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The Rise and Fall of Citizenship and Human Rights Education in Turkey

- The United Nation Decade for Human Rights Education in the context of post-Cold War democratisation encouraged the Turkish government in 1995 to revise a civics course by adding human rights themes.
- The government, allied to the military, used the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course to counter increasing vociferous political Islamist discourses.
- After the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a political Islamist party came to power in 2002 and inserted previously suppressed Islamist discourses into the main textbook of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course.
- In spite of international support for the development of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course, national agendas relating to the struggle between secular and religious nationalist parties prevailed.

**Purpose:** This article shows the effects of competing political forces on citizenship education in Turkey during the period of commitment to European Union (EU) accession (1999-2005).

**Methodology:** It draws on textbooks, archival documents and interviews. Whilst Turkey had a history of civic education to promote a secular national ethos and identity, the post-Cold War democratisation movement encouraged the Turkish government in 1995 to attempt to internationalise civics by adding human rights themes.

**Findings:** This effort occurred at a time when the hegemony of the secular nationalist establishment was challenged by the electoral rise of an Islamist party. Although Citizenship and Human Rights course suited the purposes of the secular nationalist establishment, after the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate in 1999, a new political Islamist government, elected in 2002, chose first to align the course with its ideology and later decided to repeal it. By exploring the evolution of the curriculum in a crucial period in which political power was switching from the ideology of secular nationalism to that of religious (Islamist) nationalism, the present study illustrates ways in which external and internal influences may affect citizenship education. In particular, it contributes to debates over the role of international agencies in curriculum change in citizenship education.

**Keywords:**
Citizenship education, human rights education, curriculum change, role of international agencies, Turkey

1 Introduction
Citizenship education in one form or another has been a staple of the compulsory centralised national curriculum of Turkish middle schools since the founding of the modern state in the 1920s. This article focuses on a sudden change in emphasis in the course for eighth grade students (13-14-year-olds) who historically received instruction in the official ideology of secular nationalism according to which the State is blind to individual characteristics of religion, culture, gender and ethnicity. Citizens are deemed to be equal within the Republic so long as they refrain from claiming recognition of diversity within the public sphere.

In 1995, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) agreed to reform the eighth-grade citizenship education courses in response to the United Nations’ (UN) Decade for Human Rights Education initiative. The MoNE changed the title of a course from ‘Citizenship Studies’ to ‘Citizenship and Human Rights Education’ and revised the course’s curriculum through the integration of some human rights themes (MoNE, 1995). However, this reform was overtaken by political events including the rise to power of the political Islamist Welfare Party [Refah Partisi, RP] and the subsequent military coup of 1997 that toppled the Islamist-party-led coalition government (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Çınar, 2003).

Following the military overthrow of the Islamist government, and the re-establishment of secular nationalist control, the MoNE launched the first curriculum of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course in 1998 (MoNE, 1998). Critiques noted the inclusion of militaristic perspectives which sat uneasily with Turkey’s case for recognition as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership, which was nonetheless achieved at the 1999 Helsinki Summit (Gülmez, 2001; Üstel, 2004). This article investigates the evolution of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course during the post-Helsinki era (1999-2005) in which the EU membership reforms created a sea change in the balance of power between the forces of dominant ideologies. It seeks to explore, through the analysis of interviews with key informants, archival policy documents and textbooks, ways in which...

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the EU accession process affected the content of Citizenship and Human Rights Education in the post-Helsinki era. We find that, after the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP] in 2002, the content of the course was aligned with the new ruling party’s ideology of political Islamism, and subsequently the course was wholly removed from the middle school programmes in 2005.

This article focuses on the evolution of citizenship education from the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which Turkey was accepted as an official candidate for EU membership until 2005 when the MoNE repealed the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course. Whilst a number of scholars have previously researched citizenship education in Turkey (Çayır, 2014; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Çayır & Gürkaynak, 2008; Gök, 2004; Gülmez, 2001; Ince, 2012; Karaman Kepenekçi, 2005; Üstel, 2004), this article breaks new ground in investigating its evolution in relation to the effects of the EU accession process and in drawing on the accounts of key informants and our privileged access to archival documents.

Previous studies other than Türkmen (2009) rarely investigated the impact of the ideology of the ruling party on the curriculum. Rather, the main tendency has been to explore the ways the official ideology, backed by the state establishment, has permeated the curriculum (e.g. Altnay, 2004; İ. Kaplan, 1999; S. Kaplan, 2006). In fact, the context of previous research has been the hegemony of secular nationalism that left little space for alternative ideological influences. By exploring the evolution of the subject in a crucial period in which power was shifting from the ideology of secular nationalism to that of religious (Islamist) nationalism, this study illustrates how external and internal influences moulded the curriculum. It also contributes to the debate on whether international agencies have created a convergence towards a global model of citizenship education.

2 Curriculm change in Citizenship Education

Much international discussion on curriculum change in citizenship education revolves around the question of whether or not there is a cross-national convergence in the content of citizenship education courses. A group of studies has argued that change in citizenship education has been driven by exogenous factors rather than the internal dynamics of a country. Examining a cross-national dataset of social science courses between 1900 and 1986, Wong (1991) found that social science courses replaced national history and national geography courses and epitomised the decline of nationalism in curricula. Rauner (1998, 1999) conducted a cross-national longitudinal study drawing on civics education materials from 42 countries belonging to the period from 1955 to 1995. She found a transition from a national to a global model of civic education as evidenced by the increase in references to rights, global issues and the individual that she attributed to the effective role of UNESCO in the worldwide dissemination of new civic topics.

Moon (2009, 2013c) showed that the best predictor of the adoption of HRE was a country’s commitments to international human rights regimes. Countries with a high level of involvement in UNESCO’s efforts created more provision for HRE within their educational systems. Other studies highlight the effectiveness of international agencies, by identifying the preponderance of certain common themes in citizenship education (e.g. Bromley, 2009; Buckner & Russell, 2013; Meyer, Bromley, & Ramirez, 2010; Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell, 2009; Terra & Bromley, 2012).

Other qualitative studies maintain that national curricula are shifting from nationalist to post-national emphases as evidenced by the increasing references to diversity, human rights and global issues (e.g. Bromley, 2011; Soysal & Szakács, 2010; Soysal & Wong, 2007). These studies found an increase in the emphasis on human rights, global issues and diversity after the end of Cold War. They also found that militarist themes reduced and the historical narratives shifted to a new tone that foregrounds the socio-economic history of people, not that of rulers, military leaders and dynasties.

Another group of studies admitted the impact of exogenous factors with a caveat that local and national influences remain highly influential in the shaping of citizenship education curriculum. After presenting a detailed analysis of the evolution of social studies, Morris, Clelland, & Man (1997) argued that:

“Worldwide trends can provide both rhetoric and models for specific sorts of policy changes. At a micro level, however, conflict or competition among subgroups can modify or transform proposed changes, and the adoption and implementation of the changes are determined by a range of pragmatic considerations within schools (p. 43).”

Cardenas (2005) suggests that the cross-national adoption of HRE can be accounted for by the fact that HRE provides nation-states with a source of prestige, legitimacy and respectability in national and international communities. Nonetheless, she underlined that the tension between HRE and the priorities of state authorities may lead to largely symbolic changes that eventually engender a gap between the promotion and implementation of HRE.

Some studies examined changes in citizenship education policies in European contexts. They acknowledged the influence of international agencies, but concluded that citizenship education was still far from being a standardised and homogenous entity (Keating, 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Ortloff, 2005; Philippou, Keating, & Ortloff, 2009). Hahn (2008) eloquently posited that ‘civic education in particular serves as a wonderful window on a culture’ (pp. 4-5). Janmaat & Piattoeva (2007) and Piattoeva (2009, 2010) observed great variation in the curricula of the countries, which are members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and influenced by UNESCO’s projects, and concluded that the international agencies had limited influence.

Supporting this line of literature, a recent study found that nationalism was not diminished, but remained unchanged in 576 social science textbooks from 1955 to 2011 (Lerch, Russell, & Ramirez, 2017). This study de-
monstrated that the international convergence argument is not well-founded. It encouraged caution about cross-national generalisations.

3 Political Context

The founding leaders of modern Turkey established secular nationalism as the official ideology from 1923, and it enjoyed powerful legal and military protection (Göle, 2013). Whilst this official ideology eschewed diversity, from the 1990s, struggles for the recognition of ethnic and religious identities re-emerged in the region, having been frozen under communism during the Cold War. Two contrasting worldviews confronted each other. On the one hand, there was a rise of political Islamism, reclaiming a Turkish Islamic identity, and Kurdish separatism. On the other, secular nationalism grew in popularity amongst the urban middle classes using symbols associated with Atatürk such as his signature, image and aphorisms, to signal their attachment to the secular constitution and modern liberal values (Özyürek, 2006).

Secular nationalist groups are identified with modern values and use liberal western societies and the Republican era of Atatürk as the primary frame of reference to legitimise their group beliefs and behaviours (Bora, 2003). By contrast, those who embrace political Islamism use the religion of Islam, the Ottoman past and the Islamic golden era of the Prophet Muhammed as the primary frame of reference to justify their beliefs and behaviours. Secular nationalism holds that Turkish society is secular, modern and in the process of becoming a part of liberal western societies, whereas political Islamism envisions society with an emphasis on its Islamic past and status amongst other Muslim nations.

The 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey’s application for the EU membership was formalised, represents a turning point in the democratisation history of Turkey. During the post-Helsinki era, the Turkish Parliament passed democratisation reforms to meet the EU criteria for opening accession negotiations (Müftüler Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2000). The balance of power between these ideologies changed considerably in the post-Helsinki era because the status of the military as the guardian of Atatürk’s legacy of secular nationalism and hence what Jenkins (2007) calls ‘the mystical embodiment of the Turkish nation’ had to be re-defined in order to meet the EU criteria (p. 354). Although the EU accession process required the military to relinquish its dominant role, leaders of the armed forces in fact applied pressure on the government to resist such EU demands. The tension between the government and the military was starkly revealed when the Deputy Prime Minister, fearing damage to the case for EU accession, blamed the military for afflicting Turkish politics with ‘national security syndrome’ by prioritising ‘the indivisible and secular character of the regime as more important than the need for democratic reform’ (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 2003, pp. 213-214).

The EU accession process for a while provided a context for democratisation and limitations to military influence. Military judges were removed from the state security courts in 1999 (Jenkins, 2007). In October 2001, the composition of the National Security Council (NSC) was reconfigured by including the Justice Minister and Deputy Prime Minister thus increasing the proportion of civilian members (Hale, 2003). The state of emergency and effective military rule in some parts of southeast Turkey were repealed in 2002 (Müftüler-Baç, 2005). The death penalty was abolished, and the ban on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was lifted.

The limitation of the military’s power provided an opening for political Islamism to prevail in the post-Helsinki period. A group of young Islamist politicians founded a new political party in 2001, the AKP, which came to power in 2002 following an extended period of coalition governments. Even though the military was alarmed by the AKP’s rise to power, the new political context was no longer favourable to military interventions (Jenkins, 2007). Indeed, unless the AKP pursued policies that were explicitly in contradiction with secular principles, known as laicism, the military was powerless to influence events.

In addition, the AKP, with its conciliatory rhetoric, used the EU integration reforms to reduce the role of the military (Tombuş, 2013). In the early years of the AKP government, none of the parties wanted to jeopardise Turkey’s chances of opening accession negotiations due for the Brussels summit in December 2004 (Jenkins, 2007). That said, it was not long before the AKP government’s enthusiasm for the EU waned (Öniş, 2008, 2009; Patton, 2007). The AKP developed an instrumental view of the EU accession process that enabled it to consolidate its power domestically (Usul, 2008). For example, the EU accession required reforming the National Security Council by reducing the frequency of meetings which limited the military’s contact with the cabinet (Müftüler Baç, 2005). These significant changes in restricting the military’s influence enabled the Islamist government to challenge the hard-line secularism that was the Kemalist legacy to the Turkish state.

4 Background of citizenship education reform

In Turkey, citizenship education courses were historically used in the service of promoting secular nationalism. Their status in the timetable and content changed according to the direction in which the dominant groups in power wished to take the country. The immediate responsiveness of citizenship education to the regime in power resulted from the fact that one centralised curriculum authority made all curricular decisions and approved all curricular materials in Turkey. Table 1 shows the names and dates of the citizenship education course, which have been taught since 1923:
The concept of citizenship first appeared in the title of the course in 1948 after the transition to multi-party democracy in 1946; human rights, in 1995; democracy, in 2010. The changing course titles are linked to the resurgence of democracy and human rights in the wake of the end of the Cold War, epitomised by the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993 (UNHCR, 1994).

In the single-party era (1923-1950), citizenship education courses promoted a monolithic national identity that relied on the ethno-cultural characteristics of Turkishness (İnce, 2012). The motto of the Republic, one language, one culture, and one ideal, was repeated, while the terms of citizen and Turk were used synonymously in textbooks (Çayır, 2007). After 1936, citizenship education took on a political role to create a social base for the single-party in power. Since the ruling party was identified with six principles, known as six arrows, the inclusion of those principles in citizenship education textbooks led Gülmez (2001) to call the version of citizenship after 1936 as ‘six-arrow citizenship’ (p. 218).

After the democratic transition of power to a new party in 1950, citizenship education textbooks included a new unit, entitled ‘Democracy’, in which the multi-party regime was positively presented (Çayır, 2008; İnce, 2012). One of the statements of Atatürk, ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, was included in textbooks, while some introduced a full text of the UDHR in their appendices (İnce, 2012). In this period, textbooks included an image of a woman wearing a headscarf and a modified definition of the concept of nation, whereby religion was counted as a constitutive element (Üstel, 2004). These changes were significant because the single party rule had eradicated all religious visibilities in education.

In 1985, citizenship education was reestablished as a discrete subject again as one of the three courses replacing Social Studies was a course, entitled Citizenship Studies (Üstel, 2004). The objectives of Citizenship Studies included the term of ‘citizen’ on only one occasion. Citizenship Studies textbooks defined a nation as ‘a unity of language, religion, race, history and culture’ (p. 177).

The inclusion of religion is significant consi-dering that religion had not been previously included in the definition.

After joining the UN Decade for Human Rights Education initiative in the 1990s, the MoNE changed the name of Citizenship Studies course to Citizenship and Human Rights Education. A programme for the course was announced in 1998 (MoNE, 1998). The longest unit of the programme which made up 30 per cent of the content was entitled the Elements of National Security and National Power (Gülmez, 2001). After identifying many human rights issues in textbooks, Gök (2004) concluded that ‘the main goal is to impose and indoctrinate a militarist and nationalist ideology under the pretext of international threat, terror, and animosity’ (p. 116). Similarly, Çayır and Gürkaynak (2008) pointed out that the textbooks promoted a ‘very particularistic, nationalistic, passive and authoritarian notion of citizenship’ (p. 56). Üstel (2004) found that the textbooks depicted religious nationalists as internal threats.

After examining citizenship textbooks, Çayır (2007) and Çayır & Bağlı (2011) concluded that an ethno-religious conception of national identity underpinned by a notion of assimilationist citizenship permeated textbooks. Investigating the evolution of the promoted notion of national identity in textbooks, Kanci (2009) concluded that the ethno-religious citizenship definition permeated textbooks in more subtle forms in the post-Helsinki era. A European Commission-funded project examining Turkish textbooks across the curriculum concluded that ‘the most serious problem observed in almost all textbooks is the underlying state-centered mentality that prioritises and indeed often sanctifies the state, the state authority, and national unity over the individual’s rights and freedoms’ (Tarba Ceylan, & Irzik, 2004, p. 3). The MoNE repealed the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course in 2005 with a promise that the content would be infused to the content of other courses.

5 Methodology
This research is based on an analysis of policy documents, interviews and textbooks. The Board of Education (BoE), the national curriculum authority, granted the first author access to make a photographic record of nearly 900 archival documents in September 2014. The first author made seventeen semi-structured interviews with key informants from September 2014 to October 2015. They included civil servants, philosophy and history teachers, curriculum designers, academics and the CoE educational experts. Of the seventeen interviewees, nine worked in the curriculum development committees for the citizenship education courses, two were civil servants, two were members of the BoE, one was CoE expert, one was EDC/HRE coordinator, one was a member of Turkey’s EU delegate team, and one was an NGO representative. The common characteristic of the interviewees was that they played a role in the evolution of citizenship education curriculum in the given period.

In addition to interviews and policy documents, we analysed the course’s textbooks (Çiçti et al., 2001,
2004). The main textbook of the course was printed five times between 1999 to 2003 (Çiftçi et al., 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). All editions of the textbook were identical. However, the second series of the textbook, which was printed in 2004 and 2005, included revised, removed, replaced and newly added sections (Çiftçi et al., 2004, 2005).

In analysing the archival and interview data and the textbooks, we drew on concepts and ideas from critical discourse analysis, which suggests scrutinising micro-relations of language in the text in relation to the ideological power structures of the broader context (Pennycook, 2001). The primary function of ideologies is to produce consent for the perpetuation of existing power relations (Fairclough, 2013). Ideologies manufacture consent through discourse, which can be defined as ways of construing the social reality. Ideologies perpetuate group interests such as ‘unjust privileges, or minimal conditions of existence’ (van Dijk, 1998, p. 138). They always mirror a positive representation of the group they belong to and a negative representation of rival social groups. In contrast to ideologies, knowledge represents the common interest of the whole society. Knowledge is based on the shared discourses of the whole community, whereas ideologies are based on particularistic discourses of social groups and do not have a currency beyond the social group to which they belong.

We followed a three-stage sequential path of analysis similar to the one proposed by Fairclough (2001, 2013). At the first stage, we scrutinised the lexical and grammatical features of the text, such as foregrounding and backgrounding of agents, use of modalities, tenses and pronouns and presuppositions. At the second stage, we linked the specificities of language use to the power relations within the broader context. At the third stage, we explained how the discourses in the text contributed to or challenge the existing power relations.

Our review of literature guided the selection of excerpts from data sources. We paid attention to choose excerpts that best represent the role of national and international influences in the reform process and the curriculum. We have cited the archival documents with the name of the institution where they were produced and the date when they were produced, as in the following example: Board of Education, March 30, 2010 or BoE, March 30, 2010.

6 The curriculum reform in the pre-AKP period (1999-2002)
Turkey’s recognition as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit changed the official approach to reforming the militarised content of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course. The archival documents show that the Board of Education (BoE) gave a diplomatic response to the CoE invitation to participate in the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative in the pre-Helsinki Summit period (BoE, January 14, 1997). This lukewarm response was an effect of the power struggle between the forces of the dominant ideologies before the 1997 coup. However, after the military suppressed the Islamist movement and the EU signaled its positive approach to Turkey’s membership at the 1998 Cardiff Summit (Müftüler Bağ, 2005), the BoE began to express an interest in the EDC/HRE initiative discreetly at first (BoE, January 11, 1999) and then quite overtly following the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

An archival letter written by the head of the foreign relations directorate of the MoNE shows this change in the official approach (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate General for Cultural Affairs, February 18, 1999). The director wrote the letter after joining a meeting of the CoE’s Council for Cultural Co-operation (CDCC), that brought together state representatives, high-profile bureaucrats and NGO representatives to promote the CoE’s core principles (democracy, human rights, the rule of law) through education, culture and sports. In the letter, the director first gives introductory information about the administrative structure of the CDCC to show ways in which Turkey would participate in the works of CDCC more efficiently. The letter gives an impression that Turkey approaches the CoE to make a positive representation of itself, not primarily to collaborate on educational reforms.

Just as this archival document revealed that the MoNE’s engagement in the Europe-based educational projects was driven by the prospect of EU membership, one of the key informants underlined the same external source of motivation for the curriculum reform:

“For the first time, a ministry responsible for the EU is created under AKP rule. Now, we are talking about a country with this perspective and this ministry. When we hear Europe, the first thing that springs to our minds is a thoroughly-functioning judiciary. How is that possible? It is possible through democracy. Then, it needs to be addressed in the curricula, in the education system (Interviewee 9-Curriculum Designer, 1 September 2014).”

According to the interviewee, citizenship education reform is an educational effort to bring Turkey’s culture of democracy and human rights in line with European standards. There is a sense that it is only external pressure that motivates the introduction of democratic citizenship education. Similarly, Interviewee 10, who is also a curriculum designer, agreed that Turkey turned its face to the West at this time and that education policies were affected by this choice (September 1, 2014). The archival documents and interviewees’ accounts suggest a close association between the citizenship education reform in Turkey and the EU membership bid.

In 2000, a board member for the first time joined in the final conference of the first phase of the EDC/HRE initiative. This high-profile representation of Turkey in the meeting is another indication of the growing interest. After the conference, the board member reported that pupils should be given opportunities to practise democracy while teachers should be offered in-service training on democratic citizenship education. The report also emphasised the importance of school-society cooperation in...
terms of providing a quality citizenship education (BoE, September 19, 2000).

In 2001, at the request of the CoE, the BoE appointed a national coordinator for the second phase of the EDC/HRE initiative (BoE, March 3, 2001). The appointed national coordinator joined in the EDC/HRE activities, maintained correspondence and organised several efforts, including the formation of an EDC/HRE project group and advisory committee, the adoption of an EDC/HRE national plan and pilot implementations (BoE, August 2, 2001). The way in which the advisory committee was formed and the way in which the EDC/HRE project group held meetings manifested a concern to keep in line with the CoE’s recommendations. The EDC/HRE plan was developed with the contributions of 42 participants from various sectors. Two primary and two high schools were selected to pilot the materials (BoE, March 8, 2002). Interviewee 14, who was Turkey’s EDC/HRE coordinator and took part in the preparatory efforts, acknowledged the positive approach to the citizenship education reform:

“It was 2001 or so, efforts on democratic citizenship education began in the Board of Education, and sub-committees were formed (…) in that period, there were board members at the BoE who were dedicated to this business [citizenship education reform]. There were board members who were working diligently with a full effort (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).”

Interviewee 14’s testimony corroborates evidence from the archival documents that the citizenship education reform was taken seriously in this period. Interviewee 15, who was a high-profile educational bureaucrat, described the efforts of this period as ‘in-depth’, ‘having philosophical depth’ and ‘well-established’ (August 4, 2015).

Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a Turkish EU Secretariat-General was created in 2000 to develop relations with the EU authorities and started work using the ‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance’ (IPA) framework. The IPA framework is intended for candidate countries to apply for financial assistance in realising integration reforms (European Union Ministry of Turkey, 2015). Although the EU acquis does not include a criterion concerning citizenship education, education was perceived as an instrument to meet the Copenhagen criteria in the Turkish case (Alexiadou, 2014; Keating, 2014). One of the interviewees, who worked in Turkey’s EU delegation team mentioned that they considered citizenship education as a tool to improve human rights and democracy in Turkey (Interviewee 13, July 6, 2015). This perspective on citizenship education paved the way for the preparation of an IPA project proposal on citizenship education in 2001 (BoE, September 27, 2002). In the following years, the official interest in the IPA project proposal served as a barometer that showed the level of interest in the citizenship education reform.

6 The curriculum reform in the AKP period (2002-2005)
The first appointee of the Islamist AKP government to head the BoE began work in March 2003. The archival documents show that the new administration was less enthusiastic towards collaboration with the CoE in respect of the EDC/HRE activities. After the new head came to the BoE, the last EDC/HRE activity report, which had been sent to the CoE in February 2003, was revised and re-sent in April 2003 (BoE, February 20, 2003; April 30, 2003). The differences between the old and revised versions show how the official interest in the curriculum reform changed under a new government.

The new version uses a formal and diplomatic language in informing the CoE about educational reforms (BoE, April 30, 2003). It does not include anything about the government’s democratisation agenda. It presents democratisation efforts in education as part of the implementation of the 2001-2005 Working Programme. The new report signals that the new administration intends to maintain the relationship with the CoE in a diplomatic manner.

After the second half of 2003, no EDC/HRE activity report was sent to the CoE. In August 2003, the BoE declined the CoE’s invitation of a representative to participate in an upcoming EDC/HRE initiative meeting (BoE, August 19, 2003). The BoE’s response to the draft of a CoE-sponsored study, All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies, shows an early symptom of this negative approach (BoE, June 27, 2003). One of the CoE experts who had been commissioned to review EDC/HRE policies of a group of countries including Turkey sent his draft to the BoE to receive comments. In response, the BoE criticised the CoE for including a topic entitled “The 1974 Coup and the Ensuing Turkish Invasion”.

In 2004, the BoE decided to appoint an academic as the new EDC/HRE national coordinator (BoE, May 10, 2004). Unlike the previous national coordinator, the new coordinator had not previously worked in the BoE:

“It is a job which you are supposed to do completely voluntarily (…) What I mean by this is that there is no financial profit from this job for me (…) It was an effort to show that (…) the name of our country is heard, something is being done in Turkey and some things are really done in Turkey (…) I want to underline that when I was appointed to the project, I could not reach any document, there was no information. I was not going there for decorative purposes. Someone from there told me, dear, this project is like a stillborn child, do not tire yourself too much (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).”

The commissioning of an academic from outside the MoNE is indicative of the MoNE’s indifference to the EDC/HRE activities in this period. In fact, the interviewee clearly felt that it was a purely nominal or ‘decorative’ role and was shocked at the lack of cooperation from the civil servants even though the appointment was made by the education minister. The likening of the EDC/HRE project to ‘a stillborn child’ is highly suggestive of institutional indifference. The Interviewee’s account and the archival documents provide ample evidence of the declining interest in citizenship education reform after the AKP’s rise to power.


7 The revision of the main textbook

Previous researchers who analysed the course’s textbooks did not note that the different editions of the course’s main textbooks were different (Çayır, 2007; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Gök, 2004; Ince, 2012; Üstel, 2004). Our examination showed that the textbook content became subject to an ideological shift after the AKP came to power in 2002. Our line-by-line comparison revealed a discursive shift in the content of the course reflecting the alignment of the curriculum with the dominant ideology in power. For instance, the militaristic discourse denigrating the Kurdish people as an internal enemy who colludes with foreign enemies was toned down in the new series of the textbook:

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<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<td>In some places, citizens’ not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive (Çiftçi et al., 2001, p. 69).</td>
<td>Our citizens should individually be sensitive to activities of terrorist organisations (Çiftçi et al., 2004, p. 63).</td>
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The old version is based on a discourse that the people of the region where terror is rampant, which Turkish readers will recognise as the southeast region, are abetting and aiding terrorists. It blames the Kurdish people of the region for facilitating terrorism. This statement was replaced with a more neutral phrase in the new version which makes a general warning regarding terrorist organisations. The phrase ‘citizens’ becomes more inclusive, ‘our citizens’, and the phrase ‘terrorist/s’ becomes ‘terror organisations’. In this way, the new version is phrased as a piece of advice in contrast to the old version’s accusatory tone.

The new textbook also tones down ethnic-nationalist discourses. The following comparison illustrates this discursive shift:

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<td>By saying ‘How happy is the one who says I am Turkish’, Atatürk expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish. This understanding shows unity in plurality [understanding] in our culture. Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: ‘If there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish.’ We should all be proud of our country and society. As Our Great Father advised, we should all work, be proud and trust (p. 76).</td>
<td>By saying ‘How happy is the one who says I am Turkish’ Atatürk expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish (p. 68).</td>
</tr>
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In the old version, the first quote from Atatürk presents Turkishness as an identity that can be adopted by everyone who says I am Turkish. However, this is contradicted by the second quote from Atatürk that implies that Turkishness is acquired by birth. By removing the italicised part of the old version and highlighting the last sentence, the new version eliminates the contradiction by focusing on the possibility of self-identifying as Turkish.

When political Islamists, who were referred to by derogatory expressions in the previous version of the textbook, came to power after 2002, the expressions used to denigrate them were wholly removed from the textbook. For instance:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Turkish nation is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking nor pious. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious (p. 73).</td>
<td>The Turkish nation is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious (p. 86).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old version attaches the attributes of secular nationalist groups to the whole of the Turkish nation. Some of the descriptors used in the old version like ‘fundamentalism [köktençilik], bigotry [taassup], backwards-looking [gerici], and pious [yobaz]’ were the pejoratives that were used to denigrate political Islamists. In the new version, the italic part is removed, and the characterisation of the Turkish nation is made in a more inclusive way.

The old version of the textbook aimed to justify the anti-democratic measures of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban. The new version reflects a discursive shift:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What would be the dangers [sakınçolar] of people’s interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (p. 74).</td>
<td>Is the right to education a fundamental right for the enjoyment, improvement and protection of other rights? (p. 84).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old version aims to make students agree with the military impositions of the 1997 coup that people must respect the authorities and accept limitations on their freedom of conscience and religion. The new question conveys a message that education is a fundamental right, and no one should be deprived of the right to education under any circumstances. It may encourage students to question the still existing headscarf ban in schools.

Many parts of the previous version of the textbook depicting the army as the most vital institution are modified in the new version. The old version of the textbook presented weapons as a basic need, which is modified in the following way:
The new version subverts the discourse of the old version firstly by specifying a reason why mankind needed weapons, and secondly by getting rid of the part which compared the need for the weapon with the need for food and drink. The new version explains the need for weapons by highlighting a reason for it (protection and nutrition).

The old version of the textbook presented a glorified picture of the army. It included statements that can be construed as legitimising the military’s interferences with Turkey’s parliamentary democracy. The old version of the textbook also strongly promoted secular nationalism through adulation and veneration of Atatürk as an incontestable national hero. Atatürk’s aphorisms were included throughout the textbook. The following expressions exalting Atatürk were in the previous version: ‘the republic which Atatürk founded’ (p. 80), ‘Atatürk gave the Turkish citizens the Republic of Turkey as a present’ (p. 75) and ‘this duty [of protecting the Republic] assigned by Atatürk’ (p. 75). These phrases all disappeared in the new version. The following comparison illustrates the discursive shift in respect of Atatürk:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence (p. 68).</td>
<td>Mankind has needed weapons to hunt animals in nature or benefit from them since the first day of his existence (p. 62).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old version overlooks women’s agency, instead glorifying Atatürk’s contribution. It portrays the progressive reforms regarding women’s rights as Atatürk’s personal success. The new version recognises women’s agency in gaining their rights and de-emphasizes the personal role of Atatürk. It links the progress in women’s rights to women’s ‘heroic acts’ in the War of National Independence. The last statement of the old version is expressed in an active form to highlight the role of Atatürk, whereas the same statement is expressed in a passive form in the new version, which breaks the tie of dependency between ‘opening up new horizons for Turkish women’ and Atatürk’s leadership. The backgrounding of Atatürk’s role and removal of discourses exalting Atatürk are manifestations of the changing balance of power at the time of the EU integration drive.

8 The repeal of the citizenship education course
In spite of the revised textbook that introduced some religious discourses to the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course, the ruling AKP decided to repeal the citizenship courses in 2005 (MoNE, 2005). An informant revealed that after the course was abolished, the BoE turned down the EU’s offer to start the implementation of the IPA project in 2005 on the grounds that this was an external rather than a national project:

“The head of the Board of Education rejected it by saying ‘We do not need a course which will be taught as a result of an imposition from outside; we are successfully teaching it as cross-disciplinary subject, we do not do business by incultation from outside’. With this idea, he rejected the project and whatever that would come with the project (Interviewee 5-Curriculum Designer, September 2, 2014).”

However, the removal of the citizenship and human rights education course required governmental support because the BoE sits within the MoNE, under the education minister who is part of the Government. Since the head and members of the BoE board are appointed by a tripartite decree of the prime minister, education minister and president (MoNE, 2012), the removal of the citizenship education courses and the dismissal of the EU’s offer for the IPA project were not simply decisions of the head of the BoE.

Arguably, the demise of citizenship and human rights education was an effect of the dominant ideology in power which considers citizenship education as a way of the adoption of European values. In Turkey, political Islamist circles make a distinction between scientific advances and the moral values of Europe. They tolerate the adoption of scientific and technological elements but are careful to abstain from the adoption of moral values (AKP Program, 2002). At the same time, there was a worsening of Turkey-EU relations following the 2004 Brussels Summit, which took its toll on the citizenship education reform.

9 Discussion
This study reveals that the EU reforms facilitated the ideological shift in the citizenship education curriculum by contributing to changing the balance of power between secular and religious nationalism. Changing government priorities have been shown to influence citizenship education in other contexts. Parker (2004) noted a close association between dominant ideologies and citizenship education in Palestine, Brazil, Israel, the United States and South Africa. Davies & Chong (2016) found that the formation of a Conservative-led government led to less emphasis on human rights and the positive representation of the monarchy in citizenship education in England. Soysal & Wong (2007) found that after the socialists came to power in France, ‘ample space is devoted to substantiate and prescribe plurality and tolerance as corrective measures to racism and dis-criminalisation’ (p. 83). In South Korea, after the transition to a democratic system, citizenship education textbooks began to
mention women, workers, immigrants/refugees, indigenous peoples and sexual minorities (Moon, 2013a).

The present study challenges the main argument of previous studies that there is a cross-national transition from national to post-nationalist forms of citizenship education (e.g. Bromley, 2009; Meyer, Bromley, & Ramirez, 2010; Moon, 2013; Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell, 2009; Ramirez, Suarez, & Meyer, 2007; Rauner, 1999; Soysal & Schissler, 2004). Unlike these studies, we found that Turkish citizenship education curriculum remained essentially national. References to human rights, diversity and global issues were largely tokenistic since they were evoked only in the context of other countries not Turkey itself.

In this respect, this study shows that curriculum change cannot be explained without taking into consideration the local and national influence (e.g. Cardenas, 2005; Keating, 2009a; Levinson, 2004, 2005; Morris et al., 1997; Ortloff, 2005). The ways in which human rights were instrumentalised in the power struggle showed that the gatekeepers of the citizenship education curriculum in Turkey were still nationalist actors in the given period. Even though these gatekeepers had been exposed to transnational educational discourses, their aim was to serve their group interest in the ongoing power struggle. In fact, the first (pre-AKP) textbooks contained militarist and exclusionary discourses targeting the Kurdish people and religious nationalists. What was called human rights education in Turkey had little in common with international standards. In this sense, this study found that the international agencies had a limited and largely symbolic impact, while the underlying discourses kept favouring those in power.

10 Conclusion
Since the government-controlled curriculum development system in Turkey reflects the dominant ideologies in power, it is not surprising to record the rise and fall of the citizenship and human rights education course. The pre-AKP part of the post-Helsinki era saw a series of preparatory efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CoE, but no tangible change in the militarised curriculum of the course. Under AKP rule, the transition of power from secular nationalism to political Islamism created opportunities for the curriculum reform. Since the AKP government wished to replace militaristic discourses in education, it reinforced a reform rhetoric that the EU membership requires to re-design the curriculum.

Since the AKP’s ideology of political Islamism disputed the discourses of secular nationalism and European norms and values, the MoNE repealed the citizenship education courses and abandoned the reform agenda in 2005. Under AKP rule, even though the BoE was interested in removing militarist perspectives from the citizenship education curriculum, it was reluctant to introduce democratic citizenship education. The evolution of citizenship education went in parallel with the changing configuration of the balance of power, which left its discursive traces in the citizenship education curriculum.

In 2010, the MoNE introduced a new course, named Citizenship and Democracy Education (MoNE, 2010). Çayır’s (2011) research highlighted that the new course was ‘still based on Turkishness with a single language and a single culture’ (p. 27). This course too was repealed 2 years later with the announcement of a new timetable for middle schools (MoNE, 2012a). The 2012 timetable increased the weekly course hours of middle schools to 36, but did not include a citizenship course. It preserved the compulsory religious education course (two hours per week) besides introducing three new Islamic education courses (each one two hours per week). From 2012 onwards, eighth-grade students have been enabled to take an unprecedented eight-hours Islamic education courses per week out of 36 total weekly hours. It appears that the AKP government sacrificed citizenship education to make more room for Islamic education courses.

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Endnotes

1 The first Citizenship and Human Rights Education textbook, based on the programme of study of the course, was first published in 1999. Previous textbooks were based on the revised programme of study of Citizenship Studies course.

2 To avoid repetition, the excerpts from the textbooks are cited with only a page number.