Bringing representations to distinctness: German Rationalist method, the Critical Philosophy, and the case in the Appendix

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I, Helen Sarah Robertson, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract

The so-called ‘amphiboly’ section of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is a section that has remained relatively understudied in commentaries and literature on the *Critique*. In this brief appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant puts forward a charge against his German Rationalist heritage – the philosophical tradition of Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten – claiming for this heritage the error of an ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. When the precise nature of this charge is appreciated, it is possible to see that both the recognition of the error and the identification of its correction play a crucial role in the Critical philosophy itself. In this study, it is my aim to bring to light certain significant details of Kant’s case in the appendix and the crucial ways in which these play a subsequent role in the *Critique* itself.

The study begins with an examination of the case in the appendix, focussing on what I take to be a crucial line of reasoning found in its introductory passages. Thereafter, the study divides broadly into two parts. In the first part, I examine the line of reasoning insofar as it concerns a claimed error in the German Rationalist tradition. I show that the error is to be found in an implicit commitment in the first stage of the German Rationalist method for philosophical cognition, the stage of bringing the representations of philosophy to distinctness, and show the line of reasoning in the appendix to constitute Kant’s Critical response to this commitment. In the latter part of the study, I turn to the significance of the line of reasoning for the early parts of the *Critique*, in particular for the proofs of the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition, showing these proofs to be the culmination of Kant’s corrected Critical method for bringing the representations of philosophy to distinctness.
Impact statement

The research presented in this thesis is likely to be of particular interest to scholars within the history of philosophy with the aim of furthering the interpretive understanding of one of the key figures in philosophy since the Eighteenth Century, Immanuel Kant. The research puts forward a novel interpretation of both some relatively under-appreciated passages in Kant's magnum opus, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as well as some of the more well-worn passages, each of which are significant for our understanding of Kant's philosophy as well as for our understanding of the ways in which contemporary philosophical accounts have been influenced by this celebrated and important text.

This development in interpretive understanding is likely to be incremental, as much philosophical development is, and will not be limited by region.
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    thank you, thank you.
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I must, on this occasion, crave indulgence. I have as little taste as the next man for the fastidious wisdom of those who spend so much time in their logic-laboratories subjecting sound and serviceable concepts to excessive analysis, distilling and purifying them until they evaporate altogether in vapours and volatile salts. However, the object of this present reflection is of such a kind that one must [...] patiently accept an analysis of one’s concepts into these atoms.

Kant, I. *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763)
Introduction

The so-called ‘amphiboly’ section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a section that has remained relatively understudied in commentaries and literature on the *Critique*. In this brief appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant puts forward a charge against his Leibnizian heritage – a tradition equally influencing Wolff and Baumgarten – claiming for this heritage the error of an ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. When the precise nature of this charge is appreciated, it is possible to see that both the recognition of the error and the identification of its correction play a crucial role in the Critical philosophy itself. In this study, it is my aim to bring to light certain crucial details of the case that Kant puts forward in the appendix and to trace out the ways in which these play a significant subsequent role in the *Critique* itself – a role that has, as yet, gone unappreciated.

Over the course of gaining an appreciation of the case put forward in the appendix, a number of different, though interrelated, lines will come to light. Each of these will form part of the overall picture here put forward, a picture ultimately meant to establish the Critical significance of the case. In this brief introduction, I will trace these lines and provide something of an overview of the picture that the study means to establish, turning thereafter to some of its qualifications and caveats.

In its most familiar formulation, the charge put forward in the appendix concerns a certain confusion regarding the objects of our cognition. Indeed, as we find it explicitly formulated in the appendix, the Leibnizian philosophy is said to “[take] the appearances for things in themselves, thus for intelligibilia, i.e., objects of the pure understanding” (A264/B320). Or again, the ‘transcendental amphiboly’ that it commits is that of a “[confusion of] the pure object of the understanding with the appearance.” (A270/B326) Now, this formulation is not erroneous. Indeed, these are the terms in which Kant himself formulates the case. It is, however, the tail-end of a much more complex and systematic case that is to be found in the appendix – a tail-end that emerges as an implication of the case’s more fundamental core. Once properly understood, the charge will be seen to concern, not the objects of our cognition, but our representations considered as representations. It is here that the fundamental error with which Kant is concerned in the appendix is to be found – the error upon which the more familiar charge depends.
The key to the appendix and the core of its case is contained in its short, lesser treated, introductory section. It is in this brief introduction that we find a complex, and at times opaque, line of reasoning. In this line of reasoning, we are presented with the distinction between an erroneous and a correct employment of a certain, less familiar, set of concepts, the concepts of reflection. In crucial contrast to the concepts put forward prior to the appendix, the concepts of reflection are not concepts of objects, but concepts of representations. They are, as Kant tells us, somewhat opaque, concepts of the “relations of given representations among themselves” (A260/B316). And what this line of reasoning shows is that the possibility of a priori, or philosophical, cognition requires precisely that the correct employment of these concepts is distinguished from their erroneous employment and that they are so employed.

In order to understand this case that Kant puts forward in the appendix, it will be necessary to digress to an examination of Kant’s account of philosophical method. It is only once we locate the employment of the concepts of reflection within the procedure for arriving at philosophical cognition, a procedure shared in important ways by Leibniz, Wolff and his followers, and the Critical philosophy, that the importance and intricacy of the role played by the concepts of reflection in such cognition can be seen. Over the course of this examination, we will come to see that the case in the appendix concerns a further crucial way in which the Critical philosophy involves a correction to the philosophical method of its heritage, the correction to its employment of the concepts of reflection – a correction that has not, thus far, been recognised in extant discussion. Having in hand this understanding of the employment of the concepts of reflection within philosophical cognition, and indeed of their correct employment in such cognition, we will then be able to see how the early parts of the Critique, in particular the proofs of the Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition, are, in significant ways, the culmination of their corrected employment.

The study proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I with an examination of the case in the appendix itself, focussing on what I take to be a crucial line of reasoning found in its introduction. This examination is preceded by an exposition of the account of the appendix as it is familiarly formulated in the literature. In Parts II to IV, I then turn to a progressive comparison of the correct method for philosophical cognition as it is put forward under German Rationalism, under Kant’s ‘moderate’ pre-Critical account in the Inquiry, and under the Critical philosophy. The discussion in Parts II to IV
proceeds from the general to the more specific, with Part IV identifying an implicit complex commitment at a narrow, precise point in the methods, which commitment involves the employment of the concepts of reflection. In Part V, I turn to the significance of these findings for the early parts of the Critique, in particular for the proofs of the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition. Part V, which also emerges as the longest part of the study, begins with a number of overlooked details in Kant’s explanation of the Metaphysical Exposition, which details are followed by an intricate analysis of the proofs themselves. The part is appended with some discussion of the continuity and discontinuity between the Critical philosophy and its German Rationalist predecessor in relation to philosophical method. Finally, in Parts VI and VII, I return to the case in the appendix. Part VI is a re-examination of the case and its familiar formulation in light of the discoveries of Parts II to V, while Part VII is an examination of three important accounts of the appendix that deviate both from the familiar formulations and from my own in important ways.

Before commencing shortly on this course, it is worth noting a few caveats and qualifications with regard to the aim and subject matter of our study. First, the aim of this study is to be understood as philosophical rather than historical. That is, our underlying aim will be to make philosophical sense of the case in the appendix, and to come to an understanding of its philosophical role in Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical accounts of philosophical cognition. The study is not intended as an exhaustive historical account of the claims and traditions that it treats. In consequence, our appeal to historical sources will extend only as far as is needed to achieve this philosophical aim, and not as far as it would do if our aim were the contrasting one of providing a thorough historical account of the claims. This consideration plays out in the range of texts found in the study in at least two ways. First, although precursors and passages relevant to the claims of the appendix can be found in a number of texts and passages both in Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical writings, I will focus on only on certain of these – viz. on those that turn out to be crucial to our philosophical understanding of the case in question. Secondly, rather than bearing any pretence to thoroughness with regard to the tradition to which Kant is responding, our appeal here will be to a select and limited range of these German Rationalist authors and texts – viz. to those that clearly express or evince the philosophically relevant claims and positions. In many instances, I will provide references to a number of such authors or
passages, but again, these parts of the study are not to be understood as an attempt to provide a thorough historical exposition of the claim or position.

The subject matter of this study is also narrow in a second way. In the appendix, Kant, for the most part, directs his case to the Leibnizian philosophy. And this aspect of the case equally applies, as we will see, to the tradition influenced by Leibniz, the philosophical tradition of Wolff and Baumgarten. There is, however, another tradition towards which Kant’s case in the appendix is directed, a tradition that is charged with a converse error: “Locke,” Kant tells us, “sensitivized the concepts of understanding” (A271/B327) and, in this converse way, is, alongside Leibniz, the other “great [man who] holds on only to one of [the two different sources of representation] which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves.” (ibid.) In these remarks, Kant is typically taken to raise a charge against a tradition that, in various ways, opposes that of Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten: The empiricist tradition of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (and, to varying degrees, of Lambert, Knutzen, and Tetens). Now, while I believe that the case that we will uncover in the introduction to the appendix applies equally – as Kant indicates – and no less interestingly to strands of this later tradition, our attention in this study will be restricted to the former aspect of the case, viz. to its application to the tradition of Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. The reasons for this are threefold. The first is the obvious and usual spectre of constraints of space. As we will see, an understanding of Kant’s charge against the Leibnizian philosophy will require a detailed and lengthy digression into the philosophical methods of the tradition within which Kant was working. It would not be possible to do this sort of justice to a further tradition within the space of this study. Secondly, the first aspect of the case, as mentioned, is the charge as it applies to the tradition within which Kant was working, and it is arguably the more fundamental of the two aspects to the appendix’s case, both in terms of chronological priority and in terms of its implications for the Critical philosophy. Finally, and relatedly, the culmination of the case in the appendix is, as we will see, a correction of the tradition of Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. That is, the Critical correction of the error laid out in the appendix, as it is found in the Critique itself, is a correction to the error as it is found within this tradition. Our point of interest will thus be restricted to the case of the appendix as it is directed towards the tradition influenced by Leibniz, regrettably overlooking the contrasting tradition of Lockean stripe.
This study is narrow in a third way. Turning to the reception of the *Critique* and Kant’s legacy, certain claims of the appendix were debated, rejected, and defended in various ways. These responses to the *Critique*, and equally to certain claims found in the appendix, might be divided very broadly into two. First, there were those responses that, in various ways, attacked the *Critique* on the basis of its failing to fulfil its aims – that is, on the basis in failing to provide a coherent fundamental account of our cognition that corrected the preceding tradition of German rationalism. With regard to the claims of the appendix, we might here mention Maimon’s attempt to give a more significant role to the concepts of reflection. Secondly, there are those that attacked the *Critique* in defence of the preceding tradition of German Rationalism. Again, in relation to the claims of the appendix, it is well-known, for example, that Eberhard and Kant undertook an extensive debate over the distinctness of sensibility and the understanding.

Now, although these subsequent debates and developments of the material of the appendix are of unquestionable interest in their own right, this study will be restricted to the claims of the appendix as a response to the prior tradition and will not extend to this ‘after-life’ of the appendix chapter as an examination of its reception in turn. Again, our first reason for this restriction is the constraint of length. Secondly, and more importantly, many of these discussions would render us too far afield from our place of interest. The crucial details of the case in the appendix that we will bring to light are details that apply to the pre-Critical tradition of German Rationalism, as Kant understood it, and our interest here will be in the appendix as putting forward a crucial, yet unrecognised, response to this tradition. One potential exception to this restriction can, of course, be found in the second of the responses to the *Critique* – viz. in those who responded on behalf of German Rationalism. Nonetheless, as will become clear over the course of the study, the features of the German Rationalist account with which Kant is primarily concerned in the appendix can be found in a number of the German Rationalist figures prior to Kant, and, given the philosophical nature of our aim, an examination of the subsequent Eberhard-Kant controversy or similar would be supplementary and an occasion for a different discussion.

Finally, as a third point of narrowing, this study is – for better or worse – largely not intended to be evaluative. That is, our aim here will, for the most part, be to put forward an account of a specific aspect of Kant’s
response to his preceding tradition, and not to provide any further or explicit evaluation either of the strength of Kant’s position nor that of his predecessors, whether from the perspective of the accounts prevalent at the time or in our own contemporary terms. (This caveat is, however, admittedly qualified. A certain *implicit* evaluative element will be evident at certain points insofar as our aim is to render Kant’s case as intelligible and clear as possible.) As we will see, merely putting forward an interpretive account of Kant’s response in the appendix will carry us to the length of this study, and so the further task of explicitly adjudicating between the views, and their comparison or incorporation into contemporary accounts, is one for a later undertaking.
Part I

The case in the appendix

The point of interest of this study is a case put forward by Kant that concerns the employment of a less familiar set of concepts, viz. the employment of the concepts of reflection. This case is to be found in the brief appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, the section entitled ‘On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. As we will come to see, this case, found in this brief and oft-overlooked section of the *Critique*, turns out to be crucial to the Critical philosophy and to our understanding of it. In this part, I turn to an examination of the appendix and the case that Kant there puts forward.

Part I proceeds as follows. In Section I, I begin with some preliminary discussion of the appendix in order that we might orient ourselves somewhat in its relation to the rest of the *Critique*. Section II turns to the formulation of the case in the appendix as it is familiarly found in the literature. In Section III, I give a brief preliminary exposition of the novel subject matter of the appendix, the concepts of reflection. Thereafter, in Sections IV and V, I turn to a crucial, but inadequately treated, line of reasoning that Kant puts forward concerning these concepts: In Section IV, I examine this line of reasoning more closely, while Section V addresses a number of questions and puzzles that arise when we consider the precise meaning of Kant’s case concerning these concepts, along with some preliminary and speculative answers to these.

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1 Throughout this study, ‘Critique’ will refer to the first of Kant’s three critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with all A/B citations referring to the passage numbering of the 1781(A) and the 1787(B) editions of the text respectively. When referring to any of Kant’s other texts, I will use an abbreviated title of the text, indicated where necessary, with all two-value (volume:page) citations referring to the location of the passage in the Academy edition of Kant’s works.
I. Preliminary orientation

The appendix is to be characterised in a number of ways. Foremost, however, it is an examination of the employment of a newly introduced set of concepts, the concepts of reflection. These concepts are, in important ways, to be distinguished from the representations treated in the preceding Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic and from the concepts treated in the subsequent Dialectic. Most notably, in addressing the concepts of reflection, Kant turns his attention from concepts of objects to concepts of representations. More specifically, the concepts of reflection subsume, Kant tells us, the relations of representations “among themselves” (A260/B316). In so doing, the appendix comes to be populated with a distinct subject matter. Kant is no longer concerned with concepts that might ultimately subsume objects, but with concepts that are in some way of the subject. The concern of the appendix is with the correct employment of a certain set of such subjective concepts.

Secondly, the appendix explicitly treats, for the first time within the Critique, the activity of transcendental reflection. It is here that such reflection receives explicit characterisation, and it is here that we find the line of reasoning that shows it to be necessary for a priori cognition. Transcendental reflection, we are told in the introduction, is “consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition” (A260/B316) or again, later, “the action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated” (A261/B317). As we will come to see, the appendix shows such reflection to be “a duty from which no one can escape if he would judge anything about things a priori.” (A263/B319)

Neither of these characterisations, however, constitute the appendix with which we are most familiar. The appendix – the ‘Amphiboly Chapter’ – is surely most closely associated, thirdly, with a charge that is raised in it against the Leibnizian philosophy. Here Kant charges this philosophy with committing an ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. Such an amphiboly involves “a confusion of the pure object of the understanding with the appearance” (A270/B326), and in the appendix Kant claims to show how Leibniz’s “allegedly synthetic principles […] are grounded solely on [such] a transcendental amphiboly” (A270-1/B325-6).

Such are the primary ways in which the appendix might be characterised. As we progress, these various strands of the appendix will
come to light. Before beginning a closer examination of the appendix itself, however, I turn to a discussion of the appendix as it is most familiarly treated in the literature.

II. The familiar formulation

The case in the appendix, though understudied, is by no means unstudied, and has received a familiar formulation in various discussions in the literature. A few of these discussions are found within an overall commentary on the *Critique*, though by-and-large the appendix has tended to receive little or no treatment among these general commentaries on the *Critique*. Other mention is often found within discussions that involve the appendix somewhat tangentially. More recently, a number of more detailed treatments of the section have appeared, motivated by various interpretive objectives. Aside from a few noteworthy exceptions, three of which I will deal with in Part VII, these discussions all characterise the case in the appendix in a broadly similar way. In what follows, I will outline the case in the appendix as it is typically presented in this literature.

In its familiar formulation, the Amphiboly Chapter is, in the first instance, concerned with putting forward a charge against the philosophy of Leibniz. This charge attributes to the Leibnizian philosophy a general


5 The primary of these are de Boer (2010), Longuenesse (1998), McBay Merritt (2015), and Waxman (2013).

6 Although Kant’s entire discussion in the appendix is expressly directed towards Leibniz’s philosophy, the following are worth noting:

(i) There has been a fair bit of discussion in the literature both as to the exact content of the claims attributed by Kant to Leibniz and as to whether the claims are in fact attributable to Leibniz.

(ii) In many cases, it is plausible that the claim in question is also, or sometimes in fact rather, attributable to the Leibnizian tradition (the so-called ‘Leibniz-Wolff’ tradition). This tradition, which included the philosophies of Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, and Knutzen, among others, was informed by and coincided with Leibniz’s philosophy in many ways (in its adoption of the principle of sufficient reason, for example), but received its
error, which error is claimed to manifest in four of its fundamental ontological principles. Now, the general error is emphasised or formulated in various ways in these discussions, many of which formulations are found explicitly in the appendix itself. These different emphases or formulations of the error can usefully be divided, non-exclusively, into four:

Under the first of these formulations, the Amphiboly Chapter charges the Leibnizian philosophy with a confusion. The general error of the Leibnizian philosophy, according to these accounts, is to confuse phenomena (or the appearances) with noumena (or things in themselves or pure objects of the understanding). Leibniz takes what are, under the Critical account, phenomena to be noumena. As Langton paradigmatically puts it, Leibniz “‘took’ the phenomena for things in themselves, according to Kant.” (1998, p. 71) And this formulation is indeed found explicitly in the Amphiboly Chapter in an oft-cited passage at A270/B326: The error of the Leibnizian philosophy, Kant there tells us, is “a confusion of the pure object of the understanding with the appearance”.

Under this first formulation then, the error with which Leibniz is charged is a confusion of two sorts of object. As can be seen, the objects in question are differentiated in various ways, both by Kant and in the literature. At times, Kant puts the confusion as one concerning the appearances and things in themselves (A264/B320). At other times, it is paradigmatic formulations in the metaphysical treatises of Wolff and Baumgarten These treatises, despite containing a number of identical claims, differed from Leibniz’s philosophy in their systematicity, method, and rigour.

(iii) In what follows, our concern will be with one particular feature of Leibniz’s philosophy (which feature is ultimately identified in Part IV). This feature is attributable both to Leibniz as well as to the Leibnizian tradition, though it is manifest most clearly in the case of the latter. Thus, in what follows, I will discuss the appendix as involving a case that applies to the Leibnizian tradition, mentioning Leibniz’s philosophy itself only when needed. To refer to this tradition from Part II onward, I will use the term ‘German Rationalism’.

(I will thus also set aside any debates that concern claims attributed to Leibniz other than those concerning the particular feature in question.)

7 By dividing up the accounts in this fourfold way, I neither mean to claim that the various formulations of the error are incompatible with one another nor that any given discussion formulates the error in only one of the ways. The different formulations are, as they stand, compatible, and many discussions formulate the error in one or two of these ways, while some do touch on all of them. My aim here rather is to divide up the literature along some natural lines, lines which will also be seen to have relevance in terms of the responses we might give to them (these responses will be put forward in our re-examination of the familiar formulation in Part VI).

formulated as a confusion of the objects of the senses with things in general (A272/B328). Still elsewhere, it is contrasted in terms of phenomena and noumena (A269/B325). Similarly, some discussions in the literature put the error forward as “mistaking [the] objects in space and time for things in themselves, namely, for monads” (Nunziante and Vanzo, 2009, p. 133), while others emphasise it as Leibniz’s taking “the appearances for things as they are in themselves” (Langton, 1998, p. 72). Despite these differences in specifics, these accounts involve a common construal of the error as essentially a confusion of two sorts of object.

A second way\textsuperscript{9} in which the error is typically formulated is similarly in terms of a confusion. Under this second formulation, the Leibnizian philosophy errs insofar as it confuses objects with concepts. More specifically, the Leibnizian philosophy is said to compare the concepts of objects, for the various distinctions between them, but to mistakenly take this to constitute a comparison of the objects of the concepts. As Bird puts it, “Kant argues that the source of the trouble lies in the attempt to infer truths about objects from truths about concepts” (Bird, 1962, p. 71). Again, we find this formulation of the error suggested in certain places in the Amphiboly Chapter itself. At A269/B325, for example, Kant contrasts concepts “compared logically” with “get[ting] to the objects with these concepts” (A269/B325). This second formulation of the error can also be found stated in terms of the logical and the real: Leibniz mistook merely logical distinctions between concepts for real distinctions between objects.

Thirdly, in many discussions,\textsuperscript{10} the error is put forward in terms of a failure to recognise the distinctness and significance of the faculty of sensibility. The Leibnizian philosophy, under this formulation, treats the difference between conceptual and sensible representation as one of degree and not of kind. It thus fails to recognise that sensibility makes a distinct and ineliminable contribution to our cognition. As Parkinson puts it,


Wilson’s discussion is worth singling out as a more complex and detailed version of this formulation. Wilson characterises the fundamental error attributed to the Leibnizian tradition as treating conceptual and sensible representation as merely differing in degree, but goes on to distinguish the further step in which this manifests in the metaphysical claims of the tradition (1990, p. 73). Stock, too, recognises the fundamentality of Kant’s epistemological or subjective claims, which then imply the metaphysical disagreement (1990, p. 115).
“Leibniz did not see in the understanding and the sensibility two different sources of representation” (1981, p. 304), but “failed to note […] the conditions of sensible intuition also carry with them their own differences” (ibid.).

A further, and perhaps most prevalent, way in which the error is emphasised is as the committing of a fallacy – the fallacy of amphiboly. This formulation is, of course, straightforwardly extracted both from the title of the Amphiboly Chapter – ‘On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’ – and from Kant’s explicit remarks in one of the most-cited passages from the chapter: “Without [transcendental] reflection […] there arise allegedly synthetic principles, which […] are grounded solely on a transcendental amphiboly” (A270/B326). The formulation of the error as one of the fallacy of amphiboly is common to nearly all discussions, though in most cases, the error is simply noted as involving a fallacy and then discussed in terms of one of its other formulations. Few accounts examine the error as a case of the fallacy in any detail. Those that do diverge in terms of their details. Some discussions note the error as a fallacious employment of the concepts of reflection – a formulation found explicitly in the title. Others note it as a fallacy of ambiguity involved in the confusion of objects. De Boer, for example, explicitly characterises the ambiguity as one involved in the concept ‘thing’, which the Leibnizian philosophy fails to disambiguate between ‘thing of the understanding’ and ‘things such as they appear to the senses’ (2010, p. 65).

The final, most developed formulation of the error brings together a number of the elements above and is one which makes the best work of the title and subject matter of the chapter. A paradigmatic statement of this formulation of the error can be found in Parkinson’s 1981 discussion in ‘Kant as Critic of Leibniz’. Under this formulation, the error is characterised as traceable to an error involving the concepts of reflection, the newly introduced concepts of the Amphiboly Chapter. The broad account of this problematic employment is given as follows.


12 Again, one account here worth singling out is that of Kleist (2012, p. 52). Kleist interestingly recognises the fallacy of amphiboly in a historically correct way, as one involving syntactic, rather than lexical, ambiguity. While the account that will be presented in this study can, I think, be made to fit well with this understanding of the fallacy, I will not, for reasons of length, take it up in any detail.

The concepts of reflection, these accounts note, have a normal and unproblematic employment. Standardly, the concepts of reflection are employed in every case of judgement, prior to the judgement’s being used objectively, and this employment yields the logical form of the judgement. As Parkinson puts it: “Kant’s view is that before we make any objective judgement, we must compare concepts. Suppose, e.g., that we make a universal judgement about certain objects: we must first compare concepts to find in them an identity of many representations under one concept.” (1981, p. 303, emphasis omitted) Thus, in their standard employment, the concepts of reflection are used to compare the concepts found in a judgement with one another, prior to the judgement’s being applied to any objects. This comparison of the concepts with one another yields the logical form that the judgement takes as universal, particular, affirmative, negative, and so on. The oft-cited passage in which Kant points out this standard employment is found towards the start of the Amphiboly Chapter: “Prior to all objective judgements”, he states, “we compare the concepts, with regard to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of universal judgements, or their difference, for the generation of particular ones, with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgements, or opposition, for negative ones, etc.” (A262/B318)

These discussions then turn to the Leibnizian philosophy. The concepts of reflection are employed by the Leibnizian philosophy; however, its use of them, it notes, is somewhat different. The Leibnizian philosophy proceeds by comparing concepts by means of the concepts of reflection, thereby establishing the logical relations of the concepts to one another, but at once takes these comparisons to establish the relations between the objects of the concepts themselves. That is, the concepts of reflection are employed not solely for the sake of establishing the logical relations between the concepts of objects, but are also given, what we might term, an ‘ontological’ significance. As de Boer puts it: “Kant’s criticism of rationalist metaphysics aims to demonstrate that the synthetic a priori principles it generates rest on a particular fallacy. This fallacy arises, according to Kant, if the concepts of reflection are employed for ontological purposes.” (2010, p. 64)

The employment of the concepts of reflection in comparing our concepts allows us to draw conclusions about the logical relations between the

14 It is worth noting that de Boer’s account is not an instance of this formulation. I examine her more nuanced account in Part VII.
concepts. However, it does not allow the further step – it does not allow us to draw the same conclusions about the objects of the concepts. Leibniz’s philosophy errs in its giving the concepts of reflection this further ontological employment.

Kant’s reasons for this claim are, according to these discussions, as follows. The worry, according to Kant, is that the objects in question, the objects whose relations the Leibnizian philosophy takes itself to establish in employing the concepts of reflection, are objects that are given or presented to us by sensibility. And crucially, it is further noted, such objects bear relations to each other that are not adequately captured by comparing the concepts of the objects in the understanding. Sensibility, as is emphasised, “brings with [it its] own distinctions” (A270/B326). So, in comparing the concepts of the objects and taking these comparisons to be sufficient for the comparison of the objects themselves, the Leibnizian philosophy overlooks this point. The relations captured in comparing the concepts of objects is not sufficient for the relations between the objects of the concepts. Thus, concludes Kant, according to these accounts, the ontological employment of the concepts of reflection is illegitimate and cannot yield the purported conclusions about the objects of the concepts.

Such are the various ways in which the error put forward in the Amphiboly Chapter is formulated in most discussions of the chapter. As noted, these accounts also typically examine the error as it is borne out in four central ontological principles of the Leibnizian philosophy: The principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the impossibility of opposition between realities, the doctrine of the existence of monads, and the principle of the dependence of outer relations (space and time) on the inner determinations of monads.15 Again, different formulations of the manifestation of the error are found, depending on the way in which the general error itself is formulated. The first, second, and fifth formulations above tend to be associated with certain correlative discussions of the principles, and I will focus on these.

Under the first formulation, the general error of confusing phenomena with noumena is borne out in the adoption, by the Leibnizian philosophy, of ontological principles that hold of noumena, but not of phenomena,

15 These four principles do vary in terms of their details across the literature and they are certainly not always designated by the labels that I have chosen here. Nevertheless, they are uniformly identified with the four ontological principles put forward at A263-8/B319-24 (and again as discussed at A270-6/B326-32).
which are, under the Critical account, the objects in question. As Nunziante and Vanzo put it:

The four arguments against Leibniz follow the same argumentative pattern. If objects of knowledge were noumena, or things in themselves, and if we knew them with the pure understanding, Leibniz’s doctrines (i.e. principles) would be true. Instead, objects of knowledge are appearances in space and time, and we know them by means of sensibility. Sensible appearances follow different laws from objects of the pure understanding. Hence, Leibniz’s conclusions are wrong.

(2009, p. 138, emphasis my own)

Under the second formulation, the error is borne out in these four principles insofar as the Leibnizian philosophy takes logical principles, principles that hold of concepts and applies them to the (real) objects of our cognition. The Leibnizian philosophy thus takes merely logical principles for ontological principles. As Longuenesse puts it, in the case of the second mentioned principle: “Because no logical conflict, or contradiction, can be thought between two positive determinations or realities thought by concepts alone, no conflict could be thought between two positive determinations or realities in things.” (2005, p. 225)

Finally, the manifestation of the error under the fifth formulation is a more developed form of the above: Under the fifth formulation, the manifestation of the error in the principles is cast in terms of the concepts of reflection. The principles of the logical employment of these concepts are interpreted ontologically. This is frequently illustrated by appeal to the first pair of concepts of reflection: When we employ the first pair of concepts of reflection (identity and difference) in an unproblematic way, we take two concepts to be (numerically) identical when they contain all the same marks or predicates. If they differ in any predicate, a difference in the concepts is yielded. Correspondingly, this employment is interpreted ontologically in the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. If two objects have all the same inner or intrinsic determinations, then they are one and (numerically) the same object, while a difference in any intrinsic determination between objects yields a (numerical) difference between the objects.

A final feature of the case of the Amphiboly Chapter noted prevalently in these discussions is the solution to the error that Kant puts forward in it: The solution to the error, claims Kant, is transcendental reflection. Such reflection, these accounts point out, involves an awareness of the faculty of
the objects of our cognition. Thus, if the Leibnizian philosophy were first to engage in transcendental reflection, and thus to recognise that the faculty of the objects in question is not solely that of the understanding, but that in fact these objects are given to us in sensibility, it would realise in advance that any comparison of the concepts of these objects cannot straightforwardly yield any conclusions about the objects themselves, and that the legitimate employment of the concepts of reflection is their logical employment for the sake of judgement and not their ontological one. Transcendental reflection would thus allow the Leibnizian philosophy to avoid this potential erroneous employment of the concepts and the ensuing problematic ontological principles found in it.

Such, in broad outline, are the main features of the account of the appendix – the ‘Amphiboly Chapter’ – as formulated in most familiar discussions in the literature. Discussions then tend to focus on the account in one of two ways: Some concern themselves with the merits of Kant’s specific discussions concerning the four rejected ontological principles.\(^\text{16}\) Many extant discussions in the literature focus on such discussions in order to evaluate the arguments and claims that Kant puts forward.

A second common focus concerns the correctness of the views attributed by Kant to Leibniz.\(^\text{17}\) These discussions focus on the various assumptions and principles attributed to Leibniz in a historical way. Such discussions aim to establish, on the basis of Leibnizian texts, whether or not Kant’s attributions to Leibniz are in fact accurate. For example, in the course of the argument outlined above, Kant attributes to Leibniz the claim that the understanding and sensibility are in fact only different in the degree of clarity with which they are able to represent the objects of our cognition, but that they are not different in kind. This claim regarding Leibniz’s commitments is one of a number that have been questioned with regard to their accuracy in representing the actual views that Leibniz held.

These familiar formulations of the case in the appendix are, in many respects, correct, both in their focus and details. In the following study, however, a somewhat different picture of the case in the appendix will emerge. This picture will show the appendix to involve a far more complex and systematic case than is captured in the formulations above – a case that will be seen to have far-reaching consequences within the Critical


philosophy. More specifically, this picture will show the case in the appendix to inform the Critical account from the very start of the *Critique* – from the very elements put forward in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

In the following three sections, I set aside the familiar formulation of the appendix, in favour of an examination of the text as it stands – and in particular of an examination of a line of reasoning that appears near the very start of the appendix. The merit and adequacy of this method will, with luck, become apparent by the end of the study, when we will be able to return to the familiar formulation with a subtler understanding of the complex case in the appendix. In order to begin gathering the details we need, let us then return to the case in the appendix, to study it in closer detail than has thus far been presented.

III. The concepts of reflection

Before we look at the case itself that Kant puts forward in the appendix, it will be helpful to introduce in some more detail, the distinct subject matter with which Kant is concerned in the appendix, viz. the so-called ‘concepts of reflection’.

As noted above, the concepts of reflection are most usually associated with their role in yielding the logical form of a judgement. This role is mentioned in the appendix, as we saw, at A262/B318. Kant does not give much further explication of this role in this passage, and what I wish to do here is to begin a step back, and to examine the concepts of reflection afresh, in light of Kant’s various explicit remarks about them in the appendix. We will return to this more familiar role of the concepts at the end of the section.

Having examined various concepts in the preceding Aesthetic and Analytic, in the appendix, Kant turns his attention to concepts not yet treated in the *Critique*, the concepts of reflection. As mentioned, these concepts are importantly different to those found elsewhere in the *Critique*. As with all concepts, the concepts of reflection are mediating general or universal representations that subsume a number of different things by means of a common mark or marks found in the concept (A320/B377). In contrast to the categories of the Analytic, and the ideas of the Dialectic, however, the concepts of reflection do not purport to subsume the objects of our cognition. As Kant emphasises at A269/B325, the concepts of
reflection are “distinguished from categories by the fact that what is exhibited through them is not the object in accordance with what constitutes its concept [...]”, but rather only the comparison of representations, in all their manifoldness, which precedes the concepts of things.” Thus, the concepts of reflection are not concepts that mediate our relation as cognising subjects to the objects of our cognition, as, for example, the concept ‘table’ or ‘substance’ mediate my relation to the furniture before me. They are instead higher-order concepts – concepts of concepts and other representations. Thus, in the appendix, Kant’s attention turns from the objects of cognition and the concepts found applicable a priori to these, to the subject of cognition. Kant is here concerned with distinguishing various things about the subject, viz. with distinguishing its representations in various ways.

Now, there are a number of concepts treated in the Critique that are characterisable in this way. An example that comes immediately to mind are the various concepts of the faculties or capacities of the subject – the understanding, sensibility, reason, and so on. These concepts are not concepts of the objects of our cognition, but are concepts of the cognising subject of any such objects – in particular, the capacities of that subject. Similarly, the concepts of the various sorts of representations – ‘intuition’, ‘concept’, ‘idea’, and the like – are not concepts under which the objects of our cognition fall, but concepts under which some feature or element of the subject falls. The concepts of the appendix – those ‘of reflection’ – are similarly to be grouped among such concepts of the subject. They are, however, a less familiar and somewhat more opaque set of these.

Broadly-speaking then, the concepts of reflection subsume the representations of the subject. More specifically, however, they are concepts of the relations of our representations to one another, or, ‘among themselves’ (A260/B316). It is worth here noting that it is the relations among our representations that fall under these concepts, and not the representations themselves. The concepts of reflection are not monadic concepts under which some representation considered in isolation might fall, and thus are not further concepts to be found alongside ‘intuition’, ‘concept’, ‘idea’, etc. The concepts are diadic concepts under which the relation between two or more representations falls. Put another way, they are concepts of the connections between our representations rather than concepts of the representations themselves.
Now, in all of the above cases of subjective concepts, and perhaps most particularly in the case of the concepts of reflection, there are the questions of how precisely the concepts are to be understood and how that which falls under the concept is to be understood. How, for example, are we to understand the distinctions between the varieties of representation (intuition, concept, idea)? Do they mark distinctions among the content of the representations or among the faculties by means of which we have the various representations? Or more broadly, how are we to understand the possibility of subsuming various elements and features of the subject as such? And indeed with regard to our concepts of interest, those of reflection, what precisely are they concepts of? How are we to understand the distinction between concepts of representations and concepts of the relations among our representations? Such questions must inevitably arise in this change of subject matter from concepts of the object to concepts of the subject and, over the course of our study, these questions and their answers will be addressed. For the moment, however, it is our aim simply to put forward in more detail that which is found in the appendix.

Turning to the taxonomy of the concepts of reflection themselves, we find four pairs of concepts: Identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and determinable and determination (or, as they are elsewhere termed, matter and form). These are the ways in which representations can be related “among themselves” (A260/B316) or, as Kant formulates it later, the relations in which “concepts in a state of mind can belong to each other” (A261/B317). Each of these concepts, then, subsumes a different relation that our representations can bear to one another. It is the employment of these four pairs of concepts that constitutes the distinct subject matter of the appendix.

Kant’s explicit remarks in the appendix also bring to light a third feature of these concepts. It is in the act of the comparison of representations with one another that the concepts of reflection are employed. We compare and contrast representations with one another, and, where they bear a certain relation (for example, if they differ in some respect), we subsume the relations under the relevant concepts of reflection (for example, subsume the mentioned relation between the two concepts under the concept ‘difference’.) As Kant variously puts it: These are the concepts under which our representations are “connected or compared” (A260/B316). We “compare […] concepts with regard to identity […] or their difference, […] with regard to agreement, […] or opposition” (A262/B317-8, emphasis my
own). And this indeed seems to be the corollary to the concepts subsuming the relations between our representations. Any subsumption of a relation by a concept seemingly must involve a comparison of the two relata.

Such are Kant’s explicit remarks on the concepts of reflection, as they are found in the introductory section to the appendix. As noted, this section also mentions their role in yielding the logical form of a judgement, and it is with this employment that the concepts of reflection are most closely associated. At A262/B318, Kant tells us that, prior to “all objective judgements”, the four pairs of concepts are employed in order to yield the form of a judgement, respectively in four ways. The discussion here passes fairly quickly over this employment, however, and with little explication, and it is necessary to turn elsewhere for clarification on this role of the concepts. Considering both Kant’s discussion in the appendix, as well as remarks found variously in the Jäsché Logic, the employment of the concepts of reflection in the logical form of a judgement might be illustrated as follows. Due to the increasing opacity of Kant’s remarks, I will, for present purposes, focus only on the first two pairs of concepts.

If we consider a judgement such as ‘All men are mortal’ or ‘No men are feathered’, in both of these cases, the concept taking subject position is wholly included in or excluded from the concept taking predicate position (wholly included in the case of the former and wholly excluded in the case of the latter). When we connect two such concepts in a judgement, the judgement, in virtue of the concepts bearing this relation, is universal in form. Now, this relation between two concepts (of one’s being wholly included or excluded in another) is recognised by means of comparing the concepts in terms of the first pair of concepts of reflection. Insofar as a concept in a judgement is wholly included in or excluded from the other concept in a judgement, the two concepts have been compared “with regard to identity” (A262/B318). Now, what distinguishes the two judgements in our example is that, in the former, the subject concept is wholly included in the predicate concept, while in the latter, the subject concept is wholly excluded from the predicate concept. Again, any judgement connecting two concepts bearing one of these relations, is said to be affirmative or negative in form, in virtue of the concepts bearing the relation. In recognising this relation between the concepts, the second pair of the concepts of reflection plays a role. The concepts are compared “with regard to agreement” (ibid.) in the case of the former and “[with regard to] opposition” (ibid.) in the case of the latter.
In contrast to the above examples are the judgements ‘Some men are wise’ and ‘Some men are not wise’. In the case of these latter judgements, the concept taking subject position is not wholly included in or excluded from the concept taking predicate position. In this case of the relation between the concepts, the judgement is singular in form, and it is the second of the first pair of the concepts of reflection that plays a role when such concepts are compared. The concepts are compared “[with regard to] their difference” (ibid.).18

Such are some of the primary ways in which the new subject matter of the appendix, the concepts of reflection, can be characterised. Before we arrive at a clearer understanding of these concepts, however, it is necessary to turn again to the introductory section of the appendix, in which we find an important, yet under-appreciated, line of reasoning concerning these concepts.

IV. The line of reasoning in the introductory passages

As we have seen, the appendix is concerned with a particular set of concepts of the subject, the concepts of reflection, which concepts are employed in the comparison of representations for their relations among themselves. Now, in the appendix’s brief introduction, we find a line of reasoning that concerns the employment of these concepts. This line of reasoning turns out to be crucial in understanding the concepts of reflection themselves and the case that Kant puts forward with regard to them. In this section, I turn to these introductory passages in order to examine the line of reasoning that is to be found there. I will begin by reproducing the relevant passages. Thereafter, I will turn to an exposition of the line of reasoning that is to be found in it. My aim here is to give an exposition of these crucial passages in terms that remain as close as possible to Kant’s own. In

18 The third and fourth pairs of concepts of reflection are more opaquely treated in Kant’s discussions. Seemingly, the third pair is used in the comparison of concepts that are subordinated to one another as subject and predicate and as ground and consequent, yielding judgements with categorical and hypothetical forms respectively. And finally, the fourth pair of concepts have their role in the modality of a judgement, with the first of the pair yielding judgements that are problematic and the latter yielding judgements that are assertoric.

Discussion of the fourth pair of concepts can be found later in the appendix at A266-7/B322-3, and of the third and fourth logical forms of judgement in the Jäsche Logic [1800] at 24:102.
subsequent sections, I will turn to the various questions and concerns that emerge from this exposition.

The relevant passage is to be found shortly before the main section of the appendix. At A261/B317, Kant tells us,

> The action through which I make the comparison (Vergleichung) of representations (Vorstellungen) in general with the cognitive power (Erkenntniskraft) in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared (verglichen) to one another as belonging (gehörend) to the pure understanding or to pure intuition (sinnlichen Anschauung), I call transcendental reflection. The relation (Verhältnis), however, in which concepts (Begriffe) in a state of mind can belong (gehören) to each other are those of identity and difference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer, and finally of the determinable and the determination (matter and form). The correct determination (Bestimmung) of this relation depends on the cognitive power in which they subjectively belong (gehören) to each other, whether in sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) or in understanding. For the difference (Unterschied) in the latter makes a great difference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.

Prior to all objective judgements we compare the concepts, with regard to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of universal judgements, or their difference, for the generation of particular ones, with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgements, or opposition, for negative ones, etc. On this ground it would seem that we ought to call these concepts concepts of comparison (Vergleichungsbegriffe) (conceptus comparationis). But since, if is not the logical form but the content of concepts (Inhalt der Begriffe) that is concerned, i.e., whether the things themselves (Dinge selbst) are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., the things (Dinge) can have a twofold relation (zwiefaches Verhältnis) to our power of cognition, namely to sensibility and to understanding, yet it is this place (Stelle) in which they belong that concerns how they ought to belong to each other, then it is transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation (Verhältnis) of given (gegebener) representations (Vorstellungen) to one or the other kind of cognition, that can alone determine (bestimmen) their relation (Verhältnis) among themselves, and whether the things (Dinge) are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., cannot immediately be made out (ausgemacht werden) from the concepts themselves through mere comparison (comparatio), but rather only through the distinction (Unterscheidung) of the kind of cognition.
(Erkenntnisart) to which they belong, by means of transcendental reflection (reflexio). […]

To be sure, one could therefore say that logical reflection (logische Reflexion) is a mere comparison (bloße Komparation), for in its case there is complete abstraction (gänzlich abstrahiert) from the cognitive power to which the given representations belong, and they are thus to be treated the same as far as their seat in the mind is concerned; transcendental reflection, however, (which goes (geht) to the objects themselves) contains (enthält) the ground of the possibility of the objective comparison (objektiven Komparation) of the representations to each other, and is therefore very different from the other, since the cognitive power to which the representations belong is not precisely the same. This transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one can escape if he would judge (urteilen) anything about things (Dinge) a priori.

(A261-3/B317-20, emphasis omitted)

In this line of reasoning Kant distinguishes between two ways in which we might carry out the comparison of our representations. First, we might carry out such comparison straightforwardly. That is, we might begin with the representations in question and compare them without taking into account anything about the faculty or power of the subject to which they are due. As Kant puts it, “in [the case of such comparison] there is complete abstraction from the cognitive power to which the given representations belong” (A262-3/B318-9). In such comparison – or ‘mere comparison’ as Kant terms it – all representations are treated as having arisen by means of the same faculty or power. In contrast to this, however, we might carry out our comparison such that it does not involve an abstraction from the faculty to which the representations in question are due. In this latter case, we compare our representations in order to determine the relations between them while taking into account the faculty or power to which the representations in question are due. That is, our comparison involves both establishing the relations of the relevant representations to one another as well as the relation of the various representations to the relevant faculty. Now this latter, viz. to become aware of the relation of a representation to the faculty to which it is due, is the activity of transcendental reflection. Indeed, as Kant construes it earlier in the introduction, transcendental reflection is the “action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are
situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition.” (A261/B317) Thus, the line of reasoning distinguishes comparison that omits transcendental reflection from comparison that includes or is preceded by transcendental reflection.

What the line of reasoning is ultimately concerned to show is that, if we are to secure a priori cognition, the latter form of comparison is needed. That is, if a priori cognition is to be possible, comparison that involves transcendental reflection is necessary. As the passage explicitly concludes, “[such] transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one can escape if he would judge anything about things a priori.” (A263/B319)

Now, the line of reasoning that shows this conclusion involves two steps. First, Kant tells us, “the correct determination of [the relations of our representations among themselves] depends on the cognitive power in which they subjectively belong to each other, whether in sensibility or in understanding. For the difference in the latter makes a great difference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.” (A261/B317) That is, in comparing some given representations for the relations between them, the relations that we are to take to hold between them will vary depending on the faculty to which we take them to be due. If we suppose the representations to belong to one faculty, their relations must be taken to be thus and so. If we take them to belong to some other faculty, their relations must be taken to be otherwise. Further, as Kant emphatically reminds us, in the case of discursive subjects, which are the subjects we are, two distinct and mutually dependent faculties of representations are needed in order for us to stand in relation to the objects of our cognition, sensibility and understanding. The "cognitive power to which the representations belong is not precisely the same." (A263/B319) Thus, in this first step, we find a dependence claim: The correct determination of the relations among our representations will depend on our taking into account to which of these two faculties the representations in question are due and determining them accordingly.

The second step of the line of reasoning (beginning A262/B318) places the considerations above within the context of cognition. Kant distinguishes a further form of comparison: The ‘objective’ comparison of our representations is such that in determining the relations between our representations, the relations among the objects of our cognition are thereby also captured. That is, in the case of objective comparison, we are
concerned, not merely with whether our representations bear this relation or that relation, but with the ‘content’ or objects of those representations – with “whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, etc.” (A262/B318, emphasis my own) Now Kant’s crucial claim here is that only the comparison of representations that includes transcendental reflection allows for objective comparison. As he tells us, “it is transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation of given representations to one or the other kind of cognition, that can alone determine their relation among themselves [i.e. the relation of the given representations among themselves], and whether the things [i.e. the objects of the representations] are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., cannot immediately be made out from the concepts themselves through mere comparison […] but rather only through the distinction of the kind of cognition to which they belong, by means of a transcendental reflection” (A262/B318). Thus, Kant’s claim here seems to be that objective comparison – that is, comparison such that not only the relations among our representations are determined, but the relations among the objects of the representations are also thereby determined – requires the correct determination of the relations of our representations among themselves. Such correct determination, as we have seen, itself rests on transcendental reflection and thus the possibility of the objective comparison of our representations rests on transcendental reflection. Indeed, as Kant emphasises in concluding the passage: “[T]ranscendental reflection […] (which goes to the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of the objective comparison of the representations to each other” (A263/B319).

We might formalise this as follows:

(1) For any given representations, a difference in the faculty to which they are attributable implies a difference in the relations we are to take to hold between them (a difference in the way in which the concepts of reflection are to be employed).

(2) In our case, our representations are attributable to either one of two distinct and mutually dependent cognitive faculties, the understanding and sensibility.

(3) Thus, the correct determination of the relations of our representations among themselves (the correct employment of the concepts of reflection) requires the taking into account of the faculty to which the representations belong (transcendental reflection).
(4) The objective comparison of representations, i.e. comparison such that not only the relations among our representations are determined, but the relations among the objects of those representations are also thereby determined, requires the correct determination of the relations among our representations (the correct employment of the concepts of reflection).

(5) Thus, transcendental reflection is necessary for the possibility of objective comparison.

(6) Objective comparison is necessary for the possibility of a priori cognition.

(7) Thus, transcendental reflection is necessary for the possibility of a priori cognition.

Such is the primary line of reasoning as I take it to be found in these introductory passages to the appendix. Now, the passage also contains a subsidiary line of argument, and this is the line that tells against Leibniz’s philosophy and implies the charge for which the section is known. If the line of reasoning thus far is correct, then a contrast is to be drawn between any form of comparison that omits transcendental reflection and comparison that includes transcendental reflection. Given that the latter is required for objective comparison, engaging in the former rules out the possibility of objective comparison. In its subsidiary line of argument, the passage identifies logical reflection as a case of comparison that omits transcendental reflection. In the case of logical reflection, we compare whatever given concepts are in question for these relations of identity, difference, etc., but in terms of their “logical form” (A262/B318). That is, logical reflection treats “[all given representations] the same as far as their seat in the mind is concerned” (A263/B319), viz. as representations of the understanding. Thus, as Kant concludes, “one could therefore say that logical reflection is a mere comparison, for in its case there is complete abstraction from the cognitive power to which the given representations belong” (A262-3/B318, emphasis my own). The crucial consequence of this is then that logical comparison, too, rules out the possibility of objective comparison.

We might thus summarise the subsidiary line of reasoning as follows:

(1) ‘Mere comparison’ is the comparison of representations for their relations with one another among themselves without taking into account the faculty to which the representations belong (without transcendental reflection).
(2) Transcendental reflection is necessary for the possibility of the objective comparison of representations.

(3) Thus, the objective comparison of representations is impossible under mere comparison.

(4) In logical reflection, representations are compared with one another for their relations among themselves as concepts (that is, as representations of the understanding).

(5) Thus, in logical reflection, representations are compared without taking into account the faculty to which the representations belong (without transcendental reflection).

(6) Thus, logical reflection is a case of mere comparison.

Thus, the objective comparison of representations is impossible under logical reflection.

Such are the primary and subsidiary lines of reasoning that we find in the introduction to the appendix. In the later ‘Remark’, this line of reasoning is then shown explicitly to tell against the philosophy of the Leibnizian tradition: Leibniz, we are told at A270/B326, “compared all things with each other solely through concepts, and found, naturally, no other distinctions than those through which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from each other.” Thus, this tradition is attributed with (i) comparing all representations for their relations as concepts (i.e. with carrying out logical reflection) and, (ii) taking this to be adequate for the objective comparison of the representations. However, as the line of reasoning above has shown, the latter assumption is illegitimate. Despite its intentions, the Leibnizian philosophy cannot succeed in such objective comparison: Objective comparison, and so too a priori cognition, is impossible under logical reflection.

V. Puzzles arising

In the above, I have given an exposition of the line of reasoning that comes to light in the introduction to the appendix, in terms that remain relatively close to Kant’s own. Now although we might identify and extract this argument relatively straightforwardly, a number of important questions and puzzles arise when we begin to consider its precise meaning and
Kant’s grounds for the various claims found in it. In this section, I will turn to a closer examination of this line of argument. I begin with some points of emphasis and some remarks in support of the foregoing exposition of the argument. Thereafter, I will turn to a number of questions and puzzles that present themselves when we examine it more closely, along with some initial speculative answers to these.

A first crucial point to note with regard to this argument are its two distinct steps. The discussion at the start of the passage – the first paragraph cited above – concerns solely the relations among our representations. Kant has not yet made any reference to the objects of our cognition and the discussion is solely at the level of representations per se. That there is a distinct step in the line of reasoning, in which Kant is concerned with a point that has to do with the relations among our representations, is evident in a number of places – most prominently in the very opening lines of the introduction: “Reflection,” Kant tells us, “does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition, through which alone their relation among themselves can be correctly determined.” (A260/B316, emphasis my own) Now although there is presumably much to be said as to the distinction that is made in the first line – between the concern with objects for the sake of acquiring concepts and the concern with the subjective conditions for arriving at concepts – it is clear that Kant means to emphasise his central concern here as not being that of objects. As is stated in the second line, the concern is with the relations between our representations among themselves. This is the point at which we find the employment of the concepts of reflection – the concepts of reflection subsume the relations of our representations among themselves – and this is the fundamental point of concern of the appendix – an appendix entitled ‘On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’.

This first step is often conflated with the second step – a step that does introduce consideration of the objects of our cognition. Although Kant’s fundamental concern in the appendix is at the level of representations as such, this concern is relevant to the pages of the Critique insofar as it has implications for the possibility of a priori cognition. The second step of the argument makes explicit the role of the determination of these relations
within a priori cognition. Here, we do find mention of the objects of cognition. However, it is crucial that we recognise that the two steps are distinct. The concepts of reflection do not subsume objects. Despite Kant’s explicit formulation, the potential point of error put forward here is not straightforwardly a conflation of two sorts of object. It is instead a potential error found at the level of our representations as such, which error then has implications for a priori cognition and thus implications for the objects of our cognition. Thus, even in this early stage of our discussion, we have some signs that there is more detail to the case in the appendix than is included in its more familiar formulations.

A second point of clarification concerns premise (6) of the argument. In the passage, Kant distinguishes objective comparison and identifies transcendental reflection as necessary for the possibility of such comparison. By the end of the passage, however, Kant has moved from the claim that transcendental reflection is necessary for objective comparison to the claim that transcendental reflection is necessary for a priori cognition. Now although we have yet to establish the relation between the two, I take it to be minimally clear – even at this stage – that while objective comparison must play a role in a priori cognition, a priori cognition does not amount to objective comparison (for a priori cognition cannot amount simply to a comparison of our representations as representations). If this is correct, then Kant’s inference here from premise (5) to premise (7) is an implicit one. He does not explicitly state that objective comparison and a priori cognition are distinct, nor does he tell us the relation between them such that the necessity of transcendental reflection for the former entails the necessity of transcendental reflection for the latter. He simply moves from the one premise to the final conclusion (7). Thus, my exposition of the argument makes explicit a premise that must be implicit in it if we are to deny that a priori cognition amounts simply to objective comparison. This claim will be examined and established in various ways in what follows; for the moment, this caveat is to be noted with regard to how closely the argument follows Kant’s own formulation.

Granting these clarifications, the line of reasoning is in many ways not yet perspicuous. A number of questions arise when we examine it more closely and attempt to understand what precisely is going on in it. In what follows, I will address a number of crucial questions and considerations that present themselves when we examine the line of reasoning more closely.
As we have seen, although Kant’s ultimate concern is with a priori cognition, the fundamental point of worry in the appendix is with the correct employment of the concepts of reflection, or equivalently, the correct determination of the relations between our representations as representations. It is because transcendental reflection is necessary for their correct employment, and because their employment plays a (yet-to-be-specified) necessary role in a priori cognition, that transcendental reflection is necessary for a priori cognition. Two sets of questions naturally emerge from this.

The first of these concerns the employment of the concepts of reflection themselves, or, the comparison of representations for their relations among themselves. Nowhere in the introduction to the appendix, nor in fact anywhere later in the appendix, does Kant explicitly indicate or explain the nature of such comparison. As noted, the discussion concerns the level of representations as representations. But how is this to be understood? What precisely is it to compare representations for their ‘relations among themselves’? And how are these relations that fall under the concepts of reflection to be understood? What is the nature of the representations so compared? This is a first set of questions that needs to be addressed if we are to understand the argument that Kant is putting forward here in the appendix.

A second set of questions concerns the role of the determination of these relations within a priori cognition. How is it that these relations are such that in determining them we might thereby determine the relations among the objects of our cognition? That is, how are we to understand this possibility of objective comparison? And indeed, is Kant here straining under a claim that is in tension with the Critical account? The Critical account means to attack the unprincipled or assumed transition from representations to objects. Can Kant’s account of objective comparison be made to avoid this? And then further, what is the role of such comparison in a priori cognition, such that securing objective comparison is a necessary condition for the former? The answers to these will give us an answer to the question of the role that determining these relations plays within a priori cognition. Put another way, it will give us an answer to the fundamental question, what role do the employment of the concepts of reflection play in a priori cognition?

Having set these questions out in a broad sense, I turn now to some speculative answers to these. Having little guidance from the appendix
itself as to the details of the answers to these questions, there are nonetheless some things that we might say in advance of uncovering the further details of Kant’s case. I will address each set of questions in turn. Along the way further puzzles and questions will arise, some of which might be dispelled here while others must be dispelled once we have covered further crucial ground in understanding Kant’s case.

Our first set of questions concerns the claims of the determination of the relations between our representations as representations. As we saw, the first step in the line of reasoning concerned the conditions for the correct determination of these relations – or, equivalently, the correct employment of the concepts of reflection. Before we ask after the determination of their relations, we might consider the appeal to representations as representations. How are we to understand this mention by Kant of representations as representations? In taking a first stab at the focal point of Kant’s argument here, the following considerations seem to present themselves:

Recall that in the line of reasoning of the introduction, objective comparison involved a distinction between the relations of our representations ‘among themselves’ and the relations that hold between the objects of those representations. (That is, objective comparison is such that, in capturing the relations of our representations to one another, the relations between the objects of the representations are also thereby captured.) Thus, a distinction is drawn here by Kant between the determinations of the objects or things represented and the determinations of the representations themselves. I take it that in considering representations ‘as representations’, or more specifically the relations between representations as representations, we are considering determinations of the representations themselves, as distinct from any determinations of the objects thereby represented. Thus, a discussion of the relations of our representations as representations, or ‘among themselves’, minimally involves the recognition of features or determinations of representations as distinct from the features or determinations of the objects (of those representations). That is, minimally, within cognition, we must distinguish between features or determinations of objects (the objects of the representations) and features or determinations of representations.

In fact, it seems we might at this point make a threefold distinction. If we consider representation in isolation from any objects themselves, two sorts of determination are already to be distinguished. Given that
representations represent their objects, they will involve, as part of their
*represented content*, the determinations of those objects. Thus, if we consider
representations in isolation, we can distinguish determinations of the
representation considered as a representation and determinations that are
part of the representation insofar as they are part of the represented
content. The determinations involved across these two cases will differ and
they will be determinations of different things. The former will be
determinations of the representation itself; the latter determinations of the
represented object. Thus, a threefold distinction emerges: We can
distinguish between (i) determinations of representations themselves, (ii)
represented determinations of the object, and (iii) determinations of objects
themselves. In considering the relations of representations among
themselves, I take it that Kant is considering determinations that are
distinct both from the determinations of objects and from determinations
that are part of a representation insofar as they are part of the represented
content/are determinations of the object represented.

We might illustrate this point. I will begin with a toy example, and then
proceed to an example that is perhaps closer to the focus of Kant’s
discussion here. First, suppose we consider a painting of a young Kant
walking over a third bridge in Königsberg. The river is running idly
beneath the bridge and Kant is looking up reflectively at the not-yet-starry
sky. Here we might make a threefold distinction: The slow flow of the
water depicted on the canvas is distinct from the slow flow of the water
that runs beneath the bridge under (actual) Kant’s feet. The former
determination (the slow flow) is a *representation* of the latter. Similarly, the
thickness and angle of the brush stroke of paint on the canvas that play a
role in depicting the water’s flow are again distinct from the determinations
of the water thereby represented. They bear relations to the various brush
strokes on other canvases that they could never bear to the represented
flow of the water, nor to the flow of the water itself beneath Kant’s feet.

To take a less far-removed example, suppose we consider entertaining
the thought of Kant’s crossing the bridge in Königsberg. Here too, we
might make a threefold distinction. In the thought of the river scene, the
water runs beneath the river at its slow pace. This is part of the thought
insofar as it is part of the content represented by the thought, and it is
distinct from the flow of the river itself than runs underneath the bridge.
Again too, there is a third set of determinations that are distinct from both
of these. Given the other beliefs we might have at the point of entertaining
the thought, this thought of Kant’s crossing the bridge will be amenable to
certain inferences and not others. This particular feature, of amenability to
inferences \( x \) and \( y \), but not \( z \), is neither a feature of represented flow of the
river (the same represented content might be found in the thought of
someone else with different beliefs) nor a feature of the flow of the river
itself (such a flow would perhaps be amenable to all possible legitimate
inferences). Thus, again we find a threefold distinction that is to be made in
the case of representation.

Further, it seems that we must distinguish the determinations of the
representation itself from these two other sorts of determinations. If we do
not, representation and object collapse. We do away with the
representation-object relation. In order to see that this is so, suppose the
threefold distinction above to be replaced with a twofold distinction: the
distinction between the determinations of the object itself and the
determinations represented of the object that are part of the content of the
representation. In order to distinguish the former determinations from the
latter, there must be some further thing about the latter that make them
determinations that are part of the representation and not simply those of
the object. That is, the representation itself must in some way be
distinguished and involve determinations that are not determinations of
the object. Given that a representation represents its object and thus
includes the determinations of its object as part of its content, in order to
distinguish the two, a level of differentiation over and above the
differentiation found in the object is necessary. This level of differentiation
are those determinations that pertain to the representation itself as a
representation and which are not at all to be taken as part of the content of
the representation, that is, not as determinations of the represented object,
but as determinations of the representation itself. Indeed this seems to be a
minimal condition both on Kant’s account of representation as it is
implicitly found in the appendix and, as I have suggested, on any account
of representation.

This distinction is, as noted at the start, involved in Kant’s appeal to
mere and objective comparison. Without a distinction between the relations
of representations ‘among themselves’ as determinations of the
representations themselves and relations that hold between the objects of
those representations, there would be no intelligible distinction between
mere comparison and objective comparison at all. (Whether and how the
latter can yield the former is a further question, to which we will return.)
That is, supposing no such distinction, any purported comparison would either amount solely to a determination of the relations between objects or a determination of the relations between our representations. As is evident, in both cases, we do not arrive at any intelligible distinction between mere and objective comparison. There is no sense to ‘representation’ in the first case, and no sense to ‘object’ in the second.

The distinctions above, which distinguish determinations or features of representations themselves, lead naturally to the next point of consideration in coming to understand the concepts of reflection. We have distinguished representations themselves as having certain features or determinations, but what is the nature of these representations? What is it that we are considering when we consider representations themselves, and consequently when we consider their relations among themselves?

To begin, there are two understandings of ‘representation’ that it is important to dispel. There is a threat of reification on two fronts. Let us recall some of Kant’s claims. The concepts of reflection are employed in the comparison of representations. We compare and contrast representations with one another, and, when that they bear certain relations (for example, when they differ in some respect), we subsume the relations under the relevant concepts of reflection. This comparison of representations for their relations leads us naturally to think of representations in terms of something akin to Cartesian ideas, Humean impressions, or empiricist sense data. If we are to determine the relations between some representations, it is most natural to suppose that their features or determinations must be in some way ontologically given – ontologically determinate – in order even to begin comparison. Yet, it cannot be that this comparison is a comparison of representations of the Cartesian or Humean or sense data variety, or indeed of entities of any sort that involve an ontological commitment. The reasons for this are twofold. First, it would seem that the order of argument does not here allow any implicit ontological commitments. The appendix is situated between the Transcendental Logic and the Transcendental Dialectic. Each of these sections treats certain a priori concepts, with the aim of showing these necessarily to apply to the objects of our cognition in the former case and necessarily not to apply to the objects of our cognition in the latter. Nonetheless, the order of argument, in each of these sections, is from a characterisation of the subject to any relevant claims about the objects of cognition. The project of the Critique is – at least intended as – an
investigation that is prior to any ontologically committing metaphysical claims. Moreover, secondly, the Critical philosophy does not, at any point, allow for any such an ontological commitment. Cartesian ideas, Humean impressions, and the like are transcendentally real objects, albeit mental ones, and we cannot have cognition of such objects, albeit it mental ones. Thus, in whatever other ways such representations might be understood, Kant’s claims here are not claims about the comparison of ontologically determinate and independent mental entities.

On a second and related front, the representations here cannot be understood to be the representations of a soul, nor any other subject that involves an ontological commitment as to its nature. Our reasons in this case are the same. First, in terms of the argumentative structure of the Critique, Kant cannot begin with such an ontological commitment. Critical philosophy is the prior investigation into the nature of the faculties of the subject in order to determine whether and how, for example, cognition of the soul is possible in the first place. Thus, whatever the sense of ‘subject’ and ‘faculties of the subject’ here in question, it cannot be that of the subject as a soul or substance. Again, secondly, as is familiar, Kant ultimately denies the possibility of theoretical cognition of the soul as subject. Thus, even once the Critique is concluded, we cannot understand ‘representation’ as ‘representation of a soul’.

If these representations are not those of a subject to whose nature we are committed ontologically, nor even representations to whose nature we are committed ontologically, how then are these representations to be understood? The answer here is that the representations in question are those of the subject of cognition or epistemic subject. This, I suggest, is a minimal way in which this is to be understood. Such an epistemic subject is, in the first instance, distinct from an ontological subject insofar as claims about it involve no ontological commitment. (Indeed, the implication here is that even if there was a commitment to a soul that had representations, its being an epistemic subject is conceptually distinct from this.) Secondly, such a subject is seemingly distinct from a merely representing subject, such as a video camera or painting. An epistemic subject involves the possibility of correct or incorrect representation – of representations standing the subject in relation to the object of cognition or of them failing to do so – while the latter seemingly involves no such possibility. The representations of a merely representing subject simply represent the object – as a video camera records the scene before it – or there simply fails to be
such a subject. Thus, the determinations distinguished above are determinations of the representations of an epistemic subject, and our distinguishing of them allows for the prising apart of the representations of such a subject and the object of cognition.

That the representations in question are representations of an epistemic subject might equally be gleaned by considering the project of the *Critique*. The *Critique* as such is concerned with the conditions for philosophical or a priori cognition. The appendix is similarly concerned with these conditions: Transcendental reflection is a condition for the correct employment of the concepts of reflection and the latter is a condition for a priori cognition. If we recall, we claimed that the concepts of reflection signalled a turning from concepts that ultimately subsume objects to concepts that are, in some way, of the subject. Thus, it seems that ‘subject’ here must, minimally, be understood in this way.

Thus far, we have given some speculative and, as yet, inconclusive answers to the question of how these relations as subsumed under the concepts of reflection are to be understood as determinations of representations and to the question of the nature of these representations. We have not yet, however, distinguished how Kant is to be understood in focussing on the *relations* as determinations of representations. A further puzzle arises when we examine this claimed comparison of representations for their relations. Recall, representations are compared, by means of the concepts of reflection, for their relations among themselves. Now standardly, in cases of relations, *relata* precede their relations. The relation depends (in some furtherly specifiable way) on the relata. A paradigm and pedestrian case of comparison for relations might be the comparison of people for their relative height. In such comparison, the people (here the relata) clearly precede the relations (their relative heights). Transposing this to the case at hand, the comparison of representations would involve *beginning* with representations that are determinate in at least some way, such that their relations could then depend on, and be ‘read off’ from, this determinacy.

And yet, in the Kantian case, this seems reversed, for it seems that the individuation of the representations themselves depends on these relations. The determination of the *relations* makes a difference to the representations so represented – to the *relata*: Consider, for example, the relations of ‘agreement’ and ‘opposition’. Now while this is yet to receive a more perspicuous treatment in what follows, I take it that if some representation
$x$ is related to some representation $y$ as ‘agreeing’ with $y$, then representation $x$ is part of representation $y$. Thus, we cannot have a characterisation of representations $x$ and $y$, that is, a characterisation of the relata, that precedes and is independent of mention of the relation ‘agreement’. Indeed, the correct determination of this relation serves to determine the relata themselves. Thus, it would seem that the determination of these relations in some way precedes the representations thereby determined. If this is indeed so, then it is a mystery as to what we are to begin with when we carry out this procedure of comparison in terms of the concepts of reflection. Seemingly, we are to begin with indeterminate ‘representation in general’ and proceed, by means of such comparison, to make such representation determinate. Needless to say, whether this line of thought is on the right track or not, the way we are to understand Kant’s claims about the ‘relations’ between our representations as it features in the line of argument here requires much further clarity.

A related set of questions concerns, not the relations between representations, but the activity of comparison by means of which we are to determine these relations. Is such comparison a conscious, willed activity? Or is it an activity that takes place in some other way – perhaps one that is due to the nature of our cognitive capacities and which takes place unconsciously and without our ‘carrying it out’? A first point worth noting with regard to such comparison as the activity of determining these relations under the concepts of reflection concerns how ‘determine’ is here to be understood. Kant’s use of this word naturally yields an ambiguity in English that it is crucial to remove. One might ‘determine’ something insofar as one stipulates or decides on it. A restaurant owner determines which dishes are to appear on this week’s menu. An auctioneer determines which paintings are to be put for auction at which times. However, ‘determine’ in the case of the comparison of our representations is not to be understood as determining the relations in this sense. The relations are not stipulated or decided upon in comparing our representations. As is clear from Kant’s discussion, there is a standard of correctness for this activity that is entirely independent of the choice of whoever is doing the determining. The relations can be correctly or incorrectly determined. ‘Determine’ here is to be understood in the sense of ‘establish’ or ‘ascertain’ or ‘apprehend’. In such comparison, we determine the relations between our representations insofar as we ascertain or establish what these relations
are – just as the restaurant owner determines, i.e. ascertains, the cost to him to prepare each dish.

Having noted then that the relations are ascertained or apprehended in the activity of comparison, how then is this activity to be understood? Prima facie, the following seems to be the case. According to the line of argument, transcendental reflection is necessary for a priori cognition because it is necessary for the correct determination of the relations among our representations and because the correct determination of these relations is necessary for a priori cognition. Thus, it would seem that such determination is present in every case of a priori cognition. Thus, insofar as philosophy (as a conscious, willed activity) involves establishing the synthetic a priori judgements that constitute our a priori cognition, such determination is involved in a conscious, willed activity. Further, Kant’s discussion in the appendix leads us to think that such determination itself is a conscious, reflective activity that forms part of philosophy’s overall route to establishing such cognition: He explicitly draws out and distinguishes the correct way to carry out such comparison from an incorrect way to carry it out. And so it must be that we are able, consciously and in the course of examining our cognition, to distinguish these two ways of carrying out such comparison and thus to carry out such comparison.

Having considered the first set of questions mentioned above, I turn now to some speculative answers to the second. Recall, part of what needs to be uncovered if we are to understand Kant’s case in the appendix is the role of determining these relations – the role of the employment of the concepts of reflection – in cognition. How is it that these relations are such that in determining them we might determine the relations among the objects of cognition? That is, how are we to understand objective comparison? And then further, what is the role of such comparison in a priori cognition?

Now it seems to me that this relevance might minimally be understood as follows. In cognition, we stand in relation to an object of cognition by means of some representations. Suppose that, in a certain case and by means of some yet-to-be-specified manifold of representations, we stand in relation to two different objects of cognition. It would seem that a minimal condition on so standing is that the representations in the manifold are in some way or another taken to be different from one another. It seems impossible to stand in relation to two different objects of cognition by means of some representations if we suppose (per impossible on Kant’s
account) that only a single representation is involved. Similarly, a minimal condition on standing in relation to one object by means of certain representations is that the representations in question, even if otherwise different, be taken to be in some way identical. Thus, it would seem that the employment of the concepts of reflection plays a role in the objects to which we might stand in relation by means of those representations, and any variation in this employment is similarly going to have an effect on the objects to which we might stand in relation. We can thus see, in a still highly speculative and minimal way, why the correct employment of these concepts might be a concern for the possibility of cognition.

In the above, we have seen a number of questions and puzzles that arise when we consider the explicit line of reasoning put forward regarding the concepts of reflection in the appendix’s introduction, and I have put forward a number of speculative, and yet under-determined, answers to these. Regardless of these speculations, however, the concepts of reflection and their employment in a priori cognition remain opaque. To uncover the workings of the case in the appendix, we will need to venture beyond the claims of the appendix to an examination of Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical accounts of arriving at a priori cognition. It is here that we will find the landscape necessary to understanding the case in all its complexity – a complexity that will lead us ultimately to the early parts of the Critique. Before starting on this course, however, it is worth reviewing in outline what has been put forward above.

In the above, we began with an overview of the material of the appendix chapter quite broadly, in its relation to the rest of the Critique. We saw that the appendix introduces and treats a set of concepts, the concepts of reflection, that contrast in important ways to the other concepts treated in the preceding and succeeding parts of the Critique. We saw also that the treatment of these concepts involves the first mention within the Critique of the activity of transcendental reflection. We turned then to extant discussions of the literature and examined the account given of the appendix, the ‘Amphiboly Chapter’, in these discussions. Familiar formulations, we noted, focus on the charge that the section raises against the Leibnizian philosophy, a charge which received various emphases in these discussions but which was commonly taken to be underlain by an erroneous ontological employment of the concepts of reflection. In the latter part of our discussion, we turned to the text of the appendix itself – more specifically, to its introductory sections in which we found a line of
reasoning that links the concepts of reflection to the activity of transcendental reflection, claiming the latter to be necessary for the correct employment of the former, and this latter to be necessary for the possibility of a priori cognition. This line of reasoning was extracted relatively straightforwardly, but, as we saw in our final section, a number of questions and puzzles arose as to the precise meaning of the case: What precisely do the concepts of reflection subsume? Why is transcendental reflection necessary for their correct employment, and what role does this employment play in securing a priori cognition? These were some of the questions that we raised, and to which, towards the end of our discussion, we put forward some speculative answers. Nonetheless, it seems evident that the case in the appendix – including the crucial line of reasoning found in its introductory passages – has unanswered questions, unanswered both by the familiar formulation and by our speculative answers. It is to this task that we turn in the remainder of this study. And I hope, by the end, to show that the appendix contains a systematic, complex, and hitherto overlooked case that distinguishes a corrected, Critical employment of these concepts in addition to their erroneous Leibnizian employment, which corrected employment is at work in securing a priori cognition from the very first pages of the Critique itself. Let us turn then to this task.
Part II
Method in philosophy from the Inquiry to the Critique

As we have seen above, the appendix puts forward what Kant takes to be an error in the German Rationalist employment of the concepts of reflection. What has also come to light is a line of reasoning that seemingly underlies this charge, the line of reasoning that we find in the introductory sections to the appendix. Now, in order to understand more precisely the nature of the concepts of reflection and the role that Kant takes them to play in philosophical cognition – both of the German Rationalist variety and within the Critical philosophy – it is necessary that we examine how, under each of these accounts, we arrive at philosophical cognition. Once we have an understanding of the route to philosophical cognition under German Rationalism, along with the way in which the Critical route to such cognition is to be contrasted with it, we will be better placed to understand and to pinpoint the role of the concepts of reflection within such cognition – and thus to understand the case and charge put forward by Kant in the appendix. Here in Part II, I will begin with this task.

In what follows, I will examine the method of German Rationalism and Kant’s contrasting Critical method by focussing primarily on two texts: The pre-Critical Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1763) and the Doctrine of Method that forms the second major division of the Critique (A707-855/B735-883). Although

19 As noted in footnote 6 above, although Kant explicitly directs his arguments in the appendix to the philosophy of Leibniz, many of the central claims of the appendix, including our argument of concern, apply equally, if not in fact more precisely, to the philosophical tradition of Wolff and his followers. From here on, I will use the term ‘German Rationalism’ to refer to this tradition.

20 Hereafter, ‘Inquiry’.

21 Although these two texts cannot, without further argument, be taken to be paradigmatic statements of the method of German Rationalism, our interest here is not in German Rationalist method for its own sake, but rather lies in Kant’s understanding of this method. It will be the method of German Rationalism, as Kant understands it, to which the arguments of the appendix are directed and, thus, in order to understand these
Kant’s discussions of method in philosophy are to be found as early as *A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition* (1755) and indeed later in the inaugural dissertation, *On the Form and Principles of Sensible and the Intelligible World* (1770), it is in the *Inquiry* and the Doctrine that Kant’s primary treatment of the methods are to be found, and it is in these that we find his clearest statements of the significant changes made under the Critical philosophy to the pre-Critical method – the changes that will come to be crucial in understanding the case put forward in the appendix.

As is well-known, German Rationalism – or at least the variety that Kant takes himself to be rejecting – is committed to the claim that the route to metaphysical cognition is to be modelled on that of mathematics.22 That is, the correct method to adopt in the case of metaphysics is the method that is used in obtaining and furthering our mathematical cognition. Even prior to the Critical philosophy and its method, Kant rejects the wholesale adoption of the mathematical method in philosophy and instead proposes a more moderate philosophical method (put forward in the *Inquiry*). In what follows, I will progress towards the Critical method by examining in turn each of the following: (I) The mathematical method as it is construed by Kant in the *Inquiry*, (II) Kant’s reasons for rejecting this method as correct in philosophy, as these are put forward in the *Inquiry*, (III) Kant’s preferred ‘moderate’ method of the *Inquiry*, (IV) the mathematical method as it is discussed in the *Critique*, (V) the Critical rejection of this as the correct method in philosophy, and (VI) Kant’s proposed Critical method. Finally, in Section VII, I will highlight an important feature of these methods that will bring us closer to understanding the concepts of reflection and their arguments, we need a picture of German Rationalist method as it was understood by Kant.

22 This commitment is stated explicitly in Mendelssohn’s essay entered in the Berlin Royal Academy of the Sciences 1763 competition alongside Kant’s *Inquiry, Über die Evidenz in den metaphysischen Wissenschaften* (1764, p. 280), in Lambert’s *Treatise on the Criterion of Truth* (1761, §22), in Wolff’s so-called ‘German Logic’ (1712, p.20-21) and the Preliminary Discourse to the ‘Latin Logic’ (1728a, §139), and in Meier (1752, §§415, 422). The method is evident in Crusius (1745, §29) and Knutzen (1735, §§23 and 28). A paradigmatic statement of Kant’s attribution of this method to ‘dogmatic metaphysics’ can be found at A713/B735.

The potential of employing the methods of mathematics in philosophy or metaphysics is, of course, traceable further afield than its expression in German Rationalism. Descartes, for example, is frequently cited as well-known proponent of the ‘geometrical method’ in philosophy (see, for example, Part Two of the *Discourse on Method* of 1637). The method is beautifully evident in Spinoza’s *Ethica: Ordine Geometrico demonstrata* (1677), and also clearly evident in Wolff’s predecessor, Von Tschirnhaus (1687).
role in a priori cognition. As mentioned, I will, for the most part, focus on the two primary texts in which Kant’s treatment of these methods is to be found. The discussion will be informed, however, at various points by Kant’s other Critical and pre-Critical works and by those of his predecessors and contemporaries.

As a final brief point of orientation, this part of the study along with Parts III and IV proceeds from the general to the more specific: Part II examines the transition from Kant’s pre-Critical to his Critical account of philosophical method in the broadest, and briefest, way. In Part III, I turn to a more detailed examination of the first stage of this method. And in Part III, I focus yet more closely on a particular feature in this first stage – a feature to which the case in the appendix will ultimately be seen to apply.

I. Mathematical method in the Inquiry

Turning to Kant’s understanding of mathematical method at the time of the Inquiry, we find the following. Mathematical cognition begins with definitions of its concepts and with first principles or axioms (Inquiry 2:283, §2 and §3, and Blomberg Logic [1770s] 24:278). From these, all further propositions are derived. The concepts in question are concepts of mathematical objects, and in their definition the features or marks of the object are put forward as contained in the concept (Inquiry 2:280). These definitions take the form of propositions that take the marks as predicates and the concept of the object in question as subject (Blomberg Logic 24:272). Full definition of a concept involves specifying all and only the features or

23 It is worth noting that not all of these features are treated explicitly in the Inquiry. However, most of them are implicit or assumed in this discussion, and can be found explicitly stated elsewhere. In these cases, I have given references to the relevant passages in Kant’s other texts. Further confirmation of this basic structure of the mathematical method can be gleaned from Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine of Method and from the picture found in various accounts within the German rationalist tradition (see below). Although Kant’s understanding of the mathematical method has changed in significant ways by the time of the Doctrine, it has not changed in the elements of the basic structure presented here.

24 Cf. The false subtlety of the four syllogistic figures [1762] 2:38. (Hereafter, ‘False Subtlety’.) In this passage, Kant formulates the point in terms of ‘judgements’, where, at this point prior to the critical account, ‘judgement’ is the connection of subject and predicate concepts by means of the copula. (The passage further complicates the picture with the claim that a full definition can only be given over the course of a syllogism. This is further treated in Part III in our discussion of the distinction between immediate and mediate marks.)
marks of the object of the concept in question. These definitions are put alongside the axioms or first principles in which the concepts feature as the starting point of such cognition. The first principles are those propositions that are indemonstrable or immediately certain, needing no appeal to prior principles for their certainty (Inquiry 2:281). From these definitions and first principles, all further propositions are to be derived. The latter are the demonstrable or derived propositions of mathematics.  

Such are the defining elements of mathematical cognition, and constitute such cognition in its entirety. A number of points might here be noted. First, the certainty afforded in mathematical cognition rests on this structure of elements. The immediate certainty of our first principles and definitions yields certainty for all further propositions that derive from them. In sum, the entire structure allows for an absolute degree of certainty in our mathematical cognition.

Secondly, although Kant formulates his discussion in terms of certainty, it seems clear that what is also at issue are the grounding relations among the propositions themselves – and so among the objects to which the propositions refer. It is not simply that the first principles bear some epistemic mark of certainty and are epistemically sufficient for deriving the further propositions with certainty. Rather it is that the first principles ground all the rest, regardless of whether they are known to be certain or not. It is not simply that the first principles are those on the basis of which the rest might be known to be true, but those on the basis of which the rest are true.  

German Rationalism is committed to the adoption of this method equally in our philosophical cognition. Philosophical cognition bears the same structure as mathematical cognition and is to be obtained by using precisely the same method. We are to begin with axioms or first principles and with the definitions of the concepts featuring in these. From these certain propositions, all further propositions of this cognition can be derived with similar certainty and the edifice of our philosophical cognition can be established in its entirety. Philosophical cognition, however, is distinct from mathematical cognition in its objects. “The general object of

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25 This, in broad outline, was the view of cognition in mathematics widely held at the time of the Inquiry and indeed during Kant’s critical period. These commitments can be seen in Lambert (1761, §§1-3) and in Wolff (1712, Chapters 1, 3, 4, 1728a, §§115-124, 139, and 1728b, §332ff.)

26 This distinction, between the series of epistemic grounds and the series of grounds of truth or being, is also put forward in De Jong (1995).
mathematics”, as Kant puts it in the *Inquiry*, “is magnitude” (*Inquiry* 2:282) or, as Kant puts it elsewhere, *quantity* (*Blomberg Logic* 24:29). By contrast, the “real object[s] of philosophy [are] infinitely many *qualities*” (*Inquiry* 2:282, emphasis my own). Although Kant does not, in the *Inquiry*, detail this distinction any further, the transcripts of his lectures in Logic are more illuminating: The objects of philosophy are “the universal qualities and characters of things […] [Philosophy] only asks, what is posited? [Mathematics], on the other hand, investigates how many times the thing is posited, and investigates the [quantities] of things” (*Blomberg Logic* 24:29). Thus, while German Rationalism recommends the same method across the two disciplines, it recognises this difference in their objects.\(^{27}\)

Although the *Inquiry* does not explicitly contain any illustration of this method in philosophy, a paradigmatic and beautiful case of such purported philosophical cognition is found in Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica* (1739). As per the method, philosophical cognition begins with definitions of its concepts, where the marks contained in the concept in question are to be all and only the marks or features of the object of the concept:

That which is not nothing is SOMETHING [i.e. a possible thing].  

(1739, §8)

Along with the immediately certain first principles in which these concepts feature:

Nothing – […] something impossible […] – is both A and not-A. […] This proposition is called the principle of contradiction, and it is absolutely primary.

(1739, §7)

From these, the further propositions of this cognition are derived:

Everything possible either has a ground or does not. If it has a ground, something is its ground. If it does not have one, nothing is its ground. If nothing were the ground of something, it would be knowable from nothing why that thing is, and hence the nothing itself […] would be

\(^{27}\) This distinction in subject matter between mathematics and philosophy was prevalent within the German rationalist tradition. Statements of it can be found variously in Kant’s pre-critical writings (see, for example, *Blomberg Logic* 24:24, 24:29, 24:229, 24:797-8 and *Jäsche Logic* 9:23), and in his contemporaries (Meier (1752, §3), Mendelssohn (1764, p. 278)).
something, [...] which is absurd. Therefore, something is the ground of every possible thing, [...] which is to say that nothing is without a ground.

(1739, §20)

II. The Inquiry’s rejection of mathematical method

In the Inquiry, Kant puts forward a number of reasons for rejecting this picture of the route to cognition in philosophy. In each case, he points out an important difference between mathematics and philosophy that renders the method of the former unsuitable for attaining cognition in the latter. I will discuss each of these in turn.

The first point of difference raised in the Inquiry concerns the concepts that feature in the definitions and first principles of mathematics and of philosophy respectively. In particular, there is a crucial difference in the way in which definition of these concepts is achieved across the two cases. That is, there is a difference in the way in which the marks found in the concept are to be identified. In mathematics, our concepts are arrived at, Kant tells us, synthetically. The marks found in a mathematical concept are combined by our stipulation, arbitrarily. For example, a trapezium is characterised by “four straight lines bounding a plane surface so that the opposite sides are not parallel to each other” (Inquiry 2:276), but arriving at this combination of marks is not a matter of identifying a combination of marks that is somehow given to or independent of us, but a matter of stipulating the concepts with which we are dealing. The concepts of mathematics “only [come] into existence as a result of the definition.” (Inquiry 2:276) By contrast, the concepts that feature in the principles of philosophy are, Kant tells us, given concepts. In philosophical cognition, the “concept of a thing is always given, albeit confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate fashion.” (Inquiry 2:276) We cannot arrive at these concepts by combining marks of our own choosing, but must, by means of analysis, identify and separate out all and only those marks belonging to the concept in question and in this way arrive at definition of the concept.28

28 This distinction between arbitrary or synthetic and given concepts is already to be found in Meier (1752, §254) and was prevalent at the time. However, in the Inquiry Kant draws out the implications of this distinction in an original way to reject the straightforward application of the mathematical method to philosophical cognition.
Second. Mathematical and philosophical cognition diverge in the aids available for such cognition (Inquiry 2:278-9). Mathematical cognition allows us recourse to something other than its concepts and propositions in order to further our cognition. The propositions of mathematics can be examined ‘in concreto’, either by means of particulars (a child counts up beads on an abacus, a geometer draws an instance of a triangle) or of symbols (the algebraist mechanically manipulates symbols that compose the propositions of mathematics). The only aids to which philosophy has recourse are words. Words do not show their composition and do not admit of mechanical manipulation for the sake of furthering cognition of their objects. Philosophy must examine its concepts and propositions ‘in abstracto’ or by means of the concepts alone.

Third. Mathematics has no unanalysable concepts. Philosophical cognition has a great many unanalysable concepts. A concept is unanalysable if it either does not nor cannot receive definition within the cognition within which it features. Mathematics has no such concepts. In other words, all concepts in mathematics can and do receive definition. This is because definition in mathematics is not arrived at by means of analysis, but rather by synthesis. By contrast, philosophical cognition will have “uncommonly many unanalysable concepts” (Inquiry 2:280). This seemingly stems from the vastness and fundamentality of the subject matter of philosophy, viz. the universal qualities of things.

A further point of difference between mathematical and philosophical cognition concerns their indemonstrable principles. Mathematics begins with indemonstrable principles for whose concepts it has definitions and from which all further propositions are derived. In contrast, philosophical cognition has a scheme of indemonstrable propositions of “immeasurable scope” (Inquiry 2:281), for whose concepts it does not yet have definitions, and which are not the propositions from which all further propositions in our philosophical cognition are derived. This is because philosophical cognition begins with concepts that already feature in a number of indemonstrable propositions before proceeding to the definition of the concepts. For example, before we arrive at a definition of the concept of space, and thus arrive at the possibility of first principles, we already have, claims Kant, cognition of a number of indemonstrable propositions about space: Space contains a manifold of which the parts are external to one another. This manifold is not constituted by substances. Space can only have three dimensions. (ibid.)
Four. The object of mathematics is simple. Mathematical cognition takes as its only object that of magnitude or “how many times something is posited” (*Inquiry* 2:282). Its objects are neither numerous nor varied. By contrast, there are, Kant tells us, “infinitely many qualities which constitute the real object of philosophy” (*Inquiry* 2:282). Its objects are both varied and numerous.

Five. Mathematics proceeds from the simple to the complex (*Inquiry* 2:282). Mathematics begins by arbitrarily combining a number of simple concepts to form definitions of its concepts. From these, its further propositions are derived. It thus increases in complexity as it progresses in cognition. Philosophical cognition, however, begins with complex given concepts, which require analysis before arriving at the simple concepts that are found in its definitions. Philosophy thus begins with the more complex and proceeds to the less complex as it progresses in cognition.  

These differences bear on the three elements of mathematical method in the following way. First, it is not that definition is, under these considerations, impossible *tout court*. However, there are strong qualifications to its possibility. It is impossible for philosophical cognition to proceed from definitions of its concepts.  

And further, definition will be possible only with regard to certain concepts and not others, viz. only with regard to those that are not unanalysable. Nor, secondly, are first principles, as indemonstrable propositions whose concepts have received definition and from which all other propositions can be derived, impossible. Again, the impossibility is that our philosophical cognition begin with such propositions and proceed to further itself from these. As Kant emphasises, “the most important business of higher philosophy consists in seeking out these indemonstrable fundamental truths” (*Inquiry* 2:281). These two implications, along with certain of the difficulties raised above, have implications for the third of the elements, derived propositions. Under mathematical cognition, having begun with definitions of its concepts and first principles, all further propositions in such cognition

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29 In the Blomberg Logic, this distinction is put in terms of the more familiar distinction between synthetic and analytic method. The former involves “[ascending] from the lowest and simplest [marks] to the highest” (24:153), while the latter involves a “[descent] from the composite and highest to the simplest and lowest” (ibid.). This distinction between analytic and synthetic method is prominent within the context of the *Critique* and has featured ubiquitously in extant literature on the *Critique*. The distinction is, however, somewhat tangential to our purposes and I will thus set it aside.

30 Cf. Blomberg Logic 24:268-9. It is notable, however, that here Kant seems to be committed to definitions being as easily achievable in philosophy as mathematics.
are derivable, both (i) in the sense that their truth is grounded by these first principles and definitions, and, (ii) in the epistemic sense that, for any further derived proposition, it is epistemically possible for us to cognise it (though there might be contingent psychological or other obstacles to our doing so). There are then two ways in which the possibility of derivation of further propositions contrasts with this in the case of philosophical cognition. First, given the non-exhaustiveness of the propositions from which further propositions are to be derived and given the impossibility of examining philosophical propositions and concepts in concreto, the demonstrable propositions of philosophical cognition will be far more difficult to derive. More crucially, however, the epistemic possibility mentioned above will be denied in the case of certain propositions. It will not be that, in every case, it is epistemically possible for us to derive the further proposition.

What is the significance of these claims about the possibility of the mathematical method in philosophical cognition? This is at least threefold. First, and most trivially, Kant’s discussion here raises epistemic difficulties for philosophical cognition proceeding in this way in terms of the ease with which we might acquire such cognition. Philosophical cognition encounters difficulties such that the time and effort required to progress in it are vastly greater to those of mathematics. Secondly, Kant’s discussion raises epistemic difficulties that affect our cognition proceeding in this way in principle. Mathematical cognition proceeds from an exhaustive statement of definitions of its concepts and first principles that ground all further propositions, both epistemically and as such. Philosophical cognition cannot in principle proceed in this way. We are epistemically barred from attaining cognition of this structure in the case of philosophy. Thirdly, however, it is worth noting that the claims above do not pertain to the way in which the propositions themselves are grounded. It remains a background assumption in the Inquiry that the philosophical propositions themselves (or rather the objects themselves) retain this structure of grounding. The claims of the Inquiry pertain to the possibility of philosophical cognition of these propositions proceeding in this way.31 This pertains to all three elements of the mathematical method.

31 For this insight, I am indebted to de Jong’s excellent discussion of Kant’s method in ‘How is metaphysics as a science possible?’ (1995) in which he notes that, in the Inquiry, Kant essentially separates the ordo essendi (series of grounds of truth) and the ordo cognoscendi (series of epistemic grounds) of philosophical cognition.
III. The ‘moderate method’ of the *Inquiry*

The method thus proposed by Kant in the *Inquiry* for philosophical cognition contrasts with that of mathematics. Philosophical cognition does not, as mathematical cognition does, begin with an exhaustive statement of the definitions of its concepts along with its first principles, from which all further propositions are derived. Instead, philosophical cognition begins with the identification of some marks of some of its concepts and with the indemonstrable propositions that connect these identified marks to the concept in question. These indemonstrable propositions, although neither definitions nor first principles, are the point at which such cognition begins and are capable of the same degree of certainty as is found in the definitions and first principles of mathematical cognition. With regard to many of the objects with which philosophy is concerned, Kant tells us, there is a constant awareness of a number of their different marks in the consciousness of the object. As Kant illustrates with regard to the philosophical concept of appetite, “Even if I had never defined what an appetite was, I should still be able to say with certainty that every appetite presupposed the representation of the object of the appetite; that this representation was an anticipation of what was to come in the future; that the feeling of pleasure was connected with it; and so forth.” (*Inquiry* 2:284, emphasis omitted) Thus, in our merely being conscious of certain of the objects of philosophy, we can identify with certainty some of the marks of these objects. Philosophical cognition begins with the identification of such marks, and the indemonstrable propositions that connect such marks to the concepts of their objects are the propositions with which philosophical cognition begins.\(^{32}\) From these indemonstrable propositions, certain further propositions of philosophical cognition can be derived with equal certainty.

In this, what we might term, ‘moderate’ method proposed by Kant, we thus see a relinquishment of the exhaustiveness of cognition that is secured under the mathematical method, but with the retention of certainty in the

\(^{32}\) This change to the German rationalist mathematical model is already evident in *False Subtlety*:

“All judgements in the case of which identity or contradiction are apprehended immediately, […] are indemonstrable propositions […] Human knowledge is full of such indemonstrable judgements. Every definition is preceded by a number of such indemonstrable judgements, for in order to arrive at a definition, one represents as a characteristic mark of the thing that which one immediately cognises in a thing before anything else. Those philosophers are mistaken who proceed as if there only unprovable fundamental truth and no others.” (2:60-61)
case of those indemonstrable propositions that can be cognised by the
identification of the marks of the concept as above and of those
propositions derivable from these.\textsuperscript{33}

IV. Mathematical method in the \textit{Critique}

Thus far, we have examined Kant’s account of philosophical method as it is
presented in the pre-Critical \textit{Inquiry}. By the time of Kant’s Critical
understanding of philosophical method, however, a number of
qualifications and changes have taken place that prove crucial both to the
method that is to be adopted in philosophy and ultimately to our interest in
the appendix. I turn now to Kant’s Critical account of the correct method
for philosophical cognition. The key discussion both of the method of
mathematical cognition and of the proposed Critical method for
philosophical cognition is to be found in the second major division of the
\textit{Critique}, viz. the Doctrine of Method. For our purposes, examination of the
first major section in this division – the ‘discipline of pure reason in
dogmatic use’ – is the needed task.

Kant’s account of the fundamental elements of the mathematical method
have not changed from the \textit{Inquiry} to the \textit{Critique}. In the Doctrine,
mathematical cognition is again constituted by the three elements of
defined concepts, indemonstrable first principles, and derived propositions.
However, this basic commonality gives way to a number of important
changes in detail.

Mathematical cognition begins with definitions of its concepts. However, definition here involves three requirements. It requires that the
concept be exhibited (i) exhaustively, (ii) within its boundaries, and (iii)
originally. Exhaustiveness of a concept involves a distinction of the \textit{all} the
relevant marks from one another and from all others (the former fulfilling
the requirement of clarity, the latter that of completeness). Exhibiting the
concept within its boundaries involves separating these marks from all
others (or, correspondingly, the abstraction of all marks not belonging to
the concept) in order to yield all and \textit{only} the marks belonging to the

\textsuperscript{33} It has variously been noted that Kant’s method here is based, in part, on the new
Newtonian method of the natural sciences. (See, for example, de Jong (1995) p. 250 and
Schönfeld (2000) pp. 219-220.) While this is a historically interesting influence in its own
right, our interest here is in the Critical divergence from the German rationalist model,
and I will thus leave aside any further discussion of the influence of the Newtonian – or
other – methods.
concept (this fulfilling the requirement of precision). Thus far, the account is similar to the Inquiry. Finally, the definition is to exhibit the concept originally. The ‘originality’ of a definition concerns the grounding of the defined concept. This is the requirement that the boundary of the concept and the marks included therein are not grounded by something external to or other than the concept – that they are not “derived from anywhere else” (A727/B755n.) Requirement (iii) ensures that the concept so defined can appear in the first principles, or, Kant tells us, “[stand] at the head of all judgements about an object.” (ibid.)

Mathematical cognition begins with first principles. These are again ‘immediately certain’ propositions – propositions not derived from any other propositions – and from these all further propositions are derived. Both of these propositions – indemonstrable and demonstrable – are, however, now synthetic propositions. The predicate of the proposition is not contained in the concept of the subject. Neither the ground of their connection (subject and predicate) nor their mark of certainty consists in this.

These briefly stated changes are significant. First, there is a further distinction to be drawn between the first element of mathematical cognition, viz. the concepts featuring in the propositions of mathematics, and the second and third elements, viz. the indemonstrable and derived propositions of this cognition. In the Inquiry, the distinction between these is as follows. A definitional proposition is distinguished by its connecting a mark to its concept. A first principle is a proposition derived from no other, but from which others are derived. A derived proposition is derived from some other proposition or propositions. In the Doctrine, a definitional proposition is distinct from the latter two. Only definitional propositions are analytic. The ground of the connection of the mark to the concept is nothing other than containment in the concept itself. The indemonstrable first principles of mathematical cognition and its derived principles, however, are synthetic, and the ground of the connection of their marks lies

34 Although this last requirement is an addition to the Inquiry’s account of definition, it might be seen in other German rationalist texts. In the so-called ‘German Logic’, for example, Wolff characterises a definition in terms of the essence of an object in the following way: “[That] which serves as the foundation for all other things attributable to it, is what we call Essence. […] It follows from this that the definitions of things uncovers (we discover) their essence.” ([1712], p. 59)

35 The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is already present in the Blomberg Logic lectures, but Kant does not here insist that the propositions of mathematics or of philosophy are synthetic (24:279).
in something other than the concepts found in the propositions. Thus, in
the case of these now synthetic propositions, in order for them to be
established something further is needed over and above the concepts found
in the proposition, or indeed, over and above the concepts found in any
proposition.

This difference in the nature of the first principles and derived
propositions of mathematics involves the introduction of a further
complication to mathematical cognition. Cognition of such, now synthetic,
propositions is only possible because mathematics is able to construct its
objects in pure intuition. That is, Kant has an account of how the
propositions of mathematics can constitute cognition, despite their
syntheticity.

Such is the nature of the method, in the Doctrine, to which German
Rationalism is, perhaps unwittingly, committed in the case of philosophical
cognition. If philosophy is to adopt the mathematical method, it must
proceed by these means. It must begin with an exhaustive statement of
strict definitions and synthetic first principles, and derive all further
synthetic principles from these.

V. The Critical rejection of mathematical method

The Doctrine again points to a number of differences between
philosophical and mathematical cognition. These differences imply that the
method of the latter is not suitable for the former. Philosophy, if it is to
arrive at cognition at all, must do so by some other means.

Again, under the Critical account, the concepts of mathematics are the
product of an arbitrary combination or synthesis of marks by the
understanding, while the concepts of philosophy are ‘given’ concepts,
albeit confusedly, whose combinations of marks must be identified by
analysis.

Secondly, mathematical cognition differs from philosophical cognition
in its having recourse to the objects of its concepts, while philosophy has no
such recourse: Both mathematics and philosophy are the a priori use of
reason by means of concepts. That is, both begin with and expand
cognition by means of concepts without appeal to empirical experience.
The propositions of both are synthetic. That is, the connection between the
concepts in its propositions is not containment. In order to connect the
concepts in its propositions, mathematical cognition now examines its concepts independently of empirical experience by constructing its objects in pure intuition. The connection of the concepts in its synthetic propositions is grounded by appeal to these constructed objects. Thus, indemonstrable propositions are possible in mathematical cognition and it begins with first principles. Philosophy, by contrast, has no such possibility. It cannot construct its objects independently of empirical experience and proceeds by means of concepts alone. In Kant’s terminology, mathematical cognition is the ‘intuitive use of reason through the construction of concepts’; philosophy is the ‘discursive use of reason through concepts’ (A719/B747).

These differences bear on the possibility of the use of the mathematical method in philosophical cognition in a yet more severe way than those put forward in the Inquiry. First, philosophical cognition, because its concepts are not synthetic, but given, cannot begin with definitions. (It is unclear how the more stringent requirement of originality bears on the possibility of definition in philosophical cognition. If the ‘unanalysable’ concepts of the Inquiry are now instead understood by Kant as containing their own ground, then it would seem that definition is, in principle, possible for all concepts of philosophical cognition. This is not addressed, however, in the Doctrine.) Secondly, given the syntheticity of the propositions of philosophy, but the impossibility of its constructing its objects, philosophical cognition, if it is to follow the mathematical method, can have neither first principles nor derived propositions. These are now in principle impossible.

VI. The Critical method

The situation for philosophical cognition seems bleak. How is philosophy to proceed? The Doctrine again distinguishes a method for philosophy. This method is again in certain ways similar to the moderate method put forward in the Inquiry. However, crucial changes have taken place.

As in the Inquiry, philosophical cognition does not begin with the definition of its concept, but rather only with the identification of those marks that can be found to be contained in the concept with certainty. By means of further analysis, we can identify further such marks. This identification yields what Kant now terms an ‘exposition’. An exposition
exhibits only the marks of the object, but it cannot be shown with certainty that all the marks have been exhibited. Philosophical cognition begins with expositions of its concepts.

With regard to the propositions of philosophy, the picture put forward by Kant is now quite different to that of the Inquiry. As in the case of mathematical cognition, the propositions of our philosophical cognition are synthetic. While mathematical cognition has recourse to pure intuition in order to connect the concepts of its propositions, philosophical cognition has no such recourse. It proceeds by means of concepts alone. Due to its uniqueness, philosophy must, if there is to be cognition of its propositions at all, proceed by a new method. This method is that of ‘transcendental proof’. Such a proof, the Doctrine tells us, consists in showing that the object is only possible under the concept and this is shown by means of some principle. Such a proof, as Kant tells us, “proceeds solely from one concept and states the synthetic conditions of the possibility of the object in accordance with this concept.” (A787/B815)

There is thus no distinction, under the Critical account, between first principles and derived propositions. Due to its unique method of transcendental proof, all of the synthetic propositions of philosophical cognition are derived. There is thus also an even greater distinction between the synthetic propositions of this cognition and the expositional propositions connecting a mark to its concept (in the identification of some marks of the given concept in analysis). Under the Critical method, the three elements of our philosophical cognition turn out to look very different to those of mathematics and, indeed, all other inquiry: Philosophical cognition begins with expositions of its given concepts. Its synthetic propositions are ultimately cognised, not by recourse to any empirical or non-empirical objects, but by means of the unique method of transcendental proof.

Thus, under the Critical method, we see a clear distinction between two elements in our philosophical cognition: The expositional propositions that merely clarify our already given concepts and the synthetic demonstrable propositions that constitute the establishment of our philosophical cognition. And indeed, it is precisely the distinction between these two elements that is crucially distinguished in the Introduction to the Critique: “One could call [analytic judgements] judgements of clarification and [synthetic judgements] judgements of amplification, since through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but
only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly); while the latter [...] add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis.” (A7/B11) And the final aim of philosophy, Kant tells us, now “rests on such synthetic, i.e. ampliative principles; for the analytic ones are, to be sure, most important and necessary, but only for attaining that distinctness of concepts which is requisite for a secure and extended synthesis as a really new acquisition.” (A9-10/B14)

Now, much has been written on the latter of these two elements – the synthetic a priori judgements of the Transcendental Analytic and the transcendental proofs by means of which Kant means to establish these judgements. From this point, however, our interest will instead be in the first of these elements of philosophical cognition, viz. in the nature of the claimed ‘given concepts’ with which we are to begin and with the method of arriving at expositions of these concepts. It is to this first stage of philosophical cognition that we must look if we are to understand the nature and role of the concepts of reflection in such cognition.
Part III

Bringing representations to distinctness from the Inquiry to the Critique

In Part II, we saw that the method for philosophical cognition, under both German Rationalism and the Critical philosophy, involves establishing the propositions that constitute such cognition as well as the implicit prior step of arriving at the concepts that feature in these propositions. In this part of the study, I turn to a closer examination of this prior, and lesser studied, step. Again, our interest will be primarily in the two texts that contain Kant’s account of the philosophical method of his predecessors and of his own proposed philosophical method, the Inquiry and the Doctrine, focussing now on the accounts that these contain of this prior step. Part III falls into three sections. In the first section, I examine the German Rationalist account of philosophical concepts, as it presented by Kant in the Inquiry. In Section II, I turn to the ‘moderate’ pre-Critical account of concepts with which Kant responds in the Inquiry to the German Rationalist account. Finally, in Section III, I turn to Kant’s Critical account of the concepts of philosophy, as it comes to light in the Critique’s Doctrine of Method, an account that involves certain crucial changes to the two preceding accounts.

I. Bringing to distinctness under German Rationalism

In this section, I begin with an examination of the Inquiry’s account of the characterisation of the concepts of philosophy under German Rationalism. Having then in hand some understanding of their characterisation, I will turn to the German Rationalist account of the method whereby we are to arrive at such concepts, again as put forward in the Inquiry.

If we recall, the concepts of philosophy are characterised in contrast to mathematical concepts in a crucial way. In mathematical cognition, the
concepts featuring in such cognition are “arbitrarily combined” (Inquiry 2:276), while the concepts of philosophy, Kant tells us, are “given, albeit it confusedly or an insufficiently determinate fashion” (ibid.). What then is it for the concepts of philosophy to be given? The Inquiry gives little further direct explication of this feature, but we might, even at this early point in our examination, provide a minimal account of this. The concepts of mathematics are concepts whose marks are arbitrarily chosen by the understanding and combined in order to form the concept. Given concepts contrast with such concepts. Thus, minimally, given concepts are not concepts whose combinations of marks have been arbitrarily chosen and combined by the understanding. That is, they are concepts whose combination of marks rests on something other than the act of arbitrary combination by the understanding. Just what the non-arbitrariness of the combination consists in is, at this point, yet to be determined.

The second point of characterisation in the above is that the concepts of philosophy are given “confusedly” (Inquiry 2:276) or “in a confused fashion” (Inquiry 2:278). This confusedness is variously characterised by Kant as a concept’s being given in an “insufficiently determinate fashion” (Inquiry 2:276) and as a concept’s being yet “indistinct, incomplete, and indeterminate” (Inquiry 2:283). Again, Kant does not explicitly discuss what it is for a concept to be confused, indistinct, incomplete, or indeterminate. Nonetheless, it is minimally clear that the confusedly given concepts of philosophy are concepts of which we have some awareness, albeit an awareness that is, in some way, lacking.

A third feature that seems to come to light in the case of philosophical concepts as confusedly given as it is presented in the Inquiry is that they are somehow part of our common stock of ordinary concepts. Kant mentions the concept of time as a concept that “everyone has” (2:276), and later discusses philosophical concepts as concepts “given in accordance with [our...] ordinary representation” (2:278) of them. Again, not much more is said as to how these concepts come to be part of our common stock of ordinary concepts, nor what characterises such concepts in contrast to any others.

The Inquiry has similarly little to say as to how we are to tell which concepts these are. Over the course of the discussion, a number of examples of such concepts are mentioned; the concept of time (2:277), of space (2:278), of representation (2:280), the sublime (ibid.), the beautiful (ibid.), and God (2:296), to mention a few. Later in §3, we are told that there are
"infinitely many qualities that constitute the real object of philosophy" (2:282), and so it seems that the concepts of philosophy are, under this account, in fact infinite in number. No indication is given as to how we might identify which these concepts are, but they are presumably at least those that featured in standard debates within philosophy.

Thus far no mention has been made of any objects – the objects of the concepts, the objects that our cognition in philosophy ultimately is of. Again, Kant does not treat this in any detail in the Inquiry, but we can glean a basic picture from some of his remarks. First, as we have seen, the methods in question concern establishing with certainty the propositions of philosophy. Secondly, in a number of places, Kant formulates the discussion in terms of ‘cognition’: The “[c]laims to philosophical cognition”, he tells us, “generally enjoy the fate of opinions” (Inquiry 2:283). And later, “[w]e have seen that the differences which are to be found between cognition in mathematics and cognition in philosophy are substantial and essential.” (ibid.) Thirdly, we find mention of objects directly. For example we are told that in mathematics, “I have no concept of my object at all until it is furnished by the definition” (ibid., emphasis my own). While in metaphysics, “I have a concept which is already given to me, although it is a confused one” (ibid., emphasis my own). And yet more explicitly later, we are counselled, “In philosophy and in particular in metaphysics, one can often come to know a great deal about an object with distinctness and certainty” (Inquiry 2:284, emphasis my own). Given these remarks and others, it is clear that (i) when we establish a philosophical proposition with certainty, we are thereby in possession of some knowledge about some objects, and (ii) the concepts found in such propositions are concepts of objects – they stand us in relation to objects. Thus, although Kant gives no account of the way in which this knowledge, and the concepts as standing us in relation to objects, is to be understood, it is clear that the concepts of philosophy as discussed in the above are concepts of objects.

Having noted this, we might gain some further insight into the sense in which concepts are ‘given’. Recall that a crucial feature of the concepts of philosophy is that they are, in contrast to those of mathematics, given concepts, albeit it confusedly. From what we had gleaned so far from Kant’s discussion, givenness is to be contrasted with arbitrary combination. That is, givenness is the non-arbitrary combination of marks in a concept. However, given our point highlighted above, it would seem that the non-
arbitrariness of the combination of marks must rest on the object. When we aim for the definition of a concept, we aim to characterise exactly the object of that concept. When we uncover the definition of a concept and then use these definitions in deriving further propositions, we are discovering things about objects.

Thus, the picture that we find in the Inquiry of the concepts of philosophy, as under German Rationalism, is as follows. (i) The concepts of philosophy are given concepts. They are combinations of marks such that the combination does not rest on the arbitrary act of the understanding. (ii) They are part of our common stock of concepts. (iii) They are given ‘confusedly’. Our initial awareness of them is in certain ways lacking. (iv) They are concepts of the objects of philosophy. (v) The combination of marks in the concept rests on the object of which it is a concept. Thus, the task of philosophy is to arrive at cognition by means of these confusedly given concepts.

The above account of philosophical concepts can be confirmed and detailed in certain ways by turning to the transcripts of Kant’s pre-Critical lectures on Logic. In these lectures, the distinction between the concepts of philosophy as given rather than arbitrary or fabricated is found in a number of places. For example, in the Blomberg Logic, Kant divides “all concepts of the human understanding [into...] conceptus dati or [...] conceptus facti, [where the former are] given [and the latter are] made, as such are created by us arbitrarily, or fabricated, without previously having been given.” (24:131) In none of these cases does Kant give a further explication or definition of the givenness of a concept in general. There is, however, a further specification of the distinction to be found in these discussions in the lectures that is not found explicitly in the Inquiry. In the transcripts, the distinction between arbitrary concepts and given concepts is frequently stated as the distinction between arbitrary concepts and concepts that are given either given empirically or given by pure reason. Concepts given empirically are concepts whose combinations of marks have been, Kant tells us, “abstracted from experience” (Blomberg Logic 24:253), that is, from the objects of sensory experience. The marks combined in the concept are those found combined in the relevant object(s) of sensory experience. By contrast, concepts “given to me by means of reason, [are

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36 The distinction can be found in a number of places in the Blomberg Logic. See, for example, 24:153, 24:253, 24:262.

37 See, for example, Blomberg Logic 24:131, 24:134, 24:253, 24:256, 24:270.
concepts in which I may think [...] only that which reason shows me in the thing” (Blomberg Logic 24:270). The marks combined in a concept given by reason then are those found combined in the relevant objects of reason. This is significant for our purposes in two ways. First, given this further specification of the givenness of a concept, we can see that our characterisation above is accurate. Arbitrarily combined concepts contrast with given concepts insofar as the combination of marks of a given concept rest on the combination of marks found in the object of the concept, while the combination of marks in an arbitrarily combined concept rests on the arbitrary combination of marks by the understanding. Secondly, we have uncovered a further specification of the concepts of philosophy. The concepts of philosophy are given concepts, but concepts given by reason. In this they contrast with empirically given concepts insofar as they are concepts of the objects of reason and not concepts of the objects of our sensory experience.38

Having put forward the German Rationalist characterisation of the concepts of philosophy, we might now ask after the method for arriving at these concepts. If we are to establish any propositions that feature these confusedly given philosophical concepts, and indeed these concepts as fully defined, as is required under the German Rationalist method, it is necessary that the concept be “rendered distinct by means of analysis” (Inquiry 2:276). That is, the combination of marks that constitutes the confusedly given concept has to be brought to distinctness. The procedure of rendering distinct the marks found in a given concept is, as mentioned, the procedure of analysis.

Analysis is carried out, according to the Inquiry, by means of the following steps. First, any marks that we take to be found in the concept are identified and separated out in thought from all other marks (Inquiry 2:276). These marks are then compared with the concept across “all kinds of contexts” (ibid.) or in “all kinds of relation” (Inquiry 2:277) in order to discover whether they do indeed constitute the concept. Such a comparison involves comparing the marks that are proposed as found in the concept across different cases in which the concept applies.39 Thirdly, this process is

38 These details of the characterisation will be taken up in more detail in Part IV.
39 Cf. Blomberg Logic 24:131 in which this made more explicit: “E.g., with the concept of perfection I will first direct someone to the cases in which he makes use of the expression perfection, in order thereby to instruct him what he really understands by perfection [,] what sort of concept he makes of it, and what he thinks when he utters the word perfection and ascribes it to a thing.” (24:131)
iterated in order to discover further marks. Finally, all marks so identified must be “collated with each other” (ibid.) to ensure that one is not covertly contained in another. By means of this procedure, we render distinct the characteristic marks whose combination constitutes the confusedly given concept. Having thus rendered distinct all and only the marks found in the concept, these are put forward in the definition of the concept.\footnote{Similar discussions of analysis as needed for bringing a confusedly given concept to distinctness can be found in Blomberg Logic 24: 130, 24:131, 24:134, and 24:272.}

It is worth noting a number of distinctions at work in the above characterisation of philosophical concepts as confusedly given. First, there is the question of how we are to arrive at the concepts in question. This is the epistemic question of how we are to establish which marks are found in the concept. In the case of mathematical concepts, the marks are established as part of the concept by the arbitrary act of synthesis of the understanding. It is by these means that we arrive at the distinct representation of the concept required for definition. In contrast, philosophical concepts, because they are confusedly given, require analysis. Secondly, however, the means of arriving at the marks found in the concept are distinct from that in virtue of which the marks are found in the concept. This latter concerns the ground of the marks as unified in the concept. In the case of mathematical concepts, the concept rests on the arbitrary combination by the understanding – that is, it rests on the means of arriving at the concept. In the case of philosophical concepts, however, the two come apart more noticeably. Even though it is by means of analysis that we arrive at the concept, the marks unified in the concept are so in virtue of something other than these means, that is, on the object of the philosophical concept. We must thus distinguish the epistemic question of the means of arriving at the concept from the quite different question of the ground of the combination of marks in the concept.\footnote{If the concepts of philosophy are arrived at analytically and grounded in the objects, and the concepts of mathematics are arrived at synthetically and grounded in mere arbitrary choice, then empirically given concepts constitute the contrastive case to both of these. Empirically given concepts are, as noted, grounded in the objects of empirical experience (insofar as the marks combined in the concept rest on a combination of marks found in the object), but are arrived at synthetically (insofar as the marks are not established by means of analysis of the concept, but by means of determining the combination).} Finally, it is worth noting that it is not merely the givenness of a philosophical concept that implies the need for analysis. That is, it is not the ground of a concept as the object that yields the need for analysis. Indeed, in the case of empirically given concepts, the combination of marks in the concept similarly rests on the object of the concept, but no analysis is
needed in the case of these concepts. (Similarly, the hypothetical case of concepts given by reason, but which are not in need of analysis, is equally consistent with Kant’s account here.) It is due to the manner in which philosophical concepts are given to us that analysis is required. The need for analysis follows from the confusedness of the given concept and not merely from its givenness.

Having in hand Kant’s characterisation of the procedure of analysis, we are now in a position to gain further insight into a concept’s being given confusedly. As noted, the Inquiry formulates this variously in terms of the concept’s being ‘confused’, ‘indistinct’, ‘incomplete’, and ‘indeterminate’, though no more is said as to the precise nature of each these. We now have before us, however, the contrastive case. Prior to analysis, the concepts of philosophy are confused. This is remedied by carrying out analysis. Analysis, as we have seen, involves gradually distinguishing the marks contained in a concept from all other extraneous marks. In so doing, the concept is thus rendered distinct. Thus, minimally, a concept being given ‘confusedly’ consists in the lack of awareness of each of the marks of a concept.

Again, Kant’s lectures on Logic provide us with further detail that is not put forward explicitly in the Inquiry. In these lectures, we find the distinction between obscure and clear, indistinct and distinct, incomplete and complete, and finally confused and ordered concepts. In the first instance, obscure concepts are concepts of which we are not conscious, while clear concepts are concepts of which we are conscious (Blomberg Logic 24:119). Secondly, indistinct concepts are concepts such that we are conscious of the concept as a whole, but not conscious of the manifold that is contained in the whole concept (Vienna Logic [1770s] 24:805). Thirdly, complete concepts are such that we are conscious of all of the marks of the essence of the object of the concept in question, while incomplete concepts are not so (Blomberg Logic 24:116). Finally, confused concepts are such that our consciousness of the manifold in them is not orderly (Blomberg Logic 24:42), while this is not so in the case of orderly concepts. Applying these distinctions to the concepts of philosophy then, it would seem that, prior to analysis, these concepts are clear, indistinct, and incomplete. Insofar as analysis then involves progressively distinguishing the marks of the concept, the concepts are made distinct and, finally, complete. And since

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42 See also the Jäsche Logic 9:34-5, False Subtlety 2:58, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1789] 7:137-8.
completeness is merely the terminal point of distinctness, we might say that
the task of analysis is to render concepts that are initially indistinct (such
that we are conscious of the whole concept, but not the manifold in it)
distinct (such that we are conscious of the manifold or marks contained in
the concept). It is worth noting then that the *Inquiry*’s use of ‘confusion’ in
‘confusedly given’ is in fact at odds with many of the other passages in
which Kant puts forward these distinctions. While analysis might serve
also to render our consciousness of a concept as orderly rather than
disorderly (insofar as our initial awareness of it was disorderly), its
essential task is to render indistinct concepts distinct. Thus, the ‘confusedly’
given concepts of philosophy discussed in the *Inquiry* are concepts that are
indistinct (and, by implication, incomplete). In what follows then, I will, for
the sake of precision and coherence with Kant’s other statements, substitute
the term ‘confused’ with ‘indistinct’. The concepts of philosophy are,
properly understood, concepts given ‘indistinctly’.

In order to become clearer on what German Rationalist analysis
involves, we might schematise it as follows:

We begin with some indistinctly given concept, C. We consider our
given concept more closely and from the multitude of marks that might be
associated with the concept in this or that case, we distinguish the marks
M, N, P as the combination of marks that constitutes the concept. These
marks are combined into one concept and put forward as the proposed
definition of the concept. Now, once we have so distinguished the
combination of marks, M, N, P, it is necessary that we establish whether
this is indeed the combination of all and only the marks that are found in
the concept. In order to do so, we compare the combination of marks M, N,
P, first, ‘across all kinds of contexts’. Suppose we consider the combination
M, N, P within the most recent context in which we were aware of it.
Suppose we find that, in fact, we had overlooked mark Q in our
distinguishing of the marks in C. However, when we consider our
proposed combination against our most recent context, we find that mark
Q is indeed a mark found in the concept. Mark Q is thus added to our
proposed definition and the process is reiterated. Supposing no further
marks are found, the final step is to compare the marks in the proposed
definition ‘with each other’, in order to ensure that the marks do not
partially overlap. Having carried this out sufficiently, and thereby
established that the marks M, N, P, Q are all and only those of the concept,
we have arrived at the definition of the concept, which consists in the combination of marks M, N, P, Q.

Now, the above procedure allows us, according to German Rationalism, to distinguish the marks found in the concept C. This is not, however, all that it allows us to distinguish. Recall that the concepts of philosophy that we bring to distinctness in this way are concepts of the objects of philosophy. Thus, when we distinguish the marks M, N, P, Q, these marks ultimately characterise the object of philosophy, O, of which C is the concept. Given that marks M, N, P, Q are found in the concept C, they allow us to characterise O in terms of its essential (objective) determinations, and the marks M, N, P, Q of the concept put us in relation to the object by means of these determinations. Thus, in this, distinguishing the marks of the concept at once introduces an objective level – that of distinguishing the marks of the object.

II. Bringing to distinctness in the Inquiry

In the above, we have seen the German Rationalist account of the concepts that feature in our philosophical propositions and how we are to arrive at these, as Kant understands it in the Inquiry. Now although at this time Kant had not yet arrived at the vastly different philosophical picture of the Critique, the method that he proposes for philosophy in the Inquiry is importantly different to that of German Rationalism. As we have seen, even during this pre-Critical period Kant rejects the mathematical model, both with regard to its demand for definitions and its demand for first principles. In this section, I will turn to the ‘moderate’ method that Kant recommends in place of the mathematical model in the Inquiry and examine in some further detail what the account has to say about the first and prior stage of arriving at the concepts of philosophy.

Kant’s own account in the Inquiry of the concepts of philosophy has much in common with that of German Rationalism as examined above. Under Kant’s moderate method, the concepts of philosophy are still distinguished as given concepts, and indeed as given indistinctly. The concepts are thus non-arbitrary combinations of marks, which combinations of marks rest, as under the German Rationalist account, on the combinations of marks found in the relevant objects themselves. They are still commonly-had concepts, obtained in some unspecified way.
Again, Kant is committed to the need for distinctness of the concepts featuring in our philosophical propositions. In order to establish the propositions of philosophy and in order to derive further propositions from those already established, it is necessary that the characteristic marks to which we appeal are distinguished from any others and that we have them in mind clearly. Thus, again, what is needed is that we analyse the indistinctly given concepts by comparing them with the marks proposed as found in them, across various different contexts, and that this procedure is repeated for the sake of establishing the further marks found in the concept.

A crucial point of disagreement with German Rationalism that emerges in Kant’s pre-Critical account, however, concerns the prospects for the requirement of definition of the concepts of philosophy. If we recall, Kant put forward a number of reasons for thinking that the German Rationalist requirement that we begin with fully-defined concepts is too stringent and impossible to fulfil. These claims have an effect on the method that Kant proposes in the Inquiry as the correct method for arriving at concepts in philosophy.

In response to the intractability of definition, Kant recommends that we, “first of all, by analysing [the given concept], seek out those characteristic marks which are initially and immediately thought in that concept.” (Inquiry 2:281) Thus, the first and primary difference to be found in Kant’s pre-Critical moderate account in contrast to that of German Rationalism is that of the terminating point of analysis. We do not demand that our procedure carry us all the way through to all and only the marks contained in the concept. Rather, we aim only to distinguish some of the marks that are found in the concept. We are to proceed to propositions “from a few immediately certain characteristic marks of the thing in question, and to do so without a definition” (Inquiry 2:284, emphasis my own). The concepts that feature in the propositions of philosophy under Kant’s moderate account then are not concepts all and only whose marks have, by means of analysis, been made distinct (concepts for which we have definitions), but are concepts some of whose characteristic marks have, by means of analysis, been made distinct.

A further point comes to light in Kant’s remarks above. In both of the remarks quoted above and in numerous other places, Kant formulates the procedure for arriving at concepts as a matter of distinguishing some immediately certain characteristic marks of the concept. This distinction and
point are found clearly in a later passage, within the context of the concept of a body:

\[ A \text{ body is a compound } \text{ is an indemonstrable proposition, for the predicate can only be thought as an immediate and primary characteristic mark in the concept of a body [...] } \]

The proposition, a body is divisible, is demonstrable, for the identity of the predicate and the subject can be shown [...] indirectly: a body is a *compound*, but what is compound is *divisible*, so a *body* is divisible. The intermediate characteristic mark here is being *compound*. (Inquiry 2:295)

Kant here emphasises a distinction between the immediate and mediate marks of a concept.\(^43\) In the case of immediate marks, the mark can be apprehended as a mark of the concept simply by comparing the concept with the mark. It is, on this basis, immediately evident that the mark is found in the concept. In such a case, the proposition that connects the concept with the mark as predicate is indemonstrable and knowable with certainty immediately. The mediate marks of a concept, by contrast, require the identification of some further intermediate mark. In such a case, the mark is apprehended as a mark of the intermediate mark, which intermediate mark is then apprehended as a mark of the concept. (The number of intermediate marks and connections could also be iterated). In this case, the proposed mark is shown to be found in the concept indirectly, by means of the intermediate mark (though each linking connection must ultimately be resolvable into immediate connections). In this latter case, the proposition connecting the mark as predicate with the concept is demonstrable – a syllogism taking the connections with the intermediate marks as its premises can be given.

As it stands here, Kant’s distinction between the immediate and mediate marks of a concept might seem to be a psychological distinction. Immediate marks are those marks of which we are, for one or another reason, initially or most aware of in our awareness of the concept (while mediate marks are those of which we are not initially or usually aware). However, when we look to the transcripts of Kant’s pre-Critical Logic lectures, we find that this

\(^{43}\) This distinction between immediate and mediate marks is not absent from the German Rationalist account as Kant construes it in the *Inquiry*; however, Kant’s proposed account of analysis diverges from that of his predecessors on the basis of his focus on this distinction.
is in fact a distinction between marks that can be subordinated to one another by containment and those that can’t. Immediate marks are contained in a concept insofar as they are ‘coordinated’ with one another – no immediate mark is contained in any other immediate mark, though all are contained in the concept. Mediate marks, by contrast, are contained in concept insofar as the concept contains some prior mark, which itself contains the mediate mark in question. Mediate marks are thus contained in a concept insofar as they are ‘subordinated’ to some prior (immediate or mediate) mark. This distinction can be found in the Blomberg Logic at 24:108 and 24:725-6, and on into Kant’s Critical Logic lectures (Jäsche Logic 9:59).

Thus, in the definitions at which German Rationalist analysis aims, are two sorts of marks. For some of the marks in such a definition, the marks will be identifiable only mediately, needing appeal to some other intermediate marks in the concept. For others, however, these marks can be identified as part of the concept directly and at once. (German Rationalist analysis required the comparison of the mark and concept ‘across all kinds of contexts’ in order to secure all the marks of a concept. In the case of these immediately certain marks, such comparison is seemingly not necessary.) Recognising this distinction in German Rationalist analysis allows Kant to put forward his moderate version of such analysis: If some marks can be immediately apprehended as found in the concept, then it is possible to identify some of the marks of a concept without identifying all the rest of them, with which marks we can then proceed to certain further propositions within philosophy.

44 This distinction between a mark immediately contained in some concept and a mark that is connected to a concept by an intermediate or ‘remote’ mark is also drawn in the earlier work, False Subtlety (2:59). Here, the distinction is put forward along with the following points:

(i) The connection in the former case is put forward as a judgement, while the connection in the latter case requires a syllogism.

(ii) The distinction also involves a distinction between a concept that has been made distinct by analysis and a concept that has been made complete by analysis. As we have already seen, analysis here involves the gradual distinguishing of the marks of a concept, and thus involves a distinction between a complete and partial analysis of the concept. The former renders the concept complete (and a definition of the concept). The latter renders the concept distinct. The point emphasised by Kant in False Subtlety is that distinctness requires only (a single) judgement, while the former requires syllogism (the connection of judgements).

(iii) Finally, the distinction does not involve, claims Kant in False Subtlety, a distinction in faculty. It is one and the same faculty that connects a concept in a judgement and in a syllogism (2:59). This claim will become relevant in our discussion of the criteria for establishing the marks of a concept in Part IV.
Kant’s qualification here allows us to add further detail to our schematic description of German Rationalist analysis. Recall that analysis of the given concept, C, required distinguishing a combination of marks taken to be all and only the marks found in the concept, which we supposed to be the marks M, N, P, and Q. This combination of marks was then compared with the concept across different contexts and the marks with each other in order to establish that they were indeed all and only the marks found in the concept. Now, given Kant’s qualification, for some of these marks, it will be immediately apparent that a mark is found in a given concept. Suppose that this is the case with marks M and N. All that is then needed in order to set marks M and N down as being found in the concept is to abstract from all marks other than M and N, and to apprehend immediately that these marks are indeed found in the concept. These marks can then be put down as marks found in C, and we can, according to Kant’s further qualifications, then go on to use the concept C in establishing the propositions of philosophy. There is no need to distinguish any further marks of the concept in order to arrive at a definition of the concept.

We might, however, decide or need to distinguish further marks of the concept, perhaps for the sake of establishing certain propositions in particular, and thus might continue with the procedure of analysis. Suppose that we continue with our procedure, distinguishing marks P and Q as potentially marks of the concept C. Suppose that in the case of these marks, however, it is not immediately apparent that the mark identified is to be found in the concept. Thus, in order to establish these marks as part of the concept, we will need to compare the mark in question with the concept, and perhaps along with other marks already identified, across different contexts. Suppose we do so for the marks P and Q, and apprehend, this time mediately, that the marks are to be found in the concept: P is in fact a mark of M, and M is a mark of the concept. And similarly for Q and N. Having so identified the marks M, N, P, Q, we can add these to the marks found in the concept. Importantly, it is worth noting that, although the marks P and Q were established as found in the concept only indirectly or mediately, this has no bearing on their status as marks found in the concept. Alongside the marks M and N, they are equally marks to be found in the concept.

Finally, we must remember that, for any marks distinguished as found in the concept C, either mediately or immediately, these marks are still taken, under Kant’s pre-Critical account here, to stand us in relation to the
relevant determinations of the object of the concept, O. There is thus still, in such analysis, a level of distinguishing the marks M, N, P, Q found in C along with an objective level of distinguishing the marks of the object to which the concept stands us in relation.

III. Bringing to distinctness under the Critical philosophy

Such are the German Rationalist and pre-Critical accounts of the concepts that feature in the propositions of philosophy, as these are presented in the Inquiry. Let us turn then to the Critical account, to contrast these with Kant’s final position on the correct method for arriving at concepts. The key passages in which this Critical account is to be found are, again, in the first chapter of the Doctrine of Method, the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason’.

Under the Critical philosophy, there is indeed still the question of how we are to arrive at the concepts that are to feature in the propositions of philosophy. In the Doctrine, we find that, in broad outline, this procedure has not changed from that of German Rationalism and the pre-Critical account. The concepts of philosophy are “still confused” (A728/B756), or indistinctly, given concepts. Again, in order to feature in any philosophical propositions, it is first necessary that we bring them to distinctness (ibid.). Again, this is done by the process of analysis that involves distinguishing some mark or marks that we take to be found in the concept in question and comparing it with the indistinctly given concept. Further, the Critical account retains the claim – this being the crucial point in the section on definitions at A727/B755 – that our aim with regard to the concepts of philosophy should not, and cannot, be their full definition. In this, the Critical philosophy remains continuous with German Rationalist method and the proposed moderate method of the Inquiry. Beneath this general commonality, however, a number of crucial changes have taken place.

The first and most fundamental of these changes is that by the time of the Doctrine, the concepts of philosophy have received a more determinate and complex characterisation. In order to see how this is so, we might begin with a point that Kant emphasises at length at the start of the section (A712/B740ff.).45 Here, as we have seen briefly in Part II, Kant discusses

45 The relevant section here is Section I of the Doctrine of Method, a section entitled ‘The discipline of pure reason in its dogmatic use’. As mentioned, it is here that Kant contrasts the proposed mathematical model of German rationalism (as Kant came to understand it at the time of the Critique and as labelled ‘the dogmatic use of reason’) with the Critical
mathematics and philosophy, what he takes to be essential to both, and what he takes their essential difference to consist in. In the Doctrine, Kant now explicitly recognises mathematics and philosophy equally as attempts to establish propositions *a priori*, that is, to establish propositions without any appeal to experience (A712/B740). Now the means by which mathematics and philosophy set about doing this indeed turn out to be very different, but what is of interest to us here is that, in this recognition of mathematics and philosophy as essentially establishing their propositions *a priori*, Kant recognises that the concepts that feature in these propositions are to be distinguished in an important way. The concepts that feature in the propositions of mathematics and philosophy must themselves be *a priori*, that is, concepts that are non-empirical (A719/B747). Thus, the concepts relevant to philosophy have by now been explicitly distinguished as concepts that are *a priori*.

More specifically, in contrast to the threefold distinction between concepts found in the *Blomberg Logic*, Kant has now put forward a fourfold distinction of concepts that is crucial in understanding the concepts of philosophy and the question of how we are to arrive at them. The Doctrine distinguishes four types of concepts: (i) empirical concepts, (ii) concepts given *a priori*, (iii) arbitrarily thought concepts, and (iv) arbitrarily thought concepts which can be constructed *a priori*. In order to become clear on these distinctions it is helpful to begin with the more familiar third of these divisions, viz. concepts that are arbitrarily thought. A concept is an

method that must substitute it.

47 We might note that, elsewhere, other distinctions among concepts are to be found (we have of course, the pure concepts as distinct from the schematised concepts, and these again as distinct from the concepts of reflection). And thus the fourfold distinction mentioned here is merely that which is relevant to the method of philosophy and is not to be taken as exhaustive of the division of concepts.

48 It must here be noted that the origins of this fourfold distinction are indeed present in Kant’s pre-Critical thought: As noted at the start of this part, the *Inquiry* already draws a distinction between arbitrarily combined concepts and indistinctly given concepts, which distinction is clearly involved in the Doctrine’s fourfold distinction. In fact, the transcripts of Kant’s lectures on Logic contain mention of a further distinction that is found in the Doctrine: Already at the time of the *Blomberg* transcript, Kant has distinguished between concepts given *a priori* and concepts given *a posteriori* (24:252-3). The fourfold distinction of the Doctrine does, however, signal a crucial change in Kant’s understanding of concepts insofar as it involves, as we will see, the separation of the question of the ground of the combination of marks of the concept from the question of the relation of the concept to an object. This separation is apparent in both the further distinction of arbitrarily combined concepts into merely arbitrarily combined and those for which an object can be constructed and in the requirement of a transcendental proof for concepts given *a priori*. 

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arbitrarily thought concept if it is a concept whose marks have been arbitrarily combined in an act of the understanding. For example, suppose I think of the various marks contained in the concept of a bird and separate off from these the mark ‘wings’, and then think of the various marks contained in the concept of a horse, and combine all these marks to form a new combination. In so doing, I have arbitrarily combined a number of marks in order to form the concept, ‘Pegasus’. As we have noted earlier with regard to the concepts of mathematics, the combination of marks that constitutes this concept rests solely on the arbitrary act of the understanding in combining the marks.

Concepts of the last type, viz. arbitrarily thought concepts which can be constructed a priori, are a special case of (iii), and the concepts of mathematics are now identified as being of this fourth type. Arbitrarily thought concepts which can be constructed a priori are similarly concepts that have been formed through the arbitrary combination of marks by the understanding, but in contrast to arbitrarily thought concepts in general, this last type of concept is such that, despite its arbitrary ground, it allows for (a priori) cognition. Importantly, the object to which it stands us in relation a priori is not a non-empirical object of traditional metaphysics (like the soul or God), but is an object of pure intuition. Now, whatever else objects of pure intuition amount to, it is clear that, in the case of the last type of concept, Kant is committed to the possibility of the concept putting us in relation to something in addition to the combination of marks that constitutes the concept itself (viz. the object of the concept), the intelligibility of this relation, and the possibility of cognition of this object by means of the concept, all of which are lacking in the case of other arbitrarily thought concepts.

As under the pre-Critical account, empirical concepts and concepts given a priori contrast with both of the above. Neither empirical concepts nor concepts given a priori are concepts whose marks have been arbitrarily combined by the understanding. The indication in the Doctrine as to what their distinction consists in can be found in a small remark found at A729/B757: In considering the possibility of definition for the various types of concepts, Kant writes, “[s]ince therefore neither empirical concepts nor concepts given a priori can be defined, there remain none but arbitrarily thought ones for which one can attempt this trick. In such a case I can always define my concept: for I must know what I wanted to think, since I deliberately made it up, and it was not given to me either through the nature
of the understanding or through experience; but I cannot say that I have thereby defined a true object” (A729/B757, emphasis my own). Thus, arbitrarily thought concepts now contrast with concepts that are either given ‘through experience’ or ‘through the nature of the understanding’. Empirical concepts are again concepts whose combinations of marks have not been arbitrarily combined by the understanding, but have been ‘given through experience’. That is, the combination of marks found in them rests (at least in part) on the combinations of marks found in empirical objects. As Kant states earlier in the passage, “we have in [an empirical concept] only some marks of a certain kind of object of the senses” (A727/B755). Concepts given a priori, on the other hand, are concepts whose combinations of marks have not been arbitrarily combined by the understanding, but have been ‘given through the nature of the understanding’.

One final element in this fourfold distinction that is of interest to us is not to be found here in Kant’s discussion of given concepts, but instead is to be found a little later on, in Kant’s discussion of the difference between the concepts of mathematics and the concepts of philosophy in cognition. As we have seen above, the concepts of mathematics are arbitrarily combined concepts, but such that their object can be constructed a priori. Because of this possibility, such (a priori and arbitrary) concepts stand in relation to their objects and we are afforded cognition by means of them. The concepts of philosophy are similarly a priori concepts, but, in contrast to those of mathematics, are ‘given by the nature of the understanding’. In order to stand us in relation to their objects, these concepts require a deduction or transcendental proof (A732-3/B760-1). Thus, in contrast to the ‘concepts given by pure reason’ of Kant’s pre-Critical lectures, the Doctrine’s concepts of philosophy, as concepts given by the nature of the understanding and in need of a deduction to establish their relation to their objects, are concepts whose combinations of marks rest on the nature of the faculties of the subject.

A number of important insights might be gained from the above. The first of these concerns the Critical picture of the concepts of philosophy as given. In the Inquiry, the combination of marks in a given concept of

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49 As alluded to in Section I, the case of empirical concepts is complicated slightly by Kant’s claim that our empirical concepts have a sort of fluidity to them, sometimes including certain marks and at other times including others, depending on context and usefulness. Nevertheless, though the combinations of marks found in an empirical concept are not fixed, it is always the case, for any given temporary combination, that the combination rests on the empirical object, i.e. that the marks are found combined in the object.
philosophy rested on something other than arbitrary combination by the understanding – the combination rested on the marks found combined in the object. In the Doctrine, again the combination of marks in a given concept rests on something other than the arbitrary combination by the understanding. However, the account of what this could be has now been narrowed and subjected to an intelligibility requirement. If we recall, under German Rationalism, the combinations of marks of the concepts of philosophy were straightforwardly assumed to rest on the combinations of marks found in the relevant objects of the concepts. For example, the ultimate ground of the combination of marks found in the concept ‘simple substance’ was assumed to be the simple substances themselves. By means of this concept, we stood in relation to such objects, despite their being inaccessible to the senses. By the time of the Critique, Kant has rejected this German Rationalist assumption. In order for a concept now to count as given, rather than as simply an arbitrary combination of marks, the combination of marks in the concept must rest either on the marks found combined in an empirical object (the object must be accessible by the senses) or they must rest on the nature of the understanding (they must be combinations whose source is in our faculties). The possibility of standing in relation to an object, including the objects of philosophy, where the relevant combination of marks is both grounded in the object but also not accessible by the senses, has been rejected. If there are any non-arbitrary, empirically inaccessible combinations of marks, these must be now be taken to be in some way grounded in the subject’s faculties, rather than in the object. Kant has introduced an intelligibility requirement.

It is further important to note the way in which ‘given through the nature of the understanding’ is distinct from ‘arbitrary combination by the understanding’. In both cases, the combination of marks found in the concept are in some way due to the understanding. Crucially, however, in the case of arbitrarily thought concepts, the combination of marks is arbitrary. There is nothing upon which the combination of marks rests other than the chosen act of the understanding. In arriving at such concepts, the understanding is in no way constrained to combine some marks rather than others. By contrast, in the case of concepts given a priori, the combination of marks is not arbitrary. It is a combination of marks that arises in the nature of the understanding of the subject – a nature that is in no way itself chosen by the understanding. In distinguishing the marks found in such concepts, the understanding is constrained to certain combinations.
Secondly, there are now strict requirements on which concepts count as concepts of philosophy – requirements that answer the intelligibility demand. Under the previous picture, philosophy seemingly dealt with some given concepts or other – those that everyone has, those dealt with in philosophy. This was not made exact. Here, however, Kant narrowly distinguishes the relevant concepts. All and only those that rest on the nature of our understanding are the proper concepts of philosophy.

Relatedly, it is now possible that concepts that counted as given under the pre-Critical account do not do so under the Critical account. Under the German Rationalist account, it was possible for a concept that is in fact arbitrarily combined to be mistaken for a concept of philosophy. Since German Rationalism assumes the relation of a concept to an object and requires no further work in establishing how we come to have the concept to start with, it is seemingly possible for a concept to be arbitrarily thought, handed down or inherited, and then taken to be a given concept. (In this regard it is worth noting that arbitrarily thought concepts need not be consciously combined by the understanding in question. It suffices for such concepts that they, in some way or other, are the product of human invention. Again, the concept of a simple substance, a concept recognised as philosophical in the Inquiry, turns out to be an arbitrarily combined concept under the Critical account.)

Thirdly, the concepts of philosophy are no longer simply common concepts or those that everyone happens to have. We now have an account of how and why we must all have them. To see this, we need recourse to the second step of the Critical method as well as the first. In the first step, we identify and make distinct the concepts are due to the nature of our faculties. In the second step, the transcendental proofs, Kant establishes that it is only by means of these concepts that we are able to stand in relation to any (empirical) objects at all. Thus, insofar as we do stand in relation to empirical objects, the Critical account has the implication that we must all have the concepts in question.50

Fourthly, and crucially, the assumption that such given concepts stand us in relation to objects has now been questioned and given up. That we have given concepts that do not rest on the marks found in empirical objects is intelligible insofar as the concepts arise from the nature of our

50 The claim here is a simplification. Given the distinction between concepts and intuitions, the transcendental proofs are not the only point at which Kant establishes that the representations of philosophy stand us in relation to objects. This point will be treated again in Part IV, once we have covered the needed territory.
understanding. That any such concept stands us in relation to an object is, however, then a further thing to be established. This is the second and distinct step in the Critical method.  

Finally, we can now see that the Critical account has distinguished the ‘givenness’ of a concept from its standing us in relation to an object. This is a crucial distinction introduced by the fourfold division of concepts. Givenness is now not simply a matter of the combination of marks found in the concept resting on the object, whether the object be empirical or no. Rather, givenness as such is a matter of the combination of marks found in the concept resting on something other than the arbitrary act of the understanding. This is then either a matter of the combination of marks resting on the object (as in the empirical case) or in the combination resting on the nature of the understanding. Thus, as we have seen above, a concept can be given, but not stand us in relation to any object whatsoever. By contrast, in the *Inquiry*, the givenness of a concept and its combination of marks as resting on the object did not come apart. This was due to German Rationalism’s assumption of the concept as standing us in relation to the objects of philosophy. Thus, in contrast to the *Inquiry*, by the time of the Doctrine Kant now explicitly recognises the question of the relation of a concept to an object. This is explicitly recognised across both the concepts of mathematics and of philosophy. The concepts of mathematics of the *Inquiry* were essentially arbitrarily thought concepts. By contrast, mathematical concepts now have an object under the Critical account. Mathematical concepts are a special variety of arbitrarily thought concept – they are arbitrarily thought, but such that an object for them can be constructed. And with regard to the concepts of philosophy, as we have seen, the question of whether or not they stand us in relation to objects has indeed been recognised.

In the above, we have seen that the Critical account involves a number of crucial changes with regard to the characterisation of the concepts of philosophy. Further, these changes have significant implications for how we are to set about arriving at such concepts. To begin, it is worth noting that under the Critical account, the task of identifying our philosophical

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51 It is worth here noting that not all concepts given a priori do turn out to stand us in relation to objects, under the critical account. In addition to identifying the categories as concepts given a priori, the critical philosophy identifies, across the course of the three *Critiques*, a large number of concepts that arise in the nature of our faculties, and which, in virtue of this, we necessarily have. These latter concepts, however, cannot be shown to stand us in relation to objects, but feature in our cognition in other ways (for example, as concepts of limits or as ‘regulative’ concepts’).
concepts – of identifying which concepts are given a priori – has become explicit. We are to identify those concepts whose combinations of marks rest on the nature of our understanding (in contrast, as we have seen, to those whose combinations rest on the objects of empirical experience and those that the understanding has arbitrarily thought up). In this, there is a clue as to how we might go about doing this. If the concepts to be identified are those that rest on the nature of the understanding, then it would seem that, instead of sorting through our concepts, we can begin with an examination of the nature of our understanding. We can begin, not by identifying those concepts we suppose might rest on the nature of our understanding, and thereafter seeking to show that they are such, but by identifying first the nature of our understanding, and from this deriving the concepts that are possible when considering this faculty in isolation. Now, Kant does not lay this out in the Doctrine, but it is to be seen in the way in which the Transcendental Analytic proceeds. As we find in the Metaphysical Deduction that begins the Analytic, Kant begins with an exhaustive examination of the faculty of the understanding in putting forward the table of judgements, and from this derives exhaustively the concepts of philosophy.  

Secondly, although the concepts have been qualified as ‘given a priori’ in the sense of being grounded in the nature of the understanding, these concepts are still given indistinctly. What is still necessary, according to the Doctrine, is the “distinct representation of a (still confused) concept” (A728/B756). Thus, analysis of the given concepts of philosophy is still necessary in order to bring them to the distinctness needed for their employment in philosophical cognition. The need for analysis as such has not changed under the Critical account.

In contrast, the Doctrine’s treatment of the terminating point of analysis – that is, with what is required in terms of distinctness for philosophical cognition – involves some of Kant’s pre-Critical position and some changes. Again, Kant denies that definition for the concepts of philosophy can be achieved. We are to rest content with the identification of some, but not

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52 The account presented here is, of course, a simplification, for Kant does not at all claim the concepts derived from the table of judgements to be the concepts of philosophy. These concepts require the addition of further, intuitive, representational elements, and it is only these latter, schematised, concepts that might properly be considered to be the concepts of philosophy under the critical account. We will not consider the distinction between concepts and intuitions, between understanding and sensibility, and its bearing on the critical method until Part IV. For that reason, the discussion here is simplified to overlook this distinction.
necessarily all, marks of the concept. Such analyses are now termed *expositions*. However, Kant does seem committed to nearness to definition being desirable. In contrast to the *Inquiry*'s proposed method of beginning with only a few immediately certain marks, the Doctrine does propose a longer procedure of analysis that brings to light as many marks of the concept as possible. Nonetheless, he still diverges from his German Rationalist predecessors in the claim that exhaustiveness can never be certain (A729/B757).

Finally, it is important to recognise the implications of the distinction between the ground and objectivity of a concept for the carrying out of analysis. We noted above that Kant’s fourfold distinction between concepts in the Doctrine distinguishes a concept’s standing us in relation to an object from the ground of the combination of marks of the concept. While German Rationalism took the latter always to be the former, the Critical account distinguishes the possibility of a concept having a ground other than the object. In the case of the concepts of philosophy, this ground is, in fact, always other than the object – our philosophical concepts are grounded in the nature of our faculties. Thus, if these concepts are to stand us in relation to any objects, under the Critical account, this needs to be established independently of simply bringing the combination of marks found in it to distinctness. The Critical method involves a subsequent step of establishing the objectivity of the concept.

Thus, arriving at the concepts of philosophy under the Critical account involves a number of additional steps. While the procedure of analysis is again the means by which the concepts are to be arrived at, two steps additional to this, not found in the *Inquiry* are, first, establishing the concept to be given a priori and, secondly, establishing the relation of the concept to an object. Thus, under the Critical account, we see that arriving at the concepts of philosophy involves crucially different steps, some of which are achievable only after the transcendental proofs.

In the above, we have traced out the ways in which the Critical method for arriving at the concepts of philosophy diverges from that of its predecessor. We will not yet to return to our schematic example, however, for there are further crucial changes found under the Critical account and it is to these that we now turn in Part IV.
Part IV  
An implicit commitment

In Part III, we have examined a number of crucial changes that have taken place under the Critical philosophy with regard to the concepts of philosophy and how we are to arrive at them. There is a further change, however, that has taken place – a change which involves a commitment implicit in German Rationalist analysis, and which constitutes a further crucial point at which the Critical philosophy takes dispute with this predecessor. This commitment can initially be identified in the way in which German Rationalism establishes the marks of the concepts of philosophy. As we will see, this initial implicit commitment is part of a more complex commitment – and it is this complex commitment in its entirety that Kant rejects by the time of the Critical philosophy. In Section I, we return to Kant’s pre-Critical discussion of analysis in the Inquiry in order to bring to light the complex implicit commitment in German Rationalist analysis. In Section II, our task is to uncover the Critical response to this commitment. Finally, in Section III, we turn to the proposed Critical method that is to replace the problematic commitment.

I. The implicit commitment of the Inquiry

In order to bring to light this implicit commitment, let us return to some of the workings of German Rationalist analysis. Let us return to our schematic example.

Suppose we take some indistinctly given concept C for analysis. In order to arrive at a definition of the given concept, we must distinguish the marks found in it. Again suppose that, having carried out the entire procedure of analysis, we establish that in the concept C are found all and only the marks, M, N, P, Q. If we recall Kant’s qualification, some of these marks can be established immediately as found in the concept, while others only mediately and by comparing the concept across various contexts. Suppose
that mark M is such that, having distinguished the mark, it could be established as an immediately certain mark of C, while mark N is such that it can be established as a mark of the concept only mediately and by means of further steps. A crucial question that arises here is, how are we to understand this immediate connection between the given concept C and the mark M? And similarly, how are we to understand the mediate connection that is established with certainty in the case of N?

One characterisation of the former is found at 2:284 in the Inquiry, with regard to the concept ‘appetite’:

> In the case of any particular thing, I can be **immediately certain about a number of different predicates**, even though I am not acquainted with a sufficiently large number of them to be able to furnish a completely determinate concept of the thing, in other words, a definition. Even if I had never defined what an appetite was, I should still be able to say with certainty that every appetite **presupposed** the representation of the object of the appetite; that this representation was an anticipation of what was to come in the future; that the feeling of pleasure was connected with it; and so forth. Everyone is **constantly aware of all this in the immediate consciousness of appetite**.

(2:284, emphasis my own)

As Kant construes it in these passages then, the immediate connection between a proposed mark and an indistinctly given concept is such that our initial indistinct awareness of the concept (or object of the concept) in question in some way **always already involves** the mark in question. The mark is, as Kant puts it in the Inquiry, ‘presupposed’ in the awareness of the concept. A similar statement can be found in the transcripts of Kant’s lectures on Logic:

> The matter is **already there**, then, we are only supposed to give the thing a form. By means of analytical distinctness we do not cognise **any more in a thing than we have already thought in it previously**; instead we only cognise better, i.e., more distinctly, more clearly, and with more consciousness, what we already actually knew. E.g., with the concept of perfection I will first direct someone to the cases in which he makes use of the expression perfection, in order thereby to instruct him **what he really understands by perfection**, what sort of concept he makes of it, and **what he thinks when he utters the word perfection and ascribes it to a thing**.

(24:131, emphasis my own)
This characterisation, however, is yet vague in a number of ways. First, it is not clear, as it stands, whether some further, more determinate, characterisation has been given in these passages, or whether this is merely a restatement of the requirement of analysis to bring to distinctness the marks of our initially indistinct concepts. Further, if the presupposed awareness of the mark is indeed a further characterisation, then it is not, as it stands, clear whether the awareness of the mark is part of what it is to be aware of the concept or part of what it is to be aware of the concept. In other words, is the characterisation here a psychological one, in the sense that the awareness of the mark is in some way psychologically correlated with the awareness of the concept? Or does it concern the content of the concept – that is, is the awareness of the mark an awareness of that which is part of the concept?

Now, Kant does not treat this in any detail in the Inquiry, and indeed the discussion seems to assume a shared understanding of a mark as ‘presupposed’ or as one of which we are ‘already constantly aware’. However, in some of Kant’s later Logic lectures, the characterisation is given a clearer statement:

[Distinctness of a concept] rests on the analysis of the concept in regard to the manifold that lies contained within it. Thus in the concept of virtue, for example, are contained as marks (1.) the concept of freedom, (2.) the concept of adherence to rules (to duty), (3.) the concept of overpowering the force of the inclinations, in case they oppose those rules. Now if we break up the concept of virtue into its individual constituent parts, we make it [i.e. the concept] distinct for ourselves through this analysis. By thus making it distinct, however, we add nothing to a concept; we only explain it. With distinctness, therefore, concepts are improved not as to matter but only as to form.

(Jäschke Logic 9:35, emphasis my own)

Thus, in this clearer characterisation of the connection between an immediate mark and an indistinctly given concept, we see that the connection as it is characterised in the Inquiry is to be understood as constitutive. Our awareness of the mark is not merely correlated with our awareness of the concept, but the mark is in fact part of the content itself. The connection between a concept and an immediate mark is to be understood as the connection between a concept and one of its constituent partial concepts.
A further, more determinate – and, for our purposes, more significant – characterisation of this connection can be found in the Third Reflection of the Inquiry, in the midst of a discussion of the supreme formal principles of human reason:

The form of every affirmation consists in something being represented as a characteristic mark of a thing, that is to say, as identical with the characteristic mark of a thing. Thus, every affirmative judgement is true if the predicate is identical with the subject. And since the form of every negation consists in something being represented as in conflict with a thing, it follows that a negative judgement is true if the predicate contradicts the subject. The proposition, therefore, which expresses the essence of every affirmation [...] runs as follows: to every subject there belongs a predicate which is identical with it. This is the law of identity. The proposition which expresses the essence of all negation is this: to no subject does there belong a predicate which contradicts it. This proposition is the law of contradiction [...] Any proposition [...] is indemonstrable if it is immediately thought under one of these two supreme principles and if it cannot be thought in any other way. In other words, any proposition is indemonstrable if either the identity or the contradiction is to be found immediately in the concepts, and if the identity and the contradiction cannot or may not be understood through analysis by means of intermediate characteristic marks. (2:294, emphasis my own)

Now if we recall, in the case of establishing any immediately certain marks of a concept, the propositions expressing the connection between the mark and the concept were to be understood as indemonstrable propositions. Thus, given Kant’s characterisation here of an indemonstrable proposition, we can now see that the immediate connection between a mark and a concept is to be understood either as the connection of identity (in which case the mark is to be taken as found in the concept) or as one of contradiction (in which case the mark is to be taken as not found in the concept). Importantly, however, Kant also here indicates how the mediate connection between a mark and a concept is to be understood. It is again a matter of identity or contradiction. However, in the case of such identity or contradiction, appeal is made to intermediate marks in order to establish the connection. Presumably in the case of any intermediate marks, an immediate connection would be found in each intermediate step. Thus, the picture is as follows: A mark is found in a concept if (and only if) it is
identical with some characteristic mark of the concept. Similarly, a mark is not found in a concept if (and only if) it contradicts some characteristic mark of the concept. For some marks found in a concept, this can be established immediately (in which case the proposition connecting the two is indemonstrable, falling under no proposition other than the formal principle mentioned in the passage), while for others, the identity or contradiction must be established by means of intermediate marks (in which case the proposition connecting the two is demonstrable, falling also under the propositions that invoke the intermediate marks).

Having seen, in the above, what the connection between an indistinctly given concept and a mark that is (or is not) found in it consists in, it is possible to identify a commitment implicit in German Rationalist analysis. In such analysis, we begin with some indistinctly given concept and aim to progressively establish the marks in it. However, we have now seen the implicit criteria by means of which this is to take place. The marks of an indistinctly given concept are to be established by determining, for each mark in question, whether the mark is identical with some mark in the indistinctly given concept or whether the mark contradicts some mark in the indistinctly given concept. These criteria are the implicit terms of differentiation with which we begin our analysis. They are the terms of differentiation according to which the marks for any and all indistinctly given concepts are to be determined and they suffice for determining all such marks. This is a first implicit commitment that we might identify in German Rationalist analysis.

The appeal to these as the criteria for establishing the marks of a concept in analysis can be found ubiquitously in Kant’s published and unpublished writings, both from the pre-critical and critical periods. (We might here recognise that Kant’s treatment of judgement is the more fundamental context for these criteria. Nonetheless, given that analysis yields analytic judgement, these are equally the criteria to be found in analysis.) Within the Critique, mention of them is found in the Introduction (A6-7/B9-11) and the Dialectic (A596/B624n.). In the former passages, Kant tells us, a “great part […] of the business of our reason consists in analyses of the concepts that we already have of objects […] which afford us a multitude of cognitions that […] are nothing more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is already thought in our concepts […] In these cases, I call the judgement analytic […] Analytic judgements (affirmative ones) are thus those in which “identity or contradiction are apprehended immediately” (False Subtlety 2:61) and demonstrable propositions as those “in which identity or contradiction can be cognised mediately (ibid.). Further cases in which these are the criteria put forward by Kant as those of analysis can be found in the Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science [1783] (4:267), in On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by an older one [1790] (8:242), and in the Notes and Fragments (17:258 and 17:616-7).
Now, it is important to note just what else is implicitly at work in the adoption of these terms of differentiation. A clue to this is equally to be found in the passage from the Third Reflection. These terms of differentiation, Kant tells us there, are the terms that respectively yield the “form […] of every affirmative judgement [and] the form of every negation [i.e. negative judgement]” (Inquiry 2:294). And considered in their general formulation, the terms constitute the “supreme universal principles, in the formal sense of the term, of human reason” (ibid.). In other words, in their general formulation these terms of differentiation constitute the laws of the faculty of reason. Now, at the time of the Inquiry, Kant has not yet drawn the Critical distinction between the intellectual faculties of understanding, judgement, and reason, and so by ‘reason’ here in the Inquiry, we should not understand the Critical faculty for inference. Rather, the laws put forward here are laws ultimately included among the laws of, what is more familiar in Critical terms as, the understanding. Thus, in adopting these terms of differentiation, it is by means of the laws of the understanding that the analysis of a concept is carried out. It is the understanding alone that is involved in determining whether a mark is or is not to be found in an indistinctly given concept.

This commitment can be found more explicitly in the Inquiry, in a passage in which Kant contrasts philosophy with mathematics as having no use for or aid of symbols:

By contrast, the only help which words, construed as the signs of philosophical cognition, afford is that of reminding us of the universal concepts which they signify. It is at all times necessary to be immediately aware of their significance. The pure understanding must be maintained in a state of constant attention; how easy it is for the characteristic mark of an abstracted concept to escape our attention without our noticing, for there is nothing sensible which can reveal to us the fact that the

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Although our account in Parts III and IV has turned its focus almost exclusively to Kant’s understanding of the German Rationalist method, it is worth noting the extent to which the commitment identified here, and its concomitant commitments, can potentially be attributed to a number of other figures typically associated with, or influencing, German Rationalism: Leibniz ([1686?], p. 30), Wolff (1730, §§54-5) and Baumgarten (1739, §7 and §11) all adopt the principles of identity and contradiction as principles that underlie the truth of all propositions. Insofar as analysis yields all and only the propositions that are true of the object of the concept analysed, all three are thereby committed to the crucial claims above, viz. that the fundamental criterion for analysis must be that of identity and difference, and thus that it is the understanding alone that determines the marks found in an indistinctly given concept.
A crucial corollary of this commitment also comes to light in the passage above: The understanding alone is at work in determining whether or not a mark is to be taken as found in an indistinct concept and thus whatever is indistinctly given must ultimately be a representation of the understanding alone. The terms adopted by German Rationalist analysis are the terms of differentiation for distinguishing the marks of representations of the understanding. Marks are to be differentiated as predicates of a concept. That is, there is the implicit commitment that whatever is indistinctly given is a concept and that whichever marks we might distinguish and separate out are predicates of some concept.

This is again evident when we consider the passage from the Third Reflection: We saw that the connection between a mark and the concept in which it is found is that of identity (or contradiction in the case of a mark not found in the concept). Further, we were told that such identity consists in the truth of the universal affirmative proposition that connects the two. Thus, identity consists in the connection between universals or predicates and concepts. So, in differentiating the marks of whatever is indistinctly given, the terms of differentiation adopted by German Rationalism make it such that our analysis recognises only the relations that hold between concepts and predicates. Whatever is indistinctly given to us is distinguished only in these terms.

Thus, when we examine the terms of differentiation implicit in German Rationalist analysis a little more closely, what comes to light is a complex subjective commitment. German Rationalist analysis is at once committed to (i) the terms of differentiation stated above as the sole criteria for establishing the marks of an indistinctly given concept, (ii) the understanding alone as the faculty for representing and differentiating the marks of that which is indistinctly given, and (iii) the subjective nature of that which is indistinctly given as being always and only a representation of the understanding or concept.

The trifold subjective commitment above might also be put another way. Recall, a mark is to be taken as found in a concept if and only if the latter cannot be thought without it. To put this another way, a mark is to be taken as found in that which is indistinctly given if and only if that which is
indistinctly given cannot be *represented by means of the understanding* without the mark. Is it possible to represent, by means of the understanding, that which is indistinctly given without the mark? If no, then the mark is found in it. Is it possible to represent, by means of the understanding, that which is indistinctly given with the mark? If no, then the mark is not to be found it. Thus, the terms of differentiation of German Rationalism are those of *representability by the understanding alone*. They are the terms of differentiation that characterise the understanding’s capacity for the differentiation of representations. This shows why the adoption of these terms at once commits us to the understanding as the only faculty at work in representing that which is indistinctly given and whatever is indistinctly given as always and only a representation of the understanding.

To set this in our minds, let us return briefly to our schematic description. As we had it, concept C was indistinctly given and we were to set about establishing all and only the marks found in it. Suppose we identify the mark M by separating it out from all other marks. Now, given the above, in order to establish that M is found in the concept C we must establish that it is identical with some mark of C or presupposed in every awareness of C. Suppose that in the case of M, it is immediately evident that this mark is so. That is, it is immediately evident that M is presupposed in the awareness of C – that we cannot think the concept C without the mark M. M is then to be found in the concept. Suppose we identify the further mark N, but do not find it immediately evident that N is presupposed in the awareness of C. Seemingly we can think C without N. Suppose, however, that in continuing our examination, we compare N with M and find that N is after all presupposed in the awareness of M, though we hadn’t recognised this is comparing N with C. In this case, given that M is identical with a mark of C and that N is identical with a mark of M, we have established that N too is to be found in the concept. The connection between C and M is established immediately, while the connection between C and N is established mediately via the intermediate mark M. Despite this difference, both M and N are equally to be found in C, and the criterion employed in establishing this is that of the identity of the relevant marks.

Before we proceed further with our examination of this complex commitment, it is worth emphasising what the mentioned terms of differentiation differentiate. In analysis, we are to establish whether or not
some mark, which we have separated out from the rest, is to be found in an
indistinctly given concept in question or not. As we have seen, the terms of
differentiation uncovered above are employed in order to do this. Now we
might think that what these terms allow us to differentiate is the
indistinctly given concept – indeed, they are the terms employed in order
to bring this concept to distinctness in analysis. And it is correct that these
terms are needed in order to bring the concept to distinctness and to
differentiate it from other concepts. However, what these terms might
properly be said to differentiate is not simply the concept as such, but
rather is whether or not some mark is to be found in the concept. The point at
which these terms are at work is the connection between proposed mark
and concept. What they thus allow us to differentiate is the connection or
relation that holds between the concept (as a combination of marks) and the
mark in question. They are thus the terms of differentiation for the
connections or relations between a mark and a concept as a combination of
marks.

In the above, we have thus far uncovered a complex subjective
commitment that is found in the terms of differentiation implicitly adopted
under German Rationalist analysis. This is not, however, where the implicit
commitment ends. Crucially, these terms of differentiation equally have
implications for the objects of our cognition. If we recall, the concepts
brought to distinctness, according to German Rationalism, are concepts of
the objects of philosophy. German Rationalism assumes that in such analysis
our representations stand us in relation to their objects. (Indeed, this is the
assumption that gives such analysis significance.) Thus, we saw that, in
determining the marks of some concept by means of analysis, what
German Rationalism ultimately takes itself to establish are the objective
determinations of the object of that concept. Now, given the further detail
of the terms of differentiation and the complex subjective commitment
uncovered above, this assumption can be further detailed. According to the
terms of differentiation adopted, the marks of an indistinctly given concept
are solely differentiable according to the terms of differentiation of the
understanding. It was assumed that the understanding sufficed for the
differentiation of all such marks. Thus, given that the marks are ultimately
assumed by German Rationalism to be the objective determinations of the
objects in question, the terms of differentiation imply that the objective
marks of the objects of philosophy are solely differentiable according to the
terms of differentiation of the understanding. It is assumed that these terms
of differentiation suffice for differentiating our indistinctly given concepts, and thus for differentiating the objects of those concepts, viz. the objects of our philosophical cognition. Thus, along with the complex subjective commitment comes an implication for the nature of the objects of our cognition. They are such that the understanding’s terms of differentiation suffice for their differentiation. They are objects cognisable by the understanding alone.

To set this complex commitment in our minds, let us return to our schematic example. Recall that we began with indistinctly given concept C and were to determine all and only the marks found in it. Given the terms of differentiation that have now come to light, we now know that in order for some proposed mark to be taken as found in the concept C, we must establish that C cannot be thought without the mark (and similarly, to show that it is not so to be taken, we must establish that C cannot be thought with the mark). Thus, suppose that, in our analysis, we establish that C cannot be thought without M or N. M and N are thus immediately established as a mark of C. Suppose that we further establish that M cannot be thought without the further marks P and Q, and that P and Q are thus mediately established as marks of C. Finally, having reiterated this procedure for all other proposed marks and having sufficiently compared these marks ‘across all kinds of contexts’ and ‘with each other’, we thereby establish that M, N, P, Q are all and only the marks of the concept C and have arrived at its definition. Thus, we thereby establish the marks of the object of the concept – we establish M, N, P, Q to be objective determinations of the object O.

Given our discussion above, we might emphasise two dimensions present in the example. In the example, certain terms of differentiation were employed in order to establish the connection or relation between the marks M, N, P, Q and the concept C (of object O). Now these terms of differentiation were the terms for differentiating the marks of a representation of the understanding or concept. That is, they were terms such that the only connection or relation recognisable between M, N, P, Q and C were those recognisable or representable by the understanding. Thus, the procedure of analysis of C does not solely involve certain terms of differentiation that distinguish the marks ultimately as objective determinations. Our differentiation of M, N, P as the objective marks of O involves an implicit, complex, and prior commitment at the subjective level: M, N, P, Q are marks that are representable and represented by
means of the understanding alone. They are predicates of some concept. C is a combination of marks that is representable and represented by the understanding alone. These are commitments at the subjective level – commitments with regard to the subjective nature of the marks M, N, P, Q and the combination of marks C. Correlatively, this involves a commitment with regard to the subjective faculty that represents O by means of C (viz. that it is the understanding alone). (And, this has implications for O itself. The marks of O are differentiable, and O itself is cognisable, by means of the understanding alone.)

Thus, we see that, while it was implicit before, analysis involves a differentiation at two levels. Insofar as it involves the commitment that whatever is indistinctly given is a representation of the understanding alone, whose marks are to be differentiated by its terms alone, such analysis involves a differentiation of the marks of a representation as a representation. This is differentiation at the subjective level. However, given the German Rationalist commitment that, in carrying out such analysis, the marks of the object of the concept are thereby differentiated, such analysis involves a differentiation at the objective level.

Finally, it is worth re-emphasising that this complex commitment is one that is made prior to any given representations. It is a commitment not only regarding whatever representations are given, but whatever representations could be given. The terms of differentiation are adopted as the prescriptive terms for differentiating the marks of an indistinctly given concept prior to embarking on analysis.

From the above then, we can see that, in its adoption of these terms of differentiation in analysis, German Rationalism at once involves itself in a complex and inter-related commitment. This includes a number of interdependent subjective commitments and, given the additional assumption that such analysis allows for the analysis of the objects of cognition, these commitments imply a number of commitments concerning the objects of our cognition.

II. The Critical response

In the above, we have brought to light a complex implicit commitment found in German Rationalist analysis. Now, what is the Critical response to this commitment? Indeed, we might wonder whether the Critical
philosophy is opposed to German Rationalism on this at all. As we have seen, under the Critical philosophy, the concepts of philosophy are indeed still concepts that are given indistinctly, and we are still to go about bringing them to distinctness by distinguishing their relations to various marks in analysis. Indeed, these are precisely the terms in which the Doctrine of Method sets it out: Philosophical concepts receive ‘exposition’, rather than definition, which is achieved by the “distinct representation of a (still confused) given concept” (A728-9/B756-7) in analysis. Surely this is then precisely what we are doing under this commitment of German Rationalist analysis – adopting terms that allow us to differentiate the marks of the various given concepts that are to feature in our philosophical cognition?

Now, Kant does not in fact explicitly mention the commitment identified above in the Doctrine of Method at all. Instead, the response is, as I hope to show, to be found in the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic – the section with which we began our study. Let us return again to the argument that Kant puts forward there:

If we recall, the primary point of concern of the appendix is, what Kant terms, the ‘relations of our representations among themselves’ and with establishing these. The concepts of reflection are concepts of these relations, and the appendix is concerned with their correct employment. In the course of discussing these concerns, Kant distinguishes one way in which we might go about establishing these relations. That is, in employing the concepts of reflection, we might compare them such that all are taken to be representations of the understanding. We might, as Kant terms it, carry out “mere comparison, [in which] there is complete abstraction from the cognitive power to which the given representations belong, and [the representations] are thus [...] treated the same as far as their seat in the mind is concerned” (A262-3/B318-9, emphasis my own). In such comparison then, we establish, for whatever representations are in question, their relations by comparing them as if they were one and all representations of the understanding.

Mere comparison was not the only way of comparing representations for their relations. The line of reasoning of the introduction distinguishes a second sort of comparison – a comparison that is sensitive to the faculty of the representations in question. In such comparison, we first compare “the representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated” (A261/B317) – we are first “[conscious] of the relation of given
representations to our various sources cognition” (A260/B316) and then go on to compare our representations for their relations. As we have already seen, such consciousness of the source of our representations is *transcendental reflection*, and thus the contrast Kant draws is that between mere comparison and (comparison preceded by) transcendental reflection (A262-3/B318-9).

Finally, according to this line of reasoning, the possibility of a priori or philosophical cognition rests on recognising this contrast and adopting the latter sort of comparison: It is only in the case of comparison preceded by transcendental reflection that the relations between our representations among themselves are established correctly. This is because those representations might belong to one of the two distinct faculties of understanding and sensibility and because a difference in the faculty to which we take some representation in question to belong involves a difference in the relations we are to take it to bear to any other representations. Thus, correctly establishing the relations of our representations among themselves requires transcendental reflection (and is thus impossible under mere comparison). Further, since objective comparison (i.e. comparison such that not only the relations among our representations but also the relations among the objects of those representations are established) requires that the relations between our representations be established correctly, objective comparison requires comparison preceded by transcendental reflection (and is thus impossible under mere comparison). Finally, since a priori cognition requires objective comparison, a priori cognition requires comparison preceded by transcendental reflection (and is thus impossible under mere comparison). Thus, it is recognition of the contrast between these two forms of comparison and adoption of comparison preceded by transcendental reflection over mere comparison that, according to the appendix, secures the possibility of a priori cognition.

Such is the now familiar argument found in the appendix. Now, the import of this line of reasoning to the discussion at hand might already have struck us over the head. In this line of reasoning, we find mentioned the implicit commitment of German Rationalist analysis identified above:

In the case of mere comparison, according to the appendix, we compare our representations for their relations as representations of the understanding or concepts. As we have seen, German Rationalist analysis begins with an indistinctly given concept and sets about gradually bringing
it to distinctness by identifying the marks found in it. Such a bringing of the concept to distinctness involves establishing the connection or relation of various proposed marks to the indistinctly given representation. However, as we also have seen, in establishing these relations German Rationalism adopts the terms of differentiation of the understanding. It compares that which is indistinctly given with various marks as representations of the understanding. Thus, we see that, in this line of reasoning of the appendix, Kant is concerned with precisely the sort of comparison of representations that takes place in bringing concepts to distinctness under German Rationalism. The analysis of our representations under German Rationalism is a case of mere comparison. Mere comparison is the comparison of representations insofar as they are taken to be representations of the same faculty, viz. the understanding, and the terms of differentiation employed by German Rationalist analysis commit it to carrying out just such a form of comparison.

Thus, the Critical response to this commitment is now clear. Recall the claims of the appendix regarding mere comparison: In the attempt to secure a priori cognition, such comparison is problematic. Mere comparison rules

55 We might here note a potential objection and clarification to the above proposed connection between the appendix and German rationalist analysis. In the appendix, as we have seen, Kant is concerned with establishing the relations between representations as representations. By contrast, in our discussion of German rationalist analysis, we have been concerned with establishing the relation or connection between a proposed mark and an obscurely given concept or combination of marks. In my proposed reading of the appendix, I claimed that establishing the latter relation in German rationalist analysis was a certain species of establishing the former relation. Now, it might seem that the two do not line up. Comparing two representations (taken as representations of the understanding) for their relations is seemingly not the same as differentiating the relation between a mark and a combination of marks (taken as a representation of the understanding or concept). However, it seems to me that the issue here is merely terminological: Insofar as a mark is compared with a combination of marks or a concept, it too is a representation. It is simply a more elemental representation than the combination with which it is compared. Comparing proposed marks with a concept is still, under German rationalism, a matter of comparing certain representations with other representations. The difference in terminology between the two signals only the difference between a greater combination (obscurely given and at whose distinctness we are aiming) and a smaller or smallest combination. (This is again evident in the procedure of analysis described in the Inquiry in which we are to collate the marks with one another in order to ensure that they are each presented distinctly in our definition and one is not covertly contained in the other. Such collation is not a matter of dealing with something other than representations. We are again simply comparing representations with one another, but this time merely at a more elemental level than that of the greatest combination in question in relation to its marks.) Thus, when Kant discusses the ‘comparison of representations for their relations among themselves’ in the appendix, we now see that the German rationalist ‘comparison of a concept with its marks for their relation’ can, without too much difficulty, be understood as a case of the former.
out the possibility of a priori cognition. Kant rejects the German Rationalist adoption of these terms of differentiation in its analysis. Let us look more closely at why this might be.

Recall the complexity of the commitment involved in adopting these terms of differentiation. As noted, the adoption of these terms involves a commitment to the understanding as the only faculty at work in such differentiation and, correlative, to all such representations being those of the understanding. It is crucial to remember, however, that such analysis is not merely a matter of differentiating our representations. It is equally a matter of thereby differentiating the objects of those representations. In adopting these terms of differentiation, German Rationalism thereby assumes that these terms suffice for differentiating the objective determinations of the objects of these concepts. It assumes that it is by means of the understanding alone that we stand in relation to these objects—and our philosophical cognition is by means of the understanding alone. And it is here that we find the crux of Kant’s rejection of these terms of differentiation. The Critical philosophy rejects the claim that cognition is possible by means of the understanding alone. As the appendix emphasises, “the understanding and […] sensibility […] judge about things with objective validity only in conjunction” (A271/B327, emphasis omitted). It is by means of both the understanding and sensibility that we stand in relation to the objects of our cognition, and this holds true even in the a priori case of philosophy. Let us look more closely at how, if correct, this Critical recognition of two faculties in cognition affects the outcome of German Rationalist analysis.

Let us begin by considering how such analysis must be working when we take the German Rationalist assumption to be correct. Suppose that we do ultimately stand in relation to the objects of philosophy by means of the representations made distinct in its analysis, and that it is ultimately by means of the understanding alone that we do so. Now, if we are to bring the marks of these objects to distinctness, we must bring to distinctness whatever is already involved or found in the given representation—albeit only indistinctly. Given that the representation is ultimately one of the understanding, the marks that are yet only indistinctly found in the representation are marks that are differentiable by the understanding. Thus, in order to bring the given representation to distinctness, we must employ explicitly the terms that are only implicitly employed when the
representation is still indistinct. That is, we must employ explicitly the understanding’s terms of differentiation. Now, the consequence of this explicit employment is twofold. First, given that they are the terms of differentiation of the understanding, they serve to differentiate the marks of the representation as a representation of the understanding. Secondly, since, under the given assumption, the understanding does stand us in relation to the objects of these representations, the employment of these terms also thereby serves to differentiate the marks of the objects of the representations. These terms suffice for differentiating the marks of the objects themselves. Thus, having brought the relevant representations to distinctness for the sake of furthering our philosophical cognition by means of proofs in which they feature, we can be sure that we have brought to distinctness, not only the marks of the representations, but also thereby the marks of the objects of the representations. We can be sure that the representations appearing in our philosophical propositions or cognition stand us in relation to the objects of philosophy.

Thus, if German Rationalism were correct in this assumption, that is, if it were by means of the understanding alone that we stand in relation to the objects of philosophy, then these terms would indeed suffice for the differentiation of the objects. If what we were aware of in being aware of the concepts of philosophy were also thereby their objects as objects of the pure understanding, whose indistinct representation needed only to be made distinct, then the adoption of these terms in the analysis of these representations would ultimately stand us in a cognitive relation to their objects.

By contrast, let us introduce the Critical account of the faculties into this picture. How does the Critical recognition of two distinct faculties as necessary for cognition affect the outcome of such analysis if it is carried out according to the German Rationalist commitment above? According to the Critical account, we stand in relation to the objects of our philosophical cognition by means of both the understanding and sensibility. The understanding alone is not sufficient. If this is so, then, when we are considering our various indistinctly given representations for the sake of bringing them to distinctness, it will not, for all of these representations, be the case that we stand in relation to the object of the representation by means of the understanding. In the case of some indistinctly given representations, it will be by means of sensibility that we stand in relation to the object of cognition with regard to the representation. That is,
included among these various yet-indistinct representations will be representations of sensibility. Suppose, then, that for some indistinctly given representation R, it is by means of sensibility that we stand in relation to the object of cognition with regard to R. In order to bring to distinctness the marks of the object of R, we must bring to distinctness whatever is involved in R, albeit only indistinctly. We are to employ explicitly the terms of differentiation that are yet employed only implicitly in the case of the indistinct representation. Now, the terms to be adopted for this under German Rationalism are those outlined above. We are to establish whether the representation cannot be thought without the mark or whether it cannot be thought with it. However, given that it is by means of sensibility that we stand in relation to the object of R, the marks of which we are yet only indistinctly aware in the case of R are marks that are differentiable and differentiated by sensibility. Thus, insofar as German Rationalism adopts the terms above with regard to R, it adopts terms of differentiation for representations of the understanding in the case of representations of sensibility.

The outcome of this is again twofold. What we manage to do in applying the terms of differentiation of the understanding in the case of R is to differentiate the marks of R as if it were a representation of the understanding, and not as the representation that it is. That is, applying the terms of the understanding in the case of R will mean that we do not differentiate the marks of the representation correctly as a representation. Further, given that it is by means of sensibility that we stand in relation to the object with regard to this representation, when we apply the terms of differentiation of the understanding, our analysis thereby also fails to differentiate the marks of the object of the representation. Thus, when these representations thereafter appear in our philosophical propositions or cognition, they fail to stand us in relation to the objects of that supposed cognition.

Thus, insofar as German Rationalism adopts the terms of differentiation of the understanding tout court – insofar as German Rationalist analysis employs the terms of differentiation for concepts with regard to all indistinctly given representations – it succeeds only in bringing these representations to distinctness as if they were representations of a certain sort, viz. representations of the understanding or concepts. It does not succeed in bringing these representations to distinctness correctly as the representations that they are and so does not succeed in establishing the
marks of the objects of those representations. It thereby fails to secure the possibility of a priori cognition by means of those representations.

At the outset of this part, we identified a feature implicit in German Rationalist analysis: In carrying out its analyses, German Rationalism employed certain terms of differentiation for the marks of the concepts, which terms of differentiation formed one part of a complex fourfold commitment. We have now seen the response of the Critical philosophy to this feature of German Rationalist analysis. The Critical philosophy rejects these terms of differentiation. It does so by rejecting a more fundamental assumption found in the German Rationalist fourfold commitment – the assumption that philosophical cognition is possible by means of the understanding alone. In its so assuming, German Rationalism at once commits itself to the objects of such cognition being such that they are differentiable by the understanding alone, to the faculty of the understanding as the only one involved in such cognition, and to all indistinctly given representations ultimately being representations of the understanding and their marks thus differentiable as such. It thus commits itself to adopting the terms of differentiation in question: All marks are differentiated as marks of representations of the understanding (as predicates of concepts). The Critical philosophy rejects this picture at its very centre – in its assumption concerning the faculties necessary for cognition. Philosophical cognition is not possible by means of the understanding alone, but requires the distinct faculties of sensibility and understanding. Thus, insofar as German Rationalism adopts the terms of differentiation that it does in bringing the indistinct representations needed for our philosophical cognition to distinctness, and insofar as these terms introduce the fourfold commitment and its failure to recognise this Critical claim concerning the faculties involved in cognition, the Critical philosophy involves a rejection of the German Rationalist account of analysis at its very core.

III. The Critical commitment

In the above, we have seen Kant’s Critical objection to the implicit terms of differentiation adopted by German Rationalist analysis. Now, what does the Critical philosophy propose in place of these? What is the proposed Critical method for the analysis of our indistinctly given representations
that is to replace the German Rationalist analysis that has been found wanting?

Recall the fundamental point of disagreement between the two accounts. Kant diverges from the preceding tradition in his claim of the faculties needed for philosophical cognition. The understanding and sensibility are distinct faculties, both of which are necessary for such cognition. It is this divergence from the German Rationalist account that lies at the heart of the method to be adopted for analysis. Let us then examine in a little more detail how analysis must proceed under the Critical account of the faculties, if it is to succeed.

As under German Rationalism, analysis must begin with our various indistinctly given representations. Of these, those relevant to philosophy are to be identified and made distinct. At this point, the Critical account of the faculties for cognition introduces a qualification. In all cases of cognition, thus including philosophical cognition, we stand in relation to an object only by means of both the understanding and sensibility playing a role. What this Critical insistence on two faculties means is that, at this point prior to commencing our analysis, of the various representations that are ultimately to feature in our philosophical propositions and of which we are yet only indistinctly aware, some will be representations of the understanding and some will be representations of sensibility. They are not, as German Rationalism assumes, all ultimately representations of the understanding. The distinctness and mutual necessity of the faculties implies, at this point prior to analysis, that the various indistinctly given representations relevant to philosophical cognition will be both those of sensibility and of the understanding. Of these various representations then, some of sensibility, some of the understanding, we are to bring to distinctness the marks of which we are yet only indistinctly aware.

Now, as noted above, these marks are already differentiated in our having the indistinct representation, albeit only implicitly, and they are so differentiated by the faculty by means of which we indistinctly have the representation. In order to differentiate these marks then, we must employ those terms of differentiation explicitly that are yet only implicitly employed in the case of the indistinct representation – we must employ the

56 It is worth here noting that, while the Critique is indeed ultimately concerned with our a priori concepts (viz. the schematised categories), these concepts are composed of more elemental representations that are both intellectual and sensible. Thus, when we are considering our various obscurely given representations and attempting to analyse them into their most elemental parts, some of these parts will be representations of sensibility.
terms of differentiation of the faculty to which the representation belongs. Thus, if the representation under analysis is one of the understanding, in order to bring it to distinctness, we must bring its marks to distinctness by employing explicitly the terms by means of which the understanding differentiates these marks in the case of the indistinct representation. Similarly, if the representation is one of sensibility, we employ explicitly the terms of sensibility that already serve to differentiate the marks in our having the indistinct representation. In this way, we differentiate explicitly – and now distinctly – those marks that are already differentiated implicitly by the faculty in question in having the indistinct representation. As in the case of German Rationalist analysis, the procedure is progressively carried out with regard to our indistinctly given philosophical representations until they are all brought to distinctness.

Thus, the Critical method introduces a step prior to that of German Rationalist analysis. Under both accounts, we are to begin with the various representations available for analysis, which are yet still indistinctly given to us. Prior to beginning such analysis, however, we are, under the Critical account, to determine to which faculty each of these various indistinctly given representations is to be attributed. It is only once this has been determined that our analysis can proceed according to the relevant terms of differentiation. Thus, the Critical method demands that our analysis is preceded by the “consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition” (A260/B316). Or, in a word, the Critical method demands the prior step of transcendental reflection.

Having thus determined the faculties of our various representations by means of transcendental reflection, we are then, as we have seen above, to differentiate their marks by employing the terms of differentiation of the faculty to which they are correctly attributable. Thus, secondly, the Critical method involves a change in the terms of differentiation that are to be adopted in analysis. Now, to look more closely at what this involves, we must recall what it is that these terms differentiate. As is familiar, these terms are employed in order to differentiate the marks of an indistinctly given representation – to tell whether a mark is to be found in the representation under analysis or not. Properly speaking, however, we noted that these terms differentiate not the marks themselves, but the relation between the mark and the representation (as a combination of marks). Thus, the Critical method involves a change in the relations – between mark and representation – that are recognised and recognisable in analysis.
If we are dealing with a representation of the understanding, the terms of differentiation are those of the understanding. Under these terms, certain relations will be recognised. If we are dealing with a representation of sensibility, the terms of differentiation to be adopted – and the relations to be recognised – are those of sensibility.

Now, in the above, we identified the relevant criteria for representations of the understanding to be as follows. If a representation, a concept, cannot be thought without a mark, the mark is to be taken as found in the concept. If the representation could not be thought with the mark, the mark is to be taken as not found in the concept. These criteria were given an alternative formulation in terms of representability by the faculty of the understanding. If the combination of marks that constitutes the indistinctly given concept could not be represented by means of the understanding without the mark, the mark is found in the concept. If it could not be represented by means of the understanding with the mark, the mark is not found in it. Transposing these criteria to the case of sensibility, the criteria must then be as follows. If a representation, now an intuition, cannot be represented by means of sensibility without a mark, then the mark is to be taken as found in the intuition. That is, we ask, ‘Can the representation in question be intuited without the mark?’ Similarly, if an intuition cannot be represented by means of sensibility with the mark, then it is not included in it. ‘Can the representation in question not be intuited with the mark?’ In the case of representations of sensibility then, our criteria concern what is or is not representable by means of sensibility or, alternatively, what it is or is not possible to intuit.

To set this more concretely in our minds, let us return to our schematic example. Recall that we considered the indistinctly given concept C with the aim of making distinct the marks found in it. Under the Critical method, we must carry out a prior step. Prior to bringing to distinctness the marks found in a given concept, we are to carry out transcendental reflection with regard to the concept. Better put, prior to bringing to distinctness the marks found in an indistinctly given representation, we are to determine whether it is a representation of the understanding (a concept) or a representation of sensibility (an intuition). Let us suppose then that we carry out this prior step with regard to representation C and that, for the sake of our example, we establish the representation C not to be a concept, but to be an intuition. Having established this, we then set to work bringing it to distinctness by establishing its marks.
Suppose again that we identify M as a potential mark of the representation and are to find out whether it is indeed so. Crucially, at this point, the Critical method requires that we adopt the relevant terms of differentiation. Given that the representation is an intuition, we are not to adopt the terms of differentiation identified in Section I. This would be to treat C as a representation of the understanding, which it is not. We are instead to adopt terms of differentiation that treat it as a representation of sensibility. Thus, in the case of a representation of intuition, we are not to ask whether the representation can be thought without the mark in question, but to ask whether or not the representation can be intuited without the mark in question. That is, we are to determine whether M is found in the representation C by determining whether C cannot be intuited without M. If M is such that C cannot be intuited without M, then M is to be taken as a mark of the representation C. If M is such that C can be intuited without M, then M is not to be taken as a mark of C. This is to employ the terms of differentiation of sensibility.

In our previous version of the example, we supposed that C could not be thought without M, and thus – under the (now erroneous) assumption that C was a concept – M was found to be part of the concept C. Let us suppose, however, that – this time employing sensibility’s terms of differentiation – C can in fact be intuited without the mark M. We are then to put M aside as a mark not found in the representation C and to search for further proposed marks found in the representation. Suppose that we identify a different mark, mark N, which is needed for the intuition of C. That is, it is not possible to intuit C without N. Thus, N is to be put down as one of the marks found in C. As under German Rationalism, this procedure is then reiterated for further marks and further indistinctly given representations. In each case, we identify the faculty to which the representation is to be attributed (transcendental reflection) and then set about identifying its potential marks and establishing – by means of employing the relevant terms of differentiation – whether or not the marks are found in the representation. In this way, we gradually bring our indistinctly given representations to distinctness, this time distinguished as representations of either the understanding or sensibility.

We have now seen by means of a schematic example how the Critical method of analysis differs to that of German Rationalism. A number of clarifications and elaborations are worth noting before we turn to the outcome of such analysis. First, it can be seen in the above that the
employment of different terms of differentiation allows us to recognise further relations that might hold between a proposed mark and an indistinctly given representation. The question we are to ask, in the case of a representation of the understanding, is whether or not the indistinctly given concept can be thought without the mark. The question, in the case of a representation of sensibility, is whether or not the indistinctly given intuition can be intuited without the mark. This is to ask after the relation between the mark and the representation – whether or not they bear a certain connection. But it is to ask after a relation or connection that is differentiable by means of the faculty in question. Supposing that C is a representation of the understanding, can C be thought without M? Or, put in alternative terms introduced in Part II, do M and C bear the relation such that the combination (C) is unrepresentable by means of the understanding without the mark (M)? Or, supposing that C is a representation of sensibility, do M and C bear the relation such that the combination (C) is unrepresentable by means of sensibility without the mark (M)? The latter introduces a further set of possible relations between an indistinctly given representation and its proposed marks.

Second and relatedly, once we have changed and corrected our commitment regarding the subjective nature of the indistinctly given representation C, the relation that we uncover between C and M might very well be different to those determined in the case in which C was taken to be a concept. And, given that only an analysis that correctly takes into account the faculty of the representation and employs the relevant terms of differentiation can determine the relation between C and M correctly (i.e. analysis preceded by transcendental reflection), only that relation between C and M that involves a correct assumption about the subjective nature of the representation in question is to be taken to be the actual relation between C and M. Thus, the Critical method introduces not only further possible relations between a proposed mark and indistinctly given representation, but the relations determined as the results of our analysis will be different. Under the Critical method, we will arrive at different and, according to Kant, corrected expositions of our indistinctly given representations.

Thirdly, it is important to note that the Critical correction does not involve doing away with the terms of differentiation employed by German Rationalism as such. Although Kant’s rejection of German Rationalist analysis here is a rejection of the terms of differentiation, it is rejection of
these terms as sufficient for carrying out analysis. It is not a rejection of the terms as such. Given the Critical directive to recognise both representations of sensibility and the understanding, where German Rationalism recognised only the latter, the correction is to employ additional terms alongside those employed by such analysis – viz. the terms of sensibility alongside those of the understanding.

Finally, we might note that the Critical method does not consist in or imply the identification of further or previously unrecognised given representations, though it is consistent with this. Kant’s claim is not that German Rationalism fails to recognise certain representations in its analysis, but that it treats the representations it does analyse incorrectly. So, although treating our indistinctly given representations correctly might lead us to recognise further representations as needed for establishing the propositions of philosophy, or indeed to do away with certain representations recognised under German Rationalism, the correction is prior to and independent of this. The correction consists in different resulting analyses for the same representations treated by German Rationalism.

Having noted these clarifications, let us turn then to the outcome and significance of this Critical correction to analysis. As touched on above, in contrast to German Rationalist analysis, what this prior step of the determination of the faculty of an indistinctly given representation, and its consequent employment of the relevant terms of differentiation, brings about is the correct determination of the marks of the representation given the representation that it is. If we recall, because German Rationalism employed the terms of differentiation of the understanding with regard to all philosophical representations, it thereby treated all such representations as if they were representations of the understanding. A mark was only recognised as a mark of an indistinctly representation if the representation could not be thought without it and recognised as a mark not found in the concept if the representation could not be thought with it. In so doing, such analysis misidentified the marks of any representations that were not representations of the understanding and failed to treat these representations as the representations they are. In contrast, in its demand

Indeed, in the Dialectic, Kant does precisely this for a great number of the central representations of German rationalist analysis.
for the prior step of the recognition of the faculty of a representation and the adoption of the terms of differentiation of that faculty, the Critical method now succeeds in determining the marks of a representation according to the representation that it is. Thus, in the first instance, the Critical philosophy corrects the determination of the marks of our various indistinctly given philosophical representations as representations.

In order to see how this correction ultimately allows for the correct determination of the marks of the objects of our philosophical representations, it is crucial that we return to a feature of the Critical method that we noted previously. In Part III we saw that the Critical account no longer accepts the German Rationalist assumption that the combinations of marks found in our philosophical representations rest on combinations found in the objects of those representations. Under the Critical account, the combinations of marks of the representations of philosophy are due to the nature of the faculties of the subject. (This was the only way to explain the necessary relation – and our apprehension of the necessary relation – that these representations bear to the objects of our cognition.) Now, a crucial consequence of this change for the procedure of arriving at philosophical cognition was that, even once an indistinctly given concept has been made distinct and been shown to be relevant to the propositions of philosophy, the relation to an object by means of such a representation is still to be established. We still need to show that these representations have objects. Under German Rationalism, it is assumed that the representations of philosophy have objects. Under the Critical philosophy, establishing this is a distinct step – a step that comes after analysis.58

Thus, under the Critical account, it is not straightforward that correcting the terms of differentiation in our analysis, such that they correctly line up with the faculty of a representation, suffices for the differentiation of the objects of those representations. Even once we have brought our representations to distinctness correctly, there remains the further step of showing that such representations do indeed have objects.

Two points follow from the above. First, under the Critical account, it is clear that what we analyse and bring to distinctness are our representations as representations. Given the Critical claim that the combinations of the marks of these representations rest in the nature of the subject and the

58 An important qualification here is, as mentioned, to be found in the case of a priori given representations of sensibility (a priori intuitions). We will treat this in detail in Part V.
required further step of establishing their relation to an object, all that is in question in analysis are these indistinctly given representations and their marks. Now, German Rationalist analysis equally involves determining the relations among our representations. In such analysis, we do determine the relations among indistinctly given concepts and their marks – indeed, the commitment regarding their subjective nature is found in the very terms of differentiation. But this is only incidental. What is carried out in such analysis, according to German Rationalism, is the determination of the relations among the objects of those concepts and their marks. Thus, while under both accounts, determining the relation between a representation and its marks is distinct from determining the relation between the object of the representation and its marks, the accounts diverge insofar as German Rationalism takes the procedure of analysis to be the determination of both simultaneously while Critical analysis explicitly is the determination of only the former.

Secondly, although the correct differentiation of our representations as representations in analysis does not, under the Critical account, itself suffice for the differentiation of the objects of those representations, it is nevertheless clear that the correct differentiation of our representations as representations is needed for the possibility of such objective differentiation: Given that the indistinctly given representations of philosophy are representations that have their source in the nature of the subject, and that these must then be subsequently shown to stand us in relation to an object, if they are differentiated incorrectly as representations, then they will not be the representations that do in fact stand us in relation to the objects of philosophy. Such an erroneous differentiation will thus rule out the possibility of philosophical cognition. If, however, the representations have first been brought to distinctness correctly as representations and then shown to stand us in relation to objects by means of the transcendental proofs, these representations will stand us in relation to the objects of philosophy. Thus, transcendental reflection can now be seen as a necessary prior step for the possibility of philosophical cognition. It is necessary for the correct differentiation of the marks of our representations as representations, which differentiation itself is necessary for the correct differentiation of the marks of the objects of those representations – and ultimately necessary for the possibility of philosophical cognition.

Thus, the outcome of the Critical method is manifold: Under Critical analysis, preceded as it must be by transcendental reflection, the marks of
our representations as representations are determined correctly. That is, our indistinctly given representations are brought to distinctness correctly considered as representations. Secondly, assuming the later step of transcendental proof is carried out for the representations in question, our bringing to distinctness of the marks of the representation correctly is at once a bringing to distinctness of the marks of the object of the representation. Finally, given this, philosophical cognition by means of these representations in the synthetic a priori judgements of philosophy will now be possible on the basis of such correct analysis. We have, according to the Critical method, corrected the complex German Rationalist assumption and secured the possibility of philosophical cognition.

And, indeed, our clue to these conclusions has been all along the line of reasoning of the appendix, to which we will return in Part VI:

The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call transcendental reflection. [...] The correct determination of [the relations of representations among themselves] depends on the cognitive power in which they subjectively belong to each other, whether in sensibility or in understanding. For the difference in the latter makes a great difference in the way in which one ought to think of the former. [...] [I]t is transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation of given representations to one or the other kind of cognition, that can alone determine their relation among themselves, and whether the things [that is, the objects of the representations] [bear these relations] cannot immediately be made out from the concepts themselves through mere comparison (comparatio), but rather only through the distinction of the kind of cognition to which they belong, by means of transcendental reflection (reflexio). [...] (A261-2/B317-8, emphasis omitted)

In this is part, we began by identifying an implicit feature in German Rationalist analysis. This feature was the terms of differentiation that it employed in order to determine the marks of an indistinctly given representation. We saw that these terms were those of the understanding and thus that German Rationalism involved a complex implicit assumption
about the nature of the faculties involved in our philosophical cognition and, thereby, about the objects of that cognition. We saw also that the Critical philosophy is not silent on this implicit feature. Examining the procedure of analysis under the corrected Critical assumption about the nature of the faculties in cognition, the Critical account yields a demand for transcendental reflection and the adoption of further terms of differentiation in our analysis, which terms of differentiation allow us to bring our indistinctly given representations to distinctness correctly – ultimately allowing for the possibility of philosophical cognition by means of those representations. In this, the line of reasoning of the appendix served as the crucial clue to the Critical response, and we saw that the line of reasoning there is in fact an explicit and comprehensive statement of Kant’s response to this implicit feature.

Before we return to the line of reasoning of the appendix and the questions it raised at the very start of our exploration, we will turn to an examination of analysis, as under the new Critical method that we have now uncovered in Parts III and IV. This carrying out of analysis is to be found, as we might expect, at the start of the Critique, and it is to these sections that we will turn in Part V – to the Transcendental Aesthetic.
Part V
The culmination of the Critical method for arriving at the concepts of philosophy

In the preceding parts, we have examined the method of German Rationalism for arriving at concepts in philosophy, along with the various ways in which the Critical philosophy responds to this method. In this fifth part, I set aside German Rationalist analysis and turn to the Critical philosophy and corrected analysis. I hope to show that the early parts of the *Critique*, viz. the findings of the Transcendental Aesthetic, are the culmination of the Critical method for arriving at concepts, as it has been uncovered in preceding discussions. This part proceeds as follows. In Section I, I provide a brief summary of the early parts of the Aesthetic as they are familiar to us. In Section II, I examine these early passages in light of our findings in Parts III and IV, viz. as the culmination of the corrected, Critical method for arriving at concepts. Section III then points to the ways in which this examination is illuminating of the Aesthetic in relation to extant discussions of the section. The following section, IV, is a lengthy closer examination of the proofs of Metaphysical Exposition. As I hope to show, the workings of these proofs can now be understood in a new light, having in hand an understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetic as the culmination of the correct method for arriving at concepts. Section V then turns to a final broader discussion of the *Critique* as involving a corrected first stage of analysis, to examine it as both continuous and discontinuous with the preceding tradition, and to understand more clearly the place and significance of the Transcendental Aesthetic within the *Critique*. 

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I. Overview of the Metaphysical Exposition

Let us then turn briefly to the well-known early parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic. As is familiar, in the Aesthetic’s first main section, ‘On Space’, Kant begins with a brief introduction and then proceeds to a number of well-known proofs from A22/B37 to A25/B41. Each proof, with the exception of the last, begins with a statement of its conclusion. These conclusions seemingly concern, not space itself, but the nature of the representation of space: (1) Space is not an empirical concept. (A23/B38) (2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori. (A24/B38) (3) Space is not a discursive concept, but a pure intuition. (A24/B39) (4) Space is an a priori intuition, not a concept. (A25/B40)

The respective proofs for these conclusions are, in all cases, compact and progress seemingly quickly from their premises to these conclusions. The first proof proceeds by an appeal to the possibility of “representing [sensations as related to things] outside and next to one another […] in different places” (A23/B38). This possibility in turn rests on the possibility of “certain sensations [being] related to something outside me” (A23/B38). On the basis of these premises, the proof then concludes with an asymmetric dependence claim: “Outer experience,” the proof tells us, “is […] first only possible through [the representation of space]” (A23/B38) and “the representation of space cannot be obtained from [this outer experience]” (A23/B38), or, in other words, “is not an empirical concept” (A23/B38).

In a, yet shorter, second proof, two contrasting claims concerning certain possibilities of representation are put forward: It is impossible to represent, we are told, “that there is no space” (A24/B38). Though it is, by contrast, “possible to think that there are no objects to encountered in [space].” (A24/B38-9) On the basis of this contrast, the proof concludes that the representation of space is “not a determination dependent on [outer appearances]” (A24/B39), but instead “is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances” (A24/B39).

In what follows, I will give an exposition of the proofs in terms that remain very close to Kant’s own. Though my exposition is not void of interpretation, it is, I hope, sufficiently neutral to avoid many of the primary points of dispute regarding the proofs. In Section III, I turn more explicitly to extant interpretations of the proofs, for their points of significant contrast with the account presented here.
The third proof again appeals to a claimed impossibility of representation, which is seemingly supported by a disambiguation of a contrasting possibility. It is impossible, claims the third proof, to represent “many spaces” (A25/B39), or, alternatively, it is only possible to represent “a single space” (A25/B39). The proof then turns to a sense in which it is possible to represent ‘many spaces’: This is possible when we understand ‘space’ here to mean the “parts of one and the same unique space.” (A25/B39) Thus, the proof distinguishes space as a whole from its parts, claiming the possibility of representing more than one of the latter, but the impossibility of representing more than one of the former. The proof then adds a priority claim concerning the relation between the two: The parts of space cannot precede the whole of space (the composition of space from its parts is impossible), but the whole of space must precede the parts of space (the parts of space “rest[…] merely on limitations” (A25/B39)). Thus, the proof concludes, the representation of space “is not a […] general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition.” (A24/B39)

The fourth and final proof under the ‘Metaphysical Exposition’ puts forward a claim concerning what is involved in the representation of space. “Space,” we are told, “is represented as an infinite given magnitude” (A25/B39), or alternatively, “thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself.” (A25/B40) A concept cannot be thought in this way, and the representation of space is, therefore, “an a priori intuition, not a concept.” (A25/B40)

Such are the proofs presented to us in this early section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Now, as noted, these proofs are compact and proceed seemingly quickly from their premises to their respective conclusions. This apparent simplicity, however, conceals proofs that are, on the one hand, quite opaque in their meaning and plausibility and, on the other, incredibly significant within the Critical philosophy insofar as they ground the further crucial claim of the Aesthetic, viz. the claim of the transcendental ideality of space and the objects in it. And indeed, much has been written both on the workings of the proofs themselves and on how this further claim is established on their basis. In what follows, our interest will be to examine these proofs in light of our findings in Parts I to IV. As will come to light, this deeper understanding of the Critical method for bringing our given representations to distinctness illuminates certain features of these early parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic in new ways, and we can gain a clearer understanding of certain details of the workings
of the proofs and of the place of the Transcendental Aesthetic within the Critique on their basis.  

II. The Metaphysical Exposition as Critical bringing to distinctness

Such are the early parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic as they are familiar to us. When we examine the section more closely, however, we find a number of details that show the Transcendental Aesthetic to be part of the culmination of the Critical method for bringing the representations of philosophy to distinctness. In what follows, I will focus on the Metaphysical Exposition of the representation of space, for I take it that what is put forward here can be applied mutatis mutandis to the case of time – at least insofar as Kant intended for both to be understood in the way put forward below.

Our first point of interest is a number of additions found in the B-edition of the section. In the B-edition, the section is now titled ‘Metaphysical Exposition of [the concept of space]’. At the end of the brief introduction, Kant tells us what is to be expected in such an exposition: “I understand by exposition (expositio) the distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to a concept; but the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as a priori given.” (B38, emphasis my own)

Now this remark is significant in two ways. First, if we recall the discussion in the Doctrine, what we are to expect in the case of the concepts of philosophy are not definitions but expositions. As we saw, as early as the Inquiry, Kant questions the possibility of providing definitions for the concepts of philosophy. Because the concepts of philosophy are indistinctly given, we cannot aim for their exhaustive analysis or definition as a starting point in philosophy. Instead, what Kant recommends in the Inquiry is the distinguishing of “a few immediately certain characteristic marks” (2:284) by means of which we might make the concept (at least partially) distinct. By the time of the Doctrine, Kant has allowed that our analyses might serve to distinguish many – and nearly all – the marks of a concept, but denies that such analysis could ever be shown exhaustive. Such partial analyses as are possible in philosophy now contrast with definitions and are termed

60 In what follows, I will examine the accounts found in the literature in Part III, after having brought to light the proposed implications of our findings for the proofs in Part II. In Part III, I will then consider the various accounts in the literature insofar as the account presented here might be considered an improvement on these accounts.
‘expositions’. And now in the Aesthetic, as mentioned, Kant tells us that what we are to expect in the case of the expositions from B37 onwards is the “distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to a concept” (B38). It is thus clear that the ‘expositions’ put forward in the Aesthetic are indeed ‘expositions’ of the concepts of philosophy as discussed in the Doctrine and the results of precisely the procedure of analysis that we have been examining over the course of our discussions.

Thus, in the first instance, the passages are the specification of the various characteristic marks of the concept in question, the distinguishing of which constitutes bringing the concept to distinctness as is required for any philosophical cognition that is to feature the concept. This is clearly seen in the case of the fourth exposition, for example, in which we are told that what belongs to the concept of space is the representation of “an infinite given magnitude […], [such that] all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous.” (B39-40) ‘Having an infinite number of simultaneous parts’ is thus distinguished or separated out from any other marks or representations that might be associated with the representation of space as a characteristic mark of the concept, thereby serving to bring the concept to distinctness.

The specifications of marks found in the Aesthetic are not, however, as straightforward as this. There is a further, second point of significance to be found in the remarks added in the B-edition. These passages are indeed expositions of the concept of space, but they are expositions of a special sort. Kant does not merely mean to put forward a specification of as many as possible of the characteristic marks of the concept, for the sake of bringing it to distinctness. As Kant notes at B38, the passages are an exposition of those characteristic marks of the concept that show it to be given a priori – what Kant terms ‘metaphysical’ expositions. Now this formulation should strike us as significant. Recall that under the Critical method, Kant has introduced a fourfold division of the possible grounds of a concept – arbitrarily combined, arbitrarily combined but such that an object for the concept can be given, empirically given, and given a priori. We saw that Kant explicitly distinguished the concepts of philosophy as the latter – concepts that are given a priori. In contrast to empirically given concepts, the ground of which is empirical objects, and in contrast to arbitrarily thought concepts, the ground of which is the arbitrary act of the understanding, concepts given a priori are concepts whose ground is the nature of the understanding. According to the Doctrine, these were the
concepts with which philosophy was to deal, and in order to arrive at the
categories of philosophy it was ultimately necessary to establish, of all of our
ostensibly philosophical concepts, which were a priori given. As we saw,
this new characterisation of the concepts of philosophy and the
introduction of this new task were evidence of Kant’s recognition of an
intelligibility requirement on the necessary applicability of concepts to
objects not constructible by us. Not much was offered by Kant in the
Doctrine, however, as to how we were to go about establishing a concept as
given a priori, as opposed to simply an arbitrarily thought concept made
familiar by habitual use. Kant did not there spell out the Critical method to
its full extent. Yet here in the Aesthetic, we find that Kant not only
mentions the concepts as given a priori, but also tells us that he is going to
show these concepts to be given a priori – and that he is going to do so by
means of specially chosen expositions of the concept.\footnote{Thus, a quali-
}fication to our initial discussion in Part IV arises here. In Part IV, I claimed
that Kant’s characterisation of the concepts of philosophy as given a priori provided us
with a clue as to how the concepts might be identified as such, and thus as concepts
relevant to philosophy. I claimed that instead of beginning by sorting through our
various indistinct concepts, the critical account can now proceed from an examination
of the nature of the understanding to an identifcation of the relevant concepts. Here we can
see, however, that Kant carries out such an exhaustive derivation of concepts in the
Metaphysical Deduction of the Transcendental Logic only. We can now see, by contrast,
that in the Metaphysical Expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant means to
establish a concept as given a priori by means of an exposition of the marks of the concept. In
what follows, we will examine Kant’s carrying out of this latter task in more detail.
characteristic marks of the concept to claims that concern the concept as non-arbitrary and as originating in the understanding (or non-empirical).

Turning to the proofs, this is indeed what we seem to find: The first proof proceeds to the conclusion that space is not an empirical concept. This is precisely to rule out one of the four types of concepts in Kant’s fourfold division in the Doctrine, viz. the concept of space as given, but empirically so. The second proof proceeds to the conclusion that space is a necessary, or a priori, concept. Thus, the second proof rules out the remaining two types of concepts at once. To establish the concept of space as a priori is to rule out the concept as arbitrarily combined (and thus to rule it out as arbitrarily combined but such that its object can be constructed a priori.) Thus, when we consider expositions against the background of the fourfold distinction of concepts of the Doctrine, we find that the conclusions of the first two proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition proceed to conclusions that progressively rule out the other possible grounds of space as put forward in this fourfold distinction and thus are indeed an exposition containing “that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.” (B38, emphasis my own)

Thus, the Metaphysical Exposition section of the Aesthetic has a complex structure. At the broadest level it is concerned with showing the obscurely given concept of space to be a concept given a priori. Each of the subsections to the Exposition then involves establishing, by means of a proof, an intermediate conclusion that goes part way towards establishing this primary conclusion. This is why at the outermost level, the exposition is structured as a set of proofs. Once we understand how the proofs proceed, however, we find that there is a further inner level to the Exposition. Each of the proofs proceeds from some characteristic mark or marks of the concept to the relevant intermediate conclusion. Thus, the section is indeed an exposition of the concept of space, in the sense of being a statement of the marks of the concept that constitutes bringing it (partially) to distinctness, though its nature as such is hidden within the broader aim of showing the concept to be given a priori. In putting forward the Metaphysical Exposition of the concept, Kant is undertaking two of the three tasks necessary for arriving at philosophical concepts under the Critical account at one and the same time. He is bringing the indistinct concept to distinctness and establishing it to be a concept given a priori.

Continuing through these passages, however, we find a further unexpected, albeit very familiar, feature. The conclusions of the proofs do
not solely concern the a priori givenness of the concept of space. The concern of the third and fourth proofs is to show the ‘concept’ of space not to be concept at all, but to be an intuition. When we look to the proofs themselves, Kant’s aim is seemingly not only to show the concept in question to be one given a priori, but also to show the given ‘concept’ not to be a representation of the understanding at all, but a representation of sensibility. Why then should we find this further conclusion in the proofs? And how could it contribute to the stated primary conclusion, the truth of which has already seemingly been established by the second proof?

In order to see that there is indeed more at work in these proofs, and why there must be more at work in these proofs given Kant’s stated aim, we need to recall the changes to the Critical method of Part IV, changes that rest on the case in the appendix. In Part IV, we saw that German Rationalist analysis involved an implicit complex commitment, a commitment introduced by the terms of differentiation adopted in this analysis: German Rationalist analysis differentiated its obscurely given representations by means of the understanding’s terms of differentiation, thus treating all obscurely given representations as concepts, the understanding alone as sufficient to yield a priori cognition, and the objects of our cognition as objects whose marks were differentiable solely according to the terms. The appendix counselled us otherwise. On the basis of Kant’s Critical claim of the distinctness of understanding and sensibility, the correct differentiation of our representations – and the subsequent possibility of a priori cognition by means of these representations – required the recognition that the obscurely given representations available for analysis could be of either of these two faculties. The analysis of our given representations requires not merely that these be differentiated from one another. It requires an awareness of the faculty of the representation in differentiating our given representations from one another. Thus, the appendix introduced, in contrast to other extant analyses of our philosophical concepts, the crucial requirement that analysis involve differentiating our given representations according to whether they are representations of the understanding or representations of sensibility.

Returning to the Aesthetic, we recall that the Metaphysical Exposition is indeed an exposition of the representation of space. Kant there puts forward various characteristic marks of the representation. He brings the representation to partial distinctness by distinguishing these. In the case of the third and fourth proofs, however, Kant appeals to certain of these
marks in order to show, not that the representation is given a priori, but that the representation of space is an *intuition*. Indeed, in the third proof, Kant argues from the singularity of space to its being “not a […] general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition” (A25/B38), and in the fourth argues from the infinitude of space to the conclusion that the “original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.” (A25/B39, emphasis omitted) Now, considering the appendix, with its ensuing directive to differentiate our representations from one another correctly as representations of the relevant faculty, what we find Kant to be doing in these third and fourth proofs is establishing that the representation of space is to be differentiated *as one of sensibility*. In the third and fourth proofs, Kant is distinguishing for us one of the representations that previously was differentiated from the rest of our representations as a concept or one of the understanding, when it should have been differentiated as one of sensibility.

It is worth noting that in these two proofs, Kant not only *distinguishes for us* the representation of space as a representation that, in our analysis, is to be differentiated as one of sensibility, but also *shows* it to be such. As mentioned, Kant appeals to certain characteristic marks of the representation of space to show that the representation is one of sensibility. The proofs proceed from certain characteristic marks of the representation of space to the conclusion that the representation of space is an intuition. In these third and fourth proofs then, Kant does not only mean to put forward a corrected analysis of our representations, but also shows why, in contrast to other treatments of the concept of space, this *is* its correct analysis. In these passages, Kant identifies that the representation of space as one of those to be treated as one of sensibility and proves that it is.

Thus, the Metaphysical Exposition is the culmination of the Critical account of arriving at concepts on a number of fronts. As we saw in Parts III and IV, analysis under the Critical philosophy involves a number of further complications or requirements, viz. those of the Doctrine and the appendix. The former introduces the characterisation of the concepts as being all and only those given a priori. The latter introduces the need to distinguish the faculty of the indistinctly given representations in our analysis. Here in these proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition, we thus find Kant carrying out three tasks: First, he provides an exposition of various marks of the representation of space thereby bringing it to distinctness. Secondly, he shows, by appeal to these very marks, that space *is a*
representation relevant to philosophy, that is, it is a representation given a priori. Finally, again by appeal to these various marks, that the representation of space properly belongs in the Transcendental Aesthetic and not in the Logic, that is, that the representation of space is one of sensibility.

Thus far we have seen that Kant uses the proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition to carry out three tasks that emerge under the Critical account of analysis with regard to the concept of space, viz. to establish the representation of space to be given a priori and to establish it to be a representation of sensibility rather than of the understanding. If we look more closely, however, these proofs, with their seemingly independent conclusions, can be found to constitute a systematic complex argument, the primary conclusion of which is precisely as explicitly stated, viz. that the representation of space is a representation “given a priori.” (B38) As we have already seen, by the time of the Critique, the concepts relevant to philosophy have been narrowed in a crucial way. In order for a concept to be relevant to philosophy and potentially to feature in our philosophical cognition, it must be a given or non-arbitrary concept and a concept given a priori. Now this classification, as we know, concerns the ground of the combination of marks that constitute the concept: The source of a concept is either the arbitrary act of the understanding (‘arbitrarily thought’ concepts) or it is something other than this (‘given’ concepts). If it is the latter, then the ground of the combination of marks is either empirical experience (‘empirically given’ concepts) or the nature of the understanding itself (concepts ‘given a priori’). Thus, establishing a concept to be given a priori – that is, a concept of philosophy– is at once to rule out the first two sources and to establish the ground of the concept to be the last of these three.62

However, this does not yet go far enough. There is a further distinction to be made with regard to the ground of a concept. Given the Critical commitment to the understanding and sensibility as mutually dependent but distinct representative faculties in cognition, a concept, or rather representation, given a priori could have its ground in the understanding

62 As is now familiar, the distinction put forward in the Doctrine is a fourfold distinction that involves, as the fourth classification of concepts, those that are arbitrarily thought but which are constructable a priori. While this further distinction poses interesting questions regarding the relations between ground, marks, and object, it is not relevant to our purposes here and we can set it aside. We are here concerned with distinguishing concepts as given a priori and, given that arbitrarily thought concepts whose objects are constructable a priori are a species of arbitrarily thought concepts, we need only deal with the genus.
alone or in sensibility alone (or indeed in neither of these alone but in both together). Thus, to establish that a concept is non-arbitrary or given and yet not empirically given is only to establish that the ground of a representation lies in the nature of one or another of the subject’s faculties. It is not yet to establish the ground of the representation. Thus, we can see how the Metaphysical Exposition does indeed constitute a single, systematic argument. The first proof rules out the concept of space as one empirically given. The second proof rules out the concept of space as arbitrarily thought by showing it to be a priori or having its ground in the faculties of the subject. The third and fourth proofs then rule out the concept (or now rather representation) of space as a ‘general concept’ or one whose ground is the nature of the understanding and show its ground to be the nature of sensibility. Thus, together, these four proofs form an argument (by elimination) that shows that the combination of marks of the representation of space is non-arbitrary but given, and not given empirically but given due to the nature of the subject’s faculties, and not due to the nature of the subject’s faculty of understanding, but of sensibility. In other words, the Metaphysical Exposition is a systematic complex argument that shows the representation of space to be “given a priori” (B38), and specifically given a priori ‘through the nature of sensibility’.

III. Illumination of the Aesthetic

In the above, we have seen that the Metaphysical Exposition is a systematic treatment of the analysis of the representation of space in accordance with the Critical method. In this next section, I will discuss the ways in which this proves illuminating of the Transcendental Aesthetic and its early passages, in special relation to extant literature on the section.

As a point of clarification then, it is worth noting that Kant’s discussion of the fourfold distinction of concepts as we examined in the Doctrine is seemingly abbreviated. As noted, Kant there characterises a concept given a priori as a concept given “through the nature of the understanding” (A729/B757). However, it simply is not the case that Kant is committed to all of our philosophical representations originating in the nature of the understanding in isolation. While there are some representations whose ground is the understanding in isolation (viz. the pure concepts as listed in the table of categories), many others – and indeed all those that go on to feature in our philosophical cognition – have their ground either in sensibility in isolation (e.g. space) or in the understanding and sensibility operating together (e.g. the schematised categories featuring in the principles). I thus take it that Kant’s reference to the ‘nature of the understanding’ in the Doctrine is to be understood as abbreviated. Correctly, a representation’s being given a priori should be understood as its grounded in ‘the nature of the subject’s faculties’.
First, it is worth noting that the nature of the Metaphysical Exposition, as an *exposition* of the representation of space, is seldom recognised in discussions of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Typically, discussions of the Exposition tend immediately to focus on the details of the proofs themselves – on the meaning and plausibility of their premises and on their support for their respective conclusions. However, as we have seen in Parts II – IV, the Critical philosophy retains the commitment to a first stage in philosophical cognition that involves bringing to distinctness the representations relevant to such cognition and contains a complex account of how and why this first stage is to be accomplished. By the time of the Doctrine, the results of this procedure are ‘expositions’, where such expositions put forward some of the characteristic marks of the representation and are established with the Critical awareness of the distinctness of sensibility and the understanding. This background picture of the proofs as expositions of the representations of sensibility is generally overlooked in literature on the proofs.

This recognition of the proofs as expositions is significant in a number of ways. First, understanding the proofs to be, in the first instance, expositions of the representation of space allows us to better comprehend the place and role of the Transcendental Aesthetic in relation to subsequent parts of the *Critique*. The Transcendental Aesthetic is of-a-piece with the early parts of the Transcendental Logic – that is, with the Logic prior to the deduction of the pure concepts. Both of these sections serve to distinguish and taxonomise the representations that are later to feature in our philosophical cognition.


Three important exceptions to this are McGoldrick (1985), Leirfall (2004), and Messina (2015). These accounts are closest to the account presented here and they all have a number of points in common. Our account presented here, however, diverges from each of these three accounts in important ways. In what follows, I will highlight these points of contrast as we proceed.

Subsequent to this point, we find the two further steps necessary for arriving at philosophical cognition: The deduction of the pure concepts serves as the distinct step of ‘transcendental proof’, in which the representations taxonomied in the first stage are shown to stand us in relation to objects. Thereafter, the Analytic of Principles establishes the synthetic a priori principles in which these concepts feature, which principles finally constitute our philosophical cognition.
cognition (this cognition being established in establishing the synthetic a priori principles). They do so, in part, by putting forward the characteristic marks of these representations in order that the representations with which the Critique begins are distinct. Admittedly, this is carried out quite differently across the Aesthetic and the Logic, with each of the two sections involving different demands and aims. Nonetheless, the early parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic are uniform in this task, a task that we would expect to be carried out at the very start of the Critique and which task is distinct from and prior to securing philosophical cognition. This construal of the project of the Critique as involving a taxonomy of representations is certainly not unfamiliar, but this further detail to the taxonomy – the proofs of the Aesthetic as beginning with premises that constitute an exposition of the representations in question – has gone under-appreciated.

Further, and more significantly, this recognition of the proofs as expositions allows for a subtly different understanding of certain of the proofs’ key premises. Commonly, the proofs are taken to proceed from premises that are, in some way, ‘immediately obvious’, uncontroversial, or commonsensical. This understanding of the proofs seemingly stems from the recognition that the proofs are found at the very start of the Critique, and thus cannot be interpreted as resting on any of its subsequent conclusions. In recognising the Metaphysical Exposition as an exposition, however, it becomes clear that, at least in the case of their expositional premises, the proofs are not put forward on the basis of claims that are in some way or another obvious or uncontroversial. (Indeed, it seems difficult to reconcile the further and substantial claim of the transcendental ideality of the objects in space and time with a starting point in claims that are merely uncontroversial in some vague way.) Rather, once we recognise the nature of the proofs as, in the first instance, expositions, the nature of

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67 This has already been noted in Part III, in which we distinguished the possibility of an examination of the faculty, in the case of the understanding, in order to arrive at the concepts relevant to philosophical cognition. In the case of sensibility, by contrast, the identification and taxonomising of its representations must proceed by the normal means of analysis.


69 See, for example, Parsons (1992) p. 62.
certain of their key premises can be viewed in a more determinate way. We can view certain of their key premises as *expositional claims* – as claims that put forward the characteristic marks of the representation in question. This understanding of these premises places the proofs within the Critical philosophy as a response to its roots of German Rationalism and, as we will see, allows us an account of the nature and ground of these premises that is more illuminating than their usual construal as ‘obvious’ in some way or another.

Finally, the recognition of the premises as expositional allows us to recognise and emphasise the starting point of the Critical philosophy put forward in the *Critique*, which philosophy ultimately culminates in the principles put forward in the later parts of the Logic. In continuity with German Rationalist philosophy, the Critical philosophy begins with the various and haphazard representations of the objects of our ordinary experience and philosophy must proceed by distinguishing, from these, those that constitute the necessary representations of the objects of our cognition.

A second point of illumination provided by our account here concerns certain details of the workings of the proofs, details that, again, are not sufficiently appreciated in extant discussions. As we have mentioned, each proof contains an exposition that could serve self-standingly to bring the representation to a partial distinctness. But these expositions are particular in their being used to *show the ground* – in this case, subjective – of the representation of space. This move from the characteristic mark or marks stated in the exposition to the ground of the representation then yields the proofs that are the usual focal point of the Metaphysical Exposition. We can thus come to a subtler understanding of the way in which the proofs are meant to be working. It is Kant’s view that, *by means of the marks of a representation*, we can show its *ground*. The exposition of a representation can, apparently, shed light on the nature of the representation itself. This is an interesting claim in its own right, and, again, has seldom been recognised in discussions of the proofs. In what follows, we will examine the Metaphysical Exposition more closely and attempt to gain some understanding of how Kant ultimately claims to do this.\(^70\)

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\(^70\) A standard view of the Metaphysical Exposition might at this point be usefully outlined as follows. Although the accounts falling under this view differ widely in their details, they might nonetheless be grouped together insofar as they contrast with the account presented here on each of the points discussed. (Again, the cases of this view include Allison (2004) pp. 99-112, Bird (2006) pp. 139-145, 148-150, Ewing (1938) pp. 33-39, Gardner (1999) pp. 49-52, Hatfield (1990) pp. 89-91, Kemp Smith (2003) pp. 99-109,
This second point brings to light a common misconception as to what
the Exposition is meaning to establish. Frequently it is supposed that the
proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition are ultimately concerned with the
subjective nature of the representation of space, that is, with establishing it to
be a priori and to be an intuition. It is thought that Kant’s inquiry here is
directed towards establishing something subjective. If the account put
forward thus far in the above is correct, however, then Kant is not
straightforwardly and initially concerned with the subjective nature of the
representation of space. Rather, this concern arises as a result of the inquiry
into a prior question. In the above, we have seen that the Metaphysical
Exposition is, in the first instance, an exposition or analysis of the
representation of space. It constitutes the partial distinguishing of the
representation from other philosophical and non-philosophical
representations. Secondly, and more importantly, the Metaphysical
Exposition is a complex argument for the a priori givenness of the


Under standard discussions, the overall aim of the Metaphysical Exposition is to establish
the representation of space to be a priori and to be an intuition. The former claim is
established by the first and second proofs, and the latter by proofs three and four. The
first two proofs are standardly taken to proceed from a premise concerning the concept of
space as presupposed in some other representation, awareness, or experience, while the
latter two proofs proceed from a premise concerning certain other features of the
representation of space, which features have a bearing on whether it is a concept or an
intuition.

Standardly, these premises are interpreted with the aim that they emerge
uncontroversial, commonsensical, or in some way self-evident. Paton, for example,
formulates the premises of the first proof as follows: “The ideas of space and time are
presupposed by experience. If sensa are to be related to physical objects outside my body,
and even if they are to be known as outside and beside […] one another (as they must be
in human experience) then clearly space [is] already presupposed, whether we are aware
of this or not.” (1936, pp. 110-111, emphasis my own) Debate over the premises typically
concerns (i) that in which the concept of space is claimed to be presupposed and whether
this is plausible, (ii) the sense in which the concept of space is such a necessary
presupposition (whether psychological, phenomenological, psychological, for example),
(iii) the sense in which the representation of space bears the further claimed features.
Discussions tend to focus immediately on the content of the claims in question and with
their most plausible rendering.

The inference from these premises to their respective conclusions is then taken to proceed
relatively straightforwardly. Typically, the inference to the claim of a priority in the first
two proofs is underlain by a background distinction between empirical concepts and a
priori concepts (the former being derivable from empirical experience, the latter being
part of the constitution of the mind), while the inference to the claim of the intuitive
nature of the representation of space is underlain by the distinction between concepts and
intuitions.
representation of space by appeal to the marks put forward in the exposition. Now, in aiming to establish the a priori givenness of the representation of space, Kant is not straightforwardly aiming to establish the subjective nature of the representation as such. As we have seen, a representation’s being a priori given is a matter of the representation having a certain ground of the four possible grounds outlined in the Doctrine of Method, and the question of the ground of a representation is not essentially a question of the subjective nature of the representation. In the case of empirically given concepts, for example, the ground of the concept are the combinations found in the objects of empirical experience, and this has little to do with the subject. Rather, the question about the ground of a representation is a question about the ground of the combination of marks that constitutes the representation. It might be, as in the case of our philosophical representations, that this ground is the subject, but this does not imply that claims about the ground of a representation are equivalent to claims about the subjective nature of the representation. Although they might receive the same answer, the question ‘what is the ground of representation x?’ and ‘what is the subjective nature of representation x?’ are distinct questions, and in the Metaphysical Exposition Kant is concerned with the former, not the latter.

Fourthly, the examination above brings to light an unrecognised structure across the proofs – the structure and nature of the complex argument formed by the Metaphysical Exposition as a whole. Commonly, the series of proofs are taken together to establish that the representation of space is a priori and an intuition, establishing the former by means of the first two proofs and the latter by means of the third and fourth. This way of proceeding is standardly made intelligible on the basis of the crucial role that these conclusions play in establishing the subsequent claim of transcendental ideality. That is, in the Metaphysical Exposition Kant establishes that the representation of space is, one, a priori or necessary and, two, an intuition, because these are the conclusions needed in order for him to show that the objects to which we stand in relation by means of these representations are transcendentally ideal. Our findings here, however, yield a subtly different understanding of the series of proofs and render them intelligible in a way that is prior to any claim of transcendental ideality:

As we have emphasised in our discussion above, Kant’s stated aim for the proofs is to establish the representation of space to be “a priori given”
Now, if we are correct in the above, this aim is not straightforwardly synonymous with showing the representation of space to be a priori and intuitive, but is instead a reference to the fourfold division of concepts discussed in the Doctrine. And, as we have noted, this fourfold division does not straightforwardly concern the subjective nature of a representation, but is a distinction among the possible grounds of the combination of marks found in a representation (in relation to the combination of marks of the object of the representation). If this is correct, then the series of proofs has a unity that is not captured in their standard construal as establishing the representation of space to be a priori and intuitive, and an intelligibility prior to any claim of transcendental ideality. The proofs, under this account, are to be understood as a series of proofs that progressively eliminate the other species of concepts of the Doctrine’s fourfold division. As we saw above, it is possible, and indeed plausible, to understand the proofs in this way. If this is correct, then the proofs do not together serve to show some conjunctive claim (‘the representation of space is a priori and the representation of space is intuitive’), but in fact serve to rule out the alternatives of an exhaustive list of possibilities that can be gleaned from an examination of the Doctrine and the appendix. The series of proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition form a complex argument by elimination, and thus are unified in a way that cannot be recognised without the details brought to light in the above.

And the need for carrying out this complex argument by elimination is prior to any claims of transcendental idealism. Under the Critical philosophy, the first stage of analysis involves both bringing the relevant representations to distinctness and establishing which representations these are by establishing which representations involve a combination of marks that is due to the nature of our faculties. The argument by elimination that is constituted by the series of proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition is precisely the carrying out of these first two tasks of arriving at philosophical cognition, which tasks are prior to the further claim of transcendental idealism that is established upon their basis.

(Related to the above, it is worth noting the sense in which ‘given’ is to be understood in the introduction to Metaphysical Exposition as well as in the proofs themselves. As noted, the Exposition is usually emphasised as showing (i) the a priority, and (ii) the intuitive nature of the representation of space, where ‘given’ is frequently taken to be synonymous with ‘intuitive’ or ‘being a deliverance of sensibility’. It is not, as we have seen
above, mistaken that the Metaphysical Exposition is intended to show the intuitive nature of the representation of space; however, it is important to note that ‘given’ is not straightforwardly synonymous with ‘intuitive’. As we have seen, the relevant term is that of ‘a priori given’ as it appears in the Doctrine, in which ‘givenness’ contrasts with the arbitrariness of an arbitrarily thought concept and ‘a priori givenness’ consists in non-arbitrariness that is due to the nature of the faculties of the subject. Within the context of the Exposition, specifically, this non-arbitrariness is due to the nature of sensibility – however, ‘given’ is not to be understood as synonymous with ‘intuitive’.)

Finally, our account above renders the move to the representation of space as an a priori intuition intelligible in a new way. In many discussions of the Aesthetic, the possibility and necessity of identifying a priori intuitive representations is emphasised as a key novel feature of the Critical philosophy. Indeed, Kant himself emphasises the need for the addition of the Transcendental Aesthetic prior to the Logic.71 This novel feature is made intelligible by appeal to the crucial Critical claim of the necessity of both the understanding and sensibility in all cognition, including philosophical cognition, the possibility of which is then secured only by finding such a priori intuitive representations. Again, Kant puts it in this way in the Critique itself.72 The account above, however, makes the possibility and need for finding a priori intuitive representations intelligible in a somewhat deeper way. In the first instance, it allows us to recognise the identification of such representations as the outcome of an analysis of our given representations that has its origin in German Rationalist analysis. Secondly, however, it allows us to see how a corrected form of such analysis will yield the possibility of finding a priori representations of sensibility. And it is the appendix that is crucial in this regard. As we have seen, and as we will come to see in more detail below in the case of the representation of space, the appendix puts forward the considerations that underlie the possibility of an alternative analysis of our obscurely given representations, and it is this latter that yields the possibility of identifying a priori representations that are due to sensibility, that is, intuitive representations. Thus, although the conclusion of the intuitive nature of the representation of space is indeed necessary, both for the possibility of philosophical cognition and for the claim of

71 See, for example, A21/B35-6.

72 See, for example, B73.
transcendental ideality, this conclusion is possible due to the prior recognition of the distinctness of the faculties and the implications that this recognition has for our analysis, an analysis that is continuous with the German Rationalist tradition from which the Critique has emerged. This latter has not, to my knowledge, been recognised in extant literature on the Aesthetic.

As we will see in the next section, recognising this and the above details of the proofs allows us to bring to light certain details of the workings of the proofs that have, until now, gone unappreciated.

IV. Detailed examination of the Metaphysical Exposition

In this fourth section, I turn to a closer examination of the Metaphysical Exposition and its proofs in order to examine these in light of the foregoing. A number of things have been brought to light in the above in terms of which we might now examine the Exposition. First, and beginning with the innermost structure, each of the proofs proceeds from a mark of the representation of space that together serve as the exposition of space. These are the claims that are the result of the analysis of the representation of space and constitute the “distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to” (B38) the representation. Our first task will be to identify these marks across the various proofs. Secondly, as we saw, each of the proofs proceeds from the stated mark(s) to a conclusion concerning the ground of the representation. Each of these proofs is crucial to Kant’s overall aim of showing the ground of the representation of space to be due to the nature of sensibility insofar as each rules out one of the other possible grounds of the representation. Our second task will be to bring to light the premises and workings of these crucial, and somewhat mysterious, proofs that proceed from the distinct marks of the representation to a conclusion concerning its ground. Finally, we will briefly review the workings of the overall complex argument formed by these proofs.

Before we proceed to the proofs, it is worth noting a few preliminary remarks about the Metaphysical Exposition. As we have mentioned, in the Metaphysical Exposition, Kant is concerned to establish the ground of the representation of space. It is worth beginning with a reminder of one of the changes to the method of analysis under the Critical account. The Critical
account, as we have seen, emphasises the necessity of both the understanding and sensibility in philosophical cognition. In analysis, this introduces the need to examine our given representations for those of sensibility as well as the understanding. It introduces the need, in the analysis of our given philosophical representations, to look for philosophical representations of sensibility in addition to those of the understanding. Thus, the Critical method introduces the possibility of representations that feature in the propositions of philosophy, but which are not concepts given a priori, but intuitions given a priori. This is a first point.

A second crucial point is that, prior to the Aesthetic, it is not clear that there will be any such representations. Under the traditional picture of the concepts of philosophy, the representations relevant to philosophy are one and all representations of the understanding. Further, under the Critical account, even supposing the distinctness of the faculties, sensibility is the faculty predominantly for sensations, these being precisely the representations to which philosophical cognition involves no appeal. Thus, as a default position, we might think that the only representations to be found in the case of sensibility in isolation are a posteriori or empirical. The Critical philosophy, however, requires the question of whether we might identify any representations in the case of sensibility that are a priori. If it emerges that there are no such representations, then, given the Critical claim of the necessity of understanding and sensibility, no philosophical cognition would be possible.

Given the above, it is understandable why Kant should, at the outset of the Aesthetic, immediately preceding the Metaphysical Exposition, give the directive that we “first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts […] and] then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation” (A22/B36). The question that lies in the background to the Metaphysical Exposition, and to which its exposition and proofs are aimed is that mentioned above: Are there representations of sensibility that can feature in our philosophical cognition? Within the context of our analysis of all the representations of philosophy, we are here, in the Aesthetic, focussed on those of sensibility. We can abstract from all those of the understanding in order to bring to the fore only those of sensibility, if there be such. This is what Kant is doing at the start of the Aesthetic. He is putting our attention to this portion of the analysis, with the question of whether there are any such representations in the background.
Thus, we set aside all *clearly* irrelevant representations – those of the understanding alone, as captured in the table of pure concepts – leaving behind only the plausible candidates for analysis (with Kant of course knowing that he will be able to show that these are indeed relevant). These are then brought to distinctness by means of some marks, and it is then by means of these marks, the marks of the representations, that we are able to show their ground as being given a priori through the nature of sensibility, and thus to show – thankfully! – that there are representations of sensibility that can play a role in our philosophical cognition.

Such is the broad outline of the Metaphysical Exposition as I understand it. A final point of overview before we proceed to the proofs themselves concerns the different claims that are to be found in the proofs. First, as we have seen, each proof involves a premise or premises that puts forward a mark or marks of the concept of space. Now importantly, and as was brought to light in our discussion in Part V of the marks distinguished in analysis, such marks are always *possible objective marks*, in the sense that these are marks that correspond to the objective determinations of an object in cognition. They are marks that ultimately *characterise the object or objects of the representation*, if there turn out to be such. In contrast, the conclusions of these proofs are not claims that put forward the marks of space so understood, but are claims about the ground of the representation of space. Such claims concern the ground of the combination of marks that constitutes the representation of space. Thus, the proofs proceed from a premise or premises that concern what I have called the ‘objective’ level of the representation of space (the objective determinations it represents space as having) to a conclusion that concerns the ground of the representation. Additionally, as we will see, the inference from the ‘objective level’ premise(s) to the conclusion is made by means of a claim or claims that specify a general relation between the marks of a representation and its ground. Thus, we can see that, in their premises and conclusions, each of the proofs involves at least three different sorts of claim: (i) The expositional or ‘objective level’ claims, (ii) the claims that connect the exposition of the representation to the ground of the representation, and, finally, (iii) the conclusions that concern the ground of the representation.

Let us then proceed to the proofs themselves. For the most part, I will restrict my explicit discussion to the first and second proofs. This is in part because the points I want to make can be made most clearly and easily in reference to these proofs, and in part due to constraints of length. However,
I believe that the picture put forward can be applied mutatis mutandis to the omitted cases, viz. to the third and fourth proofs. Our examination here will proceed from the parts to the whole – from the claims that constitute the exposition of the representation of space, to the proof of the intermediate conclusions on the basis of these, and finally to the complex argument that constitutes the Exposition as a whole. I begin below by distinguishing the marks of the concept of space to which Kant in each case appeals and the statement of which serves as the premise or premises that concern what I have termed the ‘objective’ level of the representation.

If we recall, I claimed that the mark to which Kant appeals in the case of the fourth proof could be identified as that of ‘having an infinite number of simultaneous parts’. Now this proof lent itself nicely to example as the mark to which Kant appeals in it is naturally understood as a mark ‘found in’ the representation of space, in the sense that part of what is represented in representing space is an infinity of simultaneous parts. When we turn to the other proofs, however, the case is not so straightforward. It is far less clear, for example, what the relevant marks or ‘objective level’ in the first proof are:

For in order for certain sensations to be related to something […] in another place in space from that in which I find myself […] thus in order for me to represent them as […] in different places [to one another], the representation of space must already be their ground […]

(A23/B38)

Here, Kant does not at all seem to put forward anything like a list of characteristic marks of the concept of the sort we might expect to find in an exposition. ‘Sensation as related to something in a different place to myself’ is certainly not a characteristic mark of space in the same way that ‘having an infinite number of simultaneous parts’ is. Nor is ‘being a thing in a different place to another’. None of these would naturally come to mind as marks that essentially characterise space. And we seem to fare no better with the second and third proofs.

It is, at this point, important to remind ourselves of the special sort of exposition that Kant is putting forward in these passages. As we have seen, Kant does not solely mean to be specifying the various characteristic marks found in the concept, thereby bringing it to distinctness. He means to be putting forward a *metaphysical* exposition that “contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.” (B38, emphasis omitted) Thus, at this stage
and without having any further understanding of which of the marks of space might fulfil this aim and why, we might expect to find any marks of space being appealed to in these passages. Bearing this in mind, I begin with the somewhat shorter second proof in order to see whether we might bring to light what is at work in the case of this exposition before turning to the rest.

The second proof seemingly both begins and ends with a statement of its conclusion, albeit formulated in slightly different ways:

Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the ground of all outer intuitions. [...]. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances. (A24/B38)

The marks to which Kant appeals thus must be found somewhere between the two. Here we find a contrast drawn between what Kant claims we can represent and what he claims we cannot:

One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. (A24/B39)

It is worth clarifying at the outset that Kant’s statement here is very plausibly abbreviated. In the corresponding proof for time, the symmetry of the contrast is made explicit:

In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. (A31/B46)

I thus take the contrast implicit in the case of space to be as follows: One can never represent objects without space, but one can represent space without any objects in it. In the case of the second proof then, Kant seemingly compares the representation of space with the representation of an object as such. What he puts forward is that the representation of an object is not to be found in the representation of space (we can represent space without representing any objects), but that the representation of
space is to be found in the representation of an object (we cannot represent an object without representing space).

Thus, as we might expect in the case of an exposition with a very specific aim, the relevant marks or representations distinguished in the analysis are not those that we might naturally expect, nor are they only the marks that are found in the representation under analysis. In the case of the second proof, Kant compares the relations between the representation of space and the representation of an object in general. The relevant marks or representations here are ‘space’ and ‘an object in general’. And indeed, in this analysis, no mark or representation is put forward as a characteristic mark of space. Instead, we are given a mark or representation that is not found in the representation of space, but instead in which the representation of space is to be found. Thus, Kant’s concern here is not all and only the marks found in the concept in question. What is instead of interest is the relation between the representation in question and certain other carefully chosen marks or representations such that the relation of the representation to these marks or representations is of significance to its ground. (If we recall, in Parts III and IV, we saw that the procedure of analysis of a concept involved establishing the relations between various proposed marks and the indistinct concept. In the case of a straightforward analysis, many of these relations are set aside in the final analysis insofar as we are concerned with only those marks found in the concept. In this special case of a metaphysical exposition, however, it is the relations to various other significant or relevant marks or representations that are singled out while the others are set aside. It is in this sense that a metaphysical exposition is an ‘exposition’ of the concept or representation in a relatively loose sense.) Further, as we can see, it is not only a partial analysis of the representation in question that might be found. Given the nature of the expositions as proofs, if the analysis of another representation contrasts in a significant way with that of space, we might expect a partial analysis of this other representation. This is the case with the representation of an ‘object in general’ above. Our proof puts forward a partial analysis of the representation of space (the mark or representation of an object in general is not found in the concept of space) and a partial analysis of the representation of an object in general (the representation of space is not found in the representation of an object in general) as the contrast between the two turns out, for yet-to-be-specified reasons, to be significant.
Further, as we will see, the expositional premises of some of these proofs are in fact complex. Kant does not in every case put forward as the exposition a single relation between the representation of space and some other single mark. Instead, the relation to the crucial mark is identified mediately by means of the immediate relation it bears to some other mark and the immediate relation this mark bears to the representation of space. These two connecting steps are put forward as distinct steps below to yield the relation in question. Thus, in these proofs, we find the manifestation of the Critical method’s distinction between ‘immediately certain’ and ‘mediately certain’ characteristic marks – a distinction that, as we have seen, Kant has already made in the *Inquiry*. The intermediate steps in the first proof below will come to light more clearly in our subsequent discussion.

Having these clarifications in hand, I return to the four proofs and the task of distinguishing the relevant marks or representations to which Kant, in each case, appeals (that in the proof which constitutes the ‘possible objective marks’ as discussed above) along with the relations put forward between these and the representation of space. These form the exposition of the representation of space from which the proofs proceed and constitute the ‘objective level’ claims of the proofs.

(i) In the first proof, the representation of space is compared with the marks or representations, ‘object in a different place to another object’ and ‘object in a different place to myself’. The expositional claims are: (1) The representation ‘object in a different place to myself’ requires or includes the representation of space. (2) The representation ‘object in a different place to another object’ requires or includes the representation ‘object in a different place to myself’. (3) (Thus) the representation ‘object in a different place to another object’ requires or includes the representation of space.

(ii) In the second proof, the representation of space is compared with the representation ‘object in general’. The expositional claims are: (1) The representation ‘object in general’ requires or includes the representation of space. (2) The representation of space does not require or include the representation ‘object in general’.

(iii) In the third proof, the representation ‘space’, ‘multitude’, ‘part of space’ are compared. The expositional claims are: (1) The
representation of space rules out or excludes the representation ‘multitude’. (2) The representation ‘part of space’ does not rule out or exclude ‘multitude’. (3) The representation of space does not require or include the representation ‘part of space’. (4) The representation ‘part of space’ requires or includes the representation of space.

(iv) In the fourth proof, the representation of space is compared with the mark or representation ‘having an infinite number of simultaneous parts’. The expositional claims are: (1) The representation of space requires or includes the mark ‘having an infinite number of simultaneous parts’.

The above, I take it, constitutes the exposition of or “distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to” (B38) the representation of space, as it is put forward in the Metaphysical Exposition. We have not thus far examined any of the conclusions that are meant to follow from this analysis, nor have we examined or evaluated the analysis itself. My aim in the above has been simply to try to isolate the expositional claims in each of the proofs.

Now, as we have noted, the exposition presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic is not simply a statement of the marks of the representation in question. These expositional claims are put forward in the service of the exposition as ‘Metaphysical’. That is, these expositional claims play the further role of showing that the representation of space is one ‘given a priori’, and indeed, that it is one given by the nature of sensibility rather than the understanding. Having then in hand these expositional claims, let us turn to an examination of the first proof, as a proof that proceeds from its respective expositional claims to a conclusion that concerns the ground of the representation of space.

As is familiar, the first of the proofs is concerned with showing that the representation of space is not an empirical concept. This is the conclusion of the first proof. As Kant puts it forward in the first line: “Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences.” (A23/B38) The proof proceeds from the exposition outlined above to this conclusion.

Thus, as we can see, the first of these proofs, like the rest, proceeds to a conclusion that denies of the representation of space one of the possible grounds outlined in Part III and IV and above. In the case of this first proof, the ground in question is that of empirical objects – that is, that the
combination of marks constituting the representation of space is grounded on the combinations of marks of empirical objects. By the end of the first proof, Kant has, if the proof succeeds, ruled out such ‘empirical givenness’ as the ground of the representation of space.

Now, as is the case in the other proofs as well, this first proof seems to proceed from a statement of its conclusion (“Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences” at A23/B38) to its exposition (“in order for certain sensations, etc....” at A23/B38) to end again with its conclusion, albeit slightly reformulated (“the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation” again at A23/B38). Thus, considering what is explicitly put forward in the proof, it would seem that it proceeds straight from its expositional claim to the conclusion concerning the ground of the representation of space. However, as in the case of the other proofs, this appearance is misleading. The proof is certainly not rendered its strongest by supposing that Kant proceeds straightforwardly from this exposition to the conclusion concerning the ground. Rather, I take it that this proof, along with the rest, is best understood if we suppose it to take the form of a reductio. The proof begins by implicitly positing a claim concerning the ground of the representation that is ultimately to be denied (viz. the claim that the representation of space is a concept given empirically), draws out the implications of this claim, and then shows these to conflict with what we find to be the case. Finally, on the basis of these, Kant concludes that the representation of space is not an empirical concept, ruling out one of the grounds in question. What is then explicitly put forward in the proof is then only the latter part of this line of reasoning, viz. the claim about what we find to be the case that conflicts with the original supposition and the denial of this supposition as the conclusion of the proof.

Now, if the argument is indeed to be understood as a reductio, then it would seem that the claim that is doing the work in showing the implications of the original supposition to be false is the expositional claim, that is, the claim that puts forward the relations that the representation of space bears to the representation(s) or marks with which it is compared, as set out above. Thus, the proof does indeed proceed from the exposition it puts forward to the relevant conclusion concerning the ground of the representation of space. However, it does so by means of a reductio: The reductio draws out the implications that supposing the representation of
space to have a certain ground has for the exposition of the representation of space. And its intermediate premise(s) of the proof is then that which puts forward these implications. This might be schematised in more detail as follows:

1. **Supposition for reductio stating the ground:** The ground of the representation of space is X.

2. **Intermediate premise stating the implications of (1) for the exposition of space:** If the ground of the representation of space is X, then the representation of space bears relation R to representation(s) T (that is, our analysis should yield such an exposition).

3. **Expositional premise:** Upon analysis, we find that the representation of space does not bear relation R to representation(s) T (our analysis does not yield such an exposition).

Thus, the ground of the representation of space is not X.

Each of the other proofs proceeds in the same manner. We have a supposition concerning the ground for the reductio, a drawing out of the implications of the supposition, and the exposition that is put forward as refuting the initial assumption.

Having now in hand a more systematic statement of the proof, we can see that it turns crucially on two claims: The implications of the supposed ground of the representation for the exposition we ought to uncover in analysis as put forward in premise (2) (this is the claim that connects the exposition with the ground of the representation as mentioned earlier), and the exposition that we do in fact uncover in analysis as put forward in premise (3) (this is the expositional or ‘objective level’ claim mentioned earlier). Let us begin then with the first of these claims, focussing on this first proof, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the workings of these proofs.

The appeal to the ground of the representation of space in premise (2) is, I have claimed, an appeal to the distinction between possible grounds for the combination of marks found in the concept. As noted in Part IV, an empirical concept is the first of the concepts found under the fourfold distinction of concepts of the Doctrine of Method: In his discussion of the dogmatic method of definition, Kant begins by examining (and ruling out) the possibility of definition for empirical concepts. With regard to these concepts, Kant claims, we have “only some marks of a certain kind of object
of the senses” (A727/B755). Now, as the Doctrine indicates, such concepts are formed by separating out, from the multitude of marks combined in some empirical object or objects, some finite number of these, which are then unified or combined by the understanding so as to constitute the newly formed concept in question. The marks so combined or ‘thought’ in the concept might vary across cases of using the concept – a variation dependent on the distinctions that are relevant or useful in the context (A727-8/B755-6).

With regard to the representation of space then, the supposition of the first premise is this. The concept of space is formed by separating out some marks of some empirical object or objects and combining these into a concept. More specifically, the concept of space is formed by separating out the mark of being in a certain place (this is separated out from different objects being found in different places) and abstracting from all extraneous marks. Now, prima facie, this supposition has implications for our analysis in the following way: If a concept, as a combination of marks, is formed by separating out and combining some of the marks found combined in an empirical object, then the representation of an empirical object and its marks must be possible independently of and prior to the representation of the concept, but not vice versa. The representation of the empirical object or objects whose marks we separate out must be possible without the representation of space while the representation of space is not possible with the representation of these objects. Thus, if the representation of space is an empirical concept, the empirical representation of different objects spatially related to one another is possible prior to the representation of space. (But, as the proof continues, when we analyse the representation of space, comparing it with or differentiating it from our other given representations, specifically that of the representation of different empirical objects located in space, we find, first, that the empirical representation of an object in a different place to myself requires or includes the representation of space and, second, that the empirical representation of an object in a different place to another empirical object requires or includes the empirical representation of an object in a different place to myself. Hence, any empirical representation of an object in a different place to

73 Such concepts are thus non-arbitrary insofar as the combination of marks is not simply any combination of marks chosen by the understanding. Even though the marks thought in the concept might vary across use, and indeed, even though the understanding might never think all the marks of the object(s) in question in the concept, it is nonetheless constrained to the combination found in the object(s).
another object requires or includes the representation of space. Thus, we arrive at the inference needed for the conclusion of the reductio: The supposition that space is an empirical concept conflicts with what our analysis of the representation of space and these other representations reveals, and thus is false.)

Filling in the details of the schema with those of the first proof, we might thus formalise it as follows:

(1) Supposition for reductio: The ground of (the combination of marks found in) the representation of space is the combinations of marks found in empirical objects in different places to one another. (I.e. Space is an empirical concept.)

(2) If the ground of the representation of space is the combinations of marks found in objects in different places to one another, then the representation of objects in different places to one another does not require or include the representation of space.

(3) Upon analysis, we find that (i) the representation ‘object in a different place to myself’ requires or includes the representation of space, (ii) the representation ‘object in a different place to another object’ requires or includes the representation ‘object in a different place to myself’, and thus (iii) that the representation ‘object in a different place to another object’ requires or includes the representation of space.

Thus, the ground of the representation of space are not the combinations of marks found in objects in different places to one another. (I.e. Space is not an empirical concept.)

Thus, in this first proof, we can see that the ground of the combination of marks in a representation has implications for the relations that the representation bears to certain of our other representations.

In the above, we have examined a prima facie connection between the ground and exposition in the case of the first proof in particular. What is needed, however, if we are to understand the workings of the proofs as such, is a general formulation of this connection. Why is it that a difference in the ground of the combination of marks of a representation should have implications for its analysis? That is, what is the general, systematic account that underlies premise (2) in the proof above and the corresponding premises in the other proofs?

It seems to me that such an account can indeed be given. What is in question is the connection between the supposed ground of a concept (that
is, whether its combination of marks is arbitrary, or is a combination of marks found in an empirical object, or is a combination of marks that is due to the nature of the faculties and its exposition (that is, the relation of the marks to the concept or of the marks of the concept to the marks of certain other concepts). The key to this connection is to recognise that the division of concepts according to their ground concerns, in part, what determines the combination of marks of the concept in question. In the case of an empirically given concept, the combination of marks found in the concept is partially determined by the marks found in the empirical object or objects in question. (This determination is only partial since the understanding plays a role in choosing to consider certain marks rather than others, which choice, as noted, may vary according to the occasion of use of the concept. Nonetheless, the marks available for this choice are determined by the marks of the empirical object itself.) In the case of an arbitrarily constructed concept, by contrast, the combination of marks is determined arbitrarily. That is, the combination is simply a matter of the stipulative choice of the subject. Finally, in the case of concept given a priori, the combination of marks is determined by the nature of the faculty to which the representation is due.

Now, this difference in what determines the combinations of marks in a concept does not have implications for every claim that might be put forward as part of an exposition (of the concept). That the combination of marks in the arbitrary concept ‘centaur’ is determined by the arbitrary choice of the subject, for example, does not have implications for whether the concept will include the combination of marks that constitutes some other empirically given concept, for example, the concept ‘feathered animal’. However, this difference in what determines the combination of marks in a concept does have implications for certain of its expositional claims. That is, it does have implications for the relation of certain marks to the concept or of certain marks of the concept to marks of certain other concepts. Consider first empirically given concepts. Given that the marks of the concept are partially determined by the marks found in some empirical object or objects, this will have implications for the relation of the concept to the representation(s) of the empirical object(s). The combination that

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74 This is only a partial characterisation of this division of concepts since the division also concerns the relation of the concept to an object. This is clearest in the case of the distinction between an arbitrary concept and an arbitrary concept whose object can be constructed. For the purposes of our discussion here, however, this dimension of the division of concepts can be set aside.
constitutes the empirically given concept will presuppose the representation(s) of the objects. The empirically given concept will not be possible without these other representations, but these other representations will be possible without the empirically given concept. Given that a concept’s being empirically given is partly defined in terms of its combination of marks being determined in this way, this turns out to be part of what an empirically given concept is.

Secondly, consider the case of arbitrary concepts. The combination of marks found in such concepts are determined entirely arbitrarily, simply by the choice of the subject. Such a combination is not determined by the combinations of marks of any objects whatsoever. So, what determines the combination of marks in this second case has implications for the relation of the concept to the representation of any and all objects (whatever these may turn out to be). The concept will not presuppose any representation of any object and it will be possible without any such representation (and any representation of any object will be possible without the arbitrary concept). Again, this turns out to be part of what an arbitrary concept is.

And finally, we can consider the case of concepts given a priori. The implications of this sort of concept for any expositional claims stands somewhat in contrast to the two concepts above. Concepts given a priori are concepts whose combinations of marks are determined by the nature of the faculty to which the concept is due. We noted earlier that this fourth division in the Doctrine is best read as including both concepts that are due to the nature of the understanding and intuitions that are due to the nature of sensibility. So that is, in the case of representations (either concepts or intuitions) given a priori, the combination of marks of the representation is determined by the nature of the faculty to which the representation is due, whether the understanding or sensibility. Now, this determination of a combination of marks by the nature of a faculty potentially has a number of complex implications for an exposition of the representation. Prima facie, with regard to the categories, for example, the representation of any object presupposes these representations of the understanding. We might thus suppose that a representation being given a priori has the converse implication to that of concept being empirically given: In the latter case, the representation of the object is possible without the concept, but not vice versa, whereas in the former case, the representation of any object is not possible without the concept, but not vice versa. However, at least two considerations can here show this to be false. First, the categories are only shown to be necessary for the representation of any object at the point of the transcendental deduction. The premises that we are considering (premises that connect the ground of a concept to its implications for the exposition of the concept) are prior to the transcendental deduction in the establishment of our a priori cognition and so these
implications that are of interest to us here, however, are the implications that such a ground of a representation has for the content of the representation. A faculty is in part distinguished from other faculties by, what I have termed, the subjective determinations of its representations (concepts stand us in a mediate relation to an object, intuitions in immediate relation)\textsuperscript{76} and in another part by the objective determinations of its representations (the marks combined in a concept are objective determinations that are universal or general, while the marks combined in an intuition are objective determinations that are particular).\textsuperscript{77} Given this, that the combination of marks is determined by the nature of the faculty to which it is due implies that the representation will have the content relevant to that, and only that, faculty. That is, this third and final ground, a concept’s being a priori, has implications for the marks that will be found to be part of the representation itself.

And these implications are indeed precisely those that we find in the expositional claims across the proofs. The first and second proofs can be notably distinguished from the third and fourth in terms of the representations with that of space is compared. In the first proof, the expositional claims concern the relation of the representation of space to that of empirical objects in different spatial locations. In the second, we find the representation of space compared with that of the representation of any object as such. By contrast, the third and fourth proofs appeal, as we have premises should not be taken to involve an implicit appeal to the deduction of the categories. Second, and more telling, it simply is not the case that the a priori givenness of a concept is correlated with a concept’s being presupposed in any representation of an object. One set of counterexamples here is the ideas of reason as treated in the later Dialectic of the Critique. These concepts are indeed given a priori, but Kant goes to great lengths to show that the concepts do not stand us in relation to the objects of our cognition and are not necessary in the representation of the objects of our cognition.

This supposed implication is seemingly further complicated in the case of representations of sensibility given a priori. Given that sensibility is the faculty by means of which we stand in immediate relation to objects, it seems that the corresponding case of intuitions given a priori, but where the representation of any object is possible without such representations, is less clearly a possibility. Indeed, this might point to the disagreement over whether establishing the representations of space and time as pure intuitions is distinct from establishing them as formal intuitions.

\textsuperscript{76} See A19/B33 and A320/B377. Although also epistemic determinations of the representations, these determinations are subjective insofar as they are not part of the objective content of the representations – that is, the mark ‘mediate relation’ is not a possible mark of the object represented by the representation.

\textsuperscript{77} I do not here mean to provide an exhaustive characterisation of what Kant understands by ‘faculty’, but mean only to appeal to certain uncontroversial necessary features that distinguish faculties from one another.
noted earlier, to representations that can be taken to be those found in the representation of space – the representation of ‘multitude’ and ‘part of space’ in the third, and the representation ‘infinite given magnitude’ in the fourth. These latter expositions involve an appeal to marks found in the representation of space that could the content of sensibility and only sensibility. \(^78\)

We have gone some way in understanding the claimed implications of the ground of a representation for its relations to other representations. But there is yet a question that lurks in the background of this discussion. It is one which concerns the second component to the proof and which crucially requires answering if we are to understand the force behind the proofs: On what basis does Kant claim the proffered analysis in the expositional premise to be the correct one? Do we, in some way, simply ‘see’ the relevant relations among our representations? Or is there some further ground for these premises? To answer these questions, I turn to the second proof, for the point I mean to make can be made most clearly in the case of this proof.

As is familiar, the second proof aims to show that the representation of space is \textit{a priori}. That is, it concludes that the representation of space is “an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.” (A24/B39) The sparsity of Kant’s explicit claims is most evident in this proof, and Kant again simply puts forward this conclusion along with the relevant exposition, viz. “[o]ne can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it.” (\textipa{ibid.}) Again, however, the proof is best understood as a reductio: Although the representation of space has been shown, in the first proof, not to be an empirical concept (its ground is not that of empirical objects), this does not yet establish it as given \textit{a priori} – as a representation that has its ground in the subject’s faculties. It remains possible that the representation

\(^78\) As noted, the standard view of the Metaphysical Exposition also typically includes a division between the first and second proofs and the third and fourth. Under these accounts, the distinction is typically underlain by the background distinctions at work in the proofs. The first and second are typically taken to turn on the distinction between empirical and a priori concepts, while the third and fourth are taken to turn on the background distinction between concepts and intuitions. The account presented here has the virtue of unifying the four proofs as concerned with the differing possible grounds of the representation of space, which grounds themselves then yield a distinction between proofs one/two and three/four due to their differing implications for the exposition of space.
of space is an arbitrarily thought concept – a representation that might seem to have a ground other than the understanding’s arbitrary construction, but which in fact does not. The relevant proposal here then, the proposal asserted for the reductio, is that space is an arbitrarily thought concept.

The proof continues by putting forward the implications of this assumption for the analysis of the representation of space. If the representation of space was an arbitrarily thought concept, then it has the following implications for the relation of the representation of space to certain other representations: Insofar as any concept is merely arbitrarily thought, it would seem that the representation of an object would be independent of the concept. The representation of an object as such cannot depend on any arbitrarily combined concepts that may or may not happen to be thought. Thus, when we consider the representation of space in relation to the representation of an object in general, it is possible to represent an object without this arbitrarily thought concept. Indeed, as Kant emphasises in the Inquiry, if an arbitrarily combined concept should stand us in relation to an object, this would be “a happy coincidence indeed” (2:277). The representation of an object, then, is prior to and possible without the arbitrarily thought concept of space. Thus, again, we see the way in which a concept’s having a certain ground has implications for the relations uncoverable in analysis.

Now, this implication is then shown, in the third premise, to conflict with what is to be found when we do analyse the representation of space. Upon analysis, so Kant tells us, we find that the representation of an object requires the representation of space. The representation of an object is not possible without the representation of space.) Thus, the representation of space is not an arbitrarily thought concept, and, since the first proof has shown the concept not to be empirical, it must be a representation that has its ground in the faculties of the subject.) We might formalise this according to our schema above as follows:

(1) Supposition for reductio: The ground of (the combination of marks found in) the representation of space is arbitrary combination. (i.e. Space is an arbitrarily combined concept.)

(2) If the ground of the representation of space is arbitrary combination, then the representation of an object does not require or include the representation of space.
(3) Upon analysis, we find that the representation of an object does require or include the representation of space.

Thus, the ground of the representation of space is not arbitrary combination. (I.e. Space is not an arbitrarily combined concept.)

Now it seems to me that the workings of this expositional premise, and indeed of the expositional claims in all four proofs, cannot be understood without recourse to the changes to analysis made under the Critical philosophy that we examined in Part IV – the changes underlain by the case in the appendix. Recalling Part IV, according to the case in the appendix, the correct differentiation of our representations from one another in analysis has a further requirement. We are to take into account the faculty of the representations in question, or alternatively, to precede our comparisons of these representations with transcendental reflection. Representations of sensibility are not to be differentiated as concepts or representations of the understanding, nor vice versa. As we saw, this directive was to hold quite generally with regard to the indistinctly given representations that are ultimately to feature in our philosophical cognition. It holds specifically then as well with regard to the comparisons of the representation of space with other representations as found in the expositions of the proofs. If these expositions are to differentiate our representations correctly, we must take account of the faculty of the representations appealed to in them. This is a first point to be noted.

Secondly, as we have seen above, part of the aim of the Metaphysical Exposition is to show that the representation of space is correctly differentiated as a representation of sensibility, not as a concept. Thus, in the case of the comparisons contained in the third premise, the faculty to which the representation of space is due is still in question. We cannot at this point then, with regard to the representation of space, take it to be a representation of one or another faculty. Nonetheless, the directive of the appendix does still hold with regard to any other representations involved in these comparisons.

Thirdly, and importantly, we must remind ourselves of the directive that we are given just prior to embarking on the Metaphysical Exposition. Recall that at A22/B36, Kant directs us to isolate sensibility. In the subsequent passages, including the proofs of the Exposition, we are concerned only with the representations of sensibility. All representations of the understanding have been for the moment set aside.
The crucial consequence of these considerations then is this. In the comparisons put forward in the proofs of the Exposition, the representations being compared are, with the exception of the representation of space, one and all to be taken to be representations of sensibility. At this first stage on the route to philosophical cognition, Kant is concerned with sensibility in isolation and with the differentiation of its representations. And the correct differentiation of these will rely on us taking this into account.

Thus, the proofs are to be understood as follows. As we have emphasised, the ground of the representation of space is in question across the Exposition. Similarly, as we have seen, the representations with which we are at present concerned are solely those of sensibility. The representations with which the representation of space is compared are representations of sensibility. What Kant then does, across the proofs, is to ‘test’ the possible grounds of the representation of space against this background of other representations whose faculty is, as it were, known or ‘fixed’. The proposed ground is varied across the proofs and, in each case, a conflict results between the exposition implied under the proposed ground and the correct exposition revealed by analysis. To relate this to our schema for the proofs:

(1) Supposition for reductio: The ground of the representation of space is X.

(2) If the ground of the representation of space is X, then the representation of space bears relation R to representation(s) T.

(3) (Upon analysis, we find that) the representation of space does not bear relation R to representation(s) T.

Thus, the ground of the representation of space is not X.

We have, as noted, two analyses in question – the implied analysis in (2) and the proffered analysis in (3). In (2), the ground of every representation mentioned in the analysis is determinate. The ground of the representation of space is made determinate by the assumption in (1). In (3), by contrast, the ground of the representation of space is indeterminate. This is our analysis in which the ground of the representation of space is in question. Crucially, however, the ground of the representation(s) T in (2) and (3) is determinate. The representation(s) T are representations of sensibility. Thus,
the proof turns on, one, the faculty of representation(s) T being determinate and, two, their ground being the nature of the faculty of sensibility.

Let us add this qualification to the schema for the second proof, which I reproduce below for ease of reference:

(1) Supposition for reductio: The ground of (the combination of marks found in) the representation of space is arbitrary combination by the understanding. (I.e. Space is an arbitrarily combined concept.)

(2) If the ground of the representation of space is arbitrary combination, then the representation (of sensibility) of an object does not require or include the representation of space (as arbitrarily combined by the understanding).

(3) Upon analysis, we find that the representation (of sensibility) of an object does require or include the representation of space (where the ground of combination is in question).

Thus, the ground of the representation of space is not arbitrary combination. (I.e. Space is not an arbitrarily combined concept.)

Recall that Kant’s concern was to rule out the second of the three possible grounds of the representation (arbitrary combination) and show it to be a priori. The representation of space was compared with the representation of an object in general. Now, according to the reductio, if the representation of space is an arbitrarily thought concept, then the representation of an object in general does not require or include the representation of space. This is the implied first analysis as in (2). However, as the proof puts forward, when we analyse our representations, we find that this is not the case. The representation of an object does require or include the representation of space. This is the correct analysis, as in (3). Introducing the newly-mentioned qualifications, these analyses are to be understood as follows: In the implied first analysis, all grounds of the mentioned representations are determinate. Thus, the ground of the representation of an object is determinate and the ground of the representation of space is determinate. In the second analysis, the ground of the representation of space is in question, while the ground of any other mentioned representations remains determinate. Thus, even if the ground of the representation of space has not yet been established, the representations with which it is compared do have a determinate ground.
Crucially, however, the ground of the representations with which the representation of space is compared – the representation of an object as such – is not to be confused. Recall that, for the purposes of the Aesthetic, Kant requires that we first “isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts [and] detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation.” (A22/B36, emphasis my own) It is important that we keep in mind, then, that the representations with which space is compared in the two analyses are representations of sensibility. That is, crucially, the representation of an object in general found in (2) and (3) is not to be understood as the concept of an object in general. It is the representation of an object by means of sensibility – it is the intuitive representation of an object.

Thus, when Kant puts forward the analysis in premise (3) that the ‘representation of an object requires or includes the representation of space’, he is not comparing the representation of space with the concept of an object. He is comparing the representation of space with the intuitive representation of an object – the representation of an object by means of sensibility. Thus, Kant is not claiming that an object as represented by the understanding requires or includes the representation of space – that it is impossible to entertain the thought of an object without the representation of space. Rather, he is claiming that the intuitive representation of an object is impossible without the representation of space. It is impossible to represent an object by means of sensibility without the representation of space.

Now in order to see how this helps our understanding of the proffered analysis, let us briefly set aside the first proof and return to the preceding tradition. How would the corresponding analysis look under German Rationalism? Recall the crucial distinction between the German Rationalist method and the Critical method brought to light in Part IV. In contrast to the Critical method, German Rationalist analysis does not recognise the distinction between representations of the understanding and representations of sensibility. In its analyses, German Rationalism treats all representations as if they were ultimately representations of the understanding. The only relations recognised between a representation and some proposed mark are those that can be recognised in thought or differentiated by means of the understanding alone. Thus, in comparing the representation of space with that of an object as such, we are to test whether the concept of an object in general cannot be thought without the concept of space or whether it cannot be thought with it. We test whether it
is contradictory to think the concept of an object without that of the concept of space.

Our result here in the case of the German Rationalist comparison between the representation of space and that of an object, then, will be different to the Critical one above: There is no contradiction in thinking an object without also thereby thinking the concept of space. Indeed, we can, according to both German Rationalism and the Critical philosophy, form the concept of an independent substance in the absence of any representation of spatial properties or of space. Admittedly, under the German Rationalist account, once we think of two or more such substances, the representation of space is included as a certain set of relations between these substances. However, the prior concept of a single independent substance is certainly not contradictory under the Leibnizian account. Thus, in contrast to the Critical analysis of these representations, the representation of an object does not, under German Rationalist analysis, require or include that of space.

Similarly, we might ask whether, under this preceding tradition, the concept of space can be thought without the concept of an object in general. Now, as noted above, the concept of space is the concept of a certain set of relations that hold between individual substances or objects. Thus, under the German Rationalist account, the concept of these individual substances must precede the concept of any relations between them. And so, under this account, it is not possible to represent space without the representation of an object – the former requires or presupposes the latter. Again then, we have a contrasting result under German Rationalist analysis.

Thus, an entirely different analysis is yielded under German Rationalism: The representation (concept) of an object does not require or include the representation (concept) of space, while the representation

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79 It might be objected here that this does not hold unqualifiedly. Perhaps under some contemporary accounts, and certainly under Kant’s critical account, there is a sense in which it is contradictory to think an object without thinking thereby also thinking of space. Under Kant’s account, there is a sense in which such a thought is ‘empty’, because the only thoughts that we can have of actual or existing objects are sensible objects. It is debatable whether this amounts to the thought being contradictory, however.

Nevertheless, these considerations are not strictly relevant to our discussion here. What is in question here is the German rationalist analysis. And since, under German rationalism, the pure understanding can stand us in direct relation to an object, the worry does not arise.

80 See, for example, B429, and Baumgarten (1739, §191).

81 See Baumgarten (1739, §§238-239).
(concept) of space includes the representation (concept) of an object. Thus, any attempted proof for the non-arbitraryness of the representation of space on the basis of the impossibility of representing an object without it will not go through, and the analysis must serve a quite different proof (viz. the opposing claim that the representation is an empirically given concept). Now this is noteworthy in the first instance as it illustrates the difference in relations and in analyses yielded under German Rationalism and under the Critical philosophy as discussed in Part IV. I will return to this below.

Secondly, however, and what is of present interest, this contrast gives us insight into the basis for the proffered analyses:

Under German Rationalist analysis, we arrive at the expositional claim that the representation of an object does not require the representation of space, where both of these are taken to be representations of the understanding or concepts. Put in another way, the concept of an object does not presuppose the representation of space, or, we can think – that is, represent by means of the understanding – an object without the representation of space. Now, in the case of this comparison, no special problem seems to arise in admitting the claimed relations. The ground of the relations is not especially mysterious: We examine our concepts for what we already indistinctly think in them and simply ‘see’ that they bear this or that relation. We ‘see’ that a logical contradiction is or is not involved, where this logical contradiction is ultimately a matter of immediately apprehending that the two must or cannot be thought together. Put another way, as in Part IV, it is a matter of representability – we simply apprehend that it is possible or impossible for us to represent something. We apprehend that we cannot, by means of the understanding, represent the two together (or must represent the two together). There is no further inference or line of reasoning here that gives us the basis for the claimed relations between the concepts, either under Kant’s view or under the German Rationalist account.

Evidence for this can be found in Kant’s discussions of philosophical method and his distinction between immediate and mediate marks: In our discussion in Parts III and IV, we saw that Kant distinguished those marks whose relation to a concept was mediate and needed to be apprehended by means of some intermediate mark or marks from those marks whose relation to a concept was immediate and could be apprehended as immediately found in a concept (and indeed, this held true for each of the intermediate connections in the case of mediate marks). To reiterate the
discussion of the concept of appetite in the Inquiry, Kant tells us that we are “able to say with certainty that every appetite presupposed the representation of the object of the appetite; that this representation was an anticipation of what was to come in the future; that the feeling of pleasure was connected with it; and so forth. [We are] constantly aware of all this in the immediate consciousness of appetite.” (2:284, emphasis my own) In the case of immediately certain marks then, the relation of mark to concept is self-evident.

The crucial rub of this then is that, if the ground of the proffered relations in the case of concepts is not mysterious, then we need not find them mysterious in the Critical case. In the case of concepts, we ‘see’ that one concept requires another concept by apprehending that it is impossible to represent, by means of the understanding, the one without the other (we immediately apprehend conceptual presupposition or contradiction). And so it is in the case of intuitions. So too we might ‘see’ that one intuition or representation of sensibility requires another by apprehending that it is impossible to represent, by means of sensibility, the one without the other.

Returning to the second proof then, the proposal here is this. In the expositional premise, Kant claims that it is impossible to represent an object without space (but possible to represent space without any objects). Now, as we have seen, this expositional claim does not seem to hold when we take the claim to be conceptual. It is possible to think the concept of an object without the representation of space. However, this is less plausible when we take the representations to be intuitions: Suppose we consider the (any) representation of a sensible object. Further, suppose that we consider any such representation in abstraction from the representation of space. It seems that we have, at the same time, removed any possibility of representing the sensible object. Once we cease representing space as a whole, we cease representing any external objects of the senses. And this apprehension is immediate. Just as we apprehend that is conceptually impossible to represent space as a set of relations between individual substances without representing substance, so too we apprehend that it is intuitively impossible to represent an object of the senses without the representation of space.

In the above, we have been examining the expositional claims found in the proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition, claims upon which the Exposition crucially turns. We have seen that they are to be understood as the uncovering of intuitive, rather than intellectual or conceptual, relations
between our representations. And we have seen that such relations need not be taken to be any more mysterious than the relations between concepts, when these are uncovered in analysis.

It would seem, however, that more needs to be said. Our aim was to uncover the ground for Kant’s proffered expositions, or analyses, and the basis on which he puts them forward as correct. Thus far, we have made only a negative claim, viz. that, even though the relations are less familiar, there is no further mystery that is added in the case of representations of sensibility. Yet we have not put forward any positive claims in explanation of the analyses. We have not yet made out how it is that we are to tell that some proffered analysis is the correct one. (And indeed, for all we have said, this question extends to the analysis of conceptual representations as well as intuitive.) We might then reiterate: What is the basis for the analyses? What justifies the claim that the ‘(sensible) representation of an object requires or include the representation of space’, and the others like it?

These questions seem to lead to a search for some sort of further basis: What are the criteria that we are to employ in order to tell whether certain representations bear the claimed relation to one another or no? If such criteria could be uncovered in Kant’s account, then we would have some basis for accepting one analysis of our representations rather than another. Another way of formulating this point can be given by returning to our claims in Part IV. As we saw there, the case in the appendix introduces a further requirement into our analysis, viz. the requirement to recognise the faculty to which the representations under comparison belong, or, the requirement of transcendental reflection. Such recognition allows for the correct analysis of our representations by allowing us to employ the correct terms of differentiation, viz. those of the faculty of the representations in question. If we recall, we are to employ explicitly those terms that are yet only employed implicitly in the case of the still obscure representation. However, the discussion in Part IV left the matter there. No more was said as to what precisely these terms were. If we could give a specification of these terms – the terms of differentiation of the understanding and by contrast those of sensibility – we would be able, by employing the correct terms, to tell whether the analyses put forward were indeed correct, as Kant claims. It would seem then that, in order to understand the basis of the analyses put forward in the Metaphysical Exposition, we must turn to the faculties of understanding and sensibility themselves. We must uncover the terms
according to which the understanding differentiates the relations between marks in its representations and the terms according to which sensibility differentiates the relations between marks in its representations.

The above line has some appeal. Yet I believe that, as an account of the ground of the proffered analyses in the Metaphysical Exposition, it is incorrect. I do not think that such an account will tell us why Kant thinks that we should accept the analyses as correct. There are at least two lines of consideration that might lead us to this conclusion. The first of these concerns the role that the expositional claims play within the proofs. Recall our reconstruction of the proof as a reductio. The initial premises of the argument explicitly suppose the representation of space to have a certain ground and draw out the implications of this for our analysis of the representation. Following these premises, the expositional premise (or premises) puts forward an analysis that conflicts with these implications. Now, the expositional premise (or premises) is introduced ultimately as evidence for the ground of space (that is, as evidence that it has a ground other than the one assumed). So, if we are looking for what it is that justifies the expositional premise – for the appeal that is made in putting forward the premise – this cannot be an implicit appeal to the ground of the representation. It cannot be that, in examining the premise, we must make sense of it or find its justification by an appeal to a certain faculty and its terms of differentiation, as suggested above. This would render the appeal circular. Because the premise is ultimately meant to show that the faculty is not the one in question, it must introduce some sort of evidence that is independent of any assumptions about the faculty of the representation of space. The evidential force that the premise has must be other than this and the premise(s) must, as it were, ‘hold itself up’ by some other means. The line of reasoning moves from the expositional claims to a conclusion about the ground of the representation. It thus cannot be that an implicit appeal to the ground of the representation of space and its terms of differentiation is what grounds the expositional claim.

The second line of consideration concerns what the evidential force of the premise does consist in. And it seems to me that our contrast with the German Rationalist analysis above, along with Kant’s remarks in the Inquiry, do in fact already give us all that we need: In the Inquiry’s discussion of analysis, Kant draws the distinction between propositions of which we can be mediately certain and those that admit of immediate certainty. In some propositions connecting a proposed mark of an object to
the representation of that object, the connection is established by means of some further mark that is found in both the proposed mark and in the representation of the object (thus by establishing propositions that connect the original proposed mark and representation to this further mark). In the case of propositions related in this way, the certainty of the original proposition is mediate – it is derived by inference from the propositions that mention the intermediate mark. In the case of other propositions, however, and indeed in the case of each of the individual propositions forming such an inference, the connection between mark and representation of the object is established with certainty immediately and without appeal to any intermediate marks.

Now I take part of what Kant to mean here is that such propositions are not established by appeal to any implicit line of inference. Rather, these propositions are self-evident, on the basis of the self-evidence of the relation between the marks or representations in question. In considering or comparing the mark and representation in question, we simply become aware of relations that are already involved in our obscure awareness of them. As Kant puts it in the Inquiry, the marks involved in such propositions are marks of which “everyone is constantly aware […] in the immediate consciousness of [the object in question].” (2:284)

It is my view that the expositional claims of the Metaphysical Exposition are such claims. As we have seen, Kant has not rejected this element of the analysis of our obscurely given representations for some of their immediately certain marks at the time of the Critical method. He reiterates in the Doctrine that we are to give expositions, as non-exhaustive analyses, and does not repeal his distinction between mediately and immediately certain propositions of such analyses. In the first proof, we have a case of the latter. The expositional premise connects the representation of an object with the representation of space immediately. The premise is an immediately certain proposition. It is self-evident on the basis of the self-evidence of the relations between the representations involved, albeit representations of sensibility. And I believe that this is precisely the evidence that they provide for the proof’s further claims about the ground of the representation.82

82 Thus, instead of a prior appeal to certain terms of differentiation to support our expositional claims, the immediate apprehension of our expositional claims results in an understanding of the terms of differentiation of the faculty in question. This is evident in the conclusion that rests on the Metaphysical Exposition, viz. that spatial representation is the form of sensibility. This conclusion about the most basic form of representation of the faculty rests, in part, on the expositional claims themselves.
What is then needed is not an identification of some further claim or criteria as the basis for these expositional claims. They are self-evident in the way that the concept of an effect is presupposed in the concept of a cause. To ask after further evidence for these claims is misdirected. What we can ask for, however, is an explanation or account of how it is that we might apprehend these immediately. And this, I think, can be given.

The clue to this explanation again lies in considering the more familiar case of concepts. As noted, in the case of concepts, we immediately apprehend either that the concept without the mark involves a contradiction (in the case of ‘identity’) or that the concept with the mark involves a contradiction. Now why is it that we should able to immediately apprehend such a contradiction? A natural explanation here, and one that indeed coheres with the picture that we have put forward so far, is that such a contradiction just is a manifestation of the capacity for conceptual representation. The capacity for conceptual representation precisely is a capacity for certain forms or kinds of representation and not others. That a certain representation is impossible (the concept with the mark is contradictory for example) is the manifestation of this. The representable and unrepresentable relations between mark and indistinctly given representation precisely are what characterise the representative capacities of the faculty in question. It is thus unsurprising that we should be able to immediately apprehend these relations – what we apprehend precisely is that our capacity for representation either does or does not allow for the representation in question.

In the above, we have progressively examined the proofs in order to come to an understanding of their workings, in light of our findings in Parts III and IV. Let us review our examination from the innermost structure of the Metaphysical Exposition to its outermost. The Metaphysical Exposition is indeed an exposition insofar as it puts forward a number of marks of the representation of space that serve, in part, to bring it to distinctness as a representation distinguished from other representations. As an exposition, it puts forward the relation of various marks (themselves representations) to the representation in question. As we have seen, however, in the case of the Metaphysical Exposition, these various marks or representations are not always those that we would straightforwardly expect as those found in
the representation, but are a number of other carefully chosen representations.

This surface-level exposition involves a number of further complicated dimensions. Focussing still only on the expositions themselves, we have seen that the Critical account involves an intricate picture of how these are to be established. In Part IV, we saw that the line of reasoning put forward in the appendix applied to the first step in arriving at philosophical cognition – to the analysis of our given representations. There we saw that, in order to determine the relations between proposed marks and an indistinctly given representation in question, it was necessary that we take into account the faculty to which the representations in question belong and employ its terms of differentiation. We have now seen that the relations put forward in the expositional claims are the culmination of this directive. As emphasised, at the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant directs us to isolate sensibility by setting aside all representations of the understanding and all sensations, in order to focus solely on the representations of sensibility. Thus, the representations under comparison in the expositional claims are to be taken as those of sensibility – they are to be compared as representations of sensibility. And it is on the basis of this recognition of faculty that the relations in the expositional claims are put forward. (A qualification to this was, as we saw, found in the representation of space. Given that the Metaphysical Exposition is special insofar as it is intended to establish the ground of the representation of space, the faculty of the representation of space was, in the case of each expositional premise, indeterminate.)

Recognising this further dimension to the exposition gave us insight into the ground and plausibility of the expositional claims themselves. As we saw, if the proposed marks in each case were taken to be representations of the understanding, or concepts, the expositional claims did not seem to be true. The proffered relations did not seem to hold. If, instead, we took the proposed representations to be those of sensibility, and allowed for an apprehension of intuitive relations analogous to the logical, then the expositional claims emerged looking no more mysterious or implausible than the corresponding claims in the case of the relations between concepts.

Such were the further dimensions to the surface-level expositional claims put forward in the Metaphysical Exposition. We have now seen how these further dimensions are underlain by the changes to the method under the Critical philosophy (in particular, by the changes implied by the line of
reasoning of the appendix). But these claims do not, as we know, exhaust the Exposition. Indeed, the exposition is ‘metaphysical’ insofar as it “contains that which exhibits the concept as a priori given.” (B38) That is, the Exposition further serves to show the ground of the representation of space. As we have seen, it does so by including each expositional claim within an argument that moves from the expositional claim to a conclusion concerning the ground of the representation of space. Let us review these arguments, or ‘proofs’, and their workings.

In each proof, a first, implicit premise stipulates the representation of space to have a certain ground. This premise serves as the assumption for a reductio argument. The second premise then puts forward the implications of this assumption of ground for the relations between the representation of space and the proposed mark in question. The third premise (and any subsequent premises) contrasts these implications with the relations established between the representation and mark in analysis (the expositional premise). Together, these premises then serve to rule out the initially posited ground. Now, what was of interest to us in our examination of the workings of the proofs individually were the latter two premises. These two premises involved claims (i) about the ground of the representations under comparison and its implications for the analysis of space, and (ii) the relations established by such analysis.

The latter of these we have discussed as the ‘expositional’ premise above, and we saw that its ground consisted in a self-evidence analogous to that of the logical. Turning to the former, we saw that the assumptions concerning ground across the proofs were assumptions concerning the ground of the combination of marks found in the representation as put forward in the fourfold distinction among concepts in the Doctrine of Method. We saw that supposing the combination of marks that constitutes a representation to have one or the other of the four possible grounds put forward in the Doctrine yields implications for the relations between the representation in question and our other possible representations.

Having now covered the workings of the proofs individually, let us move finally to the overall complex argument that constitutes the Metaphysical Exposition. In the case of each proof, we have only a negative conclusion. In order to arrive at the positive conclusion of source, the argument follows a process of eliminating a finite number of grounds. In order to determine these grounds, we saw that we needed to consider the changes to the Critical method uncovered both in the Doctrine of Method
and in the line of reasoning to the appendix. In the Doctrine of Method, Kant gives us a fourfold division of concepts in terms of ground into (i) arbitrarily combined, (ii) arbitrarily combined such that an object can be given, (iii) empirically given, and (iv) given a priori. The first conclusion serves to rule out the representation as empirically given (iii), while the second serves to rule out the representation as arbitrarily combined (thereby ruling out (i) and (ii)). As we saw, taking into account only the discussion in the Doctrine of Method, the Exposition would have been concluded at this point. However, once we again took the line of reasoning of the appendix into account, recalling that the obscurely given representations in need of analysis for the propositions of philosophy might come from one of two distinct faculties – the understanding and sensibility – it became clear that a further ground for the representation of space needed to be ruled out, viz. space as given a priori by means of the understanding. This was the task of the third and fourth proofs.

Such is the structure of the various sub-proofs and the overall complex argument of the Metaphysical Exposition. As we have seen, our renewed understanding of the Exposition is underlain at a number of places by the Critical changes to philosophical method, as examined in Parts III and IV.83

Having now put forward the above account of the Metaphysical Exposition, it is necessary to return to the accounts that were to be distinguished from what I termed the ‘standard’ account of the Exposition. The following three accounts are to be so distinguished insofar as they recognise and treat the expositional nature of the Metaphysical Exposition. These discussions, then, variously agree on many points with the account presented here, but in no case does the discussion of the Exposition line up entirely with it. I consider these in turn, highlighting those points that I take to constitute their problematic points of departure from the account presented here:

(i) McGoldrick (1985, p. 257ff.) explicitly recognises the arguments of the Metaphysical Exposition as analyses of the concept of space. However, McGoldrick’s discussion still fails to recognise the various corrections to analysis that Kant has made by the time of the critical philosophy. Under McGoldrick’s account, the expositional claims put forward in the proofs are one and all analytic claims that constitute an analysis of the concept of space, which account thus overlooks Kant’s introduction of the analysis of representations of sensibility and the further terms of differentiation relevant to such analysis, which terms, as we will see, yield expositional claims that are intuitively necessary, though not conceptually necessary or, as McGoldrick has it, analytic.

(ii) Leirfall’s 2004 discussion of the Metaphysical Exposition focuses explicitly on the passages as expositions of the concept of space and on how the exposition of a given a priori concept of philosophy contrasts with that of the definition of a concept (as found in mathematics). In many respects, Leirfall’s insightful account of an exposition (that is, as an incomplete analysis of what is contained in a given concept) coincides with what we have presented here. As is the case with McGoldrick, however, our accounts crucially part ways insofar as Leirfall emphasises the expositional claims as analytic judgements. This is so, according to Leirfall, precisely because expositions are the results of the analysis of what is contained in a concept, which analysis must yield judgements that are
And what then is the outcome of this new exposition of the representation of space, as complicated in these various ways by the changes to the Critical method? The outcome is the following complex one: First, and as noted in Part IV, by engaging in transcendental reflection in the analysis of our obscurely given representations, we arrive at different and corrected expositions. As we saw, the exposition of space contained in the Metaphysical Exposition differs from that which would be given under German Rationalism. Secondly, and crucially, the exposition allows for the analytic. By contrast, under our account here, the critical correction to the analysis of our given representations recognises the possible analysis of *intuitions*, which analysis involves terms of differentiation that differentiate, not the marks as predicates of a concept by means of identity or contradiction yielding an analytic judgement, but the marks of an intuition or representation of sensibility yielding, as we will see, a synthetic judgement.

(iii) Messina’s account in *Conceptual Analysis and the Essence of Space* (2015) is by far the most intricate treatment of the Metaphysical Exposition as an exposition of the concept of space. In it, Messina gives a detailed treatment of the nature and ground of the expositional claims, as well as a reconstruction of the first proof in light of his findings. In agreement with the account presented here, Messina recognises (i) the expositional nature of the key premises of the proofs, (ii) these key premises as containing claims about the objective marks involved in the concept in question, (iii) the proofs as proceeding from these expositional claims to their respective conclusions. Messina parts ways from what is presented here, however, in his account (i) of the nature of the representations under analysis, (ii) of the justification or ground of the expositional claims, and in his account (iii) of the ontological import of the claims. Each of these points of difference is underlain by an account of Kant’s Critical view of analysis that is more continuous with his pre-Critical account than our discussion in Parts II – IV reveal: (i) As with McGoldrick and Leirfall’s accounts, Messina views the representation under analysis as being the concept of space. Thus, as with the other accounts, Messina’s discussion does not recognise any critical introduction of the possibility of the analysis of representations of sensibility, and its concomitant additional terms of differentiation. (ii) Under Messina’s account, the expositional claims are grounded in an examination of our “modal intuitions (in the contemporary philosophical sense of the term, not Kant’s) whose evidential status is constrained by the results and method of pure mathematics” (2015, p. 418). That is, analysis of the concept of space involves a modal consideration of what would or would not constitute a case of space. As we will see in more detail below, the account presented here differs from this insofar as the expositional claims are self-evident claims about the nature of the representation of space that are ultimately grounded in the constraints presented by the nature of our faculties. (iii) Finally, and relatedly, Messina’s account claims that the expositional claims presented in the Exposition have ontological import insofar as the analysis is fundamentally one of space as the *object*, and not merely of the representation. This, Messina claims, is justified by a continuity in Kant’s view of analysis from the time of the *Inquiry* to the *Critique*. Analysis, according to Messina, still can yield truths about the essence of the object in question, though these results are defeasible by the results of the established sciences of geometry and mathematics. By contrast, the account we have presented here and in Part II – IV puts forward a different picture of the ontological import of any expositional claims. As discussed in these earlier parts, the *fourfold* division of concepts put forward in the Doctrine now involves a recognition of the question of the relation between a
identification of a representation that is \textit{given by the nature of sensibility}. Prior to the Critical recognition of the distinctness of the understanding and sensibility, and the ensuing demand for transcendental reflection, there was no possibility of identifying such a representation because there was no possibility of such representations at all. Under the German Rationalist account, all representations featuring in our philosophical cognition were concepts. Under the Critical account, however, cognition requires both the understanding and sensibility, and the failure to identify any such representation or representations will result in a failure of philosophical cognition tout court. Thus, the outcome of the identification of space as a representation given a priori, ultimately allows for the possibility of a priori or philosophical cognition, a possibility deeply in question at the start of the \textit{Critique}.

V. Bringing to distinctness: The \textit{Critique} as culmination of Critical method

In the above, we have examined in detail a part of the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Metaphysical Exposition of Space, in light of the various findings put forward in Parts III and IV. In what follows, I turn to a final brief broader discussion of analysis as it has come to light under the Critical account, to examine its relation to the German Rationalist tradition and to understand more clearly the place and significance of the Aesthetic within the \textit{Critique}.

philosophical representation and its object. Analysis of a philosophical concept now serves only to bring the \textit{representation} to distinctness, and the relation of the representation to the object is a further question. In the case of philosophical representations of the understanding, as we saw, Kant insists on a transcendental proof in order to establish this relation. (Indeed, we might, under Messina’s account, wonder why the concept of space, being a concept, needs no such proof.) By contrast, in the case of representations of sensibility, we stand in immediate relation to an object by their means, and thus once they have been shown to be representations given a priori (that is, to be representations due to the nature of our faculties), philosophical representations of sensibility can be taken to stand us in relation to an object. The account here of the ontological import of the representation of space is thus quite different from Messina’s and is one that can be given only under the supposition that the representations under analysis in the Metaphysical Exposition are not concepts.

A final point of contrast between our account and Messina’s concerns their respective understandings of the overall series of proofs and their respective conclusions. Messina does not recognise the series of proofs as constituting an argument by elimination of the three possible grounds of a concept, as underlain by Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine, and thus neither recognises the conclusions of the proofs as concerning these grounds nor their unity as a series of proofs.
As noted in Part IV, Kant remains committed to the same basic picture of the first stage of philosophical cognition as that of the preceding pre-Critical tradition. The representations of philosophy are “given [...] though perhaps only still confused...” (A730/B758), and we are to arrive at the “distinct representation” (A728/756) of such (still confused) given representations by means of analysis. The early parts of the Critique put forward the results of this analysis. Indeed, in the early parts of the Critique, we find, as we would in a German Rationalist taxonomy like the *Metaphysica*, a list of the most elemental representations that will go on to feature in our philosophical cognition. In this, the need for and legitimacy of analysis, the *Critique* is thus continuous with its preceding tradition.

Beneath this continuity, however, the *Critique* diverges dramatically from its German Rationalist counterparts. In the first instance, the analyses put forward under the Critical philosophy involve the further task of showing the representations to be representations of philosophy. That is, the analyses found on the pages of the *Critique* must establish the representations as due to the nature of our faculties, rather than due to the nature of empirical objects or arbitrary combination. As we can now see, this task is carried out differently for representations of the understanding and for those of sensibility. In the case of the understanding, the identification of any philosophical representations proceeds directly from an examination of the faculty of understanding itself and its forms of representation (the forms of judgement). In the case of sensibility, by contrast, an additional proof is needed to establish the representations as due to the nature of the faculty. Thus, the *Critique* involves the addition of the Metaphysical Deduction and Metaphysical Exposition.

Establishing the representations as due to the nature of our faculties, however, is not the only significant change to the taxonomy of elemental representations found in the *Critique*. Kant’s Critical claim of the distinctness of the understanding and sensibility results in a further change. Given this claim of distinctness, it is additionally necessary, when identifying a representation as due to the nature of our faculties, to distinguish which of these faculties is at work. An exposition of our philosophical representations as due to the nature of faculties must specify whether a representation in question is due to the understanding or due to sensibility. Again, the Metaphysical Deduction and Metaphysical Exposition carry out this further task.
Further, again given the claim of distinctness, the Critical philosophy diverges from its predecessors in the introduction of further terms of differentiation in the very analysis of these representations. Under German Rationalism, the marks of our obscurely given representations were differentiated as marks of representations of the understanding or as predicates of concepts. Under the Critical account, however, further terms of differentiation are introduced – terms that differentiate representations of sensibility rather than the understanding. Thus, the relation between mark and indistinctly given representation, put forward in the analyses of the taxonomy, are differentiated, under the Critical account, according to the terms of differentiation of sensibility.

The culmination of these divergences from German Rationalism is the addition of precisely the section that we have been examining – the Transcendental Aesthetic. This section constitutes a hitherto unrecognised distinct part of any such taxonomy and a part that is, under the Critical account, absolutely necessary if we are to arrive at philosophical cognition. We can thus recognise its place as a distinct and prior section, added at the first stage of the account of our philosophical cognition.

A final point of discontinuity that we might emphasise before turning to some brief discussion of the Aesthetic itself is the difference across the two accounts in the objectivity of these representations. Under German Rationalism, as we saw, an analysis of our obscurely given representations is itself sufficient to yield the marks of the objects of the representations. This was grounded in an assumed relation of cognition between the understanding and the objects of philosophy. In the Critique, however, the analyses put forward in the expositions of our given representations is not itself sufficient to establish anything about any objects. The relation of these representations to any objects is a further step required in securing philosophical cognition. Thus, the Critique involves the sections succeeding the Metaphysical Exposition, in which Kant addresses the question of the relation of the philosophical representations of sensibility to objects (and the nature of these objects), and the Transcendental Deduction, in which Kant establishes the relation of the philosophical representations of the understanding to objects (and indeed which involves, in its course, the crucial qualification that there are no representations of the understanding alone that stand us in relation to objects). Thus, analysis is, under both the German Rationalist account and under the Critical philosophy, both
necessary and legitimate. The reasons underlying this legitimacy, however, are, as we have seen, radically different.

Having seen the ways in which the taxonomy put forward in the pages of the *Critique* is continuous with preceding German Rationalist taxonomies, and the ways in which it more crucially differs, we can turn finally to a brief re-examination of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Having charted our findings in the above, we can now read the Transcendental Aesthetic with a renewed understanding. In the first instance, we can see that the Transcendental Aesthetic is indeed a part of the carrying out of the very first task required for philosophical cognition – the bringing to distinctness of our elemental representations. The Transcendental Aesthetic is the distinct exposition of certain of those elemental representations that are due to sensibility. As such, we might indeed expect to find it, as we do, in the very early parts of the Doctrine of Elements.

Secondly, insofar as the Aesthetic deals with our elemental intuitive representations, it constitutes a previously unrecognised addition to any such taxonomy. Carrying out the task of distinguishing the various elemental representations of philosophy under any prior German Rationalist account, or indeed under Kant’s pre-Critical account, would involve putting forward the various elemental concepts that feature in our philosophical cognition. However, the Aesthetic identifies and puts forward elemental representations that are not concepts, but intuitions.

Thirdly, we can now understand more clearly how the addition and successful carrying out of the Transcendental Aesthetic is absolutely necessary for the overall project of philosophical cognition. The Critical account demands that any conceptual representations (elemental or indeed propositions) be applicable to the sensible. Thus, philosophical cognition requires that there are some intuitive representations that are *given a priori*. Without the addition of the Aesthetic, or indeed if the Aesthetic went astray in its expositions or failed to yield any such representations, the *Critique* subsequent to it could not be written.
Part VI
Revisiting the appendix

At the outset of this study, we began with an examination of the case in the appendix (Part I). There we saw that Kant introduces and treats a new subject matter, the concepts of reflection, which concepts subsume the relations of representations ‘among themselves’. We also saw that, in the brief introduction to the appendix, Kant puts forward a complex argument regarding the correct employment of these concepts. He claimed transcendental reflection to be necessary for their correct employment, and their correct employment to be necessary for a priori cognition.

In this sixth and final Part, I wish to return to this case and the various questions and puzzles that it raised, to examine it in light of the findings that we have uncovered in the preceding part and to have it finally before us with better clarity. I begin, in Section I, with a brief reiteration of the case in the appendix before turning to a re-examination of it, now in light of the various findings that we have uncovered in Parts II to V. In Section II, I address some of the more specific questions, puzzles, and speculations presented in Part I and show their resolution according to these findings. Finally, in Section III, I return to the formulation of the case in the appendix that is familiar in the literature – the formulation with which we began our study. I will bring to light the various ways in which this formulation uncovers only a part of the far more complex and systematic case put forward by Kant in the appendix.

I. Revisiting the introduction’s line of reasoning

As is familiar, the case in the appendix concerns the newly introduced concepts of reflection. In contrast to preceding concepts treated in the main part of the Transcendental Logic, these concepts subsume, not objects, but the relations between the representations of the subject. The introduction to the appendix, as we saw, puts forward an argument concerning the correct
employment of these concepts. This argument proceeded in two broad steps:

In the first of these steps, Kant put forward a condition for the correct employment of the concepts of reflection. This condition is that any employment of these concepts be preceded by an awareness of the faculty to which the representations are attributable. Put differently, their correct employment requires transcendental reflection: Supposing some representations to be in question, the relations that we are to take to hold between them, Kant tells us, will differ depending on the faculty that we take them to be attributable to. That is, if the representations are due to some given faculty, the concepts of reflection will subsume certain relations between them, and if due to some other faculty, the concepts of reflection will subsume different relations between them. Thus, the employment of the concepts of reflection will differ across a difference in the faculty to which we take the representations to be attributable, and thus their correct employment will depend on correctly apprehending the faculty to which the representations are in fact due. Such is the first step of the argument of the introduction.

In the second step of the argument, we are reminded that it is not merely the relations of representations among themselves that is of concern. Our concern is to arrive at a priori cognition, and our interest in the concepts of reflection is ultimately an interest in their role in such cognition. In subsuming the relevant relations under the concepts of reflection, we want not only to subsume the relations between certain representations simply as representations. Rather, we want such subsumption to be at once a subsumption of the relations that hold between the objects of those representations. What is necessary for such objective comparison, according to the argument, is that the relations among our representations themselves be established correctly. That is, the correct employment of the concepts of reflection is necessary for the objective comparison of the representations in question. Thus, since a condition for the correct employment of the concepts of reflection is the correct apprehension of the faculty to which the representations belong – transcendental reflection – and since their correct employment is necessary for objective comparison, so too is transcendental reflection necessary for objective comparison. Finally, since objective comparison is necessary for a priori cognition, we see that such reflection and the correct employment of the concepts of reflection is necessary for such cognition.
Such is the picture put forward in the introduction to the appendix. The concepts of reflection play a crucial role in a priori cognition: Their correct employment is necessary for the possibility of such cognition. And, so too, the condition for their correct employment – transcendental reflection – is shown to be essential in arriving at such cognition.

Thus, the argument yielded a distinction between two ways in which the relations of our representations to one another might be determined, or, equivalently, two ways in which the concepts of reflection might be employed. They might be employed such that we are aware of the faculty to which the representations belong. That is, their employment might involve transcendental reflection. Or they might be employed such that we are not so aware. The former allows for the objective comparison of the representations, and thus for philosophical cognition, while the latter rules out such objective comparison, and thereby rules out the possibility of philosophical cognition.

More formally, the line of reasoning was rendered as follows:

(1) For any given representations, a difference in the faculty to which they are attributable implies a difference in the relations we are to take to hold between them (a difference in the way in which the concepts of reflection are to be employed).

(2) In our case, our representations are attributable to either one of two distinct and mutually dependent cognitive faculties, the understanding and sensibility.

(3) Thus, the correct determination of the relations of our representations among themselves requires the taking into account of the faculty to which the representations belong (transcendental reflection).

(4) The objective comparison of representations, i.e. comparison such that not only the relations among our representations are determined, but the relations among the objects of those representations are also thereby determined, requires the correct determination of the relations among our representations.

(5) Thus, transcendental reflection is necessary for the possibility of objective comparison.

(6) Objective comparison is necessary for the possibility of a priori cognition.
Thus, transcendental reflection is necessary for the possibility of a priori cognition.

Such is the now-familiar line of reasoning with which we began our study. Let us then, in the rest of this section, turn to what has been uncovered over the course of this study and to re-examine this line of reasoning in light of it.

Over the course of this study, we have uncovered a rich account of the first stage of arriving at philosophical cognition, a stage shared by both the Critical philosophy and its German Rationalist predecessors: Prior to philosophical cognition proper, we are, by means of a multitude of various representations, aware of the various objects of our cognition, albeit often only haphazardly and indistinctly. Now, certain of these representations stand us in relation to the objects with which philosophy is concerned, and the aim of philosophy is to establish the propositions that hold of these objects. Thus, the first step in arriving at such propositions is to separate out and make distinct those representations that will be relevant to such cognition, from this multitude of haphazard and indistinct representations. These are the representations that will go on to feature in these propositions and the gradual bringing to distinctness of these representations is a matter of the procedure of analysis.

What came to light in our study was that such analysis was not merely a matter of giving attention to indistinct representations of which we are usually haphazardly or indifferently aware. The marks of the objects of the representations in question could not be brought to distinctness in this way. What we found was that the differentiation of these marks, both under the pre-Critical and the Critical accounts, involved an implicit subjective dimension. In order ultimately to differentiate the marks of the object in such analysis, an awareness (implicit or explicit) of the cognitive faculty by means of which we stand in relation to the object in the case of the representation was necessary. The way in which we were then to set about differentiating the marks of the object was according to the way in which that faculty differentiates the marks of objects in its representing the object. It was only by means of these terms that we secure the possibility of philosophical cognition by means of the representation in question.

There is, of course, crucial divergence between German Rationalism and the critical account both as to which objects these are and as to how and why certain of our initially indistinct representations stand us in relation to these objects.
It was here, in the above first step in arriving at philosophical cognition, that the line of reasoning of the appendix had its application – and indeed here that we can locate the relevant employment of its crucial subject matter, the concepts of reflection. As noted in Part I, the concepts of reflection have a standard employment. Most familiarly, the concepts of reflection are employed in comparing concepts with one another for their relations, which comparison yields the logical form of the judgements that connect the concepts so related. This standard employment is ‘logical’ or ‘mere’ comparison, and is to be found in all cases in which concepts are employed or compared, whether these concepts are empirical or a priori (or indeed even arbitrarily combined). And we can locate this standard employment in the above first step in arriving at philosophical cognition. Where our indistinctly given representations in need of analysis are those of the understanding, that is, concepts, we find a species of this standard employment of the concepts of reflection. In bringing the indistinctly given concepts of our philosophical cognition to distinctness, the concepts of reflection are employed, now explicitly, in order to differentiate the marks of these philosophical concepts.85

Now, as we have seen, German Rationalist analysis consists in this. Under the German Rationalist account, this standard employment of the concepts of reflection, now applied to the case of the concepts of philosophy, serves to bring the marks of (the objects of) these indistinctly given representations to distinctness. However, this does not, under the Critical account, suffice in order to render distinct the representations needed for our philosophical cognition. Under the Critical account, among

85 It might here be objected that the ‘standard’ employment of the concepts is an employment found in the case of empirical judgements, and thus that their being employed in this way, this time explicitly, in order to differentiate a priori or philosophical concepts is problematic.

In response to this worry, we need only note that the concepts of philosophy ultimately distinguished under the critical account, the schematised concepts, are nonetheless still concepts, despite their being non-empirical, and their featuring in any propositions or judgements, albeit the a priori judgements of philosophy, will thus still involve their being distinguished as concepts. Insofar as both involve (at least) a relating of concepts to one another, this employment of the concepts of reflection is found in every empirical judgement as well as every philosophical judgement.

In fact, this standard employment of the concepts of reflection has a dual nature, both in the empirical case and in the case of the a priori given schematised concepts: The concepts of reflection are employed in the very initial (unconscious) formation of our concepts, and they are also employed in every case in which these concepts are applied in a judgement. Longuenesse (1998) treats this dual nature in her discussion of the concepts of reflection. I discuss this treatment in the objections and replies of Part VII.
the haphazard and indistinctly given representations relevant to our philosophical cognition are also representations of sensibility. In the case of these representations, this standard employment is inadequate. Different and further terms of differentiation were required for representations of sensibility – viz. the terms of differentiation of sensibility itself.

Now it might be that, even given the Critical recognition of both representations of sensibility and the understanding in our philosophical cognition, the role of the concepts of reflection in such cognition ends at the point put forward above. From further terms of differentiation, it need not follow that the concepts of reflection subsume anything but the relations between concepts. Referring back to the line of reasoning of the appendix, however, we find that these concepts in fact have a further employment. They are employed in the case of sensibility as well, in order to bring its representations to distinctness: As they are characterised at the start of the appendix, the concepts of reflection do not merely subsume the relations between concepts, but “the relations of [given representations] among themselves” (A260/B316). Thus, the concepts of reflection differentiate our representations in general, both those of the understanding and sensibility. Of this differentiation of our representations in general, the line of reasoning tells us the “correct determination of [these] relation[s] [viz. those subsumed under the concepts of reflection] depends on the cognitive power in which they subjectively belong to each other, whether in sensibility or in understanding. For the difference in the latter makes a great difference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.” (A261/B317) Thus, the line of reasoning of the appendix tells us that these concepts are employed both with regard to differentiating representations of the understanding and representations of sensibility, but that they will be employed differently across the two cases – representations of the understanding and sensibility are to be differentiated differently. Thus, their more familiar standard employment in the case of concepts in yielding the logical form of judgement is one species of a more general employment, viz. the differentiation of our representations in general. The differentiation of representations of sensibility is equally an employment of the concepts of reflection. And in analysis then, we find an employment of the concepts of reflection that is additional to their standard, familiar employment in distinguishing concepts. The concepts of reflection equally differentiate the representations of sensibility.
Thus, in analysis, the concepts of reflection are employed with regard to differentiating both the representations of the understanding and the representations of sensibility. We can locate their employment, and indeed identify an additional such employment, in this first stage in arriving at philosophical cognition. Let us turn then to the line of reasoning found in the introduction to the appendix that concerns the correct employment of these concepts and their role in a priori cognition. We are now in a position to see that this line of reasoning applies to the employment of the concepts of reflection in analysis, as we have located it above.

Beginning with the latter, second, step in this line of reasoning, we recall that Kant’s concern was with the role of the concepts of reflection in a priori cognition, and claimed their correct employment to be necessary for such cognition. Now, the relevant employment of the concepts of reflection is located in the differentiation of our various obscure and indistinct representations that will go on to feature in our philosophical cognition – the concepts subsume the relations of these to one another. What their correct employment consists in, then, is the correct differentiation of these indistinct representations. Employed correctly, the concepts of reflection will allow us to bring a representation to distinctness such that we correctly differentiate its marks. Now, this is significant insofar as these are the concepts that, in the distinct step of transcendental proof, are shown to stand us in relation to objects. In order for these to be representations of which this can so be shown, and thus to be representations that allow for philosophical cognition, their correct differentiation is necessary to start with. Thus, in differentiating these representations, we ultimately differentiate the marks of the objects to which we will be shown to stand in relation, the objects of philosophy.

Thus, in the above, we can see both why the correct employment of the concepts of reflection is, as the appendix claims, necessary for a priori cognition, and we can understand the distinctness and possibility of the ‘objective comparison’ of representations, which previously seemed to elude us. This latter, objective comparison, was mysterious insofar as it seemed to involve the claim that, in establishing the relations between our representations as representations, we could at once thereby establish the relations between the objects of those representations. However, it seemed that the line of reasoning of the appendix was committed to the possibility and necessity of such comparison in our philosophical cognition, and this comparison was not dismissed as part of the failings of the German
Rationalist tradition. Here we can see how such comparison is possible under the Critical account, and indeed, necessary. Establishing the relations between our representations among themselves is the aim of analysis and requires the employment of the concepts of reflection. However, once the transcendental proofs have been carried out, it turns out that this differentiation was at once the differentiation of the marks of the objects of the representations. Here then, we have an understanding of objective comparison that is legitimate under the Critical account. Further, this comparison is distinct from philosophical cognition itself. It is the bringing to distinctness of the marks of the representations that will go on to feature in the synthetic a priori judgements of our philosophical cognition, and thereby a bringing to distinctness of the marks of the objects of the representations, but it is not the establishing of these judgements themselves.

Having now in hand an understanding of the second step of the appendix’s argument, we might turn to its first step. In this first step, Kant was, I claimed, concerned with the employment of the concepts of reflection in isolation from cognition, and put forward a condition for their correct employment in the activity of transcendental reflection. Again, we are now in a position to understand the line of reasoning – to see what the correct employment of these concepts consists in, and why such reflection is necessary for this correct employment. In the above, we located the employment of the concepts of reflection in the differentiation of our indistinctly given representations. The concepts of reflection, we noted, subsume the relations of these representations to one another. Their correct employment thus consists in correctly differentiating the marks of these representations in bringing them to distinctness. Now, in the above, we have seen the condition for this. These representations are representations of the marks of objects as differentiated by a certain faculty. Thus, in order to differentiate these marks correctly, we need to employ the terms of differentiation of the faculty to which the representation is due. We thus need to compare the representation “with the cognitive power in which [it is] situated” (A261/B317) or, in a word, engage in transcendental reflection.

We can thus finally bring to light the role of transcendental reflection in philosophical cognition. Such cognition must begin by a bringing to distinctness of certain indistinct representations found in empirical experience. In doing so, however, we must begin by being aware of the faculty of the representation or representations in question. This awareness
allows us correctly to differentiate the representation by adopting the very terms of differentiation of the faculty to which the representation is due. And this correct differentiation, in turn, allows us, albeit in conjunction with the further task of transcendental proof, to differentiate the marks of the objects to which we will ultimately stand in relation when the representation appears in our philosophical propositions.

And thus, we can read the introductory passages to the appendix in a new light:

Reflection (reflexio) does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition, through which alone their relation among themselves can be correctly determined. The first question prior to all further treatment of our representation is this: In which cognitive faculty do they belong together? Is it the understanding or is it the senses before which they are connected or compared?

All judgements, indeed all comparisons, require a reflection, i.e., a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong. The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call transcendental reflection. The relation, however, in which the concepts in a state of mind can belong to each other are those of identity and difference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer, and finally of the determinable and the determination (matter and form). The correct determination of this relation depends on the cognitive power in which they subjectively belong to each other, whether in sensibility or in understanding. For the difference in the latter makes a great difference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.

Prior to all objective judgements we compare the concepts, with regard to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of universal judgements, or their difference, for the generation of particular ones, with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgements, or opposition, for negative ones, etc. On this ground it would seem that we ought to call these concepts concepts of comparison (conceptus
comparationis). But since, if it is not the logical form but the content of concepts that is concerned, i.e., whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., the things can have a twofold relation to our power of cognition, namely to sensibility and to understanding, yet it is this place in which they belong that concerns how they ought to belong to each other, then it is transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation of given representations to one or the other kind of cognition, that can alone determine their relation among themselves, and whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc., cannot immediately be made out from the concepts themselves through mere comparison (comparatio), but rather only through the distinction of the kind of cognition to which they belong, by means of a transcendental reflection (reflexio).

[T]ranscendental reflection, [...] (which goes to the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of the objective comparison of the representations to each other, and is therefore very different from the other, since the cognitive power to which the representations belong is not precisely the same. This transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one can escape if he would judge anything about things a priori.

(A260-3/B316-9, emphasis omitted)

II. The puzzles revisited

Having now in hand a better understanding of the concepts of reflection and their role in a priori cognition, we are now in a position to set aside the remaining questions and puzzles that arose in our initial discussion of the case in the appendix. I turn now to an examination of these as they arose in Part I.

Our initial questions concerned the concepts of reflection and their employment. According to the line of reasoning, the concepts are employed in the comparison of representations for their relations among themselves and they subsume these relations. Yet we had not established what such comparison and the relations in question amounted to, nor had we established how we were to understand the representations ‘themselves’.

To begin with the latter, recall that our initial attempt to clarify the appeal to ‘representations as representations’ introduced a threefold distinction: We distinguished between (i) the (subjective) determinations of
representations themselves, (ii) the represented (objective) determinations of the object, and (iii) the (objective) determinations of objects themselves. We can now see that Kant is indeed committed to such subjective determinations – and indeed to the trifold distinction. The representations in analysis (and indeed in our cognition) are to be characterised in certain ways ‘as representations’– that is, they have features beyond the features represented as part of the objective content and the features of the object itself. This point is not entirely unfamiliar. Indeed, such features are invoked in Kant’s distinction between concepts and intuitions. What is less familiar, however, is the subjective character of these representations as this comes to light in the case in the appendix. Our familiar understanding of the determinations of concepts themselves is their mediacy, and of intuitions their immediacy. 86 The picture presented in the appendix, however, concerns the relations or connections between the marks combined in a representation (or indeed between this combination of marks and other representations as combinations of marks). We were presented with a picture under which these connections varied according to the faculty of the representation in question. In the first instance then, the appendix revealed a distinction between concepts as combinations of marks that bear certain logical or conceptual relations to one another and intuitions as combinations of marks bearing intuitive relations to one another – as combinations of marks that are intuitively connected.

Secondly, the argument of the appendix revealed an interesting dependence within our initial trifold distinction: The determinations of the representations themselves have implications for both the represented determinations of the object and, given Kant’s transcendental idealism, the determinations of the objects themselves. As we saw, an indistinct representation is to be differentiated differently depending on whether it is a concept or an intuition. This difference in differentiation at the subjective level yielded (i) a difference in differentiation of the objective content of the

86 It seems to me that a concept’s universality and an intuition’s singularity, despite their frequently being equally involved in the characterisation of these two types of representations, are part of the represented (objective) determinations of the object. That some mark found in a concept thereby also involves universality seems to me to be a feature of the represented determination of the object, rather than a feature of the concept itself. This point applies mutatis mutandis to the case of intuitions.

By contrast, the mediacy or immediacy of a representation does seem to me to be a (subjective) determination of the representation itself. The representation as a representation stands one in such a relation to the object.
representation, which in turn ultimately yielded (ii) a difference in the object to which we might stand in relation by means of the representation.

Further, with regard to these representations, we can now allay the worry of ontological commitment. Recall that the appeal to the comparison of representations for their relations led us naturally to suppose what was under comparison were some mental entities, of one or another sort. We noted, however, that any account of the representations to which the appendix refers must minimally avoid any such ontological commitment. We now have a better understanding of the nature of the representations mentioned in the appendix, an understanding that does not involve the appendix in the introduction of further ontological commitment with regard to these representations. Recalling the discussion of the Doctrine of Method, the representations in general available for analysis could have one of three grounds; arbitrary combination by the understanding, the combinations of marks found in empirical objects, or the combination as due to the nature of our faculties. The representations relevant to philosophy are of the latter ground. Now, it is only the second of these (empirical representations) that, according to the Critical account, necessarily brings along with it an ontological commitment – and indeed only an ontological commitment regarding the existence of the empirical objects. For none of the representations captured under this trifold commitment is there an ontological commitment as to the existence of the representations as mental entities. With regard to the representations in question in comparison then, the representations of philosophy, these representations are combinations of (represented) marks of possible objects such that the combination is due to the nature of our faculties, and thus need not be taken to introduce an ontologically problematic commitment.

Turning now to the former questions, let us re-examine briefly and explicitly the nature of these relations and the nature of the comparison of representations that is engaged in. We have now seen that these relations are the connections between the marks (ultimately of objects) combined in a representation, which combination constitutes the representation. The relations in question are those of an indistinctly given representation to its more elemental representations. What was implicitly at work was the further dimension of being a connection within the representation of a certain faculty. (The connections within a combination of the understanding are logical; the connections within a representation of sensibility are intuitive.) To compare our representations for their relations among themselves is to
compare them for these connections – either the connections within the representation or the connections that hold between it and other representations. Put another way, to compare our representations for these relations was to distinguish the marks of our indistinctly given representations (to determine the connections holding between mark and representation according to the sort of representation it is) – and at once to distinguish the marks of the object to which we stand in relation by means of the representation. We now see that this amounts to bringing to distinctness whatever relations between marks (combinations of marks) are already indistinctly represented by the faculty in question.

Further, we now have a clearer understanding of the nature of such comparison. This comparison is a conscious, reflected, willed activity. We compare separated marks with an indistinctly given representation in order to bring the representation to distinctness. This is distinct from our ordinary awareness of the representation. It is an activity involved in carrying out philosophical investigation. However, it is important to note that the relations uncovered, that is, the representations thereby brought to distinctness, are relations and representations of which we are already implicitly aware in the multitude of haphazard and indistinct representations of our empirical experience. Such comparison happens implicitly in the case of ordinary empirical judgement, but must be carried out explicitly in the case of putting forward a philosophy. The two involve the same representations and relations or connections. The latter is a matter of actively bringing to distinctness what is already always involved in the former.

III. Revisiting the familiar formulation

In Part I, we examined what I termed the ‘familiar formulation’ of the case in the appendix – the account that is predominantly found in discussions on the appendix in the extant literature. In what follows, I return to this account, in order to examine it in light of our findings. Before I do so, however, let us briefly review this formulation.

The familiar formulation in the literature focusses on the appendix as containing a charge put forward by Kant against the Leibnizian philosophy. The charge is variously emphasised in these discussions: The Leibnizian philosophy is charged with confusing two sorts of object –
phenomena with noumena, with confusing the comparison of concepts for the comparison of objects, with failing to recognise the distinct contribution of sensibility to our cognition, with committing a fallacious transcendental amphiboly, and, in its most developed formulation, with an erroneous ontological employment of the concepts of reflection.

Under this latter, most developed, formulation, the Leibnizian philosophy, insofar as it engages in the comparison of concepts, employs the concepts of reflection in order to establish their relations. However, the philosophy involves a further complexity. It engages in such comparison, not merely for the sake of examining these concepts, but ultimately for the sake of establishing the relations among the objects of the concepts. It takes such comparison to be sufficient for the latter as well as the former. This is the first part of the underlying account of the charge as it is put forward in these discussions: The Leibnizian philosophy involves an ontological employment of the concepts of reflection.

In its second part, the standard account identifies Kant’s reasons for rejecting this employment of the concepts of reflection. The reasons here turn on the consideration that the objects in question, the objects whose relations are sought by comparing their concepts under the Leibnizian philosophy, are objects given or presented by sensibility. And crucially, it is further noted, these objects bear further relations to each other that are not captured in the concepts of these objects that are had and compared by means of the understanding. Sensibility “brings with [its] own distinctions” (A270/B326). Thus, the account concludes, the ontological employment of the concepts of reflection by the Leibnizian philosophy is illegitimate and yields false conclusions and principles, which do hold of the objects of our cognition that are objects of sensibility or appearances.

Finally, these discussions highlight the solution that Kant puts forward in the appendix to this complex error contained in the Leibnizian philosophy. This solution is to precede any such comparison of concepts with transcendental reflection – that is, with an awareness of the faculty to which the objects of our cognition belong. Such an awareness will reveal, as we have seen above, that the objects in question are objects of sensibility. And thus, such reflection will reveal the erroneous nature of any ontological employment of the concepts of reflection, as well as any conclusions or principles based on such an employment.

Such is the bare outline of the main features of the case contained in the appendix, as they are put forward in many extant discussions in the
literature. Having concluded our study, we are now in a position to see that these accounts are, as far as they go, correct in many of their claims. However, we are now equally in a position to see that these familiar formulations involve crucial omissions in their picture of the appendix and the significance of its implications, and are, in the case of certain claims, even in error. Let us turn then to a re-examination of these familiar formulations of the case, for their points of accuracy, their omissions, and their errors. I begin with some brief discussion of the first three formulations of the case, before turning to a more detailed discussion of the fifth and more developed formulation of the case. Thereafter, I will address the fourth formulation.

Under the first formulation, the error of German Rationalism is to take certain objects, phenomena, to be that which they are not, viz. noumena. The error, under these accounts, was made at the level of objects. Given our discussion of the complex commitment found in German Rationalist analysis, and Kant’s corresponding complex rejection of the commitment, we can now see that this formulation of the error put forward in the appendix is not inaccurate, but is not the fundamental error with which Kant is concerned in the appendix. The German Rationalist account does indeed involve a conflation of two sorts of objects. The criteria employed by this tradition in bringing our philosophical representations to distinctness involved the commitment that the objects of the representations in question were objects cognisable by the understanding alone. However, as we have now also seen, this is not the fundamental error with which the appendix is concerned. The charge of taking phenomena to be noumena by the Leibnizian philosophy can be found in a number of places in the Critique, in ways that have nothing to do with the claims of the appendix. (Indeed, the first main section of the Critique, the analytic, is, in part, concerned to establish the former rather than the latter as the proper objects of our philosophical cognition (A238-9/B297-8)). The true point of concern of the appendix, as we have seen, is with an error in the employment of the concepts of reflection, which subsume the differentiation between our representations among themselves. The German Rationalist account fails to differentiate our representations correctly as representations. This error, along with the ultimate claim that these representations do stand us in relation to objects, then yields an erroneous assumption about the nature of
those objects. However, the fundamental error with which the appendix is concerned is thus not a confusion of objects, but a confusion that occurs at the level of representations as representations.

In its second familiar formulation, the error is put forward as the confusion of the comparison of concepts for the comparison of objects. Under this account, German Rationalism is legitimately only engaged in uncovering the distinctions between certain concepts, but at once takes itself to be legitimately uncovering the distinctions between the objects of the concepts. Put in another way, the error of German Rationalism is to conflate logical distinctions with real distinctions. Again, our study here shows this familiar formulation of the error to be accurate, but not fundamental. As we have seen, the German Rationalist account does indeed involve the move from differentiating our indistinctly given representations as concepts to the differentiation of the objects of those representations. It assumes that the terms employed in the differentiation of concepts are sufficient to differentiate the objects of those concepts. And this indeed is a crucial step in the overall complex commitment that Kant wishes to reject. Contrary to the formulation above, these accounts correctly pinpoint the trouble as involving the differentiation of representations as representations. As we have also seen, however, these accounts are not quite yet nuanced enough. First, they do not recognise the distinctness of the two levels of concern that come to light in Kant’s argument for transcendental reflection in the introduction. The concepts of reflection, properly speaking, subsume the differentiation of our representations as representations. At this level, an erroneous and a correct employment of the concepts of reflection can be distinguished. These employments then have implications for the differentiation between objects, if they are so taken to differentiate objects. Nonetheless, the fundamental point of concern of the appendix is the correctness of their employment at the level of representations as representations. Secondly, and relatedly, these accounts do not recognise the mentioned corrected employment of the concepts at this level. Only an erroneous employment of the concepts is recognised. I will address this point in relation to the fifth formulation in more detail below.

As we have seen, German Rationalism assumes that our philosophical representation stand us in relation to objects, thereby assuming these objects to be phenomena, while in fact the objects to which our philosophical representations do stand us in relation, as purportedly proven under the critical account, are phenomena.
The third formulation of the error discussed in Part I characterised it as a failure, in one or another way, to recognise the distinctness of sensibility and the significance of its contribution to our cognition. It is now clear that these accounts are correct insofar as they identify the fundamental error as located at the level of the subject of cognition. Under these accounts, the fundamental error of German Rationalism is not a confusion of the objects of our cognition with any other thing (either objects of a different sort or with concepts), but is an error prior to this and which concerns the subject – its faculties and representations. This is indeed in line with the account that we have presented in the above study. However, discussions that characterise the error of the appendix in this third way err in the exhaustiveness of the account. The error is fundamentally located at the point of the differentiation of representations as representations (that is, at the subjective level), but this is an error relevant to philosophical cognition only insofar as it has implications for the objects of our philosophical cognition. Discussions that emphasise this third formulation run the risk of overlooking the whole of Kant’s case.

The most developed and complete accounts, however, are those that formulate the case in the appendix in the fifth way above. These accounts first identify the standard employment of the concepts of reflection in the differentiation of concepts from one another in logical reflection. This employment is then contrasted with the problematic ontological employment of the concepts under German Rationalism, in which the concepts are used logically, but taken to yield ontological conclusions. Kant’s reason for rejecting this ontological employment is then cited as the recognition of sensibility in the cognition of the objects in question and the fact that sensibility introduces differentiation among the objects of its representations that are not captured in logical reflection on the concepts of the objects. Having concluded our study, we are now in a position to examine the ways in which this developed familiar formulation of the case in the appendix is both correct and the ways in which it remains problematic. I will begin with a discussion of the former.

In our account, we saw that the case in the appendix is centrally concerned with the employment of the concepts of reflection, as concepts that subsume, not objects, but representations. This fifth formulation of the error is indeed correct in its recognition of these concepts as the concern of the appendix and as constituting a new subject matter within the *Critique*. This change of subject is not lost to these discussions.
Further, we saw that the case in the appendix does indeed identify a certain employment of these concepts under German Rationalism, which it claims to be erroneous: Under German Rationalism, these concepts are employed in the ‘mere comparison’ of representations, which comparison is a matter of treating all representations as those of the understanding or as concepts, which it then takes to establish the relations between, not only the representations in question, but also between the objects of those representations. Equally, in our account, we saw that this is precisely what Kant claims such comparison cannot do. The German Rationalist move here from the relations between representations to the relations between the objects of those representations is illegitimate. Contrasting this illegitimate employment of the concepts of reflection, we saw that the Critical method indeed demands that transcendental reflection be adopted in place of such comparison. Thus, in all of these claims, these extant discussions are in line with what we have uncovered here.

Our close examination of the case has, however, revealed a number of crucial details that have gone unnoticed in extant literature, and indeed even in its most developed formulations. The appendix in fact contains a far more complex and systematic account than is typically recognised. I turn now to examine the ways in which this formulation can now be seen to be inadequate as an account of what is going on in the appendix.

In the first instance, our understanding of the underlying workings of the error and its correction on these accounts is, at best, vague and, at worst, non-existent. Consider first our understanding of the error itself under these accounts. The error lies in the illegitimacy of the move from the relations found between the concepts of objects to the relations between the objects themselves. This move is illegitimate because the objects in question are objects of sensibility and, as such, are related in ways that cannot be captured by the relations between the understanding’s concepts. Admittedly, insofar as the latter holds, it does yield the illegitimacy in question: If the objects in question are those of sensibility and if this means that they bear relations to one another beyond those that can be captured by the understanding’s concepts, then German Rationalist does indeed err if it takes the relations between the concepts of the objects to be sufficient to yield the relations between the objects. But what we lack here is a deeper understanding of how and why the introduction of a second faculty in the cognition of these objects brings with it further relations between the objects. Here, the familiar formulation simply takes it to be self-evident that
an appeal to sensibility will bring with it further relations between the objects – relations that cannot be captured by means of the understanding.

A crucial, related worry concerns the appeal to transcendental reflection under these accounts. Transcendental reflection is posited as the solution to the error, and also as the means by which we are to tell that the German Rationalist employment of the concepts, and the principles arising from it, are incorrect. Now such reflection, under these accounts, consists in becoming aware of the faculty of the objects in question. We become aware that the objects whose relations are proposed in the principles are objects of sensibility. Such reflection then purportedly allows us to see that the relations put forward in the principles do not hold of these objects, and that there are further relations between these objects that are not captured in the proposed principles. Yet, it is unclear how precisely transcendental reflection allows us these claims. Whence the evidence that is afforded by transcendental reflection under these accounts?

This evidence, I believe, is standardly taken to be something like the following: German Rationalism carries out the comparison of concepts, which comparison it happily takes to be sufficient for establishing the relations between the objects of those concepts. This latter assumption results in the four central ontological principles identified in the appendix. However, German Rationalism fails to precede its comparisons with transcendental reflection – with the awareness of the faculty of the objects in question. If it were to involve such an awareness, it would recognise that the objects whose relations it purports to establish are in fact objects given or presented to us by sensibility – and sensibility allows us to apprehend relations between these objects beyond those that hold between their concepts. In sensibility, we look to the objects themselves and apprehend further real relations between these objects, beyond any conceptual relations captured by the understanding. Further, this allows us to see that the ontological principles put forward do not hold, as they do not hold of the objects of sensibility and these are the objects in question. Thus, transcendental reflection, on this account, allows us to identify this employment of the concepts of reflection as erroneous by allowing us to see that the supposed relations do not hold between the real objects presented in sensibility. In this, the appeal to transcendental reflection, under these accounts, signals Kant’s ‘empirical turn’ in relation to his German

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Rationalist predecessors. Recognising the objects as those of sensibility allows us to turn to our empirical experience to find out the relations between these real, empirical objects.

However, even given this more qualified picture of the appeal to transcendental reflection, the familiar formulation falters in at least two crucial ways. First, and least worryingly, the account is yet vague and indeterminate. Exactly how is it that we apprehend these further real relations? How is it that we see that the principles in question do not hold? Standardly, these accounts leave these questions answered only implicitly: The introduction of sensibility as the faculty by means of which these objects are given or presented directly is meant to signal a general turning of our attention to empirical experience, for which these claims are then taken to be in some way self-evident.

Secondly, and more worryingly, this account is erroneous as an account of transcendental reflection in at least two ways. First, as we have it above, to precede any comparison of concepts with transcendental reflection is to become aware of the faculty of the objects of the concepts in question. Becoming aware of the faculty by means of which we cognise these objects allows us to see that such comparison is inadequate. However, transcendental reflection does not involve turning to the objects of our cognition to relate them to their relevant faculty. Transcendental reflection is the apprehension of the faculty to which our representations belong, not straightforwardly the objects. Kant says this in a number of places. Such reflection is “the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition, through which alone their relation among themselves can be correctly determined.” (A260/B316) It is “the action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated” (A261/B317). In its formulation of the case, the familiar account ends up dismissing these explicit characterisations by construing transcendental reflection solely as the awareness of the faculty to which the objects in question belong. The familiar formulation thus involves a subtle, but crucial, misconstrual of transcendental reflection.

There is a second way in which the account involves an error in its understanding of the appeal to transcendental reflection. As we have presented it here, the appeal to transcendental reflection affords us an appeal to the real relations between the objects of our cognition (and thus is, according to this account, a case of Kant’s recognition of and insistence on
the real-conceptual distinction). Now, the apprehension of real relations between particular objects will indeed allow us to find any principles that deny those relations to be false. (A single instance against a principle is sufficient to show the general principle false.)\textsuperscript{89} Thus, the appeal to the real relations between objects will allow a rejection of the Leibnizian principles. However, the apprehension of real relations between particular objects will not, either under the Critical account or under German Rationalism, allow us to arrive at any correct general principles. The principles in question are strictly universal principles – they hold of all possible objects of the relevant sort – and so it cannot be that an appeal to any real relations between particular objects in our empirical experience can show the superseding principles to be true. Thus, the appeal to transcendental reflection fails, under the familiar formulation, to play a role in our arriving at (Critical) philosophical cognition.

Thus far we have seen how the familiar formulation leaves our understanding of the error and its correction vague and, in some parts, even erroneous. However, our understanding of Kant’s case in the appendix is yet worse off under this formulation. These formulations in fact almost entirely fail to capture the positive account of the correction to the error: First, as noted, the appeal to transcendental reflection in arriving at corrected principles is, under these accounts, indeterminate and inadequate. It is unclear how transcendental reflection, if understood as the recognition of the real relations between the objects of sensibility, is the solution that corrects the error and allows us to arrive at corrected principles. More significantly, these formulations fail to give any account of the corrected employment of the concepts of reflection. Under these accounts, Kant shows the concepts of reflection to be erroneously employed by German Rationalism insofar as this employment is taken to yield the relevant relations between objects. However, we are left without any indication of what the corrected employment of these concepts consists in. We have no idea how their correct employment is involved in arriving at philosophical cognition under the Critical account, or indeed, whether it is at all – or whether, in fact, their employment simply reverts to their role in producing the logical forms of judgement.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{89} Precisely this appeal is found in Warren’s discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (2013, p. 34.)

\textsuperscript{90} It might here be objected that these accounts do at least involve an implicit corrected employment of the concepts of reflection: The accounts recognise that the distinctions captured in the concepts apply to the objects of sensibility, but that they do so in a
This lack of any account of the corrected employment of the concepts of reflection is, I think, the most crucial and far-reaching worry in these discussions – and one which is brought to light when we contrast this formulation with the findings of our study here:

In applying the line of reasoning of the appendix, we uncovered, not only an underlying account of the error found in the German Rationalist employment of the concepts of reflection, but also an account of their correct, Critical, employment: In line with the familiar formulation, the line of reasoning put forward transcendental reflection as the needed solution to the error. What this demand pointed us to, however, was not an examination of the objects of our cognition for their real relations as the familiar formulation has it, but an employment of the concepts of reflection in accordance with the faculty of the representations in question. The line of reasoning brought to light that such analysis proceeds by employing implicitly those terms of differentiation that are already employed implicitly by the relevant faculty in our having the representation. Thus, if we relate, as transcendental reflection properly demands, the representations in question to their relevant faculty, we find that, for representations of sensibility, we are to employ terms of differentiation that are different to those of the understanding. This is a demand for a differing employment of the concepts of reflection. In the case of representations of sensibility, the concepts of reflection are to be employed in a different way – but they are still to be employed.

Thus, we might contrast the error as it has emerged here in our study with the error as it is found in this fifth formulation. Under this formulation, German Rationalism errs in its move from the logical employment of the concepts of reflection to their ontological employment because the objects in question are objects of sensibility, and sensibility ‘introduces its own distinctions’. Under our account, we are able to see that what is in question is the differentiation of our representations as representations. Their correct differentiation requires the correct terms of differentiation (employment of the concepts of reflection) and that this involves employment of the relevant faculty’s own implicit terms of different way to objects of the pure understanding. Here then, we have an implicit corrected employment of these concepts.

In response, we might note that this is not, in fact, an employment of the concepts of reflection. The concepts of reflection subsume representations, and this account of the corrected employment of the concepts of reflection needs to be developed so that the distinctions can accurately be understood as an employment of the concepts of reflection.
differentiation. The error of German Rationalism, then, consists in its employing the concepts of reflection *erroneously* (differentiating our representations incorrectly), due to an incorrect apprehension of the faculties in question. Under German Rationalism, all such representations are taken to belong to the understanding and differentiated accordingly. However, this is erroneous, according to the Critical account, because our cognition involves both understanding and sensibility as distinct faculties. Thus, not all representations can be treated in the way of German Rationalism. Sensibility ‘introduces its own distinctions’ insofar as sensibility introduces a further employment of the concepts of reflection in differentiating our representations. In order to move from this differentiation of representations to the differentiation of objects, the correctness of the former is required as these are the representations due to our faculties that will ultimately be shown to stand us in relation to the objects of philosophy. Thus, the move from the logical employment of the concepts of reflection to their ontological employment is illegitimate, as it yields erroneous results for the differentiation of our representations as representations.

Secondly, we can now see how transcendental reflection allows for the apprehension of further relations between the objects of sensibility. Under familiar formulations, what transcendental reflection affords us is the apprehension of the objects of our cognition as objects of sensibility, and thus, in some way or another, we are able to apprehend these objects as having certain relations not captured in German Rationalism’s comparison of the concepts of these objects. However, we now have a more perspicuous understanding of the role played here by transcendental reflection. The reason why we are able to apprehend further relations between the objects of our cognition is because we have apprehended further relations between the representations of those objects. Transcendental reflection allows us to apprehend the faculty of the *representations* in question, and thereby to differentiate them by means of the concepts of reflection correctly. This correctness then, once the transcendental proofs have been carried out, then yields a differentiation of the marks of the objects of the representations, and thus yields further relations between these objects that are unrecognised under German Rationalism.91

91 One discussion in which the differing relations between concepts and *intuitions* is recognised, albeit in passing, is in Perreijn (1997, p. 113).
Finally, we have seen that the concepts of reflection do indeed have a
determinate and crucial positive role in securing philosophical cognition. The concepts of reflection are still required in order to differentiate our representations from one another under the Critical account, though in a now-corrected way. The concepts are employed in a way that differentiates these representations in accordance with the faculty to which they belong. In this, their corrected Critical employment, the concepts of reflection play the same role as under their German Rationalist predecessors. In its account, the familiar formulation fails to recognise this.

The root cause of these failures in extant discussions is that, in their haste to examine the Leibnizian principles themselves, they overstep the line of reasoning presented in the introduction. This line of reasoning, as we have seen in the course of our study, is crucial in understanding the case that Kant puts forward in the appendix. Once it is taken into account, we find a complex, systematic, and unified account of the employment of the concepts of reflection – both of their erroneous employment in the tradition promulgated by Leibniz’s hand and, indeed, of a corrected Critical employment, which is at once continuous with this tradition as well as a correction of it.
Part VII.
Alternative accounts

In Parts I and VI, I contrasted my interpretation of Kant’s case in the appendix with what I termed its ‘familiar’ formulation as it is standardly found in literature on the section. Not all extant interpretations of the section, however, align with this familiar formulation. In this seventh and final part, I turn to three interpretations of Kant’s case in the appendix that diverge, in fundamental ways, with either the interpretation presented in this study or with the familiar formulation. I begin with de Boer’s interpretation in ‘Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique’ (2010). I turn then to Longuenesse’s well-known treatment of the concepts of reflection in Kant and the Capacity to Judge (1998), before discussing an account given by McBay Merritt in ‘Varieties of Reflection in Kant’s Logic’ (2015). In each case, I will put forward what I hope to be an accurate outline of the account insofar as it is relevant to the account presented here, followed by an assessment of its relative strengths and weakness in relation to the findings of our account.


In ‘Pure Reason’s Enlightenment’, de Boer discusses the amphiboly chapter and transcendental reflection within the context of tracing “Kant’s transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science” (2010. p. 53). De Boer’s overarching aim is to show that the Critical philosophy is crucially distinguished from rationalist metaphysics in its restriction, in various ways, of ‘things in themselves’ to ‘objects of experience’. Within this overarching argument, one of de Boer’s central claims is that transcendental reflection underlies both rationalist metaphysics and the Critical philosophy, but what distinguishes the latter from the former is its correct Critical mode of this reflection. While transcendental reflection under rationalist metaphysics involved taking the objects of our a priori
judgements to be things in themselves, corrected reflection under the Critical account involves recognising that these objects must be the empirical objects of our senses. In treating de Boer’s interpretation, I will trace out the main claims of her account of the amphiboly chapter and transcendental reflection, and then turn to some remarks on how the account I have presented here coincides with and diverges from her account.

De Boer distinguishes three types of reflection relevant to her purposes. The first of these is ‘preliminary reflection’, which (normally implicit) reflection involves considering the faculties of the representations being connected in a judgement. Empirical judgements that connect representations of different faculties (for example, ‘the cause is red’) cannot be objectively valid. The second type of reflection is that of logical reflection. Such reflection involves the employment of the concepts of reflection and is carried out both in every case of empirical judgement and also in the initial formation of concepts. Such reflection is a matter of comparing concepts with one another for the sake of their differentiation. The third and last type of reflection is transcendental reflection. Like preliminary reflection, transcendental reflection involves an awareness of the faculty of the representations connected in a judgement. It is seemingly distinct from such reflection, however, insofar as the representations in question are the a priori elements of our philosophical cognition. Transcendental reflection is the “act by means of which I determine whether the representations to be connected in a judgement belong to pure understanding or sensible intuition” (2010, p. 67).

According to de Boer, the amphiboly chapter distinguishes for us two different modes of the latter. One mode of transcendental reflection leads to rationalist metaphysics’ application of its a priori judgements to things in themselves, while the correct Critical mode restricts the application of our a priori judgements to the objects of our experience. De Boer’s account of the contrast is as follows. Under rationalist metaphysics, the concepts in an a priori judgement are, as in any judgement, logically reflected upon by means of the concepts of reflection. However, such reflection is used by rationalist metaphysics for “ontological purposes” (2010, p. 64). Logical reflection is carried out in order to define the a priori concepts that feature in our a priori judgements, which concepts are then taken to apply to objects or things in general. In this, rationalist metaphysics takes the
concepts of these objects to be “[assigned] to pure thought alone” (2010, p. 68) and so engages in a certain mode of transcendental reflection.

The key to the contrasting form of transcendental reflection, and indeed to the error present in the above mode of such reflection, de Boer takes to be Kant’s reference at A263/B319 to ‘objective comparison’. What is required, according to de Boer, for metaphysics to become a science is objective comparison or, what de Boer seemingly takes to be equivalent, empirical judgement. That is, what is required for science are judgements about the sensible objects of our empirical experience. And what the Critical mode of transcendental reflection consists in is the correct apprehension of the complex cognitive set up found in this form of judgement:

Empirical judgements connect representations of sensibility. But, de Boer reminds us, such judgements are “made possible by synthetic a priori principles” (2010, p. 69), which principles are only valid if they connect representations that belong to different faculties (that is, they “predicate pure concepts of possible objects of experience.” (2010, p. 69) Thus, the Critical mode of transcendental reflection allows us to recognise this cognitive complexity to our a priori judgements and, contrary to the rationalist mode of reflection, to “determine[s] which representations belong to pure thought and which to sensibility in an appropriate way.” (2010, p. 68) Thus, the Critical mode of transcendental reflection allows for the application of our a priori judgements to be restricted to the correct objects – viz. the sensible objects of our empirical experience.

Finally, this Critical mode of transcendental reflection involves, according to de Boer, a Critical employment of the concepts of reflection. Kant does not “[abandon] the concepts of reflection he held undergirded Leibniz’ unCritical mode of transcendental reflection” (2010, p. 69), but rather employs them correctly. According to de Boer, Kant employs the concepts of reflection in order to distinguish phenomena from noumena, prior to establishing the a priori principles:

Although Kant does not really put it this way, he seems to regard the opposites of the concepts of reflection employed by Leibniz to serve precisely this purpose. On this view, the concepts of distinctness, conflict, and the outer allow thought to conceive of phenomena as distinct from one another, as marked by conflicting forces, and as determined by extrinsic, relational properties. The distinction between matter and form,
Lastly, allows thought to conceive of phenomena as sensible contents preceded by the forms of intuition.

(2010, p. 70)

Empirical judgement thus requires transcendental reflection insofar as transcendental reflection yields this Critical employment of the concepts of reflection, which employment delineates the relevant realm of objects of such judgements prior to establishing the a priori principles.

Having seen de Boer’s account in broad outline above, I turn now to some remarks on it in light of the account presented here.

De Boer’s account can be singled out from standard discussions in the literature in an important way. Contrary to these discussions, de Boer recognises and emphasises a further legitimate employment of the concepts of reflection. As noted in our discussion of the familiar formulation in Part VI, any further legitimate employment of these concepts, as concepts that distinguish concepts or representations from one another, is either generally overlooked or fails to show how the corrected employment applies the concepts to representations rather than objects.

In contrast to these formulations, de Boer’s account does indeed recognise a further legitimate employment of the concepts that correctly characterises them as applying to representations. Under de Boer’s account, the legitimate employment of the concepts of reflection in the a priori case is still to be found in distinguishing concepts from one another – the pure concepts that are found in our synthetic a priori judgements. The concepts of reflection still serve to individuate the pure concepts found in these judgements, in the same way in which they individuate the empirical concepts found in empirical judgements or the pure concepts found in rationalist metaphysics. However, they are employed Critically insofar as transcendental reflection allows us to apprehend that the things to which they apply are objects of sensibility and not objects of the pure understanding. This latter recognition allows for a valid employment of the synthetic a priori judgements: It allows for the recognition that the synthetic a priori judgements in question are only valid when they are applied to the objects of sensibility, thus allowing us to recognise the two necessary faculties of understanding and sensibility in cognition and to employ the synthetic a priori judgements in a valid way. Thus, as de Boer puts it, “The objective comparison of representations occurring within the sciences […] ultimately rests on transcendental reflection. This is the case […]
because *valid* synthetic a priori judgments must connect representations *that belong to different faculties*. The act of reflection that precedes these judgments must ensure, in other words, that the representations to be connected stem from different sources.” (2010, p. 69)

The merits of this account are notable: It involves a substantive characterisation of a further legitimate and corrected employment of the concepts of reflection, and does not merely distinguish their erroneous employment under rationalist metaphysics. Secondly, prima facie, the account does not extend the employment of the concepts in any controversial way – the concepts of reflection still distinguish concepts from one another only, as they do under their standard employment. Thirdly, the account does not fall into the trap of rendering transcendental reflection a matter of the awareness of the faculty of the objects of our cognition. As we can see above, transcendental reflection involves an awareness of the faculties in a priori cognition as constituted in the above complex way. Finally, we have a rich account of transcendental reflection as necessary for synthetic a priori cognition: The validity of the synthetic a priori judgements depends on their being applied to objects of sensibility, and their being so applied depends on transcendental reflection as the awareness of the different faculties in this application.

There are, however, a number of ways in which the account diverges from the account presented here – and thus a number of ways in which I take the account to involve an error of one form or another. To begin, it is not clear that the account in fact manages to retain the applicability of the concepts of reflection to representations, rather than to objects. In characterising the erroneous employment of the concepts under rationalist metaphysics, this erroneous employment is distinguished from a correct employment in terms of a lack of correct awareness of the objects (and their faculties) to which the pure concepts apply. Under both their erroneous and their correct employment, however, the concepts of reflection seem to be employed in order to distinguish our pure concepts from one another. She writes:

[The] concepts of reflection can also be used for ontological purposes. Just as I can compare my representations of ‘ball’ and ‘round’ and define the latter as an intrinsic determination of the former, so I can compare my representations of ‘all things’ and ‘substance’ and define the latter as an intrinsic determination of the former. [...] In such cases, Kant notes, I “apply these concepts to an object in general (in the transcendental
sense), without further determining whether this is an object of sensible or intellectual intuition” (CPR A 279/B 335). […] Kant denounces not this employment itself, but merely the particular way in which Leibniz relied on the concepts of reflection.

(2010, p. 64)

At this point, the account still seems to retain the claim that the concepts subsume representations (viz. the pure concepts). However, in its discussion of the corrected principles, the principles seem to emerge from an application of the concepts to objects directly. According to de Boer’s account at this point, the concepts of reflection are correctly employed under the Critical account in order to distinguish the realm of phenomena from the realm of noumena, prior to the application of the synthetic a priori judgements. This prior differentiation of these two realms of object, by means of the concepts of reflection, results in the corrected, Critical principles. “On this view”, she claims, “the concepts of distinctness, conflict, and the outer allow thought to conceive of phenomena as distinct from one another, as marked by conflicting forces, and as determined by extrinsic, relational properties.” (2010, p. 70) Now, this application of the concepts of reflection seems not at all to be a matter of applying the concepts to pure concepts for their distinction – nor indeed of applying the concepts to any representations as representations. Here, the concepts of reflection are being applied to the objects of cognition, albeit it at a point prior to the application of the pure concepts. By the end of the discussion, the concepts of reflection are no longer higher-order concepts, subsuming our representations, but, like the pure concepts, subsume what will ultimately be the objects of our cognition. And this is problematic insofar as it conflicts with Kant’s explicit and repeated construal of the concepts as subsuming the relations of our representations “among themselves” (A260/B316).

A further worry concerns, in fact, the lack of any controversial extension of the concepts of reflection under the account. As noted, the account, at least in the first instance, puts forward the corrected employment of the concepts of reflection as a matter of the differentiation of the pure concepts appearing in the synthetic a priori judgements of philosophy. Our worry here, however, is that any such account fails to make sense of the line of reasoning that Kant puts forward explicitly at the start of the appendix concerning these concepts. As we have seen, there Kant explicitly puts forward a distinction between different ways of employing the concepts of
reflection, which different employments depend on whether the relations
subsumed are those of representations of the understanding or are
representations of sensibility. That is, the concepts are to be employed
differently for representations of sensibility, in contrast to those of the
understanding. But then this implies that the concepts do have an
employment in the case of representations of sensibility – an employment
that, seemingly, is unrecognised under the account in question (or, if it is
taken to be recognised in the corrected principles as above, it renders the
concepts applicable to sensible objects and not representations of sensibility).

Related to this worry, is a concern over the characterisation of
transcendental reflection and the representations relevant to it. Recall that
transcendental reflection involves an awareness of the faculty of the
representations involved in a priori cognition in the following way: Our
synthetic a priori judgements involve certain pure concepts. These, as
under rationalist metaphysics, are representations that “originat[e] in
thought” (2010, p. 69). However, these judgements must ultimately apply
to the objects of sensibility. The pure concepts must thus ultimately relate
to “representation[s] originating in sensibility” (ibid.). Transcendental
reflection allows us to recognise this distinction of faculties with regard to
our a priori cognition.

Now, under the account presented here, we need not deny that
transcendental reflection is needed for the correct recognition of the
faculties of the pure concepts and of the representations of the objects to
which these concepts ultimately apply. This is the role of transcendental
reflection with regard to the some of the largest elements in our cognition
(the concepts in our a priori judgements and the intuitions to which they
apply). However, if our account of the role of the concepts of reflection in
the proofs of the Aesthetic is correct, then transcendental reflection is
required at a point prior to this – indeed at the point of distinguishing our
various representations in isolation from one another at the most elemental
level.

A final worry with this account concerns its treatment of the corrected,
Critical principles – a concern that it shares with the familiar formulation.
As discussed in our re-examination of the familiar formulation in Part VI,
the corrected, Critical principles put forward in the appendix are, indeed,
perfectly general or universal. They are established of all possible objects of
our cognition, and not merely of some particular such objects of which we
have had experience. If we take this to be so, then an account of the
corrected employment of the concepts of reflection must show how we arrive at this universality. Under the account in question, the concepts of reflection are employed prior to the pure concepts in distinguishing phenomena from noumena in a general way. However, it is unclear how we might arrive at such universality under this account. All universality that derives from the application of concepts is dealt with in the transcendental deduction and the proofs of the synthetic principles. It is utterly unclear how or why Kant might put forward further, unannounced, unproven concept-derived universality subsequent to the arguments of the Transcendental Analytic. And the account in question seems to be committed to this. The concepts of reflection serve to distinguish phenomena from noumena in a general way prior to the synthetic a priori judgements. By contrast, the account put forward in this study does allow for such generality by introducing the possibility of intuitive, in addition to logical, representability, both of which are a matter of the employment of the concepts of reflection.

II. Longuenesse in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (1998)

By far, the most intricate discussion of the concepts of reflection is to be found in Longuenesse’s 1998 work, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. The work is devoted to an account of how discursive thought ultimately comes to be related to the sensible, and the appendix and its account of the concepts of reflection are appealed to in the service of this overall aim. In what follows, I will focus primarily on the account of the appendix that is given in the course of this broader aim, though, towards the end, I will turn briefly to some discussion of Longuenesse’s own appeal to the concepts of reflection. Again, the discussion here can be divided into two: I begin with an outline of the relevant points of Longuenesse’s account and turn thereafter to a discussion of this account in relation to that which has been put forward in our study above.

One of the primary claims in Longuenesse’s account of how discursive thought relates to the sensible concerns the corresponding syntheses involved in the generation of the a priori concepts of thought and the syntheses that must take place prior to these in the sensible given. As Longuenesse puts it, “Elucidate the forms of discursive analysis – the logical forms of judgement – and you will have the key to the universal
forms of the sensible synthesis that is prior to analysis, and therefore also prior to the categories in their proper role as full-fledged concepts.” (1998, p. 12) Her argument proceeds by intricately tracing out the activities according to which a priori concepts are generated, and the forms of synthesis involved in this generation, in order then to uncover the corresponding forms of sensible synthesis to which these concepts must ultimately apply. The discussion of the appendix and the concepts of reflection is located in the carrying out of the first of these tasks.

In order to understand how the concepts of reflection feature in Longuenesse’s account of the generation of a priori concepts, and indeed in her account of the argument of the appendix, it is helpful to begin by setting out the four types of comparison distinguished under her account, as I understand them. I begin with logical comparison in its general form. Logical comparison, under Longuenesse’s account, is the comparison of already formed concepts. Once we have concepts in our possession, these can be compared with one another for their identity, difference, etc. in terms of the concepts of reflection. Such comparison is, as Longuenesse puts it, “comparison of concepts in the understanding” (1998, p. 114). Prior to any such comparison being possible, however, the concepts require an initial generation. This generation proceeds by a trifold activity of comparison of the singular representations of intuition. This is the activity of analysis and it is a trifold activity of, at once, comparing singular representations, abstracting from some, while recognising others as falling under a universal rule, the concept. This recognition is effectively a generation of the concept. Now, although, at first glance, this activity of comparison seems to have nothing to do with the concepts of reflection, Longuenesse argues that the concepts of reflection in fact guide this type of comparison as well. This, it would seem, is ultimately because the concepts of reflection are the concepts that realise the logical form of a judgement, and because concepts ultimately obtain their universal form only in judgement as the fundamental form of universal representation. Thus, claims Longuenesse, in this activity of the generation of concepts from the singular representations of sensibility, the rules employed are the concepts of reflection. A third and prior type of comparison is identified in the aesthetic comparison of the singular representations with one another in intuition. This is a prior and necessary form of comparison according to Longuenesse: “[I]t seems plausible to assume that this transcendental reflection […] presupposes a comparison one may call aesthetic, by means
of which appearances are recognized as identical or different in sensible perception and externally related to one another.” (1998, p. 114)

Finally, transcendental reflection is a reflection on “the relation of our representations in general to their sources in our mind” (1998, p. 123), which reflection allows us to recognise the distinction between the first and third types of comparison above, that is, to recognise a distinction between the comparison of concepts and the comparison of sensible objects in intuition. As Longuenesse puts it, “[t]he distinction between (logical) comparison of concepts and comparison of objects in sensibility is effected by transcendental reflection” (1998, p. 113).

Having these distinctions before us, we might now turn to Longuenesse’s account of the argument of the appendix, and of the error with which the Leibnizian philosophy is charged. Now, although Longuenesse explicitly characterises the error of the Leibnizian philosophy as a matter of the confusion of the comparison of concepts with the comparison of objects, it seems to me that, in her detailed treatment of the concepts of reflection, a slightly different reading of the charge comes to light. In this discussion, Longuenesse distinguishes two subtypes of logical comparison, ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ logical comparison, and it seems to me that the error that the Leibnizian falls into, under her account, is ultimately construed as carrying out the former type of comparison instead of the latter.

As we have seen above, logical comparison is an activity of comparing already possessed concepts with one another. This is done, according to Longuenesse, by employing the concepts of reflection. However, a ‘narrow’ form of such comparison is distinguished by Longuenesse from a ‘broad’ form. Narrow logical comparison involves the comparison of concepts, by means of the concepts of reflection, in abstraction from the referents of the concepts (whether or not they have any). It is a “comparison of concepts alone” (1998, p. 126). By contrast, broad logical comparison involves the comparison of concepts, by means of the concepts of reflection, as concepts compared “under sensible conditions.” (1998, p. 127) Given the various Critical details and intricacies, this comparison is ultimately now a matter of the comparison of concepts as schemata, or universal rules under which the singular marks in sensible intuition fall, rather than simply as logical combinations of universal marks. And, this is what, according to Longuenesse, any comparison of concepts must be under the Critical philosophy. Thus, under Longuenesse’s account, the contrast between the
erroneous comparison of the Leibnizian philosophy and a corrected form of such comparison is the contrast between narrow logical comparison and broad logical comparison (and thus with confusing one way of comparing concepts with another way of comparing concepts).

In relation to our study here, this intricate account of the concepts of reflection by Longuenesse requires, as I see it, a response on three fronts. First, and most pertinently, we might examine Longuenesse’s construal of the case in the appendix itself in relation to the account presented in our study here. Both accounts involve a contrast between the erroneous Leibnizian employment of the concepts of reflection and their corrected employment under the Critical philosophy. The accounts diverge, however, quite dramatically with regard to this latter employment. Secondly, Longuenesse’s account involves a quite different understanding of the activity of analysis to that of our study, and this activity constitutes a crucial element under both of these accounts and some discussion of these contrastive accounts is thus necessary. Finally, a response to Longuenesse’s account of the employment of the concepts within the generation of a priori concepts is needed.

Under Longuenesse’s account, the correct type of comparison that is to replace the erroneous comparison of concepts of the Leibnizian philosophy is a comparison of concepts insofar as these refer to objects of sensibility. More precisely, under the Critical account, such concepts are ultimately to be understood as schemata and the erroneous comparison of concepts in abstraction from their referents is thus to be replaced by the comparison of schemata. Now, it seems to me that we must, under any understanding of the appendix, recognise this latter type of comparison. Indeed, once we are dealing with the schematised categories – once we are dealing with concepts that refer to sensible objects – these concepts will be capable of comparison with one another, as such concepts, and we will thus find such a type of comparison. However, under the account presented here, the contrast between erroneous and correct comparison, and thus the point at which the concern of the appendix is located, is prior to the comparison between concepts of this sort. It is a comparison that concerns the fundamental elements involved in such concepts – their elemental conceptual and sensible representations, but yet in isolation from one another. According to our account, the corrected employment of the concepts of reflection is to be found in their additionally being employed with regard to sensible representations in isolation. Our account then
implies that, in relation to Longuenesse’s four types of comparison, the correction of the Leibnizian error involves employing the concepts of reflection in the third of these types, viz. in aesthetic comparison, and is not a matter of employing the concepts for the sake of broad logical comparison rather than narrow logical comparison.

Now, what is to be said in support of this understanding of the error and its correction over that of Longuenessee? First, there are formulations in the appendix that seem to indicate that the concepts of reflection can be employed with regard to representations of sensibility considered in isolation: “The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition”, Kant tells us, “I call transcendental reflection.” (A261/B317) Thus, to suppose that a corrected employment of the concepts involves their role solely in the comparison of concepts, albeit schemata, does not do justice to these formulations. Secondly, there is, as we have seen in Part IV, reason to suppose that the erroneous employment of the concepts of reflection is located in the German Rationalist procedure of bringing already possessed concepts to distinctness for the sake of philosophical cognition. Now, this procedure is a matter of bringing to distinctness the representational elements in our cognition, down to the most elemental of these. This is the required starting point of the analytic method according to which German Rationalism proceeds. And the Critical philosophy is continuous with this. The first step in philosophical cognition is to bring our already possessed representations to distinctness, right down to the most elemental. Thus, if we are, under the Critical account, to arrive at these most fundamental elements, and if the erroneous employment of the concepts of reflection is indeed to be located in the German Rationalist procedure for arriving at such elements, then their corrected employment must be found in the analysis of the representational elements of our cognition, down to their most elemental. And, given the separate contributions of the understanding and sensibility to our cognition under the Critical account, some of these elements are going to be representations of sensibility in isolation.

Let us turn then to the contrasting accounts of analysis found in the two discussions. Longuenessee takes analysis to be a bringing about of clarity insofar as it is a matter of generating a concept. Analysis is the trifold activity of comparison, reflection, abstraction by means of which a concept
is initially generated. Under our account, analysis is equally a bringing about of clarity or distinctness, but with regard to representations that we already have. Now, it is worth noting that this does not strictly effect a disagreement over the claims of the appendix. A bringing to distinctness of already possessed representations is one activity. A bringing to distinctness in generating a concept is another. And Longuenesse and I both agree that the issue in the appendix concerns two ways of comparing representations already possessed (with Longuenesse’s independent and ultimate interest being in the role of the concepts of reflection in the generation of a concept). Nonetheless, we might note that Kant’s use of the term ‘analysis’, when it is evidently used in a technical and not ordinary sense, is primarily found referring to the procedure outlined in our account, viz. of bringing our representations to distinctness. It is further worth pointing out, however, that, although this provides evidence for the use of ‘analysis’ to refer to this procedure, this does not rule out Kant’s being committed to the further trifold procedure as that which is involved in the generation of concepts.

Finally, and turning to Longuenesse’s account within the context of its overall focus, we might examine her claims regarding the concepts of reflection in the generation of a concept, in relation to the account presented here. The role that Longuenesse uncovers for the concepts of reflection in our a priori cognition might be outlined once more as follows. As noted at the start of our discussion, the concepts of reflection are employed in the logical comparison of concepts, that is, in the comparison of concepts that we already possess. They are equally, however, employed in the initial generation of any such concepts, such that the synthesis of marks in the concept already possessed is paralleled in its generation. Now, these two employments are found in the case of all concepts – both empirical and, crucially, a priori concepts. This latter is the focus of Longuenesse’s account. Under this account then, the concepts of reflection can be employed in the logical comparison of our a priori concepts, once we are in possession of them. Crucially, however, the concepts of reflection are employed in this initial generation of the a priori concepts as well. By means of the trifold procedure of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, the a priori concepts of philosophy are generated by reflection on sensible intuition (where such intuition is pure in the case of a priori concepts) by the employment of the concepts of reflection. What then might be said in

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92 See, for example, A7/B11, A14/B28, B23, B130, and A77/B103.
response to this understanding of the concepts of reflection as employed in the generation of the a priori concepts of philosophy?

It is perhaps first worth noting that it is not this employment that is at issue in the appendix, either according to Longuenesse or according to our study here. Longuenesse’s concern in the case of this employment is with the *pre-conscious conditions* that make possible our a priori concepts and the synthetic judgements in which they feature. By contrast, under both Longuenesse’s and our account, the concern of the appendix is with the *conscious treatment* of these concepts in the explicit establishing of these judgements. (Indeed, I take it that Longuenesse does not mean to claim that the corrected Critical employment of the concepts of reflection, the employment that contrasts with their erroneous employment under Leibniz, is *in* their role in the generation of concepts. This cannot be the case as the contrasting erroneous employment is a matter of the comparison of concepts *already had*, and Longuenesse distinguishes a corrected ‘broad’ form of this, which latter employment is *distinct* from the “embryonic” (1998, p. 124) employment of the concepts of reflection in generating a concept.) Nevertheless, this employment is significantly related to the point of interest of the appendix in the following way.

As noted, under both Longuenesse’s and the account put forward in this study, the concern of the appendix is with the employment of the concepts of reflection in the *conscious treatment* of our a priori representations for the sake of explicitly establishing the synthetic a priori judgements that constitute our philosophical cognition. It is not concerned with the *pre-conscious* processes that initially serve to generate these concepts. Nonetheless, it seems that the latter must indeed have implications for the former – and this in the way suggested by Longuenesse. If we are to uncover certain relations between our concepts or representations that we already possess by means of the former sort of comparison, then the latter pre-conscious processes or conditions we describe must be such that the relations in question will be found. And this is indeed what Longuenesse claims: “Elucidate the forms of discursive analysis – the logical forms of judgment – and you will have the key to the universal forms of the sensible synthesis that is prior to analysis, and therefore also prior to the categories in their proper role as full-fledged concepts.” (1998, p. 12)
McBay Merritt’s most developed interpretation of the appendix is found in her recent paper, ‘Varieties of Reflection in Kant’s Logic’ (2015). The overriding concern of the discussion is to systematise and clarify the various appeals to ‘reflection’ across Kant’s writings. These appeals, claims Merrit, are both technical and non-technical or everyday. With regard to the former, Kant’s technical senses of ‘reflection’ divide primarily into four varieties, with each variety relevant or proper to a species of logic. The line of argument of the paper thus begins by distinguishing the four species of logic found under the Critical account, in order then to identify the correspondent form of reflection.

Merrit’s discussion of the appendix appears towards the end of this line of argument. Pure general logic has been distinguished as the constitutive rules for thought about objects, where this is independent of the domain of objects. The reflection proper to this is reflection under the analytic unity of apperception. Pure applied logic concerns the non-constitutive norms for the good use of judgement. The reflection relevant to these norms is consideration of the general entitlement to make a claim. Pure special (transcendental) logic concerns the constitutive rules for thought about a particular domain of objects, viz. phenomena. The reflection correspondent to this logic is reflection under the synthetic unity of apperception. Special (transcendental) applied logic is the non-constitutive norms for the good use of judgement with regard to phenomena. The reflection proper to this logic, claims Merrit, is transcendental reflection. Although this systematisation of the species of logic and their correspondent forms of reflection is of great interest, I will, for the most part, set it aside in what follows, focussing on her claims concerning the appendix itself. I will raise these further distinctions as and when they are relevant to these concerns.

Merritt’s account of the appendix might be outlined as follows. In the appendix, Kant introduces and contrasts logical and transcendental reflection. Kant’s primary concern thereafter is a polemic against Leibniz that charges Leibniz’s philosophy with engaging in the former instead of the latter. The former of these varieties of reflection is an organisational activity. Logical reflection, according to Merrit, is the activity of organising and clarifying concepts that we possess into a systematic structure. The concepts of reflection are employed in this organisational activity. They are the concepts that organise and clarify our concepts in relation to one
another – they are used in “analysing […] these concepts to determine their points of identity and difference.” (2015, p. 13) The error with which Leibniz’s philosophy is charged, according to Merritt, is to engage in this activity of the organisation of concepts in relation to one another, while failing to “be clear about the general nature of the object represented through the concepts in question: i.e., whether it is phenomenal or noumenal.” (2015, p. 18) This latter task is transcendental reflection, and Kant thus charges Leibniz with engaging in logical reflection instead of transcendental reflection. Leibniz’s error, according to Merritt, is that he “failed to care about the substantive requirements on thinking relative to a certain domain, and instead cared only about the systematic coherence of his thought.” (ibid.)

Although, in the final analysis, Merritt’s account and the account that we have put forward in this study diverge significantly, and perhaps more significantly than do the other accounts examined, Merritt’s account is also the only account of the appendix that equally locates logical reflection within the procedure of German Rationalist analysis:

Standard accounts of logical reflection, according to Merritt, take it to be part of a threefold sequence of acts – comparison, reflection, abstraction – that allow for the production of concepts. Logical reflection is a reflection on non-conceptual material for the sake of the initial generation of concepts. Support for this account, Merritt notes, comes in the form of an appeal to §§5–6 of the Jäsche Logic in which Kant is concerned with the constitution of concepts, which discussion cites the mentioned threefold sequence. In contrast to this view, Merritt claims that logical reflection is not a reflection found in the generation of concepts (and indeed that Kant gives no account of such concept generation at all), but is instead the activity of organising concepts of which we are already in possession. The appeal to logical reflection in the appendix, according to Merritt, “alludes to German Rationalist logic […] For [the German Rationalists], reflection is trained on concepts already at hand, considering their points of identity and difference in order to clarify their content through their articulation into a systematic whole.” (2015, p. 17) Thus, at this point, Merritt’s account is in agreement with the account presented in this study. Logical reflection is “trained on concepts that are already in hand — and not obviously to create new ones, but rather to clarify existing concepts and their relation in an organised whole.” (2015, p. 10, emphasis my own) According to both Merritt’s account and the account presented here then, logical reflection is
involved in the German Rationalist procedure for bringing concepts of which we are in possession to distinctness by their comparison with one another.

Our accounts, however, diverge almost immediately in a number of significant ways. This divergence between the accounts is primarily found on three fronts. First, under the account presented here, Merrit’s account involves a misunderstanding of the nature and significance of such logical reflection under German Rationalism. Logical reflection is not a merely organisational afterthought in philosophical cognition. It is both necessary for, and partly constitutive, of such cognition. Secondly, the account equally involves a misunderstanding of the nature and significance of the Critical correction of logical reflection. Both German Rationalism and the Critical philosophy are committed to the necessity and legitimacy in philosophical cognition of bringing our representations to distinctness, albeit for different reasons and in quite different ways. Finally, and relatedly, due to its misconstrual of the Critical correction of the error, Merrit’s account involves a subtle misconstrual of transcendental reflection. I will deal with these in turn and thereafter raise a few smaller points of concern.

Although Merrit’s discussion does not explicitly address the context or purpose of logical reflection in great detail, the discussion seems to take such reflection to be something of an organisational afterthought to philosophical cognition. The aim or end of such reflection is, according to Merrit, an “organised whole” (2015, p. 13) or “systematic cognition” (ibid.), but the emphasis here is on the ordering or organisation of our concepts or cognition and not on securing any cognition or concepts themselves. Seemingly, the (sole) purpose served by logical reflection is that of organising and clarifying our concepts, and this purpose is not strictly necessary for a priori cognition. Its rules are “simply rules for the organisation of thought” (2015, p. 17, emphasis my own) and there is “nothing wrong with [such] reflection; it simply provides no sufficient basis for metaphysics” (2015, p. 18). (Transcendental reflection, by contrast, is explicitly recognised as necessary for such cognition under the account.) From these remarks, Merrit implicitly seems to take logical reflection to be essentially an activity of ordering already possessed concepts or cognitions, at a point subsequent to cognition.

Now, under the account presented here, the above does not suffice to characterise logical reflection, nor does it capture the significance of such
reflection under German Rationalism. German Rationalist logical reflection is not, under our account, a merely organisational afterthought. It is not an organisational afterthought insofar as such reflection is a necessary first step in securing philosophical cognition. The concepts involved in such logical reflection are not those gleaned from our already secured cognition (although such reflection can be carried out on these as well), but are concepts of which we are indistinctly aware, which stand us in relation to the objects of our philosophical cognition, but which do so indistinctly, and which thus require a bringing to distinctness in order that cognition by means of them might be secured. Secondly, and more crucially, such reflection is not an organisational afterthought. German Rationalist logical reflection is partly constitutive of philosophical cognition. There are two points here to be noted. First, as we have seen, such reflection is carried out by employing the concepts of reflection. This is equally noted by Merrit. However, only under the account presented here is it recognised that carrying out such reflection by employing these concepts involves implicit terms of differentiation. In such reflection, the concepts of reflection do not simply differentiate identity and difference, but the identity and difference of concepts. The concepts of reflection subsume differentiation among representations of a certain sort. Secondly, and crucially, given the German Rationalist assumption that these representations (concepts) are sufficient for representing the objects of our cognition (and the assumption that the representations in question do in fact so stand us in relation), this carrying out of logical reflection by employing the concepts of reflection does not only succeed in organising the concepts. It suffices for distinguishing the marks of the objects of the concepts as well. Thus, the concepts of reflection as employed in logical reflection are not, as Merritt claims, “simply rules for the organisation of thought” (2015, p. 17). Logical reflection is constitutive of our philosophical cognition under German Rationalism, as the rules according to which the marks of objects are differentiable are (taken to be) paralleled in the rules according to which the marks of our concepts are differentiable.

This leads us to a second primary point of divergence between the two accounts. Once we recognise the constitutive role played by the employment of the concepts of reflection under German Rationalism, we are able to uncover a contrasting constitutive role, now corrected, under the Critical account. Under Merritt’s account of Critical cognition, the concepts of reflection remain confined to their employment in logical reflection,
which reflection itself remains consigned to the post-cognition merely organisational tasks. The employment of the concepts of reflection under German Rationalism, in reflection “trained on concepts already at hand […] in order to clarify their content through their articulation into a systematic whole” (2015, p. 17), remains, for Merritt, their employment under the Critical philosophy. What is introduced and emphasised under the Critical philosophy, under her account, is the further dimension of consideration of the nature of the objects to which the concepts are meant to refer.

By contrast, under our account, the Critical philosophy equally recognises a constitutive role to the employment of the concepts of reflection, though the picture that underlies this constitutive role is quite different to that of German Rationalism: Under the Critical philosophy, the representations involved in our philosophical cognition must be, if there is to be any such cognition, representations of both the understanding and sensibility. The concepts of reflection have now been recognised as concepts that subsume, not specifically the differentiation between concepts, but the differentiation between representations generally. These concepts are thus now employed in the comparison of both representations of the understanding and sensibility for their clarification. This is a first point of difference. As under German Rationalism, this clarification is not merely organisational, but is both a necessary first step to philosophical cognition and plays a constitutive role in such cognition. Again as under German Rationalism, the representations compared in terms of the concepts of reflection ultimately stand us in relation to their objects and the differentiation of the marks of these representations by means of the concepts of reflection at once serves to differentiate the marks of the objects of the representations. However, the Critical philosophy does not assume that the understanding stands us in relation to the objects of philosophy as does German Rationalism. Sensibility stands us in direct relation to objects, and its representations can be assumed to stand us in relation to their objects, while the representations of the understanding are given transcendental proofs to show that they do stand us in relation to their objects. Given this, employing the concepts of reflection in order to differentiate the representations will allow for differentiation of the marks of their objects, provided this is done correctly. Thus, the concepts of reflection have a further Critical employment that is unrecognised under Merritt’s account. This employment is equally a necessary first step in our philosophical cognition and equally plays a constitutive role in such
cognition, though this time, under the Critical account, this is because the rules according to which the marks of our representations are differentiable are (shown to be) paralleled in the rules according to which the marks of their objects are differentiable. This employment is distinguished in the crucial line of reasoning concerning these concepts in the appendix to the introduction.

Finally, a third point at which our account presented here must take issue with that of Merritt’s concerns its characterisation of transcendental reflection. According to Merritt, standard accounts of transcendental reflection take such reflection to be the equivalent of logical reflection in the case of philosophical or a priori concepts. That is, such reflection is involved in the generation of a priori concepts from non-conceptual material. By contrast, under Merritt’s account, transcendental reflection is a reflection that corresponds to normative requirements that guide the good use of thought, rather than constitutive requirements of that thought. As mentioned, the account crucially distinguishes two broad sorts of reflection —reflection that corresponds to the constitutive requirements of thought (pure logic) and reflection that corresponds to the normative requirements on the correct use of thought (applied logic). Under her account, transcendental reflection is a case of the latter. It is the reflection that corresponds to the norms guiding the use of our thinking with regard to the domain of phenomena. It is, in Merritt’s words, “to consider whether any given claim concerns objects in a sensible or a merely intelligible world.” (2015, p. 18) It is to “be clear about the general nature of the object represented through the concepts in question: i.e., whether it is phenomenal or noumenal” (2015, p. 18) or to “care about the substantive requirements on thinking relative to [the domain of phenomena]” (2015, p. 18).

Thus, in contrast to the standard account, claims Merritt, transcendental reflection can, under her proposed account, be understood as a ‘duty’. Under standard accounts, such reflection must be implicitly present insofar as we have cognition by means of the concepts in question or “something that we are all already doing anyway, by sheer analytic default” (2015, p. 19). By contrast, under her account, transcendental reflection, as the consideration of the general nature of the objects represented through our philosophical concepts, is an activity that we can carry out or fail to carry out in our attempts at philosophical cognition.
However, the account presented here must take issue with this account of transcendental reflection, and it must do so on the basis of the explicit definition of such reflection given by Kant in the appendix. As we have noted, transcendental reflection is characterised in a number of places by Kant as an activity of comparing *given representations* with the *faculty to which the representations* are due: It is “consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition” (A260/B316). It is a “distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong”, (A261/B317) or the “action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition” (A261/B317).

The account put forward by Merritt wreaks havoc with this explicit definition in three ways. First, under her account, transcendental reflection seems essentially to involve reference to the *objects* of the representations under comparison. Under one formulation, we are to “be clear about the general nature of the object represented through the concepts in question: i.e., whether it is phenomenal or noumenal” (2015, p. 18). As we have seen, however, Kant’s explicit definitions involve no direct mention of the objects of the representations. In contrast to our account, however, under Merritt’s account there is no intelligible sense of transcendental reflection in abstraction from an appeal to the objects of the representations. Secondly, the ‘givenness’ of the representations involved is not, under Merritt’s account, understood in the technical sense of the Doctrine – as involving a non-arbitrary combination of marks – but is instead understood in the ordinary sense of ‘having in hand’ or ‘in possession of’. As we have seen, Kant’s mention here of ‘given’ representations is to be understood as referring to the same representations discussed in the Doctrine of Method. Finally, and perhaps most worryingly, transcendental reflection, under Merritt’s account, is characterised in a number of other ways that are not equivalent to the explicit definition of such reflection given in the appendix, as when, for example, Merritt characterises it as “to consider whether any given claim concerns objects in a sensible or a merely intelligible world” (2015, p. 18), to “be clear about the general nature of the object represented through the concepts in question: i.e., whether it is phenomenal or noumenal” (*ibid.*), or to “care about the substantive requirements on thinking relative to [the domain of phenomena]” (*ibid.*).
Finally, there one further, lesser concern with Merritt’s account that I wish here to raise. The worry concerns transcendental reflection, as Merritt construes it, as the *correction* to Leibniz’s error. Under Merritt’s account, the error is to engage in logical reflection as the organisation of concepts, without consideration for the nature of the objects to which the concepts apply. However, even if Leibniz does, as Merritt’s account recommends, consider this nature, he is likely to arrive at the same account. The point here is that the correction, as it stands under Merritt’s account, does nothing to correct the concepts with which Leibniz is working.

Having thus dealt, in some further detail, with these three accounts that diverged in significant ways from the account presented in this study, and from the familiar formulation, we might, for the moment, lay this all to rest and proceed to some brief concluding remarks.
Concluding overview

Our aim in this study was to bring to light a complex and systematic case put forward by Kant in the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, the ‘Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. In order to do so, we examined, in Part I, a crucial line of reasoning found in the oft-overlooked introductory passages of the appendix. This line of reasoning revealed a prior, though lesser treated, Critical condition of the possibility of a priori, or philosophical, cognition: The correct employment of the concepts of reflection. These concepts, we were told, find their employment in the establishing of our relations among our representations as representations, and their correct employment was put forward by Kant as requiring an awareness of the faculty of the representations in question, or ‘transcendental reflection’.

To arrive at an understanding of this line of reasoning and the crucial condition it contained, we turned, in Parts II to IV, to Kant’s pre-Critical tradition of German Rationalism. In particular, we examined the method adopted by this tradition for establishing philosophical cognition. Our examination culminated, in Part IV, by revealing a crucial feature of the first stage of this method. In the stage of bringing our various representations to distinctness, German rationalism adopted the terms of differentiation of the faculty of the understanding and in so doing employed the concepts of reflection under an erroneous awareness of the faculties of the representations in question. German rationalism was thus at once erroneously committed to the understanding as the only faculty necessary for philosophical cognition and to the objects of philosophical cognition being differentiable by the understanding alone.

In Part V, we turned to Kant’s claimed Critical correction of the error and the correct employment of the concepts of reflection. Under this correction, in bringing our various representations to distinctness, these representations were to be recognised as stemming from both the understanding and from sensibility. This recognition allowed for their correct differentiation by means of the concepts of reflection, which corrected differentiation revealed the a priori representations of sensibility, viz. the representations of space and time. We thus saw that a corrected employment of the concepts of reflection was to be found from the very start of the Critique, in the proofs of the a priori representations of sensibility found in the Metaphysical Exposition, and that this employment
underlay the workings and possibility of the proofs, and indeed the possibility of the philosophical cognition that rested on them.

Finally, in Part VI, we returned to the appendix and to the line of reasoning of its introductory passages, having now an understanding of the crucial Critical changes made by Kant to the German Rationalist method, in order to clarify and dispel the puzzles that it had initially seemed to introduce. Woven between this structure, in Parts I, VI, and VII, was an examination of the more and less familiar accounts of the appendix section—a section which this study has, I hope, shown to contain a case far more systematic and crucial to the philosophical cognition put forward in the Critique than preceding accounts have taken it to be.
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