Chapter Title: Researching spaces of violence through family

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Abstract
This chapter uses families’ spatial practices as a lens for exploring violence. Geographical understandings of violence and conflict often focus on international terrorism and domestic governance. This can create situations where certain contexts, often in the global South, are apprehended solely as spaces of death, destruction and demise. Far less attention is paid to the experiential and everyday dimensions of violence or the context that co-constitutes it. This chapter uses the family as a lens for exploring violence and lived experience. While the family can be a site of gendered and patriarchal violence, this chapter argues that family relations need to be understood in more complex ways. In particular, geographical practices of family can do other kinds of work that enable people to endure and resist violence and conflict. These arguments are given substance through a detailed exploration of Palestinians living through, resisting and enduring Israeli settler-colonial violence.

Key words

Introduction
In the past 15 years, there has been a significant increase in the amount of geographical scholarship that has sought to understand spaces and practices of violence and conflict (e.g. Flint 2003, Gregory & Pred 2007). The temporality of this interest roughly coincides with the 2001 September 11th attacks in the US and the subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. As Pain (2014: 532) has recently noted,

[G]eographers’ emphasis has been on the impacts of the threat and fear of global terrorism on international relations and domestic governance, including the state terrorism that some western governments perpetrate or support as part of their response. There is relatively little empirical attention to the experiential, emotional and everyday dimensions of global terrorism.

Pain’s work demonstrates how geographical studies of violence and conflict might learn much from engaging with longer standing feminist scholarship on other kinds of harm, such as domestic violence, or the structural violence embedded in labour markets. This chapter follows her lead by asking how
studying the family might open up new understandings of violence and conflict. The case study of Palestine is examined, since it is an enduring site of colonial violence and conflict. As the chapter will argue, exploring family relationships and spaces amidst violent conflict and colonialism foregrounds practices of endurance and resistance, which in turn move beyond understandings of families as only forms of hetero-patriarchal violence.

Geography and family
After Valentine’s (2008) call for geographies of families that don’t subsume family within concepts such as social reproduction and care, there have been a growing number of studies exploring how families are enmeshed in spacings of transnational migration (e.g. Pratt 2012), home (e.g. Harker 2010, Stenning et al 2010), the (post)colonial nation-state (e.g. Oswin 2010), law and borders (e.g. Martin 2012), while being part of a broader array of intimate relations and spaces (e.g. Valentine et al 2012, Sharma 2012). This work provides a much-needed corrective to the prioritization of, and focus on, individual subjects and processes of individuation that has characterized much social science scholarship in recent decades.

Valentine (2008: 2099) argues that the historical neglect of families as an object of geographical study can be tied, in part, to a feminist and queer politics of rejection of a particular type of family: ‘traditional patriarchal and heteronormative models of “the family”’. The reasons for this rejection are clear: such normative family ideals, and the practices they promote, have had and continue to have devastating effects. For example, Oswin’s (2010, 2014) research in Singapore demonstrates how a very powerful statist production of a heteronormative nuclear family ideal, in part through the residential space of the apartment block, creates forms of exclusion that impact on a whole range of non-heteronormative, ‘queered’ subjects, (many of which might otherwise be thought about as families, e.g. single parents with children, queer couples). In the context of the US, Cowen & Gilbert (2007) have shown how a particular normative family discourse, put to work in state policy making, constructs a ‘national family’ that is highly exclusionary of both ‘foreign’ others and ‘deviants’ within the national ‘family’ (see also Martin, 2012). These studies give credence to suspicions of ‘the family’ as a politically conservative form of collective subjectivity. Consequently, critique of family often becomes a point of departure for imagining an expanded sphere of intimate relations beyond the family, which might include same-sex intimacies and personal relationships such as friendships and communities (see Valentine 2008 for further elaboration).

Geographies that critique the patriarchal, hetero-normative family do important political work, exposing the means through which various forms of oppression and exclusion are rooted in and routed through the family (both as it is practiced and as a discursive construction). However, studies that only critique the family as a geographically specific heteronormative ideal overlook other political registers through which other types of families might be critically encountered. This chapter will develop this argument by examining a range of recent studies of Palestinian families, focusing mainly on those living in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories. As will be shown later, attending to this specific context reveals a much more messy and complex array of families and family politics. However, it is first necessary to provide some background on how this context is usually understood in existing geographical literatures.

Geopolitics of Palestine
Palestine is a site of longstanding settler-colonial violence and conflict. Settler-colonization by Israel began in 1948, and continues to this day. The types of violence enacted during this period have varied, from forms of disciplinary power and biopolitical control to periods of intensified military violence where Israeli sovereign power asserts itself (Gordon 2008). The spatiality of this violence has largely been apprehended and analysed through a critical geopolitical frame. Geopolitical analyses of Palestine have tended to focus on two themes, the geographies of (1) territory and borders and (2) power/knowledge.

Scholarship on territory and borders has traced the shifting production of different territories and boundaries that constitute Palestine and Israel (e.g. Falah 2003, Newman 2002). Some of this work has also produced a series of statements about state formation that seek to address politicians, negotiators and diplomats, very much in the mould of classical geopolitics (Falah 1996). More recent work on territory has been attentive to the ways in which the everyday practices (particularly those of the Israeli Occupation) have produced Palestinian territories. Such work includes studies of land seizure and displacement (e.g. Falah 2003), the destruction of Palestinian cities and built environment (e.g. Falah 1996, Graham 2004), the construction of Israeli settlement-colonies in the Occupied Territories (e.g. Weizman 2007) and the role surveillance and mobility play in striating these territories (e.g. Zureik 2001, Weizman 2007, Harker 2009). Similar studies have been conducted in Palestinian spaces beyond the Occupied Territories (e.g. Ramadan 2009). This work on territories and borders has helped to explain the ways in which Palestinian spaces (national, municipal) are produced, and the constitutive role played in these productions by different Israeli actors, and depending on the context, other Arab actors too. Such work has generated more general insights about how particular states are performed and how boundaries are produced, reproduced and disrupted.

Geopolitical work on Palestinian territories has also been instrumental in unpacking the contorted topologies of power/knowledge embodied in such spatial formations. This second thematic includes studies that have explored the discursive construction of both Palestine (e.g. Gregory 2004, Gordon 2008), and Palestinians (Ramadan 2009, Bhungalia 2010), and how these interconnected discursive constructions are entangled with a range of material practices that have devastating consequences for the spaces and bodies that they enrol and act upon (e.g. the destruction of Palestinian built environment). Such studies expand the category of ‘political’ actors beyond statesman and militants to include architects, planners and economists (Weizman 2007). Bhungalia (2010) also shows how the geopolitical scriptings employed by the Israeli military and politicians exclude Palestinian ‘terrorists’ and ‘civilians’ from the realm of politics (and political actors).
By recentering the analytic gaze from up on high to within embodied individuals, this group of studies has produced more variegated understandings of spatialized power in the Occupied Territories. However, politics and violence, whether military, bureaucratic or state-based, remain the common basis for geopolitical studies of Palestine. This is hardly surprising, given the intense vulnerabilities many Palestinians experience while living in (and moving between) the Occupied Territories, the state of Israel and the manifold spaces of exile. It would be negligent and naïve to ignore such relations, and the analyses mentioned help to unpack such violence. However, an unintended consequence of this relatively consistent analytical focus is that Palestine becomes envisioned and ‘known’ as a place of politics, conflict and violence. While many individual studies do move beyond these foci, the reiteration of particular tropes at collective level creates a stereotype.

This is an epistemological critique, but it also has ontological implications. As critical geopolitics has clearly shown, particular representations of space actively participate in socio-material ‘fabrications’ that have devastating consequences (Gregory 2004). In the context of Palestine, epistemologies of politics and violence participate in the re-creation of spaces where Palestinians often have little agency (Bhungalia 2010). Weizman’s (2007) study of Israel’s Occupation provides the clearest example of this problem. While the Israeli Occupation is the explicit focus of his work, the spaces in which Weizman’s analysis moves are nevertheless Palestinian (too). However, the occupied are a derivative, of both the occupation and of Weizman’s analysis. Put differently, in exploring how Israel creates a land hollowed out of its Palestinian inhabitants, Weizman does much the same thing himself. His analysis of the ontology of occupation bleeds into and comes to define an epistemology of Palestinian life.

Weizman’s work demonstrates how an ontological axiom of uneven power relations between Palestinians and their various ‘others’ (Israeli, Lebanese, Jordanian, etc), and the multiple vulnerabilities Palestinians experience as a consequence, is translated into an epistemological axiom that dictates Palestinians can only be apprehended through politics and violence (and frequently as largely passive victims to such processes). This tacit consensus, which subsists in Geography because of the sheer number of geopolitical studies of Palestine, can unintentionally reinforce inequitable power relations at a discursive level, and create one-dimensional representations of Palestine and Palestinians. This is problematic not only because it leads to the production of stereotypes (Palestinian children as victim of occupation, or on the other side of the same coin, as hero of resistance), but also because it obscures a whole series of other social performances and time-spaces.

This problem extends beyond the context of Palestine too. Despite the many intricate differences in various critical geopolitical approaches, their analysis of the geographical basis of politics across a series of spatial and temporal extents are largely characterized by a focus on violence. This often leads to accounts of death, destruction and demise, and sculpts representations of place that offer little sense of forms of endurance and lives lived beyond the purview of state
violence. There is nothing wrong with this at the level of individual studies. It is important to understand how such violence happens. But collectively, as a body of knowledge, this is problematic. Through the repetition of tropes of violence and politics, geopolitical scholarship collectively produces – albeit unintentionally and unknowingly – stereotypical representations of place. These stereotypes cast certain places as violent (often feeding into Orientalist discourses when those places are in Southern contexts). Consequently, geopolitical studies are one of many forms of Western scholarship in which ‘different places come to stand in, stereotypically, for certain kinds of events or processes’ (Robinson 2003: 279).

Decentring geopolitics

How can this problem be addressed? To counteract the tendency towards stereotypical representations of place, Robinson (2003: 279) suggests that what is needed instead is a method for ‘learning from the complex and rich experiences and scholarship of different places’. What this means in practice is a broadening of the epistemological palette, which works at the limits of and goes beyond geopolitics. This is not a rejection of geopolitics as a mode of analysis, but rather an attempt to think about violence in different ways. This necessarily entails a more modest geopolitics, situated within an expanded field of intellectual and political endeavours concerned with power-infused spaces and spacings. Such an approach does not ignore or downplay the role of violence and particular types of political process in shaping various places and lives throughout the world. Rather, it endeavours to situate and link such processes within a broader array of geographies.

In the context of Palestine, Taraki (2006) makes a similar argument for more sustained work in the social and cultural realm that is nevertheless contextualized within the ongoing Israeli occupation.

The political reality must be the basic backdrop against which we examine the routines of life and the small dramas of daily life. (Taraki 2006: xii)

A preoccupation with Palestinian political economy and political institutions has precluded a serious study of social and cultural issues. (Ibid: xxvii)

This chapter takes up Taraki’s challenge by using the family as a theoretical frame to understand different practices of violence, resistance and endurance. Studying family relations and practices can offer a range of important insights into social-spatial processes of violence and power relations that animate, inter alia, nationalisms, colonialisms and economic change (Joseph & Rieker 2008). This remains true even as family compositions and practices in certain places have changed significantly in recent decades.

Political geographies of Palestinian families

Palestinian families are a heterogeneous analytical phenomena. Johnson & Abu Nahleh (2004) argue that despite commonly held assumptions about the
importance of family in Palestinian society, there is actually little scholarly research on the topic. The reasons for this, they suggest, are tied to the Palestinian condition after the Palestinian *nakba* (catastrophe) in 1948, when Mandatory Palestine was wiped off the map through the creation of the State of Israel, and an estimated 700,000 Palestinians became refugees. The enforced dispersion of Palestinian families into a variety of different contexts subsequently constituted a diversity of family practices, relations and spacings. This increasing heterogeneity became hard to subsume under the singular analytical framework of the Palestinian family (Johnson & Abu Nahleh 2004).

Furthermore, after 1948 there was no longer a ‘Palestine’ (i.e. a recognized nation-state) to anchor studies of Palestinian families. Other Arab nation-states often discouraged research on the Palestinian communities within their midst, (likely because such research would expose the severe neglect of Palestinian refugees and reflect poorly on the host nation). The research that was done with Palestinian communities overwhelmingly focused on historical and political narratives as part of a broader Palestinian nationalist politics (Johnson & Abu Nahleh 2004). Nevertheless in recent years this lack of scholarly interest has begun to be addressed, in large part by the Arab Families Working Group. Since 2001, researchers working under the auspices of this project have traced family relations and formations across Palestinian, Lebanese, Egyptian and transnational space. Much of this work will be drawn upon in what follows.

The Palestinian family is also an ambiguous subject because even when focusing on one spatial context, such as the West Bank, ‘family’ is understood and practiced in a number of different, although interrelated, ways. Family relations and spaces may include ‘aila, the nuclear or ‘small’ family; *hamula*, the extended or ‘big’ family; *qaraba*, or ‘closeness’, which can refer not only to kinship ties, but also fictive kin articulated through class, location, religion, political affiliation (Johnson et al 2009); and *dar/beit*, the household or home (Jean-Klein 2003). As Johnson (2006) notes, these shifting understandings of family are far from uniform within the Occupied Territories, and also differ in spatial and political contexts beyond the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Palestinian families are also Arab families. In other words, they are partially constituted by discourses about (the importance of) the family that span the Arab world, a regional space that in turn is (re)created and modified by the mobility of families and familial discourses. Palestinian and Arab families overlap in a number of different ways, not least through the lives and family practices of Palestinians living in a number of Arab states (usually as refugees). However, Palestinian families are differentiated from other Arab families through their various ties to the Palestinian nakba (catastrophe) and dispossession that began in 1948. Thinking about the ways in which Palestinian families are more broadly Arab families opens up a series of intellectual resources, albeit ones that must be carefully modified to the specific context in which they are being used. For example, Joseph & Rieker (2008: 3) argue that it is vital to understand Arab families in relation to states, and particularly ‘the failure of Arab state-building projects and the contradictory deployment of family structures, within those processes, in the crises of modernity’. This statement holds true for Palestinian families. However, in contrast to other ‘Arab’ families, most Palestinian families...
have been at the behest of state forms that are not their own, whether this is the British, Israeli and United Nations regimes in Mandatory Palestine and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, or other Arab governments in spaces of exile (i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, etc). To a great extent this remains the case in the present day Occupied Territories, since Palestinian Authority governance has been severely limited by Israel’s continued colonial sovereignty.

Given the variety of different Palestinian family relations and spaces found in different nation-state contexts, this chapter focuses mainly on Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. Within this particular context, there are three family geographies that I want to explore because of the ways in which they intersect forms of colonial violence. I outline these geographies through the concepts of discursive objectification, resistance and endurance. These political geographic practices are closely interrelated and hard to separate empirically. However, the conceptual separation of these practices illustrates different ways in which Palestinian families have been politically entangled and the ways in which familial geographies constitute, resist and/or endure heightened experiences of vulnerability due to colonization, war and violence.

Discursive objectification
The politics of discursive objectification refers here to the ways in which a discursive object – the Palestinian family – is produced, reproduced and circulates within and beyond the Occupied Territories. This object, characterized as patriarchal and heteronormative, encompasses both the ‘aila (nuclear family) and hamula (big family, clan), although it is often the latter that is emphasized. Interpreted as the benign foundation for society or contrastingly, a repressive ‘prison house’ (Joseph & Reiker 2008), this object is far from natural. Rather, it is rooted in and routed through a particular historical geographical production that spans governance, data production, law, education, media, and everyday life.

Johnson & Moors (2004) suggest that the family has been a key target for different governmental projects in Palestine, whether colonial or national. The role of the hamula has been particularly important in this regard. An important part of Ottoman era economic and social life in the Levant, hamula identification was reinforced and reinvigorated between 1948 and 1967 by the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes that controlled the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively, as a means of suppressing Palestinian nationalism (Hilal 2006). Israel had a similar goal in mind when it intensified these practices following its invasion of what became the Occupied Territories in 1967. The Village League system (1978-1987), which invested limited forms of power in male heads of particular hamula, was the most visible manifestation of this broader aim (Gordon 2008). Subsequently, when discussing family reunification as part of broader negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israeli officials constructed the Palestinian family as nuclear, in contrast to a Palestinian focus on the hamula (Zureik 2001: 219). Following the Oslo Accords, the then newly established Palestinian Authority used the hamula as a means of seeking legitimacy to govern, through the establishment of a presidential office for clan affairs (Johnson and Moors 2004). However, Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories remained largely under the authority of Israeli Occupation. During
the second Palestinian intifada (uprising), Israel intensified a different form of family-focused colonial governance: home demolitions, deportations and collective punishment all based on family relations (Joseph & Reiker 2008: 2).

Closely connected with governmental projects, statistical data, particularly census data, have been one of the key means through which the Palestinian family has been discursively constructed by colonial and other forms of governance. As Reiker et al (2004) note, methods of data collection have been closely tied to colonial and modernizing projects since the British Mandate. Since 1948, the Palestinian family has increasingly been framed as a threat: a demographic ‘timebomb’. Such data-driven discourses, which began in Israel and Jordan, were initially echoed by the head of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics when this institution was created in 1995 (Reiker et al 2004: 189). While this discourse disappeared within the Occupied Territories during the second intifada, as the survival of a Palestinian national polity once again became an existential issue (Ibid), it may yet be making a resurgence following the (relative) lull in militaristic forms of violence (see Taraki 2008).

Data collection, and its roots in particular colonial and modernist epistemes, has also been partially responsible for the discursive elision of family with household. Since the Ottoman era, households rather than families have been enumerated in censuses and surveys (Reiker et al 2004: 192-3). This practice, continued by the British, identified a male ‘head of household’ to enumerate household members, and thus reiterated and reinforced patriarchal social relations. Furthermore, the focus on household composition ensured that wider notions of family and kinship were lost in data sets. ‘Families’ were counted, measured, profiled and thus produced in ways disconnected from their everyday, lived realities, but closely connected with a more geographically extensive modern (colonial) nuclear family ideal (Ibid: 195-6).

Law and education have also played their part. The relations between law and family in the Occupied Territories are complex and cannot be adequately outlined here (see Johnson & Moors 2004). However, it is worth briefly noting that Shari’a law, while not producing the nuclear family itself, does provide a strong material form to the conjugal tie, since women are entitled to a ‘house’ (room) of their own when married (Reiker et al 2004: 201). Education, closely intertwined with colonial, national and modernisation projects that have taken place in the Occupied Territories, has also played its part in the construction of the Palestinian family. For example, Ibrahim et al (2004) note that after Israel invaded the Occupied Territories, (Palestinian) nationalist sentiment in textbooks was quite literally translated into familial sentiment: “Our unity will frighten the enemy” was replaced by “Our success will please our parents” (Ibid: 77). After 1948, education became a form of highly desirable social capital, and in some contexts the family became a key enabler of education, as older siblings would work to support the education of younger siblings.

Moors (2004) notes that discursive constructions of a homogenous Palestinian family are in tension with divergent everyday practices of different family relations, forms and practices. Nevertheless, the Palestinian family as discursive
object is also co-constituted through everyday practices, including a range of symbols, appearances and styles of dress. Such everyday performances of family have become closely connected with mass media discourses of family. This sphere of discursive production spans national, regional and global space, and is one of the ways in which ideas of the ‘Arab family’ are circulated (El Shakry & Moors 2004). While different discourses of family may be discerned within various forms of media, El Shakry & Moors (2004) suggest that the full complexity of these relations has yet to be fully examined.

In summary, the Palestinian family is a discursive object that has been constituted in a variety of different and often interconnected ways. While the Palestinian family as a patriarchal heterosexual norm is often interpreted through Orientalist tropes of tradition, timelessness and backwardness – all of which promote a certain kind of naturalism – it is a thoroughly contemporary production, firmly routed through and rooted in colonial violence. The family as discursive object works as a frame, or way in which a particular world is made known. Examining the production of this frame exposes the ways in which ‘the Palestinian family’ is enmeshed in patriarchal, state and colonial forms of power and violence, and thus offers a platform for (political) opposition to such family practices and discourses as forms of violence in themselves. However, to only envision Palestinian families through this frame ignores practices through which Palestinian families have enacted political resistance or provided the basis for other forms of response to colonialism and violence.

Resistance
While the Palestinian family as a discursive object is one that has been iteratively produced by a range of colonial and modernization projects, actual family practices have often been a means of responding to prolonged crises (Sayigh 1981). In other words, family practices have enabled and enacted forms of anti-colonial and anti-patriarchal resistance. Particularly in relation to Israeli colonisation, some commentators suggest that Palestinian families have been the central source of Palestinian survival and national identity (Johnson & Abu Nahleh 2004: 308). Since 1948, most Palestinian families have lived in nation-state contexts where they have no formal political representation. In such circumstances, the family has become a key protector and form of social authority (Giacaman & Johnson 1989). This remains the case even in the present day Occupied Territories, where the Palestinian Authority wields ‘prosthetic sovereignty’ only (Weizman 2007). The Palestinian family must therefore be thought about not only as a form of oppression, but also, simultaneously, a form of solidarity. This becomes most easily discernible when focusing on the two most explicitly visible moments of anti-colonial resistance in the Occupied Territories, the two intifadas (uprisings).

During the first Palestinian intifada, a broad based and largely non-violent uprising that began in 1987, familial responsibilities such as nurture, defence and assistance were extended to the entire community (Giacaman & Johnson 1989). For example, many women sought to protect young men from beatings by Israeli soldiers, through the claim ‘he is my son’ (Ibid.: 161), regardless of kinship affiliation. This transformation involved the expansion and enlargement
of existing roles and spaces – particularly women’s roles in relation to the space of home – rather than creating new social-spatial subjects altogether. As family relations and spaces became a key platform for practices of political resistance, relations within families changed, for example restrictions on women’s movement relaxed. Popular committees, the purportedly ‘new’ political forms through which much of the anti-colonial resistance was organised, were framed by both external and internal discourses as ‘democratic’, in opposition to the ‘traditional’ (and by extension repressive) kinship sociality of the Palestinian family. However, these committees in fact emerged from, overlapped with and often refreshed and remade existing familial relations (Jean-Klein 2003). In particular, the first intifada transformed intergenerational relations, as young men usurped the power of their father, and mothering as maternal sacrifice was used to demand equal rights for women (see Johnson & Abu Nahleh 2004: 313-6 for fuller discussion).

The second Palestinian intifada, a more militarized uprising beginning in 2000, was conducted by a small subset of the population - groups of armed young men. This second uprising created a crisis in masculinity that affected familial relations (as a new generation of young men supplanted the authority of older men who had participated in the first intifada), and caused various forms of stress at the level of the household and the community. However, many families were largely audience to, rather than participant in, this anti-colonial struggle. Johnson et al’s (2009) study of weddings illustrates the different roles families played in the first and second intifadas. They note that while marriages were simple and inexpensive during the first uprising, reflecting a broader culture of austerity that all Palestinians participated in, ceremonies during the second uprising involved much more conspicuous consumption. Reflecting the lack of popular engagement in the second intifada, violence was seen as an external threat to the ceremonies and ‘ordinary life’ more generally (see also Kelly 2008). Hence in the context of the second intifada, particular types of familial practices, such as getting married, became a form of resistance to violence. Unlike the first intifada, this was not only resistance to colonial violence, but also to the militarized anti-colonial violence practiced in response to the Israeli Occupation. Jad (2009) nevertheless notes that the rise of group weddings during the second intifada was a means through which the dominant Palestinian political parties in the Occupied Territories promoted factional politics. She also notes that group weddings (re)produced socially conservative beliefs and practices, particularly with regards to gender dynamics within families.

In addition to family as a mode of resistance during the intifadas in the Occupied Territories, it is also useful to briefly examine family as a form of resistance in spaces of exile and refuge. Kuttab (2004: 154) notes that Palestinian refugees were often families (unlike migrants who tend to be individuals), and kinship groups often settled together in exile. While other Palestinian spaces and institutions of belonging and identity were destroyed in 1948, the family was a durable and portable relational form; hence Sayigh (1981) asserts that the Palestinian family is a response to a crisis, not a cultural remnant. The expansion of family relations, by marrying into host communities, has been a means of surviving exile (Kuttab 2004). Family relations have also enabled ‘return’ to the
spaces of Mandatory Palestine, now Israel, through marriage (Ibid) or prior to 2000, family reunification (Zureik 2001). While such processes have not necessarily challenged the heteronormative patriarchal family – Kuttab (2004) suggests that women remain the ‘shock absorbers’ within refugee families – they have been a means through which colonialism and inhospitable state regimes have been resisted.

In each of these contexts (i.e. first intifada, second intifada, refuge), family relations and practices have been an important means through which war, colonial oppression and exile have been resisted by Palestinians. Furthermore, in each context, families as forms of resistance have different relations with the patriarchal heteronormative family ideal. As Jean-Klein (2003) illustrates, during the first intifada popular committees, enabled by family relations and spaces, transformed those families by challenging some patriarchal relationships and the practices associated with them. In the contexts of refugee studied by Kuttab (2004), changing family compositions did not transform gender relations within families. In the second intifada, some family practices that resisted violence (re)produced socially conservative beliefs and practices with regards to gender relations within families (Jad 2009). Palestinian families are thus potent forms of political resistance in each of these three contexts, but the relationship between family and violence differs in each instance. Taken together, these family practices therefore offer an alternative frame through which Palestinian families might be known, which disrupts the discursive objectification (or framing) of the Palestinian family described earlier. The next section also explores family practices that disrupt the frame of the Palestinian family, albeit through a different means of being political.

Endurance
Studies of getting married during the second intifada, which focus on one way in which Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have attempted to maintain an ‘ordinary’ life amidst extra-ordinary conditions (Kelly 2008, Johnson et al 2009), reveal a third form of political practice that is not entirely subsumed within either discursive productions of the Palestinian family or various enactments of resistance to colonial and state power. This type of political practice is termed endurance. Endurance describes practices of persistence and adaptation through which people who experience multiple forms of violence create alternative worlds for themselves (Allen 2008, Povinelli 2011). Endurance is similar to what Bayat (2010: 19-20) terms ‘the quiet encroachment of the ordinary’, whereby the actions of uncoordinated actors work collectively to enact change in practical and pragmatic ways. This is not a politics of protest, targeted at a perceived external source of power, but a politics of redress that seeks to directly change things on the ground (Ibid). In the context of the Occupied Territories, a politics of endurance is one that currently takes place amidst the Israeli Occupation, but doesn’t take the Occupation, or resistance to the Occupation, as its start or end point (see Harker 2011).

One example of this politics in relation to families is Palestinian men who built Israeli settlement-colonies during the second intifada (Kelly 2008). While such labour contradicted broader Palestinian nationalist politics and forms of anti-
colonial resistance, these men did this work in order to feed their families. While acts such as this may be interpreted as forms of acquiescence to the colonial regime, Kelly (2008) argues that they can be understood as efforts to live an ‘ordinary’ life in conditions of extraordinary violence and economic hardship. Slightly less ambiguous politics of endurance are evident in the practices and spaces of mobility during the second intifada. This includes checkpoint economies through which commerce and public space are articulated despite barriers to movement (Hammami 2004) and journeys around the West Bank that maintain familial relations (Harker 2009). Post-Oslo movement restrictions and the fragmentation of Palestinian space in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which intensified after 2000, also produced new forms of localism that in turn reinvigorated the importance of the spatially co-present family (Johnson 2006). Migration beyond the West Bank provides families with another way of enduring the occupation (Hilal 2006, Harker 2010), even as such migrant practices have historical roots stretching far beyond the Israeli Occupation.

Studies conducted in and around Ramallah (Taraki 2008, Abourahme 2009, Harker 2010) have also highlighted how refiguring the family as nuclear (aila) enables forms of intergenerational endurance through interconnected investments in education, consumption and transnational mobility. While this transformation is decidedly middle class, analogous processes have been reported in refugee camps, where refugees refigure the physical and symbolic spaces of the camp while maintaining the political right to return (Abourahme & Hilal 2009).

These practices of endurance, many of which are familial in motivation or method, expose another response to violence. While they do not constitute an orchestrated or organised politics of protest, they have enabled meaningful forms of change as families deal with the violence of Occupation and war. Practices of endurance enable a reduction in exposure to heightened vulnerability, and in the case of the movement/migration, such political strategies are explicitly geographical. However, these political changes are often unremarkable and unremarked upon because they are ‘ordinary’ (i.e. part of the practice of everyday life), and ‘quiet’ (i.e. emerging from disparate and non-unified sources). Practices of endurance, like resistance, also disrupt the discursive objectification (frame) of the Palestinian family.

Conclusion
The family practices and politics described in this chapter are undoubtedly more complex, nuanced and fragmented than can be summarized. Even the concepts used to describe them (i.e. discursive objectification, resistance and endurance) are inadequate attempts to corral an always excessive plurality of spatial practices for the purposes of analysis. However, these concepts and the discussion they enable, illustrate the diverse ways in which Palestinian families intersect with spaces and practices of colonial violence. While the family may embody colonial violence, family relations also enable Palestinians to endure and resist this violence. Studying family practices not only reveals the diverse geographies of family, but also presents Palestine as more than a space of death, destruction and demise. Families therefore offer the potential for a form of
intellectual engagement that not only generates new understandings of violence and conflict, but also richer representations of place.

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References


Keywords
Family, Palestine, Geopolitics, Colonialism, Global South, Resistance, Endurance