Alienation, Education and Markets: A Philosophical Discussion

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ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a Marxian critique of 'marketization' in school provision and schooling. The first part argues that a degree of marketization of school provision and schooling has taken place in the UK. It examines contemporary philosophical defences of these markets in the works of James Tooley and Harry Brighouse. The second part broadens the philosophical context by examining some of the philosophical ideas associated with the growth of markets which Marx, in his theory of alienation, is both influenced by, and against which he reacts. The central argument is that alienation is a necessary consequence of marketization, on account of the transfer of control (and, increasingly, ownership rights) from the public to the private sector. This results in the control of school provision and schooling necessarily being passed, even from those who are to some extent working under the direction of democratically elected institutions, to those who may well use the marketization process primarily to further their own interests. This further loss of control is bound to increase alienating relations and estrangement.

The third part examines whether it is possible to escape from alienation by moving in a socialist direction while retaining markets to varying degrees. Critical accounts are given of different proposals of this kind, drawn from David Miller, Patricia White and Oskar Lange. It is argued that, because these proposals all retain market relations, these would make an unalienated form of education impossible. By contrast Mihail Markovic argues that markets, as remnants of capitalism, cannot of necessity prefigure an unalienated society. The final chapter, with reference to Marx's concept of 'the realm of freedom', distinguishes Marx from anarchist thought and illustrates the relations and conditions which would be necessary to support an unalienated society, and enable education as an 'end-in-itself'. 
I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

Signed ....\.

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Introduction

No man is an Island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main.

John Donne 1571(?) -1631
Devotions XVII

Marx died in 1883, but his ideas are still relevant

In September 2008 the myth was exploded that the capitalist system had the checks and balances necessary to prevent market collapse. In this thesis I support the argument that, although Karl Marx is dead, his ideas are still relevant, especially his analysis of the alienating relations which are necessarily present within markets. In particular, I apply Marx’s philosophical analysis of alienation to the marketization of school provision and schooling\(^1\).

I begin this thesis by producing empirical evidence to show that the marketization of school provision and schooling is not merely a series of isolated reforms, as many liberal philosophers of education assume, but rather the result of a series of policy moves which are designed to reconstruct school provision using the external and internal relations involved in the market, defined in the classical sense of the term.

I am not aware of any liberal philosopher of education who has attempted either to analyze how the marketization of school provision would necessarily increase alienating relations, or how certain relations and conditions would necessarily overcome this alienation. I maintain that the failure of these philosophers of

\(^1\) Although the social relations involved in exploitation are linked to alienation, exploitation is different from alienation, and is not systematically analyzed in this thesis. Exploitation involves the loss of part of the wealth which a social individual creates; alienation deals with the loss of the capacity to develop human powers and capacities of social individuals as a result of social relations in which their activity is embedded.
education to recognise the alienating relations present within a market is due to a perception of the market resulting from an ontology based on external relations that are contingent in nature. According to this ontology the relations present in market reforms may or may not develop in a specific direction and their development is, therefore, speculative. I therefore maintain that an ontology based on external relations consequently results in such philosophers perceiving the developing market in school provision as merely a series of isolated and separate package of reforms.

In contrast, within an ontology based on internal relations the range of all possible developments is necessary: that is, each actual development has to have been inherent in the relevant social relations. However, the sufficiency of the conditions and social relations for the occurrence of a particular social development involving human activity also depends on human thought and action. It is therefore the range of possibilities which is determined by inherent social relations, rather than any particular outcome within the range. The act of introducing market relations into school provision and schooling necessarily alters the possible directions in which schools can develop. For example, almost any private involvement in school provision or schooling would operate as a 'Trojan horse,' potentially opening up the sector to the process of privatization.

The social relations which James Tooley and Harry Brighouse describe are perceived to be only external, and therefore contingent. In this thesis I argue that this ontology leads Brighouse to argue a) that the results of commodification of schooling are speculative (Brighouse, 2000, p. 49), and b) that such commodification does not necessarily lead to a situation where markets drive out education (Brighouse, 2000, p. 52).
The reliance on external relations has also caused such philosophers to perceive the developing market in school provision as an isolated and disparate package of reforms not necessarily linked to the marketization of schools. For example, in his *Reclaiming Education* (2000), Tooley explicitly questions the argument of Geoff Whitty, David Halpin and Sally Power (1998) that the “state reforms of devolution” are “actually moves towards markets” (Tooley, 2000, p. 13).

By contrast, Marx’s systematic analysis of the markets and alienation is based mainly on social relations that have necessary or essential connections (Marx, 1975 [f], p. 323) which mutually condition each other (Marx, 1975[f], p. 335). These connections are defined as ‘necessary’ because they contain “all possible developments prefigured by the relevant relations” (Ollman, 1976, p. 19).

Marx argues, firstly, that alienation arises through the selling, and the consequential relinquishment of control of their labour by those who, having no capital, must sell their labour so as to use the capital owned by the capitalists to make their living. Secondly, and being interrelated, for Marx alienation also includes estrangement. For Marx, this latter condition occurs when something existing outside and independently of the social individuals confronts them as a hostile and alien power. In Marx’s philosophy, the social processes which Hayek describes would be necessarily alienating because they form a “force over and above” social individuals, dominating the latter, and over which these individuals have no control.

For Marx, the ‘active interconnections’ between alienating structural relations and the subjective experience of alienation would necessarily influence the awareness of the social individual. Within an ontology based on external relations, although social individuals *might* be happy in circumstances where social relations

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2 A social individual can be defined as individual-in-social relations.
are alienating, this psychological state is contingent and so consequently will not necessarily continue. For example, social individuals might be happy in their work because they are involved in activities which they find fulfilling. Within such alienating structural relations happiness is contingent on particular social relations and conditions existing and happiness is not necessarily supported by such structural relations. What has not changed, in the above example, is the structural relation within capitalism between workers and an owner of the means of production.

By contrast, I maintain that within the objective structural relations of a non-alienated society the normal psychological state will be one of non-estrangement. This is because the structural relations which support non-alienation will, in the normal course of events, usually result in the subjective experience of non-estrangement. Under such social relations social individuals would not necessarily be happy all the time; this latter state would be because of contingent accidents and not because of the objective structural relations. For example, an individual might be unhappy when certain personal relations break down.

An alternative theory of alienation has been provided by Jean-Paul Sartre. In his *Critique of the Dialectical Reason* (first published in 1960), Sartre states that the foundation of alienation is “the concrete and synthetic relation of the agent to the other through the mediation of the thing, and to the thing through the mediation of the other” (Sartre, 1976, p. 66, n. 27). Unlike Marx, for Sartre, alienation is an immutable ontological state (Sartre, 1976, p. 181). As a consequence, Sartre does not analyze the necessary interrelation between objective social relations and the social individual and, in particular, the conditions and relations which necessarily result in alienation.

In this thesis I note that Tooley does not systematically consider alienation.
When Tooley does refer to alienation he equates alienation solely with “disaffection” and “falling engagement” of young people in the process of education (Tooley, 2002, p. 5). The process of “disaffection” and “disengagement” is also referred to in the government paper entitled Schools Achieving Success (DfES, 2002, pp. 13, 30). I note above that this concept of alienation is based on the view that alienation is a psychological state which is fundamental to the human condition and does not necessarily result from social structural relations such as the market. Therefore it is not surprising that the role of the market in supporting the development of such dispositions is not examined by either Tooley or by the UK New Labour government. However, for Marx, alienation is supported within objective structural relations so, for him, there is no immutable ontological state which constitutes the foundation of alienating relations.

Methodological discussion.

My exploration of alienation develops from an analytical philosophical approach into a more interrelated and dynamic ontology which is based on necessary relations. The ontological approach I use is based on internal as well as external social relations and, to my knowledge, has not been used within the philosophy of education in order to explore the marketization of schooling and its alienating relations. In this ontological approach, internal social relations are necessary relations which mutually influence each other. For example, when Marx uses such ontology, he argues that within private property relations “the worker exists as a worker only when he exists for himself as capital, and he exists as capital only when capital exists for him” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 335, original italics). As a consequence, for Marx, “the existence of capital is his [the worker’s - GT] existence, his [the worker’s] life, for it determines the content of his [the worker’s - GT] life in a manner indifferent to him”
Within an ontology based on internal relations, the appearance and/or function of an entity necessarily changes when some of or all of internal relations in that entity change: for example, if wage-labour disappears, the worker's relation with capital radically alters and capital as a logical category would no longer exist. Within the ontology of internal relations, alienation is not the result of an all-or-nothing set of structural relations. Although everything is internally related, some things are more closely related than others. As Bertell Ollman has noted:

Each capitalist practise [sic] and institution reflects the alienated relationships of the whole system, but the more distinctive qualities of alienation - separation from and loss of control over one's immediate environment, mistaking human for inhuman agencies, manipulation by indifferent and/or hostile forces, etc. - exhibit differences of degree and form .... (Ollman, 1976, p. 265).

In this thesis I argue that although the most intense form of alienation occurs within capitalism alienation is still present, to some degree, in 'socialist' models based on the market, even though the conditions of work there might be more agreeable for many workers. This is because, within economic relations based on commodity production, surplus value and exchange value are still present. Chapters Eight and Nine of this thesis outline what conditions and relations would be necessary in society to prefigure education as an unalienated activity.

In this thesis I maintain that the marketization of school provision introduces new internal relations into schools: relations which then remove potential control from parents and communities and transfer them to private entities. Schooling thus becomes a tool in the hands of these new controllers of schools, who have been seen to use it for both business and ideological reasons, and who introduce relations which are oppositional to the education process.
Within my research, empirical data is used on occasions to illustrate the content of social relations and the influence of past social relations on present processes. I also argue that historical processes play a prominent part in seeking to understand the nature of present economic and political relations. However, my thesis does not depend upon such empirical or historical research to confirm or deny the presence of alienating structural relations. It is the content of such relations which is a matter of empirical or historical data. In the process of change, although content is important in so far as it influences change, the form of social structures is largely a matter of logic, and it is this logic which I mainly explore in this thesis. It is for this reason that I do not explore the detail of pedagogical practices within the social processes which I analyze.

Marx is the main theorist to systematically consider alienation in objective market relations. I therefore explore his theory in connection with the marketization of school provision. I have found Marx a convincing theorist because he gives a systematic analysis of the markets, showing the necessary connection between the alienating relations involved.

A prominent place is also given in this thesis to those thinkers who have proposed possible solutions to the problem of alienation. These tend to be thinkers who support different forms of market socialism. One such theorist is David Miller, who argues that alienation can be overcome even in an end-state where the market is present. Miller rests this proposal on the hope that a form of progressive consciousness can be used to transform the structures of the market into non-alienating relations. In Chapter Six I produce arguments to show why I consider that this is not possible. In Chapter Seven I consider the form of a socialist market designed by Oskar Lange, which he

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3 Other theorists, such as Bertell Ollman, have merely presented Marx's work on internal relations in a more systematic way.
proposes as a synthesis of Marxism and market socialism. I maintain, in Chapter Seven, that although in Lange's model the emphasis would appear to be on socialist relations rather than market relations, market relations and laws are fundamental to the operation of both the 'socialized' sectors and non-socialized sectors of the economy.

Lange's model is interesting because it is very similar to those previously used by many Soviet bloc countries. I show how Lange's model was at variance with Marx's writings and, by doing so, I hope to have laid to rest (for the purposes of this thesis at least) the accusation that Marx's writings are a variant of the form of political economy found in the former Soviet bloc under Stalin and his successors (or, for that matter, in China).

When considering my alternative to market-based school provision and schooling, I base my arguments primarily on the writings of Karl Marx and Mihailo Markovic. Both these writers attempted to overcome alienation by positing the conditions and relations needed for unalienated activity. In this thesis, I argue that these conditions and relations are needed in order for it to be possible for education to be an unalienated activity which would be an 'end-in-itself.'

Structure of the thesis.

This thesis is divided into three main parts, themselves divided into a total of nine chapters. In Part One, Chapter One, I introduce the context for the thesis by using empirical evidence illustrating how UK governments from 1979 to date have attempted to develop a market in school provision and schooling. I use this empirical data to show how the 'choice-based mechanisms' have increasingly developed the key features of classically defined markets, including commodification of school provision resulting in an increase in the alienating relations. In this thesis I maintain
that the social relations involved in the marketization of school provision and schooling are necessarily oppositional to those needed to provide an unalienated society. As a result of the empirical evidence gathered in Chapter One, I conclude that the internal market created so far is not a series of isolated events, but is rather a set of internal relations which will necessarily influence the future organization of schools in the direction of marketization in the classical sense of the term.

Part One, Chapter Two describes and criticises examples of two different market models which have influenced recent education policy in England. The first is the lightly regulated model of the type supported by Tooley, which has been dominant in the Conservative Party since Baroness Thatcher’s premiership, and which also seemed to influence Gordon Brown, Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer from May 1997 - June 2007 then Prime Minster from June 2007 – May 2010.

Minimal or ‘light touch’ regulation usually means regulation which preserves rules enabling the enforcement of contracts, so preventing coercion and enabling ‘free markets’ to operate smoothly. The other popular model is of a more specifically regulated market, championed by such philosophers of education as Harry Brighouse. The details of this model are outlined and analyzed in Chapter Two, where I argue that regulation fails to ameliorate the worse aspects of the market, including its alienating relations.

Part Two outlines the conditions and social relations which led to the growth of the market, including the ideological context supporting the process of marketization. In Part Two, Chapter Three, I consider the philosophical tendencies against which Marx reacts, and yet also on which he builds: namely those of Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach. I note that Adam Smith’s description of alienation is mainly psychological in nature and that
therefore, for Smith, alienation is a contingent state. In Chapter Four I consider Marx's theory of alienation, and in Chapter Five I apply this analysis to the developing market in schools and show how market relations intensify the alienating relations that are present in capitalist society.

Part Three introduces proposed solutions to the problem of alienation caused by the marketization of schools. In Part Three, Chapter Six, I consider David Miller's model of market socialism and the means by which he tries to overcome alienation; and I relate Patricia White's ideas on school provision and schooling to this model. I show that capitalist relations are still present within Miller's model, and also why progressive consciousness alone is insufficient to overcome alienation.

Chapter Seven describes the oppositional and alienating relations present in the model of a socialist market used in 'Soviet Marxism' and supported by Oscar Lange. I show how Lange's 'Marxism' is at variance with the works of Marx and, therefore, why his model cannot be said to be a synthesis of market socialism and Marxism.

Chapter Eight describes a response from Mihailo Markovic, a Yugoslavian/Serbian praxis theorist, to the type of statism supported by Lange.

Unlike Lange, Markovic supports a 'social market' as a transitional stage in a society which is developing into a non-market economy, in which the conditions and relations would gradually support unalienated activity. Within such conditions and relations Markovic envisages education becoming a form of unalienated activity within which social individuals would have the possibility of developing their capacities as 'ends-in-themselves.'

The development of capacities as ends-in-themselves is something which liberal philosophers of education such as Tooley and Brighouse advocate, but which, I have

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maintained, would not necessarily be achievable within the structural relations of capitalism. I maintained in Section 4.9 that the choice of education as an end-in-itself is not part of the normal course of events in capitalism, because the structural relations of capitalism are necessarily oppositional to the educational aims of Tooley and Brighouse.

In contrast, Chapter Nine outlines the conditions and relations which would be necessary for an unalienated society to exist, and which would support the possibility of an unalienated form of education as a normal activity. I argue that these conditions necessarily include the availability of the abundance of goods and services, in turn enabled by advanced automation. This automation, by freeing social individuals from being directly involved in production, would also enable the ability of all social individuals to take part in activities meaningful to them. The existence of such a society would be dependent on social individuals being willing to support each other, in the absence of a coercive state. (It is envisaged that there would be associations of social individuals particularly interested in science and technology, and that the technological underpinning of this society would be undertaken by means of these associations). I argue that only these conditions and structural relations could enable education as ‘meaningful’ activity, because such structures and conditions would support the development of human capacities and interests in an unalienated way.

I note that, as at 2010, the policies of all three major UK political parties support the marketization of school provision and, therefore, necessarily increase the alienating relations in society and erode the social conditions and relations which could be prefigurative of education as an end-in-itself. In this thesis I, therefore, conclude that policies enabling the marketization of school provision and schooling should
not be supported. Instead support should be given to the structural relations and conditions which support the development of those social processes which could be prefigurative of a less alienating society, and consequently, which would support the development of education as an end-in-itself.
Part One: Setting the scene and defining the problem

Chapter One
The developing nature of relations within the markets for school provision and schooling since 1979.

Introduction

This chapter maintains that certain events which occurred within school provision since 1979 were not a series of isolated reforms, but instead were the result of a series of policy moves designed to reconstruct the distribution of school provision using the structural relations found in the classical model of the market (Ball and Youdell, 2008). In this thesis, I argue that almost any private involvement in school provision and schooling would operate as a 'trojan horse', potentially opening up the whole sector to the process of privatization. Recently, the sociologist Stephen Ball described this process in the following way:

With each new piece of legislation, each new regulation or procedure, each new category of school, new possibilities emerge. Things that were unthinkable become possible, and they then become obvious and necessary (Stephen Ball, quoted by Peter Wilby, 2010, p. 1).

The view that the creation of a market in school provision and schooling was instead merely a series of separate reforms in the provision of schools is one that has been held by such philosophers of education as Harry Brighouse, (Brighouse, 2000, p. 19); Terry McLaughlin, (McLaughlin, 1994[b], p. 154); James Tooley, (Tooley, 1994[b], p. 149 in Bridges and McLaughlin; 2000, pp. 10-13; 2003, p. 428) and John White (White, 1994, p. 122).

I began to argue in the late 1990's that the choice-based mechanisms (some introduced in 1975), were not merely policy moves designed to create internal markets, but were also attempts to restructure school provision and schooling to enable the process of marketization and the transfer of schools from public to
private control. This view is supported in *The UK Government’s Approach to Public Sector Reform* (Cabinet Office, 2006), by educational theorists such as Geoff Whitty, David Halpin and Sally Power (Whitty, Halpin, and Power, 1998, p. 128); and by Glenn Rikowski (Rikowski, 2003, p.1).

Important and interesting though the work of Ball is on the marketization of schools and schooling, he argues that this process is mainly an “epistemic shift” or “profound change in the underlying set of rules governing the production of discourses…” and that social structures and relations mainly “take shape as the flesh and bones of the dominant discourse” (S. Ball, 2004, p. 15). Ball argues that this process is designed to result in “reworking of existing public sector delivery into forms which mimic the private and have similar consequences in terms of practices, values and identities” (Ball, 2004, p. 2, GT’s italics). Although I acknowledge that the process of marketization involves changes in the “dominant discourse,” I dispute the contention that the resultant changes in structural relations primarily occur as a result of this discourse.

In this thesis I argue that the process of marketization is primarily geared to bringing about a fundamental transfer of property relations from the public to private sector, and that it is this transfer which contains the social relations which prefigure all possible developments. In the next section I outline, in an abstract form, the relations regarded as being necessary for a ‘perfect’ market.

1.1 Characteristics of the developing markets in school provision and schooling.

Unlike ‘internal markets’, ‘perfect markets’ are based entirely on private property relations. According to Stephen Munday there are five main assumptions involved in the analysis of perfect markets. These are, firstly, that there are a large number of buyers and sellers in the market. This means that no producer or consumer,
acting individually, can affect the market price or any other part of the market operations (it being assumed also that market-rigging by a number of players does not occur). Secondly, Munday posits that what is being bought and sold is a commodity, that is, all products are identical and therefore it is immaterial to any purchaser from which supplier he or she buys. Thirdly, says Munday, there is perfect knowledge in the market among both consumers and producers. This would therefore preclude a situation, for example, where producers or suppliers are aware of product quality variations unknown to purchasers. Fourthly, Munday says, all factors of production have to be perfectly mobile such that they can be exchanged between production of different goods. Finally, for Munday, in a perfect market there should be no barriers to entry, or exit from, the industry concerned for producers (S. Munday, 2000, p. 19). This last condition of course also needs to apply to consumers in any market. What has been normally described as 'the market in schools and schooling' refers in fact to separate markets. However, entrepreneurs often operate in several markets. For example, Mott MacDonald (a major construction firm involved in Private Finance Initiative [PFI] contracts) also owns Cambridge Education Associates (which specializes in both school management of schools and staff training); while the Unity Academy, Middlesbrough, is sponsored by the major construction company, Amey. Amey also works in conjunction with Nord Anglia. In 2001 Amey was given a 7-10 year contract to run certain London Borough of Waltham Forest schools in conjunction with Nord Anglia (which specializes in school management and the provision of schools). For ease of analysis, I consider separately the markets school provision, schooling and the building of schools.

1.1.2 The market in school provision.

The first market I consider is in the provision of schools. This market directly
relates to my thesis on alienating relations in schools. The market in state-funded schools which are ‘owned’ by private sponsors has been in existence since the Education Act 2002 has been in force. The Education Act 2002, Part One (Transfer Schedules), Schedule 7 (paragraphs 3a and 3e), specifically allows for the transfer of “any right or liability held by the authority as holder of interest in the land to be transferred to a person (the transferee) who is specified in the scheme and is concerned with the running of an academy” unless the school ceases to exist as a school. This legislation enables sponsors to act ‘as if’ they were the owners of schools. Under the standard lease provisions, an Academy can make alterations to school buildings, sub-let the property and grant licenses over the land. However, the company must gain permission for any change of the use of land. If the site ceases to be used for a school, the land reverts back to the ownership of the Local Education Authority (LEA) according to the Act (Education Act 2002, Schedule 7 [Former Academies], paragraph 8 [6]). As well as giving sponsors ‘ownership’ rights, the same Act also gave the owners of Academies the right to alter their teachers’ national conditions of service, giving the owners direct control over the conditions under which the teachers work.

As at early 2010 the organizations sponsoring most Academies were the United Learning Trust, Oasis and the Harris Federation. The United Learning Trust is currently the largest sponsor of Academies. It is a subsidiary of the United Church Schools Trust, which runs fee-charging schools. Oasis, which sponsored the second largest number of Academies, is a Christian organization and its ethos is informed accordingly. The Harris Federation had the third largest number of Academies. As a consequence of the control they had through ownership, the activities of such firms

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1 An academy is legally a company limited by guarantee with charitable status, a legal entity often called a not-for-profit company.
directly intensified alienating relations within schools (see Chapter Five for more details).

Although Academies are not-for-profit organizations, high salaries and expenses are allowed. Moreover Section 11, Education Act 2002, allows such schools to become companies which can invest in other companies which are profit-making entities. School sponsors then can hire these firms to run their schools on a contract-for-profit basis. In this case, profits are derived from the difference between the contract price and the actual cost it takes to run a service. In this process certain state revenue (money paid by the state to run the services) is transformed into private profit. For example, Francis Beckett reported that, as of 2007, Alec Reed (of Reed Employment - who has sponsored the West London Academy) had paid £140,030 to Reed Charity (chaired by Mr Reed), £37,683 to Reed Learning and £3,251 to Reed Training, without putting any of the work out to tender (Beckett, 2007, p. 92). Another further opportunity for involvement by these firms in schooling came after the Conservative Liberal coalition government announced that it wished to encourage more schools to be run by parents (Wilby, 2010, p. 1). It is expected that many of these parents would need help in running their schools from companies already involved in schools.

1.1.3 Markets in school services.

The second market which I consider is the market in ‘outsourcing’ of educational services (such as management, some LEA services, inspection services, teacher appraisal, and teacher vocational training, catering and teacher supply). When this market began to develop, those showing particular interest in the management and ownership of schools were firms whose ‘core’ business was information technology, finance and/or construction. Such firms sought to deal with their lack of
expertise in education in two main ways. They tried to recruit senior staff from LEAs and/or they sought to take over, or merge with, firms which had educational expertise but which tended to be small. For example, Mott MacDonald merged with Cambridge Education Associates; Ensign formed an alliance with Tribal, and Nord Anglia with Hermes Pensions. In 2008 Nord Anglia was to be taken over by Barings Private Equity Asia in a deal worth £190m. (Blackhurst, C. [ed.], 2008). Barings specialized in mid-market buy-outs that required capital for expansion or re-capitalization. Barings were to allocate Nord Anglia's assets to both the Learning Services Division and the International Schools Division of Barings: as a result, they were to operate both in the market for the 'outsourcing' of school services and the market in the ownership of schools. Sections 11 and 12 of the Education Act 2002 specifically support governing bodies in contracting the services needed by a school (including teaching and management) to for-profit companies.

Although such a market does not directly result in alienating relations, it can affect the conditions in which schooling takes place and influence the actual content of alienating relations. Importantly, some of these firms are investigating setting up not-for-profit trusts, allowing them to run schools directly; as well as to make profits by selling services to the trusts (Wilby, 2010, p. 2).

1.1.4 Markets in school materials.

Next, I consider the market in provision of commodities to schools (for example, computer technology and information technology materials, classroom materials, testing packages, training packages and financial management packages). This market has broadened under the influence of the development of new information and communications technology (internet, satellite, video-conferencing, video-cassettes) for 'e-learning'. This market can particularly affect schooling if the school
is used to promote the consumption of certain of these goods and services. This thesis is not specifically about commerce in the classroom, but I note that commerce in the classroom may influence the content of schooling and have a distorting effect on education. The effect can be particularly powerful when the firms providing this material are also controlled by school ‘owners’, because they have a commercial interest in ensuring that their commodities are portrayed in an advantageous way.

1.1.5 The market in school building.

Finally, there is the market in the building, refurbishment and maintenance of schools, using finance partnerships such as PFI (Private Finance Initiative), PPP (Public Private Partnerships) and BSF (Building Schools for the Future). In this market contracts to build and/or maintain schools are signed by LEAs, who undertake to pay back the sums involved over a 25-30 year period. The firms involved in this market are usually from the construction industry. In this last-named ‘market’ a handful of ‘qualified bidders’ with set rates are selected by the government and then a mini-competition for building contracts is run. Importantly this is a market for contracts and not in school provision. As was pointed out in Section 1.1.2, some of the firms in this market are also involved in markets in the provision of schools and/or the supply of commodities and education services.

1.2 The process of creating market relations in school provision and schooling, 1979 to 1997.

I begin my survey in 1979 when the Conservative Party came to office with a neo-liberal ideology. In the mid-1980’s, as a result of the success of privatizations such as those British Telecommunications and British Gas, the Conservative government began to discuss the privatization of schools. The Conservative government recognised that the ability to take schools out of LEA control was
dependent upon delegated budgets, *per capita* funding and parents able, and willing, to vote for their school to ‘opt out’ of LEA control (K. Baker, 1993, p. 215).

In 1986 the then Education Secretary, Kenneth Baker, unveiled his plans for a pioneering network of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) in urban areas. These colleges were to be sponsored by the private sector and were to specialize in science, technology, business, languages, sport or the arts. Although CTCs were to be partly funded and regulated by the government, they were to be more independent of LEA control and were able to own their land and buildings.

Each college was intended to take about 1,000 pupils, who would be specially selected who would not pay fees. Baker made it clear that the Treasury would directly make extra public money available to help finance the costs of new colleges, thereby by-passing local authorities, so that CTCs would be more easily perceived as being fully independent of LEA control.

Private sector sponsors of CTCs could have legally been from the business community, churches or from existing educational trusts, although they tended to be from companies. These sponsors were asked to make a major contribution to the initial capital set-up costs. Sponsors were initially asked to provide £8m. for each school toward capital costs, but when sponsors refused to put forward this amount of money, the government requested £2m. and stated that it would provide the remaining initial costs (£10m. on average). Although the government was paying most of the capital costs and all the running costs, the sponsor had ownership rights of the CTC. Thus a policy move was made to significantly change the relations between the sponsors and the management of the schools by involving local employers and industrialists in the management (K. Baker, 1993, p. 177).

Some influential members of the Cabinet regarded these structural reforms as
part of a process leading to a more market-based system of school provision (K. Baker, 1993, p. 163). That Baker also conceived of these reforms in this way can be seen from a strategy memorandum he sent to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1986, suggesting that these reforms would result in such a market (reprinted Baker, 1993, pp. 479, 481). The fact that this market was not merely an internal one, but also one based on private sector control, is also endorsed by Richard Pring (1987).2

The Education Act 1988 instituted a set of reforms in which the development of market structures was enabled by a new legislative framework. This Act instituted the provision of the information needed for a market between schools and parents. A National Curriculum was also established which enabled the standardization of the subject matter in the curriculum. National testing on its contents for pupils aged seven, eleven, and fourteen enabled the results of individual schools to be recorded. Later the Education Act 1992 required schools to publish National Curriculum test results, as well as those of external examinations. This information on comparison between schools was seen as essential for market activity.

The 1988 Act also removed the restriction on the numbers of pupils that schools could admit, allowing each school to potentially increase the numbers admitted by up to ten per cent over the previous maximum roll. Parents, as a collective body, could decide whether they wished their school to remain in local government control or whether they wished to vote to ‘opt-out’ and seek grant maintained status. These ‘opted-out’ schools were to be funded directly by the Department for Education and Science (DfES). These schools also had autonomy, including over staffing.

In 1991 the Local Management of Schools (LMS) was instituted and gave

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2 In his 1987 article “Privatization In Education”, Pring recalled a meeting with “a very distinguished Chief Education Officer” who in 1981 had stated that privatization was deeply embedded within Treasury thinking and would shortly result in “the gradual transformation of a public sector into a private sector” (Pring, 1987, pp. 289-90).
schools freedom to manage their resources. School governors assumed a *de facto* position of employers, while LMS schools were allowed to have control over their own budgets. These budgets were to be allocated by the government according to a formula related to the number and ages of pupils at individual schools. The transfer of budgets to schools meant that purchasing power was now under school management. This resulted in a further essential structural change in the creation of the conditions for a market. This also forced LEAs into the market to sell their professional services to schools. This transformed the administration of schooling into a set of contractual relations which enabled cost and profit calculations to take place. As a consequence, the social relations between schools and LEAs became those of consumer and producer, rather than of supportive partners sharing expertise.

1.3 New Labour and the marketization of school provision and schooling.

Although the Conservatives lost the general election in 1997, the process of marketization of school provision and school services continued unabated under the UK New Labour government. On its election New Labour adopted the following policies, which were to inform and influence their marketization of school provision. These policies were a) the reduction of personal taxation and taxation on investment (*Britain Deserves Better*, Labour Party Manifesto [later referred to as BDB], 1997, pp. 13, 14); b) reliance on private sector to be dynamic enough to manage public services more efficiently (BDB, 1997, p. 13); c) the expectation that corporate businesses would divert money into education (BDB, 1997, pp. 8, 9; Tony Blair’s Morpeth School Speech [MSS], 1997, p. 1); d) the recognition of the inevitability of economic globalization and the harnessing of part of this process for the needs of the UK (T. Blair, MSS, 1997, p. 1; T. Blair’s speech “New Britain in a Modern World”, 1998, pp. 1, 3); e) the attempt to encourage the private sector by following
a policy of deregulation so that markets would be *lightly regulated* (T. Blair’s CBI Speech, 1997, pp. 1, 3), and f) the re-organization of education generally to produce an adequate number of suitably skilled workers to compete internationally (BDB, 1997, pp. 7, 12).

New Labour continued the Conservative Party policies of ‘opting out’, local management of schools, and the National Curriculum and its tests. This was hardly surprising because the continuation of ‘opting out’ was necessary to create the diversity needed for market competition, while the National Curriculum tests were needed to provide information for the operation of the market. Grant Maintained Schools stayed when New Labour came into power but were required, under the Schools Framework Act 1998, to become either Foundation Schools\(^3\) or to rejoin the LEA as Maintained Community Schools.

In 1998 the New Labour government began to entice private sector providers into the market by setting up Education Action Zones (EAZs). EAZs were intended as a means of ‘levering in’ private sector finance and management into the management and development of schools, especially in disadvantaged areas. Businesses which sponsored zones were allowed to nominate the Chair of each EAZ, and one business was to be the lead partner in each zone. These zones were defined on the basis that each:

> will normally comprise between 15 and 25 primary, secondary and special schools, working in partnership with local parents, Early Year Providers, businesses, the LEA, community organisations, TEC(s) [Training and Enterprise Councils - GT], career services, colleges, other statutory agencies (such as health authorities, the youth service and the police) and others (House of Commons, H.C. 130, 2000-1, p. 12).

In the event, EAZ nationally raised barely half the government’s target for

\(^3\) Foundation Schools employ their own staff directly and control their own admissions procedures. Their buildings and land are owned by the governors of the school and they have a charitable status.
sponsorship (£1,296,000 rather than £2,562,000). Some EAZs were successful: others raised only four to five figure sums (House of Commons, H.C. 130, 2000-1, p. 12). Only Newham, in East London, raised more than a quarter of its EAZ budget from the private sector and, at least in one year, exceeded its sponsorship target (H.C. 130, op. cit; Times, 22 November 2000, p. 4). It is important to note that the Newham EAZ, in the so called ‘arc of opportunity’\(^4\), was an area projected to have a buoyant economic future because land values were expected to rise dramatically following extensive publicly-funded infrastructure projects. This extended site followed the previously industrial lower Lea Valley, which had been extensively bombed in World War II and subsequently only partly rebuilt. It also had close proximity to Canary Wharf with, at the time, a likely perception of potentially unlimited funds from global finance.

In June 2000, the consultants Capital Strategies issued a report entitled The Business of Education (Capital Strategies, 2000, p. 9) in which they noted that firms were reluctant to invest in schools because they believed the market to be over-regulated. Capital Strategies particularly cited the constraints of the National Curriculum; the period within which sponsors were supposed to reach their targets; the length and complexity of the bidding process the sponsors’ lack of educational expertise, and the involvement of local councillors and governors in schools (this last factor allegedly causing sponsors to be marginalised over strategic decisions).

1.3.1 The Academies programme.

Despite the limited success of EAZs to involve the private sector in school provision, in 2000 New Labour introduced City Academies (from then on known as Academies, because their remit was extended beyond urban areas). Academies were companies limited by guarantee and had a charitable status.

\(^4\) See the advertisement for Newham Council recruitment in Estates Gazette, 6 March 2010, p. 179.
The New Labour government continued to loosen regulation in order to attract investment from businesses in school provision\(^5\) (which, according to WTO and EU rules, has to apply to foreign firms wishing to invest in the UK, as well as to domestic entities).

Despite this relaxation of the rules governing the regulation of school provision, the government still failed to attract a sufficient number of business sponsors. The government asked for a maximum contribution of £2m., later to be reduced to £500,000 (which could be paid in kind), towards the cost of a new school; or £1.5m. in the case of refurbished old buildings. In return, the government allowed donor(s) to determine a school’s ethos and curriculum even though the government had provided the balance of the funding in line with an agreed budget. Each Academy received a General Annual Grant from the Secretary of State to meet its normal running costs. This was calculated on the basis of the funding formula of the LEA in which the Academy was situated, with an additional allowance for the money which the LEA would hold back from Maintained Schools for centrally provided services.

The Education Act 2002 went some way to addressing the reservations which some sponsors had been voicing since 1998, in particular those of constraints of the National Curriculum and of the lack of strategic control by sponsors, since the latter claimed to be otherwise answerable to a governing body composed mainly of teachers, support staff and a few LEA representatives. As a result of the Education Act 2002, sponsors could appoint the majority of the governing body and Academies were required to have within the governing body only one parent governor and only one staff governor. Moreover, there was no requirement to have any teacher on the

\(^5\) The deliberate nature of this strategy, in response to industry complaints, was endorsed by oral evidence from a Director of Cambridge Education Associates at a London Institute of Education seminar organised by The Economic and Social Research Council on 5 May 2005.
governing body (it was said that teachers could be represented by any other staff 
member) while the LEA representation, with its committee of elected councillors, had 
now been replaced by self-governing trusts led by corporate sponsors.

As a consequence, in 2006, sponsors were not asked to pay capital costs but 
merely to promise goods in kind. The recession in 2008/09 caused a further decrease 
in sponsors. As a result, in 2009, New Labour announced that it was scrapping the 
sponsorship fee and reducing set-up costs for Academies opening after 2011 (Turner, 

I contend that, as a result of this change in governance, it was legitimate to ask 
whether governing bodies had been integrated into the corporate sector as part of a 
process of creating a form of corporate and self-governing ownership (Ranson and 
Crouch, 2008, p. 48). I contend that this brought the alienating relations found in 
markets directly into schooling and that this necessarily resulted in the increase in the 
comparative disengagement experienced by teachers and pupils within schooling. 
This process is further explored in Chapters Four and Five.

Although Academies were expected to provide a broad and balanced curriculum 
based on the requirements of the National Curriculum, they could seek the Secretary 
of State’s permission to disapply parts of the National Curriculum. There was a 
requirement to follow only the ‘core’ curriculum of English, Mathematics, Science 
and Information and Communications Technology. In addition the sponsor could 
choose a subject specialism (since all Academy schools were to be ‘specialist’).

A significant change in property relations with respect to Academies took place 
with the implementation of Schedule 7, Education Act 2002 (which inserted 
Schedule 35A into the Education Act 1996). As was noted in Section 1.1.2 the 
Education Act 2002 allows schools to buy the land on which they are built, to
own school buildings, to employ staff, control admissions and to trade for services independently from the LEA. Section 11, Education Act 2002, also gives schools the power to form companies which, in some cases, could trade with other companies having the same owner as the school. Under this legislation schools can also merge to form chains or ‘federations’, gaining economies of scale and thereby increasing the profit-making capacity for third parties (see Section 1.1.2). In return for their sponsorship, sponsors are given the right to rename the school(s) concerned and to control the board(s) of governors. The basis for the government’s Academies programme has been a collection of legislative powers taken from the 1988 Education Reform Act and originally intended to establish City Technology Colleges (CTCs). City Academies resembled the CTCs in five main ways. Firstly, as with CTCs, City Academies were established by partnerships involving the government, the voluntary sector, church and business sponsors. A sponsor’s role was to “animate the academy’s vision, ethos and management structures” (Francis Beckett, 2007, p. 24, quoting the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust). Secondly, City Academies were to be directly accountable to the Secretary of State. They were state-funded with the Treasury directly making funds available to assist with capital costs and the entire day-to-day running costs. Under this system the LEA was merely a commissioner of schooling: once an LEA had ‘commissioned’ an Academy it could do nothing about the way the Academy worked. Thirdly, sponsors were asked initially to provide £2m. as a contribution to initial capital start-up costs but, in return, the government would pay the running costs and allow sponsors to influence the curriculum. Fourthly, like CTCs, City Academies could specialize only in technology, languages, sport or the arts. Fifthly, like CTCs, City Academies were registered as independent schools and so they, therefore, were outside the legislative framework specifically governing
'normal' state schools. The sponsors/owners of Academies also had jurisdiction over teachers' pay and conditions since, unlike their colleagues in 'normal' state schools, Academy teachers were not employed under the terms of the Schoolteachers Pay and Conditions Regulations. Academies therefore could vary teachers' conditions of service, according to financial circumstances (including profit considerations of other suppliers to Academies). Academies could replace more senior teachers (who were also more expensive) with cheaper teachers and/or extend teachers' working hours (perhaps through holiday reduction).

Originally, Academies were also able to set their own criteria for admission. They were able to use admissions tests and 'structured discussions' between parents and a member of the school's senior management team. The final decision on which pupils went to a particular Academy rested with the head teacher. As Academies were not Maintained Schools, they did not originally come under the remit of the government's admissions adjudicator and were allowed to select up to ten per cent of their intake by 'aptitude'. Appeals over admissions made, in the first place, to the school governing body. From 16 January 2008 parents were able to appeal to the admissions adjudicator, but this would have been for a ruling only over how the school had applied its own criteria rather than on the fairness of the criteria itself. Therefore, despite the government's apparent commitment to parental choice in admissions to secondary schools, the balance of power had been slipping away from parents towards schools, as their own admissions authorities, choosing their own pupils.

The explanation given by the government for these Specialist Schools and Academies was that they would import managerial expertise from business, which would both raise standards and increase curriculum innovation. For the first few years Ofsted
produced little evidence of standards being raised by such managerial input. However, in spite of this lack of evidence, the government planned to increase the number of Academies and Specialist Schools. In the 2005 White Paper entitled *Higher Standards, Better Schools For All*, the DfES stated that it wished to “enable every school to become a self-governing Trust School, with the benefit of external drive and new freedoms, *mirroring* the successful experience of *Academies*” (DfES, 2005, p. 23, GT’s italics). However, unlike Academies, Trust Schools were to remain part of the “local authority family of schools” (DfES, 2005, p. 28). The Education and Inspections Act 2006 introduced this new ‘Trust’ status, which was broadly similar to the foundation status (Section 1.3, n.2) incorporated into the Academies programme.

All Trust Schools which appointed governors and held land had to be charities and were required to use any income they received or generated for charitable purposes. Trust Schools could be partnered by the local not-for-profit sector or by businesses. Trust Schools could appoint their own governors, employ their own staff, set their own admissions procedures and could apply for ‘additional flexibilities’ both for curriculum provision, and for pay and conditions of work for staff. Trust Schools could also own their own school buildings and land, and would be able to contract or procure their own building projects, but were required to use any income they received for charitable purposes.

1.4 New Labour policies from 2007 to 2010.

In June 2007 Gordon Brown became Prime Minister and it appeared to some that the marketization processes might be slowed down, if not halted. In his first House of Commons speech in his new capacity as Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, Ed Balls stated that he would reduce the curricula freedoms of
Academies, although there would be no change in the formal powers of local authorities. In this speech Ed Balls signalled some changes of emphases from previous Secretaries of State for Education. New Academies could now only proceed if the Secretary of State was satisfied by LEA responses to consultation. This was interpreted as meaning that LEAs had a *de facto* veto over the establishment of new Academies (H.C. Debates, 10 July 2007, col. 1321). There were also to be fewer sponsorships from multi-academy groups and wealthy individuals, and more from universities and local authorities (Meyland-Smith and Evans, 2009, pp. 17-18).

Fiona Millar argued that these changes did not amount to a fundamental change in the Academies programme. Millar noted that, although Academies would become more accountable and also more collegiate and mainstream, they had not changed fundamentally since Academies were still independent schools and sponsors were still in almost exclusive control. Millar noted that the new prospectus for Academies clearly stated that sponsors would always have the controlling interest on the governing arrangements, while the governing body was still unelected and so excluded representative parents. Millar noted that “when the school is up and running, the local council can have little realistic leverage”, even as local authority co-sponsors (Millar, 2007, p. 4).

It was argued by Rogers and Migniulo (2007) that sponsorship gave ownership rights so, “for a very modest investment, control of a public asset, which continues to be publicly funded, passes *in perpetuity* and *with minimal accountability* to private individuals or institutions, albeit of a philanthropic bent” (Rogers and Migniulo, 2007, p.13, quoting Sir Jeremy Beecham from the Local Government Association, GT’s italics).

In the following year, Ed Balls, as a Labour/Co-op MP, declared his particular
interest in Trust Schools with co-operative governance models. In this model local community groups, including parents, teachers and local businesses can come together to give input and to help govern schools, provided that they are members of the Trust. At the time, Ed Balls said:

I want to see more parents and communities actively involved in schools and the co-operative model is an ideal way to do this. This is about putting power in the hands of those who are directly engaged with local schools, and who know best what is needed in their area (Ed Balls, DCSF Press Notice 2008/0196, 11 September 2008, p. 1).

In the same press release, Peter Marks, Chief Executive of the Co-operative Group, said:

We believe that the co-operative structure allows all stakeholders greater participation in the running of the school and a sense of ownership and engagement which has sometimes been missing in the public sector (Peter Marks, DCSF Press Notice 2008/0196, 11 September 2008, p. 1).

The Labour Party Manifesto 2010 largely endorsed the sentiments of Ed Balls outlined above (Labour Party Manifesto, 2010, Section 3:3). The role of central government in schools would also remain largely unchanged: central government would still set the overall direction of schooling. The 2010 Labour Party Manifesto stated that local authorities would also be expected to create more provision if necessary, or if parents were dissatisfied with schools, or if standards were low. These problems would be addressed by federations of schools with proven ‘track-records’ which could ‘take over’ failing schools (Labour Party Manifesto, 2010, Section 3:3). Where parents were dissatisfied with schools, local authorities would be required to secure ‘take-overs’ of poor schools, or in some cases secure entirely new provision.

Importantly, although parents could “trigger a ballot on whether to bring in a new
leadership team”, they still have little control, by way of local government representatives, on what goes on in the school. Therefore, it can be seen that the policy of New Labour was still away from democratic control and towards management by “trusted accredited providers” (Labour Party Manifesto, 2010, Section 3:4). This process led a study jointly commissioned by the London University Institute of Education and the Sutton Trust to conclude:

The Academies programme’s apparent endorsement by the PMDU [Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit - GT] review and its subsequent acceleration means that Academies will remain part of the schools’ landscape for some time to come. It has survived a change in prime minister and a succession of Secretaries of State, and is now supported by the Conservative Party..... (Andrew Curtis et. al., 2008, p. 49).

In the next section I show that the policy of marketization of school provision and school services is supported by the other main parties and would probably continue unabated no matter which of the three main political parties were to be in power.

1.5 The Conservative and Liberal Parties and their education policies from 2000 onwards.

Although there were some differences in emphasis in the education policies of the three major UK parties, there were also many fundamental similarities. All three worked to a market model of school provision which was to be very similar to the Academies programme developed by Tony Blair. In 2000, although the Conservative Party had supported the Academies programme, including the establishment of primary academies, they believed that New Labour was heading towards a policy of too much state regulation. In 2008 David Cameron, as Leader of Conservative Party, described this concept in the following way:

where a church, a voluntary body, a private school, a third sector organisation can set up a new school in the state sector and take state pupils and make sure they are subject to minimum standards in terms of inspection, they get state money per pupil, and they can bring that
innovation and dynamism to the state sector that we need (Cameron, 2008, p. 9, GT's italics).

A similar concept is advocated by James Tooley, and is analyzed in Sections 2.1 and 2.4 as part of my analysis of Tooley's model.

In 2010 David Cameron gave a speech in which he outlined his concept of society. In this speech he stated that a major "technique" for creating such a society was decentralization. He did not explicitly mention schools, but he did state his intention "to open up public services to new providers like charities, social enterprises and private companies" (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 4).

In a speech entitled "Join us to help bring the change Britain needs", given on 15 February 2010, Cameron began to incorporate references to "co-operative, bottom-up partnership" which led many commentators at the time to believe that he was advocating co-operatives (Cameron, 2010[b], p. 3). Initially, within Cameron's policy, co-operatives would be possible for primary schools only. They would be funded by the state so long as they met national standards, but would be free from control by a centralized bureaucracy and from political micro-management. They would be not-for-profit organizations, any profits being re-invested into the service rather than being distributed to external shareholders. In Section 1.1.2 it was noted that Section 11 of the Education Act 2002 allows not-for-profit schools to form companies which can invest in other companies which are profit-making entities. In this process money paid by the state to run the services is transformed into private profit. The economic problems connected with such a model are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.

Given the comment from Cameron above, it is likely that he has a similar concept of co-operatives to that of Nozick (see Section 4.9). That is, within Cameron's model, co-operatives would be operating within the conditions and social relations which make up a capitalist society based on minimal state intervention and a form of
decentralization (Cameron, 2009). Therefore, I maintain that Cameron's concept of co-operative ownership of property is another variant of capitalist private property relations which has the same alienating relations as those analyzed in Chapter Four of this thesis. In Chapter Five I extend this analysis of alienation to markets in school provision and schooling, and argue that extending marketization to school provision and schooling objectively contributes to the break-down of social relations. Although Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the break-down of 'society' in his speeches entitled "The Big Society," given in both 2009 and 2010, he failed to take into account the fact that the marketization of school provision would necessarily result in objective relationships which would prefigure such a break-down (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 4).

This policy to increase the marketization of schools was endorsed in the Conservative Party's 2010 Manifesto. In that manifesto support was given to the hybrid of the Swedish Kunskapsskolans ( 'Knowledge Schools'), and the Charter Schools in the USA (Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, p. 53). Kunskapsskolans's selling point is personalised, web-based, independent learning via a "knowledge portal." Students have an individual tutor, whom they see weekly for about 15 minutes to review work and to set a programme for the following week: some of this will include taught lessons in small groups, but much will be independent study. Rather than attend specialist teaching areas within each school, students would spend one week each term in a purpose-built centre run by Kunskapsskolans. Many of the 'schools' are not purpose-built facilities but converted offices. The sponsors are not required to build libraries or sports facilities: instead students use municipal libraries and sports centres.

Unlike UK schools, the Swedish schools have to follow a broader national
curriculum and the sponsors are not allowed to select pupils by ability. In Sweden the Kunskapsskolan schools are profit-making. Although Cameron has stated that such schools in England would be not-for-profit organizations, Michael Gove (Secretary of State for Education) has stated that the government has “no ideological objection” to school governors using for-profit companies to run their schools (Barkham and P. Curtis, 2010, p. 6).

In their 2010 manifesto the Conservative Party supported new regulations which would make it easier for parents, charities and businesses to set up Academies, including downgrading building regulations so that schools could use different kinds of buildings, such as former banks and offices. The manifesto also allowed “good schools” to escape regular visits from school inspectors and also supported scaling back of the National Curriculum and reforms to Standard Attainment Tests (SATs) to move the latter from primary to secondary schools. It also included the scrapping of the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency and extending the freedom Academies already had to set pay and conditions for teachers. In addition, in early March 2010, Gove announced that he intended to withdraw from LEAs and parents’ bodies the power to stop schools becoming Academies (J. Shepherd, 2010, p. 6).

In the following Queen’s Speech (H.L. Debs. [2010-11] Vol. 719, No. 3, col. 5) it was announced that these policies would be included in an Academies Bill, enacted before the summer break.

The Liberal Democrats had similar proposals to the other two parties for the involvement of private providers in schools and schooling. In the Liberal Democrat Party Manifesto 2010 it was stated that they would replace Academies with “Sponsored-Managed Schools”:

These schools will be commissioned by and accountable to local authorities and not Whitehall, and would allow appropriate
providers, such as educational charities and parent groups to be *involved in* delivering state-funded education (The Liberal Democrat Party Manifesto 2010, p. 37, GT’s italics).

A Conservative-Liberal Coalition government was formed on 12 May 2010. On 25 May 2010, in the Queen’s Speech, the new government made a commitment to increase the number of Academies and to allow new ‘providers’ to enter the school system (HL Deb [2010-11] Vol.719, No. 3, col. 5).

In this section I have observed that, as is also argued by a former Secretary of State for Education (Estelle Morris, 2010, p. 3), support by all three major political parties has been made clear for the *increased* marketization of schools, In the next section, I show that this support is hardly surprising when policy-making moves are contextualized within the UK’s international obligations since 1997.

1.6 The modern global context of education policy-making in the UK.

In this section I intend to outline the global context in which education policy is made. I argue that UK New Labour took an enthusiastic role in an agenda to create a global market in services such as schooling and school provision. It has been argued by Hirst and Thompson (1994) that, within both the European Union and World Trade Organisation treaties, nation states should “provide the domestic constitutional framework and policy support for effective regional governments”. This means that the EU and WTO will consider as legitimate such national restrictions, including policy decisions of nation-states (Hirst and Thompson, 1994, p. 245). This is covered by Article 95 (4)-(6) (formerly Article 100a [4]) of the EU Treaty. Moreover, in theory, member states can withdraw from the European Union if they so wish (Article 49 A [1]) should any state consider membership conditions too onerous or inapplicable. Although such withdrawal might until the 2008 financial crisis have seemed very unlikely, in the last year or two since the crisis there has been at least
theoretical discussion as to the viability of membership of the EU's Euro-zone currency on the part of smaller and less industrialized states. In fact, of course there is the precedent of Greenland's withdrawal from the European Community in 1985.

The fact that one member state chooses to place under public control an industry that another member state prefers to locate in the private sector is not of itself objectionable under EU law. What the member states are forbidden to do is to discriminate on the grounds of nationality within the same kind of trade. Therefore, a government could choose nationalization of a certain sector of the economy and still be within the letter of the EU law, provided that no section of that particular sector was already privatized. Therefore the fact that, within the UK, there exists a private sector within schooling and school provision means that the whole school sector must be open to competition.

The EU, as a signatory to the WTO, is also bound by WTO agreements including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Treaty, which came into being in 1995. The GATS Treaty has been described as a voluntary agreement because countries can decide which sectors of the economy they will agree to be covered by GATS rules. Lawyers Gottlieb and Pearson, however, have noted that there are aspects of the agreement that would question the voluntary nature of the Treaty (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001): see Appendix A1 of this thesis for further details. Importantly, I note that there is a built-in agenda committing signatories of the GATS Treaty to 'progressive liberalisation'. GATS Article XIX states:

In pursuance of the objectives of this agreement, Members shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalisation (GATS, 1995).

New Labour chose to be at the forefront of the global development of markets
in areas such as educational provision and services. The enthusiasm of New Labour for the ‘marketization’ of educational services can be shown by the fact that, since it came to office, the New Labour government continued the Conservative Party’s programme (Kavanagh, 1997, pp. 334-5; Whitfield, 2001, p. 118). Indeed, New Labour has been at the forefront of the programme of the marketization of schooling and school provision, and requested that the ‘liberalisation’ of such services be itemised in the GATS liberalisation agenda at a time when many other countries were content not to make such a request.

Since 2003 a market in school provision has been developing into a major export industry. In 2003 Dulwich College, in south London, took the first steps to create an international franchise by opening three schools in China (Adi Bloom, 2008, p. 28). In 2007 Nord Anglia Education planned to raise £4.77 m. in order to help meet the demand for “British-style schooling” from an expanding expatriate community in Asia and the Middle East. Investec, a company broker, predicted that two-thirds of Nord Anglia’s operating profits would come from its international school business by 2009 (Pan Kwan Yuk, 2007, p. 20). In 2008 Harrow School was also operating schools in Thailand and China. In the same year, the head of the City Academy in Bristol spoke of opening off-shoots of fee-charging schools in Africa (Gould, 2008, www.guardian.co.uk, last accessed 24 January 2010).

Commentators began to see the potential trade in school services as a means of offsetting the losses experienced in manufacturing which had been occurring since 1997. Kable was quoted in the Financial Times (N. Timmins, 2004, p. 6) as stating that education was a fast-growing sector of the UK economy, with sales of outsourcing and existing contracts expected to reach £10.3bn. by 2006-7, starting

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6 Kable is a firm specialising in information technology and public service ‘markets’.
from the estimated base figure of £4.5bn. in the financial year 2003-4. In this article Karen Swinden, head of forecasting at Kable, stated that this growth was likely to come from “foundation schools, responsible for managing their own assets, and the potential for support, administration and direct educational services” (Timmins, p. 6).

In conclusion, in this chapter I have produced empirical evidence which I believe conclusively shows that what may appear to be a series of separate reforms is, in fact, a process towards the marketization of school provision which is influenced by economic policies generated at an international level.

I believe that I have shown that this process of marketization has been advanced enthusiastically by successive UK governments since 1979, and that this marketization will be continued, with increased intensity, by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition. I consider that I have also shown that at present the difference between the three parties is mainly in the degree of government regulation which they support. A Conservative government would aspire to follow a model with less regulation than that used by the previous Labour government led by Gordon Brown.

Similar policies to those aspired to by New Labour and the Conservative Party are echoed by some philosophers of education. James Tooley, especially in his early writings, supports a model which is similar to that espoused by the present-day Conservative Party and which has less regulation than the model used by New Labour. Although Harry Brighouse also supports a model which includes market relations, his model supports more specific regulation than that likely to be supported by the Conservative Party.

In Chapter Two I compare Tooley’s market model with that of Brighouse, and argue that Brighouse’s regulations are not necessarily capable of modifying, to any
significant degree, less desirable market activities. Whether Brighouse’s regulations modify market activities is entirely contingent upon the willingness of the markets to co-operate with governments: it may or may not happen. I leave until Chapter Five a consideration of the alienating relations which, I contend, are necessarily present in both of these market models regardless of whether or not they are government-regulated.
Introduction

This chapter compares James Tooley's concept of a 'lightly' regulated market \(^1\) with Harry Brighouse's concept of a regulated market and shows why oppositional relations will still be present between the market and education, despite the presence of regulation. This chapter also notes that Tooley's epistemological argument in favour of the marketization of school provision and schooling rests on Hayek's concept of 'tacit' knowledge and 'spontaneous orders' (Tooley, 1994 [a], p. 197; 1995, pp. 78, 81; 1996, pp. 106; 1998, pp. 273-4; 2000, pp. 166, 208, 215; 2010, p. 109). Tooley uses Hayek's concept of tacit knowledge and spontaneous orders to argue that the knowledge claimed by central planners (in any type of society) cannot be articulated and that, therefore, any model based on central planning is misconceived (Tooley, 1995, p. 81). The model of central planning which Tooley criticises is borrowed from that used by Hayek. Hayek used this model when debating the viability of market mechanisms in socialism with Oskar Lange in 1935. I postpone a discussion of the Soviet model of the state until Chapter Seven. In Chapter Seven Soviet Marxism and the Soviet concept of alienation, as supported by some prominent supporters of the Soviet regime in the mid-twentieth century, is discussed. I now outline Tooley's model of the market in more detail.

\(^1\) As noted in the introduction, minimal or 'light touch' regulation usually means regulation which preserves the rules enabling the enforcement of contracts, prevents coercion and enables 'free markets' to operate.
2.1 James Tooley’s concept of a market

In *Reclaiming Education* (Tooley, 2000, p. 11), James Tooley lists the defining characteristics which have to be present for a market to exist as a) no state involvement; b) no state funding (except perhaps for targeted funding for the poor); c) relatively minimal regulation; d) relatively easy entry for new suppliers (who, in 2000, he argued should be education companies: Tooley, 2000, p. 85), and e) a price mechanism to allocate goods. Although these are the characteristics associated with the economic theory of a ‘perfect market’, Tooley admits (Tooley, 1994[b], p. 139) that perfect markets “may or may not have a purchase in the real world” (Tooley, 2010, p. 110).

I now deal with the market relations favoured by Tooley in more detail, starting with the absence of a state in the running of schools. In his Ph.D. thesis (Tooley, 1994[a]) and in *Disestablishing Schools* (Tooley, 1995), Tooley envisages schools as being controlled either by community groups, businesses or by groups of families. Tooley maintains that businesses have a profit incentive when involved in schooling, and that his model would benefit producers who might be willing to provide schooling because they “would be able to tie-in their private goods with this public goods provision”; for example, advertisers and producers of radio, television or computer hardware and software could be involved in providing materials for schooling (Tooley, 1994[a], p. 322). In this way his model is very similar to that supported by the Conservative Party under David Cameron (Cameron, 2010[a]).

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2 This model seems to have relations very similar to that found in the model proposed by Ivan Illich (outlined in Section 9.4.4). This is despite the fact that Tooley, in *Reclaiming Education* (Tooley, 2000, p. 26), seems to distance himself from the ‘de-schooling’ model used by Illich. I surmise that, as a Hayekian, Tooley probably believes that it is necessary to have a state to provide the legal framework necessary for the capitalist system to function.
However, in *Reclaiming Education* (2000), Tooley’s model is based solely on business providers whose main business is education (Tooley, 2000, pp. 18-19). In *Reclaiming Education* there is no mention of schools run by communities or groups of families and no explanation as to why such groups are not mentioned. Also, in *Reclaiming Education*, Tooley acknowledges that firms which sponsor schools (as opposed to firms whose only business is education) “subvert” education to their own ends (Tooley, 2000, p. 19). In this argument, Tooley supports Alex Molnar’s argument that “corporations don’t exist either to serve the best interests of children or to promote ‘family values’” (Tooley, 2000, p. 19, quoting Molnar, 1996, p. 47) because “they want to make profits to [sic] shareholders who are not particularly concerned about the educational impact of what they are doing” (Tooley, 2000, p. 19).

In *Reclaiming Education* Tooley argues for “businesses whose only business is education (Tooley, 2000, p. 18, GT’s italics) because he contends that:

(For) real education businesses — the sort I will defend here — *do* exist ‘to serve the best interests of schoolchildren’ and their families, as well as shareholders. If they are not serving the interests of children then they will go out of business. The only way they can make profits for their owners is if they provide high-quality educational services (Tooley, 2000, p. 19).

In Section 2.4 I criticise the argument of Tooley which states that competition within the market for school provision would ensure that schooling would be of a good quality, arguing that Tooley fails to address some actual market practices. In Section 2.4 I also argue that even sponsors of businesses whose only business is education are still predominantly interested in making a profit. If this were not the case they would be engaged in philanthropy which, of course, is not predominantly a money-making activity. For example, Sunny Varkey, a businessman who does specialise in schooling and owns the GEMS firm, when
questioned about the money-making aspect of his ‘operation’ said “It’s my business so why should I do it as a charity?” (Jon Boone, 2005, p. 12). Therefore, I contend that, the observation of Tooley (Tooley, 2000, p. 19) that the ends of education can be subverted to the ends of the business people involved, still applies even where the business is solely school provision or schooling.

Next I deal with the second characteristic of Tooley’s model, namely, absence of state funding. Tooley argues that, for families on average incomes, private sources could fund the full cost of schools (Tooley, 2000, pp. 96-7). Tooley assumes that, if state provision were reduced, most people would be able to keep more of their money because of lower taxation, and thus would be able to put this towards the purchase of schooling (Tooley, 2000, p. 96). Tooley also argues that extra money could also be found by cutting down on alcohol, tobacco and luxuries such as ‘eating out’ (Tooley, 2000, p. 96). In Appendix A3, in relation to a similar proposal is made by Harry Brighouse, I produce empirical evidence to show that if those in the lowest and second lowest quintile of the population were to have cut back on tobacco, alcohol and leisure goods, they would still not have been able to have afforded fees of £3,000 per annum for one child on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis.

Tooley acknowledges that a small number of people would need a form of safety-net to enable them to provide schooling for their children, and suggested that these families could be helped by several initiatives. Tooley lists such examples as: other families could sponsor such children for altruistic motives; schools could provide for poorer members of society by combining schooling with production (that is, making goods and selling them); schools could also provide services at a profit, and use this profit to fund poorer children, or some entrepreneurs could link the provision of schooling in a community to the purchase of a private good. Some
entrepreneurs might set up schools that are free or subsidised at the point of delivery, but where children purchase food, books, writing and sports equipment on the premises. Finally, Tooley suggests that schooling could be provided as a ‘public good’ through private-financed radio, television and computer networks (Tooley, 1994[a], p. 322; 2000, pp. 118-123, 134). In Reclaiming Education Tooley states that such subsidies would have to be administered skilfully in order to prevent them from being a disincentive to other families’ saving. Tooley suggests that they should be administered by a committee, “made up of local people and the good and the great”, who should be able to allocate funds sensibly (Tooley, 2000, p. 91).

Next I deal with the third characteristic of Tooley’s model. Tooley argues that there is no reason why providers of schools and schooling need to be answerable to the state (Tooley, 2000, p. 176). Tooley argues that there is no need for state regulation when the market puts ‘consumers’ in charge of the curriculum, because consumers can ‘shop around’, thus ensuring that school provision is appropriate to their children’s needs (Tooley, 1994[a], p. 256). Tooley states that there is accountability in the market through the various forms of redress which individuals can obtain if not satisfied with goods. Firstly, there is the ability of the consumer to purchase from another competitor. Secondly, there is the ability to demand a refund for inadequate goods or services. Thirdly, Tooley argues that, if there is an adequate supply, the quality of education would be assured by competition between education companies (Tooley, 2000, pp. 84-85, 176; 2003, p. 445).

Tooley (Tooley, 2000) also argues for the use of ‘brands’ as part of the process to use market mechanisms to ensure quality:

Just as all parents can shop at their local Safebury’s and know the quality of food and service will be the same in their locality as at
anywhere else around the country, so all parents could be able to send their children to excellent schools. If there were these competing education companies with strong brand names, there need be no more ‘sink’ schools (Tooley, 2000, p. 85).

Tooley, therefore, argues that, within a market, there is no need for a mechanism through which parents could appeal over school selection (Tooley, 2000, pp. 15, 176-7). However, brands can be franchised to different firms and not all of them may operate according to the quality standards of the original firm. One can buy a product which is advertised as being manufactured by a particular ‘brand’, only to find that another firm has brought the franchise, and that the quality targets of the new firm are not the same.

I maintain that in Tooley’s market model, ‘choice’ is only applicable to those who can exercise effective demand, that is, those who have sufficient purchasing power for the ‘brand’ they wish to purchase. Moreover, market processes (both in Tooley’s model and in a more regulated model such as that supported by Harry Brighouse) can involve schools in covertly selecting pupils in order to reinforce the school image (Ball, 2004, pp. 6-7). Children with special and emotional needs may well be disadvantaged under this system (Whitty, et. al., 1998, p. 117).

2.2 Tooley’s concept of autonomy.

Tooley (Tooley, 1994, p. 182) argues for negative liberty on the basis of Hayek’s later epistemology, in particular as is found in Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty (1960), New Studies in Philosophy, Economics and the History of Ideas (1978) and Law, Legislation and Liberty (1976). Tooley looks to John Gray’s The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions (1992) for a “framework in which to explore” whether decision making about education for autonomy should be conducted at the level of governments. In The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions (1992), Gray
supports a moral justification of the market based on the support it provides for the exercise of autonomy (Tooley, 1995, p. 77). In *The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions* (1992), Gray defines the autonomous individual as one “who is self-possessed, who has distinct self-identity or individuality, who is authentic and self-directed and whose life is to some significant degree a matter of self-creation” (Gray, 1992, p. 25).

Like Tooley, Gray also argues that negative liberty should be valued, not in and of itself, but as an element of autonomy (Gray, 1992, p. 22). For Gray his concept of autonomy does “not rest on the contribution made to general or collective welfare by the markets, nor on their embodying any imagined system of rights (such as rights to negative liberty), but on their contribution to individual well-being” (Gray, 1992, p. 2). Gray argues that markets enable individuals to live autonomously “in their personal knowledge — knowledge that is typically tacit and practical in form” (Gray, 1992, p. 3, quoted by Tooley, 1995, p. 78), and which “by its very nature cannot be collected by a central planning board” (Gray, 1992, p. 7, quoted in Tooley, 1995, p. 78). I analyze this epistemological position in more detail in Section 2.3.1.

Unlike Tooley, Gray acknowledges the need for life to contain “valuable options furnished by a common stock of inherently public goods” (Gray, 1992, p. 2, quoted in Tooley, 1995, p. 78). As a result, Gray argues for an enabling state to provide public goods when the market fails to do so (Gray, 1992, p. 58). Also as part of the conditions for this provision to work, Gray argues for the “obligation to pay taxes to support the minimum state” (Gray, 1992, p. 59). Tooley argues that under these circumstances “the great majority” of individuals and families would be able to provide the schooling which their children need (Tooley, 1995, p. 79). In Appendix A2 I produce empirical evidence to challenge this assertion. I do not comment on any
other political or philosophical positions which may have been taken by John Gray at
other times, because I am not aware that any of Gray’s other writings have been
quoted by Tooley in support of the latter’s market model.

2.3 The influence of Friederich von Hayek’s epistemology on Tooley’s thought.
2.3.1 Tacit knowledge and spontaneous orders.

In this section I explore Hayek’s concept of tacit knowledge, since Tooley
claims that the Hayekian epistemology of tacit knowledge is fundamental to his
own defence of the marketization of school provision and schooling (Tooley, 1995, p.
aspects of knowledge remain hidden and so incapable of verification:

While we are clearly often not aware of mental processes because they
have not yet arisen to the level of consciousness but proceed on what
are (both physiologically and psychologically) lower levels, there is no
reason why the conscious level should be the highest level, and there
are many grounds which make it probable that, in order to be
conscious, processes must be guided by a supra-conscious order which
cannot be the object of its own representations (Hayek, 1967, p. 61).

In his lecture “Economics and Knowledge” (first given in 1936 and published in
1948 in Individualism and Economic Order), Hayek applies this epistemology to his
market theory. Hayek argues that, within the theory of economic equilibrium, both
the conditions under which the tendency to equilibrium
exists, and also the nature of the processes by which knowledge is changed, are
unknowable and unverifiable (Hayek, 1948, p. 45). (General equilibrium is defined
as “the set of interrelated markets when there is no excess demand or supply in any
market” [Bannock, Baxter and Davis, 1992, p. 180]).

From 1960 onwards Hayek refers to this type of knowledge as tacit knowledge. In
his paper “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility”, first given in 1963 and reproduced in
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Hayek, 1967, p. 44), Hayek defines
tacit knowledge as the capacity to act “according to rules which we may be able to
For Hayek, tacit knowledge involves the capacity to perceive regularity or patterns in the actions of others through the interpersonal recognition of the particular conditions and relations within which these particularities are believed to form. For Hayek, these patterns form clues from which men recognise what to them, are significant aspects of a situation. Hayek argues that in most cases there will be “no specific clues in the sense of single events but merely a pattern of a certain kind which has meaning to them” (Hayek, 1967, p. 55). Hayek calls this process “rule perception” (Hayek, 1967, p. 56). Hayek claims that the process of rule-perception is based on “what eighteenth-century authors describe as sympathy” (Hayek, 1967, p. 58). [See Section 3.3 for a discussion of Smith’s concept of “sympathy”.

For Hayek, the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts because it presupposes that the social elements are internally related to each other. This ontology informs Hayek’s concept of spontaneous orders and tacit knowledge and provides a coherence to Hayek’s philosophy. Although Tooley adopts Hayek’s the concept of ‘tacit knowledge,’ he does not acknowledge Hayek’s ontology. Yet Hayek’s concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ is based on internal relations.

As was noted above, for Hayek, ‘tacit knowledge’ involves the capacity to perceive regularity or patterns in the actions of others through the interpersonal recognition of the particular conditions and relations within which particularities are believed to form (Hayek, 1967, p. 54).

Hayek has a mechanistic conception of the social relations between individuals which does not sufficiently take into account the subjective aspect of activity. Hayek does not acknowledge that associations of social individuals influence social processes through their thought and activities, and writes as if
social individuals are purely enabled, or constrained, by objective social structures. Consequently, for Hayek, society is not the product of conscious design but the unintended product of evolution making such processes transhistorical (Hayek, 1967, pp. 96-105).

The ontology of internal relations found in Hayek's writings differs from that found in Marx. Hayek's concept of internal relations removes social relations from their historical context and, in so doing, reifies them. For Marx, social processes as Hayek conceives them are alienating because they are a "force over and above" social individuals which dominates them, and over which they would have little or no control. This aspect of Marx's thought is considered in more detail in Section 4.2.

For Hayek, prosperity and 'civilization' depends on such capitalist structures and values. Consequently, Hayek maintains that those who champion liberation through the abolition of alienating relations "would destroy the basis of freedom," which, for him, is capitalism (Hayek, 1988, pp. 64-5, 153).

Both Hayek and Tooley define freedom as the absence of restraint and champion 'freedom' on the grounds of the relations found within capitalism (Tooley, 2002[a], p. 3). Therefore Hayek does not acknowledge the importance of alienation, although he does support the influence of objective social relations on the subjectivity of social individuals (Hayek, 1948[a], p. 44).

Although Tooley occasionally mentions alienation, he never presents a systematic analysis or an explicit definition of the concept. In Education without the State and in his paper "Market Approaches to Education, Examples and Evidence" (2002[a]) Tooley equates alienation with estrangement which he implies is the result of a "separate youth culture" (Tooley, 1996, p. 12). In "Market Approaches to Education, Examples and Evidence" (Tooley, 2002[a]), in the context of
discussing the UK Government’s White Paper *Schools Achieving Success*, [DfES, Cm. 5230, 2002], Tooley equates alienation with “disaffection” and “falling engagement” (Tooley, 2002, p. 5). This concept of Tooley’s refers to a subjective individualist state and seeks to establish only if alienation has occurred as a result of personal experience within social relations. I maintain that such a description of a social situation is only partial and that such a description does not include the objective relations and conditions which necessarily give rise to “dissatisfaction”. I also maintain that such a description does not provide the material relations and conditions necessary to provide an adequate solution to the problem of “dissatisfaction” or what Marx calls estrangement (entfremdet). This concept is discussed in Chapter Four.

In part of his 2002[a] paper, Tooley states that alienation can be addressed through reform of educational delivery, that is, through increased “flexibility” in the curriculum and more “individualised patterns of learning” (Tooley, 2002[a], p. 5). This methodological approach does not consider the necessary relations in which schooling is embedded and the necessary influence which these relations have on social individuals. Tooley’s methodology seeks to establish if alienation occurs as a result of personal experience within social relations: it cannot be used to analyse the alienating relations which necessarily occur as a result of objective relations such as those found in the market. I note in Appendix A2 that Hayek disagrees with formal models of the market such as that used by Tooley in his paper (Tooley, 2002[a]) because he disagrees with the use of the rational constructivism, which is found in such models, to organize society.
Tooley's later market model.

In his paper "Economics and Knowledge" (Hayek, 1948[a], pp. 35-45) Hayek argues against such formal economic models as those used in Tooley's model in "Market Approaches to Education" (Tooley, 2002[a] and 2002[b]).

Firstly, Hayek argues that the propositions of such models are merely hypothetical because they are based on the actions of an individual, which by their ontological nature are, for Hayek, different from actual social interrelations (Section 2.3.1).

Hayek also maintains that, in the type of market economics which Tooley subsequently used in his 2002 papers, the "supposed existence of the tendency towards market equilibrium" means that ".......under certain conditions, the knowledge and intentions of the different members of society are supposed to come more and more into agreement ...." (Hayek, 1948[a], p. 45, original italics). Hayek goes on to conclude that, because market equilibrium is "an assertion about what happens in the real world" it "ought, at least in principle, to be capable of verification" (Hayek, 1948[a], p. 45):

The only trouble is that we are still pretty much in the dark about (a) the conditions under which this tendency is supposed to exist and (b) the nature of the process by which individual knowledge is changed (Hayek, 1948[a], p. 45, original italics).

In Section 2.4 I outline some of the actual market practices which Tooley ignores in his argument that competition within the market for school provision would ensure that schooling is of good quality. Some of the problems resulting from Tooley's ideas about the viability of the voucher system as a pricing mechanism are outlined in more detail in Appendix A2. In the next part of this chapter I deal with other economic and social problems which I contend that Tooley's model fails...
2.4 Criticisms of Tooley’s concept of a market in school provision.

I maintain that, in order to set up schools within Tooley’s early model (Tooley, 1994[a]), local communities would need to raise finance either from the private banking sector or with specific sponsorship from firms. To successfully raise capital, schools would have to prove to banks that they could make profits. It is likely that schools in poor areas would have particular problems in making profits and therefore in raising finance. In any case, the price of entry to a market would often be high, making it difficult for small firms to enter without state funding.

In the year 2000 it was estimated by the government that the capital cost of a secondary school building was £8-10m. (Cassidy, 2000, p. 5). At the time, the annual cost to run a comprehensive with just over 1000 pupils was estimated at £3.5m. year on year; the cost of buying or building a school being even higher.

For Tooley, the alternative to government funding for secondary education would be to charge parents £3,000 per annum per child in 2000 prices (or £16,800 over seven years, per child, after tax relief at 20%). According to the UK Office of National Statistics’ Social Trends Volume 30 (2000, p. 68), approximately 40% of families did not have both parents at work. In Appendix A3, I argue that it is unrealistic to expect parents to cover fees probably of at least £3,000 per annum per secondary school place, at 2000 prices.

In 2010 parents were encouraged by the Conservative-led government to form ‘free’ schools. At the time it was estimated that the initial start-up cost of a small school (for 48 pupils aged 2-7) was £50,000 (Uzel, 2010, p. 9). Not surprisingly, some groups of parents found it difficult to start schools without state funding and the provision of an already existing school building (Abrams, 2010, p. 2).
I note that firms could form cartels to overcome market entry problems and that this would in turn make it even more difficult for new firms to enter the market. These cartels could allow affiliates working in the same area to use their resources to keep prices low by cross-subsidizing their schools. This would allow these firms to drive smaller competitors out of business and, when the latter had disappeared, to raise their prices. An example of this type of economic activity was uncovered in 2003 when fifty leading independent schools, including Eton, Harrow, Winchester and Cheltenham Ladies’ College were fined a total of £3.5 m. in a case involving the Office of Fair Trading (Clare, 2003, p. 8).

There is, arguably, a tendency for the rate of school fees to be set by the most expensive school in an area, as no school would wish to be perceived as ‘second best’ to the most expensive. There would also be an incentive for many schools to appear exclusive and to turn away certain pupils, for example, disabled pupils, pupils perceived to be below a certain IQ, pupils with emotional difficulties, pupils from certain socio-economic groups or other pupils with special needs. Examples of how this could be done have been given in an article by David Starkie and Jessica Hunt (Starkie and Hunt, 2003, www.economics-plus.co.uk, last accessed 18 May 2005) and in a report by Phillip Noden and Anne West (Noden and West, 2009, www.rise.trust.org.uk, last accessed 10 December, 2009). Moreover I note that within Tooley’s system of a relatively unregulated market there would be no way to allow parents to appeal over school rejection and thus try to prevent the type of ‘cherry-picking’ described in this report.

It is (of course) a logical fallacy to say that all parents would be able to send children to ‘the best schools’ within a system of unregulated market competition. I
also argue that standards in general just cannot be guaranteed to ensure the provision of good quality schooling for all without government regulation: the latter, of course, being objected to by Tooley. For example, if all the firms in a particular price-band were to reduce the breadth of the curriculum, and/or reduce access to extra facilities (such as swimming pools) and/or organize schooling to a particular standard, then parents would have to make a choice within the standards that the market would be willing to provide, irrespective of their own or their children's needs or desires. This would particularly be the case if cartels existed, especially bearing in mind that Tooley's system ensures only a "basic standard of schooling" (Tooley, 1995, pp. 117-9).

These financial and economic problems do not appear to have been addressed by Tooley. Instead Tooley seems to rely on the assumption that, within a market, those whose main business is "education" will necessarily supply only what is best for pupils. He has not considered actual market practices like 'fee-swapping' and the formation of cartels, which is often found in large markets.

Neither has Tooley considered that sponsors of all types might not always be able to raise finance, especially in times of economic downturn, when certain sponsors might turn out to be particularly vulnerable. While money and investment might be available in times of boom, it becomes tenuous in times of slump. (There would likely therefore be a tendency for school entrepreneurs to plan for safer financial outcomes.) Such a situation occurred at the beginning of 2009 when many Private Finance Initiative projects involving school buildings, under which capital funding was provided by private companies, were badly hit because of the lack of credit available owing to the economic recession (Hawkes, 2009).

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3 In 2008 it was said that Academies might be hit by the credit crunch because some sponsors made money through hedge-funds and so were vulnerable to the financial downturn (Polly Curtis, 2008).
In such a scenario, the failure of firms to raise finance might well cause discontinuity and dislocation of the provision of schooling, with potentially devastating effects on pupils. As a result of such discontinuity, pupils might have to enrol with different schools, potentially losing contact with friends and teachers. This is more likely to occur in poor areas where families would have less money to help schools, and so this would cause further disparity between schools in affluent areas and those in poorer ones.

2.5 Harry Brighouse's model of a choice-based mechanism: a specifically regulated market in school provision.

Harry Brighouse is another example of a philosopher of education who supports markets, as elements of his model of a choice-based mechanism of school provision. Unlike Tooley, Brighouse has a strong concern with justice and argues that regulated markets in school provision and schooling are possible means of achieving justice. Brighouse's concept of justice is based primarily on the support for autonomy. Brighouse defines autonomy as the capacity of individuals to be rationally self-governing, and argues that "justice requires that each individual shall have significant opportunities to live a life which is good for them" (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37, 68-9). This concept of justice is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.2 but briefly, for Brighouse, it entails having the equal opportunity to live according to the principle of rational autonomy.

In the next section I show the similarity between Brighouse's philosophy and that of John Rawls. I begin this exploration by outlining the concept of autonomy supported by Brighouse and Rawls and that promoted by Immanuel Kant.

2.5.1 Brighouse's ethical individualism.

As with that of John Rawls, Brighouse's overall concept of autonomy is very similar to that of Kant. As with Kant, it is fundamental to Brighouse's philosophy
that moral principles are the object of rational choice. A synopsis of Kant’s concept of autonomy is given by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1972, pp. 251-7). Rawls notes that Kant holds that a person is acting autonomously “when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being” (Rawls, 1972, p. 252, GT’s italics). Rawls adds:

The principles he acts upon are not adopted because of his social position or natural endowments, or in view of the particular kind of society in which he lives or the specific things that he happens to want. To act on such principles is to act heteronomously (Rawls, 1972, p. 253, GT’s italics).

Rawls, and Kant as Rawls interprets him, are arguing that “to express one’s nature as a being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be chosen if this nature (as a free and equal rational being) were the decisive determining element of the principles which are acted upon” (Rawls, 1972, p. 253 GT’s italics).

Like Kant, Brighouse argues that a good life is one that is endorsed from “the inside”, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to our lives (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37, 69). Like Kant, Brighouse argues that this makes persons the ultimate arbiters of what actions they take and what beliefs they hold. As does Kant, Brighouse argues that one’s “sense” of living well should be an autonomous decision, guided by one’s rationality (Brighouse, 2000, p. 69).

I now briefly consider the ontological implications of this concept. This concept of the rational autonomous individual, not being necessarily influenced by social relations, rests on a concept of society in which social relations are external. In this ontology, social relations are contingent, and therefore might or might not be present (Brighouse, 2000, p. 49). I contend that, because such an ontology is
based on contingent relations, it has led Tooley and Brighouse to conclude that the marketization of school provision has been merely a series of separate reforms rather than a continuous process.

In contrast, within an ontology based on internal relations, an entity necessarily changes its form and function when one or more of its relations changes. Therefore, within such an ontology, possible changes are not entirely speculative but are prefigured in the relevant social relations. For example, if schools are privately owned by entrepreneurs, control over schooling becomes necessarily dependent on the will of the entrepreneur, and, therefore, happiness at work would not necessarily be the normal state of affairs.

2.5.2 Brighouse’s concept of justice.

I now briefly consider Brighouse’s concept of justice, on which he bases two abstract principles: the principle of autonomy and the principle of educational equality. Brighouse claims that these principles are similar to Rawls’ principles of liberty and equal opportunity (Brighouse, 2002, pp. 2, 7). As was noted in Section 2.5.2, for Brighouse, autonomy-facilitating schooling includes equipping the individual with the ability to analyze social situations rationally (Brighouse, 2000, p. 67). Both Brighouse and Rawls argue that governments need to ensure that “basic freedoms” exist if individuals are to have the opportunity to live well (Brighouse, 1996, p. 158; 2000, p. 162).

Brighouse’s principle of educational equality is akin to Rawls’ principle of equal opportunity. For Brighouse, the argument for the principle of equal educational opportunity is based on two strands in the purpose of schooling. These are, firstly, the instrumental strand, that is, that schooling gives competitive advantages in the job market; and, secondly, the intrinsic strand, that is, that
education guarantees opportunities and resources to all pupils to fulfil life experiences regardless of their instrumental advantage (Brighouse, 2000, p. 116).

In policy terms, the principle of educational opportunity translates into two broad principles for Brighouse. These are, firstly, that “children of different classes but the same level of natural talent should receive roughly equal educational resources”. The second principle is that “more must be spent on the schooling of disabled students than on ordinary-able students, with the rider that significant resources must be spent on all” (Brighouse, 2000, p. 138). Brighouse concludes that mechanisms for choice have to be institutionalized in order to give assurance of justice (Brighouse, 2000, p. 162).

2.5.3 Brighouse’s definition of a choice-based mechanism for schools.

Brighouse is primarily concerned with a theory of justice which promotes choice, and argues that a market in school provision would likely enable parents to exercise such choice. Brighouse argues that the quality of schooling can be positively influenced in two main ways. These are, firstly, through the capacity of parents to withdraw a pupil from a particular school (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 56-7); and, secondly, by demands being made through the democratic channels making up the “infrastructure” of schooling (Brighouse, 2000, p. 55). For Brighouse, these quality issues would include government regulation on staffing levels, the physical condition of schools, the curriculum (including the provisions of autonomy-facilitating schooling), admissions (especially the use of a lottery: Brighouse, 2006, p. 91) and the publication of value-added tables, including the ratios of administration expenditure to classroom expenditure and to profit (Brighouse, 2000, p. 186). Brighouse argues that the publication of value-added tables could result in the indirect control by parents of the conditions of schooling, by informing their choice.
of school (Brighouse, 2000, p. 55). Brighouse also believes that choice will "have the advantage of improving schools because less well-informed parents will identify and mimic (sic) the decisions of better informed parents" (Brighouse, 2000, p. 33).

Brighouse's model of a choice-based mechanism is derived from some of the features found in the model of Bowles and Gintis (Brighouse, 2000, p. 182). However, as is noted in Section 4.9, Brighouse rejects the Marxist ontology on which Bowles and Gintis base their model.

Within the Bowles and Gintis model, Brighouse is particularly impressed with seven features. The first feature is that parents/guardians may choose the school that their children attend. The second feature is that schools may be established by private, or by for-profit or not-for-profit firms, or by public institutions or associations of teachers, or by local community groups. Therefore, it can be seen that Brighouse is not adverse to a market in school provision. Interestingly, Brighouse supports Bowles' and Gintis' argument that the "profit-motive provides a mechanism where failing schools can exit the market of their own accord" (Brighouse, 2000, p. 188). The third feature of Bowles and Gintis model which Brighouse supports is that the participating schools should be publicly funded, the per-pupil amount of public subsidy being set according to the educational needs of pupils and the price level and competitiveness of the local market (Brighouse, 2000, p. 184). In the model of Bowles and Gintis, schools are prevented from charging 'top-up' fees, in order to ensure that they do not price themselves out of the reach of poorer parents and "thus become exclusive private schools for middle and

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Brighouse notes that the Bowles/Gintis model is designed for a market in education in the United States (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 183, 187). In his later works he acknowledges that, in some cases, this model results in educational policies that are inappropriate for the UK (Brighouse, 2002[a], pp. 24-25).
upper class children receiving a government subsidy” (Brighouse, 2000, p. 184).
(See Appendix A3 for empirical data to support the assertion that schools which charge ‘top-up’ fees would price themselves out of the reach of poorer parents).
The fourth feature of the Bowles and Gintis model which Brighouse favours is that each school should be required to achieve heterogeneity in the school population. In order to achieve this Brighouse recommends both the use of a lottery (Brighouse, 2006, p. 91) and of an integrated housing policy, to prevent post-code advantages (Brighouse, 2000, p. 205). Brighouse maintains that this housing policy would attempt to integrate neighbourhoods by class and race, by placing mandates on new developments and designing appropriate subsidies and incentives for existing neighbourhoods to develop housing that is accessible to these groups. In this way, Brighouse hopes to open access to schools for disadvantaged pupils and to remove the effects of the so-called post-code lottery.

The fifth feature of Bowles’ and Gintis’ model which Brighouse favours is the recommendation that public regulation should govern staffing levels, the condition of school buildings, curriculum levels and content, admissions, adequate funding and an adequate level of ‘autonomy-facilitating schooling’ (Brighouse, 2000, p. 186). Brighouse assumes that, if this is done, schools will spend the maximum possible on teaching children.

The sixth feature of the Bowles/Gintis model which Brighouse favours is the quantitative measures of the performance of participating schools made by government accredited independent bodies. This information would be disseminated to the public in a readily understandable form including retention rates, teacher accreditation levels and test scores, in addition to the ratio of expenditure on ‘bureaucracy’ to classroom teaching.
The seventh feature of the Bowles/Gintis model which Brighouse favours is the use of increased competition among schools to attract parents, together with a "national certification of competencies". This latter, he argues, would insulate the system from the influence of those individual schools emphasising teacher-graded work in order to inflate the grades of their pupils (Brighouse, 2000, p. 187). In this section I hope to have shown that the model of Bowles and Gintis, which Brighouse favours, has market relations within it and could support the marketization of school provision if the political will existed to enable such a possibility.

2.6 Comparison of the relations in the market model of Brighouse with the relations in the market model of Tooley.

In this section I explore an interesting article by Tooley entitled "Why Harry Brighouse is Nearly Right about Privatization," in which Tooley argues that Brighouse's work contains "the seeds of a defence of the privatization of schooling." Tooley argues that this is so because Brighouse both allows "for a considerable degree of choice" and favours "features relating to privatization", as defined by Tooley (Tooley, 2003, pp. 429, 445).

In his article, Tooley notes that Brighouse recognises as strengths the efficiency, diversity and the profit motive of markets. On the question of efficiency, Tooley quotes Brighouse as arguing:

Inefficiency is wasteful, and waste is bad, because it constitutes opportunity cost. If we could get exactly the same results under Plan A costing $100 as under Plan B costing $150, we are morally bound to choose plan A, since that will free up resources for expenditure on other socially valuable projects. If the same level of educational achievement as the status quo achieves could be achieved at half the cost under some set of reforms, thus freeing up resources for (other) expenditure....then these reforms should be pursued (Tooley, 2003, p. 441, mainly quoting Brighouse, 2000, p. 31).

Tooley also notes that Brighouse argues in favour of diversity in a manner which
shadows the argument that competition promotes innovation (Tooley, 2003, pp. 442-3, quoting Brighouse, 2000, p. 31).

Tooley notes that these arguments "seem to contain the kernel" of his 2000 proposal outlined in *Reclaiming Education* (Tooley, 2003, p. 440), and correctly notes that Brighouse's model has three main features which would lead in the direction of privatization. Firstly, Brighouse's model would increase the number of pupils' funded places outside the state sector (Tooley, 2003, p. 429). Secondly, Brighouse's model would increase the amount of private funding within schooling and, thirdly, Tooley notes that Brighouse refers favourably to choice-mechanisms in the USA which involve schools that are privately provided and have a reduced regulatory "burden," and so "have the features of privatization" (Tooley, 2003, p. 429). As a consequence, Tooley concludes that "Brighouse seems close to recognising the virtues of privatisation and the private alternative, even while ostensibly preparing a critique of educational choice......" (Tooley, 2003, p. 440).

Brighouse answered Tooley's arguments in his article "What's Wrong With Privatising Schools?" (Brighouse, 2004 [a]). Brighouse stated that, while he was not going to argue that full privatization is never wrong (Brighouse, 2004 [a], p. 618), his objections to full privatization of school provision come from his concept of social justice.

Brighouse's concept of social justice has been outlined in Section 2.5.2 of this chapter. Brighouse argues that the conditions (he does not mention social relations) needed for an adequate education cannot be guaranteed unless the state "is the ultimate guarantor of justice" (Brighouse, 2004[a], p. 618).

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5 Full privatization is defined by Brighouse as complete withdrawal of the state from any role in funding, regulation or provision of education (Brighouse, 2004 [a], p. 617).
Brighouse aspires to a regulated market in schools but recognises certain problems with effective regulation are present in capitalist society (Brighouse, 2004[b], p. 19). Brighouse concludes that he could not agree with full privatization because this type of privatization would not allow for a sufficient amount of government regulation so as to ensure a good quality form of schooling (Brighouse, 2004[a], p. 630).

2.7 Inability of a regulated market to ensure quality provision.

Next I intend to show that private education businesses do not necessarily provide a better service than the public sector, even if they are regulated. For example, in Southwark, a contract with the engineering firm W. S. Atkins was terminated two years early because a majority of headteachers were unhappy with the firm’s performance and had refused to publicly support the firm’s actions. In March 2003 Atkins announced it was terminating its contract with Southwark but did not have to pay termination costs because the contract was ‘weighted in its favour’. Rather than place Southwark’s school management under government control, New Labour contracted it to another firm – Cambridge Education Associates (CEA), a subsidiary of Mott MacDonald, an engineering firm. However, CEA had a questionable track-record. In the same year, 2000, when Islington schools were taken over by CEA, the latter was fined by Islington council for failing to meet targets in five areas including failure to set up a complaints procedure, identifying systems to support schools in special measures and monitoring school budgets (Patfield, 2000). In addition, the Ofsted report of 25 March 2001 stated that the CEA’s targets in English were nine per cent lower than those set by the education authority in primary schools and five per cent below those set by the

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6 Tooley would agree to light regulation if it is needed to enable markets to operate smoothly. However, he would not agree to the specific form of regulation which Brighouse is arguing for (Tooley, 2000, p.
authority for GCSEs ( *Inspection of Islington Local Education Authority*, Ofsted, 2001, paragraph 76). In 2003 Islington CEA had to forgo £518,645 of its annual management fee because of the lack of progress in primary schools and for failing to improve the percentage of pupils gaining five or more good GCSE’s. Islington CEA missed seven out of eleven strategic targets and fell short of five out of twenty nine operational targets (Smithers, 2003, p. 5).

A similar trend was to be found in Bradford where Serco, another engineering firm, failed to meet its targets. In 2003 Serco was allowed to re-negotiate its targets downwards rather than be fined. A similar situation occurred in 2000 when New Labour was trying to establish EAZs (Section 1.3). I therefore contend that government regulation does not necessarily ensure that schooling is of a good quality, and cannot necessarily enable Brighouse’s concept of justice. Next I consider the oppositional principles which John McMurtry argues are necessarily present between markets and education, regardless of whether or not the market is regulated.

2.8 Oppositional principles and relations within a market system.

In his article “Education and the Market Model” (1991), John McMurtry indicates why the aims of markets and education contain oppositional principles. Firstly, McMurtry points out that “the goal of commercial agents in the market place is to maximise private money profits” while “the over-riding goal of educational agents in schools is to advance and disseminate shared knowledge” (McMurtry, 1991, p. 211). Secondly, McMurtry maintains that “the determining motivation of the market is to satisfy the wants of whoever has money to purchase the goods that are wanted” while “the determining motivation of education is to develop a sound
understanding”, that is, regardless of one’s purchasing ability (McMurtry, 1991, p. 212). Thirdly, McMurtry shows that there are differences between the methods employed in the market and education:

The market by definition can only satisfy the motivations of those who have the money to buy the products it sells. The place of education, on the other hand, remains a place of education only in so far as it educates those whose motivation is to learn, independent of the money-demand they exercise in their learning (McMurtry, 1991, p. 212, GT's italics).

Fourthly, McMurtry notes that there are opposing standards of excellence and achievement in the market and in education:

The measures of excellence in the market are: 1) how well a product-line is made to sell; and (2) how problem-free the product is and remains for its buyers. The measures of excellence in education are (i) how disinterested and impartial its representations are; and (ii) how deep and broad the problems it poses are to the one who has it (McMurtry, 1991, p. 213).

Everything available in the market is acquired by being able to exercise effective demand, that is, to be able to pay for it. In markets for schooling only the means to achieve schooling can be bought. The ability to pay for schooling does not mean that education will necessarily take place. Education requires the active participation on the part of the student; the development of one’s powers and capacities cannot come about through someone else’s activity so, therefore, cannot be purchased as a commodity.

McMurtry, correctly, in my view, concludes that these oppositional principles undermine the aims of education, arguing:

....the demand that the one [education] operate in terms of the other’s [the market’s] opposed requirements, as has been increasingly demanded of the educational process, implies the negation of education as such (McMurtry, 1991, p. 216).

McMurtry’s discussion of the oppositional principles found in a market in
‘education’ gives a further illustration of why market regulation alone cannot ensure quality of education. However, it is important to note that McMurtry’s argument in his article “Education and the Market Model” (1991) rests on logical principles and external relations and, as such, gives only an abstract analysis of the social relations between markets and education. Consequentially, it does not adequately examine the social processes involved in marketization.

I maintain that it is as a result of an ontology based mainly on external relations that Brighouse argues, in School Choice and Social Justice (2000), that commodification is not objectionable (Brighouse, 2000, p. 48). Ignoring ontological interrelations, Brighouse takes an ethical position arguing that it is not wrong to buy or sell schooling. In doing so, he makes reference to two types of market: firstly, the market in school provision and, secondly, the market in labour power (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 49-50). Referring to teaching as a job, he argues that, as a matter of justice, teaching is a job which should be paid for in monetary terms so that society can obtain good teachers. There is, of course, ‘a sleight of hand’ in this argument: what Brighouse is arguing for here is the need for the commodification of labour in a society where labour power is only supplied as a result of monetary payment. It is a kind of tautology: teaching is a commodity in a system where teaching is a commodity.

I argue that commodification is more than choice: it is the exchange of a good or service for exchange value, rather than the organization of production for human need. It is giving access to schooling only in exchange for exchange value, and is the necessary result of marketization. Likewise, in the case of labour power, the value of the teacher’s labour predominantly is reduced to exchange value (for which the owner of the school pays) and not to the human use, which it addresses.
in enriching the lives of pupils. (This process, with the consequential estrangement of pupils, is described in more detail in Chapter Five).

Despite his stance on markets, in his article “Channel One, the Anti-Commercial Principle and the Discontinuous Ethos” (Brighouse, 2005) Brighouse voices some concerns about the market in commodities concerned with the provision of information, namely, television programmes and text books. Brighouse argues that the commercialization involved undermines the school’s capacity to deliver its mission, since commercial interests control what information pupils do have and how it is presented (Brighouse, 2005, p. 542). Brighouse particularly cites the use of the television programme Channel One in schools in America. The firm Primedia freely installed televisions and videos without charge in schools, in return for the schools’ ensuring that pupils watched a daily 12-minute Channel One news broadcast which was accompanied by advertisements for ‘teen products’. The question has to be asked: how could Brighouse believe that such commercialization could be prevented within a political and economic system that supports the marketization of schools and schooling?

In conclusion: In this chapter I have considered two different market models in school provision and schooling, one regulated and one unregulated. I have supported the argument of Tooley that the regulated model of Brighouse has ‘the seeds of privatization in it;’ and in addition shown that, although Brighouse’s model of a regulated market would modify some of the worst excesses of the market, it does not necessarily ensure a good quality of schooling for all or necessarily prevent the oppositional relations which can distort the educational processes between the human needs of pupils and the needs of others who control schools.

In this chapter I contend that Brighouse’s conclusion is wrong where he says
that the results of social changes are merely speculative, and that Brighouse draws this conclusion because his ontology is based on external relations, which are contingent and arbitrary. I contend that Brighouse fails to appreciate that, when the internal relations in an entity change, that entity's appearance and/or function necessarily changes, and that the results of changes in relations are not speculative but prefigurative of future social relations. I maintain that, consequently, Brighouse fails to appreciate that when market reforms are introduced into schools and schooling the function of the school necessarily changes. I maintain that, under these circumstances, even a regulated market will not necessarily prefigure the conditions and relations which enable the possibility of an education mainly addressing the human needs of pupils which, in Brighouse’s terms, should be an “autonomy-facilitating” education.

An explanation of how the marketization necessarily results in alienating relations is given in Chapter Four, together with a discussion of why some liberal philosophers of education, such as Brighouse, have omitted to recognised the oppositional influence which alienating relations necessarily have on the process of education including the way in which marketization of schooling reduces the possibility of leading a life that is endorsed from “the inside”, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to our lives (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37, 69).

The next part of this thesis charts how alienating relations increased as a result of the development of market relations in England from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, and considers the main ideological responses to these changes. The next chapter also analyzes how these changes, and their major ideological interpretations, have influenced Marx’s analysis of alienation.
Part Two: The ideological context of the problem

Chapter Three
The historical and philosophical roots of market relations and alienation.

Introduction

This chapter explores the ideological context within which the development of the labour market took place, and gives a brief description of the main philosophical ideas and social relations, antecedent to Marx, which both influence him and against which he reacts. In particular, this chapter explores the influence of the ideas of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Georg Friederich Hegel (1770-1831) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872).

This chapter begins by considering the historical roots of the market and of the ideological support that Hobbes' concept of abstract and possessive individualism gives to the development of markets in the seventeenth century. This chapter then shows the similarity between the abstract ontology of Hobbes and the ontology used by some modern philosophers both from libertarian positions and also from the so-called 'left of centre.' This chapter also explores Smith's description of alienation and shows why this description is a springboard for the analysis of the roots of alienation which Marx gives in his early writings (R. Lamb, 1973, p. 285). Finally, this chapter considers how Hegel and Feuerbach both support a concept of alienation which influences Marx, and against which he also reacts.
3.1 The historical roots of markets and their alienating relations.

After the English Civil War, the main users of markets in consumer and capital goods were merchants and landowners. When Thomas Hobbes refers to individuals he is referring almost exclusively to merchants and “people of property”, so not to all individuals (Macpherson, 1962, p. 64). Not surprisingly, working people and their communities were not included by Hobbes in his market model or in his theory of the social contract. (Indeed it was not until the late eighteenth century that working people were included in market models as consumers.)

Hobbes’ ideas must be seen in their historical context of the abolition of feudalism de jure in England and its gradual de facto abolition as a result of industrialization. Prior to industrialization the majority of working people lived in rural communities. Most people were too poor to afford consumer goods and obtained the goods and services they needed from their communities. Within these communities social individuals often depended for their survival on a mass of social connexions. Although the bulk of production and appropriation was carried out individually, local bonds of solidarity were re-inforced through the use of communal land, the sharing of produce and through social traditions about ownership of land.

Because transport was expensive, the vast majority of working people stayed in their localities all their lives and rarely went further than neighbouring villages: as a consequence, there was hardly any change in the social relations in these communities. Most of these had relatively static feudal structures in which individuals were defined as particular members of the community according to their objective relations with the conditions of production which in the case of these communities was, of course, land.
Marx analyzed feudal communities, and noted that the serf (still legal in England in early Tudor times) was merely regarded as being one of the natural, "objective conditions of production" (Marx, 1973[a], p. 500). In all these rural, pre-capitalist communities the productive activity of working people was divided between assigned functions, which social individuals then looked upon as 'natural':

natural presuppositions, natural conditions of the producer's existence just as his living body, even though he reproduces and develops it, is originally not posited by himself, but appears as the presupposition of his self (Marx, 1973[a], pp. 489-90, original italics).

Marx also notes that, although the serf is estranged from his productive activity, he does not "alienate" (sell) his labour to an employer and therefore his estrangement is not a result of alienation (when alienation is defined as verausserung [selling]). Interestingly, Marx notes that these conditions and relations are similar to those which occur in the case of slavery. In the case of the slave there is a form of estrangement, and, like the serf, the slave's estrangement does not arise from alienating (selling his labour) to his over-lord. The slave cannot sell (alienate) his labour-power because his owner has the right, within a slave society, to dispose of the slave as he wishes. Although the slave is a commodity, which can be bought and sold, the slave can not sell (alienate) his labour-power (Marx, 1967, p. 21) because the slave, together with his labour-power, is sold totally to his owner.

By the mid-seventeenth century (in Hobbes's time) the growth of the enclosure movement in England resulted in many agricultural workers being deposed from 'their' land. As a consequence many working people were forced to sell their labour-power and, as a consequence, a market in labour-power began to develop. C. B. Macpherson in his
book The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962) notes that, by the mid-seventeenth century, "very nearly half the men were full-time wage-earners; if the cottagers are counted as part-time wage-earners the proportion is over two-thirds" (Macpherson, 1962, p. 61)\(^1\).

The resulting increase in individual appropriation and the possibility to create surplus value, which could be traded, resulted in the growth of markets and in social individuals confronting each other as competitors. By the mid-seventeenth century many merchants, landowners, artisans and market traders had become increasingly influenced by the ideology that each property owner was "so much a master of whatsoever he possessed, that it could not be taken from him upon any pretence of common safety without his consent" (Hobbes, Behemoth, written 1668, [ed.] Tonnies, 1990, p. 2). C. B. Macpherson calls this concept "possessive individualism" and describes its consequences in the following way:

> the relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual (C. B. Macpherson, 1962, p. 3).

This market activity supported the material functionality of competitiveness and acquisitiveness: precisely those dispositions which Hobbes, from his materialist point of view, mistakenly argues to be natural to the identity of the individual rather than being the result of human activity within structural relations. The interrelationship between objective structures and the acquisition of dispositions is discussed in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 9.4.2.

\(^1\)Macpherson seeks support for this from J. H. Clapham's *A Concise Economic History of Britain: from the Earliest Times to 1750* (Clapham, 1949, pp. 212-3).
By the mid-eighteenth century, the increased enclosure of land had forced more workers to sell their labour directly to employers and to migrate to the towns in search of the means to make a living. As a consequence of this movement of population, there was an increase in demand for food by urban populations, which encouraged many land owners, in order to increase supply, to experiment with new farming techniques and new forms of agricultural organization. As a result of these new farming techniques, an increasing number of landowners converted strips of common land into larger private holdings.

Before 1780, many rural workers and their families engaged in the production of cloth from home in order to supplement their income. E. P. Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class (1968) gives a graphic description of the family life of weavers at the time:

The young children winding bobbins, older children watching for faults, picking over the cloth, or helping to throw the shuttle in the broad-loom; adolescents working a second or third loom; the wife taking a turn at weaving in and among her domestic employments (Thompson, 1968, p. 339).

In his book, Thompson notes that there were three main kinds of “weaver-employer relationships” at this time. Thompson firstly considers the “…customer-weaver” who lived in independent status in a village or small town, much like a master-tailor, making up orders for customers” (Thompson, 1968, p. 298, GT’s italics). Thompson describes this weaver as having “the status of superior artisan, self-employed, and working by the piece for a choice of masters” (Thompson, 1968, p. 299). The skill involved in this work together with the means of production would have often been handed down through families, together with the means of production. This weaver would
have been able to afford to renew and modernise the means of production, through the income he could command as a master craftsman. Moreover as a proprietor of land he could provide himself and his family with food and as a skilled weaver he could make the clothes his family needed. As a consequence labour could still be “half-artistic, half end-in-itself.” Although this might seem to be a very idyllic life-style, such social individuals would not be able to fully exercise choice because they would be subordinated to prescriptive definitions of their activities. Consequently, the development of their abilities would still be very narrow and they would not be able to become fully developed social individuals (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497).

Thompson’s second category of weaver is the “journeyman weaver.” The “journeyman weaver” worked either in the shop of the master-clothier, or “more commonly,” in his own home. Thompson illustrates the nature of this work as follows:

On the credit side, the journeyman considered himself to be a ‘clothier’ rather than a mere weaver; his work was varied, much of it in the loom, but some of it out and about; he had some hope of obtaining credit to buy wool and of becoming a small master on his own account. If he worked in his own home, rather than the master’s workshop, he was subject to no work-discipline except that of his own making (E.P. Thompson, 1968, p. 302).

The “journeyman weaver” owned his own loom and worked for a single master who was usually a miller or a ‘putter-out.’ This category of weaver had less control over the conditions of his productive activity than the first category of weaver because he worked directly for an employer. As a consequence of this relationship, this category of weaver had to provide the type and amount of cloth that the master required and produce the finished product within a certain time-span. As with the “customer–weaver,” this work would have appeared alien and hostile to the weaver to
the degree to which he lost control over his activity.

Finally, Thompson lists the “small-holder weaver,” who produced cloth part-time because of the need to subsidise his main income from farming. The small-holder weavers had a fairly varied week. As with the journeyman-weaver, all these activities were done by the small-holder weaver because he had to make a living. As a consequence he would have been constrained from taking part in activities he would have otherwise preferred. This small-holder weaver might have found his work meaningful but this would be have been a contingent, rather than necessary, result of the social relations and conditions within which he worked.

Increased mechanisation of weaving took place after 1730, when John Kay invented ‘the flying shuttle’. The flying shuttle enabled one person to handle a wider loom and therefore to increase productivity, enabling cotton to be provided more cheaply. However, cotton production continued to take place mainly in workers’ homes until the 1780’s when the power loom was invented. The power loom was essentially a factory machine; it was too large to fit into people’s homes and was too expensive for the average person to buy. As a consequence, more weavers and spinners had to work directly for employers in workshops or factories (Smith, 1976, Bk. I, p. 74). Marx notes that, in many cases, weaving workshops had as many as 200 workers.

As a result of working directly for an employer, weavers lost substantial control over the conditions of their productive activity and as a result the alienating relations involved in their work increased. Unlike R. Blauner (Blauner, 1964), I am not contending that the root of estrangement lies intrinsically in the mechanisation of

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work, but rather in the lack of control that the worker has over the conditions of his productive activity as a result of the need to sell (or alienate) labour-power. Chapter Four gives a Marxian explanation of these alienating relations and Chapter Five argues that the structural relations and the causes of alienation are the same today as in Marx's time, although the content of these relations is different.

The following sections of the present chapter consider the ideological context which gives support to the historical development of market relations outlined in this section. This exploration begins with the seventeenth century and the Hobbesian concept of abstract and "possessive individualism". This concept, supported by the market relations which were developing in the seventeenth century, was a dominant concept when Marx was writing his "Manuscripts" (Section 4.4.1).

3.2 Thomas Hobbes' concept of abstract and "possessive individualism" and its consequences for alienating relations.

Hobbes is influenced by the materialist ideas of his time and bases his theory of human nature on psychological propositions. Hobbes defines a person as "he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man" (Hobbes, 1996, p. 106). For Hobbes, the self exists prior to, and is independent of, the ends, aims and values it holds and the social relations into which it enters. For Hobbes possession is a function of freedom and is "found in the conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities owing nothing to society for them" (Macpherson, 1962, p. 3).

Hobbes also includes, in his concept of human nature, the psychological assumption that individuals wish
to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life (Hobbes, 1996, p. 66, GT’s italics).

Hobbes’ concepts of both human nature and freedom result in a perception of individuals who relate to each other only as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they acquire by their exercise of these capacities. For Hobbes, the social relations between individuals are external and, as such, contingent. Consequently, in Hobbes’ model of society, individuals are not perceived as an integral part of a larger social whole, and the range of possible social relations and activity open to individuals is not prefigured by existing social relations.

As a result of his experiences of the Civil War, Hobbes infers that, in particular, the fear of scarcity gives rise to competition for “riches, honour, command, or other power”, and this competition inclines “men” to “kill, subdue, supplant or repel the other” (Hobbes, 1966, p. 66). However, because of an ontology based on external, contingent relations, Hobbes fails to grasp how the necessary connections between private property relations, greed, exchange and competition, value and the devaluation of “man”, all necessarily result in estrangement and, possibly, war.

In Section 9.1 I argue that scarcity is not necessarily a permanent condition and so, within the objective structural relations which support the creation of abundance, the normal psychological state would not be that of supporting individual acquisition. I argue that this is because the structural relations supporting abundance would be sufficient to discourage individuals from hoarding goods and wealth. If, within the objective conditions which support the creation of abundance, social individuals do not
feel economically secure all the time, this would be because of contingent circumstances and not as a result of the objective structural relations in society.

Hobbes does not rely on religious ideas and structures to maintain social cohesion: instead he relies on a strong government to keep social order. Hobbes contends that such a government could be legitimised through a social contract:

when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution (Hobbes, 1996, p. 115).

Hobbes argues that once such an agreement is made and a Commonwealth or Monarchy is initiated, then an absolute contract is made, giving sovereignty to the Monarch (Hobbes, 1966, p. 115). It is non-absolute contracts, in which the worker sells his labour power, that are more relevant to the conditions of capitalism. In Hobbes' theory, the individual signs away his rights to control over the product which he makes and the conditions of his productive activity (Hobbes, 1996, p. 87). Within these social relations, the worker has little power over the conditions of his productive activity because he needs access to the means of production, which the capitalist owns, in order to be able to make a living. In Hobbes' model, allowing workers to have a say in conditions of work is still contingent upon the will of the employer. Therefore, although such contracts give workers some rights, they do not necessarily remove the alienating relations which give rise to estrangement. Hobbes argues that the alienating relations to which workers are subjected do not necessarily oppose the relations needed for the good life because he was writing only about the elite in society and such people were sufficiently wealthy to realize their preferences.
3.3 The concept of abstract individualism in some twentieth-century philosophers.

There are modern philosophers both from libertarian positions, and from the so-called ‘left of centre’, who also employ the abstract ontology supported by Hobbes. Their arguments, with specific reference to alienation, are outlined in Section 4.9. A familiar case from the libertarian position is that of Robert Nozick in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974). In this book Nozick argues that individuals give meaning to their lives only when each is able to make choices “on the basis of abstract principles or considerations it formulates to itself” (Nozick, 1974, p. 50). This contention is based on an abstract conception that the individual is a sovereign agent who rationally chooses his own ends and seeks to possess, rather than to discover, them (Nozick, 1974, pp. 49-51).

Nozick’s concept of meaningful activity is supported by two main moral conclusions. Firstly, Nozick says that individuals must be regarded as ends and not means and, as such, they may not be sacrificed for others’ ends without their own consent. Secondly, Nozick maintains that because “I am mine” I have the right to act in accordance with my own choices, unless these choices infringe the equal right of others to liberty. As a consequence, Nozick concludes that individuals should be able to choose alienated work if it is their preference. This argument is analyzed in Section 4.9.

Less obviously, I would argue that Brighouse’s arguments for markets in school provision (see Chapter Two) also rest on an ontology of abstract individualism (cf. Nozick, 1974, p. 48; Brighouse, 2000, p. 12). However, it is noted that the political conclusions of Nozick and Brighouse are different. The main political difference centres on the role of the state. Nozick argues that the only role of the state is to protect the rights needed to conserve liberty: liberty here being lack of interference by the state.
or other individuals. For Nozick, the main rights which protect liberty are:

1) Each individual, so long as he does not violate the same rights of others, has the right not to be killed or assaulted; and
2) Each individual has the right not to have his own property illegitimately taken, or the use of it limited (Nozick, 1974, p. 10).

Nozick contends that in a free society there can be "no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out" (Nozick, 1974, p. 235, original italics) — even if it has been decided democratically that this should be the case. Nozick contends that there is no role for a state in administering welfare services and education. Nozick notes that provision of these services would involve raising revenue through taxation, and maintains that this would violate the right to hold property because it would force some to help others and would, therefore, be a form of robbery. Instead, Nozick relies solely on a free market to allocate and distribute resources, believing that this would be the result of individuals making rational choices. Nozick favours this process in place of redistribution because he contends that, in allowing the exercise of negative liberty, the state does not violate individual rights.

Rational choice is also a fundamental dimension of Brighouse's concept of justice (see Section 2.5.2). However, Brighouse contends that:

from the point of view of justice it is not good enough that an individual's rights never happen to be violated: it is essential that we establish institutional forms which assure individuals that they can make and execute their life plans without fear of rights violation (Brighouse, 2000, p. 162, original italics).

As was noted in Section 2.6, for Brighouse it is the state that is the "guarantor of justice" (Brighouse, 2004[a], p. 618) using a regulated market, as described in
Section 2.5, to ensure that each individual has significant opportunities to “live a life which is good for them” (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37, 68-9). Section 2.7 points out the reasons why a regulated market cannot necessarily support the conditions and social relations needed to ensure that individuals can execute their life plans, and therefore why regulated markets cannot necessarily enable Brighouse’s concept of justice.

Section 4.9 argues that, within an ontology based on social relations such as that supported by Nozick and Brighouse, social relations are contingent and therefore cannot necessarily be prefigurative of specific social relations such as those necessary for the ‘good life’ in the model of Brighouse. In contrast, this thesis notes that, within an ontology based on internal relations the range of all possible developments is necessary, that is, each actual development has to have been inherent in the relevant social relations.

The next section explores the ontology of Adam Smith (who has been cited by both Hayek and Margaret Thatcher as being the father of classical economics). Unlike Hobbes, Smith supports an ontology in which the social whole is more than the mere sum of its parts, because the whole comprises social relations which are interrelated to each other. The prominence of Hayek (who also used an ontology based on an interrelated whole [see Section 2.3.1]) and of Smith in market theory indicates that political ideas which support the market do not have to be based on an abstract, rationalist, ontology such as that supported by both Nozick and Brighouse.

3.4 Adam Smith’s ontology of the social individual.

Smith’s ontology is an amalgam of the Stoic interpretation of natural law theory and of medieval Christian thought, and is similar to that adopted by the pre-
capitalist rural communities described in Section 3.1. Stoicism is based on an ontology in which the individual "is a part, but practically an insignificant part, of a whole" (W. Watt, 1904, p. 204; Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments* [first published in 1759], 1984, pp. 140, 275), the significant part of the whole being the Divine Being. Smith called the Divine Being "the Great Conductor and the Watchmaker" (Smith, 1984, pp. 87, 166, 236-7, 274) or at other times Divine Providence or the Great Designer.

For Smith, the Divine Being is an impersonal first cause and as such does not have *personal* contact with mankind. For Smith, this Deity mechanistically attempts to direct the affairs of men, including economic affairs, (Smith, 1984, pp. 235-6, 276-7, 289-290; Smith, 1976, Bk. IV, p. 477) in order to maximise happiness for individuals (Smith, 1984, pp. 235-6).

It has been convincingly argued that Smith regarded the Great Designer as the same 'invisible hand' which Smith argues influences the workings of the market (Raphael and Macfie, 1984, p. 8; A. Dennis, 2005, p. 2; Smith, 1984, p. 185; 1976, Bk. IV, p. 477). In this Deistic view, Smith relegates the structures made by "Man" to be of secondary importance to those informed by God:

> The administration of the great system of the universe, however, the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God not man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country... (Smith, 1984, p. 237).

In *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith refers to the "union of mankind" (Smith, 1984, p. 88) and maintains that it is composed of "connexions and dependencies of things" (Smith, 1984, pp. 227, 236, 275-6, 290, 293). As has been noted above, for
Smith, the organic link between the parts of the whole and the individuals is ultimately sustained by the activity of the Divine Being rather than solely through the activities and thoughts of social individuals within internal relations, as it is in Marx (Sections 2.3.2 and 4.2). As a consequence, the interrelationships in Smith’s model are more mechanistic and less volitional than those in Marx (see Section 4.2).

It is a relation with the Deity which is of primary importance for Smith, and not objective conditions and social relations. Smith emphasises the need to develop belief in God and his commandments, particularly the commandment to love one another (Smith, 1984, pp. 235-6) in order for society to flourish and be “happy”:

> It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature to that situation for which he was made. All the members of human society stand in need of each others [sic] assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy (Smith, 1984, p. 85).

For Smith, the role of science and rationality is mainly to discover the working of the Deity, or Providence, in nature and society; and to use this knowledge to inform the individual’s perceptions of right and wrong. For Smith, the first perceptions upon which the rules of society are founded are the individual’s sense and feeling:

> But reason cannot render any particular object either agreeable or disagreeable to the mind for its own sake. Reason may show that this object is the means of obtaining some other which is naturally either pleasing or displeasing and in this manner may render it either agreeable or disagreeable for the sake of something else, which is not rendered such by immediate sense and feeling (Smith, 1984, p. 320).

For Smith, individuals are social only to the extent that they are capable of “sympathy”, and “other generous and disinterested motives” (Smith, 1984, p. 86).

Smith defines sympathy as “the sharing of any feeling” (Smith, 1984, p. 13). For Smith,
when the faculty of sympathy is destroyed, individuals become isolated and estranged (Smith, 1984, p. 86).

Unlike Hobbes, Smith does not believe that all individuals are driven mainly by self-interest. As a result of being convinced of the ideas of Christianity and Stoicism, Smith concludes that individuals are essentially good (Smith, 1984, pp. 236, 315, 318) and that human nature is something susceptible to the influence of "that great, benevolent and all-wise-Being who directs all the movements of nature" (Smith, 1984, p. 235, GT's italics).

In *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith argues that the source of "misery and disorders of human life" comes from "over-rating the difference between one permanent situation and another" (Smith, 1984, p. 149). As examples of negative dispositions Smith cites avarice, which "over-rates the difference between poverty and riches"; ambition, which over-rates the difference "between a private and a public station"; and vain-glory, which over-rates the difference between "obscurity and extensive reputation" (Smith, 1984, p. 149). For Smith:

the wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interests ... should be sacrificed to the greater interest of the universe, to the interest of that great society of all sensible and intelligent beings, of which God himself is the immediate administrator and director (Smith, 1984, p. 235).

For Smith, the prudent individual "...is not a bustler in business where he has no concern; is not a meddler in other people's affairs; is not a professed counsellor or advisor, who obtrudes his advice where nobody is asking it" because "in the bottom of his heart he would prefer the undisturbed enjoyment of secure tranquillity" (Smith, 1984, pp. 215-6).
Although Smith notes that prudence is "regarded as a most respectable and even, in some degree, as an amiable and agreeable quality" it is not for him "either of the most enduring, or of the most ennobling of virtues" (Smith, 1984, p. 216). For Smith, the most ennobling virtue is universal benevolence. Smith argues that prudence should be combined with other virtues, and that benevolence is the most important virtue (Smith, 1984, pp. 235-7). This contention would seem to be contrary to the appeal to self-interest which Smith is believed to have made in Wealth of Nations. The next section shows that this apparent appeal to self-interest is not as fundamental to Smith's philosophy as is commonly assumed.


An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (usually known as The Wealth of Nations and first published in 1776) is a treatise written about market activity within a capitalist society. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith argues that capitalist activity is needed to produce what are regarded as the necessities for all walks of life:

Among civilised and thriving nations.......though a great number of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times more labour than the greater part of those who do work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessities and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire (Smith, Introduction, 1976, p. 2).

However, Smith notes that a market economy subsists from "a sense of utility, without any mutual love or affection"; and "no man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other" (Smith, 1984, p. 86, GT's italics). Smith notes that
self-interest is the dominant disposition within a market economy, and so he deduces that in a market economy it is "in vain" to expect help by appealing solely to benevolent dispositions, which he defines as pleasant feelings which come from the exercise of benevolence (Smith, Bk. I, 1976, p. 18).

Although Smith argues that the capitalist system is necessary to produce the wealth needed for the standard of living which most people find acceptable, he is contemptuous of the acquisition of wealth, which he calls "contemptible and trifling" (Smith, 1984, p. 183):

We naturally confound it [wealth] in our imagination with the order, the regular harmonious movement of the system, the machine or oeconomy [sic] by means of which it is produced. The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when considered in this complex view, strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow on it (Smith, 1984, p. 183, GT's italics).

Smith maintains that, within capitalism, one's imagination rarely regards wealth in the abstract and philosophical way which, he argues, is necessary in order to perceive its real nature. Smith notes that this "deception" is important to capitalism because it "roused and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind" (Smith, 1984, p. 183).

To recapitulate, for Smith, the ideal state for social individuals is the state of tranquillity (Smith, 1984, pp. 149, 216) which, Smith argues, is attained by living according to the commandments of God (Smith, 1984, p. 235).

On the basis of this assertion by Smith, I dispute two aspects of Tooley's argument found in his article "From Adam Swift to Adam Smith" (Tooley, 2007). Firstly, I dispute Tooley's contention that the social "propensities" which Smith regards as most desirable are those that "promote successful capitalist activity" (Tooley, 2007,
Although Smith acknowledges that the market activities inspiring utility, self-love and individual acquisition are functional to the provision of goods desired by the “majority in society” (Smith, 1976, Introduction, p. 2, Bk. I, p. 18; 1984, p. 187), he does not believe that such market activities support lasting happiness (Smith, 1984, p. 236). For Smith, lasting happiness can only come about as the result of activities motivated by the idea that:

all the inhabitants of the universe, the meanest as well as the greatest, are under the immediate care and protection of that great, benevolent, and all-wise Being, who directs all the movements of nature” (Smith, 1984, p. 235).

For Smith, this relation between God and “man” necessarily occurs because God’s nature is “determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain in it, at all times the greatest possible quantity of happiness” (Smith, 1984, p. 236, GT’s italics).

Therefore I contend that Tooley is incorrect to equate the observations which Smith made in *Wealth of Nations* with Smith’s moral preferences. I note that Smith acknowledges that activities supported by utility, self-love and individual acquisition are those functional to the provision of abundance. However, I contend that Smith does not believe that these virtues necessarily support activities which are informed by the highest form of morality (Smith, 1984, p. 235).

Secondly, I maintain that, contrary to the argument of Tooley in his article “From Adam Swift to Adam Smith” (Tooley, 2007, p. 736), Smith acknowledges the negative influence of alienating relations, and, in particular, argues for the need to change the “understandings” brought about through alienating productive activity. Smith argues that education is necessary to develop the “understandings” of those
whose work is confined to a few simple operations because:

The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part of rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of everyday life (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, pp. 302-3).

Smith argues that society cannot rely on working people to provide education for their children because such parents have to send their children to work in order to ensure that the family has sufficient sustenance. Therefore, Smith argues that, in order to ensure social cohesion, the public needs to facilitate education for the children of such families:

but though the common-people cannot, in any civilised society, be so well instructed as people of some rank and fortune, the most essential parts of education, however, to read, write and account, can be acquired at so early a period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those occupations. For a very small expence [sic] the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, p. 305).

The next section explores Robert Lamb’s article “Adam Smith’s Concept of Alienation” (R. Lamb, 1973), in which Lamb argues that Smith’s description of alienation is “an important predecessor to Karl Marx’s concept of alienation” (R. Lamb, 1973, p. 275).
3.6 The influence of Smith's description of alienation on Marx's earlier writings.

In his article "Adam Smith's Concept of Alienation" (R. Lamb, 1973), Lamb notes that many of Smith's descriptions of labour as productive activity, and, also, Smith's "more general analysis of the wage-labour relation to capital owners" are used in Marx's concept of alienation, particularly as found in "Manuscripts" (Lamb, 1973, p. 85), and especially passages relating to "Wages of Labour" (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 282-295) and "Estranged Labour" (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 322-334). Lamb particularly notes that Smith describes alienation in terms of "isolation", "estrangement" and "powerlessness," which are also similar to some of the terms used by Marx. Moreover, Lamb points out that, in Smith's system, "isolation", "estrangement" and "powerlessness" are interconnected (Lamb, 1973, p. 281). To briefly recall, it has been noted in Sections 2.3.1 and 3.5 that Smith's ontology is more mechanistic and less volitional than that of Marx (Lamb, 1973, pp. 281-2) and that the dynamic nature of Marx's ontology is outlined in Section 4.2.

Lamb notes that Smith's concept of estrangement stems from his observations of pin-makers, weavers, metal, chemical and munitions workers. Lamb notes that, for Smith, estrangement is engendered through the division of labour:

In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments (Smith, 1976, p. 302, GT's italics).

Smith also notes that workers are powerless in their disputes with employers, and have

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3 Referred to as "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" by the Soviet writers of the early 1930's, also sometimes referred to as "1844 Manuscripts" or "Paris Manuscripts".
no control over determining the numbers of pieces in piece-work, the speed of their work, or the form of payment (Smith, 1976, Bk. I, pp. 74-6). Smith’s description of the worker as a commodity is more or less summed up in “Manuscripts” when Marx writes:

From political economy itself, using its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and moreover the most wretched commodity of all; that the misery of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and volume of his production; that the necessary consequence of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands (Marx, 1975[f], p. 322, GT’s italics).

Like Smith, Marx also notes that:

The division of labour is the economic expression of the social nature of labour within estrangement. Or rather, since labour is only an expression of human activity within alienation, an expression of life as alienation of life, the division of labour is nothing more than estranged, alienated positing of human activity as real species-activity or as activity of man as a species-being (Marx, 1975[f], p. 369, original italics).

Like Smith, Marx concludes that:

This relationship is the relationship of the worker to his own activity as something which is alien and does not belong to him, activity as passivity, (Leiden), power as impotence, procreation as emasculation, the worker’s own physical and mental energy, his personal life — for what is life but activity? — as an activity directed against himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him (Marx, 1975[f], p. 327, original italics).

For Smith, estrangement does not necessarily arise because of the objective structural relations of capitalism, but as the natural consequence of separating work into simple operations. For Smith, it is as a result of work which mainly consists of “performing a few simple operations” that individuals degrade their physical, moral and intellectual faculties together with the ability to feel “generous, noble or tender sentiment[s]” (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, p. 308), and so become “in a still more essential part of the character of human nature mutilated and deformed” (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, p.
Moreover, Smith notes that the dispositions that are engendered as a result of alienating activity break the bonds keeping a "happy and agreeable" society together and lead to individuals becoming isolated from one another (Smith, 1984, pp. 85-6).

To recall, it is noted in this section that Smith conceives estrangement to be the effect of division of labour on the ability of individuals to understand or comprehend social relations and cultural bonds. Smith argues that as a consequence, the individual's ability to sympathise or communicate with others is stifled, and he becomes estranged. Smith merely describes this process within the division of labour but does not explain how this occurs. The first systematic explanation of how this estrangement occurs within the market relations of capitalism was developed by Marx, and is discussed in Chapter Four. The development of Marx's concept of estrangement was significantly influenced by G. W. F. Hegel, and the next section briefly considers Hegel's ideas and shows which of these ideas Marx adopts and which he reacts against.

3.7.1 Objectification in Hegel's philosophy.

As with Adam Smith, Hegel has a concept of society as an organic whole, the latter being a partial aspect of an impersonal Deity. For Hegel, this Deity is conceived of as Truth in the form of Rationality:

The objects of philosophy ..... are....the same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and only God is the Truth (Hegel, 1975, p. 3).

For Hegel, history takes the form of an abstract and logical process which brings about the reconciliation of self-conscious reason with actuality as found in the Absolute or Rationality (Hegel, 1975, p. 128). In Phenomenology of Mind first
published in 1807 (Hegel, 1967), Hegel describes this process of reconciliation as entfremdung, defined as occurring when the “the natural self” becomes strange and alien to itself, resulting in a feeling of dissatisfaction.

For Hegel, entfremdung always occurs during the process of objectification. The process of objectification occurs when individuals give material form to their own powers and intentions, but are constrained as a result of doing so. Hegel argues that individuals are constrained during objectification when they accommodate themselves (entausserung) to the properties of nature, or to other persons participating in practices and institutions inherited from the past.

Hegel argues that individuals must pass from what he calls the realm of immediate experience to one in which, through the negation of existing appearances, individuals as the subject of history recognize themselves as able to mediate:

For mediating is nothing but self-identity working itself out through an active self-directed process; or in other words, it is reflection into the self, the aspect in which ego is for-itself, objective to itself. It is pure negativity or reduced to its utmost abstraction, the process of bare and simple becoming (Hegel, 1967, p. 82).

For Hegel, something can only become fully known after its opposite has been recognized. Therefore, for Hegel, in order to determine the essential relations between and within forms, all development hinges on alienation and the ability to become the opposite of what appears.

Marx praises Hegel for his understanding of self-estrangement as part of the process of objectification:

Hegel grasps man’s self-estrangement, alienation of being, loss of objectivity and loss of reality as self-discovery, expression of being, objectification and realization (Marx, 1975[f], p. 395).
In particular, Marx supports the significance which Hegel gives to labour:

man’s act of self-creation and man’s relation to himself as an alien being and the manifestation of himself as an alien being as the emergence of species-consciousness and species-life (Marx, 1975[f], p. 395, original italics).

However, there are fundamental differences between the concept of self-creation and objectification in the writings of Marx and Hegel. In the "Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy," Marx also produces two main criticisms of Hegel. Firstly, Marx criticises Hegel for defining human nature only "as abstract thinking being, as self-consciousness" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 396, original italics).

For Marx, "man" reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and actually so he can contemplate himself in a world he has created (Marx, 1975[f], p. 329). Secondly, Marx criticises Hegel for a formal and abstract concept of the process of "man’s" act of self-creation and objectification (Marx, 1975[f], p. 396).

In his introduction to Marx Early Writings Lucio Colletti notes:

The realm of empirical truth is transformed into an internal moment of the Idea. Hence, the particular, finite object is not taken to be what it is, but considered in and as its opposite (the universal, thought): it is taken to be what it is not (Lucio Colletti, Early Writings, Marx, 1975, p. 19, original italics).

In other words, for Marx, Hegel argues that all experiences of consciousness have no validity of their own because their validity lies with the Absolute.

3.7.2 Hegel’s “On Love”.

For Hegel, "love" is a positive consequence of re-experiencing the primordial

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4 The concept species-life and species-consciousness were, of course, initially formulated by Ludwig Feuerbach (see Section 3.8).
existence of unity. For Hegel, this experience results in finding what is right in oneself, and the ability to transcend negative separations. In “On Love”, written in 1798 and re-published in *Early Theological Writings* (Hegel, 1948), Hegel discusses love (a concept which also appears in Marx’s “Manuscripts”) and shows that “love” is the opposite of estrangement. Hegel describes love as a genuine living bond, a true unity of opposites which results in commitment to the Other (see the Introduction to “On Love” by Richard Kroner, in Hegel, 1948, p. 302). For Hegel, love results in the finding of what is right in oneself through the experience of a higher unity, and a transcendence of negative separations. Hegel argues that in this situation, because all oppositions are excluded, partners are not treated as objects by others, and neither individual is restricted by the other (Hegel, 1978, p. 304). This concept of love is based on the following ontology:

In fact, nothing is unconditioned; nothing carries the root of its own being in itself. [Subject and object, man and matter] each is only relatively necessary; the one exists only for the other, and hence exists in and for itself only on the strength of a power outside itself; the one shares in the other only through that power’s favour and grace (Hegel, 1948, p. 304, original brackets).

In “On Love” Hegel argues that the experience of love also results in harmony of thought, being, conscious existence, reason and emotion: all of which, he argues, can only be fully experienced when *entfremdung* (estrangement) is fully overcome. In “On Love,” Hegel contrasts this experience of unity with the alienated consciousness engendered as a result of private property relations because, the one who sees the other in possession of a property must sense in the other the separate individuality which has willed this possession. He [the individual - GT] cannot himself annul the exclusive dominion of the other, for this once again would be an opposition to the other’s power, since no relation to an object is possible except mastery over it; he would be
cancelling one of the other’s relationships, namely his exclusion of others from his property (Hegel, 1948, p. 308).

The concept of “love” is used by Marx towards the end of Marx’s Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy (written in 1844 simultaneously with “Manuscripts”). Briefly, in Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy, Marx states that one would only be confirmed in the love of another as a result of taking part in unalienated activity (Marx, 1975[e], p. 277). Marx maintains that a state of unalienated consciousness could not necessarily be achieved within capitalism (Marx, 1975[f], p. 386) because the conditions and social relations needed to support unalienated consciousness do not necessarily exist within capitalism. If such conditions and relations do exist they are contingent and might or might not exist. Therefore I support the contention of Marx, that “love” could only be generally exercised within the conditions and social relations within his “realm of freedom”, outlined in Chapter Nine of this thesis.

3.8 The influence of Ludwig Feuerbach’s concept of alienation on Marx.

Between 1841 and 1843 Marx became attracted by attempts to translate Hegelian metaphysics into a materialist form of humanism. In the 1844 “Manuscripts” Marx described Feuerbach as “the only person who has a serious and critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made real discoveries in this field. He is the true conqueror of the old philosophy” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 381).

Feuerbach set out to demonstrate how the content of the Hegelian absolute spirit could be derived from sensuous existence. As a result Feuerbach eliminates the Absolute, and rewrites Hegel in less metaphysical terms. Central to Feuerbach’s philosophy is the contention that all human beings are conscious of their species. Feuerbach calls this sense species-being. Feuerbach argues that, as a result of this
"sense," social individuals are able to relate to each other, and to the environment, in a manner appropriate to their species. Feuerbach calls this activity species-life. Feuerbach contends that species-life results in the full and conscious participation in collective fulfilment of the possibilities of the species, while simultaneously acknowledging the limitations of social individuals as part of the whole. Feuerbach argues that the essential difference between "man" and animals is that "man" is able to attain this self-consciousness of the nature of species-being, while animals merely respond to their environment and are not conscious of the nature of their species. For Feuerbach, this sense of species-being has the potential of coming to full realization only through living in an ethical community. Feuerbach contends that, in such a community, individuals would have the possibility of realizing the fulfilment of their human potentialities as a consequence of relations with others as species-beings. For Feuerbach, human existence as self, as subject, or as 'I', becomes objective in relation to another 'I'. It is important to note that Feuerbach is not arguing that the individual becomes "engulfed" in the species-being to which he belongs. Feuerbach recognises that individuals are conscious of other individuals who are both like and unlike themselves. Marx developed Feuerbach's concept of species-being by situating the development of species-life within objective social relations, which are both prefigurative and dynamic in nature (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2).

In conclusion: this chapter has explored the ideological context within which the development of the labour market has taken place, and has given a brief description of the main philosophical ideas and social relations, antecedent to Marx, which both influence him and against which he reacts. In particular, this chapter explored the
influence of the ideas of Hobbes, Smith, Hegel and Feuerbach on the development of Marx's thought with particular reference to the development of Marx's concept of alienation. This chapter noted that, although Marx took positive philosophical influences from Smith, Feuerbach and Hegel, most of his work on alienation is based on criticisms of these thinkers. It is the development of these criticisms into a new theory which is explored in more detail in Chapter Four.
Part Two

Chapter Four
Marx's theory of alienation applied to productive activity in private property relations.

Introduction

This chapter shows the way that Marx adapts the philosophical positions held by both Hegel and Feuerbach and, in so doing, creates a new theory of alienation that for the first time systematically considers the alienating relations of capitalist markets. Although this chapter emphasises the philosophical dimension of Marx's work prior to 1845, it does not ignore Marx's later work. In Section 4.6 I contend that there is a considerable degree of continuity between Marx's analysis of alienation in his earlier works and that found in his later works. Before one can fully understand Marx's theory of alienation, it is important to understand the ontology which informs this concept. Therefore this chapter begins by exploring Marx's concept of species-being.

4.1 Species-being: a theory of human nature.

As is noted in Section 3.8, the concept of species-being was initially formulated by Feuerbach and developed by Marx, using and developing Hegel's concept of labour. To briefly recall, Marx argues that Hegel recognised that objective man was the result of his own labour (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 385-6, 395), as more fully discussed in Section 3.7. In "Manuscripts" Marx defines species-being as "conscious life activity," arguing that it is within conscious life activities with others that social individuals refine their possible functions, abilities and faculties. Marx notes that it is by virtue of "man's" ability to consciously shape his environment that he shows himself to be different from animals (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 328-9). Like Feuerbach,
Marx defines those powers specific to “man’s” species-being as willing, consciousness (Marx, 1975[f], p. 328), thinking, awareness, wanting and loving (Marx, 1975[f], p. 353).

In “Manuscripts,” Marx notes that these powers are enabled by relations that are both natural and social. For Marx “man” is not only a natural being; he is a human natural being” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 391, original italics); that is, he realizes his species-powers in social relations with others:

The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with other men, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human existence and nature becomes man for him (Marx, 1975[f], p. 349, original italics).

By “natural”, Marx means the “real, sensuous objects as the object of [“man’s”] being and of his vital expression” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 390, original italics). In this section I support the argument that things contain, as part of what they are, relations with nature and other social beings (Ollman, 2003, p. 13). In the next section, I deal with the arguments put forward by G. A. Cohen, who supports the ontological existence of external relations.

In the meantime I note that, for Marx, purely ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ needs are an abstraction, and only a partial explanation of the human condition. Marx draws attention to the relations between natural objects in the following quote:

The sun is an object for the plant, an indispensable object which confirms its life, just as the plant is an object for the sun, an expression of its life-awakening power and its objective essential power (Marx, 1975[f], p. 390, original italics).

Marx notes that, for “man”, objects “outside of themselves” are necessarily mediated by conditions and social relationships. For Marx, it is the nature of “man’s”
needs, and the manner of satisfying them, that result in these interrelated relations:

it is only when objective reality universally becomes for man in society the reality of man’s essential powers, becomes human reality, and thus the reality of his own essential powers, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, objects that confirm and realize his individuality, his objects, i.e. he himself becomes the object (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 352-3, original italics)

For Marx, social relations and social conditions also provide the content of “man’s” natural needs and powers, and mediate the development of such needs:

Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth (Marx, 1973[a], p. 92).

Marx argues that the way in which species-powers become objectified depends both on the nature of the object and the nature of the essential power that corresponds to it (Marx, 1975[f], p. 353). Marx notes that, although the “objects of his [“man’s”] drives exist outside of him,” these “objects are objects of his need, essential objects, indispensible to the exercise and confirmation of his essential powers” (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 389-390, GT’s italics). I maintain that Marx argues that there are internal relations between objects and social relations. During the course of objectification, the social individual’s powers become “vehicles’ carrying a mutual effect between the individual and his object (joined together in an internal relation).” (Ollman, 1976, p. 87). Marx states that it is the particular influence of this relation that shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation (Marx, 1975[f], p. 353). The process of objectification is dealt with in more detail in Section 4.3. Within this process of objectification, both social and natural relations
provide the content of social individuals’ powers. When social individuals accommodate themselves to the properties of nature and other social relations, these internal relations become constitutive of their human nature.

It is as a result of this process that Marx, in “Concerning Feuerbach”, calls the essence, or nature, of “man” an “ensemble of social relations” (Marx, 1975[d], p. 423). In this section I maintain that Marx’s analysis of human nature differs from that which Norman Geras, in his article “Human Nature and Progress” (1995), represents as Marxian

The notion of an enduring human nature served Marx as a standard of normative judgement......Regardless of what he might have envisaged in his idea of self-actualization or the free development of the individual......the principle he espoused of distribution according to need was to cover at least those fundamental material needs consequent upon the common make-up of human beings (Geras, 1995, p. 154, GT’s italics).

This argument is the result of Geras’ assumption that

while it is true that to evaluate particular forms of self-realization one may well need to make reference to culturally specific standards of one kind and another, it is equally the case that in evaluating and in positively valuing as an instance of human self-realization [original italics] any activity or cultural form whatsoever, one will have to rely [GT’s italics] upon some generally applicable limit-concept of the constituent conditions... (Geras, 1995, p. 157).

For Geras, there is throughout Marx’s writings a “transhistorical evaluative standard” which is defined by “man’s” human nature. This standard is informed, but not influenced, by historical circumstances (Geras, 1995, p. 154). As a consequence, in both the article written in 1995 and his famous book Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend (1983), Geras omits to analyze the internal relations which, I maintain in Section 4.2, are fundamental to Marx’s ontology.

4.2 Dynamic internal social relationships.

I now consider the nature of internal social relations. Although Marx
frequently refers to internal relations as “essential”, “necessary”, “inevitable” or
“active”, he does not, to my knowledge, define them. This lacuna has been filled by
Bertell Ollman, who has defined and described internal relations in a way that, I
maintain, is commensurate with Marx’s ontology:

The relations in which anything stands as essential parts of what it is, so
that a significant change in any of these relations registers as a
qualitative change in the system of which it is a part (Ollman, 2003, p. 5)

Within an ontology based on internal relations, relations and conditions are
defined as being “necessary” when an actual range of possibilities is inherent in their
internal ties with other social relations and conditions. In this ontology, all social
relations are prefigured, that is, they are the coming-to-be of what potentially existed
within previous social relations.

In contrast, within an ontology based on isolated and external relations, the
elements in ‘A’ are not prefigurative of ‘B.’ As a consequence of this ontological
assumption, the establishment of a single exception to ‘if A then B’ means that ‘if A
then B’ cannot be true. Within an ontology based on external relations, any such
exception is a reason for denying the prefigurative nature of social relations. For
example, here it would be denied that an increase in marketization would necessarily
result in increased alienation if one person could be found who claimed to be
unalienated at work.

However, an ontology based on internal relations denies that, should a social
individual feel unalienated within market relations, such a feeling could correspond to
the actual situation. Within an ontology based on internal relations, such a
psychological state would be contingent and would not necessarily continue because
the structural relations of the market do not enable an unalienated society.

In the next part of this section I explore the nature of internal relations in more
Within an ontology based on internal relations, the whole is only a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its internal relations; and the parts are what they are by virtue of being members of the whole. For Ollman this results in a whole which is composed of interdependent internal relations which are sometimes structured, that is, rooted in relatively stable connections (Ollman, 1973, p. 496).

Ollman argues that these structural relations comprise four processes. Firstly, he says that “the whole shapes the parts to make them more functional within this particular whole”. Secondly, for Ollman, “the whole gives meaning and relative importance to each part in terms of this function (laws in capitalism are only comprehensible as elements in a structure that maintains capitalist society, and are as important as the contribution they make).” Thirdly, Ollman argues that “the whole expresses itself through the part, so that the part can be seen as a form of the whole” and, fourthly, he says that the process of change of internal relations will “forge the contours and meaning of the whole, transforming it into an ongoing system with a history, a goal, and an impact” (Ollman, 1973, p. 496).

I now intend to explore the nature of social processes in more detail. The influence of surrounding conditions on the function and/or appearance of an entity is illustrated in the following example provided by Ollman:

[It] is only because a machine is owned by capitalists that it is used to exploit workers. In the hands of a consumer or of a self-employed operator, that is, conditioned by another set of factors, operating under different imperatives, it would not function in this way (Ollman, 2003, p. 16).

When the social relations within a school change, and it becomes owned by a private owner, then it becomes an education business and subject to the law of profit accumulation, as James Tooley has acknowledged (Tooley, 2000, p. 18-9).

For Marx, conditions may be twofold. On the one hand natural conditions such as
land and raw materials are important. On the other hand, social conditions, such as social individuals, the existing form of social relations and subjective conditions such as consciousness, language and skills must be considered. Objective conditions and internal relations are also influenced by how they are perceived. Institutions, people and processes may be viewed in a variety of ways by different social individuals under changed conditions and this may produce a different, and in some cases, opposite conclusion or effect. For example, when a school is owned by capitalists it is used to exploit workers. In the hands of a democratic socialist state, that is, conditioned by another set of relations and conditions and operating under different imperatives, the degree of exploitation would not be so great and it would not function in the same way as when owned by capitalists. When people conditioned as capitalists look at a school, they see capital in which they have invested, and something that is going to make them a profit. When teachers conditioned as workers look at the same school, they see only an instrument that will determine their labour movements during the schooling process.

Within social processes, it is the range of possibilities which are necessarily prefigured by internal social relations, rather than a particular outcome within the range. This is because internal relations contain relations which, as part of what they are, have “ties with other relations” (Ollman, 2003, p. 13), both material and social (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 329, 349, 353, 390). Within this ontology, all social change is therefore a coming-to-be of what potentially was as well as what is. Social change is, therefore, the further unfolding of an already existing process in which past and present relations are internally related rather than being separate or contingent.

During the process of social change, there is a build-up and slow-down of
"qualities" or properties which involves a transfer of "qualities" to other constitutive relations of an entity. Initially this process takes the form of a quantitative change. At a certain point, a qualitative transformation takes place which is indicated by a change in the appearance or function of an entity. When this has occurred the entity has become something else. This is the nature of the processes which I explored in Chapter One, where I described the development of the process of marketization of school provision, and in particular the gradual influence of private property relations from 1998, when private sector providers were enticed into the financing and management of schools through the establishment of Education Action Zones. In 2002 this process of private ownership was complete when private sector sponsors were allowed to own and control 'their' own school. Although such schools were funded and loosely regulated by the State, they were almost exclusively within the control of private providers. In this process one can see the conscious attempt by successive governments to construct the relations which necessarily comprise the market, as defined in Section 1.1.

Within social processes there is sometimes the incompatible development of oppositional relations:

paths of development do not only intersect in mutually supportive ways but are constantly blocking, undermining, otherwise interfering with, and in due course transforming one another. .......The future finds its way into this focus (Ollman, 2003, p. 17).

These relations influence the development of processes by either enabling goals to be realized or by undermining their development. Within this materialist philosophy, it is as a result of these relations that social processes remain dynamic. In the absence of oppositional relations, Marx's system would require a vitalistic spirit to initiate change as, for example, did the system of Adam Smith (see Section 3.4).

Within an ontology based on external relations, entities are a collection of
externally related elements which exist in and by themselves, as was noted in Sections 2.5.1 and 3.2. Because within this ontology relations do not stand as essential parts of internal social relations, a significant change in any external relations does not necessarily change the function/appearance of an entity.

Therefore, within an ontology based on external relations, social change is perceived to occur as a sequence of events perceived as causal change based on a linear logic. I argue in Chapter Two that perceiving social change in this linear way caused both Harry Brighouse and James Tooley to perceive the social changes outlined in Sections 1.3-1.6 as a series of events which are contingently related, rather than as an unfolding process in which the social relations and conditions are internally related.

An ontology based mainly on external relations can be found in G. A. Cohen’s book Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (1978). In this work Cohen states that his aim is to construct a theory of history “which is in broad accord with what Marx said on the subject”, using both the tools of twentieth-century analytical thought (Cohen, 1978, p. ix) and a form of materialism in which “history is fundamentally, the growth of human productive power, and forms of society rise and fall according as they enable or impede that growth” (Cohen, 1978, p. x).

As a consequence of using analytical thought, Cohen analyzes the whole into component parts, separating and isolating different elements and aspects, so defining them in isolation. This excludes the possibility of structural relations which are internally related within an organic whole and as a result, I contend, is fundamentally opposed to Marx’s ontology.

I also contend that Cohen also differs from Marx in arguing that a force or power is not a relation (Cohen, 1978, p. 28). For Cohen, a force or power “is not something
which holds between objects, but rather a property of an object” (Cohen, 1978, p. 28).

For Cohen “no social characteristics may be deduced from their material characteristics” (Cohen, 1978, p. 91). To make this point Cohen appeals to the concept of a ‘relational property’:

A husband is a man related by marriage to a woman: he is not also a relationship of marriage. Being a husband is a property of that man, one he has in virtue of that relationship, and commonly styled a relational property. Being capital and being a slave are, similarly, relational properties of means of production and men. More specifically, they are social relational properties, whereas being means of production and being a man are not. The latter are possessed independently of the social form. Remove the social form in thought experiment and those properties persist (Cohen, 1978, p. 90, original italics).

For Cohen, the character of the productive forces only functionally explains the character of relations:

the production relations are of kind R at time t because relations of kind R are suitable to the use and development of the productive forces at t, given the level of development of the latter at t (Cohen, 1978, p. 160).

Cohen argues that, for Marx, the development of productive forces, (which are only contingently related to social relations), is the primary force for historical change. For Cohen historical change occurs when a “society adjusts itself to nature” (Cohen, 1978, p. 285):

The material description captures a society’s underlying nature. In this sense of ‘nature’, nature is of course a product of history, changing in and as a result of social forms. Humanity in social organisation thrusts itself against its environment, altering it and its own nature, for it develops its own powers and needs in the course of the encounter (Cohen, 1978, p. 96, original italics).

Cohen argues that the economic structure is the primary determinant of the character of the political superstructure. For Cohen the economic relations and political forms are the mere effects, the outcome of a particular level of development of the
productive forces. The relations of production and the superstructure are thus regarded as inactive results, with no independent life or internal dynamic of their own (Sayers, 1984, p. 11).

In this section I have showed that, as a result of an ontology based on external relations, Cohen perceives society and nature, form and content to be exclusive opposites; and social relations to be entirely external to and logically independent of, material content.

In his paper "Marxism and the Dialectical Method" (1984), Sean Sayers criticises Cohen’s analysis, arguing that as a consequence of relying on an analytical methodology, Cohen

insists on analysing the whole that he is considering into its component parts. He insists upon separating and isolating the different elements and aspects of the given concrete totality, and considering and defining these in isolation (Sayers, 1984, p. 4).

Sayers criticises Cohen’s ontology by arguing, like Ollman, that all properties are relational and exist within internal relations (Sayers, 1984, p. 8). Productive forces are productive forces only in the context of the necessary relations of production — in the absence of these they are mere useless objects. A spinning jenny, therefore, is a machine for spinning cotton only given certain relations of production: transferred to the stone age it would be a mere physical object of no productive use (Sayers, 1984, p. 7). In this section I support the argument proposed by Sayers and Ollman, namely, that for Marx, in both his early and later works, this context of relations is internal and essential to the nature of things, and not external and accidental (Marx, 1973[a], p. 84).

Marx perceives concrete things in the context of their interconnectedness with other things situated within a wider whole. According to Marx:

The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each
other ........are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which these definite individuals living under definite relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity (Marx, 1970, p. 87).

In this section, I therefore support the argument of Sayers, that the ontology of Marx is “quite distinct from the abstract and metaphysical views propounded by Cohen” (Sayers, 1984, p. 12). Moreover, I argue in this thesis that an ontology based on external relations, such as that propounded by Cohen, would have been rejected by Marx because the social relations found in Cohen’s ontology result in alienating and dehumanising activity:

This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations (Marx, 1970, p. 54).

The rest of this chapter is an analysis of Marx’s concept of alienation. An important dimension of Marx’s concept of alienation is objectification which I consider in more detail in the next section.

4.3 Objectification in Marx’s philosophy.

I begin this section by briefly recalling Hegel’s concept of objectification, because of its substantial influence on Marx. In Section 3.7 it is noted that Hegel defines objectification as the process of self-realization which occurs when transforming objects, and that Hegel recognises that, during the process of objectification, a social individual accommodates himself to the properties of nature and/or other social individuals. It is also noted that, for Hegel, objectification always results in a change in the subjectivity of the social individual and so results in a loss of self, that is, in alienation.

In Chapter Nine it is argued that only when objectification occurs within unalienating conditions and social relations does it necessarily support self-
realization. When this type of objectification occurs, products confront agents not as something other but as something which is their own. This concept will be explored in relation to education in Chapter Nine. Before I consider the necessary structural relations in Marx's concept of unalienated activity, I explore his concept of alienation and its necessary relations.

4.4 Marx's concept of alienated labour.

I now consider Marx's concept of alienated labour in more detail. For Marx, alienating relations occur in a set of social relations where:

the means of my life belong to another and that my desire is the inaccessible possession of another, but also in the fact that all things are other than themselves, that my activity is other than itself, and that finally — and this goes for capitalists too — an inhuman power rules over everything (Marx, 1975[f], p. 366, original italics).

The predominant form of property relations which existed when Marx was writing was based on the concept of possessive individualism (see Section 3.2). Briefly, to recall, this is the contention that "man" is "an exclusive owner whose exclusive ownership permits him both to preserve his personality and to distinguish himself from other men" (Marx, 1975[e], p. 266). Marx argues that if we assume that "man’s" personal, distinguishing and essential capacities and powers are his private property, as did classical economists at the time, then it necessarily follows that "loss or sacrifice of that private property signifies the alienation of the man as much as of the property itself" (Marx, 1975[e], p. 266).

In Marx's day, such relations were found within an early form of capitalist production. Marx defines capital in the following way:

But capital is not a thing, it is a definite social relation pertaining to a particular historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this thing a specific social character. Capital is not the sum of the material and produced means of production. Capital is the means of production as transformed into capital, these being no
more capital in themselves than gold or silver are money. It is the means of production monopolized by a particular section of society, the products and conditions of activity of labour-power, which are rendered autonomous vis-à-vis this living labour-power and are personified in capital through this antithesis. It is not only the workers’ products which are transformed into independent powers, the products as masters and buyers of their producers, but the social powers and interconnecting form of this labour also confront them as properties of their product. Here we therefore have one factor of a historically produced social production process in a definite social form, and at first sight a very mysterious form (Marx, 1981, pp. 953-4).

The next section considers the fundamental structural relations that result in alienated labour within capitalism. Although alienated relations are necessarily interconnected, for ease of analysis I describe these structural relations separately. I begin with the relations involved in verausserung (alienation through selling) which results in entfremdet (estrangement) and entausserung (relinquishment).

4.4.1 Verausserung (alienation through selling).

Marx notes that, within capitalism, there are two fundamental structural relations which result in alienated labour. These relations are necessarily interrelated, and are those necessarily involved in the act of verausserung (alienation through selling the product of labour), and those necessarily involved in entfremdet (estrangement). Marx argues that these relations necessarily entail relinquishment (entausserung). For Marx, relinquishment (entausserung) occurs when individuals accommodate themselves to something which exists outside and independently of themselves, such as a hostile owner, or the properties of nature, or to other persons participating in practices and institutions inherited from the past (Marx, 1975[f], p. 324). In the case of private property relations, this relation occurs as a necessary result of selling one’s labour-power to the owners of private capital.

Marx argues that private property and alienated labour are oppositional. However, both are “forms of the world of private property” and, as such, “they form a
single whole” (Marx, 1956, p. 51). For Marx private property is “the product, result and necessary consequence of alienated labour…” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 322, GT’s italics), and within these relations “the worker exists as a worker only when he exists for himself as capital, and he exists as capital only when capital exists for him” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 335, GT’s italics). In other words, private property relations are prefigured by the act of alienation [verausserung] (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 331-3).

I now deal with Marx’s analysis of “man’s” relation to private property and productive activity. Within the structural relations of capitalism the worker’s productive activity will not necessarily enable the worker’s essential powers to be manifested (Marx, 1975[f], p. 326) because, by virtue of verausserung, this activity belongs to another. For Marx, within capitalism, the productive process is “the subjective manifestation of the fact that capital is man completely lost to himself, just as capital is the objective manifestation of the fact that labour is man lost to himself” (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 334-5). As a consequence, self-estrangement results and the worker may well ask “what is life but activity? — as an activity directed against himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 327).

Moreover, although a social individual’s needs stand in an inner relation to the products of the labour of others, the system of private property turns this internal relationship into an external relationship through the use of currency as a medium of exchange (Marx, 1975[e], pp. 274-5). Marx continues by arguing that “the thing that gives your need for my possessions a value, a worth and an effect…..is simply and solely your possession, the equivalent of my possession” i.e. exchange value (Marx 1975[e], p. 276, original italics).
4.4.2 The capitalist and alienation.

It was noted in Section 4.4 that the workers and the capitalists are both necessary aspects of private property. Therefore, Marx argues that capitalists as well as workers (Marx, 1956, p. 51; 1975[f], p. 334) are alienated by the capitalist system. For Marx, it is the relation of the capitalist to the product of the worker which places the capitalist in the situation of alienation. For the capitalist, the object of a worker’s life activity is only to produce something to sell at a profit. The capitalist needs to do this in order to buy the goods and services which he himself does not have the means to produce.

As Marx notes “the human properties of man as a worker — a man who is nothing more than a worker — exist only in so far as they exist for a capital which is alien to him” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 335, original italics). As a consequence, the worker cannot necessarily have human relations with the capitalist and the capitalist cannot necessarily have human relations with the worker. This argument is summarised in the following passage:

He [the capitalist] looks upon the slave labour of others, their human sweat and blood, as the prey of his desires, and regards man in general — including himself — as a futile and sacrificial being. He arrogantly looks down upon mankind, dissipating what would suffice to keep alive a hundred human beings, and propagates the infamous illusion that his unbridled extravagance and ceaseless, unproductive consumption is a condition of the labour and hence subsistence of the others (Marx, 1975[f], 366, original italics).

As a consequence of this process both the capitalist and the worker both become "physically and spiritually dehumanized being[s]" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 336, ). Marx argues that, although the capitalist is not dominated by products in the same way as the worker, he is influenced by the same social conditions in which his products are produced and distributed. Marx systematically presents his view on the alienated relationship between the ‘non-worker’ and the worker at the end of the first section
of "Manuscripts". Here he states:

The first thing to point out is that everything which appears for the worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears for the non-worker as a situation of alienation, of estrangement. Secondly the real, practical attitude of the worker in production and to the product (as a state of mind) appears for the non-worker who confronts him as a theoretical attitude. Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against the worker which the worker does against himself, but he does not do against himself what he does against the worker. (Marx, 1975[f], p. 334, original italics).

In The Holy Family, written in 1845, Marx also notes that alienation for the capitalist differs from that of the workers because capitalists find in their alienation “confirmation,” of their “own power” (Marx, 1956, p. 51).

As a result of the processes outlined in this section we can see that, within capitalism, the expression of the life of both the capitalist and the worker is the alienation of their life (Marx, 1975[f], p. 351).

To recall, it was noted in Chapter Three, within capitalism, human powers are reduced to having and possessing. As a consequence social individuals view everything they come into contact with as essentially a form of private property, including their own essential powers. As Ollman notes, in order for workers to be able to sell their essential powers all social relations which might inhibit such a sale have to be reduced (Ollman, 1976, p. 229). As a result the “sensuous appropriation of human essence and of human life, of objective man and of human works, by and for man” becomes understood “only in the sense of direct, one-sided consumption, of possession and of having” (Marx, 1975[f], p. 351).

4.5 Marx’s concept of unalienated activity.

Marx argues that it is only in a situation which allows for fully human activity that one can confirm one’s “authentic nature” in the thoughts and love of another (Marx, 1975[e], p. 277). A discussion on love in Hegelian thought is given in
Section 3.5. To briefly recall, within Hegelian thought, love is the opposite of alienation and it will be recalled that love is a genuine living bond, a true unity of opposites, which results in commitment to the Other (Hegel, 1948, pp. 304-5).

Within these Hegelian relations, one is disposed to consider the other individual not as a means, nor as an external imposition on the satisfaction of our own ends, but as a fellow human being who has value qua a human being. Marx accepts this aspect of Hegelian thought when he describes the subjective aspect of unalienated labour as:

In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human need, i.e. that I had objectified human nature and hence had procured an object corresponding to the needs of another human being. In my production I would have objectified the specific character of my individuality and for that reason I would have enjoyed the expression of my own individual life during my activity and also, in contemplating the object, I would experience an individual pleasure, I would experience my personality as an objective sensuously perceptible power beyond all shadow of doubt (Marx, 1975[e], p. 277, original italics).

For Marx, such productive activity is meaningful and worthwhile because through it are developed, exercised and actualized human essential powers which are worthwhile and meaningful for social individuals.

4.6 Continuity in Marx’s concept of alienation.

Although I place particular emphasis on the philosophical dimension of Marx’s work prior to 1845, I do not ignore his later work, and I am persuaded that the philosophical ideas found in Marx’s early works are also echoed in later works. Concerning alienation, I am persuaded that the concepts concerning productive activity and alienation found in Marx’s earlier works are embedded in Marx’s later works. I support the argument that Marx’s later works merely emphasise the objective social and economic structural relations that give rise to the more subjective concept of alienation described in the “Manuscripts”. I therefore consider that there
is a continuation of argument between Marx’s earlier works and his later works, rather than there being a fundamentally different philosophy, as such Soviet theorists as T. I. Oiserman have argued (see Section 7.4.2).

Echoes of “Manuscripts” can also be found in *Wage-Labour and Capital*, first published in 1849. For example, in “Manuscripts” Marx writes:

Firstly, the fact that labour is *external* to the worker, i.e. does not belong to his essential being; that he therefore does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working he does not feel himself (Marx, 1975[f], p. 326).

In *Wage-Labour and Capital* Marx writes:

But the exercise of labour-power, labour, is the worker’s own life-activity, the manifestation of his own life. And this *life-activity* he sells to another person in order to secure the means of his subsistence. Thus his life-activity is for him only a means to enable him to exist. He works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has made over to another. Hence also, the product of his activity is not the object of his activity (Marx, 1967, p. 20, original italics).

One can also see similarities if one compares the concept of alienation as outlined in “Manuscripts” with “The Results of the Immediate Process of Production” (written in 1863-1866). In “The Results of the Immediate Process of Production” Marx writes:

Within the production process labour is transformed into capital. The activity of labour-power i.e. labour, *objectifies* itself in the course of production and so becomes value. But since the labour has ceased to belong to the worker even before he starts to work, what objectified itself for him is *alien labour* and hence a value, called *capital*, independent of his own labour-power.” (Marx, 1979[a], p. 1016, original italics).

In the same article Marx notes the lack of control of labour in the above process:

In the labour process regarded also as a capitalist process of production, the means of production utilize the worker, so that the
work appears only as an instrument which enables a specific quantum of value i.e. a specific mass of objectified labour, to suck in living labour in order to sustain and increase itself...... Capital utilizes the worker, the worker does not utilize capital...... (Marx, 1979[a], p. 1008, original italics).

4.7 Marx after 1845: new methodology, same philosophy.

I now specifically consider how Marx developed his arguments after 1845, with particular reference to the arguments having a bearing on alienation. Gradually, between 1845-6, Marx began to repudiate the metaphysical elements in Feuerbach’s philosophy, arguing that Feuerbach’s concept of human essence was ahistorical. Marx adds that, as a consequence, Feuerbach conceived of “essence” only as a “genus”, as “an internal, dumb, generality which naturally unites the many individuals” (Marx, 1975[d], p. 423, original italics).

Marx argues that, because Feuerbach is satisfied with postulating “man” as an abstract and imaginary subject, Feuerbach has no compulsion in finding the concrete causes that make real men act the way they do. This results in an uncritical acceptance of average conditions, in which social inequalities and human sufferings are treated as chance differences between individuals.

Furthermore, in the treatise “Concerning Feuerbach”, written in 1845, Marx argues that human nature is influenced by material activity or practice (which is sometimes referred to as praxis), and that “in its reality it [human essence] is the ensemble of the social relations” (Marx, 1975[d], p. 423).

In German Ideology (first published in 1846) Marx begins to systematically develop a conception of history based on the development of the social relations which emerge around particular processes of production:

This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form
expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production (Marx, 1970, p. 42, original italics).

Using this materialist methodology, Marx outlines in Grundrisse (written 1857-8) that four "historical presuppositions" are needed before alienation can occur in productive activity (Marx, 1973[a], pp. 497-8). Firstly, he argues that what has to occur in "man’s" relation to nature is the dissolution of "man’s" original natural condition in which both production and property are solely communal. Secondly, Marx considers the dissolution of relations in which the producer appears as proprietor of his instruments of production. This presupposes a specific development of manufacture, for example, craft and artisan work (see Section 3.1 for a brief outline of the actual historical development). Marx notes that, with craft and artisan work, "labour still as his own; definite self-sufficient development of one-sided abilities etc." (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497). Thirdly, Marx notes that as proprietor of land and instruments of production the artisan inherits the mode of his work, together with many of the instruments involved in his trade (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497). This allows the artisan to have the means of consumption in his possession before production which allows for him to live as a producer (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497) [see Section 3.1 for examples from the textile industry]. At this stage the capitalist is the "master-journeyman" and, labour is part artisan and part 'end-in-itself'. Importantly, Marx notes that labour at this stage still results in the development of "one-sided abilities" and therefore does not lead to the development of all of the capacities and powers of the social individual (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497). Fourthly, Marx notes that there is a fundamental change in social relations, from those in which workers are treated as an objective condition of production (for example, in the case of a serf or
a slave), to those in which the worker sells (alienates) his individual labour-power to the owner of capital (Marx, 1973[a], p. 498) [see Section 3.1 for examples from the textile industry]. In the next part of this section I describe how this economic 'base' is linked to the ideological superstructure and consciousness.

4.7.1 The concept of base and superstructure.

In German Ideology, written between 1845-6, Marx begins to formulate the concept more commonly known as the "base" and "superstructure" to describe the inter-connection between the material process of production and the "theoretical products and consciousness" (Marx, 1970, pp. 57-8). In this theory, it is within the objective social relations found in the economic base of society that the social relations which necessarily result in alienation as the 'normal' state of affairs.

For Marx, the economic base has a predominant influence because it gives unity to other aspects of the movement in society. In a passage from "The Preface" (to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, first written 1857 (Marx, 1975[a]) and intended as the first section of Grundrisse), Marx states that in the base there are the forces of production, the relations of production and the means of production. The means of production are the instruments of production and the raw materials while the forces of production are the means of production plus labour power. It is within the relations of production that the alienating relations described above occur. Marx notes that in the social production of the conditions of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite social relations, which are independent of their will, because they are reliant on the use of the means of production, which others own, to make a livelihood.

For Marx, the totality of the relations of production constitutes the economic structure, being the real foundation on which arises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. In the Preface (to "A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy"), Marx develops the ideological nature of the superstructure (which, for Marx, includes legal, political, religious, artistic, and philosophical forms). Schooling belonged to this aspect of society in England after the 1944 Education Act, when the state first began to directly intervene in the schooling of all pupils in order to address the needs of the economy (see Section 5.2).

Although Marx gives primacy to the economic base, he does not regard it as always the most evident determinant (Marx, 1970, pp. 57-8). In “Manuscripts,” Marx argues that:

productive life is species-life. It is life-producing life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life activity, and free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man. Life itself appears only as a means of life (Marx, 1975[f], p. 328, original italics).

Even in Capital, which concentrates more on the material forces in society than do “Manuscripts”, Marx argues that man’s relationship to the economic base does not merely correspond or reflect economic structures but, more precisely, that the social individual’s relation to the economic base involves social and economic relationships which change partly as a result of the ideas and conceptions held about economic activity:

The same economic basis—the same in its major conditions—from displaying endless variations and gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analysing these empirically given conditions (Marx, 1981, pp. 927-8).

Engels, who worked closely with Marx, in his letter to Bloch of 21 September 1890, makes the dynamic nature of the relationship between the economic structure
and superstructure even clearer:

According to the materialist conception of history the determining element in history is **ultimately** [GT's italics] the production and reproduction in real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. If therefore somebody twists this into the statement that the economic determinant is the **only** [Engel’s italics] determining one he transforms it into a **meaningless, abstract and absurd** phrase [GT’s italics] (Engels, 1934, p. 474).

In the same letter, Engels adds that the “political, legal, philosophical theories, religious ideas and their further development........also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and **in many cases** (GT’s italics) preponderate in their determining **form**” (Engels’ italics). Engels notes the dynamic interactions which shape social relationships when he added:

> There is an interaction of all these elements, in which, amid all the endless **host** of accidents (i.e., of things and events whose inner connexion is so remote or so impossible to prove that we regard it as absent and can neglect it) the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary (Engels, 1934, p. 475, original italics).

**4.7.2 Marx’s labour theory of value.**

Marx began to develop a more economic concept of alienation and exploitation after 1845 (Marx, 1979 [a], p. 271). As I state in my Introduction, I do not intend to give a systematic analysis of exploitation in this thesis because, although I recognize that the relations involved in exploitation are linked to alienation, exploitation is different from alienation. However, in this Section I give a brief explanation of labour theory of value, which is the concept which informs Marx’s concept of exploitation, because it is a theory which recurs in debates about the viability of Marx’s analysis of the market.

After 1845, as part of the process of developing a more economic concept of alienation, Marx continued to develop Smith’s ideas about the labour theory of value in a systematic way. This systematic account first appears in *Capital*, written in 1867.
In *Capital* Marx argues that, in all types of market economies, every commodity has a double-value: use-value, because of its material qualities, and exchange value, because a portion of social labour has been expended upon it. Exchange value presupposes use-value: the qualities which give a commodity use-value, in such a system, are the “material carriers of exchange value”. Marx argues that the exchange value of a commodity is nothing but a fraction of “abstract human labour”. As exchange value it has mainly quantitative significance, namely, as its amount itself can be measured by the “minimum socially necessary labour time” embodied in the production of the commodity. Socially necessary labour-time can be defined as “the labour time necessary to produce any use-value with the normal conditions of social production and social average degree of skill and intensity of labour”. Marx argues that labour itself has no separate use-value if it is merely the expression of exchange value. In terms of schooling, the teachers’ labour-power becomes mainly a means to create extra value for the entrepreneurs who own and control the schools, rather than being of maximum use-value for pupils (see Chapter Five).

Marx argues that the commodity reflects the social character of labour. Under the market economy goods must have use-value but, for the producers, goods have only exchange value. A good only has use-value when it leaves the hands of the producer and is received by a consumer. In the process of exchange commodities, therefore, goods have exchange value and use-value. In this process the relation is a double one – of exchange value and use-value. Although exchange value is the equivalence of things which are embodiments of the same quantities of labour-time, it must also be related to specific use-values.

A commodity, therefore, is something in addition to the limited capacity of a specific-value; it is also the carrier of exchange value and its universal equivalent is
money. Marx notes that exchange value is merely an abstraction that masks the nature of the social relations, and therefore also the alienating relations, involved in the market economy. Marx regards labour-power as a commodity which, as well as the means of production, the capitalist buys. After workers have produced a commodity, with the help of the means of production, the capitalist normally sells the produced commodity for more money than he advanced. The additional money is the surplus-value which, in capitalist terms, equals gross profit.

4.8 The relevance of Marx’s account of alienation to the twentieth century.

In this section I examine the charge that, as the exact conditions of production which Marx described are now very rare in Western Europe, there is the argument that his theory of alienation is consequently no longer relevant (J. Wolff, 2002, p. 110). In this section I note that property relations have remained fundamentally the same, even though the content of capitalism has changed from entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly or corporate capitalism.

To recall from Chapter Three, I note that entrepreneurial capitalism began to emerge at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Within the relations of entrepreneurial capitalism, it was relatively easy to identify the capitalists and workers. The capitalist legally owned the means of production and controlled labour-power quite directly. He personally bought the raw materials and was physically present to supervise labour-power and finished products. During the middle of the nineteenth century joint-stock companies began to replace family firms. Today almost all large firms have the legal form of joint-stock companies, with large amounts of money being invested in firms directly by means of shares or lent by way of bonds. Under this system there is often no single owner of a firm: ownership or control tends to lie with corporations and many of the ‘owners’ (in the form of shareholders) may
have no other significant connection with the firm. The function of the capitalist therefore no longer rests with an individual: it is often performed collectively on a national or global basis.

Moreover, economic control of large firms tends to be centred upon senior managers and directors of corporations, while day-to-day control of labour-power tends to be in the hands of junior managers or supervisors closer to the point of production. Nevertheless, the owners of the firms still retain ultimate control and can sack senior managers. Despite this change in these social relations, the organization of the economy is still based on the interests of private property.

The means of maximising profit changed dramatically at the beginning of the twentieth century. These changes began in America, in response to a labour shortage which caused wages to rise dramatically. Because of this increase in wages, industrialists were persuaded that there was a large potential market for mass-produced goods. This form of production led the American F. W. Taylor to formulate a systematic theory of production based on a planned flow of processes, which in turn allowed for the ‘scientific management’ of labour. ‘Taylorism’, so-called, paved the way for the re-organization of entire production processes (sometimes by means of a moving assembly line) and their standardization.

One of the first areas of production where this was applied was in the American car industry. Henry Ford initiated a production process organized around moving assembly lines. This modification of Taylorism became known as ‘Fordism’. It had four key elements: firstly, the separation of different work tasks between different groups of workers; secondly, the standardization of spare parts; thirdly, the arrangement of machines in the correct sequence required by a particular manufacturing process, and, finally the linking of the various parts of the production
process together by a conveyor belt or assembly line to facilitate the quick and efficient fulfilment of tasks. From a socio-psychological perspective some would no doubt argue that Taylorism and Fordism must increase alienation because working all day on a production line is boring (R Blauner, 1964). I argue in this thesis that it is not such practices in themselves which necessarily increase estrangement and alienation, but rather the structural relations of capitalism.

There was a general post-World War II decline in Britain's share of the world export market for manufactured goods, which fell, for example, from 16.2% in 1961 to 8.8% in 1981. The rate of capital investment in machinery and factories in the UK during this period was well below that of Japan and some other European countries, reflected in the then 'productivity gap' between the UK and other major capitalist countries (S. Pollard, 1992, pp. 301-2). This process of decline was exacerbated by the ferocious competition to which British manufacturing was exposed after Britain was finally admitted to the European Economic Community in 1973. This in turn led to large-scale restructuring of capital, resulting in mergers and acquisitions. It also led to firms, particularly large corporations, looking to diversify into other potential markets, including service areas such as education.

In Chapter One I pointed out that, since 1979, successive governments have tried to develop external trade in UK services, including in education, by being at the forefront of creating a market in these services. The means by which this marketization has been attempted is outlined in Chapter One.

By the 1970's the introduction of new computer-controlled technology enabled capitalists to employ fewer people, resulting in a fall in the cost of production. As a consequence many work processes have been restructured: they are now often divided into more specialized tasks which can easily be automated. For example,
during the 1980's and 1990's, such former white-collar jobs as messengers and typists became redundant or transformed as a result of word-processing and e-mail. Many of the new jobs created, therefore, demand more technical skills, schooling and flexibility than the old manufacturing or office jobs they often replaced.

In modern times investment in technology means that white-collar jobs are no longer to be worked solely from 'nine to five'. Under the pressure of global competition, many offices are now open twenty-four hours a day and many large firms use call-centres for low-level administrative tasks. Many white-collar workers are expected to undertake shift work, and many also use computers to work from home outside office hours. Therefore, for many, the number of hours at work is still quite high and as a further consequence of technology more speed, productivity and flexibility is expected from most workers. Therefore I conclude that Marx's concept of alienation is still as relevant as when he was writing. In the next section I consider some of the philosophical arguments made by some twentieth-century philosophers against the claim that Marx's analysis of alienation is still relevant.

4.9 Criticisms of Marx's concept of alienation by some modern philosophers.

Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick, 1974) and Harry Brighouse, in his article "Should Marxists Care About Alienation?" (Brighouse, 1996), have asserted that, since Marx was writing in the mid-nineteenth century, people have become more content at work on account of more congenial work conditions. For example, some individuals have been able to work from the alleged comfort of their own home. It has also been pointed out that real wages, and consequently living standards, are much higher for most workers than in Marx's time, thus allowing workers to buy more leisure activities. In this thesis I contend that, even when this is the case, the same economic relations are present as those in Marx's day.
so that even though the contents of these relations are different, the structural relations of capitalism necessarily result in alienation. Even were these relations to appear to be favourable, the worker could not necessarily rely on such conditions continuing because of the nature of capitalist relations already outlined in this Chapter. Importantly, most workers still have had no choice but to sell their labour-power in order to survive.

Nozick (1974) and Brighouse (1996) also argue that individuals should be able to choose alienated work if that is their preference. They argue that individuals may wish to undertake alienating work for a high remuneration. As was noted in Section 3.2, Nozick’s concept of a meaningful life is informed by two main moral beliefs. Briefly, these are firstly, that one is regarded as an end (and not means), which may not be sacrificed for others’ ends without one’s consent; and that consequently one has the right to act in accordance with one’s own choices unless, secondly, these choices infringe the equal right of others to liberty (Nozick, 1974, p. 48). Moreover, Nozick also contends that if unalienating work is regarded as sufficiently important, it can be achieved by voluntary means through the market without the means of state intervention (Nozick, 1974, pp. 248-9). Nozick argues that, within “a free society” (Nozick, 1974, p. 252), powers of ownership could be extended if there were a sufficient number of individuals willing to form their own democratically-run co-operative firms (Nozick, 1974, pp. 250-3). However, Nozick acknowledges that within his system there would probably be a problem in “gathering” sufficient resources to set up such enterprises (Nozick, 1974, p. 253).

In the next part of this section I concentrate on Brighouse’s arguments against the Marxist concept of alienation, which are outlined in his article “Should Marxists Care About Alienation?” (Brighouse, 1996). In this article, Brighouse is
particularly exercised by the values implicit in Marx's concepts of both species-being and unalienated labour. Brighouse notes that alienation from species-being mirrors the traditional liberal concern with the preference that individuals should be, or be able to be, self-governing; and that lack of self-understanding and/or an understanding of "the network of social relations within which we act" (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159) are barriers to self-governance. Moreover, Brighouse objects to the substantive concepts that Marx has of both species-being (Brighouse, 1996, pp. 158-9) and of self-realization.

Like Nozick, Brighouse starts from the position of accepting the existence of capitalist society. Within such structures he argues that, not to make available to everyone a variety of options about the kind of work to do and also to organize this work more rewardingly, would result in a loss of productivity and "a significant cost" which some would be unwilling to pay (Brighouse, 1996, p. 154). To recall, Brighouse argues that some individuals should be able choose an alienated form of labour if they so wish. However, in the same article Brighouse acknowledges that alienated labour is involuntary under capitalism, because alienated labour is often forced on individuals out of necessity. This situation, therefore, also raises the question as to whether or not individuals can exercise a high degree of autonomy within the capitalist system.

Brighouse argues that, in the economies with which we are familiar, the preference for satisfying work is an expensive one, the fulfilment of which also has costs for those who do not share it. As a result, Brighouse concludes that within capitalist relations it is wrong to accord unalienated activity high priority in the design of social institutions simply because we think alienation is a bad thing (Brighouse, 1996, p. 156-7).
Next, I turn to Brighouse’s observations about Marx’s concept of species-being. Brighouse argues that Marx’s concept of human nature gives precedence to creativity and production (Brighouse, 1996, p. 158) and, therefore, argues that “the particular notion of species-being [no hyphen in original] is unacceptably non-neutral” (Brighouse, 1996, p. 158). That is, Brighouse argues that Marx’s concept is not compatible with his (Brighouse’s) "value-neutral" form of liberalism. I maintain that this form is in fact based on a specific set of values: it is a form of liberalism which gives precedence to individual autonomy and choice (Section 2.5.1).

Nevertheless, Brighouse argues that “the idea that we should not be alienated from our species being, [sic] whatever that is....” (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159) is unacceptably non-neutral if it implies, as he believes it does, that alienation is morally wrong. Brighouse argues that it is only if Marxism did not claim that alienation was morally wrong, but merely gave a description of the content of structural relations, that he [Brighouse] could support it as a form of ‘liberal Marxism’:

On this kind of account [of Marxism, GT] it would not be claimed that alienated lives are to be considered intrinsically inferior to unalienated lives. But, it could be said, capitalist social institutions systematically deprive everyone (or nearly everyone) of the opportunity to live unalienated lives (Brighouse, 1996, p. 155).

However, Brighouse acknowledges that, if Marxism made choice for alienated or unalienated activity optional, it could not necessarily aim to eliminate the evils of capitalist society, which is one of the main reasons for its existence (Brighouse, 1996, p. 155). I consider that this results in rendering implausible Brighouse’s argument about the viability of his criticisms. Brighouse is rejecting Marx’s proposals for overcoming alienation and would prefer to have alienation within his system than to embrace the substantive values which, I contend, are part of
Marx’s theory. I maintain that because Brighouse’s conclusion results in an acceptance of capitalism, this conclusion narrows choice to only those activities which are enabled by the structures and conditions found within capitalism. For example, because the structures of Brighouse’s model do not support unalienated activity, it necessarily results in the inability of individuals to necessarily choose unalienated activity.

I note that Marx has never held unalienated activity to be possible for working people within the conditions and relations of capitalism because, for Marx, the conditions and relations of capitalism are oppositional to unalienated activity and consequently cannot prefigure it. Therefore, I maintain that Brighouse is in fact criticising Marx’s concept of a fully-fledged communist society, and not merely Marx’s ethical ideas. This is because Brighouse is aware that, for Marx, alienated activity would not be possible within the structures and conditions found in a capitalist society. Importantly, Brighouse argues as he does despite his recognition that the conditions and social relations which give rise to alienation, also compromise the ability to be rationally self-governing (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159).

As is noted in Section 2.5.2, this ability to be self-governing is, of course, fundamental to Brighouse’s concept of justice.

In conclusion: in this chapter I argue that Marx never held that unalienated activity was possible for working people within the conditions and relations of capitalism. For Marx, the conditions and relations of capitalism are oppositional to unalienated activity and therefore dehumanising. For Brighouse to accept Marx, Marx would have to argue both a) that it is possible for working people to opt out of alienated labour within capitalism, and b) that it should be also possible for alienated labour to exist within a fully-fledged communist society. In this Chapter I
have argued that Brighouse is in fact criticising a fully-fledged communist society, and not merely Marx’s ethical ideas, because he is aware that, for Marx, alienated activity would not be possible in such a society. This is also despite Brighouse’s recognition that the conditions which give rise to alienation would also compromise the ability to be self-governing (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159).

In this chapter, I note that Nozick and Brighouse do not make the option for unalienated labour available. Importantly, the inability to make alienated activity available to those who would choose it is one of the main reasons which Brighouse, in his 1996 article, uses to criticise Marx’s definition of alienation. In this chapter I argue that Brighouse fails to make unalienated activity available because he supports a system based on a specific set of values, which gives preference to individual autonomy and choice. I therefore argue that, because his theory is not value-neutral and, on Brighouse’s own terms, political theories should be value-neutral, his main argument against Marx’s theory of alienation fails. In the next chapter I explore the alienating relations found in schooling since the time of Marx, with particular emphasis on how the marketization of school provision and schooling has increased these relations from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.
Part Two

Chapter Five
A Marxian analysis of alienation applied to schooling in England in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Introduction

Marx did not write a systematic treatise on education, and does not appear to have directly applied his concept of alienation to any of the comments that he did make about schooling. At the time Marx was writing, politicians and industrialists maintained that schooling was increasingly necessary for the development of the economic base of society and, as a result, politicians gradually supported the schooling of the children of working people. Marx was against either the state or the church controlling schooling (Marx, 1974[b], p. 357), supporting the argument favoured by the General Council that education could be national without being governmental (S. Padover, 1973, p. 114 [quoting from the minutes of the General Council of the First International, 10 August, 1869]). Importantly, Marx realised that a change of both conditions and social relations was necessary for there to be an unalienated system of education (S. Padover, 1973). The conditions and relations Marx considered to be important are explored in Chapter Nine.

In the present chapter I attempt to apply Marx’s concept of alienation to schooling in England in, and since, the nineteenth century. I begin this chapter by considering the alienating relations that existed within the type of school provision in Marx’s time. I then consider why alienating relations exist in schooling in England today, and show how they have been intensified by the marketization of school provision. I do this within the context of the two representative market models of school provision, analyzed in
Chapter Two. I maintain that the ‘lightly regulated’ model of a school market and a specifically regulated model are different ends of a market spectrum which is subject to the fundamental social relations of capitalism, and therefore which is necessarily subject to the same alienating relations.

5.1 The development of schooling between 1830 and 1879.

In the early nineteenth century there was a limited demand for literate labour and consequently the state did not intervene to enable schooling. Schooling in England was entirely controlled by private people and organizations. E. G. West in his article “Resource Allocation and Growth in Early Nineteenth Century British Education” argues that lots of very poor families paid for schooling in the early nineteenth century.¹

H. J. Kiesling (1983) in his critique of E. G. West’s article argues that this was not so because, of those working-class parents paying fees, the overwhelming number would have been paying a proportion of fees of less than 50% of the cost. Kiesling notes that 64% of working class pupils attended religious monitorial schools, the cheapest schools and those which were mainly interested in teaching morals and catechism (Kiesling, 1983, p. 423).

There were areas of dispute between Kiesling and West over the accuracy of statistics, the difference in statistics from different decades, the relevance (or not) of Scottish comparisons, the difference between ‘not [currently] receiving instruction’ and ‘not instructed’ (i.e. relating to pupils attending school for a few years only) and also the implication of family size (West, 1983). West appeared to concede that parental finance would have normally been less than half the cost of schooling in the case of most

¹ In his Ph.D. thesis, James Tooley (1994[a], pp. 328-339) argued that if E. G. West’s arguments were correct households in the twentieth century could afford private schooling if they ‘cut down’ on luxuries.
(working-class) parents. Following Hobsbawm (E. Hobsbawm, 1999, Diagram 8a), I have assumed that the working class would likely have been about four times the size of the lower middle class, and that the upper working class referred to would have been of the order of the top 10-15% of those classified as working class. West also stated (West, 1983, p. 432) that the fact that many pupils were excluded from the market in school provision (presumably by poverty) was not an ‘inefficiency’ of the market, but was instead a ‘prior constraint’. It was also noted that at some points the debate neglected the problem of parents affording the schooling of more than one child at once. As a result, I do not consider that West’s arguments on the affordability of schooling prior to 1870 have been proved to the extent claimed by Tooley (Tooley, 1994[a], pp. 328ff).

5.2 Base and superstructure, related to schooling.

As was noted in Section 3.1, by the end of the eighteenth century less and less land was given to agricultural use and as a result Britain came to rely on imports for foodstuffs, especially grain. Britain paid for these imports by exporting industrial products and ‘invisible’ exports such as shipping, insurance services and financial services, within a market which became increasingly international from the 1850’s. The trend towards the creation of international markets in heavy manufacturing, textiles and invisible services increased in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of the growth in world trade. Several European countries, especially Germany, began to increase their technical competence and investment and British industrialists believed that Britain’s position as a multinational trader was under threat.

Industrialists began to realise that schooling for the artisan and lower middle classes was important if British industry were to compete in both technique and cost with
industrialists in Europe. Endemic crime, social unrest and fear of social disintegration also prompted the state to directly intervene in schooling (Stephens, 1998, pp. 77,101).

In early 1870 W. E. Forster presented his Elementary Education Bill, arguing that:

> Upon the speedy provision of elementary education depends our industrial prosperity. It is no use trying to give technical teaching to our artisans [sic] without elementary education; uneducated labourers – and many of our labourers are utterly uneducated – are, for the most part, unskilled labourers, and if we leave our work-folk any longer unskilled, notwithstanding their strong sinews and determined energy, they will become overmatched in the competition of the world (H. C. Debs., 1870).

The ‘Forster’ Act of 1870 made schooling compulsory for 5-12 year olds, and stated that a primary school should be within the geographical reach of every child in England. It also enabled grants to be given to the voluntary sector in areas where schooling was not already provided. All but the very poor paid fees so the reform cost little, but there was increased state funding for the public inspection of schools. School Boards made grants to existing Church schools or, where no schools existed, erected their own elementary schools. Such schools were managed by School Boards that were answerable to either Parish Councils or Borough Councils. These Boards gave some communities an incentive to become actively involved in the education in their areas (W. B. Stephens, 1998, pp. 79, 101).

In 1902 the government decided to bring schooling under government control and in the same year the ‘Balfour’ Education Act created Local Education Authorities (LEAs), thereby bringing education under the direct control of local government, and thus ultimately under government control (W. B. Stephens, 1998, p. 101). This brought schools directly into the superstructure of society (as defined in Section 4.7.1) although in practice LEAs did not exercise much control over schools, and especially not over the
Church schools. Although from the late nineteenth century governments had considered state elementary schools as places where future workers were trained in the skills, attitudes and values needed by capital, it was as a result of the 'Butler' Education Act 1944 that secondary schooling became universally available. After the Education Act 1944, almost all the expenditure on public-sector schooling came either from the national exchequer or from local taxation (the 'rates'/council tax), bringing schools under the direct control of the state. Because schools were not directly generating surplus-value for the capitalists, a growing portion of educational expenditure was regarded, by many owners of capital, as being consumed unproductively (in economic terms); and so was regarded as a drain on their profits.

As was noted in Section 4.8, towards the end of the long post-World War II economic boom, schooling gradually began to be regarded also as a potential export, particularly when the rate of capital investment in machinery and factories in the UK was well below that of Japan and of many other European countries. This latter factor had resulted in the 'productivity gap' between the UK and these other countries. As Kevin Harris (1982) noted:

since capitalism is firmly stuck with its ideological commitment to and political need of compulsory schooling, and possibly with lengthening the average period of schooling, the only possibility open is to turn some aspects of educational expenditure towards counteracting the drain on surplus value (K. Harris, 1982, p. 68).

Towards the end of the 1970's, this 'productivity gap' led to the start of large scale restructuring of capital in the UK, resulting in many mergers and acquisitions. This economic move was supported by the followers of Hayek and Friedman, who also sought to reduce government funding for public services, including schooling. This
process gradually led to the call for the privatization of public services, including school provision. This meant that public services, including schooling, became more tightly incorporated into the economic life of society, or what Marx calls the “base”; and subject to economic rules and relations of the market.

Even in David Cameron’s speech on “The Big Society” (Cameron, 2010[a]), where communities are supposed to be more empowered, the control of schools still lies substantially with private companies (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 4); with communities taking over the running of parks, libraries and post offices (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 5).

5.3 The relevance of Marx’s analysis of alienation to the marketization of school provision and schooling, since 1979.

In Chapter One I show how, since 1979, successive governments have tried to develop schooling in a direction that will assist the success of the UK trade in services (Baker, 1993, p. 177; DfES, 2004, pp. 5, 73). Although at the start of this period the state was the main employer in schooling, there were moves to make many areas of school provision and schooling not then directly controlled by commercial interests nevertheless subject to the rules and relationships of the market. In Chapter One, I also show how as part of this process governments have sought to involve business and industry in the running and funding of schools (Baker, 1993, p. 177; DfES, 2004, pp. 5, 10, 73). In this chapter I aim to show how within this process the economic relations involved in the production of goods and services remains similar to those of Marx’s day. In Marx’s day most education in England was provided by private schools. In these profit-making schools the aim was to produce profit over and above the value represented by teachers’ wages, leading Marx to compare teachers, in these schools, with productive workers who produced surplus-value for capitalists:
If we may take an example from outside the sphere of material production, a school master is a productive labourer, when in addition to belabouring the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground to enrich the owner of the school. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, makes no difference to the relation (Marx, 1979[a], p. 644).

Marx clearly implies that teachers in such schools experienced alienation in the same way, and for the same reasons, as other workers situated within private property relations. I discuss these relations in more detail in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.4.

From World War II until the later part of the twentieth century most teachers in England alienated (verauseerung) their labour-power to the state and not to a private employer. I maintain that as a result of verauseerung, such teachers were still necessarily subject to the alienating relations discussed in Section 4.4.1 although the employer was the state. As Harris (1982) points out, such teachers work for a wage and are contracted to perform agreed-on activities in return for agreed-on remuneration. As a consequence, teachers “have little occupational independence, little control over their labour process, and little access to the means of production” (Harris, 1982, p. 70). In Chapter One, I note that the trend is recently towards more teachers being employed by the private sector and I predict in Section 1.5 that this trend is likely to increase. Whether employment is by the state or private firms, teachers still alienate their labour-power, resulting in a lack of control over their activities. As a result of increased control by the private sector over the process of schooling, the work of teachers and consequently the subjective life of teachers, becomes directly subject to corporate values and goals. In the next part of this chapter, I explain why such a process necessarily results in relinquishment of control and estrangement (Section 4.4.1, to the detriment of the education of pupils.
To recall briefly, in Chapter Four I note that according to Marx’s analysis the alienating relations which result from veräusserung (selling one’s labour-power) within private property relations (which would include a private provider of schools) are a) lack of control of productive activity; b) instrumentality of productive activity, and c) the inability of labour to objectify itself in a way which confirms itself (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 327-8). I now intend to describe these relations in the context of the marketization of school provision, and to show how alienating relations subvert and distort the educational process.

Within private property relationships, labour-power is of value to the owners of capital in so far as it creates surplus-value (Section 2.1). In the present chapter I show that, in the search to create profits, both the concern with results in terms of league tables and the image of their particular school in the market place become major preoccupations of teachers. They consequently perceive their job security to rest, at least partly, on projecting a ‘good’ image of the school. Moreover, pupils in this process become instrumental to the needs of the school and so exist, in the eyes of the school sponsors, for the school rather than the school for them. Therefore pupils become mainly ‘things’ which have value in the market (S. Ball, 2004, p. 6), and therefore schools would seek to attract pupils who are perceived to be the easiest and cheapest to teach and, plausibly, more likely to attract other like pupils.

As an essential part of such processes, grades and examination passes become the main indicators of success, and parents and pupils perceive good grades as merely tradeable assets in the job market. Importantly, successive governments have used
GCSE passes and SAT grades to decide on grants for particular schools and, in some cases, whether or not the schools concerned should stay open.

Because the GCSE A*-C band is a key indicator, teachers are encouraged to prioritize situations which will ensure that the maximum number of pupils’ results are GCSE A*-C passes. Because pupils with potential A* to B grades fall in the same band as pupils with potential Cs, many pupils in the A*-B band are marginalized in favour of those who are in the D band, especially if the latter are borderline Cs. As a result, the educational needs of many pupils are sacrificed to the measurement of a school’s success in the terms laid down by the government’s market reforms.

The drive towards gaining good results in league tables also affects the way the curriculum is delivered. Already, some teachers have been required to use computer technology in order to assist major corporations to design teaching programs, which will then be the exclusive copyright of these firms, with many teachers receiving no extra payment or recognition for this (Hallgarten, J. 2003). The result is the production of a program over which such teachers have no control, and which is commodified solely to make a profit for computer firms. As a result, teachers will not necessarily be enabled to exercise their powers and abilities in a ‘fully human’ way or to enter into positive social relations with their pupils, and as a consequence both the teachers and the pupils become dehumanised.

I maintain that the internal relationships entailed in schooling in a market situation necessarily result in estrangement (entfremdet) between teachers and pupils, since both see each other in instrumental terms rather than as partners in the learning process. As a result, for many pupils, meaning in general lies outside school: and as a consequence a
significant number of pupils will truant or be excluded from school.

5.4 Alienation in the market models of Tooley and Brighouse.

The alienating relations outlined above can be found in the process of the marketization of schools which I describe in Chapter One, regardless of whether the market is specifically or lightly regulated. To briefly recall, in Chapter Two I note that within a lightly regulated market, the control of schools and schooling resources is exercised mainly by those entrepreneurs who fund the schooling. This removes control from those who use schools and work within them, and delivers it to those whose main aim is to create wealth. Even if the latter have some interest in education they are involved *qua* business people. I note in Section 2.5.3 that a more regulated market in school provision was argued for by Harry Brighouse as a means for supporting quality of provision. However, in Section 1.3 I produce empirical evidence to show why, to date, this type of regulation has not worked in England. For example, in Section 1.3 I note that in June 2000 Capital Strategies issued a report entitled *The Business of Education* (Capital Strategies, 2000) in which they recorded that businesses threatened not to invest in schooling unless regulations were changed about the length and complexity of the bidding process, the constraints of the National Curriculum and the time allowed to reach targets. Capital Strategies also noted that these education businesses demanded more strategic control of schools and the ability to control governing bodies.

In this section I specifically explore the alienating relations which are found in both the ‘specifically regulated’ and ‘lightly regulated’ markets in school provision as illustrated by Harry Brighouse and James Tooley respectively and argue that, because
these models are towards opposite ends of the market spectrum within the capitalist system, they point to conclusions for capitalist markets as a whole. In this exploration I employ similar conceptual categories to those employed by Marx in “Manuscripts” (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 327-328).

The teachers working within the models of both Tooley and Brighouse have to sell (alienate) their labour to the owners of the schools (or the state) in order to acquire the goods and conditions needed to live. To recall, as a result, the control of the teacher’s productive activity is handed over to the owners of the school. These owners will control the conditions of work of the teachers, the curriculum and the ethos of the school. As a result teachers, as workers, have to work within the structures, goals and values set by the owners. As a consequence, productive activity does not necessarily satisfy the teacher’s needs, but is merely instrumental to satisfying needs outside of himself or herself, thus dehumanising the teacher as a worker (Marx, 1975[f], p. 326). I maintain that this alienation occurs regardless of whether the market is ‘lightly regulated’, in the case of Tooley, or ‘specifically regulated’ as in the case of Brighouse. Interestingly, Brighouse does not mention the regulation that could be used to protect workers: his regulation is specifically in order to ensure that pupils have an education which would allow them to lead autonomous lives. Even if such regulation for teachers and other school staff as workers did exist within Brighouse’s model, it could not mitigate the alienating relations which necessarily exist within capitalism.

Within Tooley’s model, schooling is provided by business men/women as primarily a means to generate profit. Indeed Tooley acknowledges that, although the business people in his model would be specialists in education, their predominant aim as business
people would be to generate a profit (Tooley, 2000, p. 19). In the case of Tooley’s model, parents are paying customers and so, the greater the perceived quality of a school, for example in terms of examination passes, the larger the number of parents who would want to send their children to a particular school. Because of the lack of government regulation within Tooley’s model, if particular pupils are felt to be detrimental to the reputation of the school, or if the cost of their schooling is likely to be relatively high, they could be refused entry or could even be asked to leave a particular school.

To recall briefly, Brighouse’s model is also based on choice-based mechanisms which may be situated within a market. Within this model, social individuals are put in competition with others and pupils as a consequence are taught to perceive other pupils as adversarial to them. This form of education is, therefore, corrosive to both social cohesion and to an appreciation of social interdependence. In Brighouse’s model the government pays subsidies to a particular school according to the number of parents choosing to send their children there. Brighouse acknowledges that, in the case of oversubscribed schools, the schools choose the pupils and not vice versa. As an alternative to overt choice by schools, Brighouse recommends the use of a lottery as a solution to oversubscription (Brighouse, 2000, p. 52). Later, in On Education, Brighouse argues that such a method would not be applicable in the UK, both because of political opposition and also because of the different laws on religious schools (Brighouse, 2006, p. 91).

Instrumentality can be found in the market models of both Tooley and Brighouse. This results in estrangement (entfremdet) between teachers and pupils, as both perceive each other in instrumental terms, rather than as partners in a learning process. Teachers, because they have sold (alienated) their labour-power to the sponsors of the schools, have
to implement the goals of the sponsors, which will be primarily concerned with making a
profit: this is the case even when the main business of the sponsor is schooling (see
Section 2.1 for a discussion of this argument). To recall, this could result in conditions
and relations which are adverse to the pupil’s learning such as large classes or a narrow
curriculum (see Section 2.1). These conditions and relations would result in many pupils
finding it difficult to get the schooling that they need. If pupils demand a change in these
conditions and relations, but teachers could not effect such a change, a breakdown in trust
and respect would result, and schooling would become perceived as something alien to
the needs of both pupils and teachers.

Moreover, the lack of control which comes from selling one’s labour-power to a
private sponsor within Tooley’s model means that teachers cannot necessarily be
assured that they can teach in a way which they believe to be meaningful. This lack of
control must necessarily result in alienation. This alienation will also occur in
Brighouse’s model, whether teachers alienate their labour-power to private sponsors or to
the state. However, I contend that alienating relations will be greater within Tooley’s
model because schools will be owned mainly by entrepreneurs in education whose
purpose as entrepreneurs will be primarily to make a profit (Tooley, 2000, p. 19).
Because pupils will be educated within a system in which schooling is valued even more
as something instrumental to employment or to making a profit, the processes of
schooling within the systems of both Tooley and Brighouse increasingly distort and
devalue the processes of education. As a consequence, education becomes redefined and
changes its meaning, becoming something more akin to commodity production.

Within Tooley’s model the only possibility of parents influencing their children’s
schooling is through the market. Within market structures, pupils who cannot gain access to schools of their choice are individuals with unsatisfied economic demands, not individuals with unsatisfied human needs. Therefore, within such a model, the economic relations which are necessarily created are those that enable private possession to be satisfied at the expense of human need (Section 2.1). In this process pupils and teachers are valued mainly as commodities and, as a consequence, pupils are encouraged to perceive other social individuals as mainly instrumental to their goals.

In conclusion: I have argued in this chapter that, as a consequence of marketization of school provision and schooling, the productive activity of teachers has become more alienated (entfremdet) and the process of education more distorted. This is because both 'specifically regulated' and 'lightly regulated' markets are models within capitalism, albeit at opposite ends of the spectrum of market relations.
Part Three: Market socialism and alienation

Chapter Six
An analysis of market socialism as an ‘end-state’, with reference to school provision and alienation.

Introduction

This chapter explores some of the attempts made to escape alienation, as defined by Marx, within various forms of market socialism. This exploration begins by examining the concept of market socialism proposed by David Miller in his article “Socialism and the market” (1977) and further developed in Market, State and Community (1999). The application of Miller’s ideas to schooling was undertaken by Patricia White in Beyond Domination (1983). The term ‘market socialism’ was used in the 1930’s to refer to the concept used by writers such as the Polish economist and diplomat, Oskar Lange. Although Lange’s model has been labelled as a form of market socialism, it is fundamentally different in form and content from that of David Miller, as is discussed separately in Chapter Seven.

Briefly, Lange supports classical markets in consumer goods and labour-power and uses an adaptation of a planned economy with quasi-market mechanisms\(^1\) for heavy industry. Miller makes a more extensive use of markets than does Lange (Miller, 1999, p. 9, n. 15). In Market, State and Community, Miller argues for the use of markets and contends that, given certain conditions (discussed in the next section), it is possible to counter alienation within markets. In this chapter I show why it is not possible to counter alienation using the methods that Miller suggests.

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\(^1\) In these industries managers are allowed to adjust inputs and outputs according to the indicators found in models of ‘markets’ (such as pricing), together with agreed pre-set criteria.
6.1 David Miller's model of market socialism.
6.1.1 Miller's rationale for the market.

Miller gives five reasons for supporting the existence of a regulated market as a fundamental structure of his model (Miller, 1999, p. 18). Firstly, Miller argues for the presumed efficiency of the market; secondly, for the ability “to confine the economic role of the state in a way that makes democratic government feasible”; thirdly, for the ability “to protect the autonomy of workers”; fourthly, for the ability to “to bring about a much more equal distribution of primary income (rather than relying entirely on secondary distribution)” (Miller, 1999, pp. 9-10), and finally, says Miller, the development of the individuality of each individual is thereby potentially enabled (Miller, 1999, p. 213). The first two reasons cited above concern the regulation of markets. The weakness of regulation in the market in school provision is illustrated in Sections 1.3.1 and 2.7.

Miller argues that the individuality of workers is protected by the market in four main ways. Firstly, Miller argues that market structures, by supporting exchange value, enable an individual to develop both his individuality and his individual powers (Miller, 1999, p. 213). Miller argues that this is because market structures confer a kind of negative freedom, which enables the individual to have “a certain kind of independence from material and social ties” (Miller, 1999, p. 210), and a “degree of autonomy” (Miller, 1999, p. 211). The impossibility of having a high degree of autonomy within capitalist markets is discussed in Section 4.9.

Secondly, Miller argues that when markets supply goods and services to consumers they “circumvent judgments about the intrinsic goodness or badness of
what is supplied" (Miller, 1999, p. 74). Miller goes on to argue that markets are
"neutral with respect to the relationships that people choose to establish for the
purpose of carrying on economic activity" (Miller, 1999, p. 74). Miller defines
neutrality in terms of effects rather than in terms of the rationale that lies behind
institutions. For Miller, neutrality is defined as "when, as far as can reasonably be
foreseen, it does not favour any particular conception of the good at the expense of
others" (Miller, 1999, p. 77).

Thirdly, Miller argues that the relationships involved in market exchange
support a kind of equality. This is because individuals and individual legal entities
who meet in the market simply do so as bearers of exchange value, and so are
necessarily equals in the legal sense (Miller, 1999, p. 212). Fourthly, Miller argues
that the mobility of labour, forced upon the individual by the law of supply and
demand, has forced the worker to develop many skills; and hence to develop himself
further (Miller, 1999, p. 212).

Miller argues also that the properties of a market should be preserved, provided
that the alienating "properties" outlined by Marx (Miller, 1999, pp. 207-8) can be
"countered" (Miller, 1999, p. 223). Miller defines alienation as "a condition where
a subject finds himself separated from some feature of his context, this separation
being regarded as damaging in human terms" (Miller, 1999, p. 203). However, unlike
Marx, Miller does not outline the causes of alienation. Despite the fact that Miller
does not analyze the causes of alienation, he argues that capitalist alienation can be
countered if market conditions become the expression of collective will, based on
humane and co-operative dispositions within the structures of a "democratic" market
economy (Miller, 1999, pp. 221-3). I explore this argument further in Section 6.2.2.
Next, I place Miller’s argument in context by outlining Miller’s model of the economy.

6.1.2 An analysis of Miller’s system of self-governing enterprises.

In Miller’s economy capital is treated as a social resource and “any worker who wanted to could readily obtain access to his own capital” (Miller, 1999, p. 196), with the following provisions:

individuals can acquire resources only through engaging in productive activity, and these resources, once acquired, cannot be converted into private capital. People can save, receive interest on their savings that reflects a time discount, but they cannot lease their assets to other individuals on terms that represent a return to the assets themselves. Capital investment remains the prerogative of the public agencies (Miller, 1999, p. 197).

This capital is distributed through state-funded investment banks, subject to stipulations laid down by the state (Miller, 1999, p. 312). Miller claims that this indirect form of leasing protects the autonomy of self-governing firms from direct state interference. This makes the form of political economy which Miller advocates fundamentally different from that advocated by Oskar Lange, and discussed in Section 7.2. In order to prevent direct interference from the state, Miller advocates a plurality of investment banks, which are allowed to decide what investments to make, within government remits which balance profitability against wider national and regional economic objectives (Miller, 1999, pp. 310-312). This mandate would include the duty to sponsor co-operatives by allocating capital to a) the expected profitability of enterprises; b) enterprise creation; c) employment needs; d) market opportunities, e) local needs, and f) environmental needs (Miller, 1999, pp. 310-11). Miller is not totally explicit about the conditions of leases for capital goods or for land, but he suggests that a) lessees agree to pay lease charges; b) that lessees
cannot sublet or transfer capital assets to anyone else, or c) use the initial capital to create further private capital (Miller, 1999, p. 197).

Worker/producers are likely to have to report to investment banks (which are national banks) annually on the profitability of their businesses and to work within the stipulations the banks lay down. Although banks are at 'arms length' in Miller's model, they are partly funded by tax revenues and partly by savings. Miller argues that this protects the autonomy of the banks and also protects particular business enterprises from direct political interference (Miller, 1999, p. 310). Miller argues that it is possible that the banks' performance might be reviewed by an appropriate representative body, who would decide how successfully each bank had fulfilled its various objectives over a large number of cases (Miller, 1999, p. 311).

However, Miller argues that, irrespective of such governmental mandates, the goals of 'a socialist state' would be best achieved "by, for instance, creating an appropriate incentive system and then allowing markets to operate; or by establishing semi-autonomous bodies acting under policy guidelines" (Miller, 1999, p. 319). As a result of both state mandates ("semi-autonomous bodies acting under policy guidelines" and of market decision-making), decisions would be made with no direct input from worker/producers or consumers.

6.1.3 An exploration of Miller’s political system.

I now consider the type of state which would support Miller’s economy. In his book Market, State and Community (1999), Miller outlines three main functions of his state. He says the first function of his state would be to safeguard the

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2 The revenue from leasing capital from investment banks goes to a social fund which is allocated according to principles of distributive justice (Miller, 1999, p. 197), based on shared standards (Miller, 1999, p. 265).
resources and benefits that accrue to individuals (Miller, 1999, p. 295). The second function would be to allocate resources to meet the standards of distributive justice, that is, each individual would receive on average the exchange value that he has created (Miller, 1999, p. 175).³ The third function that Miller recognizes is one of regulating the economy so that it satisfies the criteria of efficiency. This must include, for example, operating anti-trust legislation (thus ensuring that most industries remain competitive); encouraging the creation of new industries, and managing those parts of the economy (he mentions health and education) in which, for Miller, a private competitive solution is not applicable. Miller suggests choice-based mechanisms could be appropriate instead for health and education services. (Miller, 1999, p. 317). These structures would need to enable the dissemination of information to allow consumers to make effective choices, and to allow enterprises to plan their future activities with a maximum chance of success. In Miller’s model, the state would provide training to allow people to switch skills, and to provide or enable public goods such as recreational facilities, public transport, and environmental protection (Miller, 1999, pp. 296-7).

For most people, Miller envisages political activity mainly taking place in local assemblies, where individuals would act as representatives on a rotational basis (Miller, 1999, p. 301). These representatives would make ground rules and administrative priorities but would not become involved in the day-to-day management of resources (Miller, 1999, p. 236). The latter would be carried out by full-time salaried officials. In Miller’s model, the higher levels of government would basically operate according to the principles of representative democracy, with an

³ Here Miller does not seem to address such issues as disability or retirement.
election every five years between which powers would be given to operate without necessarily any recourse to the electorate.

Miller argues that a constitution would be needed which would demarcate democratic citizenship from the sphere which, he argues, is rightfully occupied by specialists and administrators (Miller, 1999, p. 301). These specialists would be permanent, salaried officials appointed by the state because of their expertise and also their willingness to support constitutional guidelines (Miller, 1999, pp. 299, 309, 311, 312, 319). For Miller, such administrators would not be accountable to the electorate. This is because Miller argues that the electorate would not necessarily have the knowledge, or the time to acquire the knowledge, necessary to make informed decisions on technical matters (Miller, 1999, pp. 299-300, 312). For Miller, the state would also be funding ‘expert’ organizers and assigning full-time salaried officials to deliver a vast range of programmes. This would be expanding the role of the state, which would direct economic activity and social services, such as schooling, as a result of decision-making at a national level. In Section 6.2.1 I argue that such structures result in reified social relations over which social individuals have no control. In Section 6.2.1 also, I maintain that such reified social relations would be oppositional to the objective collective and co-operative relations needed to support the subjective co-operative and collective relations which Miller argues are necessary to overcome alienation (Miller, 1999, pp. 220-3).

6.1.4 Miller and schooling.

Miller does not write systematically about school provision in Market, State and Community (1999). However, he does “tip in favour” of a “public system” which incorporates “a substantial element of consumer choice” (Miller, 1999, p. 317)
and which he later acknowledges does create quasi-markets (Miller, 2000, p. 50).

Miller is not, in principle, adverse to regulated markets for the distribution of public goods, provided that the state ensures that everyone has the ability to purchase the goods they need, whether through provision of income or by vouchers (Miller, 1999, p. 316).

In England in 2009 a Trust Schools model of schooling (backed by the Co-operative movement) was proposed which would seem to be commensurate with schooling within Miller’s model. In Section 1.3 I noted that Trust Schools were to be government funded and could join forces with business, charities and other public-sector organizations. By joining the Trust, members became part-owners of the school and could take part in choosing school trustees. Two of the people representing the wider community could sit on the board along with trustees from partner organizations.

Trusts were to have powers to employ staff, own buildings and set their own admission policies. Trust schools could apply for ‘additional flexibilities’ both for curriculum provision, and for pay and conditions of work for staff. Although Co-operative Trusts were to be free to set their own admissions policies, they were instructed to work with LEAs to ensure that they were complying with the framework set by the national admissions policy.

Miller argues that “public welfare can contribute to egalitarian aims only in conjunction with a broader policy aimed at reducing inequalities in primary incomes” (Miller, 1999, p. 315). This raises an interesting debate, but it is one in which I have not engaged in this thesis because it is not central to my analysis of alienation.

As noted in the previous section, in most areas of public sector Miller tends to
favour a "public system" which incorporates "a substantial element of consumer choice". He favours a market in housing (Miller, 1999, pp. 19, 317) and does not rule out the use of a market mechanism in health and education (Miller, 1999, p. 314). However, Miller has two main reservations about markets. Firstly, he argues that efficiency is hard to assess in markets in the absence of a pricing mechanism (Miller, 1999, p. 316): presumably he believes this will be the case in health and education. Secondly, Miller says that in markets consumer sovereignty is difficult to implement in a situation where recipients may not be competent to judge between various providers (Miller, 1999, pp. 316-7). It was noted in Chapter One that, in England since 1999, a pricing mechanism has been implemented which enables demand, in terms of the number of entrants, for particular schools to be rewarded by the government in terms of cash grants. (The problem of "product" information is, of course, being addressed continually by successive UK governments and, so far, has been addressed by the institutionalization of league tables and school testing). I now consider some criticisms of Miller’s model.

6.2  Criticisms of Miller’s model.

6.2.1  Oppositional relations in Miller’s model of ‘non-exploitative capitalism’.

It was noted in Section 6.1.2 that, in Miller’s model, capital is socialized and situated within what he claims to be ‘non-exploitative capitalist relations’ (Miller, 1999, p. 196). I maintain that the leasing of capital to individual collectives of producers would necessarily result in the fragmentation of production and competition between co-operatives. As a consequence, social individuals seem to be independent of each other and ‘free’ to exchange goods and services within this system. I also contend that such social relations would necessarily be oppositional to objective collective and co-operative relations needed to support the subjective co-
operative and collective relations which Miller argues are necessary to overcome alienation (Miller, 1999, pp. 220-3). In Miller’s model, the co-operatives would operate in a similar mode to pre-capitalist artisans or journeymen, as considered in Section 3.1. Marx’s position is that such an artisan relates to the instruments of production and the land “as an owner” (Marx, 1973[a], p. 499). In the following section I consider the alienating relations which result from this.

6.2.2 Alienating relations in Miller’s model.

In this section I argue that capitalism, even the ‘non-exploitative capitalism’ of Miller, consists of relations which are necessarily alienating. Estrangement from collective activity, in Miller’s model, is acknowledged by Miller himself for three main reasons. Firstly, Miller accepts that, within market economies, goods are primarily produced as commodities, and producers ‘have to be’ concerned about what exchange value they receive if they are to remain in business. Miller observes that the need to create exchange value comes between producers’ work and directly catering for human needs, and so must result in the dehumanization of the producer. (Miller, 1999, pp. 205-6). Secondly, Miller notes that “partners to an exchange transaction are at best indifferent to one another’s interests; at worst there is an active conflict of interests between them, and each will seek to benefit at the expense of the other”, resulting in mutual suspicion and possible hostility (Miller, 1999, p. 206). Thirdly, Miller argues that alienation “from the collective results of human activity seems to be a feature of all market economies merely in [sic] virtue of the fact that they are unplanned” (Miller, 1999, p. 207, GT’s italics). Miller acknowledges that “in this sense man is, in Marx’s terms, ‘the plaything of alien powers’ [Marx, 1975[g], p. 220] in a way that he seems not to be in an ideal planned economy, where every
outcome is directly related to a human decision, and social relations become [again in Marx's words] ‘transparent’" (Miller, 1999, p. 207, GT's italics).

I maintain in this chapter that, although co-operatives in Miller’s model would not have full rights of ownership of the means of production, they would have full, exclusive rights of the use of capital for their own productive activities (Miller, 1999, p. 10). Therefore although worker/producers would not be 'owners' of capital, in a market economy, they would operate as if they were capitalists. Indeed, Miller maintains that it is possible for capitalist relations to predominate within a system of 'non-exploitative capitalism':

The condition for this would be that any worker who wanted to could readily obtain access to his own capital – presumably from public sources – so that capitalist employment would represent a genuine choice (Miller, 1999, p. 196).

Therefore, I contend that, although the private property relations of classical capitalism would have been taken over here by a form of collective control, the collective in which worker/producer act has a property relation with the rest of society as if it were a private possessor of property.

Within this situation, the Marxian category of worker would not be abolished; workers would still alienate (sell) their skills and goods to other members of the community in return for money. As such, the economy is still primarily based on commodity production and exchange value. Within this situation, private property is still the relation that the community has to the world of things, and the community acts as if it were the 'freehold' owner of capital. Consequently, the alienating relations outlined in Section 4.4 are still present.

Within Miller’s model, worker/producers have the right to autonomous control
over the goods produced, the productive process and the management structures [as long as they are democratic] (Miller, 1999, p. 10). The restriction on creating fresh capital assets is not as onerous as it might seem because many co-operatives would not usually use assets to create new capital. For example, a co-operative using a machine for, say, packing would not necessarily be likely to have the wherewithal to make another such machine. Importantly, however, Miller’s model gives no indication as to how new capital would created.

Miller acknowledges that, although workers no longer have to sell their labour-power (Miller, 1999, p. 198), there would still be a labour market. Although workers who both invest and work in the same firms are not selling their labour-power to an employer, they are still subject to the ‘market’ which occurs as a result of workers having a free choice of which enterprise to join, and of the co-operative enterprises choosing how many worker/producers to take on (Miller, 1999, p. 198).

Miller argues that the economic relations of market socialism will eliminate some aspects of alienation as diagnosed by Marx. In particular Miller states that “where work is organized co-operatively and the profits of enterprises are shared among all the members”, workers will not be estranged from their products “given that they benefit directly from the sale of these products in the market place” (Miller, 1999, p. 205). I contend that while it is true that, within Miller’s model, workers have more control over productive activity than within classical capitalism, they are still subject to the market relations outlined in Sections 4.4 to 4.4.2. I also contend, however, that it is questionable whether alienating relations can be eliminated while investment banks are controlling the flow of capital within economic relations which are fundamentally capitalist. Importantly, Miller also acknowledges that, if
alienation cannot be adequately ‘countered’, then this lack provides a strong objection to his model of a market economy (Miller, 1999, p. 223).

I now turn to how Miller himself proposes to negate alienation (which, for Miller, is defined in Section 6.1.1). Miller bases his proposal on the example of a game of tennis to illustrate the possibility of the dual nature of economic relations. For Miller, these relations are instrumental, competitive and spontaneous as well as co-operative and humane within the same structure (Miller, 1999, p. 223). In his game of tennis Miller argues that, although on the surface the relationship between the players is competitive, under the surface in fact it can be co-operative. Miller argues that because both parties understand the co-operative character of the relationship, it is able to survive the apparent competitive nature of the game.

In the above scenario, Miller ignores the effect of objective relations and argues that, within market socialism, social relations might not be alienating if their deeper co-operative character were to be understood and actively supported. From this argument, Miller concludes that “economic relations may take on a dual character, at one level instrumental, competitive, and spontaneous, but at another level human and co-operative” (Miller, 1999, pp. 221-3, GT’s italics). However, Miller fails to show why social individuals should be human and co-operative within this situation in the first place. Moreover, Miller is also acknowledging that such non-alienating relations are contingent and therefore might or might not occur. Therefore, in his own analysis, Miller’s method of overcoming alienation might or might not bring his desired result.

To briefly recapitulate, Miller acknowledges that if alienating relations were to still exist in his system, then they would remain a powerful argument against market socialism (Miller, 1999, p. 223). Miller relies on a thought experiment based on a
tennis match to show how consciousness can overcome alienation. In this section I note that Miller’s method advocates only a subjective means of overcoming alienation: the objective relations which support such alienating relations still remain; and, on Miller’s view, the ability to overcome alienation is not guaranteed.

6.3 Patricia White’s model of a political economy.

A model of democratic schooling which claims to be situated in the type of political economy advocated by Miller (Miller, 1999) is supplied by Patricia White in Beyond Domination (White, 1983). White argues that a “modified form of it [Miller’s political economy] may be essential for the realization of some democratic values” (White, 1983, p. 48, GT’s italics). White comes to this conclusion because she contends that it is “basic to the idea of the market that decisions to produce goods or services are made not by some authority but by the producers themselves with a view to selling to customers who have no obligation to buy from them” (White, 1983, p. 48). She goes on to argue that “such a market allows for individual initiative, flair and ingenuity in producing goods in a way in which non-market public ownership systems [presumably of a non-democratic type – GT] do not” (White, 1983, p. 49). White also contends that:

The market system in the participatory democracy allows for the exercise of imaginative business flair extolled by businessmen in our present society but without the morally obnoxious motivations often associated with that in practice – the desire for individual aggrandizement, for instance, or the desire to exercise power over others....(White, 1983, p. 49).

White contends that, in a participatory society, the motivations are different and include “the desire to make a profit for the community generally, to enhance the quality of life in it and the satisfaction of working with others on a project which has been jointly planned, developed and organized”
(White, 1983, p. 49). I now consider White’s political economy in order to show the similarities between her model and that of David Miller. Like Miller, White supports an economy based on self-governing workers’ co-operatives, within which worker/producers make their own decisions about production and prices, and which lease their capital from the state (White, 1983, p. 48).

White supports a broad system of community regulation as a means to ensure that the needs of the wider community are addressed. For White, this regulation would be decided by an elected National Forum. This National Forum would be a representative, rather than a participatory body; and members would be elected on a one-member-one-vote basis. Members of the National Forum would not be present as delegates and would not be subject to recall even if its policies proved unpopular with the electorate (White, 1983, pp. 40-1). White argues that a National Forum is necessary for three main reasons: firstly, to ensure that constitutional rights are protected; secondly, to provide a monitoring/co-ordinating role outside the network of local groups, and thirdly to arbitrate where preferences in society are divided (White, 1983, pp. 82-3).

White does not debar decisions being made by specialists, but stipulates that such specialists should be accountable to fellow members of the workforce (White, 1983, p. 52). In this way her model of democracy differs from Miller’s. White’s rationale for this structure is that the monitoring/co-ordinating of policy needs to be performed by some ‘accountable’ authority standing outside the network of local groups. However, she does not say how such a body would be made accountable.

White maintains that, because workers’ groups would be self-governing, it is not
possible to determine *in detail* the *internal* machinery of management. However, she
does outline some details of the internal machinery which are necessary to support her
concept of democracy. Next I consider how White applies her ideas to schooling.

6.4 White’s approach to schooling.

In White’s model schools are treated like other workplaces and have the same
structural relations on issues relating to work (White, 1983, p. 92), so she believes
that control of how subjects are taught and of how the school is organized should
be under the control of those affected by such structures and conditions, including
senior pupils. However, in her model, the community is not directly consulted in the
way the school is run. For White, community control is exercised through
representatives acting on national bodies, which exercise power over and above the
wider community.

Although White has no objection to a market in school provision, in the model
outlined in *Beyond Domination* schools are funded, regulated and inspected by
employees of the National Forum acting on behalf of the state (see Section 6.4).
White argues that schools should be more heavily regulated than the economy for
three main reasons. Firstly, she posits that national guidelines should ensure that
there is a reasonable uniformity of learning objectives and training of teachers, so that
pupils and teachers can transfer easily between schools. Secondly, she argues for the
necessity of ensuring that educational machinery and policies deliver to pupils the
schooling which is reflective of their constitutional right. Finally, she says, a National
Forum is necessary to ensure that those policies which affect the well-being of the
whole community are undertaken in the public interest (White, 1983, pp. 82-3).

For White, schooling should support the principles, attitudes and values
underlying participatory democracy. For example, equality in the exercise of political power should be made explicit and available for critical consideration (White, 1983, pp. 90-1). In addition, White argues that schooling for democratic activity should form an important part of schooling.

White argues that what is taught formally can be undermined if the organization of the school does not support the message given formally. White contends that "simply by being within the educational structure one acquires, implicitly, and by degrees, and not necessarily in logical order, some understanding of the political structure of society, particularly as it bears on education" (White, 1983, p. 89). White concludes that the democratic principles and values which apply to other work places should also apply to schools (White, 1983, pp. 81, 92). White, therefore, concludes that the roles and status assigned to staff in any school should be those appropriate in a democratic society (White, 1983, p. 93).

For White, the decision-making arrangements of a school have an important impact on pupils' schooling in three main ways. Firstly, they influence the acquisition of political attitudes. Therefore, she argues that, although individuals can learn abstractly about the rules of democracy, they also need to experience democratic decision making in order to develop the appropriate skills and dispositions needed to support a democracy (White, 1983, p. 95). For White, these are the dispositions to care about freedom (which she discusses under the concept of autonomy), equality, justice and fraternity; with the predominant disposition being towards autonomous activity (White, 1983, pp. 49, 70-2, 140). I explore how she intends to develop these dispositions later in this section.

Secondly, White says, guided experience of decision making in school would
provide a yardstick against which to measure authority structures and would enable people to make some contribution to the organization of democratically-organized work places (White, 1983, p. 96). Therefore White argues that, thirdly, properly planned school experience in decision making should provide opportunities for everyone to feel that they could be politically effective and could contribute to decision making in the wider society (White, 1983, p. 96). White concludes:

This means concretely that all those working in a school should be able to participate in decisions which affect their work and be accountable to their colleagues for their delegated responsibilities in the running of the institution (White, 1983, p. 92).

Although White argues in favour of markets in Beyond Domination, she states that she is opposed to an entrepreneurial form of management. Importantly, White acknowledges that an entrepreneurial form of direction would necessarily be anti-democratic (White, 1983, pp. 89, 126). I contend that any structures involved in an entrepreneurial style of management would not necessarily support the development of fraternal attitudes in one’s fellow citizens. Such a development would be contingent and might or might not happen.

White believes that “there are no moral experts on the good life for individuals” (White, 1983, p. 10). She argues that “the only authority on the good life is therefore the individual himself or herself who has had the chance to reflect on possible lives” (White, 1983, p. 10). White argues that the conditions supporting this are best protected through a political system based on participatory democracy because, for her, participatory democracy rests on the “basic principle of justice as impartiality” (White, 1983, p. 14).

I now explore the dispositions which White has argued are needed to support
democracy. Firstly, I consider autonomy as outlined by White. White does not give a definition of autonomy: instead, she defers to Steven Lukes' discussion of autonomy in his book *Individualism* (Lukes, 1973). Lukes argues that an individual is autonomous:

To the degree to which he subjects the pressures and norms with which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation, and forms intentions and reaches practical decisions as a result of independent and rational reflection (Lukes, 1973, p. 52).

Secondly, I consider equality. White's concept of democracy also rests on "the fundamental moral presumption of the equality of all normal human beings as choosers" (White, 1983, p. 14). She is particularly keen to discuss equality in the context of "the access to the exercise, or control, of political power which must obtain in a democracy" (White, 1983, p. 30). For White, the exercise of power by a person or a group or an institution is *always* objectionable and so it would be ideal if power relationships could be completely eliminated from human life (White, 1983, p. 24).

White's concept of justice has freedom as a twin principle of democracy (White, 1983, p. 9). White argues that these principles are enshrined in the concept of democracy when it is interpreted as "each person must have access to an equal share in the exercise, or control of power, so that no conception of the good life is arbitrarily imposed on anyone, and no one is subject to arbitrary interference" (White, 1983, p. 9). Next I consider White's concept of fraternity. For White, fraternity is outlined in the following way:

Fraternity as I have outlined it, namely as feeling a bond between oneself and others as equals, as moral beings with the same basic needs and an interest in leading a life of one's own, is the necessary *emotional attitude* between citizens who hold that one of the basic principles of their society is that power must be exercised, or
controlled, equally by all moral agents who form the citizen body (White, 1983, p. 72, GT’s italics).

This concept of fraternity found in White differs from the concept of love found in both Hegel and Marx. In Sections 3.5 and 4.5 I noted that, for Hegel and Marx, “love” is based on a “genuine living bond” which is a recognition of the existing unity of opposites and a resultant commitment to the other. Within such a relation, one looks to the other person not as a means, nor as an external imposition on the satisfaction of our own ends, but as a fellow human being who has value qua a human being. For White fraternity is an “appropriate attitude” and not an ontological bond (White, 1982, p. 72, GT’s italics).

I contend that any structural relations involved in an entrepreneurial form of school management would not necessarily support the development of fraternal attitudes to one’s fellow citizens. I argue that such process would be contingent and might or might not happen. For White, fraternity is not necessarily supported by structural relations. As White seems to acknowledge, such development is contingent: although social individuals might be fraternal in circumstances where social relations are alienating, this psychological state is contingent because, within alienating structural relations, fraternity is not necessarily supported by structural relations which are alienating:

- engagements in communal projects may not generate such feelings [of comradeship and togetherness – GT], but feelings of competitiveness, envy, even hostility… even if they do generate more positive feelings of, for instance, liking to be in the company of others, such feelings may not be sufficient or even necessary for the fraternal attitude (White, 1983, p. 70).

6.5 Oppositional and alienating relations in White’s model.

In Section 4.3 I argue that when productive activity takes place within
alienating relations, an object confronts the agent as something other, as something which is not his own and which is alien to him. Only in unalienating conditions and structures is the confrontation of the object by the agent not as something other, but as something belonging and satisfying to the agent. Only in unalienating conditions are there structural relations which necessarily support harmony of thought, being, conscious existence, reason and emotion. In Chapter Nine I argue that the structural relations and conditions necessary to ensure the operation and development of fraternity can be found only in an unalienated society when unalienating structural relations will necessarily support the development of such bonds and the consequential accompanying dispositions.

Although White acknowledges that people are educated through the structures of society (White, 1983, p. 87), she ignores the internal relations that, I maintain, occur within the structural relations of schools. For example, it was noted in Section 6.4.2. that White does not rule out a market in schooling. This is despite the fact that she acknowledges that a market model of education would result in an entrepreneurial style of management, which is necessarily anti-democratic, and to which she has to be opposed (White, 1983, pp. 89, 126). A philosophy including internal relations would have prevented such a mistake and possibly also indicated the alienating relations necessarily involved in the marketization of school provision and schooling.

In conclusion: in this chapter I have shown why it is not possible to counter alienation in the way which Miller has suggested because, for Miller, overcoming alienation is primarily the result of changing awareness, rather than of changing the objective relations and conditions which are necessary to enable unalienated activity.

I also note that, since the model of both Miller and White is embedded in
private property relations, it is subject to the objective alienating relations laid out in Chapters Four and Five. I also argue that the conditions and social relations in the model of White and Miller do not support their concept of justice, because the structural relations in their models cannot necessarily support the development of autonomy and freedom. I argue that by basing their economy on capitalist market relations, both Miller and White are supporting relations which are oppositional to the principle of freedom (as manifest in autonomy and freedom of choice) and the development of fraternity, and, as such, cannot necessarily be prefigurative of the development of autonomy and freedom of choice as defined by both Miller and White.

In Chapter Seven I analyze the model of a ‘socialist market’ used by the Soviet Marxist Oskar Lange, in which the emphasis would appear to be on socialist relations rather than on market relations, in order to ascertain how far such a system could prefigure an unalienated society which would support a ‘meaningful’ form of education.
Part Three

Chapter Seven
Oskar Lange's 'socialist market' and alienation, within the Soviet context.

Introduction

In this chapter I analyze Oskar Lange's model of a socialist market, in order to ascertain how far such a system could prefigure an unalienated society and support education as an unalienated activity. In this chapter I note that, although within Lange's model the emphasis would appear to be on socialist relations rather than market relations, market relations and laws are fundamental to the operation of the 'socialized' and non-socialized sectors of his economy.

Unlike David Miller, Lange regards himself as a Marxist, and adopts many Marxist concepts and much Marxist terminology. In this chapter I show that the meaning which Lange gives to many Marxist concepts and terms is different from that given by Marx. For example, Lange has a different meaning for the concept 'higher stage of socialism' from that found in the writings of Marx. In "The Critique of the Gotha Programme" (first published in 1875), Marx divides the relations of a socialist society into the "first phase of communism" and the "advanced phase of communism" (Marx, 1974[b], p. 347). Marx notes that the first phase of communism develops out of the conditions and relations of capital and, particularly at the beginning, is consequently subject to the conditions, relations, ideological ideas and values, of capitalist society:

We are dealing here with communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society. In every respect, economically, morally, intellectually, it is thus still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from whose womb it has emerged (Marx, 1974[b], p. 346, original italics).

For Marx, there is not a sharp delineation between the first phase of communism and the advanced phase of communism: the advanced phase of communism can be said to exist when:
the subjugation of individuals to the division of labour, and thereby the antithesis between intellectual and physical labour, have disappeared; when labour is no longer just a means of keeping alive but has become a vital need; when the all-round development of individuals has also increased with their productive powers and all springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly...... (Marx, 1974 [b], p. 347)

For Marx, the defining moment of the advanced phase of communism occurs when the means of production have become common property and where there are no markets (Marx, 1974[b], p. 345). In Capital (Marx, 1981), Marx calls the first phase of communism and the advanced phase of communism the “realm of necessity” and “the realm of freedom” respectively. These realms are considered in more detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. Briefly, the period of the realm of necessity has often been defined by other writers as socialism, and the realm of freedom communism.

However, unlike Marx, Lange argues that markets should be used as part of the transitional process to what Lange calls the higher stage of socialism (thus often known as a version of communism). Lange does this for two reasons: firstly, because he assumes an element of scarcity even at the higher levels of socialism (Lange, 1938, p. 141); and secondly because he discounts the labour theory of value as a means of assessing value at the socialist stage (Lange, 1938, p. 133).

In Section 7.1 I show that Lange’s preference for market economics is ideological as well as instrumental. I begin Section 7.1 by showing why Lange preferred market economics, in particular Marshallian economics, to Marxian ‘economics’ when choosing the analytical tools he maintains were necessary for developing the objective conditions within the Soviet Union (Lange, 1935, p. 191, n. 1).

7.1 Lange’s model of a socialist market and his use of neo-classical economics.

In 1935, in his article “Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory” (Lange, 1935, pp. 189-201), Lange claims that economic (i.e. market theory) has a “universal significance” and that Marshallian economics offers more “for the
current administration of the Soviet Union” than does Marxian economics (GT’s italics): specifically, on how to achieve economic equilibrium in an economy where the law of supply and demand operates.

For Lange the “superiority” of Marxian economics lies in “the field of explaining and anticipating a process of economic evolution,” (Lange, 1935, p. 194) and with “the definite specification of the institutional framework in which the economic process goes on in capitalist society” (Lange, 1935, p. 194), rather than in its ability to inform the organization of the political economy. In particular, Lange argues that Marx’s labour theory of value (Section 4.7.2) does not have the conceptual apparatus to deal with how to achieve market equilibrium in the business cycles found within “the economic system of Soviet Russia” (Lange, 1935, p. 191, n.1). Instead, Lange argues that Marx’s labour theory is used by Marx to provide a scientific basis for long range anticipations guiding the rational activity of a revolutionary movement directed against the very institutional foundations of the capitalist system (Lange, 1935, p. 191, n.1).

Lange would seem to be advocating the use of the market for all ‘day-to-day’ purposes, while reserving Marxian theory for policies in the distant future.

Lange notes that that the ‘law of value’ by which equilibrium asserts itself in an exchange economy is based on the division of labour which is found in any type of exchange economy, “whether capitalistic or an ‘einfache Waren-produktion’ ” the latter being defined, by Lange, as an exchange economy consisting of small independent producers each of whom possesses his own means of production (Lange, 1935, p. 197; 1938, p. 73, n. 22).

In Section 7.5.1 I consider the article “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” by Ludwig von Mises, first written in German in the 1920’s and reformulated by Hayek in 1935 in “The Present State of the Debate” in Collectivist
Economic Planning (Hayek, 1935[b]). In this section, I briefly outline the basis of Mises' argument in order to give the context of Lange's famous treatise on the use of market mechanisms within a 'socialist' economy. The basis of Mises' argument is that the principles involved in the private ownership of production are oppositional to those found in 'socialism,' where all the means of production are the property of the community (Mises, 1935, p. 90).

However in his essay Hayek maintains that the problems which Mises identified lie in the real nature of the problem rather than in pure logic:

But what is practically relevant here is not the formal structure of this system but the nature and amount of concrete information required if a numerical solution is to be attempted and the magnitude of the task which this numerical solution must involve in a modern community....... to make the result comparable with that which the competitive system provides (Hayek, 1935[b], p. 208).

Lange was heartened by Hayek's apparent rejection of the outright denial of the possibility of economic calculation in a socialist economy:

They [Hayek and Robbins, GT] do not deny the theoretical possibility of a rational allocation of resources in a socialist economy; they only doubt the possibility of a satisfactory practical solution of the problem (Lange, 1938, p. 62, original italics).

Lange noted that Hayek and Robbins did not actually provide a mechanism by which 'rational calculation' could be achieved within a 'socialist' economy, so Lange wrote On the Economic Theory of Socialism in 1938 as a way of addressing the problem (Lange, 1938, p. 65).

7.2 Lange's model of a socialist market in On the Economic Theory of Socialism.

In this section I briefly explore the way in which Lange proposed to use quasi-market mechanisms within the socialized sector of the economy. There are also classical markets in consumer goods and labour-power, the market in consumer goods appearing to be quite large (Lange, 1938, pp. 73-4, 79). Lange maintains that
“in any actual socialist community” there “must be a large number of means of production privately owned ” [e.g. farmers, artisans and small-scale entrepreneurs ] (Lange, 1938, p. 73, n. 22, GT’s italics), and this was certainly the case for a period in the Soviet Union, even after the socialization of the major industries.

A defining aspect of Lange’s model is his system of ‘shadow pricing’ within the socialized sector of the economy. In Lange’s model shadow prices, that is, accounting prices, are used to mimic the functions of the market. In this model shadow prices are used as a means of regulating and co-ordinating the means of production and raw materials in the socialized sectors of the economy, mainly heavy industry. Lange maintains that, in the socialized sectors of the economy, shadow pricing allows the Central Planning Board, which is composed of salaried bureaucrats, to plan to combine factors of production, choose the scale of output for a plant and determine the output for an industry, allocate resources and to plan to fix other prices. Lange maintains that this is done in order to balance the quantity supplied and demanded for each commodity. In Lange’s model, each industry has to produce exactly as much of a commodity as can be sold or accounted for to other industries at a price which equals the marginal cost incurred by the industry in producing that particular amount of the commodity concerned.

In Lange’s model, the Central Planning Board does this without recourse to working people, and without even consulting those people directly working in the industries concerned (Lange, 1938, p. 83): the bureaucracy, therefore, behaves as if it were the ‘market’. In the case of socialized industries the bureaucracy, substituting itself for the ‘market,’ uses quasi-market mechanisms and laws. As a result, I maintain in Section 7.5.2, that economic relations between workers and employers (even within ‘the state-controlled system’) are the same as those between worker and employer within a capitalist system.
Lange argues that the ‘accounting prices’ used by the Central Planning Board differ from market prices because accounting prices take into account all the social costs of production (including the cost of eliminating negative externalities such as pollution and protecting health) which are conducive to the social good, but which might not make a profit and which would otherwise need government subsidies. I contend that although the content of the market mechanisms might be different from those within capitalism, the economic laws and mechanisms which operate within Lange’s system of consumer goods distribution could be said to operate according to the same economic logic as those which exist in commodity production within capitalism.

Within both the socialized sector of the economy and the non-socialized sector of Lange’s model, the allocation between goods and services is based on same exchangeability between commodities as is found in a regulated market economy within capitalism. I maintain that, within Lange’s system, the state as a producer behaves in similar way to a capitalist as described in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. For example, the market in labour-power in Lange’s system necessarily results in the loss of control of productive activity by the worker. Therefore I conclude that, within Lange’s model, the employer behaves as a capitalist in both the case of the state and in the case of the “large number” of small entrepreneurs who privately own the means of production.

Lange’s ideological support for the market economy is confirmed in a letter he sent to Hayek, written in 1940 (in T. Kowalik, 1994, pp. 298-299). In this letter Lange stated that he recommended socialization only in a situation of monopoly. This preference for a market mechanism seems to continue even in Lange’s later works which, in Section 7.3, I show were significantly influenced by the epistemology of Stalinism.
7.3 Lange’s epistemology and ontology from 1950 onwards.

I begin this section by illustrating that between 1944-1964 Lange held positions of trust within the Soviet establishment. I maintain that this indicates that the overt theoretical positions which he held were reflective of the dominant ideology within the Soviet bloc.

Towards the end of World War II, Lange broke relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London and transferred his support to the Lublin Committee sponsored by the Soviet Union. In 1944 Stalin prevailed on President Franklin D. Roosevelt to obtain a passport for Lange to visit the Soviet Union so that he could speak to Lange personally: as a result, Stalin proposed offering Lange a position in the future Polish cabinet. In 1945 Lange became ambassador of the Polish Peoples’ Republic to Washington and became a go-between between Stalin and Roosevelt during the discussions on post-war Poland. In 1946 Lange served as the Polish delegate to the United Nations Security Council. Lange was a deputy chairman of the Polish Council of State from 1961-1965 and as such was one of the four acting Chairmen of the Council of State (head of state) from August 7 to August 12 1964, during a change of government. It can, therefore, be assumed that he was regarded as a trustworthy official of the state and, indeed, that his economic theories were consistent with the dominant social and economic ideology in the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war period.

Lange’s writings continued to be influenced by Stalinism after Stalin’s death. Stalin’s post as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was taken over by Nikita Khrushchev from 1953-1964. Although Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s methods in 1956, and introduced certain more egalitarian policies, it has been argued that the basic social structures introduced by Stalinism were not greatly altered (A. Nove, 1989, p. 144). It has been noted that Khrushchev maintained
similar policies to those of Stalin in several areas. For example, Khrushchev still supported bureaucratic control of the economy, technological education and the training of 'specialists', at the expense of an education which would allow social individuals to fully develop their capacities and powers (the role of schooling in the Soviet economy is outlined in Section 7.4.1). Khrushchev also encouraged close working relations between the country's scientific establishments and the military. Krushchev's policies were influenced by the target of catching up and outstripping the West in terms of technology (in particular military technology) so that, as well as providing military security to its people, the Soviet Union would not be dependent on the West for expertise or component parts.

In this section I contend that Lange's political theories were influenced by the epistemology of Stalinism and, as such, were also based on similar ideas about the nature of social change. In order to support this argument I now briefly compare the epistemology of Lange with that of Stalin. I begin this comparison with a brief outline of Stalin's epistemology, as outlined in *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1951). Here Joseph Djugashvili (Stalin) argues that matter exists outside and independently of consciousness. For Stalin, matter is primary: consciousness being secondary, a mere reflection of being and a passive reflection of objective reality (Djugashvili, 1951, p. 18). For Stalin, this results in the concept of historical processes as natural and inevitable. For Stalin, these processes are not ones in which there is active sensuous influence by social individuals. This epistemology is used to support the argument for the transfer of political initiative from self-conscious human beings to structural entities which, in Stalin's case, are compromised bureaucrats not directly accountable to society. Stalin concludes that it is up to the Communist Party to impose on society a 'true' reflection of reality. Lange's support for social organization consistent with this epistemology can be seen in *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*. 
As was noted in Section 7.1, in this book the Central Planning Board co-ordinates economic activity without recourse to working people, and without even consulting those people directly working in the industries concerned (Lange, 1938, p. 83).

Lange explicitly supports a Stalinist epistemology in *Political Economy* (1963), where Lange argues that the economic laws underpinning classical economics operate independently of human consciousness or will. The epistemological assumption in this contention is mistakenly grounded in the belief that social processes operate according to laws which are similar to natural laws, that is, unconsciously and according to a predetermined pattern (Lange, 1963, p. 78). Lange therefore concludes that, although the actions of individuals may be purposeful and conscious, the social relations in which these actions are embedded necessarily interplay in such a way so as to produce pre-determined outcomes:

> These conditions, in particular the existence of production relations, do not allow economic activity to be arbitrary. They determine the furrow which economic activity is forced to follow, that is to say, the amis [sic, surely “aims”, GT] and means of action, and the manner in which the activity of various individuals or groups interplay. These conditions, determined by history independently of human will and consciousness, determine the economic laws which operate in such conditions (Lange, 1963, p. 56).

In *Political Economy*, Lange argues that social processes can be analyzed by professionals who have the necessary ‘scientific’ knowledge of social processes, which are perceived to be similar to natural processes. Importantly, even in his later works, Lange still envisages that market mechanisms could be controlled by bureaucrats. These bureaucrats are deemed to have an understanding of the necessary ‘scientific’ knowledge which, in this case, appears to be a combination of knowledge of market economics and ‘scientific socialism’. For Lange, ‘scientific socialism’ enables ‘organized society’ to overcome spontaneity in social development and subject “the operation of economic laws [that is, market laws, GT] and the economic development of society to the direction of human will” (Lange, 1970 [b], p. 100).
Importantly, within Lange’s model there are no democratic channels through which the interpretation of ‘the scientific knowledge’ of the bureaucracy can be debated by those outside the bureaucracy/party: as a consequence the “direction of human will” is the result of interpretation by professional bureaucrats. Lange contends that this latter interpretation is needed because “the very process of the social revolution which liquidates one social system and establishes another, requires centralized disposal of resources by the new revolutionary State” (Lange, 1970, p. 106).

For example, Lange maintains that during the first period of a socialist economy, both the planning and economic development of the ‘socialist sector’, that is, all sectors except consumer goods and labour, should be highly centralized under a bureaucracy. Lange argues that the minimum requirement of the plan should be based on the allocation of investment to different branches of the economy (Lange, 1970[b], p. 106) in a way similar to the model outlined in Section 7.2. Lange also argues that the allocation of state investment would determine the direction of economic development because it would be aimed at the key parts of the economy, such as heavy industry. For Lange, this plan would include targets operated within market mechanisms to achieve the production of raw materials and the basic means of production, also to achieve the co-ordination of various aspects of the economy (Lange, 1970[b], p. 106).

Lange argues that the realization of this plan would be achieved by two methods: firstly, by direct administrative orders and secondly, through a system of market incentives. These market incentives would be operated by bureaucrats in order to induce people “to do exactly the things which are required by the plan” (Lange, 1970[b], p. 107). This is done by making “use of the automatic character of people’s responses to given incentives” so that people will “react in a certain way which can be calculated” (Lange, 1970[b], p. 108, GT’s italics) in order to realize “the conscious will of organized society” (Lange, 1957[b], p. 100) as interpreted by bureaucrats.
employed by the Party.

Following the Khrushchev era and the Prague Spring of 1968 Lange maintains that after a period of intensive industrialization, bureaucratic methods should not be used beyond their “historic justification”, that is, after “the moment when socialist society starts to overcome these centralistic, bureaucratic methods of administrative planning and management.....” (Lange, 1970[b], p. 103). At this time Lange argues that rapid industrialization will bring about a growth in both the number and consciousness of the working class and also in the “growth of a new socialist intelligentsia” from the ranks of workers and peasants (Lange, 1970[b], p. 104).

However, it is difficult to see what social relations could prefigure a change in the structural relations of such a society, in the absence of democratic relations within Lange’s system. The importance of democratic relations in order to prefigure a socialist society is discussed further in Chapter Eight.

7.4 Soviet organization of schooling.
7.4.1 The development of schooling in the USSR between 1917 and 1920.

Lange did not write systematically about education but, given Lange’s support for the Stalinist concept of political economy (Section 7.3), it is likely that he would have endorsed the Stalinist concept of schooling then prevalent throughout the Soviet bloc. This concept held that schooling was mainly a means of providing skilled workers for the areas of the economy that the Party and bureaucracy considered important. The seeds of the bureaucratic control of Soviet schooling were evident from as early as 1918 and grew considerably in the later 1920’s under the increasing influence of Stalin’s wish to increase the production of the economy.

I begin by exploring the schooling which existed in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution of 1917. In 1917 Anatoly Lunacharsky was appointed as the
Commissar of Enlightenment\(^1\) (Education Minister) for the first Soviet government and remained in office until 1929. In his speech to the First All-Russia Congress on Education, in 1918, Lunacharsky advocated a Soviet system that rested on popular initiative, and supported handing the control of schools to the organs of local self-government:

We want true people’s government, i.e. the transfer of all power to the masses of the people. Our line is this: to arouse the interest of the population at large in school affairs, to so order things that teachers should be elected and checked up on by the local population, which organized in committees or councils, should be the ultimate judge (Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 16).

Lunacharsky wanted senior pupils to be involved in running schools, together with parents and teachers, so that these pupils would gradually become capable of running collectives. He also argued that senior pupils should particularly be allowed to run their own societies and clubs and to generate their own journals (Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 25). However, in the same speech, he argued that the small-peasant population did not understand the nature of either democratic reforms or the reforms of the schools. He also noted that the peasantry were concerned about the separation of the church from the state and that they perceived reforms to be “something imposed from outside” (Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 17). As a result Lunacharsky modified his earlier position, arguing that:

We could not hand the whole undertaking over to the population at large, because it was not prepared. When we saw that the population was not coping with the given task, we had to correct its decision, to guide it, and in this respect we were acting as the people’s assistants, saying to them, “Look, this is what workers’ and peasants’ government really means” (Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 17).

\(^1\) Enlightenment being a term synonymous with education.
\(^2\) Lunacharsky is referring to the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on “Freedom of Conscience, and on Ecclesiastical and Religious Societies”, issued on 20 January 1918, forbidding the teaching of Scripture in schools.
However, this position was not held by everyone in the Narkompros (Commissariat of the Enlightenment). Commenting on the point of view voiced by Lunacharsky, Nadezhda Krupskaya (Lenin's wife) said:

Let us not be afraid of the people, let us not be afraid that they will elect the wrong sort of representatives, and bring in the priests. We want the people to direct the country and be their own masters. We are always thinking in old terms, that if we do not spare ourselves and work day and night in the people's cause, that is enough. Our job is to help the people in fact to take their fate into their own hands (Sheila Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 28, quoting from Krupskaya's article "On Educational Soviets", 1918, original italics).

However, rather than allowing the direct democratic control of schools which Marx advocated (Marx, 1974[b], p. 357), the Narkompros issued a "Statement on the Organization of Education in the Russian Republic" in which popular initiatives were to be organized through 'educational soviets' which would be elected by the population at local, regional and national levels. These soviets were to be entrusted with the administration of education within their areas (S. Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 26). These soviets were responsible only to their own organs in the order of hierarchy: local to regional, regional to district, district to national and national to the Narkompros.

The Narkompros was thus in a position of an appointed government body atop a pyramid of elected soviets. However, it denied itself the role of a 'central directing power' (Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 27). Importantly, these educational soviets were to be "controlled in political respects" by the Soviet of Deputies [the state's supreme governing body] (Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 26). This established the educational soviet as a "controlling advisory" body under the education department. The soviet was to consist of elected representatives of all organizations represented in the Soviet of Deputies, in the same proportion, together with the elected representatives of teachers, pupils and "informed..."
persons". Its function was to "listen to the reports of the education department and consider the plan of work in education proposed by the department". The department itself was to be appointed by the executive committee of the local Soviet of Deputies (according to the instruction of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs [NKVD]) and financed by the central commissariat. The educational soviet was to hold executive power in local educational administration, and its lowest unit (in spite of NKVD instruction) was to be the volost [local] department. This policy brought the Narkompros into conflict with the Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Third Congress of Soviets, both of whom wanted to establish departments of each People's Commissariat at local, regional and national levels. Members of these departments would not be elected, but appointed by the executive committees of the local Soviet of Deputies. Each department would be jointly subordinate to the local Soviet and its central commissariat.

Krupskaya insisted that the administration of schools should not begin at regional levels (according to the NKVD instruction) but at local level, because control of education would be in closer contact with local people. This would, of course, conform more closely to the model that Marx supported (Marx, 1974 [b], p. 357).

Within the Soviet Union, between 1918-1920, there was a debate between those who wished to see schooling as an aid to produce workers for the underdeveloped economy and for military defence against invasion, and those who wished to see education solely as a means of aiding the self-realization of the social individual. In theory the Narkompros' education policy excluded the possibility of specialized technical training for school-aged children. In 1918 the Narkompros attempted to close all schools designed to provide technical
education to those under the age of seventeen. Criticism followed from the labour union leadership, the Supreme Economic Council (Vesenkha) and the Young Communist League. They made a case based on the shortage of skilled workers and the need to provide youth with technical training relevant to their place of employment. In fact in defiance of central policy, labour unions, factories and local departments of education sponsored schools for young people, offering part-time instruction for two hours a day, six days a week. In the autumn of 1918, the Narkompros accepted these schools as a fact and agreed to accept shared jurisdiction over them with the State Committee for Professional-Technical Education and the Section for Professional-Technical Education. The debate about the degree of technical education in schools continued, with a sizeable number of delegates supporting more technical education.

In 1920, the Soviet of Peoples’ Commissars (equivalent of the Cabinet) ordered a reorganization of Narkompros and upgraded the Main Administration for Professional-Technical Education (Glavprofobr) to administer vocational schools, special courses, technicums and higher education instructions. Glavprofobr aspired to have a network of vocational schools to replace Narkompros’ polytechnic schools. Glavprofobr expanded its network of schools and proposed to admit pupils under the age of seventeen.

7.4.2 Schooling in the USSR under Stalin and its relations to the economy.

In this section I show why the relationships between schooling, the state and the economy became more integrated. The move towards technical education was given a boost in 1922 when Stalin became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the late 1920’s Stalin supported the policy of Socialism in One

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3 Technicums is a Soviet term meaning a mass-education facility training for lower-level technical staff.
Country, that is, the belief that it was possible to build a self-sufficient society in one country only, the Soviet Union.

Under the influence of this policy, the dominant educational ideas in the USSR from 1928 onwards were ones based mainly on the provision of the skills and knowledge needed for technological development. The Glavprofobr announced that it was preparing curricula based on particular branches of industry for grades eight and nine of the secondary school. Glavprofobr began to devise a programme of academic and technical training for these schools, in which general academic subjects were to relate to the type of industry with which the school was affiliated. Consequently, schooling became more subservient to the needs of the economy. As Stalin, speaking in 1931, said:

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years or we shall go under; to eliminate the vestiges of educational innovations of the twenties and to intensify moral upbringing in schools (Joseph Zajda, 1980, p. 23).

In 1931 the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party asserted total control over education and rejected the curriculum based on the open classroom, interdisciplinary approach to learning, group teaching and progressive assessment—all which, of course, had been introduced by the post-revolutionary government under the inspiration of Lunacharsky. In The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse (1991), Larry Holmes quotes the Central Committee of 25 August 1931 as stating:

The Central Committee declares that by a large margin the Soviet school does not meet the huge demands placed before it....The school's fundamental defect at the present time (is) its failure to provide a sufficient level of general-educational knowledge and an unsatisfactory preparation for technicums and higher education of fully literate people who have mastered the fundamentals of science (physics, chemistry, mathematics, native language, geography etc.)... (L. Holmes, 1991, p. 137, original italics).

As a result of this policy, the curriculum was restructured to enable the re-introduction of basic disciplines with special emphasis on the 3 R’s and Russian.
Another important component of the curriculum was the ethical dimension of the system. Soviet education not only imparted knowledge and skills but also instructed pupils into the ‘norms and values’ of the Soviet system, particularly as to the value of work. This was a process which, it was hoped, would enable the ruling group to inculcate loyalty to “the communist regime and to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, mastery of the environment, the acceptance of authority, love of the socialist Motherland, collectivism, conscientious labour for the good of society, a high moral sense of public duty, an uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, and so on” (from the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961, p. 108, quoted in Zajda, 1980, pp. 108-9).

Post World War II, Stalin continued to emphasize the growth of heavy industry, partly by importing technology and technological ideas from the West. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, Stalin deemed it necessary to compete militarily with the West and, in order to do this, to accumulate the products of heavy industry. Secondly, Soviet theoreticians at this time accepted the policy that the transition to the higher stage of socialism in Russia would take place between 1960 and 1965 (H. Marcuse, 1958, p. 167). For Stalin and his successors this transition to a higher stage of socialism was based on the continued growth of all social production, with preponderant growth in the means of production.

In the next section I illustrate the oppositional principles between Lange’s model of a ‘socialist-market’ and orthodox socialist principles, using Mises’ famous article “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” (Mises, in Hayek [ed.], 1935) which formed the basis of the famous debate between Hayek and Lange in the 1930’s on the viability of the use of market mechanisms in a ‘socialist’ society.

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4 The Soviet Union embraced Taylorism and Fordism, and imported American experts in these fields (Section 4.8). Hughes believes that concepts within the Five Year Plan can be linked to Taylorism (T. Hughes, 2004, pp. 250-1).
7.5 Criticisms of Lange’s model of a socialist market.

7.5.1 The oppositional nature of Lange’s socialist market to socialist relations.

In 1935 Mises, in his article “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” (Mises, in Hayek [ed.], 1935), uses Aristotelian logic to show that under socialism all of the means of production are the property of the community and therefore, logically, it is the community alone which can dispose of them and determine their use in production. In the same work Mises argues that exchange value is only applicable when production is carried out by independent producers, using a market to co-ordinate the distribution of goods and services. Mises argues that because, in a socialist economy, all the means of production are under the control of the community, no produced good will become the object of exchange for value. Mises concludes that it is, therefore, impossible to determine the monetary value of any such good under socialism, because money has only use as a medium of exchange and computation in a market:

> It is irreconcilable with the nature of communal ownership of production-goods that it should rely even for a part of its distribution upon economic imputation of the yield to the particular factors of production (Mises, in Hayek [ed.], 1935, p. 90).

Mises further deduces that, because in a socialist system there is no role for exchange value, money or prices there can be no market (Mises, in Hayek [ed.], 1935, pp. 90-93):

> It is logically absurd to speak of the worker enjoying the ‘full yield’ of his work, and then to subject to a separate distribution the shares of the material factors of production... [because]... it lies in the very nature of socialist production that the shares of the particular factors of production in the national dividend cannot be ascertained (Mises, in Hayek [ed.], 1935[a], p. 90).

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5 Mises allows for the giving and receiving of presents (Mises in Hayek [ed.], 1935, p. 91) as exchange not for value would no doubt take place.
Interestingly, Mises's criticisms of Lange's model of market socialism mirror Marx's observations about communal control and the distribution of goods and services:

Within the co-operative society based on common ownership of the means of production the producers do not exchange their products; similarly, the labour spent on the products no longer appears as the value of these products, possessed by them as a material characteristic, for now, in contrast to capitalist society individual pieces of labour are no longer merely indirectly, but directly, a component part of the total labour (Marx, 1974[b], p. 345, original italics).

However, although Mises indicates the oppositional principles that are present in Lange's model, Mises' analysis of a communist society rests solely on a linear form of logic and deals with logical principles rather than dynamic, interrelated social processes. As a consequence of a reliance on linear logic, Mises' analysis can neither analyze the social relations which necessarily result in alienation nor explore the historical processes which could prefigure a socialist society. In the next section I therefore propose to explore the alienating relations which necessarily occur within Lange's model, using a form of analysis based on social relations which are necessarily interrelated.

7.5.2 Market and alienating relations in Lange's socialist market model.

In this section I show how alienating relations are necessarily supported by 'market' relations, in both the socialized and non-socialized sectors of the economy (Section 7.1), and intensified by the oppressive nature of the bureaucracy which administers the market mechanism in the socialized sector of the economy.

I note in Section 7.2 that there are classical markets in labour-power and consumer goods within Lange's model (Lange, 1938, pp. 75, 79). In the market in labour-power, workers are able to offer their services to the industry or occupation paying the highest wages (Lange, 1938, p. 79). Although the wages of those working "for publicly owned capital and natural resources" are fixed by the Central Planning
Board, the level of wages is fixed according to market mechanisms and laws (Section 7.2). In Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2 and Section 7.2 I maintain that, in the market in labour-power (even when the state is the employer), the relations between the employer and the worker are similar in form to those found within capitalism. In Lange’s model these relations occur in following ways. These are, firstly, as a necessary consequence of the relation between the ‘employer’ and the ‘worker’ in which the latter loses control over the objects and services he produces, as well as over the conditions in which his productive activity takes place. Secondly, as a result of his productive activity, the worker develops estranged relations with other social individuals. Thirdly, instead of employing his capacities in creative, stimulating activities, the worker has to submit his capacities and powers to the goals of his employer and, as such, becomes in effect an appendage of the machine with which he works. Fourthly, as is noted in Section 4.4.1, a system based on price results in an external relationship through the use of exchange value. Within the system of exchange value any given product is representative of the equivalent of a different kind of product. As a result, the product’s immediate identity as itself has given way to the equivalent of another because the existence of a product as an exchange value is a determination of itself (Marx, 1975[e], p. 268). Importantly, within Lange’s model there is also a market in consumer goods, even in the higher stage of socialism (Lange, 1938, p. 141) [Section 7.2].

In Section 7.5.1 I maintain that the social relations and dispositions which would accompany this market activity are oppositional to the relations and dispositions needed to sustain the higher stage of socialism as envisaged by Marx. For example, market activity, because it is based on fragmented production, necessarily results in competitive activity; and this type of activity is oppositional to the human and co-operative activity needed to sustain the higher level of socialism, as conceived by Marx.
Lange is mainly concerned with the objective conditions needed to develop abundance and does not consider the subjective effects of market relations. For Lange, alienation, as described by Marx in *German Ideology* (Marx, 1970, p. 56) and discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, is mitigated when economic laws of the 'market' (Lange, 1963, pp. 79-81, including n. 41) are employed by bureaucrats who have the 'knowledge' of scientific socialism which, Lange contends, is necessary to achieve abundance (Section 7.2).

I now consider the alienating (entfremdung) relations which occur in Lange's model as a result of bureaucratic activity. Marx provides a perceptive description of bureaucracies in "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'" (written during 1843-4), which seems to have been ignored by Lange. Although obviously written about a nineteenth-century bureaucracy, this work deals with the nature of bureaucracy itself, and so could also be said to be relevant to the bureaucracy found in Soviet Russia. In "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'", Marx describes bureaucracy as the "state consciousness", the "state will", the "state power in the form of a corporation, i.e. of a particular, self-contained society within the state" (Marx, 1975[b], p. 107, original italics). For Marx "the spirit of bureaucracy" is "the formal mind of the state" which the bureaucracy makes into a categorical imperative (Marx, 1975[b], p. 107). Marx argues that the bureaucracy safeguards the imaginary universality of the particular interest in order to safeguard its own interest, and part of doing this is to desire the state to be "a power" (Marx, 1975[b], p. 107). Therefore, Marx concludes, a bureaucracy is "compelled to claim the formal for its content and its content as the formal" (Marx, 1975[b], p. 107). As a consequence "it enters into conflict everywhere with 'real purposes at every point'" (Marx, 1975[b], p. 107).

This way of managing social processes is contrary to the local democratic control proposed by Marx. Marx correctly observes that a bureaucracy would likely lead to
“passive obedience, the worship of authority” and “fixed, formal action of rigid principles, views and traditions” where “real knowledge appears lacking in content, just as real life appears dead, for this imaginary knowledge and imaginary life pass for the substance....” (Marx, 1975[b], p. 108, original italics). This leads to the bureaucracy being a power above people which treats social individuals as things. For Marx, this results in the following form of alienation:

The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside of them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control....(Marx, 1970, p. 54).

A more recent analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the Soviet system is given by Herbert Marcuse in his book Soviet Marxism (Marcuse, 1958). Marcuse notes in this book that the maintenance of “repressive production relations enabled the Soviet State, with the instrumentalities of universal control, to regiment the consciousness of the underlying population” (Marcuse, 1958, p. 190). Marcuse notes, contrary to Lange, that the repressive production relations cannot prefigure an unalienated society because

No matter how high the level of technical progress and material culture, of labor productivity and efficiency, the change from socialist necessity to socialist freedom can only be the result of conscious effort and decision (Marcuse, 1958, p. 190).

Marcuse argues that this conscious effort is stifled by the “‘spirit’ of Soviet socialist construction,” that is “the specific rationality of the system” (Marcuse, 1958, p. 190), which assumes “the role of an active factor determining the direction of the societal development” (Marcuse, 1958, p. 191). In Soviet Marxism, Marcuse also analyzes the nature of the “rationality” utilized by Soviet Marxism. Marcuse notes that Soviet Marxism claimed to have been able to create a “conformity” between productive relations and the “character of the productive forces” which could eliminate the conflict
between the individual and society, and between the particular and common interest.

For Soviet Marxist theoreticians, "reason ceases to be split into its subjective and objective manifestations; it is no longer antagonistic to and beyond reality, a mere 'idea' – but is realized in the society itself" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 85). For Soviet theoreticians, "such a society contains all standards of true and false, right and wrong" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 86, GT's italics). Within Soviet Marxism, the Soviet State became equated with Reason and was concerned with the actualization of historical processes "in which commanded political practice would bring about the desired facts" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 87, original italics).

In the next section I propose to analyze the concept of alienation supported by Lange. As is noted in this section, Lange does not give a systematic analysis of alienation so, in the next section I analyze work on alienation by T. I. Oizerman, a prominent defender of the Soviet Union who has a very similar economic perspective to that held by Lange in the 1960's.

7.5.3 A critique of the concept of alienation supported by Lange and T. I Oizerman, a prominent defender of Soviet Marxism.

Lange's concept of alienation in the 1960's was consistent with the official Soviet interpretation, but he did not defend this concept in a systematic way. I consider it reasonable to examine an official Soviet source, T. I. Oizerman, a Soviet philosopher regarded in the 1960's as a "leading representative of the 'official' Soviet position on Marx's Manuscripts and the concept of alienation" (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 38).

According to Oizerman, Marx is primarily an economist and historian (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 40) writing about market relations, including on alienation. Both writers, therefore, claim to understand alienation as a result of studying Marx. For both Oizerman and Lange, alienation is mainly "conditioned by objective circumstances" (Oizerman, 1964, p. 41), and has its roots "in certain historically transitory conditions"
of material production”, that is, in the “underdeveloped state of the productive forces of society, in the low level of social production”, namely, in a market economy (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 40, quoting from Oizerman writing in Istoriia Filosofi [Oizerman, 1959, p. 59], GT’s italics). Oizerman argues that “alienation is essentially a certain social relationship; it is therefore a question of alienated social relations, the destruction of which becomes possible and necessary through the development of the productive forces of a communist society” (Oizerman, 1964, p. 41, GT’s italics).

Oizerman argues that the development of modern industry would outgrow these institutional forms and that, together with “scientific and technical progress and necessary social reforms”, would support the abolition of alienation (Oizerman, 1964, p. 42).

For Oizerman, the attitude to work as something external to the worker, as something imposed from the outside rather than satisfying man’s need for productive activity, is acknowledged to be an essential element of Marx’s concept of alienated labour. Oizerman notes that:

(The ) attitude of a man towards his work as towards something alien, external, forced is conditioned by certain historically transient factors: the low level of productive forces in the society which had bought about private ownership of the means of production, social inequality and exploitation (Oizerman, 1964, p. 42, GT’s italics).

In his later writings Oizerman, like Lange, acknowledges that while socialism would free man from the “elemental forces of social development” (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 41) only communism would mark the end of all alienation, because only in communism would the productive forces have developed to the point where alienated social relations would disappear (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 41; Lange, 1938, p. 141).

This theorist does not explain how concretely the rule of bureaucratic planners using market techniques would come to an end (if it would). Therefore, there were no mechanisms for ending the market in labour-power in Lange’s model (or in similar
ones). For me the best analysis of this conclusion is expressed by Marcuse, who pointed out that within Soviet Marxism a dominant goal of communism is that all will be labourers of one community and that labour will change from burden to enjoyment (Marcuse, 1958, p. 183). Soviet patriotism, joined with "proletarian internationalism", served as justification for the "complete endorsement" of work as the very content of the individual's *whole life* (Marcuse, 1958, p. 234, GT's italics). Free time was considered to be time when individuals took part in polytechnic training, not in education as an 'end-in-itself.'

However, Soviet orthodoxy did not recognize labour in the Soviet Union to be alienated, because the social individual was supposed to invest all his energy and his aspirations in whatever function he found himself in, or was put in by the authorities, in order to achieve the ends aspired to by "organized society" (see Section 7.2). As Marcuse notes, there is nothing socialist or communist in this formula — as long as labour does not allow for the free play of human faculties (Marcuse, 1958, p. 236). For Marcuse:

> It is this obliteration of the decisive difference between alienated and nonalienated labour which enables Soviet Marxism to proclaim for the Soviet system the full development of the all-round individual as against the mutilated individual of Western society (Marcuse, 1958, p. 235).

Marcuse correctly notes that Marx "made an essential distinction between work as the realization of human potentialities and work as alienated labour" and that, for Marx, "the entire sphere of material production, of mechanized and standardized performances, is considered one of alienation" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 234). Marcuse goes on to argue:

> By virtue of this distinction, the realization of freedom is attributed to a social organization of labor fundamentally different from the prevailing one [in the Soviet bloc countries, GT] to a society where work as the free play of human faculties has become a 'necessity', a 'vital need' for society, while work for procuring the necessities of life no longer constitutes the working day and the occupation of the individual, (Marcuse, 1958, pp. 234-5).
The bureaucratic system in Lange's model is the form of central planning cited by both Hayek and Tooley (see Chapter Two), and also by Judith Suissa (see Chapter Nine) as being representative of all socialist states. However, I have tried to show that this form of 'socialism' is not the model of 'socialism' advocated by Marx; neither is it the model that I support in this thesis. In fact, equating bureaucratic central planning with socialism was at the time is the ideology which had particular dominance in the Soviet bloc.

In conclusion: in Chapter Seven I analyze Oskar Lange's model of a 'socialist market', in which market relations and laws are used in both the 'socialized' sectors and non-socialized sectors of the economy, and note that these market relations necessarily result in alienating relations. I also note that Lange acknowledges that the nature of economic processes in the capitalist system is not substantially different from the nature of the economic processes in any type of exchange economy (Lange, 1935, p. 197), including in his own model. Specifically, Lange notes that Marx argues that the 'law of value' which operates in an exchange [market] economy is based on division of labour, so that the structural relations which result hold for any type of exchange [market] economy, "whether capitalistic or an 'einfache Warenproduktion,'" the latter being an exchange economy consisting of small independent producers, each of whom possesses his own means of production (Lange, 1935, p. 197).

I give three main reasons why the market relations present in Lange's model dehumanize the worker. Firstly, the worker loses control over the objects and services he produces. Secondly, the worker becomes estranged from other social individuals and, thirdly, the worker becomes effectively an appendage of a machine. The role of schools in the model of Soviet Marxism, which Lange supports, is to provide skilled
workers for the ends which "organized society" considers important. Therefore, although schools are not marketized in Lange's model, they are subject to some of the similar alienating conditions and social relations as state schools in 1950's England (Section 5.4), by virtue of being instrumental to the goals of a society that has market relations similar to those found in capitalism.

I conclude that the form that alienating relations take within Lange's system are similar to those found in capitalism, but intensified by the role played by the bureaucracy in Lange's system. Consequently, in this chapter I maintain that the market and bureaucratic relations found in Lange's system cannot prefigure the structures and conditions needed to enable unalienated activity, including education. In Chapter Eight I argue that the conditions and social relations which could prefigure an unalienated society can be found in the system based on Marx and developed by the Yugoslav/Serbian Praxis theorist Mihailo Markovic (1923-2010).
Part Three

Chapter Eight
A transitionary period of a socialist market and the process of overcoming alienating relations.

Introduction

This chapter attempts to show how the conditions, social relations and values found in the model of socialism which has been defined by Marx and developed by Mihailo Markovic could prefigure a society in which unalienated activity would be a material possibility. I begin this section by outlining the social relations in which Markovic personally was embedded. Markovic was mainly writing for a Yugoslav audience. He primarily addressed how Yugoslavia could be enabled to move from bureaucratic 'socialism', as outlined in Chapter Seven, to a form of socialism enabling the conditions and relations needed to prefigure an unalienated society. Markovic's model assumes a situation in which the socialization of the major industries and services, including schooling, has already occurred. A major aim for Markovic is to criticise a social model similar to that advocated by Lange, in which the bureaucracy administers without recourse to the majority of the people, and to suggest the relations and conditions which are necessary to prefigure an unalienated society. Unlike Lange, Markovic contends that the social change which supports unalienated activity cannot be prefigured by the manipulation of objective social relations and conditions. Markovic realizes that, for the move towards an unalienated society to be successfully completed, the support of the majority of the people is essential. In Section 8.1 I consider the conditions and social relations necessary for Marx's realm of necessity and the transition to Marx's realm of freedom, both of which were defined in the introduction to Chapter Seven.
8.1 The conditions and relations necessary for Marx's realm of necessity and the transition to his realm of freedom.

In the Introduction to Chapter Seven it was noted that the realm of necessity develops out of the conditions and relations of capitalism. Consequently, the realm of necessity contains some of the conditions, relations, ideological ideas and values of capitalist society, including those of market relations. It was also noted that the social relations and values found in capitalism will gradually dissolve as the conditions, social relations and values necessary for the existence of the realm of freedom develop and gain social support. The conditions and social relations needed to support the realm of freedom are outlined in Chapter Nine.

While it is true that alternative modes of social organization will start to develop before all the objective conditions and relations necessary to support them are in place, these alternatives modes cannot be successfully completed without these conditions and relations coming to fruition. Social individuals cannot successfully build alternative social organizations solely on the basis of values, propensities and tendencies. The structural relations involved in the realm of freedom are conditional upon certain social relations and conditions.

A necessary objective condition for the development of an unalienated society is the socialization of the means of production, that is, where productive resources belong to the society of all social individuals, without anyone having the right to sell, bequeath or further alienate any resources. The socialization of the means of production is a necessary objective condition because it provides the foundation for the rational, democratic planning which allows associations of producers both to control their own conditions of production and to develop ways of satisfying human needs, all in a manner appropriate to the nature of human beings:
socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature (Marx, 1981, p. 959).

Socialization of production, under democratic control, releases significant economic resources. This can be illustrated by consideration of the pharmaceutical industry. For example, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, production of drugs by private firms causes a vast transfer of finance from the public purse to private firms. It has been reported that GlaxoSmithKline was charging the British National Health Service £6 per dose of swine flu vaccine which cost the firm £1 only to produce. The UK Government ordered 60 million doses, making GlaxoSmithKline £300m. in profit. During the period May–July 2009 the company announced profits of £2.4bn. (Lucy Tobin, 2009, pp. 1-2). In this case, the socialization of such a firm under democratic control would necessarily enable the release of these profits to address human needs, including the production of new drugs. Under the present system by comparison such expenditure from profits will have been contingent upon the will of the firm’s owners.

Another necessary objective condition for the development of the realm of freedom is a high enough level of technological advance to achieve abundance. This provides enough leisure time for social individuals to follow activities which are meaningful to them, and which simultaneously enable them to take part in changing society, so that there is both abundance and more ‘free’ time. It is as a result of technological development that social individuals would be able to step “to the

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1 Marx defines abundance as “material elements for the development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared” (Marx, 1973[a], p. 325).
side of the production processes instead of being its chief actor" (Marx, 1973[a], p. 705), for example, by enabling machines to make other machines. Such technological development would reduce the extent to which social individuals have to engage in manual labour, and would be fundamental in enabling them to relate to the production process in a supervisory capacity. In brief, the realm of freedom is said to begin when “labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends” (Marx, 1981, p. 959).

Technological development also enables many raw materials to be replaced by artificial materials and new forms of renewable energy to be developed and introduced widely. The increased use of technology per se might initially be regarded as necessarily damaging to the environment. However, planning of the sort outlined in this chapter would be directly accountable to people, and would almost certainly aim to reduce damage to the environment by a) changing the composition of output to less damaging products; b) replacing harmful economic inputs such as fossil fuels by renewable energy sources; c) developing technology so that resources are used more efficiently, and d) decreasing the ‘environmental intensity co-efficient’ by changing not just the technical relations of production but also the social (Dickenson, 2003, p. 20).

For Dickenson, planned obsolescence, destruction of plants and machinery during slumps and production for conspicuous consumption are all oppositional to the production for human need; as would be the duplication of resources generally. Moreover, increasing the efficiency of energy use and the use of different raw materials would have a significant impact on reducing pollution, avoiding waste resources and reducing the cost of production. Because of abundance and the socialized distribution of goods, market relations would no longer necessarily be
needed in the realm of freedom. In Section 8.2, I support the argument that market relations would “wither away”, along with the antagonistic dispositions which market relations support.

The assumption by some writers that the “withering away” of market relations would be impossible because individuals are innately selfish and acquisitive is based on the belief that scarcity will always be a material reality (Nove, 1991, p. 18ff; Lange, 1938, p. 141). I maintain that acquisitiveness is related both to a perception by social individuals of the scarcity of resources, and also to their calculation of the probable actions by others. Therefore, I contend that as abundance grows, the market becomes less dominant and so aspects of human nature such as acquisitiveness and possessiveness gradually lose their material purpose. As acquisitiveness loses its material purpose the reaction of social individuals will usually be to share with others:

In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human need, i.e. that I had objectified human nature and hence had procured an object corresponding to the needs of another human being (Marx, 1975[e], p. 277, original italics).

I maintain that this is not because individuals would have become ‘good’ because of a “transhistorical evaluative standard, defined by our human nature” (Geras, 1995, p. 154), but because acquisitiveness would have lost its material purpose. As argued in Section 4.1, there is no permanent selfish aspect of human nature preventing the development of new social relationships, contrary to a view consistent with the argument of Geras.

It is important to repeat at this point that the type of society Marx is advocating would come into existence only because it would enable the type of activity and values which the vast majority of social individuals would support. The need for
support from the majority of social individuals for the institutionalization of social relations is a dimension of Marx's thinking which David Miller fails to acknowledge when he argues that there are no 'features' in Marx's future society to prevent individuals from relapsing into forms of awareness and activity reminiscent of capitalism (Miller, 1999, p. 217).

Another condition necessary for the realm of freedom to develop is the growth of the realm of necessity at an international level. This is because the conditions considered above when applied internationally would, over time, create the conditions for abundance in all countries. This is even in cases where the supply of some resources would not quickly be increased, and thus unalienated activity would only gradually become a reality. For example, the more advanced countries could combine to assist the less advanced, and help to regularize prices for those goods and services still exchanged internationally on the market. Consequently, as a result of the gradual reduction in competition over resources, there would be a decrease in antagonistic internationally. As a result the likelihood of armed conflict would decrease and the need for coercive institutions such as an army (or armed police) would be less (see Section 8.2). This situation would allow the reduction of expenditure on arms. This in turn would allow governments to release funds previously earmarked for military purposes, which could instead be used to address the needs of social individuals. An indication of the amount of money that would be released can be found from a consideration of some articles written about the arms trade.

In an article written in 2003 entitled "How Big Is the UK Arms Trade?" Brian Wheeler, the BBC News On Line Business Reporter, noted that in 1999 the UK government spent 2.6% (say, £26bn. at 1999 prices) of the Gross Domestic Product
on arms: resources which, I contend, could instead have been spent on such socially useful projects (www.bbcnews.co.uk, last accessed 16 April, 2009). Wheeler quotes former United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower as saying:

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children... This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense (Former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech on 16 April 1953, quoted on www.globalissues.org, last accessed 16 April 2009).

8.2 The process of transcending the state in Mihailo Markovic’s model.

Both Marx and Markovic argue that the goal of an unalienated society would be made possible as a result of the conditions and social relations outlined in Section 8.1, which would prefigure both the “withering” of market relations and the abolition of the state.  

However, both Marx and Markovic note that in the realm of necessity some state functions would still be needed.

Markovic gives three main reasons for this need. Firstly, he says, “it preserves a minimum of order and security which is an indispensable life-condition for every citizen.” Secondly, he says, “it mediates among conflicting particular interests of various social groups, regions, nations, races and religions”. Thirdly, he says, “it regulates and co-ordinates the basic economic, educational and cultural activities of the whole society” (Markovic, 1982[a], p. 116).

Markovic notes that while the political organization of society has “the form of a state, the room for autonomous functioning of self-governing bodies will be greatly

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2 As Engels notes (Engels, 1975, p. 333), aufheben does not mean to annihilate or destroy, but to transcend, while the content is preserved in a new and higher form. Aufheben has sometimes been translated as withering and the process is often referred to as the “withering of the state”.
restricted" (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 33). Markovic states that:

> When the state determines both the legal framework and the social conditions under which those organs may operate, this constant interference decreases the sense of responsibility, initiative, dignity, and creative imagination of workers, and dangerously shifts their interest from the issues of production towards issues of distribution (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 33).

Therefore, unlike that of Lange (Chapter Seven), Markovic’s concept of self-governance is based on support of the material realization of self-determination. This is because it is through the structural relations of self-managed units of production and full participation in all aspects of political, social and economic life that, Markovic argues, alienation can be mitigated. I outline these relations in detail in Section 8.3.

For Markovic, the nature of self-determination is conditioned “by a given social situation, by the level of technology, the given structure of production, the nature of political institutions, the level of culture and the habits of human behaviour” (Markovic, 1974[a], pp. 209-10). Markovic differs from Soviet theorists such as Lange by placing more emphasis on subjective choice and conscious activity than on bureaucratic decision making. For Markovic, it is essential for self-determination that:

1. external objective conditions constitute only the framework of possibilities of a certain course of events, whereas upon the subjective choice and conscious activity will depend which of these possibilities will be realized; (2) that the subjective choice is autonomous, genuinely free and not heteronomous and compulsory. This means that the subject by his own activity creates a new condition of the process instead of merely repeating time and again an act which he was compelled or for which he was programmed. This act need not be arbitrary and groundless; it should be an act of self-realisation, of the actualization of basic human capacities, of the satisfaction of genuine human needs (Markovic, 1974[a], p. 210).

As was noted in Sections 3.2 and 8.1, when social individuals no longer have to fight for resources the antagonistic features of human behaviour would disappear and
the coercive functions of the state would no longer be necessary. At this stage there would be no need for a state because no incompatible choices between social individuals would have to be made and no opportunity foregone. Because resources would be collectively owned there would sometimes be choices for the totality of social individuals, but there would be no financial gain for any social individual or group of social individuals. Under these circumstances there would be no need for any social individual or groups to compete and take possessions for their own exclusive use from what is freely available to all. Because abundance would have been achieved, the task of planning, at this stage, would involve no competing interests. There would still need to be an administration to deal with the distribution of things, and decision making would merely be about the order in which things could be done (Section 8.3). Importantly, this administration would control things and services, but not people. It would not be a ‘power above’ social individuals and therefore not as alienating (entfremdet) as the state outlined in Lange’s system in Chapter Seven.

8.3 A brief exploration of the background to Markovic’s model of socialism.

Markovic defines socialism as “the transformation of private property into common social property” (Markovic, 1982 [a], p. 88). Socialism for Markovic is therefore a process which necessarily begins with the aspiration to transfer the ownership of the means of production either to associations of producers or to other organizations representing the populace.

In order to situate Markovic’s model historically, I briefly describe the context of Markovic’s work. If one considers the geographical composition of Yugoslavia, one can see why Markovic favoured a federal system of governance at a national level. The term Yugoslavia refers to several regions, many of which are based on separate ethnic identities: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and
Slovenia.

The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was proclaimed in 1943 by the Yugoslav Partisans resistance movement which operated during the World War II. It was renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946. The political model which was adopted was based on the lines of centralized planning and state ownership of enterprises (with the exception of agriculture). The centralized planning of the means of production applied mainly to raw materials and large-scale industry, while small-scale industrial production and agricultural production were still provided by private producers and co-operatives. Because of the fragmentation of production, markets were needed to distribute goods and labour power. It was envisaged by socialist theorists that, as large-scale industry became more mechanised and productive, small-scale industry would gradually decline and, with it, the need for markets.

On June 28 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, but had associated member status of the economic grouping Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), known in the West as Comecon. Under the influence of Edward Kardelj and Milovan Dijas, the leaders of Yugoslavia began to re-assess the Soviet model of governance. In 1950 a law was introduced supporting workers' self-management, initially in a limited number of economic sectors. This law gave workers the right to directly elect workers' councils as the main decision-making bodies of a work-place. These decision-making bodies were to have the right to decide on production plans, inputs, hiring policies and, to a limited extent, income-distribution. Centralized planning took the form of a set of targets and the setting of a single price-structure. In 1953 state property was replaced by 'social property' which was regarded as the property of society as a whole. Although this did not give property
rights to enterprises in the social state, it gave them the right to use socially-owned assets and to appropriate their product. The form of this model was supported by Markovic, but he explored ways in which the content of the model could be made less bureaucratic and more democratic. To re-call, Markovic’s aim was a unalienated society of the type advocated by Marx which, of course, differed fundamentally from the type of ‘unalienated’ society envisaged by the Soviet theorists who supported Stalinism (Section 7.4.2).

8.4 Markovic’s model of self-management.

For Markovic the highest authority of an enterprise’s self-management would be “the collective of all workers (in small working communities), or the council composed of workers’ delegates (in larger ones)” (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 28). At the workplace, such a body would be:

responsible for the basic making of decisions regarding all issues of production, and distribution, employment in principle, such as rights to, and of, election and re-election of the operative management that is responsible for technical decision-making (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 28).

For Markovic, self-management is enabled when “the functions of directing social processes are no longer performed by forces outside of the mass of society, opposed to it, but are instead in the hands of the very same people who produce, who create social life in all its forms” (Markovic, 1982[b], pp. 32-33).

Therefore, Markovic’s style of management rests on structural relations, all of which are designed to return political power to associations of social individuals. The members of a self-governing body, at any level of social organization, would be directly electable by the people, or be delegated by a lower-level organ of self-government or by associations of social individuals in a given field; but not allocated from a “centre”. In this system it is the lower-level organization which
decides regulation of day-to-day matters pertaining to the work-place. In the case of schools this would be about the pattern of the working day, the hiring and firing of staff, and liaison with the local community.

Markovic, being within the political and demographic context of Yugoslavia, argues for a central organ of self-management, that is, a federal congress of 'peoples' delegates', which I discuss in Section 8.6. For Markovic, co-ordination and control of services used by the whole of society would take place at a higher level. Therefore, the authority of the central federal assembly would rest on that of national or regional assemblies, and all of them would be ultimately authorized to decide on certain matters by councils of basic working organizations and local communities.

The members of self-governing bodies would be elected for limited periods, with the principle of rotation strictly observed, and the members of self-governing bodies being directly responsible to their electorate (rather than to any political organization). Such delegates would be obliged to report regularly to the community which they represent, are subject to recall and regular re-election, and must not enjoy any material privileges as a result of their elected position. Therefore it can be seen that, for Markovic, self-management does not mean that every social individual takes part directly in all levels of self-management. In Markovic's model only the basic level of self-management is characterised by direct democracy (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 36).

The next level of self-management is constituted by councils of larger working associations and assemblies of larger communities where, for Markovic, referenda would be the only feasible way to direct democracy. Markovic argues that such structures would be able only to resort to means compatible with the "autonomy" and the "self-determination of each unit." Markovic argues that this would reduce the
likelihood of centralism, in turn preventing the "lasting, alienated authoritarian power" (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 32).

An intermediary level of decision making would be constituted by co-ordinating boards for whole branches of activity and/or by regional bodies of self-government. These bodies would coordinate the development of all communities in a defined geographical area. All these councils would be limited in their decision making by existing legislation and, by the accepted policies made at a federal level of decision making (Section 8.5).

Although Markovic believes in a significant amount of decentralized decision making, he also contends that, in the realm of necessity, there would be a role for central co-ordinating bodies. Markovic argues that, during the realm of necessity, the main reasons for coordination at a regional and national level would be to eliminate waste, reduce social friction, solve ecological problems and develop mutual aid in order to help the vulnerable.

However, Markovic argues that, within the structural relations of self-government, professional officials should not be able to block or control any political organization, or to determine general policies, the definition of general goals or the criteria for the evaluation of possible political programmes. Professional officials would merely act as advisors to the delegates, and have to be subordinate to the assemblies and councils of self-governance (Markovic, 1974[b], pp. 228-9). Unlike the managers in Lange’s model, such professionals would not be permanent paid officials. These post-holders would be directly answerable to the bodies electing them and could be replaced at any time if they are regarded as being unsuitable. The structures considered above could also be used in the management of schools, and are considered in Section 8.6.
8.5 Markovic and federalism.

For Markovic, federalism is a real alternative to centralism and decentralism in Yugoslavia. Markovic defines federalism as "a union of communities (national states, provinces, cultural or political organizations) which collaborate as equal partners while preserving a high degree of autonomy" (Markovic, 1982 [b], p. 30). Markovic notes that supporting such an institution would require an understanding of the need for solidarity.

For Markovic, a federal assembly would consist of several chambers. Markovic suggests that, in order to prevent power falling into the hands of one group, there should be a central organization, composed of three chambers, whose decision-making would be made by delegates subject to recall and re-election. Markovic recommends that one chamber of the federal assembly should be composed of delegates of workers, another constituted by delegates of communities and a third composed of directly elected delegates of all citizens. The first two chambers would approach issues from the point of view of particular professions or regions. The third chamber would mediate between the two from the point of view of the interests of all society.

Markovic argues that a federation of this kind would be possible "when all component communities have an objective interest in co-operation, in sharing certain natural or cultural resources, in exchanging goods and experiences, [and sic] in joining efforts against natural forces or some other threat" (Markovic, 1982 [b], pp. 30-1). Markovic argues that such a structure would be "a free creation of parts rather than a primary whole that determines the conditions of its parts" (Markovic, 1982, [b], p. 31). He argues that this is because, in his model, federalism does not have any dominating centre "because none of its component units aspires to domination, and/or
because all of them strongly resist any such tendency” (Markovic, 1982, [b], p. 31).

8.6 Markovic and schooling in the realm of necessity.

Neither Marx nor Markovic write extensively about schools and schooling. Therefore I extrapolate from the ideas of Marx and Markovic when outlining the possibilities for schooling within the realm of necessity.

In the realm of necessity, the state and the ideological superstructure of society would still exist and schooling would form part of that superstructure. However, the content of the superstructure will be different from that which exists in capitalism because the processes would be under the democratic control of majority of the people and, therefore, there would be the possibility of starting to develop the conditions and social relations needed for an unalienated society.

In the realm of necessity, schools would play a vital role in supporting the transition to an unalienated society by both providing pupils with an appreciation of the values which support such a society and the knowledge and skills necessary to support the development of the conditions and social relations necessary for an unalienated society. Because of the socialization of the main areas of the economy including schooling and social services, there would be no private provision of schools or of schooling for profit.

Schooling at this stage of society would take place in schools which would probably look very much like schools today. However, the management of the schools would differ substantially. Schools at this stage would be under democratic control in order to support the development of conditions and social relations which would enable fully human activity.

However, for Markovic, schooling, in the realm of necessity, is not an end-in-itself. For Markovic, schooling, at this stage, is primarily instrumental in building
the conditions and relations needed to enable the transition to a society that would support fully human activity and education as an end-in-itself. Therefore schooling is structurally related to the economic and political needs of society.

For Markovic, schooling is structurally related to the economic and political needs of society in two main ways. Firstly, it provides future workers with the knowledge and skills necessary to increase the productive capacity to a level where abundance can be achieved. Secondly, schooling would be vital to provide the knowledge, skills and dispositions needed to support the democratic self-management of productive activity. Therefore, Knowledge of mother tongue, Mathematics, Science and Technology and the skills necessary to take part in decision making would be central, and probably compulsory, parts of a curriculum for pupils of school age. This is because this knowledge and these skills would be essential for society to provide the level of abundance necessary for social individuals to take part in fully human activity.

Marx was insistent that the state should not interfere in the study of ‘pure’ subjects. Marx argued that such subjects should be studied for according to their “eternal principles” (Marx, 1974[a], pp. 209-10; 1974[b], p. 357; 1974[c], p. 326). This is an important condition if society intends social individuals to gradually develop their powers and capacities in an unalienated way. Therefore it can be assumed, in a society influenced by Marxist ideals, that subjects and skills not needed for either technological development or the administration of things would be taught in such a way as to enable social individuals to develop their capacities in ways that are meaningful to them.

At this stage of social development, because of the release of resources and the political consensus underpinning society, decision makers would try to enable
unalienated activity where possible. It is probably safe to assume that education could be a life-long experience and be free at all levels. One could also assume that there would be no entry qualifications for courses. Social individuals would be able to enter a course at whatever level they chose, the assumption being that they would drop out if they did not have the aptitude or necessary knowledge for the course they joined. Individuals would, of course, be advised at what level they should start any exploration of a subject, the emphasis being solely on the development of the individual’s skills and capacities.

As was noted in Section 8.2, the knowledge and these skills need to participate in the collective decision-making are also needed in order to create the social relations which enables associations of social individuals to move forward to a fully human society. This type of schooling, provided within a society inspired by Marxist ideals, is therefore a necessary condition for transition to an unalienated society. The content of this schooling would be decided democratically through structures similar to those outlined in Section 8.4. However, because schooling has an impact on society as a whole, the content and style of the curriculum and the management of schools, the standards of teaching and the standards of school buildings would be laid down and monitored by centrally elected bodies. Within Markovic’s model, school inspectors would be directly responsible to the higher decision-making bodies at a national level. The management of this schooling differs substantially from that of ‘Soviet Marxism’ because schools in Markovic’s model are under democratic control even at a national level, and, as such, reflect the concerns of the wider community and not merely the interests of bureaucrats.

The importance of democracy in supporting the development of the relations needed to overcome political alienation means that democratic dispositions and values
have to be encouraged within schools. Therefore, it is vital that schools are organized in a way which supports the development of the skills and dispositions needed to enable the development towards the realm of freedom. Schools safeguard democracy by developing a critical spirit and building up the free and independent public opinion essential for the development of the process towards an unalienated society.

Within Markovic's model, the workers in the school, parents and older pupils would have a say in the manner in which the schools is run. This issue has been addressed by Patricia White in Beyond Domination (Section 6.4.2). Although White situates her model of schooling in a liberal democratic society, the mechanisms she suggests for developing democratic dispositions are still relevant. However, because she bases her model on external relations, she fails to address the way which the interrelations between the structural relations of the school and the pupils would necessarily need to support the acquisition of such dispositions. For White, the development of such dispositions is contingent and may or may not happen. The consideration of the necessary relation between the structural relations of the school and the development of the dispositions of individual pupils would have provided the basis for a very interesting ontological study into the role of school organization in developing the confidence and political consciousness of pupils. I have not addressed the epistemological basis of this process because my thesis primarily considers the ontology of alienating relations. However, I consider that such a study would make an important contribution to the philosophical analysis of self-realization.

The day-to-day management would be overseen by delegates from such "communities for education" as schools, universities, scientific institutes and academies, as well as from representatives of such artistic institutions as theatres, publishing houses and galleries. Each local group of schools would send delegates
from schools to local councils and from local councils would be sent delegates to regional and republic-level assemblies. Assemblies at republic-level would make final decisions on educational, scientific and cultural policy and take responsibility for distributing school funds. These funds would consist of guaranteed amounts, which would be automatically allocated according to a fixed percentage of the total fund accumulated each year to cover general social needs.

8.7 Alienating relations within Markovic’s system.

It was noted in Section 8.1 that, at the beginning of the realm of necessity, there would still be many of the conditions and social relations found in capitalism. In this thesis I contend that although these conditions and social relations might have a slightly different content, the economic principles operating would still be the same as within classical capitalism. For example, at the beginning of the realm of necessity there would still be commodity production, markets and, workers would still need to alienate their labour. As a result of verausserung (alienating through selling) would still take place.

There would still be a market in labour-power even though the state would be the employer and the worker would be paid out of communal capital. Therefore, the category of worker would not be abolished at this stage and the community would be still being a community of labour (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 346-7).

Although the worker would have the knowledge that what he is producing would contribute to the goods needed by social individuals, nevertheless, the worker would lack direct control over their productive activity, and consequently still be estranged from the productive process.

Although the day-to-day management of the means of production would be in the

\[\text{3 The most prominent one being in foreign trade.}\]
hands of associations of worker/producers, ultimate control of the means of production would still be exercised through state bodies and, even though these bodies would be elected by associations of producers, the worker would still relinquish control of his productive activity.

Where there is the fragmentation of production, the distribution of goods would still be conducted through markets. Because of the fragmented nature of production, exchange value would still be the measure of value and the mediating function between persons engaged in productive activity (Marx, 1974, p. 346). Because of the social need for veräusserung (alienating through selling) of a social individual’s labour, social structures still support individual possession of goods as an essential aspect of life. As a consequence, man’s will, his activity and his relations with other workers would still be to a certain extent competitive. As a consequence of this form of social mediation, the social individual would perceive others as independent of himself and also strange and alien to himself.

Nevertheless, in Markovic’s system, workers would exercise more control over the conditions of their productive life than would workers subject to the systems favoured by Oskar Lange and, therefore, some of the social relations which would prefigure an unalienated society would be present. In Markovic’s system, power in self-governing bodies would be delegated to people in a particular field and not allocated from the centre as it is in Lange’s model. When all decision-making comes from the top, social power is alienated; but not so when it is delegated from lower-level social organisations (Markovic, 1982 [a], p. 121). However, it can be seen from the following quote, that in this system, a significant amount of control over conditions of activity is still taken by intermediate and higher level bodies over which social individuals have no direct control:
a certain amount of power is, then, delegated to it. In such a way the authority of the central federal assembly rests on that of national or regional assemblies, and all of them are ultimately authorised to decide on certain issues by the councils of basic working organisations and local communities (Markovic, 1982[a], p. 122, GT's italics).

Markovic differentiates his model from those of bureaucratic states and of liberal doctrines of ‘social contract’ and ‘majority rule’, by arguing that, in his model, “power originates from the councils in the atomic social community, even when a considerable amount of it has been delegated to higher-level self-governing institutions” (Markovic, 1982[a], p. 122).

Markovic contends that his system is less alienating than other statist systems, because his model is based on societal support for solidarity and the autonomy and self-determination of each social unit (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 32). However, Markovic’s form of governance still has structural relations which take a “certain amount” of control over the conditions of life out of the hands of the majority of working people and into the hands of delegates over whom they have no direct control. I maintain that, as such, the relations in Markovic’s system would be still alienating, although to a lesser degree than those found in Lange’s model. I have argued that, on the basis of the scenario outlined in Section 8.1, national co-ordination is needed to ensure efficient use of resources at a time when there is still scarcity. However, I noted in this chapter that, as technology develops and abundance becomes more realizable, many, if not all, of these structures would wither and that, as a consequence of the social relations in Markovic’s model, a non-unalienated activity.

In conclusion: in Chapter Eight I give three main ways in which the relations and conditions in Markovic’s model could prefigure the social relations necessary to support an unalienated society and education as an unalienated activity. The first way
is that the socialization of the means of production would be under democratic control and would enable the greater satisfaction of the material needs of social individuals. The second way is that market relations, commodity production and exchange value as the measure of value would gradually decline in importance in every-day life. The third way is that the technological development necessary to gradually increase the amount of free time would enable social individuals to take part in meaningful activities. Moreover, increased automation of production and abundance would gradually support the political decision to release schooling from being mainly instrumental to the needs of the economy, thus enabling it to become a service which addresses human need and unalienated activity.

In this Chapter I have shown how the conditions and social relations found in Markovic’s model could prefigure an unalienated society and, consequently, enable education as an unalienated activity. The form and content of such an unalienated society are discussed in Chapter Nine.
Chapter Nine
The global realm of freedom, including education as an unalienated activity.

Introduction

This chapter explores in more detail the social relations and conditions which would be necessary to support unalienated social relations. I note in Section 8.2 and in the conclusion of Chapter Eight that the realm of freedom begins only when “labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends” (Marx, 1981[b], p. 959); and with the disappearance of markets and the state. In Section 8.2 I note that this is made possible when abundance in all necessary goods and services has been achieved, and by the general support for the co-operative and humane dispositions which enable such a society. In this chapter I note that, as a result of abundance, there would be no need for social individuals to compete with each other over resources, or to hoard goods. As a result the disposition to acquire and possess ‘things’ would gradually disappear as the material forces supporting such dispositions wither away. Consequently, the need for coercive institutions, such as the police, to intervene in conflicts over property rights. It would also be unnecessary to have any deliberate educational intervention as part of a ‘civilizing process’.

In the latter part of this chapter I explore the concept of education as an ‘end-in-itself’, with reference to philosophers as apparently different as John Dewey, Paul Hirst and Ivan Illich. I also illustrate the differences between my own argument and those of most anarchists, since the lack of authority structures in both my model and the models supported by anarchists may otherwise result in the perception that my model is a model of anarchism.
9.1 The conditions and relations necessary for unalienated activity.

The realm of freedom would be enabled by three main conditions. The first condition would be the expansion of productive forces and technology. This would release social individuals from being directly involved in production. For example, the tools and equipment needed for production could come from automated productive processes unless, of course, certain instruments or component parts come from the creative products of craftsmen/women who would be pursuing their productive activity as an end-in-itself.

The second condition would be the decision by the majority of social individuals to support the realm of freedom. I maintain that the presence of abundance and the changes in the nature of productive activity, which would have been taking place since the beginning of the realm of necessity, would have been transforming the social individuals involved into 'different subjects' from those existing within capitalist relations (Marx, 1973[a], p. 712). To briefly recall, it was noted in Section 4.3 that when productive activity takes place within alienating relations, an object necessarily confronts social individuals as something other, as something which is not their own and which is alien to them. In unalienating conditions an object would not confront social individuals as something other, but as something belonging and satisfying to them. The activity involved in the realization of social individuals' powers would create an awareness of what is required for their realization, especially the awareness that the activity to realize the conditions and relations necessary must be done with others.

The need of social individuals for unalienated activities would be paramount; and this would also be the predominant aim for associations of social individuals. Therefore, in the realm of freedom, it is likely that the social individuals regulating production
would be members of scientific or technological associations which would take part in productive activity because they would both value their own activities as an end-in-itself. They would also understand the necessity of providing the goods and services to others, in order to enable the latter to take part in unalienated activities, including education. I maintain that as a consequence of both the enthusiasm for particular activities and the willingness to help others, there would be no need for formal schooling to ensure a supply of socially-aware skilled enthusiasts.

The third main condition for existence of the realm of freedom is abundance. In the realm of freedom goods would be available on demand in much the same way as that described by William Morris in *News From Nowhere* (Morris, 2003, Chapter Six: “A Little Shopping”). In Morris’ society, goods are free, abundant and of good quality. They are available at shops for the asking, without the exchange of money. Because of the absence of scarcity, social individuals would have no material need to hoard; and dispositions such as acquisitiveness, possessiveness, greed and egoism would no longer be materially relevant. Consequently, there would be no grounds for conflict between groups of people on the basis of financial or positional gain and no need for coercive organizations such as the police or army. I now consider David Miller’s criticisms of Marx’s concept of a communist society, which I examine because these criticisms form a coherent whole, being similar to some ‘classical’ criticisms of Marxism.

**9.2 Miller’s criticisms of Marx’s concept of unalienated activity.**

David Miller, in *Market, State and Community* (1999), has criticised Marx’s description of a communist society on three grounds. Two of these criticisms are ontological and the third is economic. I begin with the two ontological criticisms, both of which are concerned with the capacity of social individuals to develop their
individuality within “communism”, without the return to what Miller calls “the personal engulfment of pre-capitalist societies” (Miller, 1999, pp. 214, 242-3).

Miller’s first ontological argument therefore specifically draws on Cohen’s concept of “the personal engulfment of pre-capitalist societies” and argues that market structures would be necessary in a “communist” society to prevent the personal identification with a specific task, in the manner found in pre-capitalist societies. Miller borrows the term “engulfment” and the concept of “personal engulfment of pre-capitalist societies” from G.A. Cohen’s discussion in his article “Marx’s Dialectic of Labour” (Cohen, 1974, pp. 242-3). In this article, Cohen uses the concept of engulfment to describe this process of identification with a group or task (Cohen, 1974, pp. 239-243). For Cohen the concept of engulfment is primarily based on feelings rather than on structural relations. For example, for Cohen, “engulfment by X is compatible with a feeling of constraint by Y, where X and Y are distinct: a person lacking the freedom of detachment may also experience obstacles to, and pressures upon, his will” together with “a lack of awareness of oneself as capable of independence from X” (Cohen, 1974, p. 240, GT’s italics). For Cohen, the self is never completely effaced by environmental circumstances or other selves.

Miller acknowledges that Marx was against market structures in a communist society, and maintains that there are two possible ways Marx could have responded to the charge of engulfment. Firstly, Miller proposes that Marx might have said that capitalism had brought about an irreversible shift in human nature, which would have enabled persons in a post-capitalist society to continue to develop as individuals. Secondly, Miller considers that Marx might have argued that the development of individuality begun under capitalism could continue and be enhanced under

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1 Interestingly Miller uses the term individual, not social individual.
In reply to these possible responses of Marx, Miller argues that the “irreversible shift in human personality” would “model the transfer of capitalism’s human achievements to communism on the transfer of its material achievements – the expanded forces of production etc.” Miller argues that it is difficult to see “how aspects of human personality can be transferred in the same way as physical objects, or even as scientific knowledge” (Miller, 1999, p. 214). I maintain that Miller’s argument is a misinterpretation of Marx, and instead argue that Marx maintains that “social individuals” may be distinct from their activity when such activity is an object of [their] will and consciousness. For Marx “social individuals” separate themselves from their immediate feelings, experiences and activities, in order to inform these feelings, experiences and activities with the results of their deliberations.

Next I consider Miller’s second ontological argument. In this argument Miller denies that the mechanisms of a communist society would prevent individuals from lapsing back into “the immediate identification with the social group” (Miller, 1999, p. 215). In this argument, Miller notes that in a communist society work will be voluntary and tasks rotated, but argues that he is not clear how such features would be sufficient to support the development of individuality. As part of this second ontological argument, Miller contends that the rotation of tasks brings two difficulties. Firstly, Miller maintains that rotation of tasks may prevent individuals from developing their individual capacities to the full. Secondly, Miller claims that, if an individual wishes to spend a lot of time on a specific activity, a certain degree of coercion would be necessary by society to ensure that other tasks, essential to the functioning of society, are performed (Miller, 1999, pp. 215-6).

Regarding the first point, Miller argues that, within communism, individuals might still “work in a spirit of simple identification with their task and their social
group” in such a way that constrains the exercise of individual choice and the development of individuality (Miller, 1999, p. 215). I contend that Miller’s concept of productive activity in communist society is contrary to that held by Marx. Marx argues that an unalienated society would only be sustained when “social individuals” are willing to undertake activities because they realise the need of others for goods or services. It is as a consequence of this willingness to address the needs of others, that there would be no compulsion to ‘work.’

Moreover, Marx points out that in capitalist societies simple identification with social tasks takes place as a result of the division of labour supported by similar market relations to those which Miller favours in his model. Marx argues that the structures of a market society force a “cleavage between the particular and the common interest”:

> each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, *which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape*. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood (Marx, 1970, p. 54, GT’s italics).

Marx concludes that within capitalism choice takes place within conditions and social relations over which most “social individuals” have no control, and that there is not the capacity to choose unalienated activity in a capitalist society. It is only within the realm of freedom that “social individuals” have the possibility of choosing unalienated activity:

> While in communist society, *where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity* but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, *just as I have a mind, without ever becoming* hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic (Marx, 1970, p. 54, GT’s italics).

Importantly, Marx argues that it is only in a communist society that social individuals
are not subordinated to prescriptive definitions of their activity:

With a communist organisation of society, there disappears the subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from division of labour, and also the subordination of the artist to some definite art, thanks to which he is exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc., the very name of his activity adequately expressing the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities (Marx, 1970, p. 109).

In Marx's day, when large swathes of the countryside were given over to labour-intensive agrarian production, these skills would have been developed by individuals taking part in activities with their parents from an early age. However, in an industrial or post-industrial age this is not the case and social individuals would probably have to learn these skills from others with whom they would have neither family ties nor market relationships. In these cases social individuals would need to access the skills and knowledge of other individuals who were enthusiasts and willing to share their skills with others. The development of social dispositions and awareness would make it highly likely that social individuals who were enthusiasts in activities would take pleasure in sharing their knowledge and in helping others develop some expertise.

In the realm of freedom or a communist society, all the activities would be learnt by observing and directly taking part in activities with skilled social individuals. Hunting, in a post-capitalist society is a group activity and social individuals would learn and have their skills developed through taking part in the activity with others who would be already experienced and skilled. Even where the activities which Marx lists are ones which could be conducted alone, for example, fishing, they are also activities which, predominantly, would involve the acquisition of skills from experienced practitioners.

In support of Marx's argument, G. A. Cohen has pointed out that this type of activity would be possible because individuals do not enter a "position in a structure
of roles, in such a way that he could identify himself, if only for the time being, as a hunter, etc" (Cohen, 1974, p. 259). Cohen argues that this is because, in the realm of freedom, Marx maintains that individuals have the possibility of facing one another without the mediation of institutions representing "fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us" (Marx, 1970, p. 54).

Next, I consider Miller's economic criticism of Marx's concept of a communist society. This is based on Miller's argument that, in the absence of a market, there would no mechanism for encouraging the development of new products (Miller, 1999, p. 218). Miller states that planning would be done by planners (presumably bureaucrats) informed, at best, through customer surveys (Miller, 1999, p. 218). As a result of Miller's assumptions about the nature of planning, Miller concludes that labour will not result in a communal bond between producer and "consumer" [Miller's term] (Miller, 1999, p. 218).

I maintain that Miller's theory of how production would be organized is very similar to that of Lange, described in Chapter Seven. This is because Miller's model is also one based on partial commodity production, combined with partial bureaucratic allocation of resources. Therefore the social relations in Miller's political economy (see Section 6.1.1) cannot necessarily be prefigurative of an unalienated society.

Miller's criticisms of Marx are abstracted from the conditions and structural relations upon which Marx's theory of an unalienated society is based. For example, Miller has ignored the fact that a condition for the existence of the realm of freedom is that work will be practically non-existent (G. A. Cohen, 1974, p. 261). This aspect of Marx's concept of an unalienated society is possible because technology will have automated work practices and created sufficient abundance, so that social individuals
have the possibility of sufficient free time to fulfil their interests. Therefore, for Marx, in the realm of freedom, the impetus for following an interest will come from internal need and not external necessity.

When Marx refers to social individuals driven by the external necessity of "bringing nature under the control of society", he is referring to societies that still need to develop technology to the level where many work processes are automated (Marx, 1979 [a], p. 649). (It is only at a stage following this automation that social individuals do not need to have a direct involvement with production.) By definition, these are not societies that have the conditions and relations found in the realm of freedom, a point which G.A. Cohen accepts in *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (Cohen, 1978, pp. 23-4). It is this issue to which Miller refers in his book (Miller, 1999, p. 219, n. 29). This is an example of Miller's tendency to transfer some of Marx's statements about an unalienated society to prior stages of society with different conditions and relations.

As was noted in Section 9.1, if one places the activity possible in the realm of freedom within the internal social relations and conditions that necessarily exist, there would be no tension in the social individual between the wish to take part in unalienated activity and the wish to take part in the production of the goods and services needed by all social individuals. There would be no need either to calculate the amount of time put into social activity in order to claim time for individual leisure activities (contrary to Miller's assertion, 1999, pp. 216-7). It follows that there would be no need on the part of society, contrary to Miller's suggestion, to use compulsory methods to ensure that social individuals take part in production (Miller, 1999, p. 216). To recall from Section 9.1, this is because, in the realm of freedom, social individuals would be aware of the fact that their capacity to engage in unalienated activity would depend on the willingness of others in society to produce goods and
services for all, thus enabling the development of human unalienated activity, including education, which would have become by then an end-in-itself.

9.3 Education and other unalienated activities, in the realm of freedom.

In this section I consider the way in which education could be conceived in the realm of freedom, and show that this is not an unfamiliar way of thinking about education. I illustrate by reference to writers as apparently diverse as John Dewey, Paul Hirst and Ivan Illich.

In this section I maintain that the instrumental rationale given for schooling in the realm of necessity (Section 8.5) no longer necessarily applies in the realm of freedom because, in the realm of freedom, there would be abundance and the automation of most production. The existence of these conditions would enable all social individuals to have the opportunity to take part in activities which are meaningful to them. As noted in Section 9.1 any technological work needed would generally be done by associations of enthusiasts in that field. Moreover, because there would be no need for a state, state functions would be replaced by the administration of things (Section 9.1). Once again, it is highly likely that this administration would be done by social individuals interested in “keeping things together” (Morris, 2003, p. 130). Consequently, education in the realm of freedom would enable the development of human powers and capacities as ends-in-themselves.

In the realm of freedom education would not be a separate activity, as it is under capitalism, but would form an integral part of the social activities in which social individuals choose to become involved. Social individuals would learn the skills and the knowledge which they feel would be needed as a result of taking part in activities meaningful to them. For example, social individuals might become guides to a historical building in their locality because they wish to give others the opportunity to
study the building. As a consequence of the questions they are asked, they might then develop an interest in the history of the building and locality and possibly of the relevant historical periods more generally. Moreover, social individuals would be able to spend as much time as they considered necessary in such activities. During the course of these activities they would develop a variety of skills and capacities. In the words of William Morris, “information lies ready to each one’s hands when his own inclinations impel him to seek it. In this as in other matters we have become wealthy: we can afford to give ourselves time to grow” (Morris, 2003, p. 111).

I now consider the ways in which John Dewey, Paul Hirst and Ivan Illich each explore the concept of education as an end-in-itself. John Dewey has noted in his article “Self-Realization as the Moral Idea” (Dewey, 1893) that it is in such a situation that one finds the self and therefore has the possibility of achieving self-realization. Dewey defines the self not as a “presupposed fixed schema” but as capacities defined as concrete specific activities (Dewey, 1893, p. 653). For Dewey, in this situation, activity “is not action for the self that is required (thus setting up a fixed self which is simply going to get something more, wealth, pleasure, morality, or whatever), but action as the self” (Dewey, 1893, pp. 661-2, original italics):

To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as to fill up some presupposed ideal self. It means to act at the height of action, to realize its full meaning (Dewey, 1893, p. 659).

Dewey argues that a capacity is realized “when we can say that no possible future activities or conditions have anything to do with the present action except as they enable us to take deeper account of the present activity” and to “see it in its totality” (Dewey, 1893, p. 659). For Dewey, the whole character of man is “identical with man in all his concrete make-up and manifestations”. Dewey argues that “certain traits of character have such an obvious connection with our social relationships that we call them ‘moral’
in an empathic sense” (Dewey, 1916, p. 415). Dewey also argues that “the moral and social quality (sic) of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical with each other”.

Therefore, for Dewey, to possess virtue “means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others in all the offices of life” (Dewey, 1916, p. 415).

Although Dewey gives an interesting analysis of capabilities, he does not recognise that only in an unalienated society, of the kind described in this chapter, can capabilities be realized as ends-in-themselves. I maintain that this is because Dewey fails to recognise the interrelated nature of social relations and the oppositional nature of capitalist relations to the self-realization of social individuals’ capacities. Although Dewey’s concept of morality is based on social action, it fails to support the emancipatory action which would be needed to provide the conditions and relations which would support the development of capacities as ends-in-themselves. I now consider a different concept of education as an end-in-itself.

Throughout Paul Hirst’s works also, liberal education is something that has a value in its own right, as an end-in-itself. However, for Hirst, learning involves drawing on what is known and what is handed down by specialists. It is something external: a power above the person and therefore alienating. For Hirst, knowledge can be acquired only from a “master on the job” (Hirst, 1974[a], p. 45). In other words, knowledge is within the purview of a specialist elite. Hirst argues that knowledge can only be learnt from a master on the job because a) the forms of knowledge (as logical units) require “particular training in distinct worlds of discourse”; b) the forms necessitate the development of “critical standards according to complex criteria”, and c) the forms involved one coming to look at experience in particular ways (Hirst, 1974[a], p. 45).
In his later version of liberal education, Hirst broadens the scope of social practices to be included in such education. He regards social practices to be a “modification of present practices” (Hirst, 1993, p. 185). Hirst states in his article in *Educational Theory* (1983):

> If we are to develop rational educational practice it now seems to me we must start from a consideration of *current practice*, the rules and principles it actually embodies and the knowledge, beliefs and principles that the practitioners employ in both characterising that practice and deciding what ought to be done. The practical discourse in which what is going on can be expressed will have much in common with the discourse of *everyday practical activities*........The activities and practices of everyday life are developed and modified in a wide context of knowledge, beliefs and values about men and their physical and social context (Hirst, 1983, pp. 16-19, GT’s italics).

I contend that Hirst therefore imports concepts and dispositions which, being derived from capitalistic practices, are therefore necessarily alienating. Hirst, therefore, has to contend with the limitations which capitalism imposes, such as scarcity and lack of leisure (Hirst, 1993, p. 193). Indeed, Hirst acknowledges that a life involving intrinsically worthwhile pursuits is “*not* merely as a logical possibility but ... a *practical* ideal, the good life, to which *all should* aspire, difficult though it may be to attain for contingent reasons” (Hirst, 1993, p. 185, GT’s italics).

In this chapter I have maintained that the limitations which capitalism imposes will have gradually been overcome during the realm of necessity and will, by definition, no longer exist at the start of the realm of freedom. In the realm of freedom the availability of resources, human and non-human, needed for practical activities could be made available through informal networks such as those proposed by Ivan Illich (Illich, 2007) and Everett Reimer (Reimer, 1971). Alternatively, or in addition, centres supervised by enthusiasts would enable social individuals to have access to the
objects needed for learning, including lists of those already engaging in specific activities. Although I envisage information networks such as those suggested by Reimer, my model is necessarily based on social conditions and relations fundamentally different both from those in the model of Reimer/Illich and from those in the anarchist school of thought which influenced them (R. Chappell, 1978, p. 369). There is a fuller discussion of the ideas of Reimer/Illich on education in Section 9.4.4.

In the next section I show the differences between my own argument and those of most anarchists, since otherwise the lack of authority structures in both my model and the models supported by anarchists may result in the perception that my model is a model of anarchism.

9.4 A brief exploration of anarchism and education.

Since the nineteenth century, there has been a debate between Marxists and anarchists about the nature of social change and the role of the state in any transition to a communist society. The anarcho-communists have more in common with Marxism than have other anarchists. The main difference between the Marxist and the anarcho-communist views of an unalienated future lies in the nature of social change. To clarify this difference, I begin this section by briefly outlining the ideas of the French anarcho-communist Elisee Reclus (1830-1905) on social change. I start with Elisee Reclus because he is in sympathy with significant aspects of Marx’s ideas on political economy.

9.4.1 Elisee Reclus: anarcho-communism and Marxism.

Elisee Reclus, a contemporary of Marx, is attributed as saying that an anarchist society was necessarily a communist society, because the communist means of production and distribution (as defined by Marx) necessarily results in similar features. They share the collectivist critique of Marxism but reject the title collectivist.
to those of an ideal anarchist society (Marie Fleming, 1979, p. 194). Reclus argues that the communist means of production and distribution necessarily result in no state, and therefore in no hierarchical forms of organisation. As with other anarchists, Reclus strives to implement his ideas about power and hierarchy within contemporary society. In this chapter I have argued that the ideal society which Reclus wishes to achieve must be prefigured by the social relations and conditions outlined in Section 8.1, and can only be institutionalized when these social relations and conditions have been fully established.

Not all anarchists have the same view of the ideal society. Although all anarchists aim for a society without a state and a hierarchy, they have different ideas about economic relations within an ideal society: for example, Reclus' anarchism differs from that of anarchists who support mutualism. Anarchism based on mutualism is based on private property relations and as such it necessarily results in fragmented production, the division of labour and markets. This mutual form of anarchism is sympathetically described by Judith Suissa in her book Anarchism and Education (Suissa, 2006), which is discussed in the following section.

9.4.2 Judith Suissa's interpretation of social anarchism and its implications for education.

In this section I use Suissa's book to illustrate my differences with mutual anarchism. Suissa acknowledges that "many of the central ideas and principles of social anarchism overlap with those of Marxism" (Suissa, 2006, p. 12, GT's italics). I maintain that this overlap includes Suissa's view of human nature, and especially the dialectical relation between consciousness and the social context, which she supports (Suissa, 2006, pp. 28-9, 97).

To briefly recall, in Section 4.1 I argue that Marx accepts that, although it is possible to abstract common components from the concept of human nature, these
components give only a partial view of the social individual, and do not by themselves correspond to reality. Also in Section 4.7 I note that Marx maintains that, although human nature is mediated by social relations, the sufficiency of these conditions and social relations for the occurrence of a particular development involving human activity also depends on human thought and action. It is therefore the range of possibilities which is determined by inherent social relations, rather than any particular outcome within the range.

Suissa does not acknowledge the similarities between her view of human nature and that of Marx. I maintain that this is because she has adopted the view that, in Marx’s thought, consciousness is determined solely by the material conditions of life, particularly of those of production:

the anarchists reject the basic Marxist materialist assumption that consciousness is determined by the material conditions of life – specifically, by the relations of production. The anarchist position implies, at least to some degree, life may be determined by consciousness ...... (Suissa, 2006, p. 136).

Suissa’s view also results in her assumption that, in Marx’s writings, thought structures are determined mechanistically by the base/superstructure relationship (Suissa, 2006, p. 136). In Section 4.2 I argue that Marx’s ontology cannot be deterministic because his conception of social development allows for the influence of human thought and action and, in Section 4.7.1, I outline Marx’s and Engel’s criticism of such a mechanical concept of the base/superstructure. Briefly, in Section 4.7.1, I note that, although Marx gives primacy to the economic base, he does not regard it as always the most evident determinant (Marx, 1970, pp. 57-8). I also note that Marx argues that man’s relationship to the economic base does not merely correspond or reflect economic structures. More precisely, the social individual’s relation to the economic base involves social and economic relationships which
change *partly* as a result of the *ideas* held by social individuals about economic activity (Marx, 1981, pp. 927-8). Moreover, although Suissa acknowledges that individual freedom and well-being is "sustained in the context of social interaction" (Suissa, 2006, p. 115), she does not acknowledge the prefigurative role of internal relations involved in social interaction; for her social relations tend to be mainly external and therefore contingent.

Suissa cites some of the political differences that exist between anarchism and Marxism: in particular, the support of Marxists for a common, central ownership of the economy, state control of production and the need for "a period of dictatorship", during the period of transition from socialism to communism (Suissa, 2006, p. 13). Suissa argues that, if revolutionaries use the state to realize their goals, they would "inevitably reproduce all its negative features (the corrupting power of the minority over the majority, hierarchical, centralized authority and legislation, and so on)" (Suissa, 2006, p. 13, GT's italics). She contends that, accompanying this political view, is an epistemology in which "Marxists claim to create a scientific theory of social change...[which]... leads to a form of elitism in which the scientific 'truth' is known only to an elect few, which would justify attempts to impose this truth on the 'masses' without any critical process" (Suissa, 2006, p. 13).

Instead, Suissa argues that "the exact form which the future society will take can *never* be determined in advance; the creation of the harmonious, free society is a constant, dynamic process of self-improvement, spontaneous organisation and free experimentation" (Suissa, 2006, p. 13, GT's italics). Attacking what she perceives to be a form of Marxist epistemology, Suissa argues that anarchist theorists have insisted "that the revolution itself was not subject to scientific understanding, and its course could not be determined in advance, favouring instead an organic image of social
change” (Suissa, 2006, p. 13). Suissa states that anarchists do not regard the revolutionary process “as a linear progression, in which there is a single point of reference — the means of production — and a single struggle” (Suissa, 2006, p. 136). She contends, therefore, that anarchists reject “the basic Marxist materialist assumption that consciousness is determined by the material conditions of life — specifically, by the relations of production” (Suissa, 2006, p. 136).

9.4.3 Critique of Suissa’s model of society and social change.

The form of ‘Marxism’ that Suissa is criticising in *Anarchism and Education* is broadly the model I criticise in Sections 4.7.1 and 7.3. I argue that Suissa’s interpretation of Marx is not an accurate version of either Marx’s theory of social change or his theory of the state. To conceive of social change as a linear progression would have been contradictory to the dialectical method which Marx uses. As a result of the dialectical method, Marx would not provide blue-prints so as to specify the particular content of future societies. However, Marx did produce *a priori* arguments to show why certain conditions and relations would be necessary for an unalienated society, and it is these arguments which informed his critique of capitalist societies.

To recall, in Section 4.1 I argue that, for Marx, the process of social change is not deterministic, contrary to Suissa’s argument in her book *Anarchism and Education* (Suissa, 2006, p. 13). Instead, for Marx, the process of social transformation from capitalism to an unalienated society is only possible if people behave in a certain way. Marx assumes that they would behave in this way only *if* they were aware of certain structural and relational possibilities and would be prepared to struggle for them.

Absence of this type of analysis means that Suissa is at a disadvantage when analyzing how to change social systems. All that can be guaranteed by Suissa are aspiration and hope; but these alone, I argue, are insufficient to change a socio-
economic system. Additionally, there is nothing in Suissa's methodology which necessarily allows for the establishment and maintenance of the objective conditions and relations necessary to underpin her new system. Therefore it follows that, for Suissa, whether the social system is changed or not is a matter of chance.

Regarding Suissa's understanding of Marx's theory of the state, I also contend that her concept of the state disregards Marx's work on the organization of the Paris Commune, as outlined in *The Civil War In France* (Marx, 1974[a], pp. 209-213). Crucially, Suissa's model disregards a form of governance which allows for change within the state through social relations based on the self-management of workers. Contrarily, Suissa argues that all states enshrine a hierarchical mode of organization with repressive measures which control their subjects, and also engage in aggressive acts against other states (Suissa, 2006, p. 13, quoting David Miller's *Anarchism* [Miller, 1984, p. 82]). It follows that, for Suissa, within anarchism schools should be run entirely by communities with no input from a state or any other administrative body (Suissa, 2006, p. 48). She argues that this would be possible because society would be organized in small communities (Suissa, 2006, p. 70). She believes that such communities would be sustained if there were an anarchist system of education nurturing altruistic and co-operative values (Suissa, 2006, p. 41). Suissa assumes that, at this stage of society, individuals would be committed to social values by virtue of the nature of the communities in which they live, and the hopes that these communities would have for their future. While I agree that such values would be necessary to sustain such a community, I contend that this aspiration has insufficient recognition of the objective conditions and social relations which must necessarily underpin such a society if the life-style for it to which Suissa aspires is to be a real possibility.
9.4.4 Everett Reimer and Ivan Illich: anarchism and education.

I note in Section 9.3 that Ivan Illich and Everett Reimer also engage in a joint exploration of models of schooling influenced by anarchist ideas. In this section I intend to explore their concept of education in more detail. Of his book *School is Dead*, Reimer states, "This book is the result of a conversation with Ivan Illich that has continued for fifteen years. We have talked of many things, but increasingly about education and school, and eventually about alternatives to school" (Chappell, 1978, p. 369, quoting Reimer, 1971, Foreword). Illich states, in a letter to Chappell (1977), that he [Illich] is influenced, but to a lesser extent than is Reimer, by nineteenth century anarchists, especially by Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Sterner.

Reimer aims to base his model in a neo-liberal political economy, where justice gives the "distribution of wealth, and other values" consistent with the "minimum of constraint by others" (Reimer, 1971, p. 99). Reimer’s model, therefore, contains coercive elements of liberalism which I maintain are alienating. Reimer admits that non-coercive education is only fully realizable as greater social justice is also achieved. Reimer also argues that both education and social justice are intimately interrelated (Reimer, 1971, p. 94).

Reimer argues that low state intervention in the economy (and, presumably, in education) would necessarily result in the private provision of education through market mechanisms, with ‘grants’ being paid into individual education accounts from which individuals could purchase education (Reimer, 1971, pp. 135, 147). In other words, Reimer’s model of schooling is compatible only with a system where there is a low level of state intervention at all levels of society, such as that found in laissez-faire capitalism. In this chapter I argue that a model of deschooling, such as that supported

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by Reimer, can in fact only apply within the conditions and social relations exist in Marx’s realm of freedom, and which are discussed in Section 9.1.

I now consider Illich’s work on deschooling in some detail. Illich states that a good education system should have the following goals:

1. To liberate access to things by abolishing the control which persons and institutions now exercise over their educational values.
2. To liberate the sharing of skills by guaranteeing freedom to teach or exercise them on request.
3. To liberate the critical and creative resources of people by returning to individual persons the ability to call and hold meetings – an ability now increasingly monopolized by institutions which claim to speak for the people.
4. To liberate the individual from the obligation to shape his expectations to the services offered by any established profession – by providing him with the opportunity to draw on the experience of his peers and to entrust himself to the teacher, guide, adviser or healer of his choice... (Illich, 2007, p. 56).

In conclusion: in his ideal society, Illich argues that there should be easy access to the things and people that would be needed in order to become educated. To access these facilities there would be a need for a system of categorization. Importantly, Illich notes that this categorization would be administrative purposes only, and that knowledge cannot be delineated in such a hard and fast way (Reimer, 1971, p. 124).

Illich sets out this access to educational resources in the following way. Firstly, there would be reference services to educational objects that are needed for learning. Reference services and objects could be stored in libraries, laboratories, museums, theatres and factories. Secondly, there would be skill exchanges which would enable individuals to list their skills, the conditions under which they are willing to teach, and the addresses where they could be reached. Thirdly, there would be peer matching via a communication network which would enable individuals to describe their interests. Fourthly, and lastly, there would be a directory of independent educators (Illich, 2007, pp. 42-3). The possibilities for this type of database would be enhanced by computer
technology, as can be seen through the advent of the internet.

Like Reimer, Illich argues for a market in schooling (Illich, 2007, pp. 6, 24), and supports some of the methods used by Milton Friedman and James Tooley to facilitate school choice (Illich, 2007, p. 4). Like Reimer, Illich suggests that funds should be made available to students by the state in a form of a grant which would enable students to “purchase” a “share” of the education of their choice (Illich, 2007, p. 5). There are similarities between this method of funding education and that advocated by James Tooley which is analyzed in Appendix A3. Like those of Reimer and Illich, Tooley's model also rests on 'light' state intervention and private provision within market mechanisms, with vouchers being given to parents in order to purchase a minimum level of schooling. In Chapter Five I show how market models based on private property relations are oppositional to education as an unalienated activity. I note that Illich and other anarchists mentioned in this section disregard the necessity for the social relations and conditions, outlined in Section 9.1, to prefigure an unalienated form of deschooling. To my mind this makes their models unworkable and, as such, merely aspirational.

In Chapters Eight and Nine I show that alienation can only be completely overcome within the social relations and conditions which Marx ascribes to the realm of freedom. I argue that it is only within such an unalienated society that unalienated activity, including education, may be actually chosen by all social individuals. In my final conclusion to this work I outline the implications this finding has for the process of marketization which is occurring with increased speed and intensity in England today.

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Tooley mentions Illich's model in Disestablishing the School (Tooley, 1995, p. 2).
**Conclusion: Enabling education to be an ‘end-in-itself’**.

This thesis offers an analysis of the marketization of school provision and schooling, with particular reference to the alienating social relations which necessarily result from objective market relations. I based this analysis on the concept of alienation developed by Marx because Marx is the main theorist to analyze, in a systematic way, the alienating relations which necessarily result from objective market relations.

This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part sets the scene within which my analysis of the marketization of school provision and schooling takes place. At the beginning of Chapter One I produced empirical evidence to support the argument that changes which allow the marketization of school provision and schooling are not merely a series of isolated reforms, as the liberal philosophers discussed in this thesis have maintained. They are rather the result of a process in which policy moves are made to support the marketization of school provision and schooling, where markets are defined in the classical sense of the term. At the time of writing, I am not aware of any liberal philosopher of education who has maintained that the marketization of school provision and schooling necessarily increases alienating relations oppositional to the possibility of education being an end-in-itself.

In this thesis I maintained that the failure of liberal philosophers of education to recognise the alienating relations necessarily present in the marketization of schooling is mainly due to two reasons. One reason is ontological and one is ethical. The ontological reason is that, for liberal philosophers, market relations are primarily based on external relations, which are contingent. This
ontology results in the perception by liberal philosophers that the direction in which markets reforms are moving is entirely speculative. The ethical reason given by Harry Brighouse is that Marx's analysis is irrelevant because it is not compatible with the 'value-neutral' form of liberalism which most liberal philosophers of education support.

In Chapter Two I compared the relations within James Tooley's concept of a 'lightly' regulated market with those within Brighouse's concept of a regulated market. This is in order to show that, despite the presence of regulation within Brighouse's model, oppositional relations between the market and education are present in both models.

In Section 2.3.1 I examined the epistemological and political concepts which influence Tooley's model. I noted that Tooley bases his support for markets on Hayek's epistemological and political beliefs. I also noted that Tooley never seems to address Hayek's ontological assumptions, despite the fact that Tooley supports Hayek's epistemology. Tooley supports Hayek's political belief that prosperity and 'civilization' depend on capitalist structures and values. Like Hayek, Tooley never presents a systematic analysis or an explicit definition of alienation: when Tooley briefly mentions alienation he equates it with "disaffection" and "falling engagement." Tooley seeks to establish only if alienation has occurred as a result of personal experience within social relations. I maintain that such a conception of alienation is only partial because it does not include the objective relations and conditions which necessarily give rise to "dissatisfaction."

In Section 4.9 I noted that Brighouse dismisses Marxism solely because it contains substantive values. Brighouse acknowledges that, if Marxism made the
choice for alienated or unalienated activity optional, as Brighouse recommends that Marx should, Marx’s theory could not necessarily aim to eliminate the evils of capitalist society which, Brighouse notes, is one of the main reasons for the existence of Marx’s theory. I conclude that Brighouse would prefer to have alienation within his own system rather than to embrace the substantive values which, I contend, are an essential part of Marx’s theory. In Section 4.9 I show that Brighouse’s form of liberalism narrows choice to only those activities which are enabled by the structures and conditions found within capitalism. I therefore maintain that, because the structures of Brighouse’s model cannot support unalienated activity, they necessarily result in the inability of individuals to choose unalienated activity.

In contrast to an ontology based on external, contingent relations, Marx’s systematic analysis of the markets and alienation is based on internal social relations. Within an ontology based on internal social relations, the range of all possible developments is necessary: that is, each actual development has to have been inherent in the relevant social relations. However, the sufficiency of the conditions and social relations for the occurrence of a particular social development crucially depends on human thought and action. Within this ontology, it is the range of possibilities which is determined by inherent social relations, rather than any particular outcome within the range.

Part Two of this thesis sets the ideological context for the development of market relations. Part Two, Chapter Three charts how alienating relations increased as a result of the development of market relations in England from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, and considers how the main ideological responses to these
changes, and the major ideological interpretations of these changes, have informed Marx's analysis of alienation.

In Chapter Four I note that Marx defines alienation using two main strands which are interrelated. The first strand is based on the selling of labour-power and the consequential relinquishment of control of their own labour by those who have no capital and who have to sell their labour-power in order to be productively active. The second strand is based on the estrangement which occurs, as a result of the first strand, when something existing outside and independent of the social individuals confronts them as a hostile and alien power.

In Section 4.8 I showed the relevance of Marx's analysis of alienation to the process of marketization in school provision and schooling in the twentieth century and maintained that private property relations have remained fundamentally the same since Marx's day, even though the content of capitalism has changed from entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly or corporate capitalism. In Chapter Five I have specifically tried to show the relevance of Marx's analysis of alienation to the present process of marketization in school provision and schooling, with specific reference to the market models of James Tooley and Harry Brighouse.

Part Three explored the alienating relations found in various forms of market socialism, and proposed an alternative model based on Marx's realm of freedom. In Chapters Six and Seven, I explored models of market socialism where the market is an integral part of the 'end-state'. In Chapter Six I analyzed the market model of David Miller as outlined in his book *Market, State and Community* (1999). I noted that, in this book, Miller argues for market relations in most areas of the political economy, and does not discount market relations in services such as education.
In Chapter Six I also noted that Miller concedes that it is important to overcome alienation to allow his model to be viable. In the same book, Miller maintains that a progressive consciousness supporting co-operative and humane relations would be a sufficient condition for overcoming alienation. In the same chapter I maintained that it is not possible to counter alienation in the way which Miller advocates because, for Miller, overcoming alienation is solely the result of changing awareness rather than of changing the objective relations and conditions necessary to enable unalienated activity. I also argued that, by basing his economy on capitalist market relations, Miller is supporting subjective relations which are oppositional to the principle of freedom and the development of fraternity, and so which cannot necessarily prefigure the development of freedom as defined by Miller.

In Chapter Seven I analyzed Oskar Lange's model of a 'socialist market', within the Soviet context, in order to ascertain how far the relations found within such a system could prefigure an unalienated society. In Section 7.2 I noted that, although within Lange's market model the emphasis would appear to be on socialist relations rather than market relations, market relations and laws are fundamental to the operation of both the 'socialized' sectors and non-socialized sectors of the economy. In Section 7.2 I showed that Lange's preference for market economics is ideological as well as instrumental. I also noted that Lange acknowledges that the nature of economic processes in the capitalist system is not substantially different from the nature of the economic processes in any type of exchange economy, including those in his own models.

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1 As manifest in his book as autonomy and freedom of choice.
I also noted in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 that the role of schools in the model of Soviet Marxism which Lange supports is to provide skilled workers for the ends which "organised society" considers important. I also noted that, although schools are not marketized in this model, they are subject to such similar alienating relations as schools, say in the 1950's in the UK, in that they are instrumental to the goals of a society that has market relations operating within the same economic logic as those found in capitalism. In Section 7.5.2 I gave three main reasons why the structural relations present in Lange's model are similar in form to those found in classical capitalism (Chapter Four) and, as such, are dehumanise the workers within their productive activity. Briefly these are, firstly, the worker loses control over the objects and services he produces; secondly, that the worker becomes estranged from other social individuals and, thirdly, that the worker becomes effectively an appendage of a machine.

Lange argues that alienation (as described by Marx in The German Ideology) is mitigated when economic laws of the 'market' are employed by bureaucrats who have "knowledge of scientific socialism" which, Lange contends, is necessary to achieve abundance. In Section 7.5.2 I noted that Lange does not give a systematic analysis of alienation so, in Section 7.5.3, I explored the philosophical work on alienation written by T. I. Oizerman, a prominent defender of the Soviet Union who has a very similar economic perspective to that of Lange. In Section 7.5.2 I also showed how the alienating relations present in Lange's model are intensified by the role played by the bureaucracy.

In Chapter Eight I maintained that the conditions and social relations which could prefigure an unalienated society, so supporting education as an unalienated activity,
could be found in the model based on Marx and developed by Mihailo Markovic, a Yugoslav/Serbian praxis theorist. In Chapter Eight I outlined three main ways in which these social relations and conditions are prefigurative of an unalienated society. Firstly, that market relations, commodity production and exchange value as the measure of value would be present to a ‘normal’ extent only at the beginning of Marx’s the realm of necessity; and would diminish in importance thereafter. Secondly, Markovic maintains that the socialization of the means of production must always be under democratic control, including at the work place. Thirdly, Markovic’s model recognizes technological development to be essential to gradually increase the amount of free time crucial for social individuals to be able to take part in meaningful activities. I also noted that increased automation of production, and so abundance in more products, would gradually support the political decision to release schooling from being mainly instrumental to the needs of the economy. This process would gradually provide the conditions and social relations necessary to support the realm of freedom and enable education to become an end-in-itself and thus become a meaningful activity for social individuals.

In Chapter Nine I discussed in more detail the conditions and social relations necessary for an unalienated society to exist, and the form that unalienated education could possibly take within an unalienated society. In Chapter Nine I also showed why alienating relations could only be completely overcome within the social relations and conditions which Marx ascribes to the realm of freedom. I argued that it is only within such an unalienated society that unalienated activity, including education, could be actually chosen by all social individuals.
In the latter part of Chapter Nine I outlined the differences between my own argument and those of many anarchists, since the lack of authority structures in my model may otherwise result in the perception that my model is a model of anarchism. I briefly explored the political ideas of Elisee Reclus because his ideas are closer to those of Marx than are the ideas of many other anarchists. However, I noted that Reclus claims that his ideas could be implemented directly within a market society (presumably if supported by a sufficient number of people). Reclus also rejects the realm of necessity as a phase of development which necessarily prefigures development towards an unalienated society. Therefore I rejected Reclus' theory as one which contains the relations and conditions necessary for an unalienated society.

Chapters One and Two of this thesis consider market relations as supported by present-day capitalism. In Chapter One I have maintained that all three major UK political parties, by extending marketization to school provision and schooling, have objectively contributed to an increase in alienating relations. In Section 1.5 I showed that marketization of school provision and schooling would be firmly on the political agenda, no matter which of the three main parties became the party/parties of government. I maintain that despite the concern of Prime Minister David Cameron for “our broken society”, he fails to take into account that marketization results in objective social relations, which necessarily prefigure an increase in the alienating relations which, in turn, result in “our broken society.” In this thesis I have argued that every opportunity should be taken to slow down and even reverse the policy of marketization of school provision and schooling which, I argue, is occurring at an increasing rate in England today.
The finance and banking crises of Autumn 2008 shook the faith of many in capitalism. Simultaneously, the fall in the stock market affected many pension funds, causing many of the most supposedly affluent parts of the working population to be very angry and scared. Apparent ‘double standards’ were shown when, for example, the Scottish Widows’ life insurance company stopped small investors withdrawing their money from one of their allegedly troubled funds, while no such prohibition applied to the major ‘players’ in the financial markets. In the second half of 2009, although markets showed signs of recovery, the economic situation still remained uncertain. The ongoing recession (including the accompanying austerity measures) has exposed the claims that capitalism has the necessary checks and balances to prevent a general market collapse. As Martin Wolf, the senior financial commentator on the Financial Times, noted:

the combination of the fragility of the financial system with the huge rewards it generates for insiders will destroy something even more important - the political legitimacy of the market itself - across the globe (M. Wolf, 2008, p. 11).

In response to the crisis there have been movements of resistance internationally. In Europe alone in Greece, France, Spain, Portugal and Ireland strikes and protests have been accompanied by alternative programmes and debates about the way forward for anti-capitalist movements. Within this process lie the conditions and social relations which prefigure the change in consciousness necessary to support the emergence of a non-capitalist party. Such a non-capitalist party would be logically opposed to the marketization of social goods, including school provision and schooling, and in favour of services which would be run by accountable, democratic bodies.
At the present time an emergent non-capitalist party would be writing a manifesto for a situation where a significant number of schools would be controlled by private providers. Some of these private providers would have ownership rights of schools, while others might have been given a contract of five years (see the section entitled Privatisation Failures on the European Strategy Unit website www.european-services-strategy.org.uk). It is possible that such a non-capitalist party, being committed to reverse marketization, would initially seek to reverse legislation which allows private providers to opt-out of the regulations making schools subject to a broad and balanced National Curriculum. A non-capitalist government would develop a National Curriculum which would enable pupils to develop the values, skills and knowledge needed to sustain and develop a democratic socialist society which would prefigure an unalienated society.

Under present conditions, in order to start to bring schools under accountable democratic bodies, these would need to be run by councillors and directly-elected school governors (subject to recall), acting on behalf of the local authority. Legislation to support the above democratization of schools would likely impose extra costs on any school where previously all key decisions would have been taken by an owner or, say, an area director acting on behalf of the owner. As a consequence, it might well be anticipated that some schools would directly leave the private sector, thus enabling the government to put these schools under the control of democratically accountable local authorities. This would make such schools more responsive to democratic, rather than market processes, and thereby decrease alienating relations. Such a process would have ideological consequences because it would be in direct opposition to the neo-liberal ideology, which portrays the market as a mechanism of superb efficiency.
which must not be interfered with under any circumstances. This process would show that conscious human action could over-ride the supposedly natural laws of the market and would raise the question of why the economy as a whole could not be run in the interests of the majority of people.

In Chapter Nine it was argued that over a period of a few years a non-capitalist government would plan to take into public ownership the land, finance and the major corporations. Such socialization would contain the necessary conditions and social relations which would prefigure a society in which widespread rational, democratic planning would be possible. Consequently, the conditions and social relations in such a society would enable associations of producers and service-providers to have more control over their conditions of work. This would enable social individuals to develop the conditions and social relations which would prefigure an unalienated society. It is only within such an unalienated society that the possibility of social individuals developing their “true individuality” (Marx, 1956, p. 176) would be the normal state of affairs. An important dimension in developing this individuality would be education. In this thesis I maintain that it would only be within such an unalienated society that education would necessarily be an unalienated activity.
A1. Assessment of Article XIX of the GATS Treaty, with reference to school provision and schooling.

In particular Article XIX of the GATS treaty, which allowed countries to engage in progressive liberalisation, together with the Guidelines and Procedures for Negotiations on Trade in Services issued on 26th March 2001 stipulated that the starting point for negotiation of specific commitments should be the then current schedules.

Schedules attached to past WTO reports have cited higher educational services as services to be included in this agenda. In 2001 Gottlieb and Pearson, an international law firm specializing in trade law, was hired by the Canadian Association of University Teachers to analyze the way the Treaty affected education services. Although Gottlieb and Pearson were acting for university teachers the same implications seemed to apply to schools (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 13).

In their legal opinion published in 2001, Gottlieb and Pearson have drawn attention to the fact that, because of the wide interpretation of ‘non-commercial’ and ‘not in competition’ terms, public sector/government service providers may not have been exempt from GATS rules under the concept of services under government authority (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, pp. 10-12).

Gottlieb and Pearson pointed out that the situation was especially complicated where there was a mixed public/private education system, or where a significant amount of funding for public institutions came from the private sector or where ‘public’ institutions were providing privatised programmes. Gottlieb and Pearson noted that key terms such as ‘not in competition’ and ‘commercial basis’ and ‘services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ appeared to have been given their ordinary meaning in the context of their object and purpose. Therefore there did not appear to be any limits or qualifications to the terms (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 12). Commenting on the term ‘competition’, Gottlieb and Pearson observed that “placed in the context of its GATS provisions, the term ‘competition’ would normally imply the interaction of “like” service providers” (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 12, GT’s italics). However, they noted that in accordance with Article 1.3(c) of the GATS treaty, service providers did not have to be “like” service providers or provide “like” services to be in competition with one another. They noted that, according to Article 1.3(c), “to be in competition” providers simply had to “try to get what others seek” (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 12). Gottlieb and Pearson also noted that it could be argued that “competition may take place between providers irrespective of the mode of supply”, for example a provider delivering a course through the internet could have been in competition with a provider delivering the same course through a classroom (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 12).

In conclusion: I maintain that the judgement of Gottlieb and Pearson confirms that almost any private involvement in school provision would operate as a legal ‘Trojan horse’, potentially opening up the whole sector to privatisation.
A2. Philosophical and empirical considerations of Tooley’s 2002 ‘70% voucher plan.’

Tooley, in his Ph.D. thesis (Tooley, 1994[a], pp. 32, 148-9), originally assumed the view that, apart from an implied quite limited safety net provision, there would be no public sector provision of schooling in his market model.

Since 2000 Tooley has argued, as an alternative to the above position, that a school fees voucher system which would also enable pupils to access their local state school (or any private alternative) would probably reduce overall government spending and, as a consequence, taxation. The latter part of this appendix evaluates certain aspects of the suggested voucher scheme as possibly applied in England, and also attempts to verify or refute its effect on government finance.

Tooley’s model of school voucher introduction for England and Wales, written in his 2002 paper entitled “Market Approaches to Education, Examples and Evidence Part I”, may be criticized for two main reasons. Firstly, from a Hayekian point of view the type of model used by Tooley in this ‘70% voucher plan’ would be unacceptable for the epistemological reasons already cited in detail in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Briefly, according to Hayek, any conclusions from a model such as that used in Tooley’s 2002 paper would be based on logical presuppositions which are unverifiable empirically, since they do not correspond to the nature of many social processes.

Secondly, I argue that Tooley has made two conceptual errors within the economic analysis used in the model used in this 2002 paper. I note that Tooley has not taken into account the behaviour of suppliers in the market - the private school operators - who will of course be ignorant of the increased opportunities which the vouchers give them in setting fees. This argument is consistent with the subsequent findings of the 2005 UK Office of Fair Trading enquiry (Office of Fair Trading, 2005), in relation to the setting of school fees, as to the way an individual school, or school-owning company, might be expected to act. This named 50 independent schools as exchanging fees information, resulting in higher fees.

I also note that Tooley did not deal with larger families. In Social Trends, 2007, it was estimated that in Britain, in 2006, roughly three quarters of households with children had more than one child (Office for National Statistics, 2007[a], Table 2.5 page 16). Therefore, any financial inducement which would work only for a single child per carer(s), would exclude three-quarters of households with children and, of course, many more children than three-quarters. Households Below Average Income (DWP, 2006) concluded that 60% of three-child UK households and 78% of four child households belonged to the two lowest quintiles for household income (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006, Supplementary Table E2, p. 138).

In Social Trends (ONS, 2007[a], Table 5.14, p. 65) it is estimated that for Britain in 2004 about one child in nine in the lowest financial quintile had gone hungry at some point in the survey period, compared with one child in two hundred in the top quintile; whilst the comparable figures for missing leisure facilities were given as one in three compared with one in fifty respectively (it is acknowledged that there might be some differences as between ‘British’ and ‘English’ figures, but it
not accepted these would affect the validity of my analysis).

Thirdly, I deal with two *categorical* errors in Tooley's 2002 paper. Before dealing with these errors, I briefly outline the data on which I base my analysis. Using the UK government official figures from *Population Trends 2007*, for the secondary age-range for England, I have estimated that as just over 600,000 children would be in each age cohort the total pupils within ages 12-17 would be approximately 3.7 million pupils (Office for National Statistics, 2007[b], Table 1.2, p. 35). The original percentage of pupils at private schools is given in 2000/2 as roughly 7% of the cohort in a DfES survey in 2000/2 (news.bbc.co.uk, last accessed 17 July 2010).

In his paper (Tooley, 2002, Part 1, pp. 37-39, and Table 8) Tooley estimates an increase of private secondary sector schooling take-up by means of '70% cost vouchers' being given to parents. Tooley states that around 277,000 new students would be educated in the private sector as a result. It can therefore be seen from Tooley's figure that, as a percentage of the age-range in England schools, private education would probably double the existing private take-up by proportion of the cohort (from very roughly 7% of the 3.7 million pupils (as above), to very roughly 14%).

I now deal with the two categorical errors I believe to be in Tooley's 2002 paper. Firstly, Tooley states that there would be a considerable saving to the Treasury, and argues that the '70% voucher' would be a spending [cost to the Treasury] as opposed to [in place of] the full 100% average spend per pupil in state schools. In this argument, I maintain that Tooley has confused the concepts of average and marginal costs. When a school expands pupil numbers, there are additional or marginal costs per extra pupil: similarly, if a state school were to contract pupil numbers, under the mechanism Tooley describes, there would likely be a contraction of costs. However, to deal with the cut in approximate percentage figures in Tooley's proposals (from 7% to 14% of the cohort), it is not obvious that if a state school cohort were to contract from say 93 to 86 pupils then fewer teachers would be needed. It would be quite plausible that class sizes would merely contract from 31 to 28 or 29. The school might well not be able to function with fewer classrooms, a smaller playground, fewer gym, music, or art facilities or fewer science laboratories, just because of this size of reduction in pupil numbers. Therefore, although it is likely there would be some savings, it is not likely that these savings would 'pay' for the private sector voucher. Therefore, in my view, Tooley has not demonstrated any overall saving.

I now outline what I regard to be the second categorical error in his 2002 paper. Tooley says that, on account of increased competition, private school expansion should result in a lowering of fees. It would seem he has confused a basic assumption of neo-classical/traditional economics. What he has proposed is not a planned expansion of supply (of private school places) but a subsidy which would increase the demand. Most economics textbooks explain that the effect of a subsidy to demand in any market will be to increase the price. Tooley seems to be alive to the issue of price elasticity of demand, as he has varied this relationship within his model to give differing results, but he has not seemed to have considered the normal expectations of supply side adjustments to the market price.

In conclusion: In this appendix I offer two main criticisms of Tooley's '70%
voucher plan’. Firstly, I criticize Tooley’s ‘70% voucher plan’ from a Hayekian epistemological point of view since, according to Hayek, any conclusions from a model such as that used in Tooley’s 2002 paper would be based on logical presuppositions which are unverifiable empirically because they do not correspond to the nature of many social processes. Therefore, it has to be questioned whether Tooley, in his 2002 paper, can still be said to be influenced Hayekian epistemology. It could be argued that the model used in Tooley’s 2002 paper is more influenced by a type of epistemology based on rational deduction. If so, one might ask whether Tooley is supporting the very rational constructivism which he condemned from 1994 onwards.

Secondly, I criticize Tooley’s model on account of a number of conceptual or categorical errors. I note that Tooley has made two conceptual errors within the model of economic analysis used in his 2002 paper: namely, a failure to show a gross saving to the public purse and also a likely increase, rather than a decrease, in the price of private school fees by confusing his voucher plan, which is clearly a subsidy to demand for school places, with a mechanism to necessarily expand the number of private school places.

I consider that it is therefore questionable whether private schooling can in fact be organized for the majority of pupils in England by means of a voucher system along the lines that Tooley proposed in 2002.
A3. Empirical consideration of government funding to households in anticipation of their future educational expenditure.

This section deals with the criticism, made in a private communication in October 2000 by Harry Brighouse, of my assertion that most UK or English households could not then have afforded £3000 per annum school fees per child, if given a tax rebate for education. This £3000 figure was derived from a particular state secondary school’s spend per pupil at the time, and the figure was subsequently confirmed as broadly correct as a minimum figure by the DfES website which, accessed in early 2008, said, among other things, that the real terms funding per pupil in 2005/6 aged 3-19 was £4230 per annum, up from £3030 in 1998/9. Brighouse argues that my conclusion is wrong for three reasons. Firstly, he says that additional tax savings would outweigh the additional schooling costs for all but in “very poor and very large” households. Secondly, he argues that those considered at the upper levels of the poor could save money from non-essential goods in order to pay school fees. Thirdly, Brighouse argues that school fees could be paid over a lifetime rather than on a ‘pay as you go’ basis.

Firstly I deal with Brighouse’s first criticism of my argument. I begin by outlining the information on which I base my argument. Although below I concentrate on school fees for households with one or two children only, it should be remembered that for one and two adult households with children, 4 million had two or more children as against 2.5 million with one child only.

Using statistics from the UK official source Family Spending (Office for National Statistics, 2000[a], Table 1.3) it is possible to obtain average income tax figures paid by each household income decile group. I note from official tax statistics for the financial year 1999-2000 (Revenue & Customs, 2004, Table 3.11) that the amount of income tax owed for England for financial year 1999-2000 was £81.5bn. I also note, from Table 1.3 in Education and Training Statistics for the United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics, 2001), that during 1999-2000 the total public expenditure on education was £40.77 bn. for the UK, of which £32.77 bn. was for England (80.37% of the UK figure). The schools budget for the UK was £25.44bn. and so it would seem plausible for the share for England to be approximately 80% of this UK figure. However, further figures for the UK were given as £1.97bn. for educational services and student support while a further figure of £1.41bn of the UK education budget was not broken down by precise function. In order to make a proper comparison with expenditure by private schools, therefore, there must be a range of figures for the school budget, depending on what proportion of these extra costs would in fact be borne by schools. The overall calculation for England therefore turns out to be a schools budget ranging between about £20.45bn. and £23.17bn, respectively 25.09% and 28.43% of the income tax take of £81bn. To be as fair to Brighouse as possible, I have assumed a 28% figure for the income tax rebate on which to base the subsidy to the cost of schooling for different decile groups of income-tax rebate recipients. From the Family Spending (ONS, 2000[a], Table 1.3) figures, it was possible to calculate the monetary worth of a reduction by 28% of the income tax take for each decile group. This proposed rebate from income

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1 Email dated October 20 2000, forwarded to me, from Professor Brighouse.
tax to enable families to buy children's schooling in the market place can then be compared for each decile group. (Since at the time of my original writing some updated figures for government expenditure were not available for the years 1999/2000, assumptions were made for calculations [taking into account inflation] from the 1997 government schools' budget figures).

The school fees proposed by Brighouse of £3000 per annum per child at the time corresponded to £57.69 per week on a pay as you go system for each child. Brighouse argued that, by reference to savings schemes, that if each child is educated for thirteen years (total £39000) in primary and secondary education, payment could in principle be made over an adult's total working life, which I have taken as thirty-nine years. Taking any interest paid from such a savings scheme to be equal to inflation, about £19.23 per pupil per week in 'real terms' money would have to be paid over thirty-nine years to provide for thirteen years' primary and secondary education for one pupil.

Income tax rebates would only be payable as follows: twenty-eight per cent of income tax paid per decile per week ranged from £0.31 for the poorest household to £4.14 for the 4th decile/2nd quintile, £9.16 for the middle (decile 5), £12.24 for the 6th decile, to £18.00 for the 7th decile, £24 for the 8th decile and £34 for the 9th decile. One tenth of households could afford pay as you go school fees from income tax rebates, another one fifth or three tenths could likely manage a savings scheme, but at least 60% of the population would be unable to afford to pay for private education for only one child by means of tax rebates - even paying over a working lifetime.

Brighouse had objected in May 2000 that private schemes would allow in principle for fees to be paid up front and the loan to be paid off gradually. I agree, but argue that for a family with two children to have to pay off such a debt (£78 000) would require a large tax rebate to service the debt which only those in the higher income brackets could afford it. Fewer people would be able to afford any commercial scheme than would be able to pay via a government 'zero-[real] interest' loan.

I now show why Brighouse's second criticism, namely that households could cut down on other expenditure in order to fund education for their children, is not viable. Firstly, I will outline the information on which I base my argument. UK official figures (Office for National Statistics, 2000[a], Table 4.5, p. 71) give UK weekly family spending by the one and a quarter million households with one adult and child (ren) in the two lowest quintile groups by income of such households. These tables show spending of £7.40 and £13.10 on leisure goods and £10.40 and £14.80 on leisure services. The figures for alcohol and tobacco are respectively £3.50, £3.80, £6.60 and £7.10. Leisure goods' breakdown includes all books, newspapers and magazines, TV purchase, photography and garden plants, as well as toys. The breakdown of the 'leisure services' category includes TV rental and licence, 'educational and training expenses', holiday expenditure, sports admissions, cinema, theatre, as well as gambling and cash gifts (presumably to children). The totals of the above spending categories are £27.90 per week for the lowest quintile and £38.80 per week for the second lowest. The elimination of practically all such expenditure quoted would still not enable fees of £3000 per year even for one child to be made on a pay as you go basis. For the second lowest quintile, fees for two children would be
possible over a working lifetime of thirty-nine to forty years at around £3000 pa. each (schooling for two over 13 years possibly totalling £78000). This would of course involve a household not having a TV, or books, and withdrawing children from all leisure facilities and sports which are not provided totally freely by the school. It would also involve never taking a holiday away from home, or going to a film, or anywhere which charged admission.

It can be seen that for households at the second quintile of income distribution, any income tax rebate (£4 or so weekly) would not be large enough to increase the number of children (two) whose schooling could be paid for over a life-time. For 1999-2000, 59% of children in three-child households and 83% of children in four+ child households were in the bottom two quintiles for income distribution (DWP, 2006, p. 138, table cited in Appendix A2). This would therefore leave many children whose parents could not afford to pay for schooling under Brighouse’s model.

In conclusion, I conclude that the statistics available for 1999-2000 do not indicate that the cost of private schooling could then have been easily financed by the means of income tax rebates for a large number of households and/or by such households cutting down on so-called “non-essential” goods. At the time of writing, Brighouse has not provided any model with contrary results.
A4. Milton Friedman’s market theory.

Unlike Hayek, Friedman claims to base his economic and ethical ideas mainly on a positivistic approach to economics, politics and ethics (Friedman, 1953, p. 4). Positivists believe that statements obtain their validity only by their relationship to a concrete referent or to logic. For Friedman, the task of positive economics “is to provide a system of generalisations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances” (Friedman, 1953, p. 4). Within Friedman’s model, this is to be done by “the development of a ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields meaningful (i.e. not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed” (Friedman, 1953, p. 7).

For Friedman, theory is to be a blend of two elements, a “language” and a body of “substantive hypothesis designed to abstract essential features of a complex reality” (Friedman, 1953, p. 7). In its former role, with the comment that, “theory has no substantive content; it is a set of tautologies.” Friedman likens such a theory to a filing system (Friedman, 1953, p. 7). The validity of a “theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena it is intended to explain” (Friedman, 1953, p. 8). The distinction between ‘language’ and ‘hypothesis” is the positivist one between “analytic” and “synthetic”.

In the process of verifying theory, no appeal is made to preference. This does not mean that Friedman does not state a preference for certain values, merely that values are not relevant to the examination of the consequences of certain social policy decisions. According to positivists, theories contain two types of principles: internal tautologies and “bridging principles”. The bridging principles link the theoretical terms to observed entities. However, Friedman argues:

- economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if it is to be able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action;
- if it is to be something different from disguised mathematics. And the usefulness of the tautologies themselves ultimately depends,……on the acceptability of the substantive hypotheses that suggest the particular categories into which they organize the refractory empirical phenomena (Friedman, 1953, pp. 11-12 ).

Friedman argues that it would be an error to suppose that a test of the validity of a hypothesis is whether it conforms to reality (Friedman, 1953, p. 14). He argues that one cannot perceive facts without a theoretical construct. He argues that “the ideal types [of theory] are not intended to be descriptive; they are designed to isolate the features that are crucial to a particular problem” (Friedman, 1953, p. 36).

Unlike Hayek, he argues that constructs will not fully correspond to empirical reality:

- A theory or its “assumptions” cannot possibly be thoroughly “realistic” in the immediate descriptive sense so often assigned to this term. A completely “realistic” theory of the wheat market would have to include not only the conditions directly underlying the supply
and demand for wheat but also the kind of coins or credit instruments used to make exchanges; the personal characteristics of wheat traders such as the color (sic) of each trader……..Any attempt to move very far in achieving this kind of ‘realism’ is certain to render a theory utterly useless (Friedman, 1953, p. 32).

For positivists, hypotheses are not dependent on observations corresponding to reality but on assumptions (Friedman, 1953, p. 14), see also:

the validity of a hypothesis ….is not by itself a sufficient criterion for choosing among alternative hypotheses. Observed facts are necessarily finite in number; possible hypotheses infinite. If there is one hypothesis that is consistent with the available evidence, there are always an infinite number that are (Friedman, 1953, p. 9).

Friedman acknowledges that public policy making predictions have to be evaluated, which means importing values into models. Friedman adds that in making public policy there are two steps. These are a) predicting the consequences of a suggested policy and b) evaluating the consequences. For Friedman “the first step is the domain of science, the second of values” (Friedman, 1953, pp. 317-8). For Friedman, then, values merely have the status of preferences because they cannot be verified either logically or empirically.
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