UNTANGLING THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION POST-LISBON:
A COMPETENCE/REMEDY MODEL

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Abstract
The aim of this article is to shed light on the legally important and politically sensitive question of the respective responsibility of the European Union and its Member States for the performance of WTO obligations. Specifically, it seeks to challenge two propositions often found in the literature on the basis of a rigorous analysis of WTO dispute settlement practice. First, the claim that EU’s exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law by its Member States has been widely accepted by other WTO members and dispute settlement organs is not well grounded in existing WTO jurisprudence, nor supported by recent post-Lisbon WTO dispute settlement practice. Second, and contrary to what some EU law scholars appear to suggest, what has been decisive in assigning international responsibility in the WTO is not the division of external (treaty-making) competences between EU and Member States but, rather, the allocation and exercise of internal (treaty-infringing/treaty-performing) competences. In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty has not fundamentally changed how the issue of EU/Member States international responsibility is to be approached in the WTO, insofar as the Member States remain members of that organization in their own right. With this in mind, a redefined ‘competence/remedy’ model is put forward to help us untangling ‘who is responsible’ to third parties for breaches of WTO law.

1. Introduction

This article revisits the legally important and politically sensitive question of how the unique position of the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) as full members of World Trade Organization (WTO) has affected their respective responsibility for the performance of WTO obligations. As is the case for any other ‘mixed’ agreement, this joint EU/MS membership of the WTO inevitably prompts the question of ‘who is responsible’ towards third parties for breaches of WTO law. The question of the EU’s international responsibility
vis-à-vis that of its Member States has been the subject of intense study in the past years, partly due to the increasingly prominent role of the Union on the international scene but also due to the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO). And yet within this broader debate, the WTO is often presented in the scholarship as providing both an ‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ case-study.

Not only is the WTO one of the rare international fora in which the EU can fully participate as a party in dispute settlement proceedings, but the Union –perhaps not surprisingly as one of the world’s leading trade powers– has actually been one of the key players in the WTO dispute settlement system: out of the total 522 disputes that have been brought for resolution to the WTO since 1995, the EU (alone or jointly with its MS) has participated in 339 of them. Moreover, this active participation of the EU in the WTO dispute settlement system has been praised as constituting an example of its international actorness and leadership: in fact, the Union has been eager to come forward as single litigant and to assume sole responsibility in WTO disputes, even for alleged breaches by its Member States. Against this background, it has been argued that WTO dispute settlement practice shows how the duty of cooperation (Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)) has allowed the EU to speak with one unified voice, with that voice being the European Commission as porte-parole for the Union.

The aim of this article is not to dispute this prevalent view that the Union’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement system has largely been a ‘success story’. Rather, it is to address two critical questions which have not been, in the author’s view, convincingly addressed in the prevailing scholarship. First, to what extent have third parties in the WTO

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1 See e.g., A. Delgado Casteleiro, *The International Responsibility of the European Union – From Competence to Normative Control* (2016); E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), *The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and International Perspectives* (2013); and further references in part 2 below.


accepted this EU’s eagerness to assert its exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law by its Member States? And second, which role (if any) has the division of EU/MS competences under EU law played on determinations of international responsibility in the WTO dispute settlement system?

In order to do so, the article proceeds as follows. Part 2 sets out the scene by outlining the theoretical questions of international responsibility stemming from the parallel EU/MS membership of the WTO against the ARIO framework. As will be seen, the knotty point has been since the ARIO discussions whether and to what extent the ‘rules of the organisation’ – and in particular, the delimitation of EU/MS competences under EU law– should be the decisive criterion for determining their respective international responsibility in the WTO. Against this background, Part 3 turns to analyse how this issue has been tackled in the practice of the WTO dispute settlement system. Drawing upon this in-depth analysis of practice, the article seeks to accomplish two main objectives. First, it will be argued that the proposition that EU’s exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law by its Member States has been accepted, ‘by and large’\(^6\), by other WTO members and dispute settlement organs is an overstatement. This is because there is no (as of yet) well-established authoritative WTO jurisprudence on this sensitive matter, while joint complaints against the EU and its Member States have relatively increased following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 and have concerned matters falling within both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ common commercial policy (CCP).\(^7\) This fact shows that the question of who is responsible for breaches of WTO law has not been settled in a post-Lisbon context, but if anything has become increasingly unclear to third parties. It is therefore necessary to shed further light on the impact that the division of EU/MS powers under EU law has had on determinations of international responsibility in WTO dispute settlement practice, which is the second aim of the article.

With this in mind, Part 4 suggests a redefined ‘competence/remedy’ model to assist our understanding of how EU competence rules have influenced the approach to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. Significantly, this departs from the ‘competence

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\(^7\) Article 207(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2010] C83/49, extending the scope of the CCP from trade in goods (‘old’) to trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct investment (‘new’).
model’ proposed by Kuijper and Paasivirta (and endorsed by other EU law scholars) in one crucial point. Contrary to what they appear to suggest, it is not the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) competences between EU and Member States that is of primordial importance for the purpose of assigning international responsibility in the WTO. Rather, it is the division and exercise of internal (treaty-infringing/treaty-performing) competences and here, as will be seen, the Union does not have exclusive regulatory powers for all areas covered by WTO law even post-Lisbon. This is because, from the perspective of providing juridical restitution (i.e., the WTO preferred remedy), what matters is who (i.e., the EU, its Member States, or both) has the actual power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent, whereas the allocation of external competences under EU law is largely irrelevant to answer this question. Accordingly, the fact that the EU has acquired exclusive external competence for quasi all WTO matters by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty has not fundamentally altered how the question of EU/MS international responsibility is to be approached in the WTO. So long as the EU Member States remain members of that organization in their own right, it is the allocation and exercise of internal regulatory powers between the EU and its Member States that is key in deciding who is responsible for breaches of WTO law. Part 5 concludes.

2. EU/MS Joint Membership in the WTO and Questions of Responsibility

A. WTO Agreement as a ‘Mixed’ Agreement

As is well-known, the (umbrella) Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (or WTO Agreement) was jointly concluded by the EU and its Member States following the famous Opinion 1/94, where the EU Court of Justice ruled that the Union had exclusive

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8 This ‘competence model’, with specific reference to the WTO dispute settlement system, is proposed by Kuijper and Paasivirta, supra note 6, at 54-63, and further discussed in part 4 below. This seems also to be the position of the European Commission: see further part 2 below.

9 Except for transport services (Article 207(5) TFEU). With regards to the TRIPS Agreement, see confirmation in: Case 414/11, Daiichi, judgement of 18 July 2013 (not yet reported), paras. 45-61. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess whether, as matter of EU law following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the WTO agreement could now be concluded as an EU-only agreement, notwithstanding the exclusion of transport services from the common commercial policy: on this point, see P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edition, 2011), chapter 2; and F. Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union’s Common Commercial Policy a year after Lisbon—Sea Change or Business as Usual?’ in P. Koutrakos (ed), The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon (2011) 83, at 83-84.


competence to conclude only the multilateral agreements on trade in goods (Annex 1A), whereas such external competence was shared with the Member States in relation to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This is reflected in Article XI:1 WTO Agreement, which refers to the EU (then ‘European Communities’) and its Member States as full ‘original members’ in their own right. Like for any other so-called ‘mixed’ agreement, this joint EU/MS membership of WTO inevitably prompts the question as to ‘who is responsible’ towards third parties in situations of non-performance. However, unlike other multilateral ‘mixed’ agreements concluded by the EU, the WTO Agreement does not contain any ‘Declaration of Competences’, and thus there is no indication as to which part of the WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements) binds the Union and which the Member States.

In other words, there is no express delimitation of their respective responsibility in relation to the performance of WTO obligations. This state of affairs has been maintained after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, even though the scope of EU exclusive powers under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) now encompasses quasi all WTO matters.

Against this silence in the WTO Agreement, the general rules of international responsibility as codified by the International Law Commission provide that the existence of an internationally wrongful act entailing international responsibility depends on the twin conditions of breach of an international obligation and attribution of conduct. For our purposes, this raises two questions: (i) how to apportion international obligations as between the EU and its Member States under a ‘mixed’ treaty such as the WTO Agreement; and (ii)

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12 For the benefit of simplification, this chapter will refer to the European Union only, even though Opinion 1/94 concerned the then ‘European Community’, and indeed it is the ‘European Communities’ that formally became a member of the WTO (see Article XI:1 WTO Agreement).


16 Supra note 8.


18 Article 2 ARS; Article 4 ARIO.
when will conduct\textsuperscript{19} of the EU Member States which violates WTO law be attributed to the Union (and vice-versa). A sticking point in the discussions leading up to the drafting of the ARIO was, however, whether the ‘rules of the organisation’ – and in our specific case, the delimitation of EU/MS competences under EU law – should play a role in determining the respective international responsibility of an international organisation and its members. While it is not the place here to paint a complete portrait of this theoretical debate,\textsuperscript{20} the main diverging positions will be briefly outlined below as a backdrop to the subsequent analysis of practice in the WTO dispute settlement system.

B. \textit{Question of Apportionment of Obligations}

As they currently stand, the general rules of international responsibility do not specifically address the question of how to determine the respective obligations of an international organisation and its members in cases where both are parties to an international treaty, such as the WTO Agreement for the EU and its Member States.\textsuperscript{21} In this respect, the European Commission’s position, as elaborated in its submissions on the ARIO to the ILC, has been that the question of apportionment of international obligations should be ‘entirely determined by the rules of the organisation, since these rules define the tasks and powers of the organisation which possesses its own international legal personality, vis-à-vis those of the member States.’\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the EU takes the view that apportionment of obligations ‘is really the primary question’ and should be clearly distinguished from the secondary question of attribution of conduct.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} In this paper, the term ‘conduct’ is interchangeably used with the term ‘measure’, which in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system equally means ‘any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member’: WTO, \textit{US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review – Report of the Appellate Body}, 9 January 2004, WT/DS244/AB/R, para 81.


\textsuperscript{21} See Article 11 ARIO; Articles 12-13 ARA.

\textsuperscript{22} ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organisations – Comments and Observations received from International Organisations’, Doc A/CN.4/545, dated 25 July 2004 [hereinafter, ARIO Comments 2004], at 26 (para. 2). This seems also the view taken by Advocate General Mischo in Case C – 13/00 \textit{Commission v Ireland} [2002] ECR I-2923, para. 30 of the Opinion; as well as by Paasivirta and Kuijper, \textit{supra note 20}, at 216.

\textsuperscript{23} ARIO Comments (2004), \textit{supra note 22}, at 26 (para. 3).
Applying this line of reasoning to the case of the WTO, this would mean looking at EU rules on the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) powers in order to determine whether a particular WTO obligation has been entered into by the Union or its Member States. In a pre-Lisbon context, this would have been an strenuous task given the dynamic and blurry delineation of external competences, and it was hardly realistic to expect WTO dispute settlement organs to engage with such complex questions of EU law, nor does it seem desirable from the perspective of safeguarding the ‘autonomy’ of the EU legal order. Arguably, this issue has now become less complicated with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, by virtue of which the Union has acquired exclusive external competence for virtually all matters presently regulated by WTO law. Following the Commission’s view, this would imply that, as the sole bearer of WTO obligations in a post-Lisbon setting, only the EU is capable of incurring international responsibility in the WTO. If this is so, there would be no need to consider the question of attribution: for the Commission, it is impossible that a wrongful act can still be attributed to the EU Member States, once it has been established they are no longer carriers of the relevant WTO obligations. Even if one accepts that this proposition is true as a matter of EU (competence) law, it is not equally valid under public international law.

From an international law perspective, so long as both the EU and its Member States remain parties to the WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), the presumption is that they are each bound by all obligations therein and may not invoke internal rules as justification for non-performance, unless it is otherwise agreed in the treaty or in situations covered by Article 46 VCLTIO. However, as already mentioned, there is no ‘Declaration of Competences’ or any other textual basis in the WTO Agreement for apportioning obligations and responsibility as between the EU and its Member States. In addition, it is doubtful that

24 For a similar view, see Eeckhout, supra note 5, at 459.
25 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU.
26 ARIO Comments (2004), supra note 22, at 26, para. 4-5, applying this reasoning to customs matters.
28 This flows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, 21 March 1986 (not yet in force) [hereinafter, VCLTIO].
29 Article 27 VCLTIO.
30 The only caveat to be noted in this regard is the GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments: the EU schedule currently in force (GATS/SC/31) only covers the 12 Member States in 1994, while the consolidated schedule negotiated following EU enlargements has not yet entered into force: see WTO, ‘Communication from the European Communities and its Member States – Draft Consolidated GATS Schedule’ (S/C/W/273), 9 October 2006. At the time of writing, the 16 Member States that acceded to the EU after 1994 are still bound by their individual Schedules of Specific Commitments, which has implications not only for their market access obligations (Article XVI GATS), but also other obligations in the GATS that are applicable only to the extent
Article 46 VCLTIO could be invoked in this case: given the ambiguity as to the division of treaty-making competences between the EU and its Member States prevailing at the time when the WTO Agreement was concluded, a violation of these rules could not have been ‘manifest’ (i.e., objectively evident) to third parties. Consequently, this author shares the majority view in the academic literature that the EU and its Member States are jointly bound by all provisions of WTO law, and as will be seen, this has been also the position taken by WTO dispute settlement organs. However, this does not mean that there will be joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for breaches of WTO law in each and every case. This is because being bound by the same WTO obligation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States. In the logic of the system of international responsibility as codified by the ILC, a breach of an obligation needs to be supplemented by attribution, and therefore the key question is whether the WTO-infringing conduct is attributable to the EU and/or its Member States.

C. Question of Attribution of Conduct

that a WTO member has undertaken specific commitments in its Schedule (notably, Article XVII GATS on national treatment, as well as e.g., Article VI:1 and VI:5 GATS on domestic regulation).

31 Article 46(2) VCLTIO provides: ‘An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance.’ Article 46(3) VCLTIO further states: ‘A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State or any international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal practice of States and, where appropriate, of international organizations and in good faith.’ (emphasis added).

32 For a similar view, see Eeckhout, supra note 5, at 451; and E. Steinberger, ‘The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s and the Member States’ Membership of the WTO’ 17 EJIL (2006) 837, at 842-848 and 856-857. For a different view, see M. Björklund, ‘Responsibility of the EC and the Member States for Mixed Agreements – Should Non-Member Parties Care?’ 70 NJIL (2001) 373, at 388-402.


34 See further part 3 below.

Unlike for the issue of apportionment, the general rules of international responsibility deal specifically with the attribution of conduct to an international organisation.\textsuperscript{36} Article 6 ARIO provides that conduct of an organ or agent of an international organisation shall be attributed to it, while Article 7 ARIO extends such an attribution to the organisation for the conduct of an organ of a State in cases where it is ‘placed at the disposal of’ the organisation and if the latter exercises ‘effective control’ over such conduct. However, the European Commission and some EU law scholars have argued that these attribution rules are not flexible enough to accommodate the distinctive features of the Union’s constitutional structure and functioning.\textsuperscript{37}

This concern is not entirely misplaced, as applying the ARIO rules on attribution to the EU/MS relationship would considerably limit the situations in which the Union incurs (sole) responsibility for breaches of WTO law.\textsuperscript{38} Due to the multilevel and decentralised implementation of most areas of EU law (i.e., so-called ‘executive federalism’),\textsuperscript{39} EU organs directly implement only a limited (even if important) segment of the CCP: namely, trade defence measures,\textsuperscript{40} which are clearly attributable to the Union pursuant to Article 6 ARIO. For other areas of the CCP, the Union is largely dependent on its Member States to execute EU law, and thus national authorities are likely to be more visible to third parties as the factual actor of an alleged WTO breach. Customs administration constitutes the most obvious example of this special character of the Union’s ‘executive federalism’: even though this is a core EU exclusive competence, there is no EU customs service but 28 national customs administrations that implement (directly applicable) EU customs legislation. In this sense, it is true that the EU’s \textit{modus operandi} is different to that of traditional international organizations that mainly conduct their action through their own organs or agents as reflected in Article 6 ARIO.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{36} Chapter II ARIO.
\textsuperscript{37} See e.g., Kuijper and Paasivirta, \textit{supra} note 6, at 69.
\textsuperscript{38} Note that Chapter IV ARIO provides for a number of situations in which the responsibility of an international organization may arise in connection with the act of a State, presumably \textit{without} attribution, including where the international organization ‘aids or assist’ a State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act (Article 14) or ‘circumvents one of its international obligations’ through decisions or authorizations addressed to its members (Article 17), which could be arguably applicable to the EU/MS relationship. However, unlike Articles 6-7 ARIO where responsibility through attribution seems to be a ‘black-or-white’ question (i.e., either the organization or the State), Chapter IV ARIO appears to create an additional layer of responsibility for the organization without prejudice to that of the State (Article 19), leading therefore to joint responsibility. See further, Hoffmeister, \textit{supra} note 6, at 727 and Nollkaemper, \textit{supra} note 34, at 323-324.
\textsuperscript{40} Article 291(2) TFEU; see Hoffmeister, \textit{supra} note 6, at 740.
\textsuperscript{41} Paasivirta, \textit{supra} note 19, at 456-457.
As the European Commission aptly noted in its comments to the ILC, ‘[t]he fact that the implementation of [EU] law, even in areas of its exclusive competence, is normally carried out by the member States and their authorities, poses the question as to … when the [EU] as such is responsible not only for acts committed by its organs, but also for actions of the member States and their authorities.’\textsuperscript{42} Yet, it is commonly accepted that Article 7 ARIO does not provide an appropriate basis for attributing acts of the Member States when implementing EU law to the Union: its ‘normative control’\textsuperscript{43} over the conduct of Member States is generally considered to fall short of the ‘effective control’ test in that provision.\textsuperscript{44} Alternatively, the EU would need to constantly rely on the exception provided for in Article 9 ARIO so as to ‘acknowledge and adopt’ conduct of its Member States as its own.\textsuperscript{45}

That being so, it is understandable to some extent that the European Commission pressed for a special rule of attribution of internationally wrongful acts during the ILC codification process,\textsuperscript{46} which was initially opposed by the Special Rapporteur Gaja and eventually led to the introduction of Article 64 ARIO on \textit{lex specialis}. It reads:

These draft articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of an international organization … are governed by special rules of international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the \textit{rules of the organization} applicable to the relations between an international organization and its members.\textsuperscript{47}

Whereas Article 64 ARIO leaves open the possibility that the general rules on attribution, and hence responsibility, may be set aside in the case of the EU and its Member States, it does specify which ‘rules of the organization’ may instead become relevant in this respect. As seen earlier for the question of apportionment, the European Commission considers that the

\textsuperscript{42} ARIO Comments (2004), \textit{supra note 22}, at 29 (para. 3).
\textsuperscript{43} Hoffmeister, \textit{supra note 6}, at 742, suggests that there are two conditions for determining ‘normative control’ of the Union for the purpose of international responsibility: (i) EU law governs the substantive legality of Member State action; (ii) this is ultimately controlled by the EU judiciary. This approach is borrowed by Kuijper and Paasivirta, \textit{supra note 6}, at 55; and Nollkaemper, \textit{supra note 34}, at 335.
\textsuperscript{44} ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries’ (2011) [hereinafter, ARIO Commentary 2011], at 20-26, reflecting it was mainly intended to codify rules on the responsibility of international organizations for military operations using forces of its members. See also, Hoffmeister, \textit{supra note 6}, at 726-727; Nollkaemper, \textit{supra note 34}, at 331.
\textsuperscript{45} For a criticism, see Paasivirta and Kuijper, \textit{supra note 20}, at 217.
\textsuperscript{46} For a more detailed account, see Hoffmeister, \textit{supra note 6}, at 728-729.
\textsuperscript{47} The commentary thereto explicitly records that there is a variety of opinions concerning the possible existence of a special rule with respect to the attribution to the EU of conduct of the Member States when they implement binding acts of the Union: see ARIO Commentary 2011, \textit{supra note 43}, at 100; and Hoffmeister, \textit{supra note 6}, at 728-729.
division of external competences under EU is equally decisive for the purpose of attributing conduct. Drawing on its statements in the WTO case EC – Computer Equipment (1998) discussed below, the Commission posits that acts of Member States’ authorities when implementing EU law in a field of EU exclusive (external) competence should be attributed to the Union itself. According to Hoffmeister, this would follow from Article 2(1) TFEU containing ‘a strong indication that in areas of exclusive external Union competence [such as the CCP] action of either Union institutions or the Member States should be attributed to the Union, as only the Union has the legal power to act in this field and to remedy a potential breach of international law.’ Moreover, he suggests that Article 64 ARIO should be invoked, if necessary, to defend this (external) competence-based approach to attribution and international responsibility.

The problem of attribution of Member States’ conduct to the Union should be further refined, though. In support of its position, the Commission often relies on the example of customs legislation, which is a purely external matter and extensively harmonised though EU Regulations that are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the Member States. Put differently, EU customs legislation clearly instructs what the Member States have to do and they have no choice but to implement it. In these particular circumstances where Member States’ conduct is strictly confined to implementing EU law, it is not difficult to accept that national customs authorities act de facto as organs of the Union. Yet importantly, this perfect example of EU executive federalism is not necessarily applicable to all areas covered by WTO law. As we move away from tariffs and customs matters, the relationship between the EU and its Member States becomes in fact more complex than the Commission suggests. Part of the reason for this is that the exclusive EU external competence under the CCP is not, unlike Hoffmeister posits, fully matched by an exclusive competence to regulate internally in every field covered by WTO law. As Eeckhout rightly points out, the taxation of products provides a case in point: externally, such taxation is subject to Article III GATT falling under exclusive CCP powers, whereas internally Member States retain competence for certain forms of taxation that are not fully harmonised or even regulated at EU level. When Member

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48 See section 3.B below.
49 ARIO Comments (2004), supra note 22, at 29 (para. 5).
50 Hoffmeister, supra note 6, at 743 (emphasis added); and Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(e) TFEU.
51 Hoffmeister, supra note 6, at 745-746; similarly see Kuijper and E. Paasivirta, supra note 6, at 69.
52 Article 288 TFEU.
53 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54 Eeckhout, supra note 5, at 460-461.
States impose such taxes through independent national legislation, they can hardly be regarded as functionally acting as organs of the Union.

Similar doubts may arise in other ‘grey areas’ where, even though Member States do act within the scope of EU law, the degree of the Union’s normative control over their conduct is more limited than in the context of implementing EU Regulations. One example is State aid, which is subject to WTO disciplines on subsidies: unlike classical executive federalism, EU Member States are not here acting to execute a certain harmonised EU rule, but rather individually providing aid within certain boundaries set by EU law. In addition, the link between Member States’ conduct and EU law may not always be straightforward when they act to implement EU Directives, as these are only binding with respect to the aim(s) pursued but leave some discretion as to the form and method of implementation, and thus a varied application is likely to result across EU Member States. Moreover, particularly in the fields of consumer and environmental protection, it is not uncommon for the EU to adopt so-called minimum harmonisation Directives setting out standards that national legislations must meet but may exceed if a given Member State so desires. One significant example in light of the on-going WTO dispute Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging are the UK and Irish legislations on standardised packaging of tobacco products, which go beyond the requirements of the EU Tobacco Products Directive. The question thus arises as to

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55 The term ‘scope of EU law’ is here used to refer to encompass Member States’ action not only when implementing EU law sensu stricto (e.g., fully binding and directly applicable EU Regulations), but when acting under the normative umbrella of the EU Treaties in a broader sense (e.g., providing State aid within the boundaries set by EU law): similarly see, Hoffmeister, supra note 6, at 741.

56 Articles 107(2) and (3) TFEU stipulate the conditions under which State aid, otherwise prohibited under Article 107(1) TFEU, may be considered ‘compatible with the internal market’. Article 108(3) TFEU requires Member States, as a general rule, to notify new State aid measures to the European Commission and they may only put these measures into effect after obtaining the Commission’s approval. However, there are some exceptions to this requirement of prior notification/approval (e.g., State aid covered by the so-called ‘Block Exemption’ Regulations and de minimis aid).

57 Article 288 TFEU.

58 This is in line with Articles 169(4) and 193 TFEU.

59 WTO, Australia — Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Procedural Arrangement between Australia and Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Indonesia, 28 April 2014, WT/DS434/12, WT/DS435/17, WT/DS441/16, WT/DS458/15, WT/DS467/16.

60 WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification by the United Kingdom’ (G/TBT/N/GBR/24/Add.1), 2 October 2015; ‘Notification by Ireland’ (G/TBT/N/IRL/1/Add.2), 20 June 2016.

61 Council/EP Directive 2014/40/EU [2014] L127/1. Article 24(2) specifically allows Member States to introduce further requirements in relation to the standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products, provided they are justified on grounds of public health, are proportionate and are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
whether such a restricted EU normative authority over Member States’ conduct may be enough to attribute it to the Union for the purposes of international responsibility.\textsuperscript{62}

Against this background, the next part turns to analyse how the WTO dispute settlement system has tackled the joint membership of the EU and its Member States: have these theoretical questions of responsibility been a controversial issue in practice? Or conversely, have third parties in the WTO \textit{de facto} accepted the EU’s assertion of exclusive responsibility for all breaches of WTO law, even by its Member States?

3. \textbf{Revisiting EU/MS Responsibility in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice}

A. \textit{The Broad Picture}

At a first glance, the joint EU/MS membership of the WTO appears hardly visible in dispute settlement practice. As reflected in Table 1 below, the EU undoubtedly stands out as one of the most active users of the WTO dispute settlement system: out of the total 522 disputes that have been brought for resolution to the WTO since 1995,\textsuperscript{63} the Union (alone) has participated either as a complainant (97), a respondent (70) or third party (162) in 329 of them. By way of comparison, the United States (US), as the other key player in the WTO dispute settlement system, has participated in a total of 380 WTO cases.\textsuperscript{64} In contrast, the EU Member States (individually) have played a minimal and passive role in WTO dispute settlement:\textsuperscript{65} to date, none has initiated a dispute against a third country\textsuperscript{66} or intervened as a third party in any

\textsuperscript{62} This seems to be the position taken by Hoffmeister. \textit{supra note 6}, at 746, suggesting the following special rule of attribution: “[t]he conduct of a State that executes the law or acts under the normative control of a regional economic integration organization may be considered an act of that organization under international law, taking account of the nature of the organization’s \textit{external} competence and its international obligations in the field where the conduct occurred.” (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{65} The lack of active litigation by EU Member States in the WTO dispute settlement system may be due to purely political/institutional reasons, but may also be explained by legal constraints resulting from EU law, and in particular the duty of cooperation: for a discussion, see Delgado Casteleiro and Larik, \textit{supra note 5}, at 251-252.

\textsuperscript{66} To date, the only EU Member State to have initiated WTO dispute settlement procedures is Denmark, but in respect of the Faroe Island and against the EU: \textit{European Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring}, Request for Consultations by Denmark in respect of the Faroe Island, 7 November 2013, WT/DS469/1. On 21 August 2014, the parties informed the Dispute Settlement Body that the matter raised in this dispute was settled: \textit{European Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring}, Joint Communication from Denmark in respect of the Faroe Island and the European Union, 25 August 2014, WT/DS469/3.
WTO case, while only some have been occasionally targeted as individual respondents by another WTO member (i.e., the US in all 10 cases).  

Table 1 – EU/MS Practice in WTO Dispute Settlement (1995 – 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complainant</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Third Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU (individual claims)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>70(68)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/MS (joint/parallel claims)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14(69)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS (individual claims)</td>
<td>1(70)</td>
<td>10(11)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, for the purpose of our discussion, it appears pertinent to examine more in depth the statistics concerning passive litigation –i.e., EU and/or its Member States acting as a respondent jointly or individually– as an indicator of how the question of EU/MS

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**Notes:**


68 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the EU sole responsibility was invoked by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ (i.e., this being the first step in WTO dispute settlement procedures; Article 4 DSU) addressed exclusively to the EU. Note, however, that in some of these cases, a ‘mutually agreed solution’ was reached by parties to the dispute, while a considerable number of other cases have been formally pending for years at consultations stage.

69 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the ‘joint’ responsibility of the EU and its Member States was invoked by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ addressed to the EU jointly with one or more of its Member States (e.g., WT/DS375-377, European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products), and those addressed to the EU in parallel to claims on the same subject-matter addressed to MS (e.g., WT/DS62, EC – Customs Classification of Computer Equipment, in which the US also brought separate claims against Ireland (WT/DS68) and the UK (WT/DS67)).

70 See supra note 62.

71 This number reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ addressed only to individual EU Member States (see supra note 63), even though the EU may have intervened as a party to negotiate a ‘mutually agreed solution’ to the dispute (see infra notes 83-84).
international responsibility has been approached by third countries and dispute settlement organs in the WTO. In doing so, it seems also interesting to break down such statistics into pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon period as a means to gauging whether, and if so how, the internal transfer of exclusive external competence to the EU for all CCP matters has influenced the approach to EU/MS international responsibility in the practice of WTO dispute settlement.

B. Pre-Lisbon Practice – Pragmatism towards EU Exclusive Responsibility

A glimpse at Table 2 below would seem to support the view that, ‘[i]n fact, the whole discussion on the [joint responsibility] of the EU and its Member States in the WTO is put aside in favour of the sole responsibility of the Union in the WTO dispute settlement system’, particularly during the pre-Lisbon period.

Table 2 – EU/MS as Respondents in WTO Dispute Settlement (1995 – 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Pre-Lisbon</th>
<th>Post-Lisbon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU (individual claims)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/MS (joint/parallel claims)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS (individual claims)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently, the vast majority of WTO disputes (54) during the pre-Lisbon period were brought against the EU alone. In all instances, the Union (through the European Commission) has been eager to come forward as lead litigant and to assume exclusive responsibility for all alleged breaches of WTO law, including in the field of the TRIPS agreement that still fell within EU/MS shared external competence at that time. However, one should not be bewildered by this wide targeting of the EU as single respondent, given that most of these

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72 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. Thus, in Table 2, ‘pre-Lisbon’ period refers to all WTO disputes initiated between 1 January 1995 and 1 January 2008, whereas ‘post-Lisbon period’ to those initiated between 1 January 2008 and 1 March 2015.

73 Delgado Casteleiro and Larik, supra note 5, at 238.

74 Notably: WTO, European Communities — Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs – Report of the Panel, 20 April 2005, WT/DS174/R. However, this case did not directly address the question of EU/MS international responsibility, as the US raised violation claims against the EU only, and no specific measure by the EU Member States was identified.
complaints concerned only legal acts of the EU institutions,\textsuperscript{75} which are clearly attributable to the Union pursuant to Article 6(1) ARIO.\textsuperscript{76} Nonetheless, in some cases, claims directed against the EU alone have involved also measures of its Member States, not only when implementing EU law \textit{sensu stricto}, but when acting under the normative umbrella of the EU in a broader sense. A well-known example is the \textit{EC – Biotech Products} (2006) dispute, where the contested measures included national safeguard measures prohibiting the import and/or marketing of specific biotech products, which had been taken by six Member States in reliance on the possibility provided for in the relevant EU legislation.\textsuperscript{77} Even if the degree of EU normative control in respect of these safeguard measures was somehow restricted (i.e., to authorisation),\textsuperscript{78} the WTO panel accepted the EU standing as single respondent bearing sole responsibility for these measures, based on two pragmatic considerations:

It is important to note that even though the member State safeguard measures were introduced by the relevant member States and are applicable only in the territory of the member States concerned, the [EU] as a whole is the responding party in respect of the member State safeguard measures. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the Complaining Parties have directed their complaints against the [EU], and not individual [EU] member States. The [EU] never contested that, for the purposes of

\textsuperscript{75} With the exception of the following disputes: \textit{European Communities – Trade Description of Scallops}, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from Canada and the European Union, 19 July 1996, WT/DS7/12 and \textit{European Communities – Trade Description of Scallops}, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from Peru, Chile the European Union, 19 July 1996, WT/DS12/12, WT/DS14/11, concerning a French measure; \textit{European Communities – Measures Affecting Butter Products}, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from New Zealand and the European Union, 18 November 1999, WT/DS72/7, concerning decisions by the European Commission and the United Kingdom’s Customs and Excise Department; \textit{European Communities – Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products}, Communication From Canada, 3 December 2014, WT/DS369/3, concerning measures taken by Belgium and the Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{76} It suffice to cite the well-known WT/DS26 and WT/DS48 \textit{European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)} involving (inter alia) claims under GATT, SPS, TBT against Council Directive (EEC) No 602/81, Council Directive (EEC) No 146/88 and Council Directive (EEC) No 299/88; WT/DS27 \textit{European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas}, involving (inter alia) claims under the GATT, GATS and Import Licensing Agreement against Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93; WT/DS265, WT/DS266 and WT/283 \textit{European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar}, involving claims under the Agriculture and SCM Agreements against Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 and related measures; as well as various WTO cases concerning EU trade defence measures (e.g., WT/DS141 \textit{European Communities — Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India}, involving claims under the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and WT/DS326 and WT/DS328 \textit{European Communities — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Salmon}, involving claims under the Agreement on Safeguards).


\textsuperscript{78} See Council/EP Directive 2001/18 [2001] OJ L106/1. Article 23; and Council/EP Regulation 258/97 [1997] OJ L43/1. Article 12 permitting, under certain conditions, EU Member States to adopt safeguard measures in respect of biotech products that have obtained approval for EU-wide marketing. It has been reported that the safeguard measures at issue in this dispute had not been approved by the EU, nor had the European Commission open infringement procedures against the Member States concerned, which in practice were arguably free from EU’s normative control: see Delgado Casteleiro, \textit{supra note 1}, at 186.
this dispute, the **challenged member State measures are attributable to it under international law and hence can be considered [EU] measures** …\(^79\)

In support of this pragmatic approach, the Panel referred to the earlier *EC – Asbestos (2001)* case, where the EU was targeted as sole defendant –and potentially sole responsible if a breach of the WTO law had been established (*quod non*)– of the challenged French decree banning asbestos and asbestos-containing products, even though the link between this national measure and EU legislation was not readily obvious.\(^80\) Another less cited but also important case is *EC – Commercial Vessels (2005)* concerning the grey area of State aid. Here, the challenged measures included national aid schemes adopted by five EU Member States pursuant to an EU Regulation (providing for a temporary defensive mechanism for the shipbuilding sector), which had been explicitly *authorised* by the European Commission.\(^81\) After formally noting that Korea had made the panel request with respect to the European Union only,\(^82\) the Panel accepted the EU’s sole responsibility for the national aid schemes emphasising two key elements: first, the EU Regulation and Commission’s decisions were the “legal authority” under which EU Member States provided aid; and second, in the event of a finding of WTO-inconsistency, the EU had declared to assume responsibility for ‘any actions that may be required to bring into conformity the measures at issue’, removing thereby the ‘legal basis for granting any further aid’.\(^83\)

Turning to the ten WTO disputes against individual Member States, these were all brought (perhaps non-coincidentally) by the United States and date back to the early years of the WTO dispute settlement system (1995-2000). Some of these cases concerned claims under the GATS and TRIPS, and to some extent may be genuinely motivated by the lack of legal clarity, which prevailed at that time following *Opinion 1/94*, as to the exact division of external competences –and thus, respective obligations– between the EU and its Member

\(^{79}\) *EC – Biotech Products (2006)*, *supra* note 76, para. 7.101 (emphasis added).

\(^{80}\) WTO, *European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos — Report of the Panel*, 5 April 2001, WT/DS/135/R, [hereinafter, *EC – Asbestos (2001)*], paras. 3.32-3.35. While the EU had adopted a series of Directives on the matter since 1980, it was only in May 1999 (i.e., 3 years after the adoption of the French decree) that it decided to introduce an EU-wide ban on all types asbestos (including chrysotile asbestos at issue) with effect from 1 January 2005.

\(^{81}\) WTO, *European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels — Report of the Panel*, 20 June 2005, WT/DS301/R [hereinafter, *EC – Commercial Vessels (2005)*], paras 7.36-7.51. The five EU Member States concerned were Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., para 7.33.

\(^{83}\) Ibid., paras 7.33 and 7.53, and footnote 156.
States in these fields of WTO law. However, others involved claims in areas that were unequivocally held in Opinion 1/94 to fully fall under EU exclusive external competence (i.e., the GATT and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement), and may well have been motivated by a strategic attempt to weaken European unity and leadership in the WTO. In any event, no WTO panel has pronounced itself on the responsibility of EU Member States in these disputes, as six of them have been formally pending for years at consultations stage, while in the other four a ‘mutually agreed solution’ was reached. Nevertheless, it is significant that in all but one of the cases resulting in a ‘mutually agreed solution’, this was achieved with the EU intervening as a negotiating/responding party, not only for matters falling under its exclusive external competence, but also for issues revolving around the application of the TRIPS agreement where the extent of its competence was not entirely clear in this pre-Lisbon setting.

Most significant for our purposes, only in a few cases (5) have third countries formally invoked the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for alleged breaches of WTO law, by targeting them together (1) or by directing parallel claims on the same subject-matter.

84 With regards to GATS claims, see: Belgium — Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory Services, Request for Consultations by the United States, 13 May 1997, WT/DS80/1. As to the TRIPS, see: Denmark — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, 21 May 1997, WT/DS83/1; Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property, Request for Consultations by the United States, 6 May 1996, WT/DS37/1; Sweden — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, 2 June 1997, WT/DS86/1.


86 On this point, see S. Billiet, ‘The EC and WTO Dispute Settlement: Initiation of Trade Disputes by the EC’ 10 EFAR (2005) 197, at 199.

87 This is the case of the five WTO disputes (at supra note 81) concerning claims under the SCM Agreement, as well as that involving GATS claims (at supra note 80).

88 The exception being: Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property Act, Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution from the United States and Portugal, 8 October 1996, WT/DS37/2.


90Danmark — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from the United States, the European Union and Denmark, 13 June 2001, WT/DS83/2; and Sweden — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from the United States, the European Union and Sweden, 11 December 1998, WT/DS86/2, both following amendments in the respective national laws to provide for provisional measures inaudita altera parte in civil proceedings involving intellectual property rights.
to each of them separately (4).\textsuperscript{91} \textit{EC – Computer Equipment (1998)}\textsuperscript{92} was the first case in which the joint EU/MS membership of the WTO caused controversy as to who was responsible in panel proceedings. The case concerned the tariff treatment of certain computer equipment, which the US claimed was in breach of the tariff concessions contained in the EU Schedule under Article II:1 GATT. Thus, it typically illustrates the kind of responsibility question that may arise in the context of classical EU executive federalism –i.e., who is responsible for acts of Member States custom authorities in situations where they functionally act as organs of the Union? Unsurprisingly, the EU sought to assert its exclusive responsibility for any GATT infringement, based on its understanding that apportionment of obligations and attribution of conduct in the context of international responsibility should follow the delimitation of external competences under EU law.\textsuperscript{93} In particular, the EU stressed that it was an ‘original member of the WTO in its own right’ and that the tariff concessions ‘were bound in the GATT 1994 […] exclusively at the level of the [EU] and not at the level of individual member States.’\textsuperscript{94} Positioning itself as the only bearer of the GATT obligations in question, the EU declared its readiness to assume the entire responsibility for all measures in the area of tariff concessions, whether the measure complained about had been taken at EU level or at the level of the Member States.\textsuperscript{95} Significantly, the Union went further to support its full responsibility by linking it to the question of who can remedy the alleged wrongs: ‘it was exclusively competent for the subject matter concerned and thus the only entity in a

\textsuperscript{91} In addition to the \textit{EC – Computer Equipment} dispute discussed here (\textit{infra note} 88), the other three cases in which parallel claims were directed against the EU and its Member States separately have resulted in a ‘mutually agreed solution’ or been formally pending at consultations stage for years: (i) France — \textit{Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System}, Request for Consultations by the United States, 31 May 1999, WT/DS173/1; and European Communities — \textit{Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System}, Request for Consultations by the United States, 31 May 1999, WT/DS172/1, concerning GATT and SCM claims; (ii) Ireland — \textit{Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights} and European Communities — \textit{Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights}, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from United States, the European Union and Ireland, 13 September 2002, WT/DS82/3, WT/DS115/3; (iii) Greece — \textit{Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs} and European Communities — \textit{Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs}, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from the United States, the European Union and Greece, 26 March 2001, WT/DS124/2, WT/DS125/2, dated.


\textsuperscript{93} See part 2 above.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{EC – Computer Equipment (1998)}, \textit{supra note} 91, para 4.10.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, paras 4.11 and 4.15.
position to repair the possible breach”\textsuperscript{96} – i.e., the only entity capable of ensuring the necessary restitution under WTO dispute settlement rules.\textsuperscript{97}

The US, on the other hand, submitted that both the EU and two of its Member States were responsible for the allegedly wrongful tariff treatment, arguing that Ireland and the UK were ‘independent members’ of the WTO and equally bound by the EU Schedule under the GATT.\textsuperscript{98} The Panel, however, avoided explicitly addressing the US request to clarify the responsibility of the respective defendants and instead put forward compromise language that could satisfy both parties:

since the [European Union], Ireland and the United Kingdom are all bound by their tariff commitments under Schedule LXXX, our examination will focus, in the first instance, on whether customs authorities in the [European Union], including those located in Ireland and the United Kingdom, have or have not deviated from the obligations assumed under that Schedule.\textsuperscript{99}

On the one hand, the formula ‘customs authorities in the European Union’ could be read as endorsing the EU’s proposition that Member States customs authorities act functionally as EU organs when implementing EU law,\textsuperscript{100} and thus responsibility for their conduct should be solely attributed to the EU.\textsuperscript{101} On the other hand, the Panel sided with the US in that the relevant EU Schedule was equally binding on both the EU and its Member States,\textsuperscript{102} presumably implying all bear international responsibility for any breaches thereof, even if this is an area of EU exclusive external competence. Nevertheless, the Panel ultimately found that

\textsuperscript{96} ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations’, Sixty-third Session, Doc A/CN.4/637, 14 February 2011, at 24 (emphasis added), where the EU clarified that it was not simply adopting Member States conduct as its own (as per Article 9 ARIO).
\textsuperscript{97} On this point, see further part 4 below.
\textsuperscript{98} EC – Computer Equipment (1998), supra note 91, para 4.13. The US further argued that transfer of powers for tariff matters from the Member States to the Union under EU law was irrelevant externally, and did not result in ‘fewer rights and obligations being allotted to the Member States’ under WTO law (para 4.14). Taking the view that the conduct of the Irish and UK customs administrations was attributable to those two States, the US claimed to have been told during consultations with the EU that it ‘could not control the classification practices of member State customs authorities’ (para 4.12).
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., para 8.16.
\textsuperscript{100} This federal-type agency argument was further advanced by the EU and accepted by the WTO panel in: WTO, European Communities — Selected Customs Matters — Report of the Panel, 11 December 2006, WT/DS315/R [hereinafter, EC – Selected Customs Matters (2006)], paras 7547-7553. However, this case touched only indirectly upon the issue of EU/MS international responsibility, given that the US violation claims under Article X:3 GATT were only addressed against the EU, and not against the EU Member States themselves.
\textsuperscript{101} This is the reading by Hoffmeister, supra note 6, at 732.
\textsuperscript{102} This was also the position of the Panel in EC – Selected Customs Matters (2006), supra note 99, para 7.548: ‘it would appear that the [EU] as well as its constituent member States concurrently bear the obligations contained in the WTO Agreements, including those contained in Article X:3(b) of the GATT 1994’ (emphasis added).
it was the Union alone to have ‘acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article II GATT’ and addressed recommendations to the EU only.103

The other borderline case of this pre-Lisbon104 period in which the joint responsibility of the EU/MS was invoked and addressed by a WTO panel was the famous EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011),105 which was initiated by the United States back in 2004 but this time directing claims against the EU and four of its Member States together (Germany, France, Spain and the UK). The US claimed they had all provided subsidies separately and in parallel to Airbus large civil aircraft106 in contravention of ‘their obligations’ under the GATT and SCM Agreement.107 Again not surprisingly from an EU law standpoint, the Union requested that the Panel determine, as a preliminary matter, that the EU was the ‘only proper respondent’ in the dispute, stressing that it was not simply ‘representing’ the Member States in the proceedings, but took ‘full responsibility’ for their actions.108 However, the EU’s argumentation was essentially limited to restating that the alleged GATT/SCM violations related to matters within its exclusive external competence and for which it bears sole responsibility in the WTO,109 with no indication as to how it would ensure compliance with any potentially adverse Panel’s recommendations also by its Member States in this specific case.

The Panel rejected the EU’s request endorsing instead the formal argument advanced by the US that consultations and panel requests had been made with respect to the four Member States ‘in addition’ to the EU: ‘[e]ach of these five is, in its own right, a Member of the WTO, with all the rights and obligations pertaining to such membership, including the

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104 While the case was initiated in 2004, Panel and Appellate Body proceedings were only concluded in 2011.
106 The principal measure at issue were the so-called ‘Launch Aid’ or ‘Member State Financing’ (LA/MFS) arrangements, provided by France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom to Airbus for the development of large civil aircraft (LCA). Other measures challenged were: (i) Loans provided through the European Investment Bank to Airbus for LCA design, development, and other purposes; (iii) infrastructure and infrastructure-related grants to Airbus provided by Member State authorities; (iv) the provision to Airbus of equity infusions, debt forgiveness, and grants through government-owned and government-controlled banks; (v) research and technological research funding to Airbus provided by the EU and the Member States.
107 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Request for Consultations by the United States, 12 October 2004, WT/DS316/1.
108 EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), supra note 105, paras 7.171, requesting that the term ‘certain Member States’ be dropped from the name of the case.
obligation to respond to claims made against it by another WTO Member. For the Panel, the rules of the organisation –i.e., division of powers under EU law– were of no relevance for the purpose of apportioning WTO obligations and allocating responsibility for any possible breach thereof between the EU and its Member States. Notably, it reasoned that the fact that the four Member States had chosen not to directly defend their interests in the dispute by making oral and written submissions separate from those of the EU was ‘a matter entirely within their discretion’ and subject to their obligations under EU law, but did ‘not affect their rights or status as respondent parties’ under WTO law.111 Taking this position a step forward, it held that: ‘whatever responsibility the [EU] bears for the actions of its member States does not diminish their rights and obligations as WTO Members, but is rather an internal matter concerning the relations between the [EU] and its member States.’112 Following this line of reasoning, the Panel determined that both the EU and the four Member States had acted inconsistently with their WTO obligations and addressed recommendations accordingly –i.e., significantly, the first and only WTO ruling to date establishing such a joint responsibility.113

C. Post-Lisbon Practice – Challenging EU Exclusive Responsibility?

Against the backdrop of the pre-Lisbon practice just examined, it is readily apparent from Table 2 that joint EU/MS membership of the WTO is becoming much more visible in dispute settlement practice post-Lisbon –even if this may appear somehow counterintuitive from an EU law perspective with the Union having been granted exclusive external competence for all CCP matters. At the outset, two main observations can be made: first, complaints addressed jointly to the EU and one or more of its Member States (9) are no longer the exception when compared to complaints directed against the EU alone (16); and second, it is no longer just the US bringing such joint complaints, but also other active players in the WTO dispute settlement system (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Japan and Russia). Out of the nine cases in which the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States has been formally

111 Ibid., para 7.176.
112 Ibid., para 7.175.
113 Ibid., para 8.5. Note that the European Union did not appeal the specific issue of the proper respondent, and thus the Appellate Body did not have a chance to rule on it in an authoritative manner; see, European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Notification of Appeal by the European Union, 23 July 2010, WT/DS316/12. The Appellate Body addressed its recommendations to the EU only. However, it also upheld the Panel’s recommendations to ‘the Member granting each subsidy’ for those findings that were not appealed: EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft, Report of the Appellate Body, 1 June 2011, WT/DS316/AB/R, paras 1416 and 1418.
invoked, only one\textsuperscript{114} has led to the adoption of a WTO panel report, while the others appear still at consultations/panel proceedings stage.\textsuperscript{115} Therefore, it is too early to appraise the significance of this trend in WTO dispute settlement practice. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that these cases concern claims under WTO covered agreements falling within the ‘old’ (i.e., GATT and other multilateral agreements on trade in goods) and ‘new’ EU exclusive external competence (i.e., GATS and TRIPS) alike, and increasingly involve Member States measures taken in the framework of EU legislation in the field of energy and climate change policies.\textsuperscript{116}

At the time of writing, the issue of EU/MS joint responsibility has only been addressed by the WTO panel in the \textit{EC – IT Products (2010)} dispute concerning the tariff treatment of certain information technology products, which the US, Japan and Chinese Taipei claimed was in breach of the EU’s and its Member States’ obligations under (\textit{inter alia}) Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) GATT as it did not respect their commitments to provide duty-free treatment for these products under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA).\textsuperscript{117} The complainants addressed the consultations and panel requests jointly to the EU and its Member States, on grounds that both the EU and its Member States played a role in the application of the duties concerned. The complainants submitted that, while the Union had promulgated the challenged measures, customs authorities of the Member States, in implementing these EU


\textsuperscript{117} \textit{European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products}, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Japan and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, WT/DS375/8, WT/DS376/8, WT/DS377/6, dated 19 August 2008, which also includes claims under Article X GATT (publication and administration of trade regulations) by the United States and Chinese Taipei.
regulations, issued ‘Binding Tariff Information’ decisions specifying the customs classification code and applied customs duties to the products at issue. They further argued that the ‘internal legal relationship’ between the EU and its Member States ‘cannot diminish the rights of other WTO members’, including under the DSU to bring claims against the EU Member States as WTO members in their own right.\textsuperscript{118}

However, the EU notified the Panel that it would participate as sole respondent in the proceedings and bear sole responsibility for any GATT breach. As in the \textit{EC – Computer Equipment (1998)} dispute discussed above, the EU’s assertion of exclusive responsibility was here supported by a combination of internal and WTO-based legal arguments. As could be expected, the Union reiterated its exclusive competence under EU law for all tariff matters, arguing that the role of national customs authorities was limited to applying measures previously enacted at EU level. But critically, it also stressed that this meant, from a WTO law perspective, that only the EU could take ‘remedial action’ to implement the Panel’s recommendations to the extent a GATT violation were determined, and thus ‘addressing any recommendations to each [EU] Member State would serve no useful purpose.’\textsuperscript{119} In addition, the Union sought to assure the Panel that the EU Member States would be required, as a matter of EU law, to apply any such implementing measures taken at EU level.\textsuperscript{120} The Panel made its recommendations to the EU only, hiding behind a rather formalistic argument (i.e., an ‘as such’ challenge), but ultimately persuaded that EU sole responsibility will bring a satisfactory settlement of this specific dispute:

\begin{quote}
[...] we note that the complainants have framed their claims as \textit{challenging the [EU] measures "as such"} and have confirmed to the Panel that they are not making claims with respect to specific applications of those measures by national customs authorities of any member States. Under the circumstances, the Panel considers that it is not required to make, and does not make, findings with respect to member States’ application of the [EU] measures that were challenged "as such" in this dispute. Moreover, we are of the view that findings with respect to the measures adopted by the [EU] will provide a \textit{positive solution} to the dispute.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}

\section*{D. \textit{Overall Assessment – Third Party Acceptance and Impact of EU Competence Rules}}

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{EC – IT Products (2010)}, \textit{supra} note 114, para 7.81.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., para 7.80.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., para 8.2 (emphasis added).
In light of the questions raised at the beginning of the article, the preceding analysis first reveals that theoretical questions of responsibility arising from the joint EU/MS membership of the WTO have seldom been a controversial issue in dispute settlement practice. In fact, the question of EU/MS responsibility has thus far been litigated and directly addressed only on three occasions in WTO panel proceedings (i.e., EC – Computer Equipment (1998), EC – IT Products (2010) and EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)) and never thus far in Appellate Body proceedings. Furthermore, in these few instances where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, what caused contention was the Union’s eagerness to be held responsible in lieu of its Member States, and not them seeking to hide behind each other so as to evade international responsibility altogether.\footnote{122} Put differently, concerns over ‘accountability gaps’ have not really materialised in EU/MS practice within the WTO dispute settlement system.

However, and by the same token, this limited jurisprudence does not support the proposition made that WTO dispute settlement practice ‘has gone a long way in the direction of attributing the acts of the Member States to EU, in particular when the Member States implement EU law or when their acts fall within the scope of EU legislation.’\footnote{123} This statement seems both misleading and premature for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen, out of the total 70 WTO disputes in which the EU was targeted as sole respondent, only a few actually raised this sensitive question of attribution of conduct of the EU Member States to the Union. Since the vast majority of these cases involved complaints against EU measures only – rather than specific applications thereof by the Member States, there was no ambiguity that the Union bore sole responsibility for the alleged WTO-inconsistency of such acts.\footnote{124} Second, there were certainly some instances, particularly in the pre-Lisbon period, in which WTO members could have challenged but instead tacitly accepted EU exclusive responsibility for actions of the Member States taken under its (limited) normative authority – notably, EC – Asbestos (2001), EC – Commercial Vessels (2005) and EC – Biotech (2006). And it is also true that WTO panels have refrained from interfering with this course of action insofar as it was acquiesced to by WTO members.\footnote{125} However, this does not necessarily set a precedent for future disputes.\footnote{126} Indeed, our examination of post-Lisbon practice reveals that

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{122}{For a similar view, see Delgado Casteliero and Larik, \textit{supra note 5}, at 255; Eeckhout, \textit{supra note 5}, at 456.}
\footnote{123}{Kuijper and Paasivirta, \textit{supra note 6}, at 63; for a similar view, see Hoffmeister, \textit{supra note 6}, at 734 and 743; and Delgado Casteliero, \textit{supra note 5}, at 202.}
\footnote{124}{See \textit{supra note 71} and \textit{supra note 72}.}
\footnote{125}{In this sense, the approach to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO has been rightly described as being marked by both assertiveness of the Union and pragmatism of all parties involved: see Delgado Casteliero and Larik, \textit{supra note 5}, at 254; Eeckhout, \textit{supra note 5}, at 456.}
\footnote{126}{This point is further corroborated by the fact that there is no strict rule of \textit{stare decisis} in WTO dispute settlement according to which previous rulings bind panels in subsequent cases, nor an Appellate Body decision}
WTO members have increasingly brought joint complaints when challenging measures adopted by the Member States within the normative sphere of EU law, and it remains to be seen how these claims of joint EU/MS responsibility are dealt with if actually contested in WTO panel proceedings.

With regards to the degree to which EU competence rules have been considered a relevant criterion for the purpose of allocating EU/MS international responsibility, the approach of WTO panels has not been entirely consistent in the three cases in which this proved a controversial issue. Understandably from an international law perspective, WTO panels have consistently taken the position that transfers of external powers under EU law do not affect the validity of WTO obligations for EU Member States: as full WTO members in their own right, they are bound by the entire WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), in spite of whatever external competence the Union may have for parts thereof as a matter of EU law. In other words, the rules of the organisation are largely irrelevant for the question of apportioning WTO obligations between the EU and its Member States, so as long as the latter remain independent member of that organization. Conversely, the available WTO jurisprudence is less clear on the extent to which the rules of the organisation may be relevant to the question of attributing acts of the Member States to the Union. Whereas in cases of classical EU executive federalism (i.e., EC – Computer Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010)) WTO panels have ultimately accepted the Union’s sole responsibility for acts of its Member States when implementing EU (customs) legislation found in violation of the GATT, the Panel in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)) drew a line in this regard and held both the EU and its Member States responsible for breaches of the SCM Agreement. These different findings cannot be easily explained in light of the allocation of external powers under EU law, since both the GATT and the SCM Agreement have long been within the exclusive external competence of the Union. Yet, as will be argued next, this case law may appear less inconsistent if viewed from the perspective of WTO rules on remedies, which on the matter that could be relied upon by future panels; see P. van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (3rd edition, 2013), at 51-53.


128 In this context, note that the Panel in EC – IT Products (2010), supra note 114, para 8.2, sounded a warning that, if necessary, it would have been prepared to address specific recommendations to the Member States, even if they are merely implementing EU legislation found WTO-inconsistent. For a similar reading, see L. Bartels, ‘Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ 4 JIDS (2013) 343, at 352.

129 Kuijper and Paasivirta, supra note 6, at 60.

requires us instead to look at the distribution of internal regulatory competences under EU law.

4. Untangling EU/MS International Responsibility in the WTO – A ‘Competence/Remedy’ Model

In comparing the different approaches to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO and under the European Convention on Human Rights, Kuijper aptly qualifies the relative impact of EU competence rules on determinations of international responsibility. He argues that it is not just internal factors, such as the scope of EU powers and whether the Member States may be seen as de facto Union organs in certain instances, which determine the degree to which the EU will bear sole or joint responsibility. Rather, these internal elements ‘will be strongly vary in impact on the final questions of attribution and responsibility’ depending on the specific treaty regime in which the responsibility of the EU and/or its Member States is invoked, and in particular the prevailing remedy for an internationally wrongful act preferred by the regime in question. In the context of the WTO, both the legal texts and the practice of the dispute settlement organs clearly attach a strong preference for juridical restitution –i.e., the ‘prompt’ withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-inconsistent measure and continued performance of WTO obligations. In such a system where the primary consequence of international responsibility is the return to legality, the key question becomes who (i.e., the EU or the Member States, or both) has the actual power to undo the wrongful act and ensure conformity to existing WTO obligations. In this sense, as rightly pointed out by Nollkaemper, the role of power in determining international responsibility (whether joint or not) is a fundamental one. Put simply, why would WTO dispute settlement organs bother to assign responsibility to a WTO member that does not hold the power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent?

That being said, does it necessarily follow that the EU is the one and only able to provide for restitution and ensure performance of WTO obligations in all instances? This would seem to be the view taken by Kuijper and Paasivirta in suggesting the so-called ‘competence model’ for managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. In their

132 Ibid., at 2.
133 Article 3.7 DSU; see also Articles 19.1 and 21.1 DSU; and van den Bossche, supra note 124, at 194-195 for an overview.
134 Nollkeamper, supra note 34, at 307-308 and 346.
opinion, the relevant WTO member is the Union, and not the Member States, because the near-exclusive EU external competence for WTO matters post-Lisbon implicates that only its institutions can provide for the necessary restitution. Following this line of reasoning, the Union should be solely responsible for the WTO-inconsistency of all acts taken in the sphere of EU law, including by its Member States. But if this proposition is accepted, what would be the legal justification for the Member States to remain independent members of the WTO, given they are claimed entirely incompetent to fulfill one of the key obligations of that membership – i.e., to ensure the conformity of their laws, regulations and administrative procedures with WTO obligations?

In reality, the proposed competence model may need some refinement, as evidenced by the EU’s own argumentation in the three WTO cases previously discussed in which the issue of EU/MS international responsibility proved contentious at panel proceedings. On the one hand, the two premises underlying the competence model appear perfectly sensible when applied to situations of classical EU executive federalism such as those posed by the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010) disputes, both involving EU customs legislation. In both cases, it was plainly clear that: first, the EU had required the Member States to act inconsistently with WTO law – i.e., by adopting the challenged (directly applicable) regulations that Member States have no choice but to apply and which left no room for discretion in terms of implementation; and second, the EU was the only entity with the actual power to provide restitution – i.e., to modify/withdraw the regulations found WTO-inconsistent. Under these circumstances where the Union has full ex-ante and ex-post normative control over Member State action, it would not be very efficient nor provide much legal certainty from a third-party perspective, to hold EU Member States responsible as they do not have any individual power to undo the wrongful situation and ensure performance of WTO obligations.

On the other hand, it is less clear that these two assumptions underpinning the Kuijper and Paasivirta’s competence model can be upheld as we move away from tariffs and customs matters into other areas of WTO law, which are not so extensively regulated at EU level and where the role of the EU Member States is not strictly confined to executing EU law. This point is well illustrated by the EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute. First, it is generally the case that, in the field of State aid, the EU does not require but

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135 This model was first introduced in Kuijper and Paasivirta, supra note 6, at 54-55, and further elaborated in Kuijper, supra note 129, at 8-9 and 18. A similar view is taken by Hoffmeister, supra note 6, at 743 (supra note 50 and accompanying text). See most recently, Paasivirta, supra note 19, at 457.

136 Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement.
at most authorises Member States to provide aid under certain conditions,\textsuperscript{137} and therefore Member States do enjoy some level of discretion in whether or not they act in contravention of the SCM Agreement. Moreover, in this particular dispute, the EU did not point to any Commission State aid decision actually authorising the separate subsidies granted by the Member States,\textsuperscript{138} and it has indeed been reported that such subsidies were not subject to a specific EU authorisation.\textsuperscript{139} This being so, it would be hard to see how the EU could claim to exercise normative control over subsidising action taken by the Member States where there appears to be no basis in EU law for assessing the substantive legality of such action.\textsuperscript{140} Indeed, even in an area where the EU has exclusive competence both externally and internally,\textsuperscript{141} it may be possible for Member States to act outside the scope of EU normative authority in a manner that violates the SCM Agreement: a key reason for this is that the Commission’s control powers are limited to government support that constitutes ‘State aid’, which is a narrower concept than the WTO’s notion of ‘subsidy’.\textsuperscript{142}

Second, in terms of remedial action, the EU did not attempt to argue that it was best placed to implement the Panel’s recommendations. In fact, it is far from evident that the Union alone could have remedied the wrongful situation, particularly for those ‘Member State Financing’ (or ‘Launch Aid’) measures that the Panel found to constitute a prohibited (export) subsidy under Article 3.1(a) SCM Agreement and had to be withdrawn within 90 days.\textsuperscript{143} Under these circumstances, it appears perfectly sensible for the Panel to address individual recommendations to each subsidising EU Member State, as they had actual power and full

\textsuperscript{137} See \textit{supra} note 52.

\textsuperscript{138} See e.g., \textit{European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft}, First Written Submission by the European Communities, February 2007, WT/DS316, at 89-95 providing the factual background to MSF/LA arrangements.

\textsuperscript{139} See e.g., Kuiper and Paasivirta, \textit{supra} note 56, at 63; and Delgado Casteleiro, \textit{supra} note 74, at 206. In this sense, \textit{EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)} significantly differs from the \textit{EC – Commercial Vessels (2005)} dispute, where EU law was clearly at the origin of the national aid schemes found WTO-inconsistent and EU sole responsibility was accepted (see \textit{section} 3.B above)

\textsuperscript{140} Hoffmeister, \textit{supra} note 6, at 742, stating that it is necessary to establish that EU law governs the substantive legality of Member State action as one of the conditions for determining ‘normative control’ of the Union for the purpose of international responsibility.

\textsuperscript{141} Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.

\textsuperscript{142} An obvious reason for this is that Article 107(1) TFEU confines ‘State aid’ to government support measures that distort competition and trade \textit{within} the EU, whereas WTO disciplines apply more broadly to subsidies that affect \textit{international} trade (e.g., export and import substitution subsidies prohibited under Article 3 SCM Agreement) and cause ‘adverse effects’ to other WTO members (i.e., so-called ‘actionable subsidies’ under Article 5 SCM Agreement). For further discussion, in the specific context of the \textit{EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)} dispute, see M. Wu, ‘Why not Brussels? European Community State Aid Rules and the Boeing-Airbus Dispute: Comment on Piet Jan Slot’ in K. W. Bagwell, G. A. Bermann and P.C. Mavroidis, \textit{Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in International Trade} (2010); and more generally, C-D. Ehlermann and M. Goyette, ‘The Interface between EU State Aid Control and the WTO Disciplines on Subsidies’ 4 ESALQ (2006) 696.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)}, \textit{supra} note 105, paras 8.1 and 8.6, pursuant to Article 4.7 SCM Agreement. Note, however, that this finding was later reversed by the Appellate Body: \textit{EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft}, \textit{supra} note 113, paras 1415-1416.
discretion to withdraw their WTO-inconsistent subsidies with no need for any prior EU legislative action.

Therefore, the *EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)* dispute highlights that a perfect match between EU *exclusive external competence* for WTO matters and *exclusive remedial capacity* for any breach of WTO law, which underlies Kuipjer and Paasirvita’s competence model, cannot simply be taken for granted. The question remains, however, whether this may be considered a marginal case due to the peculiarities of EU State aid rules, or conversely whether similar doubts as to the EU’s exclusive ability to provide restitution could arise in other fields of WTO law. Arguably, this could also become an issue in WTO disputes involving acts of the Member States apparently aimed at implementing EU Directives, where it can be highly complex, particularly for a third party, to identify whether the alleged WTO-inconsistent measure is required by EU law, or instead results from an autonomous decision of the Member States, or indeed implicates both.\(^{144}\)

A case in point is the recent complaint brought by Argentina against the EU and some of its Member States regarding certain measures affecting the marketing of biodiesel products and supporting the biodiesel industry.\(^{145}\) On the one hand, the EU seems clearly responsible for GATT/TBT claims against the ‘sustainability criteria’ for biofuels and bioliquids:\(^{146}\) these are established as mandatory common standards in the EU Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality Directives\(^{147}\) (i.e., only conforming biofuels and bioliquids may count towards meeting the obligatory national renewable energy targets set out for each Member States\(^{148}\) and/or be eligible for financial support) and thus only the EU is in a position to modify (or withdraw) these criteria if found WTO-inconsistent. On the other hand, it is less obvious whether the Union is equally responsible for GATT/SCM claims against tax exemptions/reductions on such ‘sustainable’ biofuels allegedly applied by some EU Member

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\(^{144}\) See e.g., *European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector*, Request for Consultations by China, 7 November 2012, WT/DS452/1, at 1.


\(^{146}\) Ibid., at 1-4. With regards to these GATT/TBT claims (Part A), Argentina appears indeed to invoke solely EU responsibility in referring to Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement, whereas this reference is not made with respect to GATT/SCM claims in Part B of the consultations request.


States:149 these tax incentives are not, strictly speaking, required by EU law150 and therefore Member States retain the power to withdraw them if found WTO-inconsistent. In fact, this case raises the type of responsibility question that was pragmatically avoided in the EC – Biotech (2006) dispute discussed above and, should it reach panel proceedings, may provide a first opportunity for WTO dispute settlement organs to actually rule on the question of who is responsible for conduct of the Member States that is authorised in EU Directives.151

The above example also corroborates the key point that there is no strict parallelism between EU exclusive external competence in the field of the CCP and the distribution of internal regulatory competences between the Union and its Member States.152 To put it differently, even if it is accepted that the Union has exclusive treaty-making powers for (nearly) all WTO matters, it does not have exclusive treaty-infringing powers. There are some important policy fields covered by WTO law that have been only partially regulated at EU level and where Member States retain considerable regulatory autonomy internally: in addition to internal taxation just seen (covered by GATT/SCM),153 another example is patent law (covered by TRIPS).154 In these areas, it could well be that an act of a EU Member State outside the scope of EU legislation infringes WTO law. If presented with such a scenario, proponents of EU exclusive responsibility may still argue that the Union has internal control mechanisms to effectively ensure compliance with an adverse WTO ruling.155 It is true that the WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements) is ‘an integral part’ of EU law,156 and thus the European Commission can in principle initiate infringement proceedings against Member

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149 Argentina Consultation Request (2013), supra note 143, at 4–7. The EU Member States concerned are Belgium and France.
150 Council Directive 2003/96 [2003] OJ L283/51, para. 26 of the Preamble and Article 15 allow Member States to exempt or reduce excise duties so as to promote the use of biofuels. As such tax exemption/reduction may constitute ‘State aid’, Member States are required (Article 26) to notify such measures to, and obtain approval from, the Commission pursuant to Article 108 TFEU (see supra note 52). Implementation of such tax incentive schemes varies significantly across EU Member States: for an overview, see A. Jung et al., Biofuels – At What Cost? Government Support for Ethanol and Biodiesel in the European Union: 2010 Update (International Institute for Sustainable Development, July 2010), at 42–47, available at: https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/bf_eunion_2010update.pdf.
151 See also, European Union and its Member States — Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Russia, 28 May 2015, WT/DS476/2, concerning inter alia GATS claims against Council/EP Directive 2009/73 [2009] OJ L211/94 and Member State implementing measures (particularly Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania). Here, however, the degree of discretion left to the Member States in implementing the EU Directive (Article 9) does not appear to be the only rationale for invoking their responsibility: rather, the alleged claims of violation of Articles XVI and XVII GATS are based on the specific commitments that the three EU Member States concerned (presumably) undertook in their individual Services Schedules (see supra note 30) with respect to pipeline transport services.
152 This is reflected in Article 207(6) TFEU.
153 Article 113 TFEU; and Eeckhout, supra note 5, at 461.
155 See Kuijper and Paasivirta, supra note 6, at 39 and 59.
156 This is so by virtue of Article 216(2) TFEU; see also C-181/73 Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, para 5.
States to ensure compliance with WTO law. However, this argument misses out on a fundamental point: why should WTO dispute settlement organs rely on the Commission’s infringement action, when it would seem more effective to held the infringing EU Member State(s) (if targeted as respondent) directly responsible under WTO law?

To sum up, when approaching EU/MS responsibility for breaches of WTO law, the key practical question is who has the actual power to provide juridical restitution and secure performance of WTO obligations, as underscored by the ‘competence/remedy’ model suggested here. From this angle, EU competence rules become a relevant criterion for the purposes of attributing EU/MS international responsibility: complaining parties would generally address their claims, and WTO dispute settlement organs their findings, based on their assessment of who is in the best position to withdraw or amend the WTO-inconsistent measure. However, the key in answering this question is not the division of external competences under EU law, since this says nothing about who has the power to act internally to undo an internationally wrongful situation but merely indicates who has the power to conclude a given international treaty. Rather, what is decisive in terms of providing juridical restitution is the division of internal (and not external) regulatory competences under EU law, as well as the manner in which these are exercised by the Union and/or its Member States. Accordingly, and contrary to what Kuipjer/Paasarvita suggest, it is not true that the EU will be best placed to remedy breaches of WTO law in each and every case just because it has acquired exclusive external competence for (nearly) all WTO matters after Lisbon. Particularly as we move away from highly integrated areas of the CCP, individual Member States may well be the relevant actor with a power to take remedial action, because EU normative control over their WTO-infringing conduct is either limited or absent altogether. In this case, and insofar as EU Member States are targeted as respondents, there are no compelling grounds why WTO dispute settlement organs should instead rely on the Commission’s infringement action or other internal enforcement mechanisms so as to ensure due performance by the Member States concerned of their WTO obligations.


158 However, see Delgado Castelero and Larik, supra note 5, at 253 rightly noting that complaining parties in the WTO may strategically target the EU as a respondent, rather than individual Member States, fostered by the prospects of being capable to retaliate. Yet arguably, this possibility of retaliating against the EU as a whole is not impaired by bringing joint complaints against the EU and (some of) its Member States.

159 For a similar view, in the context of non-compliance proceedings under multilateral environmental agreements, see Nollkaemper, supra note 34, at 343 and 346.
5. CONCLUSIONS

It is largely undisputed that the European Union has played a prominent role in the WTO dispute settlement system over the past three decades. As one of the rare international fora where the EU is actually allowed to fully participate in dispute settlement proceedings, it is not surprising that the Union has been eager to stand as a ‘responsible’ – if not ‘over-responsible’ – actor in the multilateral trading system, even if not always compliant with WTO law. And yet, this ‘success story’ should not lead us to overstate neither the degree to which third parties have accepted the EU’s eagerness to assume exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law by its Member States, nor to misrepresent the relative impact of its own competence rules on determinations of EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. The main reason calling for a more qualified assessment is that we simply do not have (as of yet) well-established authoritative WTO jurisprudence on the sensitive question of when can Member State conduct be attributed to the Union: 160 as we have seen, it has been raised and adjudicated only on three occasions in WTO panel proceedings and never thus far in Appellate Body proceedings. In addition, WTO dispute settlement practice reveals that joint complaints against the EU and its Member States have not ceased but relatively increased, even if the Union has been granted exclusive external powers for almost all WTO matters under the Lisbon Treaty.

In fact, what emerges from existing WTO jurisprudence is that the division of external competences under EU law has not, unlike the Commission and some EU scholars submit, been decisive in assigning responsibility for breaches of WTO law. In all three cases where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, WTO panels have unambiguously held that EU Member States are bound to perform all obligations incumbent upon them under the WTO Agreement (and its annexed agreements), so as long as they remain full and independent members of the WTO and irrespective of the (exclusive) external powers they may have transferred to the Union in the CCP field under EU law. While this stance may grate on the ears of most EU lawyers, it is legally sound from an international law standpoint. Moreover, it also wise from a broader governance perspective: to put it bluntly, it is not for WTO dispute settlement organs to turn the WTO Agreement de facto into a ‘pure’ EU agreement for the

160 See section 3.D above, indicating that the vast majority of the total 70 WTO disputes in which the EU was targeted as sole respondent concerned EU measures only – and not Member States measures as such – and therefore there was no ambiguity that such EU acts were attributable to the Union.
purpose of international responsibility. That being so, in assigning international responsibility –i.e., whether solely to the EU (EC – Computer Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010)) or jointly with (some of) its Member States (EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)), these WTO panels were seemingly guided by one pragmatic consideration: who has the actual power to remove (or modify) the measure found to be WTO-inconsistent?

However, and contrary to what other scholars appear to suggest, it is not a foregone conclusion that the EU is always the one and only entity with the actual power to provide juridical restitution in the WTO dispute settlement system, just because it has exclusive external competence for nearly all WTO matters. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to highly harmonised segments of the CCP (e.g., tariffs and customs matters), where the conduct of the Member States is strictly confined to implementing directly applicable EU legislation: evidently, the EU only can amend/withdraw such legislation if it is found WTO-inconsistent. And yet, as we have seen, it is less straightforward why the EU would also have such an exclusive remedial capacity for breaches of WTO law in cases where its normative control over Member State action is more limited, or indeed entirely absent: for instance, why couldn’t the EU Member States themselves withdraw their own subsidies, or regulatory measures permitted but not required by EU law, if found WTO-inconsistent? In fact, from the perspective of providing juridical restitution, it is not the delimitation of external (i.e., treaty-making) competences between EU and Member States that is of primordial importance. Rather, it is the allocation and exercise of internal (treaty-infringing/treaty-performing) competences which, importantly, are not within the exclusive regulatory domain of the Union for all subject matters covered by WTO law even post-Lisbon. This being so, insofar as EU Member States are targeted as a respondent in a WTO dispute and hold the power to end an eventual breach of their WTO obligations, there is no cogent reason why WTO dispute settlement organs should rely on EU control mechanisms instead of direct responsibility and accountability under WTO law.

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161 In a post-Lisbon setting, this would have likely been the practical consequence had WTO dispute settlement organs accepted the Commission’s proposition that the apportionment of obligations should strictly follow the distribution of external competences under EU law and be the decisive factor in assigning international responsibility (see section 2.B above).
162 See supra note 135.
163 See part 4 above.
164 Again, doing so would de facto turn the WTO Agreement into a ‘pure’ EU agreement, whereby EU Member States are not seen as WTO members in their own right and bearers of the contractual obligations, but mere vehicles for carrying out the EU’s obligations under WTO law.
In closing, it is important to underline that the issue of EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO is not, of course, a purely legal question but one that is highly political for all players involved. For the EU, the capacity to speak with one voice and assert its exclusive responsibility in the WTO dispute settlement system is certainly instrumental in forging its own identity as a leading trade actor and power on the global stage,\textsuperscript{165} but also important at a more practical level.\textsuperscript{166} At the same time, it appears politically unviable for (some) EU Member States to even consider relinquishing their independent membership of the WTO.\textsuperscript{167} For their part, other WTO members may target the EU and its Member States jointly as respondents not solely out of genuine legal concerns,\textsuperscript{168} but strategically as a means to challenge the Union’s unity and leadership in the WTO.\textsuperscript{169} In these circumstances, the EU and its Member States may increasingly find themselves at a crossroad between maintaining their joint membership of the WTO while claiming the EU’s exclusive responsibility in its dispute settlement system. Indeed, aside from voting and other political considerations,\textsuperscript{170} one may well question whether there is still a legal need, as a matter of EU law,\textsuperscript{171} for the parallel EU/MS membership of the WTO. It is not the purpose of this article to engage with convoluted questions of EU law, nor to take a position on the highly controversial and politically sensitive issue of whether the Member States should remain WTO members in their own right.\textsuperscript{172} What is here submitted is that it is for the EU and its Member States to address these matters in-house, and meanwhile the WTO dispute settlement organs have made a judicious choice not to interfere.

\textsuperscript{165} Delgado Castelheiro and Larik, \textit{supra note 5}, at 255.
\textsuperscript{166} Kuijper, \textit{supra note 5}, at 224.
\textsuperscript{168} Arguably, the \textit{EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)} case could be cited as an example here.
\textsuperscript{169} Arguably, the \textit{EC – Computer Equipment (1998)} and \textit{EC – IT Products (2010)} cases could be seen as an example of the US ‘divide and rule’ strategy: see Billiet, \textit{supra note 82}, at 199.
\textsuperscript{170} Under Article IX(1) WTO Agreement, the EU has a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States (i.e., 28 at present) in WTO decision-making. From this perspective, the EU may not want to give up its current voting power should WTO decision-making practice move away from consensus in the future. On this point, see M. Bungenberg, ‘Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon’ in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte (eds.), \textit{European Yearbook of International Economic Law} (2010), at 134-135; Hanh and Danieli, \textit{supra note 165}, at 53-54.
\textsuperscript{171} From an EU law perspective, besides the exclusion of transport services from the scope of the CCP (see \textit{supra note 9}), EU Member States seem to attach particular significance to the fact that they (not the EU) contribute to the WTO budget to justify their continued participation in the organisation: see e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review Body, ‘Trade Policy Review – Report by the European Union’ (WT/TPR/G/248), 1 June 2011, at 6 (footnote 2). However, see \textit{Opinion 1/94, supra note 11}, para 21.
\textsuperscript{172} From a WTO law perspective, any member may unilaterally withdraw from the WTO (Article XV(1) WTO Agreement). In favour of preserving the status quo, see e.g., Hanh and Danieli, \textit{supra note 165}, at 61-63. For a seemingly different view, see Bungenberg, \textit{supra note 168}, at 134.