Chapter 14 – Challenges of Inequality to Democracy

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Word count: [34,440]

Abstract: [119 words]

Keywords (website): public equality, embedded democracy, gender inequality, populism, democratic innovations

Keywords (index): public equality, embedded democracy, political rights and opportunities, participation, representation, deliberation, horizontal accountability, multireligious society, gender inequality, generational inequality, democratic inequality, populism, promise of democracy, technology and democracy, demos, multiculturalism, democratic innovations, mini-publics, fairness, marginalization of minorities
Abstract:

Democracy, as we understand it, is a process of collective decision making among persons, which issues in collectively binding norms for the society of those persons. It is a process of decision making in which persons participate as equals in determining the legal and conventional norms that bind them and in which the group of persons, taken collectively, are sovereign. Democracy can be understood as a descriptive term, referring to political societies that actually exist, or as a normative ideal for the evaluation of political societies. This chapter is primarily about the basic moral principles that can justify this egalitarian process of collective decision making and on the challenges to understanding and realizing this ideal in the modern world.
Summary:

Democracy, as we understand it, is a process of collective decision making among persons, which issues in collectively binding norms for the society of those persons. It is a process of decision making in which persons participate as equals in determining the legal and conventional norms that bind them and in which the group of persons, taken collectively, are sovereign. Democracy can be understood as a descriptive term, referring to political societies that actually exist, or as a normative ideal for the evaluation of political societies. Our focus in this chapter is primarily on the basic moral principles that can justify this egalitarian process of collective decision making and on the challenges to understanding and realizing this ideal in the modern world. After an initial account of the basic principle and the social and institutional realization of this principle, we address the challenges to articulating and implementing this principle that arise due to the reality of economic inequality and the religious, ethnic, gender and racial pluralism of modern societies, and to the fact that state-based democratic systems operate within a larger global society. We then discuss and evaluate the appropriateness of democratic institutions, procedures, and organizations to translate the moral principles into the structural grammar of present-day democracies and to what extent they can guarantee the fundamental principles and normative promises of democracy. As we will see, the ideas of equality and sovereignty at the base of democracy cannot be fully appreciated without a grasp of the pluralism, complexity and global interconnectedness of modern societies.

The Basic Principle

We take public equality as the basic normative principle underwriting democracy and guiding our efforts to understand the challenges that democracy faces. The principle helps us think about democracy along two distinct dimensions: procedural and substantive. Democracy is grounded in the principle of equality in
the sense that because persons have equal status and worth, the collective decision-making process is meant to realize the equal advancement of the interests of the members of the society. The ideal of democracy is a uniquely public realization of the equal status and worth of each citizen in the sense that all can see that they are treated as equals despite all the disagreements and conflicts of interest that arise in modern societies. Democracy achieves this by giving people an equal say in the making of collectively binding decisions and by protecting basic civil rights. This equal say involves equality in capacities to deliberate with fellow citizens and equal voting power and capacities to negotiate when disagreements persist. The challenge is to extend and deepen this idea in the context of highly pluralistic and globalizing societies.

**Structure of the Chapter**

We have structured the chapter along the fundamental challenges democracy is facing in the twenty-first century. The first part explores the challenges of socioeconomic inequality, gender inequality, religious inequality, racial inequality, generational inequality, and racial inequality. It then turns to globalization as an external threat to public equality, populism as an increasingly powerful internal threat within the OECD world, and the challenge science and technology pose to democracy. Though these single sections focus particularly on the challenges to democracy, they also provide some responses to them. The second part of the chapter changes the focus insofar as it deals mainly with responses, such as some proposals for reestablishing the demos and renationalizing democracy, democratic innovations in Europe and Latin America, and the democratic norms that should guide the procedures of supranational governance. We conclude with suggestions for limiting the effects of inequality of wealth on democratic decision making and some different ways of organizing electoral systems for increasing minority participation.
Introduction: Democracy as Public Equality

Democracy, as we understand it, is a process of collective decision making among persons, which issues in collectively binding norms for the society of those persons. It is a process of decision making in which persons participate as equals in determining the legal and conventional norms that bind them and in which the group of persons, taken collectively, are sovereign. Democracy can be understood as a descriptive term, referring to political societies that actually exist, or as a normative ideal for the evaluation of political societies. Our focus in this chapter is primarily on the basic moral principles that can justify this egalitarian process of collective decision making and on the challenges to understanding and realizing this ideal in the modern world. After an initial account of the basic principle and the social and institutional realization of this principle, we will address the challenges to articulating and implementing this principle that arise due to the reality of economic inequality and the religious, ethnic, gender and racial pluralism of modern societies, and to the fact that state-based democratic systems operate within a larger global society. We then discuss and evaluate the appropriateness of democratic institutions, procedures, and organizations to translate the moral principles into the structural grammar of present-day democracies and to what extent they can guarantee the fundamental principles and normative promises of democracy. As we will see, the ideas of equality and sovereignty at the base of democracy cannot be fully appreciated without a grasp of the pluralism, complexity and global interconnectedness of modern societies. The work of this chapter is a collaborative project.
The Basic Principle

We take public equality as the basic normative principle underwriting democracy and guiding our efforts to understand the challenges that democracy faces. The principle helps us think about democracy along two distinct dimensions: procedural and substantive. Democracy is grounded in the principle of equality in the sense that because persons have equal status and worth, the collective decision-making process is meant to realize the equal advancement of the interests of the members of the society. The ideal of democracy is a uniquely public realization of the equal status and worth of each citizen in the sense that all can see that they are treated as equals despite all the disagreements and conflicts of interest that arise in modern societies. Democracy achieves this by giving people an equal say in the making of collectively binding decisions and by protecting basic civil rights. This equal say involves equality in capacities to deliberate with fellow citizens and equal voting power and capacities to negotiate when disagreements persist. The challenge is to extend and deepen this idea in the context of highly pluralistic and globalizing societies.

Democracy addresses the question of who gets to decide on the collectively binding norms in circumstances of disagreement and conflicting interests. Under the assumption that persons and groups have only limited understandings of the perspectives and interests of other persons and groups, persons and groups are generally biased in favor of their own perspectives and interests even when they attempt to construct conceptions of the common good, it is important for all persons and groups to have a say in the collectively binding decisions that constitute the social and political order of a society. Each person and group brings their limited and partial perspectives on how society ought to be organized and attempts by means of argument and negotiation to reconcile their limited points of view with those of others. Each thereby is able to stand up for his or her own perspectives and interests and is able to learn about those of others. In this way, the biases of each person are partly mitigated by a
process of discussion and negotiation. They are unlikely to reach full agreement on how to live together. And thus each is unlikely to be fully satisfied that society is organized as it ought to be organized since the points of view and interests of many others will have to be accommodated. It is not just important that all have a say but that each has an equal say. Only in this way can the issue of who decides be settled in a way that recognizes and affirms the equal status and value of all persons (Christiano 2008).

The principle of public equality also grounds the fundamental civil rights of persons as well. There are certain basic civil and liberal rights whose respect and protection are as important to the public realization of the equal status and worth of persons as democracy itself is (Habermas 1992). And these rights must be respected and protected by democratic decision making just as much as democracy itself if persons are to be treated publicly as equals. This substantive dimension of public equality is also a source of debate and contention (Bellamy 2007).

At the same time, the idea of equality at the heart of democracy is itself a contested notion. And the challenges addressed in the subsequent parts of this chapter bring out some of the main sources of contestation. And so the ideal of public equality itself must be subject to continual discussion and revision. In this sense, democracy is an ideal that is never fully realized among persons. So the ideal of public equality serves both as a standard for the evaluation of the procedural aspects of the democratic process as well as a principle for the assessment of the substantive outcomes of democracy. The most obvious way in which it does this is that democratic societies must decide how to reproduce democracy themselves in their constitutional forms as well as in the social bases of democratic participation. In this respect, the discussions of this chapter are designed to inform this continual process of reflection on and the reproduction of democracy.
Social and Institutional Realization of Democracy

The principle of public equality, according to which people are to be treated as equals in a way that they can see that they are treated as equals, is quite abstract and needs to be realized in social and political institutions. This chapter is in significant part about the challenges to this realization. In order to understand just how challenging this is it is important to lay out some elements of a conceptual framework. One distinction important for understanding how the collective decision making of a society realizes public equality is between the deliberative and power dimensions of collective decision making. The first looks at how societies enable people to participate as equals in the processes of deliberation and discussion that lead up to decision making and that form the conceptions of the alternatives societies face and the considerations in favor of and against those alternatives. The second explores how institutions and societies distribute power to persons so that they can advance their views and interests. These are not exclusive categories. Many aspects of political decision making involve both dimensions.

For the deliberative dimension, when a group of people make a decision that is binding on all of the members, they must engage in a process of discussion to learn about their interests and how those interests can be accommodated and advanced in a just and harmonious way. This discussion is necessary to constructing the decision and thinking about alternatives. This process of deliberation does not start merely when a decision has to be made, it is an ongoing process that occurs throughout the society over a long course of time. It requires processes of discussion within particular sectors of society in which interests and conceptions of the common good are formulated and debated. And it requires debate and discussion on a society-wide level. Of course in a highly pluralistic society the participants in this discussion have to listen to each other and try to understand each other even when their experiences and the problems they face are diverse and unfamiliar to each other. The
The democratic ideal is that they listen to each other as equals. This is an extraordinary challenge that many of the sections of this chapter are focused on. In particular, the challenge of including and listening to people from different ethnic, racial, and religious groups as well as different genders.

The dimension of power is involved when discussion and debate do not resolve all the issues and there is disagreement and conflict even though a decision has to be made. Then the distribution of power involved in voting, in organizing groups to vote and pressure representatives, in negotiating compromises with other groups in order to come to a unified standpoint despite disagreement, becomes essential to the democratic ideal of public equality. When discussion and debate fail to reach consensus, the distribution of power becomes essential.

To be sure, the dimensions of deliberation and power come together in a variety of ways. One especially prominent way is that some groups are not listened to because they are marginalized because of their ethnicity, race, gender, religion or socioeconomic status. They are deprived of power because they cannot participate as equals in the process of deliberation (Young 2000). Another important way occurs when the inequality of wealth and income in the society play a large role in enabling some groups to get their views out and disabling others from getting their views out.

This suggests a second distinction between formal and informal mechanisms that is important to evaluating the democratic quality of a process of decision making. There are formal mechanisms and rights for giving people power over the collective decision, such as the right to vote and the electoral system that aggregates these votes. And there are formal mechanisms that enable people to participate in deliberation such as the rights of each to express themselves and to associate with other likeminded or like interested people. There are also formal mechanisms of contestation such as the system of courts for contesting the legality of legislative or administrative action just
to name a couple. These are formal because certain rights are assigned to people and the mechanism is designed so that the exercise of those rights have legal consequences for the society.

There is also the informal character of democracies that consists in the extent to which groups actually organize to advance certain interests or viewpoints. Are the conditions present so that all the diverse interests in society are enabled to advance their interests? There is also the previously mentioned question as to whether, when a group is formed to present its interests and viewpoints, the other members of the society listen to them and take them seriously. Modern democratic societies have done reasonably well in developing legal regimes that protect the basic political and civil rights of their citizens, though there are important issues to be dealt with here, as in the question about how future generations can be represented in collective decision making. Great strides have been made in protecting the civil and political rights of minorities. But it remains the case that religious, racial and ethnic minorities are often not accorded the respect owed to them as equal citizens in the societies. Some of the sections of our chapter are concerned with these fundamental inequalities in the deliberative and informal aspects of democratic equality.

Of course, the egalitarian dimensions of the informal aspects of political participation can be enhanced by legislative and constitutional action to some degree. For instance, one of the main ways in which interest groups find it difficult to organize and exert influence on the collective decision process is because the group is significantly poorer than the dominant majority. So they have less resources with which to participate in the deliberative and negotiating process. Furthermore, lower middle class, working class and poorer citizens generally have distinctive interests in the society but find that they have significantly less resources with which to advance those interests. To some extent these inequalities can be mitigated by means of campaign finance reform. But the political platforms of major political parties and candidates seem to have less
and less room for these interests in American and European societies. They seem to be less and less able to get people to listen to them (Bartels 2009). One consequence of this is that we see the rise of populist demagoguery in these societies as we discuss later in this chapter. We do not discuss the effects of socioeconomic inequality on political inequality in this chapter since it is well covered in Chapter 13. We will however suggest some recommendations for mitigating the effects of this inequality.

There is a further feature of democracy that is essential to a discussion of equality. This involves the ability of a democratic society effectively to govern itself. There are two major and connected challenges here. The first challenge involves the fact that democratic decision making takes place in a context in which there are other powerful economic actors in a society that are able to impose costs on a democratic society when it makes certain decisions. Large economic firms can impose costs on a society when the society tries to regulate or tax their behavior and lessen their profitability as in the case of legislation to curb the production of pollution or increases in corporate taxes (Merkel 2014a). A firm can fulfill a threat to move to another jurisdiction if these measures are imposed and the legislature may forego important legislation in order to avoid the unemployment corporate moves would make. This is an exercise of power outside the normal democratic channels and so endows these entities with a kind of power in addition to their powers to participate in politics. The second challenge that arises here is that democratic societies must interact with other political societies to achieve certain aims in the international environment. They do this currently by means of treaties and agreements. But the processes of treaty making and agreement making can also be subjected to democratic norms of equality as we will discuss later. It should be noted that those two challenges are connected in that international cooperation among states can lessen the threats imposed by multinational firms by coordination on tax regimes or environmental regimes, to name just two examples.
Structure of the Chapter

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Part I: The Challenges to Public Equality

1.1 Representation and (Social and Civic) Participation – barriers to public equality

Socioeconomic inequality

Democracy as public equality is constituted empirically within a political system possessing the following five components: (1) a democratic electoral regime; (2) political participation rights; (3) civil liberties; (4) the institutional safeguarding of mutual constraints and horizontal accountability; and (5) the de jure and de facto guarantees of the effective power to govern of democratically elected representatives. Socioeconomic inequality challenges each of these components.

The electoral regime

Voter turnout has declined moderately in Western Europe and drastically in Eastern Europe, while remaining at a problematically low level in the United States. Declining electoral participation is due to the political apathy of the lower social classes and not to their permissive abstention, as some conservative observers argue. While the gender gap has nearly closed, selectivity in terms of social class has significantly increased. The increasing socioeconomic inequality of the last three decades has translated into heightened inequalities in cognitive resources and political knowledge across social classes. The lower their political knowledge, the less the voters are able to translate their interests into corresponding voting preferences. The more unequal a society, the greater is the number of voters who are unwilling or unable to participate meaningfully in elections. The more unequal electoral participation, in turn, the likelier it is that
substantial representation on the parliamentary level becomes similarly distorted.

**Political rights and opportunities**

For almost three decades European party systems have been changing: the traditional “catch-all parties” are in decline, while more specialized or populist parties have emerged — from ecological parties and left-socialist parties to right-wing populist parties. While catch-all parties traditionally mobilized lower-class voters better than most other parties, the “new” parties rarely represent the interests of the lower classes. Attempts have been made to stop the trend toward political exclusion through democratic innovations such as referenda, deliberative assemblies, participatory budgeting or citizen councils. However, given they are cognitively and politically more demanding than voting in general elections, they risk being even more socially exclusive. That said, this caveat may apply above all to advanced (post)industrial societies and established democracies. Studies of Latin America show that in certain contexts, these new forms of political participation may intensify the involvement of citizens in political processes in their municipalities or even on the national level (Pogrebinschi 2012).

**Civil rights**

Compared to the early 1960s, when women (Switzerland) or African Americans (six US states) were not allowed to vote, when women did not enjoy the full range of economic and civil rights in many democracies, when homosexuals were criminalized and discrimination against ethnic minorities was ubiquitous, the civil rights situation has improved considerably. Today’s governments, parliaments, parties, and the political elites are under greater pressure to be more transparent. Contemporary civic associations are more numerous and more political, monitoring politics much more closely than some decades ago. John Keane (2011) has even spoken of an emerging “monitory democracy.” Yet we are not living in a world
where civil rights and the rule of law are unchallenged, as recent revelations of the surveillance practices of the American National Security Agency (NSA), the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and secret services elsewhere in the world have shown. In the age of the Internet, private monopolies such as Google also pose a challenge to individual privacy rights. It is also true that democratic states must come up with more inclusive and lasting forms of selecting, accepting, and integrating immigrants into their societies and political systems. Indeed, hard-fought advances in equal rights for ethnic minorities have been recently challenged in Europe, the United States, Australia, and Asia. On the whole, however, there can be no doubt that the overall civil rights situation has improved within the OECD world in the past half-century.

40 Horizontal accountability

41 The last decades have seen a weakening of national parliaments. Globalization and transnationalization have strengthened executives at the cost of parliaments. Governments, from Argentina to Greece to Germany, are blackmailing their legislatures in the name of executive emergency rights and policy-making imperatives under the real or pretended pressures of crisis. The German chancellor Angela Merkel notoriously admonished the public and the parliament of the need for “market-conforming democracy,” elevating the markets to the status of sovereign. Moreover, only governments are represented in supra- and international governance regimes such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and EU. Parliaments, the core bodies of representative democracies, have lost key legislative and monitoring powers vis-à-vis executives. Transparency and accountability have been among the first victims as a result.

42 Effective power to govern

43 What governments have gained in power vis-à-vis parliaments on the one side, they have lost to the markets on the other. Deregulation and globalization have empowered financial actors such as banks, hedge
funds, investors, and global firms. “Markets” have become the principals, governments the agents. If these principals are hit by self-inflicted crises, as it has been the case with the financial crises after 2008, they can externalize their problems by forcing governments to bail them out.

**Conclusion**

In sum, four out of the five components of democracy have witnessed democratic erosions over the course of the last decades. Only the regime of civil rights has seen considerable improvements. The rights of women and minorities (ethnic, religious, sexual) have made impressive advances, de jure and de facto in most countries, although not completely up to the actual level of men and majorities. In times of globalization it seems easier for democratic governments to advance noneconomic identity rights than to halt the increasing socioeconomic inequalities (Merkel 2014a) in times of deregulated global markets and the dominant economic paradigm of austerity politics and policies.

We do not conclude that “democracy” (singular) is in crisis, since there is no theory that can tell us where the threshold between challenges to and crisis of the democratic system actually lies (Kneip and Merkel in press). It would be wrong to assume that the established democracies of the OECD world have already transformed into postdemocracies, since there are, rather, asynchronous developments that have strengthened the proper working of democracies in certain ways and weakened it in others, as we have pointed out. We are also not facing the “end of representative politics” (Tormey 2015). But what will be discussed in the following chapters is to which extent the multiple challenges of inequalities are undermining the very idea and practice of democracy and which democratic reforms and innovations can reduce the danger of shifting axes of democratic legitimacy in the twenty-first century.
Racial inequality

For many, ethnic identity is a point of deep pride and personal connection. Ethnic groups create and transmit vital aspects of cultural knowledge and practice including philosophy, literature, music, art, food, and language. They also serve as powerful sites for social progress, facilitating bonds across individuals and allowing for mobilization. Yet ethnic and racial identity also pose deep challenges to democracy and the public equality that underlies it. This is in part because practices and beliefs differ across groups, and groups therefore struggle for power to determine the rules and practices of the society in which they live. But this is something of a red herring; most people, regardless of ethnicity, share a personal interest in safety, security, shelter, protection for civil liberties, and a society in which they are respected by their co-citizens. In this section, then, we focus on obstacles to public equality that stem not from ethno-racial differences but from ethno-racial hierarchies – structures that distribute power and advantage to members of some ethnic groups and not others.

Ethno-racial hierarchies are not natural, but instead are a product of historical and current structures established by groups seeking domination. These hierarchies are rooted in centuries-old patterns of colonialism, conquest, slavery, and/or forced migration. Groups identify common traits to bond them together and to justify practices that strip those outside the defined group of power. In the United States, this pattern began with European settler colonialism over Native Americans and chattel slavery of Africans. Although these practices came to a formal end, they leave an indelible mark on American society. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example, it became increasingly challenging for whites to use legal structures to oppress the Native American and Black populations. Scientists instead generated theories of “biological differences” between races, with whites being “naturally superior” and therefore fit to rule over nonwhite inhabitants. This justified stripping these
inhabitants of rights and liberties, including claims to decent work and living conditions. While theories of biological racism have since been scientifically debunked, they still hold significant sway, showing up explicitly in white nationalist views and more subtly in the widely-held belief that America is “post-racial” and that differences in outcomes between whites and nonwhites can be attributed to inherited differences in talent, motivation, and initiative rather than systemic barriers and institutionalized racism.

From here on out, references to “ethnicity” refer to both race and ethnicity. This is because ethnicity is an umbrella term that includes, but is not limited to, features associated with race such as skin color, hair type, and ancestry (Horowitz 1985). Membership in an ethnic group is based upon possessing traits “believed to be associated with descent” (Chandran 2006). By “believed to be associated with descent,” we mean those traits “around which a credible myth of association with descent has been woven, whether or not such an association exists in fact” (ibid.). These traits are either genetically transmitted (skin color, hair type, physical features) or have to do with the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, caste, clan, nationality, or race of one’s parents and ancestors (ibid.). It is essential to recognize that racial and ethnic categories are not “fixed” but rather constructed. The salience of a cluster of “ethnic” features thus changes across time and space. Someone with the same phenotypically “black” features would encounter different obstacles and opportunities in Brazil than they would in France or Kenya. Indeed, each society has its own unique history of ethnic and racial hierarchy. Recognizing this, we nonetheless strive here to identity patterns, frameworks, and interventions that can help policy makers and activists worldwide understand the relationship between ethnic identity, public equality, and democracy.

Across the world, social and economic inequality tracks ethnic identity, threatening the underlying substantive equality essential for democratic practice. Residential segregation is one of the primary drivers of persistent group inequality. Segregation occurs due to
housing discrimination, minority self-segregation, and patterns where families from the dominant ethnic group move away from neighborhoods when they become populated by ethnic minority groups (Anderson 2010). In Paris, for example, many low-income immigrants live in isolated suburban public housing communities. They have poor access to public transportation, quality food, good schools, and other public goods. They are also socially isolated, which means that they rarely interact with white French citizens, at least not on terms of respect. This threatens the deliberative component of the democratic ideal, decreasing understanding of and empathy for people outside one’s ethnic group.

Limited interaction breeds stereotypical thinking: if you very rarely encounter someone from a minority ethnic group, then your opinions about a group are going to be limited to media exposure and a small number of personal interactions (ibid.). Stereotyped thinking affects everyone in a society, from its lawmakers to its police officers. Biased laws, and the biased application of fair laws, significantly impedes public equality. Individuals acting on behalf of the state like judges, juries, and representatives frequently and unconsciously act in ways that deprive citizens of basic rights and liberties. Police officers and prosecutors perform one of the most essential tasks in a democracy: ensuring internal order. This job is challenging, requiring them to make frequent high-stakes decisions about whom to pursue and how. Toward this end, officials worldwide use generalizations based on race, ethnicity, national origin, instead of evidence or individual behavior, as the basis for directing discretionary law enforcement actions” (OSJI 2009). This tactic, known as ethnic profiling, leads police officers to stop, question, arrest, and detain ethnic minorities at disproportionately high rates. In Spain, for example, Romany are ten times more likely to be stopped on the street by police than “white” residents, Moroccans at 7.5 times the rate of whites, and Black Africans at 17 times the rate of whites (García Añón et al. 2013).

Despite its popularity, ethnic profiling is both ineffective and unjust. Because ethnic minorities are stopped at much higher rates,
disproportionate number of individuals killed during the pursuit of a suspected criminal are from minority groups. In cases where the suspect is not killed, the effects of ethnic profiling accumulate: disproportionate stops lead to disproportionate arrests, arrests lead to prosecutions, prosecutions lead to incarceration, and incarceration leads to difficulty finding employment and alienation from one’s family and community. In all, the initial act of ethnic profiling in policing leads to much higher rates of prosecution and punishment for members of ethnic minority groups. This is compounded by the fact that juries and judges face severe obstacles to fair evaluation due to implicit bias. In some cases, police officers even kill people during stops. When this occurs, police officers are not typically held accountable, even when the victim was unarmed and not engaged in any criminal activity.

Given the clear problems associated with ethnic profiling, countries across the world are considering legislative and police reforms. First and foremost, it is essential that independent bodies are created to review officer-involved shootings. States must also build trust between police officers and the communities they serve by diversifying the population of police officers, conducting workshops on implicit bias, and explicitly teaching skills associated with conflict mediation and interethnic communication. Another promising reform involves officers wearing body cameras that record interactions with constituents. When an officer kills a constituent in the line of duty, stakeholders in the victim’s community can see the footage and work with police to determine whether the officer was reacting appropriately given the level of danger at hand.

In addition to internal police reforms, there is need for legislation banning stops for “furtive” movements such as a reaching for waistband or acting nervous, stops for being in a high-crime area, and stops for matching a generalized description of a suspect. New York City requires officers to report the details of every stop that occurs including the location, race and gender of the suspect, whether force was used, and whether a firearm was found. This has led to a sharp
decrease in baseless stops. Finally, policy makers could decriminalize activities that do not threaten public security but give police officers easy justifications for stopping someone, including public alcohol consumption, marijuana possession, loitering, spitting, and jaywalking.

56 While these legislative and institutional reforms are essential to ending ethnic profiling, unfair policing is a symptom of larger societal problems that must be addressed, including the fact that public goods like education, safe roads, electricity, healthcare, and police protection are distributed unequally along ethnic lines. Unequal public goods provision is partially explained by opportunity and resource hoarding – a group with existing power and resources benefits from limiting access to these goods. Social scientists have found that cities with higher levels of ethnic diversity spend less overall on public goods (Alesina, Bagir, and Easterly 1999). This is because wealth levels map to an ethno-racial hierarchy, with certain ethnic groups possessing more wealth than others. In-group hoarding occurs when there are disparities in wealth along ethnic lines because well-resourced groups have more to lose, and poor individuals have more to gain from redistribution (Baldwin and Huber 2016). What’s more, wealthy individuals are better able to substitute private goods for public goods (purchasing private education, private security, etc.), making them less sensitive to the levels of overall public goods provision. Consider the distribution of a public good – physical security – in Brazil. During the past decade, the murder rate for white citizens has decreased by 24 percent while the murder rate for Black and mixed-race citizens has increased by 40 percent. This is because white rich citizens are able to purchase private security, which both increases their safety and decreases their motivation to fund public security in the form of policing for others.

57 Political parties frequently mobilize voters alone ethnic lines, explicitly promoting ideologies that play up “inherent” differences between ethnic groups. In the United States, for example, Black Americans are twice as likely to be unemployed and nearly three
times as likely to live in poverty. Based on this, and drawing on centuries of bigoted stereotypes, white politicians often cast African-Americans as “lazy” and “lacking work ethic.” The reality is that African-Americans cannot access jobs due to poor access to education, employment discrimination, and other forms of oppression that result from the unequal distribution of public goods. To the extent that African-Americans are out of work, this is because whites “tend to limit access to stable jobs to fellow whites, relegating blacks to temporary, part-time, or marginal jobs in the secondary labor market” (Anderson 2010). In short, political ideologies that play up “inherent” differences between ethnic groups “misrepresent the effect of group inequality as its cause” (ibid.).

Spatial segregation and unequal public goods provision undermine the substantive elements required for citizens to deliberate and determine the law as equals. Toward this end, spending on public schools ought to be equalized across ethnic groups, or in some cases even increased given the high need for supplemental “wrap-around” services like counseling, food, special education, and school supplies in high-poverty areas. Yet improving primary and secondary education is not a silver bullet; these efforts must be accompanied by steps to end residential segregation and increased spending on other public goods like childcare, paid family leave policies, healthcare, adult job training and employment, and access to nutritious food.

There is a tight relationship between the substantive and procedural conditions of public equality. Equal participation requires voter mobilization, campaigning, and lobbying financial capital, political knowledge, time, and access, which members of these groups frequently lack for the reasons described. As a result, they are less able to deliberate with fellow citizens on an equal footing. As was made clear earlier in this chapter, it is therefore urgent to put in place campaign finance laws distributing political resources across groups and limiting the influence of existing private wealth. Additionally, close attention must be paid to the interaction between existing ethnic hierarchy and democratic procedures. Direct democratic
measures are on the rise in modern democracies. These practices that allow citizens to propose and vote directly on measures, are appealing to democratic theorists because they foster grassroots organizing, ensure numerical voting equality on issues, and allow those without powerful ties to politicians to have their voices heard. Yet careful attention to the empirical effects of these practices highlights how substantive inequalities and biases may infect democratic procedures. Voters bring in their own stereotyped beliefs and biases to the booth, which can result in a tyranny of the majority at the expense of minority groups.

In Switzerland, for example, foreign residents become naturalized in three stages: vetted first by the federal government, then the state, then at the municipal level. While some municipalities have elected politicians vote on the applications, others allow voters to decide directly via secret ballot. A recent study found that, between 1970 and 2003, foreign residents were 50 percent more likely to get naturalized when elected politicians made the decision rather than voters (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016). The quality of the applicant pool was the same across districts, implying that voters discriminate against qualified applicants that would have been approved if accountable legislators had made the decision. In fact, the effect of switching from direct to representative democracy was notably stronger in areas where citizens were more xenophobic (ibid.). This is because representatives, even if they hold the same prejudices as the voters, are publicly accountable for their choices and know their decisions are subject to evaluation in the courts. In short, under certain circumstances, direct democratic measures can be used to suppress the legitimate interests of ethnic minorities. Therefore, policy makers should be attentive to the circumstances under which ballot referenda are used, particularly when it comes to decisions concerning citizenship and the distribution of public goods.

Ethnic hierarchy poses a substantial threat public equality. One’s membership in an ethnic group often determines whether one can access basic civil rights and liberties as well as the goods and
resources essential for discourse on terms of mutual respect. This, in turn, poses clear challenges to democracy as a process of decision making in which people have an equal ability to determine the laws and norms that bind them.

**Religious inequality**

The defining feature of democracy, as already expressed in the introduction, is that all groups and persons be recognized as equally valued members of the society to which they belong. If this is so, and if, further, the collective decision-making process is the public realization of the equal worth of every citizen, then any practice that involves discrimination, exclusion, marginalization or oppression of groups and persons violates the principle of democracy. For our purpose here, inequality may be viewed as a condition where such exclusionary and/or discriminatory practices thrive, where power is illegitimately deployed to thwart the basis interests and values of individuals and groups. A fully realized democracy then cannot coexist with inequality.

The focus of this section is on one such type of inequality namely: religious inequality. Religious inequality can be of two kinds. In a society with multiple religions, members of one religious group may treat members of other religious groups as unequals, as when a government controlled by non-Muslims refuses permission to build a mosque with minarets, or when Hindus and Christians are debarred from standing for public office in an Islamic state. Let this be called interreligious inequality. A second kind of religious inequality also persists in many societies. Consider the persecution of Catholics by Protestants or the de-recognition of Ahmadiyas as Muslims. Here members of a broadly conceived religious group treat their own members as unequals. Let this be called intrareligious inequality. Another deeper form of intrareligious inequality also exists. For example, in India a whole group of people, formerly called “the untouchables” continue to find it difficult to enter many Hindu temples; in some places, women are still hounded because they are
believed to be witches, women between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five are not allowed entry into a temple because they are menstruating and therefore believed to be polluted.

The question before us is how should states deal with these different forms of religious inequalities. Are democratic states in a better position to address such inequalities than nondemocratic states? Furthermore, are some forms of democratic states better equipped to deal with religious inequalities than others? While the distinction between democratic and nondemocratic states is important, an even more important distinction for our purpose is between religion-centered and secular states. It is our view that all religion-centered states perpetuate religious inequalities and violate important principles of democracy. If the reduction of religious inequalities is our objective, then, it is argued here, religion-centered states must give way to secular states. Only secular democratic state can undermine religious inequalities. But this simple answer does not suffice because all forms of secular-democratic states are not equally capable of addressing religious inequality. This begs the question: which form of secular-democratic state is best able to reduce both intra- and interreligious inequalities? To answer this question is the central objective of this section.

What are religion-centered and secular states? Religion-centered states grant privileged recognition to any one religion. They promote the values and interests of that religion and justify most of their laws and policies in terms of these values or interests. Sometimes, entire apparatus of such states is run by religious personnel. The connection of states with religion is so strong and constitutive that their very identity is defined by religion. Such states then are Christian, Islamic or Hindu.

Secular states are different. They withdraw privileges that any established religion had previously taken for granted. This they can do only when their primary ends or goals are defined independently of religion. Thus, a crucial requirement of a secular state is that it has
no constitutive links with religion, that the ends of any religion not be installed as the ends of the state. For example, it cannot be the constitutive objective of the state to ensure salvation, nirvana, or moksha. No religious community in such a state can say that the state belongs exclusively to it. The identity of the state is defined independently of religion, and certainly independently of any one religion. Furthermore, laws and policies of such states cannot be justified solely in terms of reasons provided by any one religion.

Which of the two, religion-centered or secular states can better undermine religious inequalities and build an inclusive society and polity on fair and equal terms? A cursory evaluation of these states shows that all religion-centered states are deeply troublesome. Take first historical instances of states that establish a single church, the unreformed established Protestant Churches of England, Scotland and Germany, and the Catholic Churches in Italy and Spain. These states recognized a particular version enunciated by the church as the official religion, compelled individuals to congregate for only one church, punished them for failing to profess a particular set of religious beliefs, and levied taxes in support of one particular church (Levy 1994, 5). In such cases, not only was there inequality among religions (for example between Christians and Jews) but also among the churches of the same religion. Such multireligious or multiple-denominational societies were frequently wrecked by interreligious or interdenominational wars and if not, their religious minorities faced persistent religious persecution (Jews in several European countries till the nineteenth century).

States with substantive establishments have not changed color with time. Wherever one religion is not only formally but substantively established, the persecution of minorities and internal dissenters continues today. One has only to cite the example of Saudi Arabia to prove this point (Ruthven 2002, 172-81). Or consider the situation in Pakistan where the virtual establishment of the dominant Sunni sect has proved to be disastrous to minorities, including to Muslim minorities. For example, Ahmedis have been deemed a non-Muslim
minority, forbidden from using Islamic nomenclature in their religious and social lives (Malik 2002, 10; Bhargava 2010, 63-108; 2010a, 81-102); and has been formally excluded by the state, both symbolically and materially, from its own religion. Moreover, by making adherence to Islam mandatory for anyone aspiring to the highest offices in the country, the Constitution ensures the exclusion of religious minorities from high politics (Malik 2002, 16). Likewise, many people in India believe that the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra would be disastrous, particularly for Muslim minorities, perhaps even for the Dalits (former untouchables). The Jewish state of Israel in effect fails to grant equal rights to its religious minorities.

So if religious inequalities are to be reduced, religion-centered states must be dismantled. However, while secular democratic states are committed to equality of citizenship, they also differ from one another in their respective understandings of how they must relate to religion. All agree that they must be separated or disconnected, but differ on how the metaphor of separation is to be unpacked. For one, separation is total disconnection or mutual exclusion. The state has neither a positive relationship with religion, for example there is no policy of granting aid to religious institutions nor a negative relationship with it; it is not within the scope of state activity to interfere in religious matters. The Constitutional state of the United States is frequently interpreted to instantiate this model, advocating mutual exclusion of state and religion (a wall) primarily for the sake of religious liberty and denominational pluralism. Thus by protecting religious freedom of all groups and ensuring interdenominational equality as also by ruling out discrimination in the official domain on grounds of religion, this model prevents certain forms of religious inequalities. However, it has two major limitations: (a) By its refusal to negatively intervene in religious practices, it may allow discriminatory, oppressive practices within a religion; (b) by eschewing any positive help to all religious groups, it may overlook, to achieve equality, some vulnerable religious minorities require assistance from the state.
In another, second type, disconnection is partial and is conceived at the level of law and public policy in a wholly one-sided manner. Here to disconnect is to exclude religion from the affairs of the state but to allow virtually limitless intervention by the state in the affairs of religion to control, regulate and even to destroy religion. Such secular states are decidedly antireligious. They often advocate one-sided exclusion primarily for the sake of a stringently guarded common public culture that gives a uniform and equal identity to citizens. In their authoritarian form this model is at least partly exemplified in Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia. Its democratic version is best enunciated in France.

These secular states (model 2) have one advantage over model 1. Since they are willing to intervene in religious affairs, they can undercut oppressive and exclusionary religious practices and achieve some forms of interreligious equality. However by refusing to grant positive recognition or financial aid particularly to newly immigrated religious groups and by their obstinate refusal to acknowledge the entanglement of both official and public practices with a historically embedded majority religion, they at least unwittingly perpetuate interreligious inequality.

Partial disconnection is also the form of state-religion relationship in the third (model 3) type of secular-democratic state. Disconnection is partial here because the state continues to partially support one religion, usually the dominant one, on the ground that it is part of cultural inheritance and historical legacy of its citizens and therefore a significant public good. Such states are found in large parts of Western Europe. Such secular-democratic states, though not religion-centered, remain single religion-friendly. Why, if they provide to support to one religion, are such states secular?

There are several reasons for this. First, (a) because of a historical pattern of hostility to church and church-based religions on the ground that they were politically meddlesome and socially oppressive
– a pattern explicit in the unchurching struggles in France but also found in most West European countries; (b) second, over time there has over time been a decline both in church belonging and in doctrinal adherence. Surely, if there is one place where secular humanism is perhaps naïvely taken for granted as the only ontological and epistemological game in town, it is Western Europe! Both (a) and (b) have had an impact on Europe's constitutional regimes. A fair degree of disconnection exists at the levels of ends, and so the same basket of formal rights (to different kinds of liberty, and forms of equality, etc.) are offered to all individuals regardless of their church affiliation and regardless of whether they are or are not religious. In the dominant political discourse, the self-definition of these states is that they are not religious (Christian) but (purely) liberal democratic.

However, it is equally true that some connection exists between state and religion. Several states continue to grant monopolistic privileges to one or the other branch of Christianity (The Presbyterian Church in Scotland, the Lutheran Church in most Nordic countries, the Orthodox Church in Greece, the Anglican Church in England). Moreover, at the level of law and public policy, state intervention exists in the form of support for the dominant church/churches. Thus though no longer religion-centered, they remain single-religion friendly states. State-religion connections combined with a significant degree of disconnection mean that these democratic states are at best modestly secular by the standards set by the idealized American model or the French model (Tariq Modood).

How do states of Western Europe fare when evaluated by norms of religious equality? Not all that well, it seems. Blind to the more complex dimension of interreligious inequalities, they do not even see that in this dimension they are not secular. Despite all changes, European states have continued to privilege Christianity in one form or another. The liberal democratization and the consequent secularization of many European states have helped citizens with non-Christian faiths to acquire most formal rights. But such a scheme
of rights neither embodies a regime of interreligious equality nor effectively prevents religion-based discrimination and exclusion. Indeed, it masks majoritarian, ethno-religious biases. Thus, to go back to the example of schools run by religious communities, only two to five schools run by Muslims are provided state funding in England. In France there is at least one state-funded Muslim school (in Réunion), and about four or five new private Muslim schools that are in the process of signing “contrats d’association” with the state. In Germany not a single school run by Muslims is funded by the state. Other examples exist in the failure of many Western European states to deal with the issue of headscarves (most notably France), in unheeded demands by Muslims to build mosques (Germany and Italy), in discrimination against ritual slaughter (Germany), and in unheeded demands by Muslims for proper burial grounds of their own (Denmark, among others).

So, do forms or conceptions of secular-democratic states that better address religious inequalities exist? One particular model outside the West (in the Indian subcontinent) that has tried, often unsuccessfully, to eliminate deep religious inequalities, and which currently lies in shambles everywhere, needs careful attention.

Several features of this fourth kind of secular-democratic state are worth mentioning. First, multiple religions exist in their background not as optional extras added on as an afterthought but as part of its foundation. These secular democratic states are inextricably tied to deep religious diversity. Second, they are committed to deeply diverse set of values, not only liberty and equality but also fraternity (or sociability) – conceived not narrowly as pertaining only to individuals but interpreted broadly also to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities and, in limited and specific domains, their equality of status in society – as well as other to foster a certain quality of relations among religious communities, perhaps even interreligious equality under conditions of deep religious diversity. They have a place not only for the right of individuals to profess their religious beliefs but also for the right of religious
communities to, say, establish and maintain educational institutions crucial for the survival and sustenance of their distinctive religious traditions.

The acceptance of community-specific rights brings me to the third feature of this model. Because this form of secular democratic state was born in a deeply multireligious society, it is concerned as much with interreligious inequality as it is with intrareligious inequality. Whereas other secular democratic states appear to provide benefits to minority religious groups only incidentally (e.g., Jews benefited in some European countries such as France not because their special needs and demands were met via public recognition but because of a more general restructuring of society guided by an individual-based emancipatory agenda), in these states some community-specific sociocultural rights are granted for their intrinsic value.

Fourth, such secular democratic states do not erect a wall of separation between religion and state. There are boundaries, of course, but they are porous. This situation allows the state to intervene in religions in order to help or hinder them without the impulse to control or destroy them. This intervention can include granting aid to educational institutions of religious communities on a non-preferential basis and interfering in socio-religious institutions that deny equal dignity and status to members of their own religion or to those of others; for example, the ban on untouchability and the obligation to allow everyone, irrespective of their caste, to enter Hindu temples, as well as, potentially, other actions to correct gender inequalities. In short, this form of secular democratic state interprets separation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality, but what I call principled distance, poles apart from one-sided exclusion or mutual exclusion.

What does principled distance mean? First, religious groups have sought exemptions when states have intervened in religious practices by promulgating laws designed to apply neutrally across society. For example, Sikhs demand exemptions from mandatory helmet laws to
accommodate religiously required turbans. Principled distance allows a practice that is banned or regulated in the majority culture to be permitted in the minority culture because of the distinctive status and meaning it has for the minority culture’s members. Religious groups may demand that the state refrain from interference in their practices, but they may equally demand that the state interfere in such a way as to give them special assistance so that they are able to secure what other groups are routinely able to acquire by virtue of their social dominance in the political community. For example, subsidies are provided to schools run by all religious communities. Some holidays of all religious communities are granted national status.

Moreover, principled distance allows state intervention in some religions more than in others. Minority religions are granted a constitutional right to establish and maintain their educational institutions. Limited funding may be available to Muslims for Hajj. State engagement can also take a negative interventionist form. For the promotion of equality, special measure may be required in one religion. To undermining caste hierarchies, Hindu temples in India were thrown open to all, particularly to former untouchables should they choose to enter them. Likewise, constitutionally it is possible to undertake gender-based reforms in Hindu or personal Muslim personal law.

Fifth, such states are not compelled to choose between active hostility and passive indifference or between disrespectful hostility and respectful indifference toward religion. They combine the two, permitting necessary hostility as long as there is also active respect. This is a complex dialectical attitude to religion that I have called critical respect. So, on the one hand, the state protects all religions, makes them feel equally at home, especially vulnerable religious communities, by granting them community-specific rights. But the state also hits hard at religion-based oppression, exclusion, and discrimination, in short all forms of religious inequalities.
This section has argued that secular-democratic states of the principled distance variety have a better chance of reducing religious inequalities. In sum, a society progresses the more it moves away from (a) a religion-centered to a secular-democratic state and (b) secular-democratic states hostile or aloof from religions generally or friendly exclusively to one religion to those that keep a principled distance from all religions.

**Gender inequality**

Gender equality is a Mission Impossible, now more than ever. First, there is an ongoing perpetuum mobile of gender inequality that is driven by structures and daily actions of human beings across all walks of life. Second, gender equality as an objective is deeply political and inherently contested. Finally, while deep democracy is needed to mobilize and organize the inevitable ongoing feminist struggles against the tenacity and complexity of gender inequality, democracy currently seems to be shrinking rather than deepening and strengthening.

These triple troubles call for more attention to the linkages between the fates of democracy and of gender equality, and for more feminist engagement in struggles for deeper democracy. This means more attention for the pervasiveness and the tenacity of gender inequality in our societies, for the political nature of gender equality as a goal, and for a clearer perspective on democracy that shows the interrelation between gender equality and democracy. Given the current fate of democracy in Europe, this section will end with a call for action.

**The pervasiveness and the tenacity of gender inequality in our societies**

Even the briefest look at feminist history shows how significant victories in the past have never been enough to end gender inequality. Women’s access to higher education, their legal personhood, women’s suffrage, all these hard-won long battles by
brave and engaged feminists have not brought an end to male domination. If anything, they have revealed the tenacity and complexity of gender inequality regimes. Gender inequality regimes have proven very flexible in readapting to changed contexts and structures. Laws and formal governmental regulations have not changed reality as intended. Progress is made, but mostly partial and never ensured. The impact of ongoing gender inequality on people’s lives is huge, given that gender inequality restricts the lives of both women and men that do not fit well into conventional gender norms.

We now know something about the reasons why progress is so slow. The tenacity and complexity of gender inequality regimes is caused by the multilevel and multidimensional character of gender, its location in all social domains, and its deep connections to other inequalities. As the world is deeply social, none of this is fixed, and everything is in flux. The multilevel character of gender means that gender is part of societal structures and organizations, symbols and norms, identities and behavior. Identities, personalities, routinized behavior, symbols, norms and structures are made and remade on a daily basis by the human beings on this planet. They make conscious decisions about this gendered world and their positioning in it, but also often just routinely follow the gendered scripts that history provides. It is hard to think of a domain where these gendered tracks or scripts would be absent. Gender inequality is both public and private, and is crucial to constructing what is seen as public and what is seen as private (similar to sexual inequality). Whether in economy, polity, violence, health or knowledge, the gender unequal configurations of the past offer the material that people use to make their lives, provide the words and signs people use to be accepted and understood by others. In doing so, people reproduce and to some degree reorganize these gendered tracks, these gendered words, this gendered world across all domains. Whether people benefit or suffer from it depends on their gendered locations (men, women or nonbinary).
Feminist collective action – focused political pressure to change an element of these inequality regimes – such as quotas in politics, a more permissive abortion law, father’s leave or the opening of shelters for domestic violence victims, aims at change, and their hard-won victories matter. They are small steps with tremendous impact on the lives of some women (and men). Yet, there are intersectional caveats to most victories: not all women, not all men equally benefit from them. Quotas in politics might be opening space mostly for high educated women, access to abortion might be almost impossible for rural women, gay fathers may not be eligible for paternity leave, minority women victims of domestic violence might have good reason not to engage with shelters organized by social workers for fear of being stigmatized in their communities or having custody of their children taken away from them.

It is clear then that it is very hard to fundamentally change the dynamics of gender inequality, or to abolish gender inequality. Collective action’s role in inducing and supporting change is well demonstrated. But what are the conditions that foster such actions? What makes feminist collective action successful? How to ensure that these are victories for all women? To answer to these questions, the quality of democracy is key. The quality of democracy matters for gender equality because the tenacity of gender inequality in our societies calls for better conditions for feminist collective action, and such action can only thrive in democracies. This is a matter of both theory and practice, of both a better understanding of the politics needed and more engagement to make such politics happen.

The political nature of gender equality as a goal

If anyone should know what gender equality is, feminists should. And they do indeed, each and every one of them. Yet they give very different meanings to these goals, contradictory meanings even, including objections to the wording used here. Feminists fight fiercely about what the goal of feminism needs to be even if there are many
examples of large-scale collective feminist actions for an agreed upon feminist cause. To make progress on how to deal with the challenge of the multitude of feminist goals – the challenge of the deep political nature of the feminist goal – two questions need to be addressed: What exactly are the bones of contention? Where do hegemonic understandings of gender equality come from? Intersectionality is key to address these questions because history shows, over and over again, that intersectional inequalities and the political choices that need to be made about them occupy center stage in internal feminist struggles and in the outcomes of these struggles. The intersection of class and gender was a bone of contention when feminists were fighting for the suffrage in Europe; the intersection of race and gender was at the heart of suffrage dynamics in the United States. In both Europe and the United States, sexual orientation deeply divided the feminist movement in the 1970s, and current conflicts over transrights are equally divisive. At the level of feminist ideology and feminist theory, one of the strongest divides runs between liberal feminism – aiming for a gender equal society within the settings of a capitalist world –, and socialist feminism – aiming for a gender equal society in which capitalist exploitation is abolished or at least tamed. There is no way gender inequality can be understood or addressed separately from other major inequalities built around class, sexuality and race.

This political nature of gender equality cannot be escaped, and the ongoing struggle of feminists and others about the meaning of gender equality is essential. Such “productive antagonism” (Butler 1993) or refusal of “ultimate truths” (Scott, J. W. 1988) produces a dynamic understanding of feminism that can address the moving target of gender inequality by adapting to its changing forms, and that enables wider sets of coalitions to profit from emerging political opportunities. The format of ongoing struggle enables feminism to challenge domination as well as unstated “norms” of dominant groups within itself, to uncover and address processes of hegemonisation within the feminist project (Hooks 1981). Open spaces and explicit
rules are needed to include the perspectives of previously excluded subjects, ensuring that new inequalities are not made. For all the reasons stated, feminism as a political project needs democracy.

*Democracy and its interrelation with gender equality*

Gender inequality as a political problem, and gender equality as a political goal are too dynamic to fit comfortably within classic formats of formal electoral representation. Formal representation and formal political actors, because of their acceptance of the boundaries of a certain nation or state, do not work well for giving voice to the nonrepresented, or for contributing to the articulation of political problems by those who are in one way or another not fully included in our societies. Social movements are the main actors that can introduce new actors to politics; that can develop and introduce new political problems to societies, and pursue political change to address these problems. For social movements to do this well, how citizenship is organized is key: who are included and excluded in societies, and who decides on this? Some degree of voice, of inclusive citizenship is needed for social movements to emerge and flourish. A first problem is that formal citizenship rights do not fully translate into actual access to participation in democratic institutions. The documented list of barriers for women in politics is long, ranging from non-inclusive language, to ridicule, absence of role models, biased electoral systems, problematic access to campaign funding, lack of compliance with formal rules or outright harassment. Additionally, there are many human beings who are located at the intersection of gender and other inequalities and who lack basic rights in democracies as we know them. Consider the lack of bodily autonomy for women from states without abortion or contraception rights, the lack of resources for many women given the persisting wage gap, the lack of access to family rights for many lesbian and gay parents, the lack of freedom of movement for trans citizens from states without full trans rights, the lack of economic rights for asylum seekers in states that forbid them to be active on the labor market. Moreover, in order to really function as a democracy, a society needs to organize
space not only for its subaltern groups, but also for disruptors of its way of functioning: for people who remind everyone that the political landscape does not cover all of society’s problems, the political stage does not show all the actors actually involved in society, and change is needed to address newly politicized problems.

What kind of democracy does feminism – the political project that is home to feminist social movements – need? Authors such as Walby (2009) and Tilly (2007), show the need to expand on the classic procedural rules of electoral democracy with wider rules on citizenship and attention to the practices and outcomes those sets of rules produce in a society. The wider rules are non-exclusionary rules on citizenship that define how political arenas for debate and struggle are constructed (who is part of the demos), facilitate engagement of people in the societies relevant to them, and construct links between civil society and formal politics, thereby increasing the possibilities for democratic engagement toward gender equality. Following Tilly, state capacity is a crucial ingredient of democracy too, as it is essential to assure democratic practices. Including the practices and outcomes and not just the classic formal rules is also essential because of feedback effects between rules and outcomes.

Current troubles with democracy in Europe

Along with ongoing problems of democracy unrecognized by most political scientists, such as “democratic” states that are simultaneously monarchies or colonial powers, or have rules allowing parties to be ruled autocratically, there are substantial problems for democracy hindering further progress in abolishing gender inequality, as the following examples from the wider Europe illustrate. There is the intrusion of the domain of the economy in the domain of the polity, visible in the failure of democracies to constrain financial capitalism, the tendency to allow businesses to financially opt out of democratic decisions (TTIP), and the contagious spread of business reasoning in governance (as in NPM). All this weakens democracy, and expands the possibilities for gendered capitalist
exploitation by either restricting welfare state arrangements or increasing the possibilities for precarious labor. Moreover, there is a renewed **strengthening of the political power of organized religion** as part of the polity, which is a major source of opposition to gender and sexual equality. While public attention centers mostly on Islamist states, the Vatican and Orthodox churches are much more important in the European context. There is also a **rise of authoritarianism** that is visible in the strengthening of the Radical Right and its connection to authoritarian style geopolitics. There is a **rise in illiberalism and populism**, including criticism on independent thinking and on collective action. There are increasing calls for political restriction to academic autonomy (Turkey, Hungary), and laws that “gag” civil society in European Union member states (Spain, Hungary). Across European countries, there are **increasing (calls for) restrictions on citizenship based on racialized features** (religion, origin) across European countries. And there is an increase in sham democracies: mafia states adopting democratic masks to stage the theatre of their coercive power conquests. In sum, democratic structures supportive of women's rights – such as social democracy, welfare, civil society engagement and academic freedom – are being eroded, with opposition to gender and sexual equality growing in frequency and strength (Verloo 2017).

**Intersectional challenges for democratic struggles about gender equality**

Under conditions of endangered democracy, groups of women at the intersection of gender and sexuality, gender and class, and gender and race already encounter severe backlashes and further exclusion. Even for more privileged women, there is an urgent need for more wage equality and political representation, and less gender-based violence. But the challenges for various intersectional groups of women are far more substantial. The rise of authoritarianism and the extreme right in Europe increases the salience of certain inequality projects in politics and hinders working toward more gender, sexual and racial inequality. Within conservative and extreme right political...
ideologies, heteronormativity and traditional perspectives on gender prevail, with a center piece on fertility in the national interest. Sexual equality is almost always opposed and that impacts negatively on gender equality. The far right’s rise to power has set in motion backlashes against reproductive rights and has diminished hopes for such rights in countries lacking them. Racial inequality is at the heart of most far right ideologies and proposed actions, constructing “racialized others” based on changing contextual configurations of skin color, religion (especially Judaism and Islam), origin (migration) or language. These variations in racialization complicate collective action against it. Class inequality is on the rise, linked to austerity measures leading to the weakening of welfare states in Europe. The weakening of social democratic parties, combined with their traditional blind spot for gendered class inequalities, seriously hinders action to reduce gendered class inequalities.

103 Strategically, the authoritarian preferences of far-right and populist parties strengthen the tendency to decrease the space given to civil society, further hindering collective action toward gender equality. The tendency for civil society restriction is exacerbated by the current terrorist attacks in Europe that trigger political responses that restrict civil liberties. In such contexts, it seems almost utopian to consider giving political space to the subaltern.

104 Summarizing, while a high need exists for more political engagement with gender equality, intersectional challenges to gender equality mean current developments all point to fewer opportunities to do so.

105 Gender equality and democracy are linked in an intricate and reinforcing feedback loop. The more democracy, the more chances for gender equality; the more gender equality there is, the more chances for democracy. Because of their interdependence, we need to be as clear and specific as possible about what kind of democratic principles and practices are needed to achieve real gender equality. As a set of principles, practices and outcomes guiding, organizing and
producing the polity and civil society, democracy is utopian but the only hope for achieving real gender equality.
Generational inequalities

There are at least three forms of generational inequalities that may constitute a challenge for the goal of democratic equality: (1) inequalities between non-overlapping generations; (2) inequalities between coexisting birth cohorts; and (3) inequalities between age groups. These three forms of generational inequalities will be the focus of the sections that follow.

The challenge of justice between non-overlapping generations

Our unsustainable use of natural resources has created large problems that future generations will have to tackle. Deforestation, overfishing and pollution have had a tremendous impact on biodiversity. The future is bleak with expected frequent natural catastrophes as a result of climate change. Some populations will be hit harder than others and, as entire territories will inevitably be replaced by water, millions will be forced to migrate. As a result, it is becoming more and more likely that future generations will have difficulties accessing the resources they need, including food, water and clean air.

The environmental crisis and its myriads of consequences result in large part from the incapacity of present democratic institutions to reverse, stop, or at least stabilize climate change, global warming and their various consequences. It epitomizes an endemic short-termism in democratic politics, and gives us the suspicion that our political institutions may not adequately promote long-term interests, in general, and the interests of future generations, in particular.

We face fundamental challenges such as global poverty that demand the urgent use of some non-renewable resources. But those important interests need to be balanced with those of future people. And yet, it is fair to worry that the fundamental inequality in power and representation of interests between current and future generations has translated into a radical form of political inequality.
There are at least two ways in which this inequality is challenging from the point of view of democratic equality: one is procedural and the other is substantive.

First, in order for our decisions to have long-term procedural legitimacy, largely regardless of their actual content, adequate weight must be given to the interests of future generations. Even though in theory we can grant that their life and interests matter as much as ours do, it is not easy to ensure that they enjoy some presence in representative and deliberative bodies. It is even harder to make sure their interests are accounted for in voting procedures. But with the increasing realization that we are harming future generations, we ought to develop imaginative mechanisms that ensure future people have some form of voice.

More controversially, the second challenge is substantive. It relates to the content of the policies that our democratic systems generate. Intergenerational justice requires at the very least that we make decisions that are sustainable. This goal of sustainability through time applies to other domains than the environment. It has implications for the levels of debt we are entitled to pass on to future generations, for the public infrastructure we invest in, for the budget we must devote to research, and for the extent to which we must protect heritage.

Sustainability is a substantive requirement of intergenerational justice, but also a demand of democratic equality. Indeed, the environmental crisis threatens the basic subsistence and, in fact, the very existence of future generations. Future generations have a higher stake than current people in the long-term detrimental effects of current political decisions. If those interests are sidelined, then the basic foundations of the democratic ideal – that each person’s interests matter equally, and that each person’s basic liberties cannot be disregarded – are undermined. Therefore, the second challenge of intergenerational inequalities for democratic equality is substantive: to entrench the ideal of sustainability in democratic institutions.
We can distinguish at least four types of mechanisms that respond to the challenges that come from the structural invisibility of future generations. First, some institutions give a political voice to future generations. The introduction of parliamentary commissioners for future generations (like in Hungary) and the proposal for an International Ombudsperson for Future Generations are two such mechanisms. Another promising proposal is a committee for future generations in parliaments (like in Finland), whose role would be to scrutinize all policies from the perspective of future interests. Second, independent institutions that monitor progresses are proposed – for instance, an independent Council for the Future to complement parliamentary commissions. A third and fourth type of mechanisms consists in the constitutional entrenchment of intergenerational provisions and the implementation of institutions that directly promote a more sustainable future. The latter contributes to what we have identified as the substantive demand of democratic equality for future generations. From the proposal of a world climate bank, to the use of sovereign wealth funds with an individual dividend to give a stake to citizens in environmental management, those reforms can help bring about more sustainability in the management of nonrenewable resources.¹

Inequalities between birth cohorts

In addition to the general anxiety about the kind of future that we may leave to future generations, there is a growing concern for a lost generation – a large mass of young adults burdened with debts, structural unemployment and precarious work. This concern has been particularly stark in European countries struggling with high rates of youth unemployment, as high as 50 percent in Greece and Spain, but often two to four times as high as for older age groups in other European countries. High rates of unemployment at a young age scar people in the long run and make them more likely to be unemployed or underpaid later in life compared to other cohorts at

¹ For more on all those proposals, see Gonzales-Ricoy and Gosseries (2017).
the same age; so young people are not likely to be compensated later in their lifespan.

The emergence of a disadvantaged generation may be a challenge for our generational contract and for intergenerational justice, but not as such a challenge to the ideal of democratic equality the authors of this chapter subscribe to. Young cohorts may be worse off in terms of their job market related opportunities or they may enjoy lower rates of benefits to contribution, but their basic civil rights and liberties may not be threatened in a fundamental manner. Nonetheless, as we will now show, there is ground to be concerned that such inequalities between birth cohorts might still pose a challenge to democracy.

Indeed, in addition to being massively at risk of social exclusion, young cohorts are at the margins of formal politics. They enjoy a low political power both through their low voting turnout and the ageing of the electorate. Voters’ turnouts are strongly correlated with age. In the 2009 local elections in the UK, only 10 percent of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds said that they had voted compared to 85 percent of people of sixty-five years old and more. The quantitative difference between potential voters, registered voters, and actual voters is directly correlated with age: the younger the voters, the higher the difference between potential and actual voting turnouts will be. This trend is widespread. One could go as far as arguing that there is an emerging “intergenerational democratic deficit” whereby young people are becoming marginalised within the democratic process (Berry 2012, 5).

Together, the socioeconomic concerns of current younger generations and their political disengagement from formal politics feed the suspicion that their interests may not be represented fairly by democratic institutions. The problem does not necessarily have to be that older generations are willingly trying to exclude or disadvantage younger generations. The concern is that they are more numerous, vote in higher proportions and are overrepresented in parliamentary institutions. Older age groups may thus be in a
privileged position to shape politics and parliaments with their values, attitudes and interests. One recent example of this is the generational data of the Brexit referendum in the UK. Some studies show that up to 73 percent of the eighteen to twenty-four age group have voted Remain when more than 60 percent of voters older than sixty-five years voted Leave. Younger generations’ views, values and perceived interests may in fact get sidelined even when fundamental decisions that will affect them for longer than older age groups are taken.

There are a number of possible ways to improve youth involvement in formal politics. One set of solutions consists in reenfranchising the young through lowering the voting age to sixteen years old. Youth participation can also be promoted through implementing easier voting systems and making registration simpler. Increasing funding for youth political initiatives, supporting the development of youth wings in political parties, and developing civic education in schools and universities are additional ways to work toward their reengagement.

Inequalities between age groups

There is another form of generational inequality that is often hidden behind the aforementioned inequality between birth cohorts: inequalities between age groups. Age groups are groups of people of a given age at a given period of time. Individuals will only belong to one birth cohort in their life, but they will change age membership throughout their lives. Age-group and birth-cohort inequalities are distinct since inequalities between age groups do not necessarily translate into inequalities between birth cohorts. Age inequalities pose a separate challenge to democratic legitimacy, regardless of whether they translate into inequalities between successive birth cohorts. Let me focus on two examples.

First, age groups have access to unequal political rights. In most countries, young people below the age of eighteen cannot vote or run for office. For instance, while sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were allowed to vote in the recent Scottish referendum, they were not allowed to vote in the Brexit referendum. One must also be of a certain age to be a member of the Senate (thirty in the United States) or to run for president (thirty-five in the United States). These age-based inequalities in basic rights are meant to capture unequal levels of competence, abilities and sense of responsibility. But they are not unproblematic.

For a start, the young have a higher stake in the long-term consequences of decisions made today. There are very good reasons to keep children out of politics – those have to do with their autonomy and the fact that they could end up manipulated, for instance. But it is not clear that there are such reasons for older teenagers and young adults. Older teenagers are allowed to join the labor force, they can be imprisoned, and they can join the army in many countries. It seems consistent with this status that they should have the right to vote too.

A second example is the underrepresentation of young people between eighteen and thirty-five years of age in parliaments. At the international level, fewer than 2 percent of representatives are younger than thirty years old in two-thirds of single and lower houses; and three-quarters of upper houses do not elect young parliamentarians at all (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014). As many have pointed out, the underrepresentation of young adults in parliaments does not look as unfair as the exclusion of women or ethnic minority, since they are only unequally represented for a portion of their lives. Still, the underrepresentation of youth remains problematic since it reinforces the self-image of youth as apolitical and may have a negative impact on participation rates. Second, decision makers may be lacking experiential knowledge because of
the lack of young representatives. As a result, they may often not give equal weight to the interests of old and young.

One radical policy to correct the underrepresentation of young people in parliaments is the introduction of youth quotas in the legislatures (Bidadanure 2017). Drawing on existing examples of youth quotas in the form of reserved seats for young people in parliament in Uganda, Kenya and Morocco, the UNDP (2013) puts forward the introduction of youth quotas in electoral laws as a way to enhance youth representation and participation. The presence of young MPs can be expected to have at least two kinds of impacts on decision making. The first is substantive. Regardless of their party membership, young MPs can be expected to contribute to expanding the available party policy packages through pushing for the better inclusion of youth concerns in political agendas. Quotas can prevent the important risk that policies and debates become driven by paternalism and condescendence, if conducted solely within some age groups and in exclusion of others.

The second potential impact of youth quotas relates to their symbolic role. If we consider that people’s self-image are partly tied to their political image, then it seems that descriptive representation has meaning for whether given individuals are acknowledged as equals. Youth quotas would signal to society and young people that their contribution is valued and that they are considered with equal respect. The absence or underrepresentation of young people in parliament, on the contrary, signals the opposite and may contribute to an apolitical self-image of young adults.

In summary, this section has considered three inequalities between generations that pose a challenge to democracy, and are yet often overlooked. We must devote more time and resources to understanding how each of those inequalities threatens democratic equality. The first challenge derives from the political invisibility of future generations and the endemic short-termism that comes with it. Mechanisms to give voice to future generations today (like
parliamentary commissions) to legally entrench long-termist goals and to monitor progress and drawbacks must be considered. The “democratic deficit” between coexisting generations is the second intergenerational challenge that we considered: the risk is that small and/or disenfranchised cohorts may see their interests sidelined. Solutions there include simplifying registration and voting procedures, as well as investing in quality political education. The last challenge was identified as relating to age-group equality. Here we questioned the exclusion of some age groups (in particular teenagers and young adults) de jure or de facto from political institutions, including from electoral and parliamentary ones. We urged politicians to not take for granted those age-based differential treatments and to consider ways to make sure the interests of disenfranchised age groups are not sidelined. The potential benefits of the descriptive representation of young adults in parliaments for democratic equality were highlighted.
1.2 External and Internal Sources of Democratic Inequality

Globalization

Democracy has something of an ambivalent relationship to globalization. On the one hand, globalization is typically seen as a product of the highest stage of democratic development – a benign condition of healthy interdependence made possible by the attainment of a prior condition of democracy amongst its beneficiaries. Globalization is, in effect, the product of a democratic peace. On the other hand, the more detailed analysis of the consequences of globalization typically depicts globalization as a complex agent of de-democratization – something whose attainment makes the practice of democracy ever more difficult. Globalization produces, in other words, a democratic deficit.

The two perspectives are not strictly incompatible. But this kind of connection is rarely made, with the literature and wider public discourse of and about globalization typically resolving itself to a positive and benign view of globalization starkly counterposed to a negative view of globalization’s corrosive effects.

The aim of this section is to bring these two opposed perspectives into greater dialogue. The argument is presented in two parts dealing, respectively, with the challenge posed by globalization and the responses to which it might give rise.

The challenge of globalization

Semantics

Globalization is in fact a generic term for a rather disparate array of things understood in a great variety of different ways. For the most part, however, these understandings can be arrayed along a continuum. This ranges from the geographically least precise and unexacting to the geographically most restrictive and demanding. At
the former end of the spectrum, to point to globalization means little more than to identify cross-border flows of goods and services, finance, migrants, pollutants, infectious agents and so forth. By contrast, at the latter end of the spectrum, such flows need to be increasingly planetary in their scope to be regarded as evidence of globalization. Yet this is not the only definitional divide. It is important also to distinguish between contending understandings of globalization in terms of whether it is seen as a condition or property of the world system that has already been achieved or as a still ongoing process or tendency (which may be resisted) for the world system to become more global or globalized over time.

Such definitional choices have significant implications – both for whether we see evidence of globalization or not and, indeed, for the significance of any such observation for the viability of democratic systems of governance. Clearly, if to confirm the globalization thesis we need only show a proliferation of cross-border flows of goods, services and so forth, then evidence of globalization abounds. But understood in this way globalization may be rather less significant a factor than we tend to assume. Conversely, if to confirm the globalization thesis we need to establish that such flows are in fact both increasingly extensive in their (planetary) scope and increasingly intensive in their magnitude, then evidence of globalization is going to be rather more difficult to find – but all the more significant if, as and when we do find it.

There is clearly plenty of room for conceptual confusion here. Authors who may well agree on the facts themselves may nonetheless disagree over the extent of globalization simply because they impose upon the term different definitional standards. Indeed, on closer inspection what may seem at first like a dispute over the evidence itself often boils down to little more than a semantic difference of opinion.

The full implications of this become clear when we start to look in more detail at those theories that suggest that globalization and the
respect for democratic choice are likely to be in significant tension with one another. For, as we shall see, what many of these share is a common analytical structure in which the effects for democracy of globalization (typically, a series of imperatives) are derived logically from a stylized assumptions about both the behavior and motives of business and the degree of integration of world markets. It is to such theories directly that we now turn.

141 Globalization as a source of economic imperatives

The idea that globalization is corrosive, if not of democracy itself, then of the effective space for democratic choice – since its effects serve to restrict the array of credible policy options – is not a new one. But in its contemporary form it is simply stated. In closed national economies, such as those that characterized the pre-globalization era, capital was essentially immobile and national in character; it had no “exit” option. In such an environment governments could impose punitive taxation regimes upon unwilling and relatively impotent national businesses with little cost to the domestic economy.

143 In a world of globalization, by contrast, open economy conditions pertain. Capital may now exit from national economies at minimal cost. Accordingly, by playing off the regulatory regimes of different economies against one another, capital can ensure for itself the highest rate of return on its investment. *Ceteris paribus*, capital will exit higher taxation jurisdictions for their lower taxation counterparts, comprehensive welfare states for residual states, highly regulated labor markets for flexible labor markets and economies characterized by strict environmental regulations and high union density for those characterized by lapse environmental standards and low union density.

144 The process pits national economy against national economy in an increasingly intense competitive struggle. States must effectively clamber over one another in an ever more frenzied attempt to
produce a more favorable investment environment for mobile ("footloose") foreign direct investors than their competitors. Yet this is not a one-shot game – and an early influx of foreign direct investment only increases the dependence of the state upon its continued “locational competitiveness.” If investment is to be retained in such an environment, states must constantly strive to improve the investment opportunities they can offer relative to those of their competitors. Any failure to do so can only precipitate a hemorrhaging of invested funds, labor shedding and, eventually, economic crisis. Big government, and more importantly perhaps the democratic choice for big government, is rendered increasingly anachronistic – a guarantor not of the interests of citizens or even consumers, but a sure means to disinvestment and economic crisis.

If this is the general form of the argument, then there are two important extensions of it that it is also important to consider. The first concerns financial markets – and the political imperatives arising from the financial market integration associated with globalization. The second is more specific to the period following the global financial crisis. It concerns public debt, the state’s obligations to its creditors and the associated political imperatives arising from such financial dependence.

Globalization, of course, is not only associated with trade and foreign direct investment flows. Increasingly significant in accounts of globalization’s political imperatives are financial flows, particularly short-term financial flows. Here the argument is again very simple. In a world of heightened financial interdependence, financial market actors can be seen, effectively, to “take positions” on the policy preferences exhibited by governments. In a sense they reward and penalize governments for their conduct of domestic economic governance. In so doing, they have the capacity to wreak almost instant domestic havoc through the positions they adopt in foreign exchange markets and/or by modifying the effective rate of interest on government debt. Understood in this way, governments have a need to appease financial market actors through their economic and
social policy choices by, in effect, internalizing a series of external and non-negotiable financial imperatives (for fiscal prudence, deficit and debt reduction through austerity and a hawkish commitment to price stability). Such imperatives, once again, circumscribe as they discipline democratic governance at the national level.

Finally, in a context of unprecedented levels of public (and, indeed, private) debt following the global financial crisis, such imperatives are typically seen to have been ratcheted up several notches. As Wolfgang Streeck (2014) puts it, today’s nation-states are “consolidation states,” simultaneously beholden to their citizens for democratic legitimacy and to global financial market institutions for the borrowing on which their spending relies. Here, as elsewhere, global economic interdependence makes democratic governance a more complex juggling of conflicting imperatives in which the capacity to respond directly to the demands of citizens is seemingly attenuated.

But is this credible? Insofar as we are right to accept the combined and mutually reinforcing logics of the argument democratic choice is, at the national level at least, profoundly threatened by economic globalization. The stakes could scarcely be higher. And for this reason, above all, we need to proceed with some caution.

Whilst the logic is a compelling one and one that has proved exceptionally persuasive, not least amongst political elites, the evidence for the anticipated effects of such a logic is not nearly so strong. The problem here is the convenient simplicity of the analytical assumptions from which logics of this kind are derived which assumes, for instance, that all taxation is anathema to the interests of capital. It is but a short step to the imperative of fiscal and, hence, state retrenchment.

But this stands in marked contrast to the available empirical evidence. This shows, amongst other things, a strong, positive and strengthening correlation between state expenditure and economic
growth under conditions of globalization; a propensity for foreign
direct investment to be attracted not by low but by high rates of
corporate taxation, not by highly flexible but in fact tightly regulated
labor markets and not by low but by high environmental standards;
and a similar tendency for financial market actors to be
comparatively lenient on budget deficits, accumulated debt and even
the inflationary preferences of governments (and central banks), at
least in OECD countries.

The reason for all of this is relatively simple. State expenditure, and
hence the taxation receipts out of which it is funded, is not nearly as
damaging of competitiveness nor, relatedly, the return on capital
invested, than is typically assumed in such models. Foreign direct
investors, it seems, seek not deregulated labor markets nor low
corporate taxation so much as highly skilled and flexible labor, stable
industrial relations regimes and privileged access to the kinds of
affluent consumer economies typically characterized by the highest
levels of social and other state expenditure. Similarly, in a context of
incomplete and costly information, financial markets, are less
discriminating – and, crucially, less constraining – in their behavior
that we tend to assume (Mosley 2003).

This suggests that the space for democratic deliberation and the
national policy-making autonomy on which it relies is not as
restricted as we might assume. But there is a catch. Insofar as our
political elites are impressed by such logics they may well act as if
such non-negotiable economic imperatives were real (Hay and
Rosamond 2002). The effect is much the same, even if the mechanism
by which it is achieved is very different.

The prospects for political globalization

This is all very well – and for how we think about democratic
governance at the national level, it is undoubtedly profoundly
important. But it is to privilege the national level and, in a context of
globalization, that is unquestionably problematic. Perhaps the
simplest way to conceive of this is in terms of the uneven character of the process of, not economic, but political globalization. We might think of this in terms of the (uneven) globalization of political problems and the globalization of political solutions – the point, of course, being that there is a gross disparity between the former (evidence of which abounds) and the latter (where we are surely right to identify a governance deficit).

Both forms of political globalization pose problems for traditional forms of democratic governance, which tend to privilege the national level. Two examples serve particularly to reveal the extent of the difficulty. The first is the challenge of global climate change. Here, respect for the democratic preferences of citizens at the national level is likely to compromise profoundly the capacity and authority to impose solutions at a global level. And, whilst we still lack a vision of what a genuinely democratic, yet at the same time global, resolution of such a problem might entail, this disparity between national and global solutions is likely to manifest itself in terms of a political stalemate.

The second example, the problem of global financial market regulation, seems as yet no less intractable. Here again we witness the palpable disparity between the need for, and supply of, global governance. If, indeed, global financial market actors are as globally interconnected and interdependent as the global financial crisis reveals them to be, then regulation at a national level, however prudential, cannot guard against crisis through contagion. Clearly global governance is required. Yet in a context in which different states have, in effect, different exposures to and investments in the financial markets they ostensibly regulate there is a proliferation of potential veto players in the move from national to global regulation. The outcome is predictable. The transition from national to global governance, despite the inherent logic of such a move, has proved as yet impossible. Here the impediment is not so much the capacity to envision democratic global governance as to envisage genuinely global governance at all.
And herein lies the cusp of our contemporary dilemma. There is a demonstrable and palpable need for global governance and yet, at the same time, a clear and compelling argument that respect for the democratically expressed wishes of citizens at the national level is both anathema to, and will ultimately always thwart, the passing of political authority from the national to the transnational level. In the end there is only one solution to that problem – the envisioning of a form of global governance that is not only efficacious at a planetary level but also credibly democratic at the planetary level too. That is a tough ask – a challenge to political theorists as much as it is a challenge to proponents of democratic global governance.

Put bluntly, we have yet to make democracy and globalization compatible – and we have, for far too long, proceeded on the rather naively optimistic basis that, since globalization is a benign process, there is little or no risk to promoting its development in advance of any clear strategy for its democratization. We are rapidly reaching the point at which that comforting delusion no longer holds – and, in so doing, we reach a political watershed. The choice is ours.

**Populism: The danger to be avoided**

After years of neglect, populism is now a central theme of political experience and research. Until recently, interest in the study of populism was traditionally strongest among scholars who saw it as a problem. Political scholars who have suggested that populism might have a positive role to play in contemporary democracy are thus rare. For this minority, however, populism’s putative virtues include “folk politics” versus “institutionalized politics;” the concerns of large numbers over the interests of the few; the lived experience of local, the village, the neighborhood over an abstract, distant state; and finally the consistent actualization of popular sovereignty as the substance of the whole over and above constitutional rules (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2001). Populist scholars emphasize also the political directness, sincerity, and transparency of ordinary people versus the
indirection and opacity of representative institutions; they oppose the “purity” of political purpose of the many to the bargaining games by the politicians, who are part of the few and the elite; they praise decisiveness (and also decisionism) over time-consuming parliamentary compromises, procedural formalism, and institutional obfuscation; they use the language of the organic unity of the *populus* rather than the artificial and abstract language of intellectuals and scholars; finally they stress the priority and homogeneity of the whole versus pluralism and the conflict of interests (Kazin 1995; Canovan 2002). They make the character of populism overlap with that of democracy and propose to see both of them as the best expressions of politics, the art of persuasion and decision by which means the people construct their community according to their will (Laclau 2005a).

Despite the power contrasts drawn by scholars sympathetic to populism, they have yet to converge on even a rough definition of it. Populism remains a deeply contested term, more useful polemically than analytically, often used merely to brand and accuse actual political movements or leaders; this explains the “repugnance with which words ‘populism’ and ‘populist’ are uttered,” particularly among European scholars (D’Eramo 2013). However, recent events in Europe and the United States and recent literature have helped shed light on populism and some agreement is possible upon basic definitions of it concerning its ideological character, its relation to democracy’s promises of public equality, its sociocultural content and its strategic mechanism.

*Populism’s recognizable characters*

Although plural and diverse because it is socially and historically contextual, populism develops within representative democracies (not merely democracies) as a fight over the meaning and representation of the people, an extreme expression of intense majority politics and thus a straining of constitutional democracy to its extreme limits, beyond which a change of regime (tyranny or dictatorship) could occur. Recognizing populism’s contextual
specificity (thus its plural manifestations) is no impediment to using comparative analyses in view of understanding the reasons of its present success in democratic societies. All populist movements exhibit a strong reservation and even hostility to the mechanisms of representation, in the name of an almost unanimous collective affirmation of the will of the people under a leading figure and above party pluralism. Yet they do not renounce representation to institute direct democracy. Populism is “parasitical” not on democracy in general but rather on representative democracy in particular;[6] it is a distorted form developing from within it, rather than a regime of its own. The relationship of populism with democracy is an issue of contention rather than compatibility.

Populism is not external to representative democracy but competes with it about the meaning and use of representation as a strategy for claiming, affirming, and managing the will of the masses. Its representative claim is the source of its radical contestation of parliamentary democracy, its real target. Indeed, it treats pluralism (of interests and ideas, but also as manifested by parties) as litigious claims that fragment the body of popular sovereignty and thus must be simplified so as to create a polarized scenario that makes the people immediately know how to judge and with whom to side. Simplification and polarization are in the view of achieving a deeper unification of the masses against the existing elites and under an organic narrative that most of the time a leader embodies (Urbinati 2014). Benjamin Arditi has thus written (2008) that populism can be seen as representative democracy’s “internal periphery” hardly conceivable without a politics of personality. Hence, I propose to identify populism with two intertwined political processes: one that goes toward polarization of the citizenry in two homogenous groups (the many and the few), and the other that goes toward a verticalization of the political system that minimizes the role of deliberation and mediation and exalts instead that of strong majorities and steadfast decisions. Polarization and Caesarism go hand in hand and both of them constitute a radical challenge to
constitutional democracy. Populism can thus be rendered in the following way: it is a symptom of representative democracy’s malaise as denunciation of the failure of constitutional democracy to be consistent with its promises of guaranteeing that all citizens enjoy an equal political power and that public equality is the norm leading institutions, politicians, and citizens.

The promise of democracy

Both in its classical and modern version, democracy promises to institute and guarantee legal, civil and political equality. It promises isonomia or that all the members of the demos (the citizens) are equal as subjects to the law and are treated equally by the law. To make legal equality and civil equality certain and secure, modern constitutions incorporate a list of rights that limit the decision-making power of the government and watch over the equal treatment of all by the magistrates. Democracy promises also isegoria or that all adult citizens have the same identical political power when making decisions on public issues and the same chance to speak up frankly in public, to associate for and promote their views. In representative government, this entails that as electors all are identical because their votes have equal weight (on this premise only majority rule achieves democratic legitimacy); and it entails that as citizens all are different in their social conditions and endowed with an equal right to give voice to their differences, to form and make public their opinions, to know what their government does, and finally to influence elected and electors as well.

Legal, civil and political equality inspire both the mode and the substance of public behavior because identical as members of the demos and in their voting power, democratic citizens are not identical and not even equal when they give expression to their voice and cast their vote. In relation to its promises of equality, thus, democracy proposes things at first glance seem contradictory: that political power should be distributed regardless of the social, cultural, and economic conditions of the citizens and that it should be used by the
citizens to make sure that those conditions are not so unequal if the
equal political power is to be effective. Democracy claims that
procedures must ignore the social conditions of the citizens and yet
that they will be used so that the citizens can make their social
condition a close as possible to their political status. The tension
between formal and substantial equality is in the very genes of
democracy, not an accident or a defect because citizens’ equality
refers to both a way of making decisions (government form) and a
way of participating in making them (political form). This makes a
procedural conception of democracy simply an incomplete picture.

A purely procedural reading is too narrow to be explicative of the
potentials and transformations which a democratic society is capable
of. For sure it can hardly grasp populistic forms of representation but
also ideological identifications among citizens and partisan
aggregations animating the public forum. To complete our picture, we
should consider that in nation-state based constitutional
governments, the diarchic nature of democracy has been actualized
through the construction of “the people” as the legal and legitimate
sovereign of the law but also as the representative claimant that
contests and proposes, that reclaims its visibility beyond its legal
status. Like democracy, the people possess a double nature as is at
once the norm or legal actor in whose name decisions are made and
the concrete actor of the proposals and decisions.

De jure and de facto levels are intertwined and their tense
combination makes a democratic society an amalgam in permanent
and sometime turbulent motion, in which the promises of equality are
at once working procedures and instigations to social criticism and
innovation. This tension feeds populism, which represents an all-
political transformation of the forum of opinions that becomes a force
more authoritative than elections, often amplified by the media.
Populism repudiates democracy’s diarchy of opinion and decision in
view of merging fully the way people think and the way people want.
It is to representative democracy what demagoguery was to direct
democracy. According to Aristotle’s pivotal analysis, demagoguery
within democracy is: (a) a permanent possibility insofar as it relies upon the public use of speech and opinion like democracy; (b) a more intense use of the principle of the majority so as to make it almost absolute or a form of power more than a method for making decisions (populism is the rule of the majority rather than a politics that uses majority rule); and (c) a waiting room for a possible tyrannical regime. We may attribute the following four aspects to populism: it flourishes as a fellow traveler of democracy; is a radical form of democratic action as strong majoritarianism; develops in times of social distress and increasing inequality; and its outcome may be risky to constitutional democracy (Taggart 2000).

Populism's contextual specificity

A complex category hard to synthetize in a clear-cut definition, populism’s factors and implications are deeply contextual and connected to the malaise of democratizing or democratic societies. In the United States, where the term was coined as a party name in the age of post-civil war industrial reconstruction and never brought upon a regime change, populism developed along with political democratization and was, and still is, predictably met positively by historians and political theorists because of its claim of inclusion of the many or no so well represented (Kazin 1995). Born when the country was ruled by an elected notabilate representing the interests of an oligarchy (before universal suffrage was implemented), the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights became extant conditions for a more democratized polity, and populism a collective movement against the “domestic enemies of the people” (Frank 2010) in the name of an alleged purity of the origins of popular government and its adulteration by the artificial complexity of civilization and the institutional organization of the state (Lasch 1991). The bureaucratic and normative state apparatus, which started to be built in mid-nineteenth century, made the work of the government more distant from the people and its operations more opaque and hard to be understood by ordinary citizens.
On the other hand, in some Latin American countries, “the land of populism” in Carlos de la Torre’s words (2016), populism has been met with mixed feelings in relation to its historical phases: thus whether it was evaluated at the beginning of its career or at the pick of its fulfillment as a regime; as an opposition party mobilizing against an existing government or as a regime itself; and then also, as a regime in its consolidation or facing a succession in power (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Finchelstein 2014). Like in the United States, populism in Latin America also emerged in the age of social modernization but much like fascism in Italy it governed the path toward modernity that used state power to protect and empower their popular classes, repress dissent, and meanwhile implement social-welfare policies (Germani 1978). Thus Ernesto Laclau (2005) described populist (and Peronism in particular) as a strategy of hegemonic rebalancing within the “power blocs” through the incorporation of the popular-democratic ideology of the masses within the ruling majority. Finally, in Western Europe, populism made its appearance with democratization in early twentieth century, along with colonial expansionism, militarization of society coinciding with World War One, and the growth of ethnic nationalism per effect of the distress that the war. It helped justify xenophobic ideologies that aimed at homogenizing the nation and in fact promoted Fascist regimes based on mass propaganda, political simplification of friends/enemies divide and Caesaristic leadership incorporating the people as one (Mueller 2011).

Populism is growing once again, not only in Latin America and in poor societies struggling to modernize and democratize. Populism is back in several European countries, within a supranational quasi-federative context and several decades of cosmopolitan culture of rights and toleration that lessened nationalistic politics. The European Union that developed as antitotalitarian project after World War Two, is a novel frontier of populism, which is emerging no longer and simplistically as a claim for going back to a pre-European Union order, but rather as a design for a new representation of the
European peoples as ancestral totalities against external sources of contamination such as affluent cosmopolitan elites and migrants. Decline of socioeconomic well-being combines with an erosion of democratic legitimacy in relaunching populist leaders and movements in several European states and also the United States, which is experience resurgent nativism aimed against immigrants much like the old Europe and is no longer the exceptional and only place in which populism is the name of good democracy. To be sure, some leftwing forms of populism in both continents there are that claim to be inclusive of the new immigrants rather than exclusionary, yet they make their claim not in the name of the democratic promises but as a challenge to the constitutional fabric of representative democracy (Weyland 2013).

Renascent populism witnesses waning confidence in core representative democratic institutions such as parties, parliaments and elections. As leading scholars have stressed, shrinking party membership and increasing estrangement between politicians and voters testify to disillusionment with representative democracy (Manin 1997; Mair 2013; Merkel 2014; Rosanvallon 2015). Politicians are regularly accused of having lost touch with ordinary people’s concerns and made politics into an insipid mainstreamism that chooses to neglect society’s most grave needs and concerns in order not to compromise electoral consent. Yet antiparty sentiment is primed to damage constitutional democracy as citizens need to be offered recognizable political proposals in order to side with and against and choose and participate. In consolidated democracies, thus, populism seems to follow a cycle of electoral abstention and apathy, which is a side effect of mainstreamism and at the origin of citizens’ mistrust in party politics, the growth of antiparty sentiments, and the attraction of the populist rebuff of “practical democracy” (Mair 2002). When elected politicians and citizens become two separate groups that make the opposition between “the many” and “the few” an easily grasped catchword, when ordinary citizens witness increase of social distress and gross violations of economic
equality in the general indifference of their representatives and while the most powerful acquire more voice in politics, it may very well happen that people distrust “practical politics” (Mény and Surel 2002).

These are traditional factors that help explain the growth of populism in democratic societies: the quest for more intense power by the majority is primed to emerge from time to time like a symptom of mistrust in democracy’s ability to fulfill its promise of equal political power. Yet some additional factors contribute today in reinvigorating the populist rhetoric, such as a globalized financial capitalism that weakens the decision-making power of sovereign states and a globalized market of labor force that narrows the possibility of striking a social-democratic compromise between capital and labor upon which democracy was rebuilt after World War Two. The weakening of state sovereignty before global corporate business meets with the people’s call for closed borders in several nation-states as if democratic citizens thought that the protection of their political power demands the containment of free movement of peoples and of free competition over salary and social benefits. Like in the past, populism associates politics of social redistribution with protectionist politics; in addition, the dramatic phenomenon of terrorism associated with Islamic extremism propels a politics of state security at expense of civil rights and highlights the nationalistic character of democracy as a vital condition of cultural and religious homogeneity to be protected against external enemies. Hence, in several member-states of the European Union, anti-European sentiments, economic distress, and a cultural discourse dominated by cosmopolitan elites determine a representative deficit which can open a political space for those who have the perception of not having their voice represented: populist leaders are primed to find there an inviting milieu for their antiestablishment plans.

In a globalized world, populism comes to play two roles: that of denouncing social inequality and the privileges of the wealthy few and that of reclaiming the priority of the national unity of the people.
Resuming the two ancient categories – *ethnos* and *demos* – whose mix steered the construction of post-eighteenth century democratic “people,” one might say that populism’s renaissance in several democratic countries is both a symptom and a triggering force that can disrupt that mix. Indeed, on the one hand, the demos (“the people”) tends to de ate its political meaning as the collective of equals in power (citizens/electors) and to translate it into a social unit identified with the majority, and on the other hand, the ethn*os* (“the nation”), which the political nation of the equal subjects to the law was meant to neat of all ancestral meanings, tends to be identified with prepolitical characters not acquirable by simply being subjects to the law (Portinaro 2013). Briefly, populism combines two processes: of politicization of the ethnical aspect and of ethnicization of the political aspect that have made for “the popular sovereign” in modern democracy. It thus shows how weak and context-dependent the roots of representative democracy are.

*Populism’s strategic mechanisms*

Based on these premises, a distinction has to be made between *populism as a popular movement* and *populism as a ruling power*, a prospective that allows us to face populism both in its rhetorical style, its propaganda tropes and ideology, and finally its aims and achievements. This double condition mirrors the diarchic character of democracy we have mentioned: power of decision and power of opinion qualify constitutional democracy as an order in which citizens have an equal right to make decisions by voting directly on issues (referenda) and for representatives and to construct the issues or claims that ask for decisions to be made, sustained, or revised.

Populism has to be evaluated and judged in relation to both authorities: as a movement of opinion and as a system of decision making. It is inaccurate to treat it as identical with “popular movements,” movements of protest, or “the popular” as it can be much more than that. Hence there is populist rhetoric but not yet populist power when the polarizing and antirepresentative discourse
is made up of a social movement that wants to be a constituency independent of elected officials, wants to resist becoming an elected entity, does not have nor want representative leaders unifying its several claims, and wants to keep elected of officials or the government under the scrutiny of the public. This was the case, for instance, of popular movements of contestation and protest like the Girotondi in Italy in 2002, Occupy Wall Street in the United States in 2011, and Indignados in Spain in 2011. Without an organizing narrative, the aspiration to win seats in the Parliament or the Congress and a leadership claiming its people to be the true expression of the people as a whole, a popular movement remains very much what it is: a sacrosanct democratic movement of opinion, protest, and contestation against a trend in society that betrays some basic principles of equality, which society itself has promised to respect and fulfill.

On the other hand, there is populist rhetoric and populist power when a movement does not want to be a constituency independent of the elected officials but wants instead to conquer the representative institutions and win a majority in order to model society on its own ideology of the people. This is for instance the case of Hungary’s Fidesz party that in 2012 won a supermajority of the seats in Parliament and used it to scrap the old Constitution by amending it continuously, entrenching its own political vision at the expense of opposition parties and an independent judiciary. Similar events happened in Poland after the electoral victory of Kaczyński’s PiS after 2014.

Populism, both as a movement and populism as an intrastate power, is parasitical on representative democracy either because it opposes representative democracy or wants to conquer it. But while a certain populist rhetoric is to be detected in almost all parties (particularly when they radicalize their claims close to elections), populism as a ruling power has some recognizable characteristics that can sharply contrast with “practical democracy” and the procedural structures of ordinary politics, like hostility toward party pluralism, the principles
of constitutional democracy and the division of powers. Hence although ingrained in the ideology of the people and the language of democracy, populism as a ruling power tends to give life to governments that stretch the democratic rules toward an extreme majoritarianism, often discriminating against minorities. Populism in power is a pars-pro-toto project that may have devastating effects on constitutional democracy (Arato 2013). This makes me conclude that while a symptom of political and social malaise in democratic societies, populism can hardly be a cure. Factors driving populism can be found in the partial regimes of elections and political rights to participation within embedded democracies (see: Introduction), where people at the lower end of the social strata feel systematically excluded and underrepresented or simply fear to be victims of threats they cannot face and control with ordinary legal and political means. In addition, a cause for populist discourse is also to be found in the partial regime of “power to govern” as national sovereignty is challenged by global markets and supranational governances such as the European Union. Yet regardless of its social specificity and the objective duress that fuels it, if populism comes to power it explicitly challenges the proper working of the “civil rights” regime and the regime of horizontal accountability granting too much power to the executive (decisionism and democracy of the leader) at the expenses of the legislature and the judiciary (deliberation and the rule of law). The question is that although populist leaders seeking power promise to include the excluded and overturn an elected oligarchy, once in power they end up by attacking the institutions of liberal democracy, seizing central government, controlling and even repressing social movements and oppositions, limiting civil liberty and contrasting media pluralism. For this reason, although a symptom of malaise of democratic societies, populism can hardly be a remedy.

Technology and science

As contemporary societies increasingly build their governance structures and their imaginations about future developments around scientific knowledge, as they privilege specific kinds of expertise and
embrace technological innovation as a sign of advancement, it is essential to carefully reflect how this politics of knowledge and technology is entangled with questions of inequality. When it comes to questions of democracy and inequality we often witness the coexistence of rather contradictory positions. Political leadership strongly tries to construct and keep alive an unquestioned ideal of scientific and technological rationality as a key governance principle, pretending that this would quasi-automatically improve democratic societies and render them more equal for its constituencies. However, simultaneously concerns are voiced that science and technology might contribute to reinforcing existing, or even creating new, inequalities. Indeed, access to the advancements in science and technology had become an important generator of power differentials both within and across societies.

The situation is complex. While both scientific knowledge and technologies have definitely created partial solutions to problems in the areas of health, food, energy, communication, or transport, inequalities persisted. Thinking democracy and inequality together, thus means to question the impact of the knowledge and technological infrastructures which form the basis of contemporary democracies, to be attentive to the many places and moments the performance of democracy is tied to questions of techno-scientific choices, and to unpack the new challenges citizens have to face in order to fully participate in contemporary societies.

(In)equality has to be understood as a situated outcome of specific forms of techno-scientific change and are always shifting. In analogy also “a democratic society cannot fully or at every moment be a democracy” and will “depend upon mutually reinforcing democratic ideas, political culture, political imaginaries, institutions, and practices” (Ezrahi 2012). Science and technology play an essential part in both, democracy and (in)equality. The aim is to think how we can bring them together reasonably well.
The attention therefore has to move from asking principled questions – is something democratic and do techno-scientific developments create conditions of equality –, and be attentive to the multiplicity of situations in which both democracy and equality are to be realized. This also means considering shifting socioeconomic conditions, the ways in which access to education and to different kinds of innovation is structured, the distribution of the capacities to raise voice in relation to techno-scientific issues, and many more. And it becomes essential to investigate the structural conditions – that is, technological, educational, or market infrastructures – which might keep inequalities in place.

**Values, science and technology: Whose values?**

Scholarship in science and technology studies (STS) has shown how the knowledge and technologies we create and the dominant values and normative ideals we express in our societies have to be seen as deeply intertwined (Jasanoff 2004). As a consequence, we have to admit that the places where technologies are designed and knowledge is generated matter as well as the persons who hold the capacity to steer or at least to participate in these processes. Scientific knowledge and its technological realisations are thus imbued with values specific to the environment in which they were created; they have to be understood as (re)producing existing value orders. In terms of asking the democracy-equality question it is thus essential to pay attention to who gets imagined as potential user (groups) and who is forgotten; to who defines the problems to be solved and what counts as adequate solution; to the places where innovations are created; and, finally, how sets of values get imposed through the introduction of new technologies or the foregrounding of specific kinds of knowledge.

This calls us to pay attention to how specific technological arrangements are tacitly implemented for keeping certain social or political orders in place. In particular feminist scholars such as Judy
Wajcman (2009) have pointed to the fact that the material forms in which technologies come, afford or inhibit certain gender power relations. If we consider the importance of broader economic and social circumstances of technological production, the exclusion of specific groups of people (women, members of lower socioeconomic classes, ...) from technological domains points to a reinforcement of inequalities in a techno-scientific world. This then does not stay limited to questions of equal employment opportunities, but it is about how and for whom the world we live in gets shaped. The politics of knowledge and technology is thus an integral to the renegotiation of power relations – with gender and other inequalities in the focus.

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*Ordering societies through classification and standardization: Whose order?*

A second site where questions of democracy and inequality are addressed are the classifications and standards that have become the basic infrastructures assuring that contemporary societies can work. Whether or not you are granted certain civil rights, have access to
specific kinds of health care, or can choose your way of living, all this is related, in one way or another, to how well somebody is represented in such classifications and standardization processes. Thus, the very idea of equality and its realization in the political realm very much depend on the outcome of such orderings of society. Throughout nineteenth and twentieth centuries we witness countless efforts of emerging nation states to make classify their constituency and thus make them calculable – efforts to design nation states in line with what is believed to be scientific rationality (Scott, J. C. 1999).

These processes of ordering society produced ever more extended collections of information on citizens, on social relations, economic life and many more, but also supported numerous planning efforts meant to realize desired futures. Such processes never simply describe the world as it is, but they make it through the description. The census, for example, contributed to the creation of communities which did not exist prior to the counting of and the accounting for them. In the end, it was a small elite who decided what should be counted and what order should prevail, thus allowing political power greater control over the lives of their subjects.

While classifications and standards are essential to extending our reach in space and time, we have to be aware that “each standard and each category valorizes some point of view and silences another” (Bowker and Star 1999). While we can argue that classifying is inescapable if we want to live in an ordered world, it is still related to value choices. Classifications and standards advantage some while pushing others to the margin, some areas get privileged while others suffer. The power of these classifications lies in the fact that over time they are regarded as “natural” and are taken for granted. They only become explicit when belonging to a specific category denies access or does not give the same rights as to others. In many ways ethnic and racial, but also gender and sexual categorizations, though used very differently in different national and supranational contexts, are excellent examples for the making of essential differences and thus defining relevant groups, to be cared for. Democratic societies
therefore need to carefully reflect how these classifications are made, and how they are decided upon, giving voice to specific groups and individuals, while implicitly denying it to others.

Part of these questions of addressing differences have be more recently reformulated in an expanding diversity discourse, which tries to reevaluate what it means to attend to differences among human bodies and lives. Implementing the concept of diversity in health care, which is key area where inequality matters, shows the difficulty of dealing with bringing together social justice concerns with evidence about the uneven distribution of health and disease across populations, with empowering and positive visions of differences and concerns of being able to uphold contemporary healthcare system (Felt, Felder, and Penkler 2016). Access to health care is one such site where classifications potentially can do both create better access and create (new) inequalities.

*Living in an experimental society: Whose benefit, whose voice?*

More than two decades of scholarship have pointed at the experimental nature of contemporary societies, that is, at our limited capacity to anticipate the outcomes of techno-scientific change. The recent disaster in Fukushima has clearly pointed to the complexities and uncertainties of what it means to different groups of people to live with nuclear technologies. Or, when it comes to the impact of environmental damages, we clearly witness the unequal distribution of risks and benefits. Under the label of environmental justice STS scholars carefully investigated how the consequences of such real-world experiments often have to be carried in a disproportional manner by marginalized groups, pointing to the importance of considering categories like race, gender, or class as they come to matter in important ways (e.g., Ottinger and Cohen 2011). Reflecting the nexus of democracy and inequality thus means asking: Who has the authority to design and do such experiments? Who is exposed to them? And, who might benefit from them? Answering these questions
might lead us to understand how inequalities do both emerge and are kept in place.

These reflections have a quite immediate connection to two related debates: one on participatory justice in techno-scientific societies and the other on the role of information access in a world structured by new information and communication technologies (ICTs).

More than two decades ago, the question of an increased need for public participation started to be raised persistently with the crumbling of the strong belief that the spread of scientific knowledge and technologies across contemporary societies would lead to more democracy and equality. Concerns were voiced about the emergence of new hierarchies, allowing only a rather exclusive elite of knowledgeable subjects to direct societal choices. This has triggered a flurry of participatory exercises that were on a formal level deeply committed to openness, equality, representativeness and transparency and in which citizens should be able to express their concerns regarding techno-scientific developments. However, science and technology studies scholars have pointed the severe limitations such exercises meet in practice (Felt 2007). Not only are assumptions about who may legitimately speak in the name of society already built into participatory designs, in most exercises also the questions were preframed, severely limiting the potential outcomes. Furthermore, social orders are at work within the discussion settings, but a strong educational bias of those participating hinted at rather unequal conditions of participation (e.g., Chilvers and Kearnes 2016).

A number of case studies have successfully demonstrated the potential value of granting lay expertise space in shaping techno-scientific developments. Examples would be the AIDS movement in the 1970s that managed to change essential parts in treatment and prevention or, more recently, the citizen science groups forming around radiation measurements in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. In all these cases, we have seen how important it is to open up knowledge generation to different perspectives and how this
allows to make important changes to how democracy and equality can be connected in new ways.

This brings us, second, to the question of ICTs, which feature prominently in debates concerning questions of science, technology and inequality (Wyatt et al. 2001). When introduced, they were expected to free people from a number of limitations. Access to information from a broad variety of sources, participation in political processes from remote places as well as access to health expertise should become more equal. This should allow for a gain in overall justice and thus bring us closer to the ideal of democratic societies. This rather positive and inclusive view is however clearly opposed by analysts who argue that the “ICT revolution” might, quite to the contrary, be a source of new inequalities. Unequal access to the internet between and within regions, but also the need to develop new skills in searching, sorting, and assessing information, creates advantages only for some while further disadvantaging others. Threats to exercise social control through different forms electronic surveillance would undermine the value of privacy held very high in liberal democracies and might touch vulnerable groups stronger than other parts of society. In the same move, we also witness new forms of segregation on the labour markets, given the information intensive forms of work emerging. Finally, the spread of algorithms introduces unaccounted biases and calls for a broader public debate on these structures as one way to be able to reflect and navigate the information landscape in a self-defined manner.

To sum up, there is no doubt that science and technology have made essential contributions to the advancement of contemporary democracies. Yet, putting scientific and technological rationality at the core of governance has not necessarily led to creating more equality, both within nation states as well as between regions of the world. It has in some areas even rendered societal inclusion more challenging than ever before. This means that we need to recognize that fostering science and technology alone will not suffice to create the desired outcome, but that new models assuring access to the
benefits of techno-scientific advances for broader constituencies of societies and meaningful models of participation in the development of knowledge and innovations need to be developed. The challenge will remain, to achieve both building our democracies along techno-scientific rationalities while acknowledging that this is necessarily always also linked to ethical choices for which we need to take responsibility. Embracing science and technology can thus not be conceptualised as a moment of depoliticising choices concerning the directions in which our societies develop, but much rather of acknowledging that this is politics by other means.
Part II: The Democratic Responses to These Challenges

Bringing the demos back in

“We the people” was a formative proposition, declaring many people a people and thereby constituting them as such. Moreover, it was a democratic people not only because the constitution organized fundamental democratic values – liberty, equality, well-being – into an institutional design, but also because the public debate between Federalists and antifederalist created, a democratic consciousness. A democratic people or demos is a body of political individuals that perceive themselves to be citizens within a state, one civic people, with conflicts and arguments, different representative institutions that nevertheless adhere to a set of rules and feel part of a collective political identity. Democracy is government of the people, for the people and by the people: the people make the body-politics of the sovereign state; the authors of its legitimacy. The demos rules by way of expressing the will of the people. This will is a shared will – to be part of the people, and to be involved in the decision-making and policy processes of the polity. Being a demos is a continuous prerequisite for democratic self-rule that embeds political equality: one person, one vote. Each citizen, being part of the body politic, has her own unique voice, cast as a vote. A vote for a candidate, party, worldview – that represents her through elections in the governing of the state. The will of the people is not one will of all the people, but an expression of the contingent will of the majority, respecting the minorities, believing in continuous debate and the possibility of replacing the ruling power. Moreover, a citizen’s political self-realization goes beyond just the vote, involving participation in political debate, the policy process and the creation and recreation of the public will.
Much contemporary democratic practice and theory abandons the demos. However, while nationalism, populism, racism, and xenophobia are problems of and for contemporary democracy; democracy without a civic body within a sovereign state – that shares a political collective identity expressed through public media, public opinion and public consciousness – and based on shared values of freedom, self-realization and crucially public equality – is a defective democracy.

**Democracy and inequality: The structure of the argument**

Global inequality is becoming mixed up with social inequality. That is why the renationalization of democracy (through greater social cohesion and reappropriation of the political by citizens) is one way of combating both simultaneously. This struggle must therefore be a top priority for our time (Rosanvallon 2013, 299).

To suggest the renationalization of democracy in the postnational constellation of a globalized era sounds like a reactionary project. Yet renationalization – or, alternately, redemocratization of democracy by way of rethinking the demos as a core concept of democracy – is at the heart of democracy. Rosanvallon wants to renationalize democracy in order to combat economic inequality, analyzing capitalism as the driving force behind the crisis of democracy manifested in a crisis of equality. Yet the crisis of democracy is also a crisis of equality as a political concept. There are strong connections between economic inequalities and political disempowerment – but we consider democratic inequality on its own terms, as stemming from the disenchantment with the demos as the locus of the political collective identity. Re-instating the demos is thus a precondition for democratic equality.

This section addresses three basic challenges to the democratic state – cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and democratic governance – from the perspective of public equality. In contrast to some other contributions to this chapter, it argues that a demos is a fundamental
part of democracy that embodies public equality and provides political dimension which the global or the local levels cannot replace.

**Humanity as a whole?**

The argument for a cosmopolitan world community goes something like this: a state is an arbitrary, historically contingent invention; the ethical community that underlies all individuals is a cosmopolitan community, based on universal human rights, in a borderless world. Thus, since individuals possessing universal rights are all equal, the relevant moral community is the global one.

Is the idea of political community coextensive with a sovereign state redundant? From the ethical perspective, all humans possess human rights. But is the best way to protect human rights one unitary regime? Empirically, we live in a world of sovereign states with some international bodies that derive their legitimacy from agreements among the constituting states. There are no global political institutions whose legitimacy does not derive from states. Moreover, those international bodies enjoy declarative force but a minimal real ability to coerce or sanction against violations of human rights. Some members of the human rights council of the UN are far from protecting human rights in their own countries. Human rights may be universal in nature; yet, they are, today, best protected and practiced through being enshrined in the constitutions and public cultures and processes of democratic states. Thus, realizing human rights is not a given but a process. The idea of one ethical-political community, actually undermines the legitimacy of sovereign states, thereby risking the only enclaves that actively protect human rights. But what about equality? Equality of the individuals is their equality as citizens within a state. There is a profound relation between their ability to experience self-autonomy and be active political citizens in a sovereign state. Being part of the policy process, of decision making, of bringing about change – is crucial for the translation of autonomy into practice. It is hardly achievable in a global community.
Social policies, based on solidarity, are also under threat. It is one thing to pay taxes and gain national security, public health and education, quite another to provide it to every traveler in a borderless society. Solidarity is an embodiment of the idea of public goods. The public good for humanity is almost an empty signifier. But the public goods that are being debated, decided upon and acted on within a democracy are fundamental to democracy. In particular, the balance between economy and politics is a major function of states, which will be undermined by globalism. Neoliberalism – that seeks to weaken the state and let the market rule alone – would prevail. States are the only collective actors that act through fiscal and other means to change structures of inequality, to invest in the public domain and to redistribute resources, as elected governments have the legitimacy to promote equality of opportunities. The poor would be poorer without states, and in a borderless world there would be no solidarity either one’s fellow citizens.

The third fundamental dimension of political equality that is being lost in a so-called global community is the demos as a discursive community. The “will of the people” is what emerges from political discussion, debates, conversations, contestations and conflicts. Being part of the political discourse is what enables each citizen to be a political actor, who self-realizes herself in the public realm. The demos is not an ethnos, it is being part of a political community within a democratic state. Cosmopolitanism, for the sake of abstract universal rights, jeopardizes the protection of human rights via the rule of law and the fundamental role of the demos.

Multiculturalism – a fragmented political arena?

The second challengers are voluntary associations – cultural, ethnic, religious and local communities, usually situated in civil society. The argument is the following: the idea of shared values and active participation have a deeper political meaning in communities than in states, where political behavior is reduced to voting and the national
identity is loose. Local communities are more involving and relevant to the people than the abstract state. Politics as a way of life is best practiced in communities.

What happens to the concept of equality under a multicultural gaze? The liberal view assumes that community is the extension of the liberty of the individual; but what about equality? Free individuals are free to join different communities. But the main idea of equality is a second order one: equality of the groups to be different from one another. Equality of difference extended to communities. What happens to individuals under such a framework? Some might thrive; others might be sacrificing their human rights under the shared values of a particular community, women rights in traditional communities notwithstanding. Still others may choose or find no significant community to be part of. The individual is no longer the building block of politics but groups and hence is vulnerable. Who is to enshrine the individuals within those groups, and those without communities? The rule of law; the state.

What does multiculturalism mean for democracy? How do different communities collectively decide whether to go to war? Raise taxes? Decide what are the shared values or public goods? While communities act on their own interest, what authority do they have to act on behalf of individuals? Do African-Americans or Muslims or lesbians have shared ideas on fiscal policies, state/religion relations or war and peace? Hardly so. So communities perform a partial role and should not be viewed as alternatives to citizens acting together within states.

Finally, most communities are still based on a primordial association – one is born into an ethnos, religion, gender or sex. A releasing power of democracy is that it treats individuals as equal. It provides a process of transformation of representation from identity into interests, ideology and policy preferences. A citizen may choose whether she votes as a Catholic, worker or a feminist. It is not prescribed to her by a primordial identity. So communities may
appear as much more engaging in nature but in fact fail to perform the roles of the democratic state in the various faces of equality. They may compliment and revive the demos, not replace it.

221 Democratic governance beyond the demos?

Contemporary theory argues that human societies are increasingly governed by a web of organizations that partake in the policy processes and provide global governance through deliberative democracy. Those voluntary associations – international NGOs, activists, social movements – are acting in the free market or civil society. This theory of governance connects the local with the global and gives only a partial role to states. But what is the account of public equality in a complex theory of governance?

223 A. Participation

Citizenship is a form of membership in the political game within democratic states. Active civil society extends participation far beyond voting. But moving participation from institutional democracy to global or local civil society entails moving from universal to voluntary participation; from individuals to organizations; from relatively compact participation – voting – into demanding engagement. The clear losers of such transformations are the disadvantaged groups. While voting is based on political equality, voluntary participation leaves those who lack time, resources or education outside of the effective participation circle. True, in the minimal act of voting the dropping levels of participation is most dramatic for the poor. Yet, this would be even more the case in voluntary associations and deliberative processes in which the highly educated middle classes participate. Moreover, while within a democracy there is an institutionalized solidarity among the demos, enhancing public education and welfare, which facilitate participation, there is no such obligation in global civil society.
B. Political Representation

Voluntary associations, as the building blocks of new forms of representation, undermine the role of parties as the main representative actor in sovereign democracies. NGOs become the main actors. The move from the individual to the group is the first hindrance to equality. Politics of recognition – symbolic power and the right to be different communities – often works against economic equality. Also, in the party system the main ideological axis is the Left-Right axis: the major conflict in society is about redistribution of resources, life chances and welfare. Identity politics moves the nexus of contestation from economics to culture and away from the state to global civil society, decreasing the centrality of economic and political equality on the political agenda.

C. Governing

As for governing, working through networks and deliberative governance means that the partners of policy making are no longer elected representatives of the demos, but philanthropic or self-interested groups. Such groups have access to resources, decision makers, communication, media and funding and thus discriminate against those who lack resources. There is no accountability. The main vow of democratic politics – self-rule of the people by the people for the people – is being severely damaged as the sovereign people has no priority in terms of decision making, the public interest is not clear in a borderless world and it is not clear who governance networks work for – as they have no democratic legitimacy.

Crucially, networks of governance are almost always composed of those who have interests in the matter at hand. Instead of protecting the people from private and particular interest groups, which usually command the resources and the power, global governance adopts them as part of the web of decision makers. The silent majority is out of the web of stakeholders’ deliberation. The self-selectivity of governance by networks, their lack of accountability and
responsibility and the bias in their participation in the policy-making process, makes it highly problematic. Governing by networks actually undermines the legitimacy of sovereign states and democratic processes, as well as weakening the demos as the main unit of self-rule by incorporating those with clear interests into the policy-making process.

Reinstating the demos within democracy

The crisis of democracy has led to advances that favor plurality and freedom over equality. Can the demos be reconstructed as a core concept of democracy in a postnational constellation? Democracy is an on-going project. Citizenship is being extended from rich men to workers, to women, to immigrants. Politics is transformed and an active civil society enhances it. Yet at the core of the democratic project stands the individual, who becomes a political actor by way of belonging to a demos. Within this demos, a conversation and debates are going on about shared values, social policies, rights and wrongs. The basic value that holds this construction together is public equality between free individuals within a state, who form a political community. In our world, states can secure political rights. To go beyond the state should not mean to abandon the demos; multiethnic in its nature and hence remote from organic nationalism, and moving toward greater human rights on an international scale as a regulative norm, the evolving, equality-striving demos as a creation of democratic states is a guiding principle of humanism. It is therefore still a viable route to claim a civic demos at the heart of democratic polity as the main institutional design to embed public equality. Both universal rights as an ever-extending horizon for democracy, and a rich active civil society within the public sphere, should enrich rather than undermine the on-going discussion of the demos and provide new rather than fewer opportunities for equal citizens in sovereign states.
Democratic innovations

New forms of participatory governance – often referred to as “democratic innovations” – are increasingly being enacted across the world in response to the failures of established institutions of representative government to promote and realize fully public equality. They are explicitly designed to increase and deepen participation by citizens in the political decision-making process. They are largely sponsored and organized by public authorities, although civil society organizations have also established democratic innovations independently or in collaboration with state actors. Such processes have engaged citizens in, for example, constitutional change, political reforms, formulation of public budgets, the implementation of social policies, and the monitoring of public services delivery. It is problematic, though, to generalize about their impact. Variations in design and implementation across the world mean that these institutions realize democratic goods in very different ways (Fung 2003; Smith 2009).

The spread of participatory practice does not entail that all democratic innovations respond effectively to political and social inequalities and exclusions and have meaningful impact. Many processes are poorly organized and can have detrimental effects, reinforcing inequalities and mistrust in public authorities and the democratic process.

But democratic innovations can be designed to overcome aspects of exclusion, giving voice to and increasing the well-being of politically and socially marginalized and disadvantaged social groups, increasing citizens’ competence and political skills and engaging citizens in the formulation and implementation of more just public and social policies. Citizens can exert meaningful influence, and in some cases control, over the decisions that affect their lives.

Given the complexity of practice, this section is necessarily selective and illustrative. We discuss briefly the practice of four democratic
designs and the different ways in which they enhance public equality. Participatory budgeting, policy councils and national public policy conferences originate from Latin America. This region has experienced an explosion of participatory governance following the period of redemocratization and decentralization that provided space for experimentation and institutionalization. The fourth innovation – randomly selected mini-publics – emerged in Europe and North America. Both participatory budgeting and mini-publics have experienced significant policy transfer. For further examples of democratic innovation, see Participedia http://participedia.net and LATINNO https://www.latinno.net/en/.

Participatory budgeting

Participatory budgeting (PB) is arguably the best known democratic innovation and was designed with explicit recognition of the structural disadvantage suffered by poorer citizens. Typically operating at the municipal level, citizens participate in the definition, formulation, decision, and control over significant proportions of the municipal budget. PB was first established in Porto Alegre in 1989 and by the turn of the century around 16,600 citizens were participating annually in its popular assemblies, influencing the distribution of around $160 million in investments. Since then, PB has spread across Brazil and Latin America to more than 1,000 cities across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania. While there is evidence that PB can be transferred effectively, what has been implemented under the name of PB has not always reflected earlier Latin American experience. Much rests on the willingness of political authorities and pressure from civil society to embed more participatory and redistributive practices, in particular restructuring bureaucratic practices to build civic infrastructure in poorer neighborhoods and ensure swift implementation of decisions.

The attractiveness of PB, especially in Latin America, is tied to its capacity to ameliorate clientelism and corruption and generate a more equitable redistribution of public goods. Increased participation
among disadvantaged, less educated and lower income groups reverses traditional patterns of influence on decision making on budget distribution. There is evidence that PB improves social well-being, with increased spending in health care and decreases in infant mortality rates across Brazil’s largest cities.

In its original form, PB was designed explicitly to separate demand-making and rulemaking processes – both of which are controlled by citizens. In the demand phase, large numbers of citizens mobilize to propose and support local projects and hold the administration to account. In a separate rulemaking phase, elected citizen representatives (with limited terms of office) from each district of the city establish and apply the rules to distribute the budget. As no district or partisan interest is able to dominate, the rules that guide the distribution of resources tend to reflect considerations of social justice, prioritizing the needs of the poor and infrastructure and services deficiencies (Smith 2009).

PB processes continue to innovate, developing digital and multichannel forms that broaden participation. For example, La Plata in Argentina combines offline, online and remote (SMS) voting, which in its 2010 cycle directly engaged around 50,000 citizens: 10 percent of the local eligible population, many resident in remote and marginalized areas of the city. There has also been experimentation with specific policy areas, committees and procedures (including quotas) dedicated to promoting the interests of women, young people, indigenous people and other politically excluded groups.

Policy councils

Policy councils bring together combinations of public officials, civil society organizations, ordinary citizens, private stakeholders, and service providers and users in areas such as development, infrastructure and social policies. In some countries, such as Brazil and Paraguay, virtually all cities have a form of policy council and there are national level councils in several countries. In Mexico, for
example, there are at least 163 councils at the federal level with an advisory role on various fields of public policy, including environment, rural and economic development, culture, education, health, and security. The design of policy councils has varied as their practice spread, as has their capacity to provide a space in which marginalized social groups are able to advance their interests.

The most common policy councils are advisory and restrict membership to state, civil society and private sector leaders, although they can be more open and embedded in decision making and administration at the local level. There is evidence that such structures can be used to promote inclusion, collaboration, transparency and accountability.

A variation in design, management councils have a more explicit decision-making function, empowering citizens and civil society leaders in the formulation and implementation of policies in areas such as health, education and housing. In Brazil, all 5,570 municipalities have a health council constituted by representatives of government institutions (25 percent), nongovernmental organizations (25 percent), and citizens (50 percent), who meet at least once every month to formulate health policies and oversee their implementation. Explicit attention is given to participation of citizens from poorer and traditionally excluded social groups to improve the responsiveness of the national health system to their needs.

Where management councils are more concerned with redistributive policies and operate mostly at the local level, representative councils deal with recognition policies primarily at the national level. They are an explicit attempt to promote public equality and fight discrimination through the direct engagement of under-represented and minority groups in the policy process, particularly women, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, racial and religious groups – and more recently youth and the elderly. Representative councils tend to have an agenda-setting and monitoring role. Both Ecuador and Brazil have national policy councils for women, the elderly,
people with disabilities and indigenous peoples. In Ecuador these and other councils were created in 2014 under the *Law of the National Councils for Equality* aimed at protecting minority rights. In Brazil, the national council for women’s policy has been responsible for the drafting and enforcement of the first national policy plans exclusively addressed to their needs, improving women’s representation and the realization of social rights (Pogrebinschi 2014).

**National public policy conferences**

National public policy conferences (NPPCs) are designed to overcome challenges of scale associated with participation in national level policy making. NPPCs connect citizens and civil society organizations through multiple and successive rounds of deliberation and representation at the local, regional and federal levels. Brazil has a long tradition of experimenting with NPPCs in more than fifty policy areas including health, education, culture, cities and racial equality. Again this democratic innovation has spread to other countries of Latin America with some interesting variation in format and scope (Pogrebinschi 2012).

While initiated by the federal government, the NPPC process begins at the municipal level, where the first round of deliberations is open to anyone to participate. Delegates are elected to represent the municipality in the state (regional) conferences where they deliberate with public officials on the policy proposals originated from the local stage. Proposals and delegates are then sent to the final, national, stage, which generates a set of policy recommendations. While these proposals are not binding, there is evidence that in Brazil the government has taken these inputs seriously in the formulation of federal policies and laws, including policy areas such as food security and nutrition. As NPPCs become institutionalized in some policy areas, they have begun playing an important role in policy evaluation and monitoring.
The NPPCs have been particularly important in increasing inclusion, with impressive numbers of citizens taking part (7 million people are reported to have participated in 82 NPPCs that took place between 2003 and 2011). Important social outcomes have been achieved, with NPPC proposals leading to progressive policy change in areas of gender, race, ethnicity, disabilities and age. Many of these policies recognize new groups and enact rights – including constitutional rights – for groups previously excluded from the policy process (Pogrebinschi 2014).

**Mini-publics**

Where the previous innovations have emerged from Latin America, mini-publics have been developed in North America and Europe, although their practice has spread to other continents. Mini-publics are defined by their use of random and stratified selection and facilitated deliberation amongst a diverse body of citizens who hear evidence from experts and witnesses and generate political recommendations. Mini-publics are typically used as consultative bodies by political decision makers. Examples include citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, deliberative polls, citizens’ assemblies and G1000s. The number of citizens selected and length of time they are brought together varies between 12 to 1,000 citizens over one day to several weekends (Smith 2009).

Arguably the most impressive experimentation with mini-publics has been the citizens’ assemblies in Canada, the Netherlands and Ireland that have dealt with constitutional issues. Whereas other designs require citizens to participate for between one to five days, in Canada and the Netherlands citizens met over a series of weekends for a number of months, learning, deliberating, consulting and deciding on a new electoral system. In British Columbia and Ontario the provincial governments committed to put recommendations to a province-wide referendum. The Irish Constitutional Convention took the unusual step of including one-third politicians as members
alongside randomly selected citizens. There is evidence that its recommendations were critical in bringing forward legislation on same-sex marriage.

Mini-publics recruit a far more heterogeneous group of citizens than any legislature or other political institutions. Forms of random or stratified selection recall the fundamental democratic procedure of ancient Athenian democracy: no social group is systematically excluded; the equal status and value of all persons is recognized and affirmed. Inclusion in the deliberative process is promoted through active facilitation, ensuring that the process is not dominated by the politically confident.

Mini-publics are one of the most researched democratic innovations and there is evidence that structured deliberation amongst such a socially diverse group of participants increases sensitivity to the perspectives and arguments of others and defends against group polarization that is common amongst more homogenous groups. There is growing evidence that citizens are willing and able to come to sound judgments and recommendations on highly complex and technical issues, and that there are positive effects on participants’ knowledge, interpersonal trust and political efficacy, and that the broader public views the judgments of mini-publics as credible and trustworthy.

Institutionalizing democratic innovations

Democratic innovations can be designed to better realize public equality in very different ways – for example, through random selection, group representation or rules that prioritize the interests of the politically marginalized. Institutional designs can empower minority groups, recognize new social and cultural identities, as well as incorporate historically marginalized groups in the public sphere. The practice of well-organized and politically salient innovations provides evidence that citizen participation can break political deadlocks, lead to decisions that redistribute state resources, refocus
the delivery of public goods to those most in need and provide access to public services for the poor.

The major challenge facing participatory governance is how democratic innovations can be embedded effectively within democratic systems. One aspect of this challenge is that the radical impulse and original designs of democratic innovations are often watered down as practice spreads. PB is a good example: many of the PBs across Latin America bear a strong family resemblance to early Brazilian practice. However, as it traveled to Europe and North America, many of the newer PBs were relatively poor imitations.

The second challenge is that democratic innovations are too often either not given decision-making power or are poorly coupled or integrated with existing decision-making processes. One lesson from Latin America is the importance of political, administrative and fiscal autonomy for different levels of authority within a polity as a precondition for democratic experimentation and an opportunity to have a meaningful impact. But the decision to sponsor, organize and respond to democratic innovations is often at the discretion of elected or appointed public officials. When innovations are not institutionalized through norms or law, they can lose their force and undermine citizen efficacy. The internationally renowned PB in Porto Alegre exemplifies this challenge: it was not codified and was weakened by the incoming mayor as soon as the Workers Party lost control of the city. In other parts of Latin America, such as Peru and the Dominican Republic, PB is mandatory under national law. However, legal or constitutional codification can be a break on creativity and further innovation.

An intriguing development is the emergence of autonomous public organizations charged with promoting public participation. The Quebec Environmental Public Hearings Board and the former Danish Board of Technology are rare examples of institutions that have been created by governments with the mandate to establish independent,
high quality and recurrent practices of participatory governance in specified areas of policy (Bherer, Gauthier, and Simard 2014).

Unsurprisingly, vested political and economic interests are suspicious of democratic innovations: when well designed, they open up the political process and promote public equality. But designing new and creative participatory institutions is not enough; it is crucial also to embed these practices within, alongside or, more radically, in place of representative institutions if democratic innovations are to contribute to overcoming political and social inequalities in contemporary democracies.

**Democracy below, beyond and across the state? Equality between citizens or states?**

We propose to give a unified account of the ideal of equality of voice across the domains of the domestic state and the international community. Some have thought that some variant of a democratic world state is the natural application of this idea. We argue that the ideal of political equality in the modern democratic state is a special case of a more general principle, which covers equality in collective decision making traditionally conceived and a kind of equality in the conditions under which voluntary agreements are made among separate parties. We argue for a principle of proportionality, which asserts that persons ought to have a say in some issue area that is proportional to the stake they have in that area. Proportionality is particularly useful in the context of international decision making where societies have very different stakes in the agreements they make. We define an ideal of fair negotiation among states that conforms to the broader ideal of equality. This is an individualistic ideal in the sense that the ultimate entity that is to have a say is the individual. States act as representatives of individuals in the process of making voluntary agreements.
The basic challenge of globalization to democracy is that the citizens of a democratic state are deeply affected by the policies and actions, or the lack thereof, of citizens in other states. Partly this is the consequence of the fact that certain goods, or bads such as pollution or the spread of disease, cannot be contained within the borders of states. Partly it is a consequence of decisions that states have made to increase openness to international trade and the movements of persons and capital. To the extent that the democratic principle implies that persons should have a voice in the basic conditions that affect their lives, there is a strong impulse to give citizenship a wider scope than it has had till now. Relatedly, the global community is currently facing some fundamental moral challenges, which can be recognized as such on virtually any scheme of morality. The aims include the preservation of international security and the protection of persons against serious and widespread violations of human rights. In addition, it must pursue the avoidance of global environmental catastrophe; the alleviation of severe global poverty; and the establishment of a decent system regulating international trade and the movements of people and capital. Meeting these challenges will require significant cooperation from many of the world’s states. As a consequence, there are moral duties on the part of the people who are members of different states to attempt to achieve effective cooperation with other people in pursuing these mandatory aims.

All states have signed on to these aims (in the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations Charter, the WTO and various environmental agreements) they make sense from the standpoint of any moral theory that takes the promotion, protection and respect for the fundamental interests of persons to be essential to a well ordered political system. The morally mandatory aims specify certain very weighty aims that it makes sense to require the international community to pursue, given its current capacities and challenges.
The question is, from the standpoint of democratic ideals, how are we to make decisions regarding how to pursue these aims? A natural thought here is that a fair process of decision making among states would be a majoritarian one. But this majoritarian idea can take different forms. One can imagine a majoritarianism of states such as one state, one vote. There are two problems with this approach that arguably attend many of the majoritarian approaches to international rulemaking. The first problem is that states are of very different size and so a majoritarian rule would not conform to the more fundamental principle that we want power apportioned to individuals in a way that treats individuals as equals.

The second problem is that a majoritarian rule of this sort violates in some way the political and legal integrity of political societies. The political societies within what are initially arbitrary borders have developed highly integrated legal systems with integrated economic and social arrangements, as well as systems of accountability for transforming and adjusting these arrangements. States have arisen to establish justice and protect the basic needs of persons within limited areas. States have some interest in protecting the borders and the integrity of the systems operating within those borders in order to carry out their core responsibilities. From an international perspective, we have a kind of division of labor in which the world is divided into units that are capable of establishing justice in each unit (Goodin 1988).

Hence, it is through state consent that democratic ideals be realized. But the requirement of consent must be modified in three ways: first, unreasonable refusal of consent must be excluded; second, consent must be given under fair conditions; third, state consent must be broadly representative of the people of the state.

The justification for the state consent requirement is also grounded in the fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how to pursue
the morally mandatory aims. Though there is general agreement among scientists that the earth is warming up due to human activity, there is disagreement as to how much this is happening and how quickly or what a fair and efficient distribution of costs might be. The same uncertainties attend thinking about how to alleviate global poverty and how to protect persons from widespread human rights abuses. And there is significant disagreement about the limits of free trade and the methods for opening up trade as well as how to deal with the relationship between uneven development and trade. This kind of uncertainty, together with the centrality of states in making power accountable to persons, provides a reason for supporting a system of state consent with freedom to enter and exit arrangements because it supports a system that allows for a significant amount of experimentation in how to solve problems (Keohane and Victor 2011).

But the system of state consent must be heavily bounded given the morally mandatory need for cooperation. In the case of treaties that attempt to realize a system of cooperation that is necessary to the pursuit of morally mandatory aims, exit or the refusal to enter it must be accompanied by an acceptable explanation. States must lay out the reasons for thinking that the treaty would not contribute to solving the problem and that some alternative might be superior. The explanation must be in terms of the morally mandatory aims or in terms of a crushing or severely unfair cost of cooperation. The reasons given do not need to be the right reasons, but they must fall within the scope of what reasonable people can disagree on. For example, an explanation must not go against the vast majority of scientific opinion. A state must not free ride on others’ contributions to morally mandatory aims or refuse to shoulder the burden. The international community is permitted to pressure or coerce states that fail to provide adequate explanations for refusal to participate in cooperation for mandatory aims (Christiano 2015).

In this context we have to think about one of the major effects of globalization, which is the increase in the relative bargaining power
of capital over labor as a consequence of the increasing mobility of capital. Democratic societies have had increasing difficulty in imposing constraints on capital because of the threat of flight. This imbalance can only be rectified by states cooperating in producing an international regime of taxation and regulation of capital.

How do we assess the fairness of state consent and the negotiations that lead up to this? A state’s consent to a treaty must not be coerced by the other party and must not be the consequence of fraud by the other party. And states cannot validly create obligations that violate the *jus cogens* norms.

We can also see further norms through the lens of democratic theory. When a state engages in making agreements, contracts and other arrangements with other states, it is in effect attempting to shape the social world surrounding it. It alters the rights, duties and powers that other states have in relation to it. That world is the product of coordination and in part the product of conflict since states are able to shape this world more or less depending on how much social power they have.

Just as a citizen participates in shaping the overall character of the society he lives in by participating in collective decision making about the overall collective features of the society, so a state shapes parts of the social world in which it exists by engaging in agreement making with others. The justification of these different powers of shaping the social world is grounded in the same common liberal concerns. Persons and the groups of which they are members have fundamental interests and concerns that often conflict and they disagree on how best to shape their common social worlds and so we give each person or group some power to pursue those interests.

We want to assert here as a general principle that persons ought to have a say in a collective decision in proportion to the legitimate stakes they have in the decision (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). On the whole persons ought to have an equal say in democratic decision
making within states because they have roughly equal stakes in the set of decisions overall. Where there are unequal stakes, we distribute power unequally, as in federalist arrangements.

Given the analogy of agreement making to democratic participation, we can see that the principle of proportionality applies to agreement making. In the case of voice, stakes are defined in terms of the whole range of plausible and legitimate alternatives in the different issue spaces. In the case of agreement making, the fundamental determinant of stake is the outside option or what a person or group can expect if no agreement is made with the other party, in other words, the value of exit. I have a lot at stake in an agreement if I would be very badly off without it. You have a lot less at stake if you would not be so badly off without the agreement.

The fundamental argument for the principle of proportionality of power to stakes is that persons and groups of persons know their interests better than others do, normally. Thus in situations of conflict of interest, one should want the party with the most interest at stake to have more of a say if one is concerned with advancing the interests of persons.

There are four key differences directly relevant to fairness between states and persons that complicate the application of the ideas of fairness to interstate transactions. First, states come with different size populations; second, states have very different levels of wealth for which the present generation cannot be held responsible (usually); third, these conditions occur against a background in which there are no higher order political institutions with the capacity to rectify serious differences of opportunity and information; fourth, the negotiations that create international institutions are morally deeply fraught issues or at least more so than most ordinary negotiations. Two important structural differences also mark the transactions among states. Furthermore, there are a small number of states so the interactions among states never replicate the conditions
of competitive markets, which sometimes play a large role in equalizing bargaining power among individual persons.

Population and wealth are two important determinants of stake for states. From the standpoint of democratic theory, the power of a particular state in negotiation ought to be proportioned to population so that each state has power apportioned to per capita stakes. The role of wealth is not so straightforward. Suppose one has two societies at very different levels of wealth entering a negotiation. When impoverished societies negotiate with wealthy societies, they have a lot less wealth at stake but they have more at stake in some fundamental sense since their abilities to finance basic goods for their populations are at stake.

One of the most fundamental puzzles in a system of free transactions among persons is that this principle of power proportionate to stakes can easily be violated. For example if you have two persons who depend on making an agreement to advance certain interests, the one who has the least stake will often have more power. This is because they can more easily afford no agreement. But this means that power is often inversely proportioned to stakes in a scheme of free transactions, while the normative principle tells us that power ought to be proportioned to stakes.

The problem of inequality of stakes in international politics is extremely hard to solve because there is no higher political entity capable of rectifying the imbalance of power. The poor and the vulnerable are frequently in very difficult bargaining positions relative to wealthy and powerful societies as we see in trade negotiations and in environmental negotiations. But it is not as if nothing can be done here. First of all, multilateral and inclusive conferences tend to be helpful to poorer societies. Here transparency can play a significant role in making negotiations fairer because though rich and powerful states are willing and able to engage in very hard bargaining with poorer states, they do not like to be seen to be doing so, either to their own citizens or to the global public. If hard
bargaining becomes too open, it becomes damaging to the reputations of powerful states, which reputations are important assets in international politics. Two, coalition building among poorer countries can also offset the tremendous bargaining power that comes with wealth. This is because the great majority of the world's population is poor and the sheer size of this group can give it bargaining power (Narlikar 2012). This alteration of the bargaining situation is not unlike the change in bargaining between capital and labor that occurs when unions are allowed to form.
We have so far discussed the underlying principle of public equality and a number of important challenges to its realization. As we saw, three kinds of challenges stand out. First, are the challenges that arise from socioeconomic inequality in society. Second, are the challenges that arise from the marginalization of minorities, women and the young. Third are the challenges stemming from globalization, which reinforce many of these others. All three challenges are manifested in the rise of populism. Our proposals here are essentially institutional proposals that supplement those offered in Sections 1 and 2 on age groups, future generations, enhancing participation through democratic innovations, and the prospects for global democracy.

The problems associated with the first challenge of socioeconomic inequality and its effect on the political system is discussed in much more detail in Chapter 13, but we will discuss here some institutional mechanisms by which the difficulties can be overcome. First let us get a quick characterization of the nature of the problem. The fundamental difficulty with the idea that economic inequality can issue in political inequality is that a society in which the affluent play the dominant role is one that violates the underlying principle of public equality. The idea is that the affluent have a much greater opportunity to influence the making of political decisions than do the less affluent. We hold to the fundamental democratic idea that persons’ conceptions of the common good unwittingly reflect their interests and their distinctive experiences. So a society in which the affluent dominate the processes of persuasion and political choice is one in which their interests are likely to be much better served than those of the rest of the society. There are a number of mechanisms by which this can happen. One, if electoral campaigns are financed privately, then the affluent will play the role of selecting like-minded people to run for election. Campaign contributions in the United States tend to come almost entirely from the upper 10 percent of the income distribution. This implies that these people are playing are
dominating role in the setting of the agenda in political decision making. In this first mechanism, there need be no suggestion of corruption but it does imply that the interests of the affluent will be disproportionately advanced in these societies and the interests of others will be significantly ignored. But a second mechanism does suggest the possibility of corruption; campaign finance contributions in return for promises to pass certain legislation favorable to the contributor. This is the main mechanism people think in terms of when they think of the influence of money on politics, but researchers have not found a great deal of evidence for this mechanism in the United States and Europe. A third mechanism relates in part to the process of globalization of markets. By virtue of its mobility, capital is able to secure good terms for itself from the political system simply by suggesting that it will move elsewhere or disinvest in some other way. It has a kind of independent political power in the political process. Charles Lindblom described this as the automatic punishment that business exercises over the political system. If stringent pollution controls are mandated by popular will, the business moves to an area where pollution control are less, thus imposing a cost in the form of unemployment on the political system. Other theorists have described this as the structural dependence of the state on capital. A fourth mechanism influences the generation of political opinion in modern societies. Most people rely, as Anthony Downs argued, on heavily subsidized transmissions of opinions and arguments in modern societies. Inevitably the main source of the subsidization of opinion consist in the affluent. As a consequence there is likely to be a significant bias in the system of information and opinion generation toward the interests and concerns of the affluent.

All four of these mechanisms imply a great deal of inequality of opportunity to influence the democratic process and thus imply political inequality. Anthony Downs argued that inequality of political power is inevitable in modern societies. The question is: what kinds of institutions can mitigate these effects? Public financing of elections has been proposed as a partial solution to the first and second
problems. A second kind of proposal is to have citizens assemblies of the sort analyzed in the democratic innovations section. They might deliberate about and propose potential pieces of legislation that would be subject to legislative votes or referenda. Here the idea is to insulate a significant part of the agenda setting power in a legislature from the influence of money. Another proposal for mitigating the effects of the independent power of capital might consist in the restructuring of corporations so that their boards represent the workers in the corporations and perhaps other stakeholders. This would bring about decision making that would be more reflective of the wider interests in society. It may also serve to mitigate some of the mechanism by which great inequality is created. A fourth proposal, suggested by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, would be to set up a voucher system for the support of interest groups and political parties, which might mitigate some of the domination of the affluent over the major media and interest groups. A fifth proposal is to attempt to revive and support organizations that advocate for the interests of working class and poor people such as unions. This could create a kind of independent source of knowledge generation.

The second challenge is the subject of many of the sections on gender and minorities of this chapter. The problem is not primarily institutional though institutional reforms may help mitigate the problem. To put the point simply: for a democratic society to realize fully the equal citizenship of its members, people must see each other and treat each other as equals in the processes of democratic deliberation and communication generally. They must take each other seriously in the sense that they must listen to others and take their expressions of their conceptions of the common good and their own interests seriously. It is here that the marginalization of minorities and women can take an insidious and subtle form, but for all that a very powerful form. And of course, this marginalization can be compounded when persons are members of more than one marginalized group as studies of intersectionality suggest. This constitutes a threat to the political equality of citizens to the extent
that being able to communicate one's ideas and interests is essential to one's ability to influence the political process. If a majority of persons or even a significant minority cannot but think of one as not to be taken very seriously then one cannot communicate effectively and one's ability to influence the system is mitigated and one's interests are not likely to be advanced very well.

The marginalization of minorities and women in the democratic process can take two forms: it can take the form of an overt denial of civil and political rights, or it can involve a failure of processes to give voice to minority or marginalized voices. With regard to the former, common instances of these forms include voter suppression, enforced discrimination against minorities and women in the rules regulating economic and family life, and rules restricting the religious practices of minorities. There has been considerable progress over the last fifty years in many modern democracies toward the protection of the rights of minorities in terms of civil and political rights. There is some danger of backlash against these gains from the larger society, which has been discussed under the heading of populism. The latter forms of marginalization are more subtle and difficult to mitigate than those to the first. Probably the most prominent kinds of institutional fixes here are those having to do with representation. The idea is to give persons a stage on which they can express their views and which accords that expression legitimacy and authority. We have already looked at the role democratic innovations may play in this regard. Another, more mainstream, institution that may help with this is proportional representation. Thinking in terms of a kind of party list proportional representation, such a system enables a greater plurality of voices to get a hearing in the society. Single member district representation tends to displace the expression of the variety of interests and views in society to a less public place and takes it off the main legislative stage. Proportional representation tends to realize a more egalitarian representation of the plurality of views and interests in the society and it does so primarily by letting people choose for themselves what the important issues and identities are
that they wish to associate themselves with. But to the extent that there are problems of marginalization that minorities wish to combat, it enables these minorities to form groups or play roles in shaping larger groups to be represented at the legislative level. So there may be better representation of interests and perspectives and there may also be better descriptive representation to the extent that minorities play the leading role in these parties. This can play a role in enhancing the legitimacy of minority voices and it may also put on display the diversity of voices within each minority. Proportional representation as an institution will not solve the problems entirely by any means. Other representation mechanisms may include quotas that ensure that a certain proportion of the representatives are women or are minorities.
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[3] I use gender equality and feminism as empty signifiers here, to be able to discuss its various contested meanings (Verloo 2017).


[6] Following Arditi (2008) I take this definition of a parasite from Jacques Derrida (1988, 90): “The parasite then ‘takes place.’ And at the bottom, whatever violently ‘takes place’ or occupies a site is always something of a parasite. Never quite taking place is then part of its performance, or its success, as an event, or its ‘taking place.’” Populism is a permanent possibility within representative democracy, and the “never taking place” refers to its being a permanent mobilizing possibility even when it is strong enough to manifest its power. If all the populist potentials were actualized it would replace representative democracy altogether but this would be a regime change (like what happened when fascism “took place”).


[9] To be clear, the mandatory aim of alleviating severe global poverty, I think, argues strongly for much greater openness to migration. I make this argument in detail in (Christiano 2016).
See, for example, Keohane and Victor (2011: 9, 12, 15) for a discussion of how uncertainty plays a role in motivating and perhaps justifying fragmentation of regimes attempting to deal with global problems.

Jus Cogens norms are norms that are generally recognized by the community of states as having a peremptory force, from which no derogation is permitted. Whether they are moral norms or positive norms remains a matter of controversy and which norms are on the limited list of jus cogens is also a matter of controversy. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53.

Colonel Rainborough in, “Putney Debates,” in (Wootton 1980).