IDEOLOGIES, POLICIES, AND THE CONTROL OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS IN ENGLAND AND JAPAN

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the transformation of the university systems of England and Japan since the early 1980s, with particular reference to the changing modalities of university autonomy and the power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market. The analysis compares the various policy positions of the relevant stakeholders in the two countries, highlighting the ideologies of neo-liberalism, university autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism. These ideologies coexist in both the English and the Japanese university systems. However, the interpretations of these ideologies made by stakeholders, the patterns of the interrelations between them, and their contextualisation as elements in the policy and stance of each stakeholder, differ between England and Japan.

The thesis argues that convergence between the English and Japanese university systems are, to a large extent, explained in the 1980s transformation of the university system in England, and the continuity of the Ministerial jurisdictional mechanism in Japan. In England, the transformation of the university system has been related to changes in government policies and ideologies – around the themes of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism in the era of the global economy – and changes in policies and functions of the University Grants Committee, and of the universities. In Japan, the continuity of the Ministerial jurisdictional mechanism has been largely linked to the establishment of anti-neo-liberal consensus within the Education Ministry in the early 1980s, the close anti-neo-liberal stance between the Education Ministry and the national universities in the 1990s, and confrontation and compromises between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups since the 1980s. The thesis suggests that the continuity of distinct and divergent features between England and Japan can be explained contextually, giving attention to political, economic, socio-cultural, and historical differences between the two university systems.
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1. ABBREVIATIONS

1.1 ENGLAND

AUT Association of University Teachers
CATs Colleges of Advanced Technology
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CNAA Council for National Academic Awards
CVCP Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals
DES Department of Education and Science
DfE Department for Education
DfEE Department for Education and Employment
DfES Department for Education and Skills
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
HEFCE Higher Education Funding Council for England
HEQC Higher Education Quality Council
HMI Her Majesty's Inspectorate
HRD Human Resource Development
LEA Local Educational Authority
MASN Maximum Aggregate Student Number
NATFHE National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education
NPM New Public Management
QAA Quality Assurance Agency
QUANGOs Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations
RAE Research Assessment Exercise
UFC Universities Funding Council
UGC University Grants Committee

1.2 JAPAN

ANUP Association of National Universities Presidents
CCE Central Council on Education
CIE Civil Information and Education Section
FJPU Federation of Japanese Private Universities
HERG Higher Education Research Group in the LDP
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MECSST Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology
MESSC Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture
2. GLOSSARY OF TERMS

2.1 ENGLISH TERMS

Block Grant
the funding provided by the Funding Council to an institution for teaching and research. This does not include special funding

RAE
an exercise carried out periodically to determine the quality of research in UK higher education institutions. The results are used by higher education funding bodies for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to allocate funds for Quality-related Research (the largest component of research funding).

Research Councils
government-funded councils on research through the Office of Science and Technology to support research in their fields of interest, in both their own establishments and in higher education institutions. There are six Research Councils.

2.2 JAPANESE TERMS

Bunkyo-zoku
unofficial cliques composed of the LDP Members of Parliaments sharing an interest in education, typically composed of those MPs having served in posts in the Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimu Chosakai or Seichokai) – policy review organ in the LDP.

Chuki keikaku
mid-term planning

Chuki mokuhyo
mid-term purpose

Daigaku unei kyogikai
university management commission

Fukuzatsu na kadai no kaiketsu ni torikomu sogoteki na noryoku
comprehensive competence in dealing with complex problems

Gakkoreki
education background giving attention to the reputation of the particular institution

Gakubu jichi
department autonomy

Gakureki syakai
qualification-based social structure

Gakusyureki
learning background
Genba
locus for practice

Genjyo iji
the maintenance of the status quo

Hiroi chishiki
broad knowledge

Hojinka
corporatisation

Hyogikai
senate (national universities); board of trustees (private universities)

Jihatsu-sei no soncho
respect for spontaneity

Jiko sekinin
self-responsibility

Jimu kyoku-cho
director-general of the administrative bureau

Jiritsusei
self-regulation

Jisyu kaihatsu-gata
self-development type

Jisyusei
self-determination

Jisyuteki sogoteki ni kangaeru chikara
Competence in self-autonomous and comprehensive judgement

Jiyudo
degree of discretion

Jiyuka
neo-liberalism

Jyunanka
flexibility

Kadai tankyu noryoku
competence in pursuing research questions

Keizai kikaku cho
the Economic Planning Agency

Keizai no kokusai-ka
economic internationalisation

Kigyoka seishin
entrepreneur spirit

Kiseikanwa
deregulation

Kiso kyoiku
basic education
Ko
individual

Kodo-senmon syokugyo-jin
advanced professionals

Kokensuru jichi
autonomy for contribution

Kokusaika
internationalisation

Koseika
Individuality

Koza-sei
disciplinary system whose locus of power is centred in a chair (a professor). This system — a German model — was first introduced to Tokyo University in 1893.

Kyogi keiyaku kankei
counselling and contract relations

Kyojiyu-kai
faculty committee

Kyoso no genri
principle of competition

Mizukara kangae handan saseru kyoiku
education for autonomous thinking and self-judgement

Mono wo mirume
insight

Nemawashi
the decision-making process on the basis of bottom-up consensus

Ringi sei
formalised nemawashi in a system

Rijikai
boards of directors of educational foundations

Sanyokai
external delegation meeting

Shubetsuka
dividing it into classes

Shiji kantoku kankei
direction and supervision relations

Shijyo genri
principle of the market

Shimon
request for advice

Syutaisei
self-autonomy
Tayo heiritsu gata
- diverse parallel tracks

Tayoka
- diversification

Teiko suru jichi
- autonomy for resistance

Unei shimon kaigi
- management advisory council

Unei kaigi
- management council
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER I
This chapter offers an overview of the thesis. It first presents the objective of the study. Secondly, it sets the scene for a comparative enquiry, which identifies similarities and differences in recent trends between English and Japanese universities. Thirdly, it addresses the research questions of the study. It then elucidates the delimitation of the study. Finally, it outlines the structure of the thesis.

1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The main objective of the study is to identify the key factors related to the ideologies of the main stakeholders that account for similarities or differences in the change in English and Japanese universities in the context of power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market.

The rationale for selecting these two university settings – England and Japan – is presented in Chapter IV [see 4.3.1].

1.3 SETTING THE SCENE: ENGLAND AND JAPAN
Recent changes in the power relationship between central authorities, the universities, and the market can be analysed in many ways. For example, Guy Neave, proposing his conception of the 'Evaluative State', argues that the mode of government control over the universities in Western European countries has, since the mid-1980s, changed by increasing governments' output quality control, and their remote steering over the universities. Neave's other expressions, the 'supervisory state' and 'conditional autonomy' (in which the universities renegotiate between the external norms of national priorities, and the internal norms...
of academia within individual universities), also indicate the changing relationship between central authorities and the universities.\textsuperscript{2} Applying a similar line of analysis to the increase of government control in order to enhance quality, Gareth Williams identifies the pattern of change since the 1980s in the funding allocation as increasing governments’ financial incentives, introducing market mechanisms in government funding, and increasing non-traditional sources of finance.\textsuperscript{3} These trends can be observed, according to Williams, not only in the UK, but also in Japan and the US.

The change in the pattern of state control since the 1980s in the UK, and to some extent, in Japan (e.g. funding allocation) has an implication for the meaning of the universities, including the definition of university autonomy. For example, Brian Salter and Ted Tapper, in the British context, argue that the meaning of university autonomy has been reformulated since the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{4} They identify two changes in ‘traditional university autonomy’: the tight link between institutional and individual autonomy which existed within the British university system in its previous form, has been broken; and a further reformulation of autonomy relates to the framework within which the funding councils operate – their parameters of management extend across the universities in the area of finance. Salter and Tapper’s analysis of the redefinition of university autonomy in the UK may be applicable to other higher education systems, as Guy Neave and Motohisa Kaneko similarly argue in the European and Japanese contexts respectively.\textsuperscript{5}

The direct and indirect factors for the change in the relationships between government and the universities in different university systems include not only globalisation and technological innovation, but also the following two contemporary trends observed in different university systems: massification and neo-liberalism. First, this thesis argues that the massification of the university sectors – which could change them both qualitatively and quantitatively, as Martin Trow and Peter Scott argue\textsuperscript{6} – indirectly relates to change in the relationships
between central authorities and the universities. The linkage between the massification of the university sectors and the changing relationships between central authorities and the universities can be found in the public funding crisis — as a consequence of massification — and the resulting change in government strategies for controlling the universities. A crisis in public funding is, as Neave points out, a common major factor for change in the relationship between central authorities (or governments in Neave’s literature) and the universities in the different higher education systems.

Secondly, this thesis argues that neo-liberalism has a substantial effect on the central authority and university nexus through the government’s application of neo-liberal policy, although it is possible that neo-liberal doctrine does not influence power relationships between the two, being only rhetorical or failing its application at the implementation level. Michael Apple claims that the usages and effects of neo-liberalism are historically contingent by states, although neo-liberal discourse and policies are similarly observed in different education systems. He suggests further research on the effect of neo-liberal discourse and policies (e.g. privatisation, marketisation, performativity, and the ‘enterprising individual’) on education notably, in the contexts of class, race, and gender.

In order to contextualise these general arguments to England and Japan, the following paragraphs elucidate four main differences between the English and Japanese university sectors: (1) the different modes of central authorities’ control of the universities; (2) the different definitions of university autonomy; (3) the different timing of massification; and (4) the different interpretation and application of neo-liberalism to the university sectors. These differences relate significantly to the issue of the relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market, which is the focus of this thesis.

First, the central authorities’ modes of control of the universities differ between England and Japan: in England, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) allocates funding to both pre-1992 and post-1992
universities; the original aim of this system to protect the universities from government intervention. The financial mechanism in the post-UGC (University Grant Committee) period (from 1988 onwards) is transparent. In contrast, in Japan, there is no the ‘buffer body’ system. Central administration—MESSC (Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture) [or The MECSST (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology) 2001 onwards]—directly allocates public funding to both national and private universities (in the case of the private universities, central administration provides subsidies and special funds relating to financial incentives). The methodology of the Ministry's funding allocation is not transparent.

Secondly, the definition of university autonomy differs between England and Japan: in England, university autonomy can be understood in the context of the conflict between the universities and external stakeholders, including government. The locus of power relating to university autonomy is seen in an institution as a whole rather than in its departments and faculties. The English version of university autonomy is based upon university charters, rather than state legislation and the funding allocation mechanism of the HEFCE.

In contrast, university autonomy in Japan can be understood not only the context of conflict between the universities and external stakeholders, but also the conflicts between the centre of the universities (including university presidents) and departments or faculties. The locus of power of university autonomy in the Japanese case is found at the department and faculty level rather than that of an institution as a whole, (although an erosion of department and faculty autonomy can be observed since the 1990s, as argued in Chapters III and VI).

Thirdly, the expansion of the universities in England relates to the change in the central authority’s control pattern in the university sector, and therefore, in the changing relationships between the central authority and the universities. The expansion of the university sector and a strong correlation with a funding crisis, can both be observed since the 1980s. The massification of the universities has
brought about a debate over 'who should pay?', resulting in the introduction of the funding council's strategic funding allocation, and the shift of funding responsibility from the state to consumers.

In contrast, in Japan, the linkage between the massification of the universities and the central authority's control of the universities is not so straightforward. The massification of the universities has not been clearly related to the public funding crisis. While a public funding crisis has been observed since the 1980s, the first stage of massification of the university sector (between 1963 and 1976) – which was more significant in terms of quantitative expansion than the second stage of massification (since 1992) – was observed long before the funding problem. A plausible explanation for the limited relation between the funding crisis and massification is that the universities, as Masakazu Yano argues, expanded on the basis of consumers' self-funding (mainly students' parents' funds) rather than public funding. That the expansion of the universities was observed in the private rather than the national universities is a testimony to the limited relations between public funding and massification.

Fourthly, the different effects of neo-liberalism in the English and Japanese sectors can be examined by taking account of the different political climates in England and Japan. In England, the examination of both rhetoric and substantial dimensions of government neo-liberal policy is significant. In Japan, a pluralistic understanding on the basis of the examination of multiple stakeholders is necessary because attitudes to neo-liberalism differ among influential stakeholders in the university systems. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party – the ruling party – applies a neo-liberal policy, while central administration – the MESSC or the MECSST [2001 onwards] – and the national universities have taken anti-neo-liberal positions, in particular, against the privatisation of national universities.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The basic research problem of the study is an examination of the similarities and differences between England and Japan in the development of the universities during the 1980s and the 1990s. The study concomitantly gives attention to the micro-levels within each university sector, distinguishing the differences between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities in England, and national and private universities in Japan.11

The focus of the study is the changes in the relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market in England and Japan. The initial research premises of the study are that convergence, divergence, or the continuity of differences between England and Japan — regarding these relationships — are related to the changes and maintenance of particular stakeholders’ ideologies and policies.

On the basis of these research premises, the thesis addresses research questions at two levels. Those at the first level, which are to be examined in Chapter II, are:

i. How have the university sectors in England and Japan, since the 1980s, changed in the context of the balance between central authorities, the universities, and the market?

ii. What is the extent to which the university sectors in England and Japan have converged or diverged?

Exploring identified comparative patterns between England and Japan in the examination of Questions (i) and (ii), the research questions at the second level seek for the factors causing convergent or divergent trends between England and Japan. The research questions at the second level are to be examined in Chapter IV and V. They are as follows:

20
iii. Why have the university sectors in England and Japan converged or diverged since the 1980s in terms of relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets?

Where the examination of questions (i) and (ii) reveals a continuity of distinctive features of English and Japanese university sectors, rather than convergence or divergence between them:

iv. What are the main factors in the English and Japanese university sectors which have influenced the continuity of differences between the two?

These questions are, in accordance with the focus of this thesis, to be examined in Chapter V and VI in the context of change and continuity in the ideologies of particular stakeholders. The study, nevertheless, does not deny that there are other causal elements in economic, socio-cultural, and historical dimensions for the explanation for changes in power relationships among stakeholders. The thesis identifies other factors in the Conclusion of this thesis (Chapter VII).

1.5 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

It is not the intention here, to generalise beyond the confines of the comparative case studies of England and Japan. Accordingly, the arguments of the thesis refer only to the two university systems under study.

The thesis examines the university system of England rather than that of the UK. This is because of the distinct differences between the university systems of England and Scotland, and, to a limited extent, between England and Wales. The differences between the university systems in England, Wales, and Scotland became explicit in the 1990s with the establishment of Funding Councils in Wales and Scotland (1992), and the devolving of political power to Scotland (1999), and to a limited extent, Wales (1999). Nevertheless, when referring to the economic and policy dimension, the thesis frequently uses the political unit – the UK – since
economic data and governmental policy documentation are usually available on the basis of this political unit.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II offers established and new models for the analysis of the transformation of the university systems in England and Japan in relation to the power balance between central authorities, the universities, and the markets. The chapter conceptualises the convergence and the continuity of distinctive and divergent forms between the two systems. The time segmentation between established and new models is the mid-1980s, when the pattern of central authorities' control over the universities changed in both England and Japan.

Chapter III explains the convergence and the continuity of distinctive and divergent forms between England and Japan, identifying the paradigms underlining the transformation of the university systems from the established model to the new model outlined in Chapter II. This chapter first defines 'ideology'. It then provides the theoretical framework of this thesis, clarifying the links between four ideologies – neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism – by using the late stage of 19th Century's utilitarian thinking. The chapter elucidates the different definitions of the four ideologies between the English and Japanese university settings in order to clarify the different effects of these ideologies between the two.

Chapter IV presents the research propositions and the method applied in this thesis, relating these to the theoretical chapter of Chapter III. The chapter provides reasons for the choice of particular methods – documentation and documentary analysis – by elucidating the strength and weakness of these methods.
Chapters V (England) and VI (Japan), following the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical framework outlined in Chapter II and III, examine the ideological stances of stakeholders in relation to the transformation of the university systems. The ideologies to be examined include neo-liberalism, university autonomy, vocationalism, and new managerialism. Chapter V signifies the change in the ideologies of funding councils to explain the changing balance of power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market.

Chapter VI, which provides an explanation for the continuity of ministerial power in both university systems, signifies the ideologies of the MESSC, and conflict and compromise between the neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups.

Finally, Chapter VII reflects on the main argument of the thesis. The chapter suggests areas for further research and identifies some of the implications of the findings of the thesis.
CHAPTER II: MODELS FOR TRANSFORMATION OF
THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS IN ENGLAND AND JAPAN

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis by using two models which demonstrate the transformation in power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets in England and Japan. These models suggest that in both England and Japan, the power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets, have re-balanced since the 1980s. The pattern of change, however, differs between England and Japan in respect of central authorities’ manoeuvres to steer the universities, government activity in the markets of the university sector, and the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence at the universities.

The purpose of the models is to clarify similarities and differences between the transformation of the university systems in England and Japan. The two models – the established and the new models – focus on the power relationships between central authorities and the universities. The established model shows the patterns of the central authority and university nexus between 1945 and 1978 in England and between 1945 and 1982 in Japan, in which differences between England and Japan are emphasised. This model does not refer to the market, since neo-liberal discourse and policies were not observed in the university sectors until the 1980s in either England or Japan. The new model shows the new patterns in relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets in both university settings, between 1979 and 2000 in England and between 1983 and 2000 in Japan; in this model, both similarities and differences between England and Japan are emphasised. The time periods for the established and new models relate to the impact of the New Right on the university sectors, since the New
Right philosophy was significant in the change in power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets. This time segmentation differs slightly from that in the political sphere, as referred to in Chapter I, because of the time lag between political debate and any substantial impact on the university sectors.

The comparison between England and Japan in terms of the transformation from the established model to the new model can be understood in both the convergence of the traditionally distinctive university systems, and the continuity of distinctive and divergent forms between the two. Guy Neave’s conceptual work on the changing boundaries of two contrasting concepts of ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’ is useful to understand the change and continuity in the university systems between England and Japan. The ‘private definition’ of university autonomy according to Neave, is embedded in the right of academic staff to determine the nature of their work. The ‘public definition’ of university autonomy highlights the utilitarian pursuit of the universities by external stakeholders.

This contrast of academic and public values can be observed on a continuum. The continuum can help to conceptualise the change in the balance of the relationships between government, the universities, and the market by its summative illustration. ‘Private definition’, at one end of the continuum, refers to self-determination of the universities, including the purposes and functions of the universities. In contrast, ‘public definition’, at the other end of the continuum, refers to the purposes and functions of the universities which external stakeholders – such as central authorities, the community, and interest and pressure groups in society as a whole – determine. The purposes and functions of the universities relating to ‘public definition’ include both their economic roles and functions such as their response to changes in the global economy, as well as their social and cultural roles. This type of ‘public definition’ differs from the traditional type of ‘public definition’ in England – which was closely associated with the Church
(until the 1830s) – in respect of a significant influence by the ideology of government.

'Private definition' and 'public definition' on the continuum closely relate to ideologies of the academic community and government respectively. For instance, the value shift from 'private definition' to 'public definition' signifies the change in balance of the relationship between central authorities and the universities. There is a wide spectrum of 'private' and 'public' definitions on the continuum.

In the context of England and Japan, the following examination shows there is a shift from 'private definition' to 'public definition' in the English case, and the maintenance of compatibility of 'private and public definitions' in the Japanese case. In both England and Japan, the university sectors between the mid-1980s and 2000 in this respect, emphasised the 'public definition'. However, the main influential stakeholders in the 'public definition' of the university system differ between England and Japan; agencies in the former, and the Ministry in the latter.

This chapter argues that the English and Japanese education systems have, to some extent, converged by emphasising Neave's 'public definition', although the convergence is rather superficial. In England, the change in the boundaries from 'private definition' to 'public definition' can be observed, while in Japan the continuity of 'public definition' pertains.

2.2 DEFINITION OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

The definition of 'university system' in this thesis relates to the stakeholders in the university sector rather than educational activities, themes, or issues. This association is by reason of the focus of this thesis – the relationships among stakeholders in the university sectors.

The thesis largely accepts Burton Clark's notion of 'system' and 'higher education system' because of the similarities between Clark's work and this thesis
in respect of the political approach, focusing on power relationships among particular stakeholders. Clark defines 'system' and 'higher education system' as follows:

> When we use the term [system], we construct boundaries, arbitrary definitions of relevant actors and structures that fashion insiders and outsiders. An economic system is a body of actors engaged in exchange of goods and services, together with the institutional forms they use, but such actors are outside the system when they are otherwise occupied. A political system may include those who vote only occasionally as well as those who are attentive and active, but unless the term is made synonymous with existence in a polity, individuals are clearly not in the system when they tend to their nonpolitical activities.

...But, made clear by context, I shall at times switch to a broader approach that includes any of the population when engaged in postsecondary educational activities, either as controllers, organizers, workers, or consumers.

Accordingly, the definition of the university system, which this thesis employs, is a collective entity of stakeholders engaged in the activities of the universities.

The next section outlines the established models of the English and Japanese university systems.

### 2.3 ESTABLISHED MODEL OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS

This section proposes the established model of the university systems in England and Japan by analysing chronologically traditional patterns in the relationships between central authorities and the universities between the two systems before 1988. The established English model is, this section argues, based upon the significant degree of insulation of the pre-1992 universities (the institutions which obtained university status before 1992) from government pressure. Insulation was relative, notably in comparison with the present period, rather than complete
insulation. In contrast, the established Japanese model is understood in relation to Ministerial planning in both national and private universities.

The comparison between England and Japan in the established model, which has been inspired by Peter Maassen and Frans van Vught's comparative framework on higher education systems, relies upon differences rather than similarities between the two systems. Maassen and van Vught categorise university settings in different countries into two different types, focusing on government and university relationships. In the first type, the state plays only a minor role. The universities are, in accordance with their charters, responsible for admission policy, their curricula, and the employment of faculty. In the second type, the state is the overarching and primary regulator in the university system. The universities are subordinate to the state.

Maassen and van Vught's two different types of university settings are, to a large extent, adaptable to both English and Japanese contexts. The first type – the state's minor role in the universities – is adaptable to the established English model in respect of the limitation of government intervention and the dominance of the ideology of the universities, including educational liberalism and cultural reproduction, rather than that of utilitarianism – the state's ideology. Government intervention in the established English model before the funding crisis of the early 1980s was mainly in the area of funding, not quality. The second type of strong state role on the universities is adaptable to the established Japanese case in respect of ministerial jurisdiction on funding allocation, and the predominance of utilitarianism regarding the manpower needs of the economic sector. Education is viewed as 'part of a deliberate, state-directed, policy of “catching-up” modernisation', in Ronald Dore's terms.

The analysis in this section is based upon the following time periods: 1945 - 1963 and 1963 - mid-1980s in England; and 1945 - 1952, 1952 - the 1960s, and the 1960s - early 1980s in Japan. The analysis starts from the post-war period because public funding dependency of the universities after 1945 amounted to
more than two thirds of the total income of the universities in England. In the Japanese case, 1945 was a historical turning point with fundamental changes in the Japanese education structure taking place as a result of the US Occupation of Japan between 1945 and 1952. The section divides into two historical periods at the 1960s because of the historical significance of Ministerial policies on expansion of the universities. In the 1960s, the university sector in Japan underwent considerable expansion largely because of manpower planning associated with the ‘New Long-term Economic Plan’ (Shin-choki Keizai Kekaku) in 1957, and the ‘Dual Income Plan’ (Syotoku Baizo Kikaku) in 1960. In England, the university sector started to expand slowly as a consequence of government pro-expansion policies (see the 1963 Robbins Report), although rapid expansion was not observed until the late 1980s.

The next sub-sections analyse the relationships between government and universities before the mid-1980s.

2.3.1 CENTRAL AUTHORITIES

ENGLAND

The analysis in this section suggests, with respect to the pre-1992 universities, that between 1945 and the mid-1980s there was a gradual movement away from insulation from government pressure to a higher degree of interaction between government and the universities. The historical analysis of the post-1992 universities is excluded in this section because the focus of this thesis is the university sector rather than higher education as a whole.

Before 1945, the relatively low financial dependency of the universities on public funding [Table 2.1 (below)] and the role of the UGC as a buffer suggest an insulation of the universities from government pressure. It can be interpreted that the establishment of the UGC in 1919 indicated the establishment of an active relationship between government and the universities. This event, however, does not necessarily imply the creation of a hierarchical power relationship between
them. The domination of academic members of the UGC, and the lack of a planning role of the UGC before 1945 provide counter-evidence for the argument of government control of the universities; it rather suggests the significant influence of the universities on the UGC. The large proportion of university staff and the small proportion of staff from the education department in the UGC minimised state influence and protected institutional autonomy.25 Michael Shattock's historical description of the role of the UGC suggests a passive role before 1945; it functioned not as a planning body, but simply as a funding mechanism for resource allocation.26 The 1945 proposal of the UGC for a ten-year university development plan—which was submitted to the Treasury in order to increase government grants27—suggests a change of the UGC from a passive to a more proactive entity in 1945.

Table 2.1 UGC's Recurrent Grant, Fee Income and Research Income as a Percentage of Total University Income in Great Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recurrent Grant (%)</th>
<th>Fee Income (%)</th>
<th>Research Income (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925/26</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989/90</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Original sources are UGC Returns: 1925-26 (Table 9), 1939-40 (Table 5), 1949-50 (Table 10), 1959-60 (Table 11), 1970 (Table 41), 1980a (Table 2); UFC Returns, 1989-90a (Table 1).


The discussion above suggests three characteristics of the relationship between the UGC and government, and those between the UGC and the universities during the period between 1945 and 1963. The first is the significant independence of the UGC from government pressure. The second is the high
degree of institutional autonomy of the universities, despite increasing public funding dependency of the universities. The third is increasing influence by the UGC over the universities.

The first and second characteristics can be understood in relation to the Minister / UGC nexus. There is a lack of substantial evidence to support the view that there was increase in government intervention in the universities through the UGC; on the contrary, it is plausible to interpret that the UGC insulated the universities from government intervention. The example of the UGC’s rejection of the 1952 ministerial statement in the House of Lords is, to a significant extent, testimony to the UGC’s independence from government pressure. Ministerial statements referred to public funding for a new technological university, special funds for Imperial College, and technological faculties in some universities.

The third characteristic of increasing influence of the UGC over the universities is linked to the UGC’s change in funding methodology, abolishing the full block grant. The change included the earmarking of particular fields of study (e.g. medical and dental education, agricultural and veterinary studies, teacher education, social science, Oriental and African studies, and Slavonic and East European studies in the period 1947 - 1952), and the renewal of quinquennial visitations of the universities by the UGC.

Between 1963 and the mid-1980s, the Robbins Report (1963) and the change in administrative links of the UGC from the Treasury to the Department of Education and Science (DES) suggest increasing government interest in the university sector, and increasing UGC control of the universities. These two changes, however, do not provide sufficient evidence to suggest a substantial change in the degree of government involvement in the sector through the UGC, but partially support the idea of the UGC changing to a planning body. The analysis on the recommendation of the 1963 Robbins Report on the expansion of higher education suggests a more pro-active role of the UGC, including a planning role, in order to increase student enrolment. The change in legislative control
through the introduction of the General Memorandums of Guidance for the universities in 1967\textsuperscript{32} could be interpreted as an attempt by the UGC to increase its influence over the universities.

JAPAN

The chronological analysis in this section suggests that the MESSC increased its planning capacities in the context of the universities between 1945 and the early 1980s. This change in the nature of the MESSC suggests significant changes in the relationships between the MESSC and national universities during the period, and some changes in the relationships between the MESSC and private universities.

Kazuyuki Kitamura argues that the Japanese Government did not involve itself in higher education before the early 1970s, and that higher education policy in Japan did not exist because of the ideology of university autonomy and the governmental concentration on the level of compulsory education.\textsuperscript{33} This argument holds in respect to the lack of government or ministerial policy concerning higher education before 1970. However, government and ministerial involvement in the university sector was, as shown later, observed in the earlier period in relation to economic policy. The following chronological analysis of the relationships between the ministry and the universities suggests a change of the ministerial function towards a planning body between 1957 and the early 1960s, and the incorporation of a comprehensive view on ministerial university policy in the 1970s.

Between 1945 and 1952, during the period of Occupation, there was the absence of any Ministerial planning role in relation to the education policies of the CIE (Civil Information and Education Section) of the then US Government. The CIE’s policies between 1945 and 1952 included the minimal intervention of the Ministry in the university sector, power devolution from the Ministry to local authorities, and the legalisation of a status for the universities and of the power of
the Ministry. The absence of any CIE proposal to abolish the Ministry’s role in the funding allocation to national and private universities suggests that the CIE did not intend to remove the Ministry’s funding role, but only its planning role. The lack of Ministerial policy on the universities between 1952 and the late 1950s, when manpower policy was launched, suggests that the policy of the CIE to minimise the power of the Ministry was effective until the late-1950s.

Ministerial policy for economic policy between 1957 and the early 1960s suggests a change in function of the Ministry towards a planning entity. The education policy of the Ministry in the 1960s related to two economic plans: the ‘New Long-term Economic Plan’ (Shin-choki Keizai Kekaku) in 1957, and the ‘Double Income Plan’ (Syotoku Baizo Keikaku) in 1960. The logic of economic growth and education during the period was based upon the assumption of a correlation between economic growth and the increased number of graduates in science and technology. The 1957 CCE Report, ‘Policy on the Promotion of Science and Technology Education’ (Kagaku Gijyutsu Kyoiku no Shinko Hosaku ni tsuite), was testimony to the linkage between economic and education policy during the period. This Report focused on the increase in graduate numbers in science and technology.

The failure in the implementation of the Ministerial policy, which was caused by the resistance of the universities, testifies to the power of the universities. For example, the 1968 and 1971 CCE recommendations on differentiation policy – which labelled the universities in several categorised groups – failed to be implemented as a result of the resistance by the universities.

The first and second five-year higher education plans between 1976 - 1980 and 1980 - 1986, as well as the establishment of the department of higher education plan of the Ministry in 1972, all signify increasing control by the Ministry. The first and second five-year higher education plans included two reviews on the pattern of the expansion. One review concerned the expansion of private universities and the large gap between the planned number of student
places and the substantial number of the re-enrolled students. The other review considered the density of the student population in large cities and the emphasis on local universities.

Amano Ikuo identifies a difference between the education policies of the MESSC in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and those in the 1970s. Education policy in the first period was significantly related to economic planning. Education policy in the 1970s was more comprehensive, and included socio-cultural concerns.

The next sub-section analyses the features of universities in England and Japan before the mid-1980s.

2.3.2 THE UNIVERSITIES

ENGLAND

This section suggests that the insulation of the pre-1992 universities from government pressure before the 1980s, together with the only moderate expansion of the university sector in the late 1960s, were particular features of the pre-1992 universities between 1945 and the mid-1980.

The features of pre-1992 universities include the discipline-based subject division, the limitation of diversification in programme and subjects, and the emphasis on academic skills and knowledge such as the ability to apply knowledge, research skills, specialist knowledge, critical analysis, written communication, and logical thinking. Such skills, knowledge, and competencies are equivalent to the concept of liberal education, which are the founding disciplines of the universities demanded by old liberal professional careers (e.g. theology, and later medicine, law, and administration) and which inferred the broader demand of an elite for gentlemanly cultivation. This suggests that the universities in the established model monopolised and determined the definition of knowledge in society, as well as in the university sector.
In contrast to the pre-1992 universities, disciplines and programmes in polytechnics tended to be (and still, in the post-1992 universities, arguably tend to be) vocationally oriented.44

JAPAN

Since 1945, the features of national and private universities which relate to the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in the universities have been two-fold.45 These features are still observed to a significant extent in the contemporary period, although the new trend has concomitantly been observed since the 1980s, as argued before. The first feature is the emphasis of the universities on general education. The second feature is group-oriented ‘values’ and ‘attitudes’ – such as patience, respect, hard work, and diligence. These particular features are notably observed in the areas of humanities and social sciences.46 In the areas of engineering, technology, and medicine, however, the universities emphasise job-specific and discipline-based skills, knowledge, and competence.

These features are related to the Human Resource Development (HRD) strategy of the government and of large Japanese companies in respect to universities. The HRD strategy is embedded in a distinctive way in work organisations such as the long-term employment and seniority wage systems. ‘Developmental State Theory’, relating economic development to the role of the state and the HRD – in particular, skill formation – seeks to identify reasons behind the successful economies in East Asian countries. Andy Green elaborates this theory, identifying the significance of value and attitude formation as well as core skills (in the areas of literacy, maths, and science) and the role of central government in traditional skills formation in Japan and other East Asian countries.47 He associates attitude formation in general education with in-house occupational training in large companies:
Given that they provide very extensive occupational training in-house they tend not to expect new recruits to have many occupationally specific skills. Instead they look to the school systems to produce graduates who have good basic skills and are thus easily trainable, who have the right attitudes, including the ability to cooperate and work in teams, and who are prepared to be flexible. Companies are therefore content that the school system should concentrate on providing a broad general education with strong emphasis on attitude formation.48

This section has argued that the patterns of government and university relationships differ between the English and Japanese university sectors, in respect of the degrees and methodology of government involvement. The next section elucidates the changing balance of relationships between government, the universities, and the market in the new economic conditions. The section analyses the quasi-market on account of the emergence of the market as a significant source of influence since the 1980s.

2.4 NEW MODEL FOR THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS

This section examines a new model for the university systems in England and Japan by analysing contemporary patterns in the relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market in the 1990s. The new model, as this section argues, is based upon both the convergence and the continuity of distinctive forms between the two systems. Convergence between the two systems includes central authorities’ intensive control of the universities and the markets, the significant response of the universities to external demand, and central authorities’ creation of market conditions and their operation in the markets. Distinctive forms between the two systems include the different types of central authority control and involvement in the universities and the markets, the different universities’ responses to external demand, and the different processes involved in moving from established to new models.
The new model for the university systems is conceptualised by scrutinising the applicability of Guy Neave’s ‘supervisory state’ and Burton Clark’s and Barbara Sporn’s ‘entrepreneurial universities’ to English and Japanese contexts. Both the supervisory state and the entrepreneurial universities provide a clear convergent view of English and Japanese university systems, although focus on change in university sectors differs between supervisory state and entrepreneurial universities. The supervisory state focuses on the change in state control patterns by emphasising funding incentives and output and performance based quality control mechanisms, while entrepreneurial universities stress the transformation of the universities towards more adaptive institutions by responding to pressures arising from external, socio-economic demands.

Neave’s concept of supervisory state centres on the idea of the change in government strategies, and the consequent shift in the universities’ attitude, seeking negotiation with government. Government strategies have changed by reducing public expenditure on higher education, and stressing output, performance control on individual universities by setting targets and monitoring them. Neave expresses these new methods of state control over the universities by introducing the term, ‘remote steering’. The core concept of remote steering is inherent in two powers: continuous government control despite the Continental European trends of decentralisation, devolution, and federation; and increasing self-regulation of individual universities. Thus, a state’s remote steering, for Neave, does not mean the erosion of the universities’ discretion. On the contrary, Neave emphasises that individual universities, despite intense government regulation, can decide their own strategic response to the broad guidelines on national policy and market forces.

Clark’s and Sporn’s entrepreneurial universities are based upon the notion of the necessity of the universities to respond to internal and external demand. Clark defines entrepreneurial universities as follows:
An entrepreneurial university, on its own, actively seeks to innovate in how it goes about its business. It seeks to work out a substantial shift in organizational character so as to arrive at a more promising posture for the future. Entrepreneurial universities seek to become “stand-up” universities that are significant actors on their own terms. Institutional entrepreneurship can be seen as both process and outcome.

‘Entrepreneurial universities’ emphasise organisational adaptation, institutional discretion, and a process of incremental change of the universities. Clark and Sporn illustrate entrepreneurial universities in relation to the rise of new managerialism, a changing pattern in state control of the universities, the changing relations between the state and the market, renewed concern about the definition of university autonomy, and the attention given to accountability.

The focus of both Clark and Sporn is the conditions necessary for the transformation of the universities to entrepreneurial universities, although Sporn gives more attention to diversified funding and internal resource allocations than does Clark. Clark identifies five elements determining the success of university organisational transformation towards innovation and adaptation: a strengthened steering core; an expanded developmental periphery; a diversified funding base; a stimulated academic heartland; and an integrated entrepreneurial culture. Clark also stresses the significance of the self-definition and self-regulation of entrepreneurial universities, while he concomitantly argues that ‘formal grant of autonomy’ does not guarantee the transformation of the universities towards more adaptive institutions. For Sporn, the common patterns of institutional ‘adaptation strategies’ to external demand are six-fold: university re-organisation; transformed leadership, management and governance; enhanced quality, programme review, and evaluation; applied research and technology transfer; financial accounting and fund-raising systems; and personnel restructuring. Sporn suggests that the institution would need to have a discretional funding base and strong autonomy to be an adaptive university in the changing environment.
The common threads between Clark’s and Sporn’s entrepreneurial universities and Neave’s supervisory state include their attention to the changing government role (e.g. declining government regulation and increased steering capacities), university autonomy, market forces, cost-effectiveness, and institutional efficiency (including managerialism and governance). The focus of entrepreneurial universities and supervisory state differs; the central concept of entrepreneurial universities is the universities’ response to external demand, while that of supervisory state is the state’s pattern of control.

Supervisory state and entrepreneurial universities are, to a large extent, useful in conceptualising the convergence between the two university sectors in England and Japan. However, supervisory state and entrepreneurial universities do not incorporate the different trends between the two university settings, including the aforementioned different types of central authority involvement in the universities and the markets of higher education, and the different types of economic demand which are derived from particular corporation cultures.

The following sub-sections, in order to elucidate not only convergence but also distinctive forms between England and Japan, examine the pattern of central authorities’ regulation, the response of the universities to socio-economic demand and the markets, in relation to the policies of central authorities.

2.4.1 CENTRAL AUTHORITIES

This section focuses on similarities and differences in the control of universities by the central authorities in England and Japan.

Guy Neave’s supervisory state explains the continuity of, or even increase in, central control of the universities in England and Japan; however, Neave’s concept of ‘remote steering’ is, as argued, not applicable to the English and Japanese contexts. The particular patterns of central control in England and Japan are characterised in the types of involvement by particular central authority
stakeholders in the universities. In England, government is involved in the university sector in the areas of funding, evaluation, and legislation, through agencies – the Higher Education Funding Council for England and, to some extent, the Quality Assurance Agency, while in Japan, ministerial influence in both national and private universities in those areas is significant. However, the private universities in Japan, to some extent, enjoy institutional discretion despite the substantial influence from the Ministry. The thesis refers to the English version of the central authorities’ involvement as ‘agencies’ co-ordination’, and to the Japanese versions as ‘bureaucratised co-ordination’ in the case of national universities, and as a ‘combination of bureaucratised co-ordination and institution discretion’ in that of private universities. Table 2.2 (below) shows these different versions of central authorities’ involvement in the universities, giving attention to the areas of funding, evaluation, and legislation. The next sub-sections illustrate the pattern of central authorities’ control over the universities in England and Japan.

On the basis of the analysis of the sub-sections, this section argues that in England, funding on the basis of enabling legislation is a significant government policy instrument steering both pre-1992 and post-1992 universities in the direction of competitive and financial efficiency. This funding method is reinforced by links to outcome quality control, using indicators, criteria, and targets in the area of research. In contrast, in Japan, administrative control on the basis of detailed prescriptive legislation is an effective Ministerial policy instrument to control not only national universities but also private universities. This legislative method relates to process control on quality. In both England and Japan, performance based quality control is becoming a significant policy instrument of the central authority.
Table 2.2 Central Authorities’ Control over the Universities in England and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England 'Agencies’ Co-ordination'</th>
<th>Japan 'Bureaucratised Co-ordination' (NJ) / Combination of 'Bureaucratised Co-ordination' and 'Institution Discretionary' (PJ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pre-1992 and post-1992 universities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proliferation in funding</td>
<td>• Great dependency on public funding (changing towards proliferation in funding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Block grant</td>
<td>• Input-based funding by the MESSC grant includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budgets itemised by performance targets in student numbers and research activities</td>
<td>- Teaching Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Teaching Activities (Number of Students; Subject-related Factors; Student-related Factors; Institution-related Factors)</td>
<td>- Research Activities [e.g. ‘Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research’ and funding for private universities]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Research Activities (RAE (HEFCE) and Research Councils)</td>
<td>• Direct payment by students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Special Funding</td>
<td>• Great dependency on tuition fees in which government subsidy is only part of the total income of private universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct payment by students</td>
<td>• Direct payment by students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pre-1992 and post-1992 universities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Performance and output based quality control</td>
<td>• Performance and output based quality control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) QAA</td>
<td>1) 'University Evaluation Institution'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ‘Contractual agreement’ between QAA (in terms of quality assessment) and the relevant funding councils</td>
<td>• External evaluation system by a quasi-governmental organisation, ‘University Evaluation Institution’ [(Daigaku Hyoka Kikan) provisional name] (pilot since 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outcome (tighter specification of outputs)</td>
<td>• Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Academic quality audit [the strengths and weaknesses of the management of quality at the institutions, together with recommendations for improvement]</td>
<td>- Teaching;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Quality assessment [the quality of teaching and learning in specific subjects or disciplines within institutions]</td>
<td>- Research; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Link to finance (Research)</td>
<td>- Linkage with community and the economic sector, and contribution to the society as a whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Quality control by the MESSC on the basis of ‘Standards for the Establishment of the Universities’ on establishing the universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualification of academic staff;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure of courses;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credit calculation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical plant; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) ‘University Evaluation Institution’ – discretion for PJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Quality control by the MESSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cf. Regulation is the same as the NJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legislation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Government action on market in the areas of students numbers and research</td>
<td>• Limited change in the degree of bureaucratic jurisdiction by deregulation and privatisation policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing legislative binding on the universities</td>
<td>• Bureaucratic action on the market in the area of research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* OE = Old Universities (Pre-1992 Universities) in England
* NE = New Universities (Post-1992 Universities) in England
* NJ = National Universities in Japan
* PJ = Private Universities in Japan
This section implies that there are differences in terms of the features of central authorities’ control over the universities between England and Japan. As table 2.3 shows, in England, government influence through the quality agencies – the HEFCE and the QAA – is intense and frequent. This is related to the legislation that makes the involvement of these agencies in the university sector feasible. In contrast, in Japan, the education ministry’s control is rigid, extensive, and routine, which is based on detailed and prescriptive legislation. In the case of private universities, the Education Ministry’s control over them is not extensive in comparison with national universities, which allows them to have institutional discretion to some degree (e.g. in the areas of internal funding, governance, and management).

Table 2.3 Summary of Central Authorities’ Control over the Universities in England and Japan, and their Traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Central Authorities’ Control on the Universities</th>
<th>England (OE/NE)</th>
<th>Japan (NJ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Agencies' Co-ordination'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Output or performance based budgets and quality control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Link between quality control and funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agency for public purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government action in market mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quality of teaching and learning in specific subjects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Governmental target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Performance evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managerial budgetary outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial strategies and incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The features of Central Authorities’ Control</th>
<th>England (OE/NE)</th>
<th>Japan (NJ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(OE/NE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intensity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* OE = Old Universities (Pre-1992 Universities) in England
* NE = New Universities (Post-1992 Universities) in England
* NJ = National Universities in Japan
* PJ = Private Universities in Japan
ENGLAND

Government regulation, according to F. van Vught, is “the efforts of government to steer the decisions and actions of specific societal actors according to the objectives the government has set and by using instruments the government has at its disposal”.

Regarding the governments’ ‘policy instrument’, L. Goedegebuure and F. van Vught consider level of restraint to be a critical factor in the nature of policy instruments:

The various categorizations of policy-instruments to a large extent are based on the criterion of the level of restraint the instruments try to produce with respect to the behaviour of societal actors.

Highly restrictive instruments, Goedegebuure and van Vught assume, are more applicable to rational planning and control in which governments restrain the behavioural options of other actors according to their own objectives.

The level of restraint is manifest in the various means by which governments control the universities in particular areas such as funding and evaluation.

Goedegebuure and van Vught, in another study with Kaiser, Maassen, Meek, and de Weert, identify four types of ‘policy instrument’ — funding, planning, evaluation, and regulation. ‘Regulation’ in their category is illustrated in the range of deregulation policy. Roger Dale adopts three forms of state governance of education derived from existing studies on the form of state intervention in the welfare state: funding, regulation, and ‘provision and delivery’. Dale, in his analysis of ‘regulation’, gives attention to deregulation, jurisdiction, and New Public Management; for that of ‘provision and delivery’, he focuses on material and cultural capital of consumers, taking a Marxist perspective.

This section selects funding, evaluation, and legislation for the analysis of government control of the universities. This choice is based upon a comparison between England and Japan, in which funding, evaluation, and legislation are significant; furthermore, both have highly restrictive ‘policy instruments’.
analysis of ‘legislation’ in this thesis involves an analysis of ‘regulation’ as defined in the studies by Dale, and by Goedegebuure, van Vught, Kaiser, Maassen, Meek, and de Weert. The choice of the term, ‘legislation’ is to avoid the dual usage in the meaning of ‘regulation’: the synonym of control on the one hand; and a term closely linked to deregulation policy and neo-liberalism on the other.

Funding

Funding is, according to Goedegebuure, Kaiser, Maassen, Meek, van Vught, and de Weert, “the most powerful instrument available to government for steering and changing higher education systems and institutions”. This assertion, however, does not only give attention to legal power, but also the different degrees of government steering resulting from differences in funding mechanisms and methodologies.

The degree of government steering is poorly understood in a one-dimensional analysis of funding mechanisms and methodologies. The thesis affirms that it is significant to use multiple dimensions for the analysis of funding. This section selects the following dimensions as areas to measure government steering: (a) the proliferation of funding sources; (b) the change in the formula of funding allocation from block grant to performance-related budget; (c) government steering in the quasi-market in teaching; and (d) government steering in the market in the area of research. The reason for this selection is based upon the areas in which government funding strategies influence the universities. The first dimension – the proliferation in funding [see Figure 2.1 (below)] – could be an indicator of the extent to which government financial strategies have an impact on individual universities.
Source: HEFCE, Funding Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates Its Funds, Guide 00/07, February 2000, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub00/00_07.html], accessed date (6 March, 2000).

The logic of the relationships between funding dependency and the degree of government control is based upon the understanding that the greater the funding the universities receive from government, the more the universities are influenced by government policies. This logic, however, has not been tested empirically.
In the policy context, two trends outlined below, testify to the fact that, since the early 1980s, the degree of government control has not significantly correlated to the degree of public funding dependency of the universities. One is the decline of public expenditure on the university sector in the early 1980s. The other is increased government policy on the proliferation of non-government funding of education. Guy Neave, taking this line of argument, argues that government strategies have, since the 1980s, changed towards output based control following the introduction of a substantial reduction of total public expenditure on the university sector.

The second dimension — the formula for funding allocation — relates to the degree of government steering. The 1988 change in the English funding mechanism and methodologies indicates an increase of government control in the area of funding and signifies the decline of universities' autonomy. The 1988 change was a shift from block grants in pre-1992 universities and input-based funding in post-1992 universities, to output and performance-oriented budgets for research in pre- and post-1992 universities. [Funding allocation in relation to the number of students, however, remained input-based, except in the case of research students.] The funding mechanism on the basis of block grants before 1988 conferred financial responsibility on the universities. This suggests a greater funding autonomy of the universities in the pre-1988 funding mechanism. In contrast, the output and performance-oriented funding mechanism since 1988, according to Gareth Williams, enables government to steer the universities by using financial incentives in accordance with national priorities. This method, in Williams' estimation, could increase restriction by the introduction of further detailed regulation. Budgets itemised by output and performance targets contracts involve future outputs, rather than inputs. The above discussion suggests that output related funding can be highly restrictive by itemising budgets in advance and monitoring the universities through the funding agency.
The third dimension — government activity in the market in teaching — exemplifies input-related government control by providing a grant according to undergraduate student numbers multiplied by a prescribed weight (factor) per student. [The number of research students, who are funded by the ESRC, is however an example of output-related government control as it is assessed by the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).] The methodology in the calculation of teaching funds (teaching resources) as well as funding memoranda suggests two points. One is that government funding control in teaching is concerned more with quantity rather than quality; the other is that government influences the types of students (e.g. traditional and non-traditional students, mature students, full-time and part-time students).

Teaching funds (teaching resources) are allocated on the basis of the calculation of a ‘standard resource’ for the institution, an ‘actual resource’ for the institution, and the percentage difference between ‘standard’ and ‘actual’ resources. Public funding in teaching, which is on the basis of the number of students and subjects, is not linked to performance quality control. The ‘standard resource’ is dependent on the following criteria:

- Number of students;
- Subject-related factors, which can be categorised into four groups of subjects: clinical stages of medicine and dentistry courses and veterinary science; laboratory-based subjects such as science, pre-clinical stages of medicine and dentistry, engineering and technology; subjects with a studio, laboratory or fieldwork element; all other subjects;
- Student-related factors [e.g. part-time students, mature students, and students on long courses in 1999-2000 student premiums]; and
- Institution-related factors [e.g. London premium, pensions, specialist institutions, small institutions, and old and historic buildings in 1999-2000 institutional premiums]71

The ‘actual resource’ is based upon the funding allocation to the institution in the previous year, the HEFCE’s estimation of income resources, and concerns such as
the failure of institutions to meet the requirements of their funding agreement, inflation, and additional students.\textsuperscript{72}

The fourth dimension – government involvement in the market in the area of research – comprises a research grant, in particular, a periodic RAE, which is selectively provided on the basis of measured quality. [Public research funds are based upon a dual support system by the HEFCE and the Research Councils. The HEFCE provides the cost of the salaries of permanent academic staff, premises, libraries and central computing costs, while the Research Councils provide direct project costs and contribute to indirect project costs.\textsuperscript{73}]

\section*{Evaluation}

The analysis of the pattern of government quality control in England in this section shows the intensity of government quality control by means of detailed, comprehensive methods, linked with funding in research, and contractual relationships between the HEFCE and the QAA.

Neave and van Vught distinguish between 'product control' and 'process control' in quality control.\textsuperscript{74} Examples of 'product control' include control of the output of qualified graduates, type and level of qualifications, projects completed, publications, and patents taken out. Examples of 'process control' include control of curriculum balance, disciplinary profile and the distribution between disciplines, and duration of studies. Neave and van Vught argue that 'procedural autonomy' tends to increase when government regulation takes the form of 'product control' rather than 'process control'.\textsuperscript{75} 'Procedural autonomy' is, according to Neave and van Vught, the power of higher education institutions to determine the means by which its goals and programmes are implemented. 'Product control' allows institutions more autonomy in the various means to achieve the ends than does 'process control'.\textsuperscript{76}

In the English context, external quality control has taken the form of 'product control' since 1992 when the HEQC and the HEFCE started quality audit
and assessment respectively. The intensity in product quality control on the basis of the following four aspects of quality control suggests that the emphasis on 'product control' does not guarantee procedural autonomy in the English context. Intensity, in this line of argument, could limit the choice of the universities in methods to achieve government targets in both teaching and research in a search for more strategic and applied, and short-term effects.

The first aspect of quality control by the QAA includes 'subject benchmark standards' and 'codes of practice'. The second aspect is a 'contractual agreement' between the HEFCE and the QAA in the method of quality assessment.

The third aspect of quality control is the comprehensive coverage of the objects to be evaluated in both quality audits and quality assessments; these quality audits and quality assessments have been conducted by a single body, the QAA, since 1997. Quality audits by the QAA, which does not evaluate individual departments or academic programmes, covers:

- Design and review of courses and programmes;
- Teaching, learning, and the student experience;
- Recruitment, training, development and appraisal of staff;
- Student assessment and examining including degree classification;
- Academic standards;
- Feedback and verification systems; and
- Institutional promotional material.

Quality assessment by QAA covers the following:

- Curriculum design, content, and organisation;
- Teaching, learning, and assessment;
- Student progression and achievement;
- Student support and guidance;
- Learning resources; and
- Quality management and enhancement (at department level).
The fourth aspect – the distinctive feature of the English version of quality control – is the linkage between external quality control and financial allocation by using the periodic RAE carried out by the HEFCE. The practice of the RAE changed in 1992. The main change involved the inclusion of the number of research students in the quality assessment formula, the selection of active research staff (not all academic staff members), and the withdrawal of baseline funds, which indicate the absence of a research fund for the units rated 1 in assessment. The impact of the change in the RAE strategies on individual universities, according to Ian McNay, has been observed in five areas: tighter policy, better management and more administration, strategic staffing initiatives, fund transfer ‘from higher graded to lower graded departments’, and some restructuring to cluster research staff. The negative impact of the RAE performance includes the division of teaching and research, disputes over assessment methods, and arguably the deterioration of quality in the long-run. Special funds are provided by the HEFCE for a wide range of purposes – apart from all teaching, research, and related activities, which are reviewed regularly [see 5.4.3].

Legislation

The distinctive characteristic of legislation in England can be captured in terms of ‘enabling legislation’. ‘Enabling legislation’ is legislation that empowers a government agency to exert its control on both pre-1992 and post-1992 universities within a broad framework of legislation. The universities under ‘enabling legislation’, are not legally bound to the state in respect of the relationships between the state and government, although it can be interpreted that financial memoranda can be binding on the universities, establishing contractual relationships between the state and the universities. There has been no formally organised system in which the universities have been subordinated by ministerial
control, nor have university professionals been legitimated as civil servants. The 1988 Education Reform Act, the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act, and the 1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act are testimony to the change in the pattern of government control of the university sector.

In England, government control has intensified through the use of financial incentives in accordance with national priorities, relating quality control to funding allocation in the area of research, and introducing detailed output-related quality control.

The next sub-section analyses government control of the universities in Japan.

**JAPAN**

This sub-section takes the same analytical framework as the previous sub-section, selecting the three areas of funding, evaluation, and legislation by reason of the explicit usage of such policy instruments by the MESSC.

This analysis gives attention to the difference in Ministerial control between national and private universities. The national universities have been under the direct control of the MESSC (e.g. approval of new courses and research programmes at the national university level). The private sector, which comprises approximately 70 percent of the total number of the universities, has been also under strong governmental pressure and influence; T. Pempel has characterised the private universities as entities subsumed into the system with a close relationship with government.

**Funding**

The degree of government steering through funding is understood in the following multiple dimensional analysis: a) the dependency of national universities on public funding and self-funding of the private universities; b) the form of funding allocation; c) government financial incentives in the area of research; and d) the
market mechanism. The analysis below suggests that the pattern of government control of the universities by means of funding is complex, pointing to a different impact between national and private universities, and research oriented and teaching oriented universities.

First, the difference between national and private universities in terms of the public funding dependency suggests a different degree of funding autonomy between the two types of universities. The greater dependency of national universities on public funding suggests a limitation in their funding autonomy. Approximately three quarters of governmental expenditure on higher education goes to national universities and colleges. In 1994, 76.0 percent of the public funds for higher education was spent on SANEI (Special Account for National Educational Institutions), while merely 14.2 percent of the public funds for higher education went to government subsidies on private universities [Table 2.4 (below)].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Amounts (in billion yen)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfer from the General Account to SANEI</strong></td>
<td>1462.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Universities</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Costs in Private Universities</td>
<td>273.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale Equipment and Facilities in Private Universities</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants-in-aid for Science Research</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Japanese Scholarship Foundation</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Special Account for National Educational Institutions, which was established in 1964 in order to provide for the operation of national educational institutions, including universities.

The income of national universities from the General Account was 62.2 percent of the total expenditure of SANEI in 1994 [Table 2.5 (below)].

Table 2.5 SANEI (Special Account for National Educational Institutions) Budget for National Education Institutions in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Items</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer from the General Account</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from University Hospital</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from the Disposal of University Properties</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations and Other Revenue from External Bodies</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data was cited by Baba, Masateru, and Takafumi Tanaka, “Government Funding versus Private Funding in Japanese Universities”, *Quality in Higher Education*, vol. 3 (1997), no. 3, p. 267.

The self-funding of private universities, whose revenues come mainly from tuition fees paid by students or their parents, signifies the greater funding autonomy of private universities. Governmental subsidies of the private institutions of higher education have been less than 30 percent of the total income of individual private universities between 1970 (when governmental subsidies of private universities were introduced) and 2000. Revenue from tuition fees from students or students' families was 65.6 percent of the total revenues of the private universities in 1992. In contrast, revenue from government subsidies was 11.0 percent of total revenues in the same year [Table 2.6 (below)].

In the policy context, the dependency of government on using funding methods for steering the universities has declined. This change pertains to governmental emphasis on the significance of the increase in income from non-state funding resources (e.g. economic sectors) in the 1990s.
Table 2.6 Revenue in Private Universities in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuition</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Subsidies</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening Fees and Other Commissions</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and Use of Assets</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains from Sale of Assets</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from School Business</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These data were collected from 116 private universities in 1992.


The consequences of the decline in the total amount of expenditure in the university sector are several. They include a reduction in the financial allocation to national universities for facilities, teaching, and research, and also in some financial subsidies to private universities. Expenditure on salaries in national universities and in the areas providing strategic funding by the MESSC has, however, increased. For the private universities, their income from governmental subsidies (as opposed to other types of income) declined between the fiscal years 1980 and 1993; this income fell from its peak of 29.5 percent of private universities' total income of in the fiscal year 1980 to 12.4 percent of the total income in the fiscal year 1993.

The introduction of strategic funding distribution in the early 1980s by the MESSC was related to a decline in the total amount of education expenditure from the General Account. The decline was caused by a tight fiscal situation facing the Government and the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform. The Ministry of Finance imposed a 'spending cap' on the national budget in general in the 1980s in order to control budget expansion. The
imposition of the 'spending cap' eventually resulted in reduced funds to universities, and in raised tuition fees for the national universities.  

Secondly, the input based funding allocation by the MESSC to national universities suggests a limitation in their funding autonomy. In contrast, the subsidies allocated to private universities by the MESSC suggest a greater funding autonomy of private universities. Input-based funding is, as defined by Gareth Williams, funding in which the expenditure categories of the annual budget of the national universities are determined by input elements. These elements are determined on the basis of agreed staffing establishments and resources, according to needs in the areas of teaching and research. The input based funding method leads to funding inefficiency by focusing on maximising revenue rather than the usage of funds, giving little extra incentive to operate financial management efficiently (as well as little incentive to improve quality). The details relating to the proportion and method of financial distribution to individual national universities by the MESSC are not transparent.

Thirdly, funding is allocated selectively not in the area of teaching, but in that of research, which suggests that research oriented national universities are more influenced by Ministerial strategies than are teaching oriented universities. The Ministerial strategic funding allocation has increased despite the decline in the total public expenditure in the university sector. For instance, the expenditure on ‘grants-in-aid for scientific research system’ (kagaku kenkyu hi) – a major strategic funding area by the MESSC which was intended to increase efficiency and effectiveness in funding – increased from 45.1 billion yen in 1987 (3.6 percent of the GDP growth rate) to 112.2 billion yen (10.2 percent of the GDP growth rate) in 1997. This grant is offered not only in the natural sciences but also in the humanities and social science.

Fourthly, government activity in the quasi-market by means of financial incentives is irregular in terms of the access of students; government activity in the quasi-market is, as argued later, more clearly observed in relation to regulation and
deregulation policy rather than funding policy. Two clear government funding actions in the quasi-market were observed in the 1980s: the introduction of a 'self-supporting budget' (juekisha futan) policy (1984) – the principle that students must pay for what they receive regardless of their academic ability, family earnings or social status – and the decline of public expenditure in the university sectors. Both actions moved a quasi-market mechanism in the university sector closer to that of a pure market.

The decline of public expenditure had an indirect impact in the quasi-market through the influence of the national universities on the tuition fee. The income of national universities from student tuition fees increased, reaching 15 percent of the total income of national universities in 1997.98 The increase of student tuition fees at national universities has changed the competitive niche of the universities by a reduction in the gap between the tuition fees of the national universities and those of private universities.

Evaluation
The degree of government steering through quality control by the MESSC can be understood by analysing: (1) accreditation and chartering; and (2) the external quality control mechanism.

(1) Accreditation and chartering
The quality control of the universities by the MESSC in relation to accreditation and chartering pertains to legislation. The Japanese version of accreditation and chartering is distinctive in the following aspects: a) the adoption of the same standard for accreditation and chartering; b) application to both national and private universities; c) screening for chartering not only in establishing the universities but also in changing institutional organisation; and d) the limited number of private universities which are members of the Accreditation Association.
The first aspect is that both accreditation and chartering are screened in accordance with *Standards for the Establishment of Universities* (1955) (*Daigaku Secchi Kijyun*) by the MESSC.99 The screening process for chartering reflects the view of the Council for University Chartering. *Standards for the Establishment of Universities* covers qualifications of academic staff, proportion of numbers between staff and students, structure of courses, total credits towards graduation, physical plant, and university property. The second aspect is that accreditation and chartering are applied to both national and private universities, although the accreditation for private universities relies upon the discretion of each private university. The third aspect is that chartering is applied not only to new universities, but also to pre-existing universities in respect to changing their institutional organisation (e.g. establishment of new departments and change in student numbers). The fourth aspect is that the accreditation mechanism in the university sector has not affected all the universities in Japan; only 140 out of 500 universities applied for accreditation and were accredited in the early 1990s.100 A substantial number of universities are not even affiliated to the Accreditation Association.

The rationale behind the four distinctive aspects of chartering and accreditation as well as the dual system of quality control *per se* — chartering and accreditation — can be historically explained in relation to the CIE's policy between 1945 and 1952. The focus of the CIE policy — the review of chartering and the introduction of the accreditation system — was to remove the power of the Ministry by setting up non-bureaucrat examiners for the review of chartering and accreditation. The confrontation of the CIE with the Ministry and the universities resulted in a certain prudence by the universities regarding joining the Accreditation Association, and inefficient methodology for accreditation in the post-war period.
(2) The external quality control mechanism

The MESSC could control both national and private universities through the National Institute for Academic Degree (NIAD) [Daigaku Hyoka / Gakui Jyuyo Kiko] – a quasi-governmental organisation in the external evaluation system which was introduced in 2000. The external evaluation system differs from quality control through chartering and accreditation in respect of the focus on output and the comprehensive coverage of areas to be examined; this quality control is, therefore, categorised as product control, although it is not linked to funding.

The areas to be examined by NIAD cover:

- Comprehensive Evaluation by theme [e.g. university management to meet aims and functions of individual universities; strategies for general education and basic academic competence; strategies for reinforcement of organisation in teaching such as syllabus and class evaluation by students; strategies for student affairs such as learning environment, financial support, and career support; policies for the promotion of research; contribution to the society as a whole; strategies for the link between the universities and industry; and contribution to international society];
- Teaching Evaluation by subjects [e.g. purpose; content and method; support for students; achievement of aims and plans; contribution to the society as a whole; and systems to enhance quality in education]; and
- Research Evaluation by subjects [e.g. purpose; research contents; contribution to society, economy, and culture; achievement of aims and plans; systems to enhance quality in research].

This wide range of coverage by NIAD complies with the recommendations made by the 1998 University Council – which proposes ‘multi-dimensional evaluations’ on the basis of diversified evaluation methods and standards; for example, social accountability and industrial needs.

NIAD is not involved in the funding allocation to national universities by the MESSC despite the recommendation of the 1998 University Council on this issue. It is, nevertheless, stipulated that, if requested, NIAD releases information
to external financial providers, such as charities and private companies which attempt to use the results of evaluations as indicators of financial support.\textsuperscript{105}

\textit{Legislation}

The distinctive characteristic of legislation in Japan can be captured in terms of ‘detailed prescriptive legislation’. 'Detailed prescriptive legislation' is legislation that stipulates the extent of the power of the Ministry and the universities, and their relationships in a detailed and prescriptive framework of legislation. 'Detailed prescriptive legislation' is significant in respect to the MESSC’s control of the universities, functioning as a policy instrument of the MESSC.

The aforementioned \textit{Standards for the Establishment of Universities} is legislation which the MESSC has frequently used to steer both national and private universities. \textit{Standards for the Establishment of Universities} was amended 16 times between 1955 and 1990.\textsuperscript{106} Its amendment before 1982 focuses on teaching issues.\textsuperscript{107} The amendments in the early 1990s were targeted to encourage the self-evaluation of the universities.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Standards for the Establishment of Universities} has also been used by the MESSC for manipulation of student numbers. Ryoichi Kuroha illustrates the change in \textit{Standards of the Establishment of Universities}: the expansion policy in the 1960s; the regulation policy between 1975 and 1985; and the expansion policy between 1985 and the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{109} In the 1960s, the Ministry deregulated the standards for the establishment of new universities and departments. The main methodologies taken by the Ministry were to remove regulation in the number of departments and student places and the size of university property. Between 1975 and 1985, the Ministry adopted the regulation policy on the expansion of the universities, which consisted of two strategies. One was to introduce a new Ministerial statute which tightened the procedures for approval to establish departments (the Department of Medicine in 1972 and the other departments in 1976). The other was to introduce a Ministerial approval system for the number of
departments and student places (amendment of Article 5 of Private University Law). The restriction policy on the number of departments and student places in private universities in the mid-1970s was linked to funding policy which sought to increase public funding to private universities. The logic behind this policy was that the state could control private universities more strictly than before by creating a condition of higher funding dependency of private universities on public funding. This policy was, however, never accomplished. Between 1985 and the early 1990s, the Ministry again shifted through policy amendments towards a flexible system in the number of university staff and size of university properties. The MESSC, according to the 1999 Program for Education Reform, also deregulated the establishment of new departments in private universities by revising the criteria for their establishment, and by simplifying the process.\textsuperscript{110}

This section has argued that in England, funding on the basis of 'enabling legislation' is a significant government policy instrument for steering the universities. This funding method is reinforced by being linked to outcome quality control in the area of research. In contrast, in Japan, administrative control on the basis of 'detailed prescriptive legislation' is an effective Ministerial policy instrument to control the universities. This legislative method relates to process control on quality.

The next section analyses the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in the university sectors in England and Japan.

2.4.2 THE UNIVERSITIES

Burton Clark’s and Barbara Sporn’s ‘entrepreneurial universities’ focuses on the organisational adaptation of the universities to respond to a changing external environment.\textsuperscript{111} Clark’s case study of the University of Warwick illustrates the application of the concept in the English context.
This section, however, focuses on the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence rather than the central concerns of entrepreneurial universities such as management and governance, and university autonomy. The reason for the focus are that Clark’s initial focus in the triangle of co-ordination was knowledge, which is, according to Clark, ‘a concept central to the discussion of education at any level’.\textsuperscript{112}

There are two interpretations of the relations between new knowledge, governmental regulation and control, and university autonomy. These interpretations could, in practice, complement each other. One is Clark’s assertion that the nature of knowledge generation requires freedom from state direction.\textsuperscript{113} This position tends to be taken by pre-1992 universities in England. The other is the argument by Michel Gibbons et al. that the state’s steering of the universities contributes to new forms of knowledge – such as the applied and trans-disciplinary knowledge which is beneficial in the milieu of the global economy.\textsuperscript{114} This argument by Gibbons et al. is adopted by governments in England and Japan to justify their intervention in the university sectors. The relations between government involvement and efficiency in the creation of new knowledge, and the consequent economic growth are, however, complex; empirical research is required to establish the validity of Clark’s and Gibbons’ arguments.

This section argues that in both England and Japan, the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence at the universities is defined by external stakeholders, at least to some extent. Academically and externally defined skills, knowledge, and competence coexist both in the English and Japanese universities; however, the relations between these differ between England and Japan. In England, skills, knowledge, and competence defined by the academic community – which include critical thinking and academic writing – are at odds with those defined by external stakeholders – which are more vocational, operational, and practical. In contrast, in Japan, skills, knowledge, and competence defined by the academic community are compatible with those defined by external stakeholders. The compatibility
relies upon the external stakeholders' emphasis on generalist skills, knowledge, and competence, which consequently reinforces academic-oriented curricula. The different provision of skills, knowledge, and competence between England and Japan relies upon the dissimilar visions of external stakeholders in relation to the necessity of economic growth, and of the different corporate cultures.

It is worth noting that the provision of skills and knowledge also differs among institutions. For instance, the post-1992 universities in England tend to give greater attention to vocational-oriented skills, knowledge, and competence than do the pre-1992 universities. The national universities in Japan emphasise the fields of engineering and technology, which stress professional and specialist skills, knowledge, and competence. There is a contrary trend in private universities; they emphasise humanities and social science, which stress generalist skills, knowledge, and competence.

The next sub-section analyses the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in the universities of England.

**ENGLAND**

Prior to the 1980s, the type of skills, knowledge, and competence provided at the universities, as argued, tended to be defined by the universities. In contrast, it can be argued that since the late 1980s, they have tended to be influenced by more diverse demands of more diversified external stakeholders in particular in mass education, than hitherto.

The new provision of skills, knowledge, and competence has to some extent become vocationally oriented. Ronald Barnett, from the post-modern viewpoint, argues that competence has shifted from an academic version of competence to a more operational version of competence which relates to an emergent vocabulary of performance, achievement, and outcomes.\(^\text{15}\) In the academic version of competence, higher education was, to a significant extent, epistemologically monopolistic, determining knowledge in society. In the operational version of
competence, higher education has lost its epistemological monopoly, in that knowledge has shifted from contemplative to performative ways of knowing. This operational competence, according to Barnett, is related to economic competitiveness.¹¹⁶

Vocationalism has two systematic implications. The first implication is the diversification of the vocational dimension in the university sector, in which the meaning of vocationalism is not confined within particular disciplines and programmes. Rather, vocationalism in the contemporary period is understood in the diversification of disciplines and programmes, unlike the traditional vocationalism which was linked only to particular disciplines and programmes, which can be identified in relation to old liberalism.¹¹⁷

In this line of argument, Guy Neave relates the expansion of the vocational dimension of the universities to massification of the university sector and their consequent diversification in the 1980s, highlighting the economic role of the universities.¹¹⁸ Neave argues that diversification and differentiation of higher education have resulted both in institutional diversity and programme diversity, and in a broader course content.¹¹⁹ Institutional diversity includes extension in mission, and in the ways the individual establishment may and should organise itself to meet a particular mission or consumers’ demand. Programme diversity includes the expansion of applied and vocational subjects.

The second implication of vocationalism is change in the academic and vocational boundaries, although the tension between academic and vocational education still continues. Three examples of the ambiguity of academic and vocational boundaries at the system and policy level can be observed:

(i) The unification of academic and vocational qualifications,¹²⁰
(ii) The incorporation of the vocational-oriented former polytechnics into the university sector in 1992,¹²¹ and
(iii) The rise of the new discourse of ‘lifelong learning’,¹²² which links education with employment, and the universities with the private sector.
The pattern in the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in relation to accountability to society as a whole, and the way of responding to change in the external environment differs between pre- and post-1992 universities. Peter Scott suggests a relation between 'knowledge society' and the differentiation between elite universities and other cutting-edge research establishments, and other types of universities.\textsuperscript{123} These relations are apparent in graduate outputs rather than research outputs. Guy Neave suggests a different response between pre- and post-1992 universities in relation to the labour market, arguing that post-1992 universities have been both more practical and technical in orientation and content, responding to the dynamism of the labour market.\textsuperscript{124} In this line of argument, it could be argued that the emergence of new discourses relating to the labour market – such as transferability, employability, core, key, or generic skills, and lifelong learning – has significant implications for pre-1992 universities.

The next sub-section analyses the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in the universities of Japan.

**JAPAN**

This sub-section argues that the ambiguity of the boundary between academic and vocational skills, knowledge, and competence in Japanese universities relates to the definition of skills, knowledge, and competence by economic interest groups and government, and US policy during the period of Occupation.

The provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in the national and private universities since 1945 has had two distinct features – the emphasis on general education, and that on values and attitudes – as argued in 2.3.2. These features observed in humanities and social sciences have significantly changed since the 1980s (discussed below). More recently there has been: (1) an emphasis
on individual-oriented and creativity-related skills, knowledge, and competence; (2) increased emphasis on vocationalism in post-graduate courses; and (3) re-emphasis on general education in undergraduate courses.

(1) An emphasis on individual-oriented and creativity-related skills, knowledge, and competence

The emphasis on these particular values and attitudes has changed significantly since the 1980s, suggesting the extent to which the university sector responds to external demand, in particular that of economic interest groups. The old mode of attitude formation, as argued in this thesis (in the section discussing the traditional model), has focused on group-oriented values and attitudes, and diligence, patience, and respect, notably in the areas of the humanities and social sciences. Despite the changes, the old mode of values and attitudes can still be observed.

The new mode of attitude formation in Council Reports in the late 1980s and the 1990s includes more individual-oriented and creativity-related skills, knowledge, and competence. Individual-oriented attitudes include individuality, spontaneity, international awareness, flexibility, self-learning, problem finding/solving, self-learning, and self-development. For example, the concept of individuality is incorporated into that of 'competence in pursuing research questions' (kadai tankyu noryoku) in the 1998 University Council Report. ‘Competence in pursuing research questions’ is, according to the Report defined as ‘competence for seeking research questions individually to respond to “change” and finding solutions taking account of various points of view’.

This new mode of attitude formation responds to demand from economic interest groups for values and attitudes associated with human capital. For example, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations proposes a new mode of values and attitudes, emphasising the old mode continuously. This proposal was based upon a 1990 survey by this organisation, on employment and human resources strategies in 421 firms. In the sample, human resources
managers who were satisfied about the ‘diligence’ and ‘congeniality to peers’ of both technical and non-technical staff when recruiting totalled 75-90 percent of all respondents. In the same survey, in relation to technical recruitment, human resources managers who were not satisfied about ‘spontaneity’, ‘persuasiveness’, and ‘creativity’ comprised respectively, 74.2 percent, 71.4 percent, and 68.8 percent of all respondents. Regarding non-technical recruitment, human resources managers who were not satisfied about ‘knowledge in specialty’, ‘creativity’, and ‘spontaneity’ comprised respectively 82.9 percent, 72.1 percent, and 65.6 percent of all respondents. Another survey taken by the same organisation in 1989 indicates that, for employers, desirable qualities to be obtained through worker education were ‘innovative ideas and imagination’, ‘sensitivity’, ‘international perspective’, and ‘leadership’.

The change of emphasis in attitude formation is largely related to government policy which is attempting to respond to increasing pressure to upgrade from a ‘catch up’ economy to a leading-edge economy, as Green points out. Green warns that such policy could erode traditional skill formation which hitherto supported important components of economic competitiveness (e.g. group cohesion and social cooperation).

(2) Increased emphasis on vocationalism in post-graduate courses

The rise of the new discourse of ‘advanced professions’ (kodo senmon syokugyo jin) and the expansion of vocation-oriented courses in post-graduate study have, since the 1990s, re-balanced academic and vocational skills, knowledge, and competence. This change, rather than the actual change in the labour market, relates not only to the view of the universities and government on the change in demography and therefore the pattern of student access to universities, but also those of government and economic interest groups on economic change. Shogo Ichikawa, for example, argues that policies relating to the increase in ‘advanced professions’, as well as the gradual increase in student enrolment in post-graduate
courses in humanities and social science since the 1990s, have not been related to an actual demand in the labour market. The expansion policy has been linked to the supply side of the universities – which attempts to increase the population of adult learners, following the decline of the 18-year-old cohort – rather than students’ demand on access to universities.

The 1998 University Council Report is testimony to the MESSC policy on ‘advanced professions’ and the link between this policy and the post-graduate expansion policy of the MESSC. The Council Report, suggesting the concept of ‘advanced professions’ to be close to job-specific skills, relates the concept to lifelong learning, refresher education, and the issue of job qualifications.

There are four apparent gaps between the policy for the expansion of post-graduate courses and the observed reality: (i) the limited number of adult learners who return to universities for ‘refresher education’; (ii) the mismatch between students’ demand for post-graduate programmes and the supply of post-graduate programmes by the universities; (iii) the unclear definition of ‘advanced professionals’; and (iv) the increasing hierarchy among subjects. In relation to (i), the number of adult learners undertaking ‘refresher education’ is limited, although the total number of adult learners has been increasing.

In relation to (ii), governmental and ministerial policy on the expansion of graduate courses does not correspond to substantial trends of demand and supply in the graduate labour market, although the policy corresponds to the employers’ long-term forecasts based upon perceptions rather than reliable data. This has created a gap between economic policy and reality. There is no evidence to suggest that employers have changed their recruitment to a preference for post-graduates rather than graduates, except in the subject area of engineering, as a result of the increase in the supply of post-graduates in this field since the 1970s.

On the contrary, hard evidence on employment rates indicates a surplus of supply over demand for graduates of both master’s and doctoral courses. The employment rate for master’s course graduates never surpassed 75.0 percent of the
total number of these graduates between 1965 and 1995, whereas the employment rate for undergraduates in the same period was over 75.0 percent – except during the oil shocks and the 1990s recession. The employment rate for master’s course graduates steadily increased from 47.6 percent of the total number of master graduates in 1965 to 73.0 percent in 1990; however, after the peak of 1990, it gradually fell to 67.3 percent in 1995. In the case of doctoral graduates, the employment rate of doctoral graduates rose steadily from 62.1 percent of the total number of doctoral graduates in 1980 to 66.6 percent in 1992; however, it declined after 1992, having dipped to 62.6 percent in 1995. Government expansion policy of post-graduate courses is not based on reliable empirical data, but on governmental and ministerial economic forecasts (it could be influenced by employers’ views). The University Council’s Report in 1991, Daigakuin no Ryoteki Seibi ni tsuite [Report on Quantitative Promotion for the Infrastructure of Graduate Courses], recommended that these courses should expand, doubling their student intake by the year 2000. This was the first report to focus on the expansion of post-graduate courses. This policy was not confirmed by empirical data. In the report, it was merely assumed that both demand for post-graduates in research agencies and corporations, and demand for recurrent education would increase.

In relation to (iii), the unclear concept of ‘advanced professionals’ was destined for failure in implementation at the institutional level. The concept of ‘advanced professionals’ is not clear at the policy-making level; neither the University Council nor the MESSC have provided a definition of it. Many research deans in both national and private universities, according to findings in the 1994 survey conducted by Kazuyuki Kitamura of the National Institute for Educational Research in Japan, had no clear views about how to incorporate the ‘advanced professionals’ policy into their curricula, nor how to improve access for adult learners.
In relation to (iv), there has been an increasing perception of differing status among subjects, which relates to funding, and staff and student rates. The ‘superior’ subjects include the sciences, engineering, and technology; the ‘inferior’ subjects include those in the humanities, business, and economics. The sciences, engineering, and technology are emphasised in the national universities, as mentioned previously, while humanities, business, and economics are predominant in the private universities. The financial system of the universities suggests that it is difficult for the private universities not only to expand high-cost subjects in the sciences, engineering, and technology, but also to maintain quality in the humanities, business, and economics.

The effect of the ‘advanced professions’ policy of the MESSC is more significant in the social sciences and humanities than in technology and engineering as detailed in the 1998 University Council Report. The Council Report suggests management / administration, finance, international development and co-operation, public policy, and public hygiene as the possible subjects for the ‘advanced professions’. [The expansion of graduate courses in engineering and technology had already occurred in the mid-1970s.] The expansion in the enrolment of adult students since the 1990s has been observed in the area of the humanities; student enrolment in engineering and technology is dominated by traditional students from the 18-years-old cohort.

(3) Re-emphasis on general education in undergraduate courses

The emphasis on general education in undergraduate courses has been a distinctive feature of the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence at Japanese universities. However, the balance between general and specialist knowledge in Japanese universities shifted towards a greater emphasis on specialist knowledge in the 1990s. As a result, a gap exists between ministerial policy, which emphasises general knowledge, and the universities’ focus on specialist knowledge. Evidence below suggests a continuity of the ministerial policy
emphasising general education. First, *Standards of the Establishment of Universities* was amended in 1991 to ensure the significance of general education in the re-defined purpose of undergraduate studies. [The credit requirement of general education (which included health education and a second language) as well as the general methods of calculation of credits have been removed in order to strengthen institutional discretion in the area of curriculum]. Secondly, University Council Reports in 1991, 1997, 1998, and 2000 and the CCE (Central Council on Education) Report in 1999 emphasise general education.

According to Ikuo Amano’s observation, national universities have de-emphasised general education, at least since the 1991 curriculum reform. The abolition of the national regulation on credit requirement for general education, and the increasing emphasis on specialist education in individual universities, along with the erosion of the Department of General Education, are testimony to the de-emphasising of general education in national universities. The change relating to general education is more explicit in the fields of humanities and social sciences than in engineering and technology since the humanities and social sciences have hitherto emphasised general knowledge at undergraduate level, while engineering and technology emphasised specialist and professional education at undergraduate level.

This sub-section has treated the universities as a whole; however, the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence differs between national and private universities. The different emphases in the area of studies between national and private universities suggest that national universities have emphasised skills, knowledge, and competence pertaining to particular disciplines (e.g. technology and engineering), technical competence, and the job-specific capacities demanded by professional careers. National universities, in this respect, have responded to the economic demand for technicians and engineers. In contrast, private universities have not emphasised job-specific skills, knowledge, and competence.
Private universities have responded to student demand to access to universities rather than employers' demand, as evidenced by an emphasis on the humanities and social sciences rather than science and technology.

The distinctive feature in the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in Japanese universities can be explained in historical and economic contexts. In the historical context, the aforementioned second and third features of provision—increasing emphasis on vocationalism in post-graduate courses; and emphasis on general education in undergraduate courses—can be understood in the axis of democratic values of the US and nationalist values of Japan during the period of Occupation (1945-1952). The education policy of the CIE (Civil Information and Education Section) of the US force included two strands: the introduction of general education at the undergraduate level, and the establishment of vocational-oriented master courses. The proposal of the CIE for the introduction of general education, whose model was close to that of liberal arts colleges in the US, was implemented during the period of Occupation. The proposal of the CIE for the establishment of vocational-oriented master courses was only implemented in a limited number of universities. The enrolment of master students in engineering and technology did not expand until the 1970s, when demand for graduates in engineering and technology increased as a result of economic growth. The enrolment of master students in humanities and social sciences did not expand until the mid-1990s, when post-graduate expansion policy of government was introduced.

Shogo Ichikawa explains that the minimal expansion of post-graduate courses until the 1990s was a result of financial constraints and labour market trends. Financial constraints included not only public funding but also financial support from families, which were the main factor behind the minimal expansion of the post-graduate courses in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The labour market trends have not required the post-graduate level of specialist and professional
skills, knowledge, and competence because of the provision of on-the-job training by corporations.

In addition to a limited expansion of master courses, master courses in general were academic-oriented by providing for academic professionals as Japanese academics intended, not for non-academic professionals as the CIE intended. Furthermore, the CIE plan for the introduction of one-year taught master courses and three-year taught doctoral courses was not implemented; instead, the Japanese Ministerial plan, which emphasised academic professionals by introducing two-year master courses and five-year doctoral courses, was implemented.

The extent to which CIE policy has been implemented relates to conflict and compromises between the US and Japanese Governments in the period of Occupation. [The implementation of the CIE policy in the post-Occupation period can be understood in the conflict and compromises among stakeholders within Japan such as between the Ministry (nationalists) and the Teacher’s Union (proponents of democracy), and to a lesser extent, between the Ministry and the Association of National University Presidents]. The conflict and compromises between the US and Japan can be understood as ideological conflict between the democratisation of the US and the nationalism of Japan. The ideal model of the democratisation of education, for the US, was the US type of education system such as the single co-educational 6-3-3-4 system (six-year elementary school, three-year junior high school, three-year high school, and four-year university). The key concept of democratisation of education was egalitarianism. In contrast, the ideal model of education, for Japan, was embedded in the maintenance of the pre-war education system, with the multiple tracks in secondary and university education. The key concepts of nationalism in education in this context included diversification and elitism.

In the economic context, there is a gap between the substantial change in the university sector in the 1990s, and government university policies in the same
period. The substantial change in the university sector in the 1990s can be mainly observed in the expansion of departments of humanities and social sciences, whose graduates tend to be employed in the service sector and fields unrelated to technological innovation.

At the university policy level, however, the change in the manufacturing sector has been paid more attention to by policymakers than has the service sector in the 1990s, although government economic policy focuses on the change in the service sector as well as the manufacturing sector.160 For example, University Council Reports in the 1990s asserted that the significance of the university reforms is in the role of the universities to respond to the following: the change in work organisation in the manufacturing sector such as the decline of on-the-job training and tenure; the increasing pressure to upgrade from a 'catch up' economy to a leading-edge economy, (which relates primarily to the manufacturing sector); and the challenges posed by economic globalisation.

This section examined the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence in the universities in England and Japan. The next section scrutinises market mechanisms in England and Japan.

2.4.3 QUASI-MARKETS

The market is not always antithetical to government control. On the contrary, market mechanisms observed in the university sectors in both England and Japan can be understood in relation to government creation of market conditions and government operations in the market.161 This thesis refers to such markets defined by government involvement as the 'quasi-market'.

This section argues that the English version of the quasi-market since the 1980s has been partially conditioned by government funding policy in the area of undergraduate student enrolment and research. The government involvement in the quasi-market is regular and exerts influence on individual universities. In this
type of quasi-market, efficiency and equity can be made compatible by withdrawing student maintenance and concomitantly offering special funds for widening access.

In contrast, the Japanese version of the quasi-market is understood not in the government creation of quasi-market, but the government conditioning of quasi-market. This government conditioning is apparent in two areas: the government legislation on student enrolment; and government financial incentives in research, and the diversification of the university sector. The government involvement in the quasi-market is irregular and exerts influence notably on private universities. In the Japanese quasi-market, efficiency and equity are compatible by segregation in function between national and private universities.

The next sub-section examines the quasi-market mechanism in England.

**ENGLAND**

Martin Trow, from an American perspective, denies the existence of the market in British higher education. Trow points out the rhetorical nature of the market concept in the UK, and increasing governmental involvement in higher education in recent years. This view, however, is not based upon the concept of the quasi-market; Trow asserts that governmental involvement provides counter-evidence to marketisation. The point made by Trow in respect to the strong government pressure exerted on the universities (e.g. target setting for the number of students) can be interpreted as the introduction of the quasi-market system. The 1988 Education Reform Act (‘new arrangements for funding higher education’, sections 131-134, 1988 ERA) and the change in the public funding mechanism which encouraged expansion at marginal costs much lower than average costs in 1988 are testimony to the transfer in financial power from providers of academic services — in particular, the Government and government agencies — to consumers. Thus, the legislative and funding changes outlined above can be interpreted as a shift towards a market-oriented system.
Gareth Williams argues that market influence in England had already been introduced in the mid-1980s through the generation of income from non-government sources and the allocation of ‘earmarked’ funds – the aim of which was to encourage more market orientation – on a competitive basis (as a result of the reduction of public expenditure on higher education). His interpretation largely relies upon the change in the nature of the University Grants Committee (UGC), and the consequential shift in the relationships between government and the UGC. Similarly, Rosalind Pritchard argues that the market of British higher education has been driven by financial manipulation by Conservative governments since the 1980s, when governments started to allocate funding selectively and reduce its expenditure on the universities. In this new approach, Pritchard argues, the government intended to make the universities more accountable to clients, and to encourage the universities to look for sources of finance other than public money.

The shift in funding policy of the Conservative Government from expansion to restriction in 1994, and the introduction of the tuition fee by the New Labour Government in 1997 is testimony to the effect of government policy in relation to the quasi-market. The expansion policy of government by means of the removal of government regulations on the number of student enrolments (1988 - 1993) resulted in an increase in enrolments by over 50 percent of school leavers between 1989 and 1994 and a drop in expenditure per student by 30 percent. The abolition of the non-conditional expansion of student enrolment by the cap on further expansion of student numbers from 1995 onwards brought about only a modest expansion. As a result of the 1997 introduction of direct payment by students there has been a subsequent decline in student enrolment. These changes in funding and student enrolment suggest that the market mechanism moved away from that of ‘pure market’ in 1994, and then reverted back to ‘pure market’ by emphasising consumer power in 1997.
In the English version of quasi-market, it can be argued that efficiency and equity are not antithetical. Rather both concepts are in juxtaposition under the New Labour Government, which combines neo-liberal doctrine and social justice [see 4.2.1.2]. Gareth Williams, focusing on government funding policy on the charging of students, identifies two arguments – an ‘efficiency function’ argument and an ‘equity function’ argument. The ‘efficiency function’ argument is based upon two beliefs: that economic efficiency is best served if individual students pay directly for a service which they receive; and that the higher rates of taxation to support students by public funds impair greater economic efficiency. The proponents of this argument were, according to Williams, mainly right-wing economists of the 1980s. The ‘equity function’ argument emphasises differentiation in the financial support between different categories of students. This argument is supported by the left of centre National Commission on Education and the Social Justice Commission.

Williams’ ‘equity function’ argument suggests that the market is not always conceptually in opposition to equity. The empirical evidence for compatibility between equity and efficiency in New Labour’s policies includes the exemption of an annual tuition fee for students from lower income families, and special funds which attempt to widen access to university.

In the context of research, government stimulates the quasi-market through the operation of research councils. Research councils offer competitive grants through the coupling of institutional block funds for research on the basis of the result of research assessment exercises, and past research performance.

This sub-section argued that the English version of the quasi-market is partially conditioned by government funding policy in the area of undergraduate student enrolment and research. The next sub-section examines the quasi-market mechanism in Japan.
The market is subject to two different interpretations in the context of the Japanese university sector. One interpretation denies the market mechanism, emphasising the Ministerial control of both private and public universities. The other interpretation is based upon the notion of the market mechanism, and the change in the market conditions in the 1980s and 1990s. Ikuo Amano, for example, argues that Japanese higher education has been transformed to the market model since the mid-1980s.\(^{173}\) This change was, according to Amano, the consequence of demolishing governmental restrictionist policy on enrolment in higher education in the mid-1980s, and the declining 18-year-old population in the 1990s.\(^{174}\) This interpretation de-emphasises consumerist features such as student choice and students’ cost-benefit assessment.

Adopting the concept of the ‘quasi-market’, this thesis accepts the second interpretation of the market since government control of the universities is an acceptable condition under the concept of ‘quasi-market’.\(^{175}\) The quasi-market in Japan is understood by using the axis which shows the two extreme ideal points of total government control and of the pure market. The location of the Japanese version of the quasi-market on the axis is determined by fixed and changing market conditions. Fixed conditions include the quantitative domination of private universities (73.6 percent of the total number of the universities in 1994\(^{176}\)), and student tuition in both the national and public universities.\(^{177}\) Changing market conditions include demography, government actions over the size of the universities, and government policy on student scholarships.\(^{178}\)

In the context of massification, the quasi-market can be understood in multiple contexts including government control, increasing family income, and meritocratic culture. Motohisa Kaneko, for example, argues that the rationale behind the expansion of tertiary education was the increased overall wealth of the country, the ‘value according to education’ [the meritocratic ethos in other words], and the increased family income which consequently increased the viability to pay...
tuition fees. Shogo Ichikawa, sharing a common view with Kaneko, argues that the expansion of the universities relied upon 'pull factors', 'push factors', and government university policy. ‘Pull factors’ included increasing demand for advanced skills and knowledge as a consequence of technological innovation, and the rise of human capital theory. ‘Push factors’ were increasing family income, strengthening meritocratic ethos, and demographic change.

In the Japanese version of the quasi-market, it could be argued that the dual system of national and private universities enables the MESSC to seek both efficiency and equity. The dual system of national and private universities can be explained in relation to massification. The expansion of the universities, creating the dual structure, distinguished between the universities: traditional, elite universities, and non-traditional mass universities. For instance, Amano separates the universities into two groups of 'elite-type universities' and 'mass-type universities'. The 'elite-type universities' are national universities and traditional private universities, while the 'mass-type universities' are non-traditional private universities established after 1960. Amano argues that the impact of the massification of universities was different between the two. The 'elite-type universities' did not expand to the same degree as the 'mass-type' universities, because of the education policy on the quantitative restriction of national universities on the number of students per staff member and the policies of the traditional universities themselves on the selection of entrants. In contrast, the 'mass-type universities' have swelled, absorbing the increasing social demand for higher education.

Similarly, Masakazu Yano argues that the dual system of the national and private universities is one of the characteristics of massification. The private universities were the major institutions which responded to the increasing social demand for higher education, emphasising law, economics, and business rather than science and engineering. The national universities, on the other hand, did not respond in this way. Instead, they responded to economic needs in science and
technology, and social demand for egalitarianism during the expansion period. The national universities, in response to economic demand, have emphasised the fields of science and engineering rather than law, economics, and business. They concomitantly responded to the social demand for egalitarianism in education by maintaining much lower tuition fees in national universities than those of private universities. The gap in tuition fee between national and private universities has, however, diminished since the late 1980s, as indicated earlier.

The argument for the different responses of national and private universities to socio-economic demand during the expansion period can be explored in the context of equity and efficiency. It can be argued that the MESSC has sought efficiency and equity relating to social justice in the case of national universities, and equity pertaining to wider access to universities in the case of private universities. Amano, for example, argues that the policy of the MESSC has been based upon strategic public funding allocation seeking for efficiency, notably in national universities and in particular fields such as engineering and technology. Amano, pointing out inequity among the universities, also argues that this Ministerial policy per se has implicitly contained inequity in respect of the different provision between national and private universities (e.g. facilities, staff-student rate, and student maintenance) and between engineering / technology and social science and the humanities. However, equity in terms of equal opportunity has improved as a result of the increased enrolment in private universities.

The concept of ‘equity’, as Amano’s argument makes clear, is complex; the efficiency argument pertaining to national universities is more straightforward. The concept of ‘equity’ requires elaboration; it is necessary to distinguish between its meaning in relation to increasing participation and widening access because these two concepts are not entirely the same in a broadly meritocratic society. Equity pertaining to social justice, responded to by the national universities. Equity relating to increasing participation pertains to the quantitative and
qualitative change in private universities; increasing participation is not necessarily linked to social justice.

In the context of research, the quasi-market in research takes the form of a government financial incentive, which lacks information provision and quality assessment, and focuses on individual academics rather than institutions. For example, the aforementioned 'Grants-in-Aid for Science Research System' – the main competitive grant for research by the MESSC – is not based upon the result of research assessment exercises or past research performance. Quality control in 'Grants-in-Aid for Science Research System' rather relies upon a screening process which is based upon originality and scholastic contribution by researchers. The proposals for research projects are examined by academics. For particular topics, both academic and non-academic examiners in the private sector are selected by the Science Council.187

This screening on the basis of proposals of individual researchers or research groups indicates that financial incentives in research do not necessarily intensify competitiveness among the institutions.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The analysis in this chapter showed convergent trends between English and Japanese university systems in respect of central authorities' intensive control of the universities and the markets, the significant response of the universities to external demand, and central authorities' creation of market conditions and their operation in the markets. However, as this chapter concomitantly showed, distinctive and divergent forms between the two systems, as well as the different process of convergence, are still observed in the different types of central authority manoeuvres and involvement in the universities and the markets, and the different universities' responses to external demand.
The next chapter, focusing on ideologies – neo-liberalism, university autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism – seeks an explanation for commonality and difference in the changing balance of relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets in England and Japan.
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL EXPLANATION FOR TRANSFORMATION OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS IN ENGLAND AND JAPAN

Every time a discourse moves, there is space for ideology to play. (The late Emeritus Professor Basil Bernstein, 1996)

3.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

The previous chapter conceptualised the transformation of the university systems in England and Japan in relation to the balance of power between central authorities, the universities, and the quasi-markets. The chapter identified established and new models, emphasising both the convergence of the two university systems in England and Japan, and the continuity of distinctive forms between the two systems.

This chapter explains the paradigms underlining the transformation of the university systems from the established models to the new models in England and Japan. The chapter focuses on the concept of ideology, inasmuch as the analysis of ideologies provides theoretical signposts which are useful in explaining the causes of transformation. This chapter selects four ideologies for analysis: university autonomy, new managerialism, vocationalism, and neo-liberalism. This selection is based upon the proposition that these four ideologies relate to the power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the quasi-markets, which are the foci of this thesis.

The main argument in this chapter is as follows: the convergence and the continuity of distinctive and divergent features between the English and Japanese university systems – in the context of the balance of power between government, the universities, and the market – are, to a large extent, explained in the dimension
of ideology as well as existing macro-theories. In relation to convergence between English and Japanese university systems, ideology relates to similarities between the two university systems in policies and ideologies around the themes of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism in the context of the global economy. Regarding the existing differences in the two university systems, ideology is related to differences in the relations between ideology and power relationships between stakeholders in England and Japan.

This chapter, first, defines 'ideology'. Secondly, it elucidates the relations between four ideologies — neo-liberalism, university autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism — giving attention to different interpretations and effects of these ideologies between English and Japanese universities. Thirdly, the chapter links the theoretical perspective of the previous section to existing macro-theories which provide a causal explanation for the convergence and differences between the two university systems. The section uses two existing theories — convergence theories and the transformationalist theories of the globalisation schools.

3.2 A DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology, in Marxian-Engelsian understanding, relates to social and class stratification. The age of ideology, for post-modernists, has now ended. This section, taking a modernist standpoint, defines ideology by reviewing Antonio Gramsci and Karl Mannheim’s notion of ideology, post-modernists’ ‘end of ideology’ theory, and the contemporary uses of ideology.\textsuperscript{189}

For both Gramsci and Mannheim, ideology is the distortion of reality which is used for justification and legitimation of the position of the dominant class.\textsuperscript{190} For Gramsci, the main idea of ideology rests on his own concept of ‘hegemony’ of the ruling class.\textsuperscript{191} Gramsci, dividing superstructure into two — ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ — defines hegemony as the exercise of the dominant group to
attain the approval and consent of members of society, and to maintain its control in the 'civil society'.

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural levels: the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.

Hegemony is achieved not by the use of force, but by persuading the population to accept the political and moral values of the ruling class. Education is a central institution in the construction of hegemony because it can transmit the hegemonic code and universalises national culture.

Gramsci also focuses on counter-hegemonic struggles which are usually organised among 'organic intellectuals' in civil society. Organic intellectuals, nurtured through education, can articulate their perspective against 'traditional' intellectuals who engage in the construction of dominant ideologies.

The relations between ideology and power struggle in Gramsci's writing are understood in his own concepts of 'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of position'. War of manoeuvre is minor disagreement without threatening the ruling hegemonic block after the construction of hegemony. War of position is, in contrast, the form of political struggle of any group to 'assimilate' and 'conquer ideologically' towards dominance of the group in society at a certain point in historical development.

One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in
question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.\textsuperscript{194}

Ideology is, in this sense, the tool of a particular group aiming to obtain power dominance.

Ideology for Gramsci is false class consciousness, sharing this point with Karl Marx’s thought, although Gramsci, unlike Marx, does not assert the capability of the ruling class to fully impose false beliefs and values on the population.

Karl Mannheim also takes ideology as ‘falsity’, distancing it from the reality.\textsuperscript{195} ‘Falsity’, Mannheim points out, could be intentional or unintentional, and conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious. This standpoint on ideology as false relies upon psychological aspects, the relation to epistemology, and his belief that there is no epistemological emancipation from ontological, metaphysical, and ethical presuppositions.

Mannheim divides ideology into two categories: ‘particular conception of ideology’ and ‘total conception of ideology’. The particular conception of ideology refers to distortions in reality as a result of consciously disguising the real situation, while the total conception of ideology refers to ‘historico-social groups’ such as social class.\textsuperscript{196} The commonality between the two types of ideologies relies upon interpretation by the subject, which is influenced by the ‘specific character and life-situation’ of the subject.

Both fall back on the subject, whether individual or group, proceeding to an understanding of what is said by the indirect method of analysing the social conditions of the individual or his group. The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as functions of his existence. This means that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies further that the specific character and life-situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions, and interpretations.\textsuperscript{197}
Mannheim relates ideologies to ‘false consciousness’ – ‘the problem of the totally distorted mind which falsifies everything which comes within its range’.

Mannheim’s conceptualisation of ideology largely relies upon Marxist understanding of ideology focusing on the socio-class basis of a particular group. The difference between Mannheim’s work and the works of Marx and Engel and Gramsci is in Mannheim’s differentiation of ideology into two types – ruling class ideology and utopian ideology. Ruling class ideology supports the status quo. Utopian ideology is a vision of an ideal society and the social system (or ‘wish-image’ in Mannheim’s term), which is usually found in oppressed groups seeking social change.

In the post-modernist and post-structuralist perspective, ideology is also a falsity rather than a truth. Francis Fukuyama argues that the age of ideology has ended, applying Hegel’s dialectical approach based on the claim that history is a process progressing towards a goal. The end of ideology, for Fukuyama, means the victory of liberal democracy – in that there is no threat to be conquered by alternative ideologies, no political struggle over ideologies, and the fragmentation of alternative ideologies. Fukuyama, in this way, interprets the demise of Marxism-Leninism as a historical end point.

Fukuyama’s interpretation regarding ideology in the ‘end of ideology’ argument differs from Gramsci and Mannheim. Ideology, for Gramsci and Mannheim, is related to a social dimension – the class stratification and power struggle of a particular social group. In contrast, ideology, for Fukuyama, is linked to psychological dimension – individual human demand (i.e. desire and reason) and human struggle (i.e. thymos or struggle for recognition) – rather than a particular social group and class-based struggle.

This thesis, following the purpose clarified in Chapter I, relates ideology to neither human desire / nature nor the dominant class interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, but rather to the sets of values of multiple stakeholders in the university systems. The thesis, therefore, takes a pluralist position, although there
are some Marxist elements because of the focus of the thesis – the relationships between central authorities and the universities. The thesis partially accepts Gramsci’s, Mannheim’s, and Fukuyama’s interpretation of ideology which is based upon the notion of falsity, because of the perceived validity of this notion. The thesis does not accept the ‘end of ideology’ argument because it lacks validity in that it takes no account of various ‘isms’ (e.g. neo-liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, feminism, and international terrorism) observed in the 1980s and the 1990s. Furthermore, post-modernists, as Michael Freeden criticises, mistake ‘ideological convergence for ideological invisibility’.

On the basis of the above standpoints, this thesis proposes a redefinition of ideologies, emphasising three points:

a) the dimensions of falsity and the constitution of reality in ideology;
b) pluralistic power relationships among stakeholders in the university system rather than the relationships of ruled and ruling; and

c) the emphasis on the analytical dimension (in particular, pluralistic analysis), linking theoretical and methodological issues.

This thesis defines ideology in relation to power relationships. ‘Ideology’ in this thesis refers to values and beliefs of the manifold stakeholders in the university system, which is, to large extent, related to the power position, shaping particular relationships among stakeholders in the university systems. There are two points worthy of note in this definition. The first is that ideology can be either rhetorical or substantial, which leads to the choice of the type of behaviour by stakeholders in the university system. The second is that no stakeholders in the university system are, according to this definition of the ideology, free from ideology.

In relation to (a) and (c), the contemporary studies of ideology do not focus on the ideas of the ruling class, dismissing the debate of falsity and truth in ideology; they emphasise the analytical dimension as well as the theoretical. For example, Iain MacKenzie proposes the reformulation of ideology, stressing ‘truth of a situation’ rather than falsity, emphasising the analytical dimension rather than
theoretical device, and dismissing the traditional way of understanding ideology which relates to epistemology. Similarly, Aletta Norval, in his review of contemporary approaches to the analysis of ideology, argues that ideologies could be 'real', which is the 'part of reality which remains unsymbolized, but which always returned to haunt ideological attempts to cover it over'.

In the context of education, Roger Dale, Michael Apple, and Brian Salter and Ted Tapper indicate similar trends to the above – the constitution of reality in the conception of ideology, and the emphasis on the analytical dimension – suggesting the redefinition of ideology. Dale, in his analysis of the relations between education and the changing role of the capitalist state, suggests that ideology is no longer understood in the context of reductionist economic superiority or in Gramsci’s explanation of the dominant economic and political elites’ hegemony. Dale’s rejection of reductionism is based upon his claim of the complex role of the capitalist state, which includes not only administrative and coercive apparatus but also educative and formative apparatus. The limitation of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony in contemporary New Right analysis is associated with the significance of the middle-class group in research on New Right policy. Dale points out the significance of the creation of the new hegemonic accord – in which the focused group comprises not only dominant economic and political elites and the subordinated, but also working-class, middle-class, and new middle-class groups whose own advancement relies upon the extended use of accountability, efficiency, and management.

Apple, in the context of education policy research, identifies the ideological reconstruction observed in the contemporary New Right study in comparison with the traditional Marxist conception of ideology in his critical introduction of Dale’s *The State and Education Policy* in 1989. [Apple takes the Marxist position in respect to his research focus on class, questioning ‘who benefits’.]
hegemony in New Right study. Apple argues that Reaganism and Thatcherism did not relate to false consciousness, but reality.

In this restructuring, Reaganism and Thatcherism did not create some sort of false consciousness, creating ways of seeing that had little connection with reality. Rather, they 'operated directly on the real and manifestly contradictory experiences' of a large portion of the population. They did connect with the perceived needs, fears and hopes of groups of people who felt threatened by the range of problems associated with the crises in authority relations, in the economy and in politics.\textsuperscript{208}

The first thing to ask about an ideology is not what is false about it, but what is true. What are its connections to lived experience? Ideologies, properly conceived, do not dupe people. To be effective they must connect to real problems, real experiences.\textsuperscript{209}

For Salter and Tapper, ideology does not relate to Gramsci's conception regarding false consciousness and hegemony, but rather to reality.\textsuperscript{210} Regarding the analysis and interpretation in their study, they are not based on the bipolar relationships between ruling and ruled groups, but on pluralism.\textsuperscript{211}

In relation to (b) and (c) of the points relating to redefined ideology in this thesis, Apple's, Dale's, and Salter and Tapper's studies above imply a theoretical and analytical problem derived from the gap between pluralistic and reductionist approaches.\textsuperscript{212} Stephen Ball seeks a resolution of the theoretical gap between pluralism and neo-Marxist theories in three ideas — 'relative autonomy' of the political and ideological from the economic; the role of 'agency'; and delimitation as opposed to determination.\textsuperscript{213} Gliberto Capano proposes a new theoretico-methodological approach in order to clarify the process of policy-making, emphasising two points. The first point is the significance in the analysis of the three policy levels — basic units, individual institutions, and central authorities. The second point is the significance of the focus on particular content in higher education policies — including structure, location, admissions, governance, and curricula.\textsuperscript{214} Capano's proposal seeks to resolve the gap between Neo-Marxist and
pluralist approaches by focusing on the level of central authorities in the pluralistic framework and emphasising causal theory.

3.3 FOUR IDEOLOGIES

On the basis of the definition of the ideology in the previous section, this section provides a theoretical framework of the thesis, which explains the characteristics of the English and Japanese university systems, and their particular transformation patterns [see Chapter II].

The thesis selects four ideologies in order to seek both theoretical and empirical explanations for convergent trends between England and Japan, and the continuity of divergent forms between the two. The four ideologies are neo-liberalism, new managerialism, redefined university autonomy (contractual English university autonomy, and Japanese institutional autonomy [see 3.3.3]), and vocationalism. This selection of four ideologies is based on the observation that reference to them clarifies changes in the power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market.

In relation to aforementioned 'private definition' and 'public definition' [see 2.1], these four ideologies relate to 'public definition' rather than 'private definition' in relation to accountability to society as a whole and / or central authorities, and also in relation to associations with external stakeholders, in particular, government. Neo-liberalism, redefined university autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism can be conceptually located between central authorities' influence and the market, which concomitantly strengthens the power of university presidents rather than faculties and departments. These concepts relate to government discourse and policy which seek efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
The linkage between the four ideologies can be explained practically and theoretically. The practical explanation applies particularly to new managerialism, which can be understood as the practice of government’s neo-liberal policy.

The theoretical explanation is embedded in 19th Century utilitarian thought, in particular, that of John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism links neo-liberalism, new managerialism, re-defined university autonomy, and to some extent, vocationalism, providing conceptions shared by the four ideologies. These shared conceptions include ontological individualism (e.g. the pursuit of self-interest, the freedom of individuals, and individual choice), the separation between private and public spheres, and (in the case of the late stage of utilitarianism) a positive view of the role of the state in the protection of individual interests. The following paragraphs briefly explain the linkage between utilitarianism and the four ideologies respectively: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) new managerialism; (3) redefined university autonomy; and (4) vocationalism.

First, neo-liberalism can be understood as an ideology which overarches new managerialism, redefined university autonomy, and vocationalism. The thesis interprets neo-liberalism as closer to ‘public definition’ rather than ‘private definition’ because of the incorporation of the idea of state control over the universities in neo-liberal doctrine, and the assumption by some neo-liberals that the market increases accountability to society.

Neo-liberalism shows a direct link with 19th Century utilitarianism in respect of the emphasis on individualism and the focus on the relationships between the individuals and society. ‘Individuals’, ‘choice’, and ‘freedom’ are a common language between neo-liberalism and utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, taking the position of the classical liberal, links the free market, a minimal state, and laissez faire to the ‘principle of utility’ — the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’.

For Bentham, the pursuit of individual happiness and pleasure can be achieved under the condition of the free market, which, in his view, reinforces individual choice and initiative.
In contrast to Bentham, John Stuart Mill, to some degree, accepts the role of the state, slightly distancing himself from the classical liberal. He argues that the role of the state is to promote the aggregate of general happiness by helping individuals to pursue their development. He believes that democratic safeguards must be instituted to protect individuals against any potential abuse of power. Mill's position is based upon the two following points. The first point is his sympathetic attitude towards the unequal distribution of wealth in capitalist society; Mill, therefore, attempts to link laissez-faire and social readjustment. The second point is related to his modification of Bentham's conception of pleasure by identifying the qualitative differences in the types of pleasures between higher or 'genuine' pleasures and lower or 'base' ones. He emphasises the significance of the state's role in the pursuit of 'genuine' pleasure. Regarding individualism, Mill takes a less individualistic position than Bentham.

Utilitarianism – which incorporates classical liberal elements – and neo-liberalism, as Mark Olssen points out, share ontological individualism, which relies upon “a narrow negative conception of freedom”, stressing individual autonomy and agency. Under the principle of ontological individualism, utilitarianism and neo-liberalism both emphasise the conception of freedom, focus on the relations between the individual and society, interpret the self as a rational utility maximiser, distinguish the private and public spheres, and reject any conception of the public good as the collectiveness of individual ends.

The difference between classical liberalism and neo-liberalism, as Mark Olssen suggests, can be understood in relation to different implications for the role of the state between two ideologies. In classical liberalism, the state limits and minimises its role. In contrast, in neo-liberalism, the state takes initiatives in order to create ‘enterprising individuals’ by providing the market conditions, laws, and institutions necessary for appropriate market operation. The role of the state is, therefore, positive in the neo-liberal account. In the context of education, neo-
liberal policies encourage competition over education, and seek to justify social institutions in terms of their capacity for potential individual benefit.

Secondly, new managerialism relates to neo-liberalism in respect of its emphasis on developing market-entrepreneurial regimes by dismantling bureau-professional organisation regimes.\textsuperscript{221} The characteristics of new managerialism—which, according to Ball, stresses quality service to the customer as well as the value of the innovation with the introduction of techniques of business management and corporate culture into the public sector\textsuperscript{222}—are commonly emphasised in the university version of the neo-liberal doctrine.

Thirdly, redefined university autonomy could be understood as the reflection of neo-liberalism at the institutional level. In redefined university autonomy, the government’s role concerning the universities is seen positively, whereas the original concept of university autonomy was that it maximises academic freedom from government. Redefined university autonomy is related to new managerialism in respect of the restructuring of individual universities, including the rationalisation of their organisational forms, the culture of institutional governance, and accountability to government and society.

Fourthly, vocationalism can be explained as reflecting utilitarian views; it is, therefore, indirectly linked to the other three ideologies of neo-liberalism, redefined university autonomy, and vocationalism. Both utilitarianism and vocationalism have a significant implication for issues related to economy. In utilitarian doctrine, happiness is attained through the self-interested pursuit of economic goals. Vocationalist ideology, as Mike Hickox identifies, combines economic efficiency and social justice.\textsuperscript{223}

The relations between the four ideologies and the transformation and continuity of the university sectors are not straightforward; they differs by the particular contexts of particular countries—including political, economic, socio-cultural, and historical contexts. In England and Japan, the four ideologies—neo-liberalism, new managerialism, redefined university autonomy, and vocationalism

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— are similarly observed; they are related to public definition. However, the interpretations, applications, and effects of the ideologies, differ between the two university settings. In England, government has used neo-liberalism for the justification of its involvement in the university sector. As the result, traditional English university autonomy — the ideology of the universities — has been subordinated under economic-related ideologies such as neo-liberalism and new managerialism. In Japan, the different interpretations and stances towards neo-liberalism between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups have been significant in terms of power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market in the university sector. The anti-neo-liberal group, taking a position distant from classical liberalism, has attempted to de-emphasise the classical liberalist idea of the minimal involvement of the central authorities in the public sector, while the interpretation of neo-liberalism by the neo-liberal group has been close to classical liberalism.

In the following sub-sections, the particular types of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, re-defined university autonomy, and vocationalism are identified and defined; the definitions are guided by the focus of this thesis, which gives primary attention to the relationships between central authorities and the universities.

3.3.1 NEO-LIBERALISM
New Right doctrine can be explained by two ideologies: (1) neo-liberalism; and (2) neo-conservatism. First, neo-liberalism has been largely influenced by F. A. Hayekian economics. Hayek, who in criticising socialism, statism, and Keynesianism, argued that the free market mechanism is superior to collectivist planning because the free market can bring about greater freedoms and greater efficiency through the aggregation of individual decisions. Based upon this principle, ‘choice’, ‘competition’, and ‘markets’ as well as ‘efficiency’ and ‘cost-
effectiveness’ have become the main slogans of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism has redefined the border between public and private sectors by emphasising the private sectors, and re-orienting education to become more responsive to private sector demand. The power of the consumer is at the centre; ‘consumer choice’ relates to democracy, which is, according to Michael Apple, understood in the economic rather than the political context since “‘consumer choice’ is the guarantor of democracy”. Neo-liberal strategies arguably are in opposition to egalitarian norms and values.

In the neo-liberal logic of economic globalisation, the market is more adaptable than state planning to economic, technological, and social change, and to the uncertain and unpredictable nature of society. Therefore, the market is more accountable to society as a whole. This is the point of linkage between economic globalisation and New Right doctrine or neo-liberalism. This interpretation has been further adapted to the education sphere, by claiming that economic needs, which intensify competition for knowledge, are met via marketisation in education. This claim relies upon an assumption that people invest in education with a concern for economic returns. In the context of the universities, Guy Neave, for example, argues that the market is a key actor in the global economy, because state control is inadequate with unpredictable economic change resulting from globalisation and regional integration such as European integration. Neave explains this claim, arguing that the tight nexus between the universities and the state does not create a flexible environment that would respond to the new economic needs for skills and knowledge.

The interpretations of market influence and the strategies for national economy differ in political contexts. For example, the Conservative government’s economic views, according to Richard Aldrich, David Crook, and David Watson’s observations, changed over its 18-year term of office between 1979 and 1997. The Thatcher Government in the early period focused on training for the
unemployed. That Government in the later period attempted to create employment through a flexible competitive labour market.

Secondly, the neo-conservative view, in contrast to neo-liberalism, is close to Edmund Burke's paternalism in its pessimistic stance which interprets human interaction as, in Hobbes's famous words, 'nasty, brutish and short'. In this view, strong state control is justified. Neo-conservatism emphasises a nationalistic position, which includes social cohesion, national identity, and common culture; it is opposed to multiculturalism. 'Custom', 'tradition', and 'order' are key concepts in neo-conservative doctrine. Examples of neo-conservative strategy include national testing and 'standards'.

Apple identifies the change from 'licensed autonomy' to 'regulatory autonomy' in relation to neo-conservative policy in the context of US schooling. 'Licensed autonomy' operated on the basis of trust in 'professional discretion', in which teachers were free to act in their classroom according to their judgement. In contrast, 'regulatory autonomy' operates on the basis of an absence of teachers' autonomy, trust, and respect, with greater scrutiny by the state into process and outcomes. Apple's argument on the change from 'licensed autonomy' to 'regulatory autonomy' is applicable to the context of English universities, as indicated by the aforementioned evidence on the intensity of government regulation in this chapter, and its implication for the change in meaning of university autonomy as argued in the next chapter.

Of these two ideologies, neo-liberalism, as illustrated above, is far more strongly linked with economic values. In contrast, neo-conservatism is linked to the socio-cultural sphere. The implication of the New Right agenda for the education sphere is, as evidenced in Chapters IV and V, understood in the context of both neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, and thus economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Apple, illustrating neo-liberalism in a global context, categorises two types of government strategies linking education and the economy in the US context. One is the government proposal for 'school-to-work' and
education-for-employment' programmes, and the cost-cutting attacks on the 'bloated state'. This type of government proposal is observed in the New Labour Government's policy in England. The other category which Apple identifies is national and state-by-state proposals for voucher and choice programmes.

It can be argued that the neo-liberal stance and the implicit standpoint of neo-conservatism made the New Right's policy contradictory in respect to the two concepts of state control and the free economy. The logic of this argument relies upon the understanding that neo-liberalism emphasises laissez-faire economic doctrine, while neo-conservatism advocates state control derived from the concept of national cohesion. The conceptual contradiction in the New Right is especially relevant to two opposing directions in English education reform — centralisation, and devolution and choice in school education.

Two major criticisms of the New Right's market values relate to social inequality and the question concerning the transformation to a high-skill economy. Those criticisms mainly derive from the Old Left contention over the New Right policy and its criticisms, which are mainly political in nature. The first criticism relates to the general argument that the choice and competition of neo-liberalism have brought about socio-economic dysfunction such as the polarisation of social classes. Neo-liberal strategies yield benefit for middle-class students and disadvantage for working-class students — with the consequent running down of social infrastructures, and 'boom and bust' approaches to economic management in the 1980s (except for Lawson's 1987 budget).

The second criticism is that the marketisation of education, as Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder argue, will have 'an inverse effect on the ability of nation states to compete in the global auction for quality inward investment, technology, and jobs'. The reason, according to Brown and Lauder, is that the New Right strategy's attempt to increase the supply of advanced skills and knowledge for the global economy will not produce a high-skill and high wage economy nor develop economic productivity and prosperity. This point regarding the weakness in
New Right strategy could be understood as a casual factor of an ideological shift towards the so-called Third Way which occurred, retaining a part of New Right logic — the correlation between increase in the supply of advanced skills and knowledge and economic competitiveness.

Taking a similar position to Brown and Lauder, James Avis, Martin Bloomer, Geoff Esland, Denis Gleeson, and Phil Hodkinson criticise New Right logic on the relation between economic decline and low-skill levels. They argue that education and training cannot bring about a high-skill economy and economic competitiveness. They point to the relations between British post-compulsory education and training policy, and governmental strategies which 'modernise' the British economy and enhance its economic performance in the global economy. They also point to a contradiction in educational reforms implemented by the Conservative Government in respect to two incompatible aims: modernisation of the global economy and the preservation of British culture and values. Esland similarly denies that education and training determine economic conditions, and suggests other important variables, such as investment and finance, which can influence economic competitiveness. Brown and Lauder, criticising the neo-Fordist agenda, conclude that its strategy cannot bring about economic strength and equal opportunity for all. They point to employers' limited incentives to upgrade the quality of their labour force, the limited correlations between skill levels and income, and significance in the clarification of the conceptual difference between full employability and full employment. They also criticise the centre-left modernisers' agenda on the global economy, skill, and education, repudiating the claim that narrowing the inequality of educational opportunities will improve the nation's human resource base. The validity of the criticism of New Right policies requires further research.

In the context of the university sector, there could be a practical problem regarding the application of market philosophy to the university sector. For instance, Graeme Lindsay and Timothy Rodgers point out the practical problem of
the market of higher education — ‘a nested Principal — Agent framework’. This framework is based upon the idea that the taxpayer delegates to their agent, the government, the task of determining what is to be consumed. This practical problem derives from value incongruities between the government (the principal) and the higher education institutions (the agents) which result in different solutions between the two parties. Therefore, the role of the student as consumer is limited rather than dominant.

Giving attention to principle and practice of the New Right (above), this thesis refers to the market in the university sector as a ‘quasi-market’. The definition of the ‘quasi-market’ in this thesis highlights two aspects: the separation of service purchasers and service users, and government involvement in the market. With reference to the school sector, Geoff Whitty observes that the provision of services in the quasi-market is separated from funding. Different providers — regardless of the types of bodies such as public, private and voluntary bodies — compete to deliver the service within this mechanism. In the context of higher education, Gareth Williams emphasises a governmental role. Williams defines the quasi-market as ‘a government agency performing the role of surrogate customer, and purchasing services on behalf of the ultimate consumers, from service suppliers such as hospitals, schools, and universities’.

The quasi-market, according to the definition provided in this thesis, can be understood by locating it on an axis showing the two extreme ideal points of government control and the pure market. The reality of the quasi-market is located between these two extremes. Government policy pertaining to the size of the universities is one indicator of the location of the English version of the quasi-market on this axis; governmental capping of student numbers, and the subsequent removal of this policy imply a change in the balance between government control and the market.

The following sub-sections briefly summarise the market trends in England and Japan argued in Chapter II.
ENGLAND
The English version of the quasi-market was created in 1988 (as argued in 2.2.3.3), and has partially been conditioned by government funding policy in the area of undergraduate student enrolment and research. The government's involvement in the quasi-market is regular, and exerts influence on individual universities. In this type of quasi-market, efficiency and equity can be made compatible by withdrawing student maintenance and concomitantly offering special funds for widening access.

JAPAN
The Japanese version of the quasi-market is understood (as argued in 2.4.3), not as the government's creation of the quasi-market, but as government conditioning of the quasi-market. This government conditioning is apparent in two areas: the government's legislation on student enrolment; and government financial incentives in the area of research. The government's involvement in the quasi-market is irregular, and exerts influence notably on private universities. In the Japanese quasi-market, efficiency and equity are compatible through the segregation of functions between national and private universities.

3.3.2 NEW MANAGERIALISM
Managerialism can be conceptualised in the context of academic control and lay control. These two types of control closely relate to the continuum of 'private and public definitions'. The principle and method of academic control are both derived from academic definition, focusing on self-management of individual universities, while lay control is, to some extent, influenced by public definition, including government ideology. In this respect, academic control is conceptually located closer to institutional autonomy and administrative autonomy on the continuum. Academic control protects self-governance and self-management of the universities from external pressure and insulates the university sector against
external values. Lay control is, in contrast, more associated with the value of external stakeholders. Lay control, relating to the ideology of central authorities, implies a change in power relationships between central authorities and the universities.

On the basis of this conceptual framework, this section argues that in England, managerial culture in the pre-1992 universities has changed from 'English collegialism', based upon private definition, to 'English new managerialism', based upon public definition. Managerial culture in post-1992 universities has changed from, what this thesis calls, 'English bureaucratic managerialism', based upon public definition, to 'English new managerialism'.

The 'English collegialism' of the pre-1992 universities is, as defined in this thesis, the form of management and governance which is embedded in informal, minimally hierarchical, and trust-based collegial relationships and self-governing academic communities. 'English collegialism' minimises external influence, insulating the academic community from external stakeholders. In reference to the aforementioned continuum on private definition versus public definition in the section of university autonomy, English collegialism is conceptually located closer to private definition.

'English new managerialism' is, as defined in this thesis, the form of management and governance based upon formal, hierarchical, and minimally trusting relationships. 'English new managerialism' emphasises accountability to external stakeholders in the university sector. The change in managerial culture is related to the increase in number of lay members in the governing bodies and the growth in total managerial and administrative work, and the empowerment of vice-chancellors. English new managerialism is conceptually located closer to public definition, functioning as an ideology of government rather than an ideology of the universities, which implies an increasing power of government over the universities.
The thesis defines ‘English bureaucratic managerialism’ as the form of management and governance based upon formal, hierarchical, and bureaucratic relationships, with the Local Educational Authorities (LEAs) in direct control. This is conceptually located closer to public definition than ‘English new managerialism’ on the continuum. The reason for the particular locations of the two types of managerialism is based upon the direct control of the LEA on former polytechnics in ‘English bureaucratic managerialism’, in comparison with the contractual relationship between government and the universities in ‘English new managerialism’.

In contrast, in Japan, managerial culture in national universities has changed from ‘Japanese collegialism’ to ‘Japanese new managerialism’. This change does not indicate a shift from academic to public definition because of the compatibility of private and public definitions in both ‘Japanese collegialism’ and ‘Japanese new managerialism’. Managerial culture in private universities has not significantly changed; it retains the characteristics of ‘Japanese managerialism’ based upon public definition.255

The thesis defines ‘Japanese collegialism’ as the form of management and governance embedded in conceptually contradictory power orientations between Ministerial control and collegial relationships based upon informality, the lack of hierarchy, and trust. Collegial relationships relate to the self-government of the faculty committees on the basis of department autonomy. The confrontation of the two powers — Ministerial control and self-government based upon collegiality — is not explicitly observed, with the locus of power positioned in different areas. Japanese collegialism is positioned between private and public definitions in the continuum because of the influence from both private and public definitions.

‘Japanese new managerialism’ is the form of management and governance which is based upon formal, hierarchical, and minimally trusting relationships. ‘Japanese new managerialism’ emphasises accountability to both the Ministry and society as a whole. Japanese new managerialism is conceptually located closer to
public definition, which is the ideology of the central authority which relates to efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and accountability.

‘Japanese managerialism’ of private universities is, in the definition of this thesis, a form of management and governance based upon formal, hierarchical, and minimally trusting relationships. ‘Japanese managerialism’ emphasises accountability to the community by incorporating lay members in the boards of directors of educational foundations (rijikai) and the boards of trustees (hyogikai). Public definition in ‘Japanese managerialism’ is on the basis of individual or community interests rather than those of central or local governments. Japanese managerialism in private universities is conceptually located closer to public definition.

‘Japanese managerialism’ is located in approximately the same position to ‘Japanese new managerialism’ on the continuum for the two following reasons. The first is the lack of decisive indicators to measure the balance of private and public definitions. The second is that the significant difference between ‘Japanese managerialism’ and ‘Japanese new managerialism’ could be based on the different types of stakeholders — individual and communities in Japanese managerialism and the Ministry in Japanese new managerialism — rather than the difference in the balance between private and public definitions. The difference between ‘Japanese collegialism’ and ‘Japanese managerialism’ or ‘Japanese new managerialism’ in terms of the balance between private and public definitions is clear: ‘Japanese collegialism’ is located closer to private definition than ‘Japanese managerialism’ or ‘Japanese new managerialism’ because of the minimal emphasis on accountability to the MESSC and society as a whole.

This section emphasises both management and governance for two reasons. One is that the change in the balance of private and public definitions is observed in areas of both management and governance, which are intimately connected at the practical level. The other is that management and governance are often used interchangeably, both terminologically and conceptually, in official documentation.
in both England and Japan. Such documentation in the English context includes the 1985 Jarratt Report.\textsuperscript{256} Documentation in Japan includes the 1995 University Council Report, \textit{Daigaku Unei no Enkatsuka ni tsuite} [Facilitation of University Management], and the 1998 University Council Report, \textit{21 Seiki no Daigakuzou to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyosoteki Kankyo no nakade Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku} [Universities in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century and Their Reform and Strategy: Universities with Unique Character in the Competitive Environment].\textsuperscript{257}

This section does not use the term, 'New Public Management' (NPM);\textsuperscript{258} ‘new managerialism’ is used in order to avoid confusion, although NPM and new managerialism are often used interchangeably in the literature. Furthermore, the section does not emphasise ‘commercial management’ (in Catherine Bargh, Peter Scott, and David Smith’s use of the term) – the adaptation of private sector management styles (e.g. post-Fordist management) in the public sector.\textsuperscript{259} Rather it gives attention to ‘executive management’, which focuses on the concept of accountability and effective decision-making in the universities.\textsuperscript{260} The reason for this attention rests on the assumption that executive management is not only an issue in official documentation in England and Japan, but that it is also closely related to the power relationships between central authorities and the universities, which is the focus of this thesis.

The next sub-section examines new managerialism in England.

\textbf{ENGLAND}

This section argues that in England, the emphasis within managerial culture has changed from ‘English collegialism’ to ‘English new managerialism’ in pre-1992 universities, retaining the characteristics of ‘English collegialism’ to a large extent, and from ‘English bureaucratic managerialism’ to ‘English new managerialism’ in post-1992 universities. This change can be interpreted as an increasing influence of government ideology in both pre- and post-1992 universities.
‘English collegialism’ of pre-1992 universities was characterised by: (1) management based upon ‘private definition’; and (2) the domination of academics in the decision-making body in individual universities. The two above characteristics were interrelated, reinforcing the ideology and power of individual universities. Firstly, collegiality-based management was embedded in informal and minimal hierarchical relationships in the academic community, on the basis of trust. ‘Collegialism’ was, according to Rosemary Deem, characterised as ‘minimal hierarchy and maximum trust’ on the basis of professional autonomy. Catherine Bargh, Peter Scott and David Smith, taking a similar position to Deem’s, emphasise the aspect of discipline and peers in the concept of ‘collegialism’, using the terms ‘professional value’ or ‘universities as communities of scholars’. Ted Tapper and David Palfreyman regard self-governing bodies of scholars as characteristic of collegiality. Martin Trow, emphasising the value of academic communities, identifies the traditional type of managerialism, ‘soft managerialism’ (in his original term), in that the academic community itself determines the norms and traditions for managerial effectiveness which aims at high quality provision at lowest cost. Maurice Kogan, giving attention to the area of governance, defines collegium as ‘a group of academics of equal decision-making power acting together to determine standards of entry and accreditation, to share collective resources, and to determine divisions of labour and reward systems’.

Secondly, the locus of power in the collegial form of pre-1992 universities was in the senate, which was dominated by academics; in the civic universities, the power of departments, which were headed by professors, was also significant. The proportion of academic members to lay members in the governing body suggests the considerable self-governing power of academics.

The changed context, which included massification, marketisation, the decline of public expenditure on the university sector, and increasing government control as well as increasing criticism of professional power and quality since
the 1980s suggests a change in the traditional collegial-based management and governance supporting collegiality. Bargh, Scott, and Smith, for example, identify, as reasons for the emergence of new managerial culture, the pressure of massification and marketisation, as well as the debate on the legitimacy of new universities and the responsibilities of university councils and governing bodies.  

Maurice Kogan emphasises the decline of public finance as a major reason for the change in managerial culture. From the aspect of government control, Deem stresses, as reasons for managerial change, the government’s attempt to impose tighter monitoring and auditing as the result of public funding constraints and the issue of quality in the universities, as well as criticism of professional power. Similarly, Tapper and Palfreyman relate the change of collegiality to increasing government control (e.g. RAEs) and financial constraints, which have consequently brought about the discourse of cost-effectiveness. Focusing on agencies, Martin Trow points out the intention of funding agencies as well as the departments, to improve quality and lower unit costs, as major reasons for the rise of new managerial culture.

The timing of the change in governance in which academic self-government was challenged was, according to Bargh, Scott, and Smith, between 1981 (when a budget-cut occurred) and 1985 (the year of publication of the Jarratt Report) for the pre-1992 universities. The timing for the post-1992 universities was between 1983 (creation of the National Advisory Body) and 1988 (by which time universities were free from control by the LEA). For the pre-1992 universities, the ‘collegial’ form, which emerged between the two world wars in association with the establishment of academic guilds and intensified after 1945, has gradually shifted to a new form: a combination of new managerialism and collegialism. The change in the organisational culture of post-1992 universities has been more dramatic than in pre-1992 universities. This suggests that the impact of the introduction of new managerialism has been more dynamic in post-1992 universities than in pre-1992 universities.
‘English new managerialism’ has four-fold characteristics: (1) bureaucratic and hierarchical management, with an absence of trust; (2) the changing nature of governing bodies to being accountable bodies to external stakeholders; (3) the emphasis on the role of vice-chancellors, stressing accountability and cost-effectiveness; and (4) the effort of institutions as a whole to improve cost-effectiveness and efficiency, which has been influenced by public funding constraints. First, ‘English new managerialism’ can be characterised as hierarchical and bureaucratic management on the basis of an absence of trust in relation to government, as Bargh, Scott, and Smith, and Deem argue. Martin Trow, for example, argues that management in the UK universities changed from soft managerialism to hard managerialism as a result of a withdrawal of trust between government and the universities and the introduction of the criteria of performance and rules for accountability by government. The locus of power in hard managerialism is, according to Trow, outside the academic community; it resides in governments and the business sector which attempt to introduce management systems for accountability, quality, and efficiency by imposing funding and accountability mechanisms.

In contrast to the pre-1992 universities, for most of the post-1992 universities the traditional form was bureaucratic and hierarchical, ruled by the LEAs, and influenced by central government in the area of quality control through the HMI and the CNAA. There were no academic boards in polytechnics which were analogous to pre-1992 universities at least until the mid-1960s. The thesis refers to this type of management as ‘English bureaucratic managerialism’.

The bureaucratic form has shifted to a more collegial form as well as an increasing administrative autonomy by a removal of hierarchical and rule-bound bodies as a result of opting-out from the LEA in 1988 and a change in governance framework in accordance with 1988 Education Reform Act and 1992 Further and Higher Education Reform Act. The abolishment of external regulation by the HMI and the CNAA provide other testimony of the change towards a more
collegial form in respect of quality assessment. This is not to suggest that post-1992 universities enjoy the same collegial form which pre-1992 universities had previously. The introduction of quality audit of HEQC and quality assessment of HEFCE in 1992 [later the QAA] suggest a less collegial form in the post-1992 universities in comparison to that of the pre-1992 universities. In addition, the strengthening power of the Secretary of State for Education suggests a limitation of collegiality.

Secondly, the increasing number of lay members in the governing bodies of pre-1992 universities, which were hitherto dominated by academic members, suggests a declining influence of 'private definition' through academic staff and an increasing influence of 'public definition' except in the case of Oxbridge (the 'Hebdomadal Council' in Oxford University and 'Council of the Senate' in Cambridge University do not include any lay members). The councils in pre-1992 universities (except for Oxbridge) — the executive governing bodies responsible for finance, investments, management of the university estate and buildings, and the oversight of teaching and research — consist of both academic and lay members. Academic members include staff and student representatives. The appointment of lay members is made by the Court of individual universities, local authorities, or the Council itself. According to Kogan, the increase in lay members has been accompanied by an increase in the total managerial and administrative work at institutional and intra-institutional levels.

The influence of lay members and the minimal impact of academic members in post-1992 universities are more explicit than that in pre-1992 universities, since the majority of the governing body are lay members. The 1988 Education Reform Act stipulates that the majority of boards of governors should be independent members who are not members of staff or students of the institution or elected members of a local authority. The membership of the majority of boards of governors is limited to a maximum of 24 and a minimum of 12 approved by the Secretary of State for Education. The background of
independent members, which is suggested in this Act, includes experience and capacity in industrial, commercial, or employment matters, or the practice of a profession. The governing bodies are not required to include staff and student representatives.

Thirdly, the empowerment of vice-chancellors suggests an increasing influence of government discourse including accountability, cost-effectiveness, and efficiency. David Smith, Peter Scott, Jean Bocock, and Catherine Bargh's empirical study supports the argument that the role of vice-chancellors has changed towards a more managerial role as a result of a decline in 'donnish collegiality', although collegiality is retained at the operational level. Their main findings include four points. The first is an increased general expectation about vice-chancellors' managerial experience. The second is the prevalent view that the new managerial role of vice-chancellors is contingent. The third is the significance of the attachment to collegiality to retain the confidence of academics. The fourth is the prevalent view that accomplishment of the precarious role of vice-chancellors depends upon effective working relationships across the two domains of governance and management. In addition to Smith, Scott, Bocock, and Bargh's findings, the fact that vice-chancellors are not selected or elected from the professors of the universities is also suggestive of 'public definition'. That is, the role of vice-chancellors is not embedded in 'private definition' or collegiality, but rather 'public definition', acting as executive leaders rather than representatives of the academics.

Fourthly, a reform or change in governance, management, and leadership tends to be linked to financial issues (including efficiency and cost-effectiveness). This point is related to the casual relations between the rise of new managerialism and public financial constraints.

The relations between 'new managerialism' and traditional 'collegialism' are not simple in reality. Henry Millar interprets that the rise of New Public Management has eroded 'English collegialism'. In contrast, Kogan argues that
collegialism and New Public Management are compatible, suggesting that New Public Management does not replace or subordinate collegiality. Deem, in the context of a gender study, identifies a considerable degree of hybridisation between old and new managerialism, highlighting the tension between the logic of managerial control and the convention of professional autonomy, in which female managers tend to use soft management, while male managers use hard management. Tapper and Palfreyman argue that a collegial tradition concomitantly continues within particular layers and segments of institutions such as research teams, departments, and faculty members, although managerial culture and entrepreneurialism in departments and faculties which have resulted from increasing state control might cause tensions with collegiality.

This point – the erosion of collegialism, to some degree, and the continuity of collegiality to a significant degree – is supported by Bargh, Scott, and Smith’s empirical research. The evidence in their study includes the pattern of governance retained in the traditional mode in practice; the process of the recruitment of new managers which largely relies upon informal networks among existing members; and the behaviours of governors who tend to play both passive and reactive roles.

The aforementioned different balance of academic and lay members between pre-1992 universities and post-1992 universities suggests that the balance between collegialism and new managerialism differs between them. Pre-1992 universities still emphasise collegialism more than post-1992 universities.

‘English new managerialism’ of pre- and post-1992 universities in relation to the government and university nexus can be understood in the context of two opposing directions in the change of power. One is the increase in government control and the influence of government ideology relating to accountability, cost-effectiveness, and efficiency. The other is the empowerment of institutions as a whole; as suggested for example, by the empowerment of vice-chancellors. Berit Askling identifies both central regulations and devolution of authority as being
relevant in this regard. Askling, focusing on the role of the intermediary bodies, argues that quality assurance has changed institutional behaviour in two ways by strengthening the power of the institutions and influencing the criteria by which academics are judged and make judgement.

The power duality between government and the universities, and the aforementioned ideological orientation — government ideology — in 'new managerialism' suggest a change in power orientation and ideology in 'new managerialism'. The change is related to the increase in the power of the institutions, while the traditional collegial based value of the universities has eroded to some extent. This can be explained by two factors relating to the political and academic cultural context: (1) change in the nature of individual universities; and (2) change in the pattern of government control. First, the nature of individual universities has become more 'entrepreneurial', which is the idea derived from the organisational model, taking the universities as organisations. Bargh, Scott and Smith identify the shift of organisational culture in the universities towards the entrepreneurial in which the university functions as a 'living organism', undertaking 'a continuous process of adaptation and change'. The tensions and contradictions between the collegial and the bureaucratic are, in Bargh, Scott and Smith’s entrepreneurial view, less explicit; they have identified a recent trend relating to increasing government control and marketisation which are conceptually integrated in entrepreneurial universities.

Secondly, the pattern of government control has changed; it can be understood in a set of concepts of government control such as 'surveillance' and Neave’s Evaluative State. These concepts emphasise the value of efficiency, related to the recent trend of government control and regulation such as output, performance based budget, and quality control through the setting of government targets [see 2.4.1].

The same stance on this interpretation is taken by Catherine Bargh, Peter Scott, David Smith, J. Marceau, and Ivar Bleiklie, in the specific context of New
Labour's policies, and by Ross Fergusson. Bargh, Scott, and Smith argue that the rise of new managerialism, in which governance shifts from the 'dignified' to the 'efficient', increases the importance of the role of governing bodies by emphasising a monitoring or surveillance role, and therefore, relates to government 'distance steering'. They argue that effective governance tends to depend more on interpersonal and informal relationships rather than constitutional and structural arrangements, criticising new managerialism, in which the goals and framework of institutional action are defined by government which use funding methodology.

Marceau emphasises the universities' autonomy, entrepreneurial management, and the government's indirect, incentive-based policies of 'steering at a distance'. The common features of the Evaluative State and New Public Management identified by Bleiklie are useful in the English context, although his research is confined to the Norwegian context. Those features include the emphasis on universities monitoring and managing their own activities, the introduction of explicit standards and measures of performance, and greater stress on output controls. On the basis of these shared concepts between Evaluative State and New Public Management, he concludes that corporate management ideas of New Public Management are the appropriate form of organisation in the 'evaluative state'. Fergusson, linking managerialism and New Labour's modernisation agenda, argues that New Labour, in comparison with the New Right, is more managerialist as well as more interventionist by focusing on targets and benchmarks rather than simply providing comparisons with other institutions.

This section argued that in England, managerial culture has changed from a collegial to a bureaucratic and hierarchical basis. A common change in governance, management, and leadership is also observed in the Japanese context, as evidenced in the next section.
This sub-section argues that the emphasis on managerial culture in national universities has changed from 'Japanese collegialism' to 'Japanese new managerialism' by the erosion of 'Japanese collegialism'. In contrast, change in managerial culture is not observed in private universities, which suggests the continuity of 'Japanese managerialism'.

'Japanese collegialism' has two-fold characteristics: the principle of department autonomy (gakubu jichi); and the influential power of the MESSC. The first is 'minimal hierarchy and maximum trust', which are derived from 'academic value' and department autonomy. 'Japanese collegialism' insulates individual universities against external values in particular areas. Such areas include academic personnel (except for the appointment of the presidents of universities), curricula (except for credit calculation methods and the total number of credits for the awards), research plans on the administration of facilities, and arguably financial allocation (in principle). In respect to governance, the collegial power in Japanese national universities resides in faculty committees (kyojyukai) under the principle of department autonomy (gakubu jichi). The power of the faculty committees is observed in decisions on the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of faculty members, on the curriculum, and on student affairs (entrance, dropout, and graduation). The power of faculty committees suggests a degree of department autonomy and the strength of 'private definition'.

The second characteristic, the influential power of the MESSC, conceptually contradicts the first characteristics of department autonomy, in respect to its hierarchical nature, and the absence of trust. At the operational level, department autonomy and the power of central bureaucracy are not in conflict because of the different loci of power. The areas which the MESSC influences include the appointment of university presidents and administrative personnel, and funding allocation.
'Japanese collegialism' differs from 'English collegialism' in respect to the influence from the MESSC. The power of the MESSC can be observed in the following areas: administrative personnel (appointment of the director-general of the administrative bureau by the MESSC); funding allocation; credit calculation for curriculum (e.g. the total number of credits for the awards, and credit calculation methods on the basis of the division of general and specialised education); and the duration of study.

The failure of the implementation of the policy on the inclusion of lay members in university governance since 1948 suggests the power of the academic community. The failure of the 1948 blueprint 'Ad Hoc University Law', the implementation of the 1951 Bill 'Governance on the National Universities', the 1962 CCE Report, and the 1971 CCE Report are testimony to this argument. The blueprint 'Ad Hoc University Law' (Daigaku-ho Shian Yoko) regarding university governance, which was released by the Ministry of Education in 1948 was not implemented due to the rejection by the universities. The 1951 Bill 'Governance on the National Universities' included the establishment of the 'National University Council' and a review of the role of senates, faculty committees, university presidents, and deans of departments. This bill was not passed because of resistance by the universities. The recommendations of the 1962 CCE Report include the increase of power of university presidents, the restriction of the power of the faculty committees, the establishment of the position of vice-president, and the establishment of the university council. These recommendations were not implemented because of the rejection of the Association of National University Presidents (Kokudaikyo). The recommendations of the 1971 CCE Report include the increase of power of university presidents and vice presidents, the inclusion of lay members on selection panels for recruiting university staff, and the reform of the status of national universities (e.g., the corporatisation of national universities, or reform in university governance).
In private universities, 'Japanese managerialism' has been characterised by the significant influence of lay members in the boards of directors of educational foundations (rijikai) and the board of trustees (hyogikai). 'Japanese managerialism' is conceptually located closer to public definition. The positioning should not be perceived in terms of the influence of ideologies of central or local government, but rather in the pursuit of individuals or clusters of stakeholders (e.g. a particular community).

There is insufficient evidence to suggest that 'Japanese managerialism' is totally incompatible with the existence of the collegial form in private universities. Private universities, sharing the characteristics of 'collegialism' in national universities in respect of 'minimal hierarchy and maximum trust' and the emphasis on 'private definition', concomitantly take the collegial form. The locus of power is located in faculty committees, which consist of individual faculties and institutes in the areas of faculty appointments, curriculum making, student affairs, and research plans. The significance of 'collegialism' in private universities can be interpreted in relation to lay control in the boards of directors of education foundations and internal consensus based decision making rather than the relation with the MESSC.

The organisational culture of national universities has been changing as the result of the rise of 'Japanese new managerialism', which is intimately related to the debate on the corporatisation of the national universities.

The significance of the change towards 'Japanese new managerialism' is not in managerial culture and tension between academic and lay members or collegialism and managerialism. This is due to the fact that the 'hierarchical and bureaucratic' characteristics of 'new managerialism' as well as the influence of 'public definition' are not new in Japan. In addition, the rise of 'new managerialism' is not related to the balance of academic and lay members in governing bodies, rather it relates to: (1) the expansion of power of the administrative bureau; and (2) the centralisation of institutional power in.
individual universities by a shift in the locus of power from diversified faculties or faculty committees to university presidents.

With regard to (1), the expansion of power of the administrative bureau suggests minimal erosion of collegial culture by growing managerialism in the administrative bureau rather than the areas which directly influence collegial culture (e.g. governing bodies). Evidence for this expansion include the growth in total managerial and administrative work, and the empowerment of the director-general of the administrative bureau, who is appointed by the education minister.

This change in the administrative bureau, in respect of the balance between academic and lay members, suggests that the relations between 'Japanese new managerialism' and 'Japanese collegialism' do not necessarily entail a significant erosion of the collegial culture because there has been an increased power of lay members in the administrative bureau (this trend has not however occurred in the governing bodies including council and senate\textsuperscript{324}). From the empirical point of view, Takekazu Ebara's research suggests a continuity of collegial culture as well as administrative autonomy in national universities, despite rigorous bureaucratic control and regulation [see 2.4.1].\textsuperscript{325}

The policy context supports this argument, implying collaboration between academic and lay power, or 'collegialism' and 'managerialism', rather than confrontation between the two: the recommendations in the 1995 and 1998 University Council Reports seek a collaborative relationship between academic and lay members as the result of the extension of power of the administrative bureau.\textsuperscript{326}

With regard to (2) – the centralisation of institutional power in individual universities – this has occurred as a result of the empowerment of university presidents, a reduction in the power of the faculties, and arguably the decline of department autonomy. [The 1994, 1995 and 1998 University Council Reports recommended increasing the power of university presidents and senate, and reducing the power of the deans of departments and research institutions.\textsuperscript{327}] The
MESSC started to subsidise special funds for the leadership of university presidents (Gakucho Sairyo Keihi) in the 1990s. The MESSC, in relation to the corporatisation of national universities, proposes a change in the appointment system of university presidents: they should be selected by a senate (or informally elected by academic staff and appointed by a senate) and then appointed by the ministry. 328

There are two plausible interpretations for the relations between ‘Japanese new managerialism’ and the power relationships between government and the universities: increasing central regulation and devolution of authority. The first interpretation – an increase in the influence of the central authority – is due to the empowerment of the administrative bureau, following the statutory power of the education minister to appoint the director-general of the administrative bureau. This interpretation, however, faces counter-evidence: the government partial deregulation policy observed in the area of curriculum which removed regulation in curriculum calculation in 1991. The second interpretation – the devolution of authority – comes about through the increase of the power of an institution as a whole, mainly as a result of the empowerment of university presidents.

Arguably, there is a measure of truth in both interpretations although there is not enough empirical data to endorse either interpretation since the change in organisational culture is a recent phenomenon and policy.

In contrast to national universities, change in the organisational culture of private universities has only been observed at the policy level; the 1988 University Council Report recommends that governance in private universities should be reviewed to achieve greater efficiency. 329

The argument, derived from the concept of New Public Management, provides an interpretative framework of two opposing ideological implications of ‘new managerialism’, highlighting two different types of university systems: centralised and de-centralised systems. Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney argue that the New Public Management approach is more influential within the
centralised university system since the power relationships between the governments and the universities shift towards decentralisation. The application of this argument in the context of national universities in Japan is restricted since there is no convincing evidence of a diminution of state control, decentralisation, and devolution in the centralised university system in Japan.

This section argued that managerial culture in the pre-1992 universities in England and the national universities in Japan has commonly changed from collegialism to new managerialism. However, the balance between private and public definitions observed in new managerialism differs between England and Japan.

3.3.3 UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY

Some argue that the concept of university autonomy has no watertight definition; its definition is determined by the context in which it is used. Guy Neave, for example, defines university autonomy as 'contextually and politically defined'. Similarly, for Brian Salter and Ted Tapper, the definition of university autonomy is not fixed; it is relative and changes over time.

This thesis, however, identifies a matrix of concepts relating to university autonomy in the university sectors in England and Japan, while noting the contextual nature of university autonomy. The section, thus, first provides a general definition of university autonomy, and then outlines different characteristics of university autonomy in England and Japan.

The general concept of university autonomy applied across various university settings can be located in the two contrasting concepts of 'private definition' and 'public definition'. These two concepts can be understood by locating them on a continuum. 'Private definition', at one end of the continuum, refers to the purposes and functions of the universities which the universities determine by themselves. Central to 'private definition' is self-determination of the universities. 'Private definition', therefore, closely relates to 'institutional
autonomy' in respect of the loci of power in individual institutions. The historical evidence on interrelations between 'institutional autonomy' and 'academic freedom' suggests that 'academic value' also links conceptually and practically to 'academic freedom'. According to Guy Neave and Frans van Vught, this refers to the freedom of the academic scholar to pursue truth in teaching and research activities without fear of punishment from political, religious or social orthodoxy.

'Public definition', at the other end of the continuum, refers to the purposes and functions of the universities which external stakeholders determine. 'Public definition' includes the economic role and functions such as the response of the universities to changes in the global economy as well as the social and cultural roles of the universities. Central to 'public definition' is the influence of external stakeholders on the universities. 'Public definition', therefore, closely relates to ideologies of the external stakeholders such as government, community, and interest and pressure groups in society as a whole. 'Public definition' often derives from the ideology of government.

This section argues that in England, university autonomy has been redefined from 'traditional English university autonomy' to, what this thesis calls, 'contractual English university autonomy'. 'Traditional English university autonomy' is, in the definition of this thesis, the self-determination of the universities in which a funding council – the UGC – insulates universities from government pressure, functioning as a 'buffer'. The relationship between government and the universities in 'traditional English university autonomy' is not stipulated in legislation. 'Traditional English university autonomy' was an ideology of the pre-1992 universities which highlighted their roles, purposes and functions as these were determined by themselves, and were opposed to utilitarian values. 'Traditional English university autonomy' is conceptually located closer than 'contractual English university autonomy' to 'private definition' on the continuum. This ideology functioned to protect self-governance of the pre-1992
universities from external pressure and to insulate the university sector against external values. 'Traditional English university autonomy' is not applicable to the then polytechnics since they were directly controlled by LEAs until the 1988 Education Reform Act; therefore, polytechnics were influenced by 'public definition', in this case, that of the LEAs.

In contrast, 'contractual English university autonomy' highlights public value, in particular in relation to government ideology. 'Contractual English university autonomy' is, as defined in this thesis, the self-determination of the universities as confined by contractual relationships with government agencies which are empowered to exert their control and pressures on the universities. The funding councils – the UFC, and later the HEFCE – therefore, functions not as a 'buffer' but as a government agency. 'Contractual English university autonomy' is compatible with the utilitarian values in the university system. The change, therefore, relates to the shift in the balance between 'private definition' and 'public definition', in the focus on principle to that on practice, and in the power relationships between government and the universities. The function of 'contractual English university autonomy' is, therefore, to justify government 'product control' [over the universities, incorporate discourse and ideologies of government in the university sector, and change power relationships between government and the universities. 'Contractual English university autonomy' is, therefore, conceptually located closer to 'public definition'.

In contrast, this section argues that university autonomy in Japanese national universities has been redefined from 'Japanese faculty autonomy' to 'Japanese institutional autonomy'. This change is not necessarily interpreted as the shift from academic to public values because of the compatibility of academic and public values in both 'Japanese faculty autonomy' and 'Japanese institutional autonomy'. This shift, as argued later, can be understood in the context of the change in power relationships within an institution and that between the Ministry and the universities.
'Japanese faculty autonomy' is, in the definition of this thesis, the self-determination of the universities whose power is embedded in faculty committees — on the basis of the notion of 'department autonomy' (gakubu jichi) — rather than the power of an institution as whole. The universities based upon 'Japanese faculty autonomy' are not understood in relation to insulation from government pressure, but rather Ministerial control and regulation. 'Japanese faculty autonomy' is related to both 'private definition' and 'public definition' in two ways; these particular relations between 'private definition' and 'public definition' could be viewed as a main factor limiting visible conflict between 'private and public definitions' in Japan. The first is that 'private definition' could be observed in principle, while 'public definition' was manifest in practice of government control, so that tension between 'private definition' and 'public definition' was not observed, at least openly. The second is that 'private and public definitions' were observed in different areas. 'Private definition' was, and still remains in relation to university empowerment, observed in the decision of appointment, promotion, curriculum, the management of student affairs for faculty committees, and dismissal of faculties. In contrast, 'public definition' was, and still remains in relation to Ministerial empowerment, observed in the appointment of the university presidents and administrative personnel, and funding allocation.

'Japanese faculty autonomy' was not an ideology used by an institution as a whole, but rather by the faculty committee (kyojukai), a governing body of the faculty. 'Japanese faculty autonomy' was located between 'public definition' and 'public definition' on the aforementioned continuum because of influence from both 'private and public definitions'.

'Japanese institutional autonomy', like 'Japanese faculty autonomy', is related to both 'private definition' and 'public definition'. 'Japanese institutional autonomy' is, as defined in this thesis, the self-determination of the universities based upon the leadership of university presidents rather than the power of faculty committees. In 'Japanese institutional autonomy', the Ministerial and university
relationship is based upon the legislative framework. ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ highlights the increase in ‘product control’ by government and the emphasis on institutional management and governance as strategies for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Therefore, the change from ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ to ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ cannot be understood in relation to the change in the balance between ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’. The change has related to power relationships both within individual universities from faculty committee to the president of the universities and between the Ministry and the universities. ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ and ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ are located in the same position.

‘Contractual English university autonomy’, ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ and ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ share common characteristics in respect to the significance of ‘public definition’ with its emphasis on accountability and government ideology and policy. ‘Contractual English university autonomy’, ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’, and ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ are located in the point of the continuum closer to public definition. ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ is located closer to public value than is ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ because of the emphasis on accountability, the roles of lay members, and new managerialism in ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’. This thesis does not aim to compare the different degrees of ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’ between the two university systems – ‘contractual English university autonomy’ and ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ / ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ – but rather, it compares different characteristics relating to university autonomy.

The function of ideology, as argued in the next sub-section, differs between ‘contractual English university autonomy’ and ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ / ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’. ‘Contractual English university autonomy’ functions to change the power relationships between government and the universities, while ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ and ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ do not function in the same way. ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’
highlights the mode of government control rather than the justification of government control.

The next sub-section gives attention to the differing emphases on ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’ between England and Japan, between old and new universities in England, and between national and private universities in Japan. The ‘private definition’ of the university sector is more strongly emphasised in England than in Japan. In the English university setting, pre-1992 universities enjoyed ‘private definition’ to a significantly greater extent in particular before the mid-1980s than did post-1992 universities, although the situation has changed drastically since the 1980s. Within the Japanese university sector, national universities have been less autonomous than private universities, as will be argued below.

ENGLAND

In the English context, ‘traditional English university autonomy’ of the pre-1992 universities can be interpreted in relation to the role and function of the University Grants Committee (UGC).

Peter Scott interprets the role of the UGC as an ‘executive agency’ which was responsible to ministers for planning the development of the university sector between 1945 and 1989, when the UGC was abolished.\(^{337}\) He argues that the period when the UGC functioned as a buffer body insulating the universities from direct intervention by Whitehall was short — between only 1919, when the UGC was established, and 1945.\(^{338}\)

Scott’s view that there was state intervention via the UGC in the university sector before the 1980s is, however, not completely sustainable in two respects. The first is the validity of Scott’s interpretation that the establishment of the binary system\(^{339}\) in higher education was \emph{de facto} the erosion of university autonomy. This ignores an alternative interpretation, which is that it could serve to protect university autonomy by avoiding direct government influence. The second is that
Scott interprets government discourse in that period as if it involved substantial manipulation of the UGC and substantial intervention by government in its functioning. This thesis does not deny that there was government involvement in the university sector during the period. However, it rejects the interpretation that such involvement entailed substantial intervention; rather it was primarily concerned with financial support, at least between 1945 and 1975.

In contrast to Scott's interpretation of the role of the UGC as an 'executive agency', Salter and Tapper, and Neave interpret the UGC as a 'buffer body', which created informal relationships between government and the universities. The UGC, according to them, functioned to insulate the universities from state pressure and economic and utilitarian values, minimise state control, and defend university autonomy. Salter and Tapper illustrate the limited influence of external stakeholders on the UGC, including governments, the Public Accounts Committee, Treasury, and the Department of Education and Science. They believe the change in the nature of the UGC occurred in the 1980s, when the UGC started to function as a 'planning agency' on behalf of the state from the 1980s onwards.

Salter and Tapper argue that traditional university values, which originally consisted of the Christian-Hellenic and liberal traditions, had strong ideological power which could insulate universities from other ideological challenges such as economic ideology, at least until the 1960s. This ideological power of the universities, for example, insulated the university sector from the pressure of governments which attempted to respond to increasing economic demand for scientists, engineers, and technologists in the 1950s.

As mentioned before, Neave, criticising Scott's view of the UGC as an 'executive agency', has offered an alternative interpretation of the role of the UGC as a 'buffer'. The foundation of the UGC, Neave argues, created 'an area of negotiation between state and university' which the universities themselves controlled. This negotiation with government was, Neave identifies, informal
and based upon ‘trust and confidence’, not formal administration or constitution.\textsuperscript{346} These informal relationships between government and the universities are similarly pointed out by Martin Trow.\textsuperscript{347} There was no detailed code of regulation at that time. Even University Charters did not refer (and still do not refer) to the relations between government and the universities, although they did secure university autonomy in principle.\textsuperscript{348}

In the ideological setting, ‘traditional English university autonomy’ is interpreted as the ideology of the universities which was embedded in both institutions and individuals. ‘Traditional English university autonomy’ at the institutional level was, as argued, secured by University Charters, and protected by the collegial style of self-government.\textsuperscript{349} Concrete examples of this type of university autonomy at the institutional level included the discretion to offer rewards and determine their provision and standards. ‘Traditional English university autonomy’ at the individual level was exemplified by tenure.

In contrast to ‘traditional English university autonomy’ which was derived from the institutions themselves, the autonomy of polytechnics was defined by both the LEAs and central government. The latter controlled polytechnics by undertaking quality control of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI), and the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA).

From the 1980s onwards, the increasing governmental control of the universities, as evidenced in Chapter II, and the presence in funding councils of non-academic members\textsuperscript{350} suggests a discontinuity of ‘traditional English university autonomy’ defined in relation to the insulation of the universities from external pressure. The discontinuity of ‘traditional English university autonomy’ can be interpreted in two ways; university autonomy has either declined or has been reformulated.

C. Russell argues that university autonomy has been declining as a result of increasing state intervention in the university sector.\textsuperscript{351} Salter and Tapper, and Neave dispute the claim that university autonomy has declined, arguing instead
that the meaning of university autonomy has been reformulated. Salter and Tapper, for example, identify two changes of ‘traditional university autonomy’: the tight link between institutional and individual autonomy within the British university system in its previous form has been broken; and the reformulation relates to the framework within which the funding councils operate; their parameters of management extend across the universities in the area of finance.

Taking Salter and Tapper’s, and Neave’s position because of the validity of their interpretation as evidenced below, this section identifies reformulated university autonomy and calls it ‘contractual English university autonomy’. ‘Contractual English university autonomy’ can be conceptualised by identifying two characteristics, which contrast to the aforementioned characteristics of ‘traditional English university autonomy’: (1) a shift towards increased ‘public definition’ and (2) a greater focus on the practical and operational dimensions of university autonomy.

(1) A shift towards increased ‘public definition’

The first characteristic relates to the change in the balance between ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’, with a tendency towards increased ‘public definition’ which is explained below by using Neave’s concept, ‘boundary’. Neave redefines university autonomy by introducing this concept, and proposes a new term, ‘conditional autonomy’. The concept of ‘boundary’ highlights the contrast between Neave’s two concepts of the ‘private definition’ of university autonomy or academic norm, and the ‘public definition’ or public norm, and the changes in the balance between the two norms. The ‘boundary’ between the two definitions, according to Neave, has been redefined by the increase in the number of stakeholders, who bear down on decisions about the priorities of academic work made by the ‘community of scholars’ and redefine what is considered ‘legitimate’ academic autonomy:
They do, however, increase the number of stakeholders as well as giving further weight to the view that the university is a public service rather than a community of scholars. And this, in turn, brings about a subtle alteration in the public perception of academic autonomy. It is, in short, defined in terms of a visible public service that is external and sustained to the extent that the academic is willing to perform those public services as laid down by external agencies. On the other hand, such a public definition tends to discount the 'private' definition of academic autonomy held by many of those inside higher education which is the pursuit and development of particular disciplines, not all of which may readily correspond to the basic utilitarianism implied in the former. The private definition is then acceptable only insofar as it falls within the public one.

Neave’s concept of ‘boundary’ is applicable to explain ‘contractual university autonomy’ because the main change in university autonomy can be observed in the balance between ‘public definition’ and ‘private definition’, and consequently in the power relationships between government and the universities. In ‘contractual university autonomy’, the ‘public definition’ of university autonomy increases in relation to the increasing impact of discourse, ideology, and policies of government. This entails the strengthening notion of accountability and subsequently, as Trow argues, the withdrawal of ‘trust and confidence’ relationships between government and the pre-1992 universities in the ‘traditional English university autonomy’ model. Furthermore, the changing balance between ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’ rather than the disappearance of ‘traditional English university autonomy’ suggests a continuity of the traditional sense of university autonomy, although the strength of such university autonomy changes. Examples of existing academic discretion include the form of block grant in the financial mechanism, and the legal status of pre-1992 universities in the Charter. These examples point to a continuity of the ‘traditional English university autonomy’ and ‘contractual English university autonomy’ in the pre-1992 university sector.

Neave defines a new type of university autonomy – ‘conditional university autonomy’ – which has resulted from the above change in the ‘boundary’ between
the 'private definition' and 'public definition' of university autonomy.\textsuperscript{359} The central idea of 'conditional autonomy', which is, according to Neave, applicable to the United Kingdom as well as to the Netherlands and France, is the concept of 're-negotiation' between the external norms of national priorities and the internal norms of academia in individual universities:

Autonomy can be exercised only on condition that the individual institute or department fulfils national or establishment norms which are continually to be renegotiated in the light of public policy. Thus, it is possible for both the British and the Netherlands governments to argue that reinforcement of the controlling framework is not directly antithetical to the exercise of autonomy. Any restriction introduced by individual establishments in response to changed external conditions is, after all, a decision reached by academics \textit{en toute connaissance de cause}.\textsuperscript{360}

Neave's explanation of 'conditional autonomy' signifies the power of academics and their institutions to exercise autonomy, as well as that of government. This is a point of contention in respect to the extent to which the two stakeholders – government and institutions – have power. This point is understood with the second characteristic of university autonomy.

(2) A greater focus on the practical and operational dimensions of university autonomy

The second characteristic of 'contractual English university autonomy' relates to the change in the focus from the conceptual dimension of university autonomy to the practical and operational dimensions, highlighting increasing government regulation and control. Neave's central concept of 're-negotiation' in redefined university autonomy includes a problem in respect to the degree of negotiable power of the universities and the methods of negotiation, although his explanation of the change in 'boundary' between 'private definition' and 'public definition' is (as already observed) applicable to the English context. Li-chuan Chiang, in questioning Neave's 're-negotiation' of the practical aspect of university
autonomy, distinguishes between the principle and the practice of university autonomy. Chiang argues that a new type of university autonomy – ‘contractual autonomy’, the concept having been inspired by Neave⁶¹ – focuses on the dimension of ‘institution’ rather than ‘idea’ (‘institution’ is probably equivalent to the ‘practice’ of university autonomy at the institutions). This line of argument highlights a contrast with ‘traditional autonomy’ in England which operated on the basis of ‘ideal’ or ‘principle’ (e.g. statements on their purpose, mission, and function) rather than ‘institutions’ or ‘practice’.⁶³ Chiang offers further insights into the interpretation of ‘contractual autonomy’: the substantial involvement by government affects both the practice of university autonomy as well as the traditional meaning of university autonomy.

The practical dimension of ‘contractual university autonomy’ relates to the pattern of government control and regulation in England, which includes: the contractual relationships between government and the universities; ‘product control’ (Neave’s concept); and increasing government control. Neave and van Vught argue that ‘procedural autonomy’, which is the power of higher education institutions to determine the means by which they achieve their goals and deliver their programmes, tends to increase when government regulation takes the form of ‘product control’ rather than ‘process control’.⁶⁴ Examples of ‘product control’ include control of the output of qualified graduates, type and level of qualifications, projects completed, publications, and patents taken out.⁶⁵ Examples of ‘process control’ include control of curriculum balance, disciplinary profile and the distribution between disciplines, and duration of studies. It can be interpreted by applying Neave’s argument that ‘procedural autonomy’ is retained in the English case since the increase of government control takes the form of ‘product control’ rather than ‘process control’. University autonomy in the context of government’s ‘product control’ is non-monolithic, conditional on meeting objectives set by the government, and has changing boundaries.⁶⁶
The increasing extent of government control and regulation is apparent in the areas of regulation, finance, and quality control. The restrictions by legislation include the abolition of academic tenure (the Education Reform Act 1988) and empowerment of the Secretary of State over the universities (the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 and the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998). Legislation was not used by government to control the pre-1992 universities before 1988. Examples of government control in the area of finance include the dependency of the universities on public funding, the government funding strategy for the universities, particularly the use of funding memoranda and special funds, and the legal status of the HEFCE (a quasi-governmental organisation). Examples of government control in quality control include the linkage with financial allocation on the basis of the contractual relationships between the HEFCE and the QAA, and externalisation of the function of quality control by introducing detailed methods such as 'codes of practice' and subject benchmark standards.

Autonomy of post-1992 universities has been redefined differently to pre-1992 universities. The balance between 'private definition' and 'public definition' in the post-1992 universities has changed from a greater emphasis on 'public definition' to a blend of 'public definition' and 'private definition' as a result of increased 'private definition', which is close to what the pre-1992 universities have had. This change in the post-1992 universities is strongly related to change in legislation and quality control. Legislative change includes the opting out by polytechnics from control by local authorities in accordance with the 1988 Education Reform Act. Another example of legislative change is the empowerment of former polytechnics to award degrees in their own right following the abolishment of the CNAA and the acquisition of the title of universities in accordance with the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act. The change in the pattern of quality control practice by government from quality control via the CNAA and the HMI to quality audit of HEQC and quality
assessment of the HEFCE in 1992 (later the QAA), suggests a change in the form of university autonomy.

It is worth noting that university autonomy of the post-1992 universities is, in legal status, more restricted than pre-1992 universities, in terms of government control. Most of the post-1992 universities are legally defined by the 1988 Education Reform Act (as amended by the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 and Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998). The Acts stipulated that any Higher Education Corporation, which includes higher education institutions previously maintained by local education authorities, should be managed in accordance with articles of government approved by the Secretary of State. [In contrast, pre-1992 universities are not controlled by the Secretary of State; they are regulated by Charters.]

This section argued that university autonomy in England has been redefined from ‘traditional English university autonomy’ to ‘contractual university autonomy’. The next section discusses the Japanese version of university autonomy and its change.

JAPAN

This section argues that in Japan, the meaning of university autonomy consists of ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’, as in the case of England. However, the ways in which these two values manifest themselves in the university sector differ from the English context.

‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ was embedded in a faculty committee rather than an institution as a whole. ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ had two phases: the pre-war period and the post-war period. The section focuses on the second phase of the post-war period because the latter period is relevant to this thesis. ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ in the second phase was, together with the power of the faculty committee, characterised by minimal tension between ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’ by the division of the two values into two different spheres of
principle and practice. ‘Private definition’ can be observed in principle, while ‘public definition’ is manifest in the practice of government control.

The establishment of ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ relates to a historical incident in 1913, when a decision made by Seitaro Sawayanagi, then president of Kyoto Imperial University, to dismiss seven professors, was disputed and reversed by professors and associated professors at the Law School of Kyoto Imperial University. The staff at the Law School challenged the decision on two grounds, which became the central concepts of ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’. One was that university autonomy resided in faculty committees. The other was the absolute autonomous power of faculty committees, which even university presidents could not challenge. The original concept of the autonomy of faculty committees expanded by applying not only to academic personnel but also in other areas including teaching and research. The concept was also used in the context of the relationships with government, the Ministry, and the Military (before 1945).

‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ based upon faculty committees, in comparison with institutional autonomy, has been marked by two issues: the significant power of small units including chairs or departments; and the absence of strong leadership of university presidents, and consequently the lack of consensus in an institution as a whole.

‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ in the post-war period has been understood in relation to legislation as well as increasing ministerial power. The legislative framework which the state provides is paradoxical in terms of ‘public definition’ and ‘private definition’, and bureaucratic control and university autonomy. The Constitution (Article 23), the ‘Fundamental Law of Education’, the ‘School Education Law’, and the ‘Private School Law’ (in the case of private universities) stipulate that both national and private universities should be protected from governmental intervention in their operation in such areas as teaching and research, and governance and management. The empowered areas in the university sector guaranteed by legislation include academic personnel (except for
university presidents — who are appointed by the education minister) — curriculum content, administration of facilities, pedagogy, and arguably financial allocation. Financial allocation, in practice, is the responsibility of the MESSC.

Concomitantly, both national and private universities in Japan are legally obliged to respond to demand from external stakeholders including government, the economic sector, and society as a whole. The legislation on the status of private universities stipulates that government is to ensure the public role of private universities, legitimising private universities as ‘non-profit school corporations’. It is also entitled to specify the appropriate mechanisms in their structure and management. Private universities, despite being ‘non-profit corporations’ (cf. Civil Law), are allowed to undertake profit-raising programmes to reinforce the financial basis of individual institutions under the Private School Law. Accordingly, the ‘public definition’ of university autonomy has been widely adopted even in legislation.

‘Public definition’ in ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’, in this line of argument, is not conceptually located in an antithetical position to ‘private definition’. Rather ‘private definition’ of university autonomy and ‘public definition’ are located in principle and in practice respectively, so that both types of values are not in tension. University autonomy, according to Motohisa Kaneko, has been emphasised at the level of principle, while state control has been emphasised at the level of practice. Kaneko links this argument to an historical perspective of the relations between the government and the universities, in which government has, on the basis of the utilitarian view, controlled the universities as the part of the political strategy to promote modernisation.

The gap between the principle and practice of university autonomy is apparent in the financial mechanism as well as the aforementioned Article 23 of the Japanese Constitution. The interpretation of Article 23, “academic freedom must be guaranteed”, includes the protection of university governance in the
financial sphere as well as other areas such as personnel, teaching and research, thus insulating the universities from external pressures.\textsuperscript{382}

Nevertheless, in practice, the MESSC distributes public finance in a strategic manner to both public and private sectors of the universities, seeking the improvement of cost-effectiveness.\textsuperscript{383} The MESSC’s strategic fund has increased since the 1980s, despite a decline in the total amount of expenditure on education.\textsuperscript{384} For example, the expenditure on the ‘Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research System’ (the fields of which include humanities, social science, and natural science) increased from 45.1 billion yen in 1987 (3.6 percent of the GDP growth rate) to 112.2 billion yen in 1997 (10.2 percent of the GDP growth rate).\textsuperscript{385}

The different loci of ‘private definition’ in principle and public definition in practice, together with an ambiguous and indefinite notion of university autonomy in the whole university sector, relates to the different functions of national and private universities. Motohisa Kaneko, focusing on the concept of university autonomy in relation to governmental control,\textsuperscript{386} explains the ambiguity in university autonomy in the context of different functions between national and private universities.\textsuperscript{387} Kaneko explains that the main factor in the implicit confrontation between university autonomy and government control has been embedded in the dual functions, which is distinctive in Japanese higher education.\textsuperscript{388} National universities have functioned for modernisation and economic development, while private universities have functioned to meet individual demands for educational opportunity. This dual mechanism, Kaneko argues, has masked the gap between the meanings of university autonomy at principle and practice levels – the legislative guarantee of university autonomy and minimal practice of university autonomy. In Kaneko’s logic, the fact that the separation of functions between national and private universities has not yet been changed (the privatisation of the national universities has not been implemented) suggests that the implicit confrontation between university autonomy and accountability has continued. Ikuo Amano and Masakazu Yano offer a similar
argument in respect of the differentiated socio-economic functions of private and national universities in the context of university expansion.\textsuperscript{389}

On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that there has been a gap between principle and practice in ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’. The definition of ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ has changed since the first half of the 1990s by a reduction in the power of faculty committees and an increase in the power of university presidents. It could be argued that the relations between university autonomy and accountability have changed as a result of the reformulation of the meaning of university autonomy. According to Motohisa Kaneko, the concepts of university autonomy and accountability have not obviously collided in Japanese universities since the establishment of the universities in the pre-war period, because the differentiated functions of the national and private universities have prevented any ideological confrontation between university autonomy and accountability.\textsuperscript{390} The demand for accountability has been met in the public sector — which has functioned to meet the state’s needs — while the private sector functioned primarily for individual and social needs. Kaneko identifies the relations between university autonomy and state control — the concept of which is adjacent to accountability to the state in this context — and argues that the two concepts have only implicitly collided. University autonomy has been emphasised at the level of principle, while state control has been at the level of practice, and linked to the political strategy for modernisation and utilitarian aims.\textsuperscript{391}

Faculty autonomy has changed mainly as a result of two historical incidents: the education reform initiated by the CIE (Civil Information and Education Section) employed by the US Occupational force (1945-1952) and university turmoil involving a student uprising (late 1960s and early 1970s) as well as socio-cultural, economic, and political factors associated with the university reform, since the 1990s. The education reform by the CIE was significant in respect to the change in the definition of ‘Japanese faculty university autonomy’. University autonomy defined by the CIE was based upon two elements.\textsuperscript{392} One was to
empower an institution by reducing the power of the faculty committees and of the education ministry. The other was to legislate university autonomy rather than to continue informal, conventional agreements on university autonomy, which was the case in the pre-war period.

The continuity of 'Japanese faculty university autonomy' as a result of the failure of the implementation of the CIE policy on university autonomy in the post-war period related to the conflict between the CIE and the Japanese universities during the period of Occupation. The abolishment of the 1951 Bill 'Governance on National Universities' — which proposed the empowerment of university presidents — as a result of the resistance of the universities is testimony to the power of the universities.

The student uprisings in the late 1960s had implications for the redefinition of university autonomy in the 1990s. The university turmoil — which resulted in the loss of social confidence in the management competence of the faculty committees — raised the question of traditional university autonomy based upon the autonomy of faculty committees.

From the 1990s onwards, the shift in the pattern of government control, and declining power of faculty committees in institutions as a result of changing internal management and governance suggests a change in the definition of university autonomy. The section calls the new type of university autonomy 'Japanese institutional autonomy'. The absence of 'Japanese faculty autonomy' is not observed, which suggests, to some extent, the continuity of 'Japanese faculty autonomy'. 'Japanese institutional autonomy' has two main characteristics: (1) government's 'product control' and (2) the strength of internal management and governance.

The first characteristic is that 'Japanese institutional autonomy' has partially increased, what Neave and van Vught call 'procedural autonomy', by a changed emphasis in government control from 'process control' to 'product control'. The areas of 'process control' by the MESSC have included curriculum balance
between ‘general education’ (Ippan Kyoyo Katei) and ‘specialist education’ (Senmon Katei), 395 the setting of new courses, and the duration of studies. The bureaucratic control on the balance of curricula – the main element of ‘process control’ – has been removed by the abolition of the previous formula of ‘general education’ and ‘specialist education’ in the 1990s. ‘Product control’, which was not previously emphasised, was accentuated following the introduction of the external evaluation system by the University Evaluation Institution in 2000. 396 The change in the emphasis of government control from ‘process control’ to ‘product control’ suggests a partial increase in ‘procedural autonomy’ and a decline in university autonomy in output. It cannot be simply related to the shift in the areas of university autonomy and the degree of university autonomy.

The second characteristic is the emergence of the new discourse of university ‘self-autonomy’ (syutaisei) and ‘self-determination’ (jisyusei) in the areas of administration, management, and governance. 397 The frequent usage of these terms in university council reports and later in Education White Papers in the 1990s indicates three things. One is that the discourse of self-autonomy and self-determination was originally derived from central authority rather than the universities. Another is that the concepts of self-autonomy and self-determination in those documents are not linked to traditional Japanese university autonomy based upon the power of the faculty. The other is that self-autonomy and self-determination in the policy context tend to be used together with a ministerial institutional governance policy such as the empowerment of the university presidents, administrative bureau, and the decline of faculty power.

The change from ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ to ‘Japanese institutional autonomy’ is not manifest in the balance between ‘private and public definitions’, and the distinctive division between the principle and practice of university autonomy. The continuity of the main characteristic of ‘Japanese faculty autonomy’ – the division of the meanings of university autonomy between principle and practice – is observed in this respect. Therefore, Neave’s concept of
change in ‘boundary’ between ‘private definition’ and ‘public definition’ is not applicable to the Japanese case.

The change in university autonomy is rather observed within the practice of university autonomy by a change in pattern of government control and regulation. This signifies that the implications, in particular in relation to ideologies and power relationships between government and the universities, are not explicit in the Japanese case.

This section argued that the locus of university autonomy in England has changed from academic to public definition, while the change in university autonomy in Japan has not been manifest in the balance between private and public definitions, but within institutions – from faculty autonomy to institutional autonomy. The common shift between private and public definitions is also observed in the areas of governance, management, and leadership. The next section examines vocationalism.

3.3.4 VOCATIONALISM

The new provision of skills, knowledge, and competence at the universities could be understood in the context of the change in labour market and supply-side economy. The ideology of government observed in the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence is associated with high skills policy in relation to the notion of government on the change in demand for skills, knowledge and competence. High skill policy is embedded in the point of view held by upskilling proponents. High skill policy criticises deskilling and polarisation interpretations. It emphasises the response to economic globalisation, economic competitiveness, and the knowledge-based economy. Previous studies concerning changes in skills are mainly categorised into three: deskilling, upskilling, and the polarisation of skills between upskilling and deskilling.

Proponents of deskilling argue that the mechanisation and automation resulting from technological and scientific changes reduce the levels of skill in
non-manual occupations, and undermine the traditional skills of manual occupations. The diffusion of automation makes the content of work into a routine; in the context of management, it enables employers to strictly control employees and allows less discretion to workers.

The proponents of polarisation of skills between upskilling and deskilling synthesise the optimistic and pessimistic views in the deskilling and upskilling debate (that advanced technology brings about higher levels of skills and knowledge). They suggest that the concepts of diversification, complexity, and heterogeneity provide a conceptual apparatus for explaining the current shift in knowledge and skills. Parsons and Marshall, for example, argue that upskilling, deskilling, reskilling, and multiskilling coexist. David Ashton and Francis Green argue for the heterogeneity of skills demanded by employers, those supplied by national institutions, and the actual usage of skills. Michael Rose, Roger Penn, and Jill Rubery, criticising the upskilling and deskilling debate, point out that some workers perceive no change in their level of skill.

The polarisation interpretation relates to the issue of occupational stratification, or more precisely the skill and occupational hierarchy. Duncan Gallies, for example, examines contentious arguments about the patterns according to skill changes among upskilling, deskilling and polarisation scenarios. Gallies argues that there is a skill hierarchy between service-class occupations and working class occupations, and in gender linked occupations. Admitting that upskilling trends exist in service-class occupations, Gallies presents evidence of class and gender segregation; skill gains are rarely found in working-class occupations. Women have generally fared worse than men; and women working part-time in unskilled manual tasks have fared worst. Endorsing Gallies’ argument on the occupational hierarchy, Peter Elias argues that high-skilled workers tend to attain further skill gains, but low-skilled employees remain with relatively low skills.
... the already more skilled employees, and those occupying more skilled posts, were more likely to acquire skill and to gain more challenge in their work; those with least skill stood most at risk of losing it and, though they more often gained skill than lost it, they thereby gained relatively less skill and challenge.\(^{408}\)

Hence, not only ‘complex’ jobs, to use Elias’s term for high skill occupations, but also ‘simple’ jobs, in low skill occupations, have been increasing, which means that both the upskilling and the deskilling arguments are rejected.\(^{409}\)

Richard Scase also analyses the hierarchical and unequal occupational structure in the contemporary period.\(^{410}\) Scase’s study focuses on the binary structure between managerial, professional, and technically qualified workers (‘core’ or ‘primary’ sector workers) and less skilled workers (‘periphery’ or ‘secondary’ sector workers).\(^{411}\) The demand for managerial, professional and technically qualified workers, who have control over lesser skilled workers, increases as the result of technological and scientific change, the introduction of management information systems, and the emergence of knowledge and the service economy. In contrast, skill demand for controlled workers, including routine workers and skilled craft employees, declines. Their pattern of occupation on an analysis of wages, and skills and knowledge are segregated by age, gender, and ethnic groups. Scase’s argument challenges the classic Marxist account of class-related conflicts, attempting to replace the variable of class by that of professional occupation.

The third interpretation of upskilling, which has attracted policy makers in the industrialised world,\(^{412}\) relates to high skill policy. Upskilling proponents adopt an optimistic perspective.\(^{413}\) They argue that advanced technology brings about higher levels of skill and knowledge, which changes the occupational structure, for example with an increase in non-manual occupations and a decline in manual occupations.\(^{414}\) Furthermore, skill gains may have an impact upon the pattern of work organisation. For instance, employees may attain greater discretion at work,
to allow the maximised usage of their skill and knowledge as well as the stimulation of their motivation.

High skill policy, which endorses the upskilling interpretation, emphasises the need, generated by economic competitiveness and the knowledge-based economy, for those with high skills. High skill proponents are concerned that the net effect of the changes has been in the direction of upskilling. Stephen McNair, D. Campbell, and Robert Reich espouse the high skill view in relation to economic competitiveness; McNair suggests that the knowledge-based economy requires more graduate-level skills. Campbell argues that international competition stimulates the demand for high level skills. Reich asserts the value of knowledge in the new economic milieu:

The new barrier to entry [into the new economic environment] is not volume or price; it is skill in finding the right fit between particular technologies and particular markets. Core corporations no longer focus on products as such; their business strategies increasingly center upon specialized knowledge.

The main difference between the high skill view and the upskilling debate is that the high skill view emphasises a new attribution of skills, knowledge, and competence in the knowledge based economy. In the high skill view, skills and knowledge required in the new economic environment encapsulate similar attributes such as flexibility, creativity, and capability for problem-finding and problem-solving. There is, however, some variance of opinion among high skill proponents. For instance, Reich's 'symbolic analysts' have the capability for problem-identifying, problem-solving, and strategic brokering by manipulating symbols such as data, words, and oral and visual representations. The significance of knowledge for a 'symbolic analyst' is not in the collection of information, but in its effective and creative usage:
The high skill view has affinity to the post-Fordist debate, both emphasising the increase in skills. From the post-Fordist perspective, the paradigm is shifted from Fordism to post-Fordism. Fordism emphasises high-volume, standard production economy on the basis of the uniform and routine work. Post-Fordism emphasises high-value, flexible specialisation and the customisation of goods and services. This paradigm shift is explained by the change in organisational forms from the bureaucratic organisation of Fordism to the post-bureaucratic organisation of post-Fordism. The characteristics of Fordism include a rigid hierarchical division of labour, low skills, low trust relations between managers and workers, and low-discretion in work roles of employees. The characteristics of post-Fordism include flexible organisation, high-skills, high trust relations, and a high level of discretion in employees’ work roles and participation in decision-making.

In the context of management, Richard Scase proposes a new term, 'creative leadership' skill, to explain the newly required competence in the use of human resources in 'post-bureaucratic' management. Scase's vision of the economic transition is close to Brown and Lauder's post-Fordist account; that is to say, the management mode has shifted from tight supervisory control and rule to flexible, adaptive, and highly decentralised operations. This operational shift requires new modes in human resources – 'creative leadership' skills – changing from the old modes of rigid skills and knowledge, and the stress on loyalty in the previous management system. ‘Creative leadership’ skill is based on a greater understanding of human relations and on flexible and accommodating interpersonal skills, so as to enable managers to share problems and discuss possible solutions and strategies with their subordinates. ‘Creative leadership’ skills are
required for communication in the new environment based upon cooperative, high-trust, egalitarian attitudes.

In the context of the universities, high skill policy claims that new demand for skills, knowledge, and competence has a greater implication for the function and roles of the universities. Using Reich’s and Scase’s concepts as an example, the analogy in Reich’s ‘symbolic analysis’ and Scase’s ‘creative leadership’ skill, and other high-skill proponents’ vision, signifies the increasing value placed on human resources. These views consequently highlight the function of education, seeking to impose economic demands for higher skills on higher education.

However, Reich and Scase (in another study with Phillip Brown) do not perceive that the effects of economic globalisation impact evenly across the whole university sector. They suggest that the effects, tasks, and functions of the universities, in terms of skills, knowledge, and competence, are diversified among the universities. Reich differentiates prestigious universities from other universities, arguing that only prestigious universities can provide ‘symbolic analysts’ - who can use knowledge on the basis of equations, formulae, analogies, models, constructs, categories, and metaphors. Reich considers that the ‘symbolic analyst’ practice of education starts earlier, implying that it takes time to attain ‘symbolic analyst’ skills. Reich asserts that ‘fortunate children’ who have graduated from private schools and prestigious universities tend to become ‘symbolic analysts’. This view alludes to both institutional hierarchy and class inequality.

Scase and Brown criticise the continuous socio-cultural phenomenon of social reproduction of the class structure in the university sector. They argue that the paradigm shift will not be accomplished unless the dominant, elite-based culture changes. This argument is based upon two observations by Scase and Brown. One is that students in new universities are less successful in obtaining qualifications necessitated in the new paradigm which confer access to managerial and professional occupations. The other is that the proportion of lower socio-
economic groups, ethnic minorities, and women is high in new universities. This socio-culture factor, in relation to institutional hierarchy, makes the transition of the new paradigm difficult, reinforcing elements of the bureaucratic paradigm such as tighter surveillance and interpersonal competition.429

The following sections briefly summarise the arguments offered in Chapter II.

ENGLAND
Skills, knowledge, and competence in the English case defined by the academic community — which include critical thinking and academic writing — are at odds with those defined by external stakeholders — which are more vocational, operational, and practical.

JAPAN
Skills, knowledge, and competence in the Japanese case defined by the academic community are compatible with those defined by external stakeholders. The reason for this compatibility is the emphasis on generalist skills, knowledge, and competence by external stakeholders, which consequently reinforces academic-oriented curricula.

This section has offered the theoretical perspective of this thesis, combining four ideologies and providing the different implications of the four ideologies in the English and Japanese university systems. It has focused on the level of the university system, rather than that of the nation-state. The next section focuses on the level of nation-state, providing a more comprehensive and comparative perspective.
3.4 THEORETICAL EXPLANATION AND COMPARATIVE MATRIX: MACRO-THEORIES

Why did the governments in England and Japan similarly apply neo-liberal policy in the university sector as well as other sectors? The answer for this question could be related to the macro-level changes (e.g. the change of the nature of the nation-states, and government role in terms of national economy and public sectors). In addition, the identification of the global phenomena, such as the acceleration of interdependence in international economy and advanced technology, could be useful.

The purpose of the next two sections, from the macro-theoretical point of view, is to explain similarities and differences in the transformation of the two university systems. These sections provide a more comprehensive, comparative theory of the transformation and continuity of the university systems, which could be theoretically valid, although there is empirical limitation. The existing literature is used for this purpose. Section 3.4.1 seeks a comprehensive and comparative-based explanation for the convergent trends between English and Japanese university systems and the continuity of divergent forms between the two systems [see Chapter II] in the approach in existing convergence theories. Convergence theories identify the contradictory patterns of convergence (cf. supervisory state and entrepreneurial universities) and continuity of distinctive features in the two university systems. This section suggests the significance of contextualisation in theory, analysis, and interpretation in order to elucidate the factors contributing to the continuity of divergent forms between the two university systems.

Section 3.4.2 explores the rationales behind the convergent trends and the continuity of differences between English and Japanese university systems by using the transformationalist theories of the globalisation schools — the contextual theory. This section, referring to the significance of contextual analysis and
interpretation, suggests further research on economic, socio-cultural, and historical contexts in England and Japan in order to identify the continuity of the distinctive features of the two university systems.

3.4.1 CONVERGENCE THEORIES
The similarities and differences between the transformation of the university systems of England and Japan can be theoretically explained by invoking convergence theories. Such an explanation is useful in two respects. The first is that these theories are useful in explaining the implications of economic globalisation in the sphere of education across countries. The second is that the central concepts of convergent theories have similarities and differences, as derived from Alex Inkeles' definition of convergence and divergence. Inkeles defines convergence as movement 'from different positions toward some common point', while divergence is 'movement away from a given point, common or not, to new points farther apart than was the case in the original condition'.

Inkeles and Larry Sirowy's empirical research — which concerns 'economic development' rather than economic globalisation — for example, indicates that there is a tendency for national education systems to converge towards a common educational structure and practice. The process of convergence is, according to Inkeles and Sirowy, highly differentiated, proceeding at very variable rates in different realms of the socio-cultural system. Regarding existent divergent forms, Inkeles and Sirowy's evidence concomitantly reveals divergent patterns, and the mixture of convergence and the continuity of divergent forms in student-teacher ratios and secondary school comprehensiveness.

Roger Dale and Andy Green, emphasising the existing diversity of education systems in the context of economic globalisation, identify the contradictory effects of globalisation as both the convergence and the continuity of divergent patterns. Dale argues that economic globalisation does not necessarily lead to greater homogeneity in policy or practice in education in different
Green argues that globalisation does not lead to any systematic convergence at the level of structure and process in different countries. There is, however, according to Green, convergence at the level of policy rhetoric and general policy objectives (e.g. lifelong learning, internationalisation of higher education, decentralisation in regulation and governance, the introduction of evaluation and quality control mechanisms, and increasing approximation of education and work) as a consequence of the response to common demographic, economic, and cultural changes.

Different interpretations of convergence, the continuity of divergent patterns, and the mix of convergence and the continuity of the diversity in the education systems largely rely upon different classifications or categorisations (e.g. areas and levels of study) as well as different time periods and methodological issues (e.g. criteria). For example, Dale, Green, and Inkeles and Sirowy explain the different patterns in the change of education systems by classifying areas and levels differently, and by analysing the different effects and/or variations both among the identified areas and levels and within the same areas (e.g. different types of deregulation). For Dale, the objects to be analysed are regimes, sectors, and organisations. For Green, the objects are policy rhetoric, policy objectives, structure, process, and outcomes, in the particular context of Europe and East Asian countries since the mid-1980s. The detailed categorisations above suggest that over-simplification is avoidable by conceptual as well as methodological apparatus. For Inkeles and Sirowy, these are the ideational and legal, the structural, the demographic, the administrative and financial, the dynamic, and the curricular, on the basis of their wide-range of cross-national analysis which covers both developing and industrialised countries between 1950 and 1980.

The theoretical explanations of the paradoxical phenomena of convergence and the continuity of divergent patterns are inherent in contextual causality. Rationales for the changes include the political, economic, socio-cultural systems
and their history, the manner and degree of interaction with economic and other factors, the speed and timing of changes, and the approach to policy transmission (e.g. comprehensive or partial; and policy borrowing or policy learning). Green, for example, explains that limited convergence results from different starting points and / or changes at different rates. Green also points out the significance of the differences in existing structures:

The structures of national systems are fundamentally determined by national differences in industrial structures and labour markets arrangements, in political traditions and institutions, and in cultures of citizenship and knowledge traditions.

Inkeles and Sirowy provide an explanation for both the convergence and the existing variation of education systems, giving attention to the influence of the maintenance of differences, and of the stimulation of distinctive and divergent forms of educational structure and practice. They explain that convergent tendencies rely upon a common response to external socio-economic pressures:

Convergence in education is, in fact, a response to pressures from other elements of the social system, most notably pressures arising from the requirements of operating a large scale, complex, technologically based economy and society.

Inkeles and Sirowy also identify forces which maintain differences, stimulating distinctive and divergent forms of educational structure and practice. The obstacles to convergence, in Inkeles and Sirowy’s explanation, include the pattern of level of economic development (the most influential ‘force’), political systems, historical traditions, and economic capacity in the political systems between capitalism, socialism, and communism, and in historical experience.

Dale explains that phenomena pertaining to convergence and existing diversity can be explained by the dual mechanism – traditional policy transfer mechanisms such as policy borrowing and policy learning, and globalisation as a
mechanism of policy transfer. The key features of both policy borrowing and policy learning include voluntarism accepted by the recipient nation, the explicit process of their impacts, and viability at a national level according to existing national norms and expectations. In addition, they include the impacts at the sectoral and organisational levels (rather than the regime level), and initiation by the recipient. In contrast, the effect of the globalisation mechanism, according to Dale, can be identified in several areas. These include the extra-national locus of viability (the locus of power outside the recipient country such as supra-national organisations, e.g. the OECD), the indirect forms of impact, external initiation by a supranational body, the focus on policy goals as well as policy processes, and the impact on the regime level as well as the sectoral and organisational levels.

A synthesis of the views of Dale, Green, and Inkeles and Sirowy, suggests that the rationales behind observed convergence in the university systems in industrial countries can be understood as common external pressures, including economic and technological factors. This observation could lend force to the argument that economic globalisation brings about the convergence of university systems. The continuity of distinctive and divergent forms is explained contextually; economic, socio-cultural, political, and historical contexts interrelate, conditioning particular forms in the university systems. In this line of explanation, economic globalisation and advanced technology, both of which condition convergence, could simultaneously be factors which maintain previous forms in the university systems, interacting with other infrastructure including particular economic, political, socio-cultural structures, and history. The different interpretations of, and responses to, economic globalisation influenced by different political cultures are testimony in this respect.

The rationale behind the convergence and the continuity of divergent forms of the English and Japanese university systems can be explained in relation to economic globalisation and communication technology as well as policy borrowing and policy learning. The next section elucidates the factors for
convergent trends and the continuity of divergent forms between English and Japanese university systems.

Similarities and differences between England and Japan in relation to the transformation of the university systems are theoretically explained by invoking convergency theories. Analysis and interpretation in Chapters V and VI showed the validity of the application of convergence theories in English and Japanese university contexts.

The logic of Dale, Green, and Inkeles and Sirowy is adaptable to the contexts of England and Japan, inasmuch as economic globalisation arguably contributes to the contradictory movement towards convergence and the maintenance of distinctive and divergent forms between the two university systems. The convergence observed in the English and Japanese university systems is explicit in the following areas:

- Rhetoric;
- Government application of similar ideologies and policies [see Chapters V and VI];
- Central authorities' intensive involvement in the university sectors [see Chapter II];
- The emphasis on public values in the university systems [see Chapter II]; and
- A range of external pressures on the universities.

Common rhetoric employed by central authorities in the two university systems includes 'competitiveness', 'efficiency', 'cost-effectiveness', 'value for money', 'standards', 'accountability' and 'quality' [see Chapters V and VI]. This rhetoric is also used by the universities in both England and Japan [see Chapters V and VI]. Common external pressures in English and Japanese university sectors include the challenges posed by globalisation, restructuring of the economy, the changing role of the state, constraints in public finance, shifting demography, and the introduction of new technologies. The other elements shared by the two
systems include intensive controls by central authorities, the introduction of quality assurance mechanisms (since the 1990s in both England and Japan), and mass education (since the late 1980s in England, and the late 1960s in Japan).

There are three key differences between English and Japanese university systems: (i) government manoeuvres to steer the universities and involve the market; (ii) the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence (indicating diverse responses of the universities to economic and technological demands such as economic globalisation and technological innovation); and (iii) convergent processes between the two systems. In England, the university sector has moved toward centralisation in respect to increasing the control of universities by agencies (with the exception of planning). In Japan, the university sector—which became centralised much earlier since the establishment of the national education system in the Meiji era (1868-1912)—retains central control, although the Ministry has concomitantly sought greater flexibility in the areas of curriculum since the 1990s.

The next sub-section revisits the transformationalist globalisation theories, and assesses their usefulness in explaining convergent trends between the English and Japanese university systems, and the continuity of differences between the two.

3.4.2 ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION
Economic globalisation theory can be one of the most plausible comprehensive explanations for convergent and divergent trends in the English and Japanese university systems. Globalisation theory can be categorised into three schools: (1) the hyperglobalist theories; (2) the sceptical theories; and (3) the transformationalist theories. Among the three schools, the transformationalist theories emphasise contextual understanding, which is significant in understanding the continuity of distinctive features between English and Japanese university systems, as argued in the previous section; this section, therefore, outlines the
transformationalist theories in more detail than the other two. This section reviews the three schools of globalisation theory; it suggests that transformationalist theories have the greatest applicability for the purposes of this research.

(1) The hyperglobalist theories
The main argument of hyperglobalists, such as Kenichi Ohmae, is that economic globalisation has brought about the ‘denationalisation’ of economies through trans-national communication networks, trade, and finance. Hyperglobalists interpret globalisation as a new and revolutionary economic phenomenon. In this theory, the declining power of nation-states is a primary concern. The hyperglobalist stance was taken by the New Right in the UK, whose doctrines advocate ‘small government’ and marketisation.

(2) The sceptical theories
The sceptical theorists, chief among them being Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, criticise the hyperglobalist point of view that economic activities have globalised, pointing out not only theoretical but also empirical deficiencies in hyperglobalist theory. Hirst and Thompson, for example, offer the two following counter-arguments. The first counter-argument is that the contemporary economic phenomenon of world-wide flows of trade, investment, and labour is not historically unprecedented; the contemporary level of economic interdependence already existed, although the commonly used term was the ‘internationalisation’ of the economy, not ‘globalisation’. The second counter-argument is that economic exchange in the contemporary period is not on the basis of world-wide activities, but rather that of regional activities. The criticism of hyperglobalist theory by globalisation sceptics includes the issue of the power of nation-states: Hirst and Thompson point out that economic ‘internationalisation’ still depends upon national governments’ regulation, and therefore nation-states have not lost their
governability in the ‘international’ market. Critics of globalisation sceptics, such as Martin Albrow, point out that the opponents of globalisation tend to interpret globalisation only ideologically. Similarly, Anthony Giddens argues that the position of the sceptical theorists is prone to be taken by those aligned to the Old Left in the UK. The Old Left interprets globalisation as the ideology of advocates of the free-market, appeals for governmental control of economic life and for a welfare state, and criticises the free market and tax-cutting strategies of the New Right.

(3) The transformationalist theories
Transformationalists, including Anthony Giddens, interpret the transformation of the economy in the contemporary period as historically unprecedented, agreeing with the hyperglobalists in this respect. However, transformationalists, unlike hyperglobalists, do not focus on the existence of globalisation per se, but rather on its consequences. Moreover, transformationalists interpret globalisation more comprehensively than do hyperglobalists and globalisation sceptics, arguing that globalisation, as a powerful central driving force in contemporary social, political, and economic transformations, reshapes modern societies and the world order.

The distinctive features of transformationalist theories are two-fold. One is its attempt to incorporate social and political as well as economic dimensions, whereas the hyperglobalist and the sceptical theorists tend to focus on economic dimensions only. The other is its focus on the change in the nature of nation-states rather than the change in the power of nation-states — as asserted by both hyperglobalists and sceptics; as indicated earlier, hyperglobalists assert that the power of nation-states is weakening, while sceptics assert that the power is maintained. Transformationalists argue that nation-states have been reshaped or reformulated. For instance, Giddens argues that the dialectical nature of globalisation — the ‘pull and push’ between ‘reflexivity’ (a character of modernity) and ‘sovereignty’ — changes the nature of nation-states. The transformationists
extend their arguments to the significance of the functions and roles of the nation-states in the global environment. Giddens for instance argues, in the context of economic globalisation, that the states’ positive activities such as the promotion of the infrastructure of satellite communications, and the state’s operation in the financial market also shape globalisation.\textsuperscript{463} He emphasises interaction between governmental activities to promote globalisation, and the influence of globalisation on governmental decision-making.\textsuperscript{464}

Manuel Castells, whose academic position in respect to globalisation theory is complex and therefore is not categorised in the three schools of globalisation thought discussed above, focuses on the successful economic performance by nation-states in the global competitive economy.\textsuperscript{465} Castells argues that the political capacity of national and supranational institutions to steer the growth strategy of the states is one of the main processes determining the form and outcome of competition in the new global economy.

The relations between the transformationist position and political ideology are not clear-cut, although the fact that the leading transformationalist theorist — Anthony Giddens — has been an advisor to New Labour in the UK since 1997 suggests a closer alignment to the Third Way in the UK, which cannot be easily demarcated as the political right or left.\textsuperscript{466}

The transformationalist interpretation of globalisation is, among the three globalisation schools, the most appropriate to explain the transformation of the university systems in England and Japan; there are four reasons for this, some of which relate to the aforementioned features of transformationalist theories. The first reason is that there is insufficient evidence to indicate a decline in the power of nation-states;\textsuperscript{467} this argument also holds true in the education sector. It has become apparent in this thesis that the hyperglobalist thesis on globalisation is not applicable to the context of the university sectors in England and Japan, in that the power of nation-states has not been weakened, as evidenced in Chapter II. Rather, it is the case that there has been a reformulation of nation-states in relation to
changes in government activities in order to respond to changes in the economic, political, and socio-cultural environment.

Andy Green, for example, argues that economic globalisation has not diminished state control of education. His argument has application in the context of the university sectors in England and Japan, where there is insufficient evidence to suggest that government or bureaucratic power and capability to influence the universities has declined in either case.

In England, state control has in fact been strengthened, where "education is less part of social policy but is increasingly viewed as a sub-sector of economic policy", as Guy Neave points out. Changes in relationships between government, the universities, and the quasi-market, particularly in 1988 (with the change in funding mechanism) and 1992 (with the introduction of an external quality assurance system) did not indicate reduced government involvement in the universities. Rather these incidents of change suggest the opposite interpretation – increasing government control of the universities.

The state’s control of the universities is still maintained in Japan. The corporatisation of the national universities is unlikely to reduce ministerial jurisdiction, although corporatisation could change the former pattern of relationships observed in the Ministry and the national universities [see Chapter VI].

The second reason for employing the transformationalist interpretation in this thesis is that transformationalist theory construes globalisation contextually. The rise of particular ideologies such as neo-liberalism, contractual university autonomy, vocationalism, and new managerialism could be related to not only economic factors but also ideological, demographic, political and socio-economic factors in the case of both England and Japan. For example, in England, the rise of the Third Way is related to a socio-cultural factor – the increasing gap between middle class and lower socio-economic groups [see Chapter V]. In Japan, the rise
of the New Right in the early 1980 was significantly associated with socio-cultural factors [see Chapter VI].

The third reason for applying the transformationalist interpretation in this thesis is that transformationalist theory can provide an explanation for the contradictory changes – convergent trends between the English and Japanese universities systems, and the continuity of divergent forms between the two. Globalisation is, in a transformationalist explanation, a steering force effecting change and at the same time, a resistant force to change.

Finally, transformationalist theory provides insight into a new direction of the globalisation debate, which is no longer primarily concerned with the existence of economic globalisation, but rather with the way to respond to global change. This new direction in transformationalist theory has, as Anthony Giddens and Roger Dale point out, implications in the area of governance, the focus on the balance between the state and the market, and the function and role of ideology.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a theoretical explanation for convergent trends and the continuity of the distinctive and divergent forms between the English and Japanese universities systems. It has focused upon four ideologies: neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism.

19th Century utilitarian thought – in particular, that of John Stuart Mill – has been useful in linking the ideologies of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism. The four linkage points in the ideologies have been the emphasis on the role of central authorities, individualism (such as the pursuit of self-interest, the freedom of individuals, and individual choice), and the separation between private and public spheres. Mill argues that the role of the state is to promote the aggregate of general happiness by helping individuals to pursue their development. This view is consistent with neo-liberal
doctrine in respect to the significance of the role of the state in order to protect individualism.

In the context of England and Japan, four ideologies are similarly observed in these university systems. However, the implication of these ideologies for the university systems differs between them, which appear to be related to convergent trends and the continuity of differences between them. Such differences include the different patterns of government involvement in the market, and the different approaches to change in the pattern of management and governance and in the conception of university autonomy and vocationalism.

The next chapter outlines the method applied in this thesis.
CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the methodology which is used in this thesis, relating it to the theoretical framework provided in the previous chapter. The chapter, first, states the research propositions of the thesis. It secondly offers the research design, incorporating a comparative approach, data collection, and data analysis employed in this thesis. Thirdly, it elucidates the validity, reliability and ethical issues of this study. Finally it delimits the empirical study.

4.2 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY

This section, in order to clarify the focus of the thesis – the common and different factors behind the convergent trends of English and Japanese university sectors and the continuity of divergent forms between the two – addresses the two research propositions. They deal with the change in the ideologies and policies of stakeholders within each university sector. The research propositions follow:

i. Convergent trends – such as central authorities’ intensive control of the universities and the markets, the significant response of the universities to external demand, and central authorities’ creation of market conditions and their operation in the markets – between England and Japan are understood in similarities between the two university systems in policies and ideologies around the themes of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism in the era of the global economy.

ii. Existing distinct and divergent forms in England and Japan can be partially explained by differences in the functions of these ideologies and by the relations between ideology and the power relationships of stakeholders in England and Japan.

Those propositions guide the empirical studies in Chapters V and VI.
The next section provides the research design, including the research method applied in this study, in order to examine these propositions.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
This sub-section elucidates the comparative approach, data collection, and data analysis which are used in this thesis.

4.3.1 COMPARATIVE APPROACH: SELECTION OF TWO UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS
This thesis, bringing two single country studies together for the causal explanation of the continuity and transformation of the university systems, employs comparative approach. The comparative approach is useful to elucidate the distinctive characteristics of the university systems and their changes, and as Leo Goedegebuure and Frans van Vught discuss, develop theoretical framework by conducting a casual comparative study.

The comparative method in social science research, according to E. Lane, is defined in two ways: ‘thin definition’ and ‘thick definition’. The thin definition refers to “a method of analysis that focuses on several objects of study in order to identify similarities and differences”. The thick definition “argues that comparative social inquiry involves the analysis of properties of various kinds of spatial units: countries, states, societies and sub-national government entities”. This thesis takes the latter definition, signifying the macro-level of understanding—the nation-state level—on the change of the university system.

The problems of the comparative approach can be both practical and theoretical / conceptual. The practical problems of the comparative approach, according to Ulrich Teichler, include, language barriers, unsatisfactory accessibility of information, additional costs incurred in comparative research, and lack of mutual understanding in international cooperation among researchers.
Such practical problems are not issues in this study with very rare exceptions in respect to accessibility of information.\textsuperscript{477} The theoretical and conceptual problems of the comparative approach, according to Goedegebuure and van Vught, include the problem of equivalence (the difficulty of comparing different countries by using equivalent indicators), the limitation in the number of macro-social cases which causes the problems in representation, internal variance, and a theoretical leap, and Galton's problem (lack of the independence of cases).\textsuperscript{478} This thesis, in order to reduce these possible problems, provides theoretical argumentation and justification (e.g. macro-theoretical contexts within different systems) for selecting specific cases. In addition, the thesis, in order to avoid Galton's problem, ensures that the cases are independent.

This thesis selects England and Japan for its comparative study. This study does not aim to generalise by use of comparison. There are two main reasons for choosing these two particular university systems. First, England and Japan share some common conditions of advanced capitalist economies in respect to the activities of MNCs (Multi-National Corporations), the internationally-oriented production of goods and services, foreign direct investment,\textsuperscript{479} and advanced information technology.\textsuperscript{480} These common economic indicators enable the thesis to limit some of the complexity of economic globalisation – the pattern of influence of which is uneven\textsuperscript{481} – and permit a focus on change in the university sectors.

Secondly, the common external pressure of economic globalisation and technological innovation has changed the relationships between central authorities and the universities in both England and Japan. The effect of the external factors, however, differs between England and Japan, partially because of the different traditional modes of central authorities' control [See 2.3.1]. In England, the areas in which government was involved in the university sector were limited (e.g. funding), before the funding crisis of the early 1980s. In contrast, in Japan, the
Ministry has had a significant function in the university sector since the Meiji era (1868-1912).

4.3.2 DATA COLLECTION: DOCUMENTATION

This study uses existing documentary evidence as its main source of data. The method is to scrutinise relevant documents relating to the research questions [see 1.4] by identifying factors influencing convergent trends between the English and Japanese university systems and the maintenance of differences between the two.

The primary reason for the choice of documentary analysis is that documentation is appropriate for a theory-driven and deductive approach, allowing a systematic, yet flexible, analysis, as well as a comprehensive study of the subject of inquiry. In addition, the other advantages of the collection of secondary data (e.g. government White Papers, institutional documents, and newspapers), as Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight point out, include the following:

1) Because collecting primary data is difficult, time-consuming and expensive;
2) Because you can never have enough data;
3) Because it makes sense to use it if the data you want already exists in some form;
4) Because it may shed light on, or complement, the primary data you have collected;
5) Because it may confirm, modify or contradict your findings;
6) Because it allows you to focus your attention on analysis and interpretation;
7) Because you cannot conduct a research study in isolation from what has already been done; and
8) Because more data is collected than is ever used.482

The thesis does not use other methods of data collection because of the substantial amount of documentary resources that were available to the author. This delimitation is compensated by far-reaching documentation — as detailed below. It is worthy of note that the documentation includes electronically published material, which facilitates the analysis of current thinking.
The study collected documents from selected stakeholders in order to examine the research questions [see 1.4]. The guiding principle for the selection of stakeholders is the perceived degree of the stakeholder's influence in the power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market in England and Japan, which is the focus of this thesis. Table 4.1 presents selected stakeholders.

The choice of stakeholders is not exactly the same in England and Japan because of inherent differences between the university systems; in England, funding councils – which strategically allocate funding to the universities – are analysed because they have clearly articulated their views in respect to the relationships between government and the universities. In contrast, in Japan, there is no counterpart to English funding councils; the MESSC strategically allocates funding directly to the universities. The University Council, an advisory body to the Minister of Education, was significant in terms of higher education policy making between 1987 (its establishment) and 2000 (its abolition). Its function did not include funding allocation to the universities, but only planning on higher education issues. Regarding the university bodies, there is no university body reflecting both national and private universities in Japan. Unions for university staff are not examined in the Japanese context because of its limited influence on the relations between central authorities and the universities.

The thesis does not examine student organisations in either England or Japan because of the problem in the accessibility of reliable data, and in the contexts of Japan, the lack of evidence on their influence on the relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the markets. The thesis refers to the founders of the universities and Treasury when they are significant in relation to power balance between central authorities, the universities, and the market in the contemporary context.
Table 4.1 Stakeholders: England and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>England</strong></th>
<th><strong>Japan</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Authorities</strong></td>
<td>• Political Parties</td>
<td>• Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Labour Party</td>
<td>◦ The Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Conservative Party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Central Administration</td>
<td>• Central Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ Department for Education [1992-1995]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Funding Councils</td>
<td>• The University Council [1987-2000].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ University Grants Committee [1919-1988]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ University Funding Council [1988-1992]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ Higher Education Funding Council [1992 onwards].</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Universities</strong></td>
<td>• Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals</td>
<td>• The Association of National University Presidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Association of University Teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employers</strong></td>
<td>• Confederation of British Industry and Institute of Directors.</td>
<td>• The Federation of Economic Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Japanese Committee for Economic Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry483</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◦ The Kyoto Group for the Study of Global Issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Documentation through the above stakeholders is, if necessary, complemented by publications from international organisations, statistical agencies, and political think-tanks. Furthermore, the selected texts and documents
include not only official documents and party manifestos, but also legal statutes, political debates and speeches, policy papers, commentaries, and publications by politically influential intellectuals.

4.3.3 APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS

The thesis critically assesses collected documents in light of the research questions [see 1.4]. The study applies three stages of documentary analysis: (1) the background of documents and their arguments; (2) language, and change in language; and (3) the ideologies of stakeholders. The first stage of documentary analysis is guided by suggestions made by Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight:

- Who is the author?
- What is their position?
- What are their biases?
- Where and when was the document produced?
- Why was the document produced?
- How was it produced and for whom?
- In what context was the document produced?
- What are its underlying assumptions?
- What does the document say, and not say?
- How is the argument presented?
- How well supported and convincing is its argument?
- How does this document relate to previous ones?
- How does this document relate to later ones?
- What do other sources have to say about it?

Example 4.1 offers an example of the first stage of documentary analysis.
Example 4.1 Documentary Analysis of the Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities (Jarratt Report)\textsuperscript{485}: 1\textsuperscript{st} Stage

(1) Author: Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals
(2) Committee Members (13 people):
   - Chairman
     - Sir Alex Jarratt from Reed International PLC and Chancellor of Birmingham University.
   - Other members
     - Academics, including managerialists (e.g. St. John’s College, Cambridge University; University of Warwick; and London Business School);
     - Administrator of the institution (i.e. Registrar and Secretary, University of Surrey);
     - Managerialists from the private sector (e.g. Director of Finance and Executive Director of Ford Motor Company Ltd.; and Director of Finance and Deputy Chief Executive of the Plessey Company PLC.);
     - Those from para-government bodies (e.g. Chairman of the University Grant Committee; and Prime Minister’s advisor on efficiency).
(3) Author's position: Employers' view.
(5) Purpose of the Report:

“To promote and co-ordinate, in consultation with the individual institutions which it will select, a series of efficiency studies of the management of the universities concerned and to consider a report to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals and the University Grants Committee on the results with such comments and recommendations as it considers appropriate; provided that the commissioned studies will not extend to issues of academic judgement and not be concerned with the academic and educational policies, practices or methods of the universities.”\textsuperscript{486}

(6) Commissioning body to the committee: the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals.
(7) Focus of the Report: institutional management and leadership and institutional responsibility.
(9) Political, economic, and socio-cultural contexts of the Report:

Political and economic contexts: the restriction in public funding, and its consequence, which was that Government intended to urge individual universities to promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

(10) Main argument:
The efficiency and the cost-effectiveness can be achieved by restructuring the internal management of institutions such as:

- transferring the management power from departments to the central institution;
- transferring power from the academics to the managers at the centre of the institution;
- strengthening the power of Vice-Chancellors, whose expected roles are, (according to the Report) both academic and chief executives;
- introducing performance indicators; and
- introducing corporate plans discussed by not only academics but also lay members.
(11) Main recommendations of the Report:

For the CVCP
• The CVCP should consider whether it can extend its role in training to developing the management skills of Vice-Chancellors, Pro-Vice-Chancellors, Deans and Heads of Departments...

For the UGC and CVCP jointly
• A range of performance indicators should be developed, covering both inputs and outputs and designed for use both within individual universities and for making comparisons between institutions...

For the universities
• Councils to assert their responsibilities in governing their institutions notably in respect of strategic plans to underpin academic decisions and structures which bring planning, resource allocation and accountability together into one corporate process linking academic, financial and physical aspects.
• Senates to continue to play their essential role in co-ordinating and endorsing detailed academic work and as the main forum for generating an academic view and giving advice on broad issues to Council...
• Recognising the Vice-Chancellor not only as academic leader but also as chief executive of the university.
• Establishing a planning and resources committee of strictly limited size reporting to Council and Senate with the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman and both academic and lay members...
• Developing reliable and consistent performance indicators, greater awareness of costs and more full cost charging.
• Appointing Heads of Departments by Councils, on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor after appropriate consultation, with clear duties and responsibility for the performance of their departments and their use of resources (pp. 35-37).

(12) Bias of the Report:
The efficiency and the cost-effectiveness can be achieved by introducing performance indicators, establishing a central planning committee (limited to ten or twelve people), and transferring power from departments to the centre of the institution (i.e. a central planning committee and the university council), and from academics to managers. There is insufficient evidence to support this claim.

(13) Successive documents relating to the Report:
Review of the University Grants Committee [Croham Report] in 1987, which emphasise managerial and accountability aspects, supports the Jarratt Report to a significant extent. The report was ignored by the Government; there were, according to Kogan and Hanney’s interpretation, two reasons for Government’s disregard. The first is that the Government wanted to curtail the UGC’s independence, while the underlined argument of the Croham Report was to strengthen UGC’s power. The second is that ‘for the DES, Croham was simply a holding operation while it prepared for the formal and statutory recognition of its ideological victory … once it had prepared the necessary legislation Croham became irrelevant’. The Croham Report refers to the Jarratt Report below:

We share the view of the Jarratt Committee that planning by the universities becomes more not less important in times of financial uncertainty … But we also wholly endorse the Jarratt Committee’s conclusion that rapid changes in funding are not conducive to the efficient use of resources.

(14) Influence of the document:
a) The establishment of the working group on the introduction of performance indicators by the CVCP and UGC [see Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, Performance Indicators in Universities: A First Statement by a Joint CVCP / UGC Working Group, (London: CVCP, 1986)].
b) The establishment of the committee under the chairmanship of Lord Croham, in order to implement recommendations made by the Jarratt Report.
The second stage of documentary analysis is the examination of language and of change in the usage of language, focusing upon texts. Analytical schemas of language and change in language include the identification of:

- the repetition of key words and phrases;
- prominent and detailed concepts and logic;
- patterns of variation within and between text(s) (e.g. to reconcile conflicting ideas, to cope with contradiction or uncertainty, to counter alternatives, and to shift language forms); and
- the absence of concepts or discourses

The thesis compares selected documents in order to improve validity [see 4.4]. Example 4.2 offers an example of the second stage of documentary analysis.491

**Example 4.2 Documentary Analysis of the Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities (Jarratt Report): 2nd Stage**

| (1) Repetition of key words and phrases: efficiency, cost-effectiveness, performance indicators, and accountability. |
| (3) Prominent logic: The public financial crisis should be resolved by improving efficiency and cost-effectiveness at the individual institutional level. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness can be achieved by the centralisation of the institutions in terms of strategic planning, and the introduction of management and performance indicators. |
| (4) Absent concepts and discourses: collegialism, power of faculties, and power of students. |

The third stage of documentary analysis is examination of the ideological position of different stakeholders, and of their change within a historical framework.492 This analysis focuses on:

- whose ideologies have become validated; and
- what the nature of those ideologies are.

Example 4.3 offers an example of the third stage of documentary analysis.

(1) Whose ideologies are validated:
Vice-Chancellors and Principals, the UGC, the Government, the DES, and the Secretary of State, rather than faculties and students
(2) The nature of those ideologies:
Emphasis on 'public definition'

Four ideologies are examined in accordance with the conceptual framework in Chapter III: neo-liberalism, university autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism. The choice of these four ideologies is guided by the focus of the study which gives primary attention to the relationships between the central authorities, the universities and markets. The weight of analysis of the four ideologies differs between stakeholders in each university setting for two reasons. The first relies upon a theoretical concern; the thesis gives greater attention to neo-liberalism than new managerialism, redefined university autonomy, and vocationalism, because neo-liberalism is an overarching ideology for the other three ideologies [see 3.3]. The second reason relies upon the different emphases of particular stakeholders on particular ideologies.

The length of the analysis of four ideologies of individual stakeholders varies in accordance with the availability of documents, and the significance of the analysis in relation to the theme of the thesis – the relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market.

4.4 VALIDITY

Validity is, according to Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight, relates to the extent to which "your methods, approaches and techniques actually relate to, or measure, the issues you have been exploring". The main criticism of the validity of data collection in qualitative research includes the problem of 'anecdotalism', which is the lack of critical investigation of data by only relying on the use of a few chosen
examples. This critical point can be resolved by careful collection of the data and its analysis. David Silverman, for example, proposes five antidotes to the problem of anecdotalism to improve validity.\textsuperscript{494} These antidotes are as follows: the refutability principle (to refute initial assumptions about the data in order to achieve objectivity); the constant comparative method (to find another case through which to test out a provisional hypothesis); comprehensive data treatment (to incorporate all cases of data); deviant-case analysis (to seek out and address deviant cases); and the use of appropriate tabulations (to use tabulated categories relating to a theoretical account). He argues that these five solutions are more useful than ‘triangulation’ (‘the attempt to get a “true” fix on a situation by combining different ways of looking at it or different findings’)\textsuperscript{495} and ‘respondent validation’ (the feedback mechanism tracing back to ‘the subjects with our tentative results and refine them in the light of our subjects’ reactions’).\textsuperscript{496} The inappropriate use of ‘triangulation’ and ‘respondent validation’, according to Silverman, includes problems in ethics, politics and practicability.

This thesis partially accepts Silverman’s proposals to improve the validity of qualitative research. Nevertheless, it acknowledges the limitation of Silverman’s comprehensive approach in relation to data collection, notably when the availability of data is small in terms of the analysis of the ideology of particular stakeholders. The thesis, therefore, emphasises two additional points. The first point is the comparison and contrast of the selected documents with other documents published by other authors or stakeholders. The second point is logical and contextual understanding across time during the process of documentary analysis.

4.5 RELIABILITY
Reliability is, according to Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight, related to the following two questions:
1) How well have you carried out your research project?
2) Have you carried it out in such a way that, if another researcher were to look into the same questions in the same setting, they would come up with essentially the same results (though not necessarily an identical interpretation)\textsuperscript{497}

Similarly, M. Hammersley claims that reliability refers to 'the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions'.\textsuperscript{498} For Margaret LeCompte and Judith Goetz, reliability relates to 'the extent to which studies can be replicated', which requires that 'a researcher using the same methods can obtain the same result as those of a prior study'.\textsuperscript{499} Reliability is, as David Silverman argues, significant not only in quantitative research but also in qualitative research.\textsuperscript{500}

Reliability can be considered in terms of 'external' and 'internal' reliability. External reliability is, according to Clive Seale, the 'replicability of entire studies', while internal reliability is related to the themes which requires the establishment of trust and examination of a research text in some testing circumstances.\textsuperscript{501} Internal reliability is, as LeCompte and Goetz point out in the context of ethnographic research, significant when a researcher or research project teams use the same techniques to study a problem at several research sites. The thesis, therefore, gives attention to external reliability rather than to internal reliability.

The thesis, in order to increase external reliability, highlights the following points:\textsuperscript{502}

- attention to social situations and conditions, which may affect the accessibility of the data;
- the outline of theoretical premises and definition of analytic constructs (e.g., definition of a key term); and
- clarification of the methods of data collection and analysis.
4.6 ETHICAL ISSUES

The thesis gives attention to the complexity of ethical issues, in particular, the issues of anonymity and confidentiality of certain documents.

Ethical principles and biases, according to R. Bogdan and S. Biklen, include:

1) The subjects' identities should be protected so that the information you collect does not embarrass or in other ways harm them ...
2) Treat subjects with respect and seek their cooperation in the research ...
3) In negotiating permission to do a study, you should make it clear to those with whom you negotiate what the terms of the agreement are, and you should abide by that contract ...
4) Tell the truth when you write up and report your findings

In accordance with these ethical principles and biases, the thesis, where necessary, protects the anonymity and confidentiality of documents by changing the mode of presentation of some evidence (while taking care not to distort its meaning). These ethical issues are particularly significant in respect to topics currently under discussion involving documents not yet publicly released such as the corporatisation of the Japanese national universities.

4.7 DELIMITATION OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The analysis in this thesis focuses mainly on the university sector, rather than higher education institutions as a whole because central authorities' control differs between the universities and other higher education institutions. However, this does not mean that the thesis ignores the former polytechnics in England. It pays attention to the post-1992 universities (the institutions which obtained university status after 1992).

The thesis takes an account of the diversity of the universities by analysing the collective university bodies of both pre-1992 and post-1992 universities in
England and national and private universities in Japan, although it does not analyse individual institutions and functions within an institution (e.g. central management, departments, faculties, and individual academics). The scope of analysis is determined by practicability and time considerations.

The study concentrates on the periods between 1979 and 2000 in England and between 1983 and 2000 in Japan. The selection of these time periods relates to the rise of the New Right in the political sphere since New Right philosophy has been significant in the change in power relationships among government, the universities, and the market. It can be interpreted that in England, the coming to power of the Conservative Government in 1979 was a significant historical turning point in respect to the introduction of New Right policies in the university sector. The thesis recognises the discourses of the New Right observed before 1979 such as the Black Papers of 1969, and the significance of James Callaghan’s speech at Ruskin College in 1976, which can be interpreted as the herald of the 1980s change in the university sector. In Japan, it can be interpreted that the establishment of the National Council by Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1983 marked the first overt manifestation of New Right philosophy in education.

The next two chapters (Chapters IV and V) test the theoretical framework offered in this chapter and seek to identify the factors behind the change and continuity of the power balance among stakeholders in England and Japan. The chapters focus on four ideologies of individual stakeholders in the English and Japanese university systems: neo-liberalism, new managerialism, redefined university autonomy, and vocationalism.
CHAPTER V: ENGLAND

5.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENTS

The purpose of the chapter is to examine the English context of the main argument of the thesis, which was outlined in Chapter III.

This chapter argues that the emphasis on particular ideologies — neoliberalism, contractual university autonomy, vocationalism and new managerialism — by government, the central administration, and economic interest groups since the 1980s has influenced the change in ideologies of the universities and funding councils. Since the 1980s, the universities have been influenced by change in the pattern of state jurisdiction and have made some degree of compromise between government ideologies and their ideology — traditional English university autonomy — as will become clear in the discussion below.

The emphasis on the ideologies of the funding councils has changed, in that they have taken an ideological position close to government. This change is understood as the shift in the function of the funding council, from being a protector of traditional university values — a buffer — under the regime of the University Grants Committee in the 1980s, to being a state apparatus. By the mid-1980s, the University Grants Committee had changed its financial policies in a systematic and strategic way, targeting them to meet state demands and starting to work with the state more closely than with universities. The change in the financial mechanism, from the UGC to the University Funding Council, and later the Higher Education Funding Council, further extended the function of this intermediary body as a state apparatus, responding to state demands, such as those for economic prosperity.

It is worthy of note that the main differences between the transformation of the English university system and that of the Japanese university system are, as
argued in the next chapter, two-fold: (1) different relations between particular ideologies and change in power relationships between government and the universities; and (2) the significance of the change in the ideology and role of one particular stakeholder—the funding council—in the English context. (The four axes of the ideologies of stakeholders in England—university autonomy, neoliberalism, vocationalism, and new managerialism—generate the shared ideological ground to justify government control over the university sector and reinforce centralisation.)

5.2 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS IN ENGLAND

The relationships between main stakeholders are not straightforward because of their intricate informal and formal interaction, and the different forms of their involvement in the university system which changes for different issues and time periods. Nevertheless, the analytical approaches of policy-making could provide an insight into the relationships between the main stakeholders in the university sector, [although the thesis does not aim to identify policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation in the context of the universities (see the purpose of the thesis in 1.2)]. The analysis of policy and policy-making includes six main approaches: the stagist approach (which views the policy-making process as composed of a series of steps or sequences), the pluralist-elitist approach, the neo-Marxist approach, the sub-system approach, the policy discourse approach, and institutionalism. Among them, the frameworks of the pluralist-elitist and policy discourse approaches are instrumental in this thesis because of their focus on language and pluralistic value with special attention to two main stakeholders or groups. The pluralist-elitist approach analyses power and power distribution among groups and elites and the way they shape policy-making. This approach shapes relationships among stakeholders with particular focus on the central
authority – university nexus. The policy discourse approach examines the policy process, giving attention to language and communication.

On the basis of the frameworks of the pluralist-elitist and policy discourse approaches, the identification of the main stakeholders’ nature and functions in the areas of funding, policy and planning, quality, and legislation appear to be useful in understanding the relationships between stakeholders: the central authorities, the universities, and the employers [see Figure 5.1 (below)].

**Figure 5.1 The Relationships between Stakeholders in England**
First, the central authorities include political parties, the central administration, and funding councils. Political parties and funding councils are commonly involved in the areas of funding, policy issues, and to some extent, legal issues (including acts and contract). The involvement of political parties in the university sector (e.g. setting up national councils on higher education, enacting legislation, and introducing a particular higher education policy) is often irregular, except for annual budgeting for higher education. The difference between political parties and the central administration in terms of values is ambiguous; the value of the central administration is not necessarily the same as that of any political party. The main reason is that board members and state officers ranked below the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State are usually non-partisan. Differences between political parties and the central administration in respect to functions are clear. Political parties are involved in the policy-making process, while central administration is more focused upon implementation or the provision of information.

The funding council, since the mid-1980s, can be understood as a state apparatus rather than a buffer body [see Chapter II]. The functions of the HEFCE include funding allocation, quality control (i.e. RAE), and contracting with individual universities (i.e. financial memoranda). The funding council is linked to political parties, the universities, and the central administration. The links between the funding council and the universities are mainly regular and routine in terms of funding allocation. The relationship is, as argued, 'contractual'.

Secondly, the representative bodies of the universities include the CVCP and the Unions (The AUT and the NATFHE). They negotiate with political parties on issues relating to the universities (e.g. funding). Individual universities are, as service providers, involved in the areas of funding, strategic planning (corporate plans), internal and external quality control, internal and external legislation (e.g. University Charters and Codes of Practice, and 1988 ERA and 1992 FHEA respectively), and internal governance and management.
Thirdly, the collective bodies of employers, such as the CBI as well as individual employers, can be linked to political parties, central administration, funding councils, and the universities. Such employers' bodies, as pressure groups and partners to the public sector, attempt to influence the university sector.

In order to identify the transition in the ideologies of individual stakeholders and their relationships in England, this chapter, first, analyses ideologies in the 1963 Robbins Report, the 1988 Education Reform Act, and the 1997 Dearing Committee Report, identifying the ideologies of particular stakeholders which influenced these Reports and Act. It, then, analyses the policies and ideologies of individual stakeholders in the university system.

5.3 THE REFORMS: NEO-LIBERAL POLICY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE UNIVERSITIES

This section argues that the concepts of (global) economy, (neo-) liberal values, and traditional university values were all incorporated albeit in a different manner in three documents – *Higher Education Report* chaired by Lord Robbins (Robbins Report) in 1963, *Education Reform Act* in 1988, and *Higher Education in the Learning Society* chaired by Sir Ron Dearing (Dearing Report) in 1997.\(^{506}\)

In order to test this argument, this section separately reviews 1) Robbins Report, 2) the 1988 Education Reform Act, and 3) the Dearing Report. The Robbins Report is selected as a text to be analysed since it can be assumed that the Report is significant in respect of the relations between university autonomy and utilitarianism although the publication year of the Report was before the period with which this thesis is primarily concerned. The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act is only referred to in the analysis of the 1988 Education Reform Act, the reason being that the 1988 Education Reform Act is of more significance than the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act in terms of its implications for the market, and the increase of state control.\(^{507}\) A documentary analysis between 1963
and 1988 has not been undertaken because the change in the relationships between government and the universities – which was apparent in the 1980s – has been already examined in the context of the change in funding councils.

Notwithstanding that Lord Robbins himself was a neo-liberal economist, the Robbins Report did not enshrine a neo-liberal point of view. Furthermore, little attention was given to the international dimension of economic change (change in the economic environment was identified only in respect to the UK economic performance relative to other countries). Economic value was linked to the utilitarian view of higher education in the Report; however, the emphasis was minimal in that the focus was on the value of traditional university freedom and utilitarianism in socio-cultural contexts.

It is suggested that the 1988 Education Reform Act has only a restricted linkage with neo-liberalism and the global economy. The Act was associated with the New Right strategy of the then Conservative government in respect to the increase of state control, where the traditional concept of university autonomy [see 3.3.3] was not emphasised. However, this Act was not significantly relevant to the creation of market conditions. A blueprint of the 1988 Education Act – the 1987 White Paper – only refers to the global economy.

Similarly, the Dearing Report identified the change in global economy and emphasised the response of higher education to this change and the increasing significance of the economic function of higher education. However, this concept was not directly linked to the market principle which is the central concern of neo-liberalism. The concept of neo-liberalism was unclear in the Report; utilitarianism was associated with university autonomy.

5.3.1 THE ROBBINS REPORT
The inquiry of Robbins Report was conducted long before the rise of Thatcherism. The emphasis on academic freedom, the rejection of state involvement of the universities, the only partial attention to the economic
dimension, and the absence of the concept of market in the Robbins Report, as analysed below, suggests a continuity of the traditional university values in the Robbins Committee. Furthermore, the submissions of the University Grants Committee and the Ministry of Education to Robbins Committee—which asserted the importance of the protection of academic freedom—suggest that even the UGC and the Ministry supported traditional English university autonomy during the period.

It can be interpreted that the dominant value in the Robbins Report was educational liberalism, which was conceptually located in opposition to economic values. Peter Scott argues that the ideological value influencing the Robbins Report was liberalism, although he concludes that the significance of the legacy of the Robbins Report in the higher education system was inherent in the modern scenario, rather than the liberal scenario. The discourse of liberalism in the Robbins Report, as Scott characterises, differed from the concept of liberalism in the contemporary period; liberalism in the Robbins Report was inherent in anti-utilitarianism and individualism. The Robbins Report rejected the utilitarian view of higher education, by not stressing vocational courses, applied research, and collaboration with industry. Individualism in the Robbins Report was a 'liberal corporatism', which incorporated a progressive state as the principal instrument both for improving the individual and for reforming society. This differed from the contemporary concept of 'privatised individualism', by emphasising 'citizenship' and 'a common culture'.

In contrast to Scott's interpretation of the Robbins Report as expressing anti-utilitarian liberalism, Guy Neave points out its utilitarian elements, which included the recommendation for the increase of technological and scientific output, and its instrumentalist view of higher education as a means of meeting manpower planning requirements. Utilitarianism in the Report, however, resided in a balance with the continuity of a traditional degree of academic internal
control over its ‘private life’; this balance between academic and external values is, in Neave’s interpretation, the legacy of the Robbins Report.

Utilitarianism in the Robbins Report, however, differed from that in the New Right and Third Way strategies in the 1980s and 1990s in the degree of emphasis between utilitarianism and university autonomy; and the scope and aspect of economic change and needs. First, traditional English university autonomy was much more strongly emphasised in the Robbins Report than were utilitarian elements, where state intervention was denied and the concept of accountability was ambiguous. The Robbins Report rejected the idea of direct intervention by government or Parliament, emphasising the continuous protection of the independence of the universities through the policies of the University Grants Committee. Secondly, the scope of economic issues, to which the Robbins Report referred, was narrow. Attention given to the economic dimension in the Report was confined to particular aspects such as ‘skills’ which were incorporated into one of the four main aims, and output of graduates in science and technology. The Report did not give attention to other aspects including changes in labour market, and skills and knowledge. Furthermore, the Report focused on socio-cultural purposes rather than the economic context, highlighting ‘cultivation of some breadth of interest in the activities of human spirit’ and ‘guardian of civilisation’ as core functions of the universities.

The analysis of the memoranda submitted by witnesses to the Robbins Committee suggests that the characteristics of utilitarianism in the Robbins Report were related to the dominance of the value of university autonomy among stakeholders in the university system as it was at that time. There were three main characteristics in the system based upon the values of university autonomy:

i) The adoption of economic liberalism in higher education was not an issue among actors.

ii) The values based upon utilitarianism and accountability were given focus by the Federation of British Industries and Treasury (former), and
Public Accounts Committee (latter), while university autonomy was emphasized by the UGC and the CVCP, as confirmed by Treasury. However, in the higher education system as a whole, the dominant value was university autonomy rather than utilitarianism and accountability.

iii) There were no strong advocates attempting to change the relations between the state and the universities in any form (most actors supported the maintenance of the relationships between the Treasury, the UGC, and the universities).  

First, the Federation of British Industries, an economic interest group, did not propose the adoption of economic liberalism (e.g. the market principle) in the sphere of the universities. The relationships between the Government and the universities were not its main concern.

Secondly, value conflicts of university autonomy vs. accountability between the UGC, the CVCP, and Public Accounts Committee did not extend to the issue of the relations between the Government and the universities. Both the UGC and the CVCP were strong supporters of university autonomy. The UGC supported university autonomy in the following areas: the size and rate of growth; the appointment of academic staff; the selection of students; the content of teaching; the control of degree standards; the balance between teaching and research; the selection of research projects and publications; and the allocation of income among the various categories of expenditures. The CVCP supported the then relations between the Government and the universities, arguing for the attention to the protection of the universities from political interference and supervision. The position of the Treasury was significant during the Robbins' inquiry, as it took a mediator stance between the Public Accounts Committee – proponents of accountability – and the UGC and the CVCP – proponents of university autonomy. On university autonomy, the Treasury took the position that public expenditure in the university sector should be different from other sectors; it should not involve scrutiny in the evaluation of its accountability because of the special relationship between the Government and the universities:

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The Treasury has throughout taken the view that the relationship between
the Government and the universities is unique justifying therefore
exceptional arrangements in the field of financial control, notwithstanding
the very large and growing subventions to the universities from public
funds.522

On the basis of a similar argument, the Treasury supported the then university
system which was based upon the relations between the parliament, the UGC, and
universities.523 The Treasury did not deny the expansion of the universities in
response to the national interest – to meet industrial demand for manpower – using
human capital theory to calculate the economic value of the expansion of higher
education and its return. The Treasury did however take a cautious position in
respect to the estimated increase of public expenditure as a result of the
expansion.524

5.3.2 THE 1988 EDUCATION REFORM ACT

This section argues (in relation to neo-liberalism) that the 1988 Education Reform
Act does not incorporate the concept of pure market, and consumerism; rather, it
emphasises the increase in government power. In this Act, the values of
government – including accountability and utilitarianism – are much more
emphasised than is the value of the academic community – academic freedom.

The implication of neo-liberal doctrine in the 1988 Education Reform Act is
evident in the change of the funding allocation. The change to the financial
system in the universities in accordance with the Act is as follows:

i) New contract arrangements on a statutory basis;
ii) Increase of the power of the Secretaries of State;
iii) Emphasis on accountability; and
iv) Limited emphasis on academic freedom.

First, the 1988 Education Reform Act – the first legislation that the Government
used as a means of exerting control over the universities525 – is a testimony to the
new relationship between government and the universities. Two provisions illustrate this change. One is a new statutory framework for the relationships between government, the funding body, and the universities. The other is financial memoranda in which funding councils can exercise their powers to attach conditions to payments to which the universities must comply. Financial memoranda are based upon a contractual system by setting out requirements of the funding councils in respect of individual universities, which replaced the arrangement between the universities, the former UGC and local authority for both recurrent and capital expenditure by the contractual system.

D. J. Farrington points out that the financial memoranda pattern:

a) States the respective responsibilities for accounting for and securing value for money from the use of public funds between the Council and the governing body of the institution and requires the governing body to designate a principal office of the institution, the holder of which will be responsible for satisfying the governing body that the conditions have been complied with;

b) Indicates how some funds will be unearmarked and others earmarked for specific purposes and imposes restrictions on use and virement;

c) Imposes on the institution a requirement to have sound systems of internal financial management and control, to maintain financial viability, and specifies the circumstances under which deficits may be incurred;

d) Requires the institution to develop and maintain an estate strategy, imposes restrictions on transactions over specified limits without consulting the Council and specifies the circumstances under which part or all of the proceeds of disposal of assets must be returned to the Council;

e) Specifies the conditions under which borrowing and leasing arrangements may be entered into;

f) Requires the institutions to keep proper accounting records and provide annual reports and financial statements in a specified form and timescale;

g) Requires the institutions in general terms to recover the full costs of research contracts and external services;

h) Specifies the arrangement for financial audit, provision of information and insurance.
Secondly, the 1988 Education Reform Act emphasises an increase in state power rather than the pure market *per se*. The articles of the 1988 Education Reform Act in relation to the power of the state include:

The Secretary of State may order, confer or impose on either of the Funding Councils such supplementary functions as he thinks fit; and any such functions shall be treated.\(^{529}\) [Article 134 (1) ERA]

In exercising their functions under this Part of this Act each of the Funding Councils shall comply with any directions given to them by the Secretary of State.\(^{530}\) [Article 134 (8) ERA]

Any institution conducted by a higher education corporation shall be conducted in accordance with articles of government, to be made by the corporation with the approval of the Secretary of State.\(^{531}\) [Article 125 (1) ERA]

Since the previous Education Acts had never made provision for this matter,\(^{532}\) these articles conferring reserve power on the Secretaries of State to give directions are significant.\(^{533}\)

Thirdly, the 1988 Education Reform Act emphasises the concept of accountability to the state and society, in particular, the economic aspect, reviewing the purpose of higher education and that of the UFC. For instance, the 1987 White Paper – a blueprint of the 1988 Education Reform Act (as aforementioned) – proposes that the aim and purpose of higher education is to, *inter alia*, ‘serve the economy more effectively’ and ‘have closer links with industry and commerce, and promote enterprise’.\(^{534}\) The aim and purpose of the establishment of the UFC is, in the same White Paper, ‘to clarify responsibilities, improve financial accountability and increase effectiveness. The University Grants Committee will be reconstituted as a smaller, statutorily incorporated, Universities Funding Council’.\(^{535}\)

Fourthly, university autonomy is not emphasised in the 1988 Education Reform Act. On the contrary, in some respects it has declined as the result of the
enactment of the Act. For example, the abolition of tenure by the state can be interpreted as the decline of traditional English university autonomy.

In the 1988 Education Reform Act, as the above suggests, the governmental New Right strategy is influential, while the value of the universities associated with university autonomy has not, to any significant extent, been incorporated. Its subordination is confirmed by an analysis of the gap between the 1987 Education Reform Bill and the 1988 Education Reform Act, suggesting a conflict of values between the government and academia. Salter and Tapper point out three aspects of the 1987 White Paper to which academic opinion strongly objected. One was the Government’s intention ‘that payment of grants to institutions should be replaced by a system of contracting between them and the body to succeed the UGC’, and ‘any serious failure to meet the terms of a previous contract may result in revised terms or a failure to renew’. The second is the implication that the UFC simply receives orders from the Secretary of State, and passes them on to universities, rather than providing advice to the Secretary. The third is the absence of proposals in the White Paper to protect academic freedom.

In the 1988 Education Reform Act, the first aspect in respect to ‘contract’, which Salter and Tapper address, was not altered, as indicated earlier. The second and the third aspects in respect to the power of the Secretary of State and the absence of the protection of academic freedom were not dramatically changed, but were slightly moderated in the 1988 Act. The original draft of the 1987 Education Reform Bill attempted to give the Secretaries of State more power over higher education by permitting the Secretary to intervene directly in the affairs of institutions over a much wider area of activity than Parliament had previously allowed. The ambiguous term, ‘any direction’, in Article 134 (8) of the 1988 Education Reform Act, regarding a reserve power of direction by the Secretaries of State, is testimony to the compromise between the government and higher education institutions.
As stated above, the concept of university autonomy is absent in the 1987 White Paper; however, the concept is incorporated in the 1988 Education Reform Act (although it is not emphasised, as indicated earlier). The Article on academic tenure, in which University Commissioners (1988-1993) are empowered to amend university status so as to bring academic staff of the universities within the operation of the general law relating to employment, is incorporated in the phrase regarding protection of academic freedom:

In exercising those functions, the Commissioners shall have regard to the need to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.\textsuperscript{541} [Article 202 2a]

The inclusion of the phrase on academic freedom is the consequence of a concession during the passage of the Education Reform Bill.\textsuperscript{542}

5.3.3 1997 DEARING COMMITTEE REPORT

This section argues that \textit{Higher Education in the Learning Society} (Dearing Report) chaired by Sir Ron Dearing can be characterised within the 'utilitarian' concept in relation to changes in the global economy.\textsuperscript{543} This characteristic of the Report is relevant to governmental New Right strategy for minimal emphasis on the traditional meaning of university autonomy [see 3.2.1], and a set of associated concepts including a utilitarian view, and strong support for the governmental position.\textsuperscript{544}

Utilitarianism is emphasised in relation to the function of higher education in the context of a changing global economic milieu in the Report. Identified economic changes in the Report include increasing economic integration in the world, changes in the labour market, and the changing structure of the UK
Utilitarian values in the Dearing Inquiry are exemplified, in particular, in two of the four purposes of higher education which the Dearing Report advocates: 'to increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to foster their application to the benefit of the economy and society'; and 'to serve the needs of an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based economy at local, regional and national levels'.

In this line of argument, the Dearing Report supports the governmental utilitarian views on higher education, not in relation to public funding, but rather to the economy:

This report demonstrates the ways in which higher education has now become of national economic importance, and that its place in the national economy will grow. This means that, even were it not to be a major source of funding, the Government would wish to concern itself with higher education, as it has so strongly done in the last decade.

The characteristics of the Dearing Report which are outlined above are associated with other values including neo-liberalism and university autonomy, and relations among actors in the universities. The following sections analyse neo-liberalism and university autonomy in relation to utilitarianism and conservatism.

**Neo-liberalism**

The Dearing Report takes a similar stance to the Government on the concept of the 'quasi-market'. David Robertson argues that the Dearing Report fails to resolve the principal tension between the market and state steerage. The market policy, Robertson explains, emphasises the importance of regulation and control in the hands of state agencies and the DfEE, while state steerage eschews concepts relating to a market-based alliance of providers, service users and other stakeholders. This interpretation, however, by locating the concept of market in opposition to state steerage, does not consider the concept of the quasi-market. Moreover, the Dearing Committee, in fact, supported market strategy by
recommending a contribution by graduates in employment to the costs of higher education.\textsuperscript{549} The elements of the market (which are notably observed in the area of funding), however, are embedded in pragmatism rather than in the response to global economy. Given the estimated increase in higher education expenditure as a result of the expansion of higher education (which the Dearing Inquiry supports) the Committee poses the question, ‘who should pay for higher education?’\textsuperscript{550}

University Autonomy and New Managerialism

The Dearing Report emphasises accountability, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness rather than university autonomy and institutional freedom. The Dearing Inquiry gives attention to university autonomy to some extent, linking it with the concept of diversification in higher education.\textsuperscript{551} However, clear recommendations to maintain or improve either the diversification of higher education or universities’ autonomy are absent. For example, Recommendation 61 attempts to deflect the criticism of the increasing homogeneity of higher education as a result of the strategies of the funding bodies (suggesting an increase of state control and a decline of diversity). However, it fails to propose a crack-down approach:

\begin{quote}
We recommend to the Government and the Funding Bodies that diversity of institutional mission, consistent with higher quality delivery and the responsible exercise of institutional autonomy, should continue to be an important element of the United Kingdom’s higher education system; and that this should be reflected in the funding arrangements for institutions.\textsuperscript{552}
\end{quote}

The reformulation of the concept of university autonomy [see 3.2.1] is not an issue in the Report; there is minimal emphasis on it. The issue of management is emphasised in relation to effective and efficient use of resources by institutions, in particular the expansion of higher education, giving attention to: ‘how the “value for money and cost-effectiveness should be obtained in the use of resources”’.\textsuperscript{553}
The issue of governance is also stressed in the Dearing Report, incorporating the concept of 'code of practice' and defining its purpose. This implies an increase in the homogeneity of the university system.

This section has argued that the Dearing Committee attempted to gain consensus among stakeholders in the universities, which caused a reduction in the number of dynamic and radical recommendations, notwithstanding that governmental discourse is influential as a whole. On the basis of the arguments and analyses, offered above, the next section concludes this chapter.

5.4 CENTRAL AUTHORITIES
5.4.1 POLITICAL PARTIES
This section analyses the policies and ideologies of the Conservative New Right (1979-1997) and the New Labour's Third Way (1997-2000). The main documents analysed are listed below. The selection was based on the criteria of relevance and the availability of the data.

The section identifies that Conservative Governments and arguably the New Labour Government have taken a neo-liberal stance, employing neo-liberal discourses such as 'competitiveness', 'efficiency', 'cost-effectiveness', 'value for money', 'standards', and 'quality'. The Conservative and the New Labour Governments have also espoused contractual English university autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism. These ideological positions of Conservative and New Labour governments justify governmental intervention in the university sector.

It is argued in the next section that one of the main differences between Conservative and New Labour Governments is that the notion of the knowledge economy in the New Labour Government is more elaborate than that articulated by Conservative Governments.
5.4.1.1 THE NEW RIGHT

Neo-liberalism

The ideological stance of Conservative Governments was coherent in terms of its support for neo-liberalism between 1979 and 1997. The following documentary analysis, however, suggests changing application of neo-liberal doctrine over the Conservative Governments' period. The different application has caused a complexity in the changing pattern in the balance between government and the quasi-market. An analysis of the 1985 Green Paper, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, as well as the adoption of strategic funding allocation by the UGC suggests that the neo-liberal stance of the Conservative Party with respect to the universities can be traced back to the mid-1980s — before the introduction of the quasi-market system in 1988. The 1979 introduction of the full-cost payment for international students could be interpreted as the first sign of a shift towards the marketisation of the university sector. The proposal in the Green Paper includes two significant elements of a ‘quasi-market’, although the neo-liberal discourse of the Conservative Party, such as ‘market’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘cost-effectiveness’, and ‘efficiency’ was not directly used. One is the creation of the condition of a competitive environment (e.g. financial incentives by the state). The other is a set of recommendations relating to the increase of state control, although the Paper concomitantly rejects central planning. For instance, the Paper stresses the continuity of periodic letters of guidance by the Secretary of State for Education and Science about the UGC’s financial allocations, implying the future expansion of governmental guidance on finance related issues such as student intake. Other examples include the Paper’s support of the Green Paper for the UGC’s strategic funding allocation and its stress on new relationships between government and the UGC.

The following evidence between 1988 and 1994 suggests that the balance between the state and the market – after the establishment of the quasi-market in 1988 as a result of the change in the funding mechanism – has not been
permanently fixed; it has been changing. First, three observations based upon a comparison between the 1985 Green Paper and the 1987 White Paper, *Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge*, indicate increasing government interest in the universities and the subordination of the (higher) education policy to economic policy. The first observation is that the 1987 White Paper emphasised central planning and the Secretary of State’s reserve power to issue directions to the UFC, while the 1985 Green Paper clearly rejected state planning. The 1987 White Paper proposed government planning guidelines for the university system as a whole:

> the Government sees no practical scope for a united planning body for higher education of the kind comprehended by the term "overarching body". It accepts its own responsibility for higher education policy and planning as these may be enhanced by the absence of such a body. (1985 Green Paper)

The Government should provide guidelines at appropriate intervals to set the framework for the planning process which the UFC and the universities should conduct. (1987 White Paper)

The second observation is that the shifting language for the transmission of messages between government and the UFC, from ‘guidance’ and ‘periodic letters’ in 1985 to the UFC being ‘governed’ by ‘financial memoranda’ in 1988 is also testimony to an increase in government control. The third observation is that the 1985 Green Paper did not clearly relate economic need to strategic financial allocation. However, in the 1987 White Paper, the Government identified economic need, and linked it to financial incentives for the stimulation of a competitive environment by proposing that the UFC should make public funds available to universities to reward those institutions successful in meeting the needs of industry and commerce. At the practical and strategic levels, the responsibility of the universities for the community’s economic wellbeing was
incorporated in the university sector by constituting the committee of the UFC from members of both the academic and the non-academic communities (including those from the economic sector).

Substantial government control (not merely discourse) can be observed in the areas of quality and tenure [see 2.4.1 regarding quality control, and 3.3.3 regarding government involvement in the tenure issue].

Secondly, the 1992 reform — the incorporation of polytechnics into the university sector (which, abolished the dual higher education system) and the introduction of a single funding structure in 1992 — can be interpreted as a change in the balance between the state and the market towards the pure market. The logic of the proposal in the 1991 White Paper, Higher Education: a New Framework, for a unitary higher education system was that a uniform higher education system could promote competition among institutions through competition for funds, which would consequently bring about efficiency.561

Thirdly, in the area of funding, the placing of a cap in student places in 1994 suggests that the quasi-market was distance from the concept of pure market.

University Autonomy and New Managerialism
The argument regarding the extent to which governments have historically involved themselves in the governance of the universities is open to question. For example, Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney argue that the universities have never been free from the influence of the centre, pointing to the Royal Commissions in the nineteenth century, Royal Charters granted through the Privy Council, and circulars, visitations, and subject-based resource allocation by the UGC.562

The analysis of official publications in 1985 and 1991 provides an insight into the Conservative Governments’ political stance in relation to university autonomy and management issues over the period. The 1985 Higher Education Green Paper, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, contained the
concepts of accountability, utilitarianism, and greater value for money. It also proposed improvement in the governance of individual institutions, especially by strengthening the vice-chancellor’s role in providing management particularly to promote quality enhancement and efficiency in financial management. This proposal had already been made by the UGC and the Jarratt Committee Report in 1985, which called for higher education to adopt more efficient managerial styles and structure.

Accountability was linked to quality control in governmental policy in the 1991 higher education White Paper, *Higher Education: A New Framework*. The Paper emphasised the enhancement of quality control, in particular, in economy-related areas including ‘the links with industry and commerce’ and ‘the industrial and commercial relevance of provision’. This document also gave attention to external examiners from the economic sector, proposing that the steering council of the single quality assurance unit should have industrial and professional members as well as academic members.

**Vocationalism**
The section argues that the economic views of the Conservative Governments — in particular increasing competitiveness, and the rapid and unpredictable changes in the global economy — had a strong impact on their policy strategies. In the Competitiveness White Papers published between 1994 and 1996, the Conservative Governments justified intervention in economic activities. Those White Papers provided strategic policies which attempted to provide a stable macroeconomic environment, promote liberalisation with the encouragement of foreign direct inward investment, provide for updating and upgrading the skills and knowledge of the labour force, and improve value for money and standards in public services such as education. The Higher Education White Paper of 1991 identifies the significance of the economic function of higher education and lifelong learning in meeting changes in the labour market such as the increase in
self-employment and employment in small and medium-sized enterprises, and the trend to ‘portfolio careers’.\textsuperscript{572}

Pressure to respond to the substantial needs of the national economy was exerted on the former polytechnics rather than the university sector. In the 1980s, accountability, human capital, and economic needs were all considered to be government concerns. The 1985 Green Paper’s main concern was to increase the output of highly-qualified manpower.\textsuperscript{573} The 1987 Higher Education White Paper emphasised greater accountability for the provision of highly qualified manpower for the state’s needs.\textsuperscript{574} It stated that the aims and purposes of higher education are to ‘serve the economy more effectively, pursue basic research and scholarship in the arts and humanities, and have closer links with industry and commerce, and promote enterprise’.\textsuperscript{575} The 1991 Higher Education White Paper reconfirmed and endorsed a utilitarian standpoint in defining one of the major tasks of higher education: to meet the needs of industry and commerce. This economy-oriented stance was strategically linked to quality enhancement and to ‘cost-effective expansion’ policies such as the introduction of a quality assurance system, and the increase of part-time courses for those in employment.

Governmental strategy to meet economic needs was substantially changed in the mid-1980s. The 1985 Green Paper emphasised the need to increase the output of graduates from particular subjects such as science, engineering, and technology.\textsuperscript{576} However, since the release of the 1987 White Paper, the emphasis has shifted; the government has no longer focused on particular subjects, but rather all subjects, emphasising the expansion of participation in all subjects.\textsuperscript{577} This point is linked to the government expansion policy on higher education.

5.4.1.2 THE THIRD WAY

This sub-section argues that New Labour’s Third Way political strategy for the universities does not largely differ from New Right policy in respect to the relations between the universities and economic globalisation, and those between
government and the universities. The Third Way discourse of the New Labour government has reinforced the power of government and supported the rationalisation of institutional management, in which traditional English university autonomy is not emphasised.

**Neo-liberalism**

New Labour's ideology is commonly referred to as the Third Way, defined in terms of the contrasts between the concepts of Old Left and New Right. Tony Blair's Fabian pamphlet, *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century*, and the work of Anthony Giddens (Tony Blair's advisor) suggest there are elements of both Left and Right in Third Way ideology.

Tony Blair, in the Fabian pamphlet, explains that the Third Way is the policy of the centre-left, which departs from both the Old Left agenda such as 'tax and spend', and the New Right's agenda. The latter is criticised on the grounds that its strategies brought about failing education, social polarisation, and an increase of crime. Blair defines the Third Way as a 'modernised social democracy' committed to social justice.

Giddens locates the Third Way in the political left-of-centre, while asserting that it is different from the Old Left [see Table 5.1 (below)]. Old-style social democracy, or the welfare state, was characterised as a mixed economy, government involvement in social and economic life, full employment, egalitarianism, and Keynesian demand management and corporatism. The Third Way in Giddens' concept is a 'renewed social democracy', in which Keynesian demand management is abolished; the concept is more diversified than the original social democracy, which is seen as corresponding to the philosophy of welfare states before the surge of the New Right's neo-liberalism. New social democracy has shifted from concentrating on the redistribution of wealth, as in the Old Left, to promoting wealth creation, which implies that the Third Way accepts some social inequalities as a consequence of capitalist wealth creation.
### Table 5.1 Conceptual Differences between the Old Left, the New Right, and the Third Way, as Seen by Anthony Giddens

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In Giddens’ definition, New Right elements are not incorporated in the Third Way.⁵⁸⁶ Giddens generates a causal explanation for the avoidance of New Right concepts in the new ideology, finding a rationale for the rise of the Third Way ideology in contradictions within the New Right philosophy — which is informed by both conservatism and market philosophy.⁵⁸⁷ (Neo-liberalism, in Giddens’ rationale, is almost an equivalent term to ‘New Right’.) More accurately, conflicts between conservatism — whose central concern is based upon preserving inheritances of the past — and the market principle — which focuses on the hope for continuous economic growth in the future — weakened the New Right.⁵⁸⁸

Neo-liberal values embedded in Third Way ideology are concentrated in two areas: (a) the contradictory dimension between the two concepts related to state power — increased state control and minimal government intervention in the socio-economic domain; and (b) economic policy (discussed below).

(a) the contradictory dimension between the two concepts related to state power

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In borrowing the neo-liberal framework, the new Social Democracy of the Third Way avoids extensive government intervention and planning in the socio-economic domain, which the Old Left, in contrast, practised. The Third Way, however, does not adopt a pure market policy; government is interventionist insofar as it seeks to create favourable conditions in the global economy, so that firms can be, according to the logic of the New Labour Government, innovative, and workers more efficient. The difference in terms of the interpretation of neo-liberalism between New Labour and the Conservative Governments is, in the New Labour Government’s view, that the New Labour Party attempted to distinguish its market strategies from those of the New Right, emphasising partnership between the government and industry. The 1997 manifesto of New Labour, _Because Britain Deserves Better_, stated:

> The old left would have sought state control of industry. The Conservative right is content to leave all to the market. We reject both approaches. Government and industry must work together to achieve key objectives aimed at enhancing the dynamism of the market, not undermining it. 589

Between 1997 and 2000, the emphasis on neo-liberalism declined in New Labour policy, although the introduction of the tuition fee and the continuity of the standard national fee provided a complex picture in terms of neo-liberalism. 590 This argument is, however, based on a narrow definition of neo-liberalism; it does not take account of the concept of the quasi-market. The relation between neo-liberalism and the Third Way is more appropriately understood within the concept of the quasi-market, and the balance between government and the market as well as the review of the state’s role on particular issues. 591

The combination of neo-liberalism and the social democracy of New Labour’s ideological position provides a different policy implication for education. For example, Ross Fergusson argues that New Labour’s modernisation policy focuses on inclusionary policies, collaboration, together with the concept of risk
sharing and ‘responsibilization’. New Labour, within modernisation policy, seeks ‘modernizing managerialism’ based upon ‘best value’ and long term effectiveness by replacing cost reduction and short term efficiency gains with the setting of standards and performance targets. This focus, according to Fergusson, differs from the New Right agenda of the Conservative governments which emphasised competition on the basis of ‘best value’ and long-term effectiveness over narrow conceptions of economy and efficiency. The New Right agenda relating to managerialism emphasised ‘market-replicating managerialism’ on the basis of consumer sovereignty and the devolution of controls to institutions.

(b) economic policy

The strategies of the Old Left and neo-liberalism in the Third Way reinforce each other in terms of the qualitative and quantitative emphasis on the demand for human capital for competitiveness in the global economy. The discourse of ‘more qualified labour’ and ‘anyone who has the capability for higher education’ provides evidence of the combination of the two ideologies.

The Third Way and the New Right share a similar view of economic globalisation. The logic which New Labour employs is that new knowledge, high skills and creativity, emphasised in ‘a new culture of learning’, are determinant factors of success in a knowledge driven economy. These capabilities can, in this logic, create high productivity business processes, high value goods and services, and therefore national competitiveness and personal prosperity. This logic is similar to the New Right discourse in the text of the Competitiveness White Papers since 1994. The apparent lack of a clear demarcation in economic policy between the Third Way and the New Right – at least in respect to skills and knowledge in the global economy is seen as one of the principal weaknesses of the Third Way.

There is criticism of this aspect of New Labour’s strategies. For example, Ken Jones and Richard Hatcher, criticising the ‘post-Fordist’ policy initiated by
the Labour Party, argue that the logic of post-Fordism is problematic in respect to its assertion that higher quality oriented education programs bring about an evenly developed economy.599

In the context of school education, elements of both Old Left and New Right ideologies are also found in New Labour's policy strategy in the context of school education. Sally Power and Geoff Whitty argue that both Old Left and New Right elements can be identified in the educational programme of New Labour's Third Way, in particular, in the Educational Action Zone policy, suggesting similarities of education policies – at least at the practical level – between Conservative and Labour governments.600 The social-democratic agenda of old Labour found in New Labour's educational agenda includes state involvement in education and an emphasis on egalitarianism. Features of the neoliberal agenda found in New Labour policy include the emphasis on quasi-markets and arguably the acceptance of inequality as the outcome of choice and diversity, as was emphasised during the terms of office of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Power and Whitty extend the argument further, arguing that New Labour's Third Way relies upon the New Right's agenda more than old Labour's, since the emphasis on 'equity' and 'inclusion' in New Labour's current education policy is relatively weak.601 Ann Hodgson and Ken Spours similarly identify the old Left and New Right as New Labour's ideological bedrock.602

In the context of the universities, New Labour's policy strategy can be characterised as a combination of (a) Old Left elements and (b) New Right elements. First, Old Left elements in Third Way policy can be summarised not only as the continuity of central control of the university sector (including government activities in the quasi-market), but also government policy relating to egalitarianism (e.g. government social inclusion policy). The social justice policy seeks to include those who have been under-represented in higher education, such as people from semi-skilled or unskilled family backgrounds and those with disabilities. The schemes in this policy include widening participation in the
universities by lifting the cap on student numbers (which Conservative Governments imposed), and the provision of additional funding as a reward to institutions committed to widening access and outreach. For example, David Blunkett, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, announced a new drive to improve access to higher education for able students from lower socio-economic groups in May, 2000. The concept of welfare – which was on the agenda of the old Labour Party – in contrast, has altered under the slogan, ‘Welfare to Work’. The government logic of the ‘Welfare to Work’ programme is clear: to break the cycle of poverty and welfare dependency by improving the skills of the jobless and emphasising that motivation is more effective in a high productive economy than are welfare benefits.

Along with widening participation, New Labour emphasises lifelong learning policy (which also applies to the Conservative Governments in the 1990s), incorporating higher education under the concept of lifelong learning and expanding adult education. The concept of lifelong learning is linked to employability in the changing labour market and the promotion of employees’ skills to meets employers’ needs.

Secondly, New Right elements in Third Way policies include the introduction of the payment of tuition fees by students (1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act), and the promotion of student’s choices by providing them with sufficient information.

In relation to the economy in the context of the universities, New Labour, like Conservative Governments, takes an instrumental view of the function of higher education, linking (higher) education and the (global) economy, and emphasising the enhancement of both the quality and the quantity of human capital. Tony Blair asserts that “education is the best economic policy we have”. This New Labour stance is also explicit in the context of a number of governmental documents such as the 1997 Labour Party manifesto, the 1998 Competitiveness White Paper (Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge...
Driven Economy), 1998 Education Green Paper (The Learning Age), and 1999 Education White Paper (Learning to Succeed). A key difference in economic strategies between the New Labour and New Right is that, in the Third Way policy strategies, economic policy is linked to social policy (e.g. to generate employment) while for the New Right social policy is accorded less importance.

New Labour’s strategy to promote the link between the universities and the economy includes four elements. The first is to encourage institutions to increase programmes offering students work experience opportunities. The second is to promote entrepreneurship in higher education programs, promoting ‘Business Links’ especially with SMEs (Small and Medium size Enterprises). The third is greater attention to core skills. The fourth is the introduction of a two-year vocationally-oriented Foundation Degree, and the introduction of the Reach Out Fund (launched in 1999 to encourage higher education institutions to respond to the needs of industry and the community for the improvement of the state’s economic competitiveness).

New Labour’s think tanks such as DEMOS argue still more strongly for the instrumentalism of higher education for economic competitiveness. DEMOS emphasises the crucial role of higher education in a knowledge driven economy. Danny Quah at the London School of Economics and Political Science, as a New Labour advisor, argues that higher education could help the ‘missing middle’ in public policy by developing the cultural experience – which is inevitable in a knowledge economy – within higher education institutions. The Institute for Public Policy Research, a New Labour think tank, has similarly emphasised an instrumental view of higher education for the purpose of the economy, publishing Higher Education: Expansion and Reform, and University for Industry: Creating a National Learning Network.
University Autonomy and New Managerialism

New Labour's *Higher Education for the 21st Century: Response to the Dearing Report* (1998) indicates that the Government supports the idea of institutional reform in governance, management, and leadership:

The Government agrees with the Dearing Committee that the quality and effectiveness of higher education institutions' management and governance is and will continue to be very important, as will their accountability to their public for performance and responsiveness. Further, in the interests of public understanding, there needs to be more clarity and consistency in the use of institutional titles and names.\(^6\)

The New Labour Government supports the Committee's recommendation of improvement of this area, in particular, to ensure that the identity of the governing body in each institution is 'clear and undisputed' in the roles of the Councils and Courts (Recommendation 54 in Dearing Report).\(^6\) In relation to traditional English university autonomy [3.3.3], the Government, in this document, takes a cautious position regarding the traditional sense of university autonomy. The Government's response to the issue of the removal of degree awarding powers from under-performing universities (Recommendation 64 in Dearing Report) is testimony to such a stance of the Government.

**Recommendation 64 in Dearing Report:**
We recommend to the Government that it takes actions, either by amending the powers of the Privy Council or by ensuring that conditions can be placed on the flow on public funds, to enable the removal of degree-awarding powers where the Quality Assurance Agency demonstrates that the power to award degrees has been seriously abused.

**New Labour Government’s response:**
The Government has considered this recommendation carefully and agrees that it is important for speedy and effective action to be taken in the circumstances described. It believes, however, that the new arrangements for safeguarding standards should be put in place and tested and hopes that measures short of the withdrawal of the power to award degrees will be sufficient to safeguard standards.\(^6\)
The analysis of *Higher Education for the 21st Century: Response to the Dearing Report* yields three interpretations relating to why the Government supports the improvement of 'institutional management and governance': (1) its compatibility with the concept of accountability, particularly in respect of performance and responsiveness; (2) its relevance to governmental strategy for quality enhancement; and (3) its compatibility with governmental manoeuvres. The first interpretation indirectly links accountability with economic globalisation inasmuch as a strengthening of institutional management and governance will empower institutions to assume greater accountability in respect to economic imperatives. The second and third interpretations are linked to the debate on the extent to which the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) can intervene in institutions' performance. New Labour endorses intervention by the QAA at the institutional level, although as pointed out above, it takes a cautious position on the issue.

The relationships between the QAA, government, and the universities have continued to fluctuate, raising the question of the extent to which the QAA should be involved in the universities.

**Vocationalism**

The Labour Government's stance on vocationalism is similar to that of the Conservative Governments in two respects. One is that it accepts the importance of the transition towards a knowledge-based economy. The other is the Government's endorsement of the view of the Dearing Committee's, that increased significance be given to the economic function of the universities. The view of the Dearing Committee endorsed by the Labour Government includes the idea that:

- a competitive economy relies on the capability to generate, engage with, and use knowledge which has been advancing rapidly;
higher education is increasingly significant in order to meet changes in the labour market such as the increase in self-employment and employment in small and medium-sized enterprises, and the trend to "portfolio careers"; greater flexibility in higher education would allow for work and study at the same time; and economic change requires a trans-disciplinary curriculum (this notion is expressed merely as a statement, not as a recommendation).

As argued, the political strategies of both Conservative and New Labour governments are not significantly different in terms of their quasi-market strategies; the consequences of their policies in relation to the relationships between government and the universities are similar. Such policy strategies of both governments are partially conveyed via the bureaucracy, the nature of which, however, has changed since the mid-1960s.

The next section examines changes in the economic related ideology of the central administration of government.

5.4.2 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

The argument for the political neutrality and rationality of the central administration is contestable; the nature of central administration is not politically neutral. On the contrary, its nature bears similarity to that of a number of interest groups. Burton Clark, for instance, observes:

... central administrative staffs are not neutral tools of higher education policy, but rather become interest groups themselves, ones with privileged access, vested rights, and self-sustaining points of view.

The ideological stance of the central administration can be understood in the context of utilitarian and vocational values. The perspective of the central administration on traditional English university autonomy and neo-liberalism – in
which the guise of the neutrality of the central administration on the surface makes it difficult to identify its ideological position – is unclear; its ideological position remains ambiguous.

This section argues that utilitarian and vocational values of the central administration of education have been increasingly emphasised since the 1960s, although the extent to which its ideology has affected the university sector is not so clear-cut. [Utilitarianism, as it is employed by the central administration, reinforces the centralisation of the university system.] It can be interpreted that this change in the balance of ideology within the central administration was the result of an ideological tension between the external and academic communities, and a compromise between the two parties.

This section focuses on an analysis of economic values and ideology of the central administration and their implications for the universities during the following periods: (1) the Department of Education and Science (DES) (1964-1992); (2) the Department for Education (DfE) (1992-1995); and (3) the Department of Education and Employment (DfEE) (1995-2001). The analysis of the third period (under the administration of the DfEE) is more detailed than the first and second periods (DES and DfE) because documentation on the DfEE is more accessible. The ideology of the DfES (Department for Education and Skills) (2001 onwards) is not analysed because the period – 2001 onwards – is out of the scope of this thesis.

The interpretation provided here is based upon the documentation produced by the central administration rather than that of political parties.

5.4.2.1 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (1964-1992)

This sub-section argues that in the mid-1970s prior to Thatcherism, the central administration employed utilitarianism, which was conceptually opposed to liberal education. The Department of Education and Science (DES) started to extend its jurisdiction by taking over the responsibility for the UGC from the Treasury in the
The power of the DES over the UGC became significant by the early 1980s. The utilitarian ideology of the DES, however, was not largely effective in the university sector.

Notwithstanding the past usage of utilitarian ideas, there is no conclusive evidence on which ideology, if any, was dominant in the central administration and the extent to which there was an ideological influence in the university sector between 1964 and 1992. There are several different interpretations of this issue. Brian Salter and Ted Tapper argue that the DES had developed an economic ideology internally by the 1970s, which was partly caused by external pressure from other departments, Parliament and political parties. The Department, according to Salter and Tapper, started to attempt to pass on its economic ideology to the universities in the late 1970s, which led to a long-term political strategy to demolish the power of liberal values in higher education. The influence of bureaucratic control on higher education was a new trend. This bureaucratic dynamic, Salter and Tapper suggest, has changed the relationship between the state and higher education. Salter and Tapper’s interpretation has been endorsed by the recent historical analysis undertaken by Richard Aldrich, David Crook, and David Watson, who further expand their argument. They suggest that there was movement towards an internal consensus in the DES on the need to meet the demand for industry in the 1970s, paying attention to young people’s ‘overt stratification’ relating to socio-economic background.

Criticising these arguments, Maurice Kogan and Stepen Hanney point to the absence of evidence in relation to a departmental consensus. In their argument, they emphasise the significance of the role of the Secretaries of State for Education – in particular, Sir Keith Joseph, Kenneth Baker, and Kenneth Clark – rather than that of the central bureaucracy.

Synthesising the above arguments, the most plausible interpretation of the ideology of the DES and its impact on the university sector is that the DES gradually strengthened its utilitarian, vocationalist, and interventionist stance in...
the 1970s; however, the extent to which the DES reached an internal agreement is not clear. James Callaghan’s Ruskin College speech in 1976 and the ‘Great Debate’ suggest that utilitarianism took hold before the rise of Thatcherism. Such an interpretation can lead to the assumption that the utilitarian stance of the Department might have brought about an antagonistic attitude of the DES to the concept of liberal education and the associated relevant ideology of university autonomy.

A gap existed between the Government’s intention and its implementation when the DES was established in 1964. This suggests that the impact of the DES on the university sector was restricted, at least until the mid-1980s. For example, there was, according to Kogan and Hanney, an intention on the part of the DES to promote science education in the universities through an increased allocation of funding for science.627 Such a governmental intention was never accomplished in the higher education context.628

5.4.2.2 DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION (1992-1995)

There is a lack of evidence to suggest that the change from the DES to the DfE in 1992 resulted in a significant shift in the ideology of the central administration in relation to neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism. The DfE, in particular, focused on two points: (1) the application of neo-liberalism by reinforcing quality control and promoting private funding, and (2) the emphasis on vocationalism.

First, two DfE publications relating to quality control — *Higher Quality and Choice: The Charter for Higher Education*, and *Value Added in Education: A Briefing Paper from the Department for Education* — as well as the establishment of Higher Education Quality Council and the HEFC’s introduction of the RAE during the DfE period indicate that the DfE attempted to implement neo-liberal policy with a particular emphasis on the improvement of quality.629 DfE’s publication, *Education Means Business: Private Finance in Education* indicates
that the DfE attempted to increase private funding in the university sector, which could be seen as a force to move the university sector closer to pure market.\textsuperscript{630}

Secondly, the DfE's stance on vocationalism can be understood in two ways: the emphasis on vocationalism in the university sector; and an apparent de-emphasis on science. "Vocational Education: Fastest Growing Area of Higher Education" in \textit{DfE News} suggests the DfE's vocationally oriented stance.\textsuperscript{631} It could be interpreted that the exclusion of the term, 'science' in the change of name from the DES to the DfE in 1992 signalled a rescinding of the government's intention to promote science education in schooling as well as the government's intention to separate the main part of research expenditure from the teaching budget.\textsuperscript{632} There is, however, little evidence to suggest that a de-emphasis on science applies to the university sector.

\textbf{5.4.2.3 DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT (1995 - 2001)}

This sub-section argues that the education bureaucracy between 1995 and 2001 emphasised the following ideologies: 1) utilitarian and vocational values; and 2) accountability. These ideologies, which were strongly linked to the concept of economic globalisation, were not conceptually opposed to education liberalism as espoused by the DfEE.

First, it could be interpreted that the integration of the Departments for Education and Employment in 1995 strengthened utilitarian ideology through the merging of two previously divided areas — academic and vocational qualifications, and education and industry. Two pieces of documentation — the proposal for the creation of DfEE from the Tory Reform Group and the stated aims of the DfEE — suggest that the central administration reinforced its utilitarian and vocational view by creating the Department for Education and Employment. The analysis set out in the Tory Reform Group's 1994 publication, \textit{The Great Jobs Crisis}, which recommended the merger of the Departments of Education and of Employment, suggests that the formation of the DfEE was intended to strengthen the vocational
value of the central administration of education. The report emphasised the importance of improving the linkage between the academic and vocational spheres in order to respond to new labour market trends including structural unemployment and competitiveness in global markets. Interestingly, this report by the Conservatives includes the dimension of social justice; it is, however, discussed in relation to unemployed mature workers rather than in the context of education.

This utilitarian and vocational view is also observed in the overall aim of the DfEE in 1995 under the Conservative government and in 1998 under the New Labour government. The overall aim of the DfEE when it was established in 1995, reads as follows:

To support economic growth and improve the nation's competitiveness and quality of life by raising standards of educational achievement and skill and by promoting an efficient and flexible labour market.

Between 1998 and 2001, under the New Labour Government, the DfEE continuously paid attention to the global competitive economy, although social justice (or more accurately, individual achievement and social inclusion) were also overarching goals:

To give everyone the chance, through education, training and work, to realise their full potential, and thus build an inclusive and fair society and a competitive economy.

New Labour's incorporation of the concept of social justice was the main difference between the administrations of the Conservative and the New Labour governments.

Both DES and the DfEE shared common utilitarian and vocational values. However, the two gave attention to different areas of the economy; therefore, they had different focuses on the sphere of education, including economic supply and
demand. The DfEE focused on sets of concepts – economic competitiveness, globalisation, lifelong learning, and the supply side of the economy – while the DES gave attention to structural unemployment, social costs, and the demand side of the economy. These values of the DfEE which relate to economic globalisation and vocationalism were derived from those of the Conservative government in the later part of its administration, (and arguably by the New Labour government). Richard Aldrich, David Crook, and David Watson argue that the institutional merger of the DfEE in 1995 was associated with ‘several components of later Conservative thinking’. Later Conservative thinking included the shift of emphasis from the demand to the supply of skills, and the rise of the conceptions of lifetime learning, labour flexibility, and re-training. These shifts, they suggest, were inherent in the development of the notion of globalisation and post-Fordism; this, consequently, changed the patterns of governmental responses to the economy – from structural unemployment and its social costs, to the organisation of work which required a different conception of the role of education.

Secondly, the review of the central administration concerning the ‘modernisation’ of administration as it is commonly referred to, including the DfEE, by the New Labour Government (from 1998 onwards), suggests a change in the profile of the DfEE towards a more accountable, efficient, and modernised entity. It is, however, too early to assess the full impact of this ‘modernisation’. The 1998 White Paper, *Public Services for the Future: Modernisation, Reform, Accountability*, set up measurable targets (Public Service Agreements) to raise standards and improve the quality of public services.

The central bureaucracy viewed vocational and academic values, and accountability and education liberalism as compatible and of equal worth. The aforementioned Conservative Government’s report, for example, attempted to incorporate both vocational and academic values.

The restriction of the substantial power of the DfEE over the universities, despite the strengthening of utilitarianism within the Department, can be observed
in relation to the role of the Secretary of State. The regular involvement of the Department with the universities was not extensive. While not altogether compelling, evidence below suggests that governmental policy relating to the universities was conveyed to the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) directly via the Secretary rather than the DfEE. The legal basis of the relationship between the Secretary of State and the HEFCE set out in the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act provides for a direct channel of communication between the Secretary and the HEFCE. In addition, the guidance given in annual letters and circulars by the Secretary of State to the chairman of the HEFCE reinforces the power of the Secretary of State in respect to the universities.

This section argued that the utilitarian and vocational views of the central administration of education were strengthened following the institutional change from DES / DfE to the DfEE. The next section examines the ideologies of funding councils, a distinctive stakeholder in the English university system, giving attention to the relations between government and the universities.

5.4.3 FUNDING COUNCILS

The argument that the political stance of the central administration is not neutral [see 5.4.2] can be applied to funding councils. Funding councils have sought to maximise higher education budgets, provide funding to the universities and colleges strategically, and increase their authority over the universities.

This section argues that in the 1980s, the emphasis of funding councils in relation to ideology changed from traditional English university autonomy to contractual English university autonomy, neo-liberalism, and vocationalism, leading to a greater response of the funding councils to economic demand. This change had significant implications for the transformation of the university system towards a domination of ‘public definition’ over ‘private definition’, which was outlined in 2.1 of the thesis. Funding councils have not given great attention to
new managerialism; thus, this section does not analyse the ideological position of
the HEFCE towards new managerialism.

This section analyses funding councils chronologically from the University
Grants Committee (UGC) [1919-1988] to the University Funding Council (UFC)
[1988-1992], and later the Higher Education Funding Council for England
(HEFCE) [1992 onwards]. The change of ideology within funding councils from
the UGC period to the HEFCE period was dynamic during the period of the UGC
in the latter half of the 1980s and during the transition from the UGC to the UFC.
The analysis includes the period before 1979 – beyond the timeframe of this thesis
– in order to clarify the change in the characteristics of the UGC.

In the UGC period, two changes – the shift in the administration of the
UGC from the Treasury to the Department of Education and Science (DES) in
1964, and the UGC’s financial arrangement in the 1980s – indicate the shift in
balance of the ideologies of the UGC from traditional liberal education to
utilitarianism. The power shift in 1964 had major implications for the ideological
positioning of the UGC from the traditional liberal ideal of the university to
utilitarianism; this shift can be explained by the different ideological stances of the
Treasury and the DES, and in their relationships with the UGC. The ideology of
the Treasury at that time was embedded in the traditional liberal ideal of the
university. Accordingly, the Treasury functioned as a device to protect the
traditional liberal ideal of the universities from the values of the Committee of the
Public Accounts in Parliament which espoused greater accountability.640 By
contrast, DES employed utilitarian values which were in stark opposition to
traditional liberal ideals.641 This change in administrative responsibility from the
Treasury to the DES should not be exaggerated since utilitarianism within DES
did not strengthen until the economic crisis between 1974 and 1975. The 1974-
1975 economic crisis, as Salter and Tapper have argued, had a great impact on the
UGC’s ideology because the UGC used this historical incident as the primary
justification for the intervention of DES into the higher education system.642 In the
early 1980s, the transformation of the UGC’s financial arrangements – the large reduction of governmental expenditure on the universities after the post-war expansion period and the subsequent dependence of the universities on it moved the UGC towards a systematic financial strategy and prioritised allocation of funding. This change brought about a significant response of the UGC to economic demand, in particular, in respect to the issue of increasing the number of science and technology students.

The new financial strategy of the UGC suggests a shift in ideology of the UGC towards accountability. In 1980, all general subsidies for overseas students were withdrawn in accordance with the introduction of the full-time course fee for overseas students in 1979. In 1981, the UGC started to impose cuts on a selective basis in compliance with the 1981 Public Expenditure White Paper which advocated a 15 percent reduction in higher education expenditure in the next three years. By the mid-1980s, the UGC had switched towards a competitive basis in the provision of educational services by means of monetary incentives, and a more direct response to governmental interests.

In 1989, the change in the funding body from the UGC to the UFC had a major impact on the shift in the function of the buffer bodies to that of becoming a state apparatus. Gareth Williams identifies differences between the UGC and the UFC: the UGC was to subsidise ‘core funds’, which constituted the largest part of the income of universities, while the UFC was ‘to provide funds in exchange for the provision of specific academic services rather than to subsidise institutions’. In other words, the state purchased higher education, which implied that the higher education system was subordinated to state interests such as economic prosperity. Similarly, Rosalind Pritchard argues that the establishment of the UFC was illustrative of the governmental intention to attempt to create a competitive market environment by using financial incentives, limiting resources, and encouraging the universities to increase student numbers. More accurately, the UFC situated the university sector in a competitive environment by
providing full-funding to half the student population out of the extra part of the student proportion which had increased as a result of university expansion, and ‘fees-only’ funding to the rest of students. Therefore, the universities were indirectly forced to attempt to attract fully funded students for financial reasons. Pritchard’s arguments above accord the elements of contractual autonomy [see 3.3.3].

A letter from the Secretary of State for Education and Science to the Chairman of the UFC in 1988 is testimony to Williams’ and Pritchard’s views on the change in the nature of the funding body: 649

I shall look to the Council to develop funding arrangements which recognise the general principle that the public funds allocated to universities are in exchange for the provision of teaching and research and are conditional on their delivery. 650

The new values adopted by the UFC largely aligned with that of the New Right Government, stressing the market doctrine, in which the confrontation between economic and university traditional values was no longer an issue. This was evident in the same letter from the Secretary of State for Education and Science which expressed the governmental intention to position the higher education system within the market economy:

I very much hope that it will seek ways of actively encouraging institutions to increase their private earnings so that the state’s share of institutions’ funding falls and the incentive to respond to the needs of students and employers is increased. 651

In the HEFCE period, the ideologies of the HEFCE (1992 onwards-) can be characterised as follows: (1) an emphasis on utilitarianism and accountability; (2) an emphasis on neo-liberalism; and (3) support for contractual English university autonomy and minimal emphasis on traditional English university autonomy.
These characteristics are similar to the stance of the UFC on utilitarianism, accountability, and neo-liberalism.

(1) An emphasis on utilitarianism and accountability

The documentary analysis indicates that the ideologies of the HEFCE are embedded in utilitarianism and accountability. For example, the submission of HEFCE to the Dearing Committee in 1997 emphasises the utilitarian dimension—in particular, the economic function of higher education—in the purpose of the higher education:

The HEFCE believes that the purposes of higher education (HE) set out by the Robbins Committee 30 years ago are still relevant today, but have been expanded to put more emphasis on preparing people for work, and responding to the needs of industry and commerce.632

The submission of the HEFCE to the Dearing Report makes a clear statement on accountability and value for money; ‘a body [the HEFCE] will be needed to distribute the public funds provided as institutional grant, and to ensure effective accountability for public funds and value for money’.633

Similarly, the HEFCE Strategic Plan 1999-2004 provides evidence that the ideology of the funding body is no longer ambiguous; it now emphasises utilitarian values, espouses governments’ economic policies, and functions as a state agency.634 In this Report, economics-based values as well as lifelong learning are central as well as its package concepts—accountability for the use of public funds, efficiency, and value for money. The Report advocates that the HEFCE ‘aims to be a major contributor to the debate about the central role for higher education in the UK’s economic development and the learning society’.655 The key concepts espoused by the HEFCE include five elements: an emphasis on the external demand from other stakeholders; the HEFCE’s involvement in higher education institutions; support of interaction between higher education, industry,
and commerce for the encouragement of knowledge transfer; support of the programme enhancement of teaching and research for the needs of employers and the economy; and student employability.

(2) An emphasis on neo-liberalism

The HEFCE employs neo-liberal doctrine, in which central intervention is justified, and in which student choice and diversity and differentiation of the universities are emphasised. The Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education in 1997, for example, espouses the market principle, while concomitantly stressing the need for an increase of central intervention in relation to the issues of diversity and differentiation:

The Council believes that market forces, student choice and the self-interest of individual institutions should continue to be primary instruments of change, reinforced by financial and other inducements provided through the funding mechanism. Nevertheless, in the future, more central intervention may be required to achieve diversity and differentiation between institutions and more co-operation.

The marketisation policy of the HEFCE emphasises graduates’ payments on the basis of a loan scheme, and student choice.

In the context of the government and university nexus, the support of the HEFCE for central intervention involves two concepts: the diversity and differentiation of the universities on the one hand; and centralisation of public funding and quality / standards on the other. Two concepts, in principle, create a contradiction in policy feasibility in practice. For example, the HEFCE supports the 1997 recommendations of the Dearing Report in its Response to the Dearing Report on the functions and roles of the QAA – quality and standards. The HEFCE also issued a warning about the setting-up of one unified standard in the university sector, emphasising the significance of the maintenance of diversity and differentiation in the university sector. Another example is the contradiction in
the stance of the HEFCE toward governance. The HEFCE supports recommendations of the Dearing Committee on the codes of practice on governance; the HEFCE concomitantly emphasises the diversification of universities:

We welcome the [Dearing] Committee’s recommendations that codes of practice should be established for governing bodies... Existing governance arrangements in the sector are diverse, and universities and colleges have different funding instruments, traditions and management practices. The implementation of the Committee’s recommendations, including the development of a code of practice, should reflect this. We would see value in a code which established common key principles, to be applied differentially according to circumstances, rather than one which was a uniform set of regulations.661

The neo-liberal logic employed by the HEFCE includes three characteristics: a rejection of the assertion of an association between the economy and the quantity of graduate outputs; a cautious stance on the expansion of the university sector; and incorporation of the concept of social justice. The first characteristic – the relations between graduate outputs and economic performance – is that the HEFCE denies casual relations between investment in higher education and economic performance.662 Therefore, the Council does not believe that the expansion of universities will bring about better economic performance. However, the HEFCE does focus on the relations between the universities and economic performance in respect to other issues. For example, the financial allocation of special funding for a variety of purposes of higher education suggests that the focus of the HEFCE policy responds to government economic priorities. In Higher Education Reach-out to Business and the Community Fund: Funding Proposals (1999), the HEFCE proposed new special funds to enhance the capability of higher education institutions to respond to the needs of businesses, from small to large companies, in an attempt to promote wealth creation.663 In the same year, out of a total £435 million for special funding, the HEFCE allocated
£11 million to the strategic special funding for business and the community in 1999/2000 [see Table 5.2 (below)].

Table 5.2 1999-2000 HEFCE Special Funding in England

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding in Million Pounds</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Learning and Teaching</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access and Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business and the Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>International</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Facilities</td>
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<td>Inherited Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value for Money, Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: HEFCE, Funding Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates Its Funds, Guide 00/07, February 2000, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub00/00_07.html], accessed date (6 March, 2000).

This position relates to the second characteristic of the HEFCE’s neo-liberal logic — its cautious stance on the expansion of the university sector — that is, that public funding should be allocated strategically. The HEFCE, in the submission to the Dearing Report, proposed that there should be no further expansion of higher education at the expense of an erosion of funding levels.

The third characteristic of the HEFCE’s neo-liberal logic – the incorporation of the principle of social justice – relates the principle to financial allocation and HEFCE’s support for wider participation in higher education by encouraging more participation from socio-economic groups who hitherto have been under-represented in the university sector. This ideological stance corresponds to that of the New Labour government. The 1997 publication of the
HEFCE, *Response to the Dearing Report*, supported the recommendation of the Dearing Report for the promotion of social justice.\(^{667}\) The *HEFCE Strategic Plan 1999-2004* provides an example of the alignment of ideologies between the HEFCE and New Labour's Third Way policy on social democracy.\(^{668}\) This Report emphasises widening participation in higher education for all ages by encouraging institutions to increase access, secure equal opportunities, support lifelong learning, and maximise achievement for all who can benefit from higher education.\(^{669}\) This policy became feasible as a result of a financial allocation; in its 1998 circular, *How the HEFCE Promotes Value for Money*, the HEFCE made clear its intention that the funding allocation could be linked to widened access to higher education in the future.\(^{670}\) In 1999/2000, the HEFCE allocated £20 million to recruit and support students underrepresented in higher education.\(^{671}\) In 2000/01, this was increased to £25 million.\(^{672}\)

Thirdly, the HEFCE espouses contractual English university autonomy, stressing the contractual relationships between government and individual universities, referring to government control of student numbers and government's financial penalties for individual universities which have not followed a 'contract':

---

Public funding for higher education is limited. We need to ensure that it provides value for money and is used for the intended purposes. One of the ways we do this is through an agreement with each institution, setting out the conditions it must meet to receive funding. The institution must have proper systems for managing and controlling its finances, and must submit annual audited financial statements... In return for the grant, each institution must teach a certain number of students, although this can vary within given limits. Each year the Government also sets a maximum number of full-time students, so that it can control public expenditure on higher education. We translate this into a maximum number for each university or college. There are financial penalties if these limits are exceeded.\(^{673}\)

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The Financial Memorandum is testimony to the strategy of the HEFCE which relates to contractual autonomy. For instance, the Financial Memorandum
between the HEFCE and the Institute of Education, University of London clarifies the responsibility of the Institution of Education to the HEFCE as follows:

The Institution shall must [sic.] report to the Council any use of funds which were earmarked or provided for specific purposes, for purposes other than those for which the funds were earmarked or provided, as soon as it becomes aware of such use.\textsuperscript{674}

In relation to student numbers, the Financial Memorandum between the HEFCE and the Institute of Education stipulated an upper limit for award holders, expressed as a maximum aggregate student number (MASN) in 1996/1997.\textsuperscript{675} The Financial Memorandum emphasised that any recruitment beyond these limits would give rise to a reduced grant in 1996-1997, although under-recruitment against the MASN would incur no financial penalty in the year.

The HEFCE’s espousal of utilitarianism, accountability and contractual university autonomy does not involve a complete rejection of traditional English university autonomy; the concept of traditional English university autonomy is still retained within the values of the HEFCE. Despite the legal setting of the HEFCE’s statutory relationship with government – which is legitimated under the Secretary of State in the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act – the Council’s relationships with government and higher education institutions has continuously been reviewed.\textsuperscript{676} The Dearing Committee Report recommended that the HEFCE should continue to be an intermediary body such as is the case with the present funding council, safeguarding the autonomy of institutions within a broad framework of public policy.\textsuperscript{677} In the DfEE’s review of the function of the HEFCE in 1998, the Steering Group rejected the option of abolishing the HEFCE and transferring its activities to the DfEE or an agency under the Department.\textsuperscript{678} The Steering Group in this review pointed out the significance of the traditional ideology of academic autonomy and the Council’s function as a buffer body for the reason of this rejection.
The HEFCE's approach to funding allocation also illustrates the safeguarding of traditional English university autonomy. The 'block grant' based financial allocation suggests that the value of the traditional English university autonomy has not been eroded. This assertion is based upon the definition of 'block grant', which is a collective funding unit which does not categorise such areas as teaching, research, and related activities in each institution. 'Block grant', therefore, allows each institution to be free to allocate finance internally at their own discretion, according to their own priorities, as long as they comply with the conditions set out in their Financial Memorandum with the HEFCE.

5.5 THE UNIVERSITIES
This section analyses three university bodies: the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) [currently ‘Universities UK’ (since 2000)], the Association of University Teachers (AUT), and National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (the NATFHE). The reasons for the selection of these particular university bodies are three-fold. First, the analysis of collective bodies should avoid any inconsistency in results of analysis which might occur by using data from individual universities. Secondly, these university bodies are influential stakeholders in the university system, as the number of their publications and submissions attest. Thirdly, this selection helps to identify the different ideological positions between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. The section, when necessary, refers to the collective body of the former polytechnics – the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics (abolished in 1992 following the integration of the Polytechnics into the university sector).

The CVCP comprises the vice-chancellors and principals of all the pre- and post-1992 universities in the UK. As Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney have pointed out, the role of the CVCP has increased, in particular, in the areas of the management of institutions and quality assessment since the 1980s, although the
degree of its effectiveness as an interest group is open to question. Examples of the increasingly influential role of the CVCP include the establishment of political entities such as the Jarratt and Reynolds Committees, the Academic Audit Units, and successor bodies. The extent to which individual universities use the CVCP as an interest group is not clear; at least, according to Kogan and Hanney, no such use was made of it by the pre-1992 universities.

The AUT had some 42,000 members from the academic and academic-related-staff (e.g. administrators, librarians, and computer staff) in both pre- and post-1992 universities in 1998. Its main activity is the negotiation of salaries and conditions of employments with government. The AUT’s members are still dominated by staff from the old universities even since the AUT’s absorption of the Association of Universities and Colleges in 1997, which increased the Association’s membership by 3,000 from the new university sector.

The members and associates of NATFHE include lecturers, tutors, and researchers at post-1992 universities and colleges of further and higher education. The aims of the NATFHE are as follows:

- To protect and promote members’ professional interests;
- To regulate their conditions of employment;
- To advance further and higher education;
- To protect members against discrimination;
- To advance equal opportunities;
- To promote the views of members to relevant bodies; and
- To promote standards of professional conduct.

Neoliberalism

Documentary analysis indicates that the CVCP has espoused the concept of the quasi-market which is embedded in the division of funding responsibility among government, graduates, and employers. Social justice is incorporated within this neo-liberal position of the CVCP. The CVCP’s submission to the Dearing
Committee, *Our Universities Our Future: The CVCP’s Evidence to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education* (1996), emphasises the significance of a balance between central planning and the market, thus supporting a quasi-market:

> A centrally planned system is not the answer, nor is one based entirely on the market. What is required is a balance between competition on the one hand and collaboration and complementarity on the other.⁶⁸⁵

The funding mechanism in this CVCP model is based upon the division of funding responsibility among government, employers, and university graduates. The 1996 CVCP submission to the Dearing Committee proposes sufficient public financial support and the replacement of maintenance grants by an effective loans system for students, (which was introduced by the New Labour Government).⁶⁸⁶ Similarly, the *CVCP Corporate Plan 1998/2001* — which sets out the key objectives for the organisation and outlines the strategies proposed — stresses the importance of strengthening quasi-market niches. It proposes an increase in public funding and improvement in the provision of information to consumers such as students, employers, and government.⁶⁸⁷

The CVCP’s neo-liberal stance is closely aligned to the concept of the pure market in respect to the CVCP’s support for the removal of the government’s cap on student numbers, (removed in 1994), and the introduction of the tuition fee (introduced in 1997). Regarding the removal of the government’s cap on student numbers, the CVCP, in its submission to the Dearing Report, supports the expansion of universities in response to market demand.⁶⁸⁸ The CVCP and Committee of Directors of Polytechnics in 1990 proposed to the then Conservative Government an increase in public funding, and, if necessary, the introduction of student payment of the tuition fee.⁶⁸⁹ This stance did not change when the Labour Government introduced the tuition fee in 1997; the CVCP demonstrated its
support for the recommendation of the Dearing Report by endorsing the introduction of £1,000 tuition fees for students in 1997 and 1998.690

The CVCP’s quasi-market strategy on the expansion of higher education incorporates a concern for social justice, emphasising participation by groups which had historically been under-represented. This position is compatible with the CVCP’s support for successive government’s neo-liberal strategies; the CVCP has, for example, endorsed both the introduction of £1,000 tuition fees and grants for lower socio-economic groups. The timing of the publication of the submission to the Dearing Committee – which was before the 1997 electoral victory of the New Labour Government – indicates that this was the original stance of the CVCP rather than one influenced by government.691 The CVCP continuously gives attention to widening access to higher education by young entrants from lower socio-economic groups; the 1998 CVCP report, *From Elitism to Inclusion: Good Practice in Widening Access to Higher Education*, is an illustrative example.692

The CVCP’s ideological position on social justice, however, involves an element of contradiction such as its support for the introduction of a top-up fee as proposed by the Russell Group in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Such a stance suggests a gap between the CVCP’s view and that of individual universities, many of which opposed the top-up fee. This contradiction reflects the diversity of values, interest, and views on university-related issues within the CVCP.

The NATFHE’s stance on neo-liberalism is weaker than that of the CVCP as evidenced by its criticism of the 1997 introduction of student fees, the removal of grants, and the unimplemented policy of top-up and differentiated fees (until 2001), despite the fact that both NATFHE and the CVCP are pro-expansionist.693 The ideological stance of NATFHE is embedded in social justice as evidenced by its support for widening participation and improved equity.694

In comparison with the CVCP and NATFHE, the AUT’s ideological stance in relation to neo-liberalism is not explicit.695
University Autonomy

The ideological stance of the CVCP in respect to university autonomy is explained in relation to the concepts of accountability and utilitarianism.

The following analysis suggests that the CVCP has traditionally supported traditional English university autonomy (which was conceptually isolated from the utilitarian view at least before the late 1980s). The CVCP’s ideological position was earlier identified in the memorandum of evidence and oral report of the CVCP to the Robbins Report (statements by members of the CVCP at a meeting with the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Lord President of the Council, regarding the Report of the Robbins Committee on Higher Education) in 1963. The evidence in these documents (as outlined below) suggests that the ideology of the CVCP in the early 1960s was based upon traditional English university autonomy. Firstly, the CVCP rejected ministerial responsibility for higher education. Secondly, it recommended the continuity of the ‘buffer principle’ of the UGC, which supported the then existing funding system via the UGC, and functioned to protect it from political interference.

Regarding utilitarian value, the CVCP presented its view on the function of the colleges of advanced technology (CATs) and training colleges, referring to the need for them to respond to state economic imperatives. However, there is no reference to the role of the university sector in respect to state economic imperatives. It could be interpreted that this omission signifies the CVCP’s implicit rejection of the application of the utilitarian view in the university sector.

The CVCP has redefined university autonomy by introducing the concept of contractual English university autonomy, where the traditional sense of university autonomy and the concepts of accountability and utilitarianism are compatible. For instance, the 1991 CVCP Report, the State of the Universities, emphasises the gravity of ‘accountability’ in particular. The logic of this Report is based upon the belief in a correlation between increased public funding and an improved response of the universities to the economic and social demands of the
state. The concept of accountability from the mid-1990s onwards has been combined with the concept of traditional English university autonomy – a concept historically antagonistic to accountability and utilitarianism – which have since become the twin concepts of ‘autonomy’ and ‘accountability’ in the discourse of the CVCP. For example, the *Corporate Plan 1996-99* and *Corporate Plan 1998-2001* identified the twin concepts as one of the six priority areas.699

The change in the ideological position of the CVCP can be understood in relation to the change in function of the CVCP in the university system. The function of the CVCP changed from that of a negotiator with the UGC particularly on the issue of the improvement of university staff conditions, to that of proactive interest group involved in an extended range of issues in the late 1980s. Ted Tapper and Brian Salter argue, in their historical study which investigated the changing role of the CVCP, that the demise of the UGC, as well as governmental financial cuts in the 1980s, has changed the nature of the CVCP from an obscure body to a more proactive pressure group.700 Even in the increasingly bureaucratised mode of higher education of the post-second World War period before 1988, the CVCP exercised indirect, informal political influence mainly through its relations with the Treasury (pre-1964), the Department of Education and Science (post-1964), and the UGC.

In its relations with the UFC (1988-1992) and later with the HEFCE (after 1992), the political behaviour of the CVCP has changed towards a more active political entity since 1988. There are two possible reasons for the change. First, that in comparison with the UGC, there has been less incorporation of the university’s voice in UFC policy, mainly because of the limited number of academic representatives in the UFC. Secondly, that the funding councils have functioned as managerial bodies attempting to impose the will of successive governments, not as buffers like the UGC. These changes in the relations with funding agencies, Tapper and Salter argue, have made the CVCP a more proactive participant in the higher education system.701
The CVCP's attitude towards quality control suggests that its ideological stance on university autonomy has not completely shifted; on this matter, the CVCP has continuously espoused the traditional sense of English university autonomy. It has supported the general principle of the establishment of the QAA; however, it refused financial allocation on the basis of quality judgement made by the QAA and governmental intervention on standards. The CVCP, criticising duplication of quality control performance by the HEFCE and the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) (1992-1995), endorsed plans by a Joint Planning Group for the establishment of a single quality control body (the current QAA), which proposed a minimum standard for degrees within cognate programmes.\textsuperscript{702} The CVCP, in response to the Dearing Report, endorses the functions of the QAA (Recommendations 24) made by the Dearing Report – such as a comprehensive code of practice.

The CVCP's position on quality control endorses the QAA policy that funding allocation not be tied to the results of the evaluation, and the universities' initiatives on the issue of quality control. For instance, the CVCP, in response to the Dearing Report, retains the final clause of the recommendations related to quality issues in the Dearing Report that the enforcement of some QAA requirements would be achieved by making compliance a condition of public funding.\textsuperscript{703} Another example is that of the CVCP's consistent stance on quality which is that the prime responsibility for quality of teaching and training rests with individual institutions rather than government. The CVCP has affirmed that 'the lead on standards must remain with the higher education sector itself'.\textsuperscript{704} For example, the 1991 CVCP Report, \textit{CVCP Response to White Paper Higher Education: A New Framework}, supports a quality audit unit in teaching which covers all higher education institutions, but stresses the principle of 'academic freedom' within individual universities.\textsuperscript{705}
The most significant CVCP publication hitherto relating to new managerialism is the *Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities* (the Jarratt Report) published in 1985. The power shift between government and the universities is not an issue in the report; the role of government is not emphasised. Rather, the report recommends that the government provide only broad policy guidelines, so that the universities and the UGC can undertake strategic and long term planning. The underlying theme of the Jarratt Report — which is a defensive document attempting to prevent government intervention in the area of management — is that universities should scrutinise their own management structures by themselves rather than with government involvement. The power shift which the Jarratt Report emphasises, is therefore, within the universities themselves rather than between government and the universities. Examples of recommendations in the Jarratt Report include strategic plans of individual universities ‘to underpin academic decisions and structures which bring planning, resource allocation and accountability together into one corporate process linking academic, financial and physical aspects’, the development of performance indicators, and the introduction of staff development. An analysis of the Jarratt Report suggests that the CVCP’s ideological stance towards new managerialism was based upon the compatibility between traditional university autonomy and accountability.

The recommendation submitted to the Government and the Committee’s attention regarding the limitation of university autonomy as a result of Parliamentary accountability and the planning imposed by the UGC and government indicates the CVCP’s significant attention to the traditional sense of English university autonomy. The report concomitantly focuses on accountability, affirming the need to ensure the effective use of available resources:
[The] university must also maximise the effective use of available resources. The crucial issue is how a university achieves the maximum value for money consonant with its objectives.\textsuperscript{710}

\textit{Vocationalism}

The following documentary analysis indicates the rise of the vocational dimension in the CVCP's policy in the mid-1990s, with a concomitant emphasis on the academic dimension, which can be understood in relation to the balance between utilitarianism and traditional English university autonomy. Two 1991 CVCP Reports, \textit{Towards the 21st Century – A Prospectus for UK Universities} and \textit{The State of the Universities} attempt to justify the idea that the universities had been historically accountable to national needs as can be seen by changes in their defined functions. These Reports do not include the concepts of economic competitiveness and high skills. In contrast, the 1995 CVCP Report, \textit{Learning for Change}, identifies global competition in the sphere of industry and commerce as well as in education, and the significance of new skills and knowledge based upon adaptability, flexibility, and the ability to learn and to continue learning.\textsuperscript{711} In this report, such new skills and knowledge merge with traditional academic skills and knowledge:

Students need more than simply the capacity to absorb an increased volume of information. Of greater value will be the acquisition of higher level skills in critical analysis and interpretation, and the readiness to acquire new knowledge and skills throughout working life.\textsuperscript{712}

The CVCP's first report on skills which was released in 1998, \textit{Skills Development in Higher Education: Full Report}, further explores the vocational dimension with an emphasis on both traditional academic and vocational skills by identifying both types of skills as 'employability skills' for UK economic competitiveness.\textsuperscript{713} Such skills include traditional intellectual skills, the new core or key skills, personal
attributes deemed to have market value, and knowledge about how organisations work and how people in them carry out their job.

Traditional intellectual skills include five types of skills: 'critical evaluation of evidence and its interpretation'; 'error-free reasoning'; 'the ability to sustain a logical argument and reach a conclusion that can be defended as reasonable'; 'the ability to analyse and synthesise information'; and 'the ability to compare and contrast theoretical explanations and to integrate different methodologies'. The new core or key skills includes communication skills, numeracy, and information technology. The 1998 Skills Report as well as the higher education Dearing Report defines the new core or key skills in relation to the NCVQ (National Certificates of Vocational Qualification). Personal attributes deemed to be of market value — self-reliance, adaptability, flexibility, drive, 'nous', and creativity — correspond to the skills requirement of a high-skill policy. The knowledge of how organisations work is, in the 1998 CVCP Report, related to full-time undergraduates without substantial employment experience. It can be suggested that the four types of skills outlined above are the result of the amalgamation of traditional academic skills, vocation-oriented skills for economic purposes, and the high skills demanded in a competitive global economy.

This analysis of documents reveals that the introduction of the vocational dimension reflects an internal policy change within the CVCP as well as the change in membership of the CVCP in 1992 by incorporating polytechnics into the university sector. As mentioned earlier, Tapper and Salter's argument in respect to the change in the nature of the CVCP to one that is more proactive, has some validity in the financial context. For example, the setting up of the Dearing Committee was the result of the CVCP's successful pressure on government for the resolution of the financial crisis of higher education. However, the following evidence suggests that Tapper and Salter's argument is less applicable in other areas such as in the skills and knowledge context, which suggest a different pattern of involvement by the CVCP. In contrast to the financial issue, the Committee's
stance is comparatively reserved and is co-operative with the central authority as the joint report with the Department for Education and Employment, *Skills Development in Higher Education* (1998), shows. The diversity of views expressed by the CVCP leads to one possible interpretation that the CVCP, in principle, attempts to be a proactive pressure group; however, in practice it takes a reactive position, in particular, in the process of negotiation and compromise with the central authority. It would appear that the CVCP takes the latter position on issues relating to skills and knowledge. It can be interpreted that the CVCP aligns itself with vocationalism and economic competitiveness to justify its position advocating an increase in public expenditure.

It can be assumed that the synthesised timing of the emergence of the CVCP's attention to vocational education in its publications was associated with the 1992 amalgamation of the CVCP and the Committee of the Directors of Polytechnics (CDP). The renaming of polytechnics as 'universities' occurred at the same time. In 1991, the CVCP had not articulated the vocational dimension of the university; only its contribution to professionalism had been set forth in *Towards the 21st Century – A Prospectus for UK Universities*. This Report stated that the universities produce graduates in 'the key professions on which the wealth of the nation and the quality of life ultimately depend', exemplifying professional occupations such as doctors, scientists, lawyers, public servants, and teachers. The vocational dimension of higher education has become a core issue for the CVCP since 1993/94, resulting in the establishment of a working group within the Committee which aims to develop policies on NVQs / SVQs and GNVQs / GSVQs. In the subsequent year (1994/95), the Committee further explored the concept of vocationalism as well as professionalism in the context of lifelong learning in education and training:

Due to recognition of the HE sector’s role in lifelong learning and in educating and training a far larger proportion of the population to higher levels of knowledge and skill, the vocational and professional dimension
is now achieving wider prominence and esteem, assisted by effective links between university staff and employers. Vocationally-relevant skills are important at all levels of university education, not least at the sub-degree (diploma) level. While individual institutions will vary in the extent of their involvement, the CVCP is committed to this area of work and will continue to play a full role in the development of the framework for higher vocational qualifications.\textsuperscript{723}

In comparison with the CVCP, the AUT has not defined clearly the kinds of skills and knowledge required for the national economy. The AUT, in identifying economic and technological changes and the changing role of higher education in meeting socio-economic needs, accepts human capital theory. In 1996, the AUT outlined the concepts of this theory in order to highlight the significance of education for the national economy:

More recently in economics, human capital theory has formalised the common sense understanding that differences in the quality of labour have an impact on organisational success. An influential current in contemporary economic thinking suggests that the human resource may soon be the only possible route to economic success. The thesis is essentially that the advance of technology and the globalisation of capital are 'leveling the playing field' such that eventually the only factor which differentiates nations economically will be their capacity to produce people with skills in an arena which Reich calls symbolic analysis... It can be concluded that economic success is directly dependent on the quality of education available.\textsuperscript{724}

The acceptance of the new human capital theory brought about the AUT's inclusion of the concept of transferable skills in higher education in the same year, when there was (and is) a debate about whether students should learn specific or vocational skills.\textsuperscript{725} The AUT defined transferable skills as concrete or tangible skills such as IT literacy or language competence, and competence in more abstract skills including communication and problem solving. The AUT's vision of skills and knowledge for the new economic environment does not incorporate the concept of high skills such as flexibility and creativity, but does embrace key
skills in national vocational qualifications. One of the explanations for the
deficiency in the AUT's vision is embedded in its interest in traditional academic
values. This stance of the AUT is related to its criticism of the state's
overemphasis on economic values such as those related to employment and labour
market needs. Nevertheless, the AUT does not totally deny the utilitarian function
of higher education. On the contrary, it strongly supports the economic function
of higher education which was identified in the Robbins Report.

The AUT's central interests relevant to the maintenance of traditional
values are three-fold: 1) abstract or theoretical skills; 2) core subject-specific
course content; and 3) balance of subjects. In order to protect traditional values
and accumulated human capital, the AUT rejects the imposition of a particular
curriculum related to transferable skills and the emphasis on particular subjects
such as science and technology rather than the humanities. The AUT's view about
the safeguarding of abstract or theoretical skills has informed its basic stance that
transferable skills in higher education should be a secondary concern.

The AUT suggests three possible approaches for the inclusion of
transferable skills in higher education: a) their integration into all courses and
inclusion in final degree marks within the frame of core subject-specific courses;
b) their inclusion as a requirement for the award of a degree; and c) their inclusion
as an option. The preservation of core subject-specific courses has led to the
AUT's rejection of broader, general courses, and of the introduction of liberal arts
colleges. In respect to the preservation of a balanced curriculum — one of the
major concerns of the AUT — the AUT strongly criticises the government's policy
which promotes particular subjects (science and engineering) for the sake of the
national economy. The AUT asserts that all existing disciplines play a significant
role in the vocational dimension; therefore, the existing balance of subjects should
be retained:
The AUT deplores the continued devaluation of the contribution made to the nation by the arts and social sciences... The attempt to shift subject balance in universities is an extremely dangerous consequence of this ignorance. The simplistic concept of 'vocationally relevant' courses begs the question of how the university sector responds to rapidly changing demands. It can be clearly seen that high-quality graduates in any subject are recognised as having a valuable vocational education and training since they are in great demand from employers in every walk of life.¹²⁹

The AUT's concern bears on the issue of the expansion of higher education, arguing that the increase in the number of graduates in science and technology should be achieved by the expansion of higher education, not a change in the balance of subjects.³⁰

This section has examined the ideological stances of the universities. The next section examines the ideologies of an economic interest group – the Confederation of British Industry.

5.6 EMPLOYER: THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

This section argues that the ideological stance of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) is informed by neo-liberalism and vocationalism.

The distinctive characteristic of the CBI is that 90 percent of the total members are from small firms with fewer than 200 employees, despite the general assumption that its policy proposals denote the voice of large firms.³¹ Many large firms do not join the Confederation, preferring to deal with governments individually. The service sector and multi-national firms are also underrepresented entities in the CBI.³²

The extent of the CBI's influence in the university sector is not entirely clear; as Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney argue the position of industry and employers as pressure groups is complex.³³ The common discourse between the
CBI and successive governments such as ‘employability’, ‘knowledge-driven economy’, ‘competitiveness’, and ‘lifelong learning’, and different views on such activities as public finance (as argued earlier) suggest that relationships between the CBI and government is not straightforward. There is a lack of tangible evidence on the influence of the CBI on changing relationships between government and the universities. The CBI focuses on education and training in general rather than the universities in particular. Its only publication which confined itself to issues of higher education in the 1990s was *Thinking Ahead: Ensuring the Expansion of Higher Education into the 21st Century*. The areas given attention by the CBI — which include skills and knowledge, qualifications, and employment, collaboration in research on an individual institutional basis — and the disregard of curriculum issues similarly suggest a limitation of involvement by the CBI in the university sector. This CBI’s stance relates to its reticent view on the issue of university autonomy.

Furthermore, internally, there is a lack of consensus on the issues of higher education within the CBI. For example, at the CBI Conference in 1995, Gillian Shepard, the then Secretary of State for Education and Employment, condemned the failure of employers to provide a clear signal to higher education by presenting opposing opinions in respect to the debate on the expansion of higher education.

Nevertheless, limited evidence suggests that the CBI’s influence in the university sector has increased in some areas, including its lobbying activities through its participation in political party conferences, the invitation of prominent academics to speak at meetings, and publications. Examples of publications include *Thinking Ahead: Ensuring the Expansion of Higher Education into the 21st Century* in 1994, and the CBI’s submission to the Dearing Committee in 1996. Further, the attendance of Tony Blair at the 1999 CBI National Conference, as the first prime minister from the Labour Party to attend a CBI Conference, suggests that a close relationship exists between the New Labour Government and the CBI. It is also worthy of note that there has been an increasing appointment of business-
men / women to quasi-governmental organisations such as funding councils and governmental bodies of institutions, suggesting an increased influence of the economic sector.

The ideologies to be analysed are as follows: (1) neo-liberalism; and (2) vocationalism. This section does not analyse new managerialism because the CBI's position papers do not refer to issues regarding internal management and governance of universities.

Neo-liberalism

The neo-liberal position of the CBI in the context of the universities is best identified in three areas: (1) expansion; (2) quality; and (3) finance. The CBI supports centralisation in the area of public funding and the central quality control mechanism by means of a single quality body. The CBI, concomitantly, opposed government involvement in the expansion of the university sector, proposing demand-led expansion. 

First, in relation to expansion, two documents — *Thinking Ahead: Ensuring the Expansion of Higher Education into the 21st Century*, and the CBI submission to the Dearing Report — indicate that the CBI expansion policy is based upon the concept of the market. These documents propose demand-led expansion rather than government control over the number of enrolled students. In 1994, the CBI proposed that the target for the expansion of higher education should be 40 percent by the year 2000, which was 7 percent higher than the government's target, and that the expansion should be based upon a market oriented approach according to individual student demand. In 1996, the CBI recommended that the Government remove the cap on student numbers in higher education.

Secondly, regarding quality, the CBI, as stated above, supports quality control by one quality agency. Proposals put forward by the CBI include the standards of core skills, involvement of employers and other external stakeholders,
and competence-based professional teaching standards and qualifications in a 
'Staff and Educational Development Association'.

Thirdly, in relation to finance, the funding policy proposal of the CBI indicates that its stance is based upon the concept of the quasi-market with an emphasis on the financial role of government. In 1994, the CBI recommended that public funding should be maintained at a constant proportion of state income in accordance with the increase of national economic growth, and that students' tuition fees should not be introduced. The CBI's position on the support for publicly funded education has been consistent in the last two decades. In the submission to the Dearing Report in 1996, it proposed a 'market based model'. The model was based upon state funded entitlement and the introduction of real incentives for 'genuine efficiency gains', which led to the recommendation of the report that resources should transfer from student maintenance to provision with an expanded student loan scheme in the private sector. In this model, the CBI asserted that universities could expand with real incentives for genuine efficiency gains, and that the immediate introduction of tuition for full-time students would not be necessary. This stance in favour of the expansion of higher education and its objection to the introduction of tuition for full-time students has not changed. The emphasis on the significance of public funding support for the universities and the proposal of the 'market-based model' suggests that CBI's view is not in full accord with economic liberalism. This ideological position is the result of a compromise between CBI's original proposal on the increase of public funding and the reality of limited governmental resources. This does not imply that the CBI's policy stance espouses a strong government role in university planning; rather it reflects a perceived need to ensure the steady production of qualified human capital by guaranteeing financial resources to the university sector.
Vocationalism

The CBI's perspective on economic globalisation – which endorses the need for an increase in highly qualified human resources – is coherent with the general stance of the CBI regarding the relations between the economy, human resources, and education. Its stance supports governmental intervention in education – including the university sector.

In respect to economic globalisation, the CBI proposes that there will be a need for more highly qualified human resources in the knowledge-driven economy to satisfy the demand for specialist labour. The CBI's view on skills and knowledge is associated with its argument that the workforce has been continuously upskilled with the increase in the number of professional and managerial occupations and the reduction in manual occupations. The CBI highlights the relationships between the increasing demand for the higher level of skills in the 'higher-values added' sector and the importance of education. The CBI News in 1996 described this as follows:

In a global economy, without a highly-educated and skilled workforce, Britain will not compete successfully in higher-value added sectors. The alternative of competing on price is neither attractive nor possible. Education of our people will become the key determinant of this nation’s future prosperity.

The relationships between economic performance and education output reflect the general stance of the CBI regarding the relations between the economy, human resources, and education, asserting a correlation between effectiveness in education and the wealth of the state. The CBI's joint-research with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on the quality of the workforce provides a justification for the relations between these two concepts. The report concludes that higher education is 'a prime source for many of the qualities that make up such people: creativity, analytical skills and problem solving abilities'. The CBI's proposition on the correlation between economic growth and higher
education overlooks the negative effects resulting from the expansion of the universities, which include not only graduate unemployment but also the underutilisation of graduates—the increased recruitment of graduates in previously non-graduate jobs. The CBI defends itself against criticism of its view on underutilisation by its usage of the concept of ‘long-term and short-term effects’, arguing that in the long-term the workforce will need graduate level knowledge and skills:

The recent economic downturn has meant the rate of graduate unemployment has increased. But it does not follow that employers have reached a saturation point, and that there is no room in the economy for any increase in the number of graduates. Such a view would be misplaced and short-term. The occupational forecasts already mentioned point to a long-term need for people with graduate level knowledge and skills in the workplace. In the short term, and as the economy strengthens, employment prospects for graduates will increase. The experience of the recession in the early 1980s suggests that graduate prospects recover from an economic downturn faster than those for people without higher education qualifications.

The CBI’s proposal that higher education should provide both traditional academic skills such as analytical skills and more vocationally oriented skills such as communication and ‘the application of number’ suggests that the CBI affirms academic values, while concomitantly emphasising the vocational dimension.

Two major publications deal with skills and knowledge in the context of higher education among the CBI’s publications: Thinking Ahead: Ensuring the Expansion of Higher Education into the 21st Century (1994) and “The CBI Input to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education” in Human Resources Brief (1996). In the 1996 Human Resources Brief, the CBI proposes three kinds of skills and knowledge, suggesting that the quality assurance agency should give particular attention to high-level knowledge, intellectual skills, and key skills. Their definitions can be gleaned from the contextual analysis of the two documents, Thinking Ahead and the 1996 Human Resources Brief. High-level
knowledge is specialised knowledge. 'Intellectual skills', which are those 'typical of the competent graduate' such as analysis and synthesis should be transferable for making sense of complex situations and information. Key skills can be equated with core skills, which were categorised into six areas in the 1994 document: personal and interpersonal skills, communication, information technology, application of number, problem solving, and modern language competence. The CBI places more emphasis on intellectual and key skills than on high-level knowledge. This is notable in its proposal regarding the national qualification system and education and training. The CBI’s 1996 proposal to make compatible traditional English university autonomy and the increasing demand for skills and knowledge in the global economy aims to:

- specify in detail both the knowledge and the skills about the 'learning outcomes' of their courses
- set up 'threshold standards' for degrees, which include key skills as well as knowledge and technical skills, and allocate public funding on the basis of these 'threshold standards'
- set up rigorous assessment to ensure that teaching and assessment methods deliver the defined outcomes

The CBI’s view on skills and knowledge has two main characteristics: a focus on the individual, and general and transferable skills rather than specialisation of skills and knowledge. In respect to the latter, the CBI points out that high-level knowledge should not be over-specialised. It also recommends that 'intellectual skills' should be transferable, and that the focus should be on key or core skills – which are recognised as transferable skills – more than the other two kinds of skills (intellectual skills and high level knowledge). Secondly, the CBI identifies the benefits for the economy by reinforcing:

- Avoidance of wasted human resources
- Individuals’ skills and preferences being best matched to occupations
- Improved levels of job satisfaction
- Higher rates of productivity
- Reduced absenteeism
- Increased mobility of the workforce, both within organisations and throughout the economy, which now encompasses the Single European Market.\textsuperscript{763}

The CBI asserts that ‘individuals are more able to customise their learning experiences and enhance their employability’\textsuperscript{764}. This principle of ‘individual focus’ is linked to key concepts of the CBI such as transferability, lifelong learning, the improvement of career guidance, and the enhancement of credit accumulation and transfer systems to transform individuals’ opportunities. This assemblage of concepts suggests that the CBI attempts to stimulate labour mobility in an efficient manner, possibly by imposing financial responsibility on education and training on the employees’ side, rather than on that of the employers.

The next section concludes this chapter.

5.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that there are convergent trends in the values relating to university autonomy, new managerialism, vocationalism, and neo-liberalism among stakeholders in the university system at the superficial level. However, the balance between, and the interpretation of, ideologies – such as between traditional English university autonomy and contractual English university autonomy, and between collegialism and new managerialism, – differ among stakeholders.

Guy Neave’s ‘Evaluative State’ is appropriate in the English context in respect of the increasing government output control as well as increasing direct government control of the universities such as financial memoranda by funding councils.\textsuperscript{765} The analysis of the changing ideologies of stakeholders in Chapter IV
has elucidated the factors which determined the particular pattern of transformation of the university system in England: most especially, the increasingly intensive state control in the areas of funding and quality control. The main factors are two-fold: the change in the ideologies of the UGC; and that in the universities. First, this chapter affirms that the change in the ideologies of the UGC — from emphasising 'private definition' to 'public definition' by stressing contractual English university autonomy, neo-liberalism, and vocationalism in the later 1980s — is significant in the transformation of the university system [see Chapter II]. This change of the UGC suggests a relationship between ideology and power relationships between government and the universities. This chapter's emphasis on the shift of the UGC's ideologies in relation to the transformation of the university system partially contradicts Salter and Tapper's emphasis on the change in DES's ideology. The lack of evidence of the government's power to enforce its policy through the DES leads to the logical conclusion that the change of the UGC's ideologies was more significant than that of the DES in explaining the change in the English university system towards an emphasis on 'public definition'.

Secondly, the change in the CVCP's ideologies is another causal factor in the transformation of the university system in England. The chapter has identified a change in the CVCP's ideologies, from an emphasis on traditional English university autonomy, to an emphasis on contractual English university autonomy, neo-liberalism, and vocationalism. It has pointed out the compatibility between traditional English university autonomy, accountability, and utilitarian values. The CVCP's acceptance of government discourses relating to contractual English university autonomy, neo-liberalism, and vocationalism suggests that discourses do not always function to gain or maintain power, but rather to compromise with other political entities.
The next chapter analyses and interprets the ideologies of stakeholders in the Japanese university system, giving attention to the changing relationships between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups.
CHAPTER VI: JAPAN

6.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENTS

The purpose of this chapter is to test the main argument of the thesis in the Japanese context.

The relationships between government, the universities, and the quasi-market in Japan cannot be fully understood in the government-university nexus alone; the confrontation and compromise between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups also need to be considered. The neo-liberal camp includes the Economic Planning Agency (*keizai kikaku cho*), economic interest groups, and the Members of Parliament who belongs to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), excluding the LDP’s *bunkyo-zoku* (an unofficial group composed of the Members of Parliament who specialise in education). The stakeholders in the neo-liberal camp share a common view on the introduction of the market into the education sector. The anti-neo-liberal group includes *bunkyo-zoku*, the MESSC (Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture) [the MECSST (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology) since 2001], and the universities. The stakeholders in the anti-neo-liberal group share common values in opposition to the market.

This chapter argues that the continuity of Ministerial power in the university sector in Japan relates to two themes. The first is that the MESSC reached an anti-neo-liberal consensus to a significant degree in the early 1980s, which was one decade earlier than that of the neo-liberal group, in particular, the LDP. The second theme is that the substantial influence of neo-liberalism in the university sector can be largely understood in conflict and compromise between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups.
6.2 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS IN JAPAN

The relationship between the main stakeholders in Japan is illuminating in that it highlights pluralist-elitism (which emphasise not only three influential stakeholders of the LDP, central administration, and employers but also other stakeholders), the role of central administration and zoku-giin, and hierarchical relationships between the central administration and the universities. In this respect, the frameworks of the pluralist-elitist and policy discourse approaches in the analysis of policy and policy-making – which were illustrated in the English context [see 5.2] – are useful in the context of Japan.

On the basis of the frameworks of the pluralist-elitist and policy discourse approaches, the identification of the main stakeholders’ nature and functions in the areas of funding, policy and planning, quality, and legislation appear to be useful in understanding the relationships between stakeholders: central authorities, the universities, and the employers [see Figure 6.1 (below)]. First, central authorities include political parties, central administration, and the university council. The ruling party – the LDP – and the MESSC, together with employers or economic interest groups, formulate elite power in the university system. They play the central role in the process of policy formulation.

The LDP and the MESSC are involved in the areas of funding, policy and planning, legislation, and to some extent, quality. The LDP are involved in the university sector: it formulates the annual budget for the universities, enacts relevant legislation, and establishes national councils for the universities. Among the MPs, zoku-giin (MPs specialised in particular fields) is significant in being a mediator between the political parties and the MESSC, and between the political parties and economic interest groups, in the process of policy formulation. Bunkyo-zoku (MPs specialised in education) belonged to LDP before the early 1990s; however, some of them have belonged to other parties since then because
of the movement in the political restructuring (including the reformation of political parties) in the 1990s.

**Figure 6.1 The Relationships between Stakeholders in Japan**

* Employers include the Federation of Economic Organisations, the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and The Kyoto Group for the Study of Global Issues.
The function of the MESSC is significant not only as a key player in an administrative role at the stages of both policy formulation and implementation and in providing public funding to universities, but also in conducting informal political negotiation with the political parties, through zoku-giin and personal networks. The MESSC and the LDP do not always share the same values, although both are similarly conservative. An example of the different values between the MESSC and the LDP is the issue of the corporatisation of national universities [see 6.4.1 and 6.4.2]. The relationships between the MESSC and both national and private universities are intimate, regular and routine. The relationships are hierarchical — the universities are subordinated under the MESSC.

The function of University Council (1987-2000) was policymaking and planning — not funding allocation; its recommendations were submitted to the Education Ministry. There was, to a significant degree, an accord between recommendations of the University Council and the MESSC’s policy in general.

Secondly, the representative bodies of the universities include the Association of National Presidents (ANUP) and the Federation of Japanese Private Universities (FJPU). They negotiate with political parties and the MESSC on issues relating to the universities. These bodies, according to Leonard Schoppa, are sometimes incorporated in the decision-making process; other times, they work as lobbying groups. Individual universities are involved in the areas of funding, planning (strategic planning is now encouraged, following the change from national universities to corporations), internal and external quality control, internal and external legislation, and internal governance and management.

Thirdly, the collective bodies of employers — such as the Federation of Economic Organisations, the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry — are involved in decision-making process by accessing political parties and the MESSC. They are, as Schoppa categorised, ‘incorporated
Employers tend to be the committee members of the University Council. Employers have direct access to the universities in the areas of university – industry collaboration and licensing.

The next section first analyses whose ideologies became validated and why, examining three education reforms: the 1967-1971 reform by the Central Council on Education (CCE); the 1983-1987 reform by the National Council on Education; and the ‘Six Reforms’ – which include Economic Structure Reform, Monetary System Reform, Administration Reform, Funding Structure Reform, Social Security Structure Reform, and Education Reform – in the late 1990s. The reason for the analysis of these reforms is to clarify the historical transition of the ideologies of neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups and the relationships between them. Secondly, the chapter examines the ideologies of the stakeholders in the university system, elucidating the different ideological stances – neo-liberalism, university autonomy, vocationalism, and new managerialism.

6.3 THE REFORMS: NEO-LIBERAL GROUP VS. THE ANTI-NEO-LIBERAL GROUP

This section will identify whose ideologies have been adopted in the university reforms, giving attention to power relationships among stakeholders in the university system. The analysis is based upon three education reforms: the 1967-1971 Central Council on Education (CCE), the 1983-1987 National Council on Education, and the ‘Six Reforms’ in the 1990s (on-going reforms since 1997). The decision to analyse these three reforms is based upon the nature of the interaction between government, the universities, and the quasi-market in the shaping and implementation of these reforms, as the discussion will make clear.

The three reforms commonly relate to the ideologies of neo-liberalism, institutional autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism. However, the extent to which these reforms reflect these ideologies differ in each case. In the
CCE (1967-1971), neo-liberalism *per se* was not a dominant ideology; although the neo-liberal value can be, to some extent, observed in the recommendations on the corporatisation of the national universities. These recommendations focussed on institutional autonomy in relation to internal governance of a university; vocationalism was incorporated in some measure. In the National Council on Education (1983-1987), neo-liberalism was an influential ideology in the policy deliberation; nevertheless, the recommendations in the Report de-emphasised neo-liberal policy as a result of the confrontation and compromise between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups. Institutional autonomy and new managerialism were incorporated in the Report. In the ‘Six Reforms’ of the 1990s, neo-liberal policy, institutional autonomy, and new managerialism followed the same policy line in relation to the corporatisation of the national universities, aiming to reinforce the power of university presidents and changing the relationships between the state and the universities.

These three education reforms shared socio-economic elements — such as excessive pressure on students in the examination system, criticism of ‘qualification-based social structure’ (*gakureki syakai*), and support for economic internationalization (*keizai no kokusai-ka*). However, the degrees of emphasis on the economy and the balance between social and economic factors were different in the reform proposals; those in the later years were influenced by economic motives — in particular, economic restructuring.

The ideological characteristics and power relationships in the three education reforms can be summarised as follows:

**Main ideological conflicts**
- 1970s: democracy vs. nationalism and reformism vs. Ministerial inertia
- 1980s: neo-liberalism vs. Ministerial inertia (antagonism to neo-liberalism)
- 1990s: pragmatism (management) vs. antagonism to neo-liberalism
Change of main stakeholders
1970s: progressive group vs. nationalist group, and less consensus within the nationalist group
1980s: neo-liberal group vs. anti-neo-liberal group — conflicts within the anti-neo-liberal group
1990s: neo-liberal group (in particular, the LDP) vs. anti-neo-liberal group (including the ANUP)

This section argues that the primary reason for the non-implementation of the policies relating to neo-liberalism, institutional autonomy, and new managerialism in the 1970s and the 1980s can be explained in terms of the power relationships among stakeholders. In the case of the 1970s and 1980s there was internal conflict within the MESSC and resistance of anti-neo-liberal group to neo-liberalism, and the resistance of universities to institutional autonomy and new managerialism. The change observed since the 1990s has related to the increasing opposition of neo-liberal groups to anti-neo-liberal groups such as the MESSC and the universities. This change in power relationships is a result of economic factors including public financial constraints which have altered power relationships between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups.

The rationale behind the university reform is explained in socio-cultural, political, and economic contexts. The balance of the effects of individual contexts on these changes differed over time. Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, the socio-cultural context — notably, the late 1960s university turmoil, and problems relating to school education (e.g. bullying and youth crime) around 1980 — was more explicit than other contexts. In the early 1990s, the political context (e.g. political reform) and the socio-cultural context (e.g. demographic change) had a significant influence on university reforms. In the mid-1990s, the economic context (as part of the political reform to restructure the economic system and restrain financial expenditure) was dominant.
6.3.1 1967 - 1971 CENTRAL COUNCIL ON EDUCATION


Neo-liberalism was not a prominent ideology among stakeholders in the 1970s — the period before the rise of neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, discourses and policies relating to neo-liberalism was observed in the CCE Report, including the corporatisation of national universities. This sub-section argues that internal conflict within the MESSC was significantly related to the failure of the policy deliberation and implementation associated with neo-liberal doctrine. The introduction of new managerialism was not implemented due to the resistance of the universities. Conflict and confrontation relating to vocationalism among stakeholders were not observed.

The following sub-section examines: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy and new managerialism; and (3) vocationalism.

Neo-liberalism

The CCE Report took a moderate neo-liberal position which is closer to state control rather than concepts of the pure market. The discourses of a radical neo-liberal agenda such as ‘market’, ‘privatisation’, and ‘small government’ were not observed in the text; the removal of Ministerial control were not a concern in this Report, instead there was an emphasis on the significance of central planning. 772

The analysis of the CCE recommendation on the corporatisation of universities is testimony to the moderate neo-liberal position of the CCE. 773 The recommendation did not indicate minimal state control, rather there was a clarification of the relationships between the state and the universities, accountability of the universities to society as a whole, and reinforcement of internal governance. On the basis of this principle, the Report made two proposals on this issue. One was the corporatisation of national universities, in which
corporations are publicly funded and organised according to their own discretion. This policy proposal was originally derived from the proposal of the business community, which was a proponent of the market principle.\textsuperscript{774} The other was not based upon the change in the legal status of the institutions, but in governance and management (e.g. including the establishment of a new governing body whose members include lay members, and the inclusion of lay members in the appointment of academic staff and evaluation).

The rationale behind the review of the relationships between the state and the universities in this Report can be explained in the then criticism of universities – which derived from university turmoil in the late 1960s, and a subsequent inquiry into the ambiguity of the locus of responsibility (the universities, the state, or the local authority) for university governance.\textsuperscript{775}

The ideological stance of the CCE Report and the implementation of its recommendation can be understood in the ideological conflict among the following stakeholders: (a) nationalism of the nationalistic camp vs. democracy of the progressive camp; and (b) internal conflicts within the MESSC over reformism (internationalists) vs. Ministerial inertia (mainstream bureaucrats in the Ministry).

First, the nationalist camp valued the ‘diverse parallel tracks’ (\textit{tayo heiritsu gata}) elite education system in the pre-war period, which advocated ‘dividing it into classes’ (\textit{shubetsuka}) [e.g. two or three year institutions providing courses in the humanities and social science, and five-year institutions providing courses in science].\textsuperscript{776} The nationalist camp included the LDP, the MESSC, and economic interest groups. The progressive camp, denoted by the Japanese Teachers Union (\textit{Nikkyoso}), emphasised the maintenance of the post-war ‘democratic’ education system, which was initially introduced by the US occupation force.\textsuperscript{777} This group was in opposition to the policy-makers including the LDP and the MESSC, being located outside of the decision-making structure.

Secondly, the reformists’ (internationalists) chief value was dynamic change, as Schoppa suggests,\textsuperscript{778} while those supporting bureaucratic inertia
(mainstream bureaucrats) ['conservative' in Schoppa's terminology] took a more moderate position. These ideological conflicts within the MESSC did not directly bear on the concept of the market, state power, efficiency, or cost-effectiveness, which is the neo-liberal agenda. However, these conflicts were significant in respect to the scaling down of the recommendations of independent agencies to ones which were more moderate and to the eventual blocking of their implementation in the 1970s. At the policy deliberation stage, the text in the report suggested that the reformers' intention was influential in that it spotlighted the issue regarding new types of corporations (e.g. autonomous public corporations responsible for their own administration). It made reference to the removal of state control, although it also suggested that the reformists compromised with the opposition by giving the universities 'choices' for their own administration structure: a change to a new type of corporation, the introduction of 'new administrative organs', or no change at all.

At the implementation stage, this recommendation was strongly opposed by a number of people in the MESSC, as well as the progressive group, and the Association of National University Presidents (which was initially in support of higher education reform). (The issue of the Tsukuba University reform, as a single 'model university' for autonomous public corporations, however, provides another picture, that of consensus — 'lowest common denominator politics' in Schoppa's terminology — among the MESSC, a number of influential figures in the LDP, and a core group of faculty within Tsukuba University.)

University Autonomy and New Managerialism

The CCE Report espoused institutional autonomy. The Report supported the 1969 CCE Report which recommended the leadership of university presidents; the elucidation of the relationships between executive, the senate, and faculty committees; and the inclusion of lay members in the decision-making body on the issues of funding and personnel. The Report, giving attention to the
accountability of the universities to society as a whole, disputed the assertion that the inclusion of lay members erodes university autonomy.  

The CCE Report proposed a re-definition of university autonomy, from a definition based upon the external relationships of national universities with the state to one which related to internal governance within an institution. The main concept of the proposed university autonomy was the discretion of individual universities, repeating particular discourses such as ‘respect for the spontaneity’ (jihatsu-sei no soncho) of higher education, ‘self-responsibility’ (jiko sekinin), and ‘self-regulation’ (jiritsu-sei).

The ideological position of the CCE report corresponded to the ideologies of the MESSC, supporting institutional autonomy with an emphasis on accountability.

Vocationalism

Vocationalism was not emphasised in the CCE Report, except in reference to the vocational dimension in post-graduate courses. Minimal attention was given to the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence.

The provision of skills, knowledge, and competence referred to in the CCE Report was summarised as ‘comprehensiveness’ in knowledge and thinking patterns. The CCE Report defined the purpose of education as one which is concerned with ‘the formation of personality’ and emphasised ‘comprehensive competence in dealing with complex problems’ (fukuzatsu na kadai no kaiketsu ni torikomu sogoteki na noryoku). The Report, on the basis of the principle of comprehensive competence, stressed the continuity of generalist education (including foreign languages, and health and physical education) and coherence in the curriculum, in particular, between generalist and specialist education by abolishing curriculum formation on the basis of a distinction between the two.
The policy on the abolition of the distinction between general and specialist education was not implemented until 1991, after the University Council retreated and recommended this policy change.

6.3.2 1983-1987 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

This sub-section argues that the moderate neo-liberal position in the National Council Report relates to power relationships between the neo-liberal and the anti-neo-liberal groups. The ideological stance of the National Council towards institutional autonomy and new managerialism was close to that of the MESSC; the confrontation among stakeholders on this issue was not observed at the stage of deliberation on recommendations. The ideological stance of the National Council towards vocationalism was similar to that of the MESSC, proposing advanced professions and a review of general education.

This sub-section examines: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy and new managerialism; and (3) vocationalism.

Neo-liberalism

The analysis of the National Council Report suggests that the National Council applied a moderate neo-liberal doctrine, in which the power of the state was not defined. Therefore the relationships between the state, the universities, and the market remained ambiguous. The recommendations relating to neo-liberalism included the introduction of private funds (diverse financial resources), the promotion of financial incentives and effective funding allocation, and the extension of financial autonomy of national universities in the area of financial management. For example, the Report emphasised the financial autonomy of national universities:

More flexibility should be given to the budgeting and accounting systems and practices in national universities, and individual national universities
should be encouraged to set up their own funds and affiliated foundations, so that they may be given more financial autonomy and [so] that they may be provided with such conditions as will enable them to give full scope to their initiatives in financial management.\footnote{791}

The radical neo-liberal discourses such as ‘privatisation’, ‘marketisation’, and ‘the principle of the market’ were absent in the Report. It emphasised the internal power within universities (not in relation to the state), included discourses such as self-autonomy (jisyu-sei) and self-regulation (jiritsu-sei), and indicated a lack of discourses showing change in power relationships between the state and the universities (such as devolution).\footnote{792} The internal power within universities related to the issue of institutional governance and management in the Report, affirming the top-down governing structure in an institution.

It could be interpreted that this moderate neo-liberal stance of the National Council largely related to conflict and compromise between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups regarding the power of ministerial control. The following discussion focuses on stakeholders, and conflicts and compromise between stakeholders.

A wider range of stakeholders was a distinct characteristic of the National Council, notably in comparison with the 1967-1971 CCE. The stakeholders included not only the LDP and the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, but also other ministries such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, mass media, and other influential stakeholders.\footnote{793}

These multiple stakeholders could be categorised into neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups: the neo-liberal group includes the LDP, non-education ministries, and economic interest groups, while the anti-neo-liberal group includes the MESSC and bunkyo-zoku. Both neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups are, in T. Pempel’s analysis of the policy-making structure in Japanese education, in the same group – the ‘conservative camp’.\footnote{794} In Pempel’s framework, the focus of power relationships is between the nationalist camp of the decision-making
stakeholders (e.g. the LDP and the MESSC) and the progressive camp of the opposition. In this framework, the values of both neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups are convergent in respect of their nationalistic attitude, preferring the pre-war education system and taking a hard line on the progressive group.

Pempel’s framework is useful for analysing the 1967-1971 CCE, but redundant in the context of the National Council, since significant conflict and compromise between stakeholders occurred within the ‘conservative camp’, highlighting the issues of Ministerial power and of the relationships between the Education Ministry and education institutions – including the universities. [The conflict between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups in the National Council was well observed in school education.]

The values of the neo-liberal group and the anti-neo-liberal group were different, especially in two respects: free market versus state control, and economic superior attitude versus education centric attitude. The neo-liberal group emphasised free market philosophy and economic superiority, attempting to adopt economic philosophy in the education sphere. The anti-neo-liberal group endorsed the value of state control, taking an education-centred attitude. These differences in values were not clear in the CCE – state control was not a central issue for the Council.

The analysis of the issue of the corporatisation of national universities in the National Council Report (four volumes) articulates a confrontation and compromise between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups. The Report failed to reach a consensus on the corporatisation of the national universities, and only suggested further discussion on this issue without making recommendations. The three observations below suggest confrontation and compromise between the two groups: 1) ambiguity of the recommendations in the Council Report (four volumes), 2) the absence of this proposal in the Second Council Report, and 3) the failure of implementation stage.
1) The Final Council Report was a significant dilution of the CCE recommendation (4.5.1):

(Final Report) Types of Establishment of Universities
It is desirable that a drastic examination be made of the type of establishment of national and local public universities to help create the ideal pattern of control of a university, as well as the mechanism by which the national government participates in the administration of universities. The Council requests the national government authorities and university people to deal actively with this particular subject.795

(Third Report)
... it is desirable that a drastic examination be made of the type of establishment of national and local public universities to help create the ideal pattern of control of a university and the mechanism by which the national government participates in the administration of universities. The Council requests the national government authorities and university people to deal actively with this particular subject.796

2) The Second Council Report, in which the stance of the MESSC was most influential in comparison to the First, Third, and Fourth Council Reports (most comments were non-controversial and few of them far-reaching),797 excluded the issue of the autonomous public corporation.

3) At the implementation stage, the MESSC and University Councils did not deal with this issue in the establishment of the special committee for the implementation of the National Council until the Cabinet raised it again in the late-1990s.

The rigorous resistance of the MESSC to the neo-liberal group suggests that the MESSC, to a large extent, reached a consensus in contrast to the CCE. The main reasons for this consensus are three-fold. Firstly, the National Council was set up as the advisory body to the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, while the CCE was a Ministerial council. Secondly, the ideological confrontation involved state control and regulation, which was the Ministry’s main concern.
Thirdly, the process of setting up the National Council\textsuperscript{798} made clear the conflicts between the two ideological groups.

\textit{University Autonomy and New Managerialism}

The analysis of the National Council Report suggests that the National Council supported institutional autonomy in the area of finance and governance, as they relate to the concept of accountability.\textsuperscript{799} This ideological position of the Council was not in opposition to faculty autonomy; the Report supported faculty autonomy.

The Report, in the context of national universities, recommended the empowerment of university presidents and faculty deans, and the elucidation of roles of the university president, faculty committees, and the director-general of the administrative bureau.\textsuperscript{800} The Report’s support for the continuity of the power of faculty committees and the senate suggests that the National Council did not intend to remove faculty autonomy. The Report, in the context of private universities, recommended that the leadership of university presidents should strengthen, that the responsibilities between university presidents and faculty committees should be elucidated, and that academic and administrative governing bodies should co-operate.

Institutional autonomy in the National Council Report is conceptually distinct from Ministerial power and the power relationships between the Ministry and the universities.\textsuperscript{801} Institutional autonomy instead relates to accountability through the inclusion of lay members as well as governance in a university. The logic of the National Council is that university reforms, on the basis of individual institutions, are more responsive and efficient than top-down reform in the context of rapid and unpredictable economic and social change and the diversified demands on the universities. The Report, emphasising the accountability of the universities to society as a whole, recommends the inclusion of lay members in governing bodies and a review of the present governing bodies including lay
members and of the 'external delegation meeting' (sanyokai) in national universities and senate in the private universities.

**Vocationalism**

The ideological stance of the National Council regarding vocationalism was similar to that of the MESSC, proposing advanced professions and a review of general education. The Report, in relation to advanced professions as well as lifelong education, recommended expansion of post-graduate courses by increasing the number of part-time students and establishing one-year master courses. On general education, it recommended coherence of curriculum formation in general and specialist education, criticising general education and re-emphasising the significance of language education, physical and health education, and specialist education. The Report also recommended that the nature of provision in terms of skills, knowledge, and competence should be at the discretion of the universities.

### 6.3.3 SIX REFORMS IN THE 1990s

The university reforms in the 1990s relate to neo-liberal doctrine. The strength of the impetus behind neo-liberalism differed between the 1980s and the 1990s. This difference was associated with the conflict between the neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups. In the 1980s reform, the opposition of the MESSC and bunkyo-zoku to the neo-liberal movement was significant. This consequently weakened the neo-liberal impact on the National Council report. In contrast, in Hashimoto and Obuchi's Six Reforms of the 1990s [see 6.3.3], the resistance of the MESSC and bunkyo-zoku was restricted by powerful top-down decisions from the cabinet office. In this reform, the economic rationale, which related to the economic crisis, was influential.

This section argues that a neo-liberal policy — the corporatisation of the national universities — became influential in the late 1990s as a result of the
increasing influence of neo-liberal groups and the change in the characteristics of the anti-neo-liberal group. There were two such changes: a) the MESSC became an active reformer instead of attempting to maintain the *status quo*; and b) the ANUP became a main stakeholder, participating in the decision-making structure, rather than acting as an interest group. Stakeholders in the university sectors shared a common ideological stance in respect of institutional autonomy, new managerialism, and vocationalism; the national universities also supported faculty autonomy.

The ideological confrontation between nationalism vs. democracy observed in the 1970s, and to some extent in the 1980s, was no longer the case in the 1990s, mainly because of the decline in power of the progressive group – in particular, the Teachers’ Union.

The following sub-sections examine: (1) neo-liberalism, (2) university autonomy and new managerialism, and (3) vocationalism. The analysis of neo-liberalism, university autonomy, and new managerialism relies upon the proposals of stakeholders on the issue of the corporatisation of the national universities.

**Neo-liberalism**

The implications of the New Right ideology for the universities in the post-National Council period is best understood when the pattern of university reform is considered at two different levels: the Cabinet and the MESSC. At the Cabinet level, university reform was largely embedded in dynamic neo-liberal values, including the corporatisation of national universities as a result of the compromise with the MESSC and the national universities. On the other hand, at the Ministerial level, university policy applied more moderate neo-liberal values, increasing the partial deregulation of university curricula (which was initially recommended in the 1987 National Council Report) and creating a competitive environment mainly to promote the quality mechanism. Privatisation and comprehensive deregulation which would dramatically weaken the MESSC’s
control over the universities were not a primary focus; there was, however, an emphasis on institutional autonomy. In both types of reforms led by the Cabinet and the Ministry, the concept of accountability did not conflict with the ideology of university autonomy, even in private universities. In relation to policy, the consumer-oriented market was not an issue for either the Cabinet or the MESSC. Accordingly, the market strategy did not appear in relation to student loans and grants, but rather in the area of the financial incentives offered to the universities by the MESSC as well as quality control (in terms of providing information).

The political stance and policy strategies of central administration and the LDP, however, were not always in conflict with each other. Examples include the similarity of the MESSC policy and the Cabinet plans – *Kisei Kaikaku ni tsuite no Dai-2-ji Kenkai* [Second Views on Deregulation Reform] and *Kisei Kanwa Suishin 3-kanen Keikaku* [Three-Year Deregulation Promotion Plan] initiated by the Headquarters of Administrative Reform Promotion and enacted in 1999.\(^8\) These Cabinet plans excluded a deregulation strategy (e.g. marketisation, privatisation, and student choice) – which is in opposition to the interest of the MESSC – but merely the flexibility of the university system.

The ideological stance of the stakeholders towards neo-liberalism at the university system in the 1990s is clear in the context of the corporatisation of national universities. There were two characteristics of the recurring issue of the corporatisation of national universities in the 1990s: a) the policy proposal on the corporatisation embedded in economic and central administration reforms; and b) an increase in the Ministerial control in the areas of mid-term purpose and planning, and evaluation. First, the policy proposal on the corporatisation of the national universities was embedded in economic strategy – the policy attempting to cut-back the number of civil servants and to minimise public expenditure – rather than educational strategy. This was associated with two themes: the aim of the reform, and the area in which the issue on the corporatisation re-emerged in the late 1990s. The aim of the reform, which is part of the ‘Six Reforms’
advocated by the then Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1997, was to create ‘Economic and Social Systems’ (Keizai Syakai Shisutemu) on the basis of a crisis notion of the government which relates to increasing competitiveness in the global economy, the predicted decline of economic growth as a consequence of demographic change, and a deterioration of public finance. The origin of the re-emergence of the issue on the corporatisation also formed a part of the Administrative Reform (one of the Six Reforms initiated by the Cabinet), rather than the Education Reform (also one of the Six Reforms). In the Administrative Reform, the main stakeholders in the education domain, such as the MESSC, were subordinated stakeholders, although they have taken an initiative in education reform per se.

Secondly, the issue of the corporatisation had two opposing dimensions: 1) the increase of Ministerial management in the areas of mid-term purpose and planning and evaluation; 2) and the decline of state control in the area of funding management with the increase of financial autonomy.

These two dimensions relate to two confrontations among different stakeholders in the university system: 1) between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups; and 2) between the MESSC and the universities. First, the power relationships among stakeholders on the issue of the corporatisation are explanatory in the framework of neo-liberal group vs. nationalist and the ANUP. The neo-liberal group in the context of the education reform in the 1990s includes the Cabinet, the Administration Reform Committee in the LDP, and the Higher Education Research Group (HERG) in the LDP. These stakeholders share a pragmatic stance on cost-cutting public expenditure, especially in the area of personnel (civil servants), and emphasise minimal Ministerial control, originally proposing privatisation of the national universities.

However, their main concerns differ. The main concern of the Cabinet and Administration Reforms Committee are cost-effectiveness and efficiency (articulated in neo-liberal discourses), while the HERG in the LDP is concerned
with the particular context of the universities rather than the direct adaptation of economic philosophy in the sphere of the universities. This stakeholder takes a moderate stance, attempting a compromise between the neo-liberal group and the opposition group. The blueprint of ‘Kokuritsu Daigaku-hojin’ [National University Agency] released by the HERG in March, 2000 is testimony to its moderate stance, with an emphasis on university autonomy (e.g. the choice of personnel by the universities). 807

The stakeholders opposed to the corporatisation of the national universities include the MESSC, the ANUP, and the bunkyo-zoku. This section does not analyse the attitude of bunkyo-zoku on this issue because of the lack of data. The Nikkei and Asahi Newspapers suggest that bunkyo-zoku and the MESSC formed a coalition to oppose this issue, (e.g. the five-year procrastination of the decision about independent agencies as a result of the strong resistance of this coalition). 808

The anti-neo-liberal group, avoiding the radical neo-liberal discourses such as ‘privatisation’ and ‘marketisation’, proposed an increase of Ministerial management in their corporatisation proposal after the group had accepted the proposal of corporatisation derived from the neo-liberal group. The stance of the MESSC on the corporatisation of the national universities is testimony to the absence of this issue in the Programme for Educational Reform, which was designed in 1997 and revised by the MESSC for the inquiry by the then Prime Minister Hashimoto’s ‘Education Reform’ – one of the ‘Six Reforms’ [see 6.3.3].

The attitude of the ANUP on the issue of corporatisation has been coherent since the 1967-1971 CCE until the present time. The ANUP has voiced a strong opposition, emphasising the significance of the self-control of universities. 809 The ANUP gave attention to technological innovation and global competitiveness (without specifying a particular area), and the increasing role of the universities under competitive circumstances. 810 Accordingly, both the neo-liberal group and the ANUP share the concept with respect to increasing competitiveness and the significant role of the universities. However, the strategies proposed by the neo-
liberal group and the ANUP are different in relation to their interpretation of the effect of the market. In the logic of the neo-liberal group, the market enhances competitiveness, while in that of the ANUP, the market damages teaching and research in higher education and diminishes competitiveness.\textsuperscript{811}

The analysis of the documentation released by the MESSC and the ANUP following the compromise with the neo-liberal group on the issue of the corporatisation of the national universities in 1999, points to a further elucidation of the values and ideological attitudes of both stakeholders. A press release by the MESSC in 1999,\textsuperscript{812} 'Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin-ka no Kento Hoko' [Discussion on the Corporatisation of the National Universities],\textsuperscript{813} gave less attention to the minimal state control inherent in the neo-liberal view on the condition of corporatisation. The MESSC, rather, argued that the policy strategy on corporatisation could increase the control by the Education Minister on the universities. Accordingly, the value emphasis of the MESSC concentrates on 'self-control', 'self-regulation', and 'self-responsibility' in administration of the present national universities, attempting to clarify the roles between the Education Minister and the universities. For instance, the report proposed a mid-term plan and strategy set by the Education Minister, and a long-term plan and strategy set by the institutions.

The compromise of the ANUP with the neo-liberal group – the Cabinet and Administration Reform Committee in the LDP – is evident in the 1999 report by the ANUP, \textit{Kokuritsu Daigaku to Dokuritsu Hojin-ka Mondai ni tsuite (Interim Report)} [National Universities and the Problem on Corporatisation].\textsuperscript{814} This report argues for the corporatisation of universities, on the condition that national universities accept the proposal on the change of their status into that of corporation. In the report, the ANUP emphasises the significance of self-control and self-regulation, in particular, in the areas of personnel (notably, the choice of director of the universities), and long-term plans / targets on teaching and research. (Regarding quality assurance, it emphasises the balance of self-evaluation and
external evaluation.) This point made by the ANUP suggests that the ANUP does not view the issue of corporatisation as one which is ideologically embedded in the minimal state as advocated by neo-liberalism. The ANUP, rather, highlights the possibility of the expansion of state control by the Education Minister.

The views and political stance of the ANUP analysed hitherto do not correspond to views and policies of individual national universities; the national universities have not achieved consensus on this issue. Tokyo and Kyoto Universities have opposed this issue, while some national universities have expressed their support, emphasising that the change of legal status of the national universities could promote the principle of competitiveness.

The position of the MESSC has changed from inertia to reformism through increasing pressure from neo-liberal proponents in the 1990s. It can be assumed that this change has implications for the change in the relationships between government and the universities.

In the neo-liberal group, the cabinet-led university reform emphasises deregulation and privatisation. This reform is confined to particular issues including the corporatisation of national universities and the decline of Ministerial jurisdiction. In contrast, the university reform initiated by the MESSC focuses on the creation of a competitive environment by using funding incentives. Discourses relating to the decline of Ministerial jurisdiction such as deregulation, devolution, and decentralisation in this reform are not emphasised in the Program for Educational Reform and Education White Papers published by the MESSC in the 1990s. The deregulation policy taken by the MESSC can be observed to a limited extent in the area of curricula. This university reform by the MESSC covers more comprehensive issues than those addressed by the Cabinet.

In the anti-neo-liberal group, it could be argued that the ideological characteristics of the MESSC have changed from Ministerial inertia, to reformism in the post-National Council period. In its period of Ministerial inertia two main components were apparent: nationalism (including social cohesion, national
identity, and common culture), and ‘the maintenance of the status quo’ (genjiyo iji), which resulted in political ‘immobilism’ in the pre-National Council period (before 1987). 821 Regarding the first component, the MESSC, according to Leonard Schoppa, took the same nationalistic line as the LDP in principle, although it tended to take a more moderate position than the ‘hawks’ of the LDP. 822 The consequence of the LDP’s prolonged political regime in the post-war period can in part be explained by the Ministry’s espousal of a nationalistic view. The second component — the ‘maintenance of the status quo’ — was, as Schoppa argues, associated with the MESSC’s extreme ‘conservative’ nature (e.g. resistance to change in particular with the issue of equality) in comparison with the other Ministries. 823

The aspect of Ministerial inertia which has made the education reform difficult was, in Schoppa’s explanation, in the context of the policy-making process. It related to three conceptual components: genba (the actual site), nemawashi (the decision-making process on the basis of bottom-up consensus), and ringi sei (formalised nemawashi in a system). 824 The policy of the middle-level officials is more effective in terms of education reform than that of the senior officials in nemawashi and ringi sei for two reasons. One is the close link between the middle-level officials and genba. The other is inefficiency in consensus based decision-making. Schoppa’s explanation of the formation of ‘bureaucratic conservatism’ (the term equates to ‘Ministerial inertia’ in this thesis) is plausible, although he does not provide any evidence that senior officials were more liberal than middle-level officials.

In the post-National Council period, it can be argued that the characteristics of the MESSC are two-fold: (1) a democratic entity – an active reformer initiating university reform; and (2) the maintenance of the Ministry’s control over the universities [which differs from ‘the maintenance of the status quo’ characteristic of the pre-National Council period]. Nationalistic tendencies are still inherent in the MESSC (in particular, for primary and secondary education); however, these
tendencies are no longer a major influence on the Ministry’s policy strategies in the post-National Council period. These changes have not engendered a dramatic change in the Ministry’s views on neo-liberalism. The MESSC’s first characteristic, as a democratic entity is related to the democratisation policies of the Ministry, such as the ‘transparency and open-door’ policy of the 1990s, aiming to improve transparency in decision-making and release information to the taxpayers. The transparency and open-door policy was introduced in accordance with ‘open information’ policy as part of the Administrative Reform (1997) at the Cabinet level. This policy, enacted in 1998, has been adopted as the ‘Plan for the Promotion of Administration Information at the MESSC’. It requires that all education councils, for example, should be open to the public. This policy stems from the severe public criticism of the Ministries (including the Education Ministry) and the LDP, triggered by political scandals in the 1980s and the 1990s, and the consequent crisis of the bureaucratic system, as Eiichi Miyakoshi identifies.

The second characteristic, the maintenance of the Ministry’s control over the universities, differs from ‘the maintenance of the status quo’ characteristic of the pre-National Council period. The Ministry’s initiative relating to the dynamic of the university reform from the 1990s onwards is self-evident with respect to the change in the Ministry’s position from ‘political immobilism’, in Schoppa’s term, which expresses the political inertia which prevents education reform, to that of an active reformer. The change in the Ministry’s position is significant in two respects. One is the shift of the LDP by introducing the New Right philosophy in the party platform of the LDP. The other is that the on-going cabinet-level reform could strengthen top-down decision-making by breaking the traditional pattern of bottom-up decision-making (e.g. *nemawashi* and the *ringi sei* system), which has caused Ministerial conservatism.

The new characteristics of the MESSC suggest that the MESSC has partially lost its power on the one hand, and maintained its power on the other. It
can be conjectured that the strengthened democratic characteristic of the MESSC has been diminishing its power. One possible interpretation is that the Ministry’s control of advisory councils has been weakened by making public the content of their discussion. There are two concrete cases which suggest a decline in the Ministry’s power: the relaxation of the curriculum and the corporatisation of the national universities. With respect to the former, there has been a relaxation of the regulations in university curricula as part of the deregulation policy. The latter case refers to the Ministry’s failure to block the government’s intention on the corporatisation of national universities. One interpretation of the rationale behind this is that the move of some bunkyo-zoku into other political parties from the LDP in the 1990s has made it difficult for the MESSC to access political power at the Cabinet or Diet levels, where the MESSC previously influenced political decision through bunkyo-zoku.

Conversely, there is ample evidence to indicate that the power of the MESSC has not been diminished. Akira Arimoto and Egbert de Weert argue that despite deregulation policy, the government still possesses significant power:

It seems in Japan that the government still maintains strong power despite the introduction of the deregulation policy, because every institution has to report to the MOE [the MESSC] about the present situation of self-monitoring and evaluation if they want to carry out new plans and reforms concerning the establishment of facilities, departments, and other changes at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Without these reports, no plans and reforms will be approved by the government. The government still regulates and controls in this sense.

This argument is still valid. The new reformist characteristics of the MESSC suggests that the power of the Ministry in both spheres of policymaking and implementation has not declined; the areas of policy-making in which the Ministry’s power has declined (as a result of reforms initiated by the Cabinet) have seen only a negligible decline in power. In view of the fact that the influence of the government’s deregulation policy on higher education is only partial (e.g. 269
the relaxation of regulations in curricula) the continuous control by the MESSC is not in dispute. Furthermore, the MESSC is still capable of blocking the implementation of policy. For example, the MESSC has not implemented the recommendations relevant to the Ministry's power in the 1987 National Report such as the introduction of financial co-operation between local governments and local universities, and the expansion of financial independence of public universities in the area of financial budgeting. In addition, the Administration Reform initiated by the Cabinet, despite the fact that its principle is based upon 'small government' policy, plans to enlarge the MESSC through integration with the Agency of Science and Technology.

**University Autonomy and New Managerialism**

The analysis of the ideological stance of individual stakeholders to new vocationalism in previous sections suggests that in the 1990s all stakeholders in the university system which were examined in this chapter supported institutional autonomy, although the national universities concomitantly emphasised the significance of faculty autonomy.

The discourses such as 'self-autonomy' (syutaisei), 'self-determination' (jisyusei), and 'the degree of discretion' (jiyudo) in the context of self-management, self-evaluation, and self-reforming by each institution are testimony to the ideological positions of stakeholders in the university system.

**Vocationalism**

The analysis of the ideological stance of individual stakeholders to vocationalism in previous sections suggests that stakeholders in the university system have espoused vocationalism through the increase in advanced professions through the expansion of post-graduate courses. There is however some disparity in that the MESSC and the University Council emphasise general knowledge, while the universities emphasise specialist knowledge. The prescribed cluster of values and
attitudes provided in the university curricula also differ among stakeholders—even within economic interest groups—although all stakeholders refer to comprehensive competence in judgement, analysis, and knowledge.

6.4 CENTRAL AUTHORITIES
6.4.1 POLITICAL PARTIES
This section argues that the neo-liberal stance of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), in attempting to minimise ministerial power, has been strengthened by achieving a party consensus on the application of neo-liberal policy in the late 1990s. The LDP has, in criticising faculty autonomy, espoused institutional autonomy as well as accountability by strengthening the leadership power of the university presidents, including lay members of governing bodies.

The ideologies to be analysed are: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy and new managerialism; and (3) vocationalism.

*Neo-liberalism*
The documentary analysis below shows that the ideological stance of the LDP towards neo-liberalism differs between the periods 1984-1987 (the term of the National Council) and the mid-1990s, when the issue of the corporatisation of the national universities was raised.

Between 1984-1987, the analysis suggests that the LDP ideological stance towards neo-liberalism was not based upon a party consensus inasmuch as neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal views co-existed. The neo-liberalism observed in the LDP during the National Council period related to the personal views of the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Nakasone’s ideological position, which was informed by New Right ideology, emphasised both neo-liberalism and nationalism. Nakasone’s neo-liberal interpretation was closer to the concept of the pure market rather than that of the quasi-market, focusing on the removal of
ministerial control in education. Nakasone’s discourse was testimony to his radical position on neo-liberalism. The discourse which Nakasone employed included neo-liberalisation (jiyuka), [his concept of liberalisation equated with the equivalent terms in neo-liberalism, with an emphasis on marketisation and ‘small government’], flexibility (jyunanka), and deregulation (kiseikanwa) as well as nationalist jargon.\textsuperscript{836} Another illustration of his radical neo-liberal stance is the Nakasone Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform established before the beginning of the National Council of Education.\textsuperscript{837} Privatisation and free-market competition were the dominant discourse and policy in this reform.\textsuperscript{838} Furthermore, the publications of Nakasone’s intellectual advisor mark Nakasone’s ideological standpoint on education reform. Kenichi Kayama, a committee member of the National Council, in his publications of Monbusho Kaikaku no Hitsuyosei ni Kansuru Kosatsu [On The Necessity of the Reform of the Ministry of Education] and ‘Kyoiku no Jiyuka’ Ronso no Rekishiteki-igi [The Historical Significance of the Dispute over Liberalisation], criticised ministerial control of education, and advocated the introduction of the market principle into education.\textsuperscript{839}

Nakasone’s nationalist stance is characterised by his emphasis on national cohesion and tradition which did not either conceptually or in practice relate to centralisation or the strength of ministerial control, as Schoppa’s analysis suggests.\textsuperscript{840} Nakasone’s nationalistic agenda, which focused upon the areas which had been reformed as part of post-war democratisation, included change or abolition of the Fundamental Law of Education and the 6-3-3-4 education system [see 2.2.3.2] – the symbols of the post-war democratisation of education, and the reintroduction of the pre-war system. This nationalistic design ultimately failed during the process of the Diet’s approval of the establishment of the 1983-1987 National Council. The failure was the result of Nakasone’s compromise, not with the left-wing groups demanding democracy, but with bunkyo-zoku and the MESSC, who both took an antagonistic position to Nakasone because of fear of losing power through neo-liberalisation.\textsuperscript{841}
Nationalistic values are incorporated in the National Council Report at the level of basic principles and in the context of compulsory education, but not in the university sector. Mark Lincicome conceptually locates nationalism in opposition to internationalisation (*Kokusaika*), which became one of the principles of the Council report.\(^842\) He argues that the Council report was the result of conflict and compromise between the ideological contradictions of nationalism and internationalism, as well as political contradictions between the members of the National Council and the MESSC. An example of compromise between nationalism and internationalism includes the expression coined ‘*Sekai no Naka no Nihonjin*’ (The Japanese people as Cosmopolitans) – the emphasis on ‘Japanese’ relating to nationalism and ‘cosmopolitan’ derived from internationalism. These contradictions have not hampered the internationalisation of education at the implementation level.\(^843\)

The analysis of the gap between Nakasone’s neo-liberal stance, and the recommendations in the National Council Report suggests the extent to which the LDP reached an ideological consensus in the National Council period.\(^844\) The discourse of the National Council Report did not entirely correspond to Nakasone’s New Right ideology outlined above. In this report, the radical neo-liberal vocabularies of ‘market’, privatisation ‘competition’, and ‘choice’ *per se* were absent, and the mild-toned neo-liberal terms such as ‘deregulation’ were selectively used without referring to the issue of state control. For example, the terms ‘privatisation’ and ‘corporatisation’ were avoided in the discussion of the change of status of the national universities. Instead, the report used the phrase ‘the ideal pattern of control of a university’:

It is desirable that a drastic examination be made of the type of establishment of national and local public universities, to help create the ideal pattern of control of a university, as well as the mechanism by which the national government participates in the administration of universities. The Council requests the national government authorities and university people to deal actively with this particular subject.\(^845\)
The division between neo-liberal proponents and neo-liberal antagonists such as *bunkyo-zoku* within the LDP, explains, to a significant extent, the gap between Nakasone’s discourse and the National Council Report. Leonard Schoppa’s analysis not only indicates an ideological confrontation between a neo-liberal camp (some LDP members and economic interest groups), and an anti-neo-liberal camp (the MESSC and *bunkyo-zoku*), but also suggests a limitation of consensus within the LDP.846

From the mid-1990s onwards, the LDP ideology reflects the party consensus on neo-liberal strategies, as evidenced by the LDP New Party Platform. This aspect of the party consensus in respect to the application of neo-liberal principle differs from LDP’s neo-liberalism in the 1980s, which was on the basis of Nakasone’s individual values and leadership. The New Party Platform enacted in 1995 incorporates the New Right values of smaller government and deregulation, and the conservative value of the respect for tradition:

In order to lessen the government’s burden on the public we aim to establish smaller government by resolutely carrying out administrative reform, deregulation and federal decentralization... With respect for our traditional culture we aim to teach morals to Japanese youth so as to realize a higher quality of education and an enriched family life for Japan’s citizens.847

The LDP’s neo-liberal policy relating to the university sector in the 1990s is characterised by two features: 1) the incorporation and subordination of the university reform under economic and administrative reforms; and 2) the decline of centralised planning and of ministerial power. First, *Katsuryokuaru 21-seiki no tameni 6 tsuno Kaikaku* [Six Reforms for the Active Society in the 21st Century] issued in 1997 – which outlines the principles underpinning the political reform in the late-1990s and the early 2000s, focusing upon the six areas (i.e. education, administration, finance, social security, economics, and the monetary system) – prioritises the revitalisation of the Japanese economy and proposes education
reform for economic purposes. This reform proposal acknowledges the impact of economic globalisation – in which corporations choose countries on the basis of the free flow of people, goods, resources, and information in an integrated world – and the predictable low economic growth. The proposal advocates the creation of a 'Scientific and Technological Great State' (Kagaku Gijutsu Taikoku).

Secondly, the neo-liberal policy of the LDP, in the administrative dimension of the Six Reforms, focuses on the decline of centralised planning and of ministerial power. This policy has two themes: central administration reform and corporatisation of the national universities. The reform of central administration has not brought about a significant diminution of ministerial power since the MESSC has recently been enlarged by a merger with the Science and Technology Agency in 2001. The dominant view within the MESSC is that there will be no change, at least in the administration of the universities.

The analysis of Teigen: Korekara no Kokuritsuno Arikata ni tsuite [Proposal: Status of the National Universities] released by a Policy Study Group in the LDP in 2000 indicates the LDP's minimal emphasis on ministerial control after it reached a party consensus on the application of neo-liberal policy. The LDP, for example, criticising present ministerial control, proposes to deregulate and give greater latitude to corporations in the areas of funding management, personnel, salary, and organisation. Another example is the LDP's reluctance to directly apply Corporation General Law in the university sector because the Law empowers both the minister and ministry, which is in opposition to LDP's policy to minimise their power.

The LDP's neo-liberal stance, however, is not based upon the principle of a pure market; the proposal rejects the application of this principle in the university sector. The ideal relationships between the state, the corporations, and the market are not explicit in the LDP proposal, which does not even refer to the establishers of corporations.
University Autonomy and New Managerialism

Teigen: Korekara no Kokuritsuno Arikata ni tsuite [Proposal: Status of the National Universities] indicates that the LDP, while criticising faculty autonomy, espouses both institutional autonomy and accountability of corporations to society as a whole. The LDP proposal, for example, emphasises the reinforcement of the power of university presidents, proposing new governing bodies which would support university presidents and the inclusion of lay members in governing bodies. The LDP, in relation to accountability, proposes the inclusion of lay members (including taxpayers) in the selection of university presidents, and criticises the informal institution-wide election process in the present system.

The logic of the LDP proposal is that university representatives are accountable to society as a whole for responding efficiently to rapid and unpredictable economic and social change. According to this logic, extended ministerial control and the power of faculty committees are irreconcilable with the leadership of university presidents.

Vocationalism

A literature survey suggests that the LDP’s attitude towards vocationalism has not been articulated. Closer relationships between the LDP and economic interest groups suggest that the LDP’s economic stance on vocationalism may be similar to that of economic interest groups, which in general support vocationalism, (a point which is argued in more detail later in this chapter).

This section has argued that in the late 1990s, the LDP’s consensus on the application of neo-liberal policy strengthened the neo-liberal stance. By reinforcing the leadership powers of university presidents and the empowerment of lay members of governing bodies, the LDP has promoted institutional autonomy and endorsed accountability.

The next section examines the ideologies of central administration.
6.4.2 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

The nature of the central administration is not politically neutral, as argued in 5.4.2. According to this line of argument, the MESSC is a collective body of interest groups which has ‘privileged access, vested rights, and self-sustaining points of view’. The MESSC exerts its power over the universities through the allocation of finance, the regulation of their establishment, and involvement in the policymaking process. With regard to the latter, the MESSC consults bunkyo-zoku (unofficial interest groups composed of Members of Parliament of the LDP who share an interest in education); drafts legislation and ministry regulations; and selects external members of advisory councils who hold views close to those of the MESSC.

This section argues that the MESSC has taken an antagonistic position to neo-liberalism — in particular, on the privatisation of the national universities. A proposal put forward by the LDP supporting their privatisation was disregarded owing to the resistance of the MESSC and the universities. The MESSC has espoused both institutional autonomy and accountability to society as a whole: regarding institutional autonomy it has strengthened the power of the university presidents and eroded faculty autonomy; accountability has been increased by including lay members in governing bodies. The MESSC espouses vocationalism by emphasising attitude formation such as individuality, the vocational elements in post-graduate courses, and general education in undergraduate courses. This policy stance is aligned to the LDP and economic interest groups.

The ideologies to be analysed in this section are: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy and new managerialism; and (3) vocationalism.

Neo-liberalism

Leonard Schoppa’s analysis of the political stance of the MESSC in the 1970s and the 1980s indicates a lack of consensus on neo-liberalism within the MESSC, and opposition to neo-liberal doctrine by conservative officers within it. He expresses the attitude of the MESSC towards neo-liberalism (referred to as ‘reformists liberalisation’) as follows:

The ministry was less subtle in its opposition to the reformists’ liberalization proposals. While it expressed support for junanka [‘flexibilisation’ in Schoppa’s terminology] at least in principle, it did not even go that far in its evaluation of the more controversial proposals for jiyuka [‘liberalisation’ in Schoppa’s terminology]. It was strongly and openly opposed to any liberalization whatsoever... (Insertions in brackets added)

Schoppa’s study also reveals how the substantial number of conservative officers in the MESSC imposed conditions which de-emphasised the issues raised by neo-liberal or ‘internationalist reformists’ (such as Kikuo Nishida at the MESSC), during the term of the CCE. The then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and zoku reformists also put forward proposals during the term of the CCE.

Education White Papers in the 1990s and Program for Educational Reform published by the MESSC in 1997, 1998, and 1999 suggests a continuity of the anti-neo-liberal stance of the MESSC in respect of the maintenance of the ministerial power in the 1990s. The documents above also suggest, however, that change in the MESSC has occurred in three respects. First, there has been a significant degree of consensus on an anti-neo-liberal stance within the MESSC, which is evident in the lack of apparent conflict within the MESSC. Secondly, the MESSC has accepted moderate neo-liberal doctrine such as deregulation, competitiveness, and a greater latitude to individual universities. Thirdly, the MESSC has introduced new discourses relating to institutional autonomy such as ‘self-autonomy’ (syutaisei), ‘self-determination’ (jisyusei), and ‘self-regulation’ (jiritsusei). The policy of the MESSC relating to ‘self-autonomy’ and ‘self-
determination' can be observed in its encouragement of administrative and financial efficiency of individual institutions. 'Self-regulation' is emphasised in the area of research, in relation to the reform towards flexibility in personnel and funding. The lack of reference to the privatisation or corporatisation of national universities in the documents suggests a ministerial opposition to pure market philosophy.866

Analysis of Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka no Kento no Hoko [Direction of the Discussion on the Corporatisation of the National Universities] released by the MESSC in 1999, highlights two points.867 One is the change of power balance between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups; the MESSC accepted the neo-liberal policy of the Cabinet and the LDP on the corporatisation of the national universities in 1999.868 The other is the extent to which the neo-liberal doctrine influences the anti-neo-liberal ideology of the MESSC.869 This MESSC proposal excludes major neo-liberal concepts — such as devolution, deregulation, and competition — which relate to government and the university nexus. The proposal rather focuses on self-determination and self-regulation of the universities; this is in contrast to the LDP proposal, which emphasises deregulation notably in the areas of funding management, salary, and organisation.870

The MESSC position paper on corporatisation gives significant attention to practical relationships among the Ministry, Education Minister, and the corporations, attempting to introduce both input and output ministerial control through the new policy instruments of the MESSC: a) the mid-term purpose (chuki mokuhyo); b) mid-term planning (chuki keikaku); and c) evaluation.871 The ideas relating to mid-term purpose, planning, and evaluation are derived from Corporation General Law (1999 onwards). The mid-term purpose is, according to the outline in the Ministerial position paper, to be set up by the Education Minister. Mid-term planning — which is created by individual institutions according to the mid-term purpose — is to be approved by the Minister. Mid-term
planning is linked to the funding allocation, about which the Education Minister
confers with the Funding Minister in the process of the approval of mid-term
planning. This linkage between mid-term planning and funding is not referred to
in the LDP proposal. \(^{872}\) With respect to evaluation, according to the MESSC
position paper, the Evaluation Committee (Hyoka linkai) is to be established in the
Ministry – whose members are appointed by the Minister – according to
Corporation General Law in order to evaluate the implementation of the mid-term
planning. This ministerial proposal on the ministerial evaluation of mid-term
planning by a Committee rather than by the National Institution for Academic
Degree (NIAD) [Daigaku Hyoka / Gakui Jyuyo Kiko] signifies the extent to which
the MESSC attempts to control the mid-term purpose and mid-term planning.

The MESSC proposal differs from the LDP proposal\(^{873}\) in respect of intense
ministerial control of the mid-term purpose (chuki mokuhyo) and the evaluation of
mid-term planning as well as the power of the Education Minister to appoint and
dismiss university presidents. The LDP objects to the mid-term purpose
announced by the Minister and the increased power of the Ministry. Furthermore,
it stresses the significant role of the NIAD (2000 onwards), without referring to
the evaluative function within the Ministry.

*University Autonomy and New Managerialism*

Historical incidents since 1948 and documents released by the MESSC (below)
suggest that the MESSC has supported both institutional autonomy and
accountability to society as a whole. Regarding institutional autonomy, it has
strengthened the power of university presidents, and eroded the power of faculty
committees. Increasing institutional autonomy, according to logic, results in an
increase in the influence of the MESSC because university presidents are
appointed by the Minister. Accountability has been increased by including lay
members in governing bodies.\(^{874}\) The relations between the increase in lay
members and university autonomy is complex; it can be argued that an increase in

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lay members reduces faculty autonomy; this argument requires empirical research. This ideological stance of the MESSC has been coherent in the post-war period.

The example of historical incidents includes the 1948 blueprint 'Ad Hoc University Law' (*Daigaku-ho Shian Yoko*), and the 1951 Bill 'Governance on the National Universities'. Both were proposed by the MESSC but were not enacted owing to the resistance of the national universities. Both documents indicated a ministerial ideological position which supported institutional autonomy by proposing to reduce the power of faculty committees to review the role of the senate, and to increase the power of the university presidents. They both gave attention to lay members in governing bodies.

The following ministerial documents indicate that the MESSC has taken a similar view of the university reform of the mid-1990s to that outlined above, in its support for institutional autonomy and the accountability of the universities to society as a whole, and its criticism of faculty autonomy. For instance, the MESSC, in the 1998 Education White Paper, criticises faculty autonomy, and endorses the 1995 University Council recommendation for strengthening the leadership of university presidents. The MESSC, in the 1999 *Program for Education Reform*, supports the logic of the 1998 University Council that the empowerment of the university presidents rather than the present system which operates on the basis of the power of faculty committees, will lead to accountability and efficiency in the universities. According to this logic, the leadership of the university presidents, efficiency in university management, and the accountability of the universities to society as a whole are inter-related. Furthermore, the 1999 *Program for Educational Reform* refers to the establishment of a management advisory council (*unei shimon kaigi*) which includes lay members, a functional division between faculty committees and the senate (*hyogikai*), and outlines the role of the deans of department. The policy above is in line with the 1995 University Council Report, *Daigaku Unei no Enkatsu ka ni tsuite* [Facilitation of University Administration], and the 1998
The MESSC position is clearer in its policy proposal relating to corporationisation: *Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka no Kento no Hoko* [Direction of the Discussion on the Corporatisation of the National Universities] in 1999. The MESSC is attempting to reduce the power of the senate and faculties and empower university presidents and their supportive bodies—planned management councils (*uneigaigi*), which include vice presidents, academic staff appointed by university presidents, and the director-general of the administrative bureau (*jimu kyokucho*) of individual universities.

The MESSC stance, in this policy proposal, differs from the LDP on the appointment of university presidents; the MESSC proposes the appointment of university presidents by the minister, while the LDP proposes that they be made by both the senate and lay members (including taxpayers). This ministerial proposal indicates the ministerial intention to increase its power.

**Vocationalism**

The general stance of the MESSC towards the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence is explicit in the following areas: attitude formation, post-graduate courses, and general education.

Firstly, in the 1999 *Program for Educational Reform*, the MESSC supports the proposal for ‘competence on pursuing for research questions’ (*kadai tankyu noryoku*) in the 1998 University Council Report. The definition of this competence—‘competence for seeking research questions individually to respond to “change” and finding solutions taking account of various points of view’—provided in the Council Report indicates that this competence relates to individuality (*koseika*).
Secondly, the MESSC, by emphasising the new vocabulary of ‘advanced professions’ (kodo senmon syokugyo jin), adopts the expansion policy of post-graduate courses [see 3.3.4].

Thirdly, the MESSC emphasises general education by changing the purpose of undergraduate studies in the *Standards of the Establishment of Universities*.

The observation is that the change, as indicated earlier, has been in the humanities and social sciences rather than in engineering and technology. The logic is derived from the change noted above and the evidence on different emphases in skills and knowledge between humanities/social sciences, and engineering/technology. At undergraduate level, the humanities and social sciences have emphasised general knowledge, while engineering and technology emphasised specialist and professional education.

This section argued that the MESSC has taken an antagonistic position to neo-liberalism. It has espoused both institutional autonomy and accountability to society as a whole: regarding institutional autonomy it has strengthened the power of the university presidents and eroded faculty autonomy; and it has increased accountability by including lay members in governing bodies. The MESSC espouses vocationalism by emphasising attitude formation such as individuality, vocational elements in the post-graduate courses, and general education in undergraduate courses.

The next section examines the ideologies of the university council.

6.4.3 UNIVERSITY COUNCIL (1987-2000)

The University Council – an advisory body to the Ministry of Education – was established in 1987, following the recommendation of the 1983-1987 National Council. It was abolished in order to reduce public expenditure in the Administration Reform in 2000. In the course of its existence, the University Council made numerous recommendations, many of which have been implemented by the MESSC. It did not have the role of funding allocation like the
This section argues that the University Council took a moderate neo-liberal position, recommending deregulation and competition. It did not refer to privatisation or corporatisation of the national universities or devolution. The University Council espoused both institutional autonomy and accountability to society as a whole: institutional autonomy by strengthening the power of leadership of university presidents and eroding faculty autonomy; and accountability by including lay members in governing bodies. The University Council supported new vocationalism.

The ideologies to be analysed are: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy; (3) new managerialism; and (4) vocationalism.

**Neo-liberalism**

Two formal letters of 'requests for advice' (*shimon*) issued from the Education Minister to the University Council in 1987 and 1997 did not include the concepts of market and deregulation. The concepts incorporated were self-determination of individual universities and their degree of freedom in relation to the concepts of accountability and quality.\(^{886}\) In their logic, being socially accountable required the reform to be initiated by institutions; therefore, institutional individuality should be encouraged. In the context of economic globalisation, the rationale behind the introduction of the quality system is, according to these letters, on the basis of the notion of the expansion of higher education, the diversification of student demands, and the decline of quality.

The documentary analysis below suggests that the University Council took a moderate neo-liberal position, giving attention to deregulation without referring to minimal ministerial power, devolution, and the privatisation or corporatisation of national universities.\(^{887}\) The logic of the University Council relating to its deregulation policy was that deregulation could bring about a diversified
university system, asserting a correlation between diversification in the university sector and the degree of university accountability in accordance with socio-economic demand.

*Heisei 12-nendo Ikou no Koto-kyoiku no Syorai Koso ni tsuite,* [Strategic Plan of Higher Education after 2000] (1997) refers to the change of market conditions — the expansion of undergraduate courses and the decline of the 18-year old university entrance population.888 These factors are used as the rationale behind the necessity of university reform in individual institutions such as changes in institutional organisation and teaching method.

Another example is the 1998 University Council Report, *21-seiki no Daigakuzo to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyoso-tekii Kankyo no naka de Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku* [The Universities in the 21st Century and Their Ongoing Reform and Strategy: Universities with Unique Characteristics in a Competitive Environment].889 In this Report, the concept of a ‘competitive environment’ is not understood as a market principle in the Japanese university sector, but rather as the world-wide market of universities connected by information technology, students and staff exchange, and shared intellectual resources. This Report sets forth the rationale behind the necessity of reforms such as quality assessment and improved access to information for the broader society.

*University Autonomy and New Managerialism*

The University Council’s defence of institutional autonomy and case for increased accountability is articulated in the University Council Reports of the 1990s.

The 1995 and 1998 University Council Reports, which outline the key recommendations made by the University Council on governance, are testimony to the ideological stance of the University Council on institutional autonomy. The 1995 University Council Report, *Daigaku Unei no Enkatsuka ni tsuite,* [Facilitation of University Administration] criticises faculty autonomy for its lack
of accountability to society, and emphasises the power of university presidents and the director-general of the administrative bureau (jimu kyoku-cho).\textsuperscript{890} The Report does not explain how faculty autonomy relates to the lack of accountability. Regarding the leadership of university presidents, it recommends the following: the extension of the duration of the president; reinforcement of the president’s support structure (e.g. a vice-president and a presidential assistant office); change in the selection of university presidents (e.g. the selection of two candidates by the senate; election among academic staff; and the inclusion of candidates external to universities); introduction of new funds for the leadership of university presidents; and encouragement for university presidents to involve themselves in the selection of academic staff.\textsuperscript{891} The Report, in relation to the role of the director-general of the administrative bureau, recommends a longer term of office.

The 1998 University Council Report, \textit{21 Seiki no Daigakuzou to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyosoteki Kankyo no nakade Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku} [Universities in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century and Their Ongoing Reform and Strategy: Universities with Unique Characteristics in a Competitive Environment], takes a similar ideological stance to the 1995 University Council in respect of criticism of the power of faculty committees and emphasis on leadership of university presidents and role of the director-general of the administrative bureau.\textsuperscript{892} For instance, the 1998 Report, in relation to the leadership of university presidents, recommends a president-initiated research and teaching plan which aims for effective funding allocation; and introduction of supportive bodies for university presidents such as a management council (whose members would include vice presidents and academic staff appointed by presidents and the director-general of the administrative bureau). The 1998 Report emphasises the inclusion of the director-general of the administrative bureau in the membership of its proposed management council.

The difference between the 1998 University Council Report and the 1995 University Council Report is in the elucidation of the roles of governing bodies
and further emphasis on the inclusion of lay members in governing bodies. For example, the 1998 Report outlines a different role for the senate and faculty committees: the role of senate includes deciding the institution-wide requirement of the curriculum, and addressing the institution-wide problem in governance; and that of faculty committees focuses on the curriculum and student issues such as enrolment, graduation, and awards. The 1998 Report clarifies relationships between senate and faculty committees, between university presidents and deans of department, between university presidents and senate, and between university presidents and faculty committees. The principle of the proposed relationships among governing bodies in this Report is the subordination of small units, such as departments, under the institution as a whole, and of advisory bodies, such as the senate, under an executive such as university presidents. Furthermore, the 1998 Report emphasises accountability of the universities to society as a whole. It criticises the ambiguity in the function of the ‘external delegation meeting’ (sanyokai) (which consists of lay members), and proposes a new ‘university management commission’ (daigaku unei kyogikai) which includes lay members. It also discusses the universities’ purpose, plan, budget, self-evaluation, and the value of co-operation with the community and the economic sector.

In the context of private universities, the University Council made similar recommendations to those made for national universities on institutional autonomy, by establishing an institution-wide governing body. The Council, however, gave less attention to private universities overall.

**Vocationalism**

The University Council Reports in the 1990s indicate that the University Council espoused vocationalism. The Council’s recommendations focussed on three elements: (1) an emphasis on both the new and traditional modes of value and attitude formation; (2) an increased emphasis on vocationalism in post-graduate courses in the context of the expansion policy for post-graduate courses; and (3)
an emphasis on general education in undergraduate courses. The proposed elements of new vocationalism reflect the view of the University Council on economic and technological shifts in the global economy, their link to human capital, and consequently to the enhancement of standards in the universities.

(1) Recommendation regarding values and attitudes
The University Council Reports\textsuperscript{895} emphasise not only the traditional modes of value and attitude formation such as diligence, patience, and respect, but also new aspects such as individuality and creativity. For example, the 1991 University Council Report, \textit{Heisei 5 nendo Ikou no Koto-Kyoiku no Keikakuteki Seibi ni tsuite} [Plan on Higher Education after 1993], introduces a new discourse relating to individuality – ‘education for autonomous thinking and self-judgement’ \textit{(mizukara kange handan saseru kyoiku)}\textsuperscript{896}. The 1998 University Council Report, \textit{21 Seiki no Daigakuzou to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyosoteki Kankyo no nakade Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku} [Universities in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century and Their Ongoing Reform and Strategy: Universities with Unique Characteristics in a Competitive Environment], similarly incorporates the concept of individuality in the proposed purpose of undergraduate study – to increase ‘competence in pursuing research questions’ \textit{(kadai tankyu noryoku)}\textsuperscript{897}. ‘Competence in pursuing research questions’ is defined in the Report as, ‘competence for seeking research questions individually to respond to “change” and finding solutions taking account of various points of view’\textsuperscript{898}.

By emphasising particular skills, knowledge, and competence, the logic of the University Council – that the market in the university sector is more appropriate for the new economic milieu than is state planning, since the former can rapidly respond to rapid, unpredictable economic change – was not adopted.

(2) Recommendation regarding an increased emphasis on vocationalism
The University Council’s stance on vocationalism in post-graduate courses relates to two aspects: a) the introduction of a new purpose for post-graduate study – the development of ‘advanced professionals’ (kodo-senmon syokugyo-jin); and b) the expansion policy in post-graduate courses.\textsuperscript{899} First, the concept of ‘advanced professionals’ or occupational professionals articulated in the Reports has been introduced in the statement of the aims of the post-graduate study – which was for researchers only – in the amended \textit{Standards for the Establishment of Universities} (the combination of vocationalism and traditional professionalism) since 1991 onwards. There is, however, no clear definition of advanced professionals; it can be assumed that advanced professionals, as distinct from researchers, are more closely related to new occupations created by technological and communication innovations (e.g. those in computer science).

The concrete policy associated with advanced professionals recommended by University Council includes establishment of one-year post-graduate courses (implemented), the exemption from a dissertation in post-graduate courses (implemented),\textsuperscript{900} and the linkage between master courses (e.g. law school) and occupational qualifications (partially implemented).\textsuperscript{901}

Secondly, the expansion policy of the University Council in post-graduate courses related to vocationalism is shown below in the analysis of two concepts – advanced professionals and ‘refresher education’.\textsuperscript{902} Refresher education is defined by the MESSC as courses in the universities provided for employees attempting to acquire further skills and knowledge for their jobs. In 1988, the University Council recommended amending the purpose of doctoral courses by introducing an aim in addition to the original aim of producing researchers who will work mainly in universities after their graduation.\textsuperscript{903} The proposed aim was to develop human resources through advanced capabilities and increased knowledge suitable for various occupations.\textsuperscript{904} Since master courses had already aimed to produce both researchers and professionals, this recommendation meant that the purpose of the graduate courses as a whole was now to produce both researchers
and 'advanced professionals'. The concept of 'refresher education' had already appeared in this initial report on reforms in post-graduate courses, although instead of the term, 'refresher education', which started to be used later in the mid-1990s, the phrase, 'demand for re-education for adults' was used. In 1993, in accordance with previous recommendations of the University Council, the Standard of the Establishment of Graduate Universities amended the purpose of doctoral courses from a single purpose of producing researchers to binary purposes of producing both researchers and 'advanced professionals'. 905 Since then, the concept of 'advanced professionals' has been central in the reform of post-graduate courses.

(3) Recommendation regarding an emphasis on general education in undergraduate courses
The 1991 University Council Report, Daigaku Kyoiku no Kaizen ni tsuite [Improvement of Education at the Universities], emphasises both general and specialist education at the undergraduate level, using the discourses 'broad knowledge' (hiroi chishiki), 'insight' (mono wo mirume), and 'self-autonomous and comprehensive judgement' (jisyuteki, sogoteki ni kangaeru chikara). 906 This recommendation has been implemented in curriculum reforms which have attempted to increase the discretion of individual universities in order to incorporate general education into different curricula in accordance with different purposes, and to improve efficiency in academic staff allocation. 907

The 1997 University Council Report, Koto Kyoiku no Isso no Kaizen ni tsuite [On Further Improvement of Higher Education] also emphasises general education. It criticises the trend in curriculum reform among a significant number of universities to de-emphasise general education. 908 The 1997 Report explores the issue of general education and questions the relationships between under-graduate and post-graduate education with respect to the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence. 909
(kiso kyoiku) such as the liberal arts, and post-graduate study for its emphasis on specialist and professional education.

The second and third proposed elements of vocationalism have an implication for the distinction between undergraduate and postgraduate courses in respect of generalists and professionals (including specialists). The 1998 University Council Report proposes a differentiation in the function of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in terms of skills and knowledge; a broad knowledge in undergraduate courses, and professional knowledge of a discipline in post-graduate courses. The provision of broad knowledge is similar to the concept of liberal arts, and a basic knowledge of a discipline. Since the 1960s, the expansion of undergraduate courses has increased the number of generalists on the graduate labour market, since a large population of graduates in humanities and social sciences – which were greatly expanded fields – have been employed as generalists. The expansion policy for post-graduate courses is designed to lead to an increased output of advanced professionals, on the assumption that the post-graduate labour market can expand by employing them.

This section has argued that the University Council adopted a moderate neo-liberal position. Deregulation and competition were inherent in its recommendations. Institutional autonomy and social accountability were endorsed. The University Council supported vocationalism.

The next section analyses the ideologies of the universities.

6.5 THE UNIVERSITIES

The policies and ideologies of the national and private universities differ to a significant extent.

This section argues that the Association of National Universities Presidents (ANUP) [Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyokai] adopts an antagonistic position to neo-liberalism – in particular, the privatisation of national universities – and to some
extent, institutional autonomy and governance on the basis of the erosion of faculty autonomy. This ideological stance suggests a continuity in 'private definition' of the national universities, notwithstanding the fact that the ANUP commonly accepts 'public definition' in particular after the 1990s [see 2.1]. The Federation of Japanese Private Universities (FJPU) [Nihon Shiritsu Daigaku Dantai Rengokai] adopts an ambiguous position with respect to neo-liberalism, new managerialism, vocationalism, and, to some extent, university autonomy; they support the Ministerial deregulation policy, adopting a passive position on Ministerial policies relating to governance and vocationalism, while emphasising 'self-determination' (jisyusei) and 'self-regulation' (jiritsusei) of individual universities. The ideological stance of the FJPU is complex; they are not clearly aligned with 'public or private definitions'.

This section examines policy and ideologies of two university bodies — the ANUP and the FJPU. The ANUP is the representative of national universities, whose members are university presidents.9 The FJPU consists of three private university organisations: the Federation of the Japanese Private Universities, the Association of the Japanese Private Universities, and the Association for the Promotion of the Japanese Private Universities. The components of the FJPU are institutions rather than individuals.

Neither the ANUP or the FJPU functioned as policy makers or as pressure groups until the late 1990s; before then they acted passively.912 They did not propose a new agenda and barely addressed major policies recommended by the University Council or initiated by the MESSC. Yukuo Imura, a former president of the ANUP, pointed out in 1997 that the major problem with the ANUP was its lack of initiatives on educational reforms and its heavy reliance upon the MESSC.913 He considered that these problems were due to administrative weaknesses such as the limited number of board meetings and the lack of regular committee members working for the ANUP on a full-time basis.914 The LDP policy on the corporatisation of the national universities has transformed the
organisational nature of the ANUP to that of an active body, which both resists and compromises with the LDP on this issue.

The organisational nature of the FJPU has been compliant and generally aligned to that of the MESSC. The FJPU lacks the capability to make effective proposals and recommendations to the central authority, due to the difficulty of reaching a consensus among over 350 private universities.

The documentation to be analysed in this section includes the submissions of the ANUP and the FJPU to government, political parties, the Education Minister, the University Council, and the Minister of Finance, in particular. The ideologies to be analysed are: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy; (3) new managerialism; and (4) vocationalism.

**Neo-liberalism**
The analysis below suggests that the ANUP has opposed neo-liberal doctrine, especially since the second half of the 1990s, when the Cabinet and Diet employed neo-liberal policy in relation to the national universities. With respect to the FJPU, neo-liberalism is not a counter-ideology; it supports for the Ministerial deregulation policy.

The ANUP’s rejection of the LDP’s initial plan — the privatisation of national universities — and the acceptance of corporatisation as the result of negotiation suggests the ANUP’s desired relationship between the ministry and the universities. Regarding the privatisation of national universities, the logic used by the ANUP is that given the diverse nature of the university sector and the significance of long-term vision in research, the privatisation of national universities is not appropriate. This view has been contentious within the academic community. The purpose of corporatisation is, according to ‘Corporation General Law’ (Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin Tsusoku-ho) from 1999 onwards, to separate planning [by the Ministry] and the implementation of corporations in order to seek efficiency. This definition suggests that the
concept of corporatisation is not antithetical to government control; on the contrary, government control is strengthened in the area of planning and evaluation. Therefore, the corporatisation policy involves disparity between principle (which is derived from neo-liberal doctrine), and practice (which results in a strengthening of government control). The acceptance of the corporatisation plan and the rejection of privatisation by the ANUP suggest that the ideological position of the ANUP is aligned to ministerial control, and distanced from the concept of the pure market.

The analysis of *Kokuritsu Daigaku to Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin-ka Mondai ni tsuite (chukan hokoku)* [National Universities and the Problems in Corporatisation (Intermittent Report)] suggests that national universities take a position closer to that of the MESSC position paper: *Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka no Kento no Hoko* [Direction of the Discussion on the Corporatisation of the National Universities] (1999). The common stance suggests a juxtaposition of policy ideas between the ANUP and the MESSC on the issue of corporatisation of the national universities.

The primary purpose of this report, which seeks a compromise with neo-liberal groups such as the LDP and economic interest groups, sets forth the Association’s opinion on the corporatisation of the universities. The main focus of the report is the legal setting of the current national universities following their change from being national institutions, particularly in relation to ‘Corporation General Law’. By emphasising self-autonomy (*syutaisei*) and self-determination (*jisyusei*), and the continuity of public funding to corporations, the report recommends new relationships between corporations and the MECSST [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology] (2001 onwards).

The ANUP, in the position paper, accepts the new ministerial control – the mid-term purpose announced by the Ministry, the mid-term planning approved by the Ministry, and funding allocation on the basis of the achievement of mid-term planning. The ANUP stresses the continuity of public funding through the
Special Account for National Educational Institutions. With respect to evaluation, the ANUP warns that quality control by Hyoka Iinkai (Evaluation Committee) in the MESSC should be restricted, confining the area of evaluation by the Evaluation Committee to mid-term planning only, not the comprehensive evaluation which the University Evaluation Institution – the quasi-governmental organisation – is supposed to cover from 2003.

The position paper published by the University of Tokyo, Kokuritsu Daigaku no Hojin-ka ni tsuite [Corporatisation of National Universities], signals more of a departure from the MESSC proposal than the ANUP’s position papers. [The voice of the University of Tokyo has been influential in the Japanese university sector because of its institutional history (as the oldest university in Japan) and its reputation.] The University of Tokyo proposes new relationships – counselling and contract relations – between the corporations and the MECSST; ‘direction and supervision relations’ (shiji kantoku kankei) have been hitherto taken between the MESSC and national universities. The function of the state is to establish corporations and provide funding for them; the function of corporations is to manage, and, to a significant extent, obtain funding and administrative autonomy. With respect to ‘direction and supervision relations’ the state has established, funded, and managed national universities. The difference between corporations and private universities in the proposal by the University of Tokyo is that corporations are established and funded by the state, while private universities are established and funded by non-governmental organisations.

The University of Tokyo criticises the involvement of the Minister and the MECSST in the mid-term purpose. Therefore, in this respect, the University’s position differs from that of both the ANUP and the MESSC.

The submission of the FJPU to the 1998 University Council suggests that the ideological position of private universities in relation to neo-liberalism entails maximising public funding support and minimising ministerial regulation, with an emphasis on ‘self-determination’ and ‘self-regulation’ of the universities.
FJPU, in relation to policy on minimal ministerial control, supports the government's deregulation policy such as flexibility in the co-ordination of curricula, and criticises the Ministerial regulation policy on the expansion of undergraduate courses from the 1990s onwards. Furthermore, in the area of evaluation, the FJPU stresses that the National Institution for Academic Degree, if established, should not involve state institutions.

University Autonomy

The discourse of the ANUP in the ANUP monthly journal did not include university autonomy until the late 1990s; the main concerns have been insufficient financial support from the state and the treatment of university staff. The position paper of the University of Tokyo suggests that the weak value of university autonomy is no longer a concern.

The University of Tokyo clarifies two distinct views regarding university autonomy in the position paper. The first is the redefinition of university autonomy from 'autonomy for resistance' (teiko suru jichi) to 'autonomy for contribution' (kokensuru jichi), which emphasises accountability to society as a whole. The second is the continuity of the 'autonomy of faculty committee' in redefined university autonomy, resisting an overemphasis on institutional autonomy. The University of Tokyo recommends that the areas of 'autonomy of faculty committees' and 'institutional autonomy' should be separated.

New Managerialism

The policy stance of the national universities on governance has been in opposition to that of the MESSC, which, as argued earlier, attempted to reduce faculty autonomy, and to reinforce the leadership of university presidents during the post-war period. Historical incidents and documents published by the AUNP and the University of Tokyo (discussed below) suggest that the ideological stance of the national universities on governance reflects an adherence to 'academic
value’, stressing faculty autonomy and objecting to institutional autonomy. The ideological stance of the private universities has not been explicit, partly because it has been a minor issue in MESSC policy, and as aforementioned private universities have taken a passive and generally compliant stance with that of the MESSC.

The policy stance of the national universities can be elucidated by historical examples. Since 1948, ministerial policy on governance has included an increase in the number of lay members in governing bodies, a reinforcement of the power of the university presidents, and a decline in the power of faculty committees.

The 1948 blueprint of ‘Ad Hoc University Law’, the 1951 ‘Governance on the National Universities’ Bill, the 1962 CCE Report, and the 1971 CCE Report are testimony to this ministerial policy.

The resistance of the national universities to the ministerial policy of reducing the power of faculty committees, and the failure of the implementation of this policy suggest two things. One is that the ideological stance of the national universities has been located in ‘private definition’ in the post-war period. The other is that national universities have not been always passive and submissive to the MESSC.

The publication by the ANUP suggests that the national universities’ opposition to the ministerial policy has started to change; the ANUP has taken a co-operative position with the MESSC on the issue of the corporatisation of national universities since the late-1990s.933 The change in the policy stance of the ANUP to the MESSC policy on governance from one of opposition to one of acceptance could relate to conflict and compromise on the issue of the corporatisation of the national universities between the Cabinet / the LDP and the ANUP / the MESSC. The policy stance of the University of Tokyo is, in contrast to the ANUP, closer to the traditional position of the national universities.934

As documented in *Kokuritsu Daigaku to Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin-ka ni tsuite (chukan hokoku)* [National Universities and the Problems in the
Corporatisation (Intermittent Report)] (1999), the First Permanent Committee of the ANUP neither emphasised the continuity of faculty autonomy, nor criticised the empowerment of university presidents. The report, in addition, supports the establishment of supportive bodies for university presidents: a ‘management council’ (unei kaigi), whose members consist of vice-presidents and academic staff appointed by the presidents, and a ‘management advisory council’ (unei shimon kaigi), which includes lay members. The ANUP shares a similar view on governance with the MESSC and the 1998 University Council in this respect. It is, however, worthy of note that, unlike the MESSC and the 1998 University Council, the ANUP policy excludes the director-general of the administrative bureau from the memberships of the ‘management council’, and emphasises the continuity of the power of the senate (hyogikai) as a supreme decision making body. The issue of the introduction of a ‘management council’ and a ‘management advisory council’ is in debate (August, 2001).

In comparison with the ANUP report, the University of Tokyo, in Kokuritsu Daigaku no Hojin-ka ni tsuite [Corporatisation of National Universities], takes a position closer to the traditional academic value on governance, criticising ministerial policy on the empowerment of university presidents and the removal of the power of faculty committees. The University criticises the absolute power of the minister to appoint university presidents under ‘Corporation General Law’. It justifies the present appointment system of university presidents – selection by the senate (an informal procedure with an election among academic staff) and appointment by the Ministry – arguing that the present system is democratic and appropriate in accordance with the principles of self-determination (jisyusei) and self-regulation (jiritsusei) of the universities. The University, furthermore, stresses the significance of the continuity of the appointment and objects to the dismissal of academic staff by faculty committees and on the basis that the appointment of all administrative staff should be made by the university

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The power of the senate, and power relationships between the senate and faculty committees are not addressed in this report. The policy stance of the private universities on governance is closer to that of the 1995 and 1998 University Councils, except on the issue of the power of boards of directors of educational foundations (rijikai). An example of the common stance between the FJPU and the University Council can be seen in the power relationships between the boards of directors of educational foundations and the presidents of the universities, and between the boards of directors of educational foundations and the boards of trustees (hyogikai). Another example is the incorporation of lay members into governing bodies. The FJPU points out that the boards of directors of educational foundations and the board of trustees already include lay members. Since 1986, the irregular position paper series, 'Opinion of the University Council', suggests that the common stance of the FJPU and University Council relies to a significant extent upon the organisational nature of the FJPU, which as indicated earlier, is passive and generally aligned to the MESSC.

The main difference between the FJPU and the 1998 University Council Report resides in the issue of power of the boards of directors of educational foundations. The FJPU prefers to maintain the power of the boards of directors of educational foundations as an ultimate decision-making body in administration. The 1998 University Council Report, in contrast, suggests that the power of the boards of directors of educational foundations should be confined to administrative issues, not including teaching issues.

Vocationalism
Documents published by the ANUP and the FJPU cannot be read in terms of the conceptual opposition between accountability and university autonomy, partly because those concepts have been compatible for national and private universities, and partly because they have not been a major issue for national and private
universities in the post-war period. In addition, the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence is not a major issue for the ANUP and the FJPU.

Both the ANUP and the FJPU accept utilitarian views. They do not object to the economic task of the universities imposed by the University Council and the MESSC, although they have expressed concern about the overemphasis in particular fields such as science and technology. For instance, the 7th Permanent Committee in the ANUP recommended in 1997 that universities should promote the US style of university-industrial co-operation in order to respond appropriately to the dictates of globalisation. Furthermore, in 1998, the ANUP declared that the economic and social tasks of universities have been increasing as a result of globalisation.

Similarly, the FJPU confirmed the economic task of universities in its submission to the University Council in 1990, although in the case of the FJPU, it also referred to the importance of traditional university values. The FJPU has taken social accountability for granted, and given limited attention to university autonomy in their submissions in the last 15 years. The FJPU has affirmed the purpose of graduate schools — to nourish advanced professionals and researchers, and has, more recently, proposed further promotion of the network connecting higher education and the industrial sector.

Neither the ANUP nor the FJPU has proposed or specifically referred to the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence. The ANUP does not express any objections to the ‘creativity’ and ‘nourishment of advanced professions’ policies introduced by the MESSC; it supports ‘competence on pursuing for research questions’ (kadai tankyu noryoku) which was proposed by the 1998 University Council. In the case of the FJPU, it accepts the recommendation made by the University Council on ‘specialist knowledge’, ‘comprehensive knowledge’, and ‘comprehensive judgement’, admitting that the universities have not stressed ‘thinking and judging’ in teaching; their primary concern has been the transmission of knowledge. [The definition of ‘thinking and judging’ is unclear.
in the text; it can be assumed that the concept is close to critical thinking.] The FJPU also supports general education which was emphasised by the 1991 University Council. 960

This section argued that the ANUP takes an antagonistic position with respect to neo-liberalism, in particular, the privatisation of the national universities, and to some extent, institutional autonomy and governance on the basis of the erosion of faculty autonomy. This ideological stance suggests the continuity of 'private definition' within national universities, although the ANUP significantly accepts 'public definition', in particular, after the 1990s. The FJPU takes an ambiguous position with respect to neo-liberalism, governance, vocationalism, and, to some extent, university autonomy.

The next section examines the ideologies of the economic interest groups.

6.6 EMPLOYERS

The economic interest groups to be analysed in this section include the Kyoto Group for the Study of Global Issues (Sekai o Kangaeru Kyoto Zakai) and the four largest economic associations: the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations (Nikkeiren), the Japanese Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai), and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nissho).

Analysis of policy proposals of the five economic interest groups suggests that economic interest groups exert significant influence on the university policy of the government and the MESSC; in particular, their perceptions of economic change and the new demands for skills and knowledge. However, the emphasis on neo-liberal values differs among economic interest groups. Policy proposals of economic interest groups largely correspond to the university policy formulated and implemented by the MESSC. This correspondence suggests that these economic interest groups are profoundly involved in the policymaking structure.
The similar proposals of the four largest economic groups — on issues such as diversification, deregulation, university governance, lifelong education, internship, and co-operation among corporations, higher education institutions, and public sectors — are actually the foci of the higher education reforms initiated by the MESSC in the late 1980s and the 1990s. A scrutiny of the timing of policy decisions by the central authority, and the publication years of economic interest groups’ policy suggests that many of the principles underlying the contemporary education reforms originally came from the economic sector. For instance, the issue of diversification was addressed in *Chyokumen suru Daigaku Mondai ni Kansuru Kihon Kenkai* [Basic Views on Problems in the Universities] issued by the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations in 1969, and *Challenging towards Diversification* [*Tayoka e no Cyosen*] by the Japanese Committee for Economic Development in 1979. Co-operation between the universities and corporations can be identified in the same document of the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations in 1969. Furthermore, the principles of the education reform of the late 1980s and the 1990s — creativity, diversity, and internationalisation — matched those used in the title of the policy proposal of the Japanese Committee for Economic Development in 1984. All of this indicates that economic groups have been proactive on education reform, and that their proposals have had a major impact on the educational reforms in Japan in the late 1980s and the 1990s. (Their influence on current reforms is also tangible.)

While the proposals of the economic interest groups tend to correspond to the educational policy of the MESSC, not all policy proposals of economic interest groups have been implemented. For example, the 6-3-3-4 year school system has not been changed, despite the fact that both the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations in 1969 and the Japanese Committee for Economic Development in 1984 proposed modifying it. A further example is that the ‘principle of the market’ (*shijyo genri*), which economic groups proposed particularly before and during the discussion of Nakasone’s National Council (1983-87), has not been
introduced in the radical way which these groups proposed – to leave education to the market by removing state control. The confrontation between neo-liberal groups and conservative, humanitarian groups in the National Council and their compromise resulted in the introduction of the more moderate concepts, ‘deregulation’ (kiseikanwa) and ‘diversification’ (tayoka). Since the 1983-1987 National Council, the proposals of the four largest economic groups rarely use the term, ‘principle of the market’; instead reference is made to ‘principle of competition’ (kyoso no genri), in which the essential idea is not the removal of state control, but competition among universities for quality enhancement. The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry does not refer to market philosophy in the context of higher education. The Japanese Committee for Economic Development refers to deregulation, not to the pure market principle. Both the Federation of Economic Organizations and Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations propose the principle of competition with no reference to Ministerial control. A plausible interpretation is that the essential concept of the removal of state control was largely absent until the privatisation (later, corporatisation) incorporated into neo-liberal doctrine re-emerged in the mid-1990s. It is thus clear that while a policy alignment exists in some areas, economic interest groups and the MESSC have not always reached a consensus.

This section argues that economic interest groups have espoused neo-liberalism, adopting discourses of deregulation, diversification, and the principle of competition. Their neo-liberal stance is close to the concept of the pure market in that they support the removal of Ministerial control of the universities. Economic interest groups, sharing a common stance with the University Council, support new vocationalism, institutional autonomy, and accountability to society as a whole.

The ideologies to be analysed in this section are as follows: (1) neo-liberalism; (2) university autonomy and new managerialism; and (3) new vocationalism.
Neo-liberalism

The literature suggests that the neo-liberal stance of economic interest groups is close to the concept of the pure market in that they propose the removal of state control of the universities. For instance, the 1994 policy proposal of the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, *Taisyuka Jidai no Atarashii Daigakuzou wo Motomete* [To Search for the New Type of University in the Mass Education Era], proposes deregulation on *Standards for the Establishment of Universities* in the areas of establishment of institutions and new departments, the qualification of academic staff, the number of academic staff, and the site of the universities. The Japanese Committee for Economic Development, furthermore, in the same proposal, recommends the improvement of the university-led accreditation system and questions Ministerial-led chartering based upon the *Standards for the Establishment of Universities.*

The Federation of Economic Organisations and the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations take similar, but more moderate neo-liberalism positions to that of the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, supporting deregulation, diversification, and the principle of competition without referring to the removal of Ministerial control. The position papers of the Federation of Economic Organisations and the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations (in 1993 and 1995 respectively), which use moderate neo-liberal expression and avoid radical neo-liberal discourses such as privatisation and the principle of the market, are testimony to the ideological stance of these two economic interest groups.

University Autonomy and New Managerialism

The publications of economic interest groups suggest that economic interest groups support institutional autonomy and new managerialism, adopting a similar view to that of the University Council.
Two documents published by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Japanese Committee for Economic Development in 1994 are testimony to the ideological position of these two economic interest groups relating to university autonomy and governance. A 1994 proposal by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry emphasises the reinforcement of the power of university presidents by extending the duration of their presidency, establishing new supportive bodies for presidents, and strengthening presidential budgetary control. The aforementioned 1994 proposal by the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, *Taisyuka Jidai no Atarashii Daigakuzou wo Motomete*, [To Search for the New Type of University in the Mass Education Era], criticises the present system of selection of academic staff by faculty committees in the national universities, and ambiguous functions among the boards of directors of educational foundations (rijikai), faculty committees, and the university presidents of private universities. It proposes the leadership of university presidents.

**Vocationalism**

The position papers among economic interest groups encapsulate similar points with respect to skills, knowledge, competence (such as creativity), internationalism, and individuality, while individual economic interest groups emphasise particular skills, knowledge, and competence, in different degrees, among traditional and new modes of personal aptitude (e.g. for the former, diligence, patience, respect and creativity; and for the latter, individuality and flexibility), and generalisation and specialisation. In 1996, the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations affirmed the importance of the development of human resources for the new era: the capability to think structurally, to be creative and original, to identify and resolve problems, to respond appropriately to globalisation, and to be a leader. In 1997, the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations focused on the issue of new demands on human resources as a result of 'globalisation', stressing the international
dimension of human resources: self-regulation (*jiritsusei*) such as individual capability in problem-finding / solving, understanding of and respect for global diversity, and the language capability to communicate with foreigners, and specialised skills and knowledge.\(^{971}\) The Japanese Committee for Economic Development (1984) asserted that creativity, diversity, and an understanding of internationalism would be the expected qualities of young people in the future.\(^{972}\) Four years later, the organisation focused on the individual (*ko*), publishing *The Nourishment of the New ‘Individual’ (Atarashii Ko no Ikusei).*\(^{973}\) The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry alluded to similar values in 1993: creativity, and an understanding of internationalism, as well as the traditional values of patience, diligence, strong will, a social and public oriented mind, and consideration for others.\(^{974}\) In the context of higher education, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1994) further stressed the aspects of originality and individuality, creating a new term, ‘self-development type’ (*jisyu kaihatsu-gata*) – human resources possessing the capability to find and explore new values on their own.\(^{975}\) The Federation of Economic Organizations (1993) similarly regarded the needs of human resources in the new era as creativity, foresight, specialisation with comprehensive perception, and an understanding of internationalism.\(^{976}\)

The four economic groups, however, emphasise new and traditional modes of personal aptitude and generalisation and specialisation to different degrees. On the issue of new and traditional modes of personal aptitude, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development has emphasised new modes of personal values – creativity, diversity, and an understanding of internationalism – with less focus on traditional modes since 1979. The Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations has historically emphasised the traditional modes; however, its focus has recently changed to the new modes. The Federation of Economic Organizations likewise emphasises new modes rather than traditional modes. In contrast to the other economic groups, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry still emphasises traditional modes more than new modes. On the issue of
the balance between generalisation and specialisation, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, has, since 1979, claimed that the overemphasis on generalist education is one of the causal factors of educational rigidity, and has advocated further training of specialists. The Federation of Economic Organizations similarly stresses specialisation, but in a more modest way, adding the significance of understanding other fields. The Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations emphasises the balance of liberal arts and specialisation. In contrast to the other three economic groups, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry places more emphasis on liberal arts and history, and less emphasis on specialisation.

The differences outlined above relate to the characteristics of the respective economic groups, in particular their memberships and the purposes of their establishments. The Japanese Committee for Economic Development is the most liberal of the four. This economic group, which comprises thousands of businessmen and businesswomen, established by then young managers, was established to promote modernisation and democratisation in the post-war period. Its founding aims have informed its liberal perspective. The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which comprises small and medium sized firms, is the most conservative among the four economic groups and takes a nationalistic position, seeking the re-introduction of the pre-war educational system. The Federation of Economic Organizations and the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations share similar views on skills and knowledge. In general, both organisations have close relations and share similar organisational members (trade associations and corporations). These organisations are more conservative than the Committee for Economic Development and less liberal than the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

In the context of (higher) education, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development is well incorporated into the policymaking structure. The reasons for the considerable influence of this economic group on higher education policy
(and education policy more generally) are two-fold. One is the innovative nature of its proposals which provide a pragmatic vision of the education reforms. The other is that its proposals are generally aligned with the policy direction of the MESSC. For example, the Committee stresses liberal accounts of 'the principle of competition'; however, there is no reference to the issue of state control. The Committee regards both the economic and education systems as an integrated system; therefore economic and education reforms should be complementary. It proposes, as one of its solutions, a new mode of employment on the basis of employees' capability and 'learning background' (gakusyureki) rather than 'institutional background' (gakkoreki) or institutional reputation. This concept has generated a concrete agenda for higher education reform; it includes changes to university entrance, the transferability of credits among education institutions, and lifelong education. In particular, lifelong education has been a major focus of this organisation in the latter half of the 1990s; it has attempted to facilitate the flow of people; integrate 'learning', 'working', and 'leisure'; and remove the barriers of education institutions and corporations.

Similarly, the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations, 'an umbrella organisation for management' perceives that it is important to introduce a new Japanese style of management for the future. The issues include evaluation on the basis of capability, salary on the basis of what employees achieve, the use of specialists by reducing the training for generalists by means of rotation in a corporation, and changes in the recruitment system, such as an emphasis on the 'learning background' and the introduction of middle career employees. However, unlike the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations does not have a clear vision on the relationship between education and the economy, although co-operation between corporations and educational institutions has been an issue for this organisation since 1969. The Federation's conservatism and patriotic orientation stress the importance of national consensus, history, and tradition; its
ideology has informed its interest on curricula since the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{983} The organisation's proposal on curriculum reform of the universities in the 1990s includes an emphasis on Japanese history, as well as liberal arts, internship, and volunteer activities.\textsuperscript{984} Economic liberalism is strongly espoused. The principle of competition is one of its major proposals for higher education reform.\textsuperscript{985}

The view of the Federation of Economic Organizations is more dynamic, taking account of the structural change of the Japanese economy. The proposals put forward by the organisation, with its significant attention to economic globalisation, includes enhancement of the productivity of white-collar workers, the promotion of product originality and its development, the enhancement of basic research, and change to the traditional employment system with an emphasis on creativity, foresight, specialisation, and an understanding of internationalism.\textsuperscript{986} The Federation of Economic Organizations emphasises not only pragmatism and specialisation in the curriculum, but also changes to university governance such as the reinforcement of the power of university presidents and the expansion of public expenditure on higher education. In terms of economic liberalism, the Federation of Economic Organizations is the most radical among the four largest economic groups. In the context of school education, it expresses a strong antibureaucratic view, and advocates private sector initiative in the economic arena. Nevertheless, in the context of higher education, the organisation is more moderate in its proposals, emphasising the principle of competition between institutions – the moderate application of economic values – rather than a diminution of ministerial power.\textsuperscript{987}

The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which consists of small and medium-sized firms, did not give attention to educational issues until 1991, when the Committee on Educational Problems was established. This organisation's view of economic change is not distinctive, except in relation to advanced technology in the manufacturing sector and innovative entrepreneurial attitudes in the service sector. These two exceptions make the policy proposals of
this organisation distinctive in their emphasis on science and engineering in higher education and the promotion of 'entrepreneurial spirit' (kigyoka seishin). Unlike the other three economic groups, which do not particularly distinguish between the fields of the humanities and science/engineering in their agenda for higher education reforms, this organisation does so. The reason for this is presumably that small and middle sized firms cannot afford on-the-job training and that they have difficulty in recruiting high skilled workers in competition with large firms. The promotion of 'entrepreneurial spirit' by stimulating flexible thinking and 'a critical mind' also corresponds to the contemporary situation of small and medium sized corporations – the decline of the keiretsu system (the form of cooperation among industrial groups), government’s deregulation policies, and the increased independence of such firms, which has thereby increased business opportunities. The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry is not liberal in ideology; like its counterpart – the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations, it is conservative and patriotic in orientation. The introduction of 'the principle of competition' is not a major concern of the organisation. Like the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations, this organisation is interested in curriculum reform, and stresses liberal arts and history with a somewhat nationalist and retrospective vision of the pre-war educational system.

In addition to the four largest economic groups, the Kyoto Group for the Study of Global Issues is another influential organisation, established by Matsushita Konosuke, a leading business entrepreneur, for the purpose of political influence. This organisation is more radical than the others, attempting to promote a neo-liberalist perspective in the sphere of education – from primary to tertiary. This group was influential in the National Council between 1984 and 1987, advocating the introduction of liberalism in education, which resulted in the introduction of the Ministry’s deregulation policy. The recent influence of this group is not explicit since it is not often consulted in the policymaking structure. For instance, it was not invited to participate in the Education Reform Forum of
1997, 'Economic Society and Education', held by the MESSC (the other organisations participated).

The next section, which concludes this chapter, considers the arguments and analyses outlined above.

6.7 CONCLUSION

Guy Neave's 'Evaluative State' is appropriate in the Japanese context with respect to the change in the nature of the universities. The terminology expressing institutional power such as 'self-autonomy' (syutaisei), 'self-determination' (jisyusei), 'self-regulation' (jiritsusei), 'self-responsibility' (jiko sekinin), and 'the degree of freedom' (jiyudo), and the Ministerial policy supporting institutional autonomy and new managerialism suggest that Neave's argument is, to a significant extent, adaptable to the Japanese context.

However, it has become clear that Neave's concept of the state's 'steering' of the universities does not apply to the Japanese case because of the continuity of Ministerial power. The analysis of the ideological position of stakeholders has elucidated the factors making for the continuity of Ministerial power in the following three areas. First, the nature of the MESSC has changed from Ministerial inertia to being a more proactive reformer through initiating university reform, while maintaining the form and scope of the jurisdictional mechanism of the Ministry in legislation (e.g. chartering new institutions and departments) and retaining the power of financial allocation.

Secondly, the MESSC, to a significant degree, reached an anti-neo-liberal consensus within the Ministry in the early 1980s, which was one decade earlier than the achievement of the neo-liberal consensus within neo-liberal groups, in particular, the LDP. Schoppa argues that ideological confrontation between the LDP and the MESSC / bunkyo-zoku resulted in the failure of the education reform in the 1980s. Schoppa's argument on the causality of the failure of the education
reform which relates to confrontation between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups can be applied to the case of the policy deliberation in the 1983-1987 National Council Report. However, his interpretation of power relationships between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups needs to be re-contextualised for the university reform in the 1990s by taking account of a partial change in the disposition of the MESSC, from inertia to reformism, and of a rationalisation of institutional governance in the area of governance and management.

Thirdly, the close anti-neo-liberal stance between the MESSC and the national universities reinforces the Ministerial ideological stance, although the neo-liberal groups have significantly influenced university policy since the mid-1990s. The analysis in this chapter has showed that the collective body of national universities became an active player through its participation at the stage of policy deliberation, taking a common anti-neo-liberal position.

It would appear that the transformation of the university systems can be largely explained by the socio-cultural context in the 1980s and the economic context in the 1990s. The socio-cultural context in the first half of the 1980s — when neo-liberalism had a more rhetorical than substantial influence — brought about the dynamism of the university reform from the late 1980s onwards. The economic context in the 1990s — in particular, in relation to the economic recession — included the recurrent concern regarding the corporatisation of national universities and the power of the Ministry over corporations. Therefore, the dynamism of the transformation of the university systems cannot be understood in the political context alone; economic and social contexts also have a role to play.

The next chapter concludes this thesis.
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

7.1 PURPOSE

This chapter concludes the thesis. First, it brings together the main findings of the study, reflecting on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks presented in Chapters II and III in light of the analysis and interpretation of the ideologies of the stakeholders in Chapters V and VI. It then evaluates the main arguments of the thesis by using relevant literature. Finally, the chapter suggests avenues for further research.

7.2 MAIN ARGUMENTS AND FINDINGS

The principal objective of the thesis has been to identify the main factors related to the ideologies of the main stakeholders that account for similar or different changes in English and Japanese universities in the context of power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market [see 1.2]. To this end, the thesis (in Chapter II) first conceptualised the transformation of the university systems in England and Japan. Burton Clark's triangle model was invoked in a conceptual comparison of the two university settings. It was, however, found to be necessary to re-contextualise the three stakeholders – central authorities, the universities, and the market – taking account of recent trends observed in England and Japan.993 The analysis and interpretation in Chapter II confirmed that the current balance of power relationships between the three stakeholders in the English and Japanese university systems are closer together in Clark's triangle than they were previously. The power position of England has changed from a point closer to the universities (or academic oligarchy in Clark's term) to that of state authority and the market by increasing state control since the mid-1980s, introducing the market mechanism in 1988, and shifting university funding
dependency from public funding to consumers and university self-generation. The power position of Japan has, since the late 1980s, moved to a position closer to the universities and the market by emphasising the market principle and the university-initiative reform rather than state-initiative.

Chapter II reinforced the convergence argument relating to the English and Japanese systems, providing both the empirical and conceptual accounts. From an empirical perspective, the chapter identified common traits in the English and Japanese systems, which include central authorities’ intensive control of the universities and the markets, the significant response of the universities to external demand (e.g. the increase of the qualified graduates to meet the changing economic environment and the production of up-dated research), and the central authorities’ creation of market conditions and their operation in the markets.

From the conceptual perspective, Guy Neave’s ‘Evaluative State’ (1986) and ‘private and public definitions’ of the university systems (1988), and Burton Clark’s (1998) and Barbara Sporn’s (1999) ‘entrepreneurial universities’ were invoked to illuminate the convergent patterns in terms of state control and the characteristics and conception of the universities between the English and Japanese university systems. The thesis, by using ‘private and public definitions’, argued that the convergent process of the two university systems entailed a shift in the English system from the supremacy of ‘private definition’ of the universities to that of ‘public definition’, and the continuing supremacy of the ‘public definition’ in the Japanese system. The change and continuity relating to ‘private and public definitions’ explained the convergent process between England and Japan.

The concepts of ‘Evaluative State’ and ‘entrepreneurial universities’ highlighted the common elements of the English and Japanese university systems after their convergence. The findings of Chapter II in relation to convergent trends are consistent with Neave’s, Clark’s, and Sporn’s arguments in respect to the significance of the central authorities’ quality control and strategic funding
allocation, and the change in the conception of the universities.\textsuperscript{995} The chapter elucidated the differences between the English and Japanese university systems by providing an historical view of the established models, and the different convergent processes in the two systems. There are significant differences between England and Japan in the relationships between the central authorities and the universities, and in the conception of the universities in relation to accountability to the society as a whole. In the traditional model of England, the insulation of the universities from external pressure, and the autonomy of the universities — including the provision of particular skills, knowledge, and competence — are significant characteristics. In contrast, the established model of Japan, the Ministry control, the conception of the universities by external stakeholders, and arguably accountability to the state and the society are the main traits. In the Japanese model, the provision of skills, knowledge, and competence is partially defined by external stakeholders such as government and economic interest groups.

Chapter II also stressed the continuity of the difference between the English and Japanese systems because of the different starting points in the two systems, and different political, economic, and socio-cultural environments. The observed differences between the English and Japanese systems include the different types of central authority control and involvement in the university and the markets, the different university responses to external demand, and the different processes involved in moving from established to new models.

On the basis of the conceptual work in Chapter II, the thesis offered the following research propositions [4.2]:

Convergent trends — such as central authorities' intensive control of the universities and the markets, the significant response of the universities to external demand, and central authorities' creation of market conditions and their operation in the markets — between England and Japan — are understood in similarities between the two university systems in policies
and ideologies around the themes of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism in the era of the global economy.

Existing distinct and divergent forms in England and Japan can be partially explained by differences in the functions of these ideologies and by the relations between ideology and the power relationships of stakeholders in England and Japan.

The findings in Chapters V and VI, (as argued below), have been useful to clarify these propositions, emphasising the governments' application of neo-liberalism in both England and Japan, the change in the value and function of the funding councils in England, and different neo-liberal interpretations within the central authorities in Japan.

Chapter III, on the basis of the conceptual framework in Chapter II, provided the theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter explained the rationale behind the convergent trends between the English and Japanese systems, and the continuity of the differences between the two. The chapter, linking four ideologies — neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism — argued that the ideologies are commonly observed in the university systems in England and Japan. However, the application and interpretations of those ideologies differs between the two.

Chapter IV explained the methods applied in this thesis, relating them to the theoretical framework provided in Chapter III.

Chapters V and VI offered the empirical study of the thesis, according to the theoretical and analytical frameworks in Chapter III and IV. These chapters showed that the convergence and divergence of the English and Japanese systems can be explained by the four selected ideologies — neo-liberalism, new managerialism, university autonomy, and vocationalism — espoused by influential stakeholders in England and Japan. The thesis has confirmed that both the convergence and continuity of differences between England and Japan are
primarily explained by the changes at the meso-level within each university system as well as macro-level within each nation-state (e.g. the changing characteristics of the nation-state).

Thus, the continuation of differences between English and Japanese university systems—such as the different methodology of central authorities’ control, and the different idea of university autonomy—can be related to different institutional histories, the differential impact of ideologies, and different relationships between stakeholders.

Regarding convergent trends between the English and Japanese systems, there are commonalities and differences. The commonalities include the political parties’ application of neo-liberalism, the compromises and negotiation of the universities with central authorities’ policies, the external environment of the universities which influences the universities towards a more market orientation (e.g. technological innovation and globalisation), and the significant effects of neo-liberalism, new managerialism, and vocationalism in the university systems.

Different factors include the different interpretation of ideologies and different political stances of the various stakeholders in England and Japan. In England, government used neo-liberalism—whose rise was related to rapid economic and technological change, the notion of government’s role to improve national economic competitiveness in the global economy, and belief in the correlations between high economic competitiveness and the provision of high quality education in teaching and research—for the justification of their involvement in the university sector. Economic dynamics which government identifies (e.g. technological and communication innovation, and increasing competitiveness in global economy) were significant factors in the change of the university system. In contrast, in Japan, economic dynamism has reinforced government’ and economic interest groups’ involvement in the university sector, changed the definition of the university autonomy from faculty autonomy to institutional autonomy, generated the MESSC involvement in the areas of quality
and (by the end of 2003) governance and management, and pressured the universities to change towards being more market-oriented institutions. However, political dynamism — in particular the MESSC's informal political negotiation with the political parties — as well as the tradition of government involvement in the public sector which was related to the modernisation of the country — has maintained the balance between central authorities and the universities.

Summarising the findings of the thesis in the English context, change in the ideologies of political parties, central administration, the universities, and importantly, of funding councils was, as Chapter V suggested, significant in terms of the changing boundaries of the university systems from 'private definition' to 'public definition' in the 1980s. Putting the argument differently, the change of the ideologies of influential stakeholders in the university system has resulted in, and conditioned the supremacy of, the 'public definition' of the universities over the 'private definition'. The change in the ideologies of the UGC, from those close to the universities (e.g. traditional English university autonomy) to those close to government (e.g. contractual English university autonomy and neo-liberalism) in the 1980s, to a significant degree, explains the change in the boundaries of the university systems from 'private definition' to 'public definition'. This change in ideologies is associated with the change of the function of the UGC, from the protector of the universities from external pressure, to an agency to implement government policies in the university sector.

The following main findings in Chapter V which were associated with the relations between four ideologies and stakeholders in the university sector indicates the main factors for the change of power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market in the mid-1980s:

1) The application of neo-liberal doctrine by both Conservative (1979-1997) and New Labour (1997-) governments in order to justify their involvement in the university sector;
2) The CVCP's acceptance of government neo-liberal doctrine and the idea of 'contractual' relationships between the universities and funding bodies;

3) The change of the UGC's emphasis from traditional English university autonomy to 'contractual' university autonomy, functioning as state apparatus rather than buffer bodies;

4) As the result of a), b), and c), the significant degree of consensus among governments, funding councils, and the CVCP in terms of neo-liberalism and institutional autonomy, as well as new managerialism and vocationalism (this consensus has not been in-depth); and

5) As the result of a), b), and c), the subordination of traditional English university autonomy under economic-related ideologies such as neo-liberalism and new managerialism.

In addition to the factors above, it can be assumed that the change of the funding councils' funding methodology which partially came about by introducing financial incentives, as pointed out in Chapter II, empowered government to impose their ideologies, values, and interests, through funding councils, on the universities.

Contradictorily, the Chapter found that the CVCP has also emphasised traditional university autonomy and both traditional academic skills and vocational skills for economic purposes (including high skills demanded in a competitive global economy). This finding suggests a continuity of the traditional university value, which is argued in Chapter II. [Regarding new managerialism, it is worthy of note that the CVCP has accepted new managerialism, concomitantly protecting the universities' discretion at the practical level (e.g. internal governance, funding allocation, and management.)] The AUT more strongly emphasised traditional university autonomy and the significance of abstract or theoretical skills and core subject-specific course contexts, than has the CVCP. The gap between the CVCP and the AUP regarding the attitude towards university autonomy and vocationalism, and their differences in terms of components (employers of the universities in the case of the CVCP, and employees in the AUT) imply that the
traditional sense of university autonomy also strongly exists, in particular at faculty level.

In the context of Japan, the change in the ideologies of the influential stakeholders in the university systems is subtle in comparison with the English case. The negotiation and compromise of the MESSC with neo-liberal groups such as the LDP has been, as Chapter VI indicates, significant in terms of the continuing influence of the 'public definition' of the university system. In addition, the achievement of an anti-neo-liberal consensus within the MESSC in the early 1980s, and the compromise of the neo-liberal camp – the MESSC, the national universities, and bunkyo-zoku (unofficial cliques composed of the LDP Members of Parliament sharing an interest in education) – with the anti-neo-liberal camp, such as the LDP and economic interest groups, provide another explanation for the continuity of the MESSC’s power despite the LDP’s application of neo-liberal policy.

The following main findings in Chapter VI which were associated with the relations between four ideologies and stakeholders in the university sector indicates the main factors for the continuity of power relationships between central authorities, the universities, and the market:

1) The informal political negotiation of the MESSC with political parties (through bunkyo-zoku), in order to influence their own interest in the university sector (such as the maintenance of the power of the MESSC);
2) The achievement of the anti-neo-liberal consensus within the Ministry in the early 1980s, which was one decade earlier than the achievement of the neo-liberal consensus within neo-liberal groups, in particular, the LDP;
3) The maintenance of the form and scope of the jurisdictional mechanism of the Ministry in legislation (e.g. chartering new institutions and departments) and retaining the power of financial allocation, although the nature of the MESSC has changed from Ministerial inertia to being a more proactive reformer through initiating university reform;
4) Regarding neo-liberalism, confrontation and compromise between the anti-neo-liberal group (the MESSC, bunkyo-zoku, and the national
universities) and the neo-liberal group (the Liberal Democratic Party and economic interest groups);

5) Relating to d), the different interpretations and stances towards neo-liberalism between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups (the anti-neo-liberal group, taking a position distant from classical liberalism, attempts to de-emphasise the classical liberalist idea of the minimal involvement of the central authorities in the public sector, while the interpretation of neo-liberalism by the neo-liberal group is close to classical liberalism);

6) Sharing values between the MESSC and the University Council, including support for new managerialism, deregulation policy rather than privatisation, and institutional autonomy rather than faculty autonomy;

7) The limitation of power of the university bodies – the ANUP and the FJPU; and

8) The subordination of faculty autonomy under institutional autonomy in the university system, attempting to empower university presidents. The empowerment of the university presidents possibly reinforces the power of the MESSC because of the appointment process of the university presidents by the Education Ministry.

Regarding c), the areas which the MECSST (since 2001) are likely to extend its involvement in the universities include the internal governance and management within individual universities, followed by the change of national universities' status to corporatisation. In relation to d) and e), the conflict and compromise between neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal groups observed in the process of neo-liberal policy formulation are not observed in that of new managerialism. The Education ministry as well as bunkyo-zoku and the LDP has supported new managerialism, while the universities object to it.

The findings relating to the transformation of the university system in Chapter VI follow:

9) The achievement of the neo-liberal consensus within the LDP in the 1990s;
10) The continuous substantial influence of economic interest groups, whose neo-liberal positions are far closer to classical liberalism;
11) The emphasis of the creation of the competitive university market by the MESSC;
12) The change in the nature of the MESSC from Ministerial inertia to being a more proactive reformer through initiating university reform; and

13) The acceptance of part of neo-liberal policy by the MESSC and the ANUP (e.g. deregulation policy and corporatisation of national universities).

Regarding vocationalism, it is worthy of note that there is a significant degree of consensus on the emphasis on general knowledge and new modes of personal attitude (e.g. creativity, individuality, and flexibility) among stakeholders in the university sector; however their views on specialised knowledge and the old modes of personal attitude (e.g. diligence, patience, and respect) differ.

The theoretical implications of these findings in both English and Japanese contexts is that the functions and effects of ideologies are bound in the political, economic, socio-cultural, and historical contexts of each country.

7.3 THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DYNAMIC IN THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS

The relations between the transformation and continuity of the university systems and ideologies are not straightforward; they require not only an economy-centric interpretation but also a political interpretation. Brian Salter and Ted Tapper, in the English context, focus on the economic dynamic, arguing that the change in the ideology of the DfE in the 1970s which introduced an economic ideology in higher education, enabled the state to impose its interests on the universities. In other words, the economic dynamic has changed the ideology of the DfE and the power relationships between the state and higher education institutions. Salter and Tapper explain that state interests – that is, in changing "the way it [higher education] organises knowledge and the knowledge-status hierarchy, and transmits knowledge to occupational groups (new and old) through teaching and producing new knowledge through research" – can exert ideological influence, and consequently a change in values in the higher education sector. The power of
ideology which strengthens, modifies, and eradicates particular values in the university systems includes the reshaping of the university and the relationships between government and the university. This thesis endorses the significance of the economic dynamic (including advanced technology and economic globalisation), which has resulted in more market-oriented university systems in both England and Japan. In England, the economic dynamic has been related to the application of the neo-liberal policy of both Conservative and New Labour Governments since the end of 1970s, and the change of the characteristics and function of the UGC in the mid-1980s. In Japan, it resulted in the LDP’s application of neo-liberalism in its platform and policy in the 1990s.

However, the economic dynamic solely, cannot explain the continuity of the university systems – in particular, the continuity of the Ministerial power in Japan. Leonard Schoppa, in his analysis on the policy formulation and implementation, suggests a possible explanation for its continuity in Japan is linked to the effect of the political system. He argued that the increasing power of zoku-giin since the mid-1970s, the close relations between education zoku-giin and the education ministry, and the conflict between Prime Minister Nakasone and the education Ministry / the LDP education zoku-giin brought about political ‘immobilism’. He argues that these elements led to a failure of the Government’s education reform in the 1980s. The credibility of this argument is in need of scrutiny because of the substantial change in the Japanese higher education system in the 1990s – after the publication of this Schoppa’s work. However, his argument is useful in explaining the locus of the Ministry’s power and the continuity of Ministerial power. In addition, it provides an insight into the significance of the political dynamic in our understanding of the continuity of the Japanese university system.

This thesis emphasises the influence of both economic and political dynamics in its the explanation of the change and continuity of the university.
systems, in particular in the context of Japan. It found that the MESSC’s informal political negotiation through *bunkyo-zoku* have been effective notably in the case of the corporatisation of the national universities, by blocking the neo-liberal group’s attempt to minimize the power of the MESSC. Concomitantly, the thesis found that the Japanese economic situation since 1992 (economic stagnation and the political attempt to restructure the Japanese economic system) was one of the main factors in the achievement of the neo-liberal consensus within the LDP in the 1990s.

7.4 FINAL COMMENTS

The relation between ideology, and the change and continuity of the university systems is complex. It appears that a topic which could merit further research – is a contextual explanation for the transformation and the continuity of the university systems in England and Japan. An in-depth analysis of economic, socio-cultural, and historical dimensions would be useful in theorising the change and continuity of the multiple university systems – beyond the two university settings of England and Japan. Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney highlight the significance of contextual understanding and analysis. Criticising Salter and Tapper’s interpretation of the higher education change in which ideology is treated as a single factor, they argue that the change of higher education is complex; it does not rely upon a single factor:

We have noted that the ideological drives behind change were complex and multivalent. Our own preference is to take note of the power of ideology, but not to allow it such an important role as do Salter and Tapper and therefore not to assume it to be always the driving force of change. So although the rise of the economic ideology was important and based on concern about the economy and the place that higher education might play in its enhancement, its conversion into expansion of the system was not the result of a continuous explicit and deliberate policy.
The thesis accepted Kogan and Hanney's scepticism of the ideology-centred interpretation for the transformation of the higher education system. Concomitantly, it valued the in-depth analysis of ideology, treating ideology as one of the significant factors for the transformation of the university systems.

In conclusion, this thesis, confining its focus to ideologies, has identified some of the major factors contributing to the transformation and continuity of the university systems in England and Japan. Furthermore, it has offered a theoretical explanation for contradictory trends – convergence and the continuity of distinctive features – in the two systems. It is hoped that the analysis in this thesis will help to elucidate our understanding of the far-reaching changes occurring in the English and Japanese university sectors and thereby provide a contextual understanding to assist policymakers in their formulation of university policy in the wake of globalisation.
ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I


9 Akira Arimoto identifies two stages in the massification of the Japanese higher education system [Arimoto, Akira (ed.), Cross-National Study on Post-Massification Academic Organizational Development, (Hiroshima: Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University Press, 1997).]. The first stage in the massification of
higher education was, according to his observation, between 1963 and 1976. During this period, the percentage of new high school graduates out of all new high school graduates who chose advanced level of study increased from 15 percent to 39 percent [Arimoto, Akira (ed.), *Cross-National Study on Post-Massification Academic Organizational Development*, (Hiroshima: Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University Press, 1997), p. 2.]. The second stage of massification of higher education can be observed since 1992. The quantitative change in higher education at the second stage is less than that at the first stage. Arimoto argues that qualitative changes (e.g. change in the definition of the universities) at the second stage are far more significant than that at the first stage, questioning categorisation – if it is identified as massification or post-massification [See also, Arimoto, Akira, “Daigaku Soshiki Kaikaku: Taishu-ka to Posuto Taishu-ka no Shiza” [Organisational Reform of the Universities: Vision Relating to Massification and Post-Massification], in Akira Arimoto (ed.), *International Comparative Study on Academic Reforms in the Post-Massification Stage of Higher Education*, (Hiroshima: Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University Press, 1999), pp. 7-20.].


11 For example, in the English context, the pre-1992 and post-1992 universities have different relationships with government, which were, in particular, explicit in the binary higher education system before 1992 (Chapter II). The pre-1992 universities, in particular before 1988, used to have little government restriction over internal funding allocation within individual institutions and therefore greater funding autonomy than polytechnics, which were controlled by the Local Education Authority.

In the Japanese context, the national and private universities have different relationships with government (Chapter II). The national universities have had less funding autonomy than the private universities.
CHAPTER II


14 Ibid., p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 5.


Peter Maassen and Frans van Vught use the terms ‘state supervisory model’ for a higher education system in which the state plays a minor role, and ‘state control model’ for a higher education system in which the state is the overarching and primary regulator. This thesis has not used these terminologies – ‘state supervisory model’ and ‘state control model’ – in order to avoid over-usage of the term, a ‘model’.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


27 Ibid., pp. 1-5.

28 Ibid., pp. 1-5.

29 Ibid., pp. 1-5.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., pp. 6-8.


35 Since the establishment of the university system in the Meiji era, the state has been involved in higher education in many respects, including the ministry’s financial allocation and the approval of charters for new institutions and departments. In particular, the instrumentalism of higher education has been apparent in Japanese traditional human capital policy, so that it is difficult to take ‘higher education as a crucial economic resource’, according to Kitamura, as merely a recent trend. [Kitamura, Kazuyuki, “Policy Issues in Japanese Higher Education”, *Higher Education*, vol. 34
The ‘Double Income Plan’ was meant to double the GDP.

See Amano, Ikuo, for the relations between economic and education policies between the late 1950s and early 1960s. [Amano, Ikuo, Nihon no Kyoiku Shisutemu: Kozo to Hendo, [Education System in Japan: Structure and Change], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1996).]


Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 170-180.

Peter Scott, for example, identifies the traditional meaning of competence, which has been narrowly defined. [Scott, Peter, The Meaning of Mass Higher Education, (Buckingham: SRHE and Open University Press, 1995).]

For a different perspective between liberal educationalists and vocationalists, see Phil Hodkinson (1991).

Academic education is primarily concerned with learning for its own sake, while vocationalism is concerned with education for a purpose. Academics are concerned with cerebral activities. Knowing and understanding for them are the core of education. Vocationalists see their job as training people to do things. Knowing how is more important than knowing what. Where academics are concerned with personal development, they see it in terms of personal autonomy: the ability to think critically, and to arrive at logically supported independent ideas and beliefs. Vocationalists who are similarly concerned with personal development will talk about personal competence of effectiveness: the ability to do things, and to make things happen. [Hodkinson, Phil, “Liberal Education and the New Vocationalism: A Progressive Partnership?” Oxford Review of Education, vol. 17 (1991), no. 1, p. 75.]

Hodkinson, focusing on pedagogy, argues that the two positions of liberal education and new vocationalism are complementary rather than antipathetic.

Personal communication with Andy Green at the Institute of Education, University of London on 6th April, 2001.

University Press, 1997), pp. 27-44.


46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid, pp. 269-270.


See also, Guy Neave and van Vught (1991), for commentary on two extreme forms of the role of government: the ‘facilitatory state’ and the ‘interventionary state’ [Guy Neave and Frans van Vught (eds.), *Prometheus Bound: The Changing Relationship between Government and Higher Education in Western Europe*, (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991)]. The facilitatory state refers to the absence of government activities in the areas of patterns of participation, internal governance, and academic programmes. The interventionary state refers to government activities which influence the nature of student output, the internal affairs of the universities, and relationships between a university and its environment such as links with industry. The ideal concepts of the facilitatory state and the interventionary state focus on an extreme pattern of government control and regulation.


52 Burton Clark’s study is based upon case studies of five universities in Europe:
University of Warwick in England; University of Strathclyde in Scotland; Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden; University of Twente in the Netherlands; and University of Joensuu in Finland. [Clark, Burton, *Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways of Transformation*, (Oxford: IAU Press and Pergamon, 1998).]

Babara Sporn’s study is based on her precursors’ conceptual work and case studies of three European universities and three US universities: New York University; University of Michigan; the University of California at Berkeley; Universita Bocconi in Italy; Universitat St. Gallen in Switzerland; and Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien in Austria. [Sporn, Barbara, *Adaptive University Structures: An Analysis of Adaptation to Socioeconomic Environments of US and European Universities*, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1999).]

The environmental demands identified by Clark are four: access to higher education claimed by more and different types of students; the need for retraining graduates and other sections of the population; changing expectations of patrons linked to the state; and uncontrolled growth of knowledge leading to higher specialisation and differentiation. The changing external environment of the universities identified by Sporn includes: the restructuring of the national economy; the changing role of the state; shifting demographics; technological innovation; and the increasing globalisation of market and politics.


See also, V. Meek, for the concept, ‘entrepreneurial’. He argues that the marketisation of higher education leads to convergent structures in line with the entrepreneurial model of higher education, rather than diversification in the higher education system. [Meek, V., “Diversity and Marketisation of Higher Education: Incompatible Concepts?”, *Higher Education Policy*, vol. 13 (2000), pp. 23-39.] This entrepreneurial model is, according to Meek, driven by the knowledge mode of production and the technological and digital revolution and advances in telecommunications in the post-industrial society.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Roger Dale, for example, identifies five principles for the distribution of funding in the context of school education as follows:

- Funding may be directed to organizations or to individuals (e.g. in the form of scholarships or vouchers) or to combinations of both;
- Funding may be available to all members of, and / or organizations within a given population (a territory of the state, an income bracket or ‘pooled insurance risk’ of the market, ‘recognized members’ of the community), or targeted at particular groups or individuals (whether on the basis of virtue – e.g. scholarships – or need, as in the case of compensatory funding);
- Funding may be made subject to conditions (e.g. some form of payment by results);
- It may be available only on a competitive basis; and

64 For example, see DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, (London: HMSO, 1985).


66 Institutions are free to distribute block grants internally for teaching, research, and related activities at their own discretion.


68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., p. 185.

70 HEFCE, Funding Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates its Funds, (Bristol: HEFCE, 2000).

71 Ibid., p 9.

The HEFCE is cognisant of the ‘factors’ (e.g. the type of students, and nature of subjects) which require different levels of resources. Accordingly, the HEFCE attaches funding premiums when it calculates the standard resource for each institution. [Ibid., p. 10]

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., p. 16.


75 Ibid.

Frans van Vught identifies the problems inherent in the ‘(student) outcomes approach’ in the difficulty in measuring the outcomes of student studies, and the usefulness of this outcomes approach in terms of benefit to students, faculty administrators, or institutions. [Van Vught, Frans, “The New Context for Academic Quality”, in David Dill and Barbara Sporn (eds.), *Emerging Patterns of Social Demand and University Reform: Through a Glass Darkly*, (Oxford: IAU Press, 1995), pp. 194-211.]


Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

The main funds are allocated on a formula basis: \( A = U(Q-1)N \) \( A \) is the total sum allocated to an institution for a particular unit of assessment; \( Q \) is the quality rating; \( N \) is the number of research-active mainstream academic staff submitted; and \( U \) is the basic allocation per point for any particular unit.


Ibid., pp. 191-203.


The government subsidises national, local, and private universities. National universities are funded via the Special Account for National Educational Institutions in the MESSC. Local universities, which are mainly funded by prefectural and municipal governments, are subsidised by only a small amount of money from the national budget. Private universities, under the regulation of the ‘Private School Support and Promotion
Law', can be subsidised by the government via the Private School Promotion Foundation (PSPF). The PSPF is a quasi-government organisation. [For the review of the funding structure in Japan, see Baba, Masateru and Takafumi Tanaka, "Government Funding versus Private Funding in Japanese Universities", Quality in Higher Education, vol. 3 (1997), no. 3, pp. 263-276.]


89 The Private School Promotion Subsidy Law stipulates that government provides subsidies and offers long-term loans to private institutions through the Japan Private School Promotion Foundation, and adopts favourable taxation measures for school corporations.

The largest proportion of the total income of private universities, excluding loans, goes to staff salaries. Total income has gradually declined, although expenditure in the areas of teaching and research programmes and of institutional administration has gradually increased. [MESSC, Japanese Government Policy in Education, Science, Culture, and Sports, [English version], 1990, [http://www.wp.monbu.go.jp/eky1990/index-11.html], access date (15 March, 2001).]

90 See University Council Reports in the 1990s.


95 Ibid.

The research categories in the ‘grants-in-aid for scientific research system’ include specially promoted research (research which is highly regarded internationally), research on priority areas (prioritised, tactical research conducted over a specific period in areas of considerable scientific and social need), scientific research, exploratory research, encouragement of young scientists, international scientific research, publication of scientific research results, creative basic research, Centres of Excellence research, and JSPS fellows. [MESSC, *Japanese Government Policy in Education, Science, Culture, and Sports*, [English version], 1997, [http://wwwp.mext.go.jp/eky1997/index-10.html], access date (12 March, 2001).]


See Syozo Toda (1990), for a discussion of the merits and demerits of one standard for chartering and accreditation, and a historical point of view on this issue. [Toda, Syuzo, “Nihon ni Okeru Daigaku Kijun to Daigaku Hyoka no Rekishi” [The Standard of Universities in Japan and History of Evaluation of the Universities], in Soichi Ijima, Syuzo Toda, and Haruo Nishihara (eds.) *Daigaku Secchi / Hyoka no Kenkyu* [Research on University Establishment / Evaluation], (Tokyo: Toshindo, 1990), pp. 37-38.]


*Daigaku Hyoka Kikan Sosetsu Jyunbi Iiinkai* [Preparation Committee for the Establishment of the University Evaluation Institution]. *Daigaku Hyoka Kikan no Sosetsu ni tsuite: Hokaku* [Establishment of the University Evaluation Institution: Report], February, 2000, pp. 4-7.


Ibid.

*Daigaku Hyoka Kikan Sosetsu Jyunbi Iiinkai* [Preparation Committee for the Establishment of the University Evaluation Institution]. *Daigaku Hyoka Kikan no Sosetsu ni tsuite: Hokaku* [Establishment of the University Evaluation Institution: Report], February, 2000.]

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.


See also Kuroha, Ryoichi, "Nihon no Daigaku Secchi Kijyun Unyo no Keii to Kada"", in Soichi Ijima, Syuzo Toda, and Haruo Nishihara (eds.) *Daigaku Secchi / Hyoka no Kenkyu* [Research on University Establishment / Evaluation], (Tokyo: Toshindo, 1990), pp. 41-68.


113 Ibid., p. 179.


116 Ibid., pp. 27-44.

117 Personal communication with Andy Green, at the Institute of Education, University of London on 6th April, 2001.


119 Ibid.

120 See Michael Young and Ken Spurs, for the unification of academic and vocational learning. They propose unifying academic and vocational learning as a strategy to bring

121 The demand for skills, knowledge, and competence in the labour market was in a large part responded to by institutions outside the university sector. The end of the binary system, therefore, suggests increasing expectations from stakeholders for the economic function of the universities, i.e. that the universities — including pre-1992 universities — should respond to change in the labour market.

122 For empirical data on the change in the pattern of enrolment of the universities in relation to a new trend in higher education, see Andy Green, Alison Wolf and Tom Leney (1999). [Green, Andy, Alison Wolf, and Tom Leney, *Convergence and Divergence in European Education and Training Systems*, (London: Institute of Education, 1999).].

123 Scott identifies two characteristics of mass education: reflexivity, and the shift from closed intellectual systems to open systems. In the closed intellectual system, the “academic agenda is determined by the inner dynamics of disciplines and expressed through the professional activities of experts”. In open systems, “both cognitive values and social practices are shaped by transactions between knowledge producers and knowledge users, a partnership between academy and community”. [Scott, Peter, *The Meaning of Mass Higher Education*, (Buckingham: SRHE and Open University Press, 1995), pp. 168-179.]


125 Ibid.


128 Ibid.

129 Source: Keidanren [Federation of Economic Organizations], *Opinion Survey on Employment and Human Resources Strategies to Adopt to the New Changes in Economic

130 Ibid., p. 12.


132 Ibid.


134 Ibid.


136 Ibid.


140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.


143 Two other aspects include the increasing numbers of post-graduate and international students.

144 Kitamura, Kazuyuki, “Daigakuin Jyushi Seisaku ni taisuru Genba no Iken ni tsuite” [Opinion of Institutions about the Graduate School Focused Policy: A National-wide


146 Ibid.


148 Ibid.


151 Ibid.


155 Ibid.


159 For example, see Ozaki, Hitoshi (1995). He points out that the disagreement between the US and Japan is apparent in respect to general education and the role of graduate schools. [Ozaki, Hitoshi, Sengo 50 nen ‘Shinsei Daigaku’ no Kiseki ['New Universities' System for the Last 50 Years], IDE: Gendai no Koto-kyoiku [IDE: Modern Higher Education], vol. 372 (December, 1995), pp. 5-10.]

160 Since the late 1990s, there has been more emphasis on the service sector in government economic policy.


The creation of the quality control system is significant in this respect, although it is questionable that quality assessment provides sufficient information to consumers to ensure that the market performs efficiently. Dill points out the difficulties in measuring academic quality, as well as the traditional question of whether monopolistic government purchasers act for consumers’ interests or whether government purchasers pursue their own priorities, replicating centralised educational planning.

Furthermore, in the policy context, governments in England and Japan commonly seek for what Will Bartlett and Julian Le Grand call, ‘productive efficiency’. Bartlett and Le Grand differentiate between ‘productive efficiency’ and ‘crude efficiency’ used in common parlance—the latter refers simply to the costs of service provision, and the search for cost-cutting. They relate ‘productive efficiency’ to ‘value for money’; that is, what ‘gives the most value for money is those which provide a given quantity and quality of service for the lowest possible cost’. [Bartlett, Will and Julian Le Grand, “The Theory of Quasi-Markets”, in Will Bartlett and Julian Le Grand (eds.), Quasi-Market and Social Theory, (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 13-34.]
Contrasting the US and Continental higher education systems, Martin Trow contends that the UK higher education systems are in a peculiar position, in which strong pressure from the government rather than society *per se* brought about external accountability to stakeholders, and ultimately the society at large, resulting in the rigorous quality system. [Trow, Martin, “Trust, Markets and Accountability in Higher Education: A Comparative Perspective”, *Higher Education Policy*, vol. 9 (1996), no. 4, pp. 309-324.] He asserts that the market is political rhetoric, incorporating concepts of customer and efficiency gains, in which government attempts to control the price which universities charge for their services and the amount and variety of services provided.

Trow suggests that the rationale behind this movement is governmental anxiety about the national economy, and quality and standards in higher education, which has brought about increased state regulatory devices such as the quality assurance mechanism to monitor the performance of institutions. The first governmental strategy for the national economy was associated with the governmental attempt to enhance the performance of universities in the context of the globalisation of economic competition, which has brought about an extreme stress on accountability. The second governmental strategy aimed at the improvement of quality and standard of higher education is the massification of higher education in the UK with tighter control by the central authority—with such outcomes as the reduction of formal institutional diversity, and tighter administrative controls by an agency of central government.

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Most postgraduate full-time students on taught courses are self-funding, while those on research courses are often paid by Research Councils. More than a third of the
fees for part-time students are paid by employers. Overseas students from outside the EU are not funded by the HEFCE. [HEFCE, Funding Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates its Funds, (Bristol: HEFCE, 2000), p. 9.]


170 Ibid., pp. 77-87.

171 Ibid.


174 Ibid.

175 The two opposing interpretations of the market outlined above suggest that the concept of the market is interpretative, and highly relative between different higher education settings.


177 The budget of the Special Account for National Education Institutions and revenue in private universities indicates that the national universities largely rely upon government subsidies, while the private universities depend upon tuition fees. For instance, the money transferred from the General Account to Special Account for National Education Institution (SANEI) was 62.2 percent of the total revenue of the SANEI in 1994, while tuition was merely 10.7 percent in the same year. In contrast, in private universities, income from tuition fees was 65.6 percent of the total revenue of the private universities in 1992, while that from government subsidies was 11.0 percent in the same year. [The original sources of these data follow: the MESSC, Education Policy in Japan in 1994, for the budget of Special Account for National Education Institutions; and the White Paper on the Japan Association of Private Colleges and Universities in 1992. The data pertaining to the revenue of private universities were collected from 116 private universities in 1992. The data were cited by Baba, Masateru and Takaumi Tanaka, “Government Funding versus Private Funding in Japanese Universities”, Quality in Higher Education, vol. 3 (1997), no. 3, p. 267 and p. 269.]

178 The Government offers the student aid program administered by the Japan Scholarship Foundation, which received, in the fiscal year 1995, a government loan of 81,300 million


182 Ibid.


185 Ibid.

186 Ibid.

CHAPTER III


192 Ibid., p. 12.

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid., p. 10.


196 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

197 Ibid., p. 50.

198 Ibid., p. 62.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 5.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 482.

Ibid., p. 414


The assertion that new managerialism is the consequence of the successful introduction of the market mechanism is questionable. Graeme Lindsay and Timothy Rodgers, for example, argue that the mistaken governmental intention to change higher education institutions from a production orientation to a market orientation, before and after the Education Reform Act, has resulted in the development of a more bureaucratic organization. [Lindsay, Graeme and Timothy Rodgers, “Market Orientation in the UK Higher Education Sector: The Influence of the Education Reform Process 1979-1993”, *Quality in Higher Education*, vol. 4 (1998) no. 2, pp. 159 - 171.]


Ibid., p. 60.

Ibid., pp. 57-78.


Ibid.


The contemporary education agenda is understood in not only economic but also socio-cultural dimensions, as Apple argues:

It would be simplistic, however, to interpret what is happening as only the result of efforts by dominant economic elites. Many of these attacks do represent attempts to reintegrate education into a national and global economic agenda. Yet, they cannot be fully reduced to that, nor can they be reduced to being only about the economy. Cultural struggles and struggles over race and gender coincide with class alliances and class power. [Apple, Michael, “Between Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism: Education and Conservatism in a Global Context”, in Nicholas Burbules and Carlos Torres (eds.), Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 58.]

Apple, Michael, “Between Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism: Education and Conservatism in a Global Context”, in Nicholas Burbules and Carlos Torres (eds.),

239 Ibid.


241 Ibid.


249 Will Bartlett and Julian Le Grand provide a comprehensive interpretation of the quasi-market in the context of welfare services as a whole, including the education sector. [Bartlett, Will and Julian Le Grand, “The Theory of Quasi-Markets”, in Will Bartlett and


251 Ibid.


253 Ibid., p. 277.


255 Governance of the universities in Japan takes the form of an amalgam between continental European and the US systems.

    The governance of national universities in Japan is characterised by four features. The first is the strong power of the faculty, which has affinity to the German model in respect of the strong power of chair holders, who exercise collegial control within faculties and universities. The second is the strong power of the central bureaucracy over the universities, which is closer to the French model. The third and the fourth are the absence of institutional trustees and relatively weak institutional administration. [Clark, Burton, *The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective*, (CA: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 130-131.]

    Governance in private universities is similar to the US universities in respect of trustees, relatively strong campus administrators, and departmental organisations. Private universities are influenced by central bureaucracy to a significant extent. [Clark, Burton, *The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective*, (CA: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 130-131.]

256 *The Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities* (Jarratt Report) recommends the creation of a new framework of governance as 'corporate enterprises', the empowerment of the governing body, and the establishment of a joint committee to oversee policy, planning, resource allocation, and other key strategic activities. [CVCP, *Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities*, (London: CVCP, 1985).] The Jarratt Report identifies the vice-chancellor not only as an academic leader, but also as the chief executive of the institutions. The Report does not refer to the power balance between the governing body and the vice-chancellor.
The Dearing Report identifies differences between governance and management. The Report is concerned with the ways in which institutional governance relates to the policy level, while institutional management is associated with the operational level:


This distinction between management and governance is not convincing, since the concept of management can be observed at the policy level, and that of governance at the operational level.

The Dearing Report focuses on the role of the governing body as the ‘ultimate decision-making body’ in an institution, emphasising that a governing body should ensure accountability. The Dearing Report recommends that governing bodies have a majority of lay members, implying that it is supportive of new managerialism. [National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, *Higher Education in the Learning Society: Main Report*, (Norwich: HMSO, 1997), p. 236.] The Dearing Report recommends that the governing body of each institution should include student and staff membership and a majority of lay members [Recommendation 55].

257 The 1995 University Council Report recommends the empowerment of the ‘director-general of the administrative bureau’ (e.g. the extension of his / her period in office), and co-operation between the administrative bureau and organisations regarding education and research.


258 The focus and emphasis within the ideology of New Public Management differ in the area of practice. Mike Bottery points out that New Public Management does not have a single intellectual underpinning. He uses C. Hood’s framework of seven elements of New Public Management:

- ‘Hands-on’ professional management in the public sector;
- Explicit standards and measures of performance;
- Greater emphasis on output control;
- The break-up of monolithic units into smaller manageable units;
- Shifts to greater competition in the public sector;
- The stress on private-sector styles of management practice; and
- The stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use [Hood, C. “A Public Management for All Seasons?”*, *Public Administration*,
These elements of New Public Management, which originally come from C. Hood, are cited by Mike Bottery.


262 ‘Professional value’ focuses on disciplines and peers, while ‘managerial value’ emphasises institutional imperatives and bureaucratic formal hierarchical positions. [Bargh, Catherine, Peter Scott, and David Smith, *Governing Universities: Changing the Culture?*, (London: SRHE, 1996).]


267 Ibid., pp. 146-147.

268 The rise of managerialism is confined to New Public Management, and the ‘3Es’ – economy, efficiency, and effectiveness – which are often highlighted in the literature. See, for example, Mike Bottery (1996). [Bottery, Mike, “The Challenge to Professionals


275 Ibid.

Similarly, Rosemary Deem argues that there has been a different direction in the transformation of the management form between pre- and post-1992 universities, although she does not specify the timing. [Deem, Rosemary, “‘New Managerialism’ and Higher Education: The Management of Performances and Cultures in Universities in the United Kingdom”, *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, vol. 8 (1998), no. 1, pp. 47-70.]


278 Bargh, Scott, and Smith provide two models of decision making in relation to
governance. The first model, the 'professional model' emphasises the power of the academic oligarchy and its subordinate leaders, and issues relating to disciplines and peers. The second model, the 'managerial model' focuses on the bureaucratic, hierarchical organisational culture embedded in the governing body and the senior management group which imposes centrally-driven imperatives, in particular economic objectives (e.g. efficiency and value for money) on differentiated academic units.


Trow's analysis is not formulated on the basis of a substantial change in management, but on the change in financial and quality control by government. This absence of an analysis of management per se retains his argument in abstract.


For example, boards of governors are appointed under articles of government approved by the Secretary of State for Education in accordance with the 1998 Education Reform Act and the 1992 Further Higher Education Reform Act.

As far as 'lay control' – which is the central characteristic of 'new managerialism' – is concerned, it is not something new, but rather something reformed. Lay control in new managerialism, is different from traditional lay control, in that lay control in new managerialism relates to the ideology of government, while traditional lay control was more linked to the individual, and communal interests, which were associated with their foundation.

For traditional lay control, see Bargh, Scott, and Smith (1996). [Bargh, Catherine, Peter Scott, and David Smith, *Governing Universities: Changing the Culture?*, (London: SRHE, 1996), p. 5.] Bargh, Scott and Smith argue that lay control in new managerialism is not new, since lay control in the pre-1992 universities and the post-1992 universities was arguably the norm before the 1960s. However, this revived form of lay control, they point out, differs from traditional lay control in respect to a greater gap between lay and academic, the significance of senates and/or vice chancellors, and the high status of lay as 'dignified'.

Chiang, Li-chuan, *The Relationship between University Autonomy and Funding in*
In addition to councils, the change in the faculties and departments also suggests increasing managerial culture and influence from the external stakeholders. Ted Tapper and David Palfreyman's empirical study shows the change in the nature of faculties and departments in order to respond to the cost-effective demands from the General Board of the Faculties which has become a more interventionist body in Oxford and Cambridge Universities. [Tapper, Ted and David Palfreyman, “Continuity and Change in the Collegial Tradition”, *Higher Education Quarterly*, vol. 52, no. 2, (April 1998), p. 158.]

The councils are generally chaired by the pro-chancellor.


Ibid., p. 32.

Maurice Kogan also identifies the ‘bureaucratization’ of the collegium or the development of academic administration. [Kogan, Maurice, “Academic and Administrative Interface”, in Mary Henkel and Brenda Little (eds.), *Changing Relationships between Higher Education and the State*, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1999), pp. 263-279.]


Ibid.


This point is associated with two questions: whether New Public Management promotes centralisation and decentralisation; and whether the implication of New Public Management influence differs between centralised and decentralised university systems. Ivar Bleiklie argues that the introduction of New Public Management as well as the Evaluative State pulls in both directions towards centralisation and decentralisation. In the direction of decentralisation, deregulation by political authorities reinforces the internal structure of governance and strong leadership within individual universities on the principle that decisions ought to be made as closely as possible to the level at which services in practice are delivered. [Bleiklie, Ivar, "Justifying the Evaluative State: New Public Management Ideals in Higher Education", *European Journal of Education*, vol. 33 (1998), no. 3, pp. 299-316.] This matter of centralisation and decentralisation as an impact of New Public Management is elaborated by Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney, who elucidate different implications between the centralised and decentralised university systems. They argue that New Public Management in the decentralised system such as the British system is less significant than in the centralised system, in which responsibility for the delivery of hitherto centrally determined priorities is devolved. [Kogan, Maurice and Stephen Hanney, *Reforming Higher Education*, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2000).]


Ibid.


Bleiklie characterises three types of organization: public agency, autonomous cultural institution, and corporate enterprise. [Bleiklie, Ivar, “Justifying the Evaluative State: New Public Management Ideals in Higher Education”, European Journal of Education, vol. 33 (1998), no. 3, pp. 299-316.] The first type of university is identified as institutions which implement public policy, whose organization is set within a hierarchical bureaucratic order. The second type rests upon academic culture, whose internal organization was originally grounded in autonomous chairs with affiliated apprentice students. The third type is related to New Public Management, emphasising quality and efficiency.


The power of the Senate and faculties includes the appointment and dismissal of academic officers and faculty members, which is protected by the Special Law of Educational Civil Servants.

The selection and appointment of university staff (qualifications) is on the basis of the University Standards and the Junior College Standards.

Standards of the Establishment of the Universities have stipulated the total number of credits for the awards. It also stipulated credit calculation methods on the basis of the division of general and specialised education, which was abolished in 1991.

Financial autonomy is constitutionally guaranteed; however the MESSC influences financial allocation in practice.

The national universities have taken the form of the classic pattern of faculty guilds, where the chair holders have exercised strong collegial control such as personnel control within faculties, in particular, in the old ‘imperial universities’. [Clark, Burton, The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective, (CA: University of California Press, 1983).] Institutional trustees and strong institutional administration have been absent in this system.

In contrast, the private sector is distinct from the national universities in respect of having trustees, strong campus administrations, and departmental organisation. [Pempel, T. J., Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experience from Higher Education, (Colorado:
There is a distinct difference in the functions of presidents between national and private university sectors. In the national universities, the professors, the faculty bodies, and the university senate – which is composed of representatives of professors and faculty bodies – are influential in the decision-making mechanism since the presidents of the national universities functions on their behalf.

In contrast, in the private universities, the power of the boards of trustees and presidents are stronger than that of the professors. [Arimoto, Akira and Egbert de Weert, "Higher Education Policy in Japan", in Leo Goedegebuure, Frans Kaiser, Peter Maassen, Lynn Meek, Frans van Vught, and Egbert de Weert (eds.), Higher Education Policy: An International Comparative Perspective, (Oxford: IAU Press, 1994), p. 173.]

Faculty Committees exert power in the following areas:

- Faculty appointments and promotion (Article 4 of Kyoiku Komuin Tokurei-ho);
- Curriculum making (Article 59 of 'Gakko Kyoiku-ho' [School Education Law]);
- Student affairs (entrance, dropout, and graduation) (Article 67 of 'Gakko Kyoiku-ho'); and
- Research plans (Article 59 of 'Gakko Kyoiku-ho')

The president of the universities is elected by the university senate and appointed by a Minister (Article 4 of Kyoiku Kokumin Kokurei-ho and Article 55 of Kokka Komuin-ho).

The power of the director general of the administrative bureau, who is appointed by the Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport, is worthy of note since he/she is a member of the senate (hyogikai), [which consists of the president of the universities (Gakucho), deans of faculties and research institutions (Bukyoku-cho / Kenkyusho-cho), professors elected from each faculties, and the director general of the administrative bureau], which de facto runs the institutions.

The MESSC is located at the top of the authority structure in the university system, followed by the president (gakucho), the university administrative council or university senate (hyogikai), faculty bodies (kyojukai), department (gakka), and chairs (koza) in the national university sector, and the board of trustees (rijikai) the president, the faculties, and departments in the private university sector. [Arimoto, Akira and Egbert de Weert, "Higher Education Policy in Japan", in Leo Goedegebuure, Frans Kaiser, Peter Maassen, Lynn Meek, Frans van Vught, and Egbert de Weert (eds.), Higher Education Policy: An International Comparative Perspective, (Oxford: IAU Press, 1994), p. 172.]

Standards for the Establishment of Universities stipulates more than 124 credits for the award of a bachelor’s degree (188 for medicine and dentistry, and 182 for veterinary medicine).
Standards for the Establishment of Universities stipulated a certain number of credits in general and specialised subject areas as a prerequisite for graduation. There were abolished in 1991.

Standards for the Establishment of Universities stipulates more than four-years for the duration of study for a bachelor’s degree (six years for medicine, dentistry and veterinary medicine).

The boards of directors of the educational foundations decide any institution-wide issue on the basis of advice from the board of trustees, which is empowered to decide the budget (Articles 41 and 42 of Private School Law). The boards of directors of the educational foundations have power to appoint the president of the universities.

The boards of trustees are composed of representatives of teaching and administrative staff of the universities and colleges, their graduates, and others appointed by the director-general of the board of directors.

Private universities in Japan share traits with civic universities in England before 1945 in respect of lay control by individuals and communities.

This information is derived from the IDE Panel Discussion (Ikuo Amano and others), “Important Issues in 2000”, which appears in IDE: Gendai no Koto-kyoiku [IDE: Modern Higher Education], vol. 414 (January 2000), pp. 5-61.

The senate consists of the president of the universities (Gakucho), deans of faculties and research institutions (Bukyokucho / Kenkyusho-cho), and the director general of the administrative bureau.

Takekazu Ehara’s analysis on faculty perceptions of university governance which was conducted in 1992-1993 concludes that governance in national universities in respect to the involvement of faculty in the administration is decentralised, while that in private universities is centralised. [Ehara, Takekazu, “Faculty Perceptions of University Governance in Japan and the United States”, Comparative Education Review, vol. 42, no. 1 (February 1998), pp. 61-72.]


The 1994 University Council Report, “Kyoin Saiyo no Kaizen ni tsuite” [Improvement of the Recruitment of Teaching Personnel] recommends that the flexibility of personnel decisions among teaching staff should be reviewed:
• To take into account varied experience and backgrounds for appointment decisions. The appointment of non-academic members of society should be accelerated, and women should be actively recruited;
• To review selection criteria and methods of personnel appointment, concerning academic capacity and adaptability to the aims of individual universities; and
• To recruit foreign teachers. [Daigaku Shingikai, Kyoin Saiyo no Kaizen ni tsuite [Improvement of the Recruitment of Teaching Personnel], (Tokyo: Daigaku Shingikai, 1994).]

The 1995 University Council Report, “Daigaku Unei no Enkatsu-ka ni tsuite” [Facilitation of University Management] recommends:

• clarifying power relations between the president, the executive council, and faculty committees;
• improving centralised decision-making organisations such as senates;
• reinforcing the leadership of the university presidents in particular in the area of appointment methods, the tenure system for university presidents, the university president support system, personnel decisions, and budget allocations; and
• creating an environment in which deans and other administrators can fulfil their roles adequately and exercise leadership
  - To improve centralised decision-making organisations such as senates to make decisions with university-wide issues
  - To improve administrative systems
  - To improve the support system for deans and administrators

[Daigaku Shingikai, Daigaku Unei no Enkatsuka ni tsuite [Facilitation of University Administration], (Tokyo: Daigaku Shingikai, 1995).]


328 Monbusho, Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka no Kento no Hoko [Direction of the Discussion on the Corporationisation of the National Universities], (Tokyo: Monbusho, 1999).

329 Daigaku Shingikai [University Council], 21 Seiki no Daigakuzou to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyosoteki Kankyo no nakade Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku [Universities


333 E. Ashby characterises 'institutional autonomy' as follows:

- The freedom to select staff and students and to determine the conditions under which they remain in the university;
- The freedom to determine curriculum content and degree standards; and

334 Guy Neave and Frans van Vught point out that academic freedom is not necessarily protected by academic autonomy since a government organisation can guarantee academic freedom. [Neave, Guy and Frans van Vught, “Government and Higher
Maurice Kogan and Susan Maton point out that 'academic freedom' relates to the 'individual academic'. [Kogan, Maurice and Susan Maton, "The State and Higher Education", in Maurice Kogan, Marianne Bauer, Ivar Bleiklie and Mary Henkel (eds.), Transforming Higher Education: A Comparative Study, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2000), pp. 89-108.]


Autonomy can be exercised only on condition that the individual institute or department fulfils national or establishment norms which are continually to be renegotiated in the light of public policy. (p. 46)

Three years later, he developed the conception of 'conditional autonomy' by introducing the term of 'conditional contracting' by emphasising negotiation between government and the universities to set up particular conditions. Li-chun Chiang's idea of 'contractual autonomy' seems to be autonomy based upon this 'conditional contracting'.

1988 Education Reform Act.


Ibid.

The binary system of higher education consisted of the university sector and the polytechnic sector.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Trow explains the relations between higher education and society by using three concepts: accountability, trust, and the market. [Trow, Martin, “Trust, Markets and Accountability in Higher Education: A Comparative Perspective”, Higher Education Policy, vol. 9 (1996), no. 4, pp. 309-324.] He characterises the traditional UK higher education system on the basis of trust between the state and higher education.

The power of the chartered universities in practice is contentious in regard to the effect of public financial control over the universities.


An extreme case was observed in the membership of the UFC. The majority of the members, including the chairman, were not from higher education. [Williams, Gareth, “The Market Routes to Mass Higher Education: British Experience 1979-1996”, Higher Education Policy, vol. 10 (1997), nos. 3/4, pp. 282-289.]


355 Ibid., p. 43.


357 The block grant used to be one of the main methods of protecting university autonomy in the regime of the University Grants Committee.

The extent to which the form of block grant guaranteed ‘traditional English university autonomy’ is not simple, taking into account the different implications of short and long time spans and other elements such as financial incentives by government.

358 University autonomy of the pre-1992 universities is guaranteed by the legal status of the universities. Most of the pre-1992 universities are constituted by Royal Charters granted through the Privy Council, together with an associated set of statutes (Chartered Corporations). This legal status of pre-1992 universities in accordance with Royal Charters, however, does not signify complete insulation from the state. As D. J. Farrington points out, the Privy Council has a role in Royal Charters. Farrington identifies increasing manifestation of state control, observing that it is impossible for the charters and statutes of the universities to be changed without the consent of the Privy Council. [Farrington, D. J., *The Law of Higher Education*, (London: Butterworths, 1994), p. 42.]


360 Ibid., p. 46.
361 Ibid.


363 Li-chuan Chiang argues that the contractual relation between government and the universities (rather than the block grant) is helpful in explaining the practice of university autonomy, criticising the prevailing argument that increasing private resources or diversification of funding brings about greater autonomy. She suggests that there are no clear relations between university autonomy and funding. [Chiang, Li-chuan, *The Relationship between University Autonomy and Funding in England and in Taiwan*, Ph.D Thesis, (London: Institute of Education, 2000).]


365 Ibid.

366 Ibid.

367 This is discussed later in this chapter, in an analysis of the Further and Higher Education Reform Act 1992. The Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 (Section 26) gives the Secretary of State powers to compel higher education councils in England and Wales to impose conditions on university governing bodies as a condition of receiving grants. This Act also empowers the Secretary of State, through the funding council, to prescribe fee levels for all home and European Union students.

368 The income of higher education institutions from the HEFCE – which has been the main source of income for the universities in the area of teaching. It was on average 38 percent of the total income in 1996-1997 in England [HEFCE, *Funding Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates Its Funds*, Guide 00/07, February 2000, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub00/00_07.html], access date (6 March, 2000).]

369 Financial memoranda by the HEFCE bind the universities on the usage of public finance.

370 For example, see the main elements of special funding in 1991-2000 in the following HEFCE document. [HEFCE, *Funding Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates Its Funds*, Guide 00/07, February 2000, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub00/00_07.html], access date (6 March, 2000)]
Quality control was previously conducted within the universities (e.g. peer review, self-evaluation, and corporate judgement by peers).

'Codes of practice' are recommended in the Dearing Report in order to promulgate good practice to support student learning and maintain academic standards.

The QAA justifies the introduction of the 'Code of Practice', which has been criticised in relation to university autonomy:

Some institutions thought that a formal requirement to adopt the QAA Code posed a threat to their autonomy, and that it would be more appropriate if they were to be asked instead to 'agree to adhere' to it. The Agency accepts this point of view. It does not believe that adherence to the Code is an end in itself, but it is one good means by which quality and standards can be more reliably and demonstrably secured. It expects that there will be benefits for institutions in having an authoritative and consensus-based point of reference to inform their own internal quality assurance policies and practices. It will be for the institutional review process to come to a view on whether 'non-adherence' in any particular aspect or instance is or is not diminishing that security to an unacceptable extent. [QAA, *Higher Quality: The Bulletin of the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education*, October 1998, no. 4, p. 21.]

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1998 Education Reform Act.


Ozaki, Hitoshi, "Kokuritsu Daigaku Kanri Mondai no 50 nen" [Problems in Governance in National Universities in the Last 50 Years], *IDE: Gendai no Koto-kyoiku* [IDE: Modern Higher Education], vol. 413 (November and December, 1999), pp. 28-33.

Ibid.


University Establishment Law stipulates the total credits towards graduation.

See 2.2.3.1, for the difference between the national and private universities in respect to public financial arrangement, evaluation and legislation.

The MESSC has distributed public funding strategically since the early 1980s because of a decline in the total amount of education subsidies from the General Account which was caused by a tight fiscal situation facing the Government and the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform. [Monbusho, *Wagakuni no Bunkyo Shisaku* [Japanese Government Policies in Education, Science, Sports and Culture], (Tokyo: Okurasho, 1997). See also, Baba, Masateru and Takefumi Tanaka, “Government Funding versus Private Funding in Japanese Universities”, *Quality in Higher Education*, vol. 3 (1997), no. 3, pp. 263-273.] The decline in the total amount has resulted in the decline of the financial allocation to national universities in facilities, teaching, and research, and financial subsidies to private universities, although the total of staff salary by the MESSC have increased. [Baba, Masateru and Takefumi Tanaka, “Government Funding versus Private Funding in Japanese Universities”, *Quality in Higher Education*, vol. 3 (1997), no. 3, pp. 263-273.]


The concept of state control is adjacent to accountability to the state in his text.


Ibid.


Soichi Ijima identifies the general policy of the CIE. [Ijima, Soichi, “Shinsei Daigaku 50 nen no Syomondai” [Problem of the New University System in Last 50 Years], IDE: Gendai no Koto-kyoiku [IDE: Modern Higher Education], vol. 413 (November and December, 1999), p. 9.]

Ozaki, Hitoshi, “Kokuritsu Daigaku Kanri Mondai no 50 nen” [Problems in Governance in National Universities in the Last 50 Years], IDE: Gendai no Koto-kyoiku [IDE: Modern Higher Education], vol. 413 (November and December 1999), pp. 28-33.


The curriculum, whose total credits towards graduation were set up according to Standards for the Establishment of Universities, was divided into two: ‘liberal arts subjects’ and ‘specialist subjects’. Liberal arts subjects were provided in the first two years, while specialist subjects were provided in the later two years.

The new external evaluation system was introduced by the establishment of the ‘University Evaluation Institution’ (Daigaku Hyoka Kikan [provisional name]) in 2000 (pilot) [actual start in 2003]. The implications of government regulation for national universities are greater than for private universities since private universities are not involved in the newly established external evaluation system, which is only an option for the private universities.

See University Council Reports in the 1990s.


404 Ibid.

405 Ibid.

406 Ibid.


408 Ibid.

409 Ibid.


411 Ibid.


414 Ibid.


418 Ibid., p. 182.


423 Ibid.


425 For example, Richard Scase explains that the change in the economic function of universities in the post-bureaucratic paradigm relates to the context of changing occupational structure of managerialism and managers’ qualifications. [Scase, Richard, “Organizational Restructuring Corporate Needs for Changing Managerial Skills, and the Role of Higher Education”, in Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder (eds.), *Education for Economic Survival: From Fordism to Post-Fordism?*, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 76-94.] Examining the transitions in the occupational structure of management and managers’ qualifications, Scase argues that the role of universities has been strengthened. In the bureaucratic paradigm, the role of universities in management occupations is limited since a large proportion of management posts are occupied by non-graduates, middle-class people who have had less prestigious education and who are capable of filling middle management positions, rather than university graduates. However, in the post-bureaucratic paradigm, universities have become major suppliers of educated labour to meet the increasing demands of large-scale organisations as the result of the changing occupational structure of management and managers’ qualifications.


429 Ibid.


431 Ibid., p. 38.

432 Ibid.


These terms were originally used by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perratton. [Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perratton (eds.), Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture, (London: Polity, 1999).]


This term was coined by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. [Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton (eds.), *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*, (London: Polity, 1999).]


Ibid.


Ibid.


The characteristics of Anthony Giddens's theorisation on globalisation include the association of globalisation with the concepts of 'risk' and 'uncertainty'. This thesis does not focus upon these concepts since they are not directly relevant to its main argument. [Giddens, Anthony, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 33.]


According to Manuel Castells, the other main processes which determine the form and outcomes of competition are as follows: technological capacity; access to a large, integrated affluent market such as the European Union, the United States / North American Trade Zone, or, to a lesser extent, Japan; and the differential between production costs at the production site and prices at the market of destination. [Castells,


CHAPTER IV


474 Ibid.

475 This point was cited by Goedegebuure, Leo, and Frans van Vught, “Comparative Higher Education Studies: The Perspective From the Policy Sciences”, *Higher Education*, vol. 32 (1996), pp. 378.


477 The author of this thesis is a national of Japan who has resided in Japan for twenty-two years. She has visited Japan as necessary to access information.


479 In Japan, outward FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) has rapidly grown since the 1980s, while inward FDI has been relatively small. [Dicken, Peter, *Global Shift: Third Edition*, (London: Paul Chapman Publishing, 1998), pp. 42-59.]


483 The Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry are the four largest economic associations.


Ibid., p. 6.


The range of historical analysis was largely restricted by the availability of documents. For this reason, the historical dimension is not emphasised in the analysis of the Confederation of British Industry.


Ibid., p. 177.

Ibid., p. 177.


502 See also LeCompte and Goetz's study on reliability and validity in the context of ethnographic research. [LeCompte, Margaret, and Judith Goetz, "Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research", Review of Educational Research, vol. 52, no. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 31-60.]


504 The thesis does not give significant attention to the local universities in Japan because of their small number: the number of local universities and junior colleges totaled only 72 out of the total number of universities and junior colleges (649) in 2002. [MECSST website, [http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/git/81a.gif], access date (24 April, 2002)].
CHAPTER V


507 The 1988 Education Reform Act and 1992 Further and Higher Education Reform Act adopt the same line in respect to the New Right strategy of increasing state control (in the context of higher education). The 1992 Act is related to neo-liberalism in respect of the enlargement of the market in higher education by incorporating the polytechnics into the university sector. However, it is a point of contention whether the abolition of the binary line has brought about more appropriate market conditions, as argued earlier.

508 For example, Graeme Lindsay and Timothy Rodgers, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, argue that the governmental intention to change higher education institutions from a production orientation to a market orientation both prior to and following the 1998 Education Reform Act has been misplaced by changing institutions to selling-oriented, rather than market-orientated, organisations. [Lindsay, Graeme and Timothy Rodgers, “Market Orientation in the UK Higher Education Sector: The Influence of the Education Reform Process 1979-1993”, *Quality in Higher Education*, vol. 4, (1998) no. 2, pp. 159-171.]


510 The Robbins Report in 1963 identified the economic task of higher education as one of higher education’s main four aims. However, the Report did not incorporate substantial Governmental strategies related to the economic task of higher education.


At that time, the Public Accounts Committee and the Treasury were at odds on the issues of accountability and university autonomy. The Public Accounts Committee argued 'the right of scrutiny' for the universities, while the Treasury was a proponent of university autonomy. [Committee on Higher Education, *Higher Education Report* [Robbins Report], (London: HMSO, 1963), pp. 243-244.]

The Robbins Committee defined one of the aims of higher education as 'instruction in skills suitable to play in the general division of labour'. [Committee on Higher Education, *Higher Education Report* [Robbins Report], (London: HMSO, 1963), p. 6.]

The CVCP emphasised the significance of traditional liberalism; it was the CVCP which originally asserted that the aim of the first degree should be 'the cultivation of some breadth of interest in the activities of the human spirit' which, as aforementioned, was incorporated in the Robbins Report. [Committee on Higher Education, *Higher Education Report: Evidence — Part One Volume D* [Robbins Report], (London: HMSO, 1963), p. 1127.]  


Ibid.


Financial memoranda are based upon the idea that the relationship between the funding councils and the institutions should be based on negotiated contracts for the provision of...


528 Ibid., pp. 109-110.


530 Ibid., p. 139.

531 Ibid., p. 129.

532 The recommendation that the Secretary of State should have a reserve power of direction was first made in the report of the review of the Croham Report of the University Grants Committee. [Farrington, D. J., *The Law of Higher Education*, (London: Butterworths, 1994), p. 83.]


   At the operational level, the University Funding Council sought to achieve efficiency gains and encourage an entrepreneurial spirit in the universities by inviting those in the private sector to bid for the number of students which they accept and specify their price. However, there were reductions in real terms in the payment per student received from the UFC since the number of both universities and students increased. [Lindsay, Graeme and Timothy Rodgers, “Market Orientation in the UK Higher Education Sector: The Influence of the Education Reform Process 1979-1993”, *Quality in Higher Education*, vol. 4 (1998), no. 2, p. 163.]


538 Ibid., p. 32.

539 D. J. Farrington describes the legislative power of the State over higher education as follows: ‘far-reaching powers were given to the Secretary of State for Education by the 1994 Education Act; however, the government did not attempt to use them in practice’. [Farrington, D. J., *The Law of Higher Education*, (London: Butterworths, 1994), p. 87.]
These bills were the first attempt by the Government to use legislation as a means of exerting control over the universities. [Farrington, D. J., *The Law of Higher Education*, (London: Butterworths, 1994), p. 87.]

540 During the passage of the Further and Higher Education Bill, the issue of the powers of the Secretary of State (conditions of the grants to the Funding Councils) caused most debate; consequently, some powers of the Secretary of State were repealed. [Farrington, D. J., *The Law of Higher Education*, (London: Butterworths, 1994), p. 93.]


543 David Robertson argues that the value of conservatism which gives a focus for the maintenance of the status quo rather than the introduction of 'moderniser's' changes is associated with the aim of the Dearing Committee for a consensus not to intervene in the sphere of elite institutions, and to avoid internal tensions within the Committee. [Robertson, David, "Who Won the War of Dearing's Ear?", *Higher Education Review*, vol. 30 (1998), no. 2, pp. 7-22.] Robertson, extending his argument in the context of the management of higher education, argues that businessmen—who emphasise not only issues related to employment but also efficiency—and sector administrators and civil servants—who stress 'greater system tidiness'—are most influential in the Dearing Report. [Barnett, Ronald, "The Coming of the Global Village: A Tale of Two Inquiries", *Oxford Review of Education*, vol. 25 (1999), no. 3, pp. 293-306.] In contrast, the views of the academic community are largely absent in the Report. This argument made by Robertson, however, is too simple. As argued previously, actors in the university system have reached a consensus on the economic function of the university, and accountability of the university to the state and society.

A plausible interpretation is that the rationale behind the conservatism of the Dearing Committee is not strongly associated with influential views from the business sector and administrators. Rather, it is likely to relate to a consensus on utilitarianism and accountability which is steered by government, as well as to Robertson's first argument that the Committee attempted to avoid internal tension and conflict with elite institutions.


545 In the larger picture, Dearing took a wider view of the socio-cultural and economic contexts of higher education in comparison with the view outlined in the Robbins Report. The Dearing Report covered 11 contextual elements:

- Increasing economic integration across the world;
- Change in the labour market;
- Changing structure of the UK economy;
Public finances;
Family finances;
New communications and information technology;
Social and cultural changes;
Demographic patterns;
Environmental changes;
School and further education; and
Development in higher education elsewhere in the world. [Ibid., pp. 51-69.]

The economic dimension encapsulates four elements; if the categories of new communications and information technology are included.

The Dearing Committee's economic concern was, therefore, comprehensive, including the increase of economic integration across the world, change in the labour market, skills and knowledge, and the changing structure of the UK economy.


This utilitarian stance apparent in the recommended purposes of higher education can be compared to that in the Robbins Report. In the Report, one of the four purposes of higher education — 'instruction in skills suitable to play a part in the general division of labour' — related to the economy, but the Report did not make linkages to the global economy. [Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education Report: Evidence — Part One Volume D [Robbins Report], (London: HMSO, 1963), p. 6.] It can be assumed that the absence of the concept of the global economy is not the result of ignorance but rather that the economic environment of the 1960s was not marked by globalisation.


Ibid.

The Report supports diversification because the Committee regarded this as 'a strength in responding to the increasing diverse needs of students as participation in higher education widens, and in providing genuine choices for students'. [Ibid., p. 252.]

Ibid., p. 252.
The Dearing Report recommends, in relation to management, that higher education institutions should make ‘a sustained effort to improve the effective and efficient use of resources by institutions’ in order to ‘secure the long term future of an expanding higher education system’. [National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, *Higher Education in the Learning Society: Main Report*, (Norwich: HMSO, 1997).


Ibid.


*Higher Education: A New Framework* proposes a new framework by integrating the universities and the PCFC (Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council), and setting up unified funding councils and quality control mechanisms. [DES, *Higher Education: A New Framework*, (London: HMSO, 1991).]


Ibid., p. 30.


Ibid.

Ibid.
As one of the strategies to attract and retain foreign direct inward investment, the 1995 Competitiveness White Paper proposed to create ‘a skilled workforce and excellent labour relations’. This policy is based on the belief that one of the effective strategies with which the UK can compete with low-wage countries is by the provision of a highly skilled labour force.


Conservative governments asserted that the shifts in the labour market dictated a need for the updating and upgrading of skills and knowledge. The labour market trends identified by the Conservative governments include:

Areas of employment which have recently increased:
- small and medium-sized enterprises;
- foreign multinational corporations; and
- service sectors with reduction in manufacturing sectors (post-industrialization);

Types of employment which have recently increased:
- part-time / temporary / self-employment jobs; and
- skilled workers.

(The decline in the employment of unskilled workers was also identified.)

The governmental policy on SMEs was significant. The 1995 Competitiveness White Paper acknowledges the growth of SMEs both quantitatively and qualitatively, and supports their further growth. One of the strategies for promoting SMEs is to link small firms with educational institutions so as to improve skills.


Ibid., p. iv.


582 Ibid.

583 Ibid.


585 Ibid.

586 Ibid.

587 Ibid.

588 Ibid.


590 Giddens argues that Third Way policy has limited relevance to neo-liberalism, but quite significant relevance to globalisation. [Giddens, Anthony, in his lecture, “The Global Third-Way Debate”, at the London School of Economics and Political Science, on 8 November, 2000.]

591 Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


In February, 2000, David Blunkett, the Education and Employment Secretary, encouraged the universities and colleges to prepare themselves to meet the challenges of globalisation and the knowledge economy. He announced the introduction of the Foundation Degree as a new vocationally-focused route into higher education. [“Radical Changes will Prepare Higher Education for the 21st Century – Blunkett”, DfEE News, 64/00, (15 February, 2000), [http://www.dfee.gov.uk/news], access date (15 February, 2000).]


Ibid., p.7.


Ibid., p. 46.

Ibid., p. 51.


National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Higher Education in the
Many of the approaches and techniques in the new industries require more than one traditional subject area in higher education. This poses the question of whether higher educational institutions are able to respond, as the context and boundaries of subjects and disciplines change and as the flexibility of thinking required in the economy of the future increases. The prevailing classification of disciplines could serve the UK poorly if it inhibits the development of new programmes of study and if it means that research is focused on areas which are, in economic terms, of limited currency. [Ibid., p. 59.]


Although research expenditure has made within the part of the DTI budget, seeking for the contribution to the UK economy, the research expenditure of the HEFCE which are allocated according to the result of the RAEs has remained the part of the education budget. This is, according to Gareth Williams one of the reasons why the HEFCE has emphasised the RAEs, attempting to show that it can target research expenditure as sharply as the Research Councils. [Information is derived from informal communication]
with Gareth Williams on 5th November, 2002.]

633 The Great Jobs Crisis of Conservative Party’s Reform Group in 1994, without focusing upon the university sector, merely refers to the universities in relation to the new Training and Enterprise Councils, proposing that the universities should build up closer relationships with local enterprise. The recommendations included a supportive function for business development and education and training, close relationships with the Training and Enterprise Councils (which are also proposed in this report), and the promotion of the attraction of inward investment particularly in the area of science, although the report concomitantly accepted a more traditional academic role. [Ayer, Julian, The Great Jobs Crisis: Mobilising the UK’s Education and Training Resources, (London: TRG Honorary Officers, 1994).]

634 DfEE, DfEE Press Release, 210/95.


637 Ibid., p. 35.


641 Ibid.

642 Ibid.

643 The recurrent grants of the UGC as a percentage of total university income increased from 33.1 percent to 61.5 percent between 1939/40 and 1949/50 [see Table 3.3 in Appendix III]. The increase of the dependence of the universities upon public funds in the post-war period was associated with the strengthening of the notion of accountability espoused by the Committee of Public Accounts in Parliament. [Salter, Brian and Ted


645 Ibid.


647 Ibid.


650 Letter from the Secretary of State for Education and Science to the Chairman of the University Funding Council, 31 October, 1988.

651 Ibid.

652 HEFCE, *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*, November 1996, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub96/m27_96.htm], access date (26 October, 1997).

653 Ibid.


655 Ibid.

656 HEFCE, *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*, November 1996, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub96/m27_96.htm], access date (26 October, 1997).

657 *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education* proposes a loans system, which involves the repayment of loans on the basis of graduates’ income after graduation. [HEFCE, *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*](http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub96/m27_96.htm) proposes a loans system, which involves the repayment of loans on the basis of graduates’ income after graduation.
The HEFCE’s *Response to the Dearing Report* (1997) supports the Dearing recommendation that graduates in work should contribute to the costs of their higher education. [HEFCE, *Response to the Dearing Report*, (Bristol: HEFCE, 1997).]

The HEFCE’s *Response to the Dearing Report* (1997), recommends:

by the year 2003, at least 60 per cent of public funding to institutions should be distributed according to student choice. It believes that a system where funding follows the student to a greater extent, and less is provided as a block grant, will make institutions more responsive to student needs.


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660 HEFCE, *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*, November 1996, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub96/m27_96.htm], access date (26 October, 1997).


662 HEFCE, *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*, November 1996, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub96/m27_96.htm], access date (26 October, 1997).


665 HEFCE, *Submission by the Higher Education Funding Council for England to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*, November 1996, [http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub96/m27_96.htm], access date (26 October, 1997).

666 Ibid.

HEFCE, *HEFCE Strategic Plan 1999-2004*, April 1999
[http://www.niss.ac.uk/education/hefce/pub99/99_31.html], access date (3 March, 2000).

Ibid.

HEFCE, *How the HEFCE Promotes Value for Money*, Guide 98/63,


HEFCE, “HEFCE Provides £4.38 Billion for Teaching and Research in 2000-01”,
*HEFCE Press Release*, 2 March, 2000,


In the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, the HEFCE acts as an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by the DfEE in the higher education system. Given that the HEFCE functions as state apparatus, one can surmise that there is an accord of values between government and the Council. The Act legislates that the Secretary of State is empowered to appoint the members of the HEFCE Board with regard to the desirability of including people from higher education, industrial, commercial, financial, or professional backgrounds.


Ibid., p. 225.


See the NATFHE web-site. [http://www.natfhe.org.uk], access date (25 September, 2001).

Ibid.


The CVCP estimates the future growth of the student population if the Government removes the cap. The number of UK entrants to full-time first degree courses could expand by 25 percent by the year 2003, as a result of demographic and social class changes. [CVCP, *Our Universities Our Future: Volume 2, Main Evidence*, [http://www.cvcp.ac.uk/dearing], access date (25 October, 1997).]

This issue of social justice is a predominant concern of the CVCP. For example,


694 Ibid.


In the oral reports, there was no reference to the economic function of the universities or even economic issues in the statement by Sir William Mansfield Cooper, then chairman of the CVCP. The main issues which Sir William referred to were the expansion of the universities (this was the main issue of Robbins Report as well) and their subsequent problems, such as staff-student ratios, and staff salaries. [Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education Report: Evidence — Part One Volume D [Robbins Report], (London: HMSO, 1963), pp. 1-21.]


701 Ibid.

702 CVCP Our Universities Our Future: Volume 2, Main Evidence, [http://www.cvcp.ac.uk/dearing], access date (25 October, 1997).]

703 CVCP, A New Partnership: Universities, Students, Business and the Nation: CVCP’s Agenda for Action Following the Dearing Report, October 1997, [http://www.cvcp.ac.uk/
pubs/partner.html], access date (20 November, 1997).

704 Ibid.


707 Ibid., p. 35.

708 Ibid.

709 Ibid., p. 8.

710 Ibid., pp. 11-12.


712 Ibid., p. 2.


715 Ibid.

716 Ibid.

717 The Committee’s abiding interest in the rise of public expenditure on higher education has directed its standpoint. There are two crucial periods of the Committee’s financial policy: post World War II to the mid-1980s, and from the mid-1980s up to the present. The Committee concentrated on the funding of salaries and of student grants in the earlier period. In the later period, it has stressed the increase of public funding in teaching and research. One interpretation of this change is that the Committee was profoundly involved in the policymaking structure in 1982 after accepting an invitation from the Chairman of the University of Grants Committee to revise university accounting practice in order to bring about a greater degree of uniformity. The Committee’s contemporary financial policy for the increase of public expenditure can be found in its 1991 and 1996 submissions. In the 1991 submission to the Government, *Response to White Paper on Higher Education: A New Framework,* the Committee stresses that the governmental
policy on the expansion of higher education should be properly funded. It accepts the governmental policy proposal on the selective allocation of research funding, warning that it should not be based upon student numbers. [CVCP, *CVCP Response to White Paper Higher Education: A New Framework*, CM 1541.] In the 1996 submission to the Dearing Report, the Committee’s proposal on public funding per student appears to be compromised at the level of the maintenance of 1995-96 expenditure, since it could not be increased, due to the limited governmental budget. [CVCP, *Our Universities Our Future: The CVCP’s Evidence to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education*, (London: CVCP, 1996).]


719 The 1986 CVCP publication, *The Future of the Universities*, refers to ‘effective oral presentation and team work’ and ‘a greater knowledge of management skills’ for economic needs, denying the need for specific manpower policy and narrow specialist knowledge. This concept is closer to traditional academic skills than to vocational skills. [CVCP, *The Future of the Universities*, (London: CVCP, 1986).]


721 Ibid., p. 6.


726 Ibid.

727 Ibid., p. 12.


730 Ibid.

732 Ibid., p.1.


734 An example includes the National Education and Training Targets (NETT).


737 The CBI supports a single coherent qualifications framework for lifelong learning, combining all qualifications: academic (GCSE, A/AS level, Bachelor, Diploma, Master, and MPhil), vocational-related (GNVQ and RVQ), competence (NVQ), and the Foundation Degree. For a discussion on a single coherent qualification framework, see CBI, “Qualified to Compete: Creating a World-class Qualifications Framework”, *Human Resources Brief*, January 1998. Regarding the Foundation Degree, the CBI supports the Government’s objectives in setting up a vocational Foundation Degree (which would expand higher education and make courses more relevant to work), although the CBI suggests that the Government should clarify if the Foundation Degree meets the long-term needs of employers and students. [CBI, “Foundation Degree Objectives Right, But Details Wrong, Says CBI”, *News Release*, 19 May, 2000, [http://www.cbi.org.uk], access date (24 January, 2001).]

738 The CBI, in particular, emphasises the new concept of ‘employability’. Its definition is given as follows:

> Employability is the possession by an individual of the qualities and competence needed to meet the changing needs of employers and customers, thereby helping to realise his or her aspirations and potential in work. [CBI, “CBI gives Blunkett New Employability Plan to Help People Survive in Knowledge Economy”, *News Release*, 16 July, 1999 [http://www.cbi.org.uk] access date (24 January, 2001).]


"The CBI Input to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education" in Human Resource Brief implies that the original stance of the CBI endorsed full financial support by governments, including the additional cost as the result of expansion of the universities. However, the CBI's original stance came to a compromise in view of the reality of limited governmental resources. [CBI, "The CBI Input to the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education", Human Resource Brief, November 1996.]


Ibid., p. 9.


Ibid., p. 12.
755 Ibid., p. 10.

756 Ibid.


759 Ibid., p. 2.


761 Ibid.


CHAPTER VI


769 Ibid.


Many recommendations proposed by the Council were not implemented because of strong opposition from the progressive group and a lack of consensus in MESSC [Schoppa, Leonard, *Education Reform in Japan: A Case of Immobilist Politics*, (London: Routledge, 1991).


In the late 1980s and the 1990s, the recommendations made by the National Council were crystallised by the University Council; many recommendations in the University Council were subsequently implemented by the MESSC.


773 Ibid., pp. 50-51 and pp. 74-76.


777 Ibid.

778 Ibid.

779 This thesis did not use the term ‘conservative’ because the meaning and political
position associated with this term changes in different political and historical contexts.


782 Ibid., pp. 194-198.


784 Ibid.

785 Ibid.

786 Ibid., p. 49.

787 Ibid.

788 Ibid., p. 9.

789 Ibid.


791 Ibid., p. 499.

792 Ibid.


The Council report explained the reason for this ambiguity as follows:

...the Council has specifically deliberated on the possibility of granting each national university the status of non-profit corporation and of defining them as 'special public corporations'. As a result the Council has reached the conclusion that, before deciding on that possibility, it should consider a great many factors, both theoretical and practical, including: the extent of the participation of the national government in the administration of the universities; the system of university administration and management; the legal and economic status of university teachers; and the transitional measures needed to implement the shift from the existing system. Consequently, more comprehensive and substantial studies are needed to solve these problems. [National Council on Educational Reform, Government of Japan, Reports on Educational Reform, (Tokyo: NCER, 1987), p. 378.]


798 Ibid., pp. 212-215.


800 Ibid.

801 Ibid.

802 Ibid.

803 Ibid.


805 Nihonseifu, 6 no Kaikaku [Six Reforms], (Tokyo: Kantei, 1997), pp. 3-4.

806 Ibid.


808 Newspaper articles further suggest that coalition was not only between the bunkyo-zoku and the MESSC, but that the labour union was also involved. [Nikkei Newspaper, 17 December, 1998, p. 2. Asahi Newspaper, 31 October, 1998, p. 2.]


Kokudaikyo, Tokuæetsu Iinkai (Special Committee, Association of National Universities), Gyozaisei Kaikaku no Kadai to Kokuritsu Daigaku no arikata (Hokoku) [Problems of Administrative and Finance Reform and National Universities (Report)], June, 1997.

Asahi and Nikkei Newspapers provide information on the acceptance by the Ministry of Education of this proposal. [Asahi Newspaper, 8 September, 1999, p. 1. Nikkei Newspaper, 12 August, 1999, p. 30.] The Ministry emphasises 'the respect of autonomy' (Jichi Soncho) as a condition of this compromise.


Kokudaikyo, Dai-1 Jyochi Iinkai, Kokuritsu Daigaku to Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin-ka Mondai nitsuite (Chukan Hokoku) [National Universities and the Problems in Corporatisation (Intermittent Report)], (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyokai, 1999).


See for example, Nihonseifu [Japanese Government], Katsuryokuaru 21-seiki no tameni 6 tusno Kaikaku [Six Reforms for the Active Society in the 21st Century], (Tokyo: Kantei, 1997). This report summarises the direction of political reform in six areas, including education.


Ibid.


Ibid., pp. 93-98.


Eiichi Miyakoshi identifies the characteristics of Japanese policy-making, as being based upon bureaucracy, and the contemporary trend of the bureaucratic system. [Miyakoshi, Eiichi, “Kyoiku Kaikaku no Syuho to Jisshi Taisei” [Strategies and Steps for Education Reform: The Case of Japan and the UK], Hikaku Kyoiku [Comparative Education], vol. 24 (1998), pp. 11-13.]


831 Ibid.


838 Ibid., pp. 67-72.


841 Schoppa characterises both the LDP and the MESSC as conservative and nationalistic. [Schoppa, Leonard, *Education Reform in Japan: A Case of Immobilist Politics*, (London: Routledge, 1991).]


843 Ibid.

845 Ibid., p. 502.


851 Interview with an Assistant Dean (Kacho Hosa), Tetsuo Goda of the MESSC, 21st December, 1999. The interview was held at the office of the MESSC in Tokyo.


853 Ibid.

854 Ibid.

855 Ibid.

856 Ibid.

857 Ibid.


859 For a discussion on ministerial involvement in the decision-making process, see Leonard Schoppa (1991). [Schoppa, Leonard, *Education Reform in Japan: A Case of


Ibid.


Ibid.


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The MESSC had accepted the corporatisation policy of the LDP when the then Education Minister Hirofumi Nakasone criticised the university reform initiated by the MESSC. He argued that the reform initiated by the MESSC demonstrated a lack of dynamism and supported the corporatisation of national universities. [“Monbusho ga Kokuritsudai no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka wo Hyomei” [Acceptance of the MESSC on the Corporatisation of National Universities], *Asahi Newspaper*, 27 May, 2000, [http://endo.phys.saga-u.ac.jp/union/ff200005.html], access date (18 July, 2000).]

871 Monbusho, *Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka no Kento no Hoko* [Direction of the Discussion on the Corporatisation of the National Universities], (Tokyo: Monbusho, 1999).


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878 Daigaku Shingikai, *Daigaku Unei no Enkatsuka ni tsuite* [Facilitation of University Administration], (Tokyo: Daigaku Shingikai, 1995). Daigaku Shingikai [University Council], *21 Seiki no Daigakuzou to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyosoteki Kankyo no nakade Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku* [Universities in the 21st Century and Their Ongoing Reform and Strategy: Universities with Unique Characteristics in a

879 Monbusho, *Kokuritsu Daigaku no Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojinka no Kento no Hoko* [Direction of the Discussion on the Corporatisation of the National Universities], (Tokyo: Monbusho, 1999).


881 *Kyoiku Kaikaku Proguramu* [Program for Educational Reform] was planned by the MESSC in accordance with the request of the then Prime Minister Hashimoto. *Kyoiku Kaikaku Proguramu* emphasises the link with the community and the school education system, the introduction of the university evaluation system in both teaching and research, university entrance, and internationalisation of the universities (e.g. international exchange of students, promotion of foreign language learning, and international co-operation in education).


886 In the 1987 letter, Education Minister Masajyuro Shiokawa linked the concept of accountability to the management of individual universities. In the 1997 letter, Education Minister Takashi Machimura emphasised the ‘positive stance’ and ‘greater freedom’ of individual universities, in particular in relation to management and evaluation systems. His concern did not extend to the issues of devolution and deregulation.

887 For example, Daigaku Shingikai, *Heisei 12-nendo Ikou no Koto-kyoiku no Syorai Koso*


890 Daigaku Shingikai, Daigaku Unei no Enkatsuka ni tsuite, [Facilitation of University Administration], (Tokyo: Daigaku Shingikai, 1995).

891 Ibid.


893 Ibid.

894 Ibid.


898 This phrase was translated by the author of this thesis. [Daigaku Shingikai, 21-seiki no Daigakuzo to Kongo no Kaikaku Hosaku ni tsuite: Kyosoteki Kankyo no naka de Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku [Universities in the 21st Century and Their Ongoing Reform and Strategy: Universities with Unique Characteristics in the Competitive Environment], (Tokyo: Daigaku Shingikai, 1998), p. 31.]
See University Council Reports in the 1990s.


The purpose of master’s level courses is ‘to nourish research capabilities in the specialized field or the high-level capabilities which are necessary in occupations requiring advanced specialization’. That of doctoral courses is ‘to nourish advanced research capabilities or knowledge for the usage of such capabilities in order to conduct research activities as a researcher or engage in advanced, specialized tasks’. [Amended *Standards of the Establishment of Graduate Universities*.

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