THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN IRAQ AND JAPAN:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines cultural continuities and changes over time in the education of leaders in Iraq (1921-1968) and Japan (1868-1912), in times when both countries experienced drastic political and social changes.

Based on documentary research, the analyses developed in the first narrative, on Japan, describe the modernity projects in the Meiji period, the consequences of the transformation of Shintō and Bushidō, and the new forms of the bureaucracy and the education of leaders. The focus is on the changing concepts of merit in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan as these were defined in the education system. Similar approaches are used in the second narrative on Iraq; the thesis describes the continuing roles of İslâm and of Arab tribal values as Iraq itself changed. It focuses on the changing concepts of merit in Abbāsid, Ottōman, monarchical and republican Iraq.

The education of leaders was shaped by struggles over both state and social modernity, renegotiations of cultural traditional values which were based on religious and ethnic values and concepts of merit, and the institutionalisation of these values in the education systems at the state and social levels. While Japan transformed traditional values and concepts of merit by combining them with foreign knowledge, Iraq preserved much of its tradition, resisting modern pressures. Modern state and social developments in Iraq and Japan have been decisively influenced by cultural traditions in political, social, cultural and intellectual contexts.

New styles of state and cultural leaders emerged, differing in each country. Rapid change was instituted in Japan and a new, coherent society was constructed, whereas in
Iraq changes were slow and fragmented communities were created. As a consequence, the patterns of the education of leaders in the two countries developed different styles and different routes with contrasting long-term consequences.
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\(^1\) Key terms used in Japanese and Arabic which appear in the glossary are highlighted in bold Italic type where they first arise in the text. However, many of the Japanese and Arabic terms within brackets which relate to institutions, professions, laws, projects, virtues, ideologies, curricula and events, (for example, national morality (kokumin dōtoku) in p. 40.) are common words today in particular political or social groups; hence they are significant for shaping how the Japanese and the Iraqis understand their societies. Therefore I have decided to provide translations of these terms, and their explanations in the text.
ABBREVIATIONS

CUP:  Committee of Union and Progress
IBP:  Iraqi Ba'th Party organisation
ICP:  Iraqi Communist Party organisation
PER Movements:  People’s Freedom and Rights Movements (*jiyū minken undō*)
TCCDR:  The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (*nidhām d’āwā al-\-ashā’ir*)
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter identifies the main themes of the thesis, its analytical frame, its purpose and arguments, and its chapter structure. The thesis offers a comparative interpretation of the state modernity projects and the education of leaders in Japan (1868-1912) and Iraq (1920-1963) - times when both countries experienced revolutionary political and social transitions.

The thesis pursues two main ideas. Firstly, as each state modernised itself, changes in concepts of merit and in what was counted as good knowledge in both Japan and Iraq were shaped by renegotiating the previous cultural traditions. Secondly, these changes created new styles in the education of leaders.

The detailed analysis and narrative of the thesis are displayed in three chapters each on Japan and Iraq. These chapters investigate the projects for modernising the Japanese state in the Meiji period and the Iraqi state in the monarchical and republican periods.

Thus the main themes are: (1) the role of state modernity projects, which affected the education of leaders; (2) the continuities in the changing traditional concepts of merit which shaped the different styles of the education of leaders in the modern period; and (3) the political and intellectual struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined traditional values in the education of leaders.

Overall, the thesis asks how cultural traditions were adapted in these societies in times of rapid change, how they affected the education of leaders, and how these themes may
be understood comparatively.

However, this perspective on the thesis took a long time to develop. There were shifts in my approach, although the sources of my curiosity were constant. They were personal.

**Origins of the thesis: personal involvement**

Both of my families, in the two countries, were involved in these historical changes. By 1867, my father’s family in Japan was in the service of the Tokugawa Yoshikatsu, the lord of the Owari domain (now Aichi Prefecture, whose capital is Nagoya).\(^1\) After the Meiji Renovation in 1868, they were responsible for the establishment of a new style of classical Chinese school, the Wagō Shoin, and for maintaining order in the Owari fortified town and province, protecting the *Bushi* families who had suddenly lost their positions in society when the domains were abolished.\(^2\) The personal relationships between my family, the families of students at the Wagō Shoin and the Tokugawa family continued through the new shared Owari vision applied in the formation of Yakumo, a village in Hokkaido. In order to introduce dairy farming in Japan, my great-grand father studied in England. The village rapidly developed, adopting the Danish school system and revitalising the Wagō spirit.\(^3\) Today the Yakumo area is still known for dairy farming.

The professions in the family gradually changed, and became specialised in later generations. However, there is a historical link over generations, because the family retained a moralistic family discipline (*kakun*), which was redefined by each generation and encouraged the individuals of the family to meet social obligations.\(^4\)
In contrast, in terms of family history, the transformations of individuals, positions, experience and occupations were slow in Iraq. Over generations, my Iraqi husband’s family was a family of tribal sheikhs. In the early twentieth century, my father-in-law and his tribal members were heavily involved in the Arab nationalist movement in the Diyāla governorate. After playing a vigorous role as a leader in the 1920 tribal movement there, he was the sheikh al masheikh Azza (the chief sheikh of the whole tribe of Azza). He was personally involved in the politics of King Faisal’s vision, but he soon resigned as a governor of Khālis and as a member of the Parliament, and chose to remain as a sheikh of the tribe. The family legacy of the learning style of the traditional diwān, which he cultivated, continued in the next generation and attracted all sorts of visitors to the village. After 1990, the sheikh’s main diwān moved to Baghdad.

His son, my husband, was a state leader until the Saddam regime came into power in 1979. He returned to a tribal sheikh’s life in 1981, and devoted himself to creating a new style for the traditional Fasl negotiations, and to maintaining peace among the tribes through his diwān. The family has learned from their father in particular about diwān culture and peace-making between the communities, through Fasl practice as a social obligation. Our village, 120 km northeast of Baghdad, has remained a village, but the area is changing as a result of the government dam on the Diyāla River, which is controlled by the military, and more recently, as a result of the 2003 war and its aftermath.

Thus both the Japanese and Iraqi families experienced four generations of the modernisation of their country. The Japanese family retained traditional values, but
combined them with new knowledge, and continually invented new styles of association. In contrast, the Iraqi family retained and continued the traditions within the family more strongly than the Japanese family. This was the case in the twentieth century, especially in Iraq between two wars (1979-1991) and during the UN economic sanctions (1990 to 2004).

For the last four generations, there have been international and social struggles over the renegotiation of traditional values and new knowledge. There have been important cultural continuities in the socialisation of the leaders within the families. However, the transformations of the education of leaders were different in each family. One of my first areas of study was the literature on the education of leaders.

**Existing studies of the comparative education of leaders**

There are studies of the education of elites which refer to the formation of elites and the role of state education, but there are few comparative interpretations of these studies of elites. Elites may be defined sociologically as small status groups of privileged people who normally exert power and influence over social or political decision-making. They share cultural aspects of knowledge, legal knowledge, morality, ideology and consciousness as members of elite groups, and occupy certain parts of a hierarchical social structure.

Among the few comparative studies of elite formation and education, Rupert Wilkinson's classical study of 'The Prefects' described the way in which Victorian public school prefects were created and trained to be rulers. Wilkinson's idea, in his comparisons with other countries, was that the English public school produced a strong
prevailing ethos. One way to identify this ethos is to examine the public school as a political institution. Japan and China were used as critical test cases to help understand this English experience, because of the sensitivity to deep culture and the highly consolidated bureaucratic elites formed in those countries. Although Wilkinson’s study is Eurocentric in its interpretation of “totalitarian” Japan, “corrupt” Chinese bureaucrats and “gentleman” British civil servants, it offers an important comparative analysis of the nature of different societies by illuminating the relations between the indigenous traditional cultures, their legitimation and the moral order in state institutions.

In contrast, Wright Mills’ work was not a comparative study but a detailed analysis of power elites, their education and American society. In his account of the education of the power elites, Mills emphasised the lack of a truly common elite programme of recruitment and training. His argument was that behind the decision-makers and events of history there are linkages of the major institutions of modern society; the typical institutional unit has become enlarged and administrative. Mills’ detailed study of education for the power elites is a useful source for comparison with the various elites in modern institutions, and for how a new elite could gain access to positions of power in politics, the economy and the military, though each state has different ways of unifying these three sets of institutions.

Like most other scholars, Wilkinson and Mills emphasised the cultural discontinuities in political value systems. For them, the dichotomy between the new state elites and the disadvantaged citizens was a moral issue. What Wilkinson and Wright Mills overlooked in their studies was the exploration of the changing styles of the education
of elite leaders. This is one of the areas which I wish to explore.

In this thesis, leaders are defined as persons, sometimes charismatic persons, who hold leadership positions in the state or private institutions, and influence others effectively by playing specific roles through their personalities and activities in political or social processes. In Japan and Iraq, there were two groups of leaders in addition to those in the traditional positions of Emperor or Sultan. First, political figures in the new state, military officials and civil servants in the bureaucracy were parts of the state leadership. Second, another new group of leaders offered alternative voices to those of the first group. In the thesis this group is called ‘the cultural leaders’; they will be defined in the section on the education of leaders later in this chapter.

Leadership positions and their associated educational institutions changed in both the pre-modern and the modern epochs in Japan and Iraq. In Japan in the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), the Emperor (Tennō), the Shōguns, and Daimyō clans took the political leadership positions and had their own education. In Iraq in the Abbāsid period there was an occupational separation between Arab political leaders and Islamic leaders. During the Ottoman Empire, the sultans and their courts continued the Islamic legacies. In both Japan and Iraq, the education of leaders emphasised morals, martial arts and refinement. In modern Meiji Japan as well as modern Iraq, the new civil servants and the military officers held state power. Leadership positions in Japanese society were found in the private universities led by the cultural leaders. In Iraqi society, traditional religious and tribal leaders continued their leadership within their own communities.
However, such changes are complex. To address them in the two societies in a systematic way, this chapter briefly discusses ‘modernity’ from the perspective of Tönnies, moves on to Cowen’s transitologies, to three themes from Weber, and offers my own core ideas. The next section will discuss these initial theoretical choices.

**Modernity theory**

I began by using versions of modernity theory drawn from the classical western sociologists. I worked in particular on Ferdinand Tönnies’ concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* which offered an interpretation of traditional and modern social relations. Tönnies traced four themes in the modernisation of society: first, the distinction between community and association, second, the sociological displacement of community (*Gemeinschaft*) by non-communal modes of organisation (*Gesellschafft*), third, new knowledge and scientific sociological inquiry as the solution to the modernity crisis, and fourth, social change marked by a shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*.\(^{14}\)

However, when I began to construct the thesis, it became clear that Tönnies’ modernity theory did not apply easily to the two cases of Japan and Iraq. First, Tönnies defined a clear difference between *Gemeinschaft* as “a living organism”, and *Gesellschaft* as “a mechanical aggregate and artifact”.\(^{15}\) However, the dichotomous definition of two types of society does not describe Japan and Iraq well, since both societies were characterised by simultaneous interactions of tradition with modernity processes.

Second, Tönnies explained the sociological displacement of community by non-communal modes of organisation, such as law and polity. However, the societies in
Meiji Japan and Iraq were not modernised by the displacement of old communities but by struggles over the institutionalisation of newly defined traditional values practised in the old communities. Tönnies overlooked the specific importance of the study of groups and individuals who opposed the Gesellschaft type of social system and who continuously used traditional Gemeinschaft cultural resources to revitalise individual ways of life and identities.

Third, Tönnies suggested individual intellectual struggles for knowledge and will as the solution to the modernity crisis. As in the case of the contemporaries of Tönnies, intellectuals in Meiji Japan and Iraq searched for a source of identity through a reform of knowledge. However, the way in which knowledge was sought and developed in Meiji Japan and Iraq was different from what Tönnies expected. Tönnies assumed a positivistic reform of knowledge in Gesellschaft, in a rational and contractual context.

Fourth, the modernisation of Meiji Japan did not change the society through a monolithic and sequential linear shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. In his analysis, Tönnies overlooked the effectiveness of the old knowledge and values which were re-negotiated in the processes of modernisation of the state and the society.

In the cases of both Japan and Iraq, traditional values and knowledge continued, though in ways which were different in each country. The state and leaders in the society of Meiji Japan tried to renegotiate old and new foreign knowledge, combined them, and institutionalised new knowledge in the new education systems. In Iraq, leaders in the society retained old knowledge, and continued their previous practice.
Modernities

The concept of modernity was discussed by philosophers, social and political scientists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has continued to be studied by them, as well as by historians, anthropologists, psychologists, and educationists. There is much literature on the state dimension of modernity. 17

This dimension normally arises from political pressure from the international environment, and absorption into the world system and cultural processes. The following propositions will help to frame the analysis. In this thesis, projects in the state dimension of modernity entail the rational imposition of a vision, and aim at changes in the political and social orders, in the mode of being, in existence and thoughts; hence these projects entail double modernity processes. They develop:

(i) to establish the state’s central value systems in the context of the destruction, recognition or reconstruction of institutions and social stratification systems;
(ii) to renegotiate cultural traditions and values, the concept of merit and what was counted as good knowledge: the redefined culture is used to reinforce a political vision;
(iii) to legitimate the redefined traditional values in highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms; and
(iv) to institutionalise these values in the state education of leaders.

In the process of modernising the state, the state education of leaders leads to the emergence of new technocratic, civil servants and military officers who give their loyalty to the nation-state.

The dynamism of the projects for state modernity derives from the timing of the changes in the social stratification systems and of the emergence of new leaders and their education systems, and from the negotiations of the political, social and moral orders between the new state leaders and leaders in the society.
There is a large literature on the social dimension of modernity. In this thesis, social modernity has two aspects. First, it is a part of state modernity projects; although it normally contains social and cultural elements. This means that social modernity is incorporated or integrated into state modernity projects through the state’s institutionalisation of the redefined traditional values. Changes were particularly visible in the case of Abdül Hamid II’s Islamic version of social traditions in the later Ottoman Empire and in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey, Mao Zedong’s China, Stalin’s Russia and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Shi’a version of social tradition. Changes were often related to new identities in an affirmation of an ideological collectivity. For example, the social dimension of modernity even includes instructions about new clothes and personal appearance; hence social modernity involved struggles for each individual. Thus state modernity not only includes projects which modernise the state itself, but also contains strong social motifs and often alters social and ontological experience.

Secondly, social modernity can also emphasise alternative visions of society to those of the state modernity projects. Alternative voices are normally raised by cultural leaders to protest against political values and projects, to defend intellectual knowledge as well as values based on the life experiences of individuals and groups in the society, and to institute redefined traditions and alternative projects. In Meiji Japan, the state projects which emphasised defending the Imperial nation-state and revering the Emperor were resisted by voices calling for the formation of a democratic and independent Japan. These opposition voices expressed alternative visions from those of the cultural leaders.
Transitology

Transitology is a new concept, in the sense that it has only recently been formalised. Robert Cowen defines transitologies as social processes "occurring in a short time span: operationally ten years" and they are:

the more or less simultaneous collapse and reconstruction of (i) state apparatuses; (ii) social and economic stratification systems; (iii) the central value system, especially the political value system, to offer a new definition of the future; and (iv) political visions of the future in which education is given a major symbolic and reconstructionist role in these social processes of destroying the past and redefining the future.\(^{20}\)

This concept of transitology does not only apply to central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Cowen suggests, for example, that Meiji Japan (1868-1912) was in principle a transitology. First, changes in the early Meiji period included new state apparatuses. Second, changes in political, economic and social stratification occurred simultaneously. Third, a new central value system stressed the formation of a strong and rich state. Fourth, in this ideological context, state educational systems were rapidly established. These political, social and educational transitions occurred, more or less, in a span of ten years with the emergence, growth and maturity of the Meiji state.\(^{21}\)

However, the Meiji period is not fully captured by Cowen's concept of transitologies. In my view, the political and social changes were not a rapid collapse and equally rapid reconstruction, but showed continuous renegotiation of the past. There were cultural and moral continuities led by the state and leaders in the society.

In the main body of the thesis, it will be argued that, in the early Meiji period, political and social changes took place through the restoration of *Shintō* and *Bushidō*. The shift
was rapid, and new leaders came into power. In the process of the modernisation of the state, moral values and knowledge of Shintō and Bushidō traditions were legitimised in highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms, and in the redefined notions of loyalty and filial piety. There were political, social and intellectual struggles. At the same time, the Tokugawa legacies of learning networks in the society continued.

Similarly, Iraq was not a transitology in Cowen’s sense. It will be argued that the political and social changes and the reconstruction of Iraq were slow, and that traditions continued.

In both countries, changes were indeed seen in the state apparatus, economic and social stratification systems, the central value system, the education system, and the socialisation of leaders. Overall, however, the more I thought about the two countries, the more I became interested in the ways in which political, social and educational change occurred through cultural renegotiation, with strong cultural continuities in the interactions of state and society.

I worked in particular on Max Weber’s perspectives on rationalisation, legitimation and the education of leaders, because these three themes offered significant interpretations of modernisers’ struggles over the political, social and educational changes.

**Rationalisation of authority and modernity projects**

Weber’s concept of the rationalisation of authority involved the rationalisation of state authority, of social authority and of individual lives and thought. Rationalisation meant the ‘disenchantment of the world’, expressed mainly in the spread of modern
science. ‘Disenchantment of the world’ meant that magical elements of thought and mysterious incalculable powers accepted in previous times were displaced by technical performance and calculations. This Weber called ‘intellectualisation’.22

The rationalisation of state authority meant that the state’s domination of power in the society was made acceptable. The state had both legal rational authority. Modern bureaucracy was one form of the legitimation of power associated with legal rational authority, and affected all aspects of social life. For Weber, the increase of bureaucratisation was a powerful manifestation of the historical process of rationalisation; the analysis of bureaucracy was a means of illuminating Chinese, Indian, and ancient Roman society as well as Europe, and distinguished the modern from the medieval Western world as well as from the ancient and Asian worlds.

Rationalisation involved the development of forms of state and social organisations, association and community, which were characterised by the achievement of cultural values through systematically calculated means. This rationalisation implied interference in all aspects of human life: in diverse cultural and social structures as well as in individuals’ or groups’ values, knowledge, codes and status. It led to the absorption of individuals and groups into rational institutions. Rational state projects worked for the rationalisation of the value systems of individuals and social institutions. Weber called this phenomenon (the rationalisation of values, knowledge and authority), the ‘fate’ of the modern era.23 He argued that an increase of irrationality and a loss of ideals and of meaning in existence are the consequences of rationalisation.24 The tensions between the modern state and social changes, and the development of individuals and that of organisations, were key themes of Weber’s
In working on this thesis, it was useful to keep in mind how rationalisation affected thought, authority and social life through modern state projects, changes in society, indigenous values and knowledge, and selection for leadership positions and education.

**Legitimation and modernity projects**

Weber viewed the legitimation of state authority as a part of the rationalisation process. However, in terms of the social dimension of modernity, the legitimation of the state's power was not always accepted by the citizens. In Iraq and Japan, there were alternative voices against this legitimation of the state's authority. Traditional leaders often retained cultural and traditional authority and the value of status, honour and trust within their groups, though they were liable to be undermined by the rationalisation process of the state. Weber's perspective on the legitimation of authority did not allow for these voices of disagreement.

Thus this thesis first investigates different forms of interaction within particular political and social environments and the continuities of cultural processes in the educational institutions. The narrative brings out the way in which different political and social actors pursued their own agendas with differing results.

At the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, scholars considered tradition, charisma or modernity separately. But Weber was trying to think about these three phenomena by relating them to each other historically, sociologically and imaginatively. In Weber's perspective, religion was described as a form of power and
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as a legacy of politics, theology and cultural thought. In his time, as sociological thinking developed, religion, the state and social relations were linked with domination, legitimation, and authority. For Weber, the sociological investigation of religion was required to understand the meaning of religious phenomena, which included the social action of the leaders, and the development of religious ethics and ways of intellectual learning. Weber's analytical framing of rationalisation and religion is relevant in this thesis, as Shinto in modern Meiji Japan and Islam in Iraq were absorbed into the nation state's projects. This meant that the modernisation of the state and the society were affected by religious traditions, and in both countries the religious roots of identity have oriented the education of leaders at different levels of the cultural process.

The education of leaders

Weber clarified the notion of the education of leaders in the early twentieth century. Modern science had made the world systematically calculable and predictable, and created a new world different from the previous non-scientific world of the West. Weber emphasised the development of diplomas from universities and colleges, since the creation of educational certificates in all fields made for the formation of a privileged stratum in bureaucracies and offices. The most common phenomena were the increase of special examination systems and of the trained experts that were indispensable for modern bureaucracy. All these phenomena were manifestations of the rationalisation process.

Taking education as a crucial element in the 'sociology of authority', Weber defined a sequence of three types of authority within specific social relationships. According to
his account of the Chinese literati, charisma was replaced by religious tradition in the early history of China, and the cultivated Chinese literati were replaced by experts.31

Weber’s strategic framing of ‘the expert and the cultivated’ entails sensitivity to cultural changes. This contrasting frame enables this thesis to propose a way to think about the modernity projects in terms of struggles over the institutionalisation of cultural traditions in the education of leaders and of those who aim to modernise the state and develop the society. The thesis considers the roles of religious and traditional social groups’ values and knowledge, the cultural renegotiation of these and the forms of the education of leaders at both state and social levels.

To do this, three types of leaders are considered in this thesis, namely the expert, the cultural, and the traditional leaders. The source for this classification is Weber’s essay, ‘The Chinese Literati’.32 The expert as an authority uses knowledge of modern techniques and specialised knowledge, and has formal qualifications which identify persons for occupations in modern societies and modern bureaucracies. Second, cultural leaders use cultivated knowledge, which includes philosophy and access to moral principles through it. They emerge with alternative voices to state modernity by redefining the values of cultural traditions with new knowledge and debating in public their social obligations and a vision of the new society. They do this at a time when political and social transitions are in tension. Third, traditional authorities in tribal society use especially their knowledge of the moral order and older forms of loyalty and obligation. Critical discussions of all three types of leaders will be an integral part of this thesis.
Overall, Weber's thinking is helpful for the thesis as offering the broadest way to think about its themes within the classical sociological perspective. The thesis considers the changes in state and society through perspectives on the cultural traditions which were renegotiated and institutionalised by leaders at state and social levels in the modernisation process. Weber's approach enables me to frame this thesis; it offers a context for understanding the narratives in it, and comparing the two societies of Iraq and Japan. However, discussions of Weber will not appear in each chapter; the thesis will revisit his ideas only in its conclusion.

The Central Arguments

The arguments of the thesis cluster round three core ideas: firstly, cultural debate over foreign knowledge and indigenous knowledge, and over the Way to Truth and new scientific knowledge; secondly, changing concepts of merit, and thirdly cultural continuities.

Cultural debate, the first theme, normally arises from modern pressures, and from political, social and intellectual struggles over the impact of foreign knowledge on indigenous knowledge, and over the traditional Way to Truth and new scientific or pragmatic knowledge. In the process of the debates, different kinds of knowledge and values were redefined in the form of combination, absorption, adjustment, interruption, preservation, revitalisation or cancellation. These differences and changes were discussed in both Japan and Iraq, and the debates could in a loose sense be called, 'discursive struggles'.

Thus the thesis attempts to understand the education of leaders through a classical
sociological perspective, drawing in particular on Weber's sociological investigation of religion and modernity and his analytical framing of rationalisation, legitimation and education. It traces political and social changes through perspectives on cultural traditions debated and institutionalised by the different types of leaders. However, the thesis is concerned with the education of leaders and modernities in two societies, those of Iraq and Japan, which Weber did not look at directly.

Second, the changing concepts of merit in both Japan and Iraq had strong political implications and were shaped by renegotiating and institutionalising the previous cultural traditions. The changes in the concepts of merit, and the struggle over modernity, created new modes of the education of leaders. Merit in Japan and Iraq will be seen as having two components, namely philosophical knowledge and practical or useful knowledge. The changing concepts of merit in the two countries will be identified, in particular by showing how people at various times understood good knowledge as the balance between philosophical, practical, useful and moral knowledge, and how this knowledge was negotiated and renegotiated over generations.

The third theme is cultural continuities, and these are found in: (i) the legacies of traditional values and merit to modernity; (ii) the changes from foreign to new indigenous values and vice versa; (iii) the education of leaders in state and private education systems; and (iv) the contexts of transformations in the social stratification systems. These four types of cultural continuities are often interrelated. Continuities are seen in the outcome of the values and knowledge institutionalised through the cultural debates and the struggles over the changing concepts of merit.
Based on these three interrelated core ideas, the thesis will first analyse Japan, but will later apply the same perspective to the analysis of Iraq. In times of drastic state and social changes in Meiji Japan, cultural leaders struggled over the institutionalisation of the forms and contents of cultural traditions as well as foreign knowledge; hence they established altered religious and moral values derived from the traditional social groups in the private universities.

The concept of merit was changed at state level, and as a reaction to it the cultural leaders brought up issues about individual, social and national independence through public debate. In contrast, in Iraq, changes in the traditional values and the concept of merit at state level retained Ottoman legacies of religious values and leadership. The reaction of the cultural leaders to the militaristic state power and projects was to confine and develop their traditional values in the education of leaders within their communities.

Overall, this opening chapter proposes, first that, as each state was modernised, the cultural traditions were renegotiated and institutionalised in the education of leaders, and various styles of education were created; second, that while Japan transformed its values and concepts of merit by combining them with foreign knowledge, Iraq preserved much of its tradition; third, that rapid change was instituted in Japan whereas in Iraq changes were slow. As a consequence, the patterns of the education of leaders in the two countries developed different styles which had long-term consequences.

For this comparative study, research sources in the English, Japanese and Arabic languages were sought. The approach to the thesis is documentary research, which
leads to the detailed narratives. My documentary research uses historical information within a broad sociological and comparative perspective. The thesis has not considered Kurdistan, due to its different language, political and social experiences and history. It was not possible to conduct research in Iraq, due to the very delicate political situation. For the investigation of Iraq, given the sociological and cultural framework of the research, the documentary work mainly included the collection of historical information from some archival research and newspaper articles, laws and curricula, personal letters, statements, speeches and official diaries and reports. Research was mainly conducted in the British Public Record Office, which has a large collection of political and cultural materials, in libraries and cultural institutions, and through written enquiries. For political reasons, many sources of Iraq are unpublished and kept in private homes or exist as unwritten memories.

The structure of the thesis

The thesis will take Shintō and Bushidō as the core of the religious and cultural traditions in Japan, and as Japanese equivalents to Islām and Arab tribal traditions, in particular Fasl practice in Iraq.

Chapter 1 locates the approach used in the thesis. Japan is analysed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 describes the renegotiation of Shintō and Bushidō values, the change of the social structure and the modernity crisis in Japan (1868-1912). Chapter 3 focuses on the changing concepts of merit and of what was counted to be good knowledge and leadership, and their institutionalisation in the education system. Chapter 4 examines the education of leaders.
Iraq is analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 describes the ways in which cultural traditions, namely Islām and the Arab tribal values, were renegotiated and retained as Iraq itself changed (1921-1968). The emphasis is on how social stratification and leaderships were affected by the British mandate and the modernity crisis in Iraq. Chapter 6 focuses on the changing concepts of merit and of what was counted to be good knowledge, and their institutionalisation in the education system before and after the Ottoman Empire period. Chapter 7 examines the education of leaders.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main themes of the work and with comparative reflections on what has been analysed.
CHAPTER TWO
CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY PROJECTS IN
JAPAN 1868-1912

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the ways in which the education of leaders was shaped through the renegotiation of cultural traditions, namely Shintō and Bushidō, as Japan itself modernised.

This chapter has two main arguments.

Firstly, in Meiji Japan the previous cultural traditions continued but were renegotiated by the state and leaders in the society. In the process of the modernisation of the state, the cultural traditions were legitimised in highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms, and were pragmatically reinforced in the new state institutions.

Secondly, the institutionalised Shintō and Bushidō values in the state education system and bureaucracy led to criticism of the state’s modernity projects. There was the emergence of the peoples’ rights societies, and the growth of an awareness of rights among the new social groups and cultural leaders.

It will be recalled from Chapter One that cultural leaders in this thesis are characterised as the leaders who emerge as a reaction to the renegotiation of traditional values institutionalised by the state projects. Cultural leaders are taken as representing a status group which redefines the values of cultural traditions and debates in public their social obligations and a vision of the new society.
To test these arguments, the chapter is organised into three sections. Firstly, it examines the state's official modernity projects, which aimed to change the social structure and leadership in Tokugawa Japan. Secondly, it identifies the historical and political contexts of Shintō and Bushidō, and demonstrates the renegotiations and institutionalisation of cultural traditions within the state modernity projects. The state institutionalisations of cultural traditions were legitimised. Thirdly the chapter examines the political, social and intellectual struggles against the bureaucratic power of the state. It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter One that the concept of 'social modernity' refers to the transformation of state modernity into cultural, social and private projects developed in civic society. As suggested in Chapter One, the process of redefining cultural traditions to modernise the society was complicated.

**Political and social structure**

The Meiji Renovation (*Meiji Ishin*) in 1868 marked the end of two hundred and sixty-four years of Tokugawa rule and a turning point in the history of Japanese leadership. This section argues that the new state leaders succeeded in changing the social structure by redefining the old and new political cliques and reconceptualising 'good' knowledge.

The new leaders of the Renovation proclaimed the legitimacy of their new government. Their battle cry was 'Revere the Emperor'. In order to realise the political ideology which led to the formation of the modern Imperial State, their first task was military action against the Tokugawa government. Co-operation between the upper and lower echelons of the *Bushi* stratum in several western domains, especially Chōshū (the present Yamaguchi prefecture), Satsuma (the present Kagoshima
prefecture) and Tosa (the present Köchi prefecture), with some involvement from the imperial court nobles, toppled the Tokugawa regime and established a new political power.³

A new ruling status group thus emerged. The term “ruling status group” refers in this thesis to the group which has major influence within the political order and tries to change the social order. In the case of Meiji Japan, the ruling status group was composed of the civil and military bureaucrats.

In order to construct a modern Imperial state, the next challenge was to eliminate the local domain system. The idea of the abolition of the domains was first negotiated within the clique of Kido Takayoshi and Ōkubo Toshimichi.⁴ It was achieved quickly. In 1871, the government replaced domains by prefectures. The whole of Japan was divided into three urban prefectures and seventy-two other prefectures.⁵ This marked the end of the landlords (Daimyō), and of the feudal system in which Daimyō and the local population had enjoyed political autonomy from the central government.⁶

Local government institutions were created in 1871 by the introduction of two laws, the law of the Bureaucratic System of Prefectures and the law of the Governors of the Prefectures. These laws were enacted in rapid succession, within two months. The prefectures were, in 1888, positioned under the strict control and surveillance of the central government.⁷ The local bureaucrats were appointed by the central government and had to come from outside the local area.⁸

As the central and peripheral political systems were rapidly reformed, the government
destroyed various local customs and privileges of the *Bushi* by abolishing hereditary salaries and introducing a conscription law.⁹

The replacement of the old state leaders changed the previous social structure. One of the consequences of political change in the Meiji period was to disturb the immobility of the four social strata of the Tokugawa period. In order to promote a rich and strong nation-state (*fukoku kyōhei*) and industrial and economic development (*shokusan kōgyō*),¹⁰ 'equality of the four status groups' (*shimin byōdō*) was called for.

In this context, Meiji state bureaucrats displaced the previous *Bushi* stratum but soon constructed new privileged social strata. The Imperial family became the highest stratum known in Japanese as *kōzoku*; other court nobles, the *Daimyō* and new state leaders who were from the western domains, rewarded with the title of the nobility (*kazoku*). The *Bushi* stratum in general was renamed as the gentry (*shizoku*), and all the other social strata became the common people (*heimin*). The previous outcast groups (*senmin* or *eta*) were merged with the common people.¹¹ By redefining the social strata, the government opened up access to the *bunbu-kan*, positions as officials in the governmental agencies.¹²

The national slogan, 'Revere the Emperor', was soon made concrete by the summons to serve 'the rich and strong nation-state' and to make the political and economic position of Japan equal to the West.¹³ The most fervent supporters of this political ideology were a new generation of privileged state leaders, many from the lower *Bushi* stratum, all of whom had acquired Western learning, either abroad or at new educational institutions. The new Meiji government was soon staffed by new leaders.
The creation of these groups was made possible by the highly developed systems of social communication and learning networks at the end of the Tokugawa period, which enabled the political leaders in different domains to learn about and from each other.

In the Tokugawa period, due to the lack of access to the formal legal system by individuals, knowledge of justice according to Shintō and Bushidō morality, and arts and skill in the mediation of disputations between the ordinary people in the society were needed by the Bushi stratum. In Meiji Japan, as the laws and legal systems were being modernised, the life of the population was now differentiated and particularised by new rules and new institutions. All of this required the re-negotiation of Shintō and Bushidō.

**Shintō and Bushidō**

Meiji political modernisers, such as Kido, Ōkubo, Iwakura Tomomi and Saigō Takamori, institutionalised these redefined cultural traditions to create a Shintō state. This section argues that Shintō and Bushidō traditions were politicised in the formation of an imperial nation-state equal to the West, to shape national ethics, and to frame a bureaucratic government.

One of the primary objectives of the early Meiji regime was to win legitimacy. The government needed an ideological defence for the realisation of the Imperial state. As early as 1868 the struggle for state modernity was seen as an area for the restoration of eighth century Shintō traditions and as requiring the creation of efficient state institutions at the political centre.
The motto of the new state leaders was ‘restoration of the Emperor’. The leaders justified the overthrow of the Tokugawa government by calling for a return to Imperial government (ōsei fukkō) and for people to ‘honour the Emperor and expel the barbarians’ (sonnō jōi). The restoration of the Emperor was intended to be not only a change of government from the families of Bushi to the family of the Emperor but also a return to the original political order which Emperor Jimmu had established in 710.15

In order to legitimise the new state and the new leadership, state leaders renegotiated and redefined Shintōism in four main ways, Shintō for the state (Kokka Shintō), for the Imperial House (Kōshitsu Shintō), of the sects (Kyōha Shintō), and for the common people (Minkan Shintō).16 Among these, Shintō for the State and Shintō of the sects became a national political creed. Shrine rituals and education at shrines became public institutions. Shintō for the Imperial House was politicised, became a part of Shintō for the State, and had a major impact on the modernisation of the state.

Shintō, in its original conception, had embraced theology, ethics, government and society. Paradoxically, once the traditional cultural concepts of faith and the institutions of government had proved unstable, religion became a powerful force for change in the government. Among the learning study groups, there were two opposing factions: those led by Hirata Atsutane and by Ōkuni Takamasa. Hirata Atsutane looked at Shintō and the Emperor in the context of religion. The Emperor was seen as sacred and divine. Ōkuni suggested universal Shintōism which emphasised the Emperor as a centre of power (moto) in the world.17

A centre of power (moto) depended on the moral values of loyalty, the obligation of
care and obedience, which were rooted in Shintō combined with Taoism. The young state leadership supported Ōkuni’s theory. Thus the idea of Shintō for the state was derived from Ōkuni’s new concept of universal Shintōism. At the same time Ōkuni offered the practical idea of defining a national morality (kokumin dōtoku). Traditional Shintō values were redefined and legitimised as ‘national’ ethics in highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms.

Ōkuni’s understanding of Shintō is seen in the way in which the Meiji state modernisers re-legitimated the political and social position of the Emperor and respect for ancestors in the secular state’s policies of (i) the restoration of the Shintō tradition (ii) the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles (gokajō no goseimon) and (iii) the Meiji Constitution (Meiji kenpō 1889).

The restoration of the Shintō tradition was seen in the revival of the traditional imperial festivals. Shintō for the Imperial House came to be considered as a way to respect the ancestors, and the festival sites of the Imperial court became politically important places. The old political and cultural traditions were proclaimed by law as the state ideology. For example, a declaration (13th March 1868) reintroduced the saisei-itchi theocracy which was the system that claimed to preserve harmony between the Emperor and the Deity (Kami) and Gods through ritual. The traditional conformity between religious ritual and government (saisei-itchi) became the state ideology, which authorised the political and social position of the Emperor as a consequence of absolute divine right (as had been originally claimed by the Jimmu Emperor in 710). Thus in the early Meiji period, the renegotiation of imperial tradition meant the restoration of divine right and the Emperor’s political supremacy. Shintō rituals became an
inseparable part of national politics. Ōkuni’s moral values of loyalty, obligation of care and obedience reinforced the conformity between religious ritual and government.

There was also work on the Imperial Oath by Ōkubo, Kido and Inada Masatsugu, and their influence was decisive.25 The substance of the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles was in line with the aspirations of the radical state modernisers to legitimise the state, but the fact that it was an oath sworn to the Emperor by his subjects was equally significant.26 By the declaration of the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles, the Emperor was recognised as the source of all authority in general, and as the authority over Shintō and its beliefs and practices.

The Charter Oath constituted a declaration of the state vision, namely the establishment of the Imperial State and the realisation of the equality of commoners, but what became clear was the state modernisers’ political aim, which was a drastic and decisive change in the distribution of power in Japan. Article One promised to the commoners political participation through established assemblies and public discussion. Article Two promised a revolutionary break with feudal strata and the introduction of ideas of welfare. Article Three stated the obligations of the commoners, but also promised access to promotion through merit. Article Four promised legal protection to the commoners. Article Five opened the way for Western knowledge and Eastern ethics.

The last article contained what was to prove the basic philosophy of the whole Shintō restoration in the context of ‘a centre of power’ as suggested by Ōkuni: that is, “knowledge” should be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. Japan was to be modernised and strengthened through the
use of Western knowledge, because the only defence against the West lay in the creation in modern form of the ancient Chinese ideal of “a rich and strong military country” which could best be achieved through Western technology and the Japanese cultural tradition. Japan needed to unite so as to be equal to the West and to defend its political interest.

Thus Shintō was effectively made into the state religion (Kokka Shintō). The formation of the Imperial nation-state became an official political ideology, which was pragmatically used to secure the political power of the state leadership in terms of the name of the sacred Emperor. The new political status of Shintō as the state religion began to diminish the strength of Buddhism and other sects. The government started controlling religious practices, including the Shintō of the common people (Minkan Shintō), through public and shrine administration. On the day after proclaiming the Oath of Five Articles, the state announced, as state policy, the abolition of Christianity. The state also abolished many local shrines and constructed new state shrines to perform its ritual festivities.

On March 28, 1868, the Office of Shintō Religion declared the separation between Shintō and Buddhism:

There is no Shintō temple, ever so small, in which the title of its Kai has not been designated ever since the middle Ages by a Buddhist term, such as Avatar of Gozu-Tennō. Each of those temples shall, as soon as possible, submit a notice containing the detailed history of the temple.

The place of Buddhism was made officially subsidiary to that of Shintō. Shintō rituals were made political and became state rituals. The rituals of the imperial court acquired a political meaning by making the Emperor a political figure. By separating
Shinto from other religions, Shinto ideology was embedded in the 1889 Meiji Constitution. Many Shintōists saw the restoration of the Emperor as confirming the independence of the spirit of Japan, and such a new political entity required new policies. This affected traditional definitions of Bushidō values.

Bushidō values in the Tokugawa period had centred on the relationships between the landowning lord and his House followers. The lord and his followers were, as Fukuzawa Yukichi pointed out, tied to the Bushidō values which were reflected in 'personal independence in relation to the lord'. Selfless loyalty was not valued. This spiritual notion of independence was defined in the Tokugawa period, by Yoshida Shōin, as self-obligation and self-respect. Shōin emphasised the cultivation of the inner person, using his favourite term shisei [fulfilling sincerity].

A Meiji philosopher, Inoue Tetsujirō, suggested that Bushidō should be seen as the national morality (kokumin dōtoku) and should be recognised by the state leaders. According to Inoue, national ethics were the essence of the national polity (kokutai). This renegotiation of the previous Bushidō values was a reconsideration of the harmonious relationships between 'pen' (bun) and 'sword' or the martial arts of war (bu):

*Bun* and *bu* are like the wings of the bird, or wheels which go parallel...and ...in harmony. There is no eternal peace without *bu*. *Bun* and *bu* must be kept a balance. Those who have the knowledge of *bun* have the beauty of *bu* (bubi) and a leader (kunshi) must not be a man of only the pen. It must be important to cultivate the ability to defend the nation-state by providing 'bu' to those who have knowledge of 'bun'.

Inoue emphasised that *bun* is prior to *bu*. That is, in order to attain the aim of 'pen' (*bun*), learning of *bu* is only a prerequisite. In this way *bun* and *bu* must not be equal
but in superior (*bun*) and subordinate (*bu*) relations. If *bu* is prior to *bun*, militarism emerges. The purpose of *bu* is the realisation of *bun*.

Thus the *Bushidō* spirit, according to Inoue’s concept, penetrates the personal cultivation of *bun* and *bu*. Inoue’s vision for the Meiji state was the construction of a moral entity:

> As a historically developing construct, *Bushidō* exists for the sake of the protection of the moral national polity. In other words, we use *bu* in order to achieve the purpose of *bun*, and so it is not *Bushidō* if we emphasise ‘*bu*’ before *bun*. Therefore, ‘*Bushi*’ should not forget the spirit of ‘do-ji’ - the way of obligation to both values.

*Bushidō* values were thus used as a national ethic and as a device to modernise the bureaucracy. The concept of *Bushidō* as traditionally understood was transformed for the ideological and institutional purposes of the state. These purposes are seen in the state’s effort to place bureaucratic institutions such as the military, the ministries and police at the political centre.

Furthermore, the abolition of the *Bushi* stratum in 1871 made *Bushidō* even more the property of the entire nation. The *Bushi* ‘bugyō’, as a commissioner of the government in Tokugawa Japan, was changed to a central civil servant as *bishi* and a local civil servant as *gushi* in the early Meiji period, and renamed as a civil bureaucrat (*bunbu-kan*), or to a military bureaucrat (*gunbu-kan*).

In the military, bureaucratic and public educational systems, with the Emperor replacing the feudal lord as the object of selfless loyalty and sacrifice, *Bushidō* became the foundation of ethical training. The change of loyalty marked the end of the *Bushi*
social system and the disappearance of the autonomous Bushi professions. The renegotiation of Bushidō contributed both to the rise of Japanese nationalism and to the strengthening of wartime citizens' morale up to 1945.

Thus the official modernity project of the state was served by the institutionalisation of Shintō and Bushidō values. This institutionalisation involved a de-emphasising through a national code of ethics, of the value of personal autonomy in relation to society. As a consequence of this, the social cohesion of the Bushi was undermined and the concept of loyalty to the person of the lord was replaced by that of loyalty to the nation-state.

In the process of constructing a modern state, the traditional systems of loyalty were pragmatically utilised to serve the power of the bureaucracy, but their contents, forms and function were deconstructed. At the same time new state institutions were constructed and the traditional leadership was eliminated or marginalised in the process. The consequence of this was that the traditional leaders were caught up in the pressures between nation-state priorities and their traditional cultural identities.

In the next section, the institutionalisation of cultural traditions is described. The section describes how Shintō and Bushidō values were institutionalised in the civil bureaucracy and the military, and shows what kind of state leadership was produced and reproduced in the state institutions. The official modernity project of the state included educational requirements.

The development of the Meiji state is seen in the changes of the bureaucratic
leadership. The changes are divided into three stages: the emergence of the Meiji state (1868-1872), the growth of the Meiji Imperial state (1872-1890), and the maturity of Meiji Japan (1890-1912).

_Shintō and Bushidō renegotiated_

**(1) The emergence of the Meiji State (1868-1872)**

This section describes the shift of cultural traditions as the state was modernised. The years 1868 to 1872 were marked by the emergence of the Meiji state, by political struggles over the renovation of _Shintō_ and _Bushidō_ traditions in the new political system, and by the establishment of a consensus about the new types of knowledge needed to support the bureaucratic institutions at the political centre.

In the same year as the Meiji Renovation, the Officials of _Shintō_ Worship, who were included in a ‘Three Offices’ system (san shoku-sei), were restored. As indicated earlier, the idea was suggested by Ōkuni Takamasa; it was intended to establish the Ministry of _Shintō_ at the centre of the new government.⁴⁰ The theocratic “Three Officials” were called ‘the Council of State’ (Dajōkan). The name was derived from the Grand Council of State in the Nara period (710-784). The old system of court ranks for government officials was revived. The senior members of the Emperor’s government were called the _Sōsai_ (the Governor), the _Gijō_ (Senior Councillors), and the _Sanyo_ (Junior Councillors).⁴¹ These offices were established in Kyoto in 1868 and became the new Imperial court government.⁴² This institutionalisation of the ancient _Shintō_-oriented political system was the starting point for developing the bureaucracy in Japan.
The state leaders aimed to sustain the traditional conformity between the government and religious ritual. As indicated earlier, all shrines and priests were controlled by the state, and the political ideology of 'the sacred state' was developing. The ritual of 'The April 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles' was conducted in the Imperial court. It was performed by senior members of the Emperor's government, Senior Councillors and Junior Councillors at the Imperial Palace in Kyoto. Thus the Emperor became involved in politics. For example, on 2nd April 1868, he presided over what a British diplomat called 'the first Parliament of Japan', a conference of the Emperor's government, including the Governor, Senior and Junior Councillors, in Nijō Castle.

However, the power of the Imperial governmental offices and Shintōist officials was gradually weakened as the lower Bushi stratum staffed the modernised government. In 1871, in a reform of the bureaucratic system, the Council of State was divided into three chambers for legislative, administrative, and judicial functions, and the Office of Shintō Worship was downgraded to the level of an ordinary ministry. The top posts, normally held by court nobles and Daimyō, became symbolic and lost their autonomy.

The Emperor became the highest leader of Japan but was only a political symbol in the new bureaucratic power structure. His political function was embedded in a sacred ritual context, and actual political power was in the hands of the government.

By 1871, the construction of the Imperial State (rather than the construction of the sacred Shintō state) had become the most important political project. The formation of the new state was strongly supported by the military. In the first uncertain years
following the 1868 Renovation, one of the most rapidly evolving state institutions was the military administration.  

In August 1869, it was renamed the War Department and in 1872 divided into separate army and navy departments which were equal departments of the government. At first, the real line of authority within the military was informally determined by the influence of certain individuals and groups rather than by the formal structure of the bureaucracy.

The War Department played a part in the modernisation of the state and the society. It was the first large bureaucratic organisation, and not only did it play a key role in the formation of the new army and navy, but also it was integrated with the civil ministries. Both civil servants and military bureaucrats played a role in the formation of the Meiji state by renegotiating Shintō and Bushidō traditions. Traditional values of personal loyalty to authority were replaced by loyalty to the Imperial State as the basis of national ethics. The 1882 Rescript ordered soldiers and sailors to:

neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics but with single heart fulfil your essential duty of loyalty.  

Other regulations excluded military personnel from voting and from standing for election; involvement in politics became a criminal offence under the Army and Navy Penal Laws. Traditional Shintō and Bushidō values, systems and leaders became convenient tools to realise the Imperial nation-state and thus reinforce the political power of bureaucracy. This development is described in the next section.
(II) The growth of the Meiji Imperial State (1872-1890)

The period from 1872 to 1890 was marked by political struggles. There was a shift from a Shintō-oriented to a privileged and Bushi-oriented state. Meanwhile, there was an internal institutional and cultural transformation in which the state and shrine education were involved. There was a rapid growth of civic bureaucratic institutions, marked by political, cultural and intellectual conflicts among state and social leaders. There was a growth of political opposition.

In the Reform of 1872, the Council of State (Dajōkan) was deliberately strengthened by abolishing the Ministry of Shintō.

The aim of this Dajōkan Reform was to reinforce the authority of the Bushi clique rather than that of the Shintōist court nobles. The legitimisation of their new leadership required emphasis on the political ideology of the Shintō-oriented imperial nation-state.

At the same time as the Ministry of Shintō was abolished, in 1872 the government established the Department of Religion.

This department was established to politicise Shintō priests, to disseminate state Shintoism through them, to reinforce the ideology of the separation of Shintō from Buddhism, and also to defend Shintō against the increasing number of Christians. Shintōist bureaucrats (jingikan) and priests were defined in their identity as teachers or Shintō missionaries.
As indicated earlier, shrine rituals and education became public institutions. Nationalised Shintōism was reinforced by a campaign for teaching Shintō values through the Department of Religion. This was launched as a Shintō socialisation movement and was called the Great Promulgation Campaign. The campaign was supported by the Ise Grand Shrine. By nationalising the Grand Shrine and by gaining support from the local shrine administration, the Campaign led to further success in the diffusion of state-defined Shintōism.60

The movement permeated Japan through preaching conducted by trained priests, and was highly influential in making local people see Shintō as a state religion. Etō Shinpei issued two principles for the teachers of Shintō: reverence toward the Deity and patriotism, and the encouragement of loyalty, care and obedience to the Emperor. Thus the content was national ethics rather than theological doctrine, and the emphasis was on the reinforcement of the new Shintō value of loyalty to the nation-state.

The Great Promulgation Campaign was politically successful. The forms of Shintōism associated with the Emperor gave pride of place to the Shintōists in overseeing the transformation of society within a national morality.61 However, this movement ended when the Department of Religion was degraded and placed under the newly established Ministry of the Interior. The ending of the movement was emphasised when the Shintōist leader of the Great Promulgation Campaign, Urata Chōmin, resigned from his position as Commissioner for the Ise Grand Shrine.62 This change produced resistance from Buddhists and local Shintō believers.

However, any criticism of the government and any movements for democratic rights
were prohibited by Imperial Ordinances. In the middle of the Meiji period, all the activities of the government were based on statutory declarations. This was seen in the cases of the proclamation and abolition of the Ministry of Shintō, the Great Promulgation Campaign and the 1886 Imperial University Order. There was no law in the modern democratic sense, but only the remnants of the Tokugawa legal system. This meant that the characteristic feature of the growing Meiji government was that power was not clearly divided between the legislature, executive and judiciary. Judicial power was subordinated to executive power until the Supreme Court was established in 1875.

This absence of the balance of three powers made it easier for the old bureaucrats to create new rules and institutions and reinforce their privileged position. The fact that most government officials were recruited from the former Bushi stratum contributed to the persistence of shizoku social statuses. This resulted in a strong sense that the government bureaucrats were placed above the ordinary citizens. Public administration was permeated by absolutism, the Home and Finance Ministries being the most powerful of all the ministries. In the 1870s, the bureaucratic institutions were growing in size.

Administrative reforms were continually devised to meet the needs of growing state power and specialisation within the government. By monopolising state honours, the bureaucrats were becoming a new privileged social stratum. Originally, bureaucrats came from the Bushi stratum, but a bureaucrat who came from the commoners was now promoted and awarded the title of a shizoka. This social rank was passed on to his offspring. In 1873, they were exempted from conscription. The privilege became
decisive when the 1876 bureaucracy law guaranteed the status of the bureaucrats by exempting them from punishment in criminal cases.\textsuperscript{68}

As the bureaucrats became privileged, there arose a political dispute about the bureaucracy within the government. In 1869, Kido Takayoshi, who was from the Chōshū domain and against the bureaucratic system,\textsuperscript{69} was deprived of his official position and was replaced by Hirose. This meant that, by 1880, the Bushi clique, who were new bureaucrats from the Satsuma and Chōshū domain cliques, represented by Ōkubo, came to hold real political power over the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{70}

The opposition group consisted of those who supported the establishment of a political party system, and was represented by Saigō Takamori and Itagaki Taisuke.\textsuperscript{71} Large-scale resistance movements grew at grass roots level.\textsuperscript{72} The new government had for some time been attacked by both right and left opposition groups. The opposition from the right came from the middle social stratum of previous Bushi families, which were distressed by the loss of feudal privileges and by economic pressure. This dissatisfaction led ultimately to the Satsuma rebellion of 1877. The opposition from the left demanded a more representative form of government, sponsored petitions and established, in 1874, Japan's first political party.\textsuperscript{73}

Itagaki protested against the bureaucratic and oligarchic government (hanbatsu) which was dominated by men from the Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa domains. Given the increasing protest movement, the Meiji government responded to the first of these attacks by summonses against Kido, Ōkubo, Itō and Itagaki. On 24th April 1875, the government promised the population the gradual establishment of constitutional
government through the establishment of legislative judicial organs. The effort to meet this promise resulted in the emergence of the political party system and the opening of the Parliament.

(III) The maturity of Meiji Japan (1890-1912)

As indicated earlier, in the early Meiji period the leaders of the state had restored the ancient political Shinto system and the rights of the Emperor. In the late Meiji period, Shinto was continuously used as a convenient device for the justification of political and social change. Although the new constitution was influenced by the German advisor, Hermann Roesler, many of its supporters stressed that it was in line with distinguished Japanese traditions adapted to modern times. For example, the acclaimed historian Shigeno Yasutsugu, professor at the Imperial University, gave a lecture entitled “The Constitution of our Country since Ancient Times and the Situation of the University”. Overall, the ideology of the Meiji Renovation and Ōkuni’s notion of a centre of power (moto) emphasised the continuity of the rituals and the symbolism of the Emperor. Shinto priests came to be paid by the state, according to Article 28 of the 1889 Constitution.

However, many other changes limited freedoms. Article 10 prescribed the fundamental characteristic of bureaucrats as the servants of the Emperor. The legal independence of the military from civil bureaucracy encouraged the army to assume a dominant role in politics. Article 11 defined the Emperor’s military role, stipulating that he “has the supreme command" in practice. The Emperor’s supreme power meant that all functions of the army were disconnected from civil bureaucracy. In fact, the Emperor himself had little in the way of real power, but great importance in the
performance of symbolic observances. The change of the political position of the Emperor in relation to the military resulted in the reinforcement of the political power of the military bureaucracy over the civil bureaucracy.

The traditional values were reinforced in the civil bureaucratic institutions in a different way. The traditional role of the *Bushi* as warriors, administrators and judges ended, and a new group of bureaucrats emerged, educated as experts specialising in administration or legal affairs. The study of law rapidly developed, due to the need to train the bureaucrats and to the government project to compile a legal code.

By establishing these state education systems, the old bureaucrats rapidly created a new privileged bureaucratic elite stratum. In July 1884, a new Peerage Ordinance declared that, in addition to the previous landowners of the domain and the court nobles, one hundred leaders of the Meiji Restoration were to be ennobled as a reward for services rendered. This measure was designed to unite the old aristocracy of court nobles and *Daimyō* and the new oligarchy of Restoration leaders in a House of Peers which would be strong enough to offset the influence of the proposed popularly elected House of Representatives.

Thus the cultural traditions of *Shintō* and *Bushidō* values were institutionalised in the peerage system. The 1887 Discipline of the Bureaucrats (*kanrifukumu kiritsu*) was an indication of the old bureaucrats’ plan to establish the bureaucracy as a privileged stratum of “servants of the Emperor”.

By 1900, the elderly state leaders were replaced by new technocratic bureaucrats, and
so the power of the bureaucracy continued and was defended by the new political party groups. Article 55 of the Meiji Constitution blocked the joint responsibility of ministers, by prescribing the responsibilities of each minister. Political, social and cultural struggles over the consolidation of political parties were evident in the oligarchic reaction to the new party groups, and in the establishment of a solid state education system before the opening of the parliament and the promulgation of the Constitution.

Thus the cultural traditions of Shintō and Bushidō values were renegotiated throughout the Meiji period. Shintō values were consolidated in the early Meiji period and were mixed with Confucianism, which was also a constituent of Shintōism in the late Meiji educational system. The life of citizens changed as the state modernised. The modernisation of society developed through resistance to state modernity.

**Shintō and Bushidō renegotiated**

(IV) The emergence of Meiji Society (1868-1872)

The years 1868-1872 were marked by cultural leaders challenging the state projects for Shintō and Bushidō. The political and social struggles were intense.

The development of new technology, industrialisation, the conscription law and the tax reform had changed the local social structure. Many of the Bushi found it difficult to adjust themselves to the new society. The 1877 Seinan war, led by Saigō Takamori and organised by the shizoku, was the last collective resistance movement against the government. The government’s policy on agricultural land ignored the perception of
land as belonging to the community. Dissatisfaction in the countryside led to uprisings by the farmers.87

Social resistance to state Shintōism also emerged. As described earlier, the state Shintō movement affected Japan as a whole.88 The ideology of the saisei-itchi was promoted in society,89 but Buddhism was recognised only as a private belief and its leaders were excluded from the right to conduct funeral rituals. As a result, the Buddhist temples lost their social position.90

Subsequently a resistance movement emerged among the priests and local people who were believers in the Shinshū Buddhist school of thought, in many domains such as the Sado, Matsumoto and Toyama prefectures, and they linked with the central temples, Higashi and Nishi Honganji in Kyōto.91 This movement made the government retract the order to destroy the temples in the Toyama prefecture.92

As counter-pressure to popular resistance, the Great Promulgation Campaign was accelerated. Preaching in local areas aimed to unify the consciousness of the population.93 Preaching took place immediately after the ritual of the drinking the holy sake. It emphasised gratitude for the tolerance of the Emperor who protected peace, security, the crops and welfare.94 The leaders of the festival activities taught people to respect the elders.95

Thus, as was suggested in Chapter One, the modernisation of society by the government resulted in the loss of local religious autonomy and in excluding the previous religious leaders from central political participation. What was required
furthermore was the dissemination and consolidation of the new belief system through the institutions of formal and informal education, so that it would achieve popular acceptance.  

The law of Tokugawa Japan had prohibited religious association under suspicion of rebellious tendencies, and as a result, new religions in Meiji Japan had to seek the sponsorship of local elites in order to escape persecution. The new religions could not operate satisfactorily on the model of popular preaching. Ministers’ counselling, healing, and congregational meetings were important; the new Shintō religious associations, such as the Kurozumi-schools and Konkō-schools, needed permanent buildings and ministries. For these two associations, participation in the Great Promulgation Campaign provided the keys to growth and to avoiding suppression.

During the lifetime of the founder, Munetada Kurozumi, the Kurozumi-schools were established in Okayama rural society mainly through the patronage of rich farmers, but after the 1850s priests began to become ministers of the group. During the Great Promulgation Campaign, Kurozumi-school meetings were held using entirely the forms of Shintō. The Kurozumi-schools performed funerals incorporating the name of Munetada Kurozumi into the ritual.

The Kurozumi schools as well as the Konkō-schools tried to legitimise themselves in the eyes of the state, so as to assume the position of educators of the population. To do this, they made significant compromises, agreeing to change their deities, to call themselves Shintō, to submit their organisations to government supervision, to be distinct from Buddhism, and to harness their ways of self-cultivation to such state goals.
as tax-paying, compulsory education, and the idea of the formation of a rich and strong nation-state. Both groups mediated the relation between the state and the rural populace, introducing themselves as extensions of state authority.

The Great Promulgation Campaign gave Kurozumi and Konkō-schools groups a place in an ideological order called (after 1875) Shintō. Recognised by the Meiji state, both schools committed themselves deeply to Shintō and to the socio-political order. They did not seek to become leaders of the political order but saw their mission as providing pathways to salvation within society. Thus in Meiji Japan, Shintō and the subsequent study of the Japanese classics (kokugaku) continued, and leaders of new religions attempted to appropriate them.

Post-Meiji Shintō was no longer the restored ancient religion of Japan, as Shintō was responding to situations which the Meiji influenced.

Similarly, Bushidō was renegotiated by the state and became a code of national ethics, emphasising loyalty to the Imperial nation-state, which was institutionalised as the central political value. The traditional Bushidō leadership was caught up in the pressures between nation-state priorities and traditional requirements. These tensions were resolved in different ways. The new leaders either moved away from the previous role of Bushi as loyal warriors, administrators and judges or became civil servants.

Traditional relationships between leaders and the government were, as Yoshida Shōin, Inoue Tetsujirō and Nitobe Inazō emphasised in their books, based on personal
independence in relation to society in general and to personal authority in particular. Fukuzawa Yukichi emphasised the importance of mutual relations between private and public virtues. Explaining these relations, he expressed the basic idea of education and learning in the context of independence and self-respect as the general principle of the education of virtue. Fukuzawa further interpreted the spirit of independence among the population as the spirit of civilisation.\textsuperscript{106}

Fukuzawa's concept of the education of leaders, as his own life-style showed, aimed to nurture good citizens who could stand and speak for their personal autonomy and knowledge in relation to social and political obligation. Claiming that individual independence leads to the state becoming independent, Fukuzawa admonished his readers to consider that those who do not have the spirit of independence do not think about the state deeply, do not have the ability to develop independence in relation to the foreigner, depend on other people, and do bad things, for example, betray the state.\textsuperscript{107}

The way Fukuzawa, as a nationalist, defended the formation of the Imperial state was based on his concept of the conflation of intellectual Bushidō values and Western knowledge. In his books \textit{The Encouragement of Learning} and \textit{The Outline of the Theory of Civilisation}, he pointed out that there are two distinct aspects of civilisation. One is the form and the other is the spirit. Emphasising the spiritual aspect of civilisation, he suggested that the fundamental value of civilisation resided in the reform of the human heart and the development of wisdom and virtue in the population, and therefore, to construct a modern nation, the people, particularly the new generation, were important. In his book \textit{The Outline of the Theory of Civilisation}
he emphasised private virtue as the highest life principle. He perceived Bushidō as a new model for leadership and vitality, suggesting that the current independent shizoku should follow the previous law of Bushi to make great achievements.

Seiyo Jijō (The State of Affairs of the West) written by Fukuzawa, influenced members of the shizoku stratum through informing them about Western political systems, values and knowledge. Ueki Emori, an active organiser of the People’s Freedom and Rights Movement (PFR Movement), was among them. Reading Seiyō Jijō, Ueki learned that there were different political systems as well as the dominating political system operated by the Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa cliques. Having joined the PFR Movement, led by Itagaki Taisuke in his Tosa domain, and having opposed the state education system, Ueki became an active liberal advocate of the new education.

(V) Society and the Meiji Imperial State (1872-1890)

It is argued that during this period the consolidating bureaucratic system was challenged by the new cultural leaders. They struggled over the institutionalisation of Shintō-Bushidō values in the PFR Movement. This section focuses on the process of transformation of Bushidō values and the emergence of new leaders and new educational institutions in society.

As described earlier, the PFR Movement developed by resisting bureaucratic privilege and coercion. The leaders at the beginning of the movement were former state leaders such as Itagaki Taisuke, Gotō Shōjirō and Fukushima Tanenomi. Their appeal affected the 1874 petition for the opening of the Parliament and the rights of political participation and social welfare, and for the practice of ‘public discussion’ which was
recognised in Article One of the 1868 Imperial Oath and Five Articles.\textsuperscript{111}

Differences between the anti-government movements in the early and the middle period were marked in two ways. In the early period, revolts were concerned with a deteriorating life-style, and therefore there was little networking among the different cultural leaders. In the middle period, revolts led by the cultural leaders reflected their concern about personal autonomy and social obligation. New Western knowledge and new learning circles (\textit{kai}) were introduced during the PFR Movement, in networking activities at study meetings (\textit{gakushū-kai}) and speech meetings in public (\textit{enzetsu-kai}). The speech meetings were where state power and the PFR Movement directly confronted each other.\textsuperscript{112}

A society for the study of debate (\textit{gakushū tōron-kai}) was established in 1882 in the city of Itsukamachi. There were participants from 16 cities and villages. Among them, six parties developed. Associations of this kind emerged throughout Japan, aiming to find the new styles of knowledge and political thought which would suit the new era. There was a modern style of debate with a chairman and secretary; opinions and decisions were written down. The activities of the speech meeting movement created learning groups. The participants, who had been passive, in time became active leaders of the movement. By the early 1880s, throughout Japan, speech meetings were flourishing.\textsuperscript{113}

However, these activities were threatened by the government. The April 1880 Law of Assembly forbade the attendance of the police, military men, teachers and students at any public assembly. Journalists who were active in the peoples' rights groups were
often imprisoned. There were many cases of the interruption of speeches. Meetings were stopped or dispersed. Any assemblies and associations needed to avoid violating the law, which regulated discussion or debate on current political and legal matters.  

In the case of Mito prefecture, the 1880 Regulation of Assembly restricted local speech meetings. However, the demand for open ‘speech meetings’ was strong and in June, the Mito Association for the Study of Law (Mito hōgaku kan) was established. This association published a newspaper. Every Saturday and every second Sunday of each month, the association held a meeting for debate. There were 2000 in the audience on 17th March 1881 at the theatre of Kamiichi in Mito prefecture, but after the speech of Miyachi Mohei, the meeting was ordered to stop and dissolve. However, the movement was not weakened by the restrictions, but spread in many different forms throughout Japan in the 1880s and in the later Meiji period.

(VI) Meiji Japan (1890-1912)

Meiji Japan developed with a combination of cultural, educational and intellectual struggles. The 1890s were marked by increasing political networking associations and publications, the establishment of the political party system and the opening of Parliament.

At the same time, academic leaders struggled over the institutional independence of the educational system. The scholars in Tokyo University claimed independence. According to the 1886 Imperial University Order (Teikoku Daigaku rei), Tokyo University was under the immediate control of the Ministry of Education, so that the
government could interfere in the academic affairs of the university. Consequently the institutional independence of learning and research were the focus of discussion. At the end of the 1880s, when Niijima Jō campaigned for the establishment of Dōshisha University, intellectuals called for the expansion of higher education. Takada Sanae, the editor of the Yomiuri newspaper, criticised nationalistic education, and supported the establishment of Waseda University.¹¹⁷

There were disputes between the state and the cultural leaders on how the new knowledge and technology could be applied to leadership in daily life.¹¹⁸ The intellectual struggles within the political debates on the new style of politics resulted in an increase in public demonstrations. In 1881, Fukuzawa in his newspaper (Jiji Shinpō) said:

Politics is important, but the civilisation of the country is not systematised by politics only. Politics is one phase of civilisation and so must go parallel with the enterprise of the learning of technology and commerce.¹¹⁵

Fukuzawa’s suggestion was intended to encourage a sense of a distinctively Meiji political and cultural community that would bridge the many particular identities of the citizens. In July 1882, he published articles in Jiji Shinpō, emphasising the importance of those scholars who stood outside political parties for the development of civilisation and of Japan. He stressed that the use of knowledge should not be separated from the development of the spirit of freedom and independence.¹²⁰

But the tensions were severe. For example, there was an emphasis on the study of Germany. Yamagata Aritomo supported the study of the law and politics of Germany.¹²¹ Against this, the scholar Nakamura Masanao, in his Zanbun Gakukai
Kaisetsu Kokubun, explained the necessity of restoring the study of Chinese classics and other traditional learning. Fukuzawa Yukichi in his “Suggestion to the Member of Literary Circles (bungaku-kai)” showed a critical attitude towards the movement to restore Chinese classics, and stressed the necessity of practical learning by criticising the existing tendency which separated learning from daily life.¹²²

Like Fukuzawa and Ono Azusa, many cultural leaders were aware of their role of balancing the old and new knowledge. For example, in 1887, an article by Nishimura Shigeki “Perspectives on the Study of the Oriental Association” presented to the Philosophy Association emphasised the importance of learning both Western and Japanese as well as other oriental knowledge. In his book Nihonkōtoku ron, he supported Western learning without losing sight of Confucianism.¹²³

**Conclusion**

In the Meiji period, the previous cultural traditions were redefined and institutionalised by the state and leaders in the society. Structural political and social changes were introduced. Firstly, a rapid change in the social structure was made by replacing the previous state leaders through the abolition of the domain system, integrating the local leaders into the central government and establishing a new political power centre based on the Chōshū, Satsuma and Tosa Bushi clique. The abolition of the domains led the Bushi status groups to adjust themselves to the new political and public or private services.

Secondly, the Meiji state legitimised itself by redefining Shintō and Bushidō traditional values, establishing political ideologies based on these, and institutionalising them
rapidly in the new state education systems. The Shintō state emerged by redefining the Emperor as a centre of power in the world, rather than as a sacred and divine figure. Simultaneously, shrine rituals and Shintō education became state institutions. This state Shintō reinforced the traditional conformity between the state and religious ritual. Renegotiated Shintō was politicised and legitimated in the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles and re-legitimated in the Constitution (1889), positioning respect for the Emperor and ancestors in the state’s policies.

Within four years after the Meiji Renovation, as the state modernised, a shift from a Shintō-oriented to a privileged and Bushi-oriented state was made by repositioning the Department of Religion. Renegotiated Bushidō values became politicised as a code of national ethics, and were institutionalised in the bureaucracy to support obligation and loyalty to the nation state. These new values were used to strengthen the ideologies of a rich and strong nation-state and industrial and economic development. Thus in the process of the modernisation of the state, the cultural traditions were legitimised in highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms, and were pragmatically reinforced in the new state institutions. As the redefined national morality reinforced the state’s ideologies, which called for modernising the state and the society, state education was shaped by the redefined religious and Bushidō values. The education systems reinforced these values by using a textbook on the national morality based on Shintō mixed with Confucianism. The Tokugawa legacy of Shintō and Bushidō traditions continued in the modernity processes, functioned as a part of the state projects and reinforced the political ideologies which allowed the Imperial nation-state to emerge. The traditional Bushi leadership was caught up in the pressures between nation-state priorities and traditional requirements. Criticisms raised by the cultural leaders first
attacked the Meiji administrative reforms which rationalised and consolidated the privileges of the civil servants. In 1874, Itagaki, Gotō and Fukushima supported a petition calling for the opening of a parliament, the establishment of a constitutional state and the right to have a political party system. These cultural leaders developed the PFR Movements linking religious, academic and human rights issues, raised citizens’ political consciousness. In particular, Fukuzawa remarked the importance of mutual relations between private and public virtues. As Yoshida, Nitobe and Inoue emphasised, Fukuzawa interpreted the spirit of independence among the population as the spirit of civilisation.

The voices calling for a democratic and independent Japan expressed the cultural leaders’ social alternative to the Imperial nation-state vision. The redefined Shintō and Bushidō valued by the state leaders emphasised personal loyalty, while the cultural leaders emphasised personal autonomy. Both groups struggled over the institutionalisation of these values and knowledge in the different education systems. The education of leaders in Meiji Japan became a new part of the modernity projects. The tensions between the state and the cultural leaders were intense, but there were mutual efforts to resolve the issues between them through dialogue and negotiations.

The social modernity projects had strong political, social and intellectual implications for the institutionalisation of the redefined traditional values in the private education systems. For example, at the end of the 1880s, when Nijima Jō campaigned for the establishment of Dōshisa University, academic cultural leaders called for the expansion of higher education. Takada and Ueki struggled over the institutional independence of the private educational system. As a cultural and Shintō leader, Kurozumi did not seek
power by becoming a leader of the political order, but saw his mission as providing pathways to salvation within society. Thus Shintō and the study of the Japanese classics ( kokugaku) continued, and leaders of new religions attempted to appropriate them.

Meiji Japan was oriented towards becoming a democratic society with major changes in personal status. This meant that social modernity in Meiji Japan developed in civic society by transforming state modernity into cultural, social and private educational projects in terms of the rights of free and independent individuals, the society and the citizens to participate in the political life of Japan. Political and social changes were simultaneously structural and symbolic; hence they were rapid and dynamic.

Differences among the new state and cultural leaders were marked in their routes to leadership positions and in their education. As was seen in this chapter, one core problem was how to redefine and institutionalise concepts of merit and what was counted as ‘good’ knowledge. The next chapter focuses on how this issue was reflected in the educational institutions of Tokugawa and Meiji Japan.
CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTS OF MERIT AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION
IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN JAPAN

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the changing concepts of merit and what was regarded as good knowledge in the Tokugawa (1603-1868) and Meiji (1868-1912) periods as the state institutionalised them in the education system. In parallel to the subsequent analysis of Iraq, this chapter offers an interpretation of these changes and of the implications of the political, social and intellectual struggles over the nature of merit in Japan.

The first argument is that the concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated throughout the Tokugawa and Meiji periods at state and social levels. The merit valued in Tokugawa Japan was not fully politicised. People who had merit possessed a balance of knowledge, morality and obligation.

The second argument is that the new Meiji government redefined the concept of merit as loyalty and obligation to the Imperial nation state, and absorbed it as a part of the state modernity projects. The state project institutionalised the redefined knowledge and morality in the state education system, but overlooked the Tokugawa legacy of what was counted as good knowledge, morality and sense of obligation. However, in society, the Tokugawa legacy of the concepts of merit was maintained and developed by cultural leaders in private educational institutions.
The concepts of merit and education in Tokugawa Japan

This section describes the development of the concepts of merit and its institutionalisation in social practices. It is argued that the concepts of merit were taken up and defined within a political ideology but not seen as a matter of state policy. However, merit was socially valued for the purposes of status group mobility and personal cultivation.

It is suggested that one of the ways in which merit became a political concern was through the demand within the government for a meritocratic principle based on Bushidō, Shintō and neo-Confucianism as part of the search for national identity and anti-Sino-centrism. The isolation policy of Tokugawa Japan, marked by strong anti-Sino-centrism and the containment of foreign influence, led to the emphasis of neo-Confucianism, a revival of historical studies and the development of the learning and teaching of kokugaku [the study of Japanese classics] based on Shintō values. There was a struggle over balancing the neo-Confucian idea of the Way of Heaven with the practical application of this idea to personal and social mobility and within the different status groups.

In the seventeenth century, in Kaibara Ekken’s view, understanding the Way of Heaven showed that morality was allied to merit and vice versa. Kaibara called his teaching concept “the Way of Heaven” (Ten no Michi) or “the theory of heaven and earth” (Tenchi no Ri) which meant the ‘Way’ of human beings throughout history. The emphasis was that a human being can be both taught and required to be creative. An example of this teaching can be seen in Kaibara’s concept of the way of human being and of learning.
All this entitles man to be called the 'most spiritual of all creation'. *Tenchi* [heaven and earth], which loves all creatures (as demonstrated by the fact that it brings them into existence), especially loves mankind as a creative being who, when he might have been any one of ten thousand other things, is selected to be a man and is thereby under a great obligation to *Tenchi*, which can only be fulfilled by serving *Tenchi* all his life. This is therefore the duty—the 'way' of man.  

Kaibara especially emphasised the five fundamental virtues required to realise the way of man: human kindness, a sense of justice, knowledge of correct social conduct, wisdom and trustworthiness.  

Tokugawa intellectuals searched for a way to teach and learn the Way of Heaven. According to Kaibara, such learning was to start with the acquisition of the way of practising these five virtues and the five human relations, then that of the way of managing a home and governing a people:

To learn for ourselves is true learning, while to learn for others is ostentatious learning. The main object of learning is not to become famous, but to discipline ourselves and thus become true men. Always study yourself. Seek good friends and follow their best advice. Since the object of learning is to correct our faults, let us not be afraid to admit them, as well as our mistakes, before others. We are not sages, and we cannot always be right.

Thus his understanding of virtue in learning included practical educational knowledge, which was based on disciplining oneself in relation to society.

Itō Jinsai had a different idea from Kaibara about virtue. For Itō, the aim of learning was the improvement of human life:

In science, one should look for living principles, and not cling to dead ones. Withered plants and dried roots, bronzes, stones and pots are called dead things because they have a fixed form and change no longer. But man is not like that. When he does not advance, he recedes; not to recede, he must advance; there is not a moment's halt, for man is not like a dead thing. Therefore the superior man values not the fact that he does not err, but that he can improve.

After handing over his business to his younger brother, Itō Jinsai established an
academic group and school in Kyōto. He considered merit in relation to practical and useful education (*jitsugaku*), and suggested that the Way of the human being (*jindō*) is to honour the teacher as a means of honouring the Way:

> Therefore the teacher should show the justice which reigns between the ruler and subject and the parental love of a father for his child. The teacher who rejoices when his pupil excels him is a true teacher. He who hates to be excelled is a bad teacher. The pupil shall look upon his teacher as upon a father, and though his learning should surpass that of his teacher, he should always honour him and never fail to honour his duty towards him. 

Thus, in the early Tokugawa period, there was a discussion of the concepts of merit which revolved around good knowledge. Neo-Confucianist teaching emphasised the importance of understanding oneself in relation to one's surroundings.  

This ideal was blended with *Bushidō* values, which were personal independence through self-cultivation in relation to social obligation. 

The ideal model of merit for the *Bushi* stratum was first defined by the 1615 Law Governing the Military Households (*Bukeshohatto*). The article on 'Learning' was placed first in the law. Article One called upon the *Bushi* to devote themselves to balancing learning (*bun*) and the military arts (*bu*):

> [The way of] the arts of peace and war, including archery and horsemanship (*bunbu kyūba no michi*), should be pursued single-mindedly. From of old the rule has been to practise "the arts of peace on the left hand and the arts of war on the right"; both must be mastered. Archery and horsemanship are indispensable to military men. Though arms are called instruments of evil, there are times when they must be resorted to. In peacetime we should not be oblivious to the danger of war. Should we not prepare ourselves for it? 

This injunction was passed down by the *Daimyō* leadership to their own retainers. The law was piously re-enacted over the succeeding centuries by later *Shōguns*. There
was a constant interest in the study and practice of the concepts of Bushidō throughout the Tokugawa dynasty. Article 13 of the first Bukeshohatto states:

The lords of the domains should select officials with a capacity for public administration. Good government depends on getting the right men. Due attention should be given to their merits and faults; rewards and punishments must be properly meted out. If a domain has able men, it flourishes; if it lacks able men it is doomed to perish. This is the clear admonition of the wise men of old.\textsuperscript{12}

The concepts of merit and of the ideal Bushi, ‘the right men’ (literally, the correct or true men) were established in the basic Tokugawa rule that regulated the relationships between the central government and local domain administrations run by the Bushi stratum. The way of Heaven as taught to Bushi emphasised the importance of practical and useful learning. \textit{Jitsugaku}, based on a study of Japanese classics (kokugaku) and neo-Confucianism, was one of the Tokugawa concepts of academic merit.

This merit, which was knowledge combining philosophical and practical learning, was encouraged by the Shōgunate throughout the Tokugawa period. This is seen in the encouragement of the study of western science through Dutch learning and astronomy by the \textit{Shōgun} Yoshimune (reigned 1716-1745).\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Jitsugaku} was applied by various social strata and professions and developed as a method of learning.

In the early Tokugawa period, the attempts to translate the merit principle into practice were within a feudal social order based on heredity. Despite the limits on mobility in Tokugawa society, new ideas about merit were developed, as can be seen in the emergence of the bureaucratic system and its operation at state level. At Tokugawa government level, due to the long peace after the 1600s “Inland War” period, there were increased administrative responsibilities for the \textit{Shōgun} and the lords of domains.
Finding competent officials with managerial ability became the government’s continual concern. Selection based on a hereditary ranking system was no longer sufficient. Promotion was particularly open to the lower class of Bushi.14

Ogyū Sorai, who established the Ken-en academic group, argued that a person’s ability was a good reason to promote him to a position of responsibility. He favoured a system of government whereby men of lower position, if they possessed ability, could rise to positions of administrative power and influence. Ogyū also argued that if men of merit were not recruited to the government and rewarded with high office, then the collapse of that government was both predictable and imminent.15

When men of talent and wisdom are no longer at the top, it signifies the end of a regime; confusion and disorder will open the way for men of talent and wisdom to rise up and overthrow the dynasty. Being profoundly aware of this truth and solicitous of preserving the dynasty, the sages instituted the system of punishments and rewards in order to raise up men of talent from below.16

The concepts of merit in relation to the concepts of learning linked personal, pedagogical and nationalistic perceptions.

Although the concepts were applied in the feudal system, this period was a time of the strong cultural influence of family ties,17 and so merit was not legitimated as a political concept. Although the attempts to translate the merit principle into practice were kept firmly within the bounds of the traditional social order (for example, in dispute reconciliation) knowledge came to be considered a necessary quality for successful political leadership.18 The ideal meritocratic principle of Bushi was applied to the bureaucratic Tokugawa government, and domain bureaucrats had administrative and judicial knowledge as well as Bushidō values.19 The Tokugawa regime governed the
population through ‘rule by status’. Status was recognised by the populace in the form of the authority of personality (the person of character) and the obligation of duty (*nin*). The *Bushi*, farmer, artisan and merchant and priest had distinctive social statuses according to their different social responsibilities and professionalism.  

The consequence of this was the emergence of the new status group and its group communities which promoted self-regulation, such as the community of *Bushi* and the community of the farmer. As John W. Hall argues, the impersonality of administration and law guaranteed a kind of equality of opportunity within the confines of status and self-regulating groups.  The legal vacuum was filled by self-regulating communities, which saw to the administration of justice.

Conciliation was a prominent feature of Tokugawa law. Much has been made of the strong value attached to harmony. The positive value attached to harmony is evidently an aspect of social control. There was also a demand for ethical guidance, spiritual support and solutions to the disputes between groups that occurred in daily life. It is suggested that in the Tokugawa period, there were five distinctive characteristics of the legal system.

First, there was the absence, until the later Meiji period, of any definition of law as a distinct symbolic and institutional arena.

Second, no strong emphasis on criminal law as part of the Imperial or *Shōgunal* administration developed.
Third, there was no system of law courts apart from various administrative bodies. The legal ideology of the Tokugawa regime assumed the "Rules for the Tokugawa House" as the basis of social order.  

Fourth, the legal system which epitomised the essence of Tokugawa centralisation was represented by "status law" which combined a high degree of regulation of relations between statuses with a relatively low level of interference in the internal life of each stratum or domain.  

Fifth, there was a lack of national or state law for conflict resolution. This legal vacuum was central to the transformation of Shintō-Bushidō values and neo-Confucianism and to some extent also of Buddhism in Japan. The solution of disputes which occurred in daily life was the social responsibility of the residents.

The concepts of merit, based on philosophical, practical and useful knowledge and moral values, were a functional contribution to the needs of a society at peace rather than an individualistic conception and was integrated into the notion of political loyalty within the Bushi stratum. There was a political and social and legal obligation to show moral values, which related individual loyalty to personal authority.

The idea of social ranking changed and developed when the Tokugawa isolation policy collapsed under foreign pressure. The arrival of the warships of Commodore M. C. Perry at Uraga in 1853 and the treaties with Britain, America, Russia and Holland made the Tokugawa government recognise the need for new talented personnel in senior administrative offices and for supplementing the principle of appointment
according to general talent and honesty with that of demonstrable merit.\textsuperscript{30}

The new concepts of merit had important political implications. The appointment of individual \textit{Bushi} to offices in the \textit{Shōgunal} government implied the collapse of traditional lord-vassal relationships. The decline of human relationships based on loyalty within \textit{Bushi} stratum meant the collapse of \textit{Bushi} society as a whole. The late Tokugawa period was characterised by the origins of the educated leaders who figured prominently in the transition from the Tokugawa to the Meiji regime.

Despite the limitations on mobility in Tokugawa society, concepts of merit were institutionalised in the establishment of educational facilities and training for the central and local government as well as at the social level. Tokugawa Japan had no organised national education system,\textsuperscript{31} but the concepts of merit as the way of Heaven were institutionalised and taught in many schools through the learning of \textit{Bushidō} and neo-Confucianism.

Tokugawa education was characterised by separate types of institutions for education. Education reflected the distinction between social status groups, hence it was socially hierarchical and varied according to occupational differences. In general, there were separate schools for the nobility, for the priests, for the \textit{Bushi} stratum (\textit{hankō}), for the scholastic village dwellers (\textit{gōgakudō}), and for the scholastic town dwellers (\textit{shijuku}).\textsuperscript{32} Among these types of schools, the schools for \textit{Bushi} and the town dwellers formed a major foundation for the new high educational system of Meiji Japan.
The hankō, domain schools for Bushi, were run by the local Daimyō. The schools were established in each domain in the mid-eighteenth century. This was due to the need for talent in the bureaucratic system of administrative offices within each domain. Tokugawa scholars were clear about what was a good curriculum for future leaders. In the late seventeenth century, Kumazawa Banzan, a bureaucrat who served the Lord of Okayama and who was one of the leading writers on education in Tokugawa Japan, considered that the school was a place for teaching the way of human beings (jindō):

Upon men schooled in righteousness the peaceful government of a country is based. That is the first principle of government. A man of virtue and intelligence should be elected as the principal of the school. The school should give the Bushi literary and military education. The Chinese classics should be learned from the eleventh or twelfth year. Music lessons should be given every day... Archery and horsemanship should be commenced from the fourteenth or fifteenth year. Mathematics should be studied gradually either at home or at school, during leisure hours, when days or evenings are long.... Thus youths are to be disciplined in both mind and body from eight to thirty years of age.33

For the Bushi stratum, the study of neo-Confucianism was a prerequisite, but other curricula were freely chosen and developed differently according to the domain’s policy. In Meirindō, a domain school in Owari (the present Nagoya prefecture), had a private library, a statue of Confucius, the classroom and regulations. The school curriculum included, first, literary subjects, such as reading, rhetoric, and interpretation; poetic composition, mathematics, music, etiquette, Confucianism, divination, law, medicine, Japanese classics (kokugaku), and Chinese classics (kangaku).34 Secondly, the curriculum included martial arts, the use of guns, rifles, spears, swords, wrestling, artillery, the study of military affairs and military engineering and law and politics. In contrast, in the case of Kōtokukan, a domain school in Echū (the present Toyama prefecture), major attention was given to composition, penmanship, the Chinese classics and etiquette.35
The concepts of merit in Tokugawa Japan came to include social, political and educational training. Developments at Hagi School in Chōshū are a case in point. The term for a person of talent (*jinzai*), first appeared in a document which announced a fief loan to the school to enable it to enrol additional dormitory students. Opening positions to *jinzai* became the fundamental principle of fief administration. The belief was held that if there were more students then a greater proportion of talented men would be produced. The aim of the school’s founders was to have it serve as a national model of standards for training potential leaders:

> Henceforth (it declared) everything that happens in the school shall be considered as outside the system; differences of rank shall be ignored and in all matters precedence shall depend on the extent of a student’s ability and achievement, and on his accomplishments in the various skills.

As educational expansion increased, there were many debates among the educated about how far the social and political system might be opened to merit. Fujita Yūkoku emphasised the ideology of loyalty which was important in forming political attitudes. Fujita Tōkō who was instrumental in the establishment of the *Kōdō kan*, a Mito domain school in 1841, condemned the practice of ‘prudent behaviour’, which his term for the outward display of virtue and blind obedience, and called for administrators who would pursue their duties with intent, certainty, devotion, and selflessness.

Thus in the middle period of Tokugawa, the idea of merit itself changed. In Fujita’s opinion, this notion of merit was the single most important criterion in recruiting men to serve the government.

The government aimed to restore a strong feudal society in response to the crises of
central and local government caused by local economic developments. Over two hundred and fifty years, the government imposed three main reforms, namely the edicts of the Kyōho year (1716), Kansei year (1789) and the Tempo year (1837). Among these reforms, the Kyōho Edict involved the renovation of the Bushi leadership position. Shōgun Yoshimune, who imposed this edict, made an effort to implement the traditional ideology of merit by opening up senior posts to able men from the lower Bushi class, and incremental stipends were offered to individuals who occupied key positions in the central administration. Parallel to this governmental reform project, the landlords in many domains took steps towards economic and educational reforms in the areas which they governed without any intervention by the central government. The reforms, which led to talented men from the lower class of Bushi being appointed in these domains, in many cases strengthened the economic power of such domains.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, recommendations of the new merit principle became standard among reformers. The Tokugawa central government aimed at reinforcing feudal society through the three reforms of 1716, 1789 and 1837. However, in spite of the reformers’ intention, the outcome amid economic development was pressure on the Bushi stratum, and society began to change.

Both the central government and the fiefs were forced to modify their systems of recruitment. Over the two and a half centuries of Tokugawa rule, there were continuous modifications. In its mildest form the growing emphasis on ability carried no danger to the status system; ‘promoting ability’ merely meant ‘honest appointments’. The turning point came when the local domain government began to
open up appointments to lower class Bushi without intervention from the central Tokugawa government.

In rural Japanese society, many farmer-scholars or scholarly rural officials who were originally lower Bushi in pre-Tokugawa Japan, advanced locally by learning kokugaku. Although there was a restriction on travel to other domains, within the domain there was protection for villagers who visited and stayed in the towns. Thus the farmers could move to the towns to study. In the seventeenth century, there were farmer-scholars who developed new practical agricultural scientific methods. Miyazaki Yasusada, who wrote The Compilation of Agriculture (Nōgyō Zensho), is one example of these. Many supported agriculture by defending the culture and moral virtues of the farmers.

For the scholarly rural officials this concept of merit expressed their desire for the official promotion of the group in the feudal political structure. Despite the farmers' balanced knowledge and their contributions to the development of rural societies, the political position of these farmer-scholars was not changed. However, they were socially recognised as leaders of the village teachers who provided good and useful knowledge and action in peace keeping and consultancy.

In the late Tokugawa period, educational development was seen in the fact that hierarchies and education systems became more open to other social strata. Although there was not much development of the popular arts, there were constant debates about the construction of new life in Japan and so there was much development in learning and thinking, and in the networks within and between social strata.
Networks of scholars and commoners developed rapidly in the mid and late Tokugawa period, and thus many active scholars were leaders of learning and morality; hence trust emerged among the various strata of professionals. For example, Yamazaki Anzai was a Confucian scholar and at the same time a Shintōist and earlier a Buddhist and a teacher. The Confucianist, Itō Jinsai, was originally a merchant. The nationalist Kumazawa Banzan was an administrator, and advocated schools for administration and curricula that emphasised etiquette and good manners. Ogyū Sorai was a notable Confucianist, and a teacher. The scholar of the Japanese classics (kokugaku), Hirata Atsutane, was a physician as well as an astronomer.

In the late Tokugawa period, as the autonomy of the domains increased, the feudal hankō education system was opened to the non-Bushi townspeople. Many sons of Bushi, Confucianists, medical practitioners and experts in the martial arts travelled to gain new knowledge across domains. Changing networks within and among the schools, scholars and students and the intellectuals made it possible to study across the domains.

During the 265 years of the Tokugawa period, according to the position and the role of professions there were three interrelated ideal models of merit; knowledge, loyalty and jinzai respectively. As Itō Jinsai, Kaibara Ekken and Kumazawa Banzan emphasised, knowledge meant philosophical knowledge combined with practical and useful knowledge (jitsugaku) and moral values. The Way of Heaven was expressed in terms of the way of the individual human beings (jindō) and the way of literary and martial art. This knowledge, based on the idea of the Way of Heaven and on neo-Confucianism within Shintō and Bushidō values, was reflected in the Bukeshohatto [the
Law Governing the Military Households], the domain schools and the conduct of scholarly rural officials and farmer scholars, such as Miyazaki. Thus the concepts of the Way of Heaven penetrated the whole political and social order.

Throughout the Tokugawa period, a strict ranking order was observed among the Bushi. This order prohibited the lower-ranking Bushi from offering allegiance to a lord other than the one directly above him. This feudal relation was crucial to maintaining the social order of the Bushi stratum.\textsuperscript{49}

As Fujita Tōkō and Kaibara Ekken stressed, fidelity and loyalty were related to the individuals’ autonomous determination to fulfil their duties or responsibility.\textsuperscript{50} The concepts of the Way of Heaven and jindō were based on personal autonomy and the acceptance of responsibility. To accept social obligation was to behave morally in Tokugawa society. The rules of the relationship between the lord and his retainers and political benevolence and responsibility were described in the Bukeshohatto.

The term ‘jinzai’ was a new invention in the Tokugawa period. It referred to a person who had talent (knowledge of skill) but also included the moral qualities of virtue, wisdom and honesty. As Ogyū Sorai emphasised, the concepts of merit related to the notion of bureaucracy, continued in particular within the lower Bushi stratum. Ogyū’s support for men of talent and wisdom was based on his argument that a person’s ability was a good reason to promote him to a position of responsibility. The Tokugawa legacy of the obligation of duty (nin) was based on philosophical and practical knowledge together with loyalty as a moral obligation.\textsuperscript{51} This balance included personal autonomy as well as accepting obligations within the status society.
However, as described earlier, the concepts of social values were politically and socially integrated by the concepts of the Way of Heaven based on Shintō-Bushidō values blended with neo-Confucianism. It can be suggested that Tokugawa education was far from stagnant, even in its purely formal development, because there was a variety of principles which were acceptable. As indicated earlier, the merit valued by the educated during the Tokugawa period was not a concern of the government. The accepted concepts of merit emphasised its contribution to social mobility as much as to individual life, but social action was confined within the status group. During the Tokugawa period there developed, in fiefs of the various Daimyō and in that of the Shōgun himself, many groups of people who would play important roles in the subsequent overthrow of the Tokugawa government system. Most were educated in the numerous Confucian academies that were founded in this period - some by the Shōgun, the Daimyō or the merchants - and they drew members from different strata, especially from the two ends of the spectrum, Bushi and merchants.

To summarise, concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated throughout the Tokugawa period at state and social levels. There was a national demand for a meritocratic principle based on Bushidō, Shintō and neo-Confucianism. This demand resulted from the search for national identity and from anti-Sino-centrism. The concepts of merit were not fully politicised, but they were related to the notion of bureaucracy, in particular within the lower Bushi stratum. The moral code of philosophical learning (the Way of Heaven based on Shintō and Bushidō values combined with neo-Confucianism) was combined with practical and useful knowledge (jitsugaku). The study of Japanese classics (kokugaku), Chinese classics (kangaku), Neo-Confucianism (shushigaku) and Western science (rangaku or yōgaku) were used
for the maintenance of the ethical communities within the different strata.

Overall, the notion of the Way of Heaven meant personal autonomy within a concept of social obligation. Accepting social obligation was part of the moral code of merit in Tokugawa society. The concepts of merit in Tokugawa Japan was social, within a status society. This moral codes of merit and what was regarded as good knowledge continued in the Meiji period. Two ideas of the way of Heaven and jindō were combined by Fukuzawa Yukichi and expressed as tenri-jindō [Reason of Heaven and the Way of the human beings] to explain the relation between state and the individuals.52 [1]

The concepts of merit and education in Meiji Japan

The Tokugawa legacy of concepts of merit and education were renegotiated and transformed as the Meiji state modernised itself and the Tokugawa legacy of the personal-social moral code, the Way of Heaven, was renegotiated at state and social levels in different ways. Within the political vision of becoming a strong and rich state equal to the west, the concepts of merit changed: the new emphasis was on merit acquired through state education. The concept was deliberately taken up within the state modernity project and was legitimised and institutionalised in the new state education system, which — in turn - functioned as a reinforcement of the new state system.

[¹] Of course, the meaning of jindō was changed. Kaibara’s perspective on the Way of Heaven was redefined by Itō as the Way of human beings (jindō) which requires practical and useful knowledge (jitsugaku). Kumazawa and Ogyū’s definition of that was used to define the moral code for the government officials. The Way of Heaven and of human beings were redefined by Fukuzawa and expressed in his ‘Encouragement of Learning’ in terms of individual autonomy, social obligation and egalitarianism.
The requirements of the Meiji state were new western knowledge, national moral guidance, new human talent and a new modern education system. The idea of grafting the new western knowledge on to traditional concepts of learning was central to struggles to promote the Meiji state and social modernity projects.

Among those who advocated the adoption of western ideals and values were Sakuma Shōzan, Yoshida Shōin and Fukuzawa Yukichi. In the early Meiji period, they preserved the Tokugawa legacy of merit as a Way of Heaven. They were eager to introduce western knowledge, but their primary attitudes were based on the values of personal autonomy in relation to Meiji Japan and to the rest of the world.

Sakuma advocated in a well-known poem that in Japan Eastern morality should be retained, with room for the introduction of Western technology:

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Eastern morality, Western technique
Mutually complete a circular pattern:
The girth of the earth is ten thousand Ri:
Half of it should not be missing! 53
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Yoshida Shōin, a disciple of Sakuma Shōzan, ran his private school, shōkason-juku. Itō Hirobumi, the first Prime Minister, and Yamagata Aritomo, a founder of the Japanese Army, and other loyalists to the Emperor learned from Shōin. He used the classical term ‘yamato’ (the Japanese) and emphasised the responsibility of Bushidō. Yoshida’s emphasis in the pursuit of learning was “not the ability to read classical texts and study ancient history, but being fully acquainted with conditions all over the world and to having a keen awareness of what is going on abroad and around us”. 54
Fukuzawa considered the concept of learning as referring to a way of understanding the relation of oneself with heaven:

In the pursuit of learning, the important thing is to know one’s proper limitations. What is meant by limitations is conformity to the reason of Heaven and humanity, and attaining one’s own freedom without infringing upon that of other men.\textsuperscript{55}

Fukuzawa pointed out that what was lacking in Japanese society was the application of science as \textit{jitsugaku} [practical and useful learning], and spiritual independence.\textsuperscript{56} Fukuzawa determined to disseminate spirit of individual independence as the basis of social morality, and called this \textit{kifū} [ethos].\textsuperscript{57} In his autobiography, he stated that a nation’s destiny depends upon the education of its people; there must be some fundamental differences in the education of the western and eastern peoples.

Fukuzawa’s idea of the relation of the state and the society was that while it was important for the government to have capable people, it was equally important that some capable people remain outside of government to carry on the work of civic society, and to function as an independent check on official action. He wrote this for a magazine, \textit{Meiroku Zasshi}.\textsuperscript{58}

The new merit system could eliminate the previous social class system and create the equality of the four classes. In his book \textit{The Encouragement of Learning}, published in 1871-2, he argued that:

A man will be defined only by his ability and the position he holds. It is proper, for example, to pay respect to a government official, but this is not respect to the man himself. We respect the fact that he holds his position because of his ability and administers the precious laws for the benefit of the people. It is not the person that one is to respect, but rather the law.\textsuperscript{59}
By law, Fukuzawa meant the state law and personal spiritual principles which lead to Way of Heaven through the concept of “independence” and “self-respect” in each profession. He advocated equality of access to learning for the whole population:

The movement to make the four classes—Bushi, farmer, artisan, and merchant—equal has been placed on a firm footing. . . . There will be no such thing as rank by birth. Heaven did not create men above men nor put men under men.  

He believed that the progress of Japan depended on its accepting the principle of equality: “On the basis of equality, if an individual pursued knowledge and learning, Japanese society would be both enriched and strengthened” The two ideas of the way of Heaven and jindō were combined by Fukuzawa and expressed as tenri-jindō [Reason of Heaven and the Way of the human beings].

Unlike Yoshida Shōin, Fukuzawa was an advocate of merit as shown by ability assessed through the examination system. The ideas of the encouragement of learning among all social strata and of merit as ability assessed through examination influenced the early establishment of the education system, as can be seen in the Preamble of the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei). A full national school system was projected.

This Gakusei Code took a while to develop. The Ministry of Education, which was established in 1871, set up a study group to investigate western educational systems and prepare the draft of the Gakusei. Twelve persons were appointed to draft the Gakusei. Minosaku Rinshō who had studied modern Western medicine and natural science through the Dutch language became student in France. Seven persons were from the Kaisei government school and the medical school, and they had studied in
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain. Tsuji Shinji and Uchida Masao were scholars of the Japanese and Chinese classics. Nishi Amane, who came from the government, co-operated. The returning overseas students played a key role in determining the modernisation of education.

The *Gakusei* called for the encouragement of learning among all social strata for the attainment of life’s goals, and a concept of merit which embraced personal and social mobility. This is seen in the first part of the Preamble, which states the reason for the establishment of schools:

It is only by building up his character, developing his mind, and cultivating his talents that man may make his way in the world, employ his wealth wisely, make his business prosper, and thus attain the goal of life. But man cannot build up his character, develop his mind, or cultivate his talents without education - that is the reason for the establishment of schools.

Talent was perceived as merit which could promote individual life-chances through education:

Language, writing, and arithmetic, to begin with, are daily necessities in military affairs, government, agriculture, trade arts, law, politics, astronomy, and medicine; there is not, in short, a single phase of human activity which is not based on learning. Only by striving in the line of his natural aptitude can man prosper in his undertakings, accumulate wealth, and succeed in life.

The meaning of learning was focussed on the practical aspects of life. Practical learning (*jitsugaku*) became the content of education as a whole.

In the early Meiji period, the state educational system had an egalitarian starting point. The legitimisation of personal and social promotion, opened to all social strata through educational achievement, was a challenge to the previous feudal system. This became
the national principle of equal access to education and subsequent mobility for all social strata.

The Meiji government’s first major effort was to organise state education. Articles 48-57 of the *Gakusei* dealt with the examination system and stressed that egalitarianism in pursuing learning for attaining personal and social merit had to be guaranteed through the educational system and competence through examinations. The examination system became the means of promotion from one grade to the next. Admission to secondary and higher institutions was based strictly on ability, and on the development of human resources to realise the national ideology. Superior talent shown in scores was accepted without regard to class or status, and students upon graduation found the way open to high positions.

Among the provisions of the *Gakusei*, Chapter 39, on the creation of normal schools was considered of particular importance in assuring the effectiveness of elementary education. All graduates were required to pass an examination of academic competence as well as an evaluation concerning personal character as requirements for receiving a new license for the next seven years. The *Gakusei* established 31 chapters of regulations for students studying abroad and students on scholarships (chapters 58 to 88). The consequence of these regulations was that personal-social merit was changed into merit defined by the state.

As the state grew and strengthened its military and civil bureaucracy in the middle of the Meiji period, there was debate over the *Gakusei* and the degree of government control and intervention. Ito Hirobumi was among those who strongly advocated the
amendments of the draft. The *Gakusei* was replaced by the 1879 Education Order (*Gakkō-rei*).

Against the view of education as an institution in the service of the state, Mori defended his preference for private and local initiative and expressed his suspicion of control by central government and politicians:

> the law should leave the establishment of middle schools solely to private scholars who are willing to operate them....I consider it desirable that elementary education be free of control by politicians......in the making of educational policy, highly qualified people should be brought together in conference to work out measures of improvement.69

The Education Order explicitly stressed national revitalisation. The state required patriotism and the establishment of a school system. The 1879 Education Order reshaped the school system in an attempt to counter persistent popular opposition to educational centralisation and the imposition of national standards on local areas.70 A second reform, the 1880 Revised Education Order, stressed the new vision of state education, which became more nationalistic than the 1872 *Gakusei* and the 1879 *Gakkō rei*.

By the 1880s, state leaders wanted the training of reliable and technically competent persons with a spirit of loyalty to the nation-state and the Emperor. State education was a tool of the state, rather than provision for the development of young minds for participation in life as well as the provision of opportunity for political and social promotion.71 The Tokugawa legacy of a concept of learning which encouraged a moral code of philosophical and practical knowledge of some individual independence was replaced by national moral guidance emphasising loyalty to the Emperor and the nation state.
The educational policy of Mori was to position the Gakusei within the state vision of the formation of a modern, ‘strong and rich’ Imperial nation-state. In contrast to Fukuzawa’s ideas of the establishment of education in relation to cultural tradition, Mori considered the formation of a modern education system necessary, and educational values should be moulded within this state system.

In the two decades after 1870 in the late Meiji period, under the leadership of Mori, the structure and orientation of Japanese education were reversed from local to central control, from an individual to a state-centred orientation, from a pro-western ideology to nationalism and from personal obligation to loyalty to the state. Thus Meiji state education set goals and structures for Japanese education tied directly to the interest of the state. 72

The aim of the Meiji state included raising academic standards and the use of the school as a primary agent of moral and political socialisation. Despite the intellectual struggles over the Tokugawa legacy of merit and over honouring the Way of Heaven, the concepts of merit were now redefined by political ideology and state educational policy. The new concepts of merit were institutionalised in a new selection of knowledge and within the state education and political systems.

Although the ethos of the earlier reforms was discarded, the practical gains of the educational reforms of the previous two decades were carried forward by reinforcing the education and training of the bureaucrats. Education at every level was greatly expanded to provide for the rapidly growing bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the new industrialisation. 73 The concept of merit based on achievement through education
in the new knowledge was parallel with processes in the construction of a modern nation-state. These projects encompassed new conceptions of ideal personal relations and of the family, of the political realm and of public space. All were grounded in the distinctly modern legitimisation of the state.\textsuperscript{74}

The year after the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (\textit{Kyoiku Chokugo}), the Minister of Education Ōki Takato called upon local government to take full responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of elementary schools. However, local government could not independently formulate policy.\textsuperscript{75} It was the central political oligarchy and the central bureaucracy that shaped the institutionalisation of the concepts of merit in education in the highly centralised Meiji society.

The state modernity project institutionalised education for the promotion of a state moral code. \textit{Shintō-Bushidō} values were institutionalised as a national system. The school became a major agent within a hierarchical political ideology that sanctified the relationships among children, their parents, ancestors, and the Emperor.

The 1872 \textit{Gakusei} required children over the age of six to attend schools. As Minister of Education, in 1885, Mori Arinori solidified a centralised educational system, an eight-year elementary school programme, a four-year middle school course and a three-year higher school, which was preparatory for the state university, The Imperial University.\textsuperscript{76} The primary school was compulsory, comprehensive and coeducational, and within a hierarchical order: each primary school was connected with a specific higher school and thus with the university.
However, after the six years of elementary schooling, it became extraordinarily difficult for students to proceed from the middle school to a higher stage. For example, only one out of 13 middle school graduates could expect to enter higher school, and only one out of 25 was admitted to the prestigious higher schools that opened the way into the Imperial Universities. One of the main reasons was that the competitive examination was decisive. If one failed in the examination, there was no opportunity to take it again.

The government aimed to increase meritocracy through the examinations. These were competitive, and their content was indicated by the types of leaders which were produced in the new state educational training system. The training focussed on western knowledge. The 1880s marked an increase of bureaucratisation and at the same time, the legitimisation of the examination system for the selection of civil servants. As the new state bureaucrats acquired privileged social status, though only for a short time, there prevailed in the society the notion of ‘kanson minpu’ [respect the governmental bureaucrat and despise the commoner].

Many private schools (shijuku) held examinations, such as the Teki-juku run by Ogata Kōan. Fukuzawa, as his student, was a supporter of selecting human talent through the examination system. Many social leaders from the private schools perceived the examination system as a means of breaking down the system of four social classes and also the bureaucratic system. For the state leaders, the examination system was a practical means to produce new talent and to reinforce their position in the bureaucracy. The examination system brought about the neglect of the Tokugawa legacy of a moral code of knowledge.
To promote state and social modernity and to cultivate human talent, Western knowledge became important in the new education at state and social levels. The encouragement of the introduction of western knowledge was first made clear in Article 5 of the 1868 Imperial Oath of Five Articles: "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world in order that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted". However, Western knowledge was institutionalised in the form of control of the school curriculum which, became a channel for the recruitment of the technocratic civil servants.

Following the proclamation of the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education, reforms of the method and content of education became urgent. The Ministry of Education issued the 1872 Regulations for the Course of Study for Elementary Schools. The contents of curricula and textbooks were regulated. Spelling, calligraphy, pronunciation, arithmetic, oral instruction in morals and recitation were to be taught for the first semester, and many subjects such as 'science' based on Western models, were to be gradually added as the students were promoted to the senior levels.

The middle school curriculum was regulated when sixteen subjects were approved for the secondary school by the provisions of the 1872 Code. These included Japanese language, mathematics, calligraphy, physical geography, history, foreign languages, science, drawing, the classics, geometry, bookkeeping, natural history, chemistry, morals, surveying and Western music. The Outline for the Course of Study for Middle Schools issued by the Department of Education in October 1872 indicated that the middle school was organised to prepare students for a university education.\textsuperscript{80}
In September 1872, the Department of Education issued regulations for the Course of Study for Middle Schools with foreign teachers. These regulations also provided for one-year preparatory courses in foreign languages to be taught in the middle schools. The high school curriculum included fifteen subjects: Japanese language, mathematics, calligraphy, foreign languages, science, mechanical drawing, the classics, algebra, geometry, book-keeping, chemistry, morals, surveying, economics, mechanics, and zoology, botany, geology and mining. The emphasis on the sciences and other Western knowledge was new. 81

The curriculum was outlined in the Education Order. Itō Hirobumi argued that:

It is science that, together with politics, brings about prosperity. In law and politics, examinations should be stricter, the number of students limited, and only the best students granted admission. 82

As a result of the emphasis on the acquisition of western knowledge, and education leading to prestige through the examination system and the strengthening of the bureaucracy, there was an awareness among the cultural leaders of the loss of morality in the educational system. This awareness was demonstrated in the criticism of the bureaucratic government within the people’s freedom and rights movement (The PFR Movement). In the mid-1870s, an ambivalent attitude to the bureaucracy arose among the civil servants.

Inoue Kowashi, Privy Councillor, the Minister of Education (1894), admonished the bureaucrats on their lack of morality. 83 He pointed out that there was no legal distinction between the private and public conduct of the bureaucrats. In 1884, General
Regulations for Middle Schools were issued stressing the need for these schools to deal with the moral development of their students.

Consequently there were debates among the state leaders and between the state and cultural leaders about the institutionalisation of moral education. Inoue Kowashi and Nishimura Shigeki, the companion of the Emperor and a Confucian scholar, asserted the need for moral discipline in the educational system. Mori, as well as Itō Hirobumi, was aware of the importance of education in virtue, but Mori did not approve of introducing Confucianism into the school curriculum. He opposed the idea of creating a school text defining national morality (*shūshin*) as part of the Education Order. Fukuzawa, Mori and many Meiji leaders in the society were against the idea of controlling morality by specific rules. For the cultural leaders, moral values should not be specified by particular persons or groups.

The disputations over the institutionalisation of redefined moral values in the education system ended in changes. A particular interpretation of Confucianism, the national morality of loyalty to the Emperor, was introduced in the education system. This was suggested by Motoda Nagazane. A patriotic Confucianist, Motoda replaced the Tokugawa legacy of philosophical learning and the virtue of merit by national morality (*kokumin dōtoku*).

The moral code of knowledge valued in Tokugawa Japan had reflected the concepts of the Way of Heaven and had promoted individual and social mobility. This code was replaced by a state moral code of knowledge, which reflected the concept of the Way of the Emperor. The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, proclaimed:
The essence of education, our traditional national aim, and a watchword for all men, is to make clear the ways of benevolence, justice, loyalty, and filial piety, and to master knowledge and skill and through these to pursue the Way of Man... In the Meiji Restoration the abandonment of the undesirable practices of the past, and learning from the outside world... had a serious defect: it reduced benevolence, justice, loyalty and filial piety to a secondary position.  

Moral teaching, as emphasised in the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo), was used as a tool to guide young children to develop loyalty to the nation state and the Emperor. The renegotiation of the cultural traditions emphasised loyalty and piety. These two concepts were institutionalised in the school curriculum as moral education and were included in the textbook for moral teaching.

A certified copy of the Imperial Rescript was transmitted to every school, where a ceremony for the respectful reading of the Imperial Rescript was to be carried out. In the following year, Inoue Tetsujiro’s commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education (Chokugo Engi) was published and was used as the textbook for morals (shūshin sho) for the middle and normal schools.

The aim of morals was the cultivation in children’s consciences of the principles of the Imperial Rescript on Education. It stressed that the subjects, filial piety, brother and sisterhood, propriety, friendship, benevolence, self-cultivation, sincerity, courage, humility and other moral qualities were to be taught. In particular, the spirit of Reverence for the Emperor and Love of the Country was stressed. Thus the acquisition of knowledge was directed to the state’s interest rather than to personal and social merit and mobility.
The elementary school textbook for morality based on the Imperial Rescript on Education was subject to strict examination. The authorised morality was called the "philosophy of virtues". Teaching hours for it in the elementary school increased from one-half hours per week to three hours for the ordinary, and two for the higher elementary school. For the Ministry of Education, the teaching of morals was a practical and useful tool to realise the Imperial Rescript on Education.

From the 1890s to 1912, the curricula of the various schools were consolidated and standardised throughout Japan. Traditional classical music and Bushido martial arts, which had been prerequisite educational backgrounds for a Tokugawa leader, became obsolete.

By means of school rituals, courses of study, and extra-curricular activities, the principles of the Shinto and Confucian moral order and Bushido, such as loyalty, filial piety, cleanliness, physical strength and perseverance, were reinforced. The role of the school was defined comprehensively and broadly; it extended to supervisory rights over student behaviour outside the school. Almost all elementary and the secondary schools had prescribed codes on such matters as clothing and places where students might go by themselves or only with adults. By 1900, the government’s merit system incorporated compulsory knowledge defined by the examination system and an emphasis on the transmission of compulsory moral principles in the education system.

**Conclusion**

The concepts of merit in the Tokugawa period were negotiated and renegotiated but not fully politicised. People who had merit possessed a balance of knowledge, morality
and obligation. The *Bushi* concepts grew out of domain education based on the principles of Confucius and neo-Confucianism, in particular, as Kaibara, Kumazawa and Itô emphasised, the moral code of philosophical knowledge combined with *jitsugaku* related to the Way of Heaven. In these circumstances, as well as due to the economic reforms, the development of the local domains, and foreign diplomatic pressures, acquiring *Bushi* virtues as a condition of promotion became a focus of the late Tokugawa government’s concern. *Jinzai* [skilled knowledge with moral qualities] and benevolence and responsibility were perceived as new concepts and entailed the notion of bureaucracy, in particular within the lower *Bushi* stratum.

Scholars of the Japanese classics, the Chinese classics and a Dutch scholars were not confined to the *Bushi* stratum but also came from the merchants’ and the farmers’ strata. Learning networks in the towns and rural areas and for scholars in different social strata emerged and developed.

In the Meiji period, the Tokugawa legacies of the concepts of merit were transformed in different ways at state and social levels. The honoured Way of Heaven was redefined by Sakuma, Yoshida and Fukuzawa in terms of “Eastern Morality and Western Technique”, and was endorsed in the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education. However, as the modernity projects advanced, the importation of Western technical and professional learning was emphasised. The competitive examination systems were deliberately taken up within the modernity projects. A new concept of merit was institutionalised in a new selection of knowledge within state education and the bureaucracy, and functioned as a reinforcement of the new state system. However, the expansion of the opportunity to compete for positions of leadership through the
examination system was limited. The meritocratic talent policy produced the kansonmimpu attitude [respect the governmental bureaucrat and despise the commoner]; a new privileged group emerged.

Through the 1879 Education Order and the 1880 Revised Education Order, the education system was shifted from local to central control, and from individual cultivation to a state-centred orientation. The Tokugawa legacy of the concept of learning shifted from teaching autonomous personal obligation to teaching loyalty to the Emperor, and from a moral code of philosophical and practical knowledge, with some individual independence, to nationalist moral guidance. The notion of national loyalty and fidelity to the Emperor and the nation-state was legitimated in the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education. Moral teaching was used as a tool to guide the lower classes in the primary school into loyalty to the nation state and the Emperor, with emphasis on filial piety and sacred power. Mori Arinori, as the Minister of Education, established an educational system that was intended to create individuals loyal to the state.

Such a definition of loyalty was challenged, and the cultural leaders debated new philosophical and practical moral values in public, resisting the state's education reforms. For the cultural leaders, morals and ethics implied personal, social and national autonomy and institutional independence.

In the process of using traditions for modernising purposes, reinforcing the central value system and changing the relations of leaders to the state and society, there were interrelations between the state and the cultural leaders and between the cultural leaders
and the citizens. Hence a cohesive society emerged, and the new knowledge spread widely. In these ways and in this sense, the historical legacy of the concept of merit was transformed, and continued by changing its forms and contents at state and social levels.

The next chapter discusses the effects of these changes on the education of leaders.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN JAPAN

The chapter identifies what will be defined as leadership positions for the purpose of this chapter, and then analyses new forms of the education of leaders for those positions. The chapter also examines the Tokugawa legacy of the education of leaders.

The education of leaders in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868)

Leadership positions

During the 260 years of the Tokugawa period, Japan had no constitution which defined the locus of supreme power. The Tokugawa government had only a small institutional basis for its authority, and depended on a highly developed household system, which developed during the inland war periods.

Leadership positions in Tokugawa Japan were held by the Emperor (Tennō), the Shōguns, and Daimyō. The Tokugawa government accepted the premise of a sovereign the Emperor. The Shōgun was a generalissimo and exercised military power in Japan in the name of the Emperor. The Shōgun had authority over his peers and the Daimyō, who were the landlords who governed over 10,000 koku, granted by the Shōgun.

The Tokugawa government entered into the lives of the people through four main institutions: the imperial court, the religious houses, the Shōgunate and the Daimyō domains. However, the imperial court and the religious houses covered only a fraction of the population of the registered territory of Japan: over 98 percent was administered by Daimyō.
As indicated earlier, the education of leaders in Tokugawa Japan emphasised morals, martial arts and refinement. The socialisation of leaders was framed by Shintō-Bushidō combined with neo-Confucianism. There was a balance between a philosophical and moral code on the one hand and practical, useful knowledge on the other. Learning and networking communities developed for the different status groups and in local domains.

Having a strong sacred role in the Shintō religion, the Tennō symbolised moral virtue. The Shōguns were lords of the House of Tokugawa (bakufu). Their role was to govern the country as leaders in administrative offices, the law, the military and the executive committees of the Shōgun Council. The Shōgun and the Daimyō used education to stabilise their own position by learning morality, Bushidō literacy (bun) and martial arts (bu), which were blended with neo-Confucianism.

**The education of Bushi leaders**

The institutions for the education of the Tennō, Shōguns and Daimyō were similar. All of them were educated in their own private study rooms, which were used for political and cultural gatherings. By promoting private relations between the teacher and the students, the Japanese tradition of the school system emerged and developed as one of the most effective methods of socialisation in moral values and knowledge. This private study could also promote academic education. Shōguns and Daimyō summoned Confucian scholars and military and other specialists to give lectures, which their chief vassals were required to attend.

This well-established learning system began to undergo changes in the late eighteenth...
century.

In the time of the *Shōgun* Iemitsu, the concepts of the education of leaders, of the neo-Confucian philosophical and moral code and of practical learning became matters of political interest. Hayashi Razan’s private school, established in 1690, came under Shōgunate control in 1797. The majority of the students in his school, named *shōheikō*, were sons of *Daimyō* and *Bushi* from the domains. *Bushi* of the various fiefs were required to attend the neo-Confucian schools in the domains.

The institutions for the education of *Bushi* leaders developed in three ways: through Tokugawa government schools (*shōheikō*), the local *Daimyō*’s domain schools (*hankō*) and private schools (*shijuku*). As the *Shōguns* opened *Shōheikō*, *Daimyō* built and ran their domain schools. In 269 domains, there were around 300 domain schools. Learning institutions spread rapidly throughout the country.

Some of the domain schools admitted people from non-*Bushi* status groups, except for learning the martial arts. After the abolition of the domain system in 1871, these schools developed into the middle and higher schools. Most Meiji reformers received their education in the domain schools and *shijuku*.

Although each domain school in principle selected its own topics and curriculum, most of the schools provided Chinese knowledge for the *Bushi* status group. Instruction focused on Chinese classics, the study of neo-Confucian doctrine and the history and literature of China.
Meirindo at Owari and Kanazawa, was permitted access to the Daimyō's private library. Libraries were instruments of learning where Daimyō, for example Tokugawa Yoshinao, Owari Daimyō who owned over 1000 books, used to read and allowed their companions to study. In this way the Daimyō educated himself and at the same time facilitated the development of educational institutions.

One area of Western learning which received the attention of Daimyō was medicine. The study of Western medicine developed primarily in private schools. The first state institute of Western medicine was an immunisation centre, founded in 1858, which continued to the end of the Shōgunate as the leading centre for Western medicine (Seiyō Igakujo). Following the Meiji Renovation it was re-established by the new government. The Tokugawa legacy of various styles of schools continued in the Meiji period.

Knowledge

The most important knowledge for the Tennō was Chinese classics (kangaku) and music. The content of learning was moral and religious. The basic educational obligation of the Shōgun was the promotion of Bushidō, neo-Confucianism, and the law governing Bushi families (bukeshohatto). Within the central and local government, there was no prohibition or restriction on the educational activities of the retainers as long as Daimyō remained loyal to the learning of neo-Confucianism and the development of Bushidō. Shōguns took initiatives to combine their moral code with practical learning (jitsugaku).

The eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune (reigned 1716-1745), encouraged the acquisition of
practical learning of foreign knowledge, and of Western sciences, in the medium of the Dutch language. 19

The eleventh Shōgun, Ienari (reigned 1787-1837), opposing Sino-centrism and seeking to confirm national identity, introduced in 1790 a law which prohibited the study of classical Confucianism (kansei no igaku no kinshi no rei). Instead, neo-Confucianism was stressed. Neo-Confucianism came to be officially advocated by the government as its ideas were seen as useful for governing the country, for the law and for the military. 20 They helped to legitimise the Shōgunates’ political leadership and to rebuild the highly centralised feudal society through the unifying force of neo-Confucian thought. 21

In the executive committees of the Shōgun’s Council, the Shōheikō became the authority for teaching neo-Confucianism and Chinese classics. Many Confucian scholars were employed by the domain. 22 The development of the Shōheikō was thus closely linked to the 1790 law prohibiting the study of any philosophical thought, with the exception of neo-Confucianism. This law applied to all Daimyō throughout Japan. For example, in the entrance examination held in 1792 for the Shōheikō, Daimyō who did not accept neo-Confucianism were not allowed to be candidates. 23

In the last five years of the Tokugawa period, studying in other domains became the top political and educational priority. The purpose of the provisions dealing with students studying in other domains was to encourage the learning and enlightenment brought to the domain by these returning students. 24 The subjects which most Daimyō encouraged students to study at the domain’s expense, but outside it, were basic military science and medicine. After these, the subjects stressed were neo-
Confucianism and Japanese and Chinese literature, which included poetry and ethical philosophy.\textsuperscript{25}

Neo-Confucian education emphasised the cultivation of the moral qualities of learners. The emphasis was on the combination of achievement with the extension of trust and harmony. These moral principles, together with philosophical and practical knowledge, were further cultivated in \textit{kakun}, the primordial family discipline, and applied in \textit{Bushi} families over generations.\textsuperscript{26}

The political principle of \textit{ninsei} [the politics of benevolence and responsibility] was based on the education of leaders in family principles.\textsuperscript{27} This tradition continued in the Meiji period.

At the end of the Tokugawa period, the education of leaders were based on moral values and a diverse selection of \textit{jitsugaku}; these defined the education of leaders in the family, and leaders encouraged newcomers to take up individual obligations within status groups.\textsuperscript{28} Hence the top vassals’ views on politics and on status groups were based on a sense of family principle. Education was not designed to stabilise individual positions. The purposes of learning for \textit{Bushi} families were to promote self-cultivation and the discipline of the peer group, and to maintain control of their own domain governments.\textsuperscript{29} This Tokugawa legacy of the education of leaders shifted into different forms and directions in the Meiji period.
The education of leaders in Meiji Japan

Meiji Japan (1868-1900)

Leadership positions

The Tokugawa legacy of the education of leaders shifted as the Meiji state modernised its political leadership. By the time of the establishment of the new Meiji government, the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, and the opening of the Diet, the highest positions in the state were held by the Tennō, the prime minister and cabinet ministers, the president and members of the two aristocratic institutions, namely the Privy Council and the House of Peers, influential political parties, and the admirals and other leading military officers. Among them, it was Itō Hirobumi, a peer and the first Prime Minister of Japan, who consolidated the bureaucracy and the structure of the Imperial state.

Under Itō’s leadership, the Meiji government redefined the Tennō’s position as symbolic, turning it into a sacred ritual institution. Tennō-symbolism assumed institutional importance, particularly in education and higher education, and occupied a central position in the political consciousness of wide sectors of Meiji society. After the rise of the political parties, Itō, as Prime Minister, created a privileged aristocratic social class (kazoku) by providing the five ranks of aristocrats with titles; they became dukes, marquises, counts, viscounts and barons.\(^\text{30}\)

The first Meiji state leaders, who began the modernisation of the country, were the generation who negotiated the Meiji Renovation.\(^\text{31}\) Many were Western-trained. Among them, there were Mori Arinori, the Minister of Education, and General Yamagata Aritomo, later the Prime Minister.
Both the first and second generation of state leaders, however, retained traditional *Bushidō* values, neo-Confucianism and indigenous nationalism: their slogans were ‘return to Imperial government’ (*ōsei fukko*), ‘honour the Emperor’ (*sonnō jōi*) and the formation of the strong and rich nation-state (*fukokukyōhei*). They remained in control of state policy for the next three decades.

In the middle of the Meiji period, the second generation of leaders was Western-trained, either abroad or in Japan at the Imperial University, with Western-language texts and sometimes Western teachers. The Law School of the Imperial University was a source of recruitment for the civil bureaucracy, and the Military Academy for the military officials.

In 1899, at the time of the Yamagata Aritomo cabinet, thirty percent of the House of Representatives were Tōkyo Imperial University graduates. The graduates from this university were thus important in both the bureaucracy and the political parties.

The *Bushi* stratum moved into the new positions, particularly in administration, police, the press, transport, communication, education and the exploration of Hokkaido. The new state education of civil servants was important.

**The education of civil servants**

In the early Meiji period, the supply of well-educated bureaucrats was a prerequisite for the new government to realise a ‘rich and strong Japan’ in the international system of nation-states. This requirement put pressure on the leaders of the state to review how to educate its civil servants. In 1877, the state established Tōkyo University by
merging the existing Shōheikō (the Tokugawa neo-Confucian Academy), the Medical School and the Kaisei-jo (the school for Western learning). 

In establishing the Imperial University as a university for the state, the government was following the German model. However, the Imperial University included departments in the applied sciences, engineering and agriculture, subjects that were excluded from German universities but were seen as useful in Japan. 

This role for Tōkyo University, now as the Imperial University was explicit. In 1885, when Mori Arinori took office as the first Minister of Education, he gave this institution the designation of the Imperial University. Article 1 of the 1886 Imperial University Order stated: “The Imperial University has as its goal the teaching of, and fundamental research in, the arts and sciences necessary for the state”.

The Imperial University began as the highest educational institution and as the most prestigious institution of learning for the civil service. The first and second generations of the civil servants were shaped by Western knowledge, through learning foreign languages with foreign teachers.

Knowledge

In 1881, when the university established the faculties of medicine, science, literature and law, English was taught as the basic essential language. German was required for science, French for law and English for the literature course. The emphasis was on language skills rather than literature. The training had a vocational orientation.

Between 1881 and 1882, the faculty of science expanded to include courses on
chemistry, mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, engineering, geology and metallurgy. Politics and economics (rizaigakka) were studied in the literature department. Beside these two fields, there were courses in philosophy and in kokugaku [the study of Japanese classics based on Šintō values] and Chinese literature. Tokugawa legacy of kokugaku was replaced by a study of wabungaku [Japanese literature] in 1886. Law students studied highly specialised Western law. In 1885, the study of politics and economics was incorporated into the faculty of law.

In the same academic year of 1881-1882, first-year students in the law department studied Japanese literature, Chinese literature and composition, and history. The Tokugawa legacy of studies in Chinese classics, including neo-Confucian and Confucian doctrine, continued. English literature and composition, the French language, logic and jurisprudence were added to the traditional subjects. Thus the future state leaders acquired proficiency in the French, English and Chinese languages and in classical Japanese literature. In the second, third and fourth years, the study of law focused on English law, British constitutional law, French law and public and private international law. The study of ancient and contemporary Japanese law was introduced, but the students had less time for this work.

Training the students for positions in the bureaucracy included studies abroad. The provision of overseas study was not new. In the late Tokugawa period, the enthusiasm of the government and the Daimyō for the adaptation of foreign knowledge was reflected in their commitment to the dispatch of students overseas. Based on Sakuma’s idea of combining Western knowledge and eastern morality, the missions aimed to modernise their own domains. Overseas studies in the Tokugawa period were
characterised by the choice of knowledge and of countries according to individual and domain interests.

Between 1860 and 1867, such projects were organised in thirteen domains, and in total, 153 students were sent to twelve countries. The Satsuma domain sent Mori Arinori and others to Britain and the United States. In 1864, the Chōshū domain sent Itō Hirobumi to Britain to study military science and the navy. At the time of the Meiji renovation, this flow of students studying overseas was increasing.46

In the Meiji period, the delegation system was gradually integrated and overseas studies was monopolised by the state system, institutionalised and stabilised. The overseas studies projects went through three phases: the emergence of the state overseas studies project (1868-1874), the consolidation of the training for the bureaucrats (1875-1881), and meeting the need for academic professionals (1882-1912).

In the first stage, the new government centralised the overseas studies system by devising travel permits for persons leaving Japan. In 1870, the government allowed fifteen domains to send two inspectors from each as official government inspectors. In 1871, the first Iwakura Mission group was sent to the United States. It aimed to inspect the way in which the Western countries were modernised. In the same year, the Grand Council established the Order Concerning Study Abroad (Kaigai Ryūgaku Kisoku).47

In 1872, the Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei) was promulgated, and
institutionalised the overseas students missions as a national system.\textsuperscript{48} The students selected by the university were young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two. Among them, there were two types of students: those who were to receive a general education abroad for a Bachelor’s degree, and those who were to study special subjects, primarily law, chemistry and engineering. The role of the returned students was to introduce Western knowledge and technology into Japan for her civilisation and enlightenment. Among them there were Ono Azusa and Kataoka Kenkichi, who became active cultural leaders of the People’s Freedom and Rights Movements (The PFR Movement) and cooperators in the establishment of the private universities.

In the second stage, overseas training met the state’s needs for a modern civil service and the consolidation of the bureaucracy. Western knowledge and countries were deliberately selected. Tōkyo University limited the chosen students to the graduate groups who had received a general education in Japan, and then majored in a special study abroad. In 1879, graduates from the law, literature and science faculties were sent to England and France. In the same year, three graduates of the medical faculty went to Germany.\textsuperscript{49} Graduation overseas became a prominent entry route to the civil service.

The other group of overseas graduates played the role of primary organisers of academic societies and became the model for the overseas students in the third stage. The role of overseas students changed, when the bureaucracy was solidified and the foreign teachers and experts were gradually giving way to indigenous experts, and to returned overseas students. The overseas studies programme was limited to academic institutions and to graduates, researchers and university lecturers.\textsuperscript{50}
reinforced by the reform included in the 1882 Overseas Student Law. The law applied the overseas studies system mainly to Tōkyo University students, and helped to meet the state's needs for academic professionals, teachers of higher education, and a technocratic civil service.51

The increase of students sent to Germany led to a change in the quality and selection of learning. The emphasis was not only on medicine but also on natural science, politics, pedagogy, philosophy, the humanities and social science.52 Overseas study in Germany was institutionalised as one of the powerful avenues to success in academic life.

Thus at the end of the Meiji period, the target of Article 1 of the 1886 Imperial University Order was realised. Nationalism played an important role in the development of the bureaucracy, the state university and the overseas studies project. New meritocratic bureaucrats and academic leaders were shaped by foreign knowledge and technology, and by a strong sense of national identity. New academic societies of arts and science were formed by the returned overseas students. Notably, the Japan Seismology Society was established by the group led by Hattori Kazumi in 1881. The Tōkyo Biology Society was established by Minosaku Yoshikichi and Yatabe Ryōkichi in 1883. Engineering societies in many fields were established, one after another.53

In the 1880s, the Tokugawa legacy of the idea of education as being designed for self-cultivation and social obligation shifted into education for the mobility of individuals and their education in Western knowledge. This was the particularly the case for the military leaders who had a slightly different educational experience from the civil
servants in relation to the acceptance of foreign knowledge and the consequences of the modernity project.

*The education of the military leaders*

In the early Meiji period, the establishment of the army and the navy, the supply of highly skilled officers, and the creation of a modern military system were urgent issues. In 1869, a military school and an attached elementary school were established in Numazu. The elementary school, which became a preparatory institution for the Military Academy, did not initially admit commoners, but after the introduction of the 1883 Conscription Law efforts were made to open it to commoners who were exceptionally successful in the entrance examination.

The Military Academy was established in November 1882. It aimed to train staff officers and to develop research. The Meiji army was modelled on the Prussian army, and the navy on that of Britain. In 1872, foreign military advisers from the U.S.A numbered sixteen, from Britain 119, from France, ten, from Holland two, and from Prussia, eight. The military overseas studies project started in 1870 and continued until 1883, when the military institutions were stabilised through the promulgation of the Conscription Law and a sufficient number of teachers had returned from overseas studies.

The impact of the returned overseas students in the Military Academy was evident. Katsura Taro, who had been an overseas student in Germany, became a teacher at the Military Academy in 1882. It was Katsura who invited Klemens Wilhelm Jakob Meckel (1885-88), a German major.
Curricula valued in the Military Academy were greatly influenced by Meckel. His curricula emphasised military tactics, strategy and military history. The training of the army leaders focussed on judgement. To be an efficient strategist, quick decisions through the understanding of psychology, power, judgement and action in war situations were required. The study of history centred on European history and wars, and was taught by Western teachers. Education focussed on skills. Students were trained in these skills by teacher-students in one-to-one lessons, but they did not study the Japanese classics and history, hence they did not integrate their knowledge of tactics and manoeuvres into indigenous war history based on Eastern philosophy and Bushidō values. New military officers emerged who were highly skilled in tactics and in the technical perspective of modern European warfare but lacking in the moral traditions of the original Japanese army and spiritual leaders.59

The curriculum of the Military Academy between December 1914 and November 1915, for example, emphasised foreign languages and practical Western knowledge. It included English, French, German, Russian, Chinese, transport, mathematics, statistics, public international law, national law, general knowledge about horses, horse riding, hygiene, accounting, the use of weapons, fortress construction, measurement, applied earth science, Western military history, manoeuvres, tactics in naval battles, the practice of war strategy and autumn field practice.60 Meckel's curricula continued until the end of the Second World War. Meckel’s students were only junior officers in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, but many of the military leaders in the 1940s had experienced his curriculum.61

The new civil servants and military leaders thus had technocratic knowledge and
experience of life overseas. They aimed to modernise the state and to change the social structure. The state leaders put their loyalty to the state before their individual obligations. In contrast, what the thesis calls 'the cultural leaders' had different perceptions of foreign knowledge and the selection of knowledge.

*The education of the cultural leaders*

By the late 1880s, as the state modernised, there were various attitudes to the state modernity project for the formation of a Western education system. There were two main issues.

Firstly, the Imperial University graduated only a few students. In 1888, there were ten graduates in English law, and thirty-four in the French law department.62 In the same year, the total number of graduates from the Imperial University was 127. As against these small numbers, the need for human talent in various social sectors was overwhelming.63

Secondly, and more importantly, state education emphasised practical Western knowledge, and neglected indigenous knowledge and moral values in the education of leaders. This provoked a reaction. Cultural leaders included Nakae Chōmin, Tokutomi Sōhō, and some academic leaders at the Imperial University challenged the absence of indigenous knowledge, Japanese learning, academic autonomy, and the dominance of the state in moral education and cultural leaders responded to this situation by establishing private universities.64 In the process, several different styles of educational institutions and leaders emerged.
In the 1880s, at the time when there was an increase in the number of indigenous experts and returned overseas students, private institutions for education in law were rapidly established. Teaching Western knowledge in the Japanese language and by Japanese lecturers began. This was due to the shared interests in study and research on law and education in Japan among the cultural leaders and some academics. Among the new academic leaders (comprising most of the returned overseas students), there was a determination to forge Japan’s cultural and intellectual uniqueness, through recreating the originality of its learning by combining Western and traditional knowledge. The achievements of these leaders came from networks based on the cultural heritage from the previous period, but the networks played new roles in the new society, drawing on what was learnt from the West.65

One concrete outcome of the challenge to the state programme was the establishment of an institution which provided for the study of law. In 1885, with the support of Hozumi Nobushige, a dean of the law faculty of Tōkyo University, the School of English Law (later, Chūō University) was founded. Hozumi was a returned overseas student from England, and one of the academics who resisted the state training of leaders and emphasised the significance of private education.66 Some of his graduates became judicial officials.

In fact, in the early period of the establishment of the school, the number of graduates who passed the law examination for the civil service exceeded that of graduates from the state university, but very few officials from the School of English Law found senior positions.67
Under the auspices of Megada Shutarō, Aiba Eifu, Kaneko Kentarō, Hatoyama Kazuo and Tajiri Inajirō, the Senshū Gakkō (later, Senshū University) was established in 1880 as of the specific educational institution for law and economics.

In 1880, Keiō Gijuku set up a faculty of law with the support of Aiba, Kaneko and Megada. In 1890, Keiō Gijuku University (Keiō University) was established by Fukuzawa Yukichi as the first private university, with faculties of law, literature and economics. New commercial studies were based on *jitsugaku*, practical and useful learning] in opposition to the previous abstract and theoretical Confucian and national learning. Consequently, the majority of the graduates followed careers in business rather than in politics. There were no science and technology departments, because of the lack of finance. Fukuzawa used the term 'jitsugaku' for science, by which he meant learning which was "closer to ordinary human needs".

Tōkyo Specific College (Tōkyo Senmon Gakkō, later Waseda University) was founded in 1882 as a specialised college by Ōkuma Shigenobu, a scholar and state leader, and by his networking group of supporters including Hatoyama Kazuo and Ono Azusa, within a year after that they had left the government and moved into political opposition. Waseda University was intended to be a private coeducational institution of higher learning and the nurturing ground for future politicians. Its core departments were those of political science, law, English, and psychology. In 1890 its faculty of literature was established.

The different features of Keiō(gijuku) and Waseda Universities reflected the different ideas of the founders. The knowledge valued by Fukuzawa was *dokuritsu jison*. 
[independence and self-respect], while Ōkuma valued the ‘independence of academic institutions’. Fukuzawa encouraged graduates to be leaders in the new fields of ‘modern Japan’, such as industry, banking, journalism, law, and philosophy, while Ōkuma encouraged graduates to be state leaders.\textsuperscript{74}

The spirit of Keiō(gijuku) University, \textit{dokuritsu jison} served as a model of \textit{jitsugaku}, which continues today. \textit{Dokuritsu-jison} is a mixture of traditional values, as described in the previous chapter, merit and knowledge based on the idea of the Way of Heaven which demonstrates individual autonomy and social obligation, but is enriched by knowledge of the foreign ideas of independence reflected in the American Declaration of Independence of July 1776. In 1866, Fukuzawa translated the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution, which appeared in his book, \textit{Seiyō Jijō} [The state of affairs in the West].\textsuperscript{75}

The private higher educational institutions played an important role in society by selecting and combining the meaning of foreign knowledge with indigenous knowledge to realise national and personal independence.

\textbf{Knowledge}

As indicated, the knowledge valued by the cultural leaders was a combination of Western knowledge with indigenous philosophical and practical knowledge, in order to create a Japanese form of learning and to realise the independence of society which leads to the independent state in the world. The cultural and intellectual struggles over the institutionalisation of this knowledge were seen in the rapid establishment of private faculties of law and literature, work on translation, and the emphasis on
jitsugaku including the study of foreign languages.

The English Law School aimed to spread the study of law in the Japanese language. The School aimed to promote the knowledge of English law, as opposed to French law which dominated the civil bureaucracy. As indicated earlier, teaching Western knowledge in Japanese and by Japanese lecturers demonstrated the academic leaders' determination to form Japan's independent position in the international arena.

In the 1890s, the cultural leaders' determination to emphasise the independence of the country and learning was reflected in the rapid formation of the faculties of literature. The private institutions redefined indigenous literature and foreign knowledge, but in different ways from the Imperial University and also from each other.

Waseda University (Tōkyo Senmon Gakkō) established a faculty of literature in 1890. Unlike the Imperial University, Waseda University provided three literature courses on Japanese classics, Chinese classics and Western literature. The emphasis was on criticism and research rather than on teaching. The course was similar to that of Kokugakuin University, which emphasised studies based on Japanese history, Shintō religion and classic literature and philosophy. Shintō, Confucianism and Buddhism were studied in the philosophy department.

In contrast, the faculty of literature in the Imperial University provided a course in the study of politics, economics, foreign affairs and history and philosophy. In 1881, curricula for Japanese and Chinese literature courses were established, but Western literature was not included. The literature course in Keiō University provided English,
German and other languages, and Japanese and Chinese classics.

This was the time when criticism of state modernity surfaced, and indigenous *kangaku* [the study of Chinese classics] was re-emphasised, together with *kokugaku* [the study of Japanese classics]. There was constant criticism of the state overseas projects and their selection of knowledge for study. Overseas studies in other Asian countries were excluded from the state projects.⁷⁹

In the first half of the 1880s, there was a change in the understanding of the study of foreign knowledge among academics. Yoshino San Jin redefined the value of traditional *kangaku* by establishing a new approach to learning. Both Western knowledge (*yōgaku* or *rangaku*) and Chinese knowledge were to be understood as learning about the world, and not as a study of the West or China, or of equal or opposing knowledge. Yoshino suggested in the Tōkyo arts and sciences magazine (*Tōkyo Gakugei Zasshi*) that scholars of the Chinese classics should study in China. His plan was to send 10 young men to China to study there for 15 years.⁸⁰

In 1881, Keiō University received two Korean overseas students. They came to Japan in order to absorb modern Western culture, rather than studying in the Western countries, because - it was argued - it was best to learn from Japan, which had chosen and imported practical and useful Western culture.⁸¹ According to the records of the overseas studies project of Tōkyo Senmon Gakkō [Waseda University], the total number of graduates from overseas studies between 1884 and 1900, the years from its establishment to its promotion to a University, was 53 students. Most of them studied in the United States, England, Germany, France and China. About 80 percent of the students were from the faculties of law and politics and obtained bachelors, masters
and doctoral degrees.\textsuperscript{82}

The work of translation of foreign knowledge demonstrated the cultural leaders' consciousness of the need to find the way to develop education to create an independent and democratic state in the international arena. Fukuzawa established a four-year course in translation and writing skills, while the law department of Tōkyō University practised these in the first grade.

In 1883, Fukuzawa reformed the method of teaching foreign knowledge by separating foreign teachers' lectures and oral instruction from the study of English language (the reading of original English texts). The students read large amounts in the original language, and Western textbooks were also translated into Japanese for wide use. The use of textbooks on Western geography and customs, technology, ethics and morals, and works on political economy and scientific thought was also encouraged. These texts served as popular guidebooks to the laws of natural phenomena, to enlighten the Meiji population in general.\textsuperscript{83}

Foreign knowledge was combined with indigenous knowledge through the development of teacher-student relationships, including those with the outstanding, leader Fukuzawa, and later spiritual leaders of the Keiō group.

Fukuzawa stated that Japan's institutions would not function well unless social leaders possessed high skills in applying Western values in speech, argument and verification. Applying this idea, Fukuzawa invented the word 'enzetsu' [speech] and wrote a book on debating skills.\textsuperscript{84}
In June 1874, the Mita Speech Hall (*Mita enzetsukan*) was established, and the *Mita enzetsu kai* [association] was formed. The first two debates were on the questions of the subjugation of Taiwan by the Japanese army and the protection of the traditional silk industry by the government. Thus the subjects were political, and focussed on the ambivalence and the accountability of the modernity projects. The distinction between scholars and state modernisers was argued by Obata Atsujirō on 19th July 1874.85

Keiō University maintained the new tradition of ‘speeches’ at Mita Hall as a significant part of the education of leaders. By June 2003, 676 speakers, including foreign scholars and professionals, had given speeches at Mita Hall.

Tōkyo Senmon Gakkō began speech and debate meetings in 1884. The purpose was similar: to train the students in public speaking and at the same time to deepen the close relationships between the lecturer and the student.86

At this time, a public discourse in support of the PFR Movement was growing, while the government’s restriction on free speech was tightened. In February in 1883 the government prohibited judges, public prosecutors and professors at Tōkyo University from participating in lecturing at the private law schools.87 Through networks, Miyake Kōtoku, Hatano Tokichū and Seki Naohiko, lecturers at Tōkyo Hogakkō, helped to replace the cancelled courses.

Parallel to the acquisition of academic knowledge, Fukuzawa advocated *Bushidō* based on the martial arts. Keiō University emphasised sports as essential in the education of leaders. In 1889, the *Taiiku kai* [Sport Society] was established. It encouraged kendō,
jūdō, baseball, boating, archery, physical training (sōren) and walking. In every student group, the seniors were responsible for the juniors. This style of education was the Tokugawa legacy of the socialisation of the younger generations.\textsuperscript{88}

At the end of the 1800s, the cultural leaders were rapidly emerging. There were new opportunities for social success. At the same time, new kinds of bureaucrats and military leaders were also being formed. In this rapid transition, the real basis of morality in the state education system had not yet been reconsidered. Both state and cultural leaders challenged the state-dominated morality.

Within fifteen years after the Renovation, the importation of foreign knowledge brought about the rapid emergence of highly skilled bureaucrats. These new and privileged state leaders were, however, restrained within a given identity as the servants of the Tennō in the government.

A redefined version of Shintōism based on Confucianism was taken up politically as the national morality in the education system. This marked a shift in traditional moral values and the concept of merit. The 1880 Education Order was implemented to impose a Confucian moral education. Fukuzawa as well as Mori Arinori opposed Motoda Nagazane, a Confucian lecturer to the Emperor. He had suggested the use of the Imperial Rescript in compulsory education (Kyoiku Chokugo), and the reinforcement of Confucianism as a national morality.\textsuperscript{89}

Fukuzawa emphasised the traditional moral value of independence and self-respect, and the creation of new Japanese individuals to advance civilisation. In contrast, Mori
wanted a modern education system linked to the state system, and the creation of new Japanese individuals for the sake of the country. Mori defined education as a means to serve the state’s interest, the spirit of morality and nationalism and advocated three virtues: dignity, friendship and obedience. Although he granted the university relative freedom, Mori strongly controlled school education. The slogan “for the sake of the country” implied not only obedience but “training” as well.90

Despite the public debate started by Fukuzawa and Mori, in 1879 Motoda Nagazane revived Confucian moral thought and institutionalised its values in educational policy by legitimising them in the Imperial Rescript on Education.91 The notion of loyalty and filial piety following neo-Confucian principles was confirmed in compulsory Japanese education. The Imperial Rescript on Education in 1879 argued that:

> the danger of indiscriminate emulation of western ways is that in the end our people will forget the great principles governing the relations between ruler and subject, and father and son. Our aim, based on our ancestral teachings, is solely the clarification of benevolence, justice, loyalty and filial piety. For morality, the study of Confucius is the best guide. People should cultivate sincerity and moral conduct, and after that they should turn to the cultivation of the various subjects of learning in accordance with their ability. In this way, morality and technical knowledge will fall into their proper places.92

Thus the Rescript proposed a strengthening of traditional morality and virtue in order to provide a firm base for the formation of the Imperial nation-state.

There was a dispute between the state leaders. Itō suggested to Motoda that there still remained an urgent need to seek new knowledge from the West.93 But Motoda rejected Itō’s argument.
Thus most indigenous morality and knowledge were, as indicated earlier, firmly institutionalised in the education system in the form of ritual, the political ideology of national morality (kokumin dōtoku), loyalty to the Tennō and nation-state, and the dissemination of a textbook for shūshin [national morality] in the schools.

Shintō and Bushidō based on Confucianism and neo-Confucian values were a convenient tool to realise the Imperial nation-state. In the late middle Meiji period, the military intervened in politics and took up a special place in the Meiji state by formalising the position of the national armed forces in the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. The Tennō was designated as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This had the effect of securing the independence of the armed services from the civil organs of government. At the same time the Tennō himself exercised little power, though his position was of great importance in ceremonial and symbolic observances.

In the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889), education was not directly addressed, but Article 9 referred to the issue of the necessary administrative orders on the basis of the supreme power of the Emperor. Article 10 prescribed the power of the Emperor to establish various government organs. Based on Article 10, imperial orders set up central and regional bureaucracies for the administration of education and specified the salaries of higher and junior level officials. Thus, under the Meiji imperial orders rather than laws were relied on to create the system for the government’s administration of education.

The Constitution of 1889 endorsed the autonomy of the army and navy, and gave them the position they had until the end of the Second World War. Although the language of
unified *Shintō* and *Bushidō* was distinctly Japanese, these developments paralleled similar struggles in the West, in particular Germany and Austria, to create a special bond between the ruler and the armed forces.\(^9^6\)

However, as described earlier, by this time the private educational institutions were on the increase and new practical knowledge was disseminated widely. The approval of Waseda and Keiō Universities by the state signified the desire to provide educational facilities of a broader nature than those of the specialised schools.\(^9^7\)

It took 32 years for Keiō Gijuku to be recognised as the first private university in Japan. The founder, Fukuzawa, had learned Western knowledge through Dutch studies and had established a private school for Dutch studies (*Shijuku*) in Teppozu, Edo, in 1858. In 1863, the school developed into a centre for English learning. In 1868 the school was relocated in Shiba Shinsenza and was renamed as Keiō Gijuku.\(^9^8\) From 1858 to 1896, Keiō Gijuku struggled. In 1868, there were 103 students at the Dutch school, the origin of Keiō (Gijuku) University. (These students were delegates of their domains). In 1872, the number reached 317. However, the abolition of the domain system in 1871 reduced the number of these students. In 1873, the loss of support from the domains led to a reduction in the number of students to 240. As a result of the Seinan war, there followed a further drastic decrease, to 105 in 1877.\(^9^9\)

Overall, the new Conscription Order of 1883 reduced the number of students in private schools, from 331 in 1883 to 223 in 1884. This order did not apply to Tōkyo University students, but only to private school students. Fukuzawa published arguments in the newspaper *Jijishinpō* against the conscription system enforced by
the state and also argued against the views of Yamagata Aritomo, the Minister of the Interior, and Ōki Takato, the Minister of Education. In 1884, Fukuzawa made a formal appeal to the governor of Tōkyo, to grant private university students exemption from military service.\textsuperscript{100} Among his supporters were Ono Azusa, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Nijima Jō and Nakamura Keiu.\textsuperscript{101}

Thus the struggle over the role of private education was part of a struggle about the nature of the State and its leadership. A double structure for the education of leaders was being consolidated, one for the state modernisers from the state universities, and the other for the social modernisers from private universities. Both groups absorbed Western knowledge. However, for the state modernisers, morality meant a political and educational obligation of loyalty to the Emperor and the nation state, while for the social modernisers, the emphasis was on social obligations. One group of leaders were the graduates from the state universities (members of new aristocratic families and either members of the House of Peers, Privy Council bureaucrats or members of the political parties). The other group was made up of those from the private universities.

The struggle was particularly marked over consolidating the bureaucracy. Firstly, the traditional bureaucrats established state universities and cliques (gakubatsu). The culture of the leaders shifted from an immersion in morality and the arts, to Western knowledge. Secondly, they controlled the education of bureaucrats through a competitive examination system.\textsuperscript{102} The majority of the high echelon of civil servants were the product of a university education in law, had passed civil service examinations which demanded knowledge of Western languages, had knowledge of law and jurisprudence partly on the basis of foreign experience, and were assured of
tenure. Thirdly, by the law covering the Imperial University Order (*Teikoku daigaku rei*) and civil service recruitment, graduates of the Faculty of Law of the Imperial University were exempted from the entrance examination for the civil service.\(^{103}\)

By 1900, the state leaders included civil servants, selected ‘meritocratically’ in a state education system, who served the imperial nation-state loyally.

**Meiji Japan (1900-1912)**

Overall, the beginning of the twentieth century was the time when, based on renegotiated cultural traditions, the private universities developed curricula mixed with foreign knowledge and established their own overseas students’ projects to send as well as to receive foreign students.\(^{104}\) In contrast, at state level, the shifts in the renegotiation of the values of *Shinto* and *Bushido*, the concepts of merit, and the role of the education system and its shaping of leaders were almost completed.

**Leadership positions**

The third generation of political leaders passed through the Meiji state elementary schools, which had been framed by the new version of the Imperial Rescript on Education completed in 1911.\(^{105}\) The stress was on ‘patriotism’ through a consolidation of the curriculum in 1912. Elementary school textbooks were supervised by the state.

There was a change in the nature of patriotism, which the educational texts sought to promote. From “love of country” the emphasis moved to “loyalty to the Tennō”; the new texts dwelt not on each individual’s membership of the nation and the need for
individual initiatives to promote that nation’s material welfare, but on the need for
spiritual solidarity within a nation-family loyal to the Tennō:

Our country is based on the family system, and indeed our whole country is
one vast family; the Imperial family our founding family, the stem family
from which we are all descended. With the same sense of loving respect as
the child bears towards its parents, we Japanese revere the Imperial Throne,
descended in direct link through ages eternal. It is in this sense that loyalty
and filial piety are one and indivisible.¹⁰⁶

This extensive legal framework for the educational system was a result of the state
leaders’ determination to stabilise the state education systems and bureaucracy and
build a source of national identity by redefining moral values, and old and new
knowledge.

Between the years 1868 and 1912, 182 educational statutes (decrees, orders and
regulations) were issued. There were also 15 cultural and scientific educational
statutes.¹⁰⁷

The opposition group in the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors was
from the private universities. By 1910, entry routes to the government bureaucracy
were narrow for the private university graduates. For example, in 1910, sixty eight
percent of graduates of the Tōkyo Imperial University entered into the House of Peers,
while nine percent were from Kyōto University, established in 1897. The graduates
from the private universities were one tenth of the total members. The graduates of
Waseda University had four percent of the total seats. Those of Keiō University had
five percent and Chūō University had about two percent.¹⁰⁸

By 1910, entry routes to the political parties were also narrow for the private university
graduates. In the same year of 1910, the majority of the group who entered the political parties was also from the Tōkyo Imperial University. They occupied 33 percent of the total seats. Kyōto University graduates were six percent, while the graduates of Waseda University were sixteen percent, Keiō University were eight and Chūō University were seven percent.¹⁰⁹

Compared with Tōkyo Imperial University graduates, among the private universities Waseda University had the highest percent of graduates entering the House of Peers and joining political parties, followed by Keiō and Chūō University. Other private schools, notably the schools which developed into the present Senshū, Meiji, Hōsei, and Nippon Universities, were primarily concerned with training aspirants for official careers.¹¹⁰

Education in Tōkyo Imperial University, in particular in law, was a tool to change social position. This phenomenon continued in the twentieth century. It was only in 1915 that the law faculty was overtaken by the rest of the universities, though it continues to remain the largest single faculty up to the present time.¹¹¹ It was also after 1900 that the increasing new private specialised schools were recognised as having the same status as Imperial Universities, and their graduates were seen as qualified for the higher civil service.¹¹²

**The education of the civil servants**

The expansion of state higher education was slow. The Tōkyo Imperial University had been established in 1877 as Tōkyo University. By 1890, six colleges were established for
law, medicine, literature, science and engineering, and the College of Agriculture was founded.\textsuperscript{113}

The Imperial University system started expanding after the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) and Russo-Japanese Wars (1904-05). In June 1897, Kyotō Imperial University was established as the second Imperial University. Kyōto University consisted of the four colleges of law, medicine, letters, and science and engineering; the latter opened in September 1897 and the three other colleges between 1899 and 1906.\textsuperscript{114} At the same time, the name of the first Imperial University was changed to Tōkyo Imperial University.

The education of the military leaders

In 1902 the Military Academy regulation was promulgated. Article 1 prescribed that the university selected the military officers. Article 1 further specified that the Military Academy should promote specific knowledge which concerned military 'research'. The emphasis in the recruitment and the promotion of students was on examination results.\textsuperscript{115} Hence, personal upward mobility was possible through conscription and the examination system.

However, the Military Academy lacked one important dimension. It did not offer the students interaction with the symbolic and moral personality of a mentor, such as the president of the Military Academy, because the principals of the Academy frequently changed. They changed seven times between 1889 to 1912.
The education of the cultural leaders

In the early twentieth century, the number of specialised schools increased, and it became necessary to establish standardised rules for these schools. In 1903 there were 39 specialised schools and eight specific vocational schools. Through the Specialised School Order of 27th March 1903, the Minister of Education authorised nine private schools to become universities, and in the following year nine other schools were approved as universities.

Among them, there were Keio Gijuku, which had already established a university department in 1890, the School of English Law (Hōgakuin, the present Chūō University) and Waseda.

In 1904 Waseda University acquired university status, with Schools of Political Science & Economics, Law, and Literature, English and the psychology department. Redefined traditional religious universities also emerged. The Sōdōshū University and Nichirenshū University were admitted as universities specialising in the study of Buddhism. Kokugakuin University introduced Shintōism and indigenous Japanese literature into the curriculum. A university for women, Nihon Women University, emerged. There was one specialised university. Taiwan kyōkaisenmonn gakkō, which aimed to nurture jinzai who worked in other Asian countries. Also, Mori Arinori, at his own expense, established the Commercial Law Institute (Shōhō Kōshūjo) in 1875. In 1920 this school became the government-supported Tōkyo Commercial University, known today as Hitotsubashi University.

The struggle over academic independence and freedom continued. At Waseda, the first
president's foundation address was a plea for academic freedom and the need to make education independent of government restrictions. At a time of rising nationalism, it was significant that he found academic independence and freedom important mainly as a condition for national independence.\[^{118}\]

Citizenship in the new world: the true aims of education of Waseda University are the realisation of the independence of study, the practical application of study, and the cultivation of model citizens. We must strive to pursue original research and to apply the results of such studies practically. According to present usage, the term "nation" has two parts. The one is the state, the other is society. If society does not develop in an orderly way, the nation cannot be stable. And at the very root of this relationship is the family. The family is the basis of the state. Morality and ethics find their source in family life. Thus, the fundamental principle of education must be the cultivation of character.\[^{119}\]

The curriculum of the law department in Waseda University between 1901 and 1902 did not include the study of French law and English law, as at Tōkyo Imperial University. But it included Roman law, and international private and public law. Besides the main study of law, curricula included a wide range of classical and modern subjects; the study of the state, sociology, the history of modern diplomacy, the history of the constitution and law, the history of Japanese literature, the history of English literature, Chinese literature, Japanese literature, the history of the East, rhetoric and psychology.\[^{120}\]

A university literary journal was important for the education of cultural leaders and the creation of new knowledge through a combination of old and new knowledge. *Waseda Bungaku* (*Waseda Literature*) was the first specialised literary journal, and was founded and edited by Tsubouchi Shōyō, a leader of the literature improvement movement which emerged in the late 1880s.\[^{121}\] The second series, between 1906 and 1927, became a major vehicle of Japanese Naturalism. Similarly, the journal *Mita Bungaku* (*Mita Literature*), founded at Keiō University to compete with *Waseda Bungaku*
(Waseda Literature), was published from May 1910 and has continued to the present day. Under its first editor, Nagai Kafū, *Mita Bungaku* joined forces with the magazines *Shinshichō* and *Subaru* against Japanese Naturalism.

These cultural academic leaders struggled over the promotion of individual autonomy and institutional independence. The new concept of autonomy and independence was a mixture of the traditional 'way to Heaven' and the Western notion of independence. Their political, cultural and intellectual struggles concerned the provision of foreign knowledge, its combination with traditional values of balanced knowledge that is, combined epistemological, ontological knowledge with practical and useful knowledge. The consequence of this was the emergence of a cohesive society in Meiji Japan.

**Conclusion**

In the Tokugawa period, the education of *Bushi* leaders developed within a struggle about Chinese influence. *Bushi* identity began to be based on neo-Confucianism. This aim was institutionalised in the 1790 law prohibiting the study of classical Confucianism and other learning except neo-Confucianism, *shijuku* and domain schools.

The Meiji Renovation was a time of challenges to political leadership. There was a threat to national independence from the imperialism of the Western countries. It was also a time of major change in the agricultural and industrial base and in social stratification. Leadership was not only based on cultural traditional values and knowledge, but also developed within the political process of integrating the local
Thus the education of leaders reflected the struggles of creating a new society.

The shift in the education of state leaders was marked in the following three contrasting ways.

Firstly, as the state and the society modernised, the state leaders created new cultural values, and subsequently new kinds of state leaders, by renegotiating the Tokugawa legacy of Shintō-Bushidō values and neo-Confucianism. The previous values were replaced by a state morality which emphasised the Way of the Tennō. In particular, the notion of loyalty and filial piety within Confucianism was legitimised in the 1890 and 1911 Imperial Rescripts on Education. The moral code for the education of leaders was framed by Shintō-Bushidō combined with Confucianism.

Secondly, the educational institutions were substantially reformed. The Tokugawa legacy of Shōheiko, which the Shōgunate had operated, became Tōkyō University (1877-1885), later the Imperial University (1886-1896), the Tōkyō Imperial University (1897-1949) and finally Tōkyō University. The Meiji state positioned the Imperial University as a research institution and as a place for the training of the new civil servants. The previous institutions of shijuku were officially abolished, although they continued in the form of personal learning and networking circles. As a consequence, two institutional structures of higher learning emerged: one provided higher education for the civil service and the military leaders, the other was for cultural leaders. While the state system for the education of leaders gave little space to academic independence, the private education of leaders was more autonomous in the selection
of what could be studied and in the internal and international networking between educational institutions.

Thirdly, there was the problem of the renegotiation of the Tokugawa legacy of knowledge. The traditional knowledge of Tokugawa Japan, *jitsugaku*, was practical and useful knowledge, within a moral code of learning represented by the neo-Confucian idea of the Way of Heaven. The state university broke this structure of balanced knowledge.

As the Meiji state modernised, the emphasis on the importation of foreign technical knowledge entailed the loss of indigenous knowledge and the moral code of learning from the education system. Motoda revived Confucian discipline and emphasised morality of loyalty to the nation-state in the education system. This provoked a reaction. The cultural leaders and some academic leaders at the Imperial University challenged the absence of indigenous knowledge, Japanese learning, academic autonomy, institutional independence and denounced the dominance of the state in moral education. The cultural leaders responded to this situation by establishing private universities. In the process, several different styles of educational institutions and leaders emerged.

What was counted as good knowledge combined old and new knowledge, and was institutionalised in the private universities. In these, teaching offered gave access to Western vocational knowledge, the English language and the indigenous moral code of learning, the Way of Heaven. For example, Yoshino San Jin called for the study of both Western and Chinese knowledge, to be understood as learning about the world,
and not as a study of the West, or China, or of equal or opposing knowledge. Courses in *kokugaku*, *kangaku* and Western science (*yōgaku*) were set up, which had not existed in the state university. Western law was taught by Japanese professors in the Japanese language; this was a new idea. Parallel to the acquisition of academic knowledge, the establishment of sporting associations aimed to encourage the Tokugawa legacy of the socialisation of the younger generations through traditional Tokugawa and Western sports. The skills of speech valued by Western intellectuals were institutionalised in the Keiō and Waseda speech associations. Foreign knowledge was combined with indigenous knowledge through the development of teacher-student relationships, and through the work of translators. The new concepts of egalitarianism, autonomy and independence were a mixture of the traditional Way to Heaven and the Western notions of, for example, the American Declaration of Independence.

The emergence of the cultural leaders was a consequence of the Meiji state’s ambiguous modernity project. As was seen in the PFR Movement, cultural leaders were aware of their role in disseminating traditional values blended with new knowledge, which, they emphasised, would lead to the autonomy of Japan in the international world. Meiji cultural leaders in society were keen nationalists.

However, until 1890, the private universities were not recognised as leading to the same careers as the state universities. Private university graduates had little access to the higher civil service. As a consequence of this blockage and of their differences over morality with the bureaucracy, the cultural leadership group, which included the former state leader Ōkuma Shigenobu, turned to political opposition against the privileged bureaucracy and the state modernity projects.
The main difference between the civil servants and the cultural leaders was that the bureaucrats perceived cultural traditions based on *Shintō* and *Bushidō* values and knowledge as convenient tools to reinforce the new political ideology, while the cultural leaders saw such cultural traditions as valuable in themselves and in relation to social obligations. The cultural leaders determined to develop their promotion of personal autonomy and institutional independence, which were dynamic and derived from the core cultural traditions of the Tokugawa period.

Thus the complexity of the struggles over the state modernity project is found in the struggles within the cultural traditions over the concept of merit and what was counted as 'good' knowledge and over the new synthesis of old traditions and 'Western' ways. To the Meiji state leaders, the modernity projects were derived from their desire to construct a strong and rich Imperial nation-state. To do this, Meiji state leaders needed to establish a national education system and to consolidate the training and selection of bureaucratic leaders. In contrast, a private higher education system developed, with different definitions of good knowledge and merit and leading to different occupational opportunities. In this process the Tokugawa legacy of personal and institutional learning networks was practical and useful within the cultural leaders groups.

Thus, differences between the state modernity project and social modernisation were marked in the routes to leadership positions, in the education of leaders, and in socialisation into differently valued knowledge. The main feature of the state modernity projects were as mentioned earlier, their ambiguity. The state leaders deliberately tried to integrate the society into the state modernity projects. Meiji state leaders created political instruments, including the privileged bureaucracy, and a state-
built higher education system, to modernise the state - and emphasised a synthesis of Western technique and Eastern morality. The education created by the state leaders was aimed at training bureaucrats selected meritocratically in the new education system. The second generation of state university graduates received general Western knowledge and specific study and training overseas. They were legitimised as a new privileged social class, but their identity as the bureaucrats of the Tennō were shaped by the government.

A new political group, opposed to this new state leadership position and education systems, emerged among the graduates from private universities. Their attitudes were derived from cultural traditional values (Shintō-Bushidō values blended with neo-Confucianism) and Western knowledge. The redefinitions of Meiji Japan were complete – but the tensions were visible over time and in the slide into militarism in the 1920s.

Coda

The section on Iraq will show that, as in the Meiji period in Japan, the struggles over the institutionalisation of cultural traditional values and knowledge in the education of leaders and disputes about the concept of merit were within and between different political and cultural leaderships. However, the two societies differed considerably in their specific mix of cultural traditional values and modernity.

Iraq in the first half of the twentieth century was, like Japan, involved in political, social and cultural struggles over political power; these were among tribal leaders, Mandate officials of the British government, the military leaders and the sharifian [the
Arab officers in the Ottoman army] urban intellectuals who were educated in Istanbul, and the new young and educated Ba'athists, communists and free officers’ groups. Iraq consisted of a mosaic of status groups, with urban notables, an Arab tribal and clan background and a dominant Sunni Islamic culture, together with Shi'a and many other religious communities and the Kurdish and other ethnic groups.

The first revolution in Iraq was led by the tribal, religious and urban leaders. The 1920 tribal movement was led by them against British control in Iraq, and influenced the British to establish their Mandate control of Iraq in 1921. In a formal sense, Iraq was not subject to colonial rule but was under a Mandate as part of the international system established by the League of Nations.

The Iraqi state was new, and the cultural groups kept their traditional and fragmented identities. When Iraq became independent in 1932, the country had two main forms of Islam, a strong Ottoman legacy in its education system, and the British recognition of tribal leaders’ power.

The change of leadership was linked with the British Mandate and its modernity projects. As the state modernised, those who had been educated in Istanbul seized control of the government. In spite of the Mandate’s legacy of a legitimised political position for the tribal leadership, it was kept out of political power at the national level.

Cultural traditional values and modernity projects played important roles in the changes of the state leadership. Firstly, throughout the first half of the twentieth century in Iraq, the state leaders adapted Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism based
on Western knowledge, but neglected the traditional values of Islam and Arab tribal values in the modernity projects. No opposition was allowed. Secondly, there was a change in the political role which the Iraqi army assumed from 1936. Thirdly, the most obvious change in the state and the society was the changes of the supporting status groups whenever new regimes were established.

Iraq is, like Japan, a country with strong cultural traditions. Historically Iraq had clear patterns relating to the education of leaders.

Philosophical and Islamic colleges developed in the eleventh century in Baghdad, weakened when the scholars became salaried employees of the government. However, throughout the Ottoman Empire period and monarchical and republic Iraq, Islamic studies have been revived and reconstructed by Sunni and Shi‘a ulamā [Islamic scholars]. The private learning communities, majālis in the cities and diwān among the Arab tribal communities, heiya ulamā Muslim [the Association of Muslim Scholars] and hawza in Shi‘a Islamic religious communities, were equivalent to the personal learning and networking private educational communities in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan.

In Iraq, as well as in Turkey and Egypt, the secularisation of Islām and the modernisation of tribalism were parts of the state modernity projects and the social modernisation which reacted to these. The section on Iraq will look at Islām and Arab tribal values as the equivalent core cultural values to Shintō, Bushidō and neo-Confucianism.
CHAPTER FIVE
CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY PROJECTS
IN IRAQ 1920-1968

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the ways in which the education of leaders was shaped through the redefinition of cultural traditions, namely Islamic and Arab tribal values, as Iraq itself modernised.

There are two main arguments. Firstly, previous cultural traditions continued but were renegotiated by the state leaders and cultural leaders in the society. The traditional values were legitimised in highly centralised secular forms, and were embedded in the new state institutions to reinforce a political ideology.

Secondly, the Islamic and Arab values institutionalised in the state education system and bureaucracy led to criticism of the state modernity projects. Cultural traditions, were also embedded in the Islamic religious and Arab tribal communities and their education of leaders.

The consequence of the renegotiation and institutionalisation of the Islamic and Arab values was the emergence of new ways of educating leaders.

To test these arguments, the chapter is organised into three parts. Firstly it examines the state modernity projects, which aimed to change the social stratification system, and the leadership patterns in Iraq inherited from the Ottoman period. Secondly, it identifies the historical and political contexts of Islamic and Arab tribal values. Then it
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To test these arguments, the chapter is organised into three parts. Firstly it examines the state modernity projects, which aimed to change the social stratification system, and the leadership patterns in Iraq inherited from the Ottoman period. Secondly, it identifies the historical and political contexts of Islamic and Arab tribal values. Then it
examines the redefinition, legitimisation and institutionalisation of these values, and how the state projects aimed to modernise the state through Western knowledge but at the same time to preserve much of the traditional values, social structure and leadership positions. Thirdly, the chapter examines the political and social struggles against the power of the state projects.

**Political and social structure**

This section examines efforts to change the social structure and leadership inherited from the Ottoman period. The changes in political and social structures began through the British Mandate's modernity projects, when the existing political and social leaders were repositioned and traditional knowledge was redefined. This affected the education of leaders.

The modern state of Iraq was formed under a British Mandate from the League of Nations in 1920. Its constituents were the Ottoman vilayät (the Ottoman Provinces) of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.¹ The proclamation of Prince Faisal bin Husain al-Ḥāshimi as King of Iraq at the Cairo conference in March 1921 and his enthronement following the Treaty of 1922 did not give Iraq complete independence, but retained the provisions of the Mandate.² In this treaty, King Faisal recognised the British Mandate, a two-chamber parliament, and the role of the civil service, the army and the police force. The British Mandate officials built the bureaucracy from three types of leaders: national, urban and rural.

The first task of the Mandate was to establish a political system. In November 1920, an urban notable, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Gailāni, formed the first Iraqi government.
The Iraqi Constitution was promulgated in 1924. The legitimacy of the state was consolidated through the legitimisation of the leaders, who included former Ottoman military leaders and civil servants, former members of the Young Turks' group, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and of Ottoman families, as well as Sharifian Arabs who had been officers in the Ottoman army. CUP used the language of nations, patriotism and constitutions. Among the Sharifian leaders, Ja'far al-Askeri and Nurî al-Sa'îd had been active in the Arab resistance to the Ottoman Empire before the First World War. Nurî al-Sa'îd, the most frequent minister and the real power behind the Monarchy, was entirely in favour of the Sunni government regime. A characteristic of the new state structures was the absence of Shi'a appointees to senior administrative positions. The Ottoman legacy of a limit to the social mobilisation of the Shi'a Arab groups continued.

The new leading status groups were based on the urban traditions of Sunni Islām, but were affected by the British Mandate officials' interest in integrating the local tribal sheikhs (Arab tribal notables) into the nation. The Mandate officials were ambivalent about the state modernity projects, but their main concern was to establish a recognisable state and state leaders, and to develop the social order.

The tribal sheikhs were newly accredited by the British Mandate officials. In 1924, these officials introduced the Law of Tribal Regulation (kāmūn nīdḥām al-Asḥā'īr). As a part of this code, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) (nīdḥām d'āwā al-Asḥā'īr) was introduced; through this legitimisation of the redefined roles of the tribal sheikhs and their tribes, the tribal system and structure were absorbed into the political system. Subsequently, the position of the tribal leaders
was strengthened. The available national census of 10th October 1947 shows that the population of Iraq was 4,814,122. Of these, 78 percent were constituted by the tribal groups with agricultural or nomadic life styles. There were about forty main tribes with their sheikhs. There were now many different ways of being a member of a tribe. All of these diversified communities were to be gradually assimilated in the new state modernity projects. At the same time, the tribal affiliation system was weakening and the relationships between the tribal sheikhs and their members started to change due to the TCCDR and the process of agricultural and pastoral settlement.

The second task was the establishment of the army. The young Iraqi officers, including some sharifians, Arabs officers in the Ottoman army, were graduates from the military college in Istanbul. The first stage of the state modernity projects was initiated by these officers, who took an active part in the public debate about the Sunni Arab state institutions. The establishment of the Military College in Baghdad in 1923 was an important step for the modernisation of Iraq in terms of the expansion of Arab nationalism and the maintenance of the Ottoman legacy of 'a cohesive officer corps'. The real line of authority within the military was informally determined by the influence of certain individuals, such as Ja’far al-Askari and al-Sa’id, and groups. These favoured the existing social order, leaving aside the Kurds and other religious and ethnic groups. However, new social and military groups were emerging from the Sunni tribal groups in the provinces and the overseas studies projects in Britain. A Conscription Bill was introduced in 1927, and the central and local political systems were rapidly formed.
Thus the leading status groups were those who had Sunni and Arab knowledge, the civil servants and military leaders, and newly accredited Arab tribal leaders. The political and social structures were characterised by the new political ideology of Arab nationalism, religious and ethnic divisions, and tribal affiliations, hierarchies and customs. As the state modernised, the political systems were also characterised by the patronage of the small groups in power, the marginalisation of many factions and the use of violence.

The establishment and extension of the state education system were slow. Educational change was difficult, because the Ottoman legacy of education was largely confined to urban dwellers and geared to training for the government service or the teaching profession. In addition, there were problems of finance and the scarcity of skilled personnel. The state was concerned about the education of medical and academic professionals and competent officials with managerial ability, as these were urgently needed to develop the infrastructure. The unbalanced and slow provision of state education for the citizens posed serious problems, and reflected a lack of social trust between the privileged and the excluded groups, in particular the rural, tribal and Shi’a groups, which lacked access to a sufficient education system.

In the late 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, new social leaders, namely the Ba’thists (originally Pan-Arab nationalists), the communists (in the Iraqi Communist Party: the ICP) and the new military officers (who called themselves the Free Officers), were emerging from the new state colleges. These young educated groups, who had acquired Western knowledge, associated with individuals from the formerly disadvantaged social strata, particularly young Shi’a groups in the southern regions. In 1958, Abd al-Karīm
Qāsim, a military officer, with these groups, overthrew the Monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq.\textsuperscript{15}

However, unlike in Meiji Japan, there were difficulties for Iraqis in relating to the new state, because the life of the population was differentiated according to their religion, ethnicity and region, and redefined by new laws, rules and educational institutions and the political system. Different religious communities and ethnic groups had different histories, knowledge and views of what the state meant for them. Shī‘a groups and many of the nomadic tribes found it difficult to adjust themselves to the new political environment and understand the new creature, ‘the state’, and foreign domination. There were difficulties within and between different social groups in finding a common vision and direction for the development of a new social structure, due to their different historical legacies. All these communities required the renegotiation of the values of Islām and Arab tribal traditions.

\textbf{Islām and Arab tribal values}

The state leaders in Iraq strengthened the Sunni political ideology, tried to shape national ethics, and framed bureaucratic government and education systems. The Ottoman legacy of Islamic values was continuously politicised in a highly centralised form. The Arab tribal system was legitimated and used as a part of the state projects.

In the nineteenth century, imperial laws (\textit{kānūn}) were introduced directly from the sovereign will of the sultans.\textsuperscript{16} The commercial aspect of contract law in the \textit{Sharī‘a} was replaced by \textit{kānūn}, but the personal status law, that is the family law, of the \textit{Sharī‘a} was intact. On November 3, 1839, an Imperial Rescript, read by Reşid Pasha
at Gülhane, initiated the era of reform:

All the world knows that since the first days of the Ottoman state, the lofty principles of the Qur‘ān and the rules of the *shari‘a* were always perfectly preserved. Our mighty sultanate reached the highest degree of strength and power, and all its subjects had ease and prosperity. But in the last one hundred and fifty years, because of a succession of difficult and diverse causes, the sacred *shari‘a* was not obeyed nor were the beneficent regulations followed; consequently, its former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and poverty. It is evident that countries not governed by the *shari‘a* cannot survive... Full of confidence in the help of the Most High, and certain of the support of our Prophet, we deem it necessary and important from now on to introduce new legislation in order to achieve effective administration of the Ottoman government and provinces.17

This document was rendered in the form of a Decree, which applied to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire.18

In the same year, the *Tanzimāt* [the Reform] was introduced and continued for thirty-seven years. The *Tanzimāt* included Land Law (1858) and *Vilāyāt* Law [Provincial Law] (1864) and was a state project for the defensive modernisation of the state against foreign intervention.19 The traditional social policy based on Islamic law started to change.

The *Tanzimāt* brought about political, social and educational changes in the religious and ethnic communities. The Sunni *‘ulamā‘* [clerics] lost their autonomous judiciary when the new state Hanafi court system was legitimated. The *Tanzimāt* reforms weakened the independent authority of the Shī‘a *‘ulamā‘* and forced the Shī‘a to respond to military conscription, tight control of the shrines and the acceptance of Ottoman nationality. Although economically and socially the shrine cities were absorbed into the larger Ottoman system, many Shī‘a were not integrated socially with the civil servants or landowners.20
The Shi'a clerics and the Shi'a Arab tribal groups remained alienated from the official Ottoman culture, being much closer to the Iranian cultural milieu. Among these threats caused by the Ottoman modernity projects, the one which most seriously affected the independence and livelihood of the 'ulamā' was the abolition of Shi'a legal courts and the enforced monopoly of the government courts. Torn between conflicting political loyalties and obligations, secularism and identity struggles, the Shi'a continued to resort to their own theological learning communities (hawza), and developed their religious values in hawza. Hawza is defined in this thesis as the Shi'a learning community and theological madrasa.

In Iraq after 1922, the Ottoman legacy of Islamic values was redefined. In the Ottoman period, to be a Shi'a meant to have limited access to political life, the government and the state education system.

When Iraq was established, the Sunni state leaders needed religious and ideological defences for the legitimisation of their regime and for the modernity projects. The political difference between the Sunni and the Shi'a brought about a gap between social and political leadership positions in the central and local administration caused by different access for the Sunni and Shi'a to political rights and state educational facilities. The subjugation of the Shi'a to the Sunni continued. This political environment continued during the British Mandate, the Monarchy and the Republic. The Shi'a were excluded from the Military College, but conscription was enforced on them. Prohibiting Shi'a rituals in public, while politicising the Sunni clerics and training Sunni school teachers for the state educational institutions, became features of the modernisation of the state. The Shi'a modernised themselves by developing the
raising their consciousness of political identities, and by political debate among
their clerical leaders.

Islam and Arab values were historically and socially inseparable. Besides the
 politicisation of Islamic values, the Iraqi state leaders needed Arab traditions to realise
the formation of a nation-state and legitimise themselves. The changes in the Arab
tribal value system began through the British Mandate’s modernity projects, when the
existing values and traditions, in particular the Fasl tradition [the reconciliation of
disputes between two parties] were redefined and institutionalised as a part of the state
modernity projects.

In the late fourteenth century, the Arab historian Abu-Zaid Abd al-Rahmān Ibn
Khalīdūn defined the Arab tribal community as a self-contained and autonomous
organisation having socially protective functions through social solidarity. 24
Throughout Arab history, each tribe formed a small state, headed by a patriarchal
sheikh, with its own kinship, common descent, military force, code of justice and rights
in the territory which it inhabited. The tribal federations were voluntary alignments
from which each tribe was free to withdraw at will. Each tribe’s political system was
based on hierarchy and affiliation. In the twentieth century, tribes in Iraq, particularly
tribes of nomadic origin, retained individual loyalties to family (ā’ila), clan (fakhiz),
tribe (ashīra), large confederated tribe (qabīla), and then to the Islamic Arab
community (umma), which were more important than loyalty to the state. 25

Before and during the Ottoman period, the traditional tribal systems retained their
customary law. These systems functioned through a fairly democratic process of
consultation (*ṣhūra*), and consensus (*ījāma*). This *diwān* was the tribal sheikh’s private reception at his home, in which all matters of tribal issue and policy were discussed, tribal news and information were exchanged and studied, tribal judicial affairs were settled in accordance with Islām, and guests were received and honoured.\(^{26}\)

The sheikh was elected and had to be approved by the sub-sheikhs. He was not an absolute authority, because his decisions and actions were guided by the *diwān* system. Sheikhs and sub-sheikhs in tribal institutions were sometimes in tension. The *diwān* functioned as a tribal institution for education, and continues to do so today. It required group feeling or kinship and traditional knowledge of customary law and moral values.\(^{27}\)

The roles of the tribal sheikh related to tribal resources, to the traditional values of solidarity and security within the tribe, to alignments between the tribes and to jurisprudence based on the tribal customary law. Tribal jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and customary traditions constituted two aspects of knowledge: specific knowledge (*fiqh khās*) and general knowledge (*fiqh ām*).\(^{28}\)

Within the tribes, and between the various non-tribal communities, tribal *fiqh* was related to *Fasl* practice. This tribal *fiqh* included the Islamic forms of criminal justice: disputation (*jādal*), consensus (*ījāma*), and the creation of new law (*ijtiḥād*). In the ‘Abbāsid period, the study of criminal procedure under Islamic law (*Sharī'a*) and the Islamic justice system were a concern of Islamic scholars, and in the education of political and theocratic leaders.\(^{29}\)
Fasl is a traditional Islamic and Arab tribal method of settling disputes by using mediators, and is based on customary law. Its traditional purpose was to pardon the offender, prevent revenge and maintain peace in Islām.\textsuperscript{30} The Prophet reconciled disputes as a judge in the mosque. Hassan Abdul Laṭīf el-Shāfī defined it as “one of the most important institutions in Muslim society; its concern is with the administration of justice, being the reason why prophets were dispatched and sacred texts revealed”.\textsuperscript{31} 

Fasl, as a system of tribal members’ religious and social obligations, continues today.

This system was redefined and proclaimed by the TCCDR in 1924. The idea of the regulation was introduced by the Mandate officials, who had learned the effectiveness of such systems from experience in India. The regulation was based on the Government of India’s Act of the same name and encoded into Iraqi law in 1924.\textsuperscript{32}

The British were pragmatic in shaping the tribal hierarchies within all the occupied territories. The aim was to integrate the tribal communities into the state apparatus and to change the tribal structure by legitimising and hence promoting the sheikhs’ position, and by institutionalising the tribal regulations within their communities.

On the basis of the tribal customary laws, the TCCDR included a wide range of offences dealt with by the tribal judiciary. Cases for Fasl ranged from homicide and trespass to oral insult (hasham). The regulation emphasised the social significance of the mediation of disputes, the guarantee of security and the protection of individuals and families. It also emphasised the new roles of the sheikhs as the main final decision-makers on compensation (diya), and the roles, the aim of Fasl traditions and the diwān system were redefined. Subsequently, the meaning of the Fasl traditions
was distorted by redefining the tribal sheikhs and the ethical power of diwān. Article 2 (b) defined a ‘tribesman’:

a member of a generally recognised tribe or tribal section, which has been accustomed to settle its disputes by recourse to the arbitration of elders or sheikhs and not by recourse to the courts of the land as ordinarily constituted.33

By setting up Political Officers, the state decided to intervene in Fasl. Article 2 (a) defined a “Political Officer” as:

an officer appointed by the G.O.C.-in-Chief to settle tribal affairs within such local limits as may be by the G.O.C.-in-Chief prescribed and includes any Assistant Political Officer, serving under the orders of the Political Officer, appointed by the Political Officer, by order in writing, to exercise all or any of the functions or powers conferred upon Political Officers by this Regulation.34

A state arbitration system was established, and named Fasl ‘idāri [literally, administration]. ‘Idāri was a new system, a governmental instrument which required no consensus, while Fasl ridā’i was a system of tribal decision-making which required consensus on the final decision at the tribal court.35 The new ‘idāri system appointed the arbitrator, normally a local governor, and gave him the right to the final decision. Taking orders from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and later from the Ministry of Interior, the local governors intervened in the tribal tradition, as arbitrators who acted as judges. Thus by redefining the traditions of the ridā’i system, and by legitimising and institutionalising the new ‘idāri in the Fasl system, the government absorbed the tribal sheikhs and members into the state institutions. Both systems continue today. However, the ‘idāri system eroded the tribes’ traditional Fasl autonomy.

Traditional Fasl was normally conducted at the tribal sheikh’s diwān. Each case of
Fasl should be studied and checked with the customary law by the sheikh himself.\textsuperscript{36} When a criminal incident occurred, it was necessary for the two parties to make efforts to exchange visits at their diwān in order to appoint an arbitrator, who would reach a final decision on compensation.\textsuperscript{37}

This procedure, in particular the Fasl process of selecting arbitrators by developing the tribal network system, was drastically simplified by the 1924 Law. Article 2 (c) defined the diwān as a majlis, and defined this as:

\begin{quote}
any chief, sheikh, arbitrator, or body of chiefs, sheikhs of arbitrators nominated and appointed by a Political Officer under the provisions of the Regulation to settle according to Arab tribal usage any dispute in which a tribesman is involved.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

By establishing the new Political Officers the state often intervened in the final decision-making process and weakened the sheikhs' rights. This contradiction between the values of the Arab tribal traditions and the TCCDR was due to the double roles of the tribal Fasl traditions, which now served the state value system on the one hand and dominated the original tribal value system on the other.

The final decision of the sheikh, announcing the tribal consensus, was recognised as an official statement. According to Article 2 (e):

A “finding” is the reply of the “Majlis” to an “order of reference. When the “Majlis” consists of more than one person, the unanimous opinion of the majority constitutes a “finding”. A “finding” must be in writing and signed or sealed by those members of the “Majlis” whose opinion it embodies.\textsuperscript{39}

The state's intervention in the Fasl tradition disregarded the functions of the alliance or negotiation (hilf) for the tribal rights of peace, security and protection of the tribe, family and individuals. For example, the appointment of the third sheikh (the guarantor), who should defend the future peace of the two parties, was neglected.
Furthermore, the *Fasl* decisions made by political officers often did not satisfy the two affected parties.

Overall, although altered by the TCCDR, the traditional education of tribal leaders continued in the *diwān*, and knowledge of *Fasl* was developing within the Arab tribal communities in Iraq.

The advantage to the British authorities was that new leaders who were accredited and their communities were absorbed into the central administration. The High Commissioner, MacMahon, drew on his experience in India and emphasised that in countries where tribal customary law exists in full force, it forms:

> an instrument for the suppression of crime which in simplicity and effectiveness can be surpassed by no other legal system which we can invent, for the simple reason that it is based on the character, idiosyncrasies and prejudices of the people among whom it has originated and by whom it has been evolved during long periods of time to meet their own requirements and remedy their failings.\(^{40}\)

The new state leaders succeeded in changing the social structure by repositioning the old and new political factions and retaining Islamic and tribal groups as their supporters. The new civil servants lacked knowledge of the tribal and Islamic legacies of *Fasl* conduct, skill in negotiating or allying for peace and public security, the ability to use networks quickly through verbal and intellectual skills in negotiation and knowledge of others, and the ability to take decisive action.\(^{41}\) Nevertheless the government depended for regional peace on tribal and urban communities. Therefore *Fasl*, an independent traditional practice, was important for the state as well as the community.

A significant by-product of the TCCDR project was that tribal leaders and members
sought trust and support, influence and the protection of individuals and families through justice in *Fasl* and made efforts to reinforce old tribal alliances or establish new networks.

The tribal meaning of loyalty was related to the individuals’ autonomous determination to fulfil their tribal obligations. The sense of honour and dignity of individuals, families and tribes was related to this. Although there are some differences between tribes, traditionally the sheikhs and tribal members are responsible for six tribal values: tribal obligations, tolerance, dignity or honour, trust and support (*misdaqīya*), leadership and Islām. There are five main tribal obligations: to support the internal members politically, socially and economically, to support and protect every tent, to protect any refugee, including political asylum-seekers (*dakhīl*), to preserve alliances (*tahlīf*) and to keep face (*wajīh*). Through these tribal virtues and obligations, the sheikh, sub-sheikhs and tribal members maintained multiple positions, networks and functions. Through *diwān*, tribal sheikhs governed the tribal system and ensured its welfare.42

Overall, the Islamic and tribal groups had political and social difficulties when the state absorbed their cultural traditions and institutionalised them. Islām was more politicised by state modernity projects than were the Arab tribal values, while the Shi‘a traditions were excluded from participation at all levels. The different political positions of the Sunni, the Shi‘a and the Arab tribes brought about the emergence of different styles of leaders and ways of education. The traditional leaders were caught up in the pressures between nation-state priorities and their traditional cultural identities.
The next section describes how Islamic and Arab tribal values were institutionalised in the civil as well as the military bureaucracy, and shows how these values were transformed, absorbed or contested, and how they affected the education of leaders. Subsequently, the section describes what kind of state leadership was produced and reproduced in the state institutions. The official modernity projects of the state required the establishment of the state education of leaders.

**Islam and Arab tribal values renegotiated**

There were three stages in the modernisation of the Iraqi state: the Mandate and the emergence of Iraqi state (1920-1932); the growth of the Monarchy (1932-1958); and the emergence of the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968).

(1) *The Mandate and the emergence of the Iraqi State (1920-1932)*

The years 1920 to 1932 were marked by the emergence of the Iraqi state and by struggles over the integration of the traditional status groups into the new Iraqi state. This sub-section describes how Sunni Islamic values were institutionalised in the bureaucracy and were resisted by Shi‘a groups, and how this affected the education of leaders. It also describes the redefinition of Arab tribal traditions and their institutionalisation in the political system.

It is suggested that, until the Iraqi state was created, there was no single Iraqi nation, and people had different views about what Iraq should be. The Iraqi state emerged in the process of political and social struggles over the redefinition of Islām and Arab tribal traditions and their institutionalisation in the political and education system and the bureaucracy. The traditional Ottoman conformity between the government and
religious creeds was replaced by the political ideology of Arab nationalism and the consolidation of the Sunni Arab military. The Sunni leaders educated in Istanbul transferred their loyalties from the Ottoman state to the new Iraq as a part of the Arab nation, and formed the privileged bureaucracy.

The Constituent Parliament opened in 1924, and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was passed. About one-third of the members of the parliament were sheikhs of tribes. The Shi'a abstained from participating in the parliamentary elections, due to their rejection of the election system. A number of the influential Shi'a clerical leaders, the mujtahid, were estranged from political practice, turning back to Islamic jurisprudence and moral exhortation. This affected the development of the hawza education of leaders.

The Mandate officials saw the tribes as distinct entities within the new Iraqi state. Among the British Mandate officials, there was ambivalence toward the modernity projects for framing the political and social structure. However, their tribal modernity project was pragmatic in exploiting the tribal resources and value system. Tension arose between the centralising state power and attachment to the traditional Arab tribal communities. During the 1920s and 1930s, the TCCDR renegotiated and legitimised the values of the tribal cultural tradition and established new roles for the sheikhs and tribal members. These roles included the prevention of any violence against the government in their communities, the collection of taxes on cattle and the government’s share from the agricultural revenues, the supply of wood, and also the provision of voluntary labour for building canals in an emergency. The 1927 Conscription Bill forced the Sunni and Shi'a tribal sheikhs to offer fighters in times of war, whether the war was with other countries or an internal uprising.
In this connection, the new collective punishment of the sheikh and his tribal members was legitimated. The punishment of the sheikh for not paying taxation was applied to his tribal members. The tribal sheikhs were obliged to act as mediators between the state and the tribal members. This politically motivated tribal order continued until the 1958 revolution.

The consequence of these changes was that the meaning of kinship and the identity of the tribal members in relation to the sheikh and the nation state were changing in many ways.

With the growing number of army officers in the 1930s, the state leaders perceived the tribal provincial areas not only as the basis of a traditional moral social order but also as an area of human and material resources which could be exploited for the benefit of the bureaucracy. 47

The tribal networking system was utilised to serve the bureaucracy. However, not all the tribal sheikhs were subjected to the modernity projects. 48 Disputes about supporting the government occurred within and between the tribes. Some sheikhs remained in relationship with their tribal members through the traditional organic group feeling, trust and support in the cause of tribal autonomous protection and traditional obligations. Others, in particular those who became agricultural landowners, compromised with the state and set up authoritarian feudalistic relationships with their members. Subsequently, the new types of mechanical loyalty to the authority, new tribal obligations and the patronage system were used by the sheikhs in relation to the state leaders and the tribal members; hence, different styles of tribal leaders and tribes emerged, and their loyalty changed according to the regimes.
The tribes started to fragment, and until the present day there has been no official association of Iraqi tribal sheikhs.

The Arab tribal groups were politically defined, and served as parts of the state modernity projects. When the tribal leaders and members resisted the political power and coercion which the state leaders operated, the sheikhs’ *diwān* and *diwān* education provided an ethical code for the protection of members of their community. Hence the year 1924 was marked by the emergence of new positions of the Arab tribal sheikhs and new importance in the education of leaders. The educational movements within the Shi‘a and the tribal groups became the roots of the social movements which began in the 1920s.

After the independence of Iraq in 1932, with the intervention of the military in politics, Islamic and Arab tribal values were used to reinforce the competing political ideologies of Arab and Iraqi nationalism. This is discussed in the next section.


The period from 1932 to 1958 was marked by the rapid emergence of different types of state and cultural leaders. The state leaders aimed at political and social changes by strengthening Pan-Arab nationalism (*qaumîya*), Iraqi nationalism (*wataniyya*), and Western knowledge, by preserving Arab values and by institutionalising these ideologies in the state education system. The state leaders were ambivalent towards the formation of a new independent Iraqi state. There were disputes among them; hence power in the state was contested.
The establishment of the army was a triumph for the traditional Islamic-Arab martial spirit and for the independence of the country. After the British occupation was ended in 1932, the *sharifians*, who were Arab officers in the Ottoman army, and the Young Turks’ group intervened in political affairs and took power twice, from 1936 to 1941 and from 1958 to 1978, and tried to unite Iraq. They shared the common Arab national ideology of building an Arab state. In 1936, a military coup d'état was led by General Bākr Sidqi, and Hikmat Sulaimān became Prime Minister. However, the lack of leadership after the assassination of Bākr Sidqi left the army divided, while different interests among the leading army officers made them patronise a different set of leaders in the society.

The significance of this military coup was that militarism became a new factor in the politics of Iraq. The army continued to influence political decisions, and became virtually the deciding factor in Cabinet changes from 1936 to 1941. Until 1941, when the British army reoccupied Iraq, the military was used as a political means for gaining power over the opposition movements. There was no tolerance of opposition; any political opposition was immediately crushed by the new state’s military power.

As the state modernised, nationalism was used by the different leading status groups to enforce their modernity projects. The two political ideologies and the redefined Islamic and Arab and military loyalties were legitimised in centralised secular forms and institutionalised in the bureaucracy and the state school systems. The Arab nationalists supported the establishment of a united Arab nation to resist imperialism and Zionism. The Iraqi state was in their view a part of the Arab nation. Arab nationalism was pushed forward by King Faisal 1 in his last years, his successors, King Ghazi and the Regent ʿAbd al-Ilāh, the educationist Satiʿ al-Husri, the military, and
state leaders like Yasin al-Hashimi and al-Sa‘îd. On the other hand, Abd al-Karîm Qâsim and the Communist groups under his regime supported Iraqi nationalism; all efforts should in their view be directed to building Iraq with its different peoples, in particular the Arabs and the Kurds.

The two political ideologies, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, were institutionalised in the state school systems by training the teachers, establishing the examination system, distributing textbooks and providing knowledge for Arab national leaders. One of the primary objectives of the project for an independent state was to legitimise Islamic and Arab loyalty to the Monarchy, and consolidate support from the urban and tribal Sunni leaderships. However, the project was not defined in terms of the indigenous Arab values of the cultural traditions.

The state leaders had a different perception of the history of ‘the glorious Arabs’ from that of the Islamic Arab and rural tribal peoples, who were the leading groups in Islamic and Arab history. The Ministry of Education issued in 1941 a statement on *Muallim al-Jadîd* [the New Teacher] in an Educational Bulletin:

The most characteristic feature of Iraqi education today is its nationalism. The term ‘Iraqi nationality’ is a cornerstone in the political foundation of the Iraqi modern state. But our thinkers universally agree that our people are insufficient; for small countries cannot afford to live in isolation in this recent and complex world of ours. Thus the cultured man in our country does not confine his national feelings and loyalties to the territorial boundaries of Iraq but tends to extend them far beyond that to a wider national association, namely the association of all the Arab peoples.

The notion of ‘the Arab peoples’ meant a new imagined ‘nation’. The ‘nation’ was interpreted in terms of relationships among individuals and groups. The history of the Arab nation was to be the history of the Arabs. Islâm’s role in history was to spread
and preserve Arabism as the identity of the Arabs; Arab culture and history were renegotiated as the focus of loyalty despite one’s religious belief and communal ties. Hence nationalism separated Arabism from Islām as well as from Arab tribal values. The values of the Arab traditions were thus different for the state leaders and for the traditional and new urban civic leaders. What was emphasised was collective loyalty to the state and its modernity projects. Arab nationalism was used to unify the diverse society and as a defence against imperialism and Zionism. Iraqi nationalism was used for the unification of diverse societies, and traditional values of loyalty were renegotiated to emphasise selfless service to the state regime.

Among the most important influences shaping the outlook of the emerging middle class was state education, especially at the intermediate secondary school level, which was the highest level of education which most Iraqis received. The history and social studies texts used through the 1930s until the British occupation of 1941 were intensely Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. Although during the Second World War a number of Arab nationalist teachers were dismissed by the British officials, the Arab nationalist movement in schools continued. Iraqi students who went through school in the 1930s and 1940s emerged in the 1950s with sharply different views and aspirations from those of their elders.

For example, from the mid-1930s on, while the military and civil bureaucrats were in conflict, political groups, including the ahāli group and the Arab nationalists were emerging.

In the 1930s, Kāmil al-Chadirchi, the new, young educated leaders and other returned
overseas students from the American University of Beirut set up the *al-Ahāli* group [the People, literally ‘family’] in Baghdad. Among them there were Abd al-Fatah Ibrahīm, Husain Jamīl, and Munḥammad Ḥadīd. They called for “greater democracy, land reform and the legitimisation of trades unions”. The movement was composed of college students, workers in key industries, lawyers, engineers, and other educated groups. The *al-Ahāli* newspaper was edited at first, in February 1932, by a Marxist, Abd al-Qādir Isma’īl. It incorporated the views of Marxists, liberals, Fabian socialists and reformers. It supported political freedom, parliamentary democracy, and moderate socialism, and was supported by the Istiqlāl Party which owned the opposition newspaper *Liwā‘-l-Istiqlāl* [The Flag of Independence]. Fā’iq al-Samarrā‘ī, a chief editor and a member of *al-Ahāri* group, opened public debate on anti-imperialist and strong Arab nationalist views. *Al-Ahāli* became the organ of the National Democratic Party after the Second World War. In the 1930s and 40s, a non-political press developed. By 1958 there were about thirty such publications with a total circulation of about 100,000.

In 1935, the *Muthanna* Club was established. The Club, headed by Colonel Sabbagh, a Pan-Arab nationalist, developed political gatherings and public debates to “disseminate Arab nationalism, to retain Arab traditions, to strengthen the sense of Arab manhood in youth (*murrā‘a*) and to create new Arab culture which is equivalent to the civilisation of the West”. Although the British military intervention of 1941 led to the breaking up of the club, its leaders survived. Although they had contradictory tendencies and aspirations, their voices called for an independent Iraq. By 1947, there were no fewer than 5,450 members. There were various types of professionals in this club: Pan-Arab military officers, anti-British officials, government officials, merchants, and
members of the professional middle class and the old aristocracy of officials.

The Communist party group called in particular for the independence of the country, the amelioration or eradication of poverty and the realisation of greater social justice.\textsuperscript{59} The growing frustration of the younger generation of Shi‘a over their exclusion from the political process resulted in the massive adherence of the Shi‘a to communism, particularly in the late 1940s and during the 1950s, as well as the revival of Shi‘a Islamic ideology in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{60}

The semi-governmental Academy of Sciences was established by Salim al-Alousi in 1947.\textsuperscript{61} From the 1940s to the 1960s, international associations such as al-Rābita [the League for the Defence of Women’s Rights, literally ‘the tied’], emerged and mobilised materially and spiritually to support Arab efforts for Arab and Palestinian freedom.\textsuperscript{62} The Muntad al-Adabi [club of literature], established by Abdul Kalīm al-Khalīl in 1935, and international associations of al-Rābita reflected the citizens’ confidence in the new social solidarity based on Arab nationalism.

In this time of the growth of the cities, in particular Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, the traditional ‘Abbāsid legacy of learning networks, majālis, was reinforced by both the state leaders and urban notables. A historian, Ibrahim al-Drūbī defined majālis [literally, the places for sitting or assembly] as “the people’s requirement of tradition and identity”.\textsuperscript{63} They were held in various places, including at diwān in private houses, which the heads of majālis considered ‘the centre of knowledge’ and ‘the centre of family honour’, and also in the religious institutions. Unlike diwān and hawza, the majālis did not aim to nurture or mobilise political or civic leaders, but to strengthen academic associations and public debates. The majālis run by cultural leaders supplied
common Islamic or historical and political knowledge to knit the separate small groups
together. The Sunni gathering at the Abu-Hanīfa and Sheikh Qādi mosques was called
‘Friday *Majālis*’. ⁶⁴

Among the leaders of *majālis*, there were Christian leaders, such as al-Abu Anstats al-
Karmerī, Muslim scholars such as Abbās ‘Azzāwi, and urban notables such as
Mahmoud Deftarī, Mahmoud al-Aloosi and Abd al-Wahhāb al-Nāʾīb.⁶⁵ The Mahmood
Sobhī Deftarī circle included many state leaders.⁶⁶ Many of the circles contributed to
historiography. Taʿīkh al-Shāʾirī’s circle contributed to political history, and the
origin of Arab letters was taught by Dr. Sālim Alūsī. The method of learning was oral
disputation. The learning networks attracted the state leaders. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs opened a *majālis* for a short time.

The rapid development of these varied social groups, including the young military
officers and the Baʿthists, was partly due to the fact that, as Tripp pointed out, the old
social classes in the bureaucracy were indifferent to the emerging social solidarity but
called for military loyalty and political docility.⁶⁷

These two decades were marked by increasing political power struggles between the
civil servants and military bureaucrats. The emergence of the new types of leaders,
Arab nationalists, communists and young military groups, from the 1930 to the 1950s
was a consequence of the modernity projects, the new state education and the political
condition in which they were placed. As in Meiji Japan, the pressure of state
modernity was challenged by the new civic leaders.
For the new civic leaders, the nation was interpreted in terms of relationships among individuals and groups. By the 1950s, a number of cultural leaders who had obtained foreign knowledge from higher education had emerged. There were three different types of young nationalists: the Ba’thists, the Communists and the Free Officers. The struggles of these young leaders were political, cultural and educational, over nationalism, ethnicity and religion. They opposed the Ottoman legacy of the bureaucratic state and struggled for political participation and new visions in politics. Rejecting political loyalty and docility, the Ba’thists, the Communists and the Free Officers brought about the 1958 revolution.

The modernisation of tribal communities by the new state resulted in the loss of local autonomy and in excluding the tribal members from central political participation and state education. In 1933 the ‘Revised Tribal Case Regulation’ was issued, and all the tribal members were excluded from the new 1933 Civil Law. Tribal criminal justice followed by ‘idāri system remained in the hands of the Ministry of Interior, the governors and political officers, whereas civil law and urban criminal cases among the urban dwellers were dealt with through the new institution of the civil court. This divide-and-rule policy towards the tribes continued until 1958. By establishing both tribal and civil law, the state leaders attempted to balance power and influence between tribe and town, to stop de-tribalisation and to prevent a nation-wide alliance against their authority. The tribal sheikhs and their communities were kept in their traditional places. There was a powerful continuity in Fasl tradition legitimised through diwān education. The traditional education of tribal leaders continued.

Under the pressure of the state and its modernity project for tribal society, the
traditional tribal system for the preparation of leaders continued without changing much. The traditional communities did not create a new type of society by grafting themselves onto other communities. There was no access to dialogue with the state leaders on the new regulations, the establishment of modern schools in the village and the acquisition of foreign knowledge.

Thus each national, religious and tribal group retained different forms of knowledge, different cultural traditions, and different approaches to the revolution.

(III) The emergence of the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968)

The new state modernity projects led by General Abdul Qāsim formed Republican Iraq. However, the legitimised political ideology and the authoritarian political system were re-creations of the previous period.

Although the 1958 revolution was supported by the Ba’thists, the Communists and the free officers, power soon rested in Qāsim’s hands, supported by the army. Qāsim set up a dictatorship. The new military regime was constituted by only fourteen free officers. All executive and legislative powers were entrusted to the Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet. Ba’thists in Iraq and Syria as well as Egypt pressed Qāsim to join the United Arab Republic. Qāsim, as an Iraqi nationalist, found that the Iraqi Communist Party was useful for resisting the pressures of Arab nationalism. The Communists dominated most of the Iraqi press and radio, and students were heavily involved in the control of several ministries. Iraqi national identity superseded Arab national identity.
By 1960 an anti-communist movement had developed in Najaf, Karbalā and Hilla, led by the grand mujtahid Muhsin al-Hākim. Exhortations to Muslims appeared in the non-communist press, usually signed by Jama'āt al-ʿulamāʿ fi al-Najaf al-Ashraf [the Association of Najaf Clerics]. On 15 October 1960, al-Fayha, a Hilla weekly, published a memorandum signed by the Islamic Party, which included both Sunnis and Shiʿa. Muḥsin al-Hākim issued a fatwa [judgement based on religious jurisprudence] asserting that communism was incompatible with Islām. Recognising the young Shiʿa groups’ involvement in the communist movements, Ayatollāh Abu al-Qasim al-Khōeī and Mujtahid, later Ayatollāh, Muḥammad Baqir as-Sadr devoted themselves to the modernisation of the hawza theological learning community.

Among the Baʿth party members and the officers in the Qāsim regime, tension developed, first between Qāsim (an Iraqi nationalist), and Abd al-Salām Arīf (an Arab nationalist), and then between Qāsim and his military supporters. Having lost political support from the parties which he once supported, Qāsim was overthrown by a military coup in February 1963. However, between February and November, personal tensions among the Baʿth party members reached an extreme point, and several members withdrew.

Young Baʿthists had different ideas about what was important for the nation-state’s formation. Some Baʿthists, who left the party before 1963 emphasised democracy, and others emphasised socialism. The Baʿthist slogan, ‘Unity, Freedom and Socialism’, was firmly embedded in the educational system until 2003. In November 1963, co-ordinating their actions with the military Baʿthists, Arīf’s forces attacked the National Guard in Baghdad. Arīf established his control of Iraq. The tension, accumulated from
the 1950s, ended in a massacre of the communist leaders in Mosul.

The products of the Military and Staff College whose members mostly came from Sunni and particular tribal backgrounds rapidly consolidated a new, privileged military regime. The previous legacies of Sunni and Arab values were reinforced in the system of privilege, and used to support the power of the bureaucracy.

It is now useful to summarise the relationships of the emergence of the various state leaders in the Monarchy and Republic of Iraq, the state modernity projects and the struggles over the institutionalisation of the cultural traditional values in the education system. Firstly, to the Iraqi state leaders, the ideas for the state modernity projects were derived from their desire to construct a united Iraqi state or a Pan-Arab nation. Arab and Iraqi nationalism were to be the sources of the national and individual identities. The projects were disputed and contested by the different state leaders, because these leaders were ambivalent towards the projects, and there was also a lack of trust among the state leaders. The diverse society was fragmented further.

Secondly, Islamic and Arab values were renegotiated, and characterised by a Sunni emphasis. The emphasis reflected the fact that all Iraqi military officials were Sunni. Arab and military loyalty was again emphasised and embedded in the higher education system, and reinforced the official ideology.

Thirdly, to realise the political ideology, the state leaders needed to establish a state education system and to consolidate the training and selection of nationalists. The education system was characterised by the formation of the identity of Sunni Arab
nationalists, and the social stratification system was determined by this system.

The next section will discuss the conflicts over the state modernity projects, the subsequent emergence of various significant urban cultural leaders and of Shi‘a clerical and Arab tribal community groups, and their struggles for the institutionalisation of cultural continuities in the education of their leaders.

**Islām and Arab tribal values renegotiated**

**(IV) The emergence of Iraqi communities (1920-1932)**

This sub-section examines the political and social struggles of the cultural leaders against the domination of the British Mandate and over the institutionalisation of their renegotiated cultural values in their communities.

It argues that the 1920 social movements (*thawra ashrīn:* literally the 1920 Revolution) emerged through the political and social struggles of the tribal, clerical and urban citizens to create new social relationships and to form a new independent Iraq in spite of the institutional pressures of the British Mandate’s modernity projects. In these social and cultural resistance movements, the traditional institutions reinforced the specific forms and contents of an ethical code of knowledge. New ways of learning in communities and of socialising their leaders emerged and developed.

The 1920 social movements were supported by the different religious groups and the Arab tribes. Sunni and Shi‘a tribal and religious groups co-operated in the cause of Iraqi independence. The Muslim leaders’ purpose was to establish an Islamic
government, while the Arab tribal sheikhs aimed to establish a national and Arab government. Both types of cultural leaders determined to promote the independence of their communities from foreign powers and the state. 71

The new ways of educating leaders emerged in the social, cultural and political process of struggling over the institutionalisation of the redefined cultural traditional values.

(V) Society in the time of the post-Mandate Monarchy (1932-1958)

In the cities, the 1930s and 1950s saw cultural change. Pan-Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism were challenged by the new political and cultural leaders through public debates and the establishment of learning institutions and networks. At the same time, as described in Section II of this chapter, the exclusion of citizens from political rights led to criticism of the state modernity projects by the new cultural leaders.

The urban, rural and religious communities remained fragmented, and separate majālis, diwān and hawza learning networks developed within these communities; hence the values and knowledge of the urban, tribal and religious groups were developing separately. After the 1958 revolution there was a conscious effort on the part of the cultural leaders to construct a new identity, which would minimise tensions and differences between the leaders in the different communities.

(VI) The emergence of the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968)

As in Meiji Japan, Iraq developed through a combination of cultural and educational struggles. Cultural leaders were aware that traditional values embedded in the education of community leaders reinforced the value of personal autonomy in relation
to social obligation as a part of an ethical code of welfare and protection. After the overthrow of the old political order and the radical political changes Iraqi political and cultural leaders, including writers and artists, expressed their ideas through public debates in books, journals and newspapers, as well as sculpture, painting and theatre.\textsuperscript{72}

Iraqi society became more fragmented than in the 1920s and 1930s, though there was dynamism within the small communities, through the emergence of new leaders and their education systems. Rural-urban relations and social stratification changed as people joined the Ba‘th party and the Communist groups reacting against the new state modernity projects.

In Baghdad in 1958, when Qāsim abolished the 1924 TCCDR, the rural and urban leaders reacted differently.\textsuperscript{73} In Baghdad Zeki Sāleḥ, supported abolition. Their reason was that the TCCDR prevented the development of loyalty to the state. Tribal people were loyal to the tribe; the system did not promote democracy and the development of tribal society.\textsuperscript{74} The Minister of Education, Matta Akarāwi, who held a Ph.D from Columbia University, considered that since the state continued to control the tribal communities, it should keep the TCCDR, but at the same time a Western law court system should be adopted. A sociologist and writer on \textit{Fasl}, Abd al-Razāq al-Tāhir, suggested that if the \textit{Fasl} system stayed there would be two laws in the nation. During thirty-four years, the tribal groups had lived without modern laws. Modern Western law and Arab tribal tradition could be \textit{mutarābita} [interconnected].\textsuperscript{75} Tribal sheikhs supported the abolition of the TCCDR. However, both groups, urban leaders and sheikhs did not agree with the abolition of the \textit{Fasl} tradition. That tradition, with the role of the tribal sheikh and \textit{diwān} education has continued to be supported by the
people until today.

To the Arab tribal leaders, the modernisation of the community was necessary to free it from the political pressures of the modernity projects. However, their vision of political participation, the protection of welfare and the code of justice and rights, and institutional autonomy was not realised yet. The continuity of hawza and diwān education was the consequence of the resistance to the dominant state modernity projects, and an expression of the wishes for the survival of their community. Among the cultural leaders, there was ambivalence towards the modernity projects and their social, political and cultural processes, but a number of Shi`a clericals, such as as-Sadr, were tolerant of other groups' values and knowledge and tried to harmonise Sunnī and Shi`a. However, the modernity projects designed by the Shi`a clerical leaders brought about internal disputes between leaders, and these continue today.

As the new Republic emerged, after the 1968 coup d’etat, and in the later periods, the three traditions, the tribal, the Shi`a and the urban Ottoman state tradition, and their institutionalised education of leaders continued.

**Conclusion**

The state modernity projects of Iraq were characterised by a re-creation of the Ottoman legacies of the Sunni-centred social structure and of government by the civil servants and military leaders. In both the monarchy and republican Iraq, power rested with these old urban social groups and, most of the time, with the military leaders educated in Istanbul. Thus the leadership patterns basically inherited from the Ottoman period continued. The exclusion of the traditional Shi`a communities from central politics
was also a legacy of the Ottoman period. The traditional Arab tribal sheikhs were newly accredited by the British Mandate officials and their social relationships within and between the tribes rapidly developed.

Each group of national, traditional and urban intellectuals *al-Ahāli* and *Muthanna* club groups, the Ba’thists, the communists and Free Officers, imagined the state in different ways, and placed a different emphasis on the modernity projects and the institutionalisation of the cultural traditions; these differences were reflected in the emergence of different styles of the education of leaders.

The state education system was characterised by the formation of the identity of Ottoman legacy of Sunni Islām and new concepts of Pan-Arab nationalism and local nationalism. The social stratification system was determined by this state education system. The Islamic and Arab values institutionalised in the state education system and bureaucracy led to contradictions in the modernity projects. Tribal traditions were legitimated in the 1924 TCCDR, institutionalised and functioned as a part of the state modernity projects.

Tribal sheikhs reacted to these state projects by reinforcing the *diwān* system and *diwān* education of leaders when the Mandate state intervened in the traditional tribal system, in particular, the *Fasl* system, and forced the tribal leaders into new roles. The Shī‘a leaders resisted the state modernity projects through the struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined *hawza* community, in particular in 1924 when Ayattollahs were deported, and in the later 1950s, when the young Shī‘a were involved in the Communist movement which Qāsim exploited. Traditional tribal and Islamic values continued, and were reinforced in the *diwān* and *hawza* education system. In
both Arab tribal and Shī‘a groups, the renegotiated traditional Islamic and tribal values provided a moral code which supported personal autonomy within the community obligations and the protection of and security for the members of their communities and identities.

Shī‘a leaders’ struggles were to develop *hawza* by pursuing *ijtihād* and to overcome the exclusion of the Shī‘a from the political centre. The tribal struggles concerned the balance between the state’s requirement and tribal rights and autonomy. As a reaction to state intervention, the *diwān* education of leaders was revitalised to deal with the roles of *Fasl* and the new obligations given by the state to the tribal members. The form of *Fasl* associated with Islām and *ijtiḥād* gave a sense of honour, dignity and authority to the tribal members in protecting their families and communities within a tribal morality. Hence they preserved the traditional values and knowledge without much development.

Throughout the twentieth century, the voices calling for social change were oppressed by military power and coercion. The preservation of the traditional society was a consequence of the state modernity project. This meant that unlike in Meiji Japan, social modernity in Iraq did not develop civic society by transforming state modernity into private educational projects.

The traditional Shī‘a religious leaders shifted from being traditional clerics, ‘*ulama‘*, to being secularised, without losing their theological professionalism. The tribal requirement for a leader changed from a reputation as a commander to a reputation for *Fasl* skill and an ability to keep sound relationships with the state. Two types of tribes emerged. One type was patronised by the state; the other was autonomous. All these
processes required *diwān* education. Both the Shi‘a and the Arab tribal leaders required the entrepreneurial ability to develop *hawza* or *diwān* education and to promote the groups’ welfare and protection.

A significant by-product of the modernity projects was the different social groups’ awareness of their political identity. Within the communities, the meaning of the modernity projects was based on their religious or tribal code of social obligation. However, there was a lack of knowledge shared with other groups. The historical legacy of the lack of trust between culturally deep-rooted Iraqi communities was a problem.

Differences among the new state, traditional and cultural leaders were marked in their routes to leadership positions and in their education. One challenge was how to redefine and institutionalise, in a time of rapid political and social change, the traditional concepts of merit and what was counted as good knowledge in the previous time. The next chapter focuses on how this issue was reflected in the educational institutions of the Ottoman period, and of monarchical and republican Iraq.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCEPTS OF MERIT AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN IRAQ

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the changing concepts of merit before and during the Ottoman Empire, especially in the nineteenth century, and in monarchical and republican Iraq in the period from 1921 to 1968, as the new state institutionalised them in the education system.

The concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated throughout Ottoman, Monarchical and Republican Iraq at state and social level. The merit valued in the Ottoman period was politicised Islamic loyalty, moral obligation to the Empire, and foreign knowledge, which were institutionalised in the state education system. People who had merit within their communities possessed traditional religious and tribal knowledge, morality and obligation.

The Ottoman legacy of the concept of merit and the new ideology of merit were embedded in the Iraqi education system as a part of the modernity projects. The state leaders overlooked what was socially counted as good knowledge, morality and a sense of obligation, but this other concept of merit was maintained and developed by cultural leaders in their traditional hawza and diwân educational institutions.

The structure and sub-structure of the chapter are the same as in Chapter 3: it is divided into three sections. Firstly, it describes the concepts of merit before and during the Ottoman period, and their institutionalisation in the education system at the state and
social levels. Secondly, the chapter describes the struggles over the renegotiations of the concepts of merit and their institutionalisation as new educational ideas in Iraq. Thirdly, it describes how the renegotiated concepts of merit lost their effectiveness in the education system. It also describes the social context of the struggles over the nature of knowledge and its institutionalisation in the hawza and diwān education.

As indicated earlier, for the purposes of this thesis, merit in Japan and Iraq will be seen as having two components, namely philosophical knowledge and practical and useful knowledge. ‘Balanced knowledge’ – it will be recalled - is defined in this thesis as a moral code which harmonises philosophical, practical and useful knowledge.

The concepts of merit and education before and during the Ottoman period

The concept of merit in the ‘Abbāsids period was derived from Islamic morality and loyalty, and from ijtihād as one way to follow the Way of God. The individual pursuit of the Way of God through intellectual searching was emphasised in the education of the Islamic clerical leaders, administrative and court officials and scholars. Those people who had merit possessed knowledge of the ‘Straight Way’ of God (sirāta mustaqqīm) which was emphasised in the Qur’ān in the chapter Al-Fātih [The Opening]:

Show us the straight way, the way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy Grace, those whose (portion) is not wrath, and who go not astray.¹

The chapter “Thunder” reminds the Muslim of the Straight Way:

God will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in their hearts.²

This verse in the Qur’ān suggests an orientation towards the ideal human society deriving from high morals and valued knowledge and based on the interaction of God’s
goodness and individual human beings.  

In the time of the ‘Abbāsids, the study of Islam developed. To have the licence to teach Islam, a further study of *ijtihād* was required. *Ijtihād* is literally “exerting oneself” for new knowledge, and includes the independent interpretation of Islamic law (*Shari'ā*) and jurisprudence (*Fiqh*). To reach *ijtihād*, the study of reasoning (*al-Aqīl*) and consensus on jurisprudence (*ijmā'*) was required. The person who reached *ijtihād* by using individual reasoning was called a cleric (* mujtahid*).  

Islamic law (*Shari'ā*) was the rules guiding the life of a Muslim, and required knowledge of the science of jurisprudence. A study of jurisprudence [Islamic jurisprudence which involved knowledge of Islamic law and reasoning about causes] was not necessarily for a political or social leader, but was a prerequisite for being an Islamic leader. The religious leaders’ scholastic method of disputation (*jādal* or *munāzara*) required a combined study of Islamic knowledge, law and traditions. In this connection the study of disputation and *fatwa* [legal judgements] was created as a new methodology for the learning of Islam, and became a fundamental source of knowledge for study in jurisprudence.

*Fatwa* and *ijtihād* became a source of merit for promotion within the clerical scholastic community. Subsequently, as philosophical disputation became the scholastic method, ability as a speaker became a prerequisite for leaders of academic and social communities. *Ijtihād* was institutionalised in Sunni judicial training, Shīa theological learning, and the *Fasl* system in the Arab tribal community, as described in the previous chapter.
The ideas of forming the ideal Islamic community (umma), Islamic morality, loyalty to Islâm, and access to ijtihād as one of the direct ways to God were negotiated and renegotiated at the social level, while at state level Islamic morality and loyalty were renegotiated.

**The concepts of merit and education in the Ottoman period**

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Sultans and bureaucrats modernised the Empire by defining the concept of merit to support the bureaucrats' position, and to legitimise and consolidate the bureaucracy. Merit was defined within a political ideology as a matter of state policy. The Islamic terms were explained in terms of the moral duties which were institutionalised and embedded in the text ‘The Guide to Morals’ (Rehber-i Akhlâk). The result of the state modernity projects was an emphasis on foreign and traditional knowledge, but there was a loss of the traditional Islamic philosophy, knowledge and morality.

However, in the society, within the Arab tribal and Shi'a communities, merit was valued as meaning the acceptance of personal obligations within these communities.

It is suggested that one of the reasons why the concept of merit became a political concern was that the Empire needed a meritocratic principle to consolidate the civil bureaucracy and the military leadership in order to centralise the Empire, and to defend it against foreign political and economic pressures. The conquest of Syria and Egypt in the sixteenth century led the Ottoman Empire to unite through the re-vitalisation of Islâm, historical studies and the learning and teaching of classics based on Islamic values. The Ottoman national idea, which first appeared in the mid-nineteenth century,
was marked by strong resistance to foreign influence, and this led to the emphasis on Islamic morality and loyalty to the Empire.

The changes in the concept of merit and their institutionalisation in the education system may be divided into three stages: the emergence and growth of the golden age of the Islamic Ottoman Empire (1299-1566), the imperial decline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the modernisation of the Empire (1808-1922). This thesis focuses on the third stage in particular the time when the *Tanzimât* (the Reform system (1839-1876) drastically affected the lives of the three provinces of the Mesopotamia through the modernisation of education and the time when Abdülhamid II (reigned 1876-1909) redefined Islamic moral obligation in the education system.

As described in the previous chapter, in the mid-nineteenth century the most effective Ottoman reforms, the *Tanzimât*, were introduced. Sunni Islâm became a resource for nationalist identity and served to re-strengthen the Empire. The reforms were drastic. There was a growing determination to reform the state’s administration, legislation, military organisation and training, economy and education, in large part on western models. The *Tanzimât* led to the emergence of a new style of education of leaders in the provinces of Mesopotamia.

The provincial people had been little touched by the apparatus of the state. In 1869, Midhat Pasha, one of the ablest administrators in the Ottoman service, arrived in Baghdad as the governor of Baghdad; he aimed to reintegrate the Mesopotamian provinces into the Empire. The Land Law of 1858 and the provinces (*wilâyât*) law of 1864, which were applied to the Danube province, were applied also to the province of Baghdad.
The new emphasis was on merit acquired through state education. A meritocratic principle based on personal and Islamic morality, that is loyalty to the Empire, and an examination system were required in order to consolidate the Sunni religious, civil, and military, bureaucracy. Hence a new achievement-oriented school system was instituted; it trained the future military officers, civil servants, teachers and tax collectors.\textsuperscript{12}

The Education Law of 1868 and the Regulations for Public Education in 1869 promulgated four years of compulsory elementary schooling. These regulations legitimised the education of the general public. In the same year, two years of lower secondary schooling (\textit{rushdiya}) and two years of higher secondary schooling (\textit{i'dadiya}) had been established for boys in Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kikuk, and Sulaymaniya.\textsuperscript{13}

Later, the educational ladder was fixed as a three years' elementary course and three years of upper elementary study, renamed as \textit{rushdiya}. The higher secondary schools offered four years of preparation for higher education. These schools prepared students for training as military leaders and civil servants. In Baghdad since 1869, the civil and military \textit{rushdiya} schools increased and, after completion, young generations proceeded to study at the Law Schools and the War College in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{14}

Under the reign of Abdülhamid II, in both sets of institutions, for official civil and military training, the students dressed in uniform, recited slogans such as ‘Long live the Sultan!’ and participated in a regimented daily routine. Whereas in non military school classrooms, maps were the only visual material apart from the blackboard, maps in the military schools were displayed along with pictures of military heroes drawn from both Ottoman and non-Ottoman history, including Mehmed the Conqueror and Napoleon.\textsuperscript{15}
There was a revival of historical studies and the absorption of foreign knowledge and languages, but, unlike in Tokugawa Japan, the learning and teaching of indigenous classics based on religious and ethnic values was ignored.

A new curriculum of *akhlāk* [literally, ‘manners’] was introduced in the schools and in the examination system. The instruction in national morality included the teaching of Sunni Islamic manners and the Sunni political system. Two textbooks, ‘The Guide to Morals’ (*Rehber-i Akhlāk*) and ‘The Science of Morals’ (*Ilm-i Akhlāk*) were used and taught inside and outside the classroom. Ali Irfan Egriboz published the textbook, *Rehber-i Akhlāk*, in the year 1899-1900. Each student acquired Western knowledge, and at the same time studied according to the traditional pedagogical practice of the Islamic world. Islamic terms, sources and concepts were explained in terms of the moral duties incumbent upon the young subjects of the Ottoman Empire. According to Fortna, “combining morals with chemistry and French derives from a different tradition from the one which linked grammar with logic, theology, and jurisprudence”. The Islamic legacy of the study of the didactic method, which emphasised theological disputation, revived, and prevailed in the form of the question–response technique of teaching and learning.

Thus, during the rapid expansion of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the nineteenth century the concept of merit, institutionalised in the education of the bureaucrats, produced intellectuals with foreign knowledge and *akhlāk*, and at the same time loyal servants of the Sultan. The state school system was designed to train such candidates. What was emphasised in education was redefined Islamic morality, *akhlāk*. What was neglected in the renegotiation of Islam was personal learning and the ontological and
epistemological knowledge which led to *ijtihād*.

Among the Iraqi intellectuals in Istanbul, there were also the sons of tribal sheikhs who studied at the tribal sheikhs’ sons’ school (*Asīret Mektebi*) established by Abdūlhamid II in 1892. Based on his personal views, this school aimed to educate the sons of the tribal chiefs and to centralise and control tribal power. The tribal sheikhs’ involvement in Ottoman authority was apparent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Abdūlhamid II cultivated ties with prominent tribal leaders in the Iraqi provinces and with leading families of the notables (*ashrāf*) in order to revitalise the Empire in terms of his pan-Islamic world view.¹⁹

In classrooms for the sons of sheikhs, the emphasis in lessons on Islamic morality was on the recitation of the Qur’ān with melody [*tajuvīd*], theology and stories of the Prophet. Within three years, students were to gain knowledge of Turkish orthography [*imlāʿa*] reading and writing and conversation, drill [*taʿlīm*], Persian calligraphy and lexicology [*lugāt*], Arabic syntax, Arabic and Turkish grammar, geography, French, drawing, engineering, first aid, and principles of accounting and arithmetic. The method of study was learning by heart.²⁰ The graduates of the school for the sons of tribal sheikhs were entitled to enter the War College.

The state’s modernity projects aimed to transmit its power in Mesopotamia through the new education system, *iʿdādiyya* and *rushdiyya* and the colleges in Istanbul. The state’s power was transmitted in Ottoman society through the state school system. Modern education consolidated Imperial education, and trained and privileged the bureaucrats in religious values and in loyalty, together with Western knowledge. The bureaucracy
had an advantageous position for influencing the process of change by controlling recruitment, training, promotion and the uniformity of education. In the early twentieth century, to the young educated Turks and Iraqi military officials, the essential change in the modernity projects was to emphasise westernisation more than Sunni Islamisation. In this transformation, it was important to replace Islamic conceptions of identity, authority and loyalty with new concepts of Western or Arab origin.

Among the military officers, a new group of young, educated Iraqis from the Mesopotamian provinces emerged, and opposed the Sultan’s government. For example, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, Nāji Shawkat, Hamdi al-Pachachi and Hikmat Sulaimān took part in the debates raging in Istanbul about constitutionalism, liberalism, decentralisation and secularism.

Thus the concept of merit in the Ottoman period included foreign technical knowledge and a refined version of Islām in the form of the national morality, obligations, and loyalty to the Sultan government. As the Empire modernised, the new privileged civil servants and the military leaders worked for the consolidation of the bureaucracy and the unification of the Empire. However, Arab tribal and Shī‘a communities which were excluded from the main Imperial modernity projects resisted them, and preserved different concepts of merit from the new state leaders.

**The Arab tribal and the Shī‘a concepts of merit**

The Islamic and Arab tribal groups retained the concept of traditional merit within their communities during the Ottoman period, since the tribal communities retained their autonomy, and the traditional tribal order was in the hands of the tribal sheikhs. The
school for the sons of sheikhs in Istanbul were hostages in the political strategy for the control of Arab tribal communities within the Ottoman Empire. Despite the Sultan's offer, not all the Arab tribal sheikhs allowed their sons to study in Istanbul. Some preferred to send their sons to notable Islamic clerics living in Baghdad or other holy cities. Not all the returned sheikhs' sons were appointed as local administrative officials; some preferred to succeed to tribal sheikhs' positions. As long as the traditional tribal system and the customary laws protected the tribal members, diwân education was little affected by the institutionalisation of the Ottoman concept of merit and knowledge provided in Istanbul.

As described in the previous chapter, the tribal concept of merit system developed through the reconciliation system (Fasl) in Islamic law and the Arab tribal communities. Merit implied individual honour and dignity (sharàf). Strong value was attached to peace (salâm). The tribal members' obligations to Fasl and peace negotiation and the knowledge needed for these activities were institutionalised in the diwân education system. Each tribe was, as Ibn Khaldûn emphasised, bound by kinship solidarity (asabîya) based on the virtue of loyalty to tribal obligation. For Khaldûn, from the educational point of view, asabîya required loyalty (wallâ'h) in dealings with one's fellows. This did not mean selfless loyalty to the leader, but loyalty based on the person's autonomous decisions according to the dignity promoted by Arab cultural values.

The main sources of diwân education were the Islamic concept of ijtihâd, customary law on the basis of Fasl traditions, tribal history and poetry which existed as an oral tradition from the pre-Islamic period.
The most traditional concept of tribal merit was that of a *murū‘a*. *Murū‘a* is the spirit of the ideal youth of the tribe. The term *murū‘a* was first used in Arabic poetry of the pre-Islamic period. Every tribal member is required to be a person of *murū‘a*. The sheikh has to be a man of generosity (*karāma*) and courage (*shijā‘a*) recognised by the tribal members. Hence, personal autonomy within a concept of social obligation was retained in the community, changing its meaning, and continued in the twentieth century.²⁶

The tribal legacy of the concepts of merit (notably *fasl* skill, *ijtihād*, *asabīya* and *murū‘a*) was reinforced as a reaction to the 1924 Law of Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) - a theme which is discussed in the next chapter.

The Shī‘a structure of learning which evolved during the nineteenth century was the product of centuries of Islamic tradition. In the middle of the nineteenth century, *Usūli* doctrine, which recognised the single most learned *mujtahid*, developed a convention that the *mujtahid* in Najaf was to be the chief cleric of all the Shī‘a.²⁷ This position was supported by charitable and religious contributions from notables, governments, and merchants of the old markets throughout the Shī‘a world.

*Hawza* communities, as centres independent of the state, are best described as communities of learning. Students developed a sense of pride in their circle of study and shared a group identity, *asabīya* in Litvak’s term, as disciples of a specific *mujtahid*.²⁸

The invention of the three stages in reaching *ijtihād*, and of obtaining leadership positions of *mujtahid*, introduced a way of educating Shī‘a clerical leaders. The first
stage of study was called the preliminaries (muqaddamāt) and lasted between three and five years, in which studies focused on achieving a firm knowledge of Arabic as well as basic concepts of logic and rhetoric. Optional subjects included mathematics and astronomy. The second stage lasted an average of three to six years. Jurisprudence (fiqh) and the principle of jurisprudence (usūl al-Fiqh) were the two main topics of study. There were also higher-level courses in logic and grammar. Each subject had its own specific universally-accepted texts, which were read successively.

Classes in the first two stages were usually held in small groups of one to three students, who would choose their teachers. The latter were mostly students at higher levels or experts in specific fields who rarely advanced in the ‘ulamā’ hierarchy. The highest stage of learning (al-Bahth al-Kharij, literally, research exceeding the book) was aimed at the attainment of ijtihād. “Exceeding the book” means that the mujtahid does not read a specific book from an assigned curriculum, but whatever he chooses. The teacher did not use specific books but discussed the various questions and issues, citing opinions of different ‘ulamā’ and adding his own comments and criticism. Most classes were held in the shrine courtyards, in mosques, or at the mujtahid’s homes.

Without state intervention, the hawza learning community developed the study of theology and played an essential role in consolidating the new networks of learning and maintaining traditional law and order in them. The key element in the community was the patronage tie between teacher and student, which extended beyond the period of study into networks of patronage encompassing the various Shi‘a communities in the Middle East. Concurrently, the growing population of scholars and students came from different ethnic groups and classes. These communities of learning in the shrine
cities were little affected by the state leaders, compared with the Ottoman hierarchy based on merit which emphasised loyalty, *akhlāk* as the national moral value, memorizing the Qur'ān, and foreign knowledge. By emphasising philosophical and practical knowledge of *ijtiḥād*, the religious leaders retained a form of Islām in which the communities and their members could grow.

To summarise, the concept of merit in the Ottoman period was defined within a political ideology as a matter of state policy in consolidating the bureaucracy. The education of the military leaders and civil servants reflected the *Tanzimat* and was characterised by an emphasis on practical knowledge needed for the modernisation and unification of the Empire: Islamic loyalty, *rehaber-i Akhlāk*, history and the selected technical foreign knowledge and languages. As a result of this, education was also characterised by the absence of the encouragement of personal cultivation and indigenous ontological and epistemological knowledge which led to *ijtiḥād*. The institutionalised foreign knowledge was not combined with this traditional knowledge. The privileged military leaders and civil servants were the modernisers of the Empire but at the same time the servants of the Sultan.

In contrast, the merit valued by the tribal and Shīʿa leaders required personal cultivation and accepting obligations within the community. The socialisation of these leaders was little affected by the new Ottoman *Tanzimat* system. The tribal merit system continued through the *Fasl* tradition in *diwān* education. Both clerical and tribal leaders acquired the concepts of merit based on traditional philosophical and practical Islamic knowledge and social obligation, which implied individual and community honour and dignity. The concepts of merit valued by the Islamic clerics and Arab tribal leaders had the same root in the pursuit of *ijtiḥād*.
The late Ottoman concepts of merit shaped by the *Tanzimāt* reforms were redefined and continued as a part of the merit required for leadership positions in the period following the foundation of the Iraqi state.

**The concepts of merit and education in Iraq**

The Ottoman legacy of the concepts of merit continued as the Iraqi state modernised itself. This legacy was deliberately absorbed into the state education system and reinforced the political ideologies in monarchical and republican Iraq. Merit was redefined within a new political ideology, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, and served to consolidate the bureaucracy. The Shi'a clerical and Arab tribal leaders challenged the fragmenting society and developed the traditional concept of merit within their education systems.

Immediately after the military occupation of Iraq in 1917, the civil authorities turned their attention to education. The state education of leaders continued the Ottoman legacy, except for the change of language and the replacement of the emphasis on Islam by Arab nationalism. The Turkish, French and Persian languages were replaced by Arabic. The state school system, instituted under Ottoman rule, began slowly to expand under British supervision. The educational provision in primary schools after 1919 under the British Mandate stressed traditional Islam, Arabic, the English language and calligraphy from the first grade.32

Subsequently the concepts of merit were institutionalised in the state education system, which were modelled on Western ideas in three areas: firstly, the establishment of the elementary schools, the colleges and later the university and the competitive examination system, secondly, curriculum control and thirdly, the expansion of the
education system. The institutionalisation of the concepts of merit in the education system most affected the control of the curriculum.

Under the British Mandate projects, the Ottoman discipline of the school for the sons of sheikhs in Baghdad was not supported by the Mandate officials. However, the Mandate officials valued the education for the sons of sheikhs and therefore, though weakened due to its insufficient budget, there was a project to reconstruct this school in Baghdad. In the Report of His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration of Iraq for the period 1923-1924, the following statement was made:

A residential school for the sons of sheikhs (in Baghdad) has been included in every budget since 1920. The need for combining tribesmen and townsmen for political purposes into one harmonious whole is now greater than ever. An educated aristocracy among the tribes would do much to reconcile them to a more modern form of government. A Sheikh’s school appeared for the fifth time in the budget for 1924-25. It would be costly, but the cooperation of the tribes in the government of the country is worth paying for. 33

The debate on the education for the sons of sheikhs continued until the end of the Mandate in 1932.

Education at every level was expanded to provide for the rapidly growing bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the diffusion of the new ideology of merit. In 1920, the Iraqi Army was formed. Throughout 1921 the work of recruiting and training units went on rapidly. The country was divided up into recruiting areas, with a recruiting officer in each. By 1933, the total strength of the Iraqi Army was estimated at twenty thousand of all arms. 34 The institutionalisation of military training in the schools began in Baghdad in 1932-33. The independence of Iraq was obtained in 1932, but the British advisers and officials continued at their posts, as well as the British military mission for
training the Iraqi army. As described in the previous chapter, the young Iraqi officers were graduates from the military college in Istanbul. However, new social and military groups were slowly emerging from the Sunni tribes in the provinces and the overseas studies projects in Britain. To the new monarchy, the army was the only instrument to consolidate the state and maintain social order.

The Iraqi military officials, unlike those of Meiji Japan, intervened in politics and education. The politicisation of the army officer corps had begun as early as 1932, when two army officers, Tawfiq Husayn and Tāha al-Hashimi, propagated the active role of the army in politics on the model of Turkey. These "Sharifians," military leaders in the Ottoman period, many from a lower-class background, were the core of the movement for Arab independence, and major political beneficiaries of the struggle in post-Ottoman Iraq. The civil servants and military officers had in common their public life at the centre.

The British officers, graduates of the Royal Military Academy, taught and trained the Iraqi military staff using the Sandhurst curricula, which included modern and traditional knowledge: imperial military geography, modern history, economics, languages, mechanical engineering or electricity and wireless technology and science, morality and leadership. However, this foreign knowledge was not combined with traditional knowledge. This issue is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

In the Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq, on May 20th, 1932, the mandatory regime in Iraq was terminated and guarantees were given to the Iraqi council headed by Nuri al-Sa‘īd. Chapter 1, Article 8 stipulated:
1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, the Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the Iraqi government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.

2. Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas [local government] the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish as the case may be.

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in the rest of Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, Iraq undertakes that the officials shall, as hitherto, be selected, so far as possible, from among Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

The merit required for modernising Iraq included competence in the Arabic language, but the languages of the non-Arab ethnic groups were excluded from state education.

Sāti’ al-Husrī set goals and structures for Iraqi education tied directly to the interest of the state, that is the education of Arab national leaders. Unlike Sultan Abdülhamid II, al-Husrī, born in Aleppo (Syria) and educated in Istanbul, did not believe in Islamic political unity, due to the existence of linguistic and cultural diversities in Iraq as well as among Muslim nations, and he called for education for the Arab nationalists.

Al-Husrī’s idea of merit was based on Arab nationalism and opposed to ethnic separatism and sectarianism. Although the Kurds were outside the political ideology of Arab nationalism, Sunni, Shī‘a, Christian and Jewish groups could accept it. Behind this, there was al-Husrī’s perception of education. His aim in education was to create the conditions for the cultural flourishing of the Arab nation and the creation of a united Arab state. He maintained that:

the union of two spheres, language and history, leads to a union of emotions and aims, sufferings, hopes, and culture. Thus the members of one group see themselves as members of a unitary nation, which distinguishes itself from others. However, neither religion nor the state nor a shared economic
life are the basic elements of a nation, and nor is common territory. If we want to define the role of language and history for a nation we can say in short that the language is the soul and the life of the nation, but history is its memory and its consciousness. 43

By redefining the Ottoman legacy of a dominant Islamic identity, al-Husri advocated Arabisation, which became the root of Iraqi educational projects until 2003.

Al-Husri advocated the acquisition of both foreign knowledge and Arabic. As a professor at the Higher Teachers’ Training College, he shaped the thinking of a new generation of high school teachers. The primary school curriculum and texts for the academic year 1922-1923 were defined by al-Husri. The textbook for the Arabic language was called ‘khalduniya’, named after Ibn Khaldün. The Ottoman legacy of Islamic manners, rehber-i Akhlâk, shifted into secular akhlâq al-Mudniya [civic ethics]; al-Husri preached egalitarianism and self-sacrifice for Arab nationalism. The study of akhlâq al-Mudniya included a study of the political system and was obligatory from the elementary schools to the university level. 44 Thus the emphasis on the acquisition of indigenous knowledge, the Arabic language, history and geography and civic ethics was a part of the state modernity projects.

Despite the intellectual struggles over the Ottoman legacy of Islamic merit and over honouring Arab nationalism, the concept of merit was now redefined by political ideology. The new concept of merit was institutionalised in a new selection of knowledge and within the state education and political systems. To realise the establishment of the Iraq state and the Arab nation, and consolidate the bureaucracy, the acquisition of Western knowledge became important. In European history, the emphasis was on the study of Garibaldi and Bismarck. 45 This selected foreign
knowledge was a means to communicate and consolidate individual loyalty to the nation-state and strengthen national identity.

Thus the concepts of merit were negotiated at state level by al-Husrī. As in the case of the Ottoman legacy of education, his education system was an ideological training for the civil servants and Arab nationalist civic professionals. Arab nationalism and Sunni belief became sources of merit and promotion. The institutionalisation of traditional and foreign knowledge and languages in the new education system shaped the Arab nationalists, in particular civil servants, school teachers, academic scholars, lawyers, scientists and medical doctors.

Al-Husrī’s new concept of merit, social solidarity based on Ibn Khaldūn’s ideas, was secular, and he aimed to build a civic society constituted by Arab nationalists. However, his unitary notion of merit excluded non-Arab and non-Sunni status groups from access to the state merit system. This meant that there was no newly created knowledge to share with the urban, religious and Arab tribal groups.

There was ambivalence among the state educationalists towards the modernity projects. Al-Husrī was tolerant and opened dialogue with the British, the minorities, the Kurds, and the Shī‘a groups. However, his strong sectarianism and honouring of Arab nationalism brought about a lack of trust. Although his curriculum of Arab nationalism and akhlāq al-Mudnīya continued in the educational projects until 2003, the unequal provision of education delayed the modernisation of the country. The education of leaders was affected by this lack of shared knowledge, feelings, languages, history and concepts of merit among the different communities. Eventually, the hostility of the
British and the Shi'a led to his resignation as Director-General of Education. He was replaced by Muhammad Fādhl al-Jamālī in 1934.  

Although al-Jamālī was a strong supporter of Arab nationalism, al-Husri's view of cultural identity appeared to him as incompatible with the principles of pedagogy.  

Opposed to al-Husri's Sunni Arab centralism, al-Jamālī, an urban Arab nationalist, emphasised the importance of educational provision in the rural areas. By the mid-1930s the Shi'a had come close to dominating the Ministry of Education. The removal of al-Husri from his position of influence in the Ministry paved the way for the Shi'a to push for the expansion of state education in the rural areas, beginning with the 1933-34 academic year.  

In 1934 al-Jamālī established directorates of education in each province in Iraq, and encouraged the directors to introduce reforms in the schools under their jurisdiction according to the specific social needs of their province. Emphasising a decentralised educational system, he ensured increasing Shi'a access to secular education in the local areas and was responsible for an increase in the number of Shi'a in the student missions sent abroad.  

In 1934, he emphasised merit in education in the Islamic context:  

The Muslim educator should think again and evaluate his actual position. On the one hand, he should uphold his Islamic heritage and Islamic identity; on the other, he should adopt from the West elements of human welfare, power, science, industry and organisation. He should beware of distortion of his national and religious identity, and of the mistakes and ills with which the West is now afflicted.
For al-Jamāli, Islām and Arab traditional and western knowledge were a means to strengthen state ideology and to serve the nation-state. He proposed a role for a 'new man':

The 'new man' will need new characteristics, and the educator can shape his work to produce them. First, integrity. Next, emotional control. Control of the right kind must be the whole truth, and that not merely in a scientific sense. Truth is greatly needed in human relationships. ...Only those who have been set free can free others. Only the loved can love. School life can make it clear that a position of any sort is an opportunity for service, not self-advancement.\(^{51}\)

The education of new men was thus focussed on the practical aspects of life, overlooking the traditional concept of merit as requiring Islamic philosophy and self-cultivation. Al-Jamāli considered that character-training was necessary to equip a responsible “new type of man” that the state needed. However, the development of individual autonomy and social responsibility so as to ensure a person’s success in life was hardly mentioned.

Just before the end of the Mandate, in 1931, the Iraqi government invited Professor Paul Monroe of Columbia Teachers’ College to prepare a report on the modernisation of education in the country.\(^{52}\) Al-Jamāli was a member of the Monroe Commission of Enquiry, and he was Monroe’s Ph.D. student. The Report of the Commission recognised the fragmented ethnic, religious and social components of Iraq and proposed the decentralisation of the educational system.

Al-Jamāli was aware of the educational problems of the separation between the Sunni and the Shī’ā, and between the urban and the rural groups and his emphasis in the Monroe Report was on the problem of tribal education.
The Report focused on two issues: first, the fostering of secondary education which would contribute to the training of the country’s future leadership, and secondly, tribal education as the basic problem. State education was largely confined to city dwellers, and largely directed towards government service and the teaching profession. The Commission proposed the guiding principles for tribal education which they conceived as essential in carrying out any educational programme. The Report stated:

It is important that, as far as possible, education should be directed among the tribes by people from the tribes. We see a great danger if tribal education is divorced from the tribal situation. Those tribal children who are sent to city schools certainly will not be happy in going back to live with their tribes. Moreover, the tribes should not be supplied with educational workers from cities and towns, for these are not well received by the tribes on the one hand, and on the other hand no city man can live comfortably with the tribes for any length time. The practical problem, then, is how to train educators from the tribes for the tribes.

Education must cherish the desert tradition of vesting leadership in the hands of the most able. Although theoretically hereditary, we have seen that chieftainhood in the desert is based on real merit and the ability to lead.

As a solution to the problem of tribal education, the Monroe Commission suggested peripatetic schools for the tribes. Knowledge about health and farming would be provided for the rural tribal members. In 1935, the Training School for Rural Teachers was established in the Rustamiya district of Baghdad.

The Monroe Commission Report stated:

There should be no separate provision for the education of the sons of the sheikhs. The sons of the sheikhs should not be brought up differently from the sons of the tribal members. Such favouritism will lead to serious social problems for the country in the long run. The leadership among those tribes should be natural rather than imposed. This has been the desert tradition and it is the best. If the sons of the sheikhs aspire to leadership they should get it by merit and not by adventitious factors. They should live and grow with the sons of the tribal members, and their capacity for leadership must grow from within. We lay down this principle to discourage such decisions
This report was written by al-Jamālī. He was aware of a practical problem, which was that his support for democratic civic society contradicted the preservation of education for the tribes and the socialisation of tribal leaders. However he was not sufficiently aware of the knowledge and merit of the tribal leaders which was valued by the tribal members. Al-Jamālī tried to apply Western universal egalitarianism to tribal education. In fact, as described in the previous chapter, very few secondary schools were opened in the provinces.

Al-Husrī criticised the Monroe Commission Report as a foreign, hastily prepared, evaluation without an understanding of the cultural traditions and the politics of Iraq. Al-Husrī’s request to open dialogue was rejected by the Committee and al-Jamālī. The cultural and educational separations of Sunni from Shi’ā and urban from rural areas were not discussed with these opposing leaders. The varied state modernity projects, which contained different ideas on the state and civic leadership, paralleled the development of the state education system.

Al-Jamālī’s education policy confirmed the fragmentation of ethnic and regional groups. The gap between civic and rural knowledge was strengthened by the separation of tribal and civil law in 1933. Shi’ā Islamism and tribalism revived, and reacted against the state project. The socialisation of tribal and religious leaders strengthened. Through their life experiences, tribal and Islamic history, literature and philosophy were reinforced in the diwān and hawza educational systems within the community. Foreign knowledge as advocated by al-Jamālī and his vision of new Iraq
were not combined with indigenous philosophy and practical knowledge.

Like al-Husrī and al-Jamāli, Sāmī Shawkat, a medical doctor, later the Director General of Education in 1939, and a Minister of Education in the 1940s, supported Arab nationalism. His concept of merit was based on the Islamic morality of loyalty, but was absorbed in a militaristic and pragmatic way in the education system and in the bureaucracy. This helped Shawkat and other state leaders to strengthen the political ideology calling for the formation of an Arab nation and an Iraqi nation-state, and to consolidate a military and bureaucratic government. The effect of his educational modernity projects was the emergence of a militaristic style of leadership.

The militarisation of state education meant the assimilation of Western nationalist and Fascist models. By this time, nationalist youth organisations were already established in Italy, Germany, Bulgaria, India and Egypt. However, unlike in the youth organisations of some other countries, memberships of the Iraqi youth organisation was compulsory for all male secondary school students.

As early as 1932, Shawkat and other Arab nationalists had envisaged the militarisation of Iraqi society by training the youth, and institutionalising their ideologies in education. This educational programme was called futūwa (literally, the youth). Futūwa was an Islamic term for the ideal youths in the Ummayyad and ‘Abbāsids periods. The traditional futūwa was redefined by Shawkat as having the spirit of chivalry. The vision of state education set goals and structures tied directly to the interest of the state: Sunni Islamisation, Arabisation and the militarisation of education.
In the 1934, a *futūwa* programme was developed jointly by the Ministries of Education and Defence. The programme was popular with the administrative bureaucrats and was supported by the Arab nationalist Muthanna Club and teachers at the Teachers’ Training College. Among them, al-Sabbāgh Amin al-Umari and Yūnis al-Sab’awi supported *futūwa* education for the unification of the Arab nation. The Prime Minister, Jamil al-Midfa‘i, became the patron, and the Ministry of Education supervised further development. In 1935, under the Yashin al-Hashimi regime, the *futūwa* programme was legitimised and was enacted as ‘*Nidhām al-Futūwa* [the Youth Chivalry Regulation]’. The magazine *Al-Futūwa* [Chivalry] was established and continued for two years in high demand. This publication increased the popularity of the *futūwa* movement. Many professionals and teachers supported *futūwa*.

The compulsory *futūwa* curriculum was extended from all secondary schools, to high schools, and teachers’ colleges and later to all other educational institutions and administrative offices. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defence led the establishment of a paramilitary youth organisation, *Jaish al-Futūwa* (the Youth Army), inspired by German and Italian youth organisations. These organisations were developed by Shawkat and Tāha Hāshimi, who graduated from the *Rushidiya* in Baghdad, attended the War College in Istanbul and Staff college, and was later a general, a military scholar and the Minister of Education under Yashin al-Hāshimi’s regime.

By 1936, the government had incorporated compulsory knowledge, defined by the examination system and an emphasis on the transmission of compulsory moral principles, in the education system. The merit which was institutionalised in the Youth
Chivalry Regulation was used to guide the Iraqi youngsters to develop loyalty to the nation-state and a sense of involvement in a historical mission aiming at a total renovation of Arab society. A whole political culture was built on their role as a national vanguard ready to restore the Arab tradition. Strongly influenced by German ideas of nationalism, and encouraged by Fritz Grobba, German Minister in Baghdad, Shawkat, the General Director of Education in 1939, defined history as a subject in the schools. He addressed high school students on the inauguration of military training for them:

Iraq’s ambition [literally ‘hope’] extends to all the Arab countries on the banks of this formidable [Tigris] river.....Harūn al-Rashid established his throne and.....ruled over 200 million people. We shall not deserve to be proud of him and claim that we are his grandsons if we do not rebuild what he constructed. The spirits of al-Rashid and al-Ma’mun want that Iraq would have, within a brief time-span, half a million soldiers and hundreds of airplanes. To power [then], O youth, raising high the banner of [King Faysal 1], heir (khalīfat) of Harūn al-Rashid. 70

The military profession was regarded as the fulfilment of a religious duty. 71 The ideal soldier was the perfect citizen, retaining the traditional values.

We wish every success for our soldiers and hope that Iraq will soon have a strong army so that the country may gain complete independence and true freedom. 72

This speech was largely based on both Iraqi and Arab history, using traditional classics to motivate nationalism. For Shawkat, Arab nationalism was a means to realise military politics, and, unlike in Meiji Japan, the military was the means to realise the independence and the freedom of the country.

The Ministry of Defence assigned officers as teachers for Jaish al-Futūwa. Resisting the view of education as a militaristic institution in the service of the state, al-Husrī
opposed the idea of military bureaucrats teaching in the schools. There was no dialogue between al-Husri and Shawkat. Teaching was focused on the cultivation of the individual Islamic spirit, the English language and the militaristic values of the march and chivalry. Between 1934 and 1935, secondary school students completed the curriculum of military training for the infantry and cavalry, and the use of small arms. Educational ceremonies were students' parades and meetings, modelled on similar gatherings taking place in Germany and Italy. These events became frequent. Students were classified by military rank and wore corresponding chevrons and badges. They formed the audience of Shawkat's speeches. The militarisation of education was a reflection of Shawkat's personal educational background:

> I hereafter shall permit no one to make any propaganda for peace and shall oppose anyone who advocates peace. We want war. We should shed our blood for the sake of Arabism. We should die for our national cause.... It is our duty to perfect the profession of Death, the profession of the army, the sacred military profession.

Although this speech was criticised and ridiculed by the more moderate sectors of the population, the principle of individual sacrifice for the sake of national salvation remained a part of the state modernity projects. Thus the military were fervent supporters of the futūwa in state education. Shawkat institutionalised the ideals of Arab nationalism and selfless loyalty in state education.

In 1939, a new Public Education Law was promulgated. Article 5 forbade injury to national unity, and Article 31 allowed the authorities to close any private and foreign schools whose activities were seen as contravening of Article 5. Article 32 forbade private schools to accept financial aid from foreign sources without the approval of the Ministry of Education. Article 34 prohibited the use of books that were incompatible
with the spirit of Article 5.  

In 1940, the law extended direct government control over all private schools, stipulating that only Arab teachers approved by the Ministry of Education could teach Arabic history, geography and civic ethics, and the establishment of a national examination system of baccalaureates for the primary (6 years) intermediate secondary (3 years) and preparatory secondary grades (3 years).

As mentioned earlier, the state's educational modernisation and what was counted good knowledge were renegotiated by the British from the 1940s onwards.

*Changing the concept of merit*

After the British re-occupied Iraq in 1941, Professor Herbert Russell Hamley, an educator from the University of London Institute of Education, saw the necessity of promoting Western liberal democracy as a serious alternative to Arab fascism. Hamley was pivotal in the educational process of Iraq. His appointment at the Ministry of Education was a turning point in its history. With his coming, the Ministry came under British influence. He had two main objectives: first, to eliminate the fascism which was widespread at the Ministry and in the schools, and secondly to re-organise the curriculum of the schools, destroying the strong relationship between fascism and the curriculum.

Both state and social modernisers were involved in the internationally influenced renegotiation of existing cultural traditions and knowledge. Hamley had to prepare for action and fill the gaps at the Ministry of Education. He had enough authority and
power to make changes. He brought in Sādiq Jawhar from Egypt, Hasan Ahmad al-Salmān from Basrah, and Abdul Fatah Ibrahim from Baghdad, and started his efforts to change the curriculum. The *futūwa* educational project was abolished in 1941. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the Ambassador, sent a letter to Mr. Eden:

Professor Hamley has been able to make some progress with the reform of the Ministry of Education but it seems clear that he will continue to meet with serious obstruction until Dr. Sāmi Shawkat and Dr. Fādhlī Jamālī, the joint directors-general, are removed. The Prime Minister was trying to obtain an eminent Egyptian educationalist as a new head of the department.

Meanwhile, Professor Hamley has enhanced his already high reputation by organizing a successful summer school for older boys in which he has been able to demonstrate the value of sane, healthy principles of education, while indicating at the same time the opportunities that exist for constructive youthful endeavour within the country. It is hoped in this manner to combat to some extent the pessimism that seems to cloud so many young minds in Iraq.

The most important aspect of Hamley’s educational programme was citizenship education. The summer school for older boys was also called a summer school of citizenship. As Jamālī had used summer military training for boys, Hamley used the summer camps for citizenship to empower the young democratic citizens. Their informal curriculum, including foreign knowledge, developed the socialisation of the learning network among the teachers. Cornwallis wrote that the actual running of the ‘Summer Schools of Citizenship’ was wisely left in the hands of the Iraqi teachers.

Summer camps or summer military training camps, were also used for the socialisation of the ‘al-Ahālī’ groups – the origins of the communist group in the 1950s - and for Ba‘th party members and the expansion of their membership.

The Ottoman legacy of *akhlāq* and Husrī’s *akhlāq al-Mudnīya* were now redefined as citizenship in terms of liberal education. During Hamley’s stay in Iraq, he saw the importance of rural education, and of uniting the urban and rural groups.
In the 1950s, Iraq, under al-Sa‘īd's regime, experienced industrial development assisted by the increase in oil revenues. Unlike education in the 1920s and 1940s, in the 1950s there was much more focus on technical education for the modernisation of the state and the society. Al-Sa‘īd and al-Suwaidi established a new type of education for citizens. ‘Civic ethics and national education’ were provided for the students of the second and third grades in the intermediate schools. Al-Sa‘īd encouraged civilian and military loyalties to the state and the Arab nation, and political docility among the students. Physical education, military training and civil defense were obligatory in all intermediate and preparatory schools and within both literary and science courses, and continued until 2003. In the 1950s, the education of military officers at the staff college in Baghdad continuously strengthened their training. The Ministry of Education sent the officers and graduates of the Military and Staff College to the Sandhurst Staff College.

The clerical and tribal leadership were also pivotal in the democratisation process. However, during the Qāsim regime (1958-1963), the educational system was politicised in a new form. The vision of education was stated in the 1958 Public Education Law. Article 1 declared:

The duty of the Ministry of Education is the creation of an enlightened and conscious generation believing in Allah and in its own homeland, having confidence in itself and its nation, aiming at high ideals of individual and social conduct; tenacious of the principles of justice and good; possessing will-power for the common struggle, the ways and means of decisive action, and the ability to carry through positive policies. Armed with scientific knowledge and sound character, the Iraqi may thus be able to strengthen the position of his people as well as of the Arab nation among the nations of the world, and to establish the Arab nation’s right to freedom, security, and dignified life.

To Qāsim, Arab and Iraqi nationalisms were important sources of the national identity.
This law emphasised the ideal individual and social conduct to realise the formation of the Arab nation. In 1964, in Arif's period, the teaching of ideal “individual and social conduct” became part of the curriculum. The Ministry of Education called for a course in ‘National and Social Education’ to prepare citizens who were faithful to their country, the new nation and humanity at large. According to the intermediate school syllabus for this year, “national and social education should be effective for the acquisition of useful attitudes, good habits, noble emotions, moral values and a belief in the right of the nation to lead a dignified life and to contribute to the progress of human civilisation”.

Nationalism worked as a part of the political system to strengthen state ideology, but also marginalised the tribal and civil factions through the use of violence and ethnic and religious divisions. The state leaders were intolerant of the Shi'a traditions, knowledge and values, and of certain tribal groups. These leaders neglected to apply the indigenous traditions in the state educational curriculum. The traditional Islamic study of *ijtihād* was not included in the school curriculum, but was a core of the learning in the *diwān* and the *hawza*. *Fasl* traditions were not studied in the College of Law. The urban lawyers were ignorant of indigenous tribal jurisprudence.

During the conflicts between the religious leadership and the communist party members who were supporters of the Qāsim government, *Mujtahid*, later *Ayattolah*, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr found himself in the midst of a bitter confrontation between traditional Najaf and the Communists. His world view was formed with this twofold intellectual background: a Socialist-Communist call which was affecting the whole of the Middle East and which permeated the concern in his writings with the ‘social
question', and the traditional education of the hierarchy. In opposing communism, as-Sadr’s redefinition of Shi’ism had a political dimension.

Against the increase of communist support for Qāsim’s regime, as-Sadr defended in public Islamic knowledge which led to spiritual and material harmony. He recognised the existence of contradictions in society and in political ideology. In his Falsafatūnā (Our Philosophy) as-Sadr gave an idea of Islamic philosophy at work, claiming that the idea of contradiction in the dialectics of Communism is redundant:

Motion in its dialectical understanding rests on the basis of contradiction, and the opposition of contradictions. These conflicts and contradictions are the inner force, which pushes movement and creates development. In contrast to this, our philosophical understanding rests on a notion of movement, which is considered a course [of passing] from degree to a corresponding degree, without these corresponding degrees ever meeting in one specific stage of the course of the movement.

The idea of the renovation of hawza began in the 1960s, through the efforts of Ayatollahs Muhsin al-Hakîm, as-Sadr and Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei. Al-Hakîm aimed to preserve the institutional independence of the community from the government and from the transformation of the system at the political centre. He expanded his influence by increasing enrolment in the hawza in Najaf and by developing plans to establish a Western-style Šī‘a academy in Kufa for future Šī‘a political leaders. As-Sadr helped establish the Usūl al-Dīn College in Baghdad in 1964, and set up its curriculum. For first-and second-year college students, he wrote three textbooks on the Qur’ān, the usūl al-Fiqh, and Islamic economics.

The method for the education of Šī‘a leaders changed. It was as-Sadr who transformed the learning community itself. He institutionalised his redefined Islamic political thought and Islamic political movements by reinforcing new political parties.
First, he pursued the enlargement of Islamic political activities by including laymen. Secondly, he renovated the *hawza* by writing new textbooks, by changing the method of learning and by institutionalising academic promotion.

As-Sadr believed in a new Islamic education, as an important part of his answer to the problems of the politically vulnerable *hawza* system. Rather than maintaining *hawza* scholar communities, he aimed at the establishment of western-style universities that would hold the student responsible for completing certain courses and passing regular examinations. He allowed the intervention of the clerics in politics, which had occurred in a sporadic and individual way throughout the history of Shi'a communities.

Thus as-Sadr’s thoughts were institutionalised in the *hawza* and its enlarged Najef University. However, within the *hawza*, there was conflict over principles. As-Sadr and Shams-Din redefined Islām in terms of political thought, as-Sadr more widely in terms of economics, sociology and other worldviews. Al-Khoei supported non-political Islām. Al-Khoei’s message to the Shi’as was not an aspiration to set up an Islamic theocracy; all of the ‘ulamā’’s emphasis was to be on encouraging individual access to *ijtihād*.

Conflicts over the cultural redefinition of Islām and the political actions of each group affected the state. These conflicts and the state leaders’ absence of social trust created difficulty for both the state and the society in developing the modernisation of the country.

Unlike the Shi’a leaders, the Sunni leaders focused the education of leaders on the
training of judges, and have continued to do so in the contemporary era. The National Institute for the Training of Judges was supervised by one of the assistants of the Minister of Justice. This system continues today.

Arab and Iraqi national identity was continuously a source of merit valued by the state for leadership positions. The redefined merit system, loyalty and Arab Islām were institutionalised in the education system.

The education of tribal sheikhs and Shi‘a leaders played a large role in forming their political worldviews. As in the case of Meiji Japan, the moral code within balanced knowledge encouraged personal autonomy within a concept of cultural and social obligation. Islamic and Arab tribal education remained fundamentally an informal enterprise revolving around the teacher-student relationship or the hierarchical relationship between tribal sheikhs and members. The traditional concept of merit which functioned in Islamic and Arab tribal communities could be combined with foreign knowledge, and create new forms of civic society. For this purpose, the private Najaf University was established in 1960.

**Conclusion**

The education of the Ottoman military leaders and civil servants started in the Tanzimāt. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, the concepts of merit were characterised by an emphasis on practical foreign knowledge, history and indigenous morality, which was needed for the consolidation of the bureaucracy and the unification of the Empire. The subjects studied were selected areas of foreign technical knowledge, languages, and redefined Islamic loyalty, that is, rehber-i Akhlāk as defined in the Guide to
Morals. The idea of *rehaber-i Akhlâk* was politicised. It called for national morality, national obligations, and loyalty to the Sultan’s government. The Islamic legacy of theological disputation was continued in the form of the question–response technique of teaching and learning, but the pursuit of the ontological and epistemological knowledge which led to *ijtihiad* was neglected. Thus the Ottoman modernity projects shaped meritocratic intellectuals who were loyal servants of the Sultan. The new Military and Law College and the sheikhs’ sons’ school, as well as the school system, were designed to train such candidates. The redefined concepts of merit were based on recruitment, promotion and the competitive examinations.

The Arab military groups educated in Istanbul were those who first raised voices of opposition to Ottoman Islamisation of the modernity projects and called for Pan-Arab nationalism and secularism. Under the Mandate’s education policies, the state modernisers redefined *rehaber-i Akhlâk* as *akhlâq al-Mudniya* [civic ethics] and embedded it in a textbook, taught as a part of the compulsory curriculum and continued in Monarchical and Republic Iraq. The idea of loyalty to the state as a civic obligation combined with the two ideologies of nationalism and was institutionalised in the state education system. However, the different state ideologies of the centralisation of education advocated by al-Husnî, decentralisation by al-Jamâlî and militarisation operated by Shawkat contested with each other in the first fifty years of the history of Iraq. These three controversial ideologies, though they declined in the 1940s, revived and co-exist in the state education system today.

The establishment of modern curricula for the education of civil servants eroded the social values contained in the moral code of Islamic and Arab tribal knowledge.
The Sunni-centred *Tanzimāt* projects continued to exclude the development of the Shi'a community. As a reaction to this, the Shi'a religious leaders revitalised the *hawza* learning communities in order to protect their life styles and fulfill their theological obligations, in particular the pursuit of *ijtihād*. The exclusive political environment continued to oppress the Shi'a throughout the twentieth century.

There were the constant debates about the construction of a new life in the 1920s and 1930s and not all the previous sources of merit continued. For example, the Mandate officials struggled, for more than ten years, over the education of sheikhs' sons in Baghdad and the institutionalisation of tribal merit in it. Though the Mandate officers agreed on the rejection of the Ottoman educational policy, this continuous struggle was mainly caused by the insufficient budget, and disputes among the officers on how to reconstruct the education of sheikhs' sons. There was, as the Report for 1923-4 said, ambivalence towards the project among the officers, and after Iraq became independent in 1932, the education of the sheikhs' sons at the state level was not valued. In contrast, *diwān* education was defined by al-Jamālī as a problem for the new Iraq as well as for his concept of the new man. His state modernity projects for rural education brought about the loss of shared knowledge and feeling which could lead to mutual understanding between urban and rural dwellers.

Under the pressure of the 1924 law of tribal regulations, the tribal leaders reinforced the *diwān* education for the protection and the welfare of their communities and peace with other tribes by using tribal knowledge of *Fastl*. The Shi'a leaders' resistance to the pressures of the exclusive state modernity project led to the emergence of differences in the ideas of as-Sadr, al-Khoei and al-Muzaffār about the Shi'a position in
relation to the state. *Hawza* education played an essential role in inter-communal protection and in fostering a new style of leadership.

What was neglected in state education was the knowledge included in the cultural legacy which was maintained and developed in the traditional *hawza* and *diwān* educational institutions. The study of the thinking needed to reach *ijtihād* [the one straight way to lead to Heaven] was overlooked in the Ottoman and Iraqi state education systems. The tribal knowledge of *ijtihād*, which was used for *Fasl* peace-making, and Shīʿa knowledge of *ijtihād* for the development of theology remained alien to the state leaders, as the state education system disregarded these subjects in the curriculum. The state modernisers, the nationalists and military leaders, ignored values and knowledge of the Arab tribal or Shīʿa groups and failed in finding a new common goal across the communities. The study of *ijtihād* developed gradually within both communities, in *hawza* and *diwān*, but it was not revitalised by a combination with foreign knowledge, or combined with other indigenous knowledge. The concepts of merit continued in different styles, and continue today.

The next chapter discusses the way in which these varied concepts of merit and knowledge were institutionalised in the education systems and the effects of the changing education of leaders in the state modernity projects and within the different communities.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN IRAQ

This chapter, like Chapter 4, identifies what will be defined as leadership positions. It then traces the original forms of the education of leaders in Iraq, before and especially during the Ottoman period, and analyses the changing education of leaders under the Monarchy and the new Republic. The chapter argues that political and cultural struggles over the institutionalisation of what was regarded as good knowledge and moral values created new styles in the education of leaders.

The changes in Iraq are divided into two phases, those of the Monarchy (1921-1958) and the Republic (1958-1968). The chapter offers four sections, but the titles of the subsections are not the same as those in Chapter Four. This is due to the fact that unlike Meiji Japan, Iraq did not experience public debates about moral values.

The education of leaders before and during the Ottoman period (750-1922)

Leadership positions

In the 'Abbāsid period, there was an occupational separation between Arab political leaders and Islamic leaders. The caliphs were successors to the Prophet Muhammad and the political leaders of the Islamic community (umma), while the Islamic scholars ('ulamā') and the judges were the religious leaders. Having a strong theocratic position and continuity with orthodox Sunni Islām, the caliphs were represented as symbols of sacred moral virtue. Their leadership position required Islamic virtues, arts and refinement. The roles of the caliphs were to disseminate Islām and encourage Islamic study as heads of the administrative offices and the military and justice
systems. Following Muhammad’s example, the caliphs held the highest authority for the solving of disputes.

The holder of the highest religious position in the caliphate’s administrative offices was called ‘muftī’ [a legal expert who issues fatwa] and recognised by the caliph as the person who was familiar with fatwa in the context of religion. The muftī was the product of the ‘Abbāsid education of religious leaders and new professions. At the end of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty (750-1258), the Sunni clerics and muftī were defined as persons of talent. Opening positions to muftī became the fundamental principle of the caliphates’ administration. The caliphs established posts for the muftī and the judges, appointed them and paid them. This was in the thirteenth century, when the concepts of the education of leaders, of the philosophical moral code and of practical learning became political concerns and the muftī became governmental bureaucrats. Among the Sunni muftī, there was resistance to the new system of obtaining salaried secular positions.¹ The clerical scholars were, however, gradually absorbed into the caliphate’s offices.

**The education of administrative and Islamic legal experts**

In the ‘Abbāsid period, especially in the eleventh century, administrative, religious, military and academic leaders emerged through the new educational institutions. The education of these leaders took place in their administrative offices (diwān), madrasa [college of law and religious school] or in the mosque. The diwān developed around the caliphs and their scholarly companions, becoming places for the exchange of ideas, and reaching their highest popularity during the period of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid, who reigned from 786 to 809. Al-Rashid used the diwān for initiating debates among distinguished scholars on religion, theology, philosophy, rhetoric, grammar and poetry
The madrasa al-Mustansiriyya [al-Mustansiriyya school], founded by the Caliph Mustansir in 1237, was the highest educational institution during the 'Abbasid period.  

The term majālis was used in the first century of Islām to designate a sacred hall for the teaching of hadith [oral tradition and the records of the collections of sayings and acts of the Prophet and the first Muslims]. In the ‘Abbāsid period, many types of majālis emerged in Baghdad, for example as meeting places for poets, for consultations on jurisprudence (fiqh), and for legal disputations.  

Foreign works in Greek, Persian and Sanskrit gained in importance in bookshops and public libraries, the House of Science (the dār al-Ilm), and the hospitals. The House of Sagacity (beit al-Hikma) encouraged the learning of Islām as well as new knowledge, and the translation of important Greek, Persian and Sanskrit writings into Arabic. Literature, theology, philosophy, mathematics and natural sciences flourished.

Education through majālis developed learning networks. The official educational institutions were built by the waqf. Waqf were Islamic charitable trusts based on the support of private property, and were established from the time of the Prophet. Property was dedicated to waqf for the advancement of education, which was synonymous with the advancement of religion. Supported by the caliphs and urban notables, the waqf distributed funds to the students of the College of Law and encouraged the new study of Islamic science and law. Thus the study of law was institutionalised in the education system. The legal justification of a waqf was its charitable objective. Islām and Arab moral values were seen in the system of scholarships, which were usually offered by the teachers and distributed among their
followers. Through their patronage, the community of teachers, students and other institutional personnel developed.6

When the four Sunni schools and their jurisprudence were consolidated, and the muftī were absorbed in the bureaucracy as salaried clerics, the intellectual search for *ijtiḥād* weakened.7 The Sunni schools closed the door of the debates on jurisprudence, and the study of *ijtiḥād* was interrupted. However, Shīʿa leaders established new communities in Najaf, developing a separate Islamic identity from the orthodox who were centred in Baghdad.

This ʿAbbāsid legacy of the education of leaders shifted into different forms in the Ottoman period.

**The Ottoman period (1299-1922)**

As the Ottoman state modernised itself, changes were made in political leadership. Political and cultural struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined Islamic knowledge and the acquisition of practical foreign knowledge created new styles of the education of the Ottoman civil servants and military leaders.

During the 613 years of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans and their bureaucratic courts continued the Islamic legacies. The Ottoman leaders emphasised that justice and wisdom were needed in the leaders who were to harmonise society by standing apart from the different social orders.8 At the same time, the Sultans were the heirs to the Islamic tradition and could claim to exercise legitimate authority in Islamic terms. They were the upholders of the *Sharīʿa* but, as they themselves maintained, they were the servants of the sanctuaries of Islām. In a large city, the muftī, appointed by Sultan,
were the chief legal experts for the Sunni administration of waqf. In most cases, the highest offices in the legal service were held by graduates of the Imperial foundations in Istanbül. The chief judges of the provincial capitals, Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, were Palestinian Mamluks and Turks sent from Istanbül.9

The traditional learning system continued in the Shi’a religious communities. Iraqi Shi’a leaders had their own history. With the rise of the Shi’a Qajar state in Iran (1779-1925), the shrine cities served as important recruiting grounds for clerical personnel. From the middle of the nineteenth century, a convention developed that the leading clerics in Najaf were the chiefs of all the learned Shi’a clerics.10

The education of civil servants and military leaders

In 1868, the Galatasary Lycee was established in Istanbül; it provided a comprehensive system of education from primary to university level. The school furthered the dominant French impact on Ottoman culture.11 The curricula for all secondary study (rushdiya) were similar, except for the emphasis on gymnastics in the military schools. Instruction was in Turkish rather than in French, and for those who did not know Turkish, an extra year was required to catch up. New students needed some knowledge of arithmetic and reading. In 1899, the course of study was four years long and included Islamic history, Ottoman geography, elementary engineering, arithmetic, natural science, Arabic, Turkish, French, hygiene, and gymnastics. The preparation course for higher education (i’dâdiya) included trigonometry, algebra, engineering, hygiene, astronomy, geography, religion, calligraphy, drawing, gymnastics, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, French and English.12 Graduates from rushdiya and i’dâdiya were expected to enter the War College and the colleges of law and medicine. The students
in Istanbül under Abdülhamid II’s rule were educated in boarding schools, secluded from city life. The Arab students in the War College developed networking circles and played an important role in the politicisation of officers before and after 1936 in Iraq.

In 1917, the system of schools in the Baghdad province consisted of one school of law, one i‘dādi, one training school for teachers, one technical school linked with the irrigation project, and 71 primary schools.

**The education of religious leaders**

The traditional educational institutions, including the religious institutions, were unable to meet the demands of state education, and the resulting pressures led to the opening of additional modern schools, first at the secondary level. The traditional Sunni and Shī‘a leaders had different theological doctrines in terms of the practice of jurisprudence, the weight of *ijtihād* and the focus of leadership. The Sunni community focused on the traditional education for judges. Baghdad, Mosul and Basra continued to be centres for the study of Sunni Islam and leadership.

**The education of the tribal leaders**

Within the Mesopotamian provinces, educated groups, including many Iraqis, emerged in the various professions. This was due to the Ottoman education system based on *Tanzimāt* projects. However, what was counted as good knowledge for the civil servants and military leaders and sons of the tribal sheikhs was not derived from education for individual cultivation and Islamic moral values. The process of institutionalisation of these traditions, in particular the philosophical learning of Islam,
history and literature lost its effect in the Ottoman state education system.

In contrast, the socialisation of the tribal leaders through the traditional forms of diwân education continued. The purposes of learning for tribal leaders were, as discussed in Chapter Five and Six, to promote self-cultivation in order to serve the tribal obligations and to maintain the protection of their own boundaries and welfare. Thus differences in the education of leaders at state and social level emerged in the Ottoman period.

To summarise, political and cultural struggles, over the institutionalisation of Islamic moral values, national morality and technocratic foreign knowledge and languages learned through state education, shaped the late Ottoman civil servants, military leaders, academics and school teachers. Emphasising national moral values and practical knowledge, a well-disciplined imperial education system was constructed, but there was a loss of knowledge of Islamic philosophy. Practical foreign and indigenous traditional knowledge were not combined.

Excluded from the Tanjimât projects, the Shi‘a group revived and developed the Shi‘a learning community and theological education in the hawza in the later Ottoman period. This education of clerical leaders was different from meritocratic state education because of differences over Islamic obligation and the community. The Ottoman legacy of a meritocratic education system was recreated, though in different forms, in Iraq as a part of the state education system in the twentieth century.

**The education of leaders in Iraq (1921-1968)**

**The British mandate and the Monarchy (1921-1958)**

In this second section, the chapter identifies the leadership positions of the civil
servants, the military leaders, the urban and tribal leaders and the clerics. It describes the ways in which the state leaders struggled over a cultural renegotiation involving the Ottoman legacy of knowledge and Western knowledge, and their institutionalisation in the education of leaders. As the state modernised itself, changes were made in political leadership. Change in the political and social order was driven by the reinforcement of the state bureaucracy as the pivot of the state’s power. However, the differently educated leaders pursued their own agendas with differing results.

The Ottoman legacy of the education of leaders was recreated as the Sunni Arab state leaders educated in Istanbul took political power. The development of the education of leaders in Iraq is seen in the changes in ideologies and in the leadership positions of the civil servants, military bureaucrats and cultural leaders.

Until the British Mandate took control, Iraq was composed of three Mesopotamian provinces with various types of leaders and a mosaic of societies. In the first half of the twentieth century, three types of political leaders emerged. The first group included military leaders who were educated in Istanbul. The second group included the tribal sheikhs. The King, his family, and the tribal sheikhs’ positions were legitimised by the British Mandate officials. The tribal sheikhs’ power and community influence have continued until today. The third group included the young urban political leaders who were graduates from the new state colleges, including the returned overseas students.

The establishment of Mandate Iraq took place at a time of challenges to state leadership. King Faisal was ceremonially enthroned, but his power in political practice was restricted by the 1925 Constitution. Except over military affairs, power was put
into the Prime Minister's hands.

King Faisal was aware that with the existence of divergent community groups and interests within his kingdom, a strong national army was needed to symbolise and preserve a minimum degree of cohesion in society and prevent it plunging into chaos. Immediately after his proclamation as King of Iraq, Faisal turned his attention to strengthening the state's newly established army. In the absence of mass support and of a deep-rooted power base, King Faisal insisted on the introduction of conscription in the face of intense opposition from Britain and tribal sheikhs.17

The new Iraqi government was controlled by the ministers, often under the domination of a strong figure such as Nūri al-Sa'īd, who had graduated from the War College in Istanbül.19 From 1921 until 1956 there were more than fifty Councils of Ministers (cabinets) in Iraq. In the Mandate, from 1921 to 1932, nine of the fourteen prime ministers were previous Ottoman military officers, as were thirty-two out of fifty-six major cabinet members.19 The membership of the first 50 cabinets was drawn from the same group of 150 men. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century Iraqi politics was unstable; the cabinets were reshuffled 58 times between 25 October 1920 and 14th July 1958.20 There was, however, a heavy concentration of ministerial political power.

By 1936, among those Iraqi officers holding posts of high rank in the new Iraqi army, fifty out of sixty-one were ex-Ottoman officers who had received their education in Istanbül.21 The Iraqi army emerged at the centre of politics through the Bakir Sidqi coup in 1936. The civil servants and military bureaucrats' power over the Iraqi population, combining politics and military affairs, constituted the particular form of
the Iraqi political system. These features of the political background made the formation of Arab and Iraqi national projects difficult.

**The education of civil servants**

In the earlier stage of the state modernisation projects, the most obvious issues which were taken up by the government were the ideological basis for state education, the formation of national identity and the supply of technocratic experts. The new state and the Mandate officials attempted to unify the existing educational systems and to centralise them under the control of the state, in terms of Islām and Arab and Iraqi nationalism. However, there was an absence of social trust and pedagogical dialogue between the state educationists. There were no debates on their controversial educational policies between the state and leaders in the society. The PhD thesis of al-Jamālī on *The Problem of Bedouin Education* was not translated into Arabic.

There were also conflicts between the civil servants and military bureaucrats, and between the Pan-Arab nationalist and Iraqi nationalist groups. Those who supported nationalism were a variety of groups from different social and educational backgrounds, belonging to different networks and clubs at state and social levels. Most nationalists had a functionalist view of the *futūwa* education project. The emphases were on the students' role as the national vanguard, the way to the Arab nation-state, and on the civic ethics and political docility and knowledge to realise the project.

**Indigenous and Western knowledge**

When the British Mandate was established in 1921, not only was there a shortage of military officers but also of bureaucrats, schoolteachers, administrative officials, judges, engineers, and physicians. The state school system and the College of Law,
instituted under Ottoman rule, began slowly to expand under British supervision. The College of Law was established in Baghdad in 1908. Engineering, Medicine, and Higher Teachers’ Training Colleges were established in the 1920s. Although it took more than twenty years, the efforts of the Iraqi and British governments for the establishment of the first university started in the 1930s. In 1936, the College of Pharmacy was set up. In the 1940s, the Colleges of Commerce, Literature, and Science were established and in the 1950s the Colleges of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine and the Dental College.

The College of Law was the first new tertiary institution in Iraq since the destruction of the University of al-Mustansiriyah by the Mongols. The college aimed to train bureaucrats, diplomats, lawyers and judicial administrators, but had limited numbers. In the academic year 1949-1950, the college offered 30 courses including civics and economics. In the first year, students studied principles of law and history of Roman law, constitutional law and Shari’a, in particular Islamic civil and family law. Each subject was given three hours a week, and English was studied for six hours a week. Western criminal law was taken in the first and second years, while Shari’a continued in the third year. In the second and third year, various fields of law were studied. Among them were international law, theory of obligations, administrative law, public international law and criminal law. In the third year, the subjects were focused more on practice. Among them were public finance, theory of obligations (contract and tort), civil court procedure, commercial law, and criminal court procedure.

In the fourth year, two special subjects were available, one to prepare lawyers and judges, the other to prepare local government administrators. The prospective judges took, in addition, criminology, medical law and criminal psychology, while the future
administrators took administrative law, financial law, diplomacy, political science, the history of politics and statistics.\textsuperscript{27} Assessment was formal and obligatory, and affected ranks in subsequent careers. Indigenous philosophical literature and tribal customary law were excluded from the study of criminal court procedure. The knowledge provided for the future state leaders had no room for the indigenous traditional philosophical and moral values, hence there was no knowledge and feeling shared with the indigenous citizens.

The Ottoman legacy of the combined study of politics, law and economics continued. In 1969, the subject of political science was added, and the college was renamed the College of Law and Politics (also known as the College of Law and Political Science).\textsuperscript{28} The knowledge offered for the civil servants included politics and economics, which were incorporated into the knowledge of law.

The training of students for positions in teaching and the bureaucracy included studies abroad. The provision of study outside Iraq was not new. In the late Ottoman period, the educated Iraqis who were members of the Young Turks' groups CUP, military leaders and sons of the tribal sheikhs were the products of education in Istanbul as part of the modernity projects. When the state of Iraq was established, the overseas studies projects were institutionalised and stabilised by the government. The new state needed researchers and trainers in the fields of agriculture, industry, business, economics, sociology and hygiene.\textsuperscript{29} Education abroad had social effects.

It was in 1921, just after the foundation of the state and the accession of King Faisal 1 to the throne of Iraq, that the Ministry of Education proposed sending qualified students abroad to study. Based on Arab nationalism, and the vision of the
establishment of an independent Iraq through applying Western knowledge, the overseas studies project aimed to modernise Iraq. The project went through three stages: the emergence of the state overseas studies project (1921-1929); the growth of the academic professions (1930-1951); and their consolidation (1952-1968).

In the first stage, overseas studies aimed to train specialists in teaching, and were characterised by the choice of knowledge and of countries to overcome a lack of human resources in the fields of health, agriculture and education. The project was focussed on graduates from the senior secondary schools. Nine boys were selected; six were sent to the American University of Beirut and three to Britain. Two were to study medicine in England, one was later to study agriculture in the United States, and six were to prepare for high-school teaching.  

In 1926, the first overseas students returned to Iraq and were absorbed in the secondary schools and the Primary Teachers’ College.

In 1927, when the Royal College of Medicine was established in Baghdad, the overseas study of medicine ended, except for graduate study, dentistry and veterinary science. In 1929 the medical college adapted the curriculum of the Faculty of Medicine of Edinburgh University, under the supervision of Professor Harry Chapman Sinderson.

From the 1930s to 1951, the dispatch of students abroad was expanded. The American University of Beirut served as a conduit for students going to America to improve their English, and prepared them for advanced study in the United States. England and Germany were second to the U.S. in popularity. The number of overseas students rose from nine in 1921 to thirty-five in 1928-29, and sixty-six in 1938-39. The projects included English teacher-training. The number of students reached a peak of 234 in
1951-52. Altogether more than 700 students were sent abroad for study after 1930. Both in the first and second stages, the roles of the returned students were to introduce Western knowledge and technology to the country.

In 1936-37 seventeen students were sent to the U.S, and thirteen to England. In the next year, 1937-38, only one student was sent to the U.S, while eighteen went to England, and the next year, 1938-39, three students went to the U.S and only one to England. The dispatch of students to England, the U.S., Egypt and Lebanon continued during World War II, but the inconsistent pattern continued during and after the war.

Germany received the most students in the 1930s. This was due to the personal interest of the German Minister in Baghdad in exporting the German style of education to Iraq. The end of the 1930s and the 1940s was the period when the British Council strongly cooperated with the Ministry of Education to support technical, vocational, medical and English-speaking teacher-training in Britain.

In the third stage, in the 1950s and 1960s, study with foreign teachers was gradually giving way to study with the returned overseas students. By this time, overseas studies projects were promoted by several ministries. More emphasis was placed on postgraduate study to prepare advanced specialists.

In 1952 and 1953, 2346 students were sent abroad by the Ministries of Information and Labour. Of these, 1331 studied specific subjects and 1015 were sent as government researchers. Forty-three percent of and the students were sent to the U.S.A, while twelve percent went to Turkey and eleven percent to Britain. Other chosen countries were Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, France, Sweden, Belgium,
India, Iran and Pakistan. The returned overseas students were obliged to serve within the state institutions.

During the Mandate period, scholarships abroad were very few and were not in proportion with the real needs of the country for specialised cadres in various fields. The majority of returned overseas students became academics. This was because the state needed these. Only about a fifth of the total of ministers had studied overseas, mainly in Europe or the United States.

Overall, the overseas studies programme gave impetus to the growth of a new middle class. However, the effects of the project were small. Its most significant effect was the increase of academics, but political, social and educational changes were small as the returnees did not have freedom in their roles, which were ordered and defined by the administration.

*The education of the military leaders*

The military school in Baghdad was a major mechanism for linking positions in the bureaucracy and a means for politicisation. Modern knowledge and training for the future military leaders included studies abroad. However, the state bureaucrats lacked trust in the overseas returnees from Sandhurst, hence this overseas project did not greatly affect the emergence of a new style of military leaders. However, education at a Sandhurst is discussed here, because of the assumption that the returned officers' group was involved in the social movements.

As soon as the state was established, the process of creating an Arab army was set in motion. The first step was the setting up of the Ministry of Defence and the
appointment of Ja'far Pasha al-Askari, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hijaz army, as the Minister. Britain had high hopes for the young Iraqi officers. Parallel to the education of civil servants, the education of the military leaders rapidly expanded. British influence was in the main channelled through the training and instruction of officers and cadets. The Iraqi Military College was established in 1924, on the Sandhurst model, accepting students from secondary schools and the law school. A Staff College was established in 1928; it offered a two-year graduate programme which trained air force and army officers for high command.

The Ottoman rushdiya school system for basic military education was not revived, but the school for tribal sheikhs' sons continued in a different form. In 1928, although 75 percent of the infantry rank and file were of urban origin, 25 percent of officers were of tribal origin. This meant that although some sons and relatives of the tribal sheikhs who could read and write were absorbed into military careers, they received a separate education at a lower educational standard. The urban officers remained in the majority.

*Foreign knowledge, the Iraqi Military College and Sandhurst*

When the Military College was opened, the British staff included not only its director and his assistant, but also fifteen out of the twenty instructors. The British officers, graduates of the Royal Military Academy, taught and trained the Iraqi military staff using the Sandhurst curricula, fitting them to take their place in the army as instructors, leaders and, officers. The courses included military geography, modern history, economics, languages, mechanical engineering or electricity and wireless technology and science. English military textbooks and training manuals were translated into
Arabic, and even ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers were required to undergo fresh training in order to learn the new system.\textsuperscript{46}

It was in 1924 also that a first batch of four cadets was sent to England and India for further training; this annual flow was augmented until it reached an average of twenty-five during the years 1932-6 (twenty of them going to England). The Ministry of Defence dispatched large numbers of Iraqi military officers to the Staff College in Great Britain, and army cadets to Sandhurst between the 1930s and the 1950s.\textsuperscript{47} It is important to notice that there were Iraqi military officers who were influenced by foreign knowledge through the curriculum at Sandhurst.

The Charter of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst stated in 1950 that the object of all training was to produce:

\begin{quote}
a young officer with a sound education in appropriate Academic and Military subjects, with a wide interest in the current problems of world affairs, and the enthusiasm to continue to increase his knowledge by his own initiative. He will be firmly grounded in the British Army Officer's traditional code of behaviour, responsibility and reliability and his powers of leadership will have been developed. He will thus have been brought to the stage in Military and Academic subjects where, ... he is fit to command a platoon or equivalent sub-unit.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

A military officer had to be a man suitable to command other men in all sorts of conditions of difficulty and danger - and hence must command their respect before he was able to acquire the appropriate professional skills.\textsuperscript{49} Education at Sandhurst provided the teaching subjects by mixing the King's Own Royal Regiment and Royal Army Service Corps staff with civic lecturers and professors from Cambridge, London, Manchester, Oxford and other universities.\textsuperscript{50}
Before 1954, education at Sandhurst focused on three areas, technology and science, morality and leadership, and community development through sport. This education system was changed in 1954, according to an inspection report by the Ministry of Education. The curriculum was divided into two courses, for military instruction and for academic subjects. Moral leadership was absorbed into the basic training course.

In 1955, a new curriculum for military history was provided. This subject was taught on an academic basis by officers. This study aimed:

to give an essential background to an Officer Cadet’s profession through the study of selected leaders and their careers and campaigns, thereby providing insight into the art of leadership, into the understanding of the principles of war, and into the application of strategy and tactics in practice; to inculcate the habit of self-study; to encourage the search for information and the weighing up of evidence, and to provide practice for the officer cadet in writing, talking and discussing, taking discussions and model-room work.

An officer cadet could elect to study any one of the following: Alexander the Great, Marlborough, Napoleon, Nelson, Stonewall Jackson, Wellington. The British campaigns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were valued in the study of history. Individual instructors were given the maximum discretion in the way in which they approached the study of their particular leaders. Frequent practice in written work was afforded, to improve the standard of English. Thus the students gained depth in historical knowledge of particular times.

The philosophical and practical study of morals and leadership was directed to the setting in which leadership was exercised by junior officers in the regular army. The course aimed to examine through discussion the essential qualities of military leadership, discipline and morale. Thus in 1954, as in Meiji Japan, the study of morality and leadership was separated from the acquisition of knowledge. In the same year of 1954, top Sandhurst officer cadets could be prepared to proceed to degree
courses at Cambridge University for mechanical sciences and London University for engineering. There were strong recommendations to obtain officer cadets with Arts qualifications, which should be given similar recognition to that enjoyed by those whose abilities were of a more scientific nature. 55

The overseas studies projects for the military leaders started in 1924 and continued until the 1970s. Although no actual figures are given for later years, the British Embassy continuously dispatched students of the Iraqi Military College and officers at the Staff College in Baghdad overseas. 56 Within ten years, from 1954 to 1962, twenty Iraqi military cadets graduated from Sandhurst. Sons of traditional Arab tribal families were among them. 57

Studying abroad was politically and sociologically significant. However, despite the increased number of cadets and staff returning from overseas studies, the overwhelming majority of high-ranking officers continued to be ex-Turkish and ex-Sharifian officers. In September 1936, for example, the Iraqi officer corps (comprising officers with the rank of commander and above) numbered 84: a sample of 61 of these officers shows that 50 had served in the Turkish army, whereas out of the fifty cadets trained abroad in 1935 and 1936, only two had been given senior appointments by October 1936. 58 Under the regime of Nuri al-Saïd [1948-1958], the educational backgrounds of the cabinet ministers were concentrated in four fields: law, military studies, the arts and sciences. Engineering, education and medicine were the background of only a small proportion of the numbers. Of the cabinet ministers, the old urban Sunni group and graduates from the Baghdad Law College held forty-one percent of the seats. Another fifteen percent were graduates of the military academies in Istambül or Baghdad. 59
From 1921 to 1958, during the monarchical period, twelve army officers who had studied in Istanbul were ministers. Eight other officers were graduates from Baghdad. Major General Hussain Mekki Khammas, a graduate from Istanbul and Sandhurst, was Minister of Defence for a short period, from 17th September, 1953 to 17th June, 1954 in al-Jamali and Arshad al-Umari’s regime. Before Khammas in 1953, Nuri al-Sa’id was Minister of Defence, and in 1954, Major General Khammas was replaced by Nuri Said, who became Prime Minister and concurrently the Minister of Defence. Thus an overwhelming proportion of army officers who had studied in Istanbul was ruling for most of the time.

This phenomenon suggests, firstly, that the state bureaucrats from the old ruling classes did not trust and tolerate those who were trained at Sandhurst or renowned military academies abroad. The returned overseas officers’ superior qualifications and more independent identity did not secure them a proportional share of senior appointments. Secondly, since Iraqi politics was personality-orientated and bound to patronage and interpersonal ties, there could be no institutional autonomy, whether in the military, administrative or political spheres. The army was therefore not an independent institution, but reflected the society of which it was a part, and also the influences and aspirations operating in Sunni society. As described in the previous chapter, the militarisation of secondary education was enthusiastically supported by the military officers, the Muthanna club, the Ministry of Education and the Teacher Training College.

The roles of the military leaders and the civil servants were muddled. However, the young generation of military officers, calling themselves Free Officers, were able to
expand their group in the 1950s and brought about the 1958 revolution.

**The education of religious leaders**

Religious schools for the tertiary level were organised by the Ministry of *Awqaf*. The *waqf* system changed its forms and contents, but retained its social significance as an endowment of property or money, which was held in trust for charitable and religious causes. The nine types of Islamic administrative officials in Iraq were institutionalised: (1) a religious scholar (‘Alim (pl. ‘ulamā’)); (2) an expert in the established *Shari‘a* (Faqih); (3) an Islamic prayer leader (Imām); (4) one who gives a Khutba (sermon) in a Shi‘a mosque during Friday prayers (Khatīb); (5) one who delivers the call to prayer from the minaret of a mosque (Muezzin); (6) an expert in *Shari‘a*, competent to give a *fatwa* (legal judgement or opinion) on matters not covered in Islamic law books (Mufti); (7) a scholar in *Shari‘a*, competent to give interpretations (Mujtahid); (8) a religious scholar (Mulla); and (9) a judge who administers the *Shari‘a* and issues decisions in specific cases (*Qādhi*).

Dār al-‘Ulūm, the religious school, was established in 1937, and renamed Al-Imam Al-A‘dham College in 1946. The College offered a Bachelor of Arts degree programme in Islamic jurisprudence, for men only. Graduate clerics were paid, and Sunni knowledge was geared to serve the state as a part of the modernity project. Unlike the Shi‘a education of leaders, the Ottoman legacy of the state education of Sunni religious leaders continued, and was not independent from the state. The role of the institutions for Sunni leaders was to organise the Sunni social and political environment in a way which would help Iraq to unify its people.

The state modernity projects were impersonal and unrelenting to the new, educated
citizens. Despite the increase in the number of college graduates, young educated Iraqis were excluded from political participation. This was due to the old state leaders, who were committed to the status quo of bureaucratic power, and the positions of the old ruling classes.

Resistance arose among many of the returned overseas academics, and those educated in the state education system, protesting against the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Unlike in Meiji Japan, the struggles of the academics for institutional independence and academic autonomy had to wait for success; the establishment of semi-private educational institutions (financially supported by the state) was prohibited until 1963. Hence access to foreign knowledge was through the channel of state education only.

In their social networking processes, several educational institutions and leaders in the society emerged, with religious or tribal purposes for the education of leaders which were different from those of state education. In the Sunni tradition, Islamic learning was passed to succeeding generations in the mosques. In the 1950s there were no formal Sunni Islamic schools, but there was a learning community, *heïya 'ulamâ* [the Association of Muslim Scholars], established by Amjad al-Zahawi. The study of jurisprudence, theology and the interpretation of the Qur'ân was a prerequisite for a member of the *'ulamâ*.

In the Shi'a tradition, Islamic learning and the pursuit of *ijithād* were passed to succeeding generations by the clerical teachers in the *hawza*. This was changing its forms and contents throughout the twentieth century, in reaction to the state modernity projects. In 1918, just before the 1920 social movements, no fewer than 6,000 students were attending the *hawza* in Najaf. They were a major obstacle to the creation of the
Iraqi state under the British Mandate until June 1923, when the British and Iraqi authorities deported to Iran a number of leading Ayatollahs, including Muhammad Mahdi al-Khalīsī, as a result of their refusal to withdraw fatwas against Shi‘a participation in the Iraqi elections.\footnote{68}

Shi‘a religious leaders pursued their religious and social obligations by reforming hawza. One of the reformers was Sheikh Muhammad Ridah al-Muzaffār. In the mid-1930s, al-Muzaffār led a drive to renew Shi‘a religious learning, which, in his view, was essential for reforming religion itself. He organised a publication club, Muntada al-Nashr. In 1935 the Ministry of the Interior approved the new Shi‘a madrasa, Muntada al-Nashr, named after the publication club. Its members were drawn from Najaf’s religious circles. This institution became the educational body of the Muntada al-Nashr.\footnote{69}

Having established a new curriculum, the Muntada al-Nashr became a higher institution for religious learning. Its role was twofold. On one level, it aimed to narrow the gap between secular state education and the hawza, and to link the development of the Shi‘a community to the mainstream of modern life in Iraq. On another, the Muntada al-Nashr was intended to bring the religious and secular components of the Iraqi Shi‘a community close together.\footnote{70} In authorising the establishment of the Muntada al-Nashr and controlling its affairs, the state gained a new generation of Shi‘a teachers and clerics loyal to the state. The state could appoint Shi‘a clerics only from among the graduates of the Muntada al-Nashr, thus isolating the members and graduates of the hawza.\footnote{71}

In and around 1943, Muzaffār’s struggles over the institutionalisation of a faculty for
preaching and guidance generated strong opposition in Najaf, particularly among many traditional clerics, who were influencing hawza. They did not recognize the Muntada al-Nashr as a true madrasa, and discouraged pious Shi'a from contributing money to the school. The Muntada al-Nashr had difficulties in gaining sufficient funds from Iraqi Shi'a donors. Its development is discussed in the next section, on the education of leaders after 1958.

Thus not all the Shi'a students were educated in the traditional hawza communities. Some were educated in the Muntada al-Nashr and other state institutions joining the ahāli and communist party groups and the Ba'th party, as described in the previous chapter, or through joining the party organisations. All of these groups emerged during the 1930s, 40s and 50s.

Different styles of Shi'a leadership emerged. The academic theological activities and the selection of knowledge for the Shi'a leaders were affected by the views of al-Muzaffar, as-Sadr and al-Khoei on how the Shi'a should relate to the state. The tensions within the clerics and between the Shi'a community and the state resulted in the fragmentation of the Shi'a community. The contestations between the religious leaders made the modernisation of Shi'a Islam and community lives difficult. The effect of the conflicts in the 1960s is discussed in the section in the education of leaders in the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968).

The education of the tribal leaders

As mentioned in Chapter Six, not all the sheikhs were educated in Istanbul; some were enrolled in one or other of the religious schools in Baghdad and took extra supervision under the religious leaders. Sons of sheikhs expanded their learning networks in the
city with the political leaders and the intellectuals. In their villages, the Arab tribal communities strengthened the solidarity of the tribal alliances, the *Fasl* system between the tribes, and the tribal sheikhs’ *diwān* education and dialogue. These urban-rural and tribal networks, and the connection of state and intellectual urban and rural leaders (many of whom were cultural leaders), resulted in the 1920 nationwide tribal movement demanding the establishment of the state of Iraq by the national communities.

In tribal society, which was affected by the establishment of the 1924 TCCDR, the Monroe Report and the separation of the civil law from the TCCDR, as described in the previous chapters, tribal leaders and members revitalised the traditional values in *diwān* education. To the tribal sheikhs, knowledge of Islām remained as knowledge of the sacred as well as being philosophical, while knowledge about the Arab tribes was developed as knowledge for practical use based on Islām. Before and after 1958, the Arab tribal sheikhs continuously needed skills in peace negotiations between the tribes for the protection of the community and its welfare. In this context, strong *diwān* education continued, with the Islamic, judicial and literary language and traditions.

Knowledge institutionalised in *diwān* education such as *Fasl* achievements, *fiqh*, literary history and events, and the classical oral tradition was shared knowledge among the tribal communities and brought about the cohesiveness of the tribal groups, hence strong tribal identities. These were transmitted by tribal families over generations. Tribal history included not only wars but also cultural relationships between the tribes. Some pastoral tribes enjoyed the cultivation of Arab horses and hawks, and exchanged these and knowledge about them with the Kurdish tribes for greyhounds.
High skill in negotiation and knowledge of poetry and prosody (*al-Balāgha*) were required to realise tribal alliances. The game of impromptu composition of poems between two teams in Arab tribal *diwān* is one of the oldest survivals of tribal culture. *Balāgha* originated in the pre-Islamic era and was important for recognition as both women and men leaders within the tribe. This source of merit continues today. Each tribe passed its historical *ballāgha* from generation to generation. Hence the learning of the tribal history at *diwān* included poetry, *ballāgha* and stories of the tribal fame gained through war, *Fasl* and peace alliances.78

At this time, as described in the previous chapter, the gap between civil and rural knowledge and feeling was strengthened by the separation of tribal and civil law in 1933. The gap in the levels of the social infrastructure between the urban and rural areas increased in terms of transport, communications and educational systems. The failure of the reforms in land law since the *Tanzimāt* and the increase of feudalism in the south of Iraq brought about massive migration from the south to the cities. Those who migrated continued in the cities their relationships with those who were left in the village, and with their sheikhs who possessed homes both in the cities and the villages.

The tribal legacy of interdependent relationships continued. At *diwān*, there were various learning and teaching contents for different occupational groups within the same tribes: for example, tribal sheikhs, sub-sheikhs, state leaders, lawyers, business, merchants, medical doctors, religious families, farmers and artisans. Thus instruction was not only given by the sheikhs, but by those who visited *diwān*, including the tribal members who lived outside Iraq. Sheikhs and their tribal members’ learning circles continue today.
To summarise, in both the Ottoman and Iraqi periods Islamic knowledge was absorbed into national moral values, which dominated the traditional religious and ethnic knowledge, moral values and obligations. During the monarchical and republican periods, the legacy of the Ottoman educational system continued. The education of leaders meant the training of civil servants and military leaders, and was a part of the political projects. The acquisition of technical foreign knowledge and of a national identity based on Arab and Iraqi nationalism and the state morality of civic ethics was at the centre of curricula.

The practical aspects of traditional knowledge, namely Islām and Arabic language and history, were emphasised in order to reinforce the national ideology. For the nationalists, there was no room for other indigenous knowledge. The effect of the overseas studies projects was the emergence of new styles of leaders in the academic and military communities.

The crucial issue was the lack of access to Western knowledge, resulting from the state’s uneven provision of education. As a result of this, there were little understanding and shared feelings between the different regional, religious and ethnic groups in the provinces and between the rural and urban people.

Until 1958, the state leaders’ emphasis on nationalism, loyalty and political docility in the state education of civil servants and military leaders continued. The young generations, educated in the new state education system, began the 1958 revolution, after the gradual process of the Communists and the Ba’thists which had started in the late 1930s and the 1940s.
The Republic of Iraq (1958-1968)

This fourth section of the chapter identifies the conflicting leadership positions and the changes in the education of leaders. Between the 1958 and the 1968 revolutions, new styles of leaders and the education of leaders emerged at the state and the community levels. In the 1960s, the academic leaders, the clerics and the tribal leaders struggled politically and defended their institutional independence. Baghdad University established the Council of the University to defend its independence from the government. The cultural Shi‘a and tribal communities were rapidly fragmenting. However by the early 1960s, the differences within the communities were dynamic, as the Shi‘a and tribal communities were transforming and solidifying diwān and hawza education.

Under the regime of Abd al-Karīm Qāsim [1958-1963], the leading ministers were most likely to be military leaders of Arab Sunni family origin. At the second level, they were more likely to be Shi‘a or Kurds, but the participation of these in politics declined. Increasingly the ministers were born in a provincial city or town, especially in the northern Tigris and Euphrates area. The top official was most likely to be an army officer, a graduate of the Iraqi Military College, but less often the Staff College, who had probably not lived abroad and did not know a foreign language well. The modern military regime emerged, and was led by middle-class national radicals.

The educational backgrounds of the cabinet ministers, that is, law, military affairs, arts and sciences, did not change from those of the first generation of the highest ministers; 70 per cent were educated primarily in the Baghdad Law College or the military academies in Baghdad or Istanbūl. However, between 1958 and 1968, the cabinet
ministers who were graduates from the Law College declined from 41 per cent (1948-58) to 22 per cent of the total who were graduates from higher education. The graduates from the Military College increased from 15 to 29 per cent.\textsuperscript{80}

The old Ottoman-educated cohort was replaced by men who were educated entirely in Baghdad, and the cabinet tended to become polarised between those who were Baghdad-educated and those who were foreign-educated. The gaps in knowledge and overseas exposure between the military and the highly educated citizens led to tension.\textsuperscript{81}

The top echelon of the cabinet was composed of army officers and graduates from the Baghdad military college, professionals who were technocrats with Ph.Ds from Western universities, and graduates of the Baghdad Law College. Having lived abroad and studied one Western language well, they had acquired a high degree of technical competence in their field, but had little practical experience in administration and politics.\textsuperscript{82}

Under the new military regime after 1958, there were frequent dismissals of civil servants and their replacement by military men. Political instability reduced the number of experts at the top. Thus while the new cabinets incorporated a higher degree of talent than the previous regime, they were unable to use their competence and knowledge effectively.\textsuperscript{83}

\textit{The education of the civil servants}

In 1956, eleven colleges were united under the name of Baghdad University.\textsuperscript{84} The 1958 Revolution and the 1960s were significant in the development of higher
education. Baghdad University aimed to advance scientific research and to train leaders for the Arab-Islamic state of Iraq. The 1958 Charter of the university states that “the university shall encourage scientific research, and artistic and technical studies, and work towards the propagation of Arabic and Islamic cultures”.

All the colleges of the university required specialists in the arts and the sciences, and applicants needed to have diplomas in education in order to qualify as teachers in secondary schools. This formal concern with educational training led to an abundance of holders of higher degrees, that is MAs and Ph.Ds. Most of these were employed in the state educational institutions.

In 1960-61, the approximate percentages of students in the major fields were 80% in engineering and 15% in social and literary studies. The high percentage in engineering indicates the persistent needs for specialisation in areas most needed for Iraq’s socio-economic development. In the second generation of the various colleges in Iraq, the emphasis in overseas projects was shifted to post-graduate study to prepare advanced specialists. Literature (adab) was studied only when incorporated into the courses of Arabic language department of Baghdad University.

The year 1963 was a turning point for the University. Under the new presidency of Abdul Aziz al-Douri (1963-68), Law No. 51 for Baghdad University stated:

Article 3. the university will provide education through the emphasis on scientific research, the protection of the Islamic Arabic heritage and rational education. Article 8. the University is an independent body separated from the Ministry of Education. In dealing with the university’ affairs, the Council of University is represented by the University President.

Based on this law, Baghdad University defended its independence until the 1968 Revolution.
In spite of being an independent institution, the College of Law and Politics was slow to develop. In the academic year of 1967-68, the curriculum of the College of Law and Politics was surprisingly similar to that of 1949-50. For twenty years, there were no reforms in the curriculum of the College of Law and Politics. One difference between the two periods was that in the earlier time, the students studied the English language more than in 1967-8. The students acquired wide knowledge of civil, criminal and contract law, as was the tradition of the Ottoman legal profession. Iraqi lawyers who graduated from the university were not allowed to specialise. This regulation continued until 2003.

Admission to the university was restricted. In 1954-55 there were 1,324 students. (No information on the number of teachers is available.) In 1964-65 there were 1,905 students and 26 teachers. In 1970-71, there were 847 students (21% women) and 77 teachers. Women had no right to be judges. This continues today.

At the same time, massive migration from the rural areas to the cities continued from the 1950s. The numbers of students at all levels of education trebled during this period, and there was a burst of school-building activity. However, the numbers of teachers did not increase proportionately, leading to problems in the provision of education.

The education of the religious leaders

In contrast, the Iraqi Shi'a clerics enjoyed relative independence from the government. At least since the nineteenth century, when the Ottomans controlled Southern Iraq, the Shi'a clerics had retained financial autonomy, which not only allowed them to decide on teaching issues, but also secured the avoidance of the
military draft. Being self-financed, the clerics could set their own course of studies in accordance with their traditions and beliefs.  

Within the Shi‘a groups, there were leaders who renegotiated Islamic traditions differently from each other and had different philosophical positions on the individual, the community and the state’s identity. Each leader contested the others’ visions within the communities. Among them, there were four religious leaders, who resisted the pressures from the state modernity projects and were developing their communities differently through the institutionalisation of the learning communities and through their *hawza* movements. They were Sheikh al-Muzaffar, *Ayatollah* al-Khoei, As-Sadr and Shams al-Dîn.  

As described in the previous section, al-Muzaffar was responding to the way in which the state was modernising. In 1958, a College of Jurisprudence (*Kulîyât al-Fiqh*) was established under the auspices of al-Muzaffar. The knowledge provided there for the future Shi‘a nationalists included modern philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, the English language and comparative literature. The College of Jurisprudence produced government officials as well as some members of the Iraqi Shi‘a opposition groups, most notably the *Da‘was*, which gained strength in the late 1960s and the 1970s.  

In contrast to al-Muzzafar, *Ayatollah* Abu al-Qāsim al-Khoei had a traditional view of Islām as independent from the state. His groups had no aspirations to set up an Islamic theocracy (*wilāyat al-faqih*), but were more active in religious, social and cultural affairs. The practice of jurisprudence and *ijtihād* was for al-Khoei an important aspect of learning Islamic law. In the 1960s, the learning of Islām in the *hawza* community
changed from that of the Ottoman period and the 1930s. Al-Khoei reformed the traditional *hawza* according to the new way of learning about Islam and the development of the pursuit of *ijtihād*. 99

The first grade was devoted to introductory subjects (*Muqadmatā*). This took four to six years. Then the undergraduate level (*al-* *Sutūh*) took four to five years. The highest degree was at the postgraduate level (*al-* *Bahth al-Kharīj*), after an additional four or five years for the acquisition of access to *ijtihād*. 100

The first stage of introductory studies required work on the Arabic language including syntax (*al-Nahw*), inflection and grammar (*al-* *Sarf*), prosody (*al-* *Balāgha*) and logic. Optional subjects were literature, mathematics, and other subjects, with one or more students, usually less than seven but on rare occasions as many as twenty, choosing and receiving instruction from a teacher whom they knew to have higher knowledge of the subjects involved. 101 The syllabus was taught in Arabic. In addition, Arabic literature and linguistics were studied in great depth and detail. 102 For intermediate studies, the required subjects were the principles of jurisprudential inference and rational jurisprudence. Optional subjects were rhetoric (*ilm-ul-Kalām*), philosophy, and exegesis of the Qur‘ān (*tafsiyr*).

The second stage of research and higher studies, which is known as ‘*al-* *Buhūth* [literally, research], required the principles of jurisprudence, and practical jurisprudence. A lesson was never less than half an hour in duration, and usually no longer than one hour.

The third stage involved group study, with those who passed the first two stages gathering around one of the prominent *mujtahids* (or an *imām*) who lectured on either
principles of jurisprudence or practical jurisprudence, explaining problems and engaging the students in discussion and debate.\textsuperscript{103}

Overall, traditional curricula were not changed from the Ottoman period. Mohammed Baqir as-Sadr translated the old textbooks into the modern language for the students. Among textbooks, most conspicuous was his book on \textit{usël al-Fiqh} (principles of jurisprudence). This book, which became widely used for introductory teaching at Najaf, was published in 1964.\textsuperscript{104} The important subjects were jurisprudence (\textit{fiqh}), principles of jurisprudence, the interpretation of the Qur’ān (\textit{tafsyr}), Islamic philology and \textit{hadīth} [oral tradition and the records of sayings of the Prophet and the first Muslims]. The study of the science of \textit{hadīth} was new, and included a study of Arabic literature and language. The educational programme adopted the free teaching style (\textit{al-Ta’aleem al-Hur}), in which the student chose the teacher, the time (day or night), the location, and the subject within a particular discipline in the \textit{hawza} community.\textsuperscript{105}

The classical education of Najaf in the 1950s and 1960s was retained, because of the importance of the colleges in the constitutional system of the Shī’a world. But as-Sadr tried to counter the communist appeal in his analysis of \textit{Our Economics (Iqtisādūnā)}.\textsuperscript{106} In the late 1950s, he enlarged \textit{hawza}, institutionalised this learning community and established institutions for the political movement, the Islamic Call (\textit{al-Da’wa}), by recruiting laymen.\textsuperscript{107}

The \textit{hawza} education of Shī’a leaders developed by renovating the colleges of Najaf. In the later 1950s and 1960s, the religious circles at Najaf were active. As-Sadr published \textit{Our Philosophy (Falsafatunā, 1959)}, \textit{Our Economics (Iqtisādunā, 1960)}, in \textit{al-Adwa'}, a journal in Najaf, and \textit{the Nonusurious Bank in Islam (Al-bank al-Laribawi...}
When *Our Philosophy* was published in 1959 it coincided with calls for the rejection of the communist appeal by the Najaf religious leaders. Their general perception of ‘Abd al-Karim Qāsim was hostile because, as mentioned in Chapter Five, Qāsim used communist influence in the Shi'a community. Thus under urgent circumstances of ideological threat, the Shi'a religious leaders committed themselves to disseminating new Shi'a ideas, and institutionalised these in the *hawza* in a new form to educate followers in the new views. *Al-Tadhāmun al-Islāmi* [Islamic Solidarity], *Falsafatunā* [Our Philosophy] and *Risālat al-Islām* [the Message of Islam] were calling for alternative views, and were widely read in Najaf, Nasirya and Hilla. Najaf became an active shrine city with the publication of weeklies, books, and booklets authored by various clerics, most of them junior. A number of clerical writers later became leaders of the various Shi'a establishments.

In 1959, Shi'a jurisprudence was included in the curriculum of al-Azhar, the centre of the Sunni school in Cairo. Muslim unity, tolerance for different schools in Islam and a denunciation of prejudice were emphasised.

*The education of the tribal leaders*

Although the Law of Tribal Regulation was abolished in 1958 and the position of tribal sheikhs was not formally recognised, they retained social recognition. The sheikhs' influence continued as the *Fasl* system continued and expanded in the cities. This meant that the *diwān*, and *diwān* education, remained at the centre of tribal culture. Although the *Fasl* system lost its legal framework, the civilian and criminal courts recognised the criminal cases which passed through the tribal *Fasl* system. *Fasl* decisions influenced the application of punishments and sentences in the courts. In this
context, tribal members asked for the application of the Fāsīl traditions before their appearance in courts. This phenomenon continues today.

To summarise, the new state leaders struggled over the institutionalisation of indigenous knowledge, the Arabic language, Islām and historical narratives, and synthesised these with technical foreign knowledge in the school textbooks. The knowledge and moral values selected for nationalist leaders excluded the study of literature and literary history and reinforced conformity with Arab and Iraqi national identities. The knowledge and moral values of the tribes and the Shi'a, which functioned in their communities, were not a concern in state education. This phenomenon was rooted in the Ottoman Tanzimat period.

The well-educated leaders within the clerical, Arab tribal groups and the Ba'thist, the Communists and free officers' group were dynamic. These new civic leaders, as they became cultural leaders, struggled over the institutionalisation of what they redefined as good knowledge and moral values. Suppressed by the new regime, they had different goals in their learning communities and activities, and remained divided from each other.

**Conclusion**

Leadership positions in the 'Abbāsid period were characterised by Sunni Islamic moral values and knowledge. In the Ottoman period and in monarchical and Republican Iraq, various patterns of the education of leaders emerged. Under the British Mandate, there was little change in the state leadership positions and the education system, and only a slow shift to industrialisation in spite of the discovery of oil before 1927.
The knowledge provided for the new military leaders was similar to that for civil servants; it included Sunni Islamic loyalty, *rehbel-i Akhlāk* and foreign practical and technical knowledge. The new Iraqi leaders emerged among the young officers' elite through this education system under Abdūlhamid II. These leaders became the main founders of independent Iraq. For most of the time in monarchical Iraq, the educational projects were dominated by the urban military leaders educated in Istanbul, and social modernity did not include alternative voices and citizens' struggles to create a new society. Education for the state leaders was limited in the following four contrasting ways.

Firstly, the frequent conflicts among the state leaders, al-Husri, al-Jamāli and Shawkat, over these different political, social and educational visions weakened the effect of state education. In 1963, al-Douri, as a president of Baghdd University, defended the institutional independence of Baghdad University. Among the Shi`a clerics, Muzzafar allied with the state projects, while al-Khoei, as-Sadr, and Shams al-Dīn pursued their own theological, social and political *ijtiḥād*. For the Arab tribal leaders, traditional *diwān* education was reinforced as the *Fasl* system was legitimised and separated from civil law.

Secondly, until the 1960s the impact of overseas studies on teacher training, the academics and military officials was small. This was due to the fact that the returned overseas students were obliged to serve within the state institutions. The modernity projects designed by the new military regime of Qasim were re-creations of the previous political system. The regime maintained the status quo in the bureaucracy and the exclusion of officers educated abroad from senior appointments; that is, the
state leaders did not trust the returnees. As a consequence of the state’s emphasis on military education, by 1963 different styles of military officers existed, educated in Istanbül, Baghdad, Sandhurst or Germany, and from urban or tribal backgrounds. Among them, the privileged group who held power was those who were of urban origin and educated in Istanbül and Baghdad.

Thirdly, the gaps in knowledge and overseas exposure between the military officers educated in Baghdad and the civil servants who had been highly educated abroad led to tension, but the overseas returnees were subjected to the military officers. The overseas studies programme gave impetus to the growth of a new middle class. Its most significant effect was the increase of academics, but political, social and educational changes were small, as the returnees did not have freedom in their roles, which were ordered and defined by the administration. Unlike in Meiji Japan, relationships and academic co-operation between the state leaders and the leaders in the society did not develop. However, some of the returned overseas groups joined in the 1958 revolution, together with the young educated urban modernisers.

Fourthly, foreign knowledge was not combined with traditional Islamic and Arab tribal knowledge. This was because, restricted by the state curriculum and the continuity with the Ottoman education system, state education was part of the modernity projects to reinforce national identity, morality and technical skills. Even in the university’s Faculty of Literature, the study of literature and literary history were placed in the department of language. The cultural traditional knowledge, that is, Islamic or Arab tribal *ijtiḥād*, was ignored in the curriculum and lost its effect.
In the 1960s, the religious leaders emphasised the necessity of reforming *hawza*, debated in public their redefined political, cultural and religious orientations of Islam, and struggled over the institutionalisation of these in *hawza*, the College of Jurisprudence, the Najef University and Kufa. For the Arab tribal leaders, *diwān* education was reinforced when the *Fasl* system was legitimised in 1924, separated from civil law in 1933 and its separation abolished in 1958. Tribal education of leaders continued because *Fasl* was a prerequisite to maintain peace within and between the tribes, and the modern courts recognised its effect on the final decisions.

Thus, different patterns of cultural leaders emerged with the different education of leaders and the different knowledge provided for these leaders. The emergence of the private education of leaders implied the political, social and cultural voices of alternatives to the state projects for the social order. However, throughout the twentieth century, Iraqi politics were characterised by the absence of dialogue between the state and the cultural leaders. The citizens had few opportunities for public disputes about social issues and moral values.

The double modernity process changed political leadership positions and developed political, social and cultural processes. It also shaped serious educational contradictions in Iraq. National morality, loyalty to the nation-state and foreign knowledge were emphasised, while individual cultivation in relation to group obligation was reinforced through the non-state education of Shi'a and Arab leaders. Three types of political cultures, namely traditional, state and civic political cultures, were now institutionalised in the different educational systems.
The fragmenting society will continue to exist in the structures which have developed in the past, unless the cultural leaders are determined to renegotiate what was counted as good knowledge for the people in the society, to pursue public debate and networks, and to institutionalise socially embedded values and knowledge in the education systems, to develop trust in a democratic civic society, and negotiate with the state leaders.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion to the thesis, this chapter explores the complex interrelations between state modernity, social modernity and the education of leaders in Japan and Iraq. To do so, it returns to the central arguments and themes which have been developed in the narrative chapters on the education of leaders.

The first section considers the interrelationships of modernity projects, the new leaders and their educational styles, and transformations in the social stratification systems in Iraq (1921-1968) and in Japan (1868-1912), when both countries experienced drastic political and social changes. The second section reviews the processes through which cultural renegotiations developed differently in the two societies, and the different timings of the modernity projects. This section concludes with a consideration of the nature of the education of leaders and of the strong cultural continuities in each country. The third section offers a new notion of social ontology which I think helps to understand the arguments. The fourth section identifies the limitations of the thesis and suggests future research.

Leaders and educational styles in Iraq and Japan

This section will start by reviewing the argument that as each state was modernised, the cultural traditions were renegotiated and institutionalised in the education of leaders, and various styles of education were created. The modernisation of Meiji Japan began fifty years earlier than that of Iraq. The urgent need for legitimacy felt by both new governments put pressure on the state leaders to form a new education system for the
new leadership positions. The first state university, the Imperial University, emerged by combining the shoheikō hankō and Kaisei gakkō, the military schools of the Tokugawa government and the Tokyo medical school. In Iraq, the Ottoman legacies of the Military College, the Law College and the boarding-schools for the sons of tribal sheikhs were retained.

It has been shown that, in both countries, political and social changes were effected by the state leaders who were civil servants and military leaders with technocratic knowledge who put their loyalty to the state before their obligations to individuals. Whereas the Meiji state leaders were a self-made status group, and the new Iraqi state leaders were the creation of a foreign power, both groups of leaders emerged rapidly in a non-violent way, and had a common educational background. The state leaders in Meiji Japan consolidated their political power in a relatively short period of time, in contrast to Iraq where consolidation was lengthy and conflictual.

However, analysis of the emergence of these leaders revealed a similarity in the way that they aimed to modernise the state and to change the social structure. They viewed the cultural traditional values and old merit systems as resources for reinforcing new political identities and obligations. These leaders looked at social modernity instrumentally, seeing it as a part of the state modernity project. Both were, politically and educationally, self-conscious status groups. They soon developed new places in the social stratification system for themselves, as the leaders of modern states.

Cultural leaders, the groups which reacted as opposition groups against the state modernity projects, had alternative values. They gradually emerged from the private
education system and the social movements during the political and social transitions in both countries. The educational institutions set up by the cultural leaders reflected their traditional values derived from the philosophical knowledge of the ‘Way’, which they used to promote alternative voices. To play their roles, the cultural leaders used both the new media and the traditional learning network system. As shown in Chapter Four, Fukuzawa’s critical ideology and alternative voice emphasised that the use of knowledge cannot be separated from ‘enlightenment’, by which he meant the development of the spirit of freedom and independence in society. Fukuzawa publicly suggested that scholars should remain in the private sector to promote the independence of Japan. As a state moderniser, Mori did not reject Fukuzawa’s attitude toward personal autonomy, but was ambivalent about the cultural leaders’ standpoint which saw the state and society as equivalent.

Similarly, in Iraqi society, the Arab tribal leaders and the Islamic leaders emerged as opposition groups when they resisted the British occupation in the name of freedom and independence. Leading Shi’a Ayatollahs, including Muhammad Mahdi al-Khalīsī, and various tribal sheikhs in the north and the south developed the 1920 revolution and were becoming cultural leaders by expanding the networks linking the urban and rural groups. However as shown in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, Shi’a leaders, notably Sheikh al-Muzaffar, and Ayatollah al-Khoei and as-Sadr, and tribal sheiks had different views of the state and different emphases on the modernity projects, the networks, the value systems and the education of leaders. In the 1950s, the changes in the tribal leaders’ social status and in the tribal codes, as well as the changes among the Shi’a religious leaders and the new educated young urban leaders, notably the Ba’thists, the communists and the free officers, brought about tensions between them and the state.
These tensions have continued until the present day.

In the process of the modernity projects, the cultural leaders in Japan and the emerging cultural leaders in Iraq, as well as new state leaders in both countries, were also struggling to change social stratification systems.

The Tokugawa regime governed the population through ‘rule by status’. One of the consequences of political change after the 1868 Meiji Renovation was that it destroyed the immobility of the four social strata of the Tokugawa period. The social stratification system was altered rapidly and drastically with the intention of creating a rich and strong nation-state (fukoku kyōhei) and industrial and economic development (shokusen kōgyo). Meiji state leaders quickly constructed new privileged social strata. By redefining the social strata, the government opened up access to official positions in the governmental agencies. Among these strata, the most conspicuous were the civil servants and the military leaders and cultural leaders in the society. As described in Chapters Two and Four, enterprising individuals from the old privileged Bushi stratum worked with groups from the formerly disadvantaged social strata. Thus political struggle and social change were linked. At the beginning of the twentieth century, thirty-five years after the Meiji Renovation, the visions of the private universities varied, but their common idea was, as Fukuzawa claimed, the creation of a civilised and enlightened society and of civic leaders for this society.

In contrast, Iraq failed to transform its social stratification. The Ottoman regime governed Iraqi provinces through ‘rule by status’. Status was regulated by the separation of the nomad communities, the urban communities and the rural agricultural
Despite the *Tanzimat* reforms, tribes remained self-regulating communities which saw to the tribal administration of justice. As described in Chapter Five, the Ottoman bureaucracy was recreated. The most conspicuous groups were *sharifian* (Arab officers in the Ottoman military) and urban civil servants. The Law of the 1924 Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) legitimated the position of the Arab tribal leaders but this did not imply the abolition of the previous social stratification system. Until the July 1958 Revolution, Iraq remained subject to two norms, one for the cities through the civil law and one for the tribal countryside through the tribal regulations. However, as in Meiji Japan, the new political revolutionists worked with groups from the formerly disadvantaged social strata. In the 1940s and 1950s, the disadvantaged groups were recruited by the Ba'ath party and party activists or by the Communist party activists. In contrast to Japan, private universities did not emerge in the four decades following the end of the old *sharifian* bureaucratic al-Sa'id regime. Hence higher education remained under political control, strengthening the national ideology and bureaucracy.

Overall, in both countries, the changes in the social stratification system were closely linked to the growth of bureaucracy, the emergence of cultural leaders and new educational patterns. Social change in Japan was dynamic with major changes in personal status becoming possible. In contrast, social change in Iraq was ambiguous, and controlled by the most privileged political and military leaders. The preservation of the tribal and religious traditional society was a consequence of the state modernity project.

The differences between state and cultural leaders were marked in the routes to
leadership positions, in the education of leaders, and by socialisation into differently valued knowledge. Crucial differences between the two countries in the education of leaders are seen in the way in which the leaders renegotiated foreign knowledge and its institutionalisation.

The nature of the education of leaders

This section tries to review three central arguments of the thesis and suggest that while Japan transformed traditional values and concepts of merit by combining them with foreign knowledge, Iraq preserved much of its tradition, resisting modern pressures.

The changes in the education of leaders were affected by the renegotiated and selected knowledge. In both countries, technical knowledge was valued as practical and useful to promote the modernisation of the state and the society, and was thus legitimated and institutionalised in the education system. Between the two countries, however, there was a differential acceptance of foreign knowledge and differences in the renegotiations of cultural traditional values.

In Meiji Japan, at the state level, the traditional practical learning (jitsugaku), was replaced by foreign knowledge. The acquisition of foreign knowledge was expressed in the proclamation of the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles as a basic way to construct a ‘strong and rich’ nation-state and a civilised and enlightened society. As described in Chapters Three and Four, demand for the importation of foreign knowledge was expressed in the Meiji government’s first major effort to organise state education and the importation and selection of knowledge by legitimating the examination system in 1872, and by institutionalising the overseas study projects in the
Fundamental Code of Education in 1872.

The Tokugawa legacy of practical learning (*jitsugaku*), was replaced by foreign knowledge. Consequently, as in the Law Department at Tokyo University in 1881, education in foreign knowledge and language became a preparation for official promotion; that is, foreign knowledge led to political power.

A reaction to the state's emphasis on foreign knowledge and to the neglect of the traditional moral code of philosophical knowledge resulted in the creation of private educational institutions, with a different emphasis. The cultural leaders developed academic movements, emphasised the Tokugawa legacy of *jitsugaku*, combining the contents of indigenous literature and classics and Western knowledge, and institutionalised the ideas of egalitarianism, personal autonomy and institutional independence in the private universities. The moral values of the movements were expressed in terms of these new concepts.

As Sakuma Shozan and Fukuzawa Yukichi argued in public, the philosophical aspect of traditional knowledge and *jitsugaku* in the private educational institutions continued in the society. The private universities aimed not only to educate cultural leaders but also to develop their learning. Both knowledge of classical literature and foreign knowledge were perceived by the cultural leaders as useful. In 1885, the study of law in the Japanese language became a new method of teaching. The emergence of various courses or schools for the study of law at Chūō University, Senshū University and Keiō University was the consequence of the intellectual struggles of the renegotiation of the traditional system of learning by the cultural leaders, such as Hozumi and Aība. In the
time of the rise of nationalism, it was significant that the founders of the Waseda, Keiō, Doshisha and Chuo Universities argued in public that academic freedom and educational independence were important as conditions for national independence.

In Iraq, the curricula of the state College of Law in Baghdad emphasised the mixture of indigenous and foreign languages and laws. However, the indigenous customary law currently practised by Arab tribal society was not taught as an academic subject. Law college graduates who were not from tribal families had no knowledge of such socially constructed law, which made it difficult for them to understand the Arab tribal values and identity. Consequently, knowledge of tribal affairs was not valued by the urban bureaucrats, but the survival of *Fasl* knowledge and the networking systems were useful for them to control regional security. The state leaders were determined to control and balance state and tribal power, but the knowledge required by the bureaucrats gave only a partial understanding of the indigenous world.

For example, as described in Chapter Five, the establishment of the new Political Officers allowed them to intervene in the tribal *Fasl* traditions. However, the *Fasl* decisions made by political officers often did not satisfy the two affected parties. The separation of urban and rural education gave the tribal members limited access to the new knowledge. This was seen by the fact that the school for the sons of the sheikhs in Baghdad were abolished. Also, the Monroe Commission Report and al-Jamali’s educational project underpinned the separation of the teacher training for the urban and rural area, and the separation of the civil law and the tribal law. Foreign knowledge was not combined with traditional Arab knowledge, hence the tribal life styles and much of their values were preserved within their traditions. *Fasl* remained as tribal
authority, honour and merit. The preservation of the traditional society was a consequence of the state modernity project. Educational contradictions led to tensions, not only between the state educationalists, but also between leading tribal members over the traditional knowledge and obligation, and loyalty to the state and its Pan-Arab and Iraqi ideologies.

The overseas studies programme in Iraq gave impetus to the growth of a new middle class, such as members of the al-Ahali and Muthanna groups. However, the effects of the project were small as they served within the state institutions. Unlike in Meiji Japan, relationships and academic co-operation between the state leaders and the leaders in the society did not develop. However, some of the returned overseas groups including the military officials joined in the 1958 revolution, together with the young educated urban modernisers. Under Qasim’s regime, the gaps in knowledge and overseas exposure between the military educated in Baghdad and the civil servants who had been highly educated abroad led to tension, but the overseas returnees were subjected to the military officers.

In Meiji Japan, the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei) institutionalised the pattern of students studying abroad as a national system. The dispatch of students abroad was legitimised and institutionalised in the Imperial University. In the first and second generations, the main aim was to train bureaucrats. The third generation was focussed on the training of scientific professionals. The reform introduced by the 1882 Overseas Student Law helped to meet the state’s needs for bureaucrats and then for academic teachers. The educational system supported a new privileged social class, but their identity was established by the state as that of bureaucrats of the Emperor,
with technocratic knowledge. Their knowledge was new to Japan, and separated from the historical legacy of knowledge. Until 1881, thirteen years after the Renovation, *kokugaku* [the study of Japanese classical literature] was not considered as having an equivalent value to foreign knowledge at Tokyo University. *Kokugaku* was then redefined and replaced by the study of *wabungaku* [Japanese literature] in 1886.

Thus in the two countries, at a time of political and social transitions, the balance between the acquisition of foreign knowledge and the renegotiation of traditional values became a serious issue. At the same time, there were rapid changes in the traditional concepts of merit, and these had implications for the education and socialisation of leaders.

The thesis has argued that the education of leaders was affected by changing concepts of merit, and that the struggle over state and social modernity projects created new modes of the education of leaders. The narratives on Japan and Iraq showed that what was previously counted as sound knowledge and moral values was negotiated and renegotiated throughout the pre-modern and modern epochs at state and social levels.

In both countries, as the state modernised, the merit system was gradually consolidated through the enforcement of the public obligation to acquire technocratic knowledge and the examination system. As described in Chapter Three, the examination system was perceived by Ogata and Fukuzawa as a means of breaking down the feudal system of the four social strata and also the bureaucratic system. For the state leaders, the examination system was a practical means to produce new talent and to reinforce their position in the bureaucracy. Articles 48-57 of the Education System Order [*Gakusei*]
in 1872 concerned the examination system, and stressed that egalitarianism in pursuing learning for attaining personal and social merit had to be guaranteed through the educational system, and competence through examinations. The examinations and the award of certificates for academic attainment became the legitimated way to promotion and positions of prestige, influence and power; hence the competitive examination system and curriculum control developed, and the education system expanded.

The Education System Order outlined the curriculum. In 1879, Itō argued for the importance of the acquisition of Western knowledge, and of education leading to prestige through the examination system and the strengthening of the bureaucracy. The 1880s marked an increase in bureaucratisation and, at the same time, the legitimisation of the examination system for the selection of civil servants. As the new state bureaucrats acquired privileged social status, in society, there prevailed, though only for a short time, the notion of ‘kanson minpu’ [respect the governmental bureaucrat and despise the commoner].

The main route into the bureaucratic system was established before the introduction of the Cabinet (1881-1885) and the promulgation of the Constitution (1889), by the establishment of the examination system, the Fundamental Code of Education (1872) and the Education Order (1879), and the Imperial University Order (1886). The majority of the high echelon of civil servants were the product of a university education in law, had passed civil service examinations which demanded knowledge of Western languages, had knowledge of law and jurisprudence partly on the basis of foreign experience, and were assured tenure.
In Iraq, the Ottoman legacy of the examination system continued. By 1936, the government had incorporated compulsory knowledge, defined by the examination system and an emphasis on the transmission of compulsory national moral principles, in the education system. As described in Chapter Six, Public Education Law in 1940 extended direct government control over all private schools. The two political ideologies, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, were institutionalised in the school system by training the teachers, establishing the examination system, distributing textbooks and providing knowledge for Arab national leaders. Attainment in education affected political and social positions through the examination system.

In both countries, the state education system supported a new privileged social class, but their identity was established by the state as that of official bureaucrats with technocratic knowledge.

As the state modernised, the concept of merit as honouring the Way of Heaven was in both countries shifted from personal cultivation to requirements imposed by the state educational policy. As described in Chapter Three and Four, in the early Meiji period, the Way of Heaven was re-emphasised in terms of the democratic notion of equal learning for all in the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education. However, in Article One of the 1887 Discipline Code of the Bureaucrats, the Way was redefined in terms imposed by the bureaucrats as the servants of the Emperor. In the middle of the Meiji period, the Imperial Rescript on Education established the basic ethical code of Japanese society for the next fifty eight years. The schools became major agents of socialisation by linking the family with a hierarchical political ideology that sanctified the relationships among children, their parents, ancestors, and the Emperor. In Iraq, as
seen in the educational principles of al-Ḥusrī, al-Jamālī and Shawkat, the redefined moral codes of merit and the notions of loyalty, obedience and filial piety were closely linked with the selection of religious knowledge through Arab history and were used to strengthen nationalism and militarism in terms of national morality.

By using and regulating traditions for modernising purposes, by strengthening the political ideology and by changing the relations of leaders to the state and society, the state in both countries became what I would like to call ‘a new traditional state’. Such state modernity brought about tensions and contradictions between state and social modernity projects

The important element which was reinforced in Meiji society was that the contradictions between state and social modernity were visible in the political, social and intellectual struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined concepts of merit. As described in Chapter 4, cultural leaders such as Fukuzawa tried not to conflict with Mori, who emphasised the westernisation of the state’s educational projects. The cultural leaders sought a consensus on the new knowledge and on personal, institutional and national independence. The social ethos (kifū) of “personal independence for the sake of national independence” was effective for both political and social changes. The Tokugawa legacy of knowledge of the Way of Heaven was redefined and combined with the ideas of the American Declaration of Independence by Fukuzawa.

Thus the education of leaders was affected by changing concepts of merit. In the two countries, the concept of sound merit in the previous times had strong political
implications for the modernity projects. The two elements, knowledge (philosophical and practical or useful) and moral values, were negotiated and renegotiated throughout the pre-modern and modern epochs at state and social levels. It is suggested that in Meiji Japan, the optimum pattern of ‘balanced’ knowledge composed of philosophical, practical and useful knowledge was redefined. As Fukuzawa emphasised, moral values were based on indigenous cultural values. He combined these with new concepts of independence, enlightenment and civilisation and created new moral values regarding individual, social and national independence and social obligations. In the case of Iraq, ‘balanced’ knowledge and indigenous moral values were retained in the tribal and religious groups but in different forms and contents. Throughout the twentieth century, education through majālis in Baghdad was vulnerable to government control and did not develop learning networks. Very few were retained by the end of twentieth century.

Overall, cultural leaders in both Iraqi and Meiji societies struggled over the institutionalisation of the renegotiated cultural traditions and the concepts of merit in the education of leaders. The narrative chapters showed also that the education of leaders was affected by the different timings of the formation of the state.

The thesis has described the rational state modernity projects, which suggest a remorseless, impersonal and bureaucratic structural process. Yet the narratives have shown how different leaders pursued their own agendas with different results. In my view, modernity is, as defined in Chapter One, a consequence of the simultaneous interactions of state and social modernities which included diversified changes in value systems in the state and the society. Political and social changes in Japan were rapid
and simultaneous, while the changes in Iraq were slow and asynchronous.

In the early stage of rapid and drastic political and social changes, the leaders in both countries found it difficult to adapt to the differences which arose from the state modernity projects, and to their new society. The impact of the double modernity projects on the political and social changes depended on the openness of the political system and the power of resistance to the state projects. In both countries the state modernity projects required rapid political, social and educational changes. For example, the new Meiji state emerged simultaneously with the development of the state apparatuses which rapidly legitimated the new bureaucracy, the military, the court, the social stratification system, and the state education system and the four redefined institutions of the Shinto religion.

Opposed to the state education systems and its ideologies, there was also the simultaneous emergence of various styles of cultural leaders in the society, including economic, academic, social and religious modernisers. New forms of the state education of leaders and private educational institutions emerged simultaneously as the state modernised; these changes took place fifty years earlier in Japan than in Iraq. This was due to the Meiji citizens’ involvement in the peoples’ freedom and rights movements as they expanded the learning networks, resisted the state modernity projects and raised moral issues which the bureaucracy had neglected. The cultural leaders took up the issues in public debates. There was an educational transfer of the redefined legacies of religious and social status group Bushi traditions to the new curricula of the private universities, such as Kokugakuin, Waseda and Keiō. The social modernity projects were closely associated with the new forms of private education of
leaders and the emergence of new styles of leaders. The new civic society and the private universities adapted themselves to the modernised Shintō and Bushidō codes and developed consequent changes in the education and socialisation of leaders and in social status. A new cohesive Meiji society emerged.

The emergence, growth and maturity of the Meiji state and society occurred within four decades after the Tokugawa regime collapsed in 1868. This meant that there was rapid social mobility, and new Meiji leaders could lead major political, social, economic and educational changes simultaneously over a relatively short time span; as Cowen suggested, in a span of ten years. Within 35 years of the Renovation, there were two state universities, and more than fifteen private universities with different aims.

In contrast, in Iraq it took 38 years to establish the first state university in Baghdad. The educational, economic and social changes during the monarchical period took place much more slowly than in Japan. The development of the bureaucracy was not interrelated with the industrialisation of the country. Economic growth was slow, in spite of foreign interests in the oil economy after 1910s. Although there were changes in the militaristic regimes at intervals of about ten years, the political, social and educational changes were not simultaneous. The Ottoman legacies of the Imperial moral order in the education systems and the training of the state leaders through the military and the law college were retained. Education was thus a political force. There was British support for the educational reforms which established parts of the higher education system, such as the Medical College in 1929, the Military College in 1924 and Baghdad University in 1958. However, the development of the state educational projects was uneven. Access to education remained different for urban and rural areas,
for the north and the south and for different religious groups. These differences have continued until the present day.

Three types of education of leaders in Iraq and Meiji Japan are now distinguished here.

The first type is the education of experts. The experts in the two countries emerged from the state higher education, and in the case of Iraq, this included the Military College as well as the Medical College. Meiji experts modernised and used their Shinto mixed with Confucianism and Bushi legacies of socialisation and learning networks, legitimated the redefined values of Bushi loyalty as the source of national morality and identity in the education system, and consolidated the bureaucracy. The Iraqis renegotiated but retained traditional values, keeping the Sunni aspect of these values, which, in the education system, were those of the Ottoman bureaucratic elites, and legitimated the redefined values of Islamic loyalty as the national morality of the system. In both countries, the first legitimation made by the experts was the standardisation of language. The second level of legitimation entailed the redefinition of religious, ethnic or social status groups values. At the third level, the symbolic changes of these redefined values and merit were legitimated and institutionalised in the education system. At the fourth level of legitimation, an ideology based on a selection of knowledge and the concepts of merit was developed.

The second type is the education of cultural leaders. The cultivated Japanese in the Tokugawa period had a thorough knowledge of neo-Confucian philosophy, which embraced cultural aspects of morality, the arts, in particular literary arts, and religious codes; they pursued self-discipline as well as knowledge. Leadership positions in the
Tokugawa period required philosophical and practical knowledge balanced with moral values. Notions of equality, democracy and human rights, as well as the system of values and world vision, were built on traditional values, knowledge and morality combined with foreign knowledge.

Cultural leaders in Meiji Japan emerged in private academic space and the peoples' freedom and rights movements in the 1870s. At the end of the Meiji period, a new style of leaders who possessed both practical expertise and cultural knowledge emerged, through education in the private universities. As pioneers Fukuzawa, Hozumi, Ōkuma and Nijima founded private universities. Hattori, Yatabe and Minosaku founded scientific and academic institutions. These academics, and other groups, in particular lawyers, new political party leaders, social engineers and literary and artistic enthusiasts, could adapt themselves to the rapidly changing society and expand their communications with various status groups by using their shared values, knowledge and networks. As described in Chapters Two and Four, the establishment of the constitutional state, the plural political party and electoral systems, and the private universities has largely the result of both the state and cultural leaders' efforts through negotiations and public debates, which created new networks based on the cultural heritage, including kai.

Cultural leaders in Iraq emerged from the social movements in the 1920s and 1958, in the rural tribal, religious and urban academic space. Tribal leaders were created by the British Mandate legacy of the 1924 Tribal Regulation. The Ottoman legacy of the Sunni religious hierarchy was recreated through state education, while the Shi'a hierarchy was, as described in Chapter Six and Seven, created within the Shi'a hawza
community. After the independence of Iraq in 1932 and when militarism became a new factor in the politics, cultural aspects of education were neglected in state education. High levels of study of indigenous religious, ethnic and social groups’ values and their knowledge were neglected in the state education system. There was weak institutionalisation of indigenous philosophical aspects of knowledge in the education of the experts. These aspects were fully provided and demanded in the diwān and hawza education for tribal and religious leaders. In the 1950s and 1960s, when social movements developed and Iraq changed its political form from the monarchy to the republic, the tribal and religious leaders, notably Sheikh al-Muzaffar, and Ayatollah al-Khoei, al-Hakīm and as-Sadr, struggled to relate their traditional education of leaders to the new values. The consequence is visible today.

The third type is the education of traditional leaders. In tribal society, this group, in the Tokugawa period and before and during the Ottoman period, involved those who were characterised by supporting the moral order and by older forms of loyalty and obligation, in contrast to expert knowledge. In these, the tribal and Shi‘a leaders in monarchical and republic Iraq were considered as the cultural leaders, or as the emerging cultural leaders affected by their formal and sequences of educational experiences, leadership positions and value systems. In Meiji Japan and monarchical and republic Iraq, charismatic leadership was routinised either into bureaucracy or cultural leadership.

It is suggested that the three types of the education of leaders not only reflected leaders’ different renegotiation of traditional values in their education but also leaders’ influence on other authorities as they transformed themselves into new styles of
leaders. The significant example was the political, social and intellectual interrelationships between the Meiji experts and the cultural leaders. As a consequence, new styles of leaders who possessed both practical expertise and cultural knowledge emerged in the private universities. These elements do not stand alone but in complex interrelations with other new themes.

**Reflections on the nature of the education of leaders**

Although the thesis has tried to analyse how cultural traditions were adapted to modernity by the different styles of leaderships it is not clear where the different forms of society, a coherent society in Meiji Japan and a fragmented society in Iraq, originated. It is also not clear how these sociological and educational themes may be further understood comparatively. In order to explore these two questions, I attempt here to develop an understanding of the nature of the education of leaders in times of drastic political and social transitions. The different types of societies reflected the differently renegotiated values of religious, ethnic and social groups and concepts of merit embedded in the education of leaders in Iraq and Japan.

Such an argument might be developed by understanding the social ontology underpinning the education of leaders and might enable us to understand more clearly the process of modernisation of the education of leaders which changed these societies.

**An Interpretation of the social ontology underpinning the education of leaders**

As has been shown in the thesis, state modernity not only included projects which modernised the state itself, but also implied altered values based on the life experiences of individuals and groups in the society. The state enforced the rationalisation of
traditional religious, ethical, ethnic and social groups’ values in the education systems, but these values lost much of their legitimacy.

The notion of ontology here means the nature of being as a person or group. Social ontology refers to how we conceptualise social being. Voices raised by the cultural leaders expressed alternatives to the state modernity projects. As described in Chapters Three and Six, the struggles over the changing concepts of merit and for the institutionalisation of these in the education system were cultural leaders’ expressions of the ideal social being, and this ideal underpinned the education of leaders in terms of religious, ethical, ethnic and social group values. Such voices were based on the cultural leaders’ world views and their social obligations, with which renegotiation could work.

The concept of state modernity has been defined in this thesis as a form of rationalisation, legitimation and institutionalisation of the education of leaders. As Weber emphasised in his *Science as a Vocation*, the rationalisation of authority was ‘fate in the modern era’. He encouraged his academic followers to live with this fate and their vocation. However, Weber’s construction of historical dynamics in terms of charisma and the routinisation of moral charisma contradicts his fatalistic interpretation of the process of rationalisation.¹ Although Weber was aware of the fact that social dynamics result from many social forces, he nevertheless placed great emphasis upon the rise of charismatic leaders.² In this context, Weber’s process of rationalisation of authority should not be thought to lead to fatalistic conclusions but to renegotiations.

As introduced in Chapter One, rationalisation affected not only bureaucracy and
religion but all walks of life. It implied rational state modernity and also social modernity.

In the case of the modernisation of Meiji Japan and Iraq, this approach allowed for a detailed investigation of the changes in social and cultural structures; how the state established the institutions that were meant to dominate society and how the traditional and cultural leaders established alternative ways of educating leaders and alternative social visions. As discussed in the previous section, modernity entailed ambivalent attitudes to the bureaucracy, religious, ethical and ethnic or social group values, and the education of leaders.

For the experts and the cultural leaders in the two societies, the tension within modernity projects was due not only to the way in which they struggled over the gap between the rational and social projects, but also to the intellectual gap between indigenous and foreign knowledge. Both Iraq and Japan had deeply rooted religious, ethical, ethnic and social status group traditions. Mainland Japan was called the land of the *Yamato* ethnic group. Religion became part of modern consciousness, and religious and political ideology always had an impact on the leaders in society and on the education of leaders. The concept of merit shifted from personal cultivation as the Way of Man to requirements imposed by state educational policy. Religion was vulnerable to rational authority.

Weber's sociology of religion analysed the variant social structures of religion, the relation of religion to social and economic institutions, and the role of religion in social change. Overall then, Weber's use of religion and religious leaders as a perspective
for the study of society was useful, and illuminated my main theme of the nature of institutions for the education of leaders. However, Weber overlooked the presence of alternative voices of disagreement with the rationality of state modernity, and differences between state modernity and social modernity projects at times when political and social transitions were in tension. In these processes, three types of leaders emerged.

Firstly, the rationalisation of religion in Iraq involved the development of forms of state and social organisations, association and community and in the case of the state projects, systematically calculated means, which were characterised by the Ottoman legacy of Sunni-centred Islam. This state rationalisation of Sunni Islam and nationalism implied the division of diverse indigenous cultural and social structures, as well as individuals’ or groups’ lives, cultural and philosophical thoughts, religious groups’ codes and status, and the absorption of individuals into the states’ rational ideological institutions. Islamic institutions, Islamic principles and systems of Islamic learning were entangled in religious, political and cultural conflicts. As a consequence, not all of these were developed into a modern form. In Meiji Japan, the state experts and the Shinto leaders renegotiated the legacies of Shintō values and created the Emperor State, which influenced decisively modern political and social development. They redefined previous Confucian knowledge and underpinned moral codes of merit and the notions of loyalty, obedience and filial piety in order to regulate national morality and state education.

Secondly, the cultural leaders encouraged the development of personal autonomy, and learning networks, the establishment of private universities and new curricula for
philosophy, literature and in particular, theology for the new religious universities. As discussed in the previous two sections, the consequence was the emergence of new styles of leaders. The modernisation of the Shintō religion did not emerge from the establishment of the new Shintō schools. It emerged from the independent function of the new knowledge of Shintō in the society at large, in which the religious leaders, including Kurozumi in the Meiji period, struggled for an independent role for the believers in society.

Unlike the experts and religious leaders in Meiji Japan, cultural leaders considered traditional values as a moral code derived from the philosophical knowledge of the 'Way,' and used these values to promote self-expression and a civilised society by combining old indigenous and new Western knowledge. They believed in personal autonomy, and debated in public their political stance and social obligations. The cultural leaders were aware of their roles in disseminating ideas about rights to personal and group autonomy and freedom, in the process of the growth of civic society. The idea of the Way of Heaven in the two countries was a source of individual identity and of autonomy embedded in the social system. The concepts of merit in Japan and Iraq were based on religious and ethnic values and retained at state, social and family levels. Collective social obligation was a fruit of the cultural leaders' struggles over the cultural renegotiations. The Way of Heaven in Iraq was renegotiated in terms of the philosophical development of ijtihād, and this redefined Way underpinned Fasl and hawza educational institutions. Cultural authorities in tribal and religious communities used especially their knowledge of the moral order and older forms of loyalty and obligation.
Thirdly, in both countries, memories of the modernity conflicts, including the armed clashes, and the life experiences of individuals, families, communities, and the society, were also sources of discussion, public debate and negotiation. In Meiji Japan and tribal and religious communities in Iraq, particularly, issues of morality were explicit. Within the Arab tribes, the series of *Fasl* practices of justice, forgiving, compensation and peace making reinforced tribal obligation and underpinned the *diwân* education for honour, merit and authority. In Meiji Japan, having a vision of the future state, the society and the citizen, the new curriculum in the private universities offered a new humanist model, in which the education process was centred on the human as a culturally independent being.

**Cohesiveness and fragmentation in the societies**

The processes of modernising the education of leaders in the two countries developed different forms of society.

Firstly, there was an important element of social solidarity in the two societies which served to bind the three types of leaders together. This is the moral value based on the education of leaders and individuals' or groups' life experiences. Leaders deal with these experiences when they institutionalise the redefined traditional values and the concepts of merit. In Meiji Japan, the modernisation of religious, ethical, ethnic and social groups' values and knowledge developed simultaneously through their political, social and intellectual struggles over the cultural renegotiation and institutionalisation of these in the education of leaders. As a consequence, the cultural leaders shared philosophical and cultural values and knowledge, and feelings of ethical and social solidarity — the 'trust' which promotes social solidarity. In Iraq, an ethical code of
social solidarity did not develop in society. The emergence of cultural leaders was confined to various small communities.

Secondly, the private education of leaders in Iraq was less affected by the state modernity project and fragmented, but small and protective communities developed in order to preserve much of their ways of life from the pressure of the state modernity projects. In contrast, the private educational institutions in Japan were independent of the state as well as of international institutions. They developed independent institutional principles and systems of learning, and promoted a community with shared knowledge. In this context, they were able to develop a cohesive and democratic society.

Thirdly, in addition, alternative voices to the state's modernity project were weak in Iraq in the twentieth century. There were increasing gaps between urban and rural groups concerning values, merit and knowledge. There was exploitation of indigenous knowledge concerning peacekeeping. Disruption also arose from foreign intervention in political, economic and cultural spheres. Each group of leaders placed a different emphasis on the modernity projects and the institutionalisation of the cultural traditions, and these differences were reflected in the emergence of different styles of the education of leaders who possessed different knowledge and values. The experts, cultural and traditional leaders were fragmented, and the Iraqi state continued to be patrimonial. The country lost its intellectual middle class, individual and academic autonomy, and institutional independence. Moral issues raised by the state leaders were little questioned; hence alternative voices were not raised. The religious and tribal groups' private educational space in Iraq developed within the community in
terms of protection from the state modernity pressures.

Individuals or social groups certainly make their own history. For example, in the case of Iraq, it can be suggested that British Mandate project related to the state in Iraq showed an ambivalent attitude towards the new Iraqi leadership and the education of leaders among the Mandate officials. The 1920 social movement against the British spread from north to south and took most of the year to suppress. As a consequence, the Mandate officials diverged about Iraq’s future leadership between the group which emphasised the Ottoman-trained urban Iraqis, and the other group which recognised the provincial tribal leaders. The early modern Iraqi state was formed by the British officials’ social and cultural perspectives. The 1924 Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) legitimated the social position of the sheikh within his community. The sheikh became the final decision maker of Fasl but also the arbitrator between the state and his tribal members, who were obliged to enforce the state laws. TCCDR changed the relationships between the sheikhs and members of the tribes. The British legacy of the Regulation was an outcome of their officials’ understanding of the nature of Iraqi society. The revived Arab tribal position in provincial Iraq maintained specific communities of generosity, honour and trust and these had to be protected from rational state modernity. In this context, Iraq in 1932 became independent with international agreement on its boundaries, not through its own state and military forces.

In the 1930s, after the mandate, Iraq experienced covert and overt linkages between foreign educational influences from the USA, Germany and Britain and state education, through al-Jamali, Shawkat and Hamley. Traditional tribal and religious institutions were less affected by the state and from foreign educational institutions.
Independence meant separation or fragmentation, which was a new phenomenon of modern segregation from the state’s educational institutions, and there was little religious, ethical, ethnic and social knowledge shared by the tribal and religious groups and by those who favoured the state curricula.

Overall, the creation of fragmented or coherent patterns of society reflects the education of leaders. Modernity in Meiji Japan permeated a coherent society, and in Iraq it promoted a fragmented society. However, in both countries, traditional values, institutionalised in the education of leaders and based on the life experiences of individuals or groups, were neither abandoned nor firmly defined, but negotiated, renegotiated and continued, either transformed in the society or preserved in much of the traditions in the communities.

As a consequence, the patterns of the education of leaders in the two countries developed different styles and routes, with contrasting long-term consequences. The role of the Meiji state modernity project, which established separate state and private higher education, ended in April 2004, as the state universities were turned into public or private corporations. The contemporary Iraqi state, society and education of leaders are traceable back to the Ottomans and the first half-century of modernising Iraq. The contemporary Japanese state, society and education of leaders are traceable back to the Meiji period.

Limitations of the thesis and future research

On a complex topic such as this, there will always be limitations in the structure and shape of research. I have identified three kinds of limitations in the development of the
arguments in the thesis; these are the limitation to two countries, the limited time scale, and the omission of discussion of the social trust issue in the education of leaders.

Firstly, I undertook research on the education of leaders and on modernity projects in Iraq and Japan. These countries were chosen because of my experience of living in these countries for over twenty-five years and my knowledge of their languages. Both countries had deeply rooted religious, ethnic and social traditions which had influenced the education of leaders, with various political and social consequences. However, since Iraq and Japan had particular experiences in their struggles, in order to offer a more comparative interpretation of modernisation it might have been helpful to include two further countries.

Secondly, the thesis investigated specific periods of about fifty years in each country, times when they experienced drastic political and social transitions. Although a longer time span which included the present day might have enabled an analysis of a larger spectrum of modernity processes, the periods covered by the research demonstrated particular complex changes and therefore provided an opportunity to develop particular understandings and to focus in depth on periods of particularly interesting developments. Nevertheless, not taking the study up to the present day was, for me, a weakness in what I might have achieved.

Thirdly, social trust in the two societies was different. In Meiji Japan, social trust included the state leaders' trust of the cultural leaders and vice versa, as well as trust among the civic groups, while in Iraq, there was a loss of social trust at state and social levels. As a result there were enormous differences in political and social changes in
these societies. In Japan a cohesive society was constructed, while in Iraq the fragmented but self-protecting communities continued. Future research might enable these limitations concerning time, space and social trust to be addressed.

Interestingly, on 13th April, 2006, after critical debates and dialogues more than seventy meetings over three years within the ruling party in Japan, the party leaders announced the draft of a Fundamental Law of Education Reform containing a preamble and eighteen articles, which will be submitted to the National Assembly. The limits of patriotism were debated, and Japan's wish to contribute to world peace and the welfare of all human beings was reaffirmed. Overall, the new words 'love of country and the home province' and 'public spirit' were added.

However, Japan has retained certain outcast communities. Past and current discrimination has resulted in their educational attainment and socioeconomic status being lower than those of the majority of Japanese. Powerful nationalists in previous times exploited national symbols. In this sense Japan is still organised by ethnicity. The efforts through movements to change their situation from the liberation to integration have continued over the years. In 2006, foreigners living in Japan (permanent residents) are estimated to total around 2,000,000. During the last ten years, there was a sudden increase of 600,000. The number of migrant people will increase.

In Iraq, politically, in the twentieth century, the Kurdish people and Shi'a religious groups were separate from the Sunni Arabs. In terms of Arab nationalism, Kurdish nationalism raises distinct questions. After the third war in Iraq in 2003, the chasm
between Sunni and Shi’a has become severe. In this political environment, social trust
between the state and the society, as well as between the different social groups has
disappeared. Tension between the different cultural and social groups over their social
visions increases.

Future research could examine the powerful mixture of ethnicity and nationalism, and
the sensitive versions of the excluded in both countries. In Iraq I would study the
nationalism of the Kurds and the Ba’th party after 1968. In both cases there are
different forms of social trust; in the case of Japan, social trust is restricted by ethnicity.
In Iraq it is also restricted by ethnicity but also by coercion, coalition and Iraqi politics.
What are the consequences of the previous regime and the way Saddam corrupted the
state? What is the consequence of that for the selection of leaders?

At present, Japan and Iraq are facing new questions about the nature of education, the
education of leaders and the nature of national education and social trust.

A contemporary coda

Contemporary Japan is changing the relationship between the education of experts and
that of the cultural leaders. In order to maintain a position of international leadership,
and to launch a new era distinct from the post-war period, Japan requires the education
of new leaders, the creation of a new social infrastructure and to make a contribution to
international society through university reforms. In May, 2005, the Open Course Ware
(OCW) project was established by the six allied universities, Tōkyo, Kyōto, Keiō,
Waseda, Ōsaka and Tōkyo Technology University. The syllabus and lectures taught in
the scientific departments in these universities were made available on the internet. IT
Education is rapidly expanding. At the same time the universities required, and Keiō University called for, the renovation of the cultural aspect of education.¹⁰

Education in Iraq has become today a human rights issue. Education was never set free from power - the state's power and its control of knowledge. The indigenous cultural aspect of education is separated from modern state education. Within the political, social and cultural identity crises in Iraq, with the loss of peace and security in daily life, tribal leaders in the city are now active in forming the tribal learning circles-diwan or majālis meetings. The religious community of hawza might in future be transformed into a religious or secular university. The Iraqis are now trying to search for a new identity. In these struggles, Iraq will be able to turn its plight into fortune. The Iraqi citizens can make sense of their painful experiences. As Tripp put it, "Iraqis will have good reason to fear subjection once more to a regime that equates power with force and dissent with treason".¹¹

One important factor in the education of leaders was the indigenous cultural and spiritual climate of Japan and Iraq. In my perspective, the cultural aspect of education is described as a study of the way of understanding the self and others, and as a core of education based on the legacy (ever changing and continuing) of philosophy, morality, the arts, and religion. Without cultural education based on redefined traditional values and, through it, personal understanding of philosophy, morality, arts and religion, there will be no development of education related to religion, ethnicity and social groups within the frame of social modernity and the state as well as international modernity. For such development I would like to take some responsibility in my life.
ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION


7. On *Diwān*, see the Glossary.


9. On the meaning of ‘*Fasāl*’, see the Glossary.


13. Ibid., p.5.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., pp. 3-11, 119-54, in particular, ‘addition (1911)’, p. 154.

17. There are a number of important studies of state modernity and social modernity. Among them, the works of classical political and social scientists, contemporary sociologists, historians, educationists and anthropologists are noted.

1. The classical works

The classical works illuminated the study of modernity associated with the problems of:

- the state and the growth of the economy;
- cultural traditions, in particular religion and moral values (civilisation);
- knowledge; and
- social stratification systems and the development of communities in Western societies and the rest of the world.

Philosophers and political and social scientists in the nineteenth century pursued these themes. The following authors helped me to organise my ideas on state and social modernity.


Contemporary works

2. Contemporary works by sociologists

3. Works by contemporary historians

The work of educational historians helped me in the ways in which they combined history and sociology in educational studies. They emphasise two important historical approaches; one through a range of researches and interpretations based on documentary evidence, the other through interdisciplinary research rooted in the social sciences and humanities, which include sociology, psychology, economics, geography, religion and cultural studies, anthropology and comparative study in international contexts and the application of these to historical research on education.


4. Works by contemporary comparative educationists

The study of comparative education in the 2000s emphasises the interdisciplinary approach, combining humanities and sociology. One of its aims is to reconceptualise comparative and international educational relations. This thesis tries to bridge and interpret the processes of changing cultural and traditional values and knowledge in the different space, time and cultural transfer which were affected by modernities.

M. Crossley. 2000. ‘Bridging cultures and traditions in the reconceptualisation of comparative and international education’, Comparative Education. 36 (3): 319-332,

5. Commentaries by contemporary writers included:


18. The definition of social modernity was also influenced by the following classical and contemporary works. The commentaries by these contemporary writers emphasise the contradictions, tensions and resistance caused by the process of modernity. These works encourage modern academic studies of the reconstruction of civic society, new knowledge and networks. The following authors influenced me to organise my ideas on state and social modernity.


21. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 155.
27. Ibid., pp. 54-6.
29. Ibid., p. 241.
30. Ibid., pp. 240-4.
31. Ibid., pp. 416-44.
32. Ibid.
33. Japanese and Arabic official terms and individual expressions, statements and quotations are translated into English in the main text of the thesis and the endnotes. Translations in the endnotes are my own or those of an Arabic language scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies, unless otherwise specified. The titles of books and articles have been translated by the author of the thesis, unless English titles were indicated by the original writers.
35. Politically, in the twentieth century, the Kurdish people were a separate entity from the Sunni Arabs. For the purpose of the thesis, in terms of Arab nationalism, Kurdish nationalism raises different questions. For the same reasons, other minority groups were not considered in this thesis. I looked at the majority populations of Iraq, which are the Sunni and Shi’a Arabs.

CHAPTER TWO: CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY PROJECTS IN JAPAN 1868-1912


6. Ibid., p. 73.


11. Ibid., pp. 180-1. The class distinction between the social groups known as *kazoku, shizoku* and *heimin*, was abolished when the New Constitution was promulgated in 1947. The New Constitution recognised *kōzoku* (the Imperial family) as the people of the nation.

12. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


29. Ibid., p. 55.

30. Ibid., p. 49.


35. Ibid., p. 471.

36. Ibid., p. 479.

37. Ibid., pp. 477-8.


40. Yasumaru and Miyachi, op.cit., p. 495.


42. Yui and Obinata. op.cit., pp. 426-465, 438.

43. Ibid., p. 496.


46. Mehl, op.cit., p. 52.
47. Kaei, op.cit., p. 179.
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 339.
53. Ibid., pp. 341-343.
54. Ibid., pp. 328-389.
55. Ibid., p. 344.
56. Ibid.
58. Ibid., pp. 440-1.
65. Ibid.
67. Ibid., pp. 446-7.
68. Ibid., pp. 93-100, 457.
69. M. Inoki, op.cit., p. 287.
72. Ibid.


75. The Constitution was promulgated on February, 11th 1889. The date was the official anniversary of the supposed founding of the Japanese state in 660 B.C.


77. For the English version of Article XXIII of *Meiji Kenpō* [the Constitution of the Empire of Japan] see the Glossary.

78. On Article X and Article XI, see the Glossary.


85. On Article LV of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan 1889 (*Meiji Kenpō*), see the Glossary.


89. Ibid., p. 508.

90. Ibid., p. 502.

91. Ibid., p. 512.

92. Ibid., p. 513.

93. Ibid., p. 528.
94. Ibid., p. 523.

95. Ibid.


98. Ibid., pp. 39-40.


100. Ibid., p. 57.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Reischauer and Craig, op.cit., p. 92, 100.


109. Ibid.

110. Matsumoto and Yamamuro, op.cit., p. 142.


112. Yasumaru and Miyachi, op.cit., p. 172; On *Enzetsukai* (speech associations) see Fukaya and Yasumaru, op.cit., pp. 185-211; On *undōkai* (athletics associations), see Fukaya and Yasumaru, op.cit., pp. 12-27.

113. Fukaya and Yasumaru, op.cit., pp. 173-6, 185-8, 471.


115. Ibid., pp. 461-2.

117. Matsumoto and Yamamuro. op.cit., p. 247.

118. Ibid., pp. 149-225.


121. p. 150.

122. Kornicki, op.cit., p. 29.


**CHAPTER THREE: THE CONCEPTS OF MERIT AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN JAPAN**


8. Ibid.


10. Article One of Law Governing the Military Households [the *Buke Shōhattō*], 1615. The concept of *Bushido* was delineated in the *Buke Shōhattō* as the Way to master letters, the sword, archery and horse riding (*bunbu-kyūba no michi*).


12. Article 13 of Law Governing the Military Households [the *Buke Shōhattō*]. 1615, in: ibid.,
p. 166.


15. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


29. Wigmore. op.cit., Chapter 1-Bringing a Suit, p. 11.


32. Kaei, op.cit., p. 162.


37. Ibid, p. 35.

38. Ibid.


44. Ibid., p. 355.


58. Ibid., pp. 21-28, in particular p. 24. "If my above argument be allowed, the government cannot be taken as the sole beneficiary of promoting civilization and maintaining national independence. Nor are we to rely on the scholars of Western learning"; Criticisms made by Kato Hiroyuki, Mori Arinori, Tsuda Mamich and Nishi Amane on 'gakusha no shokubun o ronzu' [Discussion of the Duty of the Scholars] which appeared in *Gakumon no Susume [An Encouragement of Learning]*: *Meiroku Zasshi* (magazine) Vol. 2. March, 1874; Fukuzawa, Yukichi. 1926. op.cit., pp. 25-34.


60. Fukuzawa. 1926. op.cit., p. 1.

61. Ibid., op.cit., pp. 1-7, 10-15, 53-61, 139-147.


68. Ibid.


71. Ibid.


74. Passin. 1965a. op.cit., pp. 149-54.


76. The name of Tokyo University was changed three times. As Tokyo University, it was established in 1877. In 1886, the name was given as the Imperial University, and in 1897, the name was changed to the Imperial Tokyo University. This university was the only State University, until Kyoto University was established in 1897.


81. Ibid., Section 3.


85. This programme eventually culminated in the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo), in: Monbu kagaku bunnka shō. 1980. op.cit., Chapter II. Section 5.

86. Ibid., Chapter III: the establishment and consolidation of the modern educational system. Section 3.

87. Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN JAPAN


2. On *koku*, see also the Glossary.


4. Ibid., p. 16.


10. On such domain schools, please see *hankō* in the Glossary.


12. Ibid.


15. Monbu kagaku bunka shō, op.cit., Chapter 1. section 1.


17. Ibid., p. 117.


31. Monbu kagaku bunkashō. 1980 (March). op.cit., Chapter 1 (Section 2).

32. Ibid.

33. Prime Minister’s Office, op.cit., p. 1105.


37. Article 1 of the 1886 Imperial University Order. Monbu kagaku bunkashō. 1980 (March). op.cit., Chapter III, section 5 (1).
38. Ibid; also see Chapter 1, section 2.


40. Ibid. Chapter 2, Article 1.

41. Curricula and Regulations of Literature Department. Tōkyō Daigaku Enkaku Binranshi [A Prospectus of A History of Tōkyō University].

42. Tōkyō Daigaku Administrative Office: The Department of Law. 1881-2. op.cit.

43. Ibid., Chapter 3. Curricula, Article 3.

44. Ibid.


46. Ibid., pp. 104-5, 301.

47. Ibid., pp. 139-41.

48. Ibid., p. 237.

49. Ibid., p. 248.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 237, 248.

52. Ibid., pp. 244-8.

53. Ibid., pp. 209-12.


57. Ibid., pp. 38-44, 198-203.

58. Ibid., p. 247.


60. Ibid., Appendix 8. rikugun daigakkō kakugakunen kakusei gakusetsu jicchi hyō [Curricula of each academic year (three years) in the Military College] December, 1914 - November, 1915.

61. Ibid., pp. 125-6, 140-1.

62. The graduates from the Imperial Tōkyō University in 1888 appeared in Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun (Newspaper), 12th July, 1888. Although the expansion of faculties in the Tokyo
Imperial University was slow, twenty one years after Meiji Renovation, the effect of the social mobility through education started to be evident in the areas of the faculties of science and engineering. In the middle of 1880s, the students came from many different prefectures, but an absolute majority of the members of the law and politics faculties still came from domains powerful in the time of Meiji Ishin, namely, Yamaguchi, Kochi, Fukuoka and Kumamoto prefectures.

63. Amano and Cummings. 1979b. op.cit., p. 15.


66. Ibid., p. 200, 316.

67. Passin(a), op.cit., p. 131.

68. Ishizuki. op.cit., p. 225.


79. Ibid., p. 106.


82. Ibid., pp. 930-9.


87. Ibid., pp. 508-9.


89. Passin. 1965a. op.cit., p. 89.

90. Thomas Lake Harris’s Brotherhood influenced Mori’s slogan “Dignity, Friendship, and Obedience”, in: Passin. 1965a. op.cit., p. 90.

91. Ibid., pp. 226-8.

92. Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku ni kansuru Chokugo or Kyōiku Chokugo). 1879. 1890.


95. On Article IX and X of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889), see Meiji Kenpō in the Glossary.

96. Westney, op.cit., p. 259.


100. A letter addressed to Yamagata Aritomo from Fukuzawa Yukichi, 29th January, 1883, in: ibid., pp. 71-2; Jiji Shinpō (Newspaper) 4th, 7th, 18th and 19th January and 7th and 8th February 1883.


104. Ishizuki, op.cit., p. 237.


109. Ibid.


111. Passin. 1965a. op.cit., p. 93.


114. Ibid., Chapter IV: Section 4 (1).


117. The recognised universities were Hōgakuin Daigaku, Nihon University, Meiji University, Hōsei University, Kyoto hōsei senmon school, Tetsugakukan University, Kansai höritsu gakkō,
Senshūgakkō, Meiji Gakuin, in 1904. Aoyama Gakuin, Taiwan kyōkai senmon gakkō, Nihon joshidai gakkō, Dōshisha daigakkō, Sōdōshū daigakkō, Waseda University, Nichiren shū dai gakkō and Kokugakum University, in: Prime Minister’s Office, op. cit., p. 1027.


119. Ibid.

120. Waseda University. 1978, op. cit., p. 758.

121. Kaei, op. cit., p. 239.

CHAPTER FIVE: CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY PROJECTS IN IRAQ 1921-1968


5. Ibid., pp. 36-9.


17. Imperial Rescript: A Royal Decree of 3rd November, 1839.


21. Ibid., p. 151.

22. On the hawza community see the Glossary.


31. Qur’an 57:25, see the Glossary.


34. Ibid.

35. *Fasl idārī* was also called *majālis tahkīm*. For the case of the Anza and Shammal tribes in 1952, see, Al-Jamil. 1956. op.cit., pp. 261-3; and see also M. Al-Jamil. 1935. *Ta’līqāt alā nizām da’wa al-Ashā’īrī wa ta’dilāt* [The Interpretation of the Tribal Disputes and Regulations]. Baghdad: [publisher not indicated]; On the customary process of *tahkīm Fasl* disputes negotiation, see Hasanayn, op.cit., p. 292-7.


38. The 1924 Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation. Article 2.

39. The 1924 Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation. Article 2 (e) prescribes that an “order of reference” is a written order by a Political Officer referring matters in dispute to a “Majlis.”


41. Several Iraqi administrative officials in the provinces wrote about the tribal lives and *Fasl* system from their observations; See; Al-Jamil. 1935. op.cit; Al-Jamil. 1956. op.cit; F. Al-Muzhir. 1941. *Al-Qadha-ul-Asha’rey* [Tribal Case Law]. Baghdad: [publisher not indicated]. This book contains the tribal tradition of the South of Iraq; Al-Rawi, op.cit., p. 227.


43. Al-Ajami, op.cit., p. 26; Constituent Assembly elections and the Role of Tribal Sheikhs. 20 October, 1924, al-Istiqlāl (the Independent newspaper).

44. Qarārāt [Decisions]: al-hukūma al-irāqiyya, qanūn intikhāb al-Majālis al-Ta’sāsi [the law of the Constituent assembly elections] (Baghdad, 1923); A. Kelidar, op.cit., p. 18. In Najaf, Karbalā and Kāzimain, the Shi’a *ulamā* issued *fatwas* to the Muslims of Iraq, forbidding participation in the elections, as it was against the wishes of the nation”. Ibid. (the original *fatwas* and their copies are in *Envelope No. 49, File 115/S/1/4*, National Archives, Baghdad.1924).


59. Ibid., p. 513 ; Sluglett and Farouk, op.cit., p. 1415.


CHAPTER SIX: THE CONCEPTS OF MERIT AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN IRAQ


6. Ibid., pp. 128-52.


8. Ibid., pp. 128-53.

10. Ibid., p. 107.


23. Ibid., p. 23.


28. Ibid., pp. 22-3, 29, 200 n. 31.

29. Ibid., p. 39, 203 n. 80.

30. Ibid., p. 44.


39. The Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq, on May 20th, 1932. Chapter 1, Article 8.

40. Ibid., Article 9 2.

41. Ibid.


47. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
48. Simon. op.cit., pp 75-95.
55. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. vi and p. 119.
60. “Peripatetic schools will deal with the various aspects of tribal life at all ages and for both sexes rather than narrowing themselves to one phase of life, at a specific age, and of one sex”. Al-Jamâli. 1934. op.cit., p. 119.
London: Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, p. 166.


67. Iraqi File no. 1469 issued 7 October 1935.

68. Al-Safuwat, op.cit., p. 222.

69. Flacker, op.cit., p. 142, 341.


71. Hemphill, op.cit., p. 93.


79. [FO 371/31371] August 11, 1942. Confidential [E 4722/204/93] Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden (Received August 11). No. 207. Baghdad, August 2, 1942. [Section 15].


81. Ibid.


87. Ibid., p. 12.


89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN IRAQ


9. Ibid., p. 239, 251.


15. [FO371/4150]. Administration Report Revenue Board, Baghdad. March 22nd to December 31st, 1917. Chapter XI.


24. [CO 730/177/2], [CO54/583].


27. Ibid.

D.C: American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, p. 98.


31. Ibid., pp. 206-207.


33. Ibid.


36. Ibid., p. 194.


38. BW1/327.


41. Ahamed. op.cit., p. 399.


43. Tarbush, op.cit., p. 74, 78.


47. Sheppard, op.cit., p. 139.


50. The Royal Military Academy Sandhurs: Role of Officers, Lectures and Officer Cadets.
51. Sheppard, op.cit., p.146; The Sandhurst: Organisation of Instruction and Syllabus, 1955. Section VIII.

52. Ibid., 1955. pp. 8-9, 37-80, 81-88.

53. Ibid., Introduction and Organisation, p. 23.

54. Ibid.


56. Ibid., p. 79.


58. Tarbush, op.cit., p. 79.

59. Ibid. “Only one-tenth of the senior officers came from the rural areas, while of the remainder nine-tenths were born in Baghdad. The most remarkable feature in the analysis of the officer corps is the fact that only 1 of 61 officers was a Shi’a and 2 were Christian, while the remaining 58 were all Sunni”.


62. The plural of waqf. On waqf system recognised in Article 6 of the text of the final draft of the Mandate, see the Glossary.


64. Ibid., pp. 138-9.

65. Ibid., J.S. Frey. p. 52, 139.


67. On Sunni heiya ulamā Muslim, see the Glossary.


70. Mahmood, op.cit., p. 275 n. 22.

72. “The Muntada was not recognised as a madrasa until Isfahan issued a fatwa for its recognition after several years”. Ibid., p. 268.


74. Ibid., p. 57.


78. For example, A. Al-Ilfi. 1908. \textit{Kitāb: Balāghat al-Nisa‘a} [The Book: women’s prosody]. Cairo: [publisher not indicated]


81. Ibid., pp. 292-3.

82. Ibid., p. 295

83. Ibid., p. 300.

84. Ibid., p. 301.

85. [FO9241/51] [FO37/133/28].

86. British Council’s view on the new university, see [BW39/16].


90. Al-Douri. 1967. op. cit. Law no. 51 for Baghdad University. 1963.

91. The syllabus of the College of Law, Baghdad, as recorded in the Calendar of the University of Baghdad 1967-68, Baghdad: Baghdad University Press, pp. 25-6.

92. Ibid.


95. Ibid.


97. Mahmood, op.cit., p. 275 n. 22.


100. Frey, op.cit., pp. 53-4.

101. The Khoie Foundation, op.cit.

102. An unpublished document including the curriculum of the hawza (the Khoie Foundation).

103. The Khoie Foundation, op.cit.


105. The Khoie Foundation, op.cit.


109. Ibid., pp. 16-19.


111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., p. 88.


**CHAPTER EIGHT: THE CONCLUSION**


2. Ibid., p. 52.

4. In 1906, Töson, Shimazaki (1872-1943) a Japanese novelist of the Meiji and early Showa eras, wrote a novel, *Hakai* [The Broken Commandment] which dealt with the *burakumin* [the outcast social group]. In 1929 he wrote about many aspects of life in his area, Kiso, including these in his novel *Yo-ake mae* [Before the Dawn]. My great-grandfather appears a little in *Before the Dawn* as the last forestry magistrate in Kiso Owari domain (today, in Gifu and a part of Nagano prefecture). In this historical novel, there are enormous individual struggles for adjusting the identities of the people in Kiso in terms of leadership and knowledge in the new Meiji era.

5. In Iraq, I would like to have an opportunity to work to develop the Diyāla Campus University, which the late Mr. Sergio de Mello, UN envoy, set up as part of the agenda for the construction of new universities. The majority of my extended family are living in Diyāla prefecture. It is actually a model prefecture, as the various ethnic and religious groups, the Kurds, the Shi‘i and Sunni, are living there together.

6. Mainichi Newspaper, 13th April, 2006; On May 12th, the Democratic Party offered a counter proposal. This party suggested changing ‘love of country’ into ‘love of Japan’. The addition of “social solidarity” was suggested. Ibid., 12th May, 2006; On May 27th, the Japan Educational Law Society, organised by scholars of education and other professionals, held a general meeting, in which they agreed submit an urgent statement asking the government to discard the proposed Fundamental Law of Education Reform. The statement pointed out that the government intends to replace the existing Fundamental Law of Education with a new law. Whereas the existing Fundamental Law of Education prescribes ‘the cultivation of self-independence and the development of autonomous personality’, the proposed Education Reform introduces national morality; hence, state control of education system. A series of symposium on the issues will be opened to the public. Ibid., 27th May, 2006; http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/minutes of Japanese Cabinet meeting on a Law of Education Reform. 001/058:164 (29). The Committee of the House of Representatives. 11th May 2006 (the latest-as of 31st May 2006).


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General Mushah’idāni Akram (a director of the department of police (Dr.)) 1997. A letter to the author on the increase of Fasl in Baghdad and the nature of crime in contemporary Iraq.


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1 The transliteration of Japanese in this thesis uses the modified Hepburn system of romanisation as employed in Kenkyusha’s New Japanes-English Dictionary (3rd and later editions). The transliteration of Arabic in this thesis uses a simplified version of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies system.

The Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq. Chapter 1, Article 8. May, 20th 1932.


JAPAN


Archives

The National Archive: Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew, England

Documents Concerning Britain in Iraq (1914-1930 and 1941-47 and 1956-58)

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Glossary

Arabic glossary

_akhlaq_ (akhlak):
National morality, literally “manners”; good dispositions and the virtues that adorn the human being with respect to sense and truth. (B. Fortna, 2000.). In the Turkish language, _akhlaq_ is spelled _akhlak_.

_akhlaq al-Mudnîya_:
Civic ethics used in the schools in Iraq in the twentieth century.

_asabîya_:
The Arab tribal virtue of solidarity; the term used by Ibn Khaldûn (1332-1406).

_ashīra_ (plural: _ashāîr_):
Tribes: the Arab tribe is a primordial group which shares a common ethnicity, language and culture. The group members unite when war is declared, but they have a tribal obligation to maximise consensus through peace negotiation between the tribes. In this context, the thesis emphasises that the tribal education of leaders based on nomadic philosophy in the Middle East forms a particular pattern and changes in various ways.

_Ayatollah_:
A title for a senior _mujtahid_ created in the twentieth century.

_diwân_:
The exclusively male guest house; the word designates the main sitting room, that accommodates a crucial socialising and educating role for the tribal leaders. It is a sheikh’s office, in which the tribal sheikhs and members deal with tribal affairs in relation to the state and the different tribal communities across the borders. The tribe’s members are consulted there. This institution is part of the Arab Islamic culture of _Fasl_ traditions endorsing systematic networks through the social, tribal and family obligation of peace keeping and making.

_fasl_:
Literally, _Fasl_ is “an adjudication between right and wrong”. Al-Zajjaj mentioned that one of the epithets for Allah is ‘Al-Faasil’. He judges fate among His creation. _Fasl_ pronounces rights, distinguishes the opposite things, and then judges and combines. _Lisan al-‘Arab_ [Lexicon of the Arab] 1956. 11vols. Beirut: Daar Beirut, pp. 521-522. _Fasl_ means ‘the final decision’, ‘conclusion of formal greetings’, ‘to make a decision’, ‘to fix the compensation’. Today, in most Arab countries, ‘_Fasl_’ is called ‘_Solf_’ which means ‘reconciliation’. It is a method of settling disputes (reconciliation) between two parties when any of the parties is a tribal member, through mediators; an Arab tribal tradition in the pre-Islamic period, recognized in Islamic law and practised by the Prophet Mohammed. Tribal knowledge served individual and community life. The most popular phrase used in the Arab world is “_Bainy wa Bainaka Ease al-Khitab_” [Between you and me there is a public procedure and final decision]. In this context
Fasl can be defined as a judicial meeting (ijutmā al qadhāī) and consultation procedure (tashāwar al-shūra) set up to reach a final decision.

**fatwa:**
A final judgement and legal opinion of the religious authority on a religious matter.

**fiqh:**
Islamic jurisprudence as well as tribal jurisprudence; literally, “understanding”.

**futūwa:**
A paramilitary youth organisation set up by the Iraqi government in the 1930s; literally, “the Sūfī Islamic notion of youth”.

**hawza:**
The Shī`a learning community and theological madrasa. According to Litvak, the hawza `ilmīya (lit. territory of learning) is the community as centre of learning independent of the state. It denotes a communal whole which encompasses scholarship and inter-personal and social bonds, as well as the organizational and financial spheres. Litvak, Meir. 1998. Shī`i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: the ‘Ulamā’ of Najaf and Kārbala’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

**heiya ulamā Muslim:**
The Association of Muslim Scholars, established by Amjad al-Zahawi in the 1950s. Under the previous regime, there was a strict control of the activities. Only six old leaders existed at the time of the fall of the regime in 2003. The learning community was expanded, and in 2004, the numbers of Sunni religious learners rapidly increased, to 6000.

**ijtihād:**
In an Islamic context: a statement of arriving at an independent interpretation of the Islamic law by employing the sources of law and by using the principles of jurisprudence(usūl al-fiqh); in a tribal context: interpretation of the customary law, or an un-precedented decision concerning compensation in Fasl.

**ijtihād used by religious leaders:**
Ijtihād, literally “exerting oneself”, is the technical term in Islamic law, first, for the use of individual reasoning in general and later, in a restricted meaning, for the use of the method of reasoning by analogy (kiyās). The ancient schools of law freely used individual reasoning, both in its arbitrary and its systematically disciplined form, and it is often simply called rā`y [opinion, considered opinion]. Shāfī`i school identifies the legitimate function of ijtihād with the use of kiyās, the drawing of conclusions by their method of analogy, or systematic reasoning from the Qur`ān and the Sunna of the Prophet. This important innovation prevailed in the theory of Islamic law. B. Lewis, V.L. Menage, C.H. Pellat and J. Schaght (eds.), 1971. The Encyclopedia of Islām: New Edition Prepared by Number of Leading Orientalists. Volume II. London: Luzac & Co, p.1026.

**Islām:**
Literally, “submission to One God”; designates a civilisation and a culture established over the centuries.
**madrasa:**
Literally, the “place of learning”; Classical instructions in the universities, colleges of law and religious schools focused on the teaching of Islamic theology and jurisprudence; nowadays, *madrasa* refers to a school in general.

**madrasa al-Mustansiryya:**

**majālis:**
A private learning network maintained by urban intellectuals. It is not for the education of leaders but an educational tradition in the city, based on the Islamic spirit of family honour. In the ‘Abbāsid period, *majālis* developed as the professor’s chair or post, and it also designated the people of the *majlis*-the place of sitting.

**muftī:**
A Muslim cleric or legal expert empowered to give rulings on religious matters; a jurisprudent consultant recognised by the Caliph as a person familiar with legal opinion in the context of religion.

**mujtahid:**
A clerical authority who is recognised by the clerical community as a competent to expresses an independent legal opinion.

**mura’a:**
The spirit of the ideal youth of the tribe, which combined the virtue of the tribe with Islam with Arabhood; The concept was retained over generations from the pre-Islamic period.

**Qur’an 57:25**
“We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the balance, that mankind might observe right measure”.

**Rehber-i Akhlāk:**
The Guide to Morals used as a text book in the schools in the nineteenth century, during the Ottoman period.
Shari'a:
Islamic law.

Sharifian:
Arab officers who served in the Ottoman army but opposed the Ottoman officers. In the 1910s, Arab officers first served King Faisal in Damascus, supported his Hashimite family and were active during the Arab resistance to the British mandate.

Sheikh:
In Arab Iraq, either a religious scholar or a tribal notable chieftain. Tribal leaders of several clans within a tribe are also called sheikh.

Sheikh al masheikh (tribal)
Literally, “sheikh of sheikhs”. The chief sheikh of the whole tribe which has a member of over fifty thousands. In the thesis ‘tribal leaders, sheikhs’ refer to sheikh al masheikh in Iraq.

Shi'a:
The Shi'a split from the main body of Islam in the first Islamic century over a political issue and later developed doctrinal differences with the Sunnis. The Shi'a school believes in Ali the 4th Caliph, as the leader of the community of Islam.

Sunni:
A school of Islam which puts emphasis on belief in the Qur'an, hadith and sunna and umma [Islamic community]. 90 percent of the Muslims in the world are Sunni. The Sunnis follow the elective principle in selecting their leaders. Hadith and Sunna are oral tradition and the records of sayings (hadith) and behaviour (sunna) of the Prophet and the first Muslims. Hence, both are regarded as defining the ideal custom and practice of the Muslims. These collections are used as an addition to the Qur'an for understanding Islam.

Tanmüat:
The 1858 Ottoman reforms which included land and educational reforms; They aimed at modernizing the Empire by extending the powers of the central authority and sapping the autonomy of the tribes and their leaders.

Waqf:
A Muslim religious endowment. As in the Ministry of Awqāf [plural of waqf]), the text of the final draft of the Mandate: Article 6 prescribes: “The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Mesopotamia shall safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners; (b) the law and (to the extent deemed expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Mesopotamia with regard to questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of waqf and personal status). In particular the Mandatory agrees that the control and administration of waqf shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders”. Stewart Erskine. 1933. King Faisal of 'Iraq: An Authorized and Authentic Study. London: Hutchinson & Co. (Ltd), Part Two: The King of Iraq and His Country, p. 123.
**Japanese glossary**

*bakufu*:
Government of the Shoguns, distinct from the Imperial court and from the landlords (daimyo) in the local domains. Minamoto Yoritomo set up the first *bakufu* at Kamakura in 1192. Tokugawa Ieyasu opened it in Edo (the present Tokyo) in 1603. Literally, “camp office” of the government in the hands of the military class.

*bishi* and *gushi*:
Bureaucrats who served the central government (*bishi*) and local government (*gushi*) at the time of the establishment of the Meiji government.

*bukeshohatto*:
The Law Governing the Military Households issued by *Shoguns*. The first *bukeshohatto* was enacted by the second Shogun Tokugawa Hidetada in 1615. The law regulated Bushi family order and identity in relation to the Tokugawa central government.

*bun* and *bu*:
In the Tokugawa period, Article One of *Bukeshohatto* described the way of the arts of peace and war, in terms of the obligation of Bushi to devote themselves to balancing learning (*bun*) and the military arts (*bu*). In the Meiji period, ideal bureaucrat was described in terms of ‘pen’ (*bun*) and ‘sword’ or the martial arts of war (*bu*).

*bunbu-kan*:
Bureaucrats. The literal meaning is: government officials who balance knowledge of literature (*bun*) and the military arts (*bu*). This *bun-bu kan* system, together with the distinction of social strata between shizoku (the gentry) and heimin (the commoner), continued until 1947. The privilege of the *bunkan* system was then abolished and replaced by the Law of the State Civil Service [Kokka kōmuin hō].

*Bushi*:
A status group of professional warriors and administrators who emerged in the 12th century and continued until 1868; literally, ‘Bushi’ means “a person who has mastered the knowledge of the martial arts (*bu*) and the world (*shi*)”. Being a samurai was a role of the *Bushi*.

*bushidō*:
Literally, the “Way of the *Bushi*”; the ideal ethical code of *Bushi*; It emphasised the loyalty, based on balanced knowledge, of a *Bushi* to his lord. In Tokugawa feudalism, the old ties of Shintō and *Bushidō* values in the feudal society were regulated by national ties and neo-Confucian ethics through *bukeshohatto* and *kakun*. The feudal relationships throughout the Tokugawa period were regulated so that the *Bushi* (C) who owed his loyalty to the lord (B) who served the higher lord (A) did not have the right to show his loyalty to (A). For example, when Naruse, who was an eminent retainer of the first Tokugawa *Shogun*, Ieyasu was appointed as an executive retainer (*karō*) of Tokugawa Yoshinao in the Owari domain, he sent a letter to his previous lord, Ieyasu in Edo, saying that “from today my lord is Owari Tokugawa and so if he revolts against you, I also shoot an arrow to Edo.” Thus the concept of loyalty held by *Bushi* was strictly in the context of direct personal relations to the lord of the domain.
In: T. Furue kawa. 1958. Bushidō no Shisō to Sono Shūhen [Thought of Bushido and its context.] Nihon Rinri Shisō Shi Kenkyū [A Study of the History of Ethical Thought of Japan] Tokyo: Fukumura Shoten, pp. 86-7. This meant that in the Tokugawa period feudal relationships between the retainer and the lord were different from western chivalry, which allowed a knight to be loyal to more than one lord.

Daimyō:
The feudal landlords under the direct control of Tokugawa government and who governed over 10,000 koku of rice crop land granted by the Shōgun. Each ruled domains (han) through their systems and leadership. During the Tokugawa period, in 1664, there were 269 daimyo domains.

gakubatsu:
Academic alliance (gakubatsu). Batsu meant a small but protective and supportive status group. Gakubatsu, political cliques (hanbatsu), and financial and industrial combines (zaibatsu) emerged in the Meiji period. Each group was originally under the control of a single ‘family’ or state or private institutional group, with or without the aid of special state or private groups’ subsidies or favours.

Gakusei:
The 1872 Fundamental Code of Education. This guided the establishment of a modern educational systems. In 1879, Gakusei was replaced by the Education Order, kyōiku rei.

gokajo no goseimon:
[The 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles] The Oath proclaimed: I. An Assembly widely convoked shall be established, and thus great stress shall be laid upon public opinion. II. The welfare of the whole nation shall be promoted by the everlasting efforts of both the governing and the governed classes. III. All subjects, civil and military officers, as well as other people shall do their best, and never grow weary in accomplishing their legitimate purposes. XI. All absurd usages shall be abandoned; justice and righteousness shall regulate all actions. V. Knowledge shall be sought for all over the world, and thus shall be strengthened the foundation of the Imperial Polity. W.W. McLaren, 1914. “Japanese Government Documents,” TASJ XLII. Part 1. Tōkyo.

hanbatsu government:
An oligarchical faction in the Meiji government based on particular domains, mainly from Satsuma (the present Kagoshima prefecture) and Choshu (the present Yamaguchi prefecture). The term was critically used as a contrast to government by a political party.

hankō:
A domain school run by a local landlord (daimyō). Among them were the Nisshinkan at Aizu and the Meirindō at Owari and Kanazawa, which had long histories, the Kōjōkan at Yonezawa, the Kōdōkan at Saga and Mito, the Gakushūkan at Wakayama, the Meirinkan at Hagi, the Yōkendō at Sendai, the Jishūkan at Kumamoto and the Zōshikan at Kagoshima. These domain schools admitted people from non-Bushi status groups, except for learning the martial arts.
**jindō:**
The way of human beings.

**jinzai:**
Human talents, or the ideal human resources of skills together with moral qualities, according to the position and the role of the various professions. In the late Tokugawa and Meiji period, the term was used to urge recruitment on the basis of ability rather than hereditary status.

**jitsugaku:**
Practical learning based on the Tokugawa legacy, advocated by *Shogun* Yoshimune and later by Fukuzawa Yukichi in the Meiji period.

**jiyū minken undō:**
The People's Freedom and Rights Movement.

**kakun:**
*Kakun* was a body of knowledge, admonition and moral principles for the family, which was transmitted orally from the time of the twelfth century. It is a socialisation in the ethical code of family education, applied in each *Bushi* family over generations. Family members' activities and educational attainments include sport and music.

**kangaku:**
The study of Chinese classics. It revived in the Tokugawa period.

**kansei no igaku no kinshi no rei**
A law of prohibition of the study of classical Confucianism and other learning except neo-Confucianism issued by 11th *Shogun*, Tokugawa Ienari in 1790.

**kanson minpu:**
The prevailing attitude “respect the governmental bureaucrat and despise the commoner”, in early Meiji society.

**kifu:**
Ethos, spirit or characteristics.

**Kokka Shinto:**
State *Shinto*. Broadly, it encompassed the state support and regulation of the emperor’s sacerdotal roles, *Shinto* rites, constitution of *Shinto* shrines and the education of schoolchildren in a compulsory national moral curriculum.

**koku:**
Unit of measurement of volume or capacity, used generally for rice. In the Tokugawa period, a *koku* of grain equaled about 0.18 cubic metre, 180.39 litres, theoretically enough rice to feed one person for a year (*chigyōdaka*). The stipends of *Bushi*, and the wealth of daimyo were all measured in *kokudaka* [land productivity].
kokugaku:
The study of Japanese classics and national learning. The term given to Tokugawa-period restorationist scholarship and thought based on the interpretation of classical Japanese texts and literary sources.

Konkō-schools:
A sect of Shinto (Kyōha Shinto) founded by Kawate Bunjiro (1814-1883) with headquarters in the city of Okayama.

Kurozumi-schools:
The first recognised sect of Shinto (1876), founded by charismatic Kurozumi Munetada (1780-1850) in the late Tokugawa period, with headquarters in the city of Okayama.

Kyōha Shinto:
Sectarian Shinto. This refers to a group of thirteen organisations which includes Kurozumi-kyō, Konkō-kyō, Tenri-kyō and Ontake-kyō. Each organisation originated in a revelation from God to a charismatic founder.

Meiji:
Literally, the “reign of enlightenment”. The name given to the reign of Mutsuhito, the Emperor between 1867 and 1912.

Meiji ishin:
In the narrow sense, the process of the establishment of the new Meiji government. In the broad sense, the process of Meiji renovation from 1868 to the creation of the modern Meiji state. The 1868 change of government is known in Japanese as the ‘Meiji Ishin’. Traditionally Ishin is translated as “Restoration”. This term, ‘Restoration’, stresses the return of power to the Emperor. However, Meiji Japan did not only restore the past. By using the term Meiji (enlightened governing) and by renegotiating and transforming the past, the Meiji government and citizens made efforts to form a new Japan. In this context, Meiji Ishin was a revolution and furthermore a renovation of the traditions in the new context. This author thus translates the term Meiji Ishin as Meiji Renovation.

Meiji Kenpō (Meiji dainippon teikoku kenpō):
The Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1889: Article IX. “The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws”. In: Beckmann, George M. 1957. The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868-1891. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Publications, p. 151. Article X: “The Emperor determines the organisation of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon)”. Ibid, p. 151. Article XI: “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy”. Ibid., p. 152. Article LV: The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, the relate to the affairs of the State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State. Article XXIII:
"Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief". Ibid., p. 152.

meiroku zasshi:
Literally, the "meiroku magazine". This was a series of academic bulletins and the public lectures delivered at its meetings published by meirokusha (Meiji Six Society). The society was founded by Mori Arinori, Nishimura Shigeki, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nishi Amane and Katō Hiroyuki in 1874 for the purpose of promoting civilisation and enlightenment. It played a leading role in introducing and popularising Western ideas during the early Meiji period. Its 332 members included some of Japan’s most eminent educators, bureaucrats, and thinkers. In 1879, Meirokusha was replaced and reestablished as Tokyo gakushikaiini. Many of the enlightened scholars from Meirokusha joined, as well as scholars in Chinese and Japanese classics. In 1906, Tokyo gakushikaiini was renamed and re-established as the Teikokugakushiin (the Imperial academy).

moto:
A centre of power in the Shintō world. The Emperor was a centre of the virtues of chū [loyalty], kō [the obligation of care] and tei [obedience].

kai:
A meeting or an assembly. Personal socialisation through regular study meetings.

rangaku:
The study of Dutch, and of Western sciences through the medium of the Dutch language.

saisei-itchi theocracy:
The traditional conformity between religious rituals and government, which authorised the political and social position of the Emperor as a consequence of absolute divine right.

shijuku:
Private schools which prevailed in the Tokugawa period. Shōheikō was originally private school run by neo-Confucianist scholar, Hayashi Razan. Primary educational institutions for the town dweller, terakoya, and the kaitokudō school [literally, "a pavilion of opened virtue"] run by the town merchants in Osaka, may also included as a type of shijuku. In the end of the Tokugawa period and the early Meiji period, shijuku were run by the Confucianists, neo-Confucianists, Japanese classical scholars, Chinese classical scholars as well as scholars of a study of Dutch or of western sciences including languages. Shokasonjuku was run by Yoshida Shōin who learned from Sakuma Shōzan. Itō Hirobumi, the first Prime Minister, and Yamagata Aritomo, a founder of the Japanese Army, learned from Shōin's school. Teki-juku was run by Ogata Kōan. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a founder of shijuku Keiō gijuku, learned from Ogata’s school.

Shintō:
The indigenous religion of Japan. Literally, Shintō is the "Way of the Deity". In its earlier history, Shintō developed by interacting with Buddhism and Confucianism. However, Shintō embraces the belief in the divine origins of the imperial family and
contains the essence of belief in nature and ancestral worship, in particular, ancestral protection, hence the individual Shinto family express gratitude to their own ancestor over generations.

**shizoku:**
The new social status group, the previous Bushi group, established by the Meiji government (established in 1869, abolished in 1947). Many differences of status within the Bushi stratum in the Tokugawa period were de-emphasised.

**Shōgun:**
The title, literally "generalissimo", given to military commanders of Japan in the name of the Emperor.

**shōheikō (shōheizaka gakumonjo):**
A school for learning neo-Confucianism, established in 1690. In 1797 the school came to be run by the central government and to focus on the education of the sons of high officials in Bushi families. In 1877, shōheikō was merged into the Tokyo University.

**shūshin:**
National moral education designed by the Meiji government.

**Tennō:**
Emperor