From access to quality? The enactment of school enrolment policy for internal migrant children in urban China

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Declaration

I, Hui Yu, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signature:

Date:
Abstract

In China, internal migrant children’s difficulties accessing schooling in metropolitan areas have been on the government’s policy agenda since 2001. By 2006, a range of policies were in place, designed to facilitate their access to compulsory education. Yet there are still large numbers of migrant children unable to enrol in state schools. While there are myriad studies devoted to the schooling of migrant children, less is known about how the policy framework surrounding their education is developed and enacted. My research aims to fill this gap. Taking a policy sociology approach, I have produced a scholarly analysis of the power relations between the different actors involved in policy enactment, drawing mainly on Bourdieusian, but also Foucauldian, resources. The overall research question is ‘How do different individuals, organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?’ I have examined what happens both outside and inside schools. I have used semi-structured interviews as the main method in order to produce rich, in-depth data. The findings of this research indicate that the migrant children’s schooling policy carries with it the principle of equal access to education. Yet the degree to which that has been realized is questionable. I argue that, through processes of policy enactment, the unequal power relations between the migrant families, schools and the local government have been further reproduced, but in apparently legitimate ways. As a result, both migrant children and the schools that mainly recruit migrant children are marginalised in the urban education system.
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Part I

Chapter 1: Introduction

In this chapter, I will give a brief introduction to the thesis research background and list the thesis research questions. I will also outline the thesis structure at the end of this chapter.

1. Research background

In China, during the last three decades of urbanisation, millions of rural labourers have left their hometowns to work in urban areas. In 2015, nationally there were 168.84 million migrant rural labourers (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016) with 13.67 million migrant children\(^1\) of compulsory education age (Ministry of Education of China, 2016). These internal migrants do not hold household registration (hukou) in the places where they are working and many of them belong to low-income groups. As I will elaborate in detail later (see chapter 2, section 3), without local hukou, these people are not entitled to full citizenship rights in urban areas and their children have encountered many difficulties accessing free compulsory education in urban state schools\(^2\). For example, in state

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\(^1\) In the existing literature, there are different names for the children from the migrant labourer families without the local household registration card: ‘migrant children’ ‘immigrant children’ ‘children from migrant workers’ families’ or ‘floating children. Although using different names, scholars actually refer to the same group of children. In this thesis, I will use ‘migrant children’.

\(^2\) The ‘state school’ (公办学校) is the fully government-funded school, which does not charge for tuition fees. Yet the private-funded school (私立学校 or 民办学校)
primary/secondary school recruitment, the schools give first priority to children with a local household registration card. Therefore, in some big cities with huge migrant populations, it is very hard for migrant children to enrol in state schools, since there is a shortage of places once the schools have recruited local students. At the same time, most migrant parents cannot afford to send their children to private schools, which have relatively higher costs. As a result, in the late 1990s when a large number of migrant children first came to big cities, many of them were unable to enrol in urban schools. For example, in Shanghai in 1997 there were 1054 migrant children of compulsory education age but only 641 (60.8%) of them finally enrolled in local schools. In the late 90s and early 00s with the changes in central and local government policies described below (chapter 6), the percentage and number of migrant children enrolling in urban state schools was increasing. In recent years, 80% of migrant children are enrolled in state schools nationwide (Table 11, chapter 9, section 2). However, in global metropolises like Beijing and Shanghai, there are still a large number of migrant children who are unable to enrol in urban state schools. Furthermore, in these cities since 2013, the local government has started to establish strict state school enrolment criteria for migrant children, producing increasing hardship in their school enrolment. What can be identified in the development of the government policies is a U-shaped

does charge. In spite of their different funding sources, both state school and private school follow the national curriculum and are under the direct supervision of the local government municipality of education.
curve of responses, from the strict criteria at the beginning of the period discussed (1996-2001) to the looser criteria in the middle period (2001-2014) and to the recent return of strict criteria (2014-).

2. Research questions

In this thesis, my data collection and analysis focus on the following question: **How do different individuals, organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?** Based on this research question, I will explore the experience of different actors involved in the policy, including their interrelationship, negotiation, conflict or struggle. I will also examine how their interpretation and enactment of the policy is shaped by political, economic, social-cultural and historical factors.

Putting the research question into the specific context of Beijing and Shanghai and applying it to the empirical data, two further sub-questions have arisen: 1. **how has the migrant children school enrolment policy developed and under what conditions?** 2. **what kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?** The data analysis in this thesis is organized to address the two sub-questions and the overall question.

3. Structure of the thesis

The twelve thesis chapters are arranged as four parts:

*Part I* presents the research background, context, review of existing
literature and theoretical resources, and methods I have used in this thesis. *Chapter 1* gives a brief introduction to the issue of Chinese internal migrant children’s schooling. It also lists the thesis research questions as well as the thesis structure. *Chapter 2* gives an overview of the situation of migrant rural labourers and their children, the urban schooling system, the household registration (hukou) system and migrant children’s academic performance as the context of this research. *Chapter 3* reviews the existing literature on migrant children’s schooling and policy in China and identifies the thesis research questions as contributing to filling some of the gaps in existing research. In order to address the research questions, I have adopted some theoretical resources from various authors (Bourdieuian, Foucauldian, and writers on ‘policy as a temporary consensus between groups’) and integrated them into a theoretical framework following a policy sociology approach (*Chapter 4*). *Chapter 5* summarises the qualitative research approach and methods I have used, including the sources of data, sampling strategies, my relationships with respondents, the data analysis method, ethical issues, and the limitations.

*Part II* presents the first cluster of my findings, which is organized around the question: **how has the migrant children school enrolment policy developed and under what conditions?** In this part, I set the national and local governments at the centre of my analysis of the policy network, which contains government, schools, teachers, and migrant and local parents and children. I start with a review of the policy developments at
central and local levels since 1996, revealing the fluctuating nature of the policy, which has transferred from a hard beginning for migrant children’s state school enrolment to an easier situation and then returning to a hard situation in recent years (*Chapter 6*). Following the big picture I have drawn in chapter 6, *Chapter 7* focuses on the recent policy changes after 2013. The Bourdieusian concept of ‘cross-field effects’ is used to explore how migrant children schooling policy is affected by politics, the economy and migrant population policies. The discussion of the inter-field relationships in chapter 7 provides a concrete foundation for *Chapter 8*, which looks deeply into the educational field regarding the recent policy change. Adopting a Foucauldian-influenced ‘policy cycle’ framework, chapter 8 explores how the new state school enrolment policy is established and identifies the growth of a new policy discourse concerning education: ‘education as social welfare’.

*Part III* presents the second cluster of my findings, which is organized around the question: **what kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?** In this part, schools become the centre of analysis of the policy network, which contains state schools, unregistered informal private schools, quasi-state schools, city and district municipalities of education, school teachers, migrant and local parents and children. I start with the review of the historical development and current situation of state schools, unregistered informal private (UIP) schools and licensed private schools
(quasi-state school), as well as their roles in recruiting migrant children
(Chapter 9). Chapter 9 provides the following two chapters with concrete
background. Chapter 10 focuses on the state school, specifically the
migrant majority state school, which is currently the predominant
mainstream schooling channel for migrant children. The core question in
this chapter is: what kind of relationships do migrant parents and children
have with teachers and local children? And how do these relationships
shape migrant children’s study and social inclusion? This chapter adopts
the Bourdieusian concepts of field, habitus and capital to explore the
interactions and relationships between migrant parents/children and
teachers and local children. In Chapter 11, my focus shifts to the other main
schooling channel for migrant children (mainly in Shanghai), which I call an
‘interim quasi-state school system’. My analytical focus in this chapter is:
what kind of education are migrant children receiving in these schools?

Part IV contains only one chapter (Chapter 12), presenting the
concluding thoughts of this thesis. This chapter summarises the empirical
findings of the thesis. It also discusses the principles of social justice
guiding the policy enactment and explores the structuring and restructuring
and reproduction of power relations in the policy enactment process. Finally,
it discusses the strategies for progressive changes, towards an objective
of attaining quality of condition.
Chapter 2: Context

In this chapter, I will firstly give a brief introduction to migrant rural labourers and their children, including a discussion of who they are and their social-economic conditions. I then move on to introduce the Chinese schooling system (compulsory education stage 6-15 years), outlining the legal aspects of compulsory education, the exam-orientated tradition and the hierarchy of schools, as well as the parents’ role in schooling in urban areas. I will also introduce the institutional barrier to migrant children’s school access, which is the household registration (hukou) system. Following the above background information, I then discuss the migrant children’s academic performance in terms of their test scores.

1. Migrant rural labourers and their children

1.1 Who are migrant rural labourers?

This section introduces social classification in China and the migrant’s position in Chinese society. Since the 1990s, researchers have explored the condition of social stratification nationwide (Peking University, 1990; Li and Wang, 1992; Li, 1993; Li, 1995; Lu, 2002). Among them, the most established and influential study to date is a nationwide investigative report published in 2002 (Lu, 2002). It outlines ten occupational categories, which are then classified into five social classes. The categorisation of social class was based on four factors, namely occupation and the
organisational\textsuperscript{1}, economic and cultural resources people have. Figure 1 shows the relationships of the ten occupational categories and the five social classes. Although that research was done 15 years ago and the description was based on a nationwide analysis, it still resonates with my fieldwork data collected from Beijing and Shanghai. I acknowledge that Figure 1 presents a convincing version of the migrant rural labourer’s class position in contemporary Chinese society. Yet it is important to note that while Lu categorizes social class by examining multiple indicators, he takes occupation as a main indicator. As a result, his visualization of the relative positions of different social classes in the social space is occupation-based. While acknowledging the contributions of Lu’s work, I do not follow his analytical approach. Adopting the Bourdieusian conceptualization of social class, my study examines the cultural, economic and social aspects of the migrant families’ life condition with a focus on the cultural and lifestyle aspects (see chapter 10 for details).

Figure 1: five social classes and ten occupational categories in China (Lu, 2002: 9)

\textsuperscript{1} In the Chinese context, the organisational resource refers to the political and/or social resources derived from the political and bureaucrat system, or broadly, from the state sector. Those who work in government departments or as state entrepreneurs tend to find it easier to access the organisational resource than people working in the private sector (see Lu, 2002).
In Figure 1, some important points need to be explained. First, while the
five classes/levels on the left side follow a descending sequence, the ten occupational categories on the right side do not necessarily follow a descending sequence. For example, being an owner of a private company (third from the top) or a professional (fourth from the top), one can both be in either upper, middle-upper or middle-middle level, depending on the exact occupation and the organisational, economic and cultural resources of that person. In other words, there is not a superior or inferior sequence between a private company owner and a professional. The same can be said of the service sector employees (seventh), industrial labourer (eighth) and the agricultural labourer (ninth). Second, within the Chinese context, the ‘bottom level class’, ‘middle-lower class’ and the bottom of the ‘middle-middle class’ resonate with the concept of ‘working-class’ in the Western context. The reason is that the three classes in China cover the main manual labourer occupation categories such as service sector employees, industrial labourer and agricultural labourer (which accounts for the vast majority of the country’s population). Accordingly, most of the migrants I have interviewed can be categorised into these three classes, as I will elaborate in the next paragraph. Finally, there is a variety of social-economic conditions within in each occupational category. That is to say, the people in the same occupational category can be classified into different social classes, depending on their occupation, income, cultural and organisational resources. For example, engaging in industrial labourer occupations, A is a technician with a professional certificate and works full-
time in a big state-owned company with a good income, while B is a low-skilled worker without a professional certificate and relevant experience, undertaking occasional work for several small private factories with low pay. Their social-economic situations can be very different. As a result, A may be considered as belonging to the middle-lower class, while B may be considered as belonging to the bottom class. Such diversity also applies to the migrant labourer group, as I will elaborate below.

However, as for the question of to which occupational category and class migrant rural labours belong, there is not a clear, unified and official definition. The term ‘internal migrant population’ refers to those who migrate from one place to another and do not hold the household registration (hukou) cards in their destination. The government, scholars, journalists and ordinary people apply the term ‘migrant rural labourer’ to more or less the same group, namely those rural migrants who are involved in routine manual work. Yet in most cases, people do not give a clear definition of this term, assuming that the readers have the same understanding as themselves. The authoritative definition of the term ‘migrant rural labourer’ comes from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS): ‘migrant rural labourer is those who have their household registrations (hukou) registered in rural areas but are working outside their villages’ (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). According to this definition, any person who is employed or self-employed can be seen as a labourer, regardless of his/her actual occupation. As a result, some rural migrants
are engaged in those occupations that can hardly be considered as akin to
a labourer’s job. For example, a rural migrant can be the owner or CEO of
a construction company in Beijing. Therefore, an ambiguity exists in the
NBS’ definition. The reason for this ambiguity is that traditionally, most of
the rural residents worked as agricultural labourers with low income. This
situation creates a perceptional link between the rural residency and
manual labourer occupation in public discourses. Although this
perceptional link is a prejudiced assumption, it is also accurate in many
cases. In other words, if you are a rural migrant in an urban area, it is highly
possible that you are working in a manual labourer job\(^1\). Since the NBS’s
definition of ‘migrant rural labourer’ does not define what kinds of
occupations are ‘labourer jobs’, in my research I do not select by people’s
occupations when selecting rural migrant interviewees. It turns out that the
majority of my migrant interviewees are working as industrial labourers,
service sector employees, and small business owners; some women are
doing part-time jobs or are unemployed, while a small number of them work
as lower level managers (see the following paragraphs). Applying their
social-economic status to Lu’s (2002) framework (see Figure 1), most of
the participants can be categorized as middle-lower class or bottom level
class. I have given a biological sketch of all the migrant interviewees in

\(^1\) There are indeed many rural students who graduated from universities and find
‘good jobs’ in cities. But if they can find ‘good jobs’, such as government officer,
state school teacher, or employment in big state/private companies, there is a
good chance that their hukou would be moved to the cities with them as a welfare
benefit of that job. In this case, legally they are not ‘rural residents’ any more, and
thus they would not have been considered as ‘migrant rural labourers’.
Appendix One.

A nationwide investigation (Wan et al., 2010: 242) reveals that 20.1% of the ‘migrant labourer’ parents are manual workers in companies; 17.2% of them run their own small businesses (often with low income); 10% are construction workers; 9.6% are shopkeepers; 6.6% of them are unemployed; 5.4% work in haulage; 5.3% are managers; and the remaining 25.8% are other kinds of labourers. In other words, most of the migrant parents are doing labourer jobs, which are unlikely to offer them a strong monthly income. As revealed by Lu (2013: 13), in Shanghai 33.4% of the migrant labourer families have their total monthly incomes within the range of ¥1,001-3,000 (£100-300 equivalent); 30.2% of the migrant families have total monthly incomes within the range of ¥3,001-5,000 (£300-500 equivalent); and only 32.6% have more than ¥5,000 (£500 equivalent) per month. The same situation can be identified in Beijing. As revealed by Yuan et al (2013), 24.5% of the migrant labourer families have total monthly incomes within the range of ¥2000-2599 (£200-260 equivalent); only 9.1% have more than ¥3000 (£300 equivalent) per month.

A possible reason for their difficulties in finding well-paid jobs is that the migrants may have relatively low literacy levels. According to Lu (2013: 12), in Shanghai, only 8.9% of migrant labourers have higher education degrees, while 68.1% of them have only junior secondary (12-15) or primary education (6-12), or are illiterate; the remaining 22.1% have senior high school education (15-18). Without a senior high school degree, it is
very hard for a person to find a well-paid job in global metropolises like Shanghai.

Migrant mother En and her daughter, who I interviewed, are from a typical migrant rural labourer family in Beijing. In her 30s, En has been living in Beijing for nine years, during which time she met her husband, who is also a rural migrant and working as a TV technician; their daughter was born and raised in Beijing. En has junior secondary school literacy. She does not have a stable job after giving birth to her daughter. She is currently working as a part time voluntary teacher (with no pay) in her daughter’s nursery, which is an unregistered informal educational setting for migrant children. Her eight year old daughter, migrant child Er, was enrolled in a state school in Beijing in September 2014. However, her school enrolment was a miserable memory for her parents since they encountered many difficulties in preparing the school application documents. For example, En does not have a formal job and her family is living in an apartment, which is legally not eligible for renting, yet having a formal job and legally renting an apartment are required in the application document. Finally, she managed to sign a fake work contract and a house-renting contract to get all the required documents prepared. As a result, her daughter got into a local state school.
1.2 How many migrant children?

During the past two decades, an increasing number of rural labourers and their children have migrated to urban areas. In 2015, nationally there were 168.84 million migrant rural labourers (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016). Figure 2 shows the nationwide number of the children of migrant rural labourers of compulsory education age. The tendency for the rate of migration to increase can be identified.

(Data source: 2010\(^1\), 2011\(^2\), 2012\(^3\), 2013\(^4\), 2014\(^5\), and 2015\(^6\))

\(^1\) Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2010 national education development statistical bulletin’ (http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/moe_633/201203/t20120321_132634.html)


\(^6\) Data source: Ministry of Education official website: ‘2015 national education
In recent years in Beijing and Shanghai, the number of migrant children accounts for around half of the total student population of compulsory education age. In 2012, the number of migrant children of compulsory education age in Shanghai was 538,000\(^1\), accounting for 45.09% of the total student number\(^2\). The number in Beijing in 2013 was 529,000\(^3\), accounting for 51.65% of the total student number\(^4\). While the official data for the numbers of migrant children in Beijing and Shanghai has not been made available to the public since 2013, the percentage of migrant children in these two cities is likely to remain more or less the same, since the nationwide trend of rural-to-urban migration has not changed.

1.3 ‘Migrant’ or ‘urban born and raised’ children?

In recent years, more and more migrant children are now born and raised in urban areas, not their parents’ hometowns. As for the children’s parents, they are migrants, but most of them have been living in urban areas for many years. According to Lu (2013: 13), 44.7% of the migrant parents have been living in Shanghai for 5-10 years, while 27% of them have been living

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\(^1\) Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘The annual report of education in Shanghai (2012)’

\(^2\) Data source: Shanghai Municipality of Education official website: ‘Education development statistical bulletin (2012)’


\(^4\) Data source: Beijing Municipality of Education official website: ‘Beijing education development statistical bulletin (2012-2013 academic year)’
in this city for more than 10 years. The same situation can be identified in Beijing. As Yuan et al (2013) has revealed, the average residency of the migrant parents in Beijing is 6.9 years. As a result, many of them gave birth to and raised their children in urban areas. Nationwide, in 2011, 29.8% of the migrant children were born in urban areas (Ma, 2015). In some cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, the percentages are higher. In Shanghai, for migrant families with children born in 2011, 58.8% of their children were born in the city (Lu, 2013: 8). My fieldwork supports this finding. Among the migrant families I have investigated, seven out of the twelve children were born in Beijing or Shanghai, three were brought to these cities before they were three-years-old, and two were brought to Beijing when they were seven and ten. In other words, most of the so-called ‘migrant children’ are now born and/or raised in the urban areas, and are second-generation migrant children. As I will detail in chapter 10 (section 4 and 5.2), these second-generation migrant children have urbanized habitus which facilitates their social inclusion in the urban schools.

1.4 Migrant children's motivations of enrolling in urban schools

According to the interviews with migrant parents, there are several reasons why migrant children need to study in the cities, rather than being sent back to their parents’ hometown. First, in many migrant families both the father and mother are working in the cities (Mok, Wong and Guo, 2011). This was the case for all my parent respondents. It is natural that parents want their
children to stay with them. If they send their children back to their hometown, it is difficult to find someone to take care of them. Second, as stated above, nowadays more and more migrant children were born and raised in the cities. They consider the city as their hometown and are reluctant to go back to study in their parents’ hometowns. Third, many migrant families are from poor rural areas or remote mountain areas, where the village schools are too weak to provide quality education. Furthermore, as a result of the village school integration reform, there are fewer schools and this has left some villages without their own school. The children living in these villages have no choice but to attend the country-centre schools, which are often far from their houses. These young children need to live in the school accommodation or spend several hours every day on their way to school. This situation is inconvenient at best and dangerous at worst.

2. The schooling system (compulsory education stage 6-15 years)

2.1 The legal aspect of compulsory education in China

In China, the nine-year compulsory education is a basic legal right and obligation of each citizen, guaranteed by the Law of Education and the Law of Compulsory Education. There are two stages of compulsory education: primary school education (from 6 to 12-years-old) and junior secondary school education (from 12 to 15-years-old). Compulsory education has the following intertwined aspects.

First, compulsion has an ‘obligation’ dimension. Every child, whether
they are living in the place of their household registration (hukou) or not, must access primary and junior secondary school in either a state or private school. In other words, if a child is not able to access compulsory education because of their parents, then the parents will have to take the legal consequences.

Second, compulsion has a ‘rights’ dimension. Every child has the right to access state school, whether they are in their place of household registration or place of residence (if the two places are different). As the Law of Compulsory Education states:

If the parents are working or living in the places which are not the places where they have their household registration cards registered and want their compulsory education aged children to access state schools there, the receiving municipality should provide equal educational opportunities for these children. The detailed policies should be decided by the provincial governments.

Here the law affirms the right of access to education for migrant children.

Third, another ‘rights’ aspect of compulsory education is that it is free of charge. All children have the right to access state school without paying tuition fees and incidental fees. Yet if the parents choose to send their children to private schools, they will waive this state educational welfare and will not receive government financial support for studying in private schools. The principle of free of charge is applied to all children in state schools, irrespective of whether they are migrant or local.

Fourth, school choice is not allowed in the state school sector for compulsory education. The state school must recruit all the local students
whose household registration cards are registered in the school district. For the migrant children, as long as they are living in the school district (and have the required proof) they are entitled to access the local state school.

2.2 An exam-orientated education tradition and the hierarchy of schools

In China, there is an exam-orientated tradition in school education (Bo and West, 2015; Chan et al., 2008). The league table of high stake exams, including the graduation examination and termly examination, is the main source of China’s hierarchy of schools.¹ Performing well in the league table guarantees a school’s reputations and the resources they can receive from the government. In return, good reputations and sufficient resources help the schools attract excellent students who go on to perform well in the exams. A child’s score in the graduation examination from junior secondary school is used as the main criterion (or the only criterion) by the senior secondary schools to select students. As a result, the junior secondary schools have the motivation to work hard to prepare their students for the exam. At primary school stage, although nowadays those exam scores are not allowed to be used as a criterion for junior secondary school recruitment, the municipality of education still holds an unpublished league

¹ Although the league table is unpublished to the public, it is accessible by the schools from the municipality of education. The information would spread to the public from the school headteachers, teachers and government officers in an informal way.
table of the scores of graduation examination and termly examination, which has a strong influence on the resources that the schools receive. As a result, teachers put a strong emphasis on the students’ academic study with regard to the exams. For the underperforming students, some teachers have to invest extra time for extra-curricular supervision and tutorials. Additionally, if the parents do not cooperate with the teachers in supporting their child’s progress, they are likely to incur a negative judgment from the teacher (see chapter 8, section 3, and chapter 10, section 5.1).

The hierarchy of the schools drives the parents to make school choices, although this is now prohibited in the state school sector. In the past, some parents used to deploy their social networks and pay expensive school choice fees to send their children to their target schools outside their school districts. In recent years, in some cities such as Beijing, the government has enforced restrictions on school choices in the state sector. As a result, it is hard for parents to choose schools outside their school district.

2.3 The parents’ role in schooling in urban areas

In urban schools, there is a tradition of home-school cooperation. Both teachers and parents believe the children’s education should be the focus of cooperation between home and school. The urban parents are readily in favour of this cooperation, since many of them have urban school or university experiences. Therefore, they have the confidence and
motivation to communicate with teachers and to facilitate their children’s study at home. For them, there seems to be a natural connection between school and home, and home is considered as a site for education. In return, the teachers do not treat parents as outsiders. Instead, they consider parents as their extra-curricular teachers at home. I will back to this point in chapter 10 (section 5.1).

The urban parents’ role as extra-curricular teachers includes cultivating their children’s hobbies. In metropolitan areas such as Beijing and Shanghai, a variety of institutions and individuals are engaged in the extra-curricular activity and hobby market, providing children with classes or individual tutoring in music, arts, sports and sciences. Some of the classes or tutorials are provided at an affordable price for non-middle-class families. Expecting their children to develop into well-rounded young adults, many parents recognize the educational value of extra-curricular hobbies. Parents have also realized that expertise in a hobby can be turned into an advantage in their children’s enrolment for senior secondary school and university. In addition, the practice of cultivating children’s hobbies facilitates class reproduction or upward mobility in different cultural contexts, even if that is not the parents’ clear intention (Vincent and Ball, 2007; Karsten, 2015). As a result, parents usually send their children to more than one extra-curricular class or individual tutorial, as reported by some of the teachers I have interviewed.
3. Household registration (hukou) system as the institutional barrier to migrant children’s state school access

In some developing countries in the world, such as India, Vietnam, Turkey, Columbia and Brazil, internal rural-to-urban migrant children are facing social, economic and political exclusion similar to the situation in China. In these countries, social exclusion in education is shaped by such factors as ethnicity, language, religion, customs and income (Altinyelken, 2009; Deshingkar, 2006; Kusadokoroa and Hasegawab, 2016; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1997; Schultz, 1971) rather than legal status (hukou), as in China. For example, in Vietnam, the migrant children have limited access to state schools and therefore have to enrol in expensive private or semi-public schools (Deshingkar, 2006). In Turkey, internal migrant children are facing exclusions in schooling because of their migration experience and low socio-economic status (Altinyelken, 2009). In short, in these countries the migrant children’s disadvantage is to a large degree a result of their cultural background (ethnicity, language/dialect, custom, religion, etc.) and socio-economic status. Yet when it comes to the Chinese context, the cultural background is not a dominant factor of internal migrant children’s disadvantage in school access. Rather, the main institutional barrier to their school access is the household registration (hukou) system, as I will elaborate below. When the children are enrolled in state schools, the factors shaping their social inclusion are mainly rural/urban differences and
class differences, rather than differences of the ethnicity, cultural custom and language.\textsuperscript{1} This situation differentiates the Chinese context from that of the other countries presented in the existing literature.

In China, the household registration (hukou) system is a unique population administration system. Before the Chinese economic reform in 1978, people were not allowed to move to reside out of their village unless they got official approval. If they obtained approval to move, their household registration would be transferred correspondingly. After 1978, the government’s population mobility control was removed gradually, and people have since been free to move and reside outside their hometowns. However, when people move, not all of them can get their household registration cards moved to the new places accordingly, since the government sets yearly upper limits for the number of transfers of household registrations to reduce local government’s financial burdens for providing these newcomers with certain social welfare services (Wu, 2009).

The household registration card is used as a credential with which people can enjoy a series of social welfare provisions in the place where they are registered. Without a local household registration card, migrant families are not fully entitled to access particular social welfare services provided by the receiving local government, including accessing state school

\textsuperscript{1} Although there are 56 different ethnic groups in China, most of the minority groups follow the cultural custom of Han (the dominant ethnic group), including the language, lifestyle, cultural conventions, etc. That is to say, normally it is hard to differentiate an ethnic minority person from the Han people in their daily life. In addition, the majority of the migrants are Chinese speakers. They may speak their hometown (Chinese) dialects at home, but can speak Mandarin Chinese as well.
education\(^1\). What can be identified here is that the hukou system is an embodied form of state sponsored welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt, 1995), under which the socio-economic policy and priority in social benefits are directed first and foremost to the region’s ‘own group’ (Mudde, 2000: 189). It restricts the local welfare provision to residents who hold the local household registration card - their ‘own people’ - as opposed to the other residents who do not. This distinction also gives rise to the ‘outsider’ discourse, which uses the household registration card status as the identifier to differentiate ‘outsiders’ from local residents (see chapter 8, section 2).

The institutional barrier of the hukou system and the ‘outsider’ discourse produce difficulties for migrant children’s state school enrolment. While in recent years 77%-80% of migrant children of compulsory education age are able to enrol in state schools (chapter 9, section 2), around one in five migrant children are studying in quasi-state schools and unlicensed informal schools, which tend to be inferior providers of schooling (chapter 11), and some children have to go back and study in their parents’ hometown. When finishing compulsory education, the migrant children face further difficulties in accessing local senior high schools. For example, in Beijing, the current policy does not allow migrant children to enrol in

\(^1\) Although the Law of Compulsory Education affirms the right of access to education for migrant children (see section 2.1), it does not state explicitly that the receiving municipality should recruit all migrant children into local state schools. By doing this, the law leaves some spaces of discretion for the local government to interpret and enact the clause, based on the specific local socio-economic context.
academic senior high schools; instead, they are allowed to enrol in vocational schools, which are lower in status than academic schools and cannot recruit enough local students.

4. Migrant children’s academic performance

As I will elaborate in greater detail in chapter 9 (section 2), in Beijing and Shanghai a large percentage of the migrant children are studying in non-elitist and ordinary state schools with a high percentage of migrant children.¹ My fieldwork data was collected from this type of school. In my interviews, nine teachers from seven state schools talked about migrant children’s test scores, and five of them compared the test scores of migrants with those of local children. Four out of the five respondents claim that the majority of the migrant children’s overall test scores match those of the local children in their schools. What my respondents have reported resonates with the findings of a quantitative study examining migrant children’s learning outcomes and loneliness in state schools in Beijing, which concludes that ‘there is little difference in learning outcome or loneliness between urban native children and migrant children who attend public schools’ (Lu and Zhou, 2013: 85).

Yet my respondents also reported migrant-specific problems with regard to their test scores. As reported by most of the respondent teachers and headteachers, some migrant children in their classes frequently do not

¹ Many of these schools are migrant majority schools with 60%-90% of their students being migrants.
finish their homework and/or show little motivation in the classroom teaching sessions. As a result, a small number of migrant children have notably low scores, lower than those that would be usual for the local students. According to these teachers, the main reason is that these children’s parents are disinterested and are incapable of supervising and facilitating their study, as I will detail in chapter 10 (section 5.1). Another unique issue is that some migrant children transferred to Beijing/Shanghai after receiving some of their education in their hometown. These children often struggle to catch up with their classmates as there is a regional difference in the content of the textbooks. As a result, their test scores are at the bottom of their classes with a big gap to the other students (migrant and local). This issue is particularly notable with English, as the schools in Beijing and Shanghai attach more importance to this subject and have more teaching resources than the schools in rural areas.

In short, in my sample schools, while there is a small group of migrant children who do not perform as well as the others owing to their past educational experiences or/and their disadvantaged home background, the majority of them are perceived by their teachers as performing equally with their local classmates in terms of their test scores. Yet this situation does not suggest that migrant children and local children (from across the cities) are performing equally in terms of their scores in Beijing and Shanghai, because my sample schools are non-elitist and ordinary state schools. The local students’ test scores in these schools does not reflect
the overall situation of the local students throughout the two cities, as most of the respondent headteachers, teachers and local parents point out that the scores of their schools are ranked in disadvantaged positions in the unpublished local league table.

Furthermore, if extending the scope of academic performance beyond test score, many migrant children in my sample schools are perceived by their teachers as having some ‘problems’ which the local students do not have in general. As I will elaborate in details in chapter 10 (section 5.1), given the migrant parents’ tendency to adopt a child rearing approach of ‘accomplishment of natural growth’ (Lareau, 2003), many children do not complete their homework and some of them are perceived as having an indifferent attitude to teachers. While this situation does not make migrant children taken together an underachieving group in terms of the scores in the fieldwork schools, it does result in extra-curricular teaching burdens for the teachers, since they have to give extra guidance to those who are unable to catch up with the class. As a result, many respondent teachers and headteachers have negative perceptions or even a deficit view of migrant children’s academic performance. I will come back and discuss the (teacher’s perception of) migrant children’s study in chapter 10 with qualitative data.
5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the broad social context of migrant children’s schooling in China, providing the readers with some background information. In section 1, I introduced the migrants’ social-economic background as being mainly involved in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. I then presented the demographic statistical data of migrant children nationwide and in Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, I elaborated on the recent tendency for migrant children to be born and raised in the urban areas, as second-generation migrant children, and I summarised the reasons why these children need to study in the city. Section 2 elaborates on some key aspects of the school system in contemporary China. First, I introduced four legal aspects of compulsory education, which are: obligation, right, free of charge and anti-school choice. I then analysed how the exam-orientated tradition reinforces a hierarchy of schools. In addition, societal expectations of the parents’ role in schooling, especially with regard to home-school cooperation, are examined. In section 3, I elaborated on how the household registration (hukou) system functions as an institutional barrier against migrant children’s state school enrolment in compulsory and post-compulsory education stages. This situation differentiates the schooling situation of internal migrant children in China from that of children in other developing countries in Asia. I then introduced the issue of migrant children’s academic performance in terms of the test scores. While the majority of migrant children, who are studying in non-
elitist and ordinary state schools, are performing at the same level as their local classmates, the migrant children (taken together) are in a disadvantaged position in the local state school system in terms of results.
Chapter 3: Literature review: migrant children’s schooling and policy in China

In this chapter, I will review the existing literature on migrant children’s schooling and policy in China. The thesis research questions will be identified at the end of the chapter, as I outline the contribution of this research towards filling the gaps in the existing literature.

Since 2001, many academics have explored important issues related to the ‘Two Main Channels’ policy (‘TMC policy’ for short). Adopting multidisciplinary research perspectives drawn from political, sociological and economic fields, the key research findings from these studies are based on data collected from tens of cities in China with interview, questionnaire and observation as the main research methods.

1. Educational financial system related to migrant children’s schooling

The existing literature has clearly identified the financial situation of the receiving local governments at provincial, city and district levels as causing difficulties for migrant children’s schooling. The main issues are threefold. First, as mentioned by all the key findings on this topic, under the current household registration (hukou) system and educational financial system in China, the receiving local governments are unable to accommodate all of the migrant children in their local state education systems because the
educational funding that a local government can receive is calculated based on the number of students with local household registration in an area. Therefore, the local government is unable to receive extra funding from its superior government for migrant children’s education unless families can obtain a local household registration (CNIER, 2007b; Fan, 2007; Han, 2007; Fu and Meng, 2008; Fan and Peng, 2009; Lei, 2010; Yuan, 2010). Second, there are some flaws in the design of the financial mechanism in the TMC policy. A main flaw, as argued by Fan (2007), Dong (2010) and Fan and Guo (2011), is that the TMC policy has not established that concrete financial responsibility lies with the Chinese central government. Therefore, central government does not offer enough financial support for all the receiving local governments. Third, some local governments are not willing to offer strong financial support to recruit all the migrant children in state schools, even if they could do so (Fan and Peng, 2009; Shao, 2010b; Yang, Tao and Li, 2011). Based on interviews with local government officers, some researchers adopt the concept ‘low-lying land effect’ to state that ‘some local governments suspect that if they recruit all the migrant children into state schools, more and more migrant children might be attracted to their administrative areas’ (Shao, 2010b: 8). Although my research does not focus on the financial systems surrounding migrant children’s schooling, the existing literature has offered adequate background information for my research to analyse how receiving local governments implement the TMC policy with limited financial capability,
with regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2).

2. Migrant children’s school enrolment in different kinds of schools

Based on interviews and questionnaires in different cities, the existing literature explores migrant children’s school enrolment in different kinds of schools in state and private sectors.

2.1 State schools (local student majority)

This type of school has widely been considered by the existing literature as optimal for providing the migrant children with an educational experience equal to that received by local students. This assertion is based on nationwide investigations in tens of cities in China (CNIER, 2007a, 2008; Li, 2010; Tao, Yang, Li, 2010; Liu, Wu, 2013; Chen, 2014). However, the existing literature has not put enough importance on the process of migrant student recruitment in these schools: which migrant children can enrol in these schools? Which migrant children cannot? Why do these schools only recruit a minor percentage of migrant children? These questions have contributed to my research on analysing the points of conflict among schools, local families, migrant families and receiving government (at provincial, city and district levels) in the TMC policy implementation, with regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2).

2.2 State schools (migrant children majority)

According to the existing literature, a large number of migrant children are
studying in this kind of school, making it an important element in the TMC policy network (Qian and Walker, 2015). The existing literature has explored the reasons why these state schools changed from mostly recruiting local students to mostly recruiting migrant children. First, based on interviews with four state schools in Shanghai and Changchun, Zhou (2012) and Li (2010) have found that these state schools are losing local students because of their relatively low quality of curriculum and teaching. In order to fill their vacancies, they have recruited migrant children. Second, based on a review of data analysis in published journal articles and monographs, Liu and Wu (2013) reveal that some city governments require state schools (normally the ones with relatively low quality, as measured by test scores) to offer most of their quotas to migrant children. These findings serve as a good foundation for my exploration of the kind of education migrant children are receiving and what their relationship with their local peers and teachers are like in this kind of school. However, the existing literature has not attached enough importance to the unique situation regarding migrant children’s education in this kind of school by answering the following questions: are there any problems perceived by the teachers after recruiting a large number of migrant children? What are the teachers’ interpretations and attitudes towards this change? These questions have contributed to my research on analyzing the impetus of the policy change after 2013, with regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2).
2.3 Unlicensed informal private (UIP) school

In some big cities where many migrant children are unable to access local state schools, there are some unlicensed informal private (UIP) schools for migrant children. Without the government’s supervision, some of these schools do not follow the standard state curriculum and are lacking in certified teachers and basic teaching facilities (especially for non-examination subjects such as arts, sports and music). Moreover, some schools have big class sizes, for example more than 50 students per class (Kwong, 2004; Woronov, 2004; CNIER, 2007a, 2008; Wang, 2008; Goodburn, 2009, 2015; Wu, 2010; Wang and Holland, 2011). The students studying in these schools have lower scores in key subjects such as Chinese and Maths (Chen and Feng, 2013; Lu and Zhou, 2013; Lai et al., 2014) and have poorer sociocultural adaptation to urban life (Yuan et al., 2013; Zhou and Guo, 2014), if compared with other migrant students who enrolled in the state schools. In certain cities, the government has closed down some of these schools. As shown in a nationwide investigation of twelve cities (CNIER, 2008), after the schools have been closed, their students were either transferred to state schools by the local government or the students were left to find other schools by themselves. In recent years, in some cities there is a new local government policy towards these schools, as revealed by researchers’ investigations in Shanghai. With
financial support from the receiving local government, some of these schools were able to improve their facilities and eventually receive formal registration (Li, 2009; Liu and Wu, 2015). The existing literature offers valuable information for future research, especially on the Shanghai government’s new policy. However, the existing literature has not given answers to some important questions: why have some private schools received the government’s support but others in the same cities have not, or have even have been closed by the government? After being registered, are these schools operating in the same way with regard to their relationship with the local municipality of education? What kinds of education these schools can offer for migrant children? These questions contribute to my analysis of the migrant children’s school experiences in the government financially supported private schools, with regard to my second sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2).

3. The conflict and cooperation among different stakeholders in the ‘Two Main Channel’ policy implementation

As commented on in a recent study, the implementation of the TMC policy is ‘a product of interaction between policy design, participants and implementation context’ (Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017: 210). The existing literature has analysed the conflict and cooperation among the following participants of the TMC policy: the governments at provincial, city and district levels and in different regions; migrant children and parents; local children and
parents; receiving local state schools; and private schools for migrant children (Zhou, 2006; Shao, 2010a, 2010b; Yuan, 2010; Yang, Tao, Li, 2011; Liu and Shenglong, 2015; Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017). Their conflict and cooperation can include different aspects and the existing literature mainly explores the receiving cities’ and district governments’ relationship with and approaches to migrant families. A typical example is research that considers the concept of ‘containment mechanism’ when discussing the conflict between the receiving local governments and migrant families (Shao, 2010a, 2010b; Yang, Tao and Li, 2011). These studies set the analysis of the TMC policy into a broad background of the overall migrant population policy. The ‘Containment Mechanism’ means some receiving local governments utilize the migrant workers’ labour resources while offering them quite limited social welfare (excluding their children’s right of access to local state schools for instance), and in doing so ‘contain’ and limit the flow of migrant families to their areas (Shao, 2010a, 2010b; Yang, Tao and Li, 2011). This concept offers a useful perspective for my study by pointing out the effects of the interactions between education policy and migrant population policy. However, it has not discussed the other potential aspects of the relationship between these two kinds of policies: the TMC policy might not only have been influenced by the migrant population policy but also have been influenced by other public policies; or perhaps the TMC policy interacts with other aspects of the policies on migrant populations. Neither has it discussed the interactions among education policy,
population policy and other policies in political and economic domains. Responding to this research gap, I adopted the theoretical concept of ‘cross-field effects’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004) to explore the interactions among the fields of politics, economy, education policy, and population policy, with regard to my first sub research question (see chapter 1, section 2). In addition, the analyses and conclusions in the existing literature are mainly based on the authors’ speculation and data from other publications as well as some government statistical data. There is little first-hand data, and especially lacking is interview data from different stakeholders.

There are other gaps in the existing literature, such as research mainly focuses on the receiving local government’s attitudes regarding the migrant families and neglects other aspects: first, the existing literature does not include all stakeholders in the analysis. For example, the Sub-district Office of Culture and Education (SOCE, the lowest level of educational administration) is often excluded from consideration. According to my fieldwork, SOCE is also an important stakeholder, since it is in charge of verifying the migrant children’s school enrolment documents and issuing the Certificate of Studying in State School. Second, the conflict and cooperation between receiving city and district levels of government and state schools has not been explored. Finally, the existing literature tends to consider the whole government system as one stakeholder in TMC policy implementation. However, this hypothesis might not be reasonable in all the conditions. As Ball (1990: 20) states, ‘[t]he central state often finds itself
in conflict with elements of the local state…. Thus we need to be aware of centre-periphery relations within the educational state itself’. My fieldwork data also shows that within the government system, there are at least four stakeholders: in Beijing for example, the Chinese Ministry of Education, Beijing Municipal of Education, Beijing district municipal of education, and SOCE. Identifying these research gaps helps me to avoid a one-sided analysis in my research. Responding to the research gaps, I have explored the following questions: what stakeholders have involved in the enactment of the TMC policy? what kinds of pressures have the city and district governments put on the state schools to recruit migrant children? What are the conflicts and cooperation between receiving city and district levels of government and state schools? These questions contribute to my analysis of both sub questions under the thesis main research question.

4. ‘Two Main Channel’ policy implementation in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou

Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou are considered the three major cities in China with a huge number of migrant children. The existing literature has already undertaken some preliminary work on the implementation of the TMC policy in these three cities. Compared to Beijing and Guangzhou, Shanghai is a relatively more successful example for including most of the migrant children into the state school system, supported by its huge financial investment. Compared to Shanghai, what the Beijing government
has done with more limited financial resources to implement this policy is not as comprehensive (Yuan, 2010; Liu, Liu and Yu, 2017). Some researchers consider Guangzhou as a negative example for including only a small percentage of the migrant children into state schools, as shown by the statistics: 29.7% in 2009 and around 50% in 2013 (Wang, 2013; Yuan, 2010). Based on statistical data and interviews, the existing literature explores the main reasons for the difference among the three cities. A direct reason why the ratio of migrant children enrolling in state schools in Guangzhou is notably lower than that of Shanghai and Beijing is that the Guangzhou city government has established much more restrictive criteria concerning who can receive the Certificate of Study in State Schools. Another direct reason is that, as Yuan (2010) points out, in Beijing and Guangzhou it is the government at district level, rather than city level, who takes the main financial responsibility for migrant children’s schooling. But in Shanghai, the situation is the opposite: it is the city government rather than district government who takes the main financial responsibility. It is important to note that in China, the government at city level usually has much stronger financial capability than the government at district level, because the city government controls the finances of the county/district governments. This is partly the reason why the Shanghai government is able to provide the migrant children with adequate financial support. Wang (2013), based on the analysis of 117 policy texts among 28 different provinces in China, explains that one of the fundamental reasons why the
Guangzhou government chose to establish restrictive criteria is that Guangzhou is undergoing an industrial structural transformation from labour based industry to technology based industry, which requires a well-educated labour force. Therefore, the rural migrant workers, who normally have relatively low education levels, are not welcome. Under these circumstances, setting restrictive state school enrolment criteria for their children as a way of deterring migrant rural workers from coming to the city is a way for Guangzhou’s government to attain its goal. Wang’s analysis is valuable for my research, since it takes the economic and social context of the TMC policy implementation into consideration, rather than merely focusing on educational issues. The existing literature offers valuable background information and perspectives of analysis for my research, which examine the policy enactment in Beijing and Shanghai.

5. The migrant children’s social relationships and social inclusion in state schools

With the majority of migrant children now studying in state schools, the existing studies have explored migrant children’s social relationships and social inclusion in Chinese urban state school (Woronov, 2004; Wang, 2008; Dong, 2009; Goodburn, 2009; Xu, C., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Kwong, 2011; Liu and Li, 2012; Lan, 2014; Mu and Jia, 2016; Zhang and Luo, 2016). Assuming the migrant children and the schools as a homogeneous group, most of the studies do not differentiate local majority state school from the
migrant majority ones, or the first-generation migrant children from the second-generation in their research designs. Accordingly, their findings show that the migrant children as a whole are distinguishable from the local students in their accent, appearance, style of dress and behaviours, and that this situation leads to negative attitudes from the local children and teachers, producing difficulty for the social inclusion of the migrant children. For example, Goodburn points out that ‘the accents, style of dress and different behaviour of many migrant children means that they are easily identifiable as different’ (2009: 498). Another investigation in Chengdu with questionnaires to several state primary/junior secondary schools reports that 26.5% of migrant children feel isolated in their relationship with local children (Xu, C., 2009). I acknowledge that the existing literature offers implications for my exploration of migrant children’s school experiences in state schools, with regard to my second sub research question (chapter 1, section 2). Yet I also note that their findings are likely to be generated based partly on the features of the first-generation migrants in local majority state schools, and cannot be generalised to the situation of the second-generation migrants in the migrant majority state school which I explore.

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1 In the existing literature, it is rare that the paper pointed out both the age of migrant children when they came to the city and the percentage of migrants in the schools.

2 Some previous studies have covered second-generation migrants in the migrant majority schools. Yet there is a possible bias in their interpretation of data. Namely, researchers merely present the data that differentiates some migrant children from the local children in some schools and ignore the data otherwise. It should be noticed that this kind of bias, or the subjectivity of a researcher, is hard to avoid (or should not be avoided) in social research, including my research.
As for the local majority state schools, they recruit some local students from middle-class family background, in comparison to the migrant children’s working-class background. In these schools, the class difference, together with the rural/urban cultural difference, make the migrant children easily distinguishable from the local students. Yet the situation can be different in the migrant majority schools, where local students are also from working-class background, as supported by my empirical data (see chapter 10, section 1). In addition, the accent, style of dress, and behaviours of the first-generation migrant children, who have already had some experiences of rural life, can differentiate them from local children. Yet it can be hard to differentiate the second-generation migrant children from the local children, as supported by my empirical data (see chapter 10, section 4). As stated earlier (chapter 2, section 1.3), most of the migrant children in Beijing and Shanghai are now the second-generation migrants. In the meantime, the migrant majority state school has now been an established part in the state school system in these two cities (see chapter 9, section 2). Focuses on the second-generation migrant children in migrant majority schools, I acknowledge that my findings cannot be generalized beyond my specific sampling context.

As for how teachers treat migrant children, an unresolved controversy still exists in the literature: are teachers treating the migrant children in the same way as local children, without discrimination? The existing evidence is contested. According to the research finding of a nationwide
investigation (CNIER, 2008) that covered 22 state primary schools and 17 state junior secondary schools in twelve big cities with questionnaire and in-depth interviews as the main research methods, the teachers in this study treated the migrant children in the same way as local children, or even gave migrant children some privileges (in consideration of their disadvantaged social background). The study suggested that teachers give the same amount of psychological and emotional guidance sessions to local and migrant children; teachers give even more emotional encouragement, assignment feedback, and individual academic tutorials to migrant children, calculated by the number of tutorial sessions; teachers also give more opportunities for teacher-student interaction to migrant children in classes. However, critics argue that some teachers do not treat the migrant children in the same way as local children with regard to their learning, philological development and emotional needs. Published as journal articles and an MA dissertation/PhD thesis, these studies use interview data from around ten state primary/junior secondary schools in Beijing, Tianjin and Changchun to support their argument (Goodburn, 2009; Li, 2010; Xu, L., 2009). Some researchers even conclude that migrant children are facing discrimination from some of their teachers. For example, based on semi-structured interviews with teachers, parents and students in Tianjin, Xu reports that some state schools consciously foster segregation by separating migrant and local children into different classes or different groupings within one class (Xu L., 2009). Based on data from
semi-structured interviews with teachers and students in six state schools in Beijing, Goodburn argues that ‘state school teachers confirmed that in most schools, students without a local hukou had no right to be selected as “thrice good” (san hao) honours\(^1\) students and had no scholarship opportunities’ (2009: 498). The controversy in the existing literature might come from the different sampling designs of different research, as the situation might be different in different cities, districts within one city, or schools within one district. Therefore, it is hard to draw a simple conclusion on the relationship between migrant children and teachers in Chinese state schools. The implication for my research is that I am not going to generalize my findings beyond my specific sampling contexts.

Furthermore with the increasing percentage of migrant children enrolled in urban schools, the migrant parents’ sometimes troubled relationships with schools has been reported by educators and researchers. The existing literature, taking the teacher’s point of view, has identified the limited parental involvement of the migrant parents as being the result of their limited literacy, poor parenting skills, and lack of time and willingness (Li et al., 2010; Liu and Jacob, 2013; Yuan et al., 2013). Yet the existing literature has not offered an in-depth exploration of the home-school interactions and how it affects migrant children’s relationships in school. Therefore, I have added parental involvement as a dimension in my exploration of migrant

\(^1\) The ‘thrice good’ (san hao) honour, which takes the students’ academic, moral and physical performance into consideration, is the top honour in Chinese primary/secondary schools. Only a small percentage of students can be awarded this honour.
children’s experiences in school, with regard to my second sub question (see chapter 1, section 2).

6. Conclusion

The existing literature provides some background information, secondary data and research perspectives for future research on the implementation of the TMC policy. Yet there are still some research gaps that need to be explored. In my study, I explore each of the individual research gaps identified earlier, under the thesis’ main research question. In the existing literature, two common and fundamental research gaps can still be identified. First, considering the research methodology, the majority of existing conclusions are not based on systematic and in-depth research with solid qualitative and quantitative evidence. Instead, many of the authors did not collect new empirical data, but mainly relied on references to other research findings or to what they understand to be common knowledge. Noticing this research gap, my research has adopted semi-structured interviews and policy documents to generate rich first-hand qualitative data (see chapter 5, section 2). Second, examining the existing literature’s understanding of the nature of ‘policy’ reveals that authors generally see policy as a top-down and linear process, within which a clear demarcation between policy formulation and implementation exists. This understanding prevents researchers from analysing some important

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1 My research would rather use the term ‘enactment’, as I elaborate in chapter 5 (section 1).
aspects of TMC policy: how do different individuals, organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact this policy? How is their interpretation and enactment influenced by political, economic, socio-cultural and historical factors? Can we understand the nature of TMC policy enactment as a set of dynamic and non-linear relationships and activities? This research gap is suitable for exploration through a ‘policy sociology’ approach, using mainly Bourdieusian and Foucauldian theoretical resources, which I will review in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Theoretical review

Following the review of literature on migrant children’s schooling and policy in China, in this chapter, I will review the theoretical resources I have used in the thesis.

As I have brought together ‘structural, macro-level analysis of education systems and education policies and micro-level investigation, especially that which takes account of people’s perception and experiences’ (Ozga, 1990: 359), the scope of the research is large and the analysis is highly complex. Therefore, a ‘toolbox’ approach to theory (Ball, 1994: 14) that integrates various theoretical resources is needed, as Ball points out, ‘in the analysis of complex social issues – like policy – two theories are probably better than one’ (1994: 14). These theoretical resources include: Bourdieu’s work on ‘field, habitus and capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996), Foucault’s work on ‘discourse’ (Foucault, 1979, 1986), and Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008)’s work on policy as temporary consensus between groups. The choosing of the above theories and concepts is based on their relevance to the main themes in my code list, which is a product of several rounds of data coding (see chapter 5, section 5). While there could be other relevant theoretical resources that I have not included here, I believe that the above theoretical resources are sufficient to give a coherent, well-rounded and in-depth analysis of the migrant children’s schooling policy in China, and thus to produce an original
contribution to knowledge. In order to address the potential charge of theoretical inconsistency, I argue that the use of a ‘toolbox of diverse concepts and theories’ (Ball, 1993: 10) is coherent in the sense that they facilitate my exploration of each sub research question, contributing towards the thesis’ main research question, as I will discuss in detail in section 4.

1. Bourdieusian resources

1.1 Bourdieu’s concepts

Bourdieu has offered us a theoretical toolkit to analyse the structure and logic of practice. Field, habitus and capital are three of his key concepts, which, taken together, offer a unique perspective to explore the structure of power-relations in practice. Furthermore, what Bourdieu offers us is more than a set of theoretical tools. Rather, ‘the task is to produce, if not a “new person”, then at least a “new gaze”, a sociological view’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 251, original emphasis). Bourdieu’s aim is to bring an epistemological change to sociology, to change the way we understand the world.

1.1.1 Field

As summarised by Thomson, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘field’ is ‘not developed as grand theory, but as a means of translating practical problems into concrete empirical operations’ (Thomson, 2012: 79). Bourdieu defines field
A field is a structured social precondition, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this precondition, which at the same time becomes a precondition in which the various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their strategies (Bourdieu 1998a: 40-41).

According to this definition, several key points should be noticed: first, as a social ‘precondition’, a field, as a bounded site, has its (invisible) structure with various actors located in various ‘positions’ within the field. Second, in accordance with the field’s structure, there is also an (unequal) power relation among the actors with visible struggle and invisible opposing forces operating among them, following the invisible logic of that field: in Bourdieu’s terms, ‘a field of forces, a force field’ (Bourdieu, 1998a: 40). In addition, what Bourdieu has not stated here, but does so in other writings, is that a field is not of a concrete, figured and stable precondition, but its scope/structure is constantly shaping and being shaped by the power relations and struggle among actors, as well as actors’ possession and activation of capitals

1 in terms of how such struggles play out. That is to say, ‘[t]here is a shift away from a structure/agency binary in Bourdieu’s fields’ (Thomson and Holdsworth, 2003: 382). The struggle among actors

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1 It is worth noting that particular forms of capital are valued more or less highly in particular fields.
is always relative not absolute, relating to the definition of the field, in the meantime, it shapes the power relations and the structure of the field.

*Analysing a field: a three-level approach*

Therefore, how does one explore a certain field? Bourdieu states that the analytical approach involves three necessary and internally connected moments:

First, one must analyse the positions of the field vis-à-vis the field of power… Second, one must map out the objective structures of relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which this field is a site. And, third, one must analyse the habitus of agents, the different systems of positions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104-105)

According to Bourdieu, in the **Level 1 analysis**, the point is to map out the position of the particular field vis-à-vis the field of power in the broader social space. Then the questions become: first, what is the field of power (how is it different from other fields and the broader social space)? The first step is to differentiate the concept of field from the social space. As Hardy summarises, ‘the term “social space” is used to indicate the sum total of occupiable social positions at any one time and space … By contrast, the term “field” is used to refer to a particular subset of the available positions’ (Hardy, 2012: 231). The field is one of the subsets of positions within the broader social space and it manifests itself by the dispositions (habitus) and resources (capital) of its agents and the way the agents struggle. As a
special form of the field, the field of power is,

[T]he space of the relations of force between... the agents who possess a sufficient amount of one of the different kinds of capital to be in a position to dominate the corresponding field, whose struggles intensify whenever the relative value of the different kinds of capital is questioned (Bourdieu, 1998b: 34).

In other words, in the field of power, the objective of the agents' struggle is not for the accumulation or monopoly on a particular form of capital, but rather the 'determination of the relative value and magnitude of the different forms of power that can be wielded in the different fields', namely, the 'exchange rate' between different types of capital (Bourdieu, 1996a: 265).

The agents in the field of power are struggling in order to occupy dominant positions in the other fields\(^1\). This character differentiates the field of power from other fields, allowing it to occupy the dominant position in the social space.

The second question is: by what means can researchers map out the positions of particular fields vis-à-vis the field of power in the social space? On the one hand, some fields are contained in the field of power, as the agents in these fields are generally dominant agents in other fields. For example, Bourdieu argues that ‘the literary field is contained within the field of power where it occupies a dominated position’ (Bourdieu, 1992: 104). That is to say, artists and writers are part of the dominant class while they are a dominated fraction of that class. On the other hand, many fields are

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\(^1\) As field is a conceptual space, the collectives of individuals and organisations can occupy more than one field at a time.
not contained within the field of power, as the field of power only contains
the dominant agents of other fields. Yet even in this sense, these fields can
still be seen as affiliated to the field of power, as their dominant agents
maintain the structural and functional homologies between these fields and
the field of power, as I will elaborate later. It is in this sense that Bourdieu
generally maintains that individual fields are within the field of power, or the
field of power is made up of multiple fields. For example, when describing
the distribution of positions and hierarchy of different fields in the broader
social space, Bourdieu writes, ‘the various fields are distributed within the
field of power according to the objective hierarchy of forms of capital …’
(Bourdieu, 1996a: 270). Bourdieu’s analytical approach to map out the
positions of particular fields vis-à-vis the field of power is based on his
observation that the field of power, which also applies to the broader social
space and its fields, is organized according to a chiasmatic structure. ‘The
distribution according to the dominant principle of hierarchisation -
economic capital - is, as it were, “intersected” by the distribution based on
a second principle of hierarchisation - cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1996:
270). This analytical approach is often visualized by Bourdieu as a two-
axes figure to present to chiasmatic structure of the positions of the agents
in particular fields and fields in the broader social space (see, for example,
Bourdieu, 1996a: 267, 268, 269; Bourdieu, 1996b: 124). In The Rules of
Art, Bourdieu maps out the position of the field of cultural production vis-à-
vis the field of power in the social space by plotting the categories and
volumes of the economic, cultural and symbolic capital that the agents hold (Figure 3).\footnote{It is important to note that while the field of cultural production is within the field of power, the method to map out the relative positions of particular fields, the field of power and the social space also applies to other fields in Bourdieu’s account.}

Figure 3: the field of cultural production in the field of power and in social space (Bourdieu, 1996b:124)
In Bourdieu’s **Level 2 analysis**, the main task is to map out the structures of relations between the positions of agents or institutions. According to Bourdieu, the field of power (and other fields within it) is a field of forces that is ‘structurally determined by the state of the relations of power … or different forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1996a: 264). Therefore in empirical work, ‘it is one and the same thing to determine what the field is, where its limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital are active in it, within what limits, and so on’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98-99). That is to say, what is happening in a particular field (‘what the field is’) and the boundary of that field (‘where its limits lie’) is the same thing as the capital. Here the configurations and volumes of the capital possessed by the agents is the analytical focus in the empirical work. As there are structural and functional homologies between the particular fields, the field of power and the social space, the analytical approach of level 2 analysis is similar to level 1 analysis. Mapping out the position of different agents is done by plotting the configurations and volumes of the capital they hold and visualized by a two-axes figure.

In the **Level 3 analysis**, the analysis focuses on the habitus of the agents and on how the habitus forms and shapes agents’ actions in a particular field. It is important to note that the focus of the analysis in this level is on the relationships or correspondences between the agents, instead of on the agents themselves or their habituses. As Grenfell
summarises, ‘we are interested in how particular attributes, which are social in as much as they only have value in terms of the field as a whole. We are not concerned with individual idiosyncrasies’ (Grenfell, 2012: 222). I will return and give detailed elaborations on the nature of the habitus and how to analyse it in a particular field in section 1.1.2.

In short, all three levels, from the external to the internal of a field, construct a well-rounded analytical approach to explore a particular field. As commented by Grenfell, ‘it is the links between individuals (habitus), field structures, and the positionings both within and between fields that form a conceptual framework for research’ (Grenfell, 2012: 223). Yet it is important to note that, although a field can be outlined through the above steps, fields remain intangible and unstable social spaces with indistinct borders.

Logic of practice

According to Bourdieu, each field has its specific logics of practice. For Bourdieu, the logic of practice is key to outlining a field; as he puts it ‘in order to construct the field, one must identify the forms of specific capital that operate within it, and to construct the forms of specific capital one must know the specific logic of the field’ (Bourdieu 1992: 108). The function of the logic in a field can be shown by an analogy: if we consider the field as a game, then the logic of practice can be seen as the ‘rule’ of the game followed by all players. Functioning as an ‘often imprecise but systematic principle of selection’ (Bourdieu 1990: 102), the logic of practice ‘proceeds
through a series of irreversible choices by the agents … in response to other choices obeying the same logic’ (Bourdieu 1990: 101). Yet unlike the rule of a game, the logic of practice functions in an ‘invisible’ way, which ‘though immediately perceptible, has none of the strict, regular coherence of the concerted products of a plan’ (Bourdieu 1990: 102). In other words, the logic is not functioning as a written plan or rule that is published to all the actors in the game. In terms of how the actors are affected by the logic of practice, they ‘agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by way of a “contract”, that the game is worth playing’ (Bourdieu 1992, 98).

Bourdieu uses the artistic field and economic field as examples to show how the logics of practice function. For example, Bourdieu argues that the logic in the artistic field is the rejection of the law of material profit, yet the logic in the economic field is that ‘business is business’:

While the artistic field has constituted itself by rejecting or reversing the law of material profit (Bourdieu 1983d), the economic field has emerged, historically, through the creation of a universe within which, as we commonly say, ‘business is business’, where the enchanted relations of friendship and love are in principle excluded. (Bourdieu 1992: 97-98)

Bourdieu also argues that while the logic of practice continuously shapes the actions of the agents, it can also be shaped by the agents’ actions, partially or completely. Agents can shape the logic of practice through changing ‘the exchange rate between various species of capital, through strategies aimed at discrediting the form of capital upon which the force of their opponents rests (e.g., economic capital) and to valorise the species
of capital they preferentially possess (e.g., juridical capital)’ (Bourdieu 1992: 99).

When discussing giving an account of the logic of practice in each field, Bourdieu argues that the researcher should choose the conduct appropriate to each situation rather than resort to the imaginary ‘file of prefabricated representation’ (Bourdieu 1990: 100). That is to say, the researcher should try to understand the logic within the context of that field at that particular time, rather than adopting the same formula in all circumstances.

*Relationships and interactions of fields*

As for the relationship between the fields (not the field of power), some fields (e.g., economic field) occupy a dominant position in the social space while others (e.g., artistic field, education field) are in the dominated positions. According to Bourdieu, the distribution of the positions of fields is according to ‘the objective hierarchy of forms of capital, economic and cultural capital in particular’ (Bourdieu, 1996a: 270). Accordingly, the positions of particular fields can be plotted by a two-axes figure (with chiasmatic structure) through examining the figurations and volumes of capital (especially the economic and cultural capital) that the agents hold, as I have reviewed in level 1 field analysis (see *Figure 3*).

The configurations of capital in different fields also brings us to a relevant issue – how to map out the boundary of fields. In Bourdieu’s account, there is not entirely discrete boundary between fields. As a field is not of a
concrete, figured and stable precondition, there can be overlapping boundaries between fields. For example, the field of private schooling overlaps with the education field and the economic field. Yet a researcher can still outline a field as a means of ‘translating practical problems into concrete empirical operations’ (Thomson, 2012: 79). Then, the question arises how to map out the boundary of fields? As Bourdieu comments, the movement to different configurations of capital ‘entails a shift from one field to another field’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 126). A field, as a conceptual space, is organized with agents holding particular configurations of capital. For example, in the education field, the cultural resources (as cultural capital) are a key configuration of capital, which differentiate this field from other fields such as the economic field where the financial resources (as economic capital) act as a main configuration of capital. Yet Bourdieu has constantly reminded us that ‘the boundaries of the field can only be determined by an empirical investigation’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 100). That is to say, there is not a definitive method that is suitable for every field. Bourdieu does offer a principle to outline the boundary of fields, as he has done in his empirical investigations. That is, as the boundary of a particular field is situated at the point where the effects of that field cease, the researchers must try ‘by various means to measure in each case the point at which these statistically detectable effects decline’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 100). A point I would add is that ‘statistically detectable’ might not be a criterion to judge whether the research work is creditable,
as the data collected through a qualitative approach can also offer another way to map the boundary of the field.

Bourdieu writes considerably about the division of fields, such as the division from the field of power to the economic field, and then to the housing field. Yet it is important to note that he does not equate the way that fields relate to each other to the relationship of a system and its sub-systems. Bourdieu claims that a major difference between field and system is that 'a field does not have parts, components. Every subfield has its own logic, rules and regularities, and each stage in the division of a field … entails a genuine qualitative leap' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). Thus, what does Bourdieu mean by a ‘qualitative leap’? A key point of the qualitative leap refers to the stake for which the agents struggle in each field. For example, in the field of power, the key stake is the ‘exchange rate’ between different types of capital, which is different from the commercial interests for which the agents struggle in the economic field. The qualitative leap also embodies the scope of the struggle, including the types of agents involved, the configurations and volumes of capital exerted. In this sense, a qualitative leap can be identified when shifting from the economic field down to the housing field, and then to the individual firm as a field. At each stage, the types of agents are narrowed and the configuration and volumes of capital become more specified or contextualized.

Bourdieu suggests that interactions exist among different fields. As the field is not a static and fixed precondition, as I reviewed earlier, its structure
and power-relations can be shaped by the logic of the other fields. For example, in the contemporary artistic field, the patronage (from the economic field) and censorship (from the political field) can shape the artists’ actions (Bourdieu 1992: 109-110). Another example is that in the journalism field, the journalists are driven by the commercial logic of the economic field and produce decontextualized pieces of news to grab the audience’s attention (Bourdieu, 1998a). He has also explored how the political field and the economic field influence the educational field (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). When analysing the interactions among fields, Bourdieu insists that ‘there are no transhistoric laws of the relations between fields, that we must investigate each historical case separately’ (Bourdieu 1992: 109, original emphasis). He does not pursue a general theory on interactions of fields. This reminds us that we must investigate each case separately.

1.1.2 Habitus

As Bourdieu observes, his thinking about habitus started from this point: ‘how can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to rules?’ (1990a: 65). I understand this as the key to understanding habitus and how it functions. For Bourdieu, habitus ‘tends to generate all the “reasonable”, “common-sense”, behaviours (and only these) which are possible within the limits of these regularities’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 55). In this sense, habitus has some similarities with rule of behaviours, since both of them constrain agents’ perceptions and behaviours. Yet Bourdieu also
differentiates habitus from rule, stating that ‘habitus is a spontaneity without consciousness or will’ (1990c: 56). Bourdieu has used the metaphor of ‘collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 53) to describe how the agents’ behaviours are shaped by habitus unconsciously. Bourdieu also deliberately separates habitus from ‘habit’. For him, an important difference between habitus and habit, which refers to individual behaviour modes, is that habitus has an underlying structure that is historically and socially constructed. Rooted in and arising from particular social-economic conditions, habitus is a ‘structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field’ (1998a: 81). As a ‘structured body’, habitus is being shaped by actors’ past/present experiences, by the forms of capital they possess, and by the structure of the field, thus becoming the embodiment of the immanent necessity of the field. In turn, as a ‘structuring structure’, habitus is constantly ‘structuring’ the actors’ perceptions of the world and their actions in the world (Bourdieu, 1998a: 81).

Based on Bourdieu’s ideas, Maton argues that ‘relation is the essence of habitus’ (2012: 60), and the concept helps to overcome several dichotomies. First, habitus links the subjective with the objective. Habitus is a socialized body, which as cited above, ‘has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 81). It is not something purely intellectual or perceptual.
At the same time, habitus constantly shapes the agents’ actions, which in turn shape the field. Second, habitus connects social (collective) and individual trajectories. The habitus of an individual has roots in the person’s unique life experiences. In the meantime, ‘the subject is not the instantaneous ego of a sort of singular cogito, but the individual trace of an entire collective history’ (1990a: 91). That is to say, the experiences of an individual’s life may be unique but simultaneously share a structure with others from the same social class, gender, etc. Finally, habitus transcends the past/present dichotomy. Habitus ‘refers to something historical, it is linked to individual history’ (1990b: 86), thus it is constructed through individual/collective past experiences and is contributing to and being re-shaped by individual/collective ongoing experiences. In short, habitus is ‘a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 54).

The concept of habitus offers a unique perspective to examine how people’s knowledge, perceptions and attitudes are shaped by invisible rules, which are particularly valid for particular social groups, producing some degree of uniformity in their behaviours within the group. If so, then, what is the structure of habitus? In his writings, especially the section of ‘Structures, habitus, practice’ in *The Logic of Practice* (1980), Bourdieu gives an account of different aspects of habitus, about how it is formed and how it functions. He has not given a definitive or authoritative definition of habitus to make it an operative concept, since he believes that the analysis
of habitus should be put together in relation to a particular field. The ‘indeterminacy and changing notions of habitus’ (Reay, 2004: 438) can lead to a danger of tautological explanation, as reminded by Bourdieu himself: ‘why does someone make petty-bourgeois choices? Because he has a petty bourgeois habitus!’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 129). When being applied to empirical studies, the indeterminacy can lead to real challenges for researchers, since ‘one does not “see” a habitus but rather the effects of a habitus in the practices and beliefs to which it gives rise’ (Maton, 2012: 61, originally emphasises). Specifically, the challenge could be giving a reasonable account in response to the following questions: ‘what particular structure of the habitus is in play here compared to other possible habitus structures? And how can we tell when that habitus has changed, varied or remained the same?’ (Maton, 2012: 61). In addition, would the analysis be at collective or individual level? Yet this indeterminacy of the meaning also creates a space for the researchers’ own interpretations, which, as Reay comments, ‘makes possible adaptation rather than the more constricting straightforward adoption of the concept within empirical work’ (Reay, 1995: 357). Indeed, this is the positive aspect of the indeterminacy of the concept of habitus.

1.1.3 Capital

‘The forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986) is Bourdieu's classic work on the forms of capital and their inter-conversions. In this paper, Bourdieu criticized the traditional understanding of ‘capital’, which was limited to its
economic form, which is marked by its immediate and direct convertibility into money and its capability of being institutionalized in the forms of property rights. Extending the concept of ‘capital’ to a wider system of social and cultural exchanges, Bourdieu puts forward the concepts of social capital and cultural capital.

Bourdieu has defined social capital as follows:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. (Bourdieu, 1986: 248-249)

According to Bourdieu, to understand the formulation and operation of social capital, it is necessary to recognize that social capital is linked to a durable network of connections that provides the agent with collectively-owned capital, and that the volume of social capital depends on the size of the network of connections owned by the agents. Therefore, the connection (or relationship) between actors is the key point for understanding social capital.

As for cultural capital, Bourdieu specifically classified its three states: the embodied state, the objectified state, and the institutionalized state. The objectified state is in the form of cultural goods such as paintings, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc. A notable feature of this type of cultural capital is that it is transmissible in its materiality. In this, the
objectified state of cultural capital is different to the embodied state and institutionalized state, which are ‘linked to the body and presupposes embodiment’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 244). While the formation of the embodied and institutionalized state of cultural capital involves the exertion of economic and material resources, it takes time and cannot occur second hand. The embodied state is in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body, for instance, so-called cultivation. As for the institutionalized state, I consider it as a special part of the embodied state. While being materialized in forms such as educational qualifications, what is underneath the institutionalized state is the formation of the long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body. Yet the institutionalized state does have a unique feature, which makes it different to the embodied state. As noted by Bourdieu, an academic qualification is a certificate of cultural competence that confers on its holder a conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value, and ‘there is an essential difference between the officially recognized, guaranteed competence and simple cultural capital, which is constantly required to prove itself’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). In addition, the institutionalized state makes it possible to establish the ‘conversion rates between cultural capital and economic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 248), by guaranteeing the monetary value of certain academic qualifications.

Unlike the social capital, economic capital and objectified state of cultural capital, the embodied state of cultural capital is not ‘transferable’ (in a
narrow sense). Instead, it could be cultivated through an accumulation process with the involvement of others’ cultural capital (this process could also be seen as ‘transference’, but in a broad sense). To offer an example, you cannot ‘borrow’ your parents’ knowledge (embodied state of cultural capital) to apply for university, but your parents’ social network and financial support might help you get a better university offer.

As an ‘accumulated labour’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 241), capital is accumulated through trajectories over time. Since labour accumulation is an ‘unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 250), it links past trajectories with the present. In the meantime, labour is an amalgam of the subjective and the objective, as the subjective endeavour is necessary during the formation of capital and the objective resources serve as the base for the subjective endeavour. The accumulation of capital is also an integration of individual and collective endeavour. Bourdieu claims that ‘[s]ocial capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).

Bourdieu argues that ‘[t]he convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social space)’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 253). Thus the conversion process amongst different forms of capital becomes an
invisible way of conserving and reproducing the capital. As for the capital conversions, although all different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, the transformation is not instantaneous and equivalent. Instead, it relies on labour and time as mediums (Bourdieu, 1986). In addition, the conversion also relies on institutional instruments. For example, the education system promotes the circulation of capital through the unification of the market in academic qualifications, which gives an agent the rights to occupy exclusive social positions and in the meantime disguises the system's function of capital circulation.

As for the relationship between capital and field, Bourdieu states that the structure of the capital represents the ‘immanent structure of the social world’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 242). Capital accumulation in turn re-constructs the field by continuously shaping the positions and power-relations of the actors, as I have reviewed earlier in this chapter (section 1.1.1). As for the relation between capital (especially the embodied-state cultural capital) and habitus, Bourdieu states that capital contributes to the formation and transformation of one’s habitus, as it converts ‘into an integral part of a person, into a habitus’ (Bourdieu 1997: 48). In turn, habitus also shapes the way people exert their capitals as well as the gaining or losing of capitals in particular fields, for example, whether s/he has the awareness or motivation to deploy cultural, social, or economic resources as relevant capital for particular fields. My analysis in chapter 10 offers an example of how migrant parents’ habitus shapes their deployment of capital in the
According to Bourdieu, field, habitus, and capital do not operate independently. Rather, the three concepts are inter-related, and Bourdieu has used an equation to illuminate their relationship: ‘(Habitus × Capital) + Field = Practice’ (1984: 101). He considers practice as a product of the collective interaction of field, habitus and capital. As I have reviewed earlier, field provides a social space (e.g. the field of schooling), which both shapes and reconstructs the actors’ power-relationships and struggles; habitus and capitals are shaped by and constantly reconstruct the field. As Bourdieu understands the concepts to be interrelated, Maton argues that ‘any attempt to explain practice using habitus alone is not Bourdieusian’ (2012: 60). This argument also applies to the relationship between capital and field. When analysing the function of habitus and capital, Bourdieu and some other researchers are always clear about the particular field in which the actors are located to avoid splitting the connections between field and habitus/capital. For example, both Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) have found that the migrant children’s habitus and capital can be marginalized in some fields while valued in other fields. Whether marginalized or valued depends on what aspect of their habitus is under discussion (the rural or urban elements) and how their knowledge, abilities or material possessions are judged in different situations, namely, the field that the children are in (urban school or rural school). The interrelationship
of the three concepts should always be kept in mind when undertaking Bourdieusian research. I will be back to this point in more details in the end of section 1.2.2, where I review the Bourdieusian studies of migrant children’s social relationships in schools.

1.2 Concepts that extend Bourdieu’s ideas

1.2.1 Field, educational policy and cross-field effects

Following Bourdieu’s concept of field, some researchers have theorized educational policy as a social field and have explored the ‘cross-field effects’ among different fields, such as educational policy, journalism/media, economy, and politics (Ladwig, 1994; Lingard and Rawolle, 2004; Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor, 2005; Thomson, 2005).

Theorizing educational policy as a social field

Bringing Bourdieu’s field theory into educational policy studies, Ladwig (1994) makes an initial attempt to examine ‘what it would mean to analyse educational policy as a social field’. In Ladwig’s account, the field of educational policy can be distinguished from the field of education. As Ladwig points out,

[E]ducational policy concerns itself (mostly) with the practices that occur within schools and educational systems and yet remains ‘outside’ or ‘above’ the schools themselves… most of the players in the field of education have little or no impact on educational policy (at the state or federal level) and cannot be considered players in the field of educational policy (1994: 344-345).

The way Ladwig theorizes the relative autonomy of educational policy field
is to explore the agents’ objective positions, habitus and capitals that are specific to this field. His analytical approach matches with Bourdieu’s own account, as Bourdieu claims that it is necessary to analyse the positions of the field vis-à-vis the field of power, to map out ‘the objective structures of relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions’ and to analyse the habitus of agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104-105; see also section 1.1.1 in this chapter). Ladwig also argues that there is an overlap between the educational policy field and the field of the State. In my research, I will further adopt Ladwig’s idea and consider education policy as a specific field, which is also a sub-field of the field of public policy (see chapter 7, section 2). I will outline the forms of capitals, the hierarchical relationships and each actor’s position, and the strategies the actors adopt in their struggle in the field of education policy.

Cross-field effects

Based on the idea of the relations and inter-dependence of different fields (Bourdieu, 1988, 1992; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; see also section 1.1.1 in this chapter), Lingard and Rawolle put forward the concept of ‘cross-field effects’, illustrating ‘how today educational policy can be spawned from developments in other public policy fields’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 361). In order to understand the relationships between media and policy, Lingard and Rawolle theorize ‘mediatisation’ (Fairclough, 2000) as a process in which ‘the logics of practice of the journalistic field reconstituted the naming of that policy [The Chance to Change] as
aphorism’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 377). Through a case study of the Australian scientific policy *The Chance to Change*, their research shows that ‘as this policy went through various iterations and media representations, its naming and structure became more aphoristic’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 361). Through the mediatisation, the aphorisms are increasingly evident in the changes of the titles of the report, in the headers accompanying each section, and in the introductions to each report. As a result, ‘the style and presentation of the reports became more and more framed by factors related to marketing the policy, making it more amenable for medial up-take’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 371). In Lingard and Rawolle’s account, mediatisation is the main mechanism of the cross-field effects among the fields of journalism, science policy and education policy.

Another main contribution of Lingard and Rawolle (2004) is that they have summarised five general categories of cross-field effects and analyse how these effects happen from the scientific policy field to the educational policy field. The cross-field effects are: first, structural effects, which relate to the links between structures of the fields. The linkage imposes, by varying degrees, the logics of practice of one field over others. For example, the science policy field has been structurally affected by the media field, in the sense that the effectiveness of many science policies is dependent on their portrayal in the media. Second, event effects, which relate to specific occurrences whose impacts cascade between fields. The effects can be
ongoing, such as a political scandal involving systemic corruption, or short-term, such as the discovery of a scientific fraud with little lasting substantive impacts. Third, systemic effects, which relate to broad changes in the values underpinning social fields. These effects are usually more incremental than event effects. For example, the principles of the government’s role as understood under the Keynesian settlement have changed under a neo-liberal consensus. Fourth, temporal effects, which are those limited in duration. Finally, hierarchical and vertical effects, which refer to the effects that exist as a result of asymmetrical structural links between fields which hold different positions relative to one another. For example, dependence can be identified between the education field and the state field, as education relies on the favourable funding and policy directions from the government. In addition, in another relevant paper, Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor point out that while the cross-field effects can happen among different fields within the nation state, they also have an international dimension with international agencies affecting domestic fields through processes of globalisation (Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor, 2005). Among the five effects, event effects and systemic effects resonate with my re-conceptualisation of cross-field effects, as I will elaborate later, hence I further develop these concepts by enriching their meanings and adding analytical elements and using them in my study. The event effects relate to specific occurrences whose impacts cascade between fields. This concept is relevant to my data in that the alterations in migrant children’s
schooling policy were shaped by changes in migrant population policy. The systemic effects relate to broad changes in the values underpinning social fields, and are usually more incremental than event effects. As shown in my data, some respondents report that they can see connections between the change of educational policy and the change of political leaders and their governing priorities and strategies. In short, Lingard and Rawolle’s work on cross-field effects provides a valuable preliminary framework to explore how educational policy can be shaped by other social domains.

While acknowledging the contribution of Lingard and Rawolle (2004), I identify the following aspects of their research that are in need of development. First, Lingard and Rawolle indicate that there are some ‘connections between different fields’ (2004: 368), serving as the precondition of the cross-field effects. However, they have not developed this idea by pointing out what the connections are and how they work. As shown by my data, the social domains (fields of education, population policy, politics and economy) are connected by the migrants themselves and the government departments in central and local level; these actors are all agents in Bourdieu’s account. This finding resonates with Thomson (2005), which identifies the role of agents as the connections in the interactions between fields. Enlightened by the data and Thomson’s work, I conceptualise the agents as the connections between fields, serving as part of the cross-field mechanisms.
Second, but more important, while summarizing five general categories of effects, Lingard and Rawolle (2004) have not conceptualised the nature of cross-field effects. The indeterminacy of this key concept limits the explanatory power of the analytical framework. Yet they have offered a unique approach to reveal the nature of the effects through their discussion of ‘mediatization’. They theorize mediatization as a process in which the logic of practice of the journalistic field continuously shapes the style and presentation of scientific policy texts, making the policy ‘more amenable for media up-take’ (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004: 371). Their attention to the logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1990, 1992) resonates with my analysis of the policy text and interview data, as it shows that underpinning the change of migrant children’s policy is the change in the local government’s definition of the type of citizens they want. The concept of logic of practice can help one to understand the logic of the educational policy and how it is shaped by other fields.

Third, Lingard and Rawolle have not focused on Bourdieu’s level one field analysis (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; see also section 1.1.1 earlier in this chapter) to map out the distribution and hierarchy within the journalistic field, the policy fields, and the field of power in the social space. As Bourdieu states, the field analysis involves three necessary and internally connected moments and in the level one analysis ‘one must

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1 In another paper, Rawolle has summarized cross-field effects as ‘effects that result from the interrelations between fields’ (Rawolle, 2005: 709). But this summary is still a literal explanation rather than a conceptualization.
analyse the positions of the field vis-à-vis the field of power’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). This is necessary for empirical studies (including mine) as it provides a holistic perspective to examine the power relations between fields (see, for example, Thomson, 2005).

Finally, the arguments of Lingard and Rawolle (2004) are based on the analysis of policy texts with little interview data. This sole data source limits their analysis of how agents exert their social/cultural/economic capitals in their struggle in the fields. My research is based on analysis of both policy texts and interview data from a variety of types of agents in the related fields. Therefore, my analytical framework will integrate the analysis of struggle among different agents shaped by their capitals, of what role the struggle plays in the cross-field effects and how their struggle is being changed by the changed logic of practice.

1.2.2 Habitus and cultural capital in education

The operationalisation of the concept of habitus: three dimensions

The existing research, including that of Bourdieu himself, has tried to operationalize the concept of habitus from three dimensions. In the first dimension, when examining the habitus from the aspect of different social groups, some studies have conceptualised specific varieties of habitus such as the ‘petit-bourgeois habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1984), ‘working-class habitus’ (Reay, 1997), ‘rural habitus’ (Atkin, 2000; Li, 2013; Mu and Jia, 2016), and ‘vocational habitus’ (Colley et al., 2003; Vincent and Braun,
In the second dimension, when examining the habitus of a particular group in a particular field, Bourdieu himself sometimes conceptualises it with a brief term, for example, a ‘habitus of order’ (1984), to capture the core characteristics of that habitus. Another example is Horvat and Antonio (1999), who when analysing the organisation habitus of an elite school summarise it as ‘a sense of oblivious entitlement’ characterized by white and wealthy privilege. My research will also conceptualise aspects of the rural habitus of migrant parents such as not seeing themselves as educators, a similar understanding to that of Lareau (1989) and Vincent et al (2010) regarding working-class groups within the US and UK contexts respectively. The third dimension is that the researchers mentioned have all explored specific aspects of the habitus. For example, Bourdieu explored the petit-bourgeois habitus from the specific aspects of ‘asceticism, rigour, legalism, the propensity to accumulation in all its forms’ (1984: 331). Among the research on migrant children in the Chinese school field, Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) have shown that the exploration of students’ habitus can include the following aspects: what kinds of language or with what accent do they speak? What kinds of routine behaviours do they have? Their way of exploring the multiple aspects of school life is supported by multiple forms of data and offers a valuable mode for my analysis.

*Habitus, cultural capital and migrant children’s education in China*

Utilizing the Bourdieusian concepts of ‘field’, ‘capital’ and ‘habitus’, the
existing literature has explored a range of topics around educational policy and international migrant children’s education in different countries, through both qualitative (mainly interview) and quantitative (survey and statistical analysis) methods (Griffin et al., 2012; Nash, 2002; Lee and Kao, 2009; Abada and Tenkorang, 2009). More specifically, some studies have explored migrant students’ social relationships in school (Devine, 2009; Gu, 2011; Li, 2013; Koo et al., 2014; Mu and Jia, 2016; Xu, 2016). Based on empirical investigations of rural-to-urban migration in Mainland China, Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) look at migrant children in compulsory education age.

Mu and Jia (2016) explores how the rural habitus of migrant children differentiates them from their urban peers, conceptualising the habitus as marked by migrant children’s hometown accents and routine behaviours, including their hygiene, hobbies, sense of discipline, and the way they talk and behave. Their rural habitus was formed through their earlier life experiences in the rural area, where ‘[t]he rural population has long been physically and socially connected to farmlands, a field that nurtures freestyle being and doing’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418). Inheriting a ‘raw model of life’, the migrant children’s behaviors are ‘at odds with the so-called disciplines shaped by the urban school fields’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418). For example, their routine behaviours are perceived by the urban teachers and classmates as ‘didn’t have good hygienic habits’, ‘very loud in public’ and having ‘impoliteness’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418-419). Yet this paper also
suggests that in some other situations, the migrant children’s rural habitus could accrue value. For example, some teachers praised the migrant children in front of Beijing local students for their independence and ability and their willingness to help their parents with cooking, laundry and cleaning, or looking after their younger siblings. Based on its findings, this paper ‘challenges the static views that stereotype the rural habitus of floating children as [being a] disadvantaged dispositions at all times in all places’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 423), which is another key finding for future research.

Like Mu and Jia (2016), Koo et al (2014) also explores how habitus shapes migrants’ transformation and deployment of capitals in the educational field. While the former focuses on the rural habitus of migrants in the urban school field, the latter focuses on their urban habitus in the rural school field. Koo et al study the remigration of migrant children\(^1\) to their hometowns as a change in their field, from the urban school field to the rural school field, and outlines the logics of practice of these fields. The logic in the urban school field places a stronger emphasis on a well-rounded education and reduces the emphasis on examinations, while the logic in the rural school field is examination oriented education. The main contribution of Koo et al (2014) is that they have innovatively conceptualise the urbanisation of migrant children’s habitus as marked by their speaking

\(^1\) Koo et al (2014) has defined the ‘return migrant students’ as those ‘who have lived in cities where they had access to the compulsory education system, [and] are sent back to their rural hometowns to prepare for higher education in China’ (pp. 795).
of standard Mandarin and their appreciation of particular forms of
politeness and civility, and being in the view if the authors ‘more civilized’,
‘more cosmopolitan’ and ‘open-minded’ (Koo et al., 2004: 802), which are
marked as characteristic of the urban field. Koo et al (2014), Mu and Jia
(2016), together with Li (2013), which focuses on rural students in
university, offer implications for my study by outlining possible markers of
migrant children’s habitus and capital: what kinds of language or with what
accent do they speak? What kinds of routine behaviors do they have? What
are their ‘way[s] of eating, walking and speaking’ (Li, 2013: 835)? What
extra-curricular hobbies and social activities do they have? Applying their
ideas to my empirical data, I have conceptualised the language that the
migrant children use, the way they behave and present themselves, and
their attitude to extra-curricular hobbies as markers of their habitus (see
chapter 10, section 4).

In addition, Koo et al (2014) argue that the urbanized habitus can hardly
be valued and transferred into valued cultural capital in the rural school
field, where the dominant logic appreciates the virtue of extremely hard
academic work, which the returning migrant children did not learn in cities.

Their ability to speak standard Mandarin - a valued form of cultural capital

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1 It is important to note that the authors tend to take a deficit view of the rural
population by conceptualising the characteristics of politeness and civility as
exclusively owned by urban residents.
2 My conceptualization here resonates with the Bourdieusian influenced Great
British Class Survey, which incorporates lifestyle indicators into its
conceptualization of the cultural capital of seven social classes, such as people’s
‘leisure interests, musical tastes, use of the media, and food preferences’ (Savage
et al., 2013: 223-224).
in the urban field - has now been devalued since both teachers and local students prefer to speak their local dialect as the instructional language and language of daily communication. Similarly, their habitus of appreciating particular forms of politeness and civility have also been devalued in this field. This field-habitus mismatch has produced disadvantages for returning migrant children’s academic performance and peer relationships. Together with Mu and Jia (2016), Koo et al (2014) reminds me that inhabiting an urbanized habitus and owning the accompanying capital does not guarantee an advantageous position in any field and in return, inhabiting a rural habitus does not necessarily produce disadvantage. In contrast to some studies which claim to be Bourdieusian yet use capital and/or habitus detached from field, Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) highlight that when analysing the function of habitus and capital, we should always be clear about the field in which the habitus and capital are functioning. I have kept this in mind when analyzing migrant children and parents’ habitus and capital in the rural and urban educational field.

Yet in the existing studies on migrants’ habitus and their social inclusion in school, what has not been well-established is a holistic view of the re-shaped identity and habitus and the inner-group differences of the migrants as a result of migration. First, it is a common practice that the researchers take a one-sided perspective of migrant’s habitus. For example, Mu and Jia (2016) focus on the rural habitus of migrants in the urban school field,
while Koo et al (2014) focuses on their urban habitus in the rural school field. In other words, both studies focus either on migrant children’s unchanged rural habitus or on their urbanized habitus, instead of exploring how the children’s habitus presents both rural and urbanized aspects. The underlying assumption of the existing literature resonates with what Erel (2010) criticises as a ‘rucksack approach’ in the studies of migrating cultural capital. The ‘rucksack approach’ assumes that the migrants ‘bring a set of cultural resources from the country of origin to the country of migration that either fit or do not fit’, whereas an alternative position is to examine the ‘ways of producing and re-producing (mobilizing, enacting, validating) cultural capital that builds on, rather than simply mirrors, power relations of either the country of origin or the country of migration’ (Erel, 2010: 642). Erel's idea also applies to the study of habitus, as capital converts ‘into an integral part of a person, into a habitus’ (Bourdieu 1997: 48; see also, section 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 in this chapter). Following Erel's idea, I examine both rural and urbanized aspects of the migrants’ habitus and cultural capital with the support of my empirical data. Second, the existing studies have a common assumption that the migrant parents and children have similar habitus. Based on this assumption, they tend to simply attribute the difficulties migrant children have in their social relationships to the common features of the dispositions of migrant as a social group. Accordingly, Mu and Jia (2016) and Koo et al (2014) have not included parent respondents in their research designs, and there are limited
discussions of parental habitus and its influences on children’s studying and the family-school interaction. The missing role of parents might lead to one-sided findings concerning children’s experiences in school. Yet as revealed by my empirical data, the migrant children’s habitus has been largely urbanised, any problems in the interaction with teachers are largely a result of their parents’ continued rural and working-class habitus. Noticing this research gap, my paper highlights the influence of home-school interactions on the migrant children’s social relationships in school. Finally, the re-shaping and differentiation of the habitus of migrant children from their parents can be examined through a discussion of the multi-dimensions of their identities. I have conceptualized three dimensions of migrant children and parents’ identity, which are ‘migrant/urban grown up’, ‘rural/urban’ and ‘working-class’ (see chapter 10, section 2). The migrant children’s habitus is restructured by their adaptation to urban life and growing up as city-based working-class children, while their parents have largely kept their identity as migrant rural workers. The three dimensions mutually contributes to the generational differentiation and shapes their power-relation with other actors in the field.

2. Foucauldian resources

The Foucauldian theoretical resources, such as the concept of ‘discourse’ (Foucault, 1971, 1981, 2002), and its usages by later researchers, such as ‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ (Ball, 1990, 1994), ‘policy cycle’
(Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) and ‘policy archaeology’ (Foucault, 2002; Scheurich, 1994), provide a unique perspective to conceptualise educational policy processes in terms of discursive formation.

2.1 Foucault, discourse, and power

‘We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation... it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined’ (Foucault, 2002: 131). According to Foucault, discourse is a group of statements, and the function of statements is to define the conditions of existence of the objects. Here, Foucault has made a distinction between statement and sentence (or grammar and logic): ‘in examining the statements what we have discovered is a function that has a bearing on groups of signs, which is identified neither with grammatical “acceptability” nor with logical correctness’ (2002: 129). Statement is more than sentence, grammar, or logic. He continues explaining that statement carries with it:

[A] referential (which is not exactly a fact, a state of things, or even an object, but a principle of differentiation); a subject (not the speaking consciousness, not the author of the formulation, but a position that may be filled in certain conditions by various individuals); an associated field (which is not the real context of the formulation, the situation in which it was articulated, but a domain of coexistence for other statements); a materiality (which is not only the substance or support of the articulation, but a status, rules of transcription, possibilities of use and re-use). (Foucault, 2002: 129)

What Foucault wants to express here is that statement is about ‘a group of
conditions of existence’ (Foucault, 2002: 131). Accordingly, Foucault (2002) puts forward what he calls archaeology as a method to explore the discursive formation. He reminds us that we should not treat discourses as ‘groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations), but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 2002: 54). This understanding directs us to the concept of power relations invested and realized in the discursive formation, which is the main task of Foucault’s method of genealogy, another method Foucault uses in his studies (Foucault, 1978, 1979). Foucault maintains that the core of the nature of discourse is the inseparable nature of ‘knowledge/power’, as he posits:

No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, accumulation and displacement, which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely no power can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. On this level, there is not knowledge on the one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but only the fundamental forms of knowledge/power... (Foucault, 1971: 66, cited from Ball 1990: 17)

Knowledge cannot be understood as simply objective facts about ‘reality’: rather, it is permeated by power relations, which can have different configurations, such as disciplinary power and biopower (Foucault, 1975, 1981). In return, it is through knowledge, as a carrier, that power reproduces, reconstructs, and disseminates itself in an invisible way. The concept of ‘discourse’ helps us to explore the inter-relationship between
knowledge and power, to reveal how our understanding of things is constructed through the conjunction of knowledge/power. Discourse constructs what can be thought, what would be thought as impossible, and what can be said. As Ball summarises, ‘We do not speak the discourse. The discourse speaks us.’ (1990: 18)

Foucault has not put forward a conceptual framework for discourse. What he has done is to remind us about the inseparable nature of ‘knowledge/power’, through asking ‘how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?’ (Foucault, 2002: 30). He has left a broad space for later researchers to deconstruct the ‘facts’, ideas and relationships that comprise our social life.

2.2 Concepts that extend Foucault’s ideas

While Foucault has put forward the concept of discourse, he did not apply it to educational policy studies. Following Foucault’s ideas, some researchers have tried to theorize the education policy process with the concept of discourse (Ball, 1990; Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1994; Scheurich, 1994), although little existing literature adopts this concept to explore internal migrant children’s education in China.

2.2.1 ‘Policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’

As Foucault puts it, ‘in any society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a number of procedures whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to master the
unpredictable event' (1981: 53). Policy processes represent such a kind of procedure that controls, selects, organizes and redistributes the production of discourse, for policies are,

pre-eminently, statements about practice - the way things could or should be - which rest upon, derive from, statements about the world - about the way things are. They are intended to bring about idealised solutions to diagnosed problems. Policies embody claims to speak with authority, they legitimate and initiate practices in the world, and they privilege certain visions and interests. They are power/knowledge configurations par excellence. (Ball, 1990: 22, original emphasis)

Since policy means to bring about idealized ‘solutions’ to ‘diagnosed problems’, it becomes the perfect carrier for power/knowledge configurations. Therefore, the concept of discourse ‘provides a particular and pertinent way of understanding policy formation’ (Ball, 1990: 22).

Taking a discursive account of education policy, Ball's research draws attention to ‘the way in which these emergent discourses were constructed to define the field, articulate the positions and thus subtly set limits to the possibilities of education policy’ (1990: 23), to deconstruct the power/knowledge configurations of policy. That is to say, the mundane talking, writing and other forms of expressions of different actors can be seen as discursive practices, and thus be analysed to explore their interrelationship, negotiation, conflict or struggle in policy interpretation and enactment.

In relation to the conceptualization of discourse, Ball also conceptualizes policy as text, as the policy texts ‘posit a restructuring, redistribution and
disruption of power relations’ (Ball, 1994: 20). A policy text may carry and present conflicting interests, present the voice of dominant interests, or alternatively a compromise between competing interests. In the meantime, the effects of policy enactment can differ from the intentions of policy authors, since the policy text is ‘decoded in complex ways via actors’ interpretations and meanings in relation to their history, experiences, skills, resources and context’ (Ball, 1994: 16). Ball’s conceptualizations of policy as discourse and as text are ‘implicit in each other’ (1994: 15), providing the policy analysts with an understanding that is based ‘not on constraint or agency but on the changing relationships between constraint and agency and their inter-penetration’ (1994: 21, original emphasis). This conceptualization resonates with Bowe, Ball and Gold’s (1992) work on ‘policy cycle’, upon which I will elaborate in the following section.

2.2.2 Policy cycle

Bowe, Ball and Gold (1992) put forward the ‘policy cycle’ framework to conceptualise the policy trajectory as three inter-related contexts, namely the context of influence, the context of policy text production and the context of practice. This framework can be used to facilitate the Foucauldian exploration of discourse and policy. According to Bowe, Ball and Gold (1992), each of the three policy contexts consists of a number of arenas of action, which involve struggle and compromise. The context of influence is where the policy is initiated, and therefore it is where discourse produces the possibilities of policy – what is a social problem and what is
a possible solution. In education, for example, it shapes ‘the definition and social purposes of education, what it means to be educated’ (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992: 19). The arenas within this context illustrate how the interested parties struggle to shape or are shaped by the policy discourses and policy agendas. Another context refers to policy text production. While articulated in the language of general public good, the policy text is the outcome of struggle and compromise and therefore presents the interests of particular groups. The arenas within this context illustrate how different interests are integrated into and presented through the policy texts. The last context is the context of practice. Bowe, Ball and Gold point out that ‘policy is not simply received and implemented within this arena, rather it is subject to interpretation and then “recreated”’ (1992: 22). That is to say, within the context of practice, the arenas illustrate how actors interpret and enact the policy within the limits of discourse. In sum, the three contexts constitute a conceptual structure for a policy trajectory study approach, which ‘provides a mechanism for linking and tracing the discursive origins and possibilities of policy, as well as the intentions embedded in, responses to and effects of policy’ (Ball, 1994: 26). It is particularly useful for my Foucauldian policy discourse analysis, as it connects the broad social context (political, economic and cultural) with policy text production (through struggle and compromise) and the actors’ interpretations and translations of the policy.

Another important feature of ‘policy cycle’, as identified by Rizvi and
Lingard, is that it ‘rejects a one-way, linear account of relationships between the setting of policy agendas, the production of the policy text and its implementation into practice’ (2010: 6). The three contexts’ ‘boundaries’ are permeable, and as Ball has commented, ‘[t]hey are loosely coupled and there is no one simple direction of flow of information between them’ (1994: 26). Therefore, the policy cycle framework can ‘capture the interactive, synergistic set of relationships between these contexts’ (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 6).

Policy sociology researchers have also put forward a range of questions for critical policy analysis, which are framed around three issues: contextual issues, policy and textual issues, and implementation and outcomes issues (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 54-56). Under the ‘policy and textual issues’, some questions match with the discourse analysis approach, so I have included them in my analysis to accompany the ‘policy cycle’ analysis. These questions include: ‘how is the policy problem conceptualised? What alternative problems constructions have been rejected/neglected? How have any competing interests been sutured together in the text? Who has advocated and promoted the policy and why?’ (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 54)

2.2.3 Policy archaeology: the role of social regularities

While creating a space for policy discourse analysis, the ‘policy cycle’ framework still needs to be complemented by other theoretical resources to strengthen its explanatory power for the discursive formation of
educational policy. The work of Scheurich (1994) meets this need. Drawing from the work of Foucault (2002), Scheurich puts forward a new policy study methodology called ‘policy archaeology’. His exploration of the four policy arenas partly matches with the policy cycle framework:

- **Arena I.** The education/social problem arena: the study of the social construction of specific education and social problems.
- **Arena II.** The social regularities arena: the identification of the network of social regularities across education and social problems.
- **Arena III.** The policy solution arena: the study of the social construction of the range of acceptable policy solutions.
- **Arena IV.** The policy studies arena: the study of the social functions of policy studies itself. (Scheurich, 1994: 300)

What can be identified is that exploring the social construction of educational problem, or policy agenda, Arena I matches the ‘context of influence’ in the policy cycle. In addition, exploring the social construction of the range of acceptable policy solutions, Arena III matches the ‘context of policy text production’. Yet different to the policy cycle framework, Scheurich differentiates the ‘social regularities arena’ (Arena II) from the ‘education/social problem arena’ (Arena I). To Scheurich, the grid of social regularities, including gender, race, class, governmentality and professionalization, constitutes ‘what becomes socially visible as a social problem and what becomes socially visible as a range of credible policy solutions’ (Scheurich, 1994: 301). That is, the network of social regularities refers to some ‘deeper’ features of social organisation, instead of being on the surface of the contexts of specific social problems. From a Foucauldian perspective, the social regularity acts as the ‘rules of formation’ (Foucault,
2002: 42). The analysis of the social regularities can therefore deepen the analysis of the discursive production of the policy agenda and policy texts. Noting its theoretical potential, I integrate this concept into the policy cycle framework, creating an additional ‘pre-context’ of social regularities, which shapes the context of influence and refers to the ‘deeper’ features of the social organisations (see chapter 8, section 2).

3. Policy as a temporary consensus between groups

Conceptualising public policy as a product of group equilibrium, Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008) have redefined what is called ‘policy’ and offered valuable implications for my research. In his 1951 book, Truman explores how the interactions among interest groups shaped the US governmental process, which covers public opinion, political parties, elections, legislative process, executive, administrative process and judiciary. Exploring the role of interest groups in the entire governmental process, this book brings an ‘interest group’ approach into political research. Although it does not specifically discuss the way that the interest groups shape policy-making, its formulation of interest groups affecting the legislative process offers some implications for policy studies. The primary implication is that ‘even a temporarily viable legislative decision usually must involve the adjustment and compromise of interest. Even where virtual unanimity prevails in the legislature, the process of reconciling conflicting interest must have taken place’ (Truman, 1951: 392). This
statement points out that the nature of the legislative decision making, which can also be extended to policy making, is ‘a unique amalgam’ (Truman, 1951: 391) of the adjustment and compromise of group interests. Another main implication is that the underlying impetus of legislative changes lies in the changes of the balance of influences among interest groups. As Truman puts it:

> Depending on the circumstances and the relative importance of these factors in a given situation some groups will enjoy comparatively effective access, and others will find difficulty in securing even perfunctory treatment. As conditions change, as some of these influences become more and others less potent, the fortunes of group claims upon the legislature will rise or decline. (Truman, 1951: 350)

This statement clearly reveals the connections between the changes in the balance of influences among interest groups and the changes in the legislature process.

Following Truman’s ideas, Latham re-conceptualises the nature of public policy as the ‘equilibrium reached in the group struggle’. As he puts it, ‘what may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive to weight in their favour’ (1952: 390). Latham’s contribution is that he introduces Truman’s ideas into policy studies and re-conceptualises the nature of public policy accordingly. Dye extends Latham’s idea by revealing the underlying impetus of the changes of policy: ‘changes in the relative influence of any interest groups can be expected to result in changes in public policy; policy
will move in the direction desired by the groups gaining influence and away from the desires of groups losing influence’ (Dye, 2008: 23). In brief, policy changes when interest groups lose or gain influences.

The works of Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008) on policy as a product of group equilibrium offers me a unique perspective to examine the formation of several unique forms of schooling for migrant children in Shanghai and Beijing. While providing me with valuable implications, their works cannot be applied directly to my research. The first issue is the use of the word ‘equilibrium’. This word contains notions of harmony and balance, which are not in keeping with a policy sociology perspective revealing conflict which I take in this study (see chapter 5, section 1). I suggest the use of the idea of temporary policy settlements instead, which suggests a temporary consensus between groups (Gale, 1999). This idea is more appropriate as it encompasses the ideas of struggle and compromise in policies in different countries and contexts (Ball, 1990, 1994; Apple, 2000, 2004; Lingard and Rizvi, 2009), including what I have found in my data (see chapter 11, section 2). Another issue is that the works of Truman (1951), Latham (1952) and Dye (2008) mainly focus on the ‘policy-making’ phase, yet my research takes a ‘policy enactment’ (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012) perspective to re-conceptualise the ‘policy making - policy implementation - policy evaluation’ linear development, and to examine the whole policy trajectory (see chapter 5, section 1). In addition, their arguments were put forward in the
US context, under which an important organisational form of social groups is the formal interest group. It is important to note that policy enactment is shaped by the political system (including political institutions, policy making process, legislative system, etc.) in which it is located, yet the political systems are not the same in different contexts, such as the US and China. Under the Chinese context, social groups do not often present themselves as formal interest groups, although the individuals in the same group do share the same interests. For example, while being widely considered as a social group, the migrant people have not established formal interest groups through which to influence public policy. Therefore, in my analysis of the formation of a new school system for migrant children, I prefer not to use the concept of ‘interest group’. Instead, I will look at the individual and collective actors, such as the district municipality of education, the UIP schools, the state schools, and the migrant parents to see how they interact with each other.

4. Conclusion: towards a multi-dimensional policy analysis framework

Taking a policy sociology approach, my study aims at excavating and presenting the complexities in the policy enactment process (Ball, 1990, 1994; see also, chapter 5, section 1). As Ball reminds us, ‘the complexity and scope of policy analysis - from an interest in the workings of the state to a concern with contexts of practice and the distributional outcomes of
policy - preclude the possibility of successful single theory explanations’ (Ball, 1993: 10). Different theoretical tools can facilitate researchers’ understandings of different aspects or dimensions of the same research topic to enrich the analysis. That is the value of a ‘toolbox of diverse concepts and theories’ in policy analysis (Ball, 1993: 10). In this chapter, I have reviewed the three main theoretical tools for my study. The following is a summary of how I use them to construct my own analytical framework.

From Bourdieu, I understand that educational policy can be conceptualised as a social field, and thus can be affected by other fields through cross-field effects (Lingard and Rawolle, 2004; see also, section 1.1.1). I am going to analyze the cross-field effects among the political field, economic field, public policy field and education policy field to explore the external influences for the post-2013 policy change. Using my empirical data to address the limitations in Lingard and Rawolle (2004), I have added several elements (the role of agents, the logic of practice, and the level one field analysis) and reconstructed the cross-field effects framework. The updated framework contains three analytical steps: Step 1: outline the interrelated fields, including their distribution/hierarchy within the field of power, their logics of practice, and the agents they share. Step 2: explore how field A ‘exports’1 its logic of practice to field B through the agents in

1 It is important to note that ‘field’ is a theoretical concept, a way of thinking through the social world, instead of a straightforward description of social reality (Ladwig, 1994). Therefore, the use of the term ‘export’ here is in a metaphorical sense to present how the agents transfer the logic of field A into field B, which will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 7. Yet the social actors may be aware that the social life can be divided into certain sectors or aspects, such as politics,
dominant positions. Step 3: explore how the changed/'confined' logic in field B shapes the relative values of different configurations of capital, the agents’ relative positions and the ways they exert their capital in the struggle for position within the field. This work is presented in chapter 7.

If examined from the perspective of Foucauldian emphasis on discourse, the power/knowledge configuration of government policy can be deconstructed (see section 2). The Foucauldian theoretical resources of ‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ (Ball, 1990, 1994), ‘policy cycle’ (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) and ‘policy archaeology’ (Scheurich, 1994) provide me with theoretical tools to analyze the discursive formation of ‘education as social welfare’ in the enactment of the post-2013 restrictive schooling policy in the educational system. By integrating Scheurich’s idea of social regularities as pre-context to the three contexts of the policy cycle, namely, the context of influence, context of policy text production and the context of practice, I have developed the policy cycle framework. This work is presented in chapter 8.

Policy can also be understood as a temporary consensus between different groups (see section 3). Based on this conceptulisation, I consider the formation of the interim quasi-state school system for migrant children in Shanghai as a temporary settlement reached through the interaction of the individual and collective actors, including district municipality of economy and education. Thus they see the existence of these sectors/aspects as reality. Both the perspectives of the researcher and the actors are presented in this thesis.
education, unregistered informal private schools, state schools and migrant parents, among others. More specifically, my analysis will give explanations to the following questions: what is the goal of each actor in the struggle? Who is in the dominant position? What kinds of compromises has each actor made? What benefits has each actor achieved in the end? What kind of temporary settlement of interests has been produced through the group struggle? It helps to reveal the unequal power relations invested and realized in the formation and function of the semi-state school system. This work is presented in chapter 11.

When examining the policy enactment in state schools, I explore the interaction and relationship of state school teachers, migrant parents and children and local children with Bourdieu’s theoretical tools of field, habitus and cultural capital (see section 1). The analysis tries to give an answer to: how do these relationships shape migrant children’s study and social inclusion in school? I explore the unique identity of the migrant family, which has three key dimensions: migrant, rural and a working-class background. By focusing on the several dimensions shaping migrants’ habitus, I examine how migrant parents and children exert their capitals and interact with teachers and local children; how their habitus guides their actions in the school field. This work is presented in chapter 10.

One might argue that the policy enactment approach in this study appears to exclude legal frameworks. I acknowledge that the exploration of the legal frameworks is important for policy studies. In my thesis, the
discussions of the legal framework of migrant children’s schooling can merely be found in chapter 2 (section 2.1) and chapter 6 (section 2, table 3). The reason for the limited discussions of the legal aspect is that currently a comprehensive legal ‘framework’ has not been established with regard to the migrant children’s schooling. In the Chinese educational legal system, the only detailed law item on migrant children’s schooling can be found in the *Law of Compulsory Education*:

If the parents are working or living in the places which are not the places where they have their household registration cards registered and want their compulsory education aged children to access state schools there, the receiving municipality should provide equal educational opportunities for these children. The detailed policies should be decided by the provincial governments.

Here the law simply proposes the principle that the migrant children have the equal educational right and the receiving municipality should guarantee their rights. Without detailed regulations, the law leaves the local governments with the space of discretion on their policies. In other words, it is hard to conceptualise a ‘legal field’ on migrant children’s schooling empirically. This is the reason why my explorations of policy enactment mainly focus on the policy fields.

Another potential argument about my policy enactment approach is that it appears to exclude the historical social processes. I admit that this is a limitation due to the limited scope of the project and available data. In this thesis, I have preliminarily reviewed the development of the policy text since 1996 (chapter 6). Yet I have not done in-depth explorations on the
historical social processes with regard to how the development of the TMC policy was shaped by the external influences from politics, economy and population policy and how the restrictive schooling policy was enacted in the educational system since late 1990s. The answers to these questions can extend the existing knowledge of the power relations invested and realized in the enactment of the TMC policy. I propose the future study to explore these historical social processes, based on the generation and analysis of relevant data.

Finally, it is important to note that the analytical focus of this study is on the national social space. I acknowledge that there is also a global dimension of the power relations in the national policy. In other words, the fields in the national social space are linked to and hence are influenced by the global fields (Lingard, Rawolle, and Taylor, 2005; Thomson, 2005; Rawolle and Lingard, 2008), just as Lingard, Rawolle and Taylor point out:

Given the social rather than geographical character of Bourdieu’s concept of social fields, it is also argued that the concept [field] can be, and indeed has to be, stretched beyond the nation to take account of the emergent global policy field in education. (Lingard, Rawolle, and Taylor, 2005: 759)

Their argument that field has social rather than geographical character resonates with what is found in my research context. For example, shaped by global processes of marketization reforms, the past forty-years marketization in China has contributed to the rise of the social welfare logic in the migrants’ school enrolment criteria system after 2013 (see chapter 7, section 3). What can be identified here is that the marketization logic in the
global political and economic field shapes the logic of the national fields and intensifies the migrant children’s disadvantages in the educational field. This example indicates that it is empirically possible to include the global dimension into the analysis of the power relations invested in the enactment of TMC policy in national and local level. Yet being a tightly focused PhD project, this study limits its scope in examining the national and local social fields and hence does not examine the international dimension. Recognising this limitation, in the future I will try and conceptualise public policy field as local, national and global and explore the intersections of the three dimensions.

**Being reflexive about the ‘toolbox’ approach to theory**

With regard to the ‘toolbox’ approach to theory I take in this study, one might have the following concerns or inquiries. One is that there might be some contradictions between the various theoretical resources I use, such as Bourdieu and Foucault. I recognise the risk of theoretical inconsistency, as different theories and concepts were created by different theorists within specific historical contexts and under different ontological and epistemological stances – as such, they cannot always be coherent in all aspects regarding all topics. However, this situation can even arise when the concepts have been created by the same theorist, as the theorist’s thinking evolved over decades and hence emphasized particular aspects of their conceptual work somewhat differently at different times. Moreover
for some theorists such as Bourdieu and Foucault, they do not intend their works to be blueprints. What they intend to provide are some theoretical lenses to be developed by others. They leave a space for individual scholars to integrate different theoretical resources and to create a theoretical consistency with regard to their particular research contexts. In my study, different theoretical tools are applied in the chapter 7, 8, 10 & 11. The tools are chosen according to the focuses of inquiry of each chapter, which embody different aspects and dimensions of my main research question. In other words, the use of the different theoretical tools is coherent in the sense that they facilitate my exploration of each sub question, contributing towards the thesis’ main research question.

Another concern might be: is it necessary to use Foucault in this study? What couldn't Bourdieu do (given that he develops concepts such as symbolic violence, misrecognition and doxa)? I acknowledge that it is possible to take a full-Bourdieuian approach to develop the thesis in response to its research questions. That is to say, with regard to the focus of inquiry of chapter 8, it is possible to use the Bourdieusian concepts, instead of the Foucauldian ones, to frame the analysis. Yet in my earlier data analyses, when I already had Bourdieusian, Foucauldian and other theoretical resources in mind, my interpretations of the data directed me to Foucauldian ones. The Foucauldian concepts, such as ‘policy as text/discourse’ and ‘policy cycle’, are well-developed for policy studies and resonate with my empirical data on how the restrictive schooling policy is
enacted in the educational system. As a result, they supply and extend my Bourdieusian analysis of why and how the migrant children’s schooling criteria became restrictive after 2013. By focusing on different forms of power relations among different actors, Bourdieu and Foucault help me to generate a well-rounded and comprehensive analysis to excavate the power relations invested and realized in policy. More specifically, Bourdieu puts forward the concept of field, which, taken together with capital and habitus, creates a conceptual social space. Within this social space, there are interrelated fields and their subfields with unequal power relationships between them. Bourdieu’s concept of field facilitates my examination of the power relations between migrant groups, local municipalities of education, Ministry of education, State Council, and national political leader (chapter 7). In other words, my analysis in chapter 7 concentrates on the actors holding both disadvantaged and dominant positions in the bureaucratic system. Changing the focus of my analysis, Foucault’s concept of discourse, as a configuration of ‘knowledge/power’, helps to deconstruct the power relations between the migrant group, state school educators, local municipality of education, and also the state and the urban society (chapter 8). My analysis in chapter 8 concentrates on the actors involved in educational practices, and supplies the Bourdieusian perspective which focus on the actors in the bureaucratic system. Finally, I acknowledge that apart from the above concepts, Bourdieu and Foucault have developed other concepts such as symbolic violence, misrecognition, doxa and
governmentality. These concepts can be used to facilitate the scholarly exploration of the power relations invested and realized in the migrant children’s schooling policy in China. Yet due to the limitations in the scope of the project (especially the relevant data), I have not used these concepts in my thesis. I aim to extend this project in the future with the help of the above concepts.
Chapter 5: Methodology

In this chapter, I will give an account of my methods, data sources, sampling strategies, my relationships with respondents, the data analysis method, ethical issues, and some limitations of my research.

The data for this study was collected from a pilot study and the main fieldwork. The pilot study was conducted in Beijing over two weeks in July 2014. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 29 participants. With the experiences gained from the pilot study, I adjusted my interview questions and the sampling scope in the main fieldwork, which was conducted in Beijing and Shanghai for eight weeks from March to May 2015. The main fieldwork involved 66 interviewees.

1. Qualitative research, post-structuralism and policy sociology

Given my thesis research question, ‘how do different individuals, organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?’, a qualitative approach is appropriate for this research. While not denying the value of quantitative methods in certain research contexts, with an ontological orientation of objectivism and an epistemological orientation of positivism (Bryman, 2016), I argue that qualitative methods, especially semi-structured interviews, are the most appropriate. This approach enables me to collect in-depth data about different actors’ experiences, interpretations, and attitudes of, and about,
migrant children's schooling and related policies.

This research follows the policy sociology approach. As a branch of critical social research, policy sociology is ‘rooted in the social science tradition, historically informed and drawing on qualitative and illuminative techniques’ (Ozga, 1987: 144). It seeks to ‘unpack’ the apparent ‘common sense’ of policy and analyse the thinking behind policy texts. Adopting a post-structural stance, policy sociology problematizes the idea that policy objectively relates the ‘truth’ of a policy problem and solution. As summarized by Foucault, the research of the regime of truth:

[I]s not a battle on behalf of the truth, but a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays. The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise the ideological contents supposedly linked to science or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. (Foucault, 1972: 132)

Policy sociology rejects seeing policy as an objective and true reality to be discovered. It argues that what some might see as a straightforward identification of policy issues and solutions is 'socially constructed' (Blaikie, 2000: 119) and policy ‘typically posits a restructuring, redistribution and disruption of power relations’ (Ball, 1994: 20). In accordance with its ontological position, policy sociology goes beyond simply excavating and reporting the ‘facts’ about the policy. It does not aim to reveal the universal principles, patterns, or correlations underneath the policy phenomenon. Instead, the emphasis is to generate contextual understanding of how the
policy is interpreted and enacted, based on a holistic analytical approach.

Policy sociology rejects a ‘one-way, linear account of relationships between the setting of policy agendas, the production of the policy text and its implementation into practice’ (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010: 6), an approach which sees the nature of policy as a linear, undifferentiated, ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ process (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 2012: 4, 6). The policy process is instead conceptualized as ‘policy enactment’, under which policy is ‘made sense of, mediated and struggled over, and sometimes ignored’ in non-linear, dynamic, diverse and complex ways (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 2012: 2, 3). The whole process is ‘permeated by relations of power’ and is ‘diversely and repeatedly contested and/or subjected to different “interpretations”’ within the ‘jumbled, messy, contested creative and mundane social interactions’ (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 2012: 2, 3, 6, 9). Here the deconstructive orientation of policy sociology can be identified.

2. Sources of data

Following the policy sociology approach, the aim of this study is to deconstruct the socially constructed reality of policy. As power relations permeate daily life, they embed themselves in various configurations, including texts, conversations, knowledge, material resources, beliefs, events, administrative settlements, and social interactions (Ball, 2012). Therefore, multiple data resources can enrich the scope and depth of the research. In my research, semi-structured interviews and policy documents
have been used to generate qualitative data.

2.1 Semi-structured interview

As a ‘conversation with a purpose’ (Burgess, 1984: 102), the semi-structured interview functions differently from the structured and unstructured interviews. The structured interview, organised in accordance with the survey interviews (Robson, and McCartan, 2011; Mason, 2002), has ‘pre-determined questions with fixed wording, usually in a pre-set order’ (Robson, and McCartan, 2011: 285). Compared with a structured interview, the semi-structured interview is more like a conversation or discussion between the researcher and respondent. While the researcher does have a checklist of topics or themes, the order and wording of the questions are always ready to be modified, so that the researcher can get a sense of how the issues are connected in the respondents’ own perceptions (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). In addition some unplanned questions are asked, as some themes emerge during the interview. More importantly, semi-structured interviews are in accordance with an epistemological position that ‘knowledge is situated and contextual… rather than facts simply being reported’ (Mason, 2002: 62-63). All these features make the semi-structured, instead of structured, interview suitable for my research, which aims to situate and contextualize the respondents’ experiences, interpretations and attitudes, and to construct, and reconstruct, situated knowledge of policy enactment.
While unstructured interviews, as another method to generate qualitative data, can be suitable for research contexts similar to my own, I did not apply this method in my project. My choice was based on practical considerations: I already had relatively clear interview topics/themes before accessing the field, based on my literature review and previous knowledge about the research topic; my research covers a large and varied number of respondents; and my research does not follow an ethnographic approach. Under these circumstances, the semi-structured interview can generate the appropriate data (in terms of the scope, quantity and relevancy) within an appropriate time period. Therefore, it better suits my research project than the unstructured interview.

There are 95 participants four of whom were interviewed twice for additional information.¹ Appendix One lists all the respondents and Appendix Two lists the interview schedule. In my research design, the priority is given to face-to-face interviews, since people’s gestures and facial expressions could offer additional information for better understanding what they were talking about. My face-to-face interviews include 83 participants: 10 government officers, 20 school leaders, 15 teachers, 17 migrant parents, 12 migrant children, five local parents, and four local children. Realizing that the telephone interview is not an ideal

¹ In the fieldwork, sometimes I felt I needed further information regarding certain topics after the interviews. In most cases, I tended not to disturb them by requesting another interview. Instead, I tried to collect relevant information from the later interviews. However, in a few cases, I felt that I needed the original respondents to offer further explanations, which is why I interviewed four of them twice.
form in my research context, I did not use it unless I was unable to conduct face-to-face interviews. During the fieldwork, nine parents and three government officers preferred to have telephone interviews, and I complied with their requests. The reason given was that they do not have private space in their offices and they preferred not to do the interviews in their homes or other places. These 12 telephone interviews, like the face-to-face interviews, provided me with rich data. Additionally, an email interview was conducted with a Beijing Municipality of Education department whose work is relevant to migrant children. At the beginning, I contacted an officer in that department through his office telephone number, without any prior acquaintance or recommendation. In response, he refused a face-to-face or telephone interview and suggested an email interview with questions generally directed to the whole department. As a result, I sent my interview questions to the department’s official email address and then received a response based on collective discussions (as the officer told me). Yet I noticed that the answers were mostly copied from published government documents, without presenting the officers’ own interpretations or attitudes.

In terms of length, 17 of the interviews are above 60 minutes, 18 are between 40-60 minutes, 17 are between 20-40 minutes, and 43 are between 10-20 minutes. The 43 short interviews include: 16 children, 16 parents, eight teachers, two government officers and one school leader. Here, I argue that their short length does not equal poor quality. My interviews with certain categories of respondents, such as children and
teachers, are designed to cover a smaller scope and thus are expected to be short. In addition, in my research design, the later stage interviews, which tend to be very short, are considered as supplementary. The following factors mutually contribute to the short length of some interviews: first, all of the children’s interviews are shorter than 20 minutes. One reason is that the interview was designed to cover a smaller scope than that of the government officers, school leaders and parents. The interview questions mainly focus on the children’s experiences in school. The other reason is that the children I interviewed are very young: most of them are in primary school (aged below 12). It can be hard for some children at this young age to maintain a conversation with an adult stranger. As I did not establish an intimate relationship with the children in advance, the stranger identity increases the difficulty of making the children fully engage in a conversation. Second, 16 out of 31 parent interviews are shorter than 20 minutes. Unlike some school leaders and government officers who tended to dominate the conversation and often started new topics by themselves, the parents tended to follow my questions. While most of them were natural and highly involved, and responded to each of the topics with sufficient details, they did not talk too much on one topic and extend the conversations. Third, eight out of 15 teacher interviews are shorter than 20 minutes. Like the children’s interviews, the teacher interviews were designed to cover a small scope, concentrating on their teaching practice and relationships with children. While we also talked about the government policy and student
recruitment, this part of the conversations was limited. Another factor contributing to the shorter length is the researcher-dominated relationship between me and the teachers (see section 4). Finally, the later stage interviewees, especially the ones with parents, tend to be much shorter than the early stage ones. The reason is that I had already collected sufficient data about the local policies and schooling practices from the government officers and school leaders. Therefore, in the interviews with the parents, I wanted to focus on their own stories.

Before I knocked on the doors of each school, I always arrived an hour earlier than the appointed time. I used this extra time to randomly and informally interview some residents living around the school, especially the persons who have young children. I stopped people on the street or visited their shops to chat with them about the school’s reputation, teaching quality and enrolment conditions. The responses I collected from them are not recorded in audio records, but in my field notes afterwards. These discussions are not counted as formal interviews, but served as useful additional background information for my inside-school interviews. Similarly, when I was in the school, I took the chance to observe classroom teaching and free outdoor activities in certain schools, which helped to inform the data gathered from the interviews in school. For example, most teachers reported that they cannot distinguish migrant children from local children merely from their appearance and accent. My observations have confirmed what they said, as I found that all the students are talking to each
other in standard Mandarin, and I could not tell who is migrant and who is local from their appearances. Through the informal interviews with residents living around the schools and the observations in schools, I have collected useful information to support my fieldwork and data analysis.

2.2 Policy documents

Policy text ‘posit a restructuring, redistribution and disruption of power relations’ (Ball, 1994: 20; see also chapter 4, section 2.2.1). Thus a text can offer valuable data for researchers to deconstruct the power relations invested and realized in the policy. Another direct usefulness of the policy document is that it offers information about what should or is supposed to happen (namely, the policy maker’s intention). While as a researcher influenced by policy sociology, I do not give a top-down and linear account of policy; however I do acknowledge the influential role that the policy maker plays. As such, there is a need to figure out the policy maker’s aims. I have analysed a series of key policy texts related to migrant population and education provision for their children. These policy texts include: a series of migrant children’s schooling policies promulgated by the Ministry of Education and municipalities of education in city and district levels in Beijing and Shanghai since 2001; the central government policies mentioning migrant population promulgated in 2011, 2013 and 2014; and the central government policy documents related to the fundamental political principles of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
since 2002. (Chapter 6 contains and discusses the key policy texts that I have analysed)

3. Sampling

Jennifer Mason cautions researchers to ‘[r]emember that qualitative research is very often about depth, nuance and complexity, and understanding how these work. Therefore, the act of focusing through sampling is likely to be as strategic as it is practical’ (Mason, 2002: 121). In this section, I will explain why I focus on Beijing and Shanghai as sites for case studies, and why I focus on particular respondents. I will also elaborate on how I chose and contacted my respondents, and give an outline of their background: what kinds of people are they? What kinds of schools are they from? In which districts are these schools located?

3.1 Beijing and Shanghai as data collection sites

While there is considerable variation among Chinese cities, considering the practical limitations of the research scope, especially with regard to data collection and analysis, this research intended to explore a smaller number of cases in more depth, focusing on two main cities within different contexts. The reasons why I choose Beijing and Shanghai are threefold. First, as global metropolises, Beijing and Shanghai can present acute examples of common problems related to migrant children’s education in Chinese global metropolises. Second, since Beijing and Shanghai have different histories and differ in terms of socio-cultural, economic and political
contexts, they can provide a useful contrast. As stated in chapter 3 (section 4), the government of Beijing has been considered by existing literature ‘unsuccessful’ in implementing the TMC policy, while the government of Shanghai has been considered as a ‘successful’ example. Additionally, researchers such as Qi and Zhou (2006) and Peng, Dong and Zhao (2005) argue that as the ‘political and cultural centre’ of China, there is a tendency towards conservative behaviours in the local governments in Beijing, whereas researchers such as Liu (2012) and Zhu and Guo (2009) argue that as the ‘economic/commercial centre’ of China, there is a tendency towards innovative (against conservative) behaviours in Shanghai. This might partially explain the differences in actors’ experiences involved in the TMC policy between Beijing and Shanghai. In this research, these differences, as well as their origins, will be explored in order to deepen the understanding of the factors affecting actors’ interpretation and enactment of the TMC policy. Finally, the existing literature on Beijing and Shanghai is extensive and can serve as a concrete foundation for future research, as I have reviewed in chapter 3.

While choosing Beijing and Shanghai as data collection sites, I do not identify my study as a typical example of a ‘case study’ (Yin, 1994, 2014). The reason is that the educational system in Beijing and Shanghai, as a ‘loosely-coupled’ system (Meyer and Rowan, 1978), is too broad to be considered as a bounded unit, since it covers many schools, government departments and individuals. Yet my research still matches some of the
spirit of a case study: taking a holistic perspective, it traces the policy trajectories throughout the local educational system in both cities, making each city a single study unit. In the meantime, the data is collected in a natural setting to present the complexities of the particular study unit, instead of being collected through an experimental or controlled variables design to produce high generalisability. In terms of the generalisability of the research findings from these two cities, it is important to note that within a qualitative research lens, no research has infinite generalisability. As Bryman comments, ‘the people who are interviewed in qualitative research are not meant to be representative of a population’ (2016: 399). That is to say, my research findings cannot be properly understood and applied to the contexts beyond my research setting. Yet on the other hand, I do expect my research findings to resonate with those researchers and practitioners who are within the same or similar context as mine. Youdell points out that the qualitative research findings ‘do not contain, expose or reflect any universal truth, but these petite narratives do resonate’ (2006: 513). The resonance can be understood in two ways: the first is what Yin terms as analytical generalisation (1994). The contribution I have made in this thesis in Bourdieusian policy theorisations may be applicable to other studies following a policy sociology approach. My research findings may also resonate with studies with other theoretical resources, but with the shared topic of internal migrant children’s education in China. However if that researcher is looking at migrant children in England, for instance, s/he may
not find that part of my research relevant since there is not a distinctive rural/urban migrant flow in England.

3.2 A map of interviewees

I set out below the rationale behind the decision-making with regard to who should be invited to participate: the policy I am looking at is an educational policy regarding migrant children’s schooling, therefore the people in the government educational department (as the policy maker) and schools (as the locale of the policy) can be considered as the key stakeholders. It is for this reason that I started with interviewing officers (in central, city and district level educational departments) and school leaders, teachers, parents and children (both local and migrant). It is important to note that during the fieldwork, I did find some other stakeholders whom I did not anticipate at the beginning, such as the Sub-district Office of Culture and Education (SOCE) and the former unregistered and informal private schools, now registered private schools for migrant children. My pilot study and main fieldwork cover 19 schools in nine districts in Beijing and Shanghai. The total number of the participants is 95, including: 13 government officers, 20 school leaders (including 15 headteachers, one chairman of the board of directors and 4 department heads), 15 teachers, 26 migrant parents, 12 migrant children, 5 local parents and 4 local children\(^1\). Appendix One lists all the participants.

\(^1\) I have more interviewees with migrant parents and children, as the focus of my research is on the educational experiences of migrant families.
The total number of participants in the pilot study and main fieldwork in Beijing is 52, including: one Ministry of Education officer, three Beijing municipality of education officers, five district government officers, eight school leaders (including six headteachers, one deputy-headteacher and a department head), nine teachers, 14 migrant parents, seven migrant children, three local parents, and two local children. While these participants are dispersed in six different districts, most of them are from three districts, namely Shijingshan, Mentougou and Fengtai. The school leaders, teachers, parents and children are from eight schools, which can be classified into five types: four state schools (primary), one state school (junior secondary), one licensed private school, one unlicensed informal school, and one unlicensed informal nursery. Table 1 lists all the participants in Beijing.

**Table 1: participants in Beijing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>School type</th>
<th>School name</th>
<th>School leader</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Migrant parent</th>
<th>Migrant child</th>
<th>Local parent</th>
<th>Local child</th>
<th>Government officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shijingshan</td>
<td>Licensed private school</td>
<td>School I</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>3 (t)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>3 (f;t)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School E</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentougou</td>
<td>State school (junior secondary)</td>
<td>School F</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School G</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (f;t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengtai</td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School A</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School B</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xicheng</td>
<td>Unlicensed informal nursery</td>
<td>Nursery A</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>4 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaoyang</td>
<td>Unlicensed informal school</td>
<td>School H</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>3 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haidian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Abbreviation code: ‘f’=face-to-face; ‘t’=telephone)
In the main fieldwork in Shanghai, the total number of participants is 43, including: four district municipality of education officers, 12 school leaders (including eight headteachers, one chairman of the board of directors and three department heads), six teachers, 12 migrant parents, five migrant children, two local parents, and two local children. While these participants are dispersed in four different districts, most of them are from three of the districts, namely Baoshan, Pudong and Minhang. The school leaders, teachers, parents and children are from 11 schools, which can be classified into three types: four state schools (primary), three state schools (junior secondary), and four licensed private schools. Table 2 lists all the participants in Shanghai.

**Table 2: participants in Shanghai**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>School name</th>
<th>School leader</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Migrant parent</th>
<th>Migrant child</th>
<th>Local parent</th>
<th>Local child</th>
<th>Government officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baoshan</td>
<td>State school (junior secondary)</td>
<td>School J</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School K</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licensed private school</td>
<td>School P</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State school (junior secondary)</td>
<td>School L</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>3 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pudong</td>
<td>State school (junior secondary)</td>
<td>School N</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>3 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School O</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licensed private school</td>
<td>School Q</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licensed private school</td>
<td>School R</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minhang</td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School S</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licensed private school</td>
<td>School T</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>2 (f)</td>
<td>3 (f;t)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuhui</td>
<td>State school (primary)</td>
<td>School M</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Sampling strategy

I followed a qualitative purposive sampling strategy (Bryman, 2016), so I contacted the schools, government departments and people that I believed had ‘direct reference to the research questions being asked’ for my research (Bryman, 2016: 408). In both pilot study and main fieldwork, I started by contacting government officers and school headteachers with whom I could get in touch through my social network. Snowball sampling (Bryman, 2016) was also used as some interviewed headteachers helped connect me to other headteachers and government officers, who were otherwise hard to reach through my own social network. After accessing schools, I took a ‘top down’ sampling strategy by asking the headteachers to connect me to teachers, then asking teachers to connect me to parents, and then to the children. The reason why I took this strategy is to make sure that the data collected from the parents, children, teachers and headteachers are from the same school and hence offer a relatively comprehensive picture of their particular context. The data collected this way offers a higher level of coherence than if I had randomly selected participants from different schools. In addition, my research design is flexible to ensure the data collection is open to emerging data. For example, during the pilot study in Beijing, after interviewing some school teachers and parents, I added the migrant parents and children in nursery to my
respondent list, because these parents are concerned about their children’s primary school enrolment and some of them are currently preparing the required documents for state school enrolment. In other words, they are engaged in the enactment of the schooling policy.

The following sections are the details of my sampling process in Beijing and Shanghai. In Beijing, my initial connections with the local government officers and school headteachers were facilitated by my former university professors, masters’ supervisor and his PhD students. I studied in the Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University for seven years for my MA and M.Ed. As a nationwide influential faculty of education, the faculty has many academic staff and postgraduate students who have wide-ranging connections with government departments and schools. Some of the staff and postgraduate students are themselves government officers or school leaders; hence, I was able to access a wide social network through my professors and their students. As for the connections with government officers, I firstly identified the most relevant departments (to my research) in the Ministry of Education and local municipalities of education at city and district levels, and then asked my acquaintances to connect me to any of the officers in these departments. I also asked my acquaintances to connect me to officers in other municipality of education departments as long as my acquaintances believed they might offer valuable information for my research. As for the connections with headteachers of all types of schools, I relied on my acquaintances and contacted any school leaders
they recommended. I did give them broad criteria for recommending people: the schools should be for those of compulsory education age and the school should have migrant children, but the percentage is not so important. Eventually, most of the school leaders they recommended to me are in the districts Fengtai, Shijingshan and Mentougou, as shown in the Table 1. After I interviewed the school leaders, I then asked them to connect me to the teachers in their schools. Following this, I asked the respondent teachers to connect me to local and migrant parents in their classes. Then, I asked the parents whether I could interview their children.

In Shanghai, my initial connections with the government officers and school headteachers were facilitated by one of my classmate’s acquaintance officer L (who works in the Minhang District municipality of education) and by my family friend teacher J, who is a teacher in state school J in Baoshan District. Officer L accepted my request for interview and connected me to another officer in the same department. Later, Officer L connected me to two headteachers in Minhang District and one headteacher in Xuhui District. Furthermore, L also connected me to a staff member in a research institute affiliated to the Pudong District municipality of education; that person then connected me to four headteachers and an officer in the municipality of education in that district. In Baoshan district, my family friend teacher J introduced me to her headteacher. After the interview, the headteacher then connected me to two other schools’ headteachers and an officer in the municipality of education in that district.
Additionally, teacher J also connected me to a school leader in that district. After I accessed the schools, I repeated the same sampling process as in Beijing.

When seeking teachers to interview, I always asked the school leader to connect me to those who are working as class tutors and at the same time are teaching Chinese or Maths. In my research, 14 out of 15 interviewed teachers are class tutors, and 13 of them are Chinese or/and Maths teachers. The reason why I prefer class tutors is that they are responsible for all affairs in their classes, therefore they would have sufficient information on the children and their parents, and so importantly they had the ability to put me in touch with parents since they are the teachers who communicate with parents the most. The reason why I prefer Chinese and Maths teachers is that in the primary and secondary schools, Chinese and Maths are two of (and the only two in primary stage) the core subjects. These two subjects are scheduled almost every day (considerably more than the other subjects). Therefore, these teachers would typically be most familiar with the children.

4. A reflection on the researcher-respondent relationships

As suggested by Mason, a qualitative researcher should mobilise ‘active reflexivity’ to conduct critical self-scrutiny of her/his actions and role in the research process (Mason, 2002: 7). In this section, taking a reflexive perspective, I examine the formation and development of the relationships
between my respondents and me, which shapes the generation of interview data. While one might assume that the researcher is in the dominant position of the researcher-respondent dyad, some researchers argue that ‘power relations can be more complex and multidirectional than this, and sometimes they may simply be reversed’ (Mason, 2002: 80; see also Neal, 1995 and Scheurich, 1997). In my interview context, three types of (power) relations can be identified. These relationships are influenced by several factors, such as my identity as an acquaintance of my respondents’ acquaintances, a young person, a studying-abroad scholar, and a non-Beijing/Shanghai household registration (hukou) cardholder. It is also shaped by the way I conduct the interviews.

I acknowledge that the vast majority of the participants in my research are acquaintances of my acquaintances. One might query whether it is possible for people to feel comfortable and talk freely in front of an interviewer who is linked, albeit at one remove, to their social networks. They might be concerned that their conversations might be leaked to their common acquaintances, despite the fact I gave them a guarantee of confidentiality. I do not deny the possibility that people behave differently in front of an acquaintance of an acquaintance and with a stranger. Yet I want to argue that this situation would not necessarily result in individuals being afraid of talking freely in front of an acquaintance of acquaintance in all cases. My experience shows that most of the participants showed frankness and offered me sufficient and valuable information regarding my
interview questions. The sources of the participants’ frankness might be as a result of, but are not limited to, the following reasons. First of all, in the views of many Chinese people, migrant children’s education is not an intensively politicalized issue about which they should be highly cautious, as this issue is publicly discussed on social media, the internet and in newspapers, and these discussions often articulate a critical attitude towards the policy and practice. Secondly, as for the government officers and school leaders, the persons who introduced me to them are their friends, not superiors. Admittedly, I was introduced to the teachers by the school leaders, yet I did not ask them questions regarding the interpersonal relationships among teachers and headteachers. What I did ask was focused on migrant children’s study and socializing conditions. As for the parents who were introduced to me by teachers, I did ask about their interactions with the teachers, but the questions were mainly technical or practical in their phrasing, for instance ‘how often do you contact the teachers?’ Finally, it is important to note that many research projects rely on a happenstance selection of participants, but that this might not have been the best choice for this particular research. I have indeed tried to contact government officers, headteachers and parents without any personal recommendations, however in most cases they did not respond to my messages or refused my interview requests. Among the four cases reached in this way that I did finally get to interview, the government officer refused a face-to-face or telephone interview and suggested an email
interview. The contents of his emailed reply are mostly copied from published policy texts or government documents. The two migrant parents and a local parent showed suspicion of my student identity and my motive for interviewing them by double-checking my ID and student card or kept asking about my personal details and motives. And these three parents all refused my request to interview their children. None of the other participants responded in this way, therefore personal recommendations offered me increased trust on the part of the respondent. These cases show that sometimes people feel more comfortable than cautious when facing an interviewer who shares their social network, depending on the research topic, research questions and contexts.

A respondent-dominated mode can be identified in the relationship between me (a young research student) and the headteachers and government officers (middle aged senior educators in superior positions). In this situation, the difference in age and the match of competence play important roles in shaping the researcher-respondent relationship. It is interesting to note that the government officers and headteachers tend to talk much more than the teachers. The officers and headteachers appeared more interested and relaxed when talking to me. They do not feel any pressures in front of me, a junior scholar. Firstly, it is important to note that the figure of ‘scholar’ within the Chinese context is socially constructed as a neutral party who is serving the public good. As a result, like other categories of respondent, they felt free to speak to me, as they believe that
a scholar is not someone who is going to report the interviewed data to the government department, even if I was indeed introduced by their government officer friends. In the meantime, they appeared to enjoy speaking to me since they have a strong confidence in their practical knowledge (vs. my theoretical knowledge), as they are senior educators and hold institutionalized positions such as the title of distinguished teacher or the position of senior educational administrator, which function as institutionalized cultural capital. Indeed, I acknowledged their high status and behaved humbly in front of these senior professionals. For them, the interview is an opportunity for peer communication, a dialogue between professional educators and academia. The factor of age also contributed to this relationship, as I am a younger generation to the respondents. As the existing literature reminds us, the respondent is not always the powerless one in the interview. Within my research context, the respondents’ dominant position can be identified from the way they talk in the interview (Maguire and Ball, 1994; Gewirtz and Ozga, 1990). Some of the respondents gave me suggestions to improve my interview questions, sampling strategy and even suggested alternative research questions for me. Their taking the initiative in this way benefitted me considerably. Nevertheless, during the interviews, I did find it was hard to organize the conversations, as the respondents often digressed from my interview questions and talked about anything they wanted to talk about. This is the process Scheurich describes as ‘interviewees carv[ing] out spaces of their
own’ (Scheurich, 1997: 71). As a result, I found it hard to include all my interview topics in the time available. Another interesting observation I made is that most of the interview topics were raised and formulated by the respondents themselves before I proposed them. This situation is not replicated in my interviews with teachers, parents and children. Finally, when I first introduced myself as a doctoral student studying in the UK, most of them appreciated and encouraged me from the standpoint of a senior (in the sense of age and social status) by saying that ‘you are a promising young scholar’. Some of them chatted with me by talking about their visits or trips to Europe or their knowledge of foreign education, or about their own or their friends’ experiences of accomplishing a PhD, or about their children who are the same generation as me. In addition, they were glad to do me a favour and help connect me to other headteachers and officers. For them, this is a ‘piece of cake’, as described by several respondents. This is another benefit of the respondent-dominated relationship. This situation of respondent dominance in my research resonates with that of Sarah Neal (1995), when she was ‘a young, low-status woman researcher’ (1995: 523) while interviewing male, middle-aged powerful respondents such as the Vice-Chancellors or senior academics.

A researcher-dominated mode can be identified in the relationship

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1 Different from Sarah Neal, I had gender in common with the majority of the headteachers and government officers (male). This gender congruence may have made a difference to how they reacted towards me.
between the teachers and me, as a university scholar usually holds a higher-status position than a schoolteacher in the cultural field. While teachers do have expertise that I do not, such as the competency of teaching a certain subject, their competencies are not socially constructed as more valuable than the advanced academic knowledge within the Chinese context. In addition, some of the respondents were junior teachers without strong experience of teaching. More importantly, they do not hold a position with institutional status as headteachers do. The teachers did not appear as confident and relaxed as the headteachers and government officers while talking to a scholar. Some of them expressed their curiosity about the education and life in Europe, about which they did not know too much. Five junior teachers expressed their admiration for my academic background. Unlike their headteacher and officer counterparts, the teachers seldom commented on my interview questions or research questions, and they tended to give well-rounded answers according to each of my questions and stop and wait for my next question. They tended then to conform to the conventions of the interviewer-respondent relationship.

As for the migrant parents, a non-hierarchical researcher-respondent relationship can also be identified. In this situation, I argue that my intersectional identity of ‘middle-class’, ‘scholar’ and ‘non-Beijing/Shanghai household registration card holder’ produced a figure of a friendly outsider. My appearance and behaviour and the language I use (standard Mandarin
and formal oral language) all set me apart from the migrant parents. Interestingly, I believe a non-hierarchical and friendly researcher-respondent relationship was still established despite the lack of obvious symmetry between the identities of me and the migrant parents, an argument which resonates with that of Vincent and Warren (2001) in relation to their research with respondents of various ages, ethnicities, social class backgrounds, and different genders. For the migrant parents facing this friendly outsider, they appeared to feel more relaxed and thus more able to share their stories. In the meantime, as I am a non-Beijing/Shanghai household registration card holder, they believe that I can understand their situations from their point of view as an ‘outsider’, particularly in a way in which the government officers and school teachers do not (as they normally hold a local household registration card). It is important to note that not holding a Beijing/Shanghai household registration card does not make my life difficult in the way it does for those of the migrant families, as I am currently living outside China. Here the basis for our shared intimacy is our shared self-identity of ‘outsider’. This shared self-identity comes from a public discourse, which defines ‘outsider’ as non-local household registration card holder (see chapter 8, section 2). Finally, as I have mentioned earlier, for the migrant parents, a scholar is someone who serves the public good, for social justice. Here a moral embodiment has been attached to the identity of scholars. For example, they expect that I will be on their side and can deliver their voices into a
broader public arena (through public media) to raise awareness, or to facilitate their individual needs with my social network. As a result of these several factors, the migrant parents usually saw me as a friendly outsider and therefore were glad to share their stories with me. The narrative of their stories was frank, detailed and sometimes emotional: some of them did not avoid telling me some illegal things that they have done to obtain places for their children at local state schools, such as making a fake document and using their social networks in the educational sector. They did not hide their negative attitudes to some policies and practices and most of them seemed to be enjoying sharing their stories with me, assuming that I can understand their situation and affirm their arguments. In addition, some of them directly asked me to make their voices heard in the public arena through publication, and several parents asked me to use my social connections to help their children enrol in state schools\footnote{Their children failed to enrol in a state school because they did not meet the required criteria. Under this situation, I was unable to help. I explained this to them.}. They responded to each of my questions and tended to add sufficient details and personal experiences to facilitate my understanding. As the interviewer, I felt most relaxed when speaking to the parents, as they were natural and highly involved, making the interviews more like real life conversations than artificial academic interviews.

Apart from the above objective factors, my subjective control also shapes my relationships with the interviewees during the interview. One
endeavour is that in the vast majority cases I connected with the respondents through their friends or teachers, which creates a natural intimacy between the respondents and me. Another principle is that I kept the direct questions about the respondents’ personal details to a minimum, and tried to extend the information that was volunteered (Vincent and Warren 2001). It emerged that only few respondents expressed their caution or suspicion occasionally in response to my questions about their personal details.

5. Data analysis

In this section, I will explain how I transcribed the voice recordings, how I conducted two cycles of coding and produced a code list, and how the thesis chapters were produced based on the code list and relevant theoretical resources.

5.1 Transcription

As ten of the participants rejected my request to audio record, and one of the interviews was conducted through email, I have 85 voice recordings. Among these records, I selected 67 pieces for full transcription. The remaining 18 recordings include: two government officers, two school leaders, four teachers, nine parents, and one child. While I have listened to all these recordings and transcribed a small part of the conversations, I did not carry out full transcriptions for several reasons: first, in the early stage of the fieldwork, I was trying to contact as broad a range of
respondents as possible to avoid limiting my understanding. This practice produces some data that is not strongly relevant to my thesis research question. For example, in Beijing I conducted an interview with a nursery teacher as an additional piece of data. That respondent helped me a lot by connecting me to his former migrant students who have now either succeeded or failed to enrol in state schools in Beijing. Yet our conversation about migrant children in nursery is not strongly relevant to my thesis research question, which concentrates on compulsory education. Therefore, I only transcribed a small but relevant part of that interview. Second, during the fieldwork I also tried to do as many interviews as possible. Even when I finished the tasks in my plan, I still tried to do some additional interviews if I had the time and connections. The contents of some additional interviews turned out to overlap with other pieces of data, including: the information about the local state school enrolment criteria; the way that the TMC policy is implemented by the local government and the schools; and the experiences, attitudes and understanding of particular groups of respondents (such as the migrant parents and teachers) about the policy enactment. For example, in school K in Shanghai, I held interviews with a headteacher, two migrant parents, and one migrant child. I felt the two parents’ experiences and attitudes about the policy are similar to one another and also similar to other respondent migrant parents. Therefore, I decided to transcribe only one section of these parent interview recordings. I chose the interview with parent Ning, since her son Nian was
also interviewed and the two interviews can give me a complete picture of this family’s experiences. Finally, owing to a variety of reasons, some interviews were unsuccessful in collecting relevant data with regard to the interview topics. For example, some respondents turned out to have limited relevance to my research. For example, when I was interviewing Officer M in Shanghai, I realized that this respondent has very limited knowledge about migrant children’s schooling as his work is not strongly related to their experiences. As a result, that interview did not last long (only 12 minutes) and I decided not to transcribe the full recording but only a small part of it, which may be relevant for my analysis. In addition, some respondents were not fully involved in the interview for various reasons. For example, my interviews with parents Fan and Fang were in their booths in a market during their working hours and our interviews were frequently interrupted by customers who came to buy things.

These voice recordings, which are all in Chinese Mandarin, were transcribed into Chinese characters and stored in Microsoft Word files. The whole transcription process was done by me without the help of transcription software. Considering that the meaning of the original conversations might be lost if translated, I did not translate the Chinese words into English. As my analysis was based on the Chinese version, when I decided to cite a particular piece of data in my thesis, I then translated those sentences into English. As for the translation, I did not invite/hire professional translators to do it. The professional translators may
not be as familiar with the research context as I am, since they may not be knowledgeable about the situation of migrant children in China and are not the person who did the interviews. In addition, while acknowledging that back translation may (or may not) improve the quality of the translation, I did not use this service owing to the financial constraints of this project. In the final stage of thesis writing, I double-checked each slice of data presented in the thesis to make sure that the English translation has the same meaning as the original Chinese sentences. Along with the thesis writing, my supervisor and other scholars who read my data (in the forms of a journal article, conference presentations and thesis drafts) have commented on my translation. Their feedback, from their perspectives as readers and English native speakers, helped me reflect on and improve my translations. I acknowledge that there might still be some inconsistencies between the Chinese and English versions. This limitation can hardly be avoided in studies engaged with multiple languages, even if the professional back translation service has been used.

5.2 **Data analysis**

Mason reminds us that the transcription is always partial because it is ‘an inadequate record of non-verbal aspects of the interaction’ (2002: 77). While my data analysis is based on the transcription text, I am aware that the transcription is partial if compared to the oral version of the record, not to mention the original conversation under the interview context. Aware of
this, when I came across some transcribed texts that embodied emotional elements, I always revisited the voice records to give a more well-rounded understanding of the respondents’ sentences.

Following a qualitative approach, the data generation and analysis is not a process of simply excavating and reporting the ‘facts’ about policy (see section 1). Instead, the data is ‘produced by the activities of social researchers acting on some version of social reality’ (Blaikie, 2000: 120). Moreover, the data generation is flexible and sensitive to my research context, as I will elaborate. The methods I have used in the first cycle coding include (but are not limited to): in vivo coding, values coding, process coding, and emotion coding (Saldana, 2013). I am aware that ‘any item or slice of data can and sometimes should be coded in more than one way’ (Bryman, 2016: 582). Therefore, some slices of data are coded in more than one way, as described below. Under the in-vivo coding, a code is presented as a word or short phrase from the actual language of the interviewee, such as ‘it is unfair’ (migrant mother En). Under the values coding, a code reflects the interviewee’s perspectives or worldview, such as values, attitudes and beliefs. For example, as a values code, a ‘standardization discourse’ can be identified from officer B (Beijing Municipality of Education) when talking about the development of the state school enrolment criteria system. As for the process coding, in brief it uses gerunds to present an action process. For example, officer B’s interpretation of the function of the ‘Five Documents’ can be coded as
‘identifying whether you are truly working in Beijing’. The emotion coding ‘label[s] the emotions recalled and/or experienced by participant, or inferred by the researcher about the participant’ (Saldana, 2013: 105). For example, when talking about the migrant children’s attitudes towards teachers, teacher C repeated the term ‘indifference’ three times. Although she did not label her emotions in a specific term, her frustration (as an emotional code) can still be observed from her facial expressions as well as the words she uses. As a result of the first cycle coding, around 180 codes were produced. In most cases, the codes are emerging from multiple slices of data. For example, under the category of the result of equal treatment inside school policy (see the Sub-theme 13 of Theme 4 in Appendix 3), there is a code titled ‘equal education discourse’. This code is emerging from six slices of data from teachers and school leaders, reflecting these educators’ experiences and understandings of how they treat migrant and local children equally at school. In addition, since I have ‘cut’ the data into very finely differentiated codes, some codes are emerging from only one piece of data. For example, under the category of central government’s motivation of policy enactment (see the Sub-theme 2 of Theme 1 in Appendix 3), I list some codes which include only one piece of data. Among these codes, some are interrelated and hence could be integrated into a single code. For instance, the code ‘National political leader’ and ‘The harmony and stability of the society’ are both related to politics and hence could be integrated into a single code titled ‘politics’. Yet
the former refers to the role of political leader in policy enactment, while the latter refers to the political practice of the leaders, namely, pursuing social harmony and stability. Considering the nuances in the meanings of the two codes, I decided to keep them as two separate codes, making both codes ‘thin’.

These codes were then ‘segregated, grouped, regrouped and relinked in order to consolidate meaning and explanation’ (Grbich, 2007: 21) in the second cycle coding. The grouping of the codes is guided by my research questions and by the ontological and epistemological position that I have taken, which is to construct situated knowledge instead of discovering the ‘truth’. My work is guided (not constrained) by the following themes, which are embodied in the interpretations of the respondents. The first theme is different aspects of the overall tag of ‘migrant children’s schooling policy’. This policy system includes three main sub-themes, which are repeatedly presented in the policies since 2001: ‘Two Main Channels’; supervising and supporting the unregistered informal private schools; and equal treatment inside school. Another theme, which emerged from the conversations between me and the respondents, is the state school enrolment criteria. These themes derive from the analytical question: what are the respondents’ experiences, attitudes and interpretations of the aims, functions and effects of the documentation system? The third is the different types of school settings recruiting migrant children, such as state school, government funded private school and unregistered informal
private school. This theme is intertwined with different aspects of migrant children’s school life, such as academic performance, peer relations, behaviours and home-school relations. Finally, some themes have been repeatedly raised by the respondents. For example, the ‘negative’ influences of recruiting migrant children for the local governments, schools and teachers; the conflicts and struggles between different actors (government in different levels, schools and parents); and the migrants’ living conditions. As a result of the above processes, the initial 180 codes were adjusted to 150 codes (each is affiliated with at least one / extract of data), which are categorized into 69 categories. The categories are grouped in 19 sub-themes under eight broad themes, producing a code list (see Appendix three). It is important to note that the divisions of first and second cycle of coding and the further analysis (connecting the theoretical ideas in relation to codes and data) are theoretical and imaginary, and there is not an actual boundary between them. Specifically, I had already started my second cycle coding alongside the first cycle coding, but not in a systemic way until I finished the first cycle. In the meantime, during the second cycle coding, the first cycle methods were still being used.

I then conducted further analysis, which aimed to produce the individual thesis chapters. At this stage, the main work was to interweave the data with theoretical resources and produce thesis arguments. This process lasted until the thesis was completed. The analysing process included adding, changing and deleting codes and categories produced by the first
and second cycle coding. The data analysis and the overall structure of thesis were guided by the thesis research questions together with the code list. The emergence of the codes and themes and the further data analysis (including thesis writing up) are data driven. Specifically, it is the fieldwork data that ‘directs’ me to seek theoretical support from the Bourdiesuan, Foucauldian, and other theoretical resources I have adopted in this thesis. Yet to some degree the analysis process can also be considered as theory laden, since I had read some of the theories discussed earlier before collecting data and kept them in mind throughout my research design and data analysis, so it cannot be denied that my research is shaped by these theories from the beginning. In short, both theoretical resources and data were woven with each other throughout the research process, just as Mason comments: ‘decisions about how to organize your data… require you to engage fully with questions about the theoretical orientation of your study as well as the practical shape of your data’ (2002: 171).

The code list also played an important role in the analyzing process by outlining several major themes/sub-themes and linking the slices of data to the themes. In the thesis, each chapter is supported by the analysis of data across several themes in the code list. One example is chapter 7, which explores how the migrant children’s schooling policy is shaped by factors from political, economic and other public policy domains. Adopting Bourdieu’s field theory, chapter 7 involves the analysis of data about local governments and state schools' pressures in recruiting migrant children,
the state school enrolment documentation system, and the development of the TMC policy, which are the themes/sub-themes in the code list. In the meantime, all the data chapters (chapter 6-11) are tied together by the thesis research question (see chapter 1, section 3). It is important to note that the role of the code list is constructive and supportive, instead of restrictive. That is to say, when analyzing data and writing thesis, I did not let the structure of the code list constrain my ideas. Instead, I treat the code list as a way to organize and present (part of) the data, to find who said what. Then I constantly revisited my original interview transcriptions and voice recordings in order to bring myself back to the contexts where the conversations took place. It is through this way that the thesis findings and arguments are constructed as situated knowledge of the respondents’ experiences, interpretations and attitudes.

The findings and arguments of this study were generated from the analysis of the whole set of data, yet in the thesis I only present part of the data. The reason is that a thesis is not merely a presentation of raw data; instead, it is a presentation of the arguments generated from data analysis guided by the research questions and theoretical resources. In my thesis, the selection of data was based on its relevance to the particular thesis research questions. More specifically, in line with each of the thesis findings and arguments, I present slices of data which act as examples and present the perspectives of the respondents, or extend the discussions of an argument. In addition, in some cases, I use my own words to summarize
the data, in order to comply with word limitations. In short, the quotes of data are used to be illustrative of the arguments made in the thesis; in the meantime, the arguments made are based on rigorous data analysis.

The coding and analysis were done with the search and edit functions of the Microsoft Word, assisted by the search function within the MacBook Air system. I did not use other software such as Nvivo or CAQDAS, since I felt I had the best control over, and ownership of, the data with minimal use of software. Furthermore, I do not believe it is necessary to use software to facilitate data analysis in every situation, since the software, such as CAQDAS, ‘itself does not actually code the data for you; that task is still the responsibility of the researcher’ (Saldana, 2013: 28). The use of software does not reduce any of the responsibilities of the researcher. The following is an example of how I used the search functions of the MacBook Air and Microsoft Word system: if I want to know which respondents have mentioned the registration card (hukou), I first open the file in which all the transcriptions (in the form of ‘doc.’) are stored; then I type in ‘hukou’ (in Chinese) in the ‘search’ area of the file, and it will automatically present all the pieces of ‘doc.’ documents which contain ‘hukou’; I then open each document and do the same search, and the document will automatically highlight all the sentences which contain ‘hukou’.

I also used the edit function of the Microsoft Word to facilitate my coding. The followings are the techniques I used in the coding and further analysis (some sample transcripts are presented in Appendix five): first, I
highlighted some sentences in the form of comments which appear on the right side of the page. These comments include the individual codes and the notes for myself. Second, for those long paragraphs containing several key points, I split them into several individual paragraphs to make the points clear. Third, for some key sentences which do not contain codes, I highlighted them with underlines and/or different colours to remind myself that they might contain useful information. Finally, I also kept all the original transcriptions without any modifications. Each time I when examined a piece of transcription, I opened the coded and the original versions at the same time. This way, I could check the highlighted information in the coded transcriptions and in the meantime read the original conversations within the contexts that they were produced.

To support and complement the analysis of the interview data, I have analysed the policy documents related to migrant children’s schooling. As a source of data, these policy documents provide me with valuable information about the different levels of governments’ policy aims and the state school enrolment criteria - the exact documents migrant children need to prepare in order to access state schools - hence providing background information to support my further analysis. Furthermore, as the main part of my analysis of policy documents, I have sorted out and classified all the details of the migrant children’s state school enrolment contained in the central government policy and in the city and district level policy texts in Beijing and Shanghai. I then analysed the historical
development of the migrant children’s schooling policy in central, city and
district levels. In addition, I have compared the changes when the same
policy item comes from the central government policy down to the district
government policy. I also compared the state school enrolment criteria
between different districts in one city and between Beijing and Shanghai.
Additionally, I have also looked at relevant migrant population policy to find
the connections it has with migrant children’s schooling policy, since both
of them mention the migrant population and their children. The above
works provide me with valuable data, together with the interview data, for
my analysis, especially the Foucauldian analysis of the formation of policy
discourse of ‘education as social welfare’ (see chapter 8).

While my analysis includes policy documents, the policy text (or more
precisely, the construction of language) is not my analytical focus. Instead,
the focus is on the knowledge/power configuration permeating the policy,
which is embodied in a variety of forms, including: texts, conversations,
knowledge, material resources, beliefs, events, administrative settlements,
and social interactions (Ball, 2012). As I reviewed earlier, my analysis of
the policy documents only counts as a small part of my data analysis. In
the meantime, the policy document analysis focuses more on ‘what is
underneath the policy’, instead of on ‘what is underneath the language
used in the policy text’. Therefore, I do not label my analytical approach as
critical discourse analysis, which seeks to ‘link language and its modes of
use to the significance of power and social difference in society’ (Bryman,
While critical discourse analysis is strongly influenced by Foucault’s work on discourse, it has an analytical focus on language as a power resource (see, for example, Fairclough, 1992, 2000, 2001, 2010), which is not the focus of my analysis of policy documents.

Finally, it is important to note that the concept of validity can be applied to the research findings produced through the qualitative methods. In this qualitative sense, validity does not mean that the research finding should be the production of excavating the ‘facts’, as I elaborated earlier. Instead, in Mason’s account, ‘if your research is valid, it means that you are observing, identifying or “measuring” what you say you are’ (2002: 39). Mason points out that there are at least two ways to demonstrate the validity of qualitative research findings: one is the ‘validity of data generation methods’ and the other is the ‘validity of interpretation’ (2002: 189-191). The focus of my research is ‘how do different individuals, organizations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?’ Accordingly, qualitative data is generated to produce a contextual understanding of the respondents’ experiences, interpretations and attitudes of the policy enactment. What can be identified here is the compatibility of data generation methods with my policy sociology approach. In addition, since I reject understandings of policy as an objective and true reality to be discovered, my data analysis aims to construct (and reconstruct) situated knowledge of policy enactment, which is intertwined with my own interpretations. It produces a particular
version, instead of the ‘reality’, of policy enactment. That is to say, my interpretation is valid in the sense that it was produced in a coherent way in accordance with my research questions and the ontological and epistemological positions I have taken.

6. Ethical issues

This research follows the BERA (British Educational Research Association) and BSA (British Sociological Association) ethical guidelines: first, before the interviews, I provided written information about the research and obtained informed consent from all adult respondents. As for the children, I obtained parental permission before speaking with them, and obtained oral consent from the children themselves before asking questions. All the children were accompanied by their parents during the interviews. As for the respondents I interviewed through telephone, I informed them about my research and their rights orally. In addition, I obtained informed consent from all school headteachers and teachers’ for my observations in schools and classrooms. Second, I informed all the participants that their participation is voluntary. That is to say, they should not feel obliged to participate in my research because of their superiors’ influence or teachers’ recommendations. I have clearly explained to all respondents that the interview can be terminated at any time and that there would not be any negative response if they rejected my interview request or quit during the interview. Third, the use of audio recording was negotiated before the
interview. Ten participants did not wish to be recorded but allowed me to take notes, and I followed their requests. Fourth, I have the participants’ permission to publish what they said in the interviews. In respect of the interviewees’ and observed persons’ right of confidentiality and anonymity, their names as well as their institutions’ names are not published. Pseudonyms are used instead. In addition, the use of the internal documents of the schools and government departments is based on the formal permission of related regulation issuers. Finally, in order to protect the security of the data collected from the participants, I have stored the data securely on my laptop with password protection. Additionally, the data is deployed solely for this research.

7. Limitations

From the perspective of an ‘ideal world’, I would not consider my research as perfect – more resources (social networks) and more time in the field would have been an advantage. As for the limitations in regards to my social networks, I was expecting to interview some officers in Shanghai city municipality of education but I failed to access them. Although the data I collected from the four officers of district municipalities of education and from the policy texts is sufficient to support my thesis arguments, I believe that it would be ideal if I could have interviewed some officers at city level who might have a holistic view of the policy situation in Shanghai. Additionally, as reported by some interviewees, apart from the ‘ordinary’
state schools that I have investigated, there are a small number of elite state schools that also recruit a small number of migrant children; however, I was unable to contact the school leaders at these elite schools owing to the limits of my social network. This is another limitation in the scope of my research. In addition, given the limited time in the field, I was not able to undertake participant observation in schools. Ideally, participant observation (for example, working as a teaching assistant or an administrative assistant, or participating in related administrative affairs for migrant children, such as teachers’ meetings and parents’ meetings) or sufficient non-participant observation would have provided me with another set of data (besides the interview data) to support my analysis of the interpretation and enactment of policy with actors in schools, such as teachers and school leaders and migrant and local families.

8. Conclusion

This research adopts a policy sociology approach. Drawing upon a post-structural ontological and epistemological stance, I undertake qualitative methods to deconstruct the power relations underneath the policy. Different forms of data have been collected from the settings in Beijing and Shanghai, which present the complexity of the educational system in both sites in a holistic way. Semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and telephone) were used to collect data about the participants’ experiences, interpretations and attitudes about migrant children’s schooling and related policies. In addition,
as the policy text offers data about the dominant conflict or compromise of interests, I have analysed some population and education policies related to the migrant population.

In the fieldwork, I followed the purposive sampling and snowball sampling strategies to get in touch with 95 participants, including: government officers, school leaders (headteachers and department heads), teachers, migrant parents, migrant children, local parents and local children. Although all the participants in my research are acquaintances of my acquaintances, different modes of the researcher-respondent relationship can be identified with different types of participant: respondent-dominant, researcher-dominant, or non-hierarchical. Despite the differences in relationship, most of the participants showed frankness and offered me sufficient and valuable data.

After data collection, I selected 67 pieces of the voice recordings to transcribe into Chinese. I then conducted two cycles of coding and produced a code list with eight themes, 19 sub-themes, 69 categories and 150 codes. Based on the code list and relevant theoretical resources, I have done further analysis and produced the thesis data chapters (chapter 6-11). The whole research process, including data collection, storage, analysis and presentation, follows the British Educational Research Association and British Sociological Association ethical guidelines.
Part II

The analysis of Part II is organized around this question: **how has the migrant children school enrolment policy developed and under what conditions?**

Chapter 6: The fluctuating policy development and the post-2013 policy change

In this chapter, I will review the policy development at central and local level since 1996, highlighting the post-2013 policy change. This review outlines the big picture, which serves as the foundation for my further analysis in chapter 7 and chapter 8.

1. Introduction

Before reviewing the policy development at nationwide, city and district levels, I will briefly introduce the hierarchy of the Chinese government administration system in order that the degree of discretion concerning policy, which is held at local level, is clear. There are five levels of government in the administration system: the top level is the central government; the second level is the provincial government; the provinces are divided into several cities, which is the third level; the cities are then divided into several counties (or districts), which is the fourth level; and the
counties are then divided into several villages/towns, the fifth level. In terms of implementing the superior government’s educational policy, there are certain degrees of legal discretion in the provincial, city, and county/district level. Take the migrant children’s state school enrolment criteria as an example: the Ministry of Education (MOE) policy does not establish specific criteria nationwide; what it does do is develop a direction, the essence of the law, for the inferior governments to follow. For example, the 2014 Decisions on Facilitating Students’ Accessing to the Nearest Junior Secondary School without Exams states that: ‘the metropolitan areas should facilitate the school enrolment of migrant children who meet the criteria in a step by step way, according to its urban developmental plan, aim of population size control, and the capability of educational resources’. Here the nature of the MOE’s policy is that the setting of the local state school enrolment criteria should follow the urban development plan, whilst maintaining the aim of population size control and staying within the means of the available educational resources. Beijing, the city municipality of education, responded to the MOE policy by putting forward the ‘Five Documents’ as school enrolment criteria, and stating that its inferior district municipalities have the discretion to add (or not) sub-items under each document requirement. As a result, there can be different requirements in different districts in terms of the exact documentation needed. For example, in Xicheng District in Beijing, in 2015 the district municipality added the following sub-items under the item of ‘Proof of Employment’ required by
the Beijing Municipality of Education: 1) Paying for social insurance for at least three months before application; 2) Both parents’ proof of employment; 3) One of the parents should work in Xicheng District; 4) Individual businessman should pay taxes in Xicheng District. However in Mentougou District, only one sub-item is required under the Proof of Employment: the parent should work in Mentougou District. This shows that legal discretion at district government level is creating discrepancies in access to education.

2. National level

In the late 1990s, when an increasing number of migrant children appeared in the urban areas and had difficulties accessing local schools, their educational problems started to appear upon the policy agenda of the central government, since the government is responsible for providing compulsory education for all children. It was not until 1996 that the central government promulgated the first national policy on migrant children’s schooling. Since then, the central government policy development has undergone fluctuation with a trajectory from procedures that meant state schools were hard to access (1996-2001), to a relaxation of the criteria demanded from migrant families (2001-2014), and then, in more recent years, a return to more demanding criteria in order to gain a place at an urban state school (2014-). Table 3 presents the policy development at the central level. At the local level, the development of the city and district
governments’ policies follow the direction of the central policy, as I will elaborate in the next two sections.

Table 3: the development of central educational policies for migrant children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy-maker</th>
<th>Policy title</th>
<th>Policy aim</th>
<th>Sub-policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>MOE</td>
<td><em>The Regulation on the Compulsory Education of Floating Children in Cities and Towns (Trial)</em></td>
<td>‘To provide floating children with compulsory education according to the law’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>MOE</td>
<td><em>The Provisional Regulation on Floating Children’s School Attendance</em></td>
<td>‘To provide floating children with compulsory education according to the law’</td>
<td>The origin of Sub-policy 1 (TMC): ‘the receiving local state school should be the mainstream receiver of floating children’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>State Council¹</td>
<td><em>The State Council’s Decision on the Reform and Development of Fundamental Education</em></td>
<td>‘To protect floating children’s right of accessing compulsory education according to the law’</td>
<td>Sub-policy 1 (TMC): ‘the receiving local government and state school should be the mainstream channels of recruiting migrant children of compulsory education age’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Six ministries (jointly)²</td>
<td><em>The Decisions on Improving the Compulsory Education of Migrant Peasant Workers’ Children in the Cities</em></td>
<td>‘Following the items in the Law of Compulsory Education’</td>
<td>Sub-policy 1 (TMC) Sub-policy 2 (equal treatment inside school): ‘the receiving local state school should treat the migrant children the same as local students in tuition fees, awards and other aspects of school life’. Sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and supporting the unregistered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ As the centre of government, the State Council is at the top of the ‘pyramid’ of the Chinese bureaucratic system. Its policy is superior to that of the Ministry of Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Sub-policies</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>State Council</td>
<td><em>The State Council’s Decision on Solving the Problems Related with Migrant Peasant Workers</em></td>
<td>‘Receiving compulsory education equally’</td>
<td>Sub-policy 1 (TMC), Sub-policy 2 (equal treatment inside school), Sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and supporting the unregistered informal private schools’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOE</td>
<td><em>The MOE’s Decisions on Implementing ‘The State Council’s Decision on Solving the Problems Related with Migrant Peasant Workers’</em></td>
<td>‘Receiving compulsory education equally’</td>
<td>Sub-policy 1 (TMC), Sub-policy 2 (equal treatment inside school), Sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and supporting the unregistered informal private schools’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Congress¹</td>
<td><em>Law of Compulsory Education (revised)</em></td>
<td>‘Receiving compulsory education equally’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>State Council</td>
<td><em>The State Council’s Decision on Improving the Balanced Development of Compulsory Education</em></td>
<td>‘Receiving compulsory education equally’</td>
<td>Sub-policy 1 (TMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>MOE</td>
<td><em>The Decisions on Facilitating Students’ Accessing the Nearest Junior Secondary School without Exams</em></td>
<td>‘Urban population size control’ discourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First stage (1996-2001): In 1996, the MOE promulgated *The Regulation on the Compulsory Education of Floating Children in Cities and Towns (Trial)*. Although this policy started to settle the responsibility for migrant

¹ The supreme legislative body of China
children’s schooling on the receiving local government, it did not set explicit financial responsibility for the government. At the same time, the policy recognized the legitimacy of the informal school/class for migrant children, in order to reduce the pressure on local formal school systems. According to this policy, the informal school/class can be in the form of ‘night classes, weekend classes, and summer/winter holiday classes’, and ‘can only offer Chinese and Maths in primary education stage’. In 1998, the MOE promulgated *The Provisional Regulation on Floating Children’s School Attendance*. The policy also replicated the avoidance of the 1996 text of establishing the explicit responsibilities of the receiving local government and state schools with regard to migrant children. While stating that ‘the hometown local government should restrict compulsory education age children from floating away’, it continued to recognize the legitimacy of the informal school/class for migrant children. Yet compared to the 1996 policy, it signalled progress by stating that ‘the receiving local state school should be the mainstream receiver of floating children’, which became the origin of the TMC policy put forward in the 2001 policy. **In short, at this stage, the policies did not require the receiving local government and state schools to take responsibility for migrant children’s schooling.**

Second stage (2001-2006): Promulgated in 2001, *The State Council’s Decision on the Reform and Development of Fundamental Education* was the first State Council’s policy on migrant children’s education. As a milestone in the development of migrant children’s education policy, it
started to establish explicit responsibilities for the receiving local government and state school by stating that ‘the receiving local government and state school should be the mainstream channels for recruiting migrant children of compulsory education age’. This policy was therefore called ‘Two Mainstream Channels (TMC)’ for short, and has been followed by later policies. Yet the 2001 policy merely offered a direction for the subsequent policies without detailed statements. Promulgated in 2003, The Decisions on Improving the Compulsory Education of Migrant Peasant Workers’ Children in the Cities extended the TMC policy into what I call a framework for ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’, which focuses on promoting migrant children’s equal education. In this framework or policy system, there are three main sub-policies. Sub-policy 1 is ‘Two Main Channels (TMC)’. Following the 2001 policy’s ‘TMC’, the 2003 policy established the financial responsibility of the receiving local government for the first time. Sub-policy 2 is ‘equal treatment inside school’. The 2003 policy required that the receiving local state school treat the migrant children the same as local students in charging fees, awarding prizes and other aspects of school life. Sub-policy 3 is ‘supervising and supporting the unlicensed informal private schools’. The 2003 policy delegitimized the informal school/class for migrant children, and required that the receiving local government should supervise and support these schools in order to improve their quality. In short, it is during this stage that national policies emphasised the responsibility of the receiving local
government and state schools through formulating a policy system directed towards the ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’. This had been the overall directive for subsequent policies until recently.

Third stage (2006-2014): In 2006, two important policies were promulgated and the Law of Compulsory Education (revised) also added an item on migrant children’s education. The 2006 The State Council’s Decision on Solving the Problems Related with Migrant Peasant Workers reaffirmed the 2003 policy system with sub-policies 1, 2 and 3. And The MOE’s Decisions on Implementing ‘The State Council’s Decision on Solving the Problems Related with Migrant Peasant Workers’ was a detailed version of the 2006 State Council’s policy. It followed the principals of the State Council’s policy and added some detailed regulations. For example, it made the responsibility of the receiving local government more practicable by offering two explicit ways of realizing the financial responsibility of the government:

The government’s educational department should cooperate with the financial departments to include migrant children’s educational funding into the local educational appropriation budget. It should also provide funding for the state schools which recruit migrant children, according to the appropriation budget.

This policy item has clarified the source of the funding for migrant children’s education. Another example is that it initially put forward that to ‘enrol in the nearest state school without any selective exams’ was the principle of school allocation. More importantly, the Law of Compulsory Education
confirmed ‘receiving compulsory education equally’ as the policy aim in the policies promulgated after 2006. **In short, these three policies and law, taken together, produced significant progress, building on the 2003 ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’ policy system, and making it a coherent policy system.** Later on, the 2010 *The Outline of National Medium & Long Term Planning of Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)* and 2012 *The State Council’s Decision on Improving the Balanced Development of Compulsory Education* followed this policy system.¹

Fourth stage (2014 to present): A main change occurred in 2014 as a result of the alteration of the central government’s population policy in 2013. As I will elaborate in more detail in chapter 7, the *Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Main Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform* (2013) states that the ‘super-large city must limit its population size in a strict way’ (my emphasis). The main policy tool that central and local government adopted to restrict migrant population size was establishing stricter admittance criteria for migrants trying to access social welfare, including access to state school education. As a result, the MOE promulgated *The Decisions on Facilitating Students’ Accessing the*

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¹ While these two policies did not mention sub-policy 2 (‘equal treatment inside school’ policy) and sub-policy 3 (‘supervising and supporting the unlicensed informal private schools’ policy). This neglect can be seen as a result of the word ‘limitation’, since they are comprehensive policies for all aspects of education, rather than a specific policy on migrant children’s education. Since this policy did not revise or deny sub-policies 2 & 3, it can be seen as following the 2006 policy system.
Nearest Junior Secondary School without Exams in 2014, stating that: ‘the metropolitan areas should facilitate the school enrolment of migrant children who meet the criteria in an incremental way, according to its urban developmental plan, aim of population size control, and the capability of educational resources’. The 2014 MOE policy legitimates the restrictions on migrant children’s enrolment, which had already appeared in Beijing Municipality of Education in 2013. I will elaborate on this in the next section.

3. City level

Following the central government’s 2001 and subsequent policies, the local governments in Beijing and Shanghai started to promulgate local policies on migrant children’s education. Some of these policies are specific policies on migrant (educational) issues, while others are in the form of single items concerning migrant children in other policies, such as Beijing and Shanghai local governments’ annual regulations on student recruitment of compulsory education age. These policies identify the detailed state school enrolment criteria for migrant children on an annual basis. Within both cities, the state school enrolment criteria for migrant children are varied in different districts¹, as I will explain in the next section.

In Beijing, the development of the city and district level criteria system has undergone constant alterations over how many documents are

¹ There are 14 districts and 2 counties inside Beijing, while there are 16 districts and 1 county inside Shanghai.
required. As shown by Table 4, during the period of 2002 to 2011, it was relatively easy for a migrant family to meet the criteria in this stage. Although there were still lots of migrant children who were unable to enrol in local state schools owing to the limitations of the recruitment quotas\(^1\), the municipality was working hard to accept as many migrant children as possible. In order to achieve this goal, it established loose and accommodating state school enrolment criteria for migrant children. During 2002-2007, the requirement was that migrant families should prepare the ‘Four Documents’ (namely, ID, Household registration Card, Temporary Residential Certificate, and Proof of Employment). In the meantime, in 2004, the city government proposed the ‘Five Documents’ as preferential criteria (rather than compulsory criteria)\(^2\) for the 2006 and 2007 enrolment. In 2008, the ‘Five Documents’ were established as compulsory criteria. This drastic policy change made it difficult for migrant children to enrol in state schools. As a result, at the end of 2008, another local/national government policy reduced the ‘Five Documents’ to the ‘Three Documents’. This was to maintain the spirit of national policy at the time, which was aimed at ensuring migrant children’s access to state schools. The ‘Three Documents’ continued in 2009 and 2010, and then were reduced to ‘Two Documents’ in 2011. Yet after 2012, it became more difficult for migrant

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\(^1\) This phenomenon can be reflected in the number of unregistered and informal private schools in that city. In Beijing, the number of these schools was 263 in 2005 and 128 in 2010.

\(^2\) The idea is that if you meet ‘The Four Documents’, you can enrol in state school; if you meet ‘The Five Documents’, not only can you enrol in a state school but also enjoy exemption of the ‘Jiedu Fee’.
families to meet the criteria, since the Beijing local government began again to follow ‘The Five Documents’, last in place in 2004. This tightening of the regulations was a result of changes in the nationwide migrant population, which in turn provoked new emphasis on restricting the size of that population. I will give detailed analyses in chapters 7 and chapter 8 as to why population size appeared on the education policy agenda.

*Table 4: the changing state school enrolment criteria in Beijing (since 2002)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy-maker</th>
<th>Policy title</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal of education</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal of Education's Regulation on Recruiting Jiedu Student(^1) in Primary &amp; Secondary School</td>
<td>‘The Four Documents’: 1) ID; 2) Household registration Card; 3) Temporary Residential Certificate; 4) Proof of Employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) ‘Jiedu student’ means that the student is studying in a school outside his/her household registration place.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Municipal of education</td>
<td>Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2006</td>
<td>(In the meantime, the 2004 ‘Five Documents’ are set as preferential criteria, with which the migrant children can enjoy the exemption of the ‘Jiedu Fee’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal of education</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2007</td>
<td>‘The Four Documents’ (2002) (In the meantime, the 2004 ‘Five Documents’ are set as preferential criteria, with which the migrant children can enjoy the exemption of the ‘Jiedu Fee’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal of education</td>
<td>Beijing Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2011</td>
<td>‘The Two Documents’:&lt;br&gt;1) Household registration Card;&lt;br&gt;2) Proof of House Renting or Ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As in Beijing, the development of the city and district level criteria system in Shanghai has undergone constant fluctuations over how many documents are required (see Table 5). During the period of 2003 to 2013, it was relatively easy for a migrant family to meet the criteria. From 2003 to 2008, the state school enrolment policy did not establish explicit criteria for migrant children. In 2008, the government started to require ‘The Three Documents’. In 2010, the government extended the ‘Three Documents’ to ‘Five Documents’. In 2011, ‘The Five Document’ requirement was reduced to another version of ‘Three Documents’ (different to the 2008 version). The 2011 ‘Three Documents' continued to function in 2012 and 2013. Yet in 2013, following the newly promulgated Residence Permit Regulation of Shanghai (a migrant population policy), the city government promulgated The Regulation on Migrant Children’s Enrolment in Different Types of Schools. This policy claimed to establish a hierarchical system for migrant children’s educational welfare, in which ‘your welfare (access) matches your contributions’ with ‘living and working legally and steadily’ as the entry criteria. Under this system, the city government changed ‘The Three
Documents’ into the ‘Option 1&2’ criteria system\(^1\), making the criteria even more restrictive. After 2013, the specific requirements of the criteria became more restrictive from 2014 to 2015 (see Table 6).

*Table 5: the changing state school enrolment criteria in Shanghai (since 2003)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy-maker</th>
<th>Policy title</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2003</td>
<td>(No criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2004</td>
<td>(No criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education's Regulation on Standardizing the Student Recruitment in Fundamental Education Stage</td>
<td>(No criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2006</td>
<td>(No criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2007</td>
<td>(No criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education's Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2008</td>
<td>(No criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five local government</td>
<td>The Regulation on Promoting the Exemption of Jiedu Fee(^2) for Migrant ‘The Three Documents’:</td>
<td>1) ID;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) This system keeps functioning in 2014 and 2015 with a further two documents added. The ‘Option 1&2’ criteria system has two characteristics compared to what existed before: first, the criteria became more restrictive. For ‘option 1’, the migrant parent should pay social insurance for a certain period. And for ‘option 2’, the *Proof of Flexible Employment* is only available for people with four certain types of jobs.

\(^2\) ‘Jiedu fee’ is specifically applied to the ‘Jiedu student’, since the school cannot receive funding from the local government for recruiting ‘Jiedu students’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education's Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2009</td>
<td>Follow ‘The Three Documents’ established in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education's Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2010</td>
<td>Follow ‘The Five Documents’ established in 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education's Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2012</td>
<td>Follow ‘The Three Documents’ established in 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal of Education's Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age in 2013</td>
<td>Follow ‘The Three Documents’ established in 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|      | Four local government departments in Shanghai (jointly) | The Regulation on Migrant Children's Enrolment in Different Types of Schools | ‘Option 1 & 2’:  
   Option 1: Long-term Residence Permit;  
   Option 2: Temporal Residence Permit |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 6: the specific requirements of the state school enrolment criteria in Shanghai (2014 & 2015)

4. District level

As I have reviewed above, the development of district level policies followed that of the city and central government policy. In the meantime, some city municipalities of education (such as Beijing) merely list which

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1 See the policy documents: Shanghai Municipality of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2014 & 2015)
documents are needed, offering the district municipalities the discretion to decide whether to establish the specific requirements under each document or not. As a result, some districts have established more restrictive criteria concerning some documents than at the city level after 2013. In some districts in Beijing, such as Xicheng district, there is a huge migrant population and thus a huge need for children’s schooling, which goes beyond the capacity of the local state schools. As a result, the district municipality of education sets more restrictive state school enrolment criteria than that of the city government. In addition, the specific requirements in Xicheng district have become increasingly restrictive after 2013. Taking the Proof of Employment as an example, its specific requirements kept increasing after 2013 (see Table 7). In Shanghai, the discretion of district government, while not as strong as the districts in Beijing, has still produced stricter district level criteria in some districts. For example, in 2014 Minhang district added ‘buying house(s) in Shanghai’ as a supplementary criterion to the city level criteria system. Under this criterion, if the migrant parents met all of the city municipality’s criteria but have not bought a house in Minhang, their children are only entitled to enrol in government-funded private schools instead of state schools.
Table 7: the specific requirements of the ‘Five Documents’ in Xicheng District, Beijing (2012-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proof of Employment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Paying for social insurance for at least three months before application</td>
<td>1) Paying for social insurance for at least three months before application;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) Both parents’ proofs of employment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) One of the parents should work in Xicheng District;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4) Individual businessman should pay taxes in Xicheng District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of House Renting /</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1) Shared house renting and basement renting are not recognized as valid;</td>
<td>1) Shared house renting and basement renting are not recognized as valid;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) An address only provides one state school enrolment quota for the same family within 6 years.</td>
<td>2) An address only provides one state school enrolment quota for the same family within 6 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Residential</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Both parents’ certificate should be issued in Xicheng District</td>
<td>Both parents’ certificate should be issued in Xicheng District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household registration Card</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of No Guardian in the</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The discretion of district government allows for different districts to produce different requirements of ‘The Five Documents’. Table 8 gives an example of the district level differences in Beijing. In Shijingshan District, since there are no specific requirements about each of the five documents, the migrant children are able to enrol in state schools as long as their parents are in possession of all five documents. Yet Fengtai and Xicheng District both set specific requirements concerning some of the documents, thus producing some difficulties for the migrant parents when preparing their applications. Taking the *Proof of Employment* as an example, in Fengtai District the specific requirement is ‘at least one of the parents should work in Fengtai’. Therefore, if the migrant family is living in Fengtai District yet both parents are working outside this district, their child would not be able to enrol in state schools in this district. In Shanghai, the city municipality has not only listed which documents are needed, but also listed the specific requirements of each document. As a result, the district municipality is unable to use its discretion to the same extent as in Beijing. Nevertheless, there is still some local diversity between different districts.
Table 8: the specific requirements of ‘The Five Documents’ in three districts in Beijing (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Xicheng District</th>
<th>Fengtai District</th>
<th>Shijingshan District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proof of Employment</td>
<td>Paying for social insurance for at least three months before application</td>
<td>At least one of the parents should work in Fengtai</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of House Renting / Ownership</td>
<td>1) Shared house renting and basement renting are not recognized as valid; 2) An address only provides one state school enrolment quota for the same family within 6 years.</td>
<td>(No specific requirements)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Residential Certificate</td>
<td>Both parents’ certificate should be issued in Xicheng District</td>
<td>Both parents’ certificate should be issued in Fengtai District</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household registration Card</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of No Guardian in the Hometown</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

From the analysis in this chapter, the complexity of policy development at both central and local levels can be identified. Indeed, the whole development can be seen as a fluctuation curve. At the central level with the first policy promulgated in 1996, the policy development has undergone four main stages: from denying the receiving local government’s responsibility (1996-2001) to the affirmation of that local government’s
responsibility (2001-2006), and then to the formation of the ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’ policy system (2006-2014). The latest policy shift happened in 2014, when national policy started to legitimate the restrictions placed by the local municipalities on migrant children’s enrolment in state schools by linking the school enrolment criteria to the urban developmental plan, the aim of population size control and the capability of educational resources. At the local level, the development of city and district level policies followed that of the central government policy, while the discretion in the city and district level government has produced regional varieties and (in many cases) stricter criteria in the district level.

The current policy situation is hard on migrant families since the city and district governments in Beijing and Shanghai started to established strict state school enrolment criteria after 2013. While the majority of migrant children in these cities are able to meet the criteria and are enrolled in state schools, there is still a group of children who cannot meet the criteria and thus have to enrol in unregistered and informal private schools or go back to study in their parent’s (not their own) hometowns. The number of these migrant children is still unknown owing to the limits of the government’s demographic census. Yet according to my fieldwork in 10 districts of Beijing and Shanghai, the number of these children is not too small to ignore, since most of the respondent migrant parents reported that some of their friends have had to send their children back to their hometowns in order to enrol
in grade one at primary school.

The review of policy development in this chapter serves as the foundation for my further analysis in chapter 7 and chapter 8, which explore the external influences and internal impetuses for the post-2013 policy change in education.
Chapter 7: ‘Cross-field effects’: the external influences for the policy change

Following the big picture I have drawn in chapter 6, this chapter focuses on the recent changes to the migrant children schooling policy since 2013. I will identify the external influences, from politics, economy and population policy, for the policy change in education, using Bourdieusian-influenced theories which I have reviewed in chapter 4 (section 1 and section 4).¹

1. Introduction

As I have reviewed in the last chapter, the most recent change in direction in the migrant children’s schooling policy happened since 2013. As a result, many migrant children either had to return to their parents' hometown to study, or to stay in the city and enrol in unregistered and informal private schools. For example, in Fengxian District of Shanghai, there were 7349 migrant children applying for state school in 2013, yet only 5666 of them succeeded in preparing for the documents and finally got enrolled in the local state schools.² Why was the policy changed at this particular time? As reviewed in chapter 3, while some existing studies have discussed how the policy influences the educational provision for these children (CNIER,

¹ Note: a version of this chapter, together with some contents in chapter 4 (section 1), has been published in the Journal of Education Policy (see Yu, 2017).
very few scholarly analyses have explored power relations between the different actors involved in the formation, enactment and development of the policy.

According to my empirical data, the drivers of change after 2013 were not entirely for the sake of education. The policy change is driven by dynamic factors both in and outside the education domain, including (but not limited to): the development of the population policy; the change of political leaders; the needs of the economic sector; and the pressures that the migrant children have brought to the local education sector. In short, educational policy is continuously re-made by politics, economy and other public policy domains, yet these influences are intertwined and function in a non-linear way. Therefore, we need an explanatory framework to outline the directions, scopes, dynamics and effects of these influences on education policy, whilst at the same time recognising the complexity of the cross domain effects. In this regard, Bourdieu’s field theory (together with capital and habitus) offers a unique way to conceptualise the power-relations in and between the social domains (see chapter 4, section 1.2.1 and section 4).

2. Mapping out the interrelated fields in the social space

In Bourdieu’s account, ‘it is one and the same thing to determine what the field is, where its limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital
are active in it, within what limits, and so on’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98-99). In empirical work, the field-specific capital, together with the agents who struggle for/with the capital, are the key to outlining a particular field. With regard to the policy of migrant children’s schooling, three fields and a sub-field can be conceptualised in my research context: political field, economic field, and public policy field with its sub-field of educational policy.

In the political field, the main agents include individuals (politicians, social organisation leaders, bureaucrats, state employees) and institutions (central and local government departments, think tanks, semi-state institutions). The ‘organisational resource’ (Lu, 2002) ¹, namely, the administrative power, is the main configuration of field specific capital, for which the agents compete. Compared with the political field, the economic field has a broader range of agents, including the state organisations, private sector institutions, managers, labourers, and costumers. This field is marked by the economic resources (especially material profits) for which the agents compete.

Like the economic field, the field of public policy has a wide scope of agents from the state sector (politicians, bureaucrats, state employees) to civil society (social organisations), the private sector (industries and companies) and individual citizens. Yet in the public policy field, the economic resource is not the only dominant configuration of capital. In the

¹ As for the meaning of the ‘organisational resource’ in the Chinese context, please see my footnote in the first paragraph of the section 1.1 of chapter 2.
meantime, what the agents compete for is not limited to achieving economic, cultural, organisational (political) resources, but also the allocation of resources in an ‘authoritative’ way (Ball, 1990: 3). The field of public policy contains many sub-fields that are in line with the established domains of social life, such as education. Accordingly, some policies, such as educational policy, mainly function within the boundaries of their specific domains. There are also policies that involve the allocation of resources across various public domains and are thus influential across various sub-fields. For example, the population policy influences the resources that different population groups are entitled to, including medical, employment, educational, and pension-related resources.

Bourdieu reminds us that ‘[e]very subfield has its own logic, rules and regularities, and each stage in the division of a field… entails a genuine qualitative leap’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). When shifting from the public policy field to its sub-field of educational policy, there is a qualitative leap. In the educational policy field, the field specific capital is narrowed down to the cultural and economic resources in the educational system. In the meantime, while the educational policy field also has a wide scope of agents as in the public policy field, its dominant agents are narrowed down to state education related departments and individuals, which are in dominated positions in the state administration system. The above features have positioned the educational policy as a dominated sub-field in the public policy field in my research context.
The distribution and hierarchy of these fields in the social space is visualised through a two-axes figure (Figure 5). As shown by the figure, the political field is contained in the field of power. As the organisational resource determines the ‘exchange rate’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 265) between different types of capital in other fields, the agents in the political field occupy dominant positions in other fields. The dominant agents in the economic field, such as the lead individuals and organisations in the state and private sector, also occupy a dominant position in the field of power, since they own strong economic resources. As a sub-field of public policy, the educational policy field occupies a subordinate position, since its agents have limited organisational and economic resources. As shown in the figure (see the orange zone), some agents are shared by the above fields and are functioning as the connections between fields. These agents are government educational departments at central, city, and district level, and the central government (State Council, CCP Central Committee). Located within the field of power, the governments and officers act as dominant agents in the field of public policy and its sub-field of education policy. These agents can transfer the logic of practice from one field to another, as I will elaborate later.

1 As I have elaborated earlier, two axes figure is frequently used in Bourdieu’s work to present the chiasmatic structure of the positions of the agents in particular fields and fields in the broader social space (see chapter 4, section 1.1.1, ‘Analysing a field: a three-level approach’).
According to Bourdieu, a well-rounded field analysis includes three-levels¹: the first is to analyse the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power; the second is to map out the objective structure of the positions of the agents in the field; and the third is to analyse the habitus of the agents and the way they exert their capital (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 104-105). In this section, the focus has been on the level one analysis, namely mapping out the individual fields and their connections and the hierarchy of these fields within the field of power. It serves as the foundation to understand the event effect and systemic effect, which I will elaborate in the following two sections. Furthermore, the level two and three analyses will be conducted alongside my analysis of these two effects.

Figure 5: mapping out the interrelated fields in the social space

¹ It is important to note that the three levels are conceptual, and in an empirical investigation there is no sequence of from where the analysis starts (see for example, Hardy, 2012).
3. Event effect

Two types of cross-field effects (namely, ‘event effect’ and ‘systemic effect’) can be identified as moving between these fields and the sub-field. Through an event effect, the changes in the migrant population policy in 2013 lead to the changes in the migrant children’s schooling policy. My analysis starts with the situation in the educational policy field before 2013.

3.1 The educational policy field (before 2013)

Before 2013, ‘social justice logic’ was acting as the logic of practice in the educational policy field. Accessing state school for children of compulsory education age in one’s place of residence was widely recognized as a basic right of all children, no matter migrant or local, by a range of agents, including central government, city government, district government, migrant families, state school headteachers and teachers. Under this logic, the central government launched the ‘Two Mainstream Channels’ policy in 2001, which was followed by a series of later policies. Accordingly, Premier Jiabao Wen wrote the following inscription for a state primary school specializing in recruiting migrant children in 2003: ‘[u]nder the same sky, (migrant and local children) should grow and progress together’, which as a metaphor implies that all children have equal educational rights. With the authority of central government, this social justice logic was imposed on the agents in the educational policy field. Although there were some oppositional voices from local state schools and parents, their voices were
marginalised in that period, as I will elaborate below. Despite difficulties, for instance the lack of state school enrolment quotas for migrant children, the city and district governments in Beijing and Shanghai tried to enrol as many migrant children as possible though a variety of mechanisms. Ministry of Education officer A summarized why the central government is motivated by social justice:

First, this is written in the Compulsory Education Law. Second, we are under pressure from public opinion. Third, the migrants have indeed contributed to the urban development. Fourth, if the migrant children cannot receive quality education, they might become ‘rubbish citizens’ [垃圾市民] in the future – that is not a good result for both themselves and society. Finally, although some local governments are ‘lazy’ [偷懒] in fulfilling their responsibilities, we in central government are not, because we are the institution who is responsible for the migrant children’s education ultimately … In sum, as a socialist state, the government has the responsibility to protect citizens’ educational rights.

From A’s statement, we can find a logic that connects all the arguments: the government’s awareness of citizens’ legal rights, of the equal opportunity discourse in the public opinion and of social justice as an underlying ethical principle. As subordinated institutions of the central government, the city governments in Beijing and Shanghai have also worked hard with their resources. The Shanghai Municipality of Education has given a large amount of funding to transform the former unregistered private schools for migrant children into registered schools during 2008-2011 (see chapter 9, section 4 and chapter 11, section 2 for details). Similarly, the Beijing Municipality of Education negotiated with state
schools to ask, or sometimes require, them to enlarge their class sizes, add new classes without recruiting more teachers, and rebuild their professional music and fine arts classrooms into regular classrooms, as reported by many school headteachers and government officers I interviewed. Although the schools have received additional funding to cover the expenses incurred by recruiting migrant children, the headteachers in the interviews complained that the schools’ regular teaching has been interrupted in order to make these accommodations.

For example:

> Along with accepting extra numbers of migrant children, our class size becomes 45 per class, yet a reasonable class size should be 38 per class according to the government regulation. With this excessive class size, teachers feel stressed and the children are not able to receive enough teaching resources as they had before. What’s more, we used to have four classes in each grade, but now the number has increased to five, without an increase in the number of teachers. That means all the teachers’ workloads are increased… In order to meet the needs of the newly added classes, we have to rebuild our professional music and fine arts classrooms, which we have spent money to build up, into regular classrooms… We understand that accepting extra numbers of migrant children is a ‘political task’ [政治任务], so we cooperate with the government positively. But I have to say that this is not good for education for its own sake. (Headteacher of State Primary School B)

This statement reflects the schools’ reluctance but obedience when faced with the government’s policy, as a ‘political task’ [政治任务]. Here we can identify a conflict between social justice logic and what the headteacher perceives to be quality education (‘education for its own sake’). It is
important to note that social justice is understood here as being about access, rather than a more broadly conceived version of social justice, which would incorporate quality, too (see chapter 12, section 2). This version of social justice produces increasing workloads for state school teachers and decreasing teaching resources for students. In the meantime, it marginalizes the school's voice in the educational policy field.

There were indeed some opponents of the social justice logic, for example, local mother Qian said:

State school education, as social welfare, should only be open to selected migrants, since not all of them are as contributive to this city as we local people… Nowadays there are just too many migrants competing with us for the social welfare that they do not deserve… But our voice has not been heard by the government and state schools. As reflected in this mother’s disappointment, the oppositional voices against the dominant social justice logic were marginalized in the educational policy field and did not result in any changes to government policy. In contrast, under the social justice logic, the identity of ‘migrant people’ became a form of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) in the field of education in that period. The city and district governments and state schools responded to their appeal for access to education positively. The migrants’ confidence and satisfaction can be deduced from migrant father Fei’s description of the situation in the years before 2013:

In the past years, there were no difficulties for our children to enrol in state schools in this school district. Almost all of my friends’ children had enrolled in state school. This had led to our optimistic expectation
for the future… What we thought was simple: every child has the educational right [to attend a state school], don’t they?

Under the social justice logic, migrant children were in a better position compared with the disadvantages they experienced before 2001. With the symbolic capital of being ‘migrants’, they were able to enrol in state schools without needing to employ particular reserves of social and economic capital.

It is worth noting that the city and district governments’ hard work in fulfilling its social justice responsibility did not translate into total commitment from government personnel. Rather, the migrant children had become a prominent source of pressure for administrators. As Beijing Municipal of Education officer B says:

In recent years, we have been under great pressure beyond our capabilities: first, the fast increasing number of migrant children goes far beyond our state school recruitment quota. This is the biggest problem we are facing. Second, the floating nature of migrant children brings lots difficulties to our planning of the state school recruitment quota, which should be based on the statistical data of the exact number of migrant children in certain school districts.

B’s argument is that the city and district level government does not have unlimited resources and solving all migrant children’s schooling problems seems an ‘impossible mission’ for the government at these levels.

3.2 The public policy field (2013): changing logic of practice

Since the 1980s, restricting the population size of metropolitan areas has been a constant theme in central government’s public policies, which have
been designed to combat overpopulation in super-large cities and its negative influences on urban development (Hao 2014; Michieka and Fletcher 2012). The Regulation on the Criteria of Setting Up Cities and Towns (1986) proposed the idea of restricting the population size of big cities, which was adopted in the following policies. For instance, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2011) states that ‘the super-large city should limit its population size in a reasonable manner’ (my emphasis). Greater pressure was created in 2013 when the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform required that ‘the super-large city should limit its population size in a strict way’ (my emphasis), thus removing the option of local discretion and urging local authorities to stick to strict restrictions. After 2013, the main policy tool that the government has adopted to restrict migrant population size is establishing stricter admittance criteria for migrants trying to access social welfare. For instance, in the Opinions of the State Council on Further Promoting the Reform of the Household Registration System (2014), the central government outlines its principles for setting up admittance criteria for migrants who want to obtain the local household registration (hukou). The indicators of the criteria include: having a legal and stable job; having legal and stable accommodation (including renting); the length of time that

1 The term ‘population’ here refers to the migrant population because this policy does not require that people with local household registration move out.
2 In this document, the ‘reform’ refers to the ‘Opening up and reform’ since 1978.
the person has participated in the social insurance scheme; the length of
time that the person has been living in the city uninterrupted.

Before 2013, the migrants as agents were in a better position in the
public policy field compared with post-2013. Before 2013, the focus of their
struggle with regard to staying in the city was around employment, rather
than access to welfare. They were able to utilize their
social/economic/cultural capital, which they gained mainly from their
previous experiences in their rural hometowns, to interact with employers
in the job market in order to find a job in the city. Yet after 2013, following
the series of policies (as important events), the central government
managed to change the structure of the relative positions of agents in the
field. The logic of population policy has been changed so that certain types
of social welfare, such as medical, employment, educational, and pension
related resources, are now only open to migrants who are ‘contributive’ to
the city’s economic and social development. Migrants’ struggles with other
agents are no longer focused solely on competing in the job market but
also on meeting the social welfare admittance criteria established by the
government. These criteria set stronger economic, social and cultural
competency requirements for migrants, placing the migrants in a more
disadvantaged position in the field. As I will argue, after 2013, some
migrant families had to activate more of their social and economic capital
in order to try to access state school education (as a particular form of
social welfare).
3.3 The educational policy field (after 2013)

Since 2013, sanctioned by the State Council, the city municipalities of education in Beijing and Shanghai, as dominant agents in the educational policy field, started to consider state school education as a form of social welfare that is only open to migrants who are ‘contributive’ to the city. Although the social justice logic still exists, it is no longer at the core of the discourses active within the educational policy field. Now, the government is concerned with how to select the children whose parents are ‘contributive’ to the city. In Beijing, the city municipality of education started to require ‘Five Documents’ pertaining to residence and employment criteria in 2012 (see table 4 in chapter 6, section 3), and went further in 2014 when the city municipality required the district municipalities to set up further specific requirements to make it clear what can be considered as ‘contributions’.

Taking the Proof of Employment as an example, in the year 2015, the Xicheng District Municipal of Education established four further specific requirements related to this document. First, provide both parents’ Proof of Employment; second, if the parent runs a personal business, s/he should have paid taxes in Xicheng; third, one of the parents should work in Xicheng; fourth, the parent should have already paid social insurance for at least three months. Here we can identify that requiring the applicant to provide the Proof of Employment is a means to ensure that this person is able to contribute to this city (or more specifically, to this district) by paying tax and social insurance, contributing to the city through both working and
consuming there. If both of the parents are working, then the contributions that this family can make are doubled. Additionally, paying for the social insurance for at least three months means that the applicant is not only a ‘contributor to the city’, but also a ‘stable contributor to the city’. Only when the migrant parents provide all of the above documents and meet all of the specific requirements can their children enrol in local state schools. Beijing Municipal of Education Officer B strongly appreciates the efficiency of the criteria system: ‘the underlying principle and main function of the criteria system is to help us judge who is truly working for this city and who is not. If you meet our criteria, you are considered as “truly working for this city”.’

Through the criteria system, the local government legitimates its own definition of ‘what kind of migrants can be considered as “contributive” to the city and hence deserves the educational welfare of this city’. Here, the ‘social welfare logic’ has been adopted from the field of public policy to its sub-field of educational policy by the dominant agents. I will back to this point and discuss the welfare discourse embodied in this criteria system in chapter 8 (section 4).

Another ‘benefit’ of this criteria system for the government is that the established criteria generate an ‘eligibility discourse’ and the hardship that some migrant children are facing seems no longer a problem, or a source of pressure, for the local or central government, as the ineligible applicant can now be positioned as illegitimate, demanding and irrational. For
example, when being asked about the hardship of migrant children in state school enrolment, officer A (Ministry of Education) responded that:

Whether there is a ‘hardship’ or not depends on what kind of people you are. There is no difficulty for the eligible children [who have got all the required criteria] to enrol in state schools. However, if you are ineligible yet still insist to apply for a state school, you will face difficulties. But if you go back to your hometown and enrol in the state schools there, as required by policy, again, there would not be any difficulties for you. Therefore, our basic attitude is that, if you are not eligible, please apply for the state schools in your hometown, and your seat will be guaranteed.

Comparing this statement with the same person's statement on why the central government has the motivation to help as many migrant children as possible enrol in the state schools before 2013 (cited above in section 3.1), we can see clearly the shift from the social justice discourse to social welfare logic. Along with the shift of the policy discourse, the developmental direction of the policies returns to the pre-2001 era. Both pre-2001 and post-2013 policies try to reduce the receiving municipality’s responsibilities for migrant children’s schooling, and both produce further hardships for migrant children. Yet, compared with the pre-2001 policies, the post-2013 ones do not reject providing state school education for migrant children; what they reject is providing education for those who are not ‘eligible’. With the eligibility discourse, the post-2013 policy appears to be more legitimate than previously. The educational needs of (some) migrant children are not simply ignored as appeared to be the case pre-2001, but positioned as illegitimate demands.
Many migrant parents argue that they are ‘contributive’ to the city, so their children deserve state school education. For example:

It is unfair to established admittance criteria against our children, since we are also contributors to this city like the local people. I have been working in Beijing for ten years, undertaking the dirtiest and hardest jobs. And finally, my daughter is not allowed to enrol in state school. It is unfair! (Migrant mother En)

Here, this mother also adopts the social welfare logic to argue that they are ‘contributive’ to the city’s development. However, since ‘contributor’ is defined by the government through its legitimated criteria, the migrant parents’ voices have been marginalized and their understandings of making a contribution to the city, such as ‘undertaking the dirtiest and hardest jobs’, rendered unjustifiable. As a marginalized group in the field, migrants have no choice but to follow this social welfare logic and struggle with attaining all these school enrolment criteria. This is different from the situation immediately before 2013, when migrant children could access urban state schools relatively easily with their symbolic capital of being a ‘migrant’. Nowadays, the migrant parents need to try hard to obtain the required documents to prove that they are ‘contributive’. For example, En reports her first-hand experience:

I am not working and not renting a house through a legal way, therefore I cannot meet the required criteria, and would have no choice but to send my daughter back to my hometown. However, our family has no close relatives in my hometown, except for my parents who are too old to take care of my child. Therefore, we have to try some ‘special’ ways to get all the required documents: with the help of my friends, I
have signed a fake job contract and a fake house-renting contract with others, at the expense of paying some money…

Here we can find intense forms of social and economic capital being wielded by the migrant families in order to get their children enrolled in state schools, and this situation is again different to that immediately before 2013. In other words, the position of the migrants becomes more disadvantaged in the field of educational policy.

Another drastic change is the nature of educational policy. Now, the state school enrolment criteria have become an apparatus of government ‘population control mechanism’, as Pudong District Municipal of Education officer K (Shanghai) reports:

Now the state school enrolment criteria in Shanghai can be considered as a sub-system of the residential certificate policy [a type of migrant population policy]… To a large degree, we chose these state school enrolment criteria to meet the needs of the government’s migrant population control policy… Here, education is treated as a certain type of social welfare.

A’s statement is confirmed in the An Explanation of the Policy of School Enrolment in Compulsory Education Age (2014), promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal of Education. This policy clearly reveals the changed nature of the educational policy, now working as a population control mechanism of the government. This mechanism works well, according to the views of government officers in both Beijing and Shanghai. These officers report that since 2013, many migrant parents have sent their children back to their hometowns for schooling, so they feel that the pressure on the city and district governments has been reduced.
From this discussion, we can outline the way that the event effect works: when an important event (the change of government population policy in 2013) happens in the field of public policy, it changes the logic of the field; then, the agents in dominant positions in the educational policy field introduce the changed logic from the public policy field. In the meantime, the changes in both fields are consolidated under influences from political and economic fields, via the field of power, through systemic effects.

4. Systemic effect

4.1 The changed political logic: the rise of economic logic in the field of power

During 2012/13, there was a change of logic in the political field as a result of the leadership transition in central government. In the period that Jintao Hu was President (2002-2012/13), the dominant political discourse was ‘the construction of a harmonious society’, which is reflected in a series of policy texts, including *The Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Main Issues Concerning the Construction of A Socialist Harmonious Society* (2006). In accordance with this discourse, the pursuit of social justice was the logic of practice in the political field. As the Chinese

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1 The years 2012-2013 can be seen as the ‘transitional period’ of political leadership: the leadership position of CCP (General Secretary & Chairman of the Central Military Commission of CCP) were transferred from Jintao Hu to Jinping Xi in 2012, then the leadership position of the state (President & Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the State) were transferred from Jintao Hu to Jinping Xi in 2013.
political leaders, as agents, occupy a dominant position in the field of power, their pursuit of social justice brought this logic to a dominant position in the field of power. After the leadership transition (2012/13-), the dominant central government political discourse changed to ‘realizing the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. President Jinping Xi has elaborated the meaning of ‘China Dream’ in many speeches, political conferences and interviews, claiming that ‘the idea in essence is to make the country prosperous and strong, rejuvenate the nation, and see that the people are happy’ (国家富强，民族振兴，人民幸福)\(^1\). Under this discourse, pursuing national prosperity becomes a dominant logic in the political field. While this logic is not directly opposed to the social justice logic, it emphasizes the nation’s economic and social competence. The political leaders’ pursuit of economic and social competence enhances the relative value of economic capital within the social value system. Accordingly, a logic emphasising economic rationality has been brought to a dominant position in the field of power. The economic logic, which has not been changed in substance owing to the leadership transition, embodies itself in the population policy as the workforce who can meet the needs of the market in the city are welcomed, and would be offered commensurate social welfare. Under this economic logic, the discourse of a harmonious society is no longer at the core of the field of power.

\(^1\) Xi said this sentence in his speech in the closing ceremony of the 12th National People’s Congress assembly, in which he was selected as the President of P. R. China.
4.2 The field of public policy (and its sub-fields) under the systemic effect

The field of power constantly produces a systemic effect on the field of public policy (and its sub-field of education policy) before and after 2012/13. Before 2012/13, there was no policy rigorously restricting urban population size in the field of public policy, as the strict restriction of the migrant population’s access to services in cities will bring hardship to migrants. The strict restriction can further lead to civil unrest, great opposition and accusations of inequality against the government, which is not what the central government hopes to see under the logic of pursuing of social justice. When it comes down to the field of education policy, the nature of systemic effect is reflected in the Ministry of Education officer A’s statement:

The central government has attached importance to solving the problems of migrant children’s schooling, because this issue has a direct influence on our citizens’ well-being, on social stability, on social harmony, on urban development, and finally, on the future of our socialism.

Here, officer A connects migrant children’s schooling policy to a broader political agenda, namely, ‘social stability’, ‘social harmony’ and ‘the future of our socialism’. The values of social stability and social harmony are in accordance with the social justice logic in the field of power.

However, after 2012/13 with the marginalization of the social justice logic, there is less of a necessity for the central and local government to worry too much about the potentially negative consequences of setting strict
restrictions on migrant populations. Promoting economic and social development at the same time as reducing the population burden through the selection of workforce becomes the core of the government’s concerns in terms of population. In addition, this new logic in the public policy field is consolidated by the rising prominence of economic logic in the field of power. Accordingly, the local municipalities of education follow the intuition of the central government. As observed by officer D (Beijing Municipal of Education):

You might have observed that, after the leadership transition in the central government, the ‘Two Mainstream Channels’ policy seems to be rarely referred to by the central government. It indeed occasionally refers to this policy, but the frequency is reduced compared with the situation before.

As a result, the ‘exporting’ of social welfare logic from the field of public policy into educational policy field (through event effect) was consolidated by the economic logic in the field of power through systemic effect.¹

5. Conclusion

Adopting Bourdieusian theoretical resources, this chapter offers an understanding of how politics, economy and migrant population policy influences educational policy in the Chinese context. It contributes to Bourdieusian theorizing by offering a framework to explore the interactions

¹ One might argue that this model is unidirectional without exploring the effects from the educational policy field to other fields, which is another aspect of the complexities of field exchange. While acknowledging this potential research gap, I would note that this is not the interest of investigation in this chapter, which focuses on how politics, economy and migrant population policies influence educational policy.
among fields. Bourdieu does not pursue a general theory on the interactions of fields, leaving researchers a space to work within their particular research contexts. Based on the Australian context, Lingard and Rawolle (2004) have written innovatively on ‘cross-field effects’. In my research, instead of simply appropriating the idea of cross-field effects into a new space, I have addressed several limitations to it with the support of my empirical data. I have conceptualized the agents as the points of connection between different fields. I also integrated the logic of practice as a key element of the cross-field effects analysis. In addition, I have added Bourdieu’s level one field analysis into Lingard and Rawolle’s framework. Based on these works, I have produced an updated framework to outline the directions, scopes and dynamics of the cross-field effects (see chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 2).

Applying Bourdieu’s level one field analysis, I have mapped out the distribution and hierarchy of the individual fields (with the sub-field) and the field of power in the social space with the educational policy field occupying a subordinate position (see Figure 5 in section 2). This has revealed how the logic of one field is exported to another field by which agents under which effect. Extending Lingard and Rawolle’s conceptualisation of event effect and systemic effect, I have identified that the event effect functions in an ‘active’ way, producing direct influence from the public policy field to the educational policy field. The systemic effect functions in a ‘passive’ and ‘static’ way with indirect influence from the political and economic fields on
the public policy field via the field of power. These two effects function synchronously. In addition, by conceptualising the interrelations between a field and its sub-field(s), and between the field of power and other fields, I have extended the analytical scope of the cross-field effect framework. Finally, my conceptualisation of the systemic effect also identifies a mechanism of functional homology between individual fields and the field of power (Bourdieu, 2005; Thomson and Holdsworth, 2003; Thomson, 2005) and extends Bourdieu’s theorizing. That is, the logics of the individual fields are consistent with the logic of the field of power through the dominant agents; in the meantime, the dominant agents in certain fields (such as political leaders in the political field) can convert the changes in these fields into resulting in a change of the logic of the field of power.

Acknowledging that any theoretical or empirical claims are particular to the spatio-temporal contexts in which are generated, my work is not aiming to produce a ‘general theory’ that is applicable to all fields under all contexts. Yet it can still be valuable for further research, especially the exploration of the interactions between the educational policy, population policy, politics, and economy.

Putting this analytical framework into practice, we can identify some changes which have increased migrant children’s hardship in state school enrolment after 2013, and which have not been revealed by the existing research. Under the event effect, state school education becomes a type of social welfare only open to migrants who are ‘contributive’ (as defined
by the government) to the city’s development and educational policy becomes a mechanism of population control deployed by the government. As a result, the city and district government sets up a series of strict state school enrolment criteria, establishing stronger economic, social and cultural competency requirements for migrants. Under the systemic effect, the current social welfare logic in the educational policy field is reaffirmed by the rising strength of economic logic in the field of power. The migrant group’s symbolic capital of being ‘migrant’ has been diminished, and their position is again one of marginalization. As a result, for those migrant families who cannot exert their social/cultural/economic capital to meet the state school enrolment criteria, their appeal to enrol in schools has been marginalized, although in an apparently legitimate manner. While this research is a ‘research of policy’ instead of ‘research for policy’ (Fay 1975, cited in Ball 1997), it still offers some implications for the policy-makers, as it reveals that the migrant children, taken together, have become more disadvantaged in the educational policy field after 2013. This situation deserves much wider social awareness, in order that access to state education in the city where their parents live is available to all children.
Chapter 8: Discourse, power and policy cycle: how the change happens in the educational system?

Following the discussion in chapter 7 of the external influences for the post-2013 policy change, this chapter examines how the restrictive schooling policy is enacted in the educational system: under what conditions has the policy agenda been set? What principles and values lie underneath and informing the policy text? How does the criteria system function in practice?

1. Introduction

As I have reviewed earlier (chapter 4, section 2 and section 4), I have adopted some Foucauldian theoretical tools, namely, ‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ (Ball, 1990, 1994), ‘policy cycle’ (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) and ‘policy archaeology’ (Foucault, 2002; Scheurich, 1994), to analyze the discursive formation with the post-2013 policy change. The policy cycle contains three main inter-related contexts, namely the context of influence, the context of policy text production and the context of practice. I integrate Scheurich’s concept of social regularities into the policy cycle and create an additional ‘pre-context’ of social regularities. Although this chapter starts from the pre-context and ends at ‘context of practice’, I do not mean to suggest that there is a chronological order or a direct causal relationship among them, as I have reviewed in chapter 4 (see section 2.2.2). What I have tried to present throughout my analysis is the co-
existence and interaction among the contexts. Applying this conceptual framework to the Chinese context, it explores how a restrictive state school enrolment criteria system was established and how it functions in practice and with what effects. It aims at revealing the inseparable nature of ‘knowledge/power’ invested and realized in the post-2013 state school enrolment criteria system.

2. Pre-context: two social regularities in the broader social context of education and migration

This section introduces two social regularities (Scheurich, 1994), which refer to some ‘deeper’ features of social organization in the educational and political fields, providing a broader context to migrant children’s schooling policy. Shaping people’s understanding of ‘who are outsiders/local residents’ and ‘what education is for’, the particular social regularities on which I shall focus shape policy agenda setting and policy text production, and thus serve as the pre-context of the policy cycle.

The first social regularity is the discourse of ‘outsider’ (外地人), under which the object of the discourse is the ‘outsider’ who does not hold a local household registration (hukou) card even if the person is in fact born and raised locally. The institutional roots of this discourse is the household registration system (see chapter 2, section 3). Before the Chinese economic reform in 1978, people were not allowed to move to reside out of their places of birth unless they obtained official approval. When they
were able to move to another place, their household registration card (‘HR card’ for short) was transferred correspondingly. Under this social administration system, there was a consistency between people’s HR card and their place of residence.\(^1\) After 1978, people were free to move and reside outside their hometowns. Yet the household registration system, as an embodied form of state sponsored welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt, 1995), under which the priority in social benefits is directed first and foremost to the region’s ‘own group’ (Mudde, 2000: 189), has not been changed. When people moved, not all of them could get their HR card moved to the new residential regions accordingly (Wu, 2009). For those who cannot or have not, they are not fully entitled to the local welfare provisions. Under this system, a person’s right to access local welfare is tied to the status of their HR card. What has been established is a conceptual binary opposition between local residents, who hold the local HR card, and ‘outsiders’, who live in the same region but do not hold the card. Interestingly, some people who are tagged as ‘local residents’ are in fact migrants but have managed to obtain the local HR card. Similarly, some people who are tagged as ‘outsiders’ are in fact born and raised locally but failed to obtain the local HR card, just like the second-generation migrant children in my study\(^2\).

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\(^1\) This consistency has practical implications, as the amount of funding that the local government receives for providing social welfare (e.g. to provide places in state schools or services in state hospitals) was calculated by the number of people who hold the local household registration. That is to say, all of the residents in a particular region whose HR cards are also registered in that region are entitled to the social welfare provided by the local government in that region.

\(^2\) Their HR cards are registered in their parents’ hometowns and they have not been transferred to their current residential places.
Under this binary, the ‘local residents’ (including the policy makers in local government departments) consider the ‘outsiders’ as ‘floating’ and ‘unstable’ and therefore not entitled to the local social welfare. Accordingly, the local government’s planning of welfare provision (such as how many state schools should be established) is normally dependent on the number of residents who hold the local HR card, leading to the insufficiency of welfare provision for residents who do not.

The second social regularity is found in teachers’ professional understandings of their role. Under the exam-orientated education tradition (Bo and West, 2015; Chan et al., 2008; see also chapter 2, section 2.2 for details), school education has been understood by educators and parents as being mainly about the quality of teaching and learning and is the dominant discourse in the educational practice of professional educators in China. ‘The purpose of schooling is to provide the students with “quality education”’ (Teacher K, state junior secondary school N). A ‘quality education’ is widely defined as meeting certain standards in terms of exam performance. Insulating itself from those political discourses in education, such as educational equity (equal educational is a right of all), the quality of teaching and learning discourse provides a version of the purposes of education, where the classroom is abstracted from the political, social, economic and cultural context: According to the responses of the majority of the state school teachers and leaders I interviewed, in their everyday teaching practice, the students’ family background (such as rural or urban,
migrant or local, etc.) is of little concern, and whether each child can find a school place is none of their business. Their job starts when children appear in their classrooms; education is simply about teaching and learning. As long as you are a student of the school, you deserve a quality education provided by the teachers. As Teacher K states, ‘[i]n fact, I do not care [who is local and who is migrant]. What is my concern is that: are you a hardworking student? Do you have any difficulties with your study? Do you need my help? These are the focuses in my work’ (Teacher K, state junior secondary school N). The majority of the respondent teachers share similar opinions that they do not care about this difference in status. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, teachers point to the importance of a healthy study environment; this is understood as consisting of an appropriate number of students in each class, cooperative parents who are able to facilitate the teachers’ work, and obedient students who comply with teachers’ orders. In other words, the absence of any of these factors could destroy the teachers’ expectations. These include: recruiting a disproportionately large number of children as this reduces the educational resources available on average for each child, thus leading potentially to decreasing exam scores; uncooperative parents would bring about extra burdens for the teachers; and undesirable behaviours and attitudes of students would have negative effects on the teaching and learning in school.

‘What I tried to do from the beginning was to analyse the process of “problematisation” – which means: how and why certain things, behaviour, phenomena, processes become a problem’ (Foucault, 1983). For Foucault, problematisation is ‘both an object of study and a method/a research disposition’ (Ball, 2013: 28). By examining the process of problematisation, Foucault problematises the practices and objects of discourse. Following Foucault’s analytical approach, this section critically examines the problematisation of ‘migrant children in state schools’ and how it facilitates the introduction of the policy agenda to limit population size from the public policy field into the educational policy field. As stated in chapter 7 (section 3.2), considering recent years of overpopulation in super-large cities (such as Beijing and Shanghai) and its negative influences on urban development, in 2013 the central government launched a new policy to strictly limit the population size in super-large cities. While this central government policy itself did not establish school access as a means of limiting migrant population size, the local governments in Beijing and Shanghai initially introduced the policy agenda of limiting migrant population size into the educational field. This new policy agenda is a result of the consensus of interests between teachers, state schools, local
government and central government, shaped by the social regularities in the broader social context, as I will elaborate in this section.

In recent years, the state schools in Beijing and Shanghai have recruited a disproportionate number of students as a result of receiving migrant children, who may otherwise lose their chance of schooling in their receiving district. As a result, the teachers and school leaders identified burdens such as increased workloads, negative emotions, and shortage of teaching resources, which result in the declining academic performance of the school. First, six out of nine teachers in my sample complained that their work burdens have increased, since some migrant parents are unable to cooperate with them on their children’s education at home as their local counterparts do. For example:

For us, the biggest problem is that things do not go well in the home-school cooperation. Many migrant children often do not finish their homework. So the teachers have to spend more time to give these students extra tutorials and supervisions. For the students, their parents do not have sufficient literacy to guide their study – that is one reason. Another reason is that they are busy with their work. For example, when their children come back home after school, they might still be working as a babysitter in someone else’s home. They do not have the attention to supervise their children (Teacher L, state primary school M).

By mentioning that ‘the teachers have to spend more time to give these students extra tutorials and supervisions’, this teacher expresses her expectation that the students are capable of a good academic performance, which is felt by the teachers to be the core purpose of education. Second,
some degree of frustration can be identified in four of the nine teachers when they describe their feelings about some migrant children and their parents. A good example is teacher C (state primary school G), whose frustration has two origins: the first is that she feels some migrant parents do not respect her work by ignoring her communication and requests:

My heart is broken… I have communicated with the migrant parents many times, requesting them to help check their children’s homework to make sure they finish it. But many of them just ignored my request, and their children never complete their homework. The parents do not supervise the children at all. That makes me and other teachers angry. Sometimes we could not tolerate this and asked the parents to come and talk to us and they promised to do as we request. But the next day, their children had still not finished their homework, leaving the workbook blank! (with a bitter smile)

The other cause for concern is that she feels some migrant students always treat her with an indifferent attitude:

Indifference [冷漠] – that is their attitude towards teachers. Sometimes the students talk loudly during a class and make lots of noise, so I shout, ‘keep quiet!’ but nobody has any reaction. They just focus on their own business and do not care about you. They do not even have an awareness of ‘how should I behave in front of the teachers?’, which they should have.

The negative emotions that this teacher has perceived come from her expectation that the parents should be cooperative and the students should be obedient. With these ideal behaviours, the parents and students would be contributors to the ‘quality education’ mission, which is the ideal of the discourse of education for practitioners, a discourse that places emphasis on teaching and learning. Third, more than half of the respondent teachers
and school leaders reported a shortage of teaching and learning resources in their school owing to the recruitment of a disproportionately large number of migrant students. The teachers report that the average teaching resources for each child has decreased, while headteachers report that the schools have to turn specialist music and arts classrooms into regular classrooms at the expense of losing these specialist spaces. The school leaders report that the small class teaching reform in their schools, which aims to improve educational quality through the reduction of class sizes, has had to be stopped.

With all these negative emotions and perceived burdens and difficulties, around half of the respondent teachers and school leaders conclude that there is an ongoing tendency of ‘declining educational quality’. Just as a headteacher reports:

The educational quality is declining… We have never been like this: this year, the school’s exam scores in Chinese and Maths are even below the average score of all schools in Fengtai District! This is the result of recruiting the extra group [beyond the school’s recruiting capacity] of around 50 migrant children last year, under the request of the district municipal of education. (Headteacher, state primary school B)

What can be identified from the above analysis is the educators define quality education mainly by the academic and behavioural performance of students. This version of ‘quality education’, which acts as the ‘grids of specification’ (Foucault, 2002: 46), produces the object of discourse – ‘declining educational quality’. The conclusions reached by the teachers
and headteachers of a situation of ‘declining educational quality’ seem unchallengeable, yet the way they interpret these facts in order to draw this conclusion is worth further discussion. If examined from another perspective, the same facts might produce a different conclusion. Education is successful in terms of social inclusion: entry into the state schools in Beijing and Shanghai gives migrant children equal status with local children and also allows them to live together with their parents, rather than being sent back to their parents’ hometowns alone. This situation is likely to positively influence their emotional and social development, which might also be considered as an element of ‘quality education’. However, this positive aspect has been eliminated by the teachers, who act as the ‘authorities of delimitation’ (Foucault, 2002: 46). In this discursive formation, a statement that recruiting migrant children leads to the declining educational quality emerges. Accordingly, a small number of school leaders even consider recruiting migrant children as a ‘mandatory political task’, a burden they have to accept. As a headteacher complains:

If it is not because of the - I would rather call it a “mandatory political task” [硬性政治任务] - from the city and district municipality of education, our school really cannot recruit so many migrant children, since we need to maintain the quality of education (Headteacher, state primary school B).

For this headteacher, the commitment to education is focused on classroom practice and abstracted from the wider political and social contexts. As a result, while acknowledging that most of the migrant children are studying and behaving well (see also, chapter 2, section 4), most of the
respondent teachers and headteachers expressed their reluctance to recruit migrant children. While these teachers and school leaders all know that, rejected by the state school, these children might lose the chance of accessing formal education or have to leave their parents and study alone in their hometown, resulting in educational inequality, none of them consider this as an educational issue which is their responsibility. The discursive formation removes the teachers as a potential source of opposition to the local government’s new restrictive policy for migrants’ access to schooling, facilitating the marginalization of migrant family’s voices against the new policy.

Before 2013, under the social justice discourse in the political field, the local government had full responsibility for the school enrolment of migrant children (see chapter 7). In global metropolises like Beijing, the local municipalities of education are concerned not with the teachers’ worries over education quality, but with creating enough school places for the incoming migrant children (who are positioned as the ‘outsiders’). For the Beijing Municipality of Education, the existing state schools are already full, while setting up new schools is understood as financially and practically unrealistic. According to officers B, C and D, the floating nature and instability of the migrant population makes choosing the location for a new school extremely complex, not to mention that it is extremely hard to find suitable land to build a school campus in the inner city. According to these officers, when the local government is undertaking school campus planning,
whether to establish a new school and how many schools should be established is normally dependent on the number of students who hold the local HR card, as they are considered by the officers as the stable population. What can be identified here is the conceptual binary opposition of ‘stable vs. unstable/floating population’, which is in line with the discourse of the ‘outsider’. Under this discourse, those who do not hold the local HR card are tagged as ‘floating’ and ‘unstable’, and therefore are not included in the local school planning agenda. Facing huge pressure for school places from the migrant children, since 2013 the local governments in Beijing and Shanghai adopted the new national policy agenda of limiting migrant populations (see chapter 7, section 3.2). To achieve this, they have enhanced the state school enrolment criteria, as I will elaborate in the next section.

Like the local government, before 2013 the Ministry of Education had also been under pressure from public opinion for failing to recruit all migrant children into state schools nationwide. After 2013, the enhanced local state school enrolment criteria formed part of a new discourse, which was then affirmed by the Ministry. The emergence of a strict state school enrolment criteria system reduced the public’s anticipation of recruiting all migrant children into state schools, as argued by Ministry of Education officer A:

Some migrant children do not meet the criteria to enrol in state schools in the receiving cities, but we cannot help them. Our principle is that we guarantee those who meet the criteria will enrol in state schools; for those who do not meet the criteria, we do not offer them places.
In officer A’s formulation, it seems reasonable that the migrant parents should take the responsibility for not meeting the criteria. Yet a key point has been concealed in this discourse, namely, whose interest is the criteria system protecting? With the confirmation of the Ministry, limiting migrant population size becomes a principle of the national education policy agenda. In 2014, a new policy featured in MOE’s *The Decisions on Facilitating Students’ ‘Accessing to the Nearest Junior Secondary School without Exams’*. The text notes that: ‘the metropolitan areas should facilitate the school enrolment of migrant children who meet the criteria in a step by step way, according to its urban developmental plan, aim of population size control, and the capability of educational resources’. It discloses the link between the state school enrolment criteria and the national policy aim of limiting migrant population size.

As I have revealed in this section, this national educational policy agenda is the production of the consensus of interests between local state schools and teachers, local government and central government, shaped by the social regularities in the broader education and migration context. In the next section, I will elaborate what has happened within the context of policy text production. The new policy agenda has produced the restrictive state school enrolment criteria system, which redefines compulsory education as social welfare.
4. Context of policy text production: redefining compulsory education as social welfare

Since 2013, the central government policy started to limit the population size of the super-large cities in a strict way. It is important to note that the agenda limiting migrant population size has produced a series of different policies in different fields. In the economic field, for example, a way of reducing migrant populations in the cities is to move the labour-intensive industry to suburban areas. In the social welfare field, enhancing the welfare admittance criteria became a specifically suitable way of reducing migrant populations, as migrants without local HR card are considered as outsiders and therefore not entitled to the local social welfare. Accessing compulsory education in one’s place of residence, which was once considered as a basic right for migrant children, has now been redefined as a restricted type of social welfare. The migrant children’s schooling issue has been included into the social welfare arena. In my interviews with government officers, I asked four of them (two in Beijing and two in Shanghai) about the function of the criteria system. All of them interpret that the purpose of setting up the criteria system is to judge whether a migrant person is truly working in this city, and to make sure the person is a ‘contributor to the city’ so they can be offered the right to access the local educational welfare. What lies behind the officers’ comment is a welfare discourse under which the state school education is understood as a
restricted type of social welfare open to all local residents, and occasionally open to those ‘outsiders’ who have a justifiable reason for living in and contributing to the city.

In the remaining part of this section, I will analyse each of the criteria in depth to reveal the grids of specification underneath the criteria and how they have contributed to the formation of the discursive object, namely, the people who are entitled to the educational welfare. Through establishing the criteria system, the welfare discourse has occupied a dominant position in the educational policy field. As Ball comments, policy discourses ‘organise their own specific rationalities, making particular sets of ideas obvious, common sense and “true”’ (Ball, 2008: 5). In the meantime, the social justice discourse of ‘education as a basic right’ is marginalized.

Before I undertake such detailed analysis, I would like to outline in brief the state school enrolment criteria in Beijing and Shanghai. In Beijing, the city government merely lists the five required documents without listing the specific requirements for each document. These specific requirements are at the discretion of the district government. Therefore, in my analysis of the criteria system in Beijing, I will adopt an example from one of its districts (see Table 9). In Shanghai, the city government sets up specific requirements for each of the documents, which are followed by the district government (see Table 10).
Table 9: the specific requirements of the ‘Five Documents’ in Xicheng, Beijing

(2012-2015)\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proof of Employment</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Paying for social insurance for at least three months before application</td>
<td>· Already paid social insurance for at least three months; · Both parents’ <em>Proof of Employment</em> should be provided; · One of the parents should work in Xicheng; · Individual businessman should pay taxes in Xicheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proof of House Renting / Ownership</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>· Shared house renting and basement renting are not recognized as valid; · An address only provides one state school enrolment quota for the same family within 6 years.</td>
<td>· Shared house renting and basement renting are not recognized as valid; · An address only provides one state school enrolment quota for the same family within 6 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proof of No Guardian in the Hometown</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temporary Residential Permit(^2)</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Both parents’ certificate should be issued in Xicheng</td>
<td>Both parents’ certificate should be issued in Xicheng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household registration card(^3)</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Data source: *Xicheng District Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015)*

\(^2\) This is a required document for all migrants living in a place other than their household registration (hukou) place. This document is similar to the passport for international migrants.

\(^3\) The household registration card is similar to the ID card, it would always be required during the administrative procedures in China.
Table 10: the specific requirements of the criteria in Shanghai (2014 & 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Option 1: Long-term Residence Permit</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Option 2: Temporal Residence Permit + Proof of Flexible Employment</strong></td>
<td>The Temporal Residence Permit should be registered for at least 2 years</td>
<td>· The Temporal Residence Permit should be registered for at least 3 years · The Proof of Flexible Employment should be registered for at least 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household registration card</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proof of Vaccination</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Beijing, the *Proof of Employment* has been a regular requirement in most of the annual state school recruitment policies since 2002. It was abandoned by the annual policy in 2011, but was reinstated by the 2012 policy. After 2013, the district level municipals of education started to add some specific requirements under this criterion. For example, in Xicheng District the applicant’s *Proof of Employment* should meet all the following requirements: the applicant should have already paid for social insurance for at least three months; both parents of the migrant children should provide proof of employment; one of the parents should work in Xicheng; and individual businessmen should pay taxes in Xicheng. According to the

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1 Data source: *Shanghai Municipal of Education’s Regulation on Student Recruitment in Compulsory education age (2014 & 2015)*
government officers’ interpretation, there are two basic reasons why the
government requires the Proof of Employment, especially with the newly
added specific requirements by district governments. First, holding this
document means that the person is a ‘contributor to the city’. As officer F
explains,

Only the people who have got a legal job in Beijing are able to obtain
the Proof of Employment. Therefore, it can be used to identify that a
person is a ‘contributor to the city’. Therefore, his/her children are
entitled to enjoy the educational welfare provided by this city. (Officer
F, Mentougou Municipal of Education, Beijing)

In other words, so long as you are working in a legal job, you are making
direct contributions to this city by paying tax, consuming, and making the
city operate. If both parents are working, the contribution your family can
make is doubled, and therefore is more appreciated. In order to ensure that
your contributions are made directly to this district (rather than other
districts in this city), the district government requires that the applicant’s
proof of employment should be issued in this district. As officer H (Sub-
district Office of Culture & Education, Haidian District, Beijing) points out,
‘if you are working and paying tax in other districts in Beijing, your children
cannot enjoy the educational welfare provided by this district because you
have not made contributions to this district’. Furthermore, requesting the
applicant pay for social insurance is to make sure that the applicant is not
only a contributor but also a stable contributor to the city. In other words,
you should have been working in and contributing to this city (district) on a
long-term basis. With the Proof of Employment (with all its specific criteria)
required, what has been established and reaffirmed is an important rule that the benefits you get are in accordance with the contributions you have made. Yet the same rule, and the social welfare discourse in total, is not found in the school enrolment of local students. In other words, holding a local HR card, even if their parents do not contribute to the local economy, means the children should still be entitled to access local education. What can be identified here is the trace of the ‘outsider’ discourse as a social regularity within the broader context of migration, which legitimates the full rights of the local HR card holders, yet limits the rights of the ‘outsiders’. While not written into the educational policy, this rule constructs the cornerstone of the welfare discourse. It has supplanted the formerly dominant discourse that people took for granted before 2013: accessing compulsory education in the place of residence is a basic right for each child.

Second, holding a *Proof of Employment* also means that the person has a ‘justifiable’ reason for living in the city and enjoying the social welfare provided by the city. In other words, this is to ‘prevent people from unjustifiably sending their children to the metropolitan areas for a better education, while they themselves are not based in that city’, as explained by officer A (Ministry of Education). The government can define a ‘justifiable’ reason as having a legal job. This concept reflects the government and local residents’ worry about the migrant population, especially about the motivation behind their migration. For example, it is assumed that some
people might migrate to live in (but not work in) the metropolitan areas just to get their children access to better education. This reveals some trace of the discourse of ‘outsider’, which constantly generates suspicion and hostility towards the migrant population from local residents and government. The trace of this social regularity emerges again in my analysis of other documents below, especially the Proof of No Guardian in the Hometown. Similar to the rule of the benefits in accordance with the contributions, the concept of justifiable reason offers a criterion for the government to eliminate some ‘unentitled’ people, thus it becoming another important rule of the social welfare discourse. Again, this rule has marginalized some basic questions relating to the newly set state school enrolment criteria, such as: do we really need a ‘justifiable reason’ for people to enjoy the basic social welfare in their place of residence? If yes, then who should define the justifiable reasons?

In Beijing, the Proof of House Renting / Ownership has been required since 2011. Between 2011 and 2014 there was no specific requirement under this document. Since 2014, the district municipalities of education started to add specific requirements, such as ‘an address only provides one state school enrolment quota within a six-year period for the families living there’. According to the government officers’ interpretation, this requirement aims to prevent people from unjustifiably renting a house in order to get their children access schools that they apparently do not deserve. As Beijing Municipality of Education officer B explains, in some
school districts with ‘good’ schools a common phenomenon is that people rent or buy a house in this district in order to get their children enrolled in their preferred schools. Then in the following year, they rent or sell the house to others who want to get their children enrolled in the schools in this district. Therefore, requiring that an address only provides one school enrolment quota within a six-year period is to prevent people from temporarily renting a property for this purpose. In short, the function of the Proof of House Renting / Ownership matches that of the Proof of Employment, in that they both raise the justifiable reason discourse.

Another requirement that contributes to the ‘justifiable reason’ concept is the Proof of No Guardian in the Hometown. In Beijing, this document has been required since 2012. Its function is to make sure that the child does not have a guardian in his/her hometown, so s/he needs to study in Beijing with his/her parents. This additional criterion is seemingly unnecessary, given that the government has already requested the Proof of Employment, the Proof of House Renting/Ownership, and the Temporary Residential Permit, which are enough to prove that the child’s parents (guardians) are based in Beijing. The government’s insistence on this concept indicates its symbolic significance, which is aiming to strengthen the ‘justifiable reason’ concept: the migrant children should have a justifiable reason for studying outside their hometown. Again, the outsider discourse has demonstrated itself through this document: the state school system in Beijing is not open to children who do not hold a local HR card; unless you can prove that you
do not have guardian in your hometown, you are not allowed to study in the local state school. These restrictions and regulations have the effect of making the reasoning behind the policy seem ‘natural’ to people, so that they (migrant and local parents as well as government officers) tend to take it for granted. During my interviews with the migrant parents, when I asked them why they wanted their children to study in Beijing or Shanghai, the first reason given would always be ‘our parents are too old to take care of our children, so the children do not have guardians in the hometown’. This argument is in line with the restrictive criteria, and believed by parents to be the most convincing reason. Alternative arguments such as ‘isn’t it natural that a child should access compulsory education in a place where his/her immediate family is currently living?’ are marginalized and are excluded from the debate.

Similarly, in Shanghai the city municipality of education has established a two-option choice criteria system since 2013: each applicant should provide the Household Registration Card and Proof of Vaccination\(^1\), and should provide the document(s) either through ‘Option 1’ or through ‘Option 2’ (see Table 10). If choosing ‘Option 1’, the applicant should then provide the Long-term Residence Permit, in applying for which s/he should provide the Proof of Employment and should have paid for social insurance for at least six months (which normally means the person’s job is a formal and

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\(^1\) This document is required to reduce the possibility of epidemic diseases. Both local and migrant children must have this.
full-time job rather than an occasional and part-time one). If choosing ‘Option 2’, the applicant should provide the Temporal Residence Permit and the Proof of Flexible Employment. The latter is only issued to people who have certain expertise and are working in these fields of expertise. The government recognizes four areas of expertise, all of which are considered as in urgent need for the social and economic development of Shanghai: nursing, agricultural labour, domestic service, and small business owner. In other words, both options carry with them the rule of the benefits in accordance with the contributions. So as long as you have a job in Shanghai and paid social insurance for at least six months, your children are able to enrol in the local state schools (through ‘Option 1’). If you have not got a formal and full-time job and thus are not paying social insurance, then at least your job should fall within the government’s designated areas that meet the urgent needs of the city (through ‘Option 2’).

Furthermore, the local municipality of education has established a ‘hierarchical system of school access criteria’, as termed by officer K in Pudong District Municipal of Education. For example, in Minhang District in Shanghai, there is an order of priority in the state school enrolment if the number of qualified applicants (who all meet the state school enrolment criteria) exceeds the number of places available. The first priority is given to people who hold the local household registration card; second priority is given to people who have more than 120 credits (calculated by their ability
to contribute to the city) with their *Long-term Residence Permit*; third priority is given to people who have bought a house in this district; and the final group merely meet the state school enrolment criteria. In practice, as reported by many of the respondent migrant parents and school leaders, the local state school system has the capacity to recruit level one to three applicants. Yet for the level four applicants, while they meet the general state school enrolment criteria, they have to attend the quasi-state schools with inferior conditions compared to the formal state schools (see chapter 11). Within this hierarchical system, moving up a level means that the contribution you have made to the city and your ‘justifiable reasons’ for living in the city are increasing, correspondingly. The hierarchical system is an intensive and straightforward presentation of the rule of the benefits in accordance with the contributions and the concept of justifiable reason. Functioning as the grids of specification, the rules contribute to the formation of the object of the welfare discourse - the people who are entitled to educational welfare - and weave the criteria into a whole system carrying the welfare discourse. This complicated system has been put into practice, facilitated by a standardization discourse, which I will detail in the next section.

5. Context of practice: producing a ‘well-regulated’ criteria system

When put into practice, the district government presents the compulsory criteria system in the form of a ‘user manual’ for parents, which includes
user-friendly websites, posters, checklists, and consulting services. The municipalities of education have created specific webpages that list all the detailed requirements for each document. The same information has also been put on posters displayed on local community bulletin boards. During the application period, the Sub-district Office of Culture and Education (SOCE) provides A4 size checklists containing all the above information to facilitate the preparation. The SOCE also provides a telephone consulting service for those who are not internet literate or policy text literate. In addition, a cooperative mechanism has been established among SOCE, municipal of education and state schools in the school recruitment process. The extra-curricular tutorial schools in the private sector are also involved in the creation and dissemination of the assorted policy literature by creating webpages to guide parents’ document preparation. Similarly, some kindergartens invite SOCE staff to conduct workshops to provide the parents with first-hand guidance for their document preparation. Presented in a user-friendly way, these manuals are appreciated by migrant parents. What can be identified from the above practice is the formation of a series of ‘policy artefacts’ (Ball, Meg and Annette, 2012: 121-136) to ‘visualize’ these criteria. Facilitated by the policy artefacts, a comprehensive, efficient and well-regulated criteria system has been formed as a discursive object, as described by officer B:

Since 2004, the standardization [规范化] of the criteria system started. In 2008, it was the first time that the Beijing Municipal of Education established the requirement of the ‘Three Documents’… But in 2011,
the ‘Three Documents’ was cut down to ‘Two Documents’… This back and forth situation reflects the hesitation of the [local] government, who were not sure what kinds of documents should be required. At that time, government was exploring, and the criteria system was to be standardized… Another problem is that the government supervision of the state school in its recruitment process was weak. It was the school that was in charge of the document checks and student recruitment, and there was not a ‘national student ID website network’ for government to monitor the student recruitment. As a result, subject to the decision of the headteacher, a migrant child can enrol in a state school without any documents. The whole process was not regulated. We started to require the ‘Five Documents’ since 2012. In 2013, 2014 and 2015, we continued this documentation system, which has been increasingly standardized. Especially in 2015, the requirements of each document are formulated clearly in the policy text, including: what are the specific requirements of each document? Where should you get these documents? Which government department is responsible for the document check? (Officer B, Beijing Municipality of Education)

This well-constructed criteria system is highly appreciated by the city and district governments in Beijing and Shanghai, since it serves as an efficient mechanism to regulate the process of recruiting (or restricting) migrant children’s school access. Under the discursive formation, a managerial and highly efficient criteria system (which promotes the social welfare discourse) is identified as ‘well-regulated’, thus justifying its implementation, and defines the former, more flexible criteria (which promoted the social justice discourse) as lacking in regulation and effectiveness. The ‘standardization’ process of the criteria system is driven by the principles of bureaucratic managerial efficiency, as the grids of specification in the discursive
formation. Underlying the principle of managerial efficiency is the disciplinary powers of bureaucracy (Foucault, 1979), which I will return to in the next section.

Parents now have full knowledge of the criteria system: the specific requirements of each document; how they can obtain these documents; how long it takes to get each of them; what difficulties they might encounter during the preparation; and what kinds of educational welfare they can access given the documents they have. The more knowledge they have about the criteria system, the more they accept as normal the restrictive conception of social welfare. As Ball reminds us, ‘[i]n Foucault’s terms we could see policy ensembles that include, for example, the market, management, appraisal and performativity as “regimes of truth” through which people govern themselves and others’ (1994: 22). Here, the criteria system and its policy artefacts act as tools of management, producing the idea of education as social welfare as a ‘truth’, while facilitating the promotion of this truth through schools, kindergartens, extra-curricular tutorial schools, government officers and the migrants themselves. Yet it avoids some crucial issues: why increase the degree of regulation in the criteria system? In whose interests is this regulation?

If failing to meet the criteria, some migrant parents claim their children’s educational rights by highlighting their contributions to the city. As I have presented in chapter 7 (section 3.3), migrant mother En adopts the social welfare discourse to strengthen her statement: ‘we are also contributors to
this city like the local people…’. Yet, in return, this statement reinforces the welfare discourse, which legitimates limiting migrant population size policy and produces continuing hardships for the migrant group. Others try to challenge the welfare discourse by challenging the legitimacy of setting up the criteria. Just as migrant father Fei argues, ‘like local children, our children are also Chinese citizens. They deserve equal treatment in school enrolment. The children are innocent. Why can’t they just access school?! I am very unhappy with the restriction from the government’. This kind of statement was powerful during the pre-2011 period, legitimized by the premier’s slogan - ‘under the same sky, [migrant and local children] should grow and progress together’ [同在蓝天下，共同成长进步]. However, it has lost its power along with the marginalization of the social justice discourse after 2013. Just as Ball has commented: ‘policy as discourse may have the effect of redistributing “voice”, so that it does not matter what some people say or think, and only certain voices can be heard as meaningful or authoritative’ (1994: 23).

‘Discourse is the condition under which certain statements are considered to be the truth’ (Ball, 2013: 19). As revealed by the above analysis, the discursive formation legitimises the following statements: recruiting migrant children leads to declining educational quality; state school education is social welfare; and standardization is necessary for the school enrolment practice. These statements permeate the policy trajectory and legitimise the restrictive criteria system. Following the spirit
of Foucault’s archaeology (Foucault, 2002), the above sections present the
discursive formation throughout the policy cycle. My analysis has also
given a clue as to the power relations in the discursive practices, which is
a main task of Foucault’s genealogy (Foucault, 1978, 1979). In the next
section, I will concentrate on the power relations in Chinese society and
their interrelations with the discursive formations.

6. The power relations invested and realized in the discursive
formation

As suggested by Ball, power relation ‘is a central concept in the analysis of
education and education policy’ (Ball, 2013: 29). From the above
discussion, several aspects of the power relations in society can be
identified. First, formed under the exam-orientated education tradition, the
dominant discourse of school education as being mainly about ‘quality’
teaching and learning (defined in relation to exam results) shapes what Ball
identifies as the ‘meaning of educational practice – what it means to teach
and learn – and our sense of who we are in terms of these practices – what
it means to be an educator, and to be educated’ (2013: 6). Taking this
discourse for granted, the schools emphasis academic performance (in
terms of the scores) as the core of the quality of the education they offer,
and the educators enact this version of education in their teaching practice.
This puts a high demand on the students’ familial cultural capital. Indeed,
the issue of cultural capital introduces us to another aspect of the power
relations – the cultural imperialism (Young, 1990) of the privileged over the dominated; the latter, in this research, is the population group of rural working-class migrants (see chapter 10, section 2 and section 3). The cultural capital valued in the urban schools, as a field of cultural production, has been socially constructed as that of urban middle-class. This situation leads to migrant children’s difficulties in academic study in urban schools (Mu and Jia, 2016; Zhang and Luo, 2016; see also chapter 2, section 4 and chapter 10, section 5.1). As a result, the practice of recruiting a large number of migrant children has been considered by the teachers in my research as causing ‘declining educational quality’. A third aspect of the power relations, which functions together with the first and second aspects, is the disciplinary power (Foucault, 1979) underpinning the traditionally established discourse of ‘outsider’. This discourse enacts the classification of population by differentiating the ‘outsider’ from the local residents, and reinforces the state sponsored ‘welfare chauvinism’ embodied in the household registration system. It sets the migrant group, as the ‘outsider’, in a disadvantaged position in their struggle with local residents, teachers, schools and government in the urban field. In short, as Foucault maintains, power is the way in which individuals are constructed as ‘subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (1982: 781). In my research context, the migrants are objectivized as ‘outsiders’ and as a risk to the educational quality of the school. The power relations between local residents, migrants,
educators, schools and government produce the formation and legitimisation of the restrictive criteria system in the policy trajectory, more specifically, in the contexts of influence and policy text production. When coming to the context of practice, the criteria system is again reinforced by the disciplinary powers of bureaucracy, which promote the principle of managerial efficiency through the ‘well-regulated’ criteria system. The standardization of the criteria system sets standards to unify the practice to enact the social welfare discourse, which is formed under the context of policy text production.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have integrated a series of Foucauldian theoretical resources into a conceptual framework. Extending Foucault’s concept of ‘discourse’, Ball’s conceptualization of ‘policy as discourse’ and ‘policy as text’ (1990, 1994) provides the conceptual foundation for my analysis. I adopt the ‘policy cycle’ (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992) as the basic framework to outline the scope of my analysis. I also complement the ‘policy cycle’ with ‘policy archaeology’ (Foucault, 2002; Scheurich, 1994) to direct my analytical focus to the discursive formation of educational policy. Applying this updated conceptual framework to the Chinese context, the findings of this chapter contribute to research on the discursive formation of educational policy and the underlying power relations.

The policy agenda of limiting migrant population size offers a consensus
of interests between teachers, state schools, local government and central
government, and has been introduced into the educational policy field
within the context of influence. This new agenda produces a restrictive
state school enrolment criteria system, which leads to a discourse of
education as social welfare informing the context of policy text production.
Under the social welfare discourse, accessing compulsory education in
one’s place of residence is understood as social welfare rather than a basic
right. Two underlying principles have played an important role in the
construction of the welfare discourse: the benefits you receive are in
accordance with the contributions you have made; and having a ‘justifiable’
reason for living in and claiming welfare from this city. The formation of both
this aspect of the state school enrolment criteria and the agenda of
limiting the size of the area shaped by social regularities in the broader social
context of education and migration. One is the discourse that education is
all about teaching and learning and the construction of an ‘ideal’ pupil to
fulfil teachers’ agendas; the other is a broader social and cultural discourse
of the ‘outsider’. Shifting to the context of practice, the restrictive school
enrolment criteria system becomes standardized and legitimized through
the user-friendly policy artefacts established by the local government.
Throughout the discursive formation of education as social welfare, the four
contexts construct a ‘policy cycle’. The coexistence and permeable nature
of the four contexts is especially clear when we regard how the social
regularities shape the production of the new educational policy agenda,
and shape the selection of certain criteria (not others) in the policy text.

As Ball reminds us, ‘we need to appreciate the way in which policy ensembles, collections of related policies, exercise power through a production of “truth” and “knowledge”, as discourses’ (1994: 21, original emphasis). What are invested and realized in the discursive practices of the policy change are the disciplinary power and the ‘cultural imperialism’ of the privileged over the dominated, which objectivize migrants as ‘outsiders’ and as a risk to the educational quality of the school. These power relations are embodied in the school and educator’s emphasis on academic performance (in terms of test scores), in the privileging of urban and middle-class culture in the school system, in the traditionally established discourse of ‘outsider’, and in the principles of bureaucratic managerial efficiency in the policy artefacts. The discursive practices result in further difficulties for migrant families in schooling. As they are a marginalized group in the educational field, the migrant families’ voices against the welfare discourse are largely unheard by schools and policy makers. Through the lens of ‘discourse’, this chapter tries to reveal the inseparable nature of ‘knowledge/power’ within policies, and highlights the power relations between local residents, migrants, educators, schools and governments in and throughout their mundane social interactions.
Part III

The analysis of Part III is organized around this question: what kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?

Chapter 9: Towards multiple types of schooling

This chapter reviews the historical development and current situation of various types of schools available to migrant children and the migrant children's experiences in these schools. It provides a foundation for the further analyses in chapter 10 and chapter 11.

1. Introduction

As stated earlier, since 2001, the local governments nationwide have tried hard to make sure the majority of migrant children could enrol in local state schools. In addition, the city governments have also provided some migrant children with private school education by paying for their tuition fees. By the end of 2014, nationwide there were 1.25 million migrant children studying in private schools with tuition fees paid by the government (He, 2015). In Shanghai, the percentage is higher. According to my fieldwork findings in Beijing and Shanghai, there are five types of schools from both state and private sector that recruit migrant children. These
schools have two shared origins, namely, state school or unlicensed informal private (UIP) school, as I will review in this chapter.

2. State school

Before the promulgation of the ‘Two Main Channel’ (TMC) policy, state schools only recruited a small number of migrant children. This situation changed after 2001. In recent years, the state school sector has recruited around 77%-80% migrant children nationwide, as shown in Table 11. At the local level, the recruitment figures in Beijing (see Table 12) and Shanghai (see Table 13) are in accordance with the national picture. Admittedly, the percentage of migrant children who are studying in state schools has not increased greatly during these years. However, the number of migrant children who are studying in state schools has increased significantly, since the total number of migrant children has been increasing every year.

Table 11: the number of migrant children of compulsory education age nationwide (2007-2014)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number (million)</th>
<th>State school enrolment percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
<td>77.5% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
<td>77.2% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
<td>78.2% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11.67 (8.64 in primary and 3.02 in junior secondary schools)</td>
<td>79.2% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12.61 (9.33 in primary and 3.28 in junior secondary schools)</td>
<td>79.4% 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13.94 (10.36 in primary and 3.58 in junior secondary schools)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12.77 (9.31 in primary and 3.46 in junior secondary schools)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12.95 (9.56 in primary and 3.39 in junior secondary schools)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>13.67 (10.14 in primary and 3.53 in junior secondary schools)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Data source: unpublished Ministry of Education statistical data (obtained from interview)
2 Data source: unpublished Ministry of Education statistical data (obtained from interview)
3 Data source: unpublished Ministry of Education statistical data (obtained from interview)
5 Data source: unpublished MOE statistical data (obtained from interview)
7 Data source: unpublished MOE statistical data (obtained from interview)
Table 12: the number of migrant children of compulsory education age in Beijing (2010-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>State school enrolment percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>98,000¹</td>
<td>70.7%²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001³</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002⁴</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003⁵</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004⁶</td>
<td>320,700</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006⁷</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008⁸</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010⁹</td>
<td>438,000</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011¹⁰</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012¹¹</td>
<td>491,000</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013¹²</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Data source: Beijing Academy of Educational Sciences official website online report: ‘Setting up a comprehensive administrative mechanism for migrant children’s compulsory education in Beijing’ (http:58.135.194.5/index.asp)
³ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
⁴ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
⁵ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
⁶ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
⁷ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
⁸ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
⁹ Data resource: Yuan et al. (2013: 32)
Table 13: the number of migrant children in compulsory education age in Shanghai (2001-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>State and government funded private school enrolment percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>286,000(^2)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>319,000(^3)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>346,000(^4)</td>
<td>34.68%(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>378,000(^6)</td>
<td>39.68%(^7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005(^8)</td>
<td>381,757</td>
<td>49.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006(^8)</td>
<td>385,703</td>
<td>53.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>384,000(^10)</td>
<td>(Lack of data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008(^11)</td>
<td>402,000(^12)</td>
<td>74.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009(^13)</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>92.7% (66.51% in state and 26.19% in private schools)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^1\) Data source: unpublished Beijing Municipality of Education statistical data (obtained from interview)  
\(^2\) Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
\(^3\) Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
\(^4\) Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
\(^6\) Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
\(^8\) Data source: Tian and Wu (2010: 217)  
\(^9\) Data source: Tian and Wu (2010: 217)  
\(^10\) Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
\(^12\) Data source: Lu (2013: 8)  
According to the state school enrolment policy, a school should give the first priority to local students. If there are still vacancies after recruiting local students, then migrant children can be recruited. When enrolled in state schools, the migrant children enjoy free education, the same as their local classmates. Under the TMC policy, the state schools in Beijing and Shanghai have been trying hard to enrol as many migrant children as possible. Taking the school B (in Fengtai District, Beijing) as an example: the maximum recruitment quota of this school was 60, which was calculated by its maximum teacher and facility capacity. However, in 2012, nearly 400 students (mostly migrant children) applied to this school. Finally, under pressure from the district municipality of education, the school enlarged its recruitment number to 96. This number is far beyond the school’s capacity, and the extra 36 students have caused an overload of teachers’ work and a deficiency in teaching resources. The same situation arose in school C in the same district: this school’s maximum recruitment quota was 180, but it finally recruited 230 students. There were 50 extra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>501,700</td>
<td>100% (73.53% in state and 26.47% in private schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>538,000</td>
<td>100% (74.72% in state and 25.28% in private schools)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

migrant children allocated to this school directly by the district municipality of education.

As a result of losing local children because of their school choice and at the same time recruiting more and more migrant children, many state schools in Beijing and Shanghai have recruited more migrant than local students and hence become migrant majority schools. In Beijing, in 2013 there were 562 schools (out of the total number of 1,440 schools for compulsory education age pupils) in which the percentage of migrant children is greater than 50%, and the highest percentage was 98%, as reported by Beijing Municipality of Education officers B and C. This phenomenon is common in both cities, as reported by all of the headteachers and municipality of education officers I interviewed, and is particularly notable in those districts with a large and concentrated migrant population. For example, the headteacher of school B reports that in Fengtai district of Beijing, except for several elite schools, most of the ordinary schools surrounded by migrant communities have a migrant population of more than 80%. Among the eleven schools I investigated (which were chosen through snowball sampling), two of them have more than 90% migrant students, six have 60-87% and the remaining three have 30-40%. A direct reason is a matter of location. As a result of the increasing number of migrant workers living in the city, some communities have moved towards a migrant majority population. Another reason is the reputation of the school. Indeed, most of the respondent headteachers and
teachers were aware of the poor status of their schools locally (see chapter 2, section 4). Therefore some local parents managed to send their children to other schools outside of their school district, a process that involves the possession and activation of social and economic capital (Lu, 2013; Zhou, 2012). Unable to attract local students, the schools have vacancies and therefore have recruited migrant children to reach their capacity. When the percentage of migrant children increased, these schools entirely lost their appeal for many of the local students living nearby. This phenomenon is termed as the Chinese version of the ‘white flight’ (Coleman et al., 1975) by Qian and Walker (2015). They point out that these schools are nicknamed ‘street market schools’ by the local residents since they believe that migrant children spend their pre-school years in street markets. As a result of such negative impressions of migrant families, many local parents ‘explore every opportunity to find another school for their children’ (Qian and Walker, 2015: 78). Their argument matches with other studies, which note that the migrant group is experiencing negative attitudes and even discrimination from some local residents (Goodburn, 2009; Chen et al., 2011). As reported by some of the respondent migrant parents and teachers, some local parents who have a relatively high socio-economic background believe that given their rural origin and labourer working conditions, migrants do not have good behaviours, good hygiene habits, or a positive attitude to studying. These local parents do not want their children to be classmates with migrant children, worrying that the migrant
children might have a negative influence on their children. Finally, in recent years, under pressure from the local municipality of education, most of the state schools have recruited additional migrant children beyond their capacity. This also contributes to the increasing percentage of migrant children in state schools.

Within the state school system there are a small number of schools that are specifically run for migrant children. This kind of school does not reject local children. In other words, if local students in the school district want to enrol in these schools, they can still enrol. Nevertheless, according to my interview with the school headteachers, only a few local parents are willing to send their children to these schools because most of them do not consider these schools as ‘good’ schools, since they have been designated by the government to run for migrant children specifically. These schools have different developmental trajectories. The schools on the first trajectory are a product of district municipality of education’s enactment of the TMC policy. For example, in 2002, a year after the TMC policy’s promulgation, the Shijingshan Municipality of Education designated four state schools (two primary and two junior secondary) to run for migrant children specifically. As noted above (see chapter 7, section 3.1), Premier Jiabao Wen even wrote the inscription ‘Under the same sky, [migrant and local children] should grow and progress together’ [同在蓝天下，共同成长进步] for one of the four schools to encourage the receiving local government to implement the TMC policy. A similar reform occurred in
Shanghai in the same period. The schools in the second trajectory are found in Baoshan District in Shanghai with five senior secondary schools for adult students. The adult schools are not responsible for recruiting students of compulsory education age. Yet since some of them have surplus teaching resources, in order to earn extra fees to enhance the teachers' income, they started to recruit migrant children from the early 2000s. Later, this innovative action was affirmed by the district municipality of education since it realized that this kind of school could help recruiting migrant children. Therefore, the government started to fund these schools to support their recruitment of migrant children. I will give detailed elaborations of how this type of schooling was formed under what conditions in chapter 11 (section 2.3).

The following is the educational experience of a migrant family in the state schools in Beijing. I present the family’s socio-economic background, their experiences of state school enrolment and the children’s academic study conditions and peer relations in schools. Migrant mother Bai is originally from Hebei Province. She has been living in Beijing for more than ten years. Currently she does not have a stable career and instead works occasional jobs. Her husband is a building maintenance worker. They have two sons who were both born and raised in Beijing. The older son enrolled in a state junior high school in September 2014 after graduating from the

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1 Data source: reported by an interviewed headteacher of this kind of school in Baoshan district
state primary school (school A) in which his younger brother enrolled in September 2012. Both schools are near the community in which they live. Bai reports that in 2014, the state school enrolment criteria became especially strict and some of their friends were unable to prepare some of the required documents (see chapter 8, section 4 for details). As a result, they had to send their children back to their hometowns. Luckily, this family prepared all the required documents well in advance and sent their older son to a state junior high school. When talking about her sons’ schooling experiences, Bai feels satisfied with the education they have received. A key point she mentioned is that the teachers are competent and responsible – ‘they have the spirit of educators’, as described by Bai. When asked if there is a ‘local/migrant’ division with regard to the children’s peer relationships in school, she does not think her sons have experienced this, as they were both born and raised in Beijing (like most of their classmates). The younger son, when asked who his friends are in his school, talks about the classmates who share the same interests as him - he plays basketball and attends an extra-curricular basketball course after school (paid for by his parents). He also talks about his friends who are also his neighbours and thus often come back home (or travel to school) with him. He does not mention the local/migrant division. As I will elaborate later, being born and raised in Beijing, the children’s habitus have been urbanized and they have gained relevant cultural capital in the urban school field (see chapter 10, section 4 and section 5.2). If compared with the other types of schooling,
as I will present in the next two sections, the state school is the ideal choice for the migrant children with regard to access to equal educational resources.

3. Unlicensed informal private (UIP) school

This type of school emerged in the late 1990s when some migrant children were rejected by receiving local state schools and were unable to afford to enrol in formal private schools. There was a boom of UIP schools in metropolitan areas such as Beijing and Shanghai during late 1990s and early 2000s. For example, in Beijing the number of UIP schools increased to 152 in 2000 and to 263 in 2005. Additionally, in some existing schools, their student numbers increased drastically. To offer an example, the headteacher of school H reported that his school was established in 1997 with less than a hundred students. By the end of 1999, the number of students increased to 1,400, and in 2004 to 3,000.

The informal nature of these schools was formalised by two Ministry of Education policies in 1996 and 1998. The 1996 policy of *The Regulation on the Compulsory Education of Floating Children in Cities and Towns (Trial)* legitimates the establishment of informal educational settings by stating that ‘[i]f the children are not able to access state school, they can study in all forms of classes and study groups to access informal education’. This policy also sets up loose requirements for these educational settings.

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1 Data source: unpublished Beijing Municipality of Education statistical data (obtained from interview)
in terms of their organisational forms and teaching content:

These classes and study groups can operate in the forms of night schools, weekend schools and holiday schools. In the primary level, the educational setting could offer only Chinese and Maths courses with the content aimed to eliminate illiteracy. In the junior secondary level, the setting could reduce its subjects. (1996 policy)

These regulations accept the limitations of the educational level at which the schools can teach. Similarly, the 1998 policy of *The Provisional Regulation on Floating Children’s School Attendance* legitimates the informal nature of these schools by stating that ‘the established criteria of the informal school could be lower than that of regular school’. While legitimating the existence of these informal schools, the 1996 and 1998 policies did not establish concrete responsibilities of the city and district government for supervising and supporting them. Without the government’s supervision, some schools did not have the standardized curriculum design and lacked certified teachers and basic teaching facilities (see chapter 3, section 2.3).

In 2003, the central government promulgated the ‘supervising and supporting the unlicensed informal private schools’ policy in *The Decisions on Improving the Compulsory Education of Migrant Peasant Workers’ Children in the Cities*. Through this policy, the local government could no longer ignore the existence of these schools. It states that:

The local government should include these schools into the supervision system for the regular private schools. For unlicensed informal private schools, the local government should establish particular registration criteria, which can be looser than that of the
regular private schools, but only in some aspects, and not including the teacher's qualification, school safety and hygiene. The local government should make a list of all of these schools in order to keep their information updated. For those who meet the registration criteria, the government should issue them with licenses; for those who cannot meet the registration criteria, the government should leave them a period to improve. After that period, if they still cannot meet the criteria, then the government should shut them down… The government should give them support and guidance in the following aspects: school campus, funding, teacher training, teaching and learning, etc. (2003 policy)

Since 2003, the Beijing and Shanghai municipality of education have started to supervise and support the UIP schools. In pursuing this aim, the two cities have taken different actions, which produce very different consequences. In Shanghai, the government provided the schools with significant financial support to help them register. As a result, all the UIP schools were turned into licensed private schools (162) or were shut down (100) (Yuan et al., 2013: 90). In Beijing, the government did not want to provide the UIP schools with a large amount of money. It required that the schools meet the registration criteria with their own efforts. However, many schools failed to meet the criteria and kept operating as UIPs. However, the government was unable to shut down all of them because the local state schools had insufficient recruitment quotas to receive all the migrant children studying in the UIP schools. By 2013, there were still 81 UIP schools dispersed in several districts of Beijing with 42,000 students enrolled.¹

¹ Data source: unpublished Beijing Municipality of Education statistical data
The following is the educational experience of a migrant family in one of the 81 UIP schools in Beijing. In this example, the parent is unsatisfied with the education provided by the school. Migrant mother Juan has been living in Beijing since 2005. She runs a small grocery shop, where she also lives with her husband and their only son. Her husband is a manual labourer. Their son was born in their hometown and was brought to Beijing at the age of three. He enrolled in an unregistered informal private school (school H) in 2008 and has stayed there ever since\(^1\). In 2008, it was relatively easy for migrant children to enrol in local state schools in Beijing, as the local government had not yet established strict school enrolment criteria. Juan reports that in her school district, the migrant children can enrol in state schools easily by presenting their household registration card as a proof. However, this family did not bring their card with them in Beijing and therefore lost the chance to send their son to a state school. Juan regrets losing this chance, as she is not satisfied with the UIP school in which her son is currently studying. She believes that her son is extremely clever, as he can quickly recite the articles in his Chinese text book after reading it two or three times, yet his test scores do not reflect his intelligence. This mother attributes his unsatisfactory performance to the education provided by the UIP school. A key issue she complains about is that the teachers are constantly changing. As a result, they cannot supervise and facilitate

\(^1\) The school provides both primary and junior secondary level education.
the students consistently. Her complaint of the poor condition of the school resonates with my visit to that school, as I noticed that the school does not even have a formal playground. During the interview, this mother keeps arguing that if her son was sent to a state school (no matter in Beijing or in the hometown), his academic performance would be much better than now. Yet she also mentions that there is no way they can send their son back to the hometown, since both parents are working in Beijing and the grandparents, who are living in the hometown, are too old to take care of the child. Furthermore, she is unable to accompany her son back to the village, as she cannot do any agricultural work because of her poor health. This mother’s dissatisfaction with the education provided by UIP schools reflects the poor condition of this type of schooling, which finds it hard to offer migrant children educational resources equal to those offered by the state schools. This is a reason why the local government wanted to supervise and improve the UIP schools to produce a number of licensed private schools.

4. From unlicensed to licensed private school

As noted earlier, after 2003 the city and district governments in Beijing and Shanghai have taken measures regarding the UIP schools, producing a series of licensed private schools to provide more positions for migrant children. Developed from UIP schools, these licensed schools are specifically run for migrant children, since the local parents would not send
their children to these schools. There are three types of licensed private schools. The first type is found in Beijing and the second and third types are found mainly in Shanghai.

In Beijing, some of the former UIP schools managed to attain the government criteria and registered as formal private schools. By 2004, there were 21 UIP schools registered as formal private schools. By 2006, there were 63 UIP schools registered with 46,667 migrant students, which accounts for 12% of the total number of migrant children (Tian and Wu, 2010: 192). While these schools receive financial support from the local government, their main income is from tuition fees. Not relying on government funding, the schools are able to operate independently and do not need to follow the government’s student recruitment criteria. Therefore, a large percentage of students in these schools are those who are unable to meet the ‘Five Documents’ and thus cannot enrol in state schools.

The following is the educational experience of a migrant family in a former UIP, now registered private school, in Beijing. Migrant mother Lian has been living in Beijing for more than ten years. She has two daughters with her husband, both of whom were born and raised in Beijing. Interestingly, while her older daughter enrolled in a state school in September 2011, her younger daughter failed to enrol in a state school as they failed to prepare the more restrictive criteria in 2014, which she has not anticipated. The reason for their failure is that one of their five documents, the Temporary Residential Certificate, is not issued in the
same district in which they are currently living. This situation was not a problem in 2011 but it became a problem after 2013, as the state school enrolment criteria became increasingly strict. As a result, her younger daughter had to enrol in a former UIP, now a registered private school (school I). With one child studying in a state school and another studying in a former UIP school, this mother feels that the latter is not as good as the former. A key point she complains about is the large class sizes in school I. Because of the large class size, the teachers do not have sufficient attention for every child. Compared to school I, the state school teachers are perceived as more responsible, as they pay sufficient attention to every child and contact the parents in a timely way when they find anything unusual with the children. Another point this mother has made is that the family needs to pay 3,800 RMB (£400 equivalent) a year for the tuition fees. While acknowledging that this is a fairly reasonable amount for a school in the private sector, this mother feels that it is not a small amount for her family. She argues that if the policy had not changed in 2013 and her younger daughter had been able to enrol in a state school, then the family would have no need to pay this fee. In short, in the view of the migrant parents, the UIP descendant private school is an acceptable form of schooling, yet not an ideal one.

In Shanghai, the city municipality of education had a three-year plan (2008-10: Shanghai Municipality of Education’s Decision on Promoting the Compulsory Education for Migrant Peasant Workers’ Children), which
aimed to support the UIP schools to register. The main form of support is that the government purchases or controls the school with a huge amount of investment. As a result, by 2011 162 registered migrant children schools had emerged with 132,000 migrant children, which accounts for 28% of the total number of migrant children.\(^1\) While these newly licensed schools can be classified into two types, a common feature is that the children’s tuition fees and the school operation fees are provided by the local government. The first type is the government-*purchased* private school. The district municipality of education managed to purchase some UIP schools from their owners. It continues investing in order to register the school with the local government as the *de facto* owner. The former owner had the option of staying on to work as the headteacher. After the transformation, the schools are now under direct control of the government. The government funding becomes the sole financial resource of the school. The school cannot charge students for tuition fees and it must follow the state school student recruitment criteria. These schools have the legal status of private schools yet operate as state schools in terms of curriculum, management and recruitment. The second type is the government-*controlled* private schools. The situation could arise whereby the district municipality of education is unable or unwilling to purchase these schools. The idea is that the municipality does not replace the private owner, yet it still offers

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\(^1\) Data resource: from the policy text *Shanghai Municipality of Education’s Regulation on Improving the Hygiene Condition in the Private Primary School Run for Migrant Children in 2011.*
financial investment to help the school to register. After registering, the school can only receive government funding as its sole financial resource. As a result, it cannot charge the students tuition fees and has to follow the state school recruitment criteria. As I will detail in chapter 11, these schools, together with the senior secondary state school recruiting migrant children in junior secondary stage (see section 2 in this chapter), have constructed an ‘interim quasi-state school system’, serving as a main schooling channel for migrant children in Shanghai.

The following is an example of the educational experience of a migrant family in a government-purchased private school in Shanghai. Migrant mother Uang has been living in Shanghai for ten years. She lives with her husband and their only daughter, who was born and raised in Shanghai. This family were unable to send their daughter to a state school because in their district, the migrant children are only entitled to access state schools if their parents have bought a house in the district. As a result, their daughter enrolled in a government-purchased private primary school (school T) in September 2014. While acknowledging that enrolling in a private school in Shanghai is better for her daughter than being sent back ‘home’, this mother expresses her dissatisfaction with the education in that school. A key issue is that there are too many students in one class (similar to the situation in the former UIP schools in Beijing). In her daughter’s class, there are more than fifty students. The mother feels that the teachers are unable to pay sufficient attention to each child. In her opinion, forty students
should be the upper limit in an ideal situation. She has talked with her daughter’s class tutor about the capacity issue. The teacher feels sorry and admits that it is better for the children to be educated in regular state schools instead of the government-purchased/controlled private schools if possible. In short, the government-purchased/controlled private schools are not seen as ideal types of schooling by the migrant parents. As I will explain further in chapter 11, operating under the local government’s low cost and inferior schooling approach these quasi-state schools do not guarantee the migrant children a ‘good’ education.

5. Conclusion

As I have reviewed in this chapter with the promulgation of the TMC policy, more and more migrant children are now able to access schooling, studying in both state and private sector schools. The state schools act as the main channel for recruiting migrant children, as required by the TMC policy. In the private sector, while most of the unlicensed informal private (UIP) schools have been turned into licensed schools or been shut down, a number of UIP schools still exist in Beijing. The licensed private schools can be classified into three types. The first type is found in Beijing. Receiving a limited amount of government funding, the schools are able to operate independently and do not need to follow the government’s student recruitment criteria. The second and third types of schools are mainly found in Shanghai. Receiving full government funding as their sole financial
resource, these government-purchased/controlled schools have been partially included into the state sector and are offering quasi-state education for migrant children, but generally under worse conditions.

Among all these types of schooling, the state school is the ideal choice for the migrant children, as it provides them with the same education and level of resources as local children and for free. Most of the migrant parents I interviewed feel happy that their children can enrol in these schools - this is the achievement of the equal education for migrant children policy launched in 2001. Yet there are large numbers of children who are not studying in the state schools. Some are studying in government-purchased/controlled private schools (in Shanghai) or licensed private schools specifically running for migrant children (in Beijing). Since these schools originate from the UIP schools, they are not considered as good as state schools, as I will elaborate in detail in chapter 11. Yet the students in these schools are still in a better position than other migrant children in the UIP schools (mostly found in Beijing), which are lacking in standardized curriculum design, certified teachers and basic teaching facilities. More importantly, the UIP school is illegal in its status, and therefore is facing the danger of being shut down at any time. If that happens, who will take care of these children? According to my interviews, the migrant parents will not send their children to the UIP schools as long as they can find any other type of schooling. Yet enrolling in a UIP school might still not be the worst situation for a migrant child. There is an invisible group of migrant children
who have not been included in the official statistical data, since they have already been sent back to their parents’ hometowns because they cannot meet the urban state school enrolment criteria. Although the state school education in their hometown might be better than the UIP or UIP descendant schools in Beijing and Shanghai, these children may suffer from being separated from their parents (or in some cases only their fathers, who need to stay in the cities). This situation might negatively influence their social and psychological development.

The review of various types of schools available to migrant children in this chapter provides a foundation for the further analyses of the school experiences of migrant children in state schools (chapter 10) and quasi-state schools (chapter 11).
Chapter 10: Towards marginalization or social inclusion in state school? Habitus and cultural capital

Following the overall review of the historical development and current situation of the schooling available to migrant children detailed in chapter 9, this chapter focuses on the migrant majority state school, which is currently the predominant or majority schooling channel for migrant children.

1. Introduction

As noted earlier (chapter 9, section 2), the state school has become the predominant schooling channel for migrant children in Beijing and Shanghai. And the ‘migrant majority’ school is now an established part in the state school system and recruits the majority of migrant children. In this chapter, I will give an account of the following questions: in the migrant majority state schools, what kind of relationship do migrant parents have with teachers? What is the relationship between migrant and local children? And how are these relationships influencing migrant children’s study and social inclusion? The analysis here is based on the data collected from the headteachers, teachers, parents and students in six out of eleven state schools involved in my fieldwork. Among the eleven state schools, three have 30-40% of migrant children, six have 60-87% migrants, and two have more than 90% migrants. I do not include the three schools with less than
40% migrants in my analysis, since they are not migrant majority schools and would not represent the common situation of this type of school. Neither do I include the two schools with more than 90% migrants, as they were designated by the district municipality of education as ‘migrant-focused schools’, and traditionally the local children do not enrol in these schools. The remaining six schools, which are school A, B, F, G, K, S, become the data source of this chapter.¹

Aiming to explore the dynamics of the interactions and the power-relations among migrant children, parents, teachers and local children in the school daily routines, this chapter adopts Bourdieusian concepts of field, habitus and capital to facilitate my empirical investigation (see chapter 4, section 1 and section 4). It conceptualizes the migrant majority state school as a field, and examine how migrant parents and children exert their capitals and interact with teachers and local children, shaped by their habitus. In this field, migrant children and parents have now become the main actors. Yet what is unchanged is the logic of practice on teaching and learning, since the staff and administration system have not changed. In the meantime, we should not neglect an invisible change – the class background of the remaining local students. As the headteacher of state primary school G claims, ‘nowadays almost all of the local students in this school are from a low-income working-class family background’. In my

¹ All eleven schools are discussed above in relation to the school enrolment criteria in chapter 7 and chapter 8.
fieldwork, two out of the four participant local parents are working as a taxi
driver and salesperson, one does not have a stable job, and one is a
housewife, which resonates the headteacher’s observation. The following
is a brief outline of how this invisible filtration mechanism works: first, the
middle-class local residents with strong economic capital would not buy or
rent a house in communities where most of their neighbours would be
migrants. If, for certain reasons, they do live in these communities, many
of them would not be happy to see their children becoming classmates with
migrant children, so they would try to send their children to a ‘better’ school.
Yet this school choice process requires the full involvement of the familial
social and economic capitals, since many elite schools charge expensive
school choice fees\textsuperscript{1}. Many of the local working-class families would not be
able to afford this. As a result, working-class children (both migrant and
local) become the majority group in these ‘ordinary’ schools. Before
elaborating the interactions between the children, parents and teachers in
school, I will first present the reconstruction and differentiation of migrant
parents’ and children’s identities in the urban life.

\textsuperscript{1} In Beijing and Shanghai, the practice of charging school choice fees has been
gradually stopped in recent years. What I am describing here is the historical
context within which some state schools became migrant majority schools.
2. Understanding the habitus of migrant parents and children

As reviewed earlier (chapter 4, section 1.2.2), in the study of socially disadvantaged groups, there is a need to examine the dimensions that help constitute and shape their habitus. I argue that migrant parents and children have at least three main dimensions to their identity: migrant, working-class and rural, and they appear discriminated against on those three dimensions. Taking just one into consideration does not fully describe the scope of their habitus or the discrimination against them.

Within the context of Chinese metropolitan areas, migration can bring changes or disadvantages to people’s situations as it is not possible for most of the migrants to get their household registration moved to the metropolitan areas, which is an institutional barrier for their children’s schooling (see chapter 2, section 3). In addition, migration creates a new arena where the migrants and their children are tagged officially as ‘rural labourer’, which activates the other two dimensions of their identity, namely, rural and working-class. As I will elaborate in the next section, migration creates opportunities for the restructuring of migrant parents’ rural habitus, which is formed because they have ‘long been physically and socially connected to farmlands, a field that nurtures freestyle being and doing’ (Mu and Jia, 2016: 418). Yet part of their rural habitus has been retained, and informs the way in which for example the migrant parents do not treat themselves as academic educators (see section 3.1). Their migration also creates generational differences between the identities of parents and
children. For the children, the migration, or precisely, their parents’ migration, offers them spaces and forms of socialization, which differently shape their habitus in contrast to their parents’. This habitus is shaped by their adaptation to urban life and by their parents’ rural habitus. What the migration has not changed is the parents’ and children’s working-class background. Yet it is important to note that the migrant labourer’s socio-economic disadvantages can be more serious than those of their urban working-class counterpart, as they face higher financial pressures and thus are in a situation of striving for survival in the city (see section 3.2). This condition leads to the restructuring of their working-class habitus, producing a disposition of ‘striving for survival’ [忙于生计], which directs the parents’ focus to the survival of their family instead of other aspects, such as an enjoyable lifestyle or the cultural cultivation of their children. This habitus, blending rural and urban experiences, establishes migrant parents in a more disadvantaged position compared to their urban working-class counterparts. In the following two sections, I will explore how different dispositions indicate different habitus and forms and volumes of capital, setting the parents and children in different positions in the field of migrant majority state schooling.

3. The continuation of the parents’ rural working-class habitus

3.1 The continuities of rural habitus: not treating themselves as
ac
dademic educators

Whilst living in an urban area, migrant families often gather in the communities where a large percentage of their fellow residents are migrants. Some live close to friends from their hometown. Additionally, their local social networks largely consist of their hometown friends or other migrants, since these people are their colleagues, neighbours, and friends’ friends, as reported by most of the interviewed migrant parents. As a result of these living and social network conditions, what has emerged is a migrant society inside the urban world, which does not offer many chances for the radical restructuring of the adult migrants’ rural habitus. In the field of urban education, the migrant parents’ rural habitus can be identified as marked by their disposition of ‘not treating themselves as academic educators’. This habitus is historically rooted in life as conducted in rural areas where the majority of the people have weak academic cultural capital with only basic literacy (or are illiterate), except for a small number of teachers, technical professionals (such as agriculture technicians) and civil servants. In the rural field of culture and education, teachers are the dominant group who possess the highest level of academic knowledge, which acts as valuable cultural capital in relevant situations. As for the ordinary people, doing traditional agricultural labour work that does not demand too high a degree of literacy, they are unfamiliar with styles of teaching and learning in school. As a result, many of them feel it is not ‘doable’ or even ‘thinkable’ to intervene in their children’s education, even
if they are literate. As a result of these ‘subjective expectations of objective probabilities’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 59), a gap between the school and home has been formed in the parent’s mind: the school is the legitimate and only site for academic education, and the home is not. This conceptual gap results in the parents’ disposition of not treating themselves as academic educators. It reinforces the teacher’s authority and their dominant position, reproducing the power structure of the rural educational field.

In my interviews, the vast majority of the migrant parents reported that they are unable to facilitate their children’s study at home, and some of them do not regularly check their children’s homework. As Lu (2013) reveals, 68.1% of the migrant parents in Shanghai have junior secondary school as their highest education level. This finding resonates with an empirical study in Beijing, which reports that 60% of the migrant parents have junior secondary school as their highest education level (Liu and Jacob, 2013). In some cases, as reported by many migrant parents and teachers, some parents are nearly illiterate and therefore struggle to engage with homework. When asked to tell me about her son’s studying at home, migrant mother Ning said: ‘He just wants to play. He does not have the motivation to study. I always tell his class tutor to help me put strict supervision on him’. Ning’s understanding of parental responsibility is the task of buying her son study materials which she has done. ‘I have bought him the self-teaching electronic pad, but he does not study hard. I have bought everything he needs to study, everything, but he just does not study
hard’. She feels helpless and anxious in the face of the child’s apparent lack of motivation and sees the teacher as the only person who can alter this situation. Briefly speaking, this mother might not be aware of the teachers’ perceptions of parental responsibility for supervising and guiding children’s study. Unlike Ning, migrant father Cai does supervise his son’s study sometimes: ‘when I finish my work and come back home, he always claims that he has finished this homework – that is what he claims. I sometimes check it, but not often, since the child is not a kid anymore, and now there are too many subjects.’ Cai’s reference to ‘that is what he claims’ indicates that the father is suspicious of his son’s self-report, but he does not exhaustively check his work because ‘now there are too many subjects’. Mentioning the complexity of the school curriculum shows the father’s lack of familiarity with the school system. Another example illustrates that the parent does not perceive the home as a site for school-like activities, reflecting migrant parents’ detachment from education. Migrant mother Ong reports that she was told by her daughter’s teacher that she loves and is skilled at painting, so she sends her to an extra-curricular painting course that costs ¥1,500 per term (£150 equivalent). Here we can see that the mother is very keen to support her child, but it is the teacher’s validation of painting as a worthwhile activity that encourages her to find an extracurricular class and tutor. For this family, communicating with the teacher is the main channel through which the parents respond to their children’s educational strengths. These cases suggest that migrant parents
do not treat themselves as academic educators – an aspect indicating the continuation of their rural habitus. Not treating themselves as educators, many migrant parents are reluctant to deploy their (weak) literacy as one form of cultural capital to support their children, yet they are ready to deploy their economic capital to support their children to form their own cultural capital.¹

3.2 ‘Striving for survival’ [忙于生计]: the disposition of (some) migrant labourers in the urban field

As the migrant labourers do not generally have high incomes, they find the living expenses of the metropolitan areas are relatively high. Without local household registration, their access to some local social welfare (e.g., education, health care, subsidies, etc.) is limited (Lu, 2002). In addition, many migrant families have two or more children (while urban residents normally have only one²), and this situation enhances their financial pressures. Taking all the factors into consideration, the migrant parents are facing more serious social and financial disadvantages compared to their urban working-class counterparts, and have to strive for their families’

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¹ Rooted in the traditional Chinese culture, the parents attach importance to their children’s achievements of educational qualifications and cultural resources, although they do not necessarily feel confident about their own literacy in supporting the children’s academic study (see for example, Archer and Francis’s studies on British-Chinese parents: Francis and Archer, 2005; Archer and Francis, 2006).

² The ‘one child’ policy was implemented successfully in cities with regard to the local residents. Rural residents are allowed to give birth to a second child if their first child is not a boy, in order to guarantee the supply of the agriculture manual labours.
survival. Taking a migrant family involved in my study as an example: the mother En has not had a stable job since giving birth to her daughter; her husband, who has junior secondary school literacy and is working as a TV technician, therefore has the pressure to work hard to guarantee the family’s income, since his salary is the main income of this family. En describes her husband as ‘always busy to earn money in order to support this family’s survival in Beijing’. In order to enhance their income, some migrants choose to extend their working hours or to do the ‘hardest jobs’ that have pretty good pay but need full devotion to the job (Li et al., 2010). For example, doing multiple part-time domestic jobs or running an open all hours restaurant can enhance their income, but they have less time to enjoy leisure with their children. What can be identified here is an invisible rule of time distribution, which guides every choice that migrant parents make and directs their concentration to the things that can best support their families’ survival. Under this ‘virtue of necessity’, ‘[t]he most improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of immediate submission to order’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 54). In other words, what has been formed is a disposition of ‘striving for survival’, which makes up part of the migrant labourer’s working-class habitus.

The disposition of striving for survival shapes the way that migrant parents convert time (as a particular type of resource) into economic, social or cultural capital. Some parents devote most of their time to work in order to gain economic capital, others devote their (or their families’) leisure time
to socializing, for example visiting old friends/relatives or attending events to meet more people, in order to gain social capital. For them, the conversion of time to economic and social capital is direct, instant and predictable, and these two types of capital are the most relevant for the families’ survival in the urban field. Yet the conversion of time to (their children’s) cultural capital through facilitating their children’s study is slow and unpredictable, and their children’s gain of cultural capital will not bring direct improvement for their current life condition. The way that the migrant parents interact with their children and the role they play in their children’s education can be understood as shaped by their habitus. As reported by a teacher I interviewed:

I am not saying that they (migrant parents) do not care about their children’s study; it is really because they do not have the energy and the ability to deal with it… They do not have the energy, as some of them are running tiny businesses, they need to get up early and finish work late – so you cannot expect them… They are still in a struggle for survival, so they need to make sure that their families get basic supplies and survive in the city. They do not have spare attention to deal with the children - as long as the children do not make trouble… That’s the situation of some migrant parents in our school. (Teacher L in school M)

From the teacher’s description, some migrant parents have to put work as their first priority with regard to their time distribution, which minimizes their attention to their children’s affairs (including education). In line with my

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It is important to note that the majority of the teachers I interviewed have a deficit view of migrant families. The deficit view takes migrant people together and tags them with the label of ‘not able/not competent/not interested’. My findings might be seen as presenting such a deficit view. Yet by quoting what this and other teachers’ expressed, I am pointing to the gap between teachers’ expectations and
research, Zhang and Luo, based on the investigation of a state primary school in Beijing, also found that the migrant parents ‘tended to concentrate all their time and energy on making money in order to survive in the city’ and are unable to focus on their children’s education (Zhang and Luo, 2016: 226). In other words, flexibility and autonomy are often benefits held by middle-class professionals (Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010), whereas migrant parents’ absence owing to inflexible working hours means that they have limited time in which to spend stimulating and developing their children.

While there is a continuation of migrants’ rural and working-class habitus, an urbanized effect can also be identified with regard to their habitus and cultural capital. This is especially the case in the second-generation migrant children, as I will elaborate in the following section.

4. The children’s urbanized habitus and gain of cultural capital

Among my migrant interviewees, all of the parents moved to Beijing and Shanghai after they completed schooling in their hometown – they are first-generation migrants. Unlike their parents, the majority of migrant children can be seen as second-generation migrants, since they were born in or brought to the cities when they were under 3-years-old, without any previous schooling experiences in their hometown (see chapter 2, section parental understandings of their role, as I will elaborate later, and am not passing value judgements about the parents’ behaviour or attitudes. I will come back and discuss the teachers’ deficit view of migrant parents in the end of section 5.1.)
Socialized within an urban context, what they can see and hear in the city, their interactions with local people, and their school experiences have all been taken for granted as part of their life.

As has been identified in existing literature, accent and dialect, or what kind of language people feel comfortable speaking, is a part of people’s habitus (Koo et al., 2014; Mu and Jia, 2016). Born and/or raised in the city, where the daily communication and official teaching language is standard Mandarin, migrant children have internalized this dialect as the normal way of speaking. And the ability to speak standard Mandarin is an example of embodied cultural capital in the field of the urban school (Mu and Jia, 2016). According to my fieldwork data, speaking standard Mandarin is among the most urbanized aspects of the migrant children’s habitus: all of the interviewed children speak Mandarin and I, as a standard Mandarin speaker myself, cannot distinguish any differences from the language of urban residents; my school observations also support this finding.

As with the way people speak, the ways in which people behave and present themselves are also part of their habitus. As the second-generation migrant children are raised in the cities, they have internalized the ways of appearing and behaving demonstrated by the urban residents. The interviewed teachers commonly report that it is hard to differentiate migrant from local children in daily life. As for their style of clothing, ‘I cannot really

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1 It is crucial to note that ‘cannot distinguish’ does not mean ‘do not know’. The reason is that for many Chinese people, the information about where s/he is from is not considered as a matter of privacy. For the teachers, especially for the class tutors, knowing the students’ family backgrounds can facilitate their work. It is a
tell who is migrant and who is local from their appearance and clothing’ (headteacher of primary school A). Most teachers report they just cannot distinguish migrant children from local children: ‘If you do not tell me, I even don’t know which child in my class is local and which is migrant’ (teacher F, school F). Some teachers further point out that because these so-called migrant children are in fact born and raised in the city, there are no differences between them and the local children. Like the ability to speak standard Mandarin, the migrant children’s urbanized appearance and behaviour functions as another form of embodied cultural capital in the field of urban school.

In addition to the influences from the urban schools and society on the children, there are also influences from the parents shaped by their adaptation to the social and cultural mores of an urban environment. Unlike their urban counterparts, the migrant parents do not possess a form of cultural capital that would allow them to position themselves as a teacher at home. Yet they are willing to exert their economic capital to support their children in constructing their own cultural capital. The appreciation of extra-curricular courses and hobbies is traditionally a marker of the habitus of families living in urban areas, where a variety of extra-curricular activities are available for free or at low price and therefore affordable (Bray, 2009; common practice that the teachers get the students’ background information through a variety of ways, including (but not limited to): talking to the parents through one-to-one conversations or in the parent meetings; talking to other teachers about a particular student’s background; reported by the students themselves in classroom teaching activities or one-to-one conversations; and most importantly, the class tutor holds the information files of all the students.
see also chapter 2, section 2.3). After a long period of urban living experiences\(^1\), the migrant parents’ disposition has been gradually (and partly) restructured by their interaction with urban residents and by influences from their children’s schools, becoming enthusiastic consumers of such products. For example, migrant mother Ong, as I have already mentioned, when reminded by a teacher about her daughter’s enthusiasm for painting, enrolled her daughter on a painting course. As revealed by Yuan et al (2013), 48.4% of the migrant children (studying in state schools in Beijing) have been sent to extra-curricular academic courses, and 46.4% of the migrant children have been sent to extra-curricular activities, for example, sports or art classes. This data implies that it is highly possible that more than half of the migrant children are attending at least one of the extra-curricular academic courses or activities. My fieldwork supports this finding, as it shows that some migrant parents buy their children self-teaching electronic pads, which are a common product in the urban supermarkets. With the acquisition of these hobbies, the migrant children have gained cultural capital that is valuable in the field of urban schooling.

While some existing literature claims that the accent, style of dress, and behaviours make the migrant children easily distinguishable from Beijing local children (Woronov, 2004; Goodburn, 2009; Mu and Jia, 2016; see also chapter 3, section 5 for a detailed review), my data does not support

\(^1\) The vast majority of the respondent migrant parents have been living in Beijing or Shanghai for more than ten years.
their findings. The different findings might be the result of different sampling designs or of regional differences inside Beijing, or simply because the demographic characters of migrant children have changed since previous studies were conducted. With all these possibilities, it is very likely that the existing literature refers to the first-generation migrant children\(^1\) who were brought to Beijing after they had already had some experiences of rural life, not the second-generation migrant children who are the focus of my study.

5. The relationships among children, teachers and parents

Bourdieu points out that: ‘when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a “fish in water”: it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). What Bourdieu describes here can be called ‘field-habitus match’ (Maton, 2012). This situation can be identified with the migrant children in their relationship with local children in the field of the migrant majority state school. The opposite situation to this is the ‘field-habitus clash’ (Maton, 2012), which makes the actor feel like a ‘fish out of water’. This situation can be identified with the migrant parents in their relationship with the teachers in urban schools, producing problems in home-school cooperation, as I will elaborate below.

\(^1\) Unfortunately, none of Woronov (2004), Goodburn (2009) and Mu and Jia (2016) have pointed out at which age the migrant children came to Beijing. But it is very probable that many of their studies are referring to first-generation migrant children, since some of their data indicates that the children have some experience of living in rural areas before coming to Beijing, and Goodburn (2009) did ask questions about the children’s memories of the schools in their home villages.
5.1 ‘**Incompetent parents’ and disappointed teachers**

As stated earlier (chapter 2, section 2.3), urban school teachers have an expectation of home-school cooperation. It seems self-evident to the teachers that the children’s education is a site of co-operation between home and school. For example, a primary school headteacher argues that:

> We believe that the children’s education should be a process of home-school cooperation. Although the school should take the majority of the responsibility, the parents’ responsibilities should never be neglected, especially for the cultivation of children’s learning habits. (Headteacher of school B)

In the view of the teachers, an ideal parent would be a person who cares about the child’s study and actively communicates and cooperates with the teachers. Teacher A uses herself (as a mother) as an example to describe the figure of an ideal parent: ‘I am a parent myself. Even though my son is still in nursery, I often contact his teachers to get updates about his condition in school. When I come to school to pick him up, I always take the chance to talk to the teachers, always’. This situation resonates with the context in some western counties where maternal involvement in primary school is understood as an indicator of ‘good’ mothering (Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010). In most of my fieldwork schools, the home-school cooperation is embodied as the Fly-message group or/and QQ groups. The Fly-message group is a cell phone message sending system that can send messages to all parents included as group members. The QQ group is an online social media group in which the parents and teachers can interact.
The main function of these virtual teacher-parent communities is to make sure that teachers can easily contact all parents after school. As reported by teacher A, one of the routine functions of the Fly-message and QQ group is to inform the parents about their children’s homework so that they can check whether the children have completed it on time. In addition, the schools establish a parent commission, which functions as a bridge connecting home and school and facilitates home-school cooperation, for example, organizing teacher-parent forums.

Yet the habitus of migrant parents, does not include treating themselves as academic educators, and so they consider that communicating with teachers or supervising the children’s study is ‘not for the likes of us’ (Bourdieu, 1990c: 56). In rural areas where they themselves went to school, home-school co-operation is not encouraged. Thus, we see what Maton (2012) describes as ‘field-habitus clash’. For many of the migrant parents, even if they wanted to, their limited academic cultural capital in turn limits their capability to support their children’s study in the urban school field. In addition, shaped by their disposition of striving for survival, some migrant parents can spend very limited amounts of time facilitating their children’s education. The influence of the rural and working-class dimensions of habitus produces the classed child-rearing approach of migrant labourer parents, limiting their motivation to exert their (limited) academic cultural capital to support their children’s study. The migrant parents’ understanding of their role in their children’s education resonates with that of some groups
of working class parents in the Western context (Lareau, 1989, 2001; Gillies, 2007; Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010). In a study of a small number of working-class parents’ educational involvement in the US context, Lareau finds that these parents ‘believe that as long as they provide love, food and safety, their children will grow and thrive. They do not focus on developing their children’s special talents’ (Lareau, 2002: 748–749). Similarly, in the UK context, Gillies suggests that working-class mothers in her study ‘viewed their role in terms of caring, protecting and loving their children, rather than teaching or cultivating them’ (Gillies, 2007: 154). While these parents are ‘proud of their children’s acquisition of early literacy and numeracy skills’, in other words, they are not uninterested in their children’s educational development, they do not ‘in general see themselves as educators’, as corroborated by another UK based study of working-class mothers (Vincent, Ball and Braun, 2010: 132). This situation is termed by Lareau (2003) as a child-rearing approach of ‘accomplishment of natural growth’, which entails children experiencing long stretches of leisure time and child-initiated play at home without many restrictions from their parents, and produces a separation between family and school. Some of Lareau’s respondent children did not enjoy or succeed at school, and this was reinforced by poor communication between parents and teachers.

In my research context, with a similar child-rearing approach, the migrant parents’ behaviours do not match with the teachers’ expectations of home-school cooperation. As a result, a discourse of ‘incompetent parents’ has
arisen among the teachers. These educational professionals blame the migrant parents for not being able to communicate and cooperate with teachers to facilitate the students’ learning at home. They argue that the parents should be responsible for their children completing homework, and generating the motivation to study. Five out of seven teachers and school leaders who talk about the parent-teacher communication report that many migrant parents are reluctant to respond to teachers’ communication. For example, teacher B describes the situation in her school as follows:

It’s very rare that the migrant parents respond to a teacher’s communication. We have a teacher-parents meeting once a term, but some parents do even not appear. Normally it is the teachers who contact the parents, not in reverse. We have a Fly-message group in each class, and our teachers use this group to keep the parents updated about the school news and inform them about their children’s homework… There are 28 students in my class, and each time I send the parents messages, I normally receive only one response. The others rarely contact teachers to talk about their children. And you don’t even expect them to come in to school to talk to you. (Teacher B, school A)

What can be identified here is what the teacher sees as the failure of the school’s home-school cooperation mechanisms because of migrant parents’ reluctance to communicate with teachers. This situation of limited contact and cooperation is found in another study conducted in Beijing, in which a teacher respondent reports that ‘at best only 50% and at worst only 20–30% of parents of migrant children attended the [teacher-parent] meeting. It is difficult to make contact with the parents. Sometimes, the telephone number is wrong’ (Li et al., 2010: 84). Another common point
that the interviewed teachers complain of is the migrant parents’ perceived ‘uncooperative’ attitude to teachers’ requests to check their children’s homework, as I have presented earlier in chapter 8 (section 3). When being asked about the percentage of parents in her class who can be considered as ‘cooperative’, teacher L says about one third, and there is another one third who totally ignore teachers’ contact and have shown no cooperation. The finding here is supported by Yuan et al (2013). Their study found that only 58.4% of the interviewed migrant parents in Beijing are in the habit of checking their children’s homework on a weekly basis. Yet the teachers expect all the parents to help check the children’s homework on a daily basis as the interviewed teachers in my fieldwork claim that urban parents normally do. While some migrant parents’ perceived ‘uncooperative’ attitudes can be understood as shaped by their rural habitus of not treating themselves as academic educators, the influence of their working-class habitus should not be neglected. In my fieldwork interviews, the phrase ‘striving for survival’, or similar terms such as ‘busy earning money to support the family’, are used by most of the teachers to explain the failure of home-school cooperation. Some teachers give examples of how some parents’ occupations shape the role they play in their children’s education. A typical example is that in some families, both parents are running tiny businesses such as a restaurant or stall. ‘As their restaurants or stalls normally close after dinnertime, they will not finish work and get back home until 10pm, when their children have already gone to bed’ (headteacher of
state primary school A). The finding here resonates with a study in Beijing, which reports that for half of the migrant parents the premier reason for their limited home-school cooperation is that they are too busy and do not have the time (Liu, Feng and Shenglong, 2012). From a teacher’s comparison of migrant parents and local parents (most of them are also from a working-class background) in terms of their willingness to check their children’s homework, the striving for survival of migrant parents can be clearly identified:

In terms of their attitude to children’s education, the Shanghai local parents are more responsible. Many migrant parents are just busy with work or other things... While some Shanghai local students are not doing well in their study, they all complete their homework, since their parents always check their homework. However, many migrant parents don’t even ask their children about their homework. In their minds, the only thing they need to make sure is that their children have eaten well (laugh). (A teacher and senior management team member in primary school K)

The local working-class parents are aware of and compliant with the school’s expectations of them. Not seeing themselves as partners with the school, the migrant parents also have practical reasons for finding such a role hard to carry out. Driven by their disadvantaged living condition, migrant labourer parents have had to devote their time to earn money or extend their social networks, described by the teacher as ‘busy with work or other things’. They are concerned with caring for their children physically and emotionally, but this does not seem to be enough for the teacher.

What the migrant parents are willing to do is to deploy their economic
capital to support their children to construct their own cultural capital. For example, as I have stated earlier, the migrant mothers (Ning and Ong) are willing to buy extra-curricular study materials or to pay for an extra-curricular painting course for their children. Yet compared to the urban working-class parents who not only communicate and cooperate well with teachers as expected, but are also able to facilitate their children’s study at home, many migrant parents’ efforts are still positioned as insufficient in the urban state school field. As the children’s aspiration of study can be shaped by the interplay of their familial habitus and capital (Archer et al., 2012), some migrant parents’ detached attitude towards academic study and their limited academic cultural capital limit their children’s motivations for academic study. As a result, many migrant children do not complete their homework and are reported by teachers as not concentrating in lessons. Apart from their attitude to study, some migrant children are perceived by teachers as having an indifferent attitude to teachers, as I have presented earlier in chapter 8 (section 3). A teacher comments that ‘[t]he migrant children do not really care about learning and about the teachers’ requirements, since their parents do not care’ (teacher C in primary school G)\(^1\). Here, the teacher points out the connection she perceives between some children’s attitudes and the parents’ attitude.

\(^1\) It is important to note that not all teachers consider all the migrants as the same. Yet most teachers do not have a strong awareness of migrant people’s intra-group difference, as they tag migrant children with the label of ‘do not care about studying’. I will come back and discuss the teachers’ deficit view of migrant parents in the next paragraph.
What is perceived as the parents’ and children’s shared apathetic attitude results in extra-curricular teaching burdens for the teachers, since they have to give extra guidance to those who are unable to catch up with the class. For some of the interviewed teachers, a frustrating fact is that their efforts do not produce corresponding exam scores that they would otherwise expect, as a small number of migrant children have notably low scores (if compared with the local working class students, who themselves may not score highly in relation to students from more affluent parts of the cities), which make the overall average score of the class lower. In addition, as reported by most of the interviewed teachers, the majority of the migrant children in their classes later on end up with a high school or vocational school qualification or lower, which do not match the achievements of their local classmates. As a result, with more and more migrant children enrolling in state schools, the majority of the teachers feel that the students and parents are increasingly ‘out of control’. As summarized by the headteacher of primary school A: ‘our teachers feel extremely lonely, like as if they are the only people in this school who treat education seriously’.

Another factor that gets the migrant parents identified as ‘incompetent parents’ is many teachers’ deficit view of migrant families (Chen, 2014; Liu, Holmes and Albright, 2015). The deficit view is a result of the teachers’ earlier negative perceptions from their interactions with some migrant parents, who were perceived as very uncooperative. It is also a result of a negative societal discourse in which the rural-to-urban migrants are
associated with ‘dirty’ jobs and are perceived as less-educated, incapable and less trustworthy (Chen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2006). A majority of the respondent teachers and school leaders can be identified as having these negative perceptions. For example, eight out of the thirteen teachers do not have a strong awareness of migrant people’s intra-group differences, as they homogenise migrant people and tag them with the label of ‘poor performance’ or ‘uncooperative’, as if all migrants were the same. Only a small number of teachers have a strong awareness that the migrants are not all the same, as they consciously point out that migrant children can also perform well in exams and note that some migrant parents are as cooperative as local parents.

5.2 Migrant and local children as ‘us’

Mu and Jia, based on cases of Beijing state schools with 4-11% migrant children, have found that ‘different accents and undisciplined behavioural patterns of floating children reportedly distinguished them from their urban peers. Unfortunately, these different dispositions sometimes resulted in exclusion or even penalties in certain situations’ (2016: 419). Yet my research on migrant majority state schools in Beijing and Shanghai has not found a distinction in migrant and local children’s interactions and relationships. In my interviews, when being asked about their peer relationships with other students, both migrant and local children talk about how personality, gender, hobbies, extra-curricular activities, and classroom
seating position and grouping affect their relationships, but none of them ever mentioned the idea of local/migrant division. When being directly asked whether there is division between local and migrant children, migrant child Peng says: ‘not at all, our class is full of harmony!’ When being asked the same question, migrant mother Ning expresses the same feeling: ‘my son sometimes mentions his local classmates who play with him, and I feel they have a good relationship’. A teacher in primary school K, who is an urban father as well, confirms the good integration of migrant and local children: ‘my son is in year four in my school. There is not a migrant/local division here. I can tell you, all of his best brothers are migrant - aha!’

Besides, all of the interviewed teachers express the similar opinion that

‘The migrant and local children have good relationships. I cannot see any problems with their relationship. It is because these so-called “migrant children” are actually born and raised in Beijing and are living in the communities around our school’ (teacher F, school F).

All the above data shows that there is a shared identity of ‘us’ instead of ‘we/they’ between migrant and local children.

Coming from working-class families, most of the local children in the migrant majority state schools have a similar social-economic status to the migrant children. Therefore, there is not a strong class gap between local and migrant children. Compared to their parents, there is not too marked a degree of urban/rural difference among the children, since most of the migrant children were born or raised in the city, and thus the children have embodied relevant cultural capital for urban life (including schooling), as I
elaborated earlier. The migrant children share similar accents, dialects, appearance, knowledge and hobbies with the local children. These similarities facilitate the integration of these children as a homogeneous group. Their similarities are further reinforced by the situation that most of them are living in the same areas or even the same community as a result of the policy that encourages families to use the local school. Both groups of children have a sense of belongingness to the cities, or more specifically, to their communities. Coming from similar family backgrounds, sharing similar knowledge and experiences, and sharing a belongingness to the communities in which they are living, both local and migrant children have a sense of ownership and belonging towards their school, making them feel like they are ‘at home’. In other words, here is the match of the habitus of the children (migrant and local) with the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 128).

However, Zhang and Luo revealed that while migrant children in their study played games together with the local children, ‘when asked who their best friends were, they usually referred to migrant classmates’ (Zhang and Luo, 2016: 227). Here an ‘invisible wall’ can be identified with regard to the intimate peer relationships between migrant and local children. Yet instead of looking at the intimate relationship (in terms of ‘who is my best friend’), I focus on the daily interactions (in terms of ‘how we get along with each other’). As reflected by my empirical data, the migrant children have achieved considerable progress in their social inclusion with local peers if
compared to their parents, who suffer from being firmly positioned as ‘other’ in the urban field (Wong et al., 2007; Chow and Lou, 2015; Cheo, 2016).

6. The effects of the relationship: cause for optimism or pessimism?

The well-integrated relationship between migrant and local children in schools indicates that the migrant children can expect enhanced social inclusion when compared to their parents. Along with their urbanized habitus and urban-specific cultural capital, their schooling experiences also reinforce their belongingness to the urban society. We are seeing the growth of a generation of ‘new urban citizens’ who are deeply embedded in urban life. If compared to their migrant working-class parents, who suffer not only from poor social-economic condition but also from being seen as deficient in the urban field, the children’s future looks brighter.

Yet these new citizens might well become a new generation of the urban working-class, since their opportunities for upward mobility are still limited. The rural and migrant labourer habitus of the migrant parents produce a child-rearing approach of the ‘accomplishment of natural growth’. This approach limits their exertion of (limited) cultural capital to support their children’s academic study. Since parental involvement is such a well-embedded feature of urban schooling in China, its lack might have serious consequences for children’s achievement. What the migrant parents are willing to do is to deploy their economic capital to support their children to construct their own cultural capital. Yet compared to the urban working-
class parents who not only communicate and cooperate well with teachers as expected, but are also able to facilitate their children’s study at home, their efforts still seem to be insufficient in the urban state school field. As a result, as stated earlier in this chapter, a small number of migrant children in the schools I visited have notably lower scores than the local students ranked in the bottom. They are facing huge academic disadvantages. Even for the majority of migrant children in my fieldwork schools, whose overall test scores match the status of their local classmates, their academic performance can hardly be considered as at the same level as the local children (taken together across the two cities). The reason is that, as I have stated in chapter 2 (section 4), the migrant majority schools themselves are ranked in disadvantaged positions in the local league table. Lacking possession of the forms and volume of cultural capital that are valuable in the schooling field, the majority of the migrant children risk ending up with a high school or vocational school qualification or lower, as reported by most of the interviewed teachers according to their follow-up information about their former students. This situation would produce a generation of low skilled or unskilled workers with relatively poor social-economic conditions, much like their parents.

7. Conclusion

This chapter identifies an increasing number of state schools in Beijing and Shanghai in which the majority of students are second-generation migrant
children. Conceptualizing this situation as a field of migrant majority state schooling, a very particular subfield within the field of urban schooling, this chapter explores the special situation of the relationship among teachers, parents and students in these schools. As this kind of school has recently become an established part of the state school system in Beijing and Shanghai, the findings of this research offer valuable implications for future research, policy and practice.

Highlighting the re-structuring of habitus and the accumulation of new forms of capital within the urban field, this research examines both the rural and urbanized aspects of the migrants’ habitus and capital. In relation to this, it identifies the general differences between migrant parents and children. In addition, instead of looking partially at only one dimension of migrants’ identity, this research explores the three dimensions of migrant identity which I suggest are particularly influential in shaping attitudes to education, namely, migrant, coming from the rural, and being working-class. The continuation of some aspects of a rural habitus can be identified with migrant parents, for example the parents’ habitus of not treating themselves as academic educators, which is interlinked with some aspects of their working-class and migrant habitus, such as their disposition of striving for survival. The habitus of the migrant children is influenced by the urban, as they were born and/or raised in the city. This is illustrated by their manner of speaking, ways of behaving, self-presentation, and their appreciation of extra-curricular hobbies. These are valuable and valued
forms of cultural capital in the field of urban schooling.

Applying Bourdieusian theoretical resources to the empirical investigation, this chapter explores the interactions and relationships among teachers, parents and children. It identifies a ‘field-habitus clash’ (Maton, 2012) of migrant parents in the field of urban schooling, producing problems in their relationship with teachers, who have an expectation of home-school cooperation. In addition, my findings support the proposition that home-school interactions do have an influence on teaching and learning in school. It highlights the perceived importance of the role of parents for migrant children’s academic study in school. What can also be identified in the field of migrant majority state school is the well-integrated relationship of migrant and local children, indeed the relative lack of divisions between the migrant and local children. This finding highlights the unique situation of the migrant majority state school. The situation may be different in those schools where the majority of students are local, and where the migrant children may be marginalized in their peer relationships with local children. Finally, this chapter defines both positive and negative effects of migrant children’s social relationships for their future social inclusion in the city. Unlike their parents, social inclusion in school would reinforce their belongingness to urban society, producing a generation of ‘new urban citizens’. However, like their parents, this generation might be a generation of low-skilled workers owing to their underachievement in academic study.
Chapter 11: The birth of an ‘interim quasi-state school system’

While the last chapter focused on state schools, this chapter shifts to the ‘interim quasi-state school system’, which is another main schooling channel for migrant children in Shanghai.

1. Introduction

As formulated in chapter 9 (section 2), the state schools are acting as the mainstream channel for recruiting migrant children. Besides the regular state schools, three other types of school also act as important channels for recruiting migrant children in Shanghai. These schools include: government-purchased private schools, government-controlled private schools, and senior secondary schools for adult students. Adopting a theoretical lens of policy as a temporary settlement of interests (Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952; Dye, 2008; Gale, 1999; see chapter 4, section 3 and section 4 for details), I will first examine the role that the conflicts and compromises of interests among different actors, including the central, city and district government, unregistered informal private (UIP) schools, and state schools, play in the formation of these schools. Grounded in empirical data, I put forward the concept of an interim quasi-state school system. This concept helps illustrate the commonalities in the three forms of schooling and to answer the following questions: what kind of education are some migrant children receiving in Shanghai? Are there any problems
with their education, and what are the sources of these problems?

2. The birth of three unique forms of schooling: policy enactment as ‘temporary settlement of interests’

While the national policy of ‘supervise and support the unregistered informal private schools’ (2003) gives local government the power to regulate the UIP schools, it also sets an obligation for the local government to take positive action to support their development, since shutting them down will not solve the problem of access to education, as the state schools are not able to recruit all the migrant children. The central government wanted the local government to provide these schools with financial support to help them register so that they can be utilized to solve the migrant children’s schooling problem by providing them with basic educational opportunities (which might not be as good as those available in the state school education). This policy allows for considerable discretion in the local government, positioning them in the dominant position in the field of migrant children’s schooling. The local government is the body that decides the school registration criteria; it also has discretion in setting the criteria (to make them either loose or restrictive); it is also responsible for providing the UIP schools with financial support, but there is no requirement that establishes the minimum amount of this support. Following the national policy, the Shanghai city and district governments’ aim was to help the UIP schools register and then utilize them to solve the
migrant children’s schooling problem. The first half of this aim matches the interest of the UIP school owners, that is, to register and to stay open. The government conducted the compromise initially, providing the schools with significant financial support to help them to register. After the schools have registered, the government covers all the operational expenses of the schools, including student tuition fees, teachers’ salary, facilities, etc. As a result, the schools became government funded private schools under the control of the local municipalities of education.

2.1 Government-purchased private school

In some situations, the district municipality of education managed to purchase some UIP schools from their owners. It continues to invest in order to help the school to register as a private school (with the local government as the de facto owner). As for the former owners of these schools, they will have to make a hard choice: either to leave, or to stay but work as the headteacher instead. If the owners choose to leave, then the district municipality will nominate senior management team members from local state schools to become the headteacher and deputy-headteacher. Many of the former owners are reluctant to allow the government to purchase the school since the schools used to be their ‘enterprise’, bringing them considerable profits. Now they have had to hand over this enterprise. A senior management team member in school P describes an owner’s reluctance when facing the government’s purchasing:

When facing the transformation (of being purchased by the
government), the owner was really reluctant. Before been purchased by the government, he could earn hundreds of thousands per year through many ways, such as operating a canteen inside the school. However, after the transformation, as a headteacher employed by the government, he could only earn around a hundred thousand per year. While feeling reluctant, the owners have had to compromise with the municipality, since they do not have the financial ability to act alone and ensure their schools meet the registration criteria. Without the government’s investment, the schools will cease to exist. The district municipality is aware of the financial difficulties of the owners, hence they can coercively purchase the school. As officer J reports:

We know that these owners are reluctant for their schools to be purchased by the government, because this transformation injures their personal interest. But we also know that they have no choice but to compromise, since they do not have the financial ability to get the schools to meet the registration criteria. As you might know, improving the campus houses needs a huge amount of money, which they cannot offer, but we government can and are glad to offer. (Officer J, Baoshan District Municipal of Education)

The government’s purchasing at least compensates the owners’ early stage investments in the school while at the same time offers them a job as headteacher, which in truth is not a bad outcome of a failing investment. After the transformation, the schools are now under direct control of the local government, and the government funding becomes the sole financial resource of the school, which is calculated by the number of students it has recruited. The school cannot charge students for tuition fees and it should follow the state school student recruitment criteria. In terms of the
curriculum, the school teaches the same range of compulsory subjects as state schools\textsuperscript{1}. I will elaborate in detail about how the government-purchased schools operate in section 3.1.

### 2.2 Government-controlled private school

The above is the story of how the district government purchased the UIP schools. Yet in some other cases, the district municipality of education is unable or unwilling to purchase these schools for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the district is unable to purchase all the buildings of the UIP schools owing to budget limitations; in other cases, the owner has developed personal relationships with local notabilities and has therefore managed to maintain independence from the government's purchasing. In other cases, the municipality feel that certain UIP schools might automatically vanish since there is a tendency for them to lose their students, so there is no need for the municipality to purchase these schools. In these cases, the municipality does not purchase the schools but controls them instead. The idea of government control is that the municipality does not replace the private owner, yet it still offers financial investment to help the school to register. After being registered, the school can only receive government funding as the sole financial resource, which is calculated by the number of students it has recruited. As in the government-purchasing

\textsuperscript{1} The schools also have some autonomy to run some optional school-based courses aside from the compulsory subjects such as Maths and Chinese. For example, it can open a pottery-making course if it has relevant teaching resources. The practice varies, depending on the special situation of each school.
situation, in the government-controlled situation, the owners of UIP schools have no choice but to compromise with the government, since they do not have the financial ability to register their schools. Yet as the owner of the former UIP school remains the owner of the registered school, s/he is able to nominate the headteacher and therefore retain partial control of the school. The municipality respects the owner’s discretion and does not intervene in the schools’ internal affairs, except for the funding and student recruitment affairs. This discretion is the production of a temporary settlement as a result of the compromise between the district municipality and the owners. Since the government is unable or unwilling to purchase the school, it has to compromise with the owners in order to make them cooperative and, eventually, realize its goal - placing these schools under a degree of government control. As officer L in Minhang municipality of education comments, ‘the taking over is a way of cooperation between the government and the private owner’. After the government’s takeover, the schools cannot charge the students for tuition fees and has to follow the state school recruitment criteria and teach the same compulsory subjects as state schools, as the government-purchased schools do. The school’s legal status as private school does not change, yet the government’s control of its financial resources and student recruitment makes it different to regular private schools. I will elaborate in detail about how the government-controlled schools operate in section 3.2.
2.3 Senior secondary state school recruiting migrant children in junior secondary stage

Unlike the two forms of schooling that share the common origin of UIP school, the third type of school is indeed a state school. Yet what makes it different to a regular state school is that as senior secondary schools serving adults, these schools are not responsible for students in junior secondary level. For these schools, recruiting migrant children is a form of expansion of the market. Taking school L as an example, the reason why it started to recruit migrant children from 2003 onwards was to create extra income, as reported by its current headteacher:

During that period [2003], there were 27 teachers in our school. However, owing to the lack of adult students, nearly half of the teachers have no work to do, wasting human resources. As a result, the teachers’ income was relatively low. Under this situation, our former headteacher came up with the innovative idea of recruiting migrant children to produce extra income.

The school needs this extra income because there was a financial deficit owing to a lack of adult students. When school L started to recruit migrant children, it attracted a large number of students, since state schools have better reputations generally than UIP schools. Its popularity among migrant children in return reminded the district municipality of its value in solving the migrant children’s schooling problem. As a result, the municipality recognized and supported the school’s irregular student recruitment strategy by providing full funding for the education of migrant children in
this school. As a result, the school must follow the regular state school student recruitment criteria and the curriculum. With the municipality’s involvement, recruiting migrant children has been transformed from a ‘market action’ into a ‘state action’, as summarised by the headteacher of school L, who considers this form of schooling as a win-win model for migrants, government and the school. I will elaborate in detail about how this type of schools operate in section 3.3.

2.4 Summary

As shown in this section, the formation of three new forms of schooling is not a production of a unilateral top-down policy of the government. Rather, it is a production of the temporary settlement of struggle among UIP schools, state schools, central and local government, all of which have made compromises in order to achieve their goals. It is worth noting that there does not seem to be space for the migrant voice, given that the policy initiatives are enacted for them. In this process, the district municipality of education always holds the dominant position, since it monopolises the two main resources for the UIP and state schools: it determines whether the UIP schools can exist and whether the senior secondary adult schools can continue recruiting migrant children; it also offers funding for these schools. Yet holding the dominant position does not mean the municipality do not need to make compromises. The main compromise that it has made is the huge amount of financial investment. At the same time, the school is not
always in a passive position. In the formation of the third form of schooling (the adult schools), the schools were the initiator. The three forms of schooling, taken together, construct an interim quasi-state school system, which serves as a main provider of migrant children’s education in Shanghai. In the next section, I will reveal the characteristics of this school system.

3. Revealing the characteristics of the ‘interim quasi-state school system’

The characteristics of the interim quasi-state school system is an integration of three aspects of belongingness to the state sector, offering quasi-state education and the interim nature. While the three aspects can be identified from all three types of schools, each of the aspects is more or less noticeable in different types of school.

3.1 Government-purchased private school

3.1.1 Belongingness to the state sector

After purchasing the UIP schools, the district municipality of education takes some measures to transform them into de facto state schools. A direct way of doing this is to nominate some senior management team members from state schools to become the headteacher and deputy-headteacher of these schools. If the former private owner chooses to stay and work as the headteacher, the municipality would then send an
inspector to supervise the headteacher. Through taking over the leadership of the school, the government makes sure that it holds full control. With the relocating of state school headteachers, the operational norms of the state sector are also being imported into these schools. After the transformation, in addition to teaching the same range of compulsory subjects as the state school, the textbooks in these schools have all been turned into the Shanghai version, and the newly recruited teachers must hold the Qualified Teacher Status as required in the state school. In addition, the teachers’ pay increases when the state purchases the school. The headteacher of school T emphasises the similarities between the government-purchased private school and the regular state school: ‘This school was run by a private owner. As a result, the teaching and management activities were not as uniform as now. Nowadays, the whole school internal management and teacher training mechanisms are following that of the state schools’.

When regulating the migrant children’s school recruitment, the municipality treats these schools as a part of the local state school system, as reported by officer K:

The enrolment criteria of these schools follow that of the state school. When allocating migrant children to schools, we treat these two types of schools as the same. That means which school the child will attend depends on which school has openings, not on the nature of the school. (Officer K, Pudong Municipality of Education)

Another important change is that, unlike some private owners who expect to make a profit through reducing the costs, which leads to a shortage of teaching and learning resources, the municipality does not expect to make
a profit from the school. It is also willing to provide financial investment to improve the school facilities. For the migrant children studying in these schools, the education they have received is like that of the state schools: they do not need to pay tuition fees and they can enjoy the teaching resources, which follows the norms of state schools.

3.1.2 Offering quasi-state education

In the government-purchased private school, the belongingness to the state sector is weak if compared to the regular state schools. The nature of offering quasi-state education originated from how the municipality treats these schools. Even being purchased by the government, the legal status of these schools remains private. In other words, the municipality does not treat them as ‘real’ state schools. This can be reflected by the identity of the teachers, who have not been included into the civil servant system.¹

As a result, all the interviewed teachers and headteachers do not consider their schools as state schools, nor do they consider themselves as state school teachers, although all the schools’ income is from the state.

As for the district municipality of education, this type of school should be ‘a place with basic study resources’, rather than ‘a place offering good education’. This can be identified in many aspects from the resources it allocates to the schools to its attitude towards the schools, as reported by

¹ In China, the state school teacher would normally get civil servant status, which is normally offered to employees in government departments, state sector enterprises and social service institutions (such as schools and hospitals). This particular status is linked to particular welfare benefits, including the awarding of the local household registration, and so on.
the respondent headteachers. For example, unlike their counterparts in state schools and regular private schools, the teachers in this type of school have not been included into the official teacher professional development project; neither can they get a professional title\(^1\). Besides, compared to their state school counterparts, the funding that the schools can receive, which is calculated by the student number\(^2\), is inadequate. This amount of money can merely support the basic teaching activities without providing extra resources for the students to do extra-curricular activities and for the teachers to undertake professional development training. As for the government’s attitude towards this type of school, a good example is the language of the school’s license. In the license, the section ‘Aims of the school’ writes that ‘providing primary education mainly for children from rural-to-urban migrant worker family’, which limits the school’s recruitment scope into migrant children who are largely from low socio-economic status backgrounds. What is interesting is that it is unusual in China that the government sets limits to a school’s recruitment scope in terms of students’ socio-economic background. In the view of one of my respondents, who is the owner of a government-controlled private school\(^3\), the formulation of the language of the school’s license is ridiculous, as it reflects the municipality’s discrimination towards these schools and their

\(^1\) An example of professional title is ‘professor’ in the higher education system. Without a professional title, it might be hard for person to get his/her former professional experiences recognized by his/her new employer.

\(^2\) The amount is ¥6000 (£630 equivalent) per student for one academic year.

\(^3\) The government-controlled private school shares the same type of license as the government-purchased private school.
pupils, denying their quality of education and depriving schools and pupils of local children. In addition, the municipality requires that these schools establish a loose student/teacher ratio, which is ‘equipping at least 2 teachers for 1 class’. Yet in the state schools, the student/teacher ratio should be ‘equipping at least 2.8 teachers for 1 class’. This clearly demonstrates an inferior teaching standard in these schools. Related to this is the fact that the municipality has not included this type of school into the league table, which may reflect the municipality’s unwillingness to supervise and improve the academic performance of these schools. In short, the municipality is conducting a ‘low cost and inferior schooling approach’ for these schools and their pupils. In response to the conflict of limited government funding and high demand for school enrolment from migrant children, the municipality chose to establish a large number of ‘schools with basic study resources’ with relatively low costs, instead of creating a number of ‘schools offering good education’ with massive investment. In other words, the realisation of access to schools for migrant children is at the expense of reducing the standard of education they receive.

Under the low cost and inferior schooling approach, the schools are facing difficulties. A direct problem is a lack of teaching resources and hardware facilities owing to their financial deficit. A good example is school T in Minhang District, which does not have any music rooms - ‘that means the school’s orchestras has to do their rehearsal outside in the playground.'
When it is raining, then they must cancel’ (headteacher of school T). In addition, the scope of the optional school-based courses, which are not on the national compulsory course list, is limited, owing to the inadequate teaching resources. Yet running a wide range of school-based courses, such as pottery, is a common practice in the state schools in Shanghai. What can be identified here is a gap in the optional curriculum between the government-purchased private school and the state school. Moreover, it is hard for the school to attract excellent teachers, owing to the low salary, absence of civil servant status and insufficient professional development resources, as reported by all the interviewed headteachers. Also insufficient is the number of the teachers. Facing these problems, some schools have tried to enlarge class sizes in order to obtain more funding, since the funding is calculated by the student number. Yet this endeavour has caused a new problem - oversized classes. As reported by the headteacher of school T, the student number in his school is 60 per class, while in state schools the number should be less than 45 per class. Such overcrowding incurs complaints from the migrant parents, as reported by migrant mother Uang: ‘there are too many students in one class, and the teachers do not have enough energy to take care of every child’. Facing all of the above problems, the quality of teaching and learning has been queried by the district municipality of education, migrant parents, and the headteachers and teachers themselves. For example, a senior leadership team member in school P says: ‘To be honest, there is still a gap between
the capabilities of our teachers and that of the state school teachers, since many of us are continuers from the private and informal school period'. Similarly, officer K comments that ‘after the transformation, the quality of teaching in these schools has been improved… However, if compared to regular state schools, I am afraid there is still a gap’ (Officer K, Pudong District Municipality of Education). The majority of the interviewed headteachers and parents also had similar comments.

3.1.3 Interim nature

In the view of the district municipality of education, the increasing educational need for places for migrant children is an acute social issue at present, but there is a possibility that it may reduce in intensity in the future because of the floating nature of the migrant population and the instability of government policy on migration. The local government's worry about the possibility of the disappearance of migrant children can be identified in the words of officer K:

We used to call these children ‘floating children’ [流动儿童], which means this group is always floating. There is no guarantee that they will stay in a place for a stable period. Under this circumstance, it is really hard for the municipality to have a long-term plan for their schooling… Their need for schooling is also affected by the policy. For example, in the last two years with the establishment of the strict state school enrolment criteria, less migrant children would enrol in the state school. (Officer K, Pudong Municipality of Education)

With this understanding of migrant children’s educational needs, the municipality treats the government-purchased schools as an ‘emergency
mechanism’ for solving the urgent problem of floating children, rather than as regular schools that serve the long-term education needs of a stable social group. The situation occurs in the government-controlled private schools as well. The owner of school R feels that the municipality does not treat this type of school as regular schools; what it wants is merely that the schools offer migrant children a place to go:

What is strange is that when the district municipality gathers the private owners together for a meeting, it seldom talks about education. What it always talks about is that the owners cannot do this and cannot do that, for the sake of campus safety… What I can feel is that the municipality does not have motivation to support us to be excellent in teaching. It merely wants us not to cause any troubles. ‘Interim’ is how the government treats us. It hopes to gradually shut our schools down - although it never directly says this, we can feel it.

As the owner points out, “interim” is how the government treats us’. The interim nature embodies as a series of actions (or non-actions) the district municipality’s attitude towards the schools. The main aspect is that the municipality does not have a long-term development plan for these schools.

When asked about the government’s future plan for these schools, officer L expresses his uncertainty:

‘For this type of schools, from a long term perspective, it is just an “interim mechanism”. Yet this interim mechanism might not terminate soon. This kind of school might gradually vanish when there is not much of a floating population in this area’ (Officer L, Minhang Municipality of Education).

It seems that the municipality does not have a clear plan; instead, it is always waiting for possible changes to the current situation. In other words,
‘no plan’ is the plan. A supporting institutional arrangement for this ‘no plan’
is the rule of yearly registration, namely, the school should re-register every
year, which gives the government annual discretion to terminate these
schools.

Having an interim nature without a long-term plan, the schools are facing
difficulties. As the headteacher of school T reports:

What is not sure and what I always want to find out is ‘for how many
more years can we exist’? This is a crucial question, because the
answer to it will determine whether the government should increase
the financial investment to build campus houses and to improve its
facilities. But there is just no answer to this question. That makes me
worried.

The main reason for this headteacher’s worry is that the government’s
financial support for these schools is unstable, depending on whether
migrant children are welcomed in particular periods, as officer K describes:

In the past few years the government’s investment was relatively
strong; yet in recent years, since the metropolitan cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai started to control their population size, the city
government do not offer as much financial support as usual. (Officer
K, Pudong Municipality of Education)

Another group that also feels worried is the teachers. With no guarantee of
their future from the government and from the school, they do not consider
their jobs as formal and sustainable. Instead, they consider this job as a
job with no future, resulting in low motivation towards their responsibilities,
as the headteacher of school T complains:

The senior leadership team is the biggest problem for me. They still
consider this job as a ‘job with no future’, believing that someday the
school will be shut down, so there is no need for them to be highly
motivated and have self-discipline towards this job. As a result, I have had to take care of all the daily management work (which should not be the responsibility for a headteacher), including revising the draft of the school daily news! The teachers are the same. I know that when I am not at school, some teachers are often late for classes, which is unbelievable in a state school.

As a result of the teachers’ low motivation, it is difficult for the headteacher to formalize the teaching and management in these schools as would be possible in state schools.

3.2 Government-controlled private school

3.2.1 ‘Belongingness’ to state sector

Being privately owned, the government-controlled private school has less of sense of belonging, or ‘belongingness’, to the state sector than that of the government-purchased school. Yet since it is also partly controlled by the government, it can still be considered part of the state sector: the government funding is the sole financial resource; the school cannot charge the students tuition fees; when recruiting students, it must follow the state school’s criteria; it also follows the same compulsory subjects as in state schools. ‘After my school got registered, I have lost the control of my own school’, reported by the owner of school R with helplessness and frustration. The owners might not have benefited too much from the government’s actions, yet the takeover indeed improves the study resources for the migrant children, since the schools have received specific funding to improve its facilities. For example, in school Q:
The government has provided our school with funding to build a computer room, music room, science laboratory, general technology room, plastic playground, basketball court, and to purchase all the PE facilities including volleyballs and basketballs. In the Pudong district, a school can receive ¥800,000 [£80,000 equivalent] on average, all received at once. (Headteacher of the school Q)

The migrant children enrolled in these schools can enjoy free education, as in the state schools. It is worth noting that in all three types of schools, the curriculum (in terms of the national compulsory subjects) and qualification of teaching staff are the same as in state schools.

3.2.2 Offering quasi-state education

The low cost and inferior schooling approach applied in the government-purchased school also applies to the government-controlled school. Therefore, the nature of offering quasi-state education can also be identified in the latter. Additionally, this type of school is facing specific problems since they are still run by private owners. The district municipality only controls the school’s income and student recruitment, while inspection of its teaching and operation is minimal. This lack of supervision can result in corruption, as reported by the headteacher of school Q. Some owners try to hire as few teachers as possible in order to save the expenditure for teachers’ salary, then they managed to move the saved expenditure into their own pockets through financial fraud. As a result, a teacher’s income in these schools is even lower than that of the government-purchased schools, while the teachers’ work-load can be greater. For example, in school R (government-controlled) in Pudong district, the teacher’s average
wage is ¥2600/month (£260 equivalent), while in school J (government-purchased) in Baoshan district, the amount is ¥3000+/month (£300+ equivalent); in school T (government-purchased) in Minhang district, the amount is ¥5000/month (£500+ equivalent). Admittedly, the same amount of money can have different purchasing power in different areas (even in different districts within Beijing and Shanghai), depending on the local economic conditions. Yet the two respondent headteachers in Pudong district both expressed regret about their teachers’ low income\(^1\), while the headteacher in Minhang district expresses his pride at his teachers’ good income. This situation has caused the instability and insufficiency of teacher supply in the government-controlled schools, which in turn has negatively influenced teaching quality and children’s social emotional development, as reported by the headteacher of school Q:

> When a teacher starts working, it takes some time for him/her to be familiar with the children. Yet when s/he and the students get familiar with each other after a term, s/he might suddenly quit this job in the middle of the term. When this emergency happens, I have to hire some part time teachers from extra-curricular educational companies. I believe this brings very bad influences to the teaching and learning, as well as the children’s social emotional development.

What can be identified here are the negative influences of the instability and insufficiency of teacher supply.

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\(^1\) In the government-controlled schools, the headteacher is not the owner; therefore, s/he has no right to decide the teachers’ wages.
3.2.3 Interim nature

The interim nature, which can be identified in the government-purchased school, can also be identified in the government-controlled private school owing to the similarities in government treatment. Moreover, since the government is not the owner of the controlled private schools, it does not feel much responsibility to them. When there is not much need for migrant children’s schooling, the government might be glad to see these schools being closed down by their owners. The government’s attitude originates from its distrust and suspicion towards the private owners, as reported by the owner of school R:

Each term we need to attend two or three meetings organized by the municipality, of which the theme would always be warning us what cannot be done, making us frustrated. Why does it organize these meetings for us? It is just because it does not trust us, neither does it respect us. It considers us as unprofessional and untrustworthy, because in its views the reason why we established the school is for profit, not for the sake of education. Now it has taken over the control of the school, it wants us to be marginalized.

The municipality has devised a particular institutional design to realize the interim nature of the government-controlled private schools: there is a mismatch between the decision-making power of the municipality and the obligation of the private owner to take the (often negative) consequences of the decisions made by the municipality. For example, the owner does not have the right to decide the school’s student recruitment criteria, which is decided by the municipality. Since 2014, the criteria are hard for many
migrant families to attain. As a result, it is increasingly difficult for these schools to recruit enough students. These schools are facing the possibility of closing down in the near future. ‘My school is at the edge of extinction’, reported by the headteacher of school Q:

In September 2013, we recruited 37 students. In September 2014, the number on roll dropped to 20. And in this year, I am not sure whether we are able to recruit this number of students, owing to the strict school enrolment criteria established by the government.

Facing the same difficulty, the headteacher of school R, expects that his school can only survive for another two or three years. However, for the district municipality of education, the school’s difficulties are not seen as its business since it is not the owner.

3.3 Senior secondary state school for adult students

3.3.1 ‘Belongingness’ to the state sector

This type of school is positioned firmly within the state sector and this can be identified from two aspects. First, these are state schools and are naturally under the government’s control; second, although recruiting migrant children is a ‘market action’, allowing the school to gain sufficient funding to survive, the recruitment is overseen by the district municipality of education through their control of the school’s funding and recruitment quota. In other words, the municipality’s control has increased the extent to which these senior secondary schools ‘belong’ in the state sector.
3.3.2 Offering quasi-state education

As senior secondary schools for adult students, the official aim of these schools is not educating junior secondary stage students. Therefore, the government is unable to provide the school with quotas to hire teachers (with civil servant status) to educate the students at the junior secondary stage. Yet it is an established fact that the school has already recruited a large number of migrant children and therefore needs more teachers. Facing this dilemma, the school has to hire teachers without civil servant status at its own expense. In school L, among its total of 46 teachers, only 26 teachers have civil servant status. For the remainder, their salary is much lower. As a result, the position of teacher without civil servant status can struggle to attract capable job seekers. The headteacher of school L comments that the teachers without civil servant status are not as capable as the teachers with civil servant status [编制):

The teachers without civil servant status do not have strong teacher professional capabilities and therefore have a negative influence on the quality of education. They cannot realize some of the school’s norms while the teachers with civil servant status can. There is a gap between these two groups of teachers in terms of their educational principles and their ability to realize the school’s norms on teaching and management.

As a result, although it is a state school, the education it offers to the migrant children can hardly be understood as being as good as it is in regular state schools. Again, what can be identified in this type of school is the low cost and inferior schooling offer made to migrant children.
3.3.3 Interim nature

In his opening sentence of our interview, the headteacher of school L reports that ‘recruiting migrant children is an interim work for our school’. Unlike the other two forms of schooling, the interim nature of this type of school can be identified as a ‘buffer mechanism’ for the district municipality to regulate the migrant children’s school enrolment. When the state school cannot recruit all the migrant children, these schools can help to recruit the extra students; when there is less demand for migrant children’s schooling in certain periods, these schools can then return to adult education. As commented by the headteacher of school L, the value of this type of school is to ‘help the district municipality to overcome the problem of migrant children’s schooling’:

The state school is the priority choice for the migrant children. But in certain periods, the state schools are not able to recruit all the migrant children, so some children come to our school. In other words, this school is an ‘interim mechanism’ for migrant children’s schooling. If (in the future) the state schools have enough capacity to absorb all the migrant children, then our mission is accomplished, and we can return to the adult education sector. Yet before the arrival of this day, we should still work hard to recruit migrant children, to help the district municipality overcome the problem of migrant children’s schooling.

3.4 Summary

Figure 6 outlines the structure of the quasi-state school system, as well as its relationship with the state school system. As presented in the figure, the government-controlled and purchased private schools are the products of
the overlap between the state and private sector. The senior secondary state school, which recruits migrant children in the junior stage, is in the closest position to the private sector if compared with the regular state schools.

Figure 6: educational system for migrant children in Shanghai

All three forms of schooling are not typical of state school education, yet all to some degree belong to the state sector. With strategies such as nominating the headteacher, providing funding as the sole financial resource and requiring the school to follow the state school enrolment criteria, the municipality has managed to include these once private sector
schools into the state sector. The following comment from the headteacher of school Q perfectly reflects the three forms of schooling and their degree of belonging to the state sector:

Although our school has now been registered as a private school, it is not a real private school because a real private school does not rely on the government funding, yet we do. How much money the government gives to us [is] how much money we spend. Therefore, in many government documents, schools like ours have been given a special tag, namely, ‘private school for migrant children’, which means the school is not a real private one. For those real private schools, we call them ‘independent schools’.

Yet the degree of belonging to the state sector is limited, in terms of the schools’ financial capability, teaching resources, and the government’s attitude towards them, which, taken together, are reflected in their symbolic legal status of not being regular state schools. As a result, the education that they offer can be identified as ‘quasi-state education’. The weak foundation of the schools in their UIP period is a common reason for the current disadvantages. Additionally, the inferiority of each type of school is shaped by the course of the struggle among the actors in its formation. For example, in the government-controlled private schools, the discretion that the municipality permits for the schools’ owners leads to corruption, which in turn results in inferior teaching resources. Yet the common source of the difficulties these schools face is the willingness of the local government to make available a low cost and inferior form of schooling, which appears to meet the letter, but not the spirit, of the 2003 policy to supervise and support what were then UIP schools. And this approach is confirmed by a
recent central government policy, the *National New Urbanization Planning (2014-2020)*, which states that: ‘For those migrant children who are not able to enrol in state schools, the local government should offer them free admissions to low-cost private schools through providing funding for these schools’. The outcome of this approach is the realisation of migrant children’s access to schooling, but at the expense of reducing the standard of education they receive.

Operating under the low cost and inferior schooling approach, the role these schools play can be understood as being the government’s ‘interim mechanism’ for solving the problems of access to schooling. The term ‘interim’ was used by two headteachers, one owner, and one government officer in their interviews. Yet the interim nature has different characteristics in each form of schooling, shaped by the way that the actors are positioned in the field. In the government-purchased school, the interim nature originates from the municipality’s decision; in the government-controlled private school, the interim nature is also shaped by the municipality’s distrust and suspicion of the owner; and in the senior secondary adult school, the interim nature embodies a ‘buffer mechanism’ for the municipality. Treating these schools as an ‘emergency mechanism’, the local government does not establish sufficient regular state schools that meet the migrant children’s education needs in the long-term.

‘Our school has a legal status of private school, yet is under the control of government, while it cannot enjoy the same benefits as state schools.’
This comment by the owner of school R perfectly summarises the conflicted identity of the interim quasi-state school system.

4. Redefining state school education

The 2006 national equal education for migrant children policy requires the receiving local government to take the main responsibility for recruiting migrant children and to supervise and support the UIP schools. Yet the central government policy does not establish any responsibilities around the quality of the education offered. When the policy comes down to the local level, it has been adjusted according to local discretion. The local government redefines what can be considered as state education: the quasi-state school system, funded by the local government, can be considered as part of the state sector and thus is able to offer state education. In light of this notion, officer K claims that the goal of the TMC policy has been achieved:

In Shanghai, the government senior leadership team has a unified statement (and expects us to follow this statement): there is no hardship, and there hasn’t been any hardship, in migrant children’s state school enrolment. The difficulty is indeed in meeting the migrants’ need of high-quality state school education. (Officer K, Pudong District Municipality of Education)

In this officer’s words, the use of the term ‘state school’ has a broad scope that covers the quasi-state schools. Based on this definition, the migrant children’s school enrolment problem seems to have been solved and the goal of offering equal opportunity has been achieved. Yet an unsolved
question is, as revealed by officer K, can the quasi-state schools provide migrant children with equal opportunities as their counterparts in regular state schools?

An explanation for this situation is that the government at both central and local levels treat migrant children’s schooling as a ‘political task’ with a solution necessary for social stability (with the indicator of ‘every child having a place to study’), rather than an ‘educational cause’ for the proper development of human beings (with the indicator of ‘every child having access to a high quality education’). Ministry of Education officer A’s statement is representative of this attitude:

The central government has attached importance to solving the problems of migrant children’s schooling because this issue has a direct influence on our citizens’ well-being, on social stability, on social harmony, on urban development, and finally, on the future of our socialism.

Here, his emphasis is on the benefits of enabling migrant children to access schooling in order to improve social stability and social harmony as a political task, rather than for the migrant child’s individual educational development. This attitude of the central government acts as the source of legitimacy for the local government’s actions of redefining state school education.

5. Conclusion

Applying the theoretical idea that policy is a temporary settlement of interests (Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952; Dye, 2008; Gale, 1999) to the
Chinese context, this chapter complements the existing literature on policy enactment. It deconstructs the formation of three new forms of schooling for migrant children, which are not a result of unilateral top-down government policy-making. Rather, they are the result of the temporary settlement of struggles among different actors, including UIP schools, state schools, district municipality of education, and migrants.

Another main contribution of this chapter is its conceptualisation of an interim quasi-state school system, an idea which arises from empirical data. It conceptualises three characteristics of this system, namely the degree of belonging to the state sector, offering quasi-state educational provision, and being interim in nature. With the identification of these characteristics, the government’s attitude towards these schools is clear. Considering the floating nature of the migrant population and the instability of government policy, the government treats the quasi-state system as an emergency mechanism for solving the schooling problem of floating children, rather than a regular system designed for long-term education. What can be revealed is the government’s willingness to allow a low cost and inferior form of education provision in these schools.

Throughout the formation and functioning of the interim quasi-state school system, the migrant people’s voices are marginalized. While some of the interviewed parents express some dissatisfaction with these schools, most of them still deemed the school to be acceptable - at least it provides their children with a place to study. While realizing the migrant children’s
right to education, this system does not guarantee them a ‘good’ education. Furthermore, the existence of this isolated school system reinforces the state schools’ exclusivity as many migrant children cannot access them. These situations, as detailed above, have produced further obstacles to the migrant children’s attempts to access quality education.
Part IV

Chapter 12: Conclusion

In Chinese metropolitan areas, migrant children’s difficulties in accessing schooling have been an issue on the government public policy agenda since 2001. By 2006, a national policy framework aiming for ‘equal compulsory education for migrant children’ had been formed. The aim of this policy is to facilitate migrant children’s access to compulsory education on the same terms as local children (see chapter 6, section 2). As a result, progress has been made in terms of the number and percentage of migrant children who are able to access free compulsory education in state schools (see chapter 9, section 2). Yet a large number of children in Beijing and Shanghai – the settings for this research - are still unable to enrol in state schools as their families are not in possession of all the government-required documents. This phenomenon has become more noticeable since 2013, when the local governments set restrictive criteria for state school enrolment (see chapter 7 and chapter 8). While there are myriad studies about the schooling experiences of migrant children, less is known about how the policy concerning them has developed and is enacted, in what contexts, and under what conditions (see chapter 3 for a detailed review). Exploring how the policy influences the educational provision for migrant children was my starting point.
My research does not simply limit itself to excavating and reporting the ‘facts’ about how the policy is implemented into practice. Instead, it aims to produce scholarly analyses of the power relations between the different actors involved in the formation, enactment and development of the policy, following a qualitative policy sociology approach (chapter 5). The overall research question is ‘How do different individuals, organizations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?’ Following this question, this thesis examines not only things happening outside schools in local and central government, traditionally considered as the main policy arenas, but also things happening inside schools, which is yet another policy arena following the policy enactment perspective (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012). The analysis is organized around two further sub questions: i) under what conditions has the enrolment policy for migrant children developed? (chapters 6, 7 and 8); ii) what kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools? (chapters 9, 10 and 11)

As the concluding chapter, this chapter summarises the empirical findings (section 1). It also discusses the principles of social justice guiding the policy enactment and explores the structuring, restructuring and reproduction of power relations in the policy enactment process (section 2). Finally, it discusses the strategies for progressive changes towards the objective of attaining equality of condition (section 3).
1. The policy enactment in practice

1.1 Under what conditions has the enrolment policy for migrant children developed?

As has been revealed in chapter 6, migrant children’s schooling policy has undergone fluctuating developments with the latest policy shift coming in 2013. Chapters 7 and chapter 8 focus on how this policy change happened and under what conditions, acknowledging that the policy is constantly shaped by various factors from both without and within the education system.

Bourdieu’s field theory helps one to understand how the school enrolment criteria became more restrictive under the influences of politics, economy and population policy. As elaborated in chapter 7, as a sub-field in a dominated position within the public policy field, the logic of the educational policy field is constantly shaped by the logics of the broader public policy field, political field and the economic field. As a result, as the social justice discourse became marginalized in the political field and a social welfare discourse became more prominent in the public policy field after 2013, educational policy has become a mechanism of population control deployed by the government.

In examining what happens inside the education system, a Foucauldian-influenced ‘policy cycle’ framework, which contains three interrelated contexts, helps to explain why and how the local municipality of education
introduced the social welfare logic into the educational policy field. As elaborated in chapter 8, state schools have problematized the recruitment of migrant children as the cause of ‘declining educational quality’. This identification of migrant children as problematic is shaped by two social regularities: the teachers’ professional understanding of their roles as educators and the broader deficit social discourse that places migrants as ‘outsiders’. In the context of influence, the school and teachers’ interest in recruiting less migrant children moves into a consensus with the local municipality of education. The latter adopts the new national policy agenda of limiting migrant populations and produces a restrictive criteria system, which imports a welfare discourse into the context of policy text production. The criteria system then becomes standardized and legitimized through user-friendly policy artefacts established by the local government in the context of practice.

1.2 What kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have after being enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?

Since 2001, the local government has made good progress in facilitating migrant children’s access to schooling with multiple types of schools in both state and private sectors involved. The state schools act as the main channel of schooling, as required by the ‘Two Main Channel’ (TMC) policy. In recent years, the state sector has recruited around 77%-80% migrant children nationwide (see Table 11 in chapter 9, section 2). With an
increasing number of migrant children enrolled, many state schools have become migrant majority schools. This kind of school has already become an established part of the state school system. In the private sector, most of the former unlicensed informal private (UIP) schools have been shut down or turned into licensed schools, under the policy of ‘supervising and supporting the unregistered informal private schools’. These licensed schools are more or less funded by the government and thus can be considered as quasi-state schools, recruiting around twenty-eight percent of migrant children in Shanghai. Then the remaining question is: does enrolling in state or quasi-state schools mean that the migrant children can now enjoy equal educational resources and expect to have outcomes equal to the local children?

Those children who are enrolled in state schools enjoy access to the same educational resources as the local children. Then the question is: does access to equal educational resources produce social inclusion and finally lead to equal outcomes? Drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and capital, chapter 10 identifies limited home-school cooperation as a result of migrant parents’ rural habitus and lack of the relevant cultural capital. As the home-school cooperation is an assumed part of urban schooling, the respondent teachers felt that the limited cooperation is a main reason for some migrant children’s underachievement in academic study. As reported by most of the respondent teachers, the majority of the migrant children risk ending up with a high school or vocational school
qualification or lower, leading them into low skilled jobs. In the meantime, and more positively, a well-integrated relationship can be identified between migrant and local children, a relationship that reinforces the migrant children's social inclusion in urban society. This situation is likely to produce a generation of new urban citizens who may yet remain working as low skilled workers like their parents.

As for the quasi-state school system in the private sector, it is an established part of the local school system in Shanghai (chapter 11). By promulgating the policy of 'supervising and supporting the unregistered informal private schools', the central government aims to facilitate the migrant children's equal access to education. Yet in the local government's interpretation, migrant children’s schooling is a political task rather than an educational tool for the full development of human beings. At the local level, the interim quasi-state school system is an emergency mechanism for solving the schooling problem of floating children, rather than a regular system designed for long-term education. While realizing the migrant children’s right to education, this system does not guarantee them a 'good' education, as it amounts to a low cost and inferior schooling approach.

1.3 The nature of policy enactment

The above discussion summarises the empirical findings organized around two sub questions of the overall research question (the sub questions are: 1. how has the migrant children school enrolment policy developed and
under what conditions? 2. what kind of education and school experiences do migrant children have after they have enrolled in state (or quasi-state) schools?) With regard to the overall question - ‘How do different individuals, organisations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy for migrant children’s schooling?’ - my findings extend our understanding of the nature of policy enactment, highlighting three points: first, educational policy is not only shaped by factors in the education system, but also by individuals and organizations in the broader social space; additionally, it is shaped by a complex interrelationship of factors both inside and outside the school. As I have elaborated in chapter 7, the migrant children’s schooling policy is shaped by the development of the population policy, the change of political leaders and the needs of the economic sector. The changes to state school enrolment criteria and the establishment of different forms of schooling are the results of interactions between migrant families, state school teachers, former unregistered informal private schools and local and central government departments (chapter 8 and chapter 11). These finding emphasis the importance of the multi-focused perspective in the scholarly exploration of educational policy (Ball, 1997).

Second, policy enactment is shaped by people’s interpretations and translations in and through their mundane social interactions. In my study, the teachers, school leaders, parents and children’s understandings of ‘what education is for’, together with their dispositions and cultural resources, can influence the enactment of the policy. For some migrant
parents, their rural and working-class habitus produces an approach to child rearing similar to Lareau’s (2003) ‘accomplishment of natural growth’. This offers little motivation to exert their (limited) academic cultural capital to support their children’s study. Their understandings of their role in their children’s education do not match with the teachers’ expectations of home-school cooperation. As a result, a discourse of ‘incompetent parents’ has arisen and migrant children’s school enrolment has been problematized in the school (chapter 10). The school’s problematisation of migrant children’s school enrolment moves into a consensus with the local municipality of education, which has been facing huge pressure for school places from the migrant children, resulting in a restrictive criteria system after 2013 (chapter 8). These findings remind the researchers to ‘people’ (Ball 1997) the research subjects and pay attention to their experiences, attitudes and understandings of the policy.

Finally, my findings highlight the value of the policy trajectory study approach I have taken in this study, which ‘attends to the ways in which policies evolve, change and decay through time and space and their incoherence’ (Ball, 1997). This approach maintains that policy is ‘made sense of, mediated and struggled over, and sometimes ignored’ (Ball, Maguire, Braun, 2012: 3) in non-linear and dynamic ways, highlighting the evolutions and changes throughout the policy trajectory. We see this when we consider the national TMC policy in my study, the policy-maker (State Council)’s stance, as written in the policy document, is that migrant
children should ‘receive compulsory education equally’ (see chapter 6, section 2). Yet in the view of the Ministry of Education and local municipalities of education, who are the government bodies that ‘implement’ this policy, the migrant children’s schooling is a ‘political task’ instead of an ‘educational cause’. As a result, the local government establishes an interim quasi-state school system to recruit migrant children. Yet the quality of education provided by this system cannot be considered as equal to that of the state school system. In addition, in the state school system, the migrant children’s school enrolment has been problematized by the educators. To be more specific, the teachers have problematized, not the restrictions on the children’s access to schooling, but rather the declining quality of the ‘raw material’ that they have to work with (the migrant children). The state school’s negative interpretation of the policy moves into a consensus with the local municipality of education, producing a restrictive criteria system which meets the letter, but not the spirit, of the TMC policy. And the teachers and heads offer tacit support to the actions of the local municipality by not speaking up for migrant families. In short, the enacted version of the policy is different from what is written in the TMC policy document, as a result of the interpretations and translations of central and local government, schools and educators.

In sum, as Ball reminds us, ‘the “effects” of policy cannot be simply read off from texts and are the outcome of conflict and struggle between “interests” in context’ (1994: 21). The strength of a policy enactment
approach is that it recognizes the complexities of policy and aims to ‘look for the iterations embedded within chaos’ (Ball, 1994: 15). The iterations embedded within chaos, from the point of view of a policy sociology approach, is the power relations working both in and through people’s one-to-one interactions and macro social relations mediated by institutions. I will come back and discuss the structure, reproduction and restructuring of the power relations in the TMC policy in section 2.2. Before that, I will first examine the principles of social justice guiding the practices of the central and local government, who occupy dominant positions in the policy enactment.

2. The principles of social justice?

This section discusses the principles of social justice guiding the government’s practices in policy formulation and enactment. As I will elaborate, distributive justice is the main principle in practice. Distributive justice refers to ‘the principles by which goods are distributed in society’ (Gewirtz, 1998: 470). The conventional conception of distributive justice is classically defined by Rawls as follows: ‘the subject matter of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions… distribute fundamental rights and duties’ (1972: 7). Under the distributive paradigm, the primary concerns are the more equal distribution of rights, duties and social and economic goods between social groups (equality of opportunity), or seek to ensure everyone does have an equal
opportunity to succeed by taking compensatory measures to prevent disadvantage, for example, distributing more resources for disadvantaged groups (aiming for increasing opportunities for equality of outcome). In either situation, attention is drawn to the allocation of social goods or rights, mainly in material configurations. Yet the reproduction and restructuring of the unequal power relations in society are overlooked. As argued by Lynch, without addressing these ‘fundamental problems of hierarchies of power, wealth and other privileges’, disadvantaged groups will continue to occupy the subordinate positions, even if the identity of those groups changes ‘from white to black, from citizens to migrant workers’ (1995: 12, 14, 24). Therefore, the distributive understanding of social justice is restrictive, as it privileges ‘who gets what’, while bracketing out questions about ‘the nature of the “what” and what influences are brought to bear upon it’ (Troyna and Vincent, 1995: 156). Noting the limitations of the distributive paradigm, some researchers underline the importance of the relational understanding of justice, which refers to ‘the way in which relations of power are distributed in society’ (Gewirtz, 1998: 471). Relational justice concerns how power is embedded in, and restructured and reproduced, both through people’s one-to-one interactions and through macro social relations mediated by institutions. Unequal power relations in society were analysed by American philosopher, Iris Marion Young as five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence (Young, 1990). Some of these ‘faces’ resonate
with my findings, as I will discuss later. In short, both distributional and relational dimensions of justice facilitate our understanding of social inequalities from different perspectives. By integrating and encompassing these two perspectives, Lynch (1995) argues for the importance of the objective of equality of condition, which offers a more holistic conceptualization of equality to inform progressive action to address inequalities. In pursuing this objective, the scope of actions should be extended to involve not only the equalization of resources or wealth, but also of power and privilege and to achieve what Young (1990) formulates as ‘justice as freedom from oppressive relations’. In this section, I examine to what extent particular social justice objectives have been achieved in the enactment of the migrant children’s schooling policy.

2.1 Achieving distributive justice: from equality of opportunity to equality of outcome?

Treating state school education as a certain type of social good, the national policy of equal education for migrant children emphasizes providing education for as many migrant children as possible. Assuming access to schooling will result unproblematically in educational achievement, this policy puts primary emphasis on the school enrolment rates, with little attention paid to the rates of success after a few years’ study in state school. What can be identified is that this policy is informed by the principle of distributive justice, and more specifically, an equality of
opportunity objective, which emphasizes access to education. Yet considering the limits of the capabilities of the receiving local governments, the TMC policy does not require them to recruit all the migrant children into the state school system. What it requires is that the state school should be the *mainstream channel* for migrant children. In recent years the local government has made good progress and the state sector has recruited around 77%-80% migrant children nationwide. This figure can be seen as a proof of a significant, but not complete, realization of the TMC policy goal. Yet the degree to which equality of opportunity has been realized is still questionable, since around 20% migrant children have failed to enrol in state schools even before 2014 when the school enrolment criteria became more restrictive. This group of children have had to enrol in expensive private schools, low cost and inferior private schools, unregistered informal private (UIP) schools, or have been sent to their parents' hometowns. After 2014, further inequality has emerged from the establishment of the restrictive school criteria, which is legitimized by the TMC policy as it does not require the state school sector to recruit all the migrant children. Under the restrictive school criteria, only those children of migrants who are defined as ‘contributors to the city’ by the local government are now entitled to access education provision (chapter 8). As a result, the migrant children’s opportunities to access state schools have been reduced, compared with the situation in the years when there was progress (2001-2014).
In addition, the central government policy does not establish as a responsibility for the local government that it should offer exactly the same type of schooling for the migrant children. In doing so, central government tolerates the potentially unequal educational experiences in and through different types of schooling, such as the quasi-state school system in Shanghai (see chapter 11). In other words, while the local government equalizes the majority of the migrant children’s school access, it overlooks questions about the quality of that education. The government follows the objective of equality of opportunity but does not aim to increase opportunities for equality of outcome. The eighty percent of migrant children who have enrolled in state schools do enjoy access to apparently equal educational conditions as their urban counterparts. However, while they enjoy more advantageous educational conditions than those migrant children who study outside the state sector, the available data suggest that many of them are underperforming in state schools (see chapter 2, section 4 and chapter 10, section 5.1). Yet in the view of the local government, the migrant children’s academic underperformance is not an urgent and serious issue when compared to the issue of school access, which is an ongoing political task.

Furthermore, under the distributive paradigm, the fact that the majority of migrant children can access state sector schools is understood as a success of the TMC policy. Yet the power relations that produce the migrant children’s continued difficulties in schooling remain unchallenged, or even
unrecognized. When examined from the relational dimension of justice, the effects of the enactment of the TMC policy can hardly be considered as achieving the equality objective. I will elaborate this issue in the next section.

**2.2 How far are the policy outcomes from achieving relational justice?**

**The structure, reproduction and restructuring of the power relations**

Ball suggests that policy ‘typically posits a restructuring, redistribution and disruption of power relations’ (1994: 20). In section 1.3 where I comment on the nature of policy enactment, I have reviewed how TMC policy is interpreted, translated and enacted by different individuals and institutions and how it evolves, changes and decays throughout its trajectory. In this section, I will identify several aspects of the power relations among those individuals and institutions in their interactions and social relations.

Bourdieu’s field theory, together with the Foucauldian concept of discourse and the policy cycle framework, help to examine the dominated position of the educational policy field in the national social space (chapter 7), and how this situation reinforces migrant children’s marginalised position in school enrolment (chapter 8). After 2013, with the change of national political leaders and the establishment of restrictive population policies, the social justice discourse has been marginalized within the educational policy field. In this field, what has been formed instead is a discourse of education as welfare. As a result, the migrant group’s symbolic
capital of being ‘migrant’, which once had some value in the political and educational fields, has diminished and their position is again one of marginalization in state school enrolment. More importantly, regardless of the policy change since 2013, the migrant population has traditionally been set in a disadvantaged position compared with the local residents under the household registration (hukou) system. As I have noted earlier (see chapter 2, section 3 and chapter 8, section 2), the household registration system is an embodied form of state sponsored ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde, 2000), namely, the state's restrictions on access to welfare for certain social group, especially migrants. It creates an inferior ‘outsider’ status for the migrants who do not hold local household registration cards, setting them in a disadvantaged position.

Bourdieu’s conceptual toolkit also helps one to examine the reproduction and reinforcement of the migrants’ socio-economic status in school (chapter 10). Enrolling in state schools, the migrant children’s disadvantaged position has not been fundamentally changed. As an embodied form of cultural imperialism (Young, 1990), the cultural capital valued in the schools has been that associated with the urban middle classes. Under the exam-orientated education tradition, possession and activation of relevant cultural capital, in the form of parents’ literacy (the embodied state) and the cultural goods they own (the objectified state), will offer families a relatively advantaged position in the educational field. Yet coming from rural, working class family backgrounds, the migrant children
are lacking in relevant familial cultural capital to support their study. The lacking of familial cultural capital arises from the migrant parents’ habitus of not treating themselves as academic educators, setting migrant children in a disadvantaged position compared to their local counterpart. Without sufficient attention to equality of outcome and measures beyond merely equal distribution, the equal opportunity policy risks reproducing the rural migrant workers’ socio-economic status. In addition, with the establishment of the quasi-state schools, the migrant children’s hardship becomes less problematic in terms of the government discourse; in the meantime, the migrant parents’ pursuit of a ‘good education’ has been marginalized (chapter 11). As a result, the migrants’ disadvantaged position has been reinforced yet in an apparently legitimate way.

Furthermore, the processes by which policy has been enacted has also shaped the relative position of certain types of schools compared with others in the educational field (chapter 10 and chapter 11). The migrant majority state schools, which are traditionally non-elitist and ordinary schools, are now facing the problem of ‘declining education quality’ in terms of their declining exam results and school reputation. As for the teachers, while they are facing increasing burdens and emotional pressures, their work does not produce the outcomes (in terms of the exam scores) they expect. As for the semi-state schools, their position has been improved by acquiring formal legal status and funding from the local government. Yet obtaining legal status and being thereby defined as offering a particular
niche provision for a low status group also legitimizes the schools’ inferior status (chapter 11). These schools do not have the scope for improvement, since the local government adopts an approach that legitimises low cost and inferior schooling. In short, the enactment of the policy reinforces the existing stratification in the urban school system by marginalizing the migrant majority state schools and creating a group of disadvantaged semi-state schools, thereby producing a number of ‘unsuccessful’ apparently ‘failing’ schools and teachers.

In short, the processes of policy enactment have reproduced, reinforced and disguised the migrant group’s disadvantages in the urban educational system: their difficulties in school enrolment; their underperformance as a group in state schools; and the quality of education they receive in semi-state schools and UIP descendant private schools. What can be identified from the above discussions is the marginalisation and powerlessness of migrant groups within an educational system marked by ‘welfare chauvinism’ and ‘cultural imperialism’. Thus the existing power relations in the broader social space are restructured and reproduced through the migrant children’s schooling policy, as I have noted at the beginning of this section quoting Ball’s comment. Returning to the relational dimension of justice, which examines ‘the way in which relations of power are distributed in society’ (Gewirtz, 1998: 471), the effects of the policy formulation and enactment can hardly be identified as achieving the objectives of justice.
3. The directions for progressive change and recommendations: towards the equality of condition

Extending Bourdieu's argument that a key role for sociology is that of 'shining a spotlight on the blinkers' (1990a: 16), Lingard argued that 'policy sociology should not only describe relations of power and processes through which policies are developed and allocated, but also point to strategies for progressive change which might challenge oppressive structures and practices' (2014: 166). As noted earlier, the migrant group is in a marginalised and powerlessness position and is suffering from 'welfare chauvinism' and 'cultural imperialism' in and through the educational system. To address these issues, it is useful to examine the mechanisms of marginalization in social life and to make progressive changes. The aim is to achieve not only the equalization of social goods and opportunities (the distributive dimension of social justice) but also of power and privilege (the relational dimension of justice), in a move towards the equality of condition (Lynch, 1995). For the migrant group, a main institutional barrier to their access to social welfare (including their children's state school access) is the household registration (hukou) system. Although in recent years the system is undergoing changes, with increasing types of social welfare being (partly) open to migrants, what has not been changed is the underlying principle of 'welfare chauvinism', which creates an inferior 'outsider' status for the people involved in migration. To
address this issue, the practical objective is to reform the household registration system to allow migrant groups the benefit of full citizenship, and thereby improve the migrant group’s relative position in society, instead of merely providing (some of) them with state (or semi-state) school education under the objective of equality of opportunity, as the current policies do.

Yet to change the hukou system thoroughly, could take years. At the moment, I suggest that we appreciate the accomplishments of the current hukou reforms, and think about ways to extend this in an incremental manner. For example, currently what has been widely established in the Chinese cities is the residential certificate system with local diversities. Under these reforms, the person’s access to certain type of social welfare can be determined by the type of residential certificate (long-term or temporary) s/he holds or the credits attached to her/his certificate (see for example, chapter 8, section 4, last paragraph). The positive effect of the establishment of the local residential certificate systems is that they make the local welfare system more open to migrants. In the future, the local government should attach more types of basic social welfares to all types of residential certificates. In the field of education, the goal should be that all residential certificate holders are guaranteed school positions for their dependent children of compulsory education age. What is currently underdeveloped in the Law of Compulsory Education is that it has not set up accountability mechanisms for local and central government to ensure
the provision of equal educational opportunities for migrant children. Noting this underdevelopment in the legal system, the direction of the future legal reform is to make it clear in the educational law and local educational policies that all residential certificate holders have the right to access compulsory education locally.

In the meantime, what should not be forgotten is that the equalization of opportunity for migrant children’s school access has not yet been fully realized although the national policy was promulgated in 2001. And the recent policy change, which is largely shaped by the central and local government’s goal of reducing the overpopulated condition of super-large cities, has further reduced migrant children’s opportunities to access school. I draw attention to the question of whether the government policies for addressing the overpopulation problem should be used to limit children’s right of access compulsory education? From a legal point of view, migrant children’s right of school access in their places of residence is affirmed by the *Law of Compulsory Education*. To protect migrant children’s right to education, the central and local governments should reconsider their work in the pursuit of equality of opportunity.

In addition, as for those migrant children who are enrolled in state schools or quasi-state schools and hence enjoy free compulsory education provided by the state, the issue of equality of outcome should be taken into consideration by the local government. The existence of the quasi-state school system indicates that the equality objective has not been fully
achieved. The local government should rethink the legitimacy of their low cost and inferior schooling offer: should the schooling for migrant children be treated as a mechanism in response to a political task, or as a regular system designed for long-term education? There is a moral and ethical element to this question, given that education is a fundamental mechanism for the individual development of all citizens. Although having shortcomings, the quasi-state school system should not be simply shut down. The reason is that a large proportion of migrant children are currently studying in or will enroll in these schools (28% in Shanghai for example, see chapter 9, section 4), hence they will lose the chance for schooling if these schools are shut down. Recognizing this practical dilemma, a pragmatic strategy for the local government is to keep the quasi-state schools yet alter its approach to these schools which currently focuses on keeping their costs low as they are seen as an inferior alternative to state schools. With regard to the future reform, chapter 11 (section 3) has some implications for the government (especially the local government) to improve the quality of these schools: first, it should enhance its financial investments to provide the schools with adequate teaching resources and hardware facilities, especially for the arts, music and PE and optional school-based courses. Second, more financial resources should be invested in the schools to make sure that they can recruit an adequate number of teachers for all subjects. In the meantime, the state school’s standard of student/teacher ratio (equipping at least 2.8 teachers for 1 class) should be applied to these
quasi-state schools to cut down their class sizes. Third, the government should treat the quasi-state school teachers equally with the state school teachers in the aspects such as salary, professional development, and the award of a professional title. In this way the schools can attract and maintain excellent teachers. In short, the long-term goal is to transfer these schools from being an interim mechanism for the fulfillment of a political task to being a part of the regular state school system.

As for the migrant children in state schools, who enjoy access to apparently equal educational conditions to those of their urban counterparts, many of them are lacking in appropriate familial cultural capital to support their study to produce equal outcome with their local classmates. As I have stated earlier, the ‘appropriate’ familial cultural capital is socially constructed as that of urban-cultural and of middle-class. In terms of the ‘cultural imperialism’ underlying these inequalities, the issue of the measures to make progressive changes goes beyond the scope of this study. Therefore I will leave this question for later studies to focus on the construction of ‘appropriate’ cultural capital in the educational field, especially with regard to the aspects of curriculum, textbook and assessment. Yet with regard to the practical problem of many migrant children’s lack of familial academic support, I propose that the state schools, supported by the government, could provide them with additional support that does not rely on parental labour, in order to try to produce equal outcomes. One single step may be small, yet collectively small steps can
produce a qualitative leap.
Appendix 1: a list of all participants

**Government officers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>f/t/e</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer A</td>
<td>Male; works in a junior leadership position in Ministry of Education; whose work is relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>105’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer B</td>
<td>Male; works in a junior leadership position in Beijing Municipality of Education; whose work is relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer C</td>
<td>Female; works in a senior leadership position Beijing Municipality of Education; whose work is relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
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<td>Officer D</td>
<td>Male; works in Beijing Municipality of Education; not in a leadership position; whose work is slightly relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
<td>telephone</td>
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<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer E</td>
<td>Male; works in Fengtai Municipality of Education (Beijing); works in a junior leadership position; whose work is slightly relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer F</td>
<td>Female; works in Mentougou Municipality of Education (Beijing); not in a leadership position; whose work is relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
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<td>Officer I</td>
<td>Male; works in the SOCE (Laoshan), Shijingshan District of Beijing; not in a leadership position; whose work is relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
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<td>Officer J</td>
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<td>Officer K</td>
<td>Male; works in Pudong Municipality of Education (Shanghai); works in a junior leadership position; whose work is relevant to migrant children’s education.</td>
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<td>Officer L</td>
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# School leaders

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<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>147’</td>
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<td>Face</td>
<td>154’</td>
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<tr>
<td>School K</td>
<td>Male; senior leadership team member</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>58’</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>School L</td>
<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>64’</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School M</td>
<td>Female; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>73’</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School N</td>
<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>72’</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School O</td>
<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>64’</td>
<td>No voice recording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School P</td>
<td>Female; senior leadership team member</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>90’</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Q</td>
<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>90’</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>School R</td>
<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>10’</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>School R</td>
<td>Male; senior leadership team member</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>140’</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School S</td>
<td>Female; senior leadership team member</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>30’</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School T</td>
<td>Male; headteacher</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>174’</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
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## Teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Length</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher A</td>
<td>Female; Maths teacher and class tutor in school A</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>28'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher B</td>
<td>Female; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school A</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>15'</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher C</td>
<td>Female; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school G</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>32'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher D</td>
<td>Male; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school G</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>16'</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher F</td>
<td>Male; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school F</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>22'</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher G</td>
<td>Male; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school H</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>18'</td>
<td>No voice recording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher P</td>
<td>Male; nursery teacher and class tutor in nursery A</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>80'</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher H</td>
<td>Female; Maths &amp; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school H</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>12'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher I</td>
<td>Female; Maths &amp; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school I</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>15'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher J</td>
<td>Female; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school J</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>14'</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher K</td>
<td>Female; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school N</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>45'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher L</td>
<td>Female; Maths teacher and class tutor in school M</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>21'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher M</td>
<td>Female; Maths teacher and class tutor in school S</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>48'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher N</td>
<td>Female; Chinese teacher and class tutor in school T</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>16'</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher O</td>
<td>Male; PE teacher in school T</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>18'</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>
## Migrant parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>f/t/e</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged between 30-40; has been in Beijing for more than ten years; no stable job; lives with husband and two sons; her husband is working as a building maintenance worker; both sons were born and raised in Beijing and are currently studying in state schools (including school A) in Beijing.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>43’</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cai</td>
<td>Migrant father; aged around 40; have been in Beijing for ten years; doing a manual labourer job; lives with his wife, who is also a manual labourer, and the only son, who was brought to Beijing at the age of three and is now studying in state school F.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>34’</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 40; has been in Beijing for more than ten years; runs her own business in a supermarket in Beijing; has bought a house in Beijing; lives with husband and the only son who was born and raised in Beijing; husband works as a cook in the district government; son is studying in a state school (school F).</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>53’</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duan</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 40; works in a liquefied gas company; has been living in Beijing for thirteen years; living with husband and their only son; her son was born and raised in Beijing, and now studying in a state school (school B).</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>18’</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 30s; living in Beijing for nine years, during which she met her husband, who is also a rural migrant and working as a TV technician, and now has a daughter who was born and raised in Beijing; does not have a stable job, and is currently working as a part time voluntary teacher (with no pay) in her daughter’s nursery,</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>52’</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which is an unregistered informal educational setting for migrant children; her only daughter is studying in a state school in Beijing.

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<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fan</td>
<td>Migrant father; aged between 40-50; has been living in Beijing for 25 years; running own small business with his wife in a grass-root market; has two daughters and a son, all of them have been sent back to hometown to enrol in state school.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang</td>
<td>Migrant father; aged around 40; have been living in Beijing for ten years; running own small business in a grass-root market; his only son was born and raised in Beijing but have been sent back to the hometown at the grade four of primary school; and his wife is now accompanying their son in the hometown.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fei</td>
<td>Migrant father; has been living in Beijing for fourteen years; running own small business with his wife in a grass-root market; has only one daughter, born and raised in Beijing.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geng</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 40; works as a marketing manager; have been living in Beijing for 20 years; her husband is living and working in Baoding, which is a city near Beijing; her only son is studying in a state school in Beijing (school A).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong</td>
<td>Migrant mother; have been living in Shanghai for twelve years; lives with husband and two children; her son was brought to Shanghai at one, and is now studying in a state junior high school (school L).</td>
<td>telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ing</td>
<td>Migrant father; aged around 40; have been living in Beijing since 2006; a worker in industry; living with wife and their only son, who came to Beijing in 2012 after completed primary education in hometown; the son is now studying in the</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Telephone Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 40; have been living in Beijing since 2005; running a small grocery shop; her husband is doing manual labourer work; their only son is now studying in an unregistered informal private school (school H).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang</td>
<td>Migrant mother; have been in Beijing for five years; works as manual labourer; lives with husband and two children; both children are studying in the registered private school I; the older child transferred to Beijing from the hometown in the grade three of primary school; the younger child came to Beijing after graduated from nursery.</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lian</td>
<td>Migrant mother; living in Beijing for more than ten years; lives with husband and two daughters; both daughters were born and raised in Beijing; the older daughter is studying in a state school while the younger one is studying in a registered private school (school I).</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin</td>
<td>Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai for twelve years; running her own restaurant with her husband; her son was brought to Shanghai when he was two; the son is now studying in a state junior secondary school (school N).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma</td>
<td>Migrant father in Beijing; lives with wife and two sons; the older son enrolled in a state junior secondary school after graduated from school I; the younger son is studying in school I.</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ning</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged between 30-40; has been living in Shanghai for ten years; lives with husband and two sons; works as a waitress in the canteen of her sons’ school; both sons were born in the hometown but been brought to and grown up in Shanghai when they were very young; both</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 40; has been living in Shanghai for twelve years; works as a worker in a factory; lives with husband and three children; her husband is working in the construction industry; her oldest daughter was born in the hometown and been brought to Shanghai before school age and now is studying in a state junior high school (school L); her second daughter was born and raised in Shanghai and is now studying in a state primary school grade five; her third child was born in Shanghai and is now in the nursery.</td>
<td>telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ong</td>
<td>Migrant mother; aged around 40; has been living in Shanghai for twelve years; works as a worker in a factory; lives with husband and three children; her husband is working in the construction industry; her oldest daughter was born in the hometown and been brought to Shanghai before school age and now is studying in a state junior high school (school L); her second daughter was born and raised in Shanghai and is now studying in a state primary school grade five; her third child was born in Shanghai and is now in the nursery.</td>
<td>telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ting</td>
<td>Migrant father; aged around 40; have been living in Shanghai for fifteen years; lives with wife and two children; his daughter was brought to Shanghai at two years old and is now studying in a state junior high school (school L).</td>
<td>telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pang</td>
<td>Migrant father; have been living in Shanghai for sixteen years; works as an individual locksmith; lives with wife and two children; both children were born and raised in Shanghai and are now studying in state schools.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran</td>
<td>Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai since 2005; working in the domestic service sector; living with husband and their only daughter; her daughter was brought to Shanghai when she was half year old; she is now studying in a state primary school (school O).</td>
<td>telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
<td>Migrant father; has been living in Shanghai for fifteen years; works as a worker in a factory; lives with wife and two children; his wife does not have a formal job; their older child was born in the hometown and brought to Shanghai before school</td>
<td>telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Father's role</td>
<td>Family description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tian</td>
<td>Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai for more than ten years; she and her husband both work as workers in factories; they have only one child who were born in their hometown, and then been brought to Shanghai at the age of three; the child is now studying in a government-purchased private school (school T).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uang</td>
<td>Migrant mother; has been living in Shanghai for ten years; lives with husband and their only daughter; her daughter was born and raised in Shanghai and is now studying in a government-purchased private school (school T).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xia</td>
<td>Migrant mother; housewife; lives with husband and only son; her son is studying in a state school (school S).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yan</td>
<td>Migrant father; has been living in Shanghai since 1998; lives with wife and their only son; his son was brought to Shanghai when he was one-year-old and is now studying in a state primary school (school K).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>f/t/e</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bang</td>
<td>Son of Bai; eight years old; born and raised in Beijing; studying in school A.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dun</td>
<td>Son of Duan; ten years old; was born and raised in Beijing; now studying in a state school in Beijing (school B).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Er</td>
<td>daughter of En; eight years old; born and raised in Beijing; studying in a state school in Beijing.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>A 13 years old girl; the only child in her family; came to Beijing in 2011 after completed grade four in primary school; now studying in an unlicensed informal junior high school (school H).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ge</td>
<td>Son of Geng; ten years old; was born and raised in Beijing; now studying in a state school in Beijing (school A).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang</td>
<td>A 13 years old girl; has a younger sister; came to Beijing in 2008 and studying here from nursery; she and her sister are both studying in an unlicensed informal junior high school (school H).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jian</td>
<td>Son of Juan; was born in the hometown and been brought to Beijing at the age of three; now studying in school H.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang</td>
<td>Son of Lin; come to Shanghai at the age of two; studying in a state junior secondary school (school N).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nian</td>
<td>Son of Ning; came to Shanghai before nursery; now is studying in school K.</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peng</td>
<td>Older daughter of Pang; born and raised in Shanghai and now studying in a state junior high school (school N).</td>
<td>Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu</td>
<td>Younger son of Pang; born and raised in Shanghai; studying in state primary school.</td>
<td>Face</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Uain**
Daughter of Uang; born and raised in Shanghai; now studying in school T.

**Local parents**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Length</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An</td>
<td>Beijing local mother; aged between 30-40; works as a salesperson; lives with husband and their only son; son is studying in school A.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>42'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang</td>
<td>Beijing local father; aged between 30-40; no stable job; lives with wife and their only son; son is studying in school B.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>20'</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma</td>
<td>Beijing local mother; aged between 30-40; works as a taxi driver; her son is studying in school A.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>38'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian</td>
<td>Shanghai local mother; aged between 30-40; works as a HR manager in a company; lives with husband and their only daughter; her daughter is studying in state primary school O.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>16'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>Shanghai local mother; housewife; her daughter is studying in school S.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>15'</td>
<td>√</td>
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**Local children**

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<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>Son of Ma; studying in school A.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>11'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong</td>
<td>Son of Chang; studying in school B.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>12'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qing</td>
<td>Daughter of Qian; ten years old; studying in school O.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>10'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zheng</td>
<td>Daughter of Zhang; nine years old; studying in school S.</td>
<td>Face</td>
<td>12'</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: interview schedule

The interview questions are organised under three main themes, namely, the participants’ experiences, interpretations and attitudes about migrant children’s schooling and related policies. It is important to note that during the semi-structured interviews, some new questions were added in a flexible way. In the meantime, some questions in the lists were not put forward by me but by the participants. In addition, the question lists have been adjusted along with the progress of my fieldwork, as I have got some new ideas after each interview. It turns out that the questions for my last interview were slightly different from the original ones. The lists presented below are in their original versions.

Government officers

• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy (broadly)

• What has been changed since 2001? (the practice, the policy itself and what the government has done)

• What kinds of criteria has the government set for the local state schools when recruiting migrant children?

• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in nationwide/Beijing/Shanghai? (if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained? (if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result? (if not yet) do you think the TMC policy’s aim can really been attained in
the current condition?
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and state school should undertake?

• What kinds of roles has the government played in implementing this policy?
What has been done by the government?
• What kinds of difficulties has the government met during policy implementation?
• What benefits can the government achieve by implementing this policy?
• Please talk about the relationship/struggling within government in different levels (central/provincial/city/county) in the policy implementation.

• Please talk about the relationship between government and the local state schools when implementing the TMC policy.
• Please talk about the relationship between government and the private schools for migrant children when implementing the TMC policy.

State school leaders

• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy (broadly)
• What kinds of criteria has the government set for the local state schools when recruiting migrant children?
• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in Beijing/Shanghai? (if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained? (if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result? (if not yet) do you think the TMC policy’s aim can really been attained in the current condition?
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and state school should undertake?
• What kinds of roles has your school played in implementing this policy?

What has been done/changed in your school in implementing this policy?
• What kinds of difficulties has your school met during policy implementation?
• What benefits can your school achieve by implementing this policy?
• Please talk about the relationship between government and your school.
• Are any tensions in peer group relationships between migrant children and others?

Private school leaders

• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy (broadly)
• What kinds of criteria has the government set for the local state schools when recruiting migrant children?
• What’s the government’s attitude to your school?
• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in Beijing/Shanghai? (if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained? (if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result? (if not yet) do you think the TMC’s aim can really been attained in the current condition?
• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and state school should undertake?
• What kinds of roles has you school played in implementing this policy?
What has been done/changed in your school in implementing this policy?

• Are there any benefits your school has achieved since the TMC policy began?
• What kinds of difficulties has your school met since the TMC policy began?
• Please talk about the relationship between government and your school.

**State school teachers**

• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy (broadly)
• What has been done/changed in your school in implementing this policy?
• Please talk about the migrant children in your school generally. Are there any pressing issues for you concerning their education?
• Please tell me about the relationship between the migrant children, local children and teachers in the classroom and outside classroom activities in your school.
• What is your relationship with migrant children’s families?
• Are there any special policies toward migrant children in your school?

**Private school teachers**

• Please talk about your understanding/attitude towards the TMC policy (broadly)
• What’s the government’s attitude to your school?
• Please talk about the children in your school generally.
• Are there any pressing issues for you concerning their education?
• What is your relationship with your students’ families?

**Migrant parents**

• Please tell me something about your family and children: the family history? How long have you been resident in Beijing/Shanghai? What is you and your partner’s occupation? What your children like to do at school and at home? ……

• Why did your children enrol in public/private school rather than private/state school? Why this particular school?

• Did you and your children meet with any difficulties when trying to enrol in state schools?

• Please tell me about your children’s experience in school (broadly).

• Please talk about the good aspects and less good aspects about your children’s education in Beijing/Shanghai. How about the education your children would have received your place of origin?

• Have you ever heard of the TMC policy? (if yes) what is your understanding/attitude towards this policy? (broadly)

• Do you think the TMC policy’s aim has been attained in Beijing? (if yes) based on what criteria can you believe it has been attained? (if not yet) what are the reasons/factors which have caused this result? (if not yet) do you think the TMC policy’s aim can really been attained in the current condition?

• What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and state school should undertake?

• What’s the government, state schools and local parents’ attitude towards
your peer group and your children’s education?

- Tell me more about your children’s academic performance, and behaviors in/outside school.
- Tell me more about your children’s relationship with other migrant children, local children and the teachers.

**Local parents**

- Nowadays there is a diversity of children’s origins in some schools in Beijing/Shanghai. How about the situation in your children’s school?
- What’s your personal attitude towards migrant workers and their children’s education?
- Have you ever heard of the TMC policy? (if yes) what is your understanding/attitude towards this policy? (broadly)
- What kinds of roles (or responsibilities) do you think the government and state school should undertake?
- Tell me more about your children’s academic performance, and behaviors in/outside school.
- Tell me more about your children’s relationship with migrant children and the teachers.

**Migrant children**

- What do you like doing best at school?
- Which teachers do you like and why?
- Which courses do you like and why?
• What do you like to do after school?

• Who are your friends? What do you like about them?

• Does everyone gets along in your class?

Local children

• What do you like doing best at school?

• Which teachers do you like and why?

• Which courses do you like and why?

• What do you like to do after school?

• Who are your friends? What do you like about them?

• If everyone gets along in your class?
Appendix 3: code list

Note: as I have explained in chapter 5 (section 5.1, the last paragraph), the code list was originally in Chinese. In this appendix version, I have translated all the category and code titles. I have also translated part of the transcript extracts, which has been directly quoted in the thesis (including its previous drafts) and conference presentations. It is important to note that the findings and arguments of this study were generated from the analysis of the whole set of data, including but not limited to the extracts in the code list (see detailed elaborations in chapter 5, section 5.2).

Theme 1: the ‘Two Main Channel’ (TMC) policy

Sub-theme 1: the enactment of the TMC policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The hardship of migrant children’s state school enrolment</td>
<td>‘There is no hardship in migrant children’s state school enrolment’</td>
<td>‘In Shanghai, the government senior leadership team has a unified statement (and expects us to follow this statement): there is no hardship, and there hasn’t been any hardship, in migrant children’s state school enrolment. The difficulty is indeed in meeting the migrants’ need of high-quality state school education.’ [Officer K]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· (another extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government’s attitude to this issue</td>
<td>‘We have already tried our best to implement this policy, so you cannot say that we are not trying hard’ [Officer A]</td>
<td>‘The migrant children’s schooling is an important issue, and the Ministry of Education has put importance on it. And we have achieved great progresses on implementing this policy.’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing number of migrant</td>
<td>‘Although the ratio of migrant children studying in state schools has been between 78.2% to 79.4% during past few...’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The achievement of the TMC policy | children studying in state schools | years, the actual amount of the migrant students studying in state schools were increasing every year by 0.09-0.1 million in the nationwide, since the total number of migrant children was increasing.’ [Officer A]

| The goal of the TMC policy | ‘The goal of TMC is to make sure that migrant children are able to enroll in state schools. Nowadays what we have done has already gone beyond this goal. And what we are doing is going towards “receiving excellent education”.’ [Officer B] |

| Policy changes drastically | ‘The government changes the policy drastically’ [Headteacher of School E] |

| The problems in the policy enactment | Low-lying land effect | ‘If we do not set up strict criteria, there will be much more migrant children come to study in Beijing. And the amount would exceed our state schools’ recruitment capability. For extract, the state school enrollment criteria in our district are not as strict as that of Haidian and Shijingshan District, therefore, some migrant children (who are residents of that two districts) apply for schools in our district, simply because they are not qualified in their districts’ [Officer F] |

| | ‘a weight that cannot be held’ | ‘As a result, it in fact brought a big challenge to the local educational resources, in other words, to the local children. Then in recent years...felt that if this situation continues, it might become ‘a weight that cannot be held’ (laugh).’ [Officer K] |

| | | ‘The policy goal goes a little bit beyond the government’s capability: it is too early to claim the “TMC” policy goal, since we do not have enough capability to fulfill the responsibility set up by the TMC policy.’ [Officer A] |
### Sub-theme 2: the actors’ motivations in the policy enactment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central government</strong></td>
<td>National political leader</td>
<td>‘You might have observed that, after the leadership transition in the central government, the ‘Two Mainstream Channels’ policy seems to be rarely referred to by the central government. It indeed occasionally refers to this policy, but the frequency is reduced compared with the situation before.’ [Officer D]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The harmony and stability of the society</td>
<td>‘The central government has attached importance to solving the problems of migrant children’s schooling, because this issue has a direct influence on our citizens’ well-being, on social stability, on social harmony, on urban development, and finally, on the future of our socialism.’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compulsory education is a public goods</td>
<td>‘one aspect of the nature of compulsory education is that it is a public goods’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The pressure from the law</td>
<td>‘this is written in the Compulsory Education Law’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The pressure from the public opinions</td>
<td>‘we are under the pressure from public opinions’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The migrants have contributions to the city</td>
<td>‘the migrants have indeed contributed to the urban development’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The city needs the migrant workers</td>
<td>‘The city needs the migrant workers as workforce. There is an interest relationship between the city and the migrant people.’ [Officer A]</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The future of the migrant children</strong></td>
<td>· ‘if the migrant children cannot receive qualified education, they might become “rubbish citizens” in the future – that is not a good result for both themselves and the society’ [Officer A]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (another extract in Chinese)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Follow the superior’s requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘the Shanghai local government always follow the central government’s directions’ [Officer K]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (another extract in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government’s responsibility</strong></td>
<td>· ‘it is the government’s responsibility. If we do not do this, who should do this?’ [Officer B]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (another extract in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State school</strong></td>
<td><strong>Follow the government policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘In fact, for us, we do not have our own motivations to implement the TMC policy. We just follow the government’s policies (laugh)’ [headteacher of school K]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· We understand that accepting extra numbers of migrant children is a ‘political task’ [政治任务], so we cooperate with the government positively. [headteacher of school B]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘If it is not because of the - I would rather call it a “mandatory political task” [硬性政治任务] - from the city and district municipality of education, our school really cannot recruit so many migrant children, since we need to maintain the quality of education.’ [headteacher of school B]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (four other extracts in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The decreasing local students</strong></td>
<td>· ‘the number of local students in this school district has been decreased’ [Headteacher of school J]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (three other extracts in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The government’s funding incentive</strong></td>
<td>· ‘no matter you recruit local or migrant student, you will receive government funding calculated by your total student number, which is 3300/year per student’ [Headteacher of school N]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Equal education discourse

- ‘the school is a place for to educate children, and the children can not be divided into “local” and “migrant”!’ [Headteacher of school A]
- ‘As for recruiting students, we do not have the utilitarian motivations. What we are thinking is just simple: we are doing educational enterprise, so we recruit as much children as we can; we do not consider other potential utilitarian interests.’ [Headteacher of school O]

Sub-theme 3: the difficulties of the receiving local governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial issue</td>
<td>Financial system</td>
<td>- ‘It is hard for the destination local governments in the east nine provinces to directly receive funds from the central government specifically for children’s schooling’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (two other extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack for financial resources</td>
<td>- ‘the difficulty is the lack of resources’ [officer K]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (one other extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political issue</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>- ‘In the political system, the local interests sometimes mismatch the interests in central level.’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (two other extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The difficulties for setting up</td>
<td>'It takes a few years and cannot solve the problems at present’</td>
<td>- ‘If you want to set up a new school, the first step is to get the approval from related government department, and this takes two to three years. Then it takes you another few years to build the school campus and recruit qualified teachers and staff. Therefore, setting up new schools cannot solve the problems at present.’ [Officer C]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (another extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
new state schools to recruit migrant children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lacking for suitable school campus in the central city</th>
<th>‘it is hard to find suitable school campus in the central city’ [Officer B]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(another extract in Chinese)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The floating and instable nature of migrants

| ‘The floating nature of migrant children brings lots difficulties to our planning of the state school recruitment quota, which should be based on the statistical data of the exact number of migrant children in certain school district.’ [Officer B] |
| ‘We used to call these children ‘floating children’ [流动儿童], which means this group is always floating. There is no guarantee that they will stay in a place for a stable period. Under this circumstance, it is really hard for the municipality to have a long-term plan for their schooling.’ [Officer K] |
| (three other extracts in Chinese)                   |

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**Sub-theme 4: micro-politics: the struggling among different actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential conflicts</td>
<td>Limited responsibility (local government) vs. Unlimited responsibility (central government)</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looking forward to the funding (school) vs. Worrying about the ‘low-lying land effect’ (government)</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants can choose the school but the locals cannot</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The nature of the TMC policy: an ‘encouraging rather than mandatory’</td>
<td>· ‘Our attitude towards these provinces and cities is always encouraging, rather than mandatory. We know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggling among the governments in different levels</td>
<td>mandatory’ policy</td>
<td>that all of them have already tried their best, and are undertaking a huge pressure. For those who have not implemented the policy well, they have their special reasons, which are reasonable. Therefore, it is inappropriate for us to punish them or compel them to attain the policy aim.’ [Officer A]</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The local government has autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td>(two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The local policy should not violate the central policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>(one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government as coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td>(one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The negotiation between governments in different levels</td>
<td></td>
<td>(one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggling among governments in different districts</td>
<td>‘If you are working and paying tax in other districts in Beijing, your children cannot enjoy the educational welfare provide by this district, because you have not made contributions to this district’ [Officer H]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIP school vs government</td>
<td>‘Old friends’ with conflicts</td>
<td>‘When facing the transformation (of being purchased by the government), the owner was really reluctant. Before been purchased by the government, he could earn hundreds of thousands per year through many ways, such as operating a canteen inside the school. However, after the transformation, as a headteacher employed by the government, he could only earn around a hundred thousand per year.’ [school leader of school P]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|  |  | ‘We know that these owners are reluctant for their schools to be purchased by the government, because this transformation injures their personal interest. But we also know that they have no choice but to compromise, since they do not have the financial ability to get the schools to meet the registration criteria. As you might
Theme 2: the documentation system (state school enrollment criteria)

**Sub-theme 5: actors’ attitudes towards the documentation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Eligible children’ discourse</td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Whether there is a “hardship” or not depends on what kind of people you are. There is no difficulty for the eligible children (who have got all the required criteria) to enroll in state schools. However, if you are ineligible yet still insist to apply for a state school, you will face difficulties. But if you go back hometown and enroll in the state schools there, as required by policy, again, there would not be any difficulties for you. Therefore, our basic attitude is that, if you are not eligible, please apply for the state schools in your hometown, and your seat will be guaranteed.’ [officer A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Some migrant children do not meet the criteria to enrol...’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Government                                                                 | in state schools in the receiving cities, but we cannot help them. Our principle is that we guarantee those who meet the criteria will enrol in state schools; for those who do not meet the criteria, we do not offer them places. [officer A]  
| [officer A] | ‘Well, since recent two or three years, regarding the migrant children’s school enrolment, [the government] started to set some...we should not call them restrictive requirements...you see, we Shanghai local children also need to meet some requirements in order to enrol in schools. Similarly, as for the migrant children, some requirements regarding to their parents’ certificate status have been set up.’ [officer K] |
| ‘hierarchical system of school access criteria’ discourse (享受梯度的服务) | (one extract in Chinese) |
| ‘Standardization’ discourse | · ‘Since 2004, the standardization [规范化] of the criteria system started. In 2008, it was the first time that the Beijing Municipal of Education established the requirement of the ‘Three Documents’... At that time, government was exploring, and the criteria system was to be standardized... The whole process was not regulated. We started to require the ‘Five Documents’ since 2012. In 2013, 2014 and 2015, we continued this documentation system, which has been increasingly standardized.’ [officer B]  
| [officer B] | (another extract in Chinese) |
| A form of local protectionism | · (four extracts in Chinese) |
| ‘Migrants have contribution to the city’ (parental perspective) | · ‘It is unfair to set up admittance criteria against our children, since we are also contributors to this city like the local people. I have been working in Beijing for more than ten years, undertaking the dirtiest and hardest jobs. And
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant parents</td>
<td>finally, my daughter is not allowed to enroll in state school. It is unfair!’ [Migrant mother En]</td>
<td>(two other extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘like local children, our children are also Chinese citizens. They deserve equal treating in school enrolment. The children are innocent. Why they cannot just access to school?! I am very discontent with the restriction from the government’ [Migrant father Fei]</td>
<td>(three other extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>create unnecessary problems for parents</td>
<td>(two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State school</td>
<td>Follow the government’s rule</td>
<td>(five extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sub-theme 6: the functions of the documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a whole</td>
<td>Follow the migrant population policy</td>
<td>‘Now the state school enrolment criteria in Shanghai can be considered as a sub-system of the residential certificate policy (a type of migrant population policy)… To a large extent, we chose these state school enrolment criteria to meet the needs of the government’s migrant population control policy… Here, education is treated as a certain type of social welfare’ [Officer K]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To make sure the person is a ‘contributor to the city’</td>
<td>‘Only the people who have got a legal job in Beijing are able to obtain the Proof of Employment. Therefore, it can be used to identify that a person is a ‘contributor to the city’. Therefore, his/her children are entitled to enjoy the educational welfare provided by this city.’ [Officer F]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Proof of employment

Prevent people from 'unjustifiably sending their children to the metropolitan areas for a better education’  

- ‘... to prevent people from unjustifiably sending their children to the metropolitan areas for a better education, while they themselves are not based in that city’ [Officer A]

For the social stability  

- (one extract in Chinese)

### Proof of House Renting or Ownership

- Prevent people from 'moving to the metropolitan cities for a better education for their children’  

- ‘To prevent people from unjust sending their children to the metropolitan cities for a better education, while themselves are not based in that city’ [Officer A]

- Easy for the government administration  

- (one extract in Chinese)

- ‘make sure that the child is living in an appropriate house’  

- ‘This document helps to make sure that the child is living in an appropriate house’ [Officer F]

### Sub-theme 7: the difficulties of preparing for the documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary residential Permit</td>
<td>Have not been living for enough time in the city</td>
<td>· (six extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did not realized its importance</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of House Renting / Ownership</td>
<td>no house rent contract</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Living in illegal houses</td>
<td>· (tree extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has not obtained the certificate</td>
<td>· (four extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The certificate does not match with temporary</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Codes</td>
<td>Extracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social insurance</td>
<td>Fake documents</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof for paying for social insurance</td>
<td>Employed by big factories</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of Flexible Employment</td>
<td>Being pragmatic in occupation choice</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of employment</td>
<td>Sign a fake employment contract</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of House Renting / Ownership</td>
<td>Sign a fake house renting contract</td>
<td>· ‘we have to try some “special” ways to get all the required documents: with the help of my friends, I have signed a fake job contract and a fake house-renting contract with others, at the expense of paying some money’ [Migrant mother En]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Theme 3: migrants’ life in urban areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Life condition                                | ‘striving for survival’ ('Mang Yu Shengji’) | - ‘... some of them are running tiny businesses, they need to get up early and finish work late – so you cannot expect them... They are still in a struggle for survival, so they need to make sure that their families get basic supplies and survive in the city. They do not have spare attention to deal with the children - as long as the children do not make trouble.’ [teacher L]  
- ‘As their restaurants or stalls normally close after dinnertime, they will not finish work and get back home until 10pm, when their children have already gone to bed’ [headteacher of school A]  
- (four other extracts in Chinese) |
| Limited time for accompany & supervision      |                                 | - ‘In terms of their attitude to children’s education, the Shanghai local parents are more responsible. Many migrant parents are busy with work or other things... While some Shanghai local students are not doing well in their study, they all complete their homework, since their parents always check their homework. However, many migrant parents even not ask the children about their homework. In their minds, the only thing they need to make sure is that their children have eaten well (laugh).’ [Senior management team member in school K]  
- ‘The migrant parents are not able, or are not willing, or do not have time to supervise their children’s study. We have communicated with them to convince them that it is important for their children to accomplish all the...” |

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homework everyday, and that they have the responsibility to supervise their children. But they just ignore our message. As a result, many children do not accomplish the homework. Eventually, we have no choice but to give extra supervision and guidance for the students to make sure they have learnt what they need to learn.’ [Teacher C]

Social network  | Job networking  | · (five other extracts in Chinese)

Countryman  |  · ‘have asked my elder sister’s husband to find someone who can help. He did speak to someone, but that person said it is very hard and they could not help.’ [migrant mother Ong]

Local network  |  · ‘no, we non-local labourers do not have local friends, unless your landlord is willing to help. Otherwise you will have no way.’ [migrant mother Ong]

Social network in educational field  |  · (three extracts in Chinese)

Theme 4: migrant children in state school

Sub-theme 10: the academic performance and social inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many are as good as local students</td>
<td></td>
<td>· (four extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Sub-theme 11: the ‘negative’ influences for schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘The reduction’</td>
<td>Rebuild the professional music and arts classrooms into regular classrooms</td>
<td>‘In order to meet the needs of the newly added classes, we have to rebuild our professional music and fine arts classrooms, which we have spent money to build up, into regular classrooms’ [headteacher of school B]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or teaching resources per child</td>
<td>· (three other extracts in Chinese)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The reduction of teaching resources per child’</td>
<td>· ‘leading to the reduction of the teaching resources per child’ [Officer D]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamper the small class teaching reform</td>
<td>· ‘Along with accepting extra numbers of migrant children, our class size becomes 45 per class, yet a reasonable class size should be 38 per class according to the government regulation.’ [headteacher of school B]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· ‘in Shanghai, there was a period that the birth rate was decreasing, and we took this chance to promote the small class size teaching practice. Yet under the TMC policy, we did not say no to the migrant children and tried to include them [into the state school]. It meant challenges for the schools, making the class size even bigger rather than smaller.’ [officer K]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· (two other extracts in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic performance</td>
<td>‘Declining’ educational quality’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· ‘The educational quality is declining... We have never been like this: this year, the school’s exam scores in Chinese and Maths are even below the average score of all schools in Fengtai District! This is the result of recruiting the extra group [beyond the school’s recruiting capacity] of around 50 migrant children last year, under the request of the district municipal of education.’ [Headteacher of school B]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturb local students’ study</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduation</td>
<td>Excellent migrant student will not stay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>School reputation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Sub-theme 12: the ‘negative’ influences for teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Excerpts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Increasing work burdens | The parents’ home education has negative impacts towards teacher’s education in school | · ‘Sometimes the parents do things against [the school education]. For example, when your child has problems, you do not come to the school. What’s more, when the teacher is contacting you, you are behaving like ‘I am not going to the school!’ We have parents like this.’ [headteacher of school A]  
· (two other extracts in Chinese) |
| Lacking academic foundation in nursery | · (one extract in Chinese) |
| 'uncooperative' parents | Migrant parents are conceived as not cooperating well with teachers | · ‘(Many) migrant parents are unable, or are unwilling, or do not have time to supervise their children’s study. We have communicated with them to convince them that it is important for their children to finish all of their homework every day, and that they have the responsibility to supervise their children. But they just ignore our message. As a result, many children do not complete their homework. Eventually, we have no choice but to give extra supervision and guidance for the students to make sure they have learnt what they need to learn.’ [teacher C]  
· ‘For us, the biggest problem is that things do not go well in the home-school cooperation. Many migrant children often do not finish their homework. So the teachers have to spend more time to give these students extra tutorials and supervisions. For the students, their parents do not have sufficient literacy to guide their study – that is one reason. Another reason is that they are busy with their work. For example, when their children come back home after school, they might still be working as a..."
babysitter in someone else's home. They do not have the attention to supervise their children’. [teacher L]

- 'It’s very rare that the migrant parents respond to a teacher’s communication. We have a teacher-parents meeting once a term, but some parents do even not appear. Normally it is the teachers who contact the parents, not in reverse. We have a Fly-message group in each class, and our teachers use this group to keep the parents updated about the school news and inform them about their children’s homework… There are 28 students in my class, and each time I send the parents messages, I normally receive only one response. The others rarely contact teachers to talk about their children. And you don’t even expect them to come in to school to talk to you.’ [teacher B]

- (three other extracts in Chinese)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent perceived not to care about children's study</th>
<th>‘[t]he migrant children do not really care about learning and about the teachers’ requirements, since their parents do not care.’ [teacher C]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘generally the parents do not put enough importance on their children’s education’ [headteacher of school A]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘In terms of their attitude to children’s education, the Shanghai local parents are more responsible. Many migrant parents are just busy with work or other things… While some Shanghai local students are not doing well in their study, they all complete their homework, since their parents always check their homework. However, many migrant parents don’t even ask their children about their homework. In their minds, the only thing they need to make sure is that their children have eaten well (laugh)’ [school leader in school K]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(two other extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Teachers’ Frustration**

- *enough importance to teachers’ communication*

  - *the only people in this school who treat education seriously’ [headteacher of school A]*
    - ‘My heart is broken… I have communicated with the migrant parents many times, requesting them to help check their children’s homework to make sure they finish it. But many of them just ignored my request, and their children never complete their homework. The parents do not supervise the children at all. That makes me and other teachers angry. Sometimes we could not tolerate this and asked the parents to come and talk to us and they promised to do as we request. But the next day, their children had still not finished their homework, leaving the workbook blank! (with a bitter smile)’ [Teacher C]
    - *(another extract in Chinese)*

- *Indifference – that is their attitude towards teachers*

  - *Indifference – that is their attitude towards teachers. Sometimes the students talk loudly during a class and make lots of noise, so I shout, “keep quiet!” but nobody has any reaction. They just focus on their own business and do not care about you. They do not even have an awareness of ‘how should I behave in front of the teachers?’, which they should have.’ [Teacher C]

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**Sub-theme 13: the conditions of equal treatment inside state school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School’s policy enactment</td>
<td>Mix local and migrant children in the same class</td>
<td><em>(five extracts in Chinese)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal treating in the rewarding</td>
<td><em>(four extracts in Chinese)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal treating in</td>
<td><em>(one extract in Chinese)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial support</td>
<td>Equal education discourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The result of policy enactment</td>
<td>‘From the school’s perspective, I actually do not care about the “equal treating inside school” policy, because it is our natural responsibility to take care every child, no mater s/he is local or migrant.’ [Headteacher of school G]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘As for the students in my class, I have no idea who is local and who is migrant. In fact, I do not care. What I do concern is that: are you a hardworking student? Have you got any difficulties with your study? Do you need my help? These are the focuses in my work.’ [Teacher K]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘the school is a place to educate children, and the children can not be divided into “local” and “migrant”!’ [Headteacher of school A]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘As for recruiting students, we do not have the utilitarian motivations. What we are thinking is just simple: we are doing educational enterprise, so we recruit as many children as we can; we do not consider other potential utilitarian interests.’ [Headteacher of school O]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(two other extracts in Chinese)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant-local children’s relationship</td>
<td>‘... not at all, our class is full of harmony!’ [migrant child Peng]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘my son sometimes mentions his local classmates who play with him, and I feel they have a good relationship’ [migrant mother Ning]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘my son is in year four in my school. There is not a migrant/local division here. I can tell you, all of his best brothers are migrant - aha!’ [school leader in school K]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘The migrant and local children have good relationships. I cannot see any problems with their relationship. It is because these so-called “migrant children” are actually born and raised in Beijing and are living in the communities around our school.’ [teacher F, school F]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Theme 5: the government funded private school (*Namin Xuexiao*)

#### Sub-theme 14: teaching and school operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The quality of teaching</th>
<th>The government’s perspective</th>
<th>The headteacher’s perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘After the transformation, the quality of teaching in these schools has been improved... However, if compared to regular state schools, I am afraid there is still a gap.’ [Officer K]</td>
<td>‘This school was run by a private owner. As a result, the teaching and management activities were not as uniform as now. Nowadays, the whole school internal management and teacher training mechanisms are following that of the state schools.’ [headteacher of school T]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(two extracts in Chinese)</td>
<td>‘We still need time and effort to improve our teachers’ capabilities... ’ [Headteacher of school T]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                         |                             | ‘When a teacher starts working, it takes some time for him/her to be familiar with the children. Yet when s/he and the students get familiar with each other after a term, s/he might suddenly quit this job in the middle of the term. When this emergency happens, I have to hire some part time teachers from extra-curricular educational companies. I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Not equal treating in the rewarding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set a class exclusively for local children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problems related with the teachers</td>
<td>believe this brings very bad influences to the teaching and learning, as well as the children’s social emotional development.’ [Headteacher of school Q]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the teacher’s aspect</td>
<td>‘To be honest, there is still a gap between the capabilities of our teachers and that of the state school teachers, since many of us are continuers from the private and informal school period.’ [Senior leadership team member in school P]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the parent’s aspect</td>
<td>‘We prefer state school because it has better teaching quality’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>‘The teacher’s salary is just too low - £280 per month. It is even less than the salary of a cleaner’ [Headteacher of school R]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No civil servant status (Bian Zhi) &amp; professional titles (Zhi Cheng)</td>
<td>‘The teachers without civil servant status do not have strong teacher professional capabilities and therefore have a negative influence on the quality of education. They cannot realize some of the school’s norms while the teachers with civil servant status can.’ [headteacher of school L]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacking for CPD opportunities</td>
<td>‘There are few chances for our teachers to access formal teacher professional development training programmes’ [Senior leadership team member in school P]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Teachers have high mobility | ‘Our teachers are unstable with high mobility... It is extremely hard for our teachers to get the ‘civil servant
status’. At the same time, their salary is low. Therefore, our teachers are always trying to find positions in better schools.’
[Headteacher of school Q]
· (three other extracts in Chinese)

| Lacking motivation | ‘Having heavy workloads, the teachers cannot receive enough salary. Therefore, they are lacking for motivation to work.’ [Senior leadership team member in school P]
· ‘The senior leadership team is the biggest problem for me. They still consider this job as a ‘job with no future’, believing that someday the school will be shut down, so there is no need for them to be highly motivated and have self-discipline towards this job. As a result, I have had to take care of all the daily management work (which should not be the responsibility for a headteacher), including revising the draft of the school daily news! The teachers are the same. I know that when I am not at school, some teachers are often late for classes, which is unbelievable in a state school.’ [Headteacher of school T] |

| ‘it [the local government] does not trust us’ | ‘Each term we need to attend two or three meetings organized by the municipality, of which the theme would always be warning us what cannot be done, making us frustrated. Why does it organize these meetings for us? It is just because it does not trust us, neither does it respect us. It considers us as unprofessional and untrustworthy, because in its views the reason why we established the school is for profit, not for the sake of education.’ [owner of school R] |

| Lacking funding | ‘Our biggest problem is lacking funding, since we are not able to recruit enough students.’ [Headteacher of school Q]
· ‘The costs of school operation are increasing, but our funding does not increase.’ [Headteacher of school T] |

| Lacking teaching | ‘We are lacking for the classrooms for special teaching use,
### Sub-theme 15: the identity dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The self-perception of the schools</th>
<th>Serving the ‘bottom of the society’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lacking teachers</td>
<td>‘Our school is lacking for teachers for all the subjects except for Chinese, math and English.’ [Headteacher of school T]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities and hardware</th>
<th>such as laboratory and arts classroom.’ [Headteacher of school T]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(another extract in Chinese)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Government funding**

- ‘In our school, all the teaching facilities and hardware are provided by the local government: computer room, playground, basketball stands, sports facilities, laboratories, etc. in sum, the government has invested £80,000 to improve our facilities.’ [Headteacher of school Q]

- ‘Although our school has now been registered as a private school, it is not a real private school because a real private school does not rely on the government funding, yet we do. How much money the government gives to us [is] how much money we spend.’ [Headteacher of school Q]

- (two other extracts in Chinese)

**Government as the in facto owner**

- ‘All the funding of the school is originally from the municipal of education. The school indeed has a board of directors, yet the money of the board is from the municipal of education.’ [Senior leadership team member in school P]

**The dilemma of the owner**

- (one extract in Chinese)
| The headteacher is assigned by the government | · ‘The headteacher and deputy head are both assigned by the municipal of education’ [Senior leadership team member in school P] |
| Operating mode | · ‘The whole school internal management and teacher training mechanisms are following that of the state schools’ [Headteacher of school T] |
| · (another extract in Chinese) |
| Recruitment criteria | · ‘Our student recruitment criteria follow the state school’ [Senior leader in school P] |
| Included into the state pedagogy system (exam, teacher’s award, assessment) | · (three extracts in Chinese) |
| Teachers without ‘civil servant status (Bianzhì)’ | · ‘Our teachers are recruited by the school, rather than the government, therefore, they do not have the civil servant status’ [Senior leadership team member in school P] |
| · ‘Without the civil servant status, we do not consider ourselves as “state school teachers”.’ [Senior leader in school P] |
| · (two other extracts in Chinese) |
| Being called ‘private schools’ | · According to the business license, these schools are called ‘private school’ |
| · (one extract in Chinese) |
| Not included into the state school league table | · ‘Our school has not been included into the state school league table. Therefore, the government does not have high expectations or requirements towards our students’ exam results.’ [Senior leader in school P] |
| The school is owned by individuals | · (three extracts in Chinese) |
Sub-theme 16: the interim nature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Excerpts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government’s ‘interim’ design</td>
<td>The institutional design</td>
<td>· ‘What is strange is that when the district municipality gathers the private owners together for a meeting, it seldom talks about education. What it always talks about is what the owners cannot do for the sake of safety... What I can feel is that the municipality does not have motivation to support us to be excellent in teaching. It merely wants us not to cause any troubles. ‘Interim’ is how the government treats us. It hopes to gradually shut our schools down - although it never directly says this, we can feel it.’ [owner of school R]</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘Our business license is issued on a yearly base (rather than on multi-year base). Through this way, the government can shut us down easily. Under this kind of policy, it is impossible for us to gain the sense of security.’ [owner of school R]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘From a long-term perspective, a nature of this type of school is its interim nature. This interim period would be a long period ends with the decrease of the amount of floating people in Shanghai.’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘For this type of schools, from a long term perspective,</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
it is just an “interim mechanism”. Yet this interim mechanism might not terminate soon. This kind of school might gradually vanish when there is not much of a floating population in this area’ [Officer L]

· ‘What is not sure and what I always want to find out is “for how many more years can we exist?” This is a crucial question, because the answer to it will determine whether the government should increase the financial investment to build campus houses and to improve its facilities. But there is just no answer to this question. That makes me worried.’ [headteacher of school T]

· ‘This school is an ‘interim mechanism’ for migrant children’s schooling. If (in the future) the state schools have enough capacity to absorb all the migrant children, then our mission is accomplished, and we can return to the adult education sector. Yet before the arrival of this day, we should still work hard to recruit migrant children, to help the district municipality overcome the problem of migrant children’s schooling.’ [headteacher of school L]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions from the government</th>
<th>General restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not charging for tuition fees</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘Although our school has now been registered as a private school, it is not a real private school. Because a real private school does not rely on the government funding, yet our school does. How much money the government gives to us, how much money we use. Therefore, in many government documents, schools like ours have been given a special tag, namely, “private school for migrant children”, which means the school is not a real private one. For those real private schools, we call them “independent school”’ [Headteacher of school Q]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective difficulty</td>
<td>Codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing students</td>
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</table>

**Theme 6: registered private school**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why exist</th>
<th>The value and necessity of the school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘the essential problem is that the state school enrolment quotas are very limited, thus cannot recruit all the migrant children’ [Headteacher of school T]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘It is not appropriate to ask the migrant children to go back and study in their parents’ hometown, since their parents are working in Shanghai. If being forced to study in their parents’ hometown, these children will have no future – this generation will again lose their future. Therefore, if thinking from the government’s side, I would suggest helping these children enroll in state schools, or at least in schools like ours.’ [Senior leadership team member in school P]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· ‘If you (the government) shut down all the schools like us, (then many children would lose the chances to study and become bad guys), in the future, you should consider building more prisons.’ [Headteacher of school H]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (four extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government’s financial support</td>
<td>Tuition fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book fees</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School buildings</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quality of teaching</td>
<td>Negative aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive aspect</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theme 7: state school (specifically running for migrant children)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim</td>
<td>The aim of the school</td>
<td>· ‘Recruiting migrant children is an interim work for our school’ [Headteacher of school L]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim nature</td>
<td>As an ‘interim mechanism’ for the state school</td>
<td>· ‘The state school is the priority choice for the migrant children. But in certain periods, the state schools are not able to recruit all the migrant children, so some children come to our school. In other words, this school is an “interim mechanism” for migrant children’s schooling. If (in the future) the state schools have enough capacity to absorb all the migrant children, then our mission is accomplished, and we can return to the adult education section. Yet before the arrive of this day, we should still work hard to recruit migrant children, to help the district municipality overcome the problem of migrant children’s schooling’ [Headteacher of school L]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Teachers without ‘civil servant status (Bianzhi)’</td>
<td>· ‘The teachers without civil servant status do not have strong teacher professional capabilities and therefore have negative influence on the quality of education. They cannot realize some of the school’s norms while the teachers with civil servant status can. There is a gap between these two groups of teachers in terms of their educational principles and their ability to realize the school’s norms on teaching and management.’ [Headteacher of school L]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theme 8: unregistered informal private (UIP) school**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Extracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The nature of the schools</td>
<td>‘stepchildren’</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interim nature</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The value of the school</td>
<td>The ‘UIP school movement’</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplement of the state schools</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The legitimacy of this kind of schools</td>
<td>· ‘Yes, our school is not as good as the state schools. But it is still better than none. The government itself also recognised this.’ [Headteacher of school H]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· (another extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government’s support</td>
<td>Teacher training</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quality of teaching</td>
<td>The external comments</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The internal comments</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The parents’ comments</td>
<td>· (two extracts in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The students’ academic performance</td>
<td>The teacher’s comments</td>
<td>· (one extract in Chinese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: sample transcripts (English and Mandarin)

Note: to protect the privacy of the respondents, in the presented sample transcripts, I use random letters to replace the names of people, school and community.

Headteacher, school A

我：请介绍一下您学校里随迁子女的基本情况（学习、人际关系…）

校长：现在咱们学校是 90%外地学生。这个 90%当中呢，主要的是在我们周边打低层次工的这样的人。为什么这个学校形成这种局面呢？因为这个学校它原来是 A 厂、B 厂、C 厂，全是八十年代的一种老企业。八十年代所有的场子都倒闭了以后呢，周围的这些老、旧房子，三十年来形成了现在这种局面。这种平房啊，包括农民的宅基地啊这种房子，老百姓不住了，那么他们都在这地方有房子了，于是这地方就形成了一个特别大的租房子的区域，所以整个儿都是一些外地流动子女在这儿租房子。所以我们学校自然也就为这些孩子服务了，因为我们等于是卧在这个地区里面。从就近入学这个角度，长期二三十年形成的，我们就老是这样的一种生源。这样的话我们接收的孩子的层次主要的以卖菜的、做点儿小的什么麻辣烫啊、小超市啊、小打印店啊，以这个为主体。所以呢，这么多年呢，因为90%都是他们的孩子，所以倒没有跟北京孩子融不融洽的问题，因为他们占主体了，严格地说。咱们说句开玩笑的话，都是北京孩子跟他们合不合的问题了，是吧，因为主体已经是他们了。所以，整个儿学校就是为这些孩子服务。总体来讲，没什么问题，管理呀没什么问题。

只不过我们遇到的管理上的问题就是，还是这些外地孩子他家长的素质还是不够。然后最主要的是家长的家庭不稳定性还是特别高，比如说他生二胎的、生三胎的，这样的话呢他就无暇顾及这个孩子，忙得生那个孩子了。然后呢，这种，怎么说呢，就是说整个家长对孩子的教育重视程度还是不行，然后孩子的习惯培养比较差。他们家长一般的还是忙于生意，一般的晚上十点来钟到家，所以他们对孩子的教育就是不行。我们遇到的一个问题就是，我们老师培养孩子会感觉很疲惫。因为咱们，说实话吧，你像我们自己有孩子，孩子大了的，我们最大的感触，我们从小可能培养
HY: Please talk about the migrant children in your school generally. For example, their academic performances and social relationships, and so on.

Headteacher: Now in our school, 90% of the students are migrant. Among the migrant children, most of them are from low status labourer families living nearby. How this situation came into being? It is because the school is surrounded by factory A, factory B and factory C, all of which are old factories of the 1980s. Since the 1980s when all these factories were shut down, and the former residents left their old houses. As a result, this whole area became a place where migrant population rent houses. Therefore our school now serves for the migrant children, since it is located in this particular area. As our students are from the communities nearby, in the past twenty/thirty years the school recruits mainly the migrant children. The majority of their parents are working as, for example, selling vegetables and fruits, running a small stall or a shop, or running a small printing shop. As a result, for so many years, since 90% of our students are their children. There is not an issue of social inclusion of migrant children, because most students are migrant, seriously. This may be a joke, but the Beijing local children now need to worry whether they can get along with the migrant children, since the migrant children become the majority. In short, our school serves these children. Generally speaking, there are not big problems related to the school operation.

The only problem we have for the school operation is that the migrant parents are lacking for Suzhi [the Chinese term Suzhi refers to people’s literacy and proper behaviours]. Another main issue is that their families are not very stable. For example, some families have a second or third children. In this situation, the
parents will be busy with their new babies and will have less time to take care of their older children. Another problem is…how to say…generally the parents do not put enough importance on their children’s education, and they are not doing well in cultivating their children’s good habits. The parents are normally busy with their own businesses and often come back home at around 10pm, hence they are not doing well in their children’s education. A problem we have is that our teachers feel very tired in educating the children. Because we…to be honest, I have a child myself. When our children have grown up, we are aware that we have cultivated them by sending them to lean this and that [extra-curricular hobbies]. However the children in my school do not learn these. They do not attend these [extra-curricular hobbies] classes, because their parents do not have the money and are not aware the importance of these classes. In contrast, we send our children to learn this and that, and we accompany our children in the night to facilitate their study and to supervise them to make sure they have finished the homeworks. We also contact the teachers on a regular basis. Yet for the parents of the students in my schools, all of these…As a result, our teachers feel extremely lonely, like as if they are the only people in this school who treat education seriously. Sometimes the parents do things against [the school education]. For example, when your child has problems, you do not come to the school. What’s more, when the teacher is contacting you, you are behaving like ‘I am not going to the school!’ We have parents like this. While some parents are incapable to supervise their children, some others do not even want to supervise. As a result, the teachers have to devote more, if compared with the teachers in other schools.

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**Officer K, Shanghai**

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我：在上海，“两为主”政策的发展大体是什么样的？

K 先生：两为主啊？这个两个为主是国务院的政策吧？这个早嘞，就是大概在二零零几年的时候就开始了对吧。我们前几年就是好像是市教委出台一个关于“持有上海市居住证（还是临时居住证，我有一点忘记了）子女入学”的一个文件，那么近几年嘛..其实大部分还是在公办学校就读的呀。现
在就是对随迁子女入学设置了一定的证件的要求，有一段时间呢就设这个限制，就全纳了。那么近两三年呢开始对随迁子女的入学设置了一定的，也不叫入学条件，你像我们上海户籍的学生入学也是需要有入学的条件对吧。那么对于随迁子女呢也相应地设置了一些持证方面的一些要求。

[第一阶段] 原先我们在义务教育都是强调按户籍所在地就读，早些年的时候上海也基本上很少收随迁子女就读，公办学校一般只收上海户籍的学生。[第二阶段] 那么后来随着国家政策的改变，随迁在父母工作地就读的需求越来越高，所以我们后来就是说有一个阶段呢上海就是只要随迁子女在上海就读，我们都是满足的。[第三阶段] 近年来上海人口急剧增长，中央也提出对北上广这种特大型城市也要适度控制人口规模嘛。所以其实也不是教育方面提出的这个单个的要求，是跟着这个居住地控制人口增长规模的这个要求，随着这个一块来的。

我：您刚才提到，这两年设置入学条件可能是受到特大城市人口调控政策的影响是吧？
K 先生：对的，对的，对的。
我：那么除了这个因素以外，还有没有别的因素影响到这两年的随迁子女上学政策？
K 先生：这个其实是根据国家的政治的需要吧，我们说政治需要，这个管理思路的变化而变化。那么前几年就强调随迁子女都在那个居住地，跟着父母来都要享受同等的义务教育嘛。所以领导有这个思路嘛，就基本上采用全纳的一种方式来接受了。这样以后呢其实也是对于我们当地的教育资源也是大的一个冲击吧，就是对本地的孩子来说也带来了一定的冲击。那么这几年就是觉得再这样下去可能对我们上海来说是“不能承受之重”了，哈哈哈。随着，现在嘛正好也契合国家整体的一个对人口调控的一个大环境嘛，所以正好是这样弄的。

我：浦东教育局在推行“两为主”政策当中有没有遇到什么困难？
K 先生：困难就是资源不足呀，我们现在。前几年因为为了做好这个工作，公办学校都是扩班、扩班额，我们班额多得一个班级有五十几个咧。没有实行这个政策的时候我们都，当时上海就因为随着人口出生率的下降，当时正好有一段时间都在推行小班化教学咧。结果这个政策就是随迁子女入学零拒绝、全纳这样弄，冲击很大，不要说小班化了，班额越来越大。当时领导就说“哪怕五六十，都得收下”，所以我们有些学校班额都接近六十、五十多。还有我们学校很多的专用教室，音乐室美术室什么室都拆掉，都用来开班了。
HY: What is the development of the ‘Two Main Points’ policy in Shanghai?
Officer K: You mean ‘Two Main Points’? I think this two Main Points is a State Council policy? It started in early 2000s I think. A few years ago, the Shanghai Municipality of education promulgated a policy document on ‘the school enrolment of the children whose parents hold the residential certificate, or temporal residential certificate’ if I remember correctly. And in recent years…in fact most [of the migrant children] have enrolled in state school. Now some required criteria have been set for the migrant children’s school enrolment, while in a previous period, there was no such restrictions and all migrant children were included [into state schools]. Well, since recent two or three years, regarding the migrant children’s school enrolment, [the government] started to set some…we should not call them restrictive requirements…you see, we Shanghai local children also need to meet some requirements in order to enrol in schools.

Similarly, as for the migrant children, some requirements regarding to their parents’ certificate status have been set up.

[The first phrase] Previously in the compulsory education stage, we required the students to enrol in schools located in their household registration places. Only very few migrant children were recruited by schools in Shanghai, as the state schools normally only recruit students with Shanghai hukou. [The second phrase] In line with the changes of national policy, there were an increasing demand from the migrant children. As a result, what we did is…in a period, as long as the migrant children wanted to study in Shanghai, we met their needs. [The third phrase] In recent years Shanghai is undergoing a population boom. And the central government also proposed that the cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou should limit their population sizes in a reasonable way. Therefore [the set-up of the restrictive school enrolment criteria] is not merely because of the request from the education sector; it indeed follows the need of limiting the increasing population size in the population receiving cities.
HY: Just now you mentioned that the set-up of the schooling criteria in recent years might be a result of the changes in the super-large city population policy?
Officer K: Yes, yes, yes.
Me: Apart from this factor, are there any other factors that shape the recent years’
schooling policy for migrant children?
Officer K: It in fact follows the needs of the national politics...I mean political needs...namely follows the changes of the administrative principles. That is to say, previously the [leaders’] focus was on including migrant children into the local school system...they migrate with their parents and hence should enjoy the compulsory education equally. As the leaders had this principle, the migrant children were generally recruited [by the local educational system] in an inclusive way. As a result, it in fact brought a big challenge to the local educational resources, in other words, to the local children. Then in recent years...felt that if this situation continues, it might become ‘a weight that cannot be held’ (laugh). Along with...now it matches the national macro environment of controlling the population size, so...take this chance do it.

HY: Has the Pudong Municipality of Education met any difficulties during the implementation of the TMC policy?
Officer K: the difficulty is the lack of resources. We are now...in the past few years, in order to get the work done, our state schools have opened more classes and extended the numbers of students per class. The largest classes had more than fifty students. Before we implement the TMC policy, we...in Shanghai, there was a period that the birth rate was decreasing, and we took this chance to promote the small class size teaching practice. Yet under the TMC policy, we did not say no to the migrant children and tried to include them [into the state school]. It meant challenges for the schools, making the class size even bigger rather than smaller. In that period, our municipality leader said, ‘even if enlarging the class size to 50-60 students [per class], we still must recruit [the migrant children].’ As a result, some of our schools had the class size of nearly sixty or fifty students. In addition, many specialised classroom, such as the music or fine arts classroom, were changed into regular classroom in order to open more classes.

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**Teacher L, school M**

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我：这些孩子的学习情况怎么样?
老师：学习习惯比较差。比方说我们一年级开始就是，坐的习惯、站的习惯，这些习惯，还有学习当中读书的习惯、写字的习惯，这些习惯都是比较差。一年级因为我们没有书面作业，基本上像我们语文都是口头作业比较多，那么口头作业呢就是看小孩子的自觉性。这个当中就是女生比较自觉，因为女孩子的学习可能比较乖巧，或者说比较有灵气，或者说比较听话一点，回家能够去完成。但是男孩子呢，玩心太重了（笑）。家长有的是配合，有的是不配合，也是很明显的。配合就是说，小孩子能够完成作业的，这个小孩子的学习就是有提高。但你要觉得不管不顾，那么小孩子的学习...

我：您觉得配合的家长能够占到多大比例？

老师：大概是有三分之一吧，（还有）三分之一是特别特别基本上是不怎么配合的。

我：那么您跟家长联系，他们会回应吗？还是？

老师：也不是，你看孩子读或不读，我们在课堂上也有小练习呀，从这小练习当中就可以看出来，花功夫和不花功夫是一看就能看出来的。我们现在就是说，你对课文熟不熟？课文里面的这些字你认识不认识？很简单的一些事情。

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我：请再谈谈您对随迁子女家长的认识

老师：我们这边家长还是，不管是从学识…我觉得差距在于，对小孩子的教育的认识上面是有差距的，有些家长他就是说把小孩子扔到学校里边，就是你学校的事情了。倒也不是说他不管，他真的还是没有精力、没有这个能力去管。我了解下来，我们班级还有几个学生的家长是没有受过教育的。有的就上过一两年，然后就辍学了，因为家庭子女多嘛，然后就把上学的机会给弟弟、哥哥啊这些，农村重男轻女。然后你要让他去引导小孩子，根本不可能。他也没有这个精力，有的家长就是做生意，做个体户呀，起早摸黑，你说他有什么…还是在这种生存线上，先解决掉温饱问题、家庭生计问题。他根本就没有这个精力去管孩子。这小孩子，只要他不闯祸，就可以了。他们的要求就是这样。小孩子能识几个字，到时候能够打个工，就可以了，这就是一部分家长。

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HY: How is the migrant children’s academic performance?

Teacher L: They have poor study habits. For example, from the grade one [of
primary school] we started to…like very basic, like how to sit, how to stand – these habits. In addition, regarding study, how to read, how to write – they are poor in these habits. In grade one, we do not have written homework, therefore for subject like Chinese, we normally arrange oral homework. And the [accomplishment of] oral homework depends on the self-discipline of the children. With this regard, the girls are more self-disciplined. Because girls might be more clever and smooth, or talented, or tend to follow the instructions, hence they can complete [the homework] when they go back home. Yet the boys are so eager to play (laugh). As for the parents, some of them are cooperative, some are not cooperative – very noticeable. Cooperative means that their children complete the homework, hence the children’s study improves. But if you [the parent] feel do not want to supervise or guide [the children], then the children’s study…

HY: For you, what proportion of parents can be considered as cooperative?
Teacher L: Probably about one third. [Another] one third of them are very very…almost not cooperative at all.

HY: When you contact the parents, do they respond? Or…?
Teacher L: Not that, you can tell from whether the children have learnt or not. In the classroom teaching we have small tests, which can clearly tell whether [the children] have spent time [at home] or not. What we can tell is: are you familiar with the text book? Can you recognise the Chinese characters in the text book? All this sort of simple things.

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HY: Please tell me more about the migrant parents.
Teacher L: The parents in our school still…no matter from their knowledge… I think the gap is, their understanding of education for the children – there is a gap here. Some parents just ‘throw’ their children to the school and let the school do the remaining things. I am not saying that they do not care about their children’s study; it is really because they do not have the energy and the ability to deal with it. I have done an investigation and found that several parents in my class do not have educational experience themselves. Some got only one or two years’ education and then dropped out from the school, because they have many siblings in their families. They gave the chances of schooling to their younger brothers or older brothers – in the rural areas people do not treat women equally as men. Then you ask these parents to facilitate their children [with their study] -
it is impossible at all. They do not have the energy, as some of them are running tiny businesses, they need to get up early and finish work late – so you cannot expect them…they are still in a struggle for survival, so they need to make sure that their families get basic supplies and survive in the city. They do not have spare attention to deal with the children - as long as the children do not make trouble. That is all their expectation – their children have the basic reading ability and can do some labourer jobs later on, that is it. That’s the situation of some migrant parents in our school.

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Migrant mother Ong, school L

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我：当时在准备入学证件时，有没有遇到一些困难？
家长 Ong：现在主要就是这个社保，别的还好。现在还有它要求我们在上海租的是大房子，因为小房子如果房东就不给你出证明了，然后你就拿不到房东的房产证、身份证啊那些复印件，你就办不了的。我家里现在租的是房东的大房子，那些（证件）房东都帮我搞好了，现在主要就是我还拿不到这个长期居住证。它一直要缴满六个月，我去年十月的时候缴满了的，然后我去办我就说办长期居住证，因为我们不懂嘛，我们是外地人嘛，是吧，然后我去的时候，我就以为像这样已经成了长期居住证。现在我三个孩子在这里上学，现在又是困难时间，今天我为了这个事情我又去搞了一天，还是没搞好。因为我那个养老金中间停了两三个月嘛，现在它又不给办，它不该停的，要一直交上去的，停掉了它就不给你办了。当时那时候我不懂嘛，我以为就这样已经是长期居住证了，谁知道孩子拿到学校去又说还是临时的，我才慌起来了嘛。现在已经没办法了，今天我又去找了，又到我们派出所去，人家还是说没办法了，你必须积满六个月的金，然后你再过来。
我：您为什么会停掉呢？
家长 Ong：因为我去年工厂倒闭了，因为孩子要生活嘛，没办法，我又去进了一个小厂，进了两三个月，小厂它是不交金的。然后我现在刚刚又进了人家大企业，这个月又开始交，现在今天我又去问了，它要我现在再继续缴满六个月才可以，现在我这个老二女儿马上要上初中，已经又来不及了，又办不了了。
我：那怎么办呢？
家长 Ong: 不知道,要不给就给她五年级再留一级。那没办法,我们在老家也没地方送。现在我就是担心怕孩子上不了学。

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我：当时为什么给大女儿选了 L 学校？
家长 Ong：它就是在 XX 小学的话,毕业只能升到 YY 中学,因为我们没有交钱,就进不去了。我就选在 X 区这里外地学校嘛,也比较近嘛,然后女儿在这里报了之后又分到 L 学校那边去了,比较远的,分到那边我说没办法,也要上学,不上学那怎么办是吧,也就这样去上了。不过那里面的孙老师对我女儿都挺好的,经常打电话关心。
我：所以女儿最后是被分到 L 学校的？
家长 Ong：对,被分到那边去的,本身报名是在 xx 地区报的。

我：当时二女儿想上公办上不了，您有没有通过别的途径争取？
家长 Ong：有争取过，有争取过没办法呀，像我们外地人在这里打工有什么办法，你找人又不认识人。我打电话到 XX 小学,像前天我还打电话去,人家 XX 小学那个校长就是“这几样东西你都还不知道！到现在了你还说什么啊？！”很凶的，那个什么姓赵的，赵校长。我就问一下他/她灵活就业证是什么嘛，他/她说“到现在你还不懂，你还在问什么啊？”他/她说。
我：您认识的朋友什么也没有人能帮上忙么？
家长 Ong：我们外地人哪，那天我姐夫也讲了，去找人。去找了人人家也讲了，搞这个东西很难，搞不到的。
我：您有认识本地的朋友么（能帮上忙的）？
家长 Ong：没有，我们打工的哪里有本地的朋友，要么就房东帮你，房东不帮你你就没有办法的。

我：您觉得 L 学校怎么样？
家长 Ong：还满意的，我女儿在那里成绩还可以吧，老师也挺关心她的，一般每次考试的话基本上在班级里都是前三名、前五名的。然后他们老师又讲了，我女儿爱学画画，我又给她去参加了学画画嘛，一学期一千五百块，反正我就只要她自己喜欢什么反正我就尽力而为满足她吧。

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HY: did you and your children meet with any difficulties when trying to enrol in
state schools?
Migrant mother Ong: the main difficulty is to prepare for the social insurance certificate. The other documents are fine. It is now required that the candidates should rent big houses [standard flats]. If you rent a small house [a single room]… the landlord will not be able to issue you the certificate, which means you will not be able to get a copy of the landlord’s house owner certificate and ID and hence will fail [in meeting the government’s requirements]. My family is currently renting a big house, so our landlord has already prepared those documents for me. Currently, my only problem is that I do not have the long-term residential certificate. The policy requires the candidate to pay for the pension [the social insurance] for six months uninterruptedly. I had paid for more than six months before October last year. Then I went to apply for the long-term residential certificate…because we do not know [the process], we are non-local, you know…I thought I have met the criteria for the long-term residential certificate. Now my three children need to study here [in Shanghai], it is a difficult period – today I spent a whole day for this document but I still failed. It is because my pension was suspended for two/three months, now I am not qualified to apply [for the document]. I should not have suspended my pension, since it should be paid uninterruptedly. If the pension is suspended, then you will not be able to get the certificate. At that time, I did not know [about this consequence], I thought what I got is a long-term residential certificate. When my child submitted the certificate to the school, the school said the certificate is a temporal one. I became panicked. Now there is no way to fix it. Today I went to the police station [which is in charge of the document application] again, they still said they cannot help because I need to have paid for six months before I can get the certificate.
HY: why did you suspend [your social insurance]?
Migrant mother Ong: it was because the factory I worked went bankrupt. My family needed [money for] living, therefore I had no choice but to start working for another factory, which is a small one. The small factories do not pay social insurance for their employees. Now I just started working for another big factory and start paying [for the social insurance] from this month. Today I went to asked [the police station], and it told me to keep paying uninterruptedly for six months before I can get the certificate. However my second daughter is about to apply for junior secondary school, and we will miss the chance [for this year] again, we
will fail to get the certificate again.
HY: then are there any ways to solve this problem?
Migrant mother Ong: I do not know. Perhaps I will let her re-enrol in the grade 5 of the primary school [so that she can try an enrol in the secondary school in the next year when our documents are ready]. We have no choice, because our daughter has nowhere to go even in my hometown. I am very worried that she will not be accepted by any school.

HY: tell me the reasons why you chose school L for your older daughter.
Migrant mother Ong: the thing is, if you graduate from primary school XX, you can only enrol in secondary school YY. [However] since we have not paid for the social insurance, we are not able to enrol in school YY. [At the beginning] we were considering the migrant schools in this community because they are close, and my daughter applied. Finally she was redistributed to school L which is far away from my home. I said we have no choice [but to accept this offer], or we will lose the chance for schooling. That is how she enrolled in this school. Her teacher, Sun, treats my daughter very well and often give us phone calls.

HY: so your daughter was redistributed to school L?
Migrant mother Ong: yes, she was redistributed to this school. Her original application was made to [the schools in] the xx community.

HY: when your second daughter failed to enrol in state school, have you tried other ways?
Migrant mother Ong: I have tried, but it did not work. Non-local labourers like me do not have ways. We wanted to use our social network but we know nobody [who has any power]. I have tried to give phone call to xx primary school in the day before yesterday. [Yet] what the headteacher responded is like: ‘it was simply a few documents, yet you have not figured out! [You have already missed the chance.] Now what you have got to say?!’ A very bad attituded person – what is the person’s surname? Oh, Zhao, headteacher Zhao. I was simply asking what the ‘certificate for flexible occupation’ is, yet s/he1 just responded: ‘Why are you

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1 In Chinese, the pronunciation of ‘she’ and ‘he’ is the same. Therefore I do not know the gender of headteacher Zhao.
still asking this? How can you still do not know this [simple process]?!’ That is what s/he said.

HY: are there any friends can help?
Migrant mother Ong: we are non-local. I have asked my elder sister’s husband to find someone who can help. He did speak to someone, but that person said it is very hard and they could not help.

HY: do you have any local friends [who can help]?
Migrant mother Ong: no, we non-local labourers do not have local friends, unless your landlord is willing to help. Otherwise you will have no way.

HY: how do you feel about school L?
Migrant mother Ong: I am satisfied with this school. My daughter’s exam scores are good. The teachers are treating her well. Normally she ranks in the top 3-5 in her class in each exam. Her teacher told me that she has an enthusiasm for painting. Therefore I enrolled her on a painting course, which costs 1,500 per term. [Although I am not rich] I still try my best to fulfil my daughter’s interests.

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Migrant child Jian, school H

我：能跟我说一说你学习怎么样么？
随迁子女 Jian：不行。老分心，后面的人老笑。
我：为什么呢？
随迁子女 Jian：后面的人一有事情就笑，吵得我都没法学习，我都过去…
我一说他就笑，再转过来，他们又笑。
我：是很多人么？
随迁子女 Jian：后面那一排

我：刘老师是你们的语文老师吧，那你们班教数学的老师是谁？
随迁子女 Jian：教数学的是个女老师，我也不知道是谁。
我：她姓什么？
随迁子女 Jian：我没记下。

我：你们初一上了哪些课呀？
随迁子女 Jian：语文、数学、英语、思品、历史，还有生物、地理。
我：有化学么？
随迁子女 Jian：化学没有。我喜欢上化学。
我：你在哪里上化学？
随迁子女 Jian：在我的家教机。

我：你在班上跟哪些小朋友玩的比较好啊？
随迁子女 Jian：后面的，后面第一个…
我：是男生还是女生？
随迁子女 Jian：男生，那当然（笑）。
我：你为什么喜欢跟他玩？
随迁子女 Jian：他好玩
我：为什么？
随迁子女 Jian：我也说不清
我：很喜欢笑是吧？
随迁子女 Jian：不是很喜欢笑，他不笑，是后面的。

我：你是什么时候来北京的？是在北京出生的么？
随迁子女 Jian：不是在北京出生的，我也不知道。
我：你是在北京上幼儿园么？
随迁子女 Jian：是。
我：你觉得自己是老家人还是北京人？
随迁子女 Jian：嗯..老家话也不会说（笑），北京的会说。
我：你觉得你是北京人呢还是老家人呢？
随迁子女 Jian：当然是老家。
我：为什么？
随迁子女 Jian：在老家出生的嘛。
我：那你爸爸妈妈呢？
随迁子女 Jian：他们肯定觉得自己是老家人。

我：你平时都喜欢什么体育活动？
随迁子女 Jian：打篮球我有点不会打，刚有点练手。
我：你平时回家了都玩些什么？
随迁子女 Jian：看电视和出去找他们玩，还有一般在家里看那种童话书。
我：你出去找他们，他们是？
随迁子女 Jian：都是小学同学。
……

随迁子女 Jian：叔叔你要走了？叔叔你喝点水。叔叔再见！

HY: How is your study at school?
Migrant child Jian: Not good. I cannot concentrate [in the study], because the people sitting in the back often laugh.
HY: why?
Migrant child Jian: People sitting in the back laugh at many things, which makes noise and disturb my study. I sometimes turn round…when I start speaking, they will laugh. When I turn round again, they laugh again.
HY: Are there many of them?
Migrant child Jian: the row behind of me.

HY: I know that Mr Liu is your Chinese teacher, then who is your Maths teacher?
Migrant child Jian: The Maths teacher is a lady. I do not know who she is.
HY: Then what is her surname [how do you call her]?
Migrant child Jian: I do not remember her surname.

HY: What courses do you have in the grade one of junior secondary school?
HY: Do you have Chemistry course?
Migrant child Jian: No, we do not. But I love Chemistry.
HY: So where do you learn Chemistry?
Migrant child Jian: In my self-teaching electronic pad.
……

HY: Who are your friends in your class?
Migrant child Jian: The one sitting behind me. The first one sitting right behind me.
HY: Is it he or she?
Migrant child Jian: He, of course (laugh).
HY: Why do you like him?
Migrant child Jian: He is funny.
HY: Funny in terms of?
Migrant child Jian: It is hard to say.
HY: Is he one of those people who always laugh?
Migrant child Jian: [He does] not like laugh. He does not laugh. They are the ones behind.

HY: When did you come to Beijing? Or were you born in Beijing?
Migrant child Jian: No, I was not born in Beijing. I do not know when.
HY: Did you attend nursery in Beijing?
Migrant child Jian: Yes.
HY: Do you consider yourself as a Beijing people or your hometown people?
Migrant child Jian: Er... I do not speak the hometown dialect (laugh), yet I speak Beijing dialect.
HY: Then do you consider yourself as a Beijing people or hometown people?
Migrant child Jian: Of course hometown.
HY: Why?
Migrant child Jian: [I was] born in the hometown.
HY: How about your parents?
Migrant child Jian: I am sure they consider themselves as hometown people.

HY: What kinds of sports do you like?
Migrant child Jian: I play basketball but I am not very good at it. I just started to learn.
HY: What entertainments do you have at home?
Migrant child Jian: I watch TV and go out and play with them, and I read the fairy tales at home.
HY: You said you go out and play with ‘them’. Who are ‘they’?
Migrant child Jian: All are my primary school classmates.

Migrant child Jian: Uncle, are you leaving now? Please drink some water [before you leave]? Goodbye uncle!
Appendix 5: sample transcripts excerpts (coding)

Note: to protect the privacy of the respondents, in the presented sample transcript excerpts, I use random letters to replace the names of people, school and community.

Headteacher, school A

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HY: Please talk about the migrant children in your school generally. For example, their academic performances and social relationships, and so on.

Headteacher: Now in our school, 90% of the students are migrant. Among the migrant children, most of them are from low status labourer families living nearby. How this situation came into being? It is because the school is surrounded by factory A, factory B and factory C, all of which are old factories of the 1980s. Since the 1980s when all these factories were shut down, and the former residents left their old houses. As a result, this whole area became a place where migrant population rent houses. Therefore our school now serves for the migrant children, since it is located in this particular area. As our students are from the communities nearby, in the past twenty/thirty years the school recruits mainly the migrant children. The majority of their parents are working as, for example, selling vegetables and fruits, running a small stall or a shop, or running a small printing shop. As a result, for so many years, since 90% of our students are their children. There is not an issue of social inclusion of migrant children, because most students are migrant, seriously. This may be a joke, but the Beijing local children now need to worry whether they can get along with the migrant children, since the migrant children become the majority. In short, our school serves these children. Generally speaking, there are not big problems related to the school operation. The only problem we have for the school operation is that the migrant parents are lacking for Suzhi [the Chinese term Suzhi refers to people's literacy and proper behaviours]. Another main issue is that their families are not very stable. For example, some families have a second or third children. In this situation, the parents will be busy with their new babies and will have less time to take care of their older children. Another problem is... how to say... generally the parents do not put enough importance on their children's education and they are not doing well in...
The parents are normally busy with their own businesses and often come back home at around 10pm, hence they are not doing well in their children's education. A problem we have is that our teachers feel very tired in educating the children. Because we...to be honest, I have a child myself. When our children have grown up, we are aware that we have cultivated them by sending them to learn this and that [extra-curricular hobbies]. However the children in my school do not learn these. They do not attend these [extra-curricular hobbies] classes, because their parents do not have the money and are not aware the importance of these classes. In contrast, we send our children to learn this and that, and we accompany our children in the night to facilitate their study and to supervise them to make sure they have finished the homeworks. We also contact the teachers on a regular basis. Yet for the parents of the students in my schools, all of these... As a result, our teachers feel extremely lonely, like as if they are the only people in this school who treat education seriously. Sometimes the parents do things against [the school education]. For example, when your child has problems, you do not come to the school. What’s more, when the teacher is contacting you, you are behaving like ‘I am not going to the school!’ We have parents like this. While some parents are incapable to supervise their children, some others do not even want to supervise. As a result, the teachers have to devote more, if compared with the teachers in other schools.
HY: What is the development of the ‘Two Main Points’ policy in Shanghai?

Officer K: You mean ‘Two Main Points’? I think this two Main Points is a State Council policy? It started in early 2000s I think. A few years ago, the Shanghai Municipality of education promulgated a policy document on ‘the school enrolment of the children whose parents hold the residential certificate, or temporal residential certificate’ if I remember correctly. And in recent years, in fact most [of the migrant children] have enrolled in state schools. Now some required criteria have been set for the migrant children’s school enrolment, while in a previous period, there was no such restrictions and all migrant children were included [into state schools]. Well, since recent two or three years, regarding the migrant children’s school enrolment, [the government] started to set some...we should not call them restrictive requirements...you see, we Shanghai local children also need to meet some requirements in order to enrol in schools. Similarly, as for the migrant children, some requirements regarding to their parents’ certificate status have been set up.

[The first phrase] Previously in the compulsory education stage, we required the students to enrol in schools located in their household registration places. Only very few migrant children were recruited by schools in Shanghai, as the state schools normally only recruit students with Shanghai hukou.

[The second phrase] In line with the changes of national policy, there were an increasing demand from the migrant children. As a result, what we did is...in a period, as long as the migrant children wanted to study in Shanghai, we met their needs.

Note: the three phrases of the development of schooling criteria: restrictive – loose – restrictive. The situation in Shanghai resonate with the situation in Beijing, see the officer’s interview. I should note it in the context chapter.

Note for further analysis: check the government statistical data.

Note: the ‘2008-10 Namin school’ reform.

Note: for further analysis: it resonates with the national policy.

Note: the same as the last note. Try and look at the ‘2008-10 Namin school’ reform.
In recent years Shanghai is undergoing a population boom. And the central government also proposed that the cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou should limit their population sizes in a reasonable way. Therefore [the set-up of the restrictive school enrolment criteria] is not merely because of the request from the education sector; it indeed follows the need of limiting the increasing population size in the population receiving cities.

HY: Just now you mentioned that the set-up of the schooling criteria in recent years might be a result of the changes in the super-large city population policy?

Officer K: Yes, yes, yes.

Me: Apart from this factor, are there any other factors that shape the recent years’ schooling policy for migrant children?

Officer K: It in fact follows the needs of the national politics... I mean political needs...namely follows the changes of the administrative principles. That is to say, previously the [leaders’] focus was on including migrant children into the local school system...they migrate with their parents and hence should enjoy the compulsory education equally. As the leaders had this principle, the migrant children were generally recruited [by the local educational system] in an inclusive way. As a result, it in fact brought a big challenge to the local educational resources, in other words, to the local children. Then in recent years...felt that if this situation continues, it might become 'a weight that cannot be held' (laugh). Along with...now it matches the national macro environment of controlling the population size, so...take this chance to do it.

HY: Has the Pudong Municipality of Education met any difficulties during the implementation of the TMC policy?

Officer K: the difficulty is the lack of resources. We are now...in the past few years, in order to get the work done, our state schools have opened more classes and extended the numbers of students per class. The largest classes had more than fifty students. Before we implement the TMC policy, we...in Shanghai, there was a period that the birth rate was decreasing, and we took this chance to promote the small class size teaching practice. Yet under the TMC policy, we did not say no to the migrant children and tried to include them [into the state school]. It meant challenges for the schools, making the class size even bigger rather than smaller. In that period, our municipality leader said, 'even if enlarging the class size to 50-60 students [per class], we still must recruit [the migrant children].' As a result, some of our schools had the class size of nearly sixty or fifty students. In addition, many specialised classroom, such as the music or fine arts classroom, were changed into regular classroom in order to open more classes.

HY: [The third phrase] In recent years Shanghai is undergoing a population boom. And the central government also proposed that the cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou should limit their population sizes in a reasonable way. Therefore [the set-up of the restrictive school enrolment criteria] is not merely because of the request from the education sector; it indeed follows the need of limiting the increasing population size in the population receiving cities.

Note: [see my last note] this whole paragraph presents the differences before and after 2013, shaped by the politics and population policy. It offers a direction for my data analysis.
HY: How is the migrant children’s academic performance?

Teacher L: They have poor study habits. For example, from the grade one [of primary school] we started to...like very basic, like how to sit, how to stand – these habits. In addition, regarding study, how to read, how to write – they are poor in these habits. In grade one, we do not have written homework, therefore for subject like Chinese, we normally arrange oral homework. And the [accomplishment of] oral homework depends on the self-discipline of the children. With this regard, the girls are more self-disciplined. Because girls might be more clever and smooth, or talented, or tend to follow the instructions, hence they can complete [the homework] when they go back home. Yet the boys are so eager to play (laugh). As for the parents, some of them are cooperative, some are not cooperative – very noticeable. Cooperative means that their children complete the homework, hence the children’s study improves. But if you [the parent] feel do not want to supervise or guide [the children], then the children’s study...

HY: For you, what proportion of parents can be considered as cooperative?

Teacher L: Probably about one third. [Another] one third of them are very very...almost not cooperative at all.

HY: When you contact the parents, do they respond? Or...?

Teacher L: Not that, you can tell from whether the children have learnt or not. In the classroom teaching we have small tests, which can clearly tell whether [the children] have spent time [at home] or not. What we can tell is: are you familiar with the text book? Can you recognise the Chinese characters in the text book? All this sort of simple things.
HY: Please tell me more about the migrant parents.

Teacher L: The parents in our school still... no matter from their knowledge... I think the gap is, their understanding of education for the children – there is a gap here. Some parents just ‘throw’ their children to the school and let the school do the remaining things. I am not saying that they do not care about their children’s study; it is really because they do not have the energy and the ability to deal with it. | have done an investigation and found that several parents in my class do not have educational experience themselves. Some got only one or two years’ education and then dropped out from the school, because they have many siblings in their families. They gave the chances of schooling to their younger brothers or older brothers – in the rural areas people do not treat women equally as men. Then you ask these parents to facilitate their children [with their study] - it is impossible at all. They do not have the energy, as some of them are running tiny businesses, they need to get up early and finish work late – so you cannot expect them. They are still in a struggle for survival, so they need to make sure that their families get basic supplies and survive in the city. They do not have spare attention to deal with the children - as long as the children do not make trouble. That is all their expectation – their children have the basic reading ability and can do some labourer jobs later on, that is it. That’s the situation of some migrant parents in our school.

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Migrant mother Ong, school L

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HY: did you and your children meet with any difficulties when trying to enrol in state schools?

Migrant mother Ong: the main difficulty is to prepare for the social insurance certificate. The other documents are fine. It is now required that the candidates should rent big houses [standard flats]. If you rent a small house [a single room]... the landlord will not be able to issue you the certificate, which means you will not be able to get a copy of the landlord’s house owner certificate and ID and hence will fail [in meeting the government’s requirements]. My family is currently renting a big house, so our landlord has already prepared those documents for me. Currently, my only problem is that I do not have the long-term residential certificate. The policy requires the candidate to pay for the pension [the social insurance] for six months uninterruptedly. I had paid for more than six months before October last year. Then I went to apply for the long-term residential certificate... because we do not know [the process], we are non-local, you know... I thought I have met the criteria for the long-term residential certificate. Now my three children need to study here [in Shanghai], it is a difficult period – today I spent a whole day for this document but I still failed. It is because my pension was suspended for two/three months, now I am not qualified to apply [for the document]. I should not have suspended my pension, since it should be paid uninterruptedly. If the pension is suspended, then you will not be able to get the certificate. At that time, I did not know [about this consequence], I thought what I got is a long-term residential certificate. When my child submitted the certificate to the school, the school said the certificate is a temporal one. I became panicked. Now there is no way to fix it. Today I went to the police station [which is in charge of the document application] again, they still said they cannot help because I need to have paid for six months before I can get the certificate.

HY: why did you suspend [your social insurance]?

Migrant mother Ong: it was because the factory I worked went bankrupt.
My family needed [money for] living, therefore I had no choice but to start working for another factory, which is a small one. The small factories do not pay social insurance for their employees. Now I just started working for another big factory and start paying [for the social insurance] from this month. Today I went to asked [the police station], and it told me to keep paying uninterruptedly for six months before I can get the certificate. However my second daughter is about to apply for junior secondary school, and we will miss the chance [for this year] again, we will fail to get the certificate again.

HY: then are there any ways to solve this problem?

Migrant mother Ong: I do not know. Perhaps I will let her re-enrol in the grade 5 of the primary school [so that she can try an enrol in the secondary school in the next year when our documents are ready]. We have no choice, because our daughter has nowhere to go even in my hometown. I am very worried that she will not be accepted by any school.

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HY: tell me the reasons why you chose school L for your older daughter.

Migrant mother Ong: the thing is, if you graduate from primary school XX, you can only enrol in secondary school YY [However] since we have not paid for the social insurance, we are not able to enrol in school YY. [At the beginning] we were considering the migrant schools in this community because they are close, and my daughter applied. Finally she was redistributed to school L which is far away from my home. I said we have no choice [but to accept this offer], or we will lose the chance for schooling. That is how she enrolled in this school. Her teacher, Sun, treats my daughter very well and often give us phone calls.

HY: so your daughter was redistributed to school L?

Migrant mother Ong: yes, she was redistributed to this school. Her original application was made to [the schools in] the xx community.
HY: when your second daughter failed to enrol in state school, have you tried other ways?

Migrant mother Ong: I have tried, but it did not work. Non-local labourers like me do not have ways. We wanted to use our social network but we know nobody [who has any power]. I have tried to give phone call to xx primary school in the day before yesterday. [Yet] what the headteacher responded is like: ‘It was simply a few documents, yet you have not figured out! [You have already missed the chance.] Now what you have got to say?!’ A very bad attituded person – what is the person’s surname? Oh, Zhao, headteacher Zhao. I was simply asking what the ‘certificate for flexible occupation’ is, yet s/he just responded: ‘Why are you still asking this? How can you still do not know this [simple process]?!’ That is what s/he said.

HY: are there any friends can help?

Migrant mother Ong: we are non-local. I have asked my elder sister’s husband to find someone who can help. He did speak to someone, but that person said it is very hard and they could not help.

HY: do you have any local friends [who can help]?

Migrant mother Ong: no, we non-local labourers do not have local friends, unless your landlord is willing to help. Otherwise you will have no way.

HY: how do you feel about school L?

Migrant mother Ong: I am satisfied with this school. My daughter’s exam scores are good. The teachers are treating her well. Normally she ranks in the top 3-5 in her class in each exam. Her teacher told me that she has an enthusiasm for painting. Therefore I enrolled her on a painting course, which costs 1,500 per term. [Although I am not rich] I still try my best to fulfil my daughter’s interests.

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1 In Chinese, the pronunciation of ‘she’ and ‘he’ is the same. Therefore I do not know the gender of headteacher Zhao.
Migrant child Jian, school H

HY: How is your study at school?
Migrant child Jian: Not good. I cannot concentrate [in the study], because the people sitting in the back often laugh.
HY: why?
Migrant child Jian: People sitting in the back laugh at many things, which makes noise and disturb my study. I sometimes turn round...when I start speaking, they will laugh. When I turn round again, they laugh again.
HY: Are there many of them?
Migrant child Jian: the row behind of me.

HY: I know that Mr Liu is your Chinese teacher, then who is your Maths teacher?
Migrant child Jian: The Maths teacher is a lady. I do not know who she is.
HY: Then what is her surname [how do you call her]?
Migrant child Jian: I do not remember her surname.

HY: What courses do you have in the grade one of junior secondary school?
HY: Do you have Chemistry course?
Migrant child Jian: No, we do not. But I love Chemistry.
HY: So where do you learn Chemistry?
Migrant child Jian: In my self-teaching electronic pad.

Note for further analysis: the student does not know his teacher’s surname - this is unusual. What he says here links to what the headteacher says. The headteacher mentions that the teachers in this UIP school frequently change, due to the low salary and continuing professional development chances in the school.

Note for further analysis: his mother also mentions the self-teaching electronic pad.
HY: Who are your friends in your class?

Migrant child Jian: The one sitting behind me. The first one sitting right behind me.

HY: Is it he or she?

Migrant child Jian: He, of course (laugh).

HY: Why do you like him?

Migrant child Jian: He is funny.

HY: Funny in terms of?

Migrant child Jian: It is hard to say.

HY: Is he one of those people who always laugh?

Migrant child Jian: [He does] not like laugh. He does not laugh. They are the ones behind.

HY: When did you come to Beijing? Or were you born in Beijing?

Migrant child Jian: No, I was not born in Beijing. I do not know when.

HY: Did you attend nursery in Beijing?

Migrant child Jian: Yes.

HY: Do you consider yourself as a Beijing people or your hometown people?

Migrant child Jian: Er... I do not speak the hometown dialect (laugh), yet I speak Beijing dialect.

HY: Then do you consider yourself as a Beijing people or hometown people?

Migrant child Jian: Of course hometown.
HY: Why?
Migrant child Jian: [I was] born in the hometown.
HY: How about your parents?
Migrant child Jian: I am sure they consider themselves as hometown people.

HY: What kinds of sports do you like?
Migrant child Jian: I play basketball but I am not very good at it. I just started to learn.

HY: What entertainments do you have at home?
Migrant child Jian: I watch TV and go out and play with them, and I read the fairy tales at home.

HY: You said you go out and play with ‘them’. Who are ‘they’?
Migrant child Jian: All are my primary school classmates.

Migrant child Jian: Uncle, are you leaving now? Please drink some water {before you leave}? Goodbye uncle!
Appendix 6: consent form & Information leaflet

Consent form

Name of Project: the study of the Enactment of the “Two Main Points” Policy (TMP Policy) for the Compulsory Education of Migrant Children in Urban Areas in China: Case Studies of Beijing and Shanghai
Start and End Date: 2013 - 2017
Researcher: Hui Yu, MPhil/PhD student in Institute of Education, University of London
Contact Details: hyu02@ioe.ac.uk (9086) 13810262646

For Participants

I have read the information leaflet about the research. [ ] (please tick)
I agree to be interviewed [ ] (please tick)
(For parents) I will allow the researchers to interview my child [ ] (please tick)
(For headteachers) I will allow the researchers to observe classes in my school [ ] (please tick)

Name __________________________

Signed __________________________ date ______________

For Researcher

I have discussed the project and answered any further questions.

Researcher’s name __________________________

Signed __________________________ date ______________
Information leaflet

Name of Project: the study of ‘the Enactment of the “Two Main Points” Policy (TMP Policy) for the Compulsory Education of Migrant Children in Urban Areas in China: Case Studies of Beijing and Shanghai’

Start and End Date: 2013 – 2017

Researcher: Hui Yu, MPhil/PhD student in Institute of Education, University of London

Contact Details: hyu02@ioe.ac.uk (0086) 13810262646

Dear participants:
Please will you help with my/our research? This leaflet tells you about me and my research. I/we hope the leaflet will also be useful, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you have.

My name is Hui Yu. I am a MPhil/PhD student in the Institute of Education, University of London. This research is part of the fieldwork to collect data for my PhD thesis, which is about the enactment of the ‘Two Main Points’ Policy for the compulsory education of migrant children in urban areas in China.

The researcher will conduct semi-structured interviews, which will take approximately 1 hour each, with 50 different respondents who are involved in the TMP Policy in Beijing and Shanghai. The respondents will be drawn from 6 different compulsory education schools in which the children are aged between 6 and 15 in Beijing and Shanghai. The interview will be conducted with the headteachers, teachers, migrant students/parents, local students/parents, and government officers.

The researcher will also spend totally 100 workdays (20 weeks/5 months) on participant observation in 4 schools in Beijing and Shanghai. The researcher will spend 25 workdays in each school. The researcher intends to be a teaching assistant in one class in the schools, and to participate in related administrative affairs for migrant children, such as teachers’ meetings and parents’ meetings.

The following questions will be explored during the interviews and observations:

- How do different individuals, organizations and groups of actors interpret and enact the ‘Two Main Points’ policy in Beijing and Shanghai?
- What is the experience of different actors (the interrelationship, negotiation, contestation or struggle among them) involved in the TMP Policy?
- How and in what ways do political, economic, social-cultural and historical factors affect the ways in which individuals, organizations and groups of actors interpret and enact the policy?
- How can the differences in practice between the two chosen cities Beijing and Shanghai be explained?
I hope you will enjoy talking to me. You (and/or your children, if applicable) decide if you want to take part and, even if you say ‘yes’, you can drop out at any time or say that you don’t want to answer some questions. You have the right to withdraw at any time, without reason and without any impact on you. If you choose to do this, my interview or observation will stop immediately, and the data will be deleted. You can tell me that you (and/or your child) will take part by signing the consent form. If you have any problems with the project, please tell me.

If you agree, I will tape record some of the sessions and type them up later. I am not looking for right or wrong answers, only for what everyone really thinks.

Note to adults if study involves young children: Please would you explain the research to your child and talk over whether they want to take part. I will also ask the children during sessions and make it clear that they can drop out if they wish.

My PhD supervisor Professor Carol Vincent (e.vincent@ioe.ac.uk) will know that you have been in this research, but I will not tell them or anyone else what you tell me unless I think someone might be hurt. If so, I will talk to you first about the best thing to do.

In respect of your right of confidentiality and anonymity, I will keep tapes and notes in a safe place, and will change all the names in my reports so that no one knows who said what.

I will send you a short report by December 2017.

Participating in this research will be non-payment. I hope you will enjoy helping me. The research will mainly collect ideas to help migrant children and their families in future, and help me learn to be a researcher so that I may do more research in the future which will help other people.

The project has been reviewed by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee.

Thank you for reading this leaflet!

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While I am proud of myself for completing a PhD thesis and passing the viva, I actually feel more appreciative than a sense of pride. These accomplishments are owing to the collective support from my teachers, friends and family. Although I am not able to thank each of you in this acknowledgement, here I want to mention some of you:

I have so many words of thanks for my supervisor, Professor Carol Vincent. Here I want to simply repeat what I have said for many times: I am so lucky to be your student! You are always patient and positive with me. You are always supportive and constructive in your feedback on the work I have done or want to do. You read every sentence I write and give detailed comments in a timely manner, for which I am greatly appreciative. Your comments and advice are always practical. I am grateful for the way you managed my thesis writing progress since the beginning of my PhD. In every supervision meeting, I would write a piece of work first and send it to you a week before the meeting so that you had sufficient time to comment on it. During the meeting, we would discuss the writing in detail and after the meeting, I would revise it. This mechanism pushed me to keep writing and as a result, I produced many raw materials for my thesis, making my thesis writing up go as smoothly as possible. As a Chinese saying points out, ‘the hardest part is to get started’ (万事开头难). Once you have a plan, you should start doing it
right now – this philosophy is the most valuable insight you gave to me. I will take it with me wherever I work and in whatever I do. On the day of the viva when the examiners announced that I had passed the exam, you seemed to be more excited than me – I am a boring person! I felt that you were so happy and proud of my progress. In September 2013, I came to the IOE without any previous experience of writing in English – now I have completed a PhD thesis in English. This accomplishment is mainly owing to your help. Although I have now finished my studies and left the UK, what you taught me has become part of my mind. I will take it with me and bring it to my students. While my PhD journey has finished, my academic journey as an independent scholar is just beginning. Yet a scholar still needs a mentor - ‘one day a supervisor, lifelong mentor’. You are my mentor.

I want to thank Professor Stephen Ball for his support in the past four years: writing a reference letter for my scholarship application, being my upgrade examiner and internal thesis reader. I have attended some of your lectures and was deeply motivated by your original thoughts on educational policy and social justice. I also enjoyed the way in which you organise your lectures to make them concise and clear. The most valuable gift you have offered to me, and to academia, is your original contributions to policy sociology. Adopting the critical policy study approach in my PhD thesis, I will further extend it in my future studies.

I also want to thank Dr Christin Han for working as my upgrade
examiner. The advice you offered was very useful for the development of my thesis.

While the viva is an examination, I take it as the greatest peer review practice, instead of merely an examination. For me, the viva is an opportunity to have conversations with two prestigious scholars in my field who have read my whole thesis. Here I want to thank my viva examiners, Professor Louise Archer and Professor Pat Thomson. I appreciate your help with reading through the whole thesis and offering valuable advice. Your advice has made this thesis a better piece of work. Furthermore, I really enjoyed our conversations in the viva. This experience has become one of the greatest memories in my life. Thank you for being involved in the last and most important part of my PhD journey!

My thesis project could not have been developed without the help of the fieldwork respondents in Beijing and Shanghai, together with the people who connected me to the respondents. You generously shared your stories with me and I enjoyed sharing your experiences, happiness and sadness. These stories shaped my understanding of rural migrant labour families and education. With your involvement, the fieldwork became a unique experience in my academic life. Respecting your privacy, I do not list your names here to acknowledge your contributions. I am sure you understand that I do appreciate your help and contributions to the thesis.
I joined the ‘Shut-up & write’ group when I started writing up my thesis. I met so many lovely people here: Annika, Miriam, Josephine, Maria, Lauren, Laela, Dorothy… The idea of the group is that you spend several hours just sitting down, not talking, and writing something. This is my best experience of peer support: we ‘supervise’ each other (no talking, no Facebook, etc.) and cheer together at the end of each session. I enjoyed the sense of achievement at the end of the working day. Thanks to Annika for setting up this group. Thanks to Miriam for the administrative work you did. Now I have ‘graduated’ from the group, in the meantime, I have lost the chance to further develop my thesis. I am a little bit envious of you for having the possibility to develop your theses differently. I hope all of you enjoy writing and making contributions to knowledge! In the future when I become a teacher, I will definitely introduce the SU&W to my students.

There is a lovely Bourdieu reading group here at the IOE: Sara, Manuela, Jiexiu, Felipe, Solomon, Sarah, Fiona, Khan, Hanna... Bourdieu is the main theoretical resource for my thesis. Our discussions in the group are meaningful and thoughtful, producing implications for my use of Bourdieu in the thesis. More importantly, here I met so many lovely people working in sociology and we have had many nice conversations. For me, attending each reading session is enjoyable and relaxing. I appreciate the work that Sara, Manuela and Fiona have done to organise the reading schedule and provide reading materials.
Being my undergraduate and master’s supervisor, Professor Fuxing Liu has always cared about my study progress. In winter 2013 when you visited the UK, you gave me advice on the thesis theoretical framework on the train to Oxford. I still keep a record of all your advice. Some of your advice has been developed as contents in my thesis and others have given me directions for my future study.

Dr Shuiyun Liu is the person who introduced the IOE to me. As an alumna, you shared with me your own experiences of doing a PhD at the IOE, which facilitated my study progress a lot. Having conversations with you is a lot of fun and is very beneficial to me. You told me that when organising our time management, we should start from the endpoint. That is to say, to have a clear final deadline first and then trace back to the deadlines of each stage. This technique helped me in planning my PhD timetable. As a result, I managed the past four years efficiently.

I met Steven and Lucia when I just started my PhD. I received lots of help from you when we were working together on the LRE special issue and the book *New Directions for Education in China*. As my ‘old’ friend, Steven always gives me frank advice. As a British scholar, you have great passion in the study of Chinese education and have contributed a lot from a Western perspective. I am sure your contributions will be recognised by Chinese academia and I am sure I will meet you again in China someday. Lucia, I really appreciate your work on proofreading the thesis. Your work is very special for me. That is to say, you are one of the six people in the
world who have read through my whole thesis - the others are me, my supervisor, internal reader, and two viva examiners. You have made every sentence more beautiful.

In the past three years, I and my wife Wei-Lin Huang have been fighting and struggling for our PhD theses together. We started our PhDs in the same year and submitted our theses in the same year. We are a couple who enjoy sitting face-to-face or next to each other in cafés to write. I guess not many couples have the same experience of being so attached to one another and writing for three years - and there will be more in the future! Most of our thesis chapters were written in the Blooms Café (on the long table in the second floor), Café Nero (near Tottenham Court Road) and the Goodenough College Library (which we could not stay in for too long because of the uncomfortable chairs). During the winter, after a whole day’s writing, we sometimes walked to Chinatown to buy ingredients to make a hotpot. When we completed a chapter, we would celebrate by travelling. The café, the hotpot and the trips are unforgettable memories in London, which are exclusive to us. Both being doctors, it can sometimes be hard for us to agree with each other. As a result, every day we spent two hours debating, debating everything. During these debates, we learnt to be tolerant of one another and to understand each other’s viewpoints. And we know that it is the power of love that can bring these two very different people together and to care for each other. The end of the PhD is the beginning of our new life. We
are going to do the same things for the rest of our lives: researching, eating, travelling, and debating together.

I grew up in a family with two big bookcases in the house. The books in the bookcases are mostly novels, history and Chinese literature (my mother’s university textbooks). Among them, my favourite ones are the novels, especially *Le Comte de Monte-Cristo* and *Shui Hu Zhuan*, and a nature & history encyclopaedia for pupils. Although I have never touched most of the books on the shelves, the presence of the bookcases constantly reminded me of the existence of a spiritual world outside our mundane lives. I became curious about this world of knowledge. Perhaps this curiosity for knowledge is one of the roots of my later motivation for doing a PhD and living an academic life. In this sense, the bookcases in my house can be seen as what Bourdieu called the objectified state of cultural capital. My parents know little about my subject, yet their appreciation of knowledge and the people who own knowledge motivates me to be a scholar. From them, I have learnt to be curious, to be open, and to do what I enjoy and am good at.

For me, these acknowledgements are not merely a practice of looking backwards, but also a practice of looking forwards. By reviewing the encouragement, support, help and love that I received in my PhD life, I have stronger motivation to move forward in my study of educational policy. I know there will always be someone who cares about me and will go together with me.


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