1999, p.111), while “[t]he basis of national education in France is initiation into a common culture through a single curriculum (Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.336), “the aim of the curriculum is to teach students to be ‘French’” (Levinson, 1999, p.123).

In this way, there are also differences with regard to what subjects and syllabuses are cultivated in schools. In England, citizenship as a subject is focused on civic knowledge and skills like, respectively, notions of laws and critical thinking more than on civic values (DfEE(S) & QCA, 1999). The focus is on political literacy, that is, on preparing “an active and politically-literate citizenry convinced that they can influence government and community affairs” (QCA, 1998, p. 9). In France, the civic education approach is completely different, since the values of freedom, equality, and solidarity and human rights are explicit central contents of such a subject (Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.336)94.

The comparison of these two systems is very useful to orientate the discussion of this chapter. However, since the present thesis is focused on Brazil, it is important to highlight some elements of Brazilian people’s notion of citizenship (developed in chapter 6 from a historical perspective) that do not conform to this dichotomy. First, the need to deal with different cultures – through accommodating them, in the case of England, and through inculcating some national values, in the case of France – is not a central problem in Brazil. While Brazil has significant regional differences, and historical ethnic diversity, these groups have been living together and mixing for a significant period of time. This process results in 97% of

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94 Related to this, it is interesting to observe how a proposal for introducing the cultivation of “British values” in schools suffered resistance amongst English schools’ communities. Though the values proposed (democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs (DfE, 2014, p.5)) are completely in accordance with Universal Human Rights, the mere reference to something that is “British” goes against a multicultural ethos, and was massively rejected by teachers and parents. This rejection has, however, an explanation based on how these ideas were put in to practice. Those who criticise this policy say that the requirement for schools to actively promote “fundamental British values” is part of the government’s strategy for countering radicalisation and extremism; a strategy that was developed not by educationalists or political philosophers concerned with democratic civic education, but by the Counter Extremism Division of the DfE staffed by the British Security Services.
people speaking Portuguese, no significant religious disputes, and so on (6.1). However, there are problems related to Brazil’s specific process of integration that have to be addressed and need development. These include but are not limited to issues concerning: a well-known huge socio-economic gap identified everywhere (6.4 and 6.5); the explosion, in the last 40 years, of Neo-Pentecostal churches which defend a very conservative agenda and have increased impact in public arena (6.5).

Regarding citizenship education, it is quite common that Brazilian people are suspicious about cultivation of civic virtues in schools, much more so than what happens in the countries quoted above. National symbols like the flag, the national anthem, and the cultivation of such “virtues”, for many people, are linked with a recent dictatorship (1964-1985). Thus, avant-garde people are usually afraid of the return of such situation. Since Brazil’s current democracy has now lasted thirty years, the fear of authoritarianism has significantly diminished, yet it is still common for communal ties to be widely seen as placing limitations on one’s civil liberties. On the opposite side, conservatives think that this civic education allows teachers (who are normally avant-garde and pro strong redistribution of wealth) to cultivate political ideas in students, something that, in their view, would not be the role of the school. The following chapters investigate in more detail laws and real practices towards citizenship education in Brazil in order to identify the realities linked with these things.

9.2. Non-neutrality: family, media, civil society and state formal education

As discussed in 5.1, Bloom (2013) claims that the roots of certain moral and civic virtues are partially the result of natural selection. However, even Bloom accepts that many characteristics of human behaviour are learned, that cultural patterns matter. Regarding this process of learning moral and civic virtues, psychology of education tries to define how much peoples’ civic ideas and behaviours are associated with their aging process. Kohlberg, amongst others, developed Piaget’s ideas in this way (5.3). However, apart from aging, different upbringings result in distinct civic ideas and behaviours.

Accepting the hypothesis that civic knowledge, skills and values are at least partially learned, it is suggested that neutral citizenship education is impossible, since people are not born with their morality already totally established and so must learn these virtues from somewhere. It is this human propensity for learning that makes different societies have distinct
characteristics and transmit culture in so many different ways. Civic virtues are part of what is passed through generations, just as scientific knowledge, aesthetic notions, ideas of what comes next after death, and so on, are passed on. Regarding this, the state, family, media, civil society, etc. are different influencers on people’s private and public morality.

In this way, normally those who ask for neutral civic education are asking for the state to be neutral regarding the cultivation of certain civic values, such as compassion. The supporters of neutrality in civic education are normally not against teaching civic knowledge and skills (chapter 8). However, neutrality means that, for them, the influence of family, media, civil society, etc. on young people’s values should not suffer any interference from the state. They understand that the state should not cultivate civic values through formal education, intervene in media, in civil society and family practices, etc. Specifically regarding formal education, they consider that teachers should not present any political statement.95 Extremists say that teachers should not even propose political debates. Reflecting on this defence of teachers’ neutrality, two questions arise: Is it possible? Is it desirable? In 9.8, this issue is discussed.

Illich (1971), amongst others, defends “deschooling society”. In this case, without the existence of the school as institution it would not make sense to imagine moral values being taught through formal education. Alternatively, if the school exists, the school structure fatally inculcates minimal civic “values” on students. Students learn at school that they have to follow certain rules – that they are not completely free to do anything they want. However, defenders of neutrality in citizenship education could say that these minimal civic values are necessary, even though they have to be aligned with parents’ wishes, rather than with a specific state’s moral and political view. Schools, in this way, should be the image of parents’ ideas, rather than something that orients a project of nation.

Nevertheless, without any type of proactive intervention of the state, values cultivated by families and private institutions, such as church communities, can cultivate certain characters in youth that make them disrespect current Western values and promote instability. It is not unreasonable to suppose that youth who have their lives restricted to their families and small communities will usually develop concerns only towards close people, and can become even intolerant to different ones. A society composed by this type of individuals is, invariably,

95 Proposals like the Brazilian group “School Without Party” (Escola Sem Partido – http://www.programaescolasempartido.org/) defend exactly this point.
conflictive. Obviously, such a society can exist and even survive, but not in a stable (for the right reasons) mode. As defended in chapters 3 and 4, some communal spirit and equality of opportunities are necessary for a healthy community to survive.

This does not mean that the connection between parents and strict communities has to be nullified. Brighouse and Swift (2013), for example, defend that “family values” can be adequately respected and promoted without granting parents the right either to entirely determine the content of their children’s education or to confer advantage on them in ways that undermine equality of opportunity. For example, certain cultural traditions and affections that develop strong ties between parents and children do not need to disappear.

9.3. The importance of the family

Following these ideas, the English model does not defend teachers’ and schools’ neutrality towards civic values, though strong national unity is not stimulated. In the English and French models, stability is aimed for, and, in lower or higher levels, not only tolerance but engagement and celebration of difference within the nation are defended through active schools’ and teachers’ practices. Chapter 3 defends that Rawls’ hypothetical contract based on moral individuals is superior to Gauthier’s neo-Hobbesian proposal. Moreover, the argument presented in 8.9 endorses Macedo’s defence of engagement and LGBT-based arguments towards celebration of difference, since for Galston education for tolerance is shown to be insufficient. In the following sections, possibilities and limits for the implementation of such educational policies, that is, reflections on levels of non-neutrality, are discussed.

This reflection on how to cultivate values in schools depends on a more careful analysis of relationships within the private sphere. There is no doubt that the nuclear family is the first place where love and affection are cultivated, even though plenty of families do exactly the opposite, unfortunately. The ties between parents and their children (and between other relatives) can be explained biologically and culturally (5.1). Independently of the reasons for the establishment of these strong bonds, it seems obvious that developing love and affection is something good, and it is unlikely that a social format different from the one based on the nuclear family would be more effective for developing these feelings. Moreover, though Plato’s suggestion in The Republic to split parents from their children in order to build a more
united society can be theoretically defended, this social structure would hardly be accepted currently, since family ties are one of the main pillars of Western societies (Munoz-Darde, 1999).

Apart from love and affection, families are important starting points for socialisation. Even when parents try to impose certain “truths” for their children and keep them quite isolated from the broader society, children are at least inserted in small communities, and this narrow contact is enough to help them to learn certain civic skills and values (Levinson, 1999, p.57).

The existence and encouragement of familiar organisations has another reason. It is possible to imagine a society – like that proposed by Plato in *The Republic* – in which children are taken by their parents and raised by the state. Apart from this lack of parental love, which maybe could be replaced by the love of the carers or mates, such an organisation would standardise the way that children understand civic values. An evident lack of plurality would be the result of this. In this sense, in order to enrich the moral spectrum of the society, it is important that children are raised by different parents with reasonable distinct moral views, rather than by civil servants with the mission of cultivate specific “virtues” on them. This argument is associated with Mill’s idea of the importance of liberty of thought in order to achieve progress (Levinson, 1999, p.66).

### 9.4. School as a complement to the influence of the family, community and media

However, excesses of private relationships jeopardise children’s civic values. They can orient children’s affections only towards their relatives and damage the development of compassion towards strangers. Schooling, further democratic participation and exposition to others through media and civil organisations balance these things.

Certainly, the most important virtues learned by children outside the family is the notion that they have rights and duties towards unknown people, something intimately related, as defended in chapter 8, to compassion towards them. This sense of collectiveness is barely developed within the family. Small communities can serve as midpoints as presented above, but they cultivate values not necessarily shared by a wider spectrum. Thus, the school – if it is minimally plural and has some common practices oriented by the state (common school) – is the first environment where children are obliged to build relationships with (at the
beginning) strangers, and to accept sharing spaces with people that they do not have affinity. Above, it is mentioned that it is important that families with different views of the world raise their children in quite different ways, otherwise, children’s education would be excessively standardised. However, this is only positive if all children are exposed to different world views, and school is much better than family and small communities to provide this.

Media can also be an interesting channel for exposing children to different people and plural ideas, though, as explored in chapter 6, in countries like Brazil, it frequently does not happen. National and international channels show realities and problems which happen far from the local realities of people. Thus, people can feel empathy and compassion for these distant fellow citizens, though certain thinkers, such as Sontag (1977), defend that this exposure can promote compassion fatigue. Moreover, free media reach children who, otherwise, would be strongly influenced or pressured by their parents or even by school colleagues in order to think like them. Imagine the liberating power of the existence of TV discussions about sexual orientation and social medias which put into contact young people who do not conform to a conservative pattern of sexuality.

Associated with this idea of exposition to diversity, are the ideas that both cooperation and also competition are constitutive parts of Western ethos (chapter 2). Family can be the first locus for developing these values, however not the best one. Celebration of difference, willingness to compete but also to cooperate are public values associated with people’s interactions that are not based on love or affection. Individuals help their children or partners, because they love each other, rather than, because they feel a sense of cooperative enterprise. It is not being said that individuals’ cooperation with unknown people should be based on mutual self-interest, but it would be too much to expect that cooperation should be based only on love or strong affection. At the same time, compassion towards unknown co-citizens makes people willing to share part of their surplus with strangers (through paying taxes, for example).

In the same way, in capitalist societies, it is outside the family bubble that real – and, many times, unfair – competitions occur. School, in this way, has to educate for competition, however for a competition that helps societies to progress but does not promote unfair inequalities. Thus, it is further discussed how schools should balance these two values and how they should be associated with the sense of collectiveness.
This thesis does not deeply reflect on the participation of family, media, and civil organisations in citizenship education. However, since these institutions can reinforce but also damage the development of civic values, and since school eventually has to counterbalance them, it is important to identify the family’s, media’s, and civil organisations’ main possible negative impacts. First, as mentioned above, the excessive influence of family over children can promote three main damages. The development of family love and affection can be exaggerated and children can lose their capacity for feeling compassion for unknown people. This possibility is linked with another even worst problem, individuals’ lack of respect for cultures that are different from the cultures supported by their families. These two problems make social cohesion and stability very difficult. Finally, such exaggerated influence of the family over children can oppress the latter independence of thinking and acting. A typical example is about a homosexual who are born within a very conservative family and would suffer if his/her life are limited to that environment.

Media can also have very bad influences on the development of people civic knowledge, skills and values. Mass media, if not regulated and balanced, can brainwash people. If, a “healthy” mass media can be a way to spread plural values, “unhealthy” media can be a vehicle of indoctrination. Additionally, the new phenomenon of social media is making exchange of information more democratic. Because of this, new sources of information are being produced and, where it exists, the private monopoly of communication seems to be “informally damaged”. Moreover, people who do not follow the pattern of behaviour of the main society and used to have difficulties of finding their peers (for example, homosexuals) are now using social medias to do this, and, as a consequence, in this case, social media is helping to empower them.

However, social media is far from being perfect. More and more, social networks like Facebook are realising that “consumers” “prefer” being connected with people who share their ideas. The fact that people are basically only dialoguing with their peers has stimulated political polarisation (Ferguson, 2017). Moreover, the anonymity (or at least the lack of real personal contact) allowed for these devices stimulates hatred instead of pacific dialogue amongst those who disagree. Finally, lack of responsibility in producing news is producing a strong new phenomenon of fake news (8.2). Polarisation, lack of dialogue and fake news are strong components of unstable societies and have to be reduced as much as possible.
Given the discussion above, this thesis agrees with Lipman’s claim that school is an institution between private and public, between family and state (2003, p.9). However, there are strong pedagogical disagreements about the role of school in individuals’ transition from family protection to integration in public life. As seen below, some scholars defend a “more natural” process of socialisation, others see the school as the key-agent of this. Some think that schools should basically cultivate civic knowledge and skills, like knowledge of laws and critical thinking, whilst others think that schools also should cultivate values like compassion towards unknown people.

Roughly speaking, the former are more aligned with the English model presented in 9.1 the latter with the French one. Regarding this disagreement on how to prepare future citizens, the two models consider formal education (schooling) as something important. However, while the English model gives also important room for family and community in this educative process, the French model defends schools’ environment from practices within families and communities, and-orients the education for preparing citizens to act in the public sphere. French schools are closer to the idea of common schools. For this reason, schools have a more active participation in citizenship education in France than in England. Indeed, these two different practices are anchored in two distinct theoretical references. Some thinkers (Galston, 1991; McLaughlin, 1984; Alexander, 2015) defend state’s openness for various types of school, including faith schools. Others (Macedo, 1990; 2000; Guttman, 1987; Callan, 1997; Levinson, 1999) defend certain common project of school for everyone.

In this chapter, a proposal between the English and French models is defended, mainly because such an intermediary approach seems to be a more consensual way to foster citizenship curriculum without facing excessive resistance from different parts of society. Thus, the discussions presented in 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7 propose how to teach/cultivate knowledge, skills and values through formal education in order to balance the influences of family/community and school/teachers over children.

9.5. How supra official curriculum should be designed

In order to reflect on different levels of citizenship curriculum, it is important to realise that parents’ rights over their children are limited by the rights of the latter and the rights of other
individuals. This section explores exactly this point and supports the idea that of common schools, schools in which the state defines the main curricular orientations and are basically equal in quality, should be provided for all. It is quite obvious that children are neither the property of their parents, nor of the state. It is also quite obvious that they have rights that have to be respected by all. This fact does not mean, however, that they are completely free from their parents’ or state’s decisions about their lives. As Levinson says:

Paternalism and limitations on the child’s freedom are required to foster the development of her autonomy, it is true; they are also required to inculcate in her a restricted, heteronomous conception of the good. The child is inevitably treated paternalistically, by her parents, the state, concerned adult friends and relatives, teachers, doctors, and so forth (1999, p.47).

In this way, thinkers such as Galston (1991) suggest that it is the duty and the right of parents to exercise this paternalism over their children. He is not afraid of children being brainwashed since “the basic features of liberal society make it virtually impossible for parents to seal their children off from knowledge of other ways of life” (1991, p.255). However, current massive offer of information is not enough. In this world full of information, children need certain guidance that does not come from the family (LEVINSON, 1999, p.94-5).

Nevertheless, even whilst considering the state’s interference fundamental, Levinson equally claims that the existence of special affection between parents and children “offers children essential emotional support and sustenance” and “inspires parents to further their children’s interests more than other agents would, by giving them greater insight into their children’s needs and greater forbearance and understanding when their children fail to live up to certain ideals” (1999, p.55-6). Going further, she also supports that families need a space of independence from the imposition of cultural values from the state by saying that “only the family whose integrity is respected is able (in conjunction with other secondary institutions) to provide children the cultural coherence that constitutes one of the essential preconditions for autonomy” (1999, p.56). Following Levinson, this thesis agrees with the balance between the family’s and the state’s influences over children to guarantee their best interest.

The previous topic claims that is not for the best interest of children to have exclusive influence of parents in their upbringing. Here, it is defended that, for reasons which go
beyond children’s best interest, the state has to participate in the upbringing of children. In this sense, common schools are defended. The first reasoning in favour of this is aligned with the idea that more than tolerance, engagement amongst unknown people and celebration of difference are fundamental for stability and refinement of justice in Western societies.

It is presented in 8.9 that Galston (1991) does not think that any state’s procedure towards cultivating more than tolerance is justifiable. He considers that, if parents’ and communities’ rights to sustain their cultures are guaranteed, stability based on tolerance is achieved. Thus, he is a critical of common schools. However, it is developed in 3.4 that, in situations of constant disrespect of minorities, such stability is only circumspectual and based on wrong reasons. In this sense, more engagement and celebration of differences are necessary.

Differentiating himself from Galston, Alexander (2015) is aware of this problem, but tries to find educational solutions without appealing for the model of common schools. Following McLaughlin (1984), he proposes to cultivate more than tolerance in young people. He, however, suggests openness to different beliefs and cultures in a much milder way than what is proposed by supporters of common school. Alexander defends that children’s moral and civic learning has to be structured over the values of the community where they are inserted, since “there are no grounds upon which to base these decisions and responsibilities outside of the traditions of conscience that foster human agency” (2015, p.138).

Regarding this point, Alexander, through proposing a “pedagogy of difference”, supports the idea that different cultures should teach their own values, while opening themselves to other traditions and respecting differences. However, through this, Alexander’s project admits that faith schools cultivate certain elements of religious doctrines that work against engagement and celebration of differences. He says that “Catholic students whose faith tradition does not sanction homosexuality should learn civic respect for [LGBT] people [...] but without undermining respect for their non-public religious inheritance” (2015, p.214). Thus, Alexander endorses the right of distinct cultures (in this example, Catholic culture) to educate their members for, in its non-public domain, distinguishing people based on (in this case) their sexual orientations.

However, “[t]his seems patently to violate the public–private distinction central to political liberalism” (Levinson, 1999, p.121). Exactly in order to challenge these types of practices,
thinkers like Levinson (1999) and Callan (1997) defend that school is the adequate place to integrate people and to reduce these non-public borders. As explored in 2.4, familiar ties are considered essential values for Western people. It is also defended that Christian doctrine is one of the pillars of Western societies. However, balanced by Roman legalism and Greek rationalism, it is equally supported that a secular ethos integrated with communal responsibilities produced, in a broad sense, an idea of equal liberty shared by Western individuals. Based on these ideas, Macedo (1990) defends that social cohesion depends on the cultivation of values that surpass the promotion of local communities’ and family’ values and tolerance among them (8.9). Engagement and celebration of differences are fundamental for this.

In this way, though Alexander (2015) aims to guarantee a healthy democracy through his proposal, his defence of splitting public and private domains seems naive, since it does not work in practice. For example, supposing that Catholics learn in schools that they cannot vote against same-sex unions, since such unions are part of public domain. However, if the Church cultivates that homosexual practices are wrong, they will respect homosexuals in public, but, at the same time, will disfavour (sometimes unconsciously) them in private, for example, in a job selection or will not be as friendly (again, sometimes unconsciously) with them in a simple conversation.

In summary, it is much more difficult to split private and public spheres in everyday life than Alexander suggests. Because of this, schools have to work towards creating healthy interactions amongst different social groups. In order words, schools are the right places to, slowly, mix private and public domains, private and public understanding of what is right and wrong. In this way, Callan sees the school as the place for challenging ideas learned at home:

[Future citizens] must become critically attuned to the wide range of reasonable political disagreement within the society they inhabit and to the troubling gap between reasonable agreement and the whole moral truth. This will require serious imaginative engagement with rival views about good and evil, right and wrong. […] The moral authority of the family and the various associations in which the child grows up must be questioned to the extent that the society contains reasonable alternatives to whatever that authority prescribes. (Callan, 1997, p.40)
Regarding this point, a conflict has to be resolved. On the one hand, as Callan puts it, schools ruled by the family’s/community’s values can dismiss children’s engagement with other cultural values. On the other, common schools can distance children from their parents. This thesis considers the first problem more serious, since parents and children have lots of other spaces for living together and building their ties. Moreover, as suggested above, completely intolerant parents have to be challenged and eventually it is better for children to be far from them. In this way, as defended by Gutmann (1987, p.41-47) parents and the state have to share the authority of cultivating moral and civic values in children. Thus, common schools counter-balance parents’ influence in their homes.

In 9.4, the common school model is defended by arguing that it is not in children’s best interest to be educated in community schools, and that engagement and celebration of difference are above children’s individual rights to be protected by their parents. However, common schools are challenged by a different problem. There is a risk that formal education promoted by common schools reduces social positive diversity. Two scenarios, totalitarianism and “sameness”, can be presented (Levinson, 1999, p.65-74). First, the common school model can be a very important vehicle for implementing or sustaining totalitarian regimes. It is not by chance that dictatorships usually have a unified educational system with strong cultivation of nationalistic values. As explored in 10.1, Brazil is one of many examples where societies have reinforced a unified programme of citizenship education as part of its totalitarian era. Nevertheless, the democratic atmosphere in Western countries makes this thesis defend that the advantages of common schools overcome the potential risk of them serving the interests of totalitarian countries, something considered very unlikely to happen.

Even assuming that many Western societies have low risk of becoming dictatorships, there is another problem with this standardised educational model. The lack of parents’ liberty for raising their children and, consequently, the reduction of the plurality of ideas within the nation. In other words, through limiting different types of schools, the plurality of scientific, aesthetic, moral and civic ideas which could produce different solutions for many social problems is reduced. However, this thesis considers that the influence of parents/community over children is very strong even when their schools have a standardised curriculum. Thus, the continuity of plurality of ideas in society is guaranteed in a system in which only common schools exist.
Nevertheless, it is very important to say that these common schools have to have special concerns to protect minorities. Of course, the mere fact that these schools are naturally plural promotes plurality and less prejudice. Even though minority groups like black, poor, women, the LGBT community, special needs people, people who do not follow beauty patterns\(^96\), and so on are still target of many types of prejudices. Schools have to actively not only protect these minorities but also educate the rest of the students to celebrate instead of bullying those different from them. Common schools that promote plural activities (such as valuing different artistic talents, their social engagement, etc.), instead of only promoting one type of activity that represents students’ success (like obtaining good grades), can also limit students’ feelings of inferiority. Through this plurality, they have several options to be productive and feel useful. This is another way to reduce bullying in schools and integrate students by affinities. These attitudes, however, should be part of schools’ wide and narrow official curricula discussed in 9.5 and 9.6.

Finally, regarding how the school system should be organised in order to help the promotion of civic values, the equalisation of the school choice process has to be discussed. Western countries like France, Germany, Japan, and Denmark have strong state schooling systems and “[p]rivate schooling in these countries is thus perceived as being less prestigious than, or at best equally prestigious to, state schooling” (Levinson, 1999, p.163). In contrast, some developed countries and also most underdeveloped countries have very unequal systems. “Private schools in the US and Britain draw about 10 per cent of the school-age population and are generally perceived as elite institutions that are presumptively better than local state schools” (Levinson, 1999, p.163\(^97\)). In Brazil, 17% of students are in private schools\(^98\)\(^99\) and there is huge quality gap between these private schools and state schools (and amongst private schools), as discussed in 11.2.

\(^{96}\) Prejudices against those who do not follow beauty patterns are usually ignored. However, this is a real problem mainly amongst the youth (11.3).
\(^{97}\) These data are from 1999, but these situations do not seem to change significantly.
Given this, either governments of countries like the US, UK and Brazil simply admit that they do not promote anything similar to equality of opportunities and continuing sending such message through their educational systems, or they reform their systems. There is a great chance of this reform reducing the existing social cleavage and promoting more stability. Obviously, this process demands good strategies, which might not necessarily be the same as those applied in France, Germany, Japan, or Denmark. One of these main strategies is to actively mix students, avoiding that schools located in rich neighbourhoods have only local students.

As an additional effect, if students perceive that their educational system promotes equality of opportunities (or, at least, reduces the inequalities), they also perceive that they have to work hard to obtain good positions in the future. However, if the system does not promote equality of opportunities, the unprivileged students know that they do not have a chance of success, and the privileged ones know that they do not have to make much effort to be successful. Obviously, this equality has to be balanced by different offers of life choices. Through this, students with different interests focus their effort on something that they can achieve better and with more pleasure.

9.6. How the wide official curriculum should be designed

Besides educational policies, school organisational structure (wide official curriculum) can help or hinder the citizenship learning process. The school organisation has impact upon the teaching-learning process of all subjects. For example, depending on how students are evaluated, they are more or less stimulated to memorise, build reasoning, practice what they learned, etc. The impact of school organisation over civic knowledge, skills and values, however, is even higher than over other subjects. Schools are constituted by rules and, in certain degrees, are linked with the communities around them. The ways that these two elements are managed by the schools’ administration body impacts significantly upon students’ development of citizenship. They learn about processes of decision-making and develop social relations with the known and unknown fellows.

The first way to develop civic knowledge, skills and values through school practices is making students participate in the school’s creation and implementation of their rules. As mentioned above, schools play a fundamental role in the transition from family to public life.
For several reasons, families (mainly when children are young) are non-democratic places. Whilst parents decide things, they can be susceptible to, amongst other things, accepting emotional blackmail of their children. Likewise, children follow their parents – though, many times, equally amongst other things, only after being threatened. Western public life is largely democratic. Regarding this difference, school is (or should be) a place in between family and public life. Not all students’ wishes should be followed, since they are not mature enough for taking all the decisions about how their learning process should be. However, for two reasons, they should be truly listened to.

First, school is the best place for youth to start developing democratic knowledge, skills and values, something presented above as a central concern in the French educational model. As suggested in chapter 8, democracy actually demands that citizens possess certain manners. They have to defend their ideas appealing to reason, but, at the same time, understanding, as discussed in 2.6, that Western societies are plural and different people can have good reasons for disagreeing with them. People can identify through reasoning that their opponents are wrong but, in many cases, the former have to accept that this is part of the latter’s burdens of judgment (Rawls, 1993). Having accepted this reasonable pluralism (Rawls, 1993), they also accept dissensus and defeats in democratic disputes. Thus, practices of democracy in schools which make students real decision-makers on certain subjects help the development of deliberative procedures – the capacity of being clear and making an effort to listen and understand others’ ideas – and respect for majorities’ decisions, that is, respecting fair rules. Moreover, through practicing democratic processes, students likely develop the wish to be a part of democratic regimes. Associated with this, they learn that, in democratic processes, they have to fight for their rights.

Regarding this discussion on cultivating youth willingness to respect fair rules and fight for rights, it is important to briefly reflect on how to deal with their feeling of anger. In 8.7, it is defended that political anger undermines social stability, something fundamental for justice being promoted. Interestingly, even White (2012), who considers political anger a virtue (against Nussbaum’s (2016) and this thesis’ understanding), says:

[C]hildren in school will not need to be encouraged to feel anger. When things they have been encouraged to care about – fair treatment, the rule of law, human rights – are threatened, they will feel it. (2012, p.9)
On the other hand, she says that “[c]ivic education should also contribute to understanding anger in the democratic process” (2012, p.10). This claim is important, since a central point that sustains this thesis’ argument is that, in a debate or in a social dispute, the other side has to be understood.

Going in a different direction, it is important to say that listening to students has another side effect: their opinions are useful for improving school practices. Regarding specifically citizenship education, it is valuable since the participation of students in decisions develops their sense of belonging to a cooperative venture, the school. This is connected with Dewey’s (1915) and Piaget’s (1930) ideas of learning by doing. Some strategies are very important for this. First, producing very clear rules and publicising their reasons. In this sense, a reduced number of rules is much more efficient. For example, legislating about hats, and, even worse, forbidding them without a reasonable explanation can produce these negative effects of imposed rules (Vinha, 2017). Second, as far as possible, students’ opinions should be heard. For example, participatory counsels, classes’ and schools’ regular assemblies are good mechanisms. Related to this, Puig (2003) defends stimulus to assemblies instead of authoritarianism or coercion in order to, through repetition, crystallise democratic values.

Moreover, certain room for discussions about subject content should be institutionalised. For example, some mathematics classes should be used to reflect on the importance (or not) of learning certain contents: logarithms, geometry, etc. In this process, teachers’ opinions should be considered more important, since they are specialists, however students should also have voice. The opposite is “a teacher who justifies a course of study to her students in terms of a state mandate or her own expertise and takes this justification to be final and sufficient. Secure in her justification, she can fail to take seriously her students’ criticisms of her decisions” (Laden, 2013, p.67). Avoiding this imposition, not only students but equally teachers would train their capacity for deliberation, and, at the same time, the importance of specialists/experts opinions would be reinforced (disregard to experts’ opinions is a current problem discussed in chapters 4 and 8).

Through this, it is possible to imagine that, at the end of the debate on the importance of teaching logarithms, the only reason for such classes is preparation for national exams. This conclusion would eventually put teachers and students in the same side on questioning the
purposes of these exams. Of course, these discussions can also generate conflicts. However, democratic environments are naturally conflictive – differently from dictatorships in which conflicts are repressed – and conflicts are “natural in any relation and necessary for the development of the child and the young” (Vinha, 2017, 17-8).

This defence of introducing democratic practices in schools has to be at least balanced by Peters’ (1974) view. He presents an apparent paradox of moral education: in order to guarantee that individuals think freely in the future, their liberty has to be limited in school. This attitude is even related to the safety and health of children. For lack of knowledge and/or imprudence, children often put themselves at risk, and it is the school’s and parents’ duty to watch over them.

The two models of teaching/cultivating citizenship presented in 9.1 are, somehow, oriented to these two ideas on how to deal with democracy in schools. If the French model presents a clear focus on developing democratic practices within the school, the English model emphasises another important structural element of the school in order to develop citizenship knowledge, skills and values: openness for the surrounding community. As discussed above, these two countries have opposite school practices towards promoting engagement and celebration of difference. France tries to cultivate national values in all students, while England is more concerned with creating strong ties between students and their communities. This thesis, agreeing with a middle ground in between republican (France) and multicultural (England) ideas, considers that the school has to be completely open to its surrounding community and that students have to be stimulated to engage with it as long as such an engagement is useful for a wider engagement in the future (Arthur & Wright, 2001, 86-7). On the other hand, schools have to be aware of communities’ oppression over members that not follow certain patterns of behaviour. For example, schools should encourage sexual diversity (celebrate difference) instead of simply accepting the impositions of certain communities’ practices.

After presenting the importance of students’ participation on the process of creating and implementing school rules and of schools’ insertion in the community to citizenship education, it is interesting to present an idea of how to develop in students a sense of cooperation and healthy competition. As a good example of cultivating cooperative values, Benjamin describes the routine of Japanese schools in which better students help the slower
ones, almost all activities are in groups, including competitions that are won or lost by everyone (Benjamin, 1997. Apud. Levinson, 1999, p.90). Analysing US and UK schools, Levinson identifies the opposite, and says that, in these countries, teachers “do use cooperative learning techniques, [but] they usually do so to help students develop group-work skills, not to teach collective responsibility” (1999, p.90).

This comparison of two different systems shows one type of school’s system focused only on individual achievement which stimulates excessive competition and individualism, and another focused on balancing cooperation and competition which prepares students for capitalist societies, but, at the same time, develops communal values. No doubt, the extremely capitalistic world outside the school teaches enough (even excessive) skills and values linked with competition. Thus, it is reasonable to think that the school has to counterbalance this in order to make social stability possible.

9.7. How narrow official curriculum should be designed

Finally, after reflecting on some unusual ways to understand the curriculum, it is a moment for a brief discussion on how the narrow official curriculum should approach civic issues. Regarding this, it is possible to start reflecting on the need or not for a specific subject. This thesis considers that a subject like civic education would be very useful and, at least in secondary schools, would establish deep theoretical discussions on certain themes related to citizenship that are fundamental. Theoretical reflections on the meanings of certain concepts, such as “liberty” and “equality”, have to be more discussed than they usually are. Spending more time with these discussions can bring positive spill-over effects. Reflections on moral and political issues normally mobilise students and can be used as bridges for developing their interest in other subjects. In history, it is possible to talk about slavery and the development of equal rights; in literature, to stimulate empathy through reading good books; in geography, to identify zones of poverty nearby schools; in languages, to develop text analysis skills; in mathematics, teaching logical skills; in biology, to compare humans’ and other animals’ behaviours. There are many other opportunities that could be identified within existing subjects to discuss issues of citizenship and develop civic skills as well as knowledge.
However, though citizenship can be introduced within other subjects, diluting citizenship contents amongst them without an effective strategy seems ineffective, as the observations presented in chapter 11 show. If teachers do not have an idea of the aims of such discussions, it is very difficult for them to deal with these things. For this reason, a subject lead by a teacher with knowledge of how to integrate these reflections is needed. Sociology and philosophy teachers seem to present this characteristic.

Social practices that make students experience social realities, instead of only learning them theoretically, are equally essential. As moral and political discussions make the development of traditional subjects more interesting, social activities give concreteness to theoretical reflections and make their learning more effective. This point is closely related to Dewey’s and Piaget’s proposals of “learning by doing” mentioned also in 9.6. In psychological treatments normally against depression, the technique of “act as if” is used. Thus, for example, stimulating students to care more about the environment, even if at the beginning they do this because they expect a good grade, is a good way to involve them with these issues.

Following this idea, if the aim is developing critical thinking, debating groups (or even contests) seem very effective. The same can be said for learning laws through visiting the legislative house and talking with MPs, or – and maybe the most important – opening the school to the problems of the community, raising awareness in students, through the contact with real problems, to the need for engagement, celebration of difference and so forth.

Thus, an open ethos has to be developed in schools and practical mechanisms ought to be built. This is an attribution of “wide official curriculum”. In this way, schools have to establish several different connections with civil society in order to find the right places for implementing such activities. However, the “narrow official curriculum” is also useful, since activities like these ones quoted above can be inserted in mandatory subjects and can be part of the process of students’ evaluation. The discussions presented below are useful to develop these ideas.

This section, among other things, reflects on the Aristotelian idea presented in *Nicomachean Ethics* of learning the cultural civic virtues by living/experiencing these virtues (habit), and the fact that this process happens in different stages, as proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg.
(chapters 5 and 8). In this way, this thesis only suggests that, before adolescence, children have to experience communal life and differences, learn that they have to respect rules, etc. Only from early adolescence, when their capacity for abstraction starts being developed (as deeply studied by Piaget (1930), critical thinking, in its more structured way, and an introduction to democratic practices have to be cultivated. Only after students develop the capacity for thinking by themselves, can they start discussions on deep political ideas and democratic practices (Levinson, 1999, p.95).

Levinson, then, suggests which subjects are more appropriate for each age:

[T]he school might help children to develop community awareness, creativity, and basic writing and listening skills in lower grades, and critical thinking, advanced writing skills, political awareness, and independence in upper grades. (1999, p.144-5)

This reduces the criticisms from certain sectors of society that accuse many teachers of trying to brainwash students, since it is being proposed that only those who can form their own political ideas should be exposed to deep political debates. Obviously, all this discussion demands much more reflection – maybe a full thesis – but the idea here is only to introduce the subject. (Regarding the concerns with brainwashing, 9.8 develops this point a bit more.)

Having presented these initial reflections, it is possible to identify a list of civic knowledge, skills and values that are appropriate to develop in the classroom through the narrow official curriculum, and how this might be achieved. Regarding this point, it is important to reinforce that the present thesis is specifically focused on secondary schools’ formal education.

Thus, this reflection starts by analysing how critical thinking should be developed in youth. Among all civic skills, it is probably the most important one. As Fisher says:

In recent years ‘critical thinking’ has become something of a ‘buzz word’ in educational circles. For many reasons, educators have become very interested in teaching ‘thinking skills’ of various kinds in contrast with teaching information and content. (2001, p.1)

Obviously, this skill is not only important for the purpose of preparing a good citizen, and it is commonly invoked in contemporary discussions of employability and twentieth century
skills. Critical thinking helps the learning process in general and the development of this capacity to connect ideas in a logical sequence allows students to understand more sophisticatedly relations between means and ends, and to project their life plans not only in short- but also in middle- and long-terms. It is part of so called process of “learning how to learn” that is related to the process of identifying trustworthy information amongst endless options. Specifically related to civic skills, critical thinking helps the development of a qualified opinion of the direction in which societies should go. In 9.8, critical thinking is compared with critical pedagogy in order to make this concept even clearer. Here, some ideas of how to develop this skill through formal education are suggested. In his book on this subject, Fisher develops fundamental skills associated with how critical thinking can be taught in schools:

- identify the elements in a reasoned case, especially reasons and conclusions;
- identify and evaluate assumptions;
- clarify and interpret expressions and ideas;
- judge the acceptability, especially the credibility, of claims;
- evaluate arguments of different kinds;
- analyse, evaluate and produce explanations;
- analyse, evaluate and make decisions;
- draw inferences;
- produce arguments. (2001, p.8)

Regarding these things, it is quite obvious that such skills could be developed for any subject. For example, an algebra account used in physics, at the end, is an argument. Actually, mathematics can be a great ally for developing critical thinking skills. From mathematical knowledge, certain logic skills can be easily developed. A proper course of logics, either inserted in mathematics, or as a special subject is very useful. However, as Fisher (1988) discusses, it is very problematic to detach the process of teaching formal logics to the real analysis of everyday life arguments. Thus, through an articulated work with languages and literature, this process can be developed in a much better way. In doing this, most of the items cited above are contemplated.

However, one demands more attention: “judge the acceptability, especially the credibility, of claims”. A long reflection on how fallacies are permeated in all types of reflections is
mandatory. In this way, it is fundamental that teachers of all subjects are aware of this and help the development of this process. This is very useful for protecting new generations from the “bad politicians”, those who, for example, appeal to generalisation fallacy, as is happening in the post-truth era discussed in 8.2.

Besides thinking critically, something essential for students to build their own conclusions from basic information obtained by them, this basic information also needs to be qualified. Youth have to understand their societies, that is, they have to have civic knowledge. Notions of history/sociology, social psychology, economics and law are fundamental for this. Basic knowledge about history and sociology avoids people’s misinterpretation of the reality. For example, certain people’s understandings of affirmative action in Brazil show this. Many people simply do not understand the series of elements behind the discussion and take one party’s position based on their shallow reasoning on it. Basic knowledge about social psychology makes people demand less from their fellow citizens, if, for example, they learn that part of people’s behaviour comes from their nature and cultural influences (5.1). Basic knowledge about economics, for example, helps people know that taxes in Brazil are regressive. It also helps them to identify a social gap and make a comparison amongst countries. Knowledge about laws and deep reflections on the purpose of them help young people to understand that they participate in a collective venture. Knowledge and discussions about documents like constitutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc. (Rawls, 1993, p.199) are very useful for cultivating in students the idea of social contract.

In particular, the knowledge about the history of their societies helps youth to be better citizens through being more aware about their belonging to a bigger social project. Through this, they are able to identify that most current inequalities are based on historical facts perpetuated over time, but, at the same time, that lots of rights applied today are the result of a long process of social improvement. For example, students learn that, because of historical racism, Western societies keep achieving conscious and unconscious biases in the selection of employees. On the other hand, because of the historical development of the notion of equality, any type of racism is currently condemned as a serious moral fault. History, in this way, gives a common narrative for a nation100, showing characteristics that citizens should be

100 Obviously, supposing that this narrative is presented without any manipulation.
proud of but also ashamed. In both cases, it gives to them elements to build a future narrative together.

However, the understanding of history/sociology, psychology, economics and law systems is important but far from being enough. The understanding of what is behind them is also essential. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, most Western people share, for instance, the value of equality of opportunity, but, at the same time, in chapter 6, the series of examples demonstrated that, at least in countries like Brazil, laws and policies that go against this idea are applied (and are at least accepted by people). The huge quality gap between rich and poor students’ education is obviously evidence of this. Sometimes this incongruence happens only because individuals do not genuinely believe in these values. However, as education is a value endorsed by Western societies, it has to be cultivated. Cultivating feelings of compassion towards unknown others, as discussed below, is a good way to implement this.

Nevertheless, in many cases such lack of synchrony between people’s ideas of equality of opportunities and their expressed political positions is caused by their superficial understandings of liberty and equality. It is possible to perceive through reading the discussions in chapter 3 and 4 that these are two very difficult ideas that deserve deep investigations to be minimally understood. In this sense, reflections about these concepts are fundamental, and philosophy is the appropriate subject to promote such reflections.

All these points discussed above are somehow connected with the development of democratic spirit. Reflecting specifically on how to cultivate this in youth, three different issues have to be addressed. Firstly, it is important that students develop knowledge about the democratic system of their nations and have a chance to compare it with others. Some theoretical classes about this are necessary. This can be inserted in subjects like philosophy and sociology, or be part of a special subject called “government”, which can involve reflections of what is guaranteed by the constitution, as it is done in (certain states of) the US.

However, knowledge is not enough. There are skills that also have to be developed. Students have to learn how to behave within the democratic sphere. Thus, practices that start within the classrooms with debates, elections of class leaders, for example, are good ways to build and exercise democratic skills. As discussed in 9.6, school organisations that stimulate student unions, participation of students in determining some school rules, or the like, are
powerful loci for such practices. In this way, as described in 9.1, the French model seems more appropriate to develop these skills than the English one.

These two complementary ways for developing democratic knowledge and skills are powerful tools for building the third aspect of democracy, the value given by students to democratic societies. In this way, a strong belief in the value of democracy reinforces the belief in the current Western project, something that develops an ethos that helps democratic Western societies to guarantee their stability. It is through the incorporation of this ethos that voters, when their preferred candidate does not win, understand that this is part of the process, and, when he/she does, realise that this does not mean the right to oppress those who lost. As explored in 2.6, Western democracies are based on certain foundational and consensual ideas, and dissensus is only accepted – and encouraged – regarding what is not in this list. Thus, for example, even if a sexist, racist or homophobic group wins the election, they cannot implement laws against minorities, since minorities rights are guaranteed by Western constitutions and are above temporary mandates.

Through mentioning a last set of interconnected civic skills and values, it is central for this thesis to discuss how/if empathy and sympathy ought to be cultivated. Though empathy is important, such individuals’ capacity to put themselves in other people’s shoes is useless if it not associated with the desire of help the others to have good lives, also called sympathy. Moreover, it is suggested that empathy and sympathy have to be cultivated in a way that these virtues can be oriented to, at least, all strangers who belong to the nation (and, somehow, to the whole of humankind), what this thesis calls compassion.

Regarding how to cultivate these virtues, the mere fact that students from different backgrounds share common spaces like the school helps such development. As discussed in 9.6, the more plural the school is, the higher the chance to develop empathy, sympathy and great compassion towards unknown people. However, aesthetic knowledge is defended by scholars like Nussbaum (1990; 1998; 2010) as very useful for making people imagine the lives of strangers without sharing spaces with them, and as a form of moral understanding. For example, literature, theatre, and the arts are strong tools for making people better understand specificities of unknown people’s lives:
What storytelling in childhood teaches us to do is to ask questions about the life behind the mask, the inner world concealed by the shape. It gets us into the habit of conjecturing that this shape, so similar to our own, is a house for emotions and wishes and projects that are also in some ways similar to our own; but it also gets us into the habit of understanding that that inner world is differently shaped by different social circumstances. (1998, 354)

It is not the concern of this thesis, but it is interesting to highlight, since it has been highly observed in Brazil, that media can also be a powerful tool to expand empathetic feelings towards strangers (Bloom, 2013, p.200).

However, as Bloom (2013) warns, literature, cinema and the arts in general can also develop hate towards certain groups. He presents examples including books like *The Birth of a Nation*, a 1915 movie that portraits black men as stupid and aggressive and Ku Klux Klan’s members as heroes, to illustrate this point. In this way, the national curriculum and literature teachers should choose their list of books and plays also based on the current ideas of equality of opportunities and compassion towards strangers. This association with historical and sociological knowledge, also helps students to develop such imagination through learning about people from whom they are disconnected in space and time. In this sense, students’ exposition to arts and humanities is fundamental.

9.8. Critical thinking and critical pedagogy

Beyond the reflections on how cultivating citizenship through supra, wide and narrow curricula, there is a dispute on how to develop students’ criticality. This issue goes further than different proposals on how to teach critical thinking skills, since many thinkers consider that a “critical” citizen also has to have a strong social consciousness. Regarding this, two different views, which at least agree that a central “educational goal” is “to help students [to] become more skeptical toward commonly accepted truisms” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p.190), strongly disagree on how teachers should behave in these regards. Burbules & Berk counterpose defenders of critical thinking (Ennis, 1962; Siegel, 1988, Fisher, 2001) and critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970a; Apple, 1979, Giroux, 1983) by saying:

101 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Birth_of_a_Nation
The primary preoccupation of Critical Thinking is to supplant sloppy or distorted thinking with thinking based upon reliable procedures of inquiry. […] The primary preoccupation of Critical Pedagogy is with social injustice and how to transform inequitable, undemocratic, or oppressive institutions and social relations. […] They are in the service of demonstrating how certain power effects occur, not in the service of pursuing Truth in some dispassioned sense (1999, p.???).

Critical thinking skills are defended by both groups, however a question remains: is it enough to grasp “procedures of inquiry” as the first group suggests? Should teachers actively defend political positions that challenge the status quo, which maintains economic inequalities and conservative social practices? Critical pedagogy is a theory that goes further in the defence of an active participation of teachers in the process of raising students’ awareness of the injustices around them. In this way, “Critical consciousness is brought about not through intellectual effort alone but through praxis – through the authentic union of action and reflection” (FREIRE, 1970a, 48).

In order to explore this comparison, it is interesting to start by analysing the difference between three possible teachers’ attitudes – apart from total avoidance of any political discussion – regarding the way that they deal with citizenship education: teachers can always be neutral (neutral chairman), they can present the other side to almost all students’ statements (balanced), or they can defend certain positions (stated commitment) (QCA, 1998). The first, and the second attitudes are aligned with the idea defended by critical thinkers. Still, most supporters of critical thinking would also go further believing that, regarding some issues, teachers should not be neutral or balanced. For example, teachers have to present their position against racism, sexism and homophobia.

Nevertheless, these types of statements are not enough for supporters of critical pedagogy tradition. Thinkers like Freire (1970a), Apple (1979) and Giroux (2004), understand that, because societies are too biased in favour of maintaining unfair status quo, teachers have the duty of going much further than critical thinking demands. Youth should understand the hegemonic power structures behind their everyday lives in order to, in the future, fight against them (McCowan, 2009, p.60). “For Freire, Critical Pedagogy is concerned with the development of conscientização, usually translated as ‘critical consciousness.’ Freedom, for
Freire, begins with the recognition of a system of oppressive relations, and one’s own place in that system” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p.???).

However, “from the perspective of Critical Thinking, Critical Pedagogy crosses a threshold between teaching criticality and indoctrinating”. On the other hand, “Critical Pedagogy sees this threshold problem conversely: indoctrination is the case already” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p.???). Based on this supposed current indoctrination, following Freire, “[t]eachers, therefore, have an ethical obligation to be ‘biased’, that is, to direct their teaching towards the construction of a just and humane society” (McCowan, 2009, p.65). In this way, Freire defends the social transformation through education, rather than through a top-down revolution (McCowan, 2009, p.64). And, replying to the accusation presented above, rather than seeing education as indoctrination, Freire believes in the dialogue between teachers and students. According to him, the role of critical pedagogy is not “explaining to the masses, but dialoguing with them about their actions” (1970a, p.55).

Rocha – despite identifying in Freire’s intentions “to combat revolutionary dirigisme” (2017, p.67) – is suspicious about the success of this process. Rocha claims that “[i]t is evident that at the centre of [Freire’s] dialogical theory and generative themes beats the heart of Mao, as Freire does not stop insisting” (2017, p.74). According to Rocha, when Freire claims that the educator, through a dialogical process, has to give back to the masses the knowledge received by them in an organised, systematised but with additions way, a top-down practice associated with Chinese revolution is established (2017, p.74-5).

As discussed above, defenders of critical pedagogy support this additional knowledge that the teacher gives back to the masses by saying that teachers’ attitudes have to be subversive, since they have to go against the hegemonic status quo. Thus, it is possible to suggest that Freire and other critical pedagogues like Apple and Giroux propose a certain type of resistance (that can also be called as a different type of “hidden curriculum”) that goes against the hegemonic official curriculum. This interpretation puts the idea of hidden curriculum not only as something used by the “oppressors”, but also by the “oppressed” or at least by those who want to help the oppressed to liberate themselves from this condition. This understanding gives to educators a central role in this process.
However, this central role of teachers to drive social change is seen as excessive by the reasoning that supports this thesis. Overlapping consensus cannot be established regarding this, since Freire’s positions are so radical that right-wing people, “as a general rule, ignore his opus entirely” (McCowan, 2009, p.62). Though Freire’s radical ideas can make sense in an undemocratic regime (the situation in Brazil when they were proposed), this thesis defends that, in democracies, cultivating students’ critical reasoning, rather than making them “conscious” of injustices previously determined by teachers, is the best way to develop their civic virtues, since, through this, all the time, a space for dialogue and, in turn, for a possible agreement is created. This criticism of Freire’s position does not mean that it is being defended a total neutrality of teachers in regards of social justice. As mentioned above, some issues like minorities’ rights, equality of opportunities, and compassion towards worst-off are seen as consensual in Western societies, and it is the duty of teachers cultivating such values. In this way, teachers should not all the time be neutral or balanced in their ideas of justice. They, sometimes, have to be stated committed. However, this thesis considers exaggerated taking for granted that, in Western societies, “hegemonic power structures” are behind the unfair status quo, and defending that cultivating “critical consciousness” is a duty of teachers. Students have to learn critical thinking skills, have to have access to trustworthy data, and have to develop compassion. Often critical pedagogy proposes that presenting trustworthy data is drawing students’ attention to the possible existence of certain structures of power. However, students, by themselves, have to judge if the power structures behind social institutions are oppressive or not.

9.9. Practical limitations on the implementation

All discussions presented in this chapter deal with an ideal proposal on citizenship education. Several practical problems are addressed in chapters 11 and 12. Here, still from a theoretical perspective, some limitations on how to implement citizenship curriculum can be anticipated. Firstly, tests like PISA are some of the most important instruments used by societies to evaluate their educational systems. From this, their internal evaluations are being developed. However, most of these tests do not measure any civic knowledge, skill or value of students. For example, societies which follow PISA consider that they have a good educational system if their students are well prepared in mathematics, languages and sciences. Most societies barely evaluate student’s civic virtues. Thus, in schools, students are “rewarded” if develop knowledge in mathematics, but not if they are cooperative.
One of the reasons for this is that national economic development still is the primary source of government evaluation and concern. “The cult of GDP as the metric of success of nations has become a kind of religion of our time” (Fonseca, 2016, p.57). Even more sophisticated indexes like HDI, which evaluate countries based on GPD, average life expectancy, and years of education, do not measure the type of education received by youth. Of course, the present thesis is not saying that governments’ focus on economic development is not important. However, it is far from being enough. By focusing on these limited indexes, governments do not take into account other aspirations of Western human beings such as, for example, the reduction of inequality of opportunities.

Associated with this external encouragement to focus on economic growth, there is a pressure of parents (and, sometimes, students) – based on their selfish interest to develop job market skills in students – towards teaching only scientific knowledge. Part of this pressure is the result of a system which rewards – for example, with places in good universities – people who possess scientific knowledge, rather than those who developed civic virtues. As developed in the next chapter, in Brazil, for example, students’ civic virtues are not even considered in these selections. This is a failure from the top, from the state. However, at the bottom, the individuals also fail, since most of them are much more interested (based on their selfishness) in what is taught in math, languages and sciences, rather than in the development of civic skills.

Finally, the natural resistance of youth against “imposed” values makes the cultivation of them even more difficult. The French model, whilst intending to develop important virtues, probably promotes more resistance than the English system. In this case, the “learning by doing” process, more aligned with community involvement, seems to be more effective in producing such civic results. The point, which is not developed in this chapter, is that youth openness to this learning cannot be ignored.

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Chapter 9 investigates, from a theoretical point of view, how the civic virtues previously defined should be cultivated through formal education. It, then, analyses the citizenship curriculum suggesting the existence of five different levels, and draws attention to an
important debate between critical thinking and critical pedagogy. In this way, this chapter is useful for the development of a feasible theory of citizenship curriculum in two different ways. First, the distinct levels proposed help a better analysis of the data empirically collected. Moreover, some idealistic suggestions serve to be balanced with this data (chapters 11 and 12).
10. Citizenship education in the Brazilian socio-historical context

In this chapter, the development of laws and policies towards citizenship curriculum in Brazil is analysed. This analysis is fundamental in order to compare ideal, legal (something in between ideal and real) and real practices towards citizenship education. The feasibility of a curriculum aligned with virtues proposed in chapter 8 depends on theoretical ideas, the state’s willingness to put them into practice and a proper environment to develop them. Thus, before analysing the reality of Brazilian schools (chapters 11 and 12), the historical and current state initiatives towards this are investigated. At the beginning, (10.1) the history of the implementation of the Brazilian national curriculum focused on moral and civic education is observed. Then, it is explained (10.2) how citizenship education is currently structured. Finally, (10.3) some challenges and pressures from different sectors of society towards such education are presented.

10.1. The development of citizenship curriculum

In 6.4, huge historical inequalities within Brazilian society are presented, and the educational gap between rich and poor people is shown as an example of these inequalities. Here, the development of education policies alongside history is analysed, but less attention to how such goods are distributed is given. The main focus of this analysis is on elements of citizenship education in such policies. As presented in 6.1, Brazil declared independence from Portugal in 1822. Until 1889, however, Brazil was a monarchy led by the same Portuguese royal family. From 1889 to 1930, a period known as the First Republic, the agrarian aristocracy ruled the country, and poor people had little space to participate in that “democratic” regime. Some things changed in the Vargas Era (from 1930 to 1945, and from 1951 to 1954). During this time, several social rights were implemented, though, between 1937 and 1945, the regime was a dictatorship.

Regarding education policies, before the 1930s, federal policies towards promoting public education were almost non-existent (Regatierry & Castro, 2013, p. 16). However, from 1930 to 1945, two important national education policies were implemented, and three forces disputed the prevalence of their ideas towards it. The New School movement defended a “state-run, universal and free of charge” school that “would create thus a basic equality of
opportunities, from which flourish differences based on personal qualities of each” (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.70). The Catholic Church, in turn, attacked such proposal of “laicisation, standardised school, coeducation, state monopoly of education, free education, liberal school” (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.75). The third power in this process was the Military forces which increased in relevance during this period. As can be imagined, “order, discipline and hierarchy and the love of country get priority in [the Military’s] proposal of pedagogical action” (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.87). However, it is interesting to notice that, though the New School project opposed most military ideas of education, at least one central point was shared by them: the belief in the importance of building national ties through state centralisation of education (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.194).

The process of implementation of such policies started in 1930 with Campos¹⁰², Brazil’s first minister of Education and Health. Identifying the Church as an important supporter of the new regime, he worked to consolidate the alliance of this institution and the state. After Campos (1930-34), Capanema replaced him having a long (1934-45) and quite ambiguous time as minister. In essence, there was a fundamental shift from Campos’ to Capanema’s policies: the former tried to balance sciences and humanities, while the latter emphasised humanistic education (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.90-3). Exploring moral and civic content, it is possible to say that it aimed to “transfer family or local to national ‘fidelity’” (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.208).

Such educational policies remained, at least by law, some years after the end of the Vargas dictatorship. In 1946, a new democratic constitution determined that a Guidelines and Bases Law (LDB – Lei de Diretrizes e Bases) should be elaborated to orient the Brazilian educational system. However, after a long debate, only in 1961, the first LDB of Brazilian history was promulgated. This process was very long because two different powers – again New School educators and Catholic Church – disputed the main decisions. Interestingly, both sides, though disagreeing completely about the participation of the state in defining curriculum and subsidising education, appealed to democratic and liberal arguments to underpin their positions (Montalvão, 2010, p.11). This dispute, was, then, solved by a negotiated agreement that resulted in the aforementioned LDB. The law “reconciled the two

¹⁰² Benjamin Constant was also important for the implementation of public policies in education at the beginning of the Republic.
projects guaranteeing to the family the right to select the type of education that they should
give to their children, and establishing that education is an obligation of the public power and
free to private enterprise” (Saviani, 1996, p.46).

This LDB, however, did not have enough time to be applied. In 1964, a Coup D’état led by
the Military changed completely the organisation of several Brazilian institutions. For 21
years, Brazil lived under a dictatorship in which basic civic and political rights were
supressed. Teachers, students, schools and universities, suffered strong interventions. In
1971, a new Guidelines and Bases Law (LDB) reflected the political and economic
atmospheres of that period orienting the two main changes in basic education. First, the
development of teaching focused on a “productivist conception of education” based on
principles of “rationality, efficiency and productivity” in order to develop human capital
needed to promote economic growth (Saviani, 2008, p.297).

Second, the introduction of two new subjects – Moral and Civic Education, and Brazilian
Social and Political Organisation – aiming to “brainwash” students to support the
dictatorship. In general terms, the objective of teaching these subjects was the “generic
formation of a citizen who loves the nation and defends moralising principles” (Martins,
2003, p 159). Thus, the idea behind this civic education was guided by “passivity, obedience,
fulfilment of its professional and social roles, faith and hope that the problems were solved by
those whose social function is to make politics” (Cerri, 2003, p. 112). Several discussions on
this subject could be developed, being one of the most important the fact that if Moral and
Civic Education became mandatory, philosophy and sociology were considered not only
useless, but also against the regime (Brasil, 2006, p.102).

This authoritarian period finished in 1985, and, in 1988, what is widely known as the “Citizen
Constitution” was promulgated. In its Article 205, it is expressed that:

> Education, universal right and duty of the State and the family, will be promoted and
couraged with the cooperation of society, aiming at the full development of the person, its
preparation for the exercise of citizenship and its qualification for work.

In this main article about education, it is important to notice that preparing students to
exercise citizenship is one of the three central aims of the Brazilian educational project.
Apart from this, as the focus of this thesis is the development of citizenship through education, it is also important to reflect on what the 1988 Constitution says about the main structure of the education system. As suggested in the previous chapter, how the educational system is built impacts on the cultivation of civic virtues. Regarding this, Article 206 guarantees the right to public, high quality and free of charge education, freedom of thinking, but it does not guarantee equal quality of education for all, since it allows private education in which teachers can be better paid and improvements in facilities can be promoted\footnote{This is consistent with all international law on education since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent legally binding treaties.}.

10.2. Current citizenship curriculum

This historical reflection helps to understand the current laws and policies related to Brazilian citizenship curriculum. This section starts by highlighting that the contemporary structure of Brazilian education is now based on the 1996 LDB (Brasil, 1996, n.9394). Such a Law was approved to guide a new educational approach, a direct consequence of the ideas of the 1988 Constitution. Already in Article 2 of the LDB (which closely follows Article 205 of the Constitution), citizenship is cited as one of the three central aims of Brazilian education.

In LBD’s Article 36, which defines contents, methods and forms of assessment of secondary education (the specific educational phase analysed by this thesis), citizenship is again highlighted as one of its three aims:

I – Domain of scientific and technological principles which lead the modern production;
II – Knowledge of contemporary forms of language;
III – Domain of Philosophy and Sociology knowledge as necessary for the exercise of citizenship.

Considering these three aims, it is interesting to notice that the development of citizenship is directly associated with only two curricular subjects: philosophy and sociology. As cited above, one hypothesis for this is that, during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), such subjects were replaced by moral and civic education (subjects thence removed from the
curriculum in 1993), and the intention of this mention was to reintroduce them in a new democratic curriculum. However, this only happened in 2008.

Nevertheless, LDB is not sufficient in order to cover all aspects that guide policymakers and schools about how to organise their educational system and curricula. Then, in 1997, the Brazilian Ministry of Education launched the National Curricular Parameters (PCN – Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais) aiming to address this. This document identified citizenship as the “vertebral axis of education” (Brasil, 1997, p.23), and philosophy and sociology as pieces of knowledge inserted in all other subjects, with the function of making interdisciplinary practices possible. This is associated with the idea that certain contents, such as “Ethics, Cultural Plurality, Environment, Health and Sexual Orientation”, have to be discussed through cross-curricular activities (Brasil, 1997, p.15).

Regarding the pedagogical theory behind these PCN, it is possible to highlight Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s influences on it (VIVALDI, 2013, p.96). It is explored in chapters 5 and 8 that Kohlberg defends the existence of a higher level of abstract values which should be reached by a moral agent. In this sense, “[a] non-relativist conception [founded in the principle of human dignity: mutual respect, justice, dialogue, and solidarity] is presented at PCN” (Vinha, 2017, p.8).

Since 1997, the PCNs have been associated with the Social Democrat Party (PSDB) government (1995-2001), and it is important to mention that, in 2013, the Workers Party (PT) government launched the National Curricular Guidelines (DCN – Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais) as a “need to update the National Curriculum Parameters” (DCN, 2013, p.146). However, regarding citizenship education, the idea is that civic virtues should be developed within each one of the subjects and through interdisciplinary projects remained.

This document, then, served as basis for the National Plan of Education, a 2014 Law which intended to design the national plans for Brazilian education for the next 10 years. In its Article 2, the plan presents ten guidelines:

I – Eradication of illiteracy;
II – Universalization of school attendance;
III – Overcoming educational inequalities, emphasizing the promotion of citizenship and the eradication of all forms of discrimination;
IV – Improving the quality of education;
V – Training for work and citizenship, with emphasis on moral and ethical values;
VI – Promoting the principle of democratic management of public education;
VII – Humanistic, scientific, cultural and technological development of the country;
VIII – Establishing a goal for the application of public resources in education as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product – GDP, which assures the fulfillment of expansion needs with quality and equity;
IX – Valuation of education professionals;
Promoting the principles of respect for human rights, diversity and environmental sustainability.

Analysing such guidelines, it is possible to identify how important education for citizenship is. Half of them (III, V, VI, VII and X) quote directly an orientation for cultivating citizenship and some correlated values: non-discrimination, moral and ethics, democracy, humanism, human rights, diversity and sustainability. Some other items (I, II, IV, V, VIII, and IX), though not concerned with cultivating citizenship virtues, guarantee through education some citizenship rights: eradication of illiteracy and investments for promoting good education and preparing for the job market.

A few months before this chapter was finalised, Dilma Rousseff, Workers Party president, was impeached. Regarding specifically educational policies, the transition government (as many others), is now announcing a complete change in the secondary level curriculum. In the following analysis, given the forthcoming elections (scheduled for October, 2018), such policies, which have low chances of being implemented, are not covered.

Returning to policies that were already in practice, secondary education is the responsibility of states, though they have historically complained that they cannot manage it without Federal Government investments. Apart from this budget quarrel, there is another important element that is within the Federal Government and states’ jurisdiction: responsibility for the definition of the educational plans which are implemented in schools. In the particular case of this thesis, it is worth analysing some innovations of the Rio Grande do Sul education policies, the state in which the empirical research of this thesis, reported in chapters 11 and 12, was carried out. In Rio Grande do Sul, a new curriculum was implemented in 2012 in all
state-run schools (private schools have more independence in these regards). It was called “Polytechnic Teaching”. Such an initiative introduced a new subject called “Integrated Seminar”, a three-hours per week space in the three years of Secondary Education created for developing activities that connect humanities, natural sciences, languages, and mathematics and develop students’ research skills. More than this, research studies associated with real problems of their communities were stimulated. In addition, a new system of assessment was implemented and students would be evaluated no longer by test scores, but according to teachers’ descriptions. Thus, while the first change opens more space for students to discuss their communal issues – which clearly works towards the development of civic virtues – the second allows teachers to value other virtues (for example, civic virtues like cooperation), rather than only academic skills.

This was the reality of state-run schools when the field work of this thesis was carried out in 2015. However, a distinct party (PMDB) started a new government in 2015, and, since 2016, this Polytechnic Teaching was partially abandoned. However, this is very recent change that cannot be analysed yet.

10.3. Pressures over citizenship curriculum

Though this development of the LDB presented a great improvement regarding citizenship education in a democratic regime, there is no doubt that it is far from being consensual. Even before the PCNs were published in 1997, protests in academia against such parameters were frequent. The criticisms against such policies labelled that government as neoliberal.

Neoliberals are those who demand education policies that promote efficiency based on production management and competition (Gentili, 1996, p.17-9). From this perspective, in order to be improved, “educational institutions have to be thought of and evaluated (that is, their results have to be judged) as if they were profitable companies” (Gentili, 1996, p.25). This observation allows Gentili to identify neoliberal public policies on education: (i) national systems of evaluation; (ii) curricular reforms based on a National Curriculum; (iii) centralised continuous preparation of teachers (1996, p.27). According to him:

The neoliberal state is *minimal* when has to finance public and *maximal* when it centralises the official knowledge that must circulate by educational institutions, when it establishes top-
down and undemocratic mechanisms of evaluation, and when it removes pedagogic autonomy from institutions and collective school actors. (1996, p.27)

This understanding of neoliberalism was used by the Faculty of Education of Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (FACED), one of the most important in Brazil, to criticise, in 1996\textsuperscript{104}, the PCN proposal of that time. In a political manifesto, this Faculty strongly criticised what they considered an attempt to preserve cultural unity and reinforce inequalities through education policies. According to them, firstly, the term is a euphemism, since these “parameters” are already a “mandatory curriculum” (1996, p.112-5). Moreover, there was a lack of democratic debate on the elaboration of them, since only few specialists were listened to, whilst teachers, unions, and social movements were silenced (1996, p.116-8). In addition, such parameters did not mention two fundamental elements towards improving educational quality: increasing teachers’ salaries and improving school infrastructure. The lack of such concerns reinforced inequalities, because poor people were (and continue to be) those who study in state-run schools (1996, p.19-20). Finally, the PCN favoured “partial knowledge (based on male, rich and white hegemonic views)” (1996, p.111-2), and did not give voice for gender, ethnicity, and class minorities (1996, p.123). Associated with this, they criticised the fact that such an approach is centred in transmission of contents and based on a depoliticised and “neutral” character.

These criticisms were presented twenty years ago, yet, since this time, after a further six years of Social Democrats (PSDB) and thirteen years of Workers (PT) in power, few things have changed. The three main characteristics of neoliberalism noted by Gentili were applied – maybe even strongly – by Workers Party: national systems of evaluation; curricular reforms based on a national curriculum; centralised continuous preparation of teachers\textsuperscript{105}. The National Pact for the Reinforcement of [State-Run] Secondary Education is a massive programme which intends to centralise continuous preparation of state-run school teachers. This practice, based on a national curriculum, is completely in accordance with the new 2014 Law [National Plan of Education]. Regarding this law, it is worth saying that one of the most criticised attitudes of Social Democrat’s government was reinforced by the Workers’ one: the

\textsuperscript{104} Strong criticisms against 1997 PCN were presented in 1996, even before this law was promulgated.

\textsuperscript{105} Curiously, these are also characteristics of systems of education of communist countries.
implementation of a huge system of evaluation and a national curriculum (Articles 5 and 11)\textsuperscript{106}.

Regarding the three main specific criticisms made by the Faculty of Education of UFRGS, the situation does not seem to have advanced much: it is not clear if more voice was given to teachers; the salaries are still humiliating and infrastructure terrible; though actively the Workers have attempted to empower minority groups through the introduction of education for diversity and reinforcement of black and indigenous history, the implementation of them was postponed by the government because allied parties were against some of them.

Since this last point is an ongoing process, it deserves a bit of reflection here. Education for diversity has been stimulated to a degree since 1997 (Brasil, 1997, p.28) It is remarkable the suggestion that sexuality has to be problematised at school, and that family values about it should be questioned. The text suggests that such “contents can be addressed in any cycle [of Primary School], varying only the degree of depth and breadth that will be worked” (Brasil, 1997, p.39). Expanding these ideas, in 2011, the Federal Government, in association with LGBT movements, prepared a series of materials (press publications and videos) defending that non-heterosexual behaviours should be accepted and celebrated (Brasil, 2011, p.75). Such material, called by the government “School Without Homophobia”, intended to stimulate in school “actions that promote political and social environments favourable to ensuring human rights and respectability of sexual orientation and gender identity in the Brazilian school environment” (Brasil, 2011, p.9). Associated with this, it also aimed “to unveil the order that puts heterosexuality as natural, normal and a single possibility of the subjects live their sexuality” (Brasil, 2011, p.12). Moreover, the videos only presented certain situations of non-heterosexual relationships and non-cis behaviour as also valuable, encouraging students who do not identify with heterosexual or “cis” patterns to be themselves. As an extrapolation of its aims, the material equally reflects on social impositions about gender differentiations – such as the stereotypes that girls should play volleyball, and boys football – and the examination of perpetuation of sexism through the use of language.

It is natural to imagine that conservative sectors of society, most of them associated with religious beliefs, are against education for sexual diversity. These critics called such material

\textsuperscript{106} Actually, this is a global movement towards standardised assessment of basic skills through following PISA.
the “Gay Kit” and repeated exhaustively that, through them, youth would be stimulated to have homosexual behaviours, which, in their view, is wrong. This does not seem to be the case. However, the pressure of religious groups within Congress, who hold significant power and whom the Workers government depend upon for support, made the government give up distributing these materials.107

Recently, another dispute associated with citizenship education divided Brazilian educators’ opinions. In 2015, the Ministry of Education presented a proposal to be discussed with society suggesting radical changes in the history curriculum of secondary education. The 1988 Constitution suggested valuing minority cultures – indigenous peoples and Africans – and approximation with Latin American countries. Following this, it was proposed to strongly reinforce in the History curriculum knowledge about Africa and (Latin) America. This curriculum, which used to be equally divided between documenting Brazil’s and Western societies’ history, now talks about American Indigenous peoples, Africans and Afro-Brazilians in the first year, all peoples in the America in the second, and Europeans and Asians in the third (Brasil, 2015, p.243). Black and indigenous movements for a long time pressured the government to have “their” history also discussed in schools. More conservative sectors of society, on the other hand, see such change as reducing excessively discussions about Western values.

Finally, there is another strong debate in Brazil related to citizenship education that deserves to be mentioned. There is a group self-proclaimed “School Without Party” which defends that, in all classrooms, the following list of teachers’ attitudes should be hung in order to remind all teachers and alert all students about how teachers have to deal with political discussions:

1. The teacher will not take advantage of the students’ captive audience to promote their own ideological, religious, moral, political, and partisan interests, opinions, conceptions or preferences.
2. The teacher will not favour or hinder or constrain students because of their political, ideological, moral or religious beliefs, or their lack of such beliefs.

3. The teacher will not make political-party propaganda in the classroom nor incite his students to participate in demonstrations, public acts and marches.

4. In dealing with political, socio-cultural and economic issues, the teacher will present to students, in a fair way, the main versions, theories, opinions and perspectives which compete in this respect.

5. The teacher will respect the right of parents of pupils to have their children receive religious and moral education that is in accordance with their own beliefs.

6. The teacher will not allow that the rights secured in the previous items are violated by the action of students or third parties within the classroom.  

This list of duties seems aligned with the balanced attitude described in chapter 9. However, opponents to these rules defend that teachers have the right (and, perhaps even the duty) to present their political opinions, and consider this proposal a type of censorship. And, following critical pedagogy criticisms (9.8), most of these thinkers defend that, indeed, the dominant group’s ideas end up being the ones defended in classrooms.

This thesis also returns to the issues of sexual education, African studies and the liberty of teachers present their political opinions at the conclusion.

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Chapter 9 observes the development of the citizenship curriculum through analysing the history of Brazilian laws and policies in these regards. A special attention to the current Brazilian situation is given. Finally, some pressures of certain groups towards different directions are also briefly discussed. This perspective somehow connects idealistic views of citizenship curriculum (chapter 8) and the reality of it application in Brazilian schools (chapter 11), as presented at the conclusion.

108 https://www.programaescolasempartido.org/
11. How citizenship education happens in Brazil

The previous chapter described the main procedures of data collection accomplished in three schools in the South of Brazil to develop the debate about citizenship curriculum. The present chapter, written as the result of this data collection, presents some specific ideas about how these schools are practicing citizenship education. It is important to reinforce that this chapter only describes how citizenship education is manifested within these schools, in the hope of better understanding the current reality within Brazil, rather than presenting normative ideas on how citizenship education should be developed or practiced. Ideas of school communities’ members in this way are presented in the next chapter. Thus, at the beginning, (11.1) teachers’ and students’ overall ideas about the most important civic virtues that are or are not encouraged at their schools are presented. Then, (11.2) the impacts of educational policies in the development of civic values (supra official curriculum) are analysed. Following this, it is observed (11.3) how schools’ official organisational structures act to help (or to hinder) the promotion of citizenship values (wide official curriculum). Next, (11.4) syllabuses and subjects related to the narrow official citizenship curriculum in these schools are identified. Later, (11.5), some individual initiatives achieved in such schools (unofficial curriculum) are also investigated. Finally, (11.6) some elements hidden in the curriculum that help (or hinder) citizenship education are problematised.

11.1. Overall view

At the beginning of this analysis, it is interesting to briefly present some overall view obtained through the main instruments of data collection applied in this empirical research, and some inconsistencies amongst them. In the questionnaires, after facing the question as to whether their school is more concerned with teaching scientific syllabuses than with encouraging citizenship virtues, 61% of teachers and 58% of students claimed that this is at least partially true. Moreover, a higher number of teachers and students said that it is completely true that all civic virtues proposed (critical thinking, solidarity, following rules, politicisation, fight for rights) are encouraged by their schools than the number of those who said that it was false. Though these results remain general, the data does allow the conclusion

109 The options were “The claim is completely true”, “The claim is partially true”, “The claim is false”, “I don’t know”.
that teachers and students do not generally perceive their schools as being totally neglectful of citizenship education.

However, during the interviews, teachers and students showed a lack of clarity regarding moral and civic education, and were able to present only a few examples of practices in their schools. For instance, only one student and one teacher mentioned empathy/compassion as a virtue that should be promoted through different activities. Furthermore, neither teachers nor students showed any deep knowledge regarding the concepts of equality and liberty. Even when questions about specific problems that put those ideas in evidence were presented, normally simplistic answers were given: for example, when asked about same-sex marriage, no one explored the idea of equal civil rights between hetero and homosexuals. (It is important to say that the ability to understand and build concepts is generally a skill associated with philosophy, and only one teacher from this specific area was interviewed.)

Observations of school environment demonstrated an even worse picture. Having spent three months immersed in all three schools, I identified very few activities related to citizenship education. Almost all classes were focused only on specific contents. In the private school, teachers were mainly concerned with university admission tests. In the state-run schools, the commitment towards citizenship education was also low, and even philosophy and sociology classes were focused on their own contents, such as Plato’s metaphysics, and the difference between Marx and Weber. Of course, the syllabi of both subjects present discussions on analysis of arguments, justice, organisation of societies, etc. However, cultivation of civic virtues did not seem to be the central aim of these classes.

This impression is aligned with other empirical studies. After meticulously filtering papers about primary observations on moral education in Brazil, Vivaldi also presented a negative conclusion regarding how it is developed in different Brazilian schools. She identified in her literature review only “one-off activities, most of the time, aimed at improving situations of indiscipline” (2013, p.209) and even violence that has turned mainly state-run schools into dysfunctional places.

Nevertheless, it is wrong to say that it was not possible to find any good initiatives related to citizenship education in my observations. First, certain individual practices introduced some debates about themes associated with this subject. For example, in a Portuguese class,
homophobia was a point discussed within a text; in a physics class, the impacts of different sources of energy oriented the debate about the importance of associating this reasoning with reflections about global warming. It is important to say that, in some cases, teachers’ behaviours positively nurtured citizenship education, while in other cases, they did not. Moreover, reflecting on the institutional level, some good intentions towards cultivating citizenship were perceived, though the practices were very incipient. Details on the data introduced in this topic are provided throughout this chapter.

11.2. How supra official curriculum is applied

Education policies can cultivate civic virtues in students simply by defining how public resources are redistributed and how students are allocated in schools. A progressive system of collecting and redistributing taxes sends a message of equality of opportunities. Providing the same quality schools for all is a way to do this. Making students from different social groups share the same spaces by stimulating them to attend the same schools integrates them. This is a way to develop cognitive empathy and compassion in them. The Brazilian educational system goes in the opposite direction.

Firstly, the structural abysm between the quality of Brazilian state-run and private schools is a symbol of failure of the Brazilian state in promoting equality of opportunities. As an evidence of this abysm, it was observed that, while in the state-run schools the facilities are very bad and teachers’ salaries are shameful forcing them to work double or triple shifts, all classrooms in the private school observed have a computer, multimedia projector, air conditioning, and teachers’ salaries are four times what their colleagues from state-run ones earn\(^\text{110}\). Of course, these things directly impact the quality of teaching and promote an obvious inequality of opportunities between rich and poor.

Thus, this unequal education system itself produces the first “lesson” about citizenship, exposing that equality of opportunities does not exist in Brazil.

\(^{110}\) In 2016, at the beginning of their careers, state-run teachers, who weekly have to teach 16 hours and have to go to meetings, prepare classes, etc. in the other 4 hours, earned R$1,000 (£250) per month. Also at the beginning of their careers at the described private school, teachers who have the same attributions earn R$4,000 (£1,000) per month. In Brazilian private schools, the salaries vary, but they are at least twice of the salaries of state-run schools.
However, the impacts of this situation over students seem not clear for the observed school communities, since this was the only reflection about such influences identified in the interviews.

Associated with the situation described, a second problem of Brazilian education system is that, as perceived in the observed schools, there is lack of integration/engagement between social classes. Regarding the vast distance between these poor and the rich students’ worlds, a teacher claimed:

I don’t see the relation of the upper classes [students from private schools] with people from state-run schools.

This reality not only perpetuates inequalities of opportunities, but also reinforces a social reality in which rich and poor people do not share spaces, and are not integrated/engaged with each other.

In the private school, however, one attempt to deal with this situation was observed. This school sustains a poor primary school, and gives scholarships for their best students to join them at the secondary school. Moreover, some sport activities integrating the two schools are organised annually. Thus, the reality of these poor students becomes part of the imagination of teachers and students in the rich school. As a teacher said:

The issue of [integrating schools] is something else. Because we start to have another view.

This project of integration/engagement, however, seems to have low impact over the students. Two students from the rich school exposed the spread lack of knowledge about realities different from theirs:

S1 (Student 1): There are people in [the school helped by the rich school] who finish primary school, and don’t go to secondary school, because they have to work and sustain the family, did you understand? And we don’t have any idea of what it is like. And, then, people, they have, I think, we have a prejudice, because we don’t live together, did you understand? Because we think that they are different people, but we are the same, did you understand?
S2: I think that empathy and proactivity, which are things that we need in today’s world, are not developed [in the school]. Because we are not encouraged to live with people of the lower classes, we are not encouraged to live with people of different faiths.

This lack of cognitive, and, by consequence, emotional empathy and compassion reinforced by this system makes rich students not perceive important injustices in Brazilian society.

Finally, it is also important to draw attention to the fact that university admission tests hardly take into account the level of civic virtues of students. For example, they are not rewarded for having been cooperative or engaged in politics. At least, some changes in these tests with the introduction of a new national test called “Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio” (ENEM – High School National Exam) are demanding more students’ critical thinking and some knowledge related to citizenship.

11.3. How the wide official curriculum is applied

After reflecting on how the whole education system impacts students’ development of civic virtues, the next step is to consider how the school environment impacts these skills and knowledge. In 9.5, schools are presented as places that promote the transition from the private sphere (family) to the public (society), that is, the transition towards a civic life. Regarding this, schools help students’ adaptation to two different situations: there, they know people that are not part of their inner circle; in school, they experience social dynamics that are not based on family values. Knowing other people can develop students’ cognitive empathy, compassion, and celebration of differences. Sharing spaces and responsibilities can make students learn how to live in democratic societies and engage with the others through balancing competition and cooperation. Brazilian schools are equally not very successful in these regards.

The first achievement, the development of a wider cognitive empathy, is dependent on how school organisation brings different people together, and on how plural the school is (an issue more related to public policies that stimulate such a plurality). As described in 11.2, the observed schools are not very plural – at least regarding economic conditions. Moreover, though obviously there are other types of differences amongst students within each school
observed, it was not perceived in these schools’ organisation any concern in actively approximating their students.

Reflecting on a different but related issue, more than only putting different people into contact, schools can make students know different life styles by stimulating them, for example, to act in plays or read books. Such practices, however, were not clearly identified in the schools observed. Reading was strongly stimulated in the private school, but not in the state-run schools. Even so, it was not possible to identify in this reading encouragement any clear intension of expanding students’ cognitive empathy or compassion.

However, though the intention of cultivating empathy and compassion was not evident in the abovementioned activities, there were some projects in the private school clearly focused on this. Firstly, the aim of promoting cognitive empathy could be identified in one of them. As the secondary school head teacher of this school said:

There is a group of international relations whose main objective is to make the student think of a particular position of a country or people under the optics of a particular country, not the one I think, but from the point of view of the country I am representing.

Moreover, developing emotional empathy and, through this, compassion/solidarity, was also a much more identifiable concern in the private school. They were encouraged to do voluntary work, and this seemed to have impact, as reported by a teacher:

Those who participate in volunteering love it. They are few, but they love it. [...] A girl who is politically right but is sensitive (she respects, she hears), this girl that we were talking about was one of the most active in the volunteering group.

On the other hand, another teacher from the same school is critical of volunteering activities:

We have a volunteering group, but, as I say, [they] think “it’s cool”, “it is important”, but I still think that it is that thing of a European coming and wanting to see the Indian, that different thing. And that this is not part of them, their world. So they go there, try the different, but not as if it were theirs. [...] They participate without being, without identifying themselves.
Different criticisms come from the students. Some consider these solidarity activities as being promotional rather than having a genuine intention to help. Others see these activities as having low impact on its students. In the state-run schools, similar initiatives also seem ineffective. Though both have a calendar day called “The Day of Volunteering”, in one school, the participation of teachers and students was very low, while, in the other, this activity was cancelled.

However, the problems presented above are not the only limitations regarding the development of empathy and compassion in students. The process of socialisation, which favours such development, depends on the promotion of integration/engagement and celebration of differences. Nevertheless, it is explored in 11.2 that the schools in this study are socially segregated, something that disfavours integration/engagement. Regarding celebration of difference, no direct action that reinforces this or avoids practices of bullying was identified in any of the schools visited.

Since bullying is almost always practiced against people who belong to minorities, while in the same social group, it is important to reflect if certain prejudices happen in these environments. Regarding this, no teacher or student mentioned any situation of either racism or sexism, and most of them declared a strong development of respect towards homosexuals. Interviews and questionnaires did not pay special attention to racism and sexism. Some questions, however, were focused on how homosexuality is approached by school actors. A positive view on this respect was presented by a teacher from the state-run school with a more heterogeneous group of students:

A thing that is very well handled is the question of girls having their girlfriends, and boys having their sexual options\textsuperscript{111}. This is very well managed amongst [the students]. It is managed in a very respectful way by the school.

Nevertheless, this optimistic view about how students deal with homosexuality is only partially true. First, this friendly atmosphere is stronger in the school where the student population is more heterogeneous than in the other two schools. Second, some conservative ideas regarding adoption of children by same-sex couples are still shared by some students,\textsuperscript{111}

\footnote{The LGBT movement usually claims that instead of “option”, people should say “orientation”.}
mainly from the poorest school. The following dialogue presented in one interview with this school students – but also identifiable in my observations – shows this:

S1: I think [the adoption by same-sex couples] is wrong, as well. Depends, he wants to have children, and such. But it can be prejudice or not, but how would I feel having two fathers? It would be, wow, are you crazy? Having two fathers?

S2: Because it is, like, let’s say: “I will call your parents at school”. Then, it comes two men [laughs]. I will suffer bullying.

Given this fact, it is interesting to add that more than 50% of students say that LGBT rights are not discussed in their schools.

Regarding other prejudices, if racism and sexism were not strongly identified, prejudices experienced by students that do not follow the standards of beauty established by society were perceived in some reports and observations. One teacher had a strong claim related to this:

Nowadays, we don’t see jokes anymore about a guy who is homosexual, or who seems to be homosexual, we don’t have this discrimination any longer based on the fact that a guy wears a piercing. […] [But], sorry, the one who always suffers is the fat boy. Oh, the fat boy, he still suffers bullying. […] The chubby girl, then, she is destroyed. This is something from the society. The beauty standard is a strong reason for joking.

Observing students’ practices, this prejudice seems stronger than it was reported. Many jokes in classes and playground endorsed this impression.

In general, regarding the prejudices based on race, gender and sexual orientation, it seems that these schools’ communities do not spread them, though their practices towards diminishing society’s prejudices are timid. Few discussions aligned with the claims of black, LGBT and feminist movements were identified. And some prejudices, such as those against overweight students, seemed to be completely ignored. These observations can be a symptom of the lack of preparation of teachers regarding civic education.
Apart from promoting integration and celebrating differences, schools’ organisation can also improve students’ socialisation through preparing them to live in a democratic society and to compete in a cooperative system. Thus, the first analysis related to this reflects on students’ participation in determining school rules and syllabuses taught. It was perceived that this participation is minimal in this process. In all interviews, a question was posed on whether students participate in elaborating school rules and in determining what they learn. In general, students claim that they have very limited space to share opinions on both of these levels.

Regarding students’ participation in the process of elaborating school rules, no concrete mechanisms were mentioned. Many students reported lack of substantial justification behind school rules and the fact that they were not properly called to participate in the decision-making process. It is possible to imagine that this make the students feel that they are only passive recipients of things that come from the top, rather than feeling part of a cooperative venture. Regarding this, it is possible to find a significant literature reflecting on the role of students on defining school rules. For example, Devries and Zan (1995) identify in the socio-moral environment of most schools the practice of fostering submissive students. Vinha and Mantovani (2007) and Vivaldi (2013, p.132) insist that rules are regularly imposed arbitrarily and that schools do not distinguish between rules that are negotiable and those that are not. These research studies are aligned with what was perceived in the three schools observed.

In the private school, the lack of opportunity to discuss the syllabuses is related to a higher pressure for preparing students for universities admission tests. As two students said:

S1: We don’t participate in the syllabus decision, no way. I think because it has to be the syllabus of ENEM [university admission test], it has to be in accordance with ENEM.

S2: We are stimulated to think on school structural issues, on curriculum, etc. But, in the end, [...] it is very difficult to tell the head teacher: “look, the teaching practice of this place, even if it has success at ENEM, is not preparing citizens”.

Interestingly, the private school teachers give much more attention to ENEM, since their students have much more chance to succeed in this exam.
Besides the fact that the practice of democracy does not have an important place in these schools’ dynamics, it is also remarkable that teachers’ reflections and schools’ debates on different ideas of democracy were neither observed nor cited in the interviews. This situation deserves to be highlighted, since it seems that Brazilian society more broadly is having for the first time since its re-democratization (30 years ago) a process of self-reflection about its democratic system, and the need for a political reform has been discussed in the media exhaustively.

Though students’ input on rules and curricula definition remains limited, some space for students to criticise the establishment does exist, though this is limited. Students from the private school frequently expressed the difficulty in establishing a dialogue with their head teacher, despite the practice of a project that holds weekly meetings between the head teacher and various groups of students. As students have expressed, this context fails to provide them with a proper voice. My observations of the school structure confirm a deep-rooted distance between students and the head teacher. It was noticed that her office is on a separate floor, and that she has two secretaries, facts that ingrain this distant contact. For this reason, the secondary school head teacher assumes an important role in bridging this gap, though still insufficient for creating a more horizontal dialogue. As two different students voiced:

S1: There is much more [hierarchy] inside [our school] than in any other school.

S2: I think that [the head teachers] pay more attention to parents than students.

However, this school Students’ Union seems to compensate this lack of communication through its active political involvement. Students fully supported and praised their representatives’ activism:

Normally, those who are concerned about the others are those who are part of the Students’ Union or are classroom representatives.

My observations confirm the students’ union’s activism. They distinguished themselves through establishing contact with me, and proposed to develop channels of support and collaboration.
Regarding these two issues, the existing situation in the two state-run schools is totally different: the implication of their Student’s Unions is limited, whereas communication between students and head teachers happens in a more direct way.

In one of the state-run schools, the Students’ Union with direct elections was re-established two years ago, and its activities are still very limited, since there is not a culture in these regards. In the other, some interviewed students have shown total distrust in their Student’s Union. One, for example, opined that:

There is room [for criticism], because there is the Student’s Union. But that Union is useless. [...] The only thing that they did for the school was to put some music on at break time, nothing else.

In contrast to the private school, the head teachers and supervisors of the two state-run schools circulated through classrooms frequently and their offices were always open. These attitudes facilitated direct dialogue between students and managers. Moreover, a new policy implemented in state-run schools as part of the new Polytechnic Education was remarkable. It stimulated students to participate in their quarterly evaluations. Through these Participatory Councils, students had the opportunity to evaluate themselves, their teachers and their schools. As one student said:

Now, all the class listens to the problems of the class, not just the representatives. And also all the class can give their opinions, not only them.

All these reflections are focused on how schools stimulate students’ fight for rights within the schools. The cultivation of such a civic value could be expanded to the development of students’ fight for rights in the whole society domain. However, it was not possible to identify any trace of teachers’ reflections about how to deal with students’ anger, the importance of stimulating them to participate in demonstrations or practice civil disobedience. Even so, regarding the stimulus to participate in demonstrations, only one situation could be perceived. A history teacher of the poorest school called up, in a very top-down way, students to participate in a demonstration against some government austerity policies. A type of assembly was organised in the playground, but basically only this teacher
expressed his view on the subject and invited the students to join him in the demonstration. Actions directly organised by students or through their Students Unions were not noticed.

After analysing the extent to which students are stimulated to elaborate and criticise schools’ rules and curricula, and mobilising themselves against unfair public policies, it is also important to think about how schools cultivate the willingness to obey rules. Thinking of internal rules and curriculum, in general, teachers and head teachers identify two main problems regarding this: lack of reflection on the reasons behind them; and lack of inspection over their enforcement.

At the start of the academic year, teachers from the private school attended a lecture by Telma Vinha, professor at one of the most reputable universities in Brazil (Unicamp), on the importance of presenting reasons behind rules. The influence of her teachings is noticeable, as three of six teachers quote her ideas in this thesis’ interviews accomplished three months after the lecture. One of them mentioned:

We have a disruptive generation, with a critical view that do not accept simple rules. Wow, [Telma] made me think a lot.

However, this private school teachers’ awareness (motivated by these type of lectures and other activities) was not identified in the two state-run schools observed. Apart from one tangential mention regarding this, no other teacher from either two schools presented any kind of comment in this line of thought.

In state-run schools, besides the lack of teachers’ awareness regarding this issue, structural difficulties impede teachers in having students follow certain rules. The absence of regulated punctuality has allowed students to arrive very late or even skip their classes. Though one of the state-run schools has improvised the presence of a doorman, the other simply does not have such a person. As one student noted:

There are rules [about arriving at the time], but I think that 90% of the students don’t follow the rules. Especially because there is not a person, a doorman, to push. They enter the time they want, they leave the time they want.
Additionally, the constant lack of teachers makes their timetable completely erratic, which develops in students the idea that schedules do not need to be followed. The head teacher of a state-run school says:

[There is] lack of teachers, teachers arriving late. Students demand this. Because I’m always demanding punctuality. […] And they: “but teacher X arrived late, teacher Y doesn’t come”.

My observations in both state-run schools confirm these problems. In the poorest school, students were left without a Spanish and Integrated Seminar teacher for two months. Moreover, first classes regularly started with a 15-minute delay, as was the case in sequential classes throughout the day. In the private school, more than a five-minute delay were scarcely perceived. On average, students from both state-run schools were frequently left without instruction for an hour per day, in most cases due to teacher absence. Additionally, it was a common practice of state-run school teachers to “administer” two classes at once, which posed obvious quality issues and added to the psychological stress of teachers. Finally, in the poorest school, classes were usually attended by only half of the students enrolled, while in the private school, it was rare to notice even one absence.

However, the private school’s control over attendance through the use of doormen and monitors posed privacy problems for some students. Some of them complained about this:

The school put a camera in the classroom. I think that is an abuse of privacy, even of the relationship between teachers and students.

Finally, some changes in the way state-run schools evaluate their students led teachers to believe in the progressive decline of the importance of rules. Changes in Polytechnic Teaching evaluating policy have relaxed end-of-year passing criteria. This, according to certain teachers, diminishes students’ commitments to their duties. As one teacher argued:

A fundamental rule is punctuality. […] In the past, when [the grading system was based on numbers], the student who handed in [his works] on the right day and time had not any discount in their grades. […] Then, all students ran to hand in on time. With this new evaluation, the student knows that, if he didn’t hand in today, he can hand in tomorrow, and so on.
Apart from these different school organisations, reflections on the importance of respecting rules for the development of a stable society were not identified.

A last reflection on how the organisation of these specific schools helps in the transition from family to public sphere is focused on how these institutions establish a balance between cooperation and competition. Regarding this, it is quite clear that, in the private school, competition is strongly encouraged, as a teacher’s quote exemplifies:

We encourage the students to excel, to be the best.

The secondary school head teacher of the private school acknowledged that competition is important for them. However, he claimed that, through stimulating the practice of sports, this virtue comes with others:

[Through stimulating sports practice], the school has a very clear idea of working simultaneously on the issue of competitiveness along with other values such as respect, ethics, solidarity.

The practices of both state-run schools go in the opposite direction. Two teachers from these two schools identified this and expressed frustration with this situation:

T1: The school does not stimulate competition very much, on the other hand, the school, we warn [the students] that there is a competition in the world. In the university entrance examination, to get a job, there are selections there [...] And school must do this.

T2: The competition is healthy. [...] School is dedicated to university access. And that access passes through the competition [...] And our school has failed [regarding encouraging competition].

Interestingly, both state-run schools seem to focus their activities on cooperation. This aim was presented by the head teacher of one of them:

I believe that we work hard the issue of cooperation, more in state-run schools than in private ones that the cooperation is worked.
It is also worth mentioning that, according to some teachers, the state-run school system of assessment mentioned reinforces this gap. It is quite common to hear that a new state-run school’s system of evaluation, which reduces the declared differences amongst students’ performances, makes them study less, because they do not have grades anymore to reward their effort:

Today, [...] we don’t give any priority for the student who studied, [...] the student who [used to score] top marks, who did everything, who should be appreciated.

In the private school, on the other hand, students are rewarded when they have good “academic performance”. As a dialogue amongst three of its students shows:

S1: There is a prize [if you have good academic performance].
S2: It depends on your score at the end of the year. It is not a competition, buuuut…
S3: If you give your best, then you win.

Such competition helps them to have a better performance in university admission tests, which enlarges the opportunities gap between private and state-run students.

Moreover, another characteristic of all systems of assessment is that they rarely reward students who cooperate. Only one teacher of sociology from a state-run school clearly mentioned that he includes cooperation in his evaluations:

Durkheim also said that what constitutes society is, as well, this solidarity chain amongst individuals. [...] Obviously, you have to have this notion of collectivism. [...] Part of my evaluation is qualitative.

A student from the private school, on the other hand, denounces what seems to be usual practice in all three schools, mainly at his own:

Officially, [cooperation amongst students] never had any recognition.

11.4. How the narrow official curriculum is applied
After observing some evidences of the Brazilian education system and schools on students’ development of civic virtues, the specific syllabuses oriented to cultivate civic virtues are analysed. In general, it can be said that the fact that there is not a specific subject responsible for discussing these issues associated with the lack of teachers’ general preparation on these regards makes what this thesis calls narrow official curriculum ineffective in cultivating civic virtues. The scenario is, however, complex and deserves a careful analysis.

First, through examining the development of schools’ National Curricular Guidelines (10.2), it is remarkable that Brazil’s official secondary schools’ curriculum does not include a subject called “citizenship education”, as is the case in England, France and other countries (9.1). However, in the private school observed, the primary level dedicated one hour per week to discuss students’ conflicts and to promote certain virtues through general class assemblies. Moreover, their idea is to expand this practice for the older students. On the other hand, the construction of state-run schools’ official curricula depends largely on states’ government decisions, and such a subject was not introduced.

Though no subject is specifically designated to teach these virtues, school communities believe that some subjects are oriented to implicitly cultivate citizenship. In the schools observed, 18% of teachers who answered the questionnaire consider that this subject actually exists. This assumption is presumably rooted in these teachers’ impression and understanding of subjects such as philosophy and/or sociology. When asked about explicit curricula that develops civic virtues in students, a state-run school teacher said:

I see all the time philosophy and sociology teachers approaching [the development of moral values].

It is possible to explain why school communities’ belief that philosophy and sociology are the main subjects responsible for developing citizenship education. In 10.1, it was discussed that, during the Dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985), philosophy and sociology were “replaced” in basic curriculum by a subject called “moral and civic education”, which was used for spreading propaganda of that regime. Then, after re-democratization, in 1993, moral and civic education was banished from the curriculum and, in 1996, the Brazilian Guidelines and Bases Law of Education (LDB – Lei de Diretrizes e Bases) associated philosophy and sociology
knowledge with citizenship education (Article 36). In 2008, these subjects were considered mandatory, though their syllabuses were not focused on citizenship education. Thus, many people think that the main purpose of philosophy and sociology is to discuss citizenship.

Observing teachers’ and students’ discourses, all subjects labelled by the name of humanities (philosophy, sociology, history and geography) are broadly considered by most as oriented to teach citizenship. For example, a history teacher endorsed the association of her subject with citizenship debates:

If I don’t discuss [gay rights] here, will it be up to the physics teacher? Yes, he can discuss it, but it is not from his syllabus, it’s not his cup of tea. It is my cup of tea.

Interestingly, “gay rights” is not part of history syllabus, but this teacher “unofficially” (as discussed in 11.5) introduces such issue in her discussions, since she considers herself able to do so.

However, as equally discussed in 10.2, curricular guidelines presented by different governments in the last 20 years claim that all subjects, rather than only the humanities, should participate in cultivating civic virtues. Indeed, such guidelines have defended the need to cultivate moral and civic virtues through cross-curricular themes activities developed across all subjects (Brasil, 1997; 2013, p.187).

Even so, this rarely happens in subjects such as mathematics, Portuguese or natural sciences. In the interviews, even when directly asked about them, few teachers and students cited any related activities. Teachers from the private school often mentioned the pressure for developing syllabus specific to the demands of university admission exams. One of them, for example, said:

The teacher’s problem is almost always the same: we have a prison, which is the vestibular [the university admission test].

Teachers from state-run schools also develop only a few interdisciplinary activities, but for different reasons. Given the low salaries these teachers receive, they have to work much more hours and do not have extra time to develop new ideas. For these reasons, it is very difficult
for state school teachers to organise meetings to discuss existing and potential avenues of interdisciplinary activities.

In addition to being unable to run interdisciplinary activities, teachers seem to be unqualified to teach citizenship. Only 30% of teachers from the schools observed considered themselves well trained to discuss citizenship with their students, while 35% considered themselves completely unprepared. These data are aligned with the literature on this subject. As Vinha, for example, says, in Brazil, “very few undergraduate courses effectively address, in their curricula, contents related to the development of autonomy and moral education in a systematised way” (2017).

Careful exploration of this issue in the interviews further revealed that almost all teachers and head teachers admit that they are not at all prepared to deal with this syllabus in their classrooms. As the secondary school head teacher of the private school said:

> The secondary school teacher received, most of time, preparation for being a mathematician, chemist, physicist, biologist, historian, and very little emphasis is on questions related to pedagogy and cross-curricular discussions. And he has many difficulties to insert into the classroom issues like violence, alcohol, drugs, “homosexualism”.

Reflecting specifically on the syllabus related to civic knowledge suggested in 9.7, it was not observed any development of knowledge of constitutional and civic rights, or notions of economics, individuals’ psychology, etc. Only Western and Brazilian history are part of schools’ curricula. Even the way that the history of peoples who formed Brazil is discussed is questionable. African and American Indian history is almost ignored, though current debates on the amplification of it in formal curriculum are happening (10.3).

Besides, teachers’ reflections on three concepts related to equality of opportunities – equality, liberty and meritocracy – were, then, investigated. In general, they showed very restricted knowledge about these ideas. Related to this, the attention given by the three schools for reflections on the concepts of equality and liberty was almost unperceivable. Investigations on such concepts are not in the official curriculum, and most teachers do not show enough knowledge to lead discussions on them. Of course, sometimes teachers mention equality and liberty in their classes. However, at least in the classes observed, no one presented any
reflection on their meanings, even less the relation of them with equality of opportunities. During the interviews, as mentioned above, only one mentioned that the opportunities of rich and poor people in Brazil are very unequal.

Reflections about merit – actually associated with the idea of equality of opportunities – were a bit more present in the interviews, however, quoted only by a few of them. The two most interesting teachers’ comments about this point were:

T1: Meritocracy doesn’t fit the Brazilian reality. Maybe [it fits the reality of] several countries like US, that is the great seller of this idea, or GB, which offers good basic education for all people.

T2: The reality is: who has more money put [their children] in the best school. [...] There is not meritocracy, there is no merit in being son or daughter of rich people.

Yet, when teachers were asked if their schools promote debates on merit and on the difference of quality between state-run and private schools, they claim that such things do not happen. This fact indicates that deep theoretical discussions on economic inequalities are not promoted in any of the schools in this study.

This was also the case for general theoretical discussions on equality of rights between, for example, people with different sexual orientations. Most teachers said that they usually do not approach this theme. One added that he felt frustrated with the omission of reflecting about these “progressive” questions within his (private) school:

I think [LGBT rights] are too little [discussed]. [...] The institution [school] doesn’t discuss these frontiers of thinking of civil society.

Critical thinking is presented in 9.7 as one of the main syllabuses to be developed in schools. Unlike the development of values like compassion, it is rare to find someone against cultivating critical thinking. Even so, critical thinking was not perceived as central to the curriculum. No one, for example, drew attention to the importance of learning how to learn. Moreover, there is not a dedicated subject focused on cultivating critical thinking skills, and,
when such a syllabus is developed in subjects like languages, this is much more the result of certain teachers’ individual initiatives, as discussed in 11.5.

Nevertheless, the private school made some effort in this regard. As the head teacher of the secondary education said:

We are also working to establish a group for debates. […] We don’t want the discussion for the sake of it: I think this, I think that. No! [We want to know] what the authors who defend such points of view think.

However, while this project is emerging in the private school, it remains absent in the state-run ones.

11.5. How unofficial curriculum is applied

The underlying impression concluded from the descriptions of 11.3 and 11.4 iterates the dysfunctional integration of citizenship education within official curricula. Teachers have attempted to compensate for this gap through a limited number of “unofficial curriculum” initiatives. In the interviews, teachers describe two types of individual initiatives towards citizenship education: direct practices that help students to develop some virtues; and adaptations of the syllabus to talk about certain issues. A teacher from one of the state-run schools presented an example of this first initiative. She reported an action that produced a good result, and involved students with social causes:

[A certain teacher] is collecting food to take to Padre Cacique Nursing Home.

However, it was not possible to identify any other similar initiative through observations or interviews.

The other type of practice occurs during classes. Some teachers adapt their syllabus to talk about civic virtues. A Portuguese teacher from the private school, for example, said that she usually presents texts about controversial issues like adoption by same-sex couples in order to develop critical thinking.
Though uncommon, a few similar individual initiatives were identified in other observations.

Beyond introducing political debates to classrooms, certain teachers presented their personal political views to students. There is a longstanding debate in Brazil on whether teachers have the right to do this. This point is treated theoretically in 9.8, in which three different attitudes towards this (neutral chairman, balanced approach, state commitment) are discussed, and is further developed in the next and final chapters. The intention of this section, however, is only to present some teachers’ existing practices regarding this. Some promoted political discussions, but assumed the position of the neutral chairman, as described by a private school teacher:

A priori, I’m in favour [of same-sex couples adoptions], insofar as we have so many orphans in the world. [...] This only touches [my] classes. [...] I, particularly, avoid giving my opinion, [...] not only about this issue, but in political issues.

However, in the same school, another teacher also discusses politics, but assuming an opposite behaviour. She described her practice thus:

During my time as teacher, I have always presented my [political] positions. And until now, I have not had major problems. I have always worked in important schools, in private schools, exactly for opening up this possibility.

On the other hand, in the two state-run schools, teachers have many more opportunities to present their own political opinions. First, since they are public servants, they have stability and are not afraid of any pressure from parents or their managers. Moreover, their own oppressive conditions, as well as those of their students, incentivise them to fight for more equality. Finally, parents are quite absent, and few complain against such practices. This environment creates conditions for some teachers to strongly present their political ideas, as one history teacher assumed to do:

I fight against all prejudices, I fight everyday against sexism, [...] against prejudices of gender, ethnicity, race. [...] I bring many daily issues, situations that happened, and I align [these things] with more academic theories. [...] I talk on the issue of inequality that is the great motive for violence.
Related to this, during my observations in the poorest state-run school, I identified some political actions led by this teacher. He mobilised students at the playground to protest against austerity policies calling them up to participate in a demonstration.

11.6. How hidden curriculum is “applied”

The last dimension of schools’ curricula related to the cultivation of the sense of citizenship is called “hidden curriculum”. As discussed in 9.8, such a curriculum is usually mentioned to criticise school practices which keep structures of power that harm the worst-off. Here, however, positive and negative elements of hidden curriculum are investigated. As section 11.3 presents, the processes of elaborating, criticising and applying rules and curricula are connected with the development of students’ civic virtues. Such development prepares students to actively participate in democratic societies. However, depending on how schools practices really happen, they can either reiterate the status quo or stimulate new ideas towards building a more just society. Here, the ways teachers challenge students to think about the status quo and to project their futures are analysed.

At the beginning, it is important to highlight that some teachers express several concerns about how certain sectors of society, mainly the media, cultivate in young people values that make them to perpetuate unjust structures. Two examples of these concerns are presented:

T1: The lack of interest in politics happens because people are politically illiterate. And this is a project [...] of Capital. [...] [The capitalists] dominate the major media, which makes people get into these individualistic fights.

T2: State-run schools have been gradually run down, and this is the fruit of a project, this is not by chance. It is increasingly a way to transform the masses, to increasingly dumb them down, to make them increasingly stupid. The more stupid, the easier they are to control.

It is mentioned in 6.1 that mass media, certain organisations of civil society (such as Neo-Pentecostal churches) and family attachments have a huge influence on Brazilian people’s behaviours in the social/public sphere. In 9.4, the school is presented as an institution that should counterbalance this influence.
Regarding this, the two teachers mentioned above have slightly different interpretations of what has been the role of schools in societies that are strongly influenced by the media. Whilst the former believes that schools are places that fight against this status quo, the latter understands them only as its by-product:

T1: State-run schools, in general, [...] stimulate collectivism, but this is a very difficult practice, because we have to combat our strong enemy, which is much stronger than us: the television.

T2: There is certain hypocrisy of thinking that the school can change society. [...] It would be weird the school producing vanguard and inquiring people. It was not for this that it was born. [...] It is a production line of minds.

The first opinion – which defends that the school stimulates cooperation – is shared by most of the 18 teachers interviewed, while the second – which understands school only as an instrument that perpetuates structures of powers – does not have another identifiable supporter amongst the interviewees. They believe that schools already help (though not decisively) students to understand, criticise, and fight against injustices, that is, to challenge the status quo.

Nevertheless, students from all schools see hidden in teachers’ practices an imposition of ideas, instead of stimulating free thinking. One student from the private school and another from the poorest school, respectively, presented similar impressions:

S1: I don’t feel encouraged to think, did you understand? It is something like paraphrase a thing that you already read. [...] I think that we should think more about what we learn.

S2: Sometimes there are teachers that think that the guy [...] is bad mannered, because the guy said something. But the guy didn’t have bad manners, he wanted to dialogue. He wanted to say that that thing is not right, that is wrong. He wants to give his opinion.

The supervisor of one of the state-run schools, however, does not consider teachers’ practices as the origin of this lack of students’ critical attitude. In the following claim, she summarised
a general impression of teachers that associated the lack of critical thinking with the apathy of students:

One of the issues that I see in this year is the relation that these students have with the government. It is a relation of fatalism, like “I can’t do anything, I can’t act, it is impossible”.

This lack of activism is reinforced (or at least not reduced), since many teachers avoid discussing these issues. They do not even assume the position of a neutral chairman, the attitude of promoting political debates but not presenting any position. Related to this, as presented in 11.5 there is a huge debate in Brazil on whether teachers should present their political positions to their students, that is, to be stated committed. Through my observations, it was possible to perceive that some state-run school teachers, mainly those from the humanities, presented certain political views to their students. They cannot be fired and they are also poor, things that make them fight more for change. This does not mean that private school teachers do not present their political opinions. Actually, it was observed, that most of the time these teachers were equally pro social change. Even so, some of the latter are afraid of losing their jobs, since they feel that their opinions can collide with parents’ ideas on justice. It is possible to say that this fear is hidden in the private school’s curriculum. Without threatening any teacher, though reinforcing that political positions have to be balanced, the head teacher of the private school in the interview explicitly said:

[At our school, the teacher] has to show the different sides of the story. One cannot frame an issue on ideological bias. [...] The teacher can only say what socialism is, but he or she cannot say that socialism is good or bad.

Regarding these two different practices, it is possible to identify two hidden practices. On the one hand, in the private school, parents’ and community’s pressures discourage teachers to present their ideas of justice. On the other, state-run school teachers, many times, apply a “hidden curriculum” through cultivating their political ideas on the students without an appropriate dialogue with them. The example presented in 11.5 of a teacher that called students up to participate in a demonstration is emblematic.

Interestingly, however, it is clear that this teacher moves students from their passivity, a problem identified in the above by a supervisor of the other state-run school. Actually,
students tended to appreciate his practices, and usually referred to him as a teacher concerned with their well-being:

The teacher that I admire most here in the school is [the above mentioned one]. With him I learn loads. [...] He tells us that we have to fight for what we want, to fight for our rights.

Besides schools’ and teachers’ hidden practices towards making students accept or question the status quo, some school actors’ discourses and procedures that are fundamental in shaping students’ future aspirations are also hidden in the curriculum. Regarding this, it is remarkable to notice that the private school prepares the future leaders, while the state-run schools try but are unsuccessful in preparing their students for the future. As a state-run school teacher said, leadership is intimately connected with the structural gap between the two types of Brazilian schools:

Why is state-run schooling so precarious? Because it is not interesting that people think. [...] There is a private school oriented to prepare leaders, and a state-run school oriented to prepare subalterns. And this is not in the project, it is not in the curriculum, but it is evident at the practice.

In this study, the practice of preparing leaders was being institutionalised in the private school through a project called “The Leader in Me”\textsuperscript{112} which aimed at developing in its students virtues linked to leadership. It is interesting to highlight that half of the private school teachers interviewed explicitly mentioned the vocation of the school to prepare future leaders. As three of them claimed:

T1: [At Farroupilha, students] are extremely competitive and encouraged to compete, knowing that they will be the leaders that will give orders.

T2: Because [students] have a very high purchasing power, they will fill in a role of taking decisions within society. At least, we expect this. It doesn’t mean that the others cannot, anyway, but they already have a predisposition for this, by the fact their parents have much

\textsuperscript{112} “The Leader in Me” is an international platform which helps schools to develop leadership skills in “every student”. In its website (http://www.theleaderinme.org/what-is-the-leader-in-me/), these skills are identified as: leadership, responsibility, accountability, problem solving, adaptability, communication, initiative and self-direction, creativity, cross-cultural skills, teamwork.
money. [...] School has tried to promote a reflection [on moral values], not only with students, but with the school community in general.

T3: When I talk [on issues linked with Geography], I’m thinking of the student that will be a politician, [...] engineer or architect [...], lawyer [...], doctor.

In the first quote, it is possible to identify a strong influence of a certain type of neoliberal ethos behind this stimulus for developing competitive skills. Such an influence cannot be perceived in the second one. On the contrary, the fact that students will probably be leaders makes this teacher realise that it is even more important to cultivate moral values in them. Additionally, in the private school, students are involved in projects like “Junior Achievement” which focuses on shaping future entrepreneurs\textsuperscript{113}. This emphasis is evident in the third statement which shows the focus of this private school on preparing skilled workers and policymakers.

Actually, in the private school, political leaders’ preparation was clearly identifiable. This is exemplified by the importance given by students, teachers and managers to its Student Union. Some practices also corroborate this, such as one described by a geography teacher:

I put it, I make a point of putting the student in the place of a mayor, a town planner, a construction secretary and thinking about the city in the long run.

It is interesting to notice the completely different realities of students attending the poorest school. In general, they present much lower ambitions. Some students, for example, consider not finishing their secondary school:

S1: If they were not forced by their parents, most would stop studying. In a thousand students here, [...] it would have only a hundred studying.

S2: One is formed [at the primary school], one already knows the things, [...] already learned. Several people sometimes leave school because of this. Because they have to work.

\textsuperscript{113} The project’s official website (https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja-usa/home) says: that “Junior Achievement’s Purpose” is to “inspire and prepare young people to succeed in a global economy”.\textsuperscript{113}
The fact that many students from the poorest school in this study start working during secondary school (and nobody from the private one) implies less time for them to study and acquire fundamental knowledge to obtain good jobs. As the head teacher of this school commented, students’ inclination towards consumerism and their feelings of immediacy stimulate them to start working so early:

Sometimes they think that they need that money to buy a fashion trainer, but cannot see the other side: what they could gain if they pass that time studying and preparing themselves for a certain undergraduate course.

In the other state-run school however, only few students work. In fact, many take university admission tests seriously. Two reasons are behind this difference between the two state-run school students: on average, its students are richer and have less need to earn money; and, since the affirmative action for students from state-run schools were implemented, they now have a real chance of being admitted – this does not happen with students of the poor school, because, on average, they do not have even the minimum grades to be approved.

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Chapter 11 is based on primary data collected during three months of observations in some Brazilian schools. The five different levels of curriculum proposed in chapter 9 are observed separately in order to show how citizenship education happens. Only an initial analysis of this process is carried out in order to establish a comparison with what is ideally proposed (chapter 9) and the laws determined (chapter 10). From this comparison, and with some teachers’ and students’ suggestions (chapter 12), a feasible theory of curriculum is outlined in the conclusion.
12. How citizenship education should happen in Brazil (from school actors’ perspectives)

As a complement to the theoretical-practical analysis on citizenship curriculum, this thesis presents some school actors’ ideas on how civic virtues should be taught/cultivated. Such ideas are important for two reasons. First, views of teachers and students based on their daily classroom practices dialogue with the debate about citizenship education by presenting more feasible ideas related to this than theoretical academic work which rarely engages with these realities. Moreover, though certain teachers’ and students’ ideas on this are superficial and sometimes misleading, it is important to take these reflections into account. In this case, such knowledge becomes additional data about how things in schools happen and how schools actors think towards teaching/cultivating citizenship. In order to accomplish these things, the present chapter starts (12.1) by reflecting on teachers’ and students’ overall ideas about the most important civic values that should be encouraged at home and at school. Then, school actors’ impressions on (12.2) how the Brazilian education system (supra official curriculum) and schools’ internal structures (wide official curriculum) should be organised to promote citizenship education are taken into account. Following this, (12.3) their proposals of syllabuses and subjects related to citizenship (narrow official curriculum) that should be developed are presented. Finally, (12.4) school actors’ opinions on how to promote civic values through individual initiatives (unofficial curriculum) are also investigated.

12.1. Overall view

At the beginning, it is interesting to present a very wide view on teachers’ and students’ main ideas about what should be taught/cultivated at schools regarding citizenship education. Analysing the questionnaires, it is possible to identify an overall idea that citizenship education should be further developed. The answers to some pre-established questions have shown that about 85% of teachers and 75% students agreed that schools should have more of an impact on teaching/cultivating citizenship virtues114. From the answers to other oriented questions, it is possible to perceive that the vast majority of them also agreed that schools should encourage, more than they do, students’ critical thinking, solidarity, respect for rules, respect for rules,

114 Of course, this result was predictable and probably is similar all over the world, since people are normally not satisfied with education in general. However, it still is data that reinforce the point presented.
political awareness and fighting for rights. At least 90% of teachers and students defended these ideas. The only slightly different pattern was identified in private school students’ impressions about political awareness, where a lower number, 76%, believed that the school should encourage this.

The first two questions of the questionnaires appealed to a different strategy. They were open-ended and asked teachers and students to write what they consider the three most important citizenship virtues that, respectively, should be encouraged at home and in school. More than one hundred different answers were presented. A few of these ideas were preponderant (that is, cited by at least 10% of teachers and/or students). This list is composed of the following virtues: respect, education/manners/upbringing\(^{115}\), solidarity, ethics, honesty and responsibility:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Teachers say that it should be encouraged at</th>
<th>Students say that it should be encouraged at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/manners/upbringing</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical behaviour</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of answers does not make clear whether teachers and students differ in their views as to which virtues that should be cultivated at home compared to those that should be cultivated in school. Normally, the quotations presented the same values as those that should be taught/cultivated at both. A claim from the head teacher of one of the state-run schools summarises a very common idea about this:

> I cannot separate values [in two types]: these which have to be worked with in schools and those in families. In my view, it is a continuity. Bases are seeded at home, and these values have to be enlarged at school.

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\(^{115}\) In Portuguese, “educação” is a word that can have these different meanings.
Moreover, it is possible to identify a lack of respondents’ deep reflection through analysing the main answers of the two open-ended questions. For example, “respect” was by far the most quoted virtue that, in their views, should be encouraged both at home and in school. However, due to the limitations of the survey design, it is not clear whether most respondents shared the same idea of respect. In the interviews, the predominance of this idea could also be perceived, but teachers’ and students’ precise understanding of respect lacked clarity. Whilst some defended that students should obey parents’ and teachers’ orders, others expressed that students should tolerate and accept people who think and behave differently from them.

“Educação” was the second most cited civic virtue. However, in Portuguese, this term can mean not only “education”, but also “manners” and “upbringing”, that is, everything that parents and teachers/schools transfer to children and learners in general. Thus, no doubt, this term is even more undefined than “respect”. This lack of precision makes students quote this concept much more than teachers, since the former have more difficulty in elaborating their ideas.

As also presented above, “solidarity” is, as well, highly cited. Differently from the other two concepts, the definition of solidarity seems to be more precise: something like “helping other people in general”. It is interesting to notice that most people cited this concept, while few appealed to ideas like “altruism”, “fraternity”, “care”, “compassion” and “empathy”.

“Ethical behaviour” was highly cited by teachers as a virtue that should be encouraged. Students, in a much smaller number, also recalled this idea. Though not as ambiguous as “educação”, “ethical behaviour” is also very difficult to define. However, it is worth realising that a higher number of teachers and students considered school as the appropriate place to encourage such a virtue, and this fact may indicate that ethical behaviour is seen by them as a type of correct attitude towards the community in general.

“Honesty” – and associated ideas such as sincerity, integrity, truth – was equally highly cited virtue. Such a virtue, it is worth saying, is constantly mentioned in the media, since Brazil is a country with high levels of corruption in different sphere. Related to this the introduction mentions research from Latinobarômetro Corporation (2010) which says that Brazilians have very low level of trust in their institutions.
“Responsibility”, the sixth most cited concept, also deserves to be mentioned. As with most of the others, it is a very ambiguous concept. It could mean, at least, our responsibilities “towards our personal tasks” or “towards the well-being of the others and the environment”.

From these analyses, the first impression is: citizenship education is considered very important for most school actors, but they do not have a clear idea of what it means. The following sections pay more attention to how teachers and students understand these concepts and present with more detail their suggestions about how to implement civic education in schools.

12.2. How supra and wide official curricula should be applied

This section explores discussions related to wide official curriculum, since almost nothing was said in the interviews and questionnaires about the connection between the way that the current education system is carried out and citizenship education. In the interviews, when directly asked if all students deserve schools with the same quality, only one teacher said that parents who desire to pay for a better school should have this right; the other teachers defended the same quality of education for all. This opinion was also held amongst managers and students.

Reflections on how the educational system could impact on students’ civic knowledge, however, were quite rare. For example, only one teacher suggested that an unequal system sends a wrong message about justice and equality of opportunities for students.

Changing the focus from supra to wide official curriculum, in the questionnaires and interviews, it was not very easy to identify suggestions on how schools’ organisational structures could help students to develop certain civic virtues. Few new procedures were proposed. At the beginning, it is worth mentioning that almost none associated school procedures towards democratic participation with citizenship education. Only one teacher (among 74) and three students (among 285) mentioned “political awareness” (or some concept directly correlated) as one of the three most important civic virtues that should be encouraged at schools. At the interviews, this idea was only identified in a very broad way.

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116 In school actors’ views.
On the other hand, ways to enhance student’s autonomous choices were vindicated by some students and teachers. In the open-ended section of the questionnaire, very few respondents mentioned the concepts of liberty or autonomy as one of the most important values to be encouraged in schools. In the interviews, some approached indirectly the importance of autonomous choices when they defended the idea of students choosing, at least partially, their own subjects. One student, from the private school, and one teacher, from a state-run school, respectively, proposed:

S: [The school] should have all the basic subjects, but some of them you should choose. Like in the US, where you can advance in mathematics if you want.

T: A school should not be formatted. It should have guidelines, but completely flexible. […] It is useless for me to come here to teach the beauty of Beethoven’s works, if the guy likes to listen to funk.

However, if stimulating democratic practices was not something that school actors strongly defended, on the other hand, when directly asked, almost all teachers were in favour of encouraging students to respect rules. Interestingly, most students are also in favour of this (94% in the private school and around 80% in state-run schools). However, though they massively agreed on the issue of respecting rules, again, only one simple suggestion was presented in the interviews: to respect deadlines.

At the same time, also when directly asked, at least 90% of teachers and students think that students should be stimulated by the school to fight for their rights. However, apart from one teacher that actively stimulates his students to participate in demonstrations (mentioned in the previous chapter), no other suggestions on how to do this were presented.

Regarding the development of empathy, surprisingly, this idea was spontaneously mentioned very few times by schools’ actors as something that should be cultivated in schools. Three suggestions towards developing (cognitive) empathy, however, can be presented. The first is an activity already implemented in the private school (and mentioned in the previous chapter). After describing a project in which students were appointed to represent different countries in simulations of UN debates, the head teacher of secondary education said:
This has a fantastic result. Because sometimes we have students who condemn certain positions, but who are forced to develop arguments of protection, defence of the same position.

The other two reflections presented by one student and one teacher, both from the private school, suggested the importance of integrating/engaging different social classes:

S: What [school] should promote, but it doesn’t, is to make [students] see other social realities beyond theirs. It is marvellous that foreign schools come here to lecture showing that they can study in England, Canada and US, but they don’t know how Bom Jesus is, which is nearby. […] It would be a very nice interaction.

T: I think of practices like “From the school to life”. I think of bringing students to poor areas. […] It would be a unique experience. When we live something, experience something, this marks us much more than a short rational memory that enters and leaves flying.

School actors strongly defended the development of compassion/solidarity through formal education. More than 90% of teachers and 80% of students directly asked about this were in favour of the idea that solidarity towards unknown people should be encouraged at school. Solidarity was also highly mentioned in an open-ended question as one of the three most important virtues to be encouraged in schools (38% of teachers and 10% of students suggested this). However, few and unelaborated proposals on how to develop solidarity were presented in the interviews.

Moreover, deep reflections on what empathy and solidarity really mean, and how (and if) these concepts can reinforce each other were rarely perceived.

Concerning ideas on how to cultivate empathy and solidarity, reflections on how (and if) developing senses of competition and cooperation were also not deeply developed by school actors. Certain ideas, however, were presented. Through reflecting on this, no teacher presented any radical position against stimulating competition. Some said that the world is competitive, others that this behaviour is good for the whole society. On the other hand, all

117 It is a poor area very close to this rich school.
teachers called attention to the importance of cooperation, and said that a central role of schools is to develop this virtue. Nevertheless, few proposals on how to achieve this were presented. Three teachers highlighted the vague idea that more group work should be promoted. The impact of the systems of assessment towards this received very few comments, as well. One private school teacher, however, proposed:

Why do we not also evaluate students based on their citizen practices, everyday life interventions, collaboration?

A different idea on how schools should be organised to develop civic virtues calls attention to the importance of their approximation with families. It is mentioned in 12.1 that most teachers and students did not differentiate the types of virtues that families and school should encourage. Even so, some teachers highlighted the importance of connecting schools and families in order to encourage closer ties between the former and society in general. As one state-run school teacher said:

Basic school, in my view, is that which really brings parents into the school. Because you cannot implement an activity with children if you don’t know the environment in which they live. […] Usual daily facts have to be brought to the classroom.

In this way, a state-run school teacher ponders that, for example, the process of celebration of differences related to sexual orientation has to be promoted slowly, since family’ environments are usually more conservative than schools, and can strongly oppose such radical changes:

[The issue of prejudice against homosexuals] is getting better over the years. [...] You are going to break some paradigms while generations are renewed. I don’t think it is easy to touch on this content now. [...] Maybe if you are more prudent, you can reach more people.

A different understanding in this regards is, however, presented by a teacher form one of the state-run schools:
The school, indeed, has to work on the acceptance of [the fact] that human beings are diverse and that each one has his own path, his own characteristics, and has as many rights as I do, and there is not a standard individual, a normal one.

12.3. How narrow official curriculum should be applied

After reflecting on how teachers and students think that school environments should promote citizenship education, this section presents their opinions on how these virtues should be taught/cultivated through syllabuses and subjects. It, then, starts by analysing which kind of changes in the narrow curriculum they consider essential. In the questionnaires, five claims related to this were presented. These claims asked whether teachers and students agreed with expanding classes related to different areas of knowledge: sports, arts, humanities, sciences, and languages. More attention to sports was defended by at least 69% of students of each school, and by at least 81% of teachers of state-run schools. However, 54% of the private school teachers were against it. There, sports projects are already very well developed and probably considered exaggerated by some. More attention to arts, humanities and languages was supported by at least 88% of teachers and 72% of the students in all schools. Regarding natural sciences and maths, the picture was a bit different. In general, among all the five areas of knowledge, maths and natural sciences were considered by school actors as those subjects that need being reinforced the least. In the private school, this difference was more evident: only 54% of its teachers considered that it should be better valued compared to 88% and 75% of the state-run schools; only 39% of private school students thought in this way against 67% and 48% of the state-run schools. These data may show that knowledge in maths and in natural sciences – something very important for university admission tests – is quite well developed in the private school, but not in its state-run counterparts. Actually, it strengthens the idea presented in the previous chapter that private schools are much more concerned about preparing their students for competition.

Through analysing this data, it is not easy to identify how strongly teachers and students claim for more humanities in the official curriculum. During the interviews, however, this fact became clear. Interestingly, even a physics teacher highlighted the importance of more

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118 Brazilian Ministry of Education makes a different distinction: human sciences, mathematics, natural sciences and languages. However, such a distinction presents an unnecessary (for these purposes) separation between mathematics and natural sciences, and diminishes the importance of arts and sports.

119 Of course, these numbers are still high, but they are considerably lower when compared with other areas.
humanities in this process:

It should be increased the number of hours of humanities’ subjects like philosophy, sociology, history, geography, because they reflect much more. And, look, such a shot in my own foot: fewer hours of physics and chemistry.

Students frequently agreed, with comments like the following from this state school student being common:

There should be at least three hours of philosophy and sociology, which are subjects that make you think.

After this broad view focused on curricular subjects, four claims were presented to teachers and students suggesting different alternatives on how civic virtues should be developed: through (i) a specific subject; (ii) transverse issues crossing (almost) all disciplines; (iii) direct interaction with social problems (for example, integrating students with voluntary works); (iv) a good organisation of the school (for example, demanding students to meet schedules and deadlines). Analysing their answers, most teachers (around 90%) and students (around 75%) said that citizenship should be taught/cultivated through transverse issues, direct interaction with social problems and better organisation of the school. However, while almost no teachers and only around 15% of students were against the practices mentioned above, more than 50% of teachers and 35% of students were against the implementation of a specific subject to discuss citizenship. Through the analysis of the interviews, these different ideas on how to teach/cultivate citizenship can be better understood.

For those that considered that citizenship skills and knowledge could be cultivated through a specific subject, most school actors considered that humanities, mainly philosophy and sociology, should fulfil this task. For example, a private school student said:

There should be at least one hour for [reflections and debates], did you understand? Though it would happen in philosophy or sociology classes, for us to debate about society.

The idea of reinforcing critical thinking through creating a subject focused on it was identified in some other answers.
Analysing teachers’ ideas about civic knowledge that should be taught/cultivated in schools, few points are aligned with what is suggested in 9.7. For example, only one teacher highlighted the importance of introducing knowledge about laws:

It would be important that students studied more, for example, the Constitution, the Child and Adolescent Statute, Elderly People Statute. Anyway, all these norms of society for you to know your rights and your duties.

In a different direction, some suggestions towards opening and connecting certain syllabuses with real social problems were presented. In the previous chapter, it is easy to identify in teachers’ and students’ claims criticisms related to what is being taught/cultivated through their official curricula. However, only few of them really brought creative new ideas, though all of them were directly asked to do this. Of these, some very interesting suggestions were presented:

T1: I would start with nutrition education, respect to animals, even the issue of vegetarianism. [...] Depart from individualism to altruism. Think about what is good for the common good. Because of this, [we use the word] citizenship: citizen, city, live in community. [...] The question of safe traffic education, the question of environmental education. [...] taxes/fiscal education, [...] social education.

T2: In my school, [students] would have classes of psychology, [...] of understanding on how they proceed, on how they react to emotions. I think it is very important. They would have nutrition education, what I put inside my mouth. They would have classes about where things come from, where this milk in the carton comes from. Basic things that would make them understand that things do not come from nothing.

T3: We would have lots of gains if people had moments of reflection, moments of dialogue, even moments of meditation.

In these three answers, deep reflections on self-knowledge and how societies should be structured were proposed.
When school actors were directly stimulated to say if they consider that schools should discuss issues related to redistribution of goods and equal rights among hetero and homosexuals, the vast majority of them were in favour of both. However, as already mentioned, it was rare to find a teacher’s proposal encouraging the development of any civic virtue different from respect or solidarity.

Regarding critical thinking, when teachers and students were directly asked if such a skill should be encouraged at school, they almost unanimously agreed. On the other hand, very few teachers and students (four in over 300 participants) put virtues connected with critical thinking in their list of the three most important civic virtues to be encouraged in schools. During the interviews, maybe because a direct question about the importance of critical thinking was presented, some school actors’ interesting ideas have arisen. However, almost all of these suggestions came from the private school, where discussions and practices related to this seemed to be much more developed. Respectively, two students’ and two teachers’ reflections on the importance of critical thinking education deserve to be mentioned:

S1: This class of International Relations. It is as we were doing a debate. I think that the school should have, at least a period for this.

S2: [School] should have more discussion groups for us to develop our ideas, because, if a teacher says something (I am not saying everyone, but) some will stay with the thought that this is the only thing that exists. However, if you discuss with other people, maybe you will have a different idea.

T1: It is not that affection is not important, but I think that we can be more effective on reflexive issues. […] Because, many times, it is not done in the family, between friends. Then, I think the school would be a more pertinent forum.

T2: The main role [of the school] should be [to make] students know themselves and the others […] in order to allow them to look around themselves more critically.

However, even these teachers and students did not present suggestions on how to improve students’ critical thinking.

As a final strategy on how to develop civic virtues in schools, most teachers agreed that it is
helpful to connect different subjects through an interdisciplinary project. The idea of considering certain civic virtues as cross-curricular themes is in the core of interdisciplinary activities proposed by National Curricular Parameters (PCN, discussed in chapters 9 and 10). These parameters, however, were totally ignored in teachers’ comments.

12.4. How unofficial curriculum should be applied

Proposals presented in 12.2 and 12.3 are associated with official curriculum. Some school actors, though rare, also suggested some individual initiatives that could be implemented beyond the official curriculum. These initiatives can be simply qualified as belonging to the unofficial curriculum, or can be taken as subversive and, in turn, considered hidden in the curriculum. The first reflection on this issue analyses how teachers should deal with political debates and students’ political awareness. Few teachers mentioned points associated with the comparison between three different attitudes – stated commitment, neutral chairman and balanced approach – explored theoretically in 9.8. Even so, it is interesting to mention two opposed ideas about this point which were presented, respectively, by a private school teacher and a state-run school one:

T1: Can’t [a teacher] discuss party politics? C’mon! Let’s clarify this, we really have to discuss this! [...] It doesn’t hurt. I have this position. I respect yours [students’], as you have to respect mine. I’m not a candidate for anything.

T2: Teachers are opinion makers, and it is obvious that they will put forward what they think. But, as much as they can be exempted from that, I believe it is fundamental. [...] I avoid this, for example: “who did you vote for?”

Interestingly, the teacher of the private school, where there are more restrictions regarding these practices, defends more liberty to present their political opinions. The state-run school teacher, on the other hand, considers that these issues should be developed with some care, maybe because she identifies some attitudes that are exaggerated. It was rare, however, to identify more teachers’ opinions on this controversial point.

Besides this controversy, a private school teacher presented another criticism regarding individual initiatives towards citizenship education. She defended that:
[Moral education] should be in the curriculum and systematised. Because we do this in our classes. But what if there was no time? [...] Teachers already do an individual work. But we don’t have a homogeneous, organised work. For example, if I leave the school, it is not guaranteed that the teacher who will replace me will continue doing those kinds of things.

However, some plurality of attitudes was viewed as positive by the supervisor of one of the state-run schools:

There are teachers who can work with [moral issues] and can see this as part of the syllabus that they have to teach. I think that there is another part of teachers who define that this is not their role. [...] But, even so those more traditional teachers have an important role, they can help to create a sense of organisation and give a sense of commitment. And a more open teacher can create a situation of more negotiation, more empathy. Then, I think that there is space for many types of action, for many values, worked by example or by discourse.

This suggestion, thus, opens some room for the defence of more plurality in citizenship education.

It is possible to go a little bit further in this analysis of such distinct attitudes, and present, based on teachers’ impressions about how parents raise their children, three ideas on how to take affection into account during the educational process. The previous chapter suggested that some parents are too distant from their children, whereas others usually influence too much their sons and daughters. Because of this, teachers understand that they, somehow, have to act to balance it. Some teachers believe that they have to provide affection, others that they have to stimulate students to think critically. Most understand that they have to provide both. These different views, however, are not elaborated and no suggestion about how to develop more affection or reflectivity came with them.

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Chapter 12 is based on primary data collected during three months of observations in some Brazilian schools. The five different levels of curriculum proposed in chapter 9 are observed separately in order to show how, in the opinion of students, teachers and head teachers,
citizenship education should happen. An initial discussion of these opinions is provided to enrich the debate between an ideal proposal of citizenship curriculum and what is actually observed in schools.
PART FOUR: CONNECTING IDEAS
13. Conclusion

After this long journey through theoretical approaches and empirical observations about justice and citizenship curriculum, it is time to join these different types of knowledge in order to answer this thesis’ main research question: how can a dialogue between “feasible” ideas of justice and the citizenship curriculum contribute to building a more just society in Brazil? This conclusion, then, can be understood as an answer to this, since it is an example of a possible way to achieve this dialogue in order to offer useful reflections on how to improve justice in this country. The outlines of ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibria regarding reflections on justice and citizenship education, and the suggestion of how these equilibria are related to the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium accomplished through this conclusion are examples that serve to answer the sub-questions proposed – SQ1: In what ways does the development of ideal proposals and empirical studies contribute to build “feasible” ideas of justice and citizenship curriculum? SQ2: What are the basic characteristics of “feasible” ideas of justice and the citizenship curriculum? SQ3: How can a “feasible” idea of justice and a “feasible” idea of citizenship curriculum improve each other? – and, in turn, the main question. Thus, at the beginning, (13.1) an ideal proposal and the Brazilian situation regarding the three suggested dimensions of justice are compared in order to forward some feasible improvements of reality. The achievement of these improvements depends on Brazilian people’s possession of civic virtues. Consequently, (13.2) an ideal view of different levels of citizenship curriculum and the reality Brazilian educational system are also compared, equally aiming to present suggestions on how to ameliorate this reality. (Taken together, 13.1 and 13.2 answer SQ1 and SQ2.) Then, (13.3) it is proposed how these suggested feasible theories can favour the development of the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium, though this equilibrium can only be achieved in public sphere. (13.3. answers SQ3.) At the end, (13.4) some general reflections about moderation and persuasion related to the approach chosen by this thesis are made in order to finalise by presenting the style of writing aimed throughout the whole thesis.

13.1. Ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium towards improving justice in Brazil
Outlining an ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium of reflections of justice\textsuperscript{120} depends on balancing ideal proposals and the Brazilian reality regarding economic, cultural and decision-making dimensions\textsuperscript{121}. Through observing these three dimensions, it is possible to identify a huge gap between what is proposed theoretically (chapters 3 and 4) and what is practiced in Brazil (chapter 6). Brazilian laws regarding economic, cultural and decision-making dimensions are not sufficiently developed when compared to an ideal theory of justice. Taxes are regressively collected and redistributed, cultural minorities are not protected enough, and the democratic procedures disfavour a wider and more qualified participation of people. This comparison allows this section to outline an ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium in order to offer some directions towards proposing a feasible theory of justice.

\textit{The economic dimension}

This analysis, then, starts by outlining an ideal proposal related to the economic aspect of justice. The reasoning developed in 4.3 suggests that reasonable neoliberal and welfarist theoretical proposals agree that equalising opportunities – differing people’s earning only based on their choices and effort, rather than on their natural and social luck – should be balanced with preparing better those most talented and favour economic development. Such a balance produces a sensation of equality of opportunities and, at the same time, stimulates scientific and economic development, both characteristics that reinforce stability. However, while welfarists consider equalising opportunities – particularly through reducing the weight of social luck – more important, neoliberals understand that economic development is more important. Thus, the latter are more concerned with stimulating those more talented and those who are willing to choose professions which, though risky, can increase GDP and the goods of all, even if this can promote unequal final results.

It is difficult to identify the optimal point between these two ideas. Even so, it is possible at least to realise that ordinary people understand equality of opportunities in a slightly different way than opposite ideal theories propose. As discussed in 5.2, \textit{ceteris paribus}, individuals tend to accept that those who are born with more natural talent earn more, but do not consider fair that the same happens with those who simply belong to wealthy families. And this can be associated with the idea that stimulating those who are naturally talented increases the gains

\textsuperscript{120}This accomplishment is part of the \textit{main} original contribution of this thesis

\textsuperscript{121}This tripartite division is an original contribution of this thesis.
of all, while allowing the advantages of those socially lucky only serves to maintain unfair
privileges. Moreover, as also developed in 5.2, this defence of promoting equality of
opportunities but stimulating competition is based on people’s rational understanding of the
existence of certain duties towards others, however limited by their higher natural concerns
towards those close to them.

Thus, a first step towards outlining a non-idealised theory regarding the economic dimension
of justice seems to indicate that stability of Western societies based on values of equal liberty
and communal responsibility demands a balance between equality of opportunities and
economic growth. In this way, theoretically, taxes should be collected and redistributed
progressively and be high enough to increase the opportunities of those who were born
without social or natural luck, however without discouraging the most talented to achieve
their talents or inhibiting entrepreneurship.

The analysis of the current Brazilian situation in these regards, on the other hand, shows huge
injustices. First, a historic structural gap between rich and poor people (6.2) has strong
impacts on the current inequalities of wealth and opportunities, something reflected in the
Brazilian position in Gini index list (6.4). Its regressive system of taxes increases these
inequalities. Moreover, Brazil’s “capitalism of ties” discourages entrepreneurship, and, in
turn, economic growth. Brazil also has a low position in the GDP per capita list, mainly in
comparison to high income countries. The invasion of private relations in public affairs is
also very influential on determining who gets public positions in Brazil (6.2). Since political
and scientific offices are many times chosen based on these influences, it is not difficult to
conclude that this fact impacts negatively on Brazilian organisational and scientific
developments.

Thus, there are much higher inequalities of wealth and opportunities in Brazil than what is
identified in developed countries. These inequalities have to be reduced, but Brazilian history
cannot be ignored in this process. For example, Brazil’s so called Citizenship Constitution
(4.1) guarantees the right of wealthy parents to provide better education for their children
(10.2). Theoretically, this seems wrong, but changing this is not simple in the Brazilian
context, in which schooling is a consolidated business and there is a strong belief in the right
of parents to guarantee the best they can for their children. However, at least reflections on
the need for equalising opportunities can be enough to make policymakers more conscious
that they have to increase significantly investments in public education. In the same way, a progressive system of taxes has to be implemented. Theoretically, it seems obvious and totally feasible, if Brazilian socio-economic policies are similar to developed countries. Nevertheless, the fact that many Brazilians suspect that any proposal for greater taxation is subject to corrupt practices and does not lead to a great public benefits turns difficult to implement any type of increasing in taxes. In this way, and in order to stimulate genuine entrepreneurship, corruption has to be strongly punished and restrained.

The cultural dimension

Besides reflecting on the economic dimension, dealing with improvements in the cultural dimension is also an important task in order to improve justice. From a theoretical point of view (4.3), avant-garde proposals normally seem to be the correct ones. However, it is also important to realise that conservative views and practices about several issues are widely spread and cannot be simply disregarded in public debates. This is because it is also defended theoretically by this thesis the importance of reinforcing stability and respect to democratic decisions, something that depends on taking conservative views into account. Thus, for example, it is quite obvious to anyone operating with a broadly liberal commitment to freedom and human rights that heterosexual and LGBT community members should possess the same rights of heterosexuals, and that LGBT practices have to be celebrated. Nevertheless, conservative rejection of same-sex marriages has to be minimally taken into consideration, even because many people only have this view based on their burdens of judgment, rather than on any intrinsic bad intensions, such as keeping unfair status quo.

Given this scenario, two different considerations have to be addressed. First, theories of justice have also to deal with the issue of recognition of minority groups, something related to overcome several unfair traditional practices. Thus, it makes sense to defend theoretically some policies towards recognising minorities (laws against prejudices, affirmative action, etc.), since it seems obvious that, given the existence of structural/traditional inequalities (sexism, racism, homophobia), governments have to intervene (not to be neutral) in order to reduce this. In 5.1, for example, evidence is presented that homophobia and racism do not have natural roots, but are social constructions. On the other hand, going in a completely different direction, if the aim is to engage most of the population in public debate, more conservative views of the development of culture have to be taken seriously. Individuals from
certain groups, such as older generations, people from rural areas, some members of religious communities, etc. take longer to accept new ideas (burdens of judgment). Thus, in order to keep stability, cultural changes could be defended in a more nuanced way than what is proposed by extreme avant-gardists.

In this regard, at the beginning it is possible to say that Brazil is a quite united country. Though Brazil has almost the same area of Europe, 97% of its people speaks the same language and most of them have a certain pattern of customs, exaggeratedly moulded by private mass media (6.1). On the one hand, the social conditions of women, black people and LGBT members is much worse than the conditions of heterosexual white men (6.5). Though Brazil has a history of huge inequalities, the “coexistence of contraries” has avoided major conflicts between black and white, as well as between poor and rich (6.2). Conservative practices, increased by the expansion of Neo-Pentecostal churches and lack of education, are strong in maintaining sexism and homophobia (6.1). Regarding reducing all these prejudices, laws protecting women, black people and LGBT members have been created in the last two decades (6.5) as result of avant-gardists pressures.

In Brazilian history, it cannot be said that the development of celebration of differences and overall integration has fared as badly as attempts to reduce inequalities of wealth and opportunities. Observing the current situation, Brazilian laws and policies seem to follow most of what have been implemented in developed countries where respecting minority rights is a well-established value. On the other hand, a series of problems related to remaining prejudices make the situation of minorities worse than in these countries. Thus, changes have to happen much more in civil society than in government policies. This is an ongoing process. Minorities have mobilised themselves (social networks are important tools towards this), and, through these mobilisation, they are gaining more voice in public sphere. However, it is important that black, feminist and LGBT movements realise that, though they are right in pressuring civil society for more recognition, current changes towards this should be taken with some care. Anger makes them aggressive, and these attitudes promote a reverse anger on the other side. Polarisation, instead of plurality and integration, is the result of this (4.1 and 8.7). Given this scenario, the way to advance seems much more related to improvements of people’s civic virtues, specially their capacity to protest peacefully. This point is discussed in 13.2 and 13.3.
The decision-making dimension

Finally, improving justice through keeping institutions and reinforcing stability depends on improving the decision-making dimension. Democracy is currently a consensual Western value. Related to this, it is suggested (2.4) that the stability of Western regimes depends on ordinary people feeling part of decision-making processes. On the other hand, constitutional limits on what can be democratically decided also help to guarantee stability (3.2). They make people trust that certain fundamental rights are respected and that social justice is based on certain principles. On the other hand, the discussion presented in 4.4 allows the identification of how an efficient democratic regime should be. First, representatives who have more time and skills than ordinary people to think about the importance of these things are fundamental. In addition, these people and their representatives have to take seriously experts’ opinions, otherwise important knowledge that can help improvements of justice will not be instantiated. Finally, avoiding centralisation of power seems the best way to facilitate the dialogue between ordinary people, policymakers and specialists. In this way, parliamentarism is, then, defended as the best regime to connect these different actors. In addition to this final idea, a healthy representative regime depends on people really being represented. Inequalities of opportunities and recognition, however, cause inequalities in political representation. In some way, political systems should guarantee the representation of minorities, such as women and black people.

The Brazilian political system, however, is too centralised, something directly associated with the tradition of personalism and concentration of power in the hands of few who rule the country. Interestingly, though this practice is one of the reasons of inequalities, even poor Brazilian people usually prefer strong leaders than a more decentralised structure of power. In this way, presidentialism is their favourite political regime, this option having historically defeated parliamentarism in popular consultations. Consequently, as a vicious circle, centralised historical practices prevent Brazilian people from developing democratic skills and values, since they tend to await top-down solutions for their problems, and this absence makes people believe in centralisation (6.3).

The Brazilian situation regarding decision-making dimension is far from ideal. However, since there is still a widespread belief in the figure of a strong leader who will save the country, it is likely that changing the law towards parliamentarism and decentralisation of
power can be understood by citizens as an assault on democracy. Nevertheless, if currently such changes would not be well accepted by Brazilian people who would see them as giving even more power to untrustworthy policymakers, at least some improvements on how to connect voters and their representatives should be implemented. This change could be a way to prepare the terrain for more changes towards the ideal in the future. Moreover, in particular regarding this third dimension, citizenship education is fundamental to make people better participate in democratic processes, as explored in 13.2 and 13.3.

13.2. Ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium applied to improve citizenship curriculum in Brazil

The theoretical suggestions towards improving justice in Brazil should serve as a reference for ordinary people and policymakers to build their own ideas. In this way, though the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium that balances these people’s ideas and theories of justice only happens in the real public sphere, the proposal of a non-idealised theory presented above is the first step towards the achievement of this second reflective equilibrium. However, the limited development of certain (this thesis suggests seven) civic virtues makes Brazilian people not give a good contribution for the reduction of injustices in any of the dimensions cited. In other words, it makes them not be good agents of the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium. Taking this into consideration, this section outlines another ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium in order to propose a feasible theory of how to develop those civic virtues in Brazilian people through five levels of citizenship curriculum. This outline is the second step towards favouring theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium.

Supra official curriculum

At the beginning, from a theoretical reflection, education policies (supra official curriculum) towards guaranteeing common schools with equal quality for all are defended. These schools have to be plural in order to engage different social groups and make each one celebrate those different from them. In this way, schools have to challenge certain values

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122 This list of seven civic virtues is an original contribution of this thesis.
123 This division of citizenship curriculum in five levels is an original contribution of this thesis.
124 This achievement is another element of the main original contribution of this thesis.
learned at home, rather than reinforce them. Since parents and children have plenty of other spaces for interaction, and children are not property of their parents, the theoretical approach followed by this thesis considers that reducing the influence of the latter over the former is more than a possibility, it is a way to advance towards a society with more engagement and celebration of differences. Through this process, it is possible to expand the care ethics from the nuclear family to a wider and wider group. This “situation-oriented” procedure is part of the process towards reaching a more abstract sense of justice (5.3). This abstraction, however, is not absent of emotion, but is a type of emotion mediated by reason, something called “reasonableness”, “wisdom” or “great compassion” (5.2 and 8.5), and defended by this thesis as an important civic virtue.

However, plural common schools with equal quality are far from being a reality in Brazil. Brazilian law allows the existence of basically two types of schools: private, on average, with much higher quality; state-run, normally with low quality (10.2). The system, then, obviously, does not promote equality of opportunities at all. This is an “anti-lesson” given by the system to the students (and the rest of the population) about citizenship (11.2). Moreover, as mentioned above, the lack of contact between rich and poor worlds damages the development of cognitive and emotional empathy, and, in turn, compassion and spirit of cooperation. In addition, it was possible to identify at least two other problems in the Brazilian education system regarding the cultivation of civic virtues. First, the preparation of teachers to deal with these issues seems very limited. Second, university admission tests hardly takes into consideration any civic virtue – only civic knowledge and critical thinking, but very superficially, though the current tests (ENEM) are amplifying some demands of these virtues.

Given this scenario, implementing common schools in Brazil is hardly possible in the short- or medium-term. As mentioned above, any attempt to change completely a system would suffer different types of resistances from different groups, but this does not mean that nothing can be done. Regarding the impacts on citizenship education, such a reflection at least makes evident that differences in the school system impact negatively on the view of how just Brazilian society is, and that investments in public education would make people perceive a reduction in inequalities of opportunities and, in turn, it would increase social stability. Moreover, that lack of integration amongst Brazilian students from different social classes makes difficult amplifying the range of people’s compassion. In this way, even without
forcing them to attend the same schools, at least some policies towards integrating these
different schools through stimulating them to exchange experiences and knowledge can be
carried out. Finally, reflections on possible improvements on university admission exams can
courage public examiners to also take civic knowledge, skills and values into account when
they elaborate these tests.

Wide official curriculum

Besides education policies, schools’ organisation (wide official curriculum) can also
influence the cultivation of civic virtues. Being the school a transition from the life within the
family to the public relations in society, its structure should be the locus for the expansion,
from the nuclear family to a wider community, of the feeling of care, the great compassion.
In this way, schools have a powerful mechanism to cultivate this compassion in students:
creating as much as possible a simulacrum of public sphere within that environment (9.5). As
developed in, besides democratic knowledge (discussed below), it is important that people
possess democratic skills and values, and the school is a perfect place for introducing them.
These skills and values are basically related to students’ critical thinking and their
encouragement for fighting for justice and, at the same time, respecting the rules. Their
wishes have to be listened to and partially put into practice through a type of organisation that
allows several democratic decisions, from school rules to syllabuses. This partially
democratic system can be the first opportunity for students to feel that they are part of a
cooperative venture, the school, rather than only passive recipients of something from the top
(9.5). However, it is important that students also perceive that teachers’ and head teachers’
optinions are more important than theirs, since the latter have more knowledge and experience
on several subjects. This can help them to realise that, during all their lives, they have to take
seriously into consideration the opinions of specialists, something that improves their critical
thinking (8.2 and 8.3). Apart from these democratic skills and values, students’ sense of
competition however balanced by the sense of cooperation with the others can be stimulated
through different practices. Group activities, competitions amongst classrooms, assessments
that take their cooperative practices into account are examples of ways that schools could
organise their activities to counterbalance societies’ encouragement of competition (9.5).
However, there is little convergence between what is suggested theoretically and what was observed in Brazilian schools\(^{125}\). First, the understanding that the school is a transition place from the family to the wider community does not seem to be perceived by teachers and students, who did not present in the questionnaires significant differences in values that they suggested that should be cultivated at home and at school (12.1). Moreover, students’ participation in democratic processes, fighting for their rights and justice were hardly perceived (11.3). In general, their participation in suggesting the syllabuses were null, and very limited actions of Students Unions and dialogues with head teachers and supervisors were identified. In the poorest school, instead of being encouraged to think of what is fair, students were only called up by a teacher to participate in demonstrations in a very top-down way. A symptom of this is that, in 359 questionnaires with teachers and students, only four declared that political awareness is one of the three most civic virtues to be cultivated in schools (12.2). More than this, though even the majority of students declared that it is important that schools make them to follow rules (12.2), schools did not seem to deal with rules in an appropriate way. Rules were always imposed without justification. Much worse than this, while in the private school students felt excessively watched, in the state-run, the demand for punctuality almost does not exist, being many teachers also terrible examples by constantly arriving late (or even missing classes). Additionally, though all teachers considered cooperation important and, at the same time, no one presented any radical position against stimulating competition (12.2), very few substantive activities that encourage cooperation or healthy competition amongst students could be identified. Finally, as a general perception, teachers’ and students’ lack of deep reflections on how schools should be structured has to be highlighted.

Observing ideal and real views of wide official curriculum, it seems that most suggestions presented could be implemented without promoting major political conflicts, since they are anchored in consensual ideas of justice, democracy and competition in a cooperative system. However, it is important to perceive that the implementation of these new ideas is not that simple, since they demand strong changes in the traditional model of schooling. And such changes depend on school community better information and good will. Thus, at least in state-run schools, the lack of instruction of teachers on these regards is the first problem. Their shameful salaries (11.2) put an even more difficult problem. It is very difficult to

\(^{125}\) Primary data provided from these observations in schools are original contributions of this thesis.
convince them to make any move, since they do not feel stimulated to put any extra effort to be better. Increasing teachers’ salaries and knowledge on how to cultivate civic virtues is central for changing this scenario.

*Narrow official curriculum*

Narrow official curriculum (9.6) is the most obvious tool to cultivate civic virtues. Independently if through a specific subject or cross-curricular contents, knowledge of certain concepts, such as “liberty” and “equality”, and skills, such as thinking critically, have to be deepened. Philosophy classes could deal with these issues in partnership with language classes and other subjects, in particular, mathematics. Natural sciences and humanities have to inform students and cultivate in them the capacity to find trustworthy information in order to diminish their susceptibility to believe in fake news. Moreover, for example, knowledge of the constitution, black history, psychological reflections and sociological statistics related to women, poor, black and LGBT people’s lives have to be associated with the idea of equality of opportunities in order to enrich debates about current issues related to citizenship, such as affirmative action. Similarly, knowledge about different democratic systems is also important to help individuals to identify the problems of Brazilian political system, and knowledge of some classics of literature and theatre to develop compassion in students.

In Brazil, however, the narrow official curriculum seems hardly deal with this knowledge and skills (11.3). The first interesting observation on these regards is that, though Brazilian law establishes certain parameters (PCN) on what should be taught, which are not that far from what is being proposed, there is a strong movement within the academy against any imposed subject. Those who criticise PCN say that such parameters are proposing the transmission of neutral contents and do not give liberty for teachers to cultivate “politicised consciousness” in students. This issue is intimately related to the defence of critical pedagogy discussed below. PCN, however, clearly defend the cultivation of values, such as cultural diversity. In this way, PCN are somehow aligned with a proposal of celebrating different sexual orientations in schools called “School Without Homophobia”. Conservative groups, on the other hand, pressure to impede these discussions in curriculum. Going further, a movement called “School Without Party” defends that teachers should not present their own political views. Avant-gardists consider that it is hidden in this proposal a conservative desire of keeping the status quo which keep unfair inequalities (10.3).
Thus, it is not simple to define which contents should be discussed in Brazilian schools in order to improve students’ civic virtues. Regarding several issues, there are strong disagreements amongst different sectors of society about what should be taught. In this way, it is interesting to start focusing on what is (or should be) consensually accepted. First, a serious work towards developing critical thinking is an interesting way to start. Regarding this, the fact that critical thinking is almost disregarded by Brazilian teachers and students as an important civic virtue to be cultivated in schools (12.3), such a debate has to be better developed in the preparation and updating of teachers’ courses. Moreover, deep discussions on data showing, for example, how the tax system in Brazil is and comparing it with other developed countries could be very informative and, at the same time, those who present these data would not be accused of indoctrination. Other types of statistics that, for example, show the differences of salaries between men and women go in the same direction and can also be part of classes. Obviously, associated with all these discussions, teachers have the duty of seeking for trustworthy information and showing to the students how they can do this by themselves. In summary, it is possible for a teacher to present several types of knowledge that help the students to develop their consciousness of inequalities without “brainwashing” them and defending specific political views. This is a way of introducing important civic knowledge and escaping from critics of defenders of “School Without Party” and alike.

**Unofficial and hidden curricula**

As a final reflection of this section, it is important to compare theoretical reflections on teachers’ individual initiatives (unofficial curriculum) and some possible hidden intentions of the official curriculum and how these things could be perceived in the observed Brazilian schools (11.5 and 11.6). In theory, bottom-up activities proposed by some teachers should be celebrated, since they can aggregate new ideas to something that is rigid when only top-down proposals are followed. On the other hand, the critical pedagogy tradition sees hidden in the official curriculum normalisation and brainwashing of the new generations in order to keep a status quo of domination. Critical pedagogy is, then, defended as a way to counterbalance such status quo (9.7). As a reverse attitude, teachers are encouraged to assume political positions (stated committed), rather than being neutral chairmen. In their views, it is impossible to be neutral, since “neutrality” in these regards would be maintaining the unfair status quo. However, given the fact that, many times, doing this is going against the official
curriculum, at the end, teachers’ subversive attitudes have to be defended. In this way, such an attitude can also be seen as hidden in what teachers should do. Going in a slightly different direction, this thesis considers that the best way to promote sustainable changes in a stable democracy is by developing in students critical thinking skills, guaranteeing to them access to trustworthy data, and developing compassion in them. Obviously, a deep investigation about the status quo, which ends up showing evident injustices, has to be done. However, the judgments about the unfairness of the status quo have to come from the students, not from teachers in a top-down way.

Observing teachers’ individual (unofficial) practices in Brazilian schools, it was difficult to perceive individual initiatives towards cultivating the civic virtues defended by this thesis, and even less attitudes connected with fighting against the status quo, as recommended by critical pedagogy. From 21 interviewed teachers, only one presented clear individual initiatives towards making students think of questions such as abortion, same-sex marriage and so on. Regarding hidden attitudes towards opposing the status quo, only one teacher who declared that his role as a teacher is “to fight against all injustices” was perceived as practicing this. On the other hand, the observations showed that it is hidden in the private schools practices the preparation of future leaders and “strong” competitors, while it is hidden in the state-run schools activities the preparation of workers who will assume subaltern positions (11.5).

The comparisons between theoretical reflections and realities related to unofficial and hidden curricula put some issues on how far teachers can go in presenting their own political views. This is the most controversial point of this discussion, as made evident above. Many important pedagogues defend that teachers have to be proactive in making students aware of how oppressed they and the worst-off are (9.8). Most Brazilian teachers (at least most of those observed by this thesis, a work which tries to present a wide sample of this group), on the other hand, did not show a real concern regarding the development of students’ critical thinking or consciousness about the unfair status quo (11.6). This thesis considers critical thinking fundamental for the development of citizenship, and also defends that this should be associated with spread information of important knowledge about different issues related to justice. In this way – following what was suggested above about how to introduce discussions on tax system, differences of salaries between men and women, and so on – preparing teachers committed with debating political issues, but who avoid giving their own opinions
seems something feasible to achieve (11.6).

13.3. The importance of ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibria for the achievement of the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium

Since this thesis starts from the ideas that the principles which orient Brazilian institutions have the potential to be refined, rather than completely changed, its main aim is to suggest how to make Brazil a more just society through keeping stability and without resorting to any radical proposal. Thus, given the fact that democracy is currently taken by Western (specifically Brazilian) people as the correct procedure to improve justice, Western societies are stable only if they are democratic (2.6). Democracy is necessary, however, not sufficient for guaranteeing stability, since it is not the only value shared by most Western people. They also defend broad views of individuals’ right to be equally free and their responsibility towards their co-citizens (2.4) – values which structure the hypothetical social contract, considered by this thesis a good platform to sustain a theory of justice applicable to contemporary Western nations (3.9). Thus, stability also depends on the achievement of these values. Limiting democratic decisions by guaranteeing equal liberty and requiring from citizens certain duties towards the others is also fundamental. In this way, when people participate in democratic processes, and when constitutions which instantiate the values of equal liberty and communal responsibility are respected (sometimes even through limiting majority decisions), the hypothetical social contract becomes a real contract.

This situation of stability creates an atmosphere that allows refinements of the Western values presented and, then, favours the improvement of justice. Consistent institutions based on constitutional principles help this improvement. Moreover, these institutions help to mould people’s principles, being the school the most important one. This is fundamental, since this process of improving justice is anchored on democratic procedures and people have to possess certain civic virtues to better participate in them. Interestingly, as a virtuous circle, individuals who possess civic virtues are those who, through voting and participating in public sphere, improve social institutions. This virtuous circularity is a central point that sustains the importance of outlining an ideal-non-ideal equilibrium and developing knowledge that favours the achievement in the public sphere of the theoretical-practical equilibrium.
In this way, the achievement of feasible theories of justice and the citizenship curriculum is fundamental in this process. Feasible theories of justice present to ordinary people and policymakers the ways to refine institutions towards improving justice. Feasible theories of curriculum help educators to better prepare new generations to participate positively in the process of refining these institutions. Thus, the two ideal-non-ideal equilibria outlined above are helpful for the achievement of the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium. The latter, however, cannot be accomplished by a PhD thesis, since it happens only in reality when people’s and governments’ attitudes in the public sphere are balanced by theories of justice, in other words, when ordinary people, policymakers and specialists actually dialogue.

13.4. Final Reflections

A moderated position regarding different issues sets the tone of this thesis. However, excess of moderation can be problematic. Fonseca suggests that “nothing [should be taken] in excess, even moderation. […] How to find the right measure? If we never test the limits” (2017, p.24). This is an interesting idea that orients a final clarification on the process of reflective equilibrium. Regarding this, it is important to highlight that behind such equilibrium is not only the idea of balancing ideal and real, but also the idea that this balance is achieved by a process of back and forth. Testing the limits is a valuable procedure towards finding the just measure. Alternation of power of political parties with distinct views is like this. In the same way, it is interesting to observe how that “radical” teacher mentioned in 13.3 deals with political discussions. As already mentioned in 11.6, this teacher usually behaves much more as a union leader who moves his followers than as someone who stimulates students to think by themselves. In 13.2, it was suggested that the second attitude seems more appropriate for a teacher. However, teachers like him are also necessary, since their attitude show something important about certain dynamics that can be followed or examples of what should not be done. In other words, it is only through allowing the plurality that some excesses can be identified. Even more, observing that specific case, this teacher’s attitude does not seem so wrong, given the fact that the students of that school seemed totally passive and, through this, he at least could shake some of them. The Aristotelian idea presented in

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126 This reflection on the two types of reflective equilibria is also a main original contribution of this thesis, the accomplishment of an outline of a “world map” that connects different areas of knowledge in order to offer ways to improve justice in Brazil.
Nicomachean Ethics that the virtue is halfway between two vices, but that where this falls in any given situation is a matter of context-specific judgement, is behind this reflection.

Analysing this problem from the opposite side, most times, an effort to refrain polarisation is fundamental for guaranteeing stability. Actually, because of this, the rationale behind this thesis is strongly concerned with balancing opposite proposals. In order to have a final look on this, the debate of how cultivating the celebration of sexual diversity is appropriate. This debate can depart from the idea that discussions about diversity of sexual orientation are fundamental in order to counter certain strong prejudices still entrenched in Brazilian society. Moreover, the idea that children are not property of their parents, who cannot define everything that is taught in schools, is also important to defend the cultivation of such diversity. However, since this point is not well accepted by certain sectors of society, the process of implementing it has to be negotiated carefully with the whole society, rather than simply imposed. In this case, oppressed people (LGBT members) have to put an effort to understand the position of those who oppress them, and try to dialogue with the oppressors, even knowing that they are wrong. One reason for this is that the alternative attitude, the feeling of anger, can create instability through promoting reverse anger and polarisation, being counterproductive if the aim is improving justice. The targets of anger tend to be reactive instead of reflecting about their mistakes and, in turn, changing their attitudes. This does not mean that the feeling that allows people to perceive injustices has to be controlled. This is fundamental to engage people in fighting for improvement towards justice. However, this thesis defends that this has to be a peaceful fight, rather than a fight oriented by anger.

An example of a counterproductive lack of dialogue seems to be the current pressure of LGBT members on schools to introduce lessons on anti-homophobia (this discussion is presented in 10.3). The claim is obviously legitimate, however, depending on how it is implemented, the reaction of the community can make such a legitimate claim unfeasible. Related to this, Gabeira, a defender of human rights and diversity in Brazil, says:

a government could not ignore a large number of families who wants exclusivity in the sexual education of their children. The absence of mediation ended up giving rise to heavy criticism against the interference of the State in subjects that should pass through the family sieve.
The end result of all this was not only a collapse of the left, but also a distrust of many of its flags. They are supra-party issues, but they were understood as exclusiveness of a government and of a tendency that went into liquidation by its deep errors. One of the collateral victims of this failure was the concept of human rights, which only has value since it is universal. Many Brazilians saw it as an exclusive struggle of the left, which in turn reduced humanity to those who think in the same way. (2017, p.130)

This portrait introduces two important reflections that are appropriate as the last thoughts of this thesis. First, it is important for the process of refining ideas of justice to accept that people who think differently – even if wrongly – about these issues are not necessarily bad or unreasonable. They have at least to be listened to in the public sphere. In the example, parents who consider it wrong to celebrate diversity in schools have to be genuinely listened to. They cannot be treated as enemies and hated by avant-gardists. In this regard, it worth mentioning a huge mistake made by Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential campaign. Though it is obvious that Trump based his project on denying a dialogue with those who think differently from him, Clinton, by saying (even if regretting it later) that “you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the ‘basket of deplorables.’”128 created huge difficulties of dialogue with almost one quarter of American voters. If she were president, this type of discourse would make difficult to guarantee stability in order to make easier improvements of justice.

Finally, it is important to realise that merging different debates on justice can create difficulties for people to identify their own positions regarding each one of them. This situation favours the worst possible scenario in political debates, the polarisation of ideas. Polarisation makes people form tribes. Belonging to a tribe, in turn, reduces individuals’ capacity for thinking by themselves. Moreover, the existence of poles makes any point disputable, and develops in people the idea that the other is the enemy to be defeated, rather than making people see each other as participants in a cooperative venture.

This defence of clarification of ideas and the avoidance of seeing the other as necessarily wrong or bad sets the second tone of this thesis. Its intention is only to present a suggestion on how to link reflections on justice and the citizenship curriculum. Obviously, this suggested

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127 The president Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016.
way to associate these ideas through reflective equilibrium can be mistaken. Even more, many claims presented during these 13 chapters are likely wrong. However, this is an invitation for debate. And, in order to favour this debate, this thesis gives to the readers a map that makes it easier for them, through a comparison with their own structure of thinking, identifying with more clarity their own ideas about the discussed points. Thus, a sentence presented by Brighouse and Swift in the end of one of their articles is a good way to finish this journey: “if we have not persuaded our readers, we hope we at least have helped them to identify why not” (2013, p.219).
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Appendices
Semi-structured interviews with students, teachers and head teachers

First of all, I would like to tell you that the information recorded here will be heard only by me and that in the process of writing my thesis you will be named only by an acronym that will prevent your identifications. I can repeat or clarify any question. The duration of the interview will be about one hour.

**Semi-structured interviews with students**

(Identification)
0. What are your names and ages?
(Values of the young Brazilians)
1. Do you, out of school, learn to be more competitive or cooperative? And at school? At school, is encouraging competition good or bad? Are the students who cooperate properly rewarded?
2. Does your use of social media make you better or worse? Why?
(Role of the school)
3. What do you think should be taught at school? And what, in fact, do you learn? (Is your school just concerned with teaching traditional content?)
4. What moral values do you learn at school? And at home? Can you point out any specific activity linked to citizenship teaching at school?
(Specifying the development of some values)
5. Do you think there should be rules at school? Are they exaggerated? Which school rules are positive and which are negative?
6. Does the school stimulate your ability to put yourself in the shoes of others and to be supportive? Do you like that? There is some prejudice?
7. Does the school stimulate your fellowship with colleagues from other groups/tribes? For example, are you forced to sometimes do work with colleagues who do not have much affinity? Do you like that? (Does the school stimulate in you the ability to put yourself in the shoes of others and to be supportive? Do you like this?)
(Transmission of and reflection on moral values)
8. Do teachers tell you what is right to do, or do they encourage you to come to your own conclusions about what is right?
9. Do you participate in the elaboration of school rules? Do you think you have room to criticise what you think is wrong at school?

10. Do you participate in determining what you learn in class? Does any teacher make room for your proposed topics to be discussed?
   (Commitment of teachers)

11. How often your teachers miss classes?

12. Do you feel intellectually stimulated by your teachers? And do you realise that teachers are dedicated to your learning?

13. Do you take your teachers as examples? And your parents? *(Do you have other examples?)*
   (Political opinions of students)

14. Do you consider that people who have legitimately obtained greater wealth should have the right to place their children in better schools, or do you consider that all young people should have access to the same level of education?

15. Are you for or against same-sex marriages and adoptions by same-sex couples?

*Semi-structured interviews with teachers*

(Identification)

0. What is your name, your age, your education background, the discipline you teach and the school you work for?
   (Values of the young Brazilians)

1. Do you consider that the average Brazilians care only about themselves, their family and friends, or are they also interested in the welfare of the rest of the population? Is this related to their involvement in politics?

2. Outside school, do you think the young Brazilians learn to be more competitive or cooperative? And at school? Stimulating competition is good or bad? What practices in your school end up promoting these characteristics?

3. Does Brazilian society value talent? And effort? How are these characteristics valued at your school? What are the impacts of valuing these characteristics in cultivating students’ morality?

4. What moral values are developed in the young from the use of social networks? Is there any work in your school to make the student reflect on these issues?
   (Teachers’ and school’s roles)
5. What should be the objectives of basic education? In fact, what is taught in school?
6. Do the teacher and the school have effective roles in shaping the student’s moral values? Which of these values should be cultivated at school? And at home?
7. In your school, is there systematic work for the development of moral values in students? Are you well prepared to perform such a task?
8. Are the profiles of the students in your school different or homogeneous? What is the impact of this fact on the development of their moral values? (Specifying the development of some values)
9. Should schools encourage students to follow rules? Does your school deal well with this? Which rules of the school do you think are positive and which do you think are negative? Is there a crisis of authority in education today?
10. Should school, besides encouraging tolerance, also promote integration among young people from different groups/tribes? Does your school deal well with this?
11. Should the school stimulate empathy (people’s capacity to put themselves in the shoes of others) and solidarity towards other individuals in society? Does your school deal well with this?
12. What is more important for a person to be a good citizen: the development of his/her reflective capacity or his/her affectivity? Are you and your school cultivating these virtues? (Transmission of and reflection on moral values)
13. Can the high school student self-regulate? Should the school impose limits over students? At what level? How are you and your school dealing with this?
14. Do you and your school usually directly transmit some moral values or only stimulate students to reflect on them? How should this happen? How have you been taught about it?
15. Is there students’ involvement in the development of school rules? In determining what they learn? Are debates held in classrooms to solve problems? (Teachers’ Political Views)
16. Do you consider that people who have legitimately obtained greater wealth should have the right to place their children in better schools, or do you consider that all young people should have access to the same level of education? How should a reflection on this question be conducted in school? Is this done at your school?
17. Are you for or against same-sex marriages and adoptions by same-sex couples? How should a reflection on this question be conducted in school? Is this done at your school? (Final considerations)
18. How specifically can your classes help for the development of student moral values? Can you accomplish this task?

19. Finally, is your school successful in the cultivation of moral values? What effects of this work do you perceive in your students?

**Semi-structured interviews with head teachers and supervisors**

(Identification)

0. What is your name, your age, your education background, the discipline you teach and the school you work for?

(Values of the young Brazilian)

1. Out of school, do you consider that the young Brazilian learns to be more competitive or cooperative? And at school? Stimulating competition is good or bad? What practices in your school end up promoting these characteristics?

2. In your opinion, what moral values are developed in the young from the use of social networks? Is there any work in your school to make the student reflect on these issues?

(Teachers’ and school roles)

3. What should be the objectives of basic education? In fact, what is taught in school?

4. Do the teacher and the school have effective roles in shaping the student’s moral values? Which of these values should be cultivated at school? And at home?

5. In your school, is there systematic work for the development of moral values in students? Are you well prepared to perform such a task?

(Specifying the development of some values)

6. Should schools encourage students to follow rules? Does your school deal well with this? Which rules of the school do you think are positive and which do you think are negative?

7. Should school, besides encouraging tolerance, also promote integration among young people from different groups/tribes? Does your school deal well with this?

8. Should the school stimulate empathy (people’s capacity to put themselves in the shoes of others) and solidarity towards other individuals in society? Does your school deal well with this?

9. What is more important for a person to be a good citizen: the development of his/her reflective capacity or his/her affectivity? Does your school work well to develop these virtues?

(Transmission of and reflection on moral values)
10. Can the high school student self-regulate? Should the school impose limits? At what level? How are you and your school dealing with this?

11. Is there student involvement in the development of school rules? In determining what they learn? Are debates held in classrooms to solve problems?

(Final considerations)

12. Does your school face the problem of teacher’s absence at school? Does this have any influence on the formation of students’ moral values?

13. Finally, is your school successful in the education of moral values? What effects of this work do you perceive in your students?
Appendix 2
Questionnaires – education for citizenship – students

At the beginning, we would like to invite you to collaborate with the production of important data for conducting a doctorate research on citizenship education in Brazil. We also thank you for your availability.

The following questionnaire presents questions related to reflection on citizenship education and is directed to students from three schools in Porto Alegre. This questionnaire is composed of 3 discursive and 37 objective questions. The estimated time for accomplishment is 20 minutes. Respondents’ anonymity is guaranteed.

Your favourite area of study is:
(A) sports.
(B) arts.
(C) human sciences.
(D) math and sciences.
(E) languages.
(F) no one.

In the questions 1, 2 and 3, write your answers in a few words and do not justify them.
1. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged at home? (cite at most three)

_________________
_________________
_________________

2. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged in school? (cite at most three, equal to or different from those presented in the previous question)

_________________
_________________
_________________

3. What are the main barriers to cultivate civic values in school? (cite at most three)?

________________________
________________________
________________________
In questions 4-21, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion about possible descriptions of facts presented. So, you just have to say if you believe such statements represent facts or not, whether or not you agree with them:

4. Your school is more concerned with teaching scientific content than with cultivating civic values.

5. The need of effective redistribution of wealth between rich and poor in our society is discussed in your school.

6. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for example, adoption) is discussed by your school.

7. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students are encouraged by your school.

8. The solidarity of students towards strangers is encouraged by your school.

9. Students’ respect for rules and laws is encouraged by your school.

10. Students’ involvement of with politics is encouraged by your school.

11. In general, the students at your school fight for their rights.

12. The students’ struggle for their rights is encouraged by your school.

13. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people like themselves.
14. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people similar to them.

15. Your school develops activities focused on reducing the potentially harmful impacts of social networks on building students’ civic values.

16. Your school has an effective impact on the formation of student civic values.

17. Most of your teachers try to impose their moral values on students.

18. Most of your teachers try to make students think for themselves about moral issues.

19. Most of your teachers do not seek to reflect on moral issues with students.

20. Your family serves as an example for your moral conduct.

21. Your teachers serve as an example for your moral conduct.

In questions 22-40, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion on the proposals submitted. Thus, you must present your opinions on how things should be, that is, you must say whether or not you agree with the idea suggested.

22. In your school, the area of sports should be more valued than it is.
23. In your school, the area of the arts should be more valued than it is.

24. In your school, the area of human sciences should be more valued than it is.

25. In your school, the area of math and sciences should be more valued than it is.

26. In your school, the area of languages should be more valued than it is.

27. Your school should be more concerned with teaching scientific contents than with cultivating civic values.

28. The need of effective redistribution of income between rich and poor in society should be discussed by the school.

29. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for example, adoption) should be discussed by the school.

30. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students should be encouraged by the school.

31. The solidarity of students towards strangers should be encouraged by the school.
32. Students’ respect for rules and laws should be encouraged by the school.

33. Students’ involvement with politics should be encouraged by your school.

34. Students’ struggle for their rights should be encouraged by the school.

35. Your school should have more impact than it has on the formation of student civic values.

36. Instead of the current format, in rows, the school should promote different organizations of the chairs and tables in the classrooms (semicircles or small groups).

37. Civic values should be cultivated in school by a specific discipline.

38. Civic values should be cultivated in school through topics that are cross-cutting to the themes discussed in most disciplines.

39. Civic values should be cultivated in school through direct interaction with society’s problems (for example, involving students in voluntary work).
40. Civic values should be cultivated in the school through good organisation (for example, by meeting schedules and deadlines).

**Questionnaires - education for citizenship - teachers**

At the beginning, we would like to invite you to collaborate with the production of important data for conducting a doctorate research on citizenship education in Brazil. We also thank you for your availability.

The following questionnaire presents questions related to reflection on citizenship education and is directed to students from three schools in Porto Alegre. This questionnaire is composed of 3 discursive and 37 multiple-choice questions. The estimated time for accomplishment is 20 minutes. Respondents’ anonymity is guaranteed.

You are teacher:

(A) only at Primary School.
(B) at Primary and High School.
(C) only at High School.

The subject that you teach is associated to the area of:

(A) sports.
(B) arts.
(C) human sciences.
(D) math and sciences.
(E) languages.

In the questions 1, 2 and 3, write your answers in a few words and do not justify them.

1. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged at home? (cite at most three)

_________________
_________________
2. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged in school? (cite at most three, equal to or different from those presented in the previous question)

_________________

_________________

_________________

3. What are the main barriers to cultivate civic values in school? (cite at most three)?

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

In questions 4-21, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion about possible descriptions of facts presented. So, you just have to say if you believe such statements represent facts or not, whether or not you agree with them:

4. Your school is more concerned with teaching scientific content than with cultivating civic values.

[ ] (A) the claim is true  [ ] (B) the claim is partially true  [ ] (C) the claim is false  [ ] (D) I don't know

5. The need of effective redistribution of wealth between rich and poor in our society is discussed in your school.

[ ] (A) the claim is true  [ ] (B) the claim is partially true  [ ] (C) the claim is false  [ ] (D) I don't know

6. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for example, adoption) is discussed by your school.

[ ] (A) the claim is true  [ ] (B) the claim is partially true  [ ] (C) the claim is false  [ ] (D) I don't know

7. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students are encouraged by your school.

[ ] (A) the claim is true  [ ] (B) the claim is partially true  [ ] (C) the claim is false  [ ] (D) I don't know

8. The solidarity of students towards strangers is encouraged by your school.

[ ] (A) the claim is true  [ ] (B) the claim is partially true  [ ] (C) the claim is false  [ ] (D) I don't know

9. Students’ respect for rules and laws is encouraged by your school.

[ ] (A) the claim is true  [ ] (B) the claim is partially true  [ ] (C) the claim is false  [ ] (D) I don't know
10. Students’ involvement of with politics is encouraged by your school.

11. In general, the students at your school fight for their rights.

12. The students’ struggle for their rights is encouraged by your school.

13. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people like themselves.

14. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people similar to them.

15. Your school develops activities focused on reducing the potentially harmful impacts of social networks on building students’ civic values.

16. Your school has an effective impact on the formation of student civic values.

17. Your degree course prepared you to cultivate civic values on students.

18. Civic values are, in your school, worked through a specific discipline.

19. Civic values are cultivated in your school through themes that are cross-cutting to the themes discussed in most disciplines.
20. Civic values are cultivated in your school through direct interaction with the problems of society (for example, involving students in voluntary work).

21. Civic values are cultivated in your school through the good organisation of the school (for example, by meeting schedules and deadlines).

In questions 22-40, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion on the proposals submitted. Thus, you must present your opinions on how things should be, that is, you must say whether or not you agree with the idea suggested.

22. In your school, the area of sports should be more valued than it is.

23. In your school, the area of the arts should be more valued than it is.

24. In your school, the area of human sciences should be more valued than it is.

25. In your school, the area of math and sciences should be more valued than it is.

26. In your school, the area of languages should be more valued than it is.

27. Your school should be more concerned with teaching scientific contents than with cultivating civic values.
28. The need of effective redistribution of income between rich and poor in society should be discussed by the school.

29. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for example, adoption) should be discussed by the school.

30. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students should be encouraged by the school.

31. The solidarity of students towards strangers should be encouraged by the school.

32. Students’ respect for rules and laws should be encouraged by the school.

33. Students’ involvement with politics should be encouraged by your school.

34. Students’ struggle for their rights should be encouraged by the school.

35. Your school should have more impact than it has on the formation of student civic values.

36. Instead of the current format, in rows, the school should promote different organizations of the chairs and tables in the classrooms (semicircles or small groups).
37. Civic values should be cultivated in school by a specific discipline.

38. Civic values should be cultivated in school through topics that are cross-cutting to the themes discussed in most disciplines.

39. Civic values should be cultivated in school through direct interaction with society’s problems (for example, involving students in voluntary work).

40. Civic values should be cultivated in the school through good organisation (for example, by meeting schedules and deadlines).
Appendix 3
NVivo codes

Alternative contents
Ambition
Autonomy
Basic school activities
Basic values
Brazilian people characteristics
Brazilian way to solve problems (jeitinho)
Bullying
Communities and schools interaction
Competition and collaboration
Conflicts resolution
Creativity
Criticality
Critical thinking
Debates
Developing curriculum
Direct transference vs. reflection
Equality
Equality and meritocracy
Evaluation, effort and talent
Examples (teachers vs. parents)
Family influence
Hidden curriculum
Home vs. school
Homogeneity vs. diversity
Humanities vs. sciences
Ideologies
Institutions mould societies
Integration
Interdisciplinarity and Integrated Seminar
Lack of a project and individual initiatives
Lack of teachers
Leadership and proactivity
Legislation
Moral development
Open and/or unusual curricula
Poor students
Power structures of Brazilian society
Privacy control
Respect and tolerance
Respecting rules
Same-sex couples adoption
School impersonality
Self-regulation and negotiated rules
Social contract: rights and duties
Social networks
Socialization between families and schools
Solidarity and empathy
Specific subject
State-run and private schools differences
Students’ communication with teachers and school
Students’ immaturity and refractoriness
Teachers’ affect and engagement
Theory and practice
Thinking-saying-doing
Tired and uninterested students
Transversal contents
University admission tests and scientific content
Unprepared teachers