ORTHODOXY AND REVOLUTION:

THE RESTORATION OF THE RUSSIAN PATRIARCHATE IN 1917

Prothero Lecture

By Simon Dixon

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ABSTRACT. At the height of the October Revolution in Moscow – a much bloodier affair than the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd – the Orthodox Church installed Tikhon (Bellavin) as Russia’s first patriarch since 1700. At the most obvious level, this was a counter-revolutionary gesture aimed at securing firm leadership in a time of troubles. It was nevertheless a controversial move. Ecclesiastical liberals regarded a restored patriarchate as a neo-papal threat to the conciliarist regime they hoped to foster; and since Nicholas II had explicitly modelled himself on the Muscovite tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, the potential for renewed conflict between church and state had become clear long before 1917. Whilst previous historians have concentrated on discussions about canonical and historical precedent, this lecture emphasises the extent to which a single individual haunted the whole debate. For, until the last moment, it was widely assumed that the new patriarch would be not the little-known Tikhon, but Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii), whose attempts to model himself on Patriarch Nikon – the most divisive of seventeenth-century Muscovite patriarchs – helped to make him the most controversial prelate of the age.

‘Slaughter on the streets of Moscow’, noted Sergei Prokof’ev in November 1917, appalled at the bombing of an apartment he had planned to occupy: ‘How clever of me not to have gone
at all!’  While Prokof’ev read Kant in Kislovodsk, the revolution had become much bloodier in Russia’s old capital than in Petrograd, where the Bolsheviks seized power on 25 October. When Red Guards captured the Kremlin on the following day, it was besieged by iunkers loyal to the Provisional Government, who retook the fortress on 28 October. Once the Military Revolutionary Committee abandoned the subsequent ceasefire two nights later, vicious street-fighting ensued. Most of those who took up arms were apparently keener to thwart counter-revolution than to launch a Soviet regime. But among the Moscow Bolsheviks there were extremists such as Nikolai Bukharin, who thought 5000 casualties an acceptable price to pay. ‘One could hardly expect the socialist revolution to be as painless as some popular festival’, Bukharin warned the Petrograd Soviet once victory was assured: ‘This is the epoch of dictatorship and we shall sweep away with an iron broom everything that deserves to be swept away.’

It was against this menacing backdrop that the first Russian Church Council since 1689 resolved on the need for firm ecclesiastical leadership. When the Council opened on the feast of the Dormition (15 August), there had been no immediate prospect that the patriarchate would be restored. Indeed, so controversial was the subject that it was introduced to a plenary session only on 11 October. Under pressure from external events, subsequent progress was swift. On 28 October, the Council resolved to curtail its debates at the Moscow Diocesan House, a few streets to the north of the Kremlin, and elect a patriarch forthwith. On

Dates follow the Julian calendar, used in Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution, thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar in the twentieth century.

31 October, as violence raged nearby, three bishops were elected to go forward to the final drawing of lots: the Council’s chairman, Tikhon (Bellavin), installed as metropolitan of Moscow as recently as July, and two of his six vice-chairmen, archbishops Arsenii (Stadnitskii) of Novgorod and Antonii (Khrapovitskii) of Khar’kov.4 The revolutionaries’ final assault on the Kremlin on 1–2 November prevented a patriarchal election in the Dormition cathedral. So, on 5 November, thousands of Muscovites struggled past the university anatomy theatre, where fellow citizens queued to identify corpses destined for a mass grave on Red Square, to the cathedral of Christ the Saviour.5 There the Council’s secretary wrote out the candidates’ names in front of a packed congregation and placed the slips in a casket. At the end of a liturgy conducted by Kiev’s Metropolitan Vladimir (Bogoiaevlenskii), Tikhon’s name was drawn by a venerable monk.

Though churchmen shocked by the desecration of the Kremlin’s holy places had failed to broker a truce earlier in the week, they successfully negotiated a return to the Dormition cathedral through the mediation of Prince Nikolai Odoevskii-Malov, the beleaguered head of the palace administration who had known Anastasii (Gribanovskii), the liturgist charged with staging Tikhon’s enthronement, as bishop of Serpukhov between 1906 and 1914.6 According to Archbishop Arsenii, the Bolshevik authorities ‘did all they could to


spoil the festival’, making the ritual on the feast of the Presentation of the Mother of God into the Temple (21 November) ‘more like a funeral than the joyful coronation of a great church father’. Bishops were obliged to abandon their carriages – treasured, if much derided, status symbols – and proceed on foot to the Trinity Gate. There council delegates were delayed by the Kremlin’s new commandant, who accused them of exceeding their allocation of tickets. ‘Why do we need a patriarch? Let them walk!’ onlookers hooted as Metropolitan Vladimir, a prominent right-winger, slipped on the cobbles. It was a similar story after the service, when Tikhon circumnavigated the Kremlin in a cab to bless the crowd who had been refused entrance. Metropolitan Evlogii (Georgievskii) later claimed that red guards on cathedral square doffed their caps in reverential silence: according to the contemporary record, those outside the Kremlin sang the Marseillaise. But despite all the obstacles, Tikhon was installed wearing vestments made for his Muscovite predecessors and the Russian Church could boast its first patriarch since the death of Adrian in October 1700.

Since this was by any standards an historic moment, it is curious that historians should have treated it so unevenly. Most have ignored the restoration, implicitly dismissing it as the sort


9 There is, for example, no mention of it in Pipes, Russian Revolution, Catherine Merridale, Red Fortress: The Secret Heart of Russia’s History (2013), or Laura Engelstein, Russia in Flames: War, Revolution, Civil War (New York and Oxford, 2017). Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History of Russia (8th edn., New York, 2011), 614, say that Tikhon was elected patriarch in 1918; Nicolas Zernov, Eastern Christendom: A Study of the Origin and Development of the Eastern Orthodox Church (1963), 207, gives 31 July 1917. By
of ‘grandiose “nonevent”’ that the exceptionally well informed Catherine Evtuhov had in mind when describing the Moscow Church Council as one of those ‘powerful and directed impulses that never achieved culmination because the Revolution happened instead’. Overturning stereotypes of institutional inertia, Evtuhov herself demonstrated that a wide range of believers drawn from all sectors of society were capable of articulating a variety of Orthodox worldviews to challenge emerging secular norms. Nevertheless, most of the 564 delegates who came to the Moscow Church Council from all corners of the empire were followers rather than leaders. Scarcely any of the fifty-one speakers who registered for the plenary debate on the patriarchate had anything new to say because discussion of restoration had long been dominated by the forty or so bishops, priests, scholars and intellectuals whose private and public utterances form my principal sources. Paradoxically, although much of the most distinguished recent scholarship is replete with names, its tone is deliberately impersonal so that many individuals remain all but anonymous. I shall take a different approach, arguing that the debate on the patriarchate was inseparable not only from questions of canonical and historical tradition, but also from questions of contemporary politics and personality. In other words, churchmen’s views on matters of principle were mediated by their opinions of each other.

contrast, see Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians from earliest times to 2001* (2001), 438, for ‘the most important event in the history of the Orthodox Church for over two hundred years’.


Hopes of restoring the patriarchate had been expressed privately in ecclesiastical circles from the time of Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov), Russia’s leading prelate between the 1820s and his death in 1867. Public discussion dated from the 1880s. But a realistic prospect of restoration came only with the campaign for church reform that erupted with unexpected force in spring 1905.\(^\text{13}\) By then, the Synodal system established by Peter I in 1721 was so widely discredited that even the metropolitan of St Petersburg, Antonii (Vadkovskii), told the tsar that he had ‘always believed’ that Russian public opinion would eventually ‘declare it shameful and impossible for Holy Rus to live under such an abnormal system of ecclesiastical government’.\(^\text{14}\) However, no consensus emerged about its replacement in a series of debates at the Pre-conciliar Commission, which opened in a blaze of publicity in March 1906;\(^\text{15}\) the Pre-conciliar Conference of spring 1912, whose confidential proceedings soon leaked to the press;\(^\text{16}\) and the Pre-conciliar Council of June–July 1917.\(^\text{17}\) While some churchmen promoted a restored patriarchate as the ultimate symbol of ecclesiastical self-government, others feared it as the harbinger of papal despotism. At best, opponents argued, a patriarch would benefit only bishops, whose pretensions they questioned in search of the enhanced role for laymen and parish clergy that was crucial to their rival view of sobornost'.


\(^{15}\) *Zhurnaly i protokoly zasedanii Vyssochashe uchrezhdennogo Predsoobornogo Prisutstviia* (1906 g.) [Zhurnaly], eds. E. Bryner et al. (4 vols., Moscow, 2014), especially I, 222–317, 3–19 May 1906.


In one sense, positions were entrenched as early as 1906. ‘It smells of blood, hatred, enmity and party-mindedness’, Arsenii (Stadnitskii) remarked as the Pre-conciliar Commission began to discuss the patriarchate, accurately predicting that a liberal-leaning ‘left’ would emerge to charge the conservative ‘right’ with lifeless rigidity, while the ‘right’ retorted with allegations of Protestantism and freethinking.\(^{18}\) However, as so often in Russian history, informal personal loyalties ran across the ideological divide. A full reconstruction of these networks lies beyond the scope of this lecture. But much can be revealed by exploring reactions to the single individual who haunted the whole debate. For, until the last moment, it was widely assumed that Russia’s new patriarch would be neither the little-known Tikhon, who had served long spells in the USA and Lithuania, nor Arsenii (Stadnitskii), an efficient but unimaginative disciplinarian. The man long regarded as patriarch-in-waiting was Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii), the most controversial prelate of the age.\(^{19}\)

We shall come later to Antonii’s volatile cocktail of social conservatism and political radicalism. Let me begin by focusing on his view of Muscovy’s relatively brief patriarchal regime, for the period between 1589 and 1700 could hardly have been more turbulent in terms of the relations between church and state. In September 1916, three years after the Romanov tercentenary had festooned Russia with a riot of Muscovite imagery, Archbishop Antonii encouraged an improbable rumour that Nicholas II had once planned to abdicate in favour of Tsarevich Aleksei so that he himself could become patriarch, much as Patriarch

\(^{18}\) Quoted in Orekhanov, *Na puti k Soboru*, 168, diary, 4 May 1906,

\(^{19}\) Nikon (Rklitskii), *Mitropolit Antonii (Khrapovitskii) i ego vremia* (3 vols., Nizhnii Novgorod, 2012), reprints much primary material; Vladimir Tsurikov, ed., *Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii): Archpastor of the Russian Diaspora* (Jordanville, NY, 2014), treats most of Antonii’s interests except the patriarchate. In the period covered by this lecture, Antonii ranked successively as bishop and archbishop. For convenience, and to distinguish him from his namesake, Antonii (Vadkovskii), metropolitan of St Petersburg between 1898 and 1912, I refer to him throughout as Archbishop Antonii.
Filaret (Romanov) had guided his own son, Tsar Mikhail (r. 1613–45).\footnote{Dnevnik L.A. Tikhomirova, 1915–1917, ed. A.V. Repnikov (Moscow, 2008), 285–6, diary, 21 Sept. 1916.} In fact, Filaret’s name figured less prominently in debates on the patriarchate than that of Patriarch Nikon, whose reforms had split the church in the 1650s, and whose alleged rivalry with the autocracy was pregnant with implications for a tsar who deliberately represented himself as Mikhail’s successor, Aleksei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–76).\footnote{Nikon’s name is oddly missing from the classic study by Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, vol. 2: From Alexander II to the Death of Nicholas II (Princeton, NJ, 2000). Compare Robert L. Nichols, ‘Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii) and Religious Nationalism in Late Imperial Russia’, in Tsurikov, ed., Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii), 118–19, 129.} In the early twentieth century, Nikon’s ambition was widely regarded as limitless. Dmitrii Filosofov claimed that Nikon had even compared himself with Christ.\footnote{D. Philosophoff [Filosofov], ‘Le Tsar-Pape’, in D. Merezhkovsky, et al, Le Tsar et la Révolution (Paris, 1907), Sept.1906.} The main problem arose, however, from his adoption of the title ‘Great Sovereign’, also conferred on Patriarch Filaret.\footnote{For a modern treatment, see Olga B. Strakhov, ‘The title “Great Sovereign” and the case of Patriarch Nikon’, Russian History, 35 (2008), 429–46.} As Russia’s leading religious journalist, Vasilii Rozanov, observed in 1906, no reader of Peter I’s \textit{Spiritual Regulation} could fail to recognise the spectre of Nikon in the passage warning that a ‘Supreme Pastor’ – the word ‘patriarch’ was carefully avoided – risked being seen as ‘a kind of second Sovereign, equal to, or even greater than the autocrat himself’.\footnote{Wasilii Rosanoff [Rozanov], ‘La chiesa’, \textit{I russi su la Russia}, ed. E. Trubetskoj (2nd edn, Milan, 1906), 201–2. Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, first series, VI, 317, no. 3718, 25 Jan. 1721, part 1, para. 7, declared that Russia need have no fear of ‘revolts and disturbances’ under a collective administration.} The point had been given scholarly credibility by the historian, Nikolai Kapterev. Though his \textit{magnum opus} was completed only in 1912, the year of his election to the Fourth Duma as a moderate liberal Progressivist, Kapterev’s most controversial claim had first been advanced twenty years earlier.
This was that Nikon ‘believed and taught that the spiritual power was superior to the secular power (sviashchenstvo vyshe tsarstva)’.

In the light of such a claim, the notion that a modern bishop might imitate Nikon was incendiary. ‘Patriarch Nikon set the boiars against himself’, cautioned the most forthright episcopal opponent of the patriarchate in 1905, ‘and in the conditions of our time a patriarch could easily set everybody against himself’.

It mattered, therefore, that Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii) revered Nikon as the greatest man in Russian history – a genius close to the common people – and correspondingly despised Kapterev, an outspoken critic of Antonii’s brand of ‘learned monasticism’, as one of those unbelieving ‘parasites’ who opposed the restoration of the patriarchate so that they could continue ‘feeding off the sick body of the church’. Antonii always argued that patriarchal authority was moral rather than political. Long after the Bolshevik Revolution, he continued to insist that Nikon’s ‘great personality’ had been ‘misunderstood’ by those who failed to grasp ‘what a right vision he had of Russia as the symphony of the Church, on the one hand, and the Tsar, representing the state, on the other’.

Had he not been deposed,

25 N.F. Kapterev, ‘Suzhdenie bol’shago Moskovskago sobora 1667 goda o vlasti tsarskoi i patriarshei’, Bogoslovskii vestnik (1892), no. 6, 510; idem, Patriarkh Nikon i tsar’ Aleksei Mikhailovich (2 vols., Sergiev Posad, 1909–12), I, v, and II, passim. Kapterev’s Tsar’ i tserkovnye moskovskie sobory XVI i XVII stoletii (n.p. [Sergiev Posad], 1906), was conceived as a contribution to contemporary conciliarist debates.


28 Christopher Birchall, Embassy, Emigrants, and Englishmen: The Three Hundred Year History of a Russian Orthodox Church in London (Jordanville, 2014), 252–3, quoting Abbess Elizabeth (Ampenoff) whose family hosted Antonii (Khrapovitskii) in London in 1929.
Antonii believed, Nikon would have healed the schism with the Old Believers, a subject close to his own heart.\textsuperscript{29} Echoing the concern for the Eastern patriarchs expressed by this ‘Christian cosmopolitan’, Antonii was no less keen than Nikon for Russia to play a messianic role in the creation of a universal Christian empire.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, he went further by projecting onto Nikon his own idealised self-image: ‘Ascetic and demagogue; ruler and hermit; artist and master; democrat and friend of the court; national patriot and ecumenical saint; champion of enlightenment and strict preserver of ecclesiastical discipline; gentle soul and thunderous denouncer of untruth.’\textsuperscript{31}

II

As this striking list of binaries implies, Antonii was no ‘run-of-the mill bishop, investigating and signing consistory papers’.\textsuperscript{32} Descended from Catherine II’s state secretary, he belonged to the tiny minority of nobles among an episcopate recruited overwhelmingly from the clerical estate.\textsuperscript{33} His early career was meteoric. Appointed rector of the Moscow theological academy at the age of twenty-seven, he had a diocese of his own a decade later and in 1900, the year of his appointment to Ufa, published three volumes of collected works adorned with his own photograph.\textsuperscript{34} By December 1901, Ufa’s best-known son, the artist Mikhail

\textsuperscript{29} Deianiiia, II, 289, 18 Oct. 1917.

\textsuperscript{30} Mitropolit Antonii (Khrapovitskii), Sila Pravoslaviia (Moscow, 2012), 341–5; Deianiiia, IV, 127–8 (first pagination), 17 Nov. 1917.

\textsuperscript{31} Nikon, Mitropolit Antonii (Khrapovitskii), I, 206.


\textsuperscript{33} Jan Plamper, ‘The Russian Orthodox Episcopate, 1721–1917: A Prosopography’, Journal of Social History, 34 (2000), 22–3, Appendix 2.1, calculates that noble bishops comprised 1.8 per cent of the total under Nicholas II.

\textsuperscript{34} Episkop Antonii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (3 vols, Kazan’, 1900).
Nesterov, regarded Antonii as second only to Rozanov as an ecclesiastical celebrity – the ‘most forceful and most fascinating’ among the growing number of Russians seeking a solution to questions of religion.\(^{35}\)

Antonii’s elevation to the wealthier diocese of Volhynia at Easter 1902 struck rivals as indecently premature.\(^{36}\) But by then he had already sponsored a fresh generation of ‘learned monks’, drawn like himself from social elites un tarnished by the scholastic theology taught in church schools and committed to a sustained ascetic engagement with the modern world.\(^{37}\) While Synodal officials initially favoured these febrile young zealots as a ‘convenient administrative weapon’, their impact was inherently subversive since Antonii dreamed of ‘a breadth and freedom of action’ that was bound to undermine the ecclesiastical bureaucracy and offend churchmen wary of his arrogant ‘generals in cassocks’.\(^{38}\) Although never a charismatic preacher – his tone was shrill, his delivery rapid and his approach unemotional\(^{39}\) – Antonii always had a knack of drawing attention to himself. In 1901, when Joachim III was restored to the ecumenical throne in Constantinople, Antonii published a congratulatory letter which was widely interpreted as a call for restoration in Russia.\(^{40}\) In


\(^{39}\) See, for example, *Dnevnik Velikogo Kniazia Konstantina Konstantinovicha*, ed. T.A. Lobashkova (Moscow, 2015), 291, diary, 21 May 1910.

1903, Andrei Belyi heard that he was ‘going in for miraculous cures’ at a convent associated with St Serafim of Sarov. Crowds pursued him after he persuaded a deaf and dumb girl to say her name and another with deformed arms to cross herself. The Synod, Belyi learned, were ‘afraid’ of Antonii ‘because he has already more than once shown a penchant for surprises and tricks, and because he is one of the few to consider himself a [real] bishop’.

When the campaign for church reform began in 1905, it was hard to deny that the hierarchy as a whole had responded feebly to Bloody Sunday because they had been infantilised by the aged chief procurator, K.P. Pobedonostsev, mocked by Rozanov as a nanny who ‘feeds and dresses the babies and puts on their shoes’. Antonii (Khrapovitskii), by contrast, was swift to seize his opportunity. The moment had come, he rejoiced to the Russian elders on Mount Athos, to throw off the European yoke imposed on the church by Peter I: ‘Let us have the councils demanded by the decrees of the Holy Apostles and the ecumenical Fathers! Let us also have a Most Holy Patriarch, as a younger brother of the Eastern Patriarchs!’ First, on 20 February, Antonii denounced the intelligentsia at St Isaac’s cathedral in a sermon on the Last Judgement.

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42 V.V. Rozanov, Kogda nachal’stvo ushlo … 1905–1906 gg., eds. P.P. Aplyshko and A.N. Nikoliukin (Moscow, 2005), 34.

43 Antonii to Arkhimandrit Nifont, Good Friday [15 Mar.] 1905, in Pis’ma vydaishchiksia tserkovnykh i svetskikh deiatelei Rossii startsam Russkogo Sviato-Panteleimonova monastyr’ia na Afone, ed. Ieromonakh Makarii (Sviataia Gora Afon, 2015), 552.

44 ‘Slovo o Strashnem sude i sovremennykh sobytiiakh’, Moskovskii vedomosti, 2 Mar. 1905. Apparently, only Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) restrained him from repeating his onslaught: see Arsenii, Dnevnik, III, 51, diary, 19 Mar. 1905.
deliberately omitted from the questionnaire.\textsuperscript{45} However, sensing that the Synod remained packed against him, Antonii realised that his own chances of promotion were negligible: as he confided to a protégé, it was better to remain silent and bide his time.\textsuperscript{46} As a result, his name scarcely figured during the brief window in March 1905 when the patriarchate seemed certain to be restored.

The context was Pobedonostsev’s rear-guard action to prevent the prime minister, Count Sergei Witte, from taking church reform into the hands of the Committee of Ministers.\textsuperscript{47} Without consulting the chief procurator, Witte had invited Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) to present topics for discussion. Shortly after Pobedonostsev regained control for the Synod, it shocked him by resolving on 22 March, while he was absent through illness, to petition for an episcopal Church Council which was expected to elect a patriarch. When the news leaked that night, General Aleksandr Kireev, a fervent patriarchist who nevertheless campaigned for lay influence in the church, expected the patriarch to be placed in the first class on Peter I’s table of ranks. That would put him ‘on a par with a field marshal and the state chancellor, but will scarcely give him power or independence’.\textsuperscript{48} By contrast, the idea of

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\textsuperscript{45} Otzyvy, II, 339–46, 7 Jan. 1906. Though all these responses were submitted in the name of individual prelates, most resembled the bishops’ annual reports to the Synod, drawing with varying degrees of explicitness on contributions by sundry diocesan bodies and scholars. Antonii (Khrapovitskii) was one of only five hierarchs to write in the first person, the others being Paisii (Vinogradov), ibid., I, 87–93, Vladimir (Sokolovskii-Avtonomov), II, 153–81, Germogen (Dolganov), II, 498–511, and Lavrentii (Nekrasov), II, 536–47. Ioannikii (Kazanskii), I, 377–83, also specified his own views.

\textsuperscript{46} Evdokim (Meshcherskii) to Arsenii (Stadnitskii), 1905, in I.V. Lobanova, ‘Perepiska Arkhiereev kak istochnik po istorii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi Sinodal’noi’, Russkii istoricheskii sbornik, 7 (Moscow, 2014), 130.

\textsuperscript{47} The fullest account, Orekhanov, Na puti k Soboru, 34–80, exaggerates Pobedonostsev’s own commitment to reform.

\textsuperscript{48} Kireev, Dnevnik, 39, diary, 22 Mar. 1905.
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granting a patriarch the sort of ‘exaggerated rights’ that had divorced the ‘uncanonical’ Synod from ordinary parish life alarmed Mikhail Novoselov and his religious-philosophical circle in Moscow. It was inappropriate, these laymen argued, for the patriarchate to be restored in this way, and patriarchists later blamed them for helping Pobedonostsev to persuade Nicholas II that both council and patriarch were ‘inopportune’. ⁴⁹

By the time the tsar reached that decision on 31 March, gossips, thinking restoration guaranteed, were already discussing potential runners. When a wag quipped to Aleksei Suvorin that Pobedonostsev himself intended to become patriarch, the publisher retorted by proposing Rozanov.⁵⁰ Serious attention focused on Russia’s three metropolitans, all of whom seemed flawed to Archbishop Antonii. ‘The cleverest’ – his fellow noble Flavian (Gorodetskii) of Kiev – was ‘inactive and sluggish’; Moscow’s Vladimir (Bogoiaivenskii) was ‘honest and fervent, but insufficiently educated’; Antonii (Vadkovskii), the sole plausible candidate, though ‘intelligent [and] self-possessed’, lacked ‘fervency of spirit’. ⁵¹ He was also compromised by the collapse of Witte’s scheme. Unable to see the tsar at the height of the March crisis, the metropolitan confessed to feeling isolated and conscious of his ‘shaky position’. ⁵²

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⁵¹ Arsenii, Dnevnik, III, 52, diary, 19 Mar. 1905.

That position became shakier still as Metropolitan Antonii came under attack from the radical Right. One of his few public supporters was the monarchist lawyer, N.D. Kuznetsov, a member of Novoselov’s circle opposed to both the patriarchate and Archbishop Antonii. As stubborn as he was courteous, the metropolitan nevertheless persisted. His own reply to the Synodal inquiry on church reform declared that the new patriarch should be the metropolitan of St Petersburg and on 1 June 1906, the Pre-conciliar Commission resolved, under his chairmanship and by a majority of 33:9, that Russia’s leading bishop should bear both titles jointly. In the circumstances, even a man who abhorred intrigue found it hard to avoid charges of careerism from right-wingers who now had a further motive to campaign for his demotion: ‘This means he will not be patriarch!’ gloated the renegade terrorist, Lev Tikhomirov, wrongly predicting the metropolitan’s downfall in November 1906.

III

In fact, no patriarch could be elected in the foreseeable future because the political cards were stacked firmly against restoration. Alarmed by the unexpectedly wide range of political opinions espoused by the clergy after 1905, neither the tsar nor his new prime minister, Petr Stolypin, relished the prospect of a church council to rival the Duma. Stolypin had

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53 N.D. Kuznetsov, Po Voprosam Tserkovnykh Preobrazovanii (Moscow, 1907), 83–147, reprints speeches at the Pre-conciliar Commission implicitly directed at Antonii (Khropovitskii) via a critique of Nikon’s papal pretensions: see, for example, Zhurnaly, II, 643–4. See also, M.A. Novoselov to A.S. Glinka, 6 Jan. 1909, in Vzyskuiushchie grada, ed. V.I. Keidan (Moscow, 1997), 186, and Dnevnik L.A. Tikhomiroskii, 1905–1907 gg., eds. A.B. Repnikov and B.S. Kotov (Moscow, 2015), 301, diary, 29 Dec. 1906.

54 Otzyvy, II, 238; Cunningham, A Vanquished Hope, 263, 265.


particularly good reason for suspicion since Aleksei Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, a monarchist dismissed as chief procurator in June 1906 to make the incoming ministry more palatable to the Duma, made no secret of his intention to exploit the sobor as a ‘counterbalance’ to Stolypin’s ‘destructive parliamentary aspirations’. In January 1907, Shirinskii’s successor, Petr Izvol’skii, warned Nicholas II that church leaders conceived of a canonical regime ‘not as an internal initiative, but as a new form of power’. Since a cardinal aspiration of the patriarchists — that the patriarch should negotiate directly with the tsar — ran counter to one of the most fundamental assumptions of modern Russian monarchy, Archbishop Antonii unsurprisingly concluded, after meeting the prime minister in October, that Stolypin was ‘afraid of a council and especially of the patriarchate’.

The spectre of clericalism soon loomed larger still. Under Pobedonostsev, independently-minded bishops had been banished, like Antonii (Khrapovitskii), to backwaters such as Ufa. But this tactic backfired after 1907 when the excesses of frontier capitalism, the national aspirations of non-Russian peoples, and a burgeoning local press offered a tempting range of targets for prelates determined to convert their isolated dioceses into theocracies beyond ministerial control. In the notoriously unruly province of Saratov, Germogen (Dolganov) sponsored a populist crusade by the monk Iliodor (Trufanov) that helped to destabilise Stolypin’s relationship with the tsar. Serafim (Chichagov), who promoted regenerated parish councils as way of encompassing (and thereby emasculating)

57 Kireev, Dnevnik, 157, diary, 15 July 1906.
58 Firsov, Russkaia Tserkov' nakanune peremen, 393.
59 Kireev, Dnevnik, 147, diary, 30 May 1906; Orekhanov, Na puti k Soboru, 189.
the entire political spectrum, provoked charges of electoral malpractice when translated from Orel to Bessarabia.\textsuperscript{61}

Befriending Germogen and Serafim as allies in the Synod, Archbishop Antonii largely shared their contempt for Jews, Poles and St Petersburg’s Westernising elites. Nevertheless, he developed his own highly confessionalised form of Russian nationalism according to which harmful Western accretions were to be stripped away to reveal the Gospel ‘incarnating itself’ in the life of the common people. Antonii’s tactics, too, were distinctive. Whereas most diocesan bishops distrusted the suffragans foisted on them by the Holy Synod, Antonii willingly delegated frontline combat in Ukraine to the disciples whose appointment he successfully engineered. At the Pochaev lavra, Archimandrite Vitalii (Maksimenko), whom Antonii had rescued from expulsion as a student, printed thousands of lurid pamphlets that fanned the flames of right-wing populism across the Western Provinces, underpinning Antonii’s support for the Union of Russian People.\textsuperscript{62} Antonii’s own pronouncements were largely reserved for the national stage, where he posed as the people’s champion, scourge of the intelligentsia and nemesis of liberal theologians. Already in 1895, he had proclaimed an implicit alliance between church, tsar and narod against Russia’s ‘falsely-educated’ elites. After 1905, a series of increasingly intemperate pronouncements – in the press, in the State

\textsuperscript{61} See, for example, N.N. Dudnichenko, ‘Luchshie liudi’ Bessarabii: Arkhiepiskop Serafim, Gg. Krupenskie, Sinadino i dr. (Kishinev, 1913).

Council in 1906 and as chairman of the Kiev Missionary Congress in 1908 – marked him out as the sworn enemy of liberals in both religion and politics.63

Antonii by no means monopolised the crucial rhetorical claim that liberalism was incompatible with authentic churchmanship.64 Nevertheless, a mind that found binary opposites congenial was ideally suited to exaggerate the contrast between the two, and no group felt his wrath more severely than the academy professoriate, whom he repeatedly denounced as impious fifth-columnists.65 Not only did these critics of learned monasticism suffer the indignity of having Antonii’s acolytes imposed as their rectors. They were also exposed to the sorts of personal attack embodied in his report on the Kiev theological academy in 1908, nominally confidential to the Synod, but printed at Pochaev and leaked to the press.66 ‘It is amazing how he loves to slander and blacken everyone that for some reason he dislikes’, complained the Kazan’ professor, archpriest Nikolai Vinogradov, in 1909. By November 1911, Vinogradov could see nothing ‘saintly’ in Antonii, who seemed ‘shot through with Jesuitism and politicking, balks at nothing to achieve his aims, and to satisfy his

63 See, for example, I.I. Tolstoi, Dnevnik, ed. B.V. Anan’ich (2 vols., St Petersburg, 2010), I, 484–5, diary, 18 July 1908.
64 Compare, for example, Professor D.I. Bogdashevskii’s letters of 6 July and 30 Oct. 1908 in “‘Liubliu Akademiiu i vsegda budu deistvovat’ vo imia liubvi k nei ...” (Pis’ma professora Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii D.I. Bogdashevskogo k A.A. Dmitrievskomu’), ed. N.Iu. Sukhova, Vestnik PSTGU, series II (2013), no. 54, 84, 91.
66 Antonii, episkop Volynskii, Otchet po Vysochaishe naznachennoi revizii Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii v marte i aprele 1908 g. (Pochaev, 1908) prompted a vigorous refutation from the professoriate: Pravda o Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii: Vyuzhdennyi otvet na izdannuiu arkhiepiskopom Volynskim Antoniem broshiuru (Kiev, 1909).
diabolical arrogance spares no-one who wounds him in any way’. Sure enough, soon after Antonii’s denunciation of his study of the church schools – an implicit critique of learned monasticism – the historian B.V. Titlinov was sacked as editor of a leading ecclesiastical weekly. Reporting to the Synod, Archbishop Sergii (Stragorodskii) condemned Tserkovnyi vestnik [The Church Herald] in the manner of his mentor for reflecting the views of ‘the most unpleasant type of kadets [constitutional-democrats], namely, ecclesiastical kadets, i.e. people who had lost their spiritual links with the church and with historic Orthodoxy’.68

One can see why Metropolitan Antonii wanted to keep his namesake out of the Synod as a man who sought ‘to revolutionise everything’. Since 1905, Archbishop Antonii and his allies had transformed an anti-Erastian struggle for sobornost’ into a far-reaching campaign for social and political ‘enchurchment’ (votserkovlenie) that threatened to undermine the secular authorities. During the campaign for elections to the fourth Duma in 1912, Antonii’s protégé Andronik (Nikol’skii) portrayed ‘the Christianisation of national life in the widest possible sense’ as a moral rather than a political aspiration.70 However, as Dmitrii Merezhkovskii perceived, the very idea of divorcing Russia from European culture in a return

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68 Kolokol, 20 and 21 Oct. 1911; B.V. Titlinov, Otvet na ‘Otzyv’ arkhiepiskopa Antoniia Volynskago (St Petersburg, 1911); Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, St Petersburg, fond 796, opis 205, delo 260, 20 Nov. 1911.

69 Kireev, Dnevnik, 347, diary, 26 Dec. 1909.

to pre-Petrine values was ‘much more destructive of the existing order than the most extreme ideas of our revolutionaries’. 71

It is hardly surprising that Archbishop Antonii should have been denied a metropolitan see. He had not, however, abandoned hope of the patriarchate, and by late 1911, when a second edition of his collected works appeared, the time seemed ripe for a concerted campaign. 72 Stolypin had been assassinated in September and the recently-appointed chief procurator, Vladimir Sabler, had been learned monasticism’s leading patron until he was dismissed as Pobedonostsev’s deputy in 1905 for supporting the restoration of the patriarchate. Together, Sabler and Antonii intended to exploit the impending tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty when Antonii wanted the tsar to appoint a patriarch as the prelude to the convocation of a Church Council.

In January 1912, Antonii published a defence of the patriarchate that coincided not only with his chairmanship of the first national edinoverie congress (intended as a harbinger of reunion with the Old Believers), but also with the tercentenary of an earlier hammer of the Poles, Patriarch Germogen. That commemoration, however, was unexpectedly overshadowed by adverse publicity surrounding the exile of the late patriarch’s namesake, the bishop of Saratov, following his attack on Rasputin in December 1911. 73 Bishop Germogen, Antonii told the press, had been ‘the victim of a well-known party’, which, ‘being unashamed of intrigues’, directed ‘all its strength against the chief procurator and individual bishops in

71 D.S. Merezhkovskii, Griadushchii kham (St Petersburg, 1906), 143. At the Moscow Church Council, Vasilii Rubtsov, a provincial salesman with no formal education, portrayed the restoration of the patriarchate as a betrayal of Russia’s attempts to catch up with Europe: see Deianiia, II, 268–9, 14 Oct. 1917.
72 Antonii, Sobranie sochinenii, 2nd edn. (3 vols., Moscow, 1911).
order to replace them with its own close collaborators’.\(^74\) Here was a reference to the despised 'Rasputinite heroes’ whose appointment did much to discredit the church and even more to thwart Antonii’s ambitions. For the moment, however, he pressed on regardless, securing in spring 1912 the appointment of a seven-man Pre-conciliar Conference, packed with allies and chaired by Sergii (Stragorodskii) since Metropolitan Antonii was too ill to serve.

Critics such as Rozanov, who feared that a patriarchate would herald the crushing of the white clergy by the monastics, were brushed aside in the autumn.\(^75\) By then, plans were already afoot for a lengthy sojourn in Russia by the patriarch of Antioch, Gregory IV, who in April 1913 spent four days at the specially illuminated Pochaev lavra. On a visit timed to coincide with the consecration of his former pupil Dionisii (Valedinskii) as third suffragan of Volhynia, Antonii took advantage of the opportunity to reiterate his elevated view of episcopacy.\(^76\) But despite press drum-beating on behalf of a restored patriarchate, other projects went awry. Nicholas II unexpectedly refused to attend the controversial canonisation of Patriarch Hermogen, whose remains had inconveniently decomposed.\(^77\) ‘Exalting Patriarch Hermogen’, as Richard Wortman observes, ‘would have given the church even more prominence and created a symbol to rival the patriarch Filaret, the progenitor of the dynasty.’\(^78\) Though the war gave Archbishop Antonii new grounds for portraying Peter I’s

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\(^76\) Nikon, *Mitropol Antonii*, I, 666–82.


\(^78\) Wortman, *Scenarios of Power*, 450.
Protestant-style Synodal regime as the enemy within, it left little hope for a patriarchate as Rasputin strengthened his hold over episcopal appointments.

IV

Not until the February Revolution was the question of the patriarchate divorced from that of a sobor. On the one hand, Nicholas II’s abdication removed the biggest obstacle to the convocation of a church council, for which plans forged ahead under the Provisional Government. On the other hand, in the absence of a tsar, the notion of a patriarchal counter-balance now seemed anachronistic to almost everyone except those peasants who still craved a father-figure. Neither development boded well for Antonii (Khrapovitskii), who was powerless to prevent the new chief procurator, V.N. L’vov, from presiding over the dismissal of several episcopal allies. At the Moscow theological academy, Feodor (Pozdeevskii) resembled ‘a trapped beast’ in the face of an inquiry begun only days after the tsar’s fall; Serafim (Chichagov) was among those subsequently unseated at the behest of diocesan assemblies.79 Though it was once suggested that L’vov engineered Antonii’s own removal in order to disbar him from the impending council, his nemesis was also locally inspired.80 Either way, he retreated to the Valaam monastery to write a controversial study of the Atonement and was unable to influence the Pre-conciliar Council, where his enemies took their revenge at a meeting in Petrograd less than a week after the July Days.

As before, the central question concerned the nature and extent of executive authority in a future conciliar regime. A single executive body comprising bishops, clergy and laymen was narrowly rejected (8:6) in favour of a bi-cameral structure capped by an episcopal Synod.


But when Sergii (Stragorodskii) proposed a lifetime appointment for the Synod’s ‘leading bishop’, the professoriate suspected a covert attempt to restore the patriarchate. It was impossible to restore an impotent patriarch, insisted Professor A.I. Pokrovskii. ‘By its very nature’, the patriarchate was ‘based on power and splendour’, and if Archbishop Antonii’s dreams were to be realised, the result would be ‘a sort of dictator, the leader of a multi-million strong Orthodox army, ready to dash into battle with any forces hostile to it’.  

Since the absent Antonii evidently haunted the meeting, it is worth pausing to consider what those present thought of him. Six of them had been his pupils; at least seven more knew him in other ways. Loyal acolytes are readily identifiable. In the late 1890s, Archbishop Sergii had served with Andronik (Nikol'skii) in one of Antonii’s favourite causes, the mission to Japan. Now bishop of Perm’, Andronik was the only hierarch apart from his mentor to espouse openly monarchist sentiments since the abdication. Another trusty student, Father Simeon Shleev, had organised the edinoverie congress in 1912 when the prospect of healing the schism was crucial to Antonii’s case for the patriarchate. ‘The worst patriarch’, Shleev subsequently assured the Moscow Council, would be an improvement on ‘the best Synod’. Equally favourable to a lifetime appointment were two lay experts on the Eastern patriarchates who consistently supported restoration. To Feodor (Pozdeevskii)’s friend, P.B. Mansurov, who had seen five patriarchs come and go during his diplomatic career at Constantinople, continuity seemed self-recommending. No less enthusiastic was I.I. Sokolov, the historian who had supplanted Titlinov as editor of

81 Dokumenty, I:I, 330, 11 July 1917.
82 Arkhimandrit Sergii, Na dal'nom Vostoke (2nd edn, Arzamas, 1897); Ierom[onakh] Andronik, Missionerskii put' v Iaponiiu (Kazan', 1899); Rogoznyi, Tserkovnaia revoliutsiia, 50–52.
84 Dokumenty, I:I, 332–3, 11 July 1917; Zhurnaly, I, 277; P.B. Mansurov, Tserkovnyi Sobor i Episkopy – ego chleny (Moscow, 1912), 8, 11–12.
Sokolov’s glowing account of the Constantinople patriarchate, published in 1904, claimed (wholly implausibly) that ‘the Church had always followed the principle of freedom from any encroachment by the government or the laity upon its internal affairs’.  

Archbishop Antonii’s supporters at the Pre-conciliar Council were nevertheless outnumbered by his detractors. Much had changed since the bishop of Ufa, Andrei (Ukhtomskii), graduated together with Andronik in 1895 and taught alongside him at the missionary seminary at Ardon in northern Ossetia, a nest of budding antonievtsy. As the scion of a princely family committed to healing the schism, Andrei initially seemed a model disciple. However, alienated by his mentor’s scabrous vocabulary and by the insults of the radical Right, he had long since abandoned Antonii. By May 1917, when Andrei was defeated as L’vov’s candidate in the election for the see of Petrograd, Andronik regarded him as a socialist. Such a charge could hardly be levelled against Arsenii (Stadnitskii). Yet although he remained on civil terms with Archbishop Antonii, personal experience dating back to the 1890s had left him distrustful of the antonievtsy and he opposed Antonii’s ‘head-splitting experiments’ in the church schools. So did every professor at the Pre-conciliar Council except Sokolov. Vladimir Zavitnevich, a campaigner for academic autonomy at


87 I.A. Slanov, Ardon skaia dukhovnaia seminariia (Vladikavkaz, 1999).

88 Rogoznyi, Tserkovnaia revoliutsiia, 41–2, 151–3.

89 Arsenii, Dnevnik, I, 277–9, diary, 20 Jan. 1898; 355–6, 20 Sept. 1900; Arsenii (Stadnitskii) to Kirill (Smirnov), 18 Aug. 1911, ‘Arkhiivnye dokumety Sviashchennomuchenika Kirilla (Smirnova), mitropolita Kazanskogo, iz fonda mitropolita Arseniia (Stadnitskogo) 1907–1918’, 246.
Kiev, subsequently warned the Moscow Council against Antonii’s ‘poetic’ representation of a patriarchal regime, knowing from experience that in practice things might be different.\(^{90}\) The Moscow canonist, Il’ia Gromoglasov, had likewise been ‘staggered’ by Antonii’s ‘insulting’ public report on his master’s thesis. In 1910, Gromoglasov was dismissed on the pretext of earlier political journalism; Pokrovskii had been sacked the year before.\(^{91}\) With Antonii’s shadow hovering over them, the meeting voted 12:6 against a lifetime appointment for the Synod’s leading bishop — in other words, against restoration of the patriarchate. Little else could have been expected, Antonii complained, so long as the Pre-conciliar Council was dominated by the ‘gang of renegade Holy Joes (kuteinki)’ whose cards he had marked as early as 1905: ‘Let them be damned!’\(^{92}\)

V

Patriarchists therefore came to the Moscow Church Council in August 1917 with little hope of success. Three developments transformed their prospects. First, the mood in church circles hardened after the July Days cast doubt on the Provisional Government’s ability to preserve order.\(^ {93}\) It was this shift in sentiment that contributed to the election of Tikhon, a patron of the radical Right, as metropolitan of Moscow.\(^ {94}\) When the Council refused General Kornilov’s

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\(^{90}\) Lavrov et al, Ierarkhiia, 120.


\(^{92}\) Antonii (Khrapovitskii) to Arsenii (Stadnitskii), 3 Aug. 1917 (?), in Lobanova, ‘Perepiska arkhiereev’, 152.


\(^{94}\) The depth of Tikhon’s political commitment remains unclear. However, like Antonii (Khrapovitskii), he patronised the Union of Russian People in his dioceses and sent greetings to national congresses of the Union of Russian Men. See Pravye partii: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. Iu.I. Kir’ianov (2 vols., Moscow, 1998), I, 464, 27.
appeal for support because it wanted to bless both sides — ‘It was always the same with our bishops at critical moments’, grumbled the conservative historian Mikhail Bogoslovskii — the need for leadership became increasingly apparent. ‘At the Pre-conciliar Council, I was against the patriarchate’, noted Arsenii (Stadnitskii): ‘not on principle, but against the idea that it was timely in the near future’. Now he was changing his mind. Secondly, the Council found itself at loggerheads with the Provisional Government, which threatened clerical impoverishment through the land transfer committees created on 21 April and which refused to reconsider its takeover of the Orthodox parish schools on 1 June. A delegation led by Archbishop Kirill (Smirnov) returned from Petrograd to tell shocked delegates on 14 October that the government planned nothing less than the secularisation of society. Coincidentally, this was the second day of the plenary debate on the patriarchate. Packed with provincial teachers and officials disinclined to defer to metropolitan professors, who accounted for only nine of the 204 laymen elected to Moscow, the chamber was in no mood to prevaricate. None of the thirty-six peasant delegates spoke against restoring the patriarchate.

The social composition of the Council, the hostility of the Provisional Government, and the deteriorating state of the country benefited not only the cause of restoration in general, but Antonii (Khrapovitskii) in particular. On 11 August, he regained the see of Khar’kov, to which he had been translated in 1913, by polling 412 votes — 396 more than his closest rival. Six days later, on the anniversary of Patriarch Nikon’s death, the newly


95 Bogoslovskii, Dnevniki, 413, diary, 31 Aug. 1917.
99 Rogoznyi, Tserkovnaia revoliutsiia, 180–81.
restored prelate preached to members of the Council at Nikon’s New Jerusalem monastery outside Moscow, claiming that it was only a matter of time before his hero followed Patriarch Hermogen to canonisation. There could have been no clearer signal of the sort of regime Antonii envisaged. However, as elections for the Council chairmanship soon proved, his brand of militant interventionism was still divisive. While Arsenii (Stadnitskii) became vice-chairman on 18 August with 404 votes in favour and 31 against, Antonii joined him on 285 votes but no fewer than 150 blackballs. Both men were chosen only after Tikhon had unexpectedly run away with the chairmanship, defeating Vladimir (Bogoiaevskii) in the first round by 356:23 (Antonii came fourth with 19), and finally polling 407 votes with only 33 against. Here was the first sign of the attractions of a dark horse, whose ‘composed, almost phlegmatic’ appearance set him apart from most right-wingers in the Church: ‘There is peace in his voice’, noted Professor A.D. Beliaev, ‘clarity, and moreover not the slightest sharpness’.

The Council began to consider the patriarchate in its section on the supreme administration of the church to which some 266 of the 504 delegates eventually subscribed under the chairmanship of Mitrofan (Krasnopolskii). Recently translated to Astrakhan, Mitrofan was best known as a Russian nationalist in the Western Provinces who shared both Antonii’s contempt for the intelligentsia and his admiration for Patriarch Nikon, ‘a simply colossal person’.

Laymen proved keener on restoration than clergy, whose personal

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103 I.V. Lobanova, “‘Nam nuzhen Patriarkh ...’: Dokumenty Otdela o vysshem tserkovnom upravlenii Pomestnogo sobora 1917–1918 gg.’, in Tserkov’ v istorii Rossii, 10 (Moscow, 2015), 180, 16 Sept. 1917.
experience of episcopal despots – ‘little “Patriarch Nikons”’, as Rozanov put it at the outset of the Pre-Conciliar Commission – made them fearful of ‘a bishop squared’.\textsuperscript{104} However, on 22 September – less than three weeks after work began and two days before the Moscow City Duma elections registered a sharp rise in support for the Bolsheviks – Arsenii (Stadnitskii) joined the majority of 65:38 in support of a formula proposed by Prince Evgenii Trubetskoi.\textsuperscript{105} To the horror of Trubetskoi’s fellow liberals, this advocated a patriarch as \textit{primus inter pares} among bishops.\textsuperscript{106} Much activity had evidently taken place behind the scenes, where Archbishop Antonii and his supporters were at their most persuasive, coaxing rather than hectoring in the manner of their public pronouncements. To maintain the pressure, Antonii nevertheless reminded delegates that, in the current economic crisis, a council which had already cost 400,000 roubles risked bankruptcy before a single resolution had been reached. After an initial stalemate (38:38), Mitrofan’s section resolved (56:32) to take Trubetskoi’s formula to a plenary session.\textsuperscript{107} As a sign of his confidence by the first week in October, Antonii was sitting for the celebrated portrait by Nesterov, who boasted that he was painting ‘the potential all-Russian patriarch’.\textsuperscript{108}

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\textsuperscript{106} Randall Poole, ‘Religion, War and Revolution; E.N. Trubetskoi’s Liberal Construction of Russian National Identity, 1912–20’, \textit{Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History}, 7 (2006), 195–240, passes swiftly over Trubetskoi’s ecclesiastical involvement, but it seems that he was particularly effective in reconciling peasant and elite opinion at the Council.
\textsuperscript{107} Lavrov et al, \textit{Ierarkhiia}, 131–2.
\textsuperscript{108} M.V. Nesterov to A.A. Turygin, 6 Oct. 1917, in Nesterov, \textit{Pis’ma}, 272.
\end{flushright}
Seizing his moment, Antonii chaired the episcopal curia for the first and only time on Sunday 8 October. Having hitherto functioned as a special interest group, hearing appeals from hierarchs dismissed earlier in the year, the curia now considered Serafim (Chichagov)’s proposal for a more interventionist approach to conciliar business. Conscious of the delicacy of their position, the bishops agreed only to select a representative to express their views on any particular issue at a plenary session. Bishop Mitrofan was mandated to present the case for the patriarchate without delay, even though his section had yet to perfect its scheme.¹⁰⁹

Slicing through the historical and canonical maze, Mitrofan justified restoration on grounds of leadership, a quality soon praised by others keen to install a fearless vozhd’: ‘We need a patriarch as a prayerful representative of the Russian Church – a representative of heroic deeds and audacity – and as someone to stand up for the Russian Church. All the rest is unimportant’.¹¹⁰

Since only Archbishop Antonii fitted this bill, he was the sole bishop (effectively the sole potential candidate) selected to speak on 18 October, when the Council, alarmed by the proliferation of brief, underdeveloped interventions, voted 217:144 to restrict the debate to six orators on each side.¹¹¹ Feigning surprise at being called early, just as he had done in the State Council in 1906, Antonii launched into some characteristically personal remarks, objecting that his critics had dishonestly ascribed his support for the patriarchate to covert monarchism. Any church required leadership, he claimed, and it was not Patriarch Nikon but that ‘great destroyer’ Peter the Great who was responsible for ‘everything bad’ in Russian Orthodoxy.¹¹² By then, Andronik (Nikol’skii) had preached in favour of the patriarchate at

¹⁰⁹ Dokumenty, IV, 43–9, 8 Oct. 1917.
¹¹¹ Deianiia, II, 276–8, 18 Oct. 1917.
¹¹² Ibid., II, 289, 18 Oct. 1917.
Sergiev Posad, where the talk was soon of ‘hysterics’ on both sides. In fact, though Bishop Mitrofan, a prominent right-winger in the Third Duma, liked to tweak the liberals’ tails by referring to parliamentary procedures, the atmosphere at the Council remained civil, if tense, since patriarchists were determined to secure the passage of the transition formula, presented as a compromise designed to reconcile the ‘supreme power’ of the Council with the restoration of a patriarch.

Personalities were now to the fore. The claim by the Moscow archpriest Nikolai Dobronravov that such a petty-minded episcopate could generate no plausible candidate for the patriarchal throne was echoed by Professor Titlinov, who insisted that the office required someone capable of ‘moral charm’. ‘No such person is visible on our horizon’, Titlinov pointedly declared, adding that ‘the important psychology in our time is not individual, but social: and to social psychology the idea of the patriarchate says precisely nothing’.

Still, he could sense that the mood was against him, and so it proved. A well-known turning point in favour of restoration came on 23 October, when Archimandrite Ilarion (Troitskii) gave an emotional address claiming that the heart of Russia beat in the Dormition cathedral, whose empty patriarchal throne he compared with the wailing wall of Jerusalem. Although Ilarion has sometimes been placed on the ecclesiastical ‘left’, by 1917 he had long since marked himself out as a critic of Western progress, and no Council delegate would have missed, in his reference to a ‘beating heart’, an image beloved of Archbishop Antonii.

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Equally familiar was Ilarion’s insistence that there was no need to fear a papal patriarch, since his powers would be controlled by the Council. Five days later, as the Kremlin was temporarily recaptured from the revolutionaries, Bishop Mitrofan reminded liberals who complained that the patriarch’s powers remained undefined that the Duma itself had been created on the basis of the ambiguous October Manifesto. Last-ditch amendments to the transition formula proposed by Petr Kudriavtsev – a Kiev professor once denounced by Antonii (Khrapovitskii) as ‘an academic Voltaire’ – succeeded only in adding the word ‘supervisory’ (kontroliruiushchii) to list of the council’s powers (‘judicial, administrative, legislative’). Restoration was rapidly approved and the nervous chamber settled down to hear Kirill (Smirnov) describe the violence of the previous day, when he had been refused admission to the Kremlin because he could not say whether he represented the Government or the Bolsheviks.117 ‘In the current anarchy one can understand why a patriarch might now seem desirable even to those who previously did not want it’, Professor Beliaev noted on 29 October. ‘In peaceful circumstances, under the full, firm and unconditional authority of the secular government, the question of the patriarchate might have been decided in the negative or passed with an insignificant majority.’118

That evening, a meeting of the Council steering committee (sovet) accepted a proposal from seventy-nine council delegates that each delegate should nominate three candidates — the first three to secure an overall majority would go forward to the drawing of lots.119 The meeting was attended only by the Council’s secretary and by Tikhon, Arsenii, Antonii and archpriest A.P. Rozhdestvenskii, a professor opposed to restoration. Since their discussion was not recorded, we cannot know whether Antonii objected to the decision.


However, at the plenary session next day, one of his most loyal episcopal acolytes, Pakhomii (Kedrov), was put up to argue (in vain) that the final choice be made by the bishops alone. Another disciple, Evdokim (Meshcherskii), successfully ensured that candidates for the final draw required an absolute majority, and the council also accepted an amendment from the thirty-eight-year-old inspector of the Lithuanian Seminary, Viacheslav Bogdanovich, that delegates should be permitted to nominate only one man.\footnote{Deianiia, III, 44–5, 30 Oct. 1917.} That afternoon, Antonii received 101 of the 257 valid nominations (16 ballot papers were blank). His closest rival, Kirill (Smirnov), scored only 27; Tikhon came third with 23, Arsenii fifth with 14. Nine of the twenty-five nominees attracted only one supporter.\footnote{Ibid., 51, 53, 30 Oct. 1917.} Only when the opportunity to cast multiple votes was restored on 31 October did Tikhon and Arsenii regain ground. In the first round of the final ballot, in which 155 votes were required for an overall majority, Antonii scored 159, Arsenii 148, and Tikhon 125. In the second round, Arsenii polled sixty-two more votes than Tikhon, whose name went forward to the final draw only after a third round of voting.\footnote{Ibid., 55–6, 31 Oct. 1917.}

Changes in voting patterns since August must be analysed with caution since this ballot, like the poll for the council chairmanship, was secret and the turnout had fallen owing to the chaos in Moscow and the possible secession of some liberals.\footnote{The Council’s standard voting procedure, evidently designed to foster consensus, was for delegates to stand in their places, non-contents being counted first. Where no clear majority emerged, the chair could call for a division or a formal vote. See Deianiia, I, 49–51 (first pagination), especially paras. 174, 175, 177.} Nevertheless, it seems clear that a significant number of delegates were now prepared to suspend their reservations about Archbishop Antonii, sensing that the qualities required in a patriarch were different from those desirable in a council chairman, especially in the transformed political

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Deianiia, III, 44–5, 30 Oct. 1917.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., 51, 53, 30 Oct. 1917.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., 55–6, 31 Oct. 1917.}
\end{itemize}
circumstances. It must also be stressed that Antonii was by no means a creature of the episcopal curia. Since attendance there averaged only in the high forties and not all his fellow bishops supported Antonii, most of his votes, both at the nomination and in the final ballot, must have come from laymen and parish clergy. It was reasonable for him to conclude that his election represented the will of the majority.\footnote{Evlogii, Put’ moei zhizni, 301.}

Ironically, that majority was punctured only by the drawing of lots, a procedure never subsequently repeated. Its precedents, scarcely discussed until the last moment, were complex.\footnote{The Pre-conciliar Commission debated lots only once, with reference to the election of laymen and clergy to a future council: see Zhurnaly, I, 100–102.} The Byzantine model – in which the emperor selected bishops from a shortlist of three – had undergone significant modification in medieval and early-modern Russia. There, the role of the secular power was probably less decisive than surviving royally-inspired manuscripts make it seem.\footnote{See Paul Bushkovitch, ‘The Selection and Deposition of the Metropolitan and Patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Russia, 1448–1619’, in Marek Derwich and Mikhail V. Dmitriev, eds, Etre catholique - être orthodoxe - être protestant: Confessions et identités culturelles en Europe médiévale et moderne (Wroclaw, 2003), 123–50.} By November 1917, however, tsarist intervention was impossible and a casting role for the Synod (rejected in episcopal elections that spring) was inconceivable.\footnote{Rogoznyi, Tserkovnaia revoliutsiia, 144–50, especially 149.} Beginning with the election of Patriarch Iosif in 1642, several Muscovite patriarchs had been chosen by lot. But in their cases, the successful candidate emerged from a shortlist longer than three.\footnote{B.A. Uspenskii, Tsar’ i patriarkh: Kharizma vlasti v Rossii (Vizantiiskaia model’ i ee russkoe pereosmyslenie) (Moscow, 1998), 303–7.} For a Russian precedent for the procedure adopted in 1917, it is necessary to return to medieval Novgorod, where the resort to ‘a man chosen by God’
appears to have provided a means of resolving especially divisive episcopal contests. Boris Uspenskii has compared the mood of Novgorod’s republican popular assembly (veche) with that of the Moscow Church Council in 1917–18. However, judging from the debate on 30 October, delegates were preoccupied rather with the example of the contemporary Eastern patriarchates. As Professor Sokolov had explained at a fringe meeting the day before, these offered a variety of options. The suggested model, as the Council subsequently heard, approximated to the practice of the patriarchate of Alexandria. But no-one knew better than Sokolov that Alexandrian elections had been controversial within living memory. And whatever their grasp of rival electoral mechanisms, it seems probable that the central merit of the system adopted by the Moscow Church Council delegates was that it offered a clear resolution to a bitterly fought election in increasingly unpredictable times. The result was doubly ironic: it was only the resort to divine intervention that rescued ecclesiastical liberals who had harped on the majority principle since 1905 from the electoral triumph of their bête-noire – Antonii (Khраповицкii) – who himself had spent the previous decade decrying the falsity of parliamentary democracy.

VI

Having argued that the politics of restoration make sense only if we allocate a central role to Archbishop Antonii, it is natural for me to end by speculating what might have happened had

129 Uspenskii, Tsar’i patriarkh, 290–303; Michael C. Paul, ‘Episcopal Election in Novgorod, Russia, 1156–1478’, Church History, 72 (2003), 251–75

130 Uspenskii, Tsar’i patriarkh, 307.


he been elected in Tikhon’s place. On the day that Tikhon’s name was drawn, a relieved
Bogoslovskii concluded that the church had escaped the anarchy engulfing the state by
selecting ‘an individual around whom Orthodox Russia will unite’ — ‘a spiritual centre
towards which the scattered, the lacerated, the jaded and the tormented must gravitate’:

When yids and scoundrels stand at the head of the state, it is comforting to have a
pure and holy father at the head of the church. Under the tsar, it ought, perhaps, to
have been possible to manage without the patriarchate. But now it can render priceless
service for Russia.133

Things did not work out that way, and it is hard to imagine a better outcome for the church
had the more abrasive Antonii triumphed. Over the autumn of 1917, ecclesiastical opinions
had hardened in favour of a man who could get things done, much as they had in society
more generally. Aside from his resilience, however, Antonii resembled Lenin only in his
ability to defame his enemies and scheme against them. And although Lenin long remained
nervous of the church’s counter-revolutionary potential, it was he who held the whip hand. In
January 1918, in the aftermath of the decree separating church from state, Patriarch Tikhon
resorted to a favoured tactic of the ecclesiastical ‘right’ by anathematising the ‘madmen’
whose ‘satanic’ acts had covered Russia in blood.134 His anathema made no difference and
the church remained powerless to direct the strong current of popular religiosity that
continued to flow through revolutionary Russia. Instead, the sorts of elite dissension we have
considered widened over the following decade into multiple schisms, intensified when
renovationist churchmen deposed Tikhon in April 1923 and annulled his anathema on the
Bolsheviks. After Tikhon’s death in 1925, the patriarchate fell into abeyance until 1943. And
while Antonii emigrated to lead the Russian Church Abroad until his death in 1936, many of

133 Bogoslovskii, Dnevnik, 454, diary, 5 Nov. 1917.

the most prominent individuals discussed in this lecture became martyrs for their faith, swept away by Bukharin’s iron broom.