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A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis

Jehiel, P; Lamy, L; (2018) A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy , 126 (2) pp. 735-760. 10.1086/696273. Green open access

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Abstract

We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed.

Type: Article
Title: A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1086/696273
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1086/696273
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10046367
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