CONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL FORMATION:
PRODUCING A TEXTBOOK ON SOUTH AFRICA

ALAN JOHN LESTER

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INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
Abstract

The ultimate goal of the thesis is the construction of a text, appropriate for student use, on South Africa's social and spatial formation.

The first part of the thesis is the most lengthy. It is a sophisticated account of South Africa's historical geography since 1652. This is written in an academic style, not for students, but for a learned readership, and contains some original insights. In itself, it represents an innovative contribution to the literature on South Africa's social development.

The second part is a review of existing texts on South Africa's history and geography, written purposefully for students. These texts are subjected to a critique with content and coverage being the main criteria.

The third part is an investigation of theoretical issues concerning the relationship between readers, particularly student readers, and texts. It seeks to formulate guidelines for the writing of a student text and the devising of learning activities which are appropriate for learners.

In a brief conclusion, attention is paid to the ways in which the original aims have been manifested in a student text, included in the thesis as an appendix.

Although this text is another lengthy treatment of South Africa's social and spatial formation, this time it is written for an intended student readership. It draws on the content deemed appropriate in the sophisticated text of Part One, seeks to overcome the weaknesses identified in current student texts in Part
Two, and is written in a style, appropriate for students, suggested by Part Three. It also contains student activities devised in the theoretical context introduced in Part Three. The text is deemed to be a significant advance on previously published History and Geography educational materials.
Introduction

This thesis arose out of a combination of two interests. The first is in South Africa's historical development, and in particular, how South African society had come to be as it was at the end of the apartheid era. The second is in teaching, and particularly in teaching students taking A levels or in the early stages of degrees.

The general purpose of the thesis is remarkably straightforward: to produce a text on South Africa intended as a learning guide for such students. Its execution, however, was more problematic.

I began the task with pre-formulated ideas about South African historical geography - ideas which had been evolving over years of study since I visited South Africa as an undergraduate researcher. I knew early on that, as a first part of the thesis, I wished to formalize these ideas into some kind of grand narrative - a narrative which would be eclectic and comprehensive. The construction of this narrative would enable me to identify that "content" which I would consider most relevant for students of South Africa. (I use the word "content" guardedly at this stage, for reasons involving the link between language and "message", which will become clearer in Part Three).

I also knew early on that the end product of the thesis would be a text, ultimately derived from this comprehensive account, but written expressly with students in mind. It would have to be different from the original account in two main ways: firstly, its coverage could not be so extensive and secondly, its language and discourse structure would have to be adapted.

In regard to the former consideration - of coverage - I turned to currently available student texts on South Africa. A review enabled me to identify both achievements which I would wish to emulate, and limitations which I would wish to transcend in my own version.

The latter consideration - guidance on language and structure - proved more elusive. At my supervisor's instigation, I undertook to read literature on language structure, discourse and genre,
produced by literary theorists, educationalists and psychologists, all in an attempt to identify what it is which makes some "factual" texts more successful than others, for students as a particular type of reader.

By the time I had completed this task, I had collected together a comprehensive account of South African social formation, a review of perceived successes and failures of current student texts on the subject and a consideration of what generally makes for a successful student text. All that remained was to write my own.

This then, is the structure of the thesis:

Part One: a thorough and "learned" account of South African social formation.

Part Two: a review of student texts on South Africa, focusing mainly on their coverage.

Part Three: a consideration of the relationships between readers and texts, and the characteristics of a successful text for "learners".

Overall Conclusion.

Appendix: a student textbook on South African social and spatial formation.
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Part One


Introduction

The purpose of Part One is to render a satisfactory explanation of the nature of contemporary South African society and its spatial configuration. This explanation cannot be attempted without tracing the course of social formation and adaptation in South Africa over the last three and a half centuries. There is considerable historical inertia involved in the constitution of social structures anywhere, and South Africa's most tangible social structures have been more rigidly rooted in the past than many. A reading of Part One should enable the identification of the most important historical continuities in South Africa - those processes and traits which have had most to do with shaping South Africa's present society: its social group stratification, its political institutions, the patterns of its human geography, the structure of its economy and its external links.

However, the following account is coloured by a particular interpretation of events and processes. "All history is fiction", to a greater or lesser extent, since historical "facts" are distorted by the light of interpretation thrown upon them. There are conflicting interpretations, not just of events and medium term processes, but of the structural conditions underlying and shaping the course of South Africa's social development. The different conceptions ultimately boil down to varying perceptions of the psychological motivations of the actors involved in social change, and of the way societies in general operate.

My own interpretation of events has been derived from weighing up the explanatory attributes of various "schools of thought". Before setting out the structure of the ensuing chapters, the bulk of this introduction is devoted to a brief analysis of what have been two particularly divergent scholarly tendencies (although the delineating characteristics of the two schools have blurred recently). An analysis of the traditional cleavage of
interpretation between Marxists (or "radicals", a wider term) and "liberals", should not only allow my own interpretative tendencies to become clear early on; it should also help to clarify other, competing poles of interpretation.

The central issue around which academic conflict between liberals and Marxists has revolved, is that of the relationship between capitalism as a mode of production, and apartheid's racial structures. "Given that South African economic development was profoundly structured by racial labour policies, moulded by ideology and a violent racially repressive socio-political environment, it is not surprising that the interplay between political and economic forces has received a great deal of academic attention" (Nattrass, 1991, 654).

Behind this "academic attention" though, lies a more subtle and nuanced debate over the markers of social identity and the forms of self-conception, which divide the individuals comprising society into groups. The lines delineating these groups are inconstant and fluid, but in specific circumstances, the polarization between social units, over certain issues, is discernable.

Where Marxists have tended to find the crucial basis for social group formation in the relationship of individuals to the mode of production - in narrow terms, class - liberals have sought more diffuse parameters of group identity, based largely on ideological constructs - ethnicity, religion, nationality and culture. In recent years, proponents of both schools have recognised areas of weakness in their own accounts and interpretations which can be strengthened using insights borrowed from the other academic tendency.

Radicals have traditionally focused on "the enormous expansion which has taken place in the allegedly dysfunctional system, the continuity of the system of racial domination in the midst of economic expansion and the extensive involvement of property owners in the system of racial domination" (Johnston, cited Nattrass, 1991, 666). The underlying interpretation is that the state has supported economic growth and the interests of capitalists, primarily through two forms of apartheid intervention: labour domination and proletarianization of the
black peasantry (Bundy, 1972). Racism has therefore been seen as "rational" in the sense that it is an ideology which has legitimated the economic exploitation of black labour. South Africa has not the kind of capitalist economy in which the forces of demand and supply prevail, but a "labour repressive economy" (Trapido, 1971), in which the accumulation of a white class, or white classes, is made possible by political machinery which represses blacks (Fisher, Schlemmer and Webster, 1978).

The radical account is not confined to politico-economic relations between whites and blacks. O'Meara, 1983, extended a class analysis into the field of intra-white politics with his study of Afrikaner nationalism. Its revival in the 1930s was, for him, not so much the (re)generation of an ideology, but an expression of emerging conflict between capitals. In common with Marxist accounts of wider South African politics, "If a system could be shown to be functional to capitalism, then it was assumed that it must have arisen for those purposes" (Nattrass, 1991, 667).

Probably the clearest manifestation of capital's social-structuring role came with the mineral discoveries of the late nineteenth century. Legassick, 1980, pointed out how the scale and purpose of racial relations, developed with industrialisation at Kimberley, were quite a departure from South Africa's previous racial structures. Migrant labour flows to the mines and confinement of workers in compounds, allowed the acquisition and control of a large, cheap African labour force, and facilitated its separation from the small white working class. Capitalism had not just adapted to the pre-existing racial order, it had created a new one. Later, deep level gold mining on the Witwatersrand required vast amounts of ultra-cheap labour to make any profit out of low grade ore, particularly when the gold price was fixed. The economic importance of mining necessitated political structures supplying African labour from the reserves for temporary work in the mines.

Despite a lack of consensus within the marxian "camp" (see Magubane, 1989), during the 1970s in particular, a number of radical analysts were collaborating on, or, less evidently, mutually supporting, similar interpretations of South Africa's historical development, hinging on the changing imperatives of
capital.

One of the seminal works of the genre was a paper by Wolpe, 1972. Wolpe argued that cheap African labour was reproduced, in the early stages of industrialisation, by the pre-capitalist mode of production practised in the reserves. Industrialisation itself paradoxically undermined this source of cheap labour as traditional communal and kinship modes of redistribution in the reserves broke down with the penetration of capitalist relations.

For Wolpe, apartheid was quintessentially an attempt to maintain the pre-capitalist reserve economies and, therefore, cheap labour through more effective coercion and domination. "Since the establishment of the Union in 1910 ... the state has been utilized at all times to secure and develop the capitalist mode of production" (Wolpe, 1972). Apartheid was a state-led drive to maintain the rate of surplus value and accumulation in the face of a disintegrating pre-capitalist reserve economy, spurred on by the fact that disintegration was simultaneously feeding African urbanisation and, therefore, political unrest. It was this threat in particular which brought the state's political power to bear alongside capital's economic power, in a mutual thrust to maintain and intensify segregation in the industrial era.

The flaws of such a reductionist account are now recognised by Wolpe himself, whose brand of Marxism is today more flexible (Wolpe, 1988). Apart from containing a romanticised view of African pre-capitalist economic relations, the 1972 account bypasses the integral role of the Afrikaner nationalist movement and its political successes within the white electorate, in the formulation of apartheid. In fact, it was a whole welter of complex political and social considerations, which convinced enough of the white electorate to vote NP for its policies to be implemented after 1948, and which convinced the Afrikaner nationalist leaders that the laws forming apartheid were the best option for South Africa's future.

The role of Africans in the industrial economy was, however, highly significant in dictating their political position. "The measures (the state) undertook to mobilize and control labour virtually precluded the possibility of extending political rights
to Africans as a way of establishing some degree of legitimacy for the state" (Stadler, 1987, 34). But the relationship between capital and the state is not timeless, nor has the government's theory on the political treatment of Africans been constant. Historical specificity has been recognised as an imperative in more recent Marxist accounts. Hence Wolpe, 1988:

"The contention is that the formation of structures and relations is always the outcome of struggles between contending ... classes and that this outcome is Janus-faced, being always simultaneously functional and contradictory. Which pole of the relationship will be dominant depends on the historically specific conditions of the social formation ... the "fit" or contradiction between capitalism and racism may be eroded or expanded within particular social and economic spheres and the outcome may be a shift towards increased functionality or sharpened contradiction resulting in either case in significantly altered conditions of struggle".

Yet these shifts towards functionality or contradiction cannot be precipitated by class struggles alone, since narrowly defined class relationships, ceteris paribus, are determined by the mode of production, which is far less vacillatory than the degree of functionality within it. The shifts which occur within the overall mode of production must be explained with reference to extra-class political and social developments. Interpretations must involve concepts of political constituency, nationalism, ethnicity and racism as well as class, and allow a greater role for human agents' interaction with social structures.

Wolpe's identification of the need for historical specificity though, is part of a more general Marxian move away from structuralist assumptions that functionality is synonymous with purpose in political and economic relations. Marks and Rathbone, 1983, place emphasis on local and empirical history, with theorization secondary.

This gives rise to a "more nuanced and empirically detailed materialist interpretation of South African social history" (Nattrass, 1991, 673). But such approaches are still scantily extended to post 1945 developments.
With the introduction of greater "historical contingency" (Wolpe, 1988) into Marxian accounts, the gap between the liberal and Marxist interpretations of old has narrowed. But even some modern Marxist accounts face the limitation of an ambiguous definition of class in the South African context. If class is deterministically taken to be defined by relationship to the mode of production, then social group identity in South Africa has not been primarily based on class. If the ideologies which liberals always focused on - ethnicity, racism etc. - are incorporated within one's definition of class, then class more accurately defines social group formation. But is such a usage of the word class still Marxist or even Marxian? Have "Marxists" in effect ceased to become Marxists by adapting definitions of class to South African conditions? Attempts have been made to trace ideologies back to a material root, so that, for instance, the ideology of racism which cleaves South African society, can be represented as a superstructure, developed to legitimate the material relations which form the substructure of society (see Marks and Trapido, 1987). But such accounts too often fall into the related traps of determinism and conspiracy theory.

The writers of an early Marxist account - Simons and Simons, 1969 - would, according to Kuper, 1971, argue that "white and black workers perform the same function in the process of production, but that various factors obscure or inhibit or distort their perception of common interests and of the reality of class struggle" (Kuper, 1971, 281). Such factors include: racial and cultural diversities and national/racial cleavages; white workers' ability to be absorbed in the ruling elite; the effects of labour migration and discrimination on Africans; reactions of African and "Coloured" leaders to discriminatory policies, and the rabid racialism of white workers. Although these are words placed in the mouths of Marxists by a critic of theirs, admissions of a class approach's limitations must be made by any analyst, and far from being mere hindrances to a class-based conception of society, they mean, in Simons and Simons' own words, that "the binary model of standard Marxist theory did not fit South Africa's multiple structure of colour, class and cultural groups" (Simons and Simons, (1983 edition), 210).

The problem encountered by Simons and Simons has remained. "Marxists, like Marx himself, have had considerable difficulty in
accommodating ethnicity or other communal solidarities to the mainstream of their thought ... if ethnicity or communal identities cannot be causally reduced to, or derived from, the mode of production or class or the division of labour ... then Marxism's claims as an explanatory theory of society have to be scaled down" (Welsh, 1987, 189).

Marxian accounts have persuaded liberals that uneven capitalist accumulation and development can exacerbate conceptions of ethnicity and tension, but they have not shown how they are responsible for the initial formulation of group identity. "Europeans expressed revulsion at Khoikhoi customs, language, dress and physical appearance" (Welsh, 1987, 191) well before South Africa's age of industrial capitalism. The additional linguistic moral connotations of "light" and "dark", "white" and "black", gave emphasis to these negative racial attitudes (Welsh, 1987). This survey of South African historical social formation argues that incorporations of groups into colonial society after the turn of the 18th century occurred in the light of a racial stratification first developed under the Dutch East India Company at the Cape.

To suppose that "racial categorisation was imposed by late 19th century colonisation under conditions of industrial capitalism grossly underestimates continuity from the social structure of the early Cape colony" (Welsh, 1987, 193). The 19th century industrialists who agitated for the precursors to modern forms of racial labour regulation "were, after all, whites before they were capitalists and hence themselves embodiments of "ancient and venerable prejudices" (Welsh, 1987, 197, quoting Marx's "Communist Manifesto").

The ideological imperatives of a racially conceived society continue, at times, to take precedence over materialism. For the 19th century industrialist, the two were largely compatible, but "whites continued to endorse apartheid in the 1987 election despite nearly three years of severe economic malaise and widespread recognition among the electorate that this situation was substantially due to apartheid" (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). Materialism alone does not suffice as the motive force in South African social formation, and capital alone has not been the shaper of state racial policy. That policy has
meandered, pushed one way and pulled another by white constituencies, defined ethnically as well as by class; by the process of political electioneering only indirectly related to class, and by the political as well as economic effect of black, rather than working class, resistance. Group identity, I would suggest, has been forged as much by psychological conceptions of difference, based on appearance and custom, as by articulation with the mode of production. The group interaction comprising South Africa's social development then, extends beyond the scope of deterministic material accounts.

Contrary to radical thinking, "classic" liberal accounts, such as that of De Kiewiet, 1957, held that racial structures, far from enabling economically rational labour exploitation, actually precluded its most efficient use. De Kiewiet emphasised the retention of African labour on farms, when it would have been more productive in the growing urban manufacturing sector; its constrained mobility, and the fact that its market value was not recognised in its wages. If capitalist market forces alone had dictated its use, racial and social integration would have been facilitated. Apartheid was therefore not a boon to economic efficiency.

According to such early liberal authors, pre-existing social relations determined South Africa's racial order, rather than the relations forged during the industrial period (De Kiewiet, 1957, MacMillan, 1930). But "we cannot explain the exclusion of the workforce from political rights (in the late 20th century) as a consequence of such pre-existing social and political structures" (Stadler, 1987, 35) alone. For instance, the reversal of the Cape franchise in South Africa's industrial era represented a discontinuity, undermining a previously more favourable black political position, rather than a continuation of pre-industrial historical progression.

Most liberals today would recognise that South Africa's industrialisation was highly significant in adapting and transforming racial structures, much along the lines drawn by radicals. Nevertheless, one can temper the more sweeping statements, in favour of continuity. While "it was the mining industry and particularly gold mining which rapidly and profoundly transformed the social and political structures of
colonial South Africa" (Stadler, 1987), the migrant labour and influx control patterns that the industry established were still superimposed on a pre-existing social stratification based on race and manifested spatially in the mosaic of African polities and "white space". A realization of the really significant influence that mining capital had over the state in the formative period of South Africa's industrial society, should be blended with an appreciation of historical inertia.

This account suggests that the imperatives of modernising and progressive capital for economic stability, greater skills in the workplace and expanding domestic markets, have been a strong force behind recent reforms leading to the abandonment of apartheid. Indeed, "it should be evident that the main axis of social change since the 1980s has been the replacement of the political and ideological mechanisms of apartheid with market relations" (Lupton, 1992, 95). But this is not to say that Marxists have been correct all along in finding the motivation for government action in the interests of capital alone. For the government, the economy is important more for the preservation of its racially defined and multi-class, white political constituency's living standards, than for the maintenance of a narrower, capitalist class's accumulation (see concluding chapter on relations between the South African state and society).

This is also not to say that the "deterministically" liberal O'Dowd thesis is correct. O'Dowd, 1974, 1977, saw capital growth in itself as overcoming apartheid, through racial economic integration. Blumer, 1965, puts the argument thus: "social mobility upsets the established structure of status positions ... weakening established systems of authority and breaking down established systems of social control" (Blumer, 1965, 226). Such social mobility is a necessary component of the development of integrative capitalism. However, this view fails to square with the fact that it was the prospect of continued poor economic growth which pushed the government towards the abandonment of legal racial structures, not the presence of current economic growth. Additionally, capitalists alone did not have the power, even if they had the motivation, to remove apartheid.

Just as Marxists have had to incorporate liberal emphases on ideology and other non-material motivations in their work,
liberals have realized the explanatory value of class differentiation, particularly within white politics. Influence over the state can be seen as the prize contested through the 20th century by classes within white society. At a generalized level, white farmers and workers including miners, have sought to retain African influx controls and job colour bars, while industrialists and mineowners have, with varying degrees of energy, sought to undermine them. General elections have ensured that, at certain times, the state has disproportionately served the interests of one or more of these classes. While it was not always capital that had the ear of government, class differentiation can help define which group did.

Conceptions of Identity

The traditional debate between Marxists and liberals over the course of South African social development hinges fundamentally on the parameters of self-conception. If individuals define their identity primarily according to their relationship to the mode of production, then they will form groups based on class, and history will be shaped by the interaction between classes. If, as most Marxists themselves would agree, the parameters of identity are more diffuse and ambiguous, the principles of group formation may shift more easily over time, and social behaviour be comprised of a more complex web of interactions. An analysis of South Africa restricted to class relationships is not satisfactory since "that conceptualization is disproportionately the propensity of educated elites. The participants, especially those at the lower levels, also entertain other ideas, some of which are at odds with this conceptualization of the conflict ... the conflict cannot be reduced to what some of its more organised and articulate participants think it is about" (Horowitz, 1991,31).

Simons and Simons' 1969 Marxist account postulated two main possibilities for white worker mobilization. The first was organisation along class lines with African and "Coloured" members of the working class, to attain higher living standards in relation to capitalist classes, and, if possible, seize the state from them. The second was to join the capitalist class in a racial alliance against blacks. This option entailed an attachment to the white state, to attain privilege based on race,
rather than a furtherance of the class struggle. The white
mineworkers strike of 1922 demonstrated that these workers had
emphatically opted for racial superiority rather than class
solidarity. Thus Simons and Simons were forced to recognise that
in South Africa, society was primarily organised along racial
lines, with class divisions being secondary.

For Schlemmer et al, 1991, it is not race as such which defines
the dominant cleavages, but culture. Questionnaires revealed that
white concerns "are precisely those associated with the
maintenance of a "European lifestyle" in a pervasive cultural,
not necessarily racial sense. It is about standards, daily
security, privacy and control over the influences to which
children are exposed" (172). Historically, "whites have been a
sub-society in Africa, living by most of the rules and standards
of a modernising Europe" (op. cit,171). Coetzee, in "White
Writing", 1988, exposes traits in white literary activity which
indicate a similar conclusion.

While, on a global scale, Hobsbawm identifies the mid 19th
century as formative in capitalism's shaping of world society, as
representing "the florescence of a classical, competitive,
entrepreneurial regime of capital accumulation and social
regulation" (Hobsbawm, cited Soja,1989,27), in South Africa, the
same period saw the unstable interaction between divergent
cultures and physically different groups in, and on the eastern
frontier of, the Cape Colony. While penetrative imperial
capitalism may have been shaping social interaction on a global
scale, the attempts of colonial administrators to stabilize
relationships between divergent racial and cultural groups
overshadowed interactions between classes in South Africa's
social body. When, later in the 19th century, capital began to
exert its socially forming influence in South Africa, African
incorporation in the colonial capitalist economy was already
circumscribed by race. Even with the growth of a modern
capitalist economy, which, to some extent, penetrates across most
of South Africa, race and culture, rather than class have been
the most significant markers of social status and identity, and
the dominant basis of South Africa's social structure. This is
not to say, however, that South Africa is necessarily unique in
this regard. Comparative study of other colonies would be needed
to elaborate on such an assertion.
Even with the rejection of class as the fundamental basis of South African social organisation, a wider materialist motivation can still be ascribed to social formation along racial or cultural lines:

"Ethno-nationalism usually wins when it competes with class mobilization. However, this empirical observation in the ethnic relations literature always derives from a case of a threatened working class or a downwardly mobile petty bourgeoisie that compensates for denied aspirations with symbolic status. It has yet to be proven anywhere that a BMW-owning bureaucratic bourgeoisie with swimming pools and servants readily sacrifices the good life for psychologically gratifying ethnic affinities. Racial sovereignty proves durable only as long as it can deliver. A bureaucratic oligarchy can be expected to drop its "albatross" when racialism becomes dysfunctional" (Adam, 1990, 236).

For most whites, identification with the economically and politically dominant racial group has proved more "functional" than identification along the lines of cross-racial class. For Africans, a different prospect has been held out. The 1980s saw increasing class divisions within African society as apartheid's constraints on upward economic and social mobility began to be removed. In a post-apartheid South Africa, urban "insiders" may well come to share more characteristics and aspirations with the white urban bourgeoisie, than with rural "outsider" Africans. Within the cities, increasing polarities between the African bourgeoisie and the African working class are to be expected as the "levelling" devices of apartheid recede into the past. The general perception in the modern literature then, is that class divisions may be encroaching more on racial ones as the prime cleavages of identity in South African society, but such a hypothesis can only be proffered tentatively in the face of present, engrained realities of racial stratification.

Convergence of Interpretation

Neo-Marxist and liberal interpretations of South African society were more readily apparent as distinct tendencies in the 1970s and 1980s than they are today. Each tendency has, to an extent,
undergone a progressive modification, absorbing the lessons proffered by emphases of the other. While "rival theories ... can't be compared against an objective scale ... they are simply incommensurable, with the result that their exponents may be said to be living and working in different worlds" (Kuhn, 1970, 134-5), there has been a convergence of interpretations to the extent that, in the South African context, these "worlds" overlap, even though each retains an additional discrete portion.

In the early 1970s, both schools lacked a historical grounding in the relationship between white supremacy and economy: liberals had glossed over it while radicals "tended to argue from theory or from scraps of historical evidence and did no original historical research" (Saunders, 1988, 23). Now analysts from both tendencies would broadly agree that segregationist policies aided the growth of white farming and mining sectors in the early phases of industrialisation by supplying cheap and immobile labour, and that these white sectors were divided after 1910, with mineowners seeking to retain the reserves for migrants and agricultural capital largely pressing for the disintegration of the reserves, so as to corral African labour on white farms. The racial system which gave mineowners reserves, it is also generally conceded, imposed the counteracting cost of a job colour bar on this same "fraction" of capital.

"Radicals" would, by and large, accept that the evolution of the racial system in South Africa, whilst functional in many respects for white capitals, did not necessarily progress purposefully for their gratification, but for more complex reasons. Even the government of the day's interest in economic growth could not be confined to a response to the imperatives of capital per se.

Interpretations of the migrant labour system have also served to undermine the perception that capital's imperatives alone shape social formation. Labour migrated on a fairly large scale well before diamond discoveries gave organised, modern capital a formative role (see Harries, 1982). Migration "was to some extent a deliberate form of African resistance to full proletarianization" (Saunders, 1988b, 25). Even some mineowners resented the expense of training migrants, and the disruption to supplies which was threatened by unsettled labour.
For both radicals and liberals, "segregation is now seen not simply as something imposed from above, the product of what white capital, white labour or a white government wanted, but as shaped significantly by what happened on the ground" (Saunders, 1988b, 29). The emphasis of modern radicals on unintended consequences, rather than Machiavellian functionality forms "a point of contact between the latest Marxist empirical scholarship and liberal historiography" (Elphick, 1987, 168, see also Harries, 1982). With radicals interweaving in their accounts the Marxist "story" of capital accumulation with parallel stories of the state, of moral, ethnic and religious communities, of natural environmental processes and of the individual, the common ground between the two schools has been consolidated. Most analysts should now agree that "what is needed is a dynamic approach that reifies neither ethnicity, race, nor class, but recognizes the situational salience of each" (Welsh, 1987, 202). Such is the interpretive backdrop to the following narrative of South Africa's social group formation.
Chapter One

The Foundation of a Society

Introduction

In 1652 a settlement was established by Dutch officials at the Cape of southern Africa. The society which developed from this settlement, extending into the interior of the country, was an offshoot from the era of European discovery and mercantilist expansion overseas. Just as this era profoundly shaped current global relations, so its South African branch catalysed social developments that presaged modern South Africa. The period between 1652 and the late 18th century has been seen as formative for South African social development in two main respects. On the one hand, white ideologies supportive of racial exclusivity and economic relations founded upon racial stratification developed; on the other hand, and more contentiously, a nascent sense of Afrikaner nationalism has been held to have emerged on the early colony's frontier. It is argued here (with important qualifications) that the material and attitudinal relations between people of different pigmentation in the early colony as a whole, and not just on the frontier, were indeed portentous, but that the emergence of a distinct Afrikaans identity must be placed later in South Africa's history. Before these issues are addressed in more detail, it is helpful if one is familiar with an outline history of early white settlement in South Africa:

A Brief History of the Early Colony

Officials of the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) established a small settlement at the Cape in 1652 to provide refreshment and supplies to scurvy ridden ships on their voyages around the southern tip of Africa en route to the Far East. The subsequent performance of the station was not spectacular. It made a loss throughout the 143 years of its existence (Ross, 1989). The VOC had a range of partial monopolies on trade, preventing personal transactions, particularly in meat, between colonists and visiting ships, and between colonists and the indigenous peoples of the Cape. But VOC officials were usually corrupt to the extent that they used their own positions to conduct just such a
personal trade. These activities were to sow some of the seeds of future conflict with settlers, and they culminated in the dismissal of one governor, Willem Adriaan Van der Stel in 1706.

The indigenous peoples, from whom the VOC intended to keep the colonists apart, are usually described as existing in two distinct categories - Khoikhoi (called Hottentots by the settlers) and San (called Bushmen). But for the white settlers, Khoikhoi and San were less easily differentiated than is commonly thought. While Khoikhoi were generally pastoralists with a strong sense of wider group identity and San were hunter-gatherers who operated in small bands, throughout the period introduced here, conquered Khoikhoi who became dispossessed of their livestock would often fall back on hunting with San, and to an extent the groups merged (Elphick and Malherbe, 1989). They were also of the same genetic stock, the Khoikhoi having emerged as a stronger physical type due to a milk-based diet following their adoption of pastoralism. White settlers, despite stereotyping the physical characteristics of the two peoples, often confused them. Hereon, the term "Khoisan" is therefore used to refer to both peoples when describing developments which affected them both similarly in the 18th century.

The Cape was originally envisaged as being a self-contained settlement - a vision which turned out to be unrealistic since it lacked both the capital and, despite a significant slave presence, the labour, to develop agriculture intensively (Guelke, 1989). From 1657 the VOC allowed white farmers (freeburghers) to cultivate and trade on their own behalf whilst respecting the company's restrictions. The freeburghers were to concentrate on the less labour and capital intensive activities of livestock rearing and trading rather than wheat cultivation. In 1679 freeburghers, provided with slaves by the company (most of whom were subsequently returned due to their continuing resistance), were allowed by the VOC to disperse and farm beyond the Cape Flats surrounding the station. By 1700 the core western Cape farmers were increasing the production of wine, wheat and livestock and investing their surpluses in slaves and more land (Guelke, 1989), while "trekboers", despite the presence of indigenous peoples (see below), were continuing to occupy grazing land further to the east. The settlers' individual economic success bolstered an emerging identity different from that of the
VOC's employees (Katzen, 1982), but it was an identity distinguished by their permanent residence at the Cape, rather than by the kind of ethnic bonding between Afrikaans speakers that took place later in the 19th century.

Initially, relations between the small Dutch presence at the Cape and local Khoisan clans had been fairly amicable. Over the preceding century and a half, Khoisan had fought and killed Portuguese sailors who had stopped off at the Cape for supplies, when those sailors had attempted to take off Khoisan children or enforce unequal terms of trade in cattle. But the Dutch had been given express instructions to remain on friendly, if distant terms with them. They even offered ceremonial sticks as rewards to co-operative Khoisan "captains". Van Riebeeck then, was able to secure some cattle (though, he feared, not enough), through negotiation with the indigenous peoples. However, the increasing European presence manifested by the freeburghers, and their drive to occupy Khoisan land and expropriate Khoisan cattle in greater numbers, brought more unequal relations. Direct conflict over the local resources of production resulted in power struggles which, ultimately, given European military technology, could only be resolved in the settlers' favour. Khoisan resistance was spirited and fierce enough to delay, but not to preclude, further, larger-scale European conquest through the 18th century.

As dispossessed Khoisan moved north and east, white settlement was pushed inland, ostensibly under company supervision, as land at the Cape became scarce and arable farming costs rose. It tended to be the less wealthy and the unattached who pushed furthest inland, either off their own backs or in the service of others, but the basis of the white society emerging at the furthest limits of the colony was laid by subsistence farming families, with livestock but little capital, renting their new farms from the VOC. By the end of the 17th century the most extreme area of white settlement was about 80km inland from Cape Town. During the 18th century though, it shifted a further 800km east.

Relatively dense Xhosa settlement was, meanwhile, well established along the southeast coast of southern Africa. While Bantu-speaking peoples, of which the various autonomous Xhosa chiefdoms were a part, had been settled in what is now inland
South Africa for over 1,500 years, the white vanguard only met the settled outlying Xhosa chiefdoms in around 1770, to form the subsequently turbulent "eastern frontier". The frontier between white settler and Xhosa was never fixed in space or absolute in nature, and it was not only a frontier between different cultures and "modes of production" (Marks and Atmore, 1980), but an ecological frontier. The Xhosa had been restrained from moving much further west by insufficient rainfall for their mixed pastoral and arable economy.

The formation of the eastern Cape frontier, however, ultimately meant the closing of options for the those indigenous Cape Khoikhoi and San clans which had been involved, since the late 17th century, in guerilla warfare with settlers over grazing lands, and which had not moved out of colonial reach to the Orange River in the north. The meeting of white and Xhosa settlement set the seal on their final subjection and dispossession within the colony.

A British force took the Cape in 1795 and kept it until the Batavian republic was established in the Netherlands. In 1803 it was handed back to the Dutch by the Treaty of Amiens, only to be repossessed by the British in 1806, with the expectation of an ordered and prosperous colony. But the eastern frontier zone was only really incorporated into the Cape colonial system from the turn of the 19th century, with a deliberate extension of British rule. In a less tangible way the beginnings of industrial, rather than the previously limited mercantile capitalism in 19th century Europe, helped narrow the gulf between the externally trading Cape and the remote interior (Legassick, 1989).

**Social Structures in the Early Western Cape**

In the early western Cape colony, a coincidence of status and pigmentation was reinforced by VOC policy. Interracial marriages which would have blurred the coinciding lines of colour and status were prohibited, there were restrictions on black ownership of land and the Company appointed only white officials. But racial relations confirmed status even outside the province of Company intervention. Many of the attitudes behind a racial conception of social hierarchy were already present in Europe, and the fact that slavery was practised not just at the Cape, but
in many of the VOC's territories, has a particular significance.

By the time white settlers had arrived at the Cape, some had already inherited a set of racial attitudes within Europe. They were generally predisposed to hold in contempt people unlike themselves in behaviour and physical appearance. Yet Snowden, 1983, in an account of colour prejudice in the ancient world, could find no discernable racism within the Greek and Roman polities. He links this with the fact that conquered foes of a variety of complexions were customarily kept as slaves. With later European expansion overseas though, colonisation produced evident status distinctions between colonial rulers who were white and subject peoples who were black. Accompanying European colonisation was a racially exclusive trade in slaves. With nearly all slaves black and nearly all masters white, racist ideologies, it is argued, developed as legitimation. Certainly, participation in the West African slave trade by the Dutch had solidified vaguer notions of disdain for blacks (Thompson, 1985), and a European justification for slavery had evolved from crude environmentally deterministic explanations of the perceived arrested childlike development of Africans. In the northern Europe of the 17th century, Africans were already stereotyped in some quarters, as "idolatrous and licentious, thieving and lying, lazy and dirty" (cited Thompson, 1985, 71). Although reports of 18th century European travellers in Africa, and the earlier journals of shipwrecked sailors making their way across the eastern side of southern Africa, were more positive, emphasising African attributes of hospitality and equanimity, even early white contact with indigenous peoples was set against a background of nascent European prejudice. Sailors who had seen Khoikhoi at the Cape were particularly disgusted by their habit of eating raw the intestines of animals and then smearing themselves with their malodorous grease. By the 17th century the "Hottentot" (Khoikhoi) was already becoming a figure representing degradation in European literature (Thompson, 1985, 72).

Within the colony, the majority of the white settlers' slaves (65%) were brought from Madagascar. But others came from Delagoa Bay and the East African coast up to Zanzibar, carried by Portuguese and Islamic traders (Armstrong and Worden, 1989), and the lack of a common language amongst the colony's slaves contributed to the creation of Afrikaans as a standard medium of
communication. The importation of slaves was at its peak in the 1690s (Katzen, 1982), and thereafter, while slave imports continued throughout the 18th century, Cape-born slaves became more numerous.

There were slaves belonging to the company and those belonging to private individuals, the latter being more numerous. Many did not fit the common perception of a slave, but were skilled artisans, although amongst owners they were stereotyped according to their area of origin. For most of the colonial period before the early 19th century, the population of slaves at the Cape, numbering some 17,000 by 1795, was greater than that of Europeans (Boucher, cited Armstrong and Worden, 1989). Shell, 1989, has attempted to explain the fact that a smaller white population was able to perpetuate slavery in southern Africa, by referring to the custom of treating slaves as junior members of a patriarchal family. But the facts that slaves of diverse backgrounds were widely dispersed throughout the colony and therefore unable to communicate, and that punishments for insubordination could be extremely harsh, also helped preclude frequent revolt.

Despite Cape slavery being unusual in some respects, it was significant for future social relations in that all slaves and most labourers were black, while landowners and employers were white (Worden, 1994). The white settlers' fear of violence from rebellious slaves was a salient factor in shaping white attitudes towards Africans (Katzen, 1982), but even freed slaves continued to be subject to discriminatory legislation in the late 18th century; for instance, being required to carry lanterns or face arrest (Worden, 1994). Slavery cemented a racial conception of class relations for over 170 years. "By the late 18th century race and class had overlapped for so long ... (that) to many Europeans this social structure appeared to be natural or God-given" (Elphick and Giliomee, 1989, 544). More specifically, the system of slavery introduced at the Cape was portentous in that it generated the first implementation of passes for "non-white" racial groups. From the 1760s slaves and Khoisan were obliged to carry passes signed by their employers to prove that they were not runaways (Worden, 1994, 67).

However, there were spatial differences in social structures, even in early colonial society at the Cape. Cape Town society
differed from that of its hinterland largely by virtue of its external links through international trade. Despite the preservation of racial distinction by the "orthodox" elite, there was a relatively fluid intermixing of racial and status groups here, which was rare in the surrounding districts. External ties precipitated seasonal economic fluctuations which made more casual wage labour an alternative to the continual upkeep of slaves. The rate of manumission of slaves was therefore highest here. Interracial sexual relationships were also more common due to the presence a garrison and the periodic influx of sailors from visiting ships. Apart from its economic links to the outside world Cape Town was more closely attuned to the external flow of ideas. "Cape Town was the sluice through which passed all the colony's contacts with the outside world" (Elphick and Shell, 1989). These contacts included the importation of western European ideological currents. Later burgher revolts against the VOC were to carry the rhetoric of Enlightenment thinking from Europe and there was a negative correlation between the expression of such ideas and the distance of their implementers from Cape Town.

While social structures in Cape Town itself were relatively fluid, the southwestern Cape environs of the settlement were marked by a more rigid set of relations. This was a settled, arable, slave-owning area, engendering stability and a more ordered social fix. Aspects of European culture were adopted by blacks but they were not included in the white church or society. Prestige was tied to land and land was in the hands of whites by dint of conquest.

Khoisan Dispossession

As far as many historians are concerned, the most notable feature of South African social systems has been their marshalling of the "non-white" population into a labouring role for white employers. These material relations have been seen as laying at the heart of the later systems of segregation and apartheid. Slavery represents an earlier and more universal form of such a system, but the first "non-white" labouring force developed purely on southern African soil was composed of dispossessed Khoisan. The independent clans of Khoikhoi and San which had inhabited the Cape before European arrival were reduced by 1800 to a servile
labouring class under the control of whites, mostly farmers. Khoisan dispossession was traditionally traced back largely to a devastating smallpox epidemic of 1713, but in fact the process began early on in their interaction with white settlers (Wilson and Thompson, 1982). This outcome and the mechanisms which brought it about are held to have ramifications for the later relationship between race and class in South Africa.

The subjection of Khoikhoi to the political authority of whites at the Cape was resisted from as early as 1659 (Worden, 1994). Mutual cattle raiding resulted by the 1670s in the loss of independent Khoikhoi means of subsistence in the Cape Peninsula. Further north and east, Khoisan continued striving to eject white settler farmers from accustomed grazing land, through a series of raids, particularly in the 1730s, and there was a major "rebellion" in 1799, once nominal colonial authority had been established. But ultimately the Khoikhoi were in a weak position due to the form of their pastoralist society (Elphick and Malherbe, 1989). The prestige of chiefs was dependent upon their ownership of livestock. Once this had been lost to VOC-backed expeditions securing supplies for the station or on punitive raids, they also lost their ability to rally effective resistance. If, on the other hand, they kept their cattle, their mobility as fighters was restricted.

Once independent Khoikhoi political authority had been broken through conquest, individual Khoi were more accessible to white farmers, now moving further into the interior, who demanded their skills of rearing and herding livestock. In return, in the early stages of colonial development, the farmer could offer a refuge to the family of the labourer from San attacks, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of Khoikhoi chiefly authority. Thus the dispossessed pastoral inhabitants of the western Cape were incorporated into the white agricultural economy, the terms of their incorporation being subservience to white authority and a labouring function. Such conditions were obviously facilitated, indeed encouraged, by pre-existing white racial attitudes. "No one before the turn of the 19th century considered it the duty of government to end labour bondage and allow freedom of ownership and movement" for people who were not white (Elphick and Malherbe, 1989). White society's view of the Khoikhoi became so entrenched that the missionary John Philip wrote
"under the most favourable circumstances the great body of
the Hottentots cannot be in any other condition than that
of labourers for centuries to come. Individuals among the
Hottentots...may in 30 or 40 years, rise to possess little
farms" (cited Elphick and Malherbe, 1989).

By 1800 the Khoikhoi of the interior were landless, largely
immobile and dependent. After their incorporation as servants
only two institutional options remained as alternatives for some.
These were service in the Cape Regiment which employed Khoikhoi
soldiers under white leadership from 1793, and life on a mission
established by a European, which involved significant concessions
to European cultural mores (Elphick and Malherbe, 1989), with no
necessary social recognition by Europeans to accompany such
concessions.

The involvement of black people in the growing economy of South
Africa was set along the lines established in this period. Black
workers were to be primarily labourers and were to be subservient
to white bosses. To this extent the incorporation of the Khoikhoi
set the mould for the marshalling of the more powerful Bantu
speaking tribes into the white economy once their resistance was
broken during the 19th century. A coincidence of race and (pre-
industrial) class had already been formed by the end of the 18th
century.

Social Relations on The Frontier

In the South African version of the Turner thesis
(MacCrone, 1937), the frontier between colony and Xhosa has been
credited with a special role in presaging the later social
relations of South Africa as a whole. Specifically, the mentality
of racial segregation, and later, apartheid, has been said to
have first emerged here (MacMillan, 1923). In this conception, the
Calvinist pastoral trekboer (who, despite the name, usually
settled permanently once a farm was established) dominated, with
family, slaves and Khoikhoi labour subject to his control. Whites
entered the eastern area with preconceptions of their superior
Christian status over the "treacherous and violent" blacks of the
frontier region. The Xhosa were, if anything, perceived as being
even further removed from the white moral community than were the
Khoikhoi, and the hardships of competition for cattle and grazing with those of a different pigmentation solidified racial distinctions.

While there is a great deal of truth to this account, it is a simplification of the complicated pattern of relations on the frontier. Firstly, the white patriarchal family was merely the norm, not universal on the frontier. Guelke, 1989, has shown that a significant portion of frontier colonial society was composed of a "plural" community of, generally poorer, white men and Khoikhoi wives. The offspring of such unions were known as "Bastaards", and later, a polity of this origin, the Griqua, played out a significant role on the northern frontier (Legassick, 1989). Even the racially discrete social norm of the "orthodox" frontier community was not new in Southern Africa, but derived from that established in the slave-owning districts of the southwest. The development of the white frontier community's racial attitudes was also more complex:

The Khoisan of the eastern frontier region experienced dispossession later than those of the west, and, initially, with less onerous implications. During the period of the "open" frontier of 1770-95, when the outermost limits of Xhosa settlement had only recently been encountered by colonists, white population densities were low, with farmsteads at intervals of at least one hour's ride (Christopher, 1984). Khoikhoi were thus able to move relatively freely between farms to work, and their employer's coercion to remain was not always effective. There was an element of symbiosis between white farmer and black worker and no concrete fix of race and status. Not all whites were masters and not all non-whites servants, and relations between white and black were not so much master-slave; more patron-client (Legassick, 1980).

However, racial attitudes were indeed hardened and solidified because of material struggles between white settlers and Xhosa on the frontier. The series of wars which became so important in eastern frontier life were triggered by disputes over occupation of land and mutual raiding of cattle. Antagonism along racial lines was exacerbated by the maltreatment of Khoisan and Xhosa servants, the incursions of Xhosa into "colonial" territory (especially following drought), and the absence of overwhelming
force on either side to impose order. White administrators, when negotiating with Xhosa leaders, failed to understand the nature of Xhosa fragmentation into mutually independent chiefdoms. Even though the precedence of certain chiefs was recognised by various Xhosa groupings, this did not mean that these chiefs could impose a negotiated arrangement on them. Similarly, within the white settler population, officials could not control the actions of widely dispersed individuals (Wilson, 1982), and mutual distrust on the part of larger groups was continually heightened by the violent acts of small parties (Giliomee, 1989).

But it would be misleading to represent racial relations on the eastern frontier as a permanently volatile blend of mistrust and antagonism periodically bursting into warfare through the 18th century. For many whites on the frontier, Xhosa were trading partners and labourers before they were foes. Xhosa and trekboer were also aware of shared attitudes - especially towards cattle raiding as an opportunity for both to build up stock and power. The permeability of the frontier in the late 18th century facilitated a spectrum of relations between both groups with conflict lying only at one extreme.

By 1811 though, Xhosa had been expelled from the eastern limits of the colony, and with the infilling of white settlement, the Khoikhoi, despite frequent bouts of resistance, were reduced to a dependable labour force. Increasing pressure on the land within the colony meant that by 1812 only 18% of whites owned land, while virtually all had in the 1770s (Giliomee, 1989). As Khoikhoi were deprived of their remaining land, their ability to decline to work for whites disappeared. They were kept as servants on white farms by a variety of tactics on the part of the farmer. These included the withholding of wages, impounding of the servant's livestock and detention of the family of an employee.

The new British administrators, in spite of some sympathy for the Khoikhoi, needed the consent of the frontier farmers to secure order and the labour of the Khoikhoi to secure meat supplies for the growing Cape settlements. The outcome of their intervention was therefore to bolster the labour securing practices of white farmers. Indenture for "Bastaard" children of servants until the age of 25 was introduced, and, as we have seen, at the end of the 18th century a pass was required for Khoikhoi and slaves to move
between farms and to towns in the colony. An ideological construct - "white space" - had been created in southern Africa by dint of conquest. There were still more black people than white living in this space, but most blacks had to obtain permission, in the form of a pass from a white employer or owner, to move within it. By the early 19th century then, race had become a more concrete determinant of status and class, with Khoisan and "Bastaards" merging into an undifferentiated servile class only slightly above the level of the slaves themselves.

Afrikaner Identity

It has been argued that the material relations which were formed in the early period of colonisation were portentous. There is also an assertion that Afrikaner nationalism, which would later combine with a concern over the preservation of established material relations to bring about the apartheid system, had its origins in the period between white movement inland and the early 19th century (Sparks,1990, De Villiers,1988). The seeds of an exclusivist Afrikaner identity are said to have been sown among the Dutch speaking trekboers and farmers of the early colony, conflict with the British nurturing its growth.

The bonding elements which have been identified in the generation of a collective Afrikaans identity on the frontier include the Calvinist religion and the nagmaal, a kind of festival associated with it; the need for collective defence against a visibly different, and much more numerous black group made hostile by white conquest and competition for land and cattle; and common antipathy to the attempts of first the VOC, and then the British, to extend control (but not protection) over the independent-minded trekboers. To this list De Villiers,1988, adds the common belief that retreat into the interior was a way to solve the problems of poverty and harassment by the British law (a belief apparently manifested in the Great Trek of the 1830s).

Yet it is not necessarily the case that a prototype Afrikaner identity was formed in these early years. The factors listed above helped to forge a bond between settlers of the frontier, but their independence was often a stronger force than their collective spirit. The rise of a collective sense of ethnic
Afrikaans solidarity, and particularly nationalism, must be placed later in South Africa's history. The identity which emerged at this time was that of settlers in a relatively hostile colonial environment, not that of a nation in the making.

The rate at which farms were taken up in the interior was not related to market fluctuations, which leads one to conclude that it was primarily the desire to be the master of one's own land that motivated whites to settle there (Guelke, 1989). Once there, many had little contact with Cape Town. Trips to the town were occasioned by specific needs - for ammunition, tobacco, coffee, tea, sugar, baptism, or to sell a surplus. From the Zuurveld a return trip would take about three months (Guelke, 1989). The low density of settlement in the first half of the 18th century and the remoteness of the frontier necessitated an independence of spirit and an ability to be a "jack of all trades" rather than a sense of communal solidarity.

However, isolation and independence were not unalloyed. The nagmaals tempered the trekboer's exclusion from wider society. These were intermittent gatherings of the settlers of the frontier regions for the purposes of Calvinist religious renewal and reassertion, the marketing of home produced goods and the enjoyment of social intercourse. Calvinism itself was an important bonding factor, but as Du Toit, 1982, points out, it did not serve an Afrikaner sense of being the chosen people, but a more diffuse conception of being chosen in contrast to the heathens of the region. It did not therefore necessarily encourage an exclusivist Afrikaner identity as distinct from the later British presence.

The absence of VOC authority emanating from Cape Town in the more remote districts, is also said to have served the waxing sense of Afrikaner frontier identity, since the settlers substituted for central authority by running their own form of government involving paid officials (landdrosts) and part time burgher administrators (heemraden).

The VOC presence was weak on the frontier, and it was indeed resented. The Company on the one hand tried to monopolise, or at least supervise, trading relations with the Khoikhoi, like it did in the west, but on the other hand, was not able to offer the
acceptable aspect of authority on the frontier - protection from indigenous enemies. The Company was not only perceived as a wholly negative influence by many; it was also incapable of punishing insubordination in the remote districts when challenged. And challenged it was in 1795 when the eastern settlers rose up in a rebellion which was finally to be put down only by the new British administrators.

The independence of spirit and rebelliousness of the frontier is often held as an example of new traits developing amongst its settlers (Sparks, 1990, De Villiers, 1988). These traits may have represented the emergence of a different identity from that of the more stable west, but it was not yet an ethnically defined and exclusivist Afrikaner identity. This was not shaped by white settler antagonism to blacks or burgher antagonism to the VOC in this period, but by resistance to British interference in a late 19th century context (see next chapter). Although the first indications of antagonism to British intervention emerged in the early 19th century, they were restricted to a small group within settler society.

The administrative actions of the British which had the most far reaching effects on settlers penetrated in two main directions - the protection of Khoisan "rights" and the attack on slavery. The centrepiece legislation regarding the Khoisan was ordinance 50 of 1828. This abolished passes for the Khoisan, stated their right not to be forced into service and to own land and made parental consent a condition of child apprenticeship. Contracts were required for work of over a month, and were not to extend beyond a year (Elphick and Malherbe, 1989). Slavery was undermined first in 1808, when further trade in slaves was halted, and finally abolished in 1834.

These moves on the part of British administrators have been credited largely to liberals in Britain in the case of slavery, and in the case of the Khoisan, to missionary influence within the colony (Elphick and Malherbe, 1989), although there is also a materialist argument that Ordinance 50 represented an early attempt to establish free market labour relations (Newton-King, 1980). But the impact of the legislation was never as dramatic as its instigators would have liked. Elphick and Malherbe point out that it did not alter the essential nature of
the Cape economy - "namely its reliance on cheap, immobile labour" (p.52). In spite of Ordinance 50 the de facto position of Khoikhoi servants remained essentially unchanged. In fact slaves were often treated better than contracted Khoikhoi since they represented an asset of their owner (Stockenstrom, cited Elphick and Giliomee,1989,452).

The lack of de facto change can be put down to official unwillingness to stir up the wrath of white settlers of the colony. This was the element of the Cape's population in whose interests the government was most concerned to act. Whites were the wealth makers and the guarantors of political stability and minimal costs for the officials at the Cape. The British administrators therefore trusted markets and missionary intervention, rather than their own direct intervention, to improve the position of the Khoisan in line with liberal thinking. Indeed when further legislation entered the field from the official camp it was to be emphatically on the side of white employers.

Even the abolition of slavery in the colony can not be said to have dramatically changed its social characteristics. Following emancipation, slaves were bound to the same master for four years to make the transition easier for their owners, and after this interval, most had no option within the prevailing social structures but to continue working full time or on a casual basis for their accustomed "employer".

Despite the practical ineffectiveness of these British moves against white despotism, they generated disgust and apprehension on the part of some white settlers. It was clear that the general trend of British policy was more favourable to the black inhabitants of the colony than settlers were accustomed to. Specific incidents out of which much was later made, such as Slagtersnek, where British officialdom intervened forcefully against settlers for their maltreatment of a servant (see next chapter), were a manifestation of the trend. That the trend was resented by many is clear. That it became a focal point in the early 19th century for the emergence of Afrikaner identity in opposition to British official interference is far less clear. Indeed, for most of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the new British administrators of the colony cooperated with Dutch
speaking local officials in their organisation of warfare against Xhosa. It was later Dutch speakers who would use the events of the period to create a sense of Afrikaner nationalism, not those who lived at the time (Thompson, 1985).

Conclusion

This chapter has been an attempt to trace back the origin of South Africa's racial order, and to address the question of an early emergence of Afrikaans ethnic awareness. With regard to the former issue, if one can question the extent to which later social structures emanated from 18th century ones, one cannot doubt that in the 18th century a social order based to a great extent on pigmentation was created. In examining the mode by which this racial order originated, Elphick and Giliomee, 1989, place emphasis on the official intervention of the VOC. A racial order, they argue, was created rather than emerged. The legal structures of the VOC, imposed in the first years of settlement, provided the skeleton of the society that was to grow in the Cape. It was this basic form that was to be adapted over the following two centuries of geographical expansion and economic development. The legal status groups of the early Cape - freeburghers and Company servants, Khoisan, slaves and, later, free blacks - were the precursors of the racial categories which characterised subsequent South African society.

Such an argument may not, however, be sufficient in explaining the origins of South Africa's racial order. It emphasises administrative structures and an official moulding of the social perceptions of the population. But the members of this population brought with them ideas wherein could lie the origin of a racial structuring of society. The actions of the VOC could be seen as not so much initiating, but guarding and bolstering burghers' own preconceptions of what was a natural social order. The view of society entailed in VOC legislation already saturated the white society that the VOC administered. "The pattern of racial relationships established in the 18th century Cape must be seen in the light of the formation of the Cape colonist as a whole, the form of his inheritance from Europe and the exigencies of the situation he had to face" (Legassick, 1980, 68).

European social values brought ashore at the Cape were, however,
modified by its VOC-ruled, slave owning society. Here, settlers readily adopted racial attitudes which favoured them by slotting them into a social hierarchy according to their skin colour and European background.

Once established, such a hierarchy would be defended against, on the one hand, the physical threat of the those defined primarily by their race, and on the other, the cultural threat of a loss of European identity in Africa. The consolidation of white racism on South African soil stemmed initially from fear - the isolated coloniser's fear of the colonised, dispossessed and enslaved.

Racial attitudes on the frontier derived initially from those in the Western Cape, and despite a period of relative social fluidity, became more extreme with increasing competition between Xhosa and settler societies for land and grazing. While conflict between colonists and Xhosa was over material possessions (land and cattle), and the opposing sides in frontier conflict were not entirely racially discrete, pigmentation was the most obvious marker of allegiance and source of identity.

As Xhosa too, began to be dispossessed by whites, missionaries and some administrators developed the aim of "civilizing" them and incorporating them in white society. But the dominant settler conception held that they were to be kept outside of white social structures, and even outside of white space, unless they were servicing whites' labour needs. Prior to white settlement on the frontier, different Bantu speaking polities had dispossessed each other (as well as Khoisan) of land; but certain shared cultural assumptions and the lack of an obvious physical difference between dispossessed and dispossessor had facilitated a high degree of subsequent assimilation. The interaction between white settler and Xhosa was of an entirely different nature.

Ideological barriers associated with physical and cultural difference, notably over "ideas about land tenure, labour, marriage and the causes of disease" (Wilson, 1982, 268), plus the salient fact that Xhosa numbers were not only much greater than white, but growing much more quickly, made the assimilation of coloniser and colonised unacceptable to the vast majority of whites.

The shifting frontier zone did not, as in the "frontier thesis",
represent the seedbed of racism in South Africa, since racial conceptions associated with inherited European traits, slavery and the VOC order were already fixed in the southwestern Cape. Nevertheless, despite much interaction for the material gain of both white and black along the frontier, the region did see the consolidation of racially defined identity, partly because it was coincident with cultural identity. Although there was increasing class differentiation within the white population, and indigenous societies were never as egalitarian as is often believed, race assumed and retained paramountcy in defining social relations across the whole of the colony in the early colonial period.

Within the white population of the colony, by the early 19th century, discrepancies in outlook were emerging between British administrators and the slave-owning settlers - differentiated by their language, religion and sense of relative independence from authority - but they were not yet being expressed as significant ethnic cleavages. Despite legislation which was relatively liberal, the British administrators generally upheld fairly fixed racial relations, favourable to the settlers, based on a controlled labouring function for blacks in "white space".

While they are significant, the importance of early colonial racial ideologies and material structures for South Africa's later development, must not be overemphasised. "There was nothing in Cape society to suggest a race consciousness stronger than in many, perhaps most colonial societies of the day, nor anything that particularly prefigured the later elaboration of apartheid" (Freund, 1989, 334). While, elsewhere, similar systems were subsequently diluted by succeeding economic and social developments, in South Africa the system was modernised as far as possible.

The racial order was significantly changed as a result of South Africa's interaction with a world economy, its witnessing of an intra-white struggle and, most importantly, the incorporation of a numerically superior black population in rapidly developing industrial structures in the 19th century. The gap between early colonial social structures and those of 20th century apartheid - a more deliberate ideological imposition - is even greater. While the pre-industrial period as a whole laid the foundations for later systems of segregation and apartheid then, it did not dictate their form.
Chapter Two

Colonial Expansion, Industrialisation and Afrikanerdom

This chapter is divided into three sections, each dealing with one of the most fundamental transformations of the 19th century. Part One examines the processes and more conscious decisions by which not only African, but also white polities to the east and north of the Cape Colony were deprived of political independence, and often, ownership and control over land. Part Two describes the evolution of systems for the control of African labourers in "white space" during South Africa's first industrial revolution, and Part Three accounts for the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism in the late 19th century.

1. Colonial Expansion

Introduction

The land, both as symbol and as reality, has had resonant implications in the history of South African society. Possession of land was, since 1652, a theme of contention between racially and ethnically defined participants, and remains so today. The 19th century brought to fulfilment the white appropriation of African soil and the minerals beneath it. By the end of the century there was no enforceable African claim to most of South Africa. The magnitude of the transformation entailed was hidden from the view of most whites. J.M. Coetzee, 1988, has shown how two strands of white literature emerged; reflecting this fact. The "pastoral novel", exemplified by the writing of Van den Heever, is permeated with the assertion of white ownership of the land by right of occupation. Boer and soil are bound together and the Boer is South Africa - "the land lives in the culture of the farmer people through the plough". The "empty landscape novel", exemplified in the work of Olive Schreiner, portrays a South African landscape that is silent and forbidding. There is no recognition of a black occupation, indeed blacks are silent through most of white writing. This silence is imposed over the presence of the dispossessed. It reflects, according to Roy Campbell, the "curbed ferocity of beaten tribes" (cited Coetzee, 1988). Yet the menacing and brooding presence of Africans lies just outside the thin boundaries of white society, and it is
a recurrent image in white South African thought; available to be manipulated for political purposes.

Gunner, 1988, provides an account of the black literary response to dispossession. Sol Plaatje, writing in "Mhudi" at the end of the era of black dispossession, used the past as a source of inspiration and strength, harking back to a time before the frontier gave way to white advance, when Boers respected and feared their African neighbours. An indication of the nature of the intervening transformation, and of its impact on Africans, is present in the writings of R.R.R. Dhlomo and Benedict Wallet Vilikazi. In these, the ability to adapt to the industrial present is demonstrated by the experience of migrant mineworkers. Vilikazi also "wrestled with the question of how to reinterpret the Zulu past and how to write in a society where his own people were becoming increasingly dispossessed and displaced" (Gunner, 1988, 223). One response was to eulogise the paramounts who had presided over a powerful and independent Zululand, or resisted white incursion: Shaka, Dingaan, Mpande, Cetshwayo and Dinizulu. Many educated blacks hankered for a mythologised past in which possession of the land by black communities provided for a power and a tranquillity no longer to be found, especially in the industrialising cities.

While the literature of the late 19th century can tell us something about how attitudes across the most significant racial divide were shaped by African dispossession, it does not tell us how that dispossession came about. In order to comprehend the magnitude of the transformation which took place in the ownership of the land, and the use that was made of it in southern Africa during the 19th century, it is useful to simplify what was a complex series of interactions between different polities into two broad stages. The first stage was mainly to do with competition over grazing land: on the one hand, between settlers along the eastern frontier and the Xhosa, and on the other, between Dutch speaking trekkers, establishing republics to the north of the colony, and surrounding African polities. During this stage, which lasted from the late 18th to the mid 19th century, the loss of African independence often occurred through indirect, as well as direct means - the role of labour flows, missionaries and trade being particularly important. In the
second stage, beginning in the 1860s, mineral discoveries were seen by the British colonial administrators as necessitating a new geographical and economic order in the region. Those African, and even independent white polities, which had until now retained their autonomy, had it removed in the late 19th century, generally by overwhelming British military force.

Colonial Penetration in the "First Stage"

A seemingly tangled web of cooperation and conflict between white and black, Boer and British, and between African chiefdoms grouped under paramounts, characterises the early 19th century. But certain events stand out as microcosms of the broader interactions occurring, and they have a clear spatial dimension. There is an obvious distinction between the "settled" western Cape, where Khoisan dispossession had already occurred, and the turbulent frontiers to the north and east, where whites were encountering much more formidable Bantu speaking polities.

In the east, the zone where disputes over land and cattle were initially felt most acutely was the Zuurveld - in summer, an area of rich and nutritious grasses, which turned sour in the winter. Here, after a series of inconclusive skirmishes interspersed with periods of trade and barter with white settlers, the Rarabe Xhosa chiefdoms under Ndlambe were finally cleared across the Great Fish River by a more aggressive British administration in 1812. There was to be a total of nine wars between the colony and various groupings of Xhosa chiefdoms, caused largely by the vagaries and inconsistencies of British colonial policy and periods of increased competition for grazing land brought on by drought (see Mostert, 1992), but being the first all out assault on Xhosa territory and sustenance, this action was the pathbreaking one.

The British authorities tried to consolidate their influence over rebellious frontier settlers and Xhosa in 1820 by importing some 5000 civilians from Britain and placing them as settled farmers along the disputed tract between colony and Xhosa. The settlers were the first significant British civilian presence on the eastern frontier. They provided a backdrop for further British colonial intervention against the Xhosa in the area. Few of them stayed on their isolated allotments long. Most drifted to the
nascent towns of Albany District, as the Zuurveld was now known, and found their new livelihood in transport riding, trading, craft or hunting. By May 1823 only 438 of the original 1004 male grantees remained on their rural sites, the infertility of the soils and the unaccustomed hazards of frontier life, including Xhosa raids and three successive seasons of rust, drought and flood, having driven the rest away. Where they failed in the bush though, they generally prospered in the towns, turning tiny colonial "dorps" like Graaff-Reinet into "entrepots" of new trade (Peires, 1989a).

While the British settlers were acting as "apostles of free enterprise and free trade" (Peires, 1989a, 472) within the extremity of the colony, rumours were filtering down from the northeast, carried by traders, trekboers, missionaries and hunters, of great upheavals among the Bantu speaking peoples with whom white settlers had not yet made contact. It seems likely that a combination of ecological crisis, brought on by the structure of pastoralist agriculture, population growth and drought, and competition over trading monopoly with the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay precipitated a change in the structure of the northeastern polities around the turn of the 19th century (Guy, 1980, Hedges, 1978, Wright and Hamilton, 1988). Certainly the chiefdoms of the Ndwandwe under Zwide in what became northern Zululand, and the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo along the east coast, underwent a militarization of the amabutho (originally age cohort elephant hunting groups), a centralisation of state power over neighbouring clans and a period of intensified conflict, known as the mfecane, which resulted in the regional hegemony of the Zulu, under Shaka. Militaristic consolidation of clans into more centralised structures led to a diaspora of peoples from an epicentre in Natal. For instance, an intrusion of Matiwane into the Cape Colony was met with repulsive force in the belief that these refugees were themselves the imagined "rampaging" Zulu.

The lack of recorded evidence of these developments beyond the limit of European involvement means that no interpretation will be definitive. At the time, a hazy awareness of significant upheaval and of the rise of powerful groupings in a not too distant hinterland, permeated the frontier zone and presented yet another insecurity for the British settlers there.
Boers in their thousands had already, singly and in groups, escaped the confines of the colony to inhabit "Transorangia" to the north, alongside the Griqua, Khoisan remnants and groups of Tswana. But the decision of some 15,000 to embark upon their own enterprise of state construction away from British territory added a new and profound dimension to the course of social formation from 1836. The collection of parties moving out of the colony extended the sphere of white influence to the north and hastened the pace of conflict with, and dispossession of Bantu groups. After the Trek, the geographical spread of white settlers achieved the envelopment of the two largest black polities - the Zulu and the Xhosa, thus paving the way for their eventual conquest.

The decisive collapse of the western Xhosa's means of independence came in the 1850s. The loss of pastures, the destabilising conflict with the colony, the psychological impact of a steady undermining of Xhosa culture, and the toll of cattle lungsickness resulted in the invocation of a form of spiritual assistance - that of their ancestors. The context of the 1850s was a particularly propitious one for the prophesies of a young girl, Nonqawuse, and her guardian, Mhlakaza, to become widely accepted (Peires, 1989b). She foretold that sacrifices of cattle (many already seemingly forfeit to lungsickness) would bring forth hordes of ancestor warriors who would banish the whites and restore plenitude to the land. Such prophecies were not unprecedented in Xhosa society, and they subsequently occurred in other parts of the world where indigenous societies were under threat (see Wilson, 1982). The circumspection of many Xhosa was treated as treachery by a growing force of believers as cattle slaughtering gained momentum. Various chiefs sent emissaries during 1856 and 1857 to Nonqawuse at the Gxarha River mouth to ascertain a date for the resurrection, but a sequence of such dates passed and finally the participating Xhosa realized their predicament: thousands starved, their basis of subsistence destroyed and the only option, dependence on the colony where eager employers were waiting for their labour. Despite nearly a century of resistance, the Rarabe Xhosa was the first Bantu-speaking polity to be dispossessed.

The Gcaleka Xhosa to the east retained possession of their land and control over their labour until later in the 19th century.
Further north, in the wake of the mfecane, the trekkers, who had eventually established two new Boer republics - the Transvaal (later, South African Republic) and the Orange Free State - initially became involved in a complex series of alliances and conflicts with nearby, centralised African groupings. Most immediately, the Transvaal settlers were in dispute over land with the Ndebele (an offshoot from the Zulu kingdom), whom they subsequently drove out of the region entirely. In the 1840s, Orange Free State burghers both purchased land from the Griqua and fought the Basotho, under Moshoeshoe's leadership, for possession of grazing land between the Caledon and Orange Rivers (Worden, 1994). Neither of the republics, however, was strong enough to enforce its will over the stronger, post-mfecane, centralised polities of the region, such as the Pedi in the north and the Basotho bordering the Orange Free State (see Marks and Atmore, eds. 1980, Davenport, 1991). Their conquest would not occur until later British intervention.

Certain agencies were responsible for preparing the ground for African political subjugation, both to the east of the Cape Colony's frontier and around the trekker republics, in this early period. Labour contracts, for instance, between white farmers and individual Xhosa, made it increasingly difficult for the Xhosa chiefs to maintain the cohesiveness of the group (although in polities further from the colony's frontier, greater chiefly control was established over migrant workers' movements - see Beinart, 1982, Delius, 1983). Missionaries from the white colonies mostly viewed conversion and the adoption of Western parameters of civilisation as proceeding concurrently (William Shaw, cited Peires, 1989a, 487), and even the influential pro-Xhosa missionary, John Philip recognized that he was extending British influence and the Empire. In an innovative account, Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, have shown how Tswana cultural practices and sources of authority were subtly modified to reflect an awareness of the colonial power manifested by missionaries, well before colonial conquest itself. Traders were also influential in eroding the underpinnings of pre-colonial African societies before their final subjection, by allowing individuals within African polities to by-pass traditional chiefly control over trade, and amass wealth on their own behalf (see Colenbrander, 1979, and Kennedy, 1981, for the role of trade in the Zulu kingdom).
Individual African responses to contact with white society in this early period depended to a great extent upon the "shape of (their) rural communities" (Beinart, 1982), and the nature of their pre-colonial political functioning. A comparison between Mpondo (Beinart, 1982) and Mfengu (Bundy, 1972) is illustrative. The Mfengu had already had their chiefdoms destroyed by the mfecane before they met white colonists. As refugees from Natal they were accepted by the Xhosa, but as inferiors in the hierarchy of distribution. Having no independent political structures and little independent means of subsistence, the Mfengu were especially receptive to colonial culture, particularly conversion to Christianity. Many became allies of the colony in subsequent wars against the Xhosa. By comparison, although Mpondo adaptation occurred in the second phase of colonial penetration, when industrialisation of the interior was well under way, chiefly power was not only intact, but able to dictate the terms on which Mpondo would migrate to the colony. Chiefly direction of the processes of incorporation even extended to the collection of wages by the chief on behalf of workers from his area.

For Zulu-speakers in Natal too, even though they were under tenuous colonial rule, there was still a relatively high degree of autonomy until the later 19th century. Atkins, 1993, traces the attempts of refugees returning from places of shelter from the mfecane or escaping the marriage restrictions of the Zulu King to the north, to reconstitute their accustomed lifestyles in the region. From their position of numerical strength and their ability to attain access to land, many of them were able to successfully resist incorporation in the colonial economy as wage labourers, or, when they did participate, to do so to some extent on their own terms. It was this ability which lay behind the constant refrain of "the Kaffirs are lazy", coming in the second half of the 19th century from the colonial settlers of the region.

Colonial Conquest in the "Second Stage"

"As late as the 1870s the subcontinent was divided into a large number of polities, chiefdoms, colonies and settlements of widely differing size, power and racial composition, without political unity or cohesion" (Worden, 1994, 5), but by the end of the 19th
century, the lands of what had once been the independent African polities, had generally been reduced by a combination of war and peaceful, but insidious processes, to areas reserved on European terms for continued African occupation. During the intervening period, not only the Sotho, Tswana, Griqua, Gcaleka Xhosa, Zulu and Pedi, but also the white settler republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, had been subjected to a form of British imperial control.

The explanation for this expansion of imperial intervention, with its commitment of vast British resources, lies in mineral discoveries; first of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1868, and then, in the 1880s, of gold in the Transvaal. By raising the prospect of a self-sustaining, and even organically expanding economy within a united southern African whole - in other words a confederation - the discoveries made the independent Boer and African polities of the interior seem much more significant thorns in the side of the British colonial administration than they had previously appeared.

The aim of a confederation of white ruled polities in the region was not a new one; initially, it had been motivated in London by a desire to reduce imperial commitment and involvement in colonial vicissitudes by granting fairly cohesive self government to the region, including the Boer republics. After the 1870s though, diamond mining shed a new light on the British administrative aim. A political confederation of colonies and republics would be a significant step towards the goal of smooth economic functioning, particularly by allowing for the administrative integration of the diamond mines and their labour source areas, and the reduction of the harassment that the labour received as it traversed the Boer republics towards the mines.

Basutoland was taken under British authority in 1868, after Moshoeshoe, concerned at the increasing white interest in the region, had seen the writing on the wall, and requested British imperial protection. Griqualand West was annexed in 1871 and a rebellion there put down in 1878. Carnarvon's annexation of the bankrupt Transvaal (weakened by war with the Pedi) in 1877 and Bartle Frere's appointment as the prospective first Commissioner of a federated South Africa, were further milestones in the infusion of the idea of confederation into policy. A dispute
within the Xhosa polities gave a pretext to wage a savage war on the remaining independent Gcaleka Xhosa in 1877-8, but the first major setback came in 1879 when a British column, moving to eradicate the independent Zululand's impediment to the scheme, was defeated at Isandhlwana.

The eventual submission of the Zulu though, still did not leave the path to confederation clear. In the northern Transvaal, the Pedi, who had successfully fought off Boer attempts at control, were defeated by British soldiers with Swazi help, shortly after the Zulu war, and during the first British occupation of the Transvaal. However, despite the profusion of blood spilt and the enormous sums of money spent, confederation was still not achieved. In 1881, Transvaalers rebelled and defeated British regiments at the Battle of Majuba. With the prospect of a costly war to regain control of the Boer republic, confederation was abandoned.

Abandoned, that is, until the gold discoveries of the 1880s made it seem once more possible to outweigh the costs of conquest with the economic dividends of a united colony. Southern Bechuanaland had been annexed in 1884 to secure sources of timber, grain and labour supply to the Kimberley mines, but Southern Tswana resistance was only finally crushed after the gold mines had provided further reason for confederation, and following the Langeberg "revolt", in 1897.

The Cape Colony, having enjoyed responsible government since 1872, was opposed to this second, gold-led drive for confederation, seeing in it a threat to its own economic status. But the greatest obstacles to the new push for confederation remained the Boer republics. Their leaders were rather less concerned with economic rationality for the region and rather more preoccupied with maintaining their independence from British influence. The mines also brought mixed economic blessings for the republics, along with their political uncertainties. In the 1880s, farming had still been the dominant sector in the republics and, despite regulations restricting African labour mobility and farmers' own initiative in securing "apprentice" labour, acute labour shortages set in once the mines were functioning. By the end of the century only prosperous farmers were able to attract sufficient labour.
The republics' attempts to contain industrialisation and to control the flow of entrepreneurs and labourers entering the diamond and gold fields, constituted a serious obstacle to British plans for confederation, and provided the backdrop to the 1899 to 1902 Anglo-Boer war (see Part Three of this chapter). Once this last and most bloody, intra-white colonial war was over, the nature of the British colonial role in the region had shifted anyway, making confederation a redundant concept (see Chapter Three).

While the confederation policy was still being pursued, African polities, once conquered or absorbed within colonial structures, responded in different ways to the opportunities that presented themselves. During the second half of the 19th century, an independent black commercial peasantry emerged. Bundy has done most to recover the struggle of this peasantry to compete in an emerging market economy for agricultural produce. Mfengu in the Herschel district of Ciskei, bordering the Orange Free State and Lesotho, for example, "made considerable adaptations, departing from the traditional agricultural economy and emerging as small scale commercial farmers" (Bundy, 1980, 209). Marks and Atmore, 1980, note that many African polities had already had experience of producing an agricultural surplus during and after the mfecane; not for sale, but to provide tribute to a neighbouring and more powerful group. In the 1860s the emergence of commercial participation in agriculture in Herschel was indicated by the presence of new ploughs and wagons and the increasing diversity and quantity of crops produced. The boom stage came with the expansion of the diamond town of Kimberley in the late 1860s and 1870s, when western houses, furniture, clothes and artifacts were adopted, some going so far as to employ servants.

Increasing prosperity for some, however, coexisted with greater desperation for those squeezed out by the growing concentration of landholding. From 1883 the number of passes issued to wage seekers leaving the reserve significantly increased. What had been the fate for some soon became the fate of many, despite an ephemeral economic upswing for the region following the Witwatersrand gold discoveries and the miners' demand for riders, grain, oxen and wool. From 1895 to 1899, drought, locust and rinderpest conspired with the colonial authority's poll tax and fluctuating market prices to inflate the numbers of destitute and
increase the rate of emigration. The social stratification evident in the 1880s had become pronounced by 1900. White farmers, facing similar ecological and market forces, could rely on government assistance, but not the African peasant producer, both in Herschel and elsewhere. By 1920, Bundy writes, the reserve was easily distinguished from surrounding white areas by its evident poverty with, according to Gaoler, a large percentage of its population on "the very lowest level of bare subsistence" (quoted Bundy, 1980, 219).

In the early 20th century, elite Africans began a new, political phase of resistance, with the founding in 1912 of the forerunner of the ANC, the SANNC (South African Native National Congress). It was the creation of the solidly middle class Africans, John Dube, Pixley Seme and Sol Plaatje. These were representatives of a relatively new phenomenon - a cohesive section of African society which had used a European style education and a willingness to adopt white cultural mores, not only to improve its own social and material position, but also to speak out on behalf of Africans with less access to white opinion. Lodge argues that its mobilisation in 1912 was a response to the closing off of opportunities for the social advancement of Africans following the Union of the two colonies and two ex-republics to form South Africa in 1910 (Lodge, 1983). The Cape's assimilationist constitution had held out the potential for the advancement of educated Africans not only to social grace, but to political power. It came as a bitter pill when the Act of Union not only failed to extend the Cape constitution to the other provinces, but removed the potential for black Members of Parliament at the Cape and substituted white representatives.

In its early stages the SANNC acted primarily in the interests of its middle class founders rather than Africans as a whole. An early complaint about segregated waiting rooms on the railways was lodged on the grounds that its members would have to share benches with uncouth rural Africans (Lodge, 1983). The organisation operated to defend class privilege for a new social group, as much as to fight denial of the wider racial group. Yet its very presence denoted that, by the early 20th century, the core of Africans who had already accepted the fact of white conquest, and even a mission education from whites, were already looking for a political solution to their problems of social and
economic mobility. The political approach would gradually diffuse from this core group, through "tribal" representations, to a much broader cross section of African society.

2. Industrialisation

The Infusion Of Capital

African dispossession by no means proceeded entirely with the growth of industry in mind. It followed from the settlers' desire for land and security well before minerals were discovered inland. But the seal was set on African dispossession by the enhanced economic and consequent political power that industrial growth would proffer to its white masters. For millions of Africans the industrial system dictated the terms of incorporation into the world created by whites in South Africa.

In the first half of the 19th century the growth of an export industry, centred in the Cape, was achieved with viticulture, wool, mohair, and ostrich feathers from the more arid regions, but it was the mines of the interior which generated the wealth to transform South Africa from an essentially peripheral position within the world economy to that of a "sub-core". The mines did not just allow South Africa's economic integration with the world economy; they also brought about an internal economic integration. As Browett, 1976, points out, the gold wealth was not all returned to overseas investors; much of it was put to use in the development of new South African industries and the infrastructure necessary for further industrialisation.

Despite initial Boer reluctance, by the early 1890s, Johannesburg had already become the largest city in Africa south of Cairo, and the region's industrial and financial core. Browett and Fair's 1974 survey of the economic geography of South Africa at certain intervals since 1870 is useful in providing the outline story behind South Africa's present spatial economic relations, although its terminology and simplicity are somewhat outdated: In 1870, the only major regional "core" in South Africa was Cape Town, with Durban representing a minor regional core. Surrounding the two towns were belts with the highest white population densities and commercial farming. Lying beyond these areas were zones of medium population density, the inhabitants of which
participated in commercial livestock farming, and which contained fairly well developed urban structures for the period. Two "resource frontiers" were just emerging in the 1870s, with diamonds attracting settlement at Kimberley, and copper in Namaqualand.

Browett and Fair's next description is of the idealised South Africa of 1911, where the impact of the diamond and gold mines over the preceding 41 years had had dramatic effects. A result of the spatial concentration of newly discovered resources had been increasing differentiation in the geographical distribution of economic assets. South Africa's space had also become better integrated through the stimulation of regional specialisation, in response to growing market opportunities. Both trends were the outcome of an infusion of capital, catalysed by the mineral discoveries. The appearance of the new mineral based cores had provided first an incentive for British imperial control and conquest, and, later, magnets for black population shifts, and had brought into being a pattern of migrant labour that has formed a key characteristic of South Africa's human geography. By 1911 there were three major cores, Johannesburg being the largest. Below these Browett and Fair envisaged six minor cores lying outside mainstream economic growth, but still experiencing expansion. There was intensive economic activity using railway networks around each of the major cores and around Port Elizabeth, and it was these areas which had the highest employment densities and the most extensive urban structures. Regions lying beyond these immediate hinterlands responded to the demands for local and regional products from the minor cores (Bundy's Herschel is a case in point, where it was African, rather than white farmers who responded). Each of the major cores in 1911 was more cohesively joined to its own periphery by the flows of black migrant workers moving to and from it, than it was to the other cores.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, dramatic changes were occurring in the physical and social landscape of the areas which were evolving into "cores". An informal type of urban segregation was emerging within the white population (for example the large gardens and elaborate design of the residences in Parktown overlooking Johannesburg contrasted sharply with the small plots and gridiron pattern of the dwellings in Vrededorp, physically
and metaphorically beneath it, Van Onselen, 1982); but the consequences of spatial segregation by race were far more dramatic, being ordered and structured, rather than passively opposed by government.

The essential premise behind the treatment of black workers resident in the cities of Kimberley and Johannesburg was that they were there temporarily, and largely to extract the finite mineral resources (Smit, 1979). The possibility that blacks could become acculturated participants in a racially shared urban environment was inconceivable to most whites. The "fact" that Africans in the cities were to be only temporarily resident was seen as necessitating officially ordered migrancy and urban influx control, and these in turn helped forge racial segregation in the cities.

Lemon, 1982, has described South Africa's migrant labour system as a means of reconciling the social separation of races with the economic interdependence of a modern, expanding economy. He states that South Africa is unique in having imposed an institutionalised and legally entrenched migrant labour system on racial lines. But the policies of the government were not internally derived and then simply externally imposed. To a large extent they reflected and reinforced cultural and social practice on the part of white settlers, and, partially, of Africans themselves. Lemon points out that, from the 1850s, Africans in the Cape had been forced by white settlers, backed by the administration, to choose between assigned locations and service on colonial farms. Denied the previous strategy of farming on white owned land, and facing the demands of taxation, increasing numbers of Africans came to work for white farmers.

Migrancy to the white farm was further encouraged when railway branch lines were built to areas of white farming so as to avoid black peasant producing regions like Fingoland (Bundy, 1972), thus denying Africans equal access to markets, and stimulating their resort to employment. But even while African polities like the Pedi, Tswana and the Mpondo remained independent, their Paramounts had sent workers into the British colonies and Boer republics. Controlled migrant labour flows were a valuable way for African polities to secure not only consumer goods, but also firearms to resist further colonial incursion. Labour flows to
the sources of white employment were expanded dramatically when the destination shifted to the mines. After 1870, first the Kimberley diamond fields and then the Witwatersrand gold mines brought forth streams of potential workers. By 1899 nearly 100,000 Africans were on the gold mines alone, many from farther afield than the four states of the region themselves (Lemon, 1982).

Kimberley's significance extends beyond the centripetal force it exerted on African workers. The closed worker compounds which were built there to prevent smuggling of diamonds and establish control over the African workforce, set the mould for other mining, and then manufacturing concerns. The first step on the road to racial discrimination in the new, industrialised South Africa, was a revolt by white prospectors and merchants in 1875, to protest at undercutting by Africans.

After 1876, larger mining companies (which, as costs rose with the depth of excavation, were becoming increasingly centralised) introduced registration passes and fixed contract terms for workers, but the 1841 Master and Servants Laws were invoked to restrict the practice to black miners, who could now be arrested if found in the area without the proper pass. Developed by white prospectors, the pass system was further institutionalised by the Cape administration when the area came under its jurisdiction. Organised mining capital very much had the ear of this administration, particularly when Cecil Rhodes (who, with the De Beers company, had established a virtual monopoly over diamond mining) became Prime Minister.

Strip searches of workers for hidden diamonds began from the 1880s, but further strike action by white miners, ironically with initial black support (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989), led to the further restriction of this practice to Africans. Closed compounds for African workers followed, not just to prevent smuggling, but to enable direct supervision and control of the companies' workers and to allow wage savings, justified by the bulk provision of food and accommodation (Turrell, 1984). It was the political power of the centralised mining houses that made such controls over the workforce in the Cape possible, and it was the racial status differences established in the pre-industrial period, that enabled only white workers to combine successfully...
in resistance to the worst of them (Turrell, 1987).

In the Transvaal, the overall cost structure of the gold mines was critical for the development of further aspects of discrimination in the mining workforce - lower wages for Africans and job reservation. If owners could cut their overheads, then the less lucrative seams could be mined profitably. It would have to be the unenfranchised and "uncivilized" African worker who bore the brunt of the attempt. In 1887 the Chamber of Mines was formed on the Rand to encourage uniform policy and practice of labour recruitment across the colonies and republics. Its first attempt to impose a standard African wage disintegrated under the force of competition for labour in a period when it was still relatively scarce. But subsequent government controls over recruiting enabled employers to uniformly cut African wages by 20% in 1896 and a further 30% in 1897 (Davenport, 1991). The white Transvaal Miners' Association was formed after a 1902 strike to resist further cost-cutting piece work rates, which were now to be applied to whites as well.

After the Anglo-Boer War wages were again cut due to the fall in production and the need to exploit lower grade ores. In combination with the growth of job opportunities on the railways, the wage cuts contributed to another shortage of mineworkers. The Chamber's temporary response was the introduction of Chinese workers, whose presence was resisted by white miners afraid that oriental labour would eventually take their own jobs. The first job reservation system was applied against these Chinese workers, but it was subsequently extended, under white labour pressure, to cover Africans. By 1907, African labour had met the shortfall and the machinery for its recruitment was functioning again, but the difference in conditions of work for white and black had firmly taken root.

**Urban Structures**

Agricultural towns were already racially segregated to some degree in terms of area of residence and type of accommodation, but Kimberley's pattern of white workers in boarding houses and homes of the town proper, and blacks in segregated compounds "was an unfortunate precedent for South Africa's first industrial town to set" (Worden, 1994, 39).
Where Africans did settle according to unauthorised initiative - in backyards or vacant lots, rather than in controlled locations, like established servants, or in compounds - vociferous demands from white townspeople for official urban segregation ensued. Rapid black urbanisation was perceived as a threat to the established order of town life for South Africa's white population. The increase in the urban African population represented, for many, the demise of "white civilization", ever held to be in tenuous occupation in an African environment.

The fear of urban racial integration in South Africa is set in comparative colonial context by Christopher, 1983: "It may be argued that the historical foundations of modern Soweto...were laid by Edward I in his Welsh military foundations in the 13th century at Flint, Conway and Caernarvon". The basic premise is that English colonists, in an effort to maintain the dominant political and economic position of the English townsman, always resisted integration with the different cultural groups found in their colonies. Generally, the fear of the colonised is at the heart of the colonial settler psychology. Equality between the coloniser and colonised, in any respect, would serve to bring the spectre of a violent overthrow of the colonial yoke and its representatives closer. Physical, and particularly cultural disparities between colonisers and colonised, and a superiority in the numbers of the colonised, contribute to the ruling group's disquiet over urban assimilation.

However, there was significant variation in the level of urban segregation in South Africa's early cities, even between cities in the British colonies of Natal and the Cape (Christopher, 1990). Prior to the Union, each of the four administrations in South Africa pursued separate policies of urban planning:

While the Cape's pre-industrial towns were less rigidly segregated than others, the "natural" segregation of wealth and class tended to assume a racial composition anyway. Many ex-slaves were clustered on mission stations, while, from 1847, the eastern districts of the colony had municipally managed locations and part of the "Coloured" population outside the white towns. In Cape Town the expanding migrant labour system was responsible for the appearance of compounds separated from the white residential areas, Kimberley being invoked as a model for African migrant
control. From 1901 to 1904, an outbreak of bubonic plague in parts of the country brought about what has been labelled the "sanitation syndrome", in which fears for the health of the (white) population informed official attempts at urban segregation. In response, separate location construction took place in Cape Town, while in Port Elizabeth, Africans were shunted from their homes to the township of New Brighton. By the early 20th century the Cape had joined the rest of South Africa in implementing pass laws and influx control regulations and it was engaging in the resettlement of illegal black squatters.

Under the rather more severe Natal administration, Africans were discouraged from town locations early on and directed into barracks, under a system known as "togt". From 1873, to stay in town, Africans seeking day labour in Durban and Pietermaritzburg would have to register and wear a badge. The scheme was soon extended to cover all Africans present in the town, and accompanied by an attempt to provide barrack locations for single male workers to live in while they were there. Marks and Atmore, 1980, explain the system as an attempt at security on the part of an early colonial presence which was weak compared to the strength of African polities in the region. Subsequently, revenues from a municipal beerhall monopoly were used to construct segregated African townships for the city.

Barracks were the only early accommodation for indentured Indians brought to Natal from the 1860s to work on the sugar plantations - a form of employment rejected by the nearby Zulu. By the late 19th century, the impulse for segregation here was primarily directed against the Indian population, growing as traders established themselves alongside indentured labourers. In response to Indian trading competition, the local state pursued "residential segregation, political exclusion and commercial suppression" (Swanson, 1983).

Blacks were housed in the towns of the Boer republics by their employers or in locations built near, but outside the town. There was some differentiation between the republics, the Transvaal being less efficient in its racial ordering of urban space (and also having Indian residents, who were banned from the Orange Free State). In Johannesburg, the "sanitary syndrome" led to old African slums being razed in the early 20th century, and their
inhabitants removed to the location of Klipspruit. However, a high proportion of Africans remained living neither in compounds nor formal townships, but in freehold or leasehold accommodation in Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare or Alexandra. These were rather anomalous townships: due to the specific circumstances of their historical development, blacks within them could own the plots on which they lived (see Lodge, 1983, 156).

No general model of South African city development, let alone colonial city development, can accommodate the specific influences which contributed to the moulding of each city's form in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; rather, like a palimpsest, the influences were layered one upon another over time, and while some of those influences may have been more universal, others were local and contingent. Nevertheless, in each of the territories of South Africa, the first industrial revolution, brought about initially by mineral extraction, had set in train fundamental social changes. While white townspeople were forced to readjust to a far larger, non-servant African presence, no longer silent and externalised, but economically vital, and on their doorstep, their politicians groped for a policy to order urban space and provide the social controls necessary to reassure them.

**Segregationism**

Industrialisation brought about a contradiction central to South Africa's subsequent social, economic and political development - that between large scale African labour requirements, inclining social structures towards racial integration, and ideologies and administrative systems of spatial separation. The African labour presence in the cities could only remain temporary and separate if there were enforceable regulations overseeing arrivals to the urban areas, and territories set aside outside the cities where Africans could reside when not employed in them. The Cape Prime Minister, W.P. Schreiner summarised the official attitude towards African workers: "let them do their work, receive their wages, and at the end of their term of service, let them go back to the place whence they came - to the native territories, where they should really make their home" (cited Swanson, 1971). The diffusion of this view - segregationism - helped put an end to a competing vision of racial relations - that of assimilation.
George Grey, the governor of the Cape Colony from 1854 to 1861, had pursued a policy of partial racial integration on white terms, to make the Xhosa "a part of ourselves, with a common faith, common interests, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue" (quoted Davenport, 1991, 221). The material basis of such "liberal" thinking is set out by Trapido, 1980, but many "philanthropists" adopted the same assimilationist premises more out of a concern to benefit Africans, by introducing them to the implicit and unquestioned advantages of European civilization. Under Grey, the Cape, with a new "non-racial" constitution based on a property franchise qualification, witnessed the development of mixed-race schools and hospitals, in which whites and Africans were treated identically, and Grey himself even paid for forty sons of Xhosa chiefs to be educated in a mission school of the colony (Wilson, 1982). Meanwhile a debate on the merits of assimilation was taking place within Xhosa society, between, on the one hand, Christian converts and those who had attended colonial mission schools, and on the other hand, "reds" - those who continued Xhosa traditions such as smearing oneself with red clay (Wilson, 1982).

Within the colonies, while assimilation could guarantee the required African labour supplies, the threat of an integrated urban African workforce, particularly in Natal with its numerically overwhelming African population, was influential even before the advent of rapid urbanisation. In 1852 a commission was set up in Natal to investigate the colony's "Native Policy". The commission revealed a strong segregationist discourse among white respondents. However, spatial segregation for peace and security, was to be tempered by the colony's labour requirements (Thompson, 1985).

Shepstone's Natal "Native Policy" is most often cited as the original in large scale, formal, spatial segregation. From 1845 into the 1850s, the reservation of areas for African occupation was systematically pursued in the colony. The reserves were ruled by appointees subject to Shepstone himself, under what was described as "traditional law". Despite a British government grant, ostensibly for their development, Shepstone, in an attempt to ensure the colony's labour supplies, allowed the reserves to stagnate. The reserves came to embody stores of relatively cheap labour reproduction. Yet Shepstone himself was not an early
segregationist ideologue. He was a pragmatist, an administrator whose brief and desire was to ensure that the most efficient systems of administration were implemented in the interests of the white colonial settlers and the British government. He, unlike later South African administrators, was not attempting to implement a pre-formulated ideological programme.

The Cape Colony's Glen Grey Act of 1894 represented a more systematic attempt to implement a coherent "Native Policy" in one area. It is often interpreted as being assimilationist in nature (Davenport, 1991, Graaff, 1990), since it gave African producers in the Transkei (later Ciskei too) small plots of land, and by alienating the land from the remainder of the local African population, encouraged migration to supply the colony's labour needs. But Rich, 1981, has argued that it had an important influence as a precedent for later, segregationist, rather than assimilationist, notions of reserve administration. For the first time under the act, areas with separate administrations were deliberately set aside for African occupation; areas which would nevertheless remain functionally linked, through labour supplies, with "white space". The architect of the Act, Rhodes, saw Africans as children just emerging from barbarism. For him, it was futile to imagine that these vessels would yet contain the standards of western civilization (Parry, 1983). Turning segregated plots of 8 acres (little enough to bar qualification for the Cape franchise by dint of property) over to Xhosa, and leaving the Kholwa (Christian convert Africans) out of the scheme's provisions, effectively signalled the replacement of official attempts to amalgamate black and white societies. Instead, attempts to enforce their separation ensued.

Segregation then, already established in Natal, became accepted in the Cape by the end of the 19th century, as a device to ensure that African social advancement in an industrialising economy should not undermine white supremacy. It was a means of both regulating unskilled labour and entrenching white political control, and it was legitimated by the racial "science" of the era - a distorted form of social Darwinism. The strand of thought which had Africans as an inferior branch of an evolutionary chain prevailed in nearly all publications in the first decades of the 20th century, even in a history written in 1920 by Silas Molema, an African himself (Thompson, 1985, 95). The prominent late 19th
century white historian, Theal, thought that the intelligence of individual Africans depended on the amount of white blood their ancestors had acquired in North Africa before the Bantu migration to the south. With such immutable differences between the races "proven" by the contemporary practice of anthropology, assimilation was bound to fail, since Africans were incapable of absorbing the European traits of civilization. In accordance with the pursuit of its alternative — segregation, the Cape franchise qualification was raised under Spriggs in 1887 and under Rhodes in 1892, excluding thousands of African voters. Journalistic resistance by educated Africans like Jabavu (who, in themselves were an anomaly for the "scientific" theory) proved ineffective, and by 1910, the Cape had liquor laws preventing sale to Africans, segregated residential locations and compulsorily segregated education.

The rejection of the prospect of equality between races was, for most whites, an implicit assumption, and it was maintained in church and state through the ensuing industrial era (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). For Smuts, writing in the 1930s, the "Native Question" was "a matter decided for me in far-off days by my temperament and outlook", which were those of a white South African brought up in the late 19th century, and which "cannot be affected by what passes or happens today, but of course I see the rocks ahead quite clearly" (cited Ingham, 1988,189).

It was Milner's post Boer War Native Affairs Commission (responsible for the production of the Lagden Report), established to design a pattern for the reconstruction of the region, which encouraged the universality of segregation and portrayed it as a more coherent ideological programme. According to Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, it laid the foundations for the system of segregation adopted "deep into the 20th century".

Ashforth, 1990, who has paid particular attention to the assumptions implied by the report's language, argues that it was part of a "search for a formula, expressible in terms acceptable to "civilized" opinion in the mother country and the colonies of South Africa, by which labour for capitalist enterprise could be secured" (27). The reservation of land for "Natives", it was implied in the report, required a reciprocal gesture on their part: the offering of their labour, for the mines in particular
(Ashforth, 1990). The commission's proposals included the construction of locations for Africans near their centres of work in the white areas, with passes to control the influx of workers to these locations and a one year limit on their residence there. When not employed in the "white" towns, Africans would reside in their own reserves, where they would be free to practise agriculture.

By 1910 and the union of South Africa, "segregation" had already entered the language of official discourse to describe such a system, and it was being promoted, though with different emphases of rationalisation, by British administrators, capitalists and Afrikaner political leaders alike. In 1913 a piece of legislation was enacted which helped to reify the conception of the Native Affairs Commission in a united South Africa. The philosophy behind the 1913 Land Act derived from the inevitable outcome of colonial dispossession. By the 1870s there was already a shortage of farming land for both whites and Africans. Squatting, sharecropping and labour tenancy were commonplace, but in the 1880s and 1890s, a new class of white entrepreneur began, for the first time, to exclude both white and black smallholders from the market. Smallholders were transformed into squatters - a wholly different legal phenomenon. Given the orthodoxy of racial attitudes, both white officials and white society in general favoured action to ensure that, if there had to be squatters, white squatters should be favoured over black. Thus, African land occupation across the country was limited to designated reserves comprising 7% of South Africa's land area. Parcels of land already owned by Africans outside of these reserves became known as "Black Spots", and their inhabitants lost all security of tenure even though many remained for some time. The misery of those forced to leave is graphically portrayed in Sol Plaatje's "Native Life in South Africa", 1915. The reserves, to which they were forced to move, would provide the basis for large scale African segregation through the 20th century.
3. Afrikanerdom: The Formation Of An Ethnic Identity

The late 19th century, then, saw increasing tension, primarily between white and African, but also between white and Indian. However, it is a great (and often repeated) error to assume any kind of intra-racial group solidarity as a backdrop to the history of inter-racial group conflict in South Africa. Urbanised Africans were still attached closely to their fractious traditional polities (see Beinart, 1987, for the extent to which this was still true in the mid 20th century, and Horowitz, 1991 for a contemporary analysis). Indian solidarity was impeded by differences of caste, status, region of origin and of treatment by other racial groups. As the 19th century drew to an end, white fractiousness too, was developing into a vital and politically portentous phenomenon, through the emergence of a strong Afrikaner identity.

Twentieth century nationalist movements invariably shared (and share) certain core characteristics which facilitated the mobilisation of a large mass in the cause articulated by an intellectual leadership group. These characteristics were: an implicit threat to the culture, especially religion and/or language of a body of people; a constructed, but widely perceived history, the interpretation of which rests on the shared experience of "the group"; a threat to the economic fortune of most members of this historically defined group; and the creation of a set of symbols by which the group is demarcated and exhorted to act (see Mare, 1992).

All of these features played a part in the development of an Afrikaner nationalist ideology in the 20th century. All were emerging in the decades at the end of the 19th century. But many of the symbols which defined the group's historical experiences were drawn from the early 19th century. Characteristics of late 19th century Afrikaners were subjected to a conceptual time leap, and used to describe people of the early 19th century who were, in fact, very different. Not all commentators on South Africa have yet realised the falsity of this conceptual atemporality.

De Villiers says of the early 19th century British repossession of the Cape "in Afrikaner terms the enemy had arrived; the Afrikaners were about to enter their Een Van Onreg, their Century
of Wrong, which would open and close with war and defeat but which would serve to consolidate the tribe and form the volkseie, the fierce group cohesiveness, that drives them to this day" (De Villiers, 1988). But the "Een Van Onreg" was the publication of a 20th century Afrikaner intellectual attempting to mobilize an Afrikaner constituency, not a phenomenon that was consciously experienced and identified by the Dutch speaking population of most of the period in question.

Throughout the 19th century, members of the Dutch speaking population resented, and sometimes resisted, British interference in the ordering of their lives, but in the early decades of the century there was no cohesive "Afrikaner tribe", as such, to mobilize against the British. The "Een Van Onreg" was part of a much later attempt to create such a group. It is the characteristics of this attempt which are of most importance in the story of Afrikaner nationalism.

The Reconstructed Nationalist Past

The traditional narrative of the emergence of an Afrikaner ethnic awareness represents an acceptance of a history created in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It has the actions of the British, intent on political and economic modernisation, turning the 19th century Cape into a laboratory in which the "distillation of Afrikanerness" (Sparks, 1990) occurred. The distillation is held to have proceeded from incidents of British repression of the Boers, notably, Slagtersnek, when Afrikaner rebels were hanged, at the second attempt after ropes broke, in 1815, and the later Anglo-Boer War. With nascent group identity repressed and language and culture threatened by Milner after the war, plus the growing "poor white" problem, the necessary result is held to have been a widespread nationalism held latent until 1924 and 1948, when it achieved political expression.

This outline of the common approach is a crude one, but the emergence of a sense of affinity, of a shared identity or an "imagined community", is much more subtle than a catalogue of historical events, no matter how exhaustive, can indicate. As with frontier ideology, Afrikaner nationalist ideology is a complex and non-unitary phenomenon, with material as well as ideational dimensions. A proper account of it must therefore be a
spatially and temporally differentiated one.

The early 19th century British administrators, settlers and missionaries did indeed introduce more forcefully a set of ideas in contradistinction to those held by most Dutch speaking frontiersmen, but in a less heavy handed and far more contradictory way than orthodox accounts allow.

The Enlightenment movement in Europe had set in train a set of social philosophies which influenced the early 19th century British administrators who arrived to take up residence in the Cape (see Mostert, 1992). Philosophies of liberalism, utilitarianism and humanitarianism were introduced by those with political influence, to a closing frontier environment. Humanitarianism lay behind intervention by the colonial authorities in Khoisan labour-master relations. Nevertheless there is a distinction to be drawn between the ideological leanings of the new political elite and the change which they effected.

Despite the new labour regulations, John Montagu, the Colonial Secretary at the Cape from 1843 to 1852, felt compelled to say that colour "still forms a bar to social intercourse and intimate relations far more formidable than any rising either from diversity of origin, language or religion" (cited Elphick and Giliomee, 1989, 558).

Although the British assumption of political power over the Cape did not bring about great material improvement for most of the colony's black inhabitants, it did set up a contrast between white governors and white governed more apparent than when the VOC or the Batavian Republic were the administrators. The difference in language alone was enough to ensure this, since there was no significant English speaking presence amongst the governed prior to 1820. The English literature of the period indicates that a slighting perception of the Dutch speaking population was held by many English speakers in the colony. Around the turn of the 19th century the Afrikaner came increasingly to join the Hottentot in being portrayed as idle and degenerate in popular writing, as the dominant discourse of the Cape became a British one. Boers were commonly characterised as lazy and malicious, their life of inactivity achieved at the
expense of their slaves (Coetzee, 1988).

However, the forging of a greater distinction between colonial rulers and colonists did not automatically lead to conflict and the sharpening of an identity of opposition. Rather, cooperation between authority and settler was the norm in the early 19th century, with incidents of outright opposition on the part of the latter the exception. When the contested Zuurveld was systematically cleared of Xhosa in 1812, it was Boer commandoes under British command who were the most effective participants. There was conflict between Boers and representatives of British authority in the early 19th century, but it was exaggerated in scope and significance by a late 19th century generation of Afrikaners embroiled in a deeper conflict of interest with the British authorities of their own time.

The incident at Slagtersnek became central to this late 19th century construction of an Afrikaner history. The Afrikaner political establishment came to hold a mythology constructed on two key foundations: the historical suffering of the volk under the British yoke, and the persistent threat to the volk posed by the numerically superior black population. Both were sustained by the interpretation of Slagtersnek that was adopted in the late 19th century (Thompson, 1985). On the one hand the incident was held to be a manifestation of ethnic conflict between British rulers and a nascent Afrikaner volk. (In fact, the administrators on the scene of the rebel hangings, and most closely involved were themselves Dutch speakers). On the other hand, the episode resulted from the challenge posed to Afrikaners’ status relative to blacks, because the hanged men had rebelled over laws limiting their behaviour towards their Khoisan servants.

Before the 1870s Slagtersnek was not treated in histories as a prominent event in the forming of South African society. During that decade though, the phrase wrongly attributed to relatives of the hanged men, "we can never forget Slagtersnek", was repeated frequently enough for one to believe that it was indeed a formative event. In the 1870s Slagtersnek was being reinterpreted in the light of a contemporary form of British imperialism much more thrusting than that which existed at the time of the incident itself. The British policy of confederation was threatening the independent Boer republics. To the Boers who had
struggled to build these republics, the rebels of 1815 became heroes of an earlier struggle against British domination much like their own, and therefore, symbols of a historical continuity of resistance by the mythical volk of which they were a part. No matter that the lifestyles of the Slagtersnek rebels, the Bezuidenhouts and their allies, hardly corresponded with the 1870s ethnic leadership's ideals of religious observance and racial purity, nor that most Boers at the time of the rebellion wanted nothing to do with it; the myth would provide historical legitimacy for the present struggle. Even though the incident of Slagtersnek itself was a relatively insignificant interruption to "normal" frontier life, the interpretation of it subsequently adopted, proved, in the late 19th century, a powerful mobilizing factor for Afrikaners.

While the volk's early struggle with the British was a largely constructed history, there was a real historical experience, shared by many Boers through the 19th century, which helped provide support for a nationalistic tendency. By the second half of the century, the continuance of the Boer custom of divided inheritance, which had initially fuelled the push of white settlement eastward, became impossible for many families; fragmentation had already reduced inheritances to uneconomic sizes. A class of poor and landless Dutch speakers began to emerge, and to provide support for the nationalism that would give it dignity, and perhaps protection from competition in the labour markets of the expanding cities.

An earlier Boer response to landlessness was the trek to the north, beyond the confines of the colony. In the interpretation of the past which helped foster a sense of Afrikaner national identity in the late 19th century, the Great Trek was seen as even more important than Slagtersnek. This interpretation had the Trek as an expression of the volk's urgent desire to be rid of the yoke of British interference, and to manifest their ethnic solidarity in the form of a new and pure Afrikaner state. In fact, while the British did institute changes on the frontier which were highly significant in the decision of some 15,000 boers to emigrate, their impact was not directly to hammer a new nation into shape.

The British desire to establish the "solid prosperity of a
thriving and industrious population" (cited Peires, 1989a, 498) on the frontier was translated into a uniform and effective land tax, the abolition of monopolies and a revamped Land Board to give title and collect payment. There was to be a thoroughgoing shake up of the relatively anarchic VOC frontier political economy. The appointment of resident magistrates and Civil Commissioners to replace landdrosts and Heemraden, represented a decisive shift of power, in favour of the British and at the expense of Boers in the country districts. Anxiety about further changes was a major impulse for many who decided to leave the colony. A frontier farmer of the 1830s expresses the sentiment: "Now we have a civil commissioner to receive our money for government and for land surveys, a magistrate to punish us, a Clerk of the Peace to prosecute us and get us in the Trok (gaol), but no Heemrad to tell us whether things are right or wrong...The Englishman is very learned...They and the Hottentots will squeeze us all out by degrees" (cited Peires, 1989a, 498).

The aim of the 1830s emigration was to "generally reconstitute the way of life of which the revolution in government had stripped (the migrants)" (Peires, 1989a, 499). New implementation of rent collection, including arrears, the threat to established methods of dealing with black labour, and the legal intervention of the British, seemingly biased towards those who were not white, were already establishing dissatisfaction among burghers by the 1830s. The revelation that compensation for the loss of slaves after abolition (worth four fifths of their value) could only be collected in London, added insult to injury. As an early promise of laws to channel mfecane refugees into "useful labour" receded, and abolition approached, preparations to leave the colony were made. They were hastened by the advent of the sixth frontier war with the Xhosa.

In the interpretation of the late 19th century Afrikaner nationalists, in their decision to leave the British colony, the trekkers were upholding the volk's staunch racial integrity and antipathy to racial intercourse. In fact Tregardt, one of the Trek's leaders, had lived in Xhosa territory under Hintsa before leaving the frontier, and many Boers expressed their disgust at the British murder of the paramount chief. The old prospect of an alliance with Xhosa arms in a fight against the British was revived at times by the generation of Boers which supplied the
Trek. Legassick, 1980, argues that most of the Boers of the period were prepared to concede equality to the independent African nations, whilst defending the exploitation of their own black labourers. Equality, though, may be too strong a word. The respect Boers had for African polities was based more on the force that they could muster than on an ideological recognition of equal worth. Nevertheless "there can be no doubt that the emigration was a response to specific policies of the colonial government rather than an Afrikaner nationalist reaction to British rule or a response to the breakdown of black-white relations on the frontier" (Peires, 1989a, 499).

The Late 19th Century Reality

Despite the mythology of a later generation of Afrikaners, nationalism was not a prominent feature of the consciousness of Boers in the early 19th century. Adam and Moodley, 1986, state that the first real ethnic political mobilization of Afrikaners in fact occurred at the Cape in 1872. During this year "responsible government" was granted by the British government to the Cape Colony, with a franchise qualification set, after intense debate (primarily over the extent of African participation it would allow), low enough for even the poorer sections of the white population to vote.

Since 1820 the incoming British settlers had largely stayed clear of agriculture, leaving Afrikaners predominant in the agricultural sector. With the Cape now setting its own economic policy, these farmers mobilised to safeguard their material interests. Their virtual mono-ethnicity gave their political mobilisation an obvious ethnic dimension. They mustered around the pursuit of low taxes, agricultural credit, secure and cheap labour supplies and further state support for the sector. In the late 19th century though, the conception of ethnic struggle within the Cape extended beyond the farming sector and into the financial realm. Butler, 1989, and Giliomee, 1989, have traced an intensifying conflict between British-based and local Afrikaner banks, fought over the custom of the predominantly Afrikaans farmer. The fact that smaller banks with a more local and Afrikaans identity, in spite of receiving greater sympathy, were losing out at the end of the 19th century to the better terms offered by the bigger "foreign" banks, fed into the growing sense
of Afrikaner ethnic defensiveness. By the turn of this century then, materialistic concerns were intricately and inextricably interwoven with ethnic identity for a core group of Afrikaners in the colony.

But the political mobilisation of Afrikaners was not restricted to the Cape in the late 19th century. Davenport, 1991, has charted the creation of a politically expressed ethnic identity in the South African Republic (S.A.R.) and Orange Free State. Here, Afrikaners had constructed independent states following their emigration from the Cape Colony. The leaders of the republics had found it difficult to inculcate a national pride during the years in which they were left alone by the British, but when confrontation with the British administration of the Cape Colony developed, a catalyst for ethnic mobilization was provided from without.

Britain had already annexed the trekkers' republic of Natal in 1843. In 1852, realising that economic dependence on the Cape Colony and Natal would continue, it had recognised the independence of the S.A.R. and in 1854, that of the remaining trekker republic, the Orange Free State. But the new phase of imperial expansion in response to mineral discoveries was about to begin. In the year that Britain annexed Basutoland, 1868, a play about Slagtersnek was first performed in Cape Town, and a Bloemfontein journalist advised his readers to "Think of Slagtersnek" (Thompson, 1985, 126).

The 1815 incident was cemented in the infant mythology in 1877 with the British annexation of the S.A.R. and the Rev. S.J. Du Toit's publication of "Die Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk" ("The History of Our Land in the Language of Our People", 1877, Cape Town). Du Toit was a key participant in the formation of Afrikaner national identity in the late 19th century. He was based in Paarl, the town which became the hub of Cape nationalism, and edited its nationalist paper "The Patriot". In his influential book, six pages were devoted to the "Uprising of Bezuidenhout", with the rebels portrayed as heroes resisting British tyranny. The Great Trek was interpreted as a direct consequence of the precedent of resistance they established.

By the end of the 19th century, the interpretation of Du Toit had
found apostles among authors who were sympathetic to the republics striving to resist expansionist British imperialism. Sympathizers were galvanised particularly by the success of the Transvaal in shaking off the British yoke in the first Anglo-Boer War of 1881, when the Boers inflicted a major defeat on British line regiments at Majuba. The two major thrusts of 20th century Afrikaner nationalism - anti British and anti black - had crystallised by the 1890s, in opposition to the British "unnatural and stupid policy of equalising born masters and born servants" (Thompson, 1985, 130).

The ideological momentum developed in the late 19th century soon generated political organisation. The first branches of the Afrikaner Bond were formed in the Cape in 1880, with a Kuyperian theology as defence against "liquor, lucre and redcoats" (Davenport, 1991, 93). Du Toit played a major role in the organisation of the Bond. Initially the organisation was not approved of by the republic's leaders, but branches were subsequently set up in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Du Toit was eventually displaced as the leading light of the organisation by Jan Hofmeyr, after the latter had gained control of the Transvaal branches.

The mixed reception of the Bond by Afrikaners reveals their divided political outlook in the period. Although a certain momentum had been given to the adoption of political ethnicity, the structuring of political views according to ethnicity was by no means universal by the beginning of the second, and major Anglo-Boer War. When gold was first discovered in the Transvaal, many Cape Afrikaners, including Bond members, feared the potential for economic competition from the S.A.R. and placed their allegiance with the British colony rather than with the Afrikaner republic. In 1889, when the potential for Cape farmers and speculators to profit in central Africa was realised, Hofmeyr even pledged Bond support for Cecil Rhodes in his scheme to extend British influence northwards. Thus Rhodes, the arch British imperialist, became involved in a parliamentary alliance with the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape Parliament.

The Rhodes-Bond political alliance was maintained in the Cape, in economic opposition to the Boer republics, until the 1895 Jameson Raid. The raid was a bungled attempt by Rhodes to stir a
Rebellion of uitlanders ("outsiders" - mostly English speaking prospectors and traders) in the S.A.R. The rebellion would be ignited by an incursion of armed men, led by Jameson, and it was hoped that the Boer republic would collapse. In fact, the conspirators were rounded up and the raid led to an irreversible split between Rhodes and the Bond in the Cape. Cape politics now reflected the wider division in the region between ethnically defined political competitors. The split between Rhodes' Progressive Party and the Afrikaner Bond presaged the infinitely more violent conflict between British and Afrikaner in the subsequent Anglo-Boer War.

By the 1890s the Republic's export value exceeded the Cape Colony's, meaning that "imperial paramountcy would soon become a meaningless phrase" (Davenport, 1991, 187) if the South African Republic remained independent. The inevitable Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 was fought then, "to determine which white authority held real power in South Africa" (Davenport, 1991, 198). If British control could be established over the gold mines, the labour supplies and infrastructure necessary for their efficient exploitation would no longer be impeded by the independent Boer polities. Added to this, British financiers, particularly nervous after the recent collapse of the Baring Brothers financiers, could rely on the gold deposits as the biggest single source of the standard on which money was based - on the eve of the war gold supplies at the Bank of England were falling again (Worden, 1994, 26).

When Milner was appointed as governor at the Cape, the drive towards war began in earnest. For Milner, as with other British Cape officials, war with the Transvaal would not be purely an economic matter. The republic's government was perceived as "not one "friendly" to, and prepared to collaborate with, British imperial interests. Control over the polity of the Transvaal as much as over the economy of the mining industry, was crucial" (Smith, 1990, quoted Worden, 1994, 26).

The ensuing war, pre-emptively initiated by President Kruger of the S.A.R., "entrenched a bitterness between Boer and British which was to endure throughout the 20th century" (Worden, 1994, 28). British scorched earth tactics, in a systematic attempt to end prolonged guerilla resistance, resulted in the
deliberate destruction of over 30,000 farms. In British "concentration camps", set up to deny succour to Boers continuing the fight, over 26,000 Boer women and children died (Spies, 1986, 214) through disease and neglect. By creating thousands of martyrs for the cause of the volk, and uniting the ethnically homogenous republics against a powerful enemy, the war was a major stimulus to further Afrikaner nationalist mobilization, across what was to become the whole of South Africa, the Cape included.

The settlement of the war also contributed to Afrikaner ethnic formation. Milner's avowed aim of Anglicizing South Africa after the war, led to a policy of outlawing Dutch instruction in government schools and promoting everywhere the use of English. During the attempts by Afrikaans political leaders to vitalise Afrikaner ethnicity in the 1880s and 1890s, many Dutch speakers had placed their identity largely within class, religious or territorial boundaries, rather than ethnic ones, as the Rhodes-Bond alliance demonstrates. But the war and this policy of deliberate repression of "Afrikaner-ness" helped generate a focus on precisely that ethnicity as the prime marker of identity.

Yet, the emergence of a political constituency willing to back a nationalist political programme within the Afrikaans population, also had a great deal to do with economic conditions which were developing both prior to, and after the war. What ultimately galvanised a general, politically expressed Afrikaner nationalism was the disproportionate impact of economic distress on a broad section of the Afrikaans population. With an economic battle to be fought, and the participants clearly defined by their culture and ethnicity, ethnically based political mobilization was inevitable. The growing shortage of land had been creating a squatter (bywoner) class around the old eastern frontier through the second half of the century. With the industrialisation of the Rand, commercial farmers across the country began to fully utilise the land they owned so as to supply the expanding urban markets. Landless Afrikaners found their rural options narrowed as landowners began to evict unprofitable tenants, and the volk's drift to the cities began, as individual families felt the broad shifting structures of economic development impinging upon their lives. For those who retained ownership of the land, increasing profits were available, with government aid in credit, research
and training for farmers, plus the expansion of road and rail networks, around the turn of the century.

Prior to the Anglo-Boer war, the presence of dispossessed Afrikaners in the cities, and their obvious impoverishment compared to the traditionally urbanised English speaking population, had already helped to stimulate an urban Afrikaner political and cultural awakening (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The movement received extra boosts with the agrarian rinderpest crisis of 1890, which ejected more "poor white" smallholders from the land, and the attack on Afrikaner life, property and culture during and after the war.

In the rural regions which provided the sources of the migrants, there was particular resentment at the fact that black tenants and share croppers were becoming wealthier than many of the Afrikaners being forced out. One white landowner was nearly beaten up when he remarked that he could get more out of one of the African families on his farm than he could out of seven bywoner families (Keegan, 1986). Anti-British and anti-black feeling defined a sense of independent identity, this time in the cities. For poor Afrikaners, urbanisation brought both an obvious material disparity with urban English speakers, and an erosion of material superiority over Africans. The material concerns of the migrants dovetailed perfectly with the ideological fervour of ethnic "revival" promoted by leaders like Du Toit. As urban slums containing a mixture of poor whites and blacks sprang up, first in the eastern Cape, then throughout South Africa, the challenge to an established racial order was concentrated on a large section of the Afrikaner population.

Political ethnic mobilization represented a way of pulling Afrikaners out of their new, urban predicament. As the material gap narrowed between urban Afrikaners and Africans, a wider group came to adopt an ideology and a theology which stressed the innate differences between the races. Even if material security could not be assured, at least psychological dignity could be. The Afrikaner nationalist emphasis on Calvinism stems from the late 19th century. Afrikaner historians of the period tried to give expression to the implicit differences that they felt existed between their "volk" and blacks by stressing religion's role in the formation of an Afrikaner people. In 1882 and 1898
respectively, F. Lion Cachet and J.F. Van Oordt traced the Calvinism of the volk back through a continuum of opposition to both secular British and heathen black (cited Thompson, 1985, 85-6).

With a reinterpreted past, a recent experience of ethnic suffering at the hands of the British, an ethnic intelligentsia leading a nationalist revival, and a new material predicament, Afrikaners really were beginning to feel a sense of innate difference, and to forge a separate political identity, by the turn of the 20th century. This nationalist identity was to reach its apotheosis in the formation of the apartheid system after 1948.

Of great importance too (although it has been relatively neglected), was the development of a separate "Coloured" political identity through the same period in which Afrikaans identity was solidifying. Prior to the 1890s, many "Coloureds" in the Cape, and particularly in Cape Town, felt that the distinctions between them and whites were lessening. The Cape franchise gave them the same political rights, and some had achieved a degree of success in business. But with the late 19th century raising of the franchise qualification - primarily in order to exclude Africans - and with increasing competition in the growing urban arena for work and custom from rural migrants, sections of the "Coloured" population felt themselves being squeezed from above and below. On the one hand, local authorities were becoming increasingly concerned to protect "poor whites" from "Coloured" competition, and on the other, Africans were proving an additional threat to established "Coloured" economic status. For "Coloureds", "there was simply too much to lose through identification with Africans" (Goldin, 1989, 248). Intensifying "Coloured" identity then, was both a reaction against greater white discrimination and "a rear guard action" to preserve what distinction there had been between "Coloured" and African. Both were resorted to in an attempt to restore the possibility of "Coloured" - white integration.
Conclusion

By the beginning of the 19th century, the Cape Khoikhoi, despite the granting of de jure equality with whites, represented a distinct class as well as a racial grouping. Following their dispossession,

"the "coloured" survived because they possessed only their labour power. Cape liberalism gave them equality before the law, access to the courts, protection against lawlessness, a free labour market, and in all other respects permitted a high degree of discrimination. They were emancipated from slavery, but not from poverty, ignorance and disease. As the legal gap narrowed, the social gap between them and the colonists widened" (Simons and Simons, 1968, 29).

The 19th century brought crucial transformation to all of South Africa's social groups, as agents from Britain extended the economic and social patterns of capitalism to incorporate them. The industrial systems they forged set the conditions on which both Africans and Afrikaners would be brought into "modernity", just as the farming systems of the Boers had forced the Khoikhoi into a particular social niche in the 18th century. Africans in the 19th century, like the Khoisan before them, found their labouring function entrenched in social relations by law, both in the colonies and the republics. An uprooted African peasantry was made available for work through cultural and military conquest, annexation, taxation, and, finally, market competition. Despite a mid-century assimilationist discourse, racial discrimination became an inherent and largely unquestioned principle of government in both republics and both colonies, even if it was theoretically disallowed by legislation in the latter.

But the systems which characterise South Africa's human geography as a whole - migrant labour, influx control and spatial segregation - were not uniformly imposed on South African society. They evolved incoherently through the century from a configuration of regionally and locally specific processes. There was no centralised, overarching attempt to order South Africa's spatial flux - its urban growth, its labour flows and the distribution of its races - until the era of apartheid. This was
not just a consequence of South Africa's division into four separate states for much of the century; it was also the result of poorly connected elites, each striving to manage threatening change within their own localities. South Africa in the early 20th century represented a summation of varied local efforts to fix a racial order into dynamic social, economic and spatial relations. Each of these local agents was, directly or indirectly, under the influence of the British Empire, with its own inconsistent Colonial Office policy.

While the localities of the 19th century were not well physically connected for most of the period, they were articulated by a fairly universal hegemonic group ideology. It owed its origins to white distinctiveness at the early Cape, but it had developed and been entrenched by the experiences of warfare, industrialisation and urban growth. The novels of J.M. Coetzee, Andre Brink and Christopher Hope all impressionistically convey a white incapacity to "become African". The Boers early on adopted an African mode of production and an affinity with the African landscape and soil, but their consciousness was derived from Europe, as was their cultural expression of it. The black African presence was still "silent" in most white minds, despite the massive transformation and integration of social and material life, at the end of the 19th century. Even the physical presence of Africans in their cities was made more remote, externalised by segregationism in urban planning. The ideological legacies of the 18th century - the assumption of exclusive white access to power and wealth, and the expectation of service from cheap black labourers - were made tangible in space through industrialisation and urbanisation in the 19th century. With the option of armed resistance gone by the end of the century (though there was a last Zulu revolt, largely over taxes, in 1906), and economic competition on equal terms disallowed, most blacks either tried to maintain a subsistence in the reserves, worked for white farmers on the platteland or worked, with varying degrees of compliance, in the white towns.

Afrikaners meanwhile, had responded to the uneven material and ideological consequences of the closing of the frontier, and the penetration of British capitalism and imperialism, with the development of an ethnic particularism. A nationalist tradition was invented, and became established in the late 19th century.
The impression that the 1950s generation of Afrikaner political leaders made on South African society and space could never have been so deep without a profound sense of national identity and destiny, inherited from the late 19th century, and extending beyond mere racial consciousness.
Chapter Three

The Germination of a System

Introduction

The seeds of the 20th century system of white domination and segregation had been planted in the 19th century, by African dispossession and by early industrialisation. The structures by which that system would be administered germinated with Milner's post Anglo-Boer War reconstruction, and took firm root across the nation during the period from South Africa's formation as a nation state in 1910 to the Second World War.

The bulk of this chapter is split into two main parts to address the most salient characteristics of this period. In the first, the ideology of segregationism and the legal structures which resulted from it, are traced through the first half of the 20th century. The second part interprets the increasing political success of Afrikaner nationalism. This movement reached its apotheosis in 1948, with the election of a regime determined, with the policy of apartheid, to shore up white supremacy and uplift the volk, through the second half of the century.

But before the elaboration of a segregationist system can be properly explained, it is useful to introduce, in the next few pages, the institutional and class struggles that South Africa experienced from 1910 to 1948. These struggles provided both the context, and an important impulse, for legislation firmly entrenching an edifice of segregation.

Class and Institutional Struggles, 1910 to 1948

The British Empire, the South African state, English and local capital, and black and white labour were the main structures and agencies whose interaction shaped mid 20th century South African society. Through their dynamic relationships they provided the context for the political and economic struggles which prefigured apartheid.

Immediately following Union, the South African state was led by
two Boer generals, Botha and Smuts. Their government deliberately acted as the vanguard of a sentiment of reconciliation between British and Boer. The debates within white politics, for the next decade and a half, were to centre around this government's compromising and conciliatory stance towards South Africa's English speakers and the British Empire.

An alliance between wealthier Afrikaner farmers, mostly in the Cape and the Transvaal, and English mineowners, formed the backbone of the governing South African Party (SAP). While the party ran the country, the Chamber of Mines, through its command of finance and economic organisation, effectively ran the economy (Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990).

The obvious challenge to inter-ethnic harmony came from nationalistic Afrikaners led by J.B.M. Hertzog. Their main grievance was the leverage exerted over South Africa's political economy by English speakers within the country, and the British government without. The anti-alliance group remained within the cabinet until 1912, when it broke away under Hertzog and, in 1914, formed the Nationalist Party (NP).

In 1914 to 1915, nationalistic Afrikaners led a rebellion against the government when it decided to enter the First World war as an ally of Britain, and to invade German South West Africa on Britain's behalf.

Throughout the 20th century, the Afrikaner nationalist tradition would continue to be represented both by formal political and parliamentary organisations - the descendants of Hertzog's party - and by extra-parliamentary, and often violently inclined, more extreme groups (see part two of this chapter).

While the state, representing an alliance of ethnic elites, was ideologically and politically challenged by Afrikaner nationalists between 1910 and 1924, a more tangible challenge came from increasingly well organised workers in the economic sphere.

In 1918-19, Afrikaans, English and African workers struck in response to a decline in living standards. The result was limited gains for the white workers, and the repression of their black
counterparts. Racial differentiation within the workforce was consolidated with the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which restricted the advantages of new collective bargaining structures to unionised whites and "Coloureds", to the exclusion of Africans.

The divergence between white and African worker experience was not solely due to legal discrimination. In the early 20th century, Africans had little experience of industrial organisation, while whites were more able to draw on European traditions of workerism. The difference was reflected in the formation by whites, in 1921, of the Communist Party of South Africa (CP), founded in the belief that "capitalism and white domination ... rested on the four pillars of racialism, nationalism, jingoism and reformism" (Simons and Simons, 1968, 270), and that workers' collective action could undermine these pillars.

White workers, as the CP hoped, did come together against capitalists spectacularly in 1922, but they were in violent opposition to their African counterparts. In November 1921 the Chamber had responded to a falling gold price and rising costs by announcing its intention to eliminate the colour bar in semi-skilled work, thus facilitating the employment of cheaper black labour in jobs previously reserved for whites. The announcement raised the possibility of some 2000 white jobs being retrenched. White miners came out on strike in January 1922 and organised themselves into unofficial commandoes along the Rand. Even CP members, in their encouragement of the strike, adopted a racist stance. Their specious argument ran as follows: support for the miners in their attempt to protect the colour bar was justified, since the strike, by opposing the employment of blacks at lower rates, could be seen as a necessary step to raise levels of pay for all workers. Hence the paradoxical slogan sported on workers' placards: "Workers of the World Unite and Fight for a White South Africa".

The state's economic dependence on the mines ensured that it would have to back the mineowners' drive for continued capital accumulation (Ingham, 1988). Smuts authorized police action against the union commandoes, which resulted in three deaths at Boksburg. The union proclaimed a general strike, and Smuts
announced martial law. Several days of bitter fighting ensued which, combined with the heavy handling of previous strikes in 1913 and 1914, the war time rebellion and the shootings of Africans at Port Elizabeth and Queenstown in 1920 and 1921, gave an impression of the government's hands being stained with blood, and of Smuts himself as an autocratic ruler (Davenport, 1991).

The NP and the LP had shared sympathy for the strikers in the early stages of their struggle. The brutality of the ensuing conflict helped mobilize a union of anti-capitalist and Afrikaner nationalist sentiment which swept an NP-LP alliance to a victory over the SAP in the 1924 election.

Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990, describe this result as the first serious challenge to colonial capitalism in South Africa: "The (white) artisan had won the struggle for recognition within the white power structure. New industrial laws, the "civilized labour policy" and the LP's presence in the coalition government marked his absorption in the ruling elite" (Simons and Simons, 1968, 327).

The new state stood firmly for white labour and small Afrikaner farmers. However the political position of unskilled white workers (predominantly Afrikaners), was still in doubt. The allegiance of this class was the prize fought over by the left wing trade unions and the Afrikaner nationalists.

In an attempt at greater autonomy, the new government encouraged import substitution with a Board of Trade, and in 1928 a nationalised Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) was established. The trauma of modernisation and urbanisation for the white poor, 80% of whom were Afrikaners, was moderated by a welfare state. Small Afrikaans farmers had not only the assurance of cheap black labour supplies through the denial of black trade union membership and the 1925 Wage Act; they were also cushioned by state financial support. Poor urban Afrikaners were eligible for state protected employment on the railways or in government (the beginnings of a highly significant trait).

With incorporation in the state sector and the help of the post depression boom, the "poor white problem" had been as good as eliminated by 1939. Further, the radicalizing potential of the CP
and the white trade union movement had been effectively neutralised by the government's action in taking white labour under its wing (Davenport, 1991).

The tension between the alliance of class forces represented by the 1924-33 state on the one hand, and mining capital on the other, has been seen by some writers, as part of a wider conflict between foreign and domestic capital (Legassick and Hemson, 1976, Bozzoli, 1978, Rogerson, 1982, O'Meara, 1983). Domestic agricultural and industrial classes had a powerful ally in the state with its capacity for economic intervention. The NP's hold on government allowed it to divert English capital's surplus into investment within South Africa (Nattrass, 1981, cited Lemon, 1987), notably for the government's main economic constituencies - agriculture and domestic industry (see also Davies, Kaplan, Morris and O'Meara, 1976).

Unfortunately for the Pact government, a close understanding with domestic capital and a fervent desire for economic self sufficiency and detachment from imperial influence, were not enough to ride out the economic depression which struck the world economy in the early 1930s. Although South Africa was relatively insulated from monetary collapse by its gold reserves, it could not help being articulated with the world economy, and the depression had significant domestic political repercussions.

In the early 1930s the international demand for South Africa's exports began to fall as consumption overseas plummeted. The government, however, refused to devalue like other affected countries, not only on the grounds that it was demonstrating its cherished independence from external influence, but also because devaluation would raise the price of imports. Speculation that South Africa would nevertheless devalue led to a drain of local currency as money was invested on the London Stock Exchange. (After devaluation this could then be converted back at a profit). The speculative drain itself eventually contributed to the decision to finally abandon the gold standard and devalue in December 1932.

In 1933, with Hertzog fearing a loss of the next election, an approach was made to Smuts for a coalition of the NP and the SAP on certain terms, including South Africa's autonomy, the
retention of the national flag, equal English-Afrikaans language rights, the safeguarding of white farmers and workers and the maintenance of "white civilization and political separation" (Davenport, 1991, 276) in "Native Policy". Such terms for coalition were acceptable to many in the NP (especially in the two northern provinces), but to others, particularly in D. F. Malan's Cape section of the party, coalition on any terms with the party of English capital and imperialist collaboration, was a betrayal. Ultimately though, not just coalition, but fusion, was to occur between Hertzog's NP and Smuts's SAP, creating the United Party (UP), while Malan was to lead most of the Cape caucus of the old NP, plus northern sympathizers, into the Gesuiwerde, or "purified" NP (hereon, simply NP).

The fusion government bore the brunt of social tensions arising out of the most rapid secondary industrialisation and urbanisation South Africa had yet seen and, with Smuts in government once again, the English establishment was readmitted to political power. The cabinet considered a programme of more liberal policy options towards urban blacks, which for many Afrikaners represented a threat to the established order.

During the war, with white workers lost to the army, the job colour bar was openly flouted, with the tacit approval of the English liberal element in government. A first, tentative step towards permanently filling skilled posts with blacks was the Native Education Finance Act 1945, which freed black education from its reliance on finance raised solely from black taxes. The reforms which were envisaged beyond this, especially those suggested by the UP's Fagan Commission, set up to investigate the changes required of "Native policy", went a long way towards losing the UP the 1948 election. Government officials were contemplating, by the end of the war, the stabilisation of complete African families in the cities, village building for the landless in the reserves and the issuing of passes which would be voluntarily applied for and linked to secure employment (Davenport, 1991). In private, some cabinet ministers may even have considered ending the traditional migrant labour pattern altogether, reversing the established principle of temporary urban African residence (Wolpe, 1988).

Such thinking was induced by a dawning recognition of the need of
the expanding manufacturing sector for a stable African workforce and a more wealthy domestic market for its goods (dependent on a better paid black population). It was further stimulated by the 1946 strike of 70,000 African mineworkers, in response to rising expectations, the cutting of rations and an attack on their union. The strike, like that of 1922, was crushed by the state, but the African workers of 1946, unlike their white predecessors, were not subsequently to gain access to government.

It was urban employers who required a stable urban African workforce, but it was the UP government which would shoulder the responsibility of supplying it and face the threat of a loss of white electoral support. The NP's Sauer report - rival to the UP's Fagan Report - represented an early "spelling out of the gospel of apartheid" and "seemed to offer more security on more familiar lines" (Davenport, 1991, 312-3). While improving the conditions of African workers may have furthered the interests of manufacturing capital; mining capital, white labour and white farmers were generally protective of their dominance over black labour. Such was the prelude to the assumption of power in 1948 of Malan's NP, and its alternative programme of apartheid.

1. Ideology, Segregation and the Urban Arena, 1910 to 1948

By the beginning of this century, the Cape assimilationist discourse of the mid 19th century had been effectively replaced throughout South Africa by a quasi-Darwinian scientific racism. Scientific racism held that "the relative position of "pure races" along the evolutionary scale was "immutable"" (Dubow, 1980, 82), with the qualification that white civilization could potentially "regress", notably through "miscegenation".

In the 1920s though, on the Witwatersrand, a new "breed" of liberal anthropologist began to identify differences between African and European as cultural, rather than as objective degrees of civilization. Bantu Studies - the anthropological project that was to occupy many university departments through the first half of the 20th century - had begun. Liberals like Alfred Hoernle and Edgar Brookes found in the rather ambiguous phenomenon of "culture", a quality which would always progress,
eliminating the fear of a regression of civilization. For liberals, the concept of culture represented a compromise wherein blacks were held to be at present inferior, as acknowledged by general white opinion, but with the capacity for advancing, in the context of an urbanised, industrial society, to a state in which they would meet the white population's cultural standards.

Most liberals agreed on the essential distinction between adaptable cultural, and immutable racial differences. However, because of the cultural gulf which separated whites from Africans in South Africa at the time, many liberals argued, along with white society in general, that the policy of segregation should be continued, at least for the foreseeable future. In the 1920s "segregation appeared to be beyond the realm of political dispute" (Dubow, 1980,9).

From the late 19th century to the 1920s, segregationist Acts had seldom been interpreted as "integral elements of a united ideological package" (Dubow, 1989,39), although English speaking liberals had fostered the idea of spatial segregation as a protective shield against further black dispossession. But by the 1930s, it was becoming increasingly clear that segregation was being implemented, under Afrikaner nationalist patronage, to counter English liberal hegemony and to ensure continued white dominance over blacks in the cities.

In the atmosphere of threatening African worker mobilization, particularly under the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), the concept of a cultural gulf between the races could be invoked to stem the threat of radicalisation by promoting a return to traditional African "tribalism" in the reserves. The segregationism of the 1920s and 1930s was an attempt to "bolster a more conservative system as a means of social control" (Worden, 1994,77) against an alarming alternative focus - militant African workerist resistance. Heaton Nicholls, MP for Zululand, expressed the fear behind the 1920s segregationist drive succinctly: "if we do not get back to communalism we will most certainly arrive very soon at communism" (cited Dubow, 1989,71).

Liberals in the 1930s and 1940s then, had to re-evaluate. The liberal principle of "protective" segregation for Africans had
been used instead, to uphold white political and economic dominance against the threat of African proletarianization. It was also ensuring the impoverishment of the reserves. The liberal historian, W.M. Macmillan, was highly critical of the early 20th century form of urban segregation, arguing that it was founded on an insufficient rural base. Reserves such as the formerly successful Herschel in the eastern Cape were being noticeably eroded as their occupants' numbers swelled (W.M. Macmillan, 1930, cited Rich, 1984).

Such criticisms provoked the government response of "developmentalism" - the aim of improving the reserves with agricultural demonstrators, soil conservation and instruction. But the level of financial commitment ensured that, for most rural Africans, the material impact of the policy was insignificant.

Out of the abuse of traditional liberal ideology grew a new oppositional, or counter hegemonic ideology (or rather, an old one resurrected). Assimilationism assumed greater legitimacy among liberals as the 1930s, and particularly the 1940s, progressed. If Africans were only to be subjected to white privilege and power under segregated institutions, their best hope for advancement lay with greater integration into European social and political structures. The basis for the new liberal critique of segregationist trusteeship was well expressed by Patrick Duncan at the beginning of the 1930s:

"The people of South Africa - the European people - will not give up the idea that the country is theirs, the only home they have for themselves and their children. They do not consider that they are here as invaders with no title as against the natives but that of conquest ... But of course, it is not really a question in the end of title, legal or moral. In the end it is a question of survival in numbers and on that ground our prospects here do not look very bright. But the point here which makes our position different from most is that we are here as a minority having built up the country out of barbarism and established the conditions under which the other race could flourish in peace, and we claim the right to rule not as trustees but as a dominant and civilized race ruling their
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own country and with it the subject race which partly for
comfort and partly for the embarrassment of the rulers will
persist in inhabiting it ... That works alright so long as
the under race is content with its primitive state and does
not feel the stirrings of national and political feelings.
When they do - as they are beginning to do here now - the
trouble begins and grows apace. What the end will be,
whether we will slowly evolve into a Jamaica or be the
ancestors of a new brown race no one can tell. But it
certainly seems unlikely that the white man will be able
permanently to maintain the outlook to which he clings now"
(quoted Ingham,1988, 173).

The fundamental problem liberals encountered in their move
towards assimilationism was its unacceptability to the body of
white opinion. Political and social assimilation could not
proceed in a spatially segregated landscape, and as long as the
town was seen as a "European area in which there is no place for
the redundant native" (Davenport,1971, cited Christopher,1983),
the segregated landscape would remain. "Over and over again",
liberals in parliament, and as Native Representatives, tried to
explain how hunger and poverty in the segregated reserves, and
the industrialisation of white areas, were fostering the influx
of Africans so resented in the cities (Lewsen,1987,103-4). Some
argued for a settled urban black population, independent
commercial black farmers, and the abolition of the migrant labour
System and influx control regulations. But, by and large, their
protestations fell on deaf ears, both in parliament and in the
wider society. Inter-war liberals in Craddock, for example, felt
embattled and defensive, "unable to transform a body of ideas
into practice because they could not appeal to the perceived
interests of a sufficient number of the enfranchised"
(Sutler,1987,97).

However, liberals were not a group completely extraneous to wider
white society. Usually, publicly or privately, they shared the
fear of "miscegenation", and "friendly personal relations across
the colour line were rare, though meetings were fostered by
official occasions and letters were exchanged" (Lewsen,1987,104).
(The misunderstandings accompanying such cross-racial
correspondence in the subsequent apartheid era are well
represented in the epistolary "Not Either an Experimental Doll",


ed. Shula Marks, 1987, The Women's Press, London). Nevertheless, parliamentary liberals were instrumental in effecting minor adaptations of segregationist structures, for example, in persuading Smuts to extend legal recognition to African trade unions during the war.

The liberal desire for African tutelage and progression within a more integrated urban environment represented one extreme of white ideological influence on urban policy. At the other extreme lay the well established principle of Stallardism. This was a philosophy of urban African administration developed in the late 19th century, but enunciated more coherently in the early 1920s by the Stallard Commission. The commission had recommended that only the temporary sojourn of economically useful Africans be permitted in the cities, and that they be efficiently despatched to the reserves once their term of work had expired. In the 1940s, Smuts's government found itself tugged part way towards the liberal extreme by manufacturing interests' desire for stable, skilled and semi-skilled African labour, and towards the Stallardist extreme by mining capital's continuing need for cheap, unskilled migrant workers (Maylam, 1990).

The continuing impact on public opinion of the "sanitation syndrome" was a decisive factor in favour of maintaining Stallardist segregation. In the first half of the century unhealthy living and working conditions, long hours of work and inadequate nutrition, all conspired to make a large proportion of both the black and white urban population susceptible to infectious and nutritional disease. But, in whites' minds, disease became particularly associated with the proliferating black presence in the cities, and "the imagery of infection and epidemic disease provided a compelling rationale for major forms of social control, and in particular, the segregation of African locations" (Marks and Anderson, 1988, 176).

But the general white belief in segregation stemmed from a blend of material interests and more opaque cultural assumptions. Historians vary in the emphases they place on the two influences, and before considering the practical implementation of segregationist policy prior to 1948, it is worthwhile to consider interpretations of its ideological substructure in more detail.
Sparks, 1990, argues that segregationist assumptions derived from the transplantation of a European culture to unfamiliar African territory, and that culture's inability to adapt to, and absorb, exotic African cultural forms. Thus segregationism represented an attempt to keep Africa and Africans at bay, to preserve what was innate to European identity in a very different environment. On the other hand, Marxian historians stress the functionality of segregation, its compatibility with white material accumulation (Wolpe, 1976). It can be argued that segregationist ideology developed as a justification for the material privilege of a group defined by race, and, some would argue, class (Marks and Trapido, 1987).

J.M. Coetzee's overview of "White Writing", 1988, finds that early 20th century South African literature echoes the historical problem of "Europe in Africa". Africa lacks a depth of meaning to the European eye (Butler, cited Coetzee, 1988).

In Europe, the long historical association between landscape, language and culture, allowed the "historical resonances" of the past to be carried continuously through, giving succeeding generations a secure foundation for their sense of identity. The African landscape, though, lacked this association, having no historical meaning yet conferred upon it (the Africans' own association remaining inaccessible and therefore silent, in European representation). Coetzee argues that literature carried "the burden of finding a home in Africa for a consciousness formed in and by a language whose history lies in another continent". Extending a literary critique to the political sphere, that consciousness transplanted, meant that whites strived to realize a European lifestyle on the African continent. Such a project could be effected only through the segregation of Africans, so that white society could maintain its cultural form unchallenged.

Counter to the abstractedly cultural premises of such an interpretation, runs the firm materialistic interpretation of Marks and Trapido, 1987. For them, segregation emerged to "solve the problems of industrialisation". It was a finely balanced system which supplied the material requirements of an industrialising capitalist society, using an accessible, cheap, black proletariat. For the cities, it ensured large numbers of
unskilled workers from the reserves. These workers were complemented by a core of skilled, stabilised and "incorporated", urban, white workers. The costs of the unskilled African labour were kept low by the independent reserve base which would ensure its reproduction. The costs of social control would also be minimised under segregationist structures, through the administrative incorporation of chiefs. The system gave white farmers control over African tenants and labourers in white rural areas, and protected white urban workers from cheaper African competition through urban influx control regulations. The segregationist premise was, then, a natural one for most white classes to adopt, since it was in their own material interests.

Segregationism allowed material functionality by supplying the cities with their labour needs, but it also facilitated white political and cultural security, preventing a threatening, large scale African proletarianization by containing the spatial base of this labour in the reserves (Dubow, 1989). The practical application of the principle and the spatial forms resulting from it, provided the structures which the apartheid ideologues would seek to consolidate.

The Implementation of Segregation

Before 1948 there was much greater differentiation in the application of spatial segregation than after. Nevertheless, from the 1920s, the general direction was towards increasing centralisation of control over spatial form, and the standardisation of segregationist policy. Maylam, 1990, argues that the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act (see below) in particular, paved the way for apartheid planning. However, prior to this, the Housing Act 1920 gave assistance to municipalities for building housing estates, but only racially homogenous ones. The Act was an early, formal incursion, into the already informally, and partially segregated housing market. Before 1923, the 1913 Land Act already provided a legal basis for universal, and systematic segregation in the rural areas (although there was no legislation to remove blacks from land owned prior to the Act until 1939).

The 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act itself supplemented the rural legislation by decreeing that urban African "locations" should be
separated from their white towns. The 1923 Act was passed by the Smuts government, under the influence of the Stallard Commission.

Under the Act, the African locations would be funded through a separate Native Revenue Account. Thus Africans could be excluded from white funded urban amenities, for which they had not contributed taxes. Johannesburg and Kimberley were the first cities to respond to the new legislation by proclaiming segregated areas. Cape Town followed in 1926, and Durban in the early 1930s, although, by 1937, only eleven towns systematically implemented influx controls to the segregated locations. While the machinery to do so was there, it was not used with "optimal efficiency" (Maylam, 1990) until after 1948.

Hertzog's NP-LP government was to follow the 1923 legislation up with more systematic rural segregationist measures. The 1927 Native Administration Act finally committed all of South Africa to a 20th century form of Natal's old system of rural segregation, decisively denying the Cape assimilationist tradition. The Governor General was now the supreme chief over all Africans. The government had the power, inter alia, to appoint chiefs, define boundaries, and alter the composition of "tribes". Chiefs and headmen became government agents, paid according to the taxes they collected.

The imposition of authoritarian rule over the reserves was, however, characterised by a degree of flexibility on the local scale. Chiefs who proved not to be easily coerced into the role prescribed for them under the Act, were treated largely according to local initiative. The strategy of paramounts such as Solomon in Zululand, and Marelane in Pondoland, was to try to win formal recognition from the white authorities, as representatives of their peoples. In particular, they shared a concern that chiefly control over natural resources, concessions, traders and tariffs, be continued under the new system (Beinart, 1982). Their methods coincided at some points – for instance, the organisation of spectacular, traditional royal hunts – an expression of the chiefly status being ignored by the authorities. By and large, their claims were dismissed, but this did not preclude local flexibility in the granting of some concessions. For example, in a number of cases, the chief was allowed to continue to collect
death duties from his subjects.

In order to maintain the return of migrants to the reserves, and to restrict the urban black population, influx controls for women were made available to municipalities in 1930, although they were difficult to implement, since passes for women were not yet necessary. "Urban stability" was further enhanced in that year by the passage of the Riotous Assemblies Act, a "security backstop" (Davenport, 1991) for the body of segregationist legislation. In 1934 a powerful tool was made available to enforce segregation in the poor, racially mixed, inner city areas, particularly of Johannesburg, with the Slums Act (Parnell, 1988, cited Christopher, 1990).

One of Hertzog's conditions of fusion had been more complete political segregation. This was achieved in 1936, after a legislative struggle, with the Representation of Natives Act. This legislation finally removed African voters from the Cape electoral role, and placed them on a separate role to elect three white representatives to the House of Assembly. Four senators were to represent Africans nationwide. The Act represented the end of the Cape assimilationist tradition in practice. As partial compensation for the loss of the common vote, the land area of the African reserves was to be extended from 7% to 13% of South Africa's total area under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act.

Smuts's 1923 structure for urban segregation was consolidated with the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act, which implemented, at the local authority's discretion, influx control to the "locations" outside white towns. An African migrant staying in the location was permitted 14 days to find work (reduced to three days in 1945). If the municipal returns showed a surplus of local labour, individual Africans could be "rusticated" (Lemon, 1991) i.e. sent back to the reserves. At the same time, controls over women's entry to the urban areas were reinforced. By the time Hertzog left the government in 1939, a legal system holding back African advancement in the political, economic and spatial spheres, had been designed, and was being implemented with varying degrees of effectiveness across the country.

Following Hertzog's departure from the government on the outbreak of war, Smuts's post 1940 segregation measures were largely
directed against Indians in Natal. Their ability to trade and occupy land on equal terms with whites, was successively diminished by the Trading and Occupation of Land Act 1943 and the Asiatic Land Tenure Act 1946. But Smuts was to implement one more major piece of urban African segregationist legislation before leaving office. The 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act created the "section 10" legal category of urban African - those who may claim permanent urban residence by virtue of their having resided in the urban area continuously since birth or lawfully for the last 15 years, or by having worked there for the same employer for 10 years. The clause was only available where requested by the local authority.

While the discretionary nature of most of this urban segregation legislation permitted much local variation until the 1950s, one feature was growing universally apparent in, or rather outside, South Africa's cities in the 1940s. This was the sprawling squatter settlement. The proliferation of shacks was particularly noticeable during the war, when resources were diverted away from formal house construction in the locations. Post war industrial expansion generated further migration from the impoverished reserves, but little urban housing was constructed even after the war due to municipal reluctance to finance building through rate rises. There was also lingering uncertainty over the permanency of large scale urban African residence, since the extended life of the gold fields was still in doubt (Lemon, 1991).

The cities around which squatter settlements grew, differed widely in their application of the segregationist doctrine. Apartheid's standardising impact in the 1950s cannot really be appreciated unless one has a knowledge of how varied the spatial dispensation for Africans, "Coloureds" and Indians was before 1950.

In 1936, one third of Cape Town's population lived in racially mixed residential areas. African passes to enter the city were introduced in 1909, but, once there, they could buy or rent anywhere until 1913. From 1919 they required exemption to live outside the location. The first "buffer zones" between African locations and white residential areas were introduced in the planning of Langa location. Between 1933 and 1948, African employment in the Western Cape increased by 534% (Olivier, 1953,
Eighty percent of the Africans who had been attracted to the city lived in informal shacks along the railway line after Ndabeni location had been cleared for redevelopment in 1935. The African Nyanga township was planned beyond the built up area, to tidy the spatial pattern, in 1946, but the city's plans for segregation of its "Coloured" community were deferred following vociferous protests from the Malay "Coloured" population (Cook, 1991).

In East London, Africans had been restricted to three locations prior to 1923, and within them, they were mostly accommodated in owner-built shacks, on council rented land. By 1948, these locations had the highest rate of TB in South Africa, provoking opposition to local segregation by African trade unions and in the press. Commissions reported on the problem in 1937 and in 1949, and they were followed by the building of Mdantsane township, where the bulk of the town's African employees now live, within the "independent" Ciskei homeland's boundary. In the pre-apartheid period, local fears were directed more against the Indian population. The Daily Dispatch of 16th August 1928 expressed fears of the town developing like Durban, a "town in the python coils of an Asiatic menace" (cited Fox, Nel and Reintges, 1991). "Coloured" segregation was encouraged, but not enforced, by the construction of the exclusively "Coloured" township of Parkside (Fox, Nel and Reintges, 1991).

Durban's segregation policy, as we have seen in the last chapter, was unusually systematic, in that separate provision was in place for each race's finance and administration. Most municipalities relied on a series of ad hoc measures, rather than coherent, segregated planning bodies, when implementing spatial segregation. In Durban the Native Beer Act of 1908 had given the municipality a monopoly over the brewing and sale of traditional African beer. The revenue from the scheme was directed into African housing, thus "satisfying a capitalist precept that the user must pay" (Davies, 1991, 76). A Native Administration Department was established in 1910 to regulate African influx to the municipality. Durban's administrative and housing scheme came to be known as the "Durban system", and was used by the 1923 Act as the model for a national structure. Yet Durban, like every other major city, had a housing shortage, the inevitable accompaniment of which was the informal construction of shacks on
the periphery of the controlled urban area (Davies, 1991).

The degree of consideration behind urban planning for blacks is demonstrated nicely by Pietermaritzburg. Here, before 1923, there were only council barracks and peripheral slums for blacks. The response to the 1923 Act was the construction of Sobantu location, the "sanitary syndrome" dictating its placement well outside the pretty colonial town, and adjacent to the refuse dump. The municipal sewerage works was a later addition to the township neighbourhood (Wills, 1991).

Despite the variation in urban segregation prior to 1948, from informal and incomplete separation in Cape Town to Durban's tightly controlled system, all of South Africa's cities and towns displayed some form of spatial exclusion along the lines of race, inherited from the late 19th century colonial era and elaborated to cope with an increasing rate of urbanisation. As segregationist legislation from the central government accumulated from 1920 to 1948, local authorities' discretion in urban policy was incrementally undermined. First came the Minister of Native Affairs' capacity to compel any local authority to implement any section of the 1923 Act, then the Housing Amendment Act 1944, which set up a National Housing and Planning Commission with powers to intervene in local housing policy (Lemon, 1991). The trend of centralising control over urban space was underway, then, even before the accession to central government of Malan's NP.

Encroaching centralisation was protested by some white local authorities, but it was actively resisted by members of the black population it sought to control. Formal, organised black resistance was encouraged by the subtle modifications in consciousness and culture wrought by urbanisation, the compounds and the factories in the first part of the 20th century.

**African Cultural Change and Political Responses**

Migrancy served as a means of channelling new, urban behaviour patterns back to the reserves - patterns which challenged traditional African structures even more than 19th century missionary activity had. But migrancy was not simply imposed upon Africans by employers and the state. It was a strategy well
suited to Africans with a viable reserve base, and one with a long tradition (see, for instance, Delius, 1983 and Beinart, 1982). A temporary sojourn working for white employers in the city or on the land, enabled the retention of contact with the independent home base and often simultaneously encouraged greater cooperation with other migrants at work (Beinart, 1987).

Beinart argues that traditional ethnic consciousness among migrants in some ways facilitated the gradual development of a new class consciousness in the African workforce of the 1920s and 1930s. Traditional and "progressive" identities coexisted, with the established ethnic bond between migrants bolstering a new sense of class affinity. Ethnically "particularist associations at work made self-protection and organisation possible, rather than constraining them" (Beinart, 1987, 289). While the bulk of the less educated migrants tended to join such ethnically homogenous groups in the cities, some joined student associations, with wider African nationalist affiliations. However, the feeling of class identity that developed out of ethnic consciousness did not displace ethnic awareness. Ethnic identity remains a strong motivating factor behind some of the violence in African townships today.

The urban gang was a tangible expression of African ethnic association in the cities of the 1920s and 1930s (see Van Onselen, cited Beinart, 1982, 197). Newspapers on the Rand and in Durban expressed concern over the proliferation of knifings in fights between ethnic gangs. Councillors also rued the "immoral practices" of homosexuality, sometimes associated with gang coercion, in the migrant worker compounds (Beinart, 1987).

With the circularity of migrant flows, urban traits were soon transferred to the reserves. In a rural Pondoland setting, beer drinking groups of young men borrowed a hierarchical form of organisation from the urban gangs. Such groups combined with migrant worker gangs to present a continuing threat to both the white rural administration and the chiefs (Beinart, 1982, 159-60). Another cultural influence contributed to the atmosphere of crumbling stability in rural areas, as the reserves opened wider to mission education and tuition in the early part of the 20th century.
In the cities themselves however, African cultural adaptation extended well beyond gang mobilization. In the 1930s and 1940s, the township environments of the Rand and Pretoria, characterised by poverty, overcrowding, illegal drinking dens called shebeens and pass raids, produced "a distinctive popular culture known as "marabi"" (Worden, 1994, 62). The blending of traditional, missionary, ragtime and jazz traits, produced a new, peculiarly urban form of African music (Coplan, 1985, cited Worden, 1994, 62). But beyond music, marabi was a "distinctive way of life, impenetrable to outsiders, which helped to deal with poverty and the "lack of visible means of subsistence"" (Worden, 1994, 62-3, quoting Koch, 1983). Parallels to marabi developed in other South African urban environments: for instance, the development of popular music, carnival and self-help organisations in Cape Town's District Six (Worden, 1994).

Adjustments in African culture and consciousness soon fed into the forms of organised resistance to white administration adopted by Africans. In rural areas, the encroachment on chiefly authority embodied in the 1927 Native Administration Act was resisted in novel ways. For example, in Pondoland, an attempt was made to reject the chief imposed by the authorities in court, because he was the inheritor of a tradition represented by the 19th century chief Sigcau, who had aided white labour recruiters in Pondoland, and thus "sold" the country for his own benefit (Beinart, 1982). Rural resistance, however, was to reach its peak when the succeeding apartheid government sought to consolidate its rule in the reserves with far less flexibility.

In the inter-war period, most organised resistance came from more radical, urbanised blacks, who led the ANC from the 1920s, with many also, or exclusively, supporting the powerful urban and rural socialist movement, the ICU. The ICU taught the ANC a lesson in radicalisation over the period. If the ANC was to represent the expanding African industrial working classes, it would have to distance itself from the "courtly and often pompous discourse of African politicians" (Lodge, 1983, 6) who currently led the movement. The founding of the CP in 1921 infused a further radicalizing influence, enhanced after the CP abandoned the racism of the white labour movement following the 1922 strike, and committed itself to black mobilisation.
Garveyism was another radical movement in the black politics of the period, but it was distinct from the "left wing" tendency. While Dube, of the ANC leadership, reflected the American ex slave, Booker T. Washington's accommodationist line towards whites, many young blacks, experiencing the appalling conditions attendant upon rapid urbanisation, followed the contrary American line of Garvey, stressing black pride and perceiving black Americans as redeemers (Marks and Trapido, 1987). In one rural millenarian movement, reminiscent of the Great Xhosa cattle killing, black American aircraft pilots would intervene to protect oppressed black South Africans (Marks and Atmore, 1980). Even the socialist ICU blended elements of Garveyism into its doctrines. The Garveyist movement was strongest in the Western Cape. Here, Xhosa with their Africanist traditions, and black Americans in the docks, combined to diffuse the ideas. Marks and Trapido, 1987, highlight the contrast between the thrusting radicalism of this region's black population, and the conservatism of the "organic intellectuals" of Natal, where Zulu ethnicity and the maintenance of the Zulu monarchy's legitimacy were the most cherished ideals of African political mobilisation. Resistance to the state was largely precluded by them, and their pursuit as goals was gladly assisted by the state in its support for the Zulu Society. The political quiescence of Natal in the 1930s and 1940s provided the prelude to the violent manifestation of Zulu ethnic chauvinism in Durban in 1949, discussed below.

Meanwhile, the conjunction of socialism and Africanism in the ANC rank and file was radicalizing the movement, a tendency manifested in the election of Josiah Gumede as president. The new blend of political ideology was encapsulated in one motion passed on Gumede's accession - "the right of self - determination through the complete overthrow of capitalism and imperialist domination ... the principle of Africa for the Africans" (quoted Lodge, 1983, 8). Some members of the ANC and SACP came to share an understanding that South Africa contained a colonial situation for which two stages of liberation were necessary - a nationalist democratic revolution in co-operation with reformist African petty bourgeois organisations, followed by a socialist revolution (Lodge, 1983). This premise continued to be held by the SACP throughout its resistance to apartheid, but it was less well diffused through the ANC, which retained a core conservative membership.
Gumede was replaced as leader by Pixley Seme in 1930, and "with his ascendancy the ANC shifted several degrees rightwards into almost total moribundancy" (Lodge, 1983, 9). At the same time, the SACP was moving onto a confrontationist course with the government, a course which was to destroy its organisational structures in South Africa.

Although the ANC reached the nadir of its influence in the 1930s, by wooing traditional chiefs and businessmen, "identifying them with the general good" (Lodge, 1983, 10-11), another turning point was reached in the 1940s as African political organisation adjusted to the massive wartime expansion of the African working class, mainly in Johannesburg.

In the wartime decade, many more blacks than ever before came to pursue their wellbeing in an urban and industrial context. From 1936 to 1946, the urban African population grew by 57.2%, from 1,141,612 to 1,794,212, overtaking the white urban population by about 75,000 (Pose1, 1991, 24). The urbanisation of Africans and their incorporation as a large industrial workforce in themselves presented challenges to white urban political and economic hegemony. A sense of threshold, of the 1940s being a critical and portentous time, is apparent in contemporary reports (O. Walker, 1948; Blackwell and May, 1947; C. Norton, 1948; E. Robeson, 1946).

Despite Smuts's tentative reformism, urban Africans felt compelled to make their own attempts to resist the further encroachment of poverty. In Alexandra, in protest at fare rises, bus boycotts took place in 1940 and 1945, and from 1944 to 1947, a Johannesburg squatter movement culminated in the incorporation of Orlando into older housing estates to form the largest African township of Soweto (Southwest Townships). Workerist action was added to the "repertoire" (Tilly, cited Introduction, Clingman, 1991,) of resistance, with the increasing importance of African labour during the war and falling wages contributing to a series of relatively successful strikes on the Witwatersrand in 1942 and 1943. Once the war was won, however, the African mineworkers union was destroyed in the crushing of the 1946 strike, and the Council for Non European Trade Unions, which had been formed during the war, was severely weakened.
The ANC could not help but incorporate some of this flourishing radicalism. The Africanist element of it was manifested in 1944 with the founding of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The ANCYL soon developed influence over the leadership of the organisation as a whole, infusing it with the spirit of Africanism. Its leader, Anton Lembede, saw, in the urbanisation of the African populace, a source of mass support which, so far, the Congress leadership had shamefully neglected (Lodge, 1983). However, the Africanists were wary of that other radicalizing influence, communism. They saw in it an updated form of white paternalism, and felt their own oppression to be clearly based on race rather than class.

Radicalization of black political organisations was also encouraged indirectly by the state's own actions in the 1940s. ANC members were pushed into more radical stances by brutality towards the strikers in 1946, the extension of influx control regulations to the Cape, the creation of segregated political institutions for "Coloureds" and Indians and the consistent hedging of the Natives Representative Council into a pusillanimous ("toy telephone" to the government) role.

"Coloured" and Indian Responses to Segregation

While African organisations were being moulded into more militant forms in the 1940s, the political position of "Coloured" and Indian populations was more ambiguous. "Coloured" political identity and mobilization had been spurred by the post Boer War settlement, when the "Coloured" franchise was confined to the Cape and withheld in the northern republics. Political protest was organised by the African Political (later People's) Organisation (APO). Ethnic mobilization was aided by the fact that Coloured voters were influential in at least six Cape Town City Council seats (Marks and Trapido, 1987). With the lingering influence of scientific racism's classifications, "Coloureds" were able to utilize their perceived status as a race more advanced than Africans: "the advantages of a separate identity for "Coloureds" came to be appreciated (Marks and Trapido, 1987, 29). That the APO could benefit from drawing such a distinction became clear when "Coloureds" were exempted from carrying the passes introduced for Africans with the 1923 Act.

The Indian population was subject to much greater internal class
differentiation. There was little sense of an Indian communal identity in political discourse until the state defined such a community by its discriminatory legislation. Indian South Africans in the late 1940s though, had the advantage of international leverage, the Indian government being willing to act on their behalf in a global arena - the United Nations - when legislation was enacted against Indian land occupation and trading rights. To a certain extent this compensated for a lack of the cultural ties with Afrikaners that "Coloureds" had (Marks and Trapido, 1987).

After Union in 1910, a South African-born, Indian political elite had begun to mobilise against the separate registering of Indians in the province of the Transvaal. These clerks, interpreters, teachers and professionals, provided the personnel for Gandhi's first satyagraha campaign. Later organisation, however, mostly revolved around the property rights threatened by Smuts's government, and there was little linkage with African political movements. Indeed the 1949 Durban riots were a traumatic experience of involvement with Zulus. A minor affray between an Indian and an African set off Zulu attacks on Indians in the city, leaving 142 dead. The conflict of culture between Indian and African had been steadily exacerbated by exploitation of Zulu workers by an Indian petty bourgeoisie, and state manipulated competition between African and Indian entrepreneurs. Continuing white invective and incitement against Indians probably gave extra impetus to the conflict (Marks and Trapido, 1987).

From Segregation to Apartheid

The period from 1910 to 1948 was one in which the political and spatial groundwork for apartheid was laid, but in a varied and inconsistent manner. While centralisation of control over South Africa's space was progressing through the period, it was only partially accomplished by 1948, and there was a great degree of variation in political and spatial structures on the ground. Nevertheless, the legal framework for a more rigid implementation of spatial and political division along the lines of race, was in place by 1948.

Pre-apartheid state intervention had also precipitated an expansion of the "repertoire" of black resistance, a repertoire
that would be a crucial destabilising factor for future
government spatial and political projects.

By the mid 20th century, the context for black resistance had
decisively shifted to an urban arena, and its general form had
likewise altered from armed resistance to dispossession, through
passive protest at ill treatment, to "modern" industrial action,
although more traditional forms would coexist with the modern,
being particularly prominent in the reserves. At the individual
level, evolving systems of white social control would continue to
be met with black non-cooperation.

Apartheid's historical context included the spatial and political
forms of segregation legislated over the previous fifty years,
the attitudes behind them, and the methods of black opposition to
them. It also included another strand reaching back half a
century or more - that of a sense of Afrikaner identity,
developing progressively towards nationhood. The more
fundamentally segregationist regime elected in 1948, was intent
on a material and spiritual revival of the Afrikaner volk. Behind
the success of the NP lay a far more coherent expression of
Afrikaner nationalism than South Africa had yet seen.

2. Vitalizing Afrikaner Nationalism, 1910 to 1948

Introduction

During the 1930s, somewhat of an intellectual "renaissance"
(Sparks, 1990) emerged among Afrikaner nationalists. The
scholastic elite of the Afrikaner community engaged itself in
redefining and solidifying a nationalistic ideology which had its
roots in the late 19th century. The late 1920s and 1930s provided
an ideal context within which such ideologies could attain mass
adherence, bringing a world economic crisis and particular
material crisis to South Africa's "poor white" Afrikaners. There
has been some debate over the motivation for the resurgence of
nationalistic feeling in the 1930s, some writers emphasising the
ideological and cultural "entrepreneurship" of ethnic leaders
(Moodie, 1975, Welsh, 1987, Davenport, 1991), others, the material
impetus behind ethnic political mobilisation (O'Meara, 1983, Marks
and Trapido, 1987).
Nationalist ideology in the 1930s has been interpreted by Marxist scholars as a mental construct, built upon the solid material plight of Afrikaners experiencing discrimination under English dominated capitalism. An alliance of class "fractions" lay at the heart of Afrikaner nationalist mobilization, each fraction seeking to improve its material position through broader ethnic mobilization. However, liberal writers have placed more emphasis on the original divisions of language, history and religion between English and Afrikaans speakers; divisions which, in the first place, ensured that the impact of capitalism would be felt differentially. Such writers would not agree that the grounding of ideology in material conditions is direct. The success of nationalist ideologues in the 1948 election was brought about by a welter of subtle, non-material factors, interacting with material concerns.

Material Concerns

In the 1930s and 1940s, more people than ever before identified their political interests as lying with the NP. The pressing day to day, material concerns of these people, traced by O'Meara, 1983, helped foster their allegiance. A cluster of Afrikaans speaking classes came to realize that the programme of the nationalist movement, led by the secretive Broederbond, and politically represented by Malan's NP, could alleviate the material problems each was facing.

By 1948 the alliance was composed of a petty bourgeois leadership group, farmers and urbanised Afrikaner workers, but it was financed by, and achieved its material apotheosis in, Afrikaner -run commercial enterprises. Mobilization of the alliance was triggered largely by the blocked aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie in the northern provinces.

The frustration of this middle class was first manifested in the 1910s over the specific issue of language. English was the language of the workplace and of education, and it was English which opened doors to state employment. Dutch remained the language of "hymn, sermon and bible" (Marks and Trapido, 1987, 17). If Afrikaans speaking journalists, writers, teachers and clerics were to advance in the professional fields using the vernacular, they would have to mobilize a new constituency to empower their
language. The concentration on the importance of language, its centrality to identity, was in clear distinction to the politics of the established Afrikaans leadership, represented by Botha and Smuts.

In 1918, the Broederbond was established by aspirant professionals in the Transvaal to work for the interests of "Afrikanerdom", but specifically, in its infancy, for the promotion of the vernacular. The institution took firm root in the province, backed particularly by the Transvaal's Afrikaner teachers (Moodie, 1975). The Broederbond "provided a superb vehicle for the discussion, elaboration, adoption and eventual execution of what, after fusion, amounted to the independent programme of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" (O'Meara, 1983, 64).

Central to O'Meara's materialist argument is that this class, in order to remove the obstacles to its advancement, needed to mobilize the support of two sectors of the Afrikaans constituency in particular: the farmers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, who had displayed a willingness to support Smuts's UP after fusion, and urban Afrikaans workers, who were being enticed by the left wing movements. The ideologues of the Bond therefore sought, through their covert influence in the inter-war period, to unite these forces into an ethnic coalition. Such an alliance would "burst open the doors of economic advance" (O'Meara, 1983), presently barred to the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie by the use of their mother tongue.

In the meantime, though, this class had to endeavour to "participate in the industrial capitalist economy through the medium of its own language" (O'Meara, 1983, 66). A prerequisite was the generation of specifically Afrikaner capital. One man was particularly influential in this respect - W.A. Hofmeyr. Unlike the leaders of the Broederbond, Hofmeyr was based in the Cape. He had channelled capital derived from Cape commercial farmers into the establishment of three overtly Afrikaans companies - Nasionale Pers (press), SANTAM and SANLAM (insurance and credit companies).

By the 1930s, Hofmeyr and the Broederbond had some mutual goals. In order to drive the nationalist economic movement, the Bond needed capital to invest in the north, while Hofmeyr was seeking
to extend his influence northwards from the Cape. A tension-wrought co-operation emerged from a meeting of these, and other like-minded Afrikaners, at the 1939 Ekonomiese Volkskongres. Here, the Broederbond's official "front" organisation, the FAK (Federaisie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings), was active in creating a number of institutions to further the economic interests of the volk. The Federal Volksbelegging was set up to utilize Afrikaner capital to build up Afrikaner participation in industry and commerce. An Ekonomiese Instituut (EI) was to lead Afrikaans capital into the volk's own commercial companies, like Hofmeyr's SANLAM and Volkskas.

Economic advancement was necessary, but if the movement initiated by the petty bourgeoisie was to be ultimately successful in the political arena, it would need the support of a significantly wider section of the white electorate - particularly, as we have seen, farmers and workers. O'Meara argues that it was the promise of economic salvation which generated this support. In the 1930s, many Afrikaners, both on the land and in the cities, were in need of material redemption. By 1939, the state estimated that some 300,000 whites (mainly Afrikaners) were in "terrible poverty" (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, 31). The 1932 Carnegie Commission found that one third of Afrikaners were "desperately poor", while another third were classified as "poor". The bankruptcy of small farmers in the 1920s and 30s was given as the main explanation. In 1939 Afrikaners constituted 41% of blue collar and other manual workers, while only 27% of white collar workers were Afrikaners. With the prospect of demobilization and redundancies following the war, fears of further immizeration for the "poor whites" of the cities arose.

Even from its formation in 1933, the new NP thought that it was possible to "capture" this "poor white" voting constituency. The 1924 NP government had sought to protect Afrikaners from the effects of English capital, which, unmitigated, could have left most small white farmers as poor urban workers. But fusion brought the old NP's abandonment of that protection, and common cause between Hertzog and "Hoggenheimer", an Anglo-Jewish caricature, and the Afrikaner nationalist's despised enemy. Malan's new NP stood for the continuity of the former protection (O'Meara, 1983).
Ethnic mobilization behind the new NP would confer new material blessings upon the volk, and the FAK would create the structures needed. The Reddingsdaadbond (RDB) was set up to pursue the lead of the EI in raising Afrikaner consciousness of the volk's own financial power and redeeming it from English economic domination. Membership of the RDB brought participation in cultural events, cheap life insurance from SANLAM, burial schemes, loans, training and an Afrikaans employment bureau. The RDB "directed a clear message to all Afrikaners - only as part of the Afrikaner volk, only in exclusively ethnic and Christian national organisations would their economic interests be fostered" (O'Meara, 1983, 142). In effect the RDB acted as the link between poor white and Afrikaner capitalist institution that the Broederbond sought, and which paved the way for the NP's 1948 success. The economic movement as a whole helped diffuse the Afrikaans intelligentsia's nationalist ideology to the masses. The short term aim of the movement was to channel capital, derived from northern and Cape farmers, into industrial and commercial enterprises for urban Afrikaners (with dividends and interest as the reward for the farmers) - a rural to urban redistribution of the volk's assets to accompany that of the volk itself.

However, Afrikaner urban workers had choices as to where to place their allegiance, and their trust in a brighter economic future. If the nationalist movement was to secure their support, it would have to compete with the leftist trade unions in the workplace. A nationalist assault on trade union structures (and even, in some cases, on the persons of members) took place in the 1930s. Nationalist mobilizers stressed that ethnicity was the common denominator among poor whites of the city. Ethnicity must therefore be the organising principle behind an improvement in the workers' fortunes. The fact that, in 1939, almost 40% of adult male Afrikaners were unskilled, compared to only 10% of other whites, could be portrayed as deliberate ethnic discrimination by an alliance of "foreign" (English/Jewish) capitalists and trade union leaders. For instance the white mineworkers' union was, at one time, in an agreement with the owners which often ran contrary to the interests of its members (O'Meara, 1983). Signs that Afrikaner workers may be replaced by cheaper Africans were interpreted as an imperialist state attempt, aided by trade union leaders, to consign Afrikaners, en
masse, to poor whiteism. Only unions of a nationalist nature could really further the cause of the Afrikaans worker.

The Garment Workers Union was particularly successful in diffusing Afrikaner nationalist sentiment amongst its women members. Nationalist sentiment about women's role as the motherhood of the volk was blended with anti-capitalist rhetoric by the union's membership in the second half of the 1930s (Berger, 1987).

O'Meara argues that it was only when the Broederbond became involved in matters extending beyond ideology, that it became successful in its political aims. By focusing on the material affairs of white workers, it was able to mobilize both their political support, and their savings for the nationalist economic movement, which in turn, generated further political support. Afrikaner nationalism and material accumulation thus proceeded hand in hand, the former leading the latter. But the origins of a specifically Afrikaans constituency itself lay in ethnic differentiation, rather than material, or class, distinction.

Non-Material Concerns

Marxists have tried to depersonalize the forces which created a distinct position for Afrikaners under South African capitalism. For example, Marks and Trapido, 1987, state that nationalism "can best be understood as a response to the social dislocations and problems posed by the uneven development of capitalism in South Africa". But the factor which defines the unevenness of capitalism's impact - ethnicity - is already present. The distinction between those who, by and large, benefited from the penetration of capitalism, and those who, by and large, did not, was already established. It was a sense of ethnic identity which distinguished Afrikaners from other white South Africans, and this identity, while it may have been reinforced, was not created, by impoverishment under capitalism. Behind it lay an ideational realm, a sense of being that was only partially connected to material status. Capitalism alone could not have wrought the mobilization of Afrikaans speaking whites, as Afrikaners, "unless some line of ethnocentrism, however mild, was an intrinsic accompaniment of the process of differentiation ... One need not regard this ethnic sentiment as "primordial" or deny
the degree of contingency in its formation to assert that ethnicity played an autonomous and growing role in Afrikaner politics in the 1930s" (Welsh, 1987, 200).

The Afrikaner's material situation, in a time of world economic crisis, was probably the key factor behind the eventual scale of nationalist support, but the nationalist movement transcended economic concerns, and was firmly planted in a world view determined by ethnicity. Members of the Broederbond stressed the interrelationships between the political, economic, cultural and spiritual dimensions of their nationalism, and not merely to mobilize support for their economic interests. Each one of these forms of identity has its own "situational salience", and while class was an important form, it was "woven into a racial and ethnic fabric" (Welsh, 1987, 202). Ethnicity was a much more powerful mobilizer of political force than class alone could have been.

The ideology of Afrikaner nationalist leaders in the 1930s was linked to that of contemporaneous German nationalists, themselves extremely successful at mobilizing within exclusive group boundaries. However, there is disagreement over the extent of German influence over the course of events in South Africa (see Bunting, 1969, Sparks, 1990, Moodie, 1975, Bloomberg, 1990, chapter 6).

The most tangible link was that of the Afrikaner nationalist leaders who studied in Germany in the 1930s, and who returned to diffuse new ideas of nationhood within South Africa. But a more subtle, literary link is identified by Coetzee, 1988. German volksideologie emphasised the rootedness of the volk in its native landscape. Early 20th century Afrikaner poets also found evidence of a "natural" bond between volk and land - "that is to say to naturalize the volk's possession of the land".

The exclusive frame of reference of the Afrikaner nationalists reached its apotheosis in the 1930s, when the rhetoric of the Afrikaner's communion with the sublime in the landscape became prominent in Afrikaans writing. This was a communion denied to other ethnic groups, less proximate to God. In the 1930s, literary expressions of Afrikaner distinctiveness also reflected the pressing material concerns of the volk. The Bauernroman, or Plaasroman (farm novel), became popular in both Germany and South
Africa, as a rural way of life was increasingly threatened by urbanisation and the penetration of commercial farming capital. In C.M. Van den Heever's "Groei", 1933, tilling the soil is represented as a "quasi-religious act in a Lebensraum free from capitalistic relations, subject only to natural laws" (Coetzee,1988,76). In such novels, the tangible expression of this capitalistic threat was often the Jewish or English professional, a character who would enter the narrative as a revolutionizer of tradition, looking to buy a viable farming operation and drive the Afrikaner from his land through competition, breaking the bond of "Blut and Boden". "The Plaasroman grows out of the Afrikaner's anxiety that he will lose his economic independence and cultural identity if he leaves the land" (Coetzee,1988,135).

The importance of cultural identity was stressed by the Broederbond, an organisation that was not merely O'Meara's vehicle of petty bourgeois aspiration. Moodie, 1975, emphasises the Bond's republican political leanings. There was no republican dimension in the early Cape Afrikaans language movement, but the desire for a firm political expression of cultural independence informed a strong republican sentiment in the northern Bond. The demand for an explicitly Christian National State was added to those for Afrikaans schooling, radio time and songbooks, and, by the 1930s, was attracting overt criticism from Hertzog. The new NP's call for an Afrikaner led republic became a clamour in the 1930s, heard even above those for language rights, segregation and economic protection for poor whites (Moodie,1975).

Beyond the economic component of Bond activity lay a spiritual dimension, difficult to account for in a purely materialist interpretation. The Bond set itself the task of maintaining "the nation's religious character as well as acting as the watchdog over all its interests" (Bloomberg,1990,31) and, in line with this aim, it admitted only practising Calvinists, its members having to show "the highest degree of religious conviction" (op.cit.31). In the Bond of the 1930s, there was a strong current of thought that the volk was created by God as an independent entity, and that it should remain so. A republic, divorced from British imperial interest, would be an immutable political expression of this national entity.
Even within the Bond though, there were ideological divides. Theological fissures, in particular, split the ethnic leadership group. One prominent tendency derived its ideas from the Dutch Calvinist theologian, Kuyper. Kuyperians, like all nationalists, believed that the Afrikaner nation had been forged by God, out of the furnace of British imperialism and African savagery. But they saw the nation as one among many spheres, including the family and the individual, through which God fulfilled His intentions. Each of the spheres was autonomous in its relationship with God.

This tendency was most coherently represented by H.G. Stoker, a leader of the Broederbond in the 1930s. Malan himself had been a dominee of the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), which sought to preserve its institutional independence from the state (hence Malan's resignation from the church on entering politics), but which was broadly supportive of nationalistic politics.

During the 1930s, Kuyperian theology faced competition within the Bond, from a more secular, neo-Fichtean line of thought. Academics, such as P.J. Meyer, H.F. Verwoerd (later Prime Minister), G. Cronje (author of the Bond's "Native" policy) and, most notably, N. Diederichs, returning from German universities, brought with them a preoccupation with the volk as an organic body, held together by common historic culture. Diederichs developed a social metaphysics argument that individuals, and humanity, only exist in and through the nation. Any identitative abstraction beyond the nation, such as "universal humanity" was too vague, in an immediate sense, to have meaning (Moodie, 1975, Davenport, 1991, 288), and any identity below the level of the nation precluded efficient social interaction.

Kuyperians like Stoker and L.J. du Plessis saw this as virtually deifying the nation, and restricting the power of God over it, since it was no longer held to be one of many spheres through which His will is implemented. The nation for them, had a value in God's scheme alongside that of the individual and the family, not greater than them.

The practical implications of both tendencies, despite the differing nuances of their theological standpoints, were largely indistinguishable: the furtherance of the volk's interests. While it was the economic movement which did most to diffuse
nationalist thinking to a mass base, ideological persuasion was also influential. The constant neo-Calvinist expounding of the Volk's election as a chosen people allowed a flattering sense of dignity to filter down through the Afrikaans population. There was more pride to be had in ethnic identity, than in an identity founded upon other parameters.

Popular political support for the NP was also generated in the purely ideological sphere, notably with the FAK - organised celebration of the Great Trek and Blood River's centenary in 1938. the immense popular enthusiasm, and even hysteria, generated by the celebratory trek of wagons, each named after one of the Trek's leaders, is well documented by Moodie, 1975. Behind the enthusiasm was a new mythology, surrounding the vow to God taken by the original trekkers, led by Sarel Cilliers, before the Battle of Blood River. In 1838 the trekkers in Natal, in the event of a God - given victory over the Zulu, had apparently pledged to celebrate on that day in the indefinite future. The Vow was, in fact, largely forgotten until the late 19th century, when it was revived as part of the early Afrikaner nationalist movement. The largely mythical Vow played a central role in the 1938 celebrations which, in themselves, precipitated a welling desire for Afrikaner unity in politics. "Afrikaners had learned in their worship at the oxwagon altars how very much they had in common as Afrikaners" (Moodie, 1975, 185). The NP's virtual monopoly on organising the celebrations was a vital step in wresting control over the political expression of Afrikaner-ness from Hertzog and the UP (Thompson, 1985). Malan himself skilfully incorporated an appeal to urban Afrikaners in his celebratory speech, using the "civil religion" theme (Moodie, 1975), with urbanisation portrayed as a new 20th century trek. The battleground on which these trekkers would have to fight was not Blood River, but the labour market, supervised by foreign capitalists, and manned by an insidiously increasing urban African population.

The nationalist economic movement did not simply aim to increase the influence of SANLAM and remove obstacles from the accumulation of the urban petty bourgeoisie, it was also an attempt to transform the very basis of Afrikaner participation in the economy, from individualism to ethnic mobilization, in order to edify the Afrikaners as a nation.
The awakening ethnic identity in the inter war years was stimulated by a sense of affinity with Afrikaner forefathers. One man, Gustav Preller, was particularly active in bringing the mythologised exploits of these historical figures to the attention of the public. Preller was a nationalistic Afrikaner with supreme leverage over the media of communication. His hagiographic biography of the trekker leader, Piet Retief, ran through ten printings and sold over 25,000 by 1930. This book alone "moulded the historical consciousness of many Afrikaners" (Thompson,1985,181). Preller was more than just a writer. He was a leader in the drives to formalise the Afrikaans language, and to establish an Afrikaans historiography. But possibly his most crucial contribution was to popularize an influential version of Afrikaner history (Hofmeyr,1991). He effected this visually, through writing the script, and determining the appearance of the 1916 film "Die Voortrekkers". This was the first popular representation of the Trek and its leaders, and some 15,000 people queued each week to see it. Its contribution to the 20th century version of the Afrikaner tradition was enormous. It was a vital thread in what Hofmeyr, 1991, describes as "the cultural fabrication of nationalism". Preller shared the implicit assumption of many nationalists: that the biographies of key historical figures amalgamated to form a biography of the nation itself. He used all mediums to proselytize the nationalist faith, also being the editor, in the 1930s, of the NP paper, Ons Vaderland. But it was especially his visual images which made the nationalist elite's conception of identity concrete in the minds of Afrikaners in general.

Nationalist Disunity

Despite the coherence of its organisation, and the individual flair of its leaders, the tide of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s did not sweep away the other political identities of the volk en masse. By 1939, Afrikaner nationalism had taken on new force, through a combination of material inducement and ideological fervour, but it could not present a cohesive and undifferentiated front to the challenges that it faced. Regional differentiation had marked the nationalist movement from its inception, but the late 1930s and 1940s brought a plethora of political offshoots and competing factions within nationalist politics.
After fusion, Malan's NP had been able to assume control of much of the old NP's organisational structure in the Cape, but it faced a UP that had successfully retained most of the old NP's support in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Within the NP, the provincial party units were semi-autonomous, and had divided political interests. The "various Afrikaner nationalist movements in South African history were always constituted by a differentiated and shifting ensemble of social forces - each clearly articulating widely different conceptions and expectations of the "volk" and what "its" interests were" (O'Meara, 1983, 6). The Cape's NP component tended to be more externally orientated than those of the northern provinces, with SANLAM and the relatively wealthy vine and wool exporters articulating with the world, rather than just the domestic, economy. NP structures in the Transvaal tended to be strongly protective of the poor whites of Johannesburg and of the small farming sector from which they derived. Party members in the Orange Free State were inclined towards the interests of the province's domestic cereal producers.

Although these diverse material interests were, by and large, accommodated within the NP by 1948, ideological differentiation was far more divisive for Afrikaner mobilization. The NP leadership was thrown into a dilemma by the emergence of Oswald Pirow's fascistic New Order group, and the mass recruitment of the militant extra-parliamentary Ossewabrandwag (OB). Both organisations shared some ideological tendencies with the NP, but each was unacceptable to the body of nationalist leadership opinion. On the one hand the NP could hope to gain support by accommodating such tendencies. On the other hand, it could interpret their existence as a challenge to the party's fundamental values, and hope to successfully compete with them for allegiance. The OB was finally dealt with when the NP invoked the aid of its enemy, the government, to repress it, while the New Order group died out with the defeat of Naziism, but the story of the NP's relations with both indicates the extent of political deviation within the body of "the volk" (see Moodie, 1975, O'Meara, 1983, Davenport, 1991).

By the end of the war, the NP was the unchallenged political representative of the nationalist movement. The party was astute in quieting its membership's contentious republican clamour in
the run up to the 1948 election, focusing instead on the areas of clear agreement between the Dutch Reformed Church and the Broederbond: mother tongue education, the communist peril and checks on African social and economic advancement (Moodie, 1975).

The NP's first overtly racial policy directive arose out of concern that the gains of the Afrikaner economic movement should not evaporate through competition with Indian traders. An early NP policy pledge was to remove Indians to their "own areas", and prevent them living or trading in white areas (O'Meara, 1983). The wider apartheid policy arose from the mutual concerns of Afrikaners, given their marginal position in society and the economy. Apartheid was first mooted as a vague concept by Malan in 1943, to maintain white purity, and to secure supplies of cheap African labour to white farmers by further controlling African migration to the cities. Even though the scheme was vague, it was clear that it would favour each of the class components that the NP was concerned to protect.

Afrikaner businessmen, who had experienced rising African wages during the war, rendering competition with English capital harder, would be able to lower their costs. The NP would also combat the "laziness" of African workers, supposedly induced by their sense of security with Smuts's unemployment benefit. Once in power, one of the first moves of the NP was indeed to restrict the African unemployment benefit scheme. The financiers of the volk's mobilization in the Afrikaner commercial institutions like SANLAM, would also be assured of state accounts after a NP victory.

Afrikaner farmers were keenly concerned with the continuity of their African labour supplies, threatened by industrial growth in the cities. The NP Member of Parliament, de Wet Nel said in 1944 "just take the Free State or the Transvaal. One simply cannot get a Native to work there. The farmers are at their wits end" (cited O'Meara, 1983, 177). Apartheid held out the promise of more rigid influx control than Smuts was willing to implement, and thus the retention of labour in the rural areas. The NP would also recognise the farming community's financial contribution (via the commercial companies) to the volk's economic mobilization, and the marketing board would once more be used to protect farmers, rather than drive food prices down as it had done during the war.
under Smuts.

The "poor whites" who had already left the land for the cities, sought in apartheid, protection from the competition of cheaper African workers, again through stricter influx control regulation. They could also hope for a reversal of the erosion of the job colour bar, which had occurred during the war.

The 1948 election, then, saw a crucial shift in allegiance towards the NP, from the UP in the case of northern farmers, and from the LP and the UP in the case of Afrikaans urban workers. O'Meara's petty bourgeoisie now found an open forum, within the state itself, for the ideology it had developed. The success of the NP in the 1948 election though, was owed to something more than just the successful mobilization of Afrikaners, with varying interests, as an ethnic bloc. NP propaganda, based on the swaart gevaar (black peril) and oorstrooming (swamping), touched on the concerns of a wider post-war white electorate, and political and economic circumstances lying beyond the influence of the nationalist leadership, such as the perceived blood on Smuts's hands, also conspired to bring about the NP's narrow electoral victory (see Davenport, 1991).

Conclusion

Conciliation between English and Afrikaans speakers after the Boer War, was never allowed to be complete. Just as, in the first decades of the century, Botha and Smuts's cooperation with English speakers in the SAP was resented by Hertzog, so Hertzog's own fusion with the SAP in 1933 was resented by a generation of Afrikaners that had assumed the mantle of nationalist leadership from him.

While ethnic sentiment remained strong, racial sentiment in the white population was fully entrenched by the beginning of the century. The 1922 strike revealed that a racially exclusive sense of identity was still far more powerful than that of class, even after some fifty years of blacks and whites working alongside one another (one group, of course, supervising the other) in the mines. White fears of the changes that industrialisation and urbanisation might bring, were superimposed on an established racial ideology. Together, they brought about increasing
centralisation of control over segregation, although there were still anomalies in South Africa's spatial patterning in 1948.

In the 1930s and 1940s, the increasing pace of industrial and urban growth magnified political dilemmas. Smuts contemplated the reforms which were needed to cope with the influx of African workers that was needed, but simultaneously resented, in the cities. However, reforms conflicted with the prevailing racial ideology, and thus contributed to the popularity of the NP. But this popularity was enhanced by ethnic mobilization, coming from within the nationalist economic movement, itself feeding on the material conditions of poor Afrikaners in the cities. Urbanisation, then, was the context for the implementation of South Africa's late 20th century spatial, political and social structure. It was ultimately the changes wrought by urbanisation that made Smuts's potentially reformist government unpopular. The threat that urban African competition brought to whites in the lowest paid jobs, helped drive that government's reactionary alternative into power.

From 1910 to 1948, the enduring legacy of late 19th century white supremacist ideology was manifested in new spatial forms, and transplanted to new urban environments. An "elaboration of segregationist discourse" (Dubow, 1987) took place in 20th century South Africa despite the increasingly assimilationist stance being adopted by liberals, and indeed, the rest of the world's governments. In 1948, apartheid planners inherited an urban form that was already substantially segregated under central directive. But centralisation of a kind had also occurred in black resistance politics. Urbanisation again, had wrought profound changes. A new radicalism had emerged and, coordinated largely by the ANC, it found its expression in new forms of urban resistance, forms which were added to those of the established "repertoire".
Chapter Four

The Formulation of a Structure

Introduction

There is a common perception that the 1948 change of government, and the ensuing implementation of apartheid, represented a clean break with previous social trends and political outlooks. However, a number of structural continuities bridged the period. In an analysis of the nature of apartheid, the theme of continuity versus discontinuity is revealing. This theme underlies the first half of this chapter. The second half deals with the subsequent evolution of apartheid policy, and the black resistance that it provoked.

On the one hand, apartheid arose out of a continuation of social characteristics dating from well before 1948: racial ideologies, an Afrikaner nationalist sense of identity, the structuring of material relations between races, and the spatial structure of segregation. Its impact as a body of policies was slow to take effect and NP conception of policy in the apartheid era was often ad hoc, rather than pre-planned (see Posel, 1989). In all these senses, apartheid represented a continuation; an elaboration and an increase in fundamentalism, but, nevertheless, a building upon inherited forms.

On the other hand, insofar as apartheid marked the accession to government of a "new breed" of Afrikaner nationalist, and the generation of new ideological legitimations for its type of policy, it represented a novel development. Apartheid was also a discontinuity if the frame of reference is taken to be the preceding decade, rather than the preceding half century, in that it reversed the tentative reforms that Smuts had begun during the war.

At the level of the individual too, both continuities and discontinuities were evident. Whites would continue to experience social, political and spatial supremacy, but through policies which took them ever further away from international norms, and which generated more fundamental attitudes of both support and
dissent at opposite poles of the white political spectrum. Blacks were to feel, in the most concrete sense, the discontinuities of apartheid, with the extinguishing of the glimmer of material improvement sensed during the war. Africans were to be barred more securely from the cities and to have a new, limited, state-conceived political role conferred upon them. "Coloureds" and Indians were to experience large scale urban segregation and removals, similar to that which Africans had already undergone. A new distance developed between culturally articulated "Coloureds" and Afrikaners, and Indian politicization broadened out, from the elite group which had protested Smuts's prior discrimination, to involve a wider cross-section of the Indian population.

1. The Nature of Apartheid

When the NP narrowly won the 1948 general election, it brought to government an ideological standpoint that was distinct from that of the preceding government. The basic racial attitudes of the two ruling groups did not diverge in kind, only in degree, but their conception of white society differed fundamentally.

Analysts who have sought a material rationale for apartheid have often overlooked such discontinuities in the nature of ruling group ideology. Wolpe's influential article of 1972 explains apartheid as a rational response to the material difficulties of accumulation that, by the mid 20th century, South African capital was facing. Here, apartheid is represented as an all-embracing system, implemented on behalf of capital by a compliant state: In the early 20th century, mining, industrial and commercial capital had still benefited from viable African reserve bases. The reserves had acted to reproduce cheaply the migrant labour that capital required. But with the gradual penetration of a capitalist mode of production into the reserves themselves, increasing inequalities undermined the redistribution of resources that had sustained a partially independent (and therefore cheap) labour force in the cities. As the communal productive base of the reserves was eroded, so the permanent urban African population increased. For Wolpe, apartheid was an attempt to keep African labour costs low in the new conditions of the mid 20th century, when the reserves themselves could no longer bear the costs of reproduction. If capital were to continue to pay low wages to Africans without an independent
reserve base, the resulting unrest in the cities would threaten the whole political structure. Thus the state involved itself in economic relations, to maintain cheap African labour through new structures of repressive legislation. "Racial ideology in South Africa must be seen as an ideology which sustains and reproduces capitalist relations of production" (Wolpe, 1972).

The new government's ideology may have been partially founded upon the preservation of advantageous material relations, or at least, their justification, but it was not confined to this. The government was motivated by a plethora of non-material aims, coexistent with those of a material nature. Even the treatment of "the government" as a homogeneous and coherent bloc is false, but the differentiated components of government will be discussed later. Here, the overall direction of policy outcomes will be taken as indicating "the government's" position.

Three basic objectives are often ascribed to the newly empowered NP (Price, 1991, Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990). Firstly, the party sought to maintain a segregated society "in keeping with the precepts of the Afrikaner politico-religious doctrine" (Price, 1991), and by so doing, to preserve Afrikaner identity. Marks and Trapido, 1987, declare that it was the "petty bourgeois obsession with racial "purity" and eugenics" (21) that lay behind the passage of the Population Registration Act, the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act, but it seems likely that the preoccupation with racial "purity" extended well beyond just this class. Regarding the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts, the "primary intention and the practical effect ... was to take away from white men the freedom to drop out of the ranks of the labouring class, take up with brown women, settle down to more or less idle, shiftless, improvident lives, and engender troops of ragged children of all hues, a process which, if allowed to accelerate, would, in the end, they foresaw, spell the demise of white civilization at the tip of Africa" (Coetzee, 1988, 35).

A second goal was the securing of white political supremacy and economic privilege from potential internal and external threats, notably those of African urbanisation and social advancement. In 1930, 90,517 Africans had been employed in manufacturing; by 1955, there were 342,150. The permanent African population of the
cities was now larger than the white urban population and Africans were beginning to assert a strong moral claim to political participation (and, implicitly, therefore dominance), in the new democratic conditions of the post-war world.

Their steadily progressing assumption of positions of economic power posed a long term political threat to white control over government (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). White political and economic supremacy could only be obtained by halting African urbanisation, extending the migrant labour system from mining to manufacturing, and deflecting urban African political claims. Those urban Africans who were seen by the NP as being already "detribalised", were initially to be allowed to remain in the interests of the economy, but this urban labour force would have to be fully utilized before others would be allowed to join it (Pose1, 1989). Subsequently, however, for Prime Minister Verwoerd, "the survival of white civilization in South Africa" became "of more importance, ... even more important than expanded industrial development" (Rhoodie, 1969, cited Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

The NP's third overriding aim was to elevate the Afrikaner community into a position of social and economic equality with, if not dominance over, the English speaking population. A three-pronged programme would be pursued until the 1960s. New discriminatory legislation would be applied to Africans and extended to "Coloureds" and Indians, in order to preserve the hegemony, as members of the dominant racial group, of the poorest Afrikaners. The bureaucracy and the parastatal sector would be enlarged in order to generate specifically Afrikaner employment, and welfare programmes would be instituted to redistribute wealth within the white population for the uplifting of poor (Afrikaner) members of the racial group. The success of these measures is indicated by the fact that in 1970, Afrikaner per capita income was 70% of that of the English speaking population; in 1946, it had been less than half (Terreblanche, 1989, cited Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990).

These three considerations were undoubtedly prominent in the minds of apartheid's administrators, but they were never coherently expressed as a programme of administration in the way that is often implied. Apartheid was not the unified conceptual
model it is often thought to have been. The influential nationalist editor of "Die Burger" from 1954 to 1978, Piet Cillie described apartheid thus: "A system? An ideology? A coherent blueprint? No, rather a pragmatic and tortuous process aimed at consolidating the leadership of a nationalist movement in order to safeguard the self-determination of the Afrikaner" (cited Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). Beyond the often conflicting interpretation of policy within government circles, Posel, 1989, shows "that the powers and interests of central and local state institutions, individual African workers as well as mass organisations, individual employers as well as organised commerce and industry, must all be taken into account in explaining how Apartheid took shape" (18).

Legitimating Apartheid

Even if the conception behind apartheid policies was not entirely clear, and the policies themselves were pursued in vacillatory ways, apartheid as a broad strategy could still be legitimated, for whites, through a variety of media. A further step in the "scientific" differentiation between races, was one such medium. The initiative came in the 1950s, from Afrikaans university departments of Anthropology. "The departments of "Volkekunde" ... were expected to contribute to the theory and practice of apartheid. They have generally done more or less what was expected of them" (Kuper, 1988, 35). The scientific racism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was generally unacceptable by the 1950s. Blatantly racist language and argumentation was therefore largely avoided by apartheid theorists. Anthropology provided a new rationale for the emphasis on racial differentiation, or rather, resurrected an old one, through the use of the ambiguous word "culture".

In the 1920s, "culture" had given liberals a less rigid means than social Darwinism had allowed, of explaining racial differences. But the concept was now used to maintain that these differences were immutable, ignoring the possibility, stressed by the earlier generation of liberals, of their diminution over time. W.M. Eiselen was a leader of the field. He held that blacks were not inferior to whites according to any objective standard, but that they were culturally different. Apartheid sought merely to preserve the cherished cultural identity of each group, thus...
preventing mutual cultural degradation. Thus "Eiselen and his students - and their students - were in search of a fundamental alternative to race in the ideological edifice of South African "Native policy". With different emphases and in different ways they chose to identify "culture" as the alternative basis" (Kuper, 1988,45).

Such a mutually protective policy would require a separation in space, based on adequate resources for each racial group. "At its most idealistic apartheid was a projection of the aims of Afrikanerdom onto others. All must wish to survive as distinct ethnic units, with their own language, religion and traditions" (Kuper, 1988,46).

While Anthropology provided a secular, academic justification for intensified segregation, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) ensured that "apartheid had many of the trappings of a moral crusade beyond the more bland social engineering designs of the previous Fabian segregationists" (Rich, 1989). The Church's theology was, by and large, derived from the Kuyperian notion of separate spheres of divine intention, only boundaries were now drawn between the spheres of nationhood to coincide with those of racial group. With the evangelization of apartheid by the DRC, its broad support within the Afrikaner community was, to a large extent, assured. Its wider legitimacy was mainly to be achieved in the field of education, discussed below.

At the same time that apartheid's legitimacy was being secured for whites within South Africa, the world was moving away from the principles which had supported the colonial segregation upon which it was built. Apartheid was implemented by "a more insular governing elite that now relied far less heavily on the external Commonwealth supports, and drove segregationist ideology into an ethnocentric creed to try and fit a new world order of declining European colonial empires and resurgent African nationalism" (Rich, 1989,292). Outside South Africa, racist suppositions were gradually being dropped. Inside, after 1948, a modified racist mythology was cocooned, and propagated ever more fervently by politicians, radio, teachers, textbooks, and from the 1970s, by television (Thompson, 1985).
New Policies

The first concrete changes to emerge from the hand over of power in 1948, were largely brought about by the NP's concern to safeguard specifically Afrikaner interests. But these interventions were soon followed by those directed at securing the racial order as a whole.

On assuming power, the NP leaders began a minor purge of the senior civil service, the army and the police. Nationalist army officers, who had resigned on the outbreak of war, were reinstated, and the use of Afrikaans was insisted upon, to the detriment of those English speakers who were not sufficiently bilingual. English street names were changed and the military establishment at Roberts Heights near Pretoria was renamed Voortrekkerhoogte (Le May, 1971). The nationalist economic movement's goals were brought closer to fulfilment with the transfer of municipal bank accounts to Afrikaans institutions. Afrikaans financial houses also received a boost from central state contracts which helped, by 1980, to establish them on a par with English owned interests (Marks and Trapido, 1987, 21).

The state's preservation of the volk was not confined to the economic sphere. In 1927, sex between African and white had been banned. In 1950, the new government extended the ban to cover intercourse between a white and any "non-white" person under the Immorality Act. Not content with this, in 1957, "intimacy" falling short of full sexual intercourse, between members of two different racial groups, was also banned.

The NP's centralisation of control over South African society was the most prominent departure from the characteristics of government prior to 1948. Legislation was introduced to penetrate every area of social relations. The Immorality Act is an extreme example on a personal level, but centralisation also occurred on a broad economic scale.

After 1948, the government's influence over the economy increased dramatically with the development of parastatal corporations, initially constructed to aid in Afrikaner economic upliftment. By 1974, the state was responsible for 45.6% of total investment in South Africa, and 29.6% of industrial investment (Rogerson, 1982),
largely through corporations such as ARMSCOR (arms), ISCOR (iron and steel), ESCOM (electricity), SENTRACHEM (chemicals), SASOL (oil from coal) and NATREF (oil refining). With its participation in these concerns, the state sought to occupy "the commanding heights of the economy" (Weiss, 1975, quoted Rogerson, 1982).

A more subtle kind of centralisation lay behind the government's intervention in the education system. If apartheid was to function, its ideology would have to be secured for the future through schooling. The 1953 Bantu Education Act was the most prominent piece of legislation in this regard. This not only pegged expenditure on black education back to the level of black taxes, it also provided an apartheid epistemology. The structures of knowledge that the education system conveyed were to be tailored according to racial group. F.H. Odendaal, the administrator of the Transvaal province, told its school principles "we must strive to win the struggle against the non-white in the classroom rather than lose it on the battlefield".

Within the white education sector, Afrikaners, separated in their own schools, were given a "Christian National Education". Bloomberg, 1990, argues that the Broederbond's innate Calvinism and sense of ethnicity was solidified into a firm Christian-Nationalist ideology in the late 1920s and early 1930s, largely in response to the growing influence of Potchefstroom theological academics, and in opposition to the old NP's fusion with the secular and Anglican SAP. With the extension of the ideology from the Bond to Malan's newly empowered NP, its influence over Afrikaans education was ensured. The History syllabus, for instance, focused around the story of God's revelation of purpose; a God who has "willed separate nations of people" (quoted Thompson, 1985, 50). Afrikaner teachers, many of whom were Bond members, were organised into unilingual professional associations which "are among the most reactionary forces in South African society" (Thompson, 1985, 51).

African education under the Bantu Education Act was more restrictive than that given to the proteges of the nationalist leaders. Prior to 1948, a large part of African education was conducted under the auspices of church and mission schools. The relative freedom of content and interpretation they allowed was construed as a challenge to the envisaged role of Africans under
apartheid.

The 1953 Act forced most such schools to close, and transferred the administration of state African schools from the provinces to the central Department of Native Affairs, which would in future devise syllabi and regulations. "Coloured" and Indian education would also be centralised in the 1960s, but the immediate threat of "non White" social advancement lay with the large and expanding African population.

African primary school tuition, contrary to the demands of African political leaders, was to be given in the mother tongue, rather than in English. In 1959 the Minister of Bantu Education outlined the rationale: "The Bantu must be so educated that they do not want to become imitators, that they will want to remain essentially Bantu" (cited Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The education that was deemed suitable involved lower spending than on whites, less, and lower qualified teachers, and - the centrepiece grievance - a syllabus designed to complement the apartheid model of society. Of the version of history that was taught to blacks, even in the pre-apartheid period, Z.K. Matthews said "if it was difficult for us to accept the white man's account of his own past doings, it was utterly impossible to accept his judgements on the actions and behaviour of Africans, of our own grandfathers in our own lands. Yet we had to give back in our examination papers the answers the white man expected" (quoted Thompson, 1985, 66). By the 1950s, "Coloured" teachers in Cape Town were dictating two sets of notes to their classes. One was headed "For Examination Purposes Only", and the other, "The Truth" (Thompson, 1985, 67-8). Discriminatory education was extended beyond the school sector and into Higher Education with the paradoxically named Extension of University Education Act, which provided for segregated learning in these institutions.

Through the new education system, it was hoped that the segregationist impulse would be instilled in the minds of young South Africans. To complement this conceptual differentiation, the state would legally enforce greater communal separation. But before racial discrimination could be legally entrenched, the NP had to establish a legal basis for differentiating between the races, a task which was by no means clear cut after 300 years of racial mixing. Nevertheless, each individual would have to have a
racial category assigned to him/her, so that the discriminatory laws, which applied to racial groups as a whole, could be enforced. This groundwork was laid with the 1950 Population Registration Act, described by Cohen, 1986, as a means to "systematize previously confusing and scattered legal usages and race definitions and to stop the high incidence of "passing" (usually from "Coloured" to white) once and for all". The original criteria for classification were appearance, descent, generally accepted racial status and repute. Later, habits, education, speech, deportment and demeanour could also be taken into account. Enormous suffering was imposed (especially in the light of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts), simply through a bureaucrat's decision as to which racial category an individual fitted.

Once racial categories had been more firmly engraved on the consciousness of South Africans than ever before, further legislation could be enacted to keep the categories apart. In 1953, the government responded to a court declaration that the racial reservation of government railway facilities was illegal because it did not reflect the doctrine of "separate but equal" which the government professed. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act now made racially segregated facilities such as beaches, libraries, post office entrances, swimming pools etc. legal, even if they were of an unequal standard for whites and "non whites".

The NP was concerned, from its early days of power, to curtail the political rights which distinguished "Coloureds" from Africans. The 1956 Separate Representation of Voters Act was the culmination of a complicated series of manoeuvres to by-pass the constitutional safeguard of a Cape "Coloured" franchise. It brought their removal from the common voters roll and gave them as substitute four white representatives in parliament, elected on a separate roll.

*The Geography of Apartheid*

Apartheid’s radical thrusts into education, personal relations and political rights, was matched by its drive to remodel the South African landscape, particularly in the urban areas. The Separate Amenities Act necessitated spatial segregation, but it
was only really one facet of the major piece of apartheid spatial planning, the 1950 Group Areas Act. The act demarcated the areas in which each of the races might reside in the city. For Malan it was "the essence of the apartheid policy which is embodied in this bill". The Durban Indian-African riots of 1949 provided an official pretext for declaring separate zones of the city for each race's occupation. For the government, the riots were evidence of the friction that is generated when different races/cultures (the terms became interchangeable) rub alongside each other in an integrated urban environment. It was inevitable that, at some places and at certain times, enough heat would be generated to start a conflagration. Peaceful race relations could therefore only occur under conditions of complete racial separation.

Practically, the planners achieved, through race zoning and the Separate Amenities Act, the prohibition of "even the limited inter group social contact which might naturally occur ... in churches, sports clubs and even schools" (Lemon, 1991). But in the terms of its own justification, the Group Areas Act has failed dismally. Instead of reducing racial conflict, it has exacerbated interracial urban tensions to a marked degree. Even the government's own Theron Report reached such a conclusion (Western, 1982). As Whisson, 1971 (cited Smith, 1982) puts it, "the policy ... has been successful in creating self-sustaining barriers which make group attitudes of suspicion more likely and individual non-racist attitudes less likely". What interracial gatherings have occurred despite the urban boundaries, "have tended to be self conscious, and it is almost impossible to be truly "colour blind" in human relationships ... For the majority then, race zoning has kept people from knowing or understanding one another" (Lemon, 1991, 9). Whilst it must be remembered that such psychological barriers between individuals of different racial groups were not new (recall, for instance, the embarrassment inter war white liberals experienced in social meetings with Africans), apartheid's measures certainly perpetuated, and probably exacerbated them. Generally, whites did not (and do not) penetrate the black areas of the cities (excepting young white males, who will have done so under the extraordinary conditions of national service). But many blacks had more of an appreciation of white lifestyles, through their experience in domestic service.
The Group Areas Act's alienating impact was manifested in the subsequent design and location, according to strategic considerations, of African townships. Western, 1982, notes how their open streets allowed the rapid crushing of urban resistance, while their limited access points allowed them to be easily cordoned off, to prevent the overspill of instability into white areas. A secondary effect of the Act was to distance the problems of the urban poor from white eyes, particularly high crime rates and low standards of health. Implementing the Act, as far as possible, natural barriers were used to separate racial zones. If not, industrial or commercial belts were used.

The Group Areas Act has been seen as providing a general model for the "apartheid city", reproduced across South Africa. Many of the anomalies in the generally segregated urban forms of South Africa were ironed out with its implementation. Yet, even with the unusual degree of standardisation that it brought, the term "the apartheid city" still lacks utility beyond that of descriptive simplification. While the Act "was to be the ultimate framework of control to secure a formal city more effectively structured in the image of the social formation" (Davies, 1991), the timing and the extent of its application still varied widely between municipalities. The Act only became practically applicable after it was amended in 1957. The implementation of coherent urban segregation between all races could then provide the basis for segregated education, health and social services.

Those most affected by relocation under the Act were "Coloureds" and Indians, Africans being already largely segregated under the 1920s urban legislation. Although many of the cleared areas, like Sophiatown in Johannesburg and District Six in Cape Town, contained slum localities, there was "emotional plenty among the material shortage" (Hart and Pirie, 1984). Western, 1981, emphasises the bond between community and place, the two sharing a history of growth and development that was broken when people were forcibly removed from their homes. In terms of the Act's effectiveness, one example is representative. In 1951, the degree of Indian-African segregation in Durban had been 81%, that of "Coloured"-white 84%, and that of African-white 81%. By the 1960s, segregation between each group, excepting black servants granted accommodation in white areas, was virtually 100% (Kuper et al, 1958, 156-7, Lemon, 1987).
Municipalities varied greatly in their enthusiasm for, and degree of cooperation with, the Act. In Cape Town, where the whole of the Table Mountain area to the west of the railway line from the city to Muizenberg was zoned white, the City Council was so shocked by the potential impact on the established "Coloured" community, that it boycotted the public hearing of the Group Areas Committee (Western, 1981, 103-4). In the event, the 54% of the city's population that was "Coloured", was moved to segregated areas comprising 27% of the land. After 1954, in order to deter further African urbanisation in the Western Cape, and as somewhat of a gesture of reconciliation to its "Coloured" population, the region was declared a "Coloured Labour Preference" zone. This meant that, if available, a "Coloured" applicant would be awarded a job in preference to an African. The policy also entailed the removal of Africans from the region's urban centres, to the Transkei and Ciskei reserves, at the rate of 9000 people a year for 5 years (Cook, 1991, 30).

The range of municipal responses to the Group Areas Act is illustrated by a comparison of Cape Town's reluctance with Durban's enthusiasm. Durban City Council was a prime mover behind the tabling of the group areas legislation, perceiving it as an opportunity to diminish the threat of the city's "Asiatic menace". Three council representatives were sent to inform the NP's administrator, Donges, of their support for the Act and the NP expressed its gratitude to the council for its advice concerning the drafting of the bill (Maharaj, 1992).

Other local authorities across the country were ranged on a scale of support for the Act between the extremes of Durban and Cape Town. Port Elizabeth's diligence in implementing segregation prior to the Act's enforcement, was commended by government ministers. Here, in 1951, 31% of the population had been in the "wrong" area. By 1960 this was down to 16.2%, and by 1985, 3.8%. In 1951, 1.1% of the city's white population faced resettlement. Of the African population, 43.1% would be removed (but not directly under the Group Areas Act); 59.5% of "Coloureds" faced removal, as did the entire Indian population of the city (Christopher, 1991).

East London's local authority was opposed to the Act, but it welcomed the promised state assistance with rehousing African
slum dwellers in Mdantsane location. However, the central Group Areas Board, backed by Verwoerd, went on to overrule a local authority scheme to extend Duncan Village for further African occupation (Fox, Nel and Reintjes, 1991).

In Pietermaritzburg, application of the Act involved changing the occupants of 700 to 900 properties, and removing 9000 to 15,000 people. Of those moved, 76% were Indian, 11% "Coloured", 12% African and 1% white. The council here not only co-operated with the Act, but submitted its own additional proposals for segregation to the Board. Under the Act, the 43% of the town's population that was Indian was relocated to 13% of the land area. The town's growing Indian middle class found itself unable to afford the housing supplied to the wealthy in segregated Indian private developments, with only the poor municipal housing estates as alternatives (Wills, 1991).

A later refinement of the urban race zoning of South Africa's cities, going beyond the provisions of the 1950 Group Areas Act, was the segregation, within the African areas, of different "tribes" (documented in the case of Bloemfontein by Krige, 1991).

The impact of the enforcement of the government's spatial ideal on the social formation, was tremendous. The government's own Cillie Commission, instituted to enquire into the causes of the 1976 Soweto riots, emphasised that "no single government measure has created greater Coloured resentment, sacrifice and sense of injustice" (cited Western, 1982). For the bulk of the "Coloured" population, rather than introducing a new psychological distance from Africans, to reflect the spatial distancing, the Act served to increase solidarity.

While the Act's greatest impact on "Coloureds" was in Cape Town, Indians were affected predominantly in Natal, and Durban in particular. Here, the Board's 1958 proposals entailed the removal of 75,000 Indians (Maharaj, 1992). A crowd of 20,000 Indians mustered to protest the measures. Even when the council balked at the financial cost of moving the established Indian population to new homes (necessary under the Act), the proposals were implemented by the Board (Maharaj, 1992). For many Indian traders, it was not just a move of home that the Act entailed. A number of traders in central locations depended on African and white custom
for over 75% of their turnover. To be relocated to an exclusively Indian area was often disastrous (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). Even in the Transvaal, by 1966, only 7.5% of Indians remained materially unaffected by the Act (Lemon, 1991).

Although the impact of the Group Areas Act was in itself dramatic, it was to be only the beginning of the apartheid scheme for control of the city. From the 1950s, new mechanisms were added to those already in place to control African entry to, and activity in, the urban areas.

The NP fulfilled its promise of tighter influx control largely through the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act. Whilst, in response to a "pragmatic" line of reasoning within the party, the Act recognised the 1945 Act's "section 10" exemptions, it made a more efficient form of influx control compulsory and helped to slow down the rate of African urbanisation. Other developments included the extension of passes to women, but with considerable delay caused by the scale of African protest, and the involvement of centrally controlled labour bureaux to determine who should receive passes and where they should be permitted to go. In the cities, prosecutions for being without a pass increased, and farmers received the benefits in the form of an increasing supply of convict labour.

The protection of the NP's farming support base was an important motive behind these measures: "emigration control must be established to prevent manpower leaving the platteland to become loafers in the city" (Verwoerd, cited Lipton, 1985, 25).

African rural to urban movement was additionally controlled by the 1951 Illegal Squatting Act, aimed at the peri-urban shack dwellers who were outside the local authorities' jurisdiction for influx control removals (Lemon, 1987). The 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act laid a basis for the distribution of Africans between towns. Movement between prescribed areas would be permitted according to labour demand.

Even where Africans were permitted in the cities, the jobs they could perform were restricted, so as to favour the poor whites, their competitors in the labour market. The job colour bar was reimposed after 1948 with more vigour. In 1959 the Minister of
Labour was empowered to reserve any job in any area for particular races. Skilled work in the clothing industry was reserved in 1957, but a challenge from the courts resulted in the fixing of racial percentages instead. White job reservation was subsequently extended to ambulance driving, firefighting, and traffic policing in Cape Town. Lifts were only to be operated by whites unless they were for "non Europeans" or goods (Davenport, 1991). The 1950s marked the "high water mark" (Davenport, 1991) of the industrial colour bar.

While the state was engaged in limiting the quantity and the employment prospects of Africans in the cities, it was aware that many urban manufacturers required an expanding permanent labour force. During the 1950s and early 1960s, township construction for "section 10s" proceeded on a considerable scale, and it was only from the 1960s that the emphasis shifted to confining African workers in the reserves, by encouraging industry to move to them instead (Maylam, 1990, see below). With the rate of urbanisation increasing in the early 1950s, the state sought for ways to reduce the costs of township house construction. Site and service schemes were adopted early on, as was the attempt to make employers pay directly towards the reproduction costs of their labour, with the 1952 Native Services Levy Act. Nevertheless, the bulk of maintenance costs was imposed on the Africans themselves. "Exercise of control over urban Africans ... involved costs which the various parties wanting control were generally unwilling to bear. This was one of the major contradictions in the urban apartheid system. Moreover control not only involved large financial costs, it also generated resistance giving rise to further contradictions" (Maylam, 1990). These contradictions, emerging from the inception of urban apartheid planning, were to become nearly insupportable by the late 1980s.

Even in the 1950s, the problems were bad enough. In Johannesburg, industry and commerce generally refused to subsidize employees' housing, or pay them higher wages so that they could improve it themselves. Municipal action to improve African housing was limited by the need not to tax the important mining houses too greatly. So most black urban housing in the 1950s remained neglected. The slums of Soweto were so visible, and represented such a tangible threat to the order of the city, that Ernest Oppenheimer gave a R3 million loan to the municipality for their
It was partly the presence of the slums, but also the desire for a clearly demarcated racial pattern, that led to the 1954 Natives Resettlement Act. This allowed for the removal of thousands of Africans, so far little affected by the apartheid stock of urban segregation legislation, from the homes which they rented or owned in Sophiatown and other parts of Johannesburg's "Western Areas".

The traumatic social disintegration caused by this action is well documented in Trevor Huddleston's "Naught For Your Comfort", 1956, London. Even legislation which was not explicitly racial in content was used for racial reallocation of urban space. Scott, 1992, charts the disruption of a settled informal Indian settlement at Clairwood, south of Durban, by the implementation of "normal" municipal industrial planning laws.

From the morass of apartheid spatial legislation, certain key principles can be discerned. There is the imposition of firmer central control over African movement to the urban areas; the attempt to extend such control, through segregation, curfews and housing provision, to the activities of Africans who have been admitted to the cities; and the requirement that African urban areas be self financing.

But even in its early stages, the developing system of urban apartheid faced certain deep seated contradictions. Despite the government's influx control measures, increasing numbers of Africans continued to leave the impoverished reserves and the modernising white farms of the platteland, to establish informal dwellings or live in rented accommodation in and around the cities. The section 10 concession, provided in response to the needs of urban employers, proved crucial in undermining entirely successful influx control. By permitting the economically "redundant" families of workers to reside with them in the cities, it meant that, contrary to the aim of keeping the urban African presence to a necessary minimum, not all Africans in the cities were employed. Influx control was also undermined in the 1950s by the exploitation of loopholes and straightforward evasion of the law on the part of Africans (see next chapter) and by the fact that Africans looking for work were permitted to be in the urban areas for 72 hours before their expulsion. This made
it impossible to monitor the illegal presence without an ubiquitous police force (Posel, 1989).

Wolpe, 1988, has noted the state's actions in closing down the "space" for the more obvious judicial challenges to state legislation. For example, the Appellate Division's declaration that the removal of "Coloured" voters from the common roll was unconstitutional, was finally overcome by state manoeuverings in the mid 1950s. But the government's elaboration and intensification of discriminatory and repressive legislation helped mobilize a mass opposition far more threatening than the judiciary. The bulk of security legislation was directed at narrowing this opposition's potential for legal political action. The 1953 Public Safety Act increased penalties for protest offenses, and the burden of guilt was shifted onto the accused in some political trials, with the judge's discretion limited. Ultimately, NP supremacy in parliament through the 1950s allowed the executive to override the authority of the judiciary in the matters which most concerned it (Wolpe, 1988).

In addition to restricting direct political challenges, the new security legislation had another dimension. Much of it was directed, at least partially, at controlling black urban labour. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act has been seen in this light (Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990). Whilst declaring the CP illegal, the Act was used to smash the non-racial and black trade union movement. The 1953 Natives Settlement and Disputes Act banned blacks from registering with trade unions, and provided emasculated "works committees" instead. The 1956 Riotous Assemblies Act was used not only against demonstrations, but also against strike pickets.

Despite the extensive and deeply penetrating nature of the early apartheid legislation, it did not amount to an impregnable and immutable edifice of state control. Political, economic, social and spatial planning on a grand scale was always going to be undermined by the activities of individuals collectively striving to create their own favoured conditions of living, in spite of the government's desire to the contrary. The high degree of NP influence over the structures of state - parliament, government, courts and police - facilitated impressive restructuring of South Africa's society and space in the image favoured by the party's
leaders. But, as the example of influx control demonstrates, the party was never completely successful in imposing its ideal conception of order upon that society, nor upon its spatial expression. Even within the party, apartheid was not a preconceived blueprint, but the outcome of competing viewpoints (see Posel, 1989). Adaptations to the apartheid structure, resulting from pragmatic struggle within and without the NP, began as soon as the NP was in power, and continued until the demise of the system.

2. The Evolution of Apartheid, 1948 to 1960

Apartheid was constantly being adapted, reflecting power struggles within the ruling group, and to enable its legal provisions to cope with its changing social context; but a passing from one distinct phase to another has also been identified (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, Sparks, 1990, Posel, 1989). The second phase was based upon a new conception of the role of the reserves, which had not featured prominently alongside the urban concerns of the 1950s planners. From the 1960s the reserves were to become the bases for "Separate Development", as the government called it, or "Grand" apartheid, as it has been unofficially labelled. Grand apartheid was born out of the state of flux in which administrators found themselves in the late 1950s. At this time, the inadequacies of current apartheid practice were becoming clear, but no coherent plan had yet been devised to push the apartheid concept on into the 1960s.

The first apartheid phase is characterised by Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, as primarily an attempt to form statutory groups and implement their residential segregation. While "advances" were made in the fields of labour and influx control and security, they were not yet part of a coherent scheme. The second phase of apartheid was introduced through the agency of Verwoerd, Prime Minister from 1958 to 1966. Verwoerd was a determined ideologue, backed by the increasingly influential Broederbond. He would help push through a more systematic policy of segregation despite the more pragmatic demands of many within the NP. The programme of the 1960s was partly prompted by black resistance, but it was facilitated by a crushing of that resistance early in the decade, an economic boom placing extensive financial
resources in the government's hands (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989) and the more secure grip of the NP on parliamentary power (Posel, 1989).

**Apartheid's "Second Phase"**

The thrust of Verwoerd's innovation in policy was directed at the reserves, but his government also modified the mechanisms of urban control. Firstly, labour repression was made more systematic. An example is the treatment of the popular SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions), an alliance of black unions. This was identified by the state as being related to the black Congress opposition movement, and its leaders were banned and the organisation proscribed for three months in 1961. Under the Sabotage Act, the General Secretary and eight others were forced to sever connections with the union. The government claimed that "there are recognised federations which are representative of, and entitled to speak for organised workers in South Africa. The so-called SACTU does not fall within this category" (cited Bunting, 1969, 368).

Steps were taken to deal with the problem of political representation for those Africans living permanently in the urban areas. All vestiges of black representation in the "white" political system were removed, and the forcible removal of blacks in the cities without permission was stepped up. The "loophole" category of Section 10 was also to be narrowed in response to continuing African urbanisation. African commercial concerns in the townships were limited, and redirected to the reserves, in order not to allow the trappings of permanency in African urban areas.

Africans who were not required as workers were also to be removed from the white rural platteland. Here, the state and agricultural restructuring combined to break the link between Africans and the land (Marcus, 1989).

The official destinations for Africans expelled from the cities and the white farming areas were the reserves. These were now to form the centrepiece of Verwoerdian apartheid policy. They were to develop as semi-"independent", and, ultimately "independent" nations. Each "homeland", as they would be called, would be the
territorial and national expression of a different African "tribe" (excepting the case of the Xhosa, who were to have two homelands). It was this innovation which lay at the heart of the official replacement of apartheid by the policy of "Separate Development".

Separate development was by no means an easy step for many in the NP to take. Many of the Afrikaner nationalists who had helped bring the party to power in 1948 instinctively saw independent and autonomous political representation for Africans as a threat to permanent white control over South Africa's territory. Even Verwoerd told parliament that it "is not what we wanted to see" (Posel, 1989, 231). The shift in the NP's tack represented by the policy was not solely due to Verwoerd's persuasiveness. It had a lot to do with South Africa's relations with the external world.

The end of the 1950s brought a changing international context for the South African government's actions. Decolonisation was occurring to the north and various African peoples would soon achieve self determination within new nation states. South Africa could expect increasing pressure from without its borders, to force a deracialisation of existing domestic policy. It had not been long since Smuts was humiliated at the UN over racial policy. Many of the newly independent African states would be likely to follow India in using that forum to condemn South Africa. The gradual move towards apparent independence for the homelands could be presented to the outside world as a kind of internal decolonisation, and a recognition of autonomous African nationhood (Grundy, 1991). Within restricted NP circles, there was genuine idealism along these lines. The government-appointed Tomlinson Commission of 1956, for instance, had advocated that the South African government pursue large scale economic development of the impoverished reserves, so that they might become a viable basis for the homelands.

A "massive programme of social engineering" (Marks and Trapido, 1987, 22) was indeed implemented, but it was not directed at the economic development of the homelands; rather at the uprooting of four million people from "white" South Africa, and their removal to the homelands, which would always be too poor, and too dominated by the South African government, to be regarded by any country, other than South Africa, as national states.
While homeland governments could not deserve such recognition, they did have a tremendous impact on the lives of their subjects. "Sham or not, the Bantustan (homeland) policies had by the late 1970s created "new facts". New political institutions and the deliberate use of welfare to give reconstructed ethnic identities a material reality have created conflicting interests which now have to be taken into account in any struggle for the transformation of South Africa" (Marks and Trapido, 1987, 22).

Ideological justification of the policy followed the "separate but equal cultures" line of Afrikaans anthropology, shifting away from the traditional invocation of Bantu inferiority. A material rationale for homeland autonomy was also developed from the 1960s, as their political development was linked to government industrial decentralisation incentives. Most analysts see the decentralisation policy primarily as an attempt to stem the flow of Africans to the cities (see next chapter), but for Wolpe, 1972, the policy was designed to create an alternative to migration as a means of obtaining cheap labour power. If industries moved to or near "independent" homelands, they could employ Africans, at lower wages, to do the jobs set aside for whites in the cities. They could also benefit from the fact that homeland governments would not recognise African trade unions, and they would be freed from pressure to provide a housing subsidy for their workers, since the homeland government was to cater for the welfare of its citizens (Wolpe, 1972). In practice the decentralisation strategy was not successful and the degree of homeland government functionality for South African capital is debateable.

But before looking at the progress of the separate development policy in the next chapter, it is necessary to stress its ideological dimension - no mere expression or justification of material goals. The extent of Verwoerd's personal influence has already been mentioned. It is significant that he was Minister of Native Affairs before his accession to the Prime Ministership. His firmly rooted ideological stance was derived from his experience in that office. In his mind, the notion of preserving white society, and in particular Afrikaans identity, clearly coincided with the need to place firm limits on black social, economic, spatial and political encroachment. If black political expression must be denied within white South Africa, the shifting
climate of international opinion meant that it had to be catered for in "black South Africa", i.e. the homelands.

With Verwoerd's encouragement, from 1958, the Broederbond took upon itself the role of proselytising a republic (as it had done for a period prior to 1948), within which the new vision of apartheid would hold sway. In the early 1960s the Bond had 8000 members. By the late 1970s the figure was over 12,000 (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The Bond's members, occupying virtually all of the top positions in political, civil service, church and educational structures, were in an extremely advantageous position to diffuse the new conception of separate development. All cabinet ministers were members, as was three quarters of the NP caucus, every principle of the Afrikaans universities and colleges, half the school principles and inspectors and 40% of Dutch Reformed Church ministers (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

The state and the Broederbond's scheme of separate development was not reliant on black consultation, but blacks nevertheless proved influential in the development of the policy. The increasing scale and growing diversity of black resistance contributed vitally, in the 1950s and early 1960s, to the state's need to adjust existing apartheid structures.

### Black Political Organisation and Resistance, 1948 to 1960

The overall impact of black resistance in the 1950s was formed from the interweaving of localised and geographically differentiated strands of protest, into a fabric of broad, national scale organisation. The interaction between local and national currents of resistance is a key factor in the history of black resistance to apartheid. Black resistance has always been of most concern to the state when diverse localities were consciously articulated in their actions, and most problematic for the national resistance organisations when they were not. The following section is largely informed by Lodge's "Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945", 1983.

The tone for black organisation at the national scale was set in 1949 when the ANC conference was dominated by the movement's more radical Youth League (ANCYL). During the conference, six members of the ANCYL, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver
Tambo, were elected onto the national executive. Arrayed against the Youth League members were representatives of the more moderate "old guard" and the communists (the Youth League had attempted to expel communists from the party in 1945 and 1947). Once in the executive though, the prominentANCYL representatives tended to moderate their Africanist line in the interests of compromise with other members.

The 1950s began with organisation for a stayaway, directed against the Suppression of Communism Act, which, in fact, was invoked to suppress far more than just communism. The regionally fragmented response of this campaign was representative of the general geographical pattern that subsequent resistance campaigns, over the next decade, would reflect. The stayaway was particularly strong in the Eastern Cape, especially around Port Elizabeth. Natal saw relatively firm support from some quarters, but its overall response was muted by division, while the action was less successful in the Transvaal. Despite the spatial variation of this campaign, the stayaway became an important item in the "repertoire" of resistance through the 1950s. As a tactic it was successful in highlighting the increasingly important position of Africans in the economy, and it was relatively easy to organise among the concentrated and segregated populations of the townships. Apart from the state's response, the greatest difficulty faced by the organisers of such a campaign was, and continued to be, that of mobilising those migrant workers confined in local hostels or barracks (see Chapter Seven).

During 1952, prompted by the deprivation of "Coloured" voting rights, the ANC leadership organised a broad Defiance Campaign. Volunteers were to systematically break the racial taboos of apartheid. As it progressed, the action's targets widened from the Separate Representation of Voters Act to encompass the pass laws, stock limitation in the reserves, the Bantu Authorities Act, the Group Areas Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. The most enthusiastic response was again from the Eastern Cape. Eventually rioting in East London and Port Elizabeth, the government's imposition of bans on individuals, increasingly harsh prison sentences for breaking laws in protest, and the organisational confusion accompanying the spreading spatial extent of the protest, culminated in the immobilization of the campaign.
Lodge's explanation for the particularly vibrant opposition of the Eastern Cape throughout the decade centres on its industrial characteristics and the unusual form of administration it experienced. Port Elizabeth was the fastest growing urban centre in South Africa: Ford had established a manufacturing plant there in 1923, attracted by its port and its centrality relative to South Africa's major conurbations.

The plant was soon joined by smaller, linked industries and a wider range of heavy and light manufacturing. The expanding African working population was relatively easily organised by trade unionists, being ethnically homogenous (95% Xhosa) and having no internal linguistic barriers. The fact that these workers were accommodated in townships rather than in company-supervised hostels or barracks also facilitated communication and mobilization.

Port Elizabeth's local government had earned a reputation for a lax approach to influx control. Its stance was determined to a large extent by local manufacturing's need for labour supplies to maintain industrial expansion. But Africans moving to the city purely to find work were joined by those escaping the increasingly eroded reserves, and those evicted from surrounding white farms. A large squatter settlement developed which, by 1949, had the highest rate of TB in the world.

By the 1950s then, Port Elizabeth's African population was exceptional. A fairly cohesive industrial working class was found alongside the extreme poverty of peri-urban shack dwellers.

In 1949, raised fares prompted an extensive township bus boycott, but this action was merely a prelude for the firm resistance with which the government's subsequent, more rigid, influx control measures would be met. In Port Elizabeth particularly, "drawing on a well-established local tradition of mass protest the African community was able to link parochial concerns with more general political ideas: popular politics transcended the usual anxieties over subsistence which predominated in everyday life" (Lodge, 1983, 55).

During the Defiance Campaign, Natal too showed incipient tendencies towards popular mobilization. Here, however, the
effectiveness of the campaign was impaired by the Zulu - Indian tension which had erupted in the 1949 Durban riots. In a later period, it was to be the divide between the Zulu nationalistic Inkatha and the UDF/ANC which would be the main obstacle to a united regional resistance.

With the unprecedented spatial extent of the Defiance Campaign, and a hingepin role in the formulation of the Freedom Charter, through the 1950s, the ANC leadership enjoyed increasing popularity. But the crushing of the Defiance Campaign had taught it a lesson: it would need a long term programme and a means to sustain its hold over a larger and more dispersed following, if future campaigns were not to collapse in disorganisation just as they achieved widespread popularity. Z.K. Matthews first proposed the drawing up of a "Freedom Charter" of the expressed aims of the opposition movement, as a unifying and guiding force. Various oppositional bodies, including the white Congress of Democrats and the parliamentary Liberal Party, liaised, with the aim of planning local committees throughout the country, to elect representatives to a national convention. The convention in turn, would incorporate the people of South Africa's demands into the Charter, rather in the style of the 1789 cahiers of France. In the event, provincial ANC branches were responsible for much of the local organisation, and, at the centre, the Charter was produced by a small drafting committee, drawing on material supplied by sub committees. (Africanists within the ANC were deeply disaffected by the influence of whites on this committee).

In 1955, the Charter was publicly presented at Kliptown, where 3000 delegates amassed. Once the police were confident that the ANC and its allies had been given "enough rope to hang themselves" (Lodge, 1983), the meeting was broken up and 156 Congress Alliance members were arrested on charges of treason, launching the five year "Treason Trial".

The tensions already implicit within the ANC became explicit in 1958, during its Transvaal Provincial Congress, when brawling broke out between Africanists and executive supporters. The Africanists had grown further distant from the executive line in the years since the Kliptown Congress. They perceived a base for their "embittered and vengeful" mood (Lodge, 1983) among the young, and especially with the migrant workers of Cape Town. For
them, the ANC was too accommodating towards whites, and towards "foreign" ideologies like communism. Much of their thinking derived from a realistic assessment of popular opinion: "The masses do not hate an abstraction like "oppression" or "capitalism" ... They make these things concrete and hate the oppressor - in South Africa the white man" (Golden City Post, Johannesburg, 1959, cited Lodge, 1983, 83).

Such was essentially the principle behind the Africanists' decision to break with the ANC and form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Its leader, Robert Sobukwe, believed though, that whites could be African if they altered their behaviour and thinking in line with those of Africans. The early PAC concentrated its organisational efforts in those areas where the ANC was weak - the townships around Vereeniging in the Transvaal, and the Cape peninsular, where migrant Xhosa in particular had been overlooked by the ANC. Towards the end of the 1950s, the PAC began to mobilise its first anti-pass campaign, in order to wrest the initiative of resistance from the ANC.

The sum of African resistance to apartheid in the 1950s was not constituted entirely by the ANC and PAC. There was also the All African Convention (AAC), originally founded to oppose the 1936 legislation depriving Cape Africans of the vote. Its following was largely composed of African Marxists, and its strategy was based on rural mobilization through educational and legal services, and against enforced land rehabilitation. The movement directed abuse against the ANC for its "collaboration" in government advisory boards, but its own influence was largely confined to Cape intellectuals.

We have seen how a regional differentiation in the extent and effectiveness of resistance to apartheid accompanied political divisions in the 1950s, and has remained characteristic. A further characteristic of subsequent black resistance also developed during this decade. This is the role of certain places as symbols of wider national opposition, and as leaders by example. Soweto in 1976 and the townships of the Vaal triangle in the mid 1980s, had their forerunner in Sophiatown during the 1950s. Whilst in the former cases, there was violent physical resistance against various aspects of apartheid, in Sophiatown, tangible physical resistance was weak. Yet Sophiatown was
similarly significant for the wider pattern of resistance.

Sophiatown was a dynamic, vibrant, often violent, mixed race freehold area, connected to Johannesburg. For many of the city's whites, it manifested the very threat of an ascendant and proximate urban black population, that had persuaded them to vote NP. For the government, it was a standing contravention of the aims of apartheid. Not only could Africans own property in "white space" there; racial intermixing was the most prominent characteristic of the place. It was additionally the haunt of a plethora of urban criminal gangs. Consequently the government determined, during the late 1950s, to remove the African population of Sophiatown to an externalised, closely supervised, state-administered township.

The removals took place gradually, and with an element of support from some sections of the settlement's population. There was no wholesale, determined resistance. But there was articulate opposition nonetheless, particularly from African journalists resident in the area (see "Blame Me On History" by Bloke Modisane, 1963).

The everyday non-cooperation displayed by the residents, their persistent breaking of apartheid laws in the face of repeated raids, arrests, evictions and "rustications" and their maintenance of a vital community spirit, became known and admired by blacks (and many whites) further afield. Sophiatown's verbal and literary, if not physical, resistance, and the state's ultimate resort to coercion, informed the "heritage of resistance", which provided the context for later struggles elsewhere.

It has been part of a more general critique of the 1950s ANC that it did not involve itself greatly in the local impact of apartheid, or the localised forms of resistance, like that in Sophiatown, with which apartheid was met. Apart from its organisational structures being amateurish at this stage, Feit, 1965 (cited Lodge, 1983), argues that the ANC's limitations were those of a bourgeois leadership trying to resist its own demotion to the socio-economic level which apartheid prescribed for all Africans. But apartheid itself helped to erode the distinction between an African bourgeoisie and the wider African population, by lumping them together in the segregated townships of the poor
and the working class: "African townships, though socially heterodox in a number of ways, did not have the "geography of class" that was a feature of white suburbia" (Lodge, 1983, 92). While the preservation of class distinctions may have been an initial aim of some leaders in the ANC, their aims were modified by the very thing which they sought to resist - an integration with wider urban African communities. The African intellectual and bourgeois leadership was likely to retain some distinct concerns, but by immersing them in the wider problems of urban Africans as a whole, apartheid's spatial planners helped generate more universal aspirations.

Even the urban gangs, who usually preyed on their own community, were likely to pool their political interests with those of the wider community when it came to resisting apartheid. In fact, urban gangs were quite well adjusted to political protest as they had a ready made organisational structure which could be brought into action at short notice. In Sophiatown, for instance, they helped mobilize what little physical resistance to the police that there was, using their signalling system of banging on street lights to warn of an approaching police presence (Beinart, 1987, Huddleston, 1956).

At either end of the urban African social scale then, the 1950s witnessed a convergence of political concerns. Towards the intellectual pinnacle of urban African society was the "Drum generation" - a well defined group of African writers and reporters who contributed to the English language magazine, "Drum". Together, they showed a "social compassion and depth of anger that went well beyond their immediate class interests" (Lodge, 1983, 93). The group was distinguished by its "raucous, zany, prolific, and frequently penetrating" style of writing (Gunner, 1988, 224). Its members included Can Themba, Casey "Kid" Motšisisi, Todd Matshikiza, Nat Nakasa, Henry Nxumalo, Ezekiel Mphahlele and Bloke Modisane (whose "Blame Me On History", mentioned above, warranted a Penguin Modern Classics edition). "They were urban to their fingertips. They wrote about the crowded back streets, side streets, alleys, shanties and shebeens of places like Alexandra and Sophiatown", the urban freehold areas around Johannesburg that were "soon to crumble under the bulldozers" (Gunner, 1988, 224). African literary expression had finally followed the African geographical shift, from rural
roots to the new urban arenas of white domination. These writers were not political activists, but they shared in, and represented in their writing, the vibrancy and identity of black urban culture in the 1950s (Gunner, 1988).

In the 1950s, many of the ANC's leaders had had the benefit of an elite mission education. In this respect they were most unrepresentative of the larger African community. The desire to share in the rewards that education could offer was especially strong among the poor, particularly in the eastern Rand and the Eastern Cape. Many of the educated ANC leaders failed to perceive education as a fundamental material concern of the urban poor, alongside transport costs, food prices and housing.

Popular mobilization against the government's African education policy initially arose not so much out of the Bantu Education Act itself, as out of changes associated with it: the 2 shilling monthly education levy that would be raised on urban households, the increasing pupil-teacher ratios, the falling per capita expenditure on pupils, the cessation of school meals and the abolition of caretakers' posts, which would involve the pupils themselves cleaning the schools. "For an underprivileged society in which access to education provided the most common means of social mobility for one's children these were serious blows" (Lodge, 1983, 117).

Once the boycott of government schools had been initiated by teachers' associations, influenced by Africanists in the Transvaal, and by the AAC in the Cape, the ANC proved not to have the resources to provide an alternative education and within the ANC, there was tension over the degree of militancy that should be pursued once educational resistance had begun.

Prior to the Bantu Education Act, a tradition of student militancy had already emerged within mission schools such as Lovedale and Healdtown. Damage to school property, class boycotts and, occasionally, attacks on teachers had developed out of the issues of food and discipline in these boarding institutions. The specific problems of the 1950s were addressed through these "older, recognised repertoires" (Tilly, cited Hyslop, 1991, 86) of action. The Bantu Education Act precipitated the shift of these forms of resistance from mission to urban day schools, and from
petty bourgeois students to an urban African, working class youth. The Act also brought about a wider focus of anger amongst urban youth, from educational structures in particular to the increasingly prominent and interventionist authoritarian state in general. Yet the militants within the ANC, in endeavouring to encourage more general opposition to the state, were to find, in the 1950s and in the future, that "men and women struggling to survive economically and to provide a better world for their children are not necessarily revolutionaries" (Lodge, 1983, 128).

The Scope of Resistance in the 1950s

Despite the absence of widespread revolutionary commitment, the 1950s did mark a novel phase of resistance. Lodge, 1983, narrates the unprecedented level of women's mobilization both against African men's pusillanimity, and directly against the influx control and land rehabilitation measures as they affected women in particular (Lodge, 1983, 139-153). Rising transport costs, crucial for Africans externalised in the townships, were protested in the bus boycotts of Evaton and Alexandra, which owed much of their success to local ANC initiative. Once again, the rift between the township community and the alienated and isolated migrant hostel dwellers manifested itself. In Evaton there was violence between supporters of the boycott and migrant Basotho vigilantes.

Resistance in the 1950s extended beyond the urban areas. This and the succeeding decade were punctuated by a series of rebellions against government attempts to restructure rural social relations. The failure of reserve agriculture, which the government intervention was designed to combat, was itself exacerbated by the government's policy of concentrating the economically "surplus" African population in the reserves, with tighter influx control and anti-urban squatting legislation. The government's attempt to limit stock and prevent access to the land to allow its recovery, could not be countenanced by those already at bare subsistence level in the reserves. The disparate rebellions of Zoutspansberg, Sekhukuniland, Witzieshoek, Marico, Natal, Tembuland and particularly the nine month Mpondoland insurrection, taken together, resulted in hundreds of deaths, but, distanced and locally inspired, they were not articulated as a general revolt (see Lodge, 1983, 269-288 for the course of the
revolts in general, and Beinart, 1982, 160 for the Mpondoland revolt in particular).

It was not only the characteristics of subsequent resistance which were first established in the 1950s; the government's response also founded a pattern. It consistently attempted to impute blame for all "unrest" to the ANC's incitement. The strategy was often counterproductive. Further African support was generated for the organisation credited by the government with being its greatest foe and threat. In reality, however, the ANC could not, during the 1950s, marshall all the elements of resistance to different aspects of apartheid under its own direction. On the whole, it was reactive in its organisation, more than it was proactive.

But the importance of resistance in the 1950s lies deeper than any organisational structures. A transformation of African political consciousness lay beneath the expanding repertoire of resistance. Beinart, 1987, traces, through the experiences of a Mpondoland migrant "M", the wider development of African political awareness through the mid 20th century. Many traditional rural ideas and values were retained by the growing urban African proletariat, but it was gradually transcending the narrow limits of ethnic identity, to encompass a broader class and "all-African", "national" consciousness. M's political identity allowed a sympathy for both Congress's national campaigns and narrow, ethnically based strategies of rural resistance. It was through people like M that African nationalist and trade union leaders in the cities were able to "reach the great majority of South African blacks who had not fully absorbed their generalized positions" (Beinart, 1987, 307).

Beneath even the collective level of resistance, blacks had their own individual, day-to-day forms of resistance to personal white domination and to the racism of the workplace. White stereotypes of blacks as lazy, careless and stupid workers reflect the forms of resistance adopted by people fighting an all pervasive repression: foot dragging, feigned ignorance, false compliance and pilfering are all everyday manifestations of non-compliance with a system of exploitation and oppression (Sparks, 1990).
Conclusion

In 1948, the government of South Africa, not for the first time, passed into the hands of an elite determined to protect, and further the particular interests of a small minority of the population. Previous governments had seen the primary cleavage in South African society as being a racial one, and had endeavoured to respect and maintain that cleavage in their policy. However, the NP government, whilst continuing to safeguard white superiority with even more extreme measures, was additionally concerned with the maintenance of a division within white society - that between Afrikaans and English speakers. Its priority was the elevation of the volk, whose identity lay at the very core of its leadership's secular and spiritual world view. Afrikaners would be protected from the economic competition of both English speakers in the white population, and blacks being incorporated in the industrial economy. Paternalistic job provision and welfare distribution would ensure protection from the former, while it had long been politically legitimate to curb the activities of the latter through discriminatory legislation.

Yet the 1948 apartheid government's "Native Policy" marked a departure from the trend which had characterised the last years of Smuts's administration. Instead of accommodating and utilizing an expanding urban African population for the sake of the economy, the outcome of compromise between competing viewpoints within the NP was an emphasis on maintaining an older pattern - the preservation of cities for their white populations, with firm control over only a strictly necessary number of black workers in the urban areas. Apartheid, then, represented both a discontinuity in the trend of government policy and a continuity in the pre-existing shape of urban society. The Group Areas Act's "apartheid city" was built upon the "segregated city" of the 1920s to 1940s. Initially each city's degree of correspondence to the "apartheid model" was determined by the local authority's reaction to central initiative and its assessment of the potential force of black resistance (Posel, 1989), but by the 1960s, despite local variation in attitude, increasing centralisation of state authority under the NP would result in a more standardised South African city form.

Attempts to develop the envisaged apartheid city were accompanied
by new forms of African resistance, as the conditions of a segregated and policed city shaped more and more African lives. In particular, the residents of the townships, thoroughly urban, but externalised from the cities in which they worked, mobilized around the issues of transport and education.

As the cities were being moulded to fit more closely a central design, a parallel transformation of the reserves progressed. Increasing overcrowding and land deterioration in the countryside was largely a consequence of the redistribution of the poor, the weak and the unrequired from the cities, as stricter influx control took effect. The rural decline in turn, provoked further government intervention, which precipitated resistance of an even greater intensity and violence than in the cities.

Even though the NP government did not, as is often thought, implement a cohesively pre-planned system, the apartheid government's aggregate intention - to shape South African society and space so as to preserve an inherited, cracking mould of white superiority - involved an unprecedented degree of state intervention in black people's everyday lives. From the individual working as slowly as possible in a factory without jeopardising his/her job and the thousands of Africans who simply would not abide by influx control regulations, to the organisation of a mass Defiance Campaign or a Ciskeian battle with police, such intervention provoked resistance. Unprecedented coercion was needed to retain economic relations based on pigmentation, and to ensure the monopoly of white political and social authority, through a modern, industrial era.

Academia searched for a way of extending the ideological justification for such a system in South Africa while it was being abandoned elsewhere. Its findings were more easily supported by the white population the more the government legislated to keep the races apart: in commuting, in swimming, in queuing, particularly in education and even in bed. The inherent conception of a racial division of mankind, handed down to whites over three hundred years, was consolidated as they were prevented, even had they wanted to, from forming relationships and socialising with blacks, and as they were educated to respect an exclusive identity.
The legacies left by the 1950s, and subsequent apartheid social engineers include more than just the obvious political problems faced by South Africans today. They also include a deliberate contribution to the lived urban and rural inadequacies of shelter, health and education for the bulk of the country's population.
Chapter Five

Adaptations and Contradictions

Introduction

The turn of the 1960s brought a forceful new incentive to elaborate a firmer plan for deflecting African political claims away from the white urban areas, and towards "independent" reserve structures. The incentive came in the form of a resurgence of urban unrest, culminating in the internationally condemned Sharpeville shootings. In 1960, the relatively small township of Sharpeville, outside Vereeniging in the Transvaal, acquired international symbolism as an example of the repressive nature of apartheid. After Sharpeville the government opted more firmly for the new interpretation of its racial policy as "Separate Development" and, from 1960, real steps were taken to develop separate "homeland" administrations. Part One of this chapter explains the context for, and the reaction to, the shootings at Sharpeville, including the nature of separate development and the "homelands".

Yet, even the adapted structures of apartheid rule continued to be riven by internal contradictions and fractured by the social pressures which brought South Africa into the 1970s. Part Two of the chapter is devoted to introducing the evolution of these contradictions and their influence on the government's attitude towards apartheid. In turn, the impacts of continuing urbanisation, of the economic constraints of apartheid, of regional (southern African) political, and world economic changes, of black resistance and of socio-political changes in the Afrikaans constituency, are assessed.

1. Sharpeville and Separate Development

Sharpeville

In December 1959, both the ANC and the PAC announced campaigns directed against the pass laws. The ANC's envisaged demonstrations and petitions, however, seemed weak compared to the ongoing manifestation of disaffection in Cato Manor in Natal,
where violent revolt was proceeding with the involvement of local ANC members (Lodge, 1983). The PAC's plan was a clearer reflection of the anger felt in many areas after a decade of NP rule. Its campaign was launched early in 1960. Volunteers without the necessary pass would offer themselves peacefully for arrest, calling for the police to act with restraint. At a variety of venues, PAC members gathered to hand themselves into custody, witnessed by supporters and demonstrators.

At Vanderbijlpark the crowds were dispersed by baton charge, and at Evaton, by low flying jets. Aircraft failed to scatter the crowd at Sharpeville though, and the police at the local station refused to arrest the volunteers. PAC officials would not call on the crowd to disperse until the PAC leader, Robert Sobukwe, was able to address them. Police reinforcements brought the participants in the ensuing events to 200 police and about 5000 members of the crowd. A scuffle broke out at the gate in the wire fence surrounding the police station and, as the crowd surged forward to investigate the cause, police started firing, later claiming that they were being stoned. By the time the firing stopped, 69 Africans were killed and 180 wounded, most shot in the back. Only after a mass funeral of the victims did the residents of Sharpeville trickle back to work (from Lodge, 1983).

Chaskalson, 1991, has described the particular context of the national PAC campaign in Sharpeville. Circumstances in the township conspired to generate particularly intense disaffection with government intervention. Here there appears to be a paradox, since Sharpeville was seen as a "model township", and had better facilities than most. The resentment stemmed from the progressive removal of residents to Sharpeville from their former "Top Location".

Top Location was subject to more lax administrative control than was Sharpeville. A large, informal economic sector allowed the survival of low paid and unemployed residents in the location, but they were being squeezed out by the stricter regulation of economic activity in the newer township. Top Location's administration had also been lax in another sense: nearby Vereeniging's employers regularly overlooked a lack of workers' passes, facilitating a large population of "illegals", who would be endorsed out of the urban area once the location was entirely
153 cleared and removed to Sharpeville.

Even for the legal residents, relocation to Sharpeville meant a longer and more expensive bus journey to work in Vereeniging. They would also resent the more efficient policing of the township, since bans on certain political groups and on meetings of over ten people had been introduced to counter the recent urban African political organisation. The very quality of Sharpeville's housing was an additional drawback, given the higher rents that had to be paid, especially with local authorities being increasingly pressurised to make their townships economically self-sufficient.

Vereeniging's industries were gradually becoming more capital intensive. For the township's youth, this meant declining opportunities. As the number of young unemployed increased, their discontent was manifested in more numerous instances of reckless resistance to authority. The same factor may also have been associated with the greater prevalence of gangs of tsotsis (young violent criminals). By the late 1950s the local authority was employing African vigilantes to expel them to Native Affairs Department labour camps. But local disorder was not caused solely by the tsotsis. The "Russians", a migrant Basotho gang accommodated in local hostels, added their contribution. The rate of pass raids was stepped up, ostensibly to rid the community of this menace, but township residents soon found their own illegally resident relatives endorsed out of the township instead of the Russians. The disruption and menace of the raids is attested by Petrus Tom: "People hid under beds, in toilets, inside wardrobes and in dirty washing tubs. The raids started as early as 1.00 a.m." (cited Chaskalson, 1991, 134).

In Sharpeville then, it was the success of urban apartheid's implementation which generated the communal anger of the crowd surrounding the police station. The fact that similar crowds surrounded other official symbols in different parts of South Africa, indicates the range and depth of official interference and disruption in Africans' lives, and the resentment generated by apartheid's attempt to "level down" the quality of those lives. It was a drive to collect rent arrears at the end of 1959 which provided the final spur for Sharpeville's residents to join the PAC's campaign. Elsewhere it was other local pressures that
were more significant, but all were added to the already intolerable burden of apartheid's intervention.

While, due to the loss of life it endured, Sharpeville became the enduring symbol of the anti-pass campaign, the campaign mobilized far more Africans in the Cape than it did in the Transvaal.

The African population of the Western Cape was subjected to particularly harsh influx control, involving the "rustication" of Africans to the reserves in order to maintain the region for "Coloured" employment under the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. While the Xhosa migrant workers of Cape Town's Langa township saw opportunities in the city being closed to them by this policy, their families in the reserves were being denied land rights by the land rehabilitation policy. The settled township population was similarly suffering discrimination in favour of "Coloureds", and already had a tradition of support for the Africanist ideology. The PAC campaign then, found a large following among both migrants and township dwellers in Cape Town's environs. The campaign here also met with a violent police response, followed by riots, an extended strike supported by white liberals, a march of 30,000 on Cape Town and the cordonning off of the entire Langa township (see Lodge, 1983, for details).

On a national scale, the 1960 anti-pass campaign marked a turning point when, after ten years of apartheid's implementation, passive protest was generally transformed into more active resistance. But, despite a 90% successful stayaway, organised by the ANC in the wake of the shootings, the resistance was still centred in localised islands, set in a sea of relative acquiescence.

Nevertheless, the state of turmoil into which national politics was thrown by the events of 1960 had permanent significance. Firstly, Sharpeville marked a departure in the government's methods of dealing with black opposition. Prior to 1960, the courts and the law, adapted for government purposes, were used to stifle opposition. Often, nothing other than the neglect of black representations had sufficed. After 1960 though, the main opposition movements were banned and extra-legal activity commenced on a wide scale, both by black opposition movements and by the state's own security forces.
For the PAC and the ANC, banning meant exclusion from legal politics. The implications of this were clear and highly significant. If they were to continue resisting apartheid, they now had no alternative but to do so illegally. The state's use of overt violence during the 1960 campaign was also crucial for the subsequent development of resistance politics. So long as the state was willing to meet non-violent protest with brute force, and so long as white public opinion was willing to condone such a response, mere passive protest, the leaders of the ANC and PAC reasoned, would never be effective. Both movements now formed insurgent offshoots. The ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) began a carefully controlled campaign of sabotage, avoiding, in its early stages, any bloodshed. The Pogo movement was based on the PAC's enduring, idealistic vision of inspirational attacks on whites precipitating a popular uprising. The protest politics of the 1950s, which Lodge believes was well adjusted to specific and local grievances, but had been applied ineffectually to national campaigns, was now abandoned by both organisations.

With its new strategy, however, the ANC faced enormous difficulties, not the least of which was the supervision of its own covert units, which frequently acted independently of regional and national command. When the MK leadership was captured at Rivonia, the ensuing trial resulted in the long term imprisonment of Nelson Mandela (already incarcerated for leaving the country without valid documents) and Walter Sisulu, among others. 72 charges of minor damage, 95 of incendiary bombs in public buildings and 7 of dynamiting installations like railway lines, were levelled against the defendants. The 23 attacks which MK guerillas had launched against policemen and "collaborators", mostly in Port Elizabeth and Durban, reflected more the indiscipline of local units than the strategy of central command (Lodge, 1983).

While the Rivonia capture revealed that MK was not a particularly successful guerilla movement in its own right, the tradition of resistance that its very existence symbolised, became a key factor in the ANC's revival of fortune over the next two decades. More violent than the ANC in the 1960s were the PAC's Pogo and the white student - backed, African Resistance Movement, responsible for bombing Johannesburg's railway station concourse. Pogo was involved in a series of localised killings and
skirmishes with police, resulting in 202 convictions for murder. The movement inspired particularly vehement action in Paarl, where two insurgents were killed by police, and the insurgents themselves killed a 17 year old girl and a young man. Here, anger at the authorities was especially fierce, as the African men had recently been "resettled" from informal settlements to bleak camps, and separated from the women, who were "endorsed out" of the urban area to the Transkei (Lodge, 1983).

In rural Tembuland, Poqo's actions were largely directed against Matanzima, a chief who had taken advantage of the government's patronage under the Bantu Authorities Act 1951 to establish an independent power base, and who subsequently headed the "independent" homeland government of Transkei. In targeting Matanzima, Poqo reflected the popular opposition to his new found status. The resistance offered by the movement, here and across South Africa, was ended with mass arrests in 1963, after effective police infiltration and intelligence.

Following the internal suppression of the two main resistance organisations, the ANC proved to be by far the better adapted to exile politics, with its necessity of mobilizing international support. The PAC was hampered by a fractious and uncompromising appearance. The ANC was thus in an advantageous position for a return, in the 1980s, to ideological and organisational influence within South Africa.

In the 1960s, black mobilization was reflected not only by the political resistance movements, but also, in an overt way, within the workforce, as trade union organisation gained ground. The foundations had been laid by the Congress-linked South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in the 1950s, with its firmly expressed rejection of job reservation, exclusion of Africans from collective bargaining, racial pay differentials and restrictions on African residence and mobility (all accepted with resignation by the rival Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)).

By 1962, SACTU had 55,000 members, its strength rooted mainly in Durban and Natal. The specific trade union actions of the 1960s, even after the suppression of SACTU in 1965, led to arrests, dismissals and local organisational disintegration, but,
cumulatively, the strikes helped to raise the general level of African wages by the end of the decade (Lodge, 1983, Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Lodge, 1983, believes that, "It must be admitted ... that with the adoption of a guerilla strategy in 1961, the Congress chose to jettison a powerful weapon in the trade union organisation" (198).

1960 marked the ANC's departure from previously legal activities, but it had similar significance for the security forces. A series of amendments through the 1960s and 1970s allowed the police to detain suspects for longer, and finally, indefinite, periods without trial. Behind the improvised legal edifice of repression, the use of torture, as part of the interrogation of many of these suspects, became prevalent.

The government's strategy for dealing with its black political opposition after Sharpeville had repercussions well beyond South Africa's borders. The Sharpeville shootings and the ban on domestic political opposition precipitated a growing international political isolation, marked by its face-saving withdrawal from the Commonwealth and, following a referendum, its declaration as a republic in 1961. In 1963, condemnation of apartheid at the UN resulted in an arms embargo on South Africa. The international condemnation brought on by Sharpeville, however, also prompted a material crisis, which was of greater immediate concern to the government than ideological disapproval. After the shootings, capital, deterred by the potential for continuing instability, poured out of the country and the Rand plummeted. Sharpeville really seemed for a time to mark the crisis of an attempt to carry apartheid into the modern, interdependent world.

The economy's relative isolation prompted the government to pursue domestic development of the more capital intensive, strategic sectors of manufacturing. Growth sectors in the 1960s and 1970s included cars and accessories, chemicals, pulp and paper, military hardware, capital goods equipment and electronic and computer manufactures (Leggasick, 1974, cited Rogerson, 1982). A second grand attempt to achieve import substitution was launched. Rogerson, 1982, cites the car industry as an example. Initially, local activity was restricted to the assembly of imported components, but by differentially taxing cars with a
high percentage of foreign components, the state succeeded in encouraging the local evolution of "backward linkage manufactures" (Grundy, 1981, quoted Rogerson, 1982). As this example suggests, the initial capital flight from South Africa proved by no means disastrous for its economy. A drain of $576 million from 1959 to 1965 was converted into a $2.4 billion inflow of capital from 1965 to 1970 (Houghton, cited Price, 1991, 24). South Africa's economic growth rates were close to those of Germany and Japan (prompting many observers to conclude that apartheid was compatible with, and even conducive to, capital growth).

The government response to progressive diplomatic exclusion and alienation was "outward" diplomatic gestures to the rest of Africa. Jack Spence describes the years 1961 to 1974 as the "golden years of South African diplomacy" (quoted Grundy, 1991, 30). Confident of its control over the internal black opposition, Vorster's late 1960s government focused on ameliorating international opposition to its policies by gaining diplomatic recognition to complement its economic leverage over southern Africa. But Malawi alone among the black ruled African states entered into formal diplomatic relations, in 1967.

For the western nations, the government stressed its shared commitment to the global anti-communist struggle, particularly elaborating the communist threat that black opposition to its own policies portended. Among other influences, the tactic seemed to work fairly well. US policy from 1969 to 1986 (except during the Carter years) was informed by National Security Study Memorandum 39, which recommended that friendly encouragement, rather than pressure to reform, should be proffered to the South African government (Grundy, 1991).

After 1960, the South African government, particularly Vorster's (1966 to 1978), found itself channelling more of its efforts towards further limiting damage in its international relations, and to preventing another outbreak of domestic opposition. Both policy thrusts could be boosted by an elaboration of Separate Development. "Grand apartheid" (the package of "independent" homelands and decentralisation of industry to homeland border areas) would stem the flow of Africans joining the politicized masses in the cities, and pacify international opinion about
internal black political representation.

Separate Development

Verwoerd saw homeland self-government as sufficiently "taking into account the tendencies in the world and in Africa" (cited Price, 1991, 22). While outright "independence" was not envisaged for some time, it was perceived as increasingly feasible in the light of the independence of Britain's neighbouring High Commission territories: Botswana in 1960, Lesotho in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968. The South African government appreciated that these territories, although politically independent, were still economically dependent on South Africa for the employment of their migrant workers, and without South Africa having to pay for the social costs of this labour (housing, schooling, health etc.). This realization encouraged a more coherent plan for homeland political autonomy, leading eventually to South Africa's own conferring of "independence". Immediately however, steps were taken to abolish what white representation in parliament there still was for Africans, who would, in future, be represented only in their respective homelands.

In 1961, the UN General Secretary informed Verwoerd that "independent" homelands would only be recognised if certain conditions were met. They included sufficient and coherent territory, resettlement in the homelands only on a voluntary basis, the rapid economic and industrial development of the homelands and the consistent respect of human rights (Urquhart, cited Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, 101). In fact, their "independence" has remained unrecognised in all but South African government circles.

The patent falsity of the "separate but equal" rhetoric lying behind the development of homeland administrations, has encouraged Marxian authors to explain the homeland policy in terms of its "functionality" to South African capital. Halbach, 1988, sees the "autonomous" homelands' significance as being "reduced more and more to that of a labour surplus reservoir and a dumping ground of surplus labour, which in effect has always been their implicit role". However, Lemon, 1987, questions this labour pool function, arguing that a shift in labour demand, from unskilled towards skilled labour, has accompanied the evolution
from competitive to monopoly capitalism. This means that labour reproduction of the type required by the more influential employers is no longer carried out largely in the homelands, but in the urban areas (Keenan, 1984, cited Lemon, 1987).

If not particularly functional in an economic sense, the development of "independent" homeland structures certainly had advantages in a political sense. Overall, the policy was geared towards guaranteeing the white minority's political supremacy in the bulk of South Africa. "Independence" enabled black citizens, who would otherwise have continued to agitate for political rights within South Africa, to be conceptually, administratively, and geographically transformed into "foreign" guest workers from neighbouring states, with no claim to political expression in white South Africa. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 ensured the legality of the transformation. With these workers now the responsibility of separate homeland governments, the South African government would no longer shoulder political responsibility for their poverty, nor for their periodic unemployment. It would also cease to be the direct provider of their welfare costs, although the economic dependence of most homeland governments on the South African government meant that it was still effectively an indirect provider.

A further, more subtle, political gain could be secured by dividing the homelands according to ethnic group - the reinforcement of "latent national and regional tribal ethnocentricisms" (Halbach, 1988) - to hinder a more unified African opposition.

However, it must be remembered that the ethnic divisions which the homeland administrations have sometimes exacerbated, have an existence independent of those structures, and they do not always remain latent. "Africans really are divided by local competitions; it is not all done by mirrors ... nationalism can result in brutal chauvinism against residents of the "wrong tribe"" (Lonsdale, 1988, 7). Soni, 1992, believes that, in addition to further ethnically dividing resistance, the homeland structures serve to spatially divide the working class, hindering mass organisation. However, while this may have been a welcome spin off for the government, it seems unlikely to have been a key consideration in the formulation of the original policy.
In various ways, then, the development of extra political structures in the homelands was intended, or incidentally proved, to be politically functional. But the homeland governments were more than the politically expedient puppets of Pretoria. The fact that they provided an outlet for power, even if localised and constrained by Pretoria, fuelled their development and their entrenchment as independently existing entities. From the early 1970s, a prominent middle class of politicians, civil servants, teachers and businessmen, began to emerge in the homelands. Whilst having a stake in the order comparable with that of the chiefs of the Bantu Authorities Act, they showed an ability to be more critical than their predecessors (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

The development in the homelands of "a fully differentiated state bureaucratic-military machinery, budgetary resources upwards of R1 billion to back it up and concerns and anxieties ranging from foreign affairs to winning elections" means that, in order to accurately assess the significance of Separate Development's homelands for South African political and social structures, "a theory of the state is required" (Graaff, 1990, 61). Graaff goes on to define bantustans as states attempting to exert power over territory, a quality less than that of nation states like, for example, Zimbabwe. The territory theoretically under their control may actually be more influenced by Pretoria than, for instance, Bophuthatswana's capital, Mmbatho, whose Winterveld District is economically integrated with the P-W-V region.

Pretoria's control has generally tended to be tightest over homeland defence, security and mass media policy, and loosest in the fields of education, agriculture and urban development. Despite Pretoria's influence, for the "independent" homelands (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda), a position "on a tightrope between Pretoria and their voters periodically calls for public stances which are hostile to Pretoria" (Graaff, 1990). This became increasingly the case as the contradictions of apartheid mounted in the 1980s.

With a homeland's "independence", the conduit for Pretoria's influence shifted from the "verkrampte" (conservative) Department of Rural Affairs, to the "verligte" (enlightened) Department of Foreign Affairs and its Development Bank of Southern Africa. This
amounted to a move from the influence of the right wing of the NP to that of the left wing, and, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it brought much greater access to private sector funds for the "independent" homeland governments. But the crucial drawback to autonomy, even for the "independent" homelands, proved to be their continuing economic dependence on "white South Africa", primarily a result of overpopulation of the restricted areas provided and of a lack of internal agricultural and industrial capital.

The overcrowding of reserve land was evident even in the 1920s. Far from being eased over time, with the political development of the homelands, overcrowding was exacerbated by the removal of Africans from "white South Africa". In 1960, the reserve population was 4.5 million. By 1980, it had increased to 11 million (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Apart from natural increase, between these two dates, the homelands had to accommodate 1 million Africans removed from white farms, 600,000 from "black spots" (African owned land in "white South Africa"), and 750,000 from the cities. From 1918 to 1950, the population density of the reserves had varied between 50 and 60 people per square mile. By 1970 the figure was 125 per square mile.

However, the backward state of homeland agriculture is not primarily to do with overcrowding. In fact, much of the homelands' territory is under-, or unutilized (in Nkandla, Kwazulu 50% of the area is unused, constituting 16.3% of the possible arable total according to Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, and one third of this potential according to Halbach, 1988). The main causes of this neglect are the absence of adequate labour, with males seeking work in the cities, and the lack of capital (seeds, oxen, implements) to work the available land. The former difficulty is illustrated, again by Nkandla. Here, 81% of the 20 to 50 year old population are women and a quarter of the household heads are pensioners (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). In the Transkei, the sources of cash for rural households earning under R125 per month, were found to be 68% remittances from urban workers, 16% from pensions, 13% from local jobs, and only 3% from home production. The most significant contribution to Nkandla's cash economy was from the pensions of the over 65s (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989).
To the problem of inadequate labour, Halbach, 1988, adds the shortage of agricultural credit, deriving from a lack of lending institutions and the absence of assets to secure loans. Where capital is available, there are often inadequate advisory extension services and a dearth of information. Apart from these structural constraints, localised overgrazing, property fragmentation originating in traditional land laws, and opposition to modern farming methods, make local contributions to the generally dire state of homeland agriculture (although the late 19th century response of African peasant producers like those of Herschel indicates that, in many areas, the limitations of "tradition" could have been readily overcome if it were not for the colonial government's direct and indirect suppression of African commercial production (Bundy, 1972, Marks and Atmore, 1980)). Despite their predominantly rural nature and the fact that they lie mostly in adequate rainfall zones, the homelands taken together produce only one third of their own food requirements (Halbach, 1988). The shortages have recently been exacerbated by the severe drought which, over the last few years, has plagued southern Africa.

There has been no compensatory level of homeland industrial development. The context for a lack of agricultural development has been a shortage of labour and capital; for the lack of industrial growth, it has been the deficiency of urban infrastructure. In 1960, there were only three homeland towns, containing a combined population of 33,486. Smit et al, 1982, cite two reasons for this: the lack of a widespread African urban tradition and the inhibition placed on homeland urban development by the draining of labour to cities in South Africa proper.

Once the South African government had embarked on a programme of the decentralisation of industry, partly in order to stem further urbanisation in "white South Africa", it was more willing to subsidise urban development in the homelands. 66% of the budget for homeland physical development was awarded to urban infrastructure from 1961 to 1966. With a target of 80,000 houses, 38,500 were built and, from 1961 to 1978, over R520 million was spent by the South African Development Trust, homeland governments and development corporations on the establishment of homeland towns. In 1986, there were 88 such towns, but the increase since 1960 was not primarily because of the increasing
attractiveness of urban homeland life.
Rather, it was the consequence of the removal of 68,144 Africans from white areas to homeland towns between 1960 and 1970, and the freeze on African house building in white cities, implemented from 1968, and further contributing to the already extensive backlog. The limited decentralisation of industry that the South African government succeeded in promoting, also encouraged homeland urban growth.

The number of Africans employed in manufacturing and commerce in "white" South Africa, had increased by 50% from 1951 to 1960, fuelling an urban African population expansion from 2.4 million to 3.5 million (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The planned decentralisation of this industrial magnet to the borders of the homelands would, it was thought, allow employers to continue to meet their labour requirements, whilst preventing the further growth of a politicized urban African population in "white South Africa". The 1967 Environment Planning Act introduced the first statutory controls to accelerate decentralisation. New industrial developments or extensions envisaged in South Africa's urban areas now had to receive central permission, and firms in the proscribed areas found their African workforce limited in size (Natal was excluded from this provision), until employers' protests brought about a fixed ratio of African:white employees instead. Disincentives to expand in the cities were complemented by incentives to move to the homeland and border regions. They included grants and loans, plus the indirect advantages of lower wages and poor worker safeguards (less holiday and sick leave and a longer working week) in the homelands. From 1970, minimum wage legislation was scrapped altogether inside the homelands (Rogerson, 1982).

However, neither the incentives nor the disincentives addressed the fundamental locational disadvantages of a "border" area deprived of infrastructure (Lemon, 1987). From 1960 to 1972, a total of only 85,544 jobs emerged from the government's scheme in the homeland and border areas (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). Without an independent economic base, the homeland governments remained to various extents, dependent on Pretoria, Bophuthatswana coming closest to self sufficiency with its own platinum mines. The dependence is manifested through a reliance on both Pretoria's aid budget (constituting 70 to 80% of
Kwazulu's income and from 50 to 70% of Transkei's and Bophuthatswana's in the early 1960s, (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989)), and on the earnings of migrants employed in white South Africa. Even with the remittances of these workers taken into account, 50 to 85% of the homelands' purchasing power leaks back into white South Africa, where the major services and centres of employment are concentrated (Halbach, 1988). When assessing the degree of homeland autonomy, Lelyveld, 1987, noted that the homeland of Lebowa's GDP is exceeded by the subsidy that the South African government provides to bus its workers across the border.

2. The Pressures on Apartheid, 1960 to 1976

Economic Contradictions

Clearly, the homelands have failed as separate economic entities. It was probably never the South African government's intention that they should succeed as such. It did intend however, to create in the homelands, an outlet for African employment and urbanisation outside of white South Africa. Although the methods by which it would be achieved were the subject of dispute, since 1948, the government had always perceived limitations on further African urbanisation as being one of the central goals of apartheid.

Apart from the incentives for industrial decentralisation and the assistance with homeland industrial development, during the 1960s, the government employed other, more insidious measures to prevent further African urbanisation outside the homelands. The administration of the urban townships was transferred from the white local authorities to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. This centralisation of control enabled tighter supervision, and the implementation of further restraints on African movement, labour, housing, education and social welfare in South Africa's urban areas. "No dictator in history has exercised more power over human beings than the South African Minister of Bantu Administration" (Douglas Brown, cited Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, 69).

In order to combat the increasing numbers of Africans becoming legally resident in the cities by working for the same employer
continuously for ten years, from 1968, migrants were compelled to return to their homelands at least once a year, so that the continuity of their employment would be broken. Such "Catch 22" urban residence rights were to continue to be a feature of the adaptations of urban apartheid legislation. Through the late 1960s and 1970s, the Labour Bureaux joined the struggle to hold back further African urbanisation, by dictating legal job choices and destinations to those seeking work from the homelands.

By the 1980s though, the situation in the homelands had become sufficiently desperate for hundreds of thousands to bypass the bureaux and illegally squat or rent in the cities. Strategies to evade the system of influx control included a flourishing trade in forged passbooks, and time consuming applications for new passbooks once the "lost" original had already been stamped as "endorsed out". Although in this instance, the "offender" would ultimately be caught out, due to the cumbersome nature of the urban African administration, a reprieve of months could be gained (Posel, 1989).

The Western Cape's Coloured Labour Preference Policy was a regionally specific attempt to stem further African urbanisation. Between 1957 and 1962, 30,000 Africans were endorsed out of Cape Town, but economic growth and the demand for labour continually attracted Africans willing to defy influx control. In particular, the boom of 1968 to 1974, brought increasing numbers of contract workers, while the government froze township house construction and battled to bring the rate of evictions up to the rate of influx. The Crossroads informal settlement emerged spontaneously, as "illegals" clustered their makeshift shelters together, and it continued to grow. After innumerable evictions, clearances and illegal rebuildings, the settlement finally won official acknowledgement in 1976, but state and vigilante harassment continued into the 1980s (see Chapter Seven). By the late 1970s, the application of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy had crumbled under the weight of popular flouting by employers and workers.

Nevertheless the combined effect of the state's disparate influx control measures through the 1960s and 1970s has been estimated as the prevention of a further urban growth of 1.5 to 3 million Africans (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The growth rate of the
black urban population slowed from 6.4% from 1946 to 1950, to 3.9% in the 1960s (Cilliers and Groenwald, 1982, cited Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990).

While this slowdown partially fulfilled one of the government's key political aims, it had more negative long term economic implications. Despite influx control, by the end of the 1960s, there was still an urban oversupply of illegal unskilled labour, but there was simultaneously a shortage of skilled African labour, required in increasingly mechanised production processes (see below). Giliomme and Schlemmer, 1989, believe that mechanisation itself was a response to the restrictions on the influx of labour, but it probably had more to do with the structural imperatives of South Africa's integration with the world economy, and the inflow of capital following the reversal of Sharpeville. In any case, its result was to create, on the one hand, an enduring legacy of high unemployment among unskilled Africans, and on the other hand, an increasingly serious shortage of skilled urban workers. Through the 1960s, the more skilled employment of some blacks in the cities prompted a general increase in black wages, coexisting with rising urban black unemployment.

From the 17th century to the early 20th century, the ideological motivation behind spatial segregation and black political exclusion in South Africa was broadly compatible with white economic activity. Agriculture was served by the retention of a large, unskilled, black workforce and assisted by that workforce's exclusion from the white towns. In those towns, mining and early industrial enterprises could meet most of their labour requirements with the skilled, urban white population and a semi- or unskilled, black migrant labour workforce, supplemented by those workers permanently present in the urban townships. However, the modernisation of the economy - its increasing reliance on commerce and the updated methods of manufacturing in particular - nurtured a fundamental contradiction between apartheid's modified form of segregation and South Africa's late 20th century economic performance. The contradiction had started to emerge in most sectors by the end of the 1960s. By the end of the 1970s, it was becoming apparent to a wider cross-section of South African society.
In the late 1960s, the gold mining houses, in spite of white worker protection and the job colour bar, could still maintain profitability through the use of cheap African labour from South Africa and neighbouring states. But coal and copper mines, in fiercer competition with overseas suppliers, were already taking on an increasingly mechanised form. Their requirement for a more skilled African workforce rose correspondingly. While it took slightly longer for the gold mines to share their concern for a more skilled black workforce, when they did so, they brought far more muscle to the campaign.

In the gold mining sector, once the gold price had started to rise dramatically, from $35 to $800 in the early 1970s (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, 76), the owners were able to escape their white workers' stranglehold. The mining houses' new profitability encouraged a commitment to modernisation that would no longer tolerate skilled labour shortages for the sake of racial privilege. They were assisted in their determination by the convenient fact that white miners had also become relatively less politically important: in the early 1970s, the miners' political affiliation partially shifted away from the NP, to the new and relatively powerless, conservative Afrikaans Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), (Adam and Moodley, 1986). By the end of the 1970s the gold mines had, by and large, "finally succeeded after a century in thwarting the job colour bar on the mines" (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, 76), and some important mining concerns, notably Anglo-American, were stressing the cost advantages of a smaller, stable African family labour force to work increasingly sophisticated technology, rather than traditional unskilled migrants (Freund, 1991).

In the farming sector there was a longer tradition of racial labour domination and support for the NP to be overcome. Through the 1950s and early 1960s, large scale state support for agriculture continued, and the farming sector remained a key supporter of racial policy. By 1970, state aid constituted one fifth of the average white farmer's income (Nattrass, 1981, cited Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). As long as production remained based on the use of relatively large quantities of unskilled African labour, the government could expect white farmer support for the key apartheid policy of influx control, and for the suppression of skilled and highly paid black employment.
Yet, by the end of the 1960s, the very support provided by the state, by helping to remove African tenants from the white farms, had facilitated a transformation of white farming, to a capitalistic sector employing fewer, and more skilled, wage labourers (Marcus, 1989). The needs of large farmers were converging with those of manufacturers, as mechanisation reduced the importance of securing a large quantity of cheap labour, and therefore rendered influx control partially redundant. Instead, they required skills of their remaining black workers, which apartheid was not suited to provide. Cheap, untrained labour, they found, could ultimately be very expensive when dealing with delicate and costly equipment (Davenport, 1991). In the 1970s, the South African Agricultural Union began to press for higher wages, improved working conditions, better training and increased mobility for black agricultural workers. However, the less efficient, more marginal white farmers that still furnished the numerical bulk of the sector, tended to remain implacably opposed to these innovations.

While apartheid's labour restrictions were gradually becoming outmoded for the mining and much of the farming sector, they were proving to be much greater obstacles to manufacturing growth, and that growth assumed increasing significance as the manufacturing sector overtook the primary sector's contribution to the national economy in 1965 (Davenport, 1991). The tensions between manufacturing interests and racial economic restrictions had been manifest as early as the 1940s, but Malan, Strijdom and, to a greater extent, Verwoerd, in turn, had determined to reinforce racial separation, even at the cost of manufacturing growth. The shortage of skilled labour became increasingly evident in manufacturing in the early 1960s, when there was virtually full white employment, and whites were moving into the tertiary sector. Among those remaining in the secondary sector, it was remarked that the absence of skilled competition from cheaper blacks was leading to slackness, absenteeism and high staff turnovers (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

By the end of the 1960s, despite apartheid's regulations, more skilled work was being given to blacks in the cities, especially "Coloureds" and Indians. In 1970 the government legislated that the employment of an African in any position may be prohibited, but by this time, informal flouting of the colour bar was well
established (although many employers maintained, by agreement with white trade unions, a "floating colour bar", by which the racial pay differential would be maintained. In the gold mines, the benefits of increasing black productivity were passed on in the form of wage increases for the white workers). Manufacturing industry had found before the mines though, that with the modernisation of techniques, "low wages are not the sine qua non of profitability" (Price, 1991, 33).

While apartheid's limitations on the production side were becoming apparent, its restraints on consumption were also causing more concern. Even in the 1940s, it was remarked by some observers (for example, Blackwell and May, 1947), that, by holding down black incomes, South Africa's racial system was denying a large potential market to its industrial producers. While white domestic markets were still expanding and South Africa still had unimpeded access to external markets, the costs of the racial market restriction could be borne. But, by the late 1960s, wealthier farmers, gearing up for capital intensive production for the home market, had come to share the concern expressed by manufacturers over the preceding two decades: apartheid was helping to restrict black consumption, and therefore hindering profitability.

For the manufacturers themselves, the white market for many consumer items was by now becoming saturated, with further sales mainly on a replacement basis. For example, by the end of the 1970s the domestic car industry, in response to government encouragement for import substitution, had developed a production capacity of 400,000 cars per annum. But white sales were now only 200,000 cars per annum and the numerically dominant black population was still generally too poor to provide a significant market for new cars (Price, 1991, 33).

Even some of those producers who were not reliant on domestic markets had cause for concern by the late 1970s, as exporters found their links with external markets being severed by trading partners made hostile by apartheid. Industrialists came to particularly regret the Organisation of African Unity's boycott of South African goods, with its denial of access to the natural African market to their north. As the 1970s progressed, manufacturers came to perceive further contradictions between
apartheid and other, more subtle requirements for economic growth: internal political stability, external credit-worthiness and investor confidence (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

This account of apartheid's emerging impediments to economic growth contradicts a commonly held opinion about South Africa's economic performance and its relationship with apartheid. Marxist scholars have traditionally emphasised the rapid rates of economic growth that South Africa achieved in the 1960s, and stressed their coincidence with the period of the strictest application of apartheid. The inference that has frequently been drawn from these observations is that apartheid must have been conducive, rather than restrictive, of economic growth. Indeed the 1960s decade has often been used as the Marxists' most effective weapon in combating liberal assertions of apartheid's economic contradictions. The fact that the economy was flourishing just when black labour was most repressed by apartheid suggests that it was apartheid's function of cheap labour repression that facilitated economic growth. Thus, the Marxist view of the symbiotic relationship between capitalism and apartheid is confirmed.

However, the mechanism by which the economy was seen to prosper from apartheid in the 1960s - the maintenance of cheap black labour - is illusory. As more skilled employment and trade union gains (see below) became available through the 1960s, black product wages were actually rising, rather than being held at extremely low levels. In the mean time, apartheid allowed white wages to maintain their advantage over black, despite the absence of a compensatory advance in white productivity. Thus the 1960s saw gradually declining profit rates and rising black wages (Nattrass, 1990) - the reverse of what radical Marxians had believed.

Moll, 1990, has gone furthest in challenging the received wisdom of a 1960s "apartheid boom". Growth over the period, although impressive, was in fact slower than that in many middle income developing countries (5 to 6%, compared to a 7.6% average for Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan), and poor when South Africa's resource endowments and advantageous connections are borne in mind. After Sharpeville, South Africa had a relatively stable political system, a competent administration, a suppressed
working class, a skilled white population, good infrastructure and financial systems, easy access to overseas markets and relatively cheap local labour; yet its share of world manufacturing exports fell from 0.8 to 0.3% from 1955 to 1985 (trade sanctions being a limitation only from the late 1970s). This relative failure was "partly because the apartheid superstructure impeded economic development and partly because of the constraining effects of a range of short-sighted and ill-directed state economic policies" (Moll, 1990, 271).

Instead of encouraging exports, economic policy was directed at import substitution, which proved to contribute to a balance of payments deficit. Although local suppliers were able to displace imported consumer goods, the restricted size of the domestic market denied them the economies-of-scale needed to produce their own capital goods. As they expanded local production then, they also swelled the imports of expensive capital machinery, nullifying the exercise of import substitution. Moll suggests two reasons for the reticence in pursuing export growth: the Afrikaner nationalist desire for autonomy from external links (especially to Britain) and the urge to limit the black urbanisation and proletarianization that a flourishing export sector would encourage. Even during the 1960s "golden age" of South African capital then, apartheid's limitations combined with those of government economic policy to hamper "efficient resource allocation" and prevent "firms from making full use of black workers" (Moll, 1990, 290). Bunting, writing in 1967, believed that the government itself was aware of its limitations: "if there is one sphere in which the Nats (NP) have not yet been able to triumph as they would wish it is that of the South African economy" (Bunting, 1986, 369).

The NP had minimal representation in manufacturing concerns in the late 1960s (Bunting, 1986). From an early lack of political affinity, by the mid 1970s, more concrete opposition to the government's economic interference had emerged. Adam and Moodley, 1986, trace the growth of an industrial "reform lobby" to concerns over the skill shortages, the restricted domestic market, the blocking of international market expansion and capital inflows and the undermining of confidence caused by South Africa's negative image overseas. Industrial concern was deepened by the failure of the government's attempts to accommodate
manufacturing interests through decentralisation.

Even in the mid 1960s, Anglo American's Harry Oppenheimer was a prominent supporter of the opposition Progressive Party. He was joined by a wider group of industrialists in the 1970s. Hackland believes that Oppenheimer simultaneously gave support to both the NP and the PP, as a form of insurance in case the NP failed to protect capitalist growth (Hackland, 1980, cited Lemon, 1987, 94). Nevertheless, Oppenheimer was vocal in his belief that "rapid economic development of South Africa would in the long run prove incompatible with the government's racial policies" (Lemon, 1987, 94).

Bantu Education, purposefully stifling the accumulation of black skills, was a prime candidate for reform in the interests of the economy. In 1953, only 1064 Africans graduated from university. The Bantu Education Act had since accomplished a deterioration, by killing the spirit of those mission schools that did offer quality education and by ensuring that the number of technical colleges for blacks fell from 54 in 1953 to 21 in 1954 (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). In the 1970s, as large companies diversified into manufacturing and commerce, the concentration of ownership increased. As a result, there was a more coordinated call from industry for a more skilled mass workforce. With 45% of a sample of large manufacturers stating that they had difficulties acquiring adequate skilled labour in 1977, and 80% by 1980, the government had little choice but to commit more of its resources to black education. In 1960, 54,598 Africans were at school and 1871 at university. By 1980 the respective figures were 1,192,932 and 49,164 (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, 117-8).

This is not to say that, merely by being opposed to some aspects of apartheid, capital would bring about its downfall (along the lines of the Anglo American executive, O'Dowd's, thesis that economic growth, would in itself be an irrepressible force for greater racial integration).

Capital is an adaptive creature: when conditions are imperfect, profits can still be made, and "the notion that the interests of maturing capitalism would dictate the shape of South African government policy is a rather crude form of economic determinism"
within "capital", the interests of the farming, mining, manufacturing and commercial sectors, were internally and externally differentiated. Similarly, for capitalists, apartheid represented more than just labour repression and control. The individuals comprising the capitalist class in South Africa may have been inclined, for instance, to oppose job reservation and the denial of skills to black workers, whilst supporting apartheid's social precepts and African spatial segregation and political exclusion.

Nevertheless the general trend in employers' thinking in the 1970s was marked by the Federated Chamber of Industry joining the Associated Chamber of Commerce and some members of the Afrikaans Handelsinstituut, to protest the cost and impracticability of Separate Development. "The previously separate interests of capital were now converging" (Lipton, 1988, 62).

As the liaison of the main English and Afrikaans-speaking capitalist bodies indicates, crucial changes had also occurred within the body of the Afrikaner volk. The 1930s Afrikaans economic movement had presaged a post 1948 strategy of state intervention to "uplift" the volk, especially through the utilization and protection of its manufacturing, commercial and farming capital. Apartheid's nurturing of these capital concerns to the point, in the 1970s, where they were established and flourishing, paradoxically brought their desire to remove the restraints on future growth that the apartheid system now represented. Politically influential Afrikaans capitalists had, by the 1970s, come to share economic concerns and interests with their established English counterparts, as they found themselves drawing level with them in terms of size and diversification. Afrikaans and English capitalists were, by the late 1970s, beginning to merge into a single, economically dominant class. With their accession to economic prominence, Afrikaner capitalists became more committed to a market economy, and less dependent on the political patronage and rigid racial and labour stratification of apartheid (Thompson, 1985).

The NP had already lost the support of many small Afrikaans farmers, forced off the land by its backing of modernisation, and denied increasingly expensive subsidies. To some extent, the shedding of this more conservative Afrikaans constituency to more
extreme Afrikaans political parties, released the NP to cater more for the newer Afrikaans commercial and industrial classes. By the late 1970s then, the restructuring of Afrikaans manufacturing, commercial and agricultural capital, had helped clear the road for apartheid's economic reform.

In the 1970s, not only important members of the state's core constituency, but the state itself began to suffer more from the costs of apartheid. In 1970, Johannesburg's state-run bus service was 30% short of drivers and conductors due to the resistance of the white Municipal Transport Workers Union to "Coloured" crews (Lipton, 1985). Even in 1953, the General Manager of the same bus department had estimated that, if apartheid transport was abandoned, half a million pounds profit could be made per annum, instead of running at a loss (Bunting, 1986). Within the central state, the managers of ISCOR, SAR (railways) and the Post Office were calling in the 1970s, for labour reform, including abolition of the colour bar. From 1974, the SADF had to recruit black soldiers, and the increasing costs of apartheid were becoming manifest in a steadily increasing defence budget.

The concerns of a growing group of capitalists were not sufficient in themselves to alter the course of government policy, but when combined with apartheid's more significant economic costs to the state itself and the material threat that the current political system posed to traditional NP constituencies, by the end of the 1970s, enough momentum was generated to initiate serious consideration of a reform of apartheid, insofar as it affected the economy.

Security Contradictions

By the mid 1970s, internal contradictions were encouraging a reconsideration of the economic aspects of apartheid. But the government only shifted decisively into a change of mood when a severe escalation of the external and internal security threat was superimposed on political and economic problems within the country.

South Africa's external relations were under threat fundamentally because by the 1970s, the country was a "unique phenomenon: a pigmentocratic industrialised state" (Thompson, 1985, 191). Through
most of South Africa's history, its racial system of government had had its counterparts in other European colonies. But with the onset of independence for most of these territories, only South Africa and a neighbouring "buffer zone" to its north remained of racially discriminatory rule. In the 1970s, even this cushioning belt was to be removed, as Angola, Mozambique and, finally, Zimbabwe attained independence.

South Africa was progressively isolated in world politics, and its economy correspondingly suffered from a severing of external links. However, the loss of South Africa's northern "cordon sanitaire" meant more than just a new status as a uniquely, explicitly, and relatively isolated racist state. It also exposed South Africa's borders to incursions of ANC guerillas from the sympathetic new black states to the north, and assisted SWAPO in its challenge to the SADF occupation of Namibia. In the 1970s and 1980s, Cuban aid to the recently established Marxist MPLA government in Angola allowed it to resist a South African invasion in support of Pretoria's favourite candidate for Angolan government.

Within South Africa, the Soweto uprising, often seen as a dramatic and sudden revival of black resistance, had its prelude in the form of the unexpected strikes launched by Durban workers in 1973. Their actions highlighted the economic dimension of black resistance, which also fed into the more ideologically influenced Soweto uprising.

1973 marked the birth of a trade unionism fundamentally different from that repressed in the 1960s. Whereas in the former era of trade union revival, never more than 2000 workers were involved in strike action in one year, in 1973, 100,000 participated, and since that year, the figure has never fallen below 14,000 (Mitchell and Russell, 1989, 232). The difference was primarily to do with a change in union structure from formal, and easily repressed, leadership representation, to a "vibrant system of factory committees that provide for the democratic involvement of the rank and file membership in day-to-day union affairs at the place of work" (Mitchell and Russell, 1989, 233).

The resurgence of strike activity and its new organisational structure must be sited in the broad economic context of the
early 1970s oil price shocks. African unemployment was increasing as both the government and the private sector retrenched, but the primary incentive to strike was provided by inflation. Between 1971 and 1973 the price of essential commodities for black workers rose by 40% (Hemson, 1978, cited Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990).

It had taken from 1910 to 1959 for the general level of prices in South Africa to treble, but they did so again between 1978 and 1986 (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, 250). Wage bargaining - the normal recourse of workers - was a luxury denied to many blacks, so they were hard hit by a decline in real income (Khan, cited Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, 250). The poor were particularly affected by the rising price of paraffin - in the Transkei, over 10% of income was already spent on fuel. Between 1973 and 1980, the nationwide level of real wages fell by 16% (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, 250).

While falling real wages were of general concern, in Durban, the economic burden of the worker was further loaded. Economic consciousness and resentment had recently been nurtured in the region by local press coverage of the extent of the black population which fell below the poverty datum line and a 16% increase in bus fares between townships and the city was in the offing, generating talk of a boycott. As elsewhere and at other times, a mixture of traditional and "progressive" forms of action, was taken. The Zulu paramount chief, to whom many workers in the city still felt they owed their first allegiance, made it clear that he would support workers' action.

The strikes were led by workers from the France Textile Group, notorious for its low wages and poor labour relations (Lodge, 1983). Once the first strike had resulted in a wage rise, striking spread to other sectors and other parts of the region. The strikes tended to be apparently leaderless and of short duration. The absence of a negotiating body among the workers protected them from victimisation or cooptation by the management or the state (Lodge, 1983). In the context of the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers - the category to which many of the strikers belonged - real economic gains were often forthcoming and general moves towards a non-racial "rate for the job" and the erosion of the "civilized labour" policy, followed from the outbreak of industrial action (Terreblanche and
For the unions, the success of the strikes encouraged the wider adoption of a workerist, "grassroots" form of agitation (Lodge, 1983), which irreversibly shifted the balance of power in Africans' favour. No longer was the most significant African power base largely restricted to the relatively small middle class group of teachers, ministers, clerks and their followers (Adam, 1988), it was now centred at the core of South Africa's economy. In the long run, the shift contributed to the phasing out of job reservation and to the increasing power of black political movements with trade union associates. The greater influence of even unregistered black trade unions would force negotiations from employers and precipitate a repressive state response. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, police detentions reflected the trend of the increasing trade union threat: there was a rising number of arrests and beatings of trade union leaders, culminating in 1982, in the death in detention of the white trade unionist, Dr. Neil Aggett (Davenport, 1991).

While the general trend after 1973, was towards increased wages, the stabilisation of labour, and recognition of trade union viability, the behaviour of workers and employers remained greatly differentiated. Even within the mining sector, employers' attitudes varied significantly, with the Afrikaans Gencor and Goldfields resisting wage and trade union recognition advances, and the Anglo American Corporation adopting a "progressive" line. Throughout the sector, the migrant labour system remained intact (Lipton, 1988). The workers' position was similarly incohesive. Seemingly progressive strike action continued to be accompanied by tribalistic ritual and factional politics which often flared into inter-ethnic violence within the workplace. The adoption of new forms of struggle against economic oppression had not excluded older traits of enmity amongst the workers (see Malan, 1990, 245-63 for one example from a 1985 mine strike).

If the industrial scenario with which the state had to deal in the 1970s was confused, it is not surprising that its own response was ambiguous. The increasingly evident economic contradictions facing the state inhibited it from unmitigated repression of the organised African workforce, while the conservatism of its own white political constituency imposed
limits on the extent to which it could reform racial economic relations. "This strategic indecisiveness on the part of the state" was "one of the most significant factors which ... distinguished the development of black resistance movements in the 1970s from those of the preceding two decades" (Lodge, 1983,326).

But the context of rejuvenated black opposition in the 1970s also included the increasingly rapid rate of African urbanisation. The material deprivation of the new, urban born, African generation was in all too apparent contrast to white urban affluence. Through the 1960s and 1970s, economic forces encouraging agglomeration of the factors of production in the cities, had gained ascendancy over the ideological and political forces attempting to restrain African urbanisation (Smit et al.1982).

The most evident manifestation of this urban growth was the proliferation of informal African settlements on the urban fringe. A survey of such a settlement, Vlakfontein on the Witwatersrand, indicated that most rural immigrants had moved to the urban area in the 1970s as a result of agricultural restructuring and rural tenant eviction, flouting the influx control regulations. But of greatest significance is the fact that a sizeable proportion of the inhabitants of these shacks had been born, and lived all their lives, in the urban area. This population's membership of a poorly paid, unskilled working class and the shortage of formal township housing, had conspired to restrict it to informal accommodation, and nearly a quarter of the population were employed only casually or in the informal sector (Crankshaw and Hart, 1990). The government estimated in 1981, that in Cape Town, 42.8% of blacks were "illegals" (Dewar and Watson,1982).

For the young African generation born in the urban areas, these material conditions, in the face of white urban privilege, were increasingly resented. Exhilarated by the defeat of white regimes in Mozambique and Angola, this generation entered the mid 1970s with a receptive attitude to any ideology or organisation that offered a renewal of mass opposition to apartheid after the post Sharpeville years of quietude. "The generational shift was marked by a change in the demeanour of Africans towards whites: a change from deference to defiance" (Thompson,1985,192).
The urban African population however, did not cohesively shift to a new pattern of radical political action. Traditional forms of consciousness, carried to the cities by rural migrants, were handed down to succeeding urban generations too. Older ideals coexisted with the new in the townships, in much the same way as they did in the workplace. For instance, inyangas and sangomas retained a powerful influence in the urban settlements and traditional herbal medicine was transplanted to the townships, though it became wrapped in a western, commercialised form as it competed with western medicine for urban patients (Malan, 1990, Rolf, 1990).

The Black Consciousness (BC) movement contained this blend of traditional and modern forms of expression. As a political ideology, mobilizing and regenerating unprecedentedly vehement opposition to the state, it was novel, but its self image rested upon a more traditional appraisal of African history and identity. In the cities of the 1970s, the roots of budding political resistance partially lay in a distant, older, rural African culture.

The Black Consciousness movement's influence was greatest on the young, emergent, black middle class. The growth, during the 1950s and 1960s, of an African white collar class, cultivated on increased African education provision, facilitated a more politically conscious urban population. The BC philosophy originated among students dissatisfied with the white liberal National Union of Students (NUSAS) monopoly of anti-apartheid student protest. The South African Students Organisation (SASO) was formed as an assertive black alternative. Within SASO a philosophic and introspective movement developed, its activism being largely restricted to black community projects. The strategic and tactical questions addressed by the Africanists of the preceding two decades were largely neglected (Lodge, 1983). A precondition for future, successful resistance was identified as being the removal of the psychological sense of inferiority to which black people had been reduced, under the influence of three centuries of white domination and liberal white paternalism like that of NUSAS. Indigenous cultural traditions would have to be tapped to allow the bonds of negative self imagery to be shaken off.
The movement developed as more than just an extension of the 1950s Africanist ideology in two respects. Firstly, its ideologues recognised the reality of class divisions within the African community, and thus, the absence of racial solidarity. Secondly, it opened its structures and its sense of affinity to "Coloureds" and Indians as well as Africans. Its more inclusive approach was based upon an appreciation of common treatment under the white power structures. "More acutely than their predecessors, Biko and his colleagues understood the complexity of feelings engendered through subservience" (Lodge, 1983, 325).

By rejecting the hegemony that white, Western ideology had assumed over blacks as they were incorporated in the white urban economy, the movement "enabled the masses of the people to detach themselves from their unthinking respect for white culture" (Magubane, 1989, 11). This was reflected in the development by black writers, of a new style of literary expression. The early 1970s saw a revival of traditional African oral poetry. Township gatherings heard poems like Oswald Mtshali's "Sounds of a Cowhide Drum" read aloud. This poem in particular, reawakened a sense of a distant African cultural tradition, with Mtshali embracing "rural consciousness into his picture of dispossession" (Gunner, 1988, 228). However, traditional African poetry was extended to include direct, warlike invective against the modern South African state.

Even within the structures of the "western" prose form, a new group of black writers manipulated and subverted hegemonic interpretations. Miriam Tlali, Ahmed Essop, Sipho Sepamala, Mbulelo Mzamane and Mongane Serote were all overtly urban centred and BC oriented. They wrote explicitly in order to "conscientize" their black readers. All their novels of the period refer to a complex of injustices perpetrated by the cohesive system of white repression: Bantu Education, the pass laws, the homelands, the urban housing backlog and urban deprivation, the violent and socially disintegrative behaviour inherent in township life and the overwhelming saturation of hopelessness. All saw the white response to black assertion as being a blend of fear, brutality and vacillation, and all incited the youth to demonstrate to their passive elders how the "white man's machine" of technological capitalism could be overthrown (Sole, 1991).
Despite BC's appeal to the township youth, it never induced a mass based organisation to implement the resistance it encouraged. Its effect was more to galvanise the imagination and the belief that resistance could be fruitful after the lull of the 1960s. Its set of catch phrases, for instance, filtered down to a wider following (Grundy, 1991), while an appreciation of the ideology itself was restricted to a more select stratum of the urban African population. The thinking behind BC diffused successfully among schoolteachers, priests and journalists and its themes were taken up in the press, in township cultural events and in black educational establishments. But, while this allowed the wider diffusion of its slogans and of its motivational power, it did not necessarily engender a widespread understanding of the ideological principles upon which they resided. The influence of BC on the Soweto revolt was mediated and diffused through a filter of popular interpretation, modification and simplification.

The student originators of the movement were never able to fully enrol the wider community in their own attempts to defy the system, neither conceptually nor practically. The students of Soweto did not take on the wider grievances of rents, unemployment, inflation and working conditions as much as they were portrayed as doing by BC orientated writers. Even these writers, agitating for concerted and cohesive township action, pictured workers as "sheep-like, easily frightened, under-policitized and more susceptible to the lure of homeland governments" (Sole, 1991, 195). There was not necessarily a clear articulation between the proponents of BC theory, and the mass of participants in township revolt.

BC ideals were partially extended into the 1980s with the Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO), which allowed for more of a "workerist" perspective, but in the 1970s, the BC movement's adherents often conveyed the impression that, if only the masses would follow the lead of the intellectuals and students, drastic change would ensue. In fact, many of the schoolchildren who initiated the Soweto revolt were probably not acting directly under the influence of BC's ideological imperatives, but according to initiative conditioned partly by the more tangible influence of BC slogans, but largely by the specific conditions in which they found themselves, in their schools and homes in
1976.

Soweto's situation in 1976 was determined partly by economic and political forces affecting the whole of South Africa in the mid 1970s, and partly by the specific conditions of life in South Africa's largest, sprawling township. South Africa's deteriorating economic performance was felt by township residents in an immediate and harsh way. The recessions of 1976 and 1982 were both accompanied by a resurgence of township activism (Brewer, 1989). The widening gulf between black economic expectations and reality was generating an increasingly aggrieved sense of material deprivation in all of South Africa's townships, and in Soweto, food and transport price rises were felt particularly harshly (Price, 1991).

Wider administrative changes also had a particular impact in Soweto. By 1971 the government had decided to ensure that municipal authorities, subject to the demands of local employers, would no longer vacillate in imposing influx control and encouraging decentralisation. Township administration was taken out of municipal control and handed over to Regional Administration Boards. Soweto's West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) received R2 million less in subsidy than was currently required to make the township self-financing. In response, the WRAB increased rents and cut spending on housing. It also recouped some of the revenue by charging lodgers' fees to those over 18 living with their parents in municipal houses (Lodge, 1983). Yet, the WRAB managed to build only 2,734 new municipal houses between 1973 and 1978 (UF, 1988, cited Lea, 1982, 200). The informal housing initiative taken by Africans themselves was being met with bulldozers and evictions. By 1976, Soweto had an average of 14 people per house. When such housing inadequacies were accompanied by a 25% rent increase in the first year of the WRAB's control, and further increases in the next, there were "ideal conditions for mass rebellion" (Price, 1991, 56).

If macro economic and administrative changes provided the powder for the Soweto rebellion, educational issues provided the spark (see below). The state's expansion of urban secondary education had provided new terrain for political mobilization in black communities. While the townships themselves were under close supervision in the 1970s, the schools within them became one of
the few relatively open arenas for the development of a new, oppositional momentum (Wolpe, 1988). Bantu education had brought increasing numbers of pupils into already overcrowded schools, which lacked adequate facilities and qualified teachers. Racist History syllabi and an absence of Maths and Science teaching contributed to disenchantment among pupils. The ideology of resistance that BC represented, in popular form, found a fertile recruiting ground (Hyslop, 1991).

While BC provided, in the background, an ideological basis for resistance, its organisational complement was absent over most of the country. In Soweto, the organisational vacuum was filled by the Soweto Student Representatives Council (SSRC). Eleven of its members were subsequently tried for their role in the Soweto revolt. Whereas educational protest in the 1960s had been led by parents and conducted with ANC guidance, in 1976, it was the students themselves, particularly the SSRC, who took the initiative, while parents and the externally based ANC were swept along by events (Wolpe, 1988).

The deeper economic concerns and tension of the community fed into the township's educational establishments, but it was the decision to make Afrikaans a language of instruction in the schools that prodded deep dissatisfaction into open rebellion. Hyslop, 1991, sees the Afrikaans language issue as a symbol of the underlying grievances, drawing an analogy with Freud's connection between conscious symbols and their inaccessible root in the unconscious. An attack on Afrikaans school instruction manifested more than a detestation of the oppressor's language and the difficulty of learning through it; it symbolised an assault on the very structures of oppression. Continuing the Freudian analogy, "as students themselves moved from a symbolic to a conscious understanding of their society, what had been repressed was no longer" (Hyslop, 1991, 111).

What had started as a demonstration of revolt by Soweto students, spread through 1976, into a conflagration in many of South Africa's townships. Police brutality in dealing with localised instances of rebellion in Soweto, removed the inhibitions restraining sympathizers in other locations, and helped unleash the seething, repressed anger that was fairly universal.
In Cape Town, the 1976 uprising contained the first large scale "Coloured" rioting in South Africa's history (Western, 1987). Here, Soweto's conditions - poor housing, overcrowding and unemployment - were replicated. Before 1976, many whites had seen "Coloureds" as being more akin to themselves in their political outlook, than to Africans. The rapid spread of rebellion from Soweto to Cape Africans, and thence to Cape "Coloureds" proved disillusioning. As in Soweto, the targets of youth attack spiralled from specific educational structures to the symbols of apartheid in general: Bantu Administration offices, African beer halls (implicated in the slogan "Drink Keeps us Down"), housing offices, civic centres, police stations and the houses of policemen and suspected informers, as well as their persons.

The government's Cillie Commission of Inquiry reported the causes of the 1976 unrest as being the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and the lack of competence of police and educational officials both in anticipating the effect of this innovation and in taking counter-measures. Brookes and Brickhill, 1980, also focus on the impact of the educational changes. Unsatisfactory schools and the anger provoked by the obligatory use of the economically redundant and ideologically unacceptable Afrikaans language, are cited as the major causes of the revolt. Hirson, 1979, stresses the role of the precedent set by the 1973 strikes in galvanizing working class militancy. For him, the BC movement only acted to divert energies created by this class, and dissipate them in a non-workerist struggle. But this is probably to conceive a direct connection where none exists. The strikes were over three years before the Soweto revolt, and Durban was in a very different regional context (Lodge, 1983). Soweto's large African petty bourgeoisie and an incident in which hostel-dwelling workers attacked the protesting students, militated against a strong link between workerist revival and the township's spirit of resistance.

Kane Berman, 1978, goes to another extreme in placing the initiative for the revolt in the hands of BC activists. However, while their ideals were probably familiar in outline to the participants, and provided legitimacy for their actions, it was more the material, or as Price, 1991, puts it, the "situational" conditions in which they found themselves that provided the spur to action in 1976. This situation contained certain critical
elements: structural economic hardship, both directly for workers and indirectly for township residents, due to the requirement for self-financing local authorities; an oppressive educational context being made a significant degree further intolerable, and an expectation of political action and change to end the 1960s hiatus in resistance.

The young, urban, black generation of the 1970s contributed by its resistance, to the economic and political contradictions which were already pressurising apartheid, and directly provoked the government's reappraisal of the system. The Soweto uprising was a dramatic departure from previously localised and momentary instances of resistance. It marked the beginning of significant and coherent challenges to state structures (Lodge, 1983). The state's immediate response to the crisis was to leave 575 dead and 2389 wounded (not exclusively due to police action). The resistance, and the repression with which it was met, further deepened South Africa's sense of economic insecurity, and facilitated the re-emergence of the ANC as the primary focus of township political aspiration. The state's repression provided an impetus for hundreds of township youths to leave South Africa for training in the external ANC's armed wing and it was this hardened core of exiled, rebellious youth which, in the 1980s, would provide the personnel for the ANC's sabotage campaigns.

In the remainder of the 1970s, repression dampened, but did not smother unrest in the townships. In the 1980s, South Africa became locked in a violent equilibrium between a government that could not possibly be overthrown and a spirit of mass resistance that could be temporarily repressed, but could not be extinguished (Sparks, 1991, see chapter seven). The community-based insurrectionist tactics of the 1980s were presaged in the formation in Soweto of the first Civic Association under Nthatho Motlana. Its organisation of a rent boycott after a further 100% rent rise in 1979, marked the transition to a form of resistance which would ultimately cripple apartheid's black urban control structures.

The Soweto uprising's repercussions extended beyond South Africa's borders. It added further external pressures to the internal contradictions of apartheid. Immediately after Soweto, there was capital flight, talk of
sanctions and disinvestment, a slowing of white immigration and a
deepening of the Balance of Payments crisis. For South Africa's trading partners, Soweto "revived the whole issue of international acceptability that Prime Minister Verwoerd had sought to lay to rest through the policy of Separate Development" (Price, 1991, 62). In November 1977, when the security threat was near its peak, the UN arms embargo became mandatory. By 1978, South Africa was cut off from new long term loans and foreign owned firms based in South Africa had begun to repatriate more of the revenue they earned there. A net inflow of $660 million in 1976 had, by 1978, become an outflow of $1073 million (Price, 1991, 68), and in 1977, GDP rose by only 0.1% (Moll, 1989).

Apart from the institutional response, South Africa suffered from a consumer boycott in the West, when the repression following Soweto made alternatives more acceptable than "Made in South Africa" items. In turn, the government's efforts to overcome mounting Western hostility played a crucial role in instigating the "Muldergate" affair - the misappropriation of public funds intended for overseas propaganda - which eventually forced Prime Minister Vorster's resignation and his replacement by P.W. Botha.

**Conclusion**

By the end of the 1970s, despite extensive ideological adjustments in the guise of "Separate Development" and the pragmatic development of impoverished separate homeland administrations, a fundamental paradox had emerged within the apartheid system. The set of laws accumulated over the last thirty years to guarantee white prosperity and security, were in themselves contributing to the undermining of these very goals. The modernisation of key economic sectors was being impeded by discriminatory laws adopted for white protection in an earlier economic context, and government attempts to encourage industrial decentralisation had done little to remove the constraints. Internal economic contradictions were reinforced by the damaging effect that South Africa's political modus operandi, and black resistance to it, had on external investor confidence, first after Sharpeville, and then after Soweto.

The rising sense of black political strength in the 1970s was commensurate with an increasingly crucial black role in the economy. Black workers had realised their collective power from
the 1950s and in the 1960s, they initiated an unprecedented level of trade union activity. The 1973 Durban strikes and the Soweto revolt both reflected and catalysed further militancy. The fact that black resistance, rather than being progressively eliminated, was increasing in its scale and intensity with each discrete period of rebellion, made a secure economic and political future for apartheid unlikely. Nevertheless, the state could possibly have legitimated entrenched apartheid for longer, if the support of its own Afrikaans constituency had not simultaneously begun to fragment.
Chapter Six

The Reformulation of a Structure

Introduction

Botha came to the premiership in 1978 with the conviction that apartheid could be coherently reformed so as to ameliorate its economic contradictions, to pacify black urban resistance and to ensure continued white political and economic hegemony. In order to force through the reforms he envisaged, he first altered the nature of government in such a way as to strengthen his own position relative to the other elements involved in the formulation of state policy. With unprecedented individual power within the state, he began to take some of the directions for reform indicated by post-Soweto commissions set up by his predecessor, Vorster, and by his own advisory bodies.

Botha's background in the Ministry of Defence had helped inform his perception of a South Africa undergoing a "Total Onslaught". An ideology based upon this perception emerged within the higher echelons of government. An onslaught, ultimately orchestrated by communist elements within and outside the country, could only be met by a "Total Strategy", involving a set of new alliances with the classes and groups who would defend the type of stability favoured by the state. Capital was one of these groups and it was envisaged that "Coloureds", Indians and even urban Africans could be encompassed in a struggle to fend off radical change. Many of Botha's initiatives during the 1980s were directed at forging such an alliance.

While Botha's premiership was guided in its early stages by more of a blueprint for change than Vorster's was, the implementation of reform was still vacillatory and sometimes contradictory. The government was still, to a large extent, reactive rather than proactive in its reform measures. Elements in the reform package that seem, with hindsight, to have been components of a grand and long term strategy, were not necessarily devised in such a light. They were often the result of the unintended consequences of earlier initiatives, or of developments beyond the government's control.
This chapter is divided into three parts, which are broadly chronological in order, but with frequent temporal overlaps. The first part is an account of the adaptations which were made to government thinking and practice under Vorster, in the light of the Soweto uprising. Botha's preparations for reform and the development of reform ideology within the government are the subject of the second part. The third part recounts the policy measures which comprised Botha's reform package. African, and particularly, township, responses to these reforms, their unintended consequences, and the forceful resistance with which the state was met in the mid 1980s, plus concluding comments on the period, are left for the succeeding chapter.

1. Post Soweto Realizations and Adaptations

In the wake of the Soweto uprising, government commissions were appointed by Vorster to investigate the problems, and try to negotiate a way through the economic contradictions of urban apartheid.

Soweto had thrown a spotlight on the difficulties of maintaining white political and economic privilege. But the problems were of a structural nature, inherent within the system of government. Urban administrative chaos was the necessary outcome of so many territorial and racial structures of government (44 in the Durban metropolitan region alone, (Lemon,1991)). A deplorable housing shortage, accompanied by mushrooming squatter settlements and the dislocation between workplace and home for most of the city's population, were commensurate with the attempt to keep the city core white. Periodic upsurges in black resistance and a further deepening of economic contradictions stemmed from the conditions in which most of the city's population lived. Hence there was an underlying "conflict threshold evident from the mid 1970s" (Davies,1991,85), upon which the dramatic events of Soweto were superimposed.

Four major developments were responsible for the government's perception that South Africa was at a threshold in the late 1970s: apartheid's internal economic contradictions flowing ultimately from demography, the changing class interests of apartheid's core white constituency, the economic impact of
mounting international condemnation and the stresses and costs imposed on administration by bouts of heightened black resistance. In fact, in Habermas's phraseology, apartheid was facing both an economic and a legitimation crisis.

The perceived economic basis of the state's difficulties resulted in a shift in government ideology over the next decade. "The ruling (groups) are ... now increasingly concerned with securing their material advantages ... rather than preserving their collective identity ... when 70% of the group are considered to be middle class, avoiding jeopardising this position vies with ideological relics" (Adam, 1990, 236). Adam and Moodley, 1986, also detect a shift in the source of legitimacy, from nationalist identity and racist doctrines, towards bureaucratic notions of law and order. The shift may represent more than a simple re-evaluation; it may mark the descent into mere "survival ideology" (Adam and Moodley, 1986, 72) of a government in disarray over defeat in Angola, the Soweto uprising and the "Muldergate" affair.

Whether as re-evaluation or last resort, Professor Viljoen, head of the vanguard of ruling group ideology, the Broederbond, asked after Soweto, "must we not think again in our inner circle about Dr. Eiselen's idea of a neutral or grey area with political power shared by white and non-white alongside a smaller, exclusive, white state?" (Williams and Strydom, 1979, cited Kuper, 1988, 43).

In the late 1970s, government rethinking coincided with the advent of a broader split in Afrikaans ranks, facilitating moves in a reformist direction. A "verligte", or enlightened tendency, characterised the political outlook of some influential Afrikaners under Vorster's premiership. In the forefront of the movement, and adopting the most radical position, was an intellectual elite, nourished on the revival of Afrikaans education since the mid century, which both broadened the horizons of Afrikaans literature and followed a more humanistic approach to ethnic politics (Sparks, 1990). In particular, the 1960s and 1970s produced a generation of "radical" writers like Andre Brink, known as the sestigers ("Sixty-ers"), who had studied abroad and absorbed something of the revolutionary campus politics of the times.
The "verligte" group in general though, was more cautious in its departure from orthodox Afrikaans political belief, and it remained bound by a racially fragmented view of politics.

Bunting, 1986, traces the divide within the polity between "verligte" and conservative "verkrampte", to Vorster's attempts from 1968 to meet black leaders of other African nations, and to allow black athletes to represent South Africa abroad. Apart from opposing these specific endeavours, the "verkrampte" wing of the NP was critical of Vorster's emphasis on overall white unity and dominance, rather than on the traditional concern for the exclusive safeguarding of Afrikaners. Integration between the two dominant white groups was only marginally less feared than the first signs of apartheid's relaxation heralded by the diplomatic and sports ventures. It was thought that such innovations, seemingly innocuous in immediate conditions, by abrogating the principle of maximum segregation, contained the seeds for a long term undermining of white, and particularly Afrikaans, supremacy.

The "verligte" members of the NP were well aware of the power of a "verkrampte" reaction, and their "main objective ... was to reformulate the apartheid ideology within the party without forcing a split" (Giliomee, 1987, 376). Whilst the party would, after all, split, the growth of a "verligte" outlook in the NP, despite the "verkrampte" reaction, prepared the ground within the wider Afrikaans community for the reforms contemplated in the late 1970s. The movement also attracted some new electoral support to the NP from more liberal English speakers, and was influential in persuading Western leaders that structural change was contemplated, thereby delaying economic sanctions.

While, within the state, certain ideological shifts were occurring, opening avenues for reform, they did not extend to a reconsideration of the racial basis of policy. The implicit aim of late 1970s and early 1980s reformism was to preserve white political and economic superiority under new conditions, even if its retention involved sub optimal economic performance, rather than to jettison it entirely. Under Vorster, the prejudicial legal measures to protect separate identities - the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts and the various pieces of geographically segregationist legislation - continued
Thompson, 1985, attempts to rationalize the fundamental lack of ideological progression, and the continuation of an academically outmoded conception of identity within the wider white society. By 1980, scientists had generally abandoned the racial paradigm, but the general public in South Africa, as in North America and Europe, lagged behind. It is after all, easier to understand an immutable division of the human species into distinctive physical, and coincidentally, cultural, entities, than it is to comprehend the concept of fluid populations, defined genetically and subject to continuous cultural and even, in the long run, physical change. The findings of late 20th century physical and social anthropology were less readily filtered through white society than were those of the late 19th century. Apart from the simple index of understandability, the fixed racial paradigm also satisfied a white sense of superiority and helped uphold white self-esteem, whilst complementing neatly, white material self interest.

In Europe and North America, the real structures of society were overtaking such racially based conceptions of them, but in South Africa, the racial paradigm continued to be legitimated by reference to empirical observation. There were (and are) still great differences between rural African, and white, Western cultures. "Tribalistic" faction fights, the tension between migrant and urban workers and the endemic violence of township life, whilst all having conditions of impoverishment and oppression as their context, still provoked white fears of the unreliability and underlying barbarism of Africans. That ability and aptitude were commensurate with race could be demonstrated, as long as the background conditions were not investigated too closely, by the fact that blacks continued to do worse in their schools than whites in theirs. And in South Africa, cultural and attitudinal gulfs were deliberately perpetuated as an explicit policy goal. With school textbooks continuing to reinforce the notion of a fundamentally divided human group, for example, classifying "the African physical and cultural type" into distinct and timeless tribes (Muller, 1969, cited Thompson, 1985), it is not surprising that fixed ideological points of reference remained generally unshaken.
Views of history have played an important role in perpetuating racial fears in South Africa. With most popular, established interpretations of South African history being largely the history of racial and "tribal" conflict, a racial conception of contemporary political and social division becomes natural. "Most white South Africans have been able to ignore many of the new intellectual findings (recovering the historical flux of African polities) ... because they have represented changes from relatively simple to relatively complex explanations of human taxonomy and historical processes" (Thompson, 1985, 205). An extreme example of resistance to the academic undermining of established historical interpretation was provided in 1979, when Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB) members tarred and feathered the Afrikaner historian, F. Van Jaarsveld as he was about to deliver a lecture questioning the myth of the Blood River covenant.

Even the introduction of television into South Africa in 1976 did not allow a non-racial message to be communicated, since the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was under tight government control. The late introduction of television indicated the government's fear that the new medium would bring Anglicization and non-racialism. There was consequently a heavy pro-government slant in domestic current affairs coverage and "its news services and commentaries, like those on radio, are thinly disguised government propaganda" (Thompson, 1985, 48).

Ideological constants would not allow the transformation of South Africa's system of white rule, but the system had at least to be relaxed if future economic wellbeing was to be secured. The state's response consisted of a partial return to the rights of which urban Africans had been deprived over the last three decades (Lea, 1982). The government's philosophy can be reduced to the principle of making more rational economic use of those Africans who were already in the cities. It was anticipated that this would be commensurate with the removal of the major black urban grievances and stabilization of the political system.

The housing shortage was the most visible urban problem. In the late 1970s, a reappraisal of African housing policy was encouraged by increasing international hostility to well publicized removals and "rustications", and by the particular
The politicization of the housing issue in the townships (Dewar and Watson, 1982). A change of direction was also required on economic grounds: the state clearly would not be able to bear the cost of formally housing all legal urban residents.

Some township tenurial security was introduced with a 99 year lease scheme, although, in 1978, Building Society mortgage finance rules still barred the vast majority from taking advantage of the scheme. Within the Department of Cooperation and Development, a gradual acceptance of self-help housing emerged, to stabilize the accommodation of those outside formally built structures. In some areas, the pre Soweto pattern of squatter removals and clearances was reversed.

A more tolerant attitude towards informal economic activity accompanied the recognition of informal housing. Activities such as brewing, the running of shebeens and street trading, previously regarded as an unwelcome African intrusion into white urban space, were increasingly seen as part of a stabilization programme for those Africans irreversibly present in the cities (Beavon and Rogerson, 1982). The incorporation of such activities under official patronage also facilitated a much needed extension of the urban tax base (McGrath, 1990).

The state was not alone in initiating new housing projects. It was joined by the private sector in the form of the Urban Foundation (UF), backed by Anglo American among others. Lea, 1982, argues that the UF has "more to do with the imperatives of the accumulation process than it has to do with welfare", being a "direct and rapid response by capital to the urban unrest" (Lea, 1982, 206). Its leading lights aim not only to defend capital from unrest, but also to spread the free enterprise ethic to an emergent black middle class, thus engendering both political and economic stability in the townships. Its programme then, is interpreted as being similar to the state's own under Botha. However, an unadulterated conspiracy theory of the UF needs modifying to take into account some genuine philanthropic impulses among its backers. In terms of its practical impact, the UF has financed and organised the building of formal housing and assisted in informal upgrading. Even relatively minor improvements in housing represent significant advances in the lives of many, and they can also contribute to the political
mobilization of those whose material insecurity previously mitigated against such activity.

Apart from the promotion of housing improvement, a further area of post Soweto state reform was township administration. The 1977 Community Councils Act allowed for a limited measure of black control over local affairs in the townships, implicitly confirming the permanency of the African presence in the white cities. For the first time, those with "section 10" rights were also allowed to change jobs within their Administration Board District without recourse to Labour Bureaux (Lemon, 1991).

More flexibility in the implementation of the Group Areas Act was another response to the urban problems generated by apartheid. A 1966 amendment to the Act had allowed areas to be proclaimed according to their use rather than the occupation of any one racial group. In the late 1970s, the clause was more frequently implemented, so that, by 1983, there were 26 mixed race, free trading areas; Durban, Port Elizabeth and Kimberley having two each. Where racial occupation remained the criterion for zoning, blacks increasingly used white nominees to run concerns on their behalf within white group areas. Through the 1980s, de jure alterations recognising these developments lagged behind the rate of de facto change (Lemon, 1991).

Beyond the commercial use of white land, in the late 1970s, black employees in large corporations were the first to join the black foreign dignitaries and churchmen already living in white group areas. Gradually they were joined by blacks using nominees or front companies to occupy more luxurious houses in the white suburbs.

This very restricted movement of an economic elite preceded the larger scale black occupation of the flats in inner city areas like Johannesburg's Hillbrow and Joubert Park during the 1980s. Whilst still extremely limited when put in perspective with the scale of black urban residence, the moves displayed the government's toleration of an erosion of Verwoerdian, fundamentalist apartheid.

With a partial relaxation of control over urban black residential and economic strategies, came limited concessions in the black
urban workplace. The 1973 Durban strikes had revealed how the absence of organised negotiating partners within the workforce could render strike prevention and control hazardous and costly. In the late 1970s, the government began to offer recognition to black trade unions in order to incorporate them within official structures and channel their activities along supervised lines (Price, 1991). The move sparked a debate among black trade unionists as to the alternative strategies open to them. Ultimately, the government's attempt at containment would largely fail, as trade unions became enmeshed in the wider township community struggle against the state.

In a number of discrete moves, in the late 1970s, the state relaxed its own rules over black urban living and working. If there was a philosophy behind these moves, that philosophy can be said to have been one of containment. The Soweto uprising had revealed that the living conditions of most urban blacks under apartheid would never engender the stability needed for economic growth. With influential elements of the private sector already discarding apartheid labour practices and agitating for a more stable black urban workforce, attempts were made to ameliorate the conditions of this workforce. The majority of Africans would still be kept outside the core economic regions through influx control, but for those blacks already inside white urban economic space, concessions could be made to contain future instability. While the philosophy of containment was implicit in the series of discrete actions that the state took after Soweto, it was not explicitly revealed until the publication of two influential commissions' reports at the end of the decade. The Riekert and Wiehahn reports would provide the basis for Botha's attempts at reform in the 1980s. Initially, those attempts were a continuation of the ameliorative measures, directed at the urban black "insiders", pursued under Vorster.
The procedures by which the South African state was run began to change on Botha's accession to power. Botha immediately set about centralising NP policy within the Cabinet. His dogmatic style of leadership ensured that, throughout his premiership, the government would take the initiatives, and only subsequently would the party be brought into line. Within the party, "no one dared challenge him, and this far reaching change was accepted with little overt resistance" (Schrire, 1992, 37). These developments justify a rather personal account of the Botha government's strategies. Botha himself was far more the initiator of a mentally preconceived strategy than previous Prime Ministers had been, and, as an individual, he was more responsible for his government's actions than his predecessors were for theirs.

It was not just force of personality which effected the change. The structures of government were themselves modified to strengthen the Prime Minister's position. A Cabinet Secretariat and four permanent committees advised the Prime Minister, replacing 20 ad hoc committees set up under Vorster. One of Vorster's innovations, the State Security Council (SSC), became the most important of these committees under Botha. It developed as the key decision making body in the fields of security and foreign policy. To some extent, the SSC displaced even the Cabinet as the forum for determining government strategy. Under its supervision, a political/military apparatus was built to coordinate counter-insurgency. It was known as the National Security Management System (NSMS). The NSMS coordinated Joint Management Committees (JMCs), the territorial boundaries of which were those of South Africa's military districts (later becoming those of nine economic development regions). The JMCs were staffed by regional security officials and politicians. Their sub-regional offshoots were known as mini JMCs and they marshalled influential officials and security officers at the municipal level. The whole structure was devised so as to coordinate "on the ground" top-down initiatives from the SSC, for example implementing plans for black community assistance, and to relay local security related information back up the chain, so that the SSC could devise policy in the light of accurate intelligence from across the country.

With power within the executive shifting to a more restricted, security conscious body, the civil service had to be streamlined
so as to ensure that initiatives would not be diluted in their implementation. For instance, the Bantu Administration "empire" was dismantled, and its functions distributed to other departments, effectively transferring power from civil servants to politicians (Schrire, 1992). Nevertheless, one third of white workers and two thirds of Afrikaners remained employed by the state, and central initiatives could still be thwarted by the minor officials who were the local interpreters of the daunting morass of new legislation.

The direction that central reform initiatives should take, was suggested by the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions. Each was concerned with different aspects of the economic utilization of urban blacks. The Wiehahn Commission was set up to investigate industrial labour relations, while Riekert led a commission advising on efficient labour supplies and productivity.

The Riekert Commission was established in 1977 and headed by Vorster's economic adviser. Riekert's enquiries began with the observation that apartheid's spatial framework was being undermined by social and economic pressures which could not be indefinitely resisted. These pressures consisted of internal and international opposition to the homelands and their continued economic decline; rapidly increasing rural to urban migration, with the early 1980s drought in particular, overcoming the defences of influx control, mounting opposition to the pass laws in the cities and the increased political and economic power of urban blacks. The report was influenced by the dominant Western free market approach to economic systems. The fundamental flaw in the present system was perceived as being its failure to accommodate market forces. "Market failures" included uneconomic racial discrimination, the coexistence of skilled labour shortages and unskilled labour surpluses, the legally constrained mobility of labour and the inhibitions on domestic economic growth (Pickles, 1988).

The report called for simplification and rationalisation of the laws controlling the labour market, but the white paper based on the report made it clear that "the question to which the commission and the government had to find an answer was not whether there should be influx control, but what the right mechanism for influx control would be in South Africa's
circumstances" (cited Pickles, 1988). It was argued that influx control could still be achieved with non racially-discriminatory legislation, by limiting the lawful, urban black presence according to the availability of housing and employment.

Section 10 rights would be extended to more, currently "illegal", urban blacks, but the exclusion of further blacks from the cities would be effected by limiting the housing available and enforcing the ejection of "illegals" by fining their employers (Adam and Moodley, 1986). Thus, the distinction between black "insiders", to whom legal urban employment and housing opportunities were available, and rural "outsiders", to whom they were closed, was reinforced (Nattrass and Terreblanche, 1990).

Those who qualified for section 10 rights would be stabilized, and given a stake in the status quo, through the option (already in place) of taking a 99 year lease on their municipal properties. Further, the report recommended that they be no longer subject to a legal job colour bar, and that the "petty" apartheid discrimination of the Separate Amenities Act should be removed. Finally, the industrial decentralisation programme should be injected with new vigour in order to slow the rate of black urbanisation, without overtly racist influx control.

The Wiehahn Report complemented Riekert's vision of a more privileged black urban, working class. Investigation into labour relations in the cities yielded the finding that greater economic stability could follow from the recognition of black trade unions, and their cooptation into a formalised negotiating structure. Wiehahn advised that legally recognised trade unions exclude migrant workers, but the government's implementation of this restriction soon gave way in the face of trade union antagonism. Wiehahn shared Riekert's view that job colour bar legislation should be abolished (Horowitz, 1991).

Both reports were striving for an urban economy run along more efficient allocative lines than existing legislation would allow. Economic efficiency lay at their heart - Ashforth, 1990, noting that these government reports, unlike preceding ones (excepting the Fagan Report), spoke of urban Africans as units of labour first. Their "African-ness" was only a secondary quality. Both sought to give capital a freer reign in its use of black labour
by removing the unnecessarily discriminatory aspects of labour legislation that hemmed it in.

Economic efficiency was a salient influence on Botha's overall policy direction, as his government appreciated more the difficulties of South Africa's economic context. The country had experienced a brief period of economic recovery in the early 1980s, buoyed up partly by the revived fortunes of gold in the international economy. But, by 1983, it was becoming increasingly clear that the phenomenon would be short lived. South African capitalists had not escaped the constraints of their own particular political economy: "they worry about calm labour relations and they dislike operating in a siege economy, cut off from technology, innovation, easy capital flows and access to markets abroad" (Adam and Moodley, 1986, 22).

With the established restrictions on labour utilization and market size and, after 1983, a deterioration in external terms of trade, the extent of capital's professed reformism increased. In 1984, ASSOCOM and the FCI both made representations to the government against the detention of black trade unionists, and in 1985, they produced a "Manifesto on Reform", which called for "a universal citizenship" and "meaningful political participation" for all blacks. In September 1985, several prominent businessmen visited ANC representatives in Lusaka to sound out their attitude toward South African capital. While the representatives of capital remained diverse in their political attitudes and in their relationship to the state, a clear trend in favour of reform became more evident in the mid 1980s, a trend which was implicitly predicted in the Riekert and Wiehahn Reports.

Elements of South African capital had experienced the economic constraints of apartheid legislation since the 1960s, but the government showed a greater willingness to listen in the 1980s, as South Africa's economic position became more evidently jeopardised. After 1982, the government itself was forced to borrow from abroad, in short term, uncovered loans (Lipton, 1985) and the onset of severe drought increased the need to draw on external finance for disaster relief and homeland grain imports.

Foreign capital was not only required for rural relief; it was also needed to cover spiralling security costs, as black
resistance mounted again. However, the increasing violence and televised police brutality which resulted from security measures (see next chapter), brought domestic pressure to bear on South Africa's creditors, to deny renewal of the loans. In 1985, South Africa found itself confronted with a comprehensive package of US sanctions and the refusal of lending institutions to renew short term loans of $14 billion, which were due for repayment. The subsequent debt crisis precipitated a drastic fall in the value of the rand and the closure of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with the declaration of a moratorium on many of South Africa's foreign debts.

"Market sanctions", like those of the banks, pursued out of economic self-interest, were probably more damaging to the South African economy than foreign government-imposed, politically guided sanctions, but "both Finance Minister Barend du Plessis and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (often regarded as a government mouthpiece) have credited sanctions with pushing the government toward social reform" (Grundy, 1991, 71). Nevertheless, groups within the government continued to take a contemptuous view of sanctions, particularly in the light of ARMSCOR's success in building a domestic weapons industry once denied open access to external trade.

Botha's government paid more attention to the desires of capital than preceding ones, realizing that some degree of economic vitality was required for political stability. But the government did not see radical reform in the interests of capital as being necessary. Instead the political strategy developed in the late stages of Vorster's prime ministership and elaborated under Botha, would be sufficient to generate economic improvement. By stabilising a black urban group, and incorporating it within economic structures to a greater degree through trade union rights, the removal of some discriminatory labour legislation, improved education and home ownership, it was thought that capital's requirements could be met within the general racial structures which the government sought to maintain as part of its political strategy.

Nolutshungu, 1982, argues, from a Marxist perspective, that the crucial goal at the centre of Botha's initial strategy, was the co-optation of the black petty bourgeoisie. It seems more likely
that it was the geographically defined, multi-class, urban black group which was singled out for co-optation (James, 1984, cited Adam and Moodley, 1986). The key government agencies hoped that this group would prefer the benefits of immediate material gains in wages and services, to agitation for improved status within the racial state. A memorandum to the Prime Minister from the Transvaal Chamber of Mines claimed that such a preference was already being expressed in the cities: "The emergence of a "middle class" with Western type materialistic needs and ambitions has already occurred in these areas. The mature, family-orientated urban black already places the stability of his household uppermost and is more interested in his pay-packet than in politics" (cited Kane Berman, 1979, 156). Despite the reference to a "middle class", the primary division that such a development would foster is urban-rural, rather than class defined.

The extension of privilege to urban blacks was justified by influential figures drawn from within the administrative establishment. In 1979, the economic adviser to Botha, S. Brand, wrote in the Rand Daily Mail, that the government had to "open the system in order to save it and build upon it" (cited Lipton, 1985, 59). A 1986 Broederbond publication emphasised that "the abolition of statutory discrimination measures must not be seen as concessions but as prerequisite for survival" (cited Horowitz, 1991, 80).

The decision to advance the material cause of urban blacks so as to bring them "on side" encouraged a perception that white, and particularly Afrikaner racial ideology, already fragmented under Vorster, was being abandoned under Botha in the interests of pragmatism. Sparks, 1991, wrote "The Afrikaner revolution is over and all that is left of it is the politics of survivalism. The fortress of the volk is to be defended, but there is no faith within its walls" (328), while the South African novelist, Christopher Hope, expressed the same theme metaphorically:

"Pragmatism was the spur. And desperation. Those who ran the factory found they just didn't have enough hands to go round. To work the machine, once upon a time you had to be white, over 21, dedicated to the party and to the preservation of Western Christian civilization and believe that the Afrikaners were God's anointed. Nowadays anyone
could mind the machine, as long as they were willing to keep shooting. This policy of desperation went by the name of progress" (C. Hope, "The Hottentot Room", 1986).

There was certainly no abandonment of a racially conceived view of societal order though, and what black incorporation was envisaged, was to be firmly on the government's terms and only for the purpose of continued white supremacy. This would involve the jettisoning of some redundant, ideologically inspired racial legislation, but no fundamental re-evaluation of the racial paradigm. However, in government circles, there was a significant ideological shift within this paradigm. Malan and Verwoerd's ideological drive to segregate was gone. It was replaced by the resolution that what most whites now had would be protected by a "Total Strategy", designed to combat the "Total Onslaught" to which white supremacy was now being subjected.

These concepts - of a Total Onslaught and a Total Strategy - were first enunciated by Botha as Minister of Defence, in response to the increasingly hostile environment of 1975. With neighbouring states falling to socialist black governments, the exiled ANC in close collaboration with the Communist Party, and internal black workerist mobilization gaining sympathy from communist states, South Africa's security establishment perceived the various threats to white superiority to be coordinated by communist inspired activists. The Total Strategy was designed to counter this complex of opposition by mustering "all activities - political, economic, diplomatic and military". By 1977, the Defence White Paper had added "psychological" to the list of spheres in which counter-attack would occur (Price, 1991,85).

The outline of the Total Strategy was based on French counter-guerilla activity in Algeria, explicated by Beaufre (Sparks, 1991). Price, 1991, identifies its elements as being simultaneous reform, repression and wider, regional initiatives. Reform was required to ease apartheid's economic bottlenecks and to create a black urban grouping sympathetic to the status quo. This would guard the political stability required for renewed international investment. In this reform initiative, the involvement of private capital would be crucial.

With capital made more amenable by the removal of apartheid's
hindering labour legislation and increased resources for black
education and training, it was hoped that the rewards that
capital growth would bestow on urban blacks, would contribute to
their co-optation.

It would have been naive of the government to assume though, that
sufficient material inducements to stability could be distributed
to urban blacks in the short term. The masses of the urban poor
would have to be rendered quiescent, in the face of unequal
structures of power and privilege, by other means, while the
amelioration of their deprivation progressed gradually. While
firm repression would not ease their grievances, it would prevent
them from bursting forth in spectacular, and economically
damaging outbursts, like that of the Soweto uprising.

Security analysts within the government were aware of the fact
that the level of repression required would depend on the extent
of perceived deprivation and the degree of expectation for future
change. Security force repression, using detentions, bannings and
later, surrogate vigilante violence, would help lower political
expectations, by demonstrating the power of the white state and
its determination to control events. It also served to reassure
the ruling party's white constituency - in the 1987 whites' general election, the NP slogan "Reform-yes! Surrender-no!", was convincing on the evidence of repression under a State of Emergency, and it helped prevent wholesale defection to the Conservative Party, formed from the extreme verkrampte wing of the NP in 1982 (Schrire, 1992). In the early period of Botha's premiership, the contradiction between a path of internationally publicised repression (despite media censorship), and the goal of presenting a reformist and stable image to the world, was not yet appreciated.

In order to neutralize the external threat posed by Marxist and
ANC sympathising governments across South Africa's borders, a
third dimension was added to the reform-repress package. This was
a regional policy to establish a "constellation" of client states
within the region, economically dependent on, and therefore
politically amenable to the South African government. With South
African economic and political hegemony over the entire southern
African region, the government could not only enlarge markets for
its own capitalists, but also demand that the ANC be denied the
opportunity to organise its external opposition and internal guerilla activities from anywhere near South Africa's borders. The government hoped that the dependence of proximate states on South Africa's economy would simultaneously prevent their advocation of further international sanctions against South Africa.

The destabilization of independent economic and political progress, which would ensure these states' dependence on South African patronage, began with the collapse of their white regimes. The long catalogue of South African intervention in the region includes repeated SADF incursions into Angola in support of Jonas Savimbi's opposition UNITA movement, support for Muzorewa against Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the sponsorship of the DTA as an alternative to SWAPO in South African occupied Namibia and a litany of violent, destructive acts performed by South African backed RENAMO in Mozambique (see Hanlon,1986, Johnson and Martin eds.1989, Barber and Barratt,1990). While these actions did not necessarily ensure fully compliant regimes in the region, they did, by and large, help effect the non-functioning of the least stable, hostile neighbouring governments, particularly Mozambique and Angola. Nevertheless, South Africa's economic hegemony was resisted by surrounding states, its threat prompting the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) by Southern African states determined to forge a degree of economic independence from their aggressively dominant neighbour. The initiative was aided by Western recognition, and some material assistance.

As part of its Total Strategy, in the early 1980s, the state, as we have seen, tried to involve capital in a more strategic role within the power bloc. A complementary goal, which gained more momentum as the decade wore on, was the withdrawal of the state from the extent of economic intervention which it had assumed under the NP. Price, 1991, argues that central state intervention was what distinguished apartheid from colonial segregation. It was the central state which had become the target of rebellion over the last three decades. Its partial withdrawal from economic and administrative intervention would both remove a focus for resistance, and effect a much needed reduction in government expenditure. A privatisation of the state's role could also dovetail with the strategy of coopting a black urban group to
support government and business. An early example was the 1983 decision to sell off a part of the state's black housing stock. The goal of a home-owning, stabilized, black urban group was furthered in the Cape by the new "Coloured" area of Mitchell's Plain being made available only for purchase and not for rent (Mabin and Parnell, 1983).

Municipal house sales to occupants progressed slowly at first, but gathered pace towards the end of the 1980s, particularly in Soweto, where over 40% of the formal housing stock is now owner occupied, and elite areas like "Beverley Hills" have developed (Lemon, 1991). The privatisation of public utilities was extended from 1985, becoming the "greatest structural change in the development of South African commercial history since the establishment of ISCOR in 1927" (Davenport, 1991, 493). A 1987 white paper laid guidelines for further state withdrawal and ISCOR itself was placed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1989, with South African Transport Services and the Post Office to follow. Towards the end of the 1980s, a further motive was attached to this progression by some observers - that of leaving a future black run government with fewer economic assets under its direct control and thus, less potential for the redistribution of resources to blacks, in the way that the NP had used the state for Afrikaners.

Government economic policy in the 1980s extended beyond the privatisation of key assets in line with current Western thinking, to include encouragement of more general restructuring of the economy. By the early 1980s, South Africa had encountered, along with many other states, the classic limits to an import substitution policy, following from restricted internal markets and the need to import capital goods. The government recognised that an initiative needed to be taken in finding new international markets. A 1985 white paper stressed the need to develop the manufacturing of a "balanced promotion of exports" (Wellings and Black, 1986). Consequently export incentives were revamped and government assistance given to restructure certain targeted industries. To stimulate internal restructuring, tariffs and quotas on certain competing imports were lifted. Once again, the specific economic aim of the government slotted into its wider strategic and political goals. With closer links to world markets, there should follow an improvement in international
relations, and more sympathy for the reform package being implemented within the country.

Through the combined components of the Total Strategy, Botha sought the same goal as his predecessor - the maintenance of the white political and economic supremacy that had been forged over three centuries, and consolidated under Afrikaner patronage in the Nationalist Party's apartheid years. Now though, the mechanisms of supremacy would have to change to accommodate new global and domestic circumstances. The reforms of Botha's administration were often criticised as being "cosmetic". To the extent that they reflected no other goal than the established one, that view is accurate, but, as Botha found to his cost, "the political, social and economic dynamics into which reforms are introduced may produce a significant erosion of white power nonetheless" (Price, 1991, 83).

3. Reform Initiatives

The new constitution, announced in 1983 and effected from 1984, was the first significant legislative step away from rigid, racial separate development, and tentatively, towards a fuller image of nationhood. "Coloured" and Indian political representatives were to join the business community and sections of the black urban classes, in a coopted amalgam with vested interests in the new system (Nattrass and Terreblanche, 1990). As a strategic initiative, the new constitution was a perfect example of the problem-solving, "technocratic" image that Botha's government wished to project (Marks and Trapido, 1987).

Under the new political dispensation, two parallel houses were added to the House of Assembly (the white parliament). The House of Delegates would represent South Africa's Indian population, while the House of Representatives would accommodate "Coloured" MPs. Each house was empowered to legislate on its "own affairs", but these would be defined by the State President. What he defined as "general affairs" would be the province of the Cabinet, but legislation in general affairs would normally be passed by all three Houses. The office of State President itself would replace the office of Prime Minister, and the President would be emplaced by an electoral college of 50 white, 25 "Coloured" and 13 Indian MPs, drawn from their respective Houses.
A President's Council, comprised of 10 "Coloured", 5 Indian and 20 white MPs, plus 25 appointed by the President would advise the President on controversial legislation.

The complexity of the Tricameral Parliament system was largely due to the fact that it was "designed to ensure that policy could be made and implemented regardless of the behaviour of the "Coloured" and Indian chambers" (Schrire, 1992, 65). Several inbuilt mechanisms would ensure this. Firstly, the President's Council, with a guaranteed majority of whites, would break deadlocks between the parliamentary chambers, and could therefore force through legislation opposed by the two black Houses. Secondly, the white House of Assembly was given the capacity to act as Parliament if the other two chambers failed to function. Thirdly, there was a fixed 4:2:1 numerical ratio of white:"Coloured":Indian representation in the system, reflecting the population sizes of the three legally defined groups and entrenching white hegemony. Finally, the separation of these groups into discrete Houses made it "impossible for genuine cross-racial coalitions to develop" (Schrire, 1992, 65).

Apart from the incorporation of "Coloured" and Indian representatives, however ineffectually, into the system of government, the new constitution had two other effects, one deliberate, the other unintended. The former was the formal consolidation of Botha's grip on the reigns of government. From being a Prime Minister alongside a non-executive State President, he was now executive State President, like that of the US. With the transition, Botha's closest security advisers won greater influence over policy, while the influence of the cabinet, the NP parliamentary caucus, Parliament and the civil service correspondingly diminished (Schrire, 1992, 42).

The second effect turned out, in the long run, to be very costly for the new executive elite. This was the African reaction to being completely left out of the new central government dispensation (see next chapter). The only clauses in the Act relating to this majority were that "The control and administration of Black affairs shall rest with the State President", and that consideration of "Black affairs" would be the common concern of the Tri-cameral Parliament, since they are included in the definition of "general affairs" (Wolpe, 1988, 93).
The government's concessions to Africans were still only those which fitted the strategy of coopting the economically and politically crucial urban group. Initiatives at the level of local township representation complemented the strategy, but the national representation in Parliament of a numerically superior African population, went far beyond it. While this could be envisaged for "Coloured" and Indian populations smaller than the white population, not even a precedent-setting toehold in Parliament could be accorded to Africans.

Botha's "securocrat" government believed that the crucial African classes - those already performing a vital economic function in white cities - could be co-opted by the amelioration of their political and economic position at the metropolitan level, thus preserving central political power for the white population and its "Coloured" and Indian "allies". The proposed changes in urban African administration were based on two principles suggested by Riekert's recommendations. The first was that influx control would be maintained, but in a less patently racist guise. Limits on urban housing and services, instead of the racially based legal code that was currently used, would ensure that few more Africans would migrate to the cities. Stadler, 1987, describes this development as a revival of "liberal" methods of segregation, eschewed by Stallard in the 1920s and Verwoerd in the 1950s and 1960s, but adopted in the light of late 20th century conditions of incorporation in a world economy.

But plans to limit the expansion of the relatively privileged urban "insider" group were soon seen by the government to have been overly optimistic. The post-1982 recession and the consequent breakdown in rural labour recruitment, plus the economic state of the homelands, made access to the urban economy essential for many rural poor. Despite limits on housing and job availability, by 1989, there were an estimated 7 million informal settlers around city peripheries and an average of 15 people to a four-roomed house in the formal townships (Lemon, 1991, 20).

With the failure of market forces to halt African urbanisation, an alternative component of government spatial intervention assumed more emphasis. The government once again turned to the decentralisation of industry as a force to deflect urban growth. In the 1980s, decentralisation was also pursued for an
additional, non-political reason. This was the P-W-V metropolitan region's shortage of water supplies - the result of intensified industrial agglomeration in a relatively arid environment.

During the 1980s, Botha's government recast Vorster's policy of decentralisation into a more regional and functional framework. Botha's aim was no longer purely to decentralise to growth points in or near each homeland, but to establish eight (later nine) Development Regions. The new regions cut across homeland borders and, for planning purposes, integrated sections of the homelands with the metropolitan centres to which they were already functionally linked (Lipton, 1986). The system represented a step towards a more pragmatic planning of South Africa's economic relations: economically defined regions, containing both the metropolitan centres and their labour source regions, regardless of homeland boundaries, were to replace the Verwoerdian racial-come spatial administrative divisions. For example, Durban's labour source region in the northern Transkei was included in the "white" city's metropolitan region.

Within the nine regions, four types of industrial development areas were identified. From 1982, incentives were offered to processing and assembly industries to locate at Deconcentration Points (mostly near homeland borders) and Industrial Development Points. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was established to facilitate private investment away from the Metropolitan Areas, and direct controls were placed on further industrial expansion in these areas, to replace the existing indirect fiscal controls.

There is no consensus over the result of the policy. Some decentralisation followed its implementation (the decentralised areas' share of employment increased from 12.3% in 1972 to 18.3% in 1984), but the significance of, and motivation for this outcome are debateable. One viewpoint is that it was market forces rather than the government's intervention, which enticed industries to the target areas. The movement of labour intensive processes to homeland and border areas, where labour is cheap enough to improve competitiveness with imports, reflects concepts elucidated by Harvey, 1982 and Massey, 1984, on the increasing geographical mobility of capital and its changing technology (see also Gregory and Urry, 1985). The industries which have taken
advantage of the decentralisation package do tend to be light and labour intensive - clothing and metal products in particular.

However, generally, "efforts to redistribute population and economic activity are consistently undermined by the primate city and core region biases inherent in many sectoral policies - import substitution, subsidised urban services, international terms of trade distortions etc." (Richardson, 1987, cited Tomlinson, 1990, 137). Before the new decentralisation package was announced, many small labour intensive industries had relocated from Johannesburg, to Durban and Cape Town for instance, but not to the areas favoured under the government scheme. Industrial relocation was largely deconcentration to "border areas" already integrated with the metropolitan cores, rather than wider decentralisation (Wellings and Black, 1986).

The fact that, after 1982, firms moved to the decentralisation points like Isithebe and Dambuza is best explained by the government's employment subsidies, making labour free, or even allowing for excess revenue to be made on it, rather than as a local reflection of the global restructuring of capital. Many of those firms that did relocate under the government's patronage were eventually to see metropolitan labour as ultimately cheaper, given the drawbacks associated with their new location. Once the government's monetary incentives are withdrawn, it is quite possible that these companies may move back to core regions.

For Botha's immediate strategy of containing urban African population growth, if the industry could not be moved to homeland borders on a large scale, an alternative was to encourage the growth of homeland towns near those borders, so that workers could service the metropolitan economy, but reside outside its administrative boundaries. By 1982, there were already over 700,000 of these "frontier commuters", many making excessively long journeys to and from work each day (Lemon, 1982). To some extent these workers assumed the function of the migrant workers who had traditionally serviced the metropolitan economies (Tomlinson, 1990). Where homeland borders were too far away for the growth of white South African cities to be deflected within them, informal settlements inside "white South Africa" were often planned at unnecessarily great distances from urban workplaces, while anti-squatting controls were enforced over land nearer the
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cities. The remaining racially-based influx control legislation was finally repealed in 1986, but in a climate of black insurrection which made its repeal alone insufficient to meet expectations.

Despite the state's pursuit of continued influx control by other "liberal" means, the fact of massive and continued informal settlement growth suggests that the state had in fact "lost control of the black housing situation and in losing that control another pillar in the urban apartheid edifice is crumbling" (Maylam, 1990). However, informal, "liberal" influx control may have partially achieved its aims. Given that there is already extensive peri-urbanisation in the non-agricultural homeland fringes - a development actively encouraged by "liberal" apartheid - the removal of restraints on urbanisation may not result in rapid urban growth, and the "rush to the cities" once urban apartheid crumbled, predicted by some, may turn out to be illusory.

The second principle of urban African administration was that some African political autonomy would be granted, beyond the functions of the existing community councils in the townships. African residents in the cities were to have their own Black Local Authorities (BLAs). The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 set up Village and Town Councils, resembling white local authorities, for the townships. They would have more powers and autonomy than the Community Councils they were to replace. Black Local authorities were devised partially as an unofficial quid pro quo for African exclusion from the Tricameral system, despite the official government line that African representation was already provided for in the homelands. The Regional Administration Boards which had held responsibility for township control were abolished, and their supervision of the Black Local Authorities passed on to the provinces.

However, the main source of the Administration Boards' independent revenue - sorghum beer sales - had dried up by the mid 1980s, with shebeens destroyed in the 1976 revolt, and many Africans switching their consumption to commercial lagers. As the BLAs assumed administrative responsibility for the townships (including the unpopular tasks of influx control and the removal of "illegals"), they found themselves unable to become, as the
government intended, self-financing. Their response to fiscal difficulty was a series of rent and service levy hikes; an important factor in the next, deepest and most violent phase of black resistance (see next chapter).

The Regional Services Councils (RSCs) were a later element in the Botha government's adjustment of apartheid's spatial forms. The BLAs had, by the mid 1980s, become virtually unworkable across large swathes of the country. The 1980s township insurrection, detailed in the next chapter, accomplished their failure as legitimate, or even functioning institutions. By 1985, a more radical gesture towards urban African service provision and administration was required, from an internally and externally beleaguered government. The RSCs were intended to fulfil this role.

Despite the evident rejection of the BLAs in the townships, the government still saw their fundamental weakness not so much in terms of their racially defined constitution, but in terms of their fiscal limitations (Lemon, 1991). The RSCs would encompass the BLAs alongside white, Indian and "Coloured" local authorities, and coordinate redistribution of financial resources between these authorities. This would allow the upgrading of black townships using finance partially and indirectly drawn from local white areas, thus providing a more positive image for the BLAs. The administrative functions, lost in some townships to the informal civic and street structures of the mid 1980s insurrection, could also be reclaimed by local authorities with enhanced fiscal clout. The RSCs can be seen as part of the "hearts and minds" component of the government's Total Strategy, their provision of urban services and utilities buying calm in the townships.

By 1987, eight RSCs were established. In Natal, at KwaZulu leader Buthelezi's insistence, Metropolitan Joint Service Boards, linking the province and homeland administrations, were set up instead. RSC members are nominated by the white, "Coloured", Indian and African local authorities within their administrative boundaries, but voting power is proportional to the level of services consumed by each local authority, invariably leaving the white local authority's representatives with a controlling interest. In 1990, the voting power of Soweto, by far the largest
settlement in its central Witwatersrand Region, was only 17.27% on its RSC (Lemon, 1991). However, consensus is often achieved on the boards of the RSCs without recourse to voting. Their finance comes from taxes on employment and turnover of local business, including state concerns, which contribute about half of the total budget (Lemon, 1991). Since one of the functions of the RSCs is to redistribute spending from white to black areas within the regions, it was thought too politically sensitive to finance them from white rates.

Money indirectly raised in white areas has nevertheless been used for the upgrading of township services. Yet there has been no noticeable improvement in the efficiency of the BLAs benefitting from the finance, and "there is little evidence that RSCs have won greater legitimacy for official local government structures" (Lemon, 1991). This is largely because, to urban Africans, as well as academic observers, "it seems clear that their prime objective is indirect promotion of the legitimacy of official local government structures by means of their redistributive function" (Lemon, 1991, 25). Their imposition, without consultation, by the state and their reliance on the same racially based local authorities that had been rejected by black communities, rendered the RSCs similarly politically unacceptable.

The government was finally forced to concede de jure recognition to some racially integrated local government structures in 1988. The Free Settlement Areas (FSA) Act recognised pre-existing "grey areas" of inter-racial settlement in certain cities, and provision was made for the election by residents of their non-racial management committees. Only whites could continue to vote on a separate roll for the local authority administrating the FSA. Even in August 1989, the government was continuing to encourage whites to report on black neighbours contravening the Group Areas Act outside of the FSAs, but the fact that little subsequent action was taken against these illegal residents, and that in many cases, their residence was then formally recognised, suggests that the government encouragement was motivated more by a desire to retain the conservative vote in the forthcoming election than by a continuing pursuit of residential segregation. Meanwhile, the NP and Democratic Party (DP) council in Johannesburg was requesting that the whole city be declared a FSA, thus by-passing the Group Areas Act, while Cape Town's
council was calling instead for complete exemption from Act (Lemon, 1991).

While the overall conclusion on Botha's reforms will be left to the next chapter, once the reaction to them has also been described, something of their "performance" in relation to the government's aims has been implicit throughout this chapter. Botha had inherited a set of economic recommendations from Vorster's premiership, and had tried to implement them as part of a wider, political "Total Strategy". But even a "Total Strategy" could not predict and accommodate the events which were to ensue when a continuing struggle against apartheid was combined with the partial reform of the system.
Chapter Seven

Policy and Reality

Introduction

Many of the Botha administration's reform initiatives either had repercussions which were unintended, or simply failed in their implementation. Rather than being determined solely by government policy, the course of South Africa's economic and political development in the 1980s was dictated by a complex welter of dynamic and unpredictable factors. Both in broad outline and in local implementation, central state aims were rarely achieved before they were undermined or overcome by unpredicted events.

The single most important reason why Botha's technocratic reformulation of apartheid failed to engender stability was that state policy was met in the mid 1980s by widespread township-based insurrection. The grievances behind black anti-apartheid mobilization on an unprecedented scale and the agencies and structures which helped mobilize black counter-state power, are the subject of the first section of this chapter. The second attempts to delineate the structural conflicts, between state and activists, and between black organisations and tendencies, which combined to create the conditions of violence characterising South African townships in the 1980s and early 1990s. The state's repressive response to insurrection, recent political developments in the homelands, and shifts in white attitudes resulting from the insurrection, are traced in the third section, providing the context for De Klerk's abandonment of apartheid structures.

1. Grievances and Mobilization

In the 1980s, Botha's reformist government encountered vehement resistance to its very authority. While the structures of government could not possibly be overthrown, and outright armed rebellion was unlikely to develop in the South African context, form the mid 1980s, in specific places and for specific periods, the organs of the state were by-passed and displaced by popular township organisations. The events of August-November 1984, in
the East Rand (Vaal triangle) townships of South Africa's industrial heartland, are seen as a "watershed in contemporary South African history" (Price, 1991, 184). These events, which, with hindsight, presaged the dismantling of apartheid (Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1980), manifested a fundamental shift in the balance of power, away from the state, and towards the black resistance movements.

Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, have cited the government's own political initiatives as the partial cause of the rebellion. Botha's government embarked on reform just when the economy was beginning to resume its deterioration after the brief early 1980s reprieve. In the early 1980s, township inhabitants had been led to anticipate significant material improvements. Consequently, the sense of deprivation was relatively greater when significant material gains failed to materialize from the reform programme. In common with Louis XVI, Botha found that "The most dangerous moment for a bad government is usually that when it enters upon the work of reform" (De Tocqueville, "The Ancien Regime", Everyman Classics edition, 1988).

The government expected to cover the costs of township upgrading from economic growth. Instead, the 1980s became a period of economic stagnation as OPEC oil price rises, an Arab anti-apartheid oil embargo, international recession, a falling gold price, and apartheid's own structural economic impediments took their toll on South Africa's economic vitality. From 1980 to 1986, GNP rose by under 4%, while the population increased by over 12% (Price, 1991, 159). It was therefore not only impossible to make good earlier material promises, but difficult to stop black living standards in general from falling. With rising inflation, leading to increased administration costs, Pretoria felt that it had no option but to make its township reforms self-financing. Many township councils in the late 1970s were already on the verge of bankruptcy and the BLAs would have to raise rents and service levies to cover their costs. In the early 1980s, greater and greater chunks of income being appropriated in rent, became a salient feature of township life. In 1982 the situation was exacerbated as an IMF freeze on consumer subsidies led to a sales tax increase which shifted the fiscal burden onto the poor (Lodge, 1992). The fact that the population of the townships was swollen by prolonged rural drought in the early 1980s,
contributed to the groundswell of discontent (Lodge, 1992).

The Botha government's initial overtures to the wider world proved just as unreliable as its economic strategy. The "organisational effervescence" (Price, 1991) of the early 1980s was insignificantly hindered by the state as it sought to discard its repressive image and present a reformist image to international investors and foreign governments. Consequently, an "organizational foundation for a sustainable multi-class nationwide movement of liberation" (Price, 1991, 160) was laid during the early years of Botha's premiership. Even when the state did react to black mobilization with repression, it was precisely those black leaders who could, and probably would have moderated developing forms of resistance, who were detained and restricted (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

Within the black communities, the earliest manifestation of a resurgence of defiance after 1976 came in township schools. For many, school was the primary point of contact with state restrictions and direct authority, and as in 1976, educational issues could not be isolated from the wider social and economic concerns of the township. With unemployment levels reaching 40% among the African population by the late 1980s, and 55% of the African population being under 20 years old (Lodge, 1992), educational grievances became linked to wider mobilizational factors. The deteriorating conditions of education prompted the formation of the charterist Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the BC orientated Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) in 1979. The two organisations launched a schools boycott, beginning in Cape Town and, by 1981, spreading nationwide.

The most obvious grievances of the Cape Town students were a lack of books, broken windows, a lack of electricity and the summary removal of three popular teachers. Their discontent was exacerbated with the refusal to re-admit pupils who had failed their matriculation exams and the use of SADF veterans in teaching roles. With such grievances widespread, the boycott developed into a popular response. In Cape Town, student placards had initially proclaimed "Rights not Riots" (Western, 1982) and for the first month of protest there were no casualties. Then two "Coloured" children were shot dead as they stoned white vehicles
at Elsies. The shootings served to polarise sentiments and, two weeks later, on the anniversary of the Soweto uprising, there was an almost total work stayaway in Cape Town, followed by large scale civil unrest.

Wolpe, 1988, charts the subsequent course of the schools boycott in the Pretoria area. It began in 1983, with the demand for free textbooks to be provided in class, better qualified teachers, an end to corporal punishment and sexual harassment and the recognition of elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs). In a climate of general township unrest, the movement spread and the SRCs extended their aspirations from reform, to control over the education that Africans received.

By 1985, in South Africa as a whole, 650,000 students were receiving no education. The government's Department of Education and Training began closing schools, while the boycott's leaders were detained, harassed and, frequently, killed. COSAS was banned in August 1985 and the SADF began to move not only into the townships, but into the schools as well (for a local instance of the conflict this caused, see Kentridge, 1991, 104-109). What had begun as a boycott over specific educational grievances had mutated under the slogan "Liberation First, Education Later", into a key component of insurrection. "The boycott was no longer a tactic, it was a strategy" (Wolpe, 1988, 207).

This evolution was by no means wholly welcomed by the leaders of wider black resistance. The debate over the appropriateness of the schools boycott as a strategy to achieve a more balanced and equal education was a significant component of 1980s resistance politics, with many concerned at the prospect of a future generation of totally uneducated urban youth, and, more immediately, the perception that the boycott was a goal in itself, which meant that no benefit could be derived from its negotiated end.

In the light of these concerns, a National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was established by concerned parents. "To the students' cry of "Liberation Before Education" the NECC counterpoised the slogan "Education For Liberation" (Price, 1991, 212). The NECC began writing new History and English curricula in 1986, and in Soweto and parts of the Eastern Cape,
two days were set aside in some schools for an alternative education, the teachers being paid by the community. The envisaged education would be generally anti-capitalist in outlook. With this substitution of state structures by community ones, educational resistance entered the phase of insurrection. By the late 1980s, in the absence of state measures to conciliate, thousands of pupils remained outside school.

The causes of the schools boycott fed into wider township organisation and resistance early on, and the wider insurrection had already started before the founding of the NCCC. In the Western Cape, boycotting students directly helped to organise a community boycott of meat in support of striking workers. Soon after its inception, COSAS began to mobilize young workers and the unemployed as well as students. The boycott strategy itself was adopted in a wider range of actions, with a revival of the bus boycott in Durban and East London forcing capitulation over increased fares in 1982-3.

Within urban African communities though, the most obvious generators of grievances in the mid 1980s were the BLAs. It was the experience of their administration which townships all over the country had in common, and which served to mobilize a nationwide response to local grievances. The Civic associations which articulated these grievances began as geographically limited, single, or few-issue organisations, but they developed as the skeleton of a national movement in black society. At first, in Soweto, local residents were organised informally in neighbourhood associations which petitioned the authorities over specific local grievances - rents, fares and removals in particular (Price, 1991). Such organisations extended into broad popular associations, initially in the Eastern Cape, Port Elizabeth and the Cape peninsula (particularly in the "Coloured" areas). In addition to tackling local problems like transport, rents and poor recreational and child care facilities, "alternative" newspapers were published. The movements were frequently successful in fulfilling immediate community aspirations, for instance wielding local pressure to get shelters for commuter bus stops (Lodge, 1992).

Wider political participation followed these immediate gains, but the shift to a popular mass base often occurred even where local
organisations were less successful, as the government's rejection of their petitions prompted the formation of a more organised, formal civic group.

Police repression of the civic structures precipitated an extension of local grievances into anti-state politics in general. Continued local organisation and alliance with parallel groups in other locations and other oppositional groups in the same locality, allowed the civics as an amalgam to become a new mass political force, infusing a "politics of refusal" among township activists and coordinating school, consumer, bus and rent boycotts as well as political stayaways.

The organisational cohesion for an alliance of such locally based structures of defiance had emerged in 1983, with the founding of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in response to Africans' exclusion from the new constitution. The UDF was an umbrella body which incorporated community organisations as affiliates in the immediate anti-constitution struggle. The state-sponsored election campaign for the BLAs allowed it space to campaign against their very existence as a substitute for national representation, but its longer term objective was the development of a non-racial, unitary state. From its inception the movement was vaguely Charterist in philosophy, and it adopted the Freedom Charter overtly in 1985.

The UDF's strength was derived from its interweaving of the various strands of resistance that township communities across the country had developed. Its founding conference included 82 civic, 33 student, 338 youth (many local branches of Congresses), 18 worker, 32 women's, 16 religious, 27 political and 29 other organisations (Price, 1991). "From the vantage point of the state, the UDF was like a weed with deep roots" (Price, 1991, 179), and under UDF leadership, local and national political struggles became conceptually indistinguishable in the minds of many activists.

By its very nature as a front comprising many diverse units of organisation, the UDF's membership contained competing perceptions and prescriptions. Brewer, 1989a, identifies three main ideological tendencies within the Front. "Nationalists" mobilized around the figure of Nelson Mandela - almost as a folk
hero whilst imprisoned - and accorded the Freedom Charter a central place in the philosophy of the struggle. "National Democrats" were more socialist oriented. For them the Charter was a first step in a progression towards a socialist state, and the UDF's populism, a means to that end. The workers would be in the vanguard of this advance. This tendency was taken to an extreme by the "Socialists" themselves, who interpreted apartheid as a particular form of Western backed imperialism: "Leninism may be dead in Eastern Europe but it is not dead in the townships" (Horowitz, 1991, 20). Many of the unemployed youth who supported the UDF adopted a political position towards this extreme. "For them the millennial alternative held out by the ANC/GACP's "vulgar Marxism" (a phrase of Johnson, 1977) may be all the more compelling, removed as they are from the compromises and limited rewards of conducting their everyday existence within the labour process of a capitalist firm" (Drewer, 1990a, 227).

From outside the UDF, other influences penetrated the movement. While Africanists and BC sympathizers, who were philosophically opposed to the UDF's nonracial Charterism, remained separately organised, they had a significant ideological impact on the UDF's membership.

Examples include the use of the word "Black" to include all who are oppressed by race in South Africa, the preference for the term nonracialism over multiracialism and the Africanist application of the word "settler" to whites other than those who shifted their attitudes to become Africans too (Horowitz, 1991). These appellations indicate more than just an influence over nomenclature; they represent the infusion of a Black Consciousness/Africanist ideological stance into mainstream Charterist politics.

To a greater extent than the ANC of the 1950s, the UDF of the 1980s incorporated specifically women's struggles in its agenda. Membership of UDF affiliated women's organisations like the Federation of Transvaal Women, grew as women leaders emphasised the overlapping of three spheres of oppression: race, class and gender. South African social structure, it was pointed out, is organised so as to inflict particular penalties on black working class women, with racial laws being applied to keep women and their reproductive potential out of the urban areas and in the
homelands, where paternalistic social structures prevail; with
women concentrated in the lower paid sectors of the economy -
domestic service, agricultural and industrial shift work - and
clustering in the low paying "border" industries; with a lack of
maternity leave or benefit for many workers and with an almost
complete absence of child care provision. Such pressures
accounted for the unprecedented success in the number of women
mobilized, and integrated with wider political resistance.
Nevertheless, a disproportionate number of women, compared with
men, remained unpolarized during the insurrection, wishing
merely to remain detached from political strife.

The partial mobilization of a women's constituency was
accompanied by that of an Indian constituency within the UDF. The
Natal Indian Congress was revived after its post 1960s decline,
to help organise a boycott of the elections for an advisory South
African Indian Council in 1981. An 8% participation rate in the
polls represented the first significant funnelling of local
Indian anger into national politics since the 1950s (Lodge, 1992).
However, while the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses aligned
with the UDF, most Indians preferred to remain apolitical, and
"the serious Durban anti-Indian riots of 1949 and some much
milder but threatening episodes in 1974, 1985 and 1990 have
served to remind many Indians of the dangers that have befallen
Asian communities elsewhere in Africa" (Horowitz, 1991, 82). Many
Indians went towards the opposite extreme of those affiliating
with the UDF, by withdrawing into political conservatism,
especially those who had accumulated significant material
possessions.

In comparison, a greater proportion of "Coloureds" took part in
UDF-orchestrated insurrectionary acts. Horowitz puts this down to
a feeling of betrayal, felt by "Coloureds" as a result of the
injustices imposed upon them by a state dominated by fellow
Afrikaans speakers, in particular the massive forced removals
they were subjected to in the 1960s. Yet, there was still a large
proportion of the "Coloured" population that could be considered
apolitical, even in the midst of an insurrection.

Despite the variations in political mobilization, both within and
between apartheid's racial groups, the UDF's campaign for
"Coloureds" and Indians to boycott the national polls and for
Africans to boycott those for the BLAs, was largely successful. From November to December 1983, 21% of registered voters participated in the BLA elections, while 18% of "Coloured" and 20% of Indian eligible voters took part in the Tricameral elections (Price, 1991, cited 183). These results encouraged the civics to extend their ambit so as to by-pass BLAs in as many respects as possible by developing alternative and informal systems of township management, extending even to informal courts.

(However, as the level of township violence rose during the mid 1980s, the extent of national leaders' restraint over the activities of such bodies became questionable).

More than the partial racial alliance (also including an unprecedented level of white anti-apartheid commitment) that the UDF represented, it was its potential for economic disruption that made it powerful. In the 1980s, black trade unions coordinated skilled and economically vital manufacturing workers, in addition to the unskilled and plentiful workers that they had marshalled in the 1950s. "Amandla ngawethu!" ("Power is Ours!") was a slogan inherited from the 1950s. Then it voiced an aspiration; in the 1980s it became an assertion (Lodge, 1992, 30). The Federation of South African Trades Unions (FOSATU) was closely involved in the Vaal triangle rent boycott even before the more overtly political Congress of South African Trades Unions (COSATU) was formed. On a national scale, it was partially due to the formation of COSATU in 1985 that a record number of working days were lost in strikes between 1985 and 1987.

The progression of trade unions to a position of strength in the 1980s was also partly the result of the government's own reforms. The legalisation and recognition of black trade unions, as advocated in the Riekert and Wiehahn reports, was intended to bring their activities under control. In fact the trade union movement swelled as a result, from 39 non-racial unions with 206,000 members in 1978 to 109 unions with 900,000 members in 1986, and strike activity doubled by 1980 and doubled again by 1982 (Price, 1981, 100-4). Far from restricting themselves to workplace issues, as the government anticipated, the unions became increasingly involved in the material and political concerns of the wider black community. "Since race, not class has
been the primary basis for social discrimination and economic deprivation in South Africa, the political appeal of multi-class coalitions seeking liberation from racial oppression is very powerful" (Price, 1991, 164). Hence, many of the black trade unions could not help but become involved in struggles defined by the workers' and their community's race, as well as those on the shopfloor (see Lambert and Webster, 1988). In Uitenhage, for instance, from 1979 to 1981, Volkswagen shop stewards led the township civic association in a boycott of local suppliers.

With the formation of COSATU, the main body of black industrial trades unions joined the political struggle as affiliates of the UDF. Through the unions, not only permanently resident workers, but migrants too, were mobilized, especially in the East Rand townships, over housing, removals, unemployment benefit and family rights. Brewer, 1989a, went so far as to say that "today it is the black trades unions who present apartheid with its most serious political challenge" (249), but it must be remembered that the unions' potential to wield power was increased through the economic impact of wider political turmoil and instability, and the state's financial crisis. Apartheid's structural economic weaknesses rendered the government more susceptible to the pressure that black trades unions could bring to bear in the 1980s.

The UDF and its separate affiliates' organised political and economic opposition to the state went through a series of stages as campaigns were initiated, state countermeasures were responded to, and setbacks were suffered through the mid 1980s. The high profile campaign against the Tricameral and BLA elections from November 1983 to August 1984 was met by the security forces, with the detention of UDF leaders (see part three of this chapter). A shift towards more covert and locally based organisation was thus forced upon the front.

As it was driven "underground", the movement's initiative was supplied more from below, particularly as its members were incorporated in the Vaal uprising in September 1984. It was "the centrality of the issue of rents, and the perception of councillors as sellouts" which "helps to explain why the first major violent confrontation occurred in the Vaal triangle" (Seekings, 1988). Rents here had increased over 400% from 1978 to
1983, the greatest increases in South Africa (Price, 1991, 159). The gap between the government's reformist-induced expectations and material reality was widening in these townships into an unbridgeable gulf, and into this highly charged atmosphere, the new constitution, excluding Africans from participating in central government indefinitely, was introduced. The revolt began with schoolchildren's attacks on official buildings and developed into a general rent boycott and a violent stayaway from work.

By the end of the period of insurrectionist struggle (the story of which is continued when the state's response is considered below), the ANC was in a position to claim leadership of the anti-apartheid forces in negotiations with the government. That an externally based and banned organisation was able to formally re-enter internal South African politics at the end of the decade on such advantageous terms, was largely due to the ANC's popularity among those responsible for the insurrection, since 1983, inside South Africa.

Even in 1979, a shift away from the racially exclusive institutions and ideology of the BCM, and back towards the non-racial, inclusive ideology of the ANC, was noticeable within South Africa (Lodge, 1992). The Freedom Charter was adopted by many of the organisations which proliferated in the early 1980s, and two prominent BCM exiles - Barney Pityana and Tenjiwe Mtintso - joined the ANC in 1979. During the insurrection, slogans, songs, flags and the rhetoric of the ANC were all revived at popular meetings, and allegiance to the organisation was expressed in various polls and surveys (Lodge, 1992, 43).

The causes of this allegiance are diverse. The fact that only the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, offered significant "guerilla" opposition to the state's security forces, was a crucial factor: in 1979-80, a series of attacks on government buildings, police stations and infrastructure, forming the ANC's strategy of "armed propaganda", culminated in the sabotage of the Sasolburg plant, which was of prime importance in converting coal to oil, of which South Africa was in relatively short supply; the execution of the ANC guerilla Solomon Mahlangu in 1979 provided MK with a martyr; a generation of BCM exiles from 1976 received training from MK due to the lack of a well organised alternative, and the infiltration of these guerillas back into the townships
in the 1980s gave the ANC a widespread legitimacy denied to the other resistance organisations.

The non-racial philosophy also gained ground during the 1980s. What had been an unpopular ANC principle among many young Africans in the past, now became more legitimate. Adam and Moodley, 1993, argue that, in the late 1980s, the ANC's tradition of nonracialism was one of its most attractive features. However, while nonracialism may have been influential in attracting the support of an intellectual and academic group, the ANC's real strength lies in mass township support. That support is not based on its enlightened non-racial philosophy; if anything, the natural predilection of township activists and youth would be towards more exclusive and militant Africanism or socialism. What secures their support for the ANC is its role, via MK, as the only effective black opposition to apartheid, and its relatively successful diplomacy in exile.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of whites in the black trade union hierarchy helped to establish a greater perceived viability for class, rather than racially-based resistance, and thus legitimised nonracialism for a number of black activists. The publication, by white revisionist historians, of studies of the 1950s resistance campaigns contributed to the respectability of white involvement in the "struggle", as, to a much greater extent, did the sacrifices of many whites actively involved in UDF opposition. The easing off of state repression in the post Soweto climate of the late 1970s allowed the re-appearance of a "pantheon of ANC notables" (Lodge, 1992) in resistance politics including the white Helen Joseph, Albertina Sisulu, Florence Mkhize of the 1950s anti-pass campaign, Steve Tshwete, Edgar Ngoyi and Henry Fazzie from Robben Island prison. All, on their return to public life, became involved in UDF orchestrated resistance, consolidating perceptions of a continuity of resistance from the ANC heyday of the 1950s to the insurrection of the 1980s.
2. Conflicts and Targets

The township insurrection of the 1980s was far more chaotic and less orchestrated than any linear account can convey. Townships have always been seemingly randomly violent places, with inhabitants afraid to travel alone at night due to the depredations of the tsotsis and periodic bouts of faction fighting, in the context of material and psychological deprivation. But in the 1980s, the scale of the violence increased significantly, and it became endemic. Townships are still suffering from the round of violence associated with insurrectionary opposition to apartheid. While certain lines delineating conflicting parties can be drawn, the insurrection was marked by innumerable violent incidents which were only partially, or nothing to do with the major structural antagonisms in black society. The most evident structural conflict - that between the state and the black organisations which opposed it - is described first.

A picture of the pattern of "unrest", as defined by the security forces, can be constructed from the police unrest report published by the Cape Times for four days in January 1986 (cited Smith, 1987). The townships provided the focal points for unrest (25 out of the 34 incidents reported). Two incidents were in homeland locations and only one in a white residential area. The targets of violence were overwhelmingly the property or persons of perceived "sell-outs". A typical police report (not necessarily apportioning the blame for deaths accurately) is:

"In Pearston, 2 men were seriously injured when a private home was stoned. Police used teargas to disperse the crowd. The residence and vehicle of a previous councillor were petrol-bombed. The vehicle was extensively damaged. Police used tearsmoke and shotgun fire to disperse the crowd. The crowd killed a man and another was injured. Police arrested 16 men and one woman" (quoted Smith, 1987).

In December 1985, the Minister of Law and Order reported that 27 policemen had been killed since September and the homes of 500 black police destroyed (Smith, 1987, 157). In total, 175 people were killed in 1984 and 800 in 1985.
From 1976 to the 1980s, there was an underlying shift in the targets of violence, from the physical structures of apartheid to the people who represented the "system" (The Times, May 27, 1992). The influence of the co-optive strategy of Botha's government can be seen here, particularly the resentment generated by the workings of the state's representatives in the townships, the BLAs. The councillors on these authorities became the most visible and accessible components of the repressive "system", and therefore, the prime targets for acts of violence. The ostentatious spending on homes and cars of some councillors aggravated the community's hostility more than simply being a symbol of the state could.

The councillors' perceived responsibility for the rent and levy hikes of the BLAs and their image as "sellouts", "traitors" or "collaborators" ensured a level of antagonism sufficient for violent reprisals to be enacted by some, and condoned by many in the townships. Attacks on "collaborators" tripled between 1981-3 and 1984-6 (Price, 1991, 133). By July 1985, only five out of the 38 BLAs were still functioning (Price, 1991, 197).

Apart from attacks on state symbols and representatives within the townships, two other salient aspects of insurrectionary activity stand out: the role of public transport and that of funerals.

Given the structure of the "apartheid city", public transport, servicing the white city centre with workers from the peripheral and externalised townships, "symbolised oppression and subservience" (Pirie, 1992, 172). For millions of black South Africans, commuting to work is an "everyday encounter with one of the most palpable creatures of apartheid" (Pirie, 1992, 172). The deplorable conditions on African trains and buses (particularly the long distance carriers ferrying "commuters" from the homelands) deepens the perception of public transport as an aspect of enforced inferiority. Public transport had always, like the townships themselves, been vulnerable to "criminal" violence, including theft and organised gang muggings, murders and rapes. During the insurrection though, commuter trains in particular, became important and politicized meeting places, when other forums were closed off by the security forces. Carriages were used inter alia, as churches, strike committee rooms and boycott
organisation centres.

In the private transport sector, the informal organisation of minivan taxis (Kombis or "Zola Budds") became the focal point for independent African economic participation on the one hand (see Khoza, 1990), and for further conflict in the townships between rival operators on the other. The kombis were less prone to the orchestrated violence of the trains, but subject instead to the violently dangerous manoeuvrings of their own unlicensed drivers. They have become more popular, particularly in the last three years as commuter trains have become the sites of massacres, largely by Inkatha and/or security "third force" elements.

Much of the energy which drove forward the acts of outright resistance and rebellion in the townships during the mid 1980s was generated at township funerals. Funerals lay at the heart of a cycle of violence which seemed to take on a momentum of its own. The killing of an activist by the security forces or vigilantes aroused a determination to perpetrate further acts of rebellion in the dead comrade's name. These acts often resulted in further killings, perpetuating the cycle. The toyi-toyi, a chanting, rhythmic trot performed at funerals and at virtually all township gatherings, reinforced the solidarity and spirit of resistance of its participants and elevated the courage of the individual, who felt him or herself as part of a formidable mass. The mass singing of the ANC's adopted anthem, "Nkosi Sikelel i' Afrika" as part of a wider repertoire of resistance songs, gave a sense of bonding with the struggles of that organisation's guerillas against the state, and helped reaffirm allegiance to the ANC itself.

Even in the general insurrectionary climate of the 1980s, older regional variations in the spirit of resistance remained:

"The continuities of Eastern Cape radicalism and the traditions of African nationalism have been symbolised by the banners of the banned ANC and CP of South Africa flying at the funerals of Matthew Goniwe and his associates in Craddock, an old nationalist centre; the strength of working class consciousness on the East Rand and also its ethnic division and violence have been equally demonstrated
in recent events; while once again Natal after a period of relative quiescence has seen the backlash of conservative forces against vulnerable groups, in part a product of the politics of cultural nationalism ... Deep rooted political traditions have been re-worked to meet the demands of a dramatically changing present" (Marks and Trapido, 1987, 61-2).

The Vaal triangle, for reasons outlined above, became the arena for particularly intense conflict between police and other state symbols on the one hand, and UDF/ANC supporting "comrades" on the other. After state refusals to compromise on raised rents and levies, the Vaal Civic Association called for a strike which involved 60% of workers and 93,000 students. A harsh police reaction initiated a month long battle in which thousands of local activists were detained, 60 people killed, including 4 councillors and R30 million in property destroyed (Price, 1991, 184).

The Vaal uprising set the scene for a nationwide, low intensity civil war, characterised by the varying regional expressions described by Marks and Trapido, 1987. J.M. Coetzee's novel, "Life and Times of Michael K", 1983, portrays particularly well, the alienation felt by an individual in the strife-torn context of the eve of insurrection.

As the insurrection developed, to nullify state power and create its de facto replacement by mass mobilization in certain portions of de jure state territory, it had some parallels with the Paris commune of 1871, Russia in 1905 and Hungary in 1956 (Price, 1991). But the areas in which the state momentarily lost control were restricted to townships outside the mainstream life of the most powerful white constituency. Within these areas the ANC's call to make the townships ungovernable was more reactive than proactive, since it was local inhabitants themselves who had displaced state control. Nevertheless, even Pretoria was admitting the existence of some "no-go areas".

Direct conflict between representatives of the state and black activists was, however, offset to an unprecedented degree, by violence between different black movements and tendencies. The state attempted to divert as much attention as possible to these
conflicts, and away from those between activists and the security forces. But they existed independently of the state's spotlight, and some developed, with apartheid laws revoked, into destabilising fault lines which characterise South Africa in the early 1990s.

During the mid 1980s, horrific acts of violence were not just directed against "sell-outs" within the community, but also against followers of the "wrong" line of resistance, and the divisions became more clearly delineated and etched into the fabric of township life in the insurrectionary climate. There were not only the old divisions of Africanist-nonracialist, national populist-"workerist"; there was also a heightening of disagreement over the acceptable degree of compromise with a government deliberately setting out to co-opt a strategic black social group.

This disagreement flared between "collaborationist" organisations like Inkatha, the "Coloured" and Indian parliamentary parties and Sofasonke (the Soweto municipal party), as well as between them and the wider resistance movements. Within the unions there was disagreement over the mixture of plant and community struggles in which they should be engaged (see Lambert and Webster, 1988).

Within the non-collaborationist organisations divisions continued over long term goals, notably AZAPO's socialist Azania or the UDF/ANC's liberal-democratic state, and over the political and economic position of the white population in a post-apartheid order (Brewer, 1989a).

Behind these evident political differences lay other influences which pushed their expression towards violent conflict. In order to explain the translation of political differences into violence, one has to be aware of a context of local struggles over scarce resources, particularly land, the presence of a deprived, unemployed and politicized youth comprising a large segment of township populations, the prevalence of poor housing and the exploitation felt on an everyday basis by blacks in the workplace. These factors, combined with the social dislocation brought about by urbanisation and, particularly, the breakdown of traditional family structure, are considered by Schlemmer, 1991, to be "background conditions", shifting the likely expression of political or other difference further towards a violent extreme
and eroding the normative restraints on murder. Superimposed on these conditions are "predisposing factors" such as the social dislocation of rural migrants in the urban youth subculture (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

In this climate, professed political differences undoubtedly provided a pretext for some acts of violence which had more to do with the settling of personal scores and participation in crime (Lemon, 1991). Overt political differences were often similarly superimposed on differences of ethnicity or of material status (particularly between formal township residents and informal squatters or migrant hostel residents). Once established, the violence often became self-perpetuating.

While innumerable incidents of such violent conflict took place in all of South Africa's townships through the 1980s, two divisions stand out as being long-running and responsible for particularly heavy casualties: the conflict in and around Crossroads in the Western Cape in 1986 and, that between Inkatha and the UDF/ANC in Natal from 1985 to the present, which had (and has) the most serious impact.

Xhosa migrants to the Western Cape who are denied access to the formal housing of the townships tend to form their squatter camps under "chairmen" of squatter communities. In many cases these men are the literal descendants of traditional rural headmen and they exercise a similar kind of relatively autocratic rule over their communities. They are generally respected and feared and are often brutal in their implementation of authority. Despite a common profession of allegiance to the ANC, in line with most formal township activists, there are sharp differences between these activists and the squatters on the peripheries of the Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu townships. Whereas the township residents are relatively literate, largely employed, and occupy basic, but at least formal housing, the adjacent squatters lack these attributes and are often tenants of the formal residents. Similar differences delineate many of the conflicts between blacks in South Africa, but in Crossroads it was the influx of new squatters, rather than the presence of a more privileged township population, which triggered large scale violence.

The government's response to the increasing incidence of
squatting at Crossroads was the establishment of a new formal township at Khayelitsha and the extension of section 10 rights to the inhabitants of the squatter camps with schemes to upgrade their conditions. However, greater numbers continued to arrive and settle, particularly in the KTC area. Those who had been granted section 10 rights in Crossroads, and who were therefore being allowed to stay and consolidate their housing with government aid, became antagonistic to the influx of newcomers who threatened their newfound stability and their prospects of receiving housing assistance. The established residents were mobilized under the headman, Johnson Ngxobongwana. Ngxobongwana was soon recruited by the state to attack and destroy the new settlements around KTC so as to prevent further squatter camp growth in the area. He pursued this goal with a "vigilante" force known as the "witdoeke" after the white scarves they wore. From May to June 1986, a small scale war was fought between witdoeke and "comrades" from KTC (Davenport, 1991). During the conflict, the comrades often found themselves opposed not only by Ngxobongwana's followers, but by the state's security forces too.

Ngxobongwana eventually founded a new camp a Drift Sands, which became his personal fiefdom. But his adherents were soon in conflict again, with his successor as chairman in Crossroads, Jeffrey Nongwe, and the local ANC Youth Congress. The complex and dangerous situation descended further into chaotic instability with the emergence, in the late 1980s, of a taxi war between a squatters' Western Cape Black Taxi Association and the formal township's Lagunya Taxi Association, which was patronised by the local civic association. The conflict, involving petrol bomb attacks and over 70 deaths, was waged over the disputed control of taxi routes crucial to urban African life. Since all the organisations involved in the Crossroads violence professed ANC sympathy, "one begins to glimpse how little meaning political labels (can) have beside the more fundamental laws of squatter life" (R.W. Johnson, Independent Magazine, August 10th, 1991).

Of all the individual conflicts that can be delineated in the 1980s, the conflict between Inkatha and the UDF in Natal was the most costly in terms of human life, being responsible for over four thousand deaths. In the 1990s, the conflict became transplanted and diffused, as part of a wider struggle, in the Transvaal as well as Natal (see below). This, most prominent,
conflict between black groupings in South Africa is more clearly defined by formally organised political structures, but even here, the material conditions dividing peri-urban from urban residents, inter-generational cleavages, and disparities in privilege and access to scarce resources, have a strong motivational effect.

In the KwaZulu homeland, which is inter-digitated with Natal province, Mangosutho Buthelezi had, by the 1980s, established firm political control through the Inkatha organisation. Inkatha's patronage was necessary for many of the requirements of everyday life in KwaZulu, particularly land, so most inhabitants of the homeland found it expedient to belong to the organisation. But, crucially, Inkatha was also mobilized through a Zulu nationalist rhetoric, by which Buthelezi succeeded in instilling pride and dignity among many, mostly rural and peri-urban based, conservative Zulus (see Mare, 1992). The movement encountered its limitations more in the formal townships around Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Inkatha's unwillingness to let these urban areas fall under the influence of the increasingly popular UDF in the mid 1980s, was the background cause of the conflict, which became endemic, between supporters of the two organisations.

To some extent, there was an earlier parallel to Buthelezi's conception of the political activity in these townships. From the 1840s to the 1870s, the Zulu Kings Dingaane, Mpande and Cetshwayo, had sought to prevent their subjects from crossing into the Natal Colony to the south, where they would be outside their control. Many Zulus though, had made the crossing, in an assertion of their freedom to marry the person of their choice, or simply in an attempt to set up as independent head of household (Brookes and Webb, 1907, Atkins, 1933). Just as Buthelezi saw himself as the inheritor of the traditions of these kings, so he resented the loss of authority that independent political organisation by Zulu speakers in the Natal or KwaZulu townships entailed. In the mid 1980s, as the township insurrection spread, the UDF's civic structures found themselves increasingly arrayed against the township councils and BLAs, over which Buthelezi's Inkatha exercised a regional monopoly.

Buthelezi's "moderate" resistance to apartheid, and his identification with the ANC, had ensured his popularity with most
black South Africans during the 1970s, when he seemed capable of filling the vacuum left by the crushing of the BCM. His participation in the homeland structures was justified as opposition from within the system, and his refusal to accept "independence" for KwaZulu could be interpreted in this light. But a dispute with the external ANC and his increasingly obvious, "totalitarian" grip on power within the homeland, began to undermine his popularity with students and politicized youth in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Flashpoints in the long and convoluted history of the war in Natal included: an early fight at the University of Zululand, where students opposing Buthelezi's participation in state structures were attacked, and Inkatha attacks on UDF supporting, boycotting school pupils in 1980; the incorporation of the main Durban townships of KwaMashu and Umzazi into KwaZulu, and the initiation of the COSATU backed SARMCOL strike, which was met by violence from Inkatha's rival United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) in 1985; the suppression of the UDF civic organisation in the Pietermaritzburg township of Imbali, also in 1985; and the forced recruitment campaign of Inkatha in 1987.

But in between these specific instances of political conflict, violent encounters between Inkatha and UDF members were being perpetuated with attack and counter-attack, driven by a never-ending series of retributive raids. In many areas the political labels of Inkatha and UDF were superimposed on other divides between the warring parties: squatters versus formal residents, or older, more traditionally oriented men versus township youth. Throughout, the conflict was characterised by the security forces' active or passive support for Inkatha. The KwaZulu homeland police (ZP) in particular, were very much identified with Inkatha.

Buthelezi's personal character has often been cited as an important factor in the continuance of the conflict: "Chief Buthelezi does not appear to take the objectives of the various UDF and COSATU campaigns at face value ... (he) frequently claims that the actions of the progressive organisations are planned as a direct challenge to his political control over the region" (Kentridge, 1991, 221). He has often displayed his sensitive pride in the number of libel cases he has brought against such
The conflict in Natal grew from relatively discernable political cleavages through the 1980s into a chaotic and continuous series of seemingly indecipherable acts of terror. "Every incident makes some sense at the micro level, but at the macro level matters are less clear ... (it is) not a case of normal life plus some fighting, but that "some fighting" (has) become normal life" (Kentridge, 1991, 14).

The majority of the inhabitants in the region were non-participants in the fighting, but they were inexorably involved, as intended or accidental targets on both sides of the conflict. The numbers of refugees seeking to flee the area was testament to the pain and disruption that the conflict caused. Tens of thousands were rendered homeless, and their ranks swollen by thousands simply seeking relief from the fighting and hoping to return to their homes shortly. An element in the interpretation of the conflict, always suspected, emerged more clearly during 1991, as the scale and content of the state's assistance to Inkatha, extending, it is likely, even to military training, was revealed with the "Inkathagate" scandal.

Some clear parallels exist between the conflicts of the Western Cape and Natal, which cast light on the general conditions of strife in the black areas of South Africa. In both cases, the conditions in which the peripheral squatters found themselves, having to compete for scarce resources with a materially advantaged, established, "insider" urban population, played a role in defining the parties to the conflict. In Natal, the "insider" township group was, since the 1950s, associated with ANC urban resistance, and in the 1980s, with the UDF civics. Inkatha, on the other hand, voiced Zulu migrant and squatter interests. Thus, political overtones developed to characterise a more universal socio-economic conflict (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

The form of social organisation of relatively recent arrivals to the urban areas also differentiated them. In Crossroads, conflict with formal township residents was not the prime issue, but both here and in Natal, squatters tended to be led by chiefs transplanted from traditional rural practice, while the comrades of the townships were of an entirely different political
character, being urban, socialistic and radical. These lines of division were reinforced by a generational gulf. The older male squatters saw in the youth mobilization and politicization of the urban areas, something of a defiance of the traditional paternalistic authority of the rural areas.

During the 1980s, the number of squatters near the major urban centres of employment rose inexorably. In the homelands a combination of severe drought, a decline in real migrant wages succeeding the 1970s increase, and large scale unemployment following farm capitalization in the plateland, threw both single men and women and whole families off the land (Beinart, 1988). Where recently arrived squatters have their ethnicity too, to set them apart from established residents, conflict over resources is all the more likely. "The fighting between those identifying as Zulu and Mpondo just south of Durban in early 1986, in which over 150 died - the largest death toll in any single incident in the last couple of years - is one grim example" (Beinart, 1988, 145).

Apart from the distinction between newcomers and established urban residents, another clear dimension to both the Crossroads and the Natal conflicts, was the role of the police. Police logistical and active military support was given, in both cases, to the traditionalist, anti-ANC/UDF party. This reflects a still prominent security force view that such parties can be extremely valuable as surrogate forces in counter-insurgency action. "The vigilantes were powerful allies of the South African state and could cripple or root out radical opposition groups more effectively than could the police"; while Inkatha had a genuine support base, generally the vigilante leaders "lacked a compelling ideology and were unable to mobilize a popular and loyal social base. Nevertheless the vigilante phenomenon in the 1980s demonstrated the surprising extent to which the South African state was able to enlist, at least intermittently, powerful alliances from within the black community" (Lodge, 1992, 169).

Active security force support for one side in the conflict was usually complemented by inactivity on the part of the prosecution services and the courts in charging and convicting known killers. In Natal, several Inkatha "warlords", many with relatively high
positions in the organisation's hierarchy, were generally known to be responsible for acts of intimidation and murder, and were permitted to remain at large. On the other hand, no effort was spared by the police in hunting down and detaining or killing members of the movements opposing the vigilantes. But perhaps the most profound parallel between the conflicts of Natal and the Western Cape was the fact that most residents in both areas simply wished to stay out of the firing line, wherever their sympathies lay.

The government placed particular emphasis on the role of ethnicity in the late 1980s. The obvious implication was that, in the absence of continued white political supervision, a feuding, ethnically divided African population could not be expected to elect a stable and sound unitary government. Partly because of its association with state propaganda, the role of ethnicity in the violence of the 1980s has been by-passed by many analysts who wished to preserve their anti-apartheid credentials. Nevertheless, it has become more evident that there is an important ethnic dimension to some of the recent conflicts.

While the commonly applied epithet of "tribal violence" is eminently unsuitable for conflict between politically, spatially and economically divided modern groups, an ethnic cleavage can often become the most clearly visible division between warring parties. The eruption of Zulu migrant workers onto the streets of Soweto, attacking youths, particularly in the 1976 revolt, and the Zulu attacks on Mpondo migrants, had a variety of causes associated with the alienation of rural migrants in an urban context, but in the minds of the attackers, the alien ethnicity of the victims was a most apparent characteristic of the "enemy".

In the Natal war, many of Inkatha's Zulu "foot-soldiers" have been galvanised more by the perception of the UDF/ANC as a Xhosa dominated organisation (even though it is Zulu adherents that they are fighting), than by the political motivations of their leaders. In 1985, Shangaan and Pedi fought over the boundary between their respective "homelands", Gazankulu and Lebowa. Then in 1986, Ndebele fought Pedi over a plan to incorporate the Pedi Moutse area, outside Pretoria, into the KwaNdebele homeland (Horowitz, 1981). The recent extension of the Inkatha - UDF/ANC war from Natal into the Transvaal brought a clear ethnic
dimension to the conflict which was absent in the overwhelmingly Zulu Natal, as Zulu migrant workers carried Inkatha's offensive into the Xhosa, Sotho and Tswana (as well as Zulu) speaking communities of the Vaal region.

All of these conflicts involve political, social and economic differences as well as ethnic distinctions. Many have also involved security force fomentation, but "the fact that ethnic affiliations were available for manipulation or encouragement suggests that ethnic violence is not just the product of the state's action in setting one group against another, but reflects the continuing importance of ethnicity" (Horowitz, 1991, 74).

3. State Repression, Homeland Coups and White Responses

In 1985, the year after the insurrection had begun in the Vaal triangle, Botha hinted that announcements introducing common citizenship and a relaxation of the pass laws would be made in a forthcoming speech to the Natal Provincial Congress of the NP. Such was the level of anticipation that the speech was transmitted live on television in the US, the UK and Germany. It turned out to be not only an anticlimax, but the guarantor of deep international disillusionment with Botha's reformism.

His tone throughout the speech was defiant and defensive, and no concrete new initiatives were introduced. He pointedly refused to "lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to alienation and suicide" (quoted, Barber and Barratt, 1990, 322). Western opinion was struck by his insensitivity at a time of severe crisis for South Africa's internal and external political relations. It appeared that Botha had drawn back from his promised "crossing of the Rubicon" due to fear of an internal conservative reaction and personal resentment at external advice (Barber and Barratt, 1990, 323).

Botha's "Rubicon" speech, provoking rather than deterring international sanctions, was significant for the state's response to the township rebellion. It revealed a change in government thinking. In the light of domestic instability which would preclude economic recovery anyway, the government partially forsook its previous policy of mollifying international investors and governments, and orientated itself more towards internal
repression. Its subsequent restrictions on the reporting of the unrest were intended to limit the damage by hindering a full overseas awareness of the domestic situation, but they could not prevent a knowledge of the repressive measures that existed. The day following the speech, South African share prices plummeted and the rand fell 44.5 US cents. The Stock Exchange was closed and restrictions were placed on outward capital flow. The speech provided the cue for Chase Manhattan's precedent in refusing to roll over maturing short term loans (prompted by shareholder, client and public interest group pressure in the US). A Commonwealth "Eminent Persons Group" recommended government sanctions in 1986, having been alienated, whilst still on its visit to South Africa, by SADF raids on Gabarone, Harare and Lusaka ANC bases (see "Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report", Penguin, 1986), and the US Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act, forced through President Reagan's opposition by Congress, provided for further government-imposed economic sanctions.

In the wake of the speech and its indirect international reaction, the South African state threw its full weight behind domestic repression. Botha's NSMS was used as the primary vehicle for crushing the insurrection. An integrated strategy was pursued with, on the one hand, security forces seeking, detaining or "destroying" the enemy (establishing a pattern that the recent NP leadership found it hard to curtail), and on the other hand, a continuation of some material improvements to remove the socio-economic basis for black alienation. "Hearts and Minds" propaganda, borrowed from the military, and "counterorganisation" at the local level to displace the civics, completed the strategy (Price, 1991).

As an example of the "positive" wing of counter-strategy, the Atlantis "Coloured" township in the Western Cape received food parcels and soccer tours for its children from the local JMC. Pamphlets and newspapers publicised such benign state activities, and accorded the credit to local "Coloured" politicians who worked within state structures. In Alexandra, new homes and utilities were constructed in 1989, and BLA councillors were given the credit.

Meanwhile, the "negative" aspects of the state's reaction involved the use of treason and subversion laws against UDF
members and the outlawing of the NECC and its alternative schools courses (Price, 1991). In the townships, the police had their ambit of repressive measures excessively widened to enable them to conduct war against the UDF. The 1986 State of Emergency Regulations allowed first police commissioners, then non-commissioned officers in all branches of the police to restrict the movements and access of people, or confine or remove them, and to control services, protect installations and distribute or withhold information. There was no public right to seek court interdicts restraining police personnel from such measures, and such acts were carried out with blanket indemnity (Davenport, 1991).

Police intervention in the townships was supported by the SADF (who were often preferred by the residents for their relative moderation, many being conscripts rather than volunteers for such duties). To further assist in rooting out activists, black municipal police were recruited with brief training. Labelled "kitskonstabels" or "instant constables", they were put at the disposal of the black councillors. The kitskonstabels were often recruited rurally so that they lacked affinity with the township communities, and they rapidly established a reputation for extreme brutality.

In 1985, 8000 UDF leaders were detained. The state's action resulted in the removal of most of the organisation's national and regional executives, if not directly, then indirectly through assassinations or emigration. The intelligence which enabled such measures was gathered by Botha's JMC surveillance and filtered upwards through the NSMS. In 1986, a further 9000 were detained in eight months. This figure was twelve times that of the Goweto period. 40% of the detainees were under 18 years old, most being members of street or area committees. The second largest category was that of members of the "people's courts" (Price, 1991, 258). As well as being detained, UDF members were banned or restricted and COSATU was prevented from engaging in "external political activities".

Behind the overt clamping down on township political activity lay a shady and nebulous network of state structures, responsible for a campaign of harassment, disruption and assassination. The most notable of these bodies was the Orwellian-named Civil Cooperation
Bureau (CCB), set up to direct hit squads against civilian targets. At the start of 1989 there had been 113 attacks including bombs, arson and burglaries, against opposition organisations, with not one arrest following. Another aspect of the covert war was the use of the surrogate or "vigilante" forces whose role has been examined in the Western Cape and Natal contexts. Other than the witdoeke and Inkatha "warriors", smaller bands of vigilantes like the Ama-Afrika in Kwanobuhle, near Uitenhage, were recruited from ranks of township groups that lost out in the insurrection. Such groups included black policemen, gangsters, small businessmen, traditional headmen and disaffected UDF members (the numbers of which grew as the UDF punished those responsible for the loss of community support through bullying), as well as squatters denied formal township privileges. A number of township residents were also disillusioned when their perceived right not to participate in political action was abrogated by militant activist pressure, applied to ensure conformity in "the Struggle".

By mid 1987, a veneer of order had been returned to the townships. Yet, while overt insurrectionary activity had largely been halted, the UDF's grassroots substructure remained latently powerful. A liberatory, rather than co-opted political atmosphere could still be sensed in the townships, where there was "utter hostility and cynicism toward the government and its overtures" (Price, 1991, 266). The 1988 township elections were effectively boycotted (only 10% of eligible voters cast ballots), with over half the council seats going uncontested and no candidates at all offering themselves for 13C seats. While the state had prevented a loss of official political power to the UDF, it had failed to secure its own legitimacy or consent for, or even the functionality of, its own structures.

Rent strikes continued and trade unions could not be repressed with the vehemence directed against the UDF, given their role in the fragile economy. In June 1988, COSATU launched the biggest stayaway in South African history in commemoration of the Soweto revolt. A three day general strike was 70% effective in the manufacturing sector, and cost R500 million (Price, 1991, 267). In spite of the unions being made legally accountable for illegal strikes in February 1988, the government was still unable to either destroy or co-opt them.
It was also difficult for the government to stem the growing swell of church opposition, as ministers like Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak and Frank Chikane stepped into the gap created by UDF suppression and spoke out against the government. Even the most conservative of the three Dutch Reformed Churches admitted the sin of apartheid. Meanwhile, a detainees' hunger strike was launched with 600 participants. As 100 were taken to hospital in a serious condition, international attention intensified and fear of their deaths prompted the government to withdraw from the use of large scale detention without trial. 1980 saw more guerilla activity than any preceding year and the schools boycott was perpetuated with over 90% of pupils absent in the Western Cape (Price, 1991). The state's own black councillors began to demand the unbanning of resistance organisations and the release of political prisoners, in order to offer some sense of identity with the township communities and to avoid the continued dangers of a "collaborationist" tag (Price, 1991). Finally, a new resistance front - the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) - was formed in the late 1980s, backed prominently by church and trade union figures, to take over where the UDF had left off, with a fresh mass defiance campaign.

The scale and cost of the repression required to restore even surface calm in the townships was a significant incentive for the new NP leadership to open negotiations with the ANC. The bureaucracy developed to implement Botha's Total Strategy was in itself enormously costly. In East London, central government policy was being filtered through 27 Working Committees, 3 Regional Advisory Committees, 9 Joint Working Committees, 1 Regional Liaison Committee, several ad hoc task teams and an Eastern Cape Strategic Team (Lemon, 1991). Under these multitudinous structures, "order has been restored, but with the probable deployment of one third to one half the standing army in the townships it is likely that the fiscal strain of sustaining white supremacy is to be much greater than in the past ... it is very unlikely that the republic will ever again, under its present rulers, restore its outward facade of political confidence and economic vigour" (Lodge, 1989, 226-7, 226).

With the continuance of almost complete township non-cooperation, the late 1980s were marked by unprecedented local negotiations between township resistance organisation representatives and
local white government officials and businesspeople. Representatives of Soweto's rent boycotters, for instance, went through arduous and complicated negotiations with the Johannesburg municipality and local businesses, which resulted, by 1991, in a modus operandi for their future cooperation (for details, see Young, 1989 and Swilling and Shubane, 1991).

Around the end of the decade though, the government had to respond not only to the state of insurrection in the townships, but also to significant changes in the political composition of the homeland governments. Overall, these changes comprised a loss of the state's firm grip over the political process in rural areas to complement the outcome in urban areas.

In the Transkei, a coup led by General Bantu Holomisa in 1987, ended the rampantly corrupt rule of the Matanzima brothers. Cell, 1988, suggests that Pretoria approved of the intervention, since it soon recognised the new government. However, Holomisa's overt ANC sympathies soon brought him into dispute with the South African government. In October 1989, he raised the issue of Transkei's reincorporation into South Africa and in October 1991, his government became part of a brief, ANC-PAC led "Patriotic Alliance" (Humphries and Shubane, 1991).

A coup also took place in Dophuthatswana, in February 1988. This time though, Pretoria swiftly intervened to restore "Life President" Mangope to power. The South African government's response was provoked by possible ANC involvement in the coup and the fact that Mangope's regime controlled the most economically successful of the homeland states. Even with the later unbanning of the ANC, the Bophuthatswana administration continued to ban pro-ANC demonstrations in the homeland and, in alliance with Inkatha and right wing whites, it sought a regional role under a new constitution.

The Ciskei coup of 1990 displaced Lennox Sebe, who had assumed the title of President upon "independence". As with the Transkei coup, it was led by young army officers opposed to corruption, and it went unopposed by Pretoria. Initially, the new leadership's rhetoric followed Holomisa's, being critical of the Homelands' continued existence as separate entities. However, once the new President, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, was established, he
began to reveal a hostility to the ANC and to enthuse over a new constitution and Bill of Rights for his "subjects" - developments which somewhat contradicted his earlier professed desire for reincorporation. October 1992 saw Ciskeian armed forces open fire on pro-ANC demonstrators at the border of the territory, and revealed the administration's final conversion to a desire to hold on to the reins of power within the homeland.

Yet another military coup installed General Gabriel Ramushwana as the new head of the Venda state for the beginning of the decade. He too, professed a desire for reincorporation.

Even in the "self governing" states, under more direct South African government control, unrest developed in the second half of the 1980s, as inhabitants pressed for reincorporation. Incidents occurred in Gazankulu, KwaNdebele and Lebowa, where the local ANC was critical of Ramodike's presidency despite his expression of support for the movement (see Lodge, 1992). By the early 1990s, the Kangwane leadership had already started preparations for reincorporation and Qwa Qwa seemed favourably inclined to it (Humphries and Shubane, 1991). Only Buthelezi among the self governing homeland leaders claimed a place in post-apartheid national politics, but while he was certainly able to ensure instability in the event of his exclusion, his position had been undermined, both internally and internationally, by Inkatha's increasingly evident use of violence, the resignation of Oscar Dhlomo, Inkatha's respected Secretary General, and the Inkathagate scandal of 1986-1.

The general shift of homeland leaderships away from a position supportive of Pretoria and towards a profession of sympathy for the ANC represented a recognition of the wider shift in the balance of power. That homeland leaders should firstly want to proclaim support for the ANC and reincorporation, and secondly, should be allowed by Pretoria to do so, indicates the extent to which the South African government's systems of managing political, economic and social developments had become ineffective by the end of the 1980s. Indeed, while there was no possibility of the state being overthrown, it seemed that the government had given up hope of maintaining internal order without a State of Emergency.
The state's own white constituency was not as aware of the sea change that had taken place in the balance of power, both in the homelands and in the townships, as some politicians in the NP were. It is a remarkable feature of the insurrection that the sector of the population in whose interests the systems under attack had been formulated, generally knew little of the nature of the attack or of the detailed state of affairs in nearby black areas. However, despite a general lack of first hand experience of the insurrection (other than among security force personnel, including conscripts), developments in the townships did have a more subtle impact on the white population's sense of security. By the late 1980s, a general psychology of fear could be discerned in the white areas, and it was exacerbated by the increasing incidence of "non-political" violent crime, directed at whites by blacks.

On the one hand, "concentrated in the incompletely controlled distant periphery and African formal townships the conflict plays itself out beyond the experience and out of sight of the white metropolitan core" (Lemon, 1981). In Pietermaritzburg, while pitched battles took place between residents of the formal Imbali, and the informal Slangspruit settlements, culminating in SADF intervention, white residents less than a kilometre away, separated by a Group Areas Act "buffer strip", went about their daily lives with only the presence of African women and children refugees in the streets and garden shelters of sympathetic households as indicators of the strife nearby (Wills, 1991, 102). J.M. Coetzee's novel "Age of Iron", 1990, portrays the average level of white awareness:

"of trouble in the schools the radio says nothing, the television says nothing, the newspapers say nothing. In the world they project all the children of the land are sitting happily at their desks learning about the square on the hypotenuse and the parrots of the Amazonian jungle. What I know about events in Guguletu depends solely on what Florence (the African maid) tells me and on what I can learn by standing on the balcony and peering northeast: namely that Guguletu is not burning today, or if it is burning, is burning with a low flame" (36)

On the other hand, literary descriptions like this have in
themselves provided "another challenge to the bland assurance of the state" (Gunner, 1988, 231), and no matter how stringently the government censored news reports of the townships, an awareness of the political and economic instability into which South Africa was descending could not help but filter through to the white population. Despite their geographical separation, and their media insulation from the insurrection, the white sense of physical wellbeing and security was gradually undermined, especially when ANC bombings increased the rate of white civilian casualties from 3 in 1982-4, to 118 in 1984-6. "White" South Africa began to take on the trappings of a society under siege: public buildings were sandbagged and barricaded, metal detectors were installed at the entrance to supermarkets and periodic bomb blasts shattered windows in busy downtown streets or crowded suburban shopping centres" (Price, 1991, 236).

The growing white sense of insecurity was manifested in the emigration figures: 8,500 per annum up to 1984, in 1985, 11,401 and in 1986, 13,711. In 1987, 57% of the white male students of Rhodes University had either decided to leave South Africa or were contemplating it, largely due to its political instability and conscription for township duty. In 1989, one quarter of the draft applied for deferment of service and 15% failed to report. 38% requested exemption from township duty (Price, 1991, 238). The End Conscription Campaign became a growing force among disaffected whites, until it was denounced by Defence Minister Magnus Malan as a national threat.

The threat that the insurrection posed to white security undoubtedly contributed to a long term shift in white political outlook. In 1970, 70% of MPs and 66% of voters had supported a "pure" apartheid line (i.e. the NP or HNP). The remainder (UP) favoured a move away from apartheid, but with continued white political control. By 1989, the NP had itself moved to this position and it now commanded 57% of parliamentary seats and 48% of the vote. But a further 20% of seats and votes went to the Democratic Party (DP), which adopted a position further towards "majority rule". This gave the "reformist" parties combined 77% of the seats and 68% of votes. The "pure" apartheid line which had been dominant in 1970 was now upheld by only the CP and, insignificantly, by the HNP, the CP having 23% of MPs and 30% of voters (Price, 1991, 224). Even so, a 1988 survey showed that 80%
of white urbanites still associated majority rule with physical threat and impoverishment (Price, 1991, 244). Therefore, what seems to have underlain the white electorate's shift towards a more reformist stance was not the desire for a transformed sociopolitical future, but that for a return to stability. In this context, the NP's tough security policy proved an attraction for voters in the 1987 general election. Even the most "radical" of the white parliamentary parties - the DP - proposed that a future black-dominated central government should have its power to transform wealth distribution limited under a federal system.

**Conclusion**

Botha inherited the recommendations of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions set up by his predecessor to deal with the increasingly apparent economic contradictions of apartheid. Out of their reports arose a strategy of co-optation, by which white economic and political superiority would be maintained as apartheid was adjusted to modern economic reality. In alliance with capital, the state would ameliorate conditions for black urban "insiders" to ensure smoother economic development, whilst securing their gains from competition by effecting new "market" forms of influx control (Stadler, 1987). Industrial decentralisation would also help to limit further growth of the urban African group.

Wider political reforms would ease South Africa's international isolation and establish greater internal stability. But the Tricameral Parliament and Black Local Authorities proved largely politically unacceptable, and when they were superimposed on an economic situation which was deteriorating despite decentralisation and urban reform, the result was far from co-optation. The rhetoric of reform had, in itself, raised expectations which a deteriorating economic situation rendered it impossible to fulfil. Instead, the experience of impoverishment became all the more acute as the gulf between expectations and reality widened. Popular mobilization ensued. With a powerful economic and political role being played by the black trade unions, and with black urban communities refusing to pay the costs of their own administration, the state's initiatives were met with insurrection. A new ideology of resistance had emerged,
linking local and national political and economic grievances, and, with UDF direction, a coherent challenge was offered to the state's very presence in the townships (Price, 1991).

The extent of the challenge was sufficient to cause concern even to its initiators and beneficiaries. In achieving the ungovernability of the townships, a "brutal anarchy" (Times, May 27, 1992) became established. UDF and ANC leaders were aware of how the insurrection not only destabilised the South African state, but precipitated capital flight which could last longer than white minority rule. Political and economic instability did not just help bring the government to the negotiating table - it also rendered millions of young blacks brutalised and, perhaps, unemployable.

As UDF - orchestrated internal resistance mounted, Botha's administration was increasingly influenced by the security establishment, with its perception of Total Onslaught. A dual reform-repress strategy was formulated to counter the insurrection, and the shift of government thinking became evident in Botha's "Rubicon" speech. In the mid to late 1980s, repression became the dominant theme, interspersed with periodic reforms, which helped only to further undermine the coherence of apartheid.

In an unstable political and economic environment, De Klerk assumed the presidential office as leader of a reformist bloc within the party. He was more genuinely aware of business interests than Botha had been and he recognised the need for negotiations with legitimate black representatives, notably the revived ANC, to break international isolation, particularly as the MDM launched its new defiance campaign, and as white psychological security continued to decline.
Chapter Eight

The Changing South African State

Negotiations and Elections

This penultimate chapter narrates the developments in South African politics since De Klerk's assumption of the presidency. Particular attention is paid to the reasons why the South African executive departed from established policy conceptions and initiated negotiations with the ANC. There follows a guide to the course of those negotiations and the historic elections with which they culminated.

Botha resigned as party leader after a heart attack in 1989, but with the intention of retaining the presidential position. However, De Klerk, as the new leader of the party, began to accumulate support for this position too. "Once De Klerk became party leader, the government was largely paralysed by the simmering conflict between Botha and De Klerk and by the need to prepare for the white election that was to be held in September 1989" (Schrire, 1992, 112). Pressures mounted on Botha's presidency, including the nationwide campaign for the release of detainees, the MDM's defiance campaign and the formation of a new, reformist Democratic Party. These developments alone conspired against Botha's continuation as President, but when they were accompanied by the retirement of key Botha supporters and NP "thinkers" including Chris Heunis, he realised that he had no option but to resign, which he did, with ill concealed bitterness, in August 1989. He retired from the party altogether in May 1990.

His successor almost immediately presented a dramatically different and reformist image to the world. The release from prison of prominent ANC members including Walter Sisulu, presaged a speech to Parliament in February 1990, in which De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP, the removal of restrictions on the UDF and COSATU, an end to the practice of banning individuals, the lifting of the State of Emergency and restrictions on the media, and the suspension of the death penalty. Ten days later, after 27 years in prison, Nelson Mandela was released. In June 1991, the Group Areas Act, Land Acts and
Population Registration Act were repealed, ending statutory apartheid. The NP set about recruiting black members and almost half the "Coloured" MPs in the House of Representatives joined the party. The pace of the changes even took members of the party caucus by surprise (Morris, 1991, 55-6).

Explanations for these changes have ranged between two extremes. On the one hand are analysts who claim that De Klerk's government had no option but to engage in negotiations with the ANC, due to South Africa's dire economic position and the failure of all preceding attempts to restore political stability and order (Price, 1991, Wolpe, 1988, Lodge, 1992). On the other hand are those who perceive South Africa's economic situation to have been at least sustainable, and continued political repression to have been possible in the medium term. According to this perception, De Klerk's moves towards negotiation were more contingent on particular domestic and international developments, making negotiations propitious in 1990. An entry into negotiations at this point, rather than later, would render them far more likely to progress in the government's favour (Schlemmer, 1990, 1991b, Schrire, 1992). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the government would have seized the opportunity to negotiate, however propitious, unless previous initiatives to maintain white political and economic superiority and stability had failed.

If negotiations were taken up merely as one of a range of options, that range had narrowed considerably by the time that De Klerk assumed the presidency. Friedman, 1991, points out that for negotiations to have been entered into while the government was still able to remain in power without them, the government must have concluded that the costs of maintaining the status quo were not worth paying, and that it had a reasonable prospect of defending its core interests in a new system. Conversely, those excluded from power must have concluded that they could not overthrow the state in the foreseeable future, but that it was possible to achieve through negotiation, an order qualitatively different from the prevailing one.

If negotiations were begun partially as a positive step due to propitious timing, they were also partially the negative result of the closing off of other options for maintaining white
minority rule in the long term. Apartheid, even Botha's "reformist" brand, had remained viable only as long as four conditions persisted: "1. the South African economy continued to be dynamic and growth oriented; 2. black South Africans acquiesced in white rule; 3. the international community was prepared to trade with and invest in South Africa; and 4. White South Africans remained broadly united and cohesive" (Schrire, 1992, 8). Each of these conditions was patently unsustainable by 1990.

Narrowing Political Options

The adaptations made to apartheid structures since the 1960s had all failed to accommodate its political and economic contradictions. The NP's Separate Development or "multinationalism" of the 1960s and 1970s and Botha's "selective incorporation" of a black urban middle class in the 1980s, had been ineffective in the face of continued internal political resistance, economic constraints and international hostility. By the late 1980s there was little momentum remaining in Botha's securicrat strategy. It had been rendered impotent largely by the insurrection. The NP government had run out of options for further adapting white minority rule to changing internal and external political and economic environments:

"Herein lies the dilemma facing (Botha's) regime: Shut off from the possibility of a coercive solution it can only hope to stabilize the political situation through reforms which will win support from important constituencies among black people. However, given the configuration of white interests, notwithstanding the reformist postures of corporate capital and others, it can offer only extremely limited reforms. Since those reforms are concerned with black representation and not merely with redistribution by way of education, wages, housing and so forth, they necessarily provide the political conditions for a (continuing) resurgence of the mass democratic movement" (Wolpe, 1988, 109), and therefore, political and economic instability.

In order to transcend this unsustainable situation, negotiations
leading to concessions beyond those heretofore acceptable to the "configuration of white interests" would be necessary. And the resurgence of resistance which occurred in 1989 helped usher in this realization. The MDM's new defiance campaign was launched in the context of the resegregation of public amenities by Conservative Party councils. White hospitals became the first target and black protesters were admitted for treatment. The protests remained peaceful until police killed at least 12 protesters in Cape Town, precipitating a stayaway by 3 million workers in September 1989 and a march by 35,000 (the largest ever) through Cape Town, with similar processions in other cities. The choice of segregated hospitals as a target for demonstration, and of schools as the subject of verbal protestation, was shrewd. As the costs of maintaining their segregation mounted, many whites were coming to favour integration within these institutions. The closure, through under-use, of white hospitals and schools, contrasted sharply and evidently with the continuing over-crowding of corresponding black facilities. The government's response to the decision by some white schools to admit black pupils was muted, since it was already considering integration if the majority of parents voted for it. This policy was subsequently effected.

In contrast to the mid 1980s, when "the insurrectionary movement was being pulled into uncharted courses by cadres of youth in the streets of the townships, the popular protest in the late 1980s was choreographed and coordinated and seemed much more under the command of its leaders" in the MDM (Lodge, 1992, 114). The revival of organic resistance soon after the state felt relatively secure of its suppression of the mid 1980s uprising, emphasised the continuing instability that could be expected in the absence of significant political change. Further, as Price, 1991, points out, each successive peak episode of resistance – Sharpeville, Soweto, the 1984-6 insurrection – had a larger mass base, was more politically radical, lasted for a longer period and produced more costly international isolation. After each peak, the level of domestic political militancy did not return to the status quo ante, but remained higher. There was therefore a kind of cumulative effect of the main episodes of unrest on South Africa's international standing. The time lag between periods of major unrest was also diminishing, and the organisational capacity growing during each successive period, contributing to a
gradual, but perceptible decline in the quality of life for whites, both materially and psychologically (Price, 1991).

The state had not only lost the political initiative that Botha had been confident of in dealing with internal resistance on a national scale, it had also lost the control of local black administration that it had exercised through surrogate structures. By March 1991, about 40 informal civic associations were already involved in negotiations with Provincial authorities, stepping into the local vacuum left by the insurrectionary rejection of the BLAs (Anti-Apartheid News, March 1991). An agreement in January 1991 to establish a Metropolitan Chamber for the central Witwatersrand area, covering both Johannesburg and Soweto, was the outcome of the lifting of the township rent boycott in return for the writing off of arrears and the resumption of services at locally negotiated tariffs. It set a precedent for local government negotiations with civic structures across the country, accompanying central government moves towards negotiations with the ANC. The local developments represented a profound shift in the balance of political power towards black organisations, further restricting the range of options available to the government at the centre.

That range of options was also effectively constrained by shifts in political attitude within the government's white constituency. The 1998 white election made it clear that a continuation of Botha's policies would lead to further erosion of NP support to both the left and the right. On the left, a larger, relatively wealthy Afrikaans class, some elements of which formed an intelligentsia, had emerged. It was both socially and economically upwardly mobile, and a creature of the big cities (Schlemmer, 1991b). This class, an extension of the 1970s verligte tendency, now showed a greater propensity than ever to vote towards the liberal left wing in white elections. The NP could only encompass these voters by itself shifting further towards this extreme, so as to occupy ground held formerly by the Progressive Federal Party, and now, by the DP. Yet, on the right were more reactionary white voters, to whom the Conservative Party was becoming increasingly attractive. To escape this "pincer threat" (Schlemmer, 1991b) to its dominance over the white electorate, De Klerk's NP had to move relatively quickly in the direction of reform, so as to both retain the reformist white
vote, and, through speed, minimize the coherence and level of organisation of the Conservative Party's opposition.

Narrowing Economic Options

Just as, if not more pressing than the challenges from black and white political traits, were the economic problems that De Klerk's administration inherited. If political difficulties alone could not influence his government to negotiate, when combined with economic considerations, the range of alternatives was even more restricted.

By 1989, the government was in a "Catch 22" situation: "On the one hand the state's ability to successfully pursue its counterrevolutionary strategy required resources. These resources could only come from an expanding economy ... on the other hand continuing with the repressive strategy threatened future economic growth" (Price, 1991, 273).

By 1988, the brief economic optimism of the preceding year had been reversed. During the 1987 "miniboom", Pretoria had attempted to raise the volume of exports and thus earn more foreign exchange. However, South Africa's dependence on imports meant that economic expansion soon brought an increasing volume of imports and thus, greater claims on foreign exchange reserves. From 1986 to 1988, the import bill increased by 60%, while additional costs could not be met by borrowing due to sanctions (Price, 1991). In 1980, the impact of sanctions was fully recognised for the first time in the annual reports of key South African economic concerns - for example, Trust Bank of South Africa, First National Bank, Rand Mines Ltd., and Standard Bank Investment Corporation (Price, 1991).

The 1988 Commonwealth proposals, accepted by all members but Britain, would begin a three stage "ratcheting up" of particular sanctions, designed to make it very difficult indeed for the South African government to reject demands for the effective dismantling of apartheid. Aside from such formal measures, by April 1988, one fifth of the British firms in South Africa had pulled out under mounting domestic anti-apartheid pressure and British investment had fallen from 6 billion pounds in 1980 to under 3 billion in 1986. From January 1984 to April 1989, 184 US
companies left, driven out by the threat of further Congress penalties like the double taxation of Mobil (Davenport, 1991, 464). However, formal government trade restrictions were not as damaging to the South African economy as informal financial reticence, since they merely resulted in a shift of trading partners from West to East. Financial constraints imposed by private banks, acting according to their own perception of economic risk, led to a fall of the rand on the international money market from $1.36 in 1981 to $0.41 in 1989. South Africa's foreign debt increased to $20 billion by 1990, resulting, in 1989, in rescheduling arrangements to avoid reneging, (Davenport, 1991, 465).

The most serious impact of South Africa's Balance of Payments deterioration was that it precluded capital growth (see Kahn, 1991). Growth had been below 2% throughout the 1980s, while population had been increasing at the rate of 2.5% (Davenport, 1991, 465). With a soaring defence budget reaching R9 billion in 1989, the administrative costs of apartheid "were - it seems - more damaging than contrived economic measures to the national economy" (Davenport, 1991, 465). But sanctions augmented the effect, particularly by forcing out foreign companies with important access to international markets and technology.

The government needed an injection of new capital that would not just be exported again to pay off debt and buy imports, but the chief economist of SANLAM made it clear that "unless we get certain reforms here we won't get foreign capital again. We have to at least show the outside world that we are moving in the right direction" (quoted Price, 1991, 275). When relative political calm returned after the mid 1980s insurrection, analysts realized that new investment still was not coming in to restore the Balance of Payments. Only a guaranteed long term political solution would give South Africa the perceived stability required for investor confidence (Schlemmer, 1991b).

The failure of Botha's economic policies and of political repression to restore structural stability, contributed to a political division in the ruling elite. Securocrats saw further reform as too risky, since black "radicals" were too powerful. On the other side of the growing divide were those associated with economic and foreign relations policy, who stressed the risk to
economic survival of continued repression, and emphasised the role of reform in ending international economic isolation. It was this wing of the government that was increasingly backed by business and finance.

For the reformist group, another of Botha's significant failures, was his professed aim of rationalising, and reducing the costs of government. Instead, the Tricameral Parliament, continuing duplication of administrative departments and increasing security and regional destabilization costs had led to an increase in government expenditure as a percentage of GNP from 21% in 1980 to 32% in 1989 (Schrire, 1992). "It was ironic that Botha, the efficient hard-headed administrator, who came to power determined to rationalize government, created a massive government structure that helped to undermine the South African economy on which it depended" (Schrire, 1992, 121). The blame for this malignant growth was placed on the restriction, after 1986, of the sources of government advice to the security establishment.

On his election as party leader, De Klerk came to represent the critical, reformist wing of the party. On his accession to the Presidency, with a continuing high degree of centralised power (Morris, 1991), he set about establishing control over the enlarged security establishment, especially the NSMS. In adopting the reformist line, De Klerk also chose to further the interests of business where, despite Botha's initial courting of capital, they had conflicted, especially after the "Rubicon" speech, with those of the previous government. The sector in general urged further reform on the government during the second half of the 1980s for several reasons (Lee, Sutherland, Phillips and McLennan, 1991):

The business sector's concern was voiced most clearly in 1989, over the impact of black consumer boycotts and the implementation of separate amenities. Carletonville and Boksburg town centres were both subject to an almost complete black boycott due to their Conservative councils' decision to uphold the Separate Amenities Act. Business representatives across the country called for the complete removal of the act, rather than its selective imposition according to the dictates of particular councils, while the Carletonville Chamber of Commerce lobbied Parliament and took legal action against the town council, which resulted in
the removal of "Whites Only" signs. The episode demonstrated both the political impact that a coherent business lobby could have, and the power of united black consumers.

A second area of business concern was more general. Discontent was being expressed in 1989 at economic policy, particularly at excessive government expenditure, which prompted calls for rationalisation. The criticism of many business leaders was expressed by Aubrey Dickman, Chief Economist of the Anglo-American Corporation: "ideological concerns have taken precedence over economic exigencies" (Lee et al, 1991, 103).

Sanctions were a third cause for concern. In 1989, Chris Van Wyk of Bankorp updated an earlier report and estimated that sanctions had reduced the potential growth rate by 10%, leading to the loss of 500,000 employment opportunities (cited Lee et al, 1991, 104). A professed concern over gross societal inequalities, particularly in education, contributed to the desire for significant change. Finally, an immediate demonstration of the necessity of structural change was provided by industrial relations with black workers. A tentative alliance emerged between employers and black unions, against the government's 1989 Labour Relations Amendment Act. The alliance represented a recognition by employers of the inextricable link between the shop floor and the wider political concerns of the union members. It was appreciated by employers that stayaways and industrial disruption would not end until political satisfaction had been achieved by the workforce.

Even under Botha, the concerns of business had overlapped significantly with those of reformists within the government. Their first triumph over the securocrats came in August 1988, with the signing of the Angola/Namibia accord. "From Pretoria's vantage point the accord represented both a pragmatic adjustment to a gloomy economic reality and an effort to alter that reality" (Price, 1991, 276). The administrative cost of occupying Namibia had assumed greater significance as the shortage of resources within South Africa became more evident. The costs of military involvement against the SWAPO independence movement were raised even higher when Cuban troops and equipment moved into the besieged town of Cuito Cuanavale, in southern Angola, to repel South African forces. The battle served to highlight the failures of securocrat policies, which had proved unable to guarantee
either peace or economic security. By urging South Africa's extrication from an unwinnable war, the reformers in the government had achieved something of a coup and within two months, as a sign of renewed favour, South African diplomats were again visiting European countries (Price, 1991).

Having attained this success, the government reformist bloc focused on South Africa's internal situation. The question expressed by De Klerk - "do we want them (our children) to inherit new sanctions and boycotts?" (cited Price, 1991, 278) - led reformers within the party to the conclusion that negotiations with black organisations seen as legitimate by much of the black population, were necessary to resolve South Africa's endemic crisis. The black "moderates" with whom Botha had contemplated negotiations - mostly homeland leaders and councillors - were now rendered largely irrelevant by the general "culture of liberation" that had developed with the insurrection. Given its ascension to a position of widespread internal and international political legitimacy, the ANC's participation would be required for a restoration of stability. The fact that it would command the support of many of the black trade unions also made its role in a future settlement crucial, since the trade union's success had "brought home to government the magnitude of the confrontation they faced if they forced the black community into "illegality"" (Guardian, April 20th, 1992). The miners union leader, Cyril Ramaphosa's election as ANC Secretary General in 1991 was "a recognition of the role the trade union movement had played in bringing about the dramatic government reforms of 1990" (op cit). Once negotiations with the ANC were accepted as the way out of structural crisis, De Klerk's initial, drastic reforms were inescapable.

Thus, a lack of further options for the preservation of white minority rule and particularly, a lack of alternative ways out of structural economic crisis, can be seen as the prime influences on De Klerk's decision to negotiate. However, Moll, 1989, argues that it is easy to overemphasise the role of economic deterioration. De Klerk's government would be aware that South Africa still had certain dependable economic securities. There was a strong food producing sector, huge mineral resources, only a limited dependence on oil, a highly developed manufacturing sector, significant technological know-how and a fair level of
local savings. If negotiations with the ANC were seen as too
dangerous, they need not have been entered into yet, even as a
last resort. Despite poor economic performance, the state could
probably have held on to power in an unstable and conflict-prone
political environment for some years to come (Brewer, 1989b). The
decision to negotiate could well have been the only option for
restoring long term stability, but it could have been delayed.
The reason it was taken in 1990 then, was not just because
alternatives had failed for the government, but also because the
timing was propitious.

**Negotiations as Choice**

While the 1990 announcements were dramatic, the political
environment into which they were introduced had already been
partially prepared for them by a series of prior adjustments.
"The legalisation of the African trades unions in 1980; the
abolition of influx control in 1986; the granting of full
property rights to Africans in the common area of South Africa;
the opening of CCDs to occupational pursuits by all races; and
the law providing for certain "white" areas to become areas of
"free settlement" had the unintended combined effect that (by the
late 1980s) government itself (had) destroyed the central
purposes and principles of apartheid" (Schlemmer, 1991b, 22). A
number of positive developments led De Klerk to identify 1990 as
the right time for the completion of apartheid's legal demise.

De Klerk embarked on "an attempt to secure a settlement under
conditions which would enhance his chances of preserving the
crucial political interests of his constituency". In this light,
in 1990, "his strategic position was more favourable than it
could be calculated to be ever again" (Schlemmer, 1990, 258). By
negotiating now rather than later, the ANC would be more likely
to accept the government's "bottom line". It was the government's
perception of internal, regional and international developments
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that encouraged this
understanding.

Domestically, the 1989 election result was interpreted by De
Klerk as a mandate for further reform from the 70% of white
voters backing the NP and DP and this conclusion was actively
diffused through the media. De Klerk was also emboldened by the
failure of the CP to do as well in the election as was expected. The domestic security situation had improved and, importantly, Western intelligence had suggested to De Klerk that the ANC was not as powerful as Botha had feared (Schrire, 1992, 133).

Internationally, in the light of the traditional South African communist bogeyman, the crisis of the USSR in 1990 was reassuring for De Klerk. For many whites, the elimination of the Soviet threat, manifest in the ANC, was a consideration in favour of rapprochement. Within the region, South Africa and the USSR were even involved in a "working relationship" in the Namibian and Angolan negotiations.

The fact that the US, USSR and Western powers had displayed an "even handed approach" (Schlemmer, 1991b) in these negotiations (extending even to a favourable lack of reaction when South African troops killed hundreds of SWAPO guerillas moving outside their peace-brokered containment zones) raised expectations for a similarly benign attitude to internal negotiations with the ANC. The Namibian settlement had also won the government a degree of international respect, extending beyond the countries directly involved in the "solution", and De Klerk could rely on widespread moral support for internal negotiations.

The Namibia settlement had had the additional effect of pushing the ANC towards a more compromising position. It meant the loss of Angolan bases, with, given Mozambique's recent compliance with Pretoria, no prospect of re-establishment elsewhere in southern Africa. "Armed liberation became an absolutely remote ideal" (Schlemmer, 1991b, 17). But De Klerk was aware that there was possibly no need to make fundamental socio-economic concessions in negotiations with the ANC anyway:

"The "reasonableness" of Pretoria in abolishing legal apartheid has put great pressure on the opposition to respond in kind. International opinion wants South Africa saved from another failed socialist experiment, and the prolonged recession further pressures the ANC to accept far-reaching concessions. It appears as if the ANC cannot but accept the democratic and constitutional clamps around its options. If the ANC were again to withdraw from
negotiations, as it did in May 1992, it would have to return sooner or later in order to avoid a descent into barbarism" (Adam and Moodley, 1993, 35).

Within South Africa, even as the main party in government, it was appreciated that the ANC's capacity to redistribute and equalise material wealth between white and black would be constrained. The NP leadership under De Klerk was only too aware of the limitations: the fixed rate of investment had fallen from 32% of GDP in 1975 to 17% in 1991 and in order to redistribute, the ANC would need a growing economy; the organisation could not nationalise or deficit finance to such a degree as was anticipated by many of its followers, for fear of deterring investors; and the facts that white taxes were already high and that many blacks paid no taxes, would preclude much redistribution by way of taxation (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

The cumulative impact of these developments and realisations was to make it "abundantly clear that the strategic balance had shifted in favour of the South African government by 1990. The major price had been the relinquishing of Namibia ... in early 1990 the government could view the possible outcomes of compromise with the ANC far more positively than at any time since it came to power" (Schlemmer, 1991b, 17-18).

Even in this context though, the ANC would not be that easily co-opted. In 1990, as a result of the insurrection, the ANC itself had far more coherent internal support than it had ever had before. While, in 1990, the timing of negotiations was propitious for the government, the trend in black politics made them inevitable sooner or later.

From President De Klerk to President Mandela

The course of political change in South Africa during the four years from Nelson Mandela's release to the country's first ever nonracial elections could never have been charted in advance. Shifting alliances between seemingly irreconcilable opponents, the complexities of horse trading within, and behind the scenes of, the various negotiating forums, and the decisive impact of extraneous events such as the Boipatong massacre, the murder of
Chris Hani and the killings carried out by "Third Force" elements, ruled out any accurate predictions.

The story of South Africa's early 1990s headline-grabbing convulsions and eventual political transformation will be set out here. First it is necessary to introduce the main "characters" of the plot - the political groupings or "blocks" which may or may not have been formally identified as political parties, but which cohered around shared, or at least overlapping, ideological standpoints during the interregnum between the onset of negotiations and the ANC government. Five such "blocks" can be identified: De Klerk's "new-look" NP, the ANC leadership, Buthelezi and Inkatha, other homeland presidents and various white right wing bodies.

De Klerk's National Party and the ANC leadership were to find themselves thrown together in a common bond over the period - a bond brought about by their mutual desire to see a partial transfer of power from the former to the latter, with minimal disruption to South Africa's economic prospects. Their disputes centred on the extent of that transfer and its timing, not on the concept as a whole.

Opposed in some measure to the entire course of political change were those who had stakes in the old system: homeland leaders like Mangope who wished for a continuing regional dominance; Buthelezi - a special case, whose "appetite for power" (Mare and Hamilton, 1987), fed through the Inkatha political/war machine, would not be satiated by this, but would demand a national role; and various fractious amalgams of white "right wingers", whose agenda ranged from a return to the "labour racist" (Adam and Moodley, 1986) ideal of Verwoerdian apartheid to the nationalist dream of a secessionist state in which the culture of Afrikanerdom was allowed to exist in isolation. Parties with lower levels of support like the DP and the PAC remained mostly peripheral to the process of transition, but intruded upon and shaped that process for discrete periods.

In addition to the divisions between each of these "blocks" of political discourse, there were divisions within them. Particular media attention has focused on opening divides within the ANC. In making the compromises necessary for negotiations with a still
absolutely powerful state, the ANC leadership has, at times, alienated the militant activists and their representatives, who staged an insurrection in order to see the state pass into the hands of the movement - not to witness the moderation of its ideals and demands just when its position seemed stronger than ever. The fact that the PAC slogan "one settler, one bullet", became increasingly associated with ANC youth during the transition period is indicative of a desire for unhampered African government.

However, to some extent, each of the other negotiating or resisting parties was also an edifice built on shifting sands: De Klerk was engaged in an internal struggle with securocrats within the NP. The leadership's difficulty sprang partly out of a dual role during the transition period, as both participant and referee in negotiations. As referee, the government wished to disassociate itself from the violent "dirty tricks" carried out on the party's behalf by its security and intelligence officials. As participant, to some extent, it benefitted from the disruption to the ANC's organisation caused by the war of attrition in which security personnel took a hand. But the benefits could only be of a short term nature, and when the violence directed at the ANC grassroots threatened to overturn the whole transfer, covert security operations had to be reigned in.

The fractiousness of right wing organisations has already been noted, and it must be remembered that the white right wing is certainly not represented in its entirety by the fascistic and militaristic AWB whom the media find so fascinating: "for every rightist who breaks up a black picnic, ten anguish over their role in Africa. For every barfly telling Kaffir jokes, there's a pious householder praying for guidance. For every Terre'Blanche rattling sabres, there's a Boshoff seeking good neighbours through good fences. For every CP farmer who donders (beats) his labourers, 20 deliver their babies" (Denis Beckett, cited Adam and Moodley, 1993,154). The spectrum of right wing opinion was fully manifested during the transition, in the plethora of organisations and fronts that the block produced.

Even Buthelezi, it seems, experienced some difficulty in retaining his accustomed grip on Inkatha. As Inkatha's stand against participation in the constitutional negotiations, and
then the elections, and Buthelezi's increasingly evident links with security operations and culpability for mass violence were seen to be peripheralising the movement, there was a drift of support from within its upper hierarchy. Buthelezi's last minute dive into the electoral process was undertaken partially in recognition of the tendency.

During these four years of flux, South Africa was experiencing, in condensed form, politically transforming processes which would be considered radical had they panned out over decades. It is not surprising then, that the political interactions involved were often paradoxical and inconsistent, and always highly complex. An account of these interactions during South Africa's remarkable interregnum follows.

**Getting Negotiations Started**

Even while the NP leadership was preparing to enter into formal negotiations with its long time adversary during 1991, the state's security apparatus was executing a plan to bring that adversary to its knees. Based on the destabilisation of SWAPO in Namibia, the scheme was to bolster Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party as an alternative focus of black support to the ANC. If support was not forthcoming for Inkatha through peaceful means, then coercion would be used, a former SADF Major noting that, for military intelligence, "intimidation is the only thing that works in Africa" (Guardian, 11.6.91). But military intelligence was more sophisticated than the quotation implies. In addition to training and unleashing Inkatha impis, "educational" programmes, with a subliminal anti-ANC/African message, were run in the predominantly "Coloured" Western Cape, and various other subtle media were used across the country to discredit the ANC.

During July 1981, press investigations began to reveal the outline of the covert initiatives that had already been taken by state security apparatuses. The "Inkathagate" scandal, as it became known, involved the directing of Inkatha "warriors" against identified ANC targets, and even whole ANC supporting communities; the provision of weapons, substantial funds and logistical support to Inkatha in its war; security force involvement, alongside Inkatha, in attacks on train commuters, designed to reduce still further the level of tolerance between
Inkatha and the ANC by provoking retaliation; the funding of Inkatha's UWUSA - rival to COSATU; and connivance in KwaZulu Police "hit squads". In the immediate aftermath of the revelations, it was widely assumed that Buthelezi's political career could not survive the embarrassment. After all, a self-proclaimed "leader" of resistance to the state had been exposed as one of its key collaborators, and a particularly vicious one at that.

As the scale of covert security force support for Inkatha began to be revealed, the ANC's response was to push harder for an interim government. This would be comprised of representatives of parties other than just the NP, and it would take control until a new constitution could be devised. However, the government responded only by demoting the ministers in charge of the police and army - Adriaan Vlok and Magnus Malan.

While the Inkathagate revelations indicated the extent of resistance to transfer within the formidable state security network, there were signs that police forces "on the ground" would at least support the state against right wing opposition - something by no means to be taken for granted. In August 1991, police fired on AWB members in Ventersdorp, 100 miles west of Johannesburg. The brown-shirted AWB men, after protesting the presence of De Klerk in the town hall by throwing tear gas at police, attacked a van containing four Africans. Their rescue was effected by the police with the deaths of two attackers (Independent on Sunday, 11.9.91).

Somewhat discredited by its security forces' dirty tricks (reports of which continued to filter out even after the promise that action had been taken), and yet heartened by the support of police in the face of reactionary white protest, the government unveiled its constitutional proposals - immediately to have them rejected by the ANC for their blatant attempt to give minority parties as much power in a crucial upper house as the majority party. Against this backdrop of manoeuvres towards the opening of the real negotiations, the mass killing of both Inkatha and ANC supporters, and apolitical residents in the wrong place at the wrong time, continued.

In November 1991, media attention was temporarily diverted from
the violence to the plight of South Africa's poor, with the organisation of a strike against the introduction of VAT for medicines, basic foods, water and electricity. The strike, possibly involving an unprecedented 80% of the entire black workforce, including, for the first time, farmworkers, was backed by the major black resistance movements and characteristically opposed by Inkatha. The turnout reflected not just the material hardship that the new tax would involve for low paid workers and the unemployed, but frustration that such structural economic innovation should be taken by a government in its last days of power, without consultation with the movement that would be its successor.

Following the strike, a secret agreement was reached between the ANC and NP leaderships, paving the way to multiparty talks on a new constitution. In December 1991, formal constitutional negotiations began through the medium of the multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).

**CODESA**

CODESA was formed to establish mechanisms for the drafting of new legislation leading to the constitution of post-apartheid South Africa. The convention was attended by 19 parties including the South African government, the NP (separately represented), the ANC, the SACP, the DP, the Inkatha Freedom Party, tricameral parliament parties and homeland government parties. Working groups comprised of representatives of these parties were to concentrate on particular issues such as constitutional frameworks, the nature of an interim government and the future of the homelands, but the Inkatha and Ciskei government representatives refused to sign CODESA's declaration of intent committing it to work towards a unified, non-racial, democratic state.

Soon after CODESA was up and running, De Klerk's warning of a right wing reaction, geared towards inducing concessions from the ANC, seemed portentous, as the NP lost a by-election in Potchefstroom convincingly to the Conservative Party. De Klerk had previously portrayed the by-election result as a test of support for his reforms. In a rapid response to the outcome, the
NP leadership made the dramatic announcement of a nationwide white referendum on further reform, promising resignation in the event of defeat. Despite the opposition of the ANC, De Klerk was determined to publicly repudiate right wing claims to superior legitimacy.

There is no doubt that the NP felt secure in offering the challenge of a referendum, bolstered by numerous opinion polls and by the knowledge that the electorate was aware of the potentially disastrous and bloody outcome of reversing negotiations already initiated. A referendum would also be preferable to an alternative CP-inspired general election, in which the CP would be favoured by its support base in the over-represented rural constituencies. Amid intense campaigning the date for the referendum was set as March 17th, 1992, and the question to be put to the white electorate was formulated: "Do you support the continuation of the reform process which the state president began on February 2nd 1990, and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?".

Largely isolated from the violence continuing to wrack the townships, but aware of it as a lurking menace in South African society, 68.6% of the white referendum electorate, in an 85% turnout, voted "yes" to further reform. The result indicated more the fear of South Africa's inevitable spiral into unprecedentedly intense international condemnation and violent economic isolation in the event of a "no" vote, than an acceptance of ANC government. It also suggested faith in the NP's ability to hold out for a favourable dispensation for propertied whites under the future constitution.

That faith seemed justified when, back at CODESA and within a week of the referendum, a confident NP demanded diluted power sharing proposals involving a merely advisory, rather than executive transitional authority, the disbandment of MK, and a delay in interim rule until violence had subsided. The virtually unanimous rejection of these proposals by the other CODESA delegates (the exception was Inkatha), forced the NP to temporize, and the following day, Buthelezi too came out against the proposals on the grounds that they would strip his KwaZulu homeland of authority.
By May 1992, it seemed that deadlock was approaching at CODESA. Broad agreement had been reached on a multi-party group to oversee moves towards nonracial elections, but the shape of the new elected parliament, was the subject of fierce disagreement.

While the NP held out for a powerful upper house, formulated according to regional representation, to control the activity of a proportionately representative lower house, the ANC rejected the disproportionate strength this would accord the NP. The most fundamental disagreement though, was over the size of majority required to formulate the new constitution in the future parliament. The NP, hoping for about 25% of the vote in the elections (and therefore 25% of seats in the new lower house) wanted new legislation pertaining to the constitution to be passed only if 75% were in favour - giving the NP an effective veto. The ANC argued that a two thirds majority was customary and sufficient to amend the constitution, but it agreed to accept 70%. With no compromise forthcoming from the NP, an ANC official described the government's programme as "loser takes all". The ANC response was to organize once more for pressurizing "mass action".

The Breakdown of CODESA

Before any further constitutional progress had been made, one of the critical events of the interregnum occurred: the killings in Boipatong. On 17th June 1992, following a series of mutual attacks between Inkatha and ANC members, Inkatha hostel dwellers, assisted by police, went on the rampage in the township south of Johannesburg, hacking to death 42 men, women and children, including a nine-month old baby (Independent on Sunday, 21.6.92). From 1989 to 1992, over 7000 blacks had been killed in political violence - more than during the whole apartheid era (ibid), but this was the first such incident to provoke a coherent government response: De Klerk's visit of condolence to the township was driven off by angry crowds.

With constitutional talks ground to a halt and the state's security forces seen clearly to be continuing a war on the ANC in the townships, Mandela publicly called off further talks with the government on June 21st. Responding to the concerns of the ANC's supporters, many fighting for survival or revenge against Inkatha
members, Mandela stated that he could "no longer explain to our people why we continue to talk to a government which is murdering our people" (Guardian, 22.6.92). The negotiations, upon which the media spotlight had been focused, had broken down, but the killing continued.

Inkatha-dominated migrant worker hostels had become objects of fear and loathing within their surrounding Transvaal townships. The workers inside the hostels were aware of their vilification. They knew of the background political differences between their leader, Buthelezi, and the ANC leadership favoured by the townships; they lived in a tradition of hostel dweller - township resident cultural antipathy, and as a combative siege mentality was incited by Inkatha officials, assaults were launched on the surrounding community. The inevitable retaliation initiated the next round of local violence. When ANC leaders toured the townships, the first demand with which they were met was not for schools, hospitals, land or jobs, but for guns with which to fight Inkatha. Incidentally, it was in this context, with her militant identification with communities at war, and with the very poorest of urban black society, that Winnie Mandela staged a political comeback following her conviction for kidnapping and her separation from the ANC leader.

In the wake of Boipatong, the NP dropped its demand for a 75% majority for constitutional legislation to the 70% previously indicated by the ANC as acceptable, but the ANC's mass action campaign continued with a march on government buildings to press for more rapid moves towards an interim government.

In August 1992, as part of the campaign, up to four million workers stayed at home on the first day of a two day general strike. Accompanied by further violence and disputed claims over the level of support, the strike, together with subsequent marches involving 200,000 to 400,000 protestors, nevertheless served as a reminder that South Africa could never again be stabilised without ANC participation in a constitutional settlement.

Following a purge of high ranking security force personnel implicated in the violence (but sparing many of those associated with Inkathagate), it was revealed in September that covert
negotiations had already begun between the ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa and the government's Roelf Meyer, paving the way for a resumption of official talks. The substance of the agreement was a specified time-frame for the devising of a constitution, and a mechanism to break deadlock over the majority required for constitutional legislation. The inference was that the government had abandoned a minority veto, perhaps in return for concessions on a regional character to the new constitution (Guardian, 5.9.92).

However, even such tentative signs of a resumption in constitutional progress initially seemed premature when a new mass shooting occurred. In the Ciskei, the homeland leader Oupa Gqozo, backed by South African military intelligence, had become ever more vituperative as ANC supporters threatened to unseat him. In August, during the ANC's mass action campaign, a procession of 30,000, had marched on Ciskei, demanding that an interim administration be set up in the capital, Bisho. It was only saved from being fired upon by homeland troops and police when it was persuaded, by Antoine Geldunhuys, the head of the National Peace Secretariat, together with a UN observer, Jose Campino, to back away from the homeland border. But on September 7th, there was no saviour.

In a fresh march on Bisho, 70,000 ANC supporters were fired upon by troops from the homeland. The world's TV cameras rolled as two staggered bursts of gunfire left over 200 bloody bodies scattered along the homeland border. The firing, resulting in 29 deaths, had started without warning as a section of the crowd broke through razor wire fencing and headed for Bisho rather than the stadium allocated for the rally by a local magistrate. Mutual recriminations followed, with De Klerk blaming the inherently dangerous ANC tactic of mass mobilization and Cyril Ramaphosa, the collusion between South African and Ciskeian security forces. The moves towards resumed negotiations appeared, in the immediate aftermath, to have been reversed; but once again, the rhetoric of confrontation was followed by the revelation of behind-the-scenes contact. Four days later, the ANC announced that it was meeting the government to discuss the current level of violence. The ANC executive had decided that it could use Bisho to pressurize the government to make further concessions in restarted negotiations.

As Ramaphosa and Meyer haggled over the question of amnesty for
past apartheid crimes and the release of remaining political prisoners - preconditions for the envisaged talks on violence - tension was perceptibly mounting in Natal where Buthelezi saw his own position as homeland leader threatened by the same tendency that was aimed at Gqoza's unseating. During September, the Inkatha leader became increasingly bellicose, claiming that the ANC had effectively declared war on the Zulu by demanding the dismantling of the KwaZulu homeland, and infusing his supporters with blood lust. While Buthelezi was speaking of the greatest threat to the Zulu nation since "the conquest of KwaZulu in the battle of Ulundi in 1879" (Guardian, 25.9.92), KwaZulu civil servants who were known to be sympathetic to the ANC were having their houses burnt down and their lives threatened.

The Resumption of Talks

By the end of September, compromise had been reached on the release of political prisoners. Further agreement on the means of devising a new constitution was followed by a mutual commitment to resume negotiations. At this point, Buthelezi angrily pulled out of the resumed talks. Intent on carving out a role of national significance in any future settlement, he was exasperated at restriction of agreement so far to the NP and ANC. Realizing that his own political movement was being marginalised by talks between the real contenders for national power, his rhetoric became ever more inflamed with "predictions" of violence and instability in the event of his being overlooked. Whilst avoiding direct calls to arms, in a meeting with Gqoza and Mangope of Bophuthatswana, Buthelezi "foretold" that Zulus, synonymous in his lexicon with Inkatha, would violently resist any attempt to undermine their autonomy. In response, white right wing leaders including Treurnicht of the CP hinted at a possible alliance with the homeland leaders, in mutual antipathy to the ANC. It could be said of both groups that they "know their influence is greater now than it will be after the first election, which will cut them down to size or wipe them out altogether, and so they are making what impact they can. The country is being held to ransom by a desperate minority" (Observer, 4.10.92).

A linked desperate minority still lurked within the security forces. In November, the Goldstone Commission, set up to enquire
into security force activity, publicised Military Intelligence plans to discredit ANC leaders with prostitutes, homosexuals and drug dealers. De Klerk was forced to sack the command of the security branch, a further purge following in December. The ANC moved quickly to apply pressure for constitutional progress, simultaneously offering the security forces guaranteed job security, retrenchment packages and pensions under a future government. The government swiftly announced a time frame for future elections: April 1994.

With these fresh moves towards rapprochement between the two big parties, another marginalised political grouping - the PAC, made its presence felt. Amid continuing widespread murder in the black areas, November 1992 marked the first APLA (the PAC's armed wing) attacks on white civilians living in the disputed Transkei border region. As was intended, the disproportionate media attention given to the deaths of four whites gave the PAC an opportunity to compare the differential value still accorded to white and black life in the "new" South Africa.

Throughout the early months of 1993 numerous talks continued: between the ANC and the NP on conditions for resumed formal constitutional negotiations, and between both parties and Buthelezi in attempts to secure his involvement without conceding him the political status that he demanded. Meanwhile the partially orchestrated violence of the townships continued, the ANC releasing figures of 380 of its members killed between January and November 1992. In February 1993, the two "major players" agreed on a five year term for the new elected government - in other words, delaying the imposition of a constitution devised by that elected assembly until 1999.

Following these significant strides towards a fixed agreement, the press began its evaluation of the last "wasted year" (Guardian, 15.2.93). Analysis suggested that De Klerk, in the wake of his referendum triumph over the conservatives, had pushed the ANC too hard over the minority veto (ibid). However, it seems likely that De Klerk had envisaged such a veto all along - it was not simply an idea implanted with the achievement of a white mandate to negotiate.

Undermined by its security forces' transgressions, which were
continually entering the public domain through investigative journalism and the Goldstone Commission, and facing severe economic decline as investors were deterred by violence (see below), the government had, by 1993, reconciled itself to greater ANC influence over the writing of a new, permanent constitution. The reconciliation had possibly been made easier by an ANC commitment to formulate the constitution by consensus, even in the event of its fulfilling the legal requirements to write it unilaterally.

With the outline of the elected body which would write a constitution becoming less hazy, and having achieved little through premonitions of war, Buthelezi decided to participate once more. The CP and the PAC similarly became involved in the new "nameless" talks (the acronym CODESA having become unacceptable to these parties).

Just as previously, when progress towards a constitutional settlement had been resumed, and with the almost routine killing continuing, a particularly salient violent incident intruded. In April 1993, the MK chief of staff and SACP leader, Chris Hani was murdered by a white right winger backed by a Conservative MP and his wife. The timing was probably not coincidental. Hani was the second most popular figure in the country after Mandela (poll cited Independent on Sunday, 11.4.93), and his death resulted in the seething black frustration at continuing, directed killing, during the white state's dying months, erupting into rioting across the country. Mandela, speaking at ANC memorial services, was greeted with sullen silence when he stressed the need for moderation and chided ANC supporters for chanting "Kill the Farmer, Kill the Boer". Attacks on whites did indeed mount in the aftermath of the killing, most carried out by PAC rather than ANC supporters, though the brutalised youth of the larger movement largely condoned them. The period of turmoil brought the unprecedented sight of ANC officials desperately cooperating with police in attempts to restrain their supporters from further rioting and looting.

Following the death of the CP's leader, Andries Treurnicht, and soon after Hani's assassination, four former police and army generals, led by Constand Viljoen, ex-Commander in Chief of the SADF, combined to marshal right wing opposition to further
constitutional concessions. To some extent, they succeeded in pulling together disparate strands of white reaction - the CP, the HNP and the relatively moderate Afrikaner Volksunie. The AWB remained politically sympathetic, but preferring the extra-legal rhetoric of war to the more considered path of the generals. Through the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAC), the new body, subsequently named the Afrikaner Volksfront, forged links with the homeland leaders similarly opposed to ANC government.

By July 1993, Buthelezi had refined the rhetoric of his resistance to democratic elections by claiming to represent a tradition of Zulu ethnic independence. The strategy required roping Buthelezi's nephew and many argued, puppet, the Zulu King Zwelithini into a more prominent role as the threatened monarch. The firm setting of the election date for April 27th 1994 was followed by Buthelezi's vehement objection and an associated upsurge in Inkatha-ANC killing, centring once again on the Inkatha hostels.

When the draft interim constitution - essentially that which has in fact been implemented - was announced at the end of July (Guardian, 27.7.93), it was hoped that the provision for elected regional bodies to draw up their own constitutions would placate Buthelezi, since he could aim for the Natal/KwaZulu premiership.

Other salient characteristics of the transitional constitution - adopted for the elections and until the elected body could draw up a permanent constitution - included a national assembly of 400 members. Two hundred would be elected from across the nation by proportional representation from a party list ballot, with the other 200 comprised of those elected in regional ballots, their numbers proportionate to the populations of the regions. There would also be a senate containing 90 members - 10 from each region, representative of the composition of the regional legislatures. New constitutional legislation could only be passed under the new government if, in both the national assembly and the senate sitting together, it was ratified by two thirds of the members. Any party which attained over five percent of the national vote, or 20 seats, would be entitled to cabinet members in proportion to its vote. The regional governments, reflecting proportions of the vote within the regions, would formulate their own constitutions (subject to national limitations) with similar
two thirds majorities. Their domain would extend over urban and rural development, taxation, law and policing, language policy and the media.

Despite massive peace marches in the wake of the announcement, violence indicative of a descent towards civil war continued in the townships, with PAC gunmen extending it occasionally to white areas and white targets. Agreement on a transitional executive council (TEC) to oversee the path to elections for the new parliament, involved the ANC in a first taste of executive power. This too was followed by more seemingly random acts of terror, prompting the ANC to blame continuing "third force" activity aimed at upsetting each constitutional advance. If so, the tactic was unsuccessful: the idea of elections, under the agreed constitution, and on the agreed date, became ever more fixed in most South Africans' minds.

With the constitution finalised in November and passed by the now anachronistic tricameral parliament in December, while ANC and NP members partied in Johannesburg, Suthlezi and the Afrikaner Volksfront plotted their resistance. They were joined by Gqozo and Mangope as the TEC prepared to repeal laws recognising their "independent" homelands. Together, these groups in opposition formed a new political block - the "Freedom Alliance", whose representatives became involved in ongoing, but fruitless discussions with the government and the ANC. The celebrations of the Day of the Covenant, commemorating the Afrikaner trekkers' victory over the Zulu in December 1838, manifested exquisitely the ironies of the contemporary South African political scene. A ludicrous alliance of modern racist Afrikaners and self-proclaimed Zulu leaders remembered their own version of events in 1838, whilst maintaining united opposition to a democratic future for the rest of the country (see The Times, 19.12.93).

When, in December, the TEC announced that all homelands would, if necessary, be forcibly reincorporated, the scene was set for the debacle of Bophuthatswana. On March 11th 1994, members of Bophuthatswana's police force, afraid of losing their jobs and pensions, and perhaps even their lives in the event of forced reincorporation, mutinied and marched on Pretoria's embassy in the homeland's capital of Mmabatho, to demand immediate, peaceful reincorporation. Under additional pressure from a civil service
strike and civilian demonstrations, Mangope fled from the city, effectively leaving its political control in the hands of ANC supporters. Opposed to homeland reincorporation, and seeing themselves as engaged in a military alliance with Mangope, armed AWB members gathered in pick-up trucks on the homeland border before dramatically intervening in an attempt to restore its president.

Within hours, and minus three, they were fleeing from the homeland's police and army. The "warriors" of the right wing had driven in convoy through the town shooting over 40 black passers-by from their truck windows until they were corralled by the black police and driven off the streets. As one group was leaving though, shots continued to be fired at black stone-throwers. In response, a black policeman raked an AWB car with gunfire, killing one of the occupants instantly. In front of TV cameras and press, the two survivors, having failed to realize that their lives were still threatened by the policeman, demanded medical assistance. To the surprise of the journalists present, and even of the black spectators jeering "are you sorry now?", the policeman dispassionately shot the two men dead. As John Carlin of the Independent newspaper pointed out, the neo-Nazi Afrikaners had learned in their last seconds a lesson that they had resisted all their lives: South African blacks were no longer intimidated by white authority and violence.

In the absence of widespread sorrow for the killings, and with SADF co-operation in the removal of the remaining AWB men from the homeland, constitutional right wing leaders realized that they had reached the nadir of their opposition to the elections. Minutes before a midnight deadline, Viljoen confirmed that his movement, now called the Freedom Front, would be participating. Mangope was restored to what remained of the homeland presidency on condition that it be reincorporated following the elections, and that he allow free voting in the region.

A month before those elections, with Buthelezi still holding out, via Zwelithini, for "Zulu autonomy", the Goldstone Commission reported that "third force" destabilization had been masterminded by Colonel De Kock of the security police, assisted by three police officers in liaison with Inkatha officials. The deputy commissioner of police, Basie-Smit, the head of counter-
intelligence, Engelbrecht, and the CID commander, Le Roux, had conspired with Inkatha men such as Themba Khoza, to supply Inkatha with weapons and helped identify targets (Guardian, 19.3.94). Once again, it was predicted that Buthelezi's political career could not survive association with a security force manipulated campaign of mass murder (Independent on Sunday, 20.3.94), but once again his tenacity was underestimated.

As Buthelezi prepared for armed resistance to a democratically elected South African state, his counterpart in the Ciskei - the only other remaining homeland leader opposed to reincorporation - faced a police mutiny similar to that in Bophuthatswana. Following Gqozo's relinquishing of power, the territory was governed by administrators appointed by the TEC. The isolated Buthelezi, with some reason, now feared an ANC-coordinated plan to unseat him too. As De Klerk took half-hearted measures against the police chiefs implicated by Goldstone, fears mounted that, despite a widespread desire to vote indicated by polls in Natal, Inkatha would be able to mount effective resistance to elections in the region.

With the tension between Inkatha and the ANC at its peak, Inkatha organised an armed march past the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg. As some of the marchers, unescorted by police, veered towards the ANC building, firing erupted from the ground floor and upper levels. In the ensuing melee, both outside the building and in other nearby locations, 18 Inkatha men were killed immediately, and by the time the violence had subsided, 51 people were dead. Buthelezi insisted that, in the light of this violence directed against his supporters, elections must be delayed, but the government ruled that out of the question and, with the TEC taking the initiative, declared a state of emergency in Natal to prevent further bloodshed there diverting the path to elections.

Within Natal, however the fighting continued. Pressurized and galvanised by Inkatha warlords and rural chiefs, KwaZulu's villagers were stirred into war against the ANC. They were motivated to kill by Inkatha rhetoric of a threatened ANC/Xhosa takeover followed by the suppression of Zulu customs and the confiscation of land and even wives. When fears of this nature were combined with continuing chiefly monopoly over the
allocation of local resources, and coercion to participate, Inkatha's violence gained considerable momentum. The notorious Inkatha warlord, David Ntombela proved particularly effective at mobilizing impis through just such a blend of rhetoric and intimidation. In village meetings, at which attendance was compulsory, he would first excite the rendition of war chants with tales of ANC savagery, and then point his finger at those participating with insufficient gusto. Once his accompanying gunmen had persuaded all present to join in unreservedly, the village men would be launched against local ANC targets.

But amidst all the evidence of these forces at play, it was perhaps easy to forget the underlying sense of ethnic identity which must have been reified to produce the violence. Even if this was Zulu killing Zulu, Inkatha's impis were acting partly in the belief that they were fighting for the preservation of their essential "Zulu-ness" against the alien influences which they believed had contaminated local ANC supporters. As Rian Malan put it, "one trusts one's instincts and mine maintained that there was more to Zuluism than ever dreamed of in the philosophies of white Marxists and Methodists" (Guardian, 13.5.94). A dramatic consequence of the regional conflict was geographical. As Buthelezi supporters drove out or killed ANC members from areas they perceived as their own, the process in reverse occurred in ANC supporting areas. Geographical polarization between the politically divided Zulu communities came to reflect the gulf between their political leaders.

Buthelezi, having lost right wing, security force and other homeland allies, knowing that he stood no chance of gaining national power in the elections, and doubting that he could even achieve dominance in his declared region of KwaZulu/Natal, had desperately held out for some continuing role for an ethnic Zulu kingdom in which he could exercise post-apartheid power. But by March 1994, with a State of Emergency meaning that continued Inkatha inspired violence in Natal would meet with a coherent state military response, Buthelezi's strategy had reached the limits of its logic. It seemed certain that the elections would go ahead, and would be declared free and fair even without Buthelezi's participation, and in spite of the chaos that Inkatha could muster. In that event, the new central government would immediately cut off the funds which had directly sustained the
KwaZulu homeland structure and indirectly organised and armed Inkatha. With the SADF at its disposal, it could then rapidly crush continued armed resistance. Since the international community was united behind the electoral process in South Africa, Inkatha, unlike UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, could not rely on outside support. It simply could not sustain resistance to a new ANC led state.

Yet, despite starting talks with the government and the ANC at the beginning of April, Buthelezi continued to reject offers of full recognition for the Zulu monarchy which, Mandela pointed out, would accord it more power even than that held by Queen Elizabeth. He refused to let Inkatha take part in the elections. In the final run up to the election, polls in the KwaZulu/Natal region suggested that Inkatha would win 21%, and the ANC, 44% of the black vote (Guardian, 11.4.94). If Buthelezi could have been confident of winning this regional vote, it seems likely that he would have already succumbed. His eleventh hour refusal suggests that he was aware that the perception of widespread Inkatha support in the region rested partially on intimidation.

In the days before the election, the ANC was also increasingly concerned about competition for another region - the Western Cape. This time the challenge came from the NP. Amidst allegations of racist electioneering, the NP could trust to the fears of the region's majority "Coloured" population that a regional ANC dominance would lead to preference for Africans, similar to the preference that they themselves had received from the NP under apartheid. In particular, much of the "Coloured" electorate was concerned at the possibility of an African urban influx and one-sided competition for housing, jobs and local resources.

Exactly one week before the election, Buthelezi agreed to participate, choosing to accept watered down versions of the ANC and NP offers that he had only recently rejected. While Buthelezi claimed that the volte face was the result of personal intervention by a Kenyan self-proclaimed diplomatic specialist, it is more likely that he was facing increased pressure from those within Inkatha - perhaps even Zwelithini - who stood to lose the influence granted them by Inkatha's genuine KwaZulu constituency if the movement ruled itself out entirely from the
next government. The interpretation centring on Zwelithini's personal opposition to further boycott was strengthened by the post-electoral revelation that De Klerk had unilaterally conceded a significant portion of KwaZulu's land area to Zwelithini himself, effectively excluding it from any future ANC land redistribution scheme. Even if the Inkatha movement as a whole could not win the regional premiership, proportional representation would give it some standing under the new constitution. But if it persisted in refusing to accept that constitution, there was absolutely nothing to be gained, and all to be lost.

The Elections

With Inkatha-ANC violence subsiding in the light of Inkatha's climb-down, extreme right wingers, bereft of further creditable political opposition to the elections, began a bombing campaign on the day before elections began. 21 people were killed in Johannesburg and Pretoria on April 25th. On the next day though, the first black South Africans to vote in post-apartheid elections, went to the polls. These were special categories of voters including the elderly and disabled, allowed to vote a day before the rest of the electorate. Despite threats of further bombs and administrative chaos involving shortages of indelible ink to mark those who had already voted and supplies of the stickers by which Inkatha's late candidacy would be marked on ballots, the first day of voting was distinguished by its widespread euphoria. The same blend of anxiety over the logistics of registering and recording the votes of an electorate of roughly (no one could be sure) 22 million, and multiracial rejoicing, characterised the rest of the electoral period. A further bomb explosion at Jan Smuts international airport was followed swiftly by the arrest of 31 right wing culprits. This marked the last intervention by groups violently opposed to the electoral process.

Throughout the 27th and 28th of April, while enormous queues patiently awaited the chance to vote outside some polling booths, others, mostly in rural areas, had ballot papers but no voters. Allegations of vote rigging, particularly in KwaZulu/Natal, where Inkatha officials opened unofficial polling booths and included marked ballot papers with those of legitimate booths, continued
with the extension of voting into the early hours of the morning and, in some areas, the next day too. Even once the shambolic, but jubilant poll had been conducted, the counting process proved to be as exasperating as the voting. As results trickled excruciatingly slowly into the media, specific incidents revealed the difficulties of holding a free and fair vote - for instance, ballot boxes stuffed with neatly folded Inkatha votes and cars and warehouses containing official ballot boxes with genuine votes in them. Nevertheless, amazingly, South Africa had experienced two whole days on which not one violent crime was reported.

Even with most of the national results in, evident ballot rigging in KwaZulu/Natal, mostly in Inkatha's favour, delayed the declaration of a final result. The region's results were eventually determined not by the votes cast at all, but by an agreement between the major parties to give Buthelezi just over half the regional votes - enough to become undisputed regional premier. In spite of the protestations of the local ANC leadership, which wished to genuinely contest the region, it seems that the national ANC leadership had decided that, by giving Buthelezi a significant role, it could secure more favourable prospects for peace and, therefore, economic stability. Buthelezi had recently implied that he would accept the count only if it was in his favour. Pallo Jordan of the ANC, invoking Lyndon Johnson's phrase in a slightly different context, could have been summarizing the party's policy towards Buthelezi: it is better to have potential troublemakers 'inside the tent pissing out than outside pissing in'.

After numerous predictions that Buthelezi's political career would soon be over given his movement's role in violence and his attempts at blackmailing the country through threats of civil war, he had achieved after all, more power within the region than he had had as homeland leader. Soon appointed as Home Affairs minister in Nelson Mandela's new cabinet, he had also managed to secure an important national role. For the new ANC government, his potential to continue stirring violence is at least diminished, and he has responsibility for a difficult government role, for which he can take the blame in the event of failure to meet expectations.
The "new" South Africa then, would be governed for at least five years by the ANC under president Mandela, commanding 62.6% of the total vote - possibly through another negotiated electoral outcome, not quite enough to rewrite the constitution unilaterally. In a decision similarly geared towards international investment, the NP's Derek Keys retained the Finance post, while Roelf Meyer became Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development. The Deputy Presidents are Thabo Mbeki and F.W. De Klerk, and the radically popular Winnie Mandela has been brought on board in the relatively obscure position as Deputy Minister for Arts, Culture, Science and Technology.

From this glance at the course of the last four years' dramatic political events, it would seem that De Klerk's NP has conceded more than it intended at the outset of the reform initiative. South Africa, despite a commitment to multi-party executive government for the next five years, has no entrenched clause protecting white, or even "minority" rights, and despite failing (or declining) to achieve the parliamentary domination required to rewrite the constitution unilaterally, the ANC has a firm hold on the assembly which will write South Africa's next constitution - something that the NP sought throughout 1991 and 1992 to prevent. The outcome of negotiations which the NP first envisaged as resulting in a more limited kind of "power sharing", demonstrates the unpredictable dialectics involved in an entire political transformation.

The Shape of the "New South Africa"

With growing familiarity between negotiators from the ANC and the NP, the relative moderation and economic realism of the ANC leadership must have struck many members of the NP establishment. The ANC's early attempts to placate business interests and its shedding of the perception of nationalisation as panacea would have enhanced NP peace of mind at the prospect of less restricted ANC power. But of equal importance in the tendency to concede more than was first envisaged, was the impact of extraneous events. The sheer scale of the VAT strike, the countrywide protestation at the Boipatong and Bisho shootings, and the genuine grief at the murder of Chris Hani, all contributed to the
realisation that vehement and nationwide support for an unhampered ANC government precluded economic or political stability under any substantially different order.

But political and economic stability is by no means assured for South Africa. Firstly, the political credibility of the new ANC administration is not unchallenged. Questions over members' past behaviour are likely to fade as the party exercises power, but they have nonetheless vexed some political observers. Despite the suppression of an internal report, in 1993 it was revealed that there were incidents of routine torture at an external ANC training camp; there have been allegations of financial mismanagement and corruption in the ANC's financial arm, Thebe, and within the party's Social Welfare Department under Winnie Mandela; Nelson Mandela's personal intervention to prevent a police search of ANC headquarters after the March 1994 shooting on the Inkatha march has raised some suspicions, and there is annoyance within black townships at the "yuppification" of ANC leaders, extending even to friendships with the likes of Sol Kerzner, the millionaire who made his fortune out of homeland casinos. Yet, in comparison with the known illegitimate actions of the NP and Inkatha, the ANC is on relatively secure ground.

Political instability in the "new South Africa" is more likely to come from an inability to meet material expectations raised by the transition process than from the discrediting of leaders. The death throes of apartheid sent South Africa into economic trauma and the legacies of racial domination in land, health, education, transport and employment are all biting more evidently now that their most obvious source has been removed.

The Development Bank of South Africa has estimated that 9 million are now completely destitute and the ANC has been supported by these and others not just for its historic opposition to apartheid, but because of its promise to deliver material salvation, in much the same way that the NP did for the volk. With competition for the resources now at the ANC's disposal, scenarios disturbing for the prospect of future political stability can be posited. If high expectations are not fulfilled, the brutalised, conflict-acquainted youth could well turn out once more in opposition to the authorities, and Winnie Mandela has effectively promised to lead them.
As under apartheid, it is the established urban interests that are most likely to be successful in competition for the new state's resources. While COSATU and the still intact urban civic structures, which largely represent formal township residents, will be extremely powerful constituencies within the new body politic, less organised and less economically significant urban squatters may find the pace of material improvement too slow. Traditional rural societies in the impoverished former homelands could find themselves even further neglected in the implementation of the ANC's economic reconstruction plan.

The ability of the ANC to prevent its support base from dividing along spatial/economic lines lies in its capacity to fulfil each of its election pledges - to create 2.5 million jobs in 10 years, to build 1 million homes, to electrify 2.5 million households, to redistribute 30% of agricultural land and to improve drastically on black education and health care. A disproportionate focus on some of these goals at the expense of others could prove divisive between rural and urban areas, but even the attainment of rural goals like land redistribution could disadvantage some - for instance those who eke out a living by migrating to work on white farms.

If it is to be successful in its material goals, the new government will require a dramatic turnaround in current economic fortunes. Government borrowing already accounts for 6% of GNP (Independent on Sunday, 24.4.94), so there is little hope for an expanding budget. Very low rates of domestic savings, no immediate prospect of a rise in employment and the long term difficulties faced by a primary product exporter (Financial Times, 22.4.94) all increase the dependence on investment from outside. It was the growing realization of these difficulties, not all brought about solely by apartheid, that edged the ANC into an economic rapport with the NP during negotiations and led to its relinquishing the prospect of nationalisation.

The level of outside investment over the years of transition has been remarkably sensitive to political events. With the moves towards a negotiated future in 1990, the capital flight that had so perturbed reformists under Botha was reduced, but the uncertainty induced by the breakdown in talks during 1992 led to outflows quadrupling again, until they exceeded 4% of national
income (Independent on Sunday, 24.4.94). With Inkatha's promise of armed resistance just before the elections, the rand fell to a record closing low (Guardian, 16.4.94). In order to secure future investment then, the government must first ensure political stability. Assuming it does so, the prospects look relatively good. South Africa has established legal and financial services, a relatively well developed infrastructure, a continental economic dominance, relatively low foreign debt (rescheduled in September 1993), and the world's second largest "emerging" market (Guardian, 30.4.94) to be untapped by the new government's reconstruction programme. The economic undermining of local government structures through rent boycotts - at least politically inspired ones - has also been called off.

At present, investment in South Africa is being seen as high risk, but potentially extremely profitable in the short term. Immediate growth sectors are expected to be in construction, tourism boosted by pristine beaches, spectacularly beautiful scenery and safari wildlife, and life insurance. Institutional investors like the Prudential have already established in Johannesburg and white companies have proved keen to employ or even sell assets to black businesspeople, although this has had minimal impact on the enormous gulf between the overwhelmingly white formal business sector, and the crowded, but relatively unprofitable, black informal economy (Financial Times, 22.4.94).

As South Africa emerged from its post-apartheid elections, it was clear that the government's ability to satisfy the material expectations of those who had suffered organised state discrimination for their entire lifetimes, depended on securing their political acquiescence. This was the realization that had spurred De Klerk's NP leadership to negotiate in the first place. But that acquiescence itself would require some satisfaction of material expectations - a "Catch 22" of the kind that has held the key to late 20th century South African social formation. The greatest political question facing the South African state today is how patient will the poorest and most alienated be?
Conclusion

Conceptions of South African Socio-Political Formation

This final chapter is not so much a summary; more of an attempt to infer from the foregoing narrative, the nature of the historical relationship between the South African state and wider agencies. Firstly, general theories of state formation and interaction with society are overviewed and applied to the South African case. Secondly, South Africa's social development since the colonial period is set in a wider geographical context.

In this part of the thesis, I have attempted to describe and explain the historical formation of important South African political, economic, social and cultural structures. The often contradictory and continuously changing South African state has obviously had much to do with the evolution of these structures, but wider, socially generated agencies within South Africa have interacted with it, and with each other, to determine their final shape. In addition, many of the internal political and economic developments that have influenced South African social forms have either directly resulted from its interaction in a wider world economy, or have reflected developments occurring contemporaneously elsewhere. Here, a geographically informed approach can yield insights relatively neglected by the historians and sociologists whose work informs such a large portion of the preceding account. Indeed, the influence of space and locality themselves, have generally been neglected in studies of South Africa's social formation. The chapter concludes then, with an attempt to set the preceding account of South African social formation in a theoretical context informed by studies of state-society relations, and of South Africa's position within a wider world.

Theories of the State

Given the perhaps unique importance of the state in shaping South Africa's human geography and social interaction, state theory should comprise a part of any general survey. The absence of such a component in many analyses led Mitchell and Russell, 1989, to emphasise the need for "bringing the state back in" (Mitchell and Russell, 1989b, 315). The nature of the relationship between the
state and segments of the wider society has been a bone of contention between Marxists and liberals, each "school" having its own set of explicit or, more often, implicit and unarticulated assumptions.

Early Marxist notions of the state tended to be ranged along a narrow spectrum, from functionalist (the state acts in the interests of the economic system as a whole) to instrumentalist (the state is the agent of whichever are the "ruling classes"). An example of the former position is that of Lea, 1982, who argues that the post-Soweto attempt by government to partially address the black housing shortage was entirely intended to "guarantee the conditions for continued capital accumulation". The work of Poulantzus was intended to escape such confining Marxist notions. Instead of the pliant agent of capital, the state for Poulantzus is the site of struggle between different fractions of the dominant classes. The dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie, according to "fractionalists" who based their work on Poulantzus, form a power bloc and contend for hegemony within it, sometimes, when deadlocks occur, seeking support from non-bourgeois classes. The resulting alliances can produce state policies which appear to contradict the interests of capital; but such ostensibly anti-business policies are "ultimately in the real interest of capital" (Yudelman, 1987, 252).

Fractionalist periodization of the South African state was "littered with "turning points" where the balance of power shifted between fractions" (Yudelman, 1987, 252), particularly 1924 and 1948. Davis et al, 1976, provide illustration, with an account of the struggles between mining capital and "national" manufacturing and agricultural capital to dominate state policy on foreign trade. The implementation of protectionist policies indicated that national capital was hegemonic at a given time, while a shift towards free trade manifested the usurping of that hegemony by foreign (largely mining) capital. Despite Poulantzus's original aim of widening the state's agenda, fractionalist studies of the South African state have still tended to portray its role as limited to that of political agent to whichever fraction was dominant (Wolpe, 1988).

While a Poulantzian analysis can be seen as "neo-Marxist", Yudelman, 1987, points out that its divergence from liberal
analyses is not that great. Liberals have portrayed the state as trying to ensure a stable environment for competing groups in capitalist society. Such a framework has been adopted to its fullest extent in a liberal work by Lipton, 1985. Lipton argues that, overall this century, white labour and agricultural capital were the dominant influences on the state, despite the 1923-24 dominance of foreign-owned mining capital and that of mining, manufacturing and commercial capital from 1939 to 1948. Her analysis departs from that of the fractionalists though, in her emphasis on the nationalist or ethnic formation of the dominant groups, rather than their economic nature. White, and particularly Afrikaner, workers and farmers' interests could not be served by the operation of "free market" forces. The institutionalised racism of apartheid was largely an attempt by the state to intervene on behalf of these politically powerful "national" groups, by effecting unskilled black labour controls and the suppression of black producers and skilled classes.

Lipton's emphasis on the political and ideological, rather than the economic nature, of the "dominant classes" leads to the conclusion that "South Africa's development since Union does not support the thesis that the state was the instrument of capital". The mining companies and other key economic interests, although economically dominant, were, at times when they were in conflict with white labour, the bureaucracy or weaker agricultural interests, overridden. The "foreign" nature of many of the economically dominant fractions of capital rendered them politically unsuitable for a close alliance with government, particularly under the NP.

Although the stress on the political or ethnic nature of the most influential groups distinguishes Lipton's liberal analysis from the fractionalists (who did recognise national and foreign capital differentiation, but put the onus on their economic role), her conception of the state shares the limitation of an implied pliability, a non-autonomous reaction to demands placed upon it, which has been criticised by observers such as Yudelman, 1983, 1987, and Greenberg, 1987.

Yudelman's main point is that liberal and Marxist theories of the state all see it as representational, regardless of whether they see it as representing the general interest, a particular class
or a particular group. His own feeling is that the state should be seen in some senses as an actor in its own right, although not entirely autonomous, due to the limited range of choices it has in seeking to satisfy its major constituencies.

Before elaborating on Yudelman's perception of the South African state, it is necessary to introduce more universal approaches to the role of the state in capitalist society, developed by theorists such as Miliband and Habermas. Their ideas provide the framework for much of the more recent work specifically on the South African state.

Miliband was concerned to accord the state more autonomy than that allowed by traditional accounts. For him "an accurate and realistic "model" of the relationship between the dominant class in advanced capitalist societies and the state is one of the partnership between two different, separate forces, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate spheres of concern" (quoted Graaff, 1990, 50). Greenberg's analysis goes further, as he "portrays the state as relatively disconnected from class interests and, instead of carrying out the dictates of fractions of capital, it imposes its own project on a quiescent and pliant manufacturing sector", while "Glaser and Posel came to similar conclusions though they attribute more weight to demands of capitalists in altering and shaping these policies" (Nattrass, 1991, 675). Following Miliband then, the state can be seen to possess more autonomy than fractionalists or some liberal analysts have granted it.

While neo-Marxist accounts tended to emphasise the economic role of whichever group most swayed the state, and liberals defined it by its political role, according to Habermas, "the independence of economy and politics in "early" capitalism has been replaced by their intersection in "late" or "advanced" capitalism so that a new system of concepts is required which is capable of clarifying the role of the state in "managing the various economic, political and socio-cultural crises of advanced capitalism"" (Habermas, 1975, quoted Johnston, Gregory and Smith, 1990, 83). The duality of the state's political and economic concerns renders it susceptible to crises, both of legitimation in the eyes of its political constituents, and of economic accumulation. Its position is influenced both by political ideas
Legitimation and Accumulation in South Africa

In the light of South Africa's mid 1980s insurrection, "analysis of South African conflict is now focusing on the state's legitimation crisis, its lack of accepted authority ... and increasing inability to perform its everyday functions without the exercise of naked force" (Yudelman, 1987, 250). But the state's legitimation crisis is accompanied by an accumulation crisis. With "the growing inability of the economy to generate the revenue or jobs necessary to underpin social or political programmes ... there is structural crisis in the economy itself" (Yudelman, 1987, 251).

Due to the state's concern with legitimation as well as accumulation, Yudelman sees it as not so much the instrument of capital, more a relatively autonomous agent which enters into a relationship of symbiosis with capital. The state's concern to satisfy non-materially defined constituencies in society, as well as the conditions for capital accumulation, means that it does not submit itself pliantly to the caprice of whichever fraction of capital is dominant.

The more general work of Weber also has ramifications for South African state theory. Weber emphasised the distinction between the state and the government, the former consisting of the executive, the legislative, the civil service, the judiciary, the police and army; the latter of the cabinet of the day.

Dealing with the state first: Yudelman suggests that the South African state was "exposed earlier than most modern states to the necessity of resolving the tension between legitimation and accumulation" (Yudelman, 1987, 250). The long term relationship of symbiosis between the state and capital in South Africa developed in the post Anglo-Boer War reconstruction period, under pressure of demands from the gold mining industry, and because of the concentration and homogeneity of capital in this early period (Stadler, 1987), and it persevered despite changes in government. That the state did not entirely submit itself to the whim of dominant fractions of capital, was due to the similarly early need for legitimation: the concentration of political power in
the hands of ethnically defined Afrikaners, disproportionately found in the agricultural and working classes, led to large scale state intervention on their behalf. The state needed to legitimate itself within the white population, and Afrikaners in particular, through ideology and by broadening representation. At the same time, it needed to protect the accumulation process in order to ensure continued economic growth. "Because the state needed private enterprise to optimise the accumulation function, and because capital needed the state to perform the legitimation function, a relationship of mutual dependence was the natural outcome" (Yudelman, 1987, 253).

Applying Yudelman's concept, we can see that, at certain times, the tension between the accumulation function and the legitimation function becomes manifest - for instance, during the 1922 miners strike, when mining capital's imperative to erode the job colour bar conflicted with Afrikaans miners' political desire to retain it. In this instance, Smuts's government of the day, by enforcing the demands of capital, lost out politically in the 1924 election, but the long-term relationship of symbiosis between state and capital, by and large, remained intact.

The distinction between state and government means that discrete political events initiated by the government are often, seemingly contradictorily, superimposed on the state's long term relationship of symbiosis. For Botha's government though, Yudelman believes that the symbiosis was strengthened by the entrenchment of a legitimation crisis stemming from both black resistance and a loss of Afrikaner working and middle class support for ineffective reformism. "Business has always had a large voice in determining policy, but the current mutually reinforcing economic and political crises and the government's weakness, have enabled business increasingly to influence fundamental policy changes instead of confining itself, in public at least, simply to reacting to government's initiatives" (Yudelman, 1987, 251). However, the general thrust of Botha's political strategy after 1986, was security, rather than economically-oriented, and business, unable or unwilling, due to a short-termist approach, to drive the government to radical reform, generally remained discontented with government policy formulation. De Klerk's government, to a greater extent than Botha's, has concerned itself with the real, long term concerns
of business.

Capital's concern with the political situation has increased in proportion to the extent that it threatens the future of enterprise capitalism, especially via the expansion of international sanctions and the onset of a "siege economy" (Yudelman, 1987, 254), Afrikaner capital in particular became a part of the state's legitimation crisis in the 1980s, since it formed a component of the traditional "national" political constituency. English capital was less politically important, but integral to the accumulation crisis. Yudelman argues, however, that it is naive to allocate a degree of importance to the "political" and the "economic" with any a priori assumption. This is a matter for empirical enquiry. The issue is confusing due to the distinction between surface "political" actions of the government and the underlying economic relationships of the state and capital.

For instance, despite the government's post 1948 overt support for white mineworkers and against mineowners over the issue of the job colour bar, the costs of retaining the bar on behalf of workers were effectively passed onto the workers anyway, via relatively stable wages and the mineowners' recruitment, with government support, of cheap, foreign African labour. Thus the underlying relationship of symbiosis between the state and mineowners survived a government-imposed reversal for the mineowners.

During the 1980s, Yudelman argues, the state attempted to extend the parameters of its legitimacy beyond traditional white constituencies, to encompass disenfranchised, but increasingly empowered urban, skilled and unionised black workers. But Adam and Moodley, 1986, believe that Botha's government was not so much trying to secure legitimacy amongst an economically powerful black population, realising that this was an unattainable goal; rather, it was attempting to secure compliance, without support, through increasing living standards. Botha believed that "the state does not need legitimacy or ideology to elicit compliance" (Adam and Moodley, 1986). A more tangible effort to obtain legitimacy within the black population has begun with De Klerk's government. The present government inherited Botha's attempt to render apartheid a "dirty word" (Adam and Moodley, 1986), but has
taken more direct steps to scrap the structures identified with it.

Limitations of Theories of the South African State

Beyond the specifics of legitimacy at the reform "moment", Yudelman's theory of the state centres around the concept of its symbiosis with capital. Symbiosis, although more sophisticated than early Marxist or Poulantzian theories of the state, can still be seen as simplistic in some regards. Despite Yudelman's stress on the distinction between state and government, his portrayal glosses over the contradictory relations existing within the body of the state's components. Wolpe, 1988, states that these relations are themselves informed by struggle in the external political terrain. For example, the conflict between the pro-Botha security establishment and the reformist foreign affairs and Constitutional Development departments over the leadership of the NP government, took place within state structures and reflected wider divisions in Afrikaner society.

While Yudelman emphasises the degree of autonomy possessed by the state in its symbiotic relationship with capital, Mitchell and Russell, 1989b, point out that "relatively little systematic attention has been given to the study of the state's ability to formulate and pursue its own policies in a hostile domestic and international environment" (134) - a particularly important concern for the Botha period. Generally, most theories of the South African state address only its domestic parameters, overlooking the often crucial influence of other states and the geopolitical international system. A similarly neglected aspect of the state's autonomy is its attempts to cope with the unintended social effects of its own policies - for instance, the strong reaction from blacks against Botha's new constitution. A realistic theory of the state must also account for the historical inertia of "accidental" changes in the relationship between state and society.

State theory itself, while necessary, is not sufficient for an interpretation of the formation of social structures in South Africa. The cultural, economic and political forces which have influenced social formation (and more limited state policy) can only be adequately addressed if, firstly, the legacies of
historical change are taken into account, and secondly, South Africa is set in a wider geographical context.

This part of the thesis concludes with suggestions for lines of enquiry which could "fill out" conceptions of South African social formation.

**Historical Legacies**

The early colonial era, and the interactions shaping the Cape and its frontier's geography, remain crucial for interpretations of the development of social structures in South Africa. For Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, the frontier period is a "prime context for exploring the relations among culture and power, hegemony and ideology, social order and human agency" (quoted Crush, 1992, 15). The most innovative work on the frontier period is now being accomplished by literary historians and anthropologists. But the "landscapes of meaning" introduced by literary studies like that of Coetzee, 1988 - tracing the role of landscape interpretation in the consolidation of racial exclusivity and privilege - are inherently geographical and historical.

Coetzee shows how, in their literature, Europeans revealed a lack of association with the African landscape. They imagined a landscape, in reality occupied and orally interpreted by generations of African polities, to be empty, and they filled it with European concepts and signs. Indigenous meanings were overlooked or dismissed in the construction of white South African culture. European conquest, as well as being military, economic and social, involved the "cultural and linguistic process of appropriation and suppression" (Crush, 1992, 15). Perhaps the essence of segregation and apartheid lay in the disparity of interpretation and meaning between cultures separated by time and by space. South Africa's social formation, in addition to transformations wrought by the penetration of capital, involves the tracing of this cultural disparity - one which resulted ultimately in the fabrication and maintenance of a racially divided space. Such a space was not unique to South Africa in the colonial period, and it was transformed and bolstered in the 20th century, but this does not make its provenance any less important.
A Geographical Context

Looking at contemporary South Africa, "explorations of the relations between society and space ... seem rare indeed in the literature" (Mabin, 1989, 121). Mabin states that even geographers specializing in South Africa have not utilized newer theory in their own discipline, citing Massey's work on the integration of spatial structures, social relations and the international division of labour as an example of the missing theoretical background.

South African geographers have reacted to criticisms of irrelevance and marginalisation in two main ways. On the one hand, they have become more involved in practical planning for post-apartheid reconstruction (for example, Rogerson et al's 1989 comparative survey of urban planning). On the other hand, they have developed their appreciation and application of external currents in social theory. For Forbes, 1990, "developing geographical practice is a post-modern challenge because the discipline of Geography is, on balance, better equipped for the analysis of the subjectivity of place and of the environment than it is to global theorizing" (cited Rogerson and McCarthy eds., 1992, 5).

Johnston states that places are defined by three components - the physical environment, the built environment and the people. Study of a place's people in particular, "involves their characterisation according to how the world of work is organised, how social life outside work is structured in its manifold ways, and how politics are constructed" (Johnston, 1991, 97). Recent geographical theory has interpreted these characteristics of places within a wider temporal and spatial context.

In an address to postgraduate geographers in 1991, Massey elaborated on a "New Regional Geography" which emphasised the relations between structures and processes which are specific and particular to the region, and those which are more general, but nonetheless shape social process and pattern within the region. Places are contextualised within a network of influences which reach across the globe. A dichotomy between the particular and general is not what is envisaged - rather, an explication of
their mutual contouring. Giddens advocates such a geography as being integral to the study of society. "The focus on countries as discrete territorial units needs to be replaced by the concept of nodes in a regional network. Such nodes, which might consist of cities, transnational companies, regions or continents, are connected to each other by multiple strands. These networks are layered onto each other, separable only by analytical crystallisation" (Giddens,1981, quoted Graaff,1991,07).

The approach has been seen, despite some drawbacks, as having relevance for South African studies: "though parochial and Eurocentric in its geographical vision, the localities literature does attempt to conceptualize the ways in which the general processes of economy, polity and ideology intersect with local conditions and structures of power to constitute distinctive local geographies" (Crush,1992,18).

Within South Africa's borders then, a variety of agencies play out their socially shaping roles through their linkages with other agencies, both within and outside the city, region and country. A detailed study of these agencies, and how their intra- and inter-national interaction has contributed to social formation, cannot be accomplished here, but at least, South African social formation can be set in a wider context:

South Africa's early colonisation by Europeans was a branch of the expansion of the early capitalist economy of western Europe. One component of this expansion in particular - slavery - consolidated early assumptions of white racial superiority, at the Cape and elsewhere. Such assumptions, alongside linguistic interpretations of African space, were part of the wider cultural accompaniment of the material order being established in South Africa.

The late 18th and early 19th century British and Dutch occupations of the Cape were early by-products of the age of European imperial competition (see Hobsbawn,1987). British rule of South Africa through the 19th century brought wider imperial influences to bear on South African society, for example, through urban form (Christopher,1989,1990), land allocation and racial philosophy (Dubow,1989). Twentieth century urbanisation and industrialisation were reflections of global developments, the
penetration of capital bringing the pressures of rural to urban migration, proletarianization and class formation and shifts to bear upon a racially stratified society and racially exclusive government. Mining capital's political power in the late 19th, and the first decades of the 20th centuries also had equivalents elsewhere.

Resistance to the social and spatial order within South Africa was similarly moulded by more general influences. Urbanisation brought new forms of African resistance to white dominance, and facilitated the integration of previously spatially discrete acts of confrontation. In the urban areas housing shortages, informal settlement development, economic recession - largely extraneous in origin, and unemployment all contributed to rapid politicization, as, in some cases, did philosophies of resistance derived from abroad. In many ways, apartheid represented an attempt to control and contain the universal phenomenon of urbanisation, within a particular racially stratified society.

Whilst many of the influences moulding South African society were either local expressions of more universal processes, or had their counterparts elsewhere, their particular manifestation in South Africa cannot be explained without more locally sensitive analysis. Skinner, 1985, in a survey of the theoretical insights of some of the 20th century's greatest social "scientists", including Foucault, Kuhn, Habermas and Althusser, states that "if there is one feature common to all the thinkers I have singled out, it is a willingness to emphasise the importance of the local and the contingent, a desire to underline the extent to which our own concepts and attitudes have been shaped by particular historical circumstances, and a correspondingly strong dislike ... of all overarching theories and schemes of explanation" (Skinner,1985,12).

While Stadler, 1987, works largely within an "overarching theory" - that of broad Marxism, he also recognises the locally specific: "like other African countries, the marks of foreign exploitation of the economy during the early phase of industrial development remain in many of the features of (South Africa's) contemporary economy. Unlike them however, its wealth became increasingly controlled by domestic forces organising themselves within the framework of a powerful state" (Stadler,1987,10).
South Africa's integration with a wider world is possibly most obvious in an economic sense (Mo11, 1990), but the fact that it reflects, even if in a particular way, processes occurring elsewhere, makes comparative study - in the fields of urbanisation, agriculture (especially the role of a peasantry in the future - see Davenport, 1991, 488), environmental change and demography - of much value. Comparative work is useful not just for an understanding of historical and present process, but for coherent planning for the future (Tomlinson, 1990, Horowitz, 1991) - something of which the legacies of apartheid now render South Africa in particularly in need.
Part Two

A Critique of Formal Educational Materials on South Africa at the Post 16 Level.

Introduction

The aim of this part of the thesis is to review a selection of written materials designed to educate post 16 students about South Africa's temporal and spatial social formation. The initial problem is one of selection. There has been an enormous amount of "educational" writing on South Africa: as a particular study, as an exemplar of wider issues, and even solely as a political cause. The concern here is to analyze materials written with a formal educational context in mind: history texts geared towards external examinations, packs developed for use in schools and colleges by NGOs and resources developed for A-level Geography students. However, there are a number of resources regarding South Africa designed specifically for use by students, which are excluded from this critique. These are materials whose aim is to explore only limited areas of social interaction in South Africa, and ones which are not likely to be used widely in historical or geographical approaches - for example volumes of poetry and short stories.

Criteria For Review

In Part One, an attempt was made to present a coherent historical geography of South Africa. Guelke ("Historical Understanding in Geography", Cambridge, 1982), has argued that a study is historical not merely by presenting aspects of the past, but by selecting those past events and processes which have particular significance for the way that social structures and interactions have developed. In Part One, the key events and processes as I see them, the ideologies and material motivations that lay behind them, and the geographies which resulted from them (and which in
turn influenced them), are traced through three hundred and fifty years of South Africa's past. It is my argument that a full understanding of social formation in South Africa must be grounded in this past comprised of selected moments and trends. A description of South Africa's major human spatial structures - homelands, Group Areas etc. - is essential for students who wish to understand social interaction in the country, but to be more fully educated about South Africa, one should have an appreciation of what brought these spatial structures about. This involves more than just geographies of the past; it involves historical understanding in its own right, including a sense of chronology, of ideological evolution and of meta-theories of social structure.

An educational text on South Africa which combines these elements is ambitious indeed, but it is hopefully the outcome of this thesis. The materials under consideration here are often much more limited in their goals, but all seek in some way to educate about South Africa. The extent to which they do so will be judged by the accuracy and completeness of their description of South African social structure and interaction, and the depth of their explanation of the patterns described. These attributes, in broad terms, are the criteria for the reviews which follow. Packs which have suggested activities are assessed according to how far these activities, in combination with the pack's textual content, will go towards engendering not only empathy or understanding of a situation, but also an appreciation of how that situation came to be.

The structure of the text itself - the language employed and its appropriateness for learners - is the subject of the following part of this thesis, and will be mentioned only in passing in these reviews.

The reviews have been placed in groups in the following order: NGO packs, the Leeds Development Education Centre's publications, specifically Geography education materials and History texts.
The materials selected for review in this section were those which teachers would have found readily available for 16 to 19 year old use at the time of writing. They were comprehensively culled from library searches, bookshops, publishers' lists and NGO resource guides.

Although the criteria for review used here are derived from the content and coverage contained within the account of South Africa's social and spatial formation in Part One, a coherent body of literature has been developed on the evaluation of bias in geography textbooks in general. Before resources specifically on South Africa are reviewed, this literature will be considered briefly.

A number of articles have been written pointing to sexism in textbooks popularly used in schools during the 1980s. Wright, 1985 (D. Wright, "Are Geography Textbooks Sexist?", Teaching Geography, 10, 2, 1985, 81-85) reviewed 15 such texts and found that three times as many men as women were found in the illustrations. Bale, 1982 (J. Bale, "Sexism in Geographic Education", in A. Kent (ed.) 'Bias in Geographical Education', University of London Institute of Education, 1982) paid additional attention to the vocabulary of the text, noting for instance that the generic "man" was often used to refer to humankind. The role plays that certain texts suggested also revealed a sexual bias and reinforced gender stereotypes.

Connolly, 1993 (J. Connolly, "Gender Balanced Geography: Have We Got it Right Yet?", Teaching Geography, 18, 2, 1993, 61-64), in a more recent review of 13 Key Stage 3 geography texts, used specific criteria to assess sexist bias: language (for instance, use of the generic "man" or "he"), gender roles in role plays, omissions concerning women and treatment of
women as an identifiable group. She concludes that texts have become less overtly sexist since the early 1980s, but that illustrations in particular still tend to focus disproportionately on males.

More reviews have been produced concerning textbook bias of a racist or ethnocentric nature. Hicks, 1980 (D. Hicks, "Bias in Geography Textbooks: Images of the World and Multi-Ethnic Britain", Working Paper No.1, and "Images of the World: An Introduction to Bias in Teaching Materials", Occasional paper No.2, University of London Institute of Education, 1980) formulated the hypotheses that "images of the 'third world' are likely to be ethnocentric if not racist", that "this is likely to take the form of a 'colonial viewpoint'", and that "contemporary issues are likely to be avoided" in school texts.

A range of 30 popular geography textbooks were reviewed according to a number of specified criteria and ranked along two axes. The first axis plotted the location of the text in terms of its geographical paradigm - from "defense of the status quo" regarding inequalities and injustices through "liberal" to "radical". The second axis concerned "Perspective", and ranged from "racist" through "ethnocentric" and "non-racist" to "anti-racist". Hicks found a growing presence of anti-racist and radically-informed books, but most were still rooted in the status quo/liberal and ethnocentric approaches.

Wright, 1983 (D. Wright, '"They Have no Need of Transport ...': A Study of Attitudes to Black People in Three Geography Textbooks", in Contemporary Issues in Geography Education, 1, 1, 1983) confirms Hicks's findings. Reviewing three popular
texts for 12 to 13 year olds, he states that all "were written from a white man's point of view" (11) and concludes that "an author may be anti-racist, yet his textbook can be unintentionally racist in its effects" (15). An example is provided by texts reviewed by Wright and Pardey, 1982 (D. Wright and D.H. Pardey, "Bias in Statistics and Statistical Maps: The Example of South Africa" in A Kent (ed.) "Bias in Geographical Education", University of London Institute of Education, 1982). Here, statistical and visual representations of South Africa in textbooks for children younger than the students with whom this thesis is concerned, including population distribution maps, maps showing historical migrations and exercises based on these sources, are interpreted as reinforcing the apartheid government's own version of demographic history.

Similar analyses have been conducted on history texts. For example, Maw, 1991 (J. Maw, "Texts, Teaching Strategies and Ethnocentrism", in H. Fry, J. Maw and H. Simons (eds.) "Dealing with Difference: Handling Ethnocentrism in History Classrooms", University of London Institute of Education, 1991), examined ethnocentrism in history texts dealing with the Soviet Union for 14 to 16 year olds. She identified those texts premised upon primary sources, with the possibility of "open interpretation" as being less likely to convey bias than narrative-based texts, and confessed that she finds it "difficult to envisage the form" that a text based on narrative, "but allowing for multiple interpretations" could take (37). That, however, is just what I hope to achieve (see Part Three and Appendix).

Most of the writers of these reviews suggest methods for the detection of overt bias, and encourage teachers and students
to carry out exercises in its identification. (Of course it would be highly dubious to suggest that perceived bias could be 'corrected', given the inevitable subjectivity of the human agent.) But my focus is not on the detection of bias, for even this is to assume that the teacher or student can be a self-appointed and independent judge. Instead, I wish to assert that students should be introduced to the notion of academic argumentation as a way of coming to terms with ideology.

Familiarity with the discourse of academic argumentation heightens awareness of the subjectivity in all texts. If all narratives and explanations are accepted as but one among many possible such constructions (although with varying degrees of empirical support and internal consistency), then students are well equipped to deal with texts in a mature and responsible way. Furthermore, they are not encouraged to set themselves up as independent arbiters of bias in the work of others, and therefore, to imagine themselves as objective. Part Three is partly concerned with how such a standpoint can be brought about through the text itself.
1. Non-Governmental Organisation Packs

"South Africa Youth Information Pack", Bishop Ambrose Reeves Trust (BART), (no date indicated)

This pack, consisting of a set of posters, a broadsheet divided into a number of sections, and a resource list, is aimed at the 13 to 19 year age range. The broadsheet's particular purpose is to provide "an overview of the key structures of the apartheid system", including "essential background information" (standard covering letter sent with pack). The smaller posters cover some of the topics on the broadsheet in more detail, plus some additional aspects of life in South Africa.

The broadsheet gives a very glancing survey of South African history, beginning with the destruction of the Khoisan. This particular part of the account may actually hide as much as it reveals: at one point, it is stated that "Khoisan women were raped or taken as common-law wives by the early settlers. The descendants of those unions make up the majority of the more than three million "Coloureds"". This genesis of the "Coloured" population is obviously important, but perhaps it would be more revealing for the long term course of South African history to have described how such inter-racial unions, even in the early days of the Cape colony, were heavily proscribed by the dominant white culture. The exaggerated implication of white settlers' wholesale rapine of the Khoisan could be misleading if it is taken to mean that inter-racial unions were the accepted norm. The fact that they were frowned upon by the hegemonic white culture is as revealing of the subsequent development of South Africa's racial systems as the fact of Khoikhoi oppression.

The historical account moves on to discuss the era of industrialisation and its role in the incorporation of a black labour force under white supervision. The intra-white struggle and the formation of a racially exclusive political system follows, but there is inadequate treatment of the development, and the
crucial role of Afrikaner nationalism. Throughout the account, the history of black polities is also omitted, not I think due to an earlier historiographical tendency to overlook its importance, but in order to present an image of a united black South African populace, homogeneously oppressed by whites. This is to ignore important black political, social, economic and ethnic divisions, and for the student, it fails to set black co-optation, and violence between blacks, in any explanatory context.

The account of history on the broadsheet is necessarily very brief, and it is perhaps unfair to criticise it for omission, but given the importance of the past in shaping the present racial structures of South Africa, perhaps another of the posters could have provided further coverage of key historical developments.

The rest of the broadsheet is devoted to separate portions uncovering other key aspects of South African society, the first being " Petty and Grand Apartheid". This section includes an account of the Separate Amenities and Group Areas Acts. Another section covers the injustice of Bantu Education, the role of the introduction of Afrikaans as a learning medium in the Soweto revolt, and the recent state of educational uncertainty and disorder. The population structure of the country is investigated in another portion of the broadsheet, with a pie chart showing the proportions in each racial category and a brief account of the pain caused by the Population Registration Act.

In a section entitled "The Economy and Work", more historical context is provided with a look at the transition from slavery to Masters and Servants laws and the evolution of the migrant labour system, nurtured by mineowners with state support. The labour system's exploitation is made clear, but the more recent politically reformist influence of the skilled labour shortage is neglected. White affluence is then contrasted with the black housing shortage and inadequate standards of present accommodation in a section on standards of living. Importantly, the centrality of commuting to the lives of township workers is mentioned, as is
the even worse transport situation in the rural areas.

A section on "The Land" covers the Land Acts and the bantustans. Their moves towards "independence" are interpreted as an attempt to transfer the international image and burden of the oppressor from the South African government to the homeland leaders. In the section "Protest and Oppression", the state's late 1980s repressive security legislation is coherently overviewed. Here, there is a mention of "the regime's black "collaborators" as targets of violence, but none of the wider importance of co-optation for government attempts at stabilisation. The SADF's various campaigns in the region are documented alongside the End Conscription Campaign in a section on war and dirty tricks.

The portion on international support argues that sanctions helped pressurize the government, but importantly and accurately, it also stresses the role of financial withdrawal in response purely to economic prospects.

British youths' wishes for a nonracial state and equal opportunities are expressed and the warning is given that "apartheid is not dead", before the broadsheet concludes with an assessment of current changes and the future. February 1990 is represented as the "first breakthrough" in the struggle against apartheid, but this is to ignore the process of adaptation, resistance and political and economic instability that was its context. It is stated that De Klerk was engaged in a dual strategy to negotiate with the ANC whilst undermining it through violence and the funding of rivals. However, there can be no certainty that this was the case. To what extent the security forces, which undoubtedly engaged in this kind of activity, were under the executive's control is difficult to fathom. There is also the fact of Inkatha as an established and autonomous opponent of the ANC to be considered.

The posters accompanying the broadsheet are largely composed of photographs, but each has a short text. They are briefly reviewed
in their given numerical order:

"Work" deals with migrant labour, disadvantaged black education, and conditions in farms, the homelands and the compounds. "Youth" contains the prologue of the Freedom Charter and quotes from South African youth on hopes for an integrated future. "The Land" looks at the Land Acts and the bantustans, with future conflict over their role predicted. "Health Care" has statistics on differential standards and spending and the malnutrition of blacks. "Sport" includes a brief history of the boycott and its rationale and an account of the difficulties of non-racial sport given the legacy of apartheid. "Education" contains Verwoerd's oft-cited comment on the position of blacks in the economy and an account of Bantu Education and the role of Afrikaans instruction in the Soweto revolt. "Standards of Living" investigates domestic servants, informal settlements and the gap between rich and poor.

"International Support" comprises a review of sanctions, Western trade and international solidarity with anti-apartheid movements. "Media" has a good account of censorship, in which its implications for future elections are made clear. "Destabilization and Dirty Tricks" is distinguished by a horrific photograph of murdered villagers in Namibia. It includes an account of the rising defence budget under Botha and the withdrawal from Namibia (put down, unrealistically, solely to the battle of Cuito Cuanavale).

The strategy behind regional destabilization is not explained and there is nothing on the global political changes behind the Namibia settlement or its advantages to De Klerk. The NSMS's structures of repression during the insurrection are listed and "Inkathagate" is mentioned, but with the nature of Inkatha still unexplored.

This pack is more informative than many: it at least tries to set South Africa's present structures in historical context, and its format makes the present situation for the majority of South
Africa's population more accessible to students. Descriptively, it is valuable and could allow students to visualise and empathise with the plight of many South Africans. However, its omission of the fractures within black society and of key historical features, notably the development of Afrikaner nationalism, mean that it needs to be supplemented with a "core text" for sufficient explanation of that plight.

"The Kei Road Eviction: An Activity Pack For Groups", (after 1990), Wendy Davies, Oxfam.

This is a role play pack based around an incident in which Oxfam were involved. Background notes explain how a number of black families were privately evicted when a white-owned farm changed hands. Participants are given detailed information, based on records of the eviction, including employment conditions and brief life histories of the real people they are to play in the exercise. These include those being evicted, the white landowners and others associated, but less directly involved in the dispute over the evictions. Some of these people are also portrayed in photographs. Other participants are "TV researchers", whose role is to put together a programme on the dispute using interviews with the role players.

This is a valid and informative exercise. The photographs and the specific life histories, as well as the attempt to portray the white farmer's perspective all contribute to the sense of realism which distinguishes this role play. The aims expressed are empathy with the farmworkers, understanding of their legal, economic and social position, and consideration of possible action for change. This pack goes a long way towards fulfilling these aims, but for them to be achieved fully, perhaps it should be supplemented with more contextual material. For instance, one of the role players is told "You don't want to go to the Ciskei, because you are afraid of being beaten up by the police there", but the rationale of this observation is not explained.
The pack is nevertheless enlightening on labour relations in agriculture generally, and, as a case study, would be a valuable part of a more extended investigation into the evolution of social and economic relations in South Africa.

"School Boycotts in South Africa: A Simulation Exercise", BDAF, no date.

"The simulation asks British pupils to empathise with South African pupils who have boycotted their schools because of real and deeply felt grievances. The role sheets provided are based on real lives and events, set in the context of the 1970s and 1980s struggle in South African schools.

Using the role sheets, students participating in the role play cite grievances to the "secretary" of the Students' Representative Council (SRC), who then confronts the "Principle" with them. The grievances are those which really characterised the conflicts over education, and pushed educational resistance to the forefront of wider resistance against apartheid in the last 20 years: the refusal to recognise SRCs, the shortage of textbooks, sexual harassment of students, victimization of politicized students and teachers, the high rate of Matriculation exam failure, the presence of the SADF in schools, police detention of students, the general inadequacy of "Bantu Education", excessive use by some teachers of corporal punishment and the imposition of age limits on the re-taking of the Matriculation paper.

The Principle offers a response to the student demands and the role play continues with the students' discussion and choice of their ensuing course of action.

The Principle's reply to the first declaration of grievances is respectful and moderate, agreeing to dismiss the teacher guilty of the most extreme personal offenses, but stating that recognition
of the SRC is up to the central government Department of Education and Training (DET), and making no response to the other grievances. The students are then posed with three choices - to continue a boycott of school, to go to the DET with their demands or to return to classes. Their decision determines the ensuing stages in the role play, leading to one of a number of outcomes:

A boycott results in a police raid of a playground meeting and the death of a student. Other dilemmas ensue from this. A decision to hold a mass funeral for the victim results in a further police attack before the role play ends with the question "what now?", a question posed at the end of each of the other avenues through the role play. A decision to encourage other schools to join the boycott leads to the closure of the schools, and a decision to demonstrate outside the police station leads to detentions, torture and a further death.

For those students who decided to petition the DET, the reply is received that for the SRCs to be recognised, they must have within them the Principle, elected teachers and two representatives of the old prefect body. Other conditions are also set. The students must then decide to boycott, in which case the sequence is as above, or to accept, in which case two of the teachers on the SRC turn out to be members of a vigilante force which brutalises student activists. Their intervention leads to the detention of one of the students.

A decision to accept the Principle's original response results in the installation of security guards, who prevent activists' access to the school. The students can then boycott (outcome as above) or help activists to force an entrance, which results in police action, detentions and another death.

Throughout the role play, chance cards can throw up a COSAS or AZASO demonstration, an appeal from another school to boycott or an amnesty from the DET for Matriculation students. The role play concludes with groups making placards for a demonstration.
As an investigation into the causes of grievances in South African schools, the pack should work well. In a wider sense, it is probably quite successful in generating empathy for activists in South Africa. I would argue that, being grounded in the context of the real struggle in the townships, it is more successful on these terms than the more abstract role plays about oppression which are considered below.

The pack does not, however, extend to developing an appreciation of how the unjust educational system of South Africa came about, nor of the nature of the wider system or pattern of resistance of which it was a part. For instance, the pack declares that "it is essential to the survival of apartheid that blacks remain a source of exploitable, cheap, unskilled labour". But in the 1980s, when the pack was produced, the NP leadership had come to the conclusion that apartheid could be preserved only if blacks were allowed to develop the skills needed for a modern economy. There is no recognition of such dynamism in government policy.

The full significance of the schools boycott for wider resistance is also not appreciated. UDF leaders and parents at the time of the boycott became increasingly concerned about the disruptive effect it was having on the education of a whole generation, and as a strategy, it was criticised by prominent resistance leaders for evolving into an aim in itself, with no concessions to be gained from its negotiated end (see Part One, Chapter 7).

Here, there is a more universal problem with educational packs on South Africa: a lack of appreciation of significant developments within the system of white rule and resistance to it. Not all reforms in the 1980s should be written off as cosmetic, for this is to imply that there was no precedent or context for De Klerk's radical reforms of the 1990s. An example drawn from this particular pack is that of Verwoerd's 1953 quote on the role of Bantu Education being used to describe the more dynamic (though of course, still unjust) system of the 1980s. In fact the expansion of African educational provision in the 1970s and 1980s, although
woefully inadequate, had extremely significant implications for black resistance and the entire future course of political events. Even the specific grievances addressed in this role play were very much associated with these changes.


The introductory activity in this book contains a statement by an apartheid-supporting white South African, written in a letter to "Just 17" magazine: "Nobody has the right to criticize something they know nothing about". This is used as a lead-in for students: "how much do you know?" Students are then encouraged to read on in order to know more. The account which follows is remarkable for its use of a wide array of primary sources and personal impressions of resistance in the 1970s and 1980s, and for the imaginative activities set out for students. If used competently, it should give students a clear impression of the rationale for the schools boycott, the violence with which it was met, and some valuable insights into the wider insurrection in the communities of which the schools were a part.

Sources include quotes from Hirson's 1979 and Brooks and Brickhill's 1980 accounts of the Soweto revolt and from other, autobiographical, accounts of resistance or everyday life in the townships, extracts from newspaper articles and novels, a large selection of poems (many by youth), case studies of events in different schools, and overtly biased narratives, for example from a children's book, to be analyzed for their ideological slants.

Activities include the writing of newspaper reports, poems, short stories, radio and film scripts, conversations between people introduced in the sources and commentaries on photographs, the devising of wallcharts, "research" on historical events such as the Battle of Blood River, the graphical presentation of data, pinpointing places mentioned in the text on a map, identifying bias and choosing alternative value-laden words and role playing a
white reporter seeking to persuade a white woman that, in spite of her belief, she does not really understand the country that she lives in.

Generally these activities are fairly well supported by the information provided on youth resistance. However, I feel that some of the more imaginative exercises would be more educationally sound if a deeper historical context was known to the students. For instance, students' "newspaper reports" on the Soweto revolt would be better informed if not just the educational context of the revolt were given, but also its economic dimension. Students should additionally have a greater appreciation of the formulation of apartheid structures and resistance to them, which preceded the revolt. (It would also be advisable to ensure that any future editions of the book have the correct spelling of "Afrikaner").

When the transition is made from school rebellions in Soweto in 1976 to those in Cape Town in 1980, there is no account of intervening changes in the nature of apartheid legislation. While the educational system that was being challenged had not changed inordinately, the administration of apartheid was not a monolithic block over the period: resistance and economic contradiction had already modified the approach of the government. Some historical background to Bantu Education is provided, but it underestimates the scale and pervasiveness of segregation before the apartheid era and overlooks the role of Afrikaner nationalism. Apartheid is portrayed purely as a design to keep Africans as a labour force, its Christian-Nationalist dimension being neglected.

The book is a stimulating means of encouraging British students to come to grips with the situation faced by their South African counterparts in the 1980s, and many of its ideas for activities are well worth applying in other contexts, but it does not address the wider development of political and social structures in South Africa.

The booklet accompanying this pack contains a brief history of the Soweto revolt, the 1980s school boycotts and the founding of the NECC (see Part One, Chapter 7). Statistics on black educational failure are followed by the observation that the crisis in black education continues. Six display posters then investigate aspects of this crisis in more detail.

The "Tantu Education" poster has an introduction to the 1953 Act and the 1959 Extension of University Education Act, with Verwoerd's oft-cited comment on African education and photographs of overcrowded black classrooms. A second poster, dealing with "Uprising and Repression" and "Community Response", tells of the introduction of Afrikaans instruction and its response in Soweto schools in 1976 (not set in the wider context of the revolt) and the 1980s school-based resistance. Photographs of educational protests and a black boy behind bars accompany an account of troops in classrooms and the role of the NECC. The poster entitled "The Legacy of Apartheid" and "Worse for Women" details apartheid's discrimination in voting, expenditure, employment, land ownership and housing. The facts that girls from poor families are often absent from school due to household chores, and that women, often in low paying jobs, also comprise the majority of those who are illiterate, are stressed.

The dismal state of black education, with poorly qualified staff and inadequate syllabi, is held responsible for an "alienation from the culture of learning" in the next in the series of posters. The dominance of whites in positions of responsibility and the fact that the 1990 black matriculation results were the worst ever, lead to the conclusion that more government action is needed than the present (1993) half-hearted moves towards a more integrated system. The NECC's own work in that regard is the main subject of the next poster, and the final poster is a montage of leaflets, posters, letters, photographs and badges demonstrating
British school and college support for black education in South Africa, with the need for further support emphasised.

Written emotively by Mandla Langa, the pack presents an impressive synthesis of the current state of black schooling across much of South Africa. However, due to its very nature, and despite reference to the role of schools in wider resistance, it transcends the educational sphere very little. Within the subject of black education, it omits a key consideration affecting the outcome of black urban schooling – the role of wider township violence. From discussions with teachers in Natal in particular, where the fighting between Inkatha and ANC sympathizing elements was pervasive, it is clear that schools were all too easily sucked into the conflict.

Notwithstanding the lack of qualified staff and resources and the poverty of syllabi, this violent rift, replicated in the school environment, can provide the greatest immediate obstacle to black education.

2. The Leeds DEC


The National Association of Development Education Centres organised its December 1986 newsletter around the issue of South Africa in education. The most prominent article in the newsletter was written by Leeds DEC, which has evolved somewhat of a specialism in producing packs on South Africa for use in schools and colleges. The article is instructive in setting out the philosophy behind this work.

The Leeds DEC has a worthy aim – encouraging condemnation of apartheid. However, accepting this as an ultimate aim, its approach – introducing an explicit bias in its materials – can be
criticised. "Enforced" condemnation may prove counterproductive, for many students will deliberately and understandably reject an opinion that they are told to have about an issue, being more willing to accept what is given as fact or interpretation and then form their own opinion on it.

There is a strong case for education about South Africa to include explanations of the origins and development of apartheid. Once the system is understood in this fuller sense, then students can be left to themselves to condemn it. But in the article, the Leeds DEC "admit to bias in our presentation ... we justify this by claiming ... to represent the viewpoint of Black South Africans to balance the bias to which most people are exposed most of the time" (3).

However, it seems unlikely that most students have been exposed to much in the way of in-depth interpretation of South Africa, and the images that they receive from the media would rarely be pro-apartheid, even if they don't give the full picture from black points of view. Any explicit treatment of South Africa in school or college is likely to provide the most intensive, or even only, conscious investigation of the subject for most British students. In this case, the Leeds DEC material's bias is not corrective, but initiatory.

Emphasis is placed by the group on providing "the sort of information which we think students need in order to develop responsible opinions on the matter", but how can opinions on a matter be defined as responsible if no attempt is made to develop understanding of that matter, condemnation alone being attempted from the outset?

Without an understanding of apartheid's origins and functioning, and the perceptions behind it, condemnation by itself is only a partial educative outcome. At one point in the article, it is declared that students should understand what drives blacks to participate in "necklace killings" of collaborators. This is a
valid aim, but it should be accompanied by the aim of understanding what brought the apartheid system about in South Africa. A pack intended for a younger age group than the one this thesis is concerned with - "A History of South Africa", Holmes and West, Leeds DEC, 1986 - is informed by an appreciation of the merits of this aim: "we felt that it was important to examine the attitudes of Afrikaaners (sic) and other white groups in South Africa in order that pupils might recognise the part which these have played in determining where South Africa is today"; but the statement is spoiled by the implication that Afrikaners are something of a homogeneous block, and the aim does not seem to have extended to materials for older students.

The group's activity packs on South Africa centre around role play as a means of coming to a greater appreciation of what it is like to live under apartheid. For instance, "the Soweto game about the 1976 Soweto protest, faces students with some of the moral dilemmas they would come up against if they were South African" (3). It is my belief that such role plays can be counter-productive, in that they encourage a facile assumption that a student can really imagine the situation of another, in a vastly different context, by being given only a very limited amount of background information. By universalising black South African experiences, such activities often fail to raise awareness of the extremity of a pervasively tense situation in particular places and at particular times.

To avoid facile assumptions, role plays, if they are to be used at all, should be preceded by extensive research into the development of apartheid and its local and national impact (and by this time, they are often redundant as educational exercises anyway).

Another expressed aim of the Leeds DEC group is to stress the links between South Africa and Britain, so as to establish greater relevance for British students, and raise awareness of parallel injustices here. Specifically, links of racism, sexism, trades unions and capitalism are mentioned. Sometimes, however, rather
tenuous links are established - for example:

"the "resettlements" in South Africa ... have a parallel of sorts with the less publicised deportations of black people from this country to their "homelands". Are our immigration and citizenship laws any more just or less racist, or less overtly to do with protecting the accumulation of wealth by capitalists, than South African influx control laws?" (3).

While "our" immigration and citizenship laws are frequently implemented in a racist manner, they are simply incomparable to South Africa's policy of removals. In South Africa, black people were forcibly removed from their established homes in urban and rural areas in accordance with overtly racist legislation, many of them being discarded in "homelands" which they had never seen before. Those who were unquestioned citizens of the country had their citizenship stripped from them and, in its place, were accorded citizenship of underdeveloped "nations" recognised by no country other than South Africa. It is misleading to draw parallels between the deportation of illegal immigrants from Britain, even if often conducted in a racist manner, with such a systematically and unashamedly racist, brutal and internally directed policy.

Elsewhere, it is similarly implied that there are strong parallels between apartheid and racism in Britain. It should, however, be made explicit that these are attitudinal parallels, not parallels between political systems. No matter how much one condemns aspects of it, surely one must recognise that the British political system is fairer in principle, and less overtly racist than the South African system has been. It is my argument that excessively comparative comments like the one above, as well as establishing the injustices of many systems (which can be done in other ways), belittle the experiences of black South Africans who suffered far more intensely as a group under their government than do most black people in this country. Black people in Britain are subject to a great deal of informal, and frequently formal, racism and,
sometimes, brutality - but they are not the targets of an entire political system, expressly designed by the state to ensure their oppression. The implication that they are oppressed on the same scale as South African blacks is therefore educationally counterproductive.

In the same DEC newsletter is a comment by Bristol DEC which is more balanced and educationally sound: "The understandable temptation to meet the needs of our users with an "instant" pack, often based on partial or inadequate research, is one which in the long term can only work against the overall aims of DC (Development Education)" (6).

"A Case For Change", Leeds DEC's pack on South Africa for older students, consists of a series of discrete activities, each with its own information and role play - type activity. There is a strong and conscious emphasis on human rights as the organising concept behind the work, but there is little attempt to convey an understanding of why the Western norm of human rights has not been accepted as a universal quality in South Africa. In an attempt to take South Africa as a case study of the wider, abstracted concept of human rights abuse, the historical causation of South Africa's particular social, political and economic structures is neglected. This is stated explicitly: "A potential danger in focusing on South Africa is that it may be viewed as a "special case"" (20). I would argue that that is exactly what it is.

Although oppression occurs elsewhere, it does not occur for the same reasons or in the same manner as in South Africa. One cannot deny the uniqueness of places simply because there are universal processes and patterns and because social outcomes in different places have similarities.

Throughout the pack, the aim to combat racism and sexism in general displaces explanation and understanding of how these evils have come about and become established in South Africa's particular context. Whereas the goal of many suggested activities is for the student to put her/himself in the position of black
South Africans, not enough information about South African social structure and development is given for this to be done realistically.

In all, the activities suggested in the pack should take about 13 to 14 hours. They begin with an exercise to highlight the links between South Africa and the UK, which may well prove motivational for some students. The UN declaration of human rights is then set out, along with extracts from Mandela's 1963 speech and some facts about apartheid laws. One of the questions then set is "why has this situation (denial of UN human rights to South African blacks) developed?" - a crucial question. But, the data from which this question must be answered is merely a catalogue of apartheid laws. There is no historical account of how and why these laws arrived on the statute books, let alone of the social, economic and political processes which preceded, and set the scene for them.

Subsequent activities are clearly geared towards encouraging an emotive response from students, rather than an understanding of social pattern and process in South Africa. A few examples follow.

Activity C1 is entitled "Oppression". The members of the student group are given roles by which a "system" is formulated. The "ordinary" people in this system are forced to queue for officials who make them undertake meaningless activities in return for tokens. "Police" ensure that the system functions without rebellion. Thus the complexity of apartheid is reduced to an abstracted state of oppression. There is no attempt to understand oppression as a result of the real historical configuration of society in South Africa.

Oppression abstracted from its social context in this way cannot be properly understood.

Activity C2, "Soweto", mentioned above, attempts to give a more realistic context for a role playing exercise. A variety of scenarios, based around the 1976 introduction of Afrikaans as a
medium of instruction is presented, and certain courses of action are posited. By selecting options, students are then posed with new dilemmas and new options, so as to generate an impression of what it must have been like for black students of Soweto during the revolt.

This path through a portion of a black South African life concludes with the student either as radical activist, guerilla, policeman, informer or "ordinary" worker.

This exercise is at least set in a real context and at a specific time, and the dominant issues of the period are introduced, but the Soweto revolt cannot be understood merely as a reaction to the introduction of Afrikaans instruction, nor even as a long pent up outburst against the system as a whole. The specific economic pressures and ideological renaissance which preceded the revolt in the township, are omitted. There is not enough background information for the student to imagine accurately the state of mind of rebellious students (leaving aside the question of whether such an aim can ever be achieved).

Activity C, "Repression and the Media", is a role play intended to highlight the real political differences behind "black on black" violence. It implies that ethnicity has only a "false significance", when, in fact, ethnicity, although not in itself a cause of conflict, can act as a real marker of conflictual identity and division (see Part One, Chapter 7).

Whilst, given the well intended ethos of the pack, some of these criticisms may seem pedantic, I believe that they are important. For an education about oppression in the real world to proceed, one needs to be aware of the context and development of that oppression. An understanding of the development of oppression in South Africa can indeed provide a basis for a greater understanding of oppression elsewhere (and vice versa), but such an understanding can only emerge initially from study of the historical development of a particular situation. To be truly
educational, a pack should set its topic in a context comprised of all the influences upon it. If a pack is to focus on oppression in South Africa, it should explain that oppression as well as, and in order to, encourage empathy with its subjects.

3. Geography Materials


This series of articles on southern Africa's geographical development - a "synthesis to be put together carefully" (Griffiths, March 1986, 117) - certainly does include attempts to portray the sources of South African social, political and economic oppression. The relative sophistication of these articles stems from the fact that they were written by university specialists, each presenting a specific topic in each article, for students of the 16-19 age range.

In an introduction, the series editor, Ieuan Griffiths uses journalistic accounts to emphasise the relevance of South Africa (at the time of writing, South Africa was much in the British news due to the continuation of the township insurrection). An important article follows on population composition, from the Khoisan onwards. Omer-Cooper then presents an interesting and well written article on his original specialism, the mfecane, with comparison of the Great Trek tacked on. The Trek is set in a full historical context.

The 19th century dispossession of land is exemplified with an account of the Anglo-Zulu war, somewhat spoiled by an unnecessary and romanticised portrayal of Buthelezi as the dignified contemporary inheritor of a Zulu tradition, and a proponent of non-violence. A subsequent article covers the Land Acts, the brief cash-crop response to the growing agricultural market by an African peasantry, and the contemporary problems of homeland
farming. This latter theme is explored in more detail in the following article, on agrarian crisis and change.

Still within the primary sector, the next article in the series is a crucial and enlightening account of mining and its role in shaping a cheap migrant labour system. An article on the spread and political implications of the railways follows, before the structure and processes of change in South Africa's cities are explained, with some, but little reference to the historical and cultural origins of urban segregation. The role of the state and of external investment in South Africa's industrial development is then addressed by the South African geographer, Christian Rogerson.

The succeeding article sets a historically grounded analysis of the migrant labour system in a core-periphery framework. The geographical nature of apartheid, and its application at micro, meso and macro scales is emphasised in the last article by Anthony Lemon. He makes particularly good use of aerial photographs to show segregated urban structure, and includes an assessment of more recent reforms. His contribution concludes with a polemic against sanctions, including an argument that they would curtail rather than catalyse further reform.

The series as a whole is concluded with a report by Ieuan Griffiths on recent (at the time of writing) political developments, including the stalling of Botha's reform programme and the rise in violent resistance. The full significance of the insurrection, even though it had already passed its peak, was not yet fully realised. A pro-sanctions argument (in contrast to Lemon's) follows. It is unfortunate that, when the government's plight is being referred to, it is stated that: "the position of the Afrikaners is desperate", since it was partly a move towards reformism on the part of many Afrikaners, despite the resistance of others, which allowed the further erosion of apartheid.

Overall, this series reinforces an earlier point: the more
sophisticated analysis of these articles is often greater testimony to the injustices of apartheid than the overtly condemnatory approach of other packs. For example, in the article on migrant labour, following an account of the rise and functioning of the system, all that needs to be stated is that "The former migrant worker resident in the Transkei ... has no legal access to the attractions of the city of Johannesburg beneath which he might have spent the greater part of his working life" (Griffiths, Jan. 1987,17), for injustice to be crystal clear (further injustices of the migrant labour system similarly become evident in the article). With systematic description and interpretation of the system, the degradation for individuals caught up in it can be clearly portrayed, and, what is more, substantiated.

What the series covers, it generally covers very well. However, as an attempt at an overview of the development of South Africa's human geography, it still has gaps. For example, there is no interpretation of the cultural and material origins of early racism and the system which sprang from it at the Cape. The process of African dispossession in Natal is traced, but there is little reference to the similarities and differences in this process elsewhere. The role of industrialisation in shaping modified racial structures is adequately expressed, but the significance of the intra-white politics of the early 20th century in determining the legal expression of those structures, is overlooked. Beyond an intimation of the subsequent cultural impact of the Great Trek, there is no account of the critically important development of Afrikaner nationalism and the NP. The political and geographical significance of black resistance, particularly in the post-Soweto period, is neglected. Finally, although a conflict of interpretation is hinted at in Lemon's and Griffiths' divergent views on sanctions, there is no explicit treatment of "schools of thought" and of interpretation of South Africa's historical and geographical development.

This series is a much better analysis than most packs designed for
the age group, and it provides an excellent overview of South Africa's contemporary human geography, but I believe its focus on the historical development of this geography is generally too narrow.

D. Smith, Cambridge University Press,
Queen Mary and Westfield College.

"Update" is a series of "brief, frequently revised booklets on topics directly linked to the A-level syllabus and college or university courses" (iii). This contribution to the series, updated from a 1987 edition, is written by a geographer who has specialised in South Africa, particularly its urban characteristics, since the early 1980s. It is intended specifically as a study of the apartheid system and its own geographical consequences, rather than of wider aspects of South Africa's geography or history. Although there is a chapter devoted to explanations of apartheid (see below), its post-1948 emphasis does detract somewhat from a fuller understanding of the development of racial attitudes and spatial form in South Africa. Nevertheless, it is the best introduction to the basics of contemporary South African society available specifically for the post 16 range.

The book is a very good source of recent statistical information on demographics, political attitudes, and indices of satisfaction. However, the treatment of apartheid shows a degree of insensitivity to temporal adaptation. Apartheid is defined in Verwoerdian terms, and in a subsequent period, reforms are portrayed being made to this previously, relatively static and monolithic system. This is to obscure the dynamic and unpredictable nature of both the ideology and the practice of apartheid - its continual revision and adaptation to internal and external developments. In particular, the policy of developing "independent" homelands is presented as a natural progression from the 1950s conception of apartheid, when in fact it was a
significant departure from original apartheid thinking (see Part One, Chapter 5).

While there is significant discussion of the role of social forces in overcoming apartheid restrictions in the 1980s, less attention is paid to the social conceptions behind the formulation of segregation and apartheid, the fact of legislation being portrayed as self-explanatory. The crucial influence of intra-white political history in the construction of apartheid is glossed over, but the white political parties of the 1980s and their agendas are described with a map showing the distribution of their support.

The book's greatest strength, unsurprisingly, is its description of South Africa's contemporary spatial pattern, with population removals, migration and homelands on a macro-scale, the Group Areas Act on a meso-scale and "petty apartheid" on a micro-scale, being clearly elucidated. Detailed case studies of the various types of removal undertaken to create this form, and journalistic accounts of specific places, consolidate the image of apartheid's spatial impress, while an account of the late 1980s "greying" of some urban areas allows an appreciation of growing contradictions within the system.

The book is weaker on explanations of the political and particularly economic contradictions which faced apartheid from its inception to its collapse. For instance, the impact of progressively more comprehensive black resistance and its economic role is neglected, and despite the statement that "the second half of the 1980s called into question the extent to which the White government and international capital continue to share common interests" (36), the strains produced by structural economic shifts, are generally left unexplored.

The attempt to explain apartheid as a whole consists of a chapter which considers four alternative interpretations - the South African government's own rationale, a theory of racial political
domination (roughly equivalent to simplified liberal interpretations), an interpretation based on economic exploitation (roughly the "orthodox" Marxist account), and an analysis of attempts at the selective incorporation of blacks. It is argued that the order in which these perspectives are considered reflects "a changing understanding of apartheid with changing circumstances", although they are not "mutually exclusive" (30).

Treatment of the "racial political domination" school focuses on the "divide and rule" strategy of the homelands. This is criticised in favour of the "economic exploitation" approach, which "sees racial domination as part of a broader system which has an economic purpose: that of facilitating the exploitation of cheap (Black) labour" (34). The preference for an "unreformed" Marxist view here leads to the misleading statement that "the support of international capital may be regained - as long as Black labour remains relatively cheap" (36). But, by the late 1980s it was clear that the most influential fractions of capital, within and without South Africa, no longer wanted simply cheap labour, but productive, and generally, more skilled labour - this newer imperative having significant implications for apartheid's functioning. The growing opposition to government policy on the part of domestic Afrikaans capital is similarly overlooked.

With Smith's account of the final, and, implicitly, definitive interpretation of apartheid, based on Botha's "selective incorporation", the argument is put that, since the practice of apartheid has changed in recent years, interpretations must also be adapted. But this is to imply that apartheid, until this recent change, had been an objectified, unitary and stable system, capable of being explained atemporally by an overarching theory. Behind the chapter's attempt to explain apartheid lays an ahistorical approach, resting on the assumption that apartheid's spatial form is the outcome of contemporary functionality. Hence there is little reference to the past and its legacies in the interpretations of apartheid adopted.
In reality, there has been no one apartheid system to explain, but many temporally specific modifications, reactions and initiatives to interpret. One needs not one theory for apartheid, 1948-1980s, and another for apartheid, 1980s onwards, but a multitude of interpretations to account for the dynamic and inconsistent attempts of successive governments since 1948 to impose a fundamentally segregated order on an evolving South African society. A more useful version of competing conceptions would have included, for instance, the growing reconciliation between liberals and Marxists, who, through synthesis, have achieved greater historical and sectoral specificity, as outlined in the introduction to Part One.

While Smith's theoretical treatment of South Africa can be questioned (as could any other), what distinguishes this resource from others reviewed here is his pervasive understanding of apartheid's day-to-day spatial functioning, derived from specialist and long-term study. I would argue that the historical and theoretical context of the description needs to be deepened for a sufficient post 16 resource, but in its own terms, as a description of apartheid's geography, Smith's book is excellent.

Senior Geography, Standard 10,
C.J. Swanevelder et al., 1989, Nasau Ltd., Cape Town

This review, unlike the others in this section, is of a book most unlikely to be used in British schools and colleges. It is included for the insights it can yield about the writing of a more suitable text. The book is a South African government-approved text covering the standard Geography syllabus for the age range with which this thesis is concerned. It is the "only recommended matric textbook in Orange Free State white schools and is used extensively in Bophuthatswana" (J.H. Drummond and A.N.W. Paterson, "Apartheid in Geography Textbooks", Perspectives in Education, vol.12, no.2, 1991, 65-76). I am told that the text is relatively "liberal" and therefore more highly regarded by black South African teachers than most approved texts. Only the human
The geography section of the book is reviewed here.

The text is dense with (sometimes misleading) empirical detail on demography, types of agriculture, economic performance, world trade, and environmental influences on economic activity, and such data is usually interpreted in the light of one or other of the spatial models devised by Western geographers from the 1950s to 1970s. Yet the book manages to ignore completely the overwhelming economic, social and political impact of apartheid policies. In fact, it is quite staggering how, throughout the book, even a mention of the most significant and tangible aspect of South Africa's human geography - the legacy of its manipulation by a coercive government - is evaded. The book demonstrates that "geographic discourse can be considered ... as the instrument of a vast scheme of mystification, the purpose of which is to hinder the development of political reflection upon space and to mask the spatial strategies of the possessors of power" (Y. Lacoste, quoted in Drummond and Paterson, op cit.).

When urbanization and decentralisation are mentioned, influx control is not; when the skilled labour shortage is mentioned, black education and the job colour bar are not; when state support for industrialisation is mentioned, its restrictions on the use of black labour are not; when the economic effects of sanctions are mentioned, their cause is not; when the shortage of urban housing and long journeys to work for blacks are mentioned, their deliberate policy genesis is not, and finally, when the regional security threat to the government is described, neither its origin, nor the fact that the greatest security threat was internal, is included.

The frequent invocation of deterministic models of human behaviour is usually accompanied by allusion to racial differentiation, with a constant reminder that "the black peoples of South Africa can be regarded as developing communities" (400), whereas, by implication, the white population is "developed". For instance, an introduction to the demographic transition model is followed not
by South Africa's "position" on the model compared to, say Britain's, but by the separate positioning of the four apartheid racial groups within South Africa on the time-line deterministically drawn from the model. Having outlined the basic structure of the economy in terms of primary, secondary and tertiary activities, South Africa's "intermediate position" on a scale of development measured by the ratio between the sectors, is "explained in terms of this country's population composition where there are considerable differences between groups" (411).

To summarize crudely, Human Geography is presented as partly the study of where places "fit" on a linear progression towards development (as indicated by outdated models). South Africa's particular "performance" on this scale is explained by the "two worlds thesis" — the fact that it contains on the one hand, an advanced and "developed" white population group, and on the other, a large "backward" African population group ("Coloureds" and Indians being somewhere in the middle). Throughout, the role of apartheid in enforcing, sustaining and perpetuating relations of inequality between South Africa's government-defined racial groups is by-passed. While the question of the origins of these racially manifested differences is not overtly addressed, the reader can only assume that they are simply "natural".

While such a text, one would hope, could never be used in British schools, nor those of South Africa in the future, there is a need —to go beyond apartheid in geographical-or-historical study of the country. It was stated above that government intervention is the most remarkable and salient characteristic of the evolution of social and spatial form in South Africa. But it still does not constitute the entire sum of that form. To assume that it did would be to deny the power of human agency in resistance to the state as well as, among others, environmental, cultural and wider economic influences. Through its deliberate attempt to avoid reference to the most striking influence, and despite its deterministic invocation of discredited models and misleading statistics, this text does help identify other, less prominent,
but nonetheless relevant, influences on social structure and spatial form. For instance, the text stresses environmental and cultural impediments to efficient farming in some homeland districts. Of course, I am not saying that these factors outweigh the much more important shortages of labour and capital, but they can be locally significant. Such considerations should be appended to an account of apartheid in order for any geographical or historical resource to be thorough in its treatment of South African structures.

4. History Texts

"A New History of Southern Africa", 2nd edition,
Neil Parsons, 1993, Macmillan

This is a history textbook for final secondary/introductory university students. Questions at the end of each chronological chapter are geared towards the Cambridge International Schools Certificate, syllabus No. 2160, and many are drawn from past papers. The author's expressed aim was "to present ... academic "new history" in popular form for students of history in southern Africa, and for students of southern Africa elsewhere in the world" (v). Although "the details of history in this book are intended to be used by students as evidence to argue a particular interpretation of the past" (v), there is no specific treatment of varying interpretations or theories. The Preface to the 2nd edition explains that "the most detailed and comprehensive part of this book ... remains its coverage of later 19th century conquest and resistance".

At the beginning of each of the book's main sections, the themes that underlay that section are set out. For instance the first part, dealing with the peopling of southern Africa from the Stone Age, is woven around the themes of adaptation to the geographical environment of the region, the fluidity of ethnic identity, the development of states and of social class, and the growth of overseas contact through trade. The explication of these themes at
the beginning of the section acts as a useful "pointer", holding together the ensuing narrative. To facilitate note-taking, there are frequent headings and sub-headings. In suggested role play activities, such as one surrounding a primary source on the marriage of a Dutch man to a slave in the early Cape colony, the point is made that "there is no right or wrong answer ... credit can only be given for disciplined and realistic use of imagination" (4).

The text is consistently thorough and is evidently based on an extensive reading of southern African history. In reasonably accessible language, the "knowledge" (rather than the interpretations or theories) of specialist historians of the region is set out over 21 chapters, extending from earliest inhabitation to the negotiations of 1990. Apart from the list of essay titles at the close of each chapter, activities include the construction of time-lines and imaginary descriptions of everyday life, reactions to specific events in the words of contemporaries, or accounts of imaginary discussions between representatives of the various polities in conflict. Generally, such imaginative exercises are well supported by the factual detail of the text, ancillary primary sources, tangential inset boxes and chronological tables (although many of the activities are geared towards students in the regions being discussed).

In places the detail becomes overbearing, with intricate accounts of the waxing and waning of various polities interspersed with the names of their leaders. Notwithstanding the themes introduced at the start of each section, there seems to have been little attempt to isolate or even emphasise those social developments and "moments" which were of particular importance in the subsequent formation of South African society. Rather, historical minutiae is included seemingly for its own sake. From a purely historical perspective, this is perhaps no bad thing, but given the present aim of enabling students to understand the development of South African society as it is today, more assistance could be offered in identifying those processes and thresholds which were of
particular salience for the subsequent course of South African social development. Many of the Cambridge Board questions, to which the text is primarily geared, require detailed knowledge of events, but are undemanding in assessing the significance of those events as markers for later social and political development.

This emphasis on historical minutiae can go so far as to obscure an appreciation of the development of segregationist and apartheid ideologies. Regarding segregation, there is somewhat of a "top-down" approach, portraying it purely as the result of early 20th century legislation. A deeper analysis of the historical evolution of segregationist ideology is required - an analysis lost here in the morass of legislative detail. When ideology is the implicit focus, the intensification of segregation to form apartheid is interpreted as a reaction to growing African nationalism. But I would argue that the political challenge of African nationalism only took hold in the subsequent era of apartheid, and that, in the 1940s, the initial apartheid idea of Malan's NP was more a reaction to Smuts's "liberalism" and the social threat of an urbanised African proletariat, than to organised African political resistance.

Nevertheless, the thematic markers given at the onset of each section can be used as summaries of dominant processes - those for the era of European conquest and resistance in particular: European imperialism, horse and gun technology, trading-based and military-based kingdoms, European missionary influence and Boer states in the interior. With the omission of some of the detail in these chapters, and particularly, with more frequent explicit referral back to these themes, the book would, I believe be more useful, at least as far as my own rationale for teaching South Africa is concerned. In this same 19th century section, the fact that, in their early history, the Boer states of the interior had no monopoly of coercion over the African polities around them, and were in many ways similar to them, is, importantly, emphasised. It was the industrialisation of the white polities, both of the coast and in the interior, which gave them the power to mould future
social changes to their own model; not their inherent superiority - and the narrative makes this clear.

There are, however, some intriguing omissions. The impact on the eastern frontier, and on the evolution of white racial attitudes as a whole, of the 1820 settlers from Britain, is neglected, and the settlers themselves are mentioned only in passing. Organised Afrikaner nationalism, despite its significance for the implementation of apartheid, is not treated as one of the themes to be woven throughout the text, and, surprisingly, there is no mention of the 1973 Durban strikes which preceded the Soweto revolt and marked the onset of an upsurge in trade union effectiveness.

In general, as the statement of emphasis in the preface denotes, the account of social and political developments since the 1970s is not as thorough or as well informed as that of preceding periods - for example, there is an implication that the ANC itself initiated the 1980s insurrection. There is though, unusual and refreshing use of African cultural sources - for instance the 19th century Tswana's observation that Mzilikazi was cruel to his enemies and kind to those he conquered, but that Boers destroyed their enemies and made slaves of their friends (114).

In conclusion, with the few exceptions noted above, Parsons' text is comprehensive in terms of content, and makes a good reference source. It is clearly laid out, contains forward and backward referencing (although there could be more of the latter regarding the themes set out at the onset of each section) and frequent subheadings, illustrations and maps, and it is written in an accessible style. However, there seems to be a lack of discrimination, especially in the section dealing with the 13th century, between historical minutiae and salient events and processes, making it difficult to grasp the key strands of South African social development. By attempting to convey the complexity of historical change in the region, the text often falls into the trap of assuming that concision equals simplicity (see Part
The text is weak when it comes to the developments and motivations behind the final abandonment of apartheid, for instance, glossing over the economic contradictions at apartheid's core.

While the questions and activities are sometimes imaginative, they tend to follow the same format throughout, with little variation in student learning exercises. Relatively few of the exercises set are based directly on primary sources, although they could be used at the discretion of the student.

From a geographical perspective, insufficient attention is paid to segregation's and apartheid's spatial dimension and there are few regional and local examples of the impact of these spatially ordered systems. There is also insufficient treatment of the ruling group ideologies behind these systems, the currents of ideology being displaced by the detail of events. For all its limitations however, Parsons' book remains a worthy and impressive synthesis of historical knowledge about South Africa, and an important resource not only for A level and undergraduate students, but also for specialists.


Shillington's text is aimed at "O level" or equivalent examinations in southern Africa rather than the A level students of Parsons. It is, however, noted that "at the same time it should provide a useful introduction for students studying southern African history at a more advanced level" (v).

The narrative begins with the stone age settlement of the region and descriptions of Khoi and San customs and economic reproduction. The exercises at the end of each chapter are in three categories: Think, Discuss, Understand and Write (largely essay titles); Imaginative Writing (accounts of imaginary
scenarios based on the text), and Mapwork, Document Work and Discussion (responding to questions on specific sources or devising own maps, charts etc.). The prose is, like Parsons, accessible, and of a classically textbook "factual" style, interspersed with frequent sub-headings.

There is sufficient historical detail in parts not to be over-concise, and there is some degree of characterisation of important individuals like Moshoeshoe. I found the text to be generally more readable than Parsons, with less "superfluous" detail and a greater emphasis on the portentous. When the author's "opinion" does intercede overtly in the text, the effect is relatively striking: for example, the Langalibelele "affair", in which attempts to disarm a Natal chiefdom resulted in resistance, is described as "a clear case of whites overreacting through fear in the face of defiance by a small section of the overwhelming African majority" (95).

The use of maps is particularly good, with most of the places mentioned in the text being marked on clear and accessible sketch maps. The coverage of historical events itself is comprehensive and the primary sources used are interesting.

On the negative side, the "imaginative writing" exercises are sometimes too imaginative to be even remotely realistic - for example, an account of a meeting between Shaka, Mzilikaze, Sobhuza and Sebetwane - a meeting that could never have occurred for the very reasons elucidated in the previous chapter on the Mfecane. (It would have been more useful to ask why such a meeting couldn't have occurred than what would have been discussed had it done so).

With the odd exception, like that of the Langalibelele affair, the human motivations behind events are often taken as being self-evident. The currents of South African social formation would have been more clearly revealed if these motivations had been addressed explicitly - in other words, if theory had been discussed.
Shillington's narrative, like Parsons', becomes more cursory, and more questionable, as it nears the present. For example, the 1976 Soweto revolt is explained in the light of inferior black education compared to white - but this was a constant. What was not, was the expansion of black schooling, the economic environment facing young Africans and the emergence of a new ideology of resistance. The interpretation of the text is, in fact, insufficient for the reader to be able to answer the essay set at the end of the chapter: "What Were the Causes and Results of the Soweto Uprising of 1976?" (194).

The claim that Inkatha holds the support of at least half the Zulus is indicative of the level of simplification and generalisation in the account of the 1980s (and I stick to this belief despite the declared election results from Natal). There is no mention of the shifts in government ideology or strategy under Botha, with reforms passed off as "cosmetic". Other than a reference to business concern over instability, there is no impression of the factors leading to the abandonment of apartheid.

Shillington's text is a competently written, clear, and frequently engrossing account of South African historical development, but it is unable to convey a comprehension of the structural shifts underlying the abandonment of apartheid, or of the pressures from which South Africa suffers today. Like Parsons, the activities tend to follow well worn formats, which in themselves are good learning mechanisms, but which could be varied for greater effect.


Like the two texts reviewed above, Danziger's is written with candidates for senior secondary school examinations in mind. The book has some features which are good explanatory tools, particularly the initial relief maps, photographs and accompanying text explaining the crucial environmental context of South African history. However, it is not as competent a history, nor as useful for students as the preceding texts.
Throughout the text, "points" or "factors" are frequently ordered in numbered lists, a characteristic which may be seen as facilitating revision, but which disrupts the narrative. In the early chapters there is a heavy emphasis on the relations between the VOC and Dutch settlers, almost to the exclusion of the development of early material and social relations between coloniser, slaves and colonised.

Despite later reference to Khoisan wars of resistance, it is stated that early freeburghers expanding to the east "met with no resistance from the native peoples, as the loose social structure of the Khoi was being undermined by terrible smallpox epidemics and the San had long since been forced by black, white and Khoi into less arable areas" (21). This is simply not true, and the fact that whites had already played a role in pushing San out of the favoured areas suggests that they did indeed meet resistance.

At other points in the narrative, it is similarly implied that Khoisan simply retreated into the interior in the face of advancing white settlement. Where the 1657 Khoisan war of resistance is discussed, it is stated that the war ended when "other Khoi forced the militants into making peace as they wanted to resume trade with the fort". Later, Khoi "clans who had unwisely bartered away large herds had to adopt a San-like existence of raiding the cattle of other tribes and of the Dutch" (my emphases). Nigel Penn ("Land, Labour and Livestock in the Western Cape During the 18th Century", in "The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape", James, W.G. and Simons, M. eds., David Philip, Cape Town, 1989) documents the forced bartering of Khoisan cattle, in spite of insufficient remaining to maintain an independent means of living, and of Khoisan complaints to colonial officials. The "Dutch" cattle raided by the Khoisan, were in most cases themselves appropriated from Khoisan.

The historical misrepresentation continues: the caption to a
picture of the Company slave lodge contains the information that Company slaves received a better education than most of the colonists. While this may be strictly true, if left unqualified by an observation concerning choice and the nature of that education, it conveys a somewhat distorted picture. At one point, even with the whole of the 19th century as the context, British interest in the region is put down solely to protection of the Cape sea route - not a mention of minerals or confederation until later. Aside from discrete moments in the text such as these, in the section dealing with further white colonisation, the book perpetuates an outdated variant of the "frontier thesis" (see Chapter One, Part One).

The account of the mfecane, similarly, cannot be taken as an accurate reflection of current academic thinking. Its focus is almost entirely on the personalities of "great men" such as Dingiswayo, Zwide and Shaka, with no recognition of the structural economic and ecological crises which propelled the region towards increased conflict and state building.

It is a sensationalism derived from that of European observers of the day which holds that under Shaka "anyone not able to work was put to death" (37), not historical "truth", in any sense of the term. Elsewhere, the same overemphasis on individual personality, and omission of structural change is apparent. Two more examples of inaccuracy will suffice. Indentured Indian labourers were brought to the Natal sugar plantations not because so many Africans had left for the diamond mines that there was a labour shortage, but because local Africans could not be induced to abandon farming for plantation labouring. And the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Buthelezi, was not "elected in the Western democratic fashion" (65), if the banning of the most popular political movement in the region, and the fact that support for Inkatha was a necessity for land and security in many rural areas, are taken into account.

Apart from misleading statements and interpretations, there are
great omissions. For instance, in the section dealing with the growth of Kimberley, virtually all that was significant about the town for future social development – urban segregation, the compound system, racial discrimination in the workforce, the rise of monopoly capitalism – is overlooked.

Throughout the account of apartheid, the language used seems to partially justify oppressive legislation by portraying it as attempted solutions to "problems" facing the government. Nowhere is it implied that these "problems" were the result of its own agenda. An example is the statement that, in the 1980s, South African troops were "forced" to "violate South Africa's borders" in pursuit of ANC guerillas.

The conclusion is particularly bewildering, with statements that there have been no major wars in the southern African region for almost 70 years (Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe?); nor famines or droughts (the early 1980s drought?); that the "South African economy ... is generally considered to be one of the strongest in the world" (persistent capital outflow, severe balance of payments deficit and negative per capita, and even absolute growth rates?); and that, in times of recession, blacks are more dependent on white goodwill, and therefore less likely to revolt (1976 and 1984 were both periods of economic recession).

The essay titles included as exercises are all listed at the end of the book. They are from both the Cambridge Board and the Kenya National Examinations Council and they are demanding mostly of factual recall rather than of analytical or synthetical skill or understanding.

Zed Books, London and New Jersey

This book was originally written for exiled South African students at the ANC's Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Tanzania, with
the express purpose of focusing on the history of resistance to
white domination. The account begins with the 1860s - a rather
confusing period with which to initiate the book.

From the start, there is simplification of the array of
independent and semi-independent polities inhabiting the region at
the time, with "Tswana" and "Sotho" plotted unrealistically as if
they were coherent polities rather than loose agglomerations of
clans, chiefdoms and kingdoms, in defined territories on a map.
However, the simplification is of a kind which I believe to be
preferable, in the context envisaged, to Parsons' elaborate
documentation. Nevertheless, the book is at its weakest in the
section dealing with the 19th century. Terms such as "imperialism"
and "capitalism" are taken for granted and insufficiently
explained and exemplified, and the emphasis on conquest and
resistance means that other, more portentous developments like the
consolidation of segregationist assumptions and the fixing of
material relations between racial groups, are relatively
neglected.

The account is clearly anti-capitalist in orientation, but, with
the odd exception, the slant does not result in any obvious
distortion of versions of history "accepted" by most specialists.
However, the "wishful thinking" of united, progressive black
resistance to apartheid does tend to obscure the high degree of
ethnic consciousness within South Africa's black population, and
the account of the early ANC omits reference to the leadership's
attempts to preserve its relatively privileged position as an
African middle class.

The roles of the socialist resistance movements in particular, are
stressed, and, in the consideration given to Afrikaner
nationalism, its material dimension receives most attention,
although cultural inputs are not neglected. The materialist
emphasis, does however, need modification when it comes to
interpreting apartheid itself. This is done largely through
Wolpe's rationale of the maintenance of cheap African labour in
the face of reserve economy collapse. Fear of African urbanisation, including its cultural consequences, should be given more emphasis, as a focus on materialism alone is unrealistic. The dependence on the explanatory value of cheap labour supplies also leads to a tendency to overlook the important structural economic changes in the last decades of apartheid, notably the increasing need for skilled labour, and African wage gains (not least because of trades unions).

The focus on resistance, as well as obscuring the role of economic contradiction in the demise of apartheid, allows significant changes in ruling group ideology and practice, particularly under Botha, to go unnoticed.

Keeping these limitations in mind, the book has a number of impressive attributes. The discussions in which it is suggested students participate are often innovative, and may be "open ended"; for instance, a debate on differences between Boer and British colonizers as perceived by contemporary Africans. If the book's materialist slant is acknowledged, it can still be taken as a fairly reliable interpretive guide to most of the major social, economic and political developments in South Africa, at least until the 1960s.

Its selection of "sources" for analysis is refreshing, ranging from extracts from academic histories to clearly biased South African school texts (with exercises to identify the author's political position) and popular songs. There is good use of backward and forward referencing, evident in a suggested comparison between Milner's post Boer War Anglicization of Afrikaners and the NP's decision to enforce instruction in Afrikaans in the black schools of the 1970s. A particularly good account of the 1913 Land Act and its consequences follows.

One feature of the book that is worthy of note is that it is obviously written with the learner in mind. This may seem self-evident for a textbook, but unless there is a real attempt to
explain, rather than to take knowledge for granted, textbooks fail to reflect the fact that their readers do not already know (see Part Four). A manifestation of expressed concern for the reader here is the clear exemplification, in an inset box, of the impact of overvaluation of South African currency in the 1933 economic crisis - an important development that many students would have difficulty with.

The account is well, and clearly written, but the general narrative, like the primary sources, tends to concern itself more with resistance to racial structures than with the attitudes behind their evolution. In this sense, the book is ultimately inadequate as a guide to the formation of social structure in South Africa.

Conclusion: Insights for a Post 16 Resource

Many of the reviews above have been overtly critical, but in any field, it is only by first identifying the limitations of current practice that one can take the more positive step of reformulation. This section will be concluded with an attempt not only to identify what I see as common problems with available resources, but also to identify their positive aspects - aspects which, when combined with a consideration of suitable linguistic techniques and text structure in Part Three, can inform my own ensuing effort at resource construction.

Historical Formation

If there is one criticism which can be applied to all the resources reviewed above except the history texts, it is insufficient consideration of historical legacies in the formulation of apartheid. While the apartheid system, or aspects of it, are described, with varying degrees of accuracy and effectiveness by all these materials, none is charged with the means of understanding the evolution of that system. While all, to
some extent, confront the reader with the injustice and brutality of apartheid, none sets this injustice and brutality sufficiently in the context in which it occurs. "White psychology" and the "apartheid mentality" are addressed by the better resources, but the temporal course of their manifestation as a pervasive system of government, their reification, despite modification and adaptation, not least because of black resistance, in social and spatial forms, is sufficiently traced by none. (A related problem is the frequent use of the term "the Afrikaners" when what is really meant is the government of the day or the state. The two are far from synonymous).

The History texts tend to suffer more from a lack of attention to recent structural shifts within South Africa, and an inability to make their "story" of social formation relevant to today's situation. To varying extents, they fail to isolate sufficiently those historical traits which have most significance for the constitution of contemporary South African society.

**Historical Theory**

With apartheid now banished from the statute books, it may seem irrelevant to trace its origins as a system of social regulation, but any South African will testify, whether wistfully or angrily, to its legacy. South Africa ten or twenty years from now will still be shaped by apartheid to a very significant degree and therefore its origins are crucial to a contemporary understanding of South African society. Danziger's history is incomplete and inconsistent; Parsons', with a few anomalies, is comprehensive and Shillington's is more readable as well as comprehensive; but only Pampallis has a consistent (materialist) theoretical thread running throughout the text, and even this is an implicit and exclusive one.

Some of the historical detail of these texts is essential to an understanding of South Africa's social structuring, and it provides points of interest and involvement for students, but it
should be complemented by a more coherent consideration of competing or compatible theories of social development. To put it simply, an account of theoretical disputes is needed to explain the "why?" of South African social development; these historical texts explain only the "how?"

If apartheid's origins are to be fully addressed then, it must be partially through a consideration of theoretical interpretations of South Africa's historical development. An account of theoretical debate is not only useful for elucidating the temporal formulation of apartheid, but is also educationally valuable in assisting students to perceive that there are competing interpretations, that there will be slants and biases, by omission or by commission, in materials purporting to explain South Africa and apartheid (including the one that presents these debates). Smith's book alone among the resources specifically designed for post 16 student use, attempts, but in what I see as a confusing way, to set apartheid in an explicit theoretical context.

Social Formation Beyond Apartheid

A further common limitation of current resources is their partiality in focusing exclusively on apartheid, the implication being that apartheid constitutes the sum of human experience in South Africa. Yet, the influences on South Africa's social and spatial structures extend beyond apartheid and racial ideology to encompass more ambiguous cultural, environmental and economic influences. (Of course, the South African text reviewed goes to the other, and, were it not so serious, ridiculous extreme of ignoring apartheid altogether).

A related point is the importance of emphasising to students the salient legacies of apartheid for life in post-apartheid South Africa, both in the present and in the indeterminate future, (see Margaret Roberts, "The Ending of Apartheid: Shifting Inequalities in South Africa", Geography, Jan 1994, no.342, Vol.79, part 1, 53-
What I would see as a better resource then, would not only describe South Africa's spatial and social structures, but would also trace the development of systems of government based on racial differentiation and consider interpretations of these systems, focusing on ideological evolution, material exegesis and the relations between state and society. It would also address the economic, cultural and environmental influences that mould social and spatial forms outside of, or in direct opposition to, state manipulation or supervision. The injustices of South African social reproduction would be made apparent in such a resource, but so would the mode of their genesis.

Such is the conclusion drawn from a deliberately critical survey of existing resources. But these resources have positive lessons to proffer as well:

**Interest**

Leeds DEC's exercise of establishing links between South Africa and Britain is a way of stimulating interest in the subject on the part of British students. I would however, seek to establish more substantial and less emotive links, focusing for instance on economic interactions and the impact on South African government rhetoric and action of the general shift away from overtly racist discourse in countries like Britain, rather than direct political comparison.

A more consistent way of making South African society interesting for British students is the use of stimulating writing, resources and activities.

Texts can convey a realistic image, useful for understanding current political developments, of the tension-wrought, unstable and violent society of the years of apartheid's demise. This cannot be achieved through "dry" academic accounts alone, but with
the assistance of journalistic inserts such as those used in the Geographical Magazine series and Smith's "Update", students derive a more immediate, not to say interesting, picture of contemporary South African society. There is no reason why such approaches should not be extended to the past as well.

The History texts demonstrate that primary sources and illustrations can both convey an impression of the wider social assumptions and attitudes lying behind segregation and resistance, and, through their immediacy, generate greater interest.

Lemon's use of stimulating aerial photographs allows students to examine the segregated nature of South Africa's contemporary urban areas, while Danziger's initial outline of South African environments, through maps and photographs, is accessible and contextually important. Sources such as these could be supplemented by extracts from relevant literature, as used to exemplify aspects of white domination and black resistance in Part One of this thesis.

The Schools Boycott and Kei Road simulations demonstrate that not all role plays are relatively meaningless and a-contextual exercises. With sufficient background material and pre-developed understanding of a situation, they can help students to conceptualise the behaviour behind the events and longer term processes which shape South African society. They could even lead into more general debates on the nature of interaction between structure and agency in the determination of historical change. "The Child is Not Dead" is a useful source of further imaginative learning exercises on South Africa, to complement and extend the note-taking, discussion and essay writing activities of the History texts.
Values

The "moral" framework within which apartheid is addressed - prominent in the materials of Leeds DEC and the resources of the charitable organisations involved specifically with South Africa - can be educational to an extent. While I would not agree that anti-apartheid "bias" should explicitly inform educational materials, for reasons set out above, I believe that some "disclaimer" of objectivity should be included in an educational resource on South Africa.

Students, if they didn't already know, should be informed that contentious topics are being addressed, and that even such a resource as the one that they are using, designed specifically for the purpose of formal education, should not be taken as being "neutral".

Exercises based on a critical review of the bias in existing texts, like those in Pampallis, can be useful in this regard, as long as it is not suggested that the book in which these exercises are contained is itself "definitive" or unbiased.

Maps

Finally, and before moving on to an attempt to formulate a resource informed partly by the lessons of this review, a point about mapping. A resource developed within South Africa to provide a "People's Geography" alternative to accounts like that of Swanevelder et al, is "The Two South Africas: A People's Geography", Human Rights Commission, 1992. This emphasises the fact that most maps of contemporary South Africa represent areas inhabited by whites in some detail, whilst omitting the infrastructure-deprived "shadow" black South Africa.

Yet, "the omission of black areas reflects a distorted view of who the South Africans are, and where they live. It is an ideological statement about who is really significant, who really counts" (foreword). Before this publication, little if anything existed
"in the way of a co-ordinated geography that exposes the lie of contemporary maps and bridges the reality of the two South Africas". I would argue that a resource containing maps such as comprise this booklet, representing black townships and locations as well as the white towns they serviced under apartheid, is essential for a sophisticated 10-13 resource on South Africa.
The construction of Parts One and Two of this thesis has left me with some idea of the content which I believe should be included in a text assisting older students to understand social formation in South Africa. Three aspects of this envisaged content and its ordering are most apparent to me at this stage: it will be chronologically structured as a periodization (as was my initial formulation of South African social formation in Part One); it will explicitly address theoretical conflicts in the interpretation of South Africa's history; and it will be consciously and overtly selective in the events and processes it describes - the criteria for selection being revealed to the reader (for example, see exercise, appendix, p.417). I would like to elaborate on, and justify these three attributes before moving on to discuss dimensions of an "ideal" text other than content.

The most fundamental reason for a chronologically ordered text is that such a structure reflects my own understanding of South Africa's socio-spatial relations. This understanding rests on the metaphor of South African social formation as a palimpsest - a palimpsest comprised of layers of entrenched group interactions, patterned by structure and agency over time. I believe that only through the identification and explication of significant social, economic and political developments in each of a number of "layers" or periods (however these periods are delineated) can one attain a coherent, if simplified impression of South African social configuration. Such a structure does not reflect my own process of learning about South Africa - I did not read a series of texts dealing with successive periods of South African history. Nevertheless, as an internalised outcome of reading texts in no particular order, and of researching within South Africa, I have an imposed, ordered, mental "sense" of South African social
development that is chronological. The steps I took towards this sense were idiosyncratic, unrepeatable, and time-consuming, and it is their more ordered outcome (one of many possible outcomes) with which I wish students to interact.

Secondly, I favour a chronological ordering because of its compatibility with the sub-discipline of Historical Geography, with which I would like to see A-level students made more familiar. It is time that static descriptions and deterministic, universal spatial models be replaced by the study of real places and their empirical social and spatial patterning through time.

My final reason for a chronologically ordered text is informed by the study of literature on the relationship between reader and text - a study that constitutes the rest of this chapter. Despite post-modernist literary experimentation, chronological sequencing remains natural to narrative - the form of text that is most accessible to most readers; but it also allows the introduction of less familiar forms of discourse, such as argumentation, which will extend the "implied/intended reader's" competence or experience. The importance of such an outcome will be clarified in the following pages.

The second attribute of my envisaged text's content is its explicit treatment of theory. Some of the reasoning behind this imperative is contained in the conclusion to Part Two. To recap briefly: consideration of debates over the interpretation of South African history can engage students in attempts to understand why South Africa developed in the way that it did as well as how; and it can serve as a useful lesson on the absence of objective historical or geographical discourse, and on the detection of authorial ideology (for example, appendix, pp. 453-457). But there is an additional advantage of addressing theory in the text: competing theories/interpretations can be used as the basis for a bipolar theme, often found in fiction, running through the narrative to encourage engagement (see discussion of Egan, 1989, below).
The third envisaged aspect of my text's content is its revealed selection criteria. The text will not be an exhaustive history or geography of South Africa; it will be a discourse on those events and processes which I deem to have been particularly significant in moulding the most apparent contours of social and spatial interaction within contemporary South Africa. I believe that, as such, students should be informed of the basis on which events and themes have been selected for their consideration or "re-creation". The reader should be informed of why the author feels that a particular, selected "moment" was/is portentous (for example, appendix, pp.44-446). In this way the distance between writer as source of semi-mystical authority and reader as learner is reduced, overcoming at least some of the difficulties that student readers have been found to experience (see Robson,1983).

The envisaged text then, will be informed by these considerations of content and ordering. But there are two other attributes of the text which I feel ought to be considered before I begin its writing. The first is the nature of the activities which it is suggested that students should perform from their reading. The second, touched upon in the rationale of content above, and upon which the bulk of this part of the thesis hinges, is the structure, form and style of the text's language itself.

Student activities are suggested in any text to facilitate greater familiarity with its expressed ideas (although these will always be mediated by student interaction - see below) and retention of its "factual" content. Empathy with the peoples introduced in the text is a necessary component of these aims.

The greater the interaction and the degree of student involvement in the suggested activities, it would seem, the greater the potential for student familiarity and retention. In order to prevent staleness of interaction, activities, and the sources upon which they are based, should be varied, and at times, involve "realistic" student imagination as well as factual summation. Facile assumptions can be minimised through the enrichment of
content and retention can be assisted with guided student writing.

Such characteristics can be found in texts written without any specific reference to linguistic theory, but the attention of theorists has increasingly been drawn towards the purposes and attributes of what students write in response to the text's suggestions. The concept of genre in student writing has been developed most intensively in Australia (see for example Kress and Threadgold, 1988, Martin, 1989, Reid, 1988, Threadgold, 1988 and 1992). Genre theorists hold that the act and the form of writing are very much conditioned by the purpose of writing. The general induction of students into the language of "adulthood" involves an appreciation of how language is moulded to genre, whether the genre be, for example, narrative, reporting, description, or exposition (see Martin, 1989). As a social process, writing should take into account for whom one is writing and why (for example, exercises, appendix, pp. 42- and 616).

If our text then, is to assist students not only in developing an understanding of South African social structures, but also in coping with and handling language more generally, its suggested written activities should be explicitly purposeful, and more importantly, of manifest relevance for the student. Examples of activities developed in accordance with "genre theory" are provided by Bleiman and Dickens, 1989, in a resource on Jean Rhys' novel, "Wide Sargasso Sea", developed for English A level students. Believing that writing activities should "allow students to learn the different processes of writing for different purposes" (5), they argue that one should be aware of the rationale for each suggestion, including note-taking, charts and diagrams, creative or imaginative responses, more extensive critical writing, timed work and work arising from other, related texts. In an introduction for the student reader, it is expressly stated that the ensuing activities "should help you to approach a difficult text as active readers, confident enough to make your own meanings, tolerate uncertainty and suspend premature judgement" (16). I see no reason why just such a rationale should
not also inform the activities in an instructive text (for example, exercise, appendix, p.727).

But what of the text itself - its structure and linguistic form? Here, some of the work of literary theorists, delineating the interaction between readers and texts, is of relevance. The literature in this field is extensive and directed mainly towards readers' interaction with fiction.

In a restrictively selective overview, and drawing heavily on Carol Robson's MA thesis, I attempt in the remainder of this part of my thesis, to derive from this literature that which is of assistance in writing a formal educational text on South Africa.

**Reader and Text**

The act of reading has come to be understood by literary theorists as an interaction or transaction between reader and text, and investigations by experimental psychologists and educationalists among others have revealed an increasing array of influences, other than the text itself, on the nature of this interaction and on its outcome. While some of these influences will be touched upon in the following account, they are not fully explored since it is particularly the construction of the text which is of concern here.

Robson, 1983, suggests that interpretations of the relationship between reader and text tend to adopt one of three broad approaches. These she characterises as the "skills" approach, "views of comprehension developed by Cognitive Psychology", and the "holistic" approach. In the skills approach, the relationship between reader and text is perceived as being "one-way". Comprehension can be transmitted from text to reader (Thorndike,1971), with the reader as something of a passive, empty vessel waiting to be filled with understanding from the text. The fact that, despite a uniform textual message, different readers acquire different comprehensions, is accounted for by the
possibility of the reader making mistakes in the interpretation of words, over or under-emphasising certain elements in the text, or failing to treat ideas gained as provisional - to be adjusted in the light of further reading. According to this perception, student comprehension of the text can be gauged simply by setting questions on it - and by supplying the answers to the questions, teachers lead students to the "correct" and definitive understanding.

Expressed in such mechanistic terms, teachers might wish to reject such a notion; yet, as Robson points out, "this model is the orthodoxy of many teachers" (12). It is also frequently the implicit assumption behind educational research: for example, Lunzer and Gardner, 1979, investigating the efficiency by which understanding is "conveyed" from text to student reader, found that the critical determinant of comprehension was the reader's willingness to reflect on the reading matter. In a later account of the way in which learning from texts proceeds, the same authors similarly take it for granted that any problems experienced stem not from the text, but from the reader (Lunzer and Gardner, 1984).

Following the line of enquiry suggested by the skills approach, research has been conducted into the development of better reading skills, with strategies such as skimming, scanning and reflective reading being advocated for various types of study (Lunzer and Gardner, 1978, 1984). Whilst the development of such "skills" may indeed assist many students, they are techniques founded on an assumption of simplistic reader absorption of content. As prescriptive methods, they, and the model from which they are derived, make "little allowance for any diversification of strategies which pupils' own background and knowledge might prompt" (Robson, 1983, 15).

Since the "skills" model is not an interactive one, it offers little guidance for the formulation of the text itself. Indeed, there is an assumption that unless a text is "suitable" for its intended readership, it will not get into print in the first
place, "so text types correspond to certain kinds of reader expectation" (Lunzer and Gardner, 1984). But Robson's point is that they often do not. Her research reveals that many student readers find great difficulty arriving at any comprehension of a great deal of texts, and that many of the understandings that students do develop from texts are distorted or oversimplified (see below). Texts themselves are more subtly complicated and multifaceted than mere containers of information to be tapped.

While the skills approach hinges on the expectation that "what a text (literally) says is what it (figuratively) means ... this is at best a dubious assumption, increasingly so with the emerging corpus of scholarship from literary theorists on the character of textual discourse" (De Castell et al., 1989). This is not just a matter of textual deconstruction, but of the differential way in which texts tap the experience of readers. The skills approach assumes a neat transfer of meaning from text to reader, but "any successful transfer ... though initiated by the text ... depends on the extent to which this text can activate the individual reader's faculties of perceiving and processing ... In other words, it offers guidance as to what is to be produced, and therefore cannot itself be the product" (Iser, 1978, 107). What is needed from a text then, is greater anticipation of the interpretations it is likely to initiate in a variety of readers.

Approaches to reader comprehension developed by cognitive psychologists are more sensitive to differential relationships between texts and readers with different backgrounds. They are based on a computer-processing model, with "data" inputed from the text to the memory of the reader. Reader comprehension derives from an understanding of this "data", and evidence of comprehension comes not from questioning, but from the ability to recognise and recall aspects of the text's message. Generally, the "form" of the text - for instance, story or argument - is retained and replicated in the "form" of the reader's recall.

This suggests that familiarity with such forms assists
comprehension of the text's message. "Thus comprehension is assumed to depend upon prior knowledge structures" (Robson, 1983, 18). A recent example of such an approach is provided by Fairclough, 1989: "once we identify a text as an instance of a pattern, we happily dispense with the mass of its detail and reduce it to the skeletal shape of the familiar pattern for purposes of longer-term memory and recall" (160).

These structures or patterns in the mind of the reader - ways of formatting content - could be seen as analogous to a computer program, designed to receive data from an external source. The form in which that data is received is determined by the receptive program.

When comprehension is developed, the linguistic conventions in the text reflect the memory conventions of the mind, and the forms of the text, such as argument, narrative and propaganda, are "intuitively recognized" (Robson, 1983, 20) by the reader, guided by his/her mental structures. "Thus comprehension is achieved through an interactive process between textual structures and the mental structures of the reader; this tends to be a matching process" (Robson, 1983, 20). Incomprehension on the part of the reader will be the result of a mismatch, resulting from a lack of recognition of the discourse structure or form (Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1978).

Robson sees the work of cognitive psychologists as useful - in that it accounts for the knowledge and expectations of the reader - but limited by the omission of wider, similarly relevant attributes of the reader - notably "intentions, feelings and imagination" (21). Taken on its own, the work has little practical guidance to offer an individual author in the stimulation of further reader comprehension, since "those who apply such models to reading in the subject areas stress the importance of developing the reader's prior knowledge networks, rather than his/her experience of the text" (21).

Robson herself favours a more "holistic" view of reading as part
of learning. In such an approach, as with the cognitive psychologists, the interpretation of language as merely a means whereby "information is shunted from one person to another" (Smith, 1982a) is rejected. But there is also criticism of a view of the reader's mind consisting of "stereotyped data structures" (Smith, 1982a), and an acceptance of a wider range of variables affecting the reception of any text.

Reading is seen as just one of many learning experiences which shape, and are shaped by, evolving mental constructs. These constructs are really working hypotheses which are amended in the light of new, anomalous experience, or consolidated and retained in the light of new confirmatory experience. The legacy of past experience of every kind informs the way new experiences, such as that of a text, are construed.

This legacy is not immutable, but it will "orient (readers) powerfully towards extending their learning in ways consistent with it" (Robson, 1982, 24). Since each reader's past experience is unique, there will be a variety of individual strategies for learning from any text.

The questions that students ask themselves in order to learn from a text then, are founded in their own past experience. Yet learning, by definition, involves an extension of this experience, and it is with this extension that a text should be concerned. The text can be "active" in extending and modifying expectations and in helping to instigate new questions, so that reading becomes "an exchange of meanings with an author" (Goodman, Goodman and Burke). For such a transaction to be successful though, the text must touch the reader's present experience or expectations before it can extend them.

In instructional texts then, "it is the author's responsibility to initiate the development of expectations as the reader progresses through the book" (Smith, 1982b), choosing a register appropriate to the reader's pre-existing expectations (Robson, 1982).
Unfortunately, "orthodox" formulae for assessing the readability of textbooks do not rest on the assumption behind this view - that of reading as transaction. Rather, they focus on sentence length or the frequency of polysyllabic words (see Robson, 1982, for references), omitting any consideration of the differential relationship between these aspects of text and the reader. In consequence, "there is no causal relationship between difficulty level as predicted by a formula and the actual difficulty a reader is likely to encounter" (Lunzer and Gardner, 1979).

The expectations that a reader brings to a text are multi-faceted, shaped by linguistic competence gained outside school (Luke, De Castell and Luke, 1989), and involving "sense, emotional response, approval and disapproval" (Britton, 1977). They are also influenced by the form of authority with which a text is endowed by the teacher (see Luke, De Castell and Luke, 1989), and the mood and motivation of the student at the specific moment of reading. Indeed, some "critics and theoreticians of the 20th century ... have emphasised readers and their activity more than texts and their authors" and they "vary greatly in the standing they accord to the text and its writer" (Evans, 1987). Whilst recognising that much of the text's message lies not entirely "in the text" though, the focus here must be on that which resides within it. Olson, 1989, in his response to Luke, De Castell and Luke, addresses this concern: "the writing of texts is not a trivial matter. The task facing writers is not only to make texts assimilable; it is to make clear both the grounds for accepting claims as true and the grounds for granting persons, texts and institutions authority" (261). However, there is more that the writer can do, even if the text is necessarily going to be "reconstituted" by teachers and students in class.

But before guidelines for the writing of a "successful" text can be delineated, we need a closer focus on the specific role of the text itself in the transaction of reading.
Egan, 1989, writing about science textbooks, emphasises the role of narrative or story in successful instructional text. Stories are defined by the fact that they have an "affective meaning" - that is, they conclude when the reader knows what to "feel" about the sequence of events contained within them. In an enthralling novel, this outcome is derived from reader-text interaction and re-interpretation - activities encouraged by texts described by Eco, 1979, as "open" (as opposed to "closed", wherein a passive reader is simply entertained).

Eco's appellations were applied specifically to fiction, but the story is the most fundamental mode of human expression and understanding of any sequence of ideas. As Rosen, 1994 puts it, "narrative is ... a universal method of giving meaning to experience. Like life itself, it is there, international, tranhistorical, transcultural" (Barthes, 1982, quoted Rosen, 1994). Egan believes stories should be incorporated in both teaching and the instructional text. Similarly, in the context of a Geography text, Slater, 1991, offering guidance on note-taking, advises student readers to see the text they are "interrogating" as a narrative with plot and characters. The student's task is to isolate, relate and compare the roles of the characters (in this case contributors to eutrophication in the Norfolk Broads). For example, in the account of the Broads used for a model, "the experiments give us the overall structure of the unfolding story. They are the chapters of the story with a different character/variable featuring more prominently in each chapter" (13) (for example of role of story telling, see appendix, pp.430-431).

As far as historical (or historical geography) texts are concerned, deterministic, or "unreformed" Marxists think that they know the ultimate meaning of broad societal change, but according to Egan, "we cannot fix our affective response to (historical) events. They have too many sides, too many contexts, to allow
reduction of possible meanings to one precise meaning" (102). However, here there is a connection to be made with my earlier comments on the role of theory in the text. Competing theories attempt to fix exactly such meanings to historical processes and events. They are the underlying threads linking the happenings of the story. While Egan is right that it is impossible to fix one precise meaning to history, I see no reason why there should not be a counterpoising of meanings in a successful text. Addressing the different historiographies of South Africa not only assists in engendering familiarity with the events and developments which have shaped South African society; it also proposes valuable meanings to the drama being enacted in the text.

Egan further suggests that the most intriguing stories are those composed of binary "opposites", giving the example from Physics of heat's destructive capacity juxtaposed with heat's usefulness. Here, perhaps, a focus on interpretation or theory could serve another purpose - to define poles (for instance, of liberalism, or the emphasis on identity, and Marxism, or the emphasis on materialism) between which the story of South African social formation is told. Of course, the polarity must not be overplayed - this would be to ignore the complex and mutual contouring of these historical motivations, and to present an overly simplistic picture of theoretical debate. But at least a critical orientation along these axes, it seems to me, could usefully be employed in an attempt to "open" the envisaged text for the student (for example, appendix, pp.652-653).

An emphasis on interpretational conflict as the binary (or multiple) opposite in a narrative raises the question of authorial presence in the text. Student readers themselves cannot be expected to isolate materialist and ideational paradigms from the raw "data" of the text; they must be guided towards such poles of interpretation. Iser, 1974, notes a trend away from direct authorial guidance in the English novel. Whereas 18th century writers such as Defoe and Fielding would intervene in their texts to address the reader directly, assisting him/her to perceive
their meaning and negotiating him/her through the understandings which were the author's intent, "the reader of the modern novel is deprived of the assistance which the 18th century writer had given him in a variety of devices ranging from earnest exhortation to satire and irony. Instead, he is expected to strive for himself to unravel the mysteries of a sometimes strikingly obscure composition ... the world presented seems to have no bearing on what the reader is familiar with" (Iser, 1974, 102). It could be argued that the tendency has rendered texts more "open" in Eco's sense, since a greater degree of reader interaction and re-interpretation is necessary. Activity of this nature is of immense value for learning, but bearing in mind the need for the instructional text to touch the expectations of the relatively "unaccomplished" student reader before encouraging the extension of those expectations, such a reader will probably benefit from a degree of authorial assistance in his/her attempt to "unravel the mysteries" of the text.

Crismore, 1989, describing such authorial intervention as "metadiscourse", argues for its inclusion in the text on the grounds perceived by cognitive psychologists (for example, Anderson, 1977). They have construed knowledge as being mentally structured in non-linear patterns, or "schemata". The fact that texts must convey information linearly often arises in a disjunction for the reader. Metadiscourse - for example, "the important thing to remember is ...", or "I am arguing that ..." - can serve as an overt instruction to the reader how to construct knowledge from the text (for example, appendix, pp.65-65).

Adopting Robson's more holistic view of reading, the forms of metadiscourse help to make the text more akin to the expectations of readers who are not "mature, educated, socially experienced adults" (Robson, 1982, 39).

Robson also believes that a side-effect of metadiscourse's wider incorporation would be a diminution of the blatant plagiarism
found in many student essays. Plagiarism derives ultimately from a
gulf between the text's "objective, unelaborated, straightforward
style, emphasising the ideational function of language, with an
anonymous, authoritative "author" reporting a body of facts as one
proposition after another" (Crismore, 1989, 142), and the language
to which students are accustomed. By narrowing the gap between
this "textbookese" (Crismore, 1989) and the pupil's own expression,
metadiscourse facilitates student "translation" of the text in
essays.

Yet the author must be careful. Despite these valid arguments for
the inclusion of language which "announces, directs and guides"
(Williams, 1985), an "overloading" of metadiscourse can be
irritating: it can "bury the primary message or cause readers to
react negatively to the text if used too mechanically or
obtrusively" (Williams, 1985).

In an appropriate text then, there is a broadly narrative
structure, but within this structure, other forms of discourse,
such as argumentation, are "taught". Poles of interpretation are
subtly counterpoised in the narrative, and between these poles,
the reader is guided explicitly, but unobtrusively, by authorial
intervention towards the understandings that the writer considers
appropriate.

Before moving on to consider the linguistic patterns by which
these ideal features are produced, a note on textual organisation:
Frequently, it is assumed that texts for students should have
certain organisational features: frequent headings, "advance
organisers" like previews of ensuing content and the prominent
placing of central ideas (see History texts reviewed in Part Two).
Evaluating such devices, Robson, 1983, concludes that "sometimes
inexperienced readers are shown to be dependent on the more
explicit clues provided"; but other inexperienced readers are
"hampered or unaffected by explicit "clues" because they are not
"sensitive" to them and cannot use them" (34). In other words,
such organizational features only impact in ways relative to the
reader's experience and expectations. They are, in themselves, less important than the language of the text. Nevertheless, it is worth noting a point put by Crismore, 1989: no matter what the framework of organisation of a text is, the more apparent that framework, the more likely it is that its content ideas will be retained.

Having outlined the discourse requirements of an ideal text, it is necessary to consider how they might best be achieved through the language of the text. Halliday and Hanson, 1976, look at the "cohesion" of texts. Variables related to cohesion include "repetitions, omissions, occurrences of certain words and constructions which have in common the property of signalling that the interpretation of the passage in question depends on something else. If that something else is verbally explicit then there is cohesion" (Halliday and Hasan, 1976). For example, reference to findings already mentioned in the text (backward reference, for example, appendix, exercises, pp.567 and 614) and to those about to come (forward reference, for example appendix, pp.553-574) is "essential to the expression of a clear thread of meaning in any text" (Robson, 1982, 34). Textual discourse is also furthered through the use of conjunctions such as "then", "next", "furthermore", "moreover" and "therefore". However, it must be noted that many of these examples are components of a particular type of "factual prose - notably the structures of argument" (Robson, 1982, 35), with which student readers may not be very familiar. Many will overlook the significance of these "cohesive pointers". Robson therefore views not only the text as a whole, but also its specific quality of cohesion, as an interaction with the individual reader.

Davies and Widdowson, 1974, note that the visual appreciation of movement which occurs in spoken discourse is a vital part of the intimate exchange of meaning. Students will be more familiar with discourse along these lines than with textual discourse. For the unseen writer's text to approximate as closely as possible to this exchange, there must first be an elaboration of the metadiscourse
introduced above. But perhaps the most fundamental way of approaching in a text, the kind of spoken, animated discourse to which students are accustomed, is through the vitality of the writing itself.

Hull, 1985, compares a Biology textbook extract, written as a "store of information awaiting retrieval", with a text written enthusiastically by David Attenborough on the same phenomenon - the emergence of a butterfly. In the former account, the text has a "lack of voice", it "seeks no contact, but waits to be entered". But through the sheer enthusiasm of his writing, Attenborough "speak(s) vitally and teaches the reader" (102). There is certainly no reason why "voiceless neutrality" should be integral to the textbook. Even in the absence of metadiscoursal "contact" with the readership, the writer can still inform with what Hull describes as "warmth".

In an investigation of the "impact" of History, Geography and Biology texts on a number of sixth form students, Robson exemplifies the limitations of current texts. The sentences in the History text studied "do not so much relate to the reader as assume a shared viewpoint" (62, emphases in the original).

Generally the text draws "on the discourse competence of a reader sufficiently familiar with evaluation and argument to be appreciative of their expression in a "correctly" impersonal style and able to mobilize extensive historical knowledge of previous and current periods organised at the level of general classifications" (62-3). The "successful" reader of this textbook, like many others, already "knows what most learners are trying to find out" (64).

The Geography text analyzed by Robson also assumes a knowledgeable reader, able to establish connections, for example, between maps, text and tables, with minimum guidance. A familiarity with certain geographical terms is taken for granted. Analyzing another, Australian, Geography textbook, Kress, 1989, found the same
assumption: its "lexical and syntactic features ... construct (the reader) as a certain kind of reader; in this case a "fellow scientific geographer" (39). Further, in Robson's Geography text, "the rhetoric often eliminates or reduces to enumerated "problems" or "factors" ... processes of reasoning and particularly relations of cause and effect, thereby encouraging a passive reception of "facts"" (66).

A related point is raised by Hull, 1985, who argues that attempts to make content more accessible to students by simplifying and condensing language - "slenderizing the grammar" of the subject - only makes the subject matter "more elusive and arbitrary" (Hull, 1985, 78). Condensed statements may be recognised by a competent reader as simplifications merely for the purposes of shorthand, but it must be assumed that student readers do not have the prior knowledge that would tell them that "this is a simplification". It is wiser, if more costly, to be explicit and specific in statements to learners, rather than to write in a style that is "post-complexity and is properly called formal" (Hull, 1985, 107).

Robson's Biology text (to use just such post-complex shorthand), in contrast to the History and Geography texts, had a more personal writer-reader relationship. It used phrases such as "think for example ..." and "we must examine", and before assuming knowledge of technical or specific terms, it would define them and then use them only transitonally. Where different words were used to describe the same phenomenon, this was explained. Here "gaps" in the text were filled through explicit invitation: "imagine", "think" or "consider". The reader's competence is not assumed, but is extended through using the text.

Robson's interviews with students confirmed her own impression of the three texts. A student generally regarded as able used the History text in the manner that it must be assumed the author was expecting, filling in the "gaps" from her own erudition. Yet the text did not "help her extend her learning" (75), since material
that had not already been touched on in class was overlooked in recall.

A lack of the knowledge and expertise assumed by writers of the History and Geography texts led "weaker" students into attempts to simplify the message of the text, often resulting in distorted understandings. These texts were "actually "teaching" ... incompetence" (80). Here, empirical references in the text are relevant. Hull notes that pervasive allusions to examples from familiar experience in the text can help to avert reader misconstruction. Without such references, students "will employ ... expressions in terms of real-life situations they know, rather than in terms of the formal concepts they are only beginning to grasp" (Hull, 1985, 16). The "contact features" of the Biology text were seen by the students themselves as facilitating an extension of their knowledge and they were specifically aware of how it drew on their pre-existing competence.

It is this extension, on the one hand of pre-existing knowledge, and on the other, of textual competence, that distinguishes a good textbook from those which perpetuate stasis and those which present an unbridgeable discourse gulf to the reader. It is easier, however, for a text to initiate new content knowledge, than it is for it to extend discourse competence - the ability to recognise and replicate forms of textual structure such as argumentation, rhetoric and exposition. A more inclusive, ideal index of "readability" than those discussed, and dismissed, above, would measure the capacity of the text to actively familiarise the reader with the linguistic conventions of "academic" texts: "texts could, and should, help initiate readers into the conventions of their discourse" (Robson, 1963, 44), or, as Kress, 1989 puts it, "the function of the writer is to construct texts which confirm or alter the manner in which particular texts are read" (18). But the natural question of how raises problems. Fundamentally, familiarity with textual discourse comes only from accumulated experience of reading other texts. If a single text is to assist this process disproportionately, it must effectively teach the
reader how to engage with itself. The fact that texts can do this, is remarked by Umberto Eco:

"It seems that a well-ordered text presupposes a model of competence coming, so to speak from outside the text, but on the other hand, works to build up, by merely textual means, such a competence" (Eco, 1979, 51).

Iser, 1974, argues that just those devices of cohesion and metadiscourse described above enable the text to assist in the building of this competence. By "manoeuvring" or "stimulating" the reader into certain activities, "the opportunity for establishing connections - for filling the gaps left by the text itself" is created. Through such activity, the potential or actual gulf between textual, and accustomed reader discourse itself can be gradually filled (for example, appendix, pp. 454-455).

The Implied Reader and the Ideal Textbook

If the key to a "successful" text lies in its identification with the current attributes of its reader, and the extension of those attributes through "vital" writing and metadiscourse, then firstly, the text's "implied reader" must be profiled, and secondly, the characteristics of "vital writing" must be delineated.

As far as the reader is concerned, Iser, 1978, states that "In the first instance, we have the "real" reader, known to us by his documented reactions; in the second, we have the "hypothetical" reader, upon whom all possible actualizations of the text may be projected. The latter category is frequently subdivided into the so-called ideal reader and the contemporary reader. The first of these cannot be said to exist objectively" (27). The ideal reader shares the author's every meaning and replicates his/her "code" in its entirety, effectively rendering the act of reading redundant. Real readers are of the type described by Iser as contemporary, but while "undoubtedly there", they are "difficult to mould to the
form of a generalisation" (op.cit.,27). As far as the writer is concerned, there is only the "implied reader", with "no empirical outside reality". He/she has "roots firmly planted in the structure of the text; he is a construct and in no way to be identified with any real reader" (34).

We have seen that new textual experience is derived from the restructuring of experience that the individual reader has already "stored". For the textbook as well as the novel, "the text must bring about a standpoint from which the reader will be able to view things that would never have come into focus as long as his own habitual dispositions were determining his orientation, and what is more, this standpoint must be able to accommodate all kinds of different readers" (35). If reading a text is such an idiosyncratic process, how is the textbook writer to identify, and write for, an appropriately conceived implied reader?

While Iser focuses on the ambiguous, literary implied reader of novels, Wolff's concept of the intended reader is, in fact, of greater concern to the textbook writer (Wolff,1971, cited Iser,1978). The intended reader is "the reader which the author has in mind". These semantics however, get us little further since the intended reader is still hypothetical. Whilst we cannot profile exactly the intended reader, we can at least outline the general characteristics of the group to which the intended reader of our envisaged post 16 textbook belongs. The group will probably be studying for further education exams or in the initial stages of taking a university degree or other higher education certificate. (If the real reader is not of this group, then he/she will be curious enough about South Africa to read the book of his/her own volition).

Whilst possessing the general discourse competence required to be in such a situation, members of the group will not necessarily be avid readers, and may not therefore have developed the familiarity with texts that some current textbooks assume.

Our intended readership does not encounter text as a "container"
of meaning; it supplies knowledge as the text is read (Slater, 1989). The group will therefore appreciate textual assistance in extending both content and discourse knowledge. Whilst most accustomed to spoken (and therefore, partially visual) discourse, its members are relatively familiar with narrative discourse, but will need guidance in developing an awareness of rarer discourse forms.

Such assumptions can be made about the subject and discourse competence of the intended readership group, but these are not the only attributes which shape the reception of a text. In order to "fill out" ideas of the likely impact of the text on an intended readership, one must also account, as far as possible, for certain ideological characteristics of that readership. Obviously, this cannot be done to any degree of refinement since the subjects of such an investigation are, after all, only "implied", or "intended". But one feature of student ideology that can be expected, and could be challenged in the text, is the tendency to stereotype, for instance along the lines of gender.

Stephens, 1982, points out that "narrative structure is an ideologically powerful component of texts". Since the reader is effectively "subjected to the authority of the text", even if "the meaning of a text may ... be constituted as a dialectic between textual discourse and a reader's pre-existing subjectivity" (C), it can be easy for the him/her to assimilate its ideological assumptions. The ideological power of the text is similarly stressed, only at greater length, by Fairclough, 1989. Stephens concludes that teachers should seek to situate students partially outside the texts they use, to enable them to "interrogate" the text (see appendix, pp.4C9-410). Since this does not always happen, many textbooks continue to impart stereotypes, which are also part of the cultural currency of wider society. By reflecting such stereotypes, the text effectively reinforces and perpetuates them. While implicit racial stereotypes - the subject of overt and widespread attack - are on the wane in modern texts, implicit gender stereotypes remain common.
Focusing on gender in school literature, Gilbert and Taylor, 1991, argue that texts, "both in and out of classrooms - can best be seen as discursive products, positing particular speaking positions, and ... as Chris Weedon (1987) warns, (they are) necessarily involved in the construction of gendered subjectivities" (42). "Everything we do (and write) signifies compliance or resistance to dominant norms of what it is to be a woman" (Weedon,1987,86-7, quoted Gilbert and Taylor,1991,42); that is, there is no neutrality in text.

A further attribute then, must be assigned to our intended readership: Along individual lines, it will be either resistant to, resigned to, or accepting of, certain gendered, or other culturally (see Turvey,1992) identified group roles. What our text has to say (or, just as importantly, what it omits to say, (Gilbert,1904)) about those roles, could be significant in moulding reader consciousness, even if only by establishing a challenge to be dismissed in the light of previous experience.

So much for the intended readership - it is difficult to say more of a hypothetical abstraction. Through "vital" writing and authorial intervention, the envisaged text is expected to extend this intended readership's subject and general discourse competence. While some general features of "vital" writing have been mentioned in the above discussion of textual discourse, it remains to elaborate on them.

Jakobson, 1960, classifies the components of a speech event into six groups. Written communication can also, but often doesn't, contain these components. They are: an addresser, whose function is emotive; an addressee, whose function is conative (voluntary association with the text); the context, the function of which is referential; message, the function of which is poetic; contact, the function of which is phatic (conveying pleasantries or words not designed to carry meaning); and code, the function of which is metalingual (relating explicitly to the language used, for example, defining). In Lunzer and Gardner's view, textbooks are
primarily to convey content, and are therefore confined largely to
the context aspect of communicative language (Hull, 1985).

But there is no reason why a textbook, like a novel, should not
incorporate each of these components in order to establish
learning. Constrained to its referential function, "textbookese"
becomes "essentially sterile, an extraordinary written language
contrived as if in a spirit of irony especially for educational
purposes" (Hull, 1985, 213). The example of Attenborough's text,
mentioned above, serves as a reminder that texts can be
instructive as well as, to some extent, poetic — provided the
"poetry" derives from "natural" authorial enthusiasm rather than
from a strained and irritating attempt at "style" for its own
sake. The incorporation of all of the functions of a speech act
then, can be seen as part of our definition of good textbook
writing, as much as it is part of the structural analysis of good
novel writing.

One further example of the parallels between what literary critics
have regarded as attributes of good writing and what our analysis
of readers and texts reveals to be good textbook practice: Just as
"no author worth his salt will ever attempt to set the whole
picture before his reader's eyes ... for it is only by activating
the reader's imagination that the author can hope to involve him
and so realize the intentions of the text" (Iser, 1974, 282, on
Virginia Woolf's discussion of Jane Austen), so, as is argued
above, no textbook writer worth his/her salt will attempt
concision of content to such an extent that exploration by the
reader is precluded.

Can historical/geographical textbooks for students then, really be
comprised of a stimulating, multidimensional, guiding narrative?
Can they really teach content without excessive concision? Can
they touch the reader's present competence, and by explicitly
inviting the reader to fill the gaps of the text, extend that
competence? Ideologically laden and authoritative as they are, can
they challenge damaging preconceptions without being alienating? A
partial answer lies in the past.

A generation of history books, subsequently discredited on ideological grounds, held at least some lessons on style. Fitzgerald, 1979, "notes that, at the turn of the century history textbooks had single historian-authors, who typically wrote readable, memorable textbooks with stance and an effective style" (Crismore, 1989, 142). She argues that they wrote this way not because they were engaged in a conscious attempt to do so, but because they genuinely "had something to say" about history. The result was "natural, personal, opinionated, vivid, lively and interesting". These are the same qualities which distinguish Gibbon's and Carlyle's texts as great history, even if their interpretations have been dismissed by subsequent practitioners.

Histories with similar qualities began, according to Fitzgerald, to disappear from US schools in the 1930s as "objective" textbookese displaced lively expressions of authorial opinion. To some extent histories and geographies of the supposedly objective variety have fulfilled an important function. They have consolidated the unacceptability of overtly racist, and to a lesser extent, sexist and "classist" expression in texts. But a newer generation of historians than Gibbon and Carlyle has demonstrated, through its own lively and varied expression, that "acceptably" opinionated historical content can be conveyed with vibrancy (see for instance, Schama's "Citizens", Cannadine's "The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy" and Packenham's "The Boer War").

In some senses, this discussion has led to a dispiriting conclusion. If all that was required for an ideal text was an attention to the detail of textual organisation, the inclusion of metadiscourse and certain phrases associated with "cohesion", and the movement in the text from empirical narrative into other forms of discourse, all with an ideologically "sound" flavour, then the writing of my envisaged text would be simply a matter of labour and perseverance. But, whilst these concerns are vital, they are
not enough. My conclusion, whilst dispiriting for an author who
does not consider himself to be a great writer, must be the
obvious one - that an ideal text would also be beautifully
written. Yet a text does not have to be ideal to be successful.
While not every author can be a Schama, a Cannadine or a
Packenham, every author can at least muster the enthusiasm to
express as entertainingly as possible, the message that is to be
invested in a book. This will not guarantee reader understanding
or retention, but, along with careful regard to the
characteristics and the needs of the intended reader, it will
help.
Having considered the wider implications of textual discourse and style, it is possible to identify further limitations in the current materials on South Africa for 16 to 19 year old students reviewed in Part Two.

While many are written in a lively and engaging style (for example, "The Child is Not Dead", BDAF and "Education, Apartheid, Development", World University Service), none give attention to introducing students explicitly to the discourse of academic argumentation.

This has a number of implications. Firstly it means that the student reader is inadequately prepared to deal with the message of the text (particularly with a dense text constructed in academic discourse, such as Parsons' "A New History of South Africa"). Secondly, while texts such as Pampallis's "Foundations of the New South Africa" encourage students to identify bias in other materials, none attempt to equip the student with an awareness of the conventions of academic argumentation as a whole. Yet, it is this ability to weigh interpretations which is the best armour against ignorance, not the false expectation that the student can be made the objective judge of bias.

While these texts may indicate that other resources are rooted in particular ideologies, few admit to their own partiality. Smith's "Update: Apartheid in South Africa" probably comes closest with his explicit treatment of competing theorisations of apartheid.

The text which forms the appendix of this thesis is intended to overcome the discourse constraints of current materials on
South Africa (which are, of course more universal), as well as those deficiencies of coverage identified in Part Two.
Overall Conclusion

Part One of this thesis was an account of South Africa informed by two interwoven considerations. The first was to trace the origins of the distinctive apartheid polity, and the second, to examine the relationship between social process and spatial form throughout South Africa's modern history. The account is comprehensive and, in some respects, original. But it is written in the language of academia, for adults who have benefited from education and have learned the capacities of discourse recognition and reproduction.

Although these abilities will remain unobtrusive and implicit in most readers, they are nevertheless a valuable, and relatively rare outcome of years of reading texts. Many students never develop them and are effectively prohibited from deriving great value from texts such as that of Part One.

The aim of this thesis then was to render the insights contained in a text like that of Part One accessible to students who are (or should be) in the process of acquiring discourse capacity and, by so doing, assist in the further development of that capacity. In other words to teach about South Africa and simultaneously to teach about the derivation of value from texts.

Taking the first aspect of this joint programme - that of teaching about South Africa - in Part Two, I examined currently available students texts on the country. From my critique of these texts I derived some insights concerning the coverage and "content" of a better text.

I decided that a text was needed which went beyond condemnation of apartheid and which explained the evolution of segregation in South Africa, and its culmination in apartheid. Whilst writing the thesis, it became clear that the demise of apartheid and the institution of an ANC-led government would similarly have to be explained.
A better text than those currently available, I decided, would also place further emphasis on the spatial structures which accompanied and helped shape social and political change, and on more universal economic and social features which originated from "outside" the apartheid system, but which still affected life in South Africa.

None of these threads of South African historical development could be really understood without an explicit consideration of theoretical contention. I identified two theoretical strands which could provide a basis for examining academic disagreement over South Africa - one surrounding the relative contributions of human agency and inherited social structure, the other concerning a previous debate between Marxists and liberals.

In Part Three, some of the decisions already taken in the writing of Part Two were confirmed in the light of literature on readers and texts. A consideration of theoretical dispute could reveal the lack of objectivity and ultimate authority in the text whilst providing a "bipolar" theme to assist students in the derivation of meaning from the narrative. Further, the examination of competing interpretations would allow students to be introduced to forms of discourse other than simple narrative.

My reading of work such as Robson's suggested that an explicit treatment of such "adult" forms of discourse in a student text could greatly assist students in coming to terms with these less familiar structures of language. Indeed, it has been suggested that just such an introduction could overcome many of the difficulties which inhibit the understanding of older students in any curriculum subject.

This assistance with discourse competence was not simply an extension of my original aim to write a text on South Africa - it was integral to that aim. If my text on South Africa was to effectively teach the "content" which I had identified as being valuable, then it would have to begin within the present
linguistic capacities of its readers and, in order to introduce them to the more academic argumentation which would be necessary in explaining segregation and apartheid, actively extend those capacities.

Continued analysis of the literature on readers and texts suggested further attributes of texts which should be adopted for competent teaching. In the appendix — my own student text — I have incorporated them. There are certain "advance organisers" — warnings of the content to come, explicit guidance in handling and interpreting the text (metadiscourse), and a questioning of the ideological assumptions of the reader. I have also tried to infuse the text with my own enthusiasm for the subject rather than deliberately stifling it for the sake of an apparent academic objectivity.

I have suggested student exercises of two types. Firstly, there are those concerned with "filling in the gaps" which characterise any text. Consideration of these can enhance understanding both of discourse in general and of the specific message of the text at one point. Secondly, there are exercises concerned with revision, contemplation and learning of "content".

Finally, it remains for me to evaluate the successes and failures of my student text.

I feel reasonably secure that it is an advance on previously published material on South Africa and I believe that it could assist students to learn about the development of that fascinating society which manifests the extremes of the human condition. But I also hold that it does more than most student texts to introduce students in an overt manner to the complexities of argumentation and other discourse with which they will have to struggle in their studies.

However, these very successes result in the severest limitation of the exercise. It was impossible to achieve the important, but
wide-ranging, twin goals of initiating an understanding of South African social and spatial relations and facilitating the comprehension of discourse, in a short text. Given the pressures of the curriculum with which most 16 to 19 year old students have to deal, there simply would not be the time for most to derive the real benefit of poring over a text such as this. This is why, paradoxically, the outcome of this thesis - the student text - is less likely than its starting point - the academic account of South Africa - to be published and widely read. Nevertheless, it has insights which I believe to be valuable for education, and insights which could be applied in the "real world", even if not in such a coherent package.


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